Epicurean View on the Validity of Sensation: On the Contextual Reading of the Content of the Perception

Jelena Pavličić; Ivan Nišavić

doi:10.2298/FID2304681P

Authors

Jelena Pavličić University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy
Ivan Nišavić University of Belgrade, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2304681P

Keywords:

eidola, perception, empiricist epistemology, context, conflicting judgments

Abstract

Scholars have argued that we have good reason to defend the Epicurean view of the validity of sensation on the basis of a contextual reading of the content of perception. More specifically, it has been suggested that we can respond to skeptical challenges by acknowledging the contextual character of perceptual content and by linking its truth to the conditions under which it occurs. By examining these proposals, we identify some sources of concern and point out the limitations in providing an adequate framework for the Epicurean idea that the senses are capable of providing the ultimate criteria of truth. In particular, we argue that we should be wary of a contextual reading of perceptual content, not only because this is not a viable model for reliably distinguishing truth from falsity, but also because it is not adequately supported by the available textual evidence of Epicurean empiricist epistemology. Finally, we point out further problems for the Epicurean viewpoint by drawing on some later considerations in the history of the philosophy of perception.

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