The Relevance of Philosophy in Times of  the Coronavirus Crisis

Pavličić Jelena; Marija Petrović; Milica Smajević Roljić

doi:10.2298/FID2201233

Authors

Pavličić Jelena University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute for Philosophy
Marija Petrović University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, Institute for Philosophy
Milica Smajević Roljić University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.2298/FID2201233

Keywords:

pandemic, reliability, public trust, pandemic ethics, experts, epistemic authority, mistrust of science, conspiracy theories, fast science

Abstract

The current coronavirus pandemic (SARS-CoV-2) has presented many scientific disciplines, including philosophy, with various theoretical and practical challenges. In this paper, we deal with three philosophical issues related to the pandemic and specific approaches to them. The first part of the article is dedicated to the analysis of the term “expert,” whose significance was highlighted at the outbreak of the pandemic. By examining Plato’s ancient and Goldman’s modern understanding of this concept, we will try to emphasize the importance of expert opinion in crisis circumstances. In the second part of the paper, we will deal with the issue of public mistrust of scientific authorities as well as the problem of the flourishing of so-called conspiracy theories. Goldenberg’s and Cassam’s approach to this topic will help us see where the source of these problems might lie and what potentially harmful consequences they can produce. In the third part of the text, we list some of the main moral dilemmas we have faced since the beginning of the pandemic. Special attention is paid to Kant’s moral philosophy in which we find advice on how an individual should act in times of crisis.

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