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SEMINAR ON TIZIANA ANDINA'S BOOK *A PHILOSOPHY FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS*

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In this short lecture I will try to say something about the book you have read and something new, because I am still developing some thoughts on the subject. We can start by explaining the concept of transgenerationality. I have proposed to social ontology and social philosophy to include the concept of transgenerationality in their tools of analysis. This will make it possible to look at the question of transgenerationality from a fundamental and not just a moral perspective, as is often the case.

If you look at the specialised literature on transgenerationality, you will find that most of the interesting studies come from moral theorists and moral philosophers. So the question of transgenerationality is now a question of justice. I am trying to establish some kind of ontological and metaphysical foundation to give philosophy a more solid basis. I propose to look at transgenerationality as a constraint that manifests itself in various forms in both natural and social spheres. Both are important, but today I will try to say something, especially about the social sphere, which manifests itself in a certain kind of action that I call "transgenerational social action".

So I want to introduce three metaphysical principles. It is important to explain this idea, because I think that philosophers usually presuppose a metaphysical and ontological background as a prerequisite.

First principle: Being exists and is preferable to non-being in most circumstances.

The principle is of course not neutral and concerns metaphysics. Indeed, there is an extensive literature, even recent literature, arguing that non-being is preferable to being. However, it starts from a realistic observation: Life exists, and the idea is that it is necessary to create the conditions that serve to sustain it. Otherwise, people would live in increasingly poorer conditions and the degree of suffering to which they are exposed would increase.

Second principle: The human species recognises the existence of a transgenerational bond.

This bond is biological in nature and takes on a social structure, is recognised and supports the progress of the species. The second principle concerned ontology and recognised the existence of a bond of a biological nature between individuals of the same species, which occurs, for example, in the traditional family context. Whereby the traditional context within the union of a man and a woman - which is what we are concerned with in our case – leads to procreation. In non-traditional family contexts, in homogeneous extended families or adoptive families, on the other hand, it can be either biological or social, as in the case of families that express parenthood through adoption. The transgenerational bond can be observed above all when it breaks down, leading to the phenomenon of the replacement child: the child who replaces a sibling who died at an early age and whose present absence and experience is depicted by many artists such as Van Gogh, Dali or, for example, philosophers such as Jacques Derrida. The transgenerational bond is structured as a caring relationship. It should be noted that the human species has been able to recreate and make more complex the dynamics that arise in the familial sphere, taking it beyond the limited nucleus of the family to become the central hub of social life.

Third principle: it concerns time and can be summarised as "the rule of time".

According to this rule, time is at least as important as space. From a phenomenological point of view, perceived time can be divided into two types. Short-term on the one hand, medium or long-term on the other. Human emotions are primarily oriented towards ensuring survival. They are therefore oriented towards short-term temporality. This is recognised by psychologists and cognitivists, for example. However, some emotions are oriented towards the survival of the species and the satisfaction of needs in the social sphere. In these cases, they relate to medium and long-term temporality. Therefore, of the three temporal dimensions, past, present and future, the future must also be understood as the final cause. The future is a necessary condition for transgenerational action. Transgenerational action cannot take place outside a long-term horizon.

Ultimately, I believe that the decision to favour transgenerational acts as behaviours is a competitive advantage for the human species, which uses transgenerationality much more consciously and systematically than other animal species in general. Examples of widespread transgenerational practises within our species include education, the development of humanistic and scientific knowledge, social and political institutions. It naturally follows that the more we succeed in strengthening transgenerational social structures and the more we succeed in promoting behaviour that is oriented towards transgenerational logic, the more we will follow the evolution of the human species in its quest for greater intergenerational justice.

As I said earlier, social transgenerationality is a connection that emerges in a set of social and institutional practises. More precisely, in a particular type of social action, namely transgenerational social action. Transgenerational social action is characterised by the fact that it requires the cooperation of at least

two generations. One of the two decides to carry out the action, which has a transgenerational character, while the second has the task of continuing and possibly completing this action. The central theoretical point of transgenerational social actions lies in the fact that the subsequent generation that completes the transgenerational action generally does not have the opportunity to consent to the action beforehand. The critical point of this structure is that the generation that decides on a transgenerational action cannot require other, usually future, generations to consent to the action.

Material impossibility, however, does not exclude that from an ethical point of view, this type of action, if undertaken, should not include the adoption of spatial precaution towards future generation. I define as transgenerational those actions that require necessarily the cooperation between two or more different generations, one which is usually a future generation. Transgenerational action can be directed to our future, to the future and toward the past. When directed to the past, they refer to entities such as ancestors, some who existed and no longer exist. When directed to the future, they refer to future generation, the young or the unborn. All these cases must be treated in different ways from the ontological point of view. Theoretically speaking, the much more interesting group for a lot of reasons is the group of the unborn.

Since the concept of social action between generations refers in many cases to the concept of generation, it is necessary to make an ontological determination in order to define the kind of entity we are talking about when we speak of generation – past and future. Past and future generations are, in my opinion, abstract artefacts. They are partially or fully constructed objects. In particular, the concept of ancestors (past generations) is weakly dependent on the subject that constructs it and strongly dependent on history, while the concept of future generation is weakly dependent on history and strongly dependent on the subject that constructs the concept. We therefore analyse the concept of future generation in the sense that it includes the unborn and not the young.

I propose to consider the future generation as a particular abstract artefact. At a certain stage of their existence, they have the same characteristics as Donald Duck, for example. And more generally as fictional entities. But unlike Donald Duck, the future generation is a being that will exist sooner or later. This means that they have the property of acting or being influenced by power, or that they add the property of existence to their description. My thesis is that we have introduced these kinds of beings into the realm of social reality because they have a special function in directing actions towards the future. The future generation will enter into the dynamics of transgenerational action by continuing and completing the action. In other words, without reference to future generations, the intergenerational social action that is necessary for the continued existence of our societies would not be possible. So, we need the future generation. We need this fictitious concept. In other words, trust sets psychological mechanisms in motion at a societal level. And we know that trust is not only a normative concept, but also a useful concept for the organisation of society.

In general, there are at least two types of attitudes towards the future generation. Under certain circumstances, we shift the burden of decisions or measures that should be taken in the present onto the future generation. This is the case, for example, with measures to mitigate the climate crisis. In other cases, we oblige future generations to take measures that bind them to the decisions of previous generations. This is the case, for example, with the reduction of national debt.

Incidentally, I mentioned the climate crisis and national debt because we naturally find this type of action, intergenerational action, in certain areas of our social activities. Typically, these are activities where generations or different people in different places and at different times have to work together, such as the climate crisis or constructive sovereign debt. In both cases, we are prioritising the needs of the present rather than addressing the situation, which is more multi-layered and complex. This is particularly the case when we oblige future generations to take measures resulting from the decisions of those who preceded them.

From a moral perspective, however, the shared commitment to intergenerational action through callbacks to the future generation binds the actor of intergenerational action to the shared goal of passing on the action and promoting conditions that ensure the possibility of the existence of future generations. This is my central theoretical point, which derives from the first principle, the metaphysical principle, which I mentioned at the very beginning of the presentation.

We can refer to historical examples to understand my model. The example I mentioned on this slide is a very famous exchange between two of the fathers of the American Constitution. It's Jefferson and Madison, who did a lot of thinking during the drafting of the American Constitution. And the interesting thing is that Jefferson raised this very point with Madison, the point of the problem of the permanence of society over time from a similar perspective to the idea that I'm trying to convey to you today. Jefferson, who was overwhelmed with the debt his family had left behind, emphasises to Madison the importance of preventing the same thing from happening to the states. Remember the problem of national debt that I mentioned.

"The land", is his motto, "must remain with the living". To achieve this, he proposes that every new generation should have its debts cancelled and the constitution rewritten. That's a bit radical, if you like. In order to free himself from the ties to his father and to have the opportunity to directly choose the text that forms the basis of the political community. He therefore proposed the model of a society that would last a generation. Madison's response was sharp and very clear. He explained that such a society would be both materially impossible and unjust, and he was right. Jefferson proposed a solution that is unworkable, but the point he was proposing, which is based on what we call "false attribution of consent," remains open. That's the idea that future generations agree to pay the debt or other things. What you want is for the previous

generation to express consent to end the intergenerational social action of incurring a particular debt. This is the open question.

This kind of assumption is, philosophically speaking, something we can define as a principle of uniformity, and you can think about Jefferson's assumption in the terms I want to suggest here. This practise exposes itself to Hume's argument known as the principle of uniformity, which the philosopher formulates in the context of his critique of induction. To summarise, we can describe the uniformity argument applied to transgenerational action as follows: we have established that the complex actions of medium duration that we have labelled transgenerational social actions have a typical structure. They are decided and carried out by an alpha generation and continued and completed by the beta, gamma and delta generations, depending on the temporal extension of the action in question. Transgenerational actions initiated by an alpha generation are continued and completed by other generations - the beta, gamma and delta generations, and indeed by all generations that are functional in relation to the temporal extension of the action performed by alpha. For example, if we turn to the question of the national debt accumulated by a state, which is a classic example of transgenerational action, we will have the following type of argument.

We have established that the national debt of a certain alpha generation living in a state S is partly repaid by alpha and partly by the beta, gamma and delta generations living in certain states. The national debt of a particular generation living in a particular state is partly repaid by that generation and the following generation. This is how generations work in terms of the time it takes to repay the debt of a particular state. You can imagine a similar example, which I will not describe here, for the case of the climate crisis. Now, not only does this influence generalise the experience of debt repayment through a series of steps that imply the necessary link between debtors and descendants, but it also leads to the conclusion that intergenerational relationships enforce the assumption of debt across generations. Future generations have no choice but to assume the obligation to pay the debts of those who lived before them. So there is no other reason than the empirical one. That is the point of why future generations should take on the intergenerational obligation. It is to be expected that any other decision would lead to war, misery or environmental catastrophe. But it is not an authority of reason to follow what would otherwise be a necessity, namely to do what the previous generation chose to do.

What we have said gives rise to the principle of *transgenerational responsibility*. Intergenerational justice can be achieved by applying the principle of transgenerational responsibility, which is a necessary condition for its pursuit. This principle can be formulated as follows.

Metaphysical premise: Life exists, and in general it is worth protecting its possibility.

Ontological premise: There is a boundary between generations, the transgenerational bond that unites them by establishing rights and duties within transgenerational relations.

Observation: Transgenerational action has a special structure that ensures the necessary co-operation between the generations so that a certain action can be carried out. This cooperation is characterised by the constitutive lack of reciprocity. Especially between the supposed initial generation and the unborn.

Conclusion. Given the metaphysical and ontological premises, we must conclude that social action that has a transgenerational character must preserve the right of the future generation to exist.

Just a few words to recapitulate what I have introduced here. We have seen that the transgenerational society is based on certain principles, namely the existence of life and its preservation, the recognition of the transgenerational relationship on a biological and sociological level, the rule of time and the principle of transgenerational responsibility. We have thus seen that transgenerationality comes into its own above all in transgenerational action. This action can be orientated towards both the past and the future. Future-orientated transgenerational action implies reference to a specific type of being: future generations. Future generations can be regarded as abstract artefacts that have the property of attaining existence. They will actually exist at a certain point in time. Transgenerational acts directed towards the past refer to beings that have already existed, namely the ancestors. Recourse to past and future generations implies a certain degree of reconstructive and interpretative activity: rather limited in relation to the past, much more radical in relation to future generations. And I would like to emphasise the connection with the last part of Maurizio [Ferraris]'s talk yesterday. One of the exemplary qualities that characterise human beings is that they are oriented towards shaping the future. Furthermore, intergenerational social action can concretise the question of how, for example through which legal instruments, future generations and their interests can be represented. This is a particularly exciting problem on the political side, and I think it is possible to develop some considerations to suggest to politicians, for example, how they can move on this side. Since political representation implies an activity of "construction" of the represented subjects, it is plausible to assume the possibility of representing the interests of future generations.

PETAR BOJANIĆ
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First, I'd like to thank Tiziana. I have worked for many years with her. She's an institutionalist, as I think I am. We work at and work on different institutions, but I can say that because she's been the head of a very important center and editor-in-chief of a well-known journal, etc., – Tiziana has worked for a long time with others, all the while thematizing joint work (since she teaches social ontology, as do I), that is, in one way or another, with other people, Tiziana produces collective acts.

How come the topic of this book and why is it important from an ontological perspective? To what extent is my or our activity determined by the future or those who are not yet present (groups of people yet to come), those

who will only at some future date be present together and act together? I have written about the importance of those not (yet) present or the importance for the group or the institution of those not present (but who exist). Tiziana goes further, speaking as she does about those who are yet to come or will need to be here, which is different.

But I think an important word here is corruption. We have the great French revolutionary and institutionalist Saint-Just speaking of corruption. And the institution protects from corruption in two ways. One is the preservation of the institutions of the revolution. The other is that we are human, bodily, corruptive in the Aristotelian sense, while the institutions have to outlast us. But that means that transgenerational social acts that lie in all institutions have to take corruption into account. For they have to outlast us who generate them, us who are corruptive, because bodily.

The generational in transgenerational is how we collectively produce social acts, but in addition to us needing to protect them from outside corruption, they have to be protected from our own corruption, that is, they have to be produced such that they outlast those who made them and protect them from the outside.

And then we have the word 'trans'. 'Trans' is something beyond, but already in generation. We have a 'trans', something that emerges. And that means that there may be something opposite to generation. There is always something additional: hence, the future, and the future such that it protects from inevitable human corruption (again, I mean this in the Aristotelian sense).

How does this relate to gender? I am not entirely sure. Because this is not something that is produced through collective action. Are generation and gender different in that one implies something, it goes beyond, while the other not? I do not know.

Perhaps we turn to the idea of projects to projection. For me, there is no future without a project, without projective acts. To project means to cast something. This too is a generational act, to cast something forward. And without this act, there can be no future. There is no future without projecting, without collective social acts. I thought that generation is when acts are produced among us; in the course of producing acts (together), we are generating something. And that means already something beyond is introduced, we are already on this path upon which something more exists.

ALEKSANDRA KNEŽEVIĆ
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In her book, *A Philosophy for Future Generations* (2022), Andina aims to resolve a puzzling issue about the persistence of social institutions. Her strategy consists of illuminating how social institutions are formed synchronically and diachronically, that is, how they are distributed in space and through time. In order to particularly understand "the propensity of societies to extend in time", Andina introduces the concept of a *transgenerational bond* or *transgenerationality*. As she postulates, a transgenerational bond is formed of a biological bond

that unites a generation of people and of a bond that unites, as she writes, "the passage of generations from a historical point of view" (p. 3). More specifically, Andina introduces the concepts of *primary* and *secondary transgenerationality*. The primary transgenerationality (or the biological bond) is the bond that extends in space and connects people through their blood relations and "in the shadows of trauma". The secondary transgenerationality, the one that unites passages of generations, is a more crucial and more perplexing bond. It emerges due to the transgenerational social action, which connects people diachronically, through time, and which, according to Andina, requires "cooperation between different generations to be effectively accomplished" (p. 3).

Interestingly, from the very beginning of her book, Andina explains the ethical and social relevance of the philosophical endeavor in which she partakes. Namely, as she writes, the issue of transgenerationality is not merely the problem of how the transgenerational bond is formed. In other words, it is not only an issue in social ontology. This question, initially ontological, transitions into an ethical one that asks whether the duties of current societies and their members ought to be shaped by the rights of future generations. To put it differently, the question is simple, and do not mind me posing it in a suggestive manner: shouldn't we – the current, present generation united by biological bonds and social action – protect natural resources, which are already scarce enough and unequally distributed, so that in the future clean air, drinking water, and fertile soil could be accessible to all living creatures? The issue of the climate crisis is one of the examples Andina devotes the ending parts of her book to illustrate the real-life social implications of failing to discuss and provide an understanding proper to the ontological nature of a transgenerational bond.

In this short commentary, I will address an issue I find personally interesting regarding Andina's understanding of the primary transgenerationality.

According to Andina, the most straightforward form of primary transgenerationality includes a biological bond between parents and their offspring. This bond gives a stable foundation for building societies, considering that family forms the most fundamental social structure. It is thus usually taken for granted in the sense that it does not require further explanation. However, Andina goes a step further to ask how a transgenerational bond expands outside the family and blood relations. In answering this question, she argues that the primary transgenerationality is formed not only by a biological but also by a psychological bond, which emerges due to the generational transmission of trauma, suffering, loss, and painful emotions. Interestingly, Andina argues that this psychological transfer of meaning behind the traumatic events is due to the specific aspects of our environments which are intentionally or not constructed to embody and materialize this meaning. Therefore, unlike other theories in social ontology which require, as Andina nicely frames it, "surplus ontological commitments" (p.10), her perspective offers a simpler and a more sophisticated account of a bond that unites a generation of people.

I would like to raise some issues regarding the very basic aspect of primary transgenerationality. Namely, without disagreeing that family is the most

fundamental social structure across cultures and societies, I wonder whether families are tied only via blood relations. A cultural anthropologist, Marshall Sahlins, famously argued against understanding non-Western cultures through Westernized scientific lenses. In other words, he argued against what he saw as an ethnocentric projection of Western cultural assumptions to other cultures in the name of describing and understanding them. In his book, *The Use and Abuse of Biology* (1976), Sahlins discusses the ways in which kin relations are formed in non-Western cultures. At the time of his writing, a widely held assumption among Western anthropologists was that kin relations *should* be founded on blood relations and that if there are cultures in which this is not the case, this only serves to show that these cultures are less developed than Western cultures (in which this pattern is allegedly present). In order to argue against this view, Sahlins offered a rich plethora of cases to demonstrate diverse ways in which kin relations are made outside of Western cultures, which do not follow the "blood is thicker than water" logic.

To uncover the nature of kinship, in his later work, Sahlins (2011) introduces the term "mutuality of being". *Mutuality of being* exists among kins "who are intrinsic to one another's existence" (Sahlins 2011: 2). In other words, "kinsmen are people who live each other's lives and die each other's death. To the extent they lead common lives, they partake of each other's sufferings and joys, sharing one another's experience even as they take responsibility for and feel the effects of each other's acts" (Sahlins 2011: 14). Therefore, the notion of *mutuality of being* assumes that shared life conditions, shared memories, and time spent together are some among many factors that constitute kinship since unlike *biological kinship,* which is constituted by procreation, *performative kinship* is the consequence of the cumulative processes of mutual care among kins.

Granted, Andina's argument about the nature of social institutions does not need to claim universality. After all, most social institutions are local in their character, specific to particular cultures and societies. Therefore, it seems that pointing out diverse cross-cultural ways of how kinship is made (and thus how families are formed) is irrelevant to the claims Andina makes. At this point, I ask two things. First, is it truly the case that in Western cultures families are founded on blood relations? Second, regardless of what we think the answer to the first question is, I wonder: could Sahlins' insights about the nature of kinship as *mutuality of being* illuminate some important aspects of both the primary and secondary transgenerationality?

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MAURIZIO FERARRIS
University of Turin

My question is simpler. During your presentation, you told about a relation between 2 entities, a present generation and a future generation, and the future generation is a generation that does not exist yet. So, is it possible? A relation between something which is existing and something which is not existing? Maybe it would be better to speak about the intention or the purpose of creating a relation. But, *per se*, there is not a relation between this and this, because this does not exist.

REPLY TO PETAR BOJANIĆ

I am very grateful for your comment on the question of corruption, because I must confess that I have not dealt with it. If I understand you correctly, you are addressing two different types of possible corruption that need to be considered in the philosophy of transgenerationality, the project I am trying to develop. The corruption of life and political corruption.

I have to say that the question of political corruption probably is at the background of my research, because if I have to answer to the question: "why did you talk about the transgenerationality?" I would say because in Italy we had a lot of public debt which came from political corruption. And that was my starting point about all of this.

As you probably know, in Italy, young women who had been working in the public sector for several years were able to retire just after the age of forty, thanks to the so-called "Rumor law". This law was very damaging to the state's finances, because it did not take into account the problems of pension sustainability and the fact that it created the conditions for many young women to leave the world of work, to their detriment and to the country's development. In other words, this measure was clearly against sustainability and intergenerational equity. It should be noted that the entire parliament, including the opposition, voted in favour of this measure because it was obviously a short-term electoral consensus.

REPLY TO ALEKSANDRA KNEŽEVIĆ

Thank you for your questions and comments, both of which are very interesting.

I will try to answer them in the following way. Traditional family, i.e., the stable union between a man and a woman that can lead to the birth of children, was the nucleus of Western societies, because European marriage guaranteed the continuity of lineage and, by patrilineal means, of inheritance. In this sense, the traditional family was both a political and an affective nucleus. This does not mean that there cannot be stable relationships that deviate from this model and are based, for example, on the practice of care, i.e., the obligation of mutual care between members of the relationship. Of course, the commitment to

care - if it is generally recognised and normalised - can also enable intergenerational practices, which can be informal or formal in nature. In other words, I have nothing against the idea that family is an institution that can be organised either on a natural basis (if the term is understood in its broadest and most inclusive sense) or on a social basis, as in the case of a stable relationship between two friends who decide to live together in a mutual caring relationship.

REPLY TO MAURIZIO FERRARIS

You are right, strictly speaking it seems to be a strange relationship. So the question seems to be: Is it possible to have a relationship with something that does not exist or no longer exists? Do we have a relationship with our ancestors or with future generations? I think so, although these are special forms of relationships: they are not relationships of synchronous exchange, but relationships in which one part is absent. Ancestors have left traces in documents, books and research, and we relate to these traces. The identity of the unborn will emerge both from the world we leave them and from how we think about them. Today's generations, especially those with political power, relate to each other and to the spirits, the generations that have been and those that are yet to come. Ghosts - as Shakespeare wisely teaches us - somehow exist, at least in the sense that they have the power to determine our actions.

Maurizio Ferraris: I would not speak of a relationship, but of a cultural obligation that our species has towards future generations. Animals are not concerned with the future generation, they make the future generation, but they do not care. They can also eat future generations if they need something, including humans. Therefore, the idea of a relationship is a little misleading and becomes clearer in the cover note if you are a human whose definition includes caring about future generation. If you do not care, then you are not human. Hitler, for example, decided at the last moment of the Second World War that he did not care about the Germans because they were losing, and in that sense he was not a human being.

Tiziana Andina. Thank you for your observation: from my point of view, the relationship grounds the obligation. It is because there is a relationship that the obligation becomes legitimate. Otherwise it would be a cultural option that, in principle, depends on people's good hearts and intelligence.

TAMARA PLEĆAŠ

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Firstly, I would like to express my great pleasure in participating in this seminar. I truly enjoyed your book and gained valuable insights from it. As my primary focus in philosophy revolves around Stoicism and Hellenistic philosophy, I couldn't help but notice some connections between Stoic philosophy and the ideas you presented mostly in the first part of your book entitled 'Anthropology: Transgenerationality and Recognition'.

Notably, Spinoza was influenced by Stoicism. Stoic ethics, with its universalistic approach and advocacy for cosmopolitanism, recognizes the equality of all human beings. Stoics dedicated considerable attention to the emotions or so-called 'passions of the soul', a specific aspect of their moral philosophy. Additionally, parallels can be drawn between Spinoza's concept of *conatus* and the Stoic concept of *oikeiosis*, among other similarities. However, what was particularly important to me, and I hope it may be of interest to you as well, is that Seneca mentions *future generations* in his writings. For this occasion, perhaps I could paraphrase something he wrote to his friend Lucilius in his *Epistles*. When Lucilius asked Seneca whether he should retreat from society and focus on his thoughts, despite the Stoic philosophy's call for action, Seneca replied that he was doing so for the sake of future generations. Namely, he is spending his days and nights *because* of posterity, as they can benefit from his writings. Seneca is crafting 'some healthful admonitions,' akin to recipes for useful salves. He has found these effective on his own sores, which, while not completely healed, have ceased to spread. Seneca also expresses that he conducts his research for both himself, and future generations, because he believes he is offering greater benefit to them than when he engaged in activities such as advocating for legal matters or supporting political candidates (in times when he was lending his 'voice and aid to some senatorial candidate'). We should have in mind that despite the Stoic belief in the world's eventual destruction by fire (*ekpyrosis*), Seneca *still* writes to future generations. That is, although his works have an 'apocalyptic nature' and sometimes depict world-catastrophe scenarios, the vision of the end influences how we should live our lives and preserve ourselves, and our loved ones, in this world. That vision also includes posteriority and the feelings towards them, and it is aligned with the Stoic humanism.

It seems that Seneca was right, because many of us returned to reading his works during the period of the coronavirus crisis we all experienced. This means that we can still find certain consolation in his words. So, it seems that despite all the technological development so far, human psychology has not changed so drastically in the previous two thousand years. I wonder, and I would like to hear your opinion on this – do you think that *our generations* could even leave a meaningful answer (or guidance) to future generations when it comes to our 'inner world'? Not guidance for the next two thousand years, but rather some guidance that would be relevant in not-so-distant future, considering the complexity of today's world and the influence of modern technologies on human psychology, emotions, and life in general. Thank you in advance!

GEORGE HRISTOV
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Tiziana Andina's book, "A Philosophy for Future Generations", brings to light a previously implicit problem – the question of transgenerational action. Initially, I perceived this concept as a mere aspect of the broader notion of action. My

anticipation was that the book would delve into a specific problem or concept within the broader framework of action. However, Andina's work surpassed my expectations by not only exploring this particular issue but also offering a fresh perspective on philosophical positions and theories. The book effectively engages with and reflects upon the foundational principles of philosophers like Hegel and Hobbes, builds upon their arguments or argues against them. Through this interchange, it becomes evident that the problem of transgenerational action is not an isolated concern but rather a pivotal element in our understanding of action itself. In essence, Andina's arguments demonstrate that this particular issue is indispensable to our understanding of the concept of action as a whole.

One of the book's most compelling arguments revolves around Hegel's logic of recognition, despite his famous claim that philosophy has no bearing on the future. Andina builds upon the recognition model, using it as a basis to contemplate our connection with future generations. By contrasting political theories rooted in individualist anthropology, where the Other is seen as an external opposition, with those that view the "I" as inherently shaped by its relationship with the Other, Andina highlights the profound implications these philosophical notions have on both our present and our future. She demonstrates that the recognition model of human relations, with its roots tracing back to ancient thinkers like Aristotle, carries significant consequences for our political and social interactions with children and future generations. This is why recognition-based approaches emphasize the role of education in shaping identity, a principle evident in the works of philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Rousseau. Unlike theories that begin with abstract models of individuality in a hypothetical state of nature, these approaches acknowledge that political subjects were once children and that future generations will come into being. This is why when examining political accounts that derive the "I", from its inherent relationship to the Other, it becomes evident that they often expand their political thought to encompass family relations and interactions with children. This aspect, as Andina has rightfully pointed out, is essential to understanding action. The reason for this lies in the fact that when we start with the relationship to the Other, we cannot reduce the human being to a mere abstract presupposition. As Rousseau recognized, this abstract presupposition represents a particular human social character, which is then generalized and considered universal. Instead, we are compelled to acknowledge the human being as a biological entity, born into this world and destined to be born. This crucial perspective tends to be missing in accounts that begin with an abstracted and atomized individuality, like those presented for example by Hobbes and Locke. By embracing the intrinsic relationship with the Other as the foundation of our political thought, we open ourselves to a deeper understanding of human nature that accounts for both our social character and our biological existence. Such a view leads us to appreciate the interconnectedness of family relations, the significance of children in society, and the profound impact our actions and decisions have on future generations.

The idea that consistently occupied my mind while reading Andina's book was Hannah Arendt's concept of natality – a notion that links action to the inherent human capacity of beginning, present in each birth. As Andina points out, the shift in focus from death to birth, so central to Arendt's project, directs thought towards assuming responsibility to the fullest extent possible. By contemplating natality, Arendt encourages us to recognize the significance of each new beginning and the potential it holds. It prompts us to consider how our actions, decisions, and policies will impact future generations. Embracing this perspective allows us to appreciate the value of continuity and the legacy we leave behind.

In essence, Andina's book compellingly demonstrates that political approaches centered around fear of the Other, and the fear of death, as seen in the case of Hobbes, are confined within a temporal closure. Such approaches limit action to the immediacy of our existence, neglecting the long-term implications of our decisions. This distinction for Andina is not merely theoretical; it becomes evident in real-life examples that she provides, as shown in the case of Italy's pension reform. The pursuit of extractive measures for short-term gains can have detrimental consequences for the entire political system in the long run. An anthropology founded on the concept of fear fails to account for the long-term sustainability of a political union. Fear-driven and atomistic approaches are inherently shortsighted and neglect the broader context and interconnectedness of political actions. Thus, my initial perception of the book as being concerned with a particular problem evolved significantly through Andina's methodical approach, particularly in the way she skillfully intertwines philosophical arguments with policy analysis. It became evident that this problem of transgenerational action is, in fact, a fundamental element at the core of a profound philosophical divide, one that has significantly influenced modern political thought. As vividly demonstrated in the book, the consequences of this divide hold immense relevance for the future of our society.

ANDREA PERUNOVIĆ
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One possible way of commenting Tiziana Andina's book *A Philosophy for Future Generations* is to engage with the primary notions that it puts to work in its theoretical dwellings. Here, I shall try to address three of those notions, thus the following text will contain three segments: the first one will concern the notion of generation, the second one the notion of transgenerationality, and the third one the notion of future generations.

Generation. A quick look into the dictionary can provide us with two basic definitions of the word generation. The Oxford Languages Dictionary formulates them in the following manner: the noun 'generation' denotes in the first place « all of the people born and living at about the same time, regarded collectively ». This definition corresponds, in a very basic sense I shall claim, to the starting point from which the analysis in the book departs. Anyhow,

the same dictionary gives us a second definition. According to it, generation is « *the production or creation of something* », so evidently, generation is also a poietic, or more precisely auto-poietic process in time, a process of formation or transformation, of becoming, that ends up in the coming into being of something new. Bearing in mind these two definitions, we can ask ourselves about the primacy and even about a possibility of a concrete distinction between the two definitions of generation. In the beginning of the book, it is stated that one of its goals, if not its overall aim, is to answer the question of identity of future generations. Yet, can we speak of generation solely in terms of identity and being, or should we also consider, maybe as decisive, in an act of deconstruction if you wish, the second definition, that seems to put forth becoming and difference? What happens if we consider not only the trangenerationality as a dynamic process, but also the very generation itself as a certain form of dynamics?

In order to conclude this first remark, I shall expose how do I see, provoked by Andina's theory, these dynamics: an individual pertains to a certain generation, as well as all other people born in the same moment. We belong to this certain generation from birth. Yet, this common belonging wasn't a pre-given condition to us as individuals. Or rather: factually, it was. Biologically and timewise, maybe also in the sense of what is called in the book the *primary transgenerationality*, it was. But symbolically and socially not quite. A new generation is in a sense a *tabula rasa* - a bunch of newborns - that *will become* a generation properly speaking once it has generated itself in the process of connecting to the knowledge and institutions of the past. A future generation is thus a leap forward that carries an inherent return. It is through the process of socialization that a 'generation' becomes what it is. A generation is thus first a space where difference appear, and only in the second place an identity. In this sense, every generation is a short-circuit. In a paradoxical reconnection to itself, a generation is always already what it is, yet it needs also to become what it is. It strives to become what it is, by referring to the past that precedes not only its existence. The final aim of this becoming is the (however partial) disconnection from the past generations. In short, boomers needed to become what they are so the gen X could see their becoming start to develop; gen X represented a similar point of reference for the Millennials; Millennials for the gen Z etc. They were all heading back in order to progress, in order to actualize their potentiality. Therefore, isn't the generation, as a process of becoming, already a trans- or a transitory phenomenon? And if it is, how this affects the transgenerationality as a meta-process?

Transgenerationality. This leads us to the second segment that considers the conceptualization of transgenerationality. When writing about transgenerationality of social systems and other transgenerational phenomena like institutions, terms like endurance, preservation and conservation are often used in the book, yet the word reproduction appears only once, in a quote. Do that implicitly mean that the author do not see transgenerationality of social systems and institutions as a matter of reproduction, a matter of repetition (or of

difference and repetition, so to echo Gilles Deleuze)? These questions raise yet another questions on transgenerationality, which, I will claim is the crucial one, and that concerns Andina's distinction between primary and secondary transgenerationality. She distinguishes very clearly and decisively (and that is obviously one of the main arguments of the book) the primary and the secondary transgenerationality. To put it roughly, the first one is natural and/or biological (it includes family ties, parents and their biological children, etc), while the second one is social (and concerns our relation with otherness properly speaking). The question one could ask is the following: what happens then with Althusser's assumption that interpellation begins already in the mother's womb, or to put it in other words, that we are *always already* (*toujours déja*) subject to the secondary transgenerationality, that even before they come into being, individuals that will form future generations are a part of the social fabric, even before they had undergone the process of primary transgenerationality?

Future generations. In the very first sentence of the chapter 3, Metaphysics, Andina writes: "Transgenerationality is a bond that obliges us to plan the future, which means taking the future into consideration when shaping the present." This chapter is particularly important in my view, because of the way in which Andina relates in it the categories of agents, actions, emotions and faculties is simply fascinating. Still, there is something she dismisses explicitly from the beginning which could be possibly valuable for the reader's general insight. Namely, this is the manipulative, political potential of 'taking future into consideration when shaping the present'; or to be more precise, the potential to manipulate the obligation to take future generations in consideration, when shaping the political present. In order to begin the metaphysical investigation on the transgenerationality, Andina expresses the need to "put aside the cheap rhetoric that leads politicians and institutions to say that society needs to protect future generations and then take little to no action about it in terms of substantial decision-making." But how could look the metaphysics of this fiduciary political manipulation? How agents, actions, emotions and faculties appear in this particular discourse and what are the implications they induce in the social reality? This question appears to me as a reaction to the 2020 presidential campaign in Serbia, where we have witnessed that the current president's campaign slogan was literally: "For our children". From where stems that need and the idea to legitimize one's political program by dedicating it to the future generations? Are present generations in need of the 'future generations' hypothesis in order to gain legitimacy and credit for their current political actions? Our example seems to show exactly that.

REPLY TO TAMARA PLEĆAŠ

Your comments on Stoicism and Seneca are very interesting, and I thank you for bringing them to my attention. I think, as you rightly point out, that Seneca captured a fundamental characteristic of our species that many moral philosophers have recently been reflecting on. That trait is the need to act in

a dimension that includes the future. In other words, if we knew that there was no near future, or even no tomorrow, the meaning of our actions would change radically. They would probably even lose their meaning. Think of films that tell us about the possible destruction of the Earth by alien attack or natural disaster: because of these dangers, the actions of the protagonists take on a completely different meaning. The fact that the future is open allows us to have hope: this was true for Seneca as it is for us. I completely agree with you that the perceptual, psychological and probably also emotional structure of our species is rather stable, i.e., it changes very slowly. That is why observations that were true for Seneca are also completely true today.

REPLY TO GEORGE HRISTOV

Thank you for your detailed reflections on Hegel. Indeed, the Hobbesian and Hegelian models correspond to two very different ways of conceptualising social reality: Hobbes starts with the individual, who he sees as alone and in competition with everyone else. An evolved animal who must defend his life and his territory. Hegel, on the other hand, starts from the relation, from an individuality that is always already in relation with the other. Personally, I find the Hegelian model more convincing.

Thank you also for the suggestion about Arendt and her concept of natality; it is indeed the possibility of natality that makes the future possible. I think Arendt was right on this point: the possibility of birth takes away our species' fear of the absence of a future and, if you like, of extinction at the level of sentience. Even if death is clearly perceptible on the individual horizon, its presence is more nuanced when we refer to our species as a temporal totality. The temporal extension of our species, which, as Arendt would say, has formed a "world", provides a horizon of meaning for our actions.

REPLY TO ANDREA PERUNOVIĆ

If I have understood correctly, you were probably more concerned with the distinction between primary and secondary transgenerationality. On my view, there is an anthropological component that we have to describe and that we have to maintain even if we develop social ontologies. Even when we try to describe the sociability or the pillars of our society. So, when you try to do a descriptive work, as in my case - because I try in this book to be descriptive, not just normative or not primarily normative, I think that a good and very structured categorisation can be very useful to better describe the conditions. So that's the reason why I try to keep the distinction. As I said, we are animals. And our sociability is something that we add. And we also construct with the help of our animal disposition.

Andrea Perunović: So it's some kind of, let's say, ontological distinction, because the primacy of the animal is more ontological than chronological. This point is not so clear. That's what I wanted to talk about... That we cannot

be sure about us first in this game. This is one point and then the primacy of the social or the natural. And if this is the case for you, then this makes things clearer. I'm asking myself what is this primacy? What is this quality of primacy?

Tiziana Andina: I'm not saying it's a primacy. But it is something we need to consider. In my view, humans are transgenerational animals, which means that we are animals that are raised. This means that our species is characterised by certain natural predispositions: emotions, natural inclinations, the way we perceive the outside world and so on, which form a common basis on which we build culture and its differences.

MARJAN IVKOVIĆ
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Let me try to formulate a very brief reflection and question regarding Tiziana Andina's intriguing book by means of some elements of Axel Honneth's theory of recognition. As we know, in Honneth's perspective, recognition is an evaluative response to some key aspects of human personality, either generalizable or idiosyncratic, such as one's individual worthiness of affective care, moral respect and esteem of one's ability to contribute to the common good (Honneth, 1996). Recognition takes place in interpersonal relations, but it is always framed by particular institutional (societal) orders, which consist of *institutionalized patterns of recognition* – formalized patterns of ascribing qualities and statuses to people, upon which we draw in our everyday interactions. In a feudal society, for example, people's interactions are regulated by highly asymmetrical patterns of interpersonal recognition – people are recognized as lords or serfs, and the two identities are mutually constitutive. In modern, normatively universalist social orders, institutionalized patterns of recognition are supposed to be egalitarian, symmetrical – in our everyday interactions, we recognize each other as citizens. But what exactly this means – what will be the exact content of such generally egalitarian patterns of recognition – leaves a lot of room for maneuvering. Much of our current politics revolves around the question of what egalitarian patterns of recognition should mean – especially the question of the ratio of "formal" and "substantive" components of such patterns.

With respect to Andina's conception of transgenerational political action, I was wondering about the contents of the patterns of interpersonal recognition that we need in the present in order to be motivated to take transgenerational actions and recognize future generations. As I see it, a lot depends on what kinds of institutionalized relations of recognition we have when it comes to our ability to think and act transgenerationally about crucial matters such as climate change. There have been arguments recently about the apparent "nihilism" of large numbers of people in the West (and beyond) who support reactionary political actors that are prone to deny climate change and overturn progressive policies aimed at preventing it, such as Bolsonaro, Trump or Sweden Democrats (see Brown, 2018). The premise of authors such as Wendy

Brown is that many of the people who vote for these political actors are not really climate change "deniers", they actually understand and accept that human-induced climate change is happening, but they either don't care, or worse, they enjoy contributing to the destruction of the world. And the implicit premise here is that these people have become nihilists because they have interiorized a worldview that is based on resentment toward what they see as "liberal elites" (segments of the political-economic elite in financialized capitalism that endorse progressive cultural politics) rather than any kind of positive vision of society. A further implication is that even the apparent adherence to right-wing values among these people is instrumental rather than substantive. It is for these reasons that they become completely unable and unwilling to think and act transgenerationally.

This argument sounds somewhat plausible, and it is deeply worrying[1]. On the other hand, I was always puzzled by one (rather banal) thing – how can you be a nihilist when it comes to climate change if you have children, as most of those people in all likelihood do? Do they really want their children and grandchildren to live in hell? Obviously, there must be a degree of cognitive dissonance in these people, and this is reason for hope. Let's say they understand (intuitively) that most of the liberal-democratic establishment in the West is engaged in "greenwashing" rather than honestly committed to fighting climate change. How do we motivate them to resolve their internal contradiction in a politically progressive way and support those actors (on the left) who are trying to fight climate change for real through a substantive socio-economic restructuring of our societies, which is definitely in their "objective interest" as Marxists would say?

I would argue that the contents of institutionalized patterns of recognition are of key importance here, by which I mean the conceptions of egalitarian citizenship that the main political options today formulate within their visions of the good society. To keep it simple, let's say that the establishment liberal options articulate a conception of egalitarian recognition that is premised on abstract legal universalism. For them, egalitarian recognition means the recognition of persons as *morally autonomous decision makers* – most of the time, this form of institutionalized recognition will in practice become what Axel Honneth calls "ideological recognition", which means that the formal act of recognizing someone as a morally autonomous actor is unsubstantiated by real (above all economic) resources for practicing moral autonomy (Honneth, 2007). This, I would argue, is the reason why many people are nowadays rejecting such

1 The following example seems to corroborate such views – polling agencies in the United States *again* severely underestimated Donald Trump's electoral prospects in the 2020 presidential elections, just as they did in 2016, and in spite of their improved methodologies. This time, the error can only be explained by the fact that a considerable number of respondents did not tell the truth about who they were going to vote for – but why? In my view, the only plausible explanation is that these people had a guilty conscience – at some level, they understood that they were doing something morally wrong, but they went on and did it anyway.

conceptions of egalitarian recognition, and, in rejecting it, they become tempted to endorse a "nihilist" approach which operates through a demonstrative (performative) rejection of moral autonomy and responsibility for future generations. Such rejection is a key trait of right-wing populism. What about the left? It has mostly been trying to articulate a model of recognition that follows the Hegelian logic of "social freedom" based on substantive (material) equality and cooperative self-realization. But could we suggest that what is missing in this model is precisely the *temporal dimension* of what John Dewey would call collective intelligent problem-solving – once again, space is privileged over time (Dewey, 1946)? In other words, the left does not stress enough the recognition of persons as "intelligent problem solvers" who can contribute, over time, to issues such as climate change in participatory-democratic contexts. Could we say that this is the missing element that could help people resolve their above-mentioned cognitive dissonance in a progressive way, that could turn them away from "nihilism" and motivate them to act transgenerationally?

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SRĐAN PRODANOVIĆ

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I find transgenerationality, as one of the key issues that you raise in your book, to be of immense theoretical and practical importance – especially if we bear in mind that this topic is unfortunately often overlooked in current social theory. In that regard, your interpretation of Mead in the context of articulating a philosophical justification for the primacy of (future) *We* over *I* is particularly thought-provoking and my intervention will focus on some of the implications of this pragmatist understanding of selfhood for those problems that are relevant for future generations.

Mead's notion of generalized other is, as you rightly point out, a good way to consider those types of intuitive insights that go beyond the rigid dichotomy between the individual and collective – which is undoubtably required if we are to grasp the needs of generations to come. However, in Mead's philosophy generalized other is "boundless" mainly because it is an emergent product of interaction: actors in early childhood through role-playing games develop a sense of abstract unity (generalized other) against which idiosyncratic (and

future oriented) I is constituted and in turn (the present situated) and habitual Me aspect of the self is formed. In other words, generalized other, once established, is intrinsically dynamic because it emerges from two kinds of interactions: those that occur among different aspects of selfhood and those which arise between concrete social groups. It should come as no surprise that the end state of this "double emergent process" is notoriously difficult to predict. It also seems that Mead was quite aware of this fact. For example, in his *Philosophy of The Present*, Mead explicitly states:

> The past is there conditioning the present and its passage into the future, but in the organization of tendencies embodied in one individual there may be an emergent which gives to these tendencies a structure which belongs only to the situation of that individual. The tendencies coming from past passage, and from the conditioning that is inherent in passage, become different influences when they have taken on this organized structure of tendencies. (Mead 1932: 17-18)

In that sense, radical novelty is the only certainty for Mead. So, we come to the crux of the problem. If there is this nonlinear determinism at the heart of Mead's notion of the generalized other, then it seems that secondary transgenerationality must have a limited horizon. Essentially, it cannot be premised on the long-term perspective, because the needs of future generations cannot be adequately comprehended from our point in time (even if we adopt a We perspective). Therefore, do you think that intersubjectivity of transgenerationality must, at least partly, remain in the present if we are to hope that collective action would bring about a desired change in the future.

Moreover, even if we, as social theorists, abandon the futile dream of predicting the needs of future generations and opt to remain closer to potentialities that exist in the present moment, there will still remain some practical problems regarding secondary transgenerationality, Namely, much of the public discourse about pressing issues that are relevant to our posterity is still centered around prediction. The climate change debate is a good example. Insistence on the facts about man-made global warming is not proving particularly effective against the persistent group of sceptics who maintain that previous predictions and projections about climate have not come to fruition. In other words, if transgenerationality is a regulatory ideal (Andina, 2022:78) that we grasp intuitively, then how do we change the current state of discourse on pressing issues such as climate change which is still dominated by mechanistic linear determinism and overreliance on facts as primary motivators of action that is directed toward future generations?

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IGOR CVEJIĆ
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For me, the most interesting and the main question of the book is how to have the kind of social actions or collective intentionality with those who are not present and cannot be present. My first association to this problem is the problem of empty-set experiential group. Or the problem: can a person have collective emotions in a situation when there is no other person present, no other members of the group, so there are no sharing of phenomenal content or body exchange with others? Edith Stein has interesting example which refer to future generations:

> The experience is essentially coloured by the fact that others are partaking in it, or better, by the fact that I am partaking in it only as a member of a community. We are affected by the loss, and we grieve over it. And this "we" encompasses not only those who feel the grief as I do, but all those who are included in the group; even those who perhaps do not know of the event, and even the members of the group who lived earlier or will live later. (Stein 1922: 122)

She explicitly said that that grief, our grief about the member of the group who passed, encompasses even the members of the group who lived earlier or will live later. And she has an explanation to it. The explanation is that there is a difference between shared emotions and collective emotions. Collective emotions presuppose robust socio-cultural patterns of evaluation (Szanto 2015). And I think this is an important notion here, because we usually speak about the new generation in terms of cultural tradition. For example, radical right wing usually speaks in the name of new generation but presupposing that the robust evolutive patterns are here to stay. Another example, at the Institute for Philosophy and Social theory, of course, we presuppose some changes in the future, but we presuppose that there is some pattern of core values and that this pattern will not change even for future generations (e.g. emphasis on the importance of international cooperation, critical thinking and social engagement). To deal with this question, we have to understand the problem of relation to those who are not members, and I think it is the question of engaged acts, because engaged acts typically are related to non-member of the group or to those who don't know about an event, who are not aware or committed. With non-members we don't have joint commitment, but we can invite them. It could be used to better understand our relation towards future generations, as well. Our acts will put some pledge to the future generations, but we cannot make a proper normative obligation in terms of joint commitment.

Transgenerational acts, thus, might be understood as engagements towards the new generation. The concept of engagement helps us to understand the logic in which we are putting the pledge, the invitation to those who are recipient of this act to respond, but they can respond in different manners and probably even reject this invitation. This could be an ethical background of what we do when we are doing transgenerational acts.

I have one connected question, which could be used as some kind of example of how this can function in emotional terms. It is related to the question of forward-looking or future-oriented emotions (such as hope, fear, trust etc.). It is obvious that we have such emotions for future generations. But to be very concrete, I will refer to trust as a forward-looking emotion, as treated by Bennet Helm in his book *Communities of Respect* (2017). By treating trust as forward-looking emotion, we can avoid some epistemic problems, because trust, of course could be related to cognition and confidence to the members of society, but we don't have such a cognition about future generations.

One way of understanding this relation is that it is like therapeutic trust. For example, when mother provides trust to a daughter that she will came home until midnight, even though she will most probably come later, and mother has no evidence in the past to trust her. It is about the normative background: responsibilities and entitlements. By providing trust to a daughter, mother also provide her with responsibility and entitlement, that she could behave in the expected manner. So, even if those who are recipient of trust are not members of the group or are not even alive yet, they are immediately entitled by our trust to be responsible for what they are trusted for. We press the import of something we find valuable to them.

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REPLY TO MARIJAN IVKOVIĆ

I would say two things. Your first general question was about the political dimension that we have to use in order to push people to adopt a sort of transgenerational approach to the daily lives. I would say that the instrument that is probably much useful to do this job is that of institution. Using the institution as an instrument to organize the urgencies of people probably is one of the most important things we have to do.

I found your analysis of a possible tension between people's interest, at least those with children and grandchildren, in mitigating the climate crisis and their choice of what could be called denialist policies interesting. How can you have children and not want a healthy environment and at least acceptable climate conditions for them? I don't know if the cause of this tension is what you describe as a kind of nihilism born of resentment towards political systems that have failed to distribute wealth more fairly. It may be: if, in order to protest against an injustice, I end up giving my children worse living conditions, I am

certainly not achieving much. Economic conditions are certainly important, but they are not the only thing that matters, and resentment in particular has more to do with power than with wealth. If, even if I am not rich, the society in which I live enables me to act appropriately or according to my will, where this is compatible with common norms, I believe that resentment will find less fertile ground to take root.

What about the temporal dimension? The German court is the legal institution that spoke about the rule of time, which I mentioned in my presentation. So the idea that we have to look at our society as a permanent entity. That time is probably at least as important as space, or probably much more important than space.

REPLY TO SRĐAN PRODANOVIĆ

I think you have hit the nail on the head. We cannot describe future generations, nor can we precisely determine their wishes and needs. That's because we know nothing about their identity. However, we can work to create a world in which future people will be able to exercise their basic rights, for example human rights, which are not yet effectively guaranteed. That is what we can do, and that is what a philosophy and practice that does not forget transgenerationality can do.

Srđan Prodanović: Yeah, it also seems to me a useful term here to use is legacy. So what's to be responsible towards our legacy? It doesn't have this long-term perspective in it. Still, it encompasses all that you are trying to say.

Tiziana Andina: Inheritance is a perfect word to express the idea of heredity. But while it is true that we inherit the future - just think of the climate crisis - we also build it in order to pass it on. That's why I prefer to speak of transgenerationality.

REPLY TO IGOR CVEJIĆ

Thank you for your question and your suggestions. It is not easy to describe the kind of feelings we have about future generations. There are probably different types: fear, hope, confidence, just to name the most important ones. Emotions can be positive or negative, depending on the situation and the person. Sometimes we hope that future generations will do what we want, sometimes we fear that they will do what we do not want. All in all, I think the most common emotion is the hope that some kind of future is possible, because for some of us - probably the luckiest ones - this allows for some kind of permanence even after we die. In a way, this feeling is therapeutic, because it can create a kind of calm and a horizon for an important part of our work. Future generations have rights simply because they will be and because we invoke them to justify intergenerational action.