Democracy: Between the essentially contested concept and the agonistic practice: Connolly, Mouffe, Tully

pages: 65-87

Abstract

The text considers points of view of theoreticians of the radical pluralism (democracy): Connolly (William Connolly), Mouffe (Chantal Mouffe) and Tully (James Tully) with regard to the status and the nature of concepts in the political discourse, as well as the consequences of these conceptual presumptions to understanding democracy. The three authors emphasize the essential contestability of political concepts, the paradox of liberal democracy and the need to revise standard rational consensus theories of democracy. Also, the three authors take over the specific interpretation of Vittgenstein to the direction of political theory the centre of which consists of everyday contingent practices of politics as well as dissent about their assessment. The text analyzes the extent to which this reading is compatible to Wittgenstein's position. The author defends the opinion that the essential contestability does not imply agonism and denial of the significance of rules and tries to indicate to the points of illegitimate transition from antiessentialism to unconsensus rules. Also, the text underlines the flaws of dissent conception of democracy and social integration. Keywords: Connolly, Mouffe, Tully, political discourse, dissent, essentially contested concepts, Wittgenstein, agonism, radical democracy