The reality of lies
pages: 105-131
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1302105RApstrakt
A lie is neither a false proposition, nor a mistake, nor a mere fiction; it is a type of fiction, an act, and precisely an intentional act. An act calls for a subject, and therefore a lie is inseparable from its subject. Together, they make up a real object: it has to be real, since a lie produces effects, and the cause-effect relationship only holds between real beings. Like every real object, a lie unfolds in a (phenomenological) context. But there is more: it identifies a (dialectical) context. Keywords: lie, fiction, falsity, deception, intentional act, object, Kant, Meinong, Sartre, Derrida##submission.downloads##
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Articles published in Philosophy and Society are open-access in accordance with the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 License.