Deliberative Epistemic Instrumentalism, or Something Near Enough

Ivan Mladenović

doi:10.2298/FID2001003M

Autori

Ivan Mladenović Associate Professor, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2001003M

Ključne reči:

democracy, procedure, epistemic values, public deliberation, democratic system

Apstrakt

In her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues, Snježana Prijić Samaržija advocates a stance that not only political, but also epistemic values are necessary for justification of democracy. Specifically, she mounts defense for one particular type of public deliberation on epistemic grounds. In this paper, I will discuss the following issue: What connects this type of public deliberation to the wider context of (epistemic) justification of democracy? I will attempt to explain why Prijić Samaržija’s stance can be understood as a version of deliberative epistemic instrumentalism and to discuss the role played by the public deliberation within this framework.

Reference

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