McTaggart’s paradox and its consequences: pages: 226-242

Strahinja Đorđević

doi:10.2298/FID1501226D

Autori

Strahinja Đorđević Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1501226D

Apstrakt

McTaggart’s explanation of the human understanding of time, which uses the time series, is a significant moment in the history of philosophy, and his attempt to prove time’s unreality had strong but diverse reactions. The majority of thinkers who wrote after him agree that time is indeed real, but the intellectual division that was created around the question of which part of the paradox in dispute will dominate philosophy of time in the 20th and 21st century. It can be concluded that both major theories within this field have an undeniable influence on the division of time series which McTaggart made. After analyzing the paradox, the focus will be on clarifying the debate between tensed and tenseless theorists. The former dispute the claim that the A-series is contradictory and argue that the tensed time is the proper determination of events in time, while the latter claim that the B-series is independent and that time can be determined only by temporal relations. By recognizing the differences between these two lines of thought, it will become easier to understand the nature of their relationship to the time series, namely by considering the ways in which they defend their own and attack the contrary view. Keywords: time, A-series, B-series, metaphysics, present, past, future, earlier than, simultaneous with, later than

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