Animal Dignity and Sympathetic Imagination: Martha Nussbaum and an Analysis of  the Treatment of Non-human Animals

Iva Martinić

doi:10.2298/FID2201218

Autori

Iva Martinić University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Philosophy

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2201218

Ključne reči:

dignity, justice, capabilities approach, non-human animals, Martha Nussbaum, Christine Korsgaard, sympathetic imagination

Apstrakt

In this paper, I analyse Martha Nussbaum’s view of how we should treat non-human animals, which she links to her capabilities approach. This approach offers a conception of justice or, as Nussbaum puts it, a collection of fundamental rights that specify some of the necessary elements for a just society. In addition to justice for human beings, this approach includes animal rights. The basis for the discussion consists of two elements that justify the claim that every animal deserves to live a life that is characteristic of a member of its species. The first element is dignity, and the second is sympathetic imagination. The intention of Nussbaum’s approach is to represent an improvement on the social contract tradition (in particular, in the Rawlsian version), by offering a more encompassing theory of justice. In her view, the capabilities approach, contrary to the theories of social contract, has principled resources that allow it to include, among else, non-human-animals in the domain of justice. However, the contribution of my paper consists in showing the problems I observe in Nussbaum’s theory. These problems are related to the insufficient definition of basic concepts and to the fact that in Nussbaum’s theory, non-human animals remain, across various situations, only a means of serving human needs. The consequence is that non-human-animals are not included in the domain of justice which, after all, is Nussbaum’s fundamental ambition.

Reference

Baccarini, Elvio (2017), Moralno važna svojstva i eksperimentiranje na životinjama, u Daniel Rukavina, Krešimir Pavelić (ed.), Istraživanja na modelima laboratorijskih životinja, Zagreb; Rijeka: Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, Zavod za biomedicinske znanosti u Rijeci, pp. 33–45.

Bilchitz, David (2009), “Moving beyond Arbitrariness: The Legal Personhood and Dignity of Non-human Animals”, South African Journal on Human Rights 25 (1): 38–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/19962126.2009.11865192.

Fulfer, Katy (2013), “The Capabilities Approach to Justice and the Flourishing of Nonsentient Life”, Ethics and the Environment 18 (1): 19. https://doi. org/10.2979/ethicsenviro.18.1.19.

Kelemen, L. E. (2005), “Associations of Dietary Protein with Disease and Mortality in a Prospective Study of Postmenopausal Women”, American Journal of Epidemiology 161 (3): 239–249. https://doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwi038.

Korsgaard, Christine M. (2018), Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals, Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Leukam, Mary (2011), Dignified Animals: How ‘Non-Kantian’ Is Nussbaum’s Conception of Dignity?, Thesis, Georgia State University. https://scholarworks. gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/89.

Martinić, Iva (2020), Specizam: poremećaj cjelokupnog društva kojim se opravdava iskorištavanje ne-ljudskih životinja, Rijeka: University of Rijeka Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences (Department of Philosophy). https://repository. ffri.uniri.hr/en/islandora/object/ffri:2628.

Melin, Anders; Kronlid, David (2016), “Should We Ascribe Capabilities to Sentient Animals? A Critical Analysis of the Extension of Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach”, De Ethica 3 (2): 53–63. https://doi.org/10.3384/de-ethica.2001-8819.163253.

Momand, Maleka (2016), “Nussbaum, M. Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach and Nonhuman Animals: The Ecological Implications”, CLA Journal 4: 218–238.

Nussbaum, Martha (2006a), Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. 1, Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.

—. (2006b) “The Moral Status of Animals”, The Chronicle of Higher Education 52 (22): B6–8.

Pepper, Angie (2017), “Beyond Anthropocentrism: Cosmopolitanism and Nonhuman Animals”, Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 9 (2). https://doi. org/10.21248/gjn.9.2.114.

Poore, J., and T. Nemecek (2018), “Reducing Food’s Environmental Impacts through Producers and Consumers”, Science 360 (6392): 987–992. https://doi. org/10.1126/science.aaq0216.

Rawls, John (2003), A Theory of Justice, Rev. ed., 5.-6. printing, Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press.

Schinkel, Anders (2008), “Martha Nussbaum on Animal Rights”, Ethics & the Environment 13 (1): 41–69. https://doi.org/10.2979/ETE.2008.13.1.41.

Springmann, Marco; Godfray, Hugh Charles J.; Rayner, Mike; Scarborough, Peter (2016), “Analysis and Valuation of the Health and Climate Change Co benefits of Dietary Change”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 113 (15): 4146– 4151. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1523119113.

Sunstein, Cass R.; Nussbaum, Martha C. (2004), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, New York: Oxford University Press. http://public.ebookcentral. proquest.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=280972.

Walker, Polly; Rhubart-Berg, Pamela; McKenzie, Shawn; Kelling, Kristin; Lawrence, Robert S. (2005), “Public Health Implications of Meat Production and Consumption”, Public Health Nutrition 8 (4): 348–356. https://doi.org/10.1079/ PHN2005727.

Wissenburg, Marcel (2011), “The Lion and the Lamb: Ecological Implications of Martha Nussbaum’s Animal Ethics”, Environmental Politics 20 (3): 391–409. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2011.573361.