Normativity and factualism: Wright’s critique of Kripke’s understanding of rules

pages: 103-122

Abstract

This paper deals with Wright’s criticism of Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgeinstein and his understanding of the problem of following the rules, and particularly the understanding of a so called skeptical paradox. In the first part of the text, the author gives the basic points of Kripke’s position, whereas the second part examines Wright’s answer to the skeptical solution, that is, Wright’s defense of the objectivity of both the meaning and the connections of rules and their use. The third part discusses the range and certain weak points of Wright’s position which have to do with the issue of the constitutive question of rules and the nature of their normativity. Keywords: Skeptical paradox, noninferentiality, semantic primitivism, normativity, factualism, Wright, Kripke, Wittgenstein