Cutting the Gordian knot of world poverty: Thomas Pogge’s Alexandrian solution
pages: 290-312
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1403290KAbstract
In this paper, the author analyzes Thomas Pogge’s thesis that citizens of affluent countries are violating the negative right of the global poor not to be harmed by lending their support to the current global institutional order. The author argues, however, that Pogge’s argument is unsatisfactory because he makes an unjustified leap from collective to individual responsibility. The author begins by assessing Pogge’s argument so as to elucidate the leap. Subsequently, the author examines two proposals which could complete his argument; nonetheless, the author argues that both proposals are unsatisfactory. The first suggestion - the participation argument - contains two conceptual inadequacies; moreover, if we were to accept this argument, we would also be committed to accepting an unsavory implication. Taking cue from Thomas Nagel’s „rule in our name“ argument, the author develops Pogge’s second suggestion - the political representation argument - that promises to bridge the gap in Pogge’s thinking. The issues of misrepresentation and of underrepresentation, however, undermine this proposal too. Keywords: global poverty, Thomas Pogge, negative duty, harming, negative right, participation, political represenationDownloads
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Articles published in Philosophy and Society are open-access in accordance with the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 License.