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PIERRE BOURDIEU: THEORY AND PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

PJER BURDIJE: TEORIJA I JAVNI ANGAŽMAN





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## INTRODUCTION

Ivica Mladenović and Zona Zarić

### **PIERRE BOURDIEU: THEORY AND PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT**

This topic was inspired by the international conference “Horizons of Engagement: Eternalizing Bourdieu” that took place at The Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory of The University of Belgrade, on December 22nd-23rd 2020, on the occasion of the ninetieth anniversary since the birth of the world’s most cited sociologist – Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002). The aim of this conference was to familiarise the domestic and regional audiences with the work of Pierre Bourdieu, by presenting his academic work alongside his public engagement. We dedicate this special topic to Bourdieu, in order to not only better understand how he became a leading intellectual – after having focused in his early years on following a professional career as a social scientist – but also to fully grasp the enduring political significance of his oeuvre and public engagement, as well as his understanding of the public roles of intellectuals. The three articles in this volume were chosen based on the rigour and depth in which they engage with some of the most prominent and applicable parts of Bourdieu’s work; and the round table discussion because it brought about a lively debate with distinguished guests, familiar with Bourdieu’s engagement in the public sphere, as well as the struggles and ethical dilemmas of the time.

Pierre Bourdieu was a French sociologist, born in 1930 in Denguin, a small rural town in southwestern France. He was educated in Pau and then in Paris, where he integrated the philosophy department of the prestigious *École normale supérieure* in 1951. He finished his studies in 1954. Before being called up for military service in Algeria, he worked as a high school teacher in Moulins. From 1958 to 1960, he worked as Assistant Professor at the *Faculty of Letters* in Algiers where he made a turn from philosophy to sociology. It was during this period that he wrote his first book: *The Sociology of Algeria*. Upon his return to Paris, Bourdieu became Assistant Professor at the *Sorbonne*, then a lecturer at the *Faculty of Letters* in Lille. In 1962, he became the Secretary General of the *Centre de Sociologie Européenne*, one of whose founders was Raymond Aron. In

1964, he became director of studies at the EHESS, and in 1968, he launched the Centre de sociologie de l'éducation et de la culture, which he directed until 1985.

His scientific prestige reached its peak in 1981 when he was appointed Professor of Sociology at the *Collège de France* (one of the highest honors in the French higher education system). By then he had distinguished himself by his editorial activity : in 1964 he launched the collection *Le sens commun* (published by *Les éditions de Minuit*), the journal *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* in 1975, and in 1992 the collection *Raison d'agir* (published by *Le Seuil*). In addition to his gold medal from the CNRS, he also received numerous international distinctions: the Huxley Medal, awarded by the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland; honorary doctorates from : the University of Berlin, the Goethe University in Frankfurt, and the University of Athens; and membership in the European Academy and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. However, the greatest indicator of the scope of Bourdieu's influence is the fact that he is the world's most cited sociologist, ahead of Émile Durkheim and the world's second most cited author in the social sciences and humanities, after Michel Foucault and ahead of Jacques Derrida. As Loïc Wacquant pointed out: "Bourdieu became a name for a collective research endeavour that transcends the borders of states and disciplines".

Pierre Bourdieu's conception of sociology is probably best embodied in the following statement: *sociology is a combat sport*. This is because at the heart of his major critiques lies a systemic critique of the main determinants of the established order: colonialism in *The Sociology of Algeria*, the school system in *The Inheritors*, the aristocratic pretensions of the ruling class in *Distinction*, and the state as an instrument of reproduction of the dominant groups in *The State Nobility*. In his vision, telling the truth about society becomes the issue of social and political struggle. Finally, with his rare direct "escapes" into politics (open support for Coluche in the 1981 presidential elections, his presidency of the commission that determined the content of educational programs during the Mitterrand era 1989-1990, the letter to the French government against the Gulf War in 1990, etc.), it is with the publication of the book *Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society* in 1993 – where he pleads for "another way of running the country" – that Pierre Bourdieu becomes one of the most committed intellectuals in France. His support for the strikers and demonstrations against the "Juppé Plan" in 1995, his support for the unemployed who organized the blockade of the *École normale supérieure* two years later, his support for Algerian intellectuals, and for European social movements, are but a few of the many symbolic and political struggles of Pierre Bourdieu, that have earned him the status of intellectual enemy number one, among the most tenacious defenders of the neoliberal system in the French intellectual field. He expressed his political vision of the left in the text entitled "For the left of the left" (*Pour une gauche de gauche*) (*Le Monde*, 8 april 1998). In 1996, he launched a collection of short books of political intervention, the first of which, his own, *On Television and Journalism*, criticizes media intellectuals, "fast thinkers" of the "disposable thought".

In line with *sociology as a combat sport*, we have envisioned this special topic as a selection of articles on the concepts and thoughts at the center of Bourdieu's work, capable of responding or at least of helping us better understand the world around us, even today. Nowadays, in an age in which the perfusion and confusion of information and of knowledge deepens, the very making sense of the social world has become extremely difficult, adding to the complexity of objective informing and forming of opinions, and thus public position taking.

The first article by Marc Crépon – the former head of the philosophy department of the very same École normale supérieure that Bourdieu attended – deals with the erroneous dichotomy between “democratic reason” and “raging passions”, and the demo-phobia that often derives from it, in an attempt to give voice to all those who do not have the right to public space – one of Bourdieu's main preoccupations ever since the publication of the *Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society* in 1993. Reflecting on the crisis of political reason through the analysis of demagogic rhetoric, embodied by the elites who claim to recognize themselves in its values and principles, and yet are impermeable to the “conditions of non-existence” in which a considerable part of the population lives. Crépon makes a compelling case for a crisis of political reason, through a nuanced elaboration of a political discourse that has lost touch with “all the misery of the world”, thus pointing out to a new age of inequality.

Further developing the emphasis on the importance of discourse in social life, the second article, written by Miloš Jovanović, compares Pierre Bourdieu's sociological approach with those of Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger. These approaches are brought together in the article by their intention of overcoming the gap between “objectivism” and “subjectivism” in social theory, as well as their critique of the relativistic tendencies of postmodernism. The author then goes on to elaborate the deepening thematization of the body as a locus of social influences, a topic central to Bourdieu's oeuvre through the notion of incorporation – the pivoting point of theory as well as the practical core of the habitus. The body being the pre-reflexive organ *par excellence*, as well as the locus of action, in which the “interiorisation of exteriority, and the externalisation of interiority” (*Outline of a Theory of Practice*) operate, provides probably the most radical of all examples in Bourdieu's oeuvre, of the many modes of domination and their endurance, analyzing the ways in which it is used, transformed and transfigured by the social world.

The third article by Inga Tomić Koludrović and Mirko Petrić discusses the usefulness of using a bourdieusian framework – by applying the notion of social capital in the study of South East European societies, based on data from projects on survival strategies of individuals and households – in theorizing the modernisation of gender relations. Bourdieu describes the strength, grip and endurance of symbolic power in its inscription in bodies in the form of dispositions that are constitutive of the habitus. Thus the question of gender arises – even though not explicitly theorized by Bourdieu – and offers a novel and captivating lense for the analysis of Bourdieu's main interrogation on

the persistence of domination through often invisible, symbolic power. Thus, establishing and publicly announcing the reality of the social world becomes, in Bourdieu's vision, and our own, the main stake of social struggles. Precisely because of that, he criticises the artificial separation between scientific work that produces knowledge and intellectual engagement that introduces that knowledge into the public sphere. This positioning, coupled with the American translation of *Distinction* by Harvard University Press in 1984, is how Pierre Bourdieu acquired international stardom as one of the most relevant thinkers of the social world, a claim this topic aims to demonstrate is just as relevant today, if not moreso.

Thus, the final, closing article of this special topic, recaps an enriching round table discussion with our distinguished guests: Gisèle Sapiro, Philip Golub, Frédéric Lebaron and Franck Poupeau, as it introduces the reader to Bourdieu's public engagement through direct and enticing recollections of those who have closely collaborated with him over the years, or have been influenced and inspired by his work. Using the tools of empirical sociology, and bringing up phenomena which are not easily understood, this article aims to provide more clarity to those who actually need to use these concepts from the social sciences to be able to own their own lives and become self-determining actors. Just as Bourdieu always approached the "hot topics" of the time, and current events as a *specific intellectual* – but also as a *collective intellectual*, through collaborations and public engagements with like-minded individuals – putting his symbolic capital at the service of others and political causes, thus practicing science as a "work in progress" rather than "a ready-made set of concepts".

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Marc Crépon

## THE IMPORTANCE OF PIERRE BOURDIEU TODAY. ON CONSENT TO MISERY

**ABSTRACT**

This article reflects on the crisis of political reason in this heyday of populist rhetoric, proposing to move beyond the erroneous dichotomy between "democratic reason" and "raging passions," and the demo-phobia that often derives from it. We propose instead to follow Bourdieu's footsteps in bringing our attention to the forms of impermeability that fracture our contemporary political and social life, establishing the conditions of possibility of the reasonable and the unreasonable. What marks contemporary political passions as particularly dangerous is their impermeability to the lessons of our historical past, to the moral condemnation of the political instrumentalization of difference and to the sacred character of fundamental principles. This hermeneutical gap, however, is later explained by a more fundamental analysis of the problem of contemporary impermeability, one which operates as a reversal of the dichotomy between political reason and passion. It is no longer the electorate, seduced by the sirens of populism, which is impermeable to the voice of political reason; it is, instead, this very reason, embodied by the elites who claim to recognize themselves in its values and principles, which has become impermeable to the "conditions of non-existence" in which a considerable part of the population lives. If there is a problem of contemporary impermeability, or imperturbability, it is that of a political discourse that has lost touch with "all the misery of the world".

**KEYWORDS**

Pierre Bourdieu,  
consent, democratic  
reason, raging of  
passions,  
contemporary  
impermeability,  
populism

*To my students, with gratitude*

I

We wanted to regard the elections that brought to power charismatic populist, reactionary, sexist and xenophobic leaders all around the world as an accident of history, a fit of bad temper or an outbreak of fever. We wanted to believe that this was a moment of bewilderment of angry peoples, disappointed in politics, and that the first steps of these leaders in violating the principles and

values of democracy would soon bring the voters back to “reason”. We imagined that, in spite of everything, there existed a consensus on democratic values and principles, a consensus stronger than negative passions and constitutive of a shared heritage; a consensus strong enough to reconstitute, if not impose, a symbolic barrier against the questioning of these principles, or their destruction. This consensus had certainly given way once, but we thought it deeply rooted in the spirit and democratic culture of men and women who were not prepared to give it up permanently. We were mistaking our desires for actual reality. In Europe or the United States alike, the infatuation of a large fringe of the electorate for the populist rhetoric of these vehement and often caricatural leaders – the very ones whose gestures, language, and violence offend the intellectual, cultivated, and comfortably installed elites – seems to be confirmed with each new election.

The recent American presidential election almost gave us another confirmation. For months, a landslide victory for the Democratic candidate had been anticipated, which the same elites had been waiting for as a return to normality. This did not happen. Not only was the democratic success hard-won, but its very conditions, namely the suspicions of fraud and the contestation of the result, confirmed the magnitude of people’s distrust in the institutions, in the State administration and in the media. The very image of the democratic process was weakened when the imperative to “count every vote”, because “the choice of each individual is equally important”, was no longer agreed upon. To refuse such a count, in a helpless attempt to forge a victory for Trump, meant not only turning one’s back on that basic form of political decency which is based on the acceptance of alternation; it meant, most importantly, turning a partisan and perverse invocation of democratic rules into the springboard for their destruction. Now that the confidence required by the democratic process in order to assure a peaceful transition was compromised, one could foresee that uncontrolled manifestations of violence would ensue.

This mistrust was not insignificant. It confirmed a gap. Suddenly, it reminded us of how fragile “democratic reason” is when confronted with the “rage of negative passions” that fracture society, while at the same time distancing it from the principles that are supposed to ensure its unity and coherence. It attested to the reality of a country so fractured that eventually the two camps no longer speak the same language, becoming irreconcilable as words have lost their common meaning and nothing can be agreed upon. The words “freedom”, “equality”, “democracy” no longer convey a shared meaning, if they ever did. Paradoxically, it became possible to use these words to justify and endorse their historical antonyms: discrimination, inequality, injustice. This was not surprising. Language is a weapon that few governments and political leaders have the wisdom to mobilize without creating disorder and confusion, to capture the attention of voters or discredit their opponents. With populism, however, a new threshold is crossed with the deliberate use of a vulgar language that does not shy away from provocation, choosing to cut itself off from the most elementary rules of democratic decency. The most sacred words of

language, bearers of values that one would expect to be commonly shared, find themselves drowned, overused, diverted from their meaning, caught in the net of passions, and instrumentalized by part of the elite to trick people into espousing causes that go to their own detriment.

There is no doubt that hatred, resentment, envy, and revenge are at work in populist rhetoric. However, are we deluding ourselves again in thinking of the gap as an opposition between “democratic reason” and “raging of passions”? Are we not, once again, demonstrating bad faith and blindness by belittling the “*vox populi*,” as the elites are always inclined to do when it disturbs their frames of thought and linguistic codes? Let us remark on three traits of impermeability which these negative political passions display throughout the world. First of all, they are impervious to the warnings of history against the disastrous effects of any renunciation of fundamental rights and freedoms. Secondly, they are impermeable to the commonly accepted condemnation of all political instrumentalization of differences and of their phobias (homophobia, xenophobia, islamophobia, etc.). Finally, they are impermeable to the sacrosanct character of fundamental principles such as the separation of powers, the equality of rights, the right of asylum, academic freedom, etc.

However, one must be careful not to misinterpret this impermeability, which can be understood in two ways. The first is to put it down to ignorance and the weight of affects. It amounts to thinking that once voters are seduced by the radicalism of populist discourse, if not its extremism or even fanaticism, their attachment to fundamental rights and freedoms can no longer shepherd their political choices. This somewhat arrogant view postulates that voters, glued to the screens that capture their attention and their emotions, prioritize the self-interested and partisan mimicry of their “passions” over any other consideration. What matters to such an electorate, so the argument goes, is neither the truth and correctness of the analyses offered by the political leaders who demand their votes, nor their fidelity to the principles and values of democracy.

What matters to such voters is the skill with which politicians declare themselves in unison with voters’ emotions, persuading them that they feel, live and think things as they do — reaching out to their desires. This way of representing the *vox populi*, which I once called “*demophobia*” (Crépon 2012a) produces a pejorative image of the people in order to govern them without consent or consultation. *Demo-phobia* is defined by two features. On the one hand, it institutes and systematizes the discrediting of any opinion that expresses mistrust, discontent, or even criticism of institutions. It thereby denies any power to the people by performing a perverse reversal of the legitimacy of democratic suffrage. On the other hand, it establishes a hierarchy of opinions, differentiating between the informed, educated and competent, and the captive and manipulated, or even the idiosyncratic, instinctive and impulsive.

The second way of understanding impermeability discredits this (Nietzschean and Platonic) *demo-phobia*. It turns it on its head, switching subject and object. In this second interpretation of the impermeability of political passions, it is no longer the electorate which is seduced by the sirens of populism and

impermeable to the voice of “political reason”; it is, instead, this very “reason”, embodied by those who claim to recognize themselves in its values and principles, which has become impermeable. But impermeable to what? This is the main question that I will try to address.

If we are to speak of impermeability, we should do so with regards to the “conditions of non-existence” in which a considerable part of the population lives without any form of social recognition. I will follow in Bourdieu’s footsteps to show this claim. If there is a problem of contemporary impermeability, or imperturbability, it pertains to a political discourse that has lost touch with “all the misery of the world” (Bourdieu 1993), to quote the title of a book Bourdieu wrote in 1993, which should have alarmed us while there was still time. The category of *misery* refers to those who, struggling to make ends meet, perceive themselves as the vanquished of history, accompanied by the permanent feeling that their sufferings are ignored, and their claims never heard. “Political reason”, to which they are asked to subscribe – keeping silent, letting others decide for them with patience and confidence, waiting for better days – no longer speaks to them, as it is built upon their erasure. To use Foucault’s term, not only “political reason” makes of their sufferings “a mute remnant of politics”, but, even more violently, turns them into the blind spot of political analyses and calculations, a collateral damage of economic development at a time of globalization, a fatality of history. This language no longer speaks to them because it has remained for too long impermeable to their needs and expectations.

## II

Bourdieu’s reflections are therefore about “misery” and ignorance thereof: what we neither knew nor wanted to see, a fracture, if not a cut, which has for too long been considered incidental and inconsequential. A large part of the intellectual elites, those called by Bourdieu the “heirs”, are confronted with the success of populism, with its verbal and physical violence, with racism, sexism, chauvinism, xenophobia and ultranationalism. With the notable exception of those who feed this vehemence with ambiguous statements and inflammatory speeches, the heirs do not understand what is happening, no matter their education, knowledge and culture.

They are heirs to this culture and the codes it has adopted, the languages it speaks, and they are sure to feel the impotence of their heritage to stop the inexorable rise of an infatuation made of false promises and bad solutions, which they know to have never contributed anything but a surplus of misfortune and misery to human society. They repeat this to no avail. Is their voice less booming than in the past? The authority attached to their knowledge and titles is no longer recognized, if not in a very partial way and by those who solicit their complicit expertise, which is part of what marks their separation from the rest of the population. Is it “the people” who have turned away from them? Or should it be said, on the contrary, that today the elites are paying



for the forgotten and repressed truth of their condition, namely their own indifference to the misfortune of men?

This is the question that leads us, today more than ever, in Bourdieu's footsteps. I wonder whether the elites could be accused of what Bourdieu called "an excess of confidence in the powers of discourse", and because of a lack of timely assessment of their impermeability they find themselves brutally exposed to doubts about the capacity of their work to change the course of the world – even a little! Is it for this reason that they show themselves, once again, powerless to prevent the worst from happening, wherever it is likely to happen, starting with the proliferation of authoritarian regimes, with all their impacts on the management of migratory, health, social, environmental, and climatic disasters?

Everything becomes unstoppable and their discourses flounder against the vanity of their effects; it is an understatement to say that this results in the kind of melancholy of history that usually accompanies the disillusionment of the powers of the mind. It would be wrong to reduce it to wounded pride. This would disregard the nihilism that lies in wait and consents to the worst with this simple utterance: what's the point! There is nothing we can do about it! All that can be said and done to analyze, criticize and warn against the evil that is brewing and try to prevent it will not change the course of history. It carries too little weight to counter the seductive power of verbal outrages and extreme measures, of the murderous adventurism (actually very organized) of a charismatic leader and his servants who do not care.

To abandon oneself to this melancholy, according to which the destiny of the intellectual elite would be to see catastrophes arrive inexorably, without having the slightest chance of avoiding them, is nevertheless to miss the point, which is not so much about the limits and powers of thought as about the conditions of its practice. If we consider our analysis of demo-phobia and of the reversal of impermeability, this amounts to saying that the analysis of populisms should not focus exclusively on the permeability of hearts and minds to the extreme theses conveyed by populist ideologies, but on the impermeability of the elites to the sense of abandonment, distress, helplessness and misery of those they have cut off themselves from, whom they do not see and do not hear except from afar. This amounts to questioning the resulting complicity, which I will call "consent to misery", as I have elsewhere spoken of "murderous consent" (Crépon 2012b).

The critique of scholarly reason that the *Meditations pascaliennes* deploy proves decisive here. Mocking the pretension of some intellectuals to experience revolutions in the order of words as radical revolutions in the order of things, Bourdieu invites them to pay greater attention to the course of the world and to be more humble: "Intellectual powers", he writes, "are most efficacious when they are exercised in the same direction as the immanent tendencies of the social world, at which time they indubitably redouble, through omission or compromise, the effects of the forces of the world, which are also expressed through them". (Bourdieu 2000: 3)

### III

Let us stop and think about the gulf that separates the elites (cultivated, educated in prestigious schools and universities) from this poor, vulnerable and disillusioned fringe of the population, which, at the very least, no longer gives them the credit of reason and truth, because they don't expect anything good from them! Let us take seriously an observation that is easy to make, in Europe, Brazil, the United States and all over the world: knowledge and information technologies have long ago dethroned all forms of authority that had arrogated to themselves the power to instruct and enlighten... by inviting the vanquished of history to be patient! To understand this fracture – and this is Bourdieu's lesson – we should start afresh from our *involvement* in the world, inasmuch as it *implicitly* determines the limits of what we take the *trouble* to see and hear, the constitution within us of the visible and the invisible, the audible and the inaudible, according to which we decide what revolts us and moves us to action because we are determined to reject it.

Considering the failings, the bankruptcy, the very injustice of this partiality, we can no longer act as if we were not dependent on a collective history that has produced the categories of thought with which we apprehend the world and society, in its fractured diversity. By the same token, we cannot act independently of an individual history that has created the conditions of family, society, and schooling according to which we have appropriated those same categories of thought, while others were immediately deprived of any possible appropriation of this epistemic order.

The meaning and value we give to words, in which our perception and apprehension of the world is constructed, are themselves dependent on this double history. Against the illusion of a transparency of consciousness to itself, we must admit that this apprehension is opaquer than we are ready to acknowledge, and that being partial (in all senses of the term) is at the same time problematic. This partiality, on which I insist, is the price to pay for the implicitness that Bourdieu points out. "It is because we are implicated in the world that there is implicit content in what we think and say about it" (ibid.: 9). What is he talking about? What exactly is "implicit"? I will argue that the *implicit* determines and masks everything that may be partisan (and therefore truncated, forgetful, and ignorant) in our perception and condemnation of violence in the world – that is to say on our doorstep, in subway corridors, in suburbs and underprivileged countryside's. The *implicitness* of our condition and of our history thus offers a key to grasping not only the nature and origin, but also the configuration and extent of the "consents to misery" that define us. Amongst such forms of consent to misery, I will specifically focus on one that not only has little concern for the misfortune of faraway people, but also has little regard or compassion for those nearby.

We will not recall the conditions of entry into the academic milieu that Bourdieu analyzed in detail, except to mention that they remain, even today, the common denominator of all access to positions of power in companies

and administrations, as well as in higher education. We will not dwell on how such conditions are constitutive of the habitus shared by those who have this same heritage, whose gradual, progressive, unnoticed incorporation has ended up being second nature to them. What will be emphasized, however, is the way in which the resulting “scholarly disposition”, the conditions of existence that define it, the appropriation of the codes that guarantee it, translate into a “withdrawal from the world”.

Bourdieu’s reflections are a quarter of a century old, and it is not clear that a new analysis of the conditions of existence and the so-called “security” of those who embark on the scholarly path should not, on the contrary, prompt us to measure how they have deteriorated considerably over the years. The situation of those who aspire to enter the scholarly world, who take the first step, has become noticeably precarious, and economic and social necessities have long since painfully caught up with them. The following quote would – thus – require some added nuance: “While the suspension of economic or social necessity is what allows the emergence of autonomous fields, ‘orders’ (in Pascal’s sense) which know and recognize only their specific law, it is also what, in the absence of special vigilance, threatens to confine scholastic thought within the limits of ignored or repressed presuppositions, implied in the withdrawal from the world” (ibid.: 15).

This “suspension” does not mean that the scholarly world escapes economic hardship and remains immune to impoverishment, but that it is cut off from the “world of production”, which is undoubtedly, as Bourdieu points out, “liberatory break and a disconnection”, but contains at the same time “a potentially crippling separation” (ibid.: 15). Who would deny this today, when all over the world entire sectors of the economy are weakened by the succession of confinements imposed by the pandemic, thousands of businesses and shops threaten to close and hundreds of thousands of workers find themselves unemployed? At the same time, it must be admitted that even if the scholarly universes are affected in their operating conditions, in their credits and in their availability to future generations, they are not directly impacted with regards to the material conditions of existence of those who already belong to them.

Let us pause at this “withdrawal from the world” and at the “vigilance” it calls for! What is the point of being vigilant so as not to remain withdrawn from the world? I will argue that this withdrawal no longer allows us to pay due attention to the multiple forms of domination that structure and divide society (between classes, races, genders), or more generally to manifestations of violence, forms of social exclusion, deprivation, and frustration, which end up being part of a landscape that we presume to know, disregarding its complexity and diversity. Negligent, forgetful, if not indifferent, we no longer take the trouble to make visible and audible to ourselves the multiple sufferings such a withdrawal glosses over.

Let’s go further! This habituation is essentially due to what I called elsewhere “the sedimentation of the unacceptable” (Crépon 2018), the insidious assimilation of ways of saying that justify ways of doing things. Ways of speaking

(about mass unemployment, precariousness, security, foreigners etc.) become second nature. Fashioned out of those false evidences and abusive oversimplifications, which Bourdieu always mistrusted and held responsible for our complacent blindness, these ways of speaking draw a screen between us and others; they become part of the world as a reason for tolerating human misfortune.

#### IV

To take the implicit into account is above all to become aware of a privilege which, by definition, is very far from universal. It is also to track down the discourses and the ideology which have no other effect than to mask the profound inequalities (of access to language, of mastery of codes, of rhetorical skill) that such distinctions cover. The result should be a princely humility that Bourdieu recalls in these terms: “Awareness of this privilege forbids one to consign to inhumanity or ‘barbarism’ those who, because they do not have this advantage, are not able to fulfil all their human potentialities. It also forbids one to forget the limits that scholastic thought, owes to the very special conditions of its emergence, which one must methodically explore in order to try to free it from them” (ibid.: 15).

The Western philosophical tradition, as we know, is made up of the valorization of knowledge, contemplation, meditation, ideation and, more generally, all forms of thought. From Plato to Heidegger, the West had continuously hierarchized human activities, placing at the top of the scale that form of withdrawal from the world which is the *skhōlè*. Exemplary in this respect is the way in which Hannah Arendt, describing the human condition, detaches thought from work and labor, making it the highest form of this activity. Humility then commands us to remember that the possibility of such detachment is far from being universally shared. It never has been so. Immersion in the scholastic universe, which has always given access to positions of power in society, inasmuch as they require a normative appropriation of symbolic forms, has always presupposed “exceptional historical and social conditions”.

These exceptional conditions are quite something! They have the effect of establishing, as the sociologist points out, “a magic boundary between the elect and the excluded while contriving to repress the differences of condition that are the condition of the difference that they produce and consecrate” (ibid.: 25). Here is the deception, the magical illusion! These conditions pertain to the will to act as if differences in condition did not exist or had to be explained differently, by nature or by merit, imagining that institutions, starting with schools, are sufficient to correct them, and that they give everyone the same chances to join the camp of the elected representatives. This repression, this sleight of hand which invisibilizes the conditions of exclusion, is no longer possible.

This is what has been unearthed by the rise of populism that is overwhelming Europe, Latin America, and the United States, but also by the great waves of popular protest that challenge the elites. As the *gilets jaunes* movement in France (2018-2019) reminded us, this wave carries the hopes of those who no

longer want to be the losers of a history that has forgotten (or pretends to forget) how much it has excluded them. The masses do not forgive the elected ones for having erased the way in which the historical and social conditions of their election have contributed to maintaining the masses' own invisibility and, more generally, their conditions of non-existence.

## V

Let us move further in the analysis and determination of these conditions of non-existence. They are characterized, as we have already mentioned, by the feeling of being invisible and inaudible — of not being heard, let alone listened to. How can this be understood? What determines listening and understanding in a society? In order to extend our reflections on consent to misery, I will argue that its strongest ally is the “economy of linguistic exchange”, as Bourdieu suggests in *Ce que parler veut dire* (Bourdieu 1982). Every time we speak, the sociologist reminds us, two causal series come into play to determine our ability to speak and our chances of being heard. The first concerns our linguistic habitus, which is socially shaped by conditions of acquisition that make its disposition very unequal. This determines our capacity to formulate in given circumstances a differentiated discourse, whose singularity (that is to say, its own style, understood as what distinguishes it from others comparable to it) can only be perceived by those who have the appropriate schemes of appreciation. The second is the “system of sanctions and targeted censorship” that structures the “language market”: schools, exams, competitions, diplomas, etc., in other words, the rituals to which one must submit if they want to have any chance for their words to carry value.

As a result, in social exchanges, exposed to this market, we never deal with language, but with discourses that are dependent on this double series. It is because of the variable disposition of the habitus and of the structure of the market that, within a differentiated society, not only do different groups not give the same meaning to the same words, but they do not even recognize the same value or pay equal attention to all the discourses that may circulate. In such a society, writes Bourdieu, “what are called ‘common’ nouns – work, family, mother, love, etc. – assume in reality different and even antagonistic meanings, because the members of the same ‘linguistic community’ use more or less the same language and not several different languages” (Bourdieu 1991: 39–40).

“There are no innocent words”, he continues a little further on. “[...] Each word, each expression, threatens to take on two antagonistic senses, reflecting the way in which it is understood by the sender and the receiver” (ibid.: 40). Who will say that this is not the case with the words we invoke to justify our political choices: “liberty”, “equality”, “fraternity”, “solidarity”, “secularism” and even “democracy”? Is this the reason for the misunderstanding? Is it because the socially and economically dominant elites have long since failed to ask themselves what these words mean in the language of others that they have made themselves impermeable to their world? Is it because they have

not been able to hear those who do not have the same linguistic habitus that they have lost in return the faculty to be heard when they warn of the worst?

Whatever this misunderstanding may be, it follows from the above considerations that a language is anything but a “universal treasure” that all its speakers would share. To reason in these terms is to once again overlook both the economic and social conditions that make it possible to acquire what a given society recognizes as “legitimate linguistic competence”, and the constitution of the linguistic market that organizes the division between a “legitimate” use of language and its “illegitimate” use. It also means implicitly subscribing to the different processes that allow the state to impose, through institutions, starting with schools, administration, etc., a system of norms regulating linguistic practices. It is to deprive oneself of seeing that, in each space, the “linguistic market” is unified and dominated by a state language, which becomes “the theoretical norm against which all linguistic practices are objectively measured”. No one, Bourdieu explains, is supposed to be unaware of the linguistic law, which “has its body of jurists – the grammarians – and its agents of regulation and imposition – the teachers – who are empowered universally to subject the linguistic performance of speaking subjects to examination and to the legal sanction of academic qualification” (ibid.: 45).

Clearly, we are doing nothing more than establishing a link between the relations of linguistic domination that determine the distinction between the audible and the inaudible, and the “consent to misery” that underlies the distinction of the visible and the invisible. The strength of populist leaders is to have reckoned with it. This allows them to pretend to have heeded the anxiety, distress, and legitimate resentment of those vanquished by history and forgotten by progress, in order to make people believe that the new elites will no longer make the misfortune of mankind “a mute remnant of politics”. Thus, populist leaders pretend to know the culprits and causes of evil, as well as to know how to remedy them, using all the means afforded by power, without anything to stop them from venturing outside the limits of the law. The condition for sharing such a belief is a repeated *coup de force* against the linguistic habitus that usually governs the exchanges and debates that animate the political scene. It is to speak another language that does not prohibit insults and other vociferous expressions of anathema. In the populist mind, the virtue of truth carries little value whenever lies are more likely to mark a rupture, to have immediate effect or to assure destabilization.

So, are we left without hope? The defining feature of populism is to substitute one invisibility for another. It would be illusory, in fact, to think that its discourse and its action are based on a fine understanding of society and of its complexity, or of the tensions that run through it, and not on oversimplifications. To divide in order to reign, to multiply surrogate targets, presupposes an attention bias that compromises from the outset the possibility of being open to society’s diversity. This is why populist leaders, anxious to stir up passions, do not give themselves the means to hear the invisible any more than the leaders they intend to replace. As we know, if they come to power, the living

conditions of the historically defeated will not be miraculously transformed. And yet the damage is done, and even when the time comes for disappointment (because it always does), it is still to their side that a large part of the eyes is turned. The air bubble of their false promises does not burst, the balloon of their blustering postures does not deflate either. So, it is an illusion to believe that their audience will eventually diminish of its own accord, as the traditional political formations that dream of a “return to normal” seem to think, with a disconcerting naivety and blindness.

## VI

What should we do? Let us start by hearing and listening, rather than reconstructing. Encourage people to speak up. Give them the attention and consideration they deserve. Bring them together. Confront them. More than a decade ago, and recently again, I have emphasized the need to rethink the way democracies should go about being more participatory (Crépon, Stiegler 2007). The injunctions I have just uttered constitute conditions for not paying lip service to “participation”. They are certainly not sufficient, but they are a reminder that no one can claim the exorbitant privilege of carrying the voice of those who were never allowed to speak up. Our previous reflections are dominated by the belief that by ignoring the evils that fracture society (such as material difficulties and existential suffering) one weakens institutions and gets to a political impasse. From this impasse, populism presents itself as a disastrous exit that needs to be countered.

How can we free suffering, uneasiness and misfortune from the walls of silence in which they are locked? One last time, we will follow in Bourdieu’s footsteps by re-reading *La misère du monde*. At the bottom of the back cover, readers were invited to understand that the book proposed “another way of doing politics”. What was that about? Without filters, self-serving calculations or partisan instrumentalizations, the primary task was to learn, methodically, how to learn suffering from the mouths of those who live it. What was important was to understand, by listening to these voices, the conditions of production of social misery, of which the distant elites, trained in the technocratic language of the *grandes écoles*, had only an abstract perception primed by this very language.

As Hannah Arendt pointed out, politics exists because of human plurality. It was hopeless to expect that the professionals of politics could give justice to such plurality, as they did not have the means to comprehend it without preconceived judgments, with that form of attention and humility which is the last thing one learns in elite schools. It isn’t enough to say that the lesson was not understood and that the gulfs of misunderstanding have continued to widen. What was urgent, Bourdieu said, was to produce two effects. “Firstly, simplistic and one-sided images (notably those found in the press) must be replaced by a complex and multilayered representation capable of articulating the same realities but in terms that are different and, sometimes, irreconcilable”. Secondly,

“following the lead of novelists such as Faulkner, Joyce or Woolf, we must relinquish the single, central, dominant, in a word, quasi-divine, point of view that is all too easily adopted by observers – and by readers too, at least to the extent they do not feel personally involved. We must work instead with the multiple perspectives that correspond to the multiplicity of coexisting, and sometimes directly competing, points of view” (Bourdieu 1999: 3).

Such was the point of the essential configuration of the “space of points of view” that made up *La misère du monde*. By giving their due to the diversity of lifestyles and to the resulting social interactions, this wonderful book develops a fine and attentive intelligence of society, which is the first thing to be betrayed by the overly simplistic attempts of the elites to embody the political will and desires of the people.

In doing so, Bourdieu understood above all that it is dangerous and inconsequential to talk about misery in overly general terms. Sticking to the great “*misère de condition*” as the sole criterion for assessing, as an absolute, the suffering of all people, meant that one could not see the relative forms of small-scale misery – what Bourdieu calls “*misère de position*”. The distinction between “great misery” and “petty miseries” (since the “*misère de position*” admits a plural) calls for two remarks. The first is that we consider the latter to be negligible in import, we do not want to see them, because they are relative, supposedly subjective, and we consider them to follow in the wake of inequalities that it would be vain to claim to be able to address. They are the ones that make people say, “Stop complaining!”, “Think of all the advantages you enjoy, of what the State and society do for you!”, “Think about those who are infinitely more unhappy than you are!”. They constitute the background of the consent to misery on which our reflections have focused. The second is that nothing yields more favorable ground for the rise of populism than the abandonment of these little miseries to themselves, in indifference or contempt.

(Traduction: Micol Bez, PhD candidate, Northwestern University and Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris.)

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Mark Krepon

## Važnost Pjera Burdijea danas. O pristanku na bedu

### Apstrakt

Članak se fokusira na krizu političkog razuma u dobu procvata populističke retorike i predlaže odmak od pogrešne podvojenosti između „demokratskog razuma“ i „besnih strasti“, odnosno demofobije koja iz njih često proizlazi. Umjesto ove dihotomije, predlažemo da, sledeći Bourdijeov trag, pažnju treba usmeriti na oblike nepropusnosti koji lome naš savremeni politički i društveni život, uspostavljajući uslove mogućnosti razumnog i nerazumnog. Najpre, primećujemo da je ono što savremene političke strasti označava posebno opasnima jeste njihova nepropusnost za lekcije iz naše istorijske prošlosti, kao i za moralnu osudu političke instrumentalizacije različitosti i za sakralni karakter temeljnih načela. Taj hermeneutički jaz, međutim, kasnije objašnjavamo dubljom analizom problema savremene nepropusnosti, koja poništava dihotomiju između političkog razuma i strasti. To više nije biračko tijelo, zavedeno sirenama populizma, koje je nepropusno za glas političkog razuma; umjesto toga, upravo taj razum, koji utelovljuju elite koje tvrde da se prepoznaju u njegovim vrijednostima i načelima, postao je nepropustan za „uslove nepostojanja“ u kojima živi značajan dio stanovništva. Ako postoji problem savremene nepropusnosti ili smetnji, naša je hipoteza, to je problem političkog diskursa koji je izgubio dodir sa „svom bedom sveta“.

**Ključne reči:** Pjer Burdiju, pristanak, demokratski razum, savremena nepropusnost, populizam

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Miloš Jovanović

## BOURDIEU'S THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM OF BERGER AND LUCKMANN<sup>1</sup>

### ABSTRACT

The paper compares Pierre Bourdieu's sociological approach with the one developed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. The aim of the paper is to identify the complementarities and incongruences of these approaches. The main similarity consists in the intention to "dialectically" overcome/bridge the gap between "objectivism" and "subjectivism" in social theory. Another parallel includes a negative attitude towards the relativistic tendencies of postmodernism. These authors share the thematization of: the body as a locus of social influences, the centrality of language in social life, the social functions of knowledge, and the importance of power in social relations. Differences in theorizing are attributed to the different intellectual, theoretical, and socio-cultural contexts in which these scientists operated. The divergences of these theoretical approaches become evident when one examines the different meaning and significance attached to the concepts of individuation, structure, action, habitus and habitualization, structure of relevance and relation of common-sense and scientific knowledge. Finally, there is a visible difference in political views: Bourdieu was a critic "from the left," while Berger and Luckmann were self-proclaimed liberal conservatives.

### KEYWORDS

Bourdieu, Berger & Luckmann, objectivism/subjectivism, body, language, power, knowledge, political views

## Introduction

The importance of Pierre Bourdieu for contemporary sociology, as well as other scientific disciplines, probably needs no particular emphasis. Bourdieu was a highly respected public intellectual in France, who enjoyed immense popularity. Pierre Carles followed him from 1998 to 2001 and made the film: *Sociology is a Martial Art (La sociologie est un sport de combat)*, in order to help people

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understand his research and encourage their social engagement. The book *La Misère du monde*<sup>2</sup>, which was published by Bourdieu and his associates in 1993

sold over 100,000 copies in three months and stood atop the bestseller list for months; it was extensively discussed in political circles and popular magazines alike (conservative Prime Minister Balladur publicly ordered his cabinet members to read it); it has been adapted for the stage and is widely used by school-teachers, social workers and grassroots activists. (Wacquant 1998: 322–323 n11)

Numerous papers dedicated to Bourdieu undoubtedly speak of his status as a modern sociological classic.

[T]rying to keep up with the wide spectrum of research done in a Bourdieusian vein is a bit like Sisyphus continuously rolling his unruly stone up the hill: as soon as you think you're on top of it, a fresh wave of publications comes out proposing all sorts of new concepts and applications. (Atkinson 2020: ix)

Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann are best known for their “Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge”: *The Social Construction of Reality* (1991), first published in 1966.<sup>3</sup> In 1997, according to the votes of the members of the *International Sociological Association*, this publication entered the list of the most important books in the 20th century sociology, taking the fifth place, just above Bourdieu's *Distinction*.<sup>4</sup> One should mention here that, on the 25th anniversary of its publication, Berger and Luckmann's book saw a bulletin of the theoretical section of the *American Sociological Association: Perspectives* 15(2) dedicated to it, while three scientific journals: *Cultural Sociology* 10(1), *Human Studies* 39(1) and *Sociální studia* 13(3), dedicated separate issues to their theory on the occasion of its 50th anniversary. In Serbia, one issue of *The Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnography SASA (Glasnik etnografskog instituta SANU)* 67(1) was titled: “Theoretical legacy of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann” („Teorijsko nasleđe Pitera Bergera i Tomasa Lukmana“).

Translated into more than 20 languages, *The Social Construction of Reality* is considered one of the key works (Schlüsselwerke) of constructivism (Loenhoff 2015). The book is labeled “a bible for social constructivists” (Collin 1997: 66), “the original explicitly ‘constructionist’ study” which “established ‘social

2 English translation: *Weight of the World: Social Suffering in Contemporary Society* (1999).

3 Berger and Luckmann published their first co-authored paper “Sociology of Religion and Sociology of Knowledge” in 1963, sketching in it the ideas that would later be further developed in the book that made them famous. Before it, Berger published several more papers, either solely or together with Luckmann, Hansfried Kellner and Stanley Pullberg, in which segments of the *Social Construction of Reality* were elaborated in more detail (for the list and short comments on these papers see: Berger 2011: 83).

4 See: <https://www.isa-sociology.org/en/about-isa/history-of-isa/books-of-the-xx-century>. Besides *Distinction*, his *Outline of a Theory of Practice* also earned great recognition within his field, and was selected as one of the five most influential works in the last 25 years in *Contemporary Sociology* 25(3) (Calhoun 1996).

construction' as a permanent part of the vocabulary of social science" (Hjelm 2014: 17)<sup>5</sup>, and promoted Berger and Luckmann as the "pioneers of 'social constructionism'" (Endress 2005: 53).

Before considering the similarities and parallels, that is, differences and divergences between Bourdieu's and Berger-Luckmann's theory, one should first clarify what the term "social constructivism" actually implies and outline the relation of the two American<sup>6</sup> theoreticians towards it.

## Social Constructivism: the World is not Discovered, but Socially Created

We will provide a quite concise outline of the social constructivist approach, as not to go out of the context of this paper. We will not deal with Bourdieu's theory in this section, as we believe that this elaboration would be redundant, considering that the entire issue of this journal is dedicated to his theorizing.<sup>7</sup>

At the very beginning one finds the linguistic dilemma: "constructivism" or "constructionism"? English-speaking authors prefer the term *constructionism*, although there are exceptions (Collin 1997; Detel 2001), while German-speaking ones use the term *Sozialkonstruktivismus* and in their papers published in English one can find *social constructivism* (Pfadenhauer and Knoblauch [eds.] 2019).

The spatial limitations of this paper do not allow for a comprehensive overview of different understandings of the essential characteristics, genealogy, classifications and critiques of social constructivism, i.e. a detailed examination on whether it represents a (meta)theory, paradigm, worldview or a specific type of theoretical sensibility.<sup>8</sup> What is certain is that this *is not* the case of a "unique specified doctrine" (Detel 2001: 14264), but rather of "many constructionisms" (Hjelm 2014: 3).<sup>9</sup>

5 The first to use the phrase *social construction* was Lester Frank Ward in an article from 1905 (Knoblauch and Wilke 2016: 54), but it was only after the publication of Berger and Luckmann's book that it became ubiquitous to the extent that Hacking considers it a "tired metaphor" (1999: 35).

6 Having written their *magnum opus* in English and published it in New York, they are considered American theoreticians here, even though both Berger and Luckmann are Austrians by birth – Berger was born in 1929 in Vienna, while Luckmann was born in 1927 in Jesenice, Kingdom of Yugoslavia (his mother was Slovene). They both emigrated to America shortly after World War II and began their academic careers there. Berger remained in the USA, while Luckmann returned to Europe in 1965 having earned professorship at the University of Frankfurt, from where he moved to the University of Konstanz in 1970.

7 As well as the, already mentioned, ever growing abundance of articles, chapters and books that deal with his sociological work.

8 For various (re-/de-)constructions of "the constructionist mosaic" see: Burr 2015; Elder-Vass 2012; Gergen 1999; Weinberg 2014.

9 More than a few authors can rightfully, to a greater or lesser degree, be categorized as constructivists (Bourdieu included). The following are most often mentioned as such: Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, David Bloor, Barry Barnes, Steve Woolgar, Bruno

The vocable *constructivism*<sup>10</sup> will be used here, primarily because that is the variant used by Luckmann and Berger themselves, but also by their direct, self-proclaimed and most prolific descendants – modern German sociologists gathered around the theoretical and research programs of hermeneutic sociology of knowledge (hermeneutische Wissenssoziologie) and communicative constructivism (kommunikativer Konstruktivismus)<sup>11</sup>.

Simply put: „[s]ocial constructionism argues that the human world is not as simple and obvious as it seems and that people, you and I, take part actively in producing and reproducing – constructing – it” (Hjelm 2014: 2). The existence of “objective” facts<sup>12</sup> independent from human practices is questioned.

Language is observed as a precondition to thought, shaping it. Language occupies a prominent role in constructivist research because it serves a performative, and not only a descriptive function.

Hacking emphasizes the idea of contingency – a belief that “things” are not necessarily given, nor unchangeable – as typical for social constructivism (1999: 48).

The attractiveness of the constructivist argument lies precisely in the ironic relation towards that which is “taken-for-granted”, as a phenomenon which “not only could be otherwise but that its ‘local’ form has a history that can be written to show a collection of interests, actions, and flows of power that have created and that sustain it” (Schneider 2005: 724). What is insisted upon is the socio-cultural-historical specificity of knowledge, focusing on the processuality of social interactions and world-building practices. Thus Howard S. Becker says that for him the social construction of reality means

simply that people talk to each other, in person or otherwise, and decide what to call things around them and how to understand those things. Other people might decide those questions differently and that’s why the notion of social construction has some traction, because it makes you see that what you think is real, isn’t necessarily real for some other people, and that that creates a very fruitful area for research and understanding. (Ralón and Ralón 2013)


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Latour, Karin Knorr Cetina, Ludwik Fleck, Jean Piaget, Lev Vygotsky, Mary McCanney Gergen & Kenneth J. Gergen, Rom Harré, John Shotter, Jonathan Potter, ... For a chronological overview of the thinkers who influenced the development of constructivism, from Giambattista Vico to the “postmodern” theoreticians, see: Lock and Strong 2010. *The Oxford Dictionary of Sociology* cites William Isaac Thomas, Alfred Schütz and sociologists of “the Chicago school” as forerunners of constructivism in sociology (Scott 2014: 692).

10 However, in the quotations from the texts, we will retain the original variant.

11 See: Hitzler *et al.* 2017; Keller *et al.* 2013.

12 Compare with Nietzsche who, as a constructivist *avant la lettre*, writes: “Against positivism, which halts at phenomena – ‘There are only facts’ – I would say: No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact ‘in itself’: perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing” (1968: 267).



*Figure 1:* Construction and interpretation as means of access to the world of experience (Flick 2004: 90)

Berger and Luckmann make a decisive departure from social constructivism. Berger considers it as one of the “impressive illustrations of the unintended consequences of publishing one’s ideas” (2011: 93). In the text that depicts interesting details of their collaboration, Luckmann asks: “Who in heaven or hell, more likely hell, invented (social) ‘constructivism?’” (2001: 23). Berger explicitly denies any affinity for constructivism, which he considers a “child” from “the orgy of ideology and utopianism that erupted all over the academic scene in the late 1960’s” and he expresses the lack of “any sympathy with this *Zeitgeist*” and an assuredness that his and Luckmann’s “sort of sociology was not what all these putative revolutionaries were clamoring for” (Berger 1992a: 2).

Berger correctly assesses that this is not the case of a coherent school of thought, but rather of a set of theories with similar tendencies, and wrongly identifies Foucault and Derrida, who dwell in the “long shadow” of Nietzsche (Berger 2011: 94), as direct progenitors of constructivism, while locating constructivism (not entirely unjustifiably) within the framework of “doctrinary fashionable” postmodern theories, which to him are “each more obscurantist and intellectually barbaric than its predecessor” (Berger 1992b: 18). He calls constructivism in its most radical form a “type of nihilism” and emphasizes that Luckmann and he were repeatedly forced to declare: “We are not constructivists” (Berger 2011: 95).<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Like Marx, who had a need to distance himself from Lafargue and Guesde: « ce qu’il y a de certain c’est que moi, je ne suis pas Marxiste » (“what is certain is that [if they are Marxists], [then] I myself am not a Marxist”).

This distancing is caused by their ideological, but also epistemological position. As descendants of the modernist enlightenment project, Berger and Luckmann do not question the existence of objective reality and facts, and the possibility of knowing them.<sup>14</sup> However, between *Social Construction of Reality* and later constructivism there are significant lines of continuity – Berger and Luckmann’s theoretical setting, having “flowed” into the sociological mainstream, continued to develop through various forms of constructivism, perhaps in the directions and to an extent not really suitable to them, yet in such a way so as to rightfully claim that their book represents the origin of constructivism (Spasić 2019).

By examining the similarities with Bourdieu’s theorizing, the above “flowing” into modern sociology will be illustrated, since it has made everyone dealing with social studies a constructivist to a greater or lesser extent.

### With and against Bourdieu

Even though they did not completely ignore each other, as was the case with Émile Durkheim and Max Weber<sup>15</sup>, who were also contemporaries whose interests overlapped significantly, it cannot be said that Bourdieu paid much attention to Berger and Luckmann and *vice versa*. Thus in the text *Sur le pouvoir symbolique (On Symbolic Power)*, in a footnote Bourdieu mentions Schütz and Berger as exponents of *la tradition néo-phénoménologique* (1977: 411 n2), and in the introductory chapter of *An invitation to reflexive sociology* one can find a reference to Berger and Luckmann (Bourdieu, Wacquant 1994: 9 n17) in relation to the shortcomings of the concept of social structure “as the mere aggregate of individual strategies and acts of classification”<sup>16</sup>.

On the other hand, Berger and Luckmann bring up Bourdieu only in the interviews given at the end of their lives: Luckmann in the context of the expansion of the concept of “knowledge” that encompasses the one that is incorporated,<sup>17</sup> and Berger in a commentary on other attempts at “reconciliation” between subjectivism and objectivism in sociological theory.<sup>18</sup>

14 Bourdieu also opposed relativistic (and postmodernist) views of science (Birešev 2014: 139–169), and he considered “postmodernists” to be, in essence, conservative thinkers “whom the reactivation of the old prejudices of the philosophers against the social sciences has often led to the verge of nihilism” (Bourdieu 2008: 79).

15 See: Tiryakian 1966.

16 In a lecture held on October 19 1982 in *Collège de France* Bourdieu speaks of Schütz “who inaugurated the phenomenological school in the United States” (Bourdieu 2019: 63), where he certainly has Berger and Luckmann in mind, although he does not explicitly mention them.

17 “Bourdieu’s work is certainly consistent with much of our thinking. I don’t particularly appreciate his concept of ‘habitus,’ partly because of the word that he uses for the category, partly also because of the category itself. His work is quite interesting, definitely” (Dreher Göttlich 2016: 39).

18 “I’m sympathetic. I’ve read Bourdieu and I’ve read Giddens, and I have no big quarrels with this. Doesn’t interest me very much. I wasn’t interested in these ‘fine

It is precisely this intention to overcome or bridge the gap between the objectivist and subjectivist approach, this “false antinomy” between structure and action, that the first similarity can be observed when comparing Bourdieu’s and Berger/Luckmann’s theory.

The dialectical approach of Berger and Luckmann is a peculiar precursor to Bourdieu’s integrative solution (Dreher 2019: 237), which helped shape Giddens’ theoretical framework within which later readers found ideas and terms, without knowing their original source (Calhoun 1996: 303)<sup>19</sup>. Theoretical integration, according to Berger and Luckmann, “requires a systematic accounting of the dialectical relation between the structural realities and the human enterprise of constructing reality – in history” (1991: 208). They conceive the solution to the fundamental sociological problem of the relationship between an individual and a society as a constant dialectical process of creation, transmission and reproduction of “reality”. In that process, one can analytically differentiate between three moments: externalization, objectivization, and internalization.

Externalization<sup>20</sup> is a segment of the dialectic in which “human beings jointly ‘think up’ a social world” (Berger 2011: 90). “Every human society is an enterprise of world-building” (Berger 1990: 3), and the “‘stuff’ out of which society and all its formations are made is human meanings externalized in human activity” (8). Subjective meanings are constituted<sup>21</sup> in consciousness and then externalized, “which explains individual sociality anthropologically and phenomenologically” (Schnettler, Knoblauch, Raab 2017: 254).

Objectivization<sup>22</sup> is the moment “in which this social world attains a seemingly ‘hard’ reality over and beyond the individuals interacting within it” (Berger 2011: 90). During objectivization the content which was “externalized becomes

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distinctions,’ to use a Bourdieuan concept, between this theory and that theory. I was interested, or *I’m* interested and had been from the beginning, in: what makes people tick? What makes a society tick? And is a theory useful for understanding? And I found the approach in *Social Construction enormously useful*” (Steets 2016b: 17).

19 Giddens, on his part, considers that the analysis developed in *The Social Construction of Reality* “quite fails in its attempt to reconcile a theory of action with one of institutional organization” (1976: 171 n6).

20 *Externalization* as a concept has its origin in Hegel’s *Entäußerung*, a notion with three aspects: creating something new, giving/rejecting something of one’s own and self-opening from the inside out.

21 The subjective *constitution* of meaning in acts of consciousness (such as selection and typification), which is dealt with by phenomenological “protosociology”, is (as its precondition) distinguished from the social *construction* of reality, which is the subject of sociology “proper”.


22 *Objectivization* is a translation of the German *Versachlichung*, which has three logical stages: 1) the conversion (*Verkehrung*) of relations between persons into those of things (*Sachen*); 2) the conversion of reified relations of *Sachen* into the socio-natural properties of things (*Dinge*) – *thingification*; and 3) the conversion of production relations among persons into the reified-thingified relations of things (*Sachen-Dinge*) that embody socio-natural properties and thereby acquire a “phantom objectivity” or “phantasmagorical form” (Tairako 2017).



a reality through social processes of institutionalization and legitimation” (Schnettler, Knoblauch and Raab 2017: 254).

Internalization is the „process by which this objective ‘outside’ world is re-projected into the consciousness of individuals through various experiences of socialization, beginning in childhood but continuing throughout life” (Berger 2011: 90). Making socially objectified patterns of action and meanings attached to them “internally” enables the creation and permanent establishment of personal identity (Jovanović 2019), which is the process through which individuals finally integrate into the world.

Berger and Luckmann formulate the fundamental dialectic using the following sequence of assertions: *Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product.* (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 79). One can easily perceive a similarity with what Bourdieu writes on the construction of a theory on the manner of practice creation, which is the precondition for the establishment of “an experimental science of the *dialectic of the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality*, or, more simply, of incorporation and objectification” (Bourdieu 2010: 72).



*Figure 2: The Dialectics of Social Construction in Berger and Luckmann (Knoblauch 2011: 140)*

Any analysis of the social world that leaves out any of the three mentioned moments leads to a skewed viewpoint, since the expressing of subjective meaning and social channelling of that activity are “*both indispensable, interwoven and inseparable moments of the social process of The Social Construction of Reality*” (Endress 2019: 54; italics M. J.).

Thus, for example, neglecting externalization leads to a reified perspective of social reality, where it remains hidden that it is a result of an ongoing

and continuous human production, therefore, social phenomena are observed as “thing-like”, as being part of “the natural” (or “god-given”) world (Berger, Luckmann 1991: 222 n29; 106–109)<sup>23</sup>, thus negating the empirical existence of social order only as a product of human activity.

Bourdieu also believes that objectivism is an incomplete “mode of theoretical knowledge”, bearing in mind that objectivist knowledge neglects the mutual conditioning between a subject (who knows) and an object (as the object of knowledge) and perceives their relationship as *fait accompli* (Bourdieu 2010: 79), thereby reducing “history to a ‘process without a subject’” (Bourdieu 1990b: 41). In his critique of objectivism, Bourdieu (2010: 30) uses Marx’s remark addressed to Hegel, who according to him obscures the distinction between “the things of logic and the logic of things”.

Nevertheless, even though Bourdieu manages to overcome objectivism and subjectivism, through a “praxeological mode of knowledge”, his theory, which he himself labels “constructivist structuralism” or “structuralist constructivism” (Bourdieu 1990a: 123)<sup>24</sup>, certainly emphasizes the structural moment to a greater extent. An actor who can improvise and who is capable of invention and innovation finds his place in Bourdieu’s theory, albeit with his role remaining very limited since “invention is intentionless; the improvisation is regulated by structures” (Ritzer 2010: 183). Therefore, in a monograph dedicated to Bourdieu, Jenkins, perhaps not fully justifiably, says:

My strongest criticism of his work is probably that he consistently says he is doing one thing while actually doing something else (and usually something which negates or undermines his stated project). He seeks, for example, to transcend the objectivist-subjectivist dualism while remaining firmly rooted in objectivism. (2007: 175)

Berger and Luckmann offer a solution that leaves more room for the agency of the subject. In their conceptualization, focused on the bidirectionality of the relationship between the social and the individual, persons “*actively acquire* specific segments of the social knowledge and *sediment it in a unique way* into their own subjective knowledge” (Meyer 2008: 523; italics M. J.). At that, socio-cultural facts are fully acknowledged:

What the individual represents as his life-world and what he thinks he knows about it are the result of subjective experiences, social actions and, above all, socialized experiences. In the standard empirical case, the latter is derived from a social stock of knowledge: from the meaning reservoir that the subject encounters as something historically pre-given and socially imposed – as a ‘socio-historical a priori’. (Schnettler, Knoblauch, Raab 2017: 248)

23 Berger accepts the distinction made by Marx between *objectivation* (*Versachlichung*), *externalization* (*Entäußerung*), *reification* (*Verdinglichung*), and *alienation* (*Entfremdung*), as well as “notion that the latter two processes, unlike the first two, are not to be understood as anthropological necessities” (Berger 1990: 197 n10).

24 Bourdieu’s theory is more often referred to as “genetic structuralism”.

Individuals “designed” in this way are not reduced to Garfinkel’s *judgmental dopes* – “actors as constrained or determined by social structures and institutions and able to exercise little or no independent judgment” (Ritzer 2010: 150).

If individuation and agency, activity, and creativity of a subject<sup>25</sup> are places in which Bourdieu is theoretically “weaker”<sup>26</sup>, then theorizing the (class) structure – particularly the structure of social inequalities and institutional order – is his strong suit. This comes as no surprise since he had to creatively fight against a direct and strong influence of French structuralism, embodied primarily in the works of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Louis Althusser, and by using the concept of *field*<sup>27</sup> reconceptualize the structure of “social space” in a relational manner.

Berger and Luckmann see social structure as a mere sum of separate classification strategies and acts, which is rightfully criticized by Vandenberghe as a problematic reduction of structure to culture through an “idealistic conception of social structure as a constraining system of typifications (reduction of structure to culture)” (Vandenberghe 2018: 413 n6). Furthermore, he also sees as problematic the overemphasis on meanings to the detriment of norms and expressions (reduction of culture to symbols and signs), reduction of alienation and reification to modes of consciousness and states of mind (reduction of social pathologies to psychological ones), and finally, conservative conception of the social order (reduction of social order to social control) (Vandenberghe 2018: 413–414 n6).

By focusing on the “Hobbesian problem of order” Berger and Luckmann cannot be differentiated from Parsons and the functionalists, towards whom they were actually very critically inclined.

Drawing from Arnold Gehlen’s philosophical anthropology, they see the basis of social order in biological facts which “do not imply any *particular* social order”, but the “fundamental necessity of social order in general” (Abercrombie

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25 In a conversation held in 1999 Bourdieu “confesses”: “The whole phenomenological obscurantism; Sartre and existentialism; the heroic aesthetics in Nietzsche; the salvation of a philosophy of the subject – I have always found all of this quite dumb. I have never really been on this *trip*” (Bourdieu *et al.* 2012: 124).

26 There is a clear bias in Bourdieu’s work towards structuralism: “Unlike the approach of most others (e.g., phenomenologists, symbolic interactionists), Bourdieu’s constructivism *ignores subjectivity and intentionality*. He does think it important to include within his sociology the way people, on the basis of their position in social space, perceive and construct the social world. *However, the perception and construction that take place in the social world are both animated and constrained by structures*. What he is interested in is the relationship between mental structures and social structures. Some microsociologists would be uncomfortable with Bourdieu’s perspective and would see it as little more than a more fully adequate structuralism. They would be particularly upset by his *unwillingness and inability to deal with subjectivity*” (Ritzer 2010: 183; italics M. J.).

27 The field is a relatively autonomous sphere of society in which the actors and their social positions are located. The position of each particular actor is the result of an interaction of: the special rules of each field, the habitus of the actors, and the quantity and structure of capitals at their disposal.

1986: 18). According to Gehlen's understanding, institutions make human behavior "predictable" and "regular", by reducing human *world-openness* (*Welttoffenheit*), "plasticity" and "instability" to entrenched and habitual actions. Social institutions possess the function of "external supports" and "compartments" for behavior, thus forming a stable background for human activities (*Hintergrundserfüllung*), for the *relief* (*Entlastung*) of creativity and inventiveness. "Although it is, in a sense, biologically *required*, social order is constructed *socially*" (Abercrombie 1986: 18).

While theorizing "the problem of order" Luckmann and Berger appear conservative<sup>28</sup> when they concentrate on the "social processes which stabilize reality"<sup>29</sup> and "conceive of social change as rather a threat to the social order than as a chance for progress" (Eberle 2019: 148). They see the world as "endemicly, fundamentally, and systematically chaotic and precarious" (Abercrombie 1986: 19), and justify the need for order as a shield against the ever-threatening "dark side" of anomie – "social life abhors disorder as nature abhors a vacuum" (Berger 1971: 3).

Their theory, however, does not lack potential for debunking of order and the accompanying hierarchy<sup>30</sup>, which Berger wrote about as early as in *Invitation to Sociology* (2004: 25–53), and particularly singled out in a symposium speech "Sociology and Freedom". Here he presents his understanding that sociology is subversive (when it comes to entrenched patterns of thought) and conservative (in its implications on the institutional order):

it should be emphasized that the conservatism in question is of a peculiar kind. It is *not* a conservatism based on the conviction that the institutions of the status quo are sacred, inexorably right, or empirically inevitable. The aforementioned subversive impulse of sociology precludes this type of conservatism. Rather, it is a conservatism based on skepticism about the status quo in society *as well as* about various programs for new social orders. It is, if you wish, the conservatism of the pessimist. (Berger 1971: 4)

Bourdieu occupied the position of an optimist's activism,<sup>31</sup> but not before the 1980s.<sup>32</sup> Even though close to the French left (advocating the achievements

28 "Nostalgic about the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, he (Berger) was always critical of the Left. Towards the end of his life, he was closely associated with the neo-conservative magazine *Commentary* and the neo-liberal *American Enterprise Institute* in Washington, DC. The postings on his blog on the site of *American Interest* (<https://www.the-american-interest.com/v/peter-berger/> – M. J.), which he continued until the very last moment, point to a possible vote for Donald Trump" (Vandenbergh 2018: 408–409).

29 "We are more interested [...] in the *nomie* rather than the *anomie* processes in society" (Berger, Luckmann 1991: 226 n71)

30 "It can be said that the first wisdom of sociology is this – things are not what they seem" (Berger 2004: 23).

31 Which is ironic considering that his theory is often criticized for being too deterministic (Swartz 2005: 362 n49).

32 If the data available from the *HyperBourdieu* website are accurate, Bourdieu began to sign petitions (only) in 1980 (<http://hyperbourdieu.jku.at/hyperbourdieuPetitions.htm>).

of the welfare state, such as state pension system, job safety, open access to higher education, etc.), he was never a member of the communist party. During the 1968 protest he maintained his position on the sidelines (Eribon 1991: 298) and criticized the heroic role of the “total intellectual”, played, with an irresistible *chic radical*, by Sartre.

In the first part of his career, Bourdieu was a scientist interested above all in establishing sociology as a rigorous research and scientifically legitimate (but not a positivist) endeavor, concentrating on internal struggles in the French intellectual field, which was at the time dominated from “an extremely preferential position” by philosophy (Bourdieu 2008; Swartz 1997: 28–30) and an undemocratic way of thinking: “Althusser would refer disparagingly to the ‘so-called social sciences’. It was a manner of making visible a sort of invisible separation between the true knowledge – the possessor of science – and false consciousness. That, I think, is very aristocratic” (Bourdieu, Eagleton 1992: 113)<sup>33</sup>.

When he reached the established position<sup>34</sup> and greatly contributed to securing sociology’s place as “the critical conscience of the society” in France and a science that uses the results of experiential research to lay down a normative vision that “rightfully” expects certain political effects, Bourdieu dedicated himself to the critique of neoliberalism, pointing to the negative social and economic consequences suffered by those most directly affected by the “disassembly” of the social security system. He became an “active participant in numerous strikes directed against the neoliberal policy of the then French government, but also in protests organized as a way of support for immigrants and sexual minorities” (Birešev 2014: 13).

Bourdieu perceives the task of scientific research as “unmasking and debunking hidden, taken-for-granted power relations shaping social life” through which “new possibilities for individual and collective arrangements become possible” (Swartz 2005: 338). Contrary to Luckmann and Berger who remained value-neutral Weberians until the end, Bourdieu (with Passeron) criticized that principle as early as in *Reproduction*:

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In 1981 together with Foucault he organized the action for the support of the Polish trade union *Solidarność* (Eribon 1991: 298–303). Bourdieu was also the initiator of the French petition against the bombing of Yugoslavia: «Arrêt des bombardements, autodétermination» published on 31 March 1999 in *Le Monde* ([https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1999/03/31/arret-des-bombardements-autodetermination\\_3560545\\_1819218.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1999/03/31/arret-des-bombardements-autodetermination_3560545_1819218.html)), and his name was the first on the list of intellectuals from around the world who signed the appeal: “Why we oppose Nato’s war in the Balkans”, published on 10 May of the same year in *New Statesman* (<https://www.newstatesman.com/node/149110>).

33 On Sartre’s disdain for the sciences of man and his avoidance of even mentioning sociology see: Bourdieu 2008: 23.

34 Bourdieu’s academic career reached its summit in 1981 when he was elected full professor in the Department of Sociology at *Collège de France*, the most prestigious research institution in France.

scientific sociology must, in this case, in order to find its object, take as its object that which stands in the way of the construction of the object. To refuse such a project is to consign oneself to blind or complicitous adherence to the given as it gives itself, whether this theoretical surrender be masked under the flaunted rigor of empirical procedures or legitimated by invocation of the ideal of 'ethical neutrality', a mere non-aggression pact with the established order. (1990: 218 n34)

Ana Birešev deems that in "the foundation of the entire Bourdieu's theoretical construction lies the intention to debunk and examine the mechanisms of production and reproduction of domination relations in the society" (2014: 17), which gives the notion of *power* a crucial role.

According to Bourdieu, power is "present" in all social spheres, with a *meta-field* of power existing and influencing divisions and conflicts in all other fields. Here Bourdieu becomes an orthodox Weberian when he sees *struggle* (*Kampf*) as a foundation for the dynamic of social life. The struggle for power is at the core of all social relations – the struggle for control over material and symbolic resources, which transform into different forms of capital in that way. Therefore, examining the field of power is necessary and crucial for discovering and understanding the origin, meaning and consequences of power relations in any society.

For Bourdieu the class conflict becomes a "classification struggle" where that which is at stake is power over classification schemes and systems that form the basis for the ideas about different groups and in turn their (de)mobilization. He develops the notion of "symbolic violence" that relates to governing by "naturalization" – a process through which the conventional, arbitrary and class-based seem "natural" and "objective", resulting in power appearing, through misrecognition (*méconnaissance*), invisible and thus more efficient (Bourdieu 2001: 1–2), since legitimacy "results from the fact that agents apply to the objective structures of the social world structures of perception and appreciation that have emerged from these objective structures and tend therefore to see the world as self-evident" (Bourdieu 1990a: 135).

Berger and Luckmann do not elaborate on the notion of power, yet acknowledge its importance in society nevertheless:

the success of particular conceptual machineries is related to the power possessed by those who operate them [...] The historical outcome of each clash of gods was determined by those who wielded the better weapons rather than those who had the better arguments [...] He who has the bigger stick has the better chance of imposing his definitions of reality. [...] power in society includes the power to determine decisive socialization processes and, therefore, the power to *produce* reality. (Berger, Luckmann 1991: 126–127; 137)

Berger/Luckmann's conceptual frame is a convenient basis for the development of the theory of power, particularly the subjective dimension of the constitution of power based on systems of relevances,<sup>35</sup> which makes it possible to

35 The problem of relevance refers to the question why is something chosen as important from the totality of the lived experience – how a certain topic attracts attention,

explain the resistance of actors towards the established power structures (Dreher 2016), otherwise a problematic moment in Bourdieu's theory.

Another topic common to these theoreticians is the body as a place of social reproduction. Mastering practices is, for Bourdieu, located directly in the body and it does not include consciousness – only subconscious processes together with permanent bodily dispositions produce action. Through the notion of habitus (a system of perception, thought and action schemes), which represents the form of the embodied history,<sup>36</sup> Bourdieu theorizes the input of objective structures into the body, which gets shaped by upbringing into a permanent “reminder”<sup>37</sup> of the “appropriate” place and behavior of individuals – “[b]odily hexis is political mythology realized, *em-bodied*, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable way of standing, speaking, walking, and thereby of feeling and thinking” (Bourdieu 1990b: 69–70)<sup>38</sup>.

In dealing with the body, Berger and Luckmann begin from Plessner's understanding of *eccentricity* – “man's experience of himself always hovers in a balance between being and having a body, a balance that must be redressed again and again” (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 68). This is consequential for the analysis of action in a material environment and the externalization of subjective meanings: “Through acts of externalization, human beings establish a relationship with their bodies and their physical and social environments” (Steets 2016a: 100). One could speak of the common objective reality when there are fundamentally similar ways of thinking and worldviews related to similar bodily techniques and movements. Through internalization the objective (non)material reality transforms into bodily practices.

While Berger and Luckmann deal with the body in a society on a philosophical-anthropological level, Bourdieu considers different “bodily techniques” in the context of perpetuating social (class, gender, ...) inequalities. Similar differences exist in dealing with language and common-sense knowledge.

The English translation (and a later French edition) of one of Bourdieu's books links language and symbolic power in its title,<sup>39</sup> which undoubtedly points to the treatment of language as an instrument in social struggles. In the chapter “Language and Knowledge in Everyday Life” (1991: 49–61), Luckmann and Berger write about language as the most important sign system of the human

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which aspects of the topic are recognized as important, which parts of an individual's stock of knowledge are used for interpretation and which motives influence this process? Relevance structures refer to the principles of selection that can be used to explain the specific choices, attitudes, decisions, and actions that an actor is prepared to perform.

36 “[E]mbodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history” (Bourdieu 1990b: 56).

37 “[T]he body is thus constantly mingled with all the knowledge it reproduces” (Bourdieu 1990b: 73).

38 For more on “social construction of bodies” see: Bourdieu 2001: 7–42.

39 *Language and Symbolic Power* (1991), *Language et pouvoir symbolique* (2001); title of the first French edition: *Ce que parler veut dire: l'économie des échanges linguistiques* (1982).

society. Common objectivations of everyday life are made possible and kept together primarily by language signification. Understanding language is important for any understanding of the reality of everyday life. Due to its ability to transcend “here and now”, language builds bridges between different zones within the reality of everyday life and integrates them into a meaningful whole. Language enables objectivation, preservation and accumulation of biographical and historical experience and its transfer to new generations.

When it comes to common sense knowledge, Berger and Luckmann turn it into a central problem: “sociology of knowledge must concern itself with whatever passes for ‘knowledge’ in a society, regardless of the ultimate validity or invalidity (by whatever criteria) of such ‘knowledge’” (Berger, Luckmann 1991: 15). Their approach was labeled *the new sociology of knowledge* precisely because it meant the “democratization” of the subject of this discipline, which was until then focused on the “products” (doctrines, ideas, ideologies) of professional thinkers. While a small group of people deals with theorizing and creating worldviews (which do not cover all that is “real” to people), everyone in society lives in a “world” and “participates in its ‘knowledge’ in one way or another” (27) – possess a pre-theoretical “certainty that phenomena are real and that they possess specific characteristics” (13). This “knowledge” constitutes the fabric of meanings without which no society could exist (27).

Bourdieu, like Durkheim, sharply separates common sense knowledge from the scientific one, and approaches it over the notion of *doxa* – “natural attitude” of the dominated groups, that is, the pre-verbal apprehension of the social world as self-evident, “taken for granted” – beliefs characterized by a seemingly perfect coincidence of the objective order and the subjective principles of the organization (resulting in) natural and social world appearing as (self-)evident (Bourdieu 1990b: 23; 26). *Doxa* is not subjected to reflection and its function is to determine the sense of belonging and “someone’s place”, i.e. set the boundaries to social mobility, and as such it

represents the most radical form of acceptance of the world, the most absolute form of conservatism. This relation of prereflexive acceptance of the world grounded in a fundamental belief in the immediacy of the structures of the *Lebenswelt* represents the ultimate form of conformism. There is no way of adhering to the established order that is more undivided, more complete than this infrapolitical relation of doxic evidence. (Bourdieu, Wacquant 1994: 74)

Bourdieu, together with Wacquant, here demonstrates the connection between cognitive and political. His theory of knowledge represents a dimension and an essential part of his political theory.

## Conclusion

This paper’s (modest) aim was to identify the levels at which Bourdieu and Berger/Luckmann “come close” to each other by identifying the same problems they tackled, albeit in different ways and with different results.



We will start the summary by considering the structure/action dichotomy our theoreticians consider. As already pointed out, Bourdieu, ultimately, stands on the side that emphasizes the restrictions of structures imposed on human action. This strong social pre-structuring is aptly illustrated by his citation of Leibniz in according to whom “we are automatons in three-quarters of what we do” (Bourdieu 2002: 474), where the remaining quarter of our doings is unintentional, and eventual improvisation is, in the final instance, regulated by objective circumstances (i.e. structures).

On the other hand, Berger and Luckmann’s dialectics paves the way for the shift from subjectivism to relationality – the conceptualization of decentred, that is, not substantiated subject. Social action forms the (logical) link that overcomes the alleged polarization of objective and subjective. The dialectical relationship between subject and object is replaced by the process between different subjects in which objective social reality is created, whereas the analytical primacy is bestowed upon the relation between subjects. The foundations of relational theorizing, laid down by Elias and Mannheim, innovatively continued by Berger and Luckmann, are today taken on by Knoblauch in his project of communicative constructivism. As subjects in Berger and Luckmann’s conception are never completely socialized, the room is left for conflict and change, in contrast to the reproduction of social routines, which is the inexorable effect of the determinism in Bourdieu. It might be valuable for the theoreticians involved in the agency/structure debate encompassing the issue of reflexivity (Archer, Sayer, Elder-Vass) to (re)consider Berger/Luckmann’s hint at the “solution” of this central sociological problem.

As for the thematization of the somatic, Berger and Luckmann make a strong case for the corporal in their theory, although they restrict the analysis of the body as a requirement for social action without considering its performative role, which is of utmost importance for Bourdieu. While Berger and Luckmann present language as the essential objectivation of knowledge, Bourdieu stresses its role in social struggles. He makes a sharp cut between common-sense and scientific knowledge, whereas Berger and Luckmann stress their continuity.

The spatial limitations of this paper did not allow for a more detailed comparison of Bourdieu’s and Berger/Luckmann’s theory. Questions related to research methodologies that stem from these theoretical approaches have, unfortunately, remained unanswered.<sup>40</sup> The foundation of Bourdieu’s comprehension on phenomenology, a philosophical standpoint that greatly affected Berger and Luckmann, has not been given appropriate attention.<sup>41</sup> What was done, hopefully informatively enough, was to provide an insight into two ways of synthesizing ideas that are part of the heritage of the classics of sociology, with specific intertwining and different emphasis.

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40 As introductory literature for Bourdieu’s and Berger/Luckmann’s methodology, see respectively: Bourdieu *et al.* 1991; Berger, Kellner 1981.

41 For considerations of the relationship between Bourdieu and phenomenology see: Atkinson 2020; Crossley 2001; Frère 2012; Robbins 2016.

Finally, two short general assessments of these theories can be presented here. On the one hand, *complementarity* stands out, at least when it comes to the relationship between the subjective and the objective, and the idea related to habitus and habitualization (Knoblauch 2003). On the other, one finds the *incongruence* of these approaches, due to insurmountable differences in the theoretical “architecture” and “attitude”, yet with leaving room for one theory to “learn” from the other, albeit within the boundaries of each of these theoretical frameworks (Bongaerts 2019).

Passing the final judgment on Bourdieu's and Berger/Luckmann's theory was not the intention of this paper, but it is a recommendation for readers. The openness of both approaches, which defines their conceptual potential, can make such an attempt particularly interesting and beneficial for the contemporary sociological theorizing.

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Miloš Jovanović

## Bourdieu's Theory and the Social Constructivism of Berger and Luckmann

### Apstrakt

U radu se poredi sociološki pristup Pjera Burdijea sa onim koji su razvili Peter Berger i Tomas Lukman. Cilj rada je da se identifikuju komplementarnosti i razilaženja ovih pristupa. Glavna sličnost se sastoji u nameri da se „dijalektički“ prevaziđe/premosti jaz između „objektivizma“ i „subjektivizma“ u društvenoj teoriji. Druga paralela uključuju negativan stav prema relativističkim tendencijama postmodernizma. Ono što je zajedničko za ove autore je tematizacija: tela kao mesta društvenih uticaja, centralnosti jezika u društvenom životu, društvenih funkcija znanja i značaja moći u društvenim odnosima. Razlike u teoretisanju se pripisuju različitim intelektualnim, teorijskim i socio-kulturnim kontekstima u kojima su ovi naučnici delovali. Razilaženja ovih teorijskih pristupa postaju očigledna kada se ispita različito značenje i značaj koji se pridaje konceptima individuacije, strukture, delanja, habitusa i habitualizacije, strukture relevantnosti i odnosa zdravorazumskog i naučnog znanja. Konačno, vidljiva je razlika u političkim stavovima: Burdije je bio kritičar „s leva“, dok su Berger i Lukman bili samoproglašeni liberalni konzervativci.

**Ključne reči:** Burdije, Berger i Lukman, objektivizam/subjektivizam, telo, jezik, moć, znanje, politička gledišta

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Mirko Petrić and Inga Tomić-Koludrović

## BOURDIEU'S THEORIZATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE ANALYSIS OF SOUTH-EAST EUROPEAN SOCIETIES<sup>1</sup>

### ABSTRACT

This article discusses the significance of social capital in Bourdieu-inspired analyses of contemporary South-East European societies. We first recapitulate Bourdieu's theorization of social capital, emphasizing that it allows different operationalizations expressly because of its rather abstract theoretical character. Following that, we explain what is meant by "South-East European societies" and that their inequality-generating mechanisms are largely based on social closure. In the central part of the article, we comment on some attempts at operationalization of social capital in the SEE region. While we also discuss two cases of eclectically mixing Lin's operationalization with Bourdieusian concepts, at the center of our attention is the elaboration of Bourdieu's theorization of social capital put forward by the Serbian sociologist Predrag Cvetičanin. The relevance of his concepts of "social capital of solidarity" and "social capital of informal connections" for the study of class relations in post-socialist societies in South-East Europe highlights the advantages of a consistent application of the Bourdieusian framework in a contemporary (post-Bourdieuian) context.

### KEYWORDS

Bourdieu, social capital, post-socialism, hybrid societies, South-East Europe

## Introduction

Allow us to begin this article with a lengthy citation from Bourdieu's text. In what was published as an appendix to the second chapter of *Practical Reason* (Bourdieu 1998b), he called for identifying specific principles of differentiation at work in different societies across time and space.

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Social sciences should construct not classes, but rather the social spaces in which classes can be demarcated, but which exist only on paper. In each case it should construct and discover (beyond the opposition between constructionism and realism) the principle of differentiation which permits one to reengineer theoretically the empirically observed social space. *Nothing permits one to assume that the principle of difference is the same at all times and in all places*, in Ming China and contemporary China, or in today's Germany, Russia and Algeria. But with the exception of the least differentiated societies (with still present differences in symbolic capital, which are more difficult to measure), all societies appear as social spaces, that is, as *structures of differences that can only be understood by constructing the generative principle which objectively grounds those differences*. This principle is none other than *the structure of the distribution of the forms of power or the kinds of capital which are effective in the social universe under consideration* – and which vary according to the specific place and moment at hand. (Bourdieu 1998b: 32, emphasis ours)

In what follows we will discuss the significance of social capital in attempts to identify the generative principles grounding the structures of the distribution of the forms of power in contemporary South-East European societies. We will first briefly recapitulate Bourdieu's theorization of social capital, emphasizing that it allows different operationalizations expressly because of its rather abstract theoretical character in his work. Following that, we will explain what is meant by the designation "South-East European societies". Finally, in the central part of the article, we will comment on some attempts at operationalization of Bourdieu's understanding of social capital in the region under study. At the center of our attention are the modifications of the concept of social (and also cultural) capital put forward and elaborated by the Serbian sociologist Predrag Cvetičanin and his collaborators from several countries.<sup>2</sup> The aim of the article is to highlight the advantages of consistent application of the Bourdieusian framework in a contemporary (post-Bourdiesian) context.

## Bourdieu's Theorization of Social Capital

Bourdieu's is the oldest, and alongside Coleman's (1988, 1990), the most prominent sociological theorization of social capital. Its roots date back to Bourdieu's early anthropological work in Algeria, in which he already took note of the importance of "capital of alliances" and "the capital of prestige stemming

<sup>2</sup> To be sure, the central impetus behind the mentioned modifications was Predrag Cvetičanin's incessant work on the development of the model of class analysis applicable in contemporary hybrid societies. This work, however, involves a constant dialogue between theory and empirical practice, in which his collaborators from the United States, Serbia, Croatia, and the United Kingdom have participated in different capacities over the last ten years. They are listed as co-authors in bibliographical references. The authors of this article have also participated in theoretical, empirical, and interpretive work related to the development of the mentioned model of class analysis but would like to point out that Cvetičanin's operationalization of Bourdieu's theorization of social capital discussed later in the article preceded their involvement in joint work.

from an extensive network of affines” (Bourdieu 1977a: 65). Here he also speaks of the relative precariousness of symbolic capital (in contrast to the relative stability of economic capital), as well as of “a collective matrimonial strategy” of its acquisition and the need to “invest” in it to preserve relations. Furthermore, “interest” is mentioned, as in “the ‘family interest’ which tends to see the daughter as an *instrument* for strengthening the integration of the agnatic group, or a sort of symbolic money allowing prestigious alliances to be set up with other groups” (Bourdieu 1977a: 66).

However, while some of the mentioned keywords can easily be associated with Bourdieu’s later theorization of social capital, it should be kept in mind that in the quotes above they refer to a society with a pre-capitalist economy and forms of domination. His attempts to define social capital in a relational analysis of the foundations of the social order in differentiated, modern society, began in a discussion first published in 1973, one year after the publication of his *Esquisse* (Bourdieu 1972).

According to Field (2008: 17), it is in this discussion that Bourdieu initially defined social capital as

a capital of social relationships which will provide, if necessary, useful ‘supports’: a capital of honourability and respectability which is often indispensable if one desires to attract clients in socially important positions, and which may serve as currency, for instance in a political career. (Bourdieu 1977b: 503)

As claimed by Robbins (2000: 36), at the early stages of its definition, Bourdieu essentially treated the nascent concept as an adjunct to cultural capital. However, following the initial “provisional notes” (Bourdieu 1980), his definition of social capital was refined in a text published rather shortly afterwards in German and English (Bourdieu 1983, 1986). Here, Bourdieu asserts that

Social capital is the aggregate or actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network or more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a “credential” which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word. (Bourdieu 1986: 248–249)

Bourdieu also explained in this text that the volume of social capital possessed by an agent depends both on the size of the network that can be effectively mobilized, and the volume of capital (economic, cultural, or symbolic) possessed by all those to whom the agent is connected (Bourdieu 1986: 249). Furthermore, he emphasized that, although “relatively irreducible to economic and cultural capital possessed by a given agent”, social capital can never be viewed as completely independent, due to the nature of the exchanges instituting mutual acknowledgment, and to the multiplier effect it exerts on the capital already possessed. Finally, Bourdieu insisted that the existence of a network of connections is “not a natural given, or even a social given, constituted



once and for all by an initial act of institution”, but rather “the product of an endless effort of institution” (Bourdieu 1986: 249).

In other words, “the reproduction of social capital requires an unceasing effort of sociability” (Bourdieu 1986: 250), and the networks of relationships result from “investment strategies, individual or collective, consciously or unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term, i.e. at transforming contingent relations [...] into relationships that are at once necessary and elective, implying durable obligations subjectively felt” (Bourdieu 1986: 249).

The relation of social capital to other forms of capital is shown at a glance in Müller’s (1992: 283) representation of the “logic of the forms of capitals”.

<i>Criteria</i>							
<i>Forms of capital</i>	Basis	Objectification	Institutionalization	Embodiment	Convertibility	Risk of loss	Loss categories
Economic capital	Money	Capital	Property rights	—	High	Social upheavals (wars, revolution, economic crises)	(1) Inflation (2) Dispossession
Social capital	Relationships	Networks	(1) Titles of nobility and official titles as individual properties (2) Social and professional status; the profession as a collective	—	Low and risky (but necessary)	(1) Ingratitude (2) Asymmetric reciprocity (3) Unreasonableness	(1) Relationship traps (2) Status traps (3) Friendship traps
Cultural capital	Knowledge	Cultural goods and knowledge	Educational qualifications as individual properties	Cultivation ( <i>Bildung</i> ), taste, distinction	Medium, depending on (1) the situation of education and occupation (2) the volume of other capitals	(1) Inflation of educational qualifications (2) Obsolescence of knowledge	Antiquated habitus
Symbolic capital			Social perception of the forms of capital: “Prestige”				

Figure 1: Logic of the forms of capital (Müller 1992: 283)<sup>3</sup>

Müller’s representation also includes the individual properties of different forms of capital, which almost immediately suggest why social capital is more difficult to operationalize than economic or cultural capital. Namely, while

3 Translation from the German is ours.

economic capital obviously easily lends itself to quantification, it has also been shown that at least some aspects of objectified and institutionalized cultural capital can be successfully measured (e.g., in terms of possession of cultural goods or academic qualifications). The same goes for attending different types of cultural events. In comparison, both investments in and assets gained by social capital seem to be more “immaterial” and unstable. Furthermore, properties such as “titles of nobility” and “official titles” run the risk of appearing antiquated in most modern societies.<sup>4</sup> And finally, the reputation of different professions (including their interaction protocols) varies from society to society more so than general levels of educational qualifications (routinely used when measuring institutional cultural capital).

Even without mentioning again that the volume of social capital possessed by an agent depends not only on the size of his/her network of connections but also on the volume of the capital possessed in his/her own right by each of those to whom the agent in question is connected (Bourdieu 1986: 249), it is evident that operationalizing and measuring social capital in Bourdieu's sense of the term is a tall order.

### Why has Bourdieu not Operationalized his Notion of Social Capital?

It has been asserted that “the interpretive power of [Bourdieu's] approach is not matched by the degree of empirical precision that many sociologists would desire” (Swartz 1997: 161). This relates especially to the fact that in his empirical work “[s]ocial capital in particular is seldom measured” (Swartz 1997: 161). Field (2008: 17) also mentions that in his “monumental” *Distinction* (1979), Bourdieu “furnished only one indicator of social capital: membership of golf clubs, which he held to be helpful in oiling the wheels of business life”. Likewise, Adam and Rončević (2003: 159) acknowledge that Bourdieu “must be regarded as a pioneer who laid down the frame of reference for theorizing and research in this area”, but are quick to add that “his notion of social capital, unlike the concept of cultural capital, has not been included in a systematic empirical analysis”.

But why did this happen? Why has Bourdieu never “properly operationalized” his notion of social capital? There are several potential answers to this

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4 This estimate should not be interpreted as concurring with Field's (2008: 21) assertion that Bourdieu's theorization of social capital is “ill suited to deal with the more open and loose social relations of late modernity”. We think that this remark is of relevance only if taken to refer to the hints at operationalization implicit in Bourdieu's descriptions of the elites of his time. It is true, as Field (2008: 21) asserts, that “[c]ruises, dinner parties, Bach and chic sports are hardly the distinctive badges of today's elites”. It could also be claimed, as this author does elsewhere, that Bourdieu “perhaps over-emphasises the role of social capital based on kinship”, and that “his theory appears to be rooted in a relatively static model of social hierarchy” (Field 2008: 20). However, we take the view that sociohistorical contexts to which theorizations refer do not necessarily diminish their heuristic potential. Likewise, references to historical situations in the theory building process do not automatically invalidate the application of the resulting theoretical principles in different sets of circumstances.

question: none are exhaustive or complete but together provide a starting point for further discussion.

One could begin by quoting a laconic statement with which Müller (2014) illustrates the connectedness between economic and other forms of capital. According to this statement, “Whoever has money also has connections’, that is *social capital*” (Müller 2014: 49). Starting from such a premise, consistent with Bourdieu’s conviction that “social capital was an asset of the privileged and a means of maintaining their superiority” (Field 2008: 22), one could argue that Bourdieu’s reason for not operationalizing it was essentially scientific parsimony. Namely, the indicators of economic and cultural capital have proved sufficient to perform a more than satisfying analysis in as ambitious a work as *Distinction* (Bourdieu 1979).

As concluded by Crossley (2014: 87), “in practice Bourdieu’s mapping of social space tends to focus upon these two forms of capital alone”. In this context, it is worth bearing in mind that although in Geometric Data Analysis<sup>5</sup> “there is no drastic *parsimony* principle”, methods encompassed by it “can only be fruitful if they deal with relevant data” (Le Roux; Rouanet 2004: 11). In addition to being difficult to operationalize, data related to social capital were obviously thought by Bourdieu not to be relevant or reliable<sup>6</sup> enough to warrant the introduction of a whole new set of indicators.

However, we are certainly speaking here about more than a methodological choice. There is no doubt that Bourdieu’s focusing on economic and cultural capital also had to do with the sociohistorical context in which his analysis took place. Crossley (2014: 86–87) reminds us that Bourdieu’s “attempt to move from a narrowly materialist conception of power and inequality” happened at the time when class relations had become more complex than was the case in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Writing in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, he was aware that explanations of inequality based merely on the ownership of the means of production no longer provided an accurate picture of social reality.

As effectively summarized by Crossley (2014: 87), at the time of Bourdieu’s analysis, the dichotomous class conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat had been obscured by “among other things: partial separation of ownership from control of the means of production; the growth of public sector employment; and the emergence of high salary occupations, elevated above manual labour by their dependence upon scarce forms of technical or cultural knowledge”. Particularly important was also the unprecedented expansion of education, resulting in increased significance of qualifications. According to Crossley (2014: 87), all these changes “rendered an exclusive focus upon

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5 Multiple Correspondence Analysis, which became internationally known after its use in Bourdieu’s *Distinction* (1979), is held by Le Roux and Rouanet (2004: 1) to be “one of the main paradigms” of what was later called Geometric Data Analysis (GDA).

6 As argued by Cvetičanin and Popescu (2011: 445), a practical consequence of Bourdieu’s understanding of social capital as contributing to the reproduction of social inequality is that “respondents are likely to be more reluctant to provide reliable data”.

economic capital problematic". That is why Bourdieu's mapping of social space also relied on several measures of cultural capital.

But what about social contexts in which the analysis of social space simply requires the introduction of indicators of social capital? How to proceed in such cases? Our focus in this article is on the post-socialist societies in South-East Europe, in which informal connections continue to serve as a resource in both a low-end "economy of favors" and high-end political and economic transactions (Cvetičanin, Popescu 2011; Cvetičanin et al. 2019).

Before we proceed further, however, we should position ourselves in relation to how we approach Bourdieu's theorization of social capital. In contrast to those who consider it to be too complex and "abstract", we believe that exactly these alleged traits allow for operationalizations applicable to contexts largely different from 1960s and 1970s France. Furthermore, we cannot agree more with Adam and Rončević (2003: 164) when they state that "[t]he problem is how to execute procedures of operationalization and measurement consistent with certain theoretical premises while at the same time remaining sensitive to context".

The operationalization we discuss in the central part of the article seems to us to respond well to the task specified above. But let us first explain what is meant by the designation "South-East Europe", and what is specific about the study of inequalities in the societies in this region.

## Why South-East Europe?

Our reasons for discussing the potential for operationalization of Bourdieu's theorization of social capital in empirical studies of South-East European societies are threefold: (1) throughout the SEE region, social capital matters a great deal in generating social inequalities; (2) its relevance is not limited to the current or past contexts but is also likely to be useful in future studies; (3) there have been promising attempts at developing context-specific indicators of social capital in the region.

As regards our first reason, we should mention that the region of South-East Europe (no matter how its borders are defined) is notorious for its "culture of informality". In the socialist times, the importance of social capital (exactly in the sense theorized by Bourdieu)<sup>7</sup> was evident in the ubiquity of "connections

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7 It is fascinating to note that Kligman and Verdery (2011: 421–423), when discussing the transformations of kinship in the collectivized Romanian villages (in the following excerpt, a change that affected ritual kinship or godfatherhood), describe them in terms completely consistent with Bourdieu's theorization of social capital. According to the authors, "[r]itual kinship had always had an *instrumental aspect* but under socialism this aspect took on much greater significance. [...] [*C*]reating *personalistic ties* with [the Party] [...] was a favored way of *trying to shape an institutional, instrumentalized relationship through affective, culturally grounded ties* aiming to *personalize* it". While in the past the villagers selected as godparents almost exclusively persons from prominent local families, the pattern changed under socialism: "each generation made its own choices

and relations” needed to get anything done.<sup>8</sup> New forms of clientelism and “fraudulent behavior” were added in the post-socialist period, marked by intensive neoliberal transformation of the economy and society across former Eastern Europe (Bohle, Greskovits 2012).<sup>9</sup>

In the current context, it is certainly not easy to determine whether informal practices in the post-socialist countries are due to “a culture, a contextual rational choice, or both?” (Cvetičanin et al. 2019). However, whatever explanation we might prefer, we should keep in mind what Buchanan (1999: 123) emphasized in her review of Creed’s (1998) account of the continuity of “reforms” in Bulgaria from state socialism to “ambivalent transition”: that “post-1989 life cannot be understood without a comprehensive understanding of what came before” and that “the unfortunate dichotomization of East European social history into a before and after” should be transcended. In other words, since the social and cultural transformation of post-socialist societies is a historical *process*, and since the informality discussed doubtless contains a *cultural* component, it seems certain that social capital will continue to play an important role in the SEE region.

This, as has already been stated, is our second reason for wanting to discuss its operationalization. In the section of the article that follows we are going to do that by commenting on what we believe is a noteworthy attempt at developing context-specific indicators of social capital in the South-East European region. But before we proceed to that, we should briefly explain what exactly is meant by the designation “South-East Europe”.

In brief, although aware that geography is never innocent, we have opted for the most “purely geographical” designation for the region under discussion. Such a choice largely eliminates the type of “othering” implied in the use of the term “Balkans” (suggesting cultural and political “backwardness”). Moreover, since the late 1990s, the term “South-East Europe” has largely lost

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rather than inheriting its parents’, and people increasingly selected sponsors from outside the community, *basing their selections* not on land-owning prominence but *on other characteristics that might make them useful* – a former classmate with a powerful administrative job, or one’s factory foreman [...]. Aside from *strategic selection* of ritual kin, villagers sought to create as many *connections* as possible *with people who had resources of some sort to distribute*, seeking *links through shared acquaintances, shared localisms or school ties*, or gifts and bribes. [...] Although making friends could be a means of making a profit, [...] for most villagers it was a *necessary survival strategy* that enabled them and their families to get by”. (emphasis ours)

8 To quote but one example, Kligman and Verdery (2011: 423) inform us that in the socialist Romania, “[t]he various ways of ‘making friends’ with people who possessed economic or political capital became so common that according to a 1970s joke, the initials for the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) actually meant *pile, cunoștiințe, și relații*, or ‘connections, acquaintances and relations’”.

9 Several chapters in Whyte and Wiegatz (2016) contain case studies on how neoliberal marketisation of the public sector and financialization of the economy lead to new kinds of informal economic activity, as well as to the state’s de facto legitimization of illegal practices.

its formerly negative connotations<sup>10</sup> and has become an example of “the symbolic power of European construct embodied by the EU” (Bechev 2006: 22).

While it is true that this designation – “combining the Balkans with the neighbouring northern and eastern parts” – “lacks the structural cohesiveness of a historical region *sui generis*” (Sundhaussen 2002: 93), it is also not without reason that “external policymakers and analysts did not lose sight of certain common problems requiring regional approaches” (Bechev 2006: 19). In addition, as also argued by Sundhaussen (2002: 93), “[t]he heuristic model of Southeast Europe [...] makes sense, relating to ethnic diversity, problems of neighbourhood and interstate conflicts.” What the countries in the region also have in common is increasing peripheralization, resulting from the collapse of the previously dominant division between capitalist Western and socialist Eastern Europe (Vidmar Horvat 2018).

At any rate, in our article the designation “South-East Europe” refers to four member states located on the “internal periphery” of the EU (Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania) and to what is currently referred to by the European Commission as “Western Balkans” (i.e., the remaining post-Yugoslav countries, plus Albania). While there are obvious differences from one country to the next, all share a socialist past and its long-term influence on various practices in everyday life.<sup>11</sup> Even more importantly, from a Bourdieusian perspective, empirical work<sup>12</sup> carried out – among others– by the researchers whose definition of “hybrid societies” we are about to quote also indicates the existence of commonalities in inequality-generating mechanisms.

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10 According to Todorova (1997), who relies in her argument on the works of Bernath (1973) and Kaser (1990), *Südosteuropa* was intended at the end of the 1920s to become a “neutral, non-political and non-ideological concept” describing the region encompassing the remnants of the Habsburg Monarchy and Ottoman Balkans. However, the term was subsequently discredited by its use in geopolitical treatises advocating German expansionism.

11 In his book on Yugoslavia, Allcock (2000: 7–8) stated that the “generic characteristics of the model of ‘really existing socialism’ [...] were thoroughly present in the Yugoslav system”, despite “all its idiosyncrasies”. And indeed, works based on empirical and historical research carried out in Romania and Bulgaria, such as Kligman and Verdery’s (2011), Creed’s (1998), and Brunnbauer’s (2007), indicate similarities in patterns hidden at first glance due to Yugoslavia’s higher standard of living and openness to Western cultural influences. In methodological terms, one could say that indicators of cultural consumption in Yugoslav and Soviet-style socialism differed more than indicators of social capital.

12 The empirical research in question took place between 2014 and 2019 within two large-scale projects funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (“Life-Strategies and Survival Strategies of Households and Individuals in South-East European Societies in the Times of Crisis” - IZ73ZO\_152626) and EU’s Horizon 2020 (“Closing the Gap Between Formal and Informal Institutions in the Balkans” - Grant No. 693537). Quantitative and qualitative research was carried out in all successor states of socialist Yugoslavia (except Montenegro) and in Albania. It was performed by research teams from all the researched countries, as well as from Switzerland, the UK, and Latvia.

Setting aside for a moment all the intricacies of their different historical trajectories, one could claim that the countries in South-East Europe are commonly characterized by their “hybrid societies”. These, in turn, are defined by Cvetičanin et al. (2021: 947) as resulting “from their bearing clear marks of their socialist past [...] and, on the other hand, from having been exposed to an intensive neoliberal transformation over the last thirty years”. And furthermore, such “hybrid societies” are characterized by social inequalities in them being generated by “several mechanisms of similar strength: (1) *exploitative market mechanisms* (based on economic capital), and (2) different types of *social closure mechanisms* (based on political and social capital)”. A further analytical complication is that “[s]ocial agents use these mechanisms not only in economic, but also in all other fields”.

In this article, our attention is focused on social capital and how to operationalize it in the analysis of South-East European societies. Without for the moment entering a complex discussion on how to analyze class structure in “hybrid societies”,<sup>13</sup> let us mention here that Cvetičanin et al. (2021: 950) state that social closure mechanisms in South-East Europe are based on: “(1) political party membership; (2) social networks based on kinship, common geographic origin, and informal interest groups; (3) ethnicity, religion, and gender; and (4) credentials and membership in professional associations.”<sup>14</sup> The question that needs to be answered is: which measures should be used to indicate the possession of social (and political) capital relevant in Bourdieusian constructions of social space in the analyzed South-East European societies?

## Operationalizing Bourdieu’s Theorization of Social Capital in the South-East European Context

Whether we start from the quoted excerpt from Kligman and Verdery’s (2011) book on survival strategies of the Romanian peasants in the conditions of collectivized agriculture<sup>15</sup> or from the quoted statement emphasizing the importance of “social networks based on kinship, common geographic origin, and informal interest groups” (Cvetičanin et al. 2021: 950) in social closure mechanisms, it is obvious that any Bourdieusian analysis of South-East European societies requires an operationalization of the notion of social capital.

Namely, as many scholars have noticed, in “the structure of the distribution of the forms of power [...] effective in the social universe[s]”<sup>16</sup> of South-East European countries, this form of capital plays an important role. This in turn

13 This topic is dealt with in detail in Cvetičanin et al. 2021.

14 The elements of the presented classification were verified by the empirical research carried out within the large-scale projects mentioned in footnote 12.

15 Please see footnote 7.

16 This phrase, quoted from Bourdieu (1998b: 32), in the original refers to any “social universe under consideration”. We have here adapted it slightly (by using the plural form of the noun “universe”) to refer to the specific set of social universes discussed in this article.

means that – in the South-East European context – a Bourdieusian analysis of social capital would contribute decisively to understanding “the principle of differentiation which permits one to reengender theoretically the empirically observed social space” (Bourdieu 1998b: 32). In contrast to Bourdieu’s analysis of 1960s and 1970s France, social capital therefore simply needs to be included when constructing social spaces of contemporary South-East European societies.

### An Early Discussion of the Applicability of Bourdieu’s Theorization of Social Capital

To our knowledge, the first published systematic reflection about the potential usefulness of Bourdieu’s theorization of social capital in the South-East European context was Smiljka Tomanović’s (2006) discussion of “the applicability of Bourdieu’s concept of social capital to studying the families in Serbia”.<sup>17</sup>

In that text, the author “questions some aspects of the conceptual and heuristic value of Bourdieu’s concept of social capital” (Tomanović 2006: 111). Namely, although Tomanović obviously agrees with Bourdieu’s general view of social capital as reproducing social inequality, as well as with the claim that “it is exactly the family that has a central place in acquiring and reproducing social capital” (Tomanović 2006: 114), she also thinks that Bourdieu “neglects the aspects of solidarity and cooperation which are not interest-based” (Tomanović 2006: 119).<sup>18</sup>

Furthermore, relying on terminology coming from a different theoretical tradition, Tomanović (2006: 119) states that Bourdieu’s view of the concept “postulates that ‘bridging’ social capital is worth more than ‘bonding’ [social capital]”. She then goes on to quote empirical research showing that family networks and contacts play important roles in parenting and in transitions to adulthood in post-socialist Serbia and Bulgaria, which makes it clear that she is skeptical of the usefulness of Bourdieu’s theorization of social capital in the South-East European context.<sup>19</sup>

Namely, her interpretation of it excludes the possibility of accounting for the role of close-knit (“bonding”) family ties and intimate friendships, which – as she states elsewhere (Tomanović 2006: 115) – “play a compensatory role for the economically deprived and [are] an important part of their ‘survival

17 All translations from Tomanović’s text are ours.

18 Elsewhere in the text, Tomanović explicitly wonders whether “primary relations of solidarity, which create a sense of belonging to a group (family, group of friends) and thereby contribute to an individual’s welfare (human capital)” are not “a capital in itself, and not only in the sense of a resource with the potential of becoming a capital?” (Tomanović 2006: 118–119).

19 This skepticism is underlined by the author’s subsequent interpretation of social capital of “young people from different social strata” in Serbia (Tomanović 2012), in which she mentions Bourdieu’s “symbolic capital” but relies centrally on Lin’s (1999) distinction between “expressive” and “instrumental” social capital.



strategy”. In connection with this, she mentions (Tomanović 2006: 119) an important unresolved dilemma facing future research of social capital in the South-East European context. It relates to the question of who should be considered as the bearer of social capital: a household or an individual?

All in all, Tomanović (2006: 118) agrees with the group of authors who consider Bourdieu’s theorization of social capital as important for understanding social relations in contemporary societies but difficult to apply in empirical research. At any rate, she shares the view that Bourdieu’s conceptualization of social capital is more difficult to operationalize than are the concepts of other authors, sometimes “criticized as normative, homogenized, and the like”.

Nevertheless, Tomanović (2006: 118–120) recommends Bourdieu’s general approach to social science research<sup>20</sup> as a potential tool for coping with the intricacies of studying social capital in contemporary Serbian families. In the case at hand, the construction of the research object would require operationalization of two types of social capital, referred to (in non-Bourdieuian terms) as “bonding” (or “getting-by”) and “bridging” (or “getting-ahead”). Studying their distribution in relation to different structural characteristics would then become possible, as well as studying their connection with economic and cultural capital, and with family strategies of their reproduction and conversion.

Since multimethod research is also recommended, Tomanović (2006: 120) concludes her article with an indication of the challenge of interpreting the findings within a consistent theoretical framework.

### A Consistently Bourdieusian Operationalization of Social Capital

In contrast to Tomanović’s eclectic approach to devising a context-specific operationalization of social capital, Predrag Cvetičanin’s proposed solutions for the same problem have been developed within a consistently Bourdieusian framework.

Namely, Cvetičanin’s work on social capital indicators applicable in the study of South-East European societies took place as part of a wider attempt to account for their specific inequality-generating mechanisms. In other words, his analytical effort was not primarily directed at studying particular “field struggles” but rather at constructing “the social spaces in which classes can be demarcated” (Bourdieu 1998b: 32).

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20 Especially relevant for Tomanović’s argument is the idea of the integration of theory and method in the construction of the research object (by means of relational analysis). She also quotes from the passage in Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 31), in which it is explained that Bourdieu treated concepts in a pragmatic way, “as ‘tool kits’ [...] designed to help him solve problems”. This and further quotes support the argument that the concept of social capital should be seen as “polymorphic, supple, and adaptable, rather than defined, calibrated, and used rigidly” (Bourdieu; Wacquant 1992: 23) and that “[w]e must try, in every case, to mobilize all the techniques that are relevant and practically usable, given the definition of the object and the practical conditions of data collection” (Bourdieu, Wacquant 1992: 227).

Such “structures of differences”, as well as “the generative principle which objectively grounds” them (Bourdieu 1998b: 32), can of course be “grasped only in the form of distributions of properties among individuals or concrete institutions, since the data available are attached to individuals or institutions” (Bourdieu, Wacquant 1992: 230). That is why, at the very beginning of the article on “The Art of Making Classes in Serbia”, Cvetičanin and Popescu (2011: 444) explain why they think it is necessary to include social capital indicators into analysis, as different from Bourdieu’s empirical research, in which “the concepts of economic and cultural capital perform the entire analytical work, while social capital disappears from the stage”.

After explaining the reasons of divergence in the principles of differentiation relevant in Western capitalist and South-East European socialist and post-socialist societies, the authors put forward their proposal for “a different understanding of the principle of capital composition in comparison with Bourdieu’s research practice” (Cvetičanin, Popescu 2011: 444). They argue that – in the case of post-socialist Serbia they analyze – social capital should not be kept in the background as part of the theory of the forms of capital but should also be used in the construction of social space. Moreover, they suggest that, in the case at hand, not only social but also cultural capital “should be treated both in terms of their volume (quantity) and in terms of different types (qualities)”.

What the latter suggestion means is that the authors, based on their previous empirical and theoretical research,<sup>21</sup> saw the need to distinguish in their analysis between the indicators of “local cultural capital” and “global cultural capital”, as well as between the indicators of “social capital of solidarity” and “political social capital”. They considered the introduction of these subtypes of Bourdieu’s capital categories as a necessary precondition for a successful construction of social space in post-socialist Serbia, and it should be said right away that the relevance of these context-specific distinctions was indeed confirmed by later empirical research.<sup>22</sup>

As regards their division of Bourdieu’s category of cultural capital into its “local” and “global” subtypes, the authors have put forward the hypothesis that it could be relevant not only in the analysis of Serbian society but more generally “in societies that were at some point in history ‘Westernized’” (Cvetičanin; Popescu 2011: 445), either through colonization or through the activities of their own elites. All the societies classified above as “South-East European”

21 For cultural capital, the authors mention a paper on symbolic boundaries (Cvetičanin; Popescu 2009) and comprehensive analyses presented in Cvetičanin 2007 as sources of primary insights leading up to their suggestion. For social capital, two works by Cvetičanin (1997, 2001) are mentioned. The authors’ theoretical research was based on comprehensive secondary literature quoted in these works and summarized in Cvetičanin; Popescu 2011.

22 In addition to the research results presented in Cvetičanin; Popescu 2011, the introduction of the mentioned subtypes of capital also proved relevant in analyses performed on different data sets in Serbia (from 2010 and 2015) (Cvetičanin et al. 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2015, 2021) but also in Croatia (Petrić et al., forthcoming).

obviously fit this description, and there are indeed empirically verified indications that in countries other than Serbia “lower social classes [...] have found sanctuary and the basis for their cultural identity” (Cvetičanin et al. 2015: 207) in local culture.<sup>23</sup>

In this article, however, we are centrally interested in attempts at operationalization of Bourdieu’s theorization of social capital. We will therefore now present in greater detail both the definitions of two subtypes of social capital put forward by Cvetičanin and Popescu (2011) and the measures used in empirical research based on these definitions.

While obviously starting from Bourdieu’s theorization of social capital, the authors note the existence (in Serbia, but arguably also in other post-socialist SEE countries) of two different types of social networks resulting from “investment strategies [...] aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term” (Bourdieu 1986: 249).

According to Cvetičanin and Popescu (2011: 447), social networks representing “political social capital” connect “people” (i.e., social agents) “whose control over access to public resources (goods and services) enables them to use these resources to satisfy the private needs of other members of these networks and in this way accumulate power (and acquire access to the resources they do not control)”. To be able to put this subtype of capital in motion, one needs to accept participation in the system of exchange of “favors”. The authors point out that, within such a system, counter-favors can be returned to previously known persons occupying positions of authority (in the political sphere proper, or in companies and public institutions) but also to complete strangers who are also part of the same informal power structure.

In contrast, social networks representing “social capital of solidarity” are “based on the existence of ‘primary ties’”, i.e., on reliance on “neighbors, friends, relatives, or ‘countrymen’ who can pitch in to help with money, goods, services or emotional support” (Cvetičanin, Popescu 2011: 447).<sup>24</sup> The authors state that the emotional and expressive dimensions of networks based on “primary ties” are as important as the instrumental one. However, they point out that such networks can also be used as capital, which goes to say that they “not only provide specific benefits to individuals and groups, but can also be used to partially or fully deny those benefits to others”.

23 For example, the analysis of television genre preferences of high-school students in six larger cities on Croatia’s Adriatic coast, presented recently in Krolo et al. (2019), identified two types of taste in television: domestic television spectacles and foreign fiction television. The authors interpret this division as resulting from differences in parental cultural capital and indicating “cultural seclusion” vs. “global cultural cosmopolitanism”. Relating cultural consumption to values on the same sample as above, Marcelić et al. (2021) conclude that “the modern type” resulting from the cluster analysis “is mainly correlated with highbrow cultural practices and stronger preference towards foreign cultural artefacts, whereas traditional type is more prone to be involved in the local culture that uses national language”.

24 All the quotes that follow in this and the following paragraph are from the same page of the quoted work.

Furthermore, the authors underline the difference between “capital and resources in general”, and consistently with Bourdieu’s theory of capital, state that it can be “accumulated, transmitted and, under certain circumstances, converted into another type of capital”. The difference between “political social capital” and “social capital of solidarity” is that the former can involve “a trade-off in the form of access to previously unavailable resources” with strangers, while the latter is premised on requesting favors precisely by claiming “primary ties”. The authors also mention that capitals are field specific, which implies that agents participate in field struggles, in which they try to realize their interests at the expense of others. And finally, in Cvetičanin and Popescu’s (2011) article, the role of social capital is discussed as part of an attempt to – in Bourdieu’s (1998b: 32) words – “reengender theoretically the empirically observed social space”. Their ambition is no less than to identify the generative principles grounding the structures of the distribution of the forms of power in the society under discussion.

In light of all this, it is clear why such a consistently Bourdieusian approach to the notion of social capital is incompatible with operationalizations based on a largely metaphorical use of Bourdieu’s categories, or on using them in combination with categories prominent in the communitarian tradition of social capital research (such as “bonding” and “bridging”). The same goes for operationalizations based on Lin’s approach to social capital, which is essentially akin to Bourdieu’s but differs from it in its conception of the relationship between structural constraints and individual agency.<sup>25</sup>

We are now going to present Cvetičanin’s operationalization of social capital through measures used in the 2015 survey,<sup>26</sup> which served as a basis for the finalized version of the model of class analysis applicable in hybrid post-socialist societies in South-East Europe (Cvetičanin et al. 2021). Before proceeding further, however, we should mention that what was designated as “political social capital” in Cvetičanin and Popescu (2011) is in the new survey and article conceptualized as two separate categories: “social capital of informal connections” and “political capital”.<sup>27</sup> Likewise, we should mention that – in

25 As succinctly summarized by Song et al. (2018: 241–242), “Bourdieu more strongly emphasizes structural constraints (such as network closure and social exclusion) in the creation of social capital and the role of social capital in the reproduction of social hierarchy, while Lin more strongly underlines individual agency (such as heterophilous interaction and network bridging) in the accumulation of social capital and the function of social capital in climbing the social ladder”.

26 This survey was carried out in four SEE countries (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia) within the SNSF’s project IZ73Z0\_152626, mentioned in footnote 12. We are presenting the measures used in the questionnaire for that survey because the empirical material analyzed in Cvetičanin and Popescu (2011) was obtained from a survey carried out in 2005, before the distinction between “political social capital” and “social capital of solidarity” was conceptualized.

27 The designation “political social capital” in Cvetičanin and Popescu (2011) was inspired by Bourdieu’s (1998a) statement (which they quote), stating that “a political type of social capital” was the key principle of differentiation in socialist societies.

what follows – measures for social capital are presented together with measures for other types of capital, since its role in the attempted Bourdieusian construction of social space only becomes fully understandable in that context.

In Cvetičanin et al. (2021: 953), the authors inform us that they used (1) average monthly household income (per household member); (2) value of flat/house which members of the household own; (3) value of car(s) households possess (if any); and (4) the size of arable land (if they possess any) as indicators of economic capital.<sup>28</sup> As indicators of political capital, they used “a synthetic variable indicating whether the respondents hold an executive position in a political party or/and in public administration (at the local, regional, or national level), or a managerial role in companies or public institutions”. As indicators of social capital, the authors used responses to two questions: (1) how many people and which people (cousins, neighbors, work colleagues, political party members or religious community members) respondents can rely on when they need help (i.e., how large and diverse their social network is); and (2) whether they have any “informal connections” in public institutions (the court, police, health institutions, educational institutions, local self-governance offices) that could help them to sidestep formal procedures. Finally, as indicators of cultural capital, the authors used data on the highest level of education of (1) respondents; and (2) their mothers.<sup>29</sup>

The described indicators enabled construction of a Bourdieusian social space of post-socialist Serbian society, presented in Cvetičanin et al. (2021). However, as was already mentioned in Cvetičanin and Popescu (2011: 467), the proposed conception of social space transforms its representation into “a complex social jigsaw puzzle, [...] no longer based on uniform units of measure – ‘amounts’ of economic capital and of legitimate cultural capital”. Instead, it “encompasses the influence of the many important ‘powers and resources’

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Cvetičanin’s conceptualization of two separate categories (“social capital of informal connections” and “political capital”) reflects the new realities of the society under analysis (Serbian post-socialist society) and came about following extensive empirical work. 28 Such an operationalization of economic capital can be seen as an attempt to respond to a question similar to that posed by Tomanović (2006: 119) for social capital. Namely, in the South-East European context, it is equally unclear who should be considered as the bearer of economic capital: a household or an individual? In Cvetičanin’s operationalization, income and assets are analyzed at the household level yet in a way that obviously relates to individual class positions. Such an approach is essentially consistent with Jungbauer-Gans’s (2006: 19) description of respondents as “focal actors” in Bourdieusian research of structural social capital.

29 The authors inform us (Cvetičanin et al. 2021: 971) that their decision to use mother’s rather than father’s highest level of education was “based on the insight that mothers usually spend more time with children and decisively shape their embodied cultural capital in early childhood”, as is also implied by Bourdieu’s (1984: 75) reference to “the ‘musical mother’ of bourgeois autobiography”. (It should be mentioned here that the analyses presented in Cvetičanin et al. 2021 also contain a number of other indicators of cultural capital, but they are used in the step of analysis of class relating to lifestyles and symbolic boundaries.)

in the social formation” and presents itself as consisting of “regions defined (in addition to overall volume of capital and volume of economic capital) also by different types of cultural capital and social capital”. Such a representation of social space is positioned “in-between Bourdieuan geometrical space and more topological models of a field” and admittedly presupposes “an explicative principle of high complexity”. Nevertheless, the authors claim to have shown in their article (and indeed they have) that “different combinations of capital and subtypes of capital characteristic for particular areas of social space” helped explain why – in the analyzed case of post-socialist Serbia – “some types of social groupings and some types of social practices are more probable in certain areas of social space than in others”.

The authors (Cvetičanin, Popescu 2011: 467) conclude their contribution by stating that they believe Bourdieu’s model of social space is in effect quite reductive, in relation to the theoretical complexity of his intention to replace linear thinking with the (empirically reformulated) “structural causality of a network of factors” (Weininger 2002, 2005). In that sense, their proposal of a more complex model can be seen as a step in the direction already traced by Bourdieu. But more importantly, from our perspective in this article, the map of social space resulting from their theoretical and analytical efforts “indicates the existence of different bases (resources) for social groupings in Serbia and different strategies available to these groups” (Cvetičanin et al. 2012: 57). In other words, it enables – among other things – an insight into the effectiveness of social capital operationalized consistently with Bourdieu’s initial theorization of it.

The efforts concerning the production of the model of social space that could enable class analysis in hybrid post-socialist societies in South-East Europe were completed ten years after its initial proposal in Cvetičanin and Popescu (2011). The working of the new model is presented in Cvetičanin et al. (2021), using the case of Serbia. However, to show graphically the role of social capital in how social space is structured in this model, we are going to use diagrams resulting from the analysis of another South-East European post-socialist society (Croatia), presented in Petrić et al. (forthcoming).<sup>30</sup>

A representation of social space in Croatia, constructed using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) is presented in Figure 1. Without entering into technical details, discussed in Petrić et al. (forthcoming), we present the map resulting from the analysis, to which the labels of key resources were added (in the white rectangles next to the edges of the map). They indicate a form of “capital composition” different compared to Bourdieu’s studies (in which indicators of political and social capital are not used), but nevertheless showing a robust “gravitation pool of the social”. The added labels of key resources make

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30 The reasons for this are twofold. On the one hand, it is shown that the model works well in another South-East European society. On the other hand, the analysis described in the next subsection of this article was also performed in Croatia, and the data for it obtained in a comparable period.

it possible to understand which among them particularly affect the shaping of practices in certain regions of the social space (in addition to the influence of the overall volume of capital).




Figure 2: Social space in Croatia<sup>31</sup>

Regarding social capital, it is easy to notice that in the upper right quadrant one finds social networks of 21–40 and 40+ people, as well as 4–7 informal connections. In contrast, in the lower right quadrant and lower left quadrant one finds social networks of 6–20 and 0–5 people, and 0 informal connections. If we add to this the indicators of political capital, one notices that in the upper right quadrant respondents hold a managerial or executive role, while in the lower right quadrant and lower left quadrant they don't.

31 The map is adapted from Petrić et al. (2021). The same goes for Figure 3.

In a comparative South-East European context, it is interesting to note that already in the analysis presented in Cvetičanin et al. (2012a) and based on the data obtained in 2010 within the project “Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia”, the authors noted a difference between parts of the analyzed social space. In some regions, primarily indicators of cultural capital were distributed, while in other regions indicators of social capital dominated. Furthermore, the authors also mention “a bifurcation of the indicators of economic capital”. Their conclusion was that “[h]igh modalities of income indicators go along with maximal modalities of indicators of cultural capital while, on the other hand, with ultimate values of modalities of social capital we have high indicators of ownership, in particular, ownership of large apartments/houses” (Cvetičanin et al. 2012a: 61).

Returning to Croatia, and to the analysis of social space presented in Petrić et al. (forthcoming), it is easy to notice a resemblance with “bifurcations” noticed in Serbia. Namely, in the social space shown in Figure 2 “the aggregates of respondents whose conditions of existence are similar in terms of capital volume and composition” were identified by means of cluster analysis. This analysis resulted in six clusters (i.e., “constructed classes”, in Bourdieu’s sense of the term),<sup>32</sup> two of which represent the fractions of what is termed in Petrić et al. (forthcoming) as “Class with average capitals (CAC)”: one fraction is described as “CAC cultural” and the other one as “CAC social”.

Both these clusters are located in the upper regions of social space, but the key resource of respondents from “CAC cultural” (cluster 5/5) is expert knowledge, while the key resource of respondents from “CAC social” (cluster 6/6) are informal connections and political alliances. Likewise, over a third of respondents from “CAC social” are party members (more so than in any other cluster), while as much as 98% of respondents from “CAC cultural” are not party members. And finally, while respondents from “CAC cultural” have the highest income and highest indicators of cultural capital, respondents from “CAC social” have high indicators of ownership of large apartments/houses, cars, but also of arable land.

In sum, there are obvious resemblances between the two analyzed social spaces,<sup>33</sup> which were revealed due to the inclusion of indicators of social (and political) capital into analysis. A classical Bourdieusian approach, based on the indicators of economic and cultural capital, could simply not do the job in the

32 For brevity’s sake, we cannot verbally describe the obtained clusters, but they are shown in Figure 3. Here we only explain the meaning of abbreviations: “CPC” stands for “Capital poor class”, and its three fractions are “rurban” (cluster 1/6), “agrarian” (2/6), and “manual & service” (3/6). “IC” stands for “Intermediary class” (4/6). “CAC” stands for “Class with average capitals”, with “cultural” (5/6) and “social” (6/6) fraction.

33 One should point out here that the model of class analysis applied in Cvetičanin et al. 2021 and Petrić et al. (forthcoming) has also proved as capable of registering the differences between the analyzed social spaces. For example, while in Croatia “Intermediary class” was analytically proved to be a class, in Serbia it remained just an “intermediary cluster” without class properties.






Figure 3: Clusters in social space in Croatia

cases at hand. Yet it should be emphasized again that Cvetičanin’s elaboration of Bourdieu’s theorization of social capital was carried out in a consistently Bourdieusian way. His operationalization and measurement of social capital – to use Adam and Rončević’s (2003: 161) phrase – “follow the line of theoretical foundations”, just as the quoted authors believe it should “[i]n coherent and comprehensive research programmes”.

### A non-Bourdiesian Operationalization of Social Capital in a Bourdieusian-inspired Analysis

Finally, we would like to comment on an operationalization of social capital which was not developed from Bourdieu’s theorization of the notion but is interesting to discuss because it was used to construct a Bourdieusian social

space in a post-socialist South-European country (Croatia).<sup>34</sup> In their attempt at “identifying the ‘big picture’ of class in Croatian society” (Doolan; Tonković 2021: 612), the authors of the quoted article have relied on what they say is a juxtaposition or even “triangulation” (Doolan; Tonković 2021: 614) of “a Bourdieusian and an occupation-based approach to social class”. The authors have undertaken such a task “in order to explore how these approaches converge or diverge when it comes to empirically identifying the size of high-level class groups and exploring the relationship between ‘objective’ social class position and class self-identification in Croatia” (Doolan; Tonković 2021: 591).

Given the obtained results and their interpretation, the chosen analytical strategy can be characterized as problematic.<sup>35</sup> However, we are interested here primarily in how social capital was operationalized in Doolan and Tonković’s attempt to construct a Bourdieusian social space. Just like in the cases discussed above, we would like to present the chosen measures for social capital together with measures for other types of capital.

We start with Doolan and Tonković’s measures for economic capital, which (just like in the cases discussed above) respond in their way to the dilemma as to who should be taken as the bearer of economic capital in South-East European societies: an individual or a household?<sup>36</sup> The authors inform us (Doolan; Tonković 2021: 598) that they operationalized the economic capital with four indicators: (1) average monthly net income (salary or pension) of the respondent; (2) estimated value of the real estate of the respondent or his/her household; (3) amount of savings; and (4) subjective evaluation of ability to satisfy household needs (ability to “make ends meet”).

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34 The analysis is based on the data from a nationally representative survey of Croatian adults, carried out in 2017 as part of the project “Social Stratification in Croatia: Structural and Subjective Aspects”, funded by the Croatian Science Foundation (project no. 3134) and the University of Zadar.

35 As the authors are aware, the theoretical underpinnings of the chosen approaches (Bourdieusian and occupation-based) are incompatible (Doolan, Tonković 2021: 613). This in turn means that any attempt at “juxtaposing” or “triangulating” their results would require completed analytical procedures in both cases. Instead, the authors have simply superimposed the categories from the European Socioeconomic Groups Classification (ESeG) and respondents’ class self-identifications from their survey onto the MCA maps with Bourdieusian “theoretical classes” (or “classes-on-paper”). In brief, obviously missing from the authors’ “Bourdieusian-inspired” analysis of “social class” are any accounts of agents’ practical classifications and of the role of capital in field struggles, as well as any discussion of “the principle of differentiation which permits one to reengender theoretically the empirically observed social space” (Bourdieu 1998b: 32). Likewise, the use of categories from ESeG is not discussed beyond the statement that it is “an occupation-based approach verified by Eurostat” and that it has been “productively used” by other researchers (Doolan; Tonković 2021: 613). And finally, it is not even theoretically explained how respondents’ class self-identification could be brought into relation with classifications of others, which are in Bourdieu’s (1979, 1985, 1987) view equally important in the processes of the formation of collectivities.

36 As explained in footnote 28, this dilemma is essentially the same as that posed by Tomanović (2006: 119) for social capital.

Cultural capital (Doolan, Tonković 2021: 599) was operationalized providing indicators for all three forms of cultural capital defined by Bourdieu. Institutionalized cultural capital was measured by (1) respondent's educational level; and (2) respondent's parents' educational level. Objectified cultural capital was measured by an estimated number of books in the household, while measures for embodied cultural capital included (1) theatergoing; and (2) number of foreign languages spoken by the respondent. Referring to Atkinson (2020), the authors mention that they “work with the assumption that high values of these indicators suggest [...] a symbolic mastery of systems of symbols and signs which are valued in Croatian society”.

However, when it comes to social capital, there is no attempt on the part of the authors to develop an operationalization based on Bourdieu's theorization of it. Furthermore, unlike in the cases of economic and cultural capital, there is no attempt to formulate the indicators with the specific Croatian context in mind. Instead, standardized measures of network diversity were used. The authors inform us that they were “derived from a position generator which included 12 occupational positions”, adapted from the one used in the 2009 ISSP survey on social inequality in Croatia (Doolan; Tonković 2021: 598). Added to them was also a measure of civic participation in organizations, which can be associated with communitarian tradition of social capital research.

A total of three indicators of social capital were used: (1) overall network diversity; (2) diversity of friendship network; and (3) membership in different types of organizations (sports/recreational, educational/cultural, professional, humanitarian, religious). The authors refer to Lin (2001) and Erickson (1996), when explaining that “overall network diversity indicates the total number of accessed positions” and add that “friendship network diversity was calculated as the number of occupations in which the respondent had a friend”. They also state that, “[f]or the purpose of MCA, [both were] recoded into three categories (‘low’, ‘average’, ‘high’)” (Doolan; Tonković 2021: 598–599). In the tables with selected indicators of capitals only the results based on network diversity are shown, while membership in organizations almost completely disappears from the scene.<sup>37</sup>

In brief, when social capital is referred to in the discussion of the social space resulting from the analysis, the two mentioned network diversity indicators do an overwhelming majority of the work. Although Lin's conception of social capital is network-based just like Bourdieu's, the differences between the two become painfully obvious when the former is applied in an analysis of a Bourdieusian construction of social space.

Namely, as mentioned by Song et al. (2018: 238), the “relative aspect of accessed SES [socio-economic statuses]”, measuring “ego's relative structural position within the network hierarchy” (based on the position generator results), can be expressed by the following formula: “The greater the size of

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37 In the discussion of the social space resulting from the analysis, only “membership in professional organizations” is mentioned once (Doolan, Tonković 2021: 601).

higher accessed positions, the greater the volume of social capital; the greater the size of lower accessed positions, the smaller the amount of social capital". In a Bourdieusian discussion of social space, the use of the results obtained by the position generator is therefore certainly not well advised, because of the danger of largely reducing it to references to the overall volume of capital.<sup>38</sup>

Furthermore, the position generator – to quote Song et al. (2018: 238) again – “proves to be generalized across societies due to its association with the occupational structures common in modern societies”, in which resource allocation depended particularly on an individual’s occupational position (Blau; Duncan 1967). Approaches advocating the use of the position generator in researching social capital therefore threaten to turn any discussion of it into what is effectively an analysis of the hierarchy of occupations in a given social context.

Such approaches to social capital are especially ill-advised in contexts characterized by widespread economic informality and mechanisms of social closure (such as those throughout the SEE region). It is certain that – in such contexts – discussions of social capital centered largely on occupational structure will not tell us a lot about “investment strategies, individual or collective, consciously or unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term” nor about “transforming contingent relations [...] into relationships that are at once necessary and elective, implying durable obligations subjectively felt” (Bourdieu 1986: 249).

At any rate, it is certain that to measure “the size of accessed positions ranked higher or lower than ego’s” (Song et al. 2018: 238), one does not need to construct a Bourdieusian social space. A discussion of the position of the respondents in the occupational hierarchy, which is what a large part of Doolan and Tonković’s (2021) article essentially boils down to, does not get us any closer to “the structures of differences that can only be understood by constructing the generative principle which objectively grounds those differences” (Bourdieu 1998b: 32).

In contrast, Cvetičanin’s attempt at operationalizing Bourdieu’s definition of social capital, discussed above, simply requires the construction of social space within which the distribution of resources and different social powers can be explained. The concentration of one of the two forms of social capital he mentions (“social capital of informal connections” and “social capital of solidarity”) in different regions of the constructed social space implies – by virtue of being located there – different investment strategies, which can be further researched. In view of that, attempts at consistently Bourdieusian operationalizations can be said to be preferable to non-Bourdieuian ones (at least in the context at hand).

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38 This indeed happens in the case at hand. Numerically speaking, there are 36 references to “volume” of capital in Doolan and Tonković’s (2021) article (four of which in the theoretical part of the article), and merely three references to “composition” (two of which in the theoretical part of the article, and only one in the discussion).

## Concluding Remarks

In this article, we have discussed the possibilities of operationalization of Bourdieu's theorization of social capital in the analysis of post-socialist societies in South-East Europe. Following a brief recapitulation of that theorization, we presented the reasons why Bourdieu did not rely on this form of capital in his empirical research, and why we believe that its operationalization would contribute significantly to the study of class relations in "hybrid societies" in the SEE region. In the central part of the article, we then discussed three contributions enabling us to assess the potential of different approaches to operationalizing social capital in research at least partly relying on Bourdieu's ideas, concepts, and methods.

Two of the analyzed contributions, although generally in agreement with Bourdieu's view of social capital as reproducing inequality, are essentially skeptical about the effectiveness of operationalizations which would be based on Bourdieu's theorization of the notion. Tomanović (2006: 118) openly states that the concepts of other authors, sometimes "criticized as normative, homogenized, and the like", are easier to operationalize. And, indeed, in her empirical research of "young people from different social strata" in Serbia (Tomanović, 2012), she later relies on Lin's distinction between "instrumental" and "expressive" social capital.

Doolan and Tonković (2021: 613–614), on the other hand, conclude their attempt at juxtaposing "a Bourdieusian and an occupation-based approach to social class" by praising the former for enabling "a more context-specific and nuanced portrayal of social class distinctions, and in particular identifying those most dispossessed in society" but also mention that "[a] strength of an occupation-based approach compared to our Bourdieusian-inspired analysis is that it is relatively straightforward to operationalize for empirical purposes and can be and has been productively used for comparative purposes".

In contrast to both approaches mentioned above, the Serbian sociologist Predrag Cvetičanin has developed his operationalization of social capital working consistently within a Bourdieusian conceptual framework. After more than a decade of theoretical and empirical work with different sets of collaborators, he has managed to come up with a context-sensitive operationalization of social capital, highly relevant for studying inequality-generating mechanisms at work in post-socialist societies in South-East Europe.

Seemingly paradoxically, a consistently Bourdieusian approach has brought Cvetičanin to certain "post-Bourdieuian" solutions. To begin with, given the realities of the social context under study, his approach to operationalization of social (and also cultural) capital required their conceptualization "both in terms of their volume (quantity) and in terms of different types (qualities)" (Cvetičanin, Popescu 2011: 444). That is why he differentiates between "social capital of solidarity" and "social capital of informal connections", as well as between "local cultural capital" and "global cultural capital". Likewise, Cvetičanin's introduction of social and political capital indicators into analysis (in addition to

standard Bourdieusian indicators of economic and cultural capital) resulted in representations of social space positioned “in-between Bourdieuan geometrical space and more topological models of a field” (Cvetičanin, Popescu 2011: 467).

In both respects, Cvetičanin’s solutions can be seen as “post-Bourdiesian”, yet it should be emphasized again that they were developed not only within a Bourdieusian conceptual framework but also truly respecting the principles of Bourdieu’s research philosophy. In brief, what is “post-Bourdiesian” in Cvetičanin’s research is a result of trying to respond – in a context-specific way – to “post-Bourdiesian” realities of post-socialist societies in South-East Europe (forty years after Bourdieu’s empirical research took place in 1960s and 1970s France).

Cvetičanin is aware that his approach to the analysis of social space presupposes “an explicative principle of high complexity” (Cvetičanin; Popescu 2011: 467). However, a comparison of social spaces in Serbia and Croatia which we merely mentioned in this article indicates that his model of class analysis is capable of registering similarities and differences between societies in the SEE region, and that it can therefore also be “productively used for comparative purposes” (as Doolan and Tonković 2021 claim for occupation-based approaches).

Last but not least, we should mention two more relevant contributions of Cvetičanin’s consistent operationalization of Bourdieu’s theorization of social capital: (1) it indeed represents an effective operationalization of a highly respected theorization which has so far “stimulated very little empirical investigation” (Adam; Rončević 2003: 169); (2) it redirects attention – at least in the South-East European context – from the cultural capital focus of the early Bourdieu-inspired studies of post-socialist elites (exemplified by Eyal et al. 1998 and summarized by Outhwaite 2007) to a potentially new social capital focus.

Such a new focus seems especially relevant if we bear in mind that cultural capital has lost its former legitimizing quality throughout the SEE region and has largely been turned into a simple resource in the knowledge economy. At any rate, in the current context, characterized by a confluence of post-socialist and neoliberal informality, studying the role of social capital would certainly be more fruitful than studying how the old socialist elites used their cultural capital in responding to the requirements of a new managerialism in the initial post-socialist years. This holds true especially for “hybrid societies” in South-East Europe, in which inequality-generating mechanisms are largely based on social closure.

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## Burdijeova teorizacija socijalnog kapitala u analizi jugoistočnoevropskih društava

### Apstrakt

U ovom se članku raspravlja o značaju socijalnog kapitala u burdijeovski inspirisanim analizama savremenih jugoistočnoevropskih društava. Najpre rekapituliramo Burdijeovu teorizaciju socijalnog kapitala, naglašavajući da ona dopušta različite operacionalizacije upravo zbog svog razmerno apstraktnog teorijskog karaktera u njegovom radu. Nakon toga, objašnjavamo što se misli pod određenjem „jugoistočnoevropska društva“ i konstatujemo da su mehanizmi generisanja nejednakosti u njima u velikoj meri zasnovani na društvenom zatvaranju. U središnjem delu članka zatim komentarišemo neke pokušaje operacionalizacije socijalnog kapitala u regiji jugoistočne Evrope. Iako raspravljamo o dva slučaja eklektičnog mešanja Linove operacionalizacije s burdijeovskim konceptima, u središtu naše pažnje je elaboracija Burdijeove teorizacije socijalnog kapitala koju je predložio srpski sociolog Predrag Cvetičanin. Relevantnost njegovih koncepata „socijalni kapital solidarnosti“ i „socijalni kapital neformalnih veza“ za proučavanje klasnih odnosa u postsocijalističkim društvima u jugoistočnoj Evropi ističe prednosti konzistentne primene burdijeovskog okvira u savremenom (post-burdijeovskom) kontekstu.

Ključne reči: Burdije, socijalni kapital, postsocijalizam, hibridna društva, jugoistočna Evropa

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## PIERRE BOURDIEU AND POLITICS

This paper is the product of a roundtable discussion held at the international conference Horizons of Engagement: Eternalizing Bourdieu, organized by the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory of Belgrade, Serbia, the Centre for Advanced Studies of The University of Rijeka, Croatia, the École Normale Supérieure of Paris, France, and the French Institute in Serbia. The event was planned on the occasion of the ninetieth anniversary of the birth of one of the world's leading sociologists – Pierre Bourdieu (1930–2002). The greatest indicator of the scope of Bourdieu's influence is the fact that he has become the world's most cited sociologist, ahead of Émile Durkheim, and the world's second most cited author in social sciences and the humanities, after Michel Foucault and ahead of Jacques Derrida. As part of this discussion, we address the subject of "Bourdieu and Politics", politics – broadly constructed. We evoke Pierre Bourdieu's involvement in public affairs during the 1990s, while taking into account the concept of the collective intellectual that Bourdieu introduced into social sciences by giving it a specific meaning.

**Ivica Mladenović:** Professor Sapiro, you recently directed an impressive collective work: *Bourdieu International Dictionary* (Sapiro 2020), which has already become the best-selling encyclopedia and dictionary of sociology and ethnology on Amazon. It contains nearly 600 entries, it is composed of a team of 126 authors from 20 countries, and brings together specialists of Pierre Bourdieu, among them sociologists, political scientists, philosophers, historians, anthropologists, and others. The entries cover: concepts, objects of research, methods, disciplines and intellectual currents with which Bourdieu interacted,

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as well as his favorite authors and his relationships with his peers, his works, the journals, associations he founded, editions, significant events such as the Algerian War, May 1968, the strikes of 1995, as well as the main countries in which his work was received (from the US to Japan). I would like to ask you what was the motivation behind this immense 6-year-long project?

**Gisèle Sapiro:** It was the editor I was working with for my series at CNRS Editions who had first the idea and commissioned the dictionary. CNRS Editions has a dictionary series, and he wanted to open it to the social sciences and start with Bourdieu. I immediately accepted because I had an experience with dictionaries – I was part of the team of the *Dictionnaire des intellectuels français* (Winock, Julliard 2002) – and because over the years I had worked with a significant international network of Bourdieu specialists. We agreed from the start that it should not only be about concepts but also about his life, thinkers he discussed with, places where he published, including newspapers like *Le Monde*. We had much fun with the editorial board while establishing the list of entries. The dictionary has three objectives:

1) First a *pedagogic* one: it is an introduction to Bourdieu's thought for students, and researchers less familiar with his thought, but also for those more familiar, as it helps deepen our understanding of his work (I myself learned a lot from reading the articles). For instance, you can find not only the more specific concepts of Bourdieu's theory such as *field*, *habitus*, cultural capital, symbolic violence, but also concepts that he uses or redefines such as belief, interest, disinterestedness, *hysteresis*, misrecognition, or *nomos*. And also concepts he discusses or rejects such as public opinion or norms. You can also find classical authors he referred to: philosophers such as Pascal, Hume, Kant, Rousseau or Kripke, sociologists such as Durkheim, Elias, Goffman, Merton or Max Weber, or anthropologists such as Mauss and Lévi-Strauss. But it is not at all a purely academic approach aimed at mummifying Bourdieu's thought;

2) This brings me to the second objective: the dictionary is meant to serve all those who take on Bourdieu's theoretical and methodological approach to research, and to be continued all around the world. It is a tool for researchers willing to carry on this theoretical and empirical program in a dynamic way. It can help them navigate easily in his work, find references, connect concepts and objects with broader theoretical or methodological issues in the social sciences: why we should be suspicious about functionalist explanations, what does it mean to have a relational approach, which empirical works were undertaken on the fields of cultural production and the issue of autonomy beyond Bourdieu, and so on;

3) This leads us to the third objective: this dictionary is conceived as a contribution to *the epistemology and history of the social and human sciences*, since Bourdieu has discussed the most important paradigms and theories of his time, such as Marxism, structuralism, rational choice theory; and he contributed to developing a social history of the human and social sciences, that need not be purely conceptual and focused on key thinkers (though we did include figures

like Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault), but anchored in the social world and connected to social agents and institutions.

For instance, we included the institutions he was trained in, like the *École normale supérieure*, and the ones he worked in like the *École des hautes études en sciences sociales* and the *Collège de France*, which he himself included in his research on higher education and the academic field. We also included the journals he edited: *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, the series he edited: “Le sens commun” and “Liber”, and the main countries of reception of his work (28 entries). One can observe the different receptions: in the UK, it was first his sociology of education, in Italy and Brazil it was his sociology of culture and of symbolic power. When *Distinction* was translated in the US (Bourdieu 1984), it helped create the sociology of culture as a sociological domain, which did not exist before as such.

**Zona Zarić:** Philip, according to Pierre Bourdieu, it is easy for a sociologist to cease to be an adherent (of certain parties, unions, associations), but it is difficult to refuse adherence, i.e., the (semi-)social conscience that is at the heart of his thinking. Moreover, the history of sociology is a history of commitment, contrary to what the idea of ‘axiological neutrality’ suggests, which artificially separates the scientific work that produces scholarship from the commitment that consists in bringing the scholarship into the public sphere. Gisele Sapiro, in a recent interview, emphasized that Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology was everything but neutral. What do you think is the difference between scientific objectivity so important to Pierre Bourdieu and axiological neutrality on the other side?

**Philip Golub:** Let me begin with an anecdote to frame this issue. Many years ago, at the end of the 1990s, I was travelling to an international conference with a prominent colleague from the French academy who, at some point in our rather long journey, moved our friendly discussion to the fraught question of Bourdieu’s recent political engagement, expressing rather deep dismay over the latter’s choice to speak out and act out on the public stage about sharply contested political and social questions of the moment. In his view, by so doing, Bourdieu would have blurred the barrier between scientific analysis and activism, and broken with the detachment, the neutrality required of the scientific enterprise. To borrow the title of a classical book on the history of science, Bourdieu would have fallen off the *edge of objectivity* into the purgatory of subjectivity, of mere opinion, and thereby somehow tainted, diminished his body of scientific work, his *oeuvre*.

The epistemological problem of the edge of objectivity in the social sciences is, of course, a core concern in Bourdieu’s work. Leaving out some of the spookier parts of quantum physics, the edge is pretty well defined in the “hard sciences” such as physics which deal with inanimate objects and forces, external to the observer, subject to laws that can be discovered and verified through the reproducibility and falsifiability of experiments. This kind of knowledge is cumulative: general relativity supplanted Newtonian mechanics

but did not thereby make it useless. And Galileo's law of falling bodies works. This does not mean that there aren't complex epistemic issues involved in the production of new knowledge (scientific revolutions), but that new knowledge is subject to objectifying tests. But what defines the edge, if there is one, in the social sciences, which deal with not only material but intersubjective and symbolic dynamics?

Bourdieu deals at length with the question of objectivity throughout his work, in his courses at the *Collège de France* and in other locations. The business of social science is to bring to light phenomena that are not accessible through simple intuition or immediate perception, to discover (in the sense of uncovering) the logics of social being and of social action, logics that remain hidden in the labyrinthine structures, the "unconscious" generated by the fields and force-fields of social order. But, as Bourdieu points out, the knowing subject discovering those logics cannot achieve the "objectivism of the 'gaze from afar' of an observer who remains as remote from himself as from his object" (Bourdieu 2003: 282).

As we know, the observer observes, writes and speaks from a specific location in social space-time, emitting judgments and interpretations that can modify the facts on which they are passed – Marx is a rather good example – and that enter "into the actual constitution or production" of the social world (Giddens). In any case, one certainly cannot, as Bourdieu writes, "build a science on something as poor and disappointing as (Weberian) ethical neutrality" (Bourdieu 2015: 67). The scientific observer must certainly proceed with detachment from the object of study, to avoid simply relating the subjectivities of people and engaging in storytelling but cannot erase his/her character as a social subject. So how do we move from this issue of method to political/ethical *engagement* in the public sphere/arena? Engagement raises issues distinct from the epistemological and methodological problems of the social sciences, but the scientist (*savant*) is perforce also a citizen – in this case a citizen with an extraordinarily solid and broad theoretical toolbox on which to base his judgments – and, like everyone else, is inevitably swept up in the historical currents, the struggles, and ethical dilemmas of the present. As such, the scientist cannot avoid the inescapable question of moral choice, of ethics in politics. The choice to act or not to act.

Indeed, it is precisely because the knowing subject has a slightly greater degree of freedom than most people, having pierced through some of the veils of material and symbolic domination, and has a claim to knowledge, and hence voice, that he/she/they can and sometimes must engage. As C. Wright Mills pointed out a long time ago in his study of power structures in the United States, "the powers of ordinary men are circumscribed by the everyday world in which they live, yet even in these rounds of job, family and neighbourhood they often seem driven by forces they can neither understand nor govern" (Mills 1956: 3). The social scientist rarely governs but at least she can grasp the force fields that shape people's lives and lift the veils – the most important of which is the illusion of spontaneous freedom – that make power and domination

misrecognizable to the many. Bourdieu's oeuvre deals with various dimensions of domination, material and symbolic. And as he himself notes – I'm translating from one of his courses at the Collège de France: "There is, in any case, affinity between the position of the dominated and the scientific position. Once the scientific truth is produced, the dominated in a space – field – hear it better and use it immediately, distorting it, tampering with it so that it expresses them more completely" (Bourdieu 2015: 71). The dominated, in other words, are then in a better position to become, at least to some extent, self-determining actors. In short, the demarcation line is not as clear as some would have it, even if scientific work and engagement are obviously not on the same plane.

**Zona Zarić:** Franck Poupeau, you have collected and edited Pierre Bourdieu's public interventions in a book entitled *Political Interventions: Social Science and Political Action* (Poupeau, Discepolo, David 2008). This publication includes all of Pierre Bourdieu's interventions between 1961 and 2001. It therefore allows us to follow directly and in a very interesting manner, his evolution in relation to the topics that interested him and on which he took a position from the age of 31. Would you describe for us this evolution, perhaps by adding some nuances in the difference between the early and late Bourdieu, as well as the regularities that characterized him during this 40-year period?

**Franck Poupeau:** One of the key points of the book *Political Interventions: Social Science and Political Action*, that I elaborated in 2000 with Thierry Discepolo, was to show the continuity of Bourdieu's commitment since the 60s. A very common vision of his trajectory was insisting on his public position taking, since the social movement of 1995 in France. For example, Bourdieu's initial research questions in Algeria were very political and tackled issues such as the conditions of access to politics and politicization, and to revolutionary positions. Those are the same problems he deals with years later in *La Distinction* (1979). This Algerian period has been the metric of his entire sociological research, not only the issue of social conditions of access to politics, but also his conception of collective work in social sciences. Thus, the book *Political Interventions: Social Science and Political Action* does not only try to reconstitute Bourdieu's political commitments (even if his political interventions were the core of the book) but it also aims to explore and present his way of practicing sociology, that provided a real continuity and coherence to his scientific work, even if clearly his public interventions only became visible in the 90's.

**Ivica Mladenović:** Frederic Lebaron, you are one of the authors of the book *The December of French Intellectuals* (Duval, Gaubert, Lebaron, Marchetti, Pavis 1998). This book challenges dominant interpretations, which were given by the media and dominant intellectuals, of the intervention of intellectuals – among them Pierre Bourdieu – during the social movement against the devastation of the social security system in November and December of 1995. This was possibly the largest social movement since May 1968. At that time

you worked at the *Centre de sociologie de l'éducation et de la culture* created by Bourdieu after May 68. Is this perhaps the moment when he really begins to deeply put into question and challenge what in France is called the *pensée unique* (single-mindedness). We encounter at that time the center-left magazine *Esprit* denouncing Pierre Bourdieu as a left-wing populist, leftist extremist, and even a Krypto-Lepenist. Could you contextualize Pierre Bourdieu's commitment against the "Juppé Plan" and the reasons behind how he became the intellectual of reference for the social movement as a whole, but at the same time so stigmatized in the mainstream media?

**Frédéric Lebaron:** In 1995, Bourdieu was already present in the public space since many years (in a sense ever since he published about Algeria as Franck just explained), but it was especially the case after the success of *La misère du monde* (Bourdieu 1993). This scientific collective book corresponds to an evolution of his commitment, to the left and to more radical social movements, to put it simply. After the Rocard years – when he supported a French socialist “modernist” prime minister –, Bourdieu had been heavily disappointed by the French center-left government, especially in the sectors of education and social policy. He is one of the first intellectuals who points out and criticizes what he calls the retreat of the left hand of the State – Welfare state, social state, education, health, social welfare – attacked by the right hand (economy and security, put simply). The term “neoliberalism” is not a very present one in *La misère du monde* but rather in activist spheres (in France, around *Politique-La revue*, Jacques Kergoat etc.). Between 1992 and 1995, Bourdieu became closer to these networks, in which activists from NGOs, unions and political organizations were present, and at the same time he went on to develop an original international – European at first – intellectual network with *Liber, revue européenne des livres*.

In November and December of 1995, he is already present as a “personnalité de référence” in these national and international spheres: that is the reason why he is suddenly asked to revise a petition against the neoliberal Juppé reforms – suppression of a generous retirement scheme for railway workers, new conditions in health insurance: disguised austerity measures –, which he will rewrite and diffuse. What struck us when we studied this with a group of doctoral students (Duval, Gaubert, Marchetti and Pavis) is the large symbolic capital that Bourdieu already held at that time in these activist spheres, which made him immediately central, very visible, and symbolically powerful. This capital will be increasing in the following years, with a more international dimension.

Bourdieu who had supported Rocard and the *Confédération française démocratique du travail* (CFDT) is now a radical opponent of the neoliberal shift of this pseudo-left, and therefore seen as a traitor by the mainstream “center-left” media *Esprit*, already a place of anti-Bourdieu intellectual position-takings, it is now also closely linked to the neoliberal conversion of the left. For others (more right-wing) he is a new figure of leftist intellectual



irresponsibility. Not to be forgotten that Bourdieu was a pupil of Raymond Aron, the incarnation of right-wing responsible commitment. In his speech at the *gare de Lyon* – railway station – Bourdieu put at the centre of the process the leading role of economists, and the stakes around economics, especially at the international level (IMF, WB). This is the most original aspect of his commitment which puts social sciences at the forefront of political struggles.

**Zona Zarić:** As you all saw in our invitation, one of the aims of this round table was to understand how Pierre Bourdieu became a leading intellectual (or a public intellectual as it is referred to in the Anglophone world) – after having focused, in his early years, on pursuing a professional career as a social scientist. Gisèle Sapiro, to describe this evolution you used a beautiful expression: *from social theorist to global intellectual*. Tell us how you explain this transition and what the notion of the global intellectual means to you?

**Gisèle Sapiro:** Before I answer, I would like to remind that Bourdieu's work had a political dimension from the start, and he had commitments long before the 1990s, though he never was an activist, he always used sociology as a tool for objectifying the unequal power relations in society. In the research I did with Mauricio Bustamante on the circulation of Bourdieu's work in translation, based on a quantitative analysis of his translated books, we observed four phases (Sapiro, Bustamante 2009):

1) In the first phase, Bourdieu's work was received in specific areas, such as the sociology of education, the sociology of culture and anthropology (his theory of practice and habitus). He thus became a reference as a specialist of these domains;

2) The translation of *Distinction* into English in 1984 helped unify the reception of his theoretical framework. He then became a reference as a social theorist;

3) By the mid-1990s, as his work was getting more and more international recognition, he put his renown at the service of a cause, following the model of the French intellectual tradition since Zola and the Dreyfus Affair. In this sense we can speak of a global intellectual, who takes a stand on political issues on a global (rather than national) scale. Bourdieu's cause was the struggle against neoliberalism. But he also criticized the growing domination of the media on the political and cultural fields. His book *On television* was at the time his most translated work (into 25 languages up to 2008). It was the first of a series he launched in a small format and more accessible style, capable of reaching a wider audience. This formula was a success and imitated by others afterwards;

4) Since Bourdieu's death, there is a new phase - he is becoming a classical author, as testified by the numerous tributes, conferences around the world, and new translations. But I think it is very important not to transform Bourdieu's theory into a simple academic reference, and to keep alive its dynamic and critical, or even subversive potential, both as a research program and as a social critique of the mechanisms of domination and symbolic violence.

**Ivica Mladenović:** In an article he wrote in the 1990s about the Yugoslav affair, Bourdieu fiercely denounced a kind of narcissistic exhibitionism that leads every intellectual to take an individual position, or even to expose their little free forum or little opinion, as he put it. In fact, as we know, he advocated for collective work, in a network, which allows for combining the competences of each and every member. He thus pleaded for the creation of an international autonomous collective intellectual who would become a real instrument of symbolic struggle, a tool for the diffusion of critical knowledge and a more direct intervention in public debate. Bourdieu elaborated the concept of the *collective intellectual*, against the figure of the total intellectual embodied by Sartre – who could embrace all subjects – and in the extension of the specific intellectual defined by Foucault. What is the logic behind this idea of Pierre Bourdieu’s *collective intellectual* and what remains of this idea today?

**Frédéric Lebaron:** In 1999, Bourdieu had become rather central in the flustered sphere of social movements in France and Europe. When he wrote a text about former Yugoslavia (Kosovo war), in May of 99, he was only responding to current events as he had always done, at least since 81. For example, he signed a petition “Call for a just and durable peace in The Middle East” – almost the same title as the Kosovo one – against the first Iraq war in 1990-91 and the French intervention in the Gulf. This petition might have been his first movement out of the pseudo-left (since both Mitterrand and Rocard were clearly in favor of NATO’s intervention against Saddam Hussein and Iraq). The pseudo-left that was clearly in favor of a military US intervention, might have helped awaken Bourdieu to the reality of the French Socialist Party. One has to recall that Bourdieu and Foucault were seen as part of the anti-totalitarian left – Foucault was quite close to Bernard Kouchner and Bernard Henry Lévy – after they intervened many years earlier against the French left-wing – socialist-communist – government, annoyed by the situation in Poland under Jaruzelski, as described by Didier Eribon in his biography of Foucault.

In the 1990s, Bourdieu moved towards much more anti-imperialist and critical positions, without becoming a supporter of the soviet-type communism or “traditional” left-wing revolutionary forces, which he had criticized for romanticism in his Algerian period. He bases his international commitment on his intellectual network and his conception of universalism, which is rooted in both the theory of – autonomous – fields, and a personal intuition of international solidarity (manifested in the case of Algeria through *Le Comité International de Soutien aux Intellectuels Algériens* – CISIA created in 93). During this period, Bourdieu begins to project his action in a more collective manner, less and less on the sartrian model of *total intellectual*, rather both as a *specific* (Foucault) and *collective intellectual*. In the 80s, he wrote reports with his fellow colleagues, professors at the College de France, that were rather favorable to more competition and market in higher-education and began *Liber* after the fall of soviet-style communism. In the 90s, and especially after 1995, he invested a significant part of his time in collective action of various forms.

Most notably the *Raisons d'agir* group, that had significant international ramifications (Franz Schultheis, Luc Van Campenhout, Nikos Panayotopoulos), and a “national” basis around Gérard Mauger, Louis Pinto, Christophe Charle, Gabrielle Balazs, Claude Poliak and those we called the “young” (Franck and I included, but also Bertrand Geay and others).

This academic intellectual network was intertwined with activist networks, small struggling NGOs (“assos de lutte”, such as *Marches européennes contre le chômage* etc.) and unions (Solidaires, IG-Medien etc.). Through various international initiatives which have burgeoned after 1995 Bourdieu had met many activists; to name but a few: Detlev Henschel, Claude Debons and of course Annick Coupé. Gérard Mauger and I had developed this Bourdieu-inspired notion of ICAI (collective intellectual international autumn), which does not give complete answers about the political orientations of this ICAI, but expands Bourdieu’s ideas around the dissemination of critical tools, reflexive attitudes, empirical results of the social sciences, etc. The practical consequence of this conception is very-much related to the diffusion of symbolic tools, through various channels, such as alternative media, critical publishing houses, etc. This is clearly in line with Bourdieu’s notion of autonomy, and it is the major output of this conception of the collective intellectual. It remains relevant today, at the age of digitalization. I try to argue that in my last book *Savoir et agir*. I am of the belief that it should be reassessed in a context of global economic actors which are even stronger, especially through social media, and in a context where sciences, social and natural, are at stake.

**Ivica Mladenović:** Philip Golub, in 1999 with Pierre Bourdieu you signed a call for peace, asking for an end to the bombings against Serbia and rejecting the false alternative between NATO and Milosevic. Would you briefly introduce us to the intellectual context in France and in the Western world in the late 90s and explain to us the difficulties of taking such a heterodox position at the time and in general?

**Philip Golub:** The Bourdieu Appel of 1999, as it has come to be known, led to a very sharp ideational confrontation in France, that you carefully analyze in your PHD on the French intellectual debate over the wars in former Yugoslavia. So you are actually in a better position than I am to frame the French intellectual context in which it occurred, even if I signed the text. The Appel was a political statement that was designed to shift the course of the conversation, if one can call it that, over the bombings. It aimed to lift a corner of the veil of the dominant discourses that legitimated, transfigured and rendered misrecognizable actions of power and violence that fitted uneasily with the universalizing democratic narratives of the time. The situation was one where a great imperial power clothed its purposes in the garb of universalistic humanitarian aims, and where a predatory state group in Serbia clothed its predation and ethnonationalism in an anti-imperialist garb. The Appel argued against both, flying in the face of the blinding (in the sense of making blind) dichotomous

division between imperial democrats on the one hand and fraudulently anti-imperialist ethnonationalist gangsters on the other.

The broader intellectual environment was the emergence of a doctrine of so-called humanitarian interventions in the context of the new ordering of the world in the post-Cold War, where the democratic West enunciated a right, supposedly founded on the lessons of the Second World War and the Shoah, to intervene outside of the existing jurisprudence of international law, in the domestic affairs of so-called rogue or failed states – a classification that authorizes intervention by denying the latter the *de jure* protections afforded to “normal” sovereign states, and that *ipso facto* makes the classifier into a world policeman. As Bourdieu notes, and as I have sought to show in my work, imperial universalist discourses that make general truth claims are an instrument of “legitimation and domination, giving the dominant the sentiment that they are well-founded in their domination, at the level of national societies but also at world society level where, for instance, the dominant or colonizers could with a clear conscience consider themselves to be bearers of the universal”. The colonized, of course, always knew this universal to be fraudulent, in the sense that it was merely the expression of particularistic interests.

Hence the notion of universalist imperialisms and imperial universalisms, exemplified in French and U.S. discourses and practices (though one can extend this to other expressions of cultural exceptionalism). Due to their roles in ushering in republican and democratic modernity, both developed self-understandings as bearers and carriers of the universal. Universalism, he writes, is a “(French) national specialty [...] a claimed and presumed universality, which is accompanied by signs of a practical form of universality, a form of domination that ignores itself as such [...] This pretension to universality implies an imperialism of the universal” (Bourdieu 2012: 253–254). It also, of course, a US speciality where national aims and universalist discourses merge to produce a distinct US idiom regarding the universal application of supposedly inherent US liberal and democratic virtues, whose symbolic planetary diffusion is complemented, when the US thinks necessary (which is quite often), by the kinetic action of bombs and bullets. When asked in 1998 what justification the US had to bomb various facilities in Iraq, the then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said: “If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future”. This extraordinary statement should not have been read as hypocrisy or as a lie craftily imposed on unaware subjects, but rather as the expression of the imperial universalisms secreted by the habitus of US elites.

**Zona Zarić:** Franck Poupeau, you directed the posthumous publication of the *College de France* courses that *Pierre Bourdieu* gave between 1989 and 1992 on the question of the State (Bourdieu 2012). Earlier, you published the book *The Sociology of the State. The School and its Experts in France* (Poupeau 2003). According to Marx, the State is part of the superstructure based on the infrastructure represented by relations of production. Marx also believed that the

State takes a position in class struggles, and that it is not a neutral arbiter, but that it favors the ruling class by securing the structures and organizations of the capitalist mode of production. Bourdieu agrees that politics and the state are above all characterized by the phenomena of power. But he presents us with quite a different analysis. Could you tell us what exactly Bourdieu sees as the role of the state and politics in the functioning of society?

**Franck Poupeau:** That's a difficult question, first of all I would like to mention that *On the State* - which we should have maybe named *The Invention of the State* - was realized in collaboration with Marie-Christine Rivi re, Patrick Champagne and Remi Lenoir, and in the end, with a major contribution by Lo c Wacquant. As a preliminary remark, I would like to say that the analysis of the State is present throughout Bourdieu's sociology, even when he does not talk about the State specifically: in *La Reproduction* you won't find the word *state*, but the notion of state goes beyond the concept of pedagogic authority (Bourdieu & Passeron 1970). Thus, there is a kind of evolution of Bourdieu's perspective and this evolution has been mentioned by Frederic Lebaron when he talked about the presence of Bourdieu inside the French state since the 80s through the reports he wrote for the government on education. To add another important remark - I would like to point out that Bourdieu doesn't always refer to Marx on the State. He refers to him on many other aspects, but on the State, he is quite critical of his analysis, siding more with the French Marxists like Althusser and his notion of "the ideological apparatus of the State", which he criticizes profusely and that represents a significant part of the reason behind why he developed the notion of *field* (and consequently that of field of power, of bureaucratic field, etc.).

First of all, Bourdieu was clearly aware of the way in which the French state has remodeled traditional society since the 19<sup>th</sup> century and in *On the State* he addresses the double dimension of the State: domination and integration, monopolization and unification. So, it is not a question of antinomy between two theories - Marxist versus French republican theory - but a question of an antinomy in the very functioning of the State: the modern state is progressing towards universalization that is to say de-particularization of local culture, while at the same time monopolizing the universal as it produces a concentration of power. As Bourdieu states in *On the state*: "To a certain degree, one could say that integration - which must be understood in Durkheim's sense, but also the sense of those who spoke of the integration of Algeria, which includes the idea of consensus - is the condition for domination. This is basically the key thesis that I want to develop. The unification of the cultural market is the condition for cultural domination: for example, it is the unification of the linguistic market that creates dialect, bad accents, dominated languages" (Bourdieu 2014: 222).

This idea of the process of unification that is at the same time a process of universalization, which Bourdieu presents just as Weber and Elias do, is associated with the constitution of a unified social space linked to the State as,

I will quote Bourdieu: “The state, then, as holder of a meta-capital, is a field within which agents struggle to possess a capital that gives power over the other fields” (Bourdieu 2014 : 197). This unification of homogeneous and de-particularized space occurs in relation to a central locus which in the French case means the tendency to replace personal relations with territorial relations by constituting groups linked to the state like jurists for example. Bourdieu examines the mandatory education system as an instrument of integration contributing to the unification of the nation state. I believe that this double reality of the State explains many misunderstandings, as it is also a double reality of Bourdieu’s trajectory - he is a product of the system he criticizes, the French school system, the French academic elite, and his rebellion against the very same system, is the core of his analysis of the State, as a double function of integration and domination, unification, and monopolization.

**Ivica Mladenović:** When we talk about Marxism today, it is most often in plural, because there have always been many Marxist currents. We remember that even Marx criticized some Marxists in France when he was still alive, saying that if they are Marxists, he himself is not. On the other hand, it is harder to discern sharp distinctions, lines of fracture among the bourdieusians. Why do you think this is so? Is it because Bourdieu’s *oeuvre* is as much about method as it is about theory building? Or perhaps that it does not contain the explicitly normative and teleological elements of most Marxist thought? Or is there another more appropriate explanation?

**Frédéric Lebaron:** I think the comparison with Marx and Marxism is both fascinating, important and a bit misleading. Marx’s writings and Marxism as a global doctrine expanded especially during the second International – of course the third and fourth – and inside related national organizations of the worker’s movement (first in Germany SPD, France with a lot of struggles, then Russia, China and many other countries). Marxism gave to these organizations a set of consistent doctrinal elements which allowed a structuration of performative discourses (or as Bourdieu would put it “effects of theory”), which themselves allowed a structuration of the class as a subject, with the help of intellectuals. It was clearly normative (exploitation theory), and teleological (with the religious components of the advent of a classless society), even if it is also a scientific research program (with empirical controversies with Bernstein and the revisionists). This situation dramatically changed with the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 when it was incorporated and central in state doctrines, first the Soviet Union, then a set of important states, until today (People’s Republic of China). One should never forget this empirical reality of Marxism.

Bourdieu’s theory is developing in the international scientific field, now through necessarily partial theoretical improvements or reorganizations, and through empirical controversies (for example around *Distinction* and the social space). It is far less present in the political field in general, unions, NGOs etc. My thought on that is that we should start by analyzing the influence on

the way politicians refer to science and base their discourse on the existence of autonomous scientific fields. I argue precisely that in my last book (Lebaron 2021). The collective intellectual is not that homogeneous after all, since there are individual trajectories throughout the international level (Loïc Wacquant, Didier Eribon, Gisèle Sapiro, Franz Schultheis and others), with their own networks, and small collectives such as the group around the *Raisons d'agir* publisher, or around *Agone* and the *Savoir Agir* association around Mauger, Collovald, and myself. Among us, there are some differences in organizational style, political orientation, or relation to various organizations. This was a matter of intense debates around Bourdieu before he died, with a more “anarchist” – “libertarian” – and “radical” pole – anti-election – and a more “democratic socialist” pole, closer to the political field. They are still present today, though less visible and reorganized around new issues, such as neoliberalism, feminism, and issues of identity.

**Ivica Mladenović:** Gisele Sapiro, we very often hear that *Pierre Bourdieu* is a determinist, which serves his opponents to delegitimize his sociology. You often mention that the opposite of methodological determinism is not individual freedom but *le hazard*, or chance. Jacques Bouveresse has pointed out very well that some of our greatest philosophers, Spinoza and Leibniz for example, as well as Freud, were more rigorous determinists than Bourdieu. My hypothesis is that Pierre Bourdieu’s social determinism is perceived as menacing precisely because of this faulty understanding of freedom and its potential political implications. What do you think?

**Gisèle Sapiro:** As French philosopher Jacques Bouveresse explains (2004), a minimum of methodological determinism is necessary, otherwise you cannot do any science. As you say, and it was Moritz Schlick who pointed this out, the contrary of determinism is not freedom but chance. Any scientific explanation requires a set of explanatory factors. This takes us back to the big controversy about the human and social sciences vs. the natural sciences. Can mechanical causality be applied to human beings who have intentions, representations, choice, reflexive thought? Or should we develop a specific, comprehensive approach based on hermeneutics following Dilthey? Phenomenology opposed behaviorism on this basis. Bourdieu was trained in phenomenology, so he would never admit mechanical causality and would include representations and beliefs as part of the object. But still, like Max Weber, he does want to identify laws in human behavior. His sociology is not looking for deterministic causal mechanisms in the same way as in physics. The social sciences are working on probabilistic laws, like in medicine, and also on tendency laws, like in economy. When Bourdieu and Passeron in *The Inheritors: French Students and Their Relations to Culture* calculate the chance to access university according to the social origin, it is not a deterministic law, it is a probability (Bourdieu and Passeron 1964).

What Bourdieu's theory of the *habitus* and capital claims is that the room for manoeuvre one has varies according to one's resources and skills, meaning the economic, social and cultural capital, or under the communist and unique-party regimes – one's political capital. Sometimes one depends on the other: in countries where higher education isn't free and available to all (like in the US), economic capital conditions the acquisition of cultural capital, except for a very small proportion of scholarships. The value of the different resources may also vary from field to field: economic capital is not a sufficient resource in the educational field in the sense that you cannot buy a diploma, you need some achievements. The same applies to the fields of cultural production. The social world is all about conversion of economic capital into symbolic capital and vice-versa (for instance, winning an important literary prize increases the sales of a book). This is why Bourdieu uses the concept of strategy which means agency and the capacity to improvise in new situations, which depend both on our dispositions, that is to say our *habitus*. We also discuss other laws and effects in the dictionary, for instance the *Gerschenkron effect*: the fact that capitalism did not develop in Russia as in England or in France because it appeared later. Or the *Don Quichotte effect*: the inertia of *habitus* when the social world changes. Or a law to which he didn't give a name: the fact that the more the situation is risky, the more the interactions will be codified and formal.

So, there is a real "bad faith" in the reduction of Bourdieu's sociology to determinism. I would say that this faulty understanding of freedom derives itself from the resistance to acknowledge the social factors that restrict our freedom and room for maneuver, due to a denial of the arbitrariness of privilege and of the social conditions for acquiring cultural capital. Symbolic violence according to Bourdieu precisely stems from the collective denial of the mechanisms of domination. His sociology aims at unveiling these mechanisms. For Bourdieu, unveiling these mechanisms will have an emancipatory effect and help us enlarge the room of maneuver and try to avoid reproducing them. However, as he underscores in *Masculine domination*, becoming conscious is not sufficient, because we have internalized these schemes of perception, of evaluation and of action in our bodies in the course of our first and secondary socialization, and they are part of our *habitus*, they are like a second nature, which is very hard to get rid off. This is the biggest obstacle to our freedom. As Bourdieu argues, the main thing that education instills into us is a sense of one's place, meaning to adjust ourselves to new situations by spontaneously excluding options that are "not for us", "inaccessible" (for instance, access to some luxury goods, or to property, or to higher education).

**Zona Zarić:** Franck Poupeau, you published the book : *The Misadventures of Criticism* in the *Raison d'agir* Editions (Poupeau 2012), created by *Pierre Bourdieu*, with the idea of making scientific knowledge more accessible to the general public. In this book, you propose a very useful reflection on sociology in general, as well as the political stakes around the renewal of critical thinking. For example, you very convincingly evoke the emergence of an "increasingly



subtle and invisible domination, mixing constraint and adherence, moral conformism and logical conformism, ignorance and recognition” (ibid.: 28). If I may advance this idea: in a way your analysis adds an additional layer to Pierre Bourdieu’s sociology that is often linked to the treatment of social phenomena that are too static. Social struggles, for example, are often considered to lack individual initiative but rather to arise from objective social conditions. Pierre Bourdieu thus describes the movement of the unemployed as “a social miracle”. To express his own trajectory and social success he used when referring to himself the French word *miraculé*, or miraculous exception, referring to someone who has escaped his social fate. With this in mind, I would like to know your opinion on the tools of Bourdieu’s critical sociology that enables the dominated to act and escape their fate?

**Franck Poupeau:** Originally in this book I wanted to develop the idea of what I call *militant capital*, the techniques that activists develop through their commitments. One of the points of this notion was to try to generalize Bourdieu’s theory of the conditions of politicization (the link between cultural capital and political opinions). It aimed to demonstrate that commitment or at least politicization was not so easy and not so natural. Finally I changed my mind in the book because of the context of what was happening in France 10 years ago, and the criticisms - generated especially by people like Rancière - of the division between people who know, such as sociologist, and people who don’t know, and it seems to me that at a time there was a kind of a common agreement on many perspectives: the postmodern perspective, postcolonial perspective, pragmatist perspective, into a kind of spontaneous view of politics and mobilizations. I observed that in the naturalization of mobilization of indigenous communities in South America but also in Rancière’s works, in the work of James Scott on popular groups and their immediate and natural commitment.

That was the main objective if we want to analyze why domination is so strong and persistent, especially symbolic domination, it’s not to say only sociology can fight it, but rather to point out that in the context of development of new forms of symbolic domination, you cannot develop mobilization without learning processes and without educating groups that are concerned by this domination. So it is not only the analysis of domination and the conditions of possibility of access to politics that matters, but also the analysis of what may mobilize people and how to disseminate knowledge against symbolic domination.

**Zona Zarić:** Philip, you published a critique of the notion of soft power last year entitled *Soft Power, Soft Concepts and Imperial Conceits* that mobilizes Bourdieu’s readings of symbolic power and violence and uses a bourdieusian framework (Golub 2019). The aim of this critique was to bring to light what you call the “imperial cosmologies” embedded in the performative discourses of the powerful. Could you discuss this and tell us how you think Bourdieu can be integrated into international political theory?

**Philip Golub:** My recent critique in *Soft Power, Soft Concepts and Imperial Conceits* mobilizes Bourdieu, in ways just discussed, but also Gramsci's core concept of *cultural hegemony* to deconstruct the *imperial cosmologies* – the set of persistent cultural assumptions about modernity and historical purpose that naturalize domination and hence produce and reproduce international inequality – that underlie western international liberal discourses. I argue that “soft power”, as formulated by Joseph Nye, is not descriptive but prescriptive, serving as a performative *power discourse* that transfigures, dissimulates, and euphemizes relations of force and dominance in world politics. The paper can be read as part of a growing interest in applying Bourdieu to various issues and a variety of international/global objects. Indeed, several collective books and special issues of journals, for instance the 2011 special issue of *International Political Sociology*, have come out over the past decade, with some powerful results. A good example, to my mind, is the work of Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth on international circulation (the import and export as they term it) and the diffusion of international expertise as a competition for hegemony – discursive domination.

They show how this particular field (international governance expertise), where imperial politics are built on “prescriptive and purportedly universal discourses” (such as human rights or economic development), which are “played on a double register of scholarly learning and civic morality”, touches on a core mechanism of symbolic domination in contemporary international relations in which specialized personnel embedded in national power structures (Bourdieu 1989) as well as in international or supranational institutions produce and reproduce the meanings and practices that reproduce hierarchy. These agenda-setting and rule-making specialized personnel, working through public institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, the WTO, the European Commission, or through informal power bearing clubs and groups – the Eurogroup, the WEF, etc. – make knowledge-claims that conflate particularistic interests – either of an imperial state or of convergent transnational interests – with the universal or cosmopolitan interest.

The claim to universality is not only *genetically corrupted*, as Bourdieu notes, it is also an instrumentality of domination – the discursive field of expertise is consubstantial to what Edward Said, discussing unequal North-South relations, calls the “relationship of power, of domination... of complex hegemony” that the “West has historically maintained with non-western societies”, a remark than can just as well be applied to the relations in the European Union between the core and peripheries of the Union since the eurozone sovereign debt crisis in 2010. These, I believe, are particularly significant examples of the way in which Bourdieu's work can be translated into international relations research agendas.

**Ivica Mladenović:** I have one final question for all of you: The idea of the end, or at least the decline of intellectuals, is defended in a significant number of texts published over the last thirty years. This idea was evoked even before

Pierre Bourdieu's involvement in the social and intellectual struggles of the 90s. How do you see this hypothesis and what is, in your opinion, the role and place of intellectuals in contemporary societies and in social struggles?

**Philip Golub:** There is a classical role – the making sense of the social world – in an age in which the perfusion and confusion of information and of knowledge – has actually become extremely difficult. To try to clarify the intertwined links and show the processes at work and the lawfulness of certain processes and the way in which they work so that the making sense of the social world in a historic and generic sense – but also showing new emerging patterns of politics – and in doing so in critical fashion pointing out to a new age of inequality which needs to be theorized and then transformed into various forms of praxis, of scientific praxis, political praxis. That is the first and perhaps most important subject of such action and the second one is the creation of public spaces. If there is a role of the collective intellectual it is to create public spaces where precisely issues can be clarified, brought to light and in which the phenomena which are not easily understood or mastered can be given more clarity and mastered by people who actually need to use these concepts from the social sciences to be able to own their own lives, to become self-determining actors, at least in part.

**Frédéric Lebaron:** I analyzed this issue in an editorial of *Savoir Agir* 2015 – republished in my last book –, that I ironically entitled *Vers le retour des intellectuels* (towards a come-back of intellectuals, collective and international). It is a typical buzz of mainstream media and politicians to regularly deplore the decline or the death of intellectuals, Bourdieu had reacted to that in the 80s. Politicians such as Manuel Valls – former so-called “socialist” prime minister under the so-called socialist president François Hollande – or more recently our minister of education, the very right wing Jean-Michel Blanquer, have begun to directly attack intellectuals for being insufficiently mobilized against Islamism or even for being too sympathetic to their cause (“islamo-gauchisme”). It's a bit of a paradoxical position (the dominant media changes all the time): is it a decline or a too strong presence but on the bad side (left)? At the same time mediatic intellectuals – the ones that exist only in the mediatic sphere – are more and more permeable to racism and antisemitism.

I think more or less the contrary, scientists including social scientists are at the center of the stakes today – covid-19 crisis, epidemiologists, economists, other social scientists have a lot to say –, but our conditions of interventions have dramatically changed, and I think we should not only acknowledge it but take that more seriously into account. We in France have a remaining centralized Parisian conception of the intellectual: he is publishing books and intellectual journals – *Les Temps modernes*, *Le Débat*: both have recently died – in major commercial – for-profit – publishers, writing texts in *Le Monde* or *Libération* or signing petitions for the same audience as these newspapers. Bourdieu shared this model to some extent, at a global level as Gisèle has shown, but he

began to challenge it in the second half of the 90s with new more independent collections of smaller books of intervention, supporting alternative journals of various sorts (including satiric ones), mobilizing through more organized collectives more independent from mainstream politicians and media.

With digitalization, these evolutions are more obvious today. Part of the intellectual struggles are centered on Twitter (battles of threads), blogs and on-line direct publications, including scientific results, and their interpretation (Piketty website). We saw that to a very large degree with the Covid crisis. Collectives and activists remain weak, because there is now a large disconnection between fields. We are in a sense the victims of these unintended consequences of autonomisation. Therefore, I think we should recreate interdependencies between the scientific fields and for example the field of unions, the field of NGOs, the political fields. It was the initial idea of Bourdieu and Foucault in the 80s, but I think they were captured by another intellectual and political project. This is a general and critical issue as such. In times of growing social inequality and anomia, we have a certain responsibility here. I think we could try to organize new kinds of social solidarity in line with the analyses of *La misère du monde* and *The Economy of Happiness*. I don't mean only verbal and symbolic but also material, financial solidarity. The workers' movement has, in a sense, created the idea of welfare and social solidarity. We should reinvent solidarity at a global scale, by linking it to the diffusion of sociological (qualitative, narrative, and quantitative) accounts of various sorts of misery: misery of condition, poverty, absence of future (the "damned of the earth"), misery of positions, including that of academics in more and more precarised and impoverished institutions. We should give people collective projects in which they could create perspectives for the future. Sociologists without borders, unite!

**Franck Poupeau:** I completely agree with what Frederic said on the interaction between the fields, which is a key point within Bourdieu's framework. I did not partake in more serious research on this matter, other than through the more common sources of information that helped me better perceive this decline of the autonomy of the intellectual field, which also Phillip mentioned. There are both external and internal factors worthy of mentioning. External factors - the impact of the economy, or of the media on intellectual life, and internal factors - in the intellectual world and in the university, there is less and less funding and there is a major debate going on about the recent reforms and the further precarisation of academic employees, the process of evaluation etc. All these internal factors contribute to reducing the capacity of transformation of the field, the capacity of retranslating external elements into their own rules and norms of the intellectual field. That would be the first element of response, but on this kind of issue Gisele Saprio has worked much more precisely. To add an optimistic perspective, I would say that despite the differentiation of the fields, the main objective would be to recreate the conditions for collective work, and to try and avoid the production of "proletaloid intellectuals" mentioned by Weber between two world wars.

**Gisèle Sapiro:** This idea of the decline of intellectuals emerged in France in the 1980s. First in the context of Sartre's death and the victory of the Socialist Party in 1981. It was related to the marginalization of the figure of the leftist intellectual in the context of the rise of expert knowledge. You can find a special issue of *Esprit* in 1981 on the intellectuals' silence. By the end of the decade, this decline was more broadly connected to the absurd notion of the "end of history" in relation to the fall of communism. During the 1980s, anti-communist ideology attacked intellectuals who supported the communist regime as irresponsible and tried to discredit them. A new form of relationship between intellectuals and the government emerged with the model of think tanks imported from the US (the *Fondation Saint-Simon*). In the context of the first war in Iraq, this motto of the intellectuals' silence came back. As social scientists were getting enrolled in government expertise, the mediatic intellectuals, especially the so-called new philosophers, occupied more and more the public space in France. It was notably the case during the war in ex-Yugoslavia. Bourdieu's reflections on the collective intellectual emerged by that time, at the beginning of the 1990s, as he was thinking of ways to put expert knowledge at the service of the dominated rather than of the dominant. This is how he launched the association *Raisons d'agir*, on which Frédéric and Franck can elaborate better than I can.

I would like to highlight the underlying idea: Foucault and Bourdieu criticized Sartre's model of the total intellectual as acting on all fronts. Foucault proposed the figure of the *specific intellectual*, who intervenes based on her specialty. But he proposed that this expert knowledge, instead of being neutral and adjusted to government or economic demand, be critical and respond to demand for protest. He himself started working on prisons as he was engaging against the penitentiary system. This model of commitment was better adapted to the social sciences than that of the prophetic intellectual embodied by writers like Zola or a philosopher like Sartre.

Bourdieu added to this specific engagement the collective dimension of research: no one in the social sciences can embrace the whole domain of specialized knowledge, thus collaboration and division of labor becomes necessary, as well as the cumulative methods of science. This is why he created *Raisons d'agir*, the organization and publishing house. In practice, it means working on objects left aside by governmental policy, but also analyzing reflexively the state's demands for expertise, and how it frames our way of thinking. And of course, being critical about intellectuals themselves. Most often the media wanted Bourdieu to appear alone, and he had to fight to impose the names of his collaborators, as Frédéric and Franck can attest. For me this is a model of commitment that is more relevant than ever, and some organizations such as the *Fondation Copernic* or *Raisons d'agir* play such a role but are much less visible in the public space. This does not replace strikes, demonstrations, petitions, and other means of traditional, collective action, but can bring them some support. I would like to end on this note pointing out that in the past year France has been the theater of new modes of social movements, which include

protests of the intellectuals and artistic professions, on which we worked with my students as a form of participant observation: we saw lawyers throwing their robes, teachers throwing their books, dancers dancing outside the Bastille and so on. It was a very creative movement that was unfortunately interrupted by the pandemic. But these new modes of action are now part of the repertoire!

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II

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STUDIES AND ARTICLES

STUDIJE I ČLANCI





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## ALIÉNATION, ENTFREMDUNG – AND ALIENATION. HEGEL'S SOLIDARY DISPLACEMENT OF DIDEROT

### ABSTRACT

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* put alienation high on the philosophical agenda, as was readily recognized by Marx. Relatively well-known is also that Hegel's concept of alienation was inspired by Goethe's translation of Diderot's dialogue *Rameau's Nephew*, but the details and the conceptual implications of these details typically escape scholarly attention. Recognizing the basic idea of alienation as not-belonging to or being deprived of something, I emphasize that alienation implies a movement towards the limits of the human being, in which the mental suffering this involves is conditioned by social pathologies. To substantiate this claim, I show how Diderot's satire implies uncompromising materialist social criticism, but that it does not employ the term 'aliénation' but instead reserves it for a kind of frenzy that borders on insanity. My claim is then that, in Goethe's translation of Diderot's dialogue, and in his translation of 'aliénation' to 'Entfremdung', Hegel found a general key for the conceptual critique of the spirit of Modernity. I therefore argue that, in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel employed alienation in more than one sense, raising madness to the level of a characteristic of Modernity, stressing the detrimental implications for consciousness under such living conditions, emphasizing how alienation works as negation, and, finally, pointing nevertheless to the possibility of embracing social and political reality.

### KEYWORDS

alienation, Hegel, Goethe, Diderot, spirit, Modernity, critique, pathology

## Introduction

When philosophy tries to come to terms with life in Modernity, the concept of alienation often plays a crucial role. Themes discussed under the heading of alienation can trace their roots back more than 200 years, and one major tradition is the discussion in German philosophy undertaken under the heading of *Entfremdung*.<sup>1</sup> Hegel is often recognized as giving alienation a systematical

1 All translations from non-English sources have been translated by the present author, consulting published translations when available and considered necessary.

position on the philosophical agenda (Boey 2006: 195; Schacht 1971: 3) just as he can be recognized as using the term with a sense similar to the one used today (Schacht 1971: 15). Traditionally, the concept of alienation directs our attention towards experiences of not being at ease; for instance, of not belonging to, not relating to, not possessing, or becoming deprived of one's home, identity, social relations or possessions, or of mourning the loss of something one was rightfully entitled to as a human being or as a member of a given community, family or society.

In the history of alienation, there have been differences as to who is the subject and who is the object in the alienation process, i.e. whether the individual becomes alienated from society (for instance) or society becomes alienated from the individual. Rather than matters of conceptual history, however, I would like to emphasize the processual aspect of alienation, namely that alienation is not simply a state of being in conflict or discord with something or of relating to something unfamiliar, unknown or strange, a "deficient relation to world and self" (Jaeggi 2005: 183); instead, it refers to the experience of becoming separated, unfamiliar or estranged from something that one previously belonged to or identified with (Schacht 1971: 49). As I see it, by stressing the processual aspect of alienation in addition to the relational aspect, we are in a better position to insist that things could be otherwise, i.e. that alienation can be overcome.

Important contemporary arguments concerning alienation take place among Critical Theorists, some of which I have critically engaged with on other occasions (Sørensen 2019a). Participants in these discussions typically demonstrate their awareness of both Marx's seminal discussion of alienation in his 1844 *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* and the subsequent, intense discussion of these manuscripts in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. As early as 1969, these manuscripts could be characterized as "unquestionably the most talked about philosophical work in this century" (Mészáros 2005: 11). However, since then, and especially since the neo-liberal and postmodern breakthroughs in the 1980s, alienation has somehow gone out of fashion. Even if scholars sometimes recognize that Marx by no means is outdated (Henning 2015: 133), a more common urge has been to move beyond what are perceived as the limitations and restrictions of Marxist heritage (Jaeggi 2005: 12). I will return to Marx and Marxist heritage in relation to alienation in a future article, arguing that what was abandoned without much piety decades ago, i.e. both Marx and the Marxists, in fact deserves some recuperation, at least when it comes to alienation. In the present work, however, I will limit myself to presenting some lesser-known aspects of its pre-history.

It is relatively well known among cultural Marxists that the young Marx drew his main inspiration for the critique of alienation from Hegel. In fact, Marx himself refers to this inspiration in the manuscripts mentioned above, referring explicitly to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Marx 1968: 571–580). In his systematic register of Hegel's works (Reinicke 1979: 152–154), Helmut Reinicke also confirms that, when it comes to Hegel's concept of alienation,

the relevant place to look is the *Phenomenology*.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, by counting the occurrences and frequency of the noun ‘*Entfremdung*’ and the verbs and adjectives with the same root in the *Phenomenology* (Boey 1972: 96), we can even identify the most relevant section to study in detail, namely the second section of chapter six on the spirit, VI.B. “The Spirit Alienated from Itself. *Bildung*”.

Allow me initially to continue this arithmetic approach a little further and thus to indicate the intrinsic worth of a subject through the relative size of the discussion. In German, the *Phenomenology* is approximately 200,000 words long, of which chapter VI on the Spirit covers 60,000 alone. The chapter is divided into three sections, A, B and C, and chapter B – the primary section on alienation – is almost as long as the other two put together, i.e. almost 30,000 words. Hence, the discussion on alienation occupies a lot of space in the *Phenomenology*, and, just from the relative space attributed to it, it must be assumed that the concept plays a crucial role in Hegel’s overall argument.

Hegel put alienation on the philosophical agenda, and his concept of alienation – found in the *Phenomenology* – is similar to the concept of alienation we have today. It is safe to assume that the concept was important to him, but we still need to explain how he got his idea of alienation and what it was supposed to mean. It has been suggested that important inspiration for Hegel’s concept of alienation came from Rousseau, Schiller and other contemporary philosophers (Schacht 1971: 18–25), and Hegel certainly discusses Rousseau’s *Social Contract* in relation to the 1793 terror of the French Revolution, explicitly linking the figure of absolute freedom to the general will (see GW 9, 317–323; TWA 3, 432–440; see also Heidegren 1995: 257–260). However, among scholars of the *Phenomenology*, it is widely believed that the account of *Entfremdung* – i.e. alienation – primarily was inspired by Goethe’s translation of Diderot’s dialogue *Rameau’s Nephew*, which was published just a few years before the *Phenomenology*.<sup>3</sup> In the present article, I will also argue that Goethe’s translation of this work inspired Hegel’s conception of alienation. Again, let me just remind about some proportions in the attribution of space. The subsection discussing alienation, where *Rameau’s Nephew* is the main reference, is subsection VI.B.I. named “The World of the Spirit Alienated from Itself”. It alone is almost 15,000 words long.

In this article, I will explore the roots of the discussion of alienation and their fascinating history, investigating into layers of the idea of alienation that rarely receive the attention they deserve. In particular, I will focus on how the concept of alienation travelled from Diderot via Goethe to Hegel, and how Hegel expanded Diderot’s idea beyond its originally rather narrow confines.

2 In the present article, I will refer to two editions of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel 1980 and Hegel 1970. The page references will be indicated in brackets in the text as, respectively, GW 9 and TWA 3.

3 See, e.g. Hyppolite 1967: 387, 398–401; Hyppolite 1974: 400, 411–415; Heidegren 1995: 232–240, 465–466; see also, e.g. Granier 1980:18 ; Siep 2000: 196 ; Brauer 2008: 478, or Sørensen 2019b: 182 or Sørensen 2015: 60.

Most important for this history is presumably Goethe's decision to translate the French word 'alienation' with 'Entfremdung' (Goethe, 1996: 166–167; Goethe 1820: 126). However, this particular fact does not seem to have received much attention in the Hegel literature or in modern discussions of alienation referring back to Marx. In fact, even when serious efforts are made to map the intellectual landscape around the original discussions of alienation, the fact goes unmentioned (Feuerlicht 1978), and otherwise very interesting works on alienation also seem to be completely ignorant of it (Mészáros 2005; Jaeggi 2005).

Moreover, the particular section in which Hegel develops the idea of alienation, VI.B., has attracted very little interest among Hegel scholars (Sandkaulen 2014: 430–431), and this has apparently been the case for decades (Schacht 1971: 38). Hence, Hegel's main argument concerning alienation is rarely examined in detail. The only exceptions to this are the commentaries by Jean Hyppolite, Richard Schacht and Carl-Göran Heidegren, to which my argument owes a lot to. This conspicuous lack of scholarly interest also extends to Hegel's idea of *Bildung*, since this idea is mainly determined in the same section in relation to alienation (Sørensen 2019b: 192–193). However, I have discussed the relationship between alienation and *Bildung* in the *Phenomenology* elsewhere;<sup>4</sup> and, in the present article, I will focus on alienation *per se*.

Ultimately, I will argue that the transition of the term from Diderot via Goethe to Hegel has interesting conceptual implications for the concept of *Entfremdung*, i.e. alienation. Assuming that Hegel took over the concept from Goethe, I will examine Diderot's dialogue more closely in order to provide a better idea of what kind of phenomenon Goethe had in mind when he selected the German word 'Entfremdung' as his translation. In doing so, I wish to reach a better understanding of the kind of human and societal reality this word referred to for Hegel and which later proved so important for Marx himself, the 20<sup>th</sup> century Marxists, and today's critical theorists.<sup>5</sup> In particular, I will highlight the dual character of alienation in the *Phenomenology*: On the one hand, it implies a movement of discord towards the pathological limits of human being, indicating mental sufferings possibly conditioned by social pathologies; and, on the other hand, it assumes the operational role of the negation in the *Phenomenology*, driving consciousness forward from one figure to the other.

My overall argument is thus that, in order to understand why generations of critical scholars since Hegel and Marx have been so preoccupied with alienation, we would do well to examine not just Hegel's *Phenomenology* but also *Rameau's Nephew* and its reception in the *Phenomenology*. Such an examination must of course focus on the specific goal of inquiry, i.e. to better understand what alienation is about in terms of its semantic meaning and reference, but it must do so without disregarding the texts, thus keeping in mind the argument, narrative, structure, form and content. As Hegel is known to emphasize,

4 See Sørensen 2015, sect. II.A. (which is ch. 6, sect. B.ii. in Sørensen 2019b).

5 Apart from Jaeggi 2005, see also, e.g., Rosa 2010 and Rosa 2016, all three of which I discuss in Sørensen 2019a.

without knowledge of the realization of a concept, the truth of the matter will not be achieved. As I will argue, rather than simply using Goethe's translation of the particular term '*aliénation*', in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel interpreted the whole of *Rameau's Nephew* (and the idea of Modernity depicted there) as a genuine expression of alienation.

Moreover, to determine the meaning of a particular word, the context and ultimately the whole of the particular language must also be taken into account. Whether we employ the vocabulary of hermeneutics, structuralism, ordinary language philosophy or pragmatism, the meaning of a term depends on its specific role as part of a larger whole. Even the most careful translation of a term from one particular language to another will imply a transmission that displaces the original conceptual meaning of that particular term. Keeping in mind a future conceptual argument regarding the concept of alienation I wish to put forward, in the following paragraphs, I will therefore allow myself to delve into historical and philological details that are often considered inappropriate for conceptual argumentation. In doing so, I will follow a simple inclination, i.e. curiosity and fascination, but my claim is that showing these details sheds more light on, and helps us understand, what alienation is all about. Again, knowledge of the becoming of a concept adds to the truth of the matter.

I will first present Diderot's dialogue, stressing the claims of its open-ended dialogical and dialectical character (A.). I will then show how Diderot's satire implies an uncompromising social criticism of the material living conditions in 18<sup>th</sup>-century France that defies allegations of cynicism (B.), but that this criticism does not employ the term '*aliénation*', reserving it instead for a kind of frenzy at the limit of insanity (C.). My claim is that, in Goethe's translation of Diderot's dialogue, and in his translation of '*aliénation*' to '*Entfremdung*', Hegel found a key for the conceptual critique of the spirit of Modernity (D.). To demonstrate this, I first reconstruct Hegel's idea of the spirit as the ethical life of a people (E.); I then argue that, in the analysis of the spirit alienated from itself, Hegel employs alienation in a double sense, both expanding the madness depicted by Diderot to the societal level, stressing the implications of modern living conditions for consciousness, and letting alienation assume the role of negation (F.).

In the latter sense, Hegel lets alienation set the scene for his dialectics of Enlightenment, returning again to epistemological skepticism and highlighting its emptiness (G.). Finally, I argue that alienation in the first sense is tied to the historical world of *Bildung* and that, in the same world, exteriorization becomes pathological as alienation (H.). After pausing briefly to reveal some amusing details concerning the history of Diderot's dialogue (I.), I conclude that social criticism plays a much larger role than usually thought for both Diderot and Hegel, which is why Hegel can expand Diderot's concept of alienation to become the main characteristic of Modernity. I end the article with the claim that, considering the arguments presented, it is indeed meaningful to consider the particular origin of the term alienation in Enlightenment social philosophy.

## A. Rameau's Nephew: Open-Endedness as a Principle

*Rameau's Nephew*<sup>6</sup> is widely recognized as Diderot's 'masterpiece' (White 1970: 74). It is a substantial literary work of around 35,000 words in French and is often typeset to form a book of more than 100 pages. It is set in Paris in Diderot's time and explores the world of 18<sup>th</sup>-century operas – their composers and the antics of the cultural elite (and their followers) of the era. As J. F. Falvey explains (Falvey 1985: 38), the work uses fashionable society gossip and scandals as a social panorama for ridiculing and staging satirical attacks on ideas, groups and named individuals. Nothing or nobody appears to be sacred.

The dialogue takes place between *Moi* and *Lui*, i.e. Me and Him. *Moi* presents himself as a moral and rational philosopher, whereas *Lui* is the eccentric nephew of "le grand Rameau", i.e. Jean-Philippe Rameau, who was a successful composer of French operas in Diderot's time. *Lui* is thus the portrait of a real person living in Paris at the time Diderot wrote the dialogue. His name was Jean-François Rameau, but he was always called (and called himself) "*Rameau le neveu*", and he even used this nickname as his signature (Magnan 1993: 9–10). In contrast, *Moi* is left unspecified, and there have of course been discussions about the extent to which *Moi* represents Diderot.

It is almost certain that Diderot first drafted the dialogue in 1761, seemingly in April (or shortly afterwards). The fact that we can conclude so precisely when the dialogue was first put to paper is due to various events referred to during the conversation – and not because Diderot or anybody else has provided an original manuscript with a date. For example, in the dialogue, there is mention of the death of *Lui*'s wife (NR 131/08) but not the death of their only son; and we know that the former died in January 1761 and the latter in June the same year (Falvey 1985: 13).

Moreover, the dialogue refers to other real people and events in Paris that confirm this date, in particular *Lui*'s declaration at the end of the dialogue that he will see an opera by "Dauvergne" (NR, 132/09), which is most likely *Hercule mourant* by Antoine Dauvergne. This opera was staged only 19 times, all of which in April 1761 (Falvey 1985: 13), the opening night being Friday 3<sup>rd</sup> April.<sup>7</sup> Hence, thanks to the meticulous studies of generations of historians, philologists and literary critics, and the extensive comments of the first translator Goethe (Goethe 1820: 167–228; Goethe 1996: 237–280), we do in fact know a great deal about the factual references of the dialogue. Some interpreters even believe that the dialogue may have been constructed by Diderot but was based on real life dialogues that took place around the time the text was written.

Referring to the work as a dialogue does not require much interpretative talent. Almost the entire text is structured by entries alternating between *Moi*

6 I will refer simultaneously to the following two editions, Diderot 1983, ed. Jean-Claude Bonnet, and Diderot 1963, ed. Jean Fabre. The page references will be indicated in brackets in the text as NR, nn/nn.

7 See, e.g., "Hercule mourant"; see also Pedersen 1987, "Noter", 126.

and *Lui*, constituting a continued conversation between two people on various themes. From time to time, however, the dialogue is interrupted by explanatory notes and reflections for the reader that can be attributed, respectively, to *Moi*, a third person narrator of the text, or to the author himself, and the structure of the narrative is not dramatic in a classical sense. Its reflections thus seem suitable for reading rather than experiencing or listening to, and, as a genre, one could describe *Rameau's Nephew* as a “conversation novel” (Falvey 1985: 12). Still, the choice of dialogue as the main structural principle of the text was in all likelihood deliberate. Diderot is known to have brought with him a small volume of Plato’s dialogues when he went to prison in Vincennes in 1749, and, from that volume, he translated the *Apology of Socrates* (Jauss 1983: 3).

As Hans Robert Jauss tells the story, Diderot’s entries in the *Encyclopedia* on “The Death of Socrates” and “Socratic Philosophy” clearly demonstrate that he identified himself and his role in the French Enlightenment with that of Socrates (Jauss 1983: 3). Moreover, as in a Socratic dialogue, what sets *Rameau's Nephew* in motion is a seemingly coincidental meeting between *Moi* and *Lui* in the garden of *Palais Royal* (see NR, 45/3). Before entering into the dialogical mode, Diderot devotes a few pages to a first-person narrative introducing the reader to Rameau’s nephew as one of the most “bizarre persons in this country” (NR, 46/4). Still, as Jauss argues, the overall dialogical form reflects the fact that, in the French Enlightenment, the dialogue was highly valued due to its didactical qualities and its ability to signal both openings and even open-endedness (Falvey 1985: 12), and this is indeed the case in *Rameau's Nephew*. Diderot can thus be said to provide a restoration of a “dialogical concept of truth”, dismantling “the one-sided authority of pedagogical authority” and giving “equal rights to the opposite voice”; through the question and answer format, he lets openness prevail, to the point of provoking the reader with “unsolved *aporia* in the end” (Jauss 1983: 1).

While Jauss argues that Diderot is able to retain the dialogical quality inherited from Plato and Socrates, when Hegel makes use of Diderot’s text, this quality is arguably lost; whereas advanced Enlightenment can supposedly be dialogical, according to Jauss, “finished Enlightenment” can only exhibit a “monological dialectic” (Jauss 1983: 8). Dialectic thus signals system and closure. Nevertheless, Jauss recognizes that Hegel himself understood his renewal of dialectics as a sublation of the dialogical principle (Jauss 1983: 20), just as he admits that Hegel did not use *Rameau's Nephew* to complete the dialectical movement and that his dialectics of Enlightenment seems unconcluded (Jauss 1983: 26–28). Jauss ultimately asks himself and his readers whether “dialectic is necessarily monological by nature” (Jauss 1983: 29); and, as I have argued elsewhere,<sup>8</sup> with particular reference to both Hegel and the man Jauss recognizes as his teacher,<sup>9</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer,<sup>10</sup> I think the most fruitful answer

8 See Part Two in Sørensen 2019b.

9 See *Minutes of the Colloquy*, 1983: 52.

10 See ch. 5 and 6 in Sørensen 2019b, in particular 141–142, 168–169.

to this question is ‘no’.<sup>11</sup> Hence, I will insist that Hegel’s dialectic also retains a fundamental openness, both in itself and in the way Hegel incorporates quotations from Goethe’s text in his own.

## B. Satire and Social Criticism, not Cynicism

The motto of the first page of Diderot’s dialogue is a quotation from the *Satires* of Horace (NR, 45/3), referring to the god of change and seasons, Vertumnis, who can be considered rather unstable and unreliable, just like *Lui* (Falvey 1985: 61). However, *Lui* can even be said to be unpredictable in his unpredictability. Initially, he thus casts himself as a fool, who, as a professional parasite hosted by rich households, can entertain the master and his guests with amusing stories, insults and caricatures, i.e. by making everybody laugh; and he insists that he is uniquely well qualified in this regard (see NR, 92-96/60-65). However, as the dialogue develops, *Lui* demonstrates laudable moral character traits, first in his frankness and truthfulness in relation to his own identity, role and weaknesses, and ultimately in his sense of parental responsibility regarding the education of his son.

*Lui* declares that he “loves” his little “savage” and will raise him according to his own “molecule” rather than forcing him to become a “decent man” (NR, 116/90). He wants his son to be “happy, or what is the same: rich and powerful”. (NR, 119/93) *Lui* is aware of the danger of being “penetrated by the value of money” but does not believe that morality can come without some “inconvenience”. (NR, 118/92) Hence, the dialogue clearly contains some moral ambivalence when it comes to virtue and vice, and some have even perceived an inversion of roles throughout the work, which would demonstrate the above-mentioned openness of dialogical truth even further – radical Enlightenment thus forcing, or leaving, the reader to think for him- or herself. Foucault, for instance, emphasizes how madness assumes the task of revealing the truth but can only claim it by coincidence: The “coincidence is the only necessary link between truth and error” (Foucault 1978: 367).

As mentioned earlier, the dialogue has an introduction but no real end; instead, it is simply interrupted when *Lui* decides to leave for the above-mentioned opera. So, in this very literal sense, the dialogue is also open-ended. Moreover, the characters’ comments may appear dispersed and coincidental, and, like in many real-life conversations, what leads from one specific theme to another – and how these themes relate – may not always be clear. Still, by structuring the exchanges of the text, Falvey has identified a number of stages and recurring elements, the most central themes being genius, satire, education,

<sup>11</sup> I will not go further into the heated and otherwise interesting discussion generated by Jauss’s essay, since most of the interventions relate less to *Rameau’s Nephew* and the *Phenomenology* than to literature theory, contrasting Jauss’s reception theory and literary hermeneutics with traditional philology and other kinds of hermeneutics, as well as with post-modernism, post-structuralism and deconstructionism (see *Responses*, 1983, and *Minutes of the Colloquy*, 1983: 30–67).



morality and music. Furthermore, in many cases, the particular points are related to money, i.e. possible or actual wealth (Falvey 1985: 15, 19–21). Hence, like Falvey (Falvey 1985: 83), in Diderot’s dialogue, I cannot help noticing an entire group of themes that relate to the micro- and macro-economy, thus indicating the importance attributed to money and power in human life. In my reading, I will emphasize these aspects much more than has been done previously.

Diderot’s dialogue is indeed a satire and, as such, it is not just open-ended and unpredictable; like any true satire, the targets of contemptuous caricatures are typically rich and powerful people who are ridiculed as hypocritical, insensitive or mean – or a combination of the three. Virtues are thus recognized and considered normatively valid, though often only negatively or implicitly, which is precisely what characterizes ideology critique and social criticism. It is thus misleading to present *Lui* as an example of Benjamin’s “destructive character”, whose “scornful nihilism” (Bewes, 1997: 114) makes him criticize everything. For *Lui*, some things are indeed considered sacred. As such, it is mistaken to characterize him as cynical, provoking or merely bitter or miserable, as previous scholars have done.<sup>12</sup> On the contrary, I will claim that *Lui* is enraged and desperate, filled with indignation and revolted by the conditions of human life in the modern world. He wants to tell this truth, but, to avoid suffering the consequences of such impropriety, he has to make a fool of himself, disguising the truth as a slip of the tongue, i.e., a mere coincidence.

Hence, the point is not, as it has been claimed, that “Rameau’s cynicism consists [...] in his refusal to entertain the ‘Notions’ of state power and wealth”, or that he dismisses “patriotism, friendship [and] social responsibility”, or that he is indifferent to “freedom, independence, virtue, genius, wisdom, posterity, truth and dignity”, or “the cultural ‘Notions’ of good, evil, honour, shame, nobility, ignobility, justice, indecency, etc.” (Bewes, 1997: 112–113, 137). In fact, the exact opposite is true. What *Lui* criticizes is the actual holders of power and wealth and their hypocrisy when legitimizing their possessions normatively through such notions: Rather than denouncing the notions *per se*, the nephew conducts a social criticism of their particular instantiation in a real societal configuration. As Foucault poignantly put it, “his secret is precisely that he is not able to be hypocritical” (Foucault 1978: 367).

In one of the early exchanges, *Lui* tells a story about the king’s ministers, who had allegedly said that “nothing is more useful for the people than lies; nothing is more harmful than the truth”. (NR, 50/9) This, however, is not a critique of the notion of truth or a transformation to a dialogical concept of truth; the point is to reveal those in power as routinely lying, and this is social criticism. Hence, when the minister of justice is ridiculed for his wig and gown, it is also mentioned that he owns “millions”, while honorable officers “don’t even have bread”. (NR, 85/52) Again, this is a criticism of real social inequality. Moreover, in relation to the education of his son, he exclaims: “Gold is everything, and the rest, without gold, is nothing”. (NR, 118/92) As recognized by

12 See, e.g., Falvey 1985: 10; and Bewes 1997: 111 and Hansen-Löve 2018: 157.

Hyppolite (Hyppolite 1967: 400–401; Hyppolite 1974: 413–414), this is clearly a way of criticizing a society ruled by money whilst also demonstrating the impotency of *Lui* and his likes. Hence, in such a situation, patriotism cannot be an issue; as *Lui* puts it: “There is no longer any patrimony. All I see from pole to pole is tyrants and slaves”. (NR, 75/40) This is a criticism of the hypocrisy manifested by those who in fact ask for, and benefit from, patriotism – i.e. the king and nobility – it is not the refusal to endorse patriotism *per se*.

This argument becomes more powerful when we consider the word ‘cynicism’ in itself. Today, the dictionary can define it as the belief “that people are motivated purely by self-interest rather than acting for honorable or unselfish reasons”,<sup>13</sup> and such a belief can also be described as “sneering and [...] sarcastic” (Hornby 1985: 215). Moreover, it is not uncommon to associate cynicism with apathy and introspection, “a refusal to engage with the world, [...] an abnegation of politics, [...] a flight into solitude and interiority, [and] a condition of disillusion” that implies “relativism, irony and even decadence” (Bewes 1997: 1, 8, 111).

Some of these traits can certainly be recognized in *Lui*, and, as Louisa Shea argues (Shea 2010: ix-xii), cynicism in this sense can be considered a consequence of losing faith in the historical Enlightenment project for education and justice, and such disillusion is quite different from the ancient Greek Cynicism – with an uppercase ‘C’ – as attributed to Diogenes of Sinope, who was one of Diderot’s favorite references. As became common in Germany after Sloterdijk (Kallscheur, Niehues-Pröbsting, Eldred, Ebeling 1984), Shea thus wants to distinguish between the *Zyniker* (with a lowercase ‘c’) and the *Kyniker* (with an uppercase ‘C’). Shea’s claim is that the original Cynicism became attractive in late 18<sup>th</sup> century precisely because it offered a possible language for communicating social criticism, distancing itself from both philosophical abstraction and paralyzing skepticism.

As Shea argues, it was precisely the employment of Cynic eloquence, frankness and wit (plus a portion of provocational shamelessness) that landed Diderot in prison in 1749. In the tales told about Diogenes, he was thus reputed to have “masturbated publicly” (Shea 2010: 23), and, in order to avoid subsequent censorship and imprisonment, Diderot deliberately rejected “the bluntness, asceticism and obscenity” of the ancient Cynics, adopting instead the Socratic style of the “polite philosophers,” recognizing the dialogue as a way to draw out the truth rather than to “bark it out” (Shea 2010: 41, 48). Engaging in open-endedness and pursuing dialogical truth was therefore only a second choice, having experienced first-hand the dire consequences of telling the monological truth publicly in an unjust society.

Moreover, as *Rameau’s Nephew* demonstrates, Diderot did not give up his youthful Cynicism but merely confined it to his private chambers. The open-endedness of the dialogue may thus be said to express his inability to reconcile two conflicting aspects of his own personality as they are portrayed by *Lui* and *Moi*. As it is generally recognized (Falvey 1985: 13–14, 50–51; Shea,

13 *Oxford English Dictionary*, quoted by Shea 2010: ix.

2010: 41), Diderot kept the manuscript a secret even to his closest friends, most likely considering the uncompromising satire of the contemporary Parisian elite too sensitive a subject for both the general public and his own good. As Shea argues, within the framework of Socratic dialogue and Platonic dialectics, what is revealed is a confrontation between *Moi's* domesticated and “polite Cynicism” and *Lui's* almost classical display of “biting, mocking, and irreverent voice” (Shea 2010: 41), both of which also reveal traits of modern cynicism.

Towards the end of the dialogue, *Moi* introduces a puritan and ascetic version of Diogenes for his moral denouncement of *Lui's* betrayal of principles, the latter being accused of prostituting himself and crawling for the sake of mere “pleasure.” *Lui*, however, does not accept this domesticated image of Diogenes, arguing that the ancient Cynic also “danced a pantomime” when confronted with power and money. In addition, he insists that “a good bed, good food, warm clothes in the winter, cool in the summer, plenty of rest, money and other things” he would “rather owe to kindness than earn by toil”. As *Moi* argues, *Lui* is then just “a lazy, greedy lout, a coward and a rotting soul”, to which *Lui* simply remarks that “I believe I told you so myself” (NR 130/07).

As emphasized by Timothy Bewes, the depth of understanding of what Hegel would later consider the “disrupted, ignoble consciousness” is clearly “far more profound than that of the philosopher” (Bewes 1997: 116). Still, I contest Bewes’ understanding of this depth as plain cynicism. As Shea makes clear, what is revealed by *Lui's* wisecracks and polemics is that Diderot still recognizes the “moral strength [and] virtue” of the “radical and disruptive” (Shea 2010: 42–43) ancient Cynics. The enlightened politeness of philosophers such as *Moi* may enable the expression of “subversive ideas in a discreet manner”, thus keeping the proponent “out of trouble and in good money”; but this implies a “degeneration of philosophy” due to the “betrayal” of philosophers who bow “to the demands of property” and shut “their eyes to social reality” (Shea 2010: 55).

However, even Rameau accepts the social and material conditions as they are given. *Lui* ridicules and unmaskes “social conventions” and, as Bewes stresses, such expressions of “alienation” constitute a movement towards “total political involvement” (Bewes 1997: 200). However, as Shea identifies, *Lui* makes no attempt of “resisting or overturning the practices he mocks” (Shea 2010: 59). His main concern is not how to engage in political practice or long-term plans but how to deal with a real and imminent threat, i.e. hunger. *Lui* lives as a hanger-on, receiving board and lodging in exchange for entertainment and various illicit services. And, on the day of his casual encounter with *Moi*, he has just been thrown out of his household, not knowing where his next meal would come from (see NR, 78/43). As a true materialist, and referring to Montaigne (see NR, 128/104), Diderot lets *Lui* argue that the “most important is to ease the bowels freely, agreeably, copiously, every night” (NR, 63/25). Not to be ignored is therefore the “tumult of [the] intestines” and “the audible pang of a complaining stomach” (NR, 83/49). Again, this shows that, for him, something is indeed sacred: the acute needs of the living sensual body of each human being.

This is what makes *Lui* and those like him (i.e. the parasites of bourgeois wealth) humiliate themselves, flattering the masters and mistresses, bowing “low, the forward knee bent” (NR, 82/49). As *Lui* stresses, “it is always the appetite I return to, the sensation that is always present; I find that an [societal] order is not good when sometimes there is nothing to eat. Damned economy”. Some people luxuriate, while others have nothing to eat. Thrown out of his household, *Lui* is left with neither shelter nor food, neither for himself nor for his son. And, for *Lui*, this results in humiliation and a loss of personal dignity. The “man in need does not walk like another; he skips, twists, cringes, crawls” (NR, 127/104). In a “monarchy only one person walks. That is the sovereign. All the rest take positions” (NR, 128/105). As *Lui* himself readily admits, in his own pantomime, he takes a position that is “almost the same as that of the flatterers, the courtesans, the servants and the scoundrels” (NR, 129/105); confronted with “the rigor of need”, he surrenders to an “egoism without escape” (Foucault 1978: 368).

As Shea emphasizes, *Lui* does indeed reconstruct and cry out the behavior of powerful people in terms of egoism and strategy, but he does not adopt this cynical way of living himself (Shea 2010: 62–63). Rather than a cynic, or even an ancient Cynic, Rameau represents the necessary self-critique of the well-mannered Age of Reason (Shea 2010: 46). What he expresses is social criticism that has rightly been recognized as radical (Boey 1972: 107), being grounded in both corporal and spiritual empathy and compassion. In both the satire and the admissions *Lui* makes about his own way of living, there is a clear and radical social criticism of class society and the inequalities and vices generated by accumulated wealth, e.g. sycophancy, parasitism and prostitution. What from a superficial moralistic reading may appear as cynicism, or “self-prostitution” (Bewes 1997: 115), is in fact a commitment to organic materialism and realist social criticism.

Clearly, what Diderot highlights is material consequences and injustices of societal exploitation and poverty in modern society. In contrast to Bewes (Bewes 1997: 137–138), I therefore prefer Jon Stewart’s characterization of *Lui* as “an anarchistic radical” (Stewart 2000: 330). As it was later claimed by the classical 19<sup>th</sup>-century anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, so also for *Lui*: property is theft (Woodcock 1975: 104–107). To cheat the wealthy is thus to “steal” back, which is only fair. This helps to “restitute” things in the anarchist way, i.e. without recurring to the state. As *Lui* puts it: “We make justice between us, without interference by the law” (NR, 73/38). And there is no remorse: “The voice of conscience and honor is pretty feeble when the guts cry out” (NR, 74/38).

### C. Alienation as Being Out of Your Mind or Insane

It is in the conflict between genius and sorry material conditions that *Lui* finds the most talented expression of his dismemberment and laceration, being torn apart from within and from without. *Lui* can be considered vile and immoral, and he even prides himself on having systematically refined – i.e. pursuing in

a “reasonable and true way” – the vices that most people follow through “instinct” (NR, 92/61). It is clearly his attempt to handle the material conditions of living in a modern class society in an enlightened – and thus rational – way that has led him to become the man he is.

The open-endedness and unpredictability of *Lui*'s performance does not mean that Diderot leaves it to the reader to decide what is right or wrong, or that he himself is a cynic. A societal order that inflicts hunger on human beings is wrong, even though we may not know precisely what is right, and even though we may individually have found ways to cope with it. *Lui*'s unpredictability may be considered part of a survival strategy in a hostile society, demonstrating the adaptability and flexibility required to be part of Modern life as a self-conscious and conscientious, yet still realist, human being. Apart from simply letting *Lui* ridicule his enemies and other people worth insulting with pantomime and gossip (i.e. being generally ironic and satirical towards the Parisian upper-class culture), Diderot clearly stages a materialist social criticism of inequality and oppression in the French society of his time; and it is this societal aspect of the dialogue that I will claim Hegel developed further.

As Shea mentions, Hegel considered Ancient Cynicism banal and theoretically insufficient, apparently ignoring its “potential model” for “philosophy as a way of life” (Shea 2010: 188), and he clearly contributed to relegating the Cynicism to the “dustbin” of the official history of philosophy, thus making generations of philosophers and historians of ideas consider it only “on the margins of serious philosophy” (Shea 2010: 133). In his very short account of the Cynics, Hegel thus emphasized both their lack of philosophical education and their failure to develop thought into system and science (Hegel 1986, TWA 18: 551). However, as I will argue, this is not the whole story. By recognizing the importance of *Rameau's Nephew* and the malaise of being alienated from social conventions and reality, Hegel in fact raised the social criticism of the Cynics (i.e. the criticism of injustice and alienation) to become the core of social philosophy and politics, forging a path for Marx and those who related to his agenda to follow. As will become clear below, Hegel did indeed take seriously what a materialist Cynic like Diderot had to say about the burdens of modern society.

To get to this, we must focus on the parts of the dialogue that explicitly address alienation, which are fewer than we might assume. In fact, it is only in one spectacular scene – what has been recognized as the “the central mime” (Falvey 1985: 62) – in the last part of this hilarious dialogue that we encounter the word ‘*aliénation*’. In this scene, the nephew is acting and pantomiming a story with “thirty different airs”, taking turns in French and Italian, being both comic and tragic:

Now in a baritone voice he sank to the pit; then straining in falsetto he tore to shreds the upper notes of some air, imitating the while, the stance, walk and gestures of several characters; being in succession furious, mollified, lordly, sneering. First a damsel weeps and he reproduces her kittenish ways; next he is a priest, a king, a tyrant; he threatens, commands, rages. Now he is a slave, he

obeys, calms down, is heartbroken, complains, laughs; never overstepping the proper tone, speech, or manner called for by the part. (NR, 111/83).<sup>14</sup>

This is where *Moi* takes *Lui* to be “caught by an alienation of his spirit [i.e. in French ‘*esprit*’, in German ‘*Geist*’], an enthusiasm so close to madness that it seemed doubtful whether he would recover; if not, he would have to be thrown into a cab and driven straight to *Petites-Maisons*” (Goethe 1996: 166–167), (NR, 111/83), which, at that time, was an “*asylum d’aliénés*”, i.e. a madhouse. Obviously, the alienation of the spirit in this sense means something like being in a frenzy or out of one’s mind, approaching the state of outright madness. Still, *Lui* is not suffering acute mental illness in a clinical sense; his performance may have an aspect of folly, but he is also recognized by *Moi* as an extremely gifted artist performing at his best:

While singing fragments of Jomelli’s *Lamentations*, he reproduced with incredible precision, fidelity and warmth the most beautiful passages of each scene. That magnificent recitative in which Jeremiah describes the desolation of Jerusalem, he drenched in tears which drew their like from every onlooker. His art was complete – delicacy of voice, expressive strength, true sorrow. He dwelt at the places where the musician had shown himself a master. If he left the vocal part, it was to take up the instrumental, which he abandoned suddenly to return to the voice, linking them to preserve the connection and unity of the whole, gripping our souls and keeping them suspended in the most singular state of being that I have ever experienced. (Diderot 2001: 67) (NR, 111/83–84)

We thus find ourselves at the famous threshold between genius and madness. The alienation from himself enables *Lui* to assume, and alternate between, characters and instruments almost at will, and *Moi* is both impressed and moved. The entire account of *Lui*’s performance is attributed to *Moi* but is written in the third narrative voice and thus directed at the reader, i.e. it is not part of the dialogue. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, when it comes to alienation, this is in fact all we have from Diderot’s hand in *Rameau’s Nephew*.

The French word ‘*aliénation*’ appears only once in the entire dialogue, and when it comes to Goethe’s German translation, the word ‘*Entfremdung*’ also only appears once.<sup>15</sup> Only very few people have noticed this remarkable fact, among them Schacht and Heidegren.<sup>16</sup> Interestingly, however, the English translation of the dialogue avoids the word ‘alienation’ altogether in this context (Diderot 2001: 67; see also Falvey 1985: 35), indicating thus a possible displacement of meaning of the term ‘alienation’ between the French and English language with regards to this particular use. James Schmidt thus clearly feels a need to explain Diderot’s use of the French homonym to English language

14 See also the English translation Diderot 2001: 67.

15 See Goethe 1996: 166–167. The precise spot was pointed out to me by Heidegren during a seminar in 2019.

16 See Schacht 1971: 43. I was only made aware of this crucial fact due to a casual remark by Heidegren at the occasion just mentioned.

readers (Schmidt 1996: 642), and, in the discussions on Hegel and alienation, I have only encountered one scholar, namely Schacht, who relates to this issue.

As Schacht explains, the use of alienation as “mental disorder” can be encountered in 15<sup>th</sup>-century English, and it is still used as a “technical” term in psychiatry, although in “current English” – i.e. the English of 1971 – it is “infrequently encountered” (Schacht 1971: 10–11). This displacement of the meaning of the term between French and English is, I would think, likely to have contributed to the widespread ignorance about the present issue in English language discussions of alienation. Interestingly, the Danish translation of Diderot’s dialogue also avoids the common Danish word for alienation, *fremmedgørelse*, and instead uses *galskab* (Diderot 1987: 85), i.e. ‘madness’. With this in mind, I will now turn to the reception of Diderot’s dialogue by Hegel.

#### D. Goethe Translating Alienation – and Hegel

In the current discussion of alienation, hardly anybody notices that the key word for Hegel, *Entfremdung*, is only mentioned this once in Goethe’s translation, that it is mentioned in a very specific sense brought over from French, and that it is unclear whether Hegel is using the word in the same specific sense. In spite of the possible English language displacement in relation to the French homonym *aliénation*, which tends to neglect the aspect of insanity, and the consequent avoidance of translating *aliénation* to ‘alienation’, Diderot’s use of the French term has nevertheless had an important reception in English, namely thanks to the above-mentioned translation of alienation to the German *Entfremdung*, and especially because of its intellectual destiny, i.e. the philosophy of Hegel and Marx *et al.*

Hence, it is presumably due to Goethe’s translation of Diderot’s dialogue that *aliénation d’esprit* becomes *Entfremdung des Geistes* (Heidegren 1995: 226) and that we consequently encounter *Entfremdung* in Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Schmidt 1996: 642). Moreover, in Hegel’s hands, *Entfremdung* surely becomes a term of the utmost conceptual importance. In the *Phenomenology*, *Entfremdung* is thus used in all kinds of morphological variations, i.e. as a name, a verb and an adjective, and, as mentioned above, especially in the long chapter on the Spirit. Moreover, in the same chapter, in section VI.B., Hegel quotes extensively from Goethe’s translation.

However, in the place where we would expect to find at least some mention of alienation in the *Phenomenology*, namely when Hegel quotes from the passage in Diderot’s dialogue in which *Lui* is approaching the frenzy characterized as an alienation of the spirit (i.e. the one passage in which Goethe uses the word *Entfremdung*), there is no mention of alienation or any morphological variations of it – despite the fact that, in this section, Hegel quotes extensively from Diderot’s dialogue (see GW 9, 283–284; TWA 3, 387 and NR, 110–111/82–83). Instead, Hegel prefers to introduce the situation in terms of a “lacerated [*zerrissene*] consciousness” (GW 9, 283; TWA 3, 386) and comment on “the madness [*Vorrückheit*] of the musician” (GW 9, 283; TWA 3, 387). In

this way, Hegel seems to side with the English and Danish translators, ignoring the connotations of the French term ‘*aliénation*’.

Moreover, as Schacht has noticed (Schacht 1971: 43), the expression ‘*Entfremdung des Geistes*’ is conspicuously absent from Hegel’s discussion, and nowhere does Hegel explicitly quote the word ‘*Entfremdung*’ with quotation marks. However, I will argue that Schacht draws the wrong conclusion from this. As he has noticed, Hegel does in fact use an expression close to Goethe’s, namely ‘*der sich entfremdete Geist*’, i.e. the spirit alienated from itself, and he uses this expression as part of the title of the most important section regarding the discussion of alienation (section VI.B). Unlike Schacht, I therefore think that Hegel wants to convey a message that includes that of Diderot and Goethe, deliberately conceiving of ‘alienation’ as implying the “loss of one’s senses” (Schacht 1971: 43).

However, to explore this in detail, we first need to take a closer look at the *Phenomenology*. First published in 1807, it is often assumed that this is where Hegel first uses the term ‘*Entfremdung*’ (Schacht 1971: 25), inspired by Goethe’s translation of Diderot’s dialogue, which was first published in 1805. However, according to Heidegren, Hegel had in fact already used the term in a manuscript from 1805–06, the so-called *Jena System Sketches* (Heidegren 1995: 463), but it is only in the *Phenomenology* that we can talk of a real “innovation of philosophical terminology” (Heidegren 1995: 226): from something just mentioned, and maybe only in passing, *Entfremdung* had become a crucial conceptual element of systematic importance in the analysis of the formation – i.e. the *Bildung* – of consciousness to spirit, religion and absolute knowledge.<sup>17</sup>

So, even if Hegel hesitated to quote Goethe’s translation of the French ‘*aliénation*’ to ‘*Entfremdung*’, or, more precisely, the translation of ‘*aliénation d’esprit*’ to ‘*Entfremdung des Geistes*’, *Entfremdung* as such had clearly become a crucial moment in Hegel’s argument, and it appears that, in some way or another, Goethe’s translation of the dialogue must have influenced this. The question then becomes: what was this influence, how can it be explained, and what conceptual implications can we draw from it?

The incorporation of *Rameau’s Nephew* into the *Phenomenology* has aptly been described by Schmidt as “situating this most peculiar of dialogues into [the] most baffling of books” (Schmidt 1996: 626), thus wrapping “a riddle in-[to] an enigma” (Schmidt 1996: 629). There is, however, no doubt that Hegel was inspired by Diderot’s work: Hegel quotes passages *verbatim* from Goethe’s translation of *Rameau’s Nephew* in his analysis of *Entfremdung* (see GW 9, 268, 283–284, 295–296; TWA 3, 365, 387, 403),<sup>18</sup> and, as Heidegren has noticed, this is the only work of his contemporaries that Hegel quotes with quotation marks in the whole of the *Phenomenology* (Heidegren 1995: 466).

<sup>17</sup> See, e.g., my Sørensen 2015. Or ch. 6 in Sørensen 2019b.

<sup>18</sup> In the former edition, index and *Anhang* point to the relevant pages and lines; in the latter edition, the quotations are marked in the text with editorial footnotes referring to Diderot.



Goethe's translation was not a great commercial success (Schmidt 1996: 625), but it was exactly what Hegel had been looking for, and he attributed a similar role to Diderot's dialogue as he attributed to his favorite classical tragedy *Antigone*, where Sophocles addresses the conflict between human law and divine law. Indeed, both of these literary works are crucial for the argument in the longest and arguably most important chapter of the *Phenomenology*, i.e. chapter six, which is simply called "The Spirit", i.e. "*Der Geist*" (GW 9, 238-362; TWA 3, 324-494).

*Antigone* is quoted in the first of the three sections, "The True Spirit. Ethical Life [*Sittlichkeit*]", and *Rameau's Nephew* in the second, "The Spirit Alienated from Itself. Formation [*Bildung*]"; in both cases, Hegel marks the quotations in the original text with quotation marks but does not provide information on the authors or the works quoted. However, whereas *Antigone* is quoted only once (see GW 9, 236; TWA 3, 348), *Rameau's Nephew* is quoted three times and paraphrased at least once (see GW 9, 268, 283-284, 295-296; TWA 3 365, 387, 404) (Heidegren 1995: 465-466). In the Hegel literature, much more attention has been devoted to Hegel's use of *Antigone* than his use of Diderot,<sup>19</sup> and this is a bias I hope to put an end to.

As David W. Price argues, one can consider Hegel's incorporation of literature as an "intertextual dialectic", in which, rather than interpreting the text loyally, he uses it to say something himself. When Jauss criticizes Hegel's use of Diderot, he "fault[s] Hegel for not being Diderot", thus claiming exclusive access to "Diderot's text". However, in the playful spirit of Diderot, Hegel in fact "inserts, and at times, subverts, quotations taken from Diderot" (Price 1998: 276-277). Hence, into the quotation referring to *Lui's* mime that impresses and moves *Moi* (i.e. *Lui's* "greatest moment of triumph"), Hegel introduces another quotation in which *Lui* depicts something less impressive, namely from a scene in which he pantomimes the relationship between a pimp and a young girl.

By combining the two quotations in this way, Hegel thus very concretely reveals the "truth of the Nephew", i.e. this bewildering combination of "shrewdness and depravity" (Price 1998: 274-275) (see also NR 46/4). Interestingly, however, Price also avoids relating to alienation; but, as I will argue, much of what Hegel wants to tell us about alienation is in fact located here. Alienation is what brings consciousness to the point where nobility becomes mixed with baseness, we find "true as well as false ideas, [...] complete shamefulfulness as well as full openness and truth", implying emotions going from the "highest admiration to the deepest contempt and rejection" (GW 9, 284; TWA 3, 387).

19 Hence, Charles Taylor discusses *Antigone*, but not *Rameau's Nephew* (see Taylor 1975: 173-177), Stewart also includes *Antigone* in the systematic discussions, whereas *Rameau's Nephew* is just mentioned in passing (see (Stewart 2000: 299-209, 317, 326, 330). Siep also discusses *Antigone* systematically, relegating Diderot *et al.* to a footnote of two lines (see Siep 2000: 181-186, 196), and Klaus Vieweg and Wolfgang Welsch allot a chapter to Hegel's discussion of *Antigone*, but none to alienation or *Rameau's Nephew* (see Vieweg, Welsch 2008: 8-9, 455-473).

Upon comparison and closer inspection, it becomes clear that Hegel does not only refer extensively to Diderot's dialogue. As Jauss notes (Jauss 1983: 19), Hegel also interprets the dialogue as a whole, and, as I would like to add, he does so by expanding its basic themes, and in particular the meaning of alienation, in his construction of the dialectical formation of the spirit to science. This is particularly clear in the subsection already mentioned, but also in the chapter on the spirit as such. Even though Hegel does not associate the word '*Entfremdung*' with the specific context in which Goethe employs the term, I will argue that Hegel did in fact endorse Goethe's translation, including the connotations regarding mental disorder and insanity, but that he displaced the focus from a matter of individual psychology to a matter of social psychology, i.e. of culture, history and spirit. I will also argue that he recognized how Diderot stressed the material underpinnings of the spiritual achievements. Hence, rather than merely subverting Diderot, Hegel displaced and expanded *Lui's* social criticism of Enlightenment France anno 1761 to a systematic critique of Modernity.

Alienation of the spirit in the French sense should thus be taken seriously, but at a supra-individual and ideological level. In a way, Hegel can be viewed as an early anti-psychiatrist, arguing that insanity is the only sane reaction to an insane society, or, at least, a rational adjustment to it. Or, as it has also been put, that mental suffering is a healthy reaction to a sick society. As Ronald D. Laing argues, schizophrenia is a failure to adapt first to family and then to society (Laing, 1981: 57; see also Sedgwick 1972: 35–41). He describes normality as an "appalling state of alienation" (Laing 1981: 136), emphasizing how "normally' alienated" people have killed "perhaps 100,000,000 of their fellow normal men in the last fifty years", i.e. primarily in the two world wars of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In such a world, it is "absurd" to educate children to "lose themselves" and become "normal" (Laing 1981: 24). However, Laing also proves to be one of our contemporaries when he argues that it is only by violating ourselves that we have "achieved our capacity to live in relative adjustment to a civilization driven to its own destruction" (Laing 1981: 64). Our "'normal' adjusted state" is a "betrayal of our true potentialities", many of us being simply "too successful in acquiring a false self to adapt to false realities" (Laing 1981: 12). This is, I would claim, also what Hegel hints at. To explore this claim in more detail, however, it is necessary to look more closely at chapter six of the *Phenomenology*.

## E. The Spirit as it Immediately is

Hegel's *Phenomenology* can be considered the prime example of a philosophy of consciousness. As readers, we follow consciousness raising its consciousness of its objects and of itself from mere sense perception to self-consciousness until it finally reaches absolute knowledge. Famously, Hegel thus constantly stresses the contrast, conflict and sometimes contradiction between how reality is in-it-self and how reality is experienced for-it-self, typically by

consciousness, but also sometimes by the reader. In order to avoid unnecessary complications in the present discussion, I will largely leave this aspect of the dialectics aside. However, it is important to consider that consciousness is the English translation of *Bewußtsein*, which, translated literally, and taking seriously the constitutive elements, would be ‘conscious being’, in German ‘*bewußt Sein*’. Hence, as Marx and Engels put it, “the consciousness [das *Bewußtsein*] can never be anything other than the conscious being [das *bewußte Sein*]” (Marx, Engels 1969: 26; MEW 3).

What Hegel reconstructs conceptually is thus the process where human being becomes conscious of itself as human being and even of itself as self-conscious human being. A crucial stage of this process is self-consciousness, where the struggle for recognition between two such consciousnesses provokes a battle of life and death, which ultimately results in the famous dialectic of master and slave. Through self-consciousness, we get a first glimpse of the concept of spirit, the unity of the “*I* that is *we* and the *we* that is *I*”, (GW 9, 108; TWA 3, 145) i.e. collectivity retaining individuality. From self-consciousness we move to the stage where consciousness can claim to have reason, and, from here, we reach the stage where consciousness becomes reason as such, where consciousness “is the spirit, is the real ethical essence [*Wesen*]” (GW 9, 239; TWA 3, 326).

At this point, it could be helpful to consider how the term ‘spirit’ is used in everyday language. Think, for example, of expressions such as ‘team spirit’ or ‘the spirit of 1989’, i.e. something eminently human but supra-individual. The spirit in these examples has of course been created by a number of individual consciousnesses, but the creation and constitution take place through an infinite interplay of interactions; as such, the stability and endurance of the spirit achieved extends beyond any of the individual contributors. For these reasons, the former cannot be reduced to any of the latter. Think also of terms like ‘culture’ or ‘atmosphere’, or phenomena such as language or religion.

Hegel recognizes that humanity develops at levels where genuine collective entities gain relative independence in relation to individual entities, and that a developmental logic proper for these levels (i.e. for the collective entities) must be recognized. In fact, their importance is signaled by the term Hegel chooses for them: “ethical substance” (GW 9, 229; TWA 3, 311) or merely “substance” (GW 9, 242; TWA 3, 328). Hence, this holism is not only methodological; Hegel argues that substantial entities at this level must necessarily be included in the metaphysical account of conscious human being. This is why he claims that only now, in chapter six, after hundreds of pages, has he reached the point in the conceptual reconstruction at which consciousness is “real and alive”; all the foregoing “figures of the consciousness were [only] abstractions of it” (GW 9, 239; TWA 3, 325) (see also Hyppolite 1967: 320–321; Hyppolite 1974: 331–332).

The first four, or perhaps five, chapters of the *Phenomenology* – which Hegel students and scholars have spent thousands of hours studying – are only introductory analytical abstractions that establish elements to be used when exploring the real issues. In reality, individual human beings are only human

when part of, or mediated by, something beyond themselves – be that people, the state or (wo)mankind, i.e. spirit; or, to put it in another, more fashionable, way: As conscious being, we are always already spirit. The point is not merely that the spirit must be understood as repeating the architecture and the dialectical movements of the analytical components at a higher level, as it has sometimes been suggested (Stewart 2000: 294). It is rather that the spirit is the immediate historical reality in all of its experienced complex supra-individual particularity, demonstrating societal and existential aspects, the logic of which so far Hegel has not analyzed, because it could not be detected in the abstract analytical figures analyzed in the preceding chapters. In chapter five on reason, Hegel thus reinterprets the epistemological and metaphysical categories of the first four chapters in terms of, and mediated by, social relations, ethics and religion (Stewart 2000: 166–167), and this is what prepares the ground for his reconstruction of the particular historical logic constituting the experienced political and cultural reality.

Hence, in chapter six, in its most immediate figure, the spirit is constituted by the people. This is a people that decides for itself, like in Greek Antiquity, and this is where Antigone illustrates the tragic conflict. First, as Hegel says, there is “the spirit as the ethical life [*Sittlichkeit*] of a people [...]; the individual that is a world” (GW 9, 240; TWA 3, 326). As such, the spirit must become conscious of itself, and ultimately attain knowledge about itself, through a series of figurations, and this dialectical movement is what Hegel describes in the three sections of this chapter that cover more than one quarter of the book. Hence, from the outset, in ethical life, we are part of a people, i.e. the substance, and, as was previously the case in the other analytical figures of consciousness, this constitutes a fundamental conflict between plurality and unity, or particularity and universality. In this case, i.e. when we are dealing with the real spirit, Hegel first confronts “the universality of the known law and the ethical life ready at hand” with the “simple individuality” (GW 9, 242; TWA 3, 329).

For the spirit, this general conflict between individual and society is at stake for almost any possible figure. However, within ethical life, Hegel first pursues another more specific conflict. On the one hand, we can consider spirit as “human law”, because it takes the form of being “a reality conscious of itself”. As universals we can speak of “known law” and “the existing ethical life”; as particulars we can consider human law “the real self-consciousness of the individual” or even as “government” (GW 9, 242; TWA 3, 329). This is the idea of the democratic polis, i.e. “the ethical state power”. On the other hand, we have “another power, the divine law”, which does not relate directly to the polis but to the immediate “natural ethical common essence”, the “ethical being of the family” (GW 9, 243; TWA 3, 330). In the latter case, Hegel stresses the “duty of the family member”, e.g. in relation to the “death” of an “individual” (GW 9, 244; TWA 3, 332), and also the “piety” between man and wife and between parents and children, the latter being mixed and with “natural relations and emotions” (GW 9, 246–47; TWA 3, 336). The individual pursuit of the “pleasure of enjoyment” within the family, or the “law of the heart”, is

thus in potential conflict with the “self-consciousness as citizen of a people” (GW 9, 249; TWA 3, 339).

The dialectical argument developing the “bifurcation [*Entzweiung*]” of the “simple immediacy” (GW 9, 254; TWA 3, 345) of the ethical life does of course contain several more elements, but one relation stands out as uncompromised, that between sister and brother of the “same blood”. In this case, there is a “free individuality”, and here we find the highest kind of ethical “femininity” (GW 9, 247; TWA 3, 336). This is where Antigone comes in. Her two brothers have tragically killed each other in the struggle over the throne of Thebes, which is then taken over by their uncle, Kreon. He decides that one of the brothers has violated civil law and must be left unburied outside the city walls. However, referring to divine law and right, Antigone nevertheless buries offending brother, and, for this violation of profane city law, the king Kreon has to punish his niece (Heidegren 1995: 215–216).

The tragedy of the ethical life of true spirit is constituted by a number of conflicts, most prominently those between profane and divine law and between communality and individuality. Many of these conflicts can be considered variations of the basic logical conflict between universality and particularity, which is the fuel that keeps the Hegelian dialectics moving throughout the *Phenomenology*. However, even before reaching the stage of the true spirit, Hegel has already introduced another kind of conflict, namely when two elements or aspects are “alien [*fremde*] to each other” (GW 9, 175; TWA 3, 237). This possible relation becomes crucial for consciousness when it assumes the figure of the “law of the heart.” Here consciousness poses its good intentions with “immediate simplicity” but is subsequently contradicted not just by the reality that includes the good hearts of others but also the realization of its own intentions. The final result is the “alienation [*Entfremdung*] of itself” (GW 9, 204; TWA 3, 279).

What is important here is that, in such a self-alienating substance, i.e. in a society where the *we* is not the *I*, typically because injustice is prevalent, alienation does not simply refer to the constitutive or objectifying process of consciousness relating to something that can be both itself and not itself. As suggested by Diderot, alienation rather refers to an extreme mental state that both implies and is implied by the experience of estrangement and material sufferings in some combination. Brought to the extreme, alienation may thus involve the suffering implied by being in a state of fluctuating and unstable flux of objectification, exterioration and estrangement, as is exemplified by *Lui*’s performance.

Among Hegel scholars, however, the exact relationship between alienation and the constitutive terms is the object of conflicting opinions, which I cannot fully explore at this point – yet one of these opinions needs to be addressed. As much as I appreciate Hyppolite’s commentary, I have to contest, and in fact inverse, his wording regarding a crucial issue, including the way this wording is translated into English. As I see it, Hyppolite rightly acknowledges that Hegel distinguishes between *Entäusserung* and *Entfremdung* (I will return to

this question below). However, Hyppolite wrongly juxtaposes this distinction with the distinction between, respectively, ‘*aliénation*’ and ‘*extranéation*’, i.e. alienation and estrangement, claiming that the latter terms are stronger than the former (Hyppolite, 1967: II, 372; Hyppolite 1974: 385, 607). In the present argument, I assume that the opposite is the case; I thus emphasize the element of hostility, pathology and insanity in alienation, whereas I consider estrangement a process that is much less dramatic – a process of losing familiarity with something disposed of, which by implication becomes exterior, objectified and independent.

Moreover, for centuries, in both French and English, alienation has had a meaning that stretches from law to psychology. As a contemporary of Diderot, for Rousseau the *Social Contract* thus requires a “total alienation of each associate with all his rights to the community” (Rousseau 1993: 182–183, bk. 1, ch.vi). Hence, given that Goethe translated ‘*aliénation*’ to ‘*Entfremdung*’ and that Hegel adopted this German term in the *Phenomenology*, it requires a very good reason not to translate it back in the same way in a commentary on the *Phenomenology*. I therefore accept the well-established chain of equivalents from French via German to English, i.e. ‘*aliénation*’, ‘*Entfremdung*’ and back to ‘alienation’. Even though we may wish it had been different, considering the material qualities of the linguistic signs involved – i.e. the combined letters – this is the best way to maintain the conceptual continuity from Rousseau and Diderot via Goethe, Hegel and Marx to the established English language discussion on alienation that involves psychiatry, psychology and education as well as philosophy and sociology (see, e.g., Johnson 1973; Besag 1966; Schweitzer, Geyer 1989).

## F. The World of the Spirit Alienated from Itself

The experiential and self-reflective conflict of alienation defines the second major stage in the formation of the spirit, i.e. section VI.B. entitled “the spirit alienated from itself”, and which is also called the “formation [*Bildung*]” (GW 9, 264; TWA 3, 359). Even though Hegel, as Schacht has emphasized, does not quote *verbatim* Goethe’s expression ‘*Entfremdung des Geistes*’ with all of the pathological connotations mentioned above, he employs the expression ‘*sich entfremdete Geist*’, i.e. ‘Spirit Alienated from Itself’ in the titles at both levels in the sequential specification that brings us to *Rameau’s Nephew*. First, Hegel calls section VI.B. “Der sich entfremdete Geist; die Bildung”, and he then names subsection VI.B.I. “Die Welt des sich entfremdeten Geistes”, i.e. “the World of the Spirit Alienated from Itself”. It is as an example of what can be experienced in such a world that Hegel refers to the said nephew, including the awe-striking frenzy of genius in the central mime described above. This is the best of what can be offered by the cultural Modernity of *l’ancien régime*.

As a figure of consciousness, the spirit alienated from itself reaches a culmination in the “lacerated consciousness” of “absolute distortion [*Verkehrung*]” (GW 9, 283; TWA 3, 386). This conflict is different from the fundamental negation of the *Phenomenology*, that is, the recurring operation that creates logical

and conceptual conflicts which forces consciousness to move onwards in the pursuit of knowledge and truth.<sup>20</sup> Hence, we are still dealing with conflict, and this conflict is still operational for the development of consciousness; however, instead of merely a logical conflict of negation, what is at stake here is the failed existential identity of consciousness, i.e. the unfulfilled desire of identifying and uniting oneself spiritually with something beyond oneself, be that family, people, society, the state or humanity.

Considering the architecture of Hegel's argument, *Lui's* performance of laceration and dismemberment is clearly of central importance, but it does not bring an end to alienation. Keeping Goethe's spectacular use of the term 'alienation' in mind, one could even say that, simply by including the term in the titles of the above-mentioned section and subsection, Hegel refers directly to *Lui's* unforgettable performance on the one hand but raises the significance of alienation to a higher-order level (to a real historical figure of not just consciousness but spirit) on the other hand.

Hence, in the chapter on the spirit, we are dealing with real historical figures of the spirit. As Heidegren explains, in section VI.B. "The World of the Spirit Alienated from Itself", Hegel thus gives an account of how the breakdown of the true spirit of Antiquity opens up for a figuration of consciousness that can be recognized historically from the fall of the Roman empire to the absolute monarchy, culminating in the Enlightenment and the French Revolution (Heidegren 1995: 226). Hegel thus reconstructs the spiritual or cultural implications of pre-revolutionary French Modernity, emphasizing in particular, as Schmidt notices, money, musicality and morality (Schmidt 1996: 640). What is at stake is not the implications of psychological, corporal or genetic disorders of one specific person, e.g. the young Rameau, or other kinds of individual pathologies, but the general fractures and divisiveness of culture that reaches a culmination in the unforgettable scene in which *Lui* finally gets excited – almost beyond control – by his own caricatures and pantomime.

In general, I thus agree with Hyppolite, who argues that, with the figure of the spirit alienated from itself, Hegel generalizes what may be thought of as merely individual torments, a spectacular case being that which Diderot ascribes to *Lui* (Hyppolite 1967: II, 398–402; Hyppolite 1974: 411–415). Hence, for Hegel, the state of mind or the culture implied by experiences of *Entfremdung* is conditioned by the political, social and economic structure of the society in question. In Hegel's dialectical reconstruction of the world of the spirit alienated from itself, consciousness is torn, or alternating, between politics and economy, stressing the desirability of freedom and wealth but also problems of inequality, oppression and suffering.<sup>21</sup> As alienated from itself, consciousness can thus assume the figures of elevated obedience, nobility and honour, but, as "lacerated consciousness", it can also become "vile [*niederträchtige*]"

20 See, e.g., the preface, "A Note on Dialectics" in Marcuse 1960.

21 See, e.g., my account in Sørensen 2019b, DDD I, ch. 6, sect. B.ii. or Sørensen 2015, sect. II.B.

(GW 9, 273, 283–385; TWA 3, 372, 386–388), which is the adjective form of the noun Goethe initially used to describe *Lui*'s baseness, i.e. “*Niederträchtigkeit*” (Goethe 1996: 11).

Hence, in what Hegel calls “the world of *Bildung*” (GW 9, 286; TWA 3, 391), i.e. when the spirit becomes alienated from itself in a particularly strong sense, substantial identification and communality are likely to fail and alienation of the spirit to emerge. With inspiration from Goethe and Diderot, for Hegel, *Entfremdung* clearly signifies a state of mental or spiritual disarray that can be rather extreme; being alienated thus ultimately implies “consciousness being completely torn apart” (GW 9, 291; TWA 3, 398). Brought to the extreme, however, such alienation also implies self-consciousness. As Hegel claims, the “existence” of the “honest consciousness” is the “universal speech and lacerating judgement”, which speaks out “what is true” about what “in this real world truthfully must be done” (GW 9, 283; TWA 3, 386). This is *Lui* in a nutshell. Hegel’s consciousness is not just “tranquil”, as Bewes seems to think. On the contrary, Hegel clearly appreciates how Rameau is alive to “the utter alienation of the world from culture” (Bewes 1997: 137). As Hyppolite states, for Hegel, the vile consciousness becomes the one to speak out “the truth of the whole process” (Hyppolite 1967: 386; Hyppolite 1974: 399).

As emphasized by both Hyppolite and Heidegren (Hyppolite 1967: 389–404; Hyppolite 1974: 402–417; Heidegren 1995: 234–241), and as I have also recognized (Sørensen, 2019b: 196–197), language plays a crucial role in completing Hegel’s dialectical argument concerning alienation. However, in the present context, recognizing the materialism of Diderot, I wish to stress Hegel’s sensitivity to the material aspects of the spirit alienated from itself, i.e. on the one hand, inequality and poverty and, on the other hand, hunger and corporal suffering. As Hyppolite notes, this opposition can of course not be reduced to one “between two economic or social classes” (Hyppolite 1967: 386; Hyppolite 1974: 398). However, Hegel clearly recognizes the significance of the unequal distribution of wealth and political power in pre-revolutionary society, stressing what we, with reference to current discourse, could refer to as the ‘power-wealth nexus’ highlighting the realities of wealth whilst demonstrating a sensitivity towards those without it (see, e.g., GW 9: 270–273, 278–279, 282–283; TWA 3: 367–372, 379–380, 384–385).

Hegel explains how the arrogant rich host may believe that he has bought the “subjugation of the interior nature” of his guests merely by serving them a “meal”, but, in doing so, that he overlooks the “indignation [*Empörung*]” of the poor recipient, having already thrown off his “chains”. To again allude to traditional fixed phrases, having nothing left to lose except for chains, the poor “self-consciousness” employs the language of indignation against the “state” and the “wealth”; ultimately, however, due to the material realities of poverty and impotence, self-consciousness must humiliate itself through the “language of obsequiousness [*Schmeichelei*]” (GW 9, 281–282; TWA 3, 383–384). Again, *Lui* is clearly the reference (Hyppolite 1967: 398; Hyppolite 1974: 411). Due to the unexpected effects of the donation of the meal, the rich benefactor may face



the “interior abyss, the bottomless depth, where all the support and substance have disappeared” (GW 9, 281; TWA 3, 384), but the poor alienated genius and his family are constantly starving. Confronted with the offer of a much-desired meal, the “spirit of gratitude is therefore the feeling of the deepest abjectness as well as the deepest indignation” (GW 9, 280; TWA 3, 382). This is clearly “a pre-revolutionary state of mind” (Hyppolite 1967: 387; Hyppolite 1974: 400).

In addition, Hegel refers to the above-mentioned discussion in section B between *Moi* and *Lui* concerning Diogenes, recognizing that, confronted with the “vile” consciousness of the latter, the former may well demand the “dissolution of this whole world of distortion”, arguing for the “excellence” and “demand” of “universal reality” and the “universal individual”. However, as Hegel emphasizes, recognizing the above-mentioned egoism without escape of Rameau’s nephew, even though it may be considered “bad”, in the “real world”, the first demand of each “individual” is “to care for-it-self” (GW 9, 285; TWA 3, 388–389).

It is clear from *Lui*’s arguments in the dialogue that culture and spirit in this materialist sense affected Diderot. Through his spiritual suffering, *Lui* demonstrates, if not a healthy, sane or rational reaction, then at least a perfectly understandable reaction to the material and cultural living conditions of a particular kind of insane society – in which social inequality is extreme and the institutionalized recognition of property rights makes money necessary for bare survival. As Ludwig Siep remarks, responding to Rousseau’s critique of civilization, Hegel’s subject of alienation is the “modern human being” (Siep 2000: 192), i.e. a somatically and psychologically sound person being gravely affected by the societal living conditions he or she must endure.

Hegel thus generalizes, radicalizes and displaces the alienation experienced by *Lui* to become a general social phenomenon, i.e. another and more general world, ‘the world of the spirit alienated from itself’, which is conditioned by a particular historical phase, namely the emergence of capitalism as a societal formation. It is the material conditions of this particular historical period that really bring alienation to the fore. Alienation is not restricted to this period, but the growing social pathology of this period puts alienation on the historical agenda as a fundamental existential problem. Moreover, I will claim that this line of thought (i.e. the social criticism implied by the work of Diderot, Goethe and Hegel) sets the agenda for a critique of ideology that must have caught the interest of young radicals such as Marx.

## **G. Alienation beyond the World of Bildung: Faith, Insight and Enlightenment**

Hegel clearly takes seriously the idea of alienation. In fact, as I argue, Hegel takes it even more seriously than Diderot. In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel gives special prominence to the spectacular performance of *Lui* in the crucial section on the spirit alienated from itself. As mentioned above, however, Hegel does not employ the word ‘alienation’ to describe the experiences of self-consciousness

tearing itself apart, even though this is the only way it is used by Diderot and Goethe. Instead, Hegel displaces and expands the idea of alienation of the spirit to become an intrinsic constitutive quality of Modernity, and, in the construction of the argument of the *Phenomenology*, the spirit alienated from itself therefore becomes the figure comprising the pathologies of the historical period from Antiquity to Modernity.

However, even if the level of alienation is raised to that of Hegelian spirit, alienation does not become less pathological and less acute, quite the contrary. The expansion only means, I will claim, that alienation also assumes the task of providing the epistemological critique and negation that drives forward the dialectical movement of spirit through experience to results. Chapter VI on the spirit thus has three sections, A., B. and C, each reconstructing the developmental logic of a particular stage in the epistemic progress of the spirit. From the immediate ethical truth – i.e. *Sittlichkeit* – spirit is brought to traverse the alienation from itself and the resulting *Bildung* that together provide the mediating movement towards the morality of the spirit certain of itself.

Alienation thus assumes a crucial structural role in the *Phenomenology*, mediating between immediate ethicality and self-conscious morality. Still, given the importance attributed to the alienating performance of *Lui*, alienation cannot be reduced to that which instigates the developmental logic of spirit. Just as it was the case with the Cynicism of Diderot, for Hegel, alienation comes in two guises: one that follows directly from the existential estrangement and material discomfort expressed in the argumentative rage of *Lui* and another that is domesticated and rationalized as exemplified by the reasoning of *Moi*. Hence, alienation is a pathology that provokes certain arguments at both the individual and societal level of self-consciousness, and it is also constitutive for the universal development of spirit. And, as in Diderot's dialogue, for Hegel, neither of these comes without the other. Both are intimately connected, inconclusive, and open-ended, but not without meaning or bite.

In the rest of subsection VI.B.I, the alienation of spirit becomes manifest in pure faith that ignores the realities experienced in the world of formation, but this faith is shown by Enlightenment to be, at best, an illusion. Furthermore, in subsection VI.B.II., "The Enlightenment", the reason professed is shown not to be able to escape alienation, neither in relation to reality and the essence of everything nor in relation to itself as consciousness and spirit. Enlightenment can demonstrate the superstition involved in relation to religious idols and icons, but it has no positive answer to the fundamental questions that haunt human existence. Finally, in subsection VI.B.III, "The Absolute Freedom and the Terror", the spirit, being still deeply tormented and alienated from itself, can only utter its cry for absolute freedom, and the attempt to realize such freedom was what occurred during the French Revolution, albeit in a distorted way.

Hence, as a prelude to the dialectics of the Enlightenment, Hegel demonstrates the alienating contradictions and thus the futility of the figure that real self-consciousness may recur to after the exhausting culmination of the world of formation, namely "faith [*Glauben*]". Faith is a transitional stage, on the one

hand contraposed to the world of *Bildung*, on the other hand still part of the process of *Bildung*, and, as such, it is alienated from itself (Hyppolite 1967: 369; Hyppolite 1974: 381). To characterize Faith, Hegel explicitly refers to the famous figure discussed much earlier in the *Phenomenology*, namely the Unhappy Consciousness (see GW 9, 287; TWA 3, 392). Similar in structure, faith is thus characterized by taking refuge in thought, imagining as “pure consciousness” that the “real essence” is to be found “beyond reality” (GW 9, 287; TWA 3, 391). The pure consciousness is therefore in conflict with the real consciousness. Pure consciousness is immediate and simple “pure thought” that assumes “the essence of faith” to be an “image” in a “supra-sensible world” (GW 9, 289; TWA 3, 394), which is different from, and alien to, self-consciousness. Such a pure consciousness is “alienated” and even “alienated from itself” (GW 9, 288; TWA 3, 392–393) in the existential sense, identifying its truth with a beyond that can never be reached, an imagined self in another world than can only be alien to the real self.

Or, at least, this is how it looks from the figure that opposes Faith, namely “Pure Insight [*Einsicht*]” for which “only the concept is real” (GW 9, 290; TWA 3, 396–397). Hence, while Faith finds its truth in images of thought beyond reality, “Pure Insight relates negatively to the absolute essence of the consciousness of faith” (GW 9, 299; TWA 3, 408). It is Pure Insight that calls consciousness to be “*for itself*, what everybody *is in itself* – reasonable” (GW 9, 292; TWA 3, 398). This is the call that we know so well. Insight has the “purpose [*Absicht*]” to be “general pure insight”, since, as “pure purpose”, it “has as content pure insight”. However, Insight opposes Faith only by completing the negation of reality as the truth of spirit, ultimately recognizing as content only concepts. Faith and Insight, and thus Reason, are of the same kind, placing truth in a “perpetual beyond” (Hyppolite 1967: 423; Hyppolite 1974: 437). As Hegel argues, the pure “consciousness of the spirit” thus only presents itself as “concept” – it has not yet been “realized” (GW 9, 291; TWA 3, 397).

This sets the scene for the entry of a new major historical figure, “the Enlightenment”, i.e. sub-section V.B.II. As Kant famously claimed, the goal of enlightenment is to have the courage to think for yourself, and this implies criticism, both in the form of anti-authoritarian satire approaching existential self-alienation and in the form of epistemological skepticism nourishing the negation of received opinion. In the dialectics of Enlightenment, Hegel thus returns to the principled logical and epistemological conflicts that initiated the formative journey of consciousness, contrasting the conceptual content of pure consciousness with the thing sensed by the Sensuous Certainty of chapter I (see GW 9, 299–300; TWA 3, 409).

When it comes to the skeptical figure of Enlightenment, however, we have reached the historical realization of the spirit. Hegel thus emphasizes that the pure thought of insightful consciousness realizes itself as a movement that fights the images of institutionalized superstition and the power structures that rely on it. Hegel thus denounces how, due to their “stupidity and confusion”, people become “victims of deceit by the priesthood”, which is driven by

“selfishness” to “despotism”. It is against the “deceitful priesthood” (GW 9, 294; TWA 3, 401) that Enlightenment directs itself. Just like Diderot, Hegel is revolted by the “deliberate [*bewußte*] lie” (GW 9, 299; TWA 3, 408) of those in power.

Pure Insight clearly manifests a “simplicity” in its “reflective negativity”, being thus “according to its nature displayed as in opposition” (GW 9, 295; TWA 3, 403), and this quality is maintained in the realization as Enlightenment. However, it is mistaken to claim that, for Hegel, there is no real alienation, that alienation is simply an error of thought that must be sublated by correct philosophy, and that, as such, Enlightenment is just a transitional stage (Henning 2015: 80). It is true that Hegel takes issue with what he considers false thought and that this implies recognizing truth as the goal; hence, just like the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment, Hegel practices ideology critique, in this case in relation to the Enlightenment itself as a realized project. Adding alienated realization and self-reflexivity to epistemological skepticism, Enlightenment thus achieves special significance in the world history of the spirit. However, Hegel can be rightly accused of covering his tracks by employing a certain level of obscurity.

Pure Insight and Enlightenment thus reveal the deceit by revealing the falseness of received opinion. Interestingly, however, even when self-consciousness has committed to the past the drama of tearing oneself apart in the world of formation, when it comes to commenting on the principled epistemological arguments against faith and superstition, Hegel gives the word to *Lui*, not *Moi*. In the dialogue, *Lui* mockingly tells *Moi* that the new Trinity of Truth, Goodness and Beauty simply replaces the old one of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. First, the new “strange God” modestly takes the seat on the bench besides the “countryside idol” (NR 110/82). For Hegel, this introduces a “spirit” that is “invisible” and goes “unnoticed”, and then – and this is where Hegel quotes *Lui* – “one beautiful morning, with the elbow it gives the comrade a push, and then, Bang Crash! there’s the idol flat on the ground” (GW 9, 295–296; TWA 3, 403; see also NR 110/82) (see also Diderot 2001: 66). As Hegel presents the case, this is clearly a *coup d’état*; however, as Heidegren points out, “this silent and bloodless revolution” introduces the much more “noisy” Enlightenment that leads to the “bloody revolution” (Heidegren 1995: 246).

As Diderot lets *Lui* explain in continuation, this was how the Jesuits introduced Christianity in China and India, and, just to completely erase all suspicions of cynicism, *Lui* believes that this “political method” without noise, bloodshed and “martyrdom”, without “touching even a hair on the head”, is “the best” (NR 110/82; see also GW 9, 512–513). Even though *Lui* is obviously polemic and confrontational, his goal is not a violent revolution.

By quoting Diderot out of context and introducing *Lui* again at this stage of the argument, Hegel demonstrates his intertextual playfulness, expanding again the scope of the original argument, in this case radicalizing the humble and peaceful idealism expressed by *Lui*. However, by displacing the quotation of *Lui* as praising a silent coup, Hegel can be said to recognize the insight of Diderot even more, revealing the insufficiency of domesticated enlightenment

Cynicism when it presents its secular normativity politely with reason and without confrontation. Hence, without the material push from a radical Cynic, enlightened reason will never replace superstition, and this is the tragedy of Enlightenment as a “philosophy of the world” (Hyppolite 1967: 414; Hyppolite 1974: 427).

The realization of the Enlightenment as a historical event, and the subsequent revolution, receives insufficient momentum from the domesticated rationality of the philosophers, such as it was expressed in many of the technical contributions to Diderot’s famous *Encyclopaedia*. Without the material and corporal drives of real people desiring something beyond reason, no action will take place. Still, when it comes to Hegel’s dialectics of enlightenment in the *Phenomenology*, the logical contradictions and the epistemology of the negation are what sets in motion the movement of realization. Again, the one aspect of alienation does not come without the other.

I will not pursue Hegel’s dialectics of Enlightenment in further detail here. As scholars have noticed, it is likely that Hegel discreetly refers to an entire range of now forgotten Enlightenment writers, and there are also many interesting details in the dialectics that bring to mind the similar dialectics of Horkheimer and Adorno (Brauer 2008: 475–478); however, the basic conflict is rather simple: Enlightenment denies eternal life and insists on the perishability of everything, emphasizing in particular the sensuous qualities of religious symbols. It points out to Faith that its assumed “absolute essence” is merely “a piece of stone, a block of wood that has eyes, but does not see” (GW 9, 300; TWA 3, 409). However, due to the inherent negativity of Enlightenment, which even denies connections between sense impression and reality, ultimately empiricism is all that is left. As Hegel argues, Enlightenment thus fails to provide any positive content, leaving reality without truth or essence (Heidegren 1995: 248).

Denouncing any image of God, Enlightenment is left with “the empty” (GW 9, 305; TWA 3, 416). Instead of “truth” and “reality”, the focus shifts to “action [*Tun*]”, “natural drives” and “pleasure” (GW 9, 309; TWA 3, 421), and the only meaningful relation to reality is practical and functional, meaning that now “utility” can offer itself as positive content, i.e. as the essence, but which to faith is “horrible” and merely expresses a “platitute” (GW 9, 305; TWA 3, 417). Moreover, this demystification, which reduces reality to that which the senses can tell us, goes even further in its negativity, hence finally insisting on the “pure abstraction” of “pure matter” (GW 9, 313; TWA 3, 426). This alienating materialism sets consciousness completely free, and then we are faced with the “absolute freedom and the terror” (GW 9, 316; TWA 3, 431) of the revolution.

## H. Relating Alienation to *Bildung*, Alienation and Exteriorization

For Hegel, alienation thus has at least these two aspects, the existential and the epistemological, the latter juxtaposing alienation with negation rather than pathological estrangement. Nevertheless, for Hegel, it is possible to speak

interchangeably about “negation or alienation” also within a “world of *Bildung*” (GW 9, 322; TWA 3, 439), which, as we know, is destined to culminate in a pathological alienation. Adding to determine the idea of alienation is thus its intimate relation to *Bildung*. Hegel emphasizes that the “spirit of the alienation of oneself has its existence [*Dasein*] in the world of *Bildung*” (GW 9, 286; TWA 3, 391). Moreover, summing up the entire movement of alienation in section V.B., this “world of formation” (GW 9, 319; TWA 3, 435) is said to be “ethical [*sittliche*] and real” (GW 9, 321; TWA 3, 438). However, even though *Bildung*, judging from the title of section V.B., seems to accompany alienation all the way to the French Revolution, as I have argued (Sørensen 2019b: 194–198), for Hegel, *Bildung* clearly culminates in the uncomfortable truth realized and revealed by the bohemian consciousness of *Lui* tearing itself apart. After this dramatic incident, alienation continues to be the overall framework, but there is no further mention of *Bildung*.

Hence, when it comes to ethics, law and politics, the alienated “shamelessness” (GW 9, 283; TWA 3, 387) of *Lui* is as far as the world of *Bildung* can bring us. As Hyppolite concludes, the truth of *Bildung* is “a truth which the naïve, and non-dialectical, philosopher cannot understand” (Hyppolite 1967: 402; Hyppolite 1974: 415). The Enlightenment as such and the “absolute freedom” of the revolution brings no *Bildung*, since ultimately its realization implies its opposite, namely the abstract “negation” of terror and “meaningless death” (GW 9, 322; TWA 3, 439). As also suggested by 20<sup>th</sup>-century anti-psychiatry, being brought to the edge of insanity is the implication of a particular historical figure of the spirit, and the tragedy is that, for Hegel, this pathological self-reflexivity of the spirit cannot be overcome or reconciled by continued formation, neither psychologically nor historically. Hegel’s consciousness can continue its quest for Morality, Religion and Science, but then we are past formative alienation in the sense just mentioned; hence, in relation to these three figures, Hegel no longer speaks about *Bildung*.

Moreover, discontinuing the world of *Bildung* seems to indicate a displacement of alienation from the pathology of existential torments and laceration to the epistemological operation of negation that brings to the fore the next figures of the progression of the spirit alienated from itself towards becoming a spirit certain of itself on the way to Absolute Knowledge.

The figure of the spirit alienating itself is thus much more comprehensive than the spectacular scenes discussed above. As the first part of section VI.B. on alienation, one may consider the story of the world of formation, a very elaborate introduction to the next two sub-sections. Hence, by reconstructing the dialectics of the world of alienation and the lacerated self-consciousness of *Lui*, Hegel prepares the ground for the epistemological discussion of the period made famous by Diderot and the rest of the *philosophes*, namely the Enlightenment, and, as we have seen, to introduce the epistemological discussion, Hegel again gives the word to *Lui* – for the last time.

Adding to the complexity of the issue is the preface and the introduction to the *Phenomenology*. Whereas alienation is only mentioned in passing in these

sections (see GW 9, 18; TWA 3, 24), *Bildung* is presented in a general sense as being the entire dialectical movement of the spirit, that is, as the “movement” of spirit going through “stages of *Bildung*” to complete the “*Bildung* of the world” (GW 9, 25; TWA 3, 32), which may also be described as the “*Bildung* of consciousness to science” (GW 9, 56; TWA 3, 73). Apparently, just like alienation, *Bildung* also has two rather distinct uses, although they are related differently. In the case of *Bildung*, the two uses may be united by the thought that, as a real historical figure of the spirit, the world of *Bildung* is the fulfillment of *Bildung* in a general sense, that is, that the historical realization brings us the truth of the concept. Moreover, the “pure *Bildung*” is “the absolute and universal distortion and alienation of reality and thought” (GW 9, 282; TWA 3, 385), and this may also be said to be the full realization of *Bildung* in general, i.e. the world of *Bildung*, which is where alienation has its existence and culminates in self-alienating laceration. In modern society, *Bildung* may culminate in the formation through laceration (Sørensen 2019b: 198–199), but, unfortunately, that does not bring an end to alienation; it only changes its form.

As mentioned above, alienation also comes in at least two senses. First, there is the state of affairs implied by *Lui*’s alienation of the spirit and the socio-cultural generalization of it through Hegel’s historical narrative. However, abstracting from the pathologies and particularities of the spirit, alienation *per se* also gets the fundamental systematic meaning just indicated, namely as the negation, that is, the particular kind of existential and logical conflict that fuels the continued dialectical movement of the spirit. In this case, however, it may seem strange to consider the negation the full realization of insanity, and the opposite may seem equally strange. Still, Hegel subsumes and fuses both under the same heading, i.e. alienation, and this does in fact make sense, since the ultimate historical realization of alienation in the *Phenomenology* is the French Revolution, being both the ultimate form of alienation and a result of the formation provoked by alienation.

In his analysis, Schacht also aims to relate alienation to itself, but in another way. Schacht argues that, as well as understanding alienation as following from the involuntary experiences of discord, loss or conflict, Hegel also actively endorsed another aspect of alienation brought over from French, namely the deliberate and voluntary surrender of yourself to something bigger than yourself, that is, society or substance. As mentioned above, this aspect of alienation was emphasized by Rousseau in his *Social Contract*, where the voluntary surrender of individual rights and the renunciation of oneself is made reasonable because of the gains of becoming a member of something greater, i.e. a community or a state (Schacht 1971: 20). The solution of alienation for Rousseau is therefore political (Henning 2015: 53).

Schacht argues that, for Hegel, alienation can apparently arise both in relation to lost substantial identity and when principled opposition against the essence of a substance is raised (Schacht 1971: 68). On some occasions, Hegel thus uses the term ‘alienation’ similarly to the social contract tradition, even though, in German, this does not reflect any standard use of ‘*Entfremdung*’

(Schacht 1971: 13). In his German argument, Hegel thus seems to make good use of the dual sense of the key term inherited from French. In his analysis of alienation in the *Phenomenology*, Schacht therefore distinguishes between ‘alienation<sub>2</sub>’ and ‘alienation<sub>1</sub>’, where the former denotes what I have so far reconstructed as something existential or social, and the latter is more political, signifying a deliberate course of action. Interestingly, by using this distinction, Schacht can argue that, for Hegel, in the *Phenomenology*, alienation<sub>1</sub> may be overcome by choosing alienation<sub>2</sub> as a conscious project (Schacht 1971: 55), be that existentially, ethically or politically. Recognizing Hegel’s playfulness, we may thus say that alienation is to be overcome by alienation, emphasizing, however, that this is in fact also a serious political strategy.

In Hegel’s argument, alienation thus involves a loss whatever sense we employ. Hence, as Hyppolite emphasizes, the general will initially appears alienating to the individual (Hyppolite 1967: 376; Hyppolite 1974: 388). However, as Schacht argues, alienation in this sense can be converted to a deliberate political project, the gains of which far outweigh the losses (Schacht 1971: 57), and I find this an attractive interpretational strategy. For Schacht, Hegel is thus much more reconcilable when writing the *Phenomenology* than in his radical republican youth (Schacht 1971: 34–37). Moreover, as I have discussed earlier, a few years later, as the headmaster of a grammar school (*Gymnasium*) in Nuremberg, Hegel even conceptualizes alienation as possible with only minimal pain and thus promotes it as an attractive and operational way for his students to achieve *Bildung* (Sørensen 2019b: 199–202; see also Henning 2015: 81–85): Things are thus as they should be, even though they may be too repugnant, or alien, to embrace completely; as Schacht correctly concludes, such resignation is in fact “compatible with intense alienation” (Schacht 1971: 37). What Schacht does not see, however, is that precisely this uncomfortable and unstable reconciliation with the substance of Modernity is what Hegel recognizes in Diderot and in particular in *Rameau’s Nephew*. Unwittingly, Schacht thus confirms the significance I attribute to Hegel’s reading of Diderot through Goethe in the present article.

Adding finally to the determination of alienation, the historical realization of the concept may be considered a species of exteriorization. In general, Hegel’s idea of alienation implies that something is “exterior” to “self-consciousness”, and, as such, it is “negative”. What is exterior may be the “world.” Still, it can also be the “work of the self-consciousness”, and, as such, it may be “spiritual”, i.e. consciousness may by its deliberative expressive activity have created something itself, but, as a finished product, such a creation is nevertheless exterior and disposable, negative and thus potentially “strange [*fremd*]”. The “doing and becoming” involved in this process of “exteriorization [*Entäußerung*]” that makes the “substance [*Substanz*] real” can therefore be determined as the “alienation [*Entfremdung*] of the personality”: Its “substance is its exteriorization and the exteriorization is the substance”. Hegel even claims that “existence” is upheld through “exteriorization”, and thus estrangement and objectification, and that, without alienation in this sense, personality is “without substance” (GW



9, 264–265; TWA 3, 359–360). Hence, “self-consciousness is only *something*; it has only *reality* when it alienates itself from itself” (GW 9, 267; TWA 3, 363).

However, as Herbert Marcuse argues in relation to Marx’s *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, the alienation of the spirit from itself is not a necessary condition of human existence *per se*. What is necessary for human being is the exteriorization and objectification of the spirit that happens through work or utterance, in German *Äußerung*. Objectification thus forms part of an expressive anthropology, where self-realization and realization of ideas are essential. However, in a historical situation in which private property rights deprive the worker of the products of his or her work, work becomes wage-labor, realization through work becomes its opposite, i.e. *Ent-wirklichung*, and *Äußerung* becomes *Ent-äußerung*, i.e. disposal. Moreover, what has to be disposed of forms a system of commodities that acquires an independence that ultimately turns against the producers as an alien power (Marcuse 2004: 517–519). For Marx, alienation is thus the pathology conditioned by these specific historical circumstances.

In the chapter on the spirit, Hegel also relates to real historical circumstances. As I see it, Hegel’s argument concerns a specific historical configuration, namely Modernity that gets its reality by a formation that includes alienation in both of the senses mentioned above. When it comes to anthropology, it is therefore most fruitful to consider the basic expressive intentionality of conscious human being as enabling exteriorization, objectification, disposal and estrangement. Hegel clearly uses ‘*Entäußerung*’ to signify a process of objectification or exteriorization (see, e.g., GW 9, 290; TWA 3, 396). In this process, alienation is the epistemological motor that can take a pathological form, which offers consciousness the existential experience of being brought to the brink of insanity. My claim is thus that, at this particular stage in the historical development, i.e. just at the time of writing the *Phenomenology*, the uttering and exteriorization of consciousness as the essential expressive activity becomes indistinguishable from estrangement and alienation, and that Hegel criticizes this pathology. For Koen Boey, alienation is simply a particular historical form of exteriorization (Boey 2006: 195).

As Marx argues, by referring explicitly to Hegel’s *Phenomenology* (Marx 1968, MEW 40: 468–469, 574–575), *Entfremdung* in the pathological sense is implied by the categories of classical political economy (Marx 1968, MEW 40: 521). As Lukacs read the young Marx, however, the claim is that Hegel did not distinguish between *Entfremdung* and *Entäusserung* (Heidegren 1995: 464), and, in general, there is a long tradition within Marxism of conflating these concepts (Schacht 1971: 63). I cannot claim that Hegel was consistently committed to distinguishing between the two terms, but I think that emphasizing the distinction – as both Marcuse and Hyppolite do – helps to make sense of Hegel’s argument, and, today, this distinction is commonly assumed regarding Hegel (Boey 2006: 195; Quante 2009: 248). Michael Quante thus argues that Hegel made this distinction but Marx did not (Quante 2009: 248). However, I will postpone my discussion of Marx’s understanding of *Entfremdung* to a forthcoming article currently in progress. In the present article, I have restricted

myself to claiming – by considering genealogy, etymology, interpretation and reception – that Hegel was already engaged in the materialist social critique of alienation as a pathology of Modernity.

## I. Excursion: The Destiny of Diderot's Dialogue

Before concluding, allow me to digress slightly. I cannot help being fascinated by *Rameau's Nephew* and its remarkable history of reception and interpretation. As is presumably clear by now, my primary interest in this work has been its possible implications for the semantic meaning of alienation and the conceptual role of *Entfremdung* in Hegel's work. Still, I must admit being attracted by some curious aspects of the history of the dialogue itself.

As mentioned above, *Rameau's Nephew* was in all likelihood originally written in 1761. It was, however, reworked several times up until Diderot's death in 1784. In the literature there is mention of an important revision in 1773-74 and later adjustments and addenda as late as 1778 and 1782. Comparing various statements about known individuals and various facts, the main period of reference has been determined as 1752-76. As mentioned earlier, the first draft most likely dates back to 1761-62 and the last corrections stem from 1782 (Bonnet 1983: 9; see also Falvey 1985: 13). For reasons unknown, and in spite of several copies of the manuscript being produced during Diderot's lifetime, no version of the work was ever published before his death, nor does it appear that he made any provision concerning its publication after his death. And the apparent lack of intention to publish it at all is remarkable considering that Diderot published extensively throughout his career, i.e. including 28 volumes of the original *Encyclopædia* that appeared between 1745 and 1772 (of which he was Editor-in-Chief) and several literary and philosophical works, some of which were highly controversial. As mentioned above, it was his early Cynic writings that landed him in prison for three months in 1749.

Whatever the reason, the first publication of the dialogue was Goethe's translation, published almost 20 years after Diderot's death. As the story is told, it was Friedrich Schiller who suggested Goethe do the translation, and it was also he who provided a copy of the dialogue. The copy had been presented to Schiller by the poet Maximilian Klinger upon returning from Saint Petersburg, where he had copied it from a collection of works by Diderot (Heidegren 1995: 236; Barzun 2001: 3-4). The explanation for the manuscript being in Russia was that Diderot had received support from Katerina the Great during his years working on the legendary *Encyclopædia*, and, in return, she was to inherit some of the works he would eventually leave behind.

Hence, upon Diderot's death in 1784, a collection of manuscripts and books had been sent to Katerina by Diderot's daughter, Marie-Angélique, now Madame de Vandeul, and this was the collection that Klinger had encountered during his time in the service of the Russian czar. Hence, not only Diderot himself but also his daughter and the finest German poets of the time considered the dialogue a work of great value.

It was only after this fantastic trajectory that *Rameau's Nephew* was finally published in French in 1821, and this first French edition was in fact a translation back to French of Goethe's German translation (Bonnet 1983: 6–7). Only a few years afterwards, however, it was possible to publish a better version using a manuscript that was in Madame de Vandeul's possession. Later, when Diderot's collected work was published in the 1870s, the text of *Rameau's Nephew* was based on copies of the manuscript received by the tsarina in 1785. Then, finally, in 1891, yet another manuscript was discovered by Georges Monval, who was the librarian at the Parisian *Comédie Française*, a theatre founded in 1680 that today is home to the oldest active theatre company in the world.

The manuscript was encountered in the box of a *bouquiniste*, i.e. the famous second-hand bookstalls that are still found along *Quais de Seines*, where it was part of a collection of tragedies left behind by a duke who had recently passed away. What makes this particular manuscript especially interesting is that it is the only known manuscript of *Rameau's Nephew* in Diderot's own handwriting, and, after Monval's publication of it, it has been used as the basis of most subsequent editions. However, as late as in the 1960s, three more copies of the manuscript were discovered in the papers of Madame Vandeul – however, like the copies discovered earlier, they do not constitute real variations, only versions ameliorated with a few corrections and refinements (Pedersen 1987: 5–7; Heidegren 1995: 236–237; Falvey 1985: 12–13). As such, several versions and editions of the work exist (Diderot 1983: 241–243), but variations are in fact few (Bonnet 1983: *ibid.*), and, today, most scholars agree to follow the text in Jean Fabre's critical edition,<sup>22</sup> first published in 1950.<sup>23</sup>

## Conclusion

It should come as no surprise to readers of the *Phenomenology* that Diderot's dialogue played a crucial role for Hegel's argument concerning alienation. What may be a little surprising, however, is the specific way Hegel allowed himself to be influenced by Goethe's translation, employing the idea of alienation in a very comprehensive sense. Moreover, what may also come as a surprise is the radicality of Diderot's social criticism and the fact that this radicality is reflected so strongly in the *Phenomenology* – also how Hegel may be said to expand and displace Diderot's rather narrow conception of alienation. I hope I have also been able to shed light – even for specialists – on some details concerning the terms used to designate alienation in English, French and German, and that I have shown that these linguistic details do in fact have import when it comes to conceptual matters.

On the one hand, we have the literary reception of Diderot's dialogue, which emphasizes open-endedness, instability, laceration and dismemberment. This

22 See, e.g., Barzun 2001: 3–4 and Horst Günther, „Zu dieser Aufgabe“ in Goethe 1996: 322–323.

23 See Diderot 1963, ed. Fabre.

reception sometimes recognizes the material societal conditions of such spiritual hardship but pays little attention to a particular French word mentioned only in passing, i.e. ‘*aliénation*’. On the other hand, we have the philosophical readers of the *Phenomenology*, who know that Hegel paid a lot of attention to Goethe’s translation of *Rameau’s Nephew* and may also know that this somehow relates to the important subject of *Entfremdung*, even though the details mentioned above often go unnoticed. We have different disciplinary discussions of different aspects of the case in question that are conducted separately, i.e. without much mutual awareness or interaction. Part of my ambition in this article has thus been to let the awareness achieved from studying across disciplinary boundaries enrich the understanding of what made the idea of *Entfremdung* so appealing to the social philosophical criticism of Hegel, Marx *et al.*

My point is thus, in light of the arguments presented above, that we would do well to be attentive to the particular origins of the term alienation in Enlightenment social philosophy. As Hegel insists, knowledge of the becoming of a concept always adds to the truth of the matter. Hence, alienation is part of the logic of negation that drives forward consciousness from one figure to the next. In this sense, it can be juxtaposed with negation. This epistemological sense also has an existential aspect, namely the experience of becoming unfamiliar with or no longer belonging to what one used to identify with. Moreover, one further aspect of alienation points to having lost or being deprived of some entitlement. In the latter cases, for Hegel, the experience of alienation gets fueled by the extreme inequality and exploitation of capitalist Modernity.

This is also the case when alienation ultimately becomes the experience of consciousness being brought to the limits of human being, and the pathology of this situation is what both Diderot and Hegel make evident. Alienation is both conditioned by suffering and implies itself such suffering, and this is why the society alienated from itself must be the object of relentless social criticism. It is a process that can have both involuntary and voluntary aspects; hence, we can be objects or victims of what happens, but we can also make ourselves subjects and overcome the situation. Criticism does not imply that one has to know precisely what is right; however, we do know that unnecessarily inflicted human suffering due to a malign social order is simply wrong and that things could be otherwise. When *Lui* does not know wherefrom he will get the next meal for himself and his son, when he does not know where they will shelter the next night, there is something wrong, and something must be done. This is what Diderot, Goethe and Hegel wanted to tell us, and this message was readily understood by Marx.

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Asger Sørensen

## *Aliénation, Entfremdung* – i otuđenje. Hegelovo solidarno dislociranje Didroa

### Apstrakt

Hegelova *Fenomenologija duha* je postavila otuđenje u sam centar filozofske agende, kako je Marks uvideo. Relativno je dobro poznato i da je Hegel u ovome bio inspirisan Geteovim prevodom Didroovog dijaloga *Ramoov sinovac*, ali detalji i pojmovne implikacije ovih detalja najčešće ostaju nerazmotreni. Prepoznajući osnovnu ideju otuđenja kao ne-pripadanja nečemu, ili lišenosti nečega, u radu naglašavam da otuđenje podrazumeva jedno kretanje ka granicama ljudskog bića, da ono podrazumeva načine na koji socijalne patologije uslovljavaju potencijalne mentalne probleme, i da ovaj problem zahteva društvenu kritiku. Da bih ovo potkrepio, pokazujem da Didroova satira predstavlja beskompromisnu materijalističku društvenu kritiku, ali i da ova kritika ne koristi pojam '*aliénation*', koji ovde ostaje rezervisan za neku vrstu mahnitosti koja se graniči sa ludilom. U tom smislu argumentujem da u Geteovom prevodu Didroovog dijaloga, i posebno u njegovom prevodu '*aliénation*' kao '*Entfremdung*', Hegel pronalazi opšti ključ za konceptualnu kritiku duha modernosti. Stoga argumentujem da u *Fenomenologiji*, Hegelov pojam otuđenja ima više značenja – Hegel ludilo uzdiže do nivoa Modernosti, naglašava negativne implikacije života u ovakvim uslovima po ljudsku svest, objašnjava da otuđenje funkcioniše kao negacija i, naposljetku, ukazuje na mogućnost pomicanja sa društvenom i političkom realnošću.

Ključne reči: otuđenje, Hegel, Gete, Didro, Duh, modernost, kritika, patologija



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Christoph Hubig und Željko Radinković

## „DAS VERSTEHEN ÖFFNET EIN WEITES REICH VON MÖGLICHKEITEN...“ GEISTES- UND ERZIEHUNGSWISSENSCHAFTEN IN EINER FUNKTIONALISIERTEN WELT<sup>1</sup>

### ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Ausgehend vom Verstehenskonzept Wilhelm Diltheys werden die Modalitäten der Ausbildung von Kompetenzen innerhalb der Erfahrung der reflexiven Bildung thematisiert. Im Sinne des neuzeitlichen Wissenschaftsbegriffs wird die Rolle der Wissenschaften als Instanz möglicher Realwerte (Optionswerte) bestimmt, wobei den Geisteswissenschaften eine horzonteröffnende Funktion bezüglich der Sinnoptionen zugeschrieben wird. In diesem Zusammenhang wird auf die Infragestellung dieses Ermöglichungscharakters der Geistes- und Erziehungswissenschaften durch die Kommerzialisierung des universitären Lehr- und Forschungsbetriebs hingewiesen. Diese setzt eine Entwicklung in Gang, die auf den funktionalisierungsbedingten Verlust der konstruktiven Rolle der genannten Wissenschaften bei der Entwicklung von Kompetenzen hinausläuft.

### STICHWORTE

Verstehen,  
Kompetenzbildung,  
Ermöglichung,  
Geistes- und Erziehungswissenschaften,  
Funktionalisierung

Die Titelworte unserer Überlegungen sind einer Äußerung Wilhelm Diltheys entliehen, des terminologischen und methodologischen Begründers der Geisteswissenschaften als Disziplin. „Das Verstehen öffnet dem Menschen ein weites Reich von Möglichkeiten, *die in der Determination seines wirklichen Lebens nicht vorhanden sind.*“ (Dilthey 1958: 215, Herv. CH/ŽR) Es geht also – ganz

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allgemein – um eine Rückwendung auf Möglichkeiten und Möglichkeitsbedingungen jenseits des konkret Verwirklichten, weshalb Dilthey das Verstehen auch als eine „an sich dem Wirkungsverlauf selber inverse Operation“ (ebd.:214) charakterisiert. Hier scheint Dilthey noch ganz bei Kant zu sein, und wüsste man nicht, dass als Gegenstand der Geisteswissenschaften *Texte* im weitesten Sinne, von historischen Zeugnissen über Dichtungen bis hin zu jeglichen Kulturprodukten mit Sinnträgerschaft fokussiert werden, könnte man dieses *weite* Verstehenskonzept auch der Rede von Physikern unterlegen, wenn sie davon sprechen, dass Naturphänomene oder experimentelle Effekte noch nicht recht verstanden sind (wie z. B. die Rolle der Wasserdampfverteilung für die Klimaentwicklung). Dies hatte Dilthey freilich nicht im Auge. Und sein eigentliches Anliegen, welches ihn zum Begründer einer Lebensphilosophie werden ließ und eben hierzu die Methode des Verstehens zu privilegieren veranlasste, wäre uns entglitten. Seine Denkrichtung, der wir noch weiter nachgehen werden und die uns durch unseren Beitrag begleiten soll, wird programmatisch in einem dritten Diktum ersichtlich: „In den Adern des erkennenden Subjekts, das Locke, Hume und Kant konstruieren, rinnt nicht wirkliches Blut, sondern der verdünnte Saft von Vernunft als bloßer Denktätigkeit.“ (Dilthey 1966: XVIII)<sup>2</sup>

## 1. Jenseits der „Lehrerfrage“

Wenden wir uns zunächst nochmals seiner Funktionsbestimmung des Verstehens zu: Sie steht in deutlichem Kontrast zur berüchtigten Lehrerfrage „Was will uns der Autor damit sagen?“, deren Beantwortung als *Ziel* des Verstehens vorgestellt wird. Warum aber sollten wir uns für den Autor interessieren? Mit seinem großen Vorbild Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, dem er auch eine Biografie (Dilthey 1966b) gewidmet hat, verweist *Dilthey* darauf, dass die Freilegung des Sinns einer Äußerung nicht ein *Ziel*, sondern ein *Mittel* sei, eine „verkleinernde Kleinlichkeit“, als solche, wie jedes Mittel, dem Ziel unterstellt. Dieses liegt eben darin, die „Totalität des Möglichen wiederzugewinnen, um unser Selbst und Andere zu befruchten“ (Schleiermacher 1977: 177, 340). Es ist

2 Zu Beginn seines Textes *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* aus dem Jahr 1833 betont Dilthey, dass die Geisteswissenschaften sich auch an den praktischen Bedürfnissen der Gesellschaft orientieren sollen, wobei er vor allem die Ausbildung ihrer „leitende[r] Organe“ im Blick hatte. Diese Ausbildung müsse aber „das Maß einer technischen Abrichtung“ überschreiten: „Die Gesellschaft ist einem großen Maschinenbetrieb vergleichbar, welcher durch die Dienste unzähliger Personen in Gang erhalten wird: der mit der isolierten Technik seines Einzelberufs innerhalb ihrer Ausgerüstete ist, wie vortrefflich er auch diese Technik inne habe, in der Lage eines Arbeiters, der ein Leben hindurch an einem einzelnen Punkte dieses Betriebs beschäftigt ist, ohne die Kräfte zu kennen, welche ihn in Bewegung setzen, ja ohne von den anderen Teilen dieses Betriebs und ihrem Zusammenwirken zu dem Zweck des Ganzen eine Vorstellung zu haben“. Dementsprechend soll die geisteswissenschaftliche Einleitung dabei helfen, „dem Politiker, Juristen, dem Theologen und Pädagogen die Aufgabe [zu] erleichtern, die Stellung der Sätze und Regeln, welche ihn leiten, zu der umfassenden Wirklichkeit der menschlichen Gesellschaft kennen zu lernen [...]“ (Dilthey 1966: 3).

gerade die Alterität und Fremdheit von Sinnansprüchen, die Schülerinnen und Schüler solange irritiert, als ihre Freilegung als solche einfach stehenbleibt. Wird sie jedoch dem Ziel der Horizonterweiterung unterstellt, verhilft sie uns dazu, uns besser zu verorten und selbst anders zu denken bis hin zu dem Versuch, auch einmal anders zu leben. Die sogenannte Rezeptionsästhetik als neuerer Zweig der Hermeneutik hat dies unter dem Titelwort „Repotentialisierung“ zusammengefasst, womit gemeint ist, dass wir uns in unseren immer neu möglichen Zugängen zu Texten *selbst* immer neu erfahren, selbst wieder *vermögli-chen* und uns zu den Determinationen, auf die Dilthey verweist, in ein neues Verhältnis setzen.<sup>3</sup> Letztlich zeitigen auch die aktuellen Entwicklungen in den Geisteswissenschaften diese Tendenz, selbst wenn sie die Rekonstruktion von Sinnansprüchen radikal in Frage stellen: Wenn im Zuge einer Dekonstruktion objektive Verfasstheiten der Texte und Eigenlogiken des Materials in ihrer Eigenschaft aufgewiesen werden, subjektive Sinnansprüche zu unterlaufen oder in spezifischer Weise zu konterkarieren, werden wir gezwungen, uns dazu in ein Verhältnis zu setzen. Und wenn die Diskursanalyse diejenigen Regelsysteme, Formationen und Dispositive sichtbar macht, die in unseren Kommunikationssystemen vorgeben, was überhaupt als Aussageereignis zählt, dann wird die Option eröffnet, sich zu solchen Macht- und Herrschaftsverhältnissen seinerseits in ein Verhältnis zu setzen, z. B. im Modus der Subversion. Und die Digital Humanities, auf die ich noch zurückkommen werde, stellen uns Analyseinstrumente vor, die entsprechenden Muster noch präziser zu analysieren, sowohl was Muster der Textorganisation betrifft, als auch und gerade Muster der kognitiven Erfassung dieser Texte.

## 2. Kritik der Dualismen und Reduktionismen

Zunächst aber noch einmal zurück zu Dilthey: Seine Lebensphilosophie als Rahmen seiner paradigmatischen Begründung der Geisteswissenschaften ist darauf aus, sowohl den klassischen Dualismus zwischen subjektivem Geist und körperhafter Natur als auch daraus resultierende Reduktionismen zu überwinden. Darauf verweist schon seine Kant-Kritik. Erlauben Sie mir, diesen Gestus einer Kritik am subjektiven Geist als Instanz der Welterschließung mit Hilfe

<sup>3</sup> Zu neuen rezeptionsästhetischen Ansätzen vgl. Hubig 2011. Allerdings lässt sich hier hinzufügen, dass hermeneutische Herangehensweisen wie diejenigen Ricoeurs, Gadamers und nicht zuletzt Heideggers durchaus den Möglichkeitscharakter des zu Verstehenden betonen. In seiner existenzialontologischen Absicht und unter der Annahme der konstitutiven Rolle der Zeitekstase Zukunft wird Heidegger sagen, dass es am Existieren nichts Wirkliches, sondern nur Mögliches gibt. In diesem Zusammenhang könnte etwa die temporale Modifikation des Vergangenen als „Gewesenen“ als existenzialontologische Auffassung der Repotenzialisierung der in einer Existenz faktisch gegebenen Möglichkeiten gedeutet werden. Auch Ricoeur geht es in seinem Modell der dreifachen Mimesis um die rekonfigurative Artikulation der im Handlungszusammenhang präfigurativ gegebenen Möglichkeiten (Radinković 2011). Dennoch bleibt die Frage der „Überlastung“ der Relationen Subjekt-Werk offen (Hubig 2011).

eines anderen pointierten Zitats zu erläutern, von Jean Paul nämlich, aus seinem Bildungs- oder besser: Anti-Bildungsroman „Titan“, von dem gleich noch die Rede sein wird: „Wenn Philosophen etwas, zum Beispiel eine Idee oder sich aus sich ableiten ... sind sie ganz jener betrunkene Kerl, der sein Wasser in einen Springbrunnen hineinließ und die ganze Nacht davor stehen blieb, weil er kein Aufhören hörte und mithin alles, was er fort vernahm, auf seine Rechnung schrieb“ (Jean Paul 1961: 766). Aber auch eine radikale Verneinung einer solchen Anmaßung, eine Verneinung, die zu einem Reduktionismus führt, welcher aufwärtskausal alle mentalen Verfasstheiten auf naturgesetzlich determinierte Prozesse zurückführt, ist für Dilthey gleichermaßen abwegig. Ein solcher Reduktionismus sei illustriert mit einem aktuellen Zitat von Gerhard Roth, einem Wortführer in der gegenwärtigen Neurophysiologie-Kontroverse: „Das limbische, subkortikale System entscheidet“ und „Der Wille ist ein besonderer physikalischer Zustand“ (Roth 2003: 527, 562). Was Roth und seine Fraktion übersehen, ist, dass jeder Aufweis von Determinationszusammenhängen uns sofort in die Position bringt, uns hierzu zu verhalten, und über das Erkennen von Bedingungen hinaus, Bedingungen, denen wir zwangsläufig unterliegen, nötigt, in das normative Sprachspiel des Zulassens und Anerkennens oder Ablehnens und entsprechend Bearbeitens überzugehen. Dies geschieht nicht im „luftleeren Raum“, sondern unter Regeln als, wie Dilthey es nennt, „sittlichen Mächten“, unter denen unsere Verhältnisse zu unserer äußeren und inneren Natur schematisiert, normiert und reguliert und uns ihrerseits zur Einnahme von Verhältnissen zu diesen Regeln vorgestellt werden. Diese Sphäre nennt Dilthey (mit Hegel) diejenige des objektiven Geistes, von der Religion über die Moral bis zum Recht. Sie ist nicht von einem dritten Standpunkt aus in ihrer Wirkmächtigkeit zu erschließen, sondern nur im hermeneutischen Zirkel, der die subjektive Seite des Geistes auf die objektive bezieht und umgekehrt: Eine Analyse der Ausdrücke, mittels derer Subjekte ihren „Erlebnisstrom“ gliedern, Elemente desselben identifizieren und werten, bedarf der Rekonstruktion realer historischer Kategorien und Schemata der Erfahrung, des Urteilens und des Wertens, die sich ihrerseits in den subjektiven Ausdrücken exemplifizieren und über die Art ihrer Verwirklichung und die damit verbundene Modifikation fortschreiben (vgl. hierzu Hubig 1985: 280–285). Kant wird also in lebensweltlicher Absicht historisiert, und hierin sieht Dilthey den Ort der Geisteswissenschaften. Basis und Korpus, auf dem jene Methode prozessiert, sind die bereits erwähnten Texte im weitesten Sinne und hierbei besonders privilegiert die Biografien einschließlich der Selbstbiografien und die historischen Zeugnisse einschließlich der wissenschaftshistorischen Zeugnisse, weil sich hier die Einnahme von Verhältnissen von Subjekten zu den jeweiligen Möglichkeiten des objektiven Geistes in anerkennender oder ablehnender Haltung niederschlägt.

### 3. Rehabilitierung der Bildung – samt Bildungsparadox

Was hat aber nun dies mit Erziehung und Bildung zu tun, einmal abgesehen von der allgemeinen Formulierung, dass das Verstehen zur Horizonterweiterung

und Selbstvergewisserung beiträgt? Ich komme hierfür auch auf Jean Paul zurück, sozusagen als einleitendem Intermezzo und einer beabsichtigten Weiterführung der Diskussion in die Problematik der Vermittlung von *Kompetenzen* – den Kompetenzen, die als Zauberwort die Curricula und Modulhandbücher beherrschen. Was Jean Paul in seinem *Titan* verhandelt hat, ist nämlich insofern ein interessanter Weg, als aufgezeigt wird, wie sich der weiße, unbeschriebene Held Albano eben gerade trotz der und gegen die klassischen Bildungsbemühungen bildet – deshalb sprechen manche, wie z. B. Wolfgang Harich, von einem „Anti-Bildungsroman“ (Harich 1974). Eben dadurch wird das sog. Bildungsparadox, nach dem durch Vorgaben und Zwang erreicht werden soll, dass jemand sich zu einem verantwortlichen freien Subjekt entwickelt, überwunden, indem es eben zu seiner *eigenen* Überwindung, zu seiner Selbstüberwindung eingesetzt wird. Lassen Sie uns dies über drei Schlüsselzitate signalisieren: „Die erste Reise, zumal wenn die Natur nichts als weißen Glanz und Orangenblüten und Kastanienschatten auf die lange Straße wirft“ (III, 18) signalisiert eine aussichtsreiche Offenheit, weiß, zeitlos – das Symbol der Orangen als gleichzeitigem Träger von Früchten und Blüten – und ungebrochene Nützlichkeit der Kastanien als wertvollem Fruchtträger, dessen kühlender Schatten kein Schatten im übertragenen Sinne ist. Im Zuge der pädagogischen Interventionen nun, von denen wir diejenige kennengelernt haben, unter der Albanos Hauslehrer die idealistischen Anmaßungen seines Zöglings unterläuft und ihn als trunkenen Subjektivisten demaskiert, erfährt der Held nach und nach: „Ach, und so wenig ist der Mensch dem Menschen, ein Menschen**bild** ist ihm mehr und jede kleine Zukunft“ (Jean Paul 1961: 662 f., Herv. CH/RŽ). Er erfährt das Scheitern von Menschenbildern, unter deren Orientierung kurzfristig verheißungsvolle Planungen stattfinden, in ihrer vermeintlichen Vorbildhaftigkeit. Und er kommt schließlich zum Befund „Was große Taten sind, das kenn ich gar nicht; ich kenne nur ein großes Leben“ (Jean Paul 1961: 241). Dieses sieht er in Ablehnung der „Einkräftigkeit“ eben jener Charaktere, mit denen er sich auseinandersetzen musste, schließlich in der, wie Jean Paul etwas pathetisch formuliert, Erschaffung von Freiheit auf Basis eines Volksglücks. Er erfährt also eine reflexive Bildung – er bildet *sich* – eben unter dem Paradox transitiver Bildung. Und das, was er ausbildet, sind *Kompetenzen*, für die der prominente Sprachphilosoph Gilbert Ryle geltend macht, dass sie als menschliche Kompetenzen sich von Naturdispositionen dahingehend unterscheiden, dass sie „*mehrspurig*“ sind (Ryle 1969: 156), also einen Kontrapost darstellen zur jeweiligen „Einkräftigkeit“, auf die Interventionen in pädagogischer Absicht aus sind. Wie diese Überwindung einseitiger Orientierung freilich *nicht* stattfinden kann, erläutert Jean Paul im „Komischen Anhang zum Titan“, in dem als Gegenfigur der Luftschiffer Gianozzo präsentiert wird. Dieser lässt sich in seinem Lederwürfel aleatorisch über die Welt treiben und rezipiert sie in ihrer Verschiedenheit als „Theater des Lebens“ (Jean Paul 1961: 959), er ist sozusagen der Vorläufer unserer Zapper und Web-Surfer, die glauben, Horizonterweiterung und umfassende Einsicht auf dem Wege von *Betrachtung* und der damit verbundenen Anmutungen erzielen zu können. FN – Neugier Sie

tummeln sich in ihrer zweiten virtuellen Natur, bis sich die erste Natur rächt und im Gewitter den Fesselballon zum Absturz bringt: „Der heutige Traum hat mich und mein Ende klar geträumt“ (Jean Paul 1961: 1010).

#### 4. Kompetenzen sind nicht lehrbar

Was ist hieraus für das Problem der Kompetenzvermittlung zu entnehmen? Offensichtlich führen die bloße Vermittlung repräsentationalen Wissens oder die Anschauung des Weltgeschehens nicht zu diesem Ziel. Seit den 90er-Jahren des letzten Jahrhunderts werden von verschiedensten Gremien immer umfassendere Kompetenzkataloge erarbeitet, vom VDI über den VDMA bis hin zur Deutschen Kommission für Ingenieurausbildung, vom einstigen Rat für Forschung, Technologie und Innovation bei der Bundesregierung bis hin zu den einschlägigen Kommissionen und Beiräten pädagogischer Provenienz: Methoden-, Werte- und interkulturelle Kompetenz, Sozial-, Kooperations- und pädagogische Kompetenz, Kommunikations-, Sprach- und Medienkompetenz, interkulturelle Kompetenz, Entscheidungs-, Führungs- und Innovationskompetenz, Kreativität, Flexibilität und Mobilität sowie zahlreiche weitere -itäten und -barkeiten werden genannt, auf die hin sowohl die Lehrenden als auch die Studierenden auszubilden wären. Zur Frage, wie dies zu realisieren wäre, hat sich bereits Aristoteles, freilich sehr allgemein, geäußert: „Die Tüchtigkeit dagegen [im Unterschied zu Wissen] erlernen wir, indem wir sie zuvor ausüben“. Und: „Ohne [...] zu *handeln*, dürfte wohl keiner jemals tüchtig werden. Die Leute freilich handeln nicht so, sondern sie meinen zu philosophieren und tüchtig zu werden, indem sie sich in die Theorie flüchten“ (Aristoteles 1972: 1103 a 31, 1105 b 10). Warum sind wir auf die Ausübung verwiesen? Ein kurzer Blick auf die Verfasstheit von Kompetenzen kann hier weiterhelfen: Kompetenzen, in der pädagogischen Literatur oftmals und – wie ich meine – verkürzt als „Fähigkeiten“ bezeichnet, sind als solche im allgemeinsten Sinne Dispositionen. Diese weisen, damit sie überhaupt wirksam werden können, zwei Komponenten auf: die sog. *Strukturbedingungen* und die *Realisierungsbedingungen*. Erst wenn *beide* gegeben sind und in einem spezifischen Verhältnis zueinander stehen, werden Fähigkeiten zu Fertigkeiten. Die bloße *Sprachfähigkeit*, die den Menschen auszeichnet, macht diesen noch nicht zum Träger einer bestimmten Sprachkompetenz. Alleingelassen sind die beiden Seiten der Bedingungen fern davon, eine Kompetenz auszumachen. Ein plattes Beispiel mag dies verdeutlichen mit Blick auf die Disposition „Mobilität“, der zwei Werbesprüche gewidmet waren. Der Slogan „BMW macht mobil“ zielt offensichtlich auf eine Strukturbedingung, die ohne Realisierungsbedingungen, denen unser kollabierender Individualverkehr unterliegt, nur beschränkt wirksam werden kann. Umgekehrt gilt für „Mars macht mobil“, den Schokoriegel, dass für eine geballte Zuckerzufuhr als Mobilitätsgarant ohne entsprechende Strukturbedingungen wie etwa Lungenvolumen oder Muskelfaserdichte der Effekt verpufft. Für menschliche Fähigkeiten gilt nun, dass hier Strukturbedingungen und Realisierungsbedingungen in einer Weise wechselwirken, die zur

Herausbildung und Erweiterung von Fertigkeiten, aber auch zur Destruktion von Fertigkeiten führen kann. Man denke etwa an Ernährungs- und Trainingsbedingungen als Realisierungsbedingungen der Optimierung oder Zerstörung körperlicher Verfasstheit als Strukturbedingung. Für die uns interessierenden Kompetenzen gilt, dass die einschlägigen *Strukturbedingungen* wie Wissen, Normen, Standards und spezifische institutionelle Infrastrukturen, mit den *Realisierungsbedingungen*, die in Gestalt von Lernumgebungen, Zeitkontingent, Medien, technischen Infrastrukturen und dem Angebot an Wahloptionen auftreten, nur in ein fruchtbares Wechselverhältnis gebracht werden können, wenn sie nicht bloß *vorge stellt*, sondern im Modus der Arbeit *zusammengeführt* werden: im Zuge der hierdurch gezeitigten Widerständigkeits- und Gelingenserfahrungen, kurz: einem „Training“ in Verbindung mit einschlägigen Lerneffekten. Das war die Einsicht der humanistischen Pädagogik in Abkehr vom Ideal scholastischer Wissensvermittlung. Als Bildungsinstanz wurde das Arbeiten, vom Experimentieren bis zum Dichten, vom gestaltenden Spiel und dem Theater bis zu handwerklichen Tätigkeiten reklamiert. Comenius hierzu: „Den komplizierten Beschreibungen gelingt es schwerlich, dem Geist eine Vorstellung von den Dingen einzuprägen. Dem kann man abhelfen, indem man alles sich im Handeln den Sinnen direkt vorführt“ – „Autopsia“ (Comenius 1689, übers. v. E. Garin 1967, 35; vgl. hierzu Hubig, Rindermann 2012: 17–20). Von den frühen vorbildhaften Modellen eines interdisziplinären Projektstudiums, wie sie in der Harvard-University entwickelt wurden, und wie sie inzwischen vielerorts verbreitet sind bis hin zu einer problemorientierten integrativen Lehre, von Projekten in der frühkindlichen Erziehung bis hin zu einem Unterricht, der darauf aus ist, Erfahrungen im buchstäblichen Sinne zu *machen*, haben sich diese Einsichten fortgeschrieben.

## 5. Herausforderung qua Interdisziplinarität

Was ein Projektstudium (wie wir es z.B. an der TU Darmstadt vierwöchig jeweils zum Beginn des Wintersemesters anbieten) auszeichnet, ist die *Interdisziplinarität*, unter der die Herausforderungen entstehen, die zur Bildung der einschlägigen Kompetenzen führen. Zwischen einer kombinatorischen *Multi-disziplinarität* und einer *Transdisziplinarität*, die erforderlich wird, wenn über die Disziplinen hinaus angesichts gesellschaftlicher Problemlagen politische Fragen der Indikatorenbildung, der Bewertungskriterien sowie der Verteilung von Nutzen und Lasten verhandelt werden, ist Interdisziplinarität *im engeren Sinne* gefordert, wenn die wissenschaftlichen Problemstellungen dadurch charakterisiert sind, dass sog. *Komplexbegriffe* zum Einsatz kommen, die nicht im Lichte einer einzelnen Disziplin oder einer einzelnen Disziplinenkultur hinreichend mit Sinn zu erfüllen sind: Beispiele hierfür wären etwa „Lärm“ mit seine physikalischen, psychologischen, physiologischen, ästhetischen und sozialen Konnotationen, die erst in ihrer jeweiligen Konstellation das Phänomen ausmachen, „Pubertät“, „Altern“, „Epochenschwelle“, „Krise“. Es geht um Unterschiede *an* etwas in ihren spezifischen Relationen, nicht um Unterschiede *zwischen* etwas.

Erläutert sei dies an einem Vorhaben zur Rezeptionsforschung mit Hilfe eines per Eye-Tracking überwachten Lesens. Thema des Vorhabens war ein Beitrag zu einer genaueren Bestimmung der sogenannten Epochenschwelle bzw. der Differenz zwischen Realismus und literarischer Moderne mit Blick auf den veränderten Status von Dinggedichten. An zwei Gedichten zum (selben) römischen Brunnen, von Conrad Ferdinand Meyer („Der römische Brunnen“) und Rainer Maria Rilke („Römische Fontäne“), sollte über die textimmanente Interpretation und die sozialhistorische Kontextualisierung hinaus die Unterschiedlichkeit in der *kognitiven Textverarbeitung beim Lesen* untersucht werden. Hierzu wurde die methodische Strategie des Eye-Tracking eingesetzt, wobei das Leseverhalten und dann seine Veränderung unter Einfluss der Bildvorlage oder ihres Wegfalles untersucht wurden.

Es zeigte sich für das Gedicht von Meyer ein stringenter Lesefluss, der durch die Bildvorlage intensiviert wurde, was auf ein Leseverhalten in Absicht einer transitiven Deutung der Spezifika des Objekts (Dilthey würde sagen: unter einschlägigen realen historischen Kategorien als Erfahrungsmustern) schließen lässt. Im Unterschied hierzu ließen sich für das Rilke-Gedicht zahlreiche Rekursionsschleifen im Leseverhalten identifizieren, die in ihrer Musterbildung auch nicht durch die Bildvorlage verändert wurden, was als Indikator für eine kontinuierliche reflexive Deutung des Subjekt-Objekt-Verhältnisses erachtet werden kann, in deren Zuge sich sowohl die Konzeptualisierung des Objekts als auch des Subjekts ständig veränderte. Interessant ist nun - und hier laufen die weiteren Untersuchungen -, wie sich durch Kenntnis dieser Muster, wie sie über die Digital Humanities-Strategien herausgearbeitet wurden, bei den Versuchspersonen wiederum das Leseverhalten modifiziert. „Lesen“ erweist sich mithin als neuer interessanter Komplexbegriff (Näheres zu dieser Forschungslinie s. LitLab).

Ein weiteres einschlägiges Beispiel mag die Problemstellung sein, der sich der Exzellenzcluster 310 „Simulation Technology“ der Universität Stuttgart widmete. Im Unterschied zu der üblichen Unterscheidung zwischen Reality und Virtual Reality knüpfte man an die seit dem Mittelalter geläufige philosophische Unterscheidung zwischen *realitas* und *actualitas*, Realität und Wirklichkeit, an und ergänzte dieses Double durch dasjenige einer Virtual Reality (simulierten Sachlagen) und einer Virtual Actuality (simulationsbasierte Erfahrung von Wirkungen). Während in den Simulationen üblicherweise zunächst *multidisziplinär* Physik, Chemie, Biologie oder – bei agentenbasierten Simulationen – Soziologie und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, dann Mathematik und Informatik zur Bildung der Modelle, der numerischen Verfahren und der Codes zusammengeführt sind, konnte sich nun der Input der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften nicht nur bezüglich der Gesamtarchitektur des Clusters als zielführend erweisen, sondern auch im Detail, wenn es um die unverzichtbaren Entscheidungen für die Gestaltung der Simulationspipeline ging, nämlich die Anpassung der einzelnen Schritte unter pragmatischen Gesichtspunkten (Hubig, Kaminski 2017). Ferner waren geisteswissenschaftliche Reflexionen einzu-bringen, wenn es um den Umgang mit den Ergebnissen ging: die Performanz



der jeweiligen Visualisierung, die Gestaltung der Mensch-System-Interaktion in Echtzeit sowie die Wirkung der Animationen. Solcherlei wird inzwischen im Rahmen einer „Ethic of Simulation“, wie sie jetzt in den USA als interdisziplinäres Projekt entstanden ist, verhandelt.

## 6. Funktionalisierung, Ökonomisierung, Kommerzialisierung

Wenn zum Abschluss, dem Untertitel des Themas entsprechend, auf die Funktionalisierung einzugehen ist, sollte diese nicht, dem kulturpessimistischen Jargon entsprechend, vorab ausschließlich als basales Problem negativ konnotiert werden. In der berühmten Allegorie des neuzeitlichen Wissenschaftlers von Gregor Reisch (1503 – Abb. und Kommentar u.a. in Hubig, Rindermann 2012: 14 sowie Hubig, Kaminski 2017), in der dieser, der Programmatik und Betitelung Francis Bacons entsprechend, als Investigator, Jäger dargestellt ist, wird die Verabschiedung des Ideals kontemplativer Wissenschaft polemisch gefeiert: Die Wissenssysteme der Scholastik erscheinen als bloßer „Wald von Meinungen“, Parmenides sitzt mit vergnügtem Gesicht in der Ecke, und der Jäger ist darauf aus, mittels seiner wissenschaftlichen Instrumente das Problem zu erlegen, wobei Wahrheit und Falschheit (als Jagdhunde) nicht mehr nach Maßgabe der Darstellung einer Weltordnung, sondern nach Maßgabe der Erreichung einer Problemlösung charakterisiert werden – also durchaus pragmatisch im weitesten Sinne. Indem die Natur im Experiment durch Technik verformt wird („*vexatio naturae artis*“), wird Wissen zur Macht der Naturbeherrschung. Es wird damit zum Element einer recht verstandenen Ökonomik, die im aristotelischen Sinne in der planvollen Gestaltung des Haushaltes, des Oikos, zwecks Existenzsicherung bei knappen Ressourcen beruht und auf den gesellschaftlichen Leistungsaustausch angewiesen ist. Das unterscheidet sie von der Chrematistik, die auf bloßen Erwerb aus ist. Die Leistung der Wissenschaften liegt darin, dass sie Instanz unverzichtbarer Optionswerte sind, also Instanz *möglicher* Realwerte. Optionswerte sind Ermöglichungsbedingungen für das gelingende Erstreben von Realwerten je nach Verfasstheit der Präferenzen, die in der Zukunft unterschiedlich ausfallen kann. In grober Einteilung eröffnen die Naturwissenschaften *Möglichkeiten* der Naturbeherrschung, die Sozialwissenschaften (einschließlich Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften) *Möglichkeiten* der Modellierung und Begründung von Interaktionen sowie der Eruierung ihrer Durchsetzbarkeit und Veränderbarkeit. Und die *Geisteswissenschaften* schließlich eröffnen einen Horizont von *Sinnoptionen* als unverzichtbare Basis der Reflexion.

Im Rahmen der *Kommerzialisierung* als operativer Engführung der Ökonomik hingegen wird der *Markt* zum Regulativ der Wertschöpfung und Wertsteigerung, zum Tauschmedium von monetären Realwerten. Werden die Wissenschaften in diesen Rahmen integriert, so gilt, was Angela Merkel bereits in ihren Regierungserklärungen von 2008 und 2012 pointierte: „Die Wertschöpfung muss bereits bei der Grundlagenforschung einsetzen“. Problematisch erscheint diese Engführung, weil sie an die Stelle von *Ermöglichungsbeziehungen*

zwischen Wissenschaft, Wirtschaft und Politik *Steuerungsbeziehungen* (Dilthey würde sagen „Determinationsbeziehungen“) setzt und damit die Spezifik der unterschiedlichen Systeme in ihrer Kopplung unterläuft. Zwar weist auch Wissenschaft einen „Markt“ im uneigentlichen Sinne auf: Zirkulation von Wissen als Gut oder Kapital, Kompetitivität, eine Währung (z. B. in Gestalt von Reputation auf der Basis von Leistungsindikatoren), jedoch alle mit *Optionswertcharakter*. Sobald es jedoch wie etwa im Patentwesen um *Realwerte* geht, findet ein Übertritt in den eigentlichen Markt der Wirtschaft statt. Politik sollte beiden Märkten nicht im Modus der Steuerung begegnen, weil sie damit die spezifischen Leistungspotentiale einschnürt. Freilich ist Regelung erforderlich, wenn und sofern hierbei vor Augen bleibt, dass das klassische Ideal des Regels in der Gewährleistung derjenigen Stabilität liegt, die ein Gelingen der Steuerung *in* den Systemen ermöglicht (Ross W. Ashby 1974: 290).

## 7. Geistes- und Erziehungswissenschaften in der universitären Landschaft

Im Zuge der Engführung der Ökonomisierung auf Kommerzialisierung entsteht natürlich auch für die Geistes- und Erziehungswissenschaften ein erhöhter Problemdruck. Planung und Gestaltung der Projekte geraten in einen Projekt-Darwinismus, unter dem die am besten angepassten und risikominimierten Profile favorisiert werden. Mangels unzureichender Grundsicherung entsteht ein Verstetigungszwang bei der Akquisition von Mitteln, was sich u. a. auch in inadäquaten Zeitlimits für die Forschung niederschlägt. Zudem entstehen hohe Opportunitätskosten, verursacht durch das kontinuierlich hohe Niveau aufwendiger Antragsplanung, Administration und Begutachtung. Analoges gilt für das Qualitätsmanagement, sofern es sich an marktfähiger Leistung orientiert und sich entsprechend dem Primat der Ausbildung unterordnet, was sich unter anderem in den inzwischen 19.000 mikrospezialisierten Studiengängen in Deutschland niederschlägt. Inadäquat homogenisierte Indikatorensysteme, die der Spezifik unterschiedlicher Wissenschaftskulturen nicht gerecht werden, verstärken diesen restriktiven Effekt (was z. B. die Wertung eingeworbener Drittmittel betrifft, die sich eher an der Höhe als an der Qualität orientiert). Dies führt schließlich zur Favorisierung innovationstreibender Disziplinen, wie es sich in Leitbildern etwa einer „unternehmerischen Universität“ niederschlägt.

Das eigentliche Potential der Geistes- und Erziehungswissenschaften kann sich nur entfalten, wenn diese nicht solchen kurzschlüssigen Funktionalisierungen unterstellt werden. Dies betrifft – nebenbei bemerkt – auch eine Funktionalisierung, mag sie in noch so guter Absicht proklamiert sein, nach der die Geisteswissenschaften ihren Wert in einer Kompensation von Modernisierungsschäden hätten, nach Odo Marquard also als Reparaturbetrieb auftreten sollten (Marquard 2001: 98–116), oder, wie es Hermann Lübke fordert, als Anwalt von Traditionen fungieren, die angesichts der Disembeddedness und der Gegenwartsschrumpfung ihren Bindungscharakter zunehmend verlieren

(Lübbe 1992). Zu dieser Linie kurzschlüssiger Funktionalisierung zwecks Aufrechterhaltung des Betriebs zählt auch die arbeitsteilig den Geisteswissenschaften zugewiesene Beschäftigung mit den sogenannten „weichen Faktoren“ im Umgang mit Technik, der Entstehung von förderlichen oder hinderlichen Anmutungen und Emotionen an die Geisteswissenschaften mit dem Ziel, unsere emotionalen Haushalte zu stabilisieren.

Demgegenüber ist immer wieder auf die konstruktive Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften zu verweisen, die sie in unverzichtbarer Weise für Bildung und Kompetenzentwicklung einnehmen: Sie sind geradezu ein Motor der Interdisziplinarität, welche diejenigen Widerstandserfahrungen mit sich führt, unter denen sich Kompetenzen entwickeln. Sie gewährleisten die hierfür erforderlichen Bildungsprozesse neben der realwertorientierten Ausbildung, und sie sind in dieser Funktion ein Garant kritischer Reflexion jeglicher verengten Funktionalisierung überhaupt; sie sind nicht eine *Inстанz*, wie es Marquard und Lübbe fordern, denn Instanz ist und bleibt das individuelle Subjekt, dem es obliegt, seine Entwicklung zur Nutzerstereotype unter bestimmten Adressatenprofilen soweit im Griff zu halten, dass es nicht zum Datenstreifen mutiert und in einer ihm optimal angepassten Umgebung auf die Fortschreibung seiner Routinen reduziert wird.

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## Christoph Hubig and Željko Radinković

### “Understanding opens a wide realm of possibilities ...”. Humanities and Education in a Functionalized World

#### Abstract

Starting from Wilhelm Dilthey's concept of understanding, the article inquires into modes of forming competencies within the experience of reflexive education. In line with modernity's understanding of science, the text designates the role of sciences as instances of possible real values (of optional values), whereby the spiritual sciences are ascribed the role of giving meaning by broadening horizons. The article questions the ground that allows for spiritual and pedagogical sciences within the commercialization of university teaching and research activities. In all this, functionalization conducts a process leading to the weakening of the constructive role of these sciences in the formation of competencies.

**Keywords:** understanding, formation of competencies, enabling, spiritual and pedagogic sciences, functionalization.

## Kristof Hubih i Željko Radinković

### „Razumevanje otvara široko polje mogućnosti...“. Duhovne i pedagoške nauke u funkcionalizovanom svetu

#### Apstrakt

Polazeći od koncepta razumevanja Vilhelma Diltaja preispitaće se modaliteti formiranja kompetencija u okviru iskustva refleksivnog obrazovanja. U smislu novovekovnog pojma nauke, odrediće se uloga nauka kao instanci mogućih realnih vrednosti (opcionalne vrednosti), pri čemu se u pogledu smisaonih opcija duhovnim naukama pripisuje uloga otvaranja horizonta. U tom kontekstu, ukazuje se na dovođenje u pitanje karaktera omogućavanja duhovnih i pedagoških nauka usled komercijalizacije univerzitetskih nastavnih i istraživačkih aktivnosti. Funkcionalizacija pritom pokreće proces koji dovodi do gubitka konstruktivne uloge navedenih nauka prilikom formiranja kompetencija.

**Ključne reči:** razumevanje, formiranje kompetencija, omogućavanje, duhovne i pedagoške nauke, funkcionalizacija

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Klaus Wiegerling

## EXPOSITION EINER THEORIE DER WIDERSTÄNDIGKEIT

### ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Eine zu entfaltende Theorie der Widerständigkeit basiert auf Überlegungen, die seit dem 18. Jh. angestellt wurden um einen Nachweis für die Wirklichkeit der Außenwelt zu erbringen. Die sozialen, psychologischen und insbesondere logischen Aspekte der Widerständigkeit wurden dabei aber vernachlässigt. Die Idee einer Widerständigkeitstheorie wurde von technikphilosophischen und aktuellen Tendenzen in Philosophie, Wissenschaft und Technik inspiriert, die ihre metaphysischen Voraussetzungen unterschlagen und einem Glauben an die totale Machbarkeit der menschlichen wie der natürlichen Verhältnisse anhängen. Die Theorie versucht zu zeigen, dass es sich beim Konzept der Widerständigkeit um einen Reflexionsbegriff handelt, der auf Verhältnisse, nicht auf qualifizierbare und quantifizierbare Objekte oder Sachverhalte referiert. Ihm kommt zudem eine positionierende Funktion zu, die sowohl epistemisch, wie auch ethisch und anthropologisch von Bedeutung ist. Widerständigkeit ist ein zentrales, wenngleich nicht das einzige Charakteristikum von Wirklichkeit. Als ethische Kategorie artikuliert sie sich z.B. in der Idee der Würde, die als Widerstand gegen das nur Typologische und gegen die Unterwerfung unter ein Kalkül zu verstehen ist. Eine Theorie der Widerständigkeit redet keiner an-sich-seienden Wirklichkeit das Wort, sondern begrenzt Geltungsansprüche konstruktivistischer und narrativistischer Theorien.

### STICHWORTE

Reflexionsbegriff,  
Widerhalt,  
Unverfügbarkeit,  
Konstruktivismus,  
Wirklichkeit, Aktualität,  
Faktizität

Auch wenn die vorgelegte Exposition einer Theorie der Widerständigkeit auf ideengeschichtliche Vorgaben zurückgreifen und Wert auf ihre Verortbarkeit im philosophischen Diskurs legen muss, ist der Anlass ihrer Begründung nicht von der Ideengeschichte, sondern zum einen von technikphilosophischen, zum anderen von aktuellen Tendenzen in den Wissenschaften inspiriert. Beide Tendenzen speisen sich wesentlich aus einer Metaphysik, die die Voraussetzungen ihres Tuns unterschlägt und einem Glauben an die totale Gestaltbarkeit der menschlichen wie der natürlichen Verhältnisse anhängt. Dass Wirklichkeit eine Konstruktion oder ein perspektivisches Narrativ ist, gilt als sakrosankte

Voraussetzungen ganzer – auch ‚datengetriebener‘ – Disziplinen. Dennoch darf eine Theorie der Widerständigkeit nicht antikonstruktivistisch verstanden werden. Dass Wirklichkeitsauffassung konstruktive Anteile hat, wird nicht infrage gestellt, sehr wohl dagegen, dass man sie auf diese Anteile reduzieren könne.

Fortgeschrittene Informationstechnologien speisen sich wesentlich aus der Idee Widerständigkeit zu eliminieren. Eine adaptive, uns begleitende Technologie soll uns derart unterstützen, dass sie Widerstände umgeht und uns auf direktem Wege bei der Erfüllung unserer Wünsche unterstützt - ja mehr noch: sie soll sogar unser künftiges Wünschen erfassen und deren Realisierung vorbereiten. Die Idee einer Schlaraffenlandtechnologie, die uns die gebratenen Tauben zum Mund fliegen lässt, ist eine Leitvision fortgeschrittener adaptiver Technologien.

Die exponierte Theorie der Widerständigkeit redet keinem naiven Naturalismus das Wort. Nach wie vor geistern naive Abbild- oder Repräsentationstheorien durch die Wissenschaften. Nach wie vor gibt es in der Philosophie einflussreiche Theorien, die ihre Selbstrechtfertigung aus ihrer Anschlussfähigkeit an bestehende naturwissenschaftliche Wirklichkeitskonzepte ziehen und dabei die eigene wissenschaftskritische Aufgabe hintertreiben. Die exponierte Theorie verfolgt insofern durchaus ein transzendentalphilosophisches Ziel, nämlich eine Reflexion auf Möglichkeitsbedingungen zu leisten, die unseren Wirklichkeitskonzepten zugrunde liegen. Sie verbleibt dabei in der Sphäre der Kritik, von der her sich Philosophie rechtfertigt, und benennt Kriterien, mit deren Hilfe sich wissenschaftliche Geltungs- und Wahrheitsansprüche überprüfen lassen.

Widerständigkeit ist erfahrbar, wenngleich nicht in gegenständlicher Weise. Sie ‚zeigt‘ sich im Nichtaufgehen unserer konzeptuellen Zugriffe auf die Welt und im Scheitern unserer praktischen Eingriffe in sie. Sie ‚zeigt‘ sich in einem Sich-nicht-fügen-wollen, in Aufsässigkeit, Willenshemmung, Ereignishaftigkeit - letzteres im Sinne einer Unberechenbarkeit bzw. Unerwartbarkeit. Widerständigkeit ist inhaltlich nicht vorbestimmbar, ist kein berechenbarer Typus. Sie ist sozusagen eine leere, nur logische Möglichkeit, keine inhaltlich motivierte, keine Potentialität im Sinne Husserls (Wiegerling 1984). Sie stört und zerstört Konzeptionen, widersetzt sich Erwartungen. Sie ist als erfahrbare nicht, was sich entzieht und nur erschlossen ist. Sie ist da, wenn mir der Arm einschläft und ich die Finger nicht mehr bewegen kann um eine Sache zu ergreifen; wenn mein Selbstgestaltungswille an meinen Neigungen, aber auch organischen Dispositionen scheitert; wenn mich mein Gewissen hemmt oder eine psychische Belastung mich handlungsunfähig macht.

Eine Theorie der Widerständigkeit kann nicht allein wissenschaftskritisch agieren. Sie muss sich auch mit sozialen, kulturellen und psychischen Dispositionen des Menschen auseinandersetzen. Jenseits ihrer wissenschaftstheoretischen Bedeutung gibt es eine existentielle Dimension, die nicht ausgeklammert bleiben kann, wenn das damit verbundene Problem zwar nicht zu einer Lösung, so doch zu einer Klärung geführt werden soll. Es ist eine Grunderfahrung des Menschen, dass sich die Dinge nicht so fügen, wie er sie gefügt sehen möchte,

ja dass sie seinen Wünschen, seinem Herrschafts- und Wissenswillen sowie seinen Hoffnungen widerstreiten. Wir leben nicht im Schlaraffenland und werden es wohl auch nicht erlangen. Menschen, wie wir sie kennen, wird es dort nicht geben. Dies bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass Widerständigkeit nur etwas uns Hemmendes oder Störendes ist. Ohne Widerständigkeit gibt es weder Selbstbewusstsein noch Halt und Orientierung in der Welt, denn Selbstbewusstsein entsteht aus der Abgrenzung zu etwas, was meinem Willen entgegensteht und Halt und Orientierung benötigt letztlich das andere, auf das wir uns ‚stützen‘ und an dem wir unsere ‚Selbstverortung‘ sozusagen, wie der antike Seefahrer am Morgenstern, ausrichten können.

Die vorgelegte Exposition einer Theorie der Widerständigkeit konzentriert sich auf ‚ein‘, wenngleich zentrales Moment der Wirklichkeit. Es geht nicht darum, das Wirklichkeitsthema in seiner Fülle auszuleuchten, was mehr als eine Lebensaufgabe wäre - ist Wirklichkeit wie Wahrheit und Denken doch schlechthin Thema der Philosophie. Auch wenn diese Theorie aus einer speziellen philosophischen Denkerfahrung geboren ist, nämlich der Auseinandersetzung mit Fragen der Technikphilosophie, insbesondere der moderne Informationstechnologien, so ragt ihr Anliegen doch weit über das Feld der Technikphilosophie hinaus.

Eine an sich bestehende Wirklichkeit soll weder hypostasiert noch gesetzt werden. Vielmehr geht es darum, der kantischen Einsicht, dass es nur perspektivische Zugriffe auf die Welt, die Dinge und Verhältnisse in ihr gibt, Geltung zu verschaffen. Wirklichkeit ist mehr und möglicherweise anderes als unser perspektivischer Zugriff. Sie ist das, in dem unser Erkenntnis- und unser Gestaltungswille an eine Grenze geraten, also Widerstand erfahren. Wirklichkeit ist ein sich meldendes Korrektiv unserer Geltungsansprüche.

Auch wenn eine einzige Wirklichkeit nicht hypostasiert werden kann, bleibt die Idee einer mit anderen geteilten und teilbaren Wirklichkeit eine *conditio sine qua non* für die Wissenschaft. Nur so kann es zu einem wissenschaftlichen Austausch und zu wissenschaftlicher Kritik kommen. Auch wenn Wirklichkeit uneinholbar bleibt, können wir uns über unsere perspektivischen Zugriffe und die Intentionen, die wir mit ihnen verfolgen, verständigen. Der physikalische Zugriff ist ein anderer als der biologische, der soziale ein anderer als der psychologische. Wenn wir über Wirklichkeit als *conditio sine qua non* wissenschaftlicher Kritik reden, reden wir über eine Widerstandserfahrung, nicht über eine eindeutig qualifizierbare oder quantifizierbare Sache.

Widerständigkeit ist auch kein Horizontphänomen oder Medium, sondern artikuliert sich in einem erfahrbaren Ungenügen. Sie ist sozusagen *παρουσία*, ohne in der Weise eines gegebenen Gegenstandes anwesend zu sein.

Ideengeschichtlich taucht Widerständigkeit vor allem im Kontext leiblich-vitaler Erfahrung der Außenwelt auf (Zeller 1884, Dilthey 1961 (1890), Eisler 1898, Freytag 1904, Frischeisen-Köhler 1907), selten in gesellschaftlichen, psychologischen oder logischen Kontexten. Widerstand erfahren wir aber auch im Zusammenhang gesellschaftlicher Fügungen, etwa in Form von Institutionen. In psychologischer Hinsicht erfahren wir Widerstand bei Handlungshemmungen

aufgrund von Traumata. Nicht zuletzt bietet uns auch die Logik Widerstände. Wir können in der theoretischen Arbeit nicht gegen logische Regeln verstoßen. Widerstandserfahrungen sind also nicht nur im ‚vorthoretischen‘, ursprünglichen Kontakt mit einer physikalischen Außenwelt gegeben. ‚Ursprünglich‘ darf hier ohnehin nicht im Sinne von Unmittelbarkeit verstanden werden. Wirklichkeit ist nicht unvermittelt erfahrbar, sondern Ergebnis physiologischer, psychischer, sozialer und historischer Vermittlungsprozesse. Es wird allzu leicht übersehen, dass auch die naturwissenschaftlich erfasste Welt ein vermittelter Welttypus ist.

Jede Gesellschaft formt Menschen, indem sie Widerstand bietet, Grenzen der Anerkennung von Handlungen setzt, diese missbilligt oder sanktioniert. Widerstand ist in der Begrenztheit meiner leiblichen Vermögen spürbar, aber auch in den Grenzen meiner intellektuellen Vermögen. Individualität wird nicht nur in besonderem Begehren, sondern auch in besonderen Hemmungen erfahrbar. Immer aber wird in Widerstandserfahrungen klar, dass die Welt nicht meine Projektion, nicht meine Fügung, nicht ein beliebiges Narrativ oder eine beliebige Konstruktion ist. Auch wenn Wirklichkeitserfahrung konstruktive Anteile hat, ist und bleibt sie etwas, was über das Konstruktive hinausragt und nie in einem Konstrukt aufgeht. So sind paranoide Wahngelbilde zwar durchaus als Ergebnis von Konstruktionen zu begreifen, aber selbst Wahngelbilde kennen Widerständigkeit und Begrenzung, die nicht zuletzt für die Leiden der paranoiden Person verantwortlich sind. Diese leidet ja an ihren Gebilden, die z.B. der Mitwelt nicht zu vermitteln sind. Die Umdeutung der Welt mag helfen, schwer erträgliche Situationen ertragen zu können, dies bedeutet aber nicht die Auflösung des Widerständigen, sondern nur, wie in der Psychotherapie, die Neuorganisation und Neueinbettung von Widerstands- bzw. Grenzerfahrungen.

Widerstand hat eine leiblich-sensuelle, aber auch eine geistige Dimension. Er wird intellektuell erfahren, wenn wir lernen oder Probleme lösen wollen. Die soziale Dimension scheint eine eigene Qualität zu haben, insofern sie zwar der intellektuellen Erfahrung nahe steht, jedoch nicht darin aufgeht. Wir erfahren sozialen Widerstand auch leiblich, etwa, wenn die Mutter das Kleinkind an die Hand nimmt, um es am Fallen zu hindern. Soziale Widerständigkeit artikuliert sich also sowohl in intellektuellen als auch in leiblichen Erfahrungen.

Widerständigkeit ist auch ein Moment unseres Begehrens. Eine zentrale Rolle spielt sie in der Werttheorie (vgl. Simmel 1989: 23 ff.). Widerstand kann den Wert einer Sache erhöhen. In der Ökonomie gilt, dass überall, wo die Erlangung eines Gegenstandes aufgrund seiner Seltenheit, seiner Herstellungskosten oder des Bergungs- oder Explorationsaufwands erschwert ist, sich der Wert des Gutes erhöht. Ökonomisch bietet die künstliche Verknappung eines Gutes die Möglichkeit, dessen Wert zu erhöhen, freilich mit dem Risiko, dass mittelfristig das Interesse am Gut nachlässt, weil es Alternativen dazu gibt. Das Begehren kann schließlich aufgrund des Kostenaufwands erlischen – mit der Folge, dass es sich einem anderen Gegenstand zuwendet.

Auch im ideellen Begehren erhöht sich der Preis durch die Widerständigkeit des erstrebten Gutes. In der Liebe gilt, dass Personen, die leicht zu haben



sind, eher selten das Interesse an einer Bindung wecken. Auch in Wissenschaft und Philosophie erhöht Widerständigkeit oft den Wert eines Theorieangebots. Trotz Occams Rasiermesser, das die Einfachheit, Klarheit und Stringenz, kurz die Reduktion auf das Notwendige einer Theorie herbeiführen soll, führen allzu schlichte Theorien eher selten zu wissenschaftlicher Akzeptanz.

Wir erfahren Widerständigkeit, wenn unser Gestaltungswille gehemmt wird, aber auch, wenn unser Erkenntniswille an eine Grenze stößt, wenn das Beobachtete sich nicht meiner Erwartung fügen will. Wir erfahren Widerständigkeit im Scheitern, in Ereignishaftigkeit, die sozusagen ‚über uns kommt‘, in Erfahrungen des Nichtpassens, Nichtaufgehens, Fehlens usw. Noch nicht einmal in der Weise einer Typologie kann sie erfasst werden, insofern sie als nicht qualifizierbar und quantifizierbar keinem Kalkül unterworfen werden kann.

Widerstandserfahrung ist eine Voraussetzung für unsere Lernbereitschaft. Wir sehen, dass die Unterstützung durch Navigationsgeräte Orientierungsfähigkeiten abbauen oder der Einsatz von Taschenrechnern Kopfrechenfähigkeiten beeinträchtigen kann. Der Verlust von Widerstandserfahrung kann zu Kompetenzverlusten führen, aber auch zu Fehleinschätzungen, etwa wenn uns eine vermeintlich ‚autonom‘, also ohne aktive Bedienung agierende Technik um Widerstände herumführt bzw. sie uns erst gar nicht wahrnehmen lässt. In einer Exposition können freilich nur wenige Problemfelder freigelegt und nur grobe Charakteristiken und Thesen formuliert werden. Und dies soll hier geschehen. Zahlreiche Relationen müssen geklärt werden, so die zwischen Widerständigkeit einerseits und Wirklichkeit, Realität, Welt, Horizont, Möglichkeit und Faktizität andererseits, um nur die wichtigsten zu nennen. Der Wirklichkeitskomplex wäre unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Widerständigkeit modallogisch und ontologisch zu fokussieren. Dies gälte auch für ihr Verhältnis zur Praxis, nicht zuletzt zur praktischen Vernunft. Die Aufgaben einer Theorie der Widerständigkeit sind umfangreich und nur in ihren Grundlinien realisierbar.

Kommen wir damit zu einigen zentralen Charakteristiken der Widerständigkeit. Wir nähern uns ihr in einer Unterscheidungspraxis an, unternehmen aber nicht den Versuch sie begrifflich zu unterwerfen und damit verfügbar zu machen. Damit bringen wir Relationen in den Blick, nicht Objekte.

## **Charakteristika und Relationsbestimmungen**

### **Widerständigkeit und Wirklichkeit**

Widerständigkeit ist ein zentrales Charakteristikum von Wirklichkeit, aber nicht das einzige. So ist auch die intersubjektive Übereinstimmung in Bezug auf eine Aussage über eine Sache oder einen Sachverhalt ein zentrales Charakteristikum und nicht zuletzt die Objektivierbarkeit bzw. Konkretisierbarkeit der Aussagen. Wirklichkeit artikuliert sich in einer Verknüpfung bzw. Verknüpfbarkeit von Realitätserfahrungen. Sie ist nicht isoliert gegeben, ist Vielheit, nicht Singularität. Aber sie kommt zugleich auch als etwas in den

Blick, an dem Verknüpfungsmöglichkeiten nicht mehr bestehen. Etwas unterbricht den Zusammenhang, leistet der Verknüpfung Widerstand. Widerständigkeit ist ein Charakteristikum, das dem Erwartbaren und Gewohnten widerstreitet. Sie hemmt nicht nur meine konkrete Bewegung, etwa in Form eines physischen Gegenstandes, den ich umgehen muss, sie hemmt unter Umständen generell meinen Willensimpuls. Wirklichkeit ist also nicht nur physikalische oder physiologische Wirklichkeit, sondern auch psychische, soziale und nicht zuletzt logisch-ideelle, die sich in theoretischen Zugriffen auf Weltphänomene artikuliert.

Widerständigkeit meldet sich als etwas, das sich nicht fügt – weder unserem Gestaltungs-, noch unserem Erkenntniswillen. Wir können in Bezug auf Wirklichkeit sagen, dass sie der konstitutive Rest der Wirklichkeit ist, der mit Realität im Sinne konkret gegebener Realitätsstücke nicht ausgefüllt werden kann.

### Widerständigkeit und Realität

Realität als sachhaltige Gegebenheit tritt konkret und singular auf. Singular kann auch eine ununterscheidbare Zusammengehörigkeit bedeuten wie Regen eine Zusammengehörigkeit von Regentropfen bedeutet. Ein Realitätsverlust äußert sich anders als ein Wirklichkeitsverlust. Letzterer bedeutet den Zusammenbruch eines Verknüpfungs- bzw. Anschlusssystems, was oft mit psychischen bzw. sozialpsychischen Verwerfungen einhergeht. Realität kann falsch eingeschätzt werden, ohne dass es zum Zusammenbruch des Anschlusssystems kommt. Man kann sich in trunkenem Zustand in Bezug auf den schwankenden Boden irren. Dies bedeutet aber nicht, dass damit ein nachhaltiger Wirklichkeitsverlust einhergeht (Wiegerling 2011: 25 ff.).

Widerständigkeit artikuliert sich aber auch in der Wahrnehmung sachhaltiger Realität, und zwar in der Weise, dass Realität durch Wahrnehmungsstörungen, von sensorischen Störungen bis zu drogeninduzierten Bewusstseinsstörungen, fehler eingeschätzt werden kann. Die Sache ist anders als sie sich uns darstellt. Sie ist nicht nur mehr als das, was ich perspektivisch wahrnehme, sie ist möglicherweise auch anders als das, was ich wahrnehme. Das konkrete Realitätsstück, das sich meiner Wahrnehmung stellt, ist aber, was es ist, nur innerhalb eines Anschluss- und Verweisungssystems. Ernst Cassirer hat dies in seiner *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen* ausführlich dargelegt und exemplarisch an der chemischen Formel im Periodensystem verdeutlicht (Cassirer 1994: 45).

Wirklichkeit und Realität stehen in einem korrelativen Verhältnis. Realität fokussiert die wahrnehmbare Singularität und Konkretheit des Gegebenen, Wirklichkeit die nicht oder nicht vollständig in Wahrnehmung überführbare Verknüpfung derselben sowie die phänomenal nicht ausweisbare Widerständigkeit. Die konkrete Realität kann also nicht passen, sich meiner Wahrnehmung und Handhabung entziehen. Realität und Wirklichkeit unterscheiden sich in der Weise wie *όν* und *όντως όν*, wie Seiendes und Sein.

## Widerständigkeit und Aktualität

Komplizierter stellt sich das Verhältnis von Widerständigkeit und Aktualität dar. Aktualität ist nicht *παρουσία*, sondern fokussiert die Wirkung, die von einer sachhaltigen Gegebenheit ausgeht. ‚Actualitas‘ wurde nicht zu unrecht seit dem 18. Jh. mit Wirklichkeit übersetzt und der ‚realitas‘ gegenübergestellt. Tatsächlich hebt Wirklichkeit den Wirkaspekt hervor, was sich schon aus der Etymologie ergibt. Was Wirkung auszeichnet ist aber alles andere als einfach zu bestimmen. Wie sieht es etwa mit historischen Wirkungen aus? Während wir Wirkungen im physikalischen Sinne durch messbare Kräfte und Hemmungen bestimmen, ist dies bei historischen, kulturellen oder sozialen Wirkungen nicht möglich. Es wirken nicht nur kausal ablaufende Prozesse, sondern auch historische, kulturelle und soziale Dispositionen. Es hemmen nicht nur physikalische, sondern auch soziale, psychische und logische Widerstände. Wirkung ist nicht nur die unmittelbare Folge des Umlegens eines Schalters, sondern auch das, was verzögert oder mittelbar wirkt; es gibt kumulative Wirkungen, die lange nicht oder kaum feststellbare Folgen zeitigen, an einem Wendepunkt aber gewaltige, qualitative und sprunghafte Veränderungen zeitigen (Jonas 1979: 26 ff.). Es gibt Neben- und Folgewirkungen, die kausal allein nicht erklärt werden können, weil sie zwar motiviert sind, aber nur unter bestimmten sozialen und psychischen Bedingungen eintreten können.

Wie aber artikuliert sich nun die Relation zwischen Widerständigkeit und Aktualität? Die Bestimmung aktueller Verhältnisse gelänge wohl nur in der Gesamterfassung aktuell wirkender Kräfte und den Widerständen, die ihnen entgegenstehen im Sinne Bouterweks absoluter Virtualität (Bouterwek 1799). Widerstand gibt es offenbar nur, wo ihm ein anderer Widerstand entgegensteht. Widerstand ist nur in Korrelativität zu denken. Sowohl die wirkenden Kräfte als auch die ihnen entgegenstehenden Widerstände sind aber nicht vollständig erfassbar, da es sich bei aktuellen Verhältnissen um prozessuale Gegebenheiten mit Vorgeschichte und Tendenz handelt. Der Laplace'sche Dämon käme nur zur Geltung, wenn wir die Historizität und prozessuale Vermitteltheit der Wirklichkeit ausblenden bzw. statuieren könnten. Wirkung kann selbst in technischen Kontexten nicht auf physikalische Effekte reduziert werden, da Technik in einer Zweck-Mittel-Relation steht und insofern auch in einem gesellschaftlichen und individuellen Wertkontext. Technik erfährt auf einer bestimmten Kulturhöhe (Janich 2006: 15 ff.) ihre Realisierung und wirkt in unterschiedlichen Kulturen auch unterschiedlich (vgl. McLuhan 1968). Technik ist selbst Ausdruck einer technischen und einer nichttechnischen Geschichte, die nie vollständig und immer nur perspektivisch erfasst und ausgelegt werden kann.

Aktualität als gegenwärtige Wirksamkeit ist das Ergebnis unterschiedlicher Momente, die nicht vollständig erfasst werden können; sie ist als solche sowohl Erwartbarkeit, Anschließbarkeit an gewohnte Erfahrung bzw. lebensweltliche Praxis als auch Widerstand gegen sie, Kontingenz. Sie kann sich sowohl in Aufsässigkeit und Andersheit als auch als gewohnte Erfahrung zeigen. Immer aber zeigt sich diese Relation in einer nachträglichen Erfassung und daran, dass das

aktuell Wahrgenommene eine Disposition weiterer Erfahrungen ist, gleich ob sie korrigiert werden muss oder nicht. Sie kanalisiert und konstituiert weitere Erfahrung. Aktualität als Bewusstseinsphänomen gibt es nicht ohne Potentialitäten, nicht ohne Retention und Protention (Husserl 1950: 56 ff.). Sie ist damit die Quelle unseres Erfahrungslebens: Korrekturpunkt und zu korrigierender Punkt, selbst aber nicht erfassbar, weil uns alle Präsenz, das Hier und Jetzt in der ‚Lebendigen Gegenwart‘ (vgl. Held 1966) entgleitet. Die Ungewissheit, die mit ihr verbunden ist, artikuliert sich aber in einem Widerstand gegen unsere Phantasie- und Projektionsleistungen sowie gegenüber allem nur Typologischen.

### Widerständigkeit und Welt

Wenn Welt nur ist, was der Fall ist, dann ginge sie tatsächlich in Aktualität und Faktizität auf. Welt ist aber vielmehr der Inbegriff von Verhältnisbestimmungen, die ohne Widerständigkeit nicht zu denken sind. Sie ist ein Ganzes von Gegenständen und Gegenstandskomplexen, aber auch von wechselseitigen Wirkungen. Wenn wir von Welt sprechen, so ist weder nur ein logisches Konstrukt, noch nur eine Ansammlung von gegenständlichen Gegebenheiten, von Wechselwirkungen, Aktionen bzw. Interaktionen in ihr, gemeint. Welt ist zwar Ergebnis eines konzeptuellen Zugriffs auf ein Ganzes von Erscheinungen und wechselseitigen Wirkverbindungen, aber nicht nur Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Zugriffe, sondern auch Ergebnis nichtwissenschaftlicher, möglicherweise mythischer, religiöser oder weltanschaulicher Zugriffe. Sie ist ein Vermittlungsprodukt, das prozesshafte bzw. historische Momente beinhaltet – und kommt nur als solche in den Blick. Dieses Ganze von Gegenständen, Gegenstandskomplexen und Wechselwirkungen, in denen der Mensch selbst ein Wirkelement und Ergebnis von Wirkungen ist, ist die vortheoretische Voraussetzung aller theoretischen Zugriffe auf sie, was in Husserls Begründungskonzept der ‚Lebenswelt‘ artikuliert ist (vgl. Husserl 1954). In dieser selbstverständlichen, gewohnten Welt tauchen aber Störungen, Hemmungen, Widerständigkeiten aller Art auf. Welt ist insofern das genannte Ganze inklusive all dieser Widerständigkeiten. Die Thematisierung der Lebenswelt ist streng genommen Ergebnis einer Vereinsseitigung des Korrelativismus zwischen Selbstverständlichkeit und Aufsässigkeit bzw. Hemmung des Selbstverständlichen. Wir können es paradox formulieren: Lebenswelt kommt in den Blick, wenn Widerständigkeit aus dem Blick gerät.

### Widerständigkeit und Horizont

Horizont ist nicht wie Welt Ausdruck einer Zusammengehörigkeit bzw. eines bestimmten Ganzen, sondern das, in dem etwas als etwas, auch als Zusammengehöriges erscheint. Weltzugriffe erscheinen in einem Horizont, der selbst als solcher unbestimmt bleibt. Der Horizont ist nicht vergegenständlichbar, nicht objektivierbar, ist kein Gegenstand, kein Objekt, keine perspektivische Gegebenheit, sondern das, in dem es zu Vergegenständlichungen, Objektivierungen und perspektivischen Zugriffen kommt. Er ist eine Folie, das Dinge

und Sachverhalte zum Erscheinen bringt. Als Folie dieses Erscheinens leistet es selbst keinen Widerstand, macht aber Widerstände sichtbar. Das unterscheidet ihn auch von einem Medium. Medien bieten Ermöglichräume, die zwar erweiterbar, aber nicht unbegrenzt sind (Hubig 2006: 143 ff.). Für den Horizont macht Begrenzung keinen Sinn, insofern ist er vielmehr das, was Begrenzungen sichtbar werden lässt. Jeder Gegenstand, jeder Sachverhalt wird durch eine Grenze bestimmt und diese durch einen Widerstand erfahrbar. Biologische Zellen sind begrenzte Entitäten, die ein innerhalb und außerhalb kennen. In seelischen Prozessen werden Hemmungen und Störungen erfahren. Als offenes System steht der Mensch in permanentem Austausch mit der Außen- und Mitwelt, also mit physikalischen und sozialen, aber auch psychischen Widerständen, die Ausdruck einer Individualgeschichte, aber auch besonderer sozialer, mitmenschlicher Widerstände sind. Widerstand ist, was in einem Horizont erfahrbar wird, jedoch nicht in gegenständlicher Weise. Der Horizont ist nicht das gegenständlich Gegebene, nicht das Intendierte. Er ist in allem mitgegeben, ist nicht das Übersehene, sondern das, was sehen wie übersehen ermöglicht. Er ist aber nicht nur das, in das Gegenstände und Sachverhalte quasi eingeschrieben werden, in dem selbst Welt als Ganzes oder Inbegriff dieser Gegenstände und Sachverhalte sichtbar werden, er ist auch, was Widerständigkeit erfahrbar macht.

### **Widerständigkeit und Faktizität**

Faktizität ist Ergebnis einer Feststellung. Tatsachen sind als solche bestimmt. Sie sind festgestellte Gegebenheiten, die als solche auch Geltung beanspruchen. Als solche sind sie zugleich Teil einer Reihe von Feststellungen. Tatsachen stehen nicht für sich, sondern sind als festgestellte zugeordnet und miteinander verknüpft. In wissenschaftlichen Kontexten sind sie in der Regel Ergebnisse von Mess-, Relationierungs- und Subsumtionsprozessen. Das heißt, sie sind uns nicht rein gegeben, sondern vielmehr gerahmt bzw. paradigmatisch gefasst. Oft sind sie Ausdruck einer Tendenz oder Verlaufstypologie. Tatsachen sind Ergebnis einer Unterscheidungspraxis. Festgestelltes unterscheidet sich von nicht Festgestelltem, das entweder ‚noch‘ nicht festgestellt oder nicht feststellbar ist. Tatsachen können aber in der fortlaufenden Feststellung einer Tatsachenreihe aufsässig werden, wenn sie sich nicht mehr in die Reihe fügen wollen und es zu einer Neubewertung kommt. Tatsachen sind als Widerstände gegen unseren Formwillen zu begreifen. Als festgestellte können sie nicht übergangen, ausgelöscht oder umgangen werden. Sie gelten bis zu ihrer Neubewertung in einem absoluten Sinne, stehen aber niemals nur für sich. Eine Tatsache steht in einem Verbund, verweist auf Mittatsachen, die sich sozusagen wechselseitig bezeugen. Die Anerkennung kann der bezeugten Tatsache nicht ohne Weiteres verweigert werden. Sie leisten auch dem Widerstand, der ihre Anerkennung verweigert. Dies kann ein materialer Widerstand, aber auch ein ideeller, ein sozialer oder psychischer sein. Tatsachen melden sich auch dann, wenn sie nicht im Fokus meines Handelns oder meiner Wahrnehmungsintention

stehen. Ich kann mit ihnen rechnen, wie es Wissenschaft und Technik tun, sie gehen aber niemals in einer Berechnung auf, sind nie vollständig einem Kalkül zu unterwerfen.

## Widerständigkeit und Widerhalt – Vervollständigung der Theorie

Die wohl wichtigste Ergänzung bzw. Korrektur erfährt der Widerständigkeitsdiskurs durch Otto Friedrich Bollnow (Bollnow 2008: 85 ff.), der nicht nur die Auffassung vertritt, dass jedem Widerstand ein ‚Widerhalt‘ korrespondiert, sondern sogar von einem Primat des Widerhalts ausgeht. Er geht dabei von der realitätserschließenden Funktion der Stimmungen aus, die uns je nachdem eher die Dimension des Widerhalts oder der Widerständigkeit erfahren lassen. Bollnows Zugang ist ein psychologischer bzw. ein nicht zuletzt von Heideggers Fundamentalontologie inspirierter existentieller. Ausdrücklich sprengt er damit auch die eher physikalistischen Modelle, die den Diskurs zuvor leiteten. Den Primat des Widerhalts begründet er letztlich mit der seines Erachtens ursprünglichsten Form der Realitätserfahrung in der Beziehung zwischen Kind und Mutter. Das Kind macht dort „die Erfahrung der fördernden und helfenden Kraft, die das eigene Dasein trägt und stützt und von der her es eigentlich überhaupt erst lebt“ (Bollnow 2008: 89). Bollnows Zugang ist aber nicht der hier angestrebte. Die psychologische und existentielle Dimension sind zwar wichtige Momente, aber eben nur Momente in der Exposition einer Theorie der Widerständigkeit. Im Übrigen stellt sich die Frage, ob das Bild der Mutter-Kind-Beziehung wirklich taugt um den vermeintlichen Primat zu begründen: Die fördernde und helfende Kraft wird ja erfahren, weil es quasi spätestens mit dem ‚Geburtsschock‘ auch Widerstandserfahrungen gibt. Die Frage des Primats soll hier aber nicht diskutiert werden, zumal er die Gefahr birgt uns in metaphysische Verstrickungen zu führen. Dass eine Korrelation zwischen Widerstand und Widerhalt besteht und letzterer ebenso als existentielle Grunderfahrung verstanden werden kann, ist aber ein wichtiger Aspekt im Widerständigkeitsdiskurs. Tatsächlich bieten uns Widerstände auch Halt, der aber nicht notwendigerweise unserem Willen entspricht, wie das genannte Beispiel von der Mutter, die das Kleinkind an der Hand hält, zeigt. Widerhalt hilft Wege zu meistern, Orientierung zu erlangen und koordinierende Fähigkeiten auszubilden. Er kann uns stützen und das Leben erleichtern. Widerhalt kann schließlich als pädagogisches Prinzip verstanden werden, als Rückhalt, Hilfestellung oder Begleitung.

Im Unterscheid zum Widerstand ist der Widerhalt konkret benennbar: die mütterliche Hand, die familiäre Bindung, das Geländer, die Straßenbegrenzung usw. Widerhalt ist konkretisierbar und wird als etwas Positives erfahren. Er ist eine Realisierung des Entlastungsprinzips, eine Krücke, mit deren Hilfe wir besser stehen können, die uns stützt und entlastet. Widerhalt kann sich in sozialer Unterstützung artikulieren, in kulturellen Bereitstellungen – wozu auch mir zur Verfügung stehende technische Instrumente gehören – aber auch in der natürlichen Umgebung. Auch in psychischer Hinsicht machen wir die Erfahrung des Widerhalts in empathischer Zuwendung oder Vertrauenserfahrungen.

Widerhalt erfahren wir nicht zuletzt auch in theoretischer Hinsicht, wenn die Nachvollziehbarkeit unserer Argumentation eine methodische Unterstützung erfährt und subjektive Einsichten eine intersubjektive Absicherung erlangen.

Auch Institutionen sind Ausdruck von Widerstand und ‚Widerhalt‘. Sie entlasten und stützen uns. Die Feuerwehr hilft uns beim Löschen eines Brandes. Wir erfahren Unterstützung durch Familienangehörige und Widerstand durch Behörden. Institutionen begrenzen unsere Wirkfähigkeit, eröffnen aber auch Wirkmöglichkeiten. Familien sind Dispositionen seelischer Stabilität bzw. Ausdruck psychischen Rückhalts wie auch seelischer Verunsicherung und Verstörung. Auch Institutionen sind durch eine Dialektik von Widerständigkeit und Widerhalt gekennzeichnet.

Widerhalt artikuliert sich nicht notwendigerweise in einem Resonanzverhältnis, wiewohl wir in personalen Beziehungen von ihm Resonanz erfahren können, aber auch in dem Sinne, dass von allen möglichen Entitäten Anmutungsqualitäten (Lipps 1906; Krueger 1953) ausgehen können, die uns stimmen.

Vom konkretisierbaren Widerhalt geht zumindest ein Echo aus, das auf etwas verweist, das nicht als meine Hervorbringung zu verstehen ist, nämlich das, was diesen Nachhall ermöglicht. In psychologischer und sozialer Hinsicht könnten wir durchaus von einer Resonanz im Sinne Rosas sprechen (Rosa 2016), also von einer Reaktion oder Erwidern des Anderen. Gleich ob Echo oder Resonanz: Es sind nicht wir selbst, die uns halten oder stützen. Der Verweis geht auf das andere, das nicht mein Bewusstseinsprodukt, nicht Gegenstand meiner Hervorbringung ist.

Die eigentlich radikalkonstruktivistische Überlegung, dass Widerständigkeit in die Bewusstseinsimmanenz verlegt werden muss – die ihre Wurzel im deutschen Idealismus hat (Fichte 1962; Schelling 1979) – ist aber nur eine Scheinlösung des Widerstandsproblems. Wenn Widerständigkeit eine nur subjektiv gesetzte ist, dann kann sie – wie im Spiel – auch wieder beseitigt werden. Widerständigkeit ist aber kein Ausdruck eines Spiels, der einfach durch einen Willensakt beseitigt werden kann. Gerade das Moment des Widerhalts, von dem ein Echo oder eine Resonanz ausgeht, wirft uns in gewisser Weise auf ein Reflexionsverhältnis zurück, das nur auf einer Seite variabel ist. Wir müssen eine Antwort finden auf das, was uns Widerstand entgegenbringt.

## Modale Aspekte

Anders als im Falle der Wirklichkeit ist Widerständigkeit nicht notwendigerweise ein konstitutives Element von Möglichkeit. Im Falle von leerer, logischer Möglichkeit lässt sich – wenn überhaupt – nur in einem ideellen Sinne von Widerständigkeit sprechen, insofern dieser Raum durch logische Gesetzmäßigkeiten in seiner Erschließung eine Begrenzung erfährt. Logische Möglichkeit behandelt nur, was widerspruchsfrei ausgesagt werden kann.

Im Falle von inhaltlichen, also durch Erfahrungsverläufe motivierte Möglichkeiten, die Husserl als Potentialitäten bezeichnet (Husserl 1950: 81 ff.), sieht dies anders aus. Hier geht es nicht nur um logische Widerspruchsfreiheit.

Widerständigkeit ist hier konstitutiv bei der Erfassung von Verlaufstypologien – und zwar im Sinne inhaltlicher Begrenzungen. Inhaltliche Möglichkeiten sind erfahrungsfundiert – sie verweisen im Sinne Husserls zeitlichem Aufbau von Entitäten retentional auf Erfahrenes. Bei Typologien handelt es sich um gerahmte Erfahrungen, die in eine bestimmte Richtung weisen bzw. im Husserl'schen Sinne durch Protentionalität, also einen bestimmten Ausgriff auf zu Erwartendes gekennzeichnet sind. Typologien lassen Variationen zu, aber keine vollkommene Andersheit. Welche Abweichungen zulässig sind, bestimmt die Intention, unter der Möglichkeiten erfasst werden. Typologische Abläufe finden gewissermaßen in einem Tunnel statt, der einen Spielraum lässt, aber auch Ausbrüche verhindert. Explizieren wir das Problem der Typologie bzw. des begrenzten Spielraums anhand von Beispielen aus verschiedenen Sphären:

Beim Erfassen eines Erfahrungscontinuums formen und charakterisieren Widerstände die ästhetische Erfahrung; etwa wenn in der Musik innerhalb tonaler Strukturen atonale Elemente auftauchen. Die Aufsässigkeit der Atonalität gehört dann zur ästhetischen Konstitution des Musikstücks und deren Rezeption.

Physikalisch gesehen wirken Kräfte da, wo auch Hemmungen wahrnehmbar werden. ‚Reine‘ Kraft kann nicht erfasst werden. Erfasst werden kann nur ein Korrelat von Wirkung und Hemmung, Kraft und Gegenwirkung, Impuls und Hemmung. Dies gilt für die klassische Newton'sche Physik ebenso wie für die Quantenphysik und Relativitätstheorie. Überall werden durch Hemmungen Grenzen markiert, aber auch Spielräume eröffnet, in denen Kräfte wirksam sind und ihre Wirksamkeit erkannt und quantifiziert werden kann.

Der Begriff des biologischen Lebens kann selbst im Sinne von Widerständigkeit und Beweglichkeit bzw. Kraft und Hemmung verstanden werden. Man kann Leben als Widerstand gegen die Entropie begreifen. Widerständigkeit hat hier aber auch noch andere Dimensionen. Lebendiges widersteht, solange es lebendig ist, äußeren Widerständen, lässt sich schieben, aber nicht ohne Widerstand erdrücken. Leben ist selbst Ausdruck einer Korrelation von Einwirkungsfähigkeit auf belebte und unbelebte Dinge und Einwirkung auf den eigenen Organismus. Auch innerorganische Verhältnisse können im Sinne von Bewegung und Hemmung verstanden werden. Diffusion ist ein Prozess, der aufgrund einer relativen Widerständigkeit geschieht. Implantate sind wie jedes innere Organ in relativer Weise vom Restorganismus abgegrenzt. Jede Form von Leben findet in einem Möglichkeitsraum statt: Im Wasser, im Licht, im Dunkeln. Die Lebenssphäre eröffnet Wirkräume und ihre Grenzen sind zugleich die Grenzen des Wirkens, die nur mit technischer Hilfe überwunden werden können.

## Disziplinäre Aspekte der Theorie

### Widerständigkeit in der Werttheorie

Im Wertdiskurs spielt Widerständigkeit eine zentrale Rolle. Machen wir uns das zunächst im ökonomischen Kontext klar. Der Wert einer Sache wächst



zunächst dadurch, dass sie nicht leicht zu erlangen ist, sie etwa aus einem seltenen Rohstoff besteht. Seltenheit oder Einzigartigkeit des begehrten Gegenstandes ist meist mit Widerstand bei seiner Erlangung verbunden. Der Wert von Gegenständen, die leicht zu erlangen sind, ist in der Regel gering. Der Wert einer Sache wächst aber nur bis zu einer bestimmten Grenze, an der das Begehren zum Erliegen kommt. Es gibt ökonomisch eine Obergrenze des Wertes, etwa, wenn es um einen Wert geht, der nur mit extrem hohem Aufwand zu erlangen ist und in keinem Verhältnis zum Begehren des Gegenstandes steht. Dies ist etwa der Fall, wenn es um eine aufwändige und gefährliche Bergung eines Fracks geht. Die zu erwartenden Güter mögen wertvoll sein, es ist aber nicht anzunehmen oder nur mit hoher Risikobereitschaft zu erhoffen, dass das zur Erlangung investierte Kapital wieder hereingeholt werden kann. Der Wert einer Sache ergibt sich allerdings nicht nur aus Marktgesetzen. Es gibt gesellschaftliche oder staatliche Anerkennungen historischer Objekte, deren Wert nicht eine Frage der Nachfrage ist. Der Wert der 2019 im ‚Grünen Gewölbe‘ des Dresdener Residenzschlosses gestohlenen Gegenstände ist nicht nur Sache individuellen Begehrens, sondern auch Ausdruck einer historischen Bewertung. Es gibt insofern ‚unschätzbare‘ Werte, deren Wert nicht an Marktverhältnisse gebunden ist. Der Handel mit Kunstwerken kann entsprechend der Wertschätzung des herstellenden Künstlers oder der allgemeinen Wirtschaftslage schwanken, symbolische Werte wie Reichsinsignien dagegen nur, wenn sich das staatliche oder nationale Selbstverständnis ändert.

Auch in nichtökonomischen Verhältnissen hängt der Wert an Widerstandserfahrungen. Man schätzt Personen, die nicht leicht zu gewinnen sind, meist mehr als solche, bei denen dies leicht fällt. In amorösen Verhältnissen gilt dies ohnehin. Leidenschaft artikuliert sich oft bei Widerstandserfahrungen. Man denke an Catulls Gedichte über Lesbia. Auch der künstlerische Wert ist oft an den Widerstand gebunden, der bei der Rezeption eines Kunstwerks erfahren wird. Wir müssen mehr intellektuelle Ressourcen investieren um Goethes Faust zu verstehen als im Falle einer Boulevardkommödie. Dafür ist das Erlebnis der Rezeption aber in der Regel ein nachhaltigeres. Der Wert einer Sache steigt also nicht nur in ökonomischer Hinsicht mit der Widerständigkeit. Selbst Glückserfahrungen sind nicht selten Ergebnis harter Arbeit: der Sieg bei einem Marathonlauf, der Applaus nach einem gelungenen musikalischen Auftritt usw. Wert hängt also durchaus von der Überwindung von Widerständen durch regelmäßige Übung bzw. von deren Anerkennung ab. Dass der Reiz einer Person wesentlich auch von ihrer Widerständigkeit abhängt, gilt auch in intellektuellen Beziehungen. Man sucht den intellektuellen Widerstand eines Freundes, um sich Klarheit über eigene Einschätzungen zu verschaffen. Widerstände schaffen also offenbar Wertverhältnisse. Italo Calvino berichtet in seinem Buch *Die unsichtbaren Städte* aus dem Jahr 1972 von einer Stadt, in der die Beziehungen der Menschen von Fäden, Schnüren, Seilen und Tau- en gekennzeichnet sind. Je inniger und wertvoller das Verhältnis, desto fester die Verbindung, Liebesbeziehungen werden etwa durch Taue, Geschäftsbeziehungen durch Fäden gekennzeichnet. Dies geht freilich nur bis zu einem

bestimmten Punkt, an dem jegliche Bewegung in der Stadt unmöglich ist und die Bewohner sich entschließen andernorts eine neue Stadt zu bauen. Widerständigkeit erhöht einerseits den Wert, zugleich kann sie diesen ab einem bestimmten Grad auch wertlos machen. Der Wert der Stadt geht verloren, wenn sie jegliche Begegnung erschwert bzw. verunmöglicht.

In der Werttheorie spielt die Anerkennung des Wertes eine zentrale Rolle. Diese steht aber nicht nur unter quantitativen, sondern auch unter qualitativen Bedingungen. Begehren unterliegt sozialpsychologischen Dispositionen. Es kann durch Widerständigkeit gesteigert, aber auch zum Erlischen gebracht werden. Durch Einverleibung kann die Distanz, die das Begehren einer Sache steigert, aufgelöst werden. Der erlangte Gegenstand hat mich satt und mein Begehren zum Erlischen gebracht. Die Beseitigung von Widerständigkeit beeinträchtigt insofern nicht nur unsere Orientierung und Lernbereitschaft, sondern auch unser Begehren und Streben.

Bringen wir auf den Punkt, welche Rolle Widerständigkeit in der Werttheorie spielt: Sie ist ein konstitutives, wenngleich nicht das einzige Moment, das einen Wert auszeichnet. Widerständigkeit muss in werttheoretischem Kontext sowohl hyletisch, als auch sozial, psychisch und nicht zuletzt ideell verstanden werden. Sie ist dabei nicht nur, was es zu brechen gilt, sondern auch, was um seines Wertes willen zu erhalten ist. Ohne die Erhaltung der Widerständigkeit ist mit einem Wertverlust bis zur Wertvernichtung zu rechnen. In personalen Beziehungen artikuliert sich Widerständigkeit nicht zuletzt in der Aura einer Person, die Benjamin als eine Ferne bestimmt, die von der physischen Nähe unabhängig ist (Benjamin 1979: 15). Aura zeichnet sich durch Unerreichbarkeit aus, also dadurch, dass sie sich sowohl dem Begehren als auch dem Instrumentalisieren entzieht. Die auratische Persönlichkeit leistet quasi unserem Begehren und unserem Wunsch nach Verfügbarkeit Widerstand.

### Epistemische Bedeutung der Widerständigkeit

Widerständigkeit ist keine Dingeigenschaft und in ganz unterschiedlichen Zusammenhängen erfahrbar. Wir dürfen sie nicht in der Weise chemischer Eigenschaften wie flüssig, fest, gasförmig verstehen. Ein großer Stein auf der Straße mag für einen PKW einen erheblichen Widerstand darstellen, für einen Panzer dagegen nicht. Es kommt offensichtlich auf unsere Intention, unsere Vermögen und unsere Zurüstung an, ob und wie wir Widerständigkeit erfahren. Widerständigkeit kann nur durch andere Widerständigkeit erfahren werden. Wasser bietet dem geübten Turmspringer kaum, dem ungeübten dagegen erheblichen Widerstand. Widerständigkeit ist ein Relationsbegriff, der zum Ausdruck bringt, dass sich etwas dem praktischen Willen oder dem Erkenntniswillen nicht fügen will. Freilich lässt sich nur da von Widerständigkeit sprechen, wo Widerstand auf Widerstand stößt. Sie kann aber nicht auf ein Element einer wie auch immer gearteten Willensmetaphysik reduziert werden. Sie taucht auch da auf, wo mein Wille gar nicht betroffen ist, aber Begrenzungen wahrnehmbar werden, etwa im vegetativen Teil des organischen Leben.

Mein Bewusstsein ist kein ungeordneter Datenfluss, sondern etwas, das diskrete Einheiten aufweist und eine zeitliche Identität wahrt. Es geht nicht im Hier und Jetzt auf, sondern impliziert zurückgehaltene und geschehene Momente sowie projektive Ausgriffe, also Retentionen, Protentionen, Erinnerungen und Antizipationen – letztere sind keine konstitutiven Bestände der zeitlichen Identität, sondern ausdrückliche Artikulationen dieser Identität. Ich bin in meinem Bewusstseinsleben keine monolithische Einheit und mehr als mein aktuelles Selbstgefühl und meine aktuelle Perspektive. Ich bin auch mehr als ein transzendentes Ich, das all meine Vorstellungen begleiten können muss.

Biologisch erfahre ich mich als gegliederte Entität. Ich vermag Schmerzen und Empfindungen zu lokalisieren. Auch wenn Körperorgane und Körperteile miteinander verbunden sind und alles, was wir körperlich erfahren, sich auf den gesamten Organismus auswirkt und mit ihm vermittelt sein muss, wird der Organismus als etwas in sich Gegliedertes erfahren, mit unterschiedlichen Empfindungszonen sowie Wirk- und Wahrnehmungsorganen. Körperteile und –organe sind nicht gleichrangig: ohne Blindarm kann ich leben, ohne Herz nicht. Die voneinander geschiedenen Entitäten haben unterschiedlichen Wert.

Soziale Widerstände kennzeichnen jede Kultur. Kultur artikuliert sich in einer Bündelung von Widerständen und Spielräumen, in einer Rahmung unseres Zusammenlebens, in spezifischen Hervorbringungen, Tradierungen sowie Verfeinerungen des Alltags. Die soziale Rahmung stellt im engeren Sinne die zivilisatorische Bändigung und Verfeinerung eines Individuums dar; letzteres insofern eine Rahmung nicht nur Grenzen unseres Tuns und Lassens setzt, sondern auch Räume ausweist, in denen individuelle Gestaltungen möglich und erwünscht sind. Es handelt sich also auch um Räume zur Ausbildung von Tugenden, die der Gemeinschaft zugute kommen sollen. In diesen Gestaltungsräumen findet eine Kultivierung der Individuen statt, die sich nicht nur in sozialen Tugenden artikuliert, sondern auch in Hervorbringungsfähigkeiten. Diese sind nicht nur technischer Art, sondern auch solche, die Institutionen und ästhetische Artefakte hervorbringen. In den freien Räumen bilden sich aber ihrerseits wieder Widerstände, etwa durch Institutionen. Soziale Widerständigkeit artikuliert sich nicht zuletzt im Anderen, ob er uns nahe steht oder nicht, und ist oft an Formen der Nichtanerkennung gebunden. Gruppenpsychologische Momente und historische Dispositionen einer Gemeinschaft artikulieren Widerstände bzw. hemmen oder lenken Entwicklungen. Hemmung im Sinne der Engführung kann Prozesse auch beschleunigen. Selbst die Kommunikation, die zu einer gelingenden Verständigung führen soll, ist an orientierende Widerstandserfahrungen gebunden. Das wahrnehmbare oder bekundete Unverständnis des anderen zwingt mich meine Kommunikation im Sinne einer gelingenden Verständigung zu ändern.

Widerständigkeit ist also auch in der soziologischen Erkenntnis ein Differenz schaffendes Moment. Sie hält sozusagen Flüsse auf und gibt ihnen eine Richtung. Sie grenzt ab. Man kann nicht ohne weiteres in eine andere Sphäre dringen, was nicht bedeutet, dass es keine Türen, Diffusionen oder Übergänge gibt.

Widerständigkeit ist auch Selbstbehauptung. Jede Form von Grenzziehung dient der Selbstbehauptung gegenüber der Umwelt. Organismen, deren innere Gliederung ‚aufweicht‘, können sich selbst vergiften. In psychologischer Hinsicht heißt Selbstbehauptung Wahrung der eigenen Identität, aber auch Konstanz in der Verfolgung eigener Interessen, oft unter dem Schlagwort der Resilienz diskutiert. Widerstand ist nicht notwendigerweise Aktivität. Wurzeln haben heißt nicht nur, sich mit Nährstoffen zu versorgen, sondern auch dem Sturm zu trotzen. Widerständigkeit setzt Grenzen, lenkt Bewegungen um, hemmt aber nicht in absoluter Weise.

Erkenntnis heißt nicht zuletzt Identifizierung. Jede Identifizierung ist zugleich Ausdruck einer Hemmung. Jede Definition ist eine Grenzziehung, eine Abhebung und Artikulation von Andersheit. Grenzen können willkürliche Setzungen sein, dennoch wird die ‚Willkür‘ der Setzung immer wieder durch die Sache korrigiert. Grenzen können sich verschieben, Abgrenzungen sich als falsch erweisen. Umgrenzungen können zu eng oder zu weit sein. Unser Zugriff auf die Sache wird ihr nicht gerecht und muss erweitert oder verengt werden. Die Dinge wehren sich sozusagen gegen konzeptuelle Zugriffe und Fügungen. Die Neuansetzung und Verschiebung von Grenzen ist unser Beitrag zur Wirklichkeitserkenntnis, die Wirklichkeit aber geht in diesem Beitrag nicht auf, ist aber erfahrbar.

Erkenntnis basiert auf der Feststellung und Artikulation von Unterschiedenheit. Artikulation heißt zugleich, etwas unartikulierte zu lassen. Das Unartikulierte ist das Andere, von dem sich das Artikulierte abhebt und niemals vollständig bestimmt ist. Erkenntnisgewinn ist Erfahrung und Artikulation von Widerstand. Wo Widerstand erfahren wird, meldet sich auch Unverfügbarkeit.

Widerständigkeit initiiert eine Unterscheidungspraxis. Sie steht epistemisch für die Differenz schaffende Kraft von Grenzen und Unverfügbarkeit. Wenn eine Sache verfügbar geworden ist, ist sie kein Erkenntnisgegenstand mehr. Sie kann aber bei Aufsässigkeit wieder diesen Status erlangen. Entscheidend ist, dass die Grenze der Widerständigkeit zwar als Grenze meines konzeptuellen Zugriffs erscheint, dass sie aber zugleich auf etwas verweist, was nicht Ergebnis meiner Konstruktionen und Projektionen ist.

### **Ethische Bedeutung der Widerständigkeit**

Widerständigkeit artikuliert sich nicht zuletzt in der Anwesenheit des anderen, der meinen Wünschen bzw. Intentionen möglicherweise entgegensteht. Dem Entgegenstehen korrespondiert die Möglichkeit, dass ich meine Wünsche und Intentionen nur mit dem anderen realisieren kann. Des Weiteren entstehen viele Wünsche nur, weil es den anderen gibt, im Miteinander. Begehren lässt sich also nicht einfach als eine individuelle, intrinsische Eigenschaft bestimmen, wengleich die Erfüllung des Begehrens nur individuell erfahren werden kann.

Wie der Andere als jemand in den Blick kommt, der meinen Wünschen entgegensteht, so kommt er auch als Objekt meiner Wünsche und Intentionen in den Blick. Damit kann er zum Mittel degradiert und in seiner Selbstzweckhaftigkeit

infrage gestellt werden. Er ist dann Objekt meines Begehrens, etwa als Objekt sexueller Befriedigung, als Manipulationsobjekt meines Machtwillens oder als Erfüllungsgehilfe meiner Wünsche. Im Idealfall von Liebe und Freundschaft kann das Begehren wechselseitig sein. Das ζῷον πολιτικόν ist nicht nur das in einer organisierten Gemeinschaft lebende Wesen, sondern auch das Wesen, das den anderen begehrt. Das Begehren kann durch den anderen initiiert und gesteigert, aber auch eingeschränkt, behindert und verhindert werden. Erotik erweist sich dabei als eine Sonderform des Begehrens, sozusagen als ein Reiz eigener Art, der im Bereich des Mittelbaren verbleibt. Sie ist ein Spiel von Gewährung, Verbergung und Hemmung, einer Spannung also, die ihren eigenen Reiz ausübt und die möglicherweise höher bewertet wird als das Wunscherfüllungserlebnis selbst. Widerständigkeit ist hier keineswegs negativ konnotiert.

Der andere muss nun nicht der Wolf sein, den ich fürchten muss, ich muss ihn aber als möglichen Widerstand meines Begehrens berücksichtigen. Dabei bietet er meistens nicht in unmittelbarer, sondern in mittelbarer Weise, etwa als Vertreter einer Institution, Widerstand. Der andere verkörpert auch Traditionen, gesellschaftliche Zwänge und Konventionen, die mein Begehren behindern können.

Widerständigkeit ist selbst Ausdruck ethischer Problemlagen. Immer wenn mit den gewohnten Mustern nicht mehr auf Handlungsprobleme reagiert werden kann, wird ein Widerstand sichtbar. Ethik als Begründung und Prüfung der Zusammenstimmung richtigen bzw. angemessenen Handelns ist quasi ein Ergebnis aus konstatierten Aporien und Unstimmigkeiten im aktuellen Handeln. Oft liegen die Ursachen in neuen – oft technisch disponierten – Handlungsmöglichkeiten. Die Dinge fügen sich nicht mehr der gewohnten Handlungspraxis und stellen diese möglicherweise infrage.

Die Identität des Handlungssubjekts als unabdingbare Voraussetzung ethischer Verantwortlichkeit ist Ergebnis einer Abgrenzung und Widerstandserfahrung. Letztere äußert sich in zweierlei Hinsicht: der Widerstand des Nicht-Ich, aber auch der Widerstand, den ich selbst dem Nicht-Ich leiste.

Selbst grundlegende Vermächtniswerte wie Würde, Autonomie und Subsidiarität lassen sich als Widerstandskategorien fassen: Würde als Ausdruck einer unverhandelbaren Einzigartigkeit des Menschen ist als Widerstand gegen die Unterwerfung unter ein Kalkül zu verstehen oder als Widerstand gegen eine typologische Vereinnahmung. Autonomie ist als Widerstand gegen Heteronomie zu verstehen und Subsidiarität als Widerstand gegen Entmündigung und Paternalismus.

Auch die metaethischen Bedingungen des ethischen Diskurses können als Widerstandskategorien gefasst werden: Die Bestimmung der Wirklichkeit, in der verantwortlich gehandelt werden soll, ist ohne Widerständigkeitserfahrung nicht möglich. In simulierten Spielwelten, die jederzeit umfingiert werden können, sind wir von verantwortlichen Handlungen suspendiert. Die Identität des Handlungssubjekts, dem Handlungen zugeschrieben werden können, ist nicht nur eine Kontinuität in Raum und Zeit, sondern auch ein Widerstand gegen alles Nichtkontinuierliche. Und auch das dritte Moment des metaethischen

Diskurses, die Wahl, impliziert Widerständigkeit: Das Gewählte entlässt mich nicht aus der Verantwortung. Es begleitet mich und disponiert meine weiteren Entscheidungen. Das Gewählte ist Ausdruck meiner Freiheit, das Nicht-gewählte, was meine Freiheit begrenzt, ihr Widerstand leistet.

Die Besonderheit der Widerständigkeit im ethischen Diskurs liegt in ihrer weitgehenden Nichtanonymität. Ethische Widerstände sind meist konkret benennbar, aber Ergebnis einer Thematisierung von Verhältnissen. Der andere kommt als Person oder Rollenträger in den Blick. Dennoch gibt es auch in ethischem Kontext anonyme Widerstandserfahrungen. Es gibt Fehlentscheidungen, normative Verwerfungen in Form von Infragestellungen und Wertewandel, d.h. vor allem Verschiebungen von Werthierarchien. All das kann meine Handlungsgewohnheiten und Haltungen infrage stellen. Der ethische Diskurs wird durch Verunsicherungen des Handelns am Leben gehalten. Die Vermehrung von Bindenstrich-Ethiken belegt diese Unsicherheit in immer mehr Handlungsfeldern. Widerständigkeit ist ein konstitutives Moment des ethischen Diskurses. Als Grunderfahrung benennt sie unser ständig infrage stehendes Verhältnis zum Anderen, zu unseren gemeinsamen Lebensbedingungen und zu den Lebensbedingungen künftiger Generationen. Es liegt also auch hier ein Reflexionsbegriff vor: Der Andere wird nicht in seinem Sosein zum Problem, sondern in seinem Verhältnis, das er zu mir einnimmt. Wir müssen Antworten auf Fragen des Handelns geben, die aus der Anonymität des Sich-nicht-fügen-Wollenden auftauchen, und zwar als etwas, das sich meinem Ethos und meiner Handlungssicherheit entgegenstellt. Auch wenn Widerständigkeit konkret erfahren wird, ist der Diskurs von einem anonymen Strom begleitet, aus dem sich jederzeit manifeste Widerstände herausbilden können. Normen und ihr Wandel erwachsen aus einer Spannung, die sich aus Widerstandserfahrungen ergibt.

## Thesen

Versuchen wir am Ende dieser Exposition Thesen zu formulieren, die eine Theorie der Widerständigkeit zu diskutieren und zu überprüfen hat.

- 1) Da der Begriff der Widerständigkeit nicht – von den genannten Einschränkungen abgesehen – objektreferierend ist, handelt es sich um einen Reflexionsbegriff, der das Verhältnis thematisiert, das wir zu Dingen und Sachverhalten, aber auch zu Personen, nicht zuletzt zu uns selbst, eingehen. Der Begriff qualifiziert weder eine Sache noch einen Sachverhalt, er charakterisiert aber einen wesentlichen Aspekt in unserem Verhältnis zu Dingen, Sachverhalten und Personen.
- 2) Insofern Widerständigkeit auf Verhältnisse referiert, hat sie auch eine positionierende Funktion, womit ihr auch eine anthropologische Bedeutung zukommt. Was der Mensch ist, ergibt sich aus den Verhältnissen, in denen er steht. Diese Verhältnisse artikulieren sich nicht zuletzt auch in der Weise historischer Dispositionen und in der Weise eines Ausgriffs auf die Zukunft. Widerständigkeit erfahren heißt zugleich, seine Stellung in der Welt erfahren.

- 3) Widerständigkeit ist nicht das einzige, aber ein unverzichtbares und zentrales Moment der Wirklichkeit. Es gibt keine Wirklichkeitserfahrung ohne Widerstandserfahrung. Allerdings korrespondiert jeder Widerstandserfahrung die Erfahrung eines Widerhalts, also einer Welt, die mich stützt und mir Hilfestellung gibt.
- 4) Das nicht zuletzt technisch angestrebte Unsichtbarmachen und Umschiffen von Widerständigkeit geht einher mit einem Wirklichkeitsverlust bis hin zu psychopathologischen Befunden.
- 5) Widerstandserfahrung ist die Voraussetzung für die Selbsterfahrung und die Ausbildung von Kompetenzen – d.h. auch die Voraussetzung, dass der Mensch lernt und sich als lernendes und lernfähiges Wesen bestimmt. Selbsterfahrung hängt von der Erfahrung der Widerständigkeit der Welt ab: ich bin der, der den Widerstand des Nicht-Ich erfährt und ihm selbst widersteht.
- 6) Der Wert von Dingen, aber auch von Menschen hängt wesentlich ab von der Widerständigkeit, die sie bieten. In der Idee der Würde als Selbstzweckhaftigkeit artikuliert sich ein Widerstand gegen das nur Typologische und die Möglichkeit einem Kalkül unterworfen zu werden.
- 7) Widerständigkeit bremst den menschlichen und tierischen Willen, sie ist aber mehr als ein Moment, das unseren Willen bricht oder hemmt: Sie ist auch eine konstitutive Größe der theoretischen Betrachtung, ohne die alle Dinge gleichgeordnet und insofern ohne Erkenntniswert wären. Gleichgeordnete Dinge ohne Gravitationen wären ein unerkennbares Rauschen, bestenfalls etwas, das Artikulationen und Desartikulationen disponiert, aber als solches nicht wahrnehmbar, nicht qualifizierbar ist, reiner ungeordneter Datenfluss. Nur durch einen Widerstand, eine artikulierte Abhebung kann er als Disposition erschlossen werden.
- 8) Widerständigkeit setzt radikalkonstruktivistischen Theorien Grenzen und begrenzt Geltungsansprüche sogenannter Narrative.

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Klaus Wiegerling

## Elaboration of a Theory of Resistance

### Abstract

The theory of resistance here elaborated is based on considerations current since the 18th century and concern the proof of reality of the external world. However, what is ignored in the course of these proofs are the social, psychological, and in particular the logical aspects of resistance. The idea of a theory of resistance is inspired by tendencies in the philosophy of technology, as well as other current philosophical and scientific lines of thought that obscure their metaphysical underpinnings, advocating a position of complete achievability of human and natural relations. The theory of resistance seeks to show that resistance is a reflexive term that concerns relations, not objects or those relations that can be expressed in qualities and quantities. Furthermore, this concept has a positioning role, important in epistemological, as well as ethical and anthropological sense. Resistance is a central, although not the sole characteristic of reality. As an ethical category, it is articulated, for example, in the idea of dignity if understood as hostility to mere typologization and subjection to calculation. The theory of resistance does not advocate some existing reality, but limits the domain of validity of constructivist and narrativist theories.

**Keywords:** reflexive term, support, unavailability, constructivism, reality, actuality, facticity.

Klaus Vigerling

## Ekspozicija teorije otpornosti

### Apstrakt

Teorija otpornosti koju treba razviti zasniva se na razmatranjima koja su u opticaju još od 18. veka i tiču se dokazivanja stvarnosti spoljnog sveta. Međutim, pritom se zanemaruju socijalni, psihološki i pogotovo logički aspekti otpornosti. Ideja teorije otpornosti ispirana je tendencijama koje se tiču filozofije tehnike, ali i drugim aktuelnim tendencijama u filozofiji, nauci i tehnici koje prikrivaju svoje metafizičke predušlove i zastupaju stajalište totalne ostvarivosti ljudskih i prirodnih odnosa. Teorija pokušava da pokaže da se kod koncepta otpornosti radi o refleksivnom pojmu koji se tiče odnosa, a ne objekata i odnosa stvari koje se mogu izraziti kvalitetima i kvantitetima. Osim toga, taj koncept ima i funkciju pozicioniranja koja je značajna kako u epistemskom tako i u etičkom i antropološkom smislu. Otpornost je centralna, mada ne i jedina karakteristika stvarnosti. Kao etička kategorija, ona se artikuliše npr. u ideji dostojanstva koju treba shvatiti kao otpor pukoj tipologizaciji i podčinjavanju kalkulaciji. Teorija otpornosti se ne zalaže za neku po sebi postojeću stvarnost, nego ograničava domen važenja konstruktivističkih i narativističkih teorija.

**Ključne reči:** refleksivni pojam, potpora, neraspoloživost, konstruktivizam, stvarnost, aktuelnost, fakticitet

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Petar Bojanić and Edward Djordjević

## THE MESSINESS OF VICTORY AND HEROISM: A BRIEF RESPONSE TO CARL SCHMITT<sup>1</sup>

**ABSTRACT**

The article focuses on a passage from Carl Schmitt's *Ex Captivitate Salus* – a book famously written in a Nurnberg prison in 1946 – in which he draws, from memory, on a story derived from Serbian epic poetry, to justify his understanding of historiography, victory, and the figure of the hero. Analyzing the entire Serbian epic poem from which Schmitt extracts the vignette in question, we show how the text of the poem presents a significantly more complicated and messy picture of the figures of victor, victory, and hero, heroism. The anonymous Serbian poet, addressing himself to his contemporary audience, with which he is intimately familiar, really subverts simplistic expectations regarding the heroism and victory of the Serbian hero, Marko Kraljević. Finally, the article contrasts these complex and at times paradoxical figures of victory and the hero in the poem with their presentation in Carl Schmitt's writing.

**KEYWORDS**

Carl Schmitt, *Ex Captivitate Salus*, Serbian epic poetry, victory, hero.

Chapter 3, "*Historiographia in nuce: Alexis de Tcoqueville*" of Carl Schmitt's *Ex Captivitate Salus* – which he wrote in a Nurnberg prison in the summer of 1946 – is ostensibly a musing on historiography. In it, Tocqueville is himself a kind of Medieval knight or narrative tragic hero within history, helping Schmitt to think through the question of whether "*history is written by the victor*", and then what at all is victory (Schmitt 2017: 25, emphasis in the original). In the last, fifth section of the chapter, Schmitt suddenly shifts registers by introducing a personal recollection of being re-told part of the plot of Serbian medieval epic poem, before once again returning to Tocqueville for a last,

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brief comment to close the chapter. The German jurist was familiar with this (somewhat obscure) canon of literature because two of his wives were Serbian, as well as through his friendship with the noted writer Ivo Andrić, who was ambassador to Germany before World War II, and would go on to win the Nobel Literature Prize in 1961. Curiously, Schmitt refers to Andrić in the passage in question as a poet and completely ignores his official post as ambassador.

Our intention in this article is to probe and offer a commentary sketch on Carl Schmitt's concepts of victory and heroism as they appear in the passage in question of *Ex Captivitate Salus*. Through a more careful look at the poem and its various figures, we would like to show that victory and heroism are rather more vague and messy concepts than Schmitt would have them, indeed that he rather sanitized both the plot of the Serbian epic and the concepts in question.

## I Schmitt's Moral Victory

Before we consider the section in question, it is worth noting that in a text allegedly about historiography, Schmitt reaches for poetry and myth to help support and elucidate his point about heroes and victory. Not only that, but also the poetic reference is wrapped in the inviolability of a highly personal anecdote (from "the Serbian poet Ivo Andrić, whom I love very much", Schmitt 2017: 30), a recollection of a story he was told at a dinner party six years prior. Schmitt introduces the personal memory as having taken place in the autumn of 1940, "as France lay defeated on the ground" (*ibid.*) a conspicuous reminder to the reader of a (transient, to be sure) moment when Germany was the victor. In other words, from a seeming position of defeat at the moment of writing (summer of 1946), Schmitt appears to be textually taking refuge in recollecting a moment of victory.

What, then, is the mythological passage into which Schmitt retreats from both his present condition and his discussion of Tocqueville and historiography? He writes:

*The Serb told me the following story from the mythology of his people: Marko Kraljević, the hero of the Serbian saga, fought for an entire day with a powerful Turk and laid him out after a hard struggle. As he killed the defeated enemy, a serpent that had been sleeping upon the heart of the dead man awoke and spoke to Marko: You were lucky that I slept through your battle. Then the hero cried out: Woe is me! I killed a man who was stronger than me! (Schmitt 2017: 30)*

What is remarkable in this retelling is that despite a number of elements rendered imprecisely, despite some problematic translation choices (lapses which could have been either Andrić's in the retelling or Schmitt's own in the writing six years after the fact), and despite even the poem overall being heavily stripped down into prose and to one particular moment of its plot – Schmitt does indeed focus on the crucial, climactic moment, the two lines that upend the entire epic poem: the realization of the hero, Marko, that he has slain a better/stronger/nobler rival/opponent/knight than himself.

Such a retelling of the story suits all too well Schmitt's situation at the moment of writing: as the defeated, identifying with the defeated Tocqueville, his rendering of the story of Marko Kraljević, the Serbian hero, allows Schmitt to diminish the victory of his own captors: "it was clear to us that the victors of today do not allow themselves to be impressed by such medieval stories" (Schmitt 2017: 31). Moreover, it opens space for him to reclaim some victory, by being the one who writes the history and historiography of the moment in which he finds himself. The victor does not always write the history, and, given the opportunity (pen and paper), the story of these victors – who they are, what their victory is like – will be written by Carl Schmitt. And (in comparison to the idealized medieval Serbian hero) they will not come off well.

## II Of Knights and Knaves

What was it about this poem that so "deeply impressed" Schmitt (and, according to him, also Ernst Jünger and others)? Or better, what kind of a victor is this Marko hero that makes him so much better than "the victors of today?" The poem "*Marko Kraljević i Musa Kesedžija*" (translated by Goeffrey N. W. Locke as "Marko Kralyevich and Musa the Highwayman", 2011) belongs to the Serbian tradition of oral epic poetry and was written down in the nineteenth century by the progenitor of the modern Serbian language, Vuk Karadžić (Pavlović 2019). It is worth noting that the act of writing the poem down marks an enormous cultural shift: in the oral tradition, the poem is passed down from one generation to the next, sung in fact, and naturally, altered to fit the historical moment. Oral epic poems are therefore in a sense their own historiographical record. If Marko is the Serbian hero, Musa, the antagonist, has clearly undergone changes in identity to suit the enemy of the moment. In the opening line, the poet calls Musa of the 'Arbanasi', the old Serbian name for Albanians; but a few lines later, he is referred to as a Turk (which is how Schmitt refers to him). Since the poem was written down at a time when the Serbian nation was just coming into view, and was being carved out in antagonism to the "Turks" of the Ottoman Empire, Marko's antagonist remains a Turk in the popular imagination; which is why it came down to Schmitt as such.

However, not only is it clear in the poem that Musa is not Turkish, but Albanian (with the ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians only beginning after the time the poem was written down, Pavlović 2019), the relationship between Marko and Musa is too complicated to be encapsulated by a clear friend/enemy relation. The two knights share a past service to the Sultan, for example, and when the two finally meet face to face for their fateful duel, Musa describes Marko's childhood in a way that implies familiarity rather more than enmity. Marko's motivation for fighting Musa remains unclear, nor are we told anything about the circumstances that led to his imprisonment for three years (at the moment when we encounter him). Moreover, if we exclude the reader's or listener's familiarity with Serbian epic poems, there is little in this poem specifically that recommends Marko as a positive, valiant hero: he is the Sultan's

prisoner who seems to make unreasonable demands when he is called upon to help; he appears only to be fighting for the Sultan in exchange for his freedom and for a lot of money; he cuts off the arm of the blacksmith after the craftsman tells him that he produced a better sword for Musa; he rejects Musa's last-minute call to abandon the fight; even his guardian angel, when she shows up, chastises him for fighting on a Sunday (which he ought not do as a Christian).

If anything, it is Musa who is a valiant knight, and the whole poem would better fit the narrative of an epic and tragic Serbian heroic poem if the roles of Marko and Musa were reversed: Musa is a presumably an honest servant to the Sultan who has not been paid for his nine years of service, so he takes matters into his own hands (which should have appealed to nineteenth-century Serbian sensibilities); he swats away with ease all the mercenaries the Sultan sends (before Marko) to break his rebellion; he initially asks Marko to join him in his rebellion against the Sultan and then fights him fair and square when his offer is rebuffed, losing only due to Marko's treachery; and even dead, he frightens the Sultan when his head is presented. Perhaps unwittingly, but so impressed is the poet/singer with Musa, that the Albanian both opens and closes the poem. If we remove blind nationalist allegiance, there is every reason to hear/read this poem as being about a tragic hero named Musa who is unfairly killed by a mercenary criminal named Marko.

This reading is, naturally, impossible: the poem was sung in Serbian, to a nationalist Serbian audience, it was written down by the father of the modern Serbian language, and it is clear that the reader's sympathies are expected to be with Marko. This is in line with an understanding of epic poetry that sees the text not as object to be studied, but a response: the singer/author is not telling a new tale, but is continuing one already familiar to his audience, with any number of epic tropes already well established, among which the hero of the epic (Foley 2009). This is at least in part the reason that when the plot of the poem is retold (as Andrić did to Schmitt in France in 1940), it is difficult not to simply omit all the aspects of the story that call into question Marko's character as hero. However else the poem is read, in whatever way the puzzling elements and figures in it are arranged, the one certainty of the poem is that Marko must be a hero. Marko is simply *our guy*.

### III Better/Stronger

Let us look at the two lines of the poem that Schmitt too zoomed in on as crucial. In the original, they read:

*'Jaoh mene do boga miloga,  
de pogubih od sebe boljega.'* (Đurić 1987: 327)

Schmitt, as mentioned, renders this (into prose) as

*"Woe is me! I killed a man who was stronger than me!"  
[Weh mir, ich habe einen Mann getötet, der stärker war als ich!]* (Schmitt 2017: 30)

While Locke translates the verses into English as

*'Dear God!' he cried, 'Have mercy on my soul!  
For I have slain a better man than me!'* (Locke 2011: 201)

Now, while Schmitt's 'woe is me' exclamation is certainly in the spirit of the Serbian expression, Locke's translation shows us an additional layer present in the original, in which Marko is not just remorseful, but explicitly invoking God, seeking absolution even, putting Marko's realization into a theological register. In fact, we could pursue this line even further to explore a connection between God and victory in the Serbian tradition. Namely, given the preposition '*do*', meaning 'to', the line could also be read as Marko saying that his victory was *due to* God, or more idiomatically, 'there, but for the grace of God'. Invoking God in the context of victory and turning over responsibility for victory to God is a prominent (if not the most prominent) theme in Serbian epic poetry. The myth surrounding the battle and defeat at Kosovo in 1389 is that to the Serbs in that conflict, admittance into the kingdom of heaven was of greater importance than victory. Yet Marko, the hero of the overall Serbian saga, bucks this trend: he does not place his fate in God's hands (like the heroes of Kosovo) – and lives to regret the decision. Does this not already begin to shade Marko's character and victory away from the valiant knight that Schmitt needs him to be (to set up the contrast with 'victors of today')?

The second line poses no less of a problem for translation. It is worth noting first that Schmitt tells us that Marko has killed one stronger (*stärker*) than himself, but the Serbian is quite clear that the adjective is not stronger but better (as Locke has it). While it is entirely predictable and therefore excusable that an imprecision like this should creep into one's writing when remembering a dinner party anecdote from six years prior (as was the case with Schmitt), the distinction is, as we shall see, nevertheless important. Where Locke's and Schmitt's translations overlap is the introduction of the word 'man'; namely, Serbian grammar allows for greater ambiguity in meaning, as the adjective better (*boljega*) is gendered and as such no noun is needed after it. A more literal translation of "*pogubih od sebe boljega*", which would omit the subject and emphasize this absence of noun and therefore allow for openness of meaning, would be 'I have killed/slain one better than myself'. The ambiguity matters in that Marko acknowledges that Musa is better than him, but leaves vague at exactly what, in what way? Is he a better man, as Locke and Schmitt would have it? In that case, it would appear that Marko is concerned with his character, his values, himself as a person. Is he a better fighter? In which case, it is about his ability and skill in duel, etc. The two categories obviously overlap, and significantly so in the Middle Ages when this myth originates, but we would insist are nevertheless distinct. We would go so far as to say that Schmitt's change of 'better' into 'stronger' hints that Musa's advantage is in the domain of strength, fighting, dueling only, leaving their personalities, values, ethics aside. Once again, we see that Schmitt's use of this story runs into problems: if

his intention in 1946 is to construct for himself a moral standpoint from which he can deny the victory over himself and Germany, Marko's acknowledgement that he has beaten one not morally but physically stronger than himself – not a *better* knight but a *stronger* one – is a somewhat strange choice.

#### IV On (Marko's) Victory

Allow us now to put Schmitt aside briefly, and consider the poem and its relation to the concept of victory on its own. As we mentioned, there are a number of puzzling aspects to the poem (that it opens and ends with Musa, not Marko; the exact relation of the two knights; the reason Marko is in the Sultan's dungeon when we meet him, their relation; etc.), but perhaps none more than the manner of Marko's victory over Musa. Namely, Marko is (as Schmitt notes) the hero of the overall Serbian epic saga, he is the epitome of the Serbian struggle against the Turks, the defender of both Serbdom and Christendom. And he is, as we have mentioned, without a shadow of a doubt, the figure with whom the Serbian epic poet wants his Serbian listeners (and later readers) to identify in both the struggle against Musa in this poem and in the overall Serbian struggle against the 'Turk' – indeed, the struggle against Musa here is a synecdoche of Marko's/Serbia's overall struggle.

And yet the poem is clear – and herein lies a curious omission in Schmitt's retelling of the plot – that Marko wins his duel against Musa by underhanded means. In fact, Marko's famous remorseful cry that he has killed one better than himself, does not, as Schmitt would have it, simply come after having beaten Musa; rather, after their long and intense battle, it is Musa who knocks down Marko and sits on his chest:

*Tad omanu Musa Kesedžija,  
ud'ri Marka u zelenu travu,  
pak mu sjede na prsi junačke.* (Đurić 1987: 326)

Marko, well-nigh defeated, then calls to his guardian angel – a figure familiar to the listeners/readers of Serbian epic poetry: it is a female figure to whom Marko refers as his blood-sister. Surprisingly, the guardian angel, who returns the feeling of intimacy by referring to Marko as her brother, does not help right away: she first chides him for dueling on a Sunday (the Sabbath), then points out the unfairness of a struggle of two against one, but ultimately reminds him of his secret weapon, a knife, which she calls his “snake in the grass” (*guje iz potaje*). The poet is careful to keep the choice of how to fight squarely with Marko, as the guardian angel at no point actually helps except to remind him of his secret weapon. She merely presents him with the choice of either losing the duel or winning, but through conduct unbecoming of a hero knight. With Musa distracted by this voice (of the guardian angel) coming from the heavens, Marko draws his hidden knife and slays his adversary. Crucially, Marko expresses no remorse yet; he sees that Musa in his chest has three heroic

hearts, one of which has a sleeping serpent on it. Awaking (here Schmitt picks up the plot again), the serpent tells Marko that he was lucky it had been sleeping. Only then does Marko realize that he has slain “one better than himself”.

Let us be even more precise about what is happening here. The word *guja*, serpent, is used to describe both Marko’s hidden knife (this is his “snake in the grass”) and the sleeping heroism of Musa’s third heart (the serpent slumbering upon it). Meaning that each has his respective secret or slumbering serpent, a metaphor for underhandedness. The difference between them is that Marko’s snake is awoken in him by his guardian angel, who explicitly asks him “where is your secretive snake?” (“*de su tebe guje iz potaje?*”, Đurić: 327; in Locke’s translation “– Forgettest thou the snake that, secret, strikes...”, 2011: 199); Musa’s snake awakes too late, only after Marko has cut open his whole abdomen. The poet is clear that both Marko and Musa *could* have fought unfairly, but that Marko *did in fact resort* to underhandedness. (We see again how Schmitt’s omission of certain details shades the relation of the victor and the defeated. Namely, in Schmitt’s version, Marko wins fair and square, and while the serpent on Musa’s heart does indicate that he is the *stronger* man, the elision of Marko’s ‘serpent’ leaves Marko’s valor as a man, if not as a fighter, unblemished.)

How is it possible – this is the most puzzling thing in the poem – that *the* Serbian epic hero is presented in this way by a Serbian poet singing to a Serbian audience about the struggle for Serbian liberation? Why is Marko presented as winning in an underhanded manner, with no ambivalence left that he did in fact *choose* to fight unfairly? How can we understand both the fact that the poet leaves no ambivalence about who is the hero (the epitome of Serbdom) and no ambivalence about the treacherous nature of his victory? Could the Serbian epic poet be subtly subverting the expectations of his audience about who the good guy is, what it means to be a good man/guy/hero/knight, and whether this good guy can be victorious?

How do we address this paradox: that the poet presents Marko as the hero knight and also a treacherous knave? And what does this tell us about what is victory? Consider how Marko is first introduced in the poem: when his name is mentioned to the Sultan (and before we actually meet the hero), he winces:

*Pogleda ga care poprijeko,  
pa on proli suze od očiju:  
„Prođi me se, hodža Čupriliću!  
Jer pominješ Kraljevića Marka?”* (Đurić 1987: 322)

(Locke:)

*The Sultan looked at Chuprilich askance,  
And tears came to his eyes; he wept, and said:  
“O Chuprilich, this is but foolishness!  
Why speak the name of Marko Kralyevich?”* (2011: 189)



Obviously, there is so little explanation as to why the Sultan would shed tears at the very mention of Marko's name because the listener/reader of the lines is already familiar with what a great hero Marko is. Again, the nature of epic poetry is that it is a response to an already familiar contextual myth. Moreover, Marko stands for all the hopes and expectations of liberation and victory of all of Serbdom over the Turk. This liberation and victory will be so heroic and complete that the Sultan himself will cry salty tears! This is the expectation of both Marko and victory the poet encounters and confronts when he chooses to sing his verses to his Serbian audience.

Marko is indeed victorious, as we see; but at the cost of being degraded from valiant knight to treacherous knave. Victory is the middle term that resolves Marko's knight/knave paradox: it is through victory that the knight becomes the knave. Ordinarily, victory *leads to* status of knight, that is, by winning duels and undergoing ordeals one becomes a knight. But Marko is already a knight and hero, victory confers no greater status to him. Underhanded victory, on the other hand, should take away knighthood, but it does not seem to in the case of Marko. This seems to call into question not the status of the victor (allowing him to either become a knight or be degraded into a knave), but the concept of victory. Where the audience/readers might expect Marko's victory (over Musa, but also in general) to be sweeping and decisive, what we get here is a narrowing of potential of victory. We would like to insist that the poem is saying that victory in general is possible, just not as it is usually imagined (by the audience). Considering Marko's crying out to God, it would seem that sweeping, complete, valiant, heroic, and above all unrepentant victory is impossible. 'You will win', the poet says, 'but not in the way you imagine' or 'victory does not mean what you think it means'.

Nor are such notions of complete victory the exclusive preserve of Ottoman-occupied Serbs. In "Wars of Colonization", Bertrand Russell speaks of English fantasies of the destruction of Germany:

*When the present war began, many people in England imagined that if the Allies were victorious Germany would cease to exist: Germany was to be "destroyed" or "smashed", and since these phrases sounded vigorous and cheering, people failed to see that they were totally devoid of meaning. There are some seventy million Germans; with great good fortune, we might, in a successful war, succeed in killing two millions of them. There would then still be sixty-eight million Germans, and in a few years the loss of population due to the war would be made good. Germany is not merely a State, but a nation, bound together by a common language, common traditions, and common ideals. Whatever the outcome of the war, this nation will still exist at the end of it, and its strength cannot be permanently impaired. But imagination is what pertains to war is still dominated by Homer and the Old Testament. (Russell 1915: 135)*

The Serbian epic poet seems to agree with Russell about the impossibility of complete annihilation of the enemy. Namely, after his victory, Marko carries Musa's head to the Sultan, who is startled seeing it – even a remnant and

remnant of the defeated, the enemy is scary. Furthermore, the very last verse of the poem tells us that the rest of Musa's body remains in Kačanik, the area where the two knights fought. The defeated, thus, is still present, lying where he was slain. Complete victory is impossible because complete destruction and annihilation of the enemy is impossible, regardless of the manner of victory or even subsequent remorse.

### V On (Marko's) Heroism: Can the Good Guys Win?

To further elaborate on our previous question of what the Serbian poet is saying (always keeping in mind that it is spoken to a particular and familiar audience) about whether the good guy can be victorious, let us bring in again the moment of Marko's self-reflection and Schmitt's altering of the adjective 'better' into 'stronger'. Marko does not seem to be bothered initially by his own use of underhanded means, his hidden knife, to win the duel; it is when he sees that Musa too has his own serpent, which happens to have slumbered through this contest, that Marko cries out to the heavens. In Schmitt's version, in which Marko has no 'snake' of his own, Musa's sleeping serpent seems to reveal to Marko that he, as it were, got lucky. Had the serpent not slept through their fight, the *stronger* man would have won. But if we include the figure of Marko's serpent, of which he was reminded by his guardian angel, it is not so clear that Musa is stronger; the two knights and heroes could be read as being of equal or comparable strength, of there being a certain symmetry between them. The difference is that Marko actually reached for his hidden weapon, while Musa's remained in wait. Then the issue becomes less one of strength and more, just as the poem has it, a matter of character: seeing the sleeping serpent, Marko realizes that Musa too could have resorted to unfair methods, but since he has not, Musa is indeed *the better man*.

Yet, there is still no question of diminishing Marko's status of hero. As we have mentioned, it would be impossible for the Serbian poet's Serbian audience to somehow think less of Marko or, God forbid, switch allegiance to Musa, the better man. This untouchability of heroic status is clear also when we consider that Marko's motivation for the duel with Musa remains rather vague. Ostensibly, he is doing it for the money (which he does get at the end) and his release from the Sultan's dungeon. But this would make Marko a mere mercenary, which is, again, an unacceptable view of the "hero of the Serbian saga" (as Schmitt puts it). Once more we encounter a paradox: Marko is and remains our (the listener's/reader's) hero, our guy, despite behaving so unheroically, that is, not being the good guy of the story. How is this possible? Just as in the case of victory, it would appear that the poet's intention is not to diminish Marko's status as heroic figure, but rather to call into question the audience's conception of the hero, perhaps even offering a heroic notion of a different kind.

What is this different notion of hero that is subtly proffered in lieu of a shining and valiant one the audience expects? To answer this, we would like to turn to an essay written by Michael Walzer in 1973, on the problem of dirty

hands. Drawing on Machiavelli, Walzer points out that men of politics and war must learn how not to be good (Walzer 1973). That is to say, it would be naïve to enter a political contest or war without knowing how to make use of, and thus ability to control, means that fall outside the ethical bounds of the contest or struggle. (And such means must be ‘learned’ because such knowledge does not come naturally.) Walzer transposes Machiavelli into contemporary language: “Even if they would like to act differently, they probably can not: for other men are all too ready to hustle and lie for power and glory, and it is the others who set the terms of the competition” (Walzer 1973: 163). Recall that, indeed, both Marko and Musa, the good guy and the bad guy, have their respective secret serpents, and for both of them the ‘terms of competition’ were set by someone else (in this case, the Sultan).

Where this role of hero becomes even more complicated is precisely in the role of the audience in this whole question. Because, although the hero seeks personal glory, he is also necessarily the hero of the people. (Perhaps an epic poem could be sung about a hero in whom the audience has no investment and whose morality it could therefore judge objectively, but this would be completely uninteresting and is certainly not the case with Marko.) Our involvement with Marko’s heroism, or the Serbian songs’ audience involvement in it, also obligate Marko to win for us. Says Walzer: “He has purposes in mind, causes and projects that require the support and redound to the benefit, not of each of us individually, but of all of us together. He hustles, lies, and intrigues *for us...*” (1973: 162–163, emphasis in the original). Paradoxically perhaps, one kind of heroism comes at the expense of the other: Marko’s diminishment as a valiant, albeit naïve knight is required so that he can be the victorious but flawed hero his people needs him to be.

## VI The Hollowness of Schmitt’s Victory

However, Marko’s use of illicit means and his regret complicate significantly the concepts of victory and hero. Marko’s inviolate heroic status with the poem’s Serbian audience, paradoxically, entangles him in ways that make it impossible for him to remain the (kind of) hero he is at the outset or achieve the (kind of) victory sought or expected. It certainly complicates the figure of Marko unrecognizably from the one Carl Schmitt uses. The messiness of the concepts of victory and hero that emerges from the epic poem stands in contrast to the stylized and sanitized version presented by Schmitt. His lionizing of Tocqueville and Marko turns them into mere good guys of the story – in the case of Marko that is the story of the poem, and for Tocqueville, the story is history itself – a rhetorical move that allows Schmitt a kind of moral victory while he is in prison. But a close reading of the poem shows that Schmitt’s (concepts of) hero and victory are rather hollow, manipulative even of his own reader and audience, and as such should be resisted.

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Petar Bojanić i Edvard Đorđević

## Neurednost pobeđe i junaštva. Kratak odgovor Karlu Šmitu

### Apstrakt

U članku se dovodi u pitanje jedan pasus iz knjige *Ex Captivitate Salus*, Karla Šmita – knjige koja je, kao što je poznato, pisana u nirnberškom zatvoru u Nemačkoj, 1946. godine. U tom pasusu se Šmit oslanja na detalj iz srpske narodne epske pesme kako bi argumentovao svoje razumevanje istoriografije, pobeđe i figure junaka. Analizirajući celu pesmu Marko Kraljević i Musa Kesedžija, iz koje Šmit preuzima anegdotu o junaku Marku, u članku se ukazuje na to da su koncepti pobeđe, pobeđnika, junaka i junaštva u samoj pesmi znatno komplikovaniji i neuredniji od one koju Šmit predstavlja. Obraćajući se publici koju vrlo dobro poznaje, srpski pevač podriva pojednostavljena očekivanja o junaštvu i pobeđi srpskog junaka, Marka Kraljevića. Članak zaključuje da je ova komplikovana slika iz same pesme daleko od pojednostavljene i manipulativne slike koju nudi Šmit.

Ključne reči: Karl Šmit, *Ex Captivitate Salus*, srpska epska poezija, pobeđa, junak.

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Elvio Baccarini

## CONSENT OR PUBLIC REASON? LEGITIMACY OF NORMS APPLIED IN ASPD AND COVID-19 SITUATIONS

### ABSTRACT

This paper extends Alan John Simmons's conceptual distinction between Lockean (or consent) and Kantian (or justificatory) conceptions of legitimacy that he applied to the question of the legitimacy of states, to the issue of legitimacy of public decisions. I criticise the consent conception of legitimacy defended by Simmons, and I defend the Rawlsian version of the justificatory conception of legitimacy from his objection. The approach of this paper is distinctive because the two conceptions are assessed by investigating, using the method of reflective equilibrium, their respective prescriptions concerning the treatment of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) and epidemiologic measures.

I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium does not support the consent conception. Considering the issues of treatment of APD and of epidemiologic measures, I argue that the consent conception of legitimacy is not well-equipped for the evaluation of norms that are not strictly self-regarding. This causes a deficit of prescriptions for relevant social responses. Further, by considering the case of responses to epidemics, I argue that such a conception can avoid harmful consequences only by recurring to additional, and independent, premises. This does not cause incoherence but reduces the coherence of a normative system. Finally, the consent conception is not equipped to support social cooperation in an optimal way, which has proved to be necessary in critical conditions, like a pandemic. On the other hand, I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium supports the Rawlsian version of justificatory conception of legitimacy, because of its advantages in handling the indicated issues. In addition, I maintain that this justificatory conception is respectful of freedom and equality of agents as moral self-legislators, and, thus, it is not vulnerable to Simmons's main criticism.

### KEYWORDS

Antisocial personality disorder, COVID-19, justification, legitimacy, public reason, Rawls, reflective equilibrium, Simmons

1. In the present paper, I discuss two conceptions of legitimacy of public decisions. By following Alan John Simmons (1999), I distinguish between a conception that links legitimacy to the consent of persons subject to decisions, and a conception that links legitimacy to the justification of decisions. The

former conception is called the Lockean conception of legitimacy, while the latter is called Kantian. In a sense, one can classify both as consent conceptions of legitimacy. The difference is that what matters for the former is actual consent, while for the latter it is hypothetical consent (Stark 2000). In my view, Simmons's conceptual distinction is well founded. It is true that authors he classifies as Kantians talk about hypothetical consent, but it is important to note that this means that what is relevant is the consent of reasonable persons, when they employ their reasonableness, i.e., they respond to valid reasons. In other words, what matters is their consent when they respond to justification (Horton 2012, 133–134). Thus, we see justification as fundamental for legitimacy. This supports defining the conception as justificatory.

By 'legitimacy' I refer, in an adapted way, to "the complex moral right [...] to be binding [...] on its subjects, to have its subjects comply [...], and to use coercion to enforce the duties" (Simmons 1999: 746). Although I borrow the frame of the debate from Simmons, the focus of this author, as well as of others working in this field, is different from mine, and the results of the discussions are not necessarily equivalent. Simmons, and others, discuss the legitimacy of the state in general. On the other hand, I discuss the legitimacy of public decisions that regard policies and laws.

One could object to my focus on the legitimacy of public decisions by saying that it becomes futile once the legitimacy of the state is established. The legitimacy of the state implies the legitimacy of making public decisions, the objection would say. Thus, Thomas Nagel says that the debate about legitimacy regards the framework where decisions are made, and it is not more extended than this (Nagel 1991: 33). But, in fact, there are reasons for debating public decisions as separate issues to which we need to attribute legitimacy, as I show below.

Together with the more abstract discussion of legitimacy of public decisions, the paper has a more practical focus as well. The discussion is developed through illustrations focused on the treatment of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), as well as epidemiologic measures, with an emphasis on the COVID-19 pandemic. Such measures range from mild requirements, like wearing masks, to more demanding obligations or restrictions represented by partial limitations of freedom of movement, or limitations on running a business (e.g., temporarily closing nightclubs), and the most rigorous ones like lockdowns.

By relying on these illustrations, I opt for the Kantian conception of legitimacy. My conclusion is that the justificatory conception of legitimacy is better than the rival, at least when decisions that do not regard dimensions of life that are strictly self-regarding are concerned. Basically, the reason is to avoid social interactions that would be harmful, as well as the rule of ignorance. The reason why I opt for the critical comparison of these two conceptions of legitimacy, and I do not analyse others, is that these are the two views of legitimacy implicitly engaged in the public disputes. This is, for example, visible in the opposition to epidemiologic measures. This opposition is frequently based on an argumentative structure that we can associate to the consent conception of

legitimacy. In general, this conception seems to be a firm assumption in health care cases of decision-making, where the principle of informed consent is taken as supreme (Greene 2016: 76).

In discussing the theoretical question of legitimacy and the practical issues, I employ the method of reflective equilibrium. To put it in simple terms, reflective equilibrium is a method of reasoning about morality, proposed by John Rawls (1999: 18–19, 42–45), that consists in the mutual assessment of moral beliefs at various level of generality. Thus, as persons engaged in moral reasoning, we assess moral principles by verifying whether their application is acceptable for our considered judgments. But, on the other hand, we assess considered judgments through general principles. We strongly endorse some of these principles, and when a judgment is in contradiction with them, we have a reason to doubt it. We arrive to a reasonable result when, in the process of mutual adjustment, through revisions and corrections at all levels of generality, we form a set of moral beliefs that sustain each other.

Thus, in the present paper I verify which of the opposed conceptions of legitimacy fits better with our considered moral judgments in healthcare questions, with a focus on ASPD and epidemiologic measures. At the same time, I use the preferred conception of legitimacy to make further order among our considered moral judgments.

In the paper, I proceed as follows. First, I show reasons to discuss the legitimacy of public decisions. Second, I describe Simmons's explanation of two models of legitimacy, and his reason for favouring the one based on consent. Third, I consider challenges to Simmons's favourite model of legitimacy through the illustration of public health issues linked to ASPD and pandemic measures. Fourth, I describe further reasons to embrace the rival, justificatory, view of legitimacy. Fifth, I offer some examples of how the rival model of legitimacy can function in practice.

2. I now aim to explain the pertinence of discussing the legitimacy of public decisions. As I show above, this can be problematized. The first reason to discuss the legitimacy of public decisions is a contingent one. Simmons, the principal author that I discuss in the present paper, has John Rawls (2005) as his primary critical target. Rawls, among others, discusses the legitimacy of public decisions. For example, he indicates the question of abortion as a subject of legitimacy (Rawls 2005: 243–244). Secondly, the legitimacy of public decisions is indicated as a relevant question by Amanda Greene, one of the prominent authors in the debate, although she opts for discussing legitimacy of the state (Greene 2016: 72). Thirdly, the legitimacy of public decisions is present in public disputes, apart from questioning the legitimacy of the state. Such are, for example, cases of civil disobedience, where decisions that regard racial segregation are at the focus, not the legitimacy of the state. Even when authors do not put the question in these terms, it appears evident (, at least in my view) that, by defending disobedience of a law, authors deny legitimacy to it. But at the same time, they affirm loyalty to the system as a whole (King



1999; Rawls 1999: 319–323). It appears to me that such a view is supported by John Horton (2012), an author engaged in disputing the legitimacy of states. His thesis is that even unjust states can be legitimate. In his view, however, this does not mean that one needs always to act in accordance with the state's demands (Horton 2012: 135). For example, Horton maintains that the state can act outside its domain of authority. Further, its demands can conflict with opposing and normatively stronger demands. Horton adds that this does not mean that one should respect the demands of the state only when she agrees with them. However, it seems that such cases indicate that there is a separate question of the legitimacy of public decisions. For supporting this claim, it is not needed to deny the general legitimacy of the state; it is sufficient to endorse the view that such legitimacy is “not necessarily a decisive one” (Horton 2012: 135), i.e., a concession that Horton accepts. In fact, he does not extend explicitly his discussion to legitimacy of public decisions, but, in my view, his thesis motivates such an issue.

I do not intend to say that it is appropriate to dispute separately the legitimacy of any single new public decision. It is clearly absurd to say that the legitimacy of all public decisions is under such a constraint. Sometimes legitimate decisions are settled in advance, for example, in virtue of the established legitimacy of the decision-making procedures or the basic structure of society. It is, for example, absurd to say that the decision to punish murderers is under such a constraint, i.e., that it is not legitimate unless accepted by all members of a society in a specific situation. It is clearly absurd to say that the results of an election are not legitimate, simply because they are not accepted by all, after they are settled fairly, in accordance with the procedure established and accepted in advance. The public decisions that I have in mind in the present paper are those that are still unsettled. Such could be decisions that regard possible extensions of already accepted principles, or new balancing of already accepted principles, e.g., because of extraordinary and unexpected events.

Thus, the legitimacy of the state and legitimacy of a law (or public decision) are separate questions, although they influence, or, even, determine, each other.

3. According to the Lockean conception of legitimacy, no person is subject to the authority of a state if she has not consented to it (Simmons 1976: 274). In my extension of Simmons's discussion, the question under consideration is whether consent is the condition of legitimacy of public decisions.

Let us start with Simmons's definition of legitimate political power: “Political power is morally legitimate, and those subject to it are morally obligated to obey, only where the subjects have freely consented to the exercise of such power and only where that power continues to be exercised within the terms of the consent given” (Simmons 1999: 745). The fact, when it is a fact, that a political power is justified, is not sufficient to attribute legitimacy to it.

The Lockean conception, like Simmons explains, wants to separate two questions. On the one hand, there is a question of the quality of public decisions (or, in Simmons's original discussion, of the state). When we have in

mind such considerations, we are focused on the justification of public decisions. However, these qualities and this justification are separate questions from the legitimacy of public decisions. We can represent the difference with an illustration. Think about a shop. It offers high quality products with low prices. This, however, is not sufficient for the shop to have the right to have us as customers (Simmons, 1999: 752). Similarly, public decisions that contribute to the well-being of citizens in an exemplary way are not legitimate in virtue of this. Enforcing them, despite the will of interested people, disrespects voluntariness. In Simmons's words: "To deny this is simply to deny the natural freedom of persons, a basic and plausible Lockean premise" (Simmons, 1999: 752). Respect of natural freedom of persons is achieved only if public decisions receive legitimacy through consent. The basic merit of the consent view of legitimacy is, thus, represented by respecting natural freedom and voluntariness.

The strength of the consent doctrine, in Simmons's view, corresponds to the weakness of the justificatory theory of legitimacy. Like other authors (Greene 2016, 70, 74–76), Simmons sees its main problems in its factual detachment, or, at best, only a partial correspondence to voluntariness (Simmons, 1999: 760–761). Response to what people choose is neglected. Instead, what people ought to choose is favoured, on the basis of the justification of the choices (Simmons, 1999: 761). But by omitting to attribute moral significance to voluntariness "and how we have actually freely lived and chosen, confused and unwise and unreflective though we may have been" (Simmons, 1999: 763), we "deny the natural freedom of persons, a basic and plausible Lockean premise" (Simmons, 1999: 752).

Simmons rebuts a possible ground of legitimacy that could be appealed to by Kantians and that is represented by morally important goals, like "the most efficient provision of [...] security and welfare to which every person has a right" (Simmons, 1999: 767). Namely, in his view, among else, there is no duty to contribute to others' "most efficient provision of [...] security and welfare. [...] On the Lockean view, others have rights against us only that we do our fair shares in contributing to acceptable levels of security and well-being" (Simmons, 1999: 768).

4. I now assess the consent conception of legitimacy through illustrations represented by treatment of ASPD and epidemiologic measures. When speaking about questions of healthcare, the consent conception of legitimacy appears to be strongly intuitive, in virtue of the strongly accepted principle of informed consent in relation to them (Greene 2016, 76). But I think that the illustrations that I show do not support this view of legitimacy as decisively as it appears at first sight, and, in fact, in one of the illustrations, we find convincing intuitions to reject it.

I start with a discussion that regards possible biomedical interventions intended to remove moral impairments in the cases of criminal offenders who committed particularly severe criminal offences and who refuse rehabilitation. To circumscribe the discussion to moral problems that concern medical

interventions, I consider only cases of criminal offenders with forms of ASPD that favour severe criminal offences. I present here a possible case.

Imagine a dangerous criminal offender who has committed a ferocious criminal act. If left free, the person would iterate that criminal act. Think, for an illustration, of the Austrian film *Fear*, directed by Gerald Kargl, and based on a real-life character. The person has been released from prison. Immediately after that, he has massacred a family in a cruel way. In that story, the person has been wrongly released, because of having been deemed no longer dangerous. However, imagine a similar character that has been correctly diagnosed as being persistently dangerous, because of severe moral impairments. It is clearly established that the person resists rehabilitation, and she, even, does not want, or is not able, to simulate. The consequence that appears obvious is that the person needs to be kept in prison for far more time. But imagine that we have at our disposal interventions to remove the moral impairments and render the person non-aggressive. In fact, some authors indicate that there are promising prospective means (Chew, Douglas, Faber 2018). Would it be permissible to do so?

There are proposals that justify interventions in such cases (Douglas 2014; Douglas 2018; Baccarini, Malatesti 2017). Douglas's famous line is to argue that there are no significant moral differences between reactions to criminal acts that are usually socially and morally accepted, like imprisonment, and mandatory biomedical treatments for reaching moral improvement. In other words, he argues that incarceration and compulsory biomedical treatment of the kind indicated above are morally equivalent, and, thus, there are no reasons to refuse the latter while we accept the former. Baccarini and Malatesti (2017) offer a justification inspired by Gerald Gaus's (2011) model of public justification.

Other authors reject any kind of such mandatory interventions. The appeal is to the inviolability of the mental integrity. I will show briefly two of such refusals. One of the two authors that I take as an example of such a thesis is Robert Sparrow (2014). In fact, he is engaged in a wider discussion than the one of moral improvement of criminal offenders. He participates in the dispute about mandatory moral enhancement in general, but his arguments are relevant in the narrow context, as well.<sup>1</sup>

Sparrow remarks what he sees as the peculiar wrong of mandatory moral enhancement. Contrary to moral development through education, mandatory moral enhancement does not satisfy the condition that requires "to justify the norms that have shaped [...] the project and its content with reasons that the person being educated should accept" (Sparrow 2014: 26). This is a condition needed to respect the other part as equal, because it allows her the possibility to reply, and, possibly, to change the view of the interlocutor. This possibility is lost through mandatory biomedical enhancement. In such a case, new character traits are instilled on a person by the exclusive will of another person,

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1 I have written about these themes in Baccarini 2014, 2015.

and, thus, the former person is treated like an object. She loses her freedom and the condition of being equal.

In fact, in a society that permits mandatory biotechnological enhancement, no person is free and equal (Sparrow 2014: 26–28). At first sight, we could think the opposite. We could think that because most of us do not have criminal inclinations, our freedom is not threatened. We do not want to have character traits that the indicated case of mandatory biotechnological enhancement modifies, and thus (apparently, in Sparrow's view), our freedom is not menaced. But, in fact, says Sparrow, by embracing the republican view of freedom, when mandatory enhancement is permitted, we are in a condition like that of the slave of a benevolent master. The master leaves to the slave the freedom to do everything that he wants to do, but nonetheless, the freedom that the slave has is only a concession that can be revoked. However, freedom that depends on another's arbitrary will is, in fact, defective freedom. The fully valuable conception of freedom is established through non-domination, a condition when a person is the master of her life.

Sparrow concludes that mandatory interventions for moral enhancement are defeated. One could say that this does not, by itself, indicate that Sparrow is opposed to treatments for improvement of the moral character in the specific case of ASPD. However, it seems plausible to derive such a conclusion, in the cases of persons in condition of ASPD that are, in general, competent to assess their condition. Sparrow's argument, thus, represents a possible support to the affirmation of the principle of informed consent in the present case.

The other author whose proposal I discuss as an example of opposition to the kind of biomedical interventions under scrutiny, in the absence of consent, is Elizabeth Shaw (2018). In fact, she intends to develop a discussion in the domain of criminal law. But, because of the presence of persons with ASPD among criminal offenders resistant to rehabilitation whose rights to resist interventions she defends, it can be interpreted as a debate on medical treatment, as well.

In her view, interfering with one's bodily or mental integrity without the consent of the subject of intervention is a strong expression of disrespect, and of attribution of lesser value than each person deserves. This constitutes the moral ground for rejecting such interventions. In Shaw's view, it is this that is the dominant moral consideration in the present issue, and not a basic appeal to human rights by itself (Shaw 2018: 323). The strong disrespect expressed by such interventions, and, thus, the strong normative ground to oppose them, derive from the fact that moral and physical integrity are constitutive of a person. In addition to the attack on personhood, Shaw adds the normative relevance of the fact that such interventions, when there is no consent of the subject, often harm agency and cause suffering and humiliation (Shaw 2018: 324). In virtue of all this, there is a persistent strong moral case against such interventions, even when some of the attributive moral features are not present.

To be sure, Shaw and Sparrow do not ground their positions on the consent conception of legitimacy. On the contrary, their theses, if eventually justified, would offer reasons in support of this view of legitimacy. This is the reason

why their contributions are relevant for the present discussion. The possible consequence is that there are some values with strong normative weight that deprive of legitimacy those public decisions that are not supported by the consent of the persons involved. Such are those that regard interventions to morally improve criminal offenders with ASPD, who are resistant to rehabilitation in virtue of their evaluations. This appears to give reasons for endorsing the consent conception of legitimacy.

However, there are authors who resist this appearance. They remark socio-economic reasons that support such interventions, despite possible reasons that oppose it (McMahan 2018). For example, resistance to rehabilitation causes longer imprisonment, which is very expensive and interventions for the improvement of moral dispositions could reduce such costs. Financial resources could be, thus, redirected to socially valuable goals, like improving public health services, protecting persons' health, improving public schools, etc. The question, thus, is problematic, because it does not regard only personal domains, but also the allocation of resources for competing valuable goals.

I do not intend to presently adjudicate this debate. It is, for me, sufficient to show that we are in front of an allocative question that requires public deliberation. The public deliberation needs to be adjudicated through the best reasons that can be appealed in the dispute. In other words, public decisions must be established through justification. Such justification attributes legitimacy to them. At the end, it can be proven that Shaw's and Sparrow's arguments are decisive, and that the consent of persons is required for the legitimacy of interventions. But consent is not the foundation of legitimacy. The normative strength of consent, in the present case, is sustained by justification, which represents the foundation of legitimacy. Eventually, we could conclude that interventions are legitimate only when consent is present. But the rule holds not in virtue of the consent conception of legitimacy. Instead, the rule holds because it is justified. In other words, there is not a foundational role for consent. Its victorious normative status is ascertained through sound justification that establishes its supremacy over competing normative standards, on the basis of valid reasons, in specific circumstances.

5. I comment, now, the consent view of legitimacy through the examples of rejections of epidemiologic measures (BBC 2020; Bruemmer 2020). When I do not specify differently, I generally denote them as anti-mask, but protests against coercive epidemiologic measures are not limited to the refusal of masks. Recently, anti-vax and anti-mask protests have come together in public expressions of opposition (Bogel-Burroughs 2020). Like Rupali Limaye says, anti-vax and anti-mask opponents employ a similar rhetoric. A basic concept that they employ is that of 'individual self-management'. The idea is that each individual should be in control of making decisions (Bogel-Burroughs 2020). This could be an instance of the consent conception of legitimacy.

There are more articulated libertarian expressions on epidemiologic measures that correspond more clearly to the consent conception of legitimacy.

Contrary to the protests mentioned above, Jason Kuznicki thinks that people should wear masks and practice social distancing in a pandemic. By adopting Simmons's conceptual scheme, he would say that wearing masks is justified, but also that this cannot be legitimately mandated (Kuznicki 2020). In conformity with the consent conception of legitimacy, such behaviours need to be the result of free choices. Thus, there appears to be here a distinction between legitimacy and justification. He compares wearing a mask to brushing teeth. Both are norms of personal hygiene that we should follow, but it is not the business of public authorities to enforce them by coercion. This is true, even though wearing a mask is more important, because of its relevance for protecting from incomparably stronger harms. Kuznicki supports his claim by appealing to an expectation that, if true, would avoid dilemma in social choices. In his view, people have diffused inclinations to follow hygienic norms, and this gives us a reason to think that they would also be ready to wear masks. Their opposition to masks derives from the obligation to wear them, despite this inclination. This is an optimistic view. The problem is, however, that in fact there is no clear evidence for it, to say the least. Some researchers even show connections between misbehaviour in the pandemic and anti-social character traits (Miguel et al. 2020; Nowak 2020). Thus, although I do not exclude the possibility of diffused voluntary acceptance of wearing masks (perhaps, in some cultural contexts more than in others), the presence of people who refuse to do this must be taken in consideration.<sup>2</sup> For this reason, we need to think about policies addressed to people who persist in their refusal to wear masks. All evidence indicates that Kuznicki does not attribute legitimacy to mandatory wearing of masks, and, thus, we can take his view as a clear illustration of the thesis that justification does not imply legitimacy. I think, however, that under examination, we can reasonably judge that his view needs to be rejected, and that, in this way, we find support for affirming the connection of justification and legitimacy.

The view that a public health decision that concerns measures to contain the spreading of a virus is legitimate only if it is sustained by consent of people involved, is opposed even by libertarian views that affirm the need to be concerned with the rights of all people involved.

Jessica Flanigan (2020) is hesitant towards accepting legitimacy of coercive measures of states that restrict personal freedoms, against the opposition of persons, but, at the end, she accepts them, under conditions. First, Flanigan accepts that the duty of wearing masks is justified. Despite the very strong concern that libertarians attribute to freedom, when there is a scientific health justification for public decisions (containing the spread of the virus, and the serious danger of COVID-19), and interferences with human rights are rather limited, there is a moral justification for measures that limit liberty, but intend to avoid potentially harmful behaviour. In brief, people should wear masks, or even stay home, if this is a justified measure. The reason is that infecting

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2 Thanks to a reviewer for this point.

a person with a harmful virus violates the fundamental right to bodily integrity of this person. The risk to contribute to such damage puts an obligation on each of us.

However, there is a different question from whether persons should respect such measures. This is whether governments should have the moral authority to enforce wearing masks and lockdowns, or other coercive measures. This is the question of legitimacy. Here the answer is under stronger conditions. Governments might enforce wearing masks or other coercive measures and enforce lockdown (by which they impede some people to run their business) only if there are no alternative measures sufficiently efficacious, and only if doing this provides benefits that are superior to the costs. Thus, a condition for attributing legitimacy to restrictive epidemiologic measures is that governments first try to mitigate the spreading of the virus by less coercive means.

We see that Flanigan is more concessive, from the standpoint of the legitimacy of public decisions, than Kuznicki. At the end, epidemiologic coercive measures to mitigate the pandemic can be legitimate, because of being justified, although high burdens of proof need to be met.

Andy Craig expresses a similar view (2020). He says, for example, that social distance must be kept on a voluntary basis, as far as it is possible, and his view about this is rather optimistic. He favours voluntariness, but accepts the legitimacy of coercion, when this is justified (again, although the burden of proof is high).

I have shown two libertarian views that oppose the consent conception of legitimacy as implicitly applied by Kuznicki, and as implicitly present in part of the motivations of anti-mask protests. The libertarian elements in such views are represented by the high burdens of proof for the justification of coercion. However, coercion can nonetheless be legitimate in specific cases when it is justified. The question, now, is how reliable are the intuitions that support such views. On one hand, they are contrasted by intuitions endorsed by Kuznicki, who implicitly endorses the consent conception of legitimacy. On the other hand, these intuitions respond to the duty not to represent a threat of harm to others, as is the case of people not wearing masks during a pandemic. Thus, this view is also coherent with a widely shared principle.

In fact, obligations imposed by the harm principle are strong and we cannot imagine a plausible normative system that contradicts it. It seems to me that Simmons wants to offer a theory respectful of this duty, when he says that “On the Lockean view, others have rights against us only that we do our fair shares in contributing to acceptable levels of security and well-being” (Simmons 1999: 768). Thus, it appears to be legitimate to enforce restrictions of liberties, from the obligation to wear a mask, to more rigorous requirements, when these are needed to control the spread of a virus that threatens security and well-being.

What we have at this point is that views that implicitly correspond to the consent conception of legitimacy, and oppose coercive epidemiologic measures, are defeated by the method of reflective equilibrium, because of strong and shared commitment to not harming others.

The question remains whether only the views that we have seen as opposed to epidemiologic measures are defeated, or, more generally, the consent conception of legitimacy as such is defeated. Could we imagine a more sophisticated version of the consent conception of legitimacy that avoids the critique addressed to Kuznicki's thesis? The question is legitimate because, as we have seen, Simmons introduces a qualification that intends to save his theory from consequences that would be deleterious, if it would not be able to avoid them.

In order to answer, we need to investigate whether Simmons's theses are well-ordered in reflective equilibrium. In my view at least, they do not offer the best expression of reflective equilibrium.

Namely, by relying on Simmons's judgment about duties that we have toward others, it seems that the range of application of the consent view of legitimacy, at least, needs to be qualified. The question is, how? One could say that the consent conception of legitimacy is part of a coherent view with other principles and norms. In such a view, consent is not the foundation of all norms in society and the consent conception of legitimacy is only one of the normative consequences of the natural principle of liberty. But there are other principles as well, that need to be coherent with the natural principle of liberty and with the consent conception of legitimacy. One of these principles is represented, for example, by the one stated by Simmons, that says that "others have rights against us [...] that we do our fair shares in contributing to acceptable levels of security and well-being" (Simmons 1999: 768).

However, there is a fundamental problem for this strategy. It is represented by the question of where these principles, inclusive of the principle of natural liberty, come from. This is a legitimate challenge, and it is necessary to provide reasons to defeat it, as well as to offer reasons to endorse the principles supported by Simmons. Further, it is needed to provide reasons for the proper balancing between all these principles. We see now that consent cannot represent the foundation of the legitimacy of public decisions. Neither the principle of natural liberty nor consent can be foundational – we need to support their role with appropriate reasons. However, this means that, at the end, justification of these principles is needed, inclusive of the principle of natural liberty, and of the consent conception of legitimacy derived from it. Therefore, it becomes clear that consent is not foundational of legitimacy. It could be true that consent is needed for the legitimacy of a public decision but whether this is so is established through justification. Justification is thus foundational of legitimacy.

This discussion shows reasons in support of the thesis that the consent conception of legitimacy does not fit well with the entirety of our normative commitments and thus that it is not justified in reflective equilibrium.

6. I describe now the specific justificatory theory of legitimacy that I embrace, which is Rawls's doctrine (Rawls 2005). In this view, public decisions are properly justified, and thus legitimate, when they are sustained through the model of public reason. This model requires public justification addressed to each



person as reasonable. The conception of reasonableness that Rawls assumes is specific.

Reasonableness includes a political part, as well as an epistemic part. The political part is constituted by the endorsement of the organizing idea of society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal persons, as well as related principles and ideals (Rawls 2005: 9). Thus, among valid justificatory reasons there are certain basic rights and liberties, as well as the organizing idea of reciprocity (Rawls 2005). The epistemic part is constituted by reasons like “methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial” (Rawls 2005: 224).

Therefore, justification must be grounded on reasons for which we can reasonably expect endorsement by all persons as free, equal, and epistemically responsible (Rawls 2005: 224). A public decision is legitimate when it is justified through such reasons, as Rawls expresses in his liberal principle of legitimacy (Rawls 2005: 137).

Like Simmons says, the Kantian / Rawlsian conception of legitimacy is a middle way between the consent view of legitimacy, and a more impersonal conception (Simmons 1999: 762), such as, for example, the correctness conception of legitimacy. While for the Rawlsian / Kantian what matters is justification acceptable to each reasonable person when they reason as reasonable persons, according to the correctness conception, a public decision is legitimate when it is justified through the *de facto* best reasons, even when they are not accessible to all. This view is well represented by Richard Arneson: “Suppose the pope really does have a pipeline to God, hence warranted true beliefs of the utmost importance for all of us. Suppose that each human person can attain eternal salvation but only if she lives according to the dictates of the Roman Catholic Church. In this case the pope is surely entitled, and probably morally required, to coerce the rest of us for our own good, if he happens to have sufficient military force at his disposal. Too much would be at stake. What blocks the pope’s entitlements is that, in fact, there is no reason to believe he has such a pipeline or in other words warranted true beliefs to the effect that outside the Church there is no salvation” (Arneson 2016: 159).

The distinction between the Rawlsian and the correctness conception of legitimacy relevant here is that, although Rawls does not leave public decisions as hostages of individuals’ consent, it is not part of his view of legitimacy to impose evaluative standards, independently of the fact that some reasonable persons do not have reasons to endorse them. The specificity of Rawls’s theory is that it is respectful of the pluralism characteristic of liberal democracies, and thus justification is not based on doctrines and reasons that are controversial among reasonable persons.

I explain my endorsement of Rawls’s justificatory conception of legitimacy by showing how it is supported by reflective equilibrium. First, I answer to Simmons’s challenge that objects to Kantians insufficient care for voluntariness. The challenge is relevant for the possibility of a theory to be supported in reflective equilibrium, because voluntariness is a widely shared value. I

agree with Simmons's thesis that, although Rawls's conception does not link legitimacy to justification that is not accessible to some reasonable persons, it loses a full adherence to voluntariness. But, I share Nagel's view that the kind of Kantian conception endorsed by Rawls is reasonably close to voluntariness (Nagel 1991: 36).

Rawls achieves reasonable approximation to voluntariness, because he affirms the person's authority as a source of morality. Such authority is not given up, because justification is addressed to the reasons that people endorse, when they manifest reasonableness, and this is an expression of respect to them as free, equal, and epistemically responsible. Thus, Rawls's justificatory conception of legitimacy answers to our considered judgments that attribute a strong moral status to persons' moral autonomy and authority.

We can support this thesis through the illustration represented by Mill in the famous bridge example (Mill 1859/1977: 294). Think about a person, Alf, who wants to walk across a bridge. The bridge is defective and walking over it is dangerous. Alf is coercively stopped by Betty, who knows that walking over the bridge is dangerous. In one sense, Betty is disrespectful toward Alf's voluntariness, but, on the other hand, she is respectful of his deep voluntariness, because Alf's will is to arrive safely to a place in the quick way, not to pass exactly over this bridge. Had he the knowledge that walking over the bridge is dangerous, he would not want to do this. Like Gaus says, Alf "has an accessible reason not to cross the bridge, and that is why stopping him for crossing is compatible with respecting him as a free person (Gaus 2011: 33).

We arrive to the analogy with wearing masks, and respecting decisions based on the state of the art of epidemiology insights. I presume that ordinary people deeply want the pandemic to be contained, health to be protected, and economic activities reasonably preserved. They do not want the collapse of the public health system and a humanitarian catastrophe. If they oppose decisions based on the state of the art of an expert field (i.e. epidemiology in this example), they act incoherently with their deep will. On the contrary, coercing them is respectful of their deep voluntariness. This helps to answer to an intuitive sense of disturbance caused by the fact that "an individual is treated as though her actual non-consent does not matter for legitimacy, as long as her hypothetical consent is obtained" (Greene 2016: 77). The reply to the worry is based on the endorsement of a specific way of affirming the moral authority of persons, based on respecting the reasons they have, and not their flaws (Gaus 2011: 232–258).

There is also a more impersonal reason to give up voluntariness, in some cases, and this is that the will of persons can be silly and unreasonable. Linking legitimacy to the consent of persons, when we do not speak about strictly self-regarding actions, in order to save voluntariness, exposes public decisions to epistemic flaws and consequently to unreasonable policies, as well as antisocial or anti-cooperative attitudes, inclusive of disrespect of Mill's harm to others principle. Such a principle, or a principle close to it, is strongly endorsed. Disrespecting it most likely amounts to being defeated through the application of the method of reflective equilibrium.

On the other hand, Rawls's conception of legitimacy is able to protect from epistemic flaws, since it can be careful about the epistemic quality of reasons we can employ in justifying public decisions, at least when questions of basic justice, rights and liberties are concerned. Such are paradigmatically "methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial" (Rawls 2005: 224).

Rawls's conception of justification of public decisions, and the correlate conception of legitimacy, warrant fair cooperation because all public decisions that concern basic justice, rights and liberties must be justified through reasons that each of us can accept as free and equal. This is a further way to indicate that these conceptions are protective of persons' freedom and equality, as well as that they are sustained in reflective equilibrium.

Before concluding, I comment on a challenge to the possibility of justifying the Kantian conception of legitimacy through reflective equilibrium. Greene objects to this conception by appealing to intuitions that, in fact, it seems plausible to interpret as shared. She invites us to think about two regimes. R1 is supported by 30% of its subjects. R2 is supported by 80% of its subjects. The strong intuition, says Greene, is that R2 has stronger legitimacy than R1. The explanation of this intuition, in her view, is represented by our persuasion that popular acceptance matters, and that justification is not sufficient for legitimacy (Greene 2016: 75–76).

I agree with Greene's intuition, but I think that it is possible to accept it, and justify the Kantian conception of legitimacy, at the same time. First, it is important to note that popular acceptance in the present illustration is not equivalent neither to the consent about which Simmons speaks in his description and defence of the Lockean conception of legitimacy, nor to informed consent in medicine, that is appealed to by Greene in another illustration. In those cases, consent is a kind of right to veto. On the other hand, when speaking about popular acceptance, consent is something like the right to an equal say in public decision-making.

At this point, we can present a defence of the justificatory conception of legitimacy inspired by Thomas Christiano's theory of procedural democracy (2008). Christiano indicates the normative importance of democratic decision-making, because its procedures operationalize the status of equals of citizens. However, equality is not manifested only through the status of equals in procedures of public decision-making; it is also affirmed by recognition of certain liberties, such as: freedom of conscience, freedom of association, etc. Expressions of such freedoms can be beyond the range of democratic authority. In conclusion, other things being equal, a public decision that is sustained through a democratic procedure respectful of equality has stronger legitimacy than a public decision that is not sustained in this way, but sometimes protection of other rights has priority and legitimacy in opposition to democratic decisions, and democratic decisions are not legitimate.

We have now the resources to reply to Greene's challenge. Popular acceptance matters for legitimacy, because this is a form of endorsement of the equal normative status of each person. Sometimes, it is sufficient in order to

attribute legitimacy, and sometimes absence of popular acceptance is sufficient to deny legitimacy. However, it does not represent the only important normative standard. For example, some basic rights and liberties matter. Thus, a political order (and a public decision) that is supported by 80% of the population, but strongly discriminates the rest of the population is not legitimate. Conversely, a political order (and a public decision) that is refused by 80% of the population, but it guarantees equal rights and liberties to each citizen, is legitimate in virtue of the normative standards that it protects, and the unreasonableness of a refusal. Such equal rights and liberties represent valid public reasons, and they justify the societal order (or public decision). We can still, however, acknowledge that popular acceptance matters, and its presence increases legitimacy, as well as its absence reduces it. Thus, the intuitions presented by Greene are saved, but it is only one among valid reasons that we consider when attributing legitimacy. What finally matters, and constitutes the basis of legitimacy, is a reasonable balance among all valid reasons or, in other words, justification.

7. What are the consequences of the endorsement of the Rawlsian conception of legitimacy for potential policies related to the COVID-19 pandemic? Some of them are pretty obvious, others are more complex.

The first obvious consequence is that behaviours and policies based on anti-social and anti-cooperative attitudes are not permissible. One cannot take the stance “I don’t care whether I am harmful to others”. This obviously does not represent an attitude compatible with offering to others reasons that they can accept as free and equal, which is a condition for justifying public decisions and policies. The Rawlsian justificatory conception of legitimacy favours reciprocity in virtue of the requirement to address justification to others and excludes self-centred behaviours.

The second obvious consequence is that public decisions grounded in pseudoscience, fake news and conspiracy theories are not legitimate. Refusals of public decisions based on such reasons are legitimately dismissed. Such reasons are ruled out by the classification of “methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial” (Rawls 2005: 224) as valid public reasons.

However, the Rawlsian conception of legitimacy still leaves some questions open and leaves their resolution to fair democratic public decision-making. This is because the justificatory process frequently leads to a set of eligible decisions, and not to a uniquely justified and victorious decision. There are various instances of such cases. For example, we can expect this in epidemiologic measures, because required public policies must be sensitive to various rights and diverse legitimate interests, and different policies can favour or damage them. Restrictive measures could be more effective in saving lives and health, but they could be harmful for wealth and economic benefits, which, at the end, can have particularly bad effects for those who are, in advance, worse off (Winsberg et al. 2020). Epidemiologic measures are a matter of good balance of reasons. The Rawlsian conception of legitimacy cannot, and need not, offer

uniquely justified answers to such dilemmas – they instead result from fair political deliberation. This does not mean that the Rawlsian theory of legitimacy is not of any help. On the contrary, it helps to select valid public reasons among which we need to balance, as well as public decisions justified through them and excludes reasons and public decisions that are invalid (like “I don’t care if I am a threat to others”). One could object that these questions, that require a high level of expertise, could not be left to public deliberation. Instead, they must be postponed, until experts find a solution on which they can agree.<sup>3</sup> However, in opposition to this objection, we need to be aware of conditions when decisions are urgent, and it is not reasonable to postpone them while waiting for the optimal context when we will have consensus among experts. Besides, dissent among experts could be based on them endorsing opposed values (Winsberg et al. 2020), and this delays the moment when they will agree on a unique decision. This is why a decision reached through democratic process, among proposals that are qualified through the justification of valid public reasons, is the best resource in some situations. In support of this idea, we can mention some reasons to attribute the possibility of a certain competence to the general population, to deal with scientific reasons. This attribution regards at least the possibility that the general population can recognize experts that are the sources of information that we can use as valid public reasons, if not the ability to directly recognize valid scientific reasons (Anderson 2011).

8. In this section, I indicate a further merit of the Rawlsian justificatory conception of legitimacy, one that we can highlight through the example of COVID-19 epidemiologic measures. Cooperative spirit appears to be dramatically needed in the light of challenges in critical situations. Part of the problem for efficacious policies consists in the absence of this social stance and solidarity. In too many cases, defects of solidarity and of social attitudes, in the pandemic crisis, call to mind the description that Alexis de Tocqueville offered for some other contexts: “I see an innumerable host of men, all alike and equal, endlessly hastening after petty and vulgar pleasures with which they fill their souls. Each of them, withdrawn into himself, is virtually a stranger to the fate of all the others. For him, his children and personal friends comprise the entire human race. As for the remainder of his fellow citizens, he lives alongside them but does not see them. He touches them but does not feel them. He exists only in himself and for himself, and if he still has a family, he no longer has a country” (de Tocqueville 1835/1840/2004: 818).

A first illustration of such a condition revealed in the actual COVID-19 crisis is represented by opposition to an act of care toward others, like wearing a mask. A second illustration is represented by acts of solidarity toward those who are under the epidemiologic measures that are particularly critical for the spreading of the virus, but that also require them to interrupt their businesses. People engaged in such activities are economically and socially harmed. Social

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3 Thanks to a reviewer for this point.

solidarity in terms of economic support is needed to compensate them for this sacrifice oriented to the common good.

The Lockean understanding of legitimacy shapes a too sharply individualistic conception, that by itself is unable to support a cooperative spirit. On the other hand, the Rawlsian view is respectful of individual differences, because its core values are fairness, equality and liberty, but it also sustains social cooperation as a value.

One could reply to these comments by saying that there is nothing in the consent conception of legitimacy that impedes nurturing and affirming civic sense and solidarity – this is just a different matter than legitimacy. We can see something like this view in Kuznicki's discussion. He distinguishes what one should do, from obligations that the state can enforce. Nurturing civic sense and solidarity could find space in the former domain.

However, there is still a substantial advantage on the side of the justificatory conception of democracy. In the consent conception of democracy, civic sense and solidarity, on one side, and legitimacy on the other, come apart. They are not, in principle, in contradiction, but there is no mutual support either. On the other hand, the Rawlsian justificatory conception of legitimacy favours persons to look at each other as being engaged in a common project. This is the project, among else, of founding each other's status as free and equal. Namely, the distinctive aspect of it is that persons are mutually the sources of the political status of free and equal of each of them. Outside the justificatory process, no person has any moral or political status recognized in the details of a structured conception of justice. Thus, in the view endorsed by Rawls, before the public justificatory process of principles of justice, persons enjoy only the generally recognized status as free and equals. However, this idea needs elaboration in the public justificatory process. There are no alleged literal natural liberties that one can bring separately by herself, in order to claim specific rights and liberties in the political process and social life. This fundamental component of the justificatory conception of legitimacy is a major point of divergence from the consent conception. For example, the latter could claim that without the recognition of natural rights and liberties, individuals cannot be protected from majoritarian power.<sup>4</sup> But, this is wrong because the justificatory conception of legitimacy, in Rawls's form, is not based on majoritarian decisions when it comes to determination of basic rights and liberties. Instead, it shapes a process of justification, in the frame of a heuristic device, where all persons are situated symmetrically. This renders impossible bargaining advantages and majoritarian abuses. Further protection of individuals is offered through the more detailed specification of basic rights and liberties achieved with the employment of Rawls's public reason, that requires that each person justifies her claims to each other person, as free and equal, by having reciprocity in mind (Rawls 2005). Thus, the specific Rawls's justificatory conception of legitimacy does not leave citizens unprotected from majoritarian abuses.

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4 Thanks to a reviewer for this point.

Instead, it incorporates the protection of basic rights and liberties in the structure of public justification, through the model of public reason. In synthesis, there is no advantage of the consent conception of legitimacy over the justificatory conception of legitimacy in relation to the protection of individuals' basic rights and liberties from majoritarian power.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, there are other advantages of the justificatory proposal. I remark here one of them; the justificatory conception of legitimacy supports awareness of being part of a common enterprise, where each person realizes her moral affirmation and mutual dependence. Again, reflective equilibrium supports the justificatory conception of legitimacy. This is because this conception better supports socially responsible stance and civic sense, that become vividly needed, at least, in conditions of crisis and emergency, like a pandemic.

9. I have shown that the consent conception of legitimacy is not sustainable, because its coherent application is not able without qualifications to support people's protection from harms, to favour social cooperation, and to adjudicate conflicts. It could function only if backed up by other principles. But, because of this, the problem of justifying these other principles, and how to interpret them, appears.

I have shown the flaws of the consent conception of legitimacy, by showing its deficiencies in treatment of ASPD, and for measures in the COVID-19 pandemic. After having established that the alternative justificatory conception of legitimacy, in Rawls's shape, is preferable, I have used it to further specify justified and legitimate norms in epidemiologic measures, through reflective equilibrium. In this way, I have shown that the justificatory conception of legitimacy can be part of a coherent and reasonable set of public norms.<sup>6</sup>

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5 A further problem for the justificatory view could be represented by the exclusion, from the attribution of rights, of persons that are not part of a political society. Such are, for example, immigrants. The objection could say that, without the protection offered by a natural view of basic rights and liberties, they are left to the arbitrary decisions of people who constitute the political society. Unfortunately, I have not here the place to discuss this point. Instead, I only sketch possible answers. Namely, the justificatory conception does not need to be limited to people who actually constitute a political society, i.e. the body of persons to whom justification is due as free and equals, in the light of reciprocity. Further, a supporter of the justificatory conception of legitimacy could say that persons who justify basic rights and liberties must universalize their conclusions and thus also embrace persons who are not part of the constituency. Thanks to a reviewer for this point.

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## Elvio Bakarini

### Saglasnost ili javni razlog? Legitimnost normi koje se primenjuju u situacijama ASPD-a i Covid-19

#### Apstrakt

Ovaj rad proširuje konceptualnu distinkciju Alana Džona Simonsa između lokovske koncepcije legitimnosti (koja se zasniva na pristanku) i kantovske koncepcije legitimnosti (koja se zasniva na opravdanju) koju je primenio na pitanje legitimnosti država, odnosno na pitanje legitimnosti javnih odluka. U radu kritikujem koncepciju legitimnosti zasnovanu na pristanku koju Simons zastupa, te branim rolsovsku verziju koncepcije legitimnosti zasnovane na opravdanju od prigovora. Ovaj rad je karakterističan po tome što se ove dve koncepcije legitimnosti procenjuju kroz istraživanje, primenom metode refleksivne ravnoteže, njihovih odgovarajućih propisa koji se tiču lečenja antisocijalnog poremećaja ličnosti (ASPD) i epidemioloških mera. Tvrdim da metod refleksivne ravnoteže ne podržava koncepciju legitimnosti zasnovanu na pristanku. Izumajući u obzir problem lečenja ASPD-a i problem epidemioloških mera, tvrdim da koncepcija zasnovana na pristanku nije dobro opremljena za procenu normi koje se ne tiču striktno govoreći nas samih. Ovo prouzrokuje nedovoljan odgovor za relevantne društvene probleme. Dalje, razmatrajući slučaj odgovora na epidemije, pokazujem da ova koncepcija legitimnosti može da izbegne štetne posledice samo pozivanjem na dodatne i nezavisne premise. Iako neuzrokuje nekoherentnost, ovo umanjuje koherentnost normativnog sistema. Konačno, koncepcija legitimnosti zasnovana na pristanku nije dobro opremljena da podrži društvenu saradnju na optimalan način, što se pokazalo neophodnim u kritičnim uslovima poput pandemije. S druge strane, tvrdim da metod refleksivne ravnoteže podržava Rolsovu verziju koncepcije legitimnosti zasnovane na opravdanju zbog svojih prednosti u rešavanju navedenih problema. Pored toga, pokazujem da koncepcija legitimnosti zasnovana na opravdanju poštuje slobodu i jednakost delatnika kao moralnih samozakonodavaca, te da nije podložna Simonsovim glavnim kritikama.

**Cljučne reči:** Antisocijalni poremećaj ličnosti, COVID-19, opravdanje, legitimnost, javni um, Rols, refleksivna ravnoteža, Simons

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Josip Guć

## RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ZOOBOTIC PANDEMICS OUTBREAKS AND INDUSTRIAL ANIMAL FARMS

### ABSTRACT

The responsibility for the COVID-19 pandemic was first ascribed to persons associated with the Huanan Seafood Market. However, many scientists suggest that this pandemic is actually a consequence of human intrusion into nature. This opens up a whole new perspective for an examination of direct and indirect, individual and collective responsibility concerning this particular pandemic, but also zoonotic pandemics as such. In this context, one of the key issues are the consequences of factory-farming of animals, which contributes to circumstances in which zoonotic pandemics emerge. Moreover, it is part of a larger economic system, global capitalism, whose logic implies certain coercion toward its participants to keep it essentially unchanged and therefore to make sure that livestock health remains "the weakest link in our global health chain" (FAO). However, even though the precise answer to the issue of moral responsibility for zoonotic pandemics outbreaks in general and the COVID-19 pandemic in particular cannot be given, it is possible to list certain indicators and make a framework helpful in ascribing moral responsibility to certain persons. The paper intends to do so by examining the notion of responsibility and by applying it to the issues mentioned. The results of this analysis show that it is misleading to place moral blame on people involved in actions that directly caused the animal-to-human transmission of a certain virus or on humanity as a whole.

### KEYWORDS

moral responsibility,  
animals, pandemics,  
COVID-19, industrial  
farms, global capitalism

### Introduction

"When we eat factory-farmed meat we live, literally, on tortured flesh. Increasingly, that tortured flesh is becoming our own" (Foer 2009: 143). The meaning of this sentence is quite clear to all and requires no extensive argumentation: industrial farming of nonhuman animals, guided by the notion of efficiency (less investment for more profit), results in a greater scale of animal abuse and, at the same time, in a greater scale of diseases in both human and nonhuman animals (compared to traditional farming).

At the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic, it seems that this formula can easily be applied to our treatment of wild animals. A great majority of the scientific and non-scientific public denounced a wet market – the Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan, China, i.e. the trading and slaughtering of wild animals that occurs there, as the major culprit of the ongoing pandemic. Hence the torturing of these animals, surely held in inadequate conditions, was replicated in the “torture of torturers themselves”. Moreover, it swamped the world, including those humans who do not count as torturers themselves.

However, responsibility (which is here ascribed to someone as a precondition of being a culprit – this is discussed later on in the paper) was not only ascribed to local communities associated with wet markets, but sometimes also to the entire humankind in the context of the anthropogenic destruction of nature as a contributing element to the COVID-19 outbreak. By disrupting wild ecosystems “we shake viruses loose from their natural hosts”, leaving them to seek new hosts (Quammen 2020; see also Vidal 2020). In other words, “exploitation, as well as anthropogenic activities that have caused losses in wildlife habitat quality, have increased opportunities for animal-human interactions and facilitated zoonotic disease transmission” (Johnson et al. 2020: 1). Therefore, by bringing causation and responsibility into close connection, one could say that the “flesh tortured by the whole of humanity ‘takes revenge’ on its collective torturer”.

There is also an implicit assumption among some scientists (and an explicit one among a number of journalists) that the SARS-CoV-2 virus (which causes the COVID-19 disease) may have first “jumped” on humans from domestic animals on industrial farms. If such an assumption were valid, a great deal of the public would surely transfer the responsibility from local communities involved in wet market trade to much more powerful “market players”, i.e. those associated with industrial farming. In this respect, I will proceed by addressing the possibility of direct transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from factory-farmed animals. However, this assumption, regardless of its appropriateness in the particular case of COVID-19, is interesting for examining the responsibility for pandemics in general. Even if this assumption turned out to be wrong, certain environmentally harmful consequences of factory farming would surely prove to play a role in some of the conditions responsible for the COVID-19 outbreak according to the “official scenario”. Therefore, it will be taken into consideration here in order to examine the different forms and levels of responsibility for the COVID-19 outbreak. Since causality and responsibility are not synonymous, I will especially address the notion of responsibility, in order to provide the philosophical basis for answering the question of responsibility for the COVID-19 and other viral pandemics outbreaks (especially with regard to our behavior toward nonhuman animals).

Here I am not discussing the issue of responsibility of individuals or communities for later human-to-human COVID-19 transmissions. In order to reflect on the responsibility for this pandemic, it is crucial to reflect on the sources and not (primarily) on the “treatment of symptoms”, even though the latter is

of crucial importance once disease in humans occurs. My approach can simply be described in following terms: “While individual mitigation measures like physical distancing are critical at this time, such tactics are last-resort measures that we should rarely, if ever, have to rely upon. As we do our best to cope with COVID-19 in the present, we should work to prevent other pandemics from arising in the future” (Sebo, Stubler 2020).<sup>1</sup>

Finally, the goal of this paper is not to present statistics out of which the level of each agent’s contribution to a zoonotic pandemic can become visible, but to focus one of them – industrial animal farms. By examining the importance of this practice for zoonotic pandemics outbreaks, as well as the responsibility for these outbreaks concerning the industrial animal farms, I will show that there is no ground for placing moral blame on people involved in actions that directly caused the animal-to-human transmission of certain virus or on humanity as a whole for creating the conditions for transmission.

## 1. Industrial Farms Pandemics

“Most of the new diseases that have emerged in humans over recent decades are of animal origin and are related to the human quest for more animal-source food” (FAO 2013: 2). While this is surely true, one should also acknowledge that many zoonotic epidemics and pandemics originated from industrial farms. As Rob Wallace says, swine flu, H1N1, “appears by definition industrial in origin” (Wallace 2016: 59). Regardless of whether industrial farms are the source or major places of virus transmission, it is clear that they increase the risk of pandemics. Lisa Warden, referring to numerous scientific studies, also makes such a claim and aptly summarizes the extent of the problem:

Research shows that confined animal feeding operations amplify novel influenza strains and that large-scale commercial animal farms increase the risk of outbreaks and transmission of zoonotic disease, function to maintain and disperse highly virulent strains of influenza and increase the frequency and scale of highly pathogenic outbreaks. It also shows that factory farm-induced deforestation and rampant antibiotic use heighten risk of the emergence of novel diseases. Intensive animal farming unquestionably poses a grave, pandemic-level threat to human and animal health. (Warden 2020)

As Foer pointed out, not only that one of the greatest global health catastrophes ever – the Spanish flu – was, in fact, avian influenza (probably mutated within pigs), but “there is scientific consensus that new viruses, which move between farmed animals and humans, will be a major global threat into the foreseeable future”. Therefore, “any talk of pandemic influenza today cannot ignore the fact that the most devastating disease event the world has ever

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<sup>1</sup> However, if I had to give a philosophically more profound reason for justifiability of this approach, I would refer to a duty to evade the conflicts of grounds of obligations, shortly presented in: Guć 2019: 369–370.

known, and one of the greatest health threats before us today, has everything to do with the health of the world's farmed animals" (Foer 2009: 126–127).

What makes bird flus especially interesting and relevant for any other influenza is the fact that populations of wild birds are, according to Wallace, "the ultimate source reservoir of nearly all influenza subtypes". However, these populations (as it is ascertained by Ilaria Capua and Dennis Alexander) contain no endemic highly pathogenic strains. For developing a more significant virulence it is necessary for low-pathogenic influenza subtypes to enter populations of domestic birds. The occurrence of pathogenic influenza outbursts is significantly more frequent from "industrial", than from "backyard" domestic bird populations, due to the fact that nonhuman animals at industrial farms make "ideal populations for supporting virulent pathogens". This is due not only to *high population density criteria*, but also to *growing genetic monocultures* at these farms, which removes immune firebreaks for virus transmission. Finally, the *high throughput* at these facilities "provides a continually renewed supply of susceptibles, the fuel for the evolution of virulence" (Wallace 2016: 56–57).

One should also take into account the indirect impact of industrial farming on the emergence of pandemics. Acquisition of land for nonhuman animal feed (and consequently deforestation), pollution and other *ecological consequences of factory farming* can alone be marked as a serious risk factor. The livestock sector causes 18 percent of greenhouse gas emissions, which is a higher share than that of the entire world's transport sector (LEAD 2006: xxi), and there are strong indications that climate change has impact on animal-to-human disease spillover (Dunne 2020).

The estimates mostly based on the 2012 FAO data show that factory-farmed animals make 72.52% of all farmed land animals (Anthis 2019). This percentage, as well as the future meat consumption, will surely grow due to the fact that many developing countries are embracing "the more economically efficient processes of developed countries in the form of Confined Animal Feeding Operations" either "to improve the competitiveness of local production or fueled by large corporations moving to countries with fewer regulations" (Fiala 2008: 412–413). Even if one does not count on the future meat consumption growth, these feedlot systems are still directly or indirectly emitting more greenhouse gases per kg of produced meat than pasture systems (see e.g. Subak 1999). Finally, globalization, i.e. global trade and travel does not only increase chances for human-to-human, but also for animals-to-human disease spillover. Ever-increasing international trade in live animals and animal products (LEAD 2006: 62–63) helps spreading new pathogens around the world (FAO 2013: 58–63). Needless to say that this is most often connected with the industrialization of the livestock sector (LEAD 2006: 60–61).

Deforestation obviously poses a great threat for zoonotic disease transmissions due to increased opportunities for animal-human interactions. However, comparison between factory farming and pasture systems regarding their effect on deforestation is very complex. The famous LEAD's study the *Livestock long shadow* from 2006 takes into account estimations made by Wassenaar and his

colleagues (Wassenaar et al. 2007, at the time in print) that “the expansion of pasture into forest is greater than that of cropland” (LEAD 2006: 66). A later study made by Barona and her colleagues brings out a somehow similar, but more insightful conclusion:

The proximate cause of deforestation in the Legal Amazon was predominantly the expansion of pasture, and not of soybeans. However, in Mato Grosso, an increase in soybeans occurred in regions previously used for pasture, which may have displaced pastures further north into the forested areas, causing indirect deforestation there. Therefore, soybean cultivation may still be one of the major underlying causes of deforestation in the Legal Amazon. (Barona et al. 2010: 10)

Soybean is mostly used for animal feed at factory farms. However, it should also be noted that “soy has become increasingly related to deforestation over time. In summary, even if the *proximate* cause of deforestation was mainly ranching, it is likely that soy cultivation is a major *underlying* cause” (Barona et al. 2010: 10).

Overall, industrial farming (including its context and consequences) cannot be taken out of the equation when reflecting on the sources of a particular zoonotic pandemic. This is not only true for viral, but also for bacterial pandemics, due to the overuse of antibiotics at factory farms and consequent development of antimicrobial resistance (cf. Foer 2009: 140–141; OECD & FAO 2018: 160–161; IACG 2019).

## 2. The COVID-19 Outbreak and Industrial Farms

Already a study in which Chinese scientists examined the first 41 recorded cases of COVID-19 patients in Wuhan implicitly casts doubt on the belief that the pandemic originated at the Huanan Seafood Market. Namely, only 66% (27 out of 41) cases had direct contact with the market. The first case (“the symptom onset date of the first patient”) was identified on December 1, 2019. However, “[n]o epidemiological link was found between the first patient and later cases” (Huang et al. 2020: 500). Referring to these and some other data, Daniel Lucey emphasizes that the numbers in this study cannot easily be ignored (especially because 13 of these patients had no connection to the Huanan Seafood Market what so ever): “The virus came into that marketplace before it came out of that marketplace.”<sup>2</sup> One of the authors of the study, Bin Cao, also

2 “Lucey says if the new data are accurate, the first human infections must have occurred in November 2019 – if not earlier – because there is an incubation time between infection and symptoms surfacing. If so, the virus possibly spread silently between people in Wuhan – and perhaps elsewhere – before the cluster of cases from the city’s now-infamous Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market was discovered in late December” (Cohen 2020). Some sources claim that “we also now know, thanks to the leak of an official Chinese report to the South China Morning Post that the actual first known case of Covid-19 in Hubei was detected in mid-November, weeks before the cluster of cases connected to the Wuhan seafood market were reported” (GRAIN 2020). Even further,

expressed his doubts, claiming that we still do not know for sure where the source of this virus is: “Now it seems clear that [the] seafood market is not the only origin of the virus” (Cohen 2020). In one interview, Lucey again stresses that the first infected person in Wuhan did not get the virus at the Huanan Seafood Market, adding that animal-to-human transmission may have occurred in different places “in the supply chain of the infected animals e.g., in one or more multiple markets, or restaurants, or farms, or with wild animals, legal or illegal trade” (Lucey 2020). There are additional reasons for pointing the finger of doubt at industrial farms:

Another recently published study<sup>3</sup> identifies the most likely intermediate animal hosts for SARS-CoV-2, based on their presence in Wuhan and their having a human-like ACE2 that enables the binding of SARS-CoV-2. These are the animals the study identified: civets, pigs, pangolins, cats, cows, buffalos, goats, sheep and pigeons.

Many of the animals on this list are industrially farmed in China, even wild animals like civets and pangolins are intensively farmed for their use in Chinese medicines. Suspicions that wild animal farms may have been behind the Covid-19 outbreak have already led the Chinese government to shut down 20,000 wild animal farms across the country.

But hardly any attention has been given to some other animals on this list, which more clearly meet the “high population density” criteria. Pigs would be one obvious candidate from this list, for several reasons. (GRAIN 2020)

One of the reasons for taking pigs into consideration as the “jumping point” of SARS-CoV-2 can be found in the profound change of their raising in the Hubei province, where Wuhan is located:

Over the past decade, small pig farms in the province have been replaced by large factory farms and medium-sized contract operations, where hundreds or thousands of genetically-uniform pigs are confined in high density barns. These industrial farms are the ideal breeding grounds for the evolution of new pathogens. (GRAIN 2020)

However, following the data presented by the World organization for animal health (last updated in September 2020), the transmission of the virus has not been proven in any concrete case between animals and humans, except in the case of American mink (*Neovison vison*). Other farmed animals that can be

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a genetics team led by Shu-Miaw Chaw suggests that the bat-pangolin recombinant that was the progenitor for SARS-CoV-2 emerged around forty years before the COVID-19 outbreak (Wallace, Wallace 2020: 173).

3 Already in the abstract of the article referred to here, authors clearly claim: “SARS-CoV-2, the newly identified human coronavirus causing severe pneumonia pandemic, was probably originated from Chinese horseshoe bats. However, direct transmission of the virus from bats to humans is unlikely due to lack of direct contact, implying the existence of unknown intermediate hosts” (Qiu et al. 2020).



infected (with different levels of susceptibility) are ferrets, rabbits (New Zealand White rabbits), raccoon dogs, cattle, pigs (American Yorkshire crossbred pigs), and poultry (chicken, ducks, and turkeys) (OIE 2020). Therefore, at the present moment, one cannot prove that the SARS-CoV-2 originated in factory farms. However, such a conclusion would only add one additional reason for abandoning factory farming in order to prevent new pandemics. Without it, factory farming would still be one of the main reasons for these outbreaks, regarding above-mentioned consequences of this practice. Considering the COVID-19 outbreak, two additional indicators are most interesting, and should be seriously taken into consideration:

Deforestation (which provides space for livestock farms and our overcrowded cities), altered ecosystems (which provide shelter for wildlife), illegal trading with wildlife (Bushmeat), intensive domestic animal husbandry, and large-scale distribution of uncontrolled food of animal origin are all factors that may have contributed to the consequences of such spillover. (Contini et al. 2020: 259–260)

Starting in the 1990s, as part of its economic transformation, China ramped up its food production systems to industrial scale. One side effect of this, as anthropologists Lyle Fearnley and Christos Lynteris have documented, was that smallholding farmers were undercut and pushed out of the livestock industry. Searching for a new way to earn a living, some of them turned to farming “wild” species that had previously been eaten for subsistence only. Wild food was formalised as a sector, and was increasingly branded as a luxury product. But the smallholders weren’t only pushed out economically. As industrial farming concerns took up more and more land, these small-scale farmers were pushed out geographically too – closer to uncultivable zones. Closer to the edge of the forest, that is, where bats and the viruses that infect them lurk. The density and frequency of contacts at that first interface increased, and hence, so did the risk of a spillover. (Spinney 2020)

As Wallace pointed out, by common focus on each separate emergency one overlooks their most common structural causes. The increased occurrence of viruses cannot be adequately scrutinized without understanding its link with the industrial model of livestock production. The capital-led agriculture is, as he says, the best possible system to breed deadly diseases, removing immune firebreaks in crowded conditions of industrial farms (Wallace 2020: 33–34). In the case of the COVID-19, one could ask following question:

But how far back and how widely should we investigate? When exactly did the emergency really begin? The focus on the market misses the origins of wild agriculture out in the hinterlands and its increasing capitalization. [...] As industrial production – hog, poultry, and the like – expand into primary forest, it places pressure on wild food operators to dredge further into the forest for source populations, increasing the interface with, and spillover of, new pathogens, including Covid-19. (Wallace 2020: 35)

If one looks a little bit closer at circumstances and possibilities of SARS-CoV-2 or COVID-19 origins, one cannot locate the exact Chinese province

where the transmission of the virus happened. Wallace writes that phylogenetic analyses show that the virus' proximate origins can be placed as far south as Guandong (where both SARS-CoV-1 and H5N1 were originally identified). Following the conclusion that the SARS-CoV-2 jumped from bats to pangolins, one can say that "wild food trade in all likelihood played a foundational role in the emergence of the COVID-19 outbreak". However, this trade "shares with industrial agriculture sources of capital and economic geographies encroaching on Central China's hinterlands". Bat strains are circulating not only across Hubei province, „splattering wildlife and domesticated livestock along the way". And it would not be surprising if various SARS started to circulate among industrialized food animals. Therefore, instead of searching for the exact spot of the virus transmission, one should take broader, structural insight into this matter, here especially by noticing "the *processes* by which increasingly capitalized landscapes turn living organisms into commodities and entire production chains – animal, producer, processor, and retailer – into disease vectors" (Wallace 2020: 84–87).

### 3. What It Means to Be Responsible?

In the introduction two most frequently mentioned bearers of guilt or responsibility for the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak were recognized: people associated with trade on wet markets and humanity as a whole. However, the complexity of connections which gave rise to the pandemic is, as I presented it, much greater. In order to examine all the levels of responsibility it is not enough to pinpoint the exact moment in which SARS CoV-2 jumped from nonhuman animals on humans. The same can be said for every zoonotic pandemic. Before that, it is necessary to consider the concept of responsibility.

There are many different meanings in which the term 'responsibility' is used. The one I am referring to here is *moral responsibility*. However, the way in which this concept is understood varies with different ethical theories. As I cannot enter a discussion on this matter here, I am going to briefly explain what I presume a plausible account of responsibility must include.

Primarily, I examine something that may be referred to as "personal responsibility". As stated in Michael J. Zimmerman's entry in the *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, there are two main types of this kind of responsibility: prospective and retrospective. The first means that one has a responsibility (a duty or obligation) "to see to it that thing occurs or obtains". Retrospective responsibility concerns either (negatively) having failed to fulfill a duty, or (positively) being praiseworthy for fulfilling a duty. Besides, it can be said that, in one sense, certain individuals are "responsible persons (period), rather than responsible for something", i.e. that they are morally mature, having a certain capacity: "the capacity to make a reasonable assessment of one's prospective responsibilities (duties, obligations) and thereby to incur retrospective responsibility for one's actions". If one lacks such a capacity, one is called "nonresponsible". There is also another sense in which a person is called responsible, when one takes an

endeavor to fulfill prospective responsibilities. If this is not the case, one is called “irresponsible” (Zimmerman 2001: 1486–1487). The first sense can be marked as ‘responsibility in the sense of moral *capacity*’, and the latter as ‘responsibility in the sense of moral *validity* or *virtue*’. Being a morally responsible person according to the first meaning is a precondition for being morally responsible (or culprit in the moral sense) according to the second meaning. Here, for the sake of clarity, I use only the first sense of being a responsible person (or a nonresponsible being), while the latter differentiation can rather be marked as being morally right or wrong (and not responsible or irresponsible).

Besides personal responsibility, there is also the way of using of the term ‘responsibility’ in the sense of *causal responsibility*, simply to denote that something causes something else, e.g. “the short circuit was responsible for the fire” (Zimmerman 2001: 1486). Even though personal responsibility implies causal responsibility (at least in the sense of *endeavor* – even the lack of action can be seen as causation, as allowing for a certain causality to happen), they are not equivalents, because this would imply that nonresponsible entities can be personally responsible. However, this implication means that a person cannot be held morally responsible if he/she was in no respect the cause of a certain action.

Therefore, due to the lack of adequate capacities, nonhuman animals or even SARS-CoV-2 certainly cannot be held morally responsible for COVID-19, and no one could be held responsible in this way if purely natural causality was at work. However, this causal chain is largely “navigated” by responsible persons (moral agents). In order to be a morally responsible person, one has to be not only *capable of understanding* the moral implications of her own actions, but also to have *power* over them. However, these characteristics are not absolute (in the sense that a person either has them or not) but are rather most often present in different levels. Therefore, moral responsibility is also not an absolute concept. A person is morally responsible for a certain action in which he/she causally participates to the extent he/she has these characteristics. In this sense one should also examine another meaning of responsibility, which Otfried Höffe refers to as *task-responsibility* (*Aufgaben-Verantwortung*), i.e. “responsibility for particular roles, functions and appointments” (Höffe 1997: 315).<sup>4</sup> However, moral responsibility surely cannot be reduced to this meaning. In the context of moral responsibility, if someone has a specific social role, it only means that he/she has a greater power to cause certain actions if this role was freely chosen (otherwise it is not necessarily the case, which will become clear in the following), and not that his/her responsibility is limited to this role.

#### 4. Direct/Indirect and Individual/Collective Responsibility

The distinction between direct and indirect responsibility can be helpful in making further reflections on the levels of responsibilities of certain agent(s),

4 This concept is similar to Hart’s concept of ‘role-responsibility’ (Hart 2008: 212–214).

but might also be misleading if we put emphasis on direct responsibility at the cost of indirect one. For example, if a soldier commits a war crime under the command of his superior, the greater accusation (responsibility) will fall on the commanding officer, even though the soldier directly executed the action, while his superior can be said to have indirectly executed the action. Even though this accusation is mostly founded on legal or commanding responsibility, a similar result can be expected from moral judgment – the soldier, even though he cannot be released of his responsibility, was not independent to the same degree toward the action he executed directly as his superior who executed it indirectly.

The distinction, however, might be helpful to recognize the whole range of agents responsible for a certain action, where it intertwines with the distinction between individual and collective responsibility. Industrial farms make a good example here. Who is to be blamed for the horrifying treatment of non-human animals locked up there and consequently for the diseases that strike those animals and outbreaks of diseases from viruses mediated through them to humans? Here those who lock up the animals, torture them, kill them etc., those who are *directly* responsible for these actions are the *last to blame* because they have the smallest degree of power in the entire chain of agents involved in making decisions concerning these activities. Their highest superiors are, obviously, way more responsible. But not only them – all those agents that (and are free not to) participate in the production and consumption of animal products (in this case, originating from industrial farms) bear their burden of responsibility – to the extent they are responsible agents. However, thwarting of this responsibility (i.e. power over actions and capability to understand the moral implications of actions) should also be accounted for here: the production in general producing consumption (see e.g. Marx 1973: 90–94), cultural industry producing “artificial needs” (see e.g. Horkheimer & Adorno 2002: 96), certain traditions reproducing prejudices, and even the whole existing socio-economic system that does not allow a more sensible way of organizing production only in order to endlessly increase productivity and fight competition on the free market. Under these conditions “agricultural markets have become so competitive that animal producers are usually not free to choose any method other than the one that is most efficient” (McMullen 2015: 128). Of course, abstract entities as capitalism cannot be morally responsible, but only individuals, especially those who have more power to thwart this system (e.g. a big shareholder in a multinational company can sell his shares in order not to be existentially threatened while opposing the system – a common worker does not have that privilege). In other words: “When we say ‘capital does this’ or that, we mean that certain human actions are carried out according to the logic of capital” (Kovel 2007: 51). Due to the unavoidable destruction of nature (see e.g. Burkett 2003; Kovel 2007; Foster & Clark 2020) and unavoidable maltreatment of nonhuman animals (see e.g. Gunderson 2011) generated by this logic, an agent is responsible for his/her strivings in preserving or

overthrowing it, according to the level of his/her power to do so and capability to understand what needs to be done.<sup>5</sup>

In order to gain a more comprehensive insight into personal responsibility, actions which people are forced to commit due to certain rules in which the capitalist mechanism functions should not be observed independently of this system. Not only that agribusinesses “externalize the costs of their epidemiologically dangerous operations on everyone else” (Wallace 2020: 34), but also the “responsibility” for them. Therefore, it happens that responsibility for the emergence of certain virus, which can easily be ascribed to e.g. capital-led deforestation (made for acquiring the land for factory-farmed animal feed), is publicly ascribed to those who trade on the spot where the virus spillover was first detected, i.e. on the virus’ alleged hotspot.<sup>6</sup> Quite the contrary: “capital centers, places such as London, New York, and Hong Kong, should be considered our primary disease hotspots” (Wallace 2020: 33). In this sense, the “*absolute geographies* miss a critical part of the problem” (Wallace 2020: 89), whereas

[...] the *relational geographies* connecting different parts of the world that are driving disease emergence at a much more foundational level of causality. On the global stage, circuits of capital originating out of such centers as New York, London, and Hong Kong finance the deforestation and development driving the emergence of these new diseases at the coordinates that ecohealth investigates.

One can see how an ecohealth or One Health that blames locals for the problem of a disease spillover can serve as a next generation in greenwashing corporate land grabbing. Indeed, EcoHealth Alliance has attracted funding from some of the very multinationals driving deforestation, including Colgate-Palmolive and Johnson & Johnson, two companies dependent upon plantation palm oil. Even now in post-COVID 2020, blaming locals remains a veritable brand for the Alliance. (Wallace 2020: 90)<sup>7</sup>

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5 It should be clear by now that here used term ‘personal responsibility’ does not exclude structural causation. In that sense, this concept does not follow the one which is rightly criticized by Iris Marion Young. She points out that the discourse of personal responsibility “assumes a misleading ideal that each person can be independent of others and internalize the costs of their own actions. It ignores how the institutional relations in which we act render us deeply interdependent. The discourse fails to ask what personal responsibility individuals have for the conditions of the lives of others in these independent relationships, as well as for their own lives” (Young 2011: 4–5). There is not enough room in this paper to go into Young’s theory of personal responsibility concerning structural relations, which one should consult (primarily in: Young 2011) in order to find incentives for rethinking a wider range of issues than those addressed in the paper.

6 “Focusing on outbreak zones ignores the relations shared by global economic actors that shape epidemiologies. The capitalist interests backing development- and production-induced changes in land use and disease emergence in underdeveloped parts of the globe reward efforts that pin responsibility for outbreaks on indigenous populations and their so-deemed ‘dirty’ cultural practices” (Wallace et al. 2020a: 49).

7 Wallace and his colleagues also add that “the disease control strategies enacted to protect food animals and plants provide nominal defense, acting more as a

Therefore, people associated with the Wuhan wet market are significantly less the cause and have less power over the COVID-19 outbreak, and are therefore significantly less responsible for it. Considering the ecological situation, it is almost a coincidence that the virus appeared in this market. Responsibility cannot be ascribed due to coincidence, but it can for raising the risk of making coincidences (pandemic outbreaks in general) more likely to happen anywhere.<sup>8</sup>

In view of the above, it is pointless to ascribe collective moral responsibility in order to level out the responsibility for certain actions between members of particular groups, nations, races, etc. However, the same goes for the whole of humanity, as it is done by the *Anthropocene narrative*. Here, as Andreas Malm explains, humanity is understood as a geological factor, which is a false conclusion given the great variations of human actions through space and time. In fact, the need for constant economic growth, as one of the main causes of climate change (and, one could add, environment destruction in general) is often described as a transhistorical fact, i.e. inherent to human nature. However, it is nothing more than the ideological product of bourgeois classical economy, the legitimization of capitalist social and production relations. On the other hand, all contemporary human beings cannot be a geological factor due to the great diversity among environmentally relevant actions that people undertake in different parts of the world (and also, one could add, people acting differently in those parts of the world). Therefore, the Anthropocene narrative often “naturalizes” the disastrous human impact on nature (as an unavoidable result of human nature), and this unhistorical and overly simplistic conclusion helps not only to thwart any possibilities for change in our collective behavior, but also blurs the insight into the responsibility of different people for environmental issues (Malm 2018: 326–343). On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that all human beings participating in the capitalist logic do not participate in it with the same amount of power, independence, and possibility to understand it. To the extent they have these characteristics, they can be held morally (personally) responsible for noxious behavior concerning environmental degradation, factory-farmed animal abuse and consequently the emergence of pandemics. This reflection is helpful in order to recognize the main culprits for the mentioned actions, while under the idea

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self-exculpating scientism wielded against alternate food systems. That is, *biosecurity* is an imposition in *biogovernance*, how capital and its allies in the public sector rule societies by intervening into human populations from individual bodies to broader demographics. We argue that biosecurity is deployed first and foremost to protect the most lucrative markets in invasive agriculture” (Wallace et al. 2020b: 103).

8 “[...] the emergence of a disease is impossible to predict. It is an accidental process, i.e., the occurrence of an extremely low probability event resulting from a stochastic combination of low probability independent events. If the exact time and nature of the emergence of a disease cannot be predicted, the increased probability of encounter and occurrence of an emergence-leading chain of events yielded by anthropized environments must be considered seriously” (Afelt et al. 2018: 2).

of anthropocenic leveling out of moral (personal) responsibility, accusing others can only be hypocritical.

However, collective moral responsibility can be sound only if it is reflected under the concept of personal responsibility, namely in recognizing the contribution of each individual to a collective endeavor. In this sense the concept of collective responsibility is important for recognizing the consequences of our actions, which could not be done if they were to be examined separately. Here as well, not all participants can be equally blamed: those with more power over their participation in a collective action and greater capability to understand its moral implications are clearly more responsible for this action than those having less. However, collective engagement in a certain action can also obscure individual responsibility, especially in societies where technology is highly developed and work very fragmented, where, as Jacques Ellul puts it, no one is responsible, but “no one is free either” (Ellul 1992). One can also detect a turning point in which our collective power becomes so great that we cannot perceive and control its consequences, thereby being incapable of having responsibility (Jonas 1984), a good example of which are direct and intimate (genetic) interventions in nature. Therefore, one can finally detect another, especially profound mode of responsibility – the responsibility for creating social conditions which will not turn responsible individuals into nonresponsible beings.

## **5. Responsibility toward Nonhuman Animals Concerning Zoonotic Pandemics**

It has already been said that there is no sense in ascribing personal responsibility to nonhuman animals, since they are nonresponsible beings. However, in the case of COVID-19 (and not of this pandemic only) they are causally responsible, but surely not alone. As Wallace says in the case of the H1N1 epidemic:

[...] pigs have very little to do with how influenza emerges. They didn't organize themselves into cities of thousands of immuno-compromised pigs. They didn't artificially select out the genetic variation that could have helped reduce the transmission rates at which the most virulent influenza strains spread. They weren't organized into livestock ghettos alongside thousands of industrial poultry. They don't ship themselves thousands of miles by truck, train, or air. Pigs do not naturally fly. (Wallace 2016: 34)

Even though nonhuman animals play a certain (even indispensable) role in the causal chain of the COVID-19 outbreak, the starting point of this chain should be sought in human actions:

Pandemics have their origins in diverse microbes carried by animal reservoirs, but their emergence is entirely driven by human activities. The underlying causes of pandemics are the same global environmental changes that drive biodiversity loss and climate change. These include land-use change, agricultural expansion and intensification, and wildlife trade and consumption. (IPBES 2020: 2)

Therefore, in terms of transmission from a nonhuman animal (whichever it may be) to human beings, it is clear that the latter created the conditions for the outbreak of at least the current pandemic (and, as it has been shown, surely not it alone). Thus, the main causal role of pandemic outbreaks belongs to us, i.e. to “the decisions we humans made to organize them [animals] this way. And when we say ‘we’, let’s be clear, we’re talking how agribusinesses have organized pigs and poultry” (Wallace 2016: 34).

Being personally and morally *responsible for something* (for an action, or, in Kantian terms, origins of an action in the determination of one’s will) makes no sense without being *responsible toward someone or something* (a being toward which one has a moral obligation). Given the limits of this kind of writing form, I have so far taken for granted that we are morally obligated (at least) toward sentient living beings. However, I will only mention a thesis that was elaborated elsewhere (Guć 2019), not in order to make my case for taking animals into moral consideration stronger, but rather to shortly depict another aspect of the concept of responsibility. My claim was that the *self-realization* should be the central concept of ethics, and that our duty toward other self-realizing beings should rely on their “articulated” or “silent demands” for self-realization. *Responsible* beings are, therefore, obligated to *respond* to these demands.

It is more than obvious that intensive human interventions in wild animal habitats and factory farming of domestic (and even wild) animals are included in the sphere of human moral responsibility, as clear examples of one’s morally wrong behavior not only toward other human beings (in the sense of environmental degradation and diseases), but also and primarily toward those animals. They are not only directly tortured and banished from their habitats, but also suffer from similar consequences of these practices as humans do. Even though they usually do not get sick in the same way as humans (e.g., there is only a few exceptions in which bird flus are harmful to birds<sup>9</sup>), factory farming leads both to human and nonhuman animal diseases. As it was mentioned, some animals have shown susceptibility to the SARS-CoV-2 virus. However, in some cases the transmission (which resulted in the COVID-19 disease) most probably happened due to their contact with humans, e.g. to dogs and cats from their “guardians”, to minks from the factory-farm workers, or to tigers and gorillas from the workers in zoos (Van Beusekom 2020; CDC 2021). Therefore, it seems that humans can even transmit the disease originated from their wrongdoings toward nonhuman animals to nonhuman animals themselves, both to particular companion animals and to particular farmed or otherwise captivated animals.

It is clear that the capital did not “do” anything to strengthen the agroecological and social resilience in order to prevent the outbreak or to “control regional disease systems before public health or medical intervention”, quite the

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9 “With a few chilling exceptions, bird flus are harmless to birds, a state of host/pathogen equilibrium that suggests the virus has perfectly adapted to its host over the years, and that even the slightest nucleotide change offers no selective advantage” (Drexler 2002: 171).



contrary (Wallace et al. 2020b: 126). Capital cannot really “do” that, it is an abstraction with its inexorable logic. However, capitalist can do something, being a responsible being. If being a capitalist means to blindly follow this logic, then their duty is, simply, to stop being capitalists, or at least to advocate and to take measures for significant limitation of this system. That should at least happen when consequences of the outbreak occur. On the contrary, when the measures to limit the undesirable consequences of this outbreak are introduced, industrialized animal agricultural business try to maintain “business as usual”, exposing workers to greater possibility of getting infected and cruelly destroying animals that cannot be placed on the market (cf. Scott-Reid 2020a, 2020b; Marchant-Forde, Boyle 2020).

As it has been demonstrated, it is misleading and even noxious to ascribe responsibility for this state of affairs to every human being. In order to give a more complete account of the animal ethics issue regarding COVID-19, further reflection on the different sorts and levels of moral responsibility should not be overlooked. Our responsibility toward nonhuman animals does not only rest on the duties not to eat them or not to harm them (which both are duties as long as we are not forced to do the opposite, e.g. out of health issues). Our responsibility toward other human beings in the sense of animal-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2 shares the same elements with our responsibility toward nonhuman animals. And when I say “our”, I mean that the responsibility lies primarily on empowered participants in global neoliberal capitalism, out of which intensive animal farming and intrusions into intact nature follow as a necessity. This means that we can ascribe responsibility to those who run contemporary agriculture business and to consumers of their products who are not forced to be what they are, but not to workers in the industry who have no alternative sources of income to rely on or to people who cannot satisfy their nutritional needs otherwise than by eating meat.<sup>10</sup>

## Conclusion

In this paper, I argued that those who are responsible for harming factory-farmed animals are to a large extent responsible for harming other human beings. I also implicitly tried to show that the ethical issue of factory-farmed animals should not be observed by being reduced to direct harm performed on them, but also in respect to the harm done by this practice to many other

<sup>10</sup> These elements, as I said, are shared, but not completely overlapping. As far as this case is concerned, there are ways in which one can be responsible toward other human beings and not toward nonhuman animals (e.g. a drastic reduction of animal farming can be environmentally friendly and thus not problematic in the sense of animal-human virus transmissions, but it is still in most cases morally wrong toward farmed animals) and vice versa (it is less common, but one could find some extravagant possibilities for this, e.g. if certain people often make way very deep into intact forests and in this way come into contact with nonhuman animals carrying certain viruses without harming these animals in any way).

human and non-human beings. This has been done by explicit examination of responsibility for the COVID-19 outbreak. Those who are truly responsible for “torturing flesh” are not those who are forced to do it, but those who have power to do it (without coercion) or not (among which there are different levels of responsibility). As for the latter, this paper primarily recognizes those who are independently involved in large-scale agricultural business, overconsumption and eating animal products. Regarding zoonotic pandemics, the case against factory farming (out of responsibility toward nonhuman animals) and the case for prevention of animal-to-human disease transmissions (out of responsibility toward humans) are intertwined. The analysis presented here highly suggests that a profound examination of moral responsibility leads to the conclusion that the moral duty of preventing new zoonotic pandemics must include advocacy for abolishing factory farms and even the whole socio-economic system (global neoliberal capitalism) under which any change in the direction of reducing the intensity of industrial farming and intrusions in nature is thwarted.

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Josip Guć

## Odnos između moralne odgovornosti za izbijanje zoonotskih pandemija i industrijskih životinjskih farmi

### Apstrakt

Odgovornost za pandemiju COVID-19 prvo je bila pripisana osobama vezanima uz tržnicu morske hrane Huanan. Međutim, mnogi naučnici sugeriraju da je ova pandemija rezultat čovekovih upada u netaknutu prirodu. Ovo otvara čitavu novu perspektivu za sagledavanje izravne i posredne te individualne i kolektivne odgovornosti za ovu pandemiju, no i za zoonotske pandemije uopšte. U ovom kontekstu, među ključne probleme spadaju posledice industrijskog uzgoja životinja, koji uveliko pridonosi okolnostima u kojima zoonotske pandemije izbijaju. Štaviše, on je dio šireg konteksta globalnog kapitalizma, ekonomskog sistema čija logika implicira izvesnu prisilu nametnutu onima koji u njoj participiraju, naime, da ovu vrstu uzgoja ostave bitno nepromenjenu, pa da tako osiguraju da zdravlje stoke ostane „najslabija karika u našem globalnom zdravstvenom lancu“ (FAO). Međutim, premda precizan odgovor na pitanje moralne odgovornosti za izbijanje pandemija, posebno one aktuelne, ne može biti dan, moguće je navesti izvesne indikatore i izgraditi okvir koji bi mogli pomoći u zadatku pripisivanja moralne odgovornosti određenim osobama. Ovaj rad to namerava izvesti sagledavanjem samog pojma odgovornosti i primenom te refleksije na spomenute probleme. Rezultati ove analize pokazuju varljivost pripisivanja moralne krivice ljudima uključenima u aktivnosti koje su izravno uzrokovale prenos izvesnog virusa sa životinje na čoveka, kao i čovečanstvu u celini za stvaranje uslova za prenos.

Ključne reči: moralna odgovornost, životinje, pandemija, COVID-19, industrijske farme, globalni kapitalizam

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## HERMENEUTICS OF RECOLLECTION: GADAMER AND RICOEUR<sup>1</sup>

### ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the notion of recollection in Hans Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur's thought, in the context of time distance as "obstacles" towards understanding the past. Particular attention is paid to the understanding the phenomenon of "Death" as a time gap between the past and the present. In connection with this problem, we find efforts of philosophical hermeneutics on the one hand and historicism on the other. Differences between historicism and hermeneutics can be outlined in relation to the role that memory plays in the process of understanding in Gadamer and Ricoeur. What does Death mean in terms of understanding for history, and what for hermeneutics? How can we understand temporal distance? Is it possible and necessary to overcome it? What is the role of recollection and how does it participate in understanding? – these are some of the main issues that will be addressed in the text. Finally, the task of the text is to offer the meaning and significance of the hermeneutics of recollection in relation to the mentioned questions, through the interaction of the thoughts of the two authors.

### KEYWORDS

recollection, Death, temporal distance, representation, presence, understanding

## Introduction

At the very beginning, it is necessary to determine, at least the provisional framework, within which this paper will develop. Namely, while Gadamer's notion of recollection will be examined with regard to *Truth and Method*, and related texts in which he refers to memory or *historically effected consciousness*, the main motive for including Ricoeur in the analysis is Ricoeur's text which was (having in mind the occasion) symptomatically entitled *Temporal distance and Death in History*, and which was published in the collection *Gadamer's*

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century, published in the year of Gadamer's death in 2002. Ricoeur's analysis of the phenomenon of *Death*, and in connection with it, the notion of recollection, that we find in focus in the mentioned article are extremely useful for understanding of Gadamer's approach. The intention of the paper is to show how the hermeneutics of memory is an adequate answer to the problem of temporal distance which arises due to the death of another, and to argue to what extent this is a novelty in relation to the tradition of understanding these phenomena.

When it comes to recollection and understanding, there are two places in *Truth and Method* that are of major importance for us. These are: the "Transformation into structure and total mediation" and "Analysis of historically effected consciousness". While in the first, Gadamer speaks about the nature of recollection, distinguishing, through conversation with Plato and Aristotle, two types of the same, the second is focused on historically effected consciousness, and the way the present is burdened with the past, that is, the way the past lives in present through consciousness. The analysis of both chapters should show their connection – the way in which recollection enables the understanding of the past as the present within historically effected consciousness. Thus, in contrast to the tradition that sees recognition as its primary function, recollection also appears as an active understanding of becoming, as a *historical alterity*, in which reconstruction is rejected in favor of manifesting historical effect in the present.

Before we conclude the analysis by returning to Gadamer, we will move on to Ricoeur's approach to the problem of *Death* and recollection in history, which adequately builds on the mentioned motives. For Ricoeur, Death is not the ultimate horizon against which life is determined, so Death as an absence must be transformed into a presence, which will enable active recollection to release a living effect within the historically effected consciousness. In order to more adequately present the meaning of recollection to which Gadamer and Ricoeur refer to, the paper will also rely on Deleuze and his lines on recognition from *Difference and Repetition*.

## Transformation, Representation and Recognition

The chapter "Transformation into structure and total mediation" in *Truth and Method* Gadamer begins with an explanation of the freedom of the game. Namely, the game ceases to be exclusively a representational act of the player, separating from him, it becomes a pure phenomenon (*Erscheinung*). "It has the character of a work, of an *ergon* and not only of *energeia*. In this sense, I call it a structure (*Gebilde*)" (Gadamer 2004: 110). Nevertheless, this separation or autonomy of the game still points to representation. Although when Gadamer talk about structure he means the work of art, in its core it's about the analysis of transformation. Question is: what changes during the transformation, and what remains the same? Something that *was* is re-presented, that is, it appears in the present, in the way it *is now*. The question that arises now is: by recognizing what *it was*, do we recognize what *it is now*, or is it that by seeing

what it *is now*, we can recognize what it *was*. It is not easy to answer because the setting itself does not stand on a safe ground. The inner dialectic of transformation lies in the fact that although something that changes must retain something by which change can be recognized – something that is therefore the same, transformation also means *difference*, change as a whole – something that was is no longer, because it became *other*. Transformation into structure, means that what *once was, is no longer*, and what *is now*, is undoubtedly in its truth (Gadamer 2004: 111).

However, it is necessary to put this dialectic aside for a moment, because in order to answer the question, it is necessary to re-illuminate the connection between change as a phenomenon and the subject who initiates the change. That is why the break between the game and the player that Gadamer insists on is important. The example he gives is acting, entering another identity, another character. The one who enters into the act, wants to make a discontinuity with the existing identity. In the eyes of other observers, he wants to be something else. Of course, we cannot talk about change here, but rather about disguise – the change that is imposed on the audience, keeps the inner continuity of the one who wants to present the change. But, “...to start from subjectivity here is to miss the point” (Gadamer 2004: 111). Because the moment we introduce the question of the “meaning” of the act itself, the player must be removed from the analysis. In the act itself as *Erscheinung* there is something which no longer *permits* adequate comparison with so far *existing reality*, there is no comparison which would give an ultimate measure. Gadamer refers here to the example of a child who plays from Aristotle’s Poetics: a child who plays by imitating, thus performing a kind of *mimesis* by changing his clothes, is not doing that because it wants for us to recognize what is behind that performance, behind the *presentation*, that is, child does not want to be recognized in what *it was*. On the contrary, the meaning of the act is to confirm itself in what *it is*, to recognize what is being imitated, what *is now* (Gadamer 2004: 112). This motif, obviously dear to Gadamer, can also be found in *The Beginning of the philosophy* (Gadamer 2001: 17–18). The meaning that connects both of these motives is the virtuality of the act – the child is surrendering (*Überantwortung*) itself to play, and in that indulgence the *representation* becomes an *event*, which does not mean repeating the old, but actualizing the new on one of many possible ways – virtual.

That it is representation at stake, can only be determined by recognition, by recognizing something that reappears. And so we are again at the beginning of a dialectical problem from earlier. Recognition is a feature of recollection, understanding that we have in perception what we already knew before, that is, to perceive something again (experience, learn) – from there it follows again and again that the basis of representation as repetition is the *sameness*. It takes knowledge of something to be able to imitate it, it takes recollection – knowledge of something that was before, in order to be able to recognize. To sum up, it takes something that *was*, to be able to return to *presence*, to be able to be *re-presented*.



What has been said should by no means be understood as the only kind of relationship between what *was* and what *is*. Likewise, for Gadamer, the role of recollection can not in any case be reduced to recognition, and recognition is not just the knowledge of something we already knew. Recognizing always means knowing “more than is already familiar”. For this claim, Gadamer will offer at least two basic interpretations, and it is necessary to look at both of them. At first, we have a Platonic myth on which Platonism is based, which can be found in *Phaedo* and in *Meno* (Plato: 1963), and to which Plato refers in order to legitimize his theory of knowledge, and to distinguish the philosopher from the sophist (Ostojić 2021: 266). According to that myth, everything is already in the soul, that is, in the memory, but not in a clear way (we do not have clear knowledge about it). Recognition is thus the recognition of the essence, that is, the act in which the *Truth* or *logos* stands out from the contingent and changing circumstances that are related to its appearance. To know more in such a representation, in this case, means to be able to remove everything that is accidental in this new appearance. Recognition in this way forces the mind to better understand what is already in the memory. What Gadamer wants to underline here is that “Imitation and representation are not merely a repetition, a copy, but knowledge of the essence” (Gadamer 2004: 114). Understanding is thus a kind of recollection, but recognition is not just a return to the old actuality, but a completely new actualization of the Truth. Although it manages not to reduce the representation to “already seen”, this interpretation is strained to the extent that it neglects the ontological difference between the original and the copy that we find in Plato, as well as his critique of *mimesis*. Of course, Gadamer is aware of that, and in order to show the desired point that goes in favor of his notion of *understanding*, the argumentation turns to Aristotle.

Although Aristotle does not deal with the problem of hermeneutics, and especially not in the historical context of understanding (understanding of the past), Aristotle’s considerations presented in *Nicomachean ethics* are of particular importance for Gadamer’s notion of understanding. The reason for this is that in Aristotle’s ethics, unlike metaphysics, the notion of good does not represent an independent generality, as is the case with Plato’s Ideas. On the contrary, the knowledge of good depends on the current situation, that is, on action in *now* (Aristotle 2000: 1095a). Criticizing Plato, Aristotle shows that the basis of moral knowledge is striving (*orexis*), which develops into a fixed demeanor (*hexis*). Now it is only a step from moving from moral cognition to cognition. That transition will be completed with Heidegger and his explication of the ontological connection between *Dasein* and understanding. For Gadamer’s conception of recollection and understanding highly important is Heidegger’s claim, that understanding itself is what we most fundamentally are, including our being inseparable from the *other Dasein* (*Mitsein*) (Heidegger 1962: 149–168). Cognition, or in this case re-cognition implies “*being-in-the-world*”. So, when it comes to recollection, thanks to which we recognize the representation, the emphasis is no longer on what something *was*, but on its current actualization, which is related to the active act of understanding.

However, with Gadamer, as we have already mentioned, understanding must not remain tied to the activity of the subject, it must be considered as a pure phenomenon. Thus, with Gadamer, the experience of understanding is an *event*, and in that way the truth of the past does not exist without its actualization in that event, in the present act of understanding. “The birth of experience as an event over which no one has control and which is not even determined by the particular weight of this or that observation, but in which everything is coordinated in a way that is ultimately incomprehensible” (Gadamer 2004: 347). Thus, cognition as well as recognition happen through recollection, but they are no longer subordinated to the *Truth of the past* – of *that which was*. The Truth of *what was* is not in the historical fact, but in the active act of understanding that is happening in what is *now*. On the other hand, recollection is indispensable and necessary in the process of understanding, because *what was*, is already always included in *what is now*. Because of this connection made by recollection, that past is not inert, but its meaning is constantly reshaped in the present event of understanding.

In this way, we arrived to Gadamer’s *history of effect* (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) and historically effected consciousness, which we will refer to several times in the following chapters. After showing what the relationship is between Gadamer’s notions of recollection, recognition, and representation, the text turns to Ricoeur, in order to show how Ricoeur uses Gadamer’s motives we have elaborated, the active act of understanding, and the connection between what *was* and what *is* on the problem of *Death* as a *temporal distance*.

## Crossing the Distance: Returning to Presence

In his Essay *Temporal Distance and Death in History*, before introducing Gadamer’s hermeneutics of recollection, Paul Ricoeur begins by re-examining the phenomenon of *Death*. We can divide this examination into two stages. The first seeks to offer a new interpretation of the relationship to Death, and then the second moves on to the phenomenon of Death within history.

For these purposes, it is not necessary to re-examine all the authors to whom Ricoeur refers to in an effort to offer a “different” attitude toward Death, but one must not be left out, because the above-mentioned “novelty” in Ricoeur’s interpretation refers to him. It is, of course, Heidegger and his ontological conception of “being towards death”. In Heidegger, Death is ontologically inseparable from *being-in-the world*. This is because Death is the ontological horizon of the self of Being (*Sein*), that is, *Dasein*. Being toward death is “Dasein’s ownmost possibility” (Heidegger 1962: 307) Although Ricoeur argues that Heidegger’s *being toward death* for several reasons has no effect on the critical consideration of Death in the *sciences de l’esprit*, and especially on the problem of understanding history which is in focus here, that is not entirely true. Even if we agree with all the reasons that Ricoeur states: That Heidegger’s relationship with Death is too internal and personal to be “echoed in the relationship with the historical past which appears to be relegated to the anonymous level

of ‘one dies’ (*Man stirbt*), and that historiography is too determined to look back to the past, to keep in its own circle of understanding a pure relationship to the future implied by *being towards death*, and that therefore *being towards death* cannot contribute to understanding of Death within history (Ricoeur 2002: 240–241), from further reading it becomes clear that it is necessary for Ricoeur to reverse this view. In that sense, such an interpretation of Heidegger’s Death may not contribute to the historical understanding of Death, but it is limiting for a different understanding of Death that Ricoeur seeks to develop through the hermeneutics of recollection, which is also why Ricoeur devotes the whole chapter to something “irrelevant to his critical examination”.

To understand Ricoeur’s intent, we must begin with the problem of understanding the history. The most common gesture of historians is to understand history through reconstruction. Reconstruction of the past is done either with the help of objects or through witnesses. A historiographical gesture is an intellectual critical action, which uses objects to remove mystery from memory, materializing the past through stories in which causes are arranged and connected with consequences, in a way that assures that Truth is *representation* (Krzysztof Pomian, 1999: 63). Studying, writing or talking about history is an attempt to return the *past*, which *is no longer present*. In this regard, a witness is someone who gives objectivity to the cognitive act of recollection. The word *testis*, as the witness is spoken in Latin, had a close connection with *tertius*, which means third, and at the same time in Roman law it meant a person who confirmed an oral contract, i.e. was its guarantor, had the authority to certify it, something Ricoeur also wrote about (Ricoeur 2000). It is interesting to note here that the witness also has a role to separate the process of recollection from subjectivity, but by no means in the same way that Gadamer aimed. The witness turns the inner act of consciousness and its *encounter* with the past into an objective picture of what *has passed*, in such a way that what *has passed* is no longer in close connection with the consciousness that tries to invoke it through recollection, and thus neither with what is *now*. Unlike Gadamer’s historically effected consciousness in which the Truth of the past exists only in the present, here the witness guarantees the Truth of the past, as a truth that has no need to confirm itself in its re-actualization. In addition, as Fernando Catroga observes, the Latin word *suprestes* would also apply to a witness – as the one who is present, who has survived, a word that is also a translation of the Greek *martyros* which meant “witness” (Katroga 2011: 53). But, in both cases, this necessity and significance of the witness speaks not only in favor of the *objective truth* that lies in the past, and which needs to be discovered and then confirmed, but also of the constant and expressed “doubt”, of distrust that recollection can capture this objective truth. This doubt, however, is not enough to give up the claim to the objective truth that has remained in the past, but rather a call for a continuous examination of recollection, and recollection as an examination of what is said, by means of the *Truth that once was*. In this context, recollection and history (which is understood as a historiography) together build unique retrospectives. In Ricoeur words:

A memory subjected to the critical test of history can no longer aim for fidelity without being sifted through the truth. And a history, replaced by memory in the dialectic movement of retrospection and project (conception, tendency), can no longer separate the truth from the fidelity which ultimately attaches to the broken promises of the past. (Ricoeur 1998: 32)

The Truth in history must thus be revealed or discovered, and as an obstacle to this discovery stands temporality. Thus, Temporal distance, not only separates from the Truth that is no longer present, but, due to the temporality of the Being (everything that is), can make *objects* or *witnesses*, that can point to, or provide credibility to a certain reconstruction of the past, *absent* from our time, from *now*. *Death* can thus be interpreted as temporal distance, *as an absence* – the question posed by Ricoeur is, how do we deal with *Death* as an extreme form of temporal distance? How to return *absent* to the *presence*, and with it *the absent Truth*?

Here, Ricoeur will (although in a different context) follow Heidegger distinction between two types of speech about the past, namely “no longer is” (from *Vergangenheit*) and having-been form of time (*Gewesenheit*) expressed in a phrase “this once was” (Ricoeur, 2002: 249). Both forms speak of absence, but of two different kinds of absence. One of the tasks of history is to move from “no longer is” to “once was” and that is also a way to approach the phenomenon of *death*. The twofold meaning of absence can be explained by the “act of burial”, as well as the meaning of the *grave*.

At the level of symbolism, recollection is an act in which the absent receives its symbol, i.e. within recollection that which is absent re-present (come into presence) itself, and thus, indirectly, through the symbol acquired by recollection, it becomes *present* in the *now*. *Grave* or *burial* signifies death or the absence of an object – something which was is there no more. However, the emphasis in the previous sentence is on “signify”. To mark an absence means that that absence is placed in the presence, but so that the presence to which the grave refers is not the presence of an object from the past, but precisely the presence of its absence. Then we can say that the role of historiography is no different, it speaks of the past in order to bury it, or rather, to give it a place and distribute space” (Katroga 2011: 48). The form “no longer is” refers to those who are slowly becoming “absent from history” (*les absents de l’histoire*) in the words of Michel De Certeau. Written history is a struggle against oblivion, because it represents an appropriate transition from “grave – place” to “expression – grave” (Ricoeur 2000: 147). This is the articulation of death, and the transition from “is no longer” to “once was”, but the knowledge of “once was” rests on the meaning already assigned to it. Instead of disappearing, history as well as narration seem to bring back those who have died or disappeared as *traces*, which are completely at the disposal of those who are alive. Marking the past means giving place to the dead, and that is also sublimating the possible distribution of space and pointing out the meaning in the direction of the living. (M. de Certeau 1975). If the past is retained only as the

presence of absence, it means that the *object of the past* is transformed into an inert object, which the present has, but which, since it is inactive, no longer has an influence on it besides the one present assigns to it. There is no doubt that these objects or traces are the bearers of meaning, but the idea that their accumulation leads to the reconstruction of the *truth of the past*, turns recollection into recording, and then into recognition. What still remains there is an insurmountable time gap, because the past in reference to the historian and the present is still in a state of *otherness*, where that otherness is only hinted at, but remaining hidden (absent).

Therefore, the grave and the graveyard must be interpreted as significant wholes that articulate two very different levels: one that is *invisible* and the other that is *visible*. The semiotic layers of which this second level is composed have the role to *conceal* decay (time) and at the same time to *simulate* non-death, conveying to those who come, meaning that is able to help individual *presentation*, or rather, to *represent – restore the presence* of one who is absent with his Being. (Katroga 2011: 49)

In a certain way, a parallel can be drawn between the Platonic *mimesis* as a representation, and this representation within history. Both refer to the being of the past and the Truth of the past, but they can never be ontologically relevant as the original, both representations are just a copy, or a label that serves to refer to, to recognize the original. However, there is one important difference that will enable Ricoeur to link the representation within history with the Gadamer interpretation of representation. Namely, it is about the fact that reading the sign – becomes a funeral act, so the understanding of the meaning comes from *now*. The “absent object” in order to “preserve” itself, receives its symbol, which, although it confirms the time gap between the presence and the presence of absence, points that meaning of that symbol comes from the understanding that takes place in the present. Death turned into an inert tomb, will show its inner infinity when it encounters with the act of understanding. This will be adequately noticed, in addition to Ricoeur, by Dosse: the act of burial “reopens the horizon of possibilities, because assigning a place to the dead is a way of continuing the path towards a creative horizon, both indebted and unburdened, with a past that is not haunted by the creativity of an unknowing presence” (F. Dosse 2006: 63).

The key motive that Ricoeur opposes Heidegger’s attitude towards death is now clearly visible: Death is not the ultimate horizon in relation to which Life is determined. For the active capture of the past, for its active understanding, the setting must be reversed: Instead of Death reducing the possibilities of Life, it opens them up. This opening of possibilities does not only mean finding a space for Death by writing it down and inserting it into the narrative, which will offer new meanings for the living. It has another fundamental role, to abolish *otherness* as the predominant and only relationship of Life and Death.

In order for something like this to be possible, it is necessary to think differently about the problem of temporal distance. For, although this thought

gesture of Ricoeur and Dosse brings the possibility of multiple ways of communication between the past and the future, and thus the richer meaning of representation, in history, memory in which traces are stored as evidence constantly strives to confirm the meaning of *the past in the present*, by (with a sufficient number of traces) crossing the time distance between the absent and the present. As long as the time that has elapsed represents an abyss, or distance, for the *now*, past remains *the other*. This is where we involve the history of effect (*Wirkungsgeschichte*). In order to finish his idea on recollection as a bridge between past and present, between history and philosophy, Ricoeur needs Gadamer's notion of historically effected consciousness.

### Understanding as Encounter: Distance as Condition of Possibility

It is necessary, after all, to return once more to the notions of recollection, representation, recognition, and finally, temporal distance. Temporal distance is the distance that separate the *Being of the past* from the *Being of the present*, or more simply, past from the present. Representation is the representation, or rather presentation of something that existed before this moment in the present (which does not necessarily mean that its existence ended in the past), which means that temporal distance is space between *past being*, and its representation. We stated why, for Gadamer this is not the simple form of repeating, or recollection of something already known: in Platonic sense, representation holds the essence or the Truth of the past, being able to recognize that truth in the present, implies already a more distinct knowledge. However, here we find the similar problem as in historiography. "Original" *Being of the past* is always more than its representation. For Plato, to know something is to remember what it is (we could also say "what it was"); in history, in order to know the past, you must use representations of the past, as signs, as traces, so you can reconstruct it in its Truth (which is the Truth of the past) Turning to Aristotle understanding of (ethical) cognition, Gadamer gave a bigger role of the present moment in the process of understanding. Finally, understanding became and active act, inseparable from the way we are in that *now*, from Heidegger's *Dasein*.

The fact that understanding is an effective event dependent of the present moment, does not neglect the relevance of the *past*. Same goes for opening possibilities of *meaning* that Ricoeur talked about – temporal distance is still there. Maybe now there are more ways to cross it, but as we stated above, *past* still remains *otherness* for present understanding.

Answer to this problem lies in Gadamer's historically effected consciousness. But, what is historically affected consciousness? Understanding for Gadamer implies that something (the subject of understanding) is *speaking to us*. Consciousness, together with its prejudices, must not be neglected in this process. Only by entering the game, only by surrendering oneself to the message of *another*, is it possible to experience the *Truth of otherness*:

The naivete of so-called historicism consists in the fact that it does not undertake this reflection, and in trusting to the fact that its procedure is methodical, it forgets its own historicity [...]. The true historical object is not an object at all, but the unity of the one and the other, a relationship that constitutes both the reality of history and the reality of historical understanding. (Gadamer 2004: 299)

Hermeneutics must show the effect of history that is present in every act of understanding – the whole of history is an active process that is always actualized in that *now* of understanding. In this manner, understanding is in its most essential meaning “a historically effected event”. This means, there is no reenactment, no reconstruction of *the past*, but always its actualization. Every consciousness is historically effected one – it is the way it functions. In other words, past is always embodied inside present, there is no other meaning of the past, no other Truth than one which actualizes itself in the present moment. This mediation, or transmission of tradition in *Truth and Method* turns “temporal distance from an empty space into a field of energy”, as Ricoeur will notice (Ricoeur 2002: 250). Time between *being of the past*, and *being of the present*, absence and presence, stops to be a distance that needs to be crossed somehow in order to understand, but rather, temporal distance becomes a condition of possibility, of understanding as an event. In this way, past reopens itself on to the future, because that future is the future of the past. “Repetition *qua* reopening, allows for the completion and enrichment of the preceding mediation on death in history” (Ricoeur 2002: 250). But this notion of repetition, this representation holds different meaning. Inside hermeneutic of recollection there is no typical recognition. It is a recognition which becomes an *encounter*. Before we summarize, we will turn shortly to Gilles Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*, as it can be of great help.

Speaking about the difference, Deleuze points out that the world of representation is characterized by the impossibility of establishing a *difference* in itself, and by the same principle repeating by itself, “since the latter is grasped only by means of recognition, distribution, reproduction and resemblance in so far as these alienate the prefix RE in simple generalities of representation” (Deleuze 1994: 138) In order to reverse these traditional postulates, Deleuze starts from the notion of recognition and of course from Plato – research which is of great interest for the purposes of this paper. It starts with the following speech from *The Republic*:

[...] some reports of our perceptions do not provoke thought to reconsideration because the judgment of them by sensation seems adequate, while others always invite the intellect to reflection because the sensation yields nothing that can be trusted. – You obviously mean distant appearances, or things drawn in perspective. – You have quite missed my meaning [...]. (Plato 1963: 523b)

No doubt, this provocative place in dialogue, that can cast a shadow on our previous interpretation of Plato and the representation, begins extremely simply: Some things in our perception do not encourage thinking, while

others make us think. Undoubtedly, it would be a case of recognition first. If we see something that we can recognize, the thought, according to Deleuze, is fulfilled only with “an image of itself” (Deleuze 1994: 138). It follows that when we do not recognize, that is, when we are not sure that it is something we have already perceive, or what we already know, then we are encouraged or forced to think, as Socrates’ interlocutor will ask – but the interlocutor, as we see from the cited quote, is missing a point. Deleuze will notice that this is not at all about the known or unknown as a property of the object – the one who doubts does not escape recognition. It is about the *good will of a thinker*, as Deleuze will call it, or *good will of thinking*, that is, of the way in which thought approaches these objects. An certain object can force thinking, in same manner like the one that is suspicious, i.e. is not certain – the Notion is only a condition of possibility, in other words it is not necessarily related to thought, and thus to recollection. Recognition thus has nothing to do with the relationship between the past and the present, with the nature of the object and its representation, but with the (in)active act of thinking. Representation becomes repetition, but it is a repetition of the way in which the object of representation can be grasped – or “interpreted” for Gadamer. Getting out of the usual image of thought which tends to recognize, for Deleuze means a true *encounter* with the object of understanding. “Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental encounter [...]. It is not a quality but a sign. It is not a sensible being but the being of the sensible” (Deleuze 1994: 139). This is a fundamental part of the principle of understanding that we find in Gadamer and Ricoeur, expressed in a slightly different manner. However Deleuze will add a twist that allows us to conceive the recollection from a different angle, adding another dimension to it. The thing (re)appears inside process of recollection, but only as forgotten (Deleuze 1994: 140). It addresses recollection, only if it addresses forgetting within recollection. Indulging in conversion means forgetting. Forget to be able to surrender yourself to the voice of the Past (*Geschichtsüberlieferung*), to abolish the *otherness* of the object.

\* \* \*

This is how, through recollection, recognition becomes *encounter* of consciousness and past as the history of effect – and this is the very act of *understanding*. Whereas Death in history bears negative meaning of “temporal distance” as a loss, as a separation, the resurrection of past which happens in each representation, the evoking of meaning is the positive side expressed in the idea of *Wirkungsgeschichte*. Through Gadamer and Ricoeur, we have showed the dialectic relationship between *absence* and *presence*. Although it is true that their projects differs from here on, because Gadamer’s *mediation i prepuštvanje povesti* is not same as Ricoeur’s imaginative reconstruction or “fictive experience” (Dimitrov 2019: 14), we managed to (re)present the meeting point – as the common ground of hermeneutics of recollection.



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## Aleksandar Ostojić

### Hermeneutika sećanja: Gadamer i Riker

#### Apstrakt

Tekst analizira pojam sećanja kod Hansa Georga Gadamera i Pola Rikera u kontekstu vremenske distance kao „prepreke“ razumevanja prošlosti. Naročita pažnja usmerena je na razumevanje fenomena „smrti“ kao vremenskog ponora između prošlosti i sadašnjosti. U vezi sa tim stoje i nastojanja filozofske hermeneutike sa jedne strane i istoricizma sa druge. U odnosu na ulogu koju sećanje igra u procesu razumevanju kod Gadamera i Rikera, daće se ocrutati razlike između istoricizma i hermeneutike. Šta smrt predstavlja u pogledu razumevanja za istoriju a šta za hermeneutiku? Kako razumeti vremensku distancu? Da li je moguće i da li je neophodno prevazići je? Koja je uloga sećanja i kako ono učestvuje u razumevanju? – neka su od glavnih pitanja koja će biti adresirana u tekstu. Na kraju, zadatak teksta je da kroz interakciju misli dvojice autora, ponudi značenje i značaj hermeneutike sećanja u pogledu na navedena pitanja.

Ključne reči: sećanje, Smrt, vremenska distanca, reprezentacija, prisustvo, razumevanje



III

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REVIEW ESSAYS

KRITIČKI PRIKAZI



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Rastko Jovanov

## „JETZT SEI WIR-ZEIT“ HEIDEGGERS SCHWARZE HEFTE IM LICHT DER SELBSTKRITIK SEINES NS-ENGAGEMENTS<sup>1</sup>

### ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Der Artikel analysiert Heideggers Haltung zum Nationalsozialismus anhand seiner privaten Aufzeichnungen, die unter dem Titel *Schwarze Hefte* in neun Bänden vollständig erschienen sind. Obwohl unbestritten ist, dass Heidegger zwischen 1930 und 1934 ein ausgesprochener Anhänger des nationalsozialistischen Programms war, zeigen seine privaten Schriften, dass er seinen Irrtum und seinen falschen philosophischen Glauben an einen möglichen, durch die nationalsozialistische „Revolution“ zu vollziehenden Neubeginn der Philosophie nach dem Ende der metaphysischen Tradition des philosophischen Denkens eingesehen hat. Der Artikel erläutert, auf welche Weise Heidegger nach 1934 den Nationalsozialismus kritisierte sowie die Umstände seines im selben Jahr erfolgten Rücktritts als Rektor der Universität Freiburg.

### KEYWORDS

Heidegger,  
Nationalsozialismus,  
Brutalität, Technik,  
Machenschaft,  
Metapolitik, Wir-Zeit

Obwohl die Frage nach Heideggers Haltung zum Nationalsozialismus und Antisemitismus nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg aufgeworfen wurde, löste das Buch Victor Farías *Heidegger und Nazismus* (Farías 1987) die ersten weltweiten Debatten über Heideggers nationalsozialistisches Engagement aus. Zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts hat sich am meisten Emmanuel Faye vor allem in seinem Buch *Heidegger. L'introduction du nazisme dans la philosophie. Autour des séminaires inédites de 1933-1935* (Faye 2005)<sup>2</sup> mit diesem Thema beschäftigt. Die Seminare, auf die sich Faye bezieht, wurden kurz darauf in Heideggers *Gesamtausgabe* und im *Heidegger-Jahrbuch* veröffentlicht. Allerdings werden diese Seminare nicht so viel Aufregung in Heideggers Oeuvre verursachen wie die Herausgabe

1 This article was realized with the support of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, according to the Agreement on the realization and financing of scientific research.

2 Das Buch wurde 2009 in deutsche (Faye 2009a) und englische Sprache (Faye 2009b) übersetzt.

aller 9 Bände von Heideggers *Schwarzen Heften* aufgrund der sich darin befindenden offener Angriffe auf das ‚Weltjudentum‘ und der Überlegungen zum eigenen nationalsozialistischen Engagement in den 1930er Jahren.

Die Rezeptionsgeschichte von Heideggers *Schwarzen Heften*, die Ende 2013 begann, umfasst bereits hunderte von Artikeln, die von Zeitungsartikeln über Artikel in Zeitschriften bis hin zu einzelnen Büchern und Sammlungen zu Heideggers privaten Aufzeichnungen reichen. Zahlreiche zeitgenössische einflussreiche Philosophen haben es sich nicht nehmen lassen, die Front um Heideggers nationalsozialistisches Engagement und Antisemitismus neu zu öffnen. Mehrere wissenschaftliche Konferenzen wurden organisiert, um die Bedeutung von Heideggers privaten Schriften für seine in veröffentlichten Schriften enthaltene Philosophie zu untersuchen.

So veröffentlichten Andrew J. Mitchell und Peter Trawny in der Columbia University Press eine Aufsatzsammlung unter dem Titel *Heidegger's Black Notebooks. Responses to Anti-Semitism*, in der sich Beiträge im September 2014 an der Emory University stattgefundenen Konferenz „Heidegger's Black Notebooks: Philosophy, Politics, Anti-Semitism“ (Mitchell, Trawny 2017) befinden. Die meisten Aufsätze antworten auf Peter Trawnys Interpretation des Heideggers Antisemitismus in seinem Buch *Irrnisfuge. Heideggers Anarchie* (Trawny 2014b) und *Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung* (Trawny 2014a). 2016 veröffentlichen Marion Heinz und Sidonie Kelleler bei Suhrkamp ein Sammelband unter dem Titel *Martin Heideggers »Schwarze Hefte«*. *Eine philosophisch-politische Debatte* (Heinz & Kellerer 2016) und Ingo Farin und Jeff Malpas bei MIT Press das Sammelband *Reading Heidegger's Black Notebooks 1931–1941* (Farin, Malpas 2016). Schon im darauffolgenden Jahr erscheinen drei neue Sammelbände: Hans-Helmuth Gander und Magnus Striet veröffentlichen bei Klostermann *Heideggers Weg in die Moderne. Eine Verortung der »Schwarzen Hefte«* (Gander, Striet 2017); Alfred Denker und Holger Zaborowski beschäftigen sich mit dem Thema in zwei Spezialausgaben von *Heidegger-Jahrbuch* unter den Titeln *Zur Hermeneutik der »Schwarzen Hefte«* (Denker, Zaborowski 2017) und *Jenseits von Polemik und Apologie. Die »Schwarzen Hefte“ in der Diskussion* (Denker, Zaborowski 2018).

Die meisten Interpreten sind sich einig, dass Heidegger in seinen privaten Schriften sein nationalsozialistisches Engagement und vor allem antisemitische Ansichten offengelegt hat. Nur wenige Autoren widersetzen sich einer so tief verwurzelten Meinung und trennen Heideggers politisches Engagement von seiner Philosophie (im Gegensatz zu Emanuel Fay, der eine solche Haltung am stärksten vertrat und glaubte, Heidegger könne nicht mehr als Philosoph gelten, weil seine Philosophie, so Faye, durchaus auf einer nationalistischen politischen Haltung beruht (vgl. Faye 2005: 9–16)) und verweisen auf Heideggers immanente Kritik an der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung.<sup>3</sup>

3 Vgl. Silvio Vietta (Vietta 2015); Richard Polt (Polt 2007: 11–40) und (Polt 2017: 74–97); Slavoj Žižek (Žižek 2007: 1–43); Françoise Dastur (Dastur 2013: 853–62); Theodor Kisiel (Kisiel 2013: 127–51); Thomas Rohkrämer (Rohkrämer 2016: 239–52).

Das Hauptziel dieses Beitrags ist es, den Charakter von Heideggers politischem Engagement im Lichte seiner privaten Schriften in den *Schwarzen Hefen* zu verdeutlichen, wobei die zentrale Frage akzentuiert wird: „Wie und in welcher Weise hat Heidegger die nationalsozialistische Bewegung kritisiert?“ In diesem Jahr sind alle 9 Bände der *Schwarzen Hefte* erschienen (von GA 94 [2014] bis GA 102 [2022]).<sup>4</sup> So gewinnen wir einen vollständigen Einblick in Heideggers Haltung zur Politik und zum Politischen, die er *Metapolitik* nennt (vgl. GA 94: Heidegger 2014b: 111–162). Obwohl unbestritten ist, dass Heidegger 1933/34 den deutschen Nationalsozialismus und seine Ziele einer neuen politischen Ordnung auf der Grundlage der Idee der ursprünglichen Gemeinschaft und politischen und Rechtserneuerung offen befürwortet hat, hat er den biologischen Rassismus nie akzeptiert und ihn in seinen Universitätsvorlesungen offen bekämpft (vgl. GA 94: Heidegger 2014b: 143) (vgl. Bernasconi 2020: 50–67). Deshalb hat Marcus Gabriel recht, wenn er inmitten des Skandals um die Veröffentlichung des ersten Bandes der *Schwarzen Hefte*, das auch Aufzeichnungen aus der Zeit seines NS-Engagements enthält, schreibt:

Die historisch-kritische Heidegger-Forschung kann jetzt erst eigentlich einsetzen. Wir haben nun den Abstand, den es dazu braucht, und wir haben überhaupt erst die Texte. Außerdem wäre da noch Heideggers enorme Wirkungsgeschichte, der wir uns stellen müssen. Kaum ein Zweiter hat mit seiner Arbeit die Philosophie weltweit seit den Zwanzigerjahren des letzten Jahrhunderts mehr beeinflusst – wider Willen vor allem den Existenzialismus, die Dekonstruktion, Psychoanalyse und die logisch geschulte Ontologie. Davor dürfen wir die Augen nicht verschließen. (Gabriel 2015)

Aber schauen wir zuerst, wie Heidegger sein eigenes nationalsozialistisches Engagement gesehen hat und worin bestand dieses Engagement.

### Heideggers Sicht auf sein eigenes NS-Engagement

Der Begriff der *Metapolitik*, der in Heideggers umfangreichem Oeuvre erst im ersten Band der *Schwarzen Hefte* auftaucht, umreißt Natur, Ambivalenz, aber auch den besonderen Messianismus von Heideggers geistig-politischem Projekt, das einerseits durch politisches Handeln der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung bedingt ist, während es andererseits das Politische als das Wesentliche der geistig-politischen Führung leugnet, und zugleich auf der Versammlung geistiger Kräfte besteht, die das deutsche Volk zur metapolitischen Struktur der künftigen menschlichen Existenz in die Welt führen werden. Heidegger versucht nämlich durch den Begriff der Metapolitik die moderne Politik zu dekonstruieren und zwar gerade auf der Grundlage der immanenten Logik, die leitend ist für die Betrachtung des Verhältnisses von Individuum und Gesellschaft in der Moderne. Heidegger gibt den negativen Freiheitsbegriff auf und kehrt – in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit der politischen Philosophie von Hegel

4 Ich zitiere Heideggers Schriften nach der Gesamtausgabe (= GA).

und Schmitt in den Vorlesungen von 1933 und 1934 (Heidegger 2009; GA 86: Heidegger 2011: 59–183) – zur antiken, positiven Auffassung von Anteilnahme und Versammlung zurück. Jedoch in einem ganz besonderen Sinne. Die geistige Teilnahme an der sogenannten „konservativen Revolution“ zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen ist nämlich die letzte Konsequenz einer besonderen Linie der deutschen Philosophie, die den politischen Kampf auf einen geistigen reduzieren wird. Metapolitik wird keine Überpolitik, keine theoretische Überlegung und auch keine Rechtfertigung von Politik darstellen. Heidegger wird diesen Begriff nur für eine kurze Zeit verwenden, um seine Position an der Front des geistlichen Kampfes während seiner Rektoratszeit zu beschreiben, eine Position, die dazu auffordern wird, dass die theoretischen Reflexionen dem Handeln den Vorrang einräumen.<sup>5</sup> Metapolitik ist in der Tat ein messianisches Konzept, ein Projekt, etwas, das nur dann kommen wird, wenn, so Heidegger, die nationalsozialistische Bewegung in dieser Übergangszeit um das Jahr 1933 dem historisch an das deutsche Volk übergebenen Auftrag folgt, deren Zeit gekommen ist und der in seinen Schriften und Vorträgen schon vorliegt. Daher hat das Jahr 1933 für Heidegger dieselbe Bedeutung wie 1806 für Hegel – das Moment, in dem der Geist, das heißt das Sein, erscheint und von der Idealität der Frage zur härtesten Realität des Daseinsbehauptung übergeht: die erdachte Revolution findet ihre Verwirklichung in der Geschichte. Wie 1806, als Heidegger zufolge deutsche Sammlung begann und den Anlauf nahm, war sie 1933 bereits voll ausgebildet und wartete darauf, dass ihr Führer zur Aktion übergeht. Kräfte sind versammelt, man brauchte nur noch geistige und politische Führung – *Metapolitik*.

Sehen wir uns zunächst an, was er gleich zu Beginn seines Rektorats über Metapolitik geschrieben hat:

*Das Ende der »Philosophie«.* —Wir müssen sie zum Ende bringen und damit das völlig Andere —Metapolitik —vorbereiten. Demgemäß auch der *Wandel der Wissenschaft*. (GA 94: 115)

*Metaphysik als Meta-politik.* (GA 94: 116)

Die *Metaphysik des Daseins* muß sich nach ihrem innersten Gefüge vertiefen und ausweiten zur *Metapolitik »des« geschichtlichen Volkes*. (GA 94: 124)

An die Stelle der Metaphysik, unter deren Denkverfassungszwang, so Heidegger, die gesamte Philosophiegeschichte steht, soll die Metapolitik treten. Aber, wie man in der dritten Anmerkung sehen kann, ist sie eng mit dem Volk verbunden, es ist immer die Metapolitik eines bestimmten Volkes, und nicht irgendeines, sondern nur historischen Volkes. Das heißt, desjenigen Volkes, dem der Auftrag gegeben wurde – und für Heidegger ist es nur das deutsche Volk

5 Vgl. Heideggers Brief an Carl Schmitt, in dem er schreibt, dass er mitten in einer Polemik stecke und sein literarisches Dasein einem politischen Engagement, d. h. einer Sammlung der geistigen Kräfte an der Universität weichen müsse (GA 16: Heidegger 2000: 156).



– einen Neuanfang in der Menschheitsgeschichte zu begründen, eine wechselseitig bedingte Revolution zu beginnen, die Revolution des Wissens und die Revolution der inneren Ordnung innerhalb der Endlichkeit des Überlebens und der Welt selbst. Um diese Aufgabe zu erfüllen, braucht es nicht nur des Führers, sondern auch des Philosophen, des geistigen Führers, Heideggers selbst.

Daher kann die Metapolitik momentan, im Jahr 1933, nur ein Projekt sein. Im Moment geht es laut Heidegger nur um die Vorbereitung auf ihre Ankunft, denn “[w]ir treten in ein Zeitalter [...]” (GA 94: 126). Vorbereitung, Übergang, Revolution – all das sind Worte, die mit sich Veränderung, versteckte Gewalt bringen, und die den Raum für die Äußerung ihrer „Rechte“ nur im Ausnahme- und Revolutionszustand finden können. Da ist Heidegger schon auf der Front. Metapolitik als ein Zukunftszustand, in dem die revolutionäre Gewalt der vollständig im Kampf versunkenen Übergangszeit stabilisiert und erhalten wird. Dieses Wort bestimmt Heideggers Rektoratsengagement. Gleich zu Beginn seiner Tätigkeit wird er von diesem Wort völlig überwältigt: „der Führer [hat] eine neue Wirklichkeit erweckt [...], die unserem Denken die rechte Bahn und Stoßkraft gibt“ (GA 94: 111). Heidegger betrachtet sein Rektoratsamt als Möglichkeit, direkt in den Kampf einzusteigen. Doch kurz darauf, als Heidegger erkannte, dass sein NS-Engagement an der Universität Freiburg ein Irrtum war, der vom Glauben an eine welthistorische Wende auf der Grundlage der nationalsozialistischen „Revolution“ getrieben war, begann Heidegger, den Nationalsozialismus als eines von vielen Gebilden der modernen Technik zu kritisieren, das sich in Rechnereien und Machenschaften manifestiert.

## Die Kritik am Nationalsozialismus in *Schwarzen Heften*

Heidegger gab zu, dass sein NS-Engagement ein *Irrtum* war.<sup>6</sup> Er ließ sich vom Zeitgeist und dem Einfluss verschiedener Sprachgestalten verführen, aus denen einfach der Geist der konservativen Revolution in Deutschland der 1930er Jahre ausstrahlte. Er wurde verführt auch – wie seine privaten Aufzeichnungen im *Schwarzen Heften* zeigen – durch Begriffe und Figuren des eigenen Denkens. Die Frage ist also, wie kam es dazu, dass sich Heidegger verführen ließ. Es handelt es sich um die Verführung Heideggers, um seine eigene Verführung, die Selbstverführung. Vielleicht handelt es sich am meisten um die Abweichungen, Irrnisse und nicht nur bloße Irrtümer, die Heidegger der Seinsgeschichte zuschreibt, die neben der deutschen Versammlung und modernen Techniken auf dem Höhepunkt des abendländischen metaphysischen Denkens auch ihn als Hüter des Seins einschließt. Heidegger nennt sein politisches Engagement jedoch ausdrücklich Irrtum und nicht Irrnis, was ja das wahre Seinsdenken als solches charakterisiert. Heidegger fügt jedoch hinzu, dass seine Entscheidung, sich politisch zu engagieren, kein politischer Trugschluss im weltgeschichtlichen Sinne war, sondern er glaubte, der Nationalsozialismus, der als das Ende der Metaphysik und der Übergang zu einem Anfang des philosophischen Denkens

6 „Mein Rektorat stand unter dem großen Irrtum [...]“ (GA 94: Heidegger 2014b: 162).

gedacht wurde, als solcher augenblicklich unmittelbar gelenkt und befördert werden kann.<sup>7</sup> Der Trugschluss bezieht sich auf den „vulgären“ Nationalsozialismus, während der „geistige“ Nationalsozialismus ursprünglich das richtige Engagement war, obwohl es sich später, wie Heideggers Denken von 1934, als Irrnis, als geistlos erwies. (GA 94: Heidegger 2014b: 135, 142) (siehe auch GA 16: Heidegger 2000: 414)

Nachdem er als Rektor zurückgetreten war, sah Heidegger ein, dass „*Nationalsozialismus* nicht als fertige ewige Wahrheit vom Himmel gefallen [ist] – so genommen wird er eine Verirrung und Narretei.“ (GA 94: 114–115) Er lässt sich sogar auch nicht theoretisch begründen: „Wir wollen nicht den Nationalsozialismus ‚theoretisch‘ unter bauen, etwa gar, um ihn erst so vermeintlicherweise trag- und bestandsfähig zu machen. Aber wir wollen der Bewegung und ihrer Richtkraft Möglichkeiten der Weltgestaltung und der Entfaltung vorbauen, wobei wir wissen, daß diese Entwürfe als solche, d. h. zu ‚Ideen‘ umgefälscht, keine Wirkfähigkeit besitzen [...] Der geistige Nationalsozialismus ist nichts »Theoretisches«; er ist aber auch nicht der »bessere« und gar ‚eigentliche‘; wohl aber ist er ebenso notwendig wie der der verschiedenen Organisationen und der Stände“ (ebd.: 134–135). Deswegen ist Nationalsozialismus nichts anderes als „Ideologie“ und „Weltanschauung“ (ebd.: 142, 149, 197) mit ihrem „trüben Biologismus“ (ebd. 143): „Die Vielen, die jetzt »über« Rasse und Bodenständigkeit reden, und in jedem Wort und in jeder Handlung und Unterlassung ihrer selbst spotten und beweisen, daß sie von all dem nicht nur nichts »haben«, geschweige denn von Grund aus rassig und bodenständig *sind*.“ (ebd.: 173)

An einer Stelle kritisiert er offen sein NS-Engagement ‚Führer zu führen‘: „Gegen die Einebnung und grenzenlose Anwendung des *Führerprinzips*! Inwiefern kann ein *Wissenschaftslehrer* überhaupt »Führer« sein? Inwiefern *nicht*“. (ebd.: 156) Und zwar gerade deswegen, weil „[...] der Nationalsozialismus niemals Prinzip einer Philosophie sein kann, sondern immer nur unter die Philosophie als Prinzip gestellt werden muß.“ (ebd.: 190) Der Nationalsozialismus ist etwas barbarisches, das heißt fremd dem wahren philosophischen Denken: „Der Nationalsozialismus ist ein *barbarisches Prinzip*. Das ist sein Wesentliches und seine mögliche Größe. Die Gefahr ist nicht er selbst – sondern daß er verharmlost wird in eine Predigt des Wahren, Guten und Schönen (so an einem Schulungsabend)“ (ebd.: 201).

Während des Zweiten Weltkriegs kritisierte Heidegger seine frühere positive Charakterisierung von Nietzsches Begriff „Wille“ und verband ihn mit der

7 „Der Irrtum war nicht ein bloß »politischer« in dem Sinne, daß man sich in der ‚Partei‘ versah; politisch im weltgeschichtlichen Sinne war die Entscheidung kein Irrtum; denn es sollte im vorhinein nicht beim Nationalsozialismus als solchem bleiben, als einer Einrichtung für die Ewigkeit; er war gedacht als Ende der Metaphysik, als Übergang, der selbst nur aus dem Anfang zu überwinden sein wird. Daher der Hinweis zumal auf: Gott ist tot und auf das Anfängliche der *techné* der Griechen. Nicht einem »Humanismus« zuliebe, sondern aus weltgeschichtlichem Denken: der Irrtum bestand in der Meinung, solches könne im Augenblick unmittelbar eingerichtet und befördert werden“. (GA 97: Heidegger 2015: 148)

sich damals manifestierenden *Brutalität*; und die, verbunden mit moderner Technik, das Fundament der modernen Welt darstellt: „Was sich da andrängt in politischen Machtgestalten ist unser eigenes neuzeitlich abendländisches Wesen: Humanität, Nationalität, Bestialität – sind die Wesensstufen der Entfaltung der Subjektivität [...] die sich in der Brutalität des Willens zum Willen vollendet. [...] um die innere Folge der Zeitalter der Neuzeit noch deutlicher zu erkennen in ihrem Grundzug: ‚Von der Humanität über die Nationalität zur Bestialität in die Brutalität‘“. (GA 97: 45) Es handelt sich gerade um die „stumpfe Brutalität des ‚Dritten Reichs‘“ und „[...] die massive Brutalität des geschichtslosen ‚Nationalsozialismus‘“. (ebd.: 82, 87)

Wir haben bereits erwähnt, dass Heidegger seine Kritik am Nationalsozialismus mit moderner Technik verbindet. *Machenschaft*, d. h. Technik, repräsentiert die Vorherrschaft einer berechnenden, manipulativen Haltung gegenüber dem Seienden, das sich der Seinsfrage nicht bewusst ist. Heidegger sieht in der Machenschaft den Höhepunkt des kombinierten Subjektivismus und Objektivismus des modernen Zeitalters. Wir stellen uns als selbstbewusste und willige Subjekte vor, die im Zeitalter der Machenschaft nach rassistischen und rechnerischen Prinzipien arbeiten:

Daß im Zeitalter der Machenschaft die Rasse zum ausgesprochenen und eigens eingerichteten »Prinzip« der Geschichte (oder nur der Historie) erhoben wird, ist nicht die willkürliche Erfindung von »Doktrinären«, sondern eine *Folge* der Macht der Machenschaft, die das Seiende nach allen seinen Bereichen in die planhafte Berechnung niederzwingen muß. Durch den Rassedanken wird »das Leben« in die Form der Züchtbarkeit gebracht, die eine Art der Berechnung darstellt. (GA 96: Heidegger 2014c: 56)

Alle Nationen, nicht nur Juden, sondern auch Amerika, England sowie die bolschewistischen, faschistischen und nationalsozialistischen Bewegungen werden von der Macht der Machenschaft bestimmt. Heidegger betont sogar, dass die Nazis genau die gleiche Mentalität aufweisen wie ihre angeblichen Feinde, die Juden: Sie sind *metaphysisch gleichwertig*. (vgl. GA 95: Heidegger 2014a: 161, 258, 326; GA 96: Heidegger 2014c: 56, 218)

Eine Vorlesung Heideggers bietet uns jedoch die Grundlage für eine andere Sichtweise seines Verständnisses der sozialen Welt. Es handelt sich um die Vorlesung gerade aus dem Sommersemester des Jahres 1934 unter dem Titel *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*, die ursprünglich als *Der Staat und die Wissenschaft* angekündigt wurde. Obwohl der Vortrag auf Argumenten zugunsten der Unhaltbarkeit des in der Tradition des metaphysischen Denkens stehenden und in die Begriffe „Volk“ und „Staat“ aufgegangenen Begriffs „Subjekt“ aufbaut, betont Heidegger weiterhin die Interdependenz und Verbundenheit der Menschen und nicht das ausschließende Konzept der deutschen ethnischen Zugehörigkeit. Damit relativiert Heidegger den in den nationalsozialistischen Rassentheorien so wichtigen Begriff „Blut“. Er spricht von der „Grundstimmung“ des Menschen, von der die „Stimme des Blutes“ ausgeht, und zu dieser Stimmung gehört die Geistigkeit unseres Daseins. Die „Macht

der Stimmungen“ ist bedeutender als eine auf die Rasse bezogene Charakteristik wie etwa „Geblut“ (GA 38: Heidegger 1998: 153). Unter Verwendung von Hegels Wortschatz aus seiner *Phänomenologie des Geistes* gibt Heidegger eine sozialontologische Definition von Geselligkeit und gemeinsamer Existenz:

Wenn wir sagen: Dasein ist je meines, so kann das nach der grundsätzlichen Sprengung der Ichheit und Subjektivität nicht mehr bedeuten, dieses Dasein werde in das einzelne Ich zurückgenommen und von ihm mit Beschlag belegt, sondern ‚Dasein ist je meines‘ besagt eben, daß mein Sein dem Miteinander und Füreinander übereignet ist. (GA 38: Heidegger 1998: 163–64)

*Miteinander und Füreinander* ist nichts anderes als: „Jetzt sei Wir-Zeit“ im Sinne „der echten Gemeinschaft [...]“ (ebd.: 51).

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Rastko Jovanov

## Now Is the “We-Time.” Heidegger’s ‘Black Notebooks’ Read as Self-Critical Reflection of Nazi Involvement

### Abstract

The article analyzes Heidegger’s relation to National Socialism based on his private writing in the “Black Notebooks,” published in their entirety (nine volumes) this year. Although it is indisputable that Heidegger was an enthusiastic adherent of the National Socialist program between 1930 and 1934, his private writings show his avowed philosophical delusion that the National Socialist ‘revolution’ in Germany was going to bring about a new beginning of philosophy beyond the metaphysical tradition. The article shows how Heidegger criticized National Socialism after 1934, and the circumstances of his resignation from the post of Rector of Freiburg University in that year.

Keywords: Heidegger, National Socialism, brutality, technics, machination, metapolitics, We-Time

Rastko Jovanov

## „Sada je Mi-Vreme“. Hajdegerove Crne sveske u svetlu samokritike sopstvenog NS-angažmana

### Apstrakt

U članku se analizira Hajdegerov odnos prema nacionalsocijalizmu na osnovu njegovih privatnih zapisa pod nazivom „Schwarze Hefte“, a koji su ove godine potpuno objavljeni u devet tomova. Iako je neosporno da je Hajdeger od 1930 do 1934 bio otvoreni pristalica nacionalsocijalističkog programa, njegovi privatni zapisi pokazuju njegovu priznatu zabludu (*Irrtum*) i filozofsku zavedenost u mogući novi početak (*Anfang*) filozofije nakon kraja metafizičke tradicije filozofskog mišljenja, a koji treba da omogući nacionalsocijalistička „revolucija“ u Nemačkoj. Članak tumači kako i na koji način je Hajdeger kritikovao nacionalsocijalizam nakon 1934 i rektorske ostavke iste godine na univerzitetu u Frajburgu.

Ključne reči: Hajdeger, nacionalsocijalizam, brutalnost, tehnika, mahinacija, metapolitika, Mi-Vreme

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Miloš Ćipranić

## SLIKE, NASLOVI, PERSONIFIKACIJE<sup>1</sup>

Jagor Bučan, *Riječ je o slici*, Sandorf i Mizantrop, Zagreb, 2019.

Iva Draškić Vićanović et al. (ur.), *Slika i reč*, Estetičko društvo Srbije, Beograd, 2020.

**APSTRAKT**

Predmet kritičkog osvrtu su knjige *Riječ je o slici* Jagora Bučana i *Slika i reč* Estetičkog društva Srbije, iz čijih naslova je već očito da dele istu temu. U radu je ukazano na sličnosti između njih sa dve tačke gledišta: uočeno je ono što je prisutno u obe, ali i ono što je u njima odsutno, a čini se značajnim za razumevanje teorijskih problema kojima se bave.

**KEYWORDS**

slika, reč, umetnost,  
naslov, personifikacija

Naslovi knjiga *Riječ je o slici* i *Slika i reč*, stavljeni jedan kraj drugog, stoje skoro pa u ogledalnom odnosu. Objedinjene, imenice u njima odgovaraju shemi A – B, B – A. Na korak do potpune simetrije. Iako je mala razlika između trenutaka kada su ugledale svetlost dana, iako njihove korice imaju istu boju, iako su im naslovi veoma slični, ove dve knjige nisu bliznakinje. Malo stariju potpisuje jedan autor.<sup>2</sup> Mlađa je zbornik.<sup>3</sup> Obe knjige dele isti predmet: odnošenje

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2 Ona se sastoji od sledećih poglavlja: „Uvod“, „Pitanje jezika“, „Kategorizacija slike“, „Topos neizrecivog“, „Značenjski obzor“, „Tvorbene zakonitosti“, „Metajezik slikarstva“, „Smjerokaz smisla“, „Interpretacija – polazišta i ishodišta“, „Zaključak“. Zatvara je deo sa slikovnim prilogima koji imaju ilustrativnu funkciju.

3 Razvrstani u dve celine, zavisno da li su načelne prirode ili usmereni ka pojedinačnim delima i autorima, članci ili saopštenja koji ga čine su: Una Popović, „Jezik crteža i vizuelno mišljenje: magija u ateljeu“, Dragan Žunić, „*Ut pictura ars* – umetnost je kao slika“, Bogomir Đukić, „Slika i riječ i razna gledišta umjetnosti“, Iva Draškić Vićanović, „Reč i slika: problem (ne)mogućnosti ‚prevođenja‘“, Predrag Jakšić, „Slika i reč – sinonimi i monada“, Divna Vuksanović, „Estetika medija: reči, slike, zabava“, Miloš

slikovnog i jezičkog. Već samo upotrebljavanje sintagme „obe knjige“ tokom ovog kritičkog osvrta – u trenucima kada se ukazuje na teme, teze ili retoričku formu iskaza koje dele – lako odvođi do pojednostavljivanja, tj. zaključka da su u svemu međusobno identične, što nije slučaj. Dovoljno je navesti činjenicu da je drugopomenuta zbornik, da okuplja više autora, te da je posledično odlikuje heterogenost stajališta. Usled individualnosti autora i njihovih priloga, teško je izvesti nekakvu opštu tezu koja bi odlikovala celokupnu knjigu.

Različitost knjiga o kojima je reč ne predstavlja prepreku da se potraže sličnosti između njih. Motivi, zaključci i figurativni izrazi koji se načelno podudaraju nisu jedini kriterijum po kome se ustanovljava da su po nečemu slične. Moguće je primeniti još jedan pristup kako bi se uvidelo šta im je zajedničko, a to je ukazivanje na odsustvo nekih važnih tema u obe. Spaja ih i ono što im nedostaje. Pa ipak, nelogično je tvrditi da to što određeni predmeti nisu obuhvaćeni u njima odmah znači da su iste. U nastavku ovog kritičkog osvrta će biti izloženo šta im obema fali, a što smatram da je bitno s obzirom na ono čime se bave. Naravno, pošto se radi o jednoj koliko širokoj, toliko i razudenoj temi, ni ovaj prikaz, znatno kraći od prikazanog, neće uspeti da bude sveobuhvatan. Ta namera ne postoji, to nije njegov ukupan cilj.

Očita je, za početak, jedna trivijalna stvar: i knjiga *Riječ je o slici* i zbornik *Slika i reč* imaju crvene korice i na njima crna slova. Ta sličnost koju dele teorijski je irelevantna, u pitanju je čista slučajnost. Izbor boje uvek ima posebnu težinu kada se radi o knjigama čiji su predmet umetnost i estetika. Ali kakve veze ima boja u svojoj neposrednosti sa delima čiji su osnovni gradivni element reči? Fenomenološki nesvodiva vizuelna pojavnost boje ili jednog njenog tona neuhvatljiva je jezičkim znacima koji referišu na nju. Sa druge strane, poznato je da ne moramo, na primer, crvenom napisati ime te boje u nameri da je označimo, jer bilo koja boja dolazi u obzir. I zelenom, žutom se može ukazati na prethodno spomenutu boju. Ipak, nijedna od te tri reči ne liči na boje koje označavaju. Ako je hromatska podudarnost koja dominantno krase obe knjige slučajna, problem otuda naznačen nije im spoljašnji. Štaviše, jedan je od središnjih u razmatranju odnosa slike i reči. Opozicija apstraktnosti jedne

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Miladinov, „Hajdeger i Kle: problem slike“, Saša Radovanović, „Ničeova metafora između slike i pojma“, Bojana Tajsić, „Lesingovo shvatanje odnosa poezije i likovnih umetnosti“, Tatjana Ristić, „Ekfrazna i mimeza“, Sanda Ristić Stojanović, „Slika i reč: postavljanje jasnih granica između umetnosti i neumetnosti“, Dušan Pajin, „Slika i reč u delu Van Goga“, Srđan Šarović, „Negativna svetlost – *via negativa* u umetničkom postupku“, Dragan Calović, „Kaligrafija u islamskoj umetnosti“, Rosanda Bajović, „Na galeriji: čitanje slike u tumačenjima proze Franca Kafke“, Vladimir Vujošević, „Iskušenje slike, utjeha riječi: Luter i alegorija“, Mihajlo Stamenković, „Reljefni paralelizam prednjih planova i spoljašnjih slojeva pozadina u slikom iluminiranoj pesmi“, Jadranka Božić, „Kompatibilnost i simetrija umetničkih opusa B. K. Baltusa i E. A. Poa“, Velimir Mladenović, „Dijalog između slike i reči u romanu *Écoutez-voir* Elze Triole“, Vesna Maričić, „Dekonstrukcija slike i reči u Trirovom filmu *Pet prepreka*“ i Dragana Kitanović, „Konfliktualna estetika u filmovima Vima Vendersa“. Svakako je pažnje vredno, ali zasebno pitanje zašto je u jednoj knjizi sadržaj na početku, a u drugoj na kraju.



reči i konkretnosti boje, opštosti pojma i pojedinačnosti određene nijanse ili specifičnosti nekog kolorita.

I umetnici i oni koji pišu o umetnostima moraju da uvažavaju i da računaju na tu neumoljivu asimetričnost. Slikarima ili skulptorima je zbog primarnog materijala kojima se služe lakše prikazati određeni ton boje – čist ili kao kvalitet neke figure i predmeta – nego književnicima, pesnicima. U „umetnosti reči“ taj je cilj teže ostvariv, s obzirom da pisci to mogu učiniti samo posredno, drugom vrstom znakova. Teže, dakle, izazovnije, što je prepreka koja ipak ne blokira, nego podstiče kreativnost, ograničenost književnog iskaza koja stimulira slikovitost izraza. I to ne samo kada se radi o književnom, ili pak retorskom i teorijskom opisu jednog dela „prostornih umetnosti“. Upotrebom kojih reči ili pre poređenja je moguće nedvosmisleno predočiti čitaocima i slušaocima mantiju el Grekovog *Kardinala Fernanda Ninja de Gevare*, splitskog *Grgura Niskog* Ivana Meštrovića ili kupaće gaće *Heroja centralnog Jadrana* Enca Kujkija? U takvim slučajevima opis zaostaje za opisanim, ali se ne sme izgubiti iz vida da je u stanju da ga istovremeno i dopuni, te obogati ili produbi njegovo sagledavanje.

Dvostruka priroda opisivačkog akta – i zamračivanje i osvetljavanje opisanog – povezana je sa jednom od tema koja se pronalazi u knjigama o kojima je reč, a to je fenomen neizrecivosti. On je motiv iz dva ugla. Ako se naglasak stavi na recipijenta, onda odgovara doživljaju subjekta pred izuzetnim umetničkim delom. Posmatrač tada nije u stanju da izabere prave reči koje bi uspele da obuhvate predmet na koji je njegova pažnja usmerena, te negativnim putem iskazuje svoje divljenje prema tom objektu ili uviđa da neće uspeti sasvim da ga prikaže. Prebaci li se žiža sa tog pola intencionalnog odnosa na samo delo, onda se objekat ispostavlja kao neopisiv, preobilan. S obzirom da se jedno takvo umetničko delo svojom materijalnošću daje prevashodno u području vizuelnog i prostornog, a ne govornog, bitna odlika njegove pojavnosti je neopisivost. Međutim, potrebno je dodati da primat oblika davanja dela nije jedino polazište za razumevanje rečenog fenomena. I govorne radnje i muzičke kompozicije odlikuje sukcesivnost zvukova i imaju vremensku formu, ali ta podudarnost ne podrazumeva da je iskustvo muzike saopštivo u potpunosti. Izvor neizrecivog ili je u snažnom doživljaju recipijenta ili u teškoći potpunog prenošenja poruke iz jedne vrste označitelja u drugu. Na delu je odnos napetosti između čulnog, osećajnog i diskurzivnog.

U evropskoj tradiciji taj je motiv odavno zastupljen. Sa pravom je ukazano na njegovo prisustvo u oblasti teologije, tačnije, apofatičkog bogoslovlja. U antici je obilato korišćen i razvijan i u retorici, naročito u epideiktikom besedništvu, pa i na izvoru istorije kao discipline. Valja napomenuti da je prilično rano počeo da se primenjuje i pri prikazivanju dela prostornih umetnosti. Pre svega, arhitektonskih ostvarenja, i to često onih religijske namene. Kretanje i raširenost tog motiva u različitim disciplinama na kraju upućuju i na njihov međusobni uticaj i prožimanja. U svakom slučaju, nastavio je da se primenjuje u oblasti pisanja o umetnosti. Knjiga o istoriji toposa neizrecivosti, odnosno neopisivosti u području umetnosti i estetike čeka da bude napisana.

I dalje je stvar polemike da li su umetničkim delima potrebni iskazi o njima da bi dosegli punu moć dejstva. Na pitanje ko je od njih na kraju rečitiji, odgovoriće se verovatno da to zavisi od svakog pojedinačno. Poseban je problem da li takve reči i misli dolaze od onih koji stvaraju ta dela ili onih koji samo pišu o njima. Zapravo, radi se o mogućnosti autorefleksivnog čina institucije umetnosti, jer on traži jezik i rečnik. Da li je svaka umetnička vrsta iznutra u stanju da promišlja o sebi ili to pravo pripada samo filozofiji i teoriji umetnosti, tačnije, da li su ili uolikoj meri umetnici sposobni da grade vlastitu teoriju, pišu o svojim radovima. I kada beleže svoje misli uz ono što rade u drugom domenu, vraćamo se na prethodno postavljeno pitanje: šta je rečitije?

Leonardo da Vinči figurira se u obe knjige upravo zbog onoga što je napisao, iako je ukupno poznatiji zbog onoga što je naslikao. I posle njega, sve više, umetnici su ostavljali pisani trag o svom stvaralaštvu i nastojali da obrazlože svoje delo, nasuprot ili u prilog teorijskim okvirima, sistemima i tezama sa kojima su se susretali. U našem zborniku istaknuta je vrednost pisama Vinsenta van Goga za sagledavanje njegovih dela, iz izloženog dragocenih i za razumevanje fenomena neizrecivosti, projiciranja ljudskog ili davanja tog obliča onome što ga nema. Iz više razloga je sa tim u vezi danas zanimljiv sledeći odeljak iz članka „Umetnost i problem teorijskog: mogućnost verbalizacije umetnosti“, koga potpisuje Una Popović:

Savremena filozofija umetnosti, dakle, kako bi uopšte imala pravo na važenje, mora uzeti u obzir pravo umetnosti da o sebi svedoči i govori; ovakvo usmerenje na govor umetnosti o njoj samoj, stoga, se ispostavlja kao nužno za savremenu filozofsku misao. Da li, međutim, isto važi i za samu umetnost? Da li je obaveza svedočenja o sebi samoj istovremeno i obaveza njegovog verbalno-teorijskog artikulisanja? Drugim rečima, da li je za samu umetnost nužno da o sebi progovori na način nesrazmeran onoj artikulaciji koja se na delu i samim umetničkim delom dovodi u postojanje? Ili je takav govor ipak vanumetnički, te prepušten bitno teorijskim delatnostima, poput filozofije? Napokon, da li je takav govor uopšte i moguć? (Popović 2016: 42)

Odnos između verbalnog i neverbalnog razmotriv je i kroz pojam prevoda. I u jednoj i u drugoj knjizi postoji taj pristup. Pitanje je da li je ili barem u kojoj meri moguće preneti sadržaj jednog jezika u drugi. Zapravo, ono se da razdvojiti na dva potpitanja ili pravca istraživanja: da li je „govor“ slika prenosiv rečima i da li su dela jedne vrste umetnosti prevodiva u njenu drugu vrstu. Ovde valja primetiti da se pojmovi jezika i prevoda uzimaju u svom širem pa i prilično neodređenom značenju. Uobičajeno je smatrati da je prevođenje aktivnost koja se odvija u svetu jezika i da njemu pripada, da ona nije toliko vezana za one discipline koje se primarno ne služe rečima. Stoga se čini opravdanim stavljanje pod navodnike termina „prevođenje“ u tom kontekstu. Prevod jedne pesme sa italijanskog na francuski, jednog romana sa portugalskog na srpski ili hrvatski njegovi su tipični primeri. Kada se pomisli na tu aktivnost ili proces, iz navedenog razloga manje je verovatno da će nam prvo pasti na pamet „prevod“ fotografije u reči, neverbalnog u verbalno, a još manje grafike u

simfoniju, neverbalnog u neverbalno. To ne znači da termin „prevođenje“ nije upotrebljiv i u takvim slučajevima, već se samo pokazuje prodor jezičkog i u ona područja za koja se čini da su mu tuđa.

Teza o pravu korišćenja termina „prevođenje“ u oblasti umetnosti prostora ima smisla ako se prihvati teorijski stav da se one ponašaju kao jezik. U članku „O analogiji umetnosti i jezika“, Milan Damnjanović ne spori njihovu srodnost, ali smatra da nije prihvatljivo govoriti o njihovom poistovećivanju. Kao jedan od razloga za tu tvrdnju upravo navodi argument da je delo jedne umetničke vrste neprevodivo u delo druge njene vrste, a prevodivost jeste odlika jezika (Damnjanović 1960: 116–117). U slučaju takvog pokušaja, dobija se novo umetničko delo, čija je veza sa originalom mnogo slabija od one između nekog romana i njegove verzije na jeziku na kome nije izvorno napisan. Dok prevod romana i dalje jeste taj isti roman, na primer, *tableau vivant* nije identičan sa slikom ili skulpturom na koju se odnosi. Neprevodivost o kojoj se govori nije relativna, u smislu da uvek postoji neki ostatak koji se opire prenosu, već se tu radi o čistoj nemogućnosti.

Jedan od pokušaja – verovatno najambiciozniji, svakako teorijski iscrpno obrazlagan i tumačen od antičke epohe do današnjih dana – da se ta neprevodivost ili nemogućnost prevlada, da se neko delo umetnosti prostora prikaže u stihovima ili prozi jeste ekfrazu. U *Slici i reči* je na više mesta zastupljena i spominjana poimence, ali u *Riječ je o slici* je nema. U pitanju je jedna književno-retorska tehnika ili čak poseban žanr. Po klasičnoj i ponavljanoj definiciji, ekfrazu za cilj ima da živopisno predoči odsutni predmet ili događaj kao da je prisutan. Posredstvom reči učiniti da se vidi ono što se čuje ili pročita. Termin *ekphrasis* zbog svoje specifičnosti samo je uslovno prevodiv sa „opis“, jer postoje različiti načini opisivanja. S obzirom da je živopisnost odlika ekfrazu koja je razlikuje od egzaktnijih formi opisa, pitanje je da li je njen cilj predmet predočavanja ili sâm taj čin. Takođe, da li je njegova pratilja ili takmac.

Kada se promišlja o ontološkom statusu umetničke slike, naročito imajući u vidu njenu poredbu sa statusom reči, bitno pitanje se nameće. Da li je slika znak ili stvar, „osobita“ stvar? U pogledu reči odgovor je lakši. Ako se prihvati stanovište o postojanju slikovnih znakova, onda je u jakom smislu moguće govoriti o „jeziku slikarstva“, što je u skladu sa određenjem jezika kao sistema znakova koje je ponudila strukturalna lingvistika. Otuda iskrsava problem odnosa između prirodnih jezika i slikarstva. To je upravo jedna od tema izuzetno značajne knjige *Riječ i slika: hermeneutički i semantički pristup*, čija je autorka Vanda Božičević. Ta je knjiga objavljena dve decenije pre onih koje su predmet ovog osvrtu i skoro je identičnog naslova sa njihovim. Dok se Bučan oslanja na nju, ona se nijednom ne navodi u zborniku Estetičkog društva Srbije.

Prema Božičević, između verbalnog i slikovnog izraza postoji analognost na nivou odnosa sa označenim predmetom. Naime, oba značenjski ukazuju na u sebi odsutni predmet, sa tim što je kod slikovnog značenje čvršće vezano za njegov označitelj nego što je to slučaj kod jezičkog (Božičević 1990: 209–214). Nema arbitrarnosti između delova znaka. Formulirano rečnikom koji nije toliko semiološki, ono što se daje umetničkom slikom bitno je uslovljeno načinom

na koji se daje. Vratimo li se na primer sa bojom korica, na crvenu referišu i termini „rosso“ i „vermelho“ i razni drugi, ali zelena mrlja na platnu ili crna šara na papiru to ne uspevaju da urade. Slikovni znak je neprozirni i motivisaniji od jezičkog.

Ono što je primetno je da u obe knjige nema tematizacije institucije naslova umetničkih dela. Ta činjenica još više začuđuje pođe li se od obimnosti i iscrpnosti Bučanove monografije i mnoštva perspektiva u zborniku Estetičkog društva Srbije usled brojnosti autora ili priloga obuhvaćenih njime.<sup>4</sup> Čini se da su barem ta dva faktora – minucioznost prve i pluralizam drugog – bili kriterijum dovoljne verovatnoće da pomenuti predmet bude opširnije zastupljen u njima. Pri tome, u obe knjige se objašnjavaju njihovi naslovi. Dok je u monografiji odmah posle „Uvoda“ ukazano da se slikama ne mora nužno pristupiti rečima – dakle, ni teorijom – već se to može učiniti istom ili nekom drugom umetničkom vrstom koja nije verbalne prirode, u „Reči urednika“ koja otvara zbornik istaknuto je pitanje mogućnosti teorijskog diskursa da obuhvati i prođe u bit ili događaj umetnosti.

Nakon što smo odredili problemsku, metodološku i sadržajnu okosnicu našem pristupu, razmotrimo поближе сам наслов огледа. U njemu su pojmovi riječi i slike dovedeni u dvojak odnos. Ukoliko naglasak stavimo na posljednju leksičku sastavnicu, iskaz *riječ je o slici* prije svega predmnijeva govor o slici. Kao što to to najavili, u središtu našeg interesa bit će slika, odnosno slikarsko djelo. O njemu ćemo govoriti u različitim ključevima, odnosno registrima, ne bismo li ga prikazali u rasponu njegovih mnogostrukih značajki. Ukoliko, međutim, naglasimo prvu riječ, ustvrdili smo da ćemo o slici govoriti upravo *riječju*. Iako se ta distinkcija čini banalnom, ona to nije. Na slike je moguće referirati na različite načine, od kojih su mnogi vid govora, odnosno izraza. (Bučan 2019: 35)

Navedeno odgovara nazivu konferencije i zbornika, koji je namerno višeznačan.

Naime, za teorijsko bavljenje umetnošću prirodno je da se kreće u dimenziji verbalnog i pojmovnog, odnosno u domenu reči. Ipak, predmet takvih teorijskih razmatranja, umetnost, ne mora biti ostvaren u verbalnom mediju, a čak i kad je to slučaj, način pristupa jeziku i verbalnosti se u ta dva okvira bitno razlikuje. Ma o kakvoj umetnosti da se radi – da li o onoj koja i sama koristi slike i slikovitost kao primarno sredstvo izražavanja, ili o onoj koja to čini posredno, u smislu jezičkih slika – pojam slike u ovom kontekstu označava ustaljene i tradicijom utvrđene mnogostruke načine artikulacije pripadne umetnostima. Otuda se postavlja pitanje u kojoj meri bilo koja teorijska obrada umetnosti može istinski zahvatiti i adekvatno predstaviti sopstveni predmet, te ukoliko i može, na koji način bi odnos slike i reči morao razumeti i postaviti, da bi se željeni cilj ostvario. (Draškić Vićanović et al. 2020: 6)

4 Istina, kod Bučana značaj naslova kratko iskrsava na jednom mestu gde je napomenuto da slika usmeravajući i svojim „nazivom“ ka onome izvan nje u isti mah upućuje natrag ka sebi. Sa druge strane, u zborniku postoji jedna napomena u kojoj je preneto objašnjenje Elze Triole zašto je svom romanu *Écoutez-voir* dala taj naslov. Oba mesta su, ipak, zanemarljiva, jer uz njih ne dolazi do proučavanja funkcije naslovljavanja kao zasebne teme.

Odsustvo promišljanja funkcije naslova posebno je uočljivo s obzirom na to da je on jedno od ključnih mesta u kome dolazi do nadopunjavanja između reči i slika, bilo verbalnih ili neverbalnih. Značaj naslova naročito je neosporiv u vizuelnim i prostornim umetnostima, ali bila bi nepravda izostaviti njegov značaj i kod „čistih“ muzičkih dela, onih u kojima nema pevanja. Čak se i građevinama nadevaju imena. Među ostalim razlozima, ne manje bitnim, potreba za naslovom rasla je tokom istorije – naročito u XX veku – sa napuštanjem mimetičke koncepcije slikovnog prikazivanja, figuracije i odbacivanjem ustaljenih ikonografskih motiva u svetu umetnosti. Ne bismo znali šta je Kuki, slikar transavangarde, hteo da „kaže“ već pomenutom kompozicijom bez njegov naslova *Eroe del mare Adriatico centrale*. Činjenica je da bi bez te dopune značenje mnogih umetničkih tvorevina ostalo nepoznato ili barem problematično. Na kraju krajeva, i u jednoj i u drugoj knjizi pronalazi se more naslova raznovrsnih dela, ali ne može sve da stane na jednom mestu.

Nezaobilazna je danas i uloga naslova u književnim delima, mada se čini da im je manje potreban, jer su dovoljno „rečita“ i bez njegove pratnje. Naslovljavanje pesme kao gest nije neobičnost, međutim, naslov može da osvetli delo na koje se odnosi na jedan posve osobit način, da ukaže čitaocu na piščevu ili pesnikovu poentu. Daću jedan relativno skorašnji primer iskustva čitanja sa tim problemom u vezi. Kada sam krenuo da čitam srpski prevod romana Žozea Saramaga *Stoleće u Alentežu*, mislio sam da se to književno delo zaista tako zove. Nakon što sam pročitao roman ili pri njegovom kraju – ne mogu tačno da se setim – saznao sam da to nije originalni Saramagov naziv, već da se zove *Levantado do chão*, odnosno *Sa tla uzdignuti*. Podatak do koga sam naknadno došao bacio je novu svetlost na taj roman i naterao me je da ponovo razmislim o njegovom značenju. Prethodno nisam bio toliko svestan te jezičke slike koja mi je ostala u pamćenju nakon njegovog čitanja. Promena naslova jednog dela, pa i proznog, izvan svake sumnje u stanju je da promeni i njegov doživljaj i tumačenje.

Odluka kako će biti naslovljeno delo pripada njegovom autoru. To je barem pravilo poslednjih vekova. Naziv utvrđen za jedno delo, pod kojim je ono poznato, nije uvek invencija onoga ko ga je stvorio. Bilo da ga je nadenuo tvorac ili neko drugi, on zna da služi kao interpretativni ključ dela. Naslov je jedan od modaliteta da autori, kratkim potezom, fiksiraju značenje ili središnji motiv svoje tvorevine. Drugi bi, na primer, bila pisma, intervjui ili dnevničke beleške. Tumač dela može da pođe od njegovog naslova kao naznake koju valja slediti, ali ni ne mora, već da izabere drugi pravac u svom čitanju istog. Radi li se o kakvoj umetničkoj slici, on ima moć da postavi njeno tumačenje koje bi važilo kao autoritativno, što nije uvek slučaj, naprotiv, mada ga izvesno predstavlja na određeni način: „Stoga nije puka retorička figura kada kažemo da interpretacija sliku ‚odijeva‘. Ona sadržaj slike, njeno značenje ili smisao iznosi na vidjelo tako što je ‚oblači‘ u različite interpretacijske odore, koje – posljedično – djelo čine uistinu viđenim“. (Bučan 2019: 304) Da, oblači je, ali i „pokriva“ ili sakriva. U poglavlju „Evidencija kao opreka interpretaciji“, Jagor Bučan, kao promašeno, podseća na pozitivističko objašnjenje prema kome su El Grekove figure posledica očne bolesti, aludirajući na slikaru pripisani astigmatizam.

Posebnu pažnju zahteva i način na koji se imenuju umetnosti, odnosno princip po kome se se one klasifikuju. Dobro je znano da postoji više kriterijuma na osnovu kojih su grupisane umetničke vrste. Milan Ranković u članku „Klasifikacije umetnosti“ ističe da nijedna njihova podela nije savršena (Ranković 1972: 26–32). Termini glavni u naslovima obe knjige, odnosno dva njihova centralna dela – „reč“ i „slika“ – polazište su za ustanovljavanje razlike između „govornih“ i „likovnih“ umetnosti. Naravno, ukoliko sliku razumemo kao „grafičku“ sliku, odnosno fizički objekat koji se sastoji od elemenata kao što su masa, linija i boja, a ne kao mentalnu predstavu. Takva podela umetnosti izvedena je, dakle, na osnovu sredstva izraza kojima se služe. U našem zborniku više nego kod jednog autora pronalazimo upotrebu sintagmi „umetnost slike“ i „umetnost reči“. Odmah se nameće prigovor da ta opozicija ne važi u oblasti filma, ali jeste primenjiva kada je predmet promišljanja likovna, odnosno slikovna umetnost, čak i onda kada se ne previđa mesto i uloga naslova u razumevanju njenih dela.

U skladu sa činjenicom da su predloženi i drugi kriterijumi razvrstavanja, zastupljena su i drugačija rešenja, tačnije, podela na „prostorne“ i „vremenske“ umetnosti. Ovog puta se radi o formi davanja umetničkih dela kao odlučujućem principu klasifikacije. Iako navodi da je slikarsko delo prostorni objekat, u poglavljima „Slika i vrijeme“ i „Kretanje kao čimbenik u izgradnji smisla slike“ Bučan poput Rankovića primećuje da ono zahteva i vremensku dimenziju kako bi se njen smisao razumeo, te dovodi u pitanje predloženu i relativno utvrđenu podelu. Nužno je određeno vreme kako bi se jedna slika sagledala u svojoj celokupnosti, što još više važi za skulptorsko delo, jer nudi više uglova iz kojih može biti posmatrano. Svako delo je i istorično: njegovo značenje i vrednost se otkrivaju i menjaju u horizontu vremenitosti i potrebno je određeno vreme kako bi ono bilo izrađeno. Međutim, iako navedeni argumenti jesu prihvatljivi, oni se više odnose na subjekt koji posmatra takva dela nego na njihovu strukturu. Ona pre svega kao fizički objekti stoje na jednom mestu i zauzimaju određeni prostor. Podela na verbalne i likovne umetnosti i podela na umetnosti vremena i prostora u velikoj meri su srodne i odgovaraju našoj temi. Razlog toj tvrdnji je uvid da nizanje reči – bilo u poeziji ili proznoj književnosti – traži temporalno ustrojstvo, ređanje jedne posle druge, dok se dela slikarstva, skulpture i arhitekture – tradicionalne trijade likovnih ili plastičkih umetnosti – ostvaruju u prostornom obliku.

Uz optičaj više mogućih predloga kako podeliti pojedinačne umetničke discipline, povesno i jezički gledano, postoje brojna i različita rešenja za njihove nazive. Ako se usredsredimo na problem imenovanja slikarske umetnosti i slike uopšte, pronaći ćemo građu za propitivanje njihove suštine ili barem onoga što se smatralo da ih definiše. Još u grčkoj antici, na izvoru estetike, slikarstvo je nazivano *zoographia*, tj. prikazivanje živih bića, a njegov proizvod – jasno je – *zoographema*. Doslovni prevod grčkog poimanja te umetnosti je „živopis“. Sva tri termina prisutna su u zborniku *Slika i reč*. Danas, i to ne samo zbog ravnopravnog statusa apstraktnog ili bespredmetnog slikarstva, živopis više nije naziv upotrebljavan ukupno za slikarsku delatnost, što ne znači da o vrednosti

tog termina ne treba iznova razmišljati. U *Riječ je o slici* poseže se za primenom ikona, proizvoda vizantijske umetnosti, za čiju tradiciju je i danas vezan pojam živopisa, ali je, između ostaloga, potrebno osloboditi stega i sakralnih konotacija taj termin, kako bi se otvorila mogućnost da profunkcioniše kao opšta oznaka za umetnost slikarstva. Sa druge strane, prevođenje „fotografija“ sa „svetlopis“ ne trpi problem sužavanja opsega onoga što se podrazumeva pod živopisom u odnosu na ukupan slikarski domen.

Delatnost slikara je u antičkoj epohi opisivana i kao slikanje ili mimeza „fantazmi“, onoga što se pojavljuje pred našim očima, a *phantasma* je još jedan termin na koga nailazimo u zborniku o kome je reč i koji zahteva detaljniji osvrt na njega. Bučan na jednom mestu karakteriše sliku kao „tvarnu utvaru“. Da li je slikarski akt pre zoografski ili fantazmatografski čin? Ta dva stajališta se ne isključuju, jer slika može biti shvaćena kao prikaz izgleda ili pojave ljudskog tela tamo gde se ono ne nalazi. Uglavnom, i zoografija i fantazmografija su dva moguća i izazovna imena slikarske umetnosti, dve reči predložene sa ciljem da se pojmi svet umetničkih slika.

Analiza jezika teorijskog diskursa o umetnosti, koliko god se to činilo neobičnim, pogodna je da se prodre u neka od njegovih ključnih problema. Odatle, dakako, proističe da usredsređivanje na jezičke iskaze i postupke učestale u tom području nema za cilj ostanak na ravni lingvistike i retorike, koliko sagledavanje razloga njihovog prisustva. Ako se obrati pažnja na jezik tekstova koji su predmet ovog osvrta, očito je da je u njima veoma zastupljen rad oličavanja. Takva mesta se pronalaze ili u citatima i kroz preuzimanja ili kao autorska invencija, više ili manje spontana. Obilata upotreba figure personifikacije tu nije slučajnost. Štaviše, njeno razumevanje doprinosi odgovoru na pitanje zašto se koriste ili vladaju izrazi kao što su „jezik umetnosti“ i „govor slike“.

Pre nego što budu razvrstani i navedeni primeri personifikacije koji su pronađeni, biće iznesena njena definicija prema jednom autoritativnom osloncu. U „Nolitovom“ *Rečniku književnih termina* personifikacija je definisana kao „trop koji se sastoji u tome da se nežive stvari ili apstraktni pojmovi uvode u tekst kao žive osobe“ (Škreb 1985: 545). U skladu sa upravo izloženim, oličavana su i umetnička dela („nežive stvari“) i institucije ili discipline (što bi načelno odgovaralo „apstraktnim pojmovima“, odnosno, svemu onome što nema status fizičkog objekta). Personifikacija se, ako sam u pravu, nijednom izričito ne spominje ni u jednoj knjizi, dok se žiža često usmerava prema metafori, kao drugom i njoj srodnom tropu.

U zborniku *Slika i reč* mesta najvećeg približavanja tematizaciji figure oličavanja su ona gde se u vezi sa Ničeom govori o metaforizaciji, „antropomorfizmima“, sklonosti ljudskog bića da svet posmatra na osnovu sebe – što je tendencija koja je još ranije uočena u istoriji evropske misli – ili kada se tumači Kafkina proza, na primer, rečenica iz njegovih *Dnevnika*: „Kavez je pošao da potraži pticu“. Ipak, na tome se staje, te se pre radi o naznakama za jedan mogući pravac istraživanja, dobrim polazištima, pored prisustva te figure u samom stilu teorijskih izlaganja. Ovu primedbu ne treba razumeti kao kritiku, već iz

nje izvući sledeći zaključak: *personificatio* je u njima pre sredstvo, i to značajno sredstvo, nego predmet bavljenja.

Personifikovanje je sprovodivo preko više vrsta reči, odnosno različitim strategijama. Umetnička dela su ovde oličavana i preko imenica. Pronalaze se sintagme „osveta slika“, „rađanje umetničkoga dela“, „vizuelni“ i „nijemi“ ili „nemuš“ „govor slike“, „lice slike“, „neobična vitalnost slike“, njena „šutljivost“ ili „šutnja“, „nepokornost djela“. Slika i reč su „zastupnici“, između njih se odvija „dijalog“, na drugim mestima, specifičnije, kaže se da se on odvija između slike i pesme ili fotografije i romana. Čak se, u prenesenom značenju, govori o mogućnosti upućivanja „komplimenta“ nekoj umetničkoj tvorevini, te otuda proističe da ne mora ona samo nama da kaže nešto, nego i mi njoj. „Srodnice“ su grafička ili umetnička slika i slika uopšte, ali i slika i reč. Umetnička slika je „makar vrhovima nožnih prstiju“ u stanju da pređe preko granice svoje ograničenosti prostorom. Redi su primeri personifikacije uz pomoć prideva, ali ni oni ne nedostaju. Za određena književna dela je ironično primećeno da su to tvorevine koje su „pametne“, „učene“, „elokventne“, ali i „dosadne“, dok se za sliku kaže da je „šutljiva“, „rječita“ i „nijema“. Zastane li se na tren na ovim pripisanim joj atributima, stvara se utisak o njenoj paradoksalnosti: ona može i ne može da govori, ili pak to ne želi često da radi. U tom pravcu, sledeći iskaz je znakovit:

Sliku, međutim, valja zaštititi od preovladavajuće diskurzivne buke. Valja joj prići s dužnim oprezom, osluškujući navlastiti joj govor, nastojeći ujedno postići suglasje – harmonično višeglasje, ukoliko joj već stavljamo tuđe riječi u usta. (Bučan 2019: 283)

Čini se da je posebno efektno personifikovati umetničke tvorevine upotrebom glagola, jer one odista imaju moć dejstva na njihovog uživaoca. Ta se činjenica apostrofira vezivanjem radnje ili stanja sa delima. Repertoar rabljenih glagola je zaista širok. Umetničko delo „govori“, slika „nas osjetilno draži i poziva“, „peva“, „sputava“, „zastupa“, sposobna je da „se vazda podmlađuje“. Tu nije kraj nizu. Slikarsko delo „se obraća svom adresatu“, „djeluje“ na nas, „želi“, „utemeljuje“ i „proizvodi smisao“. Dok dela slikarstva „salijeću“ i „pobuđuju“, fotografije „komuniciraju“.<sup>5</sup> Postoje slučajevi iz iznizanih izraza kod kojih je teško odlučiti da li se odnose na živa bića ili pak na ljudska bića. Primer toga su iskaz da slika „želi“ ili onaj da ima sposobnost „podmlađivanja“, ali oni nisu toliko brojni. Dodaću tu i izraz „život umjetnosti“, koji pripada grupi narednih.

Kako je unapred naznačeno, javljaju se i primeri oličavanja institucija ili pojmova. Slikarstvo i poezija posmatrani su kao „susedi“, podseća se na ideju o njihovom „dobrosusedskom zadiranju“. Događa se „dijalog“ između filozofije i slikarstva ili umetnosti u opštem smislu, a za poeziju je rečeno da je

5 Ovaj niz se može dopuniti, s obzirom da, sa pragmatičke tačke gledišta, slike jesu u stanju različito da deluju na one koji ih posmatraju: „Ovisno o kontekstu upotrebe, slika može informirati, ilustrirati, svjedočiti, upozoravati ili pak zbunjivati, uveseljavati, razočaravati, što je s tog aspekta čini analognom govornim radnjama“. (Božičević 1990: 179)



filozofijin „ključni sagovornik“. Pronalaze se i sintagme „zvučni govor muzike“ i „rječitost slikarstva“, kao i stav u vezi sa stanjem umetnosti danas prema kome je došlo do njenog „proterivanja iz zavičaja, iz područja njenog imena“. Ta figura prisutna je i u formulaciji *toposa* o sestrijskim umetnostima. Poeziju i umetnost slikarstva karakteriše „sestrinska“ srodnost – što je zapravo varijacija motiva *ut pictura poesis* – a za slikarsku umetnost je rečeno da joj je „sestra“ takode i muzika.

U navedenim primerima, veoma brojnim, u pitanju je figurativno izražavanje, jer umetničke tvorevine nisu ljudi. Ponegde stavljanje takvih izraza pod navodnike znakovito upozorava na njihov slikovit karakter. Jezik i sposobnost govora ljudske su distinktivne odlike, a ovde ih dobijaju i neživi objekti. Uslov da umetnička dela govore je da ih personifikujemo. Već je ukazano na obilje spominjanja metafore i u knjizi *Riječ je o slici* i u zborniku *Slika i reč*. Metaforičkim iskazom se zaista traži i uspostavlja analogija između dva objekta ili pojma, tj. primećuje se da nešto izgleda ili se ponaša kao nešto drugo. I ovde konkretno iskrsava iznova analogija između ljudskih bića i dela umetnosti. Čini se da je potrebno izvršiti radikalizaciju ideje o skraćenom poredenju, slikovitosti i prekoračiti stav prema kome se tu radi tek o metaforičkom izražavanju. Toliko slučajeva personifikacije u obe knjige, a u njima nijednom imenovanja ili čak detaljnijeg i zasebnog razmatranja tropa čije promišljanje bitno doprinosi rasvetljavanju teme koju dele. Do sada rečeno u ovom kritičkom osvrtu nije toliko zamišljeno kao moguća dopuna ovim knjigama vrednim pažnje, koliko kao razgovor sa njima.

PS Razmišljao sam da ovaj kraći tekst nazovem „Umetnost i osobnost njenih dela“. Odustao sam od te odluke iz nekoliko razloga. Izborom tog naslova verujem da bih sačuvao naglasak na važnosti isticanja personifikacije kao tropa u diskursu o umetničkim delima, napravivši formulaciju iz koje se može pomisliti da je umetnost nekakvo lice kome pripadaju te ljudske tvorevine. Sa druge strane, terminom „osobnost“ bi bilo ukazano na neku posebnost koja odlikuje slike i umetnička dela uopšte kao proizvod imaginacije, koja ih izdvaja od ostalih predmeta i sveta svakodnevice i upozorava da nije jednostavno prodreti u bit njihovog „govora“ čak i kada se radi o književnim delima.

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Miloš Ćipranić

## Pictures, Titles, Personifications

### Abstract

The article provides a critical review of the books *Riječ je o slici* by Jagor Bučan and *Slika i reč* by the Serbian Society for Aesthetics. From the titles it is already evident that they share the same topic. The paper points out the similarities between the two texts on both what is present and what is absent in them, which also seems important for understanding the theoretical problems they deal with.

**Keywords:** picture, word, art, title, personification

IV

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REVIEW

PRIKAZ



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HAL FOSTER, *WHAT COMES AFTER FARCE?*, VERSO, LONDON AND  
NEW YORK, 2020.

Saša Karalić

Hal Foster's essay collection, *What Comes after Farce?* (Verso, 2020), searches through our ideological wasteland with great accuracy and insight. Divided into three chapters, the book dissects the key issues of the contemporary state of despair with forensic precision and asks the big question of our time: "How to respond?" How to respond to the terror of transgressive politics and raging plutocracy, or to the media world that offers to us a viewing seat to the disaster and, through that, as Harun Farocki – to whom Foster dedicates an essay in the book – claims, turns us all into war technicians? Foster wonders "How to belittle a political elite that cannot be embarrassed, or to mock party leaders who thrive on the absurd... in the current regime of war, terror, and surveillance, as well as of extreme inequality, climate disaster and media disruption?" (viii). These short essays on art were conceived during the last twenty years, since 9/11, but ring urgent and true in current times as an account of what has and still is happening to us – with the fact that they were published in the pandemic year only underlining their doomsday quality. Accordingly, in the preface to the essays, Foster states with resignation that "the world has moved, not only politically

but also technologically, beyond our control" (ix).

The reasons for this, according to Foster, are manifold. First of all, the main lens through which we started to view art, but also to a great extent reality itself, is that of our subjectivity. Where earlier we judged the quality of art in comparison to great examples of the past and spoke of its *interest* and *criticality*, we look now for pathos, which, says Foster, "cannot be tested objectively or even discussed much" (10). He suggests that this might have to do, among other things, with the political instrumentalization of kitsch – that "parody of catharsis", as Foster quotes Adorno – and its attempt to hide reality from us in order to secure our obedience. According to Greenberg, kitsch helps the creation of "the illusion that the masses actually rule" (12), thus in reality assisting authoritarian regimes.

Indeed, from old to new forms of nationalism, epitomized in calls for *protection of national values* or *national unity*, kitsch functions as a democratic glue of the collective, a leveling tool of national cohesion. Because of its assumed horizontality and non-elitist qualities, kitsch is an ideal instrument in the current political landscape, where hearts are to be won as equally as minds, within

a *democratic and free world*. Thus, works by artists like Jeff Koons – which once upon a time used kitsch simultaneously ironically and sincerely to reveal the psychological processes behind consumerism – seem all of a sudden like a self-fulfilling prophecy. Koons’ tongue-in-cheek attempt to “liberate people from their judgment and shame” (52) translates today into the freedom to believe whatever, against all facts, and aided by the massive production of political kitsch and sentimentality. The collective mobilization through this über-sentimentality – which has become a mainstay of contemporary politics – makes us not only accept repressive and manipulative political strategies, but also acquiesce to a constant state of exception.

In the chapter ‘Wild Things’, Foster proposes an escape route from all this by seeking the cracks in the symbolic order, which will, he assures us, eventually give in under political pressure. This moment, continues Foster, “doesn’t have to be psychotic, or even a romantic one, but a time of intense imagining of new social links” (31). This is similar to the escape route he offers in his analysis of the William Gaddis’ novel *Agapē Agape*. The Greek word for the highest form of love, *agapē* gestures towards a community united by art, which is “always aghast at its opposite: the herd numbed and silenced *agape* at blood, sex and guns” (106). Even though, Gaddis might glorify *agapē* while observing the widening *gap* between elite art and mass entertainment, claims Foster, he is at the same time fascinated by another Greek word, *aporía*, which he defines as “difference, discontinuity, disparity, contradiction, discord, ambiguity, irony, paradox, perversity, opacity, obscurity, anarchy, chaos”, and then exalts with the cry of “long live!”. Next to *agapē*, he appreciates “other gaps, other

aporias, that open up spaces for experiment and doubt, creative endeavor and critical thought” (106).

After these moments of careful and implicit optimism, in the last chapters of the book Foster returns to the question “how to respond?”. The doomsday language returns too, since the question is posed in “the world of intense alienation, not merely of man from world but also of world from man” (120). Looking at the work of Hito Steyerl, who claims in similar apocalyptic fashion that competence today is about detecting how “reality itself is post-produced and scripted” and about navigating the “networked space” of “the military-industrial-entertainment complex” (122), Foster wonders if this brand of criticism almost craves catastrophe. Steyerl is, according to Foster, too much in awe of the culture of capitalism to effectively challenge it and that, as the saying goes, it is easier for her to imagine the end of the world than the end of the system. He, then, follows Derrida’s forty-year-old criticism of the apocalyptic language of his fellow philosophers and wonders: “Why this apocalyptic tone from critics on the Left when we are surrounded by hell-fires on the Right?” (128)

Foster, of course, asks the right question, but he forgets to include his own language of catastrophe, doomsday and “hell-fires”. Perhaps, this is one of the greatest challenges of our times: to respond in our own tongue with dignity and self-reflection. The possible way out of this looping language of catastrophe might lie in a Latour quote mentioned in the book: “The critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. The critic is not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of naïve believers, but the one who offers the participants arenas in which to gather” (153).

V

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INTERVIEW

INTERVJU





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Andrea Perunović

## SUBJECT AND (POST)TRUTH BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

An Interview with Alenka Zupančič<sup>1</sup>

How do we perceive the notion of subject today, and how the notion of truth? In the second half of the last century, it seemed that these two concepts have disappeared from the radar of theory, being marked as a residue of a sclerosed metaphysical tradition by some currents of postmodernism and poststructuralism. Nevertheless, it seems that the contemporary context calls for their thorough questioning. What can be said about these canonical philosophical terms, without making mere repetitions or setting foundations for one of the numerous new ontologies? In which way we can think of contemporary transformations of subjectivity in the “era of post-truth”, when lie and truth, trust and mistrust, crises and security are intervoven in some kind of a hegelian bad infinity. Which adequate critical tools for analysing are to be found in philosophy, and which ones in psychoanalysis? When those are complementary, and when not? What can we still learn on subject and truth from Kant or Nietzsche, what from Freud and Lacan? Which insights from these authors have the potential to grasp the new normativity of our world?

Alenka Zupančič is a renowned Slovenian philosopher and psychoanalyst, professor and researcher at the Institute for Philosophy at the University of Nova Gorica and also a prominent figure of the psychoanalytic school of Ljubljana. Zupančič writes and thinks on the axis of psychoanalytic theory and continental philosophy, working on the concepts such as real, ontology, unconscious, hysteria, negation, lie, comedy, sexuality amongst others. Some of her books are entitled *Ethics of Real: Kant and Lacan*; *(The odd one in: On Comedy; The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two* and the last one published: *What is Sex?*

**Perunović:** One of the possible points of departure for our conversation that will gravitate around the notions of subjectivity and truth is the current context

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<sup>1</sup> This interview is a slightly edited transcription of the second episode of *Zvuk misli* (*Sound of Thoughts*), podcast of the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory. The original transcript can be found here: <https://podcast.rs/subject-and-posttruth-psychoanalysis-and-philosophy/>

that we're all living in. In that sense, how do you see the frequently used and often abused notion of "post-truth"? Is there anything *new* there or we're still dealing, in a fashionable manner maybe, with the same old problems that were always amongst us?

**Zupančič:** I would say that it is certainly true that we are living or witnessing a certain shift, a sudden real discursive shift that this term also tries to relate to. So perhaps the important thing is to determine what exactly is going on here, what is this shift that can be then prized or criticised, because some say that it is pretty nice that we live in post-truth, that we have finally liberated ourselves from this tyranny of truth, and so on. So I would say perhaps that, regarding the shift that is happening, that one often points the finger, and that is kept encapsulated with the term post-truth, at what appears for instance in our contemporary society as a kind of vulgar generalised realisation of postmodernism, you know, the decline of objective truth as an epistemological category, as value and so on. And then one goes on to a kind of attribute the fact that it is no longer possible to even distinguish truth; one has the tendency of attributing this into influence of postmodern theory, or modern theory or critical theory, or to this kind of movement of deconstruction of the notion of the original and to kind of general promotion of nominalism.

But I think what one needs to be careful about here, is that this enthusiasm of rediscovered realism, we see all kinds of realisms popping out, that this enthusiasm of newly discovered realism, sometimes tends to forget a very realistic fact that it is often quite objectively hard to distinguish truth from fiction. Counterfeit, I don't know, all kinds of fakes, are in fact getting better and better. I mean, obviously, technology has produced some astonishing, disturbing things in this regard. But also, our social relations in late capitalism, are excessively, I would say, fictionalised, in order for the real of the capital, for the reality of the capital, to be able to follow its course. So we don't have fiction on one hand and the real or reality on the other, they are really indistinct. It would seem that this kind of suppose postmodern questioning or undermining of the original, has kind of long since moved to reality itself, that it's not simply a question of theory of perspective, but of a certain way in which our reality is quite, I would say, objectively structured.

**Perunović:** In that vein, I would like to mention an author that that you cherish, and that you have been working on a lot during your career, and it is Nietzsche. So, is there any possible relation between the so called post-truth phenomenon and the infamous Nietzsche's dictum, which affirms that there is no truth, but only interpretations; the Nietzschean idea of truth as nuance?

**Zupančič:** Nietzsche and the question of truth is really an interesting and complex question. So I'm not even sure if we have the time and opportunity today to really dig into it in some detail. But concerning this dictum that you mentioned, I have to say that I'm not even sure if it does really describe the

predominant social climate today. Namely, just let's think about what is on the rise for instance, take the example of conspiracy theories which are not only today on the rise, but they also seem to be really forcefully entering the public space, the mainstream, even official politics. A clear example is the relation between QAnon and Donald Trump and even mainstream Republican politics. So I think that, while on the one hand, and you will see why I mentioned conspiracy theory, we can say that this supposedly democratic relativization, levelling of different claims with scientific claims is appearing as just one of many language games; this is today something that appears as a problem, as well the fact that there is no public as a general common platform, that would play the role of the big Other. Here I get to the point about what I wanted to say about conspiracy theories. What is really interesting is that followers of conspiracy theories very much believe in truth. And they take the category of truth very seriously. So they're just convinced that the truth is different from the official one. So the paradigmatic theories don't claim that there many interpretations and we just have to pick one or the other, but there is rather a kind of an almost fanatic truth, the belief in truth. So, my point was simply to say that in a different perspective, perhaps the relativization of truth that we are witnessing today, that's not exactly presented itself as a kind of playful, easy-going, post-modern dancing around, but often has precisely this kind of fanatic belief as its important ingredient.

**Perunović:** We will get to the topic belief, of trust and mistrust a bit later on, but I don't want to waste the opportunity to ask you about what do you think of the notions of lie and lying, because you were writing extensively on that subject, then you're, you're insisting notably on the fact that truth and lie, are not symmetrical. So can you please say a few words about that? And do you see the emancipatory potential in lie maybe, or what do you read from its state today? What is lie today?

**Zupančić:** When I was writing about this, I did take my starting point in this, finally, very simple notion of Lacan, that truth and lie are not symmetrical, because truth is kind of split or divided between two levels, and it is an inherent condition of speech in this sense, truth is more fundamental than lie, not in some moral sense, or in some kind of theological sense, but simply because we don't get to say anything without at the same time positing that it is true. You know, the classic example: even if I say, I'm lying, I am saying, it is true that I am lying. So, when I'm speaking, there is this dimension of truth, that is not the opposite of falsehood, but that is a kind of grounding both the truth as exactitude and lying. So, but then lying also has a very interesting dialectics of its own, because I would say that a lot of what we call lying springs, or this what one calls the culture of lying, springs from an internal difficulty, in contradiction of truth. There is this famous saying by Lacan: the truth is not whole, that you cannot say it all. And there is something that you always say too much or not enough, or there is something that disappears there. So you have all these interesting phenomena,

which are like, you can lie with truth or you can tell truth by means of a lie, which make the landscape much more interesting. But for me, this doesn't make it relative. I'm not saying it's not important whether we tell the truth or lie and so on. Just saying that we have to be careful to detect, for instance, also the instances where you can very efficiently lie by just enumerating facts, certain facts, of course, not all of them, so that it makes sense to say although everything that you said just now is true, factually true. Nevertheless, your whole speech is a lie or is there to kind of promote a certain way of social life and the other way around, you can also do the opposite and use, not like, intentionally, but nevertheless, use the lie and through lying you say a certain truth.

So I think this is interesting also today, because it's not only about facts as much as I am for this kind of enlightenment idea that there is also a truth, a scientific truth that is extremely important”.

**Perunović:** We will see maybe if we are moving to that idea of truth via our paranoiac era, because when Lacan is speaking about paranoia he's saying, in one of his seminars, that paranoia is just one step before the science. But we're far away from that right now, I think. Let's focus now our attention please on the notion of subject. While keeping in mind, of course, the context that we have traced right now, and firstly, I will propose to you to grasp it from the psychoanalytic point of view. It seems that in psychoanalytic theory, the Freudian one above all, the *topos* of censorship, the one that separates the conscious from the unconscious, and where the repression happens, is the pivotal place around which the subject is organised.

In one of your interviews, you are mapping the affect, which is the specific translation and the conscious counterpart of the unconscious drive, as a socially valorised category nowadays. In that vein, do you think that censorship and the whole mechanism of repression has changed, has loosened up in some perverse way? Or has it become more porous? Or to put this differently, has the role of censorship and repression in subjectivity changed from the times when, for example, Freud or Lacan even used to write about it?

**Zupančič:** To some extent, it definitely did change. Also, I think we should be careful to see precisely what is going on here, if it's just kind of censorship becoming less severe? Or is it that the censorship is structured, its modality is structured in a different way, which precisely includes some way of acknowledging what we know, as a way of perpetuating the repression, the *Verdrängung*, the unconscious? And I think I, okay, I don't know, I can go there directly, or you want me first to answer this more general question about the lacanian subject? What is the lacanian subject, or we go first to interrogate a little bit what are the specific modalities of repression today?

**Perunović:** Yes, let's start from the subject, if that's fine with you, that would be important for understanding repression as kind of mechanism that is inherent to the subject. So please, yes, we can start with the subject.

**Zupančič:** I think what is really interesting and quite unique in lacanian theory, and this is why I like it so much, is that differently from most of these other post-structuralist theories and so on, which, more or less, I'm simplifying a little bit, hold that the subject is simply an effect of the structure, that is to say, of some fundamentally non subjective process. As such, we can more or less do without it. Without this notion. In Lacan, there is a big difference. It's not simply that the subject is the effect of the structure, it is actually the name of the lack or contradiction or gap in this structure. So the idea is quite different. And this means that subject is not exactly the same thing as subjectivation, as this kind of richness of life experiences, as the way in which we subjectify certain things. So, it is also politically an important point that the subject corresponds to a gap in the symbolic structure, or, to put it this way: that it points to the fact that the symbolic or discursive structure is not simply consistent, or if it were consistent at all, then it wouldn't even produce, it wouldn't need the notion of the subject. But this is not how Lacan poses it. Then this notion of the subject as basically a lack in the Other, also introduces a kind of more complex landscape concerning the question of repression, *Verdrängung* the repression in this Freudian sense of *Verdrängung*, a kind of redoubling, namely: if subject is this ontological lack or inconsistency of the symbolic other, it is not only the one who represses certain things, but it also a structuring the place where the repression happens, and also the place where the symptoms of this repression, surface or emerge. So, I think Freud saw this or he intuited this as he doesn't have an explicit theory about it as Lacan does, but he intuited this, and this is why I think he introduced this term of *Urverdrängung*, the primary repression, which is the idea that the repression doesn't start with the first thing you repress, but it is built in the unconscious, built in as a negativity in the very symbolic structure. So it's not directly personal. One more important point that I think relates to this is this is why for instance, Lacan can say that, formations such as society in general, or family or this or that institutions, these are not simply formations that induce repression – *Verdrängung* – that they demand repression, as in this kind of classical frommian understanding, but are actually creations built on repression and with repression, with *Verdrängung*, so they are struggling themselves with an inherent gap that determines an inherent impossibility. And I think this is very important. So, it is important also to keep that in mind when we move then to your second part of your question, which is, what has changed lately in this way in which we repress, with which distractors we try to keep the antagonism or their inherent possibility repressed or out of sight, so to say.

Is the censorship diminishing? Freud already introduced two ways in which repression is being sustained by means of us fully consciously declaring the very thing that is repressed. You know, one well known example is from *Verneinung* paper, when the analysant says without being asked: oh, I had this dream, there was this person in it, I don't know who this person was, but it surely was not my mother. This is the way you pronounce it, you say "mother", it is there in front of your eyes, but it is a way of precisely not seeing what you say. But the

other way, which is even more relevant, I guess, for our present social way repression functions, is the case of fetishist disavowal, you know this is famous utterance “I know very well, but...”?

**Perunović:** Can you say a few words about the concept of fetishist disavowal, please? It seems really important...

**Zupančić:** I think it's really important, and it has this kind of perverse distortion in it, which I think is extremely important for the way our relationship to what is going on functions, how our unconscious can be sustained. The basic structure of fetishist disavowal can be recognized in the saying: “I know very well that this is so, but somehow I keep believing that it is not so, or I believe the opposite”. And I would really say that this is a predominant mode of how today, very often, huge or quite problematic forms of repression are being sustained by us, or sometimes by some leaders who are shamefully displaying and blatantly stating what is there, nothing follows from there. Very often we hear this formula, “but we all know what is going on”. It seems that as if this knowledge itself was a way of protecting us from acknowledging the consequences of this knowledge. So here, this perhaps becomes a little bit more complicated, but I will try to explain how I think of what is happening here.

So, we have a kind of a structure of the fetishist disavowal, we'll just say, *bien mais quand même*. But there is a further twist in it. So, it is no longer simply, “I know very well, that there is no X, but I keep believing there is.” But actually, it is now as if that I know very well that there is no X, and this is precisely why I can go on believing in it. As if this knowledge were enough and justified, as if it dropped this knowledge of all consequences, because it is enough that we know. So, while in the classic fetishist constellation, this belief, the unconscious belief, is delegated to the fetish. For instance, I know very well (this is the Freudian example) that women don't have a penis, but I do not secretly believe that they nevertheless do – it is the fetish that believes this in my step, it is the shoe, whatever it is, the belief is delegated to the fetish. And my point would be that what is going on today is that the knowledge itself functions also as this kind of fetish. This kind of precipitated acknowledge the awareness of how things really stand we know realistically how they are, makes it possible for us to ignore what we know. So, it is not “I know very well, but I nevertheless continue to believe the opposite”, but rather as I said, “I know very well and this is why I can go on ignoring it”, or it can stay in this way. I think it is really kind of blatant if you look at how very often something that is suddenly revealed and it looks like a total scandal is then immediately transformed into this kind of general consensus “oh, but we knew this all along”.

And this is quite interesting for me. This is for me the fetishization of knowledge not in the sense that knowledge is so important, in this common sense of fetishization, but precisely in the Freudian sense: knowledge itself is this fetish, this object, this shoe that takes on the suppressed or *verdräng*-belief that it is actually not true. So, this is interesting, because it looks that it is

it is not simply that everything is out in the open – this would be my point regarding your question – that now the censorship has diminished, but then directed the form of censorship and of keeping things unconscious, profoundly unconscious, has changed. The fact that they're [suppressed signifiers] right there in front of our eyes is not necessarily an indicator that the censorship is no longer there, it just means that it uses another means of being effective. So, I think there is still a lot of repression and censorship going on, but that it has found this kind of perfidious, perverse form that is very connected to fetishist disavowal.

**Perunović:** Yes, you were mentioning, when bringing closer to us this conceptual apparatus, words like belief and trust, and the perfidious way in which all of this functions. How do you see the notions of trust and belief? Do this change in modalities of repression signify the final takeover of trust, actually, it's predominance in dictating what is real?

**Zupančić:** In what I was just saying, this kind of combination of knowledge: “we know all about it, we are nobodies dupes, we are no fools” seems to be a very strong motivation in this knowledge functioning as a fetish, here in this precise, freudian sense. But I think what is interesting, precisely in this configuration, is also the kind of coincidence, I would even say, of trust and mistrust. There is a very interesting way in which the mistrust is the very form of trust.

**Perunović:** Mistrust as trust with the negation in front of it, so even more richer trust in some sense. It's not a sublated trust, if you want, it is its opposite, its identical opposite.

**Zupančić:** Precisely. And here again, if we return to the to the example that I suggested earlier, a very good example of this is precisely again conspiracy theories, you know, where you have this kind of clear coincidence of absolute mistrust, or paranoid mistrust towards all kinds of things, particularly in official versions of events, authorities, and so on; but at the same time, also this incredible trust or belief in whatever, not only in the theory that they are proposing. This combination of trust and mistrust, or coincidence of trust and mistrust, is a part of the very form of what we could call the conspiracy theory's big Other (if you use this kind of, Lacanian concept). Because conspiracy theories have a very interesting correlation to the agency that Lacan calls the big Other. Namely, on the one hand, they believe, they are convinced that the big Other actually very much exists, but differently from how Lacan says it exists. They believe that it exists in this sense that they believe that there is an agency, which is in itself absolutely consistent, which operates and purposefully, pulls all the strings, and there is no lack or gap in this agency, it is absolutely consistent. It is in this sense that they believe that the big Other exists undivided. This is the level of certainty here. But the same time, they can only trust this big Other, even if they cast it as fundamentally and deliberately deceiving.

So, this consistency of the big Other is very interesting. It is persistent because it can only be as such a big Other, it can only be a big Deceiver with capital D, a big fraud, a big cheat. You see how that there is a very interesting interplay, again, of trust and mistrust in how the very mistrust, the radicality of mistrust, is founded in this absolute trust that they really know what they're doing, and that they have everything under control, and they're pulling all the strings. So I think this is quite interesting as a way in which many things today work and we sometimes think that there is this radical scepticism, this radical criticism, but if you look at these structures more closely, you see how the scepticism is not at all very radical, not radical enough, that it actually is based on some kind of certainty which sustains it.

**Perunović:** That rises many topics that I would like to ask you about, but let's stay on the notion of mistrust – *Unglauben* – which is so important for Freud and Lacan. Of course, in relation to denial, which we were mentioning already, but also in the context of the global rise of right wing “populist” ideologies, that seem all to rely heavily on the conspiracy theories and “popular” mistrust. So, on the one hand, is denial, *Verneinung*, the new, predominant type of repression? And on the other, isn't trust definitely replaced by mistrust, as a constitutive feature of reactionary subjectivity? And finally, if we used to live in neurotic times, are we living now in a deeply paranoid era?

**Zupančić:** I mean, one thing that one perhaps needs to say, nevertheless, is that this mistrust, I wouldn't simply define it as a kind of necessarily reactionary or pathological formation, or it can be defined as pathological only in the sense, or to the extent, to which it also points to some pathology of the way our society functions today. I mean, this is not because of these people are being paranoid, but because there is something in the very structuring of the social order that not only uses, but we could perhaps even say, justifies a certain paranoid attitude. So it is not simply that: okay, they are paranoid, they're crazy... There is a certain truth, if we return to what we were talking about the relationship to truth and lying, that makes that we could say: there is a certain high or more general truth involved in this very paranoid reaction of the masses. So, something points to a real problem in the social bond and in the way it is structured these days. And I'm not only talking about these kind of conditions, of everything, including work conditions, and so on, becoming more and more precarious, of this instability of this or that, or all these things and the way in which we are precisely trained, ideologically trained not to rely too much on anything or anybody, because then we are not flexible enough to satisfy whatever we're trying. So there is certainly a lot going on. This is also why I don't think that we should also simply dismiss this movement, including the most reactionary one, as wrong. Of course, they are wrong. They are wrong in most of what they're saying – but there is a certain truth that pertains to the reasons of why and how they emerged in this particular pointing in time in history and social relations. So, this would be definitely something that we do



that we have to bear in mind. This is not a justification for the reactionary subject, it just happens that we need to keep the two levels of truth and of the lie or falsehood in front of our eyes, in order not to become prey to quickly of some kind of moralising discourse of outrage and condemnation, you know, because there are certain reasons for this, which are not direct technological reasons, but are related to certain social structuring.

**Perunović:** Maybe we should proceed now to one of your early books, entitled *Ethics of Real: Kant and Lacan*. One of the first chapters in that book is entitled “The Subject of Freedom”. In this text you are developing a very complex argument, that links the Kant’s notion of subject to the one that was developed in Lacan. And the central position in this text is take by Freud’s dictum, that goes like this: “Man is not only much more unfree than he believes, but also much freer than he knows.” What are, in your opinion, the emancipatory features of Kant’s, but also, on the other side Lacan’s, conceptions of subjectivity in the context that we were mentioning?

**Zupančič:** This is an extremely important question today, precisely because it tackles this question of freedom and it tries to tackle it in a way that is very different from all this talk about freedom that is a kind of ideological foot of the functioning of capitalism, neoliberalism, and so on, which is the freedom of choice, etc. I mean, the word freedom has been so much used, that it no longer has any emancipatory link to it at all. It almost seems that it is the very signifier of oppression: you do all kinds of things in the name of freedom, democracy or whatever. So, it is very, very important, I guess, to also philosophically try to pin out what are we talking about when we’re talking about freedom. Is this simply some kind of subjective freedom or so on. So, this is why the Kantian approach, in its very radicality, was interesting, because, on the one hand, it absolutely includes this kind of belief in causality and causal determination, but nevertheless, points at the possibility of freedom, which is not the opposite simply of this causal determination.

In relation to that, if I put it very simply, what you were quoting, I think we could perhaps for the purposes of this discussion, related to what I was saying earlier, namely, when I said that the subject is the lack in the structure, or the lack in the other, we could say that the first part of this saying, “man is not only much more unfree then he believes”, that this first part kind of confronts us with ways in which we are being determined by different structure by the symbolic order, by the discursive order and so on. So, we certainly are determined, that freedom is not to be looked at in he sense that here “we are not determining”... we are completely determined.

But the second part, “we are also much freer than we know” refers to what I was saying before about this structure of causal determination being in itself involved in a moment of inconsistency or lack, which is not simply to say: okay, here, there is no causal determination, there is, but it is constructed in a certain way, which involves a certain gap. You can also say that causality, the

notion of causality as such, always involves a gap, that it is not the same as the law of action and counter action, where the two actions are actually two sides of the same thing, but there is a gap as in this famous dictum by Lacan, when he says that there is only the cause of something that doesn't work completely smoothly. In order for the cause, to be a cause, there is a lapse through which it is determined or it is decided that it is a cause. Not to complicate things too much, we could say that the other cause of determination, in this sense, does not fully cover its own field. So, not that it is their absence or something. Freedom of the subject does not mean that then the subject can overrun causal determination or act against it in some kind of ecstatic act, it means that causal determination itself involves a kind of an internal blind spot and the name of this blind spot is subject, this is all it means. It doesn't refer to some, I don't know what kind of freedom. It is interesting, because this suggests that subject precisely is not the opposite of structure, some kind of autonomous agent or power external to the structure, but the name of the inconsistency of the structure which has this thing built into it, so to say so. And one more thing, because there was a lot of contemporary theory that emphasised also this kind of the omnipotence of the Other, of power and so on. I think this is interesting in this context as well, it has political implications, we can say of course, the power of the Other, of the discourse whatever, can be seen as very paralysing for a human agent – compared to our power. But the claim is, nevertheless, that this doesn't go without contradictions, it has weak points. But on the other hand, for instance, if you think of this notion of micro power, which was kind of very popular, fashionable at some point, I think this notion is symptomatic, because it suggests, contrary to what Lacan is saying, this idea of a closed, uninterrupted continuum of consistency – micro power basically means that power exists, or is filling in, every pore of our social tissue. So, almost like there is no lack in this, there is no inconsistency. And so this is a difference. Of course, if you say there is inconsistency, this does not imply any direct freedom, it is a point when things happen, which open up a certain space of difference, or of difference that makes a difference, and of things that can perhaps be changed in this sense. The lacanian point is simply that there is no uninterrupted continuum of the Other's consistency. Sometimes, the Other and its powers are all the more violent, they act more aggressively and abundantly when precisely this weak point is at stake. So this is not to say that they're simply weak, not at all, but this is something to be taken into account.

**Perunović:** Let's make a huge leap right now and go to your latest book, entitled *What is sex?* In it, you claim that sexuality is the point of the short circuit between ontology and epistemology. Is sex, with all of its ontological gaps and contradictions, with the knowledge that it transmits and that you are pointing at, resisting somehow to the register of the so-called post-truth? What is inevitably true in, or rather, around sex?

**Zupančič:** Yes, that's a very good question. So, okay, the project behind this book was a really big project, which was to try to take sexuality, not simply as something trivial, nor in the sense that it is meaningful or important, but in the sense that it could be taken as the place out of which precisely all these kinds of contradictions and difficulties emerge, and that it has this kind of intrinsic impossibility built into itself. So, this is why I thought it was important to make this investigation on sexuality, an ontological investigation, and not simply an investigation of different sexual practices, habits, gender studies and so on, and obviously, something that I heard many times when I was presenting the book, was that, "okay, but, you know, you took all the joy out of sex"! But I guess this is what the book actually aimed at. Not that we no longer enjoy sex, this is not the point. It is to take it as something that fits all kinds of meanings and stuff, and to show why is this so and how. The subject of my inquiry was the concept of sexuality as proposed and existing in psychoanalysis, particularly in Freud and Lacan, and not what is called sexual practice. So, I insist on this notion, this concept precisely as a concept. Sexuality is very much related, on the one hand, to what we were discussing earlier as this negativity or lack of the structure in the structure, so we can say that sexuality stands with one foot in the lack or negativity, in the minus that defines for Freud topology of the unconscious; but it also stands with its other foot in a surplus of enjoyment, as always something not simply that we want, but on top of what we want. Those notions of the surplus and minus, as I try to show, are precisely intrinsically related in sexuality, and they constitute two faces of the same surface – surface that we could also call the subject, but over here, I focus more on the structure of the drive. But if we take now from another and more popular angle this question of sex and post-truth, or what is true around sex, I would say, first of all, that sex is not the ultimate truth of anything. This is a kind of an unfortunate misunderstanding of Freud – he doesn't say that the sex is the ultimate truth of anything. Rather, he says that sex in the broader sense of sexuality, in its very ontological inconsistency, difficulty and so on, is what throws us out of joy out of self absorption, and makes us precisely curious about things, about others, about truth, open to the even the most metaphysical questions. And indeed, this is what is interesting in the point that psychoanalysis is making: it's not that it reduces all the high thoughts and metaphysical issues to sexuality as the bottom line, it is also that it shows how the sexuality itself is already a highly metaphysical question... The question of debasing, you know, these high ideas in philosophy, it's there, but this is just all about sex, so this is the truth. No, on the opposite, it is really interesting for me in psychoanalysis, how actually, if you look at the sexuality, you already see in display, or you can take out of the very template of the most metaphysical question. So here, I think we could say that I'm really, truly Freudian in this respect – I think that sexuality does drive the quest for knowledge, does drive the quest for truth, and that there is simply no original drive for knowledge as such. So, this is all Freudian..

Yet, sex is not driving the quest for truth in the sense of it being the true motive behind this quest, but precisely as its internal drive; there is something,

as I said, that is sexual in the very drive for knowledge. This is for me the revolutionary thinking about sexuality. Of course not that it is some substance to which we can attribute later other substances, but that is the inherent negativity of all these other substances or you know, also epistemologically. So, in this sense, curiosity, if we take this example when children play, even if they are very small children, curiosity for them not simply about learning how the world is, but also about seeing how the other, their partner, will react to this question: will she blush? What will happen? Does the other really know? I mean, this already involves something and I would simply say: there is sexuality in truth and in its pursuit. So perhaps to turn your question the other way around, we could say that it is not so much the question what is true in or around sex, but about how sex is implicated in truth. How this drive is in truth, where the sex stands in truth, in the very configuration of truth. But does this implication of sexuality in truth, make truth any less valid? No, I don't think so. I don't think this is simply a relativization. It makes truth more interesting, and a more complex notion. And just one more thing, relating to this post-truth. I mean, post-truth, if there is such thing, it looks for me like kind of indifferent. But at the same time, I'm totally convinced that one cannot really be indifferent to truth. I'm not even sure this is possible, we can repress it, but this is not the same thing. And moreover, I really don't see indifference as a predominant effort today. Passions arise in world around us more than they disappear. And the problem is rather that truths are becoming extremely, or almost exclusively, personal, and everybody has a personal big Other, rather than a common, rather than a shared one. So, the social dimension of truth definitely seems to be weakening. This has to do with a lot of things, but I don't think the truth or even passion to get to it is disappearing, but it is structuring in a very different way, and this social link, the way in which it is weakening, this is surely not good news, because then it is open to some kind of very problematic ways of secondary bounding, which we know from history also as not being particularly very fortunate.

**Perunović:** One last question, maybe a general one: what are the challenges of philosophy and theory (the psychoanalytic one maybe in the first place), and how is theory engaged today in the social realm? What made you start writing theory and what makes you keep dealing with it?

**Zupančić:** Very briefly, I'm not sure what made me start writing theory, I don't think I can answer this directly. Definitely some kind of drive to do it. But just perhaps two very brief remarks on this question. I think philosophy and also psychoanalytic theory is always engaged in the social realm, it's not existing somewhere else. But I don't think it works, or it should work, by way of prescribing to reality that it should change or how it should change. I don't think this is where its power and strength lies, because this would not only be kind of presumptions, precisely because we are part of this reality, but also, I think it could block the real change, because these kinds of prescriptions, you know:

this is wrong, we should do to this and that – these prescriptions are always based upon the present configuration, and they are not taking into account precisely the possibility of a radical change, which also would mean to change the very parameters of our present configuration. If we just talk from our present perspective, we can miss a lot. And we can close up our attunement to certain kinds of possibilities. So I think philosophy, also psychoanalysis, basically asks, why is reality such as it is? Not in order to justify it, but precisely to see what internal contradictions it harbours. And what internal contradictions it tries to accommodate or obfuscate or repress and how, by what means? And I think if it does this, it already does a lot. I think this is a lot to have a use of relating to these contradictions.



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## SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS

All submissions to *Filozofija i društvo* must conform to the following rules, mostly regarding citations. The Referencing Guide is the modified Harvard in-text referencing style. In this system within the text, the author's name is given first followed by the publication date and the page number/s for the source. The list of references or bibliography at the end of the document contains the full details listed in alphabetical order for all the in-text citations.

### 1. LENGTH OF TEXT

Up to two double sheets (60.000 characters including spaces), abstracts, key words, without comments.

### 2. ABSTRACT

Between 100 and 250 words.

### 3. KEY WORDS

Up to 10.

### 4. AFFILIATION

Full affiliation of the author, department, faculty, university, institute, etc.

### 5. BOOKS

In the bibliography: last name, first name, year of publication in parentheses, book title, place of publication, publisher. In the text: last name in parentheses, year of publication, colon,

page number. In a comment: last name, year of publication, colon, page number. Books are cited in a shortened form only in comments.

#### *Example:*

In the bibliography: Moriarty, Michael (2003), *Early Modern French Thought. The Age of Suspicion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

In the text: (Moriarty 2003: 33).

In a comment: Moriarty 2003: 33.

### 6. ARTICLES

In the bibliography: last name, first name, year of publication, title in quotation marks, name of publication in italic, year of issue, in parentheses the volume number within year if the pagination is not uniform, colon and page number. In the text: last name in parentheses, year of publication, colon, page number. In a comment: last name, year of publication, colon, page number. Do not put abbreviations such as 'p.', 'vol.', 'tome', 'no.' etc. Articles are cited in shortened form only in comments.

#### *Examples:*

In the bibliography: Miller, Johns Roger (1926), "The Ideas as Thoughts of God", *Classical Philology* 21: 317–326.

In the text: (Miller 1926: 320).

In a comment: Miller 1926: 320.

In the bibliography: Byrd, B. Sharon; Hruschka, Joachim (2008), "From the state of nature to the juridical state of states", *Law and Philosophy* 27 (6): 599–641.

In the text: (Byrd, Hruschka 2008: 603).

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In the bibliography: Harris, John (ed.) (2001), *Bioethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

In the text: (Harris 2001).

In a comment: Harris 2001.

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In the text: (Vieweg, Welsch 2008).

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colon, page number. The abbreviation 'p.' is allowed only in the bibliography.

*Examples:*

In the bibliography: Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret (1981), "You can have Sex without Children: Christianity and the New Offer", in *The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe. Ethics, Religion and Politics*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 82–96.

In the text: (Anscombe 1981: 82).

In a comment: Anscombe 1981: 82.

In the bibliography: Romano, Onofrio (2015), "Dépense", in Giacomo D'Alisa, Federico Demaria and Giorgos Kallis (eds.), *Decrecimiento. Un vocabulario para una nueva era*, Barcelona: Icaria editorial, pp. 138–142.

In the text: (Onofrio 2015: 139).

In a comment: Onofrio 2015: 139.

## 9. NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINES ARTICLE

In the bibliography: last name, first name, year in parentheses, title of article in quotation marks, name of newspaper in italic, date, page.

*Example:*

In the bibliography: Logar, Gordana (2009), „Zemlja bez fajronta“, *Danas*, 2 August, p. 12.

In the text: (Logar 2009: 12).

In a comment: Logar 2009: 12

## 10. WEB DOCUMENTS

When quoting an online text, apart from the web address of the site with the text and the text's title, cite the date of viewing the page, as well as further markings if available (year, chapter, etc.).

*Example:*

In the bibliography: Ross, Kelley R., „Ontological Undecidability“, (internet) available at: <http://www.friesian.com/undecd-1.htm> (viewed 2 April, 2009).

In the text: (Ross, internet).

In a comment: Ross, internet.

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Na srpskom (hrvatskom, bosanskom, crnogorskom...) i jednom stranom jeziku, između 100 i 250 reči.

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#### Primer:

U literaturi: Haug, Wolfgang Fric (1981), *Kritika robne estetike*, Beograd: IIC SSO Srbije.

U tekstu: (Haug 1981: 33).

U napomeni: Haug 1981: 33.

#### 9. ČLANCI

U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov teksta pod navodnicima, naslov časopisa u italiku, godište časopisa, u zagradi broj sveske u godištu ukoliko paginacija nije jedinstvena za ceo tom, dvotačka i broj stranice. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. Ne stavljaju se skraćenice „str.“, „vol.“, „tom“, „br.“ i slične. U napomenama, članci se citiraju isključivo na skraćeni način.

#### Primeri:

U literaturi: Miller, Johns Roger (1926), „The Ideas as Thoughts of God“, *Classical Philology* 21: 317–326.

Hartman, Nikolaj (1980) „O metodi istorije filozofije“, *Gledišta* 21 (6): 101–120.

U tekstu: (Hartman 1980: 108).

U napomeni: Hartman 1980: 108

#### 10. ZBORNICI

U spisku literature: prezime i ime priređivača, u zagradi skraćenica „prir.“, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov zbornika u italiku, mesto izdanja, izdavač i strana po potrebi. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomenama, zbornici se citiraju isključivo na skraćeni način.

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U literaturi: Espozito, Džon (prir.) (2002), *Oksfordska istorija islama*, Beograd: Clio.

U tekstu: (Espozito 2002).

U napomeni: Espozito 2002.

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U spisku literature: prezime, ime autora, u zagradi godina, naslov teksta pod navodnicima, slovo „u“ (u zborniku), ime i prezime priređivača zbornika, u zagradi „prir.“, naslov zbornika u italiku, mesto izdanja, izdavač, dvotačka i broj stranice (ako je potrebno). U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. Skraćenica „str.“ dopuštena je samo u spisku literature.

#### Primer:

U literaturi: Nizbet, Robert (1999), „Jedinične ideje sociologije“, u A. Mimica (prir.), *Tekst i kontekst*, Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, str. 31–48.

U tekstu: (Nizbet 1999: 33).

U napomeni: Nizbet 1999: 33.

#### 12. ČLANAK IZ NOVINA

U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina, naslov članka pod navodnicima, naslov novina u italiku, datum, stranica.

#### Primer:

U literaturi: Logar, Gordana (2009), „Zemlja bez fajronta“, *Danas*, 2. avgust, str. 12.

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U tekstu: (Ross, internet).

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