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TECHNO-HUMAN CONDITION: INTERACTIONS, MEDIATIONS, SPECULATIONS

The topic of this thematic issue stems from interdisciplinary research conducted at the *Digital Society Lab* of the *Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory* in Belgrade, which focuses on exploring different aspects of technological impact on humans and the ways technologies affect and transform society and culture. Emerging techno-social realities and technologically mediated practices in all spheres of life have opened a wide range of questions, approaches, and issues regarding the role of technology as the mediator of our lives and an integral part of contemporary human condition. What are the effects of our continuous online presence, from social platforms to immersive environments? How do technologically mediated interactions change our perception of subjectivity and identity? What is the role of technology in redefining the notion of human, from human enhancement and radical life extension to the concepts of post-/non-dualism, posthumanism, and non-anthropocentrism? How do everyday interactions with bots, artificial agents, manifestations of AI and other non-human, non-carbon-based organized existence affect us on individual and social level? What are the social, cultural, and ethical issues of technological influence and/or creation of value systems and decision making? Are science fiction narratives, once an inspiration for technological development, now a documentation of our present and a view into a dystopian future? What are the ideologies around technology that are reflected on and expressed through scientific, artistic, and theoretical fields? What should be further, novel methodological and theoretical reflections on issues of techno-human condition? Our continuous interaction with and reliance on technology have transgressed the boundaries between the virtual and the real, human and non-human, biological and technological, and culture and nature, resulting in the emergence of hybrid identities and lifeworlds, novel ways of communication, human enhancement, artificial agents and networks, big data,

surveillance capitalism, blockchain technologies, and other phenomena of the (post)digital culture and society.

The issue brings together four papers from different fields of digital anthropology, social psychology, communication studies, cognitive science, and media studies. Nemanja Nikolić, Ljubiša Bojić, and Lana Tucaković address the impact of the brain-machine interface on understanding subjectivity through psychodynamic psychology and philosophy. Smiljana Antonijević and Jeff Ubois examine the limits and possibilities of meaningful digital media preservation. Simona Žikić's paper looks into the ways technology has influenced and transformed communication by focusing on construction of identity of both human and non-human agents. Finally, Ivana Uspenski and Jelena Guga bring together media theory and 4E cognitive theories in order to explore the effects of social immersive environments, namely the Metaverse, on human experience. Although the topics presented in these papers may seem unrelated at first glance, what they all have in common is a critical reflection on relations between humans and technology and exploration of technological impact both within these respective fields and in a wider social, political, economic, and cultural context.

Nemanja Nikolić, Ljubiša Bojić and Lana Tucaković

BRAIN-MACHINE INTERFACE: NEW CHALLENGE FOR HUMANITY[1]

ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to clarify specific aspects of the impact of the brain-machine interface on our understanding of subjectivity. The brain-machine interface is presented as a phase of cyborgization of humans. Some projects in the field of brain-machine interface are aimed at enabling consensual telepathy – communication without symbolic mediation. Consensual telepathy refers to one of potential ways of transmission of information within singularity. Therefore, consensual telepathy is an important aspect of singularity. Singularity or human-machine symbiosis shows some similarities with child-mother unity. Therefore, the psychodynamic perspective might be considered useful in thinking about human-machine symbiosis. Knowledge from developmental psychodynamic psychology combined with insights by Slavoj Žižek and Jean Baudrillard provides an additional perspective looking at human-machine symbiosis. The paper claims that if consensual telepathy becomes another way of communication, it will have the potential to annihilate subjectivity making it schizophrenic. At the same time, we look at the possibility of an escape from our inner world through the prism of addictions.

KEYWORDS
brain-machine interface, consensual telepathy, subjectivity, human-machine symbiosis, symbolic mediation, singularity

Introduction

In 2016 at a tech conference, Elon Musk (CEO of SpaceX and Tesla) was asked to share his thoughts on perceived threats caused by rapid development in the domain of artificial intelligence. According to Musk's prognosis, humans are

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going to be perceived by AI as pets (Cuthbertson 2019). In order to avoid that hypothetical possibility, he claims that we must go for the merger of human beings and technology. That way machines and humans will become unique organisms. In other words, our societies must take into consideration "human-machine symbiosis". If the human race does not accept integration with AI, it will lead to a catastrophic scenario in which humans are going to be a subordinate caste governed by omnipotent AI.

Musk is not an isolated proponent of that course of action, with the aim to prevent a global dystopian society in which algorithms are gods. Along with Musk's company, Neuralink, dedicated to developing the bond between mind/brain and machine, some other well-known private companies and organizations share similar aspirations, such as Facebook, Kernel, Emotiv, DARPA (Gent 2017).

Does Musk's solution to the recognized threat set a stage for something that is going to be a much greater threat for humanity, one that is overlooked at this very moment? How symbiosis with machines is going to affect our core sense of self? Is subjectivity going to be radically reinvented, along with its traditionally considered properties? Will direct proximity of the reality increase addictions and how will this relate to happiness? These are legitimate philosophical questions to be asked.

Placing the brain-machine interface as a central problem triggers a wide range of questions from a variety of domains: technical, medical, psychological, sociological, political, and economic. Therefore, the main aim of this paper is to clarify hypothetical outcomes of brain-machine interface (BMI) on subjectivity. In other words, how the idea of "consensual telepathy", if materialistic (technological) circumstances make its realization possible, is going to affect our communication and consequently our understanding of subjectivity. In order to provide some answers to this question, the paper is based on insights from Slavoj Žižek, Jean Baudrillard, and psychodynamic developmental psychology. Firstly, we shall give a brief review of the current state of affairs in the field of brain-machine interface and how development in the field brought cyborgization to a whole new level.

On Becoming Cyborgs: The Current State in the Field

Donna Haraway pointed out in her essay that our digital, high-tech, culture radically problematizes dualism between machine and human subject (Haraway 2016: 60). The ubiquitous digital technologies have become a constitutive force in shaping our reality and our sense of self, amplifying our sense of connection to electrical devices as well. People very intimately experience their avatars on social media and characters in video games with whom they identify. Therefore, all these give support to Haraway's statement that the demarcation line is fluid and that rigorously understood binary opposition between human subject and machine is not sustainable. Human integration with AI-powered devices is transforming previous ideas of progress and control, as digital users

become overlooked, analyzed, directed, and cared for by algorithms, according to Nowotny (2021). We are already cyborgs due to the growing dependence on digital technologies. Some facts confirm this, such as the number of smartphone users globally, which is predicted to reach 3.8 billion in 2021. Also, the fact that 99.3% of all internet users in China go online through their mobile devices. Additionally 47% of US smartphone users stated they couldn't live without their devices, while 10.66% are addicted to their phones (Georgiev 2021).

Sherry Turkle discusses the influence of digital technologies on its users, more specifically what is their role in understanding a concept of identity. In other words, how "computer age" supports the shift of traditionally understood identity as a stable, uniform entity towards a more fluid, "chimerical" as Haraway would say, concept of identity. She even attached a metaphysical status to machines, wanting to emphasize their transformative power. Having said that, personal computers are more than mere tools we use, but "metaphysical machines" that have an impact on how we think about our psychology (Turkle 2005: 21).

There is an explicit attitude that through interaction with gadgets, people are being changed. Such as a finding that smartphones use decrease our capacity to use other media, which may relate to capability of receiving and expressing emotions, the notion that needs to be explored further (Bojić et al. 2013; Bojić (2022).

The next step is to overcome the existing barriers in communication between users and machines. Elon Musk pointed out that our interactions with machines are reduced to typing on the screen, using keyboard and mouse, or just sending voice commands, pointing out that all of these ways are "very slow". Constraints related to input-output can be solved by the implementation of "neural lace" (digital layer above the cortex) technology. It means that humans will be in direct, unmediated contact with other human beings. If that speculation becomes fully materialized, we would be able to communicate with each other only by thoughts, with no need of using symbolic code. This is one of the most speculative ideas related to the field of brain-machine interface, which demands critical reflection.

Brain-machine interface (BMI) or brain-computer interface (BCI), terms can be used interchangeably, for the first time was introduced into a scientific community by Jacques Vidal in an annual review *Toward direct brain-computer communication* (Vidal 1973). Back then, the brain-computer interface project started with the aim to evaluate the possibility of utilization of neural signals in human-machine interaction, while at the same time developing a specific tool that would be implemented in neurophysiological research (Vidal 1973: 157). The brain-machine interface is taking a significant share of the global market. Its value is estimated to be US$1.72 billion in 2022 due to increasing application in a variety of sectors: medicine, military, video game industry, etc. (Lushetich 2020: 206).

Advocates of BMI claim that technological innovations in the field have the potential to help people with a wide range of clinical disorders (Musk,

Neuralink 2019). Achievements in BMI are very promising as a part of neurological rehabilitation, finding their purpose in curing patients with neuromuscular problems (Daly, Wolpaw 2008). Janis Daly and Jonathan Wolpaw show that non-invasive, EEG-based BMI technologies can be used to control a computer cursor or a limb orthosis. Therefore, BMI technologies have shown their relevance in developing neuroprosthetic devices that can restore impaired bodily mobility due to some specific neurological disorders or loss of limb. Along with implementation in treating neuromuscular diseases, BMI is being implemented in treating patients with impaired sensory systems - hearing and vision (Fujikado 2016). Vision restoration is now possible by implementing BMI (Niketeghad, Pouratian 2019). The progress is observable in developing cortical visual prosthetics and going in the direction of creating an artificial retina (Muratore, Chichilnisky 2020). BMI is used in decoding neural signals and translating them into audible speech in patients with impaired speech function (Anumanchipalli et al. 2019). Besides restoration of lost motor and sensory functions, maturing of the field stresses an opportunity to extend the implementation to other domains. There is an idea to implement BMI in the field of neuropsychiatry for the purpose of treating patients who have impaired emotional regulation, which is one of the main characteristics of affective disorders (Shanechi 2019). If that project succeeds, it should be expected that BMI will take a significant place in psychiatry in treating mental disorders in which the biological substrate is well examined.

Nevertheless, there are a considerable number of obstacles that need to be resolved before fully functional neuroprosthetic devices can be created, such as the development of biocompatible electrodes capable of long-term, stable recording of brain activity (Lebedev et al. 2011; Patil, Turner 2008). Discussing technical procedures in BMI requires specific technical knowledge and goes beyond the scope of the paper. What is important to notice is that the development of BMI technologies goes in the direction towards a more invasive technologies, which implies the direct insertion of electrodes into the cortex to register neural activity i.e., to decode neural signals. Neuralink is one of the companies that made enormous progress in this field. They have developed a neurosurgical robot that is able to insert a device containing arrays of small and flexible electrode threads, with around 3,072 electrodes per array distributed across 96 threads (Musk, Neuralink, 2019). Neurosurgical robots optimize surgical procedures due to their advantage in precision and speed compared to human neurosurgeons. Neurosurgical robots are capable of inserting large numbers of ultra-fine polymer probes into the cortex avoiding damage to brain vasculature (Musk, Neuralink 2019). Recent innovations in this field make it possible to simultaneously cover and record signals from multiple brain regions, or in other words, multichannel neural signal processing (Hashemi 2020).

Herein, we provided a brief review of the state of affairs in the BMI research related mostly to the medical field. In addition to the implementation of BMI in different branches of medicine, there are scientific research projects that are being realized in the military context, but they are considered classified,

and due to that, their results are not available to the general public. Another great opportunity for the implementation of BMI is the entertainment industry, more precisely the video gaming industry. BMI makes mind-controlled gaming possible. Users are able to manipulate virtual objects only by thinking about them (Keisuke 1995; Raajan, Jayabhavani 2013). Art as a means of communication and expression is going to be reconsidered in a new light due to BMI (Rowland 2021). An image reconstructed from the brain activity and presented to others may be seen as an artistic product. The content of one's consciousness becomes an artistic artifact.

We have presented various uses of BMI. Based on this we can classify BMI applications into primary communication with machines, for example when a person uses BMI to control robotic arm or avatar in gaming, and primary communication with other humans, which is otherwise called consensual telepathy. It was previously noted that being dependent on digital tools already transforms humans into cyborgs. This statement is problematic in the sense that, since the dawn of humanity, there have been many technological inventions on which we as a species have been dependent. It opens up a room for debate to what extent humans are cyborgs if we think in a broader, more abstract sense. Smartphones, extensions of self as Marshall McLuhan would say, and our constant *online* presence support our transformation into cyborgs. Social media reinvented the way we communicate, making it possible to transcend limitations in terms of space and time. Besides, we have the opportunity to constantly modify the virtual persona that represents us in the digital realm. Along with social media, there are numerous sensor based apps programmed to monitor some physical and mental parameters.

Brain-machine interface renders the idea of cyborg more concrete. Implementation of microchips directly into the cortical tissue would be the clearest "physical evidence" of cyborgization of human subjects. The idea of the cyborg has been a part of literary genres such as cyberpunk and sci-fi. While it has been present in the collective imagination, the cyborgization becomes fully actualized in our times. The idea of transhumanism is at the core of brain-machine interface (BMI) projects. For example, Irvin John Good (1965) wrote that an ultraintelligent machine can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man. In that context, BMI is able to surpass and extend human capabilities.

The main goal of transhumanists is to employ technology in order to enhance human capacities and to transcend bodily limitations, which in the end should provide immortality to humans (Drexler 1985; Fukuyama 2002; Ettinger 1972; Bostrom 1998). This would be in other words, a triumph over aging and death. Therefore, transhumanism represents a very anthropocentric *Weltanschauung* placing a human subject into the mere center, and technology is considered as a mere instrument that should provide greater well-being and opportunity for actualization of all potentials. In order to obtain promised well-being and self-actualization, the human subject ought to be considered as a "bridge" that leads to the cyborg – a transhumanist interpretation of the Nietzschean concept of Übermensch (Nietzsche 1902). A question here is, if we have on

our mind speculations and projects that go in the direction of making "consensual telepathy" possible, as means of communication, when and how the transhumanist's aspirations are going to alter the very notion of being human.

Žižek clearly pointed out that these techno-naive *phantasmata* in which direct participation in others' subjective experience bypassing the use of symbolic communication is going to affect our being-human (Žižek 2020: 27). This would be the point where technology is going to radically change our experience of self-understanding. Can we expect that the human subject is going to persist as the highest value or this idea would be rejected as such?

Another question of the transformation relates to growing addictions. Knowing that the process of addiction involves escape from our frustrations and unresolved emotions to some other activity (Bojić 2013), would addictions increase even more given the fact that the escape to the virtual world would be so close? In fact, we would be merged with the "virtual machine induced world" all the time.

It is evident that implementation of BMI technologies in order to achieve consensual telepathy is at the very beginning. There is some research in the field, but far away from achieving full telepathic transmission of the content of consciousness between subjects at this very moment (Grau et al. 2014). Nevertheless, this is not itself a valid argument for not investigating potential consequences on subjectivity, especially if we have in mind rapid development of BMI technologies, which puts us in a position that we don't have enough consideration of something new, especially from the perspective of social science and philosophy, before it becomes possible.

Cancelling out Borders

The idea of "consensual telepathy" supported by the brain-machine interface radically problematizes an idea of borders. It is not only a matter of the aforementioned borders between humans and machines. It goes further from that and tackles the mere ontology – borders between subjectivity and the external objects.

Consensual telepathy implies that we will be able to directly observe one's phenomenology. Content of one's consciousness will be shared with others with no need of employing words. Consensual telepathy represents the way of transmission of information within singularity. A concept used by Ray Kurzweil to designate "new subjective experience of being immersed in a space of collective mind" (Žižek 2020: 24). Singularity, as Ray Kurzweil exposed it in his book *The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology*, is going to annihilate "a distinction between human and machine or between physical and virtual reality" (Kurzweil 2005: 18). What Kurzweil missed here is to notice that not only the distinction between human and machine is going to disappear, but the distinction between the inner world and external objects is going to fade away.

Looking through the prism of developmental psychology, the existence of borders between intrapsychic and interpersonal is a necessary prerequisite for

expected development towards a more stable personality with the capacity for integration of experience. The existence of relatively solid borders between the subjective inner world and external objects are not given by birth. Borders are not an innate feature, as common sense assumes. Hence, establishing borders between the inner mental world and external reality is a developmental task. Borders arise from child interactions with objects from external reality (Piaget 1929/1971: 34).

Speaking in a strictly psychological sense, establishing borders that differentiate the self from external reality is of crucial relevance for constituting subjectivity. Therefore, Margaret Mahler, physician and psychoanalyst, in her separation–individuation theory insisted on the metaphor of "psychological birth" (Mahler et al. 2002). Psychological birth implies that a child possesses distinct self-representations and object-representations (representations of caregivers, i.e., a person who is the most present in children's earliest experience and takes care of a child). Children gradually become more autonomous in their psychomotor and cognitive functions and achieve more independence for themselves in the course of their life. At the end of the separation-individuation process, children can maintain a reliable sense of individual identity, which is important in terms of mental health. A child that is stuck in a symbiotic phase is incapable of discerning inner experience from external reality. In the symbiotic phase, the child takes the mother's body for granted as a simple extension of its own (Fink 1996: 55). The child experiences mother and it as one – undifferentiated unity, and it leads toward symbiotic psychosis.

Symbiotic psychosis represents a chaotic state, which is characterized by the fusion of intrapsychic content with those from external reality. According to Jacques Lacan, psychosis is the result of the absence of "Name-of-the-Father". In Lacan's terminology, this concept is used to designate the importance of the inauguration of the paternal metaphor, i.e., the paternal function between child and mother. Name-of-the-Father i.e., paternal metaphor has the role to regulate a mother's desire for a child and child access to mother as well. This intrusion of paternal metaphor is developmentally inevitable in order to liberate a child from direct, unmediated contact with the mother. By paternal metaphor, the child is being introduced to the symbolic realm and adopts symbolic function (Lacan 1955/56: 83). Adoption of symbolic function helps a child to make a distance between itself and its mother. The subject who adopted symbolic function is capable of realizing a distinction between signifier and signified, words and things. The subject is no longer imprisoned in a symbiotic undifferentiated unity but emancipated in language. In other words, the subject is being psychologically born and progressively becomes able for meaningful symbolic interaction with others.

Having that in mind, thinking is possible when the subject/the child is anchored in language, i.e., stepped into the symbolic order. It does not mean that a psychotic subject is fully incapable of adopting a language. He or she does assimilate a language, but "cannot come to be in language in the same way as a neurotic subject" (Fink 1996: 55). Some psychotic subjects do not show

structural deviation in their speech (Chaika 1990: 51). They mostly have troubles in the domain of semantics, i.e., the domain of meanings. In their speech, some meanings are being too fixed while others are being far too loose (Hill 1997).

Although they have theoretical disagreements related to cognitive development, Piaget (1997) and Vygotsky (1977), agree that conceptual thinking and language are intertwined cognitive functions. Our thoughts are being tailored by the symbolic code of the sociolinguistic community to which subject belongs. It is almost impossible to think outside of language. It will be stressed again, "Thinking always begins from our position within symbolic order" (Fink 1996: 24).

Alluding to complex relations between language (symbols) and thinking (thoughts), Žižek rightly accused Elon Musk of missing a whole point in his attempts to present thoughts as absolutely pure forms unpolluted by language. Musk's premise that thoughts are present in our mind independently of their expression in language is completely unfounded (Žižek 2009: 45).

Consensual telepathy is imagined to be direct, unmediated communication by thoughts. "Consensual" means that a person must actively consent to it (Žižek 2009: 51). This opens a wide range of questions about privacy, individuality, autonomy, that will be discussed later in the text. What should be emphasized here is that consensual telepathy by canceling out usages of words cancels out subjectivity. Some main determinants of humanity – symbols/words, which have been presented as constitutive for subjectivity, are going to be unnecessary in communication. How to conceptualize subjectivity in the non-symbolic world determined by consensual telepathy? Before further hypothetical elaboration on these questions, another important aspect of BMI's impact on subjectivity should be clarified.

Subjects joined to a machine are able to move virtual objects on a computer screen, change TV stations, or move artificial limbs by thoughts. In other words, the intentionality of such subjects is reduced to a single (cognitive) activity – thinking. For a subject that is connected to a machine, it is quite enough to strongly focus thoughts on some particular object in order to move it. This is to some extent analogous to a phenomenon that is developmentally expected at the preoperational stage of cognitive development. It's about the phenomenon of magical thinking. Magical and animistic thinking are features of the preoperational stage of cognitive development. They are consequences of the immature concept of borders between the inner and the external world (Meares, Orlay 1988: 313). Patterns of magical thinking also can be identified at those with obsessive-compulsive disorders to those with more severe psychiatric diagnoses such as schizophrenia (Bolton et al. 2002; Einstein et al. 2004; García-Montes et al. 2014). Therefore, BMI supported "telekinesis" could possibly encourage magical thinking and relativize borders between inner and outer reality which could resemble psychosis.

Again, if we return to the issue of addictions and their potential impact to expression, the new BMI integrated human being may slowly lose capability to express in language, at least in written symbols, the issue which will be examined

in next chapter. However, the real question that comes out of previously noted literature is how this possibility to escape the inner world in an instant would affect imagination, creativity and the depth of emotions in this new world.

Subjectivity in a World without Symbols

Being psychologically born implies that the inner world of the subject is being colonized by symbols which by definition come from the place of "Other". In other words, subjectivity comes into being by internalizing symbols. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that "consensual telepathy" could be considered as a return to the initial (pre-symbolic) state.

Does symbiosis between human and machine resemble symbiosis between child and mother? If so, is it then possible to talk about subjectivity in strictly psychological terms at all? Drawing a parallel with child-mother unity, subjectivity in singularity potentially might be marked as psychotic, i.e., schizophrenic.

Schizophrenic subjectivity is a consequence of accelerated communication, which is accelerated to the extent that symbolic exchange is excluded. Namely, Baudrillard in his texts did not directly refer to the brain-machine interface. Nevertheless, the brain-machine interface could be considered as a simulacrum, computer-generated reality (Baudrillard 1994). This postmodern philosopher and sociologist remains a relevant commentator of the world characterized by loss of referent in reality.

In a text, *The Ecstasy of Communication*, Baudrillard himself, used a concept from psychopathology to depict a state of terror characterized by over-proximity of all things (Baudrillard 1987: 27). "Schizophrenic is open to everything and lives in the most extreme confusion" (Baudrillard 1987: 27). Baudrillard recognized that the pain and suffering that the subject experiences, comes from forced "extraversion of all interiority and from forced introjection of all exteriority" that became a categorical imperative of communication (Baudrillard 1987: 26). Metaphors that Baudrillard used such as screen and network are useful heuristic tools to think on the schizophrenic subjectivity. These metaphors are alluding to the transparency of schizophrenics. The schizophrenic subject is reduced to the mere surface, which is interconnected with other surfaces in the global network of surfaces.

Baudrillard's choice to use the term, which originates from the psychiatric nosological system, to depict his vision of subjectivity, before the advent of the World Wide Web and social media, could be understood as a good indicator of his ability to foresee in which direction possibly subjectivity may be transformed. Relativization of borders supported by digitalization and increasing pervasion of virtual into reality leads toward abolishing borders between those two. The shift towards a more accelerated and more complex way of interaction made the subject unable to repress. Hence, Baudrillard was right in attributing psychotic status to subjectivity. Fragile borders between internal and external, transparency and a sense that others could read one's thoughts are clear marks of a psychotic state.

What is going to happen with traditionally understood properties of subjectivity after the advent of singularity? Could we talk about individuality? Technology has so far increased our individuality, making us alienated monads. As Žižek pointed out, "technology introduced additional layers in our exchange with others" (Žižek 2009: 51). Consensual telepathy supported by brain-machine interfaces will do the reverse. All those "additional layers", that are amongst subjects involved in communication, are going to be abolished and distance minimized. But we must bear in mind that the new technology will also provide a link towards the virtual world and direct communication in an instant, if we presume that we would be able to communicate as human beings with our smartphones as well. This would mean operating the smartphone through our mind. Therefore, the direct communication would be reinforced. Paradoxically, technology that once reinforced individuality makes it disappear now.

Being entirely immersed into the collective mind, as singularity is conceptualized, means an end to privacy as well. The space for privacy will be getting narrower. Privacy in singularity will be sacrificed in the name of transparency. The problem that arises from questioning the status of individuality and privacy is to what extent can we be considered autonomous? In other words, to what extent are we free from machines?

The modern meaning of autonomous, rational subjectivity has its roots in Descartes's philosophy (Descartes 1967). Dynamic unconscious, which was introduced by psychoanalysis, challenges the idea of being the master in one's own house. In other words, the dynamic unconscious directly opposes the idea of autonomous, rational subjectivity. The subject's thoughts, emotions, and actions are determined by unconscious dynamics. In a seemingly contradictory way, the dynamic unconscious that has represented a great obstacle to the traditional understanding of autonomous subjectivity potentially is going to represent a little oasis of autonomy while we are in symbiosis with machines. The dynamic unconscious, a reservoir of our drives, deepest fears, fantasies, is the only place to which is guaranteed a certain degree of autonomy. Ergo, the dynamic unconscious could be considered as the only segment of our subjectivity that will elude singularity.

Introducing the dynamic unconscious in discussion on subjectivity returns us to the mere beginning, as previously discussed, the necessity of borders between internal psychic life and external reality. Something that is repressed into the dynamic unconscious is saturated with meaning that waits to be integrated into a symbolic narrative. Therefore, a minimum distance between subject and machine is a necessary condition for some sort of autonomy. Autonomy of subjectivity will be based on idiosyncrasies of our unconscious life. The logic of the unconscious will stay indecipherable to machines.

Instead of a Conclusion

Notions related to the rapid development in the domain of artificial intelligence, that humans could be overreached by machines, serve to some techno-gurus,

as Žižek prefers to call them, as a good reason to propose solutions such as human-machine symbiosis. The Brain-machine interface brought the cyborgization of humans to a whole new level and made the idea of cyborgs more concrete. Some projects in the field of brain-machine interface go in the direction of making communication by thoughts possible. However, we are still far away technologically from fully transmitting experiences to other human beings without symbolic mediation. Nevertheless, the paper critically examined the hypothetical possibility of consensual telepathy. Consensual telepathy could radically change the way we interact with the world and think about ourselves.

In singularity, we are going to be completely immersed with machines. Symbiosis with machines resembles the symbiosis of mother and child. Being one in singularity undermines the intersubjective dimension of human experience. Besides that, symbiosis with machines undermines borders between intrapsychic life and external reality that could trigger an experience essentially similar to psychosis.

Drawing some conclusions about what is going to happen to subjectivity if singularity becomes an option requires us to search for some analogies, which can provide us with knowledge in order to predict some possible outcomes. Therefore, some important aspects of child-mother symbiosis were pointed out, joined with insights from Žižek and Baudrillard.

Does singularity then presuppose a schizophrenic subjectivity? How to maintain a minimum distance towards a machine-generated collective mind? What will take the role of "paternal metaphor" to liberate us from the complete absorption into machines? In the end, how the new constellation of things, if we are capable of escaping our inner world in an instant through the BMI, will affect addictions, imagination, and creativity? These are just some questions that have arisen in the course of the paper that deserve further theoretical examination.

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Nemanja Nikolić, Ljubiša Bojić i Lana Tucaković

Interfejs mozak-mašina: novi izazov za čovečanstvo

Apstrakt

Cilj ovog rada je da razjasni neke specifične aspekte koji se odnose na uticaj interfejsa mozak-mašina na naše razumevanje subjektivnosti. Interfejs mozak-mašina predstavljen je kao faza u kiborgizaciji ljudi. Određeni projekti u oblasti interfejs mozak-mašina imaju za cilj da omoguće uspostavljanje konsenzualne telepatije – komunikacije bez simboličkog posredovanja. Konsenzualna telepatija upućuje na jedan od mogućih načina transmisije informacija unutar singularnosti. Stoga, konsenzualna telepatija predstavlja važan aspekt singularnosti. Singularnost ili simbioza čovek-mašina pokazuje neke sličnosti sa jedinstvom deteta i majke. Stoga bi se psihodinamska perspektiva mogla pokazati korisna u razmišljanju o simbiozi čovek-mašina. Znanje iz razvojne psihodinamske psihologije u kombinaciji sa uvidima Slavoja Žižeka i Žana Bodrijara treba da pruži dodatnu perspektivu gledanja na simbiozu između ljudi i mašina. Stav iznet u radu je da ukoliko konsenzualna telepatija postane mogući način komunikacije, imaće potencijal da uništi subjektivnost čineći je shizofrenom.U isto vreme, mogućnost brzog bega od našeg unutruašnjeg sveta posmatramo kroz prizmu zavisnosti.

Ključne reči: mozak-mašina interfejs, konsenzualna telepatija, subjektivnost, simbioza čovek-mašina, simbolička medijacija, singularnost.

Simona Žikić

HOW TECHNOLOGY IMPACTS COMMUNICATION AND IDENTITY-CREATION[1]

ABSTRACT
The basic thesis of this paper is that communication is a fundamental activity of all human practices and that identity is constructed with the help of communication. Defining identity cannot be explained and understood exclusively from the standpoint of philosophy, sociology, political science or psychology. Given that the Latin root of the word communication, *communio*, refers to community, we can say that communication as a science best covers the relationships that people establish within the community such as schools, families, work environment, social networks and forums. The activity of communication is the establishment of a community, i.e., sociability. To communicate means to unite something – to bring one's actions into harmony with the community and with social life. In that sense, communication is in its essence a transition from the individual to the collective.

In addition, any specific form of communication depends on the wider cultural and socio-political environment in which modern people operate. This paper aims to explore the impact of technology on individual identity, to answer questions about whether robots can have the same characteristics as personalities, and whether, and in what way, machines have an impact on people. The reason for asking such questions is the decision of the Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament to pass a law that will grant autonomous robots the status of "electronic personalities".

KEYWORDS
communication, identity, personality, language, technology

Introduction

Communication is the process of exchanging information through an agreed system of signs. It is a constant companion of human activity and it is involved in almost all human behavior. Furthermore, communication is a human need, because in order for a person to survive, she must communicate with other

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people. This process is very intense, complex and diverse. One constantly communicates with others and/or imagines communication with them.

Ever since the ancient times communication has undoubtedly been the most precious skill that human being have developed. All interaction between humans takes place through some kind of communication; thus, it is a catalyst essential for the emergence, functioning and progress of all types of communities. This mutual exchange of meanings between humans takes place mainly through language (an agreed system of signs) and is possible only to the extent that individuals have common knowledge, needs and attitudes.

A simple definition of communication should refer to the use of signs in order to transact in general and common information about a subject, object or situation. Although explicit language is the most important means of communication between humans, the process also includes a broader concept of languages: those of winking, nodding, smiling, moving, shrugging, waving, etc. Such non-explicit languages also convey information, i.e. thoughts, feelings and beliefs, and they sometimes do so more effectively than the explicit language (Davidson 1991).

Communication is a process that involves an interaction between the people who communicate, and this interaction occurs on a variety of levels, only one of which is strictly linguistic or couched in explicit statements. When one communicates, one never reacts only to the words one hears; rather one attempts to penetrate the other person's psychic reality, their feelings, thoughts and dispositions. Thus context is key to communication: whatever the explicit content of the messages exchanged in the process, they will only be successfully received if there is a general congruence between the sender's and the recipient's experiences of the world.

While this is not the place to enter into complex Kantian debates about the nature of the reality we experience, the 'thing in itself' and the representation, from a basically functionalist point of view the way in which we understand (our) are largely determined by our structural experiences, namely our experiences that arise from our relationships with others, both those in the present and in the past. Having been born into a language reality with already determined categories and conceptual frameworks used by our community, we reproduce those concepts daily. This means that our membership in our community constitutes a foundation of our 'Weltanschauung', our view of the world, and our sense of reality.

Although language is the basis and content of communication, a wide field of communication research includes human communication practices in their sociological, cultural, anthropological, psychological, political and philosophical dimensions. If communication is understood as a cultural phenomenon, then it can be viewed as a perspective that partly determines all cultural practices. Thus culture can be seen both as the content and method of communication, including not only language, but also cultural practices such as clothing, food, social behavior, social emotions, the various mannerisms involved in transport, in the community's rituals, etc.

Everything I have mentioned so far suggests that communication is not only a basic process of socialization, but also a fundamental facet of identity-formation (Mandić 2003). In fact, it is best described as a process of creating connections between humans; communication is an organic, living dynamics of life-long learning how to effectively establish social structure, namely relationships. In the explicit part of this process, access to information is provided by language, understood in a broader sense as a set of all signifying systems, including images and symbols. Moreover, language is also a source of social values. If language transmits knowledge and values that construct a culture and/or community, then we derive from this that existing meanings are not left to our decisions. Accurate reproduction of existing meanings is also confirmation of the values that exist before us, affirmation of the knowledge that our community and culture imply and consequently, the norms of the previous generation. Therefore, language is not only a method of expressing thoughts, but also a factor that, through its patterns, determines perception, way of thinking, worldview and form of behavior, while awareness of such a character of language usually does not exist.

Jürgen Habermas (Habermas 1979) states that people live in communities, that they have always done so and that they will most likely continue to do so in the future; emphasizing that he bases his philosophy on the principle that person is a social being. He states that communication is a necessary practice for the human race. We communicate to achieve mutual understanding on which the coordination of our mutual social relations is based and on which it depends. Habermas sees the answer to the question of what conditions communication must meet to achieve his goal, enabling and attaining mutual understanding (Habermas 1991). According to him, everyone who is involved in a certain action has the right to participate in communication about it. Thus the very foundation of 'participative democracy' is associated to deliberative democracy; both converge on the role of language and communication as a relationship building function in society.

The way a person perceives itself will largely determine the way it will perceive another person, as well as the model of communication with that person. The so-called self-assessment implies a person's image of itself and represents what that person is. The image of oneself may or may not coincide with the opinion of other humans, because it is formed and developed from relationships with other people (conversation, dialogue, word communication). Humans have always appreciated each other, and they mostly do that by observing them during the first meeting, and then every next one. Verbal and non-verbal communication is assessed, so perception thus represents predictions and speculations about a person based on prejudices, knowledge and experience (Gahagen 1978: 15–57).

In interpersonal communication, people also assess the other person's emotional state, his/her/they opinion of the person, conclusions about social, professional and family status, but also about intentions, value system and life attitudes. With the help of interpersonal communication, we get to know a

person and form an opinion about whether it is pleasant or not, sweet or not, dominant or withdrawn, good or bad, and the like. Thus, in interpersonal communication, the analysis of a certain communication situation does not have to be closely related to the message or information, but, for example, to the expectations that a person expresses through its communication behavior (Mandić 2003). In addition, through the establishment of relationships triggered by effective communication new emotions are developed, specifically the social emotions which connect people at a more integrated level (solidarity, trust, empathy, loyalty, etc.).

Today we communicate with the help of phones, applications and the Internet. We transmit messages via email and satellite. We share our attitudes, thoughts and feelings on social networks. We are able to communicate via the internet and walk and talk in cyberspace. Our interaction takes place with the help of video games, so we become parts of virtual reality. All of this makes the time in which we live into an age of communication.

In my view, the key problem with communication that is mediated by modern technology is a particular paradox. On the one hand technology appears to make expression easier and more immediate: it appears to emancipate the voices that, without modern technology, would have likely been unable to gain a hearing in the public space. This is the reason communication technology is often hailed as a benefit to human liberty and ability to participate in public discourses on a variety of issues, thus also contributing to a more democratic character of the public space itself. However, on the other hand, communication mediated by technology, while apparently fostering brief forms and thus accelerating understanding, in fact often stifles true understanding. It is the assumption that, if we communicate, we automatically understand each other, that causes many social, psychological and political issues associated with the blurring of identities that arises from technology, which fragments communication.

Associated with the above is the process of homogenization, where the immense impact generated by the social media and numerous affirmations of certain views (through 'likes', 'reshares' and other types of technological endorsement) generate numerous new themes on which there are standards of 'political correctness', prior to, or even without, first obtaining even the minimum of necessary information to form a credible opinion. This is the case with new ideologies based on group interests, which dominate the public space, as well as issues of current affairs in politics, international relations, security, health, etc.

A good example of this is the creation of identity images based on technology-mediated communication, where relationships of various types are established between the digital images (the digital self), rather than the real persons who interact. In the current information age, the digital self is arguably more important than the real self, because social transactions (social identities as they are perceived by employers, professional subjects, the state institutions, etc.) are based on internet searches, database-derived profiles and other markers of a digital self. The digital self does not necessarily correspond to the real

self, nor do the parameters specifically designed to generate a sense of the person's identity in the digital space really reflect the true identity of that person. Someone can have extremely low achievement level according to the digital parameters, for example, and be an exemplary human being, an exemplary helper, or teacher. However, this type of understanding of identity remains unavailable in the digital space.

If the goal of communication is to achieve a complete and comprehensive understanding, then all parties that are involved or in some way suffer the consequences of an action of this deficiency in the digital perception of the person and her identity, simply for the reason that the person is never reducible to her digital identity. It is interesting that in helping scientific disciplines, when it comes to taking care of ourselves, we rely on dialogue and conversation, which is the legacy of Greek philosophers. Somehow, we always return to the conversation about organic, 'real' relationships when we talk about true communication, which is traditionally expected to be able to heal misunderstanding by offering authentic persons in a genuine interaction – something that technology can only partially achieve.

The process of communication always takes place through the media – air, books, television, the Internet and more. The development of the civilization we know simultaneously developed the process of communication, especially in the field of interpersonal communication, which aims to develop levels of interactivity. The futuristic concept of uniqueness was invented by one of the most famous engineers and techno-prophets Ray Kurzweil (Kurzweil 2001) and he calls it transhumanism. Thus, it is said that life is less dependent on oxygen or water, but relies solely on information. Google is considered to be the first conduit of what defines the driving force of humanity: information (Kurzweil 2005). That information, which, as an atheistic deity, allegedly found its ideal special operative form in numerical language, as it enables us to fulfill our "posthuman" destiny. Thus, every form of human cognition and expression can be experienced as digital information.

Identity

The question of identity is pertinent to all scientific disciplines, especially the social sciences and humanities. Defining a person's identity requires that we know and understand all the processes and ways of an individual's communication with other individuals through the life cycles. Being human, driven by instincts, would mean following only our own needs, without, according to Freud (Freud 2009), looking at the mechanisms that a human being has, which related to the person's inner need for other people. That is why it is not easy to understand and define the person as 'a being'. We must consider the relevant processes that are inside and outside the individual. In the descriptions of psychoanalysis as a part of psychological and psychiatric practice, the unconscious in person is a question that is being researched. Thus, the contents of the unconscious in an individual are often determined by the moral standards

of the communities in which the human being develops. This brings us to the explanation of many psychologists: the forbidden need of an individual is always detected in some other relationships or circumstances because it is thus strengthened and remains in the deeper layers of human consciousness.

On the other hand, Lacan said that "desire is always the desire of the Other" because it comes from speech that the individual does not control; desires are beyond human consciousness, that is, "the discourse of the Other is unconscious" (Lacan 1983). He also states that the desire of the individual appears separately from the need of person, which makes a turn in relation to Freud's interpretation of the Ego (Lacan 1983). However, according to Freud, it unconsciously directs an individual's behavior: what is reflected in everyday behavior, interests, dreams and communication style will never be directly recognizable (Freud 2009). Furthermore, Lacan sees the very concept of a person's psychological "normalcy" as couched in "structure", namely in relationship with others, where the desire of the other, when legitimated through social processes, becomes a social norm. Such social norms, then, dictate the process of socialization, which, for Lacan, for largely simultaneous with attaining psychological health, namely a structurally stable view of the relationships one partakes in.

Jung, on the other hand, offered a different point of view, distinguishing between the individual and the collective unconscious. According to Jung, the conscious experience of individuals is the perception of the environment and themselves, through a comparison of stimuli from the environment and personal aspirations (Jung 2006). We will see in the next few paragraphs how much this coincides with today's understanding of the process of communication, the creation of an identity that is not a stable structure as traditional researchers believed.

We describe the term 'personality' as a set of characteristics and characteristics of an individual, as what makes "what we are". "Who am I?" is the basic philosophical question from which every person starts during the process of self-knowledge. Defining oneself as a person implies a set of character traits, roles and values that each individual has. Person is formed through others, with the help of communication, culture, the use of technology and science. By developing itself, each person develops others around oneself because he/she/they interacts with social communities. Person is a being of need and throughout life he satisfies physiological, cultural, social and emotional needs. Person is also a psychic being because it perceives, represents, thinks, remembers and feels, thus becoming a conscious being that is different from all other beings on Earth.

However, through conversation, an individual conveys its thoughts and feelings exclusively in contact with another person. Thus, in everyday speech, we often hear that person is a being of language and a being of practice. We have talked a lot about language in the previous paragraphs of this paper, and by stating that person is a being of practice, we mean that an individual designs (produces) objects and creates itself and the life human leads. Work as a social practice is something that is unique to person and that is why human determines it

to a great extent. Every human being is an individual for oneself and according to the theories and research of all scientific disciplines, there are no two completely identical human beings – in physical, mental, social or any other sense.

A person is also a dialogical being because one creates and develops in relation to others, so communication as a practice is a constitutive dimension of the human being. Personality is the result of individual differences, including all those abilities and characteristics that person acquires from a young age to those that he creates and develops in the society in which human lives, the communities to which human belongs and the communication human has with oneself and the world around them. All verbal and non-verbal behaviors in relation to others are turned into messages that the individual conveys, and because of the perception of a person, it is not so important what is said as it is important what others have heard. People remember how they felt, but not so much and what someone told them, and often in the professional literature we come across the fact that it does not matter what we say in interpersonal communication if others do not listen to us. We need to speak the language of those who listen to us and know that communication is always a two-way process, even when an individual thinks person is not communicating. Hence the question of identity, individual or system, the communicative question.

To remain constructively ideological as a subject in a democratic exchange of ideas, it appears to me, one needs to keep the technologically induced facets of the very process of communication in check, specifically by bearing in mind that what technology offers inherently misses a dimension of the person's identity. While in many situations one must act based on the perception of another's digital self, and thus one must work only with what communication based on technology delivers, the actual substantive choices and decisions might be of a better quality if there is psychological 'reservation' with regard to the actual completeness of the identity of another that is presented through technology. Hence, being aware of the incompleteness of the digital identity might, in itself, as an attitude, help prevent biases and assumptions that might cut short the fullness of an interpersonal process between real personalities when the communication takes place through technology alone.

Technologically Mediated Communication

David Hanson (Hanson 2017), an engineer and robotics expert, believes that by 2029, the artificial intelligence of humanoid robots will develop to the level of a one-year-old child. He also predicts that by 2045, robots will become full citizens. Therefore, it is already necessary to ask what should be done if machines enhanced by artificial intelligence really develop reason and consciousness, which would be similar to human. In the age of trans-humanity, the question of the rights of robots arises, more precisely about the "robot person", it is finally realized science fiction, somewhere between the caring mechanics of the robot cycle Isaac Asimov (Asimov 1950) and metaphysical questions Philip K. Dick (Dick 1981) about androids and their endless desire

for humanity. How to treat them; as according to property, i.e. a tool designed to perform different tasks, or as an equal "person"?

Latour (Latour 2017) says that person never became modern, but that everything too modern, as anti-modern or non-modern, has always accompanied human, pointing to the intertwining of human and machine and cybernetic organisms since both cyborgs and monsters pre-modern and anti-modern) constitute communities. It was Cary Wolfe (Wolfe 2009), one of the pioneers in trying to define post-humanism, who stated that the socio-humanistic roots of post-humanism in the 1960s were in the works of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler, Bruno Latour, Donna Haraway and other poststructuralists, deconstructionists and postmodernists, who together marked the death of the Cartesian humanist, but also ran alongside the great achievements of the social and technological sciences, such as the development of cybernetic systems theory, which included new theoretical models for biological, mechanical and communication processes. Homo sapiens removed from a privileged position in the processes of cognition and perception of the world. Laying the foundations of post-humanism, Katherine Hayles (Hayles 1999) adds the development of artificial intelligence and the desire to abolish the physical, whereby the human being as a biological organism, bound by the body, dematerializes in the information space and is interpreted as an information pattern.

These challenges were also noted by Mady Delvaux (Delvaux, Internet), Member of the European Parliament, who in mid-2016 presented to the Committee on Legal Affairs a draft law on civil law rules on robotics, which would address legal and ethical issues development and use of robotics and artificial intelligence. In February 2017, a Resolution based on this Draft Law was adopted in Europe, albeit in a slightly modified form (Hasselbalch, Internet).

Luhmann affirmed: Reality is what one does not perceive when one perceives it (Luhmann 1990: 76). Various phenomena that have influenced the theory of post-humanism to focus on reality and the individual as a decentralized information unit in the constant process of transformation and transmission, which have thus become essentially close to their technological and cyber counterparts. The post-humanist perspective points to the gradual merging of human being and machine, i.e. biological and synthetic or mechanical organism, which can even be claimed to be the end result of the millennial process of human creation and use of tools. "From a club that extends and replaces the hand to virtual reality in cyberspace, technology has evolved to mimic and multiply, multiply and thrive by relying on the real" (Poster 2012: 554).

Technology is evolving every day, so it is inevitable that intelligent robots and machines will become more and more present in our lives. Many ideas that were unthinkable in the past have been successfully realized today, so it is not impossible to develop robotics to such an extent that in the near future robots could become our fellow citizens. It is likely that this idea will initially meet with outrage from the general public, but over time, androids and other robots will become part of everyday life around the world. It is only necessary to establish certain rules in time in order to avoid abuse.

Nonhuman Agents, Trans-Humanism and Post-Humanism

American political scientist Francis Fukuyama (Fukuyama 2019) considers the interference of technology in biological generation and human development as the end of history, and he began to deal with this topic in the 1990s. In his major work, Our Posthumous Future, Francis Fukuyama explores the implications of human genetic modification, bioengineering, and technological advancement (Fukuyama 2009). Dealing with the impact of genetic engineering and pharmacology on the human body, Fukuyama warns that human nature and essence are changing significantly, interpreting these new technologies as a threat, a challenge to moral principles and an attempt at dehumanization. And more than that, Fukuyama suggests that the new post-human world will be even more hierarchical and filled with deeper social conflicts, greater inequality based on genetic perfection and greater social control and supervision.

Humanism presents person as a rational being, putting human in the center of attention, human being is spoken of as a source, a catalyst of action, while in post-humanism we think of networked, captured, produced, and uttered by technology, political powers. So human being is no longer a source but technology integrates with person. Thus, person's identity in the 21st century is no longer physically the same as the person of the 20th century, but even before that. Natasha Vita-More, Max More (More, Vita-More 2013) and Nick Bostrom (Bostrom 2014) talk about the concept of trans and post human being and take Nietzsche's example as his philosophical concept of human. Nietzsche (Nietzsche 2014) said that God is dead and that now is the time for human being to be surpassed, but Nietzsche did not leave a trace that technology could be the one that will surpass human.

Today, we often talk about the fourth revolution in which new technologies are the ones that serve to expand human possibilities. In other words, the merging of technologies leads to the blurring of the boundaries between the physical, digital and biological spheres. The mentioned revolution mainly refers to new nanotechnologies, artificial intelligence, biotechnology, neurotechnology, robotics, 3D, quantum computing and others. As such, they can reconstruct, construct and build a new form of person. Post-humanism claims that a person has limited possibilities and abilities.

Earlier, we saw technology as an extension of the human body, an auxiliary instrument that has a purpose to help a person. We are witnessing the technological and biological convergence and the creation of robotic organisms that manage to surpass human capabilities in many fields. However, we must follow the development of technology, and as a society we cannot separate ourselves from technology (McLuhan 2012). The main human trait is to communicate, to think, to have a concept of ideas, to have emotions. However, in the public-media discourse, it is said that the machine is more capable than human being, and more and more machines are taking over a part of the intellectual ability.

History has shown that people are at the core to strive forward, to develop, and that brings with it the expansion of science and technology. There will

always be two sides to the coin, that is. Reasons for and against giving androids, not necessarily human rights, but some kind of legal status. Individuals will continue to oppose the progress of robotics and claim that robots are just machines, whose sole purpose is to help us perform our daily tasks. But it is inevitable that a certain group of people will work on improving artificial intelligence and robotics, and that there is a high probability that we will live in a community with humanoid robots in the future.

We are becoming aware that technical means of transmitting messages are not passive intermediaries between transmitters and recipients, but like other intermediaries, they change not only the language, form and structure of the message but also strongly influence the transmitter and receiver (Šušnjić 1997: 112). All channels of communication are used to establish a strong communication link between people. Communication skills are the ability to effectively use the means of communication while understanding and respecting the needs of other participants in the communication process. Kittler (Kitler 2018) transferred Foucault's idea of the "end of the subject" into the field of media determination of human existence. The consequence of such a belief is that the media determines our situation, which leads to the conclusion that networks of technologies and institutions allow a given culture to select, store and process relevant data that redefine human. The human being is the effect of technology or "extension of the media" (a thought that opposes McLuhan's theory of the media as a human extension), and changes in the human are conditioned by changes in technology. However, the human is a communicative being and all communication with others is through some kind of technology, with the help of which human gets to know oneself and the world around them.

In recent years, it has been said in the public media sphere that artificial intelligence is the technology of the future and that whoever takes the lead in its development will become the ruler of the world. But many organizations, scientists and some citizens believe that all ideas and discoveries should be shared with everyone so that humanity can progress in harmony. Again, the values on which the direction of development of technology are based must be organic in themselves: technology must be directed by specifically human values, which is a point often neglected in the over-arching global enthusiasm about the new forms of technology, especially that of Artificial Intelligence. It is possible that robots will be as intelligent as human beings, but it is far less clear that robots can have actual values. Hence our reliance on values in understanding communication must remain unwavered in the face of technological advancements.

Conclusion

Communication can be defined as the process of transmission, i.e. transfer of opinions, instructions, ideas, desires, and feelings – from one person to another or to others. In the process of communication, the reciprocal role of the participants in the communication is important, as well as the context, i.e. the circumstances that determine not only the content of a message, but also the

code that shapes it. Therefore, it can often be found in the literature that the meaning of a message, i.e. information, depends on the intention of the sender, language and system of symbolic forms that structure the message, i.e. information, context and various communication possibilities.

In addition to the above, today's digital culture (hyper-sphere) can no longer survive without technology and media that affect our knowledge, our ideas, our evaluation, even if it comes down to informing about the exact time, weather forecast or news about the seasons. Referring to McLuhan's theories, technology is a message, i.e. a means of communication, a space through which some content is transmitted (McLuhan 2012). We, as a society, as a community, cannot separate ourselves from technology. In the modern world, digital culture shapes everyday life and influences people's thinking, forms their attitudes, values and norms, creates forms and mechanisms of ideological domination and helps shape the identity of the individual, shapes the message itself but also shapes the society within which the message is transmitted. With the help of technology and media content, an individual learns about oneself, others, the country in which one was born, as well as the entire planet. Person is able to learn about other nations, cultures, religions and continents. It is present in the lives of individuals, who spend time by the screen, reading newspapers, portals, going to the cinema, listening to the radio, browsing the Internet, social networks and the like. In fact, technology has a significant role to play in today's society by providing, in different ways, a wide range of information. Technology (including the media) strongly influences attitudes in a particular community, behavior and beliefs, but also plays a significant role in economics, politics and various social practices.

Long-term technologies are not just intermediaries that transmit some content, as previously believed. They created a social environment and thus became part of our personal environment. We expect a lot from technology. Today, the human defines oneself in relation to and through technology and media content. They entertain us, teach us, inform us, with their help we identify ourselves and more. Our lives unfold and are inevitably realized in the digital space.

Adam Greenfield (Greenfield 2017), who calls himself the Architect of Information, came up with a coin that reads "everywhere + hardware / software". We have all become an integral part of technology that is invisible. All places and all objects have become smart technology. In fact, we communicate using that invisible technology.

The key role in creating today's post-human world is played by Internet search engines (like Google), where the Internet has spread around the world and in which we are all networked. So, they are no longer networked worlds, but networked lives. The influence of technology on the process of communication and identity creation can be seen in trans-humanism, which eliminates the possibility of further development of spirituality, humanity, feelings and compassion, while instead of freedom of speech, diversity and play, it offers a limited, one-dimensional, uniform and homogeneous world. Such a world is made up of different combinations and syntheses of people and machines.

A key concept that is closely related to communication's role in articulating identity, and the specific role of technology in 'growing' our identities is that post-humanism largely arises from a grand vision: the vision that humans in fact 'grow' themselves in much the same way as they 'grow' vegetables and various cultures. This idea was first articulated by Daniel Sarewitz (Sarewitz 1996). We grow ourselves by implementing various technologies to our own development, in a way similar to the manner in which we use the machinery and fertilizers to grow various bio-cultures. This vision, in Sarewitz's view, gets a radical dimension in the claim that human beings themselves, in the sense of self-development, are in fact the most widely grown culture of all the cultures human beings grow, and the key element of this process is the invention and use of technology as form of communication of both the self-development and self-improvement ideal, and of the paradigm of an ideal community, which, as structures, is the framework within which we establish and confirm our individual and collective identities. These radical claims in fact suggest, but do not explicate, the idea that communication is the over-arching process for the entire technological development in the service of human development and articulation of various levels of socially informed and articulated identities.

Transhumanism is an obstacle to the further development of identity, and thus communication. On the one hand, transhumanist principles condition and change everything that characterizes an individual as a human being; while at the same time, on the other hand, instead of democracy, freedom of choice, equality, diversity and others, transhumanism offers a limited, uniform, homogeneous world, where and machines coexist in every closer arrangements. The modern man is expected to live a healthy long life; this proposition seems like a value "bait" offered in the way of a potential promise of immortality, which should symbolize the greatest achievement of the absolute robotization of man. In other words, the robot as the absolute instrument of the 21st century in Marcuse's one-dimensional world. The proposition of transhumanism in the form of merging artificial intelligence with human identity is thus a treacherous one: it 'dangles' the prospect of physical and, more immediately, intellectual immortality in its one hand, so to say, while in the other hand it holds the threat of depersonalization of identity. It is possible for a transhuman individual to have a clearly definable identity that is, at the same time, person-less in the Jugian sense. It is highly dubious whether most current human beings, if presented with this choice clearly and simply enough, would choose the trans-humanist path despite its promises.

If communication theory is predicated upon a prospect of some kind of ultimate fulfillment of the need for communication, it is only natural that such a theory suggests some kind of leveling of traditional organic interpersonal differencesing the interest of more seamless digitality in the creation of identities. Hence, transhumanism uses the principles of communication discussed here to largely level the differences between biological, human and machine systems as a form of new tranhumanist ideology that arises from communication that is increasingly reduced to digital means.

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Simona Žikić

Kako tehnologija utiče na proces komunikacije i kreiranja identiteta

Apstrakt

Osnovna teza ovog rada jeste da komunikacija predstavlja bazičnu aktivnost svih ljudskih praksi i da se identitet konstruiše uz pomoć komunikacije. Definisati identitet ne može se objasniti i razumeti isključivo sa stanovišta filozofije, sociologije, politikologije ili psihologije. S obzirom na to da latinski koren reči komunikacija, *communio*, upućuje na zajednicu, slobodno možemo reći da komunikologija kao nauka najbolje pokriva niz odnosa koje ljudi uspostavljaju unutar zajednice kakvu predstavljaju škole, porodica, radno okruženje, društvene mreže i forumi. Delatnost komunikacije jeste uspostavljanje zajednice, odnosno društvenosti. U kontekstu komunikacije, saopštiti znači nešto združiti, odnosno dovesti svoje delovanje u sklad sa zajednicom i društvenim životom. U tom smislu, komunikacija je u svojoj suštini prelaz od individualnog ka kolektivnom. Pored navedenog, specifičan oblik komunikacije zavisi od šireg kulturnog i društveno-političkog okruženja u kojem današnji čovek funkcioniše te zbog toga ovaj rad ima za cilj i da istraži uticaj tehnologije na identitet pojedinca, da odgovori na pitanja da li je moguće da roboti imaju iste karakteristike ličnosti, i da li i na koji način mašine imaju uticaj na ljude. Razlog postavljanja ovakvih pitanja je i odluka Odbora za pravna pitanja Evropskog parlamenta da se donese zakon koji će autonomnim robotima dodeliti status „elektronskih ličnosti".

Ključne reči: komunikacija, identitet, ličnost, jezik, tehnologija

Smiljana Antonijević and Jeff Ubois

REPRESENTING THE ABSENT: THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF DIGITAL MEMORY AND PRESERVATION[1]

ABSTRACT
Digital preservation has significantly expanded over the past few decades, renewing old and creating new challenges related to provenance, integrity, completeness, and context in memory and preservation practices. In this paper we explore how, perhaps counterintuitively, a more extensive digital historical record offers greater opportunities to misrepresent reality. We first review a set of concepts and socio-cultural approaches to memory and preservation. We then focus on the multiplicity of digital memory and preservation practices today, examining their limits, possibilities, and tensions; specifically, we explore the challenges of decontextualized data, personal versus institutional preservation, and "outsider" digital collections that are willingly and/or forcibly excluded from official accounts. Through these discussions, we review examples of what we consider good digital memory and preservation practices that take new approaches to context and collaboration. Lastly, we explore the optimism inherent in seeking to preserve human knowledge over the long term and to make it accessible to all.

Introduction

> – *'So you're locked up good and tight, Johnny-san? No way to get that program without the password?'*
>
> – *'The stored data are fed in through a modified series of micro-surgical contraautism prostheses.' I reeled off a numb version of my standard sales pitch. 'Client's code is stored in a special chip; there's no way to recover your phrase. Can't drug it out, cut it out, torture it. I don't know it, never did.'*
>
> Johnny Mnemonic, William Gibson

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1   The views expressed in this text are our own and do not represent the views of Lever for Change or Illinois Institute of Technology.

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For more than fifty years, optimism has been the outstanding quality of the information technology (IT) industry in approaching the techno-human condition. And why not? The technologies developed over the last few decades have profoundly affected and transformed many societies, institutions, and individuals on earth. Although there have always been skeptics about the promised benefits of new technology (Hoos 1960), experts involved in creating IT today are increasingly expressing a profound sense of remorse (Sumagaysay 2020) for what they've wrought, and a sense of anxiety about what is to come, calling to mind the physicists of the 1950s as they confronted the realities of the atomic age.

The reasons for such remorse are well known: alarms about the risks of artificial intelligence, the ability of a small number of companies to persuade billions of people to believe in things that are not true, and the application of potentially life enhancing technologies by governments for surveillance and social control are only a few.

But what about the use of technology for memory and preservation, often contested in inter-ethnic, interdisciplinary and/or political memory disputes, and entrenched as the source of remorse? For instance, a cursory look at how Hiroshima is remembered today reveals a multiplicity of contrasted claims, while reckoning with both individual and collective past generates "empires of remorse," as Benteley (2015) puts it. Will IT remain the source of optimism, at least in the area of memory and preservation, helping us enhance if not replace unreliable human memory and fragile archival sources with indestructible, incorruptible digital preservation exemplified in Gibson's Johnny Mnemonic? Preservation and archiving in the digital age have shown some ability to address deep human needs and urgent social requirements. Formal and informal digital collections and archives are increasingly given a role in the popular imagination as repositories of what is real, true, authentic, and meaningful. It's not just movies such as "Total Recall" and "Blade Runner" that revolve around what is in or is missing from personal and collective memories of tomorrow; the lives of individuals committed to preserving traces of the life today as meaningful records available in the future revolve around that premise too. From passers by recording acts of police brutality such as the murder of George Floyd, to Facebook users documenting their daily life, to Julian Assange and Wikileaks ensuring that the evidence of economic and war crimes is being preserved, digital memory and preservation activities are omnipresent. Institutions such as the Internet Archive collect petabytes of material every year too, serving as the foundation for a broad digital ecosystem of digital memory and preservation.

But the last decade's success in digital preservation has also illuminated new aspects of old issues, confronting us again with the challenges such as integrity, provenance, completeness, selection, and context. Willful distortion of the meaning of acts and remarks by careful selection or omission of relevant context has become increasingly easy and common. New sound, image, and video editing technologies can convincingly present anyone as doing or

saying anything. We are awash in the fake, and the fake is making it into the collections and archives that we depend upon.

In this paper, we explore how, perhaps counterintuitively, a more extensive digital historical record offers greater opportunities to misrepresent reality. For those who understand social reality as consisting of bits that can be preserved, transmitted, and reassembled, bigger datasets and richer multimedia deepen a conviction in faithful representation of past events. But that is exactly the condition that William Gibson (Op.cit.) personified as Johnny Mnemonic – a technologically mutated cyborg enhanced with highly sophisticated software that enables his brain to function as a vast and highly secure data storage that can preserve, transmit, and playback visual and other data. Although created to have perfect memory, this anthropomorphic data storage doesn't know – and never did know – what the data that it carries actually mean, what kind of reality it represents. In a stark contrast to the Buddha who doesn't need to *recollect* because he *knows*, Johnny Mnemonic needs to recollect because he does not know.

To further explore these issues, we first review several concepts and socio-cultural approaches to memory, preservation and archiving from ancient to digital times. We then focus on the multiplicity of digital memory and preservation practices today, examining their limits, possibilities, and tensions exemplified in the challenges of decontextualized data, personal as opposed to institutional preservation, and in "outsider" digital collections such as WikiLeaks, Paradise Papers, and Sci-Hub that both willingly and forcibly are excluded from official accounts, despite – or because of – the significance of the information they contain. Through these discussions, we review examples of what we consider good digital memory and preservation practices that take new approaches to context and collaboration. Lastly, we explore the optimism inherent in seeking to preserve human knowledge over the long term and to make it accessible to all.

Approaches to Memory

Located in the realm of the divine as Greek *Mnemosyne*, Roman *Monta*, or the Aztec *Tezcatlipoca,* memory has always been regarded as one of the essential personal, collective, and even divine capacities. In Buddhist scriptures, it is this capacity that differentiates eternal from fallen Gods, those whose memory has been lost or distorted, and who have thus been incarnated as humans. Only the Buddha, the omniscient one, is capable of *knowing* - not of *recollecting* – the past. In both Buddhist and Platonic texts, *mneme* (memory) is superior to *anamnesis* (recollection), as being able to recollect the past implies a failing of having previously forgotten it; the perfect ones do not need to remember as they never forget (Eliade 1963: 119).

And while in contemporary science fiction imagination this kind of ultimate memory derives from the power of software (Gibson 1981) or an experimental drug (Asimov 1982), mythological thought associated ultimate memory

with the close conceptual and etymological relations with origin, archive, and governance, skillfully illustrated in the familial and hierarchical relationships among the deities. *Mneme*, the muse of memory, and her sister *Arche*, the muse of origin, were the daughters of the supreme god Zeus and *Mnemosyne*, the goddess of memory. Etymologically, *arkhō* underpins the notions of *ex arkhes*, from the beginning; *árchōn*, a ruler, in the sense of a governmental official, and; *arkheîon,* a public building where the official documents are stored (Derrida, Prenowitz 1995).

This intersection reveals points to some important qualities and challenges of knowing, remembering, recollecting, and accessing the past. Being divinely touched by the Muses, like a poet or a historian, meant being bestowed a privileged access to Mnemosyne's knowledge of origins, commonly articulated in narratives about genesis, and recognized as true stories about sacred, or strong time, contrasted to chronological time (Eliade, op.cit.). But in addition to insights into the sacred time, Mnemosyne's gift to humans also includes the capacity of remembering secular, chronological time. Plato metaphorically describes that gift as a block of wax in a person's soul upon which a person imprints his or her experiences, leaving traces of the past.

Yet this gift generates at least three problems. First, the object of memory is always and only the past; there is an inherent contradiction of memory as it represents the presence of the absent. This contradiction is inevitably intertwined with mistakes, such as the risk of mistaking the imagined for the remembered, or through (un)intentional misrecognition and misinterpretation of the traces imprinted upon the 'block of wax'.

The second problem is that Mnemosyne's gift to humans often generates opposition from the prevailing political, commercial, or religious authorities of a given time, as they are engaged in the memory politics of what societies are compelled to remember and to forget. There is a reason that film, video, and discussion of the Tiananmen protest is not available for viewing in China, that disclosure of combat footage showing activities of US forces in Iraq has resulted in years of confinement for Julian Assange, and that characterization of the current Russian and Ukrainian war in anything other than prescribed terms is punishable in both countries. Mneme and Arche may be the daughters of Zeus, but that doesn't always help when their gifts challenge contemporary authorities intent of controlling the past as a way of controlling the future, as George Orwell (1949) famously put it.

Finally, the third problem is the diversity of traces of the past, which Ricoeur (2004) differentiates as written, affective, and corporeal. Do they align? If not, which of these is authoritative, or regarded as true? Written and ultimately archived traces are what constitute the official history of an era or event, and are the foundation for work by students, historians, and scholars. Affective and corporeal traces, which constitute lived, experienced past imprinted in the souls, minds, and bodies constitute a different realm. These internal traces are contrasted to 'the external marks with which written discourse is constructed,'

and pose a vital challenge of how such immaterial traces of the past can be preserved and recalled (ibid.: 14).

The primacy of written over oral and other types of preservation resulted in the institution of the archive and "selective tradition" (Williams 1961/1971) becoming the most authoritative source for exploring, recalling, and understanding the past. Regarded as the space that preserves original records, the archive symbolically assumed the role of Mnemosyne adjusted to the age of positivism. For epistemological and methodological followers of August Comte and Leopold von Ranke, the truth about the past could have been inferred scientifically, just as the laws of physics, by meticulously collecting and analyzing archival materials.

This 'allure of the archives', as Farge (2013/1989) calls it, was challenged in the second half of the 20th century, when the perception of archive as a cultural construct that privileges certain aspects of the past and excludes others made archives the subject rather than the site of research (Blouin 2004). Cultural theory, postcolonial studies, and similar lines of research highlighted the existence of multiple pasts – underprivileged, dissident, and other undesired pasts that never found their way to the official archival records.

In addition to the increased awareness about debatability of the past, as Appadurai (1981) described it, late 20th and early 21st centuries brought other developments important for destabilizing the primacy of archives and written traces. One is the development of (new) social history that focuses on history from the bottom up, "seeking out how ordinary people lived and acted in the past" (Tilly 1980: 668). As the subject of research became populations commonly excluded from official narratives and records – workers and peasants, women, heretics, and so on – examination shifted towards various non-deposited sources, such as ego documents from personal sources, written and non-written materials discovered in attics and similar informal storage sites, oral histories, and so on. Similarly, a turn in the hermeneutic tradition, which concentrated on history as remembrance found in personal and cultural memory, as well as in folk histories, refocused research attention on the unofficial and not necessarily written sources (Little 2017). This has more recently been institutionalized in the efforts such as the Shoah Foundation's *Visual History Archive Online*, which collects testimonies of holocaust survivors.

Finally, recognition of the importance of intangible cultural heritage and its preservation articulated in UNESCO's *Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage* further endorsed "living documents" and tacit knowledge – such as oral traditions, social practices, and rituals – as vital for recalling and understanding the past.

These multiple parallel approaches to memory – official and unofficial, written and multimodal, lived and recorded, collective and individual – became additionally complex with the ever wider adoption and sophistication of digital technologies, which we discuss in the next section of this paper.

Multiplicity of Digital Memory and Preservation

> ...we have allowed in the past all those advances in technology, which has profoundly changed our social and individual life, to take us by surprise...Our business is to be aware of what is happening, and then to use our imagination to see what might happen, how this might be abused, and then if possible to see that the enormous powers which we now possess thanks to these scientific and technological advances to be used for the benefit of human beings and not for their degradation. (Huxley 1962)

Spoken sixty years ago, Huxley's words referenced above seem more relevant than ever. Technological advances are not only swiftly multiplying and diversifying, but their socio-political embeddedness fluctuates swiftly too. Only two months ago it was thought socio-politically, if not technically, impossible (at least in "western democracies") to disable nearly all content coming from *.ru* (i.e. the Russian) or any other country domain name, yet we are witnessing such a tectonic shift today as part of the Russo-Ukrainian War. What are some other tectonic and gradual shifts we are witnessing? What are some of the main risks that could result in degradation of our digital memory and preservation practices? What are the examples of good practices at both individual and collective levels that enable us to use technological advances for the benefit of human beings, and what can we learn from such examples?

In this section, we address some of those questions by focusing on several key problems, illustrated with examples of what we consider good digital memory and preservation practices.

De/contextualized Big Data

Both institutional and personal archiving assumes new dynamics, meaning, possibilities, and challenges in the immense digital data ecosystem developed in the last fifty years. From NSA records to Facebook profiles, to genomic and financial data, to geolocation and beyond, intentionally and unintentionally left and gathered digital traces create extremely rich, multifaceted individual and collective imprints upon a digital "block of wax". Ham 's (1981) prescient paper termed this transformation *the post-custodial era*, foreshadowing one of the main paradoxes of digital preservation that "gives us abundant information [while] it creates an environment hazardous to its preservation" (Ham 1981: 209).

Related to digital memory and preservation, one of the most consequential risks is the focus on big data and an implicit belief that, with enough data, digital traces will speak for themselves about the past. However, although the possibility of creating more complete, multimodal historical records opens great new opportunities, it also obscures the fact that memory is always a representation of the absent, thus introducing greater risks of confusing representations with reality. The bigger the dataset, the stronger the faith in its representational validity; the greater the storage capacity, the deeper the belief

in digital immortality. But, as Poster (1990) points out, "each method of preserving and transmitting information profoundly intervenes in the network of relationships that constitute a society" (Poster 1990: 7). As we mentioned in the previous section, if social reality is understood to consist of data or bits that can be preserved, transmitted, and reassembled as that selfsame reality, confusion is inevitable. Yet, current technological capacities change nothing in Plato's timeless observation that "when the mind applies the imprint of the absent perception to the perception that is present, the mind is deceived in every such instance" (194a).

A closely related risk is confusing a dataset as a *collection* of data with the *context* of data. No matter how comprehensive and detailed, datasets are arbitrarily assembled and semi-isolated units in a broader environment. Neglecting this inadvertently advances a myopic view that makes us "too little aware of the larger historical and social landscape that surrounded us" (Ham 1981: 20). It also illustrates an occasional tendency in digital preservation to approach context in the positivistic sense, as if there were an objective and stable container of data, separable from activities, actors, or objects perceived to be located and/or happening *within* that container (Dourish 2004: 22). This is in stark contrast to the phenomenological understanding of context as constructed through social interaction, and accordingly relational, dynamic, and occasioned. It is the intangible, tacit, transient, and (inter)personal that construes context; without it, neither could reality exist, nor could a meaningful memory and/or historical record about that reality be preserved. As Doris Lessing (1997) delicately observed, "this is always the difficulty, trying to record the past. Facts are easy: this and that happened; but out of the context of an atmosphere, much behavior – facts – social and personal, seems, simply, lunatic" (Lessing 1997: 313).

Is there a threat, then, that promises of digital preservation might endanger meaningful future existence of our socio-cultural records turning them into decontextualized "factual lunacies?" Or are there strategies and practices that will allow us to pass on a more meaningful record of our times to future generations?

In that regard, Cal Lee (2011) argues about the importance of distinguishing what he calls "the broad notion of context, constituted by the interactions and relationships" from "the more specific set of contextual information that is reflected in information systems" (Lee 2011: 99). He also proposes nine sets of contextual items that can help a user better understand entities in a digital collection: object, agent, occurrence, purpose, time, place, form of expression, concept, and relationship (Lee 2011: 106). Lee's suggestion resembles Keir Winesmith's (2017) provocation "Against Linked Open Data", which points out that institutions struggle just to collect good data, let alone to use the data effectively, strategically, and in a meaningfully contextualized way. Winesmith therefore rightly argues that Tim Berners-Lee's (2006) technical principles of linked data should be preceded by a more basic yet broader set of social principles: collect the data, use it, contextualize it, and share it.

These principles, related to what some have termed the social life of infor-
mation, have already been implemented in a number of digital memory and
preservation projects that are very creative, educational, widely used, and
representative of new genres. For example, project 1917: Free history (https://
project1917.com) contextualized the unfolding and experiences of the Russian
revolution of 1917 by providing daily postings of primary source materials from
roughly 300 historical figures from 1917 in a Facebook-like website highlight-
ing the centenary of the revolution. It's worth a closer examination.

Source: https://project1917.com

Drawing on primary sources such as diary extracts, letters, photographs, poems, films, paintings, and news articles, and addressing topics ranging from the plot against Rasputin to life inside the Kremlin to musical performances, train delays, and the weather, the team running the project presented a view of events as they unfolded to (mostly eminent) persons living in 1917.

For people living in 2017, this was a surprisingly effective way to recreate something of the experience of living in 1917. The perspective of persons living then was made vivid by the surprise and the uncertainty reflected in their daily writings, which stood in contrast to the perspective of us living today and knowing what was to come for many of those quoted. Expert historians worked to ensure materials were authentic and representative of the times. Yet, those valuable primary sources were not presented as a digital emulation of traditional collections, as is commonly the case with digital archives. Instead of a traditionally cataloged collection of materials from 1917, or a series of de-contextualized archival materials used to enforce storytelling from a singular point of view – the tacit narrative, as Ketelaar (2001) calls it – this was an effort to give actuality to the past, enabling today's audience to empathize with people who lived through this historical event.

To prevent loss of context, materials were situated not just in time and place, but in a web of social arrangements, including political and social hierarchies, scientific and artistic breakthroughs of the time, as well as the daily worries and delights of the wide socioeconomic strata, from the poor vying for bread on the streets of Petrograd, to aristocracy enjoying ballet performances. Also, the 1917 materials were presented in the form familiar and appealing to today's audience – as short, daily social media feeds, using hashtags to highlight the most important themes (e.g., *#The Winter Palace*, *#The Uprising Headquarters*, and so on), and announcing the most important developments in the "breaking news" form that built on today's audiences' primed reception of such developments as particularly important (e.g., breaking news on November 7, 1917 at 9:30pm: "Revolutionary troops opened fire at the Winter Palace").

Interactivity built into the project was one of its main features and advantages, and it had several forms and layers. At one layer, historical materials and actors interacted with each other: Vladimir Lenin would post the information about president Wilson's speech to Leon Trotsky's social media profile; Grand Duchess Olga would mark on her profile that she was with Tsarevich Alexei at the Alexander Palace in Tsarskoye Selo, and so on. On another level, the audience interacted with historical materials and actors in many forms, from reacting to the posted material with thumbs up or angry emojis, over taking historical quizzes, to participating in a Time Machine Tinder that would suggest a 1917 partner to a today's user. Finally, the users also interacted with each other by responding to comments, providing materials or information that other users asked about, and so on.

In sum, authentic materials selected to be truly representative of events, expertly curated to show those materials in relation to each other through sequential arrangement and interactive presentation, proved very effective not

just in presenting the data about 1917, but in recreating lived experience and atmosphere of the time. Project1917 went beyond archiving and into production and publishing. As Kaufman (2018) notes, "...archives that recognize themselves as media producers, too, in their preservation and access roles ... often have an easier time of articulating their mission publicly in the digital age" (Kaufman 2018: 1).

The project was so successful that, upon its formal completion in 2018, the users refused to end this digital engagement with the past and started their own #1918 Live project. Unlike the original Project 1917 that did not depend on user-generated content, although it was intensive in user engagement and interactivity, the follow-up was user generated and maintained. Very interesting, as it was, the follow-up was short-lived, indicating challenges with personal versus institutional digital memory and preservation activities.

Personal and Participatory Archives

Since 2000, the possibilities of participatory knowledge production such as folksonomies, tagging, and crowdsourced transcription significantly enriched the landscape of digital memory and preservation, marking a specific turn towards participatory archive (see: Benoit and Eveleigh 2018). Through complementing or enhancing institutionally provided content, this type of engagement enables individuals to contribute personal or local materials, transforming the past from a closed historic experience to an ongoing process where everyone has the agency and opportunity to engage as a local expert, a story-teller, or an archivist. This approach yielded surprising results such as Wikipedia, PhilaPlace, and Ancestry.com, but many challenges still loom large.

One challenge with emphasizing personal approaches is that users often prefer to be story-listeners rather than storytellers, as Sumer and Nelson (2017) observed in the Goodman to Garver project. The project focused on digital preservation based on public history and encouraged anyone with a story to add it to the digital collection, but the response was limited. Sumer and Nelson thus concluded that the biggest challenge for participatory digital projects is "likely to be found not in the technical phase of coding and development, but rather in the social phase of cultivating a group of willing and eager participants" (Sumer, Nelson 2017: 5). Despite twenty years of Web 2.0 development, the vast gap between a majority of consumers and a minority of producers of online content is still a significant challenge.

Another challenge is that individually provided content sometimes introduces unverified and/or difficult to verify materials and information. As we mentioned in the Introduction, fake news and other dubious materials fill out our digital spaces from YouTube to Twitter to the Internet Archive, potentially remaining as manipulated imprints of this time. Or consider 'deep fakes' – the use of AI to cheaply and quickly edit video to put the face of one individual over that of another. The potential for manipulation of these video-editing technologies were immediately and widely apparent. Major online platforms

thus worked to remove 'deep fakes' from public view, while others suggested that systems of blockchain, timestamping, hashing and other technological solutions could make such fakery difficult to produce and easier to spot.

Though technological solutions may sometimes help solve what are essentially human or social problems, the underlying issue is the conflict between those intent on editing the past to fit present needs, and those intent on reliably preserving both the present and the past to the best of their ability. This struggle is often exemplified and enhanced through an imbalance in the power relations between institutions and individuals, an imbalance that is ripe for change. Creating an effective counterweight to the centralized corporate and governmental control of memory is essential to preserving a diversity of viewpoints and access to contested material.

One counterweight is personal digital archiving. As we previously mentioned, more recent focus on the social history of "ordinary people" brought attention to ego documents in personal digital collections and various other non-deposited sources – from grandparents' digital photo and video collections of their grandchildren's every step and milestone, to scholars' personal repositories of research notes and photographs. Such personal digital resources, collected and economically supported by individuals – with creators, maintainers, and users often being the same individual or a set of individuals – have emerged over the last twenty years, developing at a pace that has driven the creation of events and user communities, such as the series of Personal Digital Archiving conferences held since 2010 at the Internet Archive, the Library of Congress, and at various other institutions. By their nature, personal digital archives are distributed, decentralized, difficult to catalog, relatively unconstrained by institutional policies, laws, and control, and generally not motivated by commercial considerations.

This is in sharp contrast to the commercial sectors' inclination to capitalize on the human need for memory and remembrance. Among the celebrities, recent technological developments have already been used to digitally render the late Carrie Fisher in the latest "Star Wars" movie, while Kim Kardashian interacted with her dead father through a hologram she received as a birthday gift. For the wider public, a recently launched, arguably benign version of deep-fakes, Deep Nostalgia, enables users to bring their deceased back to life by using AI that animates faces from old family photos, while AI-based solutions such as Luka and Replika generate chatbots based on the deceased's text messages and social media posts. Again, there is the allure, the promise, and the risk of representing the absent as if it has neither been a representation nor the absent. And there is the critical risk of entrusting our most valuable and most intimate materials to commercial services.

We thus believe that the future of digital memory and preservation largely depends on further empowering individuals to preserve their own materials and to challenge commercial interests whenever necessary. Instead of being in the power of commercial services, individuals need an option to record, share, and preserve their thoughts, activities, and memories in a way that makes them

stewards of their content, and that enables them to in some way influence the presentation of themselves if not exercise a right to be forgotten.

Working more effectively with not for profit institutions is another way forward. A few organizations, such as the Permanent Legacy Foundation, are building services intended to serve individuals and their descendants, while projects such as Perkeep are devoted to building tools for preserving personal data. Successful partnerships between institutions and individuals or communities, where institutions provide necessary infrastructure, know-how, and sustainability for digital preservation, can also be seen in the initiatives such as *The Genocide Archive of Rwanda* and *Visual History Archive Online*, focused on preserving testimonies and oral histories of survivors and other witnesses of some of the most traumatic events in the 20th century. Somewhat different in content but equally significant is the *StoryCorps* project, which has been recording, preserving, and sharing personal life stories of everyday Americans for the past fifteen years.

Sometimes, however, preserving unwanted memories and knowledge, such as those of genocide and other war crimes, becomes mainly, or even exclusively, possible through what we call outsider projects, very briefly discussed in the following segment.

Outsider projects

Without re-litigating their ethics, as the parties involved have extremely hard and incompatible ideological positions, we believe that 'outsider' projects such as WikiLeaks, Paradise Papers, or Sci-Hub will be a long-lived feature of the preservation, publishing, and archival landscape. Namely, these projects show two elements highly important for digital preservation. One is the real power of decentralized web, which demonstrates that (for now) it is still possible to share and preserve materials over the objections of governments and corporate interest, willing to employ huge financial and technical resources to limit access to those materials. Outsider projects that promote the free global flow of information, as well as transparency and integrity in academic publishing, are therefore so important. Second, these projects, started and maintained by a handful of people, demonstrate how a committed cohort of supporters determined to remember and to provide access to materials in ways others would prohibit can serve millions of people.

While many "insider" digital humanities projects, collections, and archives sadly end up abandoned (see: Gibbs 2011), outsider projects resist not only passive neglect, but also very active attempts of forcefully silencing and disappearing them. Somewhat as *memorizing Vedic chants* requires an astonishing dedication to faithfully preserve and pass on oral traditions in an unbroken form, outsider projects require similar levels of dedication to preserving and passing on in an uncensored and uncorrupted form materials perceived to be of high societal importance.

Conclusion

Perfect ones, such as the Buddha, might not need to remember because they never forget. For the rest of us imperfect mortals, memory and preservation of memory is vital. There are many forms of remembering. Sometimes it is an old love letter carefully hidden in a basement box for years. Other times, it is a collection of old love letters shared online. Yet other times it is sacred knowledge passed from one generation to another through community rituals, or preservation of millennia old and unbroken oral traditions in the form of Vedic chants. From cave paintings to DNA-based archival storage systems (Bornholt et al. 2016), many factors shape preservation of knowledge and traces of the past – what kind of 'wax' and storage system do we use, what type of traces and knowledge are being preserved, who created them, who can access them and how.

Certainly, there is much to fear from the challenges we have discussed. Trust in the value of technological progress has declined (Anderson 2016); hopes that AI might eliminate drudgery or aid medical diagnoses have been replaced by concerns about unemployment and mass production of fake news. Public sentiment towards the technology industry has shifted too; big data is on par with big oil, big pharma, and big tobacco. The unanticipated consequences of initiatives such as *Neurolink* (a human-machine interface) can only increase such concerns. More than ever, memory and technologies of memory are misused as political weapons to enable repressive systems of government, and more subtly, to chill free expression and open debate. The technical solutions under development are, like all new technologies, certain to generate their own new problems, and probably some remorse among their early proponents.

But in the end, the act of preservation is a deeply optimistic one that includes both the intention to serve as a good ancestor to future generations, and an effort to create some representation of the absent. Looking forward, we still hope for a world that includes individual and institutional archivists, and systems that strengthen the role of the individuals and voluntary associations in ensuring long term access to digital information. The optimism reflected in the Internet Archive's mission to provide free and universal access to all human knowledge, or in other efforts such as the Arch Mission Foundation's project to "permanently archive human knowledge for thousands to billions of years" is as important to the future as the more cautious efforts to limit the risks posed by new technology.

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Smiljana Antonijević i Džef Uboa

Predstavljanje odsutnog: granice i mogućnosti digitalne memorije i očuvanja

Apstrakt

Mogućnosti i obim čuvanje digitalnih podataka i dokumenata značajno su uvećani tokom proteklih nekoliko decenija, što je obnovilo stare i otvorilo nove izazove vezane za njihovu provinijenciju, integritet, potpunost i kontekstualizaciju. U ovom radu razmatramo kako, možda kontraintuitivno, opsežni digitalni zapisi današnjice pružaju više mogućnosti za iskrivljeno predstavljanje stvarnosti. U prvom delu rada dajemo osvrt na neke od značajnih koncepata i društveno-kulturoloških pristupa temama sećanja i čuvanja podataka. Potom se fokusiramo na višeslojnost današnjih praksi vezanih za digitalno čuvanje, ispitujući njihove granice, mogućnosti, i tenzije. Konketno, analiziramo probleme dekontekstualizacije podataka, individualno nasprot institucionalnog čuvanja, te "autsajderske" digitalne kolekcije koje su dobrovoljno ili prislino isključene iz zvaničnih tokova i narativa. U tim promišljanjima analiziramo primere koji inovativnim pristupom uspešno rešavaju izazove digitalnog čuvanja. Rad završavamo osvrtom na svojevrsni optimizam inherentan nastojanjima da se ljudsko znanje dugotrajno sačuva i učini široko dostupnim.

Ključne reči: digitalno čuvanje, sećanje, velika količina podataka, kontekst, lične digitalne arhive

Ivana Uspenski and Jelena Guga

EMBODYING METAVERSE AS ARTIFICIAL LIFE: AT THE INTERSECTION OF MEDIA AND 4E COGNITION THEORIES[1]

ABSTRACT
In the last decades of the 20th century we have seen media theories and cognitive sciences grow, mature and reach their pinnacles by analysing, each from their own disciplinary perspective, two of the same core phenomena: that of media as the environment, transmitter and creator of stimuli, and that of embodied human mind as the stimuli receiver, interpreter, experiencer, and also how both are affected by each other. Even though treating a range of very similar problems and coming to similar conclusions, this still has not brought these two disciplines closer together or resulted in their interdisciplinary approach. They did coalesce in regards to traditional media such as film, but more points of connection are needed for untangling interactive and immersive media environments and their effects on human cognition, action, and perception. With the rise of VR and VR-like systems, especially as they start to evolve into the Metaverse as their main platform of interconnectivity, the tissue of the body becomes almost physically intertwined with that of the virtual surrounding it inhabits through immersion. Simultaneously, the interest in these disciplines arises anew, and especially the need to use their concepts in an interdisciplinary way. This paper's main interest is to bring these disciplines together in problematising the position of a physical body and its sensory-motor capabilities and their development within synthetic surroundings as Metaverse and anticipate potential downsides of Metaverse's uncontrolled growth. We will do so also by looking into Metaverse as an artificial-life-like phenomenon, following artificial-life rules and evolving a completely new 'corporeality', a body which is completely adapted to virtual spaces. We call this body the Dry Body, an entity sharing cognitive resources with the physical body it is not a physical part of, but has to extend to.

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Introduction: 4E cognition and Immersive VR

In the late 80s and early 90s, as digital computing gained cultural and economic momentum, cognitivist, computationalist theories began to implode. More specifically, the idea that cognition and intelligence are bound to the brain and its logical manipulation of symbolic representations could no longer withstand, giving way to the newly emerging postcognitivist paradigm in cognitive sciences (Penny 2017; Shapiro 2019; Varela, Thompson, Rosch 2016). Currently known as 4E cognitive theories, i.e. embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended cognition, these theories take an interdisciplinary approach to cognition and incorporate phenomenology, pragmatism, biology, anthropology, psychology, sociology, neuroscience, philosophy of mind, robotics, computer science, and, as of recently media studies, image science, and aesthetics. Although the 4Es have their conceptual differences, we will not deal with their individual specificities in this paper but will rather draw from and build upon their common ground, which is that intelligence, thinking, perception and cognition arise through dynamic interaction of the brain, body, and the world. It is the active, embodied engagement with the world that constitutes thinking.

Penny writes that "our understanding of the world is not separate from our exploration of the world" (Penny 2017: 199), following Maurice Merleau-Ponty's thought where he states that "[t]he body is our general medium for having a world" (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 169). According to enactivism, the world is not a pregiven backdrop of agent's actions but is structurally coupled with the agent and occupies a co-constitutive role in sense-making as the central cognitive activity (Fingerhut 2021: 5). Structural coupling, adopted from autopoietic biology, was brought into cognitive discourse by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (Maturana 1975; Maturana, Varela 1980). It refers not only to congruent structural changes between two or more interacting systems, i.e., organism and the environment, but also between organism and physical, social, and cultural artifacts that co-constitute world-making through artifactual or media habits. We will further analyse selected 4E concepts in the context of immersive VR and ALife, starting with the questions: How does 4E translate into the immersive VR environments, namely, the Metaverse? How are cognitive capacities transformed and affected by structural coupling with interactive computer-generated media ecologies and artifacts?

VR technology has been around for at least three decades and is not new in that sense. It has been the subject of research in media studies, art theory, cognitive sciences, neuroscience, and philosophy among other fields. Through a vast number of experiments with VR, neuroscientific research involving immersive VR has demonstrated different applications as well as effects VR has on human experience, perception, cognition, and behavior. With the rise of Metaverse, the literature in philosophy, art theory, or (new) media studies on VR is again in the spotlight. What is new, however, is the fact that VR has become social VR, a ubiquitous socio-cultural phenomenon that is at this point already problematic and unpredictable, making it difficult to foresee its effects and out-turns.

In the past, cognitive sciences have often overlooked image science and media studies. Even though they offered different perspectives on the same issues of transformative effects media have on human perceptual and cognitive capacities, there was barely any communication between these scientific fields. Most of the interdisciplinary research was done in the field of film studies, which cannot fully apply to immersive, interactive, and participatory media such as VR. This kind of media calls for introduction of new vocabulary, methods, and concepts such as *ecomedia* (Parisi 2021: 244), *aesthetics of behaviour* (Penny 2017: 315) or *neuromediality* and *new cognitive media theory* (Fingerhut 2021: 8). In this paper, we set out to find a common ground across different scientific fields to map and better understand the challenges of evolutionary processes of interactions in and with the immersive VR socio-cultural ecologies. In doing so, we will focus on the implications and transformative power posed by Metaverse as ALife on the human embodied mind.

Metaverse Defined

There is no one fixed definition of Metaverse. The term has relatively recently been pushed into scholar focus by the intensified efforts of predominantly social media corporations and the industry of advertising to commercialise it. With its boundaries still not clearly defined and often used interchangeably with other terms covering similar territory like virtual reality, extended and augmented reality, social VR, or cyberspace, we think it rather important to dedicate some time to scope the term and anchor it more precisely for further theoretical and practical application. In this paper, consequently, a clear distinction of the term will be made, in order to explore, structure, and differentiate Metaverse's bespoke mechanisms and modalities of impact, especially in regard to the human embodied affective and cognitive apparatus and how it is exploited as a function of ALife (artificial life).

The term Metaverse (similarly like the term Cyberspace before it) has its origin in the work of science fiction, being first employed by Neal Stephenson in his 1992 novel *Snow Crash*. He defines it as "a computer-generated universe that [his] computer is drawing onto [his] goggles and pumping into [his] earphones." (Stephenson 2011: 22) Morphologically, the term can be tracked even further back to Ted Nelson and his notion of *Docuverse* (Nelson 1987), the overarching universe of all digitized documents mutually electronically interconnected and linked in such a way that their inherent references can be called out instantaneously and in parallel with the document explored, irrespective of the author, time or place or language of its creation. In a way, the World Wide Web represents the realisation of Nelson's idea of the *Docuverse*, with hypertext being its bespoke interface, structuring and facilitating the access to this otherwise impenetrable vastness of documented information. Thus, one important characteristic of *Docuverse*, though in Nelson's work still only rudimental, is its attribute of openness to interaction and manipulation, both of which are the cornerstones of *Metaverse*, too.

Here, we would like to go even deeper and explore the etymology of the term 'metaverse', as it also can help us understand some of its underlying principles. The word itself is coined from two words of Greek and Latin origin: prefix 'meta-(μετα-)', its closest translation in English being 'beyond', 'adjacent to self'. In epistemology it has evolved to mean something beyond but encompassing things of its own kind. A meta-theory, therefore, would be a theory about theories and a meta-art would be art about art. In the case of 'metaverse', it consequently denotes that what is beyond and encompassing all universes, as the second part of the word metaverse, is the root of the Latin word 'universum', meaning 'all things', 'all in one', 'the whole world'. In that sense, Metaverse is a world encompassing all the worlds of its kind. This is how far the etymology takes us, but what is meant by the 'worlds of its kind' is yet now on us to clarify further.

What most authors agree on is that Metaverse relates to and encompasses sets of virtual, computer- generated spaces/environments we as humans can access and interact with. In line with this is the most common referral to Metaverse as social VR, an interconnected network of virtual realities and virtual reality experiences, spaces for people to connect and interact with each other, with the virtual space around them and with the objects there found. Heidicker, Langbehn, and Steinicke say that "Social virtual reality (VR) has enormous potential to allow several physically separated users to collaborate in an immersive virtual environment" (Heidicker et al., internet). This remark is important because it brings up the notion of immersion, which is one of the key terms in defining Metaverse. The actual scope and breadth of access, interaction, and computer-generation in relation to Metaverse is understood differently by different authors and practitioners.

In this paper, building on Nelson's etymological definition of *Docuverse,* we will use the definition of Metaverse as an open and shared sum of all virtual reality spaces (worlds), which are computer-generated, inter-connected, immersive, and participatory. As such, these spaces do not fall under the concept of screen-framed space of traditional or digital media. Metaverse relies on technical immersive devices that control and streamline sensory stimuli (predominantly visual and auditory but amplified by all other sensory affectations as much as technology allows it) and allow for the dichotomy of real vs. virtual world to be felt, established, and then transcended by embodied human consciousness. It is built and draws support from different technologies like virtual reality, augmented reality, different means of connectivity and is modular, dynamic, and open to new technologies existing and evolving in parallel with the real world of physical objects, with or without our presence in it.

This definition is descriptive, rather than denominative and is expected to evolve together with the evolution of technology, interfaces, and formats of virtual spaces and, in that sense, it has many limitations. Still, it underlines several elements important for the purpose of this paper which address a range of related problems identified from the point of view of cognitive theories and theories of media, trying to connect the dots between these two disciplines,

and re-apply the learnings to the discussions around a fast-growing phenomenon of ALife.

Metaverse is not one specific virtual environment or platform. It should be clearly differentiated from the commercial platform 'metaverse' launched by the company Meta (former Facebook) as only one of its manifestations, but also from any individual VR project or spaces on their own such as VR Chat, Decentraland, Spatial, or Sansar. Metaverse is a sum of all those places and platforms, which essentially run on the VR principles.

Framing Cognitive Experiences in Metaverse

Immersion, Presence, Participation

The first important term we would like to address here is 'immersion'. The notion of virtual spaces is relatively old and can be traced back to the Renaissance and the invention of perspective in painting in the 15th century. The visual technique of perspective has allowed for objective representation of "virtual" worlds, reducing the process of perception to mathematical form. Like virtual reality today, perspective turned a picture into "a window that opens onto another, different reality" (Grau 2003: 37). Immersion has further developed in meaning and scope, most evidently with the advent of electronic media, and especially computers, where not only could the reality visually be simulated, but also interacted with, making it even closer in quality to the real world it simulates. We can say that with the advent of VR technologies (HMD, Cave) the way we can approach virtual worlds has evolved from mere inspection (paintings in perspective), through interaction (CGI, partly cinema), to full immersion and participation (VR, Metaverse). Immersive spaces should be considered those where devices allow, primarily visually, the real world to be completely blocked out and replaced with that of synthetic, computer-generated environments, thus creating a new sense of the real and of the actual space inhabited. Thus, we argue, our definition of Metaverse does not fully exclude, but rather pushes to the periphery of focus, any hybrid and 'framed' computer-generated environment such as CGI video games, video-conferencing platforms, or social media chat rooms, where the sense and the perception of the real-world is still acutely present, as well as the awareness of our bodies and minds acting upon the virtual spaces from the point of reference of the real world. In short, where the sense of 'presence' has not been fully achieved.

Immersion and presence are two closely related terms, easily distinguishable by their respective points of reference. Immersion is more a technical term, related to the capabilities of a piece of technology in question used to emulate and access virtual reality environments. In that sense: "By an immersive VR system, we mean one that delivers the ability to perceive through natural sensorimotor contingencies." (Slater, Sanchez-Vives 2016: 5) The VR system in this regard can be more or less advanced and immersion seen as the ability to build the illusion of actually being in a real, rather than simulated world. For

instance, the difference between HMD and Cave immersion is that in Cave there cannot be a virtual representation of the participant's body as, when looking down, one sees their own body. In HMD, the body is substituted by a virtual body, which makes this system more immersive. Michael Heim also identifies the difference between HMD and Cave immersion by referring to HMD as tunnel VR or perception-oriented immersion and to Cave as spiral VR or apperceptive immersion. In HMD, the primary body gives way to the cyberbody and "[t]he user undergoes a high-powered interiorization of a virtual environment" (Heim 1995: 72) and identifies with virtual images. Cave, specific for freedom of bodily movement unrestricted by bulky equipment, "permits us to remain aware of ourselves alongside computer-generated entities." (ibid.: 73) Unlike immersion into novels or films, VR is a highly engaging sensory immersion, which "extends us to the maximum because it transports our nervous system into the electronic environment." (ibid.: 75)

Presence, on the other hand, stands for a subjective feeling of immersion. "Presence is the feeling of being transported to another place." (Slater, Sanchez-Vives 2016: 37) Interestingly enough, we are not constantly aware of a sense of presence in the real world (in the narrowest meaning of the word). In the real world, we just are because the feeling of presence is taken for granted. It arises only in situations where perception is in a certain way disturbed and does not function nominally, such are the states where the mind is under the influence of, for example, hallucinogenic substances or in a state of illness (certain neurological or psychological diseases). Similarly, this feeling of presence in virtual environments arises due to imperfection of the immersion technologies. Slater and Sanchez identify place illusion as the illusion of "being there" in the virtual environment and "Plausibility" as the events are really happening. "This fundamental aspect of VR to deliver experience that gives rise to illusory sense of place and an illusory sense of reality is what distinguishes it fundamentally from all other types of media." (Slater, Sanchez-Vives 2016: 5) Similarly, Thomas Metzinger identifies three major dimensions of presence as a complex phenomenal quality, those being *identification* (being present as a *self*), *self-location in a temporal frame of reference*, and *self-location in space*, defining presence as "a phenomenal quality normally going along with a minimal sense of selfhood, and it results from the simulation of a self-centered world – in VR setting as well as in everyday life" (Metzinger 2018: 3).

Apart from Metaverse being immersive, meaning that, through advanced technology it achieves radical saturation of our cognitive capacities by eliciting the sense of presence, it also goes beyond it, allowing us to act on the objects of our cognition: it is participatory. This is the function it inherits from the VR-worlds it encompasses. "VR is different from other forms of human-computer interface since the human participates in the virtual world rather than uses it." (Slater, Sanchez-Vives 2016: 3) This is why regular CGI games, even interconnected or played over social media, do not belong natively to Metaverse. They are not immersive, as they do not elicit the sense of presence and the players use the computer-generated worlds only as platforms on which to pursue

and achieve game goals. This, though, is considered a border-line case, as in multi-player games it can be argued that the computer-game worlds are inter-connected participatory platforms. There are two additional arguments that decide against CGI games being attributed to Metaverse. One is that, in its essence, participation, even when goal-oriented, accounts for many more peripheral actions that are not revolving around a pre-defined goal only, but rather around the actual virtual space inhabited and others inhabiting it, such as conversations with other participants, unmotivated space exploration, artefacts interaction. These are all only partially included in standard multi-player CGI games. More importantly, though, participation means bypassing the sense of 'otherness' or 'otherworldliness' imposed by the visible frame surrounding a virtual space. The absence of the frame puts us in the same spatial point of reference with the virtual world, which becomes the one we are present in, rather than the one we look at and act upon from outside.

Transcending the Real through 4E Experiences

Related, and further explanatory for the above is the notion of transcendence. Even though with presence and participation we by-pass the frame of 'other-worldliness', we still recognize the simultaneous superposition of both spaces (real and virtual) when we make the conscious decision to step into the latter, accepting its rules governing both our cognitive and bodily processes as dominant and acting in accordance with them, "in spite of the fact that you know for sure that you are not actually there." (Slater, Sanchez-Vives 2016: 5) We make decisions based on the virtual world's rules even in cases when they do not go in line, or even directly oppose those of the actual physical space our body physically still inhabits. We will see later that this problematises the implications of Metaverse experience on evolutionary reconfiguration of our body, jeopardizing its ability to perform its core functions dictated by a biological eco-system it had been *a priori* borne into, and still is a part of and have a significant impact on. We will especially deal with the concept of 'returning', or 'repatriate' bodies, struggling to adapt to the challenges of the real world, to which they existentially and necessarily eventually always come back to and are a part of. This issue arises on the back of the efforts society and capitalism invest in pushing for a creation of new, 'technology-designed' bodies, able to not only inhabit new, in this case virtual and computer-generated territories, but even more to evolve the abilities to, there, efficiently create value and produce more wealth for the corporations in control of those new, rapidly evolving virtual territories. Unfortunately, now this is being done disregarding the arising question of how able these new Metaverse-evolved bodies are to repatriate the real world and continue their biological survival.

    If we now look at the elements of the definition of Metaverse we have thus deconstructed, we will be able to draw a clear parallel with cognitive theories and see that Metaverse experiences draw from all 4 corners of the 4E cognition. They are embodied, meaning that they cannot be perceived without the

presence of a body, both a virtual one, which enables us to take active participation in the computer-generated world, and a biological one, whose sensorimotor apparatus it depends on. They are embedded, with a sense of full presence in the world mentioned, exposed to all its respective stimuli, artifacts, other inhabitants, as well as architecture, infrastructure, and rules. They are equally enactive, empowering us to impactfully interact with the virtual world in question, with all the rules of the responsive feedback applied (our action in the virtual world will drive respective reaction/change). "Enactivism argues that we bring forth experiences by engaging with the world and others." (Fingerhut 2021: 6) Fingerhut introduces another useful term to describe enactivism, and that is that of environmental affordances for action (Fingerhut 2021: 8), which extends some of the responsibility for cognition to the actual environment, which can or cannot afford certain actions. Therefore, the opportunities for us to act in any human-environment system are limited by the contingencies of that system. Here we have already mentioned the 4th type of cognitive experience, that which is extended. We will dedicate a separate part to it, passing it through the theoretical framework of media theories and media studies.

Metaverse as Media: Cognitive Bodies Extended

In his seminal work *Understanding Media: the Extensions of Man* from 1969, Marshall McLuhan defines media as man's cognitive extensions, meaning that media "works as 'extensions' of our senses, allowing a reconfiguration of our perceptual and cognitive possibilities" (Parisi 2021: 242). McLuhan understands that the speed of overarching development of industrial revolution, accelerated even further by the invention of electricity, has brought about changes a human, as a cognitive entity, will have difficulties keeping up with. He warns that, even though the media allow us to extend our cognitive capacities into worlds which, without the agency of media, would remain unattainable for us, we are "leasing our eyes and ears and nerves to commercial interests, [and this] is like handing over the common speech to a private corporation, or like giving the earth's atmosphere to a company as a monopoly" (McLuhan 1994: 68). Reading McLuhan's work now, more than 50 years after its publishing, it is clear that some of his concepts, especially anticipating the advent of an overall electrical networked society he saw that the introduction of electrically powered media would certainly bring about, resonates even more and gains completely new relevance.

Parisi further builds on McLuhan stating that we should differentiate between the act of extension and that of externalisation, where "the first indicates an 'enhancement' of the agent's particular activity, and the second indicates the 'transfer' of an ability onto different physical support" (Parisi 2021: 242). Extension, even as a phenomenon from physics, is heavily dependent on a material's plasticity and elasticity, its possibility to adapt to the strain imposed to it by an external force trying to make it reach the states broader than its resting state. The plasticity and elasticity are not unlimited adaptive

means, and when their limits are reached, the internal material consistency breaks and the connection becomes externalised: not of one entity being extended to encapsulate different distant states, but of now two broken entities of a same origin reaching out to each other in order to complement their respective missing states. What is being lost here is the unity, the continuity, where both parts now proceed with their development as separate entities. In the case of Metaverse, as we will see later in the paper, our cognition, after being extended, stretched too thinly from its physical body into virtual spaces, is in grave danger of breaking this inherent biological connection and becoming an externalised resource for two radically different embodiments: the physical one and the one of bodily representation in Metaverse.

The question arises if Metaverse per se can be considered a media? If we were to go back to the very origin of the term in communication theories, as it was established by Claude Shennon in "Mathematical Theory of Communication" (Shannon 1948), a media is nothing more but a vessel for transmitting information and its key role is to achieve reliable transmission, meaning that the message received (decoded), comes as close in its content and character to the message sent (encoded). "The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point." (Shannon 1948: 379) In order for the efficiency and effectiveness of information transfer to happen, the media can employ their own language, meaning code the message to better suit the characteristics of the media as a channel and make the transmission faster and more secure. The biggest problem for Shannon was, that precisely in this process of coding and transmission, various types of noise can pollute the content and the character of the message transmitted, making the end result, the received message not equal to the one sent, often losing important parts of its essence.

McLuhan already sees that media are much more than just mere channels for messages transmission. It is his famous statement saying that 'medium is the message', "it is the medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action" (McLuhan 1994: 9). Unlike radio or TV, Metaverse is not a channel in a traditional sense. Its main purpose is not transparent transfer of a message and its respective meaning, it is a platform for human association and action. "Concern with 'effect' rather than with 'meaning' is a basic change of our electric time, for effect involves the total situation, and not a single level of information movement." (McLuhan 1994: 26) Metaverse is the platform for broadcasting effects, in the sense of delivering experiences, rather than information, or to be more precise, delivering experiences as information. In the overall circulation of value and wealth, information is the key commodity. With all possibilities digital media offer for tracking and data-storage, even experiences in Metaverse are quantifiable, thus making them a form of information, too.

Therefore, we can conclude that Metaverse is a media, inasmuch that it extends human cognitive capacity, delivers associative and actionable experiences and additionally it does so by the means of media already known to

man. This is yet another characteristic of modern media, that it always starts by borrowing its language from the already existing media before it finds and develops its own. "The content of any medium is always another medium." (McLuhan 1994: 8) We have seen that newspapers have profited from the media of book and photography, computer games from all other temporal media like film, music, literature, whereas the Internet has become the most radical hypermedia combining all of these in its platform. In that sense, Metaverse is like the Internet, the media encapsulating all other media, with the difference that it evolves the human action to presence and participation. It is an ultimate metamedia, as defined by Manovich: "We are witnessing the emergence of a new cultural metalangue, something that will be at least as significant as the printed word and cinema before it." (Manovich 2002: 93)

Apart from sitting highest in the hierarchy of media, Metaverse also can be seen as the hottest media. McLuhan argues that hot media are those which oversaturate one single sense, stimulate it in 'high definition'. High definition itself is defined as "the state of being well filled with data" (McLuhan 1994: 22). The more data is given and information served 'as is', the hotter the medium. The more one has to complement the received media signal with additional data in order to have its full understanding, the colder the media. It is possible that McLuhan could not have anticipated Metaverse and the extension of the technical development of media, when he stated that hot media always saturate only one sense. This is still true even for Metaverse, as vision is the sense which gets overwhelmed the most, but others like hearing and touch especially, are catching up. In that sense, we can call Metaverse an overheated media, as it overflows many senses with data simultaneously. The only solution McLuhan sees for this problem is in cooling media through consumption diet. He sees it only in terms of quantity, what we already see parents do with children, i.e., limiting their screen time. We argue, though, that in Metaverse, it is not only quantity, but also quality of cooling that will need to be implemented. This means that it is not only the amount of time spent in Metaverse that will need to be moderated, but also what we do with that time, how we interact, consume, spend, and produce, but also how morality, legality, acceptable behaviors, and actions are defined and executed. This is a whole new regulatory territory which is beyond the scope of this paper, although we recognize the need for its further exploration.

Metaverse as Artificial Life: Evolving Dry ALife-Bodies and the Problem of Repatriating Reality

Perceptive bodies: Building the Image of the Real with Predictive Coding

A lion share of our cognitive processing, especially that which we relate to the notion of consciousness, is dedicated to ensuring our bodies remain well-orientated within the space they inhabit, so that when need arises they can perform

a necessary action: run, turn-around, scratch nose, sit or similar. This cognitive processing is of course dependent on the data-input our neurological, sensorimotor system receives. We need to bear in mind, though, that this data does not come only from the current environment (bottom-up processing), but also includes all the information stored from previous experiences, including beliefs and expectations (top-down processing). Our body with its consciousness and sensorimotor apparatus is well trained and evolved to, based on relatively limited data-input, reconstruct and predict a full model of the environment it inhabits, all with its respective potential benefits, dangers, and potentials for action. "Perception depends very largely on knowledge (specific 'top-down' and general 'sideways' rules), derived from the past experience of the individual and from ancestral, sometimes even prehuman experience." (Gregory 1997: 1126) Even in the case of vision, only a fraction of the generated visual perception comes from the data captured by the sense, the rest is our brain's best approximation of what the full picture of the environment is, based on previous experiences, predictions and 'filling in the gaps'. This is the core idea of Predictive Coding (PC). "In terms of perception, cognition and action, the computational contribution of the brain involves providing multi-layered system that produces predictions or hypotheses about the world." (Fingerhut 2021: 9)

The importance of this remark cannot be overestimated. We argue that what essentially will happen in VR systems, and consequently in Metaverse as a whole, is that our bodies, by being faced with qualitatively different and novel environmental data-input (bottom-up processing), and still relying on the existing experience data they use to complement it (top-down processing), will form a Metaverse-bespoke response, a form of hybrid virtual-real bodily affectation. When repeated enough times in similar environments and circumstances, it is expected that this response will inform the reconfiguration and evolution of top-down processing mechanisms in accordance with the Metaverse rules. This represents a danger for the repatriate body, as when it comes back to the real world, where its direct survival success is dependent on biological processes, rather than on representation and electrical computation, it becomes inadequate to act efficiently and is thus endangered. "VR not just as a reality simulator, but as an unreality simulator can paradoxically give rise to realistic behavior." (Slater, Sanchez-Vives 2016: 6) In VR, vision stands in for proprioception and other faculties – even when the user is physically inactive, neurons in these brain centers fire up in VR through vision. These new realistic, but unreal behaviours define the scope of new affordances, especially in relation to the role these affordances play in evolving artificial life.

ALife: Soft, Hard, and Wet Artificial Life

For the purposes of this paper, ALife is the term which will be used to denote the study of artificial life, whereas 'artificial life' will be used as the term describing the phenomenon of life-like behavior in non-living things. As Awodele et al. summarise: "Artifical Life (ALife) is the study of man-made (synthetic

systems) that exhibit behaviour characteristics of natural living systems. The primary goal of this field is to create and study artificial organisms that mimic natural organisms. ALife complements the traditional biological sciences concerned with analysis of living organisms by attempting to create life-like behaviours within computers and other artificial media." (Awodele et al. 2015: 5)

ALife is a relatively new field of study. We will not discuss it in depth in this paper but will use only some of its terms to help outline their possible application to Metaverse, how this reconfigures the role of human body, and to open the field for further research and discussion. The term dates back to 1989 and was coined by Christopher Langton, using it to describe "Life made by Man rather than by Nature" (Langton, internet). The term has evolved significantly since, now encapsulating the study of all non-biological life-like behavior, addressed by interdisciplinary research raging across biology, physics, engineering, philosophy, mathematics, arts, and other disciplines. Even though both refer to the biological processes that are trying to be simulated or re-created in synthetic systems/environments, artificial intelligence and artificial life come from different backgrounds and have different goals and are evolving quite separately. AI (artificial intelligence) is concerned with eliciting intelligent behaviour and decision making in computer systems. As Hiesinger rightly puts it, AI is "trying to avoid unnecessary biological detail in trying to create something that so far exists only in biology" (Hiesinger 2021: 3). ALife, on the other hand, is concerned only with eliciting life-like behaviors in non-living systems, which on their own do not necessarily need to be intelligent.

Mark Bedau defines three different types of artificial life (Bedau 2007: 595). *Soft*, which would completely be executed by computer software. In most cases those are digital simulations and constructs which exhibit life-like behaviour. *Hard* artificial life is the one where life-like systems are implemented within corresponding hardware, most common forms being all sorts of robots. The third type of artificial life is *Wet* artificial life, which refers to creating and inducing life-like behaviors in non-living biochemical materials. In this paper, for the purposes of inspecting Metaverse and its corresponding mechanisms, we will deal mainly with the first kind, Soft, fully software-generated and simulated artificial life, but some of the terminology from the remaining two kinds will be used to explain other arising, important phenomena.

Core Principles of (Artificial) Life: Self-Organisation, Growth, and Unpredictability

The foundational attribute of all artificial life behaviors is self-organisation. It is a complex term, which Gershenson et al. define as "local interactions between independent elements [which] lead to global behaviors and patterns" (Gershenson, internet). Additional important remark is that an external observer can spot this pattern as part of the system of many components, but the pattern itself is a product of the collective, and yet individualised behaviour of the system elements themselves. Hiesinger introduces two additional critical

attributes, those of information unfolding (reducing of entropy) and invest-ment, in this case of time and energy (Hiesinger 2021: 326). He further writes that self-organisation is also based on spontaneous interaction of the system components that leads to a more ordered and more complex state of the sys-tem than the state prior to the process of information unfolding and the sum of its individual components. Self-organisation is a direct result of life's pro-cess of growth, whereas growth itself requires the existence of initial genetic information, which is set in motion of transformation through investment of time and energy.

An example of a self-organised system in biological life is the brain. Biology and neurology have been long trying to explain how the brain evolves, especial-ly how individual cells know how to evolve into such a complex system that is the brain. For a long time, it was thought that genes carry a sort of a blue-print of 'brainness', a map of all the individual cells and the states they grow toward achieving in order to create it. This stance, that it is genetically encoded infor-mation that drives, dictates, and fully controls this process is true only partial-ly. "The genetic code contains algorithmic information to develop the brain, not the information that describes the brain." (Hiesinger 2021: 7) This finding was of crucial importance, as it revealed that the information captured with-in genes, as elementary unit of life's self-organisation, is not full instructions to create the brain, but only the indivisible/discrete elements of growth and a growth algorithm, whereas the actual end (purpose) of growth arises gradual-ly, driven by the principles of locality and randomness and fueled by time and energy. In the case of brain neurons this means that every individual neuron has its local growth autonomy, not having its end-state programmed into it *a-priori* in any way, creating meaningful neural connections and thus forming the brain only by randomly acting upon other equally growing neighbouring neurons, its surroundings and even upon itself. Through endless such repeat-ed processes and trials and errors of connections being made and dying-off, eventually a system as complex as the brain comes to be. This means that a life-like self-organised system starts with a very simple unit of information, which, triggered by a growth algorithm, and through acts of randomly con-necting and disconnecting with its neighbouring units, consuming energy over time grows to become an infinitely complex system, patterned and ordered. This system "would require more information to describe, than was needed to start its growth" (Hiesinger 2021: 2). This is what makes life-like behaviors im-possible to predict and simulate from knowing their initial information-states. They can be only simulated in real-time, meaning, in order to understand their end-point evolution, we need to run it in an equal amount of time from begin-ning to end. This also means that any kind of developmental growth of life-like systems and their evolution can only be analysed in retrospect, not predicted or anticipated. This phenomenon is anchored in the rule that "there may be no other way to read the genetic information than to run the program. The infor-mation is in the genes, but it cannot be read like a blueprint. It really is a dif-ferent kind of information that requires time and energy to unfold" (Hiesinger

2021: 4). This information unfolding, no matter how simple the unit of information or the algorithm containing rules for growth to begin with is, cannot be mathematically calculated or predicted before simulating or letting it grow in its entirety. This unpredictability of growth, and moreover of evolution of life-like systems is what should be the cause of concern when talking about the Metaverse and the role the human body takes in it.

One of the most famous examples of an artificial life simulation is "The Game of Life", created in 1970 by British mathematician John Horton Conway. It is a computer program running on an infinite, two-dimensional orthogonal grid of square cells, in which each of the cells can be in either of the two states: dead (unpopulated) or alive (populated). The artificial life simulation starts with the very simple initial (gene) state, with the small number of cells/squares (most often 4-12) in a predefined discrete state (dead/alive) being exposed to a very short growth algorithm, which is based on three simple rules:

1. Any live cell with two or three live neighbours (surrounding cells) survives
2. Any dead cell with three live neighbours becomes a live cell
3. All other live cells die in the next generation. All other dead cells stay dead.

This is considered the 'seed' of the system. After setting the system in motion, in a very short period of time, we can see how the system grows to become increasingly complex, creating patterns of life-like behaviors like grouping, swarming, distancing, piling, gridding, etc., quickly becoming a vast, dynamic, pulsing entity. None of the exposed behaviors is possible to be anticipated upfront or be pre-programmed.

"The Game of Life" is an utterly simplified example of a Soft artificial life, a life-like behaving system, computer simulated and living only as a software. The elementary unit of a Soft artificial life, the one that contains the software-equivalent of genetic information is called Cellular Automaton (CA), a term proposed by Andrew Ilachinski in 2001 (Ilachinski 2001). As Gershenson et al. explain, "A CA consists of many units (cells), each can be in any number of discrete states, and each of which repeatedly determines its next state in a fully distributed manner, based on its current state and those of its neighbours. With no central controller involved, CAs can spontaneously organise their state configurations to demonstrate various forms of self-organisation" (Gershenson et al., internet).

Metaverse as Soft Artificial Life: Evolving Dry Bodies

If we take all the above into account, we will propose yet another definition of Metaverse, this time from within the framework of Alife. Metaverse is a Soft artificial life system, in the early stage of its growth, with its Cellular Automaton, the elementary unit of its organisation, being a participatory human agent, self-organised in accordance with its respective local rules and interacting with

other such agents within a distributed system, creating a more complex, patterned system, driven by both growth and evolutionary algorithms and propelled by energy and time. Here we introduce a new term of *Dry Body* to refer to the human agent as Metaverse's Cellular Automaton.

Dry Body (DB) is a software representation of a human body in virtual environments, taken as a genome of Metaverse as Soft artificial life. The term is developed as an opposition to a physical, biological body, which is 'wet' and whose main constituent is water. Whereas for physical bodies as units of life the main propeller of growth is energy in the form of water, DBs as units of artificial life are equally propelled by energy, but this energy is dry, with its main constituent being electricity. Additional accelerants of growth of artificial life are algorithms, cognitive work, and capital. Whereas 'wet' bodies equally evolve with the help of growth and evolutionary algorithms, cognitive work and capital are reserved for DBs, defining how they get involved in producing additional value for their respective artificial life systems.

A DB should not be mixed-up with any of the concepts of individual human body representations in VR (i.e avatars or virtual agents). A DB, like our biological body, is understood as a vessel encapsulating a germ of life; a local unit, which is an indivisible part of a more complex artificial life system, and is its constitutional, evolutionary element. When defining artificial life-like behaviors above, we have stated that they are based on having an initial state of already existing genetic information upon which a growth algorithm is set in motion. In Metaverse, DBs are these Cellular Automata which already carry the seed of information Metaverse as artificial life needs in order to develop and grow. To sum it up, whereas an avatar is a carrier of personal information of identity, a DB is a carrier of information of a species of artificial life.

But where does this information come from? Here we return to the media theory terms of extension and externalisation. A software generated body is considered a DB only when impregnated with information it can use to contribute to artificial life's growth. It is just a software construct and what makes it potent is the information borrowed from human consciousness shaped by many dynamic embodied acts of cognition. We see here how Metaverse radically changes the essential quality and dynamics of medial extension. Whereas in traditional electronic media and CGI, media become our extensions as facilitators, empowerers, allowing us to amplify our consciousness through its extended simulation into the virtual (McLuhan calls this "technological simulation of consciousness" (McLuhan 1994: 3)), but our physical, embodied mind remains the anchor, the main agent of control. In Metaverse, on the other side, a DB reaches back out into the real for information, extending to and powering itself with that same embodied mind, which is now completely amputated from the real, physical space it inhabits. The biological body becomes only a dismorfed, feeding tube to a mind which a DB extends to for information. We see now that the human mind suddenly becomes a shared resource between two qualitatively different bodies, which are differently evolutionary motivated.

We have already mentioned evolution several times, but to fully understand the problems we discuss in regard to Metaverse, a clarification of how we use the term 'evolution' and what the difference is between a growth and an evolutionary algorithm is needed. A growth algorithm is asynchronous and linear. It is a developmental, linear process which consumes energy and time. It is a set of simple, repetitive instructions which we can call vertical, as they push Cellular Automata in question only in one direction, which is that of 'up', of being bigger and more and better organised. An evolutionary algorithm, on the other hand, is synchronous and horizontal. Heisinger defines that it is based on "the concept that a meaningful and heritable change to a biological neural network can only be achieved through random mutations in the genome and subsequent selection at the level of phenotypic output after the entire developmental process is concluded. The concept is based on the hypothesis that the effect of a mutation is fundamentally unpredictable in the absence of any knowledge of previous outcomes due to the nature of algorithmic growth" (Hiesinger 2021: 320). In essence, an evolutionary algorithm chooses horizontally between the mutations which have occurred during growth, and picks out those which have contributed to the amplification of evolutionary most desirable traits and feeds them back into the growth algorithm. This means that in Metaverse only those mutations will be chosen and fed into the growth algorithm that give rise to behaviors Metaverse sees most effective and efficient for achieving its evolutionary goals. What makes this problematic is that, like with any life or life-like system, we cannot know what their ultimate evolutionary goal is before the system achieves its end-state, so it is impossible to predict how DB will use or in which direction it will evolve our cognitive apparatus, for us to be able to react to this and compose and implement preventively a set of respective measures aimed at protecting the sensory-motor and cognitive abilities of our biological bodies.

Metaverse- Exploring the Unpredictability of Connections. From Realistic to Un-Real Behaviors

By visiting Metaverse, through entering and inhabiting one of its existing VR worlds, or expanding it by building a new one, people in a random, but motivated fashion (just like neurons in a brain) act individually by extending their attention and communicating with their neighbours, exchanging information, exploring their surroundings, and eventually creating connections. Those can be connections with other people inhabiting the same virtual space, with the space itself or with cultural artifacts found in that space, thus giving rise to and expressing novel patterns of behavior. As Parisi puts it, "what a sensorimotor body becomes is the result of coupling with the world in the sense that the world guides and limits the development of the organism through normative regulations, resulting from the relation itself" (Parisi 2021: 250).

For example, people will keep on returning to a retro-designed un-real virtual space, which contains many of the long-gone artifacts from their childhood,

because it evokes in them a sense of nostalgia, a feeling of safety and careless-ness. They will also return to the virtual spaces their long-distance friend vis-its most often, because this is the closest they can get to seeing them in per-son. They will also exchangeably go from one place to the next, probing new places as participants and in that way creating even more connections. Some of these connections will be amplified by their behavior because of the sense of gratification they bring, some connections will die-off because they either do not elicit the same gratification anymore or have simply lost their motiva-tional relevance. As the new virtual worlds and environments join Metaverse, accelerated by the fuel of capital and improved technology, so will Metaverse grow, allowing for more connections and more behavioral patterns to be made, which in turn will make it grow even further exponentially. The issue is that un-real virtual places can still give rise to realistic behaviors our bodies nat-urally perform or can be deceived into performing. For example, people in Metaverse still apologise or move aside when with their avatar they bump into another avatar, even though, unlike in the real world, this does not cause any kind of tactile affectation. It can be presumed that by repeatedly experiencing this behavior, our physical bodies will become partially or fully numb to the actual tactile stimuli when faced with a similar situation in real life.

As McLuhan wrote: "Nobody wants a motorcar till there are motorcars, and nobody is interested in TV until there are TV programs. The power of tech-nology to create its own world of demand is not independent of technology being first an extension of our own bodies and senses." (McLuhan 1994: 69) Just because we have designed a VR space in a certain way, or we have ensured that only a certain profile of people is allowed to enter it, does not mean that we can dictate or even fully anticipate the kinds of behaviors these spaces will give rise to. As mentioned earlier in the paper, we can spot the patterns form-ing in the system, but we cannot control it. Another example is that, even in Metaverse, when we in the distance see an avatar of someone we know and want to interact with, we will use our avatar to wave to them, because it is a top-down learned behavior we have inherited from the real world to draw their attention, but this behavior does not coincide with the logic of the VR spaces. It is impossible to tell how this gesture will evolve. Maybe instead of waving a hand in the future a common practice will be making a triple salto in their direction, or holding a virtual balloon with their name printed on it, or most probably something at this moment completely unimaginable, un-real, and not possible to execute in real life. Even if we do not feel it, we are already in the process of learning new behaviors and acquiring new top-down perception processes, being shaped by Metaverse the moment we step through its doors.

Our minds do have plasticity and almost endless possibility to adapt to new situations, but they have never been put in front of such a challenging task, where two qualitatively different sorts of bodies fight for the same cognitive resource and require them to evolve different responses to the same or rela-tively similar sensorial stimuli. DBs evolved in Metaverse are not required to have any plasticity or adaptive behaviors typical for wet bodies. In the world

of biological life, this makes DBs brittle, fragile, inflexible, and easy to break. The artificial life we have already unstoppably set in motion with Metaverse will evolutionarily prioritise DB as it starts to employ an ever-higher share of our cognitive capacities. If we know that smaller interactive technological systems and media like video games or especially the Internet have already reconfigured our bodies in ways which could not have been anticipated to suit their needs, the conversations about managing the impact of and cooling the media of Metaverse cannot start too early. Biological life is, after all, still a meta-life to Metaverse.

Let us close this paper with the visionary words of McLuhan: "In operating on society with a new technology, it is not the incised area that is most affected. The area of impact and incision is numb. It is the entire system that is changed…No society has ever known enough about its actions to have developed immunity to its new extensions or technologies." (McLuhan 1994: 64)

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Ivana Uspenski i Jelena Guga

Utelovljenje Metaverzuma kao arificijelnog života: na preseku medijskih i 4E kognitivnih teorija

Apstrakt

U poslednjim decenijama 20. veka videli smo kako medijske teorije i kognitivne nauke rastu, sazrevaju i dostižu svoje vrhunce analizirajući, svaki iz svoje disciplinske perspektive, dva srodna osnovna fenomena: medije kao okruženje, prenosioce i kreatore stimulusa i otelovljeni ljudski um u dinamičnoj interakciji sa okruženjem, kao i načine na koje mediji i um utiču na i transformišu jedno drugo. Iako tretiraju čitav niz veoma sličnih problema i dolaze do sličnih zaključaka, to ipak nije dovoljno približilo ove dve discipline niti je rezultiralo njihovim interdisciplinarnim pristupom rešavanju ovih pitanja. Pomak je napravljen kroz kognitivne teorije medija u kojima je u fokus uglavnom na tradicionalnim medijskim formama poput filma. Ipak, potrebno je uspostavljanje više tačaka povezivanja za rasplet interaktivnih i imerzivnih medijskih okruženja i njihovih efekata na ljudsku kogniciju, akciju i percepciju. Sa usponom sistema virtuelne realnosti (VR), posebno u trenutku kada počinju da evoluiraju u Metaverzum kao svoju glavnu platformu povezivanja, tkivo tela postaje gotovo fizički isprepleteno sa tkivom virtuelnog okruženja u kom egzistira kroz uranjanje. Istovremeno sa Metaverzumom, iznova se javlja interesovanje za ove dve discipline, a posebno potreba da se njihovi koncepti koriste na interdisciplinaran način. Cilj ovog rada je da spoji ove discipline u problematizaciji položaja fizičkog tela i njegovih senzorno-motoričkih sposobnosti i njihovog razvoja u sintetičkom okruženju kao što je Metaverzum, kao i da predvidi potencijalne negativne strane nekontrolisanog rasta Metaverzuma. Metaverzum ćemo posmatrati kao fenomen veštačkog života, prateći pravila veštačkog života i razvijajući potpuno novu

„telesnost", odnosno telo koje je potpuno prilagođeno virtuelnim prostorima. Ovo telo nazivamo Suvim telom. Ono je entitet koji deli kognitivne resurse sa fizičkim telom čiji nije fizički deo, već se na njega proširuje. Polazimo od premise da svaka nova, inovativna tehnologija u svom razvoju sledi pravila algoritama rasta, što znači da se njeno konačno 'krajnje stanje' nikada ne može znati ili predvideti unapred, kao ni promene koje ona donosi u postojeći svet i njegov ekosistem. Što je veća inovacija, to je veći uticaj i promena na stvarni stvarni svet i naša biološka tela u njemu. Metaverzum, kao krajnja tehnička inovacija u oblasti virtuelnosti i manifestacija veštačkog života koji evolutivno prioritizuje „suva tela", nosi sa sobom značajne i nepredvidive načine na koje se naša biološka tela dalje koriste i razvijaju. Konačno, naglašavamo važnost kontrolisanog, praćenog i doziranog kognitivnog učešća u Metaverse-u, kako bi se uspostavio i sačuvao kognitivni balans između suvih tela i bioloških tela.

Ključne reči: 4E kognicija, imerzivna VR, Metaverzum, artificijelni život (ALife), suva tela (DB), evolucioni algoritmi.

HEINRICH RICKERT'S PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

FILOZOFIJA KULTURE HAJNRIHA RIKERTA I NJEN ZNAČAJ

Giovanni Morrone

BETWEEN HISTORY AND SYSTEM. HEINRICH RICKERT'S CONCEPT OF CULTURE[1]

ABSTRACT
The paper reconstructs the concept of culture that emerges from Heinrich Rickert's neo-Kantianism, uncovering its major historical-problematic, methodological, and philosophical implications. The central theme of the first section is the idea that modern culture is uniquely characterized by "*fragmentation*". It also unpacks the programme of Rickert's philosophy of culture, which pursues the task of reconstructing the lost unity of culture. The second section explains the methodological implications of the problematic relationship between value and reality established in cultural goods and evaluations. Finally, the third section reconstructs the Rickertian system of values, with its peculiar effort to reconcile historicity and value absoluteness. The last part develops a critical discussion of the Rickertian project.

1. Kant as a Philosopher of Modern Culture

At an early stage Baden Neo-Kantianism took on the features of a philosophy of culture. Already in some of Windelband's essays of the late 1870s we may in fact clearly recognize a cultural philosophical intent, driven by the precise identification of modernity as an age of dispersion and incompleteness.[2] Rickert, in turn, adopted the culture philosophical interpretation of Kantianism proposed by Windelband and proceeded to include it in the systemic framework of an exhaustive philosophy of values. In a volume published on the bicentenary of Kant's birth, *contra* to the rising irrationalistic and life philosophical

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1   English translation by Dr. Matteo F. Olivieri.
2   I refer here to Windelband 1878. On the issue see Morrone 2017b. On the culture philosophical value of the Neo-Kantian movement see Tenbruck 1994, Ferrari 1998. Also see the contributions collated in Krijnen - Ferrari - Fiorato (2014). Cf. Flach 2007; Krijnen 2015.

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(*lebensphilosophisch*) cultural context, Rickert chose to reaffirm the current importance of criticism and its efficacy in expressing the conscience of the modern age (Rickert 1924). Rickert believes – closely following suit to his teacher[3] – that only through Kantian philosophy we can achieve a philosophical reflection on modern culture and the clear recognition of its structural complexity.[4]

This argumentative goal drives Rickert to laying out a philosophy historical framework aimed at defining the "essence" of modern culture, differentiating it from ancient and medieval culture. Therefore he outlines, rather schematically, the "principles" characterizing the classical Greek, Roman, and Christian civilizations.

The first one of these cultures marks the rise of the theoretical man and – in them – the awareness of the value of truth accomplished in science. The Greek theoretical man bears forth a specific form of *intellectualism* that will prove to be decisive in shaping western thought. Classical Greek culture, in fact, understood reality as a logical cosmos and believed the *logos* to be essence of the world; therefore the material reality of the senses was demoted to mere appearance, an unauthentic being of a lesser degree. Logic ultimately converged into ontology. Knowledge was intended as picturing (*Abbildung*) a given objective structure and the object was identified in the intelligible, i.e. in that which conforms to the intellect. Any aspect of reality that did not conform to the laws of thinking was rejected to the domain of appearance and un-authenticity. Rickert believed such intellectualism to have had decisive effects even in the sphere of ethics, determining the primacy of theoretical values and thus establishing knowledge as man's ultimate *destination*. Knowledge and theoretical contemplation enjoyed therefore the highest rank in the classical Greek system of virtues.[5]

The second principle, consequent to the classical Roman civilization, marks the pre-eminence of the instance of the will and its disciplining within political life by means of law. According to Rickert, only in the classical Roman civilization did it become possible to develop an adequate reflection on practical life in its communitarian aspect (Rickert 1924: 64).

The third principle finally, which coincides with Christianity, marks the advent of a religious sentiment of oriental origin that re-evaluates entirely the individual dimension of existence, through the personal relationship with god. Yet, by recognizing value to the irrational aspects of human life, this principle inaugurates an irreparable conflict with the rationalism of the first two. It is a structural conflict which the cultural synthesis operated by the Church in the Middle Ages was able to resolve merely ostensibly, by virtue of a principle of authority, one that is unifying but not harmonizing (Rickert 1924: 109 f.).

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3   On this issue see Windelband 1881. In this *lecture* in commemoration of the centennial of the publication of *The Critique of Pure Reason*, Windelband argues that the meaning of Kantian philosophy consists in having provided an adequate expression and conclusive awareness to the cultural situation of the present (ibid.: 121).
4   Rickert 1924: V.
5   On Greek intellectualism cf. ibid.: 53 ff.

To understand the Rickertian approach to a philosophy of culture, we need not to scrutinize further this simplistic outline of the philosophy of history, but we must understand how it contributes to determining the character of modern culture in its form – rather than its content. According to Rickert, modernity is born of the dissolution of the ostensible synthesis of Greek, Roman, and Christian civilizations established in the Middle Ages. Thus modernity is the age of fragmentation: *„Die moderne Kultur"*, Rickert writes, *„ist von Kräften beherrscht, die einander widerstreben, und das moderne Kulturbewußtsein trägt daher, um mit Hegel zu reden, den Charakter der ‚Zerrissenheit'"* (Rickert 1924: 121). Modern culture is a fragmented culture, not merely nor principally because, in its criticism of the principle of authority, it refuses the exterior compromises by which medieval man had been apparently pacified. Modernity reckons its character of fragmentation not simply because of the contextual consequences of historical processes. The dissolution of the medieval synthesis brings to light that "the lack of unity is in the essence of the thing".[6] The process of culture is one of growing differentiation among cultural spheres, which increasingly tend to autonomy and reciprocal independence, rejecting any subordination or reduction to principles external to their immanent legality.

Rickert explicitly recalls the Weberian analyses, remarking on the conflictive nature of modern culture and the irreducible plurality of its components, which results in a reiteration in the present of the ancient polytheism of values and in an irreconcilable conflict of world-views and diverse appraisals (Weber 1989). Yet Rickert's reference to Weber is coupled with a remark that is essential to understand the general meaning of his argument. Weber – Rickert argues – understands the fragmentation of modern culture as a "long-lasting and essentially inevitable" condition and not as the assumption that justifies and elicits the unifying mission of a philosophy of culture (Rickert 1924: 123). In this sense, philosophy of culture indeed presupposes the full acknowledgement of modernity's fragmentation – i.e. the differential and conflicting nature of the diverse cultural spheres and contexts of value – in order for it to completely develop as a theoretical reflection aimed at elaborating a "new synthesis" and thus aimed at healing the fragmentation of the present era.

This is indeed the unique meaning that Rickert attributes to Kantian philosophy: for the first time, we come to complete philosophical awareness of the process of differentiation and autonomization of cultural spheres, characteristic of the modern age since its beginning, that had remained essentially incomprehensible to pre-Kantian systems. Modern philosophy prior to Kant constantly oscillated between the need to reiterate Greek intellectualism and a form of anti-intellectual sensualism. In the former tendency we reckon the re-emergence of the ancient pretension of subordinating to the value of truth and to science the totality of the spheres of value of culture, ultimately rejecting the pluralistic essence of modern culture and the dignity of it's a-theoretical spheres. In the latter tendency, the diverse strands of modern sensualism

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6   Rickert 1924. All translations of German texts are mine. GM.

and even anti-intellectual enlightenment – according to Rickert – were never capable of developing a theoretical foundation adequate for a philosophical understanding of a-theoretical values and therefore never reached a scientific evaluation of culture in its entirety. Indeed Kant was able to overcome the opposing unilateralities of the systems of the modern age, and was the first to successfully develop a philosophy of modern culture with scientific basis.

We should look more closely at how Rickert describes the structure of Kant's *culture philosophical* accomplishment. It consists of two distinct moments bound within a logical and historical-problematical connection. The first moment occurs when the "spell of intellectualism" is definitively broken by the Copernican turn in the theory of knowledge (Rickert 1924: 160). The object of theoretical knowledge no longer constitutes, for Kant, the essence of the world; rather it limitedly concerns a specific region within the sphere of values (Rickert 1924: 158). The logical moment no longer incorporates in itself the whole of reality, indeed the latter is presupposed as the irrational domain within which the former may unfold. Still an unsurpassable chasm remains between the enlightening mission of the logical form and the obscurity of the a-logical material.

This fundamental anti-intellectualistic turn in the theory of knowledge, this reckoning of the irrationality of reality and its preservation from any emanative inclusion, is what allows Kant to achieve adequate understanding of the complex of modern culture and thus also of the a-theoretical values, such as ethical, religious, and aesthetic ones. In this sense, Rickert argues that the "liberation" from intellectualism is a condition of possibility for the "appreciation (*Würdigung*)" of the a-theoretical domains of culture (Rickert 1924: 146). Critical thought acts in limiting the possibilities of the intellect, but at the same time in recognizing the irrational values of culture and their autonomy. The irrational no longer needs to be driven out of the domain of validity, as was the case in systems of intellectualism, and can now therefore be fully valorised.

This opening of Kantian philosophy to the plurality and autonomy of cultural values is not limited nor fulfilled by its awareness of fragmentation.[7] Rickert insists that Kantianism does not mean to be the philosophy of fragmentation, i.e. it does not resolve in a mere ratification of the divided conscience of modernity. For Kantianism the conscience of fragmentation is the necessary assumption to pose "the problem of ultimate unity" of culture in a way that is adequate to the modern age (Rickert 1924: 191). Precisely this is the goal of Kantian philosophy: to develop a new kind of critical synthesis, capable of adequately accounting for the irreducible diversity of the spheres of value that must be unified (Rickert 1924: 204).

Kant showed the way to such new synthesis but wasn't always capable of pursuing it with adequate coherence and determination. Yet the path to carrying out the new synthesis is clear to Rickert: we must recognize the primacy of practical reason over the theoretical one and thus focus on the common value

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7   Rickert 1924: 202: "*von einer endgültigen Sanktionierung der modernen Zerrissenheit durch den Kritizismus darf keine Rede sein*". Cf. also ibid.: 208.

foundation that binds the theoretical and the practical to every other sphere of value. At the basis of any theoretical evaluation there is a supra-theoretical moment ("*ein Ueberlogisches im Logos*"), a will to power ("*Wille zur Wahrheit*"), that refers to the dimension of non-being, i.e. validity. We must therefore access this sphere of validity and reconstruct its formal structure. Only by this process we may recollect cultural goods from modern dispersion; only by reference to a system of formal values we may recompose the unity of modern culture.

2. Culture, Cultural Goods, Value

This introduction to Rickert's philosophy of culture from the perspective of the philosophy of history has allowed to clarify its historical-problematic context – the conscience of fragmentation of modernity – and its theoretical goal – the determination of the unity of culture by the definition of a system of formal values. Now the issue at hand is to reconstruct with greater detail the theoretical outline of this philosophical program.

Rickert identifies the object of philosophy as the world in its totality ("*Weltganze*") (Rickert 1910: 1) and not as the aggregate of the parts that compose it. The single components of the *Weltganze*, instead, constitute the objects of the special sciences (*Einzelwissenschaften*), which proceed to a specialized dissection of reality and remain necessarily bound to the partial perspectives within which they operate. The problem of the whole remains constitutively precluded to them.

The domain of the empirical sciences articulates in two fundamental directions. Windelband had distinguished nomothetic sciences, oriented towards the knowledge of the general as expressed by laws, from idiographic sciences, oriented towards the knowledge of the value-connoted individual (Windelband 1894). In his book *Grenzen* Rickert had developed and clarified the assumptions of his teacher, re-articulating the methodological dualism into a distinction between generalizing natural sciences and individualizing cultural historical sciences.[8] Indeed the latter engage in those aspects of reality embedded with value and thus they take into consideration *goods* and *evaluations*, but they do so always and ever with the purpose of reconstructing their empirical origin and determining the causal links within which they are embedded.

In spite of being empirical disciplines, which hold real elements connoted by values as their object, the historical cultural sciences (*historische Kulturwissenschaften*) constitute an essential precondition to philosophical reflection. Windelband had argued that "history is the organ of philosophy" (Windelband 1910: 284) and Rickert follows suit by stating that "the route to the supra-historical (*Ueberhistorische*) can pass only by the historical (*Historische*)".[9] This

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8   Cf. Rickert 1902. This work was revised and republished many times. The latest edition, the fifth one, was published in 1929.
9   Rickert 1910: 18. „Nur durch das Historische hindurch kann der Weg zum Ueberhistorischen führen".

means that access to and conceptual determination of the sphere of validity, which philosophy aspires to, is possible only through the critical consideration of the contexts of reality in which values take place and are realized. There is no other way by which we can bring value forth to philosophical reflection if not by recognizing its "realization" in the goods and in the evaluations and thus accepting their coming-to-being in history. Value-philosophical reflection assumes that it is somehow "provided" with values within the historical-cultural reality and only on account of this ambiguous "givenness", only tracing the mysterious adherence ("*haften*") that binds goods and evaluations to the values, it is capable of achieving the subject matter of its reflection.[10]

The close instrumental bond that ties historical sciences of culture to the philosophical reflection on values implies, on the other hand, a substantial distinction between their ultimate knowledge goals which we must not ignore.

The cultural sciences are not meant to define the articulation of the system of values, nor can they provide answers to the problem of worldview (*Weltanschauung*), which remains the exclusive responsibility of philosophical reflection. Their scope is limited to the causal knowledge of objective realities endowed with value. On the other hand, the method of the *cultural sciences* is capable of achieving full "critical objectivity" – which goes beyond mere "empirical objectivity" – only in reference to value philosophical foundation of those general cultural values that constitute the heuristic principles of selection and methodological elaboration of their material.[11] Only if the perspectives from which we select the segments of value-attributed reality destined to be involved in causal analysis can be traced back to a system of values objectively – and not merely empirically – valid, we may then attribute complete objectivity to the outcomes of the *cultural sciences*. Therefore, though on one hand history is the organ of philosophy, on the other hand philosophy, in as much as it is a doctrine of values, is the only kind of knowledge capable of securing a complete foundation to the empirical sciences of culture.

Philosophy cannot be limited to examining the single parts of the whole of values (*Wertganze*), nor can it delude itself to be able to understand it by inquiring the full extent of the intensive and extensive multiplicity of its parts. Philosophy aspires to know the whole as a whole (Rickert 1921a: 16), a whole

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10   Cf. Rickert 1910: 17. "Culture is the concept of a good and can be understood only as such. In cultural goods the multiplicity of values is precipitated practically in the course of historical development. Philosophy must therefore direct its gaze to cultural goods, to find in them the multiplicity of values. To this purpose it must call unto science, which treats culture as an objective reality, disseminating its richness and multiplicity in a individualizing way. This is the task of history. Not thus subjects, but objective realities, are what philosophy, in as much as it consists of a doctrine of values, must examine, in reference to the values that adhere to them. From these cultural objects it must separate the values, attempting to examine which values make cultural goods of cultural objects. Then it will know such values in their pure state as values, and it will understand them" (ibidem).

11   On the concepts of empirical and *critical objectivity* see chapter V of *Grenzen*.

conceived as the "complete totality of the world" [*voll-endlichen Totalität der Welt*]" (Rickert 1921a: 20). Philosophy will never reach such finiteness of the whole; it will constantly be *en route* striving towards an ideal goal of knowing and inquiring. Yet that goal can be nothing but the complete totality and philosophy can be nothing but "philosophy of the complete totality (*Voll-Endung*)" (Rickert 1921a: 21).

Rickert includes the question of *Weltanschauung* within the domain of philosophy. The totality of the world cannot be understood only in an objective sense, as an object ("*Weltobjekt*"), but it must be examined also in the subjective sense and it must include the analysis of the "position of man towards the world", of man's strive to provide meaning to his existence (Rickert 1921a: 25). "The question of the world is, thus, in the relationship between the Self and the world" (Rickert 1910: 2). But, according to Rickert, this relationship cannot be resolved in the antithesis between subjectivism and objectivism that underlies the whole of western metaphysics; an antithesis that Rickert considers utterly inadequate to tackle the problem of worldview.[12] This incapacity of both objectivism and subjectivism to adequately answer the problem of the meaning of human existence depends, according to Rickert, on the fact that they are based upon a concept of world that is too narrow and basically limited to the reality. What has been left precluded to pre-Kantian philosophy is the dimension of non-being, that is to say, validity. Validity extends beyond the real; it represents the foundation of its every possible reality. The world must thus be understood in terms of the irreducible dualism between value and reality.

Such dualism – foundational to Neokantian perspective – elicits numerous problems. They are problems similar to those that western metaphysics had to tackle when faced with pre-critical formulations of the doctrine of two worlds ("*Zweiweltenlehre*"). The obstacles to such dualism concern the possibility and mode of relationship between the two spheres of the world, between the two realms of value and reality. An appropriate conception of world must be capable of keeping together the two realms of reality and value and capable of expounding their bonds, yet at the same time preserving their structural separation.[13]

Rickert believes he can tackle the difficult problem of the bond between value and reality on account of two categories of real objects in which such bond is *de facto* realized. The first category of objects is the one of *cultural goods* (*Güter*). They are objective realities with value or – as Rickert often writes – to which a value "adheres" (*haften*). In them, and by them, a certain value is "realized"; it has shaped a certain section of reality to itself. Yet there is an essential ambiguity in the expression "*Wertrealisierung*"; it seems to refer to the "becoming real" of the value and therefore to a substantial identification of the

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12   On the specific details – which it is unnecessary herein to expound – of Rickert's argument see Rickert 1910: 1–11.
13   Cf. Rickert 1910: 11 ff. The second paragraph of the essay is titled "*Wert und Wirklichkeit*", i.e. value and reality.

value with the good within which it is realized.[14] Yet here lies – according to Rickert – a fatal misunderstanding. The good, in as much as it is a real object with value, cannot be confused with the non-being validity unique to values. In the case of the good, the value merely enters into a relationship with or adheres to a certain real object (Rickert 1910: 12). Within what Rickert considers as the error of historicism, there is the pretension to confuse the good – in its historical-objective constitution – with the sphere of non-being validity and therefore to believe that history can configure the domain of the origin of values (Rickert 1910: 16). To clarify this concept, Rickert makes use of the work of art as an example: in it the real elements that compose it (in the case of a painting the canvass, pigments, and varnish) by no means constitute its aesthetic value, which must instead be sought elsewhere and, at any rate, in the sphere of the non-real (Rickert 1910: 12). Therefore the bond between the real good and the un-real value does not configure their identification. Even in such bond, they remain separate, and according to Rickert such separateness is a structural element of the world.

The second category of real objects in which a bond between value and reality is realized is that of *evaluations* (*Wertungen*). They are real actions that can be comprised within a psychological consideration of reality, similarly to how goods are comprised within a historical consideration. Indeed, and at a closer examination, evaluations are but a perspective *a parte subjecti* on the good. In fact the value is always "bound to a subject, who evaluates certain objects" and even the work of art is such only when there is a subject who attributes value to it (Rickert 1910: 12). Nonetheless this doesn't mean that the value is identified with the evaluation, or that the evaluation subjectivelly determines the origin of the value, its becoming in reality on account of the value-activity of consciousness. Rickert strongly refuses this kind of psychological incomprehension of the sphere of validity. The evaluation is not the value, but it corresponds to the institution of a bond between an evaluating subject and the value that is evaluated.

Rickert admits the difficulties in adequately thinking about the nature of the bond between value and reality that is realized in the goods or in the evaluations. The obscurity of the *adhering* of value to real objects runs the risk of leaving in utter misunderstanding the relationship between the two domains that constitute the totality of the world, casting over them an un-relatedness that elicits lethal consequences for the *issue of worldview*.

The problem takes on a certain degree of importance even in the methodological field. Culture, in as much as it is the totality of historically realized goods, remains exposed to the harmful effects of an evanescent relationship with the sphere of validity. On the other hand, the insistence of empirical sciences on the *effectuality* of their objects, and even the definition of history as

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14   It is an ambiguity that Rickert's student, Emil Lask, attempted to probe in all its speculative possibilities by the concept of *Wertindividualität*. Cf. Lask 1902. On the issue see Morrone 2017a.

a "science of reality" (*Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*), lead to the ambiguous effect of reifying culture and its goods, thus making their evaluation problematic.[15] The world would thus appear split between a reality bereft of value and an un-real validity.

This problematic issue in the doctrine of values drives Rickert to further expanding the concept of philosophy and its scope. Philosophy must be able to think of a dimension that integrates value and reality and yet that does not endanger their structural separateness, therefore capable of preserving the constitutive dualism of the world (Rickert 1910: 22). The subject matter is, in other words, to identify an "intermediate domain (*Zwischenreich*)", which may link the two spheres of value and reality preserving their "duality and particularity" (ibid.). To this purpose, Rickert believes we must invest special attention in analysing the structure of the *Wertung*: on the one hand, we must avoid reducing it to a mere object of empirical knowledge, or to a simple psychic reality, and, on the other hand, we must look beyond the immediate lived experience of the act of evaluation (Rickert 1910: 24). In this perspective it becomes clear that the evaluation is "taking a position towards values (*Stellungnahme zu Werte*)" (Rickert 1910: 25) and it consists in the institution of a relationship between the spheres of reality and value, still taking on its meaning autonomous from the two terms it relates. Thus an intermediate realm occurs between the one of value and reality. A realm which Rickert identifies in the sphere of sense:

> The sense of the action or of the evaluation (*Wertung*) is not its being, its psychic existence, nor the value; rather it is the meaning of the action *for* the value, thus constituting the bond between the two realms. We shall call this third realm the one of the *sense*, to set it aside from all forms of existence.[16]

By this reasoning we fulfil the domain of a philosophy of values and, by the interpretation of the sense, rediscover a means of accessing reality and thus the historical "fullness of life" (Rickert 1910: 29). Philosophy must determine the system of values, but it must also define the sense that the multiplicity of cultural goods takes on with reference to such system. Only by this reasoning will it be possible to reconstruct the unity of culture and heal it from the fragmentation of the modern age.

Determining the concept of sense moreover contributes to clarifying the concept of culture and to resolving (at least in the intentions of Rickert) the ambiguous convergence between the real element and the value that characterizes it. In the 1921 edition of *Grenzen*, Rickert argues that culture does not

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15   Historical sciences – Rickert argues in the *Grenzen* – "represent reality not in reference to the *general*, but only in reference to the *particular* [*das Besondere*], because only the particular is what really happens" (Rickert 1902: 251). In contrast to the natural sciences, which, "tend to shift from particular to the general, from the real to what is valid", they address only to the real. As such, historical sciences are "the true *science of reality* (*Wirklichkeitswissenschaft*)" (ibid.: 255).
16   Rickert 1910: 26. In *System der Philosophie*, Rickert mentions the "immanent sense" (Rickert 1921: 261) distinct from transcendent sense (ibid.: 271).

refer to "mere realities as such, but to real processes that have a 'meaning' [*Bedeutung*] or a "sense" [*Sinn*] that goes beyond their real being" (Rickert 1921b: 406). Therefore, by "culture" we may intend two different things. Firstly it may be understood as "the real historical life inhered with a sense which makes it culture"; secondly it may be understood as the "unreal "content" *per se*, thinkable as the sense of such life, enfranchised from any real being and interpretable in reference to cultural values" (ibid.). In the same way as we distinguish the "real psychic act of judging" from "the unreal logic content", likewise we distinguish "culture as the reality inhered by a sense" from "the unreal sense, conceptually separate from it" (Rickert 1921b: 407).

This solution also adequately clarifies the relationship between *culture* and *life*. In criticizing the philosophy of life, Rickert reaffirms that it is impossible to gain stances of value from mere life (*bloßes Leben*). In fact, life is the "necessary condition" of any culture and thus does not have a value of its own; it is rather the instrumental substrate for the realization of the values of culture (Rickert 1911-12: 153). But, beyond this conditionality and taken in itself, life is devoid sense.[17] Rickert sometimes explains this lack of sense and value that characterizing life as an actual anti-culturality (*Kulturfeindlichkeit*). In fact, cultural goods are not the mere objectification of life, but rather – in a certain sense – they represent a kind of suppression of life: "to achieve goods endowed with their own value we must (…), to a certain degree, 'kill' life" (Rickert 1911-12: 154). To suppress life means separating from the mere flow of life the "non-vital or unreal" element, which constitutes the content of value of the cultural good, isolating it from the insignificant dross, affirming it, taking on a stance towards it by an action that shapes reality. Through life, something extraneous to life is realized, i.e. 'its' value. Such intrinsic value ("*Eigenwert*") belongs to the cultural good only improperly; in fact it transcends the cultural good and reconnects it to the unreal sphere of validity (*Geltung*). The cultural good is the evidence of an act of resistance to life, an act which strives to redeem life's meaninglessness.

This relationship can be reckoned in every cultural context. The separation between life and culture is most evidently manifest in the theoretical domain, in which the value of truth is unequivocally opposed to mere life. Each time knowledge touches unto and conceptually elaborates life, it must kill it, betray it, it must withdraw from it (Rickert 1911-12: 156). But the distance between life and culture is confirmed even in other spheres of value. Even art, according to Rickert, is not the mere expression of life but the realization of the ideal sphere of aesthetic life (Rickert 1911-12: 159). Likewise the ethical-social realm is determined "in direct opposition to mere vitality", not to kill it, but to "submit it to its ethical aims" (Rickert 1911-12: 161). A structural antagonism therefore rises between life and ethical culture, a disciplining function, to the point of the latter being repressive to the former, determining a constant tension between the two spheres. Finally, religion but confirms the antagonism

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17   Rickert 1911-12: 154: „*Wer bloß lebt, lebt sinnlos*".

between culture and life: its tendency to interpenetrate the whole of life actually incorporates religion's decisive impulse to transcend into an absolute and "supra-vital (*überlebendig*)" life, which – precisely as such – is no longer life but a value formation (Rickert 1911-12: 164).

For as much as Rickert strives to overcome the rupture between value and reality by means of an intermediate realm of sense, it is evident that such rupture cannot be overcome. Sense never emerges within the bosom of life, but it announces itself from an immeasurable distance though the value activity of the subject. The sense of life is not "of life" strictly speaking; it is the precarious relationship that a subject institutes between life devoid of value and the value itself. Such sense does not reach the point of fully giving meaning to life, it adheres to it only from the outside, it does not overcome the distance separating it from the value but leaves life within the irredeemable senselessness.

Rickert acknowledges that an insignificant life is a "condition" for culture. But such conditionality of the vital scope is not confined within the mere instrumental and deserves to be more boldly inquired in its transcendental meaning of *condition of possibility* of every signification. This would disclose the possibility of recognizing the origin of sense within senselessness itself, the realization of reason within irrationality.

3. The System of Values and the Problem of Weltanschauung

Having defined the theoretical scope of philosophy, the issue at hand now is to provide a concise reconstruction of the framework of the system of values. To do so we examine here Rickert's 1913 essay *Vom System der Werte*: a case in point of Rickertian classifying genius.[18]

Rickert introduces the idea of an "open system" of values, i.e. a system capable of providing, on the one hand, a principle for classifying values and consequently a means for their hierarchical ordering, yet on the other hand, capable of integrating the new goods constantly produced by the historical-cultural development (Rickert 1913: 298). If indeed it is evident that the doctrine of values must receive the value material to be ordered from history and from the cultural historical sciences, all the same it is clear that such material is involved/embedded in a process of constant development and accretion. How can we then reconcile the eternal change, the inexhaustible fecundity of culture's historical life with a unifying principle that can be eternal and featuring universal validity?

Rickert provides an answer fully coherent with the spirit of Kantian philosophy. The historicity of culture determines an incessant development of cultural material – precisely the goods and the evaluations – and yet it presupposes the permanence of forms – the values. The historicity of cultural material admits and indeed entails the idea of the permanence of a formal value structure, which Rickert sets out to reconstruct in its articulations. This means that it is

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18   Rickert 1913. Rickert lays out the definitive elaboration of the system of values in Rickert 1921: Cf. chapter VII: 348–412.

possible to think of the historical development only on the grounds of its su-
pra-historical conditions (Rickert 1913: 299).

If the case is that, as we have discussed, the articulation of the system of
values can exclusively be derived from the field of realising values (*Wertrealis-
ierung*), we must begin from the evaluations and from the goods, setting them
apart from unreal values but considering the former in relation to the latter, and
thus on the grounds of their value meaning. The formal principle, from which
Rickert extracts the articulation of the system of values, derives precisely from
such relational sphere that is disclosed in the space between value and reali-
ty; i.e. the sphere of realising values. Rickert sets out from an arrangement of
the cultural spheres which he considers at all obvious, as the result of the pro-
cess of differentiation of modern culture. The system of culture is structured
in the fields of *logic*, *aesthetics*, *ethics*, and *religion*, which Kant had already
identified as autonomous and had made the object of philosophical reflection.
These fields altogether make up "the historical scope of culture, from where
philosophical problems arise: or at least – Rickert significantly adds – we have
not reached anything new until now".[19] Having acknowledged this plurality
of autonomous cultural spheres, the problem of a philosophy of values con-
sists solely in "organizing these major groups according to a certain criterion"
(Rickert 1913: 298). The outcome of such organizing will evidently be affected
by the historical determinacy in which the cultural material is made available
to us and will be – in Hegel's words an understanding of "our time through
concepts" (ibid.). We must thus acknowledge this ontic assumption of Rick-
ertian philosophy of values, which files modern culture's fragmentation and
its articulation into autonomous spheres of values, deriving them from cultur-
al goods historically realized. On the grounds of this historical givenness, the
philosophy of values carries out the theoretical endeavour of systematization,
i.e. of determining the order and reciprocal relationships between single cul-
tural spheres, thus redeeming the fragmentation.

Rickert proposes two apparently distinct arrangements for the classification
of values that are, albeit not without ambiguities, in accordance to the perspec-
tive and to the course of access to the sphere of validity. The first classification
is based on the formal features shared by all cultural goods; the second one
is based on the formal modalities of the value relatedness of the subject. This
duplicity of access to the system of values – subjective-objective – reflects the
two-dimensional nature of Rickert's philosophical framework (Rickert 1909:
169–228; Krijnen 2001: 546 ff.).

The first classification is based on the formal features shared by all cultural
goods. It leads to two groups. The first one includes the *action* of *personalities*

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19   Rickert writes: "Kant speaks of four categories of values each relative to logic, aes-
thetics, ethics, religion, and with the division in scientific, artistic, moral and religious or
"metaphysical" life, as long as we consider them broadly enough, we may consider the
historical field of culture as complete, and from it rise the philosophical problems: at least
we have not reached anything new up to now" (ibid.: 297). Cf. also Rickert 1921a: 350.

connected into the *social* dimension; it comprises the *practical* sphere and it is *pluralistically* characterised – as it consistently refers to the acting individualities. The second group instead includes the *contemplative* behaviour related solely to *things*[20] and therefore remains within a *non-social* dimension; it comprises (yet is not limited to) the *theoretical* sphere and is characterized in a *monistic* sense – as it refers to the contemplative unification of experience.

This formal articulation of cultural goods lacks a hierarchical principle (*Rangordnung*) which can only be derived in the perspective of the subject who evaluates and takes a position towards the value. The second mode of classification, which provides the system with a hierarchical criterion, must therefore be established by taking into consideration the formal modalities in which the *value relatedness of the subject* is determined.[21] The subjects relates to values by the means of a normative structure. In other words, it detects in the value something that *must* (*soll*) be realized, it recognizes in it a *duty* that *must* (*soll*) be actuated in historical life. Taking of a position towards a value therefore, amounts to the duty of fully realising the evaluated values in the cultural good. Insofar the subject's action takes the form of a "striving (*Streben*)" addressed to "full completion (*Voll-Endung*)", to the complete realization of values in historical life. The various modes of the *Voll-Endung* determine therefore the formal principle of classification and hierarchical ordering of the system of values.[22]

The *Voll-Endung* is a materially affected process, i.e. exposed, on one hand, to the resistance of reality to receiving and letting itself conform by the valid form; and it is conditioned, on the other hand, by the limitedness of the value capacity of the subject faced by the unlimitedness of the matter extraneous to value. Therefore the *Voll-Endung* takes on different meanings in reference to the material that the subject submits to his strive for completion. The material may be considered in its infinite and inexhaustible totality, or in the determined specificity of its parts. In the former case the *Voll-Endung* lays out a never-ending duty for the subject, who will interpret the outcomes of its cultural work as stages of an endless process of development. In this way a unique field of the system of values is determined, which Rickert defines as the sphere of "*incomplete totality* (*un-endlichen Totalität*)" (Rickert 1913: 302). In the latter case, the subject actually does achieve *Voll-Endung*, but waiving the totality of material and limiting itself to a single part. This determines the sphere of cultural goods characterized by "complete particularity [*voll-endliche Partikularität*]". Finally, according to Rickert, there is a third possibility and thus a third

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20   Even the personality that becomes the object of contemplation turns into a thing.
21   The *Wertung* must here be intended as "*Aktsinn*" and not as a psychological fact. On the clarification of this controversial articulation of the issue, cf. Rickert 1921a: 377. In the following explanation we herein abide to the *System der Philosophie* in which Rickert puts the objective articulation of goods before the subjective one relating to the modes of the *Wertung*.
22   We must note that the principle of completion (*Voll-Endung*) is the foundation of precisely Rickert's idea of philosophy: Cf. Rickert 1921a: 20.

sphere of culture, which is the synthesis of the first two and configures the domain of the "complete totality [*voll-endliche Totalität*]" (Rickert 1913: 302).

The articulation of the system of values derived from the different modalities of the *Voll-Endung* allows setting out a corresponding hierarchical ordering of the cultural goods. Such articulation is also liable to be declined in temporal terms, moreover justified on account of the fact that the *actualization of values* is indeed a process that takes place over time. In this way we determine the distinction between "*future goods* (*Zukunftsgüter*)", for which the full completion of *totality* is a constant yet to come; "*present goods* (*Gegenwartsgüter*)", for which the realization of *complete particularity* is possible in a specific moment; "*eternity goods* (*Ewigkeitsgüter*)", in which the complete totality is realized only denying the temporal dimension and transcending the sensible sphere, to which the first two groups of goods remain bound. Finally an articulation may be laid out between good of the *immanent* and *sensible* life, to which the ones of the present and future belong; and good of the *transcendent* and *supra-sensible* life, to which those of eternity belong.

Therefore the comprehensive articulation of the system of values is determined by the application of the hierarchical framework of the degrees of *Voll-Endung*, completion (A: incomplete totality; B: complete particularity; C: complete totality) unto the formal distinction of the cultural goods (I: sphere of the non-social contemplation; II: sphere of the personal and social action). In this way, "six fields of value" are determined, which we shall summarily examine:

AI. *Science*. The first field of value is the one of science, which – according to Rickert – consists in the contemplation of things in a non-social dimension. The inexhaustibleness of its material sets out an endless task, whose complete realization can only be considered as the termination of an infinite progress. Its incompleteness is grounded in the logical foundations of knowing, structurally vulnerable to the irredeemable dualism of matter and form, of object and subject. Science therefore is included in the value sphere of the inexhaustible totality and of future goods.

BI. *The arts*. The second field of value comprises the contemplative attitude, non-judging and thus non-knowing, which, in keeping within the intuitive sphere, remains immune to the division subject-object, material-form specific to knowledge. Yet the intuitive roots of this form of contemplation bind it to the intuited particularity. Thus, relinquishing totality, this form of consideration pursues a complete contemplation of the particularity. We are here in the realm of aesthetics, alike to science it is characterized by impersonality (it engages with things and not people) and non-sociality (because, for as important as it may be for society, it does not derive its meaning from it). The validity of works of art does not depend on the future development of arts, but it is fulfilled within the completeness of the present.

CI. *Mystic religion*. The third field of value is one that provides a solution to the limits of the first two (the incompleteness of science and the particularity of the arts), realising itself in the religious contemplation of a god conceived mystically, monistically, and pantheistically as the one-everything. Even

in this field there is no place for personality, which is completely dissolved in the mystic union with the divine, nor for the community of individuals, which is refused together with the world whole.

AII. *Sphere of ethical-social values.* The fourth field includes ethical-social values, i.e. values pertinent to the social acting of man, understood as a personality. In this way Rickert proposes a communitarian characterisation of ethical values, which find their 'realization' in a strive for personal freedom and for the autonomous and conscious acceptance of social customs. It is a striving that can never fully achieve its goal. The ethical universe is limitless and therefore is included in the value sphere of the inexhaustible totality and of future goods.

BII. *Sphere of personal values.* The fifth field designates that specific area of "goods of the personal life and of the present life", different from the ethical-social goods of the future. This field seems to redress the constitutive imperfection of the ethical sphere, for it offers the ground to realize a *particular perfection*. These goods emerge as "islands" in the continuing flow of cultural development and, according to Rickert, have often been neglected by philosophical reflection. They are goods such as maternity or friendship for instance; they have often been ascribed to the ethical sphere, but Rickert considers them distinctly: in as much as they do not lean towards the need of a future fulfilment, but rather they are realized in a present perfection (Rickert 1913: 313 f.).

We must moreover notice that Rickert identifies in the love between woman and man a certain sphere that is intermediate between ethical-social values of the future (which the man realizes in his public cultural actions) and personal values of the present (which the woman realizes in the private sphere to which she is substantially relegated). And therefore the erotic sphere is where we realize the unification between the complete totality and the complete particularity, without transcending the limits of individual life[23].

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23   The fact that in this section we may reckon an axiological foundation of the difference between the two sexes is of special significance to understand the general sense of the system of values proposed by Rickert. In fact, man tends to realize the social-ethical values by means of his action in the public sphere, while as the woman "works more for the life of the present, in silence and intimacy" (ibid.: 318). This is the equivalent for Rickert of acknowledging the specific value of woman, who contributes to realising, by means of the erotic relationship with man, the fulfilled humanity (Cf. ibid.: 319). Rickert here takes a position in the debate on the question of womanhood which registered quite significant contributions precisely in the period in which he was writing. Specifically I am referring to Georg Simmel, who – in *Weibliche Kultur* (1911) – advanced the thesis according to which the specificity and the value of the female cultural action lie in the fact that they are unrelated to any form of objectification and that they are capable of achieving a condition of subjective completeness. A woman is thus unaffected by the risk of alienation, and correlated forms of social objectification, and realizes her own subjective completion in the private sphere of the "home." Following a partial elaboration in 1902 and published in *Neue Deutsche Rundschau*, Simmel's essay is published in 1911 (Simmel 1911). Marianne Weber provides a critical reply to Simmel in an essay published in the same issue of Logos in which Rickert 1913 is published: Cf. Weber Marianne 1913. In 1913 Rickert discusses Simmelian positions, as can be reckoned from his reference to the supposed subjectivity of woman's cultural action: "even in the case of

CII. *Religion of the person-god.* The sixth and last field of value is the one that stretches beyond the incompleteness of the ethical-social life and the particularity of personal values and, on account of the faith in a personal god, achieves a *complete totality*. Such completeness needs not to sacrifice individual personality into the *unio mystica*, but rather it constitutes its realization. The world is not denied, but redeemed in its constitutive plurality and imperfection. In his intra-mundane action and in the relationship with the community of believers, man finds the tools of his salvation. The present is thus joined to the future, time is joined to eternity. We are here in the value field of totality completed by effect of personal action, within which the social goods of the present are realized.

The system thus determined in its formality should be able to grant – in Rickert's intentions – the necessary openness to receiving the historical becoming of new value material. Nevertheless, precisely because of such formality, the system still appears to be incapable of providing an adequate answer to the question of worldview, i.e. to the question about the meaning of life. The systematic order and formal hierarchy of values are still not enough to guide us in establishing relationships of priority between values, capable of orienting human life amid the conflict of value fields entwined across modern culture. Simply put, the system of values doesn't tell us what we ought to do.[24]

We are here faced with the emergence of a fact that can be indeed deduced from the formal articulation of values: a structural incompatibility persisting between the value field of science and the one of worldview. The pretension to provide an answer to the meaning of life, in fact, implies the complete furnishing of content of the formal system of values and inevitably thus its closure, in the sense of its completion (Rickert 1913: 323). Such completion is in conflict with the formal structure of incomplete totality proper of the value field of science, it contradicts the constitutive provisionality and progressiveness of the results. The problem of systematically collocating philosophy as worldview cannot be resolved – according to Rickert – by shifting it into the field of complete particularity of the aesthetic value (Rickert 1913: 324), but rather broadening the scope of the theoretical beyond the field of incomplete totality. In fact, philosophy takes part in the theoretical domain even though it aspires to a degree of completeness beyond that of the special sciences. Philosophy cannot settle for

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personal behaviour in the present, it is a matter of performances, activities, indeed of 'objective cultural work'" (Rickert 1913: 318). Rickert refuses the Simmelian dialectic of objectivity and subjectivity, but the outcomes of his position on gender differences are at all effects the same as the ones of Simmel. The supposed acknowledgement of the value of woman from a man's perspective entails her exclusion from public life, relegating her to the private sphere, in which the light of the future penetrates only on account of man's love for her. Ultimately acknowledging the value of gender differences leads to a reactionary outcome.

24   Rickert 1913: 322. In *Wissenschaft als Beruf* (1917) Max Weber strongly argues that science is no longer capable of telling us "what we ought to do" and "how we ought to live": Weber 1992: 93.

trusting in the progress of scientific knowledge, but it must "achieve an *end*, even at the cost of the possibility that it is only a particular *end*" (Rickert 1913: 324).

The philosophical completion consists in seeking a "focal point in the eternal evolutionary flow", it is a stopping "to acknowledge what it has achieved, with respect to the meaning of life" (Rickert 1913: 325). Therefore philosophy is, on the one hand, rooted in the historical-temporal particularity within which the system achieves its closure; yet, on the other hand, it is included, as a single episode, within the overall flow of the history of philosophy, in which the series of systems composes an infinite progress towards the incomplete totality. Its historical fulfilment belongs therefore to the flow of incomplete totality and, ultimately, it is rooted within it (Rickert 1913: 326). Thus philosophy earns an intermediate collocation "between incomplete totality and complete particularity, between future goods and present goods", taking a position symmetrical to the erotic sphere.[25] In Rickert's view, philosophy reproduces on the contemplative plane the erotic relationship, i.e. a love for knowledge "that joins completeness in the present with the prospect of the future."[26]

4. Some Critical Observations

I have often herein drawn the attention to the fact that Rickert's system of values is consistently derived from the formalities immanent to the historical-real goods and to evaluations. Rickert consistently reaffirms that this "methodological" premise of philosophical inquiry and its "ontic" origin should not eclipse the autonomy of values from goods and their evaluations. In spite of accepting the assumption of value transcendence, we are still left to deal with the problem of identifying a means of accessing it. If – as Rickert argues – we can achieve values only through goods and their evaluations, if we can reach the field of pure validity only by the means of taking into consideration a section inevitably finite of the infinity of historical value material, then inevitably the system resulting from such reconnaissance will be limited to expressing a reflexive synthesis appropriate to a specific historical moment within the historical course of culture, it will be an understanding of "our time through concepts".

If value is given unto us only in the realization of values, then our knowledge of it will necessarily be affected by the limits and historical conditions of such realization. The pretension that the formality of the system can guarantee its a-temporal validity and, at the same time, its historical openness to future is an illusion. The form that is accessible to us is, in fact, one derived by an abstraction ("what is shared by all goods and all evaluations") of value material

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25   Erotic and philosophy are the two immanent syntheses that stand apart from the transcendental syntheses of mystic and ascetic religiosity.

26   Rickert 1913: 326. "The philosophical eros, intended as yearning (*Sehnsucht*) for fulfilment, does not forgo satisfaction. It does not want to be satisfied with the incomplete (*Un-endliche*), in spite of the fact that it is aware that its discourse on the complete (*Voll-endliche*) will be nothing but a babbling".

limited to our particular point of observation. Truthfully, simply by broadening the scope of such point of observation beyond the narrow boundaries of the bourgeois, vaguely Philistine, culture that distinguished early-twentieth century German *Bildungsbürgertum*, we can acknowledge that not only the cultural material, but moreover the forms of cultural life are subject to historical development. We can acknowledge, for instance, that the value of womanhood intended as particular completeness relegated to the private sphere is nothing but a projection into the axiological dimension of a value givenness determined and connoted in historical-sociological terms, that it does not account for neither possible future developments of historical life, nor – at a closer look – female values of the past.

An analogous consideration can be addressed to the aesthetic sphere. Also in this case, the idea of a completeness in the particular, realized within a non-social and contemplative dimension is certainly incapable of accounting for aesthetic phenomena of the current era, in which technically reproducible art has become a product of the cultural industry and therefore is included within socio-economic phenomena, both relatively to its production as well as to its fruition. Indeed Rickert's formal consideration of the aesthetic sphere does neither adequately account for primitive aesthetic phenomena, whose rapport to the sphere of religious cult constitutes a problem for their systemic collocation. And similar discussion would deserve to be developed even in the case of science and ethics.

And yet we must recognize that the openness of the system can be understood in two different ways. It consists, firstly, in the capacity to integrate within the system future historical cultural goods. Science will continue its progress coming to experience ever new revolutions, aesthetic tastes will constantly change, and customs, as much as religious sentiment, will evolve with likewise speed; and nevertheless a science, an art, an ethics, and a religion will always exist as eternal forms of culture, relating, on one hand, to values and, on the other, to real cultural goods. In this framework, the openness of the system means that the eternal flow of cultural material can be ordered within an articulation of eternal forms.

Secondly, the system's openness can be intended in another meaning which – in my opinion –makes the very idea of a system problematic. The overall cultural asset, available for reflection in the present, contains an infinite series of value concretions (goods and evaluations) which allow identifying a finite series of value forms. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that the future may bring forth not only new cultural goods that can be integrated in the known spheres of value, but even cultural materials that relate to values yet unknown unto now. Who could ever tell if the scope of non-existing validity is already fulfilled within the positional system of bourgeois culture as articulated into science, arts, ethics, and religion? Who could ever tell if the historical reality known to us must necessarily include the realization of all values? A new era will see the rise of new values; and thus to what extent will they find a place in the system?

Rickert believes it will be possible to integrate into the open system all the new goods and "new" values[27] that the future historical development may bring. In fact, the system of values is designed as the articulation of a whole, within which every new part can find a place without exposing the general structure. This solution is problematic, in my opinion.

According to the very premises of Rickert's inquiry, the cultural unfolding is differentiation and fragmentation of the unity of culture into autonomous and conflicting spheres, each endowed with an immanent legality tending to rise as the dominant point of view over the whole. Each new sphere of value that discloses is not merely a part of a whole, but moreover a perspective of signification of the whole. In other words, it contains a perspective of structuring and hierarchical ordering of the other spheres and of the other values. In this way, culture not only diversifies and specifies in its historical unfolding, but it constantly re-articulates its own structure, the positional system of the cultural goods, in reference to the values that, time after time, take up a dominant position. The disclosing of a new value scope is not merely a new part that adds up to a whole which remains unchanged. It opens a new perspective over the whole, renovating its structure. The new is not simply integrated into the existing structure, rather it puts forth the pretension of structuring according to itself the whole.

The definition of the system is possible only within a certain perspective immanent to the value material to be ordered. Rickert – in spite of the criticism to intellectualism[28] – discovers this structuring and unifying perspective in the theoretical, which is in fact a specific sphere of values. But truthfully, such unifying structuring remains bound to the contingency of the historical moment and of the material available to it. The systematic collocation that Rickert gives to philosophy as worldview confirms indeed its "cultural" provenance. Worldview philosophy, ultimately, is the contingent strive to self-awareness that culture exerts unto itself. It is a theoretical effort suffering the stigma of contingency; an effort that wholly belongs within the scope of culture that aspires to understand itself reflexively. Culture can be understood only through itself and cannot be transcended; its self-understanding is a moment in its historical life.

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27   Of course, values are new only in reference to their historical becoming. In reality they – considered *per se* – are eternal.

28   On the challenges that Rickertian criticism to intellectualism determines for the systematization of irrational values Cf. Krijnen 2001: 581.

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Đovani Morone

Između istorije i sistema: pojam kulture Hajnriha Rikerta

Apstrakt

Autor rekonstruiše pojam kulture koji proizilazi iz neo-kantijanizma Hajnriha Rikerta, otkrivajući njegove značajne istorijsko-problemske, metodološke i filozofske implikacije. Prvi paragraf se prvenstveno bavi idejom da je moderna kultura jedinstveno okarakterisana "fragmentacijom" i posvećen je analizi programa Rikertove filozofije kulture koja nastoji da rekonstruiše izgubljeno jedinstva kulture. Drugi paragraf objašnjava metodološke implikacije problematičnog odnosa između vrednosti i realnosti koji je zasnovan u kulturnim dobrima i sudovima. Treći deo rekonstruiše Rikertijanski sistem vrednosti, sučeljavajući se sa specifičnim podvigom ovog sistema da izmiri historicizam i apsolutizam vrednosti. Poslednji paragraf razvija kritičku diskusiju Rikertijanskog projekta.

Ključne reči: kultura, filozofija kulture, neo-kantijanizam, filozofija vrednosti

Tomasz Kubalica

ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE. HEINRICH RICKERT AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF ROMAN INGARDEN

ABSTRACT
The article looks at the concept of value in Heinrich Rickert's philosophy of value and attempts a systematic study of this concept in the context of the fundamental problems in Roman Ingarden's ontology of value. The result is a systematised presentation of Rickert's notion of value and a series of conclusions concerning fundamental aspects of his philosophy of culture. The essential discrepancy that the comparison reveals concerns the formal character of Rickert's philosophy of values, which implies a great deal of openness and freedom in the understanding and implementation of values. Another fundamental difference exposed by Ingarden concerns the ontological status of values.

Heinrich Rickert's Neo-Kantian philosophy of values initiated a reflection on the problem of values in philosophy. Its axiology initiated subsequent attempts, including phenomenology, a philosophical movement that emerged from Neo-Kantianism and continued to be developed by the next generation of philosophers under the somewhat arrogant slogan of a return to things themselves. This movement has, as it were, taken up the problem of value from scratch, only rarely referring to the experiences of the previous generation. An example of such a polemical reference is Roman Ingarden's 1964 text entitled *What Don't We Know About Values?* It is valuable because it not only refers to the axiology of the Baden school but also constitutes a fairly systematic summary of the reflection on the problem of values in the form of the following questions:

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"1. On what basis are the basic types and, in tandem with this, the domains of value distinguished?

2. What is the formal value structure and its relation to the value 'has'? (to the 'bearer' of the value)?

3. How do values exist, if they exist at all?

4. What is the basis for the differences between values and their 'height', and is it possible to establish a general hierarchy between them?

5. Are there 'autonomous' values?

6. How about the so-called 'objectivity' of values?" (Ingarden 1970: 221)

Therefore, I would like to attempt to juxtapose the views of the representatives of two generations of axiology. The basis for this will be the questions and partly the reflection presented by Ingarden. Due to the limited framework of this text, the proposed approach must limit itself only to general axiology and omit – developed by Rickert – the reflection on specific axiology of such value domains as logic, aesthetics, mysticism, ethics, eroticism and religion. The analysis of these specific issues should remain for further research.

1. Types and Domains of Values

Like Ingarden, Rickert expresses himself with a distance about the philosophical system. Basically, he recognises, following Nietzsche, that when we move in philosophical thinking towards wholeness, we must be confronted with a matter that is inexhaustible in its nature and with which we can never come to an end: „Nur wo das Denken arm und dürftig wird, läßt es sich zu etwas Letztem zusammenschließen".[1] (Rickert 1913: 295) He regards philosophical systems as an expression of an immature attitude resulting from insufficient knowledge. For Rickert as a Neo-Kantian, the theory of cognition is an expression of eternal striving, which he expresses as follows: „Wir dürfen nicht hoffen, eines Tages das Ganze unseres Wissens mit dem Ganzen der Welt restlos zur Deckung zu bringen. Hier bleiben wir immer beim Vorletzten".[2] (Rickert 1913: 296) However, the world as a whole is comprehensible only within a system (Bohlken 2002: 122). In contrast to systems thinking, the individual approach cannot grasp the whole because of its viewpoint. However, Rickert is concerned with the systematic combination of different particularist perspectives, pluralism. He explicitly dissociates himself from axiological relativism and calls his position relational because it is about relationships at its core.

However, Rickert does not give up the advantages of the system and proposes an open system of values, which may sound like a *contradictio in adicto*,

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1   "Only where thinking becomes poor and meagre can it be combined into something ultimate" (all translations mine).
2   "We must not hope one day to bring the whole of our knowledge entirely into line with the whole of the world. Here we always remain with the penultimate."

but for him it is not (Bohlken 2002: 124). What matters is the way he understands openness, which he defines as follows:

> Die Offenheit bezieht sich vielmehr lediglich auf die Notwendigkeit, der Unabgeschlossenheit des geschichtlichen Kulturlebens gerecht zu werden, und die eigentliche Systematik kann auf Faktoren beruhen, die alle Geschichte überragen, ohne deshalb mit ihr in Konflikt zu kommen.[3] (Rickert 1913: 297)

This incompleteness is a condition immanent to culture, through which culture constantly transcends its limits. Hence, cultural values cannot be described differently than values that open up cultural life, above all towards the future. Rickert sees that " in every system, there are super-historical factors, and how they can combine with the historical ones in such a way that an open system comes into being" (Rickert 1913: 299, all translations mine).

Krijnen comments on the openness of Rickert's value system as follows:

> Aus der Verbindung von Offenheit und Geschlossenheit im System geht hervor, daß das Wertsystem keine *endliche,* sondern eine unendliche Größe ist. Jeder Wert (bzw. jedes Kulturgebiet) kann den abschließenden Grund seiner *Geltung* nur im unendlichen Gefüge des Wertganzen haben, in dem alles mit allem zusammenhängt.[4] (Krijnen 2001: 531)

The whole can have a constitutive function about what is essential. Such an infinite value structure acts as a basis for validity, but not in the sense of negative infinity, but as an incomplete and infinite whole that contains the positive and infinite claim contained in the openness of values. On the other hand, only values are a fully completed, or closed, whole. It is only as a fully completed whole that the open system of values creates totality and functions positively as the principle of the unity and coherence of all its components.

Openness understood in such a way does not exclude the possibility of such systematisation of different domains of values that will consider this openness. Rickert refers here to Kant's division, where four types of values are mentioned: logical, aesthetic, ethical and religious, which determine the domains of scientific, artistic, moral and religious life (metaphysical) (Rickert 1921: 346). This fourfold division does not solve the problem of the hierarchy of these values, but we will deal with this problem further on. The question we pose now is the question of the criteria of this classification of values.

It should also be taken into account that the process of value systematisation had several phases in Rickert, which correspond to the different publications

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3   "Instead, openness merely refers to the need to do justice to the incompleteness of historical and cultural life. The actual systematics can derive from factors that transcend all history without coming into conflict with it."

4   "The connection between openness and closedness in the system emerges that the value system is not finite but an infinite quantity. Every value (or cultural field) can only have the final ground of its validity in the infinite structure of the value whole, in which everything relates to everything else."

of this systematisation. The first is contained in work *Vom System der Werte* (Rickert 1913) of 1913, and the second was the treatise *System der Philosophie* of 1921 and the last approach was presented by him in *Grundprobleme der Philosophie, Methodologie, Ontologie, Anthropologie* (Rickert 1934) of 1934. Rickert demonstrates the most subtle form of his systematisation of values in *System der Philosophie*, on which we will concentrate.

Rickert systematises four domains of validity: moral, aesthetic, religious and theoretical, which correspond to such transcendent values as morality, beauty, holiness and truth (Rickert 1921: 322 f.). The subject can orient himself towards them by giving his actions an ethical, aesthetic, religious and theoretical meaning, respectively, in the form of specific moral, aesthetic, religious and theoretical goods. To systematise cultural material in its specificity, Rickert uses, according to his heterothetic method, conceptual pairs: person – thing, activity – contemplation, social – anti-social, which he distinguishes based on philosophical tradition (Rickert 1921, p. 373, cf. Krijnen 2001, pp. 523–524). And so, the goods with which values can be connected to the goods of a person or a thing. The subject's relation to values can be active or contemplative and can have a social sense or not, that is, be anti-social. Thus we obtain the following combinations (Krijnen 2001: 525):

Values				
	morality	beauty	holiness	truth
type of value	social	asocial	asocial or social	asocial
subject reference	active	contemplative	contemplative or active	contemplative
good	person	thing	thing or person	thing

Rickert undertakes a value classification of the cultural world as a whole. He singles out areas of culture to which certain possible values are assigned. This classification does not have a historical form, but a systematic one. It is based on the principle of heterothesis (*Prinzip der Heterothesis*) (Rickert 1921: 353). Krijnen describes this method as follows:

> Die Klassifikaton hat die Form einer *vollständigen Disjunktion* der Glieder, und eine vollständige Disjunktion ist notwendig eine *korrelative* Ganzheit. Um diese korrelativen Ganzheiten zu finden, bringt Rickert erneut die *Negation* in ihrer »heuristischen« Funktion in Anschlag [...].[5] (Krijnen 2001: 538)

Rickert's heterology works so that the negation of one does not account for the positivity of another but only for its otherness. It is not a method of knowing values but classifying them, which assumes that values are already known.

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5   "The classification has the form of a *complete disjunction* of the links, and a complete disjunction is necessarily a *correlative* wholeness. In order to find these correlative wholes, Rickert again brings *negation* into play in its "heuristic" function [...]."

2. The Formal Structure of Values and Its "Bearer"

Rickert considers values in their historical multistage dynamics of realization and therefore distinguishes valuation alongside goods and values. In this context, however, Rickert points out to an antipsychological objection:

> Wir fragen überhaupt nur nach dem »Sinn«, der den Wertungen mit Rücksicht auf Werte innewohnt, nicht nach ihrem wertindifferenten psychischen Sein, und da dieser Sinn in seiner Verschiedenheit allein durch die Verschiedenheit der Werte bestimmt wird, so muß das Prinzip der Stufenbildung, das an dem Verhalten des Subjekts zutage tritt, auch für die Stufen der Güter und Werte selbst maßgebend werden.[6] (Rickert 1913: 301)

Rickert tries to distinguish essential stages in the dynamics of valuation, which, however, in his opinion, have nothing to do with the psychology of values. Therefore, in the subject's striving, he singles out the goal that gives meaning to the whole striving and its complete attainment will cause the striving to cease to be meaningful. Hence Rickert will consider the concept of *Voll-Endung,* which determines the ultimate direction of striving. The idea is that the striving eventually attains the state "if no gap remains in it that leads to new striving in the same direction" (Rickert 1913: 301). Every realisation of value – in general – moves towards a complete end *sensu stricto* and therefore belongs to the essence of value realisation in general, is decisive for every hierarchy of values and can thus be counted as a formal factor and not just a historical one.

These formal assumptions of development in value philosophy include: (1) any valid values, (2) any real goods to which non-real, valid values are adjacent, and (3) entities that take a judgmental stance toward values and goods. These elements determine the formal structure of value functioning (Rickert 1913: 299).

The elements mentioned above above are three transcendentally necessary aspects that constitute the meaning of cultural phenomena (Bohlken 2002: 124 f.). The point is that immaterial and non-psychic values must be combined on a material substrate by an active and autonomous subject who takes a stand for specific values by realising them in goods. Rickert's basic premise is culture, the meaningful content of which can be known through the history of cultural life. In this sense, the philosophy of culture, in finding the general and formal conditions of the possibility of cultural life, is dependent on the historical sciences of culture. Eike Bohlken draws attention to the inconsistency of Rickert, who defines the process of knowing values in culture as their discovery. Values are not found or newly formed by revaluations; they are discovered and they gradually enter man's circle of history with the progress of culture (cf. Bohlken 2002: 125). However, Rickert does not understand this in the sense of Platonic

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6   "We only ask about the 'sense' inherent in valuations about values, not about their value-indifferent psychic being. Since this sense in its diversity tends to determine only the diversity of values, the principle of gradual formation, which becomes apparent in the behaviour of the subject, must also become authoritative for the stages of goods and values themselves."

realism; values do not signify real being for him but instead have a meaning similar to Kant's regulative idea. The contents of values are recognised in cultural-historical research from historical material and brought to a conclusion. Through such thinking, they acquire a pure ideal shape. It brings Rickert perhaps closer to Weber's concept of ideal types.

Any realisation of value presupposes a content to which values are brought by 'form' to make it valuable. We can think of this as a totality of content formed by values. Rickert distinguishes four possibilities for the creation of goods.

(1) In the maximalist version, when values are combined with contents in the form of *Voll-Endung,* the infinite whole will be reconciled with the finite parts.

(2) The minimal version, when a subject directed towards an inexhaustible totality of material achieves individual goals only as stages of development, resulting in a domain of the goods of an infinite totality, in which infinity is to be understood only negatively as unpreparedness or infinity, that is, as opposed to full finitude.

(3) A synthesis of the first two areas is possible, and we can call it a synthesis of complete-infinite totality.

(4) The last combination is that of non-infinite or endless particularism.

Taking time into account, Rickert distinguishes three ways in which value is realised in the form of goods:

(1) The goods of the infinite whole (future goods) have completion in the future.

(2) Particular goods (present goods) are fully completed in the present.

(3) Eternal goods are realised in the realm of the transcendent.

Only the past cannot be the place of the realisation of values since it is already fully accomplished.

Rickert, however, is not concerned with creating a specific worldview of values but with an open system of values that show the necessary conditions for the possibility of realising values in human life. It is a formal approach:

[Ü]ber die Lösung der Weltanschauungsprobleme sagt uns dies System der Werte noch nichts. Unter Rangordnung war immer nur ein formales Verhältnis zu verstehen. Welches von den Gütern als höchstes oder zentrales zu gelten, von welchem Gebiet aus man zu einer Einheit der Weltanschauung vorzudringen hat, und welche inhaltlich bestimmte Stufenfolge der Werte entsteht, das bleibt in jeder Hinsicht unentschieden.[7] (Rickert 1913: 322)

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7   "This system of values does not yet tell us anything about the solution to the worldview problems. Ranking means only a formal relationship. Which of the goods should appear as the highest or central one, from which area one should advance to a unity of worldview, and which substantively determined sequence of levels of values arises that remains undecided in every respect."

It does not decide on the importance of personal values over material and vice versa. It does not even settle general questions about whether monism is better than pluralism, negation than affirmation. It does not answer the question of the proper procedure, whether the final stage of contemplation or action must include absolute values since both will be found in parallel side by side or all will prove transcendental. This raises the question: „wie die Zukunfts- und Gegenwartsgüter auf der persönlichen und unpersönlichen Seite sich zueinander verhalten, ob man eine mehr an der Wissenschaft oder an der Kunst, mehr an der Sittlichkeit oder an der voll-endeten persönlichen Gegenwart orientierte Weltanschauung zu bilden hat"?[8] (Rickert 1913: 323) The answer to these doubts concerns philosophy as a pure science in general, whether it can provide answers to these questions, which goes beyond the question of the value system.

However, Rickert's formalism is only one side of his philosophy of value, which stems from his research methodology based upon the transcendental principle. Krijnen emphasises that:

> Jenseits von allem bloßen ‚Formalismus' [...] sind in Rickerts Gegenstandsmodell Form und Inhalt keine einander äußerlich entgegengesetzten Größen; sie fungieren viehnehr als Glieder des Ganzen, die wechselseitig aufeinander bezogen sind und sich gegenseitig ebenso ausschließen wie limitieren: nur gegeneinander erhalten Form und Inhalt ihre eigene Bestimmtheit – sie stellen selbst ein ‚Formverhältnis' dar [...].[9] (Krijnen 2001: 528)

Hence it follows that in his value system, formality is not a disadvantage but an advantage. Formality is only one aspect of the value system that allows it to systematise every possible culture and thus remain open to different value contents.

The following relations can be discerned in Rickert's connection between goods and value forms (Krijnen 2001: 551). First, suppose the subject manifests an *Voll-Endungstendenz* with respect to an infinite totality of content as in the cognition of the totality of reality. In that case, this means that the subject does not attain complete finitude, for the totality of cognition remains an infinite task. Only an approximation is obtained, i.e., another step in producing goods, what Rickert calls infinite totality, i.e., unready and endless goods. It is fundamentally different in the case of the domain of art (infinite particularity). The subject has an ultimate tendency concerning a finite part of the infinite content, which makes possible a complete completion by the subject.

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8   "How do the future and present goods on the personal and impersonal side relate to each other, whether one has to form a world view oriented more towards science or art, morality or the entirely personal present?"

9   "Beyond all mere 'formalism' [...], in Rickert's model of the object, form and content are not externally opposed quantities; rather, they function as links of the whole, which relate to each other reciprocally and exclude as well as limit each other: only against each other do form and content receive their own determinacy – they themselves represent a 'form relation' [...]."

It is even different in the case of religion (ultimate totality) when the ultimate tendency directs the subject towards the ultimate totality, which shapes the content and fulfils any aspiration to realise value.

3. Existence of Values

Roman Ingarden's thought provides a helpful systematisation of the problems of the philosophy of value and a direct polemic with the views of Heinrich Rickert. This polemic concerns the question of the existence of values. Although Rickert's answer to the question of the ontological status of values evolved, he refrained from acknowledging their real existence. This issue posed a pressing challenge to Ingarden, as he advocated a realist phenomenology, which was also a clear opposition to Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.

Ingarden, referring to Plato's classical metaphysics and Max Scheler's phenomenology, considers values as ideal entities. Values, understood in this way, differ from goods as individual objects in that a value is a real or intentional "set of moments which, occurring on a certain 'good', make it not simply a thing but precisely a 'good'" (Ingarden 1970: 236). Ingarden allows for the possibility that there is no single way in which values can exist and that, for example, moral values exist differently from aesthetic or utility values. The most crucial difference is that moral values are related to the person. In contrast, aesthetic and utility values are related to objects, which affects how values exist: "The first is how the bearer of the value exists, the second is how the value is grounded in the object to which it belongs." (Ingarden 1970: 238) If the bearer is real, then the value is also real, and if the bearer is not real but, for example, intentional, then such an unreal value must be.

The dependence of the mode of existence of values on the object is best revealed concerning time: "Surely, one can agree that values can begin to belong to a certain object and that therefore a certain event occurs: the emergence of a given value or the beginning of its belonging to something. [...] We could perhaps then say that there is a process of realisation of certain values." (Ingarden 1970: 238) In this sense, for Ingarden, values are not independent of their bearers. They are derivative in being from the property of their bearer or the system of properties of several objects. Whether we are talking about the value of a human being, an object, a process, an activity or an event, the way they are realised will be different. However, the transience of the existence of the bearer of value generates problems concerning value. It should be asked what happens to the value, for example, usefulness, when its carrier is annihilated, or at least its functionality is reduced. Does this mean that the values themselves are mutable? It is important for reasons of moral responsibility. If the moral value is temporal, then it passes away. If not, then it remains. However, what about the possibility of change in the so-called forgiveness of guilt if it remains. Hence Ingarden comes to his conviction:

It seems that no form or variety of mode of existence as we know it – that is, neither ideal existence, nor real existence, nor purely intentional (heterono-mous) existence – is suitable to be attributed to how at least some values, and moral values, in particular, exist, insofar as the conditions for their 'realisation' exist. (Ingarden 1970: 241)

If values do not exist realistically, ideally or intentionally, then perhaps they do not exist at all, as the axiology of Rickert and the Baden School assumes.

In the context of how values exist, the question of Rickert's axiology arises. Ingarden, contrary to the Baden school of axiology, believes that

'to be valid', 'to be in duty' or to have 'importance' (*Geltung*) can only be if and when one exists in some way. Non-existence simply makes this impossible. Of course, one can say that values (moral values in particular) exist, but by exist-ing, they also have this 'validity', relevance and so on. However, is this 'validi-ty' a closer determination (if one may say so) of their existence, or is it some-thing that is most closely related to the validity of values? (Ingarden 1970: 242)

If one assumes something non-existent, it can neither be valid or invalid, valid or invalid, have weight or not have weight. The existence of values is a necessary condition for their validity. This does not settle the question of the mode of existence since validity can be a mere determination of the existence of values and even belong to the valence of values.

In the context of the question of the ontological status of values, a funda-mental difference between Rickert and Ingarden is revealed. For Rickert, val-ues in a specific sense do not exist, while Ingarden excludes the possibility of the non-existence of values. However, Rickert's ontology is derived from Ru-dolf Hermann Lotze's, which distinguished three spheres of reality: things, events and sentences. These spheres of reality correspond to three possible ways of grasping them (predicates): existence, happening and binding. Hence, the most famous, although abbreviated, formulation of Lotze's thesis appears: "being is, and values are valid." Reinhardt Pester characterises the essence of Lotze's ontology as follows: "Von einer anderen Seinsart sind für ihn [Lotze – T.K.] die Werte; sie erhalten über die Bestimmtheit der Gefühle objektiven Gehalt, sind jedoch nicht von realen Gegenständlichkeit, sondern von idealer Geltung."[10] (Pester 1997: 307) As Windelband's PhD supervisor, Lotze strong-ly influenced the emergence of Baden's philosophy of value. For Windelband, philosophy in the systematic sense is the critical science of universally valid values (Windelband 1884: 28). In this context comes Rickert, who develops Windelband's concept of philosophy as a philosophy of values following the thesis of the primacy of practical reason in logic.

For Rickert, the problem of philosophy is the problem of the object of knowl-edge, which is not the reality but primarily the value (Noras 2005: 167 f.). The

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10   "For him [Lotze], values are of a different kind of being; they receive objective con-tent through the determinacy of feelings but are not of real objecthood but ideal validity."

reality is immanent and transcendent to the subject is only the value. If cognition wants to pursue truth, then the fundamental question of its object does not appear to concern being but ought, which means the primacy of practical reason in logic. Rickert, however, is not concerned with the cognition offered by the real sciences of being but with the logical presuppositions of all cognition, which faces the fundamental dualism of being and ought, reality and value. The thesis on the primacy of practical reason was questioned by Emil Lask, a student of Rickert (Lask 1923: 347 f.). Lask attempts to combine the axiology of the Baden school with the metaphysical challenge of philosophy, i.e. the theory of two worlds – existing being and valid values and points to the non-sensible (*Nichtsinnliche*) as mediating between them. He thus broadens the understanding of the object of cognition, which is valid values and all non-sensory entities. For Rickert, the objection is so momentous that after the untimely death of his disciple, he develops his philosophy in the direction set by Lask and seeks unity in a philosophical system.

Returning to our considerations, it should be added that in the context of validity, Ingarden draws attention to two aspects of the deontic modality of value which is the ought of value:

> More complicated is the matter of this Seinsollen. That certain values 'ought' to exist can be meaningfully spoken of in two different situations: a) when these values have not yet been 'realised' and b) when this has already happened. (Ingarden 1970: 242)

The oughtness of values can make sense *in futuro* and *in praeteritum*; the former is associated with unrealised values and the latter with realised values. The temporal consequences of the different types of values are also systematically analysed by Rickert, as shown in the previous paragraph.

The first sense of the ought of value in futuro refers to such a concretisation of the idea contained in the value in question which is not necessary but demands to be brought about; is not yet, but will be when it comes to pass. At the same time, it is not just an expectation or prognosis, but a situation that: "'in order' will be the man who performs this act, that he fulfils, as we say, the duty incumbent upon him. At the same time it is so that he need not fulfil it. This »duty« flows precisely from this character of »obligation« of the existence (realisation) of a given value in a given situation." (Ingarden 1970: 243)

The second sense of the oughtness of values *in praeteritum* raises the fundamental doubt as to whether values that have already been realised can still constitute the object of oughtness: "when a value (of this type, i.e. a moral value, for example) has already been realised, already exists, its existence no longer bears any stigma that would be, as it were, equivalent to this 'oughtness' and in this respect, it does not differ in its existence from the existence of objects devoid of all value and therefore value-indifferent?" (Ingarden 1970: 243) In response to this question, Ingarden sees differences between the values of value-indifferent objects and the realisation of value, which is subject to evaluation: "the very effective existence of a value that 'ought' to be realised is, as

the fulfilment of this duty in itself, positively valuable: It is 'good', then, that the realisation of the value in question occurs. It is probably what Max Scheler had in mind when, as I have already mentioned, he claimed that the existence of a positive value is itself a positive value." (Ingarden 1970: 243) For Ingarden, however, a new positive value does not come into being with the existence of a value, but "only the value of a realised value includes, as it were, the existence of a value". This value of the existence of value has its basis both in the matter of value itself and above all in the effectiveness of its realisation: "It is not the Sollen itself that characterises, in this case, the existence of value of this type, but precisely the fulfilment of this Sollen." (Ingarden 1970: 243) Ingarden assumes the classical conception of value, which says that the content of value already exists and must be reproduced. It is different for Rickert, for whom the value content arises concerning value.

Ingarden stresses that he is only considering particular kinds of values in general, but not particular values *in individuo*. He arrives at the following conviction:

> The supposition arises that the mode of existence of values is somehow connected with various considerations, and thus with their matter, and with the type of their valence, as finally with the mode of existence of the objects to which they may belong. However, we are not able to explain these matters sufficiently and to formulate statements which are satisfactorily justified. (Ingarden 1970: 244)

Therefore, the various types of value have a different mode of existence and are not comparable. Moral values cannot be equated or compared with aesthetic or utilitarian values because their mode of existence is different; they are grounded differently in their carrier.

4. "Height" of Values

In the context of his concept of an open system of values, Rickert addresses the issue of the hierarchy of values, which is strongly linked to the problem of the height of values. He recognises that philosophy must combine historical randomness in specific value contexts to find room for the life that eludes it (Rickert 1913: 299). For Rickert, the most significant difficulty of systematics arises from the constant mutability of the matter of values; values signify development, and therefore "everything seems uncertain and changeable". In historical development, however, everything changes except the very idea of development, which means, was "has to be considered as a premise of every development, is withdrawn from development and therefore also shows a supra-historical character" (Rickert 1913: 299).

Following Scheler that there are higher values, for example, moral values, which stand higher in the hierarchy of values than lower values, utilitarian values, generally implies that the lower ones must subordinate to the higher ones. For Rickert, however, this hierarchy does not appear as subordination. Although it considers the parameter of their height, his system of values does

not hierarchise them among themselves in a vertical way but is horizontal and rather delineates a kind of archipelago of individual kinds of values.

Compared to Scheler, Rickert outlines not so much a life as a historical perspective of values. He arranges the values prevailing in historical life and the cultural goods actually present in it by noticing "on the one hand, the various types of value, also concerning their content, stand in the unified context of a gradual sequence, and in which, on the other hand, space remains for the unfinished fullness of the historical, cultural goods" (Rickert 1913: 300). For Rickert, it is not so much the specific worldview with its constitutive values that is important, but the general theory of worldview against the background of cultural values that sets the historical perspective on the development of subjects, goods and values. It is about the system of values that forms the basis of a worldview and not the worldview itself.

According to Krijnen, in Rickert's system, it is the historical subject, not the individual spheres of culture, which is the main criterion of the hierarchy of values (Krijnen 2001: 548 f.). The individual spheres of culture are understood as fields of possible realisation of subjectivity, and therefore it is the subject that has primacy. Rickert's very justification of the hierarchical nature of values is not clear enough. He acknowledges that this hierarchical nature arises from the task of philosophy as a theory of worldview. However, he also accepts the philosophical-life justification that it is a consequence of such an interpretation of the meaning of life that integrates the whole into a single life centre. Krijnen treats the necessity of a hierarchy of values as a noetic necessity (Krijnen 2001: 548 f.). The task of philosophy is the theory of values and the doctrine of the meaning of life, that is, the position of man concerning values (the doctrine of the immanent meaning).

For Rickert, it is essential to distinguish between form and content and whole and part so that a cultural good has a form and content that is formed by a whole consisting of parts. It implies different ways of realising the cultural good, which may involve either the whole or a part of this good in different value forms (Rickert 1913: 302; 1921: 378 f.). For example, in the cognition of reality, the ultimate tendency of the subject is towards the infinite whole, which means that the finite subject does not reach this ultimate whole, which is only an infinite task. We can only arrive at cognition through approximations to the infinite totality through constantly unready goods. In the case of the domain of art, whose cultural good is an infinite particularity, the subject has an ultimate tendency concerning a finite part of the infinite content, which makes possible the full completion by the subject. In contrast, in the case of religion's ultimate totality, the ultimate tendency directs the subject towards the ultimate totality, which shapes the content and fulfils any striving for the realisation of value.

The transposition to realisation in time reflects the hierarchy of values (Krijnen 2001: 552 f.). The cognitive goods of the infinite whole are realised gradually in an infinite process, so their values have future value, and their goods are future goods. The goods of the ultimate particularity lie in the present, and the acts of achieving them have meaning only in the here and now. The goods of

the ultimate totality lie beyond the future and present of the finite subject and are therefore entirely outside time in eternity. They are eternal goods realised by acts whose meaning is determined by eternal values. In this way, the essential division of goods into immanent and transcendent goods is also outlined (Rickert 1913: 302 f.; cf. 1921: 380 f.). Immanent goods are temporal goods that can be realised in the present or future. Eternal goods, on the other hand, are transcendent.

5. "Autonomy" of Values

For Rickert, autonomy has two meanings and refers, on the one hand, to take a stand on values, but, on the other hand, also to absolute values that apply independently of human recognition (Bohlken 2002: 132). There is both the autonomy of the human will and the autonomy of absolute values. Although this understanding of value derives from Kant for Rickert, it should be noted that he extends the concept of autonomy and extends beyond ethics to several other cultural fields. In this respect, one has to agree with the experts in Kantian philosophy, Otfried Höffe and Herbert Schnädelbach, that the theory of value has virtually no counterpart in Kant's philosophy and the recognition of the problem of value as a fundamental philosophical problem is what fundamentally distinguishes the philosophy of the Baden school from that of Kant. This heterodoxy demonstrates the originality of Baden neo-Kantianism. Although a line of development from Kant to Rickert can be discerned, his philosophy of value should be regarded as a remarkable achievement in the history of philosophy. Rickert uses an axiological interpretation of Kant's ethics in his transcendental philosophy of culture, at the same time transferring the notion of the autonomy of the subject from ethics to other spheres of culture and thus extending the circle of absolute values (Bohlken 2002: 137). For Rickert, the subject's autonomy does not imply the relativity of values. On the contrary, the necessary condition for the possibility of human freedom is absolute values to which the subject can relate.

In this context, it is important to clarify what is meant by absolute values. Bohlken accurately recognises that:

> Die Annahme absoluter Werte ergibt sich als notwendiges Resultat der transzendentalphilosophischen Reflexion auf die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit universell verstehbarer kultureller Praktiken bzw. der diesen zugrundeliegenden Normen und Sinngebilde.[11] (Bohlken 2002; 153)

At the same time, Bohlken notes that this argumentation is circular since "the universality of certain norms or meaning structures is already assumed in the justification". However, one should be careful with the charge of *petitio principii*. For the transcendental reconstruction of the "universal horizon of

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11   "The assumption of absolute values arises as a necessary result of transcendental philosophical reflection on the conditions of the possibility of universally comprehensible cultural practices or the norms and structures of meaning that underlie them."

meaning" in transcendental philosophy cannot be understood as a proof in the strict sense of the existence of absolute, i.e. unconditional values. The aim of such a reconstruction is to capture the potential presuppositions of universalism by explaining in a coherent and plausible way the necessary conditions of possibility. Only a universalism so reconstructed can be compared with cultural relativism to determine which provides the better explanation.

For Rickert, autonomy is first and foremost a feature of people realising a certain kind of values:

> Als Pflicht kann die Realisierung jedes Gutes auftreten, d. h. auch der wissenschaftliche und der künstlerische Mensch gehorcht freiwillig der Norm und hat einen autonomen Willen, wenn er die Wahrheit um der Wahrheit, die Schönheit um der Schönheit willen sucht, ein Umstand, der von Bedeutung für die Weltanschauungslehre ist, hier jedoch nicht weiter verfolgt werden soll.[12] (Rickert 1913: 311)

Rickert undertakes in the system the analysis concerning moral values. He acknowledges that the concept of autonomy seems too broad here since we understand morality as social morality. However, we must keep in mind that "the consciousness of duty is not only directed to the realisation of values in general but the realisation of autonomous personalities in social life" (Rickert 1913: 311). Social life entails the social expectations of its members. A person must take a conscious stance on morality, explicitly approving some and rejecting others; "if, therefore, he confronts society on his own in order to decide 'freely' about his bondage, then 'morality' arises as an autonomous recognition of what is obligatory in social life" (Rickert 1913: 312). Such an attitude can sometimes be anti-social.

The autonomy of the person understood in this way must be complemented by the social environment:

> Das ganze soziale Leben muß unter den Gesichtspunkt gestellt werden, daß es die freien, autonomen Persönlichkeiten zu fördern hat, und von hier aus sind dann Verbände wie Ehe, Familie, Staat, Nation, Kulturmenschheit usw. in ihrer ethischen Bedeutung zu verstehen.[13] (Rickert 1913: 312)

This means for Rickert that the social institutions in terms of sexual, economic, legal, political and national relations must take a form that gives persons their autonomy and personal freedom. Autonomy is thus the domain of the will of individuals pursuing values that society should meet to enable them to act freely. Rickert does not express this explicitly, but it implies that freedom becomes a fundamental social value that enables realising other values.

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12   "The realisation of every good can occur as a duty, i.e. the scientific and the artistic person also voluntarily obeys the norm and has an autonomous will when he seeks truth for the sake of truth, beauty for the sake of beauty, a circumstance that is of importance for the doctrine of world views but will not continue here."
13   "The whole of social life must be placed under the aspect that it has to promote free, autonomous personalities. From here, associations such as marriage, family, state, nation, cultural humanity, etc., are to be understood in their ethical significance."

6. "Objectivity" of Values

The starting point of neo-Kantian transcendental philosophy is an unavoidable fact. This is no different for the Baden School and Rickert, for whose philosophy of culture it is above all culture as the place where validity is realised (Krijnen 2001: 495 f.). For him, culture is, on the one hand, a material given empirically and, on the other hand, an object to be comprehended philosophically through a value system. Rickert's philosophy analyses the different types of factual claims to validity that constitute the factual material in which values are sought. Transcendental philosophy starts from this analysis and moves towards a synthesis.

The starting point of Rickert's analyses of transcendental psychology is the subject. As Christian Krijnen notes, however, this implies neither individual nor collective subjectivity (intersubjectivity) in the way values are framed (Krijnen 2001: 499 f.). Although Rickert distinguishes between the individual or general valid values from objective values, it is essential to note that their validity is limited to a given subject or subjects and is grounded in actual real valuations. Their validity is not categorical and absolute but hypothetical and dependent; if someone does not recognise these values, they do not apply to him. Rickert, however, assumes objective values that are valid independently of their recognition by a real subject (Rickert 1921: 133 f.). The distinction between subjective and objective values translates into a distinction between personal values and cultural (civilisation, life) values.

The objectivity of values reveals Rickert's attitude to the nature-culture opposition. For him, nature is a value-free reality. However, as part of nature, man has the task not only of existence in the natural sense but of embodying values, which is only possible because he is part of the natural world. Artificial culture consists of the embodiment of goods by man conditioned both by values and nature. Krijnen comments on this as follows:

> Dieser mit dem Moment der Faktizität des Subjekts verbundene Aspekt der *Geltungsrealisierung* führt so auf einen Inbegriff notwendiger natürlicher *Bedingungen,* die das Subjekt naturaliter am Leben erhalten und damit Wertrealisierung *faktisch* ermöglichen.[14] (Krijnen 2001: 501)

It is not even that one has to live to realise values, but at the centre is the observation that nature becomes a means to realising values for the subject. In other words, nature serves culture. Hence man's natural life is not axiologically indifferent like nature but becomes a value that gives human life meaning.

Cultural values should be distinguished from utilitarian values, which are autonomous and apply independently of resource values; categorical values from hypothetical values:

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14   "This aspect of the realisation of validity, which connects with the moment of the facticity of the subject, thus leads to an epitome of necessary natural conditions that keep the subject alive naturally and thus make value realisation factually possible."

Wir können aber den Begriff der Autonomie auch direkt mit dem des Eigen-
wertes selber verbinden, und wir können dann die Eigenwerte, die mehr als
bloße Lebenswerte oder Zivilisationswerte sind, als autonome Werte bezeich-
nen.[15] (Rickert 1934: 182)

The point is that proper determination is shaped by autonomous values
and is beyond whether something is helpful to live. Autonomous values can-
not be wholly reduced to actual necessity but transcend their values and the
values of civilisation. Rickert distinguishes dependent values from proper val-
ues, such as life and civilisational values (Rickert 1934: 182f.). Dependent val-
ues apply only subjectively and are goal-dependent. In contrast, proper val-
ues apply objectively. The difference between objective and subjective values
is pragmatic and not logical.

At the centre of Rickert's reflection is the problem of the objectivity of valid
values (Rickert 1921: 320 f.). Every concrete culture is a specific embodiment
of values in the form of goods produced. Hence, the objective purpose of the
value system must be discussed. In answering this question, it is essential to
reflect that the relationship between subjective and objective validity is exter-
nal since the two types of value must be related internally. Hence, starting the
analysis of values with objective values is unnecessary as a starting point since
their objectification is the end of the reflection on validity.

Rickert most fully addresses the objectivity of value in *Der Gegenstand der
Erkenntnis* concerning the cognitive value of truth, that is, the fundamen-
tal question of the validity and value of thought. This work is devoted to the
fundamental problem of the theory of cognition, which constitutes the start-
ing point and systematic foundation of philosophy as a whole, as well as log-
ic, methodology and philosophy of science. Rickert confronts the challenge
posed by scepticism and asks the fundamental questions: What is the object
of cognition? What gives our knowledge objectivity? However, his answer is
not a simple negation of scepticism, which as such, by denying the very pos-
sibility of cognition, abolishes itself. Rickert's answer is given on the grounds
of transcendental philosophy and therefore explicates the presuppositions of
cognition as the necessary conditions of its possibility. Hence, Rickert sees the
problem of transcendence in relation to the knowing subject. This, however,
implies neither relativism nor subjectivism. It is difficult to imagine anything
more objective and absolute than the capture of the complete relationship be-
tween subject and object, or immanence and transcendence. If we conveive
of the object as the measure of the validity of cognitive acts, then the object
of all cognition is its criterion, which is the measure of objectivity of cogni-
tion. Understood in this way, the object is independent of the subject since it
is thanks to the object that cognition acquires objectivity. Rickert searches for
an independent criterion of cognition, which is a necessary assumption of all

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15   "However, we can also connect the concept of autonomy directly with the eigen-
value itself. We can then call the eigenvalues more than mere life values or civilisation
values autonomous values."

cognition and concludes that neither the mind-independent world nor phys-
ically understood things in themselves can be such a criterion. They cannot
be such a criterion because they are not transcendent yet. Only the value that
gives meaning to cognition can be transcendent.

It is therefore necessary to ask what ontological status values have, in par-
ticular whether they are objective. According to Rickert, values are irreal and
should be conceptually distinguished from anything real:

> Die Werte selbst sind deshalb weder im Gebiete der realen Objekte noch in
> dem der realen Subjekte zu finden. Sie bilden ein Reich für sich, das jenseits
> von Subjekt und Objekt liegt, solange man bei diesen Worten nur an Realitäten
> denkt.[16] (Rickert 2018: 229 [F 195])

Values function separately from the reality of subject and object. Goods and
valuations must be conceptually distinguished from values. Goods as objective
realisations of values and valuations as subjective acts relating to values do not
belong to the domain of values but to that of reality.

Values understood in this way are transcendent to the subject and object,
remaining immanent. This does not resolve the dualism of transcendence and
immanence. Rickert is aware of this. Therefore, between the two, he postu-
lates a realm of sense and duty that mediates between the immanent real be-
ing and the transcendent irreal object (Rickert 2018: 283 [F 247]). Both subject
and object constitute an immanent real being. Without value and the meaning
it creates, they would be condemned to psychophysical dualism and the prob-
lem of the "bridge"; thanks to it, the realms (*Reiche*) of the psyche and physics
become a unity (Rickert 2018: 333 [F 293]). The separation of the three king-
doms and the intermediate kingdom do not, for Rickert, imply the problem
of the unity, which is a primordial or pre-cognitive and pre-conceptual state
(Rickert 2018: 336f. [F 296f.]).

In conclusion, it should be said that Rickert's concept of value in the phi-
losophy of culture initiated a reflection on the problem of values in philoso-
phy. His axiology was followed by further attempts, including phenomenology
understood as a philosophical movement that emerged from neo-Kantianism,
and was developed by the next generation of philosophers. This movement, as
it were, took up the problem of values anew, unfortunately only rarely refer-
ring to the elaborations of the previous generation.

In response to the challenges of his time, Rickert did not wholly abandon
the advantages of a system of philosophy and proposed an open system of
values, which presupposes the infinite possibility of concrete realisations of
values. Only as an entirely finite whole could such an open system of values
encompass the whole and function positively as a principle of unity and co-
herence of all its components.

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16   "Values themselves can therefore be found neither in the realm of real objects nor
in that of real subjects. So far as one thinks about these words only in terms of realities,
they form a realm of their own, beyond subject and object."

Rickert also distinguishes essential stages in the dynamics of value realisation, which, however, in his view, have nothing to do with the psychology of values. Such value realisation can ultimately aim at encompassing the whole and therefore belongs to the essence of value realisation in general. It is also essential to any hierarchy of values and should therefore be counted as a formal factor and not merely as a historical one. In this sense, the philosophy of culture, in finding the general and formal conditions of the possibility of cultural life, is dependent on the historical sciences of culture. In this spirit, Rickert distinguishes three different ways in which values are realised in the form of goods.

Very significant in Ingarden's polemic with Rickert is the question of the mode of existence or non-existence of value. The existential modus of value is derived from the mode of existence of the bearer of value or the object to which it belongs, which is best revealed in relation to time. For Ingarden, values are not independent in relation to their bearers. They are derived in being from the property of their bearer or the property system of several objects. Against this background, Rickert develops Windelband's conception of philosophy as a philosophy of values following the thesis of the primacy of practical reason in logic (i.e. the primacy of taking a position towards values) and recognises that this does not concern the type of cognition offered by the real sciences of being but the logical premises of all cognition that express the fundamental dualism of being and ought, reality and value. Rickert, influenced by his discussion with Lask, eventually recognises that values have the status of irreducible entities, and therefore Ingarden's objection applies at best to the early phase of his philosophy.

In the context of an open value system, Rickert addresses the issue of value hierarchy, which is strongly related to the problem of the height of values. He orders the values that dominate historical life and cultural goods. Although considering the parameter of their height, his system of values does not hierarchise them among themselves firmly in a vertical way but in a horizontal way, thus delineating a kind of archipelago of individual types of values. For Rickert, it is not so much the specific worldview with its hierarchy of values that is important, but the general theory of the worldview that sets the historical perspective on the development of subjects, goods and values.

For Rickert, the subject's autonomy does not imply the relativity of values. On the contrary, he is concerned with setting limits to the possibility of human freedom, the preconditions of which are absolute values. However, his transcendental reconstruction of the universal horizon of meaning cannot be understood as a proof of absolute values. Instead, it is about grasping the hypothetical presuppositions of universalism through a coherent and plausible explanation of the necessary conditions of possibility.

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Tomas Kubalica

O problemima filozofije vrednosti: Hajnrih Rikert u poređenju sa Romanom Ingardenom

Apstrakt

Tema ovog rada jeste pojam vrednosti u filozofiji vrednosti Hajnriha Rikerta. Autor pokušava da izvede sistematsku studiju ovog pojma unutar konteksta fundamentalnih problema ontologije vrednosti u mislima Romana Ingardena. Rezultat je sistematizovana prezentacija Rikertovog pojma vrednosti kao i niz zaključaka koji se tiču temeljnih aspekata njegove filozofije kulture. Ovo poređenje otkriva suštinsku protivrečnost u formalnom karakteru Rikertove filozofije vrednosti koja implicira široku otvorenost i slobodu u razumevanju i implementaciji vrednosti. Još jedna temeljna razlika koju Ingarden razotkriva tiče se ontološkog statusa vrednosti.

Ključne reči: vrednost, aksiologija, filozofija kulture, Rikert, Ingarden

Jacinto Páez Bonifaci

AT THE LIMITS OF KNOWLEDGE: PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION IN SOUTHWESTERN NEO-KANTIANISM[1]

ABSTRACT

The present paper investigates the essential tenets of the Southwestern Neo-Kantians' take on the philosophy of religion. Specifically, I concentrate on two diverse aspects of Windelband and Rickert's approaches to religion. In the first place, I look at the way in which they determine religious values. In the second place, I focus on the manner in which they confront religion with the systematic structure of culture. As a result of the analysis of the texts of both authors, we see that it is possible to detect at least three possible roads to elaborate a philosophy of religion. In spite of this plurality of paths, I argue that they exhibit a similar underlying problem, namely, the problematic relationship between transcendental philosophy and metaphysics. It is for this reason that the philosophy of religion takes the form of a reflection on the limits of knowledge, and with it, on the limits of transcendental philosophy.

1. Introduction

The place of the philosophy of religion within the system of philosophy represents one of the most obscure aspects of Southwestern Neo-Kantianism. On the one hand, writings exclusively devoted to the philosophy of religion are definitely scarce.[2] This could usher us to assume that both Wilhelm Windelband

2   This represents a relevant difference in comparison with the Neo-Kantian School of Marburg. Taking exclusively the philosophical corpus of Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp, we find the following books on the philosophy of religion: P. Natrop: *Religion*

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(1848-1915) and Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936), the two authors I am interested in, minimize the role of the philosophy of religion.[3] On the other hand, when they do talk about the philosophy of religion, it seems to occupy a chief place in their philosophical systems. Whenever they address religion, they do not investigate religious phenomena as they merely occur in human life. Nor they query the communal organization of religion through ecclesiastical institutions. For them, philosophy of religion inquires about the validity of religious values and their place in the broader totality of culture (Ollig 1979:151). In this manner, philosophy of religion obtains its distinctive Neo-Kantian sense. The most salient point in this regard is that religion locates itself in an asymmetrical position with respect to other spheres of cultural life. Scientific, ethical and aesthetic values regulate our earthly life. In the philosophical vocabulary, they provide the form of experience. In contrast, religion claims to direct our gaze to what is beyond experience. Religion seeks the meaning of immanent life in a sphere that is transcendent to life. It is precisely because of this reference to transcendence that religion does not allow itself to be treated like the other spheres of culture. As a matter of fact, because of its role regarding the other spheres of culture, religion poses itself as a direct competitor of philosophy. The difference between both is that religion resolves in transcendence that which philosophy tries to realize in a purportedly immanent manner. Moreover, unlike philosophy, it does not do so by employing either a critical method or a conceptual discourse.

Religion can appear as a cohesive factor of cultural life. Under this role it would constitute the concluding chapter of the philosophy of culture. Yet, it can configure a counter-image of philosophy. Due to this dubious position in the system of culture and the above-mentioned interplay between transcendence and immanence, religion brings forth one of the most complex aspects of the development of transcendental philosophy carried forward by the Southwestern Neo-Kantians.

Provided this problematic context, the present article investigates the essential tenets of the Southwestern Neo-Kantians' take on the philosophy of religion. Specifically, I will concentrate on two diverse aspects of Windelband's and Rickert's approaches to religion. In the first place, I will look at the way in which they determine religious values. In the second place, I will focus on the manner in which they confront religion with the systematic structure of culture. As a result of the analysis of the texts of both authors, we will see that it is possible to detect at least three possible roads to elaborate a philosophy of religion. But, beyond this plurality of paths, I will argue that they exhibit

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innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanität (1908); H. Cohen: *Der Begriff der Religion im System der Philosophie* (1915), and H. Cohen: *Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums* (1918).

3   A comprehensive study of the philosophy of religion of the Southwestern School of Neo-Kantianism should also consider writings of Bruno Bauch, Jonas Cohn, Georg Mehlis, among others.

a similar underlying problem, namely, the problematic relationship between transcendental philosophy and metaphysics. To accomplish this objective, the research will be divided into three sections. Before all else, I will deal with Windelband's position (section 2). Next I will discuss two alternative formulations corresponding to Rickert's thought (section 3). In closing, I will offer a comparison between their elaborations of the philosophy of religion. I will indicate their points in common, their divergences, and what I perceive to be a problem shared by both authors (section 4).

2. Windelband: the Holy as Religious Value

Frequently, the philosophies of Windelband and Rickert are depicted as constituting the program and system of Southwestern Neo-Kantianism. Windelband's philosophy establishes the contours of the basic problematic of the School, whereas Rickert offers the complete and systematic position in the face of this problematic.[4] The philosophy of religion is no exception to this diagnosis. Despite some differences relevant to our analysis, the way in which Rickert frames the discussion of religious values is akin to Windelband's proposal in his *Introduction to Philosophy* (*Einleitung in die Philosophie*).[5] This relationship justifies a preparatory reference to Windelband's thought. Therefore, I will concentrate briefly on the concept of philosophy defended by Windelband in order to clarify afterwards his programatic philosophy of religion.

For Windelband, the subject matter of philosophy is the general validity of the various principles that articulate our practices as rational subjects. These practices require, according to Windelband, a set of standards to which they must conform. In addition, these standards do not function as natural laws but rather as rules for assessments, i.e. rules that do not condition but guide those rational practices (Heinz 2006: 76). In view of their intrinsic normative force, Windelband decides to call these principles 'norms'.

Windelband frames his discussion of the validity of norms through an analysis of different layers or meanings of consciousness. As we shall see, the core

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4   It is interesting to note that Rickert himself emphasizes the commonalities but also the differences with respect to Windelband's philosophy. Rickert states: "The path to this knowledge [here Rickert refers to the relevance of the history of philosophy] I owe to my teacher Windelband, the last great historian of philosophy besides Dilthey. After Hegel the only one who would be able to give an overall picture of European thought. Systematically, I could never completely agree with Windelband, not even in those areas where our names are almost always mentioned together today. I was too much of a 'positivist' for him, and indeed his thinking, despite all the admiration and veneration I had for it, always seemed to me both too metaphysical and too psychological, which does not mean a contradiction, for they necessarily belong together. Psychology in the wrong place, i.e. in the basic philosophical concepts, will lead all the more surely to their metaphysical reinterpretation" (Rickert 1921: X–XI). All translations of German texts are mine.

5   Originally published in 1914, all textual quotations are taken from the second edition, published in 1919.

of Windelband's proposal is his interpretation of the interrelationship between these meanings.

In keeping with the Kantian tradition, the most comprehensive distinction would correspond to a difference between empirical and transcendental consciousness. Empirical recognition of a norm can be established at both the individual and the collective level (i.e., at the level of a given society or people). However, the factual acceptance of norms by the individual subject or a given community is not a sufficient guarantee of their general validity. Whenever we refer to a claim to general validity we must consider a transcendental sense of consciousness. Windelband calls this type of consciousness normal consciousness[6]: "Wherever, therefore, empirical consciousness discovers in itself this ideal necessity of what ought to be universally valid, it encounters a *normal consciousness* whose essence *for us* consists in our being convinced that it is to be real, without regard to whether it is real in the naturally necessary unfolding of empirical consciousness" (Windelband 2021a: 46 [Italics in the original]). Normal consciousness is recognized through the aim of transforming empirical consciousness into a rationally grounded consciousness. Hence, philosophy's questioning upon the general validity of the principles of rational behavior takes the following form: What determinations of empirical (individual or collective) consciousness actually belong to normal consciousness?

In addition, philosophy, as the science of normal consciousness, represents a normative ideal (Windelband 2021a: 48). Windelband interprets that during the history of civilization, empirical consciousness at its different levels shows a progressive process of realization of normal consciousness. In this sense, the task of philosophy could be also interpreted as fulfill the ever-unfinished project of transforming what is individual and collective into what is genuinely universal. This process of transformation takes the form of a dialectical confrontation. Windelband affirms, in a relatively simplistic manner to tell the truth, that progress is driven by the struggle between individual consciousness and collective consciousness. In this conflict, the individual recognizes that the social norm does not conform to a truly valid principle. Therefore, the individual seeks to overcome the prevailing norm. For instance, Windelband interpret Socrates' trial in exactly these terms, i.e. as a clash between the individual consciousness of the philosopher and the social norms. Socrates recognizes that existing social norms do not conform to the standard of a truly universal norm. In this way, the philosopher demands that the prevailing values be transformed so that they reflect a truly rational ideal.

This overcoming cannot consist in the mere affirmation of individual will but takes the form of a reference to a transcendent instance. This means that the contrast between empirical consciousness and the demands of the ideal always present a certain degree of tension. This tension is precisely that which

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6   Windelband employs interchangeably the terms normal consciousness and normative consciousness. For the sake of consistency, I will employ exclusively the term normal consciousness.

keeps the demand for a critique as an ever-open enterprise. The only way to solve this incongruence would be by introducing a new level of consciousness, i.e. an absolute one (Windelband 2021a: 56).[7] The affirmation of an absolute consciousness would force a halt to the critical process, because it represents a complete identification between the factual and the ideal. As we will readily see, this kind of consciousness could only correspond to God. While normal consciousness operates as an ideal in the Kantian sense, absolute consciousness would represent a hypostasis of normal consciousness, i.e., a metaphysical interpretation of normal consciousness in terms of a divine consciousness. For this reason, absolute consciousness does not belong to the discourse of transcendental philosophy.

Another source of philosophical concern is the determination of the fundamental principles that configure normal consciousness. Windelband employs a psychological thread to justify his reference to three specific directions of consciousness. Based on a probably questionable theory of the faculties of the mind, Windelband distinguishes between thought, willing and feeling as mind's primary activities (Windelband 2021a: 44).[8] Each of these activities signals a concrete sphere of cultural values. It is in this way that we encounter the 'classical' triad of values: the true, good, and beauty. Accordingly, these three spheres of values seem to comprise the sheer scope of our evaluative activity. And to them correspond the three central sub-disciplines of philosophy: logic, ethics, and aesthetics.[9] Notably, there is one major absentee in this presentation, for in this list we do not come across with the philosophy of religion. There is not a psychic activity, and therefore no proper value, related to our

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7   An interesting presentation of these peculiar meanings of consciousness is provided by the Neo-Platonic scholar Philip Merlan (1897-1968). From a systematic point of view, Merlan's interpretation is similar to the one we have uttered in the preceding paragraphs (Merlan 1963: 121). However, what is more interesting and relevant for our topic is the historical genealogy of these ideas proposed by him. Merlan tracks the origins of the concept of 'general consciousness' s' back to the beginnings of Western philosophical thought, i.e. to metaphysics. Explicitly, Merlan traces the conception of collective consciousness or an unconscious consciousness back from Kantianism, including Windelband, to a medieval discussion of the Aristotelian concept of *nous poietikós* (Merlan 1963: 114; Merlan 1963: 118). In this manner, Merlan sets the problem of articulating the levels of consciousness through ancient and mediaeval antecedents. The passages in which the Neo-Kantians refer to absolute consciousness are rather marginal. Despite this fact, this historical relation shows that in fact this marginality may be the index to a latent problem.

8   In his methodological essay "Critical or Genetic Method?" Windelband would claim again that a specific psychological theory helps us to discover fundamental values. But, once discovered, we can consider them critically, that is, independently of the way in which we obtained them in the first instance (Windelband 2021b: 377). This idea will not be taken up by Rickert.

9   For instance: "With the logical, ethical and aesthetic values the range of the human value activity, which can claim general recognition and the necessity of objective unconditionality in relation to the conveniences and purposes of the everyday life, is exhausted for the philosophical investigation" (Windelband 1919: 390).

religious life. In this tripartite schema, philosophy of religion secures for itself no visible place.

We have found so far two problems specifically connected with the philosophy of religion. Firstly, the problematic character of an absolute (i.e. divine) consciousness. And secondly, the lack of a psychic function associated to religion. It is because of this lack that we are unsure what value assign to religion. And yet, the treatment of the problem of religion occupies a preponderant role in *Introduction to Philosophy*, Windelband's last publication.[10] I will begin with the problem of the specific value associated with religion.

The *Introduction* is no exception to Windelband's architectonic of psychic functions. Windelband still identifies three fundamental psychic functions and through them three fundamental spheres of valuation: logical, ethical, and aesthetic valuation. The analysis of these values provides us with an understanding of the guiding forces of human life: science, morality and art. Nevertheless, in this book Windelband claims that religion possesses a value of its own: the Holy (*das Heilige*).[11]

Windelband's solution to this conflict reads as follows. The three core values already mentioned correspond to the architecture of our evaluative activity. To this extent, they regulate the content of our psychic life. The Holy, on the other hand, belongs to the form of valuation. It is for this reason that the Holy does not require to be grounded on a specific psychic function. That is to say, holiness comprises a form that the other values can obtain or be imbued with (Windelband 1919: 391; Windelband 2021c: 521–522). The Holy is, therefore, the value of the other values.

Each of the guiding principles of culture (the true, good, and beauty) can acquire a religious form.[12] However, none of these forms succeeds either in itself or in their conjunction in completely exhausting the religious impulse. What is specific to religion and present whenever values assume a religious form is the reference to the otherworldly: "if one asks for the common characteristic of all those evaluations which in this way possess a religious coloring, it is always the relation of the values to a supra-sensible, supra-empirical, supersensible reality" (Windelband 1919: 391).[13] The value of the Holy corresponds to

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10   I do not overlook the fact that Windelband published in 1903 an essay entitled "The Holy (Outline of the Philosophy of Religion)" (Windelband 2021c). The text of the *Introduction* takes up and expands on the ideas set forth in that essay. Yet, for my present purposes it is sufficient to refer to this work, even though the earlier essay presents some original features of its own.

11   This is, of course, a point in common with Rudolf Otto's famous book published in 1917, *The Idea of the Holy* (*Das Heilige. Über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis zum Rationalen*). To my knowledge, Otto does not mention Windelband's use of this concept. For a broader overview of the different characterizations of this concept, the reader may consult the compilation of German texts by Carsten Colpe (Colpe (ed.) 1977).

12   The reader will find a specific characterization of this religious form of values in Windelband (2021c: 527, 529, 539).

13   See also Windelband (2021c: 526).

the normal consciousness but seen as if it were a transcendent reality. Values are imbued with the aura of the sacred insofar as they surpass the dimension of existence of the individual and society. Hence, what is Holy is reason itself no longer understood as an ideal but as an extramundane reality. The goal, and the systematic place of religion in culture, is linked to this characterization.

As it is apparent, the impulse that originates the religious formation of values seems to be the same one behind the transformation of the empirical consciousness into a normal one. Religion is one of the ways in which empirical consciousness seeks to relate itself to that which is ideal. The problem of the validity of the Holy, i.e. the specific religious value, is the result of a problem of philosophical consciousness itself. This is what justifies the lofty seat of religion in the system of culture.

In view of our exposition of Windelband's ideas, we can understand why he claims that the foundation of religion is the demand for a metaphysical anchoring of values (Windelband 1919: 394). God is just another name for the problematic absolute consciousness. And his reality is assumed as a result of his necessary relationship with human consciousness. Hence, religious life is "the life of value which is conscious of these connections [between values and their metaphysical anchorage]" (Windelband 1919: 394). Windelband attempts to diminish the weight of his own assertions by stating that this reference does not contain the claim of a proof but that of a postulate in the Kantian sense.[14] As is clear from the definition of religion, its sphere of problems is none other than the connection between values and reality.

In the context of the philosophy of religion, Windelband discusses some of the most problematic aspects of his philosophical program. It is precisely in this context that Windelband develops, for one last time, his vision regarding the relationship between reality and values. Windelband's conception of values requires that they cannot be completely identified with reality. It is not only that normal consciousness fails to identify itself with absolute consciousness, thus leaving open the need to travel an infinite path. If it were to do so, it would lose its character of consciousness as such: "it is part of the essence of valuation that the norm which determines cannot be fulfilled by itself ... Ought and being, value and reality must be different" (Windelband 1919: 425–426). The duality between value and its realization is a necessary requirement that belongs to the very essence of our thinking and our will. That is why such an identification would destroy our very rationality (Windelband 1919: 434). The whole gamut of metaphysical and religious positions are built

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14   For Kant's definition of a postulate it is advisable to consult the following entries in the *Kant-Lexikon*: "Postulat" and "Postulate der reinen praktischen Vernunft" both written by Sebastian Gardner. This is an attempt by Windelband to bring his own exposition closer to Kantian doctrine, although the arguments of the two philosophers follow different paths. Although Windelband rescues the idea of an interest of reason as the foundation of belief in a suprasensible reality, his presentation of the relation between theoretical reason and practical reason does not allow for a repetition of the Kantian solution.

around the necessary connection and repulsion between the sphere of reality and the sphere of value.

It would seem then that, just as values can be considered from a psychological point of view or a philosophical point of view, there is also the possibility of a properly religious (metaphysical) point of view. At the end of the journey of transcendental philosophy, as developed by Windelband, we encounter a problem that is refractory to philosophy itself. As Windelband claims, "it belongs to the essence of things that this last problem [the reality of the ideal] is unsolvable. It is the sacred mystery, by which we experience the limits of our being and our cognition" (Windelband 1919: 434). Ultimately, the immanent worldview of philosophy inevitably confronts the fact that it cannot close in on itself, that is, it cannot preclude the alternative of a transcendent conception. If it were to do so, it would end up denying one of the conditions of possibility of valuation.

3. Rickert's Two Interpretations of the Philosophy of Religion

Rickert shares with Windelband the basic tendency to transform transcendental philosophy into a science of absolute values. Yet his definition of philosophy is supported by arguments that are original.[15] In my exposition of Rickert's philosophy, I will focus on three different aspects. To draw the parallel with Windelband, I will present succinctly Rickert's definition of philosophy. Next, I will dwell on the treatment of religion in two different presentations corresponding to the mature phase of his thought: *System der Philosophie* (1921) and *Grundprobleme der Philosophie* (1934).

Rickert does not follow Windelband's lead in defining philosophy as a science of normative consciousness. This characterization, which places consciousness in the foreground, probably had for him a psychologistic overtone.[16] Accordingly, he defines philosophy as a science that deals with the world as a whole.[17] Under this definition, philosophy is opposed to the special sciences, since they explore distinct parts or regions of the world. Furthermore, with this definition Rickert also moves away from the consideration of philosophy as a worldview. Worldviews also correspond to views of the totality, but philosophy displays the property of constituting knowledge.[18] As Crowe notes, Rickert's philosophy "is ultimately motivated by the problem of world-views, i.e.,

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15   See Krijnen (2001), especially chapter three. Important points of reference for Rickert's definition of philosophy are: Rickert (1910); Rickert (1921: 1–49); and Rickert (1934: 1–53).

16   A systematic explanation of the difference between Windelband and Rickert on this point can be found in Krijnen (2001: 507–510). See especially the footnote n°123.

17   Rickert uses various formulations: *Weltganzheit, Wetlall, das All,* etc. For instance: "the world in its totality [*die Welt in ihrer Ganzheit*], and what is to be understood by it, is to be determined first by philosophy" (Rickert 1934: 11). And later: "Philosophy, i.e. universal knowledge of everything that there is in the world" (Rickert 1934: 44). See also Rickert (1921: VII)

18   As Rickert points out, if we want to consider worldviews as philosophy, we would have to accept two senses of philosophy: as a worldview and as a science (Rickert 1934: 10).

the problem of a unified, theoretically grounded system that is able to provide an account of the meaning of human life " (Crowe 2010: 618). Nevertheless, philosophy does not develop a worldview of its own. As the German word [*Weltanschauung*] points out, worldviews are primarily intuitive. Philosophy, on the contrary, is articulated as a science, that is to say, in philosophy the conceptual component prevails.[19] In addition, religion also has a say in this constellation. Philosophy and religion, from the point of view of this characterization, can become antagonistic powers: "because religion, like philosophy, will display the tendency to relate itself also to the *whole* of the world, any attempt to recognize this whole merely theoretically, may appear as a derangement of religious beliefs (Rickert 1934: 9 [italics in the original]). This same situation is reflected in one of the few direct references to the problem of the philosophy of religion before 1921. In Rickert's programmatic essay "On the Concept of Philosophy", he says: "It is in the nature of religion that it goes beyond all culture and all history, and in the same way philosophy will also strive towards the supra-historical and the transcendent. Nevertheless, just as the religious finds its expression only in earthly life, it must everywhere tie up with the historical and immanent, in order to gain any immediately accessible material for the treatment of its problems. The path that leads us to the supra-historical goes through the historical. Thus, philosophy has to make itself aware of values as values by means of historical material" (Rickert 1910: 30). As can be seen from this passage, the problem in question consists in explaining the relationship between concrete historical existence and rational principles.[20] It is possible to see here the same duality between religion as cultural sphere and religion as the other in relation to philosophy, i.e., non-scientific philosophy or metaphysics. Philosophy is opposed to these other activities because it deals with the totality, because it adopts a theoretical position and because it is eminently conceptual.

As mentioned, philosophical discourse must meet two requirements: it must be conceptual and must refer to the totality. The conceptual determination of this totality is not a comprehensible undertaking in itself. The apprehension of this totality, as Rickert understands it, does not proceed by the addition of concepts belonging to various regions of the world.[21] The discourse on the dif-

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19   This is not to say that worldviews are not the subject of philosophy. Insofar as philosophy is a science of totality, its theme is the opposition between the totality of the human being and the totality of the world. The worldviews as modalities of this relation are also a subject of philosophy understood not as a conception of the world but as a doctrine of worldviews in general.

20   This use of history is a characteristic feature of the philosophy of the Baden Neo-Kantians. For example: "history is the bond between time and eternity, between value and reality. And this is itself the meaning of history" (Bauch 1932: 131).

21   Why are ordinary concepts useless? "The reasons why it must be so can be easily understood. Spinoza once says: 'Omnis determinatio est negatio', and this is true insofar as every content-related conceptual determination is a demarcation against other concepts and thus includes a negation. The totality of the world [*Weltganze*], however, cannot be delimited in this way. This would virtually contradict the concept of its

ferent regions of the world presupposes the clarification of the possibility of referring to such a totality. In relation to this characterization, values have to represent the concepts proper to account for the totality of the world as such.[22] Rickert's idea is that "we possess concepts which relate to each other in such a way that all parts of any whole fall *either* under one *or* under the other of them. Then the meant whole is to be determined conceptually in such a way that it includes everything that can be brought under one *as well as* under the other of the two concepts" (Rickert 1934: 41 [italics in the original]).[23] In this way, both concepts would offer in their combination a concept of the world as such. The distinctive note of these pairings is that the negation of one of these concepts involves a positive knowledge of its opposite.[24] Values are the concepts that work in this specific way. The task of philosophy is then to establish a system of such concepts.

The most detailed formulation of such a system is contained in Rickert's *System of Philosophy* (*System der Philosophie*). In this book, Rickert devotes a specific section to religion entitled "Religions and the Divine." The first thing that stands out is obviously the plural form. The starting point of the philosophical investigation are concrete religions. This starting point is relevant insofar as it is connected to Rickert's attempt to classify the different instantiations of religion according to his own value system.[25] For my part, instead of going into these details, I will concentrate myself exclusively on the architectonic problem.

As Rickert himself takes care to make explicit: "it is not as obvious as it is in ethics and aesthetics, which tasks philosophy has, as a science of value, in relation to religion. What does the religious good consist in and what value is it that constitutes the religious object?" (Rickert 1921: 338). Returning once more to the architectonic problem, there is an asymmetry between properly religious values and the values corresponding to the other spheres of culture. However, this difference becomes, once again, an extremely productive difficulty for philosophical thought.

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wholeness, apart from which there is nothing else against which we could delimit it" (Rickert 1934: 11).

22   Let us recall that in Windelband's case, the introduction of the concept of value occurred in connection with value consciousness. The story line pursued by Rickert is markedly different.

23   This is Rickert's famous heterology. For a detailed reconstruction of this idea, see chapter five from Krijnen (2001).

24   This idea articulates Rickert's entire philosophical theory. To give it a more concrete character here, we can refer to one of the examples he offers. The totality of bodies is divided into mechanical bodies or living bodies. When it is affirmed that a certain body is not a mechanism, we do not encounter a mere infinite judgment but a positive determination of that body, namely, that it is a living organism (Rickert 1934: 42).

25   In any case, this is not a minor aspect. Specifically, it allows Rickert to refer variants such as theism, polytheism, and pantheism to the same conceptual framework. In contrast, Windelband's own exposition in the *Introduction* is much more rhapsodic.

First of all, one characteristic of cultural goods is its imperfect or unfinished nature. They are, as Rickert says, "all too human" (Rickert 1921: 338). Religious values, on the contrary, correspond to a perfect, finished, superhuman reality: God (*Gott*) or the Divine (*das Göttliche*). And, regardless of one's belief in such entities, the fact is they can only be thought of in reference to specific values. In line with Rickert's heterology, the religious man understands the perfect totality represented by the eternal goods either as a person or as impersonal, he binds himself to it practically or contemplatively, as placed immanently or transcendentally, etc. The philosophy of religion must therefore clarify these different alternatives.

It is relevant to note already the similarities and differences with respect to Windelband's position. Both authors deal with the values proper to religion. Only if we can determine specific values of religion can we justify the autonomy of the philosophy of religion from logic, ethics or aesthetics. Nonetheless, Windelband and Rickert defend this autonomy by means of arguments that reveal important differences between their ways of thinking. Windelband argues from his consideration of the subject's evaluative capacity. This has already been sufficiently explained in the previous section. Rickert, on the other hand, argues for autonomy on the basis of concrete religions (Rickert 1921: 339). Concrete, i.e. historical, cultural life brings us face to face with the religious problem. Regardless of personal belief, there are in our cultural life religious goods and values associated with them. Philosophy must try to understand them as such. Therefore, Rickert is not concerned with postulating a value for religion from philosophy. What he seeks is a classification of the different manifestations of religious life present in culture from the point of view of an *a priori* system of values. Nevertheless, both authors employ an argument that could be considered intellectualist. And it is this argument that I will use to present in a philosophical manner the concept of the Holy.

The autonomy of the philosophy of religion is the result of considering a systematic problem inherent in the other philosophical sub-disciplines. The mismatch between reality and value was what motivated the religious form of values, that is, their sacralization. The imperfect character of human cultural goods leads Rickert to advance a similar claim: "We can call everything human imperfect only under the presupposition that a supra-human value, against which man can be measured with regard to his perfection or imperfection, is valid. Thus, the human as the imperfect demands the concept of the perfect, not as that of a reality [*Realität*], but as that of a valid value [*eines geltendes Wertes*] [...] and this is also the basic religious conviction as it confronts us through history: there is something absolutely perfect, supra-human, the Holy" (Rickert 1921: 339). Once more, the specificity of the philosophy of religion is associated with this overcoming of the sphere of experience. The incompleteness of the human being cannot be understood, this would be Rickert's point, without also assuming some kind of concept of the complete.

Rickert's analysis is slightly more complex than Windelband's, introducing still other interesting nuances. Rickert finds that religion has a specific mode

of incompleteness. In relation to values, the ideal of the sacred operates as a presupposition, namely, as the ideal against which we try to measure our activities. But, in its specifically religious character, the value of the sacred does not only depict the impossibility of completeness. The desire for completeness is not possible either. For the subject, the concrete realization of the sacred means nothing other than becoming a god oneself. But this would be precisely a negation of the sacred character of the Holy: "Whoever is truly human, rejects the supra-human, in order to preserve this supra-human for itself. As soon as we try to understand this, we have come to the religious-philosophical problem of value" (Rickert 1921: 340).[26]

Rickert's explanation functions as a better characterization of holiness. This reference to the contradiction in the realization of the Holy brings his presentation closer to the religious phenomenon. The characteristic of this phenomenon is precisely the conceptual contradiction between the real dimension and the ideal dimension of the divine. The affirmation of a transcendent reality is not only problematic in terms of its lack of theoretical legitimacy. The assumed transcendent reality of the ideal remains impossible to grasp in strictly conceptual terms.

Ultimately, the problem of the philosophy of religion is not merely religious life. Its problem is equally the relation between the real and the ideal, between the concrete and the transcendental, between being and value. In this sense, I believe that Crowe's statement is very accurate when, in the context of his analysis of Rickert's philosophy of religion, he affirms that "religions, with their concern for transcendent, ahistorical values such as God as 'highest good' and human salvation, present in a particularly acute form the problem of the relation between 'valid values' and contingent historical and psychological realities" (Crowe 2010: 623).

The philosophy of religion represents a survival of metaphysical problems. Obviously I cannot discuss here Rickert's detailed characterization of the various forms of religion. However, there is something important that should not be overlooked. In referring to Windelband, I pointed out the tension between philosophy of culture and religion. This can be comprehended as the opposition between an immanent and a transcendent worldview. Granting legitimacy to the latter seemed, moreover, to imply the negation of the former. Rickert is also aware of this seeming paradox (Rickert 1921: 344). While philosophy searches for the meaning of life in culture itself, there are forms of religion that deny this search in their flight to what is beyond experience. Rickert sees this form of religion for what it is, i.e., as another manifestation of cultural life. Although it constitutes a negation of culture as philosophy wants to unravel it, this religion itself is part of that culture. It is for this reason that it must itself form a part of the philosophical discourse. In the end, the relationship between philosophy and this form of religion ends up being asymmetrical again.

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26 This is certainly not the case in other spheres of culture. There would not be the same kind of contradiction in the realization of a "truly" beautiful work of art.

Rickert takes up the general problem of the philosophy of religion once more in *Grundprobleme der Philosophie* (Rickert 1934). The problem is again characterized in terms of the presence of values that do not allow themselves to be realized in experience. However, here Rickert defends a slightly different view. For Rickert directly discusses the mode of being assumed by religion, namely, a metaphysical mode of being. Rickert does not abandon the discussion of the place of religion in cultural life. However, he confines this subject to what he calls the anthropological dimension of the philosophy of religion.[27] This anthropological dimension is contrasted with an ontological dimension. The latter poses the discussion in terms of a mode of being (Krijnen 2002: 196). This shows Rickert's attempt to distance, in his own presentation, the divine and the sphere of value.[28] Another aspect to note is that Rickert no longer employs the concept of the Holy.

It remains for us to consider how Rickert, in this mature work, considers this nexus between religion and metaphysics. The core of religion is still understood in terms of the mysterious realization of that which is not but has a value. We must remember that for Rickert "a value that is effective [*der wirkt*] is not permissible for our concepts" (Rickert 1921: 340). Now, however, insofar as the understanding of the limits of knowledge has been modified, this possibility must be revisited.

The paradox Rickert points out is that our own acts of taking position guarantee the realization of values in the world. The enforced connection between value and reality only exists in reverse if we think that the world is configured or arranged in such a way that values can be realized in it or real goods produced that extend beyond the free act of the subject. Our own thought requires the possibility of this connection as a presupposition. The difference, in this case, is that the presupposition is no longer only meta-theoretical. When Windelband presents this same problem in the *Introduction*, he employs recourse to a postulate of reason to account for the very limits of knowledge. Now, Rickert concludes that the very understanding of the possibility of knowledge involves a metaphysical aspect (Rickert 1934: 138; Krijnen 2002: 197). To account for this aspect, Rickert introduces the idea of symbolic knowledge.[29]

Through symbolism, concepts refer to a sphere of being that is different from the one through which these concepts are produced. What is said by means of

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27   Here Rickert briefly takes up the exposition made in Rickert (1921). For this reason, I will not dwell on this text. It should be noted that Rickert continues to assert a certain asymmetry between science, ethics, or arts, on the one hand and religion on the other. Religion manifests a claim to organize human life in general that conflicts with the autonomy of the other spheres of culture. Religious life can become "intolerant" (Rickert 1934: 200) of other areas of culture.

28   "Nor can the divine be located in the realm of the 'mundus intellligibilis' as we understand it. In it, there are only unreal meaning formations [*Sinngebilde*], and they never adequately express the essence of a 'mighty' God on whom we depend." (Rickert 1934: 198)

29   Christian Krijnen also highlights how the inclusion of this symbolic knowledge represents a problematic return to metaphysics (Krijnen 2002: 195).

symbols represent only an image of what is really meant. Metaphysics subsequently employs images taken from the sensible world to conceive the suprasensible. The most straightforward case of a symbolic concept is that of the reality of value, by which a "higher reality" (Rickert 1934: 144) is attributed to that which we know cannot be real in the sense of the reality of experience. In this way, the paradox of the realization of that which is not, but possess validity, obtains a novel resolution.

The sphere in which symbolic knowledge finds its most concrete presentation is precisely religion. Rickert encounters a way of reintroducing themes proper to the religious tradition by accepting a certain flexibility in adopting a metaphysical point of view. Normally, the statement of Kantian heritage according to which the very limits of knowledge leave room for religious conviction does not involve the specific adoption of such a conviction.[30] Philosophy pushes such convictions beyond the limits of knowledge. And while it affirms a high degree of tolerance in this regard, it does so on the premise of leaving what is beyond knowledge as indeterminate. It is for this reason that philosophy and religion, immanent and transcendent worldview, come into conflict. On the contrary, in *Grundprobleme*, Rickert does take care to suggest the possibility of expanding discourse beyond the limits of knowledge. And it does so with a very concrete conviction: "may therefore the belief, which, formulated as a proposition, goes to the effect that I, as an individual soul, stand in a personal relation to a personal God, however unprovable it may be scientifically, be regarded as *refuted* or even as refutable by the science which tries to know the totality of the world, and have we therefore here the right to speak of the destruction of faith by philosophy?" (Rickert 1934: 203). And Rickert's answer is no.

Certainly, there can be no scientific or theoretical foundation of a religious conviction as such. Neo-Kantians cannot move away from this insight. However, in contrast to what was stated above, it is possible to encounter representative vehicles to express or articulate such a conviction. In this way, the essential mystery of religion is mitigated through a certain type of "concepts", i.e. symbols. Thus, Rickert states that "a symbolic thinking, without having to fear scientific refutation, may tie up to the concept of the free spiritual subject and develop it symbolically towards the religious side in such a way that it comes to the concept of an *indestructible* soul, as the religious believer thinks it." (Rickert 1934: 205 [italics in the original]). Although he does not develop or explain in detail how this expansion from the concept of the subject to the concept of the indestructible soul could be carried out, he does refer to the possible model represented by Leibniz's monadology (Rickert 1934: 206). Of course, these are not theoretical conceptions, but they are called beliefs formulated from a "symbolic-metaphysical" (Rickert 1934: 207) point of view. On this last point, Rickert's own proposal bears some resemblance to that of his

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30   However, Rickert's ideas have a clear antecedent in the *Critique of Judgment*, in which Kant states that all our knowledge of divinity is symbolic (Kant AA V: 254). For a reconstruction of this aspect of the Kantian doctrine, see Maly (2012).

teacher. Indeed, symbolic knowledge appears as the specifically transcendent form that the fundamental concepts of scientific philosophy acquire.

4. What's at Stake with the Philosophy of Religion?

We can now synthesize the three possible paths for the philosophy of religion, i.e., Windelband's position, the position defended by Rickert in his maturity, in 1921, and his late position, namely, in his last work published in 1934.

In a general methodological consideration, Christian Krijnen states: "From a principle-theoretical point of view, the philosophical tradition provides three paradigms to answer the question of the validity of our claims [*Leistungen*]: the metaphysical, the empiricist and the transcendental philosophical theorem of justification [*das transzendentalphilosophische Begründungstheorem*]" (Krijnen 2002: 181). This tripartition is of course one of the keys to understand the different argumentative strategies stemming from the Kantian tradition. It is precisely a matter of clarifying the transcendental alternative against the two traditional answers: empiricism and rationalism. It is also fair to state that, in the context of the post-idealist identity crisis of philosophy, the major problem of transcendental philosophy is not linked to metaphysics directly. On the contrary, the discrediting of metaphysics only strengthened the empiricist position. That is why the central task for the Neo-Kantians became the correct counter position to empiricism. An example of this is Windelband's or Cohen's emphasis on strictly upholding the distinction between questions of genesis and questions of validity.[31] Hence, the argumentative effort of Baden's Neo-Kantians consists in showing the separation between the transcendental and the factual. However, they must immediately produce their reunion since otherwise the theory would have no explanatory power whatsoever. It is this second question that comes into play when addressing the problems of the philosophy of religion. And what is at issue in this case is to delimit in a correct way the fields of experience with respect to that which is beyond experience. The problem is that religion resembles metaphysics, but is not itself metaphysics. And, to be true to the Neo-Kantian motive of offering a philosophy of culture, religion cannot be merely discarded. Quite the contrary, it must encounter some form of placement in the architecture of the philosophical system. The tensions linked to this situation can be seen throughout the philosophical evolution of both Windelband and Rickert.

As Baden's school philosophy is transformed from a program into a system, the tensions between the development of philosophy and religion becomes more relevant. Windelband's entire treatment of the problem goes in this direction. For him, in the philosophy of religion two different ways of considering reason are opposed, an immanent and a transcendent way. This is what he explains to Rickert himself in a letter from 1913: "As far as the system of values is concerned, I only briefly hint at it today: I deny that there are actually

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31 See Windelband (2021b).

religious values in terms of content (and my "Introduction" brings this out even more sharply than the Praeludien), because the so-called [religious values] are only the other values in the coloring of the supra-sensible [*der Färbung des Uebersinnlichen*]: I can therefore least of all assume two areas of rel[igious] values, I see rather just in your distinction of pantheistic and theistic values only a confirmation of the fact that they are again the same ethical-logical-aesthetic values only in two different supra-empirical colorings, one immanent and one transcendent" (Windelband 1913).[32]

Rickert begins by nuancing this idea in his mature writings, concentrating on the problem of the general structure of religion. In this sense, he achieves a clear answer to the problem of the systematic articulation of religion in the system of culture. In his later writings he takes an even more radical path than that proposed by Windelband previously. This is why we can speak, in considering his case, of a third way of approaching the problem of the philosophy of religion. While Windelband attempted to link the possibility of a transcendent discourse with the practical postulates of reason, Rickert opens up the possibility of a theoretical recourse. This is the sense we have to give to the use of 'symbolic' knowledge.

Symbolic knowledge is that which allows us to present through our language the paradox of the realization of values, that is to say, of the real becoming of that which is not but possess validity. From the point of view of the theory of knowledge, the formulation of the realization of values is always problematic. Philosophical reflection in general, that is, that vision broader than the mere theory of knowledge, is the one that leads to the very limits of theory. From the reflection on these limits emerges the possibility of a symbolic expansion of our concepts. Religion, finally, appears as the sphere where this use of symbols operates in an articulated fashion. Although there is invariably a reluctance in this regard, this is the reason why the philosophy of culture as transcendental philosophy systematically culminates with religion.

Conclusions

As we have seen, the problem of the philosophy of religion is indeed a source of obscurity in the philosophical theories of Windelband and Rickert. It is also a sign of the innovative character of Neo-Kantian philosophy. This statement should not be considered lightly. The Neo-Kantians' treatment of the problem of religion is far removed from the Kantian presentation itself. Precisely, Kant's philosophy of religion does not operate as the basis for solving the problem of the place of religion in culture. Yet the Neo-Kantians carry out this task in the form of the transcendental philosophy inaugurated by Kant (Bauch 1925:

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32   Windelband to Heinrich Rickert, Heidelberg, 20.12.1913. This letter can be retrieved in the following link: http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/heidhs2740II-IA-224_100. A transcript of this letter can be accessed at http://elpub.bib.uni-wuppertal.de/servlets/DocumentServlet?id=14793. Consulted on December, 2021. The translation is mine.

2–3). Neo-Kantians offer a novel understanding of the system of transcendental idealism. And as we have seen, religion fulfills no minor role.

On the other hand, the problem of the philosophy of religion allows us to offer an alternative perspective on Neo-Kantian philosophy. Beyond the connoisseurs of the subject, the association of Neo-Kantian philosophy with an exclusive predominance of the theory of knowledge still survives. This view has foundations in the texts insofar as the theory of knowledge remains the cornerstone of philosophy. But just as Kant's philosophy is not exhausted in the first critique, neither is Neo-Kantian reflection limited to epistemology. Through the years, Neo-Kantians deepen their own reflection by considering the possibility of expressing the truths of religion and metaphysical thought.

As for the philosophy of religion itself, it seems to occupy the highest place in the system of culture proposed by these Neo-Kantians. This position remains problematic. But in this problem also lies its relevance. The possibility of articulating a system of philosophy, understood as an all-encompassing theory of the world and as a doctrine of the worldviews, is confronted with the fact of its own immanent character. As such, it cannot fail to recognize that such immanence cannot be thought of except in connection with transcendence. Whether the symbolic procedure proposed by Rickert is the proper path for establishing a link between the transcendental and the transcendent remains in this writing an open question. The denial of immanence does not offer a positive knowledge of transcendence. But neither is it a mere nothingness. That is why it demands a language of its own. Just as in religion, philosophy also finds a mystery in its own essence. On this point, the texts are not sufficiently clear or detailed so I believe that this question no longer belongs to historical research but to philosophical reflection in its purity. What I do hope is that I have made clear both the need to consider this subject area in order to gain an accurate picture of Baden's Neo-Kantian philosophy, as well as the undeniable effort made first by Windelband and then by Rickert to push reflection on transcendental philosophy to its very limits.

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Hasinto Paez Bonifasi

Na granicama znanja: filozofija i religija u Jugozapadnom Neokantijanizmu

Apstrakt

Ovaj rad istražuje suštinska načela jugozapadnog neo-kantovskog poimanja filozofije religije. Specifično, usredsrediću se na dva različita aspekta Vindelbandovog i Rikertovog pristupa religiji. Najpre, osvrnuću se na način na koji oni određuju religijske vrednosti. Potom, fokusiraću se na način na koji oni sučeljavaju religiju sa sistematskom strukturom kulture. Kao rezultat analize tekstova oba autora, videćemo da je moguće otkriti najmanje tri moguća puta za razradu filozofije religije. Uprkos ovom mnoštvu puteva, tvrdiću da oni pokazuju sličan osnovni problem: oni pokazuju, naime, problematičan odnos između transcendentalne filozofije i metafizike. Zbog toga, filozofija religije poprima formu refleksije o granicama znanja, a samim tim i o samim granicama transcendentalne filozofije.

Ključne reči: Vindelband, Rikert, svetinja, religijske vrednosti, transcendentalna filozofija

Christian Krijnen

CULTURE AND FREEDOM IN TRANSCENDENTAL AND SPECULATIVE IDEALISM

ABSTRACT
The founding fathers of modern philosophy of culture, the neo-Kantians, and especially the Southwest school, brought the concept of culture into play as a counter concept to that of nature. Taking Heinrich Rickert's conception of culture as a starting point, the article shows how culture is conceived of as a self-formation of the (concrete) subject (agent). It leads to transcendental idealism of freedom, typical of a Kantian type of transcendental philosophy. However, in this self and world formation of the subject it is presupposed that nature is to any extent formable by values and thus by freedom. This presupposition cannot be accounted for properly within transcendental idealism. Hegel, by contrast, conceives of culture as a manifestation of the idea, leading to speculative idealism of freedom. The origin of culture, i.e., its original determinacy, should not be conceived of in terms of an opposition to nature, and consequently in the fashion of a subject (agent) of thought and action that forms itself by forming its world, culture. Rather, it should be conceived of in terms of a manifestation of the idea as the truly transcendental subject qua absolute ground of validity and thus the ground of being too. Nature and culture are both primarily determined by their ideal character and the relationships emerging therefrom.

Our so-called 'postmodern' world is characterized by a plurality that seems to call rather for 'cultural' philosophy than a philosophy of One Reason. Indeed, conceptualizing philosophy as a philosophy of culture has proved particularly promising. In the wake of local and global social developments, 'intercultural philosophy' has even become one of the usual suspects of contemporary philosophy, and the topic of 'multiculturalism' is not less widely discussed (Taylor, Gutmann 1992; Kimmerle 2002; Wimmer 2004; Yousefi, Braun 2011). For some, multiculturalism and interculturalism are even still too much connected with the stigma of homogeneity and closedness, advocating the concept of

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"transculturality" (Welsch 2017; Darowska 2010; Langenohl, Poole, Weinberg 2015). However, it is important to note that any talk of transculturality, multiculturalism, or interculturality presupposes a concept of culture. What is culture?

Historically and systematically, two dimensions specify this question philosophically: a) the scientific character of scientific cognition of cultural facts, i. e. the methodology of the cultural sciences, taking into account that cultural cognition concerns phenomena of meaning, value, or validity in contrast to the cognition of mere natural phenomena.[1] With this, b), the dimension I shall address in the following comes into view: the subject matter of cultural cognition: culture. As indicated, the original determinacy of culture is presupposed in any cognition of cultural facts. Insofar, the original determinacy of culture is transcultural. The transculturality of the original determinacy of culture is virtually an index of its transcendentality, since it consists of a whole of principles that determine culture *as* culture. It constitutes the objectivity or culturality of culture.

Nature and Culture

Not only the founding fathers of modern philosophy of culture, the neo-Kantians,[2] above all the Southwest school, brought the concept of culture into play as a *counter concept* to the concept of nature. Heinrich Rickert, for example, defines both terms epistemologically and ontologically against each other: From the perspective of logic, more precisely that of a philosophy of science, reality becomes "nature" if conceived of with regard to the "general" and "culture" if conceived of with regard to the "particular and individual" (Rickert 1926: 55; 1929: 227).

Hence, a certain material qualification – i. e. a qualification of the objects of cognition—results from the cognitive purpose of the respective cognitive attitude and thus from the logical or formal goal of 'generalizing' or 'individualizing' concept formation. Logically, natural objects are *value-free,* whereas cultural objects are *value-laden.* Ontologically, this logical opposition not only implies value-free and value-laden objects, nature and culture. Rickert also hints at their well-known and often quoted etymology:[3] Nature is the whole

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1   The (only partly valid) conviction that Kant lacked a philosophy of culture, led to all kinds of attempts in the late 19th century to supply the alleged desideratum one way or another. Paradigmatically, one can think of Dilthey's "Critique of Historical Reason", which is not very Kantian, as well as of the philosophies of the neo-Kantians, which, in comparison to Dilthey's proposal, are more Kant-oriented. With regard to a philosophy of science of the cultural sciences, within transcendental philosophy, see the seminal writings of Rickert (1926, 1929). For a thematization of Kant's philosophy of culture and history in its transcendental content see Flach (2015). Flach's transcendental philosophy of cognition and science (Flach 1994) is also co-determining for Göller (2000). See for the attempt of a Kant-oriented philosophy of cultural studies also Grünewald (2009) as well as my remarks on this attempt (Krijnen 2013).
2   For the neo-Kantian philosophy of culture see e. g. Ferrari (2003: ch. 10), Krijnen (2001: ch. 2; 2015a), and Krijnen and Orth (1998).
3   See for this etymology Perpeet (1997: ch. I).

of that which is and grows by itself (*nasci*), culture (*cultura*) is that which has been created by people acting according to purposes, i. e. that which has been cultivated for the sake of the values attached to it (*colere*). Moreover, regardless whether we apply etymology or turn towards the conceptual history of culture, we continuously see that culture refers both to the activity of cultivating as well as to the result, the cultivated. Culture is understood as resulting from human behavior, consequently as a counter concept to nature. Nature and culture are reciprocal terms, terms determining each other. Insofar they are opposed to each other. Culture is self-formation of humans, whereas nature is determinacy by heteronomous forces.

This opposition of nature and culture is accompanied by that of nature and freedom. Since antiquity, these terms are dominantly conceived of as an opposition too. Culture as the realm of freedom is opposed to nature as the realm of necessity (natural laws). Opposites such as nature and freedom, nature and culture, culture and freedom indicate the conceptual constellations that form the background of the thesis to be defended in the coming deliberations: The origin of culture, i. e. its original determinacy, should not be conceived in the way of an opposition to nature, and consequently in the fashion of a subject (agent) of thought and action that forms itself by forming its world, culture. Rather, it should be conceived in the way of a manifestation of the idea as the truly transcendental subject qua absolute ground of validity and thus the ground of being too. Culture is primarily a manifestation of the idea, not a self-formation of the subject. As a manifestation of the idea, the concept of culture is not primarily a counter concept to that of nature. Rather, nature and culture are both primarily determined by their ideal character and the relationships emerging thereby.

Culture as Self-Formation of the Subject: Transcendental Idealism of Freedom

[i] Culture as self-formation of the (concrete) subject (agent) is the paradigm of a Kantian type of transcendental philosophy,[4] leading to transcendental ideal-

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4   In the sense of rejecting Hegel's speculative conceptual development in its core and orienting itself to Kant's approach of correlations. The label 'Kantian type of transcendental philosophy' suggests that Hegel's philosophy can also be interpreted as transcendental philosophy. This is insofar true as Kant's transcendental revolution of philosophy, to think objectivity as grounded in subjectivity, is inescapable for Hegel, who's philosophy is directed from the start to the perfection of what Kant achieved in his project of 'self-knowledge of reason'. However, for Hegel "critical philosophy" is not only one of the (insufficient) 'Positions of Thought toward Objectivity' (Hegel 1991: §§ 40 ff.) and Hegel already in the 'Introduction' to his *Logic* criticizes harshly "critical philosophy" and "transcendental idealism" [= Fichte, ck] (Hegel 1951: I, 28, cf. 26–28, 32), but precisely his radicalization of the critical method of philosophy as well as of the architectonic of reason mark decisive differences to Kant's philosophy, making it problematic to determine Hegel's philosophy as a transcendental philosophy. Yet both types of philosophy agree in being validity-reflective idealism (and insofar not metaphysics or ontology). The adjective validity-reflective thus involves Hegel's speculative

ism of freedom. The basic doctrine of the structure of self-formation is that of the so-called *fundamental axiotic relation* (gr. ἄξιος = value). It is supposed to be a solution for Kant's architectonic of reason, assessed as very problematic already in early post-Kantian German idealism and also in neo-Kantianism (see e. g. Rickert's philosophy of values (Rickert 1921; 1928; 1934) or Ernst Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms (Cassirer 2001 f.)), just as in the contemporary transcendental philosophy of Hans Wagner (1980) or Werner Flach (1997).

Kant's architectonic of reason in terms of theoretical and practical philosophy or nature and freedom respectively does not only lack a transcendental justification, it also has been reproached for lacking a founding unity from which the dualism of the theoretical and the practical realm emerges. Already, e. g., Fichte (1845/46: I, 264; III: 20 f.) tried to work out practical reason as the basis of theoretical and practical reason, of thinking and willing in the way of a primacy of willing. Hegel (1951: II, 429 ff.; 1991: §§ 445 ff.), then, attempted to sublate the limitations of theoretical cognition under the idea of the true and of practical cognition under the idea of the good by a doctrine of the absolute idea, just as in his elaborations on the free spirit the dualism of theoretical and practical action of the spirit is sublated. This urge for unity determines the efforts of the neo-Kantians too. Rickert's transformation of Kant's primacy of practical reason into a primacy of self-formation, shaking of its particular practical nature, is conceived of as an encompassing idealism of freedom (Krijnen 2001: ch. 2.3, 6.3, 7.2 f.). It leads Rickert to a fundamental axiotic relation as the unity of reason itself. With regard to the subject (agent) we could also say that it constitutes a continuous relation of subjectivity. Rickert's model has proved to be very important also for later transcendental philosophers. In the following, I therefore address it as a paradigm.

Rickert (1928: 438) qualified the fundamental axiotic relation as the "starting point" and "communal root" of all philosophy; it concerns the "the correlation between valid values and the valuing subject". This correlation is a relation between *values* in which validity is absolute, although related to subjects, and *subjects* who, as subjects, are related to absolute values guiding their activity. According to the doctrine of the fundamental axiotic relation, already the realm of cognition is characterized by a(n) (objective) normative constraint. This normative constraint guides our theoretical (epistemic) endeavors. Cognizing has the structure of taking an alternative position towards values. Values are, from the perspective of the subject, the point of orientation for its theoretical endeavors. A cognizing subject is a subject that recognizes values; more precisely, it makes the value of 'truth' the determining factor of its behavior. Hence, the cognizing subject subjects itself to an 'ought' and therefore amends its criteria for determination from factors of reality to factors of validity or ideality.

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method. This method is a radicalization of Kantian transcendental reflection, but either way it concerns 'immanent deduction' and thus cognition that makes explicit the principles of sense or meaning. While the term 'speculative' creates no less confusion than 'idealism', the distinction between transcendental idealism and speculative idealism is probably the most accurate with respect to the issue at stake.

Consequently, normative constraints are in no way constitutive only for the 'practical' realm.[5] They make up the foundation of the whole human world.

The distinguished realms of culture, whichever, all are specifications of the fundamental axiotic relation. It is this relation which is thematic in the often misunderstood neo-Kantian doctrine of the 'primacy of practical reason'. This doctrine does not intend to narrow all foundations to ethics but to determine the fundamental axiotic relation. Rickert develops it by, so to speak, axiotizing the theoretical realm, giving it a paradigmatic meaning for all realms of culture.

From the perspective of the subject, that is, the validity noetic point of view, the subject obtains its fundamental determination by the concept of *self-formation:* the subject knows itself as related to values and with that subjected to a task, finally an infinite task. The fundamental axiotic relation is this relation between absolute *values* determining the subject concerning the validity of its endeavors and the *subject* which fulfils this infinite, unconditional task only in a finite, conditional way. As this infinity is a defining part of the validity claims of the validity function called 'subject', value-laden self-formation of the subject is self-formation according to values intrinsically or immanently part of its own subjectivity. Apparently, on the level of the fundamental axiotic relation the moment of self-formation, the basic characteristic of the subject, does not lead to a primacy of practical reason in the sense of a primacy of specific ethical, moral moments making up the foundation of all human self-formation. The concept of self-formation concerns the value relatedness or value ladenness, hence, the value determinacy *as such* of the subject (Rickert 1928: 189 f., 292 f., etc.). The subject *is* the validity function of self-formation. From a validity noetic perspective, both theory and praxis are conceptualized as 'taking a position towards values' (*Stellungnehmen zu Werten*). Thus for Rickert, the former "primacy of the practical" turns out to be a "primacy of values", a primacy of self-formation Rickert also qualifies as an "idealism of activity". (Rickert 1909, 216) Not only neo-Kantians but also more recent doctrines of the fundamental axiotic relation, such as Wagner's (1980: §§ 9, 25) or Flach's (1997: ch. 2 f.), are concerned with such a doctrine of self-formation, axiotizing the sphere of knowledge and conceiving of it as a specification of the fundamental axiotic relation.

As said, culture is first conceived as a counter concept to nature, as a value-laden reality versus a value-free reality. Culture, then, proves to be the result of a value-determined self-formation of the subject. Yet culture is not only opposed to nature. Rather, nature is integrated into the fundamental axiotic relation too. On the one hand, it is the object of the cultural activity we call the natural sciences. On the other hand, nature itself is founded in values; nature is a value phenomenon. How is that to be understood?

From the perspective of the natural sciences, humans are (methodologically) determined as a value-free reality, as a natural *object* of scientific determination.

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5   In contemporary philosophy, this insight is emphasized in theories of inferential semantics (cf. e. g. Brandom 1994) and philosophies of science dealing with 'epistemic values' (cf. e. g. Haddock, Millar, Pritchard 2009).

Taken as a *subject,* however, humans at the same time are the principle of realizing validity, i. e. shaping reality according to values. Culture is always a world created by humans, not a mere product of nature. For being able to act as a value-determined being, humans must *live* in the natural scientific sense of the word. Hence, the problem of realizing validity or values leads to a whole of necessary natural conditions that make value realization *factually* possible. Therefore, nature is not only the whole of value-free objects. It is philosophy that understands nature in terms of validity, i. e. in its *value-determinacy.* Nature turns out to be a *condition* for realizing values. Accordingly, Rickert qualifies nature as the *medium* of value realization; as a result, nature is embedded in the structure of values. This structure is determined by the differentiation of *"conditional values"* and *"intrinsic values"* (Rickert 1934: 167 f.; 1911: 153 f., 165) or of "life and civilization values" versus "cultural values" (Rickert 1934: 170 ff.; 1911). Such differentiations aim at bringing order into the world of humans and, at the same time, at bringing about an all-round estimation of constituents of this world. Seen systematically, they are, despite all differences in detail, prefigured by Kant and have been preserved beyond neo-Kantianism up to contemporary transcendental philosophy.

[ii] Obviously, transcendental idealism thinks the unity of realizing validity from the perspective of the subject and insofar 'subjectively': The self-formation model of culture conceives the unity of value and reality, nature and freedom in terms of a subject shaping itself and thereby creating culture. As a real subject, the subject is itself a unity of nature- and value-determinacy, of nature and freedom. Through its self-formation it brings about a world that is culture, a value-laden reality, a world that is a unity of nature and freedom.

In this self and world formation of the subject, it is *presupposed* that nature is at all formable by values and thus by freedom. According to its original determinacy, nature has to allow for a value- or freedom-based formation. "Realization of values" as "embodying" values into reality, "bringing reason into sensibility" presupposes that reason and sensibility, value and reality do not stand opposite to each other as "two separate worlds". Rather, what is sensibly real must have its transcendental condition in an "objective", admittedly not metaphysical, but "functionally lawful" order of reason.[6]

The substantiation of this precondition of subjective activity requires an objective order of reason, consequently an objective-logical transcendental basis. Hence, an approach beyond a subjective unity is necessary. This approach can be exposed, again, by taking Kant as a starting point. The fundamental axiotic relation also started with Kant's idea of transcendental philosophy, namely that the subject is subject to laws of validity founded in reason. To the neo-Kantians, Kant had to appear as the "philosopher of modern culture", to use the title of

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6   The quotes stem from Bauch (1935: 94 incl. note 3, and 141 ff.). Bauch, in particular, tried to clarify the presupposition mentioned. His attempt fails in a manner typical of transcendental idealism and its axiotic fundamental relation.

Rickert's book about Kant (Rickert 1924). Neo-Kantian idealism was accordingly shaped as a philosophy of value, turning the Critique of Reason, as the Marburgian Cassirer (2001: I, 11) formulates it, into a "critique of culture" as a "philosophy of symbolic forms". We philosophically recognize ourselves by conceptualizing our world in terms of its principles. The clarification of the mentioned presupposition of the objective order of reason, which forms the basis for the fundamental axiotic relation, leads the issue of the formability of reality by values. With that it not only addresses the compatibility of nature and freedom, and hence the possibility of creating culture, but, as indicated, it directly leads to Kant's conception of *cosmological* freedom.

In the cosmological antinomy of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant discusses the problem of the compatibility of nature and freedom and solves it by distinguishing transcendental idealistically a sensible from an intelligible world. The latter shows to be the origin of the phenomenal world. The essence of cosmological or transcendental freedom as absolute spontaneity is that it is the first cause of a series of events. Freedom is thus brought into play as the origin of the world of appearances. Kant's transcendental concept of freedom, however, is characterized by a practical profile. His conception of cosmological freedom virtually anticipates a metaphysics of the practical reason of finite subjects. Already in his proof of the possibility to think a cosmological causality of freedom it becomes clear that Kant is primarily concerned with the possibility of moral freedom for our actions (which is logically preceded by cosmological or transcendental freedom (Kant 1910 ff.: V, B 561 f., cf. B 831)). Kant models freedom as a "power" to be the cause of effects, more precisely, as a capacity to start a series of effects "by itself", "spontaneously". This power- and causal-theoretical modeling allows, what Kant is concerned with, to understand humans as an agent of their actions: not merely as an effect of a natural causality, not as an object but as a subject.[7]

Although Kant, in the course of his transcendental turn, deontologizes the onto-theologically conceived First Cause of metaphysics in favor of a transcendental idealism of reason in humans, he sticks to the practical profile of freedom. As a consequence, the relation of cause and effect remains external, that is to say dualistically conceived of. As a consequence, the original unity of the world of appearance can no longer be thought as freedom. Freedom would concern at most the formal determinacy of the relation, not its content too. The latter is 'given', in one way or another. The causal relation is not an absolute, purely intrinsic relation. Freedom as a faculty of causality has – notwithstanding all transcendental and not 'merely formal' interpretation of principles by transcendental idealism – in this respect a formalistic basic trait. This trait also applies to the fundamental axiotic relation. It hinders it to comprehend the realization of freedom, and thus culture, in its original determinacy.

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7   See on Kant's cosmological freedom and its focus on practical freedom recently Krijnen (2017b), as well as Fulda (1996), and Wagner (2008a; 2008b).

[iii] A discussion with the South-West neo-Kantian Bruno Bauch, one of the most vehement critics of a formalistic interpretation of principles, can illustrate this point not only in a paradigmatic way. Moreover, Bauch has discussed the sketched problem of the original compatibility of nature and freedom explicitly in relation to Kant. At the same time, Bauch's solution surpasses the subject-oriented orientation characteristic of a Kantian type of transcendental philosophy towards the context of a more general doctrine of the idea as the unifying ground of everything – thinking along, so to speak, with the problem of cosmological freedom contained in Kant's transcendental concept of freedom. For Bauch, the unity of value and reality is guaranteed by the transcendental conditionality of reality. This transcendental conditionality culminates in Bauch's concept of the 'idea'.[8]

In first instance, Bauch conceives of the unity of nature – causal necessity – and freedom – value-laden determinacy – as a unity of *human action:* the person actualizes values and hence unites what Bauch calls the causal and the teleological relation (1935: ch. VII, esp. 259-281).[9] The consequence of this approach is that the unity involved is a unity of the person and hence of the concrete subject. This subject spontaneously directs itself immediately to values and in doing so mediately objectifies freedom, i. e. it produces culture. Its activity is both determined by nature and values, by causality of nature and causality from freedom. However, for Bauch, as mentioned, nature and culture have their common foundation in the idea, as, to put it in terms of one of Bauch's favorite Kant quotes, "the world must be represented as having originated from an idea" (Bauch 1935: 268, 271 f., 280; Kant 1910 ff.: III, B 843 f.).

On the one hand and significantly, in Bauch's synthesis practical or personal freedom takes center stage. The unity of nature and freedom he presents concerns the concrete subject, and thus human action or the facticity of reason. Bauch does not conceive of the encompassing causality that grounds both specifications of causality as freedom. Strictly speaking, Bauch's synthesis is not a synthesis of nature and freedom but of causality and freedom (1935: 271 f., 275, 278): Bauch thinks of freedom *in* nature, not of nature *as* grounded in freedom. Bauch's "original" (1935: 275) or "immediate" (1935: 272) synthesis is a synthesis of causality and freedom in the concrete subject, not of nature and freedom.

Yet on the other hand, for Bauch, the world has to be conceived of as originated from an idea, and hence as a world that develops in levels reaching from inorganic nature to culture. This "self-unfolding" of the idea is supposed to overcome the conception of the two "separated" realms of nature and freedom in favor of their "co-existence". Their respective laws of reason originate from

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8   Bauch conceives of the idea as the objective relation of validity that, as the whole of conditions of objects, constitutes reality as well as its cognition. Everything is included in the idea, reaching from the content of sensation via the categories up to the concepts and their relationships. See on this Krijnen (2008: ch. 5.3).

9   See on Bauch's concept of the person as the factor that actualizes validity or values Krijnen (2015b: 2018).

an "overarching unity", that is the idea as the origin and aim of the whole of reality (Bauch 1935: 271 f., 278–281). The world emerges from it, as we could say, like the world of phenomena does from Kant's cosmological freedom. Nevertheless, in Bauch's conception, freedom is not this origin. Although freedom for him is a "transcendental" predicate (1935: 283), he does not conceive of the original unity, which is the idea, in terms of this predicate. Rather, it is culture that is for Bauch the "logical place" (1935: 285) of freedom. Differing from both Kant and Hegel, although Bauch himself suggests identity, Bauch's synthesis of nature and freedom is a synthesis of the acting and hence culture producing subject. Freedom, in essence, is practical freedom, not transcendental freedom in the cosmological sense.[10]

With this it becomes clear that Bauch mixes up two unities: the unity as the idea from which the world emerges and the unity as concrete subjectivity that unites nature and culture. This is a consequence of the fundamental axiotic relation. Here, the actualization of the idea is conceived of as an activity of a concrete subject that directs itself to values belonging intrinsically to its own subjectivity. In doing so, it forms itself as a person and shapes reality as culture. Freedom is freedom of the concrete subject. Apparently, the fundamental axiotic relation reproduces the Kantian model of freedom as causality. Freedom, by contrast, is not a Hegelian manifestation of the One idea that differentiates itself and is in all other with itself. Rather, it seems to presuppose such a Hegelian unity.

Culture as a Manifestation of the Idea: Speculative Idealism of Freedom

Let me conclude with some remarks about Hegel's conception of freedom and its actualization. Indeed, with Hegel we touch upon the limits of transcendental idealism of culture. Time and again Hegel reproached the sketched causal model of freedom for its *formalism,* being a case of merely abstract freedom.[11] Although transcendental philosophy continuously speaks of 'self-development', 'self-determination', 'self-justification', it cannot conceive freedom as the manifestation of an overarching unity differentiated in itself; a unity which is and remains with itself in everything else. On the contrary, in transcendental philosophy such a foundational unity remains presupposed.

Thus Hegel's criticism of formalism should be distinguished from the simplistic reproach raised time and again against transcendental philosophy, namely that forms are empty shells somehow applied to a formless content. Since

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10   In contemporary transcendental philosophy of Wagner and Flach too, Kant's doctrine of freedom as a transcendental predicate, i. e. transcendental freedom qua cosmological freedom and thus as a freedom that underlies nature and culture, is annihilated. See on this Krijnen (2017a). Wagner and Flach fall victim to the same problem as Bauch, not conceiving of the original unity as transcendental freedom.
11   See on this extensively Krijnen (2022).

transcendental philosophy conceives principles of validity as conditions of the possibility for something conditioned, it overcomes such formalism, at least in principle. The neo-Kantians clearly saw the reciprocal and well-ordered relationship of principle and concreteness. Rickert, for instance, overcomes a formalistic conception of principles through his heterology, in which 'content' itself proves to be a form and a necessary moment in the whole of thought (1921: 50 ff., 1924: 8 ff.); Bauch (1923: 181 ff.; 1926: 131 ff.), like Cassirer (1976), contributed outstandingly to an understanding of principles as functions. Principles are not merely formal but have a content-logical character.

Hegel's criticism, instead, holds that transcendental philosophy does not live up to its own claim regarding the content-logical character of principles. It turns out that the problem of a subjective unity of value and reality, of nature and freedom refers itself to a more general problem. If, in the fundamental axiotic relation, culture is conceived of as the result of a subject actualizing values, than an objective formal relation is perpetuated that Hegel scrutinized. Namely that the actuality of freedom – and culture is according to transcendental idealism actualized freedom – nolens volens cannot be understood as the result of self-formation and thus as objectified freedom. Conceptually, the existence of freedom, culture, is out of reach. The fundamental axiotic relation fails to qualify culture sufficiently because due to its formalism, as Hegel (1991: § 508) puts it, a "principle of determination" is missing. This is to say that transcendental idealism misses the methodological moment – decisive for Hegel's speculative idealism – that sublates any externality between opposites: the '*realization of the concept*' (by moments of the concept itself: universality, particularity, and singularity). Rather, in transcendental idealism 'form' and 'content' ('matter'), or more concretely 'nature' and 'freedom', remain opposed to each other. Therefore the laws of freedom, values, ideas etc. are only applicable by presupposing certain pre-given content-related determinations—determinations that are at the same time excluded by, or at least not expressed in the form as the principle of validity. The formality of transcendental idealism hinders it to comprehend actions in their actuality. Taken by themselves, values in the sense of transcendental philosophy make up only an abstract moment of human self-determination, not the principle of human self-determination. In the latter case, they should also contain the conditions of their own actualization instead of excluding them.

Hegel's speculative idealism offers a different architectonic of reason for comprehending freedom than transcendental idealism. It does not conceive of actualizing freedom in a power- and causal-theoretical fashion. Against this, Hegel presents a model of self-knowledge of the Idea as the true ground of everything and with that a model of its manifestation, not of causality. The process of self-knowledge, at a certain point of its development, is confronted with the problem of the existence of the Idea and thus of freedom too. Culture is a configuration of the Idea giving itself existence; it is a manifestation of the Idea. Only as a manifestation of the Idea can culture be conceived of philosophically.

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Kristijan Krijnen

Kultura i sloboda u transcendentalnom i spekulativnom idealizmu

Apstrakt

Osnivači moderne filozofije kulture, neo-kantovci, a posebno jugozapadna škola, uveli su koncept kulture u rasprave kao kontra-koncept konceptu prirode. Uzimajući kao polaznu tačku koncepciju kulture Hajnriha Rikerta, pokazuje se kako se kultura shvata kao samoformiranje (konkretnog) subjekta (delatnika). Ona vodi ka transcendentalnom idealizmu slobode, tipičnom za kantovsku vrstu transcendentalne filozofije. Međutim, u ovakvom formiranju sebe i sveta subjekta pretpostavlja se da je priroda u nekoj meri uobličena vrednostima, a time i slobodom. U okviru transcendentalnog idealizma, ova pretpostavka se ne može uverljivo objasniti. Hegel, nasuprot ovome, shvata kulturu kao manifestaciju ideje koja vodi ka spekulativnom idealizmu slobode. Poreklo kulture, odnosno njenu prvobitnu determinisanost, ne treba shvatati u smislu suprotstavljanja prirodi, a shodno tome, ni u smislu suprotstavljanja subjektu (delatniku) mišljenja i delanja koji se formira tako što formira svoj svet, odnosno kulturu. Umesto toga, poreklo kulture trebalo bi da se shvati u smislu manifestacije ideje kao istinski transcendentalnog subjekta kao apsolutnog osnova valjanosti, a time i kao osnova samog bića. Priroda i kultura su prvenstveno određene njihovim idealnim karakterom i odnosima koji iz toga proizlaze.

Ključne reči: priroda, kultura, vrednost, sloboda, transcendentalni idealizam, spekulativni idealizam, Rikert, Bauh, Kant, Hegel

III

STUDIES AND ARTICLES
STUDIJE I ČLANCI

Zoran Dimić

EDUCATION AND POLITIKON ZOŌN[1]

ABSTRACT
Aristotle's definition of humans determines his understanding of education (*paideia*) in Politics as *politikon zoōn*. This definition should always be considered together with the other most important Aristotle's statement about the human being, in which he claims that "man alone of the animals possesses speech (*logós*)". The ability to speak becomes most important within the specific political partnership (*pólis*), which has at last attained the limit of virtually complete "self-sufficiency" (*autarkeías*). Contrary to "every household" where the eldest member "gives the law" (*themisteúei*) to sons and spouses, in the city (pólis), the "speech (*logós*) is designed to indicate (*semaíneiv*) the advantageous and harmful, and the right and wrong". In sum, justice became political (*dikaiosunē politikóv*). It always appears like the outcome of an argument or dispute (*krísis*) on what is just (*toū dikaíou*). We should understand education (*paideia*) in the context of the previous statements. Dispute (*amfisbetéin*), the keyword of Aristotle's understanding of education, appears in the first sentence of Politics VIII. Aristotle states that "they (people) dispute" the question of what "constitutes education and what is the proper way to be educated". There is not one complete, definitive, and standard answer to the question of what is the best way to be educated that we should implement in the educational activities. Based on Aristotle's view, I claim that the first purpose of education is not to determine and constrain the activity of the youth and citizens in general, but to provoke and facilitate the dispute on the essence and aims of education.

KEYWORDS
education, *zoōn politikon*, logos, politics, dispute

The interpretation of the relationship between education and *politikon zoōn* I will begin with the political nature of human beings. The research on the political nature of human beings I consider the central part of understanding the role of education within the human community. It is directly related to the concept of logos and its critical role in ancient science and culture. I want to

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analyze one of the most representative cites throughout ancient philosophi-
cal literature. At the beginning of *Politics*, Aristotle determined the political
character of the human-animal as *politikon zoōn*: "...ō *ānthropos* fūsei politikòn
zōon"/man is by nature a political animal/ (Pol.I.2.1253a2–6).[2]

1. Politikon zoōn

At this point, we face Aristotle's first definition of man. Typically for his way of
arguing in the research area of ethics and politics, Aristotle developed his two
definitions of the human being neither from a concept nor an idea like Plato,
but from the previously established level of partnership practice. At the outset
of *Politics*, Aristotle marks and explains the human self-motional tendency to-
ward making partnerships and cites several forms of it: marriage, household,
village, *polis*. Urged by this analysis, many researchers were inclined to claim
the so-called political naturalism in Aristotle's theory of politics.[3] In addition,
they mark Aristotle as a naturalist.[4] They connect Aristotle's political theory
in many ways with the influence of ancient understanding of nature (*phusis*),
but with Aristotle's previous thoughts on the problem of nature too. We find
Aristotle at this particular point in the middle of contemporary debates on the
specific ethical views concerning naturalism and non-naturalism.[5] However,
Politics is neither the writing on naturalism nor non-naturalism; it is simply
about the close relationship between a man and politics. That is precisely the
point of view I want to shed light on.

What made Timothy Chappell, Fred Miller, and other authors emphasize
nature, self-motion, and self-sufficiency within Aristotle's assertion that "man
is a political animal by nature"? Firstly, all of these authors state in one way or
another that Aristotle's interest in natural science, mainly Physics and Biolo-
gy, is expressed in the naturalism of his politics. In short, they are searching
for the foundation of Aristotle's political theory within his natural science or
the general foundation of his theoretical philosophy. Even though we could
say that Aristotle rejects Plato's apriorism in the matters of politics – as he re-
jects it in metaphysics – we should be more careful if we assert the theoretical
foundations of his political theory.

I want to claim something precisely the opposite. Nevertheless, we should
pay attention very carefully to Aristotle's precise statement. The sentence men-
tioned above reads as follows: "Hence every city-state exists by nature since
the first partnership so exists" (Pol.I.8.1252b33). Polis is not a unique commu-
nity that has emerged by nature. The same goes for marriage, household, and

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2   Translation by H. Rackham: Aristotle 1959: 9.
3   About Aristotle's political naturalism see: Ambler 1985; Chappell 2009; Miller 2000;
Reeve 2009.
4   The detailed account of the question of whether Aristotle is a naturalist or not we
find in Timothy Chappell's article: Chappell 2009: 562–568.
5   See the details: Chappell 2009: 562–563.

village. They are all "by nature", but they are not political. I am very inclined to claim that the role of the term "by nature /fūsei/" is overestimated and inadequately outlined in this particular context. There is no reason for the particular dilemma on the proper interpretation of the meaning of nature in this context. Apart from all of these particular senses of the term 'nature' listed by Chappell, we should simply stress that this term is derived from the verb *phuesthai*, which means that nature has to do something with whatever has grown or come to be. Polis is not natural in a way a plant is natural. The naturality of a polis concerns simply the human inclination toward shaping a partnership, which we share with some other animals. I agree with Fred Miller that we should implement Aristotle's meaning of this term expressed in Physics II. Above all, polis has something to do with "the phenomenon of self-motion" (Miller 2000: 322).

Nevertheless, I would like to stress that the life of human beings within the *polis* is to some extent natural (*fūsei*), but it is more than natural. Human activity in the *polis* is partly determined by nature. However, it is determined by some exceptionally human activities that other animals cannot practice in a much greater sense. These are the activities to which we have to pay attention when trying to understand the meaning of the *politikon zōon*. Humans are animals, but they are political animals, which we cannot claim for any other animal species. Human beings are only partially realized in the biological process.

Here we come to the main point. Aristotle adds to the sentence about "the union of female and male" something exciting: "and this not of deliberate purpose (*ek proairēseos*) but with a man as with the other animals and with plants there is an natural instinct to desire (*fusikon to efiesthai*) to leave behind one another being of the same sort of oneself". Here we find out indirectly that the process of making a partnership between the female and the male for the continuance of the species has nothing to do with deliberate choice. As for other kinds of animals, the female and the male are making union by nature, which means by instinct. Hence we accidentally come to the critical point that, in the case of humans, some actions do not occur by nature but by deliberate choice (*proairēseos*). Contrary to the natural (*fusei*) issues which occur through self-motions, now I want to turn to human actions.

The additional argument why we should put the term 'by nature' aside is that we are in the middle of Aristotle's Politics and not Physics or Metaphysics. Considering all the previous, I reject Chappell's claim that "Aristotle is a political naturalist in that he believes that human nature has to be recognized as a determinant of what is possible and what is ideal in political theory" (Chappell 2009: 567). If we take that being "political naturalist" means having a good sense of real-life objection, we can accept such a statement. However, it would be excessively trivial because each philosopher could be called a naturalist. In addition, if we accept that the fundamental meaning of the term 'nature' relates to an intrinsic cause of self-motion in human beings' whole life, we have to admit that Aristotle is a determinist. The whole issue of politics would be predetermined. We would have to accept such a conclusion if Aristotle's interpretation

of politics would concern most the human instincts. However, it is precisely the opposite. Aristotle's elaboration of the political character of a human being starts when he steps out of the world of nature and steps into the world of human deliberate choices and action. It is up to humans to decide what is right and wrong, good and bad, useful and useless for a community or an individual. By practicing deliberate choices, they are shaping their lives within the polis. That is what Aristotle meant by *politikon zōon*. By stating that it is up to humans to shape their lives in the polis and shape the polis itself, Aristotle is much more a modernist than a naturalist. Within this context, in the following sections, I will determine the role of education in a polis. Here we come to the point where we realize that polis is something pronouncedly human. Polis is not a gift from nature. It is the outcome of emphatically human endeavor.

Hence I want to reject the central thesis of Chappell and Miller that it is part of human nature to be political. I want to emphasize that being political does not have to do anything with being adapted for life in a community, such as marriage, household, or village. The bees and lions are also adapted for life in partnership, but they are not political. If we want to understand the meaning of Aristotle's term 'political'/politikōs/, we have to step out of the world of nature and natural things. Thus I deny Chappell's and Miller's thesis that political naturalism could be the foundation of Aristotle's political philosophy. *Politikōs* (political) is originally linked to the *polis*. We could even assert that there is no politics outside of the *polis*. To understand the profound meaning of the statement of *politikon zōon*, besides the concept of nature, animals, and politics, we need another one. If we want to understand where we should direct the term 'political', we should recall Aristotle's second definition of man.

2. Politikon zōon and logos

Here we should find out the nature of the relationship between politics and logos. Aristotle simply states: "The partnership finally composed of several villages is the city-state (polis)" (Pol.I.2.1252b27). Unlike previous forms of partnership, the city-state represents the only kind of community in which the human being can realize its political character. It is a partnership as well as the previous ones, but "it has at last attained the limit of virtually complete self-sufficiency". However, a condition for establishing a city-state is not just the human tendency for the partnership, which is possessed by other animals, for instance, by bees, but the possession of speech (logos). Here we come to the main point, where Aristotle points out the human possession of speech while establishing the statement about the political character of human beings:

> And why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. The mere voice, it is true, is a sign of pain and pleasure, and therefore is possessed by the other animals as well (for their nature has been developed so far as to have sensations of what is

painful and pleasent and to signify those sensations to one another), but speech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong. (Pol.I.10.1253a8-15)

The animals only possess the mere voice (*fonē*), and therefore they cannot establish a polis, even if they do form a partnership. It is speech (*logos*) that prepares the conditions for the political community (*koinonīa politikē*). Nevertheless, why is a voice not enough for the founding of the polis? Why is this specific sign of pain and pleasure not enough to establish the political community? What does the voice provide to animals and us, and why is it not enough? As Aristotle emphasized, the animal's nature has been developed till that point to have sensations (*aīsthesis*) about some opposite issues, for instance, what is painful or pleasant. In addition, the voice can give those animals the ability to signify (*semaīvein*) the current problem or danger to each other. The voice can be the call for mating. The sensations like pain and pleasure, sorrow and joy, and many other feelings like fear and loneliness are part of the life of animals. The voice that marks these feelings is the only way they can refer to their sensation. Since we mostly do not understand the meaning of these signs of the animal voices, we understand them as singing and songs, for instance, in the case of birds and whales. These sensations and feelings are also part of human life. We also feel pain and pleasure, sorrow and joy, fear, loneliness, and many other feelings. Sometimes we mark our sensations by voice to signify to people around us that we are in danger or feel very good at a specific moment, but we do have another way to refer to our sensations. Human beings do not just signify (*semaīvein*) the specific sensation to other humans by voice. However, they can indicate and avouch (*tō deloūv ēsti*) what is advantageous (*sumphēron*) and what is harmful (*blaberōv*). Like animals, we are also directed to the opposite sensations, and we also have many different feelings.

Nevertheless, we also can affirm and declare what is right (*dīkaion*) and wrong (*ādikon*). This ability is provided to us by logos. The specific feature that makes us human is not just the mere possession of sensations but the ability to refer back to them and establish a relationship with our sensations. Aristotle further continues:

For it is special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has sensation of good and bad and right and wrong, and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city-state. (Pol.I.11. 1253a16-19)

The human ability of speech enables us to talk about our sensations of pain and pleasure, sorrow and joy. We estimate each of these sensations and evaluate its degree and meaning for ourselves and our partners. We spend our lives arguing about what is good and what is bad, no matter whether we talk about everyday issues or the most critical problems: choice of the school and university, the choice of profession, the choice of our partner, etc. We are invited to make decisions almost every day in our life about this or that: which book to

read, which movie to watch, where to go for dinner, etc. The implications and outcomes of our moral decisions always have good and bad aspects. No moral decision is absolute. The more people are dependent on our decision, the more delicate it is to make a particular decision. Our decision will make some people cry, and at the same time, it will make some people happy. Different people will estimate our actions and decisions as right or wrong. Everything in our moral life concerning our decisions and actions is very relative. Our morality is constantly moving between good and bad, right and wrong.

Concerning Aristotle's understanding of morality, it should be emphasized that two different issues determine human behavior and human life within different kinds of partnerships. On one side, we act naturally (*fūsei*). For instance, the partnership of female and male is made for the continuance of the species as many other animals and plants also do, because they all possess the natural tendency (*fisikōn tō éfiesthai*) to "leave behind one another being of the sort as oneself" (Pol.I.3.1252a30). The tendency to make a partnership is not exclusively human because other animals also possess this specific feature, for instance, bees and gregarious animals (Pol.I.4.1253a8). Besides "the continuance of the species", there is another reason for the partnership of females and males. They enter into the partnership "for the sake of security" (Pol.I.4.1252a32). The one who is a ruler (*ārhon*) by nature (*fūsei*) and the other one who is just a subject of governance (*ārhōmenon*) also by nature are making the partnership that can preserve both of them. However, Aristotle's use of the term 'naturally' is not as simple as we could expect.

Contrary to expectations, Aristotle did not stress the physical strength of the ruler and the master of the family (*despōte*). However, he pressed his ability, which enabled him that "he can foresee with his mind" (Pol.I.4.1252a33-34). Here is the whole sentence: "For he that can foresee with his mind is naturally ruler and naturally master, and he that can do these things with his body is subject and naturally a slave; so that master and slave have the same interest" (Pol.I.4. 1252a32-35). By the word 'naturally,' Aristotle meant not just the issues concerned the instinctive human actions but all of the kinds of actions and customs established in the polis by the specific practice. The use of the mind (*dianoia*) enables us to foresee (*proorān*) things, and it provides an advantage over the people who do not practice this activity and who "do these things with the body". According to the established practice, the one who acts by the mind is expected to be the ruler. The one who uses his or her body is expected to be the subject of governance. No matter what role they have in a partnership, they have "the same interest" (*taūtō sumfērei*), the continuance of the species, and the security of their partnership. The different kinds of established actions in different partnerships aim to achieve the specific goals of a particular partnership. The continuance of the species and the security of their partnership are particular goals of the union of females and males. Therefore, each kind of established practice that serves the realization of these goals is natural (*fūsei*). Something becomes natural if it brings us to the realization of the goals of the specific partnership. Aristotle's intention was not to present

his value judgment about women and men, and slaves and masters but to describe the specific practice that he found in reality.

Moral life in a polis is relative to our personal moral life. The entire content of Aristotle's most important writings about this kind of problem, *Nicomachean ethics* and *Politics*, testifies to this relativity, fragility, and instability of human moral and political life. We can assert quite the same about the essence of the polis. The political structure of each *polis* is not firm and stable. What is the reason for this?

Here we find proof that Aristotle's main idea at the outset of *Politics* was to stress the difference between the polis and other kinds of community. He claimed that the difference between "statesman, royal ruler, the head of an estate and the master of the family" is not the difference "of greater and smaller numbers", but the difference "in the kind" (*eídei*). Aristotle pointed out that the difference was not in the number of governed people. That would mean that "there was no difference between a large household and a small city". However, the experience was completely different. Aristotle stressed that the polis, whether small or large, was qualitatively different from other kinds of communities, for example, kingdom, household, or family. Aristotle reported here about a different kind of governing. That is the first topic in the whole book of *Politics*. By following his report, we can realize the meaning of 'political'. It first concerns who is ruling the community, that is, who is the head (*ēfestéke*). However, it is neither the person itself nor the number of the people governed that is important, but the way of ruling. Aristotle stressed here that the polis is the whole which consists of elements (family, household, village). What differentiates these different kinds of communities is the way of ruling. Here we come to the main point, which concerns the meaning of 'political' – the way or ruling in the *polis* is different from other communities.

When several families are united, and the community aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first community to be formed is a village (*kóme*). The most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family. Since households were under the royal rule of the eldest member, and the members of the colonies of the families were of the same blood, the villages were under the royal kind of ruling. Aristotle pointed out that the first Greek cities (*polis*) at first were under royal rule, and the people abroad still did so. Here is the point I want to stress. The main difference between the city, on the one hand, and the other hand household and village is in the way of ruling. In the households and the villages, "one giveth (*themisteúei*) law to sons and eke to spouses". That is what Aristotle means by "royal rule". The meaning of the verb *themisteúo* is to deliver justice (*thémis* has the meaning of ethos, custom, law, etc.). The one ruling in this way is somebody who is ruling by respecting the customs and the divine laws. It is up to him to decide what is right and wrong. He makes decisions in the name of all the other community members, whether they live in a household or a village. The way he treats justice and law is that he proclaims it. He is the one who is "in connection" with the gods and the ancestor's customs.

In addition, concerning this section, I would like to stress the following two issues. After Aristotle cited Homer ("And each one giveth law to sons and eke to spouses"), he commented further in an exciting way: "For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times". Aristotle wanted to explain why the Greeks in ancient times were inclined to the royal rule. Since they lived in scattered families, they did not have opportunities to meet each other often and communicate. As they did not talk to each other about their problems and everyday life issues, the royal one was the most convenient way of ruling. The eldest member of the family simply delivered justice and law. The second issue concerns the exciting fact that in explaining the nature of the royal rule, Aristotle mentioned the Gods and how the Greeks imagined God's way of ruling and their manner of life, which was supposed to be like a human one. So, we can conclude that some humans and Gods are inclined to the royal rule, which means letting the eldest member of the community to deliver justice and law.

Here we can complete Aristotle's statement about a man as a political animal that possesses speech. The animals that possess the voice can only indicate the sensations of pain and pleasure to one another. The human being goes further. They have a sense of the advantageous and harmful, and therefore, the right and the wrong. However, right and wrong, law and justice are not something that can be given and delivered (*themisteúei*) within the polis. There are not some eldest people in the polis who decide what is right and what is wrong. The role of speech is to enable every citizen to set forth (*deloūn*) what is right and wrong. Law and justice are not matters of delivering but of discussing, investigating, and making decisions. Within the polis, nobody possesses the law and justice so that they could deliver it like the oldest members of the village community. In addition, the law and justice are not something already done and completed so that they could be given to somebody else. Within the polis, they are always something we argue about. Shortly we could conclude that living in polis means arguing all the time about right and wrong.

It is the deeper meaning of the sentence mentioned above: "Justice is political"/ē dè dikaiosūne politikón/. For instance, most of the translators, including H. Rackham, interpreted this as "Justice is an element of the state," which leads us far away from Aristotle's point. He simply wanted to emphasize that justice always appears as the outcome of arguing, dispute (*krísis*), or judicial procedure on what is right and wrong. Here is the suggestion for translating the last two sentences of this paragraph: "However, the justice is political. The right (judicial procedure) forms the order of the political community, and the justice is a dispute about what is right". Shortly we could conclude that there is no justice out of disputing and arguing on what is right. The justice within the polis always comes as a result of a dispute on what is right and wrong, no matter whether it is part of the judicial procedure or a common dispute. The term dispute (*krísis*) becomes the most important for Aristotle's understanding of polis. That is why the term logos leads us to the proper understanding of the meaning of the political animal. Justice is not something already done

that could be delivered to all the members of the polis, as is the case within the household or village. Logos is not crucial for the household and village because there is no dispute on anything. The eldest member of these "gives" (*themisteúei*) and delivers the law and justice. Justice appears within the polis due to the particular political culture of using logos to provide arguments while discussing a problem and finding a solution about what is right and wrong. That is why Aristotle so simply stated: "Justice is political". The way of living like a political animal in polis means to be always part of arguing and disputing what is right and wrong. The natural status of the citizens is disagreement on this question. *Krísis* (arguing) is the keyword of how a political animal lives within the polis. *Krísis* becomes the keyword of man and the polis.

3. Conclusion

We should understand Aristotle's interpretation of education (*paideia*) in the previous context. The general ancient Greek view of education, which we could take over from the first philosophers in the early period of Greek philosophy, and from Plato and Aristoteles, is that education is not something naïve, innocent, and harmless. Dispute (*amfisbetéin*), the keyword of Aristotle's understanding of education, appears in the first sentence of Politics VIII: "Now nobody would dispute (āmfisbetēseis) that education of the young requires the special attention of the lawgiver" (1337a1.1). When he adds that "education ought to be adapted to the particular form of a constitution (*politeías* ēkāstes)", he stresses that we should have special education for democracy, oligarchy, etc. It appears that education is something that can be determined and resolved by law or the constitution. However, here we come to the key quotation:

> It is clear then that there should be legislation about education and that it should be conducted on a public system (*kaī tauten koinēn*). But consideration must be given to the question, what constitutes education and what is the proper way to be educated. At present there are differences of opinion (āmfisbeteītai) as to the proper tasks to be set; for all peoples do not agree as to the things that the young ought to learn, either with a view to virtue or with a view to the best life, nor is it clear whether their studies should be regulated more with regard to intellect or with regard to character. (1337a1.3)

There is not one complete, definitive, and standard answer to the question of what is the best way to be educated which we should implement in the educational activities. It is not the way we should practice education. There are many opinions about the essence and the purpose of education, and the essential thing regarding education is to dispute it. Hence the purpose of dealing with education is not to determine and constrain the youth and citizens' activity in general but to provoke and facilitate the dispute on the essence and aims of education. Keywords for both being a human and the essence of education are the same: dispute, arguing, disagreeing, making a decision about different possibilities, crisis, etc.

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Obrazovanje i politikon zoōn

Apstrakt

Aristotelovo shvatanje obrazovanja (*paideia*) iz *Politike* određeno je njegovom definicijom čoveka kao *zoōn politikon*-a. Ovu definiciju uvijek treba razmatrati zajedno s drugom po važnosti Aristotelovom izjavom o čoveku u kojoj on tvrdi da „od svih ostalih životinja, jedino čovek poseduje govor (*logós*)". Sposobnost govora na taj način postaje najvažnija sposobnost u okviru određenog političkog ustrojstva (*pólis*), koje je konačno dostiglo potpunu „samodovoljnost" (*autarkeías*). Nasuprot „domaćinstva" u kojem najstariji član „deli pravdu" (*themisteúei*) sinovima i supružnicima, stoji grad (*pólis*) u kojem „govor (*logós*) jeste sredstvo osmišljeno tako da ukaže (*semaíneiv*) na korisno i štetno, pa samim tim i na ispravno i pogrešno". Rečju, pravda je politička stvar (*dikaiosunē politikóv*). Ona se uvek pojavljuje kao ishod rasprave, odnosno, kao rezultat spora (*krísis*) oko pitanja šta je pravedno (*toū dikaíou*). Potrebno je da i obrazovanje (*paideia*) razumemo u skladu s izloženim stavom. Kao ključna reč Aristotelovog shvatanja obrazovanja, spor (*amfisbetéin*) se pojavljuje u prvoj rečenici VIII. knjige *Politike*. Aristotel navodi da se „oni (ljudi) spore" oko pitanja šta „čini obrazovanje i koji je pravi način postajanja obrazovanim". Na ovo pitanje ne postoji jedan gotov i univerzalno primenljiv odgovor. Ne bi smo ni trebali obrazovanje vršiti isključivo na jedan način. Naprotiv, na osnovu Aristotelovog stava tvrdim da se glavna svrha obrazovanja ne ogleda u utvrđivanju i ograničavanju aktivnosti mladih i građana uopšte, već upravo u pozivu na provociranje građanskih sporova u kojima će se iznova preispitivati i prilagođavati suština i ciljevi obrazovanja.

Ključne reči: obrazovanje, politikon zoōn, logos, politika, spor.

Milanko Govedarica and Aleksandar Prica

THE CRISIS OF WISDOM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS[1]

ABSTRACT

The topic of this paper is an examination of the practical dimension of contemporary philosophical culture, both in relation to the idea of wisdom in traditional philosophy and in relation to psychoanalytical practice. In the first part of the paper, we determine what philosophical culture is, primarily by emphasizing the differences between that culture and the scientific-technological culture. In the second part of the paper, we show that such a philosophical culture has fallen into a crisis. In the third part of paper, we offer a way out of that crisis, in the form of psychoanalysis, which criticizes the primacy that philosophical culture accords to consciousness, logic, diachronic and linear ways of thinking. In the fourth and last part of the paper, we present the shortcomings of this psychoanalytical model. As a solution, we offer a new model of philosophical culture, created by the synthesis of philosophy, psychoanalysis, but also other discipline of human thought, which has similarities with Nietzsche's anticipation of *Gay Science*, as well as with Jasper's idea of transcendence.

1. The Philosophical Culture

The topic of this paper is an examination of the practical dimension of contemporary philosophical culture, both in relation to the idea of wisdom in traditional philosophy and in relation to psychoanalytical practice. The reason for focusing particular attention on psychoanalysis consists in our research hypothesis that the Freudian doctrine and therapeutics represent one of the best expressions of the crisis of traditional philosophical wisdom, a symptomatic revelation of its weaknesses and an attempt to overcome it through an altered form of human experience and through a different way of living. According to

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this starting point, we will strive to explain the limits of a practically orient-ed philosophical culture through psychoanalysis, while the reservoir of philo-sophical ideas about wisdom, on the other hand, will be used to examine the limitations of the Freudian way of thinking, as well as to provide incentives for devising an eventual corrective to what is wrong with Freudian practice.

Etymologically, philosophy represents an inclination or a tendency towards wisdom, towards the right way of life or towards leading the proper life, but this discipline of human culture throughout its long and rich history has always meant something else than that. Among other things, philosophy was synon-ymous with science in general, "the handmaid of theology", a tool of ideology and politics. Although philosophy originated in opposition to mythical think-ing, many philosophers themselves resorted to myth-making or were inspired by myths. Also permeation of philosophy with non-mythological artistic exper-ince and expression are no less intensive and ambivalent. Such ambiguity has imposed the need to distinguish between philosophical fields or disciplines, and one of the most general divisions consist in distinguishing between the-oretical and practical philosophy: on the one hand the sphere of philosoph-ical knowledge and standards of correct and valid argumentation about that which is immutable is emphasized, whilst on the other, the emphasis is on the sphere of conclusive philosophical thinking about that which is changeable, on that which lies within the domain of human decision-making and transfor-mation of the existing state, its changing in direction of improvement or de-terioration. Since our intention in this text is not to explore the history of the genesis of different meanings of philosophy, but to concentrate on the con-temporary situation and status of its practice, here we will single out the love of wisdom and love of argumentation as the most important connotations of philosophical culture. At the same time, it should be immediately stated that today's Western philosophy is more characterized by a commitment to logical argumentation than a dedicated pursuit of wisdom.

Naturally, it would not be justified to make a sharp distinction between the-ory and practice, because practical interests have a constitutive role in know-ing that which exists, while each action involves a certain type of cognitive in-sight. Thereby logic is that which is common to both theoretical and practical philosophy, because in both cases, in relation to that which is always the same as well as in relation to that which is always different, it is a matter of striving towards the rational organization of human experience and towards thought-ful behaviour. In that sense, there is a connection between fundamental and applied (philosophical) sciences, between adequate theoretical obedience to natural laws and their successful tehnical exploitation for human needs and purposes. However, the wisdom or the art of living, ie. the practical side of the philosophical culture which we are considering, cannot be identified with the possession of valid theoretical knowledge, and its technical character can only be discussed in a conditional sense and by way of a distant analogy with the technical application of the results of specific subject-matter oriented sci-entific research. The question is not only about practical wisdom not being

the same as theoretical knowledge, but it is about the specific quality of human self-consciousness and dialogical coexistence, as well as the quality of the human attitude towards the whole world, and not just the degree of some specialist knowledge and mastery of a particular subject based on it. In short, the wisdom of philosophical culture signifies the value of that which is by its character non-objective.

Husserl's reflections from the period when he advocated the idea of philosophy as a strict science, are also evidence that there is a non-negligible difference between the theoretical and practical aspects of philosophical culture. In his words, "profundity is an affair of wisdom; conceptual distinctness and clarity is an affair of rigorous theory" (Husserl 1965: 144). According to our understanding, the impression of dubious profundity, insufficient clarity and an air of obscurity in the discourse on wisdom emanate from the aforementioned non-objectiveness of philosophical wisdom, from the fact that it does not have its own particular subject-matter that could be clearly spoken of and which could be technically mastered in a precisely measurable way. We may find additional illuminating remarks on the key properties of wisdom in e.g. Jaspers, Gadamer and Habermas. Jaspers emphasizes that knowledge of objects is, in the strict sense, inseparable from science and highlights that "here cognition ceases, but not though. By technically applying my knowledge I can act outwardly, but nonknowledge makes possible an inner action by which I transform myself" (Jaspers 1964: 127).

The point here is that wisdom concern the mysterious inner transformation, which occurs when man realizes that he cannot attain infallible knowledge, when like Socrates, he becomes conscious of his own ignorance and the vastness of his inability to control the cosmic order of things, which provides him with a strong incentive for greater empathy and openness to dialogical interaction, that is, for overcoming egocentrism and monological fixations. In a similar line of thought, Gadamer points to the "the primacy of dialogue" as a very important factor for human self-understanding and moral orientation (Gadamer 2004: 363), whilst Habermas emhasizes that (philosophical) self-consciousness requires the irreplaceable self-engagement of the subject and intersubjective communication, and that therefore it cannot be replaced by any technical function in the literal sense, ie. by technologically produced objects (Habermas 1971: 247–248). Although the technology is generally intended to be a substitute for man, it is unusable in the case of human activities taken in order to become self-conscious.

It follows from the above that philosophical culture differs significantly from the scientifico-technological culture, because the immanent practicability (i.e. applicability) of philosophical theorizing consists in cultivating the internal and communicative act, in the qualitative improvement of life and in deepening non-repressive communication, not in increasing dominance and power to dispose of any particular object. As such, the philosophical culture bears more in common with artistic and religious culture than with empirical science, especially in view of the importance of self-expressive articulation for

both philosophizing and artistic creation, on the one hand, as well as in view of mysteriousness of wisdom in philosophy and holiness in religion, on the other. However the strong commitment of philosophical culture to the pursuit for conclusive arguments is what makes it different from both art and religion.

2. The Crisis of Wisdom

The crisis of philosophical culture has various manifestations. After Hegel, it had to do with reflections on overcoming or ending philosophical culture, that is to say, it was concerned with the idea of the so-called post-philosophical culture. Thus, in Marx's writings, there is a tendency towards the realization of philosophy, towards its completion in social processes and in the form of revolutionary practice, Kierkegaard's deliberations are characterized by the commitment to replace philosophical rationality with religious sensibility, and in the case of Nietzsche, there exists a doctrine on the re-evaluation of traditional values which is aimed at the devaluation of the philosophical concept, in favour of celebrating and putting forward of the vital potential of art and aesthetic experience. On zhe other hand, philosophical refutation of traditional philosophical culture, especially due the propensity of its proponents to deal with unfathomable secrets and unverifiable claims, became especially characteristic of logical positivism (which empathically embraced antimetaphysisical stance of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*) by promoting a new concept of scientific philosophy and by reducing this discipline to the logical analysis of language. This has resulted in a principled self-devaluation of philosophy, in its wider capacity, both in terms of discrediting metaphysical speculations in favour of the empirical sciences, in the form of public self-limitation of philosophical interest to the logical examination of arguments, as well as in prevailing attitude of professional philosophers that questions about the wisdom of living should be left to the sphere of private taste.

If we keep in mind that the etymology of the word crisis implies separating or distinguishing of what is good from what is bad, then we might think that the judgment of time has shown that the search for wisdom is a bad thing for philosophy and that the love of neutral argumentation is that which represents the true value of philosophical culture. In that sense, it could be argued that it would be a wise decision for philosophy to no longer deal with wisdom in its public usage, but advocating such a view in itself also inevitably represents a kind of philosophizing and speculating about the optimal role of philosophical culture in the modern world. The point is that the principled position of the proponents of logical positivism on the meaninglessness and unverifiability of philosophical claims about wisdom cannot be verified nor justified, empirically or logically, which means that it shares the same status of being a non-empirical and non-analytical proposition or a stance, as much like the traditional philosophical views it seeks to disqualify. According to this insight, we hold that the examination of wisdom is an inseparable part of philosophy in all of its variants, and that it will exist as long as there is a discipline that we deal

with. In other words, wisdom will always be important for philosophy, and the end of wondering about wisdom would also represent the end of philosophy. Since philosophical discipline constantly persists and resists various attempts of self-abolishing, the question of crisis of wisdom in the modern world should be understood as a problem of transforming or redefining wisdom, and not as something that justifies or further strengthens the demand for its elimination from philosophical discourse.

If we agree with the view that it is not possible or that it is not wise for to-day's philosophy to give up the search for its practical role, that is, the search for wisdom, then the right topic for our contemplation about a focused crisis becomes the question: what kind of wisdom do we need in the modern world? Regardless of the fact that is indisputable that wisdom is primarily a personal achievement, we think that, in this regard, the prevailing attitude in the western civilization of our time, is wrong, the supposedly liberal attitude according to which this topic merely has a private character and should not occupy an important place in public discourse, that is in the public use of the philosophical mind – is wrong and we also find this type of marginalization one of the aspects of the crisis under discussion. It is not about philosophers devising ready-made recipes for the right life, but it is a question concerning the importance of providing principled philosophical clarifications and advice publicly, and not only those of a psychologising or preaching nature, but rather concerning the ways to establish a valid relationship with the whole world, one's neighbour, and one's own person, i.e. the type of advice that improves the holistic framework of orientation and irreplaceable activity of individual self-reflection. In that sense, the practical dimension of philosophical illumination is very important, since its shows that non-objectively oriented wisdom of living is also achievable, in addition to wisdom colloquialy constructed as a sort of specialized profitability in reaching an objectively formulated goal. For such authentic wisdom, it is also important to have an insight into the mutual familiarity or permeation of that which is individual (private) and that what is universal (public), contrary to the understanding of these concepts as opposite.

The crisis of traditional wisdom mostly concerns the way of philosophical communication and the role of logical argumentation within it. Unlike past times, in the modern world, in a society whose characteristic is the so-called "the ecstasy of communication" (Baurdillard 1988: 22), autarkicity is compromised as a feature of wise living, and wisdom is increasingly becoming a kind of sense organ for other and otherness. At the same time, it's not only about the lesser importance of abstinence from active participation in social life, or about the lesser importance of distanced contemplation of the world, but it is also a question about the insufficiency of the one-dimensional relation of the cognitive subject towards the cognitive object, within the framework of the empirical and experimental study of the "book of nature". We take that this is exactly the main reason why philosophers like Husserl and Wittgenstein, in the latter stages of their thought, gave up their own previously insistence on the scientific and logical rigor of philosophy, and dedicated themselves to

emphasizing and illuminating the importance of cohabitation, i.e. those forms of life that an individual shares with other people. Also, this is the reason why philosophers like Rorty (Rorty 1994) and Habermas (Habermas 1971) insist on the importance of the practical role of philosophical discourse for the integration of different dictionaries, i.e. for better communication between heterogeneous and divergent traditions and cultures. Of course, dialogical communication was already an important part in Socrates' doctrine, but our time deal with a different form of dialogical interaction, with such communication in which irrational contents is no less important than rational ones, which makes a significant difference between the current constitution of wisdom, and that which was characteristic of the philosophical wisdom of Plato's teacher.

Among other things, wisdom in crisis and its new faces, include much less presence of the so-called spirit of seriousness and much greater openness to play and uncertainty than was the case in the past. Thus Nietzsche and his followers, like Bataille, glorify the wise man who know how to dance, that is, who accept the "unbearable lightness of being" and transcend the boundaries of rationality and morality. Freud's psychoanalysis follows a similar line of re-examing of traditional philosophical theory and wisdom, and we shall focus on it in our subsequent consideration.

3. The Place of Psychoanalytic Theory and (Para)practice

At the beginning of the paper we assumed that psychoanalysis can be understood both as a symptom and an attempt to resolve the crisis of philosophical culture, i.e. philosophical way of thinking and wisdom. In doing so, we had in mind Freud's original doctrine and not the numerous revisions thereof by theorists of incomparably less philosophical influence, because we consider Freud a thinker who does not fall behind Marx and Nietzsche in his subversive radicalism. The doctrine of this Viennese physician and scientist is characterized by an effort to direct research attention to the this-worldly, rather than to the otherworldly of the traditional philosophy, in the form of naturally-historically founded psychic reality and deep psychic processes, in which the ultimate causes of all forms of human culture are sought, even man's metaphysical ideas and overall philosophical activities directed to making sense of life and achieving life wisdom. According to such an approach, Freud thought that psychoanalysis should be organized following the model of natural sciences, i.e. as a discipline that uses scientific methodology and provides verifiable causal explanations and predictions based on them, while avoiding reliance on intuition or sterile philosophical speculation that does not lead to effective theoretical and practical solutions. Of particular importance for our consideration is the fact that Freud believed that the key to progress in mental health, in that which is synonymous or analogous to wisdom, is not in improving logical relations and argumentation, but in better communicating with unconscious processes.

In the history of philosophy, Freud was remembered as a critic of traditional philosophy and especially of the primacy that it ascribes to consciousness.

Daniel Berthold-Bond notes that Freud mentions philosophy most frequently in the context of his charge that philosophy does undervalue the role of unconsciousness within the psyche (Berthold-Bond 1989: 277). Freud warns us of such an overestimation of consciousness at the expense of unconscious, because "it is much-abused privilege of conscious activity, wherever it plays apart, to conceal every other activity from our eyes" (Freud 1953: 613–614). In this critique of primacy of consciousness Freud's main collaborators are Marx and Nietzsche, whom Paul Ricouer groups together under the title of *hermeneutics of suspicion.* (Ricouer 1970: 32). What they have in common is that they see the true as a kind of lie, that is, that they consider consciousness to be false, which leads them to the problem of Cartesian doubt, The Cartesians doubted that things were as they appear, but they did not doubt that consciousness is such as it appears to itself. However Ricouer points out that Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, although sceptics, are not destroyers (Ricouer 1970: 33). For them, destruction is only a phase that leads to a new creation. With their destructive criticism, but also with their art of interpreting, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud enable a more authentic world. Just as Decartes triumphed over the doubt in things, by proving the existence of consciousness, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud triumphed over the doubt in consciousness by an exegesis of meaning. Starting with them, the role of hermeneutics is no longer a mere spelling out the consciousness meaning, but rather a deciphering of those expressions of consciousness. If consciousness is not that which it was considered to be, then a new relation must be instituted between the patent and the latent, which corresponds to relation that consciousness had instituted between the phenomenal and the noumenal. Because of that Ricouer concludes that the essence of Marx's, Nietzsche's and Freud's thought is in that, against the prejudices of their time, all three of them created a mediate science of meaning, irreducable to immediate conscious meaning. All three of them attempted to make conscious methods of deciphering coincide with the unconscious work of ciphering. (Ricouer 1970: 33–34).

Similarly to Ricouer, Alfred Tauber also thinks that the Cartesian model of psyche still dominates folk beliefs about selfhood. Common sense dictates that reflexivity reveals an inner self-identity, an entity that navigates the world and experiencs, emotions and its environment as a subject. Accordingly, probing of personal thoughts, impressions and feelings through reflexive self-introspection, can lead to a private ego, which, even though elusive, still remains sufficient for capturing some inner essence of identity. From this postulation of self-consciousness as the basis of personhood, it further follows that the mind is distinct from the world, and that this very distinction makes man's self-chosen action in the world radically his own. In this way, the commonplace sense of free will arises from the Cartesian metaphysics of selfhood, per which the mind decides its course in in the world in all respects. Tauber regards precisely this rational, contemplative, interpretative ego, which represents the Cartesian mind, as opposed by Freud's unconscious, which consists of the insticts of brain-states (Tauber 2010: 147).

Katrina Mitcheson points out that not only Freud, but also Nietzsche's warning that mental activity is not synonymous with that which is conscious introduces a problem of self-knowledge into philosophy, because man can no longer take his mental life to be transparent to introspection, but must rather attetempt to decipher this activity by taking the immediatly observable thoughts, feelings and actions as symbols of further non-observable drive activity Therefore, both Nietzsche and Freud employ the notions of interpretation and translation to describe the task of bringing to light the activity of the human drives (Mitcheson 2015: 334).

Brian Leiter comes to the same conclusion by referring to Jonathan Lear, who claims that Freud's philosophical significance consist in the fact that he shows that humans have depth, that they are complex psychological organisms who generate layers of meaning which lie beneath the surface of their own self-understanding. According to Leiter, Freud, like all practitioners of the hermeneutics of suspicion, shows than man is not transparent to himself. Leiter connects this lack of human transparency with Gettier's famous critique of the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, in which he showed that man may possess beliefs that are both justified and true, but without thereby possessing knowledge. A justified true belief does not constitute knowledge when the justification for true belief is not the cause of that belief. Thus,the epistemic status of a belief depends on its etiology. Leiter believes that exactly this discovery is behind Marx's, Nietzsche's and Freud's suspicions. Beliefs with the wrong casual etilogy can be true, but since they not constitute cases of genuine knowledge, there is no reason to presume that to be the case. To the contrary, it is justified to be suspicious of their veristic properties (Leiter 2009: 103–104).

Thus, Freudian psychoanalysis is symptomatic and paradigmatic for examining the crisis of philosophical culture, in the sense that it occupies a very important place in revealing the inability of traditional philosophy to solve the (life) problems it deals with. In this respect, along with the leading minds of his time Freud shared a disappointment in (traditional) philosophy and was prone to setting up high positivist-scientific expectations for the practical application of the results of empirical research, but, at the same time, he differed from his contemporaries in that he did not attribute the key role to rationality or to logical connections of conscious contents when it came to the wise conduct of life. One of the basic points of what may be called *psychoanalytic wisdom* is the tolerance of ambiguity, ambivalence and contradictions, while philosophical wisdom, as well as scientific knowledge, has been inherently, from time immemorial, aimed at eliminating contradictions and ensuring coherence by means of logically valid ordering of thoughts. In fact, Freud considers that philosophy, goes astray in its method by over-estimating the epistemological value of our logical operations (Freud 1964: 160–161). Admittedly, Socrates' wisdom is characterized by self-irony, which includes openness to opposing claims, but in Freud's case it is about something significantly different from methodological irony in order to philosophically lead his interlocutor

to rationally perceive the difference between good and evil, as was the case in the dialogues led by the ancient sage. Contrary to the antique intellectualistic chatter and the art of debating, as well as modern rationalist gradualness in perceiving problems, here focus is on to non-verbal expressions, phantasmagorias and their symptomatic somatization, as well as on free association and logically unfounded leaps in though. The real breakthrough in their processing does not consist of drawing crystal/clear philosophical conclusions, but in achieving cathartic emotional cognition through confrontation with one's own internal conflicts and unsolvable antinomies.

Psychoanalysis reveals the weaknesses of the diachronic and linear way of thinking, a procedure which is predominantly inherent in philosophical discourse, which is expressed by syllogistic or propositional logic, and philosophical construal of wisdom in everyday life, suggesting that by those means, in fact, only false or apparent wisdom of living is achieved. According to Freud's doctrine, mental health requires the affirmation of synchronic, cyclical and multidimensional thinking, thinking in which the clear line between normal and abnormal experience is erased, i.e. the demarcation line between convergent and divergent behaviour in relation to public standards of rationality, which is expressed in today's practical philosophy by modal logic. In this sense, the domain of psychopathology concerns not only psychiatric clinics of closed and open type, but also the daily life of people who do not need any professional help from professional psychotherapist. According to our understanding, the way to avoid the state of the need to use psychiatric and psychoanalytic services requires modifications of traditional wisdom in the conduct of one's own life, a change in direction of listening to that which is not the exclusive dictates of logic and philosophical thinking, but are illogical messages of the unconscious part of one's own being, as well as expressions of the unconscious in the other close persons. This implies that rationally designed and purposeful practice is not sufficient for the wisdom of living, which philosophical culture insist on, but that a quality parapractice is necessary, i.e. to give in to mistakes and participating in such unreasonable and aimless activities through which unconscious contents of experience are spontaneously projected and non-traumatically communicated.

To summarize, the (traditional) philosophical culture is characterized by the immanent of the conscious search for the standards of wise conduct or for mental health, and it concerns the inseparability of consciousness and reasonableness, i.e. inevitability of logical organization and founding of any conscious effort. On the other hand, psychoanalysis provide us not only with a theoretical explanation of this peculiar trap of philosophical rationality, but also by means of its practical dimension with an altogether different a model of wisdom, consisting of openness to parapractice, and to communication with parallel and unconscious contents of human experience. However, the psychoanalytic idea of wise living also has its weak points – which shall be discussed in the following two sections.

4. The Scope of Psychoanalytic Wisdom

Habermas stated that Freud's psychoanalysis is characterized by a discrepancy between its theoretical and practical aspects, i.e. between Freuds's scientific self-understanding and advocacy of natural science methodology in the domain of theory, on the one hand, – and the emphasis upon specific hermeneutics, symbolic interpretation and communicative work at the level of therapeutic practice, on the other. At the same time, Habermas pointed out that the philosophical relevance of psychoanalytic wisdom, consist in enabling of the human progression in self-consciousness and a deepened movement of reflection, by means of the linguistic return of excommunicated psychic contents (Habermas 1971). According to our understanding of the matter, incoherence or inconsistency of this type does not have to be a bad thing in itself, because it can avoid rigidity and self-destructive repressiveness of logical consistency, however it renders the philosophical nature of the overall psychoanalytical way of thinking disputable, i.e. that which connects theory and practice, and goes beyond clinical work. The issue is that self-consciousness is improved not only through philosophy, but also through other forms of cultural life, for example through artistic expression, so it does not follow that psychoanalysis have optimal philosophical potential merely because it is useful for self-reflection. After all, it is indisputable that psychoanalysis in its non-clinical practice is closer to the surrealist art form, than to any form of philosophical wisdom.

The problem is that the psychoanalytic model of thought does not provide a basis for a valid understanding of life, in the form of human self-expression, through artistic practice, i.e. the kind of life that Rorty says erases the distinction between art and morality, and without adequate reflection of which it is not possible to ensure the sustainability of any form of human existence (Rorty 1989). Baudrillard also draws attention to this lack of Freud's doctrine, pointing out that it fails to grasp the qualitative difference between neuroticism and creativity (Baudrillard 2017). In our opinion, unlike scientific and pragmatico-technocratic psychoanalysis, valid and life-giving reflection can be best provided and secured by crisis-modified philosophical culture, which is why we believe we ought to strive for an interdisciplinary alliance of psychoanalytic, artistic and philosophical wisdom. It is a question of the mutual corrective role of the parapractical dimension of the Freudian way of thinking and non-scientific or non-objective contents of philosophical culture, through mediation of non-clinical artistic stylization of psychoanalytic experience and proper philosophical perspective and wise management of such artistic existence. From the perspective of philosophical wondering about the scope of psychoanalytic wisdom, the point is that Freudianism is not fruitful in articulating an adequate broader framework of orientation, which is necessary for human self-consciousness and sustainable wisdom of living.

In his critique of psychoanalysis, Jaspers has convincingly pointed out the shortcomings of the Freudian worldview as well as some of its harmful practical consequences, suggesting in which direction the psychoanalytic way of

thinking and acting should be corrected. One of these weaknesses is of a general nature, founded in *Zeitgeist* of Freud's lifetime and it concerns the fanatical overestimation of the natural and empirical sciences, that is, the expectation that the scientific and technological achievements can replace human subjective and interpersonal efforts aimed at self-construction, and in the future lead to effective solutions to all human problems. A more specific is shortcoming consists in the psychoanalyst's excessive preoccupation with all the details of the analysand's private life, especially those belonging to the domain of sexual experiences, while neglecting his irreducible spiritual needs and experiences of all-encompassing transcendence (Jaspers 1951). We think that in this way the the analysand's harmful preoccupation with themselves is not only encouraged, but that it also creates a false and counterproductive image of cultural creativity as something that does not involve any encounter with transcendence, i.e. as something that is rightly considered only in the form of achieved results within the dynamics of man's internal biopsychological drives and his external natural and socio-historical limitations and influences. All in all, psychoanalysis has made a valuable contribution to the correction of wisdom in the direction of man's consideration of his own inability to base quality of his life on direct consciousness and logic. However, instead of continuing in that direction and cultivate new sense organ for the secret of transcendence, it wrongly redirects human expectations and the pursuit of happiness towards empirical sciences, on the one hand, and towards spiritless game of chance, on the other hand.

Thus, we believe that the potential of psychoanalysis, as a path to wisdom, and its significance for the future lies not in its confinement in within the model of natural sciences, but rather in its openness to cooperation with social sciences and humanities. This potential of psychoanalysis, despite his scientific inclinations, was noticed by Freud himself. For him, the pinnacle of culture is encouragement of man's higher mental activities, that is, science, art, religion and philosophy. However, it is significant that Freud realized that these mental activities are not mutually independent, but are on contrary closely interwoven, because they all arose from the motive of attaining utility and pleasure (Freud 1961: 94). Within this interdisciplinary approach, Freud attaches a special role to psychoanalysis. He regards text-books of psychiatry as not the only place for psychoanalysis, because psychoanalysis is not just one more type of therapy, cause its use for the treatment of neuroses is only one way of its application, which is not even the most important, Psychoanalysis, as a 'depth-psychology', contributed to the solution of the problems of the sciences that are concerned with the evolution of human civilization and its major institutions such as art, religion and social order, and has the potential to make an even greater contribution if historians of civilization, psychologist of religion, philologists, and etc., would educate themselves in the psychoanalytic method. For the sake of that education, they would have to undergo psychoanalysis themselves and within their education less emphasis would be on medical, and more on general education. Because of that Freud emphasizes that psychoanalytic education, alongside depth-psychology, which would always remain the principal

subject, must include both medical (biology, sexology, psychiatry etc.), and non-medical subjects (history of civilization, mythology, psychology of religion and science of literature etc.). That is why he concludes that the curriculum of psychoanalytic education must equally include elements of social sciences, such as psychology, history of civilization and sociology, and elements of natural sciences, such as anatomy, biology, and theory of evolution (Freud: 1959: 246, 248–249, 252)

Based on this text Howard Kaye notes that Freud believed that the most important contribution of psychoanalysis would be made in the social sciences, not in therapy. Calling psychoanalysis an indispensable instrument for sociologist, historian of civilization and a psychologists of religion, Freud expressed his belief that psychoanalysis could provide new insights into the sources of social feeling, the social causes of neuroses, the role of social institutions in the mastery of unsatisfied wishes, and the general nature and the dynamics of culture (Kaye 1991: 102).

Berthold-Bond considers that within this interdisciplinary approach, Freud's view of psychoanalysis, as a mediator between philosophy and medicine, is especially important. Referring to Guntram Knapp, he argues that the role of mediator indicates that psychoanalysis is neither philosophy nor medicine, but that Freud seeks a genuine annulment of philosophy and medicine, in the form of their synthesis which transcends the limitations of both disciplines. In this sense, the "middle position" of psychoanalysis represents the search for a genuinely new form of knowledge of the inner and outer reality of human existence (Berthold-Bond 1989: 277).

A similar point is suggested by Robert Grimwade, who warns that understanding philosophy and psychoanalysis beyond the artificial boundary lines of discipline, requires a philosophy of psychoanalysis and psychoanalysis of philosophy, i.e. something that is neither philosophy nor psychoanalysis, something entirely without borders and oppositions. In other words, it requires *philopsychoanalysis* (Grimwade 2012: 390).

We think that it is necessary to point out that the emergence of psychoanalysis, conceived in this way as an interdisciplinary project, was hinted at even earlier by Nietzsche in the form of his project of *Gay science*. Joshua Dienstag sees Nietzsche's philosophy as a combination of philosophy and medicine. He claims that Nietzsche refers to pessimism as a life-technique with medicinal qualities. In this way, Nietzsche"s philosophy finds itself beneath the universal demands of categorical rationalism but above the wise advice of Galenic medicine (Dienstag 2006: 199). Nietzsche himself warned us that all values and imperatives require psychological and physiological interpretations, as well as medical criticism. Therefore, the problem of morality, that is of values, should concern physiologists and physicians alike, while academic philosophy would be given the role of a mediator who should enable amicable and fruitful exchange of knowledge between philosophy, physiology and medicine (Nietzsche 1967: 55). For these reasons Nietzsche believed that a wise man is needed, which will form a single unified whole consisting science, medicine,

art and ethics. Therfore, Nietzsche is, in a sense awaiting the arrival of the philosopher-physician, whose goal will be total health of the people, of a race, of some period, or of humanity as a whole and who will understand that the subject of philosophy is not truth, but future, health, growth, power, and life (Nietzsche 1974: 35, 173). We believe that such a philosopher-physician actually arrived in the form of psychoanalyst. In this, we agree with Silvia Ons, who claims that Nietzsche is the philosopher closest to psychoanalysis, because he rejects faith in metaphysical philosophy, and places more hope in the doctors of the future than in philosophers. Based on that, she concludes that, although Nietzsche did not know of psychoanalysis, his philosophy had psychoanalysis as its target (Ons 2006: 80).

To conclude – pychoanalytic critique of purposeful rationality has become an important part of today's eclectic and communication-oriented philosophical culture, that is, a component of the new multifaceted understanding of of wisdom, born out from the crisis of traditional philosophy. This does not mean that relying solely on the Freudian way of thinking in pursuit of a wise life would be justified, because Freud's doctrine did not arrive to realisation that in the language of the unconscious there are also non-reductive transcendent contents, and not only biopsychological and socio-historical layers.

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Milanko Govedarica i Aleksandar Prica:

Kriza mudrosti i psihoanaliza

Apstrakt

Tema ovog rada tiče se ispitivanja praktične dimenzije savremene filozofske kulture, kako u odnosu na ideju mudrosti u tradicionalnoj filozofiji, tako i u relaciji prema psihoanalitičkoj praksi. U prvom delu rada određujemo šta je to filozofska kultura, prvenstveno tako što stavljamo naglasak na razlike između nje i naučno-tehnološke kulture. U drugom delu rada pokazujemo na koji način je takva filozofska kultura došla u krizu. U trećem delu rada nudimo izlaz iz te krize u vidu psihoanalize, koja kritikuje primat koji je dotadašnja filozofska kultura davala svesti, logici, dijahronijskom i linearnom načinu mišljenja, ali, još značajnije, nudi jedan alternativni model u odnosu na nju. U četvrtom, poslednjem delu rada, predstavljamo i manjkavosti ovog psihoanalitičkog modela. Kao rešenje, nudimo novi model filozofske kulture, nastao sintezom filozofije, psihoanalize, ali i drugih disciplina ljudskog mišljenja, koji ima sličnosti kako sa Ničeovom anticipacijom *vesele nauke*, tako i sa Jaspersovom idejom transcedencije.

Ključne reči: filozofija, filozofska kultura, mudrost, psihoanaliza, Frojd, hermeneutika sumnje, Niče, Jaspers

Miloš Agatonović

EUTOPIA AND ENGAGEMENT TODAY

ABSTRACT
The contemporary conceptions of universal basic income (by Guy Standing), tax havens extraction (by Gabriel Zucman), and climate emergency (by Christiana Figueres) are briefly presented in the form of exposition in Massive Attack's *Eutopia* EP. These conceptions address the most concerning issues of today's world, while the concept of eutopia, proposed by Massive Attack's Robert Del Naja and Mark Donne, represents "a place of well-being, as a practical aspiration," a realistic utopia in which those issues are resolved. The present paper discusses the conceptions presented in *Eutopia*, assessing the possibility of the materialisation of eutopia. As suggested by Massive Attack, the ideas of *Eutopia* can be traced back to More's *Utopia*, being rooted in a humanistic endeavour of improving humanity, inspiring engagement and search for a better and just society. Apart from discussing *Eutopia*, the paper explores *Another Now*, the political science-fiction novel by Yanis Varoufakis. Varoufakis' critique of capitalism and the alternative he proposes in the novel *Another Now* argue along the same line as *Eutopia*, encouraging engagement in today's world.

I Introduction

Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516) is a remarkable work that describes the fictional commonwealth society of the island of Utopia. It is widely discussed whether *Utopia* provides a positive political and economic content, suggesting and prescribing how an ideal society should be organised, or represents an ironic criticism of certain conceptions of an ideal society. Regardless, the locus of *Utopia* is certainly within the tradition of Renaissance humanism. According to this common approach to *Utopia*, we should interpret it with a consideration of the humanist values and ideals, and the goal of affecting the worldly endeavours and improving humanity.

Today, *Utopia* remains inspiring for the public figures activists such as Robert Del Naja of Massive Attack, a British band from Bristol, and Mark Donne, an independent writer, producer, director, and former journalist of The Guardian,

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The Independent, and Sky News. Del Naja and Donne collaborated on *Euto-pia* EP (2020), together with Guy Standing (a Professorial Research Associate and former Professor of Development Studies at the SOAS University of London), Gabriel Zucman (an Associate Professor of Economics at UC Berkeley), and Christiana Figueres (an internationally recognised leader on global climate change – former Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2010–2016) and an architect of the Paris Agreement (2015)). With *Eutopia,* Del Naja and Donne intend to disseminate the ideas that can be found in *Utopia* in traces – the ideas elaborately argued and firmly supported by the acknowledged experts, concerning *universal basic income* (Standing), *tax haven extraction* (Zucman), and *climate emergency* (Figueres).

The present paper analyses these ideas and assesses their value and the possibility of their materialisation, as well as their engaging potential. The analysis attempts to set these ideas as a part of the context of a critique of contemporary capitalism, which should prepare the ground for developing an alternative system of the post-capitalistic society. Such a critique of capitalism and an alternative to it is figuratively present in Yanis Varoufakis' book *Another Now: Dispatches from an Alternative Present* (Varoufakis 2020a), describing an alternative reality in which there is a human society without hierarchies and wages, based on the democratic decision-making procedures. The present paper shows that all these ideas can be traced back to More's *Utopia*, all of them being rooted in a humanistic endeavour of improving humanity, inspiring engagement and pursuit for a better and just society.

II   The Concepts of Utopia and Eutopia

More coined the word "utopia" (literally meaning – "no place") to designate an imaginary island with the best possible society. Originally, the concept of utopia referred to a fictional place and state, but it has captured people's imagination throughout history, seeking its materialisation. While discussing the complexities of the relation between ideology and utopia, Paul Ricoeur argues that the fantasy of an alternative utopian reality can be used to rethink the nature of our social life, to rethink radically the nature of family, consumption, authority, religion, and so on (Ricoeur 1986: 16). According to Ricoeur, "what is ultimately at stake in utopia is not so much consumption, family, or religion but the use of power in all these institutions" (Ricoeur 1986: 17). Utopia, as an idea, should inspire us to question authority, to ask whether it is possible to live better in a society. Utopia should motivate us to act and seek for all humanity to flourish. Even if it is fiction, as the island of Utopia from More's book is, the idea of a utopia enables us to reflect on our life and reality with a more critical tone. As Ricoeur stated in his *Lectures*: "From this 'no place' an exterior glance is cast on our reality, which suddenly looks strange, nothing more being taken for granted. The field of the possible is now open beyond that of the actual; it is a field, therefore, for alternative ways of living" (Ricoeur 1986: 16).

Some scholars recently argued that More's *Utopia* provides an economic system for a society based on the common property, which could be viable in the sense of productivity and happiness in life (Mangeloja, Ovaska 2019). Such an economic system is based on altruism, families as basic economic units, equal distribution of resources, with the primary goal to satisfy basic needs – food, clothing, and shelter – with additional resources for education, science, health, and national defence. According to Mangeloja and Ovaska, the present-day example of living that approximate *Utopia* can be found among Hutterites, a communal branch of Anabaptists (see "Appendix: The Hutterites" in Mangeloja, Ovaska 2019: 80). The Hutterites have common property, wear simple clothes, share common meals and have strong internal social norms and rules. Their community is mostly self-sufficient because of success in agriculture. Their excess product is traded, and the proceeds are used mostly for agricultural machinery and health related services, which they cannot produce. All children are educated within the community's elementary schools, after which they undertake jobs in the community. Overall, although the Hutterites are deprived of luxury and long-term development, they live a productive and happy life.

Such a conservative non-consumerist utopian society is on the opposite end of the utopian visions that are prevailing today. Today's visions of utopia are closely connected to the growth and development of technology. For Ray Kurzweil, the accelerating progress of technology is the continuation of evolution, which should result in the Singularity – "a future period during which the pace of technological change will be so rapid, its impact so deep, that human life will be irreversibly transformed" (Kurzweil 2005: 24). According to Kurzweil, "this impending Singularity in our future is increasingly transforming every institution and aspect of human life, from sexuality to spirituality" (Kurzweil 2005: 24). Similarly, Max More defined the goal of humanity as transcendence to be "achieved through science and technology steered by human values" (More, Kurzweil 2002, Internet; Kurzweil 2005: 249). A more realistic conception of utopia, related to our present technological capacities, is provided by Eric Schmidt, Google's CEO from 2001 to 2011, and Jared Cohen, the first director of Google Ideas (present Jigsaw LLC). In the book *The New Digital Age* (2013), Schmidt and Cohen argue that the virtual civilisation set on the Internet platform will affect and shape physical civilisations, and vice versa. The result of the interaction between the virtual and physical would be a better world, "more egalitarian, more transparent and more interesting than we can even imagine" (Schmidt, Cohen 2013: 263). However, to make the world better the Internet users have to sacrifice their freedom, in terms of privacy on the virtual platform, as Schmidt and Cohen suggest:

> As in a social contract, users will voluntarily relinquish things they value in the physical world – privacy, security, personal data – in order to gain the benefits that come with being connected to the virtual world. In turn, should they feel that these benefits are being withheld, they'll use the tools at their disposal to demand accountability and drive change in the physical world. (Schmidt, Cohen 2013: 263)

Internet connectivity should help us reach the goals of "economic prosperity, human rights, social justice, education or self-determination" (Schmidt, Cohen 2013: 263). However, it is questionable if we need to relinquish our freedom and privacy for these goals. This promise of the better world of the virtual-physical equilibrium, which demands deprivation of personal privacy, could be a false promise, set to manipulate us and exploit personal data by the big-tech companies or governments. Contrary to Schmidt's and Cohen's utopian vision, Julian Assange warned us: "The advance of information technology epitomized by Google heralds the death of privacy for most people and shifts the world toward authoritarianism" (Assange 2014: 57). We should take seriously Assange's warning, having in mind that Edward Snowden's exposed that Google, among many other Internet companies, was financed by the National Security Agency (NSA) on the mass surveillance program called PRISM (MacAskill 2013, Internet).

Technological conceptions of utopia can be characterised as escapist, which would be "pathological" in Ricoeur's sense of the term. Ricoeur defined the escapist conception of utopia: "This escapism of utopia belongs to a logic of all or nothing. No connecting point exists between the 'here' of social reality and the 'elsewhere' of utopia. This disjunction allows the utopia to avoid any obligation to come to grips with the real difficulties of a given society" (Ricoeur 1986: 17). In addition, narrowing the concept of utopia to some aspect of the possible success of humanity, as the Singularity would be such ultimate success of technological development, ignores some essential human needs and problems of today. Inequality, political and economic instability, ecological and health crises and catastrophes, corruptions of democratic institutions and processes in countries all over the world, mass surveillance of the big-tech companies, big-tech monopolies, etc.

The concept of eutopia, suggested by Del Naja and Donne on *Eutopia*, is defined as "a place of well-being, as a practical aspiration", in contrast to utopia as "an impossible concept",[1] "naïve notions of an ideal, perfect world" (Monroe, Strauss 2020, Internet). The elements and ideas presented on *Eutopia* deal with the "global, structural issues; taking the form of climate emergency, tax haven extraction and Universal Basic Income" (Monroe, Strauss 2020, Internet). The spirit of the *Eutopia* is about "the urgent & practical need to build something better" (Monroe, Strauss 2020, Internet). Thus, building eutopia is a practical necessity of the human society which is at an existential risk: the priority is to deal with climate emergencies to avoid the pollution, destruction, and extinction of the planet's ecosystem; to eliminate tax haven extraction in order to minimise economic and social inequality and injustice; we need to introduce a universal basic income which should bring about greater economic security. All these, when materialised, should converge in a state of eutopia. However, is resolving these issues sufficient for eutopia? This "place of well-being" seems to be a practical but narrow conception of utopia, which is going to be discussed in the following sections of the paper.

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1   Massive Attack's official account on Twitter, @MassiveAttackUK, July 10, 2020.

III   On Universal Basic Income

> It would be far more to the point to provide everyone with some means of live-lihood, so that nobody under the frightful necessity of becoming first a thief and then a corpse. (More 1965: 44) [2]

In *Utopia*, Thomas More described society with basic income, which was the first description of such a society. Satisfying basic needs is a prerequisite for a decent human life, a life worth living as everyone's right. Philippe Van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght, Yanis Varoufakis, Guy Standing, among many other theorists, argue for some sort of universal basic income as a human right. It can be defined as a cash allowance that is distributed individually, regularly, unconditionally, and universally. The main normative function of universal basic income is to eliminate basic economic insecurity.

The primary cause of economic insecurity are the social conditions of the contemporary world dominated by neoliberal policies and globalisation, as anticipated by the thesis of Karl Polanyi's book *The Great Transformation* (1944): "[T]he idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness" (Polanyi 2001: 3). "A stark utopia" of neoliberalism and globalisation leads to evolution of a new class – the *precariat*, a recurrent theme in Standing's work. The precariat is a socio-economic group vulnerable in terms of labour, income, work-based identity (Standing 2009: chapter 4; Standing 2011). With inequality, insecurity, and the growing precariat, social injustice grows. Universal basic income is a social "safety net" that should help to reduce the existing social injustice and prevent future injustice. It should help to eliminate what Standing identifies as the peril of the *eight giants*, eight obstacles to Good Society: (1) inequality, (2) insecurity, (3) debt, (4) stress, (5) precarity, (6) the robot advance, (7) extinction, (8) neo-fascist populism (Standing 2020a: chapter 1).

A global crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic is a catalyst for social injustice and these eight giants, and it is considered being the ninth giant in Standing's exposition in Massive Attack's *Eutopia* EP. This exposition presents the major themes of Standing's theoretical work in a nutshell. The transcription of Standing's exposition is:

> In the past 40 years, in almost every country in the world, the owners of physical, financial, and intellectual property have taken a growing share of the income, while the share going to people reliant on jobs and labour has shrunk. Today, a tiny, obscenely wealthy plutocracy and a well-padded salariat confront a growing precariat. Consisting of millions of people with bits and pieces lives, stagnant and uncertain fluctuating earnings and living on the edge of

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2   Cited in Massive Attack – Massive Attack x Young Fathers featuring Professor Guy Standing, #UNIVERSALBASICINCOME, taken from *Eutopia* EP.

unsustainable debt. Those trends are the result of policy decisions that have made economies and societies more fragile and less resilient to shocks. They have raised eight giants that block the road to a good society: inequality, insecurity, debt, stress, precarity, automation, extinction, and neo-fascist populism. Recurrent pandemics may become a ninth giant. To escape economic slump and tackle the nine giants, everyone needs basic economic security. That is a public good and it would improve public health. A modest regular basic income paid to all individuals as a right, without condition, would also boost demand for basic goods & services, kick-starting the real economy. It could be clawed back from the wealthiest through the tax system. While no panacea, a basic income as a right would rescue millions from economic hardship, curbing homelessness, suicides, and starvation. It would strengthen resilience, helping people to cope with shocks and setbacks better, and it would aid recovery by giving people the ability and confidence to spend. It would also be a much fairer use of public resources than the current morass of selective schemes. Longer term, experiments in various countries have shown that basic income security leads to better health, reduced debt, more productive work, improved status for women, and more harmonious family relationships. And it is affordable, especially if funded by eco-taxes and national capital funds. It can and must be done. (Standing 2020b, Internet)[3]

Standing's views on universal basic income should be understood as a part of the context of his critique of the contemporary capitalism, which he describes as "rentier capitalism" (Standing 2016). Here, capitalists are essentially rentiers who gain income from possession or control of assets, physical, financial, and "intellectual" property. For example, high tech companies, such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon, use their digital platforms as rentier entities. By controlling technological apparatus, they act as labour brokers in order to collect a percentage from all activities on their platforms. The capital market of the digital platforms is closed except for the elite and plutocracy. Taskers hired by the platforms are perceived as independent contractors, and so they are not covered by the law and not entitled to certain benefits and safeguards, making them a part of the precariat. In that way, rentier capitalism of the digital platforms companies generates social inequality and insecurity.

The "euthanasia of the rentier" is a part of a strategy to reduce social income inequality, as Standing quotes John Maynard Keynes (Standing 2016: chapter 2). According to Standing (Standing 2016: chapter 8), the precariat should lead a revolt against rentier capitalism, since it is the group that is most disadvantaged by rentier capitalism. To achieve the "euthanasia of the rentier", we need to build a novel distribution system. Standing proposes the taxation of rental income that would be collected in a sovereign wealth fund, and from there redirected for distribution to all citizens. Other schemes, such as profit sharing, do not have the redistributive potential of the sovereign wealth fund. Profit-sharing schemes benefit the elite and salariat more than the low-paid.

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3   Massive Attack – Massive Attack x Young Fathers featuring Professor Guy Standing, #UNIVERSALBASICINCOME, taken from *Eutopia* EP.

The optimal distribution system would be a system of "social dividend" (see Standing 2016: chapter 8; Standing 2019; Standing 2020a).

Still, financing of universal basic income is open to debate. Yanis Varoufakis (2016, Internet) provides an alternative perspective on funding of universal basic income: it should be funded from the return of the capital. Varoufakis' argument is that wealth results from collective activity, but it is privatised by those with power to do so. For example, Google's income is because of big data collected on its Internet platform, which is extracted and analysed in order to create assets and attract capital. This big data results from collective activity of users of Google's platform, which is privatised by Google thanks to its control over technological apparatus. Varoufakis proposed to create a "simple policy" to "enact legislation requiring that a percentage of capital stock (shares) from every initial public offering be channelled into a Commons Capital Depository, with the associated dividends funding a universal basic dividend" (Varoufakis 2016, Internet). Therefore, by applying the policy, Google and other rentier platform companies would provide shares that would pay for the universal basic dividend.

IV   On Tax Havens

> No living creature is naturally greedy except from the fear of want – or in the case of human beings, from vanity, notion that you're better than people if you can display more superfluous property than they can. (More 1965: 80)[4]

Erasmus of Rotterdam, who was a friend of Thomas More, says that like the Utopians, More prefers "to dress simply and does not wear silk or purple or gold chains, excepting where it would not be decent not to wear them" (Logan 1983: 11). Like Utopians, too, he is averse to "cards and gambling, and the other games with which the ordinary run of men of rank are used to kill time", and also like them, he is "otherwise... by no means averse to all sources of innocent pleasure, even to the appetite" (Logan 1983: 11). In *Utopia*, More presented a society of the simple people whose consumption is limited to necessities, although exaggerating and ridiculing some aspects of their way of life. Every citizen of Utopia was guaranteed the equal ration of basic goods and necessities, while the entire society is thriving on the altruistic goals and the welfare of the rest of humanity, prohibiting accumulation of private property. In that regard, Utopians live a simple but happy and productive life. In the closing remarks in *Utopia*, Raphael Hythlodaeus states that "the Utopian way of life provides not only the happiest basis for a civilized community, but also one which, in all human probability, will last forever. They've eliminated the root-causes of ambition, political conflict, and everything like that" (More 1965: 131).

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4   Cited in Massive Attack – Massive Attack x Saul Williams featuring Professor Gabriel Zucman, #TAXHAVENS, taken from *Eutopia* EP.

In contrast to the Utopian economy, capitalism is based on the self-interest of individuals competing for the property. Individuals, and companies likewise, will choose to maximise preferences fulfilment and minimise risks and costs. While accumulating capital, both individuals and companies are trying to minimize taxes, and the best way to do it is to evade taxes altogether. And this is *raison d'être* of tax havens: to evade taxation by moving the accumulated wealth to the locations with minimal levies. However, tax havens are the prevalent factor in the crisis of capitalism, which generates social injustice and inequality. So, to reduce social injustice and inequality, we need to eliminate tax havens. In *The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens*, Gabriel Zucman explains the financial significance of tax havens in today's world economy, providing a precise and realistic prescription of what should be done to stop tax evasion (Piketty 2015: vii). According to Zucman, tax evasion can be stopped only "if we have statistics to measure it, to implement proportional penalties against the countries that facilitate it, and to monitor progress" (Zucman 2015: 3). Touching on the major themes in his work on tax havens, Zucman's exposition in *Eutopia* discuss tax havens evasion in the COVID-19 crisis, as given in the following transcription:

> The international tax haven system syphons off 700 billion dollars in profit each year from sovereign states. Even in normal economic times, the damage to those countries is extraordinary. Countries like Britain, France, Germany, and Nigeria lose 20% of their corporate tax revenues to these offshore secrecy jurisdictions. In the year approaching the COVID-19 outbreak, close to 60% of U.S. multinationals foreign profits were booked in tax havens. Profits moving to these havens are totally artificial. There's very, very little real economic activity in tax havens. The economic and thus social scarring of this pandemic is without modern precedent. So, how do we end tax haven extraction in a time of emergency? First, we should publicly highlight that big multinationals have a tax deficit. The tax deficit is the difference between what a corporation should pay if it were subject to a minimum tax rate of say 25% in each country where it operates and what this company actually pays. Second, countries must collect this tax deficit. To do so, we can simply look at what sales are actually made. When this company makes 10% of its sales in Britain, then Britain collect 10% of their tax deficit. We don't even need a global agreement to end tax havens. Any single country can unilaterally decide to collect the tax deficit of tax-dodging multinationals today. If several nations join forces as nations like France, Denmark & Poland effectively have, in barring companies registered in tax havens from state bailouts, this could be enough to render tax havens useless for major companies. And collecting the tax deficit of giant multinationals would be vital to treasuries and public services now on course for colossal strain. (Zucman 2020, Internet)[5]

Because of the devastating economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemics, the focal interest of Zucman's exposition is tax evasion of big multinational

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5   Massive Attack – Massive Attack x Saul Williams featuring Professor Gabriel Zucman, #TAXHAVENS, taken from *Eutopia* EP.

companies, since they have the largest earnings while they evade fair taxes. In the time of global crisis such as the COVID-19, it is a tragedy of the commons that the multinationals make a lot and do not pay fairly, while the rest have a tremendous loss because they have to pay more instead. Taxes evaded by the multinationals, or by any company or individual, are "compensated for by higher taxes on the law-abiding, often middle-class households in the United States, Europe, and developing countries" (Zucman 2015: 2). So, in *The Hidden Wealth of Nation,* Zucman proposes a set of measures aimed at collecting precise information about worldwide tax evasion and a course of action to retrieve most of the unpaid taxes. For the precise statistics, we need to create "a worldwide register of financial wealth" (Zucman 2015: 4). And to retrieve unpaid taxes, Zucman proposes "to levy sanctions proportional to the costs that tax havens impose on other countries" (Zucman 2015: 5). As it is shortly mentioned in Zucman's exposition in *Eutopia*, the profits of multinational companies should be merged worldwide in order to derive the taxation they should pay, because they manipulate the locations of their profits. In *The Hidden Wealth of Nation,* Zucman clearly and carefully describes the strategies of the manipulations (Zucman 2015: chapter 5).

Eliminating tax havens should help eliminate the greed of the wealthiest, which is a root-cause of financial injustice and inequality in today's world. However, tax havens are not the only problem of today, although it is important to solve it on the global scale if we want to live in a just world.

V   On Climate Emergency

> There is never any shortage of horrible creatures who prey on human beings, snatch away their food or devour whole population; but examples of wise social planning are not easy to find. (More 1965: 40.)[6]

There have always been existential threats to humanity, the global human-caused crises or natural catastrophes. However, our choices and actions are only concerned with the problems in the realm of human affairs, which are entwined with nature. Since global natural processes, such as climate change, are affecting all aspects of human life, the present and future living conditions, climate change should be recognised as the primary issue. In the book *The Future We Choose: Surviving the Climate Crisis* (2020), Christiana Figueres and Tom Rivett-Carnac state that "climate change is the mother of all issues", and all who care about social justice, health, economic stability and investment value, and intergenerational justice, climate change should concern them (Figueres, Rivett-Carnac 2020: introduction). In the *Eutopia* exposition on the climate emergency, Christiana Figueres discusses the COVID-19 crisis as a part of the ongoing crises:

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6   Cited in Massive Attack – Massive Attack x Algiers featuring Christiana Figueres, #CLIMATEEMERGENCY, taken from Eutopia EP.

Before the COVID-19 crisis crashed into our world, governments were already facing the convergence of the climate crisis, the inequality crisis and the oil price crisis. Now, the fourth, the global health crisis has not only converged on us as well but has accelerated the impacts of the previous crises, deepening economic disorder and accentuating social suffering. In emerging from this, everyone can play their part, individually and collectively. The future we choose should be one of resilience, starting with aligning the food system to the four principles set out by the F.A.O: availability, access, utilization and stability. Energy is another sector that must be transformed. Well before COVID-19, fossil fuels were already showing signs of irreversible decline. They will recover somewhat from the historically low prices, but they will not recover their previous place as the engine of growth and development. We now know that their use is polluting our lungs and loading our atmosphere, both at life-threatening levels. Financing the transition to a clean, healthy economy requires that businesses, investors, and citizens each play their part alongside governments. Governments can be excellent first movers and their development finance institutions often are. There has never been a more critical role for them than now. The social fabric of our world, the health of democracies and the well being of people can either be destroyed or made stronger by a crisis such as the one we are living. We need to choose this crisis as the moment to anchor ourselves back into the reason humans live in collectives. We are stronger and more resilient together. We will need this solidarity to face what's ahead. Rise to the crises and thrive beyond them. It's a unique privilege that our generation can forge a healthy, bustling future through our actions today. The future we choose is in the hands of each of us alive right now. (Figueres 2020, Internet)[7]

The keyword in the exposition is "resilience". Dealing with the climate emergency and other related issues, we should develop resilience in terms of individual health, clean and healthy economy, and health of democracies. We cannot resolve the issues concerning health, economic stability, and social justice without resolving the climate change issue. According to the view from *The Future We Choose* (Figueres, Rivett-Carnac 2020: chapter 4), "systemic change is a deeply personal endeavor": to change the social or economic system we are part of, we must change our understanding of these systems. The transformation of society begins with the individual, but addressing climate change is the responsibility of every individual and every collective. The governments should not let the status quo continue, but help to solve the urgent issues of the contemporary world.

However, global climate emergency may not be a burning issue for the developing world, which deals with the high poverty, economic vulnerability, grid stability issues, etc. The primary issues for the developing countries may not be a reduction of carbon emissions and transition to a clean economy, being too expensive or unobtainable for them. So, Figueres' "systemic change" does not appeal to the individuals and collectives, such as those of the developing world, that are powerless and hopeless in the global society of today.

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7   Massive Attack – Massive Attack x Algiers featuring Christiana Figueres, #CLIMATEEMERGENCY, taken from *Eutopia* EP.

VI   A Critique of Capitalism and an Alternative in *Another Now*

Today's climate emergency should be understood as capitalism-induced. The priority of capitalism is economic growth and development, while it disregards its catastrophic effects on the environment. The political science-fiction novel *Another Now* by Varoufakis points out that share market and technology developed and created together "the Technostructure", changing their environment at the same time. "Technostructure" is the term borrowed from John Kenneth Galbraith, referring to the organization which "embraces all who bring specialized knowledge, talent or experience to group decision-making" (Galbraith 2007: 120). A paradigmatic example of a technostructure is today's big-tech corporations such as Google, Amazon, or Facebook, which Varoufakis has in mind when speaking of the Technostructure in *Another Now*. Because these big-tech corporations own the markets on their platforms, capitalism has morphed into what Varoufakis calls "technofeudalism" (Varoufakis 2021, Internet). The metamorphosis of capitalism into technofeudalism Varoufakis defines as "a qualitative transformation of capitalism into a brand new exploitative mode of production" (Varoufakis, Morozov 2022, Internet). The technostructures of the big-tech dominate the market economy, controlling political processes in their interest, while environmental and social crisis are out of control. Therefore, the crisis of contemporary capitalism leads to a crisis of democracy, as well as to climate and social crisis.

To address all these crises, we need to embrace engagement at many levels. In *Another now*, Varoufakis describes one course of action which could lead to a breakdown of capitalism. According to the storyline of the novel, the techno-rebels contact households and invite them to take part in low-cost short-term payment strikes. Those techno-rebels use the strategy known as crowd-sourcing, which cause numerous short-squeezes and lead to the collapse of the financier. An analogous action occurred in reality when the trading platform Robinhood App pushed up the price of the electronics shop GameStop in order to make the hedge funds lose (see Varoufakis 2021, Internet; Varoufakis, Morozov 2022, Internet). The number of hedge funds had bet on GameStop to lose value, but few millions of people bought shares in GameStop causing a short-squeeze, raising GameStop's share price substantially while the hedge funds were forced to buy their shares to forestall greater losses.

Compared to Occupy Wall Street, giving rise to a much wider Occupy movement in the United States and other countries, the techno-rebels' actions in *Another Now* strive to ossify capitalism as the global economic system. Besides the actions similar to the GameStop, the techno-rebels organise mass consumer strikes, targeting the big-tech companies. For example, one of the techno-rebel's leader issues a global call to boycott Amazon, which causes a drop in Amazon's usual revenues, and encouraged by their success, the techno-rebels embark on many more campaigns of widening scope. While these strikes are a part of *Another Now* fiction, in the actual reality, workers, activists, and citizens around the world joined forces to demand justice from Amazon, forming a planetary

movement MakeAmazonPay. On Black Friday, Friday 27th of November 2020, in the name of the MakeAmazonPay campaign, Varoufakis called for a global boycott of Amazon only for that day. According to Varoufakis, this small activism would translate into a tremendous blow for Amazon, even if it caused a small dent in Amazon's revenues (Varoufakis 2020b, Internet). MakeAmazonPay movement, just like the techno-rebels from *Another Now*, embraced digital platforms as an instrument to fight social injustice that was increased by technological innovations.

The novel technological devices used for the big-tech platforms rely on infrastructure and components that were originally developed owing to a government grant or through the commons of ideas produced collectively. This technology enables the existence of digital platforms and big-tech companies, making the information flowing on those platforms be a new kind of capital. Information is a collective product, having a value in the context of the platform and in relation to the user who produces it. Big-tech appropriated this socially produced capital, paying no dividends to society. In *Another Now* and elsewhere (Varoufakis 2016, internet; Varoufakis 2018, internet), Varoufakis proposes the idea of universal basic dividend as compensation for society's investment in corporations' capital. The shares from every initial public offering should be channelled into a Commons Capital Depository, with the associated dividends funding the universal basic dividend.

As an alternative to capitalism, Varoufakis proposes an anarcho-syndicalist model of corporate organisation, which replaces corporate hierarchies with decentralised systems based on equal rights and the principle of one person one vote. Each employee-partner has the right to a single non-tradable share, and the right to vote in the corporation's general assemblies. Hence, there are no wages since the employees are also the corporation owners, getting the profits from their shares, and there are no bosses since decisions are made democratically by the vote of the corporation employees. Also, there are no share markets since shares are non-tradable. The implications of this model without share markets are lower income inequality and democratisation in decision-making that favours collective, long-term interests.

However, this anarcho-syndicalist model is reminiscent of Yugoslav self-managing socialism, which was inefficient for many practical reasons. In the Yugoslav economic system, workers were supposed to manage the economy through workers' councils; in actuality, all significant decisions were made by the "directors" appointed by the politicians. The Yugoslav model that was supposed to be a democratic and decentralised system became politically controlled and centralised in practice.

VII Conclusion

Robert Nozick proposed the following thought experiment as a test for the best world imaginable:

> Imagine a possible world in which to live; this world need not contain everyone else now alive and it may contain beings who have never actually lived. Every rational creature in this world you have imagined will have the same rights of imagining a possible world for himself to live in (in which all other rational inhabitants have the same imagining rights, and so on) as you have. The other inhabitants of the world you have imagined may choose to leave it and inhabit a world of their own imagining. You may choose to leave an imagined world, now without its emigrants. This process goes on; worlds are created, people leave them, create new worlds, and so on. Will this process go on indefinitely? (Nozick 1974: 299)

This process goes on until we reach a stable world. In the stable worlds, if there are any, none of the inhabitants can imagine an alternative world in which they would rather live. A world from which any rational inhabitant may leave is called *association* (Nozick 1974: 299). Nozick's thought experiment is a *framework for utopia*, as he would say (Nozick 1974: chapter 10). This thought experiment assumes the freedom to leave any world for any other world an inhabitant would like, analogous to the freedom to leave one state and go to another in the actual reality (Cekić 2016: 143). However, this is not the freedom that most people of the actual world possess. The recent European migrant crises show the hardship of the asylum seekers and immigrants striving to reach the developed Western world.

Assuming that people can choose the world in which they would live, Nozick's framework of utopia can be useful for assessing the conceptions of utopia, such as the one proposed in Massive Attack *Eutopia* EP, as well as other conceptions mentioned in the present paper. We can ask, would the rational inhabitants of the eutopia world rather live in some other "association"? Would they leave the eutopia world, the world with a universal basic income and without tax havens, with a healthy and clean economy and without climate emergency? Without more specifics about the eutopia world, it is impossible to answer the question. The actual world we live in would certainly be better if it were a eutopia, for social income inequality and instability, injustice caused by tax havens extraction, and climate emergency are the threatening issues of today's world. However, there are some unraised issues that the *Eutopia* ideas entail: is universal basic income affordable only through taxation? Is the redistribution of wealth through taxation justified? How can economies of developing countries make the shift to a clean economy? The world in which some people work hard and pay taxes, while others do not work by choice and enjoy the benefits that came from taxation of those who work, would be unjust (see Varoufakis 2016, Internet). Such a world would not be a "stable association". If we would live in a world of a clean economy, with a preserved and

healthy environment, on a global scale, in which developing countries would have to sacrifice their development for a global cause, it would be a world of even greater injustice and inequality. In such a world, people of developed countries would live prosperously and healthily, while most inhabitants of developing countries would still suffer and struggle, living in poverty and insecurity. A clean economy is not the universal *deus ex machina* that resolves all the problems of living conditions. It is usually too expensive and insufficiently productive for sustainable economic development.

Despite the possible gloomy consequences of the solutions Massive Attack's *Eutopia* proposes, it intends to empower us to act, to change the world for the better. Furthermore, Massive Attack acts upon the ideas of *Eutopia*: in collaboration with Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Massive Attack explores possibilities for reducing emissions associated with live music touring, intending to develop "a roadmap for the wider live music sector to support delivery of emissions reductions in line with the UN Paris Agreement" (Jones, McLachlan, Mander 2021: 4). Massive Attack has designed emissions reduction modules for their 2022 tour, "to trial implementation and carry out modelling on interactive practicalities, and to then bring all project learning together in a major UK testbed live show to proliferate change" (Tyndall, Internet).

Overall, Massive Attack and *Eutopia* provide the ideas backed up by theoretical expertise and political and social activism. However, *Eutopia* does not provide a well-rounded theory, which indeed cannot be expected from such material. Although it represents an unfinished and narrow conception of realistic utopia, it suggests many paths to the future of human society, while striving for, again to cite Sir Thomas More, "the Utopian way of life", eliminating "the root-causes of ambition, political conflict, and everything like that" (More 1965: 131). *Eutopia* should be regarded as a political unfinished sympathy towards social justice and well-being that can motivate engagement and make a better world, a world closer to the ideal of utopia.

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Miloš Agatonović

Eutopija i angažovanost danas

Apstrakt

Savremene koncepcije univerzalnog osnovnog prihoda (Gaj Stending), poreskih rajeva (Gabrijel Zukman) i klimatskog vanrednog stanja (Kristijana Figeres) kratko su predstavljene u formi izlaganja u EP *Eutopia* muzičkog sastava Massive Attack. Ove koncepcije odnose se na najzabrinjavajuće probleme današnjeg sveta, pri čemu pojam eutopije, koji predlažu Robert Del Naja iz Massive Attack i Mark Don, predstavlja „mesto blagostanja i praktične aspiracije", odnosno, realističnu utopiju u kojoj su spomenuti problemi razrešeni. U ovom radu se raspravlja o koncepcijama iz *Eutopia*, uz procenu mogućnosti ostvarenja eutopije. Kao što Massive Attack u naznakama nagoveštava, ideje iz *Eutopia* mogu se pronaći u Morovoj *Utopiji*, delu koje je utemeljeno u humanističkom poduhvatu poboljšanja čovečanstva, koje nadahnjuje angažovanost i potragu za boljim i pravednijim društvom. Pored razmatranja ideja iz *Eutopia*, u radu se razmatra *Drugo sada*, politički roman naučne fantastike Janisa Varufakisa. Varufakisova kritika kapitalizma i predlog alternative u *Drugom sada* polaze od ideja koje su slične onima iz *Eutopia*, ohrabrujući angažovanost u današnjem svetu.

Ključne reči: *Utopija* Tomasa Mora, angažovanost, *Eutopia* Massive Attack, roman Janisa Varufakisa *Drugo sada*

IV

CARRIED OVER
PRENESENO

Lara Končar[1]

ON THE SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND THE EXPERIENCES OF FEMALE SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS IN CONTEMPORARY SERBIA. ARE THERE ELEMENTS OF STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE?[2]

ABSTRACT
The paper examines the socioeconomic status and experiences of women employed as seasonal agricultural workers, indicating the elements of structural and other forms of violence to which they are exposed. As a form of employment, seasonal work has been legally defined in Serbia only since 2018, and it remains a partially regulated sector marked by different forms of social exclusion. Feminist (anthropological) literature dealing with the gender aspect of seasonal agricultural work in different parts of the world has pointed to the serious problem of inequality and social marginalisation. The analysis of social, economic, cultural, legal and other structures involved in the organisation and control of these job positions, as well as the work process itself, has helped identify the ways in which the unequal status of female seasonal workers continues to be (re)produced and sustained, which leads to the question of structural violence against this category of women.

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ABSTRACT *(CONTINUED)*

In the first part of the paper I address the question of socioeconomic status of women in the sector of agriculture – seasonal workers primarily, relying on the general conclusions of the existing research on the status of women in the labour market in Serbia.

There I point to the elements of (re)production of their systemic inequality and institutional exclusion. In the second part I address the lived experience of these women, pointing to the ways in which social and economic structures, their actors and cultural patterns shape the practices and (gender) relations within seasonal labour, based on the qualitative analysis of the material collected in semi– structured and informal interviews conducted with women employed as seasonal agricultural workers. The paper is based on the assumption that the analyses of institutional framework and economic perspectives – important as they are – fail to address the sociocultural disposition of women for seasonal work, as well as the conditions and organisation of the work process, thus leaving unobserved the gender division of labour and various forms of gender based violence.

Introduction

Until 2018 seasonal work in Serbia was poorly regulated by existing laws. This is not to say that such work was entirely outside the legal framework, but rather that the laws did not properly cover the specificities and nature of seasonal work. According to available statistical analysis, "data categorized by employment sector indicate that agriculture had a high proportion of low paid and unpaid work, as well as low-productivity jobs" (Bradaš 2017: 4), with a high rate of informal employment. In terms of the gender division across employment sectors, 16.2% of working women have jobs in agriculture, compared to 20.5% of the male workforce, making agriculture a "male" employment sector (Pantović et al. 2017: 10–11). A quick survey of statements given to the media by experts in political economy and labor law (cf. Pantović et al. 2017; Bradaš 2017; Reljanović 2019; Urdarević et al. 2019) clearly demonstrates the problems in studying the activity of women workers employed seasonally, since agricultural workers (of both genders) often operate on the informal labor market. Until 2018, the number of agricultural workers employed seasonally was estimated to be between 60,000 and 150,000, with women comprising the majority (Karovski 2016).[3] The absence of a law that specifically regulated seasonal work in agriculture, that is, being only partially institutionally regulated, meant that workers had less control over their jobs, reduced ability to call on labor law, as well as limited access to public goods and services, healthcare and social security, and indeed the inability to form a union (ROZA – Association for Women's Labor Rights 2016; Reljanović 2019). However, in 2018, a law on seasonal employment was passed, which sought to suppress the "informal economy" and working

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3   Karovski, Tatjana (2016), "Sezonski rad između crnog i crnjeg tržišta", *Mašina* 25 November 2016; available at: http://www.masina.rs/?p=3582

"under the table" (National Employment Agency 2017).[4] According to official statistics, the number of people who registered as seasonal workers through the official electronic registration portal in 2019 was around 27,000 (eKapija 2020).[5] Although this number itself does not tell us much about the total number of seasonally employed persons in agricultural jobs, the newly-passed law could potentially allow for better understanding and study of the number of women employed seasonally, as well as a gender-based analysis of the issue.

Unfortunately, studies specifically dedicated to the issue of women seasonal workers in agriculture in Serbia are rare. Rather, these women's socio-economic status must be studied through qualitative analyses of women on the labor market in general. Such studies note that a large number of women associated with agriculture are in a position of associate unpaid members of a household (SeCons 2008), or else are in an unstable position, categorized as "precariously employed", due to which they engage in informal seasonal work, meaning that they relinquish their labor rights (Pantović et al. 2017). The academic literature in Serbian that looks at the position of women seasonal workers in agriculture is in the field of political economy, along with statistical analyses and reviews of public policy (cf. Pantović et al. 2017; Bradaš 2017). And although they do not explicitly look at the position of seasonally employed women, such studies nevertheless reveal the structural and institutional inequalities, as well as the difficulties of studying the position of working women. As Avlijaš points out, the unfavorable position that emerges from econometric studies in various countries, shows that institutional context is crucial. This has, in turn, led to academic interest in the impact of public and government policy on socio-economic outcomes – which, however, are often impossible to analyze statistically (Avlijaš 2017: 28). Although the present research does not deal in detail with public policy or mechanisms for the recognition and regulation of seasonal work, the lack of legal clarity and an absence of qualitative studies have provided impetus and inspiration for the examination of the gender dimension of seasonal work from an anthropological perspective. That is to say, this text begins with the premise that analyses of the institutional framework and economic circumstances, for all their importance, are insufficient to capture the sociocultural conditions driving women into seasonal work, as well as the working conditions, organization of labor, dynamics of the work itself, and of course the gender division of work and various form of gender-based violence.

This text considers the socio-economic position and experiences of women seasonally employed in agricultural work. In its analysis, the text takes a twofold approach. First, by drawing on feminist authors from sociology and (economic) anthropology whose research has been conducted in other parts of the world,

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4   Nacionalna služba za zapošljavanje (2017), "Povećanje prilika za zapošljavanje se-zonskih radnika", available at: http://www.nsz.gov.rs/live/info/vesti/pove_anje_pri-lika_za_zapo_ ljavanje_sezonskih_radnika.cid39867 (last viewed 1 December 2017).
5   eKapija (2020), "U 2019. prijavljeno 27.000 sezonaca u poljoprivredi", 3 February 2020; available at: https://www.ekapija.com/news/2773792/u-2019-prijavlje-no-27000-sezonaca-u-poljoprivredi

I seek to illuminate the various levels of systemic and institutional exclusion of women working seasonally. For clearer contextualization, in the section "Seasonal work in Serbia: normative and legal framework", I consider the official government statements, press releases, and legal sources, as a brief overview into the process of adopting the law dedicated to seasonal work and to explain the legal framework that regulates seasonal work in agriculture in Serbia. This is important, as I consider official government strategy and labor law that defines seasonal work significant for understanding the status of women in agriculture, in particular when we consider that this form of employment is regulated differently in different countries. Or, to draw on conclusions by authors who deal explicitly with the topic of seasonal work in agriculture from a gender perspective: studying the position of women in seasonal work depends to a great extent on the structure of agricultural production across all levels, from the global to the national and local (cf. Collins 1993; Barrientos et al. 1999; Barrientos, Perrons 1999; Ortiz 2002; Barrientos et al. 2004; Ortiz, Aparicio 2006; Collins, Krippner 1999). Second, due to the absence of Serbian literature that deals specifically with women seasonally employed in agriculture, I interpret their position drawing on general insights about the position of working women in Serbia in general. To elucidate the ways cultural forms, social and economic structures shape working conditions, processes, practices, and (gender) relations of seasonal work, I submit the stories of women seasonal workers about their own socio-economic reality and lived experiences in the course and about seasonal work. Thus, deploying a qualitative analysis of collected findings in the course of conversation with women workers, their insights and descriptions of living and working conditions, I am seeking to examine whether they are exposed to elements of structural (or other forms) of violence, as well as show that the gender aspect of seasonal work in agriculture must be understood by looking at the socio-cultural and economic conditions, processes, and relations that constitute and (re)produce these women's unfavorable position in today's Serbia.

To better explain the subject of research, I would like to offer a brief explanation of the concept of structural violence. I consider this important to understand the (local) circulation of women on the labor market and the lived experience of women seasonal workers. Although there is no consensus in the literature regarding a definition of violence, in the late 1960s, early 1970s, there was understanding in theory that violence cannot be reduced to physical violence, but must be understood as a complex, multivalent phenomenon (Babović 2015: 332). In the late sixties, a particular concept was used to recognize, examine, and analyze various forms of violence,[6] among which Galtung distinguishes structural violence, which he understands as a type of social relation and influence that excludes various social groups, preventing them from fulfilling their "potential" (Galtung 1969). Structural violence is a form of violence embedded

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6   For an overview of "supertypes" of power and definitions of violence, see: Babović, Marija (2015), "Teorijski i istraživački pristupi u proučavanju strukturnog, kulturnog i direktnog nasilja", *Sociologija* LVII (2): 331–352.

in various social structures, which manifests as unequal distribution of power and life opportunities (Galtung 1969; Farmer 2004). It is mostly indirect, "Silent, invisible" (Galtung 1969: 173), and is used to study social oppression that is expressed in the experiences of persons living in poverty or marginalized in some other way (Farmer 2004: 307). Yet, in this text, I go a step further, focusing on gender-based violence, which, in the broadest sense, must be understood as the intertwinement of interpersonal and structural violence, that is, a relation among various forms of violence (physical, psychological, economic, etc.) of men over women, and the institutional and structural conditions that sustain gender inequality, thus "enabling" such violent practices. In other words, no form of violence against women can be separated from structural violence; while structural violence must be understood as a form of systemic inequality or institutional exclusion that keeps women in a subservient position, either within family structures, households, or the community (Manjoo 2011: 7–8).

Finally, structural and other forms of violence manifest (and are recognized) differently in different periods, national and local contexts. Thus, the socio-economic position and experiences of women employed in agricultural work needs to be understood within the economic, social, and political transformations that have taken place in recent decades in Serbia. Postsocialist transformations – in which the economy 'shifted' from socialist to capitalist and neoliberal – have resulted in new forms of social, economic, political, and cultural relations. Anthropological studies of postsocialist societies have attempted to interpret and describe this "shift" through the concept of "transformation", rather than "transition",[7] in order to develop a "sensitivity" to certain questions and issues, such as privatization and other forms of property transformation, the transformation of a state-owned economy into a market one, political liberalization, and establishment of a system based on the rule of law and respect of human rights (Erdei 2007: 78–80). Although this text does not address these transformations, they are an important context for the understanding of structural conditions that emerge around agricultural work, understanding relations, connections, organizations, and definitions of seasonal work.

Women Working in Agriculture, an Overview

In the introduction of "Labouring in the Factories and in the Fields", Sutti Ortiz points out that economic anthropologists from the 1960s and 1970s were more concerned with questions of work and social relations in factories, with less attention paid to paid work in fields. Said focus issued from a conceptual separation of the urban and rural, with these studies generally neglecting how work was structured in agriculture (Ortiz 2002: 395). In the eighties, however, there was a turn in the academic literature (as well as in anthropology itself),

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7   On the ideological "shades" of the term "transition" and the analytical potential of the term "transformation", see: Erdei, Ildiko (2007) "Dizmenzije ekonomije: prilog promišljanju privatizacije kao socio-kulturne transformacije", in Vladimir Ribić (ed.), *Antropologija postsocijalizma*, Belgrade: Srpski genealoški centar, pp. 76–127.

with the topic of industry and its orientation towards profit becoming an important framework also for understanding employment relations in agriculture (Ortiz 2002: 396). With the backdrop of globalization and market liberalization, Barrientos et al. (2004) also looked at the transformations of work and its dynamics in both factories and in agriculture, with special attention given to processes of production globalization, fragmentation and decentralization of markets, as well as at the flexibilization of work, which resulted in a greater influx of women into these kinds of jobs. What these texts have in common is that studies of agricultural work were no longer exclusively reserved for the "rural context," but had become global market processes and structures, which was crucial for understanding seasonal work and its organization. Further, the larger number of women entering the agricultural job market had a paradoxical effect to the type of employment's socio-economic reality: although increasingly women took paid positions in agriculture, these jobs – all across the world – resulted in lower wages and temporary employment (Barrientos, Perrons 1999).

Following global trends, one of the main aspects of employing women is the flexibilization of work. "Women in particular often face informal employment, and as a result lack employment rights and benefits and have to cope with highly insecure work" (Barrientos et al. 2004: 10). However, as Standing explains (1999), the traditional division of formal and informal forms of work, manifested in formal and informal job sectors, becomes less and less significant in a contemporary context, as the fragmentation of the market and flexibilization of work has meant that a greater portion of the work force is now in the domain of temporary, occasional, and/or seasonal employment. What is characteristic for these processes is that their outcomes have led to deepening of gender inequalities: not in the sense of naturalized differentiation of men and women in doing certain jobs, but through various discriminatory practices, discouragement of women, as well as the behavior of male workers and employers. That is to say, employment with "informal" characteristics – irregular pay, labor force participation, lack of benefits and job security, acquiescence of work for lower pay, repetitive jobs without the possibility of acquiring new skills or change of status – generally describes a female work force. Indeed, processes of "informalization" (Standing 1999: 585) of different job sectors became one of the main avenues to increase the number of women in unstable jobs. In Serbia, aside from these transformations that mirrored global trends in capitalist economies, austerity measures taken by the state, in particular starting in 2014, are a significant factor to be taken into account in understanding the socio-economic position of women workers. The latest studies indicate that changes to other laws in the domains of labor, social and health security, and government strategies of austerity, have resulted in the flexibilization of working conditions, disproportionally impacting women. An already limited choice of work in Serbia meant unequal possibility for women to join the labor market, with the limited availability of child and elderly care services left many women without work, as they were unable to coordinate family life and paid work (cf. Urdarević et al. 2019: 22–36).

When it comes to studying agricultural production, numerous authors (Collins 1993; Barrientos et al. 1999; Barrientos, Perrons 1999; Ortiz 2002; Barrientos et al. 2004; Ortiz, Aparicio 2006; Collins, Krippner 1999) have precisely emphasized the issues of flexibilization and "feminization" of jobs; but also, that the study of women workers depends greatly on how particular, local agricultural production is structured. This means that the gender dimension of seasonal work does not only include issues of formal/informal employment, analysis of contract types (whether verbal or written) between employers and women workers (although significant indicators for understanding various forms of inequality and exploitatory practices), but also questions of kinship and social relations, as well as the larger socio-economic context of the seasonal work. In other words, feminist literature has pointed to the need to reveal the connections between "productive" and "reproductive" labor, and that the subjection of women must be analyzed at once from the standpoint of employment and relations within the home, where the particularities of gender relations manifest through different historical, social, and spatial contexts (Barrientos et al. 1999, 14; Barrientos, Perrons 1999). In particular if we take into consideration that historically women have worked in agriculture as unpaid members of households, and that female labor was less commonly found in certain traditional economic sectors (e.g., dealing with livestock), but that they remained working in the fields (often owned by their own family) – in a word, that agricultural work went hand in hand with housework of the same household (Barrientos et al. 2004, 8–9; Barrientos et al. 1999; Barrientos, Parrons 1999).

To understand the structural conditions that "foreclose" the same "life opportunities" available to men from women seasonal workers, it is necessary to introduce the topic of social exclusion from the perspective of structural violence. Although this concept is multidimensional and demands its own analysis, Babović explains that social exclusion can be understood as a kind of structural violence that includes a broad spectrum of inequalities: financial poverty, material deprivation, exclusion from important social institutions (such as the labor market), healthcare or social security (Babović 2015: 340). For the purposes of this text, social exclusion is best presented through the results of research looking at the problems women in agriculture face, with particular focus on rural areas (SeCons 2008; Bradaš 2017; Pantović et al. 2017). Succinctly put, women from rural areas have been recognized as one of the most vulnerable social categories in Serbia, due to a high degree of property insecurity, financial dependence, with few prospects for employment, insufficient institutional support in achieving basic economic and social rights, and few opportunities of association to achieve common interests:

> Rural households with female members are in 88% cases owned by men; women own no land in 84% of cases, and own practically no technological means of agricultural production. Women comprise 55% of the rural population and 74% of unpaid, associated members of agricultural households. There are significant differences in the informal employment of men (28.8%) and women (43.3%) [...]

A total of 12% of women has no health insurance, and over 60% have no retire-ment plan. Among women who are associated members of households, things are even worse – 93% do not contribute to social security (retirement funds), mostly due to a poor financial situation. (Bradaš 2017: 21)

In considering and analyzing seasonal work, it is important to emphasize the conceptual difference between the (statistical) categories of "associate house-hold member" and women who work seasonally in the agricultural production of smaller producers or larger companies and corporations. The distinction is between paid and unpaid work, which is important in my view for two reasons. First, the phrase "associate household member" and "seasonal worker" in agri-culture draw on differing types of socio-economic relations and ties, despite the actual work conducted by women being identical. Second, in Serbian literature and statistical analysis, the employment status of "unpaid associate member of an agricultural household" – where "women are engaged in household work without being paid for that labor" (SeCons 2008: 4) – describes an especially socio-economically vulnerable category: the "employed" person is placed in near-slavery conditions, women comprising most of these cases (Pantović et al. 2017; cf. SeCons 2008; Bradaš 2017). On the other hand, the employment status of women seasonal workers in agriculture and their socio-economic position is, unfortunately, difficult to (statistically) analyze and follow in a contemporary context, as this market is (in Serbia) insufficiently regulated, recorded, or stud-ied. That is to say, the experience of these women workers (as will be shown in their statements later) are mostly expressed as their exclusion from the labor market and insufficient access to public goods and services.

Reflections on Definitions of Seasonal Work in Agriculture

It is difficult to clearly conceptually define seasonal work in agriculture, I be-lieve, for at least two obvious reasons. In the first place, a "seasonal" charac-teristic can be found in various forms of work, such as tourism (cf. Ball 1988) or work bound to climate or environmental cycles. Or, as Jane Collins and Greta Krippner point out, "The seasonality of agricultural work is as old as agricul-ture itself" (1999: 513). Second, "seasonality," aside from designating a limited timeframe for the performance of certain jobs (the season), also indicates an absence of permanent employment in circumstances where "the success of ag-ricultural production systems has depended on finding ways to mobilize labor for crucial tasks at the right time" (Collins, Krippner 1999: 513). Thus, season-al work in agriculture is defined through its "temporary" and "occasional" na-ture, that is, through an absence of permanent (year-round) employment en-gagement. If we were to exclude the seasonal nature of agricultural work, that is, its conditionality upon climate cycles and ecological processes, the "tem-porary" and "occasional" nature can be found in other forms of employment, whether speaking of construction work or the service sector. "Seasonal", "tem-porary", and "occasional" nature are characteristics of work defined in contrast

to permanent employment, with the latter serving as the norm for further interpretation and understanding of various forms of employment. As Standing points out, the contextualization of seasonal and other forms of temporary and short-term work, often also carries socio-cultural connotations: Work patterns that are intermittent, casual and partial are bad in comparison to stable, continuous, and fulltime forms of employment (Standing 1999: 583). A good illustration is the evaluation of work of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08[8]), which places seasonal workers in the ninth group of occupations, entitled "elementary occupations" and the subgroup workers in agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Aside these professions, the group includes various kinds of custodial and cleaning services for homes, hotels, offices, miners, transportation and storage workers, food preparation assistants, street food salesperson, etc. (International Labour Organization-ILO 2012: 37).

The dichotomy of permanent and seasonal employment, as well as the impossibility of conceptually separating various kinds of temporary and occasional employment, stems from official definitions of seasonal work. Namely, the main variable in classification of these jobs is the kinds of labor contract that determines seasonal work. Thus, according to the ILO, seasonal work is placed in the category of precarious employment, with the resolution that refers to classification of employment (Resolution Concerning the International Classification of Status in Employment – ICSE) stating the following:[9]

> Workers in precarious employment can either: (a) be workers whose contract of employment leads to the classification of the incumbent as belonging to the groups of "casual workers", "short-term workers" or "seasonal workers"; or (b) be workers whose contract of employment will allow the employing enterprise or person to terminate the contract at short notice and/or at will (International Labour Organization-ILO 1993: 4–5).

As these categories of workers are difficult to distinguish based exclusively on type of contract (or verbal agreement) with employers, especially given that temporariness and the occasional nature of employment in modern economies are more the rule than exception, seasonal workers can be (officially) defined exclusively as their work being tied to natural cycles (cf. ILO 1993; Collins 1993). In France, for example, the law is clear that seasonal contracts are "by nature temporary" in the sense that the variability of employment is not based on decisions of employers or employees (Darpeix et al. 2014: 258).

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8   International Labour Organization (ILO) (2012), International Standard Classification of occupations (ISCO); availble at: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@publ/documents/publication/wcms_172572.pdf (last viewed 10 April 2018)

9   International Labour Organization (ILO) (1993), *Resolution concerning the International Classification of Status in Employment (ICSE)*; available at: https://www.ilo.org/global/statistics-and-databases/standards-and-guidelines/resolutions-adopted-by-international-conferences-of-labour-statisticians/WCMS_087562/lang--en/index.htm (last viewed 10 April 2018).

Realizing there was no simple dichotomy between permanent and temporary employment in agricultural jobs, but rather a paradox of continued employment in (multi-)year cycles, in their study, Jane Collins and Greta Krippner have invented new categories of workers based on the duration of contract with the employer: semi-permanent, permanently-temporary and/or stable temporary. This categorization of temporary workers is preceded by permanent workers, and then is followed by seasonal workers (hired during the season) and seasonal casual day laborers (Collins, Krippner 1999: 515). These variations of temporariness and occasional nature work in agriculture jobs become even more complex when we include the experiences of seasonal migrants (cf. Collins 1993; Haberfeld et al. 1999; Rogaly 2003; De Braux 2010).

Considering the issue of contractual employment of seasonal workers, Ortiz offers a thorough overview of the sociological and anthropological literature about the extant employment practices, organization and control of work in agriculture in various parts of the world (Ortiz 2002; cf. Ortiz, Aparicio 2006). As she points out, the forms of contract (and verbal agreement) between the employer and seasonal workers vary so much, not only on a national level, but on the local as well, that when we think about various kinds of arrangements of employment, we should also provide a reflection what the contracts mean for the various forms of control of work and the worker in agricultural jobs. Furthermore, the variations need to be explained through: differences in possession of resources, scale of agricultural production, the state of the labor market, expected skills of the workers, social organization, state intervention and labor law, as well as power relations between employers and employees (Ortiz 2002: 404). I consider this argument very important for a number of reasons. First, defining and understanding seasonal work and its characteristics exclusively through contract form and agreement of seasonal employment tells us very little about the lived experiences and socio-economic position of seasonal workers. Second, since seasonal work is "by nature" temporary and/or occasional, this poses the question of how workers overcome this discontinuity in a socio-economic sense and the kind of inequalities they encounter in dealing with various official institutions. Third, the local context can help us understand how the seasonal nature of agricultural jobs is regulated legally, and then how this reflects on the workers, which brings in a political dimension of understanding seasonal work.

Seasonal Work in Serbia: Normative and Legal Framework

As mentioned, although the subject of this research is not the law or official government policies, it is nevertheless important to briefly explain the process of defining and legally regulating seasonal work in agriculture in Serbia, so as to better contextualize the position of seasonal workers in general. Until 2018, analysis of seasonal work was dominated by the absence of a clearly defined legal framework that would encompass and structure such jobs in agriculture. This meant that a large number of people participating in seasonal work did

so in informal ways, often without any legally contractual basis. Before 2018, seasonal work was defined by the general Labor Law of the Republic of Serbia (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia no. 24/2005, 61/2005, 54/2009, 32/2013, 75/2014),[10] in the section "Work outside Legally Defined Employment," that is, as a type of temporary and occasional work. According to the site of the National Employment Agency (NSZZ 2017),[11] the project "Increasing Opportunities for Employing Seasonal Workers" was launched in 2017 and executed by the National Alliance for Local Economic Development (NALED) and the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ). The main project partner was the Ministry of Labor, Employment, Veteran and Social Affairs, but also included the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Finance, Tax Administration, the Central Registry for Mandatory Social Security, the Fund for Health Insurance, and several municipal governments (NALED 2019a).[12] The aim of the project was "to contribute to the reduction of work 'under the table'", calling for "the formulation of a legal framework and establishment of an electronic system for registration and paying of tax and benefits for seasonal workers" (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management 2017).[13] An interesting aspect of the mentioned project, in particular in the context of a gender dimension of seasonal workers, were the meetings across Serbian municipalities, entitled "Info Days". Aimed at employers and seekers of employment, a specific aim of these meetings was "in particular to motivate women, as a socially and economically endangered category, for work/employment in seasonal work" (NSZZ 2017).[14] While this project and the activities that came out of it require a more careful analysis, there is no room in this research for a detailed look, except to comment that if solutions for unfavorable conditions of women in Serbia could be found in "motivating" them to take up seasonal work, such strategies would be in danger of completely ignoring the larger social and economic context in which women live. Namely, in periods when they are not employed in seasonal work, they often lapse into the status of unemployed

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10   Labor Law (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, no. 24/2005, 61/2005, 54/2009, 32/2013, 75/2014); availble at: https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/zakon_o_radu. html (last viewed 1 March 2018).

11   National Employment Agency (2017), "Povećanje prilika za zapošljavanje sezonskih radnika"; available at: http://www.nsz.gov.rs/live/info/vesti/pove_anje_prilika_za_zapo_ ljavanje_sezonskih_radnika.cid39867 (last viewed 1 December 2017).

12   National Alliance for Local and Economic Development (NALED) (2019a), "Zapošljavanje sezonskih radnika"; available at: https://naled.rs/zaposljavanje-sezonskih-radnika-giz-orf (last viewed 10 September 2019).

13   Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management (2017), "Potpisivanje Memoranduma o sprovođenju projekta 'Povećanje prilika za zapošljavanje sezonskih radnika." Available at: http://www.minpolj.gov.rs/potpisivanje-memoranduma-o-sprovodjenju-projekta-povecanje-prilika-za-zaposljavanje-sezonskih-radnika/ (last viewed 1 December 2017).

14   National Employment Agency (NSZZ) (2017), "Povećanje prilika za zapošljavanje sezonskih radnika"; available at: http://www.nsz.gov.rs/live/info/vesti/pove_anje_prilika_ za_zapo_ljavanje_sezonskih_radnika.cid39867 (last viewed 1 December).

persons without income or enter other forms of temporary and occasional work and informal employment. More on this in the following section.

In 2018, the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia passed the Law on Simplified Employment in Seasonal Work (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia no. 50/2018),[15] referring specifically to seasonal work in agriculture, forestry, and fishing. It is important to repeat that the whole process of designing and adopting the law, as well as the project activities of official institutions were directed at fighting against "illegal work" and "work under the table", that is, at legal regulation of seasonal work in agriculture, regularizing workers, payment of tax and social benefits (even though the law left out, for example, seasonal workers in construction and service sector). Adoption of the Law garnered meagre attention from the media (e.g., Radnik.rs 2018a; Dragojlo 2018), and the only significant criticism referred to the right of legitimizing verbal agreements between seasonal workers and employers. As Reljanović states: "the Law on Simplified Employment in Seasonal Work introduced a novelty in Serbian law – a verbal agreement of employment" (Reljanović 2019: 75). The "Practical guide for the application of the law on simplified employment in seasonal work" elaborates that the existence of verbal agreements means that "[...] by taking up the work, the seasonal worker has accepted the working conditions and thus agreed to a verbal agreement about the performance of seasonal work" (NALED 2019b: 8).[16] The second relevant point is that seasonal work in agriculture is still defined as work outside the regular employment relation, like other forms of temporary and occasional employment, according to labor law. This means that "this law actually represents an unusual variation in temporary and occasional employment contracts" (Reljanović 2019: 75). In the case of seasonal workers, this means that they still do not have the possibility to legally take strike action or organize into a union (cf. Urdarević et al. 2019: 97–103). Although the employer has the duty to pay income tax and contribution to retirement funds, disability funds, healthcare, and worker compensation funds *in case of workplace injury or illness* (NALED 2019b: 11, emphasis added) – other labor rights go missing, such as "the right to vacation, paid leave, maternity leave, child care leave", just as they do for workers in temporary and occasional employment in general (Urdarević et al. 2019: 80).

Proposed amendments to the design of the law in the period of public debate mostly regarded issues of protection of workers and their rights. Thus, one proposed amendment sought to have employers issue workers with a written contract with working conditions, which was rejected. The law draft stated that the employer must issue a written certificate about the working conditions upon

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15   Law on Simplified Employment in Seasonal Work (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia no. 50/2018); available at: http://demo.paragraf.rs/WebParagrafDemo/?did=442382 (last viewed 10 September 2019).

16   National Alliance for Local Economic Development (NALED) (2019b), "Angažovanje sezonskih radnika u poljoprivredi: Praktični vodič za primenu zakona o pojednostavljenom radnom angažovanju na sezonskim poslovima u određenim delatnostima"; available at: https://www. paragraf.rs/dokumenti/Vodic-Zakon-o-sezonskom-radu.pdf.

request from a seasonal worker within two months. An amendment proposed to reduce this period to five days, due to the characteristics of seasonal workers, adding that the issuing of the certificate only protects one side, the employer – but it was rejected. The law draft did not define the number of working hours, nor the duration of work breaks, with an amendment proposed that the number be limited to twelve in one day, with a mandatory 30-minute break; the amendment was accepted (Radnik.rs 2008b).[17] Other proposed amendments referred to the novelty that an individual person (owner or manager of an agricultural homestead) be considered an employer, allowing them to employ seasonal workers, as well as that the category of seasonal worker not include persons not renumerated in performing seasonal work (Drča 2108).[18] Finally, the law states that a seasonal worker can be employed by a single employer for a maximum of 120 days in a single calendar year (NALED 2019b: 12), which presents a problem for some seasonal workers, whose activities in seasonal jobs take place over a period longer than the 120-day limit (cf. Lupšor, Đorđević 2016).

Analyses and studies of *gender (in)equality in the context of austerity* clearly show that women in Serbia, across nearly all domains of employment, are a particularly endangered category and suffer a high risk of poverty. The design and application of public policy, strategies and laws are mostly conducted without consideration of a gender perspective, that is, in a discriminatory way (cf. Urdarević et al. 2019: 22–36). This includes the Law on the Simplified Employment of Seasonal Work. The new law, thus, applies to certain specific groups of people: retirees, students, persons younger than 18 (but not younger than 15), foreigners, and recipients of social assistance. These groups of people may be employed seasonally without losing benefits that issue from their particular status. Under certain conditions recipients of family pensions and the full-time employed can also be seasonally employed (more on which, cf. NALED 2019b: 4–5). Although it may seem that a law designed in this way seems "inclusive", the question presents itself whether such regulation could "stimulate" the vulnerable groups in society (women, retirees, unemployed, youth, recipients of social assistance, working migrants) to enter seasonal work? Particularly if we take into consideration that seasonal work still does not afford all the benefits of full-time work, and that in 2019, minimum wage for seasonal work was "155.30 rsd per hour", (approximately 1.5 USD, NALED 2019b: 12), and that aside from women, the groups most affected by austerity measures are retirees, the unemployed, recipients of social assistance (Urdarević et al. 2019: 14-15). Finally, if we accept that social exclusion and poverty are indeed forms of structural violence (Babović 2015: 340–342; Malgesini et al. 2019: 6), it is reasonable to assume that women seasonal workers find themselves in conditions of socio-economic instability, in particular if we consider that they do

17   Radnik.rs (2018b), "Predlog zakona: Ostaje usmeni ugovor za sezonske radnike", 18 June 2018; available at: http://www.radnik.rs/2018/06/predlog-zakona-ostaje-usmeni-ugovor-za-sezonske-radnike/.
18   Drča, Irena (2018), "Nacrt zakona o sezonskim poslovima", *Pravni portal* 18 April 2018; available at: https://www.pravniportal.com/nacrt-zakona-o-sezonskim-poslovima/.

not receive all the benefits of full-time work (such as paid sick leave, maternity and/or child-caring leave), given that seasonal employment has the dynamic of temporary and occasional work. It is therefore significant to illuminate the gender dimension of seasonal work, both within a normative framework and in the labor market itself, and then examine whether these structural elements reinforce other forms of socio-economic inequality.

Women Seasonal Workers in Agricultural Jobs: on the Gender Dimension of Seasonal Work in Serbia

Gender-based violence has deep roots and is reproduced through gender inequalities; nor can it be understood outside social structures, gender norms and roles that reinforce them (Malgesini et al. 2019: 6). It can be understood as a form of cultural violence, manifested through gender and class, and legitimated through constituting cultural norms and notions that women are weaker and less capable of performing certain types of work (Babović 2015: 336–337). Although gender-based violence does not mean direct violence in a physical sense, "structural and cultural violence can be the source (cause) of direct violence, while cultural violence can be understood as a means of legitimation of both structural and direct violence" (Babović 2015: 338). Or, as Manjoo elaborates, gender-based violence must be understood within four interrelated factors acting simultaneously: structural, institutional, interpersonal, and individual (2012). Structural factors include political, economic, and social systems on a macro level; institutional factors refer to formal and informal social networks and institutions; interpersonal describe personal relations among partners and within families and communities; and the individual factors refer to personal capacities to respond to violence (Manjoo 2012: 5).

Although structural and institutional factors have already been touched upon in the previous section, it is important to briefly comment on neoliberal reconfigurations that have led globally to the dissipation of stable frameworks for organizing lives (Brković 2017a: 12; cf. Brković 2017b). To clarify, I will draw on the argument made by Čarna Brković, in which "neoliberalism" is a period of experimentation and transformation of relations between the state and society, while the fundamental ideas of neoliberal changes include that "market relations ought to be allowed to regulate any sphere of life, that the state ought to have as small a role as possible in the economy and protection of its citizens, in particular those vulnerable" (Brković 2017b: 91). However, the neoliberal reconfiguration cannot be interpreted within stable frameworks, as they differ greatly from one another depending on the national and local context, and Brković points to their main characteristic being their selectiveness. In "postsocialist neoliberalism", government institutions have not simply withdrawn, but continued to have impact on the wellbeing of their citizens, but in completely new and heretofore unfamiliar ways" (Brković 2017b: 92). This argument can perhaps be best illuminated by pointing to the aforementioned

austerity measures in Serbia, and the "stimulus" given to socially-endangered groups through public policy and the "simplification" in the new Law on seasonal work calling on these groups to enter seasonal employment. Indeed, the existence of a verbal agreement between employer and seasonal worker, which is legally treated as a legitimate contract establishing employment, can also be interpreted as a partial absence/presence of the state in regulating such relations.

The social, economic, and political transformation from socialism to capitalism in Serbia, and in particular processes that have begun in the twenty-first century have resulted in greater social inequality and significant changes to labor, including the creation of new forms of flexible employment and increased unemployment (Erdei 2018). After the economic changes in 2008, transformations took place even in economically developed countries, which resulted in new forms of "non-standard" employment (temporary, occasional, seasonal, and self-employment), while pay gaps between men and women have been noted throughout Europe (Avlijaš 2019), but also Serbia as well (Avlijaš et al. 2013). Recent statistical analysis of the position of working women note that they face difficulties in finding work much more commonly than men, with over 40% of women of working age excluded from work (compared to 27% of men, Pantović 2017: 9). A lack of job opportunities in the formal sector, along with growing poverty and low levels of protection for the unemployed result in women working in the informal sector (Pantović 2017: 12). The unemployment rate is highest among younger (20–24) and older (55–59) women, who are doubly marginalized: as women and as members of age groups with lowest levels of participation (Pantović 2017: 26).

Taking all these structural and institutional factors into account, it is difficult to survey all the various forms of inequality in seasonal work. Differences between men and women in rates of (un)employment are reflected in the impossibility to find work or getting benefits, with the result that women are (left behind as) a particularly vulnerable social group, which is then exposed to other forms of violence, in particular in the workplace and in interpersonal relations. As mentioned, gender-based violence must be analyzed at once through structural and institutional, and through interpersonal and individual factors. To illuminate the interrelation of these factors, the following portion of the text presents the research findings of conversations with women seasonal workers, their understanding of the situation they are in, and experiences this type of employment brings.

Seasonal Work, the View "from below" – Notes on Method and General Information on the Research

Over the course of 2017 and 2018, I conducted ten conversations with women seasonal workers in Serbia, employed in the domain of agriculture and pomiculture since the 1990s and 2000s until today. The conversations took the form of in-depth interviews, semi-structured interviews and informal conversations,

which were audio recorded. The fieldwork was conducted in residential units where the informants lived, and in two cases in cafes. In total, four informants had their conversation individually with the researcher, while six were interviewed in the presence of other persons, either family members or friends. Aware that the presence of other people could significantly impact the information given, I wish to emphasize that it actually aided in giving a more detailed picture, as the family members or friends present at the interviews were often also involved in seasonal work in agriculture. Interviews were held with eight women aged 40-64 and two 25-30-year-olds. In agreement with the interviewees, the research was conducted anonymously, meaning that details and specificities of their identities and locations of their homes and workplaces, as well as that of their employers, colleagues, family members have all been left out of the report.

Certain "patterns" or "regularities" can be discerned in their statements: all the women began working in agricultural jobs with one or more family member – most often partners and/or children. They all became seasonal workers due to the poor socio-economic situation in which they found themselves with their families. The reasons for entering seasonal employment could be "categorized" into three distinct groups: recipients of pensions (either due to retirement or inherited from a family member) whose incomes do not meet the basic living requirements; women of middle age who had lost their previous full-time job and/or had difficulty in finding other work; and young women who became seasonal workers as children, and remained in it, supplementing income for themselves or their families. While in the case of retirees and young women, seasonal work can be understood as "supplementary" income, whether for the individual or the family, the women of middle age who were unemployed have a more difficult relationship with the labor market, meaning that seasonal work in agriculture is their only source of income. However, it is important to note that not a single informant stated that they approach seasonal work as a "career"; rather, they explain that seasonal work is only a "temporary solution" to issues with income.

Now, given the distinction in employment status between "associate member of household" and "seasonal worker", which implies different forms of socio-economic relations despite the work itself being identical, it is important to note that eight informants were employed at smaller producers or larger enterprises; that is to say, their seasonal work was not part of family production or as owners of an agricultural homestead, and that their work has to be understood as being in the domain of "paid" labor. Two informants were engaged within their own family production, but they also had experiences in paid seasonal work for other entrepreneurs. Second, since women's labor in seasonal work in agriculture is absent from many econometric studies, and since women take informal paths of employment (without being registered), their statements could potentially initiate further research of the broader socio-economic context and legal framework, as well as their impact on the lives of women seasonal workers. Third, this study does not encompass migrant workers; all the informants in the study worked seasonally in immediate local

areas, which might help illuminate socio-cultural connections on microlevels, although it does unequivocally neglect the problems of mobility of labor force. Fourth, even though ten conversations are not enough to reach general conclusions, I nevertheless consider the statements given an important impetus for further research questions and a small step towards future examination of seasonal work from an anthropological perspective.

Questions posed to the informants were structured along six, roughly divided areas:

1. Basic information: age, marital status, number of children (if any), education level, how long and since when they are working in seasonal jobs.
2. Theoretical issues: with what framework do these seasonal workers describe seasonal work.
3. The socio-economic causes of working seasonally: how and in what way they first came to do seasonal work.
4. The gender perspective of seasonal work: according to the informants, who, in general, and for what reasons does seasonal work; are there differences between men and women in performing certain jobs, and if so – what are they and what do the informants think is their cause.
5. Ethnography of seasonal work: personal experiences of the informants in conducting seasonal work, the conditions and structure of labor, questions of gender-based violence and practices.
6. The socio-political context: the legal status, positions of seasonal workers on official institutions and broader society's relation to seasonal work.

Due to the limited scope of this text, I have focused on those parts of informants' statements that refer to two interrelated aspects of seasonal work. The first concerns reasons for and means of entry into seasonal work, in order to reveal its broader socio-economic and cultural context, as well as the position of women workers and labor conditions. This allows insights into the structural and institutional factors that made my informants begin to work in seasonal jobs. The second aspect refers to the experiences of these women in the course of work, which gives insight into the structure of work and its gender-division, as well as the nature and dynamic of social relations and networks that emerge in these employment arrangements.

The Socio-economic (Dis)advantages to Seasonal Work

All ten informants began working seasonally in agriculture through "informal" channels. Using local connections – acquaintances, such as family members or friends who were already seasonally employed, or else information reached them that there was a need for seasonal workers. This culturally specific form of sociality – acquaintances and connections – needs to be explained beyond the market logic. As Čarna Brković notes, "systemic" perspectives take "informal"

practices as a rational strategy for survival in a postsocialist society undergoing transformation. This means that people choose informal pathways because they are forced to, that is, in the absence of the state and national economy, they depend on them. However, such interpretations assume that "real" market economies operate differently, as a "mature" society, reproducing an infantile image of postsocialist countries as modern political communities that lag behind the West (Brković 2017a: 83–84). Yet, "informal pathways" are not exclusively imposed by the market, nor can entering into seasonal work by way of connections and acquaintances be understood as a form of "clientelism".[19] Such "informal" practices arise from the need of seasonal workers to form a network and a kind of (self-) protection in taking up to seasonal jobs, as well as develop a certain degree of mutual trust in their sphere of work. The social component here is particularly illuminating of these relations, as aside from a financially motivated search for work, according to my informants, they have mostly relied on "recommendations" and advice from people in their immediate circle when reaching out to employers, and they sought to join those groups of seasonal workers where they already knew someone. Significantly, all ten informants worked seasonally with other members of their household: mostly their children who at some point joined them in seasonal work, but also mothers and/or partners, with not infrequent examples of the entire family working for the same employer:

> Since you have to have a whole group, you usually have to have someone to substitute for you when you need a day off, so that they wouldn't cut your place. So, my daughter, when I need something, she goes with my husband for two, three days [...] So, she went with us.

> Or, for example, she went with us to the meat cooler for a whole month. My kid worked on the cherries and apricots, he was studying, but his father got sick, so he had to. I didn't go with him then because I had to be with my spouse, as he was very sick, his leg was in a cast, he was immobile. Then, since I couldn't go to make money, he (the son) had to; he had already finished college and wasn't working.

> This man came to our house one morning saying "Is your son here?" I said "yes", "So, can you do it?" I said "do what, I don't understand", and he said to pick apples. I happily said "yes, of course" [...] I was thrilled. I got my son out of bed, we got ready, and he drove us to this man's, and we introduced ourselves [...] We started in September, I even took my son out of school for a few days, and we worked for him until almost November.

Significant actors in introducing people to seasonal work are the so-called *group leaders* or *brigadiers*, who act as mediators between employers and seasonal workers. They are in charge of recruitment of new workers and in general their placement, oversight, and control of the work process. If we were

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19   On the moral overtones of the concept of 'clientelism' and an anthropological interpretation of 'connections', see: Brković, Čarna (2017a), *Managing Ambiguity: How Clientelism, Citizenship, and Power Shape Personhood in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, New York: Berghahn Books.

to sketch the hierarchy of positions, the rungs could be as follows: employer – group leader/brigadier – seasonal worker. Group leaders/brigadiers are often, but not always, persons who were previously employed in seasonal work in agriculture. However, an important element is the level of trust between the group leaders and employers, in particular as the former are often in charge of calculating and distributing renumeration. In certain cases, persons in charge of transport of workers also held the status of group leader. As my informants say:

> [...] there is one (person) in charge of leading the group. We call them the group leader. They are the boss, essentially. They tell us what task to do, they negotiate the price of work. So, they most often make a deal with the employer and then form a group. Anybody could do it, basically. Now, I could make my own group, but then the question is whether the employer with will want to negotiate with me, since they don't know me.

> How can explain? You're the boss and I am a brigadier, and you and I, we have an agreement. Generally, these brigadiers, they all know each other, they are all connected. So, if we're working on peppers, the brigadier and the boss have agreed that the rate for the day is 1,500 dinars, but the brigadier says "I am going to tell the workers 1,100". Right? He gets from the boss, I dunno, two thousand, and then another 400 from each of us if he agreed on 1,500, and we are told we get 1,100. I agree to what they tell me, and he said 1,100 – take it or leave it. But from the point of view of fairness, it's not fair, but in terms of the contract, he said this is the daily rate.

> Both men and women are group leaders. Where I went in our area, they were mostly women. But the farther I went, they were mostly people with their own trucks, so they were also group leaders.

As the primary reason for becoming seasonal workers, all ten informants gave only their own and their families' financial instability, as well as a lack of opportunities on the labor market. Although this research did not include the question of the incomes of other members of the informants' families, nor whether they were financially dependent on their partners or other member of their family, the conclusion drawn from the data collected is that the total family income certainly does not cover the necessities of life. In particular if we consider that a third of the informants conducted their seasonal jobs with their partners. Not a single woman cited other motives for doing this work, while the dominant explanation is a loss of full-time and formally legal employment, that is, unemployment. This, according to the informants themselves significantly impacts the price of labor:

> In all the villages, before, there was always a small factory, so the more educated got jobs there, and those less educated, if they only have elementary school – they couldn't get a job. And so they worked the land. And those ones, even today, they are still doing that. But since the nineties, we who lost our jobs, we too have been trying to get into that group and start doing that work. I don't really have much else to say about seasonal work: it's hard and it's hard to make a

dime; the work is not valued, and the worker is not valued. The seasonal work-
er is not valued. Nowadays there's lots of people who are jobless, so they are
squabbling for that dime, and so the pay is bad. If there were fewer workers, the
work would be more valued, and it would better paid. At least that's what I think.

Most of the women I spoke to (7) took up seasonal work after loss of em-
ployment, while half of the ten informants had previously been employed in
factories and/or (public) companies that in the process of privatization either
ceased to operate or became privately owned. The informants from my study
are an example of how the privatization of formerly state-owned companies
was a significant structural factor in entering seasonal work. In the period af-
ter the political changes of 2000, there were systemic attempts at encourag-
ing privatization, which becomes part of a "transitional package", with new
owners unable, or reticent, to fulfill their obligations. A large portion of the
labor force became redundant or simply unemployed (Erdei 2007: 81–85).[20] A
portion of my informants became unemployed precisely in this period, which
in some cases prevented them from taking retirement as they did not have a
sufficient number of years of service, but were nevertheless at an age disad-
vantage in seeking new work. Overall, financial instability, limited possibilities
of work and lack of choice was the context in all ten cases of women entering
seasonal work. It is furthermore important to emphasize that the informants
foreground their role within the family as "provider" and "caretaker". It can be
interpreted along two lines: they chose seasonal work to financially contrib-
ute to the overall family income, as one of the informants says: "We are help-
ing out, as they say, in our own homes." Or else they are faced with a choice
of dealing with family obligations (care for older members) and employment:

> So, I worked there until they fired me because of my grandmother. My father's
> mother broke both her hips, and we didn't have money for a hospital, and they
> wanted money. So, I thought, it's better for me to take care of my grandmother
> than be harassed, so I quit. That was around 2000. After that, I switched to the
> food processing plant and worked there. I collected branches, pruned shoots
> in saplings, which we then planted.

Two other examples of entering seasonal work were notable: retired wom-
en and those who were seasonal workers earlier in their lives. Two informants,
who had also worked in factories, recipients of either retirement or family
pensions, are seasonally employed, since their pensions do not meet the ne-
cessities of life:

> It's not my fault that the factory went under, that someone ruined the factory
> [...] I have thirty-one years of work behind me; my pension is 17,000 dinars. If

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20   For more on the privatization from an anthropological perspective: Erdei, Ildiko
(2007), "Dizmenzije ekonomije: prilog promišljanju privatizacije kao socio-kulturne
transformacije", in Vladimir Ribić (ed.), *Antropologija postsocijalizma*, Belgrade: Srpski
genealoški centar, pp. 76–127.

there is a person who can live on 17,000, regardless of my mortgage, that's my thing, let's not even look at that, but to pay all the taxes, to live on that, having to save for the winter, to pay for gas or wood – hats off to such a person, they are a magician.

I left the factory not of my own accord, but because it stopped working and I was left unemployed. So I went to the dairy plant, and fulfilled my requirement for retirement. Maybe I wouldn't have even started [to do a seasonal job], but my pension, I mean, I thank god I was able to get it, but the cost of everything is so high, we all know this, and have to adapt in life as much as we can.

The second group are two informants who took up seasonal work while still in elementary school. However, it is important not to read these statements as a form of child labor in agriculture; that is, children took up work on the fields or orchards most commonly because their parents were employed in seasonal work. As the informants themselves say:

I took up a seasonal job at age nine. My mother, since she is a single parent, we were alone, she worked in a company that was starting to collapse, they weren't getting paid, and she heard that the agricultural association [...] was looking for workers to go pick cherries [...] So, she went and put her name down. However, since there was no one to take care of me during the summer months, so as not to be alone at home, she took me along, and I could go with her to help her as much as I could. You know, cherry picking as a summer activity [...] So it was, everybody went: children, my friends, let's go make some pocket money to spend during the summer – that's how I started. After, I had to, as time passed and we needed money. Over the summer, we do seasonal work. I mean, nobody does that because they don't need the money [...] It depends if they (the parents) had enough money, then I worked for myself, for pocket money, and if we were short, then the money would go for the family.

Work on the fields or orchards, annually, is often complemented by other forms of temporary and occasional employment. After the season was over, the informants often worked together on packaging food in cooling plants. Four of the informants, aside from seasonal work in agriculture, were employed in wage labor in other agricultural homesteads, in taking care of animals, or care for the elderly:

Well, yes, everything I did as seasonal work, it would count for seven or eight years of work [that would count towards my retirement]. You know, I worked in private homes, in one I would go to milk the cows, to feed them, to clean the stables. I mean, there was no work. I took care of an old woman here (in my local place of residence), but I could no longer do that job, because she died and I started working these seasonal jobs.

Due to the lack of legal regulation of seasonal work, in some cases, these women had no contract of employment. A frequent case was that their employment status was established through youth associations, even though they could not have been properly registered in this way due to their age category

(cf. Lupšor, Đorđević 2016). Being registered under a different name, that of a young person, meant that they did not have recourse to a slew of guaranteed labor rights, in particular protection and workers compensation, leaving them in a particularly vulnerable category. Work registered by way of youth associations, in the case of women who were not of the appropriate age category, left room for various kinds of economic violence, such as lower recompense or specific forms of exclusion from labor rights. However, it is important to note that although under the new law on seasonal work these specific practices will not be possible (NALED 2019: 6), this does not mean that they will not take place in new forms. Further, a high number of informants did not have sufficient information about their labor rights, something particularly visible in the case of retirees. Women who received pensions generally feared that seasonal work would mean they could lose their pensions:

> Allegedly, you could work if you are a retiree, you could give your info for a contract. "You'll have no problems" – that's what they told us. Some of us gave our info, some didn't. Now, those who had a pension, they were really scared to lose it. So, when we go to the field, those who had pensions and were registered under different names, they worked together, so that if there's an inspection, they would skip them, so as not to lose their pensions. If there's an inspection, they just disappear. Once, this was funny, work was going normally, and there was an inspection. You hear it right away. But there, it was all fenced in. So, the brigadier runs up and says that the inspector is there, that we need to hide. Apparently, there was a hole in the fence, for us to pass through. But everybody started running every which way, it was chaos. Nobody knows where the hole is. Some jumped over – it was hilarious – they all wanted to hide. Two or three remained, but the rest fled. So, for two to three hours we hid, waited to see what would happen.

Overall, it is important to emphasize that all the informants took up seasonal jobs due to the difficulty of finding other employment or due to meager pensions. Seasonal work in agriculture was not a permanent position for any of them. In the case of younger women, further, a dominant reason was that their parents did not earn sufficient income, while in some cases this meant that several family members worked in seasonal jobs together. The absence of systemic help for unemployed women, the absence of solutions how to find them employment, and the dynamics of temporary and occasional jobs, which also fall into the "informal" sector, together with meager pensions – are all structural conditions for the manifestation of various forms of violent practices and socio-cultural inequalities, more on which in the next section.

The Gender Dimension of Seasonal Work in Agriculture

According to the informants, seasonal work is mostly taken up by women, often older age, and they think that there is no discrimination in "hiring" based on age, religion, ethnicity, or nationality. However, the informants note that the reason for the majority of workers in agriculture being women is not a

consequence of strategic gender segregation in hiring, that is, there is no exclusive demand for women seasonal workers from the employers. The greater number of women is explained by their unfavorable position on the labor market and lack of choice. Although employers do not care about the gender structure of their employees, according to the informants, women take up these jobs because men do not wish to work seasonally in agriculture, but rather seek better-paying temporary and occasional jobs:

> They (the employers) care about having enough people to do the work. How the group will function, they couldn't care less. Whether it will only be youth, only older people, only women, only men – they do not care. All they want is the job done. They don't go into who is how old, where they're from and who they are – no. You're there to get the job done and that's it.

> Well, I think that men probably do some other work – masonry or something like that – because the wages are higher. I assume that it's that; women, for their part, I mean, there's nothing left other than the field or cleaning houses. I mean, there's nothing else, nowhere else to make a buck.

> Older women and men [...] Nah, this will only last a little bit – we, older women, and soon enough they (the employers) will be crying out for hands [...] Men work too. There's not much of a difference now. I mean, it's still mostly women, but there are plenty of men. Women have less, they are less employed [...] and then these men figure that the field is for the woman, not for men.

Paradoxically, although there is no emphasis of gender segregation in "hiring", the gender division of working in the fields features prominently in their statements. Women seasonal workers testify that they do encounter a division between "men's" and "women's" tasks, which in the broadest sense can be interpreted as "more difficult" or "easier", with the wage for "men's" jobs higher compared to "women's". Aside from loading and unloading goods, among the "more difficult" jobs are considered the transport of workers, use of machines; on the other hand, "easier" jobs include tasks that demand "greater precision and hygiene" (classifying, sorting, picking, work in cold storages, etc.):

> For example, if we're working on peppers, the brigadier lady takes 30 women, only on peppers. They don't even pull the weeds, just plant the peppers. She already knows who she wants, it's always women. Then, we went to peel onions, and that was all women. But, ok, peeling onions, that required hygiene. You really need hygiene in this case [...] there's the knife, you're peeling, the cloth, wiping it clean, putting it in the crate, and it all has to be even. You can't have all that, you know, when you have to fix it, it has to be even [...] so that was all women. A man would hurry and mess up.

The concept of "nimble fingers", where women are considered "more appropriate" for certain tasks in agriculture is not a specificity of Serbia or a local area. This is an example that can be analyzed on the global level. As Collins and Krippner point out in their studies of the agricultural industry in Latin American

countries, ideas of "nimble fingers" serve to mask the fact that women are employed in certain seasonal jobs that could be defined as requiring specific skills, and thus higher wages (1999: 523). However, as in the case of Latin America, in Serbia, women do not get higher wages for performing these tasks. On the contrary, socio-cultural connotations, constituted within a gender division of work, are reflected in the cost of labor. As the informants explain, if women do "men's" jobs, such as transport of workers, there is a possibility that they will not be paid the same amount as men doing that job. As one of the informants states: "I was the only women transporting apples. And I did not always get an increase in wage." However, when men do the same work, so-called "women's" jobs, the informants point out that there is no difference in wages.

Finally, a significant research point was whether such conditions and relations in seasonal work allow space for violent practices, in the sense of physical, verbal, or any other form of direct violence in the workplace. When asked whether they encountered any sort of violence in seasonal work, all informants explicitly answered in the negative. However, through the conversation about interpersonal relations in the fields and orchards, there are descriptions of physical and verbal conflicts – among the workers, but also from the group leaders, and the informants often label them as isolated cases, not directly connected to seasonal work and its environment:

> I didn't have a really bad experience, but it's been known to happen. You know, it comes down to both us and them (the group leaders/brigadiers). It all depends [...] She can (group leader/brigadier) yell at us, yell and yell, and say all kinds. She says a lot of stuff, but I don't listen (laughter). She calls us "wally," tells us we are useless, that she's no clue what's with us today, whether we landed from Mars, from outer space, whatever.

One informant cited an experience of physical and verbal violence by her employer, when working at private stable. Although the example is not in direct relation with seasonal work in agriculture, it is important to mention, as it indicates a higher degree of vulnerability of seasonal workers in general, in particular as in many cases they move horizontally through various forms of temporary and occasional employment:

> So, when I got there, when I ground up everything in the morning, he nearly tried to hit me. To hit me! You're a cow, you're a dumbass, you're a good for nothing, you are this and that... I said, I don't know what I did? [...] and he grabbed the pail and threw the milk on me. This man was angry, and I couldn't take it when he beat his cows, I think a cow died once from the beating. I mean, it was awful. I shed more tears there than anywhere I worked. I worked a whole month there for eleven thousand. I went crazy. Plus, he abused me so much and all the horrible things he said. I worked from the morning, seven hours in the morning, and seven in the afternoon. That's how much I worked at that homestead.

The dominant topic in the conversations held were descriptions of work in the fields and orchards; for reasons of length, these details were left out of

this text. In addition to the informants' description of seasonal work as physically very demanding in specific climate conditions and/or as long-hour jobs on the lowest social rung, one particularly notable topic was the poor working conditions. Hygiene in the fields is also an important topic, above all because of a lack of designated spaces to take care of sanitation needs, places to eat, a lack of drinking water, sun and chemical protection, lack of auxiliary and protective equipment for work. Another significant topic was the price of work, which has been touched upon in this text, but must be underscored that the informants point out that the wages differ geographically, that is, that the same kinds of jobs are differently renumerated in different parts of Serbia, which is a topic for further investigation.

Concluding Remarks

The fundamental question of this paper was whether seasonal work contained elements of structural violence, specifically gender-based violence. Gender inequality reproduced in this kind of work is not exclusively the result of the absence of a particular law that would regulate it. The recently adopted Law on Simplified Employment in Seasonal Work is neither the only nor a sufficient condition for understanding and analyzing the situation of women seasonal workers in agriculture. Rather, it must be taken in combination with a slew of other laws, institutional strategies, and mechanisms. This requires a more detailed analysis of public policy, with special focus on various forms of discrimination in the domain of labor and social rights. For this reason, in this text, I have made use of data from political economy and statistics. Further, the socio-economic status of women seasonal workers in agriculture must be looked at within the framework of austerity measures, privatization, and political-economic transformations from socialism into neoliberalism in Serbia, where the risk of poverty and limited availability of public services and institutions are crucial. Namely, neoliberal reconfigurations have certainly led to ambivalences and lack of transparency in society, where roles, responsibilities, and social safety procedures remain poorly defined between the state, the market, and broader society (cf. Brković 2017b). The absence of the state is best seen in the example of the legal possibility to arrange for seasonal employment through a verbal agreement, while at the same time there is no other opportunity left to women in certain community except to become seasonal workers. Such operational frameworks are significant if we are to understand the conditions for the reproduction of inequality of women in seasonal work.

First, if we compare the official statistics about the position of women in the labor force in Serbia with the given statements by informants, we can also recognize identical structural effects in examples of seasonal work in agriculture: all informants entered seasonal work in "informal" ways, due to poverty and/or difficulties in finding other forms of employment. The informants point out the high number of older women, who are also considered a particularly vulnerable group in official statistics. This means that employing women in seasonal

agricultural jobs should be understood within so-called "underemployment" or "vulnerable employment", rather than the result of free, individual choice. Particular attention should be paid to various "categories" of women seasonal workers, depending on their age and social status: retirees, young women, women of different ethnic and national groups, recipients of social security, employed and unemployed, etc., since all these socio-economic positions reflect individual capability to respond to inequality, discrimination, and violence, particularly regarding wages and (poor) working conditions.

Second, in their statements, women seasonal workers move horizontally across the labor market: when not working seasonally, they take up other forms of so-called "elementary ocuppations" and "female" jobs (such as cleaning and care for the elderly). The cycle of seasonal work also contributes to this, as does the limit on the permitted number of working days in a calendar year for seasonal work. Many workers take up seasonal work for several different employers throughout the year, which raises questions of exploitatory practices, further "informal" employment, or renewal of registration to work in temporary or occasional employment in line with labor law. Thus, instead of evaluating seasonal work in terms of its temporary, occasional, and discontinuous nature, it is important to consider the activities of these women seasonal workers within the market, as well as when they are not active in their seasonal jobs.

Third, all informants thought that it was a good idea to place seasonal work within a legal framework, above all for the sake of health insurance and social security. This is a significant point, in particular in light of the adoption of the law regulating employment in seasonal work in agriculture. As the research was conducted at the time when there was no dedicated law, a question for further research is whether and how the law passed has helped improve (or indeed degrade) the socio-economic position of women seasonal workers. A current projection is that the existence of verbal agreements will almost certainly result in the reduction of resistance among seasonal workers to be registered in their employment, as this would allow them social security without losing whatever social benefits they already have (Reljanović 2019: 77).

Finally, what is missing from analysis of official records and economic perspectives is the socio-cultural conditioning of women to take up seasonal work in the first place, which in turn reflects back onto their socio-economic reality. All the informants took up seasonal work with other members of their families, which means that focus should be placed on familial or partner dynamics, as well as assigned gender roles within the family. In that sense, children's participation in seasonal work initiates debate about child labor, but also the socio-economic position of mothers who do seasonal work. As one of the informants states, this is very important in the case of single mothers who take their children to the site of (seasonal) work, as they have nowhere or no one to leave them with during work hours – this is an aspect that requires further investigation and analysis. Further, the work conditions and organization, the gender division of tasks, as well as the roles taken up and relationships formed in the course of work also significantly manifest gender-based violence. The

absence of gender inequality in the process of hiring is not surprising, given that these are rather low paid and socially very denigrated jobs. As the informants state, the employer's main aim is to turn a profit, which is why they do not discriminate in hiring for seasonal work. Yet, since picking, sorting, hoeing, etc. are poorly paid tasks, men mostly tend to perform tasks of transport or entirely different, better paying jobs, such as construction. The gender division of labor also indicates the importance of reproduction of gender inequality and roles in the different activities men and women perform, in pay gap, as well as violent practices in seasonal work.

The gender dimension of seasonal work, thus, must be interpreted in various directions: on an institutional level, through the lens of class and gender positions of seasonal workers, and examining the social and cultural bonds that are created through seeking and performing seasonal work. If we take the structural framework together with the statements given by the women seasonal workers themselves about their own lived experiences in performing this work, the conclusion drawn is that such conditions leave room for various manifestation of gender-based violence on a structural level, but also direct violent practices.

(Translation by Edward Djordjević.)

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Lara Končar

O položaju i iskustvima sezonskih radnica u poljoprivredi u savremenoj Srbiji. Može li se govoriti o elementima strukturnog nasilja?

Apstrakt

U radu se razmatraju društveno-ekonomski položaj i iskustva žena koje su angažovane na sezonskim poslovima u poljoprivredi, i ukazuje se na elemente strukturnog i drugih vidova nasilja kojima su sezonske radnice izložene. Kao vid radnog angažmana, sezonski rad – zakonski izdvojen tek 2018. godine na području Srbije – i dalje čini delimično regulisanu oblast u kojoj se uočavaju različiti vidovi društvene isključenosti. Feministički orijentisana (antropološka) literatura koja se bavi rodnom dimenzijom sezonskih poslova u poljoprivredi u različitim delovima sveta ukazuje na značajne probleme nejednakosti i društvene marginalizacije. Na osnovu analize društvenih, ekonomskih, kulturnih, pravnih i drugih struktura – koje se pojavljuju u vezi sa organizacijom i kontrolom poslova i samog rada – uočeni su načini na koje se (re)produkuje i (p)održava nepovoljan položaj sezonskih radnica. Na taj način, otvoren je prostor za razmatranje pitanja strukturnog nasilja nad ovom kategorijom žena. Oslanjajući se na opšte zaključke istraživanja o položaju žena na tržištu rada u Srbiji, u prvom delu rada razmatram pitanje socioekonomskog položaja žena u poljoprivredi, a posebno sezonskih radnica, i ukazujem na elemente (re)produkovanja njihove sistemske nejednakosti i institucionalnog isključivanja. Na osnovu kvalitativne analize materijala sakupljenog putem polustrukturiranih intervjua i neformalnih razgovora sprovedenih sa sezonskim radnicama u poljoprivredi, u drugom delu teksta se bavim njihovim življenim iskustvima i ukazujem na koje načine društvene i ekonomske strukture i njihovi akteri, kao i kulturni obrasci, oblikuju prakse i (rodne) odnose unutar sezonskih poslova.

Ključne reči: sezonski rad, sezonske radnice, poljoprivreda, strukturno nasilje, rodno zasnovano nasilje

V

REVIEWS
PRIKAZI

ALEKSANDAR KANDIĆ, *IZMEĐU MITA I NAUKE. RASPRAVA O PLATONOVOJ KOSMOLOGIJI*, FILOZOFSKI FAKULTET, UNIVERZITET U BEOGRADU, BEOGRAD, 2021.

Aleksandar Risteski

Nije tako čest slučaj da se u filozofskim publikacijama na temu Platonove misli, a posebno ne na srpskom jeziku, neko ozbiljno i temeljno posveti izučavanju Platonove filozofije nauke, te geometrijskih i matematičkih pretpostavki njegove kosmološke teorije prikazanih u dijalogu *Timaj*. Uz to, još je manji broj autora koji su spremni da poklone ozbiljnu pažnju pitanju i značaju *mita*,[1] te pitanju odnosa *mitskog* i *naučnog* u Platonovoj kosmologiji, a da se pri tom krajnje procene takvog odnosa ne svode na zaključke eliminativističkog ili redukcionističkog tipa.

U svojoj monografskoj studiji *Između mita i nauke. Rasprava o Platonovoj kosmologiji* Aleksandar Kandić preuzima na sebe upravo takav zadatak, da naime podrobno ispita epistemološke, metafizičke, matematičke, geometrijske i metodološke pretpostavke timajevske kosmologije, polazeći najpre od naučnog, pragmatičnog i antropološkog potencijala, te relevantnosti kako naučnog (*episteme*), tako i mitskog (*mythos*) aspekta ovog velikog dijaloga. Autor u više navrata skreće pažnju na to da mu je stalo da formuliše svojevrsni srednji put između dve krajnosti, naime, između odbacivanja mita kao suvišnog, s jedne i doslovnog čitanja, s druge strane.

Čak i letimičnim osvrtom na pojmovne konsekvence takvih interpretacija neizbežno smo navedeni na zaključak da i jedna i druga strana u osnovi odbacuju i previđaju značaj mitskog elementa, ne samo dijaloga *Timaj*, već u načelu i Platonove filozofije uopšte. Doslovno čitanje *Timaja*, kao što je čitanje Sare Brodi, čini taj previd što načelno *neutrališe* mitski aspekt dijaloga time što ga ne čita kao mit i kao verovatni govor (*eikos mythos*). S druge strane, druga krajnost koja je izražena u *metaforičkom čitanju* takođe odbacuje mitski element,[2] tako što ga smatra pukim pomoćnim sredstvom za iskazivanje racionalnih i naučnih stavova, odnosno, prema kojem se Platonovi mitovi vide kao nesposobnost autora da se izrazi egzaktnije. Prema Kandiću, mitski elementi su neizostavni za razumevanje

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1 Veoma važnu studiju o Platonovim mitovima napisala je Irina Deretić. Vidi Deretić, I., *Platonova filozofska mitologija. Studija o Platonovim mitovima*, Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, Beograd, 2014.

2 Autor navodi primer Aristotelovog kritičkog tumačenja *Timaja*.

Platonovog mišljenja, koliko i naučni i racionalni aspekti dijaloga, upravo zbog samog predmeta kojim se Platon bavi, a to je kako kosmos, tako i čovekovo mesto unutar njega. Zbog toga je Platon i osmislio takav jezik dijaloga koji je svojevrsno kretanje „između mita i nauke".

Originalnost i veličina Platonove misli prikazane u dijalogu *Timaj* jeste u tome što Platon, verovatno po prvi put u istoriji filozofije i zapadne nauke, pravi svesnu razliku između *modela* i *same stvarnosti*, na koju model treba da referiše, a na šta nas upućuje i sam Platon u svom dijalogu, predstavljajući nam bitne termine kao što su *eikos mythos* i *eikos logos*. Posmatrano na taj način, jasnije nam se prikazuje ne samo veličina, već i neverovatna *savremenost* Platonove naučne i prirodno-filozofske misli! Pitanje savremenosti Kandić adresira na veoma interesantan način, baveći se između ostalog i poređenjem fundamentalnih pretpostavki Platonove kosmologije i savremene kosmološke teorije velikog praska, pronalazeći značajne bliskosti između ova dva kosmološka modela.

Knjiga obiluje iscrpnim i detaljnim raspravama o timajevskoj kosmologiji, kao i o njenim različitim interpretacijama i recepcijama, od Aristotela, do danas. U središtu ovih rasprava i kritičkih osvrta nalazi se hipoteza o neizostavnoj važnosti i ulozi mitskog aspekta Platonove kosmologije, a prvenstveno pojmova *demijurga* i *duše sveta*.

Platonovo uvođenje ovih termina u jezik svoje kosmološke teorije predstavlja novinu od fundamentalne važnosti, jer su time „božanska" saznanja smeštena unutar psihološkog, odnosno, kosmološko-antropološkog okvira tumačenja. Na taj način su teško dostupna kosmološka saznanja učinjena mogućim predmetom ljudskog saznanja i osmišljavanja!

Umesto da se bavi pitanjem same, objektivne stvarnosti po sebi, težište Platonovog interesovanja se premešta na pravljenje preciznog *modela* celokupne stvarnosti, izraženog jezikom matematike i geometrije. Time su omogućene najmanje dve bitne stvari: s jedne strane pouzdanost i preciznost samog modela, a s druge strane pristupačnost kosmološkog saznanja čoveku.

Na taj način ideja *eikos mythos*-a i *eikos logos*-a smeraju na našu pozicioniranost unutar celokupne stvarnosti, odnosno, na granice naših spoznajnih kapaciteta, ali istovremeno ukazuje i na to da geometrijsko-matematički model kosmosa nije stvar ličnih preferencija, nadahnuća i proizvoljnosti, već rezultat temeljne refleksije o strukturi individualne psihe i celokupne, stvorene stvarnosti.

Zbog kompleksnosti teme i višesmislenosti Platonovog jezika, dijalog *Timaj* nikada nije prestajao da pleni pažnju i interesovanje najvećih filozofskih umova, čime postaje istovremeno i uzrok velikog broja raznolikih i međusobno neusaglasivih tumačenja. No, autor ne samo što adresira kompleksne teme timajevske kosmologije, već to čini na originalan i konstruktivan način, ispostavljajući kritičke prikaze različitih stanovišta, te iznoseći vlastite zaključke i tumačenja ključnih aspekata ovog dela.

Bitno je napomenuti i to da je Kandićev jezik, s obzirom na kompleksnost teme, veoma koncizan i direktan, što čini ovu studiju o Platonovoj kosmologiji veoma pristupačnom i za šire čitalaštvo. Mogli bismo zapravo reći da je autor idejno veran upravo onoj nameri koju prepoznaje u osnovi Platonovog uvođenja pojmova *demijurg* i *duša sveta*, a to je da se teško dostupno, „božansko znanje" o strukturi kosmosa, umstvenog i čulnog sveta, učini dostupnim ljudskom saznanju, te da se istakne važnost antropološkog elementa u konstituisanju jedne kosmološke teorije! Ova studija je verni prikaz te namere i nesumnjivo je od velike pomoći za razumevanje ovog nimalo jednostavnog i često, prema autorovom sudu, pogrešno interpretiranog i recipiranog Platonovog dela.

Knjiga počinje sa *Uvodnim razmatranjima* u kojima se autor bavi odnosom *Timaja* i presokratske filozofije prirode, te Platonovom heuristikom filozofske mitologije, što tematski zaokružuje posvećivanjem pažnje značaju mita o Eru, u dijalogu *Država*. U narednom poglavlju koje se bavi značajem mitskih aspekata u *Timaju*, Kandić tematizuje bitne spone između drugih važnih Platonovih dijaloga, poput *Države* i *Fedona*.

Timaj se tom prilikom ispostavlja kao jedna vrsta interpretativne matrice kosmološko-metafizičkih alegorija i mitova drugih dijaloga, te je na taj način omogućen prikaz *Timaja* i *Države* kao jedne tematske i logičke celine. S posebnom pažnjom se čini osvrt ka mitu o Eru, koji sadrži bitne matematičke, kosmološke i mitske elemente, a koji će kasnije biti podrobnije razmatrani i tematizovani u *Timaju*.

Jedan od ključnih momenata, jeste upravo Platonovo akcentovanje problema *slobode*, odnosno, slobodnog izbora, te njegovih posledica na čoveka, a što upravo predstavlja tematsku sadržinu i zadatak *Timaja*. Kandić primećuje da se u *Državi* započinje sa programom osmišljavanja temeljne reforme tradicionalne grčke mitologije, dok se u *Timaju* načelno nadilazi *mythos-logos* distinkcija. Tako se „božansko znanje" prevodi na spoznajnu ravan koja je bliža ljudima. Posmatrano na taj način, *Timaj* pruža i kosmološko i prirodnofilozofsko rasvetljavanje pitanja strukture kosmosa i idealne ljudske zajednice.

Na ovo poglavlje nadovezuje se naredno, koje se bavi pitanjem kompatibilnosti mita i nauke, odnosno *mythos*-a, *logos*-a i *episteme* u Platonovoj misli, i u kojem se iznosi zapažanje o neophodnoj vezi ovo troje, pogotovo kada je reč o razumevanju fundamentalnih postavki timajevske kosmologije. Mitski elementi dijaloga nas upućuju, najpre putem pojmova demijurga i duše sveta, na *unutrašnju strukturu i inherentna svojstva naše psihe*, čime dolazimo do zaključka da je duša sveta uzor individualnoj ljudskoj psihi, a demijurg kao metafora čiste inteligencije, zapravo, *uzor racionalnosti*, pa je tako čitava kosmološka teorija shvaćena kao slobodno odabrani model poimanja kosmosa, a ne kao doslovni prikaz objektivne stvarnosti kao takve.

Tematsko i problemsko središte knjige sadržano je u ideji o značaju i novitetu antropološke i pragmatičke zaleđine bitnih mitskih i naučnih pojmova u Platonovom *Timaju*, poput pojmova *demijurga* i *duše sveta*, a što nam ilustruju i termini *eikos mythos* i *eikos logos*. Premda se autor kroz čitavo delo osvrće na ove teme, tek u završnom poglavlju *Nauka u dijalogu Timaj*, tematizovanje ovih pitanja dobija svoj puni izraz.

Prema Kandićevom sudu, za razliku od savremenih kosmoloških teorija, Platonova je zasnovana na uvidu u neophodnost rasvetljavanja i vlastitih psihičkih struktura, odnosno, kognitivnih dispozicija individualne, ljudske psihe. Razlog tome je taj što bez pretpostavke postojanja čoveka ne bi ni imalo smisla govoriti o nekakvoj „kosmologiji". Čoveku se na taj način dodeljuje gotovo konstitutivna funkcija u formiranju jedne kosmološke teorije.

Osvrnuvši se ka etimologiji pojma „demijurg" autor zaključuje da Platonov odabir upravo tog termina nikako nije stvar slučajnosti, te da to ukazuje na bitnu antropološku zaleđinu takvog odabira. Demijurg je, u načelu, *uzor za individualni ljudski razum*, dok je duša sveta *uzor za individualnu ljudsku psihu*, a što su paradigme prema kojima treba da se ravnamo, s ciljem da steknemo što jasnije razumevanje ne samo kosmosa, već i nas samih.

S tim u vezi, Kandić skreće pažnju na to da je važno primetiti da Platon poklanja značajnu pažnju ispitivanju *mikrostruktura* kosmosa, imajući na umu upravo pomenute zadatke razumevanja strukture čitave stvarnosti, ali i *inherentnih svojstava* i *strukture individualne*

psihe. Platonov „geometrijski atomizam" isto je toliko značajno ostvarenje dijaloga *Timaj*, kao i matematički i geometrijski model kosmosa.

Pored toga, odabir termina „demijurg" vođeno je tom idejom da se kosmos, odnosno, njegov matematički model ne predstavi kao delo „slepe nužnosti", za razliku od nekih starijih kosmoloških teorija, već *umstvenog* i *slobodnog* odabira najboljeg mogućeg dizajna, čime se postavlja platforma za tematizovanje mesta *slobode* i *svrhovitosti* u prirodi, a čega nesumnjivo imamo iskustvo kao istovremeno umna i telesna bića.

Na tom tragu mogli bismo reći da knjiga adresira kompleksni i provokativni filozofski problem odnosa slobode i nužnosti, u okvirima timajevske kosmološke teorije. *Timaj* u osnovi i jeste prikaz te pojmovne kompleksnosti i napetosti u pokušajima da se s jedne strane objasni nužnost, odnosno, kosmička strukturiranost, ali da se objasne i opravdaju elementi svrhovitosti, umnosti, svesnosti i slobode. No, upravo se u terminima demijurga i duše sveta ogledaju neophodni antropološki elementi tumačenja strukture kosmosa. Ovi su impregnirani bitnim epistemološkim i metafizičkim, ali i etičkim i estetičkim implikacijama.

U pogledu važnosti ovog mitskog pojma, autoru je stalo da pokaže da se pojam demijurga ne može interpretativno redukovati na druge, bezumne, mehaničke funkcije prirode i stvorenog sveta. Takođe, stalo je i do toga da se dokaže faličnost nekih od uvreženih shvatanja prema kojima se pojam demijurga može shvatiti ne samo kao „ukras", ili zamenljiva alegorija, već se može u potpunosti odbaciti ili čak stopiti sa drugim pojmovima, kao što je *duša sveta*. Čineći kritički osvrt ka delima renomiranih svetskih stručnjaka, pretežno delima autora iz angloameričkog intelektualnog delokruga, Kandić ukazuje na to da se pojam demijurga mora razumeti kao fiksna tačka oko koje se ostali pojmovi pribiru i na temelju kojeg se gradi čitava pojmovna zgrada timajevske kosmologije.

Na temelju razumevanja da ono što podražava ontološki uvek ostaje „ispod" i „niže" od predmeta svog podražavanja, autor dolazi do zaključka da se pojmovi „demijurg" i „duša sveta" moraju prvenstveno tumačiti u ključu ontologije mimezisa: *demijurg* i *duša sveta* predstavljaju paradigme ili uzore za individualni ljudski razum, odnosno, individualnu dušu, prema kojoj se razum odnosi isto kao što se i demijurg odnosi prema duši sveta.

Uzimajući to u obzir, uviđamo da dijalog *Timaj* nije samo prikaz strukturiranosti kosmosa, već i ljudske duše i njenih kognitivnih kapaciteta i delatnosti. Ovaj Platonov dijalog se ispostavlja kao primer temeljnog promišljanja matematičkog i geometrijskog modela kosmosa, u kojem ljudski spoznajni kapaciteti igraju neizostavno važnu, pa čak i konstitutivnu ulogu u slobodnom koncipiranju i osmišljavanju jednog takvog naučnog *modela*.

LEA DAVID, *PROŠLOST NAS NE MOŽE IZLEČITI: PROPISANO SEĆANJE – OPASNOSTI STANDARDIZACIJE U IME LJUDSKIH PRAVA*, STEFAN STOJANOVIĆ (PREV.), REKOM MREŽA POMIRENJA, BEOGRAD, 2021.

Dimitrije Matić

Najnovija knjiga Lee David, sociološkinje sa Univerzitetskog koledža Dablin, donosi jedan nov uvid u odnose kulture sećanja i ljudskih prava. Nadovezujući se na svoja ranija istraživanja o načinima sećanja na Holokaust i genocid u Srbiji i drugim evropskim zemljama, autorka je kao osnovu svog teorijskog pristupa temi izabrala posmatranje *ljudskih prava* kao ideologije, nasuprot normativnoj percepciji koja je i dalje dominantna u akademskoj i aktivističkoj zajednici. Umesto posmatranja ljudskih prava kao univerzalnih vrednosti čije je usvajanje neizbežno radi postizanja mira u postkonfliktnim društvima (normativni pristup), David postavlja pitanje opravdanosti ovakvih shvatanja i svrsishodnijim smatra viđenje ljudskih prava kao ideologije u metodološkom i teorijskom smislu. Tako shvaćena ideologija ima svoju specifičnu istoriju, ključne vrednosne postulate, kao i posebne načine osmišljavanja i primenjivanja. Iako posmatra ljudska prava kao ideal i najbolju viziju kojoj se može stremiti, autorka ističe da je jedan od glavnih ciljeva njene knjige istraživanje onih neželjenih i često zanemarenih ishoda ideologije ljudskih prava, najpre na primeru posmatranja studija slučaja Zapadnog

Balkana (Srbija, Hrvatska, Bosna i Hercegovina) sa jedne strane i Izraela i Palestine sa druge strane.

Prva tri poglavlja (*Uvod*; *Ljudska prava kao ideologija? Prepreke i korist*; *Šta je moralno sećanje?*) bave se objašnjenjem teorijskih polazišta. Proučavanjem veze između ljudskih prava i politike sećanja, konstatuje se da je njhov međusobni odnos u proteklim decenijama doveo do međunarodne standardizacije preporuka o suočavanju države sa svojom represivnom prošlošću. Ovakva standardizacija, koju David naziva *globalna agenda memorijalizacije* čiji je cilj učvršćivanje *moralnog sećanja*, ima svoju istorijsku osnovu u nastanku i globalnom širenju *nemačkog modela* suočavanja sa nacističkom prošlošću, koji je obuhvatao brojne unutrašnje (državne institucije, obrazovni sistem, sudstvo, javne i stručne debate, fokus na žrtvama) i spoljnopolitičke (prijateljstvo sa Francuskom, stvaranje Evropske zajednice) procese. Tokom Hladnog rata i u posthladnoratovskoj epohi, ovaj model postao je putokaz za suočavanje sa nasleđem nasilne prošlosti brojnim državama u procesu demokratizacije, što je omogućilo jačanje organizacione i ideološke moći ljudskih prava (najviše putem

delovanja međunarodnih organizacija poput Ujedinjenih nacija, Organizacije za evropsku bezbednost i saradnju, Amnesti Internešnel (Amnesty International), Hjuman rajts voč (Human Rights Watch) i drugih). Od vremena 70-ih i 80-ih godina i sa padom brojnih autoritarnih režima (vojni režimi u Latinskoj Americi, pad komunizma u Istočnoj Evropi), izdvojila su se tri ključna aspekta moralnog sećanja: *suočavanje s prošlošću*, *dužnost da pamtimo* i *pravda za žrtve*. Nakon prikaza istorijskog i teorijskog razvoja vrednosti ljudskih prava, autorka navodi i pojedine negativne posledice ovog procesa – dekontekstualizacija i shvatanje nemačkog modela kao jedinog ispravnog načina za odnos društva prema represivnom nasleđu, zanemarivanje drugih modela (npr. španskog) i nekritičko preuzimanje *ideje izlečenja* iz sfere psihoanalize, čime se previđa da pojedinci i društva na različite načine prevazilaze prošle traume.

Naredna dva poglavlja odnose se na studije slučaja putem kojih se posmatraju efekti standardizacije sećanja i globalne agende memorijalizacije na prostoru Srbije, Hrvatske, BiH, Izraela i Palestine. Od posebne važnosti je analiza uticaja spoljnih činilaca na politike pamćenja, kao i šire (globalne) implikacije praksi memorijalizacije koju političke elite ovih država pokušavaju da promovišu. Odredbe mirovnih sporazuma (Oslo 1993. i Dejton 1995. godine), kao i pristupni pregovori za učlanjenje u Evropsku uniju (EU), u manjoj ili većoj meri podrazumevali su usvajanje praksi globalne agende memorijalizacije radi izgradnje održivog mira i poboljšanja međunacionalnih odnosa. Proces evropskih integracija davao je Evropskoj uniji veću moć da zemljama Zapadnog Balkana nametne „poželjne" obrasce sećanja, ali je primena ovih vrednosti na lokalnom nivou često imala sasvim suprotne efekte. Sa druge strane, Izrael i Palestina su, uprkos povremenim pokušajima promovisanja pomiriteljskih

narativa, i dalje nastojali da internacionalizuju glavne simbole nacionalnih patnji iz prošlosti (Holokaust i Nakba) i time steknu status žrtve koja ima najviše prava na *moralno sećanje*.

Načinima na koji je došlo do ovakvih promena i njihovim posledicama bave se šesto i sedmo poglavlje (*Ljudska prava, sećanje i mikrosolidarnost*; *Propisano sećanje, uvod u novi sukob?*). Nakon prethodne analize primene postulata moralnog sećanja i filtriranja tih vrednosti koz potrebe nacionalnih političkih elita (makro nivo), u završnim poglavljima David ispituje usvajanje ovih ideala u lokalnim zajednicama (mikro nivo) kroz proučavanje rada velikog broja dijaloških grupa koje okupljaju ljude na osnovu određenog kategoričkog poretka (npr. počinioci i žrtve) ili na osnovu etničke pripadnosti. Najveći značaj knjige leži upravo u ovim zaključcima, te David jasno pokazuje da je usvajanje univerzalnih vrednosti ljudskih prava kroz učešće u navedenim susretima suštinski kratkoročno (izjave pojedinaca o „iskustvima koja menjaju život"), dok na duže staze ovako koncipiran osećaj solidarnosti bledi i dolazi do jačanja etnonacionalističkih sentimenata i obnavljanja netrpeljivosti. Prema tumačenju autorke, mogu se izdvojiti tri najvažnija objašnjenja ovakvog razvoja: pogrešna pretpostavka o univerzalnoj primenljivosti agende memorijalizacije ljudskih prava na (post)konfliktna društva, nemogućnost kreiranja svesti o pripadnosti globalnoj zajednici „moralnog sećanja" i sukob ovih vrednosti sa dominantnim nacionalističkim narativima o prošlosti, kao i stvaranje novih nejednakosti svojevrsnim „takmičenjem" različitih grupa žrtava i organizacija za ograničen prostor i resurse koji će im obezbediti priznanje (simboličko ili materijalno) patnji.

Studija Lee David pružila je važne nove poglede na to kakvo je stvarno iskustvo primene globalno standardizovanih praksi sećanja u čijoj su osnovi vrednosti ljudskih prava. Ispitivanjem

različitih dijaloških grupa i lokalnih percepcija ovih strategija prikazane su najvažnije kratkoročne i dugoročne posledice *moralno vođene memorijalizacije*. Dodatna vrednost ovog istraživanja leži u isticanju važnosti internalizacije vrednosti ljudskih prava kod pojedinaca, što je i adekvatni pokazatelj (ne)uspešnosti glavnih nosilaca ovih vrednosti u prevazilaženju konflikata u društvima sa traumatičnim nasleđem. Međutim, studija nije bez određenih nedorečenosti. Kao osnovu za posmatranje ljudskih prava kao ideologije David je preuzela teoriju Siniše Maleševića o nacionalizmu. Imajući u vidu da autorka sve vreme ističe potpunu različitost ljudskih prava i nacionalizma (ciljevi, društveni uticaj, ključni nosioci i njihova organizaciona moć, metode širenja i učvršćivanja ideologije), postavlja se pitanje adekvatnosti preuzimanja teorijskih polazišta jedne ideologije zarad opisivanja druge. Autorka ne odbacuje vrednosti ljudskih prava kao ideala i naglašava štetnost nacionalizma kao sistema koji konstatno jača međuetničke tenzije, ali ne ukazuje na moguće alternative za uspešniju izgradnju međunacionalne solidarnosti u postkonfliktnim društvima. Treba imati u vidu da cilj ove studije nije bio dublje bavljenje onime što bi bila alternativa dosadašnjim neuspešnim praksama pomirenja, ali bi njihovo pominjanje moglo biti važna dopuna ovom istraživanju. Uprkos pojedinim nedostacima, knjiga Lee David predstavlja važan naučni doprinos i nezaobilazno štivo za sve one koji se bave odnosom kulture sećanja i ljudskih prava.

VI

FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE
IZ RADA INSTITUTA

PREGLED TRIBINA I KONFERENCIJA U INSTITUTU ZA FILOZOFIJU I DRUŠTVENU TEORIJU 2021.

Sanja Iguman i Vukan Marković

PREDAVANJA I SEMINARI:

FEBRUAR:

17. februar, sreda: Sanja Jankov: „Odbačeno, odbacivanje i telo: Sećanje na Holokaust kroz savremenu umetnost“

19. februar, petak: Godišnji seminar „Horizonti slobode“ – Džo Šo: „Paradoksi građanstva u doba pandemije“

24. februar, sreda: Ivana Dobrotić: „Politike skrbi za djecu predškolske dobi, rodne i društvene nejednakosti: Srbija u komparativnoj perspektivi“

MART:

10. mart, sreda: Seminar o Knjizi Lee David *Prošlost nas ne može izlečiti: Opasnosti nametanja sećanja u ime ljudskih prava*

- Učesnici: dr Lea David, autorka, dr Jelena Vasiljević, dr Jelena Đureinović, dr Olga Manojlović Pintar, dr Katarina Ristić, moderator: dr Milivoj Bešlin.

12. mart, petak: Saša Karalić: „Množina Veličanstva: Kolektivizam u savremenoj umetnosti i politici“

15. mart, ponedeljak: Slobodanka Boba Dekić: „Politika ili „polisi“? Suočavanje s antirodnim narativima o porodici i rodu u LGBT organizacijama u Srbiji, Bosni i Hrvatskoj“

18. mart, četvrtak: Razgovor o knjizi Nevene Daković *Slike bez sećanja: Trauma, Film Transmisija*

- Učesnici: dr Nevena Daković, autorka, dr Dragana Stojanović, dr Aleksandra Kolaković, Ivan Velisavljević, dr Predrag Krstić.

24. mart, sreda: Ivan Kadić: „Digitalni 21. vek inovacija u arhitekturi, infrastrukturi i pametnim gradovima“

31. mart, sreda: Zoltan Devavari: „Antisemitizam, Holokaust, emigracija – Jevreji u Subotici 1918–1948“

APRIL:

02. april, petak: Janis Stavrakakis: „Studije populizma u doba post-istine: Stereotipi i izazovi“

07. april, sreda: Marija Antić i Ivana Radačić: „Rod u međunarodnom pravu i diskurs o „rodnoj ideologiji““

12. april, ponedeljak: Dušan Maljković: „Denaturalizacija transpolnosti od psihoanalize do kvir teorije“

14. april, sreda: Jelena Vasiljević i Bojana Radovanović: „Koncepti i prakse solidarnosti i filantropije: sličnosti i razlike“

21. april, sreda: Desiree Željka Milošević: „Ekologija i Internet – da li Internet može da pomogne da reši ekološka pitanja?“

22. april, četvrtak: Siniša Malešević: „Živeti u nacional-centričnom svetu“

28. april, sreda: Seminar o knjizi Adriane Zaharijević: **Život tela: Politička filozofija Džudit Batler**

- Učesnici: Jelena Ćeriman, Igor Cvejić, Irena Fiket, Marjan Ivković, Marko Konjović, Predrag Krstić, Mark Lošonc (Losoncz), Olga Nikolić, Aleksandar Ostojić, Andrea Perunović, Srđan Prodanović, Milan Urošević i Zona Zarić.

29. april, četvrtak: Petra Gering: „Teorija čula između filozofije nauke, fenomenologije i etike: Mišel Ser“

MAJ:

3. maj, ponedeljak: „Ruža Smilova: Iliberalni konstitucionalizam? Zaokret protiv “rodova” u bugarskom ustavnom diskursu“

19. maj, sreda: „Milovan Šuvakov: Vizuelizacije otvorenih podataka“

26. maj, sreda: **„Šta je još preostalo od Bildung-a? Razgovor o knjizi** *Od obrazovanja do neobrazovanja* Igora Cvejića i Predraga Krstića

- Učesnici: Predrag Krstić, Igor Cvejić, Aleksandar Dobrijević, Aleksandar Milanković, Olga Nikolić, Ivan Nišavić, Aleksandar Ostojić, Vuk Petrović, Iva Subotić Krasojević, Marija Velinov.

JUN:

01. jun, utorak: Siran Hovhanisjan: „Studirati rod u Jermeniji: istraživanje, politika i buđenje antidženderizma“

11. jun, petak: Đorđe Hristov: „Građanin, buržoa i nomad: Shvatanje tri figure kroz pojam političke hrabrosti kod Hegela i Deleza/Gatarija“

14. jun, ponedeljak: predavanje Mateo Poletini: „Termodinamika između nauke i mita“

23. jun, sreda: Miljenko Hajdarović i Aleksandar Todosijević: „Kako predavati raspad jedne zemlje“

28. jun, ponedeljak: Čedomir Markov: „Nepoverenje i/ili cinizam: Ka unapređenju konceptualnog okvira za proučavanje krize u odnosima medija i publike“

SEPTEMBAR:

29. septembar, sreda: Seminar o knjizi Snežane Vesnić *Arhitektonski koncept: objekt stvarnosti i subjekt iluzije*

30. septembar, četvrtak i 01. oktobar, petak: Džonatan Volf: „Angažovana i primenjena filozofija: o društvenoj ulozi savremene teorije“

OKTOBAR:

14. oktobar, četvrtak: Nada Banjanin Đuričić „Kako predavati o Holokaustu“

29. oktobar, petak: Dimitris Christopoulos: „Pitanja i odgovori o makedonskom pitanju“

NOVEMBAR:

05. novembar, petak: Tribina o knjizi Aleksandra Pavlovi**ća** *Imaginarni Albanac: simbolika Kosova i figura Albanca u srpskoj kulturi*

- Učesnici: Aleksandar Pavlović, autor, Milan Miljković i Idro Seferi. Moderator: Milivoj Bešlin.

08. novembar, ponedeljak: Dragana Mrvoš: "Kako se suprostaviti kolektivnom konformizmu? Kritički prikaz eseja „Moć nemoćnih" Václava Havela"

10. novembar, sreda: Milana Gajović: "Književnost i samosvijest: (ne)dostižnost sopstva u djelima Uhvati zeca i Mliječni zubi Lane Bastašić"

15. novembar, ponedeljak: Nikola Zdravković: "U ime tržišta: Liberalizam i teorije zavera"

22. novembar, ponedeljak: Jelena Kupsjak: "U ruševinama tranzicije: etnografija (mentalnog) zdravlja u Hrvatskoj"

DECEMBAR:

03. decembar, petak: Voin Milevski: "Ideja moralnog obrazovanja"

08. decembar, sreda: Katja Kahlina: "Nova geopolitika seksualnosti: transnacionalni anti-LGBTQ"

10. decembar, petak: Predstavljanje knjige Aleksandre Bulatović i Olivere Pavićević *Crna ekonomija i crno društvo*

13. decembar, ponedeljak: Razgovor o knjizi Aleksandre Ilić Rajković i Sanje Petrović Todosijević *Bez* **škole šta** *bi mi?! Ogledi iz istorije obrazovanja u Srbiji i Jugoslaviji od 19. veka do danas*

22. decembar, sreda: Dragana Stojanović: "Memorijalni prostori u naracijama današnjice: Holokaust i etika turizma"

KONFERENCIJE, SIMPOZIJUMI I PANELI:

FEBRUAR:

03. – 04. februar, sreda i četvrtak: **Međunarodni kolokvijum posvećen Desetoj Nedoumici (Ambiguum) Sv. Maksima Ispovednika**

3. FEBRUAR, SREDA:

Dionisios Skliris: „Pojam oboženja u Desetoj *Nedoumici* Maksima Ispovednika"

Ištvan Percel: „Odbrana učenja o stvaranja sveta u vremenu Svetog Maksima i njeno mesto u doktrinarnoj istoriji hrišćanskog platonizma"

Aleksandar Đakovac: „Maksim Ispovednik *i Korpus Hermetikum*: moguće veze"

Endre Hamvaš: „Metafora putovanja duše – platonski motiv u *Nedoumici* 10"

Vladimir Cvetković: „Prirodno sozercanje: *Nedoumica* 10.19"

Torstejn Tolefsen: „Razumevanje *Nedoumice* 10.37"

Mikloš Vasanji: „*Nedoumica* 10, poglavlje 41: Beskonačnost Boga"

4. FEBRUAR, ČETVRTAK:

Lectura Maximi: Nedoumica 10: 37-41 (predsedavajući Vladimir Cvetković)

Izveštaji o trenutnim doktorskim istraživanjima

Bernadet Gut: „Makimusov pojam apatije i njegova filozofska pozadina"

Daniel Hajde: „Svet kao sveta tajna: evharistijska ontologija Maksima Ispovednika"

Chatroom Sv. Maksim: trenutni radovi i projekti; planovi za budući kolokvijum.

23. februar, utorak: **Međunarodna radionica – Pokret nesvrstanih i socijalistička Jugoslavija: Istraživanje društvenih, kulturnih, političkih i ekonomskih imaginarija**

MART:

03. mart, sreda: Panel diskusija: **Kriza i oporavak, od ranjivosti do autonomije**

- Učesnici: Jasna Hrnčić, Slobodan Cvejić, Dušan Ristić, Ljiljana Pantović, moderatori: Aleksandra Bulatović i Adriana Zaharijević

26. mart, petak: **Razgovori među sociolozima I (IFDT i Fakultet za sociologiju Univerziteta u Varšavi):** Dijagnostifikovanje društvene dominacije: Slučajevi poljsko-ukrajinskih i srpsko-albanskih odnosa

- Učesnici: Ewa Nowicka-Rusek, Marjan Ivković, Barbara Bossak-Herbst

APRIL:

15. april, četvrtak: **Razgovori među sociolozima II (IFDT i Fakultet za sociologiju Univerziteta u Varšavi): Diskurs neoliberalizma kao oblik moći – Lakanova teorija društvene veze i neoliberalne governmentalnosti**

- Učesnici: Krzysztof Świrek i Milan Urošević

MAJ:

14. maj, petak: Panel diskusija: **Razgovori o populizmu**

- Učesnici: Milena Dragićević Šešić, Mirjana Nikolić, Monika Mokre, Mika Pjukonen, Marjan Ivković, Mark Lošonc.

18. maj, utorak: Komemoracija godišnjice smrti Trive Indića

24. maj, ponedeljak: **Otvoreni razgovori: Kakvo društvo želimo? Kakvu životnu sredinu želimo?**

- Učesnici: Vladimir Đurđević, Vladimir Beškoski, Iva Marković, Predrag Momčilović, Hristina Vojvodić, Jasminka Oliverić Young, Aleksandar Macura, Dragana Đorđević, Ratko Ristić.

JUN:

02. jun, sreda: Panel diskusija: **Globalna etika brige**

- Učesnici: Estel Ferarez, Fiona Robinson, Gijom le Blan, Sara Klark Miler.
- Organizatori: Marko Konjović, Zona Zarić

09. jun, sreda: Panel diskusija: Šta je dobro obrazovanje u Srbiji?

- Učesnici: Iva Subotić Krasojević, Dejan Bošković, Tatjana Marković Topalović, Predrag Starčević, Slavica Gomilanović, Zorica Ivanović, Vigor Majić, Srđan Verbić.

30. jun, sreda: **Na šta mislimo kada kažemo… dobro društvo?**

Prezentovani naslovi u okviru projekta "**Angažuj, inspiriši, osnaži: Rizom angažovane demokratije**" koji realizuje IFDT sa Institutom za demokratski angažman jugoistočne Evrope, uz podršku Fondacije za otvoreno društvo:

Ivica Mladenović i Goran Marković: „Na šta mislimo kada kažemo… **Novi društveni ugovor** "

Jelena Ćeriman i Zona Zarić: „Na šta mislimo kada kažemo… **Nove politike brige**"

Mario Reljanović: „Na šta mislimo kada kažemo…**Dostojanstven rad**"

Milica Sekulović i Olga Nikolić: „Na šta mislimo kada kažemo… **Novi obrazovni sistem**"

Predrag Đurić: „Na šta mislimo kada kažemo… **Novi zdravstveni sistem**"

Iva Marković: „Na šta mislimo kada kažemo… **Održivost i zaštita životne sredine**"

Marko Božić: „Na šta mislimo kada kažemo… **Sekularna država**"

Adriana Zaharijević: „Na šta mislimo kada kažemo… **Poboljšanje položaja žena**"

Milenko Srećković i Vladimir Vasić: „Na šta mislimo kada kažemo… **Nova poljoprivredna politika**"

Nina Mihaljinac: „Na šta mislimo kada kažemo... **Nove kulturne politike**"

SEPTEMBAR:

20. 09. – 24.09. DRUGA LETNJA ŠKOLA DRUŠTVENE ANGAŽOVANOSTI I DEMOKRATIJE

20. septembar, ponedeljak: Panel: **Kriza demokratije u regionu jugoistočne Evrope**

- Učesnici: Aleksandra Nikšić, Aleksandra Tomanić, Bojana Selaković, Nebojša Vladisavljević, moderator Vujo Ilić

24. septembar, petak: Panel: **Eko-aktivizam u Srbiji**

- Učesnici: Hristina Vojvodić, Dragana Arsić, Iva Marković, Tijana Ljubenović, Nikola Arsenić, moderatorka Olga Nikolić

OKTOBAR:

18. oktobar, ponedeljak: Otvoreni razgovori: **Kakvu ekonomiju želimo?**

- Učesnici: Mario Reljanović, Sarita Bradaš, Mihailo Gajić, Isidora Beraha, Sonja Avlijaš, Saša Ranđelović, Svetislav Kostić, Jelena Žarković.

NOVEMBAR:

01. novembar, ponedeljak: Otvoreni razgovori **Kakvo obrazovanje želimo?**

- Učesnici: Dušan Blagojević, Zoran Dimić, Damir Grošin, Olja Jovanović, **Živka** Krnjaja, Ljiljana Lazarević, Maja Maksimović, Lidija Radulović, Jelena Vasiljević.

05. novembar, petak: Konferencija, **Kosovo-Srbija: Drugačiji pristup**

16- 17. novembar, sreda: Konferencija **„Kulturne politike poverenja: priznanje, institucije, demokratija"**

- Organizacija: grupa GINEDIS Univerziteta Komplutense u Madridu i Laboratorije za društvenu kritiku IFDT, Nuria Sánchez Madrid i Adriana Zaharijević

16. NOVEMBAR, SREDA:

Panel 1:

Clara Navarro: "Which King, Whose Sovereignty? Notes on the Nation-State in Times of Globalization"

Srdjan Prodanovic: "Normative intuitions, Trust and Social Change"

Mark Losoncz: "Why Should We Trust the State? Authority and Obligations From a Non-Statist Perspective"

Panel 2:

Gonçalo Marcelo: "Recognition, Suspicion and Critique. Towards a Restorative Hermeneutics of Trust"

David Hernández de la Fuente: "Modern Culture of Legality and the Classical World: between Constitutional Patriotism and State of Exception"

Lydia de Tienda Palop: "Trust and deception. The ethical dilemma in contemporary military"

17. NOVEMBAR, ČETVRTAK:

Panel 3:

Jelena **Ćeriman**, Irena Fiket i Jelena Vasiljević: "Trust relations in a neoliberalized welfare system: the case of social assistance in Serbia"

Clara Ramas: "Politics of resentment and the collapse of trust in late Modernity"

Marjan Ivković: "Trust and Structural Domination in Capitalism"

Panel 4:

Nuria Sánchez Madrid: "Transformations of Labour and Institutional Distrust in Contemporary Spain"

Igor Cvejić: "Trust as an invitation to introduce new norms or to change the existing ones: interdependence and uncertainty"

Andrea Perunović: "Money: Towards a Critique of the Fundamental Institution of Social Trust"

24. novembar, sreda: Panel diskusija: **Ciklus „Kako predavati…?" Kako (i zašto) predavati filantropiju?**

- Učesnici: Jelena Lončar, Natalija Perišić, Vukašin Kuč, Željko Mitkovski, Đurđa Trajković, moderatorka Bojana Radovanović, moderator Predrag Krstić

26. novembar, petak: Panel diskusija: **Emocionalna veštačka inteligencija i regulacija sistema za preporučivanje sadržaja**

- Učesnici: Andrew McStay, Lazar Džamić i Ljubiša Bojić

DECEMBAR:

15. decembar, sreda: Panel diskusija: **Posledice izbora u Nemačkoj**

- Učesnici: Nemanja Georgijević, Dušan Dostanić, Vladimir Simović, Nemanja Rujević.

17. decembar, petak: Panel diskusija: **Razgovori o digitalnom društvu 2021**

- Uvodna reč: Gazela Pudar Draško

Prezentacije radova članova DigiLaba:

Lana Tucaković: "Moć medija: LIWC analiza"

Marija Dankulov: "Kako su vremenske promene povezane sa raspoloženjem i ekspresivnošću na Twitter-u"

Nemanja Nikolić: "Država protiv anti-vaksera: Analiza COVID-19 "eho komora" u Srbiji"

Vera Mevorah: "Digitalna (mim) kultura sa prostora eks-Jugoslavije"

Damir Zejnuhalović: "Tehnofeudalizam ilustrovan zabranom Trampa na Twitter-u"

Fireside chat – Uticaj veštačke inteligencije na budućnost društva

- Učesnici: Aleksandra Drecun, Milan Gospić, Ljubiša Bojić

Etika u veštačkoj inteligenciji: uvidi i izazovi, šta treba da se uradi u javnom i privatnom sektoru kako bi se obezbedila odgovorna veštačka inteligencija

- Učesnici: Aleksandar Linc Đorđević, Vladimir Cvetković, Miloš Jovanović, Maja Zarić, Kristof Rojer.

Digitalne tehnologije u umetnosti i kulturi

- Učesnici: Jelena Guga, Dimitrije Tadić, Bojana Matejić, Vitomir Jevremović, Toni Maslić

Svet pre i posle influensera: društveni i ekonomski uticaj

- Učesnici: Nevena Kurtović, Vladimir Aranđelović, Sanja Lalević, Lazar Džamić, Mara Ajnštajn

20. decembar, ponedeljak: Panel diskusija: **Poslednji čin Jugoslavije – 30 godina kasnije. Pouke za Evropu danas**

- Učesnici: Tvrtko Jakovina, Ivan Čolović, Josip Glaurdić, Jovo Bakić, moderator Milivoj Bešlin

21. decembar, utorak: Panel diskusija: **(Ne)solidarnost i Evropska unija: slom ili novi početak?**

- Učesnici: Filip Ejdus, Jelena Vasiljević, Srđan Majstorović, Igor Štiks

27. decembar, ponedeljak: Otvoreni razgovori: **Kakvo društvo želimo?**

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In the text: (Anscombe 1981: 82).

In a comment: Anscombe 1981: 82.

In the bibliography: Romano, Onofrio (2015), "Dépense", in Giacomo D'Alisa, Federico Demaria and Giorgos Kallis (eds.), *Decrecimiento. Un vocabulario para una nueva era*, Barcelona: Icaria editorial, pp. 138–142.

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