Metaphysical Stuctures and Holism: Reply to Schaffer

Miloš Bogdanović

doi:10.2298/FID2503761B

Authors

Miloš Bogdanović PhD, Museum of Yugoslavia, Belgrade

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2503761B

Keywords:

flat, sorted, ordered metaphysical (ontological) structure, Quine, Schaffer, Carnap, intuitions, ontology, metaphysics

Abstract

This paper deals with Schaffer’s distinction between metaphysical structures, as well as his appeal for the revival of neo-Aristotelian approaches that imply ordered structure, based on the criticism of Quine’s method that, in his view, implies flat metaphysical structure. However, although I believe that Schaffer’s distinction between metaphysical structures is an interesting and, basically, acceptable view, I will try to show that Schaffer’s arguments are not convincing enough to persuade us to abandon Quine’s method and adopt the Aristotelian metaphysical model. Moreover, when mistakes that Schaffer makes are corrected and Quine’s method is given due attention, we will see that this can enable us to have a more tenable interpretation of the concepts that Schaffer speaks of (metaphysical structures), but also – as in his case – to draw certain conclusions that go beyond the objectives of classification as such.

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