Epistemic Justice as a Virtue in Hermeneutic Psychotherapy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1704063PKeywords:
virtue epistemology, epistemic responsibility, epistemic justice, philosophy of psychiatry and psychotherapy, testimony, hermeneutic psychotherapyAbstract
The value turn in epistemology generated a particularly influential new position – virtue epistemology. It is an increasingly influential epistemological normative approach that opts for the intellectual virtues of the epistemic agent, rather than the truth-value of the proposition, as the central epistemic value. In the first part of this article we will attempt to briefly explain the value turn and outline the basic aspects of virtue epistemology, underlining the diversity of epistemic attitudes associated with this approach and their positive impact on expanding epistemological horizons. The second part will be focused on the virtues of epistemic responsibility and epistemic justice as particularly appropriate for evaluating social processes such as, for example, testimony and conversational practices in general. In the third section we will show how the psychiatric and psychotherapeutic communicational act can be more efficiently analyzed and evaluated from the perspective of the virtue of epistemic justice, than from the traditional epistemic approach based on a monist concept of truth. The fourth and fifth section synthesize the discussion by introducing the concept of hermeneutic psychotherapy as a therapeutically and epistemically favorable framework for evaluating communicational acts in psychotherapy.
References
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Greco, J. 1992. Virtue Epistemology. In A Companion to Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.
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http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/ (web site visited 5th of January 2015.)
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Lambert, M. J., Barley, D. E. 2002. Research Summary on the Therapeutic Relationship and Psychotherapy Outcome. In Norcross, J. C. (ed.). Psychotherapy Relationships That Work – Therapist Contributions and Responsiveness to Patients. Oxford: University Press.
Laska, K. M.; Gurman, A. S.; Wampold, B. E. 2014. Expanding the lens of evidence-based practice in psychotherapy: a common factors perspective” Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training. 51 (4): 467–481.
Locke, J. 1690. Ogled o ljudskom razumu. Zagreb: Naklada Breza 2007.
Mahrer, A. R. 2000. Appropriate insight and understanding are prerequisites to successful psychotherapy. Philosophy of Science and the Foundations of Psychotherapy. American Psychologist. Ottawa: University of Ottawa.
Messer, S. B., Wampold, B. E. 2002. Let’s Face Facts: Common Factors Are More Potent Than Specific Therapy Ingredients, Clinical Psychology, Science and Practice. 9 (1): 21–25.
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Montmarquet, J. 1993. Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
Prijić-Samaržija, S. 2004. Kontekstualizam povjerenja: Od Johna Lockea do kontekstualizma, Theoria. 1-2: 7-24.
Prijić-Samaržija, S., 2006. Povjerenje i društveni kontekst, Društvena istraživanja, 15 (3): 295-317.
Prijić-Samaržija, S., 2006. Trust meets Social Psychology. In Prijić-Samaržija, S. and Baccarini, E. ed.. Rationality in Belief and Action, Rijeka, Filozofski Fakultet: HDAF, Sveučilište u Rijeci.
Prijić-Samaržija, S. 2007. Evidencijalizam i povjerenje, Filozofska istraživanja, 27 (3): 671-683.
Prijić – Samaržija, S. and Miškulin, I. 2015. Epistemička pravednost: epistemička vrlina i filozofija psihijatrije, Filozofska istraživanja, 35(2): 307-322.
Prijić - Samaržija, S., Vidmar, I. 2012. Fikcijsko svjedočanstvo. Prolegomena. 11: 65-82.
Riggs, W. 1998. What Are the ‘Chances’ of Being Justified?. The Monist. 81: 452–472.
Riggs, W. 2002. Reliability and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 64: 79–96.
Riggs, W. 2003. Understanding ‘Virtue’ and the Virtue of Understanding. U DePaul M. and Zagzebski L. ed. Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Riggs, W. 2006. The Value Turn in Epistemology. U Hendricks V. and Pritchard D. ed. New Waves in Epistemology. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Riggs, W. 2009. Two Problems of Easy Credit. Synthese. 169: 201–216.
Roberts, R. and Wood, J. 2007. Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, E. 1980. The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy. (5) 3–25.
Sosa, E. 1991. Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology. London: Cambridge University Press.
Sosa, E. 2003. The Place of Truth in Epistemology. In DePaul M. and Zagzebski L. eds. Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, E. 2007a. A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, E. 2007b. Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Volume 1: A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Storolow, R., Brandshaft, B., Atwood, G. 1987. Psychoanalitic Treatment: An Intersubjective Approach. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.
Tracey, T. G. J, Lichtenberg, J. W., Goodyear, R. K.; Claiborn, C. D.; Wampold, B. E. 2003. Concept mapping of therapeutic common factors. Psychotherapy Research 13 (4): 401–413.
Wampold, B. E., 2001. The great psychotherapy debate: Models,methods and findings. Mahwah, N J: Erlbaum.
Zagzebski, L. 1996. Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zagzebski, L. 1998. Virtue Epistemology. In Craig, E. ed. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Zagzebski, L. 2000. Responses. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 60 (1): 207–219.
Zagzebski, L. 2003a. Što je znanje. In Greco J. and Sosa E. eds. Epistemologija. Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk.
Zagzebski, L. 2003b. The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good. Metaphilosophy. (34) 12–28.
Zagzebski, L. 2012. Epistemic Authority. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Žvelc, M., Možina, M., Bohak, J. 2011. Psihoterapija, Ljubljana: IPSA
Al-Shawi, H. 2006. Psychotherapy’s Philosophical Values: Insight or Absorption?, Human Studies. 29 (2): 159-179.
Baier, A. 1995. Sustaining Trust in Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Bishop, M., Trout, J.D. 2005. Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bolton D. 2008. What is Mental Disorder? New York: Oxford University Press.
Brady, M. S. and Pritchard, D. H. eds. 2003. Moral and Epistemic Virtues. Oxford: Blackwell.
BonJour, L. 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Coady, C. A. J. 2006. Pathologies of testimony. In Lackey J. and Sosa E. eds. The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Code, L. 1987. Epistemic Responsibility. Hanover: University Press of New England and Brown.
David, M. 2000. Truth as the Epistemic Goal. In Steup M. ed. Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. New York: Oxford University Press.
David, M. (2001). Truth as the Epistemic Goal. In Steup M. ed. Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. New York: Oxford University Press.
Dreyfus, H.L. and Rabinov, P. eds. 1982. Michael Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Freud, S. 1915. The Unconscious. The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. XIV. London: Hogarth Press, (second edition,1955).
Fricker M. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Glover, J. 2014. Alien Landscapes?. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Goldman, A. I. 1992. Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology. In Goldman, A.I. Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Goldman, A. I. 2010. ‘Why Social Epistemology is Real Epistemology?. In Haddock, A., Millar, A. and Pritchard, D. eds. Social Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Greco, J. 2001. Virtues and Rules in Epistemology. In Zagzebski L. and Fairweather A. eds. Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Greco, J. 1992. Virtue Epistemology. In A Companion to Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.
Greco, J. 1993. Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 23: 413–432.
Greco, J. 1999. Agent Reliabilism. In Tomberlin J. ed. Philosophical Perspectives, volume 13 of Epistemology. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Co.
Greco, J. 2000. Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 60: 179–184.
Greco, J. 2002. Virtues in Epistemology. In Moser P. ed. Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Greco, J. 2003. Knowledge as Credit for True Belief. In DePaul M. and Zagzebski L. eds. Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Greco, J. 2004. A Different Sort of Contextualism. Erkenntnis. 61: 383–400.
Greco, J. 2010. Achieving Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Greco, J. 2011. Virtue Epistemology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/ (web site visited 5th of January 2015.)
Haddock, A., Millar, A. and Pritchard, D. eds. 2009. Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Haley, J. 1986. Uncommon Therapy, New York: W.W. Norton & Comp.
Kvanvig, J. L. 1992. The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary Epistemology. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
Kvanvig, J. L. 2003. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kvanvig, J.L. 2005. Truth and the Epistemic Goal. In Steup M. and Sosa E. eds. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing.
Kvanvig, J.L. 2010. Virtue Epistemology. In Pritchard D. and Bernecker S. eds. Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
Lackey J. 2006a. Introduction. In E.Sosa and J. Lackey ed. The Epistemology of Testimony, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lackey J. 2006b. It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony. In Lackey, J. and Sosa, E. ed. The Epistemology of Testimony, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lackey J. 2006c. Learning from Words. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73: 77–101.
Lambert, M. J., Hansen, N. B., Umphress, V., Lunnen, K., Okiishi, J., Burlingame, G.M., et al. 1996. Administration and scoring manual for the OQ45.2. Stevenson, MD: American Professional Credentialing Services, LLC.
Lambert, M. J., Barley, D. E. 2002. Research Summary on the Therapeutic Relationship and Psychotherapy Outcome. In Norcross, J. C. (ed.). Psychotherapy Relationships That Work – Therapist Contributions and Responsiveness to Patients. Oxford: University Press.
Laska, K. M.; Gurman, A. S.; Wampold, B. E. 2014. Expanding the lens of evidence-based practice in psychotherapy: a common factors perspective” Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training. 51 (4): 467–481.
Locke, J. 1690. Ogled o ljudskom razumu. Zagreb: Naklada Breza 2007.
Mahrer, A. R. 2000. Appropriate insight and understanding are prerequisites to successful psychotherapy. Philosophy of Science and the Foundations of Psychotherapy. American Psychologist. Ottawa: University of Ottawa.
Messer, S. B., Wampold, B. E. 2002. Let’s Face Facts: Common Factors Are More Potent Than Specific Therapy Ingredients, Clinical Psychology, Science and Practice. 9 (1): 21–25.
Montmarquet, J. 1992. Epistemic Virtue. In Dancy J. and Sosa E. ed. A Companion of Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.
Montmarquet, J. 1993. Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility. Savage, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
Prijić-Samaržija, S. 2004. Kontekstualizam povjerenja: Od Johna Lockea do kontekstualizma, Theoria. 1-2: 7-24.
Prijić-Samaržija, S., 2006. Povjerenje i društveni kontekst, Društvena istraživanja, 15 (3): 295-317.
Prijić-Samaržija, S., 2006. Trust meets Social Psychology. In Prijić-Samaržija, S. and Baccarini, E. ed.. Rationality in Belief and Action, Rijeka, Filozofski Fakultet: HDAF, Sveučilište u Rijeci.
Prijić-Samaržija, S. 2007. Evidencijalizam i povjerenje, Filozofska istraživanja, 27 (3): 671-683.
Prijić – Samaržija, S. and Miškulin, I. 2015. Epistemička pravednost: epistemička vrlina i filozofija psihijatrije, Filozofska istraživanja, 35(2): 307-322.
Prijić - Samaržija, S., Vidmar, I. 2012. Fikcijsko svjedočanstvo. Prolegomena. 11: 65-82.
Riggs, W. 1998. What Are the ‘Chances’ of Being Justified?. The Monist. 81: 452–472.
Riggs, W. 2002. Reliability and the Value of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 64: 79–96.
Riggs, W. 2003. Understanding ‘Virtue’ and the Virtue of Understanding. U DePaul M. and Zagzebski L. ed. Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Riggs, W. 2006. The Value Turn in Epistemology. U Hendricks V. and Pritchard D. ed. New Waves in Epistemology. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Riggs, W. 2009. Two Problems of Easy Credit. Synthese. 169: 201–216.
Roberts, R. and Wood, J. 2007. Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, E. 1980. The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy. (5) 3–25.
Sosa, E. 1991. Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology. London: Cambridge University Press.
Sosa, E. 2003. The Place of Truth in Epistemology. In DePaul M. and Zagzebski L. eds. Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, E. 2007a. A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sosa, E. 2007b. Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge. Volume 1: A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Storolow, R., Brandshaft, B., Atwood, G. 1987. Psychoanalitic Treatment: An Intersubjective Approach. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.
Tracey, T. G. J, Lichtenberg, J. W., Goodyear, R. K.; Claiborn, C. D.; Wampold, B. E. 2003. Concept mapping of therapeutic common factors. Psychotherapy Research 13 (4): 401–413.
Wampold, B. E., 2001. The great psychotherapy debate: Models,methods and findings. Mahwah, N J: Erlbaum.
Zagzebski, L. 1996. Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zagzebski, L. 1998. Virtue Epistemology. In Craig, E. ed. Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge.
Zagzebski, L. 2000. Responses. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 60 (1): 207–219.
Zagzebski, L. 2003a. Što je znanje. In Greco J. and Sosa E. eds. Epistemologija. Zagreb: Jesenski i Turk.
Zagzebski, L. 2003b. The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good. Metaphilosophy. (34) 12–28.
Zagzebski, L. 2012. Epistemic Authority. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Žvelc, M., Možina, M., Bohak, J. 2011. Psihoterapija, Ljubljana: IPSA
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23.12.2017
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Inka Miškulin, S. P. – S. (2017) “Epistemic Justice as a Virtue in Hermeneutic Psychotherapy”, Filozofija i društvo/Philosophy and Society. Belgrade, Serbia, 28(4), pp. 1063–1086. doi: 10.2298/FID1704063P.
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