

To cite text:

Stevanović, Vladimir, and Andrea Raičević. 2026. "Reassessment of Heidegger's Notion of Authenticity in Architectural Theory: Between Anxiety and Poetic Dwelling." *Philosophy and Society* 37 (3): 559–584.

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REASSESSMENT OF HEIDEGGER'S NOTION OF AUTHENTICITY IN ARCHITECTURAL THEORY: BETWEEN ANXIETY AND POETIC DWELLING

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses reflections of Martin Heidegger's philosophy in architectural theory with an emphasis on the notion of authenticity, observed through the disparity of the concepts of anxiety and poetic dwelling. Architectural affirmers of Heidegger, from a phenomenological stance, advocate authentic dwelling as a poetic alternative to allegedly threatening alienation and homelessness in the anxious state of modernity. Conversely, critics of poststructuralist and neo-Marxist provenance find this reading to be a nostalgic regression into a premodern, romantic and mythical state of homely security, far beyond metropolitan contemporaneity. The dialogue's result thus reduces to opposing a domesticated dwelling condition and anxiety provoked by the invasion of an alien presence. In this polarized and superficial discourse of architectural theory, clarifying Heidegger's understanding of the concept of authenticity is necessary. Nevertheless, these considerations should not be restricted to authenticity alone, and they need to extend to other interconnected concepts: alienation, anxiety, dwelling and homelessness. It is additionally noted that Heidegger treated all these concepts differently in early and late phases. The deliberation leads to the intersection of different interpretations from architectural theory and philosophy regarding the mentioned concepts, derived through a comparative analysis of *Being and Time* from Heidegger's early period, and essays collected in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, representative of later thought. In the light of this reassessment, research is directed towards two notions that balance, if not unify, the seemingly contradictory thinking of early and late Heidegger. These are the notions of mortality and care that could clarify dilemmas occupying Heidegger's various architectural readers.

KEYWORDS

Martin Heidegger,
authenticity, anxiety,
dwelling,
homelessness,
alienation, mortality,
care

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Introduction and Hypothesis

Authenticity, on its standard reading, signifies a state of belonging to self, the own, and the proper. On the contrary, a loss of self is a kind of alienation, where inauthenticity is a kind of existential disorientation and estrangement. Alienation in the most literal sense of the Latin term *alius* means other, always different, never reconciled with a supposed origin of nature. Not as different is Martin Heidegger's understanding of these concepts in *Being and Time*, where he uses the German term *Eigentlichkeit* formed from the adjective *Eigentlich*, which means real, actual or proper, and derives from *eigen*, meaning own (Heidegger 1996: 40). Authentic modes of existence are those in which *Dasein* – that mode of human being whose own Being is always an issue for itself – stands in a first-person relation to itself, in contrast to the second and third-person relations in which it stands to others. This is a distinction between *Dasein*'s direct, immediate and ontologically unique relation to itself in contrast to the mediated relations to others or to itself viewed from an alienated point of view, an estranged, merely observational attitude about oneself (Heidegger 1996: 166; Carman 2005: 292; 2006: 233). Heidegger's conception of authenticity refers to a particular way in which *Dasein* can relate to its own possibilities, enabling authentic selfhood to be wrested away from the average everydayness of social life. Yet, for the most part, *Dasein* exists in an alienated, inauthentic manner that is not its own; it neither thinks nor acts for itself, but conforms to the expectations of others and accepts the ready-made meanings and values of its world. Heidegger thus insists that the subject of everydayness is not the individual but *das Man* (the they), an impersonal one or anyone to which individuals collectively conform (Heidegger 1996: 107).

Alienation is also one of the key topics when it comes to the theorization of modernity. The city in the sense of a modern metropolis is being targeted simultaneously as a source and as the urban and architectural spatialization of the state of modernity. As defined by Marshall Berman, modernity is a condition of living imposed upon individuals by the socioeconomic process of modernization (Berman 1982). The experience of modernity has a profound impact on the ways of life and daily habits. On the one hand, modernity frees from the limitations imposed by traditional community. On the other hand, the triumph of reason imagined by Enlightenment philosophers culminates in economic compulsion, bureaucratic control and standardization of people's lives. The dark side of modernization gives rise to a pervasive sense of alienation, unease and despair associated with living in a disenchanted world of deadening and meaningless routine. Often, commentators of modernity criticized the labyrinthine spaces of the modern city as alienating, fragmentary, violent and disordered and identified the experience of anxiety as inherent to modernity. The generalization of anxiety became the leitmotif of theories of modern alienation and estrangement from Georg Simmel's *blasé individual* to Walter Benjamin's *flâneur*.

Anxious state that distinguished itself as an emblematic imprint of modernity, Heidegger explains in a specific way through the German word *Angst*. In

Being and Time he speaks of the uncanny or uncanniness (*Unheimlich* or *Unheimlichkeit*), as a feeling of not being at home that accompanies the experience of *Angst* (Heidegger 1996: 176). In anxiety, the tranquilized and familiar being at home of everyday life collapses. Anxiety thus reveals to us a certain homelessness – we are not at home in the world, the world faces us as uncanny. Heidegger arrives at his determination of *Angst* by exploiting the etymological meaning of not-homelike, unfamiliar and unhomely, and linking it to the term's German acceptations of strange, weird or sinister. Entering into the existential mode of not being at home in the world, *Dasein* is torn away from its everyday concerns and left with an indeterminate apprehensiveness and uneasiness; with a feeling of the uncanny.

Presented linguistic transformations of the metaphor of home direct us towards the next Heidegger's notion of our concern: dwelling. Like anxiety, dwelling gets generalized in relation to modernity, being even more specifically connected to architectural topics due to its ostensibly self-understandable architectural/building/homely aspect. All too often in architectural theory, dwelling is deployed to mean little more than a feeling of a being at home in the world. For instance, in Hilde Heynen's analysis, which is largely influenced by Berman's conception of modernity and Theodor Adorno's critical theory, modernity is described as a condition diametrically opposed to dwelling. Basing herself on Berman's standpoint, she assumes that the dynamics and the fleeting characteristics of modernity are incompatible with continuity, stability, and security traditionally linked with dwelling (Heynen 1992: 89). Heynen often quotes short remark from Adorno's *Minima Moralia*, written after the destruction in World War II, in which it is said that dwelling in the proper sense is now impossible and that the house is past (Heynen 1999: 17). While Berman was engaged in more general sociocultural aspects of modernity, Adorno wonders from an ethico-political point of view whether man can feel at home in a world where Auschwitz has been possible. In her synthesis, Heynen suggests that in the modern age homelessness has come to prevail as the almost universal condition for human being and at the same time presents Heidegger as the leading representative of this kind of criticism. Indeed, in the well-known analysis from "Building dwelling thinking" (*Bauen Wohnen Denken*; in the rest of the text we will use the abbreviation BDT), Heidegger is pointing to the tie between dwelling and remaining in peace within an inhabitation activity.

The Old Saxon *wuon*, the Gothic *wunian*, like the old word *bauen* mean to remain, to stay in a place. But the Gothic *wunian* says more distinctly how this remaining is experienced. *Wunian* means: to be at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain in peace. The word for peace, *Friede*, means the free, *das Frye*, and *fry* means: preserved from harm and danger, preserved from something, safeguarded (Heidegger 1971:147).

According to these linguistic relationships, Heidegger shows that dwelling means to be set at peace in a protected place, which further implies connotations

of cherishing and caring for. Bearing in mind that *Wohnen* also derives from *Gewohnthe*, which means what is known or habitual, Heidegger points out that genuine building, that is dwelling, “remains for man’s everyday experience that which is from the outset habitual – we inhabit it” (Heidegger 1971: 145). But, in our precarious time, in the destitute time of the world’s night, as Heidegger sometimes calls his own modern contemporaneity, this kind of inhabitation is under suspicion. Heynen assumes that dwelling, if understood in Heidegger’s ways, is an antidote to modernity which is marked by a condition of homelessness or non-dwelling. Moreover, in her conclusion, there is an unbridgeable gulf between modernity and dwelling (Heynen 1999: 17).

Heynen’s approach is actually a kind of recapitulating attitude, or even *étalon*, of how the notion of dwelling – observed through apparently self-evident architectural focus, but still colloquially oriented towards variations of the metaphor of home (being at home, homely) and its negation (non-dwelling, not being at home, unhomely, homelessness) – becomes receptive to simplistic interpretations. In that manner, the dominant branch of architectural theory forms a *pro-et-contra* relation between authentic (dwelling) and alienated (homelessness). Then, authentic – understood in a way of commonsense dogmatism as genuine, sincere and honest – would be equivalent to intimate, domestic, homely security within the four walls of the house. Following the same principle, alienated would imply foreign, strange and hostile invading of the familiar world. This approach is evident both in the proponents of Heidegger, as well as in his critics. Christian Norberg-Schulz, the most dedicated interpreter, developer and affirmer of Heidegger in architectural theory, places dwelling as an authentic alternative to the alleged threatening alienation and homelessness of modernity (Norberg-Schulz 1980). Likewise, critics equate homelessness (that is, in Heideggerian terms, at the same time the uncanny and anxiety) with alienation. For example, Anthony Vidler hails the uncanny as the dominant constituent of modern estrangement and alienation, while Neal Leach identifies alienation with “unfamiliar sense in a space where you don’t feel at home” (Vidler 1992: ix, 1996: 575, 2000: 9; Leach, internet).

However, if we take a closer look at how Heidegger defines his concepts, we will first notice that the notion of dwelling means inevitably more than a rational, utilitarian act, such as the mere erection of shelters and interior spaces, and occupying rooms or buildings. Dwelling is conceived more broadly than a spatial expression of the metaphor of home in urban-metropolitan context forced by some architectural theorists, to which notions of modernity, homelessness, anxiety and alienation are opposed all at once.

Besides dwelling, anxiety is also associated with a narrow understanding that needs to be forthwith demystified. If observed through the prism of metropolitan subject matter, it is not uncommon to regard Heidegger’s anxiety as “a radically modern interpretation of the significant mood of the first half of the 20th century” (Kurir 2022: 51). With that in mind, it is not unjustified to say that the meaningless routine brought by the process of socio-economic modernization in a certain way intensifies the phenomenon of *das Man* and

its absorption into the average majority. Yet, as Hubert Dreyfus notes (as if he had foreseen the appearance of these readings), it is misleading and superficial to interpret anxiety as the result of the constituents of modernity such as urbanization, repression, overwork, etc (Dreyfus 1995: 337). Namely, Heidegger does not understand anxiety as a mere psychological state that reflects the personality of the modern individual, but rather as an ontological phenomenon that reveals a deep truth about the nature of human beings.¹

The mere elementary crossing of some of Heidegger's notions, treated in a way proposed by the majority of architectural theory, gives off an imbalance. Here the relation between anxiety and alienation is especially indicative. As we have shown, both Vidler and Leach equalize anxiety and alienation, presenting them *vis-à-vis* as a kind of negative emotional states. Meanwhile, in *Being and Time* it is the very anxiety that is the necessary tool to resist alienation. In anxiety, exactly when not being at home, one becomes open to the possibility of authentic existence, experiencing oneself as radically individualized, free, and responsible (Heidegger 1996: 176). On the other hand, alienation is a symptom of the lack of this self-understanding; the failure to recognize one's own Being in the world as one's own. Hence, anxiety is actually closer to authenticity than it is even with alienation. If so, homelessness – in terms of not at home (uncanny), which is a nuance of anxiety – cannot be randomly associated with alienation either.

Presented starting hypotheses point that the discourse of architectural theory produces two problems: 1) understanding of Heidegger's philosophical terms in a demotic way and; 2) theoretical positioning exclusively based on Heidegger's late thought. In this sense, this paper does not delve into the dilemma of what indeed is authentic – being at home as dwelling or not being at home as anxiety – but is rather concerned with the entire set of problems of the asymmetrical treatment of these notions in early and late Heidegger. Everything suggests that critical engagement with Heidegger's notion of authenticity, as well as with all other interconnected concepts such as dwelling, anxiety, alienation and homelessness, should not be restricted to Heidegger's later work, but also requires rethinking the aspects of his earlier work. Analysis of the observed Heidegger's concepts will first be conducted in relation to divided reception in architectural theory (Christian Norberg-Schulz as the affirmer and Hilde Heynen, Anthony Vidler, Neal Leach and others as the critics). Thereafter, we will compare early and late Heidegger's basic assumptions in order to approach their philosophical insights and considerations by

1 Something similar happens to alienation, where the philosophical and sociological senses of this notion are sometimes permuted. While sociologists stress the historical conditions and circumstances of alienation, Heidegger tends to see alienation as a condition endemic to existence itself. In social theory, there is alienation from the collective, while within Heidegger's philosophical discourse it is exactly the opposite: alienation of the self and siding with the collective in terms of *das Man*. Clearly, it is not the same to speak of individual estrangement from existential standpoint and class alienation from materialist perspective.

several recent Heidegger scholars (in the forefront Karsten Harries, Jeff Malpas and Julian Young, followed by Hubert Dreyfus, Michael Zimmerman and Andrew Benjamin). At the end, these interpretative models shall be used as a guideline for the derivation of conclusions, where we will in parallel follow a less represented, although not less significant, line of Heidegger's thought that focuses on notions of mortality and care. In these findings, we propose that mortality and care unify the thinking of early and late Heidegger and, as such, bear central significance in clarifying the dilemmas that occupy his various architectural readers.

Apology: Dwelling as Authentic Response to Alienation

The first level of analysis is the apology of authenticity in the phenomenological strand of architectural theory, representative of Heidegger's admirer Norberg-Schulz. In accordance with the well-known division between qualitative and quantitative, which is related to the phenomenological critique of positivism, Norberg-Schulz's starting point is the polarization of concrete phenomena (true existential content belonging to the everyday lifeworld) and abstract data (scientific substitutes for reality). Architecture dominated by data he recognizes in modernist universalizing style, especially in its socio-economic parameters, statistical-numerical values, and rationalist ideals of technology, function and standardization² (Norberg-Schulz 1980a). Norberg-Schulz was particularly devoted to Heidegger's later essays, which he used extensively to examine the concept of dwelling, in which he overlaps several key moments. Dwelling is represented as a return to authenticity from alienation, and defined through the notions of meaning and place, but in all those instances results in a guiding concept for figural architectural practice. Norberg-Schulz observes that in modern society true dwelling has been substituted by alienation and that at the moment of confusion and crisis Heidegger's thinking may help to arrive at an authentic understanding of architecture (Norberg-Schulz 1983: 67). For him, homelessness is not so much a fundamental condition of contemporary man, but rather an incidental loss that can be redressed by a better understanding of the relation between architecture and dwelling, in order to get back to authentic dwelling (Heynen 1999: 19).

Norberg-Schulz claims that the purpose of architecture is to enable dwelling, that is, to provide the existential foothold in space and time. According to him, dwelling allows us to make and experience our environment as meaningful. Like most architectural postmodernists, Norberg-Schulz finds meaning by recovering the figural dimension of architecture, in the sense of reactualizing

2 This puts Norberg-Schulz into the frame of the well-known standpoint of postmodern critique, according to which the symptoms of modernist architecture are monotony and reduction of living space to the coordinate system, while the wider consequences are the loss of individual identity and a sense of life in everyday activities, isolation from the natural environment, as well as the neglect of values of regional and local character (Stevanović 2014: 94).

historically and contextually conditioned forms expelled by modernism. This is about figures: common and recognizable archetypal elements that keep and explain our existence, and constitute a language of architecture (Norberg-Schulz 1985). He describes figurative architecture by using Heidegger's notion of poetry from the essay "The Origin of the Work of Art". To dwell authentically, for Heidegger, is to dwell poetically, since poetry is a manifestation of truth restored to its artistic dimension. Norberg-Schulz argued that architecture set-to-work the environment in a way that reveals its truth poetically. Since poetry speaks in images, the sole nature of images is to let something be seen. In that sense, architecture becomes a setting into work of truth, and a mean of making the world visible by using archetypal figures (Norberg-Schulz 1983: 64).

An important aspect of dwelling accentuated by Heidegger is remaining. It can be said that therefrom derives the concept of place in architectural theory. As a basic human characteristic, to remain or to stay means to be in a certain relation to a place. As Adam Sharr notices, individuals come to appreciate their place in the world and the circumstances they find themselves in. Such acts of appreciation were ways to feel at home, to reach accommodation with one's surroundings. Dwelling involves somehow being at one with the world: peaceful, contented, liberating (Sharr 2007: 41). Consequently, Norberg-Schulz considers that dwelling implies bonding to place and situating in a harmonious relation with the surrounding environment. Along those lines, he defines dwelling through orientation in space and identification with unique character of place. Those are the primary aspects of man's being in the world and the basis for man's sense of belonging to a specific place (Norberg-Schulz 1985).

Since the meaning of human existence is integrated with places, Norberg-Schulz was especially fixated on expressing the meaningful relationship of the building to its site in terms of visual patterns. He claims that the aim of architecture is to make a site become a place, that is, to uncover hidden meanings potentially present in a given place. In terms of a landscape, environment or surrounding, the place is not just an abstract site, but a totality consisting of material things. According to local circumstances, the place has a particular historical and contextual identity, which is embodied by means of concrete form and substance of space-defining elements, which again have characteristic archetypal figural quality in their formal articulation (Norberg-Schulz 1980a: 14; 1983: 64). Making architecture that gathers and visualizes the properties of the place is that moment when a dwelling is inscribed in place through building in a way that is authentic.

Analysis of Heidegger's affirmation in architectural theory reveals a problem of distorted understanding of his philosophy in the sense of its simplistic application in practice. As we have shown, authenticity is a kind of hallmark within architectural phenomenology, where the concept of architecture as dwelling has become a means of combatting the alienation of modern society and resisting the homogenising placelessness of modernist architecture. This stance may be justifiable given that phenomenology is usually seen as the way to recuperate the fullness of authentic experience and save humanity from the

crisis of modernity by offering resistance to modern technological and consumerist imperatives. As pointed out by Jorge Otero-Pailos, the supposedly fragmented, distracted, technologically mediated, and schizophrenic experience of modern subjects requires the phenomenological search for stable limits (Otero-Pailos 2010: 257). It is, however, questionable whether the reading of Heidegger justifiably leads architectural phenomenologists to believe that there are authentic aspects to dwelling that can in turn be reflected in authentic approaches to the design of architectural space.³

Norberg-Schulz's attempt of phenomenological reading of architecture can, in that sense, be regarded as the outcome of a broader process of transdisciplinary synthesis of architectural theory and the series of theorizations within philosophy, social sciences, humanities, art theory, etc. The final consequence of this synthesis is that various theoretical approaches, initially conceived as methods of analysis, observation and interpretation, in architectural discourse are becoming susceptible to superficial reading, arbitrary translation and instrumentalization, which reduces their analytic potential to the formulations of production or promotion of architecture (design strategy, design process, style categorizations). It is the process of translating theory into architectural practice, which has been a topic in the academic community for a long time now (Wigley 1998; Stevanović 2013; Mitrović 2022). This filter did not circumvent phenomenology either, making the so-called phenomenology of architecture result in a certain distance from the philosophical purpose of phenomenology (Haddad 2010; Bedford 2018).

Critique: Dwelling as Nostalgic Jargon of Authenticity

Despite the fact that *Being and Time* rejected all essentialist notions of human nature within the Western tradition of thought, Heidegger's critics consider that his later account of dwelling takes little, if any, account of modern historical conditions. This is clearly indicated in neo-Marxist architectural theorists who follow up Adorno's criticism, especially in his *Jargon of Authenticity*. For example, Heynen writes that Heidegger disregards the question of concrete dwelling for concrete people and ignores the banal but very real question of actual housing needs caused by social conditions (Heynen, 1999: 221). Jeremy Till also advocates the aforementioned thesis about the exclusion of social reality, summarizing that authenticity in architectural theory is often reflected in

3 Although Heidegger begins BDT by warning the reader that his reflections have nothing to say about the practicalities of building and architectural design, this has not prevented commentators from drawing out such a connection at great length. Indeed, the essay does have a special resonance for architects. One might think, given his frequent references to peasant huts and forest paths, that Heideggerian authentic architecture would consist of idyllic country landscapes, log cabins, ski huts and rustic peasant decors. The main problem within the architectural comprehension of building and dwelling is: which comes first? Does one need an authentic dwelling attitude in order to build properly, or a proper building attitude (style) in order to dwell authentically?

the retreat from everyday⁴ living into idealized notions of dwelling (Till 2009: 129). A similar approach is evident in poststructuralist architectural theorists who build on Jean Francois Lyotard's critique of Heidegger. In *Domus and Megalopolis*, Lyotard argues against the notion of dwelling, which he presents through the term *domus* as a mythic concept (Lyotard 1997). He is contrasting two models of existence, two ideals of living: the traditional *domus* (the phenomenon of home) and our present condition, that of the alienated model of city-life. Lyotard's position becomes receptive for architectural theory, where it becomes reduced to the oppositions of rural provincialism and urban cosmopolitanism, past and contemporary, traditional and progressive, and so on (Guo 2006).

The target of this kind of criticism is Heidegger's argument, often used by Norberg-Schulz: a properly authentic being in the world is one rooted in place, thus a building should be on and of the soil, of the location on which it is built. This evocation of the soil, this call for a situated architecture, can be further read as an evocation of the homeland (*Heimat*). As Leach notices, quoting Heidegger's brief note he found in Michael Zimmerman, *Heimat* is not in the cities but in the countryside where one is most in touch with nature and tradition (Leach 1998: 33; Zimmerman 1990: 71). Leach appears to assume, presumably on the basis of Heidegger's tendency to look to rural examples, that the concept of dwelling must indeed be tied to a rural paradigm that can have no relevance to the urban. As the main example of this rootedness, Heidegger chooses a farmhouse in the Blackforest, enabling critics to disavow his pining for a more authentic understanding of architecture as a romantic approach. The point of these critiques is that dwelling, as the central notion of their considerations, takes on connotations that are further interpreted in a negative light. While Leach presented dwelling in terms of soil, *Heimat* and rootedness, Heynen does the same by associating dwelling with tradition, security and harmony, which is also the case with Sharr, when speaking of romantic provincialism (Leach 1998; Heynen 1999; Sharr 2006: 72).

More than clearly, those considerations bring us again to our introductory opposition between dwelling (now flavoured with *domus* and *Heimat*) and alienation (simply in terms of urban living conditions). To that effect, for Vidler dwelling represents an embodiment of nostalgia for the true, natal home that emerges in the face of the massive uprooting of modernity (Vidler 1992: 7). This rootlessness, as underscored by critics, is the social form that prevails in the metropolis, which can be condensed in one Massimo Cacciari's observation

4 It is quite noticeable that the meaning of everydayness is not the same for Heidegger, for his affirmers, or for his critics. In Heidegger, everydayness reflects, in not-so-positive manner, connectivity with the inauthentic they, i.e., *das Man*. On the contrary, Heidegger's apologists like Norberg-Schultz, use the term everyday to glorify phenomenological *Lebenswelt* in terms of an approximation to authentic everyday lifeworld, thereby opposing scientific and social abstractions. Finally, for Heidegger's critics, the everyday world is precisely this kind of social life composed of concrete needs and socio-economic conditions, which phenomenologists neglect.

suggesting that to deny the metropolitan situation means a backward attitude that believes in the conservative nostalgia for a better, more natural human life (Cacciari 1993: xiv). Viewed so, dwelling belongs irrevocably to the past, and non-dwelling is the essential characteristic of life in the metropolis, where modern man is called to “an adventurous existence of journeying and migrations” (Heynen 1999: 141).

Analysis of the critique of the concept of dwelling in architectural theory reveals an aporia related to the usual *ad hominem* commentary about Heidegger as the representative of Nazist values. In the first instance, Heidegger’s notion of dwelling is anathemized as romantic and nostalgic for being associated with a pre-modern life that guarantees connectedness and meaningfulness. Furthermore, Heidegger’s preoccupation with ideas of place, soil, *Heimat*, rootedness and belonging, his apparent preference for the world of peasant and farmer, and his frequent appeal to the notion of home, have all been seen as tied to a conservative and even reactionary politics.⁵ In that constellation, dwelling has taken on a connotation of a deterministic concept that is necessarily exclusionary and even violent. The said aporia can be observed as an outcome of selective attentiveness to Heidegger’s public appearances (for example, Rectoral Address from 1933) rather than any of his later writings in which the concept of dwelling was actually postulated. As Jeff Malpas perceives, it is a strategy that discredits ideas from Heidegger’s later thinking on the basis of the political engagement apparently present in the earlier (Malpas 2006: 20).

In addition to this, much of the interpretations from architectural theory have been determined by the prior assumptions of Heidegger’s main critics, first of all Lyotard and Adorno. Therefore, owing to the secondhand readings without checking what Heidegger actually wanted to say, we got a simple repetition of a standard and quite general characterization that appears in his main critics. It is evident that this approach is driven more by Adorno’s and Lyotard’s preoccupations than by any close engagement with Heidegger’s texts as such (Malpas 2021: 59). While all these critical remarks expose what could be deemed as areas of limitation within Heidegger’s thinking, they fail to encompass the scope and complexity of his discourse on the notion of dwelling and home in general. At the end, it must be stressed that a great deal of the critique of Heidegger in architectural theory has gone through the critique of Norberg-Schulz (Malpas 2014: 15). Where Norberg-Schulz spoke about orientation and identification in the sense of belonging to a specific place, critics instantly saw all aforementioned negative aspects. In that way, Heidegger’s effort in its entirety becomes reduced to the talk about Norberg-Schulz’s interpretations of Heidegger and the disavowal of these interpretations. However, critics seem to miss a far more important thing – to conceive to what extent

5 As Adam Sharr notices, while the romanticizing of country life is perceived in many cultures as the obscure and indulgent preserve of dreamers, the path of German romantic provincialism remains far more difficult. *Heimat*, region, nation, and language have here been distinctively aligned. Nazism was larded with invocations which can be linked to the ideology such as of blood and soil (*Blut und Boden*) (Sharr 2006: 6).

theorizations of this Norwegian phenomenologist deviate from the original Heidegger's thought. This, nonetheless, is a topic in its own right which requires special consideration that goes beyond the framework of this paper.

Cross-Section through Early and Late Heidegger

Presented supportive and dismissive opinions became mainstream in architectural theory, where both sides go astray to extremes in something that Heidegger never actually argued in his philosophical writings: whether in terms of building authentic architecture or explicitly siding with Nazi values. Generally, it often remains blurred whether this concerns authenticity in terms of authentic life, authentic world, authentic building, or authentic nation. What is symptomatic is that the majority of architectural theorists were immersed in the philosophy of the late Heidegger and his concept of authentic dwelling, and at the same time largely ignorant of the position of the earlier Heidegger. Given that, for them somehow under the radar remained the key question posed by Karsten Harries: Had Heidegger's *Being and Time* not placed authenticity in opposition to being at home in the world (Harries 1998: 158)? In a subtle endnote, Harries reminds us of Heidegger's insistence on the essential homelessness of human being.

To be sure, in *Being and Time* Heidegger, very much in the spirit of his place and time, makes homelessness constitutive of the human condition. But soon he was forced to recognize the one-sidedness of such an understanding. Although essentially homeless, we yet dream of home. (...) Heidegger had pointed out that first of all and most of the time we feel at home in the world. But *Being and Time* links authentic existence to a recognition of our essential homelessness in the world. Any thoughtful appropriation of Heidegger needs to confront this apparent tension in his thought (Harries 1998: 381).

In *Being and Time*, *Dasein* is essentially uncanny; in other words: not of the home. Here, not dwelling but precisely homelessness is taken as primary. As is known, the prevailing tendency in Heidegger studies is to treat his early and later philosophy as two detached periods of thought, taking as "the turn" (*Kehre*) the one that occurred in the 1930s. One of the main features of that turn is Heidegger's attitude towards home and towards the dwelling/homelessness dynamics in general. In line with that, as Julian Young unambiguously puts it: the transformation of early into late Heidegger is the transformation of the human being from one who is homeless into one who dwells (Young 2000: 193). This difference will be the key moment we will expand on in the continuation of this paper, as well as the backbone of our comparative analysis. Even though the mentioned difference is evident, in accordance with the hypotheses presented in the introduction, we will simultaneously follow the statuses of the notions of mortality and care which, as we will show, maintain a significant position in both early and late Heidegger, and which, as such, allow for a better understanding of the problem exposed herein.

Anxiety and Homelessness: Harbingers of Authentic Possibilities

According to *Being and Time*, homelessness (*Unheimlichkeit*) and anxiety (*Angst*) are structural features of human existence that disclose a deep truth about the human being in its relationship to the world. Heidegger assigns the concept of anxiety a major role in the analysis of *Dasein*, where it is linked to the possibility for authentic existence. The conception of authenticity proposed by Heidegger is highly individualistic, as it suggests that one must extricate oneself from alienating social conventions and seize hold of life's possibilities on one's own, through a solitary confrontation with anxiety. In anxiety, the everyday world withdraws, and *Dasein* is left to confront itself. Therefore, authenticity is a manner of taking hold of one's existence in terms of possibilities consciously chosen rather than facts passively accepted. Anxiety confirms that the human being lives in a mode of deep-seated existential concern for the self, and not solely as a knowing subject or a pleasure-seeking animal. This concerned preoccupation with itself reveals that *Dasein*'s most basic manner of Being is care (*Sorge*) (Heidegger 1996: 178).

However, this is not just about the tension between one's particularity and the imposition of social norms that are uncritically accepted, but it is also a question of a broader understanding of our position in time. Authentic existence is occasioned by an anxious awareness of one's true nature as a being of possibility, as these bring about a lucid attitude toward one's historical situation and finally toward one's own time limit, which is death. From here it is clear that the most unsettling experience of anxiety is connected to the possibility that is closest to myself: the possibility of my own death. This uniquely human awareness of death that is crucial to the emergence of authenticity Heidegger calls being towards death (Heidegger 1996: 219). The project of authenticity begins when *Dasein* is displaced from the inauthentic, everyday mode of existence in which one loses sight of one's freedom as a finite individual. Authenticity is thus felt as a shock to everyday existence where one is comfortable with an average understanding of things and human possibilities. By confronting death and accepting the finitude of one's Being, *Dasein* receives a sense of freedom and takes responsibility for shaping itself according to its own choices, entering into authentic existence. Heidegger linked authenticity to anticipatory, i.e., forerunning resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) in the face of one's finitude (Heidegger 1996: 247). To be resolute is to remain sensitive to the unique demands of the concrete situation, as opposed to subsuming it under generic rules, thus reducing it to a mere general state of affairs. Resoluteness is functioning as internal resistance to the obfuscating tendencies of preconceived attitudes, which constantly turn *Dasein* away from an explicit, problematic attention to its own temporality and finite particularity. Again, resoluteness is not a stable, self-sufficient mode of existence, but – as Taylor Carman puts it – a perpetual struggle against the reifying forces and continual exposure to the instability and vulnerability of *Dasein*'s world and identity (Carman 2000: 23-24). At some point, this evokes a Sartrean idea of anxiety

as a recognition of the constantly renewed obligation to remake the Self (Sartre 1957: 35). Forerunning into death, then, means being ready, willing, and able to embrace a particular and inherently fragile set of possibilities (Carman 2006: 234).

Heidegger elaborated anxiety as an authentic, privileged and revealing – but at the same time the uncanny – experience of our essential mortality. Together with anxiety, the uncanny is certainly *par excellence* manifestation of being toward death. At the moment in which anxiety swells, *Dasein* no longer feels at home within the comfort of its inauthentic being in the world. In the mode of the not-at-home, *Dasein* is left hanging as a homeless being, forced before the nothingness of existence (Magrini 2006: 79). Anxiety in the face of death reveals the truth about mortal finitude and discloses to us the banality or absurdity of life. Experienced in anxiety, uncanniness exposes to *Dasein* the fact that the meaningful world – composed of common meanings that are exactly opposite to banal and absurd – enabling of organizing the everydayness, is not a home anymore. Homelessness thus remains an ever-present possibility for human experience; the authentic experience of apprehending oneself as lacking an internal or external cause.

Despite this promising side of anxiety and homelessness, which hints to the truth of *Dasein*, we tend to avoid this mood because of its unpleasantness. Hence, there is a constant motivation to conceal that unwelcome truth and to back into reaffirmation of everyday life. Heidegger describes the refusal of anxiety as a kind of flight, where *Dasein* flees from its anxiety – which is its proper dying – with the distractions of quotidian busyness (Heidegger 1996: 172). *Dasein*'s absorption in and fascination with the world and its own average everydayness is a direct product of the temptation to flee from its own nullity, i.e., to disown its mortal existence⁶ (Carman 2000: 14). In that constellation, *das Man* is the foundation of inauthentic existence. By disburdening *Dasein* of its freedom, responsibility, and finitude, it ensures that the individual exists in alienation from its genuine human possibilities. According to Dreyfus, human beings continue to plunge into trying to make themselves at home, involved in conformist activities in which they seek to give their lives some stable meaning⁷

6 The uncanny feeling of anxiety can both motivate falling into inauthenticity – a cover-up of *Dasein*'s true structure – and undermine this cover-up, thus making authenticity possible (Dreyfus 1995: 313). In other words, one can either accept mortal existence (becoming authentic) or otherwise flee into distractions (becoming inauthentic).

7 The problem of meaning, as posed by Dreyfus, is especially significant for the discourse of architectural theory and therefore requires some additional explanation. It is about the following: Heidegger's account of authenticity has little in common with the ideal of wholeness, completion, or unified subjecthood, which can be recognized in Norberg-Schultz's architectural aspirations towards a meaningful world consisting of orientation and belonging. On the contrary, *Dasein* cannot coherently aspire to any kind of complete or total understanding of itself in its being (Carman 2005:288). Nevertheless, it still doesn't follow that the world is revealed as lacking of meaning. We always already encounter ourselves in a meaningful world. Anxiety shows us, however, that the world need not have the meaning that it does.

(Dreyfus 1995: 37). In the public world, which is presented by Heidegger as a seductive haven of flight, far from feeling despairing or homeless, inauthentic *Dasein* is fully at home with things in tranquilized familiarity (Heidegger 1996: 189). Therefore, home becomes a place to escape to; a place where *Dasein* covers up its uncanniness and calms anxiety.

Poetic Dwelling: Authentic Building

In the previous chapter, we have shown that the uncanny existential mode of the not-at-home for early Heidegger represents the most fundamental way of existence. Radical rootlessness that everyone feels fundamentally uncanny senses that human beings can never be at home in the world. However, in contrast to his early phase, Heidegger's later conception of human being as a dwelling within the fourfold presupposes that primordial dwelling is being at home in the world. In addition to the trajectory that directs dwelling towards home, crucial is the late Heidegger's connection of dwelling with Being. As Andrew Benjamin confirms, what has been suggested at the very opening of BDT is that dwelling and building demand to be thought in terms of the propriety of the question of Being (Benjamin 2000: 221). In BDT, Heidegger considered the etymological derivation of the old German word for building (*Buan*), which originally meant to dwell. *Buan* is intimately related to the verb *to be* (*Ich bin* or *I am*). In that way, *buan* refers not only to building and dwelling but also to Being. Ultimately, building is inherently related to dwelling, and both are connected to Being. At this point we come to the explanation of authenticity. Late Heidegger interpreted authentic dwelling as living in a world unified and gathered together by the fourfold; his well-known quadruple thought structure consisting of earth and sky, gods and mortals. The fourfold can be understood as later Heidegger's account of world (Heidegger 1971: 197). Accordingly, the fourfold is the basic condition of existence in which humans experience things; also the condition in which people experience buildings. Heidegger further develops an analogy between authentic dwelling, the fourfold and poetry. His engagement with the XIX century German poet Friedrich Hölderlin is the main source for the essay "Poetically Man Dwells", where he refines the theme of authentic dwelling by linking it with the poetic. In the line that Heidegger cites from Hölderlin, human beings dwell poetically, which means always to dwell in proper measure.

Man does not dwell in that he merely establishes his stay on the earth beneath the sky, by raising growing things and simultaneously raising buildings. Man is capable of such building only if he already builds in the sense of the poetic taking of measure. Authentic building occurs so far as there are poets, such poets as take the measure for architecture, the structure of dwelling (Heidegger 1971: 225).

This proper measure is not a measure given in mere calculation, but rather in relation to that which determines human being, to which it is disclosed as

what it is⁸ (Malpas 2006: 276). With the fourfold, Heidegger's aim is to emphasize the holistic sense of dwelling by pointing out that an appropriate experience of situatedness in the world requires an experience of limit, being conditioned by that which one cannot regulate and manipulate. That limit is, of course, our mortality. Poetry is adept at thinking the boundaries and existential situation of the human being on the earth as a finite, placed being. Here comes to the fore the continuity of Heidegger's thought on death, which offers a deeper explanation of the relationship between poetry and place: our place, where we dwell, is finiteness – our mortality.

Another aspect accentuated by late Heidegger within the concept of dwelling – along with mortality – is care, which is arrived at through the notion of remaining. As previously explained, the remaining issue in architectural theory was useful for directing dwelling towards place. But, in his etymological transformations, Heidegger comes to the point that remaining also means to be brought to peace, which further means to cherish and protect, to spare and preserve. This variant of remaining's meaning was seemingly more important to philosophers than to architectural theorists. In BDT, Heidegger underlines that the fundamental character of dwelling is in this preserving and safeguarding from harm and danger, which in the final instance means to look after, to take under our care. Distinctly, what we take under our care must be kept safe (Heidegger 1971: 149).

Besides the presented varieties in the interpretation of authenticity in its relation to the anxiety/dwelling complex, this moment opens, or even simply imposes, the possibility of extending the analysis *via* introducing Heidegger's understanding of the notions of mortality and care. In fact, it was not uncommon for these two notions to be compared in terms of early and late Heidegger's thinking, whether in seeking continuity or accentuating the differences. Firstly, what one can see is that in late Heidegger's terminology, authentic being in the world is called a poetic dwelling. *Dasein*, as a designation of authenticity, is a term that is less common in his later works, where he tends to refer to mortals instead. Heidegger thus replaced the earlier analysis of authentic being towards death with his analysis of authentic dwelling as staying with the fourfold. The question of care in these alterations has been carefully studied by Travis Anderson.

In BDT Heidegger recharacterizes dwelling, after Hölderlin, as the most basic and habitual character of human being on the earth. In *Being and Time*, we recall, this basic character was attributed not to dwelling but to being in the world as care. (...) Of course, dwelling entails care in some sense, perhaps even in the sense that Heidegger articulates in *Being and Time*. (...) This reversal is indicated by his shift from thinking the truth of building as a practical instance

8 In the context of well-known Heideggerian *technē/poiesis* dynamics, poetry could play a role in resisting the transition to a technological world: overcoming technology in terms of learning to hear a different language than that spoken by the technological world.

of project-driven care for a resolutely death bound *Dasein*, to a resolute yielding of poetic existence to the collaborative gathering power of being at its most elemental (Anderson 2011: 77-78).

In spite of the changed terminology, mortals hold much of Heidegger's earlier *Dasein*, in that mortals' existence is centred around the concerned temporality of the care structure. The dwelling of mortals is the action that opens the understanding of temporality in the fourfold, where dwelling is the attentive activity of engagement in which mortals take care of things. As Malpas summarized this continuity of Heidegger's thought, dwelling is taken to involve a sense of looking after or taking care that presages discussion of care (*Sorge*) in *Being and Time* as determinative of the structure of being in the world (Malpas 2006: 75).

Accepting Homelessness: Questioning Being

If the notion of dwelling in late Heidegger is connected with the notions of being at home, authentic being in the world, poetic measuring, mortality and care, does that mean that homelessness is simply everything opposite of that? To answer this question, we will focus on Heidegger's essay "The Letter on Humanism", from where the central argument of BDT is transposed. Here Heidegger reveals that homelessness consists in the abandonment of beings by Being. It was the forgetting of the question of Being that animated humanity's homelessness. Commenting on his own reading of Hölderlin, in which home and the return home, and homeland are central and recurrent themes, Heidegger developed the idea that the reversal of this forgetfulness is a matter of homecoming (Malpas 2006: 308). Thus, if homelessness is the symptom of the oblivion of Being, to come home means to dwell, to be at home with Being as such.

In the lecture on Hölderlin's elegy "Homecoming" (1943), this nearness of Being is thought on the basis of *Being and Time*; it is perceived as spoken from the minstrel's poem; from the experience of the oblivion of Being, it is called the homeland. The word is thought here in an essential sense, not patriotically or nationalistically, but in terms of the history of Being. The essence of the homeland, however, is also mentioned with the intention of thinking the homelessness of contemporary human beings from the essence of Being's history (Heidegger, 2008: 241).

This citation is important because it distances Heidegger from the common Nazi interpretation developed in one part of architectural theory. It is clear that home of which Hölderlin had spoken was not to be conceived as the geographical place in which the Germans live. The homecoming which Heidegger speaks of is a return to the nearness of Being. To come home means then to come home to the question of Being and to face that question as a question. But in BDT we will see that homecoming is something that is undertaken rather than completed, which can be recognized in one of the central theses of this essay.

The real dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search anew for the nature of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell. What if man's homelessness consisted in this, that man still does not even think of the real plight of dwelling as the plight? Yet as soon as man gives thought to his homelessness, it is a misery no longer. Rightly considered and well kept in mind, it is the sole summons that calls mortals into their dwelling (Heidegger 1971: 159).

Except that it is the only spot in BDT where Heidegger mentions homelessness, revealing the promising side of it, this quote demystifies another architectural prejudice. It is about the belief that dwelling in a sense of homecoming is returning to what is certain and stable, such as some fixed spot on earth (Malpas 2006: 310-311). Contrary to that, the question of dwelling is never a question ever settled or finally resolved. To dwell is to remain in a state in which what it is to dwell is a question constantly put anew. Here we recognize a kind of *eternal return* moment, in the context of the already mentioned Sartrean idea of anxiety as the constantly renewed obligation to remake the Self. As Heidegger presents matters, dwelling is not a matter of closed-off containment within a secure and self-sufficient domain, but an engagement in the world in its complexity and multiplicity (Malpas 2021: 67).

We can deliberate on this further through *Being and Time* and especially through the aspect of *Unheimlichkeit*. Heidegger's homecoming then is not a turn back to what is safe and familiar, but to that which is uncanny, inexplicable, wondrous (Malpas 2006: 311). Of course, it does not mean that the relationship between dwelling and care, established through the aspects of remaining and safety, is abolished. There is only one nuance to that idea: dwelling is not just a comfortable and harmonic care-fying activity, but taking care also implies an uncanny moment. Accordingly, if we look back to "The Letter on Humanism", we will be able to identify perhaps the greatest level of tension between the notions of dwelling and homelessness. As Malpas notices, the homeland that is invoked here is exactly that "uncanny district in which the essence of Being comes to presence" (Malpas 2012: 195). Considerations along a similar line can be found in Zimmerman and Harries, as well. According to Zimmerman, we are not at home because we no longer understand who we are. When we are able to recall who we really are, we are home again (Zimmerman 1985: 254). Comprehensible, a response to the question of who we are is: we are homeless. As Harries notes, "we cannot really be at home in the world as long as we fail to accept that we are wayfarers, nowhere fully at home" (Harries 1998: 166). In becoming aware of our homelessness, we become aware of our constant tendency to flee into false homes and false identities, away from the true home. To be genuinely at home in this world, we have to affirm our essential homelessness illuminated by shifting ideals of genuine dwelling (Harries 1998:200). Being thus authentic is not an overcoming of homelessness. It is, rather, a living with homelessness.

At this point it is appropriate to single out another important aporia, which is a product of architectural theory and which concerns the relation between

modernity and dwelling. Contrary to all anti-modern readings, Heidegger's focus on dwelling does not return us to some pre-modern utopia in which the uncertainties of modernity can be laid to rest. Although late Heidegger's writing is routinely treated as expressive of a nostalgic desire for home in the midst of the homelessness of modernity, there is almost nothing in his essays that presents dwelling as exclusively tied to the rural or to the past. Malpas has shown that the claim that Heidegger's account of dwelling is specifically rural and dissociated from, even opposed to, modernity cannot readily be supported by his essays (Malpas 2021: 41). In BDT Heidegger writes:

However hard and bitter, however hampering and threatening the lack of houses remains, the real plight of dwelling does not lie merely in a lack of houses. The real plight of dwelling is indeed older than the world wars with their destruction, older also than the increase of the earth's population and the condition of the industrial workers (Heidegger 1971: 159).

This quote can be viewed as a reply to Adorno's already mentioned claim from *Minima Moralia* stating that the house is past after World War II. Heidegger talks about the plight of dwelling as an ancient one. So, although the plight of dwelling, or homelessness, is a plight that is experienced today, it is specifically not a plight that belongs to this time, to modernity or the contemporary world alone. It is the homelessness that has always been and always will be a part of human being.

Questioning Being: Capacity to be Mortal

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger linked authenticity to a resolute appropriation and affirmation of our mortality. His concept of authenticity is above all a conception of the first-person perspective and its irreducibility to any other person's point of view. One crucial way in which that structural difference manifests itself is in our understanding of death. This iteration brings us back to the well-known dichotomy between authenticity as resoluteness in the face of one's finitude and inauthenticity as alienation from the inevitability of one's own death. For Heidegger, the authentic relation to death involves not being in denial, but instead recognizing the certainty of death. From here we can follow up on the previous thesis about homelessness as an indication of the oblivion of Being and continue in the direction of the interpretation of homelessness as an indication of an inauthentic understanding of death. When talking of homelessness, late Heidegger suggests that we not only find it difficult but have become altogether unable to dwell because we have become incapable of really dying (Harries 1998: 224). Such homelessness is manifest in the failure of mortals to grasp their own being as mortals. In "What are Poets for?" Heidegger is writing about this constant negation of death which produces inauthentic life. He believes that the time remains destitute because mortals are hardly aware and capable even of their own mortality.

Mortals have not yet come into ownership of their own nature. Death withdraws into the enigmatic. (...) Even those sides of life that are averted from us must, insofar as they are, be taken positively. Death is the side of life that is averted from us, unilluminated by us. Death and the realm of the dead belong to the whole of beings as its other side (Heidegger 1971: 94, 122).

This attempt to illuminate the positive side of death is deepened by Heidegger in “The Thing”, where he speaks of overcoming the thought of death as entry into an empty nothing.

Death is the shrine of Nothing, that is, of that which in every respect is never something that merely exists, but which nevertheless presences, even as the mystery of Being itself. As the shrine of Nothing, death harbors within itself the presencing of Being. As the shrine of Nothing, death is the shelter of Being. We now call mortals mortals – not because their earthly life comes to an end, but because they are capable of death as death (Heidegger 1971: 176).

Therefore, death is the other side of Being, just like homelessness is the other side of dwelling. Mortals cannot be truly mortals until they surrender and affirm their mortality, until they are capable of death as death. Heidegger in BDT speaks exactly of that capability as the capacity to dwell.

Mortals dwell in that they initiate their own nature – their being capable of death as death – into the use and practice of this capacity, so that there may be a good death. To initiate mortals into the nature of death in no way means to make death, as empty Nothing, the goal (Heidegger 1971: 148-149).

In respect to this, Young develops the conception of an ultimate security, where the notion of security covers the entire terminological domain that Heidegger used in the sense of safeguarding, protecting, preserving, sparing, cherishing, looking after, and caring for. For us, Young’s conception will be of particular significance because it provides another cross-section through both early and late Heidegger’s thinking about what is authentic in the sense of dwelling. In *Being and Time*, Young recalls, the source of our homelessness is anxiety in the face of death, that is, the nothing (Young 2000: 189). That is why early Heidegger concludes that security, being safe in the world or, as he calls it, dwelling, is impossible, thus making insecurity (*unheimlichkeit*, not being at home) an essential feature of *Dasein* (Young 2006: 526). However, if we take a moment to return to late Heidegger, we will find the opposite – that the human essence is to be in the world as in a dwelling-place (Young 2002: 63). To dwell is to be in a free place where one is protected and preserved from harm and danger. To dwell means to experience oneself as safe in, cared-for by, the dwelling-place. To dwell is to experience oneself as, in spite of the risks and dangers, in some ultimate sense secure. Dwelling, then, is security – precisely what is excluded by *Being and Time*. And *vice versa*, the insecurity is understood by late Heidegger as incompatible with, as the opposite of, dwelling (Young 2000: 189). We experience ourselves as essentially insecure and hence fail to

experience our world as a place of safety, as a dwelling place (Young 2000: 193). Clearly, when speaking of the ultimate threat to one's security, Young is pointing to death; but only to "death understood in a negative way, as terror, the abyss of annihilation, horror at the void, nothingness" (Young 2002: 64-65).

Accordingly, Young's conclusion is: if one experiences oneself as ultimately secure, then one experiences oneself as secure even in the face of death. Indications of his conception of confronting death not with the shadow of terror but rather with equanimity can also be traced in other important Heidegger's scholars. Zimmerman notes that when we are at home with our mortality, we no longer have to be enemies of the pain, loss, and death. If we no longer identify ourselves with the ego that craves security and gratification, we do not have to resist what things are (Zimmerman 1985: 254). Dreyfus underlines that if *Dasein* accepted its nullity, the same structure that seemed to threaten all its secure projects and its very identity would be seen to be challenging and liberating (Dreyfus 1995: 317).

We will assess and compare Young's premises through the two perspectives from which we consider anxiety's influence. In the first perspective, if *Angst* is interpreted in an inauthentic manner, as a constant threat to one's existence, *Dasein* flees in fear from anxiety's disturbing effects to the safety and familiarity of the status quo, repressing the knowledge of his own mortality (Magrini 2006: 85). Though by evading a direct confrontation we evade the terror of death, the knowledge remains and, consequently, our lives are riddled by anxiety. As a result, to avoid the terror of blindly staring towards the end, life becomes the anxiety of evasion (Young 2002: 118). This view can be simplified in following Zimmerman's sentence: "because we are unwilling to accept our mortality, we cannot be fully alive" (Zimmerman 1985: 251). Of course, anxiety is inconsistent with security, so such a life can never possess the absolute security which, Heidegger holds, is the hallmark of dwelling. That leads us to the second perspective: if *Angst* is perceived as the bridge to a unique form of understanding, which connects *Dasein* to the finite realities of its being in the world, then as opposed to prefiguring horror and passivity, anxiety announces itself, as the harbinger of *Dasein's* authentic enactment of freedom for its possibilities (Magrini 2006: 85).

This final comparative analysis of anxiety and dwelling observed through the prism of death and care gives us two options. In terms of early Heidegger's concept of anxiety, we obtained: authentic resoluteness into death *versus* inauthentic fleeing into average worldly distractions. In terms of late Heidegger's dwelling, we have gotten: accepting and taking care of mortality as being at home in the essential sense *versus* evading mortality and remaining in the state of false safety and familiarity. Therefore, to become at home, meaning to be authentic, requires overcoming fear in the face of death, and eventually to be capable of the good death. As Zimmerman accurately sums up: "because we are essentially mortal, learning to be at home means accepting mortality" (Zimmerman 1985: 254). *Vice versa*: learning to be mortal is the essence

of dwelling. This is a key thesis on which we intend to linger and which will serve us as the guideline for the derivation of conclusions.

Conclusion: Authenticity as Caring for Death

There is an important point in Heidegger's thinking overlooked by both his architectural apologists and critics. Overly tied to the glorification or disavowing of the concept of place, they have all failed to give attention to the aspect of time. In saying so, we do not aim at the banal space-time switch that would pivot the locus of attention to the problem of time exclusively. It is clear that the valuable role of place in Heidegger cannot be put into question. Nonetheless, it is also not suitable to propose a unilateral equalization of being in the world with being in space, as done by Norberg-Schulz, when he writes that "man as being in the world (*Dasein*) implies that man cannot be understood in isolation from his environment", or when he exalts spatiality as "a property of being in the world" (Norberg-Schulz 1979: 35; 1983: 65). We can already find discrete signs of this trajectory of thought in Harries and Benjamin.

Heidegger made homelessness constitutive of human being. First of all, and most of the time, we have lost ourselves to the world into which we have been cast. Into this state of lostness breaks the silent call of conscience, which, calling from far away, calls us beyond the world, back to ourselves. But in calling us back in ourselves, conscience does not call us to a specific place (Harries 1998: 203).

In the foreword of Sharr's book *Heidegger's Hut*, Benjamin reminds us of one detail by which, almost in the guise of an autobiography, Heidegger notes: "Strictly speaking I myself never observe the landscape. I experience its hourly changes, day and night, in the great comings and goings of the seasons." From Benjamin's perspective, this passage, quoted by Sharr, is central to any understanding of Heidegger's philosophical project (Benjamin 2006: xviii). Therefore, in accordance with the presumed hypotheses, the first key theme is revealed: how the house (or its architecture, or simply – home) represents the passing of time and, of course, mortality as the integral and highlighted part of this passing.

Just like the spatial aspect in architectural theory overcame Heidegger's notion of time, something similar has happened to another neglected aspect – that of care. As shown so far in this paper, the authentic being in the world that Heidegger associated with dwelling is presented as not primarily a matter of being in space at all, but rather of familiarity with, preservation and of looking after, taking care. Our capacities to relate intimately to and care for our world are that kind of poetic sensitivity which forms the foundation of what Heidegger calls dwelling.

We hitherto know that the building that is undertaken on the basis of our proper dwelling is a building that allows for such dwelling and so allows for the gathering of the fourfold. As Benjamin notes, what was let dwell had to do

with the role of mortals within the fourfold (Benjamin 2000:239). In that sense, the broader logic of the fourfold indicates that there are particular times, places, and things that can help us recall our mortality by calling to us as mortals. Among these are the spaces and things associated with dying and the dead. Heidegger's fullest description of assembling the fourfold in an architectural sense is his famous account of the Black Forest farmhouse.

Let us think for a while of a farmhouse in the Black Forest, which was built some two hundred years ago by the dwelling of peasants. Here the self-sufficiency of the power to let earth, heaven, divinities and mortals enter in simple oneness into things, ordered the house. It placed the farm on the wind-sheltered mountain slope looking south, among the meadows close to the spring. It gave it the wide overhanging shingle roof whose proper slope bears up under the burden of snow, and which, reaching deep down, shields the chambers against the storms of the long winter nights. It did not forget the altar corner behind the community table; it made room in its chamber for the hallowed places of childbed and the "tree of the dead"—for that is what they call a coffin there: the *Totenbaum*—and in this way it designed for the different generations under one roof the character of their journey through time (Heidegger 1971: 157-158).

The farmhouse has been built in the temporal rhythm of seasons, of the passing generations, of birth and death. The farmhouse traced its residents' understanding of their physical situation, denoted by the building's particular relationship with weather and seasons, configured with respect to sun, snow, and wind; and also their broader situation, paced out in routines of daily existence (Sharr 2007: 67-68). Its residents marked out their mortality through rites of passage between birth and death. They made certain special locations in the house where celebrations of the passing of years, and of birth and death in particular, might take place (Sharr 2007: 69). Building and dwelling circle is here understood as a thoughtfulness of our temporality, with an emphasis on the way the farmhouse gives room to death.

Since mortals cannot be initiated into their true nature unless death is allowed to be seen – to become a topic – conserving the natural appearances of death in life is a necessary precondition for such initiation (Young 2002: 118). Indeed, making space for such hallowed things in a home is part of what renders a building a proper dwelling place, and not merely a domicile. Heidegger makes reference to the juxtaposed presence of childbed and coffin corner (*Totenbaum*) with the suggestion that they are constant reminders of the specifically temporal character of human existence and, in particular, the death that awaits us all. Especially the *Totenbaum* has the power to evoke an authentic remembrance of mortality. It is a constant reminder of lives ultimately lived toward death and a presence reminding the family of ancestors whose lives culminated there (Sharr 2007: 69).

Heidegger shows that to properly dwell as mortals, we must, quite literally, invite death into our homes. If building is to let us dwell, that is, as the mortals we are, we must grant death its place. In order to arrive at this final analysis,

the essay performed a series of interpretations, in attempt to consistently keep up with Heidegger's project. The focus was on the question of authenticity, which Zimmerman boldly formulated through the question of *who we are*. This most potent question has two equal answers connected in a hermeneutical circle. The first answer is: we are homeless. We can come home only if and when we accept who we are. For that is when we are close to Being. To come home and be close to Being means to think authentically of Being as Being. A requisite for authentic thinking of Being as Being offers a second answer: we are mortals. We are mortals because Being is mortal. To think authentically of Being as Being means to authentically accept mortality. We are homeless because we have forgotten being as our home. Once again, Being is mortal. This means that we have forgotten our mortality. We are mortals, and we dwell in our mortality because death is our last home.

This conclusion represents at least a satisfactory resolution of the question of authenticity, as the main question that this essay was concerned with. Authenticity denotes a certain type of existence that is more originary, more thoughtful than everyday living, just like dwelling poetically is a certain type of existence that is far removed from mundane distractions. This should be allowed within the fourfold, as the manifest grasped in conjunction with the hidden side of reality, in short, to Being (Young 2002: 17). Exactly this was the project of *Being and Time* – to use anxiety for clearing aside the inauthenticity of the everyday in order to reveal the essential character of Being. In anxiety, a person's individuality is brought home. Dwelling in this view presupposes authentic being towards death from *Being and Time*. At last, reaching authenticity always leads through caring for death or evading death, which is a unifying stance for both early and late Heidegger.

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Preispitivanje Hajdegerovog poimanja autentičnosti u arhitektonskoj teoriji: Između strepnje i pesničkog stanovanja

Apstrakt

Tekst se bavi refleksijama filozofije Martina Hajdegera unutar arhitektonske teorije, sa posebnim osvrtom na poimanje autentičnosti koje se sagledava kroz duboku asimetriju između strepnje i pesničkog stanovanja. Polazeći od fenomenoloških pozicija, arhitektonski afirmatori Hajdegera postuliraju koncept autentičnog stanovanja kao pesničke alternative navodno pretećem stanju otuđenja i obezdomljenosti koje teskobno vreme modernosti donosi sa sobom. Sa druge strane, kritičari poststrukturalističke i neomarksističke provenijencije to tumačenje odbacuju kao nostalgичni eskapizam u predmodernom, romantičarsko i mitsko okrilje sigurnosti doma, koje je potpuno strano savremenom metropolitanskom načinu života. Tako je celokupna debata svedena na površno suprotstavljnje odomaćenog stanovanja i strepnje pred naletom nečega otuđujućeg. Da bi se ovaj polarizovani diskurs arhitektonske teorije prevazišao, neophodno je razjasniti šta Hajdeger zapravo podrazumeva pod pojmom autentičnosti. Međutim, razmatranja ne bi trebalo ograničiti samo na autentičnost, već ih proširiti i na ostale međusobno povezane pojmove: otuđenje, strepnju, stanovanje i obezdomljenost. Pritom je potrebno uzeti u obzir da sam Hajdeger sve ove pojmove tretira neistovetno u svojoj ranoj i kasnoj fazi. Diskusija konstruiše presek tumačenja arhitektonske teorije i filozofije

na temu pomenutih koncepata, izveden kroz uporednu analizu *Bića i vremena* iz Hajdegerovog ranog perioda, i eseja sakupljenih u zbirci *Poezija, jezik, misao*, koji ovaploćuju njegovu kasnu misao. U svetlu ovakvog preispitivanja, argumentacija je usmerena ka dva pojma koji nijansiraju, ako ne i konfluiraju, naizgled protivrečno mišljenje ranog i kasnog Hajdegera. U pitanju su pojmovi smrtnosti i brige, koji bi mogli da razjasne dileme koje okupiraju razne arhitektonske čitaoce Hajdegera.

Ključne reči: Martin Hajdeger, autentičnost, strepnja, stanovanje, obezdomljenost, otuđenost, smrtnost, briga