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THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL WORLD: MODERN REGIMES OF TRANSLATION

ABSTRACT
This article focuses on the individuality of language. How can language be individuated, grasped as an indivisible unity, and compared to other languages that are also assumed to be individual unities? I will attempt a historical investigation concerning the individuality of language on the one hand, and the formation of the modern international world in which individuated languages are supposed to be juxtaposed to one another. The translation is the instance in which languages are originally figured out as individuals; I will investigate how a new way of managing translation, the modern regime of translation, was introduced.

KEYWORDS
the individuality of language, the representation of translation, the modern regime of translation, monolingual address, the schematism of co-figuration, homolingual addres, the subject in transit

Introduction

Just as in modernity, the world is imagined to consist of nations and conceived of as an international assemblage, so does the modern world project the Babelic vision of a single humanity fragmented into many individual languages. This vision of the international juxtaposition of languages cannot be appreciated without reference to the historicity of the modern international world. The modern regime of translation represents the event of translation in terms of two separate figures or schemata, just like two distinct territories of state sovereignties in the international world, as sanctioned by the system of international law (*Jus Publicum Europaeum*). However, we must not forget that the vision of the so-called international world is historically specific; it came into existence for the first time in Western Europe in the seventeenth century.

A new disciplinary formation generally referred to as 'area studies' was invented a half century after the collapse of the old system of international law which manifested itself in the event of the First World War. Since then, many attempts were made to resurrect the international order of the modern world until the global hegemony of *Pax Americana* prevailed in the late twentieth

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century. The disciplinary formation of knowledge generally referred to as 'area studies' was established at universities in the United States of America after the Second World War, and served to reconfirm rather than dispense with the colonial-imperial order of the modern world. The discipline of 'area studies' was initially proposed by the policy makers of the United States as a response to two demands: a) to establish the order of the international world in which the West, not Europe, is the central index of universal reference, and b) to disqualify the old colonial rules while appropriating their legacies into a new global reign of *Pax Americana* at the same time. Consequently, area studies as a disciplinary formation retained an ambiguous relationships with the colonial studies of the pre-WWII era.

The old conventional bifurcation of the modern world into two contrasting positionalities, the West and the Rest, where the West represents the subject of knowing while the Rest is regarded exclusively as the object of knowing, had not been critically interrogated before the notion of postcoloniality was problematised. Even today the disciplines of area studies are still believed to be constructed on the basis of the *anthropological difference* between the West and the Rest, between Western humanity and the Rest of humanity, thereby preserving the colonial bifurcation of the modern world.

In this chapter, the discussion will focus on the individuality of language. How can language be individuated, grasped as an indivisible unity, and compared with other languages that are also assumed to be individual unities? I will attempt a historical investigation concerning the individuality of language on the one hand, and the formation of the modern international world in which individuated languages are supposed to be juxtaposed to one another on the other. Translation is the instance in which languages are originally represented or figured out as individuals; I will investigate how a new way of managing translation, the modern regime of translation, was introduced in the modern world.

What may be summarily called 'translation' has been practiced in many parts of the world and among many groups of people for millennia. The rendering of the Buddhist texts in literary Chinese and the Latinization of the Bible in the first millennium A. D. are two instances of celebrated achievements in the long histories of 'translation'. There are innumerable cases of translation known to have played decisive roles in the development of literary cultures, pedagogical institutions, ecclesiastic reformations, and the global spread of the nation-state and capitalism particularly since the Renaissance and the Age of Discovery.

Today an increasing number of scholars are aware of the conceptual complexity as well as the politico-ethical significance of translation. At the same time, they have come to the realization that translation must be problematized not only in the fields of artistic literary works and religious canons, but also in the spheres of commercial advertisement, popular entertainment, public administration, international diplomacy, scientific research and publication, judiciary procedure, immigration, education, and family livelihood. This article will discuss the practice of translation in reference to the fact that translation

is always complicit in the building, transforming or disrupting of power relations. In other words, translation is a historical act *par excellence*. Translation involves moral imperatives on the part of both the addresser and the addressee, since it is an incident marking the social aspect of human existence, and can always be viewed as a political manoeuvre of social antagonism. Moreover, I will investigate how the *representation* of translation brings about socio-political effects and serves as a *technê* or technology by which the individual imagines his or her relation to the national or ethnicized community. And, finally, I will touch upon the relationship between the issues of translation and modernity by showing how the particular mode of representing translation is conditioned by the 'modern schematism of co-figuration' through which we comprehend the unity of ethnic or national language as an ethno-linguistic unity. Thanks to 'the modern regime of translation,' languages are individuated and regarded as enclosed unities that are spatially external to one another. In other words, we will probe how our commonsensical notion of translation is delimited by the schematism of the world (i.e., our operation of representing the world according to the schema of co-figuration), and inversely how the modern image of the world as the 'inter-national' world (i.e., the world consisting of the basic units of nations/state sovereignties) is prescribed by our representation of translation as a communicative and international transfer of a message between a pair of ethno-linguistic unities.

The Representation of Translation and its Complexity

An inquiry into translation invokes a seemingly endless series of questions as soon as some formulaic response to it is postulated.

In retracing the network of affinity in translational equivalence, we may well find a sense of transferring, of conveying or moving from one place to another, of linking one word, phrase, or text to another, all common among the words connoting 'translation' in modern languages. In a comparison of the lexicographical and etymological explications of the word 'to translate' or its cognates in many languages, we may feel vindicated to offer the following definition: translation is a transfer of a message from one language to another. Even before specifying what sort of transfer it can be, one would realize it is hard to refrain from initially asking such questions about the message. Is what is referred to as the message in this definition not a product or consequence of transfer called translation, rather than something whose being precedes the action of transfer, or something that remains invariant in the process of the alteration called translation? Is the message supposedly transferred in this process determinable in and of itself without first being operated on or affected by something? And then about language. What is the status of language from which or into which what is called message is transferred? How can we assume that the source language in which the source text originally makes sense is different and distinct from the target language in which the translated text is made to convey the original sense or its closest approximation? How can we

presume that the source language is spatially external to the target language? What justifies the assumption that a language either of the source or the target is an enclosure so that the language between which translation takes place do not overlap or intrude into each other? Are these languages countable in the sense that you may isolate and juxtapose them as individual units like apples or oranges not like water? By what measures can you distinguish one from another, and endow each of them with its unity or body? Do we not have to suppose the organic unity of language rather than a random assemblage of words, phrases, and utterances, in order to talk about translation in this way? In short, how can we presuppose that language is an individual?

Accordingly, the message that is transferred in translation is, above all else, a supposition of the transmitted invariant that is confirmed, retroactively, after the fact of translation. So, what kind of definition is this, that includes the term that ought to be explained by what the very definition aims at determining? Does it not constitute a typical circular definition? Likewise, the unities of languages are also suppositions without which the above-mentioned definition would hardly make sense. Then, are we not required to examine what translation could be when languages are not countable or when one language cannot be so easily distinguished from another?

Here, we are already concerned with a range of problems difficult to evade when we attempt to comprehend the terms 'meaning' and 'language'. At the very least we can now say that, logically, translation is not derivative or secondary to meaning or language; it is as fundamental or even foundational in our attempts to elucidate the concepts of meaning and language. To the extent that translation suggests our contact and encounter with the incomprehensible, unknowable or unfamiliar, that is, with the foreign, we must insist that nothing starts until we come across the foreign.

If the foreign is unambiguously incomprehensible, unknowable and unfamiliar, it is impossible to talk about translation because translation simply cannot be done. If, instead, the foreign is comprehensible, knowable and familiar, it is supposedly unnecessary to call for translation. Thus, the status of the foreign must always be ambiguous in translation. The foreign is at the same time incomprehensible and comprehensible, unknowable and knowable, and unfamiliar and familiar, and this foundational ambiguity of translation derives from the ambiguity of the positionality generally indexed by the peculiar presence of the translator. For the translator is summoned only when two kinds of audiences are differentially postulated with regard to the source text, one for whom the text is comprehensible at least to some degree, and another for whom it is incomprehensible. The translator's work consists in dealing with the difference between the two kinds of audience. It goes without saying that the translator must encroach on both and stand in the midst of this difference. This situation may be rephrased as follows: for the first kind of audience, the source 'language' is comprehensible while for the second it is incomprehensible. Yet, it is important to note that the 'language' in this instance is figurative in the sense that it need not refer to any 'natural' language,

or *langue* in French, of an ethnic or national community such as German or Tagalog. Since it is equally possible to have two kinds of audiences when the source text is a heavily technical document or an avant-garde art piece. Here 'language' may well refer to a set of vocabulary and expressions associated with such professional field or discipline as 'legal language'; it may imply the style of graphic inscription or an unusual perceptual setting in which an artwork is displayed. The figurative and loose use of the term 'language' would invariably render the task of determining 'meaning' in the definition of translation extremely difficult.

This brief inquiry adequately discloses the instability of the conventional representation of translation. The source language and the target language are both relatively ambiguous, so that it is very difficult to evade a circular argument. The certainty of this representation is in fact dependent upon the certainty of the investment in this image or this co-figurative schema of translation. For the individuality of either language, source language or target language, is possible only at the level of representation. The individuality of language is figurative in the sense that it must first be figured out, that is, *represented* by a figure, image or schema.

A famous taxonomy of translation proposed by Roman Jakobson is an attempt to restrict the instability inherent in the figurative use of the word 'language.' Jakobson classified translation into three classes: "1) Intralingual translation or rewording is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of other signs of the same language. 2) Interlingual translation or translation proper is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of some other language. 3) Intersemiotic translation or transmutation is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems" (Jakobson 1971: 261). Jakobson's taxonomy neither elucidates nor responds to our query about the supposition concerning the countability and organic unity of either a source or target language. It does not empirically validate the routinized supposition; rather, it merely repeats and reconfirms it. Nevertheless, it discloses that the propriety of 'translation proper' is dependent upon the supposed discernibility of the interlingual from the intralingual translation, of translation between separate languages from rewording within the same language unity. Thereby it prescribes and demarcates the locus of difference between two presumably ethnicised or nationalised communities of speakers by virtue of the fact that Jakobson presupposes that "translation proper" can and should only take place between two unequivocally circumscribed linguistic communities. In this respect, what Jakobson indicates by the type of interlingual translation is, firstly, an act of bordering or a conduct of inscribing a border thereby instituting two separate spheres. And, secondly, this differentiation is re-inscribed as a border between two unities or individual entities. By presuming the border not as a marker of distinction or differentiation but instead as a separation of one enclosed sphere from another, it re-defines a border thus inscribed as a distance between two entities, two enclosed communities. It thereby expunges the various loci of differences within such a linguistic community and locates the foreign exclusively outside

the putative unity of a language, consequently homogenizing the ethnic or national community of language at the level of representation.

As goes without saying, Jakobson's taxonomy of translation is nothing but a schematization of the globally-shared vision about the international world, consisting of basic units of nations and segmented by national borders into territories, rather than his idiosyncratic formula. In this schematization, the propriety of 'translation proper' does not only claim to be a description or depiction of what happens in the process of translation, but it also prescribes and commands how to *represent* and apprehend what one does in translation, or more specifically, what one is supposed to do in it.

In this respect, the propriety of 'translation proper' is a discursive construct: it is part and parcel of the discursive regime of translation—an institutionalized assemblage of protocols, rules of conduct, canons of accuracy, and manners of viewing. In other words, the discursive regime of translation is regulative, poietic, or productive in bringing out what speech act theorists call the 'perlocutionary' effect, repeatedly discerning the various features of language co-figuratively—that is, one unity being figured out in contrast to another—as if the two unities were already present in actuality.

As long as one is captive to this regime of translation, one can only construe the ambiguity inherent in the positionality of the translator as a duality that a translator occupies between a native language and a foreign one. One either speaks one's own mother tongue or a foreigner's. The task of the translator would then be to figure out a difference as discernible between the two languages, a difference reducible to the *species difference*. In each language one's positionality is discernibly determined, so that the difference one deals with in translation is figured out always as being between two linguistic communities, between two *species* in the *genus* of languages in general. Despite innumerable loci of potential difference within one linguistic community, this regime of translation obliges one to speak in such a manner as to address oneself according to the binary opposition of speaking to an interlocuter who is belonging to either the same language or the other. In this mythology of the mother tongue, it is often postulated that an individual human belongs to one language and that translation takes place between one belonging to one language and another belonging to another. Of course, there may well be some cases in which one individual belongs to plural languages, but such cases are somewhat exceptional or expected to be even abnormal.

Let me call this regime operating in translation globally today 'the modern regime of translation' since it outlines the international co-presence or juxtaposition of nations in the modern international world. And I call this attitude of address the 'monolingual address,' an attitude of relating to others in enunciation whereby the addresser adopts the position representative of a putatively homogeneous language community and relates to general addressees who are also representative of an equally homogeneous language community. I hasten to offer a disclaimer that by monolingual address I do not imply the social condition of conversation, generally referred to as homolingualism, in

which both the addresser and the addressee supposedly belong to the same language; they believe themselves to belong to different languages yet can still address themselves monolingually.

Translator: The Subject in Transit

However, the ambiguity inherent in the positionality of the translator is far from being exhaustively explicated. Let me draw attention to how the translator addresses herself or himself, in order to illustrate different ways of understanding the act of translation outside 'monolingual address'.

Being engaged in the task of translation, can one perform such speech acts as promising? Can the translator be responsible for what she says while translating? Reflecting the ambiguity of the positionality that the translator cannot evade, the answer must be equally ambiguous. Here the problem of the invariant message in our discussion of the definition of translation comes back to this question of 'meaning,' of what the translator 'means' to say or what she says to 'mean.'

In relation to the source text, the translator seems to occupy the positionality of the addressee to whom the source text addresses itself. She listens to or reads what the original addresser enunciates. But one cannot overlook the very situation in which a person is assigned to the role of a translator, namely, the stage setting in which the translator is a particular character to whom the addresser speaks or to whom the addressee listens. This may appear rather confusing! Let us remind ourselves that the translator is an exceptional social role who is formally neither the addresser nor the address at the scene of an illocutionary enunciation. The translator is a rather exceptional person to whom, formally at least, the addresser does not speak; neither is she a character to whom the addressee listens: the translator is a sort of third-person presence who is deliberately excluded from the relationship of illocution, of 'I' and 'you,' so that she is not permitted to behave either as a first person singular or a second person singular. The addressee for the enunciation by the addresser must not be located at the site where the translator is present, so that, in translation, the translator is always located elsewhere than the position of the addressee.

Here we come to the ambiguity inherent in the translator's positionality: undoubtedly the translator speaks, but she is not fully an addresser; she is both an addresser and not addresser at the same time; similarly she is both an addressee and not an addressee at the same time. This is to say that, even though the translator is spoken or written to, she cannot be the 'you' as addressed by the addresser. A similar disjunction can be observed in the translational enunciation of the target text. In relation to the audience of the target text, the translator seems to occupy the position of the addresser who addresses herself to the audience of the target text. The translator speaks or writes to the audience, so in this respect she is undoubtedly an addresser. Yet, it is not the translator who is supposed to be speaking or writing in translation for the addressee. Even though the translator is the one who speaks, the "I" uttered by

the translator does not designate the translator herself but rather the original addresser as the subject of the original enunciation. And if by "I" the translator indicates the subject of the secondary and translational enunciation, she will then have to designate the original addresser by 'she' or 'he,' by using a pronoun of the third person.

Let me reformulate this pronominal disjunction. In the enunciation of translation, the subject of the enunciation (the agent who enunciates) and the subject of the enunciated (the person who is signified by the "I" or some other syntactical arrangement within the utterance)—or between the speaking I and the I that is signified—are not expected to coincide with one another. The translator's desire must at least be displaced, if not entirely dissipated, in the translational enunciation, since the archetype of desire is to be found in the desire for what is signified by "I" in my utterance to coincide with the supposedly concrete and unique—but imagined—existence of 'me' (desire in "I want to be myself."). This is why the translator cannot be designated either as "I" or as "you" straightforwardly: the translator disrupts the attempt to appropriate the relation of the addresser and the addressee into the *personal* relation of first person vis-à-vis second person. To follow the determination of a 'person' as espoused by Émile Benveniste (i.e., only those directly addressing and addressed can be called persons, and that those who are referred to or talked about in the capacity of "he," "she," or "they" cannot be "persons" (Benveniste 1971: 224), the addresser, the translator, and the addressee cannot be persons simultaneously; the translator cannot be either the first or second, or even third 'person' undisruptively. In respect to personal relationality as well as to the addresser/addressee structure, the translator must be internally split and multiple, and devoid of stable positionality. At best, she can be a subject in transit. First, this is because the translator cannot be an "individual" in the sense of *individuum* in order to perform translation, and second, because she is a singularity that marks an elusive point of discontinuity in the social, while translation is the practice of creating continuity at that singular point of discontinuity. Thus, the point in social space that she occupies is an intensive rather than extensive one. Precisely for this reason, translation is an instance of continuity in discontinuity. It is a *poietic* social practice which institutes a relation at the site of incommensurability. This is why the aspect of discontinuity inherent in translation would be completely repressed if we determined translation as a form of communication. This is what I have referred to above as the ambiguity inherent in the positionality of the translator.

Thus, considering the positionality of the translator, we are introduced into the problematic of subjectivity in an illuminating manner. The internal split within the translator, which reflects in a certain way the split between the addresser and the translator or the addressee and the translator—as well as the split within the addresser or the addressee—demonstrates the way in which the subject constitutes itself. In a sense, this internal split within the translator is homologous to what is referred to as the fractured I, the temporality of "I speak," which necessarily introduces an irreparable distance between the

speaking I and the I that is signified, between the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the enunciated/statement. Yet, in the case of translation, ambiguity in the personality of the translator marks the instability of the 'we' as the subject rather than the 'I'; this suggests a different attitude of address which I elsewhere called "heterolingual address" (Sakai 1997: 1–17) and in which one addresses oneself as one foreigner to another foreigner. Captured in the modern regime of translation, however, the translator is supposed to assume the role of the arbitrator, not only between the addresser and the addressee but also between the linguistic communities of the addresser and the addressee. And, in the attitude of monolingual address, translation as repetition is often exhaustibly replaced by the representation of translation.

The Schema of Co-Figuration and the Modern International World

Let me elaborate on the process in which translation is represented through the modern regime of translation and construed as a communication between the co-figurative pair of the original and the target languages in the representation of translation. What is of significance in this process of representation is that language thus represented as a figure is neither a substance nor a thing in or of itself. At the level of *re*presentation, language is an image, figure, or schema: a replacement for what empirically exists in itself. However, the figure of language thus represented does not belong to the empirical domain of constitution; a language thus *re*presented does not exist in experience. Rather, it exists in the domain of regulative rules; it is no more than what Immanuel Kant calls 'a regulative schema.' (Kant 1929: 180–187, 549–552; Sakai 1997: 1–17).

Through the translator's labour, the incommensurability as difference—incommensurability can never be reduced to difference between species—which calls for the service of the translator in the first place is negotiated and worked on. In other words, the work of translation is a practice by which the initial discontinuity between the addresser and the addressee is made continuous and recognizable. In this respect translation is just like other social practices that render the singular points of discontinuity in social formation continuous. Regulated by means of the modern regime of translation, it is a historically specific form of practice that renders unrepresentable difference representable and reduces difference as the incommensurate into a specific difference. Hence, only retrospectively and after translation, can we recognize the initial incommensurability as a gap, wall or border between fully constituted entities, spheres or domains. But such a recognition is rendered possible only at the level of *representation*. When difference is represented as a gap, crevice, wall or border, it is no longer incommensurate. It is already mapped onto the striated space that can be segmented by national borders and other apparatuses of national and racial identification. Thus, the social event of translation becomes appropriable into the map of the international world.

Incommensurability as difference is more like 'feeling' that is prior to the explanation of how it is given rise to, and cannot be determined as a represented

difference (or specific difference in the arborescent schemata of individual, species and genus) between two subjects or entities. What makes it possible to represent the initial difference as an already determined difference between one language unity and another is the work of translation itself. This is why we must always remember that the untranslatable or what appears not appropriable by the economy of translational communication cannot exist prior to the enunciation of translation. It is translation that retroactively gives birth to the untranslatable.

To erase the temporality of translation with which the ambiguity of the positionality of translator manifests itself as disjunctive, we displace translation with the *re*presentation of translation. By virtue of the fact that the disruptive and dynamic processes of translation are all levelled out, the representation of translation according to the modern regime of translation enables the representation of ethnic or national positionalities. In spite of the presence of the translator who is always ambiguous and disjunctive, translation, no longer as difference or incommensurability but instead as representation, is made to discriminatorily posit one language unity against another (and one 'cultural' unity against another). In this sense, the representation of translation transforms difference in repetition into specific difference between two particularities, and it helps constitute the putative unities of national languages, thereby reinscribing the initial difference and incommensurability as a specific—i.e., commensurate and conceptual—difference between two particular languages, two *species* within the *genus*/generality of languages. As a result of this displacement, translation is represented as a form of communication between two fully circumscribed, different but comparable, language communities where social antagonism and various loci of difference are expunged.

The particular representation of translation in which it is understood to be communication between two particular languages is, no doubt, a historical construct. When considering the politico-social significance of translation, it is no accident that historically the modern regime of translation became widely accepted in many regions in the world at the time when the pre-modern orders of the passive vassal subject gave way to the disciplinary order of the active citizen subject in the modern formation of the nation-state. The modern regime of translation thus serves to reify national sovereignty in the most illustrating manner. As Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt have argued, it makes "the relation of sovereignty into a thing (often by naturalizing it) and thus weed out every residue of social antagonism. The nation is a kind of ideological shortcut that attempts to free the concepts of sovereignty and modernity from the antagonism and crisis that define them" (Hardt and Negri 2000: 95).

Following Kant's concept of schematism, I have called a *poietic* technology embedded in the modern regime of translation which renders translation representable 'the schema of co-figuration.' Since the practice of translation remains radically heterogeneous to the representation of translation, translation need not always be represented as a communication between two clearly delineated linguistic media. There should be many different ways to apprehend

it in which the subjectivity of a community does not necessarily constitute itself in terms of language unity or the homogeneous sphere of ethnic or national culture. What must be emphasized here is that the unity of a language or the homogeneous sphere of ethnic or national culture as a whole comes into being in the imagination. Accordingly, it is this particular representation of translation that gave rise to the possibility of figuring out the unity of ethnic or national language together with another language unity. That is to say that the schema of co-figuration is a *technê* or technology by means of which a national community represents itself to itself, thereby constituting itself as a subject.

This auto-constitution of the national subject does not proceed unitarily; on the contrary, it constitutes itself only by making visible the figure of the other, with whom it engages in a translational relationship. It is important to note that, through the representation of translation, the two unities are represented as two equivalents resembling one another. Precisely because they are represented in equivalence and resemblance, however, it is possible to determine them as conceptually different and their difference is construed as species difference or a specific difference (*diaphora*) between two specific identities.

Modernity and the Schema of Co-figuration

In talking about modernity as understood in many parts of the world today, it is historically necessary to first anchor it in the original uses of this notion in the history of Western Europe. This is neither because the most authentic forms of modernity can be found in Western Europe, nor because modernity emanated from the centre, somewhat associated with Western Europe, to the periphery of the Rest. It implies that the notion of the 'modern' has been accepted and used primarily as a translation from its European originals for more than a century in many places, including Asia and Africa. One can talk about 'modern' as if there were a globally common understanding of it precisely because, all over the world, people assume it to be impossible to grasp without referring back to its European equivalents from which their local translations are believed to have derived. In the globally-accepted conception of modernity the schema of co-figuration between the West and the Rest is already working powerfully. Despite linguistic and social diversities among the different sites of the world, therefore, the notion of 'modern' is supposedly retraceable to the singular history of Western Europe, thanks to the Eurocentric structure incorporated in the very notion itself. In this respect, the schema of co-figuration is the form most appropriate to the representation of the Eurocentric world, and it is also a form in which the legacies of European colonialisms are preserved. As far as the local terms used for modernity are concerned, however, the situation was drastically different in 'pre-modern' periods preceding the translation of 'modern' into local equivalents.

The introduction of the 'modern' qualitatively changed the manner in which people customarily organized their historical experience. With the arrival of the 'modern', people in many places in the world began to map geopolitical

directives centring around colonial powers in Western Europe onto their pasts and futures, and to order their destinies and desires in terms of cartographic relativity. 'Modern' now implied much more than chronological closeness to the present moment in which periods are classified. Consequently, they sought a coherence in the transition from the experience of their past into the anxiety of their future by projecting a path from a *topos* outside the modern into a *topos* within. The progression of time from the past to the future was thus associated with a movement, on the cartographically imagined surface of the globe, from a geographic location outside the 'modern' civilization to another within it. As a matter of fact, this explains how the mythic construct called the West was constituted, and why it is structurally indissociable from the modern.

In the context of our discussion of translation, the 'modern' is marked by the introduction of the schema of co-figuration of the-West-and-the-Rest, without which it is difficult to imagine a nation or ethnicity as a homogeneous sphere.

It is important to keep in mind that, regardless of whether or not readers are resident in North America, Northeast Asia or countries of the European Community, today they inhabit social and discursive formations that are marked by modernity; they live in the international world. To the extent that they take the modern regimes of reading, writing, reciting, translating, and so on for granted, they tend to assume the regularities sustained by these regimes to be universally valid; they become incapable of imagining the possibilities of regimes beyond that of monolingual address.

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Naoki Sakai

Savremeni međunarodni svet: moderni režimi prevođenja

Apstrakt

Ovaj članak se fokusira na individualnost jezika. Kako se jezik može individualizovati, shvatiti kao nedeljiva celina i uporediti sa drugim jezicima koji se takođe pretpostavljaju kao individualne celine? Pokušaću da sprovedem istorijsko istraživanje o individualnosti jezika, s jedne strane, i o formiranju savremenog međunarodnog sveta u kojem se individualizovani jezici pretpostavljaju kao postavljeni jedni naspram drugih, s druge strane. Prevođenje je instanca u kojoj se jezici prvobitno zamišljaju kao individualni; istražiću kako je uveden novi način upravljanja prevođenjem, odnosno moderni režim prevođenja.

Ključne reči: individualnost jezika, reprezentacija prevođenja, savremeni režim prevođenja, jednojezično obraćanje, shematizam ko-figuracije, jednojezični adresat, subjekat u tranzitu