Exposition of two forms of semantic skepticism: Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule following and Kripke’s semantic paradox

pages: 127-143

Apstrakt

Despite persistent attempts to defend Kripke’s argument (Kripke 1982), analyses of this argument seem to be reaching a consensus that it is characterized by fatal flaws in both its interpretation of Wittgenstein and its argument of meaning independent of interpretation. Most scholars who do not agree with Kripke’s view have directly contrasted his understanding of Wittgenstein (KW) with Wittgenstein’s own perspective (LW) in or after Philosophical Investigations (PI). However, I believe that those who have closely read both PI and Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language without any preconceptions have a different impression from the one that is generally accepted: that KW does not directly oppose LW. Indeed, KW seems to present one aspect of LW with precision, although the impression that KW deviates from LW in some respects remains unavoidable. In this paper, I will attempt to elucidate the underpinnings of this impression by formulating the paradoxes presented by Wittgenstein and Kripke and revealing the complicated relation between the two forms of semantic paradoxes. I will then not only propose a new interpretation of the argument about meaning contained in PI but also suggest a schema or condition for semantics that I think holds by itself, independent from exegetical matters. Keywords: semantics, skepticism, rule-following consideration, Later Wittgenstein, Kripke