Epistemic Feature of Democracy: the Role of Expert in Democratic Decision Making

Ivana Janković

doi:10.2298/FID2001037J

Autori

Ivana Janković PhD Candidate, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2001037J

Ključne reči:

epistemic democracy, cognitive diversity, bounded rationality, deliberative democracy

Apstrakt

In her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues, Snježana Prijić Samaržija advocates that a purely procedural justification which defines the authority and legitimacy of democracy only in relation to the fairness of the procedure itself is not enough for a full justification of democracy. Some epistemic values should also be included. This epistemic quality of democracy depends on the quality of the decisions that the democratic procedures produce. In that sense, the author is advocating a hybrid theory that secures harmony between political and epistemic values, favoring deliberative procedure for this purpose, and thus promotes equal respect for both democratic values. In doing so, she is advocating the specific type of division of epistemic labor that I will attempt to critically re-examine here, as well as to bring into question the privileged role of the experts in democratic decision-making.

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