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EDITOR'S NOTE

Ivan Nišavić

EDUCATION IN ANCIENT GREECE

This thematic issue represents the efforts of the Laboratory of Educational Theories of the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade to come to a broader understanding of ancient educational conceptions. The initial assumption is that the educational perspectives of ancient thinkers, as well as their argumentation, are extremely valuable and meaningful in our contemporary society.

The questions looming on the horizon include: Why is education important? How should it be managed and who should be in control of it? Who should organize education and what subjects should be taught? When should we begin with education and how long should it last? Various answers have been offered to these and similar questions in ancient times which could be useful for a contemporary and completely different world from the ancient one. Besides, as we know, women, elderly people, the poor, slaves and foreigners were excluded from ancient educational practices. However, it should be acknowledged and underlined that there were a few philosophical schools which included these marginalized groups.

Indubitably, the approach of ancient Greek philosophers to education was comprehensive, thorough and diverse; we cannot thus expect to cover all topics in a limited space. Nevertheless, in this thematic issue, we focus our attention on several important and relevant perspectives on ancient education.

This thematic issue begins with Aikaterini Lefka's paper – "The Citizens' Lifelong Learning in Plato's Laws" – that deals with the educational program in Plato *Laws*. Lefka employs a synthetical approach: namely, she connects the educational aspect with the moral one. In other words, she tries to explain how education is beneficial for the moral development of each individual and of the polis (πόλις).

The second paper, "The Role of Education in Aristotle's Politics", by Zoran Dimić points out the significance of the reasons for creating the polis as a

stepping stone for Aristotle's educational practice. This ties in with the relationship between the polis (πόλις) and the constitution (πολιτεία) which is of paramount importance for the education of the politically capable citizen.

In her paper, "Women's Education, Knowledge and Competence in Ancient Greece", Lada Stevanović offers a comprehensive approach to the marginalized and often forgotten women's education in ancient Greece. Stevanović's approach is quite unusual as she sheds light on the disregarded and less analyzed aspects of women's education and their voices which have never been valued in the public sphere of that time.

Finally, Tamara Plećaš portrays the concept of Stoic philosophical education in her paper entitled "The Roman Stoics on the Emancipatory Potential of the Philosophical Paideia". Namely, Plećaš identifies specific Stoic ideas and educational practices and claims that they have emancipatory potential. According to her, for example, it is essential that the Roman Stoics believed that women and men were equally subjected to virtue and rationality and that they encouraged their students and protégés to speak and act freely as well as to not be afraid of authority figures. In addition, Plećaš maintains, the Stoics perceived philosophy as a discipline "that educates the mind" which is why philosophical education was also a path to happiness.

As mentioned before, the goal of this thematic issue is not to give a complete overview of ancient education. Instead, the papers in this thematic issue offer four different approaches to intriguing educational problems. Moreover, the papers in this thematic issue share a dual objective: to explore the concept of education and to make suggestions for its potential applications in contemporary educational methods.

Aikaterini Lefka

THE CITIZENS' LIFELONG LEARNING IN PLATO'S *LAWS*[1]

ABSTRACT

In the *Laws*, Plato presents an educational program for all members of the projected city of Magnesia, which concerns not only various kinds of specific knowledge, but also, and more importantly, the application of ethical and political virtues, in view of becoming excellent citizens and achieving a "good life" in the long run, at the private and public level. These objectives are realised in many ways, as for example, by the people's participating in the legislation and the city's administration, by receiving a common fundamental education, including lessons of reading, writing, mathematics and astronomy; practicing sports; playing music; singing; dancing and also by taking an active role in religious festivals. The population is then divided in three groups, according to age, and they form "choirs" dedicated to different divinities (the children to the Muses, the young people to Apollo, the elderly to Dionysus). Thus, we may deduce that Plato was one of the ancient Greek philosophers who supported the concept of "lifelong learning," expanded through various kinds of knowledge, skills and qualities. In my paper I examine the objectives, different contents of Plato's pedagogical project destined to all the Magnetes, the various methods he proposed to use in order to arrive at its attainment, as well as the eventual reasons for these choices, related to his philosophical theories. I conclude by making a comparison with the notion of "lifelong learning" as we understand it today.

Introduction

Plato (428–347 B.C.) lived during a troubled period. At the end of the 5th century B.C., the city of Athens, engaged in the Peloponnesian war against Sparta and its allies with the well-known disastrous results, presents, according to the philosopher, a serious intellectual and moral decay (supported by materialist and relativist doctrines), influencing also the political, intellectual and religious

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1   I would like to dedicate the present article to my dear father, Periklis Lefkas, extremely courageous, sensitive and generous as a person, an inspired and inspiring professor and headmaster, as well as an enthusiastic researcher for new knowledge and experiences, since his early youth till today.

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life of the next century. The Athenian democracy showed many weaknesses; some of them touched Plato, of aristocratic descent – as, for example, the sentence to death of his venerated teacher, Socrates.

The philosopher's wish to see men lead a good life in the framework of their city is fundamental. He believes, as many other thinkers of the Antiquity, that this should be the objective of politics and that philosophy should define the content of the best life, as well as the means to achieve it. Plato develops constantly the reflection around this subject since his early dialogues. Arriving at his maturity, he tries to express more precisely what he believes to be the best way to organise the public domain. His "ideal cities" take form especially in two dialogues, his longest works: the *Republic* and the *Laws*.

The *Republic* represents a discussion on the definition of justice between Socrates and his friends. They imagine the city of Kallipolis as an example for a better understanding of this notion and the way to apply it in practice.

The *Laws* are inspired by the ambition to revise all the known political systems and to elaborate in detail a model of legislation combining in an original way a selection of their most interesting elements for Magnesia, a supposed future colony, resulting from the cooperation of different cities (a "second rank" city, after the ideal one of the *Republic*). The dialogue takes place in Crete during a pilgrimage from Knossos to the sanctuary of Zeus Idaeus of three aged friends: Clinias the Cretan, Megillus the Lacedemonian and an "Athenian Stranger". The spirit of this work is much more concrete. As it is the last Platonic dialogue (I consider the *Epinomis* its epilogue), one may think that the philosopher transmitted thus the quintessence of his experience and his political, ethical and religious positions, oriented until the end by the will to realise the individuals' well-being in a society.

For Plato's ethical and political theories in general, one may say that *eudaimonia*, or the "good life", is an objective which consists in the exercise of dialectics and the persons' critical spirit for the rational definition of the Good and the virtues, so that these could be applied in the private and the public spheres, in all circumstances.[2] The government of a city, conceived in its totality as a living organism, should be undertaken by the wisest and the ethically best citizens, men and women:[3] the Platonic ideal regime is a "timocracy", where each person assumes political functions according to their qualities, in the service of the common good.[4]

There are, however, differences in the way this main idea is adopted in the ideal cities of Kallipolis and Magnesia, respectively.[5] I shall cite only briefly those that are the most interesting for us here.

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2   See, for example: Wersinger 2008; Lefka 2009; Tordo-Rombaut 2017.

3   Plato is a supporter of the egalitarian participation of both sexes in the public life, against the patriarchal attitudes of his time.

4   For Plato's political theories see, for example, Klosko 1986; Fine 1999; Bobonich 2002; Schofield 2006 and more specifically concerning the *Laws,* for example: Strauss 1975; Stalley 1983; Bobonich 2010; Sanday 2012.

5   See, for example, Aristotle, *Politics,* II, 6, 1265 a–b and Saunders 1972: 28.

In Kallipolis the social "classes" are defined clearly in relation to their function, according to each person's character and natural qualities. The exercise of political power is reserved to the philosophers, who are educated by the city in all the sciences and the practice of dialectics up to the highest point, the knowledge of the Idea of the Good, for 40 years, passing progressively from severe exams of selection among the guardians. The conditions of their life are particular: they are hosted together in the centre of the city, having no right to private property or to a particular family, so that they won't be tempted to abuse their great power, instead dedicating themselves wholly to the city's well-being.[6]

In the projected Magnesia, the citizens aren't divided in the same way (the four classes are based on financial criteria, as it was the case in Athens) and they have a greater share in the exercise of political power. Indeed, this regime tries to combine the democratic and the oligarchic dimensions, as all the citizens (men and women) participate in the assembly and may assume specific important magistrates. These are defined by nomination, vote, lot, and scrutiny, which are the means of favorising the so-called "arithmetic" equality (the same rights for all) as well as the "geometric" equality (distribution according to each person's merits). The highest administrative body is the "Nocturnal Council" (*nykterinos syllogos*), a group of seniors possessing the highest degree of knowledge, wisdom and virtue, who should ensure that the city continues to follow the philosophically defined principles and the spirit of the initial legislators, even when changes should occur in the laws (they could be considered as the equivalent of the philosopher-governors of Kallipolis) (see also Baima (internet) 2023).[7]

In Magnesia all citizens participate in the government, at various levels. Therefore, as I will demonstrate, Plato insists here on a lifelong education for the whole population, concerning not only specific kinds of theoretical knowledge and practical capacities, but also the realisation of intellectual, ethical, political, and even bodily virtues that he considers crucial for the optimal functioning of the city's common life and the good life itself.[8]

In my article, I shall examine these educational objectives and the different methods Plato proposes in order to achieve them, as well as the eventual reasons for these choices, in relation to his philosophical theories. Finally, I shall compare the positions of the ancient Greek philosopher to the actual way we usually conceive the notion of "lifelong learning".

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6   For the functions, the selection, and the education of the philosopher guardians, see *Republic,* IV, 419a 1–421c6; 423c5–d 2; V, 454d6–456d1; VII, 514a1–521c7; 535a3–540c2. For the conditions and the objectives of their life, see *Republic,* III, 416c4–417b8; IV, 423e3–424a2; V, 449c2–462e2; 464a1–466b3. See also, for example: Kent-Sprague 1976; Reeve 1988; Edmond 1991; Lefka 2011a.
7   For the Nocturnal Council, see, for example, Brisson 2003.
8   For different aspects of Plato's ideas on education in this dialogue, see also, for example: Jouët-Pastré 2000; Mouze 2000; Cleary 2003; Domanski 2007; Georgoulas 2012; Castel-Bouchouchi 2013; Calame 2017; Spieker 2017; Stalley 2017.

Plato's Educational Objectives in the *Laws*

It is noteworthy, I think, that the *Laws* begin with the word "god" (*theos*), integrated in a question about the origin of the legislation of the interlocutors' homelands (*Laws*, I, 624a1–625b1). Indeed, the most important Dorian countries, admired by Plato for their political organisation, Lacedaemon and Crete, attribute their legislation respectively to Apollo[9] and Zeus.[10] Apollo's instructions were transmitted by his oracle of Delphi[11] to the legislator Lycurgus, who adapted them in the way he thought best to the laws of Sparta. As for Crete, Zeus communicated on this subject at regular intervals with his son, the just king Minos[12], in the Idean Cave, when he was taking the same path with the interlocutors of the *Laws* to climb the sacred mountain. There are no clear references to the Ionian city of Athens here.[13] However, one could take under consideration the allusion to its founder, Athena, made by the Cretan Clinias, when he says that he calls the Stranger "Athenian" and not "Atticus", because he seems to prefer a name evoking the goddess (*Laws*, I, 626d3–5.). According to É. des Places, this name is intended to attest some qualities in common with Athena: "protector of the arts, inspirator of the sober reason and the eloquence, which are found united in the Athenian Stranger" (Des Places 1951: 4, n. 1). In fact, Plato seems to underline the "philosophical nature" common between Athena and "one of her children" to indicate the personal proximity of the Athenian Stranger with the goddess who was believed to found his country's legislation.[14]

In all the three cases of these existent cities Plato describes the legislation as a divine present and as the action of "divine men" of different kinds, who serve as intermediaries between the divinity and the city. These legislators are capable of understanding and applying the "divine justice" to the elaboration of the laws that will regulate the human societies in the best possible way (Lefka 2013: 269–270).

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9   For more information about Apollo, the archer god, protector of music and medicine, his different attributes and the Oracle of Delphi see, for example: Parke 1939; Roux 1976; Monbrun 2007; Detienne 2009. For an interpretation of his role in Plato's work, see Schefer 1996.

10   For Zeus, the divine king of the world, the "father of gods and men", see, for example, Cook 1925; Parke 1967; Lloyd-Jones 1971.

11   Therefore, it is the Pythian Apollo; see also *Laws*, I, 632d1–6.

12   Minos was considered a contemporary of Theseaus, the first king who realised the unity of Attica's *kômoi* and centralised the political power in the city of Athens. For the Idean Cave see Sakellarakis 1988.

13   It is the case in other dialogues, where the Athenians are considered as raised and educated by Athena alone (*Timaeus,* 23d4 *sq.*) or by Athena and Hephaistus (*Critias,* 109c6 *sq.*). For Athena, the virgin war goddess of wisdom see, for example: Kérenyi 1952; Herington 1955; Kasper-Butz 1990; Deacy and Villing 2001. For Athena in the Platonic dialogues, see Lecomte 1993.

14   In this passage, it is accepted by the interlocutors that the questions of the Athenian and his way to structure the information, in view of defining the principles on which a habit is founded, clarified the subject. The Stranger applies in fact the dialectic method, which succeeds to facilitate the comprehension.

In the *Laws,* the city's good function is founded on religious beliefs, which, according to the interlocutors, should be shared by all citizens: the gods exist, they are just and they care for humans (*Laws,* X, 885b4–10; 907b6–9).[15] In book X, there are specific provisions of the legislation for the "religious (re) education" of the citizens who would put into question these basic metaphysical positions, or, in case of insistence, their for social. In fact, for the legislators, a person who wouldn't believe in the existence of divine justice could at any moment transgress secretly the city's laws and would not respect any moral principle (*Laws,* X, 885c1–909d3). Plato considers the faith in the gods of the city, as established by the legislator, the only guarantee of political stability (Derenne 1930: 250–252), as other Athenians of his time do. There are, however, some important differences: Plato introduces the laws of his ideal city concerning the official religion in accordance with his personal view on religious beliefs (provided they are approved by the oracle of Delphi). He privileges the pious internal disposition rather than the external manifestations of the cult (which are however present, too, in all the city's activities and at all moments of the public life, cf. Reverdin 1945; Lefka 2013: 189–275). He is interested also, as an educator, in the psychical, ethical and epistemological condition of the "impious" (Saunders 1972: 316–318). As G. Van Riel stresses, the Platonic piety is interiorised, linked mostly to morality as imitation of the divinity: being just and observing temperance is the best way to please the god, who is the measure of all things. Plato apparently founds the legislation of the city and its ethical values on this divine measure, in order to escape from the traditional "ritual formalism", as well as from the sophists' subjectivity. The failure of the "atheists" in religion becomes thus the reason of their failure in the moral and the political domains (Van Riel 2008).

As mentioned above, the gods' good will is attested, among others, by the various presents they offer to the humans, in view of helping them to survive, but also of educating all those who wish to follow their example, cultivating

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15   It should be noted here that already in the *Republic* (especially in books II and III) Plato exercises a severe criticism against the immoral anthropomorphic elements of the traditional religious beliefs about the gods, and then he advances, for the first time in the framework of the ancient Greek religion, what he considers rationally defined "theological rules" (*typoi theologias*): the gods are excellent beings (physically, morally and intellectually); as they are just and benevolent, they accord only goods to the humans (*Republic,* II, 378e4–383c7; III, 386a1–392a1). In his references to all divine beings, Plato follows these principles, transforming the traditional divinities into models of wisdom and virtue (see also Lefka 2003c). They are taking care of the harmonious function of the whole universe and especially of humans, the only mortal living beings possessing an immortal soul – the intellect being its highest part, which should guide the two irrational parts, linked to emotions and desires (for a concise presentation of the complex subject of the parts of the soul in Plato and the relations between soul-mind-body, see, for example: Guthrie 1957; Robinson 1970; Mattéi 2000; Safty 2003: 181–226; Karamanolis 2017: 340–349). For various aspects and interpretations of Plato's religious ideas, see also, for example: Goldschmidt 1949; Menn 1995; Motte 1997; Brisson 2002; Bordt 2006; Karfik 2007; Carone 2010; Timotin 2012 and 2017; Lefka 2013; Benitez 2016; Dillon 2016; Yount 2017.

their reason and the virtues and advancing towards the realisation of a "good life", which is also considered as "becoming like god" (*homoiōsis theōi*).[16] This means that each divine present has a beneficial influence on our lives and that there exists also a "correct" way to use it, so that its aim is accomplished. For example, the "felicitous choir of the Muses" offers us the knowledge of the appropriate mathematical analogies, so that we may play with rhythm and harmony (*Epinomis,* 991b3–4).

When Plato insists on the divine character of the legislation, qualifying the laws as a godsent gift, this should imply their beneficial value and the innate connection that the well-governed human cities should present with the divine laws ruling the universe (*kosmos*).[17] At the same time, he implies that, through the divinities' intervention, there could be a certain "objective" element in the elaboration of the laws, which guarantees their ethical and political excellence, against the purely subjective, arbitrary and pragmatic vision of these products of the human society, advanced by the sophists.

The "Athenian Stranger" considers the objective of all the mentioned legislations of these excellent cities to be helping the citizens become virtuous persons (*Laws,* I, 630c1–5). And the interlocutors decide to investigate together which would be the set of laws that could achieve this goal in the best possible way for the projected colony of the Magnesians (*Laws*, I, 643a4–644b4, II 652b3–653a3).

This conception of the legislation seems perhaps surprising to our modern mind, which stands closer to the perceptions of the sophists. However, Plato in fact follows the traditional beliefs of the Greeks concerning the role of the legislator and the laws. In fact, the legislator was considered also an educator of the citizens in the civic virtue (cf. Jaeger 1947: 217). The laws were supposed to teach the citizens what is fine, good and just, and to incite them to apply this teaching in order to achieve an excellent private and common life, and therefore *eudaimonia*. In fact, the essential differences among the cities' legislations were considered to reside in the different ways of defining the virtues that would assure the best possible common life, taking under consideration especially the contribution of the citizens in the administration and the function of their city.

Plato agrees with these ideas. It would be fortunate, he says, if men didn't even need a legislation, and if they were capable to think by themselves to find what would be the best actions to undertake so that they would satisfy their city's needs (*Laws,* IX 857e3–858a3).

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16   See also, for example: Sedley 1999; Pradeau 2003; Lefka 2003b and 2013: 431–434.
17   See also *Laws,* IV, 715e3–718c10, where the legislators are thinking of a discourse addressed to the future citizens of Magnesia, in order to explain better the relation between the divine justice governing the universe and the legislation of their city. Those who freely accept these laws, because they understand their crucial importance for their own ethical quality and for the felicitous stability of the city, "follow" the divinity, who "holds the beginning, the middle and the end of everything", being thus "the measure of all things". See also Romeiro Oliveira and Simôes 2018.

For Magnesia, the three interlocutors would like to create a legislation that would lead the people not only to become pious and just, but also to a combination of the principal ethical virtues pursued by the Dorian and the Ionian cities, that is an equilibrated mixture of courage and temperance (*Laws,* I, 634a1–4). This would be an original composition of the best qualities cultivated by each kind of regime (oligarchic and democratic).

Of course, as all citizens participate in one way or another in the administrative tasks, we may deduce that they should acquire a certain degree of intellectual virtues, also, as solid reasoning and critical thinking.

Means and Methods of Lifelong Education for the Citizens of Magnesia

We shall examine now some of the most important means and pedagogical methods that the interlocutors of the *Laws* propose, in order to realise the above objectives, during an education that should be extended to the citizens' whole lifetime.

Legislation and Practice of Citizenship

A lifelong civic education is undertaken, as we saw above, by the legislation of the city of the Magnesians. The citizens are rational and free persons; therefore, the interlocutors consider that they should be treated as such. Thus they should be convinced to accept the rules the legislators think best to establish for the projected city, and not just feel obliged to submit to them, under threat of punishment. Plato believes that coercion should be used only if absolutely necessary (*Laws,* IX, 858d6–9). This is why the Athenian Stranger proposes that, in their great majority, the laws should be preceded by "preludes" that explain the reasons supporting their adoption by the citizens, in order to treat them as free persons (*Laws,* IV, 722d3–723e8).[18] I think that this way to present the laws already constitutes a method of educating the citizens to acquire critical spirit, to act as independent persons and to understand in practice the notion of respect for one's freedom (as Plato understands it here) (cf. Lefka 2003a).

Another method of lifelong civic education related to the legislation in Magnesia is the participation of the people in the revision of the laws that are related to each person's domain of activities and specialization, if they notice

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18   The commentators offer various interpretations of the preludes in the *Laws*: Bobonich 1991 and Laks 1991 consider them as an example of "rational persuasion", equivalent to the dialectical demonstration. According to Stalley 1994 and Brisson 2000: 249 (and n. 5), the preambles of the *Laws* are persuasive discourses of "mythical" or "rhetoric" type, addressed to the emotivity and not to the reason of the citizens (the one of the book X, treating of the existence of the gods, is an exception). All the preambles are just the expression of a necessity known by the legislator. Nightingale 1993: 291–292, thinks that the use of the rhetoric or mythical means of persuasion is due to the fact that these texts contain directives and not an incitation to questioning.

any problem in their application. This is valid, for example, even for the laws concerning the religious rituals of the city, introduced by the oracle of Delphi (*Laws,* VIII, 828a1–5), which can be modified after the relative objections and proposals of a person exercising some sacerdotal activity (*Laws*, VIII, 828b3–5).

This participation of the citizens in the final elaboration of the legislation is an original measure of the *Laws.* In spite of the apparent absolute and inflexible character suggested by the idea of the godsent origin of the legislation, we may attest that the divine intervention is limited to the principles of the laws, which should express justice and goodness, but that the humans concerned should constantly remodel the concrete application of these principles by participating in the legislative procedure (and therefore showing that they may possess the wisdom and the virtues of a good legislator, as well as his educative capacities).

The Athenian democracy, too, expected the participation of the citizens in the process of changing the legislation. The essential difference with Magnesia resides in the fact that all the Athenian citizens participated in the same way in the discussions concerning all the laws, on any subject. Plato thinks that the citizens should interfere only in the domain related to their personal expertise, so that the modifications would be really pertinent and efficient. For the Magnesians the criterion of participation in the legislative procedure is especially their experience regarding the specific subject and not simply their citizenship.

Their knowledge, their capacities and their qualities are also taken primordially under consideration in the procedure of their selection for specific administrative roles, as we already saw. Assuming these functions is at the same time an occasion to apply the relevant virtues.

In general, practicing the various duties of a citizen, as defined by the legislation, was considered in the Antiquity the best way to be constantly educated in being a good citizen.[19] The participation of the Magnesians in the functioning of their city is integrated in this concrete method of civic education.

The Magistrate of Public Education

Athenian Stranger: In the department we have been dealing with, we have still to appoint an officer who shall preside over the whole range of education of both boys and girls. For this purpose there shall be one officer legally appointed: he shall not be under fifty years of age, and shall be the father of legitimate children of either sex, or preferably of both sexes. Both the candidate that is put first, and the elector who puts him first, must be convinced that of the highest offices of State this is by far the most important. For in the case of every creature – plant or animal, tame and wild alike – is the first shoot, if it sprouts out well, that is most effective in bringing to its proper development the essential excellence of the creature in question. Man, as we affirm, is a tame creature; none the less, while he is wont to become an animal most godlike and tame

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19   See, for example, Pythagorean School, D.-K. 58 D 4: Stob., *Anthol.*, IV, I, 40; Solon, D.-K., 10, 3, b, 10: Stob., *Anthol.,* III, I, 172.

when he happens to possess a happy nature combined with right education, if his training be deficient or bad, he turns out the wildest of all earth's creatures. Wherefore the lawgiver must not permit them to treat the education of children as a matter of secondary or casual importance; but, inasmuch as the presiding official must be well selected, he must begin first by charging them to appoint as president, to the best of their power, that one of the citizens who is in every way the most excellent. (*Laws,* VI, 765d5–766b2)[20]

The Stranger insists here on the major importance of education for the development of a human being's character. Thus, he proposes, in an original way, the election of a magistrate officially charged with the education of all the young people of the city, boys and girls. The person elected to accomplish this fundamental function for five years should be the best among the citizens, in every way, that is someone who knows and applies virtue, so that he would be not only an expert on the subject, but also himself a living example for future citizens.[21] He should have a certain maturity and the precious experience of raising his own children, too.

In fact, in Plato's time the education of each child depended on the choices and the financial possibilities of the parents. The girls would receive only elementary instruction or just the knowledge of the practical skills necessary to keep a household and to raise children. The boys, as future citizens, would be educated progressively. The most privileged young men of the classical period would attend private courses on the art of argumentation and persuasive discourse, offered by the sophists or the rhetors, who were considered "masters of the civic virtue" – a role contested by many philosophers. Plato, among others, underlines on many occasions the importance of the coherence between the knowledge of the virtues (piety, justice, courage, temperance, wisdom) and their application in the private and the public life.[22] This is achieved by the philosophical teaching, which becomes the best education "of the civic virtue".[23] The innovations introduced in the city of Magnesia for a public education common to all the boys and girls of the city, under the official supervision of the most virtuous citizen, clearly represents in practice the way Plato conceives the necessary elementary education.

Let us add that the election of the magistrate responsible for the public education is taking place in the temple of Apollo, being thus put under the auspices

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20   Translated by Bury, 1926. For all the citations of this paper, the same edition and translation is used.
21   In fact, we find here the same concepts that Socrates expressed in the Platonic dialogue *Alcibiades I* (121d12–124a7), where he mentioned the example of the education of the king of Persia, assigned to men who are excellent in each one of the arts and virtues to be acquired by the prince.
22   Thus, the personalities of Pythagoras or Empedocles, for example, granted also with a dimension of "divine" man, exercised an attraction on their disciples as strong as the influence of their doctrines.
23   For the relation between the theoretical knowledge of the Good and its application in Plato, see also Lefka 2014.

of a divinity not only protecting traditionally the young people[24] and music, but also assuming a predominant role of guide in religious, ethical and political matters for the ancient world, through his oracle at Delphi (Otto 1947: 71).[25]

Education of the Soul by mousikē and of the Mind by gymnastikē

When the Athenian legislator speaks about the youths' education, he puts forward that it has a double objective: it should cultivate their bodies by "gymnastic" (*gymnastikē*) and their soul by "music" (*mousikē*), so that they would become "in all respects as beautiful and good as possible" (*Laws,* VII, 788c6–8). Indeed, these were the two parts of the traditional fundamental education in the Antiquity. The term *mousikē* covered the whole of the theoretical subjects of learning: reading, writing, mathematics, poetry and singing – let's not forget, too, that the Ancient Greek language was practically sung. Then the Stranger divides the *gymnastikē* in two parts: dancing and wrestling (*Laws,* VII, 795d6–e1) (which, in fact, is one of the various sports practiced in Magnesia since childhood).

The legislator insists also that there should be stability already in the games of Magnesia's children, continued in the methods and contents of their education later. In this way, the citizens may learn to keep more easily unchanged the city's principles for the political organisation (*Laws,* VII, 797a8–798d6), as permanence is also one of the objectives of Plato's political ideal.

Mousikē

In the *Republic,* Plato had already developed in detail his ideas on the capacity of art, especially poetry and music, to form the soul of the llisteners. He stressed the dangers that this would imply, if the models the poets represented in their works were immoral, like the ones of the traditional divinities figuring in the epics of Homer and Hesiod (*Republic,* II, 376e6 *sq.*). He introduced the imposition of the *typoi theologias* to the content of all works of art accepted in the ideal city, and used more particularly for the education of the young people. The different modes of music itself would be also controlled, according to the effects they could have on the character. In the *Laws,* the legislators insist also that the poetry and the music used for the education of the city's

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24   Apollo, as well as Hermes and Heracles, protect the young people who train in the gymnasiums; see Graf 1996.
25   Otto sees in this ethical function of Apollo an "interiorization" of his cathartic properties. Apollo, through his Oracle of Delphi, was giving also precepts for a good moral conduct, as "Know thyself" (*gnōthi seauton*) or "Do nothing in excess" (*mēden agan*) – the most famous of these maxims, attributed to the "seven sages", which the visitors could read when they arrived at the temple. The "seven sages" of the Antiquity, recognised as advisors in matters of virtue for all Greece, were thus placed under the auspices of this divinity. The importance of this Panhellenic traditional function of Apollo is such that certain historians of the Greek religion speak of the god as "the highest expression of the Greek genius in the religious and moral domain": see Séchan and Lévêque 1966: 213, 223 (n. 170).

youth should present paradigms of good ethical behaviour and therefore follow a strict regulation by the laws, without permitting any original deviations. The "soul's training" aims essentially at the familiarization of the young people with virtue, as it is applied by the divinities, the heroes and the humans, in a stable way (*Laws*, II, 654e, 668a, VII, 798d8 *sq.*).[26]

As for the more general sense of *mousikē,* concerning also the other parts of the fundamental education, as reading, writing, mathematics, we saw that in Magnesia all the boys and girls of the city will follow these courses, under the supervision of the responsible magistrate. As mathematics is considered by Plato to be a practice of abstract thinking and preparation for the teaching of philosophy, we may deduce that all the citizens have a certain access to this kind of high theoretical knowledge and intellectual training, whereas in the Kallipolis it remained the privilege of the philosopher-governors (Baima (internet) 2023).

Another subject that is added to the scientific education of the Magnesians is astronomy. In the *Laws* the interlocutors consider the periodical, cyclical movement of the sky and the celestial bodies as an irrefutable proof of their divine identity, i.e. of their excellent soul and their perfect intellect, which are the sources of this ideal movement. This observation concerning the "visible gods" is used as a proof for the existence of the divinities in general (*Laws,* X, 886a1–899d3).[27]

The religious, ethical and educative function of astronomy is supported in other passages of the Platonic dialogues, too.[28] Based on his astronomical observations, man will conceive how the excellent reason can guide the body in well-coordinated movements in the sky and will try to imitate the relevant attitude on earth. In this way the same harmonious connection will be achieved among the parts of the soul and between soul and body, but also among all citizens and all humans. By following the example of the stellar divinities, every individual, every state, all humankind can move, if they wish, according to the same rules of rhythm and harmony, in order to participate in the felicitous cosmic dance. These concepts are indicative of the strong relations between the movements of the body and the virtues of the soul for Plato, as well as of their multiple importance.

Gymnastikē

Sports and Panhellenic Games

As we know, sports were highly appreciated by the Ancient Greeks. They were aiming not only at the good physical condition of the body (the bodily virtues of strength, flexibility, endurance), and the acquisition of specific capacities, related

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26   On Plato's attitude towards music and poetry see, for example: Moutsopoulos 1959; Murdoch 1977; Janaway 1995; Murray 1996; Naddaff 2002; Destrée and Hermann 2011.
27   For Plato's "*theologia naturalis*" see Ferrari 1998; Naddaf 1996, 2004.
28   For example: *Republic,* 528e3–531c8; *Laws,* VII, 817e5–818a1; *Epinomis,* 986a8–988b7; see also Sedley 1997: 332; Slezák 1997; Karfík 2004; Carone 2005; Lefka 2011b.

indirectly to a constant training potentially useful for military purposes, but also at the cultivation of relevant psychic virtues, like strength of will, perseverance, temperance. Sports encouraged also a spirit of noble emulation among the athletes and of a peaceful competition among the cities, within the framework of the Panhellenic games. They were celebrated on the occasion of great religious feasts at famous sanctuaries, as the Olympic games at the temple of Zeus at Olympia, the Nemean games (at the temple of Zeus at Nemea), the Isthmian games (in honour of Poseidon), the Pythian games (at the temple of Apollo at Delphi).[29]

In Magnesia, the legislators encourage the practice of sports for children and for adults of both sexes. They insisted on those that may become agreeable exercises for the military training, like running in arms, wrestling or fighting with weapons (*Laws,* VIII, 832d9 *sq.*). They always imply also sanctuaries of divinities related to the particular activity: for example, Ares[30] for the runners in full armour, Apollo and Artemis[31] for the archer runners (*Laws,* VIII, 833b2–c2).[32] The legislator describes the runners' departure for the sanctuary that would be the middle point of a race, from which they should return back afterwards to their initial starting point, as if the runners "went towards the god" and then came back to the magistrates who had sent them. It is a very particular way to present an athletic competition. But if one takes under consideration that this game is also a way to train the citizens for their "departure for war", one may imagine that in case of a true battle, the same persons would have the impression, thanks to this kind of conditioning since their early youth, to "go towards the divinity" that will protect and help them to go back home safely afterwards, as winners. Sports become also an exercise in courage, the military virtue *per excellence*.

The legislators of Magnesia further consider that the city should participate in the traditional Panhellenic games, by choosing the best possible ambassadors to accompany the athletes. They shall thus develop the most favourable image of the city in the domain of international relationships, as it was undertaken usually by the representatives of the Greek cities at the international athletic meetings. The difference of the Platonic city is that it should earn its reputation based not on the exposition of material power and wealth, but on the excellent qualities of its citizens, corporeal and psychic.[33]

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29   For the Panhellenic importance of these competitions, whose religious character was always valorised by the inaugural sacrifices and by the processions and hymns of the closing ceremony, see Rudhardt 1992: 149–158.
30   For Ares, the god of war, son of Zeus and Hera, see, for example: Brown 1989; Jouan 1989; Wathelet 1991; Mezzadri 2002; Blanco-Rodriguez 2005.
31   For Artemis, twin sister of Apollo, the bow-bearing hunteress, protectress of the wildlife and all the young living beings, see, for example: Monbrun 1989; Serafini 2013, Ellinger 2008; Guarisco 2015.
32   The interpretation of this complicated passage has provoked many discussions; see Saunders 1972: 71–74.
33   "The games is therefore a display of money, force, ability or talent; it offers to the represented groups the occasion to show in this display their vital resources and their

Athenian Stranger: It is right that embassies should be sent to Appollo at Pytho and to Zeus at Olympia, and to Nemea and the Isthmus, to take part in the sacrifices and games in honour of these gods; and it is right also that the ambassadors thus sent should be, so far as it is practicable, as numerous, noble and good as possible, – men who will gain for the State a high reputation in the sacred congresses of peace, and confer on it a glorious repute that will rival that of its warriors; and these men, when they return home, will teach the youth that the political institutions of other countries are inferior to their own. (*Laws,* XII, 950e2–951a4)

An interesting detail is the way in which the legislator chooses to speak about the games. In fact, he says that they should send citizens to Apollo and to Zeus, so that they could participate in the sacrifices and the games in honour of these divinities. The first objective of the embassy should be religious, followed by the athletic, social, and political dimensions. It is still a way to transform a human sportive reunion into a practice of piety. The second important point to note is that the persons who can travel outside the city (only on rare occasions, as this one), should adopt an educative attitude towards the young citizens, by insisting on the superiority of the political organization of Magnesia. It is important, as we shall also see later, that the citizens are convinced of the excellent quality of their political system and institutions, so that they wouldn't wish to introduce any radical changes – this is why the legislators manifestly prefer avoiding as much as possible the contacts of the Magnesians with foreign cultures and ways of life.

Dancing and Religious Festivals

Athenian Stranger : Of dancing there is one branch in which the style of the Muse is imitated, preserving both freedom and nobility, and another which aims at physical soundness, agility and beauty by securing for the various parts and members of the body the proper degree of flexibility and extension and bestowing also the rhythmical motion which belongs to each, and which accompanies the whole of dancing and is diffused throughout it completely. (*Laws,* VII, 795e1–7)

The second part of corporeal education is dancing, which is also divided in two kinds: the first "imitates" the nobility and the liberty of the "style of the Muse". The nine Muses (*Mousai*) protect and inspire all kinds of music, but also dancing and other fine arts and sciences. Besides, their name is etymologically parented and often a synonym of the term "music" (*mousikē*).[34] The second kind of dancing, lighter, aims at the harmonious development of the body by appropriate rhythmic movements. But the legislators will advance also another important distinction of the dances they wish to implement to Magnesia.

energy. The winner is inhabited by power. The games reveal in this respect and consecrate all superiority" (Saunders 1972: 152). See also Des Places 1969: 147–148.
34   For the nine daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne, protectors of the arts, the sciences and philosophy, see, for example: Montana 1988; Murray and Wilson 2004; Walde 2000.

A. *"Civic" or "Political" (*politikoi*) Dances*

On the one hand, there are the kinds of dance Plato calls *politikoi,* which can be translated as: "civic" or "political", i.e. the two categories that correspond to the above mentioned principles and therefore may be accepted as appropriate for the citizens of Magnesia.

The first kind of civic dances, named "warlike" or *pyrrichē*, aims essentially at the education to military fighting, at reinforcing the body for fighting through appropriate movements and at developing a courageous spirit. The second kind, the "pacific" one or *emmeleia*, trains the body and the soul to the virtues that are necessary in times of peace: the well-being, the harmonious movement, but also the action showing temperance towards pleasure (*Laws,* VII, 814d8–815b6).

1. "Warlike" dances, taught by armed divinities, or semi-divine *daimones* followers of gods.

The Athenian legislator refers to the necessity for the young people to imitate the divinities or the semi-gods or the *daimones* (minor divinities) followers of gods, who were the first to teach certain armed warlike dances, and gives concrete examples coming respectively from the three states of origin of the interlocutors: Athena for Athens, the Dioscuri Castor and Pollux[35] for Sparta and the Kouretes[36] for Knossos. In this way, the youth on the one hand participates in the city's festivals, while on the other they practice the use of weapons, and at the same time honour the gods (*Laws,* VII, 796b3–d5).

It is noteworthy for the Platonic theories that the model of Athena is used here, presented as a young girl who "enjoys the amusement of dancing" to support the egalitarian education of the two sexes that the philosopher wishes to offer to all the young people of his city (cf. *Laws*, VII, 788a1 *sq.*).

2. "Pacific" dances, taught by the divinities supervising the three choirs of age groups.

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35   Mythology reports that Leda, after her union with Zeus under the form of a swan, gave birth to two eggs. Two boys came out from the first: Castor and Pollux ; from the second, two girls : Helen and Clytemnestra. Only one child of each pair of twins was immortal. The Dioscuri were connected by such a brotherly love that they obtained finally from their father to share equally among them the status of immortality and the submission to death. As heroes and *daimones,* they received a very important cult in Sparta, their homeland. They constituted the model of the regime of the "double kingship" and protected more particularly the initiation rites of the young warriors, being always represented themselves as armed horsemen. According to the Spartan traditions, they were the inventors of the armed dance; see Burkert 1985: 212–213 and 432, n. 6.

36   The Kouretes were, according to mythology, Cretan *daimones* warriors who covered the cries of Zeus, when he was still a baby, by the noise of their armed dances, so that his father Kronos wouldn't suspect the existence of the young god. This myth was used by the Cretans as an "explanatory narration" for the dances that took place on the mountain Ida during the initiation rites of the adolescents to adulthood, placed under the auspices of Zeus Kouros; see Jeanmaire 1939; Burkert 1985: 102, 388, notes 36 and 37.

Renovating the traditional beliefs, Plato presents the divinities as teaching also the "pacific" dances to the members of the city, within the framework of the religious feasts.

In book II of the *Laws,* he reminds us that the virtues, especially temperance and courage, that he considers, together with justice, fundamental for the citizens of the ideal society, are realised thanks to the right education, so that man can keep a well-balanced and wise position towards his basic emotions, pleasure and pain.

> Now these forms of child-training, which consist in right discipline in pleasures and pains, grow slack and weakened to a great extent in the course of men's lives; so the gods, in pity for the human race thus born to misery, have ordained the feasts of thanksgiving as periods of respite from their troubles; and they have granted them as companions in their feasts the Muses and Apollo the master of music, and Dionysus, that they may at least set right again their modes of discipline by associating in their feasts with gods. (*Laws,* II, 653c7–d5)

Therefore, the feasts, which the merciful divinities offer to us, become a fundamental element of entertainment, in a double way. On the one hand, they help us to relax and to take a break from the struggle for our survival. On the other hand, they remind us of the moral principles that everyday life may cast to oblivion.

That is why the gods come in person to help us organise them. This dimension of the religious festivals is an original idea of Plato, which is added to the generally accepted vision of the feasts as a tribute of honour towards certain divinities.

In the festivals of Magnesia all members of the city participate: they are divided according to their age in choirs that sing and dance in different ways.

1) The children (up to 18 years old) compose the choir of the Muses.
2) The adults (30–60 years old) are members of the choir conducted by Apollo *Paian*.[37]
3) The choir of the elderly people, who enjoy essentially the performance of the younger ones, is put under the auspices of Dionysus (as the older persons possess the necessary temperance so that they can drink following the right measure) (see also: Larivée 2003).

The content of the songs and the dances is however common: it supports that the just, pious and moderate life is at the same time the happiest and the best (*Laws,* II, 664b3–666d2).

It seems reasonable that the Muses and their sovereign, Apollo, god of music and of the education in general, who offer pleasure to the Immortals with their art according to the mythology, are presented here as responsible for

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37 This epithet is inspired by a choric song usually dedicated to Apollo or Artemis, as an expression of gratitude for the salvation from an evil, be it an illness or a military victory; it was also sung before the beginning of an enterprise, as a prediction of its success.

these educative festivals. The connection of Dionysus with dances and festive manifestations globally isn't curious, either. Many ceremonies were organised in his honour, as the agrarian feasts with specific songs, one of which was the dithyramb, the precursor of drama. However, Dionysus was also the donator of wine, and usually he was attached to the abuse and the excess provoked by abundant drinking.[38] Plato, faithful to his own theological principles, cites him on the contrary as the god who will inspire self-discipline and temperance for the best use of his present to humanity.

These gods are then "co-dancers" of the young people and the other citizens, succeeding thus to educate them, so that the natural tendency of movement and shouting that we possess since our childhood is transformed to orderly songs and group dances, where we all hold hands together, thanks to the cultivation of the sense of the rhythm and of the harmony that characterises man (distinguishing him from the other animals). Besides, "to the choir (*choros*) they have given its name from the 'cheer' (*chara*) implanted therein" (*Laws,* II, 653e5–654a8).

B. The "Not Civic" or "Not Political" dances: the Imitation of Nymphs, Pans, Silens and Satyrs

There is also another kind of dances that Plato considers too difficult to classify, as it doesn't belong either to the "pacific" or to the "warlike" dances. It concerns those danced for purificatory reasons by drunken people, disguised in divinities of nature and vegetation: Nymphs[39], Pans[40], Silens and Satyrs.[41] They are the orgiastic and other dances connected with the cult of Bacchus, taking place during festivals that usually closed the winter period and saluted the beginning of Spring and the renewal of the vegetation. As we know, theatre is rooted in these feasts and various relevant customs are still to be found in many regions of Greece during the Carnival period. Naturally, Plato cannot agree with the behaviours of these dancers and thinks that it would be better to leave this kind of dance out of the ideal city, as it is "not civic", "not political", and " unfitting for citizens" (*ouk esti politikon*) (*Laws,* VII, 815b7–d4).

I believe that this constitutes a discrete effort of Plato not to condemn openly a traditional religious manifestation, but to underline that, according to the criteria defined by the legislators of the new city, the Bacchic dances offering models of *hybris* (excess), cannot be integrated to the Magnesians' cult.

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38   For Dionysus or Bacchus, see, for example, Jeanmaire 1951; Detienne 1977; Bourlet 1983; Berti and Caspari 1989; Schlesier 2011; Isler-Kerényi 2015.
39   For the Nymphs, who animate various elements of the natural environment, like trees, rivers, lakes or the sea, see, for example, Connor 1988. For the Greek nature divinities, see Hedreen 1994; Larson 2007.
40   For the goat-legged pastoral divinity Pan, inventor of the musical instrument syrinx, see, for example: Borgeaud 1979, 1988; Bader 1989.
41   For these *daimones,* traditionally followers of Dionysus, half anthropomorphic and half animals, see, for example: Brommer 1939; Janmaire 1949; Heinze 2001a, 2001b.

Let us note also that Plato expresses one more concern. Namely, the men who participate in this kind of ceremonies call themselves imitators of Nymphs, Silens, Satyrs and Pans. However, the use of the plural for the last divinity here is indicative of a "generalisation" deprived of seriousness. Nothing proves that it is a faith based on truth. Even the minor divinities, precisely because of their divine identity, couldn't behave in ways incompatible with wisdom and goodness, according to Plato. His criticism isn't turned against the nature's divinities themselves, but against the false beliefs that men hold about them.

In book VII of the *Laws,* the Athenian legislator explains that man is impossible to stay immobile when he speaks or sings. The imitation of the discourse by the movements gave birth to the art of dancing as a whole. However, some realise these movements harmoniously and in accordance with the music, others do not. Harmony is expressed by the "civic" or "political" dances. This is why the legislator should give instructions, in order to combine the right music with the right dance and to distribute these artistic activities among all the city's festivals and in a way to assure their stability, so that no one can modify them. Thus the citizens will get used to the invariability of the pleasures offered by this music and these dances, keeping stable themselves and the whole city, which will thus be living well and achieving *eudaimonia* in the long run (*Laws,* VII, 816a3–d2).

For Plato there is a right way to choose the most appropriate works of art protected by the Muses (cf. Hatzistavrou 2011). The criteria of the "finest" Muse, who will organise the citizens' choirs and the theatrical performances and all kinds of artistic performance, are identical with the ones that express the truth: grace, pleasure, rectitude, and utility (*Laws*, II, 667a9–c7).

We may therefore say that dancing, combined with the appropriate music, when it follows these rules within the framework of the religious feasts of the city, succeeds more precisely in attaining the following aims: it educates the body in the harmonious movement and contributes to its health and its well-being, while offering entertainment as an agreeable activity. It becomes a method of ethical education for the soul, by the integration of the virtues characterising the particular kinds of music and choreography. It accomplishes important political functions, as it trains citizens in the role they have to play successfully for their country's welfare, in times of peace and of war. At the same time, it reinforces the feeling of unity among the members of each choir, who have the same age, but also of the whole city. Finally, it constitutes a crucial religious ritual and a spiritual exercise, facilitating the approach of the divinity, as the gods are considered teachers who participate in the dance themselves and humans imitate them.

In order to highlight the importance of the image of the gods dancing with us, offered by Plato, I would like to stress here that this is the only moment in our terrestrial life when the divinities are supposed to intermix with men and to enjoy with us the *theoria* ("contemplation") of the most beautiful spectacle a city can offer: the young people dancing (cf. Motte 1996).

The notion of *theoria* from the beginning has religious and social connotations, as it signifies initially the function of the representatives sent by each city-state to the Panhellenic sports games. At the level of more "personal" ceremonies, the *theoria*, or contemplation, of sacred objects and actions in the Telesterion of Eleusis was the most crucial moment of the Mysteries.

Therefore, the *theoria* becomes a source of knowledge due to its direct experience, imposed as an unquestionable truth. For Plato, the "ascending" dialectical method guides the philosopher to the sudden and direct *theoria* of the Ideas of the Fine and the Good in the *Symposium* and in the *Republic*, respectively (cf. *Symposium,* 210e2–211b5; *Republic,* VII, 516b4–c1).[42]

An equivalent image is found in the myth of the *Phaedrus* (246a2–256e2), where the soul is represented metaphorically as a winged chariot with two horses, the "desiring" and the "spirited" parts, and a conductor, the "intellect". There the human souls, before their first incarnation in a body, can participate in the periodical procession of the divinities, which reminds the movement of the circular dances, towards the supra-celestial world and contemplate with them the Ideas of the Good, the Fine, the Just and the other ethical values, which "nourish" the intellect and fortify the wings of the soul. Moreover, Plato uses here the term "the choir of the gods" (*choros ton theon*) (*Phaedrus*, 247a7), when he insists on the good will of the divinities towards humans.

In consequence, according to Plato, since the initial moments of our souls we were dancing with the gods, who guided us to a knowledge necessary for the realisation of our intellectual and ethical excellence. I think we can say that the city's dances, which are periodically organised during the specific religious feasts of every year, represent in a certain way, through the body actually hosting the human soul, this original dance and that they help the soul to "remember" the principles that it should follow to become virtuous (as we know, for Plato all knowledge is a "reminiscence" of the Ideas). In this way, man can realise the best possible life both at the private and at the public level. In addition, the soul, recovering its wings after the body's death, can join again the dance of the divinities in the supra-celestial world.

Therefore, dancing is presented as capable of providing for all people, from their childhood until their most advanced age, educational work agreeable as much as it is efficient, equivalent to the role of philosophy, that concerns only the persons who are capable and wish to practice it (cf. Lefka 2018).

Some General Final Remarks

I believe that, after the discussion above, we may attest that in the *Laws* Plato adopts an all-round lifelong education for all the members of the ideal city: religious, intellectual, ethical, social, political, which is aiming at the metaphysical beliefs, the reason, the emotions, and the body. In this way, he takes into consideration the multiple aspects of a human being and of our private and

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42   For the notion of "contemplation" in Plato see also Festugière 1936.

public life. This is indicative, I think, in the passage of this dialogue where he presents the human being as a puppet, created by the gods, moved by various strings, representing the different motivations of our actions, as our emotions, our desires, our fears, our will. These strings are hard and steely, but one among them is "golden", soft and holy: it symbolises our reason ("calculation"), as well as the just law, and moves us towards the best direction, but it is extremely weak, compared to the other strings (*Laws,* I, 644c1–645c4). Education of all these elements of the human being is therefore necessary, so that the action incited by the "golden string" would be followed with less effort.

As we saw, according to Plato, human life should aim at a stable and complete *eudaimonia*, both at the individual and at the social level. The material and corporeal goods aren't sufficient to assure the excellent life, whereas the "divine" goods of the soul, independent and stable, are the most important, as the legislators of Magnesia underline, because the material goods depend on them (*Laws,* I, 631b3–d7.). Therefore, they believe that the best way to achieve the city's welfare resides in the cultivation of all the virtues and their practice, in a cooperative spirit, by all means, within a peaceful environment.

In consequence, the "lifelong education" in the city of the Magnesians, as defined above, comes to help the citizens to attain these objectives.

> Athenian Stranger: But we must not allow our description of education to remain indefinite. For at present, when censuring or commending a man's upbringing we describe one man as educated and another as uneducated, though the latter may often be uncommonly well educated in the trade of a pedlar or a skipper, or some other similar occupation. But we, naturally, in our present discourse are not taking the view that such things as these make up education: the education we speak of is training from childhood in goodness, which makes a man eagerly desirous of becoming a perfect citizen, understanding how both to rule and be ruled righteously. This is the special form of nurture to which, as I suppose, our present argument would confine the term "education"; whereas an upbringing which aims only at money-making or physical strength, or even some mental accomplishment devoid of reason and justice, it would term vulgar and illiberal and utterly unworthy of the name "education". Let us not, however, quarrel over a name, but let us abide by the statement we agreed upon just now, that those who are rightly educated become, as a rule, good, and that one should in no case disparage education, since it stands first among the finest gifts that are given to the best men... (*Laws,* I, 643d8–644b3)

I think that here we may distinguish clearly the main difference between Plato's vision of the citizens' "lifelong education" and the one adopted by our times. The actual "developed" societies require high specialisation concerning professional training and activities, in a technological environment evolving constantly and extremely rapidly. Modern "lifelong learning" aims essentially at the updating of the necessary technical knowledge for the workers, so that they may assume their professional functions in the most efficient and productive way.

On the other hand, our world is characterised also by great instability. Resilience and the capacity to change professional occupation are considered as

great qualities for an elementary survival. Thus, contemporary "lifelong learning" may help people get acquainted with completely new domains of knowledge, but always concerning practical competences, so that a shift in their career path could become possible at any moment of their lives.

Of course, our vision indeed involves quite a different attitude towards education than the one defended by Plato in the ideal city of the *Laws*.[43] We are inspired by practical necessities, trying to affront them. One could say that the comparison of two different eras and ways of thinking should stop here. However, given the ethical and political crisis of our times, putting people in difficult positions, shouldn't we perhaps reconsider the importance of the well-being of a person from perspectives other than the material, financial or professional? Without necessarily following a position as rigid as Plato's, couldn't we think more about the eventual positive effects of educating people in view of becoming sensitive in developing harmoniously all parts of their being? That should include their critical thinking, their ethical values and their application, their emotions, their body, their cooperative social relations, their responsibility as free citizens of democracies to participate in the political life in view of the common good, and their leisure activities.

Human life is complex and difficult, but perhaps an education taking into consideration all its aspects, in a perspective of developing its best elements and of achieving personal, social and political harmony and well-being (not to mention a necessary equilibrium in the relations with the natural environment), might bring some precious advantages to the future generations.

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43   See also Dillon 2017, who considers Plato "the ancestor of the ideal of humanist education [...] which is now fast fading from the educational scene in the face of the pressure for purely vocational training: that is, the idea that the study of purely abstract subjects, whether pure mathematics, or Latin and Greek languages and literature, or whatever, is in fact the best mental training for success in a whole range of practical activities, particularly such vocations as politics, public administration, law, or the upper echelons of business, for proficiency in which nowadays specific schools and institutes have been set up, largely to the detriment of true competence in those areas. That is the true legacy of the Platonist model of education, on which modern civilisation is progressively turning its back: that the properly structured study of quite abstract subjects is the best training for the mind, even when the mind is turned to the solution of entirely practical problems". I agree with all these ideas, but I believe that Plato's educational project is richer, containing many more aspects, as demonstrated above.

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Aikaterini Lefka

Doživotno učenje građana u Platonovim *Zakonima*

Apstrakt

U *Zakonima*, Platon predstavlja obrazovni program za sve članove zamišljenog grada Magnezije koji se tiče ne samo različitih vrsta specifičnog znanja već i, još važnije, primene etičkih i političkih vrlina sa ciljem da se stvore odlični građani koji će moći da žive „dobar život" na duge staze kako u privatnom tako i u javnom smislu. Ovi ciljevi mogu biti ostvareni na mnoštvo načina, kao, na primer, kroz učestvovanje pojedinaca i pojedinki u zakonodavstvu i upravljanju gradom, kroz zajedničko osnovno obrazovanje koje bi uključivalo čitanje, pisanje, matematiku i astronomiju, kroz vežbanje sporta, kroz pevanje i igranje, kao i kroz aktivno učestvovanje u religioznim festivalima. Stanovništvo se tada deli u tri grupe prema starosti, te se formiraju „horovi" koji su posvećeni različitim božanstvima (deca su posvećena muzama, mladi ljudi su posvećeni Apolonu, a stari ljudi su posvećeni Dionisu). Dakle, možemo zaključiti da je Platon bio jedan od drevnih grčkih filozofa koji je podržavao koncept „doživotnog učenja", proširen kroz različite vrste znanja, veština i kvaliteta. U svom radu, ispitujem ciljeve, različite sadržaje Platonovog pedagoškog projekta koji je namenjen svim stanovnicima Magnezije, različite metode koje je Platon predlagao kako bi se došlo do postizanja pedagoških ciljeva, kao i eventualne razloge za ove izbore u skladu sa njegovom filozofskom teorijom. Rad zaključujem tako što pravim poređenje sa pojmom „doživotnog učenja" kako ga danas razumemo.

Ključne reči: Platon; *Zakoni*; idealni grad; etika; politika; građanin; dobar život; doživotno učenje; religiozno, etičko i građansko obrazovanje; vrline; odnos između tela, duše i intelekta; bogovi.

Zoran Dimić

THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN ARISTOTLE'S *POLITICS*

ABSTRACT
Aristotle analyzed the problem of education in the seventh and eighth books of *Politics*. Most researchers interpret his thoughts on education as "the education of the youth". Some authors try to convince us of the significance of contemplation and the problem of the best possible way of life in analyzing Aristotle's education theory. We would like to regard the problem of education in another frame. The role of education is exceptionally significant, judging from the central theme of *Politics* – the political practice of human beings. Therefore, the critical question we want to ask here is – what is the reason for creating a polis? Only when we understand Aristotle's answer to this question will we know why education plays such an essential role in a polis. Aristotle avoids definitively prescribing and ordering what music children and citizens should listen to. He leaves open the critical question about "how children and citizens should be educated". Disagreeing on the proper way of education is the very essence of education. No ready-made best way to be educated has to be applied in every case. The best way is only the one that is the outcome of the particular dispute. Just as citizens, while in power, have to think about those who are subordinate because they replace each other, when thinking about the aim of education, they have to think about each other. Outside of that process, there is no ideal form of education, the application of which would improve the political community.

KEYWORDS
education, political community, politics, virtue, happiness, disagreement, dispute

Introduction

The standard approach to the problem of education in Aristotle's *Politics* usually follows the natural path from *Nicomachean Ethics* to *Politics*. Aristotle firstly established the anthropological foundation of education (*paideia*) (EN I, 1,5,6,13). The first book of *Nicomachean Ethics* defined happiness as the most critical aim of human life. He did not explicitly claim, but it is evident that education is a part of how happiness is supposed to be achieved. In the second and sixth book Aristotle analyzed the two areas of education's responsibility. The first one is a moral habit (ἔθος) (EN II, 1– 6), and the second one is common sense (ὀρθὸν λόγον) (EN, VI, 1–9 13). Within *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle did

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not refer to the education problem directly, but he just described the broader field of its practice and contribution. However, he analyzed this problem in the seventh and eighth books of *Politics* most straightforwardly. If we want to talk about Aristotelean educational theory, we should indispensably consider these two books in *Politics*. However, most researchers interpret his thoughts on education in *Politics* as the "education of the youth" (Destrée 2014: 301). It is just partly true. Judging the appropriate education of the youth is not the main subject in Aristotle's sphere of interest. Althgough Destrée put in relationship the problem of education and the definition of human being as political animal, he misses to realize the central position of education in polis. (ibid.: 303)

Some authors (Depew, Destrée, Tuozzo) try to convince us of the significance of contemplation and the problem of the best possible way of life in analyzing Aristotle's theory of education. Depew sets the problem of education in the frame of analysis of the problem of self-sufficiency, happy life, and leisure (Depew 1991: 354). He considers Aristotle's thought on education interesting in the analysis of the relation between action and contemplation (ibid.: 374).

We would like to regard the problem of education in another frame. The role of education is exceptionally significant, judging from the central theme of *Politics* – the political practice of human beings. Therefore we want to praise Lord's idea to frame the discussion on the problem of education in *Politics* between Aristotle's analysis of the state (πόλις) and his analysis of the "regime" or constitution (πολιτεία) (Lord 1990: 203). Lord clearly marked Aristotle's position: "his belief in the necessity of education for the constitution of perfection of the city has been largely missed" (ibid.: 204). Consequently, we cannot understand why education is such an essential topic in *Politics* until we consider the fundamental goal of politics in general. Contrary to Hobbesian and modern views on politics, according to which politics is firstly a matter of reaching security, Aristotle claims that true politics should aim at "happiness" (εὐδαιμονία). City-state (πόλις) is not established just for barely living. It is the household (οἰκία) that is made for everyday life and the security of the family members (Dimić 2022: 33–47). Therefore, the critical question we want to ask here is – what is the reason for creating a polis? Only when we understand Aristotle's answer to this question will we know why education plays such an essential role in a polis.

The Origin of Polis

Aristotle gives us the most detailed and explicit account of why a polis is created in the third book of *Politics* (Pol., III, 5). After he presented some degenerated forms of political power in the previous chapter, here in the fifth one, he firstly analyzes the principle of justice and its complexity. Aristotle notices that the meaning of justice is not the same in oligarchy and democracy (Pol. 1280a 7). For instance, justice (δίκαιον) is equality (ἴσον) for those who are equal, but not for those who are not. Justice can also be an inequality (ἄνισον), though not for everybody, but only for those who are unequal. However, the point is not the

relativity of justice. Aristotle here follows a different logic, contrary to our intuition. He points out that "most men are bad judges when their own interests are in question" (Pol. 1280a 17). Thanks to Aristotle, we actually learn indirectly that justice and politics have to do with something other than self-interest. Aristotle does not believe that men formed the political community and came together for the sake of wealth. The aim of this community could not also be military alliance (συμμαχία). In addition, polis exists not for trade and business relations. As we can see, Aristotle anticipated a modern view of the essence of the state and referred to it very critically. He effortlessly expresses his crucial thought: "the state (πόλις) was formed not for the sake of life only but rather for the good life" (Pol. 1280a 32).[1] Since he claims that a household (οἰκία) is a specific community for the sake of life, Aristotle doesn't consider polis as a community that specifically has to do something with essential maintenance of everyday life.[2] Therefore regarding polis, he has much more expectations than from military alliance, trade union, or household. Aristotle provides here arguments that sound a little odd to contemporary readers. If the state was formed for the sake of life, "a collection of slaves or of lower animals would be a state, but as it is, it is not a state, because slaves and animals have no share in well-being (εὐδαιμονία) or in purposive life (κατὰ προαίρεσιν)" (Pol. 1280a 34). Thanks to Aristotle, we again learn indirectly that polis has to do something with well-being and purposive life.

In addition, he delivers a few precise arguments why the collection of slaves or lower animals, military alliance, or trade union could not be considered polis. Firstly, since the slaves and lower animals are occupied with everyday life maintenance, they cannot search for something more than bare life. The well-being is beyond their reach. Secondly, since the slaves were the tools of their masters, they could not make decisions independently and live in purposive life. Thirdly, the members of a military alliance or trade union come together "for defense against injury by anybody" or for the "sake of trade and business relations" (Pol. 1280a 33). It is a fact that they have agreements (συνθήκη) about imports and covenants (σύμβολα) as to abstaining from dishonesty and treaties (γραφαὶ) for a military alliance. Still, the point for not considering them polis is that they are not the citizens of a single state, and they don't have "officials common to them". They are just members of an accidental community made for one specific purpose. Here we come to the crucial part of this argument: the members of these communities don't take any concern "but only that they shall not commit any wrong against each other" (Pol. 1280b 6). Aristotle tells us here indirectly that it is impossible to reach good life and have purposive life in polis if you don't have concern for other people. In addition, he states clearly what he expects from the members of polis. Since this thought is crucial for what Aristotle tells us about the origin of the polis, we will deliver

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1   Aristotle 1944: 213. Here we used the following translation of Aristotle's *Politics*: Aristotle (1944), *Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; translated by H. Rackham.
2   On the specific role of the household for the sake of life, see in more detail: Dimić 2022: 33.

this quote as a whole: "All those on the other hand who are concerned about good government do take civic virtue and vice into their purview. Thus it is also clear that any state that is truly so called and is not a state merely in name must pay attention to virtue; for otherwise the community becomes merely an alliance, differing only in locality from the other alliances, those of allies that live apart" (Pol. 1280b 7).

Aristotle tells us that one of the most dangerous consequences of bad government is the degeneration of a polis into an alliance (συμμαχία). This is one of the most critical spots in *Politics* where Aristotle doesn't only describe the political world he is facing but refers to it in a normative manner. He differs between the polis that is "truly so called" and the one that is "a state (πόλις) merely in name". Since it doesn't concern civic virtue, the second form of a polis appears much closer to an alliance. If the members of a polis want to live in a proper form of political community, they must pay attention to virtue. This thought brings us to the specific role of education in a polis. As we will see in the following analysis of Aristotle's thoughts on education in the seventh and eighth books of *Politics*, there is a direct relationship between virtue, law, and education. We will close this analysis on the origin of a polis with one significant Aristotle statement regarding the difference between polis and alliance. If the members of a polis live in a political community that is "a state (πόλις) merely in name", which means that they live in an alliance rather than a polis, then we have the following situation: "And the law is covenant or, in the phrase of the sophist Lycophron, a guarantee of men's just claims on one another, but it is not designed to make the citizens virtuous and just" (Pol. 1280b 11). One of the most significant differences between polis and alliance is in the role of law. Within the military alliance (συμμαχία), or trade union, a law, represents merely a "covenant". It guarantees that the members will be together "for defense against injury by anybody" or for the "sake of trade and business relations". However, within the polis, a low becomes one of the essential pillars of the community. As we can see from this quote, Aristotle claims it is up to the law to "make the citizens virtuous and just". Since Aristotle does not understand laws as a "covenant", a kind of a "guarantee of men's just claims on one another" (Pol. 1280b 10–12), he was far away from the modern perspective on the aim of politics. If the main aim of the members of a polis should be something more than just security, a low has to be something more than just a covenant. If the main task regarding a law should be just its simple application as a guarantee, a human being would never reach the political community. It was evident to him that politics as much as ethics deals with much more complicated things, human affairs (περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια) (EN, 1181b 15). Human affairs are not solved by applying ready-made solutions or theoretical models but by arguing about possible solutions under concrete circumstances. If the law does not go beyond the "guarantee of men's just claims on one another", the city-state would never be established. Therefore we refer now to the relationship between virtue, law, and education to realize why education is so significant for the political community's well-being.

The Origin of Education in Polis

Aristotle brings us to the phenomenon of education in a manner that is pretty counterintuitive for the contemporary reader. The main difference between polis as a political community and a military alliance or trade union is the lack of "mutual dealings" (Pol. 1280b 22). The state (πόλις) has to do nothing with sharing a common locality for the purpose of "preventing mutual injury and exchanging goods". You can bring the sites of two cities together, for instance, "so that the city walls of Megara and those of Corinth were contiguous", but even so, they would not be one city. You can also enact the rights of intermarriage with each other. However, intermarriage between citzens is one of the elements of community which are the main feature of a polis, but it would still not make them the citizens of a polis. It is necessary for the group of people to be called a state (πόλις) to have something more in common than just an exchange of commodities and military alliance. Sharing a common locality to prevent mutual injury and exchange goods are necessary pre-conditions of a state's existence, but they are not enough. Gathering and making community is not the crucial point of humans as political animals.[3] Before we analyze the most significant of Aristotle's thoughts on education, we want to draw readers' attention to a specific quote from the third book of *Politics*. Bringing once again the concepts of virtue, morals, and polis together, Aristotle states the following: "the political fellowship must therefore be deemed to exist for the sake of noble actions, not merely for living in common" (Pol. 1281a 3). We arrive here at the critical topic of this paper – the significance of education for the emergence and maintenance of a political community. If noble actions are so crucial for the polis, what is the relationship between education and "noble actions"? Answering this question could lead us to a better understanding of the relationship between education and polis.

Aristotle's account of the role of education in polis starts in the twelfth chapter of the seventh book of *Politics*. The specific topic of the twelfth chapter is the aim (τέλος) of the best constitution (πολιτεία). Most of Aristotle's 35 pages account on education in the seventh and eighth book of *Politics* deals with two very concrete questions: how to educate children in their first seven years and how to educate young people in music. Aristotle focuses on general questions about education at the beginning of this account. The seventh book's topic is the polis's well-being and its members' happiness. Aristotle analyzes different aspects of the citizen's life: the best way of life, the appropriate size of the best polis, its geographical suburb, the connection of a polis with the sea, and the behavior of citizens and their social status.

Aristotle's vocabulary here is exact, and we will pay a lot of intention to it. While "polis" is a slightly more general word, and Aristotle uses it when he talks about the political community in a general sense, the term "constitution"

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3   On the essence of Aristotle's definition of man as a political animal, see in details: Dimić 2022: 110.

is much more specific.[4] Aristotle uses it when he wants to determine the relationships in the polis precisely. The general analysis of education Aristotle starts in the same way he researches the origin of a polis in the third book. The main concepts in this analysis are quite the same as in the research on the origin of a polis: well-being, happiness, and virtue. Aristotle introduces the concept of education for the first time while answering the question: "what and of what character should be the components of the state that is to have felicity and good government"? (Pol. 1331b 26) The welfare of the members of the polis consists of two essential things: the first one is the correct establishment of the aim and end of their actions, and the second one is the ascertainment of the activities leading to that end. Here we are again convinced of how pragmatic Aristotle is in his approach to the problems that characterize the political community. He pays equal attention to defining the end of one constitution and determining the practical means leading to it. Here it is stated once again what we could also learn in the third book of *Politics* – the aim of a constitution is "good life and happiness" (Pol. 1331b 39). Here we come very close to the problem of education. It is clear that all people aim at good life and happiness, but some possess the power to achieve these things, and some do not. They can not do that owing to some factor of fortune or of nature. People differ in the sense of better or worse natural disposition or specific equipment of means. Although they have the power, some people "go wrong at the start of their search for happiness".

The exact meeting place of education and the political community occurs at the moment when Aristotle explicitly formulates what he sees as his main task in *Politics*: "But the object before us is to discern the best constitution, and this is the one under which a state will be best governed, and a state will be best governed under the constitution under which it has the most opportunity for happiness" (Pol. 1332a 6). It is evident that, according to Aristotle, there is no such thing as the ultimate best constitution. The members of one state should search for the best constitution under which they have the most opportunity for happiness. It will depend on many factors, and we can not just state that democracy or monarchy is the best constitution because it had good outcomes in the neighboring state. The problem becomes more complicated if we consider the definition of happiness.

Happiness, Virtue and Education

As we could also see in *Nicomachean Ethics* (EN, 1102a 22), Aristotle's definition of happiness indirectly includes education. In *Politics*, he similarly repeats this definition: "happiness is the complete activity end employment of virtue" (Pol. 1332a 12). Regarding happiness and virtue, it is necessary that "some goods must be forthcoming to start with". Some members of the political community are naturally gifted; for them, it is much easier to live by virtue. For the state

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4 On the specific meaning of the term "constitution", see in details: Dimić 2022: 141.

it is much more significant that "some goods must be provided by legislator (νομοθέτην)" (Pol. 1332a 29). It is crucial for a better understanding of Aristotle's comprehension of education to mark that his direct analysis of education starts with considering the role of a legislator. Here we find one of the most significant of Aristotle's thoughts on the relationship between human political nature and education. Education becomes an essential issue in Aristotle's analysis of politics because the state should not wait for the virtue to be realized in the citizens, but it should produce it. Aristotle stated: "but when we come to the state's being virtuous, to secure this is not the function of fortune but of the science and policy" (Pol. 1332a 35). Shortly, the members of the polis start to think about education and how to organize it when they want to make their citizens virtuous. Therefore, the main point the government must consider is how the political community members become virtuous. That is precisely the spot for the role of education.

Regarding being virtuous, some things can be controlled by people, and there are some which cannot be. Since there are things by which men are made good and virtuous (nature, habit and reason), it is evident that we can not influence nature. One must be born as a human being and not as an animal to talk about whether they are virtuous or not. According to Aristotle, we can not also influence the quality of our body or soul. However, even if some people possess the quality of body and soul, they become modified by habit in the wrong direction. Habit is a factor that a human being can modify. This process is going on with the help of human reason (logos). Aristotle states that these "three things must be in harmony" (Pol. 1332b 6). The guarantee for this harmony can only be provided by education (παιδεία). Shortly, habit and logos need education to enable virtuous citizens. Here, Aristotle connects education with the legislator's task to produce virtuous citizens in the most straightforward way: "Now we have already defined the proper natural character of those who are to be amenable to the hand of legislator; what now remains is the task of education, for men learn some things by practice, others by precept" (Pol. 1332b 11).

Therefore we claim the central role of education in Aristotle's idea of a well-governed political community. Since every political community is composed of rulers and subjects, Aristotle intends to consider whether the rulers and subjects should change or remain the same throughout life. Here we find one of the most significant pieces of proof for our claim that education is one of the pillars of the human political community. Aristotle effortlessly states this thought: "for it is clear that their education also will have to be made to correspond with this distribution of functions" (Pol. 1332b 15). The way of education depends directly on the political constitution of a particular state. If the rulers and subjects remain the same throughout life, specific education should be applied to realize the aim of the community. However, Aristotle is not convinced that it is a good solution. He is much closer to the opposite position: "it is clear that for many reasons it is necessary for all to share alike in ruling and being ruled in turn" (Pol. 1332b 25). His argument is quite simple: "it is difficult for a constitution to endure that is framed in contravention of

justice". If the rulers and subjects are ruling and being ruled in turn, the chances for more just for all community members increase.

Education and Dispute

After this extended analysis of Aristotle's statements in *Politics*, we can slowly put together a picture of how he sees the role of education in a polis. Regardless of how we see Aristotle's determination regarding the best constitution, here we want to emphasize that it is much more significant to note that Aristotle thinks that it is much better for the citizens if those who rule and the subjects alternate with each other.[5] In the following quote, he explains how he sees the role of education in the such community: "Hence their education also is bound to be in one way the same and in another different. For he who is to be a good ruler must have first been ruledruled [...]" (Pol. 1333a 1). Now we can complete the whole picture of Aristotle's theory on education.

We can not ultimately realize the role of education in polis without understanding the essence of Aristotle's theory of human political practice. At this point, we come to the fundamental concepts around which Aristotle bases his political theory in the most immediate sense. Namely, focusing on the very core of the organization (τάξις) of the political community is the way to answer the question of what is just and what is not. At the same time, justice (δικαιοσύνη) is not something predetermined or given that the members of the polis already possess, something that is written somewhere or that resides in some eternal world of ideas. On the contrary, the only way to determine whether something corresponds to justice is to discern and decide (κρίσις); therefore, judge, weigh, and evaluate whether a particular act is just (τοῦ δικαίου) or not. However, the members of a political community do not do it in the traditional way, as it is, for example, done by the head of the household or the head of the village by "delivering" the decision about what is just to others or by turning to the gods to get answers to these questions.[6] Still, they constantly criticize (κρίσις) and discuss it (ἀμφισβητέω), using, of course, speech (logos) and arguments. Right here, we are in the very center of Aristotle's political theory, that is, his definition of the content of political practice and the definition of man as a political animal. We should seek the answers regarding Aristotle's understanding of the essence of politics in that intermediate space between the terms "κρίσις" (distinguishing, deciding), "ἀμφισβητέω" (disputing, debating), and "δικαιοσύνη" (justice).

From how questions of justice are determined in a polis, it is immediately apparent why polis has nothing to do with anything traditional or natural. Since the reasons these questions are determined in the political community do not concern anything already established, which is a part of custom or

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5   For instance, Höffe claims that Aristotle was closest to liberal democracy (Höffe 2001: 187).
6   See the difference in decision-making in household and polis in more detail: Dimić 2022: 110–115.

tradition in advance, we can freely conclude that polis is a radically modern occurrence. We can say the same about the way of decision-making that is established in it. Given that the authority of the decision about justice has become disputed and it is no longer "guaranteed" to the master or elder, in the new context, it becomes challenging to determine precisely the source of this authority. Therefore it begins to change from one person to another, depending on the arguments presented. Hence, justice ceases to be delivered but begins to rely on the angle of view, that is, the position of the one who judges. If, in a specific situation, we want to know what is just and what is not, then we have to investigate and observe the particular problem from different sides (ἀμφισ), which is precisely the original meaning of the verb "ἀμφισβητέιν". The fate of the policy members lies in the fact that they do not have a ready and once and for all answer to the question of what is just and what is not, but that every time it is necessary, they have to discuss this question anew. In this sense, we could say that disagreement about the issue of justice is the natural state of state members.

In further elaboration of Aristotle's understanding of the political character of the human being, we could then say the following. How the logos determines in polis what is just and what is not is entirely consistent with how power circulates in the same polis between those who rule and those who are subjects, which is precisely the essential characteristic of the political community that separates it from the household or village. While in the household and village, it is always unequivocally known who rules and who is subordinate, and what is just and what is not, the situation is significantly different in a polis. Namely, in a political community,, the holder of power is never the same, but those who are rulers and subjects are constantly changing in that position. Hence, no person gives the final judgment about what is just and what is not, but the citizens always decide by disputing and arguing. Therefore, we claim fundamental instability of any constitution. The critical thing on which the very organization (τάξις) of the political community is based is not something that is known in advance, something solid, reliable, and unchanging. It is controversial and subject to constant disagreement and reconciliation. Therefore, we claim that the debate (ἀμφισβητέιν) is the keyword of Aristotle's entire *Politics*, and consequently, it marks his understanding of education.

The contents of the seventh and eighth books of *Politics* represent Aristotle's exposition of many different approaches to the problem of raising children, that is, their musical education. In the eighth book, Aristotle presents arguments for different musical rhythms or gymnastic exercises. He examines all the statements in detail and presents their strengths and weaknesses. However, Aristotle avoids definitively prescribing and ordering what music children and citizens should listen to. On the contrary, he leaves open the critical question about "what music should be listened to", that is, "how children and citizens should be educated". He clearly states: "But consideration must be given to the question, what constitutes education and what is the proper way to be educated. At present there are differences of opinion as to the proper tasks

to be set; for all people do not agree [...]" (Pol. 1337a 36). Disagreeing on the proper way of education is the very essence of it. There is no ready-made best way to be educated that has to be applied in every case. The best way is only the one that is the outcome of the particular dispute. Just as citizens, while in power, have to think about those who are subordinate because they replace each other, when thinking about the aim of education they have to think about each other. The parents should think about children, a teacher about students, a legislator about the citizens, and vice versa. Mutual comparison and assessment of those who educate and those who are being educated is the essence of the educational process. Outside of that process, there is no ideal form of education, the application of which could improve the community. That is precisely the outcome of Aristotle's account of education in the seventh and eighth books of *Politics*.

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Zoran Dimić

Uloga obrazovanja u Aristotelovoj *Politici*

Apstrakt

Aristotel problem obrazovanja analizira u sedmoj i osmoj knjizi *Politike*. Većina istraživača njegova razmišljanja o obrazovanju tumači kao „obrazovanje mladih". Neki autori, analizirajući Aristotelovu teoriju obrazovanja, pokušavaju da nas uvere u značaj kontemplacije i problema najboljeg načina života. Ovde želimo da problem obrazovanja sagledamo u drugom okviru. Uloga obrazovanja izuzetno je značajna, sudeći po središnjoj temi *Politike* – političkoj praksi čoveka. Stoga je ključno pitanje koje ovde želimo da postavimo – koji je razlog stvaranja polisa? Tek kada shvatimo Aristotelov odgovor na ovo pitanje, moći ćemo razumeti zašto obrazovanje igra tako bitnu ulogu u polisu. Aristotel svakako izbegava da propisuje i naređuje koju muziku deca i građani treba da slušaju. On ostavlja otvorenim ključno pitanje „kako obrazovati decu i građane". Neslaganje oko ispravnog načina obrazovanja je zapravo

njegova suština. Ne postoji gotov, najbolji način obrazovanja koji se može primeniti u svakoj situaciji. Najbolji način je samo onaj koji je rezultat sporenja na ovu temu. Kao što građani, dok su na vlasti, moraju misliti na one koji su podređeni jer jedni druge smenjuju, isto tako kada razmišljaju o cilju obrazovanja jednako moraju misliti jedni na druge. Izvan tog procesa ne postoji idealan oblik obrazovanja čijom bi se primenom mogla unaprediti politička zajednica.

Ključne reči: obrazovanje, politička zajednica, politika, vrlina, sreća, neslaganje, spor.

Lada Stevanović

WOMEN'S EDUCATION, KNOWLEDGE AND COMPETENCE IN ANCIENT GREECE

ABSTRACT
The paper deals with women's education in Ancient Greece. In ancient times, women were dominated by men throughout the Greek world, while their roles and competence were strictly defined (albeit differently across various city-states). Although not all women were deprived of education, their education was almost never organized by the city-state. Women's knowledge and voice were never welcome in the public domain. However, the picture of women's education, knowledge and competences is not one-dimensional and it would be wrong to claim that those did not exist. Foreign women sometimes had more freedom of education and free communication with men than Greek citizens' wives (especially in Athens); education was also available for girls from rich families; some city-states other than Athens were less restrictive towards their women.

   The other aspect of the issue was the fact that there was some knowledge available to women, and in some professions, women did not appear as an exception, but rather as a rule. Such was the case of midwives, women physicians and herbal specialists/pharmacists. Their prominent role in the private domain did not only involve care of home and closest kin, but also rituals, and this should be considered an important aspect of women's competence. However, researching women's education and knowledge in antiquity is a difficult task, because veils of silence were cast over women's voices in ancient times, including those that attempted to break through the barriers of their age.

Introductory Remarks

The discussion about education and knowledge is always a question of epistemology and gnoseology. How to approach the concept of knowledge, what do we mean by it and how did the Ancient Greeks understand knowledge? It is well known that the Western philosophical tradition developed on the grounds of Greek philosophy. Furthermore, mainstream academic research about antiquity has been shaped through the lens of Western thought and 19th-century

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academia, researching antiquity from its own standpoint and focusing on particular interests – philosophy, history, arts, architecture, theatre, etc. Thus, the Western philosophical tradition and the knowledge about Greek antiquity are inevitably related, sharing the same phallogocentric thread. "Phallogocentrism as an apparatus of subjectivity works by organizing the significant/signifying differences according to a hierarchical scale that is governed by the standardized mainstream subject" (Braidotti 2002: 158). From antiquity on, the mainstream subject has been male and what we research has been *his* philosophy, *his* history, *his* knowledge. This takes place in *his* language and *his* epistemology. The very notion of reason in the Western philosophical tradition is male.[1]

Such an academic perspective has only fragmentarily been challenged for the limitations of its standpoints and prejudices. Apart from the fresh perspective and interest in the research of women, provided by Classical Women Studies (developing at first in the USA), the biggest turn and the impetus for change in the approach to the ancient world was given by the school of Anthropology of Ancient Worlds (Jean-Pierre Vernant, Pier Vidal-Naquet, Nicole Loraux etc.), but also by some related researchers on the other side of the English Channel (Geoffrey Lloyd) and across the Atlantic (Froma Zeitlin, Gregory Nagy, John Winkler, etc.) who made efforts to become aware of their own perspective, changing not only the angle of their research, but also its focus by moving towards the margins of Ancient Greek society and life. Following the methodological paths of this school that started developing during the 1960s, I will pose some questions about women's education and knowledge in ancient Greece. This challenging task involves numerous doubts and obstacles – how to research women's knowledge when only rare women had the right to education? How to research women when they were mainly silenced, absent from the public and from the available sources? Does knowledge include only what is contemplated and learned in public education, written down, or transmitted by manuscripts? Who produces and transmits knowledge? Is there women's knowledge that is not standardized or included in the intellectual heritage and as such not being mentioned in research and literature? So, apart from the already open question of reasons for women's absence from the canon, even when they "thought like men" and "did what men do" (Waithe 1987: XII), and not only when their (philosophical) problems and ethical questions transgressed the borders of the dominant paradigm (Waithe 1987: XII), the important methodological question is – how to reach and research the women's knowledge that does not fit into the dominant intellectual male streams, including not only women's intellectual heritage, but also knowledge in a wider sense? Trying to tackle this question from different sides, I will start from the sources and information that are available, primarily those concerning the (im)possibility of education for girls and women.

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1   A brilliant book on this subject was written by Genevieve Lloyd (1993).

The Education of Girls and Women in Greek Antiquity

Of the entire Greek world, only the militaristic Sparta organized education for women already in the archaic and classical periods (Pomeroy 2002: 3, 4). Just at the first glance, it might seem paradoxical that this warrior-like patriarchal society aimed at giving birth to healthy male offspring and raising future soldiers, provided their mothers with relatively good living conditions and freedom, especially compared to Athenian women (Pomeroy 2002). Unlike in Athens, women in Sparta were supplied with good food portions, they exercised, they got married much later than Athenian girls, maintaining close relationships with their primary families and other women; Spartan women, moreover, could own and inherit property and they were educated. Compared to male Spartans, it is considered that women were better educated intellectually because men were focused on improving their physical strength. However, the quality of intellectual education was not high, while average literacy was much better in Athens.[2]

It is interesting to note that one of the rare women among Plato's disciples, and also a teacher at the Academia, was Axiothea of Philesia (ancient Philus was at that time under the Spartan rule). This woman came from Peloponnesus intending to learn from Plato (Themistius, *Orationes* 23.295C, ed. Dindorf cf. Waithe 1987: 209) and stayed in the Academia as a teacher. Dicaearchus informs us that she used to wear men's clothes (Dicaearchus, *Fragmenta* 44, ed. Wehrli, Waithe 1987: 205–206). This might be related to the social norms in Athens at the time, which were extremely limiting for women (especially Athenian born women), and might have been the reason that the female philosopher decided to cross-dress, symbolically empowering her social status by at least looking like a man. In this context, it is interesting to note that in *Menexenus,* Plato used a masculine noun side by side with a feminine participle and feminine adjective when referring to the famous Aspasia: διδάσκαλος οὖσα οὐ πάνυ φαύλη περὶ ῥητορικῆς /she who is my *instructor* is by no means in the art of rhetoric (Plato, *Menexenus* 235e), although in *The Laws* (814c) he created non-existent feminine nouns to denote women citizen (πολιτίδες) as Greek nouns were easily adaptable to grammatical gender shifts. So, although women were obviously rarely educated and only few of them could educate men, teacher in ancient Athens had to have some masculine signifier be that only in terms of grammar. Another Plato's woman disciple, as well as the disciple of his successor Speusippus, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (though in fewer details) was Lasthenia of Mantinea (Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers,* Plato III 46, 317; Speusippus IV 2, 375). The presence of these and other women philosophers in Plato's Academy was possible due to Plato's philosophical position about the immateriality of soul that was eternal, non-sexual and therefore, not different between men and women (Salisbury 2001: 277).

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2   In his book on ancient literacy, William Harris argues that by the fifth century, everybody who had an important political role in all of the Greek world, except Sparta, had to be literate (Harris 1989: 74).

Anyhow, it would be wrong to claim that there were no educated women in Athens, yet female education in Athens was not formally organized. It is supposed that educated women mainly came from rich families of the former aristocracy or from the families of highly educated men who were ready to share their knowledge with the women from their surroundings. All in all, the destinies of and decisions concerning Athenian women were always in men's hands – until marriage the decisions were made by their fathers and afterwards by their husbands. The numerous vase images testify that women could be musically educated – that they danced, played the cithara, lyre or flute (Golden 2015: 62). Mark Golden mentions also the vase fragment representing an older girl with tablets which indicates that this girl was educated outside her home. Due to the fact that the vase fragment belonged to the cup used for drinking wine, Golden suggests that the represented girl was a hetaira. He uses the same argument to interpret a red-figure phiale representing a girl dancing with several other women (Golden 2015: 62).

Many educated women in this famous polis belonged to the social category of non-Athenians – especially foreigners – metics (μέτοικοι), some of whom were hetairai (ἑταίραι), known not only for their beauty, but also for their intellect. It is important to emphasize that hetairai, unlike pornai (prostitutes) were often from high social circles, refined, interesting to talk to and well educated. The status of foreign women in Athens is particularly interesting because of the independence they enjoyed in comparison to Athenian women. However, it is difficult to determine who among the educated and famous female metics was a hetaira and who was not due to the sources being quite ambivalent and unclear especially concerning Aspasia.[3]

Aspasia was probably the most famous, learned, prominent and influential woman in Athens. She was the life partner of the famous Athenian politician Pericles, having moved from Miletus to Athens around 450 BC shortly after Pericles introduced the law that Athenian citizens could be only those men whose both parents were born Athenians. The reason for such a law was to support marriages between Athenian men and women and providing Athenian brides with grooms of a proper social status. Anyhow, this law was the reason why Aspasia could have never become the legitimate wife of Pericles and their son an Athenian citizen. However, as Nicole Loraux comments on Aspasia's situation as a metic, "this status, while denying her the right to become the legal spouse of the man whose life she shared, allowed her – at the risk of a somewhat sulphurous reputation – the freedom to be seen, to think, and to express herself" (Loraux 2021: 9). She was not only the partner and probably the teacher of rhetoric to Pericles and other Athenians (such as Lysicles), but also had encounters with Socrates both as a lover and an intellectual companion (Loraux 2021: 12). But, as Loraux revealed in her brilliant and complex analysis of Aspasia, not only that the sources should be read carefully when they maliciously mention her

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3   The complicated issue of the sources in which Aspasia appears and their fictionality/factionality is brilliantly and delicately approached by Nicole Loraux (2021).

as a courtesan, i.e. the brothel owner (Aristophanes, *Ach. Anonymus, Ed.* 496; Plutarch *Pericles* 24.3), one should also take into account the very strong antithetical ideas about women which prevailed in Athens at the time – about married Athenian women being modest and foreign women having suspicious morality:

> Indeed […] in Athens maybe more than anywhere else, the image of woman is split between the figure of the wife, mother of legitimate children, deprived of all personal autonomy and legal status (and which the orthodoxy of civic representations wishes to remain as ignorant as possible), and that of the courtesan, always available, expert in the pleasures of love, intelligent, and of sound council. (Loraux 2021: 21–22)

Such ambivalent and reductive ideas about women (e.g. the idea of woman as a saint or a whore) are also found, in a somewhat different form, in other patriarchal societies, which share the tendency to neglect women's rights to free choice and independence, judging negatively any behavior which does not fit perfectly into the dominant social demands and reducing women to typical roles they may or may not fit.

Midwives and Women Physicians

Among the educated women in Ancient Greece, in addition to philosophers and poets, a special place belongs to midwives (μαῖα) and women doctors (ἰατρικῆ) mentioned in the 4th century BC already, with midwifery being one of the oldest medical professions.[4] The skills of midwifery had less to do with the knowledge acquired from books and more with the women's private domain of care and healing. And while midwifery skills were shared among women, women physicians additionally acquired knowledge always through practice as a skill from their male family members – fathers and husbands.[5]

"Women's health was women's business" (Flemming 2007: 257). This phrase did not only refer to women's choice to be treated by women, but also to the whole practice of midwives who not only helped with labor but also treated different illnesses in women and children and learned the healing skills mostly from other women. The younger women (whether slaves or daughters) generally used to learn from older ones (Tsouclas, Karamanou, Sgantzos 2014: 547). Certainly, neither midwives nor other women working in medicine could earn a diploma where "one's reputation served as one's 'certification'". (Retief, Cilliers 2006: 168)

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4   Nurses did not appear in Greek or Roman antiquity, and their appearance is related rather to the role of female deacons in the early Christian church, while usually members of the family or slaves helped (Retieff, Cilliers 2006: 167).

5   Plato, *Phaedrus* 268c stresses that medicine cannot be learned from books. However, the article by Rebecca Flemming reveals there were female authored works though all of them appeared in Hellenistic or Roman times (Flemming 2007: 257–279). However, the later sources – referring to Roman times – as Soranus inform us that literacy was a desirable (but not necessary) skill for midwives and women physicians (Retief, Cilliers 2006: 168).

It is interesting that exactly from this domain, the word that denotes midwifery – ἡ μαιευτικὴ τέχνη – was borrowed by Socrates whose mother used to be a midwife. In Plato's *Theaetetus* Socrates first mentions his mother Phaenarete (Plat. *Theatetus* 149a) and then explains that he adopted her technique to help giving birth to ideas through dialogue without the awareness of the other person (Plat. *Theatetus* 149a). The respect for the profession of midwives is obvious in this dialogue – from the surprise that Theaetetus did not know who Socrates' mother was, to the clear statement about the importance of midwives (Plat. *Theatetus* 149–150). However, the words of Socrates suggest that his philosophical skill of midwifery is much more important and difficult than the job of midwives that help giving birth to human beings:

> So great, then, is the importance of midwives; but their function is less important than mine. For women do not, like my patients, bring forth at one time real children and at another mere images which it is difficult to distinguish from the real. For if they did, the greatest and noblest part of the work of the midwives would be in distinguishing between the real and the false. Do you not think so? (Plat. *Theatetus* 150a-b)

The aforementioned Plato's text represents the earliest written source about midwifery, while other important evidences that testify to the existence of women physicians and midwives are epigraphic, most often funerary inscriptions. One of those (around 350 BC) mentions Phanostrate (from Acharnai in Attica) who was both a midwife and a physician (Retief, Cilliers 2006: 171; Pleket 1969). However, Herophilus from Alexandria (320–260 BC) left the earliest work on midwifery (*Maieutikon*), although saved only in fragments. Somewhat later, Soranus of Ephesus (98–138 AD) with his *Gynaecology* (Retief, Cilliers 2006: 171) is yet another significant source which offers detailed information about midwifery. Although evidence about women physicians is not as numerous as those about midwives, there is no doubt that society respected and accepted them, though again, to a lesser degree than their male counterparts, whose knowledge was considered to be more general (Flemming 2007: 258). Here we once again come across the issue of phallogocentrism and the values that assume that men's knowledge and skills were more valuable, although, as Soranus informed us, midwives were sometimes invited by women also for other health problems since there were fewer women physicians, and women preferred to communicate with other women (Retief, Cilliers 2006: 184).[6] Except from Soranus, other authors that mention women physicians and midwives include Martial (38–104 AD) in his epigrams, Pliny the Elder (2379 AD) in *Natural History*, Juvenal (1st and 2nd century AD) in his satires, Galen (129–200 AD) and others. However, it is important to mention one manuscript written by a woman physician – Metrodora (around 2nd/3rd century AD) titled *On the*

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6   Soranus also categorizes midwifes into three groups: 1. wise women of the village communities; 2. midwifes trained also in the theory of obstetrics; 3. generally trained women physicians (Retief, Cilliers 2006: 184).

Suffering of Mothers as Women that discusses not only diseases that might affect fertility but also contraception (Retief, Cilliers 2006: 173).

Especially in Greece and in the Greek speaking Eastern Mediterranean, the obstetric profession was highly regarded and provided good living, while in Rome the situation was different and the profession was more spread among slaves, who, however, could have earned freedom with the earnings from the job (Retief, Cilliers 2006: 184). Anyhow, we may suppose that the respect that midwives enjoyed in the Greek speaking world is related to the high status of women in the ritual sphere, particularly when it comes to the rituals related to the matters of life and death (and all the related tasks and rituals) that were regarded to be dangerous since the processes of giving birth and dying were considered to happen in the periods when borders between life and death were blurred and unstable. The strict ritual regulations and prominent place in these tabooed domains brought women high reputation in society, at the same time marking them with ritual impurity – μίασμα (Parker 1983: 32–70). Helping with giving birth and treating other illnesses were closely related to this domain and women's competence in the sphere that was at the same time practical and ritual.

However, while Plato mentions that the midwife could have been only a woman who already had her own children, later sources do not mention this condition (Retief, Cilliers 2006: 180). In the Byzantine period, the situation changed and virginity started to be the condition which provided women the license to practice male's professions. What we might conclude from this is that women's position in society was not the same throughout antiquity, neither in place, nor in time, and that we should interpret all this information with caution. Anyhow, one thing is certain – women were not forbidden to practice medicine although the respect they enjoyed in comparison to men was smaller (Flemming 2007: 279). Midwifery, as any other women's work and skill, was partly self-understandable.

Another medical domain in which women participated was pharmacology and botany. Although the domain was not exclusively female and although written sources are numerous and abundant, it is important to emphasize that the transmission of knowledge happened orally (Totelin 2016: 1). However, there is no doubt that some women were authorized to make herbal remedies and antidotes. Yet another dangerous side of this skill is described in literature. Namely, many mythical women were known as magicians – the most famous among them were Circe and Medea[7] – while Thessalian women were famous for the love potions they made (Totelin 2016: 6). Anyhow, the knowledge was considered to be a secret and interesting cross-cultural research would be possible to make across the Balkans about herbalists in the 20th century – men and women whose knowledge was enormous but secret and not easily shared.[8]

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7 About prehistoric origins of magic and relatedness of magical rituals and beliefs to the cult of Great Earth goddess, and later animosity towards it, see: Luck 2006.
8 Still famous is the case of Montenegrin herbalist Jovan Šaljić, who gained world fame helping famous actress Kitty Swan (who appeared as Jane in a film about Tarzan)

This insight into women's irregular education and the fact that there were women physicians and midwifes as well as herb specialists and healers in Greek antiquity, lead us to approach women's knowledge and skills in a wider sense without focusing on the organized education that was mainly available to men in public spaces. I would further like to open the following question: which knowledge and skills (apart from the already mentioned) were accessible to women? First of all, there are necessary skills for the functioning of home (οἶκος) and all that was related to women's life and space (and their social competence) which means all those domains that belonged to women such as care for the children and family, sexuality and birth control, care about housing and food, clothing and waving.

All of the mentioned bears belittling connotations and even today these jobs and skills are necessary but self-understanding and not much appreciated. Brule and Nevill point out that "the exploitation of gender was more commonplace than that of slaves" (Brule, Nevill 2013: 26), and emphasize that "nor does it count for much in the eyes of historians, who look more at the slaves" (Brule, Nevill 2013: 26).

However, there is another, already mentioned domain, which in ritual (and hence social) context had a huge importance, being related to the fact that women were familiar with the knowledge and secrets of life and its inseparable part – death. In addition to the practical aspect, this domain had an important dimension – the ritual one, which regulated the behavior of the whole community struck by the crisis provoked by the death or birth of a new community member. All the care around newborns and the deceased as well as all the surrounding rituals was women's responsibility. It was believed that in times of death and birth, all paths between the world of the living and of the Beyond were opened, which was one of the reasons to adhere to precisely defined rituals. As it was believed, only properly performed rituals enabled a newborn to survive, and the deceased to reach the world of the dead, at the same time protecting the living from the powers of death (and life) that at these periods of crises represented a bigger threat for the living and their whole community (Stevanović 2009: 23). Respecting ritual regulations had to provide success and protect the members of the community, eventually enabling them to go on with life.

Let us now return to women's work in households. The mentioning of ταμία – home economist, supervisor, manageress – appears very early in Greek

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after being burnt during the film set. When doctors could not help her anymore, Šaljić did. The actress spent some time in the home of Dragica and Jovan Šaljić and their treatment healed her. Šaljić balm, already famous and sold well in Yugoslavia (people would travel to Berane and wait in front of his home to be accepted and get the proper balm) became famous worldwide (Mitrović 2017). When Šaljić died, after many obstacles, a big pharmacist house bought the recipe from the family and his balms are still produced and sold. However, the people who used to buy directly from him say that something is missing and that the creams he used to make were much better. Even when written down and sold, the secret knowledge did not lose its secrecy. Probably the family did not sell the complete recipe.

literature. In the *Odyssey* it is Eurycleia (*Od.* 2.345); in the *Iliad* the "house-dame" responds to Hector, who asks about Andromache (*Il.* 6. 390), and Priamus thus addresses Hecuba (*Il.* 24. 302). However, the most interesting for us is Xenophon, who in the *Oeconomicus* through the mouth of Isomachus thus calls his wife, mentioning that he invited her to be "the guardian of the laws for our household" (Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* ix, 14, 15, 16; cf. Brule, Nevill 2013: 24). Xenophon also mentions Aspasia, through the words of Socrates, who praises her as the one who might explain how wife takes care of the household and expenses, in a way similar to the one in which husband takes care of incomes (Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* iii, 15, 16).

However, being a manageress of the house did not save women from other jobs in the house but did require organizational skills. One of the most important women's jobs was related to clothes production. From an early age, Athenian girls learned to weave, and they were doing that both for their home, i.e. private needs of family members, as well as for public needs. Even Homer mentions the capable hands and wisdom of Hippodameia (*Il.* 13. 432). Especially important and famous was the weaving of the complicated peplos devoted to the goddess Athena. Namely, every four years, for the festival of Great Panathenaea, a peplos was woven for Athena. Many women of different ages participated in this task. The peplos was magnificent and colorful, and it had a rich decoration retelling the story about Athena's victory over the Giants.

Women's Poetry, (Wo)Men's Thought, Women's Voice

When we think about women's self-expression in antiquity, we have to start from poetry and from Sappho, a poetess from Lesbos living in the 7th century BC who was a woman talking about women and their sexuality (Winkler 2020: 44).[9] So, as John Winkler emphasizes, the problem is not the subject sung in her poetry (since Alkmans' interests were similar), but rather the perspective. Namely, Sappho as a woman dared not only to speak publicly, but also to speak about the subject of women's sexuality (Winkler 2020: 44), thus breaking taboo double. Sappho's name is unbreakably tied to Lesbos, the wealthy island where she was born and gained her education. She died in Sicily, in exile (because of the island revolution), where she probably lived for thirty years. Although the greatest part of her poetry is lost – except for fragments and the "Hymn to Aphrodite" – it is supposed that Sappho had a circle of friends, a kind of women's school, where they wrote poetry. Although there is no doubt that she, alongside wedding poems, also wrote verses with homosexual content (Rayor 1991: 5), the insistence on Sappho's homosexuality in the Greek and European traditions is not that much the consequence of explicit or exclusive homosexuality in her poetry, but should be rather read in another, ideological and conservative key. As Svetlana Slapšak points out, Athenian democracy, which silenced its own

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9   For more about women lyric poets (Korinna, Praxilla, Telesilla, Erinna, Anyte, Nossis, Moiro, Hedyla, and Melinno) see: Rayor (1991).

women and controlled their life by strictly defined norms that kept them shut in homes (except in periods of ritual participation), could more easily accept (and even develop) a phantasm of the distant island on which women were not only free to speak and write poetry about their own sexuality but also enjoyed (homo)sexuality in ways women elsewhere were not allowed to (Slapšak 2013: 150–151). So, no matter how inspirational this narrative might be for contemporary pro-lesbian and feminist studies, its conservative kernel (of ascribing its freedom to the distant Other) is inseparably tied to it in this Janus-like situation. On the positive side, the questions and disputes about Sappho's lesbianism that often divided academics into different poles, inspired a lot of research and findings about the early Aegean culture, and also social sensibility of the place and time (Slapšak 2013: 151).

Except among poets, we find women also among philosophers. Already two women philosophers who were teaching in Academia have been mentioned in the text – Axiothea of Philesia and Lasthenia of Mantinea. There are two other women that are explicitly mentioned in relation to Academia – one of them is Aspasia, and the other is Diotima of Mantinea, who is mentioned only in Plato's dialogue *Symposium* as the one who influenced Socrates' philosophy of love and immortality. Among many interesting ideas of Diotima, I would like to point out the one about the possibility for people to develop abstract values and to be "'pregnant in soul' (101) – that is, those who conceive wisdom and virtue in general, and poets and craftsmen who produce beautiful things" (Salisbury 2001: 88). Is it possible that precisely this idea of the famous woman philosopher, priestess, and Socrates' teacher thus inspired the *maieutic* technique? What else might help the pregnant soul than the technique of bringing new ideas through questioning and dialogue?

However, scholars are still very much focused on questioning whether Diotima existed at all. Those who claim her fictitious character argue that Socrates would have never had a woman teacher, that the *Symposium* is the only text that mentions her, and that it is unusual for Plato to give a woman such a prominent role in the dialogue (Salisbury 2001: 89). The issue of the historicity of Diotima is brilliantly questioned by Ellen Mary Waithe.[10] Among many complex philosophical arguments, she also mentions the evidence from the 15th century that testifies to disbelief ("silliness") that a woman philosopher existed. She confronted this argument with the straightforward evidence of the archaeologists and classicists who found a carving that is interpreted as a scene from the *Symposium* – Diotima speaking to Socrates (Waithe 1987: xiv). Furthermore, Plato did ascribe to Diotima the role of Socrates' teacher and her ideas are different from the ideas of Plato and Socrates (Salisbury 2001: 89). Instead of the question whether Diotima was Socrates' teacher or not, we might ask: Why is it so difficult to believe that Socrates acquired knowledge from a woman? Undoubtedly Diotima's authority was supported by the fact that she appeared as a priestess, being related to the Earth-mother and the domain of

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10   For a detailed discussion, see: Waithe (1987).

fertility (life and death), in which women, and especially priestesses (as mediators between people and gods), were still respected.

Pythagoras (6th century BC) also had a woman teacher. She was also a priestess (from Delphi) who, as Salisbury claims, "not only links him to a woman but also gave his philosophic musings divine authority" (Salisbury 2001: 277). However, her existence is not doubted by scholars because Pythagorean teachings equated women and men regarding their reason – the most important characteristic of any human being.[11] Therefore, women philosophers were not an exception, but rather a rule in the Pythagorean community. Famous are his wife Theano I, his daughters – Myia, Arignote, and Damo – while among late women Pythagoreans (4th century BC) we come across the names of Phintys of Sparta, Perictione (actually two philosophers with the same name), Theano II, and Aesara of Lucania (Salisbury 2001: 277).

The question that is posed is how to regard women's place in the philosophical, male tradition? This question leads to the opening other problems. The first would be whether it is possible to talk about *women's voice* in ancient philosophy, especially regarding the fact that some women philosophers raised questions different from those of their male colleagues, although the main themes were always in harmony with the philosophical school they belonged to. Exactly because of the fact that the themes which preoccupy women are even today recognized as less valuable as well as because of the absence of the awareness of the fixation to the binary-valued logic characteristic of Western philosophy in which everything related to women is regarded as deprivileged (emotions, nature, the corporeal) and less valued than the other part of the pair related to men (reason, culture, spirit etc.), ancient women philosophers are more often marked in literature as women thinkers than philosophers.

One of the examples of *women's thought* in ancient philosophy is the one by Theano II in letters – *Theano II to Eubole*. She questioned the concept of harmony discussing the case of the cheated woman, trying to answer the question how this woman should have behaved (Salisbury 2001: 42–47), while Phintys and Perictione I (*On the Harmony of Women)* dealt with the same concept, asking themselves how a woman should behave in private and in public life (Waithe 1987: XII). In accordance with Pythagorean philosophy, self-control and modesty are main values, and in terms of these, mentioned texts might be characterized as anti-feminist. However, the approach of women's philosophers is more practically oriented than those of men, because they discuss specific situations and not ideal theory (Salisbury 2001: 32–34). And this perspective, that does not rise above the situation (that does not have a perspective *from above*), is feminine.

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11   However, Pythagorean philosophy is not deprived of the symbolical dichotomy that deprivileges women and what was considered to be female. Namely, one of the main Pythagorean oppositions was between the determinate and clear mode and what was vague and indeterminate, while femaleness was always related with the vague, irregular, unlimited, disorderly, and at the same time inferior. For more on this issue, see: Lloyd (1993).

Another example of thought ascribed to a woman philosopher that completely fits into the dominant male-stream thinking is mentioned by Plutarch who quotes Theano I (regarded as a disciple and wife of Pythagoras) and her reaction to the comment of her exposed arm:

> Somebody exclaimed, "A lovely arm." "But not for the public," said she. Not only the arm of the virtuous woman, but her speech as well, ought to be not for the public, and she ought to be modest and guarded about saying anything in the hearing of outsiders, since it is an exposure of herself; for in her talk can be seen her feelings, character, and disposition. (Plutarch, *Coniugalia Praecepta*: 31)

This excerpt points directly to the core of the problem of research into women's education and knowledge, because in Greek antiquity "her speech as well, ought to [have been] not for the public". In accordance with this widespread opinion, even when women's public speech or thought existed, it was covered by the patriarchal veil of silence. A problem that is hard to solve.

Nevertheless, Women's Voices

As it is already pointed out, women were free to speak only in the private and ritual domains. This actually did have an overall importance, especially during death rituals and funerals, because it was the only occasion in which women were authorized to speak publicly – in the graveyard, not only mourning the deceased, but also bringing decisions about the blood feud, an institution of common law that in spite of legal measures directed at it, continued to exist in some parts of rural Greece (especially Peloponnesus) up to modern times (1980s).[12] The Athenian legislator Solon introduced the law in the 6th century BC that had to decrease the number of women who were mourning, allowing it only to the next of kin and not professional mourners, prescribing also that the procession should be held very early in the morning so as not to disturb other citizens. Research of the Greek lament through history reveals a striking continuity of the phenomenon, which might be considered through the lens of Fernand Braudel's concept of *longue durée*, which requires considering historical events in long historical periods, because only such a perspective might enable understanding them (Braudel 1998). The research related to ancient Greek ritual by Nicole Loraux (1998) and ritual lament throughout history by Margaret Alexiou (1974/2002), Gail Holst-Warhaft (1995), and Nadia Seremetakis (1991) offer us brilliant insights into this phenomenon from antiquity through the Middle Ages, up to the 20th century.

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12   Brilliant anthropological research of lamentation and the funeral rite in Inner Mani (Peloponnesus) was done by Nadia Seremetakis, who researched this phenomenon from 1981 until 1991, spending a lot of time in the field (once during an uninterrupted 15-month stay). She also had family connections in the region, so she lived with relatives, not only as an outside researcher, but also as an inside participant of all the events and rituals related to the dead and death. See: Seremetakis 1991.

Anyhow, the knowledge of mourning was something that belonged to every woman even after the introduction of the mentioned law. The research into women's lamentation revealed the political dimension of appropriating ritual by the state, of the introduction of funeral oration (Pericle's famous speech), and of an effort of the polis to promote the ideal of heroic death in contrast to individual death, mourned and grieved in women's lamentations. Mourning was a powerful skill, and if the law of Solon made it complicated for older women to make money out of it, the practice itself was not easy to suppress.

However, there is no doubt that the new political democratic system and the abandonment of the importance of the aristocratic clans led to a redistribution of roles and power, trying to reduce the power of women (and of their voice) in the graveyard and hence its impact on the decisions of the community.[13]

Women were denied the right of participating in the political life, but, in spite of all the efforts, they did not lose their role and competence in the tabooed area of death and mourning despite the efforts of the states and later of the Church (introducing the office for the dead) to take over the control over the whole ritual. In charge of the duties related to death and life, as healers, pharmacists, physicians and midwifes, or without vocation but often in charge of all of the mentioned (and other household duties) as mothers, daughters, wives – women, especially born Athenians, were in charge of women's duties which were in antiquity (the same as today) belittled and disdained.

As for women's self-expression, apart from what we know about some women philosophers and their thought, but also vaguely about Sappho and women's circle around her, the most information we have is actually about lamentation, which was a feminine domain of expression. Although a type of oral poetry, women's lamentation is kept in tragedies, due to the fact that laments in tragedies might be regarded as examples from real life, since tragedies are not imitation, but rather a re-enactment of real life (Nagy 1998: x; Loraux 1998: 10–11). Lamentations in the graveyards, which means in public spaces, were bodily and oral performances, expressive in terms of emotion but also content. Often marked as uncontrolled and unrestrained (and even mad) behavior, since laceration of skin and hair often accompanied them, laments were actually enacted according to the existing rules, also being limited to the time and space of the ritual. The expression of grief and emotion confronted all who gathered with the loss and death, finally bringing emotional relief. Lamentation was performed by a group of women, in antiphonal structure, which corresponds to specific socio-communicational code of women. According to recent sociological research into men's and women's communication, men are

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13   City-states introduced many rituals that supported civic ideology, trying to diminish the role of women in the ritual domain too. Apart from the mentioned invention of the public funeral ritual, what was also important was the introduction of the heroic cult that had all the characteristics of the cult of the dead, however, with a changed focus. The dead ancestors and all the rituals that once belonged to them were exchanged for the eponymous heroes, the founders of the city-states (Stevanović 2009: 72–75).

more adapted to speak in monologues, while women communicate more easily with other women, preferring to take turns in conversation with others, and as good listeners developing the topic by reference to the previous speaker (Minister 1991: 27–41). Dialogue of exactly this kind is characteristic of numerous lamentations, which implies that the same women's socio-communicational model with many dialogues and turn-taking in conversation has continuously existed throughout the Greek patriarchal area ever since antiquity. This competence of women, considered to belong to the very old tradition of funeral ritual, reveals an important role of women, not just as actors in the mentioned ritual – preparing the corpse for the wake, anointing it with oils, dressing the deceased, and generally being in charge of bringing the community through the crisis – but also to confront all the members of the community with the loss and grief, and to mediate the emotions (Stevanović 2009, 158). Ancient Greeks did not know about psychology and psychotherapy,[14] but they did have ritual mechanisms to cope with loss, to handle the inner and social crisis provoked by death, and also to face one of the biggest human fears, the fear of death. Women's role in this ritual was decisive.

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14   For the way in which psychoanalysis colonized the Greek past and Greek myths thus constructing a European identity (and view to the inner self through Greek myths), see: Dubois (2013: 316–317), Khanna (2003: 23–27), and Stevanović (2020: 108–109).

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Lada Stevanović

Obrazovanje, znanje i kompetencije žena u antičkoj Grčkoj

Apstrakt

Rad istražuje obrazovanje žena u antičkoj Grčkoj. U doba antike, žene su bile podređene muškarcima širom grčkog sveta, a njihova uloga i kompetencije strogo su bili definisani (doduše na različit način u različitim polisima). Iako je bilo žena kojima je obrazovanje bilo dostupno, ono gotovo nikada nije bilo organizovano od strane polisa. Žensko znanje i ženski glas nisu bili dobrodošli u javnom prostoru. Pa ipak, slika ženskog obrazovanja, znanja i kompetencija nije jednodimenzionalna i bilo bi pogrešno tvrditi da su ih žene bile u potpunosti lišene. Strankinje su katkada uživale veću slobodu u pogledu obrazovanja i slobodne komunikacije sa muškarcima nego supruge grčkih građana (pogotovo Atinjana); obrazovanje je bilo dostupno devojkama iz bogatih porodica.

Sa druge strane, činjenica je da su postojala znanja i profesije koji su bili dostupni ženama i u kojima su se one često pojavljivale. To je bio slučaj sa babicama, lekarkama i biljarkama/farmaceutkinjama. Dominantna uloga žena u privatnom domenu nije samo podrazumevala brigu o kući i najbližim srodnicima, već i nadležnost u ritualnom domenu koja je spadala u žensku kompetenciju. Pa ipak, istraživanje ženskog znanja i obrazovanja u atnici nije jednostavno, pre svega zbog velova tišine kojima su obavijeni ženski glasovi u antici, uključujući i one koji su pokušali da se probiju kroz barijere sopstvenog doba.

Ključne reči: žene, obrazovanje, kompetencije, privatno, javno, pogrebni rituali.

Tamara Plećaš

THE ROMAN STOICS ON THE EMANCIPATORY POTENTIAL OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL *PAIDEIA*[1]

ABSTRACT
The idea that learning liberates or that education emancipates is hardly a novelty, and it can be traced to ancient times and Ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. Thus, in this paper, we aim to express that some of the ideas (like the idea that women and men are equally subject to moral virtue because of their rationality) and educational practices (such as those that encourage students to use their voices and reason independently from any authorities) embraced by well-known Roman Stoics did have emancipatory potential. Particularly important was a requirement that philosophy should be lived outside the classrooms.

The notion of emancipation comes from the Latin *emancipatio*. One of the meanings of this concept is liberation from the influence of another person or several persons. It thus follows that an emancipated person is someone who achieved freedom and independence through the act of emancipation (Lewis & Short s.v. emancipatio; see also Krstić 2021: 209–211; Krstić 2022: 168). From a legal standpoint, we could say that the Roman Stoic Epictetus began teaching philosophy in the city of Nicopolis only after he was emancipated, or after being granted his freedom (Long 2002: 1, 169). Through this particular act of emancipation, Epictetus ceased to be a slave and became a free citizen of the Roman Empire.

However, the Roman Stoics did not believe that emancipation is necessarily restricted to legal or *political* emancipation. They even thought that some

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of the wealthiest and most powerful Roman citizens, despite *de facto* being politically in the position to do practically anything they wanted, were still *only* slaves to their flawed beliefs and bad judgments. The Stoics considered Roman senators an appropriate example of people who were both self-willed and enslaved. Some senators became slaves to their own and other people's excessive desires as soon as they reached the peak of their political ambitions (cf. Epict. *Diss*. 1.4.). Some political slaves, on the other hand, were praised for their character.[2] That being said, it is clear that the Stoics reversed the conventional or common understanding of freedom.

The freedom sought for oneself included both emancipation from any kind of external supervision (as when a master watches and monitors a slave) and emancipation from prejudices, upsetting thoughts, excessive emotions, and false opinions (see also Krstić 2022). Epictetus, for example, believed that falling madly in love with someone could turn into a form of slavery since falling head over heels for someone can be seen as an excessive expression of emotions (see also Plećaš 2022: 12–13; Diog. Laert. 7.21). The predominant Stoic view was that inappropriate passions do enslave people.[3] The following illustrates Epictetus' position:

> 'What's that got to do with being a slave?' – Doesn't it seem to you that acting against one's will, under protest and compulsion, is tantamount to being a slave? 'Maybe, but who has power to compel me except Caesar, who rules over everyone?' – So you admit that you have at least one master. And don't let the fact that Caesar rules over everyone, as you say, console you: it only means that you're a slave in a very large household. – You remind me of the citizens of Nicopolis, who are forever proclaiming, 'By the grace of Caesar, we are free.' – If you like, however, for the moment we'll leave Caesar out of account. Just tell me this: haven't you ever been in love with someone, be they man or woman, slave or free? 'How does that affect whether I am slave or free?' – Weren't you ever commanded by your sweetheart to do something you didn't want to do? Did you never flatter your pet slave, and even kiss her feet? And yet if someone were to force you to kiss Caesar's feet, you'd regard it as hubris and the height of tyranny. If your lovesick condition isn't slavery, then what is? (Epict. *Diss*. 4.1.11–18.)

If we are slaves to our passions or wrong beliefs, we are not free, regardless of whether we are political slaves or in a position of power. What gives us

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2   Seneca writes in one of his famous letters that slaves, who made up an important part of the Roman economy and population, are human beings but also "lowborn friends" ("'They are slaves.' No, they are human beings. 'They are slaves.' No, they are housemates. 'They are slaves.' No, they are lowborn friends. 'They are slaves.' Fellow slaves, rather, if you keep in mind that fortune has its way with you just as much as with them." Sen. *Ep*. 47. 1). This also implies that we should treat them gently and with love. The Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius influenced the adoption of certain Roman laws that aimed to simplify the liberation of the enslaved population "even when the tax administration opposed it" (Ado 2011: 258).

3   Of course, the Stoics believed that good emotions also exist (for more on that subject see Plećaš 2020).

freedom, according to the Stoic philosophy, is education (παιδεία). Such education serves the purpose of a fulfilled life. Yet, it is not education for the sake of education that matters, and we will elaborate more on that idea in the chapters to come. At the same time, we will highlight several Stoic ideas that may be considered emancipatory.

In addition, it is important to note that the Stoics expanded on some ideas found in Ancient Greek philosophical thought. Like Plato before them, Stoic philosophers associated vicious behaviour with ignorance, implying that a vice or a vicious character *could* be changed with education or *permanent* learning (cf. Sen. *Ep*. 95.29). Plato points out in his *Republic* that "the nature which we assumed in the philosopher, if it receives the proper teaching" will attain moral virtue or excellence (ἀρετή), "but, if it be sown and planted and grown in the wrong environment, the outcome will be quite the contrary unless some god comes to the rescue" (Pl. *Resp*. 492a). In addition, in his treatise *Timaeus*, Plato suggests that proper education, or adequate educational training, allows us to go through life without limping (cf. Pl. *Ti*. 44c–d). The Stoics agreed with these insights, because, like Plato, they believed that the moral character of a human could be shaped through upbringing and continuous philosophical education and practice, and that the environment plays a significant role in this. Needless to say, this is not an easy task, but rather one that lasts a lifetime.

The Stoics' Ideas on Education

Education was acquired in Ancient Rome through schools[4], educated individuals, or private teachers. From the third century BC onward, the "tutorial form of elementary education became accessible to a fee-paying public for the first time" (Corbeill 2001: 269). Following that, an increasing number of schools opened with teachers who were often Greek slaves or freed slaves (cf. Corbeill 2001: 279) teaching for a small amount of money (cf. Rober 2009: 231). The school system was divided into primary or elementary (for pupils aged 7 to 11) and secondary schools (for pupils aged 12 to 16) where grammarians educated children. Higher education was also available (for pupils over 16), and there, rhetoric and philosophy were taught (Rober 2009: 231–232). Thus, in the Roman educational system, philosophy came at the end, and was not binding for everyone, despite the fact that philosophical discourse could be found in formal institutions, public squares, and the Roman senate. In addition, it is important to note that women of Ancient Rome had more opportunities to get an education than Ancient Greek women, and that some of them had private tutors who influenced their emancipation (see also Plećaš 2021).

According to several testimonies, teaching was one of the most preferred professions for any Stoic philosopher, besides being politically engaged as an advisor (like Seneca) or a ruler of an Empire (like Marcus Aurelius) (cf. LS 67

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4   More on the philosophical schools of that period and the meaning of the Greek word σχολή can be found in the following paper: Bénatouïl 2006.

W). The Roman Stoics lectured, just like their Stoic predecessors, in various internal or external, i.e., open-air spaces depending on the occasion. Seneca, Musonius Rufus, and Epictetus were all different kinds of teachers.

Aside from being a philosopher, rhetorician, and politician, Seneca was known as a tutor of the young emperor Nero. Marcus Aurelius valued higher education and was known for establishing imperial chairs of both philosophy and rhetoric in Athens, then a Roman province (see Bénatouïl 2006: 419).[5] Musonius Rufus and Epictetus, on the other hand, were primarily known as professional philosophy teachers, renowned for their teaching skills even in Hellenistic times. The schools of Musonius Rufus and Epictetus were mostly attended by members of upper-class Roman society, with a few exceptions. Epictetus' students were mostly between 18 and 25 years of age (Long 2002: 43), despite Epictetus still calling himself an instructor or tutor of the youth (παιδευτής) (cf. Long 2002: 123). Nevertheless, there were rumours that emperor Hadrian visited Epictetus' school (cf. Birley 1997: 58–61), as well as other senior citizens of the vast Roman Empire (see, for example, Epict. *Diss*. 3.7.1).

What were the Stoics' thoughts on philosophical education? Although the Stoics divided philosophy into three distinct areas (physics, logic, and ethics), they believed that these areas were intrinsically connected, and that philosophy is a coherent and closed system of thought (see Diog. Laert. 7.39–40; Ierodiakonou 1993; Stephens 2020). In addition, philosophy was not simply a formal discourse but rather the *art of living* (see Sellars 2009). This is why Pierre Hadot highlights that for the Stoics, philosophy is not merely philosophical speech but also a concrete and lived exercise that involves the practice of logic, ethics, and physics (cf. Ado 2011: 150). Physics implies a particular view and understanding of the cosmos, while ethics is concerned with human beings, their mutual interactions, and their place in the cosmos. Meanwhile, logic can be seen as an exercise of thought in everyday life.

Seneca writes to Lucilius that "formal discourse will not do as much for you as direct contact, speaking in person and sharing a meal", because "the quick and effective way is to learn by example. If Cleanthes had merely listened to Zeno, he would not have been moulded by him; instead, he made himself a part of Zeno's life, looking into his inmost thoughts and seeing whether he lived in accordance with his own rule" (Sen. *Ep*. 6). On the other side, Epictetus taught that all things in life come with a specific price and that moral integrity is attached to freedom (cf. Long 2002: 207–230). No one is free who lives with constant fear or resentment and is not educated to know such things (cf. Epict. *Diss*. 1.2.25). That is why he advises one of his fellow students the following: "Consider at what price you sell your integrity; but please, for God's sake, don't sell it cheap. The grand gesture, the ultimate sacrifice – that, perhaps, belongs to others, to people of Socrates' class" (Epict. *Diss*. 1.2.33). Although humans are prone to making mistakes all the time, the Stoics believed they

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5 Marcus Aurelius implies that he owes much to his Stoic teacher and philosopher Junius Rusticus who introduced him to Epictetus' sayings (cf. M. Aur. *Med*. 1. 7).

are also endowed with rationality by nature. For that reason, they may be able to develop certain potentials, but only if properly educated. Or, as Epictetus said: "Even if I lack the talent, I will not abandon the effort on that account. Epictetus will not be better than Socrates. But if I am no worse, I am satisfied" (Epict. *Diss*. 1.2.35–36; see also Plećaš 2022; Epict. *Ench*. 51.3). Thus, Epictetus followed the example set by Socrates, who guides others by his own deeds. This also meant that Epictetus, just like Seneca before, believed that learning by example is more beneficial to moral development than formal, philosophical discourse without practice. It is thus not surprising that Epictetus advises us to choose for ourselves what person we want to be. Then, having made that decision, we should act our part accordingly (see, for example, Epict. *Diss*. 4.2.10; Epict. *Ench*. 51). Philosophical knowledge should be applicable (Epict. *Ench*. 49, Epict. *Ench*. 52), because mere theory without practical application is not particularly helpful and effective in our everyday lives.

The Stoics as Mentors

One of the first mentors, according to Greek mythology, was the goddess Athena, who was a wise adviser to the Greek hero Odysseus and appeared as Mentor to Odysseus's son Telemachus as well.[6] The goddess Athena was a protector of intellectuals, philosophers, poets, and women and girls, but also of practical intelligence and crafts (OCD s.v. Athena). The term Mentor was later used "in European tradition" as a "name for an older assistant to a younger person – a student, intellectual, or artist in general" (cf. Slapšak 2013: 44–45). The term "mentor" is indirectly found in the Latin *monitor*, which also indicates supervision and monitoring, as well as an instructor, assistant, guide, or teacher of the youth (Lewis & Short s.v. monitor). Mentors may also be those who set an example for others. Mentors for the Roman Stoics included philosophers such as Socrates, early Stoics (especially Zeno and Chrysippus), and early Cynics (such as Diogenes and Crates). The Roman Stoics were mentors as well.

Seneca, for example, advises his friend Lucilius that a *crowd* is something potentially dangerous and that young people should avoid it "more than anything else", especially when it is not "yet safe" for them "to trust" themselves to one (cf. Sen. *Ep*. 7.1).[7] Additionally, Epictetus points out that "any extraordinary ability is not safe for a novice" (Epict. *Diss*. 3.13.20). This alludes, among other

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6   "Then Athena, daughter of Zeus, drew near them, like unto Mentor in form and voice, and Odysseus saw her, and was glad; and he spoke, saying: 'Mentor, ward off ruin, and remember me, thy dear comrade, who often befriended thee. Thou art of like age with myself'" (Hom. *Od*. 22.205–210). Mentor, the son of Alcimus, was an old, intimate friend of Odysseus, who oversaw and advised Telemachus.

7   Seneca explains that "contact with the many is harmful to us. Every single person urges some fault upon us, or imparts one to us, or contaminates us without our even realizing it" (Sen. *Ep*. 7.2). In addition, he says that "the mind that is young and not yet able to hold on to what is right must be kept apart from the people. It is all too easy to follow the many" (Sen. *Ep*. 7.6). Only an educated mind can be undisturbed in a crowd.

things, that from a Stoic perspective, youth needed advisors or experienced teachers or mentors to guide them through certain periods of their lives. This is why Seneca says to Lucilius, quoting Epicurus: "I write this not for the many but for you: you and I are audience enough for one another" (Sen. *Ep*. 7.11).

In his thirty-fourth letter to Lucilius, Seneca writes: "I claim you, as my own" (Sen. *Ep*. 34.2),[8] and immediately adds: "you are my handi-work. It was I who laid hands on you, having seen your potential, and encouraged you, got you going, and did not let you slow down but continued to spur you on – and I am doing that even now, but now I am cheering you in the race, and you in return are cheering for me" (Sen. *Ep*. 34.2). In letter thirty-five Seneca states:

> Give me yourself, then: a great gift. And to make you work even harder, keep in mind that you are a mortal being – and that I am old. Hurry, then, to me; but first, hurry to yourself. As you progress, strive above all to be consistent with yourself. If ever you want to find out whether anything has been achieved, observe whether your intentions are the same today as they were yesterday. A change of intention shows that the mind is at sea, drifting here and there as carried by the wind. A thing that is well grounded does not move about. That is how it is for the completely wise person, and also to some extent for the one who is making progress toward wisdom. (Sen. *Ep*. 35.3–4)

A mentor is someone a young person should trust and follow; but mentors should also strive for their own progress first and foremost. Similar to Seneca, Epictetus explains that there are times when it is more important to do something for yourself than for your students (cf. Epict. *Diss*. 1.10.8). In his work *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle says about artists that "each of them loves his work more than it would love him if it would have a soul" (Arist. *Nic. Eth*. 1168a). Such is the case with poets and benefactors. Benefactors have a similar affection for their beneficiaries – "their protégé is also their work, and therefore they love it even more than the artist his work" (Arist. *Nic. Eth*. 1168a). Furthermore, Aristotle says that the one who creates exists in a certain way in "his act of creation, his work" and thus "loves his work because he loves his existence" (Arist. *Nic. Eth*. 1168a). Similarly, we could say that Seneca watches over Lucilius and advises, teaches, and encourages him. Further, Seneca expects encouragement from his protégé. The goal of encouragement is to make the person we are encouraging to do something, to change, to work on themselves.

As previously mentioned, according to Stoicism, philosophy is not only a theoretical discipline but also, to a great extent, a practical one. Therefore, philosophy may be found in both theory and actions, and be defined as a discipline that educates the mind. In other words, philosophy teaches us to do, and not (only) to talk. A philosopher is a teacher who encourages us to *do* rather than just *say* things. Concerning that, Seneca writes the following in one of his letters:

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8   In his *L'Histoire de la sexualité* Michael Foucault writes that Seneca *rightfully* claims Lucilius as his own (cf. Fuko 1988: 63).

Philosophy teaches us to act, not to speak. Its demands are these: each person should live to the standard he himself has set; his manner of living should not be at odds either with itself or with his way of speaking; and all his actions should have a single tenor. This is the chief task of wisdom, and the best evidence of it too: that actions should be in accordance with words, that the person should be the same in all places, a match for himself. "Is there any such person?" Not many, but there are some. It is indeed difficult. And I don't mean, even, that the wise person always walks the same steps, but only that he walks a single road. (Sen. *Ep*. 20.2)

Similarly, Epictetus repeatedly emphasized the various threats to school education to his students and listeners. Specifically, the syllogisms and the Stoic texts "were not to be studied to shine intellectually in the school, but rather to know how to live outside of it" (cf. Bénatouïl 2006: 424). Or, in Epictetus' words, students must learn how to adequately address anxiety, death, pain, exile, discomfort, and other similar things, and not *only* the syllogisms, logical paradoxes, and so forth (see Epict. *Diss*. 1.2.34–40). That is the *fundamental* knowledge needed in their everyday lives. Put another way, Stoic or philosophical education should prepare students for a life outside of a Stoic school. Hence, the primary aim is not to become a professional philosopher or Stoic, but rather a human being of excellent character who leads a fulfilled life (cf. Long 2002: 111). This Stoic idea seems revolutionary and progressive even today.

A Stoic would argue that we need an education that extends beyond typical school expectations. We must learn not only how to write or read philosophical texts but also how to examine them critically, and even more importantly – we need to put the philosophical insights gained from those texts into practice. We need to change "for the better as a result of one's reading" (Reydams-Schils 2010: 566), since only the virtuous life, according to the Stoics, is a life of wisdom, and only moral virtue leads to a prosperous or flourished or happy life, known as εὐδαιμονία. Such education is essential to progress towards εὐδαιμονία.

How to *Walk a Single Road*

As the previous quote shows, Seneca advises his close friend and student on a difficult task – walking a single road. But how do we walk such a road? How can anyone hope to succeed on a single road, reserved only for the wise and virtuous? Such a task may seem impossible, like an unattainable ideal. Despite this, the Stoics advise us to try to live like Socrates or Diogenes, those who, at least from their point of view, deserved to be called wise. To walk such a road, one must be emancipated, or in other words, educated. The Stoics thus believed that humans could liberate or emancipate themselves from the influence of a crowd or others only with the help of (philosophical) education. The following are Stoic ideas and educational practices that have emancipatory potential.

Musonius Rufus advocated that philosophical education be available not only to men but also to women who are equally capable of developing moral virtue (Muson. 3, 4).

When someone asked him if women too should study philosophy, he began to discourse on the theme that they should, in somewhat the following manner. Women as well as men, he said, have received from the gods the gift of reason, which we use in our dealings with one another and by which we judge whether a thing is good or bad, right or wrong. [...] Moreover, not men alone, but women too, have a natural inclination toward virtue and the capacity for acquiring it, and it is the nature of women no less than men to be pleased by good and just acts and to reject the opposite of these. If this is true, by what reasoning would it ever be appropriate for men to search out and consider how they may lead good lives, which is exactly the study of philosophy, but inappropriate for women? (Muson, 3)

Put simply, women are rational to the same degree as men, and gender does not play a role in whether and to what extent we can attribute rationality to someone.

Epictetus explicitly calls his students to use their intellectual capacities and trust their reason without continuous reliance on external authority.[9] Authority may vary: it may be a mother's breast, a father's authoritative figure, or a mentor teaching us. At the same time, Epictetus was well aware that many of his students were lazy, and would rather spend their days in entertainment, at festivals, with Roman senators, etc. Consequently, we find the following remarks in the *Enchiridion*:

How long will you wait before you demand the best of yourself, and trust reason to determine what is best? You have been introduced to the essential doctrines, and claim to understand them. So what kind of teacher are you waiting for that you delay putting these principles into practice until he comes? You're a grown man already, not a child any more. If you remain careless and lazy, making excuse after excuse, fixing one day after another when you will finally take yourself in hand, your lack of progress will go unnoticed, and in the end you will have lived and died unenlightened.

Finally decide that you are an adult who is going to devote the rest of your life to making progress. Abide by what seems best as if it were an inviolable law. When faced with anything painful or pleasurable, anything bringing glory or disrepute, realize that the crisis is now, that the Olympics have started, and waiting is no longer an option; that the chance for progress, to keep or lose, turns on the events of a single day. (Epict. *Ench*. 51.1–2)

As already pointed out, the Roman Stoics believed philosophy is the *art of living*. This being so, genuine philosophers are only those who *behave* like philosophers in their everyday life, outside of classrooms or places where philosophy is taught (see also Plećaš 2022). These philosophers set good examples for others to follow. Moreover, philosophy, for the Stoics, was also an exercise (ἄσκησις) (cf. Gourinat 2014). Accordingly, philosophers who seek wisdom, as

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9   In a certain sense, this view of Epictetus resembles the view that Immanuel Kant would express centuries later in his famous essay *What is Enlightenment?*

well as those who already possess it, must apply their beliefs, thoughts, etc. in their everyday lives, whether they are in the Roman senate or a Greek temple and oracle, by exposing themselves to challenges and not backing down in the face of difficulties. Behind this is the idea that external circumstances do not have to be an obstacle to our well-being because the judgments, desires, or everyday choices we make, and even εὐδαιμονία itself, are ultimately up to us, and thus within our power (cf. Epict. *Ench.* 1; Epict. *Diss.* 1.1; Epict. *Diss.* 1.11.37).

Finally, this walk is made easier when a person is not alone (because humans are social beings born for collaboration[10]) and when they have others similar to them who want to make change and progress by their side. These others are often our loved ones: friends, mentors, or those who cheer for us.[11]

Lastly, we could conclude with the following remarks. For the Stoics, philosophical discourse is primarily reserved for the classroom or other places where classes were held, i.e., for school teaching (see also Ado 2011: 171), whereas philosophy outside the classrooms is lived and practiced in everyday situations. Philosophy is thus *the art of living* and has a significant impact on humans' εὐδαιμονία. The Stoics may seem to be stern teachers. Nevertheless, they encouraged their students, friends, and listeners to use their voices and reason without fear of authorities. They believed that all human beings (including women and political slaves, which was not commonplace in Ancient Greek and Roman philosophical thought) are, in principle, equal in their rationality and should and can be educated. All of the aforementioned indicates that the Roman Stoics advocated ideas and educational practices that carry emancipatory potential.

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10   Marcus Aurelius writes: "We were born for cooperation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of upper and lower teeth. So to work in opposition to one another is against nature […]" (M. Aur. *Med.* 2.1).

11   Friendship is considered one of the most important topics in Stoic ethics.

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Tamara Plećaš

Rimski stoici o emancipatorskom potencijalu filozofskog obrazovanja

Apstrakt

Ideja da učenje oslobađa ili, preciznije da obrazovanje emancipuje teško da predstavlja neku novinu, budući da se ta ideja može pratiti sve do antičkog perioda, odnosno grčke i rimske filozofske misli. U ovom radu nastojimo da pokažemo da su neke od ideja (poput ideje da su i žene i muškarci zbog svoje racionalne prirode podjednako podložni vrlini) i obrazovnih praksi (poput prakse kojom se podsticalo iznošenje sopstvenih stavova i korišćenja vlastitog razuma, bez oslanjanja na spoljne autoritete) koje su zastupali neki od dobro poznatih rimskih stoika imale emancipatorski potencijal. Posebnu važnost je nosio zahtev u skladu sa kojim filozofija treba da se živi i van učionica.

Ključne reči: učenici, mentori, emancipacija, obrazovne prakse, Seneka, Musonije Ruf, Epiktet, Marko Aurelije

INFRAPOLITICS ON MARGINS

INFRAPOLITIKA NA MARGINAMA

Alberto Moreiras

A RESPONSE, OR A COMMENT ON "THE OPEN REGION WHERE FREEDOM CAN STILL MAKE AN ADVENT."

It would be the worst form of gratefulness for these beautiful and generous essays on my book if I were to use them as a pretext to expand on them, to say more things, to summarize them or highlight their emphases. At the same time the invitation to write a response would lose sense if I were to say nothing. That is my predicament, compounded by the fact that I am convalescing from a COVID-19 infection, and my energy levels are still very low. Mostly I want to express my heartfelt thanks to Maddalena Cerrato, who put this dossier together, and to Gareth Williams, Peter Baker and Esaú Segura. Also to Đurđa Trajković, whose idea it was in the first place.

My intent, through whatever I say, is to let these essays be, as reflections on a text that they have every right to use as they see fit. Not that they are not accurate, each on them in their own way. I can only express my admiration. More secretly, also my wonder, as things have gone and will presumably continue to go, that my friends can find a way to express an attunement, beyond any exegesis, to thought procedures that have always had a dubious destiny at best, as they were born at a time of a certain shattering of destiny. But perhaps only in that shattering can a certain fraternity flourish. That it is precious and infrequent, even redemptive, is hereby acknowledged. I would rather keep away, on this topic, from rhetorical embellishments.

Could I suggest that infrapolitical reflection is always in every case tied up with the Lacanian *objet petit a*? If that is so, then of course there is no end to infrapolitical reflection, there is no way to become precise about it, and both the essays in this dossier and my response to them can only ever aspire to the ambiguous and unsatisfactory status of approximations.

There will always be a hole at the center, as it is the case for the god of Alanus de Insulis. What then would seem important, for those inclined to pursue these adventures, would not be to measure the hole, to fall into the hole,

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or to denounce the hole as an unpresentable and dangerous bad joke. It would rather be to see how the uncanny presence/absence of the hole, its sacredness in a word, reverberates, and how it stains the surrounding territories.

Is infrapolitical reflection, then, a reflection on sacredness? No doubt this would be off-putting for many, particularly for those who still think of the sacred in the form of statues of saints or through the more or less sublime feeling of star-gazing. But what if sacredness were in every case the aura of singular existence, nothing personal about it, neither private nor public, common to all, and yet quickly becoming imperceptible through the algorithms that rule our biopolitical lives to the point of leaving no residue? Anti-algorithmic thoughts, objections, withdrawals, exodus, and exception from biopolitical totalization. They are positionings that go through a retreat from positions, but the retreat ends, in every case, as and in whatever remains impassable, insurmountable. We should have no illusions.

Presumably what is primary for infrapolitics, which the essays in the dossier strive to present, or to name without naming, is not its difference from politics, even if establishing it is its necessary precondition. Infrapolitics wants to be an attempt at finding a new terrain for practical reason, neither political nor ethical nor rhetorical. This might be forbidden under present unwritten rules. Flaunting those rules means finding a stand near the sacredness of impersonal, singular existence, insofar as it is approachable, insofar as we have not already irretrievably lost a sense that it is there, somewhere. *Ankhibasie*. Nothing else is presumed or even attempted. Also, nothing less.

If the central conflict of our time is capitalism against world, well, we need to have an idea of world before any exit from capitalism can be posited. This is the paradox: the minute we claim an experience of world can only be retrieved through a militant affirmation of political struggle, political struggle sacrifices world through the very gesture of claiming to protect it. A naïve or blind reading of infrapolitics has tended to place it as some kind of abandonment of the political terrain, a flight into a netherworld of personal, idiotic existence. Infrapolitics is, however, not a craven or immature resistance to politics, as if politics were somehow the natural space of real men and women. Rather, for infrapolitics, politics is today the site of an empty and ineffectual gesticulation, at a remove, abstract and vacuous. Politics is to be thought, then, as we can see everywhere, as the space of a paradoxical resistance to politics, massive, thoroughly ideological, and ultimately deluded: nothing, or little else but, the field of superstructural expression for the ontology of the commodity form. So no *macho* assertions of politics as the real thing, no facile dismissals of infrapolitics as a weak refuge from the storm: infrapolitics is, rather, politics times two, the very politicization of the ruin of politics, which our times inherit under the sign of an urgent, if necessarily untimely, demand for thinking. This demand for thinking is hyperpolitical and at the same time other than political, but other than political through its hyperpoliticity.

After all, the notion that it is an imperative obligation of thought to turn away from politics into a reflection on impersonal, singular existence cannot

hide its rebellious, perhaps even revolting political import. It configures a hyperpolitical turn away from politics that will only bide its time. Meanwhile, things remain to be done, against the grain of everything the institution wants us to do, even to be. Read the essays in the dossier: you will see how something emerges in them that is not within the purview of what one normally does and is expected to do. There is even a certain obscene, abject quality to their positions and to their presuppositions. Which is, no doubt, why infrapolitics will continue to be read, or unread, as a dangerous supplement to the task of writing, as an impossible thought. It is a form of happiness to confirm that I do not have to feel alone in the task.

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AUTOGRAPHY AND INFRAPOLITICS

ABSTRACT
This article explores the relation between infrapolitics and autography in the work of Alberto Moreiras. This way, it offers a possible key to read Moreiras' most recent publications *Infrapolitics. A Handbook* and *Uncanny Rest* in connection to his earlier production. The relation to autography emerges as inherent and necessary to infrapolitics, as well as key to understanding infrapolitics in terms of a turn of deconstruction toward existence. Autography reveals itself as the incision of singularity that enables the emergence of the reciprocal and imperative relationship of thought and existence that is constitutive of infrapolitics. The first part focuses on the inceptive role of autography with respect to a certain preliminary displacement of thought on which infrapolitics depends, and it traces the autography-infrapolitics connection back to the affective register of thought that Moreiras first enounced in his book *Tercer espacio*. The second part focuses on the essential role that such a connection plays, and it analyzes it with respect to three main aspects of infrapolitical thinking, namely, the idea of an an-archic non-passing passage, the relationship with death and the affinity with the work of mourning, and, finally, the connection with "expatriation".

KEYWORDS
infrapolitics, autography, passage, mourning, expatriation, singularity, deconstruction, existence

[...] and the other register, more difficult to verbalize or represent, the affective register on which at once the singularity of autographic inscription and its specific form of trans-autographic articulation, that is, its political form, depend. (Moreiras 2021: 25, my translation)[1]

Grief is the other of language, the affective passivity that carries itself in advance of every responsible act of thinking and writing. (Williams 2021: 35)

Since *Glas* played a special role in my own thought, what I have to say is necessarily about myself as well as about Derrida. (Hartman 2007: 345)

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1   "[...] el otro registro, más difícil de verbalizar o representar, registro afectivo del que depende al tiempo la singularidad de la inscripción autográfica y su forma especifica de articulación trans-autográfica, es decir, su forma política" (Moreiras 2021: 25).

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The title, like the epigraphs, suggests a connection that is both theoretical and autographical.

In 2014, at the beginning of what has been my own adventure with the *Infrapolitical Deconstruction* collective, I was invited to write a piece[2] on Alberto Moreiras' work and Infrapolitics for the Chilean journal *Papel Maquina*. The piece, mostly accurate and somehow naïf in its diligent tone, explored Moreiras' production following the theme of the aporetic heteronomous nucleus of auto-graphic writing from *Tercer espacio* (1999) to the ensuing books *The Exhaustion of Difference* (2001) and *Linea de sombra* (2006), and the myriad articles and conference papers hither and yon that only recently found more of a placement in the burst of publications that followed the ten restless years of Moreiras' disciplinary exodus from Latin-Americanism. Today, the publication of *Infrapolitics. A Handbook*, gives me the opportunity to go back to that very preliminary account of a thought that I consider both theoretically and autographically decisive, to look through a new experience of reading and writing for a different attunement of thinking.

So today, choosing to inquire once more into the connection between autography and infrapolitics, means for me two things. First, it means taking up what at that time seemed more like a fortunate yet half-fortuitus interpretative insight to see whether such an insight could actually offer some solid ground for a more sustained meta-critical effort. Second, provided that the autography-infrapolitics connection reveals itself to be inherent to the very practice of infrapolitical thinking, then it also means creating the conditions in which to attempt an infrapolitical reflexive-analysis of my own coming to it as my place of thought. Then, instead of just using the question of autography as a thread to lead a more or less chronological account of Moreiras' production and theoretical contribution, this time it is rather a matter of asking to what extent the question of autography belongs inherently to infrapolitics.[3]

To what extent does the question of the paradoxical inherent heteronomy of all autographic writing, as well as the question of the autographic investment of all writing, have implications that go beyond the experience of writing and its exegesis? What does the connection to autography reveal of the two-fold nature of infrapolitics as a dimension of existence and reflexive practice? These questions are far from exhausting Moreiras' thought of Infrapolitics, or the many facets to which a complete reading of *Infrapolitics. A Handbook* should pay attention; yet I believe they offer a lead for a possible passage of thought that cuts across some crucial aspects of infrapolitics.

The 1999 book *Tercer espacio* precedes the inception of the thought of infrapolitics by a few years, yet it names something crucial about it. In the "Introduction", Moreiras refers to the need for "the meta-critical and autographical dimension of the project" of the book as what brought him to study the

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2   See Cerrato 2014.
3   On the topic see also Cfr. Baker, Cerrato "Autographic Praxis: an Infrapolitical Adventure" (under review at the time of this publication).

question of the autographic reflection in Nietzsche and Derrida. This study resulted in:

> what at that time seemed to me a modest experiential discovery, yet with not solely personal implications: that is, not only is all writing autographic but it is also that no writing is completely so; that autography never constitutes itself in and of itself, it always is implied in the invocation of another which upon being written, comes to be reconstituted as the anticipation of one self, at the same time always understood as an entry into otherness. (Moreiras 2021: 25)

This became part of the properly theoretical register of the book, or rather, its second register, leading and informing the first disciplinary register of the book, namely, "the register of the Latin-American literature to be studied" (Moreiras 2021: 25). This second theoretical register is a deconstructive register; it is a register consistent with the idea of a "turn to deconstruction" of the field of Latin-American studies, or rather, a register still set within the limits of what Moreiras calls "the first turn of deconstruction". Finally, comes one *other* register – the one that the present article's first epigraph announces – that is, an *affective* register on which two things depend: the singularity of autographic inscription and its trans-autographic political articulation, that is to say what Moreiras will then call infrapolitics and posthegemony. This other affective register is what is ciphered in the Exergue of the *Tercer espacio* and is spoken in *Uncanny Rest*. This affective register is the register that makes possible what the Exergue of *Infrapolitics. A Handbook* calls "the second moment of deconstruction", which is an infrapolitical one (Moreiras 2021: 15).

Thus, the inquiry into the autography and infrapolitics relation begins from *Tercer Espacio*'s "Exergue: on the margin", not as it prepares the site for the book that ensues, but rather because it names a placement for the encounter of thought and existence that we call infrapolitics. From such a point of departure, the challenge is a *sui generis* an-archeo-genea-logical investigation that cuts across two of Moreiras' most recent books *Against Abstraction. Notes from an Ex-Latin Americanist* [2020] and *Infrapolitics. A Handbook* [2021],[4] connecting *Tercer Espacio* [1999] to *Uncanny Rest* [2022] where infrapolitics and autography emerge clearly as inherently and intimately interrelated.

Both *Against Abstraction. Notes from an Ex-Latin Americanist* and *Infrapolitics. A Handbook,* trace two mostly chronological although indirect genealogies[5] of infrapolitics (and posthegemony), the former with respect to what one could call an academic autography, and the latter with respect to an intellectual autography. In what follows, I myself am going through a somehow genealogical exercise about Moreirais' thought of infrapolitics, yet cutting transversally its chronological

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4   Both books were first published in Spanish in 2016 as *Marranism e Inscripcion* and, in 2020, *Infrapolitica. Instruccciones de uso*; and so was *Uncanny Rest*, first published in 2020 as *Sosiego Siniestro.*

5   In the preface of *Infrapolitics. A Handbook,* with respect to the order of the chapters in the book Moreiras says: "The chapters are then arranged to offer an indirect, if partial, genealogy of my own development".

development in the, somehow preposterous, attempt to make such a genealogical exercise also an instance of an infrapolitical praxis of thought. And, on the way, it will become clear that it is the very character of infrapolitical thought and, more precisely, the distinctiveness of the connection between infrapolitics and autography that makes possible pursuing such a twofold– genealogical and infrapolitical – aim in these pages. It is such a connection that leads at once my critical attempt to think something like an *origin of infrapolitics,* as well as my meta-critical attempt to think infrapolitically about and from the *affective register* on which the singularity of its inscription depends. This also means that the affective register organizing these pages is necessarily going to be my own, that is to say, the one on which the autographic inscription of my reading depends, more than it is the one leading the process of thinking and writing the texts I am confronting here. Paraphrasing the third epigraph that I chose, since the reading of Moreiras' works over the years has played such a special role in my thought, what I have to say is necessarily about myself as well as about those works.

For the first chapter of *Infrapolitics. A Handbook*, Moreiras chose "The Last God: María Zambrano's Life without Texture" as it discusses two concepts "at the core of the infrapolitical endeavor" (xii). The chapter coincides with the materials Moreiras presented during one of the five sessions – which I remember as the first one even though it was not – of the seminar he gave from December 9 to 13, 2008 in Naples at the Italian Institute for the Humanities. There, back then, I was a first-year doctoral student. Approximatively a year later, Moreiras gave a talk as part of the processes that brought him back to the US, after a few years in Scotland, to work at Texas A&M University, where I have been now for many years too. The reference to Zambrano's 1955 opus magnum *El hombre y lo divino* was key in the second text – published as "Infrapolitical Literature: Hispanism and the Border" – as well. Zambrano's notion of *fondo obscuro* (obscure ground) – combined with those of *deslegación* (un-legacy), *vida sin textura* (life without texture), and *relación abismada* (de-grounded relation) – names the place of thought in a kind of enigmatic way. Moreiras writes: "Zambrano favors an excessive or transcendent element that in the end constitutes what calls for thinking and what needs thought – an element that remains utterly resistant to either philosophy or science" (Moreiras 2010: 188). It is beyond any specific interest in a productive textual exegesis of Zambrano's work and maybe even despite myself, that such an obscure ground became for me the name of a secret call for thinking and writing, of the enigmatic fate that lead me to this here-and-now. The idea of *obscure ground*, just as it comes to me from a mist of vague and mystifying memories, names the de-grounded relation of autography and infrapolitics, and the place from which I think infrapolitics – in a way[6] that owes everything to Alberto Moreiras, but for which he carries no responsibility. The obscure ground is for me a place of recurrent grief and mourning, and

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6   Such a way, as the reader can certainly notice, is marked by a significant emphasis on a spatial register of thinking that tends to bear more on the "infra" than is appealing to the "political" of which it is "excess – or its sub-cess; at any rate, its difference" (Moreiras 2020b: 83).

a place of exile, but also a place of passage(s) where thought and existence – in their imperative relation – can experience freedom as displacement, as negative relation to destiny and legacy; and the following pages explore it. There, the reader will find neither a comprehensive study of Infrapolitics, nor an exhaustive and philologically accurate account of all Alberto Moreiras' most recent publications; I rather offer a possible and only partial reading that is deeply marked by the inscription of my own autographic investment in them.

Ergo two Exergues

Tercer espacio's "Exergue: on the margin" names the existential site of the crucial displacement where infrapolitical thought began. It invites us to a *passage* on the margin, that is, a displacement indeed to the *existential parergon* that about twenty years later Moreiras identifies as the site for infrapolitics. *Uncanny Rest*'s May 6th entry reads:

> Infrapolitics does not address the need for any one labor, or for any one central, oriented activity, or for a specific task; it is neither *energeia* nor *ergon*. Rather, it is a practice of the step back, an attempt to meditate, therefore, on the *dynamis* that enables and controls all *energeia*, all *ergon*, all *praxis*, all *poiesis*. We could call it a *reflexive displacement toward the parergon* that, as a frame, is a condition of condition. If on the terrain of human action there are truths, or works, in art, in science, in technology in the sense of the manufacturing or invoicing of a product, in love or in politics, then infrapolitics is, not that which meditates on the basis of those factual truths – that would be philosophy or also literature, since literature is not just a procedure of art but also something else – but a *reflective exercise on the condition of condition: an exercise on the existential parergon*, and therefore an anti-philosophy. (Moreiras 2022: 44, my emphasis)

The incipit of the passage to and on the margin is a picture (fig. 1) where the child author is in his mother's arms in front of a baroque mirror. At first glance, the picture seems to portray the mother and the child looking at each other, yet it actually captures much more and much less than that. Much more because it captures more than simply two subjects who would be the object of one another's contemplative attention, this is a spatial-temporal dimension that exceeds them. Much less because such a dimension actually emerges from the missed encounter of the gazes, from the lack of focus on the object looked upon as well as from the object's failed absorption of the gaze, and from the absence of existential suture between the anticipation of the maternal imaginary and the infant's life.

> The child looks with anxious gaze the elision of the maternal gaze in this very excess of the gaze, and so also the focal point of that gaze, the eyes displaced by (the act of) viewing, absent from the very place of the encounter. That child, who does not yet know it, learns there a lesson in everything that exceeds him, in everything that his gaze does not manage to contain which the picture rescues for a then precarious future, now consummated. (Moreiras 2021: 39, my translation)

Fig.1

The mirror and the camera capture – or rather fail to capture – the scene of this crossing of attentive yet unfocused gazes that strive for an encounter yet do not meet. The mirror fails to exhaust the self-reflexive space of the child seeking to encounter himself through the otherness of his mother's gaze in the autographical narrative sutured with the maternal narrative of filiation that would cosign him to a communitarian closure. The camera fails to contain and to return/give back something like an absolute knowledge of the totality of the beings captured in an orderly structured critical space. What emerges in such a double representational failure is the trace of existential anxiety of unexhausted and inaccessible possibilities that haunt and divert the gazes of the child and his mother. The irrepresentable existential conditions of the missed encounter escape the photographic capture, yet are revealed as its limit.

> There is a third space defined by the fissure that separates the two gazes and blocks the meeting, defined by the fissure that, in postponing in patient anxiety the possibility of meeting, links however tentatively and hypothetically the first and the second spaces – links them at the same time as it separates them tenuously and infinitely. (Moreiras 2021: 39, my translation)

In the displacement from subjects portrayed to their existential surplus, a space for "the other register, more difficult to verbalize or represent, the affective register" emerges. There, and only there, we find the possibility of "the singularity of autographic inscription and its specific – political – form of trans-autographic articulation" (Moreiras 2021: 25). In the displacement from the 'subjective' spaces defined by the four points of view – both those captured in the picture, the mirror, and the camera itself – to the space that exceeds them and escapes verbalization, the singularity of affection, of grief, of mourning and of loss find their inscription as conditions of thought, rather than as individual possessions or shared experiences. From the disjuncture and offset of those four representational perspectives – child, mother, mirror, camera – what emerges is a space of the irrepresentability of *the singularity of autographic inscription*. Such an inherently marginal space of irrepresentability is the space for a *reflexive displacement toward the parergon* of existence. That is, a displacement toward the *condition of the condition* of those positions that can instead be named and narratively organized.

The exergue shows more than a visual instance of what represents the theoretical framework of the book, namely the heteronomous condition of autographic writing. It attests to the irruption of an irrepresentable existential (later infrapolitical) overflowing as the very condition of the deconstruction of the metaphysical onto-logocentrism that reveals such a heteronomous condition of autographic writing. The displacement to the margin reveals the affective register as condition of the operativity of the second theoretical register of deconstruction with respect to the Latin-American literature of the first register on the book. The *affective register* of the *singularity of autographic inscription* reveals itself as the a-principial (an-archic) condition for the deconstruction of the metaphysical onto-logocentrism as the order or condition on which not only both literature and philosophy depend, but on which their dichotomic separation as separation of life and thought also depends.

The *reflective exercise on the condition of condition* depends first on a displacement to the marginal site of autographic inscriptions of that affective register that exceeds and overflows the ontotheological structure of representability. The condition of condition, the excess of all metaphysical closure, the dimension that exceeds representability, the overflow of ontotheological understanding of the world, the existential leftover of the ethical-political capture of life are always-already-there. Yet in order to be addressed, they require a displacement to the margin, to the exergue that is the parergon, i.e. the framework and condition of all work and actions productionally understood. That is to say, the always-already-there infrapolitical dimension of existence (condition of condition) needs infrapolitical thinking to emerge, and infrapolitical thinking happens as reflection from the margin, from the existential parergon that is the third space where the autographic inscription takes place.

This way "Exergue: on the margin" is performing a displacement, a first essential passage to the site where thinking infrapolitics, and so infrapolitical thinking, become possible. This is a first displacement that summons us on the margin as the site of the inscription of an affective register of singularity that, exceeding subjectivism and metaphysics, makes their deconstruction possible. There, on the margin of life that thinking needs to locate over and over again, many other passages of thought – which yet do not actually pass but rather dwell there – become possible and needed.

The exergue opening *Infrapolitics. A Handbook* announces and enounces another displacement or transformation of thought. The exergue is titled "On Jacques Derrida's *Glas*. A Possible Second Moment in Deconstruction", and addresses the relationship of infrapolitics and deconstruction in its necessity and its – necessary – reversibility:

> If there is a remainder of absolute knowledge, if Derrida's work, even through its own unworking, seeks to perform the remainder, then no interpretative strategy can be conclusive or look for a conclusion. We ought to change the terms of the question regarding *Glas*, and from there *move on to change the terms* under which we have understood deconstruction. *This book is an attempt to begin such a change*. It posits that *the second moment of deconstruction is an infrapolitical*

one, and it looks for a rereading of the Derridean corpus in an infrapolitical key. It simultaneously proposes more and less than that: more, because infrapolitics has no interest in presenting itself as yet another modality of textual exegesis; and less, because Derridean exegesis quite exceeds it. But *we have to start somewhere*. Others have of course already done it, in their own way. (Moreiras 2021b: 4–5, my emphasis)

The second moment of deconstruction emerges in and from the first moment of deconstruction as an infrapolitical moment that turns deconstruction toward the infrapolitical dimension of existence. "What I am claiming as a 'second' moment of deconstruction has a specific sense, however, in that it requires a shift of focus from the text of *écriture* to existence", (Moreiras 2021b: 197) explains the first endnote of this exergue. If this second infrapolitical turn of deconstruction was already, yet mostly secretly, cyphered in the displacement to which the exergue of *Tercer espacio* was inviting us, in this more recent exergue, Moreiras is still presenting it as a *change* that is just at the beginning. The nine chapters of the book are the beginning of such a change, that needs *to start somewhere*.

So, this exergue – which is announcing upcoming passages turning deconstruction toward the infrapolitical dimension of existence – also needs to invite us to a preliminary *passage* to the site that is the marginal-liminal place where thought encounters the infrapolitical dimension of existence. Here the displacement takes place on the margin of *Glass* (Fig.2) toward the excess of Derrida's deconstruction of Hegel. It is the place at the margin of both the philosophical and literary captures, this is, at the margin of both Genet's and Hegel's columns, where one can find the secret of their existential excess, which is the limit of Hegel's absolute knowledge and the remainder resisting the *Aufhebung*.

Fig.2

Derrida does not name this *third space*, but, just like in the case of the picture in the first exergue, the *third space* appears in the representative failure, as the gift of that which cannot be captured because "it is the remainder itself of any capture" (Moreiras 2020c: 16). This third marginal space is the non-place where we find Antigone's inadmissible desire,[7] that is, the "unnameable *jouissance*, resistant to its own concept and to any concept" (Moreiras 2021b: 7) which is the aporetic limit of Hegelian dialectic and the condition of its deconstruction:

> Infrapolitics is also there, in that de-structuring non-place that is a condition of every structure, an un-nameable jouissance. In any case, that is the intuition on which this book is based. [...]

> Antigone, or rather Antigone's relationship to history, is literally the remainder of absolute knowledge, what subtracts itself, what overflows, what stays behind. Something in Antigone, in her character or existence, responds to the question of absolute knowledge by opening a path toward infrapolitics. (Moreiras 2021b: 7)

Antigone's position is emblematic of the singularity of the autographic inscription marked by an affective register of grief, yet it is also emblematic of a practice of freedom that not only exceeds the parameters of the political, but takes place as withdrawal from it. The constitution of the political community tries to overcome the aporia of death of the master-slave dialectic in the narrative of continuity between family and people, yet Antigone breaks with the logic of filiation. Her desire moves her in the opposite direction of the passion that marks the character of world-historical heroes and secures the coincidence of their particular destiny with universal History. Grief de-sutures her existence from the individual destiny that would subsume her within world-history teleology. The autographic inscription of grief marks Antigone's displacement to the infrapolitical dimension of existence from where she can think and act in a different register which is a register of singular freedom incipient/incepting from death.

Death plays a key role in infrapolitical thinking as it emerges clearly from both *Tercer espacio*'s and *Infrapolitics. A Handbook*'s exergues. In both cases, indeed, the autographic inscription enabling the first displacement of thought

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7   "Derrida is still not naming the secret pleasure, the jouissance that would subtract from the path to absolute knowledge as it would resist any Aufhebung, perhaps because it would be an unnameable jouissance, resistant to its own concept and to any concept. The text then informs us that Hegel solves the problem of the master slave dialectic, which is the problem of the blow to the other, and the problem that every murder is also a suicide, by recourse to politics, that is, by way of the constitution of the community into the people, breaking the aporia. And it is only then that the figure of Antigone emerges into the Derridean text as a step back from the political resolution, as a rejection of the human law and the law of Sittlichkeit, as a rupture of the logic that links family and community and unleashes interminable war. The question is, "Where does Antigone's desire lead?" (145). Antigone's desire is inassimilable by dialectics. Derrida insists then that Hegel himself recognizes and affirms the inassimilability" (Moreiras 2021b: 7).

"opening a path toward infrapolitics" (Moreiras 2021b: 7) depends on an *affective register* of mourning. It is in relation to death that thinking is exposed to the experience of a radical inscription of singularity that exceeds the limits of representability. Death marks the irrepresentable space of the photographic text that calls for a meaningful passage beyond the limits of all narrative. This is a passage that, like death itself, cannot pass, rather only dwell on death itself as the very non-place for thought from which what is a stake is a de-metaphorization of the identitarian space of the subject and denarrativization of destiny, namely, of ontotheological history. Death is the non-place of the autographic inscription that is the inscription of an affective register of grief, and yet goes beyond it as a certain infrapolitical work of mourning that is a radical experience of freedom. In his most recent book *Infrapolitical Passages*, Gareth Williams describes this[8] in the most distinct way:

> Grief lies heavily at the heart of the decision for thinking. If grief uncovers the *singularly passive and inoperative experience of staring mortality* in the face, of keeping silent watch over that of which nothing can be said (death), then grief is the originary and unspeakable other of language that carries itself not only in advance of mourning, as the toil for a certain understanding, but also in advance of every action's possibility. Grief is the other of language, *the affective passivity that carries itself in advance of every responsible act of thinking and writing*. (Williams 2021: 35, my emphasis)

The singularity of autographical inscription of grief opens up the possibility of a displacement toward the third space on the margin of existence where thought can dwell to explore the limits of all metaphysical subjectivation and access a singular experience of freedom. The experience of radical singularity is the incision that breaches the ontotheological order, opening a path for a displacement of thought toward the *condition of condition*. It is in this sense that one should understand both exergues as an invitation, which is constitutively and inherently *marginal* yet crucial to understanding infrapolitics. Both exergues invite us to a displacement that is at once a step back and a step out. A step back from the any oriented action or practice, a step out of the work or the picture. A step back from ontotheology and a step out of the subject of metaphysics. A step back from Hegelian dialectic and a step out of the positionality that sustains it. A step back from the order of the world and a step out of the coincidence between life and politics. A step back from onto-theo-archeo-teleological[9] historicity and a step out of identitarian subjectivation.

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8 The emphasis on the concept of grief, which comes from Gareth Williams' work rather than Moreiras', seemed to me particularly significant in the context of this article for at least three reasons: first, it helps emphasize the relationship between autography and infrapolitics in terms of passage (rather than ultimate coincidence) and the gap between the autographic inscription and mourning-like infrapolitical work of though attuned to death; second, it captures effectively Antigone's affective register; and lastly, it helped me to name my own autographic inscription in thought and writing.
9 Cfr. Derrida 2006: 93.

A step back from *destiny* and a step out of *character*, to refer to the key terms that Moreiras uses in the beautiful essay "Ethos Daimon".

Both exergues invite us to a displacement that involves at once a denarrativization and a demetaphorization. A denarrativization of the narrative that subsumes the particular into the universal, that reabsorbs singularity of life into common representations, that is, into metaphors that find their place in the realm of Absolute Knowledge. Denarrativization and demetaphorization name two modes of infrapolitical deconstruction as a practice of freedom. They are rather two coterminous and interrelated forms of infrapolitical thinking, or two ways of thinking in and from the infrapolitical dimension of existence, and two anarchic practices of freedom that are implying one another. As from the conclusion of "Ethos Daimon":

> If writing and thinking can do something other than serve the fallen fate of universal history, if we can *rescue ourselves from narratives of destiny that have in fact already lost their destination*, it is to healing we turn, not as a reestablishment of health, but as the possibility of *retrieval of the open region where freedom can still make an advent*. (Moreiras 2020: 181, my emphasis)

Denarrativization of thinking (and so of writing) and demetaphorization of existence let infrapolitics emerge as a dimension of existence that is a site for thinking open to an experience of freedom. And such denarrativization and demetaphorization can only come from an inscription of singularity, that is, an autographic inscription. Referring Paul De Man's essay on "Autobiography as De-Facement" (De Man 67–81) one can say that autography[10] is a dimension of writing that insists on the deconstructive power of singularity rather than a diegetic representation rooted in the identity of the self. Autography has already renounced to its function of prosopopoeia, chosen to reveal rather than vail the de-facing and muting effect of autobiography. The autographic inscription resists the narrativization of life into a destiny and exceeds the metaphorical subjectivation of the character. The singularity of the autographic inscription enables our rescue *from narratives of destiny that have in fact already lost their destination*, as it points us toward a dimension of existence haunted by inexhaustible possibilities and marked by the utter limits of singularity, namely, its infrapolitical dimension. The infrapolitical dimension of existence is that *open region where freedom can still make an advent.*

Compulsion to Passage

The reading of the two exergues helped to clarify the inceptive role of autography with respect to a certain preliminary displacement of thought on which infrapolitics depends. In this second part, I would rather like to focus more on how a connection with an autographic and affective register of thinking and

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10   Cfr. Baker, Cerrato "Autographic Praxis: an Infrapolitical Adventure" (under review at the time of this publication).

writing is constitutive of infrapolitics, yet sometimes only implicitly so. This very connection with autographic inscription holds the key to the inherent articulation of two sides of infrapolitics, namely, infrapolitics as a constitutive dimension of existence and infrapolitics as a practice or mode of thinking from, or being attuned to, such a dimension. In the fifth chapter of *Infrapolitics. A Handbook*, "The Absolute Difference (Between Life and Politics) of Which No Expert Can Speak", Moreiras captures the internal articulation of the twofoldness of infrapolitics in terms of the imperative dimension[11] of the relationship between thought and existence:

> One thinks because one must think, thinking is existing and inhabiting, thinking is inhabiting existence, and it is not an option among others, but a human need, even if frequently unthematized. But, if the relation of thought to existence is imperative, then it can be said that so is the relation of existence to thought: that is, thinking inhabits existence, but existence imposes its necessity on thought. If we can distinguish between two modes of infrapolitics, one of which would be *factical infrapolitics*, unavoidable as such, because it is infrapolitics as always already there, as *a constitutive dimension of existence, of every existence*, as the simple precipitate of the caesura between life and politics that subtracts from the language of the expert, there is also *a reflective infrapolitics that accepts its imperative dimension* and takes it on. Of the latter it can be said that it is at the same time cause and consequence of a certain existential rupture. (Moreiras 2021: 106, my emphasis)

The imperative relationship between existence and thought anchors itself in the singularity of autographic inscription exceeding the language and the register of metaphysics. The imperative relationship between existence and thought that marks infrapolitics imposes itself as an existential incision in thought that lets the infrapolitical dimension of existence become available as site for thinking. At the same time, as the imperative relationship between existence and thought is always bidirectional, *a reflective infrapolitics that accepts its imperative dimension* will cause "a certain existential rupture", i.e. a thoughtful incision in existence or, as Nancy calls it, a *decision of existence.*

The infrapolitical imperative relationship of thought and existence translates itself in a practice of freedom that is a practice of transformation that happens as *passage.* The notion of passage, which has already arisen hither and yon across these pages, is critical to understanding infrapolitics, its relationship with a certain Heideggerian (un-)legacy, as well as its theoretical and existential stakes.

Infrapolitics as a practice or register of thinking locates itself in the wake of a certain Heideggerian tradition of thought dealing with the end of metaphysics and with the transformative potential of thinking through such an

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11   On the imperative form of thought Moreiras is following Reiner Schürmann, Wandering Joy: "Two forms of thought confront each other. The type of thought that urges a path upon existence can be called 'imperative' thought; this is opposed to 'indicative' thought, which apprehends the real and establishes a noetics of it" (Moreiras 2021: 206).

end. This rather manyfold tradition[12] – which has been often referred to as Left-Heideggerianism – takes up Heidegger's deconstructionist enterprise as "the delivering over metaphysics to its truth" (Heidegger 2003: 92) as the beginning of what – in his 1954 "A Dialogue on Language: Between a Japanese and an Inquirer" – Heidegger calls a transformation of thinking "that occurs as a passage […] in which one site is left behind in favor of another [...] and that requires the sites to be placed in discussion" (Heidegger 1971: 42). As I noted elsewhere, this idea of "the passage that places in discussion both the site left behind as well as the nameless landing place" (Cerrato 2015: 89) is key to the topology of infrapolitics as topology,[13] of what Zambrano called the *obscure ground*. In this respect, here I am especially interested in three aspects of the idea of passage that have already emerged in the discussion of the two exergues, and that relate to Moreiras' controversial announcement of a second turn of deconstruction. These are: the an-archic character of the non-passing passages, the passages' relationship with death and their affinity with the work of mourning, and finally the de-patriated nature of the *non*-place of the passage and its connection with expatriation.

An-archic non-passing passages. The passage is a register of thinking that has neither a principle or a rule, nor a destination. The passage does not pass. It is the register of thinking that dwells in its own failure of capturing the inscription of singularity. The passage is not predetermined by the intention or hope to arrive somewhere. It is not a quest for a change of location. The passage that transforms thinking is an exodus or step out from metaphysics, rather than a relocation in the realm of different sovereign principles or representations. The passage means backtracking from ontotheological structure, yet without transferring to another order of thought. The passage is a displacement toward a nameless place, that is to say, it is a displacement without relocation. Such a

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12   Moreiras refers to it many times. For example in *Infrapolitics*, he says: "It must have become clear already that our project places itself in a tradition of thought marked by the work of Martin Heidegger, which it seeks to interpret or reinterpret by learning from a number of thinkers in his wake: from Reiner Schürmann to Cathérine Malabou, from Simone Weil and Luce Irigaray and María Zambrano to Felipe Martínez Marzoa and Arturo Leyte, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, Massimo Cacciari, Mario Tronti, Miguel Abensour, Oscar del Barco, Agustín García Calvo, Giorgio Agamben, the Invisible Committee, Roberto Esposito, or Davide Tarizzo, from Sigmund Freud to Jacques Lacan, Jorge Alemán and the Lacanian tradition, including of course many others. There is nothing too original here, except that we aim to keep alive a certain simplicity in Heidegger's thought that he himself covered up at times – a problem that has repeated itself in its reception" (Moreiras 2021: 69).

      See also what Jaime Rodriguez Matos says: "Left-Heideggerianism is meant to designate those thinkers for whom the work of Heidegger is a fundamental point of departure, but who ultimately assume that in Heidegger there is no answer to the question "What is to be done?", and thus no useful link between theory and praxis" (Rodriguez Matos 2015: 37).

13   Here one can understand *topology* either etymologically as logic of place, or mathematically as a logic of spatial transformation.

displacement is first and foremost an anarchic practice of existential freedom. It is a practice of existential freedom that does not seize it into a stable/permanent attainment. In this sense, the passage is always an adventure toward a new site for thought that is never conquered. Existential freedom is experienced as an adventure of thinking dwelling in the passage. What is at stake in every passage is the repetition or reactivation of a twofold atelic practice of freedom grounded in the *imperative dimension* of the relationship between thought and existence. (Moreiras 2021: 106)

The passage passes neither topologically nor temporally. There is not an after the passage settling in a post-metaphysical horizon, rather only a restless passing and, eventually, a momentary anxious dwelling in it. What is at stake in every passage is always a spatiotemporal step back from the ontotheological structure of metaphysics to dwell in its limits, or better, in the passage to its limits, to the extent that the passage to the limits of metaphysical thinking enables an atelic practice of existential emancipation. This means not only, as Heidegger was pointing out with his Japanese interlocutor, that the transformation of thinking "however, cannot be established as readily as a ship can alter its course, and even less can be established as the consequence of an accumulation of the result of philosophical research" (Heidegger 1971: 42), but also that what is at stake is not a path for redemption or a sequence of – either improvised or predetermined – stages to reach final salvation. Infrapolitics is constitutively bound to an imperative of repetition to the extent that rather than a principle and teleology or theoretical object-*ive*, what defines it is an anarchic and atelic practice of thinking that dwells in a marginal, transitional, and intentionally withdrawn position.

> It is only a decision of existence, to make oneself into what one is, which is an unfinishable project, and demands therefore in each case ceaseless repetition. It is a repetition of the simple, of the very *factum* of an existence, my own, which is neither consumed nor consummates itself in any interiority. (Moreiras 2022: 60)

Different passages are neither to be thought as topographically different, as located in separate sites of thought, nor temporally as subsequent points in a linear understanding of time, but rather as singular inscriptions of thought in the text of existence which are also singular (autographic) inscriptions of the existence in the text of thought. Such inscriptions, as we have seen in the previous section, take place on the margin on *the parergon of existence*; and this means neither where both existence and thought are involved into any sort of productivity and organized or absorbed by politics, nor in some sort of enclosed interiority: "A step back toward the world as *parergon*, toward the outside, which is never just the outside, since it in-sists and re-sists in the dimension of the existential 'ex-'" (Moreiras 2022: 63).

Infrapolitical passages and death. The relationship of infrapolitics with death has different, yet connected dimensions. As already noted in the first section, there is grief as the epitome of autographic inscription, that is, of an existential incision

of singularity that calls for a transformative experience of thinking, a displacement of thought that is inherently infrapolitical. As Williams clearly evidences:

> As such, grief per se can never be political. Rather it is only ever an erstwhile infrapolitical caring for the depths of the abyss of being-toward-death, or for the *painful assumption of a certain responsibility toward the limit and possibility of existence*. For this reason, the work of mourning, the laborious pursuit of an assignable place for death, or for the death of the other, traverses *the prepolitical passage from grief to an attunement in thinking and writing* (and therefore in acting) that *strives to account for the possibility of freedom and existence*. (Williams 2021: 35, my emphasis)

Grief is the incision of death in existence. Grief signals the coincidence of the utter limits of singular existence with the abysmal perspective of the unaccountable and inexhaustible possibilities that haunt it. It is the irruption of the affective register that speaks the "originary and unspeakable other language" uncovering the "singularly passive and inoperative experience of staring mortality in the face" (Williams 2021: 35), that is the experience of being thrown "toward the ownmost, nonrelational, and insuperable potentiality-of being" (Heidegger 2010: 241). There, grief opens up a breach between the singularity of existence and the individual-subject of the ontotheological historical-political order. What such a breach of grief reveals is a gap that is already there, that is, "the caesura between life and politics that subtracts from the language of the expert" (Moreiras 2021: 106). This way, grief opens up the possibility for a displacement of thought from the realm of ontotheology to "the open region where freedom can still make an advent" (Moreiras 2020a: 181), that is, infrapolitics as constitutive dimension of every existence. Grief as existential incision of death opens up the possibility of a different *attunement in thinking and writing* that depends on *the painful assumption of a certain responsibility toward the limit and possibility of existence*. Grief is the existential rupture that calls thinking to assume the responsibility of its imperative relation to existence. Such an assumption coincides with the decision to dwell in the passage and on the passage to strive *to account for the possibility of freedom and existence*. This is a commitment to a certain work of thought, that is, an attentive and attuned work of thought – which is also a work of writing – that commits itself to an emancipatory transformation of both existence and thinking on the basis of their difference, yet at the same time to an infinite and indefinite repetition of such a commitment.

In this sense, infrapolitics as *passage* is deeply akin, even kindred, to the work of mourning as is so clearly shown in Williams' quotations. So, the relationship of infrapolitics with death goes beyond its inception, this means it goes beyond the initial autographic inscription, as it has to do with its very constitution as an anarchic and atelic practice of passage. To borrow once more Williams' terms, "laborious pursuit of an assignable place for death" does not exhaust itself in one passage from the *affective passivity* of grief to the attunement of thinking and writing, rather this is one passage that happens in

multiple yet not sequential, almost simultaneous although not synchronized, passages. These multiple passages, although they never coincide, take place between one known site of "life" ordered according to an ontotheological understanding of existence – that is to say, according to the dichotomic binomial Life/Death activity/passivity and to the ordinary understanding of time based on the privilege of the present – and another nameless place that is never conquered. These passages deal with a suspension of the opposition of activity and passivity, as well as with an experience of the ecstatic and horizontal unity of temporality that exceeds the limits of representability. The passages dwell in there and move back and forth as if to reconcile oneself to such an uttermost experience of displacement. They are never about moving beyond and establishing different existential parameters, as they are about coming to terms with the possibilities implied in the ultimate negativity in the encounter with one's own nothingness in a way that reminds one of the *Fort/Da* game of the child dealing with the disappearance and return of the mother from Freud's analysis[14] of the compulsion to repetition.

So, death with respect to infrapolitics is the experience of the autographic inscription of one's singularity as being-toward-death, as much as it is the experience of loss of the metaphysical order of the real, the ontotheological texture of life. It is the loss of the texture of meanings that *initially and for the most part* organizes life, i.e. the loss of everydayness. It is an experience of extreme negativity that turns into the possibility of a radical and anarchic pursuit of freedom. This is what is at stake in Zambrano's notions of *deslegación* (un-legacy), *vida sin textura* (life without texture), and *relación abismada* (de-grounded relation) that Moreiras discusses[15] in the first chapter of *Infrapolitics. A Handbook*:

> In Zambrano, nothingness does not announce nihilism. On the contrary, "*la nada hace nacer*", nothingness brings into the world [...] Nothingness is for Zambrano the excess of subjectivity, the absolute resistance to – as double resistance, as double distance – subjectivity, "a resistance that is not being, since the thinking subject knows nothing about any being that is not itself" (Zambrano 1991: 174). And that which is not being is nothing, "*mas es todo; es el fondo innominado que no es idea*" ["but it is everything; it is the nameless ground that is not idea"] (Zambrano 1991: 174). To think through to this nameless ground, nothingness, since not-being, not-idea. (Moreiras 2021: 23)

14   See Freud 1961: 8–9.
15   "Starting from her radicalization of the notion of legacy, that is, from the experience of the legacy of un-legacy, Zambrano says: "[The action of nothingness] is a living action. One could call it life without texture, without consistency. Life with texture is already being, even though in life there is always more than texture, and so in man life is in excess of what it is in those for whom life is only texture. In man, life shows that it is more than being, being, that is, in the way of things, of objects. That is why in man, as being grows, so grows nothingness. And then nothingness works as a possibility. Nothingness *hace nacer*, brings into the world [I must point out the untranslatability of *hace nacer* here, since nothing could be more wrong than the obvious translation, "brings into being"] (169)" (Moreiras 2020c: 35).

Zambrano's *life without texture* captures the negativity of singularity emerging from the experience of being-toward death as "the ownmost, *nonrelational,* and insuperable potentiality-of being" (Heidegger 2010: 241). Zambrano foregrounds the radical non-relationality of such a negativity in the concepts of *un-legacy* and *de-grounded* relation. They reveal nothingness as singularity's uprooting power with respect to the ontotheological order, that is, its ability to produce an incision that severs the ties to the common ground, to the bond to the ideal place of continuity, i.e. the place of continuity and legacy. Nothingness is the excess of subjectivity that brings to light the possibility to resist all identitarian captures, transforming singularity into a particular subject acting on behalf of a common destiny grounded in the naming of an unescapable legacy. Nothingness gives birth to uprootedness as a possibility of freedom, that is, "as the possibility of retrieval of the open region where freedom can still make an advent" (Moreiras 2020a: 181).

PASSAGE AND EXPATRIATION. There is a point of coincidence and of reciprocal implication between death and ex-(/de-)patriation and it is there that infrapolitics as emancipatory practice of the imperative relation of thought and existence insists, as the reference to Antigone in the Exergues of *Infrapolitica* clearly shows.

Such a point of coincidence between death and ex-/de-patriation is the explicit symbolic anchor point for *Tercer Espacio*'s analysis of literature and mourning in Latin America. There, in the *Introduction*, Moreiras identifies US Latin-Americanist field as the *third space* that was the "lively" place of the symbolic projection of the work of mourning related to the experience of expatriation as double uprooting with respect to the ground of historicity. The autographic inscription of death and expatriation that marks the book since its dedication to the memory of a dead mother and a father left behind, is somehow rescued and repatriated in an academic field although inhabited in a critical, even heretic, always marginal yet transformative way. However, in 2018, for the re-edition of the book, Moreiras adds a brief unequivocal footnote to the introduction's passage about the US Latin-Americanist field: "I cannot but retract: in US Latin-Americanism there is not 'vital' space at all, and not understanding it from the beginning turned out to be harmful" (Moreiras 2021: 24). This footnote actually ciphers Moreiras' more than ten years long disciplinary exodus from Latin-Americanism, whose recollection and sanction is actually at stake in *Against Abstraction.* This academic expatriation played a crucial role in the emergence of the thought of infrapolitics and marks in some way all and every *passage*.

> There are many forms of expatriation, and one of them, perhaps the freest, is to expatriate yourself for the sake of another fatherland, another home, perhaps only a symbolic one. But there is an expatriation without the minimal possibility of return, a *second-degree expatriation*, when one finds oneself having to give up that other home, because it has already been lost. (Moreiras 2020a: 59, my emphasis)

In terms of the connection of autography and infrapolitics here at stake, the *second-degree expatriation* from the symbolic other home of Latin American studies represents the autographic inscription marking a displacement necessary to the call for a *second (infrapolitical) moment of deconstruction*. I have no presumption of philological and exegetic accuracy in this respect (it is actually quite a misstep with respect to the specific context of this quotation), yet the text that I have just quoted "My life at Z. A theoretical fiction" and the memory of the time when I read it brings together, all conflated into an uncertain diffuse sense of fatality, a number of sundry passages of existence and thought that seem inclined to align themselves to tell something like a "story".

In 2014, while I was still struggling with the implication of my own expatriation(s), my husband and I went to Chicago twice for so-called *university business*. I would not remember that they were two if had not been for a striking climatic difference. The first time was in January during a quite significant winter storm, and on the plane, I read a first draft of "My Life at Z" that I had printed before leaving. I remember the cold, I remember the snow, I remember thinking about the text during those cold disoriented days. I remember the encounter with a small fox in a big park covered with snow in downtown Chicago while we were walking back one evening. I remember it because in those pages I had just read, Moreiras describes his encounter with a fox "*I was running through the forest by our house, as I had done hundreds of times in fourteen years, but only that once I encountered a fox…*" and then "Nobody knows how a destiny is hatched, although sometimes things happen" (Moreiras 2020: 57–58). The text does not say anything about snow, yet that is how I imagined that encounter with fate revealing something like "that the world is after all that magical conspiracy one always wished for it not to be" (Moreiras 2020: 58). The second time we went to Chicago, that spring, was for the 2014 Latin-American Studies Association conference. At that conference, responding to the interpellation to account for a supposed "turn to deconstruction" in the field of Latin American studies, Moreiras put forward the possibility/necessity of a "second moment of deconstruction" for the first time.[16]

"My Life at Z" starts with the incision of grief, signaled by the dedication "to Elena, on her death in memoriam", followed by a short italicized exergue:

> *To render an account neither from defeat nor from victory but from a passage, starting in the passage, at a given moment of the passage, or when the exit from the passage can only be thought in terms of one's own death. To scorn both the notion of defeat and that of victory. The ground is active nihilism, the confrontation with personal values that die and vanish. I do not seek exculpation, I intend neither to critique nor to celebrate, but without telling, no matter how elliptically, what almost destroyed me, I could not return to writing. And it is time to write.* […] (Moreiras 2020: 55)

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16   The intervention originally published in Poblete 2018, and part of Moreiras 2020a.

These words mark the passage from grief to "attunement in thinking and writing (and therefore in acting) that strives to account for the possibility of freedom and existence" (Williams 2021: 35). And in what follows, thinking and writing are indeed called to the mourning-like infrapolitical work of *denarrativization* that Moreiras captures so clearly in "Ethos Daimon". What is at stake in such a denarrativization is the chance to rescue oneself "from narratives of destiny that have in fact already lost their destination" (Moreiras 2020: 181). The inscription in thought of the singularity of death acts as an incision severing all relational ties binding us to a destiny which is a mandate to belonging, to continuity, to conformity to a place and an order. Grief prepares us for expatriation as mournful practice of freedom. So, one can say that "My Life at Z" accomplishes the denarrativization of a destiny built around a symbolic repatriation in Latin American studies, sanctioned by *Tercer Espacio*, and this way it allowed Moreiras' *second-degree expatriation*, that is, a disciplinary expatriation, in turn sanctioned by *Against Abstraction. Notes from an ex Latin Americanist.* And the autographic inscription of such a disciplinary expatriation has actually been the condition for thinking a second infrapolitical turn in deconstruction.

It is certainly accurate to say that infrapolitics and the project of Infrapolitical Deconstruction "has a common genealogy, and it must have it, although it is lived differently by everyone, we must find it in our provenance—the common link is the university, and the specific field of Latin American Studies in it" (Moreiras 2021: 67). However, I would contend that the common mark is rather the experience of an autographic inscription of expatriation(s) that is also first and foremost a second-degree expatriation from any academic field as one's thought's place of belonging toward a non-place of *un-legacy* and *un-grounded relations* for a *life without texture*. In a sense, infrapolitics needs not only the first deconstructive displacement to the margin announced in the exergue of *Tercer Espacio*, but also an autographic disciplinary displacement of the site of enunciation. This is a displacement not simply with respect to the demands of a particular academic disciplinary field, rather with respect to the ontotheological structure that organizes academia as a space of production *tout court*. If in the first displacement it is existence insisting on thought, in the second it is thought insisting on existence. Both displacements belong to the interminable repetitive work of thinking and writing about our facticity in order to modify our relationship to it under the sign of a different understanding of freedom.

Uncanny Rest in the Obscure Ground

At the very beginning of these pages, I suggested that in *Uncanny Rest* infrapolitics and autography emerge as inherently and intimately interrelated and that the affective register is spoken. Indeed, a different autographic relation with the site of enunciation seems to distinguish it. The material displacement of the confinement, the artificial suspension of relationality, the mandated

abandonment of the academic spaces of production, the subtraction of common forms symbolic compensation, the interruption of the daily *harassed unrest* of late capitalism[17] have left a space of uncanny rest to thinking. Also, the book seems to bring with it – in a noncumulative way like different scars on the skin – the autographic incisions on thought and existence that the other passages left. There is no progress or simple going forward in infrapolitics, yet every decision of existence, every dwelling in the obscure ground, every time thought tunes itself into its own singularity and accepts its imperative relation to existence, then an existential trace and a thoughtful scar are left.

The difference that *Uncanny Rest* marks with respect to the rest of Moreiras' books, including the ones that came to light almost at the same time, is ciphered in the placement and treatment of another picture (which is not the only picture part of the book, yet the only one Moreiras addresses directly).

Fig.3

The picture appears in the fifth of the entries of Moreiras original meditations throughout the lockdown for the Covid-19 pandemic. It is not an exergue, it is not a marginal note, or a digression from any productive or *poietic* task. It is infrapolitical thinking addressing the *existential parergon* in its own obscure site. The picture is neither the object of thinking, nor does it capture its subject, i.e. the thinking subject. The picture is a material prompt for an autographic inscription that brings the infrapolitical dimension and its idiosynchratic trans-chronic temporality to manifest itself to thought. The extemporaneous encounter with the old picture lets emerge and identify the then-unnamed,

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17   Crf. Moreiras 2020b: 41. There Moreiras is referring to Heidegger's conference "Building, Dwelling, Thinking".

uncanny, and intimately perturbing feeling of loss and displacement that was haunting the moment of the picture, making it part of what the picture memorializes although unintentionally. Such an unnamed haunting marked then the experience as an experience of loss and disjuncture, that is, of the impossibility of being there, attuned to the time-place of the photograph. And now, at the encounter with the picture, that very same experience is not only named, but also registered as haunting the present in the form of the question that asks for who has always already teleologically ordered our existence and disposed it according to "the acquisitive time of destiny and progress" (Moreiras 2020a: 172). This is the question that unveils the existential parergon that exceeds and subcedes ontotheological capture, and so-doing opens up the path for a quest for an-archic freedom. There, one can say that deconstruction *shifted to existence* and turned into infrapolitical practice.

> As though some previous pact would have already consummated the impossibility of being there, then. As though my soul verified its previous sale – who bought it? – for a future that was never to come, but which has nevertheless ordered my life. As though everything that was done or every place I had to be was always in relation to a subtraction of time to which I would have consented immemorially, a disguise. Some form of trickery, of error. As though I was not able to be there even while being there, by virtue of being or having to be in some other place that does not exist. (Moreiras 2022: 21)

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Madalena Ćerato

Autografija i infrapolitika

Apstrakt

Ovaj članak istražuje vezu između infrapolitike i autografije u radu Alberta Moreirasa. Na ovaj način, rad daje mogući ključ za čitanje novih Moreirasovih publikacija *Infrapolitika. Priručnik* i *Nelagodni odmor* u odnosu na njegova ranija dela. Odnos prema autografiji ispostavlja se kao inherentan i nužan za infrapolitiku, kao i ključ za razumevanje infrapolitike u pogledu zaokreta dekonstrukcije ka egzistenciji. Autografija se pokazuje kao rez singularnosti, koji omogućava nastajanje recipročne i imperativne veze između misli i egzistencije, koja je konstitutivna za infrapolitiku. Prvi deo rada usmerava se na početnu ulogu autografije i tiče se određenog preliminarnog izmeštanja misli od koje je infrapolitika zavisna, te prati vezu autografija-infrapolitika nazad u afektivni registar koji je Moreiras prvi put najavio u svojoj knjizi *Tercer espacio*. U drugom delu rada, fokus je na suštinskoj ulozi ove veze i, shodno tome, analizira se u odnosu na tri glavna aspekta infrapolitičkog mišljenja, naime, ideja an-arhičnog ne-prolaznog prolaza, veza između smrti i afiniteta prema radu žalosti i, konačno, veza sa „ekspatrijacijom".

Ključne reči: infrapolitika, autografija, prolaz, žalost, ekspatrijacija, singularnost, dekonstrukcija, egzistencija.

Jaime Rodríguez Matos

INFRAPOLITICS AT THE END OF AESTH-ETHICS: ON ALBERTO MOREIRAS' RECENT WORK

ABSTRACT
In this paper I will offer a reading of Alberto Moreiras' recently published books, but within the context of his life's work as a whole: which I will consider from the point of view of a questioning of the idea of the time/history difference. After briefly tracing that overarching concern in his early work, I move to a consideration of a move away from Hegelianism in the more recent publications. This non-Hegelianism is not simply an anti-Hegelian stance. Understanding the difference will take us into the true dimension of infrapolitics. This aspect of Moreiras' contribution to contemporary debates will be illustrated by way of his paradoxical and unrecognizable Antigone.

Time/History

We should all be celebrating the recent publication of Alberto Moreiras' new work: *Marranismo e inscripción* (2016, along with its translation as *Against Abstraction* in 2020); *Infrapolítica: Instrucciones de uso* (2020); *Sosiego siniestro* (2021); as well as the new and expanded edition of two previous books in 2021 – *Tercer espacio* (previously 1999) and *Línea de sombra* (previously 2006). This abundance of new material offers a chance to clarify and bring into focus the enormous contribution that Moreiras has made in the areas of Latin Americanism, political theory, and our understanding of the contemporary world in general over the course of the last three decades (starting in 1991 with the publication of *Interpretación y diferencia* and including the groundbreaking *The Exhaustion of Difference* of 2001). I will approach that task in this paper by looking at the way Moreiras has fundamentally questioned the politico-philosophical matrix for reducing time to history.[1] This opposition between time

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1   Given the centrality of the notion of infrapolitics in what follows, I should note that the work that has been emerging over the last several years on that front has a

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and history should not be understood as the dichotomy of the presence of a time that would stand over against a logico-cartographic concept of History incapable of doing justice to the multiplicity and vitality of real or lived time. Rather, the questioning of the matrix is itself a meditation on the exhaustion of time itself (which means a questioning of all the ways in which time a-nulls itself for certain modes of thinking). That is, Moreiras work entails a different engagement with the opposition between a reductive historical framework and the redemption of what is thus reduced. This opposition itself has become one of the forms of contemporary reactionary thought. We can understand this as a radicalization of the deconstruction of metaphysics which does not only shake the paradigms of political theology that underwrite important sectors of conservatism and progressivism, but which will have important consequence for radical Heideggerian readings as well, which in the following pages will be represented by Moreiras' infrapoliticization of the an-archic reading of the ontological difference in Reiner Schürmann.

Perhaps the best illustration of this trajectory is Moreiras' Antigone. A paradoxical figure that he presents to us not as a reading of Sophocles, and not even a reading of the reading of a reading (his reading of Derrida's reading of Hegel's, for instance); what is at issue with this particular Antigone is not the foregrounding of a part that would stand for the whole, but rather the cutting down of a massiveness reduced to less than the nothing that would be the gap in the structure: "a nothingness that is at the same time not-all" – that is, infrapolitics (Moreiras 2020b: 80–81). The way that Moreiras does this will allow us to consider two interconnected aspects of infrapolitics. On one level, the figure of Antigone will function as the operator for two specific cases of demetaphorization: first, a shifting that will push the question of structurality toward a meditation on the ontological difference, and, secondly, an infrapoliticization of what Heidegger calls "the poetic". On a different level, Antigone will open a question that exposes what I understand as the heterogeneity of Moreiras' thought, which I will frame by asking the following question: what happens to the quasi-transcendental function that Antigone has in *Infrapolítica* as we confront the temporality of what in *Sosiego siniestro* is called the decision of existence?

This is the path that I want to explore as a way into the enigma of what Moreiras calls his life's single idea, as in the following description of the place of philosophy in his work:

> There is a primary relationship with the history of philosophy, with metaphysics, culminating in G. W. F. Hegel, and Marxism is part of it, since Marxism cannot be fathomed without Hegel. [...] I think I am still there, more than ever. Heidegger repeated something Henri Bergson used to say, namely, that people only

collective dimension that goes beyond Moreiras' recent publications. The work of Gareth Williams, Sergio Villalobos, Maddalena Cerrato, Peter Barker, among others, is part of a dialogue that unfortunately is not tracked in my reading of Moreiras here. An account of that dialogue remains a necessary task.

get to have one single idea in their lives; the problem is that it takes a while to recognize that single idea as such, and we get lost in marginalities. Somehow my single idea, if I may claim to have it yet, is there, connected to that particular relationship with the history of thought that I do not consider a Eurocentric relationship because I do not accept Eurocentrism as my horizon. Eurocentrism explodes once a critical relationship to Hegelianism is assumed, and the latter forces us into a cosmopolitical configuration of intellectual work. (Moreiras 2020a: 30)

I do not claim to know what that single idea is, and the passage is clear enough in terms of its desire not to reveal it completely. But perhaps we can begin to approach that constellation by way of a meditation on time, where Hegel marks the limit of a Eurocentric idea of philosophy and history. The Eurocentrism in question is not symptomatic – one cannot do away with it and leave Hegelianism intact. This line of inquiry becomes more pertinent in a moment when the rehabilitation of Hegel within important sectors in political theory is in full swing. At the same time, if we are to begin to gain a clearer understanding of Moreiras' work, particularly as it concerns infrapolitics, we cannot frame this critique of metaphysics by itself. More and more it is a question of attending to at least two further problems internal to the deconstruction of the traditional function of philosophy. On the one hand, there is the temptation of reducing deconstruction to a question of exegetical writing, which in a broader sense is also the temptation to seek answers to political questions in aesthetics. On the other, there is the temptation to try at all costs to find the political translation of the Heideggerian ontological difference, which in a broader sense means to politicize even the step back that would mark a liberation from the overreach of politics. In both cases what we find is a push toward the political that, perhaps inadvertently, closes the interrogation of history and temporality precisely where it should have opened it.

Early Moreiras

Though it is not a question of reducing Moreiras' entire body of work to a single guiding thread, the (in)difference of time and history can be seen as a constant concern. In *Interpretación y diferencia* (1991), Moreiras was trying to draw the writerly and readerly consequences of thinking the co-belonging of identity and being, as opposed to the radical affirmation of their identity or their non-identity (Moreiras 1991: 26–35). It is a move toward the unthought of thought: the absent foundation of thought. To think this co-belonging of identity and difference will mean to translate Heraclitus fragment 247, *ethos anthropoi daimon*, as "the identical, for man, is the differential [lo idéntico es para el hombre lo diferencial]" (Moreiras 1991: 47). At the heart of a this form of being at home in the unhomely (a figure that will return) there is a search for a way of thinking the place of autography (a displacement and unworking of subjectivity marking the singular dates of the history of a life in the face of the eternal return of the same) "in the time of the end of metaphysics"; that

is, a position that is a return to a new beginning for which there is no foundation yet, or, conversely, for which its foundation is already absent (Moreiras 1991: 77–78). But this is inconceivable without going through the ontological difference as difference. Heidegger is implicated in this translation; but so is the Derrida of "la différance". The issue is the "opening of the possibility of history" as temporization of the difference: "To say that historiality is the temporization of difference is not to define once and for all the condition of possibility for history in general: it is above all to define the condition of possibility for our own history, which alone knows the historical exhaustion of the metaphysics of presence [...] Difference is historial, that is to say, our history needs difference and finds in it its historical freedom" (Moreiras 1991: 66). What is perhaps no longer possible is to think that the problematic thus opened can be addressed by way of the Saussurian discovery of the sign, a situation that Derrida himself anticipated in "La différance" when he cautioned that "the thematic of *différance* may very well, indeed must, one day be superseded" (Derrida 1982: 7).

In *Tercer espacio* (1999) autography reappears as one of the three registers that the book seeks to articulate along with the theoretical and disciplinary (work on Latin America and Latin American literature). In this book, Moreiras was also keeping track of a "trans-autographic" dimension that he calls the political (Moreiras 2021b: 25). It is here that the (in)difference between time and history first takes on the form of an engagement with subalternism (or, the radical questioning of the various philosophical paradigms designed for the suppression of time in the name of an ordered History). In both *Tercer espacio* and the subsequent book, *The Exhaustion of Difference* (2001), Moreiras remains firmly planted in the space of negotiation demarcated between critique and political work. In the 2001 book, he proposes a double articulation of subalternity which today we could perhaps call hegemonic and post-hegemonic. Be that as it may, we find in the double articulation a political "subalternist affirmation" that seeks to address how to avoid simply dwelling on "the theorization of the negativity of subaltern temporality", in the words of John Kraniauskas (cited in Moreiras 2001: 287). Not that Moreiras was ever simply working within a hegemonic horizon. But he was still, if we can put it this way, trying to outline a posthegemonic horizon within a dialogue fundamentally dominated by the need to find a new hegemonic articulation on the Left.

It is with *Línea de sombra* (2006) that a distance from politics as such is first staked in full force. The non-subject emerges as a way of assuming an unworking of legacy that even Heidegger was not able to undertake, and which Moreiras proposes as a way of abandoning the sacrificial structure of history (Moreiras 2021a: 36). This involves taking a step back from the closure of temporality in late capitalism (Moreiras 2021a: 100, n. 46), or the opening of a counter Imperial and messianic time (Moreiras 2021a: 175). The historical experience at the end of this book is that of the era in which there is a total theft of the time of the subject, an emptying out of subjectivity (Moreiras 2021a: 255–256). This is one way of foregrounding the fact that what the twentieth century gave us,

in the words of Lacoue-Labarthe, was the realm between the two deaths (Lacoue-Labarthe 1991: 28). (This Antigonic position is at the heart of what I wish to illuminate of Moreiras' work in what follows.)

If *Línea de sombra* was a step away from the disciplinary borderlines of Latin Americanism and a move toward an engagement with the theoretical and philosophical texts of the political turn of the late 1990s and early 2000s (Badiou, Butler, Negri, Rancière, Žižek, etc.), the reason for this distance only becomes explicitly thematized in *Against Abstraction* (2016). In this book we find a direct confrontation with the issue of how and why the various subalternisms of the 1990s retreated from the radicality originally opened by the project (Moreiras 2020a: 77). Perhaps more important, we also encounter the proposal for a second deconstructive turn, which would be a move away from well-known postmodern commonplaces regarding endless interpretation and toward broaching the question of the ontological difference as the path that would lead toward a more radical experience of historicity and temporality.

This is a return to a thematic that is clearly at the heart of Moreiras' thought since *Interpretación y diferencia*, but now the goal is to establish a distance from politics as the realm of general equivalence, or the realm of all-encompassing Creontic administration:

> If writing and thinking can do something other than serve the fallen fate of universal history, if we can save or rescue ourselves from narratives of destiny that have in fact already lost their destination, it is to healing we turn, not as the reestablishment of health, but as the possibility of retrieval of the open region where freedom can still make an advent. (Moreiras 2020a: 181)

The confrontation with the disorientation of all destinies, as we will see, is also a confrontation with the time of infrapolitics and the decision of existence, thematics that will occupy the remainder of these pages. For the moment, let us note that this return to the possibility of being at home in the unhomely (being able to explode the narrative of destinies that have lost all destination) is not simply a return to the beginning or the origin. Moreiras' burrows into the aporias of a freedom that cannot be marked as a form of militancy (be it progressive or conservative). In a turnaround of the usual criticism leveled against deconstruction (that it is never political enough), here the issue of time-history appears as a way of indicating that a dominant (academic) version of the project of the deconstruction of metaphysics was unable to properly emphasize the step away, the distance, from politics as such – even in its most negative moments it remained caught in the task of political calculation). Infrapolitics comes in as an operator to mark this distance from politics without in the process simply becoming a-political, or anti-political, and even less archi-political. But this distance from politics, then, cannot be a retreat into some version of *écriture*.

Instead of this implying that we now have to look for the opening of historicity in a place other than that indicated by way of difference (as in the quotation from *Interpretación y diferencia*), I would argue that this moves us in the direction of thinking the problematic of difference as part of the Heideggerian

ontological difference – so that what is shifted is the issue of the event in "structure" that shook the discourse of the human sciences in the twentieth century such as Derrida outlined it in "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" (Derrida 1978: 278–293). This is not to say that Moreiras is the first to think this shift. We can discern it most fundamentally in the way that Derrida's polemic with Lacan (whose discourse is at the very heart of that structural event) touches on the insufficiency of the triad Imaginary/Symbolic/Real to think dissemination – a problematic that Alan Bass sought to sum up in the following terms in his translator's notes to "La différance": "For Derrida, Lacan's 'topology of castration', which assigns the 'hole' or lack to a place – 'a hole with determinable borders' – repeats the metaphysical gesture (albeit a negative one) of making absence, the lack, the hole, a transcendental principle that can be pinned down as such, and can thereby govern a theoretical discourse" (Derrida 1982: 6, n. 5). In "The Purveyor of Truth" Derrida writes of the Lacanian algorithms: "[...] a hole will be stopped: and to do so one does not have to fill it, but only to see it and delimit its contour" (Derrida 1987: 436; cf. Derrida 1981: 82–89, 107–113, n. 44 and Derrida 1998: 39–69). We should note that this is the function that Antigone herself will have in Lacan's seminar VII, *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis* (1959–1960). As late as 1969, Lacan had adduced the same site, the place where the structure is holed, as the ruin of absolute knowledge, only to call it "structure" (Lacan 2006: 291; see also Lacan 2005: 675–676).

From a different angle, we find an indictment of this use of the "hole" in the structure as a metaphysical misreading of Gödel's incompleteness theorem by a young Alain Badiou who, already taking formal logic as a condition of truth, shows how the incompleteness of the structure proves nothing less than that its reign is absolute – or, to put it in more palatable terms, something always escapes, but it is foreclosed absolutely within the structure. For the young Althusserian that Badiou was at that time, the suturing that was supposed to be at stake in this (still too metaphysical) structuralism only happens in the political sphere (Badiou 2012: 165). The questioning of structure is an issue that concerns an order of historicity that is of a different kind than that of the destruction of ontotheology. The emergence of a meditation on infrapolitics marks a shift in the questioning of that destruction: away from the (post)structuralist horizon – a horizon that continues to mark many of the most influential conversations on the left, but increasingly with diminishing returns.

Consider, for instance, Moreiras' fundamental point regarding the dialogue in *Contingency, Hegemony and Universality* (Butler, Laclau and Žižek 2000). In chapter four of *Línea de sombra* Moreiras objects that for these thinkers of the founding exclusion, Žižek and Laclau in particular, the task seems to be, above all, to fully exclude the enigmatic remainder that should take their politics to their very limit – which, in the case of Laclau, would be the post-hegemonic dimension of hegemony (Moreiras 2021a: 159). Ultimately, what this means is not that there is a mistake somewhere in the way that structural incompleteness is implemented, but that structural incompleteness might just

be a technique for domesticating and forgetting about the extimate essence presencing at the heart of politics. That is, a hole that is stopped simply by delineating its contour. Thus, when Moreiras, in the "exergue" of *Infrapolítica*, writes of Derrida's consideration of the destructuration internal to all structures by way of situating the figure of Antigone, and he points out that he is well aware of the risk that is involved in claiming that site (with Derrida) for Antigone and (without Derrida) for infrapolitics, it is to this context that we must refer (Moreiras 2020b: 18).

The Extimate Essence Presencing at the Heart of Politics

Given that Antigone is going to be a central figure, perhaps the best way to approach the questions at hand is by clearing a possible misunderstanding involving Lacan. Moreiras' has declared himself a "closet Lacanian" of sorts (Moreiras 2020a: 73) – and he has done so while making very important proposals regarding a possible Latin Americanism that is no longer of the ego, or that dares to step beyond the pleasure principle. The Lacanian *objet a* has been fundamental for him throughout his work, particularly as the lost and mourned object of *Tercer espacio*. But in his tracing of the exhaustion of militant thought (conservative and progressive alike) Lacan is not a figure that fares particularly well. Psychoanalysis remains dangerously close to a nostalgia for the order of masters, even if these are master signifiers. Moreiras rebukes the Lacan of the *Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, where the reading of Antigone is a centerpiece, as longing for a master capable of containing the coming evil upheaval (this as part of his reading of Donoso, where psychoanalysis appears on the margins). In the context of *Infrapolítica*, the central issue is the idea of the reactionary. Reactionary today is the thought that seeks to conserve the linear temporality of the moribund ancient regime, but also the thought that (in the semblance of progressivism) opposes to it an emergent temporality of freedom. Moreiras calls this conflict, between a residual and exhausted temporality and an emergent temporal plenitude, the idologeme of linear historical time; and "understanding the political today means to destroy that ideologeme of linear historical time" (Moreiras 2020b: 52).

As an example, Moreiras offers a short history of the fate of subalternist thought. On a first approach, subalternism sought to critique panlogicist notions of historical time, which reduced the historicity of the I and of the world to an ordered concept of world-history. Faced with the limit of the unthinkable that opens at the limit where history no longer yields to a narrativization into logic, subalternism retreats to a hegemonic notion of politics (in the post-Gramscian sense of the term). But this retreat is nothing other than "the deconstruction of the radicality of the subalternist idea as such" (Moreiras 2020b: 63). This form of progressivism becomes a different kind of conservatism. If modernity can be understood as the opposition between two distinct choices, that between, on the one hand, the secularization of the sovereign Good, and, on the other, the containment of despotic evil, this is because of the shared foundation on which politics is thought on all sides: namely, the identity of being and thought

(Moreiras 2020b: 63). However, and here we find the infrapolitical gap, "if thinking is not the same thing as being, if subject and world do not coincide", then the two options do not totalize "the political horizon" (Moreiras 2020b: 63).

The two ideas are inseparable from each other: (1) the destruction of the ideologeme of linear historical progress (along with the false opposition between a repressed and a fully present time) "is" (2) the non-coincidence of being and thought such that the political horizon is opened to its own difference. On this front, Moreiras seeks non-Hegelian tools in Heraclitus's Fragment 247, *ethos anthropoi daimon* (a recurring preoccupation throughout his work as we are beginning to see). He marks the complexity of the word *diamon* as a way of moving beyond the stifling understanding of fate and character within contemporary structures for thinking. After the damage incurred by the sacrificial structure of history, that is, of all the sacrifices that need to be justified to fuel the ideologeme of progress, it is a question of healing. And this healing is sought in Heidegger's notion of "letting be". If Hegel understands philosophy as *the* science, it is because, for him, "Time [...] appears as the destiny and necessity of Spirit that is not yet complete within itself [...]", in other words, "[...] Spirit necessarily appears in Time [...] so long as it has not *grasped* its pure Notion, i.e., has not annulled Time" (Hegel 1977: 487). For Hegel, "a *being as such*, the actual in its genuine and whole reality, is the idea, or the *concept*. The concept, however, is the power of time, i.e., *the pure concept annuls time*. In other words, the problem of *being* is properly conceived only when *time is made to disappear*. [...] The Hegelian philosophy expresses this disappearance of time by conceiving philosophy as [...] absolute knowledge" (Heidegger 1994: 12). Heidegger's proposal can be summed up as the thesis that philosophy is not a science, and this by invoking the "and" in *Being and Time* as terminating the annulment of time. It involves not just the reversal in the relationship between time and concept (such that time now is the power of the concept, and not the other way around), but a different understanding of essence as well, one in which essence is not in the remit of representational thinking. This is the step back that has to do with the Heideggerian "thing", and we will return to it.

Healing, after and beyond the age of the annulment of time in absolute knowledge, opens the way for Moreiras' non-Hegelianism, but not in the guise of the usual critiques of Hegel, which rely on the accusation of a panlogicism that is usually rejected in the name of the law of difference and singularity – a dimension (that of law) which is inimical to the infrapolitical project in question here. The way out of the Hegelian concept of History, its heroes and world-historical ordering of the time of life, is not through the opposition of a disordering or enjoyment of the present under the guise of the satisfaction of the sage at the end of time. (The most radical, perhaps even "deconstructed" version of this sage might just be the anarchic reading Reiner Schürmann makes of Heidegger's thought.) Instead, we find two interconnected procedures: the denarrativization of narrative, on one hand, and, on the other, the deconstruction of testimony as the master key to the political: "denarrativizing narrative, in opposition to mythographic or mythomaniac narrative, and the

deconstruction of testimonio as a correction to the pretension of identitarian truth that has plagued political discourse over the last thirty years and continues to plague it" (Moreiras 2020a: 176).

What is the expected result of these procedures? Moreiras puts it thus:

> Haunted thought could do worse than welcoming those visitations, particularly if they were addressed, not to [...] the hero of providence, the hero of justice, God's man, but rather to someone, anyone, for whom there is only a life to be lived in the happiest possible way, and no destiny to speak of; as if we were mortal, and only mortal, instead of contemplating, as Hegel wanted, the foam of the infinite. (Moreiras 2020a: 182)

This happiness in the face of a complete lack of destiny, this happiness without satisfaction in the realization of the Idea, a happiness that is the mark of our finite existence – this is the project of infrapolitical letting be. Healing is not the reestablishment of health (a Nietzschean preoccupation still caught in the onto-theological destiny that is being shaken here). It is rather the sustained meditation on what we can receive, the grace that was kept from us, at the end of the subsumption of time into the order of history and the historiography of the unfolding Idea. If time, one or multiple, linear or circular, has always been susceptible of being misunderstood as the time of the project of philosophy, politics, progress, revolution, emancipation, and so forth, what takes place now is the retrieval of a temporality that has nothing to do with time as it has hitherto been conceived. The fundamental point is not to understand this "hitherto" as the announcement of a coming event, as a form of the "to come". There is not preparation for this other "time". Infrapolitics is not and cannot be an announcement in preparation for anything.

If there is a single place in *Infrapolítica* where the book does justice to its subtitle (a user's manual) it is in the elaboration of this rejection of prophetic shepherding of the dispensation of Being to which we all need to submit. This amounts to critique of Heidegger that happens in Moreiras' solicitation of Schürmann's clarification of Heidegger's late work. Moreiras presents four objections to Schürmann. There is a shifting of the political emphasis (which seemed to be Schürmann's most important contribution) towards an infrapoliticization of everything that was almost unveiled. Moreiras' objections serve as a way of presenting infrapolitics and as a way of clarifying the central point of contention, which is the principle of anarchy itself. This clarification will also help us understand the character of Moreiras' Antigone and the way in which this is inseparable from a consideration of infrapolitics' relation to temporality.

1) Infrapolitics interrupts the dictation of being, the dispensation of a hegemonic ordering. This includes the paradoxical epochality of anarchy (Moreiras 2020b: 203).

2) Infrapolitics does not distinguish between time and history, and this because for it there is no hero of world-history who would anticipate, or announce in preparation, a new epoch (Moreiras 2020b: 203).

3) The era without-beyond. There is no need for infrapolitics to declare the end of epochs, opening itself up in the process to an unknowable end of history. Infrapolitics "prefers to affirm a simple habitation of the here and now [...] In other words: the time of infrapolitics is always in each case the time of the 'legislative-transgressive fracture', a time in every case posthegemonic which refuses old legislations without transgressing them in a move toward new alternative legislations" (Moreiras 2020b: 204). (Thus, an impossible place for a Lacanian Antigone.)

4) The final objection follows from the first and is therefore a redoubling of the interruption of the dictation of being. For it concerns the command for thought to acquiesce to the event of appropriation. The issue is to put in doubt the emphasis on the interpreters of such an event, as if it were the domain only of the thinkers and poets to come (Moreiras 2020b: 205). Moreiras shifts from an objection about temporality toward a warning regarding the priestly keeping of a post-epochal non-"epoch".

These four objections are then summed up as a rejection of a certain mode of obligation: "Against Schürmann", writes Moreiras,

> first disagreement, the obligation of thought is not an obligation of a historico-political nature. The obligation for infrapolitical thought, second disagreement, is not of a heroic order, and it cannot be, since it is not founded on the difference between time and history which necessarily places history in the place of a dispensation of knowledge opposed to the mere existentiality of the time of life. The infrapolitical obligation, third disagreement, does not depend on a final catastrophe of the principle that would kill all other principles, technology, or the will to will as counter intentional providers of originary [authentic] time, just as [...] it prefers not to fall into the abyss of the unthinkable of the without-beyond. Finally, the infrapolitical obligation, fourth disagreement, does not entail clearing the way for a universal acquiescence with the becoming-thing of the thing or the world-ification of the world. (Moreiras 2020b: 205)

The rejection of the principle of anarchy concerns a rejection of the persistent modernity of a still subjective reaction against the epochal dismantling of metaphysics: "In this manner, anarchy runs the risk of becoming another form of principial mastery, or, better, anarchy, as principle, is the last form of mastery" (Moreiras 2020b: 210). Moreiras looks, instead, for the rejection of all norms as given obligations to conclude: "There is no principle of anarchy which would not turn anarchic persecution into a norm and anarchic obsession into universalizable duty. Norm and duty do not belong to the infrapolitical universe" (Moreiras 2020b: 212).

What is the temporality of infrapolitics then? How does it relate to this radical rejection of "a universal acquiescence"? In the last sentence of the book, Moreiras tells us that Infrapolitics inhabits the temporal gap between the promise and its fulfillment, without belief or disbelief (Moreiras 2020b: 226). Neither promise nor fulfillment – the gap; in what sense, exactly? This is where Antigone, a paradoxical, almost unrecognizable Antigone, becomes essential.

Moreiras' "Antigone"

I want to zero in and bring into focus the nature of Moreiras' cut into two different texts, namely, Derrida's and Heidegger's concerning the tragic heroine. This cut is less a question of a cut-and-paste operation that would yield a collage of some sort and more the heart of an operation of thought. In the two cases in question there is a shift that is essential. In the case of Derrida's fascination with Antigone, which is also Hegel's, the move is away from the (post)structuralist question of the absent cause of the structure, that is, away from merely structural considerations, and toward the place of the ontological difference in political thought/praxis. This entails cutting through Antigone's sisterliness and toward her desire – which is to reconfigure the function of a heroine capable of meshing together the personal and the collective in the field of post-Revolutionary politics where sisterliness is a trope for community. In the case of Heidegger's Antigone, Moreiras moves what some could see as Heidegger's poetical covering over of political considerations (in the wake of the National Socialist catastrophe). This step away from the poetical does not lead back toward politics, but further back toward the question of being as the heart of the meditation on existence for infrapolitics. That is, toward the site where there is no overlap between life and politics, where the homeward trek back to unity (another Romantic trope embodied by Antigone traditionally) is interrupted and discarded because the place where she can be paradoxically at home, the *polis*, is no longer available to us.

In Derrida's Antigone as read by Moreiras, we encounter a form of enjoyment (*goce*) that is without relation with the field of names. There is no concept for it. It is also not sublatable (Moreiras 2020b: 17). It stands in stark contrast to the usual figure we are used to imagining within the Hegelian field. The constitution of the community into a people is Hegel's solution to the master slave dialectic (Moreiras 2020b: 17). Antigone appears in Derrida's text on Hegel as a step back from that political resolution. Where does her desire lead? Derrida reading Hegel locates that desire as what is not assimilable by the dialectic. Antigone's is an impossible place within the system, unclassifiable. Given that Hegel admits the impossible desire in question is there, is the dialectic capable of situating the abyss marked by this desire as a quasi-transcendental that allows it to be used as a (groundless) foundation for a dream of appeasement?

In the (post)structuralist context it almost goes without saying: it is always an element excluded from the system that guarantees the space of possibility for the system in the first place. That is, the event in structure that shook the all the European discourses that relied in the safekeeping of a center was the unveiling of the absence of this very center. This is not a liberation from anything – it is a clarification of the inner workings of the very matrix that made Eurocentrism work in the first place. Which is why Lacan could call this simply "structure". In Derrida's words: "The transcendental has always been, strictly, a transcategorial, something that could not be received, shaped, finished in any of the categories internal to the system. The vomit of the system. And what if

the sister, the brother/sister relation here represented the transcendental position, ex-position?" (Derrida 2021: 183). The last sentence of this passage is not cited in *Infrapolítica*. Moreiras cuts out the sister/brother relation, the place of the ex-position to the transcategorial or transcendental (we will come back to this, but for now let us simply note that he adjudicates it to Antigone's desire). The relation is not just any relation. What does "cutting it out" leave outside? Before returning to *Infrapolítica*, it might be helpful to remember what Antigone/Polynices represented for philosophy and the discourse of the human sciences in general.

George Steiner sums up the role of Antigone in modern thought and politics in the following terms:

> There is only one human relationship in which the ego can negate its solitude without departing from its authentic self. There is only one mode of encounter in which the self meets the self in another, in which ego and non-ego, the Kantian, the Fichtean, the Hegelian polarities, are made one. It is a relation between man and woman, as it surely must be if primary rifts in being are to be knit. But it is a relation between man and woman which resolves the paradox of estrangement inherent in all sexuality (a paradox which incest would only enforce). It is the relation of brother and sister, of sister and brother. In the love, in the perfect understanding of brother and sister, there is eros and *agape*. But both are *aufgehoben*, 'sublated', in *philia*, to the transcendent absoluteness of relation itself. It is here, and here only, that the soul steps into and through the mirror to find a perfectly concordant but autonomous counterpart. The torment of Narcissus is stilled: the image is substance, it is the integral self in the twin presence of another. Thus, sisterliness is ontologically privileged beyond any other human stance. In it, the homecomings of Idealism and Romanticism are given vital form. This form receives supreme, everlasting expression in Sophocles' *Antigone*. (Steiner 1996: 17–18)

We can call this the dream of Hegelianism, or the dream of Revolutionary politics and the universal brotherhood/sisterhood – it is a rebus which hides the secret of relation. If we turn to Lacan's Antigone in *The Ethics of Psychoanalysis,* we will find that he does nothing to this matrix except clarify it.

Lacan ex-poses the sister/brother relation as the site for something that was there all along but which only in the 1960s and 1970s became visible. We get to a place in *Antigone* where there is a paradoxical law, a law that is "unwritten" (Lacan 1992: 278). It concerns the dead brother subjected to the edicts of Creon – human law, the law of he "in whose rigid mind everything is political or [...] a question of interest" (Lacan 1992: 268). The other unwritten law is the gods' law, and Antigone obeys it because of the ontic singularity of the brother: "Involved here is an invocation of something that is [...] of the order of the law, but which is not developed in any signifying chain or anything else. Involved is a horizon determined by a structural relation; it only exists on the basis of the language of words, but it reveals their unsurpassable consequence" (Lacan 1992: 278). The outside of any signifying chain pushes against the structural relation. Grasping the ineffaceable character of the ontic singularity of the

dead and unburied brother, Antigone invokes a right. The language in which she does this is the emergence of a signifier that "freezes it as a thing that is fixed beyond the flux of all possible transformations" (Lacan 1992: 279; translation modified). This signifier brings to a halt the restlessness of the negative. Antigone will be "screwed" to it (which in Lacan's elaborations means that this is the place of the "aporia" – see Lacan 1992: 275). But the price to be paid for this fixity is the sundering of the subject on a more fundamental level – the secret that was not clear within the Hegelian dream, within the revolutionary dream. For Lacan, this means that whatever "clouds of the imaginary" one might see around this fixing of the ontic "is" of the brother, "Antigone's position represents the radical limit that affirms the unique value of his being without reference to any content, to whatever good or evil Polynices may have done, or to whatever he may be subjected to" (Lacan 1992: 279). This pure form without content is language:

> The unique value involved is essentially that of language. Outside of language it is inconceivable, and the being of him who has lived cannot be detached from all he bears with him in the nature of good and evil, of destiny. [...] That purity, the separation of being from the characteristics of the historical drama he has lived through, is precisely the limit of the *ex nihilo* to which Antigone is attached. It is nothing less than the break that the very presence of language inaugurates in the life of man. (Lacan 1992: 279)

The fixity and purity that is achieved empties Polynices of his historical drama. Being and history lie on two different sides of the abyss Lacan is trying to cross by way of the transgression. The gap in the structure where this signifier emerges is plugged by Antigone herself; and it is as this plug that she is "in the field of the Other" – while simultaneously marking the limit beyond which there is the monstruous as such, the Real Thing. This is the reason Lacan is careful to note that she herself is not monstruous (Lacan 1992: 263). The unwritten beyond any signifying chain is the transcategorial, transcendental center of this structure, ex-posed as absent or lost.

We would need to locate this moment in the development of Lacan's thinking on where and how to place jouissance within the structural apparatus that he constantly revised – and there would be different, less monumental, paradigms for thinking jouissance in later seminars – not least as he questioned his own structuralism, particularly in the 1970s. Which is to say that Lacan cannot be reduced to this way of presenting his understanding of the absent center of the structure and Antigone's way of covering over it. For my purposes, what is important is to see if this example can give us a way of understanding the difference between the postmodern doxa of the founding exclusion as a structural limit, and the ontological understanding of the presencing (the extimate presence as absence) of being as an opening toward the infrapolitical.

Before turning to Moreiras' text, allow me one last detour as a way of presenting a contrast already in play, though tacitly, in Lacan's *Ethics*. Heidegger's jug/thing is a model of sorts for Lacan in seminar VII. It is not a question of a

complete explanation of the Heideggerian thing; for my purposes, it is sufficient to point out how Heidegger approaches the thing as something that concerns nearness and distance in a way that is diametrically opposed to Lacan's horror/ Thing. To understand the difference between a thing and an object, Heidegger makes a distinction between the way in which our representation of objects always leaves far-off, or outstanding, even the nearest. And this distance can only be overcome by way of a step back from representational grasping:

> When and how do the things come as things? They do not come through the machinations of humans. But they also do not come without the vigilance of the mortals. The first step to such vigilance is the step back from merely representational, i.e., explanatory thinking into commemorative thinking. (Heidegger 2012: 19)

Without this step back into what he calls "commemorative thinking", things remain out of reach. We live with this impossibility constantly – it is our "natural," or normalized though un-natural, sense of the quotidian – and it is in that normalization that Heidegger finds horror:

> What is horrifying announces and conceals itself in the way that the nearness nearby remains outstanding. What does this mean? It means: *the thing does not thing: the thing does not presence as thing.* World does not world. Thing/World do not take place. (Heidegger 2012: 22)

Is the desire of Antigone, cut off from the sister/brother relation a version of this step back that would be also a step into the nearness in question here?

Back to *Infrapolítica*. Moreiras alerts us to the fact that what we are dealing with in Derrida's approach to Antigone is one of the crucial sites of contemporary thought: the necessary de-structuration of every structure as necessary condition of the structure itself. And that, as such, it is not a question of Derrida doing something exterior to Hegel's text, but an act of verifying something that is in Hegel's text, but that only in deconstruction is brought out into the light of day. Here Moreiras asserts: "I dare to propose, knowing very well the risk I am exposed to, that infrapolitics is exactly there, in the destructuring non-place that is condition of every structure, in that unnamable enjoyment (*goce*)" (Moreiras 2020b: 18). The operation at work is not so simple. To locate this moment of destructuration in Hegel's text itself means a torsion regarding Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. There, Antigone, standing in for womanhood in general, represents the "irony" of the community because she changes the universal end into a private one, shifting, to use Hegel's own metaphors, the property of the state into possession and ornament of the family (Hegel 1977: 288). This part of the community that has no part in it is not the unconscious, because Hegel would have her confess her guilt, give up her secret, and thus commit the different offence of usurping a dignity that the system does not grant her: the dignity of being a member of the community properly speaking. If Antigone is vomited by the system, she is an internal exclusion and not the

site of the system relation to the nearness of what it keeps most distant. That is, from the point of view of what Hegel means-to-say: "The community [...] can only maintain itself by suppressing this spirit of individualism" – yet "because it is an essential moment, [the community] all the same creates it and, moreover, creates it by its repressive attitude towards it as a hostile principle" (Hegel 1977: 288). The system attempts to bring to the light of day its founding night. It both erases Antigone, in the end, and erases her desire. She is sister. As Butler puts it summing up Lacan's own reading this philosophical text: "Hegel [...] reads the death drive out of desire" (Butler 2000: 47). Derrida: "What the speculative dialectic means-to-say, is that the crypt can still be incorporated into the system. The transcendental or the repressed, the unthought or the excluded must be assimilated by the corpus [...] idealized in the very negativity of their work. The halt forms merely a stasis in the introjection of spirit. Antigone is a moment to get through, a terrible and divine moment, for the brother and the sister" (Derrida 2021: 187). For this very same reason, what the system regurgitates, its "rest," when it halts, even if momentarily, is Antigone. She is surpassed but not preserved in the *Phenomenology*.[2] Put in these terms, deconstruction is the ex-position of the relation without relation which allows dialectics to always forget about any post-dialectics. Is this the risk that Moreiras takes (a risk that would in fact be the reader's risk of misunderstanding everything that is at stake in *Infrapolítica* as well as in infrapolitics in general)? When he cuts off Derrida's sentence regarding Polynices; when he leaves out the brother/sister relation and thus the issue of sisterliness as a whole; when he isolates Antigone's desire – what are the implication of the cut thus operated by Moreiras?

Antigone's desire in isolation, cut off from everything else, leaves us exposed to a desire that is not in a structural relation to what is outside any signifying chain. But if this is the case why take the risk of obscuring this insight? Infrapolitics seems to be at stake in it. Why the equivocation, why the play with the more palatable and insufficient (though also well-known and widely accepted) notion of the incompleteness of the structure – nothing other than the security of structure itself?

The exergue to *Infrapolítica. Instrucciones de uso* closes with a quotation from *Glas*, which Moreiras frames as a rare instance of Derrida using the first person; he refers to it as a voice that appears to interrupt something. It floats over or comes from an outside (*voz en off*) and it states a shared fascination with Antigone.

> Like Hegel, we have been fascinated by Antigone, by this incredible relation, this powerful liaison without desire, this immense impossible desire that could not live, able only to overturn, paralyze or exceed a system and a history, interrupt the life of the concept, take its breath away or, what comes down to the same thing, support it from the outside or the underneath of a crypt. (Derrida 2021: 187)

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2   Judith Butler puts it thus: "[...] Antigone figures the threshold between kinship and the state, a transition in the *Phenomenology* that is not precisely an *Aufhebung*, for Antigone is surpassed but not preserved when ethical order emerges" (Butler 2000: 5).

Judith Butler, on her lectures on Antigone, points out the ambivalence of this passage. Derrida's reading "seems to concur with Hegel on the desireless status of [Antigone's] relation to her brother", but, pointing to the same text that Moreiras quotes, she adds: "[Derrida] may be writing ironically, since he both negates the desire but then also calls it an impossible desire, affirming it as a desire of sorts" (Butler 2000: 89, n. 84). Yet, things do not need to be so complicated. The desire in question is the desire for the desire-less liaison between brother and sister – the dream of sisterliness and brotherliness, the dream of the end of history, the dream of the Idealist homecoming, the dream of the achieved universal Revolution. (But this is exactly the dream that tries to do away with infrapolitics as such – or the nightmare from which infrapolitics wakes up: History conceived as full restitution and plenitude.) This is what Moreiras gathers from this text:

> Antigone's desire [which is to say, the desire that Moreiras has cut off from the relation to the brother – and thus cut off from the desire for a desire-less liaison] destroys the phantasm and demetaphorizes the system, thus bringing absolute knowledge to its ruin. The phantasm is the endless metaphor of the *Aufhebung* as name of Being, which Antigone unmasks. (Moreiras 2020b: 18)

Moreiras then adds that this is what *Glas* offers us as a way into a second deconstructive turn. But this is nowhere to be found in *Glas* (a statement I cannot defend or demonstrate in these pages other than to point out that it was Lacoue-Labarthe who first inscribed Derrida's reading of Hegel wholly within the epochal interrogation of the ethico-aesthetic, the aesth-ethics, of tragedy).[3] Now, this move away from aesthetics/politics, thus from aesth-ethics, is precisely what infrapolitics makes possible today. So, it is not *Glas* that "offers Antigone as [...] the figure for a second deconstructive turn, antiphantasmatic and infrapolitical. [...] Antigone, which is not writing, [...] takes a step back..." (Moreiras 2020b: 18); it is Moreiras' work. However, the step back in question, which is a Heideggerian step back, also needs to be qualified. We turn to it now.

If the mayor temptation up until now has been the dream of the revolution as it entails the sisterly and the brotherly, when we turn to Heidegger the biggest challenge will be the German Idealist dream of homecoming, which is also encrypted into the Antigone drama. Avoiding it will require keeping track of a double loss that we must remark upon, lest we confuse it with Hölderlin's poet-homecomer. In the introduction to her translation of Hölderlin's *Der Archipelagus*, Helena Cortés Gabaudan reminds us that the search for the Greek origin concludes with the poet's realization that Greece is lost forever

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3   Lacoue-Labarthe: "[...] tragedy, after Kant (and consequently after Sade), is the decisive test of philosophy, or of thought: it is in the interpretation of tragedy that the possibility of philosophy is staked [...] the hope of its overcoming, of a step beyond, of access to another thinking; this is true of Hegel and Schelling, true of Hölderlin, true of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Lacan does not escape that rule, and neither will the Derrida of *Glas* escape" (Lacoue-Labarthe 1991: 25).

and its ideal forever impossible: "The encounter with Greece will turn out to be, in the end, a non-encounter (*desencuentro*)" (Cortés Gabaudan 2011: 14). Yet, if Hölderlin's poetry, as Cortés Gabaudan notes, serves as illustration of Heidegger's notion that above all it is in the work of art that the being of beings is alighted upon in its unveiling, then the loss of Greece, and the exposition of its non-being in the poem, becomes, for that same reason, the place where Greece is given to us "in a more truthful mode" (Cortés Gabaudan 2011: 15). We gain in the poem what was lost in the political and historical horizon. This compensatory gesture, giving over to the poem what needs to be worked out in politics and history, is exactly what is avoided in Moreiras' shift from "the poetic" to infrapolitics.

Moreiras scans through two different Antigones in Heidegger, the one that interests us is the second one. Heidegger's second reading of Antigone shifts from the historical pressures of National Socialism at the core of the first, where the issue was the relation *dike/techne*, and moves toward a more direct confrontation with ontological difference, where Antigone is the figure that learns to be at home in the unhomely of Being. In so doing, she shows the way toward a thinking that can maintain the gap between politics and *polis*. Polis is the ground, and it concerns the highest and most authentic meditation. There is no politics without *polis*, but the essence of *polis* is not political. The uncanny (*unheimlich*) is the difference between politics and *polis*. Just as cause cannot be derived from consequence, the essence of the *polis* cannot be derived from politics. Politics may have always already begun, "but *polis* finds [...] its origin in a region that cannot be reduced to politics" (Moreiras 2020b: 67). The gap, which might not be anything other than the gap-cause between politics and *polis*, is absent and present in its absence – but this is not simply a structural gap. And infrapolitics has everything to do with this: "The infrapolitical distance, absolute limit of the place where politics is narrativized, has to do with, or shows itself in, the difference between *polis* and politics" (Moreiras 2020b: 68). This distance concerns something that is necessary for life to be livable. Moreiras turns to Antigone as a figure that illuminates this site: that something that is not politics and is necessary for existence to be possible. But she also illuminates how, in the second turn of deconstruction, it is ontological difference that takes over the thematic of the absent cause. That is, in place of the linguistic or structuralist idea of an always incomplete structure, what the second turn of deconstruction, infrapolitics, alights on is the absent presencing of that which is there as a supplement to all the little holes that haunt structures. Which means that, in addition to having to think the inherent point of collapse for all hegemonic dispensations of Being, we also must make way for a meditation that does not forget the co-belonging of Being and all the incomplete or barred wholes that scan our history: history is the double articulation of all the finite and ultimately incomplete structures and their co-belonging with the gap that grounds them all singularly. How can we translate this into more concrete terms? It is not the same hole that undermines the structure of capitalism and the structure of early modern monarchies, the part that is to have

no part is different within Marxist discourse and the Lacanian unconscious. At issue there is something that concerns a political force greater than any of the ready-made political discourse already at our disposal.

Heidegger's Antigone illuminates the ontological difference, but he does this while he shifts the distinction between politics and *polis* toward what he calls the poetic, which is Antigone's desire. This is a trope, one that Moreiras will submit to de-metaphorization thus:

> Antigone is able [...] to consummate the passage through the unfamiliar and death and to gather the sinister in its essence. Antigone, therefore, as Heidegger puts it, "takes it upon herself to become homely within being". "Being homely in the unhomely", [...] is the very essence of Antigone. Heidegger calls it "the poetic". "The unhomely being homely of human beings upon the earth is 'poetic'". [...] I prefer to call infrapolitical what Heidegger calls poetic. The tearing displacement from a quotidian being with and among things toward a radical sheltering in the obscurity of the originary home, unreachable as such, but amenable to nearness, can perhaps be described poetically, but what is thus described is the infrapolitical task itself. (Moreiras 2020b: 74–75)

The infrapolitical task concerns this nearness – which is the step back toward the thinging of the thing in Heidegger's terms – and not the place of Antigone as such. Antigone does not mark for Moreiras a model to be followed.[4] Rather, he identifies a certain antigonification of us all within contemporary Creontic-politics. This is an important distinction, even if in its subtleness can be easily lost sight of:

> The infrapolitical task does not search for a home, only for a reduction in the task of getting-closer-to, of a nearness that stands over against the distance forgotten in the forgetting of the ontological difference: that nearness is thoroughly infrapolitical distance. Not a minor task: it has to do with being attuned to the fact that everywhere today politics is nothing but a venturing out without exit, an endeavor without a place. Politics, in the margins of its dignity as a concept, is sinister today. Politics is what Creon does [...] lost in the nothingness of the administrative demand. [...] Infrapolitics is what is worthy of question when there are no more questions to be asked of politics: politics is technology today, a technological endeavor [...] under the principle of general equivalence. There is no *polis* anymore – it remains a phantom of the tradition. Its spectrality subsists in the form of infrapolitics as the obscure memory of its origin; as a reminder that we were historically destined at some point in the past. No longer. Today we are all in an Antigonic position, even if we refuse to know it. (Moreiras 2020b: 75)

If Antigone abides in the uncanny, this is so only because for her there was a *polis*. In a similar fashion to Oedipus, who did not have an Oedipus Complex,

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4   Such a model is in evidence in certain psychoanalytic readings of Antigone, in which she voluntarily sacrifices herself and accepts death, "throws herself towards the Thing", becoming the signifier of desire, i.e., phallus; this is Slavoj Žižek's own self-diagnosed phallo-logo-centrism as he sees it at work in *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (2008: xvii-xviii).

Antigone can only be, for us, an existential complex to live through. And Moreiras' proposal would have to be understood as a proposal to try to avoid being screwed to the aporia it presents within our globalized situation: to fix and empty out the being of the brother into an object that will stand in as the satisfaction of the desire for a desireless liaison.

Perhaps because of the magnitude of this undertaking, any figure that is adduced as a way of illustration will be disappointing. Conversely, the impossible demand for illustration might only be properly approached by way of the paradoxical and (also for this reason unconvincing) massiveness of figures like Antigone. Bruno Bosteels has put pressure on this point in his critique of Žižek's multiple examples of the miraculous transgression (Bosteels 2010: 186). Moreiras' Antigone, what he gathers from Derrida's and Heidegger's, as well as what he leaves out, does not fall into that category once we take care to note that here Antigone might be better understood as the erasure of Antigone from the Romantic and Hegelo-Revolutionary dream. Moreiras' Antigone is the not even Antigone, it is nothing but a desire beyond writing in the difference of the non-subject. Yet, Moreiras' book, which is concerned with tracking some instances in the archive where the ontological difference has already been at work in the elucidation of what conditions politics, and not with a foundational statement which would falsely claim to invent something out of thin air, puts all of this in abeyance, and not least when he writes in an endnote that the issue of the relationship between Antigone's desire and the death drive will be set aside for a different occasion (Moreiras 2020b: 235, n. 3). This difficulty and this limit might also be the limit of Moreiras' thought, perhaps even the place where he might turn back. Is that what obtains in the meditation on "authentic temporality" in *Sosiego siniestro*? As I begin to conclude, I offer the following closing pages as a set of questions that are more questions to myself as a reader than for Moreiras himself. And this is offered as a way of marking that what is at issue here is not critique, but a place for continued engagement and thinking.

To Conclude, Not to Conclude

In *Sosiego siniestro*, the various meditations on the decision of existence, a phrase Moreiras borrows from Jean-Luc-Nancy, mark a way into a thought of the para-temporal. The decision is not something that happens in time, it has no duration: "it takes place without duration, and thus outside of time [toma lugar sin duración, y así fuera del tiempo]" (Moreiras 2020c: 79). It is the instant: "authentic temporality [...] opens in that extratemporal instant" (Moreiras 2020c: 79). The annulment of time opens the time of the subject; something is emptied out, fixed so that the subject can be pinned to it and to the repetition that it entails. The instant "does not change the subject but constitutes it. There is no transformation of the subject but [...] uncovering [*desocultamiento*] of a potentiality of subjective repetition whose character is formal because it does not have any content at all. It is simply a decision of existence,

'to become what one is', which is the project without end and that requires repetition in each case. It is repetition of the simple, of the very *factum* of an existence, mine, which is not exhausted nor achieved in an interiority of any sort. In this sense, it is pure openness [...]" (Moreiras 2020c: 79). The context of these considerations is an (impossible) dialogue with psychoanalysis and political theorist Jorge Alemán, a fact that might explain the return of the "closet Lacanian" in Moreiras as he writes *Sosiego* during the pandemic. The title of these meditations during lockdown is itself a condensation of what was at stake with Antigone as Moreiras read Heidegger (being at home in the unhomely, *sosiego siniestro*). He ventures: "that the decision of existence, unending and repeated, always outside of time because it opens time (it is the instant of a present that is not the undifferentiated and inapprehensible now between past and future), is potentially there for each of us in the strange experience of the [Covid-19] lockdown" (Moreiras 2020c: 80). The emancipation that this proposal entails is not political, on the contrary, it is "above all an emancipation from politics" – understood as that which forces us to be badly exposed (Moreiras 2020c: 80). And yet we are back at the ambiguity between the founding lack of the structure and the step back toward the nearness of the "thing". Is this form/content opposition here not a restatement, a return to the emptying out of Polynices that "screws" Antigone to the aporetic "signifier" of her desire? No wonder then that the book closes with a "post-scriptum" which almost seems to close this opening.

In closing *Sosiego* with a text on Nietzsche being read by Heidegger being read by Derrida, which concerns the imperative to become what one is and the temporality that it opens, Moreiras yields to Heidegger reading Nietzsche's own reactive autography. Nietzsche's becoming needs to be imprinted on the whole of life as vengeance. Moreiras seems to back himself into a corner. "In the same way", he admits, "the decision of existence [...] comes across the folding of its possibility into impossibility. Thus, there is no decision of existence, only its illusion: at the moment of [...] the greatest authenticity, we see in the mirror the fallen monster of ourselves which we have been trying to avoid" (Moreiras 2020c: 132). All of this seems to move in the direction of closing one of the central themes of the book: the formal, wholly empty, extratemporal, instant that opens the authentic time of the decision of existence. As he is doing this, Moreiras first tells himself, "But this is not enough" (Moreiras 2020c: 131); then, he asks, one gets the sense that not just rhetorically, "Is this all?" (Moreiras 2020c: 132). To conclude:

> Perhaps, beyond the namable and the teachable, beyond the word, beyond philosophy, there is a gesture, at the limit, which dissolves the aporia. And this gesture, when it is given, if it were possible, is the gesture that we can never learn from the other, the gesture of the implicit secret of every existence and in all existences. Beyond writing and toward the late time of the return that dictates the other imperative, this time Derridean: become what you are and then learn to live. (Moreiras 2020c: 132)

Why this Derridean addendum exactly where the aporia is resolved in the name of a gesture that cannot be the other's? And beyond that, why the mirroring of Nietzsche's autography so that to become what one is seems to be eternally returning to Nietzsche's Dionysian vengeance and its metaphysical imprinting of becoming on life as a whole? Even if it is the case for Nietzsche, by what mechanism is that guilt transferred to Moreiras? Can we answer those questions simply saying that the issue is structural? What is it that these words mark as the limit where what we should listen to is offered only as silence?

The constitutive exclusion upon which a structure repeats its effects has been misconstrued metaphysically as an absence that somehow leaves a trace on the structure itself. This dogmatic assertion, which has become so widely accepted and repeated that it is almost impossible to think through it today, pretends to solve by structure the very problem of the structure. To claim this unthought as the opening of an authentic time is monstruous, precisely in the sense that Moreiras offers at the close of *Sosiego*. The monstrosity consists in the alienation of "time" that it sets in motion precisely where we thought we were opening onto authentic temporality. This is marked by the surprising admittance of a form/content opposition at the very heart of the decision of existence. The opening is formal because it has no content. But if it is formal, it has no time (which Moreiras admits readily: "place without duration [...] outside of time") (REFERENCE?). We remain at the threshold, where the most burning question is how to think the non-time of Antigone's desire. Antigone subtracted from the Romantic, and the Hegelian and the Revolutionary dream, a desire that Moreiras more than anyone else has helped us bring into focus – how to read the non-time in which the distinction between time and history would dissolve even as its dissolution would not be the grand entrance into the History of a new epoch.

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Haime Rodriges Matos

Infrapolitika na kraju est-etike: o najnovijem delu Alberto Moreirasa

Apstrakt

U ovom radu ću ponuditi čitanje nedavno objavljenih knjiga Alberta Moreirasa, ali u kontekstu njegovog životnog dela u celini. Razmatraću njegovo delo sa stanovišta preispitivanja ideje razlike između vremena i istorije. Nakon kratkog osvrta na tu sveobuhvatnu tematiku njegovog ranog dela, preći ću na razmatranje udaljavanja od hegelijanstva u njegovim novijim publikacijama. Ovaj nehegelijanski stav nije samo antihegelijanski stav. Razumevanje ove razlike odvešće nas u pravu dimenziju infrapolitike. Ovaj aspekt Moreirasovog doprinosa savremenim raspravama biće ilustrovan njegovom paradoksalnom i neprepoznatljivom Antigonom.

Ključne reči: infrapolitika, temporalnost, Antigona, Lakan, strukturalizam, post-strukturalizam, Derida, Moreiras, tragedija

Peter Baker

THE WRITING OF EXISTENCE IN THE LATEST WORK OF ALBERTO MOREIRAS

ABSTRACT
This article approaches the latest work of Alberto Moreiras on infrapolitics as self-conscious acts of writing which thinks its own conditions, or its own contingent textual inscription. In this sense, I propose that we can read this work as being informed by a question, even a preoccupation, over what form or style of writing is appropriate to announce or re-veal the existential dimensions proposed by the notion of infrapolitics. In exploring three such untimely textual inscriptions, the article approaches the stakes of what Moreiras thematises under the name of infrapolitics through how it informs the performativity of Moreiras's own writing practice, exploring in the process the relationship that infrapolitics supposes to politics and to a certain critique of late capitalism, as well as other important concepts such as marranismo, the second turn of deconstruction, auto-graphic writing and demetaphorisation, among others.

KEYWORDS

infrapolitics, marranismo, style, deconstruction, inscription, auto-graphic writing, performance.

> *One always inherits from a secret – which says*
> *'read me, will you ever be able to do so?'*

Jacques Derrida

There is a serious question of style or form that can be read as informing the latest work of Alberto Moreiras. If Moreiras's trajectory has always reflected upon, in some way, that most existential condition of writing which resists being consumed by its reduction to the phantasms of our metaphysical tradition,[1]

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1   For the sake of brevity I will not refer to this trajectory here. But by way of offering a brief outline, I would refer the reader to a series of different texts written over the past forty to fifty years of Moreiras's writing. One can refer to *La escritura política de José Hierro* (1987); the notion of "inversión autográfica" in *Tercer espacio* (1999); to the late writing of José María Arguedas from *The Exhaustion of Difference* (2001), as well as from numerous earlier articles, some of which reappear in edited form in this collection.

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I wish to argue here that his latest writing seeks to much more explicitly perform what it seeks to announce, albeit obliquely, and precisely because it is never captured by writing, which can only ever leave its mark. This question can be considered to inform this writing almost symptomatically, remembering that the symptom for Jacques Lacan may well be inscribed in language,[2] but it is never subject to interpretation, to exegesis, it is addressed to no one, and is thus an absolutely singular relation to one's own passion or desire.[3] If the notion of infrapolitics has been so difficult for so many to fathom, according to Moreiras's own account of its history in one of his most recent books, *Infrapolitics: A Handbook* (2021), then this latest series of writings could be thought of as an attempt to work out and work through the form in which such an indexing of the infrapolitical should be announced. As we shall see, this "announcement" or performative element is a recurrent preoccupation throughout this book and other recent writings. I suggest that one of the principle questions that informs Moreiras's latest writing is over the form or style that the announcement of the infrapolitical should take, where writing is always understood as the writing of life itself, or perhaps more accurately what sub-cedes and sub-sists of life beyond or below its metaphysical capture. And, in doing so, this question of form or style is posed explicitly as a question about the way out beyond, or perhaps beneath, the reduction of life to metaphysics.

Naturally, such an announcement cannot be a systematic presentation of a how-to, a technique or a *techne*, nevertheless ironically announced by the subtitle of Moreiras's latest work in its Spanish title (*instrucciones de uso* or instruction manual).[4] Such a how-to must therefore become performative, inscribed in the very infrapolitical conditions of that singular life wherein it announces itself in and through writing, or at least as it symptomatically announces something of it or of its direction. This is made all the more difficult for myself as the author who pens this "analysis", which makes a claim to "present" Moreiras's latest work, perhaps even "explain" it or to "supplement" it somehow for an English-speaking audience, which cannot be understood simply as a work of translation or exegesis, especially considering the enormous body of work that Moreiras has already written on the topic in English and the subsequent translations into English of the works under analysis. As a former student and now colleague under Moreiras – with all the inescapable tropes of the paternal law and seminal texts which a reading of his work from my position cannot but engender – the attempt of a writing on his writing looks set to be an entangled, incestuous affair. We perhaps run the risk of clarifying nothing, and redoubling the phantasms, symptoms and obliqueness of what is announced.

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2   In Lacan's words: "Thus, if the symptom can be read, it is because it is itself already inscribed in a process of writing" (1966: 445).
3   See: Lacan (2016).
4   The more recent translation, *Infrapolitics: A Handbook* (2021) echoes this irony in its subtitle with a tongue-in-cheek reference to academic handbooks which would presume to repackage ready-made academic discourses as consolidated forms of knowledge removed from their locus of enunciation.

So be it. Is there per chance any other possibility of writing? We must take very seriously the proposition stated by Moreiras in his exergue to *Infrapolítica* that "infrapolitics does not seek to present itself as textual exegesis" (Moreiras 2020: 15).[5] Any exegetic analysis of Moreiras's work would thus fall into inevitable contradictions. But then how to think about its textual inscription, about the fact that infrapolitics as a concept – if indeed we are able to consider it as such[6] – has been inscribed textually as a mode of reflection, above all else? This should perhaps serve as a principle consideration for our strategy of reading, but one that we should nevertheless approach with some caution.

This article shall proceed, then, by offering reflections on what will be read as untimely or phantasmatic textual inscriptions, in the sense of examples of writing that attempt to consciously bear the mark of their own historical and existential circumstances (against what is often considered to be the unwritten rules of academic "objective" writing), at the same time as they assume and, in many cases attempt to overcome, a legacy by which they are inevitably marked. Beginning with the first inscription exploring the recent publication *Infrapolítica* (*Infrapolitics* in translation) to lay the foundation for our exploration of the term infrapolitics, in the second of our textual inscriptions we will explore how the issues relevant to infrapolitical reflection emerge in Moreiras's writing via a certain frustration with the academic field of Latinamericanism by analysing the publication *Marranismo e inscripción* (*Against Abstraction* in English translation). Finally, in the third and final inscription we explore how such a textual inscription takes on a particularly suggestive form for the future of infrapolitical reflection in the recent publication *Sosiego siniestro* (*Uncanny Rest* in translation). We will argue that these textual inscriptions are openly concerned with writing's performative function, and its relationship to this place "from which" such an inscription leaves its mark, as it is explicitly thematised under the name of infrapolitics. This involves, I suggest, a certain way of thinking about the relationship of life, or better, existence, to inscription.

First Inscription: January 13 2017/June 15 2020[7]

The first of the existential inscriptions that mark one of Moreiras's most recent books, *Infrapolítica: Instrucciones de uso* (Moreiras 2020a) concerns the fate of Derridean scholarship in (and beyond) the North American academy, to

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5   All translations, unless otherwise stated, are my own. Editions referred to throughout are the original Spanish *Infrapolítica* (2020a) and *Sosiego siniestro* (2020b) as these also reflect the dates of the existential inscriptions, though an English reader should note that English translations are now available (*Against Abstraction* (2020c), *Infrapolitics* (2021) and *Uncanny Rest* (2022), and I have adapted my original translations where I felt that it was better to use the official translation.

6   "And perhaps [infrapolitics] is not even a concept" (Moreiras 2020a: 80).

7   These dates refer to the original blog entry "Comentario a Glas" (2017) which later became the exergue for the book *Infrapolítica: Manual de uso* (2020a), and to the publication date of the latter.

which Moreiras's work has long made an important contribution. Criticising the historical reception of Derrida in the English language, particularly of its dissemination and, arguably, watering down in literary studies departments of the 1980s and 1990s in the United States, he sees the republication in Spanish of *Glas*[8] as an opportunity to question this common-sense reading of Derridean deconstruction. Moreiras draws attention to Geoffrey Hartman's analysis of *Glas*, who comes to stand in for a certain North American reading of Derrida, for whom the value of deconstructive écriture, as what is left of absolute knowledge after Hegel, is nothing more than the "infinite displacement of the signifier [which] would offer the possibility of a return without return, of a gift without redress, of an experience that is not subsumable and thus irreducible to any fullness of the present" (Moreiras 2020a: 13). Yet Moreiras suggests that this reading of *Glas*, which seeks to encapsulate the Derridean project as an infinite deferral of meaning located in the literary mode of Genet's passage in the margins, is an insufficient reading of what Derrida attempts to put forward under the name of deconstruction here. There is something else located in the phantasms between the literary and the philosophical, a nexus which resists determination or capture, a gift without equivalence, finding within Hegel's own textual inscription an auto-graphic remainder which cannot be subsumed by any *Aufhebung*. It is this nexus which resists capture and which becomes, then, in this exergue, an opening onto something within the Derridean project which gives a foothold for infrapolitical reflection. This is what Moreiras calls the second turn of deconstruction, and Antigone is offered as its heroine, who offers a desire which is "unassimilable by dialectics", an unassimilability which is, according to Derrida's account, "recognised and affirmed by Hegel" himself (Moreiras 2020a: 17). Would this excess of desire with respect to what the dialectic consumes, what it cannot digest, belong to an irreducible, singular passion of Hegel's own? Whatever the case may be, what is clear is that it indexes an element excluded from the system of absolute knowledge which at the same time assures its possibility. And this is the opening which gives onto the possibility of thinking infrapolitics, its affinity with the Derridean question over what is left of absolute knowledge: "I would venture to propose", writes Moreiras, "running a risk that I know well, that infrapolitics is also precisely there, in this destructuring non-place that is the condition of every structure, in that unnameable pleasure [*goce*, also the Lacanian translation for jouissance]" (Moreiras 2020a: 18). It is this non-place which is also the location of a desire, pleasure, passion or jouissance, that becomes a starting point then for infrapolitical reflection.[9]

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8   The edition referred to is: Derrida (2016).
9   Whilst not conflating these terms, it is not my intention here to disentangle or presume to be able to provide neat definitions or differences for such terms as desire or passion beyond their indexing an existential affective register that is of central concern to infrapolitical reflection. In Lacanian discourse, of course, demand, desire and jouissance play quite different roles in the affective economy of the psyche which correspond

It is curious that such a search for a starting point for the second moment of the Derridean turn would base itself, as in the reading strategy outlined here, on an (un)timely (in the sense that it gains a certain relevance some forty years after *Glas*'s original publication) focus on the performative dimension of the text, of how it seeks to put to work the remains of a Hegelian absolute knowledge which it simultaneously disavows. This performance is but a restating of Hegel, which is neither a reaffirmation, nor a simple commentary, but a putting to work of the dynamics of the Hegelian concepts in the emergence of consciousness, precisely, in the master-slave dialectic, to reveal there its undecidable, its secret, its non-place of capture, its *khora*. We have a series thus of textual inscriptions which, running from Antigone to Hegel's master-slave dialectic, to Derrida's *Glas* (via Genet), and to Moreiras's reflections, in which there is a question over what remains or moves irreducibly behind the scenes, and in each case where what comes to the fore is a certain passion, a facticity of existence, which may be read obliquely through the text. In this second turn of deconstruction, a question is raised over a strategy of reading or of writing (the two perhaps become indistinguishable here), a question over how this irreducibility should be exposed, announced or performed, and about the place of writing and of that facticity of life which drives the writing process.[10] A question which insists, I argue, as a question, throughout Moreiras's writing in this book and elsewhere.

We must not underestimate the importance of this exergue, then, which announces a second turn in the "project" of Derridean deconstruction. This book is an attempt, writes Moreiras, to begin thinking a change in the terms which up until now we have understood by 'deconstruction' (Moreiras 2020a: 15). This attempt fundamentally concerns infrapolitics, its definition (assuming such a word would be appropriate) and its relationship to politics. It must be highlighted that, regardless of the importance of the place of writing in our reflections thus far, infrapolitics must be understood as a speaking "from" a particular region of thought and experience which, unlike a certain understanding of deconstruction, is not itself a writing, even if it concerns fundamentally the relationship between language, writing and thought. If, quoting from Derrida's *Letter to a Japanese Friend*, deconstruction is "a discourse or rather a writing which can compensate for the incapacity of the word to be equal to a 'thought'" (cf. Moreiras 2020a: 82), then, for Moreiras: "Infrapolitics is also a region where [...] an unconcealable gap occurs (*sucede*) between language and thought, but infrapolitics cannot even aspire to the status of a 'discourse or rather a writing'" (Moreiras 2020a: 82). What is at stake here? We might say, perhaps, that unlike how Derrida offers up deconstruction here as

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to the imaginary, symbolic and the real respectively, though my use is not limited to Lacanian discourse. For a useful introduction to these terms in Lacan, see: Dor (1998).
10   Throughout, facticity is understood to refer to debates in continental philosophy that arise from Martin Heidegger's existential analysis of Dasein. See in particular: Heidegger (2001: § 38).

a compensatory practice, infrapolitics cannot be used for such ends. It can at best inform such a practice; it is not "useable" at all in the same way as a writing could be. As Moreiras emphasises:

> Infrapolitics is neither an analytical tool nor a form of critique, neither a method nor an act of operation, infrapolitics occurs, always and everywhere, and its taking place [*suceder*] calls to us and calls for a transformation of our way of looking, to some type of step towards another mode of politics, strange and unthematizable, which is also, and which should be, a different mode to politics. (Moreiras 2020a: 80)

There is nothing in infrapolitics that can make a *techne* of infrapolitics, or of that space which the term indexes. Nevertheless, its taking place calls for a transformation in our way of looking and to a step *towards* another way of doing politics which is at the same time informed *by* this something other than politics. This thing is strange and unthematizable, and also invokes an ethics ("should be") at the same time as the infrapolitical itself is absolutely irreducible to any ethics.[11] It is not utilizable in the way that a discourse or a writing could be, and yet, Moreiras claims that it holds an affinity with deconstruction insofar as this *could be* the role of an infrapolitical reflection. In other words, we can understand that Derrida's definition here of a practice of writing which seeks to compensate for what Heidegger might have called the forgetting of the question of being is a practice which we can also call infrapolitical reflection. But is this the main purpose of infrapolitical writing here in *Infrapolítica*? Is this, in other words, what his writing attempts to perform? I would suggest not, or at least not principally. Perhaps even in those instances where we find such examples of infrapolitical reflection as a "compensatory writing" à la deconstruction, we should consider this kind of reflection as a secondary effect of another kind that insists on making itself felt throughout Moreiras's latest work, and shares a closer affinity to Derrida's reading of Hegel('s reading of Sophocles) above. I would suggest that this first kind of infrapolitical reflection seeks, within writing, to bring attention to this taking place, to this *su-ceso* in Spanish.[12] It is an invitation to this call of infrapolitics to transform our way of looking, to paraphrase the citation above.

This role which is explored and which attempts to announce itself under the name of infrapolitics is intimately and explicitly tied to the role of politics. And, indeed, understanding what Moreiras thematises as the specific domain of the political in the history of thought is necessary if we are to appreciate the subtlety of his argument here. As has been stated elsewhere, the philosophical lineage of the notion of infrapolitics must be situated in the Heideggerian

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11   In an early work on the notion of infrapolitics, "Infrapolitical Literature", Moreiras writes that: "infrapolitical action exceeds the political and it exceeds the ethical, but it is still practical action oriented to the relation between people" (2010: 191).

12   Suceso in Spanish literally means "taking place", but its suffix (su-) refers to something below or beneath, as in the English submarine or sub-zero.

problematic of the ontico-ontological difference and our current historical moment, understood as the moment of the consummation of metaphysics, its own epochal finality.[13] It is in this space of contemporary globalised capitalism, which is also at the same time the totalisation of metaphysics' hold over the determination of our living conditions, in which politics appears as going hand-in-hand with this image of totality, in which even the most radical politics thus becomes nothing other than an internal fold within the same metaphysical game. "In the time of the self-consummation of onto-theology", writes Moreiras, "politics is onto-theological through and through even when it sees itself in a counter-hegemonic or resistant role. That this determination has been erased or forgotten is not an objection – it rather specifies its ideological nature" (Moreiras 2020a: 83). This totalisation of the social space through its reduction to onto-theology is the basis for Moreiras's argument that the categories of the social, the cultural, the subjective and the political collapse into one another, and become short hand for all that it is possible to think with regards to our own living condition.[14]

A consistent theme throughout Moreiras's most recent work has been to reflect upon how this saturation of the political field – present in his analysis since at least his reflections in *The Exhaustion of Difference* (2001) – is particularly relevant in our contemporary moment. The consummation of the onto-theological and metaphysical structuration of history is, at the same time, the era in which the real subsumption of late capitalism has created a generalised system of equivalence, which reduces life to its calculability. These reflections in *Infrapolítica* find many echoes, in the work for example of Felipe Martínez Marzoa on the logic of Marx's *Capital* and in Jorge Alemán's reading of the Lacanian notion of capitalist discourse.[15] The place and relevance of infrapolitics as a step-back from politics, therefore, is also a step-back from the absolute dominance of an economy which reduces life to calculability, which Moreiras calls, drawing from Jean-Luc Nancy, general equivalence.[16] "If general equivalence can be considered today to be a totalising principle over the administration of life, and thus as the very domain of politics", writes Moreiras, "then a subtraction with respect to this principle destroys such a totality" (Moreiras 2020a: 107). In this sense, he furthers: "To think infrapolitics is always in every case to think what the exception is to general equivalence" (Moreiras 2020a: 107). Moreiras explicitly relates this total calculability to the absolute totality of politics through the example of hegemony theory. In his words:

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13   See Heidegger (2003) for more on these debates in the Heideggerian corpus.
14   It is this sense in which, as we stated earlier, it is too easy to misunderstand the stakes if we think about this facticity of our own living being in substantial and subjectivist terms, and the term "life" lends itself to this confusion. Moreiras states with respect to this issue: "When we say 'existence' it is not just 'life' that is meant, and this is not because infrapolitics has no interest in life in general, but rather because, precisely, it approaches life from an interrogation of existence, that which we can provisionally define as the human mode of relating to life" (2020a: 127).
15   See: Martínez Marzoa (1983) and Alemán (2012).
16   See: Nancy (2014).

We increasingly live our entire lives, with diminishing differences, within a horizon of exhaustive calculability. In political terms, even the theory of hegemony, which is the last doctrine of the left, based as it is on the formation of chains of equivalence, is little more than a methodology of political calculability in the service of an alternative administration of the general political body, which is still no more than alternative *administration* of the general political body. (Moreiras 2020a: 109)

It matters, then, not just what one does, but how one does it. Resisting the system does not take a step back from the totality of the political field and its alliance with the onto-theological structuration of history, as hegemony theory demonstrates clearly.[17] Remembering that hegemony is always about an articulation, a collective signifying act that becomes consolidated or "sedimented" in chains of equivalence, we might be able to relate this kind of articulation to what Moreiras elsewhere in *Infrapolítica* calls prophetic language. The example comes from the Mapuche messianic resistance movement studied by Florencia Mallon in her book *Courage Tastes of Blood*, which invoked the return to an essentialised and mythical originary ground. Mallon's own self-confessed difficulties in arriving at the conclusion of the problematic nature of this discourse, where her starting point no doubt had been to focus on how to represent the subaltern voice within history, once again demonstrate how the reflections from *Infrapolítica* draw attention to the thinkers' own inscription and existential angst in their writing. What I really want to draw attention to, however, is the performative nature of this prophetic discourse. Moreiras thus distinguishes in this point between two kinds of articulation, the prophetic language of, in this case, a certain Mapuche discourse that Mallon writes of, and another, what he calls a post-hegemonic type. The emphasis on style or manner is important here, as it is not about questioning, by any means, the importance of Mapuche resistance to capitalist onslaught, but rather a focus on the way in which such resistance is articulated and, thus, whether or not it forms yet another hegemonic articulation which ends up confirming the political game of metaphysics (or in this case of the Chilean state), or whether it is able to adopt a standpoint which takes a step back from this totality of the political field. "But learning from the past to move towards a post-hegemonic democracy", writes Moreiras, "or, more modestly, towards a post-hegemonic democratisation, implies the radical renouncing of all prophetism, of any charismatic call. The way forward should be non-prophetic" (Moreiras 2020a: 100). And thus we find an explicit reflection on what I have argued forms a central preoccupation for Moreiras in *Infrapolítica*: how to announce, perform a writing which finds itself letting the infrapolitical be, and thus brings it to the fore, when the infrapolitical is necessarily a question of writing's erasure of the ontico-ontological difference. What mode would be appropriate for allowing this existential facticity that traces itself in writing to be felt by the

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17   The reference is to hegemony theory by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and its subsequent theoretical elaborations.

reader, to resist a "prophetic" writing? The above reflection on different types of speech act must be considered significant in this light. There is thus a certain impossibility or aporia of writing that is thematised and simultaneously haunts *Infrapolítica*, I would argue. It evades attempts to make it present and yet this evasion must be simultaneously resisted and respected, I would argue, in order for the writing to be able to announce this step back from politics in which the act of writing is always already implicated, or inscribed.

One has the impression that this strategy of reading, then, attempts to pinpoint something in the text which escapes it, and even pinpointing this strategy of writing which is to allow this "from where" to move within it must fail at every attempt. Perhaps it cannot be any other way. But let me try to approach it from a different angle. Against a certain militant leftist tradition which would identify a counter-hegemonic politics as the horizon for action on the left (thus still restricted to the totality of politics), Moreiras draws from the controversial debate sparked by Oscar Del Barco in his interview "No matarás", where he condemns absolutely any justification for murder against some claims from the militant leftist tradition in Argentina. As Moreiras points out, Del Barco's argument is as clear as it is simple:

> I know [...] that the principle of 'Thou shalt not kill', like loving thy neighbour, is an impossible one. [...] But I also know that upholding this impossible principle is the only possible thing to do. [...] To uphold the impossible as possible is to uphold what is absolute in every human being, from the first to the last. (Del Barco cf. Moreiras 2020a: 92)

Moreiras is interested in this absolute of each and every man that would render impossible any programmatic politics of a militant left, where ethics is suspended by the political and vice-versa. It is instead to emphasise, again paraphrasing Del Barco, the sacredness of man, a sacredness which, according to Moreiras, "always and in every case de-metaphorizes, de-alegorizes, insofar as the sacred is the uncompromising holding-fast to the literality of a non-equivalent singularity" (Moreiras 2020a: 95). We find ourselves close here to the Derridean reading of Hegel; there is something that sticks, something in that singularity of the sacredness of man which, if we are to stick by it, takes a step back from any totalising system which could inform any militant politics. And this sticking point is rehearsed throughout the book as the factical (non-)place from which infrapolitical reflection finds its opening.

These reflections come strikingly close to Lacan's teachings on the ethics of psychoanalysis in his 1959–60 seminar (see: Lacan 1992). Like Del Barco, Lacan appears to come out in favour of the imperative to love thy neighbour as a basis for thinking the ethical import of psychoanalysis. It is well known how Lacan exposes the Kantian categorical imperative and the Sadean project of limitless desire as both bearing the mark of an unresolved aporia that would make of them both the most totalitarian kind of moralism. If the Sadean law is ultimately unable to escape its own aporia that the imperative to do away

with the law becomes its own ethical law, the Kantian categorical imperative, in its universalism, is unable to see that it forbids a genuine ethical relation insofar as it denies the singularity (sacredness, in the terms used above) of our existence. Both misrecognise, in other words, that the desiring being that we are is fundamentally constituted by both the law *and* its transgression. De Kesel demonstrates the importance of Lacan's conclusions on this point with reference to his reading of Kant's reflections on the limits of moral freedom. Kant famously argues that the moral freedom of man is demonstrated through two situations, one in which the moral man avoids death, and another in which he chooses it. In the first, the individual will be executed if he sleeps with the woman he desires; in the second, he must choose either to bear false witness and have some innocent person killed, or be killed himself. It is Lacan's discussion of the second example that is more pertinent to our discussion. For Kant, the fact that a man would choose death over bearing false witness demonstrates the *Faktum* of his moral freedom. Yet what he does not question is the interchangeability of these two options, whereas Lacan's entire reflection attempts to think what in the human psyche resists the moral economy of goods (*biens*), their supposed interchangeability. Indeed, for Lacan what stands out in this example is precisely the absolute non-calculability involved in such a decision. This non-calculability at the heart of the decision is not based on the uncertainty of the consequences of my decision – we know that the man will be killed if he does not bear false witness – but rather on the fact that, something that would be unacceptable in Kant's view, the subject and the object of the moral law are not the same, as made evident in the ego's own self mis-recognition.

Lacan demonstrates the consequences of this insight by adapting Kant's example to surprising effect. He asks himself what would happen if a despot were to ask the man to bear *true* witness against another fellow man, someone who *might* receive the death sentence as a result. As De Kesel notes, this appears to reintroduce an element of calculability into the moral decision. Rather than weighing up a truth against a lie, instead now there appears to be a weighing up between two truths: "either I remain faithful to the universal truth that forbids me to lie, or I choose the truth that the other is my equal and that he, just like me, loves life more than truth" (De Kesel 2009: 156). Whereas for Kant these truths may be considered equivalent because they are subject to the universal reason of man, for Lacan there can be no equivalence between them. And it is precisely the recognition of an irreducible singularity nevertheless common to both upon which the recognition of the other as neighbour, for Lacan, is founded. In De Kesel's words:

> What binds me to my fellow man (and even to myself) *beyond* the symbolic law is the "thing", the ultimate, completely *singular* object of desire. This is precisely why my fellow man is not only my equal, but simultaneously – and in a more fundamental sense – my "neighbour". What binds him to himself, what binds me to myself, what binds us together at that level is a symbolically

*non*interchangeable, singular "thing". Precisely because (like myself) my neigh-
bour is ultimately based in such a "thing", the truth to which this "neighbour"
refers no longer corresponds to the truth of the universal (symbolic) law. (De
Kesel 2009: 156)[18]

This sacredness of the singularity of existence as a non-relation to self (and
thus to the other) founds this other *Faktum* not picked up by Kant: one which
recognises in the neighbour that transgressive desire which makes each one of
us irreducible to any universal law. And as is well-known, this example comes
to bear upon the figure of Antigone in Lacan's seminar, that irreducible desire
in Hegel's absolute via the Derridean reading discussed above. Lacan is very
clear on this point. In his reading of Sophocles's play, what Antigone remains
faithful to is not a family member *as such* (it is not the *polis* versus the family
structure), but to Polyneices *as* signifier – that is to say, in my reading, as sym-
bolically non-interchangeable. Antigone's blinding beauty concerns her abil-
ity to point towards both the limits of the law (against Kant) and the limits of
transgressing the law (against de Sade). On the one hand, even if it corresponds
to the symbolic dimension of language, the bearer of the signifier can never be
reduced to its universal law. On the other hand, transgression itself must be a
singular instance in order to resist the temptation to become another univer-
sal law. The example is particularly relevant to these reflections on infrapol-
itics, in my view, because they concern precisely those elements of existence
which absolutely resist both the universalism of calculability (the law of general
equivalence) *and* any reduction of the issue to a question of mere subjectivity.
They concern a passion or a desire that is *ex*-centric and comes from a place
beyond or beneath the *polis* – perhaps from the tomb of Antigone, where she
is fated to live her second death.

Between Del Barco, Lacan and Moreiras, we find an attempt to approxi-
mate ourselves through reflection to a respect for an absolute singular exis-
tence, or at least relation to existence, which is always and constantly at threat
of being violated, and violated precisely through the political order. In Morei-
ras's writing, I suggest, we find not only a reflection upon that singularity of
existence but also an attempt to assume writing's own aporetic limitations
as that which constitutes and is constituted by an impossible relationship to
that facticity which sub-cedes it and can never be captured by it. Infrapoliti-
cal reflection would be the name for a compensatory writing for that constant
erasure, in its approximation to deconstruction, but, beyond this, it is a writ-
ing which assumes its own conditions of textually inscribing the mark of that
passion that moves beyond or beneath its legibility. This is perhaps brought
to the fore and thematised even more clearly in our second of three inscrip-
tions under discussion.

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18   It is striking that the example seems to draw a parallel with the moral dilemma
presented in Javier Marías's *The infactuations* (2013), which is discussed elsewhere by
Moreiras (see below).

Inscription 2: October 1998/January 2015[19]

Marranismo e inscripción (2016) is a daring and deeply personal book about the status of Latinamericanist reflection today. As Moreiras relates in the book's introduction, the idea for this publication emerged from an interview held in the Universidad Complutense de Madrid in 2015, where the author was asked to reflect upon the state of the field and upon his own personal career trajectory. A series of chapters are offered as a contextualization of the issues that are raised in this first interview, so that the reader is able to better situate its central problems. The author explains in the introduction that: "I thought that the interview could only be understood in the context of other essays of mine over the last years that either had an explicitly polemic nature or spoke about the professional field or my inscription in it" (Moreiras 2016: 14). In this sense, *Marranismo* is situated as within the legacy of Hispanism, and of more general debates in the North American academy over the last thirty years in the field from one of its most respected scholars. The book could be said to rehearse certain events that were determinate for the professional field in general and for Moreiras's career in particular, and as the chapters progress the reader has the sensation that the book liberates itself from these events, marking a movement towards a different type of reflection that we may be able to read with some justification as Moreiras's central proposal for the book. It marks thus another textual inscription, and announces something from within that inscription, marking a starting point for another kind of work that indexes more explicitly the theme of the infrapolitical. By drawing attention to the chapters as not being an organic whole but a series of interventions and polemics which cannot be removed from the author's own inscription in the professional field, *Marranismo* performs some of the central theoretical stakes of the book, which include the question of life and its inscription in writing.

There are a number of quasi-concepts which make an appearance throughout the book that in many ways provide a guiding thread on how to read the various chapters and are clearly developments, as Moreiras himself acknowledges in one of the published interviews, on earlier concerns in the author's work such as *Tercer espacio* (1999), *The Exhaustion of Difference* (2001) and *Línea de sombra* (2007). These quasi-concepts include auto-graphic writing; marranism; posthegemony; as well as, and especially, infrapolitics, whose thematization is the object of the final chapter and interview. It picks up, in that sense, on concerns that had marked Moreiras's work and articulates them in new and thought-provoking ways, paving the way for the more recent publications under discussion in this special issue. Indeed, what a discussion of these terms share is a question of life or existence, beyond or perhaps below its determination by politics, and by a metaphysics of presence or of subjectivity, following a leftist-Heideggerian and Derridean vein which is present

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19   The dates refer to the fifth meeting of the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group in Duke University and to the interview which opens *Marranismo e inscripción*, respectively.

throughout the author's previous interventions and mark his more recent writing, in particular in the notion of the second turn of deconstruction discussed above. These quasi-concepts are also concerned with how life is inscribed in writing in ways which can either threaten to reduce its existential properties to a logic of identity (which would be Moreiras's general critique of Latinamericanist writing, and can also be related to the domain of the political in general as discussed above) or that can, inversely, provide a space in which to reflect on life without reducing the latter to politics or identity in general, what the author calls, at this stage, "infrapolitical" reflection. This second kind of writing is particularly apparent, for Moreiras, in certain literary and philosophical texts which he explores in a number of the later chapters (each themselves, therefore, instances of textual inscription). Once again, what we find is that the personal and performative nature of this book is key; Moreiras's writing reveals the operability of these concepts not only for academic discourse in the field, but also for one's place within it, which *Marranismo* shows is always at stake whenever one chooses to write. It is therefore a call for reflection on our professional practice in all its dimensions, including its most apparently everyday elements. Indeed, *Marranismo* suggests, through its own putting on stage of the writer's dilemma, that the conditions of writing are never at the mercy of the writer; rather, we are already situated in a scene of writing beyond our control, that we inherit without ever fully knowing what it is that we have inherited. Reading *Marranismo* in light of the later publication of *Infrapolítica*, therefore, can be useful to bring out more explicitly this thematic of inscription and the question over how infrapolitics should announce itself in Moreiras's most recent writing. This is certainly one of the possible ways of interpreting Moreiras's provocation to the reader when he writes that "for me, the sequence of writings that I offer is more than the story of a professional trajectory, and contains secrets that only appear in its trace and for the astute reader, if there is one" (Moreiras 2016: 14).

    The first chapter presents the reader with the interview which formed the basis of the book. In it, Moreiras speaks of the trajectory of Latin American Studies from the 1980s, mapping out the shift from literary studies as the "queen of the humanities" to the rise of theory, to culturalism and to subaltern studies, and finally to a shift towards more properly political questions from 2001 onwards. Many of the themes that will be prominent throughout the book make an appearance in this first interview, such as autographic writing, posthegemony and infrapolitics. One of the key events whose specter can be traced throughout the book first makes an appearance here; 1998, when a conference was held by the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group and which saw the dissolution of the group over deep theoretical disagreements which, Moreiras suggests, were to have a decisive impact on the shape of Latinamericanism over the next fifteen years and on Moreiras's professional career in particular. Although not all of these are mentioned explicitly in this first chapter, it is fair to say that the book as a whole identifies three general trends within the field, and the object of many of the chapters that follow will be to identify

the limits of each of these approaches in order to offer a fourth possibility: infrapolitical reflection. These three broad trends are post-subalternism, identified with the figure of John Beverley; the decolonial school, identified with Walter Mignolo and Ramón Grosfoguel; and neocommunism, identified with the work of Bruno Bosteels.[20]

A great deal of the chapters that follow can be read as a rehearsal of the effects of the 1998 conference or of events that are associated with it, and in this sense can be read as making explicit the performance of a certain work of mourning, its working through in writing, and thus symptomatic of a passion, frustrated by institutional and existential conditions, which attempts to make itself heard through the writing. In the second chapter, "Mi vida en Z", Moreiras recounts the events that through disagreements in the university led to the author being increasingly isolated by his colleagues and that, eventually, made him feel that he eventually needed to leave. This chapter demonstrates the way in which, by compiling these essays as part of a collection with common themes, they are given new meaning, as it becomes clear that this reflection is not only a personal testimony about the misfortunes that one encounters if you find yourself in the talons of superiors bent on destroying your professional career, it is also a question of the figure of the *marrano* as the heterodox seeking to survive in an order in which she finds no place; in other words, of infrapolitical life. "Taking for granted that there is no moral law", writes Moreiras at the beginning of this chapter, "and that everything is a question of either winning or losing, then the question gets shifted: what does one want to win? Pride and dignity are figured in the response to this question, which for me was never a *political* answer" (Moreiras 2016: 63). If not a political answer, then the question of pride and dignity are located at a different level, at a level which takes a step back from the political and addresses another set of problems entirely. Moreiras makes it clear in his reflections that these existential (actually lived) questions and how they are narrativised cannot be separate from the task of thinking.

Indeed, central to these set of reflections in *Marranismo* is the question of narrativisation, whether this be in an autobiographical or historical mode. Whereas many of the chapters in the book rehearse and can be read as overcoming certain impasses of theoretical positions within Latinamericanism, the fifth chapter is significant in its announcement of a "second turn" of deconstruction, thus echoing the exergue to his more recent *Infrapolítica* (2020a). In this chapter, Moreiras turns to the question of deconstruction in the field of Latin American Studies based on his experience as one of the first and most important proponents of the possibilities for deconstruction within the professional field. Providing a history of deconstructionist reflection in Latin American Studies, Moreiras outlines the importance of deconstruction as a means

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20   It is certainly notable, in that sense, that only the latter (Bosteels) is given any real attention in the latest two books by Moreiras under discussion here. This suggests a move away from these pitfalls of Latinamericanism towards another space of reflection in this later work.

to rethink the possibilities of a field, of what it means to teach about Latin America (or Spain) from the outside, without this constituting a "presentation" of Latin American or Spanish "difference", offered for the consumption or for the aesthetic enjoyment of the dominant other who regards the culture with disinterest. He turns to the recently published 1964–5 seminar by Derrida on *Heidegger and the Question of Being and History* to suggest that the starting point of a second deconstructive turn should engage with Derrida's early proposal that all deconstruction and all awakening of thought seeks the ongoing demetaphorization of onto-theological mythologies. This demetaphorisation will become a key function of infrapolitical reflection when faced with the metaphorical language of metaphysics, which is also to read, in the reading here provided, politics.

The final chapters of *Marrranismo* mark a shift from this "sticking point" of the year 1998, as if marking a liberation from what that date traces as a result of its being worked through in the writing itself. It also marks a move away from a specifically Latinamericanist-based reflection to one that extends also to Spain. It is significant, I think, in this context that the emphasis continues to be on the role of narrative and in particular of denarrativisation. In the chapter "El tiempo desquiciado", for example, Moreiras offers an analysis of Antonio Muñoz Molina's *La noche de los tiempos*, which in its turn is supported by a reading of his *Todo lo que era sólido* which is, for Moreiras, in dialogue with the former in a number of important ways. These texts become an opportunity to reflect on three transformative moments of Spanish history simultaneously, breaking with the official chronology to explore the inherent interrelatedness of their times: the Spanish Civil War, the transition to democracy, and the contemporary moment of crisis and the new hope that the 15M and other similar movements have inspired. Moreiras draws on his own coincidental parallels with Antonio Muñoz Molina, who is of the same generation as the author, to reflect on the experience of the transition among disenchanted young adults like himself and Muñoz Molina in the 1970s, asking what this meant for a whole generation of Spaniards, and what it might mean for a whole new generation of Spaniards today. Once again drawing the parallel between the practice of autographic writing and the infrapolitical theory that he explores, Moreiras points towards those dimensions of life which exceed politics even in the moment of political transformation itself, and the generational inscription of himself and authors like Muñoz Molina which is not reducible to any historicisation of the Spanish political experience. The final chapter, "Conversations on the question of infrapolitics", turns more explicitly to the question of the quasi-concept of infrapolitics, explaining its relationship to the critique of metaphysical thought in Heidegger and Derrida, and speaking about the notion in relation to both politics and ethics as the twin figures of what was once called practical philosophy. The themes of auto-graphic writing and theoretical fiction which are present throughout the chapters are here more heavily emphasized, and perhaps provide us, as the author himself suggests in the preliminary note to the book, with a different

lens through which to read the chapters that precede this one. The notion of auto-graphic writing is brought directly into conversation with the notion of life or existence; Moreiras writes:

> The writing that interests me does not seek subjective constitution through truth. Rather, it seeks truth and results in destitution. It seeks truth in the sense that it seeks in every case to traverse the fantasy, and produces destitution in the sense that traversing the fantasy brings us closer to the abyss of the real. (Moreiras 2016: 200)

Perhaps, through these inscriptions, Moreiras's writing indicates a working towards such a proximity to the abyss that will appear in his later work.

In *Marranismo e inscripción* Moreiras would appear, in a way which is at the same time very serious and tongue-in-cheek, to offer his latest publication as the remedy (the *pharmakon,* that is, both remedy and poison) to both a personal and professional malady, as his own "traversing the fantasy", and the theme of writing as both malady and cure is thematized explicitly in one of the eighth chapters of the book. In so doing, he exposes a number of theoretical impasses in the field, but also exposes his own professional trials, appearing to lay all bare for the reader. There is no doubt something that feels perhaps contradictory or at least odd about this, in a book which seeks to explore a dimension of life that can never be reduced to its re-presentation in writing. It is perhaps suggestive, therefore, that the book's epilogue – an appendix, a supplement, itself not a chapter, but something whose function could be to undo the architectonics of the book organized through its chapters – about the infrapolitical dimensions of Javier Marías's novel *Los enamoramientos*, ends with the idea of a writing which exposes the limits of narrative's capacity to lay bare life in all of its dimensions. Speaking of the central characters, Moreiras states: "Javier, in the ears of María, cannot but be deceitful with the truth, because Javier's truth is beyond all narrative and is tied up with a radical de-narrativization" (Moreiras 2016: 223). Whatever the existential imprint Moreiras would have suggested could be read in the traces of the previous chapters, therefore, something will have always escaped them, and in this sense Moreiras's own writing participates in such a performative de-narrativization. Our tracing in circles of a certain problematic of performance or announcement may not be in vain, therefore, if we accept that we are on the hunt for something which by definition always escapes. Perhaps, as Moreiras suggests, this may be true of literary production in general:

> Perhaps literature would be nothing other than the secular attempt to touch that border of narration beyond narration. This is the infrapolitical dimension of literature, its *actio in distans*, without which literature cannot be anything other than communitarian allegory, and as such fallen. (Moreiras 2016: 223)

What is clear is that the auto-graphic elements of Moreiras's writing are performative of a much more general critique, provocation and proposal, that

develop in this earlier moment of writing as a critique unfolding from out of a specific engagement with an academic disciplinary field. This, I suggest, is further radicalised in the third and final of the textual inscriptions under discussion.

Inscription 3: March 20–May 18 2020[21]

Thus far, my argument has been that in order to properly understand the stakes of what Moreiras proposes by the notion of infrapolitics as he discusses it in his latest work, it is necessary to understand the importance of a problem which is thematised, albeit perhaps not directly, in this writing – how to announce or perform that which indexes or attempts to index that unnameable whose placeholder is "infrapolitics", that space of a "from where" which cannot be determined or pinpointed by writing, given that it is always what bears its mark and at the same time escapes capture by the writing process. If infrapolitics has to do with a facticity of existence beyond or below the ontico-ontological difference and metaphysical closure, then it must make itself felt in that practice of reflection which has nevertheless been unable to capture it, yet without which that singular existence cannot take on its own singularity, appropriate itself, or think itself. We are met with an aporetic condition which, we can say, by reading how this set of questions explicitly informs a strategy of writing in the inscriptions concerned in *Marranismo* and *Infrapolítica*, Moreiras's writing attempts to fully assume in its exposition and, in so doing, make it all the more felt. If we were looking to trivialise the matter, we perhaps might argue that the singularity of Moreiras's experience detracts from the universality of its implications. This would no doubt be a misunderstanding of how infrapolitics already operates beyond such binaries as singular and universal, similar to the futility of the attempts to reduce deconstruction to a play between public and private concerns. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it is precisely insofar as it so clearly addresses such an issue, that the last of our textual inscriptions, the recent book *Sosiego siniestro* (2020b), is perhaps the most powerful exposition or indexing of the infrapolitical region to date. It is so, I would argue, precisely because it locates its textual inscription within a fundamental contemporary moment which we share and which is brought to light by the Covid-19 pandemic as an irruption of the real into the imaginary-symbolic order, as we may say in Lacanese or, to paraphrase Jorge Alemán, insofar as it touches upon our common solitude. In what remains of this article and by way of conclusion, I will briefly address some of the stakes of reading *Sosiego* from this perspective.

The *sosiego* under discussion which forms part of the book's title, which can perhaps be translated as state of calm or tranquillity (*Uncanny Rest* in its more recent English translation [Moreiras 2022]), is the starting point for these reflections. The *sosiego* offers an uncanny calm as the pandemic takes hold

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21   The dates refer to the events that appear in diary-like form in *Sosiego siniestro* (2020b). Quotes throughout refer to the English translation with Duke University Press, *Uncanny Rest* (2022).

and each of us, together and on our own, are confined by government order and in the common good to limit the impact of the public health crisis. And this *sosiego* is *siniestro* or sinister insofar as it is a state of calm which is somehow uncanny and, thus, lends itself in fact to a state of restlessness. It is this shared, singular (un)settlement which becomes, then, targeted from this singular experience and of its inscription in writing, as a calling from this "from which" that infrapolitics indexes. "The habitual has been put on hold", writes Moreiras in this book which adopts the form of a diary, "and there is an unchosen leisure, an anxious lack of occupation, and anxiety increases from my attempts at taking advantage of it, of capitalising on it. I want to be able to use this strange lapse as a possible entry into my own life, from which I seem to have been uncannily separated; to realize what is this halted time, which nevertheless continues onward" (Moreiras 2022: 3). This diary thus offers a series of infrapolitical reflections but that are themselves inscribed as part of a deeper meditation upon existence, a meditation of an experience or relation to existence in common, and therefore an invitation to share in it. Through reflections on contemporary responses to the pandemic from theorists such as Giorgio Agamben, similar to many of the reflections found in *Infrapolítica*, this search for existence becomes one that is irreducible to politics. It is a question, writes Moreiras, that is interested in "the possibility of recovery, in confinement, of an existential exteriority, of an *ex-scription* neither directly communitarian nor directly political" (Moreiras 2022: 15). It would be difficult to gloss over here the number of issues that are brought to bear upon this task – the false dichotomy between biopolitical governance in the name of public health versus the health of the economy, the critique of a call to return to a renewed subjectivity; the issues of a teleological structure of history in Gramsci, among others. Without doubt the most significant of these from our perspective, however, is an attempt which emerges about half way through this diary of confinement and picks up an almost anxious pace as the narrative progresses: namely, how to think about an assumption or appropriation of our existence which must necessarily go further than other calls from critical theory for a transformation in subjectivity (and implies therefore the question of how to think such an appropriation outside of any subjectivist and thus voluntarist logic). This becomes articulated, at some moment in the diary, as a decision of existence, which should be understood also as a decision *for* existence, a risky decision to take a step back from politics as the administration of life.[22]

What insists in this, aside from the important theoretical reflections that inform this way of thinking about existence, is a move away from a concern felt in *Marranismo* over narrativisation or de-narrativisation to a concern built upon an anxiety over the decision of existence and how to appropriate it, to thus live in relation to one's own existence authentically. It insists, it is compulsive, repetitive, and so the symptomatic nature of this drive becomes

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22   Moreiras takes this notion of the decision of existence from Jean-Luc Nancy. See: Moreiras (2017) and Nancy (1993).

thematised more and more explicitly, and with it, a sense of anxiety over the decision, over the question: "How, in any case, are these pages, my pages, inscribed in this?" (Moreiras 2022: 94). Our shared experience of a suspension of the normal time of capital, history or metaphysics (shadows of the same phantasm), allows for a reassessment of the appropriate way to dwell in this time and of our belonging to or in it. "What I have been calling the decision of existence is, after all, nothing more than the attempt", writes Moreiras, "repeated and ceaseless and belligerent, to listen to and take responsibility for the ontological difference in my life and in every life: to appropriate my time and to live that difference between becoming who I am or becoming only its mirage and slavish parody" (Moreiras 2022: 96). Infrapolitics is about the assumption of this task for thought, which refuses to become a willing slave of the metaphysical closure, and seeks to renew the political field in such a way so that we may all seek out such a freedom. The task of emancipation is displaced with respect to our political traditions, and inscribed within the question of existence itself, of *how* to live, for which the question of how to write should not at all be considered separate.

The shared loneliness of this *sosiego siniestro* or uncanny rest becomes then, I argue, a powerful indexation of the restless (non-)place of infrapolitics, not analysed, but re-vealed through a self-conscious (if such a word is appropriate in this context) assumption of the existential condition of the textual inscriptions which shape, mark, haunt and inform the series of writings that are here under discussion. What Moreiras's latest work offers is a practice of reflection, of infrapolitical reflection, insofar as it represents an attempt to think the existential *Faktum* of this (non-)place (or to re-veal it, which amounts to the same thing). What is thus intentionally obscured and displaced at every stage of this writing is a question over the act of writing itself, which becomes perhaps a passive act in the Derridean sense, where that separation between *dynamis* and *energeia* becomes undecidable. But neither is it the remaining in a non-actualised state, as proposed by the latest work of Giorgio Agamben as a new mode of ontology. "Potency or impotency, but there's something more", writes Moreiras, "something else, that overflows and escapes those two conditions. That something else is the condition of condition, the infrapolitical condition, the original gift" (Moreiras 2022: 44). How to think it? The question perhaps cannot be answered in any final way, or its answer will have always been singular and contingent, and Moreiras's writing is perhaps above all an attempt to demonstrate this in its own performative inscription. But the question is not rhetorical either. Perhaps the question is addressed to that person who may be prepared to answer the call to reflect upon the infrapolitical, or perhaps it is the call of the secret itself, asking to be read. Perhaps, indeed, they are one and the same thing. What is clear is that, contrary to all hopes and expectations, the response to this crisis which is a crisis of our planetary existence – and this is of course not only limited to the pandemic – cannot be found within our tired political tradition.

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Piter Bejker

Spisi o egzistenciji u najnovijem delu Alberta Moreirasa

Apstrakt

Ovaj članak pristupa najnovijem radu Alberta Moreirasa o infrapolitici kao samosvesnom aktu pisanja koji misli svoje uslove ili sopstveni kontingentni tekstualni natpis. U tom smislu, predlažem da ovaj rad možemo čitati kao informisan pitanjem, čak i preokupacijom, o tome koji oblik ili stil pisanja je prikladan za najavu ili ponovno otkrivanje egzistencijalnih dimenzija koje predlaže pojam infrapolitike. U istraživanju tri takva neblagovremena tekstualna natpisa, članak pristupa ulozima onoga što Moreiras tematizira pod nazivom infrapolitika kroz način na koji informiše performativnost Moreirasove vlastite prakse pisanja, istražujući pritom odnos koji infrapolitika pretpostavlja prema politici i određenoj kritici kasnog kapitalizma, kao i drugih važnih pojmova kao što su marinizam, drugi obrt dekonstrukcije, autografsko pisanje i demetaforizacija, između ostalog.

Ključne reči: infrapolitika, maranizam, stil, dekonstrukcija, inskripcija, autografsko pisanje, performans.

Gareth Williams

INFRAPOLITICAL NECESSITY, INCONSPICUOUS AND HONORABLE: WE BEGIN AGAIN

> *Time and again Antigone, a crucial figure in the Western tradition whose infrapolitical dimension is a condition of her tragicness, has been denied and concealed. It will become necessary to attend to infrapolitical Antigone more directly.*
>
> Alberto Moreiras
> *Infrapolítica (instrucciones de uso)*, 242, n.47.

> *The human being: the uncanniest of the uncanny.*
>
> Martin Heidegger
> *Hölderlin's Hymn 'The Ister'*, 51.

Infrapolitics is not a philosophy of life oriented toward the sublimation of death and extended in the name of more or better forms of representation, progress, development, culture, identity, politics, biopolitics etc. Rather, infrapolitics thinks from within a distance taken from every Hegelian operation extended in accordance with the affirmation of specific forms of life, subjectivity and politics, over and against all others. For this reason, in Alberto Moreiras' *Infrapolítica (instrucciones de uso)* (La Oficina 2020) infrapolitics uncovers an approach to the question of the ontological difference between beings and being, understanding that difference as the always double and simultaneous character of the question for the nothingness to which we all arrive, as well as for what remains bequeathed to us as a result of the closure of metaphysics.

Moreiras's thinking is an opening to the demand for a new beginning in and for thinking. This is necessary to a large extent because our epoch (that is, the epoch of total capitalism and of the systemic nihilism that we are obliged

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to experience and suffer) installs and reproduces death not as mortality – or as a mourning for the conceptual itself – but as the production of a systemic death penalty that is also a fully economized and globalized apotheosis of the metaphysics of capitalist discourse.

Moreiras seeks to distance the act of thinking from modern political orthodoxies and inherited forms of representation, including those of all institutionalized (and therefore, university) forms of political and identitary instrumentalization. Infrapolitics does this in such a way as to pose once again the question of existence itself. This involves approaching the question of being and non-being – of nothingness, of the abyss – as an integral part of the exploration of everything in the human condition that might be unsusceptible to capture, or to the submission of the experiential singularity of each and every one of us to domination and biopolitical common sense.

Always taking distance from the Hegelian philosophy of history – that is, from enlightenment claims to consciousness and to the emancipation of the subject extended in the dialectical topology of Master and Slave – infrapolitics accepts that lived experience is always, and can only ever be, a question regarding *otherness*. It is a question for the promise of an otherness that invites us to think in relation to the unknown, the unhomely, the spectral, and the uncanny. Moreiras does not avoid the responsibility of orienting thinking toward finitude or the abyss. Neither does he conceal human uprootedness through the narcissistic compulsions of "essayism", that is, through the characterization of the intellectual task as a personalist prevailing of the self over others (or even over oneself), in the name of the affirmation of political life or of specific forms of experience, of the politics of subjectivity, or of the demand for political hegemony. Infrapolitics in this book is more radical – less imaginary, more real – than any of that.

Infrapolítica (instrucciones de uso) recalls and reanimates Martin Heidegger's words in the wake of the Second World War, when he offered a response to Jean Beaufret's question "*Comment redonner un sens au mot 'Humanisme'?*" Heidegger warned his French interlocutor that in light of the saturation of the human via the technicity of reason, perhaps it would be better to no longer strive to restore meaning to humanism but to learn to renounce, to the fullest extent possible, all the pretenses of the history of humanist metaphysics: "This question proceeds from your intention to retain the word "humanism". I wonder whether that is necessary. Or is the damage caused by all such terms still not sufficiently obvious?" (1998: 241). For Heidegger (and some would say "conveniently", given his own complicities), the history of humanism uncovered the industrialized atrocity of the second world war as both cause and effect of the multiple impositions of the nationalist and imperialist instrumentalization of humanity itself. The war exposed the conditions of the inhumane that traverse every humanism in full compliance with the monstrosity of beings themselves. In the contemporary state of affairs – which is no longer that of a world at war but of a world *of* unlimited warfare – infrapolitics highlights that it is necessary to revisit Heidegger's conviction that "thinking does not

overcome metaphysics by climbing still higher, surmounting it, transcending it somehow or other; thinking overcomes metaphysics by climbing back down into the nearness of the nearest. The descent, particularly where human beings have strayed into subjectivity, is more arduous and more dangerous than the ascent. The descent leads to the poverty of the ek-sistence of *homo humanus*. In ek-sistence the region of *homo animalis*, of metaphysics, is abandoned. The dominance of that region is the mediate and deeply rooted basis for the blindness and arbitrariness of what is called "biologism," but also of what is known under the heading "pragmatism". To think the truth of being at the same time means to think the humanity of *homo humanus*. What counts is *humanitas* in the service of the truth of being, but without humanism in the metaphysical sense" (268). The word 'infrapolitics' is the contemporary name for that arduous and dangerous descent into the nearness of the near, as well as to the approach to the tragicness that underlies and conditions it.

And herein lies the figure of Antigone. For infrapolitics, tragedy marks the experiential zone in which death "crosses over into the sphere of life, a life that moves into the realm of death" (Lacan 1992: 248). Herein the singularity of experience is the gift of death alone. For this reason, infrapolitics unravels the aporias that flow beneath the signifying chains – the legacies – of modern and contemporary domination. It does this in light of the political conformism of both Right and Left, as well as in light of the promise extended through their deconstruction. For this reason, infrapolitics understands tragedy as the root of experience, but it understands it as a root that is occluded – rendered oblivious – in the order of the total subsumption of humanity to total commodity fetishism and to the fully decontained death sentence that capitalism installs.

The figure of Antigone appears infrequently, but significantly, in *Infrapolítica (instrucciones de uso)*. Having said that, perhaps it could also be said that this is a figure that traverses the entirety of Moreiras's intellectual trajectory from *Tercer espacio* (1999) and *Línea de sombra* (2006) to the present. In his most recent work, the question uncovered by Antigone appears at key moments that point not only in the direction of what is at stake in infrapolitics itself, but also in the direction of the relation upheld by Moreiras with his main references, Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida. At the end of the book's "Exergue" addressing Derrida's *Glas* (11–18), Antigone appears for the first time in a quote from Derrida who, writing in first person – an extraordinary and infrequent thing, Moreiras underlines –, signals the possibility of a thinking capable of interrupting metaphysics. The phantasmatic figure of Antigone opens the way for a second avatar for deconstruction. In *Glas*'s column on Hegel – against Hegel, Moreiras observes – Antigone "de-metaphorizes the system, carrying absolute knowledge to its point of ruination [...], she takes a step back from every commentary, her silence encrypts her language, or her language encrypts silence. Hesychastic rhythm, we begin again" (2020: 18, translation mine).

Antigone – this phantasmatic figure – re-emerges in *Infrapolítica*'s third chapter in specific reference to the question of the distance between *polis* and politics in Martin Heidegger and Felipe Martínez Marzoa. Antigone emerges

here as the spectral trace of an extra-political approximation to Being, as a figure of that "something" ("extra-political necessity", Moreiras calls it) without which life would be unlivable (68, translation mine). Through the specter of Antigone, the infrapolitical demand to "dwell in the unhomely", as Heidegger put it in his reading of Sophocles, begins again.

Why is this important? Because, as Moreiras observes, "politics today, on the margins of the abandoned dignity of its concept, is sinister. Politics is what Creon does [...], lost in the abyss of the administrative demand" (75). On the contrary, infrapolitics marks an attempt to "develop a relation to existence that dwells in and posits the other of orderability, which, as a trace, is a residue of the free human being of the primary inception – the trace of Antigone and for that reason the hyperbolic condition of all future democracy" (77, translation mine).

It is on account of all of the above that we can say that infrapolitics does not provide us with the ground for a strictly political task, even though it always touches upon and transforms the conditions of the political themselves. It does not jump to respond to the question, "Where is infrapolitics's politics?", or "What can be done politically with infrapolitics?". On the contrary, infrapolitics dwells and thinks from within the absolute distance between thinking and being, between existence and political existence, between life and politics. Within that difference, within that absolute difference, an "*other* beginning is at stake", says Moreiras (118, translation mine). This is what the author refers to in chapter five as "an existential modification of existence itself" (132, translation mine). With this in mind, it can be said that infrapolitics *is* emancipatory desire, but it is so against the determinations, omissions and silences of the modern inheritance of emancipation. Echoing Derrida's *Specters of Marx*, infrapolitics uncovers "the indestructible 'it is necessary'".

Thanks to Alberto Moreiras' *Infrapolítica (instrucciones de uso)* – a book that takes a radical distance from modern epochality itself (and therein lies its fundamental importance for all contemporary debates) – we can see that it is necessary to return to the question of the indestructibility of the 'it is necessary' in order to begin again not from within the metaphysics of humanism, but from what Heidegger called "the human being: the uncanniest of the uncanny".

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Comments and Discussions

Esaú Segura Herrera

GESTURES OF REPETITION: COMMENTARY ON INFRAPOLÍTICA, INSTRUCCIONES DE USO

Summary: Commentary on Alberto Moreiras' book *Infrapolítica, instrucciones de uso* (2020), Madrid: La Oficina, 248 pp.

> *In any case, there would be no future without repetition. And thus, as Freud might say (this would be his thesis), there is no future without the specter of the violence...*
>
> – Jacques Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*

Formulating any idea or problem requires the right words for their enunciation, but the style of the presentation is equally, if not even more important. When it is necessary to recur to a certain form of writing, and also to certain tropes, then perhaps it is less about aesthetics, than the difficulty to account for certain impasses in thought. Therefore, instead of resorting to certain figures as ornaments to articulate such problems of thought, it is sometimes the case that these figures are inherently the operation of their very content.

In my view, Alberto Moreiras's most recent book, *Infrapolítica: instrucciones de uso* (La Oficina, 2020), should fall into this category of writing. This work proposes a unique shift in regard to the contemporary horizons of political action and thought. In fact – and very surreptitiously – it is possible to locate within it the constant stylistic endeavor, chapter by chapter, that is relatively marginal to the content revealed by the author in each one of them. In other words, while seemingly in the background, the stylistic aspect is actually one of the common denominators that inter-relate, but do not identify, the various chapters. What is this style, surely one of many found in the text? The book itself announces it from the first lines, but with particular forcefulness at the end of the second chapter, under the subtitle "Piel de lobo" (wolfskin).

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I am particularly keen to grapple with to two of the many aspects dealt with in that short chapter. And in order to extract these key points that guide a possible reading of the book as a whole, I would like to briefly summarize some excerpts from the section in question. The first of these aspects stands out for its focus on what it refers to as "the aporia of time" – the intersection of at least two discordant times. It does not require a huge leap to imagine this problem in concrete terms: for example, we can find it in one generation's struggle with both its predecessor and successor. In fact, a discord usually exists between each of their languages, or between the attire of an earlier and new epoch, corresponding to reactionary and progressive political positions as described in the text. However, one can never truly identify either the merely new or the merely old in their supposed purity because, although we can "define" the old and the new in terms of age or the number of years, it also holds true they each inhabit a contemporaneity, which we could describe as differential. Aporia arises precisely here, in the never-quite-complete overlapping or resolution of an era with respect to itself. Hence, we can now isolate that first feature that says: there is aporia. That, in turn, can lead to an impasse.

The second aspect that interests me are the operations that each political position uses to try to resolve such an aporia. This task goes completely against the internal logic of the dualism of progressive and reactionary reason. On the one hand, in regard to progressive reason, the resource is the utopian narrativization, facing the pure positivity of the future and progress towards it, trying to detach it from all *previous* vestiges. On the other hand, in terms of reactionary reason, the resource is the denarrativization of the future, which also uses the appeal to pedagogy of an apparently absolute and inescapable past. However, Moreiras distinguishes these respective operations, based on the ideas of Benjamin, between the structures of the novel and of the story. In the case of the former, the narrative and conceptualization prevail, whereas in the case of the story, the importance lies in the repetition of structures of temporary affections and substances. So, if a utopia narrativizes and creates concepts, reaction repeats, or at least tries to repeat, structures. What is striking in this alternative, is that the text places infrapolitics on the side of those who are usually associated with the political reaction, from characters in some novels by Del Valle-Inclán, to authors such as Donoso and Schmitt. Does infrapolitics, according to Moreiras' book, represent a reactionary political position?

Perhaps the question is based on false premises. Or false at least in relation to the text itself. Because if indeed there is a singular interest for the characters of reaction, this is less a result of what they have or have not done with respect to a political alternative, than the repetitive production of a remnant that destabilizes the organization itself whereby that alternative is possible. It strikes me that an element of subjective advantage of reaction with regards to progressivism is implicit in the text. Insofar as the latter is recognized for its absolute positivity, self-referentiality, and will to power, reaction inhabits the contradiction of longing for a past that it already knows beforehand has been irretrievably lost. If the progressivist does not stop advancing, or in any case

believes so, nor stop constructing the story of his legitimation, on the contrary, a reactionary not only cannot follow him, but also cannot go back, because in fact there is no way of doing so. His place is the place of incessant repetition of an aporetic impasse, one of recovering a time lost beforehand. So, any act carried out by a reactionary in favor of a cause, which is already lost beforehand, best case scenario places himself in a position from which he can manage neither to save the cause, nor to remove it, or at least not completely. For there is a remnant of that cause that escapes capture by both reaction and progressivism and that places the subject in a radically heterogeneous subjective position.

Up to this point, hopefully these fragmentary observations at least contribute to raise interest in reading this book. For my part, I refrain from commenting further at the point when it is finally possible to isolate the two aspects to which I referred above. The figure of reaction has been the place in which these two aspects have been revealed, notably: the facts of aporia and repetition. And, the form of presenting these features is through inhabiting an incessant and violent aporetic repetition. I can now say that this formulation shows the style, or at least one of the styles, with which the book functions, because it is less an exposition of content, than the operation, the exercise of that which it in and of itself pretends to enunciate. In other words, each of its nine chapters repeats each time an aporetic gesture. Even more specifically, each chapter repeats having to deal with the variations of the form of these mis-encounters. Using this style, then, instead of conceptualizing or narrating, Alberto Moreiras tells a story. But one which is never the same, similarly to someone counting the beads on a necklace.

Now, what is being told (or counted)? The story tells the remnant that exists in the always-unsolvable and irreducible distance between at least two terms: to be and to think, life and politics, history and events. And what is noticeable from these pairs is mainly each one's attempt to capture the other. If in the identification of being and thinking, for example, one can place the ontotheological fate of the West, in the same way it is true that the only sign of this identification is generally only its representation. This is why taking a step back may be taking us by its insistent destabilizing mobilization. Hence, the recurrent act in the variations that the book offers is precisely the destitution of an organization, stemming from the same principle which enables it. Therefore, the apparent submission to divine law above human law allows Antigone to subtract an act which is always insistently *outside* of politics. It is the law, even recovered as a partial object, which destabilizes the law in general. Or also, challenging the ideas of Heidegger, for Maria Zambrano it is nothing but the lack of an inheritance what allows the production of a certain fate *outside* of the ontotheological fate. But perhaps more clearly in relation to Reiner Schürmann, the principle of anarchy which asks for the destabilization of all organizations, continues to be in itself an organizational principle to destabilize, *ad infinitum?*

These are just three variations offered by the book, where that which is altered, destabilized, removed, is the binary logic characteristic of Western

thought and action. For Antigone, it is not about choosing between submitting to the law or not; for Zambrano, it is neither about reifying the necessity or otherwise of an inheritance, as for the Carlist reactionary portrayed in the book, even unintentionally, the choice ceases to be one between reaction and progressivism. In all of these cases, what is at stake is the production of a gesture irreducible to the organization of each of those alternatives; a production which, even apparently later in time, is in the same way prior to the alternative itself: hence the introduction of another aporia. In all these variations, it is less about making the choice for the alternative than the passage *between* them. It is not so much about the alternative that goes from *fort* to *da*, with its subsequent reifying risk, as it is about a game of its repetition, the passage *between* absence and presence, previous to the organization of this binarism, but for which each term cannot be without its "opposite"; who could say which came first, presence or absence? This question engulfs the philosophical destiny of the West. Repetition is that of an aporetic impasse. But to inhabit this aporia is at the same time to cancel the possibility of capture by any of its sides. Neither simply being nor simply thinking, neither simply life nor simply politics, neither simply history nor simply events. Would we need to point at this *in-between*, as the place for infrapolitics?

What does this, which can only be superficially described as apolitical, imply for the most classical political decision and militancy? People die every day, they are incarcerated, murdered, and marginalized due to political and hegemonic decisions; even if its ontotheological character is specified, what kind of positioning does the infrapolitical position represent in relation to them? In as much as the repetition of this *in-between* is also the violent insistence on destabilizing the terms of any archontic organization – including leftist militant activists, it would be a false problem to suppose that this book forces us to choose between action and inaction. Since the retreat it announces does not cease to suppose a certain activity, that is, the stepping backwards with respect to identifying life and politics, but also any other captivating and substantivizing identification of a headless real. What is this about if an activity is no longer subject to the limitations of any representative binarism? Although, to be honest, there is not any representative and ontotheological logic which does not already contain the *in-between* of its destabilization. For this reason, perhaps the book is in itself the result of its epochal aporia. In fact, is it a post-universitarian discursive bet on infrapolitics, or is it in itself an infrapolitical gesture? The latter would reveal the singular statute of the author's role. But perhaps not only one or the other, but between them, from which another remnant is produced by its own paradox; knowingly: that the only instructions are that there are no instructions.

On the other hand, the destabilizing stepping-back of the instructions that says there are no instructions, the stepping-back of the principle without principles, cannot go on without its instituting correlate. This raises a question that I find is missing from the book: in that incessant repetition, always backwards, in retreat, what about its *end*? Is it even thinkable? Without sidestepping the

ambiguity that comes from speaking of *ends*, is this an interminable repetition? Or is it again another false dilemma? It seems to me that there exists a pending discussion in relation to the concrete struggles of subalternity, with which the book itself states that it engages. On the contrary, it asks "what should we do" in the middle of the paradox? This is a question always lying ahead of us.

III

STUDIES AND ARTICLES

STUDIJE I ČLANCI

Dušan Ristić and Dušan Marinković

THE FOUCAULT EFFECT IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

ABSTRACT
This research proposes that Foucault's concepts of power/knowledge and genealogy constitute a significant turning point, not only in philosophical and historical terms but also in the research framework of the sociology of knowledge. The first level of Foucault's contribution to the sociology of knowledge is widely recognized through the concept of discourse and its dimensions of materiality, power and knowledge. The second level is the analytical grid of power/knowledge itself, which focuses on the relays established between them. The third level, which we consider a crucial area open to further interpretation, is the concept of the history of the present. Although Foucault's contribution has already been acknowledged in contemporary sociological research of knowledge, our objective is to expand on this recognition by highlighting the significance of genealogy's dimensions to existing approaches, namely the historical sociology of knowledge and sociology of knowledge approach to discourse.

Introduction

Genealogy as a method used by Michel Foucault in his research has so far been the subject of numerous analysis (Elden 2003; Crowley 2009; Koopman 2013; Dreyfus, Rabinow 2017; Haddad 2020). The "project" of genealogy itself is contextualized in various ways: as a "later" or "second" phase of Foucault's work that comes after archaeology, or as an inseparable part of his opus. Despite the differences in approach and use, studies indicate the importance genealogy still has today (Haddad 2020; Erlenbusch-Anderson 2020; Lorenzini 2022).[1]

In this review of the significance of genealogy to the sociology of knowledge, the following dimensions are especially emphasized: power/knowledge

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1 Also in: Genealogy, a special issue of the journal *The Monist* (Vol. 105, Iss. 4, October 2022).

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as an "analytical grid" and a concept of the history of the present. Foucault's key contribution has already been recognized in contemporary research in the sociology of knowledge and discourse analysis (Keller 2012; Diaz-Bone et al. 2007; Khan&MacEachen 2021). Our aim is to add to these.

The first level of Foucault's contribution is already recognized through the concept of discourse, especially through the dimensions of materiality, power and knowledge. The second, level is recognized throught the "analytical grid" of power/knowledge and the "relays" established between them. The third level we recognize as a key domain: it is the the question of the *history of the present.* This concept embodies Foucault's views on the relationship between the past and the present, and it sheds light on our understanding of truth and knowledge. It is significant because it prompts us to consider layers of practices that accumulate over time, like a palimpsest, rather than simply comparing them across different periods of history. This approach invites also to re-examine archaeology of knowledge and genealogy. Ultimately, it highlights the intricate networks of knowledge and practices that are currently in place and can be studied through empirical means.

Foucault, Studies of Discourse and Sociology (of Knowledge)

The extent of Foucault's influence on social sciences is recognized in various sociological disciplines through the concepts and areas he researched: space, urbanism, and geography (Foucault 1986; 1995; Prior 1988), medicine and public health (Foucault 2003; Lupton 1995), technologies of the self (Foucault 1988; Lupton 2016), education (Foucault 1995; Grant 1997), management and economics (Armstrong 2015), and studies of organizations (Power 2011). On the one hand, there are studies arguing that Foucault's research is important in the context of bridging agency and structure, which has certainly been one of the key issues in debates in sociological theory (Silverman 1985; Eckermann, 1997). On the other hand, there have been criticisms that highlighted the shortcomings of Foucault's research and emphasized the impossibility of the application of his concepts in sociology (Fox 1998).

There are good examples of elaborated research in which the influence of Michel Foucault is seen through the application of his concepts. A good overview is given by Michael Power (Power 2011), who has not only recognized the importance of Foucault's work as a resource for various sociological disciplines, but also established an approach called *the historical sociology of knowledge.* Foucault's key ideas and concepts recognized in sociology are elaborated by Power: discourse and archeology, power/knowledge, the "historical method", and the problem of action. According to Power (2011), the research of the French thinker can be placed at the crossroads of philosophy and sociology. Topics such as madness, medical (expert) knowledge and psychiatry, sexuality, law, surveillance or space, are all areas of special interest to sociologists. In other words, the *Foucault effect* is seen in sociology even though he hasn't often referenced sociologists (ibid.).

Ian Hacking is also a philosopher who has recognized the importance of Foucault's work in researching institutional and classification schemes for what he calls "making up people" (Hacking 2004). However, when it comes to key topics and Power's approach, one should start from the significance of discourse, as a concept that is important not only for sociology, but also for the sociology of knowledge. The concept itself is defined differently in Foucault's work and there are limitations and difficulties in recognizing the border line between discursive and non-discursive practices.

Discourse is like a surface on which it is possible to see the effects of power/knowledge. What Foucault was interested in were the conditions of possibilities, thanks to which specific *effects of discourse* occur: power and knowledge. These conditions of possibilities or *rules* and *technologies* were a field of Foucault's interest. Other important area of influence of Foucault in sociology lays within the fields of social practices and methodology. Although Foucault's historical-philosophical approach was criticized both by historians and philosophers, and he considered himself neither one nor the other (Foucault 2007), the fact is that his analyzes and concepts are used both in socio-historical research and philosophy. According to Power, the field of Foucault's influence is also recognized in the research of social action. There are scholars, for instance, who developed analyses, after Foucault, "that do not appeal to the interests of specific agents, but rather seek to describe the formation of a historical a priori, in Foucault's sense, that shows how new accounting practices emerge at the conjuction of significant discourses governing what it is possible to say" (Power 2011: 44). However, Foucault's goal was not to develop a particular theory of action. He was rather interested in historical and social conditions under which people become subjects (ibid.). The fields of power, governmentality, and institutions are also the areas of research that have special significance for sociology, although governmentality studies are already recognized as a developed field of research (Burchell, Gordon, Miller 1991; Dean 2010).

In addition to the abovementioned, Michael Power (Power 2011) gives a draft for a *historical sociology of knowledge.* It takes into account the so-called *practice turn* in social sciences (Schatzki, Cetina, Von Savigny 2005). Foucault also recognized the importance of practices: "The goal of the analysis was not 'institutions', 'theory' or 'ideology', but practices – my intention was to capture the conditions under which they could become possible at a given moment [...] practices that could be understood as places of what was said and done, rules that were imposed, and reasons that justified them, places where what was planned and taken for granted meets and intertwines" (Foucault 1991: 75).

Discursive practices are of particular interest in the sociology of knowledge. Then, there is something that Foucault calls the *isomorphism* of discourses. It could be described as a common feature of discourses in different areas of social life, which permeate them as diagrams or 'axes'. In addition to discursive practices, which are crucial for genealogical analysis, the scope of research in the sociology of knowledge includes other behaviors/actions of people, such as rituals, objects, institutions, etc. These are all fields or practices in which

power relations *fluctuate*. For instance, in the domain of naming, and through the processes of (de)legitimization of knowledge. It is precisely on the discursive level, or in the "text" itself, where the rules and norms are "hidden", as well as the strategies and technologies of power.

In methodological terms, practices should also be understood as sets of *relays* that bridge these discursive foundations, while discourse is also a relay that connects two different practices. It is like the relation between theory (discourse) and practice: "No theory can be developed without running into a wall, and then, it turns to practices in order to break down the wall" (Erlenbusch-Anderson 2020).

Finally, discursive practices are elementary units both in the genealogical analysis and in the sociology of knowledge, especially in the so-called SKAD approach (Keller 2012). Yet, practices are the ones that define objects (Foucault 2002), practices articulate different types of power/knowledge, discourse regimes, truths and ways of its (de)legitimization. Furthermore, discursive practices represent an opportunity to create a world of social experience, because "discourses map out what people really do and think, without realizing it" (Veyne 2010: 29). The orientation of sociological approach towards practices in this sense moves the focus of research from the abstract to the experiential. The directions of analysis also move from the analysis of ideas, which are "localized in the individual consciousness of doers", to impersonal arenas of discourse. Or, to paraphrase Ann Swidler, the "old area" of analysis, with its ideas and agents, begins to be divided into the domain of the practical and the domain of the discursive (Swidler 2005: 75).

Let us go back to Power's conception of the historical sociology of knowledge. Interestingly, he considered *The Order of Things* (2005), first published in 1966, to be the most representative work in which "the most explicit articulation of Foucault's historically oriented sociology of knowledge" was articulated (Power 2011: 37). In Power's opinion, it was also interesting – in the context of the development of the sociology of knowledge – that the famous Berger's and Luckmann's *The Social Construction of Reality* was published in the same year. What Power claims is that Foucault's interest in practices, opened up space for research different from the history of ideas, research that led to questioning the *conditions of possibilities* for the emergence of power/knowledge. We completely agree. However, for us it does not still mean that it was an approach built as the "historical sociology of knowledge".

From Power's perspective, Foucault's earlier research into madness and medicine could be understood as historical case studies of the specific "truth regimes" (ibid.: 37). Furthermore, Power compared Foucault's approach with the approach of David Bloor in the so-called *strong programme* of the sociology of knowledge (Bloor 1976), insofar as he recognizes that the stake for Foucault was not true as such: "[B]ut the social and institutional historical conditions under which authorized statements can be made that count as true" (Power 2011: 38). In this way, Foucault seemed to apply the *principle of symmetry* that Bloor advocated as well. However, in *The Order of Things*, Foucault

explored the concepts of discourse and knowledge in three constitutive areas: life, work, and language (Marinković, Ristić 2016), which contributed to the historical appearance of man.

This is also a study of the conceptual transformation of knowledge and something he calls *an episteme* (Foucault 2005). In other words, the historical-epistemological move and transformation of the classification of knowledge (knowledge of the history of nature, wealth, and general grammar), is "without consciousness of the role of human subjects in practices of representation" (Power 2011: 38). New forms of knowledge in science (biology, political economy, and linguistics), bring two important points. First, every field of knowledge meets new "epistemological requirements" that lead to "depth" beyond the surface of phenomena. Secondly, Foucault sees in this the possibility for the development of human sciences, which recognize that "behind money" there is a dynamic system of wealth production, that "behind grammar" there are mechanisms for creating and changing language and speech, and that "behind living organisms" there are hidden evolutionary processes (ibid.: 38). The transformation of *episteme* and the appearance of new forms of knowledge also meant the possibility for the emergence of sociology within the new *trihedrals of knowledge* (Foucault 2005; Marinković, Ristić 2016).

Power's conception of the historical sociology of knowledge is composed of two important elements. Firstly, it involves studying the epistemological shift that took place at the end of the eighteenth century and paved the way for the emergence of human sciences like sociology. Secondly, it involves examining the practices of control that evolved into instruments of political economy and population governance. In particular, it focuses on the interplay between two essential elements, power and knowledge, and how they influence these processes (Power 2011: 41).

Our position is that Power's concept of the historical sociology of knowledge represents a sociological historicization of forms of knowledge. We do not deny its validity, but we believe that it is just one of the possible directions for utilizing Foucault's concepts in the field of the sociology of knowledge. Instead, we prefer to explore the conditions that make knowledge possible, which aligns with Foucault's notion of genealogy. It is because this approach opens up the possibilities for the sociology of knowledge and offers a broader research path.

Another field of research emerging under Foucault's influence, very close to the sociology of knowledge, is Foucauldian discourse studies (Diaz-Bone et al. 2008). It is a *field* rather than a *paradigm* (Kuhn 1962), because it employs Foucault in qualitative discourse research. In the last two decades or a bit more, this field of research has been growing (Diaz-Bone et al. 2008: 10). One of these fields is the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Although there are many intersections of CDA with sociological research of discourse, knowledge and ideology, it is possible to single out one particular approach that significantly emphasizes the importance of Foucault's work for sociology of knowledge. This is the approach developed by Rainer Keller (*Wissenssoziologische*

Diskursanalyse/Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse – SKAD) (Keller 2011; 2012; 2013). This approach is of particular importance not only because it connects the study of discourse and the sociology of knowledge, but also because it develops a complete *research program* to be used in empirical research. In relation to the CDA, conversational analysis, or other similar "programs", SKAD is not characterized by "focalization on language use". In Keller's opinion, it rather goes hand in hand with the absence of questioning production and circulation of knowledge in contemporary societies, despite the current agenda of social sciences (Keller 2012).

According to Keller, Foucault has given several basic ideas for introducing the concept of discourse into the sociology of knowledge. The following aspects are especially important: the idea of materiality and regularity of discursive practices, their structuring (discursive formations), as well as proposals for the analysis of these processes, concepts of statements (enunciation), the notion of dispositives, rejection of using causal, reductional hypotheses and strategies that multiply directions in research depending on the affinity for some qualitative methods in sociology, and analysis of local (micro) practices (ibid.). Nevertheless, Keller notices very well that from the point of view of "empirical sociology of knowledge", Foucault's tradition lacks social actors (individual and collective) that are not "truly conceptualized". It is because Foucault analyzes discourses as abstract structures without considering social actors or "subjects" such as classes, for instance. Precisely because of that, Keller proposes a modified version of the concept of discourse, which includes relations of regularity between the specific totality of practices and the material basis of statements and semantic content affecting the symbolic structure of the world (ibid.). Furthermore, Keller rightly believes that "processes of discursive structuring" should be analyzed rather than "singular linguistic actions" or discourses as "abstract structures". Relying on Giddens, he points out that the sociological approach pays special attention to normative rules for legitimate production of statements, semantic rules, resources of action and "other elements of dispositive" for "production and circulation of sense" (ibid.). The concept of actors is necessary, but one should be aware that they are "holders or exhibitors of discourse". That does not mean that the roots of discourse should be sought in them. Finally, for Keller, discourse analysis is primarily about an analytical reconstruction of the materiality of discourse, and then its historical and social localization. This approach further tackles the concept of knowledge, as it involves the practices of the symbolic structuring of the world (ibid.).

To summarize: the SKAD approach is important insofar as it emphasizes the sociological concept of discourse. It emphasizes the orientation towards empirical, towards materiality of discursive practices, while not excluding the importance of symbolic interaction and "production of sense". In addition, the orientation of SKAD towards social processes of communicative construction, stabilization, and transformation of meaningful and discursive dimensions of practices, opens a possibility to explore *the effects* of discursive practices. To that extent, SKAD is not the opposite neither to the Power's conception nor to

ours. The common emphasis is not only on discourse or knowledge, but also on the "related" phenomena and their historical and social contextualization.

Foucault's genealogical approach provides a valuable framework for analyzing knowledge, but it can be supplemented by sociological analysis that takes into account the layers and palimpsests of discursive practices. This means that every knowledge contains traces of current and past practices, and past and present coexist within the same time/space framework. In other words, knowledge is where past and present intersect, and some knowledge from the past is always embedded in current forms and practices. This idea of the "legacy" of the history of the present is a crucial concept for the sociology of knowledge, and the metaphor of the *palimpsest* is particularly useful in understanding it. This approach also incorporates the material and sociological aspects recognized in the SKAD approach. The significance of Foucault's concept of the history of the present will be further elaborated in the next section. Additionally, it is important for the sociology of knowledge to use interpretative discourse analysis to recognize the time/space and power dimensions of knowledge, not just its importance in the social world.

Palimpsest of Practices: Analytical Grid of Power/Knowledge and History of the Present

Analytical grid of power/knowledge

In order to additionally explain the importance of Foucault's genealogical analysis for the research program of the sociology of knowledge, this section pays attention to what Foucault called the "analytical grid" of power/knowledge and the concept of the history of the present. It seems important because it clarifies the part of Foucault's research which leads to understanding that in every present there are many layers or *palimpsests* which have their origins in different time/space frameworks.

Unlike Kant, who approached the issue of *Aufklärung* through the problem of knowledge, Foucault opened the possibility that this issue, as well as the issue of critique, should be considered closely to *power*. It is not just about the examination of legitimacy, but also the question of eventualization (événementialisation) (Foucault 2007: 49). Knowledge is heterogeneous and it generates different power effects (ibid.: 50). An important question for Foucault was also the connection or link that could be established between the mechanisms of coercion and the elements of cognition. That is what "power games" are about. Those are the games in which "a given element of knowledge takes on the effects of power in a given system" (ibid.: 50). Therefore, it is not just about truth, or the question of the possibilities and limits of knowledge. That was the case in Kant.

The term *knowledge* (*savoir*) in the context of Foucault's research, and especially in his lecture on critique (ibid.: 51) "refers to all procedures and all

effects of knowledge (*connaisance*) which are acceptable at a given point in time and in a specific domain". Another key term, *power,* "covers a whole series of particular mechanisms, definable and defined, which seem likely to induce behaviors or discourses" (ibid.: 51). Foucault also thought it is important to prevent an immediate introduction of the perspective of legitimization into the analysis of power/knowledge games (ibid.: 51). What connects power and knowledge (or *ratio* and *truth*) is meaning "that is being solely constituted by systems of constraints characteristic of the signifying machinery", that "only exists through the effects of coercion" (ibid.: 41).

One of Foucault's key innovations, especially in relation to classical sociology and the works of Karl Marx and Max Weber was his understanding of the term *power* in "historical perspective", or to put it simply, recognition that *power has history* (Marinković, Ristić 2017). At the same time, one should not forget the historicity of power that Marx saw as a continuous conflict between the ruling and subordinated classes, from ancient times to industrial capitalism of the nineteenth century. Weber's definition of power as a social relationship was crucial for sociology, but it remained in constant search for legitimacy and permanently tied to institutional actors such as political parties, the state and its institutions. In fact, Weber "interpreted the emergence of the modern state as a comprehensive process of the monopolization and centralization of power in new state structures" (Anter 2014: 27). These were classic conceptions in the great "Hobbesian shadow" in which "power traditionally exercised two great functions: that of war and peace, exercised through the hard-won monopoly of arms, and that of the arbitration of lawsuits and punishments of crimes, which it ensured through its control of judicial functions" (Foucault 1980a: 170). Making a big turn from Hobbes's conception of power, Foucault actually distanced himself from both Weber and Marx:

> I distance myself, it seems to me, from both a Marxist and a Para-Marxist perspective. As for the first, I am not one of those who try to determine exactly the effects of power at the level of ideology. I wonder, namely, whether, before the question of ideology is raised, it would no longer be in the spirit of materialism to study the question of the body and the effects of power on it. Because what bothers me in those analysis which give priority to ideology, is that we always assume some human subject whose model was given by classical philosophy and who would be endowed with an awareness that would be grabbed by power. (Foucault 1994a: 756)

Moving away from classical concept of power was one of the most important indications of Foucault's "regionalization" and "decentralization" of fundamental categories on which classical social theory was built. Because, the great "Hobbesian shadow" of sovereignty obscured all other "power games". In this old "sovereignist matrix", there were always centers, hotspots and final outcomes. Foucault's analysis of power offered something completely different: "Scattering of micropowers, a network of scattered apparatus, without a single apparatus, without foci and centers, and transversal coordination of institutions

and technologies" (Foucault 1994b: 34). Only in this way power could acquire its recent, current historicity, the history of the present or "effective history" (Hook 2005). "What we need, however, is a political philosophy that is neither raised around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the King's head: in political theory that has still to be done" (Foucault 1980b: 121).

Consequently, Foucault claimed that we have to reject the image proposed by Hobbes in which, with the appearance of the exercise of sovereign [power], war was expelled from [the sovereign power's] space (Foucault 2015: 32). Behind the great legal story on sovereignity and "sovereign's past" (ibid.: 239), genealogies of power emerged on the "scene" of revenge, on the penitentiary body, but also where classical legal and state (royal) apparatus could not have guessed it: in practices over the sick body (biopolitics), in architecture, urbanism, prisons, hospitals. Furthermore, in the new optics of unverifiable surveillance, in sexuality, madness and psychiatry. "When I think back now, I ask myself what else it was that I was talking about, in *History of Madness* (2006) or *The Birth of the Clinic* (2003), if not power? Yet I'm perfectly aware that I scarcely ever used the word and never had such a field of analyses at my disposal then" (Foucault 1980b: 229).

However, this new field of analysis in which practices and discourses of power/knowledge were placed in a genealogical perspective carried the risk of opposing the methodologies which function was in "centralizing power-effects of institutional knowledge and scientific discourse" (Hook 2005: 6). With all the risks he accepted, Foucault's fields of analysis reinforced the awareness "that things have not always been as they are" (ibid.: 7). This was especially true of the notions of power and knowledge.

In the Foucault's analysis of power and knowledge, then, it is never about *one* knowledge or *one* power, nor about knowledge *as such* and power *as such*, which can "operate" on themselves. Power and knowledge are only an analytical grid (Foucault 2007: 60). To see the analytical link between power and knowledge means to recognize that nothing can exist as an "element of knowledge if, on the one hand, it does not conform to a set of rules and constraints characteristic, for example, of a given type of scientific discourse in a given period" (ibid.: 61). Also, the elements of knowledge always contain some effects of coercion or at least incentives (what is generally accepted, rational). Conversely, writes Foucault, "nothing can function as a mechanism of power if it is not deployed according to procedures, instruments, means and objectives that can be validated in more or less coherent systems of knowledge" (ibid.: 61). Hence, it is not a matter of determining how "power abuses knowledge", but of identifying and explaining the *links* between power and knowledge, which can answer the question of how a particular practices has been established (as "normal", "legitimate", etc.). Foucault showed that while researching penal, sexual and practices related to mental illness.

Such an understanding of the analytical grid is of particular importance for the sociological approach to knowledge, as it opens up the possibility of

taking into account *empirical records* and practices – in the sense what people do – in which knowledge arises. The analytical grid of power/knowledge is also there to direct the analysis in determining the "conditions of possibilities" for the emergence of some practices, because there are neither relations nor practices without power. Therefore, the analysis of power/knowledge is neither a question of evaluation, legitimacy or truthfulness as such. Also, it is not about what is fundamental in the relationship of power and knowledge. The question is rather how certain links (*relays*) between sets of practices are established, what conditions brought them "to surface" and how a social relationship or practice is established through the game of power and knowledge. In Foucault's words: "It is a type of procedure which, unconcerned with legitimizing and consequently, excluding the fundamental point of view of the law, runs through the cycle of positivity by proceeding from the fact of acceptance to the system of acceptability analyzed through the knowledge-power interplay" (ibid.: 61). "There is no foundational recourse, no escape within a pure form" (ibid.: 63). It is important to go towards singularities, towards the analysis of networks that enable and create a singularity as an effect. The goal of the analysis is not to "bring a whole group of derived phenomena back to a cause, but rather to make them capable of making a singular positivity intelligible precisely in terms of that which makes it singular" (ibid.: 64) as a *concrete socio-historical event*. This is something that Karl Mannheim set from the very beginnings of the sociology of knowledge. The important difference and lack in Mannheim's position is the idea that sociology of knowledge has had more to do with the *comparative method* or comparison of knowledge that arises in different historical circumstances (Mannheim 2015).

Contrary to the analysis that seeks the unity of some (original) cause, genealogy searches for (many) beginnings that can make singularities more understandable. These are multiple relationships in the field of possible interactions, in which singularities become fixed by their "acceptability conditions". These conditions we recognize through knowledge. Furthermore, recognition of these conditions as socio-historical events and singularities is precisely what opens the possibility for Foucault's analytical grid of power/knowledge to be operationalized for the needs of research in the sociology of knowledge. The common feature of the genealogy and sociology of knowledge is therefore *the research of empirical conditions for the emergence and use of power and knowledge*, rather than examination of causes of their origin.

Invention (*Erfindung*) in Foucault "is opposed to origin and is 'not a synonym for beginning (*commencement*)'" (as cited in Elden 2017: 33). Foucault also states that "*connaissance* does not have an origin, but it does have a history, and this means that it is not innate in human nature" (but see: Elden 2017: 33). He understands this in the sense that "behind knowledge there is something altogether different, something foreign, opaque, and irreducible to it". Nietzsche was the first who "unraveled the idea that knowledge is a quest for truth, suggesting that truth is something imposed later, and that what precedes it is not even the 'non-true', but something which 'is prior to the division specific to

truth'" (ibid.: 34). Further, as Stuart Elden writes: "Nietzsche's argument is that knowledge is grounded on the very thing that prevents us from knowing, 'its force and not its form', from which Foucault, among other things, concludes that the practice of cognition is related to the practices of power" (ibid.: 34).

Precisely such Foucault's conceptualisation of knowledge (*connaissance*) and his comprehension of knowledge through the *network of relations* is important for the sociology of knowledge in which the notion of knowledge is not ascribed with legitimacy or (social) ontological status.

Without entering into further discussions in the philosophical framework, and the very philosophical (Nietzschean) background of this understanding, we can conclude, together with Stuart Elden, that Foucault made an important turn for such an understanding of truth, knowledge and power, by contrasting Nietzsche and Aristotle, and opposing a view close to Husserl's phenomenology. In Foucault's words: "The first characteristics of this historical-philosophical practice, if you will, is to desubjectify the philosophical question by way of historical contents, to liberate historical contents by examining the effects of power which truth affects them, and from which they supposedly derive" (Foucault 2007: 56–57). And that is the key turn that has taken Foucault towards a *relational understanding* of knowledge that is at the same time sociologically relevant.

Another important dimension that makes Foucault's analysis of power/knowledge important for the sociology of knowledge is the reference to empirically available forms and types of knowledge. Foucault has analyzed knowledge that is "embedded" in complex institutional systems. This is knowledge which emerges in a regulated, everyday practice (Elden 2017). Knowledge is a kind of *response* to special socio-historical conditions. This means that no knowledge can be formed without a system of communication, registration, accumulation and transfer, which are in themselves a form of power. On the other hand, no power can act without appropriating, distributing and retaining knowledge (*savoir*). At this level, there is no knowledge (*connaissance*) on the one side, and society or science and the state on the other side. There are only fundamental forms of power/knowledge (ibid.). What supports these theoretical understandings are elaborated concepts and analyses conducted by Foucault. For example, he has associated *measure*, as a form of power/knowledge, with the Ancient Greek polis; *inquiry* with "formation of the medieval state"; *examination* "as a form of power-knowledge linked to the systems of control, exclusion, and punishment characteristic of industrial societies" (ibid.: 69). Thus, measure, investigation, and examination are the practices of power, but at the same time the rules for establishing knowledge (*savoir*). Measure, as a way or means to re-establish order, and a matrix of mathematical and physical knowledge as well; investigation as a way of determining facts, events, actions, property, rights, and the matrix of empirical knowledge of natural sciences as well; and finally, examination, as setting or correcting norms, rules, distributions, exclusions, which is at the same time a matrix of psychology, sociology, psychiatry, in short, the science of man (ibid.).

The history of the present

According to Foucault, genealogy involves investigating numerous origins, uncovering multiple "births", and examining the duration and layers of phenomena. Additionally, exploring the history of the present provides an opportunity to identify enduring practices and the archaeological strata of discourses, and consequently power/knowledge. This aspect of Foucault's legacy is also significant for the sociology of knowledge.

In one of the earliest formulations of the idea of the history of the present, which could be found in an interview in 1969, Foucault said that "to diagnose the present is to say what the present is, and how our present is absolutely different from all that is not it, that is to say, from our past. Perhaps this is the task for philosophy now" (Foucault 1989; but see: Koopman 2013: 26).

Foucault used history to "help grasp the way in which this configuration had come into existence and to diagnose some of the fault lines ingrained within it" (Rabinow, Rose 2003: 8). Certainly, he did it to explain the present. In the book *Discipline and Punish* (1995), he explicitly described his "engagement" with history. He was not so much interested in the past but more in the *critical study of the present*. In other words, he was not interested in writing the history of the past in the categories of the present, but in writing the history of the present (Foucault 1995).

For Foucault, dealing with the history of the present didn't mean a turn towards historical methodology or historical sociology. Perhaps because genealogy was basically a critical project and an interpretative analysis which transgress established frameworks and boundaries set in the social sciences. Genealogical analysis could begin with a question about here and now, but it needs the past in order to understand a *condition of possibility* (emergence) for certain singularities. Rabinow and Rose argued that for Foucault the first important goal of writing the history of the present was an attempt to make the present outdated (Rabinow, Rose 2003: 21). Not in terms of relativizing its meaning or significance, but in terms of distancing or attempting to re-imagine the problems and their past.

The present in that context is a question of the intersection of temporal and historical processes through which we have constituted ourselves as subjects. As Koopman (2013: 29) writes, the present is constituted by its historicity and temporality. The history of the present as a tool of genealogical analysis has a specific, instrumental relationship to history. History is not a context, but a variable that indicates the connections between phenomena that are still sedimented in the archaeological layers of practices in the present. This is something that Foucault explains in the *Archeology of Knowledge* (2002) in his call for a re-examination of the status of a (historical) *document*. While in classical sociology of knowledge the task was to "move" through different epochs and explain differences in understandings of knowledge, as well as to deal with its social contextualization, Foucault's *history of the present* opens the possibility for a different *analytical attitude* towards the past. Focusing on the history of

the present is a *kind of critique* of the present, which indicates another feature of genealogical analysis and its importance for the sociology of knowledge. The meaning of the term *critique* certainly depends on the scientific and disciplinary framework. Thinking about the need for critique within the framework of the sociology of knowledge, we will single out and briefly describe two aspects.

First, critique is understood as unmasking the system of power/knowledge (Messner, Jordan 2019) in the way we have already described above. Second, critique is seen as an effort to broadly identify and explain ways of using knowledge in different social practices. Critique as problematization, in this first sense, could be defined as a practice of thinking and research that aims to unmask the rationality that underlies a practice of power/knowledge. Practices of rationality in this sense are all those practices in which some knowledge *is applied* in a certain way. By questioning different types of rationality in practices that are seemingly unproblematic, critique aims to unmask or make transparent primarily the effects of power. In other words, to make them *visible* (ibid.: 7). This is not the question of objectivity, because the goal of critique in this sense does not necessarily lead to the task of delegitimization. Sociology of knowledge, by using this kind of genealogical analysis as a research strategy, search for a "knowledge" that "circulates" in some "regime of truth" on which people rely. Only at the level of *explanation*, the sociology of knowledge can identify and distinguish between the types of knowledge (science, ideology, belief/conviction, etc.).

In a narrower sense, critique can be understood as "critical reflection" (ibid.). It answers the question of how certain knowledge *is applied* in practice and how that practice eventually produces the effects of power. The aim of critique in this sense is to explain how a certain "regime of truth" has become acceptable in a given historical context.

We have already pointed out that Foucault's concept of critique meant a kind of turn in relation to Kant's question on enlightenment. While Kant has been more interested in the question (limits) of knowledge in an epistemological sense, Foucault has turned to the problem of power. Critical practices, understood in this way are certainly ambivalent. But it can be put aside in this context, because our goal is not to discuss the problem of objectivity or the ontological status of critique (as a type of thought), but to identify the potentials of critique which, in the context of genealogical analysis, make it a suitable *research tool*.

Perhaps it should be noted that there is an obvious problem and question that arises from understanding of critique as a practice of unmasking power/knowledge. If we say that critique aims at unmasking, what does it means? Foucault himself (2007) believed that critique contributes to the games of power and knowledge. It can eventually "undermine" dominance if it makes it transparent. Critique as a type of problematization is always an element or a role in the game of power (Messner, Jordan 2019). However, this is not its limit. Precisely as such, within the framework of power and knowledge games, critique should be a *trigger* for the development and production of new practices

and new knowledge. If you identify relationships of power and knowledge in practices, you are potentialy able to *explain* social relations and the way they function (why they are accepted, legitimate, and so on). Critique, as Messner and Jordan (2019) write, is there to "unlock power relations". In short, critique is there to problematize the existing *order of things.* Foucault's use of critique as *a research tool* is a significant contribution to the sociology of knowledge. On the one hand, it enables the "unmasking" of power/knowledge relations in society. More importantly, it explains how and why different types of knowledge are *employed* in various social practices.

This is part of the broader concept of the *history of the present*, which brings us to two key points. Firstly, it involves comprehending knowledge in all its complexity, with its *palimpsest* of layers from the past and present. Secondly, it entails understanding knowledge in terms of its potential to reveal the power relations that exist in society.

Concluding Remarks

According to Koopman (2013: 24), genealogy articulates "or makes sayable and visible, that is conceptually available, the problematizations of our present". In this sense, it has the potential to recognize and *single out* singularities, dealing with the local characteristic of events, rather than with total history. This also makes it as an appropriate analytical strategy and methodological tool significant for the sociology of knowledge. Investigating knowledge itself, and the effects of knowledge, starting from the present and asking about the *conditions of possibilities* of current practices. These are the tasks to which the sociology of knowledge and genealogy are dedicated.

To study power/knowledge, as we demonstrated, means to account for their contingency and to open the possibility of their transformation. At the same time, in a sociological key, it means to study practices of normalization, institutionalization or what is in everyday life taken for granted (as knowledge). Our emphasis in this sense is on one, perhaps already common place in the analysis of Foucault's work. This is the notion of power/knowledge, which we have pointed out as an important *analytical grid*. Furthermore, this is the notion of *the history of the present*, which also opens the possibility for doing research in the sociology of knowledge. The greatest potential of these two concepts elaborated in our research is of more theoretical than empirical significance: it is about the change in the relationship towards the object of study – knowledge itself.

The sociology of knowledge deals with the study of *simultaneous existence* or palimpsests of different types and layers within knowledge, their interrelationships and effects of power. Then, the *networks of relations,* practices in which they are "caught" and in which they mediate. Foucault has already demonstrated that in the analysis of the "births" of the clinic and gaze. For example, the question of the emergence of health institutions and health policy in the eighteenth century could not be explained without understanding the

dispositives that lead to different domains of the social life, its materiality and practices (Foucault 1980a), since "it acts" as a *bricolage* (Rabinow, Rose 2003).

There are more concepts in the *toolbox* called "Foucault" to be used and further developed in the sociological research. However, our main aim was to single out, in addition to already existing and developed programs, dimension of genealogy that, to the best of our knowledge, have not been used in terms of its analytical potential since.

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Dušan Ristić i Dušan Marinković

Efekat Fuko u sociologiji znanja

Apstrakt

U ovom istraživanju polazimo od hipoteze da Fukoovi koncepti moći/znanja i genealogije predstavljaju ne samo značajan zaokret u filozofskom i istorijskom smislu, već i kada je u pitanju istraživački okvir sociologije znanja. Prvi nivo Fukoovog doprinosa sociologiji znanja prepoznat je u njegovom konceptu diskursa i dimenzijama materijalnosti, moći i znanja. Drugi važan nivo na kojem je dao doprinos ovoj disciplini je analitička rešetka moći/znanja u kojoj fokus stavljamo na odnose moći i znanja. Treći nivo, koji prepoznajemo kao ključan i u kojem vidimo prostora za dalje interpretacije jeste koncept istorije sadašnjosti. Iako je Fukoov doprinos već prepoznat u okviru socioloških istraživanja znanja, naš cilj u ovom radu je da, oslanjajući se na neke od tih pristupa – poput istorijske sociologije znanja i analize diskursa iz ugla sociologije znanja – objasnimo značaj pomenutih dimenzija genealogije.

Ključne reči: Fuko, genealogija, znanje, moć, sociologija znanja.

Maroje Višić

ONWARDS AND UPWARDS TO THE KINGDOM OF BEAUTY AND LOVE. HERBERT MARCUSE'S TRAJECTORY TO SOCIALISM[1]

ABSTRACT
Socialists today can learn from Marcuse. Starting from this premise this paper discusses and elaborates on Herbert Marcuse's trajectory to socialism. Marcuse successfully eluded the trap of "economism", and turned to subjectivity in search of a socialist solution. The transition to socialism is possible through the creation of new anthropology expressed through the concept of "new sensibility". The prototype of a new socialist human is an anti-superman. Peace and beauty are important characteristics of Marcuse's socialism. "Libertarian socialism", "feminist socialism", "integral socialism", "socialist humanism", "socialism as the work of art", and "utopian socialism" are all terms that testify to Marcuse's open and many-faceted understanding of socialism in all of its complexity of meanings. Some of those meanings can inform debates on future prospects of socialism.

Introduction – Off the beaten path

A spectre is haunting Marcuse's critical theory – the spectre of socialism yet to come. This perhaps best captures Marcuse's lifelong commitment to the ideals and goals of (future) socialism in which humans, other living beings and nature peacefully coexist and flourish, and where peace, happiness, (libidinal) reason, freedom and a sustainable way of living are the order of the day.

Socialism is a philosophy of authentic human existence and the fulfilment of human needs in which creative freedom in work allows for all-round development of an individual. The transitional goals of socialism require a guaranteed minimum: access to healthcare, childcare, transportation, education, food, housing and work, while the final goal is the transvaluation of values

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from which human liberation and flourishing flow (Reitz 2018: 172) And from his early writings Marcuse was preoccupied precisely with the possibility of an authentic and happier existence. He thus puts socialism on the agenda of "concrete philosophy" and, later, critical theory. "Concrete philosophy" should encourage individuals to take a revolutionary act of transforming society, to deliver them from "thrownness" and usher them into authentic existence: "Concrete philosophy can thus only approach existence if it seeks out Dasein in the sphere in which its existence is based [...]. Concrete philosophy will exist in the public realm, because only by so doing can it truly approach existence. Only when, in full public view, it grabs hold of existence in its daily being, in the sphere in which it actually exists, can it effect a movement of this existence toward its truth" Marcuse 2005 [1929]: 47). Socialist goals are also outlined in Marcuse's (2009 [1937a]: 105-106) understanding of critical theory: "[The] situation compels theory anew to a sharper emphasis on its concern with the potentialities of man and with the individual's freedom, happiness, and rights contained in all its analyses. For the theory, these are exclusively potentialities of the concrete social situation. They become relevant only as economic and political questions and as such bear on human relations in the productive process, the distribution of the product of social labor, and men's active participation in the economic and political administration of the whole [...]. The transformation of society eliminates the original relation of substructure and superstructure. In a rational reality, the labor process should not determine the general existence of men; to the contrary, their needs should determine the labor process. Not that the labor process is regulated in accordance with a plan, but the interest determining the regulation becomes important: it is rational only if this interest is that of the freedom and happiness of the masses".

Marcuse's ideal of socialism remains true to Marx's: the reduction of time spent labouring, shortening the length of the working day, overcoming the division of labour, redistribution of working and leisure time in favour of the latter, freedom, happiness and peace. But the path to it (slightly) differs. Marcuse abandons the proletariat as the medium for the desired socialist transformation, instead envisioning the transition to socialism as possible by redirecting the technological progress[2]: "Marxist parties and groups are still clinging to notions and goals and strategies developed in the nineteenth century—neglecting to take into account the changes in the structure of capitalism and their impact on class struggle, and equally neglecting the new possibilities and qualities of building socialism at the highest stage of technology and productivity. That is why they are losing relation to reality, why so much of what they say sounds like sectarian jargon, why they are fighting each other rather than the common enemy" (Marcuse 2014 [1962]: 115–116). According to Cohan and Serby (2021) "Socialists today should learn from Herbert Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man*:

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2   Despite allegedly straying from Marx's path (see footnote 8), Marcuse was regarded, as one student protester explained, as a "true" Marxist: "We sec Marx as the prophet, Marcuse as his interpreter, and Mao as the sword" (Feder 1968: 506).

in particular, its spirit of protest, its materialist social theory, and its warnings about commodified liberation". Their aim is to "critically re-evaluate and [re] introduce *One-Dimensional Man* for today's socialists" (Cohan, Serby 2021). Marcuse's vision of socialism needs to be (re)introduced to contemporary socialist movements (Stevenson 2022). However, *One-Dimensional Man* may serve as an inspiration for socialists today, but it almost certainly doesn't do justice to Marcuse's breadth of vision of socialism.

"Libertarian socialism", "feminist socialism", "integral socialism", "socialist humanism", "socialism as the work of art", and "utopian socialism" are all terms that testify to Marcuse's open and many-faceted understanding of socialism in all of its complexity of meanings. This paper aims to discuss and analyse Marcuse's trajectory to socialism coherently within the framework of his critical theory and in the scope of his works. Marcuse's socialism has "many faces" because he was constantly revising and enhancing it by taking cues from *praxis*[3] to make it more relevant to the specific historical situation. Socialism in Marcuse's brand of critical theory has theoretical and practical meaning. It serves as a critical standpoint against which failings of the existing socialism should be evaluated and future socialism created, and as the point at which goals of critical theory are realised in *praxis*.

Critique of the Existing Socialism

Soviet Marxism (hereafter *SM*) is the only work that is part of Marcuse's mainstream works[4] in which he critically and systematically addresses the issues of the existing socialism.[5] Marcuse's (1958) analysis of the Soviet version of socialism focuses on showing deviations from Marx's theory. The chief difference between the two concerns the problem of transition from capitalism to socialism.[6] In Marx's theory, this transition occurs through revolutionary action

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3   Marcuse openly voiced this position in his letter to Adorno: "[...] there are situations, moments, in which theory is pushed on further by praxis" (Adorno, Marcuse 1999 [1969]: 125).

4   *SM* was written under contract, and it was a product of Marcuse's employment at the Columbia and Harvard University Russian research centers (1952-1954). Marcuse never considered *SM* as part of his oeuvre and has told to Kellner 1984: 198 in an interview that he sees it as an "interruption" which is not central to his major concerns. Marcuse's argument can be easily contested. Even he in a letter to Dunayevskaya links *SM* to *One-Dimensional Man*, a piece central to his major concerns: "I may have told you that my new book [...] is some sort of western counterpart of *Soviet Marxism* [...]" (Marcuse 2012 [1960]: 59).

5   Marcuse is the only member of the 1st generation of the Frankfurt School who made a systematic theoretical effort of confronting Stalinism (Árnason 1971: 177).
     Palmier 1969 describes *SM* as a pessimistic analysis of the contradictions of Soviet Marxism.

6   Marcuse's analysis received mixed reviews. Left-liberals critiqued him for being apologetic to Soviet socialism (Stern 1958; Lichtheim 1973: 337–348). Kecskemeti (1959: 189) argues that Marcuse's critique "pertains more to social mythology [...] unreal

of the industrial proletariat: "The emancipation of the working class must be the act of the workers themselves" (Marx 2021 [1875]: 17). Thus, the original theory rules out the emergence of socialism either from a peasant revolution or from the party acting on behalf of the proletariat (Marcuse 1958: 17). Socialist revolution in the industrially underdeveloped pre-revolutionary Russia could not follow Marx's precepts. But socialism didn't emerge in the Western hemisphere either where the conditions for it were "ripe". The reason for this, as Marcuse gives it (1968), is that the working class had been successfully integrated into the "affluent society" mostly because of the advancements in technology. The development of technology made labour less strenuous and mass production and availability of affordable goods improved the standard of living for the working class who traded "revolutionary consciousness" for "happy consciousness"[7]. The law of supply and demand establishes the harmony between the ruling classes and the ruled (Marcuse 1969: 12). However, the un-Marxist unfolding of history in both societies didn't deter Marcuse from following Marx. He was adamant that Marxism's core ideas could be preserved despite being altered by historical conditions.[8] As a result, Marcuse

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concepts such as the revolutionary mission of the proletariat or the control of the economy by the 'immediate producers' do not seem to me to be helpful". The sharpest critique comes from Dunayevksaya (2012 [1961]: 222–226) who claims that Marcuse doesn't differentiate clearly between Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism and thus fails to criticize Stalinism more sharply as a perverse deviation from Marx's theory. There is some truth in the criticism. Dunayevskava has right in saying that Marcuse didn't differentiate between these three approaches, but it is wrong to say that Marcuse went soft on Stalinism. Throughout *SM* Marcuse meticulously demonstrates how Marx's ideas got twisted in the USSR. He undertakes a critique of Stalinism based on deviations from Marx's theory and explains it by using his concepts such as "the new rationality" (Višić 2017: 162). The introduction to *SM* clearly states the intention of "immanent critique," which means clarifying the actual function of Marxism in Soviet society by using Marxism as a conceptual instrument (see pp. 1–2). Marcuse avoided the wholesale criticism of all aspects of Soviet society and focused on the "immanent critique" because the former would have been easily misinterpreted as an overall attack on socialism and a rejection of Marxism (Marcuse 1994: 59). However, Marcuse fails to mention that Stalin's doctrine of "socialism in one country" proved at first to be better than Trotsky's "permanent revolution", (Kellner 1984). Parts of Marcuse's analysis are deficient in facts about Russia possibly because the study's focus is on doctrine rather than society (MacIntyre 1970: 55). However, MacIntyre partly misinterprets Marcuse's intention, for whom Soviet Marxism is something that determines the realities of Soviet development rather than an ideology used to justify policies.

7   "The happy consciousness" describes the conformism of the classes who believe that the system is good because it delivers the goods (Marcuse 1964: 87–88).

8   Marcuse faced harsh criticism for "abandoning" original Marx's theory, leading to labels like "non-Marxist" or "un-Marxist" (MacIntyre 1970: 21). However, Marcuse's Marxism is precisely marked by constant revisions and restorations of Marxist theory (such as Marcuse's turn to Freud) (Alaway 1995: 71; Kellner 1984). Marcuse never gave up on the possibility of radical social change toward socialist society and remained dedicated to the Marxist project even when the project failed to deliver (Kellner 1984; Held 1990; Alaway 1995; Višić 2017). Marcuse perceived the New Left, student movements,

(1958) concentrated his efforts first on analysing the un-Marxian situation and then on finding a way(s) out of it.

The "un-Marxian" situation of Soviet socialism which affects its future development is that it coexists with capitalism and must keep up with it.[9] To strike a balance Soviet socialism must attain the economic and technological level of capitalist society and then surpass it (Marcuse 1958: 76–77). This means skipping through developmental stages. The effort to teleport from the state of backwardness to the level of capitalist society led to the construction of the huge productive apparatus within a system of domination and regulation incompatible with individualistic rationality and freedom (Marcuse 1958: 81-83). Marx's (2021 [1875]; 1848) concept of socialism calls for direct control of the means of production by the immediate producers who are then supposed to make the transition from work performance redistribution to one based on the satisfaction of needs. Instead of socialisation Soviet socialism introduced nationalisation which Marcuse (1958: 81–82) sees as just another means of domination parallel to industrialization in capitalist societies: "Without initiative and control 'from below'[...], nationalization is but a technological political device for increasing the productivity of labour, for accelerating the development of the productive forces and for their control from above [...]" Marcuse (1964: 42–46) is aware that the technological and material backwardness of Soviet society explains and even necessitates (self-imposed) repressive measures and total administration. After all, society must first create wealth before it can redistribute it according to Marx's dictum. This explains why Soviet society postponed the transition to the second phase of socialism.[10] However, Marcuse (1958; 1964) emphasizes that even after attaining the goal of catching up with capitalism, Soviet socialism can still prolong totalitarian controls and deliberately remain stuck in phase one. The international situation of the competitive, hostile coexistence plays right into the Soviet leadership's hands enabling them to further delay the transition to the second phase and to perpetuate technical progress as the instrument of domination.[11] Nationalization

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and Women's Liberation Movement as possible new revolutionary subjects with the capacity to create qualitatively different socialist society (Višić 2020: 226).

9   Per Marx (2021 [1875]: 14) a communist society emerges within the framework of the capitalist society and in every respect (economically, morally, and intellectually) is stamped with the birthmarks of the old society.

10   Per Marx (2021 [1875]: 15–16) there are two phases of socialism. Following the overthrow of capitalism, the oppressive subordination of the individual to the division of labour continues in the first phase. Only in the second phase, when the distinction between mental and physical labour has vanished, when productive forces have increased in tandem with individual development, do inequalities cease to exist. This phase sees a socialist shift in redistribution from "each according to his ability" to "each according to his needs".

11   This also applies vice versa to capitalism for whom "communism has become the doctor by the sickbed of capitalism. If it were not for communism, it would be impossible to explain the political and economic unification of the capitalist world" (Marcuse 2014 [1965c]: 175).

and technical progress alone won't automatically bring liberation. On the contrary, they can be used to tighten the grip over the people smoothly: "The nationalized economy could exploit the productivity of labour and capital without structural resistance while considerably reducing working hours and augmenting the comforts of life. The more the rulers are capable of delivering the goods of consumption, the more firmly will the underlying population be tied to the various ruling bureaucracies" (Marcuse 1964: 46). Marcuse sees both societies as varieties of an industrial society exhibiting the common features – "centralization and regimentation supersede individual enterprise and autonomy; competition is organized and 'rationalized'; there is joint rule of economic and political bureaucracies; the people are coordinated through the 'mass media' of communication, entertainment industry, education" (Marcuse 1958: 81). Hence, domination in Soviet socialism parallels forms of social controls in capitalist societies[12]. To capture the climate in which Soviet socialism develops and under which this system of domination must pave the way for liberation, Marcuse (1958) (re)uses the new-old term of "new rationality"[13]. The "new rationality" builds on the "technological rationality" (a prevailing mode of rationality in capitalism) and Soviet socialism uses technology in the same repressive way as its capitalistic counterpart: "[…] the same mechanization and rationalization generated attitudes of standardized conformity and precise submission to the machine which required adjustment and reaction rather than autonomy and spontaneity. If nationalization and centralization of the industrial apparatus goes hand in hand with […] the subjugation and enforcement of labour as a fulltime occupation, progress in industrialization is tantamount to progress in domination: attendance to the machine, the scientific work process, becomes totalitarian, affecting all spheres of life" (Marcuse 1958: 84). The "new rationality" as the *conditio sine qua non* for the survival of the Soviet state doesn't promise a greater degree of human freedom nor does it imply socialization of the means of production. Hence, the outcome of the Soviet's development, as Marcuse sees it, is not necessarily socialism, but the reduction of social repression.[14]

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12   In *One-Dimensional Man* Marcuse describes how technological rationality numbed revolutionary consciousness: "The people recognize themselves in their commodities; they find their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen equipment. The very mechanism which ties the individual to his society has changed, and social control is anchored in the new needs which it has produced. The prevailing forms of social control are technological [...]" (Marcuse 1964: 11).

13   The "new rationality" expands on the "technological rationality", a term Marcuse (1941: 44–46) first used in 1941 to describe how technology has become an instrument of domination. Thus, in a broader sense, "new rationality" refers to a set for creating social reality: "technological rationality", pragmatic production of desired attitudes, the ideological character of language, and ritualization and magical application of Marx's theory.

14   Marcuse often uses the word 'repression/repressive' throughout his writings. In *Eros and Civilization* Marcuse (1955: 8) uses the terms repression and repressive "[...] in the nontechnical sense to designate both conscious and unconscious, external and internal processes of restraint, constraint, and suppression". Due to the scarcity of food

Technological advancements are hardly identical to development in human freedom or socialism. In *Eros and Civilization* Marcuse was overly optimistic thinking that the essence of technology is anti-oppressive and that it rebels against the repressive organization of society.[15] This led him to dismiss Freud's (1962) conclusion that suppression of instincts is an unavoidable feature of civilization. Marcuse saw technology and its development as a harbinger of socialism: "The technology operates against the repressive utilization of energy in so far as it minimizes the time necessary for the production of the necessities of life, thus saving time for the development of needs beyond the realm of necessity and of necessary waste" (Marcuse 1974: 63). Marcuse's (1958; 1964; 1969) initial optimism dwindled a bit after learning that technology is neither a guarantee of socialism nor anti-oppressive by design, but that its character is determined by its social usage.[16] Although technology fell short of Marcuse's expectations (at least in terms of socialism being realized as a direct consequence

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in general, such restrictions are unavoidable: "Objectively, the need for instinctual inhibition and restraint depends on the need for toil and delayed satisfaction" (Marcuse, 1955: 88). The demand for repression wanes as the productive capability of society rises and the prospect for gratification increases.: "Scope and intensity of instinctual repression obtain their full significance only in relation to the historically possible extent of freedom" (Marcuse 1955: 88). Nevertheless, the degree of freedom and the amount of true instinctual oppression in late capitalist society contradict each other. And thus repression becomes social domination: "Domination differs from the rational exercise of authority. The latter [...] is confined to the administration of functions and arrangements necessary for the advancement of the whole. In contrast, domination is exercised by a particular group or individual in order to sustain and enhance itself in a privileged position (Marcuse 1955: 36). In Marcuse's (1955: 100) view: "[t]he ideology of today lies in that production and consumption reproduce and justify domination". Hence in the form of social control, repression goes beyond that which is objectively necessary and tends toward totalitarian domination in which the disparity between the possible emancipation and factual disempowerment of the individual reaches an unprecedented level. Because both societies exhibited the same type of domination, Marcuse predicts a reduction in social controls as a result of Soviet development.

15   Marcuse's infusion of optimism can be explained by the fact that *Eros and Civilization* was published during the time when pessimistic philosophical views were widespread in intellectual circles, and when philosophers and social scientists declared the "end of ideology" which signalled the end of utopian-revolutionary projects of social reconstruction (Kellner, Pierce, Lewis 2011: 49).

16   Whitfield (2014: 106) points out inconsistencies between Marcuse's two major works: "*Eros and Civilization* envision technology as a catalyst of emancipation, freeing humanity from drudgery and permitting polymorphous sexuality to pervade utopia. [*One-Dimensional Man*] repudiates technocratic bureaucracy [...] and condemns the exploitation of nature that scientific progress is supposed to achieve". Marcuse initially "naively" assumed that technological development would automatically lead to socialism. However, he did not remain a naïve futurist and corrected his position after observing that both societies share the same technological base and use it to contain social change. In the essay *Some Implications of Modern Technology* Marcuse (1941) notes that technology is becoming a new subject of history. This insight remains decisive for Marcuse who was among the first to recognize technology as a new agent of history while others still had high hopes for the proletariat's revolution. Hence, for Marcuse (1964)

of technological development, and at the same pace at which technology was progressing) he didn't sink into pessimism. Insights gained from analysing Soviet society and advanced capitalism reinforced his belief that transition to socialism is possible through reconstruction and reorganization of societies' technical bases with a view of qualitatively different ends. Thus, socialism as an heir of developed societies must appear as a qualitative change in the direction of progress (Marcuse, 2014 [1965a]: 244). Marcuse realized that technological development and the idea of progress linked to it would not by itself make a leap into socialism, but even after all distortions and constraints from the repressive usage, technological rationality still contains an "element of playfulness" inconsistent with the repressive organization of society. If this creative element could be freed[17] from the pressure of necessity, then it would give a new meaning to technical productivity – one that sets the stage for the emergence of socialist women and men – "'all-round individual'" who looms so large in Marxian theory" (Marcuse 1958: 257). Technology, thus, can foster the transition to socialism, but this requires a qualitative change in its social usage and adoption of the new regulating principle. The "pacification of existence" as a qualitatively different *logos* of technology alters the relation between technology and nature and harnesses its emancipatory potential for the reduction of misery, violence, and cruelty (Marcuse 1964: 240). Whether the "pacification of existence" would become a regulating principle and technology used for attaining socialist goals is a matter of political decision (Marcuse 1958: 185) of delivering technology from oppressive usage and placing it towards creating a society in which human needs and satisfaction become regulative principles: "The technological transformation is at the same time political transformation, but the political change would turn into qualitative social change only to the degree to which it would alter the direction of technical progress – that is, develop new technology. For the established technology has become an instrument of destructive politics. Such qualitative change would be a transition to a higher stage of civilization if technics were designed and utilized for the pacification of the struggle for existence" (Marcuse 1964a: 232).

Protosocialism, Surplus Consciousness and Surplus Repression

In *The Alternative: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Socialism*, Bahro (1978) analyses internal developments in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and sees them as a glimpse of hope for the fundamental change in Soviet socialism. The book made a strong impression[18] on Marcuse (2014

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the completion of the historical process that ends in socialism is equivalent to the completion of the technological process.

17   This element can be set free through a convergence of technology and art. See part *Realm of Beauty and Love*.

18   Rudolf Bahro was imprisoned for critiquing existing socialism and proposing more emancipatory models of socialism, something that Marcuse went along with. According to Marcuse 2014 [1979]: 395–396 Bahro's key contribution is in abolishing the

[1979]: 396) who described it as "the most important contribution to Marxist theory and practice to appear in several decades". Marcuse (2014 [1979]) immediately recognises the wider significance of Bahro's study extending far beyond the borders of the GDR and applies his concepts *mutatis mutandis* to advanced capitalism. Marcuse is impressed by Bahro's (1978) analysis of "subalternity," [19] which, in Marcuse's opinion, explains why the working class exists as a subordinate class in both socialist and capitalist societies and why it is incapable of transforming society. But he is particularly drawn to Bahro's (1979: 271–314) concept of "surplus consciousness" which Marcuse sees as having transformative power: "[...] [a] free mental capacity which is no longer absorbed by the struggle for means of existence [...] a revolutionary strategy must be *based on (...) the balance of forces between this surplus consciousness and the absorbed consciousness*". Bahro makes an important insight into the changes in the relationship between "base" and "superstructure": the impetus for socialist transformation is shifted from economic necessity to subjectivity. The turn to subjectivity also applies to capitalist society.[20] Marcuse (1955; 1958; 1964; 1972; 1979) has a long time argued that advanced capitalism is producing new subjective conditions for revolution and developing new radical consciousness which is not that of the proletariat.[21] Both Bahro and Marcuse see "surplus consciousness"

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distinction between socialism and communism and demonstrating that from the very beginning socialism is communism: "[...] the entire perspective under which we have so far seen the transition to communism stands in need of correction, and in no way just with respect to the time factor. The dissolution of private property in the means of production on the one hand, and universal human emancipation on the other, are separated by an entire epoch" (Bahro 1978: 21).

19 See *The Alternative: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Socialism*, pp. 121–251.

20 Commenting on the reification of the proletariat and applying Bahro's analysis of the consciousness in existing socialism Marcuse (1979: 21) writes: "The capitalist mode of production, through the increasing mechanization and intellectualization of labour, accumulates an increasing quantity of general ability, skills, knowledge - a human potential which cannot be developed within the established apparatus of production, because it would conflict with the need for full-time de-humanized labour [...] Under these circumstances, a 'counter-consciousness' emerges among the dependent population [...], an awareness of the ever more blatant obsolescence of the established social division and organization of work. Rudolf Bahro [...] uses the term surplus-consciousness to designate this (still largely vague and diffused) awareness [...] 'Surplus Consciousness' does not describe an ideological entity, signifying a relapse into idealism. Rather, this strange term designates a quality of the mental energy expressed in the actual behaviour of men and women under the impact of the mode of production in late capitalism. This energy is 'surplus' over and above the energy spent daily in the alienated performances required by the established production relations. Blocked in finding satisfying ways of effective realisation, it becomes, among the dependent population, consciousness of frustration, humiliation, and waste".

21 i.e., the feminist movement which alongside the radical student movement and the Black and Brown militants was in Marcuse's (1971; 2005 [1974]) view the most radical movement.

as *the* potential catalyst for emancipation.[22] However, the "surplus conscious-ness" comprises two mutually opposing interests: the compensatory and the emancipatory. The former concerns the sphere of material goods that can be well met within the framework of the existing socialist and capitalist societies. The latter is oriented toward the self-realization of the all-round individual (Bahro 1979: 271–272; Marcuse 1958; 1964; 2014 [1979]: 398). Bahro (1978) like Marcuse (1955; 1969) insists that those compensatory interests can't be simply re-channelled in the interests of emancipation as they are the product of the demand for happiness and gratification that is deeply rooted in the psyche. Hence, the repression is already present in the needs themselves. What Bahro (1978) implies and Marcuse (1955; 1969) says is that society reaches the human being deeply into the instinctual level where wants and needs are formed. On the psychological level, compensatory interests are strongly intertwined with emancipatory interests which makes them anti-emancipatory: "Compensa-tory interests concern mainly the sphere of material goods: bigger and bet-ter consumption, careers, competition, profit, 'status symbols,' etc. They can (at least for the time being!) be satisfied within the framework of the existing system: they compensate for dehumanization" (Marcuse 2014[1979]: 398; cf. Bahro 1979: 272). Compensatory interests work against emancipation in the consumption model of highly developed societies.[23] Marcuse (1964: 11) gives an example of how compensatory interests operate against emancipation: "The people recognize themselves in their commodities; they find their soul in their automobile, hi-fi set, split-level home, kitchen equipment. The very mecha-nism which ties the individual to his society has changed, and social control is anchored in the new needs which it has produced". In other words, "surplus consciousness can be bought. Thus, change must go as far as on the instinctu-al level, where the germs of needs are born. As Marcuse (1972: 16–17) argues: "[W]hat is at stake in the socialist revolution is not merely the extension of satisfaction within the existing universe of needs, nor the shift of satisfaction from one (lower) level to a higher one, but the rupture with this universe, the *qualitative leap*. The revolution involves a radical transformation of the needs and aspirations themselves, cultural as well as material; of consciousness and sensibility; of the work process as well as leisure".

A reason why Marcuse is so drawn to the concept of "surplus consciousness" is that it complements his concept of "surplus-repression". By "surplus-repres-sion" Marcuse (1955) distinguishes between basic instinctual repression neces-sary for the perpetuation of humans from repressions imposed by social domi-nation. The smaller the "surplus-repression" is the less repressive is the society.

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22   Kellner concludes: "In effect, Bahro and Marcuse are arguing that critical con-sciousness and emancipatory needs are being developed by the contradictions in the social conditions of advanced industrial society – capitalist and state socialist" (Kellner 1984: 308–309).
23   For a somehow different take on the emancipatory interests see Habermas 1972: 197–212. For Habermas' criticism of Marcuse's concept of emancipatory science and technology see Agger 1976.

Hence, overcoming the "surplus-repression" is a tipping point at which Marcuse sees the transition to socialism as possible. At the heart of this "socialism" is Marcuse's critical reading of Freud's drive dynamics. Unlike Freud (1962) who saw *Eros,* the life instinct, permanently shackled to genitals as an ineluctable feature of civilization, Marcuse sees it as historically obsolete pertaining to the pre-technological era.[24] Technological development refutes Freud's rationalistic view of civilizational progress and makes possible the attainment of Marcuse's socialist ideal: the reduction of alienated labour by shortening the length of the working day, overcoming the division of labour, redistribution of working and leisure time in favour of the latter, freedom, happiness and peace. Under non-repressive conditions, *Eros* as life energy breaks the shackles and reinvigorates the whole body.[25] The new form of "socialist reason" puts instincts and reason on equal footing and breaks with the primacy of rationality on which Western philosophical tradition has insisted.[26] The "socialist reason" presupposes harmonious cooperation between reason and instincts. Marcuse expresses this through the notion of "libidinal rationality": "To the degree to which the struggle for existence becomes co-operation for the free development and fulfilment of individual needs, repressive reason gives way to new *rationality of gratification* in which reason and happiness converge. It creates its own division of labor, its own priorities, its own hierarchy".[27] Hence, the turn toward subjectivity which both Bahro and Marcuse refer to involves taking the subject in its instinctual as well as its rational sphere of existence. Some critics argue that in the "erotic socialism" reason gets the shorter end of the stick. This begs the question of what role the reason plays in the activities of reeroticized

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24   Marcuse turns to subjectivity in form of *Eros* as an alternative to history which has failed to see the proletariat carrying out its historical task. That is why Marcuse (1955; 1970) attempts to historicize *Eros* (possible due to technological development) ("there is no such thing as an immutable human nature") However, Alford (2011: 221) questions whether rendering *Eros* historical would deprive it of its revolutionary potential (*Eros* strives for evermore pleasure and is immune to social influences which makes it ahistorical). Marcuse (1955: 224) is clear that in a new "rationality of gratification" reason and instincts complement each other: reason becomes bodily and erotic, but it also adds a value dimension to instincts by setting its own priorities and hierarchy.

25   Marcuse 1955: xxv proclaims that the fight for [socialism] is "the fight for life, the fight for Eros". He sees the embodiment of this fight for "everyday life" in the New Left and in other rebellious and counter-culture movements that want to "see, hear, feel new things in a new way" (Marcuse 1969a: 37).
Heller (1984; 1999: 31) following the same line of thought advocates a revolution of everyday life instead of a political one: "We don't need to 'seize power' or have a proletarian revolution. We have to change our lives. That was the New Left agenda [...]"

26   Marcuse has discovered true humanity in Freud's naturalism. In other words, it is about the distinction between concrete humanism which deals with people as they are in given sociohistorical circumstances and abstract humanism which projects their ideal character. This is why Marcuse believed Freud's biological understanding of instinctual structure is in touch with social reality (Govedarica 2010: 67).

27   Hardt and Negri (2009: 180–181) argue that when people engage in love, they are producing a new world, a new social life.

man (Vivas 1979: 39) and what would people do in this sexually liberated state (MacIntyre 1970: 47). Kołakowski (1978: 405–406) says that Marcuse tacitly calls for a return to pre-social existence, leaving aside the difficult question of how societies could have even emerged when instincts are asocial and if there is no *logos* to lead the way. These are valid questions given that in *E&C* Marcuse fails to elaborate on the reason part of the "libidinal rationality" compound (Brujić 1981: 334). However, since society shapes subjectivity to the instinctual level, Marcuse (1955: 209) knows that simple desublimation of libidinal energies at the personal level would not have an emancipatory outcome. This must occur on the level of society. Hence, Marcuse (1955; 1964) differentiates between non-repressive sublimation and repressive desublimation. By replacing mediated with immediate gratification repressive desublimation removes emancipatory energies otherwise available for social criticism and action and, thus, functions as a compensatory force under the guise of extending freedom (Marcuse, 1964: 75–78). Non-repressive sublimation in its emancipatory form would be sublimation without desexualisation. It would be incongruous with the whole realm of social usefulness, productivity, and performance (Marcuse, 1955: 208–212). Marcuse (1955: 212) sees in the non-repressive desublimation the culture-building and human bonding power of *eros*: "[...] sexuality is neither deflected from nor blocked in its objective; rather, in attaining its objective, it transcends it to others, searching for fuller gratification". This explains the libidinal part of libidinal rationality. But Marcuse knows that the emancipatory incentive should come from reason, and this is part where Bahro's "surplus consciousness" fits.

Both Bahro (1978) and Marcuse (1958; 1969; 2014 [1979]) saw this consciousness in its developed form embodied in the intelligentsia, i.e., scientists, technicians, engineers, the "new working class" who take active participation in social processes and technical-scientific development.[28] As the primary bearers of "surplus consciousness", they would initially play a leading role, the role of enlightened reason, in the transition to socialism.[29] Marcuse (2014 [1979]: 400–402) describes them as a "democratic elite" who would assume the task of socialist education and would articulate the emancipatory interests of the masses.[30] However, Marcuse (1969: 57) is aware that these are catalyst groups with a "preparatory function" whose task is not revolution, but "radical enlightenment". Lacking a mass character their signal achievement at best could be in questioning the prevailing structure of needs and in inducing changes in

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28   For Marcuse this is a broad and expanding category to which the student and feminist movement, counterculture, etc. may be added.

29   If only they could develop "the new sensibility". Marcuse 2005 [1967]: 84; 2014 [1979]: 401 is not naïve and maintains, like Mannheim 1998 [1929], that these groups are well integrated into society and can't constitute a revolutionary class. Nevertheless, their social position gives them a leading role in the revolution.

30   Marcuse (2014 [1979]: 401) who is no stranger to the concept, asserts that Bahro's (1978) analysis calls for a reconsideration of Plato's 2000 [c. 375 BC] educational dictatorship and Rousseau's 1994 [1762]: 58 maxim that people must be coerced into freedom.

consciousness.[31] This answers the question about the role of reason and lifts any doubt about the alleged call for regression to a pre-social existence.

Even though existing socialism proved to be an unappealing alternative, Marcuse is firm that socialism remains the only viable alternative. Not the Stalinist or post-Stalinist brand of socialism, but "libertarian socialism,"[32] which has always been the core concept of socialism, in which human needs and faculties, rather than some imposed authority, govern the development of society (Marcuse 2005 [1969b]: 130). Hence, Marcuse continues to seek paths to socialism.

Socialist Anti-Superman

One such path involves the "transvaluation of values" formulated in Freudian terms as the strengthening of erotic energy, the negation of prevailing morality and new anthropology. The need for socialism must come as an instinctual urge. Instincts must rebel against "surplus repression" and this requires profound changes in the biological dimension in which human vital needs assert themselves: "[...] liberation presupposes changes in this biological dimension [...] different instinctual needs, different reactions of the body as well as the mind" (Marcuse 1969: 17). Hence, socialism requires a new type of human being who got rid of the aggressiveness, brutality and hypocritical morality, a type of man who is biologically incapable of fighting wars[33] and who works for a social and natural environment in which such an existence is possible (Marcuse 2014 [1967]: 82). Socialist human being is a sort of "*negative superman*"[34] whose system of needs and values shows in an instinctual revulsion against aggression and destruction, allergic reaction to the functioning of the body as instrument of alienated labour, in the need for privacy and an autonomous intelligence required for developing one's all-round being and for creating a humane environment (Marcuse 2014 [1965a]: 247).

Marcuse is implying that today's men and women are hardly capable of making the leap into socialism because "[...] the construction of such a society

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31   The practice of "great refusal", which is a protest against surplus repression and a struggle for the ultimate form of freedom, necessitates a mass base. As a result, this task falls not on a specific class but on the wide strata of repressed ones in all parts of the world: "the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colors, the unemployed and the unemployable (...) their life is the most immediate and the most real need for ending intolerable conditions and institutions. Thus their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not" (Marcuse 1964: 260). Marcuse (2014 [1965a]: 243) puts hope in the butterfly effect assuming that "triumph of the independence movement in one area would mean the signal for revolt in areas closer to home, the global mobilization of the exploited colored races".
32   Marcuse uses the term "libertarian socialism" interchangeably with socialist humanism to distinguish a qualitatively different socialist society from Soviet socialism.
33   This should not be mistaken for eugenics. For Marcuse it is through aesthetic education humans can cultivate different needs and sensibility. See footnote 44.
34   More appropriate term to use would be an "anti-superwoman" as those characteristics Marcuse links to "women qualities" and the feminist movement.

presupposes a type of man with a different sensitivity and consciousness: men who would speak a different language[35], have different gestures, follow different impulses; men who have developed an instinctual barrier against cruelty, brutality, ugliness" (Marcuse 1969: 21). Only human beings who have emancipated themselves from the aggressive and repressive ways of capitalism can fight for socialism. They must be *free for* socialism (Marcuse [2014] 1962: 115). Hence, they must first develop a "new sensibility" by which Marcuse means developing new needs and ways of satisfying them.[36] The new sensibility requires the cultivation of new forms of subjectivity and new ways of life. It reshapes the relationship between all living beings and nature bringing them into harmony. This is why Marcuse was so drawn to the feminist movement, which he saw as having the potential to initiate processes of redefining subjectivity and cultivating new sensibility. Marcuse's notion of the "new sensibility" introduces a care perspective. The care must be made universal via humanism, that is, the cultivation of care toward all humanity (Farr 2009: 116). The transition to socialism involves the translation of humanist values into praxis and "new (socialist) humanity" needs to develop a different ethical outlook. In Marcuse's (2014 [1965b]: 186) view humanism remains an ideology for as long as a society depends on poverty, mass media, prevented birth control, the creation and recreation of masses, of noise and pollution, planned obsolesce and waste and military rearmament. Marcuse is adamant that if loyalty to the idea of socialism is abandoned, humanism will remain a dead letter. Hence, Marcuse (1962; 2014 [1965b]; 2014 [1968]: 278) advocates "socialist humanism"[37], a humanism of all-inclusive equality where everyone can choose their way of life, their own needs, and the way of satisfying them, and so exist as free human beings. In this kind of humanism equality is understood in non-exclusive terms as equality of *Otherness*: "To the degree that society becomes humane, it makes the equality of all people (as expressed in humanism) into a reality. This means equality of every human face and person, not just among those of a particular nation, race, or tribe, but above and beyond, and in opposition to, the division of humanity into different nations, races, or tribes. Equality,

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35   For Marcuse's analysis on the usage of language in existing socialism and capitalism see *Soviet Marxism* pp. 88–90 and *One-Dimensional Man* pp. 88–107. The new sensibility develops a different language (or better to say re-appropriates the language back), because "the rupture with the continuum of domination must also be a rupture with the vocabulary of domination" (Marcuse 1969: 33).
36   "New sensibility" is another move beyond Marxism, but Marcuse believes that by making it he remains within the framework of Marx's theory. The reason for this is that the proletariat, aside from the basic ones, could not satisfy the needs by owning more "luxurious" goods, and thus wasn't able to reproduce the unfreedom contained in the needs themselves: "If Marx saw in the proletariat the revolutionary class, he did so also, and maybe even primarily, because the proletariat was free from the repressive needs of capitalist society, because the new needs for freedom could develop in the proletariat and were not suffocated by the old, dominant ones" (Marcuse 1970: 70).
37   Marcuse employs the terms "socialist humanism" and "Marxist humanism" interchangeably.

because every human being has all the qualities and capacities that define humans as human [...]. Equality in its humanist sense [...] did not involve people being all the same, but rather the direct opposite" (Marcuse 1962:108). Once again Marcuse (2014 [1965b]: 184) emphasizes that a prerequisite for the liberation of the humanistic content of socialism requires a reversal in the direction of technical progress.

Girl Power and "More than just a Pretty Face" Socialism

Marcuse (2005 [1974]: 165–171) was enthralled by the feminist movement, seeing it not only as "a revolt against decaying capitalism" but also as the potentially most radical force to reckon with. With its feminine qualities of receptivity, sensitivity, non-violence, and tenderness[38], the movement, in Marcuse's view (2005 [1974]), embodied the negation of the masculine qualities of

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38   Commenting on Marcuse's turn to Women's Liberation Movement Cerullo (1979: 21–22) writes: "[s]o many recurrent Marcusean dreams and themes found their embodiment in the movement [...] that came to be called socialist feminism: his vision in *Eros and Civilization* of love as revolution; his insistence on the possibility of a new reality principle as the promise of a socialism which could no longer be understood as a change in social institutions but had to be deepened to include a vision of a change in consciousness and the very instinctual structures of human beings deformed by exploitation and domination; his understanding of socialism as a qualitative leap to a new system of needs which are sensuous, ethical and rational in one history has revealed the power of eros, of love, which Marcuse invoked against a repressive civilization to be the power of women at work and in the community, a power which found its most concerted and political expression in the women's liberation movement". The feminist movement was not monolithic in Marcuse's times but Cerullo (1979: 22) manages to capture the message Marcuse was trying to convey: "Marcuse saw finally that what was at stake was a new morality, a feminist morality, a reversal of the values of profitable productivity, repression, efficiency, aggression, competitiveness, of an instrumental rationality severed from emotion – all this in the name of receptivity, tenderness, non-violence. It seems to me that remembering our own dream, our own vision, our own morality, whose terms Marcuse had so eloquently anticipated, is of critical importance to our Movement today – in a period in which instrumentality, competitiveness, self-assertion, aggressiveness, individualism are starkly revealed and even cynically embraced as the name of the game [...]". However, Cerullo (1979: 22–23) makes a valid objection to Marcuse's "libidinal rationality" understanding it as the feminization of male intellectuals while instead, the feminist project is about creating "space of study and solitude, of intellectual intensity and assertion, of confidence and challenge - and still to think, to act, and to be like women".
    Like Marcuse, early social feminists take a broad approach to social reality assuming that men's patriarchal interests are monolithic. Later social feminists challenge this depiction of women as powerless victims of patriarchy and capitalism. Recent social feminists contrast Marcuse's view of the one-dimensional society arguing that modern society is a multidimensional world of oppressive practices and social relations (Calasanti and Zajicek, 1993: 92–94). For further discussion on social feminism and Marcuse see Calasanti and Zajicek 1993 and Holland 2001 who reads *Eros and Civilization* through the lenses of *The Traffic in Women*.

capitalism.[39] The non-destructiveness and non-aggressiveness that Marcuse links to the "women nature", perfectly fit into the concept of "new sensibility" by which he describes the new anthropology of human beings pre-required to make the transition to socialism. Thus, "socialism, as a *qualitatively* different society, must embody the *antithesis*, the definite negation of the aggressive and repressive needs and values of capitalism as a form of male-dominated culture" (Marcuse 2005 [1974]: 167–168). Marcuse saw the roots of the "new sensibility" in the feminist movement and thus entrusted women with a leading role in the reconstruction of society, considering them capable of practically "transvaluating the values".[40] In Marcuse's words: "[...] feminine characteristics would activate aggressive energy against domination and exploitation. They would operate as needs and eventual goals in the socialist organization of production, in the social division of labor, in the setting of priorities once scarcity has been conquered. And thus, entering the reconstruction of society as a whole, the feminine characteristics would cease to be specifically feminine, to the degree to which they would be universalized in socialist culture, material and intellectual" (Marcuse 2005 [1974]: 170).

"More than just a pretty face" socialism represents the necessary modification to Marx's socialism which was, according to Marcuse (1970: 62; 2005 [1974]: 170), not radical enough. Hence "feminist socialism", as Marcuse calls it: "[...] transcends [Marx's] image. Socialism, as a qualitatively different way of life, would use the productive forces not only for the reduction of alienated labor and labor time, but also for making life an end in itself, for the development of the senses and the intellect for pacification of aggressiveness, the enjoyment of being [...] from the rationality of domination: creative receptivity versus repressive productivity" (Marcuse 2005 [1974]: 170). This would imply a free and ecologically sensitive future where nature would be rediscovered as an inorganic part of humans. Socialists with the women's movement at the forefront were therefore urged to ask whether "the good life [can] be attained without exploitation and brutalization" (Marcuse 2001 [n.d., ca. 1972-1973]: 180; Power 2009; 2013; Stevenson 2022: 87).

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39   The main criticism of Marcuse by feminists is that he simply reinforced gender stereotypes. Power defends Marcuse by arguing that feminine characteristics are social constructs that can be universalized so that all humans can develop a new sensibility: "Feminist socialism would universalize these so-called feminine characteristics so that they were no longer specifically 'feminine' at all but would characterize all culture, culminating in androgyny. Residual aggression would be channelled into 'the destruction of the ugly destructiveness of capitalism,' in Marcuse's rather neat phrase. 'Feminism is a revolt against decaying capitalism' and will ultimately have to develop its 'own morality'" (Power 2013: 79).

40   Marcuse's propensity for emancipatory movements developed as early as in his doctoral thesis *Der deutsche Künstlerroman* [*The German Artist Novel*] in which he expresses strong sympathies for liberation movements like *Sturm und Drang* praising them for their "feeling for nature and experience of love" (Marcuse 1978a [1922]). Hippies' use of language, music (and even drugs) also fit into "the new sensibility" (Marcuse 1969a: 35).

Realm of Beauty and Love

In *Eros and Civilization,* Marcuse (1955) offered a vision of a socialist society in which people are bonded through libidinal ties, where pleasure permeates all activity (including work) and where solidarity rests on love.[41] To further expand on this Marcuse turns to art and its role in the radical transformation of society.[42]

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41   Marcuse sought to broaden the meaning of love beyond the exclusive nature of couples/families. Thus, by love Marcuse (1955: 197–222) meant productive force that fosters more intense social relations, solidarity, and unity. It is as if Marcuse foresaw that love would become a topic of concern for many Marxist intellectuals. Hardt and Negri's (2009: 180) own definition of love as the process of the production of the common and of subjectivity aptly captures the core meaning of love in Marcuse's theory. Through love people form a relation to a cause and expand joy forming new bodies and minds (Hardt and Negri 2009: 181). However, Hardt and Negri (2009: 182–188) argue that capitalism has altered love from the common to the same and has produced two corrupt forms of love: 1) identitarian love, or love of the same, which means loving persons closest to you, and 2) love as a process of unification which ends in a heterosexual nuclear family that, subsequently by its identitarian love, corrupts the common. Gotby (2023) suggested a radical approach to combat identitarian love by abolishing the heterosexual nuclear family. According to Gotby (2023: 132) "[a]bolition means the end of the repetition of sameness". Practices of inheritance and the privatisation of kinship, as well as the notion of family as a form of ownership of other people, intertwine the heterosexual nuclear family with capitalist property relations. The capitalist system does not allow for the realisation of non-hierarchical, reciprocal, and non-proprietary modes of kinship, which Marcuse likewise argued for. Thus, the abolishment of the family must go hand in hand with the abolishment of the capital Gotby (2023: 137). For a detailed Gotby's 2023 account of love whose central notion is "emotional reproduction" see her book. Badiou (2012) identifies two threats to love: one is a safety threat, which is like Hardt and Negri's identitarian corruption of love, and the other threat is denying the importance of love, to treat it as a variant of hedonism. In a capitalist society, love is seen as a futile risk and something that must be calculated Badiou (2012: 10). According to Badiou (2012: 21–26) there are three distinct philosophical interpretations of love: one that stresses the bliss of the meeting, a second one which claims love should conclude in a contract, and the third one which is sceptical and sees love as an illusion. Badiou's own philosophical view of love is like Marcuse's. Badiou (2012: 22–26) argues that love cannot be reduced to any of these approximations and that love is a quest for truth: "[...] to construct a world from a decentred point of view other than that of my mere impulse to survive or re-affirm my own identity [...]. Subject of love that views the panorama of the world through the prism of our difference, so this the world can be conceived, be born, and not simply represent what fills my own individual gaze".
42   In *The German Artist Novel,* Marcuse portrays the emancipatory role of the artist in mediating between reason and sensuality as well as his quest for harmonious community (Marcuse 1922: 78). It is as if Marcuse's (1978a [1922]: 78) demand for a "Kingdom of Beauty and Love" anticipates the aesthetic ethos of socialism. Hence, *The German Artist Novel* represents "programmatic work, which vindicates a growing tendency to acknowledge the centrality of aesthetic theory in the evolution of Marcuse's thought" (Kātz 1979: 176).
     However, Marcuse's central piece is *The Affirmative Character of Culture* in which Marcuse (2009 [1937b]) dialectically discloses conservative and emancipatory aspects of culture. By affirmative culture, Marcuse (2009 [1937b]: 70) means the culture of the bourgeois epoch in which culture provides escapism by allowing individuals to *come to*

There are several reasons why art, alongside "new sensibility", could contribute to the socialist transformation.[43] The aesthetic dimension is an integral building block of the qualitatively different socialist society because "the socialist universe is also a moral and aesthetic universe" (Marcuse 1972: 3). Art is revolutionary because it follows its own logic and artworks hold the "promesse du bonheur" [the promise of joy] that is beyond the reach of any particular regime (Marcuse 1998 [1945]: 204; 1978b). Thus, art is an indictment of the established reality and aesthetic form as such invalidates oppressive norms, needs and values (Marcuse 1978b: xi–8). Art opens the aesthetic dimension which offers an insight into a radically different ethos – the aesthetic ethos. Hence, Marcuse advocates the "permanence of art" and its attachment to *eros* arguing: "… art bears witness to the […] permanent non-identity between subject and object, individual and individual […] [art] envisions a concrete universal, humanity (…), Eros and Thanatos cannot be dissolved into problems of class struggle" (Marcuse 1978b: 16–29). Marcuse sees both art and eros as allies in striving for socialism by resisting unnecessary "surplus repression". This means that the ideas expressed in art and contained in eros are universal to humans as a species being and can't be confined to a single historical period. Hence, the aesthetic dimension restores the human species' essence in its universal aspects (Reitz 2018: 171).

Socialist change, as previously mentioned, is not possible without changes in subjectivity. Marcuse rejects mind-body dualism and at the core of "new sensibility" places the interplay of reason and instincts. However, their relationship needs to be mediated and reason reconstructed in a way in which freedom would mean limiting the "'higher' faculties in favor of the 'lower'" (Marcuse 1955: 190). Thus, the "new sensibility" can be developed through aesthetic education, which cultivates imagination, phantasy, and senses, fostering a "new rationality (of gratification)" in which reason becomes political, (re)eroticized, and bodily.[44] Marcuse believes that the "new sensibility" contains aes-

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their senses in a higher, spiritual, realm while leaving existing society unaffected. But the conservative side of culture holds the key to unlocking its emancipatory potential. Art is subversive because the ideas of a better and beautiful life are transposed to it and art reflects what is denied in reality. Art safeguards those ideas regardless of its affirmative character. Marcuse (2009 [1937b]: 84) sums up the emancipatory aspect of art: "… for only in art has bourgeois society tolerated its own ideals and taken them seriously as a general demand. What counts as utopia, phantasy, and rebellion in the world of fact is allowed in art. There affirmative culture has displayed the forgotten truths over which 'realism' triumphs in daily life". Marcuse (1972) later adds that art, despite its feudal and bourgeois use, has managed to remain alienated from established reality.

43　Marcuse, as a "romantic socialist", recognized the importance of the poetic imagination and the need to tell a relatable story to the public dilemmas of the time (Lemert 2002, as cited in Stevenson 2022: 84). Marcuse grasped what radical romantic poet Percy Bysshe Shelley referred to as "the poetic principle", which could be defined as "the capacity to awaken in the imagination the desire for greater beauty and justice" (Blechman 1999: 239, as cited in Stevenson 2002: 84).

44　Marcuse embraces Schiller's concept of aesthetic education and his position that the political problem of organization of society can be solved through aesthetics, "since

thetic-erotic aspects that constitute a qualitatively different personality structure (Kellner 2007: 47). The "new sensibility" replaces consumer needs with aesthetic ones. Their radical content is clear in their determination to put an end to the technological exploitation of nature and their drive to create a less stressful, pleasing, and beautiful environment[45] (Marcuse 1969a: 28) For Marcuse (1969a: 31) "the aesthetic universe is the *Lebenswelt* on which the needs and faculties of freedom depend for their liberation.

Finally, Marcuse envisions society as a work of art and calls for the merger of art and technology in the construction of the new socialist society. Aesthetics is the form of a socialist society in which beauty is an essential characteristic of human freedom. Socialist society "ought to be light, pretty, playful [as] these qualities are essential elements of freedom" (Marcuse 1969a: 26). Cooperation between art and technology is possible because both contain ideas for a better and more beautiful world: "The rationality of art, its ability to 'project' existence, to define yet unrealized possibilities could then be envisaged as validated by and functioning in the scientific-technological transformation of the world" (Marcuse 1964: 243–244). This opens the route for transcending "technological rationality" into some form of socialist "post-technological rationality" in which the principle of beauty merges with the principle of social organization: "Technique, assuming the features of art, would translate subjective sensibility into objective form, into reality. This would be the sensibility of men and women who do not have to be ashamed of themselves anymore because they have overcome their sense of guilt" (Marcuse 1969a: 24). The union of art and technology would alter them both. The art would inspire and affect the form and construction of the machines while at the same time art would appropriate more technical characteristics: "In the reconstruction of society [...] art would have changed its traditional locus and function in society: it would have become a productive force in the material as well as cultural transformation. And as such force, art would be an integral factor in shaping the quality and the 'appearance' of things, in shaping the reality, the way of life [...]. Art would recapture some of its more primitive 'technical' connotations: as the art of preparing [...] cultivating, growing things, giving them a

it is through Beauty that we arrive at Freedom" (Schiller 2004 [1795]: 19; Cf. Marcuse 2009 [1937b]: 87). Unlike Schiller (2004 [1795]) who acknowledges the duality of the worlds of labour and culture and thus claims that beauty can never be the organizing principle of society, Marcuse takes a more radical stance. For Marcuse (1955: 187), the outcome of Schiller's idea has broader implications: "...the liberation of man from inhuman existential conditions". It also indicates changes in the nature of labour, with labour becoming a free activity for developing human capabilities. In Marcuse's view, the technological basis of society creates the conditions for the realization of Schiller's (2004 [1795]) aesthetic culture and its governing principle the "play impulse".

45   For Marcuse (1972: 17) the New Left "emphasizes the struggle for the restoration of nature, for public parks and beaches, for spaces of tranquillity and beauty". Soper (1995: 169; 2020: 124) advocates less materially and eco-friendly consumption that involves "conviviality, neighbourliness and relaxation, freedom from noise, stench and ugliness".

form which neither violates their matter nor the sensitivity" (Marcuse 1969a: 31–32). With the convergence of art and technology Marcuse (1969a: 45) portrays the "aesthetic ethos of socialism" which is also to figure as a productive force[46]: "Released from the bondage to exploitation, the imagination, sustained by the achievements of science, could turn its productive power to the reconstruction of experience and the universe of experience. In this reconstruction, the historical *topos* of the aesthetic would change: it would find expression in the transformation of the *Lebenswelt* - society as a work of art".

Conclusion: Ways to Go

Marcuse's trajectory to socialism reveals the breadth of his vision and a strong commitment to the realization of the goals of critical theory. He went the extra mile not only to save socialism when it became an unappealing alternative but also to make it the only relevant and desirable alternative by constantly readjusting and broadening the meaning of socialism, always staying in close touch with the *praxis* and concrete historical situation. Marcuse's socialism is aesthetic, green, all-inclusive, and feminine. Production is governed not only by the satisfaction of needs but also under the principles of beauty. Socialist anti-superhumans are brothers and sisters who, tied through a web of libidinal ties, live peacefully and harmoniously with each other. Their activities are determined not by the time they spend at work, but by the time they spend pursuing their own interests. Labour has lost its burdensome character and acquired an element of playfulness (work has become play). They are "genetically predisposed" to non-violence and non-aggressiveness towards each other, other living beings and especially nature. Nature is viewed not as a force to reckon with, but as a force that sustains all life, as an inorganic part of humans. Hence, the synergy of art and technology marks a turn in using technology in a way that preserves nature as a human habitat. Although parts of this description may seem like socialists' daydreaming, Marcuse holds that, by redirecting technology and technological progress toward socialist ideals, they can become (socialist) reality.

Socialists today could learn from Marcuse. Of course, a return to Marcuse can't offer ready-made solutions to the present problems of socialism and socialist practice. However, re-engagement with Marcuse may contribute to the current debates on the future of socialism. His paths to socialism demonstrate that socialism is an ever-evolving system and, as such, it should be left open to inputs from *praxis*. Marcuse successfully eluded the trap of economism, the belief that the transition to socialism follows (only) the economic track. For Marcuse, the new anthropology is required to make a leap into socialism. People need to develop different needs that would make them predisposed to socialism. Marcuse's argument that human flourishing depends on the provision

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46 Marx (1988 [1844]: 77) highlights that humans also produce things in accordance with the laws of beauty.

of green spaces prophetically anticipated the problems of contemporary so-
cieties. Struggle over parks, forest and nature are one of the socialists' strug-
gles. Marcuse saw in feminism and in other counter-culture and radical move-
ments a revolt against capitalism and immediately refreshed the concept of
socialism by picking cues from those movements. This is a valuable lesson for
modern-day socialists: every radical movement has its own *raison-d'etre* that
can enrich socialist struggles, ideals, and goals. But what stands out the most
is Marcuse's "socialist humanism" – true equality among people that can only
exist in a socialist society.

Kingdom awaits. The struggle for socialism, the struggle "to live without
anxiety" (Adorno), continues. There are paths to socialism to be explored and
probed. Herbert Marcuse mapped some of them as still worth exploring.

Acknowledgements

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Maroje Višić

Napred, ne posustajući, prema kraljevstvu lepote i ljubavi. Put do socijalizma Herberta Markuzea

Apstrakt

Današnji socijalisti mogu nešto naučiti od Markuzea. Polazeći od ovog stajališta, u ovom radu se raspravlja i elaborira Markuzeov put prema socijalizmu. Tragajući za socijalističkim rešenjem, Markuze je uspešno izbegao zamku ekonomizma i okrenuo se subjektivnosti. Prelaz u socijalizam moguć je stvaranjem nove antropologije izražene pojmom „nove osetilnosti". Prototip novog socijalističkog čoveka je anti-supermen. Mir i lepota važne su karakteristike Markuzeovog socijalizma. „Libertarijanski socijalizam", „feministički socijalizam", „integralni socijalizam", „socijalistički humanizam", „socijalizam kao umetničko delo" i „utopijski socijalizam" pojmovi su koji svedoče o Markuzeovom otvorenom i mnogostranom razumevanju socijalizma u svoj njegovoj kompleksnosti značenja. Neka od tih značenja mogu nadahnuti savremene rasprave o izgledima socijalizma.

Ključne reči: Markuze, kritička teorija, socijalizam, komunizam, feminizam, levica, marksizam, SSSR

IV

REVIEWS
PRIKAZI

SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, *SURPLUS-ENJOYMENT: A GUIDE FOR THE NON-PERPLEXED*, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC, LONDON, 2022.

Milan Urošević

It seems that the COVID-19 pandemic, which started in 2020, announced the beginning of a series of societal crises that have only been exacerbated in 2022: the new economic recession, which has been on the horizon even before the pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the various consequences of the climate crisis like droughts and forest fires across Europe. All of these, seemingly disparate, events call for critical reflection about the underlying conditions of their possibility and for thinking about possible paths that humanity can take in order to tackle their consequences. Therefore, the summer of 2022 graced us with a fitting new piece of radical theory, *Surplus-Enjoyment: A Guide for The Non-Perplexed,* the latest addition to the enormous bibliography of the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek.

Like many of his previous works, *Surplus-Enjoyment* should not be seen as disinterested philosophizing or as a value-neutral socio-cultural analysis. This book is an example of "theoretical practice" in the Althusserian sense: an engagement with various theoretical notions and problems that are closely tied to existing social contradictions. Therefore, it is not just a piece of academic writing, but an attempt at an engaged intervention with a goal of influencing the way readers think about problems that plague us globally. *Surplus-Enjoyment* fits with Žižek's general style of writing about important topics in a provocative way which aims to induce a feeling of urgency in his readers. Also, this book is aligned with an intensely engaged period of Žižek's work (starting around 2015) that is characterized by various attempts at thinking through the possibilities for social change. Various chapters of *Surplus-Enjoyment* are focused on this topic both in the more abstract theoretical parts and in the parts were Žižek is analyzing social and cultural problems more concretely.

The book *Surplus-Enjoyment* consists of four chapters which are preceded by a relatively short introduction. The introduction aims at connecting the four chapters by giving a general overview of their content but, more importantly, its goal is to present the general nature of the book to its readers. As Žižek claims, his intention is to engage with the "topsy-turvy" aspects of our current world. More precisely, he claims that our current historical reality is permeated with crises which point to the inevitability of large-scale social

change. Therefore, he intends to analyze how those crises are being reproduced as well as how we could fight them. As Žižek admits in the introduction, the chapters are written in his recognizable erratic style, characterized by a constant shifting between topics and numerous examples through which he illustrates theoretical points. Hence, the experience of reading *Surplus-Enjoyment* may invoke conflicting emotions in its readers. The process of going through the chapters can feel as an exciting journey through the thought process of one of the greatest contemporary thinkers; at the same, however, trying to find a common thread that connects various topics, concepts, and examples that Žižek touches upon can feel as a chore which definitely lessens the quality of the reading experience.

As Žižek himself claims in the introduction, *Surplus-Enjoyment* was written as a "reader's report", since every chapter is inspired by a certain text. In each of the four chapters he develops his concepts and analyses as a response to texts that theoretically deal with pertinent social issues. In the first chapter, Žižek reflects on the current climate crisis by trying to understand the relationship between ecological problems and the nature of capitalism. He does this through a dialogue with Kohei Saito's book *Karl Marx's Ecosocialism.* In the second chapter, Žižek deals with the problematic relationship between psychoanalysis and politics by reflecting on Gabriel Tupinamba's book *The Desire of Psychoanalysis.* He relates this discussion to the contemporary debate on the nature of gender and gives his take on the question of the relationship between gender and sex. The third chapter is dedicated to the traditional object of Žižek's critique – contemporary permissive culture and the nature of authority within it. By using Lacanian concepts like Law and the super-ego and by reflecting on Frenk Ruda's book *Abolishing Freedom*, he illustrates how in contemporary postmodern culture subjects are made to "desire" their own oppression. The topic of this chapter transports into the fourth chapter where Žižek develops and illustrates his understanding of "subjective destitution," a concept developed originally by Lacan. While reflecting on Saroj Giri's understanding of this concept, he presents it as a form of subjectivity that characterizes actors of radical social change thereby showing the readers what kind of subjectivity is capable of resisting forms of oppression he presented in the previous chapter.

Surplus-Enjoyment: A Guide for The Non-Perplexed is definitely a timely piece of theoretical reflection, desperately needed in a historical period saturated with contingency and feelings of perplexity. Žižek is not known for proposing practical solutions in his work, claiming that his job as a philosopher is first and foremost to ask the right questions. *Surplus-Enjoyment* is not an exception to this for the most part; nevertheless, it can definitely be said that it stands out, compared to his other works, with its sense of urgency and calls for immediate global cooperation as the only solution for numerous crises that have beset our world. Therefore, even though it is not an easy read, *Surplus-Enjoyment* is a valuable addition to the edifice of critical theory and shows how Žižek's original combination of Hegelian philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis can give priceless insights into our contemporaneity.

V

FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE
IZ RADA INSTITUTA

Vukan Marković i Tamara Plećaš

PREDAVANJA, SEMINARI I PROMOCIJE KNJIGA:

FEBRUAR:

24. februar, četvrtak: Seminar o knjizi Todora Kuljića *Manifest sećanja levice* (YugoLab)

- Učesnici: Filip Balunović, Milivoj Bešlin, Jasmin Hasanović, Marjan Ivković, Andrea Jovanović, Đokica Jovanović, Mate Kapović, Gal Kirn, Aleksandra Kolaković, Todor Kuljić, Srđan Milošević, Ivica Mladenović, Sanja Petrović-Todosijević, Milica Popović, Srđan Prodanović, Paul Stubbs, Igor Štiks, Petar Žarković.

25. februar, petak: Seminar o knjizi Jelene Subotić Žuta zvezda, crvena zvezda: Sećanje na Holokaust posle komunizma (ShoahLab)

- Učesnici: Jovan Byford, Nevena Daković, Olga Manojlović Pintar, Vera Mevorah, Milovan Pisarri, Jelena Subotić.

MART:

02. mart, sreda: Predavanje Roberta Vilijamsa „Dinamike današnjeg antisemitizma i iskrivljenja činjenica o Holokaustu" (ShoahLab)

02. mart, sreda: Seminar Viktora Ivankovića i Lovra Savića „Razgovor o članku Tri argumenta na temelju štete za moralnu obavezu vakcinacije"

09. mart, sreda: Predstavljanje *Pojmovnik angažmana* i *Angažovane reči* u izdanju IFDT-a

16. mart, sreda: Razgovor o knjizi Irine Deretić *Smrt i besmrtnost u Platonovoj filozofiji*

- Učesnici: Vladimir Cvetković, Irina Deretić, Nebojša Grubor, Aleksandar Kandić, Višnja Knežević, Duško Prelević, Damir Smiljanić, Nikola Tanasić.

18. mart, petak: Predavanje Ivan Čolovića „Pola veka obrazovanja uz Biblioteku XX vek" (EduLab)

21. mart, ponedeljak: Predavanje Larise Orlov Vilimonović „Vizantijski feminizmi u doba Justinijana"

22. mart, utorak: Prva čitalačka radionica SolidCareLab-a „Pojam opšteg dobra u istorijskoj perspektivi"

23. mart, sreda: Predavanje Tamare Plećaš „Žene stare Grčke i Rima: šta nam

antički filozofi (ne) kažu o obrazovanju žena“ (EduLab & SolidCareLab)

29. mart, utorak: Predavanje Gorana Kauzlarića „Topla strana neoliberalizma: Ezoterična politička teologija savremene kulture“

30. mart, sreda: Predavanje Kristiana Ranđelovića „Savezničke prakse sa interseks decom u školskom sistemu“

APRIL:

04. april, ponedeljak: Predavanje Tare Radović „Zapamti gde si stao: psihološki efekti prekinutih aktivnosti“ (EduLab)

08. april, petak: Predavanje Aleksandre Drecun o tome kako je osnovan Fond za nauku (DigiLab)

13. april, sreda: Radionica „Od radionice to „hodaonice“: zvučne šetnje u urbanom okruženju“ (PerspectLab)

- Voditelji: Blaž Bajič, Sandi Abram, Rajko Muršič.

13. april, sreda: Predavanje Blaža Bajiča, Sandi Abram i Rajka Muršiča „Senzorne transformacije i transgeneracijski odnosi prema životnoj sredini u Evropi“ (PerspectLab)

15. april, petak: Seminar o knjizi Latinke Perović *Ruske ideje i srpske replike* (YugoLab)

- Učesnici: Zoran Bajin, Milivoj Bešlin, Olga Manojlović Pintar, Tomislav Marković, Srđan Milošević, Latinka Perović, Veljko Stanić, Dubravka Stojanović, Milan Subotić, Aleksej Timofejev, Petar Žarković.

20. april, sreda: Razgovor o knjizi Vuka Stambolovića *Renesansa u medicini: od pacijenta-objekta do kokreatora sopstenog zdravlja* (SolidCare)

- Učesnici: Momčilo Đorđević, Gordana Marković Petrović, Ljiljana Pantović, Aleksandar Petrović, Vuk Stambolović.

29. april, petak: Predavanje Kostisa Stafilakisa „Umetnička mimikrija na postdigitalnim periferijama: slučaj Atine“ (DigiLab)

MAJ:

05. maj, četvrtak: Druga čitalačka radionica SolidCareLab-a „Pojam opšteg dobra – dileme zajedničkog“

06. maj, petak: Predavanje Aleksandra Linc-Đorđevića „Kako se svet menja kroz podatke? Uvid u Metaverse i ostale nove tehnologije“ (DigiLab)

10. maj, utorak: Predavanje Mona Lilja i Mikaela Baaza „Abecedarijum studija otpora“ (CriticLab)

11. maj, sreda: Predavanje Sonje Avlijaš „Žene, rad i društvena reprodukcija posle 1989te“ (SolidCare Lab)

12. maj, četvrtak: Razgovor o knjizi Slobodana Divjaka *Ideologije razaranja demokratskih etnoheterogenih društava*

- Učesnici: Milenko Bodin, Balša Delibašić, Aleksandar Fatić, Đorđe Hristov, Miloš Janković, Marko Konjović, Mark Lošonc, Krisztina Rácz, Milan Urošević, Ilija Vujačić, Damir Zejnulahović, Petar Žarković.

19. maj, četvrtak: Predavanje Marie Kronfeldner „Nije svaka kritika narušavanje slobode“ (CriticLab)

20. maj, petak: Seminar „Politika vodnih dobara u urbanim kontekstima“ (PerspectLab)

- Učesnici: Elena Bougleux, Nil Galvej, Čedo Maksimović, Žaklina Živković.

24. maj, utorak: Treća čitalačka radionica SolidCareLab-a „Pojam opšteg dobra – Od zajedničkih dobara do dobra za sve“

25. maj, sreda: Predavanje Aleksa Lihtenštajna „Uznemirujuća sećanja: komemoracija i rasna pravda u SAD i Južnoj Africi“ (ShoahLab)

27. maj, petak: Predavanje Kajašima Nobukoa „Obrazovni razvoj u modenizaciji Japana“

JUN:

01. jun, sreda: Seminar o knjizi Daria Đentilija *Doba prekarnosti* (CriticLab & PerspectLab)

- Učesnici: Petar Bojanić, Igor Cvejić, Dario Đentili, Đorđe Hristov, Marjan Ivković, Aleksandra Knežević, Andrea Perunović, Srđan Prodanović, Milan Urošević, Damir Zejnulahović.

03. jun, petak: Predavanje Manuela Oracija „Jadran: istorija, gradovi i arhitektura graničnog egzistencijalnog prostora" (PerspectLab)

06. jun, ponedeljak: Predavanje Ivane Đurović „Nevolje s gramatičkim rodom" (GenLab, CriticLab)

07. jun, utorak: Radionica „Nove urbane dnevne sobe" (PerspectLab)

- Voditelji:
  ◦ Snežana Vesnić i Marko Ristić: „O drugom analognom prostoru"
  ◦ Sara Nikolić: „Etnografija za dizajn"
  ◦ Sanja Iguman: „Prostorna udobnost"

10. jun, petak: Predavanje Ivice Mladenovića „Politički pejzaž Francuske nakon izbora 2022." (YugoLab)

13. jun, ponedeljak: Predavanje Tanje Vučković Juroš „Nevolje sa seksualnim vaspitanjem: Prvi pogled sa Sense AGEND-a projekta" (GenLab)

17. jun, petak: Radionica „Najnoviji trendovi u Health Tech-u i njihov uticaj na društvo" (DigiLab)

- Učesnici: Ljubiša Bojić, Damjan Damjanović, Nataša Golić, Ivana Kostić.

22. jun, sreda: Razgovor o knjizi Marie Kronfeldner Šta je ostalo od ljudske prirode? (CriticLab)

- Učesnici: Stefan Janković, Aleksandra Knežević, Ana Lipij, Janko Međedović, Marko Porčić, Adriana Zaharijević.

AVGUST:

26. – 29. avgust: 2nd Moise Architectural Seminar Cres (IFDT; DeltaLab i Centar za napredne studije, Univerzitet u Rijeci; Università Iuav di Venezia; Univerzitet u Ljubljani; Politecnico di Torino; Politecnico di Milano)

- Učesnici: Petar Bojanić, Pippo Ciorra, Giovanni Corbellini, Miloš Ćipranić, Giovanni Durbiano, Vladan Djokić, Špela Hudnik, Nikolina Jelavić Mitrović, Emil Jurcan, Ida Križaj Leko, Luca di Lorenzo Latini, Sara Marini, Morana Matković, Manuel Orazi, Alessandro Rocca, Luka Skansi, Snežana Vesnić.

SEPTEMBAR:

12. septembar, ponedeljak: Predavanje Jelene Savić „Kvir kao belina u kontekstu evropske gadžovanske supremacije" (GenLab)

13. septembar, utorak: Predavanje Slobodana Markovića „Doprinos seksologije i kulturne antropologije razumevanju i prihvatanju istopolnih odnosa u zapadnim društvima" (GenLab)

14. septembar, sreda: Predavanje Jill Diane Pope „Porcija (post)socijalističke realnosti: beogradski dreg performansi kao utvarni narativi" (GenLab)

15. septembar, četvrtak: Radionica - Predstavljanje rezultata istraživanja „Bliskost i nega: briga o starijim osobama u Srbiji tokom pandemije COVID-19" (SolidCare Lab)

26. septembar, ponedeljak: Predavanje Helge Novotni: „S verom u AI: Moć, iluzija i kontrola prediktivnih algoritama" (DigiLab)

27. septembar, utorak: Predavanje Lovra Kralja i Sanje Simper: „Hrvatska i Holokaust"

29. septembar, četvrtak: Predavanje Armina Grunvalda „Susret veštačke inteligencije (AI) i filozofske antropologije" (DigiLab)

OKTOBAR:

10. oktobar, ponedeljak: Predavanje Sanje Bojanić: „Nova materijalnost i stara sintaksa pod kožom Eda Atkinsa: Estetika i gramatika savremenih umetničkih jezika" (DigiLab)

19. oktobar, sreda: Predavanje Radine Vučetić: „Nevidljivi neprijatelj – variola vera 1972 /Mikroistorija Jugoslavije" (YugoLab)

26. oktobar, sreda: Predavanje Louise O. Vasvári, Dávid Szőke, Márta Goldmann „Mađarska i Holokaust" (ShoahLab)

27. oktobar, četvrtak: Predavanje Aizava Nobuhiroa i Širaiši Takašija: „Od „Japana i Azije" ka „Japanu u Aziji""

NOVEMBAR:

10. novembar, četvrtak: Predavanje Žan-Fransoa Kolosima: „Savremeno stanje Pravoslavlja"

10. novembar, četvrtak: Predavanje Mauricija Ferarisa povodom dodele nagrade „Miladin Životić"

11. novembar, petak: Seminar o knjizi Mauricija Ferarisa *Doc-Humanity* (CriticLab)

• Učesnici: Petar Bojanić, Miloš Ćipranić, Aleksandar Fatić, Marko Konjović, Ana Lipij, Mark Lošonc, Aleksandar Ostojić, Nataša Schmelz, Milan Urošević.

11. novembar, petak: Seminar o knjizi Ticijane Andine *A Philosophy for Future Generations* (CriticLab)

• Učesnici: Petar Bojanić, Igor Cvejić, Mauricio Feraris, Đorđe Hristov, Marjan Ivković, Aleksandra Knežević, Mark Lošonc, Andrea Perunović, Tamara Plećaš i Srđan Prodanović.

12. novembar, subota: Razgovor o knjizi Žan-Fransoa Kolosima *Raspeće Ukrajine: hiljadu godina verskih ratova u Evropi*

28. novembar, ponedeljak: Predavanje Ahmeta Alibašića „Dobra vladavina u islamskoj tradiciji" (YugoLab)

DECEMBAR:

01. decembar, četvrtak: Promocija publikacija u okviru UNIGEM projekta (GenLab): *Izazovi integriranja rodne ravnopravnosti u univerzitetskoj zajednici: protiv rodno zasnovanog nasilja -ključni rezultati istraživanja* (urednice: Zilka Spahić Šiljak, Jasna Kovačević, Jasmina Husanović) i *Rodno zasnovano nasilje u univerzitetskim zajednicama. Politika, prevencija i obrazovne intervencije u Britaniji* (urednice: Sundari Antiha i Ruth Lewis)

• Učesnice: Sundari Anitha, Jelena Ćeriman, Ruth Lewis, Dženana Radončić, Zilka Spahić Šiljak.

02. decembar, petak: Razgovor o knjizi Zlatana Hrnčića *Mapiranje rodno zasnovanog nasilja u regionu: Istraživanja o akušerskom nasilju u Bosni i Srbiji* (GenLab)

• Učesnici: Zlatan Hrnčić i Marina Mijatović.

07. decembar, sreda: Razgovor povodom objavljivanja knjige *Familia Grande* Kamij Kušner - Ćutanje kao neophodan element dominacije

• Učesnici: Bora Babić, Mark Krepon, Kamij Kušner, Zorica Tomić, Zona Zarić.

KONFERENCIJE, SIMPOZIJUMI I PANELI:

JANUAR:

26. januar, sreda: Konferencija *Holokaust: nasleđe fašizma 4*, ShoahLab IFDT i Spomen-park „Kragujevački oktobar"

• Učesnici: Aron Albahari, Nada Banjanin Đuričić, Branislav Dimitrijević,

Predrag Krstić, Olga Manojlović Pintar, Nevena Martinović, Vera Mevorah, Davor Stipić, Dragana Stojanović, Jelena Vasiljević.

FEBRUAR:

12. februar, subota: Konferencija *Multikulturalnost Novog Sada – nacionalne zajednice Vojvodine*, Regionalni naučni centar IFDT, Forum za edukaciju, saradnju, afirmaciju i podršku građanskom društvu (FESAP), Fondacija „Novi Sad – Evropska prestonica kulture"

- Učesnici:
  - Katinka Beretka „Pravne dimenzije višejezičnosti Vojvodine"
  - Viktoria Toma „Kulturološke i religijske specifičnosti u medijskom izveštavanju o migrantima i percepcija"
  - Aleksandar Pavlović „Vojvođanski *vs.* kosovski pristup problemu autonomije: zašto (ni)je došlo do nasilja?"
  - Silard Janoš Tot „Mađarska autonomija" u Vojvodini – istorija jedne političke ideje, 1989-1999"
  - Zoltan Devavari „U dvostrukoj manjini, u dvostrukom stisku. Subotički Jevreji u istorijskim burama prve polovine 20. veka (1918–1945)"
  - Ankica Dragin „Interkulturalna iskustva novosadske Mađarice reformatske veroispovesti"
  - Aleksandar Horvat „O identitetu grada i nacionalnih zajednica Novog Sada za vreme Drugog svetskog rata: percepcije mađarskog okupacionog režima i antifašističkog pokreta otpora"
  - Zoran Janjetovic „Novi Sad kao centar nemačke nacionalne manjine između dva svetska rata"
  - Okrugli sto: „Stakleni plafon – specifičan položaj žena u pojedinim nacionalnim zajednicama"; učesnice: Virđinija Popović, Ruženka Šimonji-Černiak, Kristina Rac, Jana Zahorec, Karolina Lendak – Kabok

MART:

03. mart, četvrtak: Prezentacija projekta i publikacija: *Demistifikacija planskih procedura* „Ka kolaborativnom upravljanju razvojem grada: interaktivni urbanizam" i „Javnost na distanci – demokratija u krizi: analiza planskih procedura u periodu pandemije," Centar za kulturnu dekontaminaciju, Nova planska praksa, Tačka komunikacije

- Učesnici: Ana Graovac, Jasmina Đokić, Marija Maruna, Danijela Milovanović Rodić, Ksenija Radovanović, Ljubica Slavković. Moderator: Sanja Iguman

07. mart, ponedeljak: Panel diskusija „Nacionalizam, nacionalna prošlost i Kovid-19 u Srbiji"

- Učesnici: Filip Balunović, Lea David, Rastislav Dinić, Aleksej Kišjuhas, Siniša Malešević, Zoran Panović, Aleksandar Pavlović, Tamara Petrović Trifunović, Jelena Pešić, Milovan Pisarri, Gordana Uzelac.

09. mart, sreda: Konferencija *Uloga Praxis filozofije u kreiranju alternativa u prošlosti i savremenosti* (YugoLab)

- Učesnici: Una Blagojević, Petar Bojanić, Luka Bogdanić, Ankica Čakardić, Dušan Marković, Vukan Marković, Dragoljub Mićunović, Nenad Stefanov, Lino Veljak, Mislav Žitko.

24. mart, četvrtak: Panel diskusija o zborniku tekstova *Sreten Ugričić: pisac, astronom, terorista*

- Učesnici: Dean Duda, Olga Manojlović Pintar, Nemanja Mitrović, Gazela Pudar Draško, Sreten Ugričić.

28. mart, ponedeljak: Panel diskusija – Predstavljanje nalaza istraživanja:

Lokalne fondacije u Srbiji (SolidCare Lab)

- Učesnici: Marija Mitrović, Bojana Radovanović, Nikola Rajković, Jelena Vasiljević.

APRIL:

07. april, četvrtak: Panel diskusija sa Danijelom Majstorović „Periferna sopstva: afekt, dekolonijalnost i politika mjesta"

- Učesnici: Danijela Majstorović, Nebojša Milikić, Sara Nikolić, Marija Ratković, Marta Stojić Mitrović, Igor Štiks, Adriana Zaharijević.

21. april, četvrtak: Regionalna naučna konferencija „Holokaust i teologija" (Shoahlab)

- Učesnici:
  - Srđan Dušanić, Vera Mevorah, Predrag Krstić, Željko Šarić
  - Dragana Stojanović i Danica Igrutinović „Postholokaustovska čitanja u jevrejskoj i hrišćanskoj misli"
  - Stojana Valan „Biblijski diskurs u filozofiji Emanuela Levinasa"
  - Oliver Jurišić „Holokaust i non-sematski jezik: ideologizacija teološkog jezika"
  - Zorica Kuburić „Teologija netolerancije i Holokaust – Od izabranog pojedinca do izabranog naroda"
  - Oleg Soldat „Kada je teologija ordo occidendi? Holokaust i ikonolomstvo"
  - Vladimir Cvetković „Holokaust, srpsko bogoslovlje i istorijski revizionizam"
  - Mark Lošonc „Holokaust i katarza psihodeličnog iskustva"
  - Saša Laketa „O Bogu koji je bio prisutan"

MAJ:

03. – 07. maj: Peta letnja škola *Architecture & Philosophy* „Projekat teorije"

- 04. maj, sreda:
  - Uvodna reč: Petar Bojanić
  - Jörg Gleiter: „The Project of Theory", komentator: Tommaso Listo
  - Miloš Ćipranić: „Archi- tectural Objects as Persons", komentator: Aleksandra Jarocka-Mikrut
  - Federica Joe Gardella: „Projects: Academic Research Labs on the City", komentator: Paulina Blaszczyk
  - Tommaso Listo: „What Laboratory for the Architectural Project", komentator: Viviana Torero
  - Klaus Platzgummer: „Monument, Document, Lineament", komentator: Miloš Ćipranić
  - Ozan Soya: „Expanding Notions of Tectonics at the Turn of the 21st Century", komentator: Saskia Gribling
  - lda Križaj Leko: „Non-Linear Methodology Of Design", komentator: Alessandro Armando
  - Željko Radinković: „Modal Logic Considerations and Architecture", komentator: Klaus Platzgummer
- 05. maj, četvrtak:
  - Petar Bojanić: „Architecture AND Philosophy. Forms of Conjunction or Origin of Con- ject(ure)", komentator: Jörg Gleiter
  - Snežana Vesnić: „AND: The Invention (Pro- jection) of "the Third"", komentatorČ Alessandro Armando
  - Teo Butenas Santos: „The Birth of a Type", komentator: Federica Joe Gardella
  - Paulina Blaszczyk: „The Process of Type Formation in Church Architecture", komentator: Tamara Koneska

- Giulia Montanaro: „Starting Over from Technical Anthropology to Survive the Anthropocene", komentator: Ozan Soya
- Lidia Gasperoni: „Architecture of Excess in the Anthropocene. Philosophy as a Medium of Spatial Imagination", komentator: Željko Radinković
- Saskia Gribling: „Between Norms and Exceptions. An Ecology of Urban Practices", komentator: Petar Bojanić
- Isidora Popović: „Far from the Will: The Destination of Resistance", komentator: Marko Ristić
- Francesca Moro: „Urban Ergonomics and the Transferability of Models in China", komentator: Jonida Alliaj

• 06. maj, petak:

- Alessandro Armando: „Four Ways to Innovation in Architecture: A Pragmatic Chart", komentator: Igor Cvejić
- Marko Ristić: „The Projective Character of the (Positional) Sur- in the Concept of Surrationalism", komentator: Fedor Torgashev
- Igor Cvejić: „Material Scaffolding of Affectivity and Architecture", komentator: Lidia Gasperoni
- Viviana Torero: „Style. Sign and Meaning in Contemporary Architecture", komentator: Snežana Vesnić
- Aleksandra Jarocka-Mikrut: „To Read or to Ex- perience? On Possible Ways to Understand Architecture", komentator: Teo Butenas Santos
- Jonida Alliaj: „Cities and Diversity: The Evolution of Architecture and its Aesthetic Cognition as a Result of Cultural Contamination", komentator: Giulia Montanaro

- Fedor Torgashev: „Historical Tracings and Creative Act", komentator: Isidora Popović
- Tamara Koneska: „Fragmenting the Urbicide of the Former City of Solidarity", komentator: Francesca Moro

09. maj, ponedeljak: Otvoreni razgovori - Obrazovanje za obrazovanje – problemi, izazovi, perspektive (Edulab)
• Učesnici: Olja Jovanović Milanović, Lidija Radulović, Eleonora Vlahović. Moderator: Ivan Nišavić.

16. – 18. maj: Konferencija *Revitalizacija demokratije kroz participativne demokratske inovacije*
• Učesnici: Điovani Alegreti, Rodžer Berkovic, Florian Biber, Irena Fiket, Tami Pogrebinši, Stefania Ravaci.

19. maj, četvrtak: Panel diskusija „Novi kontekst srpsko-albanskog dijaloga"
• Učesnici: Tobias Flessenkemper, Filip Lukić, Miodrag Milićević, Jelica Minić, Fahri Musliu, Aleksandar Pavlović, Idro Seferi.

JUN:

16. jun, četvrtak: Panel diskusija „Na šta mislimo kada kažemo... dobro društvo?"
• Učesnici: Stefan Gužvica, Miloš Janković, Dušanka Milosavljević, Predrag Momčilović, Sara Nikolić, Gazela Pudar Draško.

26. jun, nedelja: Panel diskusija „Između zajedničke istorije i konfliktnih identiteta" (YugoLab)
• Učesnici: Milivoj Bešlin, Ruža Fotiadis, Dragan Markovina, Adnan Prekić, Dubravka Stojanović.

27. – 29. jun: Konferencija *Kulture odbacivanja u Evropi: Prakse diskursi i kulturne formacije u polarizovanim društvima* (ActiveLab & CriticLab)

- 27. jun, ponedeljak: prikazivanje filma *How Right Wing Politics are made acceptable in Europe today*
  - Komentatori: Srđan Đurović, Gazela Pudar Draško, Sonja Stojanović Gajić, Đurđa Trajković.
- 28. jun, utorak:
  - Manuela Bojadžijev i Gazela Pudar Draško: „Setting the Scene of »Cultures of Rejection«"
  - Peo Hansen: „Getting the Macroeconomics of Migration Right, or Why Refugees Are Not Fiscal Burdens"
  - Okrugli sto „Seven Years Later: Old Routes and New Patterns of Contested Mobility in South-Eastern Europe"
    - Učesnici: Barbara Beznec, Bernd Kasparek, Andrej Kurnik, Marta Stojić Mitrović.
  - Nitzan Shoshan: „Populism and Political Immediacy in Germany and Beyond"
  - Matthew McManus: „Where Does Post-Modern Conservatism Fit Within the Reactionary Tradition?"
- 29. jun, sreda:
  - Fabio Mattioli: "The Labour of Trolling: Rent, Platforms, and Fake News"
  - Daniel Mullis i Paul Zschocke: "Covid-19 and the Geographies of the Far Right in Germany"
  - Okrugli sto „Cultures of Rejection in the Covid-Crisis"
    - Učesnici: Alexander Harder, Manuel Liebig, Daniel Mullis, Benjamin Opratko, Celina Ortega Soto, Milan Urošević, Marko–Luka Zubčić.
  - Nacira Guénif: "Rejecting Rejection, Shifting Embodiments, Shaping Alliances"

JUL:

01.jul, petak: Debata o seksualnoj demokratiji
- Učesnici: Erik Fasan, Katrin Fodri, Fia Menar, Selena Radović.

SEPTEMBAR:

14. septembar, sreda: Panel diskusija „NTA u praksi: mađarski i albanski nacionalni saveti u Srbiji" (ActiveLab, GenLab)
- Prva sesija:
  - Aleksandar Pavlović: „Od političke mobilizacije do mađarskih i albanskih nacionalnih saveta"
  - Tamaš Korhec: „Dete sporazuma ili nesporazuma: nacionalni saveti u pravnom i političkom sistemu Srbije"
  - Ljubica Đorđević „Sistematsko i dokumentovano praćenje rada nacionalnih saveta"
  - Katinka Beretka „Strateško planiranje kao implicitno javno prihvatanje saveta nacionalnih manjina u Srbiji – slučaj Mađarskog nacionalnog saveta"
  - Jelena Ćeriman „Mogu li nacionalni saveti nacionalnih manjina biti efikasni kanali za veće političko učešće žena iz manjinskih zajednica u Srbiji?"
- Druga sesija – Diskusija:
  - Diskusanti: Belgzim Kamberi, Mark Lošonc.
  - Učesnici: Brankica Janković, David Lošonc, Ragmi Mustafa, Milica Rodić.

15. septembar, četvrtak: Panel diskusija o transfobiji u feminizmu i na levici
- Učesnici: Jovan Džoli Ulićević, Stipe Nogalo.

16. septembar, petak: Panel diskusija: Nina Čolović, Karolina Hrga "O seks radu"

17. – 24. septembar: Letnja škola *Vodeni pejzaži – nasleđe i životna sredina* (PerspectLab, IFDT; Univerzitet u Begramu; DeltaLab, Univerzitet u Rijeci)

- Seminar „Urban Studies & Rijeka: Life in Antropocene" – Morana Matković
- Seminar „Seascapes in Literature and in Imaginaries" - Rossana Bonadei
- Seminar „Mirine – Fulfinum Archaeological site and its slow transformation into an archaeological park" - Morana Čaušević-Bully
- Seminar „GOLI OTOK in the History of Yugoslavia" – Stefan Gužvica
- Seminar „Fishermen Communities and impacts of Social Change" - Jelena Zlatar Gamberožić, Anđelina Svirčić Gotovac
- Seminar Marine „Tourism, Protected Areas and critical gazes over the sea" - Elena Bougleux
- Discussion „Biodiversity below the sea surface" - Stefan Andjus
- Seminar „Features and development of Yugoslav tourism in the Adriatic Sea" - Sanja Iguman
- Discussion On Alberto Fortis's *Travels* - Nika Zoričić
- Seminar „Moise Palace and its potential" – Sanja Bojanić
- Seminar „Being in the Affective Spaces: Scaffolding of Affectivity" – Igor Cvejić
- Moderator: Sanja Iguman

19. – 23. septembar: ANDEM 3 – Treća letnja škola angažovanosti i demokratije

- 19. septembar, ponedeljak:
  - Vujo Ilić: „Reprezentativna demokratija"
  - Luka Glušac: „Demokratske institucije"

- Irena Fiket: „Deliberativna demokratija u teoriji i praksi"

- 20. septembar, utorak:
  - Srđan Prodanović i Bojana Radovanović: „Opšte dobro, javno dobro, zajedničko dobro"
  - Aleksandra Bulatović, Bojana Radovanović, Marko Konjović: „Blagostanje, dobrobit, procvat"
  - Okrugli sto: Solidarna i socijalna ekonomija
    - Učesnici: Ana Džokić, Dušan Jordović, Zorana Milovanović, Predrag Momčilović, Tijana Petrović.

- 21. septembar, sreda:
  - Petar Bojanić: „Angažovani akti i građenje grupe"
  - Igor Cvejić, Mark Lošonc: „Pojam angažmana"
  - Marjan Ivković: „Angažman i radikalna društvena promena"

- 22. septembar, četvrtak:
  - Jelena Vasiljević: „Novi društveni pokreti i solidarnost"
  - Ljiljana Pantović: „Briga - angažman na granici privatnog i javnog"
  - Krisztina Racz: „Etnicitet, manjine i jezik: institucije i svakodnevnica"
  - Adriana Zaharijević: „Rod – na raskršću između ideologije i ravnopravnosti"
  - Okrugli sto: Žene i rad
    - Učesnici: Ljubinka Kovačević, Marija Jovanović, Nada Sekulić, Sonja Avlijaš, Vera Gudac Dodić.

- 23. septembar, petak:
  - Aleksandra Knežević: „Nauka, vrednosti i demokratija"
  - Aleksandar Pavlović: „Angažman u umetnosti"
  - Ana Đorđević i Sara Nikolić: „Angažovano istraživanje"

○ Okrugli sto: Eko-aktivizam u Srbiji - Civilno društvo kao katalizator promena u oblasti zaštite životne sredine

- Učesnici: Žaklina Živković, Iva Marković, Tijana Ljubenović, Zoran Bukvić, Dragana Arsić, Ivana Malinović, Nemanja Anđelković

OKTOBAR:

05. – 07. oktobar: Konferencija *Humanizam, posthumanizam i anti-humanizam: obrazovne perspektive: Čemu još obrazovanje 3* (EduLab)

- 05. oktobar, sreda:
  ○ Rosi Braidotti, uvodno izlaganje: "Key Concepts in Posthuman Critical Theory"
  ○ Panel diskusija DigiLab „Post- and Transhumanism in/and Art"
    - Učesnici: Jovan Čekić, Jelena Guga, Stefan Lorenz Sorgner.
- 06. oktobar, četvrtak:
  ○ Carol A. Taylor, uvodno izlaganje: "Starting somewhere else? Against methodolatry in posthumanist educational research: Experiments, encounters, activations and adventures"
  ○ Mohammad Khari: "Embracing the Uncertainty: Fostering Creativity and Responsibility Through Storytelling in Rhizomatic Model of Learning"
  ○ James Garrison: "Prometheus and Posthumanist Education"
  ○ Miloš Agatonović: "Nietzsche contra Transhumanism"
  ○ Antonio Pinilla: "The Who, How, and Why of a Cosmological Education in Eugen Fink"
  ○ Geraldine McDermott-Dalton: "Multimodality of Learning as a Posthuman Opening in Higher Education Practices? Screencast Design and Development in Lectures"
  ○ Patricia Gibson: "Finding Flors: Cartographies of Pedagogical Encounters with a Posthuman Teacherbot"
  ○ Tamara Plećaš: „Stoički (pre-)humanizam kao izraz post-humanizma: od mita do ekologije"
  ○ Marija Velinov i Predrag Krstić: „Zašto androidi ne idu u školu?"
  ○ Aleksandar Ostojić: „Pretpostavke i obećanja: obrazovanje i smrt subjekta"
  ○ Tamara Kamatović, Kaitlin Lucas and Michael Kozakowski: "Democratic Classrooms: Challenges and Affordances Within Online Learning Ecosystems"
  ○ Denise Mac Giolla Ri: "Threshold Graphics and Rhizomatic Learning in Social Care Education: A Semiotic Bridge In-Between Humanism and Posthumanism"
  ○ Nadja Čekolj (and colleagues): "Volunteering Has Brought Everything Closer to Us, Everything Has Become More Natural and Normal - Volunteer Programs in Formal Education and Future Posthumanist Elements"
  ○ Pummy Sharma, Sheriya Sareen: "Re-visiting the "Community of Inquiry" Framework Through Post-Humanist Lens: A Case-Study of Higher Education Institutions in Jammu & Kashmir"
  ○ Lada Stevanović: „Čemu antropologija? Zašto je školama potrebna antropološka perspektiva?"
  ○ Paula Petričević: „Čemu filozofija u školama?"
  ○ Tamara Nikolić: „Sloboda da budem i postanem: ontološki zaokret u dokoličarskom obrazovanju"

- ○ Milana Gajović: „Pojam empatije između humanizma i transhumanizma"
- ○ Alberto Simonetti: "Education for Posteriority"
- ○ Nevena Mitranić: "Diffraction Made Me Do It: Ethical Dilemmas of Doing Research with Relational Ontologies in Kindergarten Practice"
- ○ Stefan Janković: "There Is More Beyond: Non-Relationality, Object-Oriented-Ontology and the Conundrums of "Surplus" Reality"
- • 07. oktobar, petak:
- ○ Stefan Lorenz Sorgner, uvodno izlaganje: "What are the Metahumanities?"
- ○ Nataša Lacković: "What Is an Integrated Relational Pedagogy and in What Way Is It Posthuman?"
- ○ Jelena Stojković: "III, Child-Bot: Becomings, Assemble!"
- ○ Kay Sidebottom: "More-Than-Human Teachers"
- ○ Mikhail Bukhtoyarov i Anna Bukhtoyarova: "Employing the Educational Machine: Augmentation or Dehumanization?"
- ○ Camila Aschner-Restrepo: "Practicing Utopia in the Classroom: Some Ideas and Case Studies"
- ○ Ioanna-Maria Stamati i Vasso Kapetanou: "Cinema, Different Cyborgs, Accessibility and Convenience"
- ○ Dragana Stojanović: "Offline Education and Its Immersive Potential: Memory, Postmemory, and History in the Informational Age"
- ○ Jelena Ostojić: "Ethics of Artificial Intelligence in Education"
- ○ Aleksandar Fatić: "Reinventing Education as Therapy in the Age of Narcissism"

- ○ Mark Lošonc: "The Anachronism of Posthumanism – Four Attacks Against the Discourse on Posthumanism"
- ○ Natasha Rennolds: "Keeping Children Safe – A Speculative Posthuman Inquiry"
- ○ Jesús Alberto Pinzón-Ulloa: "Critical biology, post-human feminist activism and body-becoming pedagogies: a necessary posthuman entanglement in times of gender panic"
- ○ Marius Markuckas: "Historical Ontology as a Tool for the Critique of the (Trans) humanist Educational Paradigm"
- ○ Meem Arafat Manab and Adnan Aziz Chowdhury: "Spaces Within Spaces: An Anti-pedagogy to Counter the Reproduction of Spatial Silence and Structural Oppression"
- ○ Marija M. Bulatović: "A Possible Transhumanist Educational Effect: The Case of Museum "Metahuman""
- ○ Ana Lipij: „Implikacije teze utelovljene kognicije na koncepcije učenja i obrazovanja"
- ○ Aleksandar Milanković: „Vaspitno-obrazovni proces i sloboda"

NOVEMBAR:

02. – 03. novembar: Konferencija *Osnivački sastanak istraživačke mreže Rod i politika u jugoistočnoj Evropi* (GenderLab)

- • 02. novembar, sreda:
- ○ Goran Bašić, Gazela Pudar Draško
- ○ Prvi panel: „The State of Gender and Politics Research in Europe and the Balkans"
  - ▪ Moderator: Adriana Zaharijević
- ○ Petra Ahrens: "Gender and Politics Research in Europe"

- ◦ Roman Kuhar: "It's the end of the world as we know it: Anti-Gender Crusades in Europe"
- ◦ Učesnice: Amila Ždralović, Vjollca Krasniqi, Biljana Đorđević, Irena Cvetovikj.
- ◦ Drugi panel: „Who Represents Women?"
  - ▪ Moderator: Ljiljana Čičkarić
- ◦ Milica Antić Gaber: „Researching Women's Presence and Representation in Politics"
- ◦ Učesnice: Elena Nachevska, Zlatiborka Popov Momčinović, Jelena Lončar, Marsela Dauti, Biljana Kotevska, Tajma Kapić.
- ◦ Sarah Childs i Karen Celis: "Feminist Democratic Representation"
  - ▪ Moderator: Saša Gavrić

07. novembar, ponedeljak: Panel diskusija *Srpsko-hrvatski dijalog: nove perspektive*

- • Učesnici: Filip Balunović, Hrvoje Klasić, Petar Mamula, Nebojša Novaković, Katarina Peović, Dubravka Stojanović, Tomislav Žigmanov,

07. novembar, ponedeljak: Konferencija *Demokratski socijalizam: jugoslovensko iskustvo i savremena promišljanja* (YugoLab)

- • Sesija 1, moderator Petar Žarković:
  - ◦ Božo Repe: „Napuštanje jugoslovenskog samoupravnog socijalizma osamdesetih i početkom devedesetih godina u Sloveniji"
  - ◦ Milivoj Bešlin: „Uspon i pad demokratskog socijalizma u Jugoslaviji 1948-1972"
  - ◦ Hrvoje Klasić: „Praxis i '68. - jugoslavenska socijalistička alternativa"
  - ◦ Husnija Kamberović: „"Demokratski" raskoli unutar komunističkog pokreta u Bosni i Hercegovini 1970-ih i 1980-ih godina

(od Avde Hume do Hamdije Pozderca)"

- • Sesija 2, moderator Ivan Ejub Kostić:
  - ◦ Jure Ramšak: „Zašto naša ideologija ne može da podnese suptilnu marksističku raspravu i kritike koje su iz toga proizašle: društvena kritika i granice demokratskog socijalizma u Sloveniji"
  - ◦ Luka Filipović: „Dugoročne posledice promene partijskih politika Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i državnih politika SFRJ u periodu 1972-1974. godine na razvoj odnosa jugoslovenskih komunista sa komunističkim partijama Mediterana"
  - ◦ Marino Badurina: „Tko su bili liberali i konzervativci u Jugoslaviji krajem 60-ih i početkom 70-ih godina?: sukob dviju centrističkih koncepcija"
  - ◦ Petar Žarković: „Od demokratskog do realnog socijalizma: jugoslovensko-sovjetski ideološki spor"
- • Sesija 3, moderatori Ivica Mladenović i Filip Balunović:
  - ◦ Katarina Peović: „Manifest komunističke partije - tekst antikapitalističke ljevice"
  - ◦ Ivan Velisavljević: „Klasna matrica i savremene leve strategije u Srbiji"
  - ◦ Anastas Vangeli: „O globalnoj Kini, (bivšoj) Jugoslaviji i socijalizmu"

15. novembar, utorak: Panel diskusija „Da li građanske skupštine mogu biti rešenje za demokratski deficit u Srbiji?" (ActiveLab)

- • Učesnici: Jelena Avramović, Vukosava Crnjanski, Irena Fiket, Gazela Pudar Draško.

DECEMBAR:

01. decembar, četvrtak: Debata sa Mišelom Elčaninovim – U glavi Putina
- Učesnici: Vladimir Cvetković, Mišel Elčaninov, Ljubinka Milinčić.

01. decembar, četvrtak: Razgovor sa dr Mišelom Elčaninovim, francuskim filozofom i glavnim urednikom *Philosophie Magazine*
- Učesnici: Romilo Aleksandar Knežević i Nemanja Škrelić.

09. decembar, petak: Otvoreni razgovori: Peter Locke i Jelena Kupjsak – Mentalno zdravlje: razgovori medicinskih antropologa (SolidCareLab)

12. decembar, ponedeljak: Panel diskusija *Srpsko-hrvatski dijalog: mogu li knjige preko granice?* (YugoLab)
- Učesnici: Bora Babić, Gojko Božović, Ivan Ejub Kostić, Zoran Hamović, Nenad Rizvanović, Ivan Sršen.

13. decembar, utorak: Panel diskusija *3D Rekonstrukcija Jasenovca: Novi pristupi memorijalizaciji osetljivog nasleđa* (ShoahLab & DigiLab)
- Učesnici: Višnja Kisić, Nebojša Kuzmanović, Ivo Pejaković, Milovan Pisarri, Sytse Wierenga.

13. decembar, utorak: Panel diskusija *Tehnologija kao fikcionalni (nad)realizam* (PerspectLab)
- Učesnici: Davor Ereš, Sanja Iguman, Branimir Jovanović, Alexander Neuwahl, Aleksandar Ostojić, Marko Ristić, Željko Radinković, Snežana Vesnić.

14. – 15. decembar: Konferencija *„Ako ne tada, sada“. Memorijalizacija Starog Sajmišta* (ShoahLab)
- 14. decembar, sreda:
  - Uvodne reči: Aleksandar Albahari, Milan Bogdanović, Petar Bojanić, Krinka Vidaković Petrov, Robert Vilijams.
  - Sesija 1: „Holokaust na raskršću: mediji, etika i konzumerizam"
    - Ljiljana Radonić: „Globalized Memorial Museums. Holocaust Museumization as a Role Model?"
    - Učesnici: Vera Mevorah, Dejan Ristić, Nevena Daković, Milan Koljanin, Tomislav Dulić, Marija Ratković, Katarina Melić
  - Sesija 2: „Projekti na Starom Sajmištu: Projekti za očuvanje sećanja"
    - Milovan Pisarri: „Petnaest godina kasnije: Od protesta do memorijala"
    - Učesnici: Nada Banjanin-Đuričić, Milan Bogdanović, Una Ćirić, Asja Drača Muntean, Nebojša Milikić, Nikola Polić, Miško Stanišić, Adem Tutić, Sonja Viličić.
- 15. decembar, četvrtak:
  - Sesija 3: „Memorijalizacija Starog Sajmišta"
    - Učesnici: Nevena Bajalica, Milan Bogdanović, Nenad Lajbenšperger, Slobodan Mandić, Marko Terzić, Krinka Vidaković Petrov, Bojan Zorić.
    - Sytse Wierenga: „Eodyne, The 3D reconstruction of the Jasenovac concentration camp"
    - Irena Molnar: „Distributed Archiving at IFDT: Digitization of Archival Sources on the Sajmište concentration camp"
    - Bogdan Španjević: „Video instalacija „Logor na Beogradskom sajmištu""

16. – 18. decembar: Konferencija *EMERGE 2022: Digitalno društvo sada* (DigiLab)
- 16. decembar, petak:
  - Uvodna reč: Gazela Pudar Draško, Ljubiša Bojić
  - Uvodno predavanje – Damian Trilling: „News and Political Information in the Digital Society

– The Role of Human and Algorithmic Feedback Loops"

◦ Panel Diskusija: *Democracy and Technology, Bringing Deliberation to the Mass Public*

  ▪ Učesnici: Ceri Davies, Suzanne Hall, Alice Siu, Irena Fiket

◦ Sesije:

  ▪ AI and Society

    · Miloš Jovanović, Sandro Radovanović, Boris Delibašić: "Misalignment of Fairness in Machine Learning"

    · Mikhail Bukhtoyarov, Anna Bukhtoyarova: "Fill In, Accept, Submit, and Prove That You Are Not a Robot: Ubiquity as the Power of the Algorithmic Bureaucracy"

    · Nazam Laila, Adeeba Asri: "The Deconstruction of the Masculine Bias in Gendered AI Discourse"

    · Dunja Nešović: "Networking For You: The Algorithmically Mediated Network and Networked Subject of TikTok"

    · Srđan Prodanović: moderator

  ▪ Online Political Communication

    · Mathias-Felipe de-Lima-Santos: „Google News Initiative: The Stimulus of Emerging Technological Innovations in Media Companies"

    · Walid Al-Saqaf: „Potentials of Web 3.0 for News Media: Lessons From Civil, DNN, and Steemit"

    · Hajrudin Hromadžić, Helena Popović: „The Impact of Media Technology on Journalism in a "Post-Enlightenment" Era"

    · Mario Hibert, Bojana Kostić: „The Grammar of

Self-Deregulation: Speech Outside the Platform(s)"

    · Čedomir Markov: moderator

  ▪ Digital Democracy

    · Bruno Frutuoso Costa: „"Return to Censorship": Portuguese Perceptions of Digital Disinformation Regulation"

    · Miloš Kovačević: „Online Deliberation and Personal Identity"

    · Bianca Ferrazza: „The Combination of Psychometric Techniques and Big Data Analytics: Rigging the Political Election's Theater"

    · Dominic Spada: „Digital Technologies, Individualization, and Democracy"

    · Ljubiša Bojić: moderator

  ▪ Techno-Narratives

    · Payel Dutta Chowdhury: „Cultural Posthumanism and AI Takeover: Examining Human–Non-Human Relationships and Body Without Organs (BWO) in Spike Jonze's Sci-Fi film Her"

    · Jelena Mišeljić: „Desktop Films: Posthuman Gaze and Technogenesis in Contemporary Cinema"

    · Sekai Zhou: „Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence and the Novel: Realizing Women's Rights"

    · Jelena Guga: moderatorka

  ▪ Cyber Order

    · Srđan Korać: „Drone is Scrutinizing You: The Utilization of Drone Technology for Performance Control on the Battlefield"

    · Đorđe Krivokapić, Ivona Živković, Andrea Nikolić: „Is Paying the Ransom Ethical

– The Problem of Ransomware Attacks"
- Slađana Ćurčić: „Cybersecurity Culture From the Perspective of Social Cognitive Theory: A Case Study of the COVID-19 Pandemic"
- Luka Glušac: moderator

▪ Postdigital Art and Culture
- Aleksandra Marković, Drago Inđić: „Re-Capturing Creative and Contractual Digital Identity"
- Çağdaş Duman, Imke van Heerden, Anil Bas: „Artificial Intelligence and Authorship Through a Literary Lens"
- Dejan Grba: „The Mechanical Turkness: Tactical Media Art and the Critique of Corporate AI"
- Jelena Novaković: moderatorka

▪ AI in Practice
- Igor V. Pantić, Marija Mišković, Nikolina Banjanin, Ana Benčina, Nikola Topalović, Lazar M. Davidović: „Artificial Intelligence Models for Prediction of Mental Distress From Social Networking Addiction Indicators"
- Sara Major, Aleksandar Tomašević: „Identifying the Face of Populism With Computer Vision: A Deep-Learning Approach to Emotion Recognition"
- Milan Čabarkapa: „Next-Generation User Interface for Vulnerable Groups of Users"
- Marija Mitrović Dankulov: „Collective Knowledge Building in Online Social Networks"
- Vera Mevorah: moderatorka

▪ New Realities
- Shujun Liu, Luke Sloan, Tarek AI Baghal, Matthew Williams, Paulo Serôdio: „Exploring the Association Among Different Types of Twitter Activity, Loneliness Level, and Life Satisfaction"
- Oliver Tošković: „Perceived Distance Anisotropy in Virtual Reality"
- Bojana Dinić, Bojana Bodroža, Tamara Jovanović, Darko Hinić: „Effects of Individual and Social Factors on Social Media Addiction Among Adolescents in Serbia"
- Susan Perry, Claudia Roda, Nicole Santiago, Sienna Colburn: „Gendering Electromagnetic Fields"
- Ljiljana Pantović: „The Business of Umbilical Cord Biobanking in Serbia: Biocapital(Ism) and Symbolic Geographies of Health"
- Ana Lipij: moderatorka
- 17. decembar, subota: Forum – Budućnost čovečanstva vođenog veštačkom inteligencijom

○ Uvodno predavanje – Matteo Cinelli: „Echo Chambers and Polarization in Online Social Media"
○ Panel diskusije:
▪ Echo Chambers as a Threat to Democracy
- Učesnici: Matteo Cinelli, Jörg Matthes, Gazela Pudar Draško, Achim Rettinger, Damian Trilling.

▪ How can We Build Ethical AI? Experiences from the Work Group and Beyond

- · Učesnici: Vladimir Cvetković, Ana Ćorković, Milan Gospić, Claudia Roda, Nevena Ružić.
  - ▪ The Prospects of Metaverse
    - · Učesnici: Jelena Guga, Aleksandra Jovanić, Francesco Parisi, Ivana Uspenski, Dušan Žica.
- ◦ Prezentacije:
  - ▪ Dejana Ugrenović: „What on Earth is Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence?"
  - ▪ A Quick Tour of ML, AI, and Data Science
  - ▪ Uroš Sikimić: „Understanding MetaHumans as a Virtual Identity Standard"
  - ▪ Tiago Peixoto: „Computational Social Sciences and Digital Skills (For Development?)"
  - ▪ Radovan Baćović: „Data High-Way for Researchers"
- ◦ Izložba *AI-Generated Art: Is a Swarm of Bees Happy? Should we Create a Future for Humans or Machines?*

- · 18. decembar, nedelja: Forum – Budućnost čovečanstva vođenog veštačkom inteligencijom
  - ◦ Uvodno predavanje – Michal Kosinski: „The End of Privacy"
  - ◦ Panel diskusije:
    - ▪ Human Rights and Democracy in the Digital Sphere
      - · Učesnici: Grant Baker, Ljubiša Bojić, Michal Kosinski, Čedomir Markov, Susan Perry.
    - ▪ Winners and Losers in the Brave New World of Digitalized Work
      - · Učesnici: Branka Anđelković, Miroljub Ignjatović, Andrej Kohont.
  - ◦ Prezentacije:
    - ▪ Walid Al-Saqaf: „How Telegram is Contributing to Disinformation Related to the War in Ukraine
    - ▪ Nina Khamsky: „New Technologies and Forced Migration"

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Up to two double sheets (60.000 characters including spaces), abstracts, key words, without comments.

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Between 100 and 250 words.

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In the text: (Moriarty 2003: 33).

In a comment: Moriarty 2003: 33.

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In the text: (Miller 1926: 320).

In a comment: Miller 1926: 320.

In the bibliography: Byrd, B. Sharon; Hruschka, Joachim (2008), "From the state of nature to the juridical state of states", *Law and Philosophy* 27 (6): 599–641.

In the text: (Byrd, Hruschka 2008: 603).

In a comment: Byrd, Hruschka 2008: 603.

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In the text: (Harris 2001).

In a comment: Harris 2001.

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Examples:
In the bibliography: Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret (1981), "You can have Sex without Children: Christianity and the New Offer", in *The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe. Ethics, Religion and Politics*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 82–96.

In the text: (Anscombe 1981: 82).

In a comment: Anscombe 1981: 82.

In the bibliography: Romano, Onofrio (2015), "Dépense", in Giacomo D'Alisa, Federico Demaria and Giorgos Kallis (eds.), *Decrecimiento. Un vocabulario para una nueva era*, Barcelona: Icaria editorial, pp. 138–142.

In the text: (Onofrio 2015: 139).

In a comment: Onofrio 2015: 139.

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In the text: (Logar 2009: 12).

In a comment: Logar 2009: 12

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Primeri:

U literaturi: Miller, Johns Roger (1926), „The Ideas as Thoughts of God“, *Classical Philology* 21: 317–326.

Hartman, Nikolaj (1980) „O metodi istorije filozofije“, *Gledišta* 21 (6): 101–120.

U tekstu: (Hartman 1980: 108).

U napomeni: Hartman 1980: 108

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Primer:

U literaturi: Espozito, Džon (prir.) (2002), *Oksfordska istorija islama*, Beograd: Clio.

U tekstu: (Espozito 2002).

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Primer:

U literaturi: Nizbet, Robert (1999), „Jedinične ideje sociologije“, u A. Mimica (prir.), *Tekst i kontekst*, Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, str. 31–48.

U tekstu: (Nizbet 1999: 33).

U napomeni: Nizbet 1999: 33.

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U napomeni: Logar 2009: 12.

13. INTERNET

Prilikom citiranja tekstova s interneta, osim internet-adrese sajta na kojem se tekst nalazi i naslova samog teksta, navesti i datum posete toj stranici, kao i dodatna određenja ukoliko su dostupna (godina, poglavlje i sl.).

Primer:

U literaturi: Ross, Kelley R., „Ontological Undecidability“, (internet) dostupno na: http://www.friesian.com/undecd-1.htm (pristupljeno 2. aprila 2009).

U tekstu: (Ross, internet).

U napomeni: Ross, internet.