The Problem of Cognitive Significance – a Solution and a Critique
Keywords:
cognitive significance, proposition, referent, thought, sense, character, semantics, pragmaticsAbstract
In this paper I will deal with the solution to the problem of cognitive significance offered by the so-called new theorists of reference, as well as with the critique of that solution given by Howard Wettstein. I will claim that the answer to this critique provided by John Perry is not sufficiently convincing. First, I will clarify some relevant concepts in order to present the problem of cognitive significance in a clear manner. Then I will expose the solution to the problem offered by Perry and David Kaplan. After that, I will present Wettstein’s critique of that solution. Subsequently, I will also analyze Perry’s attempt to defend against this critique. Finally, I will discuss the extent to which Perry’s attempt is successful. It will be shown that it is significantly not so.
References
Evans, Gareth (1982), The Varietes of Reference, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kaplan, David (1989), “Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals”, in Joseph Almog, John Perry, and Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 481–565.
Perry, John (1988), “Cognitive Significance and New Theories of Reference”, Nous 22 (1): 1–18.
Wettstein, Howard (1986), “Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?”, The Journal of Philosophy 83 (4): 185–209.
Wettstein, Howard (1988), “Cognitive Significance without Cognitive Content”, Mind, New Series 97 (385): 1–28.
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