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INTERVIEW
INTERVJU

I

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE OBJECT OF HATRED

KAKO RAZUMETI OBJEKT MRŽNJE

INTRODUCTION

Igor Cvejić

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE OBJECT OF HATRED

This topic about the intentionality of hatred was inspired by the seminar *Can Hatred ever be Appropriate* held at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory on May 28, 2019. The seminar was prompted by Tomas Szanto's article *In Hate We Trust: The Collectivization and Habituation of Hatred*, published in 2018 (Szanto 2018). The article puts forward the innovative approach to the affective intentionality of hatred and argues that hatred can never be a fitting emotion. The core of Szanto's argument is based on the claim that the focus of hatred is 'blurred', i.e., "uninformative as to how the targets (individual refugees or refugee-groups) are related to the formal object (hateworthiness)" (Szanto 2018: 463). He ads two main reasons for this being so: "first, the formal object is indeterminate in the sense that it is all-too global (literally 'not focused'); second, the very targets are not fixed but shifting –namely between individuals, groups, generalized social types, or proxies for groups" (ibid.). Furthermore, Szanto finds the source of hatred's power in the community and proposes understanding hatred as a shared attitude that reinforces itself. This account implies that hatred has the overgeneralizing tendency to blur the socio-ontological status of its targets and depersonalize them. Besides the detailed introduction and empowered arguments by the author, the seminar invoked a debate on these issues from various theoretical perspectives and disciplines participated by Đurđa Trajković, Rastko Jovanov, Marko Konjović, Olga Nikolić, Mark Losoncz, and Igor Cvejić.

The three articles in this volume are dedicated to addressing issues from that debate, thus enhancing our understanding of hatred. Apart from some more detailed explanations and additions to his earlier arguments from 2018, Thomas Szanto's article *Can it Be or Feel Right to Hate? On the Appropriateness and Fittingness of Hatred* in this volume introduces two entirely novel accounts. Following D'Arms and Jacobson's distinction between moral (in)inappropriateness and fittingness of emotions (D'Arms, Jacobson 2000), Szanto's article

from 2018 addresses exclusively the question of the fittingness of hatred. The main concern of the first part of the article in this volume is the moral (in)appropriateness of hatred. One of its benefits is that we now have an integrated account that connects Szanto's previous arguments with the issue of moral appropriateness. Moreover, he enters into a challenging and living debate about the possibility that hatred toward seriously evil perpetrators can be appropriate, with authors such as Jeffrey Murphy and Jean Hampton (Murphy, Hampton 1988), Hans Bernhard Schmid (Schmid 2020), Berit Brogaard (Brogaard 2020), etc. However, Szanto concludes that none of the accounts can defend the moral appropriateness of person-focused hatred because they all rest on dubious presupposition, which he calls the "reality of evil agents assumption".

The second part of the paper is mainly concerned with introducing the novel focus-based model of emotional fittingness. Emotional fittingness/adequacy is one of the most important issues of the 'logic' of emotional experience in contemporary theoretical literature. The standard account portrays a picture in which the object of emotion should have evaluative properties that emotion pertains to disclose (its formal object) for emotion to be fitting. The focus-based account tries to avoid some shortcomings of the standard model (e.g., an unwanted consequence of value-realism) by turning attention to the focus of emotion and its constitutive role for the target and formal object of emotion: "we ought to assess whether the affective focus of an emotion picks out *those* evaluative properties of *that* object *that really matter to the subject* of the given emotion, to wit, 'matter' in a way that can, in turn, be assessed by looking at the emotional *commitment* that the subject has to the focus of the emotion" (Szanto, in this volume). Szanto is indeed not the first author who relied on the focus-based account. It is Bennet Helm who had already made a refined argument about differentiation and relations between focus, target, and formal object of emotions[1] in 2001 and integrated it in the question of "warrant of emotions" (Helm 2001). Although many authors adopted Helm's model in their studies, it is not until now that we have straightforward elucidation of the focus-based model of the fittingness of emotions. Szanto's article states how this model can provide the standard of the fittingness of emotions:

An emotion E is fitting, if and only if

(1) the target, eliciting E is appropriately related to the focus, such that the focus renders the evaluation of the target in terms of the formal object of E intelligible, and

(2) S is committed to the focus of E, such that in circumstances in which the target is harmed or benefited in a noteworthy way S is disposed to feel those and only those other emotion(s) $E^{\star}$ that are rationally interconnected to the focus of E. (Szanto, in this volume)

1 For earlier use of distinctions between focus, target and formal object see de Sousa 1987.

This clarification helps us to understand better why hatred can not be a fitting emotion. Apart from it, the importance of Szanto's model goes far beyond the question of hatred and represents a valuable contribution to the philosophy of emotions in general.

In his paper *A Critical Account of the Concept of De-Objectified Hatred*, Mark Losoncz challenges Szanto's account of hatred by advocating for a complex dynamic between the 'object' of hatred and the social environment. Losoncz is quite skeptical about what he calls "de-objectifying approach": "it seems that the object of hatred merely serves to 'establish or reinforce our identity as distinct from others' [Szanto 2018: 472]. The hated Other appears as a mere accidence in the dynamics of hatred as if the hater has first of all internal difficulties" (Losoncz, in this volume). By pointing out to examples of anti-Semitism and Yugoslav wars, Losoncz concludes that hatred could rather derive its power from (perhaps wrongly understood) objective circumstances: "the object of hatred is a – distorted, misunderstood – personification of otherwise entirely objective and identifiable social mechanisms" (Losoncz, in this volume).

Igor Cvejić begins his article *Some Remarks on Unfocused Hatred: Identity of the Hated One and Criteria of Adequacy* with the question inspired by Helm's argument about the possible inadequacy of love (Helm 2009): whether the identity of the hated one affects fittingness of hatred? Cvejić concludes that if the focus of hatred is blurred, hatred does not trace the identification of the hated person or group. However, this does not solve the problem of possible internal conflict that hater might have by hating someone who does not identify themselves with what they are hated for. Thus, Cvejić introduces a novel alternative. He proposes a possibility that criteria of adequacy of hatred are embedded in the cultural and social framework in such a way that they are not intelligibly justified by their relation to the focus. If that were the case, these criteria would track the properties of being 'hateworthy' and create what he calls 'quasi-fittingness' of hatred. Thus, Cvejić's account empowers us to hold Szanto's claim that hatred can never be fitting and, at the same time, explains how some people or groups of people are identified as 'hateworthy' by the haters.

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Thomas Szanto

CAN IT BE OR FEEL RIGHT TO HATE? ON THE APPROPRIATENESS AND FITTINGNESS OF HATRED

ABSTRACT
What exactly is wrong with hating others? However deep-seated the intuition, when it comes to spelling out the reasons for why hatred is inappropriate, the literature is rather meager and confusing. In this paper, I attempt to be more precise by distinguishing two senses in which hatred is inappropriate, a moral and a non-moral one. First, I critically discuss the central current proposals defending the possibility of morally appropriate hatred in the face of serious wrongs or evil perpetrators and show that they are all based on a problematic assumption, which I call the 'reality of evil agents assumption'. I then turn to the issue of non-moral emotional appropriateness and sketch a novel, focus-based account of fittingness. Next, I outline the distinctive affective intentionality of hatred, suggesting that hatred, unlike most other antagonistic emotions, has an overgeneralizing and indeterminate affective focus. Against this background, I argue that hatred cannot be fitting. Due to the indeterminacy of its focus, hatred fails to pick out those evaluative features of the intentional object that would really matter to the emoters. I close with some tentative remarks on the possibility of appropriate hatred towards corporate or group agents.

KEYWORDS
hatred, moral hatred, morality of emotions, antagonistic emotions, reality of evil, dehumanization, emotional fittingness, theory of values, affective intentionality, corporate and group agents

Introduction

Are there any circumstances under which it may be right to hate others? And even if hatred may not be morally justified, might there still be a sense in which hatred is not just an understandable reaction but indeed 'feels right'? These are the two central questions I wish to address in this paper. Intuitively, it never seems quite right to hate, and the centuries long history of religious and moral prohibitions against hatred, up to contemporary political legislations against hate-speech and hate-crime, seem to corroborate this intuition. With very few exceptions from the philosophical tradition and a handful contemporary authors, philosophers tend to share this intuition. I will not contest this intuition either, hence my position will be conservative in this regard: Against the

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few dissidents who aim to carve out a place for justified hatred, even if only a tightly delimited one, and whom I critically discuss below, I too will argue that it can never be right to harbor hatred. But what exactly is wrong about hatred? However broad the consensus, when it comes to spelling out the reasons for why hatred is inappropriate, the literature is rather meager and often confusing.

Here, I aim to be more precise and discuss what exactly it is that makes hatred an inappropriate affective reaction or attitude.[1] Adapting D'Arms' and Jacobson's (2000) seminal proposal, I shall distinguish between two different senses of inappropriateness, a broadly normative or moral and a non-moral one. In light of this distinction, the above two guiding questions can be accordingly rendered already somewhat more precise: First, the question is whether there is any relevant moral sense in which it may be right to have the sentiment, while the second – which has been virtually off the radar in discussions on the appropriateness of hatred – is whether the sentiment can ever be 'fitting', or whether hatred can, in a sense to be further specified, accurately disclose its object as having those evaluative features that merit a hateful affective response.

I will argue that neither is the case: unlike many other emotions and sentiments, including antagonistic ones such as resentment, anger or contempt, standard forms of hatred are not only morally inappropriate but also, and necessarily so, unfitting. I say 'standard' forms, because I conjecture that there is a specific form of hatred that may turn out to be morally appropriate, namely hatred towards institutional or corporate entities and certain group agents. Importantly, as we shall see, the inappropriateness of hatred in the second sense of 'unfittingness' is not owed to normative or moral considerations or its disruptive social or political effects. Rather, it is due to the peculiar affective intentionality of hatred. And yet, the ways in which hatred is wrong (inappropriate) and in which it is not right (unfitting) mirror each other. Indeed, specifying the reason why hatred is essentially unfitting, allows specifying the reasons for why it is morally inappropriate.

This is how I will proceed: First, I will critically discuss some central current proposals which fathom the possibility of morally appropriate hatred in the face of serious wrongs or evil perpetrators. I will then turn to the issue of fittingness. Here, I will sketch an original, focus-based account of fittingness. Next, I will outline the distinctive affective intentionality of hatred, suggesting that hatred, unlike anger, contempt and many other antagonistic emotions, has an overgeneralizing and ultimately indeterminate affective focus. Against this background, I will argue that hatred – for the structural reason of the indeterminacy of its focus – cannot be fitting. Hatred fails to appropriately pick out those evaluative features of the intentional object that would really matter to the emoters. I will close with some very tentative remarks on the possibility of appropriate forms of collective and intergroup hatred.

1 For reasons of simplicity, in this paper, I will not discuss in detail which affective phenomenon (emotion, sentiment, emotional disposition, etc.) hatred is. I will assume that hatred is an affective antagonistic attitude and determine its affective-intentional structure in the last section. For more on this issue, see Szanto 2020.

1. The Moral Appropriateness of Hatred, or Why Hatred Cannot Be Right

Let's then start with the issue of the appropriateness of emotions in terms of their moral, or, more broadly, socio-normative function. If we ask for the appropriateness of hatred in this sense, we want to know whether it can ever be ethical to hate, and if not, why it is morally wrong to have, maintain, let alone nourish hatred toward others. In the broader sense of socio-normative function we can also ask what, if anything, an emotion is socially, politically, etc. 'good for'. Regarding hatred, we may for example want to know whether it has any legitimate corrective or retributive social or political function, as many other hostile emotions like anger, blame, resentment, indignation or contempt.

Now, there are only very few philosophers who want to reserve a place for morally justified or appropriate forms of hatred. In fact, there are altogether not more than a handful of authors who address the issue of the appropriateness of hatred explicitly, although the literature has been recently growing. And it is probably no coincidence that almost all who engage in this discussion endorse a fairly liberal stance, arguing for the rationality or moral defensibility of hatred, albeit only under very special circumstances.[2] However, it seems to me that the moral justification of certain forms of hatred relies in most cases on an equally liberal approach to demarcate hatred from cognate but distinct hostile emotions, such as anger, resentment, moral outrage or contempt.

But such a liberal approach proves problematic, since it blurs the familiar and decisive distinction between hostile emotions such as anger or resentment on the one hand, and hatred, on the other: whereas the former are affective reactions to specific harms or particular actions issuing, and typically do not target the wrongdoer as such (I resent your betrayal, not necessarily you as such), hatred is directed globally at persons, or personal traits, ideologies or persons as proxies for social groups (I come back to that latter point in sect. 2). Anger, resentment or contempt, and hatred also have very different goals: in the former cases, the aim is to signal wrongs to others with a view to corrective measures, alleviating the specific negative features or actions issuing from the wrongdoer, whereas in hatred, the aim is a total elimination of or seclusion from the target.[3] I shall show that most defenders of the morality of hatred, while they *principally* acknowledge the importance of these distinctions either overtly or covertly, ultimately fail to account for them.

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2 With different reasons for defending hatred in certain cases as morally permissible or even demanded, the following authors, most of whom I discuss below in some detail, hold such liberal positions: Murphy, Hampton 1988; Elster 2004; Brudholm 2008, 2020; Brudholm, Johansen Schepelern 2018; Murphy 2016, and most recently Brogaard 2020. For the only account I am aware of that explicitly argues *against* the appropriateness of hatred from a philosophy of emotions perspective (beyond Schmid 2020, whom I also discuss below), see Vendrell Ferran forthcoming.

3 There are, however, intriguing dynamics between hatred and these hostile emotions, and in particular contempt and resentment. Indeed, though these latter emotions are

1. Moral Hatred? The Retributive Idea

Among those who cautiously aim at a rehabilitation of the moral value of certain forms of hatred, Jeffrey Murphy and Gene Hampton stand out. In a series of individually authored papers, conjoined in their book *Forgiveness and Mercy* (Murphy and Hampton 1988), they make the case for what Murphy calls "retributive" and Hampton "moral hatred". Murphy claims that there are certain grave circumstances, where hatred against ultra-abusive perpetrators (torturers, rapists, racist murderers, etc.), is not only psychologically understandable but can, albeit only "in principle", be a morally appropriate response to the harm. This is the gist of the retributive idea of moral hatred. Let's look at it more closely.

Most generally, morally appropriate forms of retributive hatred amount to a justified desire that perpetrators of harm get the punishment they morally deserve. Accordingly, the important point is to specify the sense in which the harm is of *moral* relevance, or a *wrong* (ibid.: 52). Wrongs are harms, in which victims are harmed in the sense of being "morally injured" (Murphy and Hampton 1988: chap. 1). Moral injury issues not from mere "wrongdoings [that] threaten or produce physical or psychological damage, or damage to our careers, interests or families" (ibid.: 43). As Hampton points out, victims are not merely "insulted" or "demeaned", "in the sense that [they are] forced to endure treatment" that they – subjectively – perceive as "too low" for them. The sort of moral injury that merits, and may justify, hatred, is such that the victim is "degraded" or "diminished" in the stronger sense of "literally lowered in value" (ibid.: 45). As Hampton specifies, a person A literally degrades, and hence wrongs, another person B, if A intentionally treats B "in a way that is objectively demeaning" or "disrespectful of [B's] worth" (ibid.: 52).

Hampton marks off hatred that responds to such moral injury and may hence be morally justified ("*moral hatred*") from two other forms of hatred: a non-moral one, "*simple" hatred*, and an irrational one, "*malicious or spiteful hatred*".[4] Simple hatred is "a strong aversion" towards a person or an object, which are "perceived as profoundly unpleasant", and where the emotional response is "accompanied by the wish to see the odious thing removed or eliminated" (ibid.: 60–61). As most philosophers of hatred, Hampton rightly points to the essential link between the aversive emotional response and its telos to physically eliminate or socially exclude the target (I come back to that shortly). But by contending that non-personal entities such as spinach or the weather can be intentional objects of hatred properly speaking, her account flies in the face of most philosophers of hatred, with whom I for one side also.

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always triggered by, and typically also only target, specific deeds or features of others, if suitably enough repeated, they can eventually encompass the target's overall personality and thus become entangled with hatred. See also Landweer 2020, and regarding the interconnections between forms of disparagement and hatred, Szanto 2021.

4 For a recent original and alternative taxonomy of different forms of hatred, including normative ones, see Vendrell Ferran forthcoming.

Be it as it may, malicious or spiteful hatred is different from simple hatred in this regard: it can only be directed towards persons, not towards physical entities, but neither towards social facts or actions or deeds committed by a person (e.g., crime). It amounts to a personal animosity, that "one tends to feel towards those who have personally brought harm to one (where that harm may or may not be a moral wrong)" (ibid.: 61). Moreover, it nurses grudge against the wrongdoer, and spite or malice when she in turn is harmed or demeaned. As such, the telos of this form of hatred is not so much the elimination as the diminishing of the (self-)worth of the wrongdoer and the competitive advantage in terms of power or status that one gains by this.[5] According to Hampton, malicious hatred is typically preceded by resentment and strategically used, when resentment is of no avail to restore one's own battered self-worth (see ibid.: 62). But even in this "strategic" or instrumental sense, malicious hatred is not appropriate, since it becomes eventually a self-defeating and hence irrational strategy, analogous to Nietzsche's (or Scheler's) account of Ressentiment, as Hampton rightly argues. In that sense then malicious hatred is a "wrong" or a "vice" (ibid.: 78), albeit, *pace* Murphy's later characterization (ibid.: 88), not in the moral sense, as precisely moral hatred.

Moral hatred, for Hampton, responds not to the moral injustice one suffers from another person and targets in the first instance not the perpetrator as such but, rather, the immorality that this person embraces. As Hampton puts it, it "is an aversion to someone who has identified himself with an immoral cause or practice, prompted by moral indignation and accompanied by the wish to triumph over him and his cause or practice in the name of some fundamental moral principle or objective, most notably justice" (ibid.: 61). As we shall see, this distinction between hating an evil person as such or her evil character, on the one hand, and hating her evil actions or immoral principles on the other, will turn out to be decisive for the issue of the moral appropriateness of hatred. For, Hampton, however, this distinction is not as clear-cut as it seems (and as it is for other authors). Though moral hatred does not primarily target "the person so much as the immoral principles with which he has identified himself", these wrong principles "get entangled up with" and corrupt her character, such that hating the former means hating the latter (ibid.).

This entanglement notwithstanding, moral hatred is instrumentally and morally appropriate or "potent" not because it targets the evilness of a person, aims to hurt her or diminish her worth – even if, like malicious hatred, and due to the entanglement of the wrongdoer's character with the immoral cause she embraces, moral hatred, too, might be accompanied by a wish to "bring down" the "vainglorious status" of the opponent and "is delighted if she succeeds" (ibid.: 82). But the key difference between moral and malicious hatred is that the moral hater's reasons for feeling so are not based on self-defeating, vicious spite, nor does the moral hater aim at "bringing down a person some

5 For an alternative view regarding this issue, see Vendrell Ferran forthcoming.

ranking ladder". Rather, the moral hater's reasons to hate are based on more noble, and precisely moral, grounds. As Hampton explains:

> the moral hater also desires to hurt [the wrongdoer] as a way of deterring his evil cause. [However,] the punishment becomes a way not only to defeat the wrongdoer in order to annul the message of his crime but also to express opposition to (and deter) this enemy of (what she takes to be) morality. And she takes satisfaction in the wrongdoer's suffering, not only because she welcomes the way in which it annuls the demeaning message of his crime, but also because she sees it as a personal defeat for this enemy of morality. (Murphy, Hampton 1988: 146–147)

Importantly, Hampton maintains that all this is compatible with a "high respect" for the wrongdoer as a person or "as the *opponent* of the moral cause". Indeed, "as in any normal competition", she claims that "the more they respect the hated ones *as* opponents [...], the more they enjoy prevailing over them, especially when their victory is for something as important as morality" (ibid.: 81).

Now, Murphy aims to show that what he conceives of as "retributive hatred" "combines elements of [Hampton's] moral and malicious hatred". For Murphy, the retribution for moral injury typically contains the "desire to hurt another, to bring him low" (i.e., the spiteful element); but, in contrast to Hampton, this "is not [...] always motivated by the competitive desire to appear better than that person in some way." Rather, Murphy suggests, "such a desire is motivated by feelings that are at least partly retributive in nature – e.g., feelings that another person's current level of well-being is undeserved or ill-gotten (perhaps at one's own expense) and that a reduction in that well-being will simply represent his getting his just deserts". This reduction aims not at bringing down the other "on some morally irrelevant scale of comparison" but at restoring "the proper moral balance of whatever goods are in question" (ibid.: 89).

Retributive hatred may then not only be "therapeutic for the victim" but, indeed, morally appropriate (ibid.: 90). Yet, Murphy is quick to emphasize that it is only "in principle vindicated and justified". In order for retributive hatred to be "ever *in fact* justified", Murphy acknowledges that we would need a "pure and clear case" of evil. But given that we might "never be in a position to know if we are confronted with one" such clear case – Hampton's 'pure rottenness' (see below) – it remains a "bad *policy* to exhibit the [hateful] response" (ibid.: 96). Murphy brings to bear a series of arguments to show that if retributive hatred becomes a routine response to, in fact, moral wrongs, it poses a number of problems, and hence must be rigorously "restrained" (108); all things considered, it ought better not be endorsed. Drawing on Kant, for instance, he points to our limited capacities to conclusively judge that "we know enough [of the evilness of another] to hate" and thus cautions against hate on *epistemological* grounds (ibid.: 99). He also mentions Kant's *moral* cautions against hate of evil, referring to one's own moral imperfection or impurity, and Rawls' idea of "luck on the natural and social lottery" (ibid.: 100–101). Developing thoughts from such various authors as Hegel, Nietzsche, Spinoza and Adam Smith, he provides further *moral-psychological* reasons "why persons may sometimes fail

to act out their retributive hatred": the "impossibility" or the "too costliness" "to get even", without corrupting or "consuming" oneself,[6] and also points to considerations of "moral decency", which imposes that the victim ought rather "settle for less than perfect or no retribution at all." (ibid.: 104–107). To conclude, even if justified, retributive hatred can never be morally or socially required, nor virtuous to bear, and, in fact, almost everything speaks against it.

Do Murphy or Hampton then succeed in restituting the moral appropriateness of hatred? My answer mirrors Murphy's caution and is a qualified 'no'. On the one hand, they do succeed to show that we must distinguish in a more nuanced way than usual potentially appropriate from clearly inappropriate forms of hatred; on the other hand, they both fail to convince of the need to introduce a concept of moral hatred that would be sufficiently demarcated from other morally justified, and indeed sometimes morally required, antagonistic affective stances such as moral disgust, anger, indignation or resentment.[7]

More specifically, Murphy is right that it is very understandable in certain circumstances to desire to hate; and it is certainly also true that "one may not be a (morally) bad person" in doing so, or that it may not be a "vice of character" as Murphy in a later essay (2016) claims; still, he concedes that eventually it morally and psychologically corrupts individuals and societies if acting upon the desire to hurt the wrongdoer in retributive hatred becomes a norm.[8] Moreover, for all that morally matters, Murphy actually discards any appropriate function of hatred. Finally, all he says about it seems rather to concern the moral psychology of hatred and the socio-moral 'policies' that we ought to consider in restraining its use than the morality of the sentiment properly speaking. For deciding upon the morality of the sentiment, the issue is whether hatred can appropriately be directed at evil actions as distinct from the evilness of the perpetrators (see more below) or track some moral principles above and beyond the injury suffered by the victim (as Hampton, in turn, points out).

Hampton for her part fails to adequately account for the distinction between the (im)moral properties of the principles or actions, on the one hand, and the character or personality features of the hated ones, on the other. Part of the reason has to do with her use of very unfortunate metaphors here: Not only does she compare the mentioned entanglement of the wrongdoer's personality and her immoral principles with the "way a cancer can get mixed up with the healthy cells of one's body" (ibid.); she also describes the eventually corrupted, or 'evil', character as of persons who "seem irredeemably 'rotten'",

6 Similarly, Brudholm (and as we shall see Scheler) cautions: "even appropriately directed hatred and anger damage or brutalize their holder. If this is plausible, it creates an additional problem for the ethics of urging other people to hate". (Brudholm 2020: 83)

7 The literature on the pro-social and pro-moral or normative functions of antagonistic emotions is vast by now, see for references Szanto and Slaby 2020, and a recent further article Wallace 2019.

8 Murphy specifies in this essay (2016) again the restrictions on the part of the hater, but also warns that even if appropriately constrained to morally justified cases, retributive hatred doesn't make hater a more virtuous person either of course.

or "totally without goodness" (e.g., Hitler or Stalin; ibid.: 80–81). And it is these cases that she conceives as the paradigm targets of the most extreme form of moral hatred, a form of hatred that "comes in degrees", according to degree of the graveness of the assessment of the moral status of the person, her "rot", as she puts it (ibid.: 81). Moreover, Hampton plays down the fact that the proper telos of hatred is really to eliminate the target, as she acknowledges for "simple hatred". But this telos is arguably incompatible with "respecting the opponent", as if in a "competition" or match for the "moral excellence" (ibid.: 81).

It is these two latter issues which Hampton fails to adequately tackle–the telos of hatred to eliminate its target and the alleged evilness of its target–that I now want to look at. I shall show how they need to be treated carefully, as they turn out to be decisive on whether or not we accept the moral appropriateness of hatred.

2. The Reality of Evil Problem

In a recent paper, Brudholm (2020) shows how these two issues are interlinked but need to be treated separately for assessing the appropriateness of hatred. He starts by referring to the following Aristotelian definition of hate by Elster: "Hatred is the emotion that A feels toward B if he believes that B has an evil character. The action-tendency is to cause B to cease to exist or otherwise be rendered harmless, for instance by permanent expulsion" (Elster 2004: 230). Brudholm suggests that Elster's definition is useful for salvaging a sense in which hatred can be rationally and morally appropriate[9] for two reasons: first, "because it does not presume that hatred is always a vice or always a matter of prejudice", and, second, because it shows that hatred is distinct from all other affective responses, in that the belief of the evilness of the target and the desire or action-tendency to eliminate the perceived evil, need to be treated separately (Brudholm 2020: 79). Now, the key point for Brudholm is that only if we take into account these two characteristics (the negative appraisal of the target as evil and the wish to eliminate it), can we capture the distinctiveness of hatred. For, as Brudholm points out,

> it is possible to believe that B has an evil character and *not* wish that B would cease to exist (one may feel fear or horror or maybe compassion). And it is possible to participate in acts of elimination or expulsion without believing that the target has an evil character (recall, for example, the works of Hannah Arendt and Zygmunt Bauman). (Brudholm 2020: 79)

I contend that Brudholm is right here. But this flies in the face of Elster's – and Hampton's – characterization of the hated *person* as evil, or the reference to the wrongdoer' evil *character*.[10]

9 See also his other work to this effect, Brudholm 2008; Brudholm, Johansen Schepelern 2018.

10 Note that Brudholm also holds that there are forms of hatred which "appear" or are "located" "beyond subjects", such as hate speech, (hateful) laws, institution,

Similar problems arise for the most recent defense of the appropriateness and rationality of so-called "critical hatred" proposed by Brogaard (2020). In her book-length analysis of hatred, Brogaard boldly aims to pave the way for conceiving of hatred as a potential "gateway to moral vision" (Brogaard 2020: xii). She distinguishes the "deplorable and insupportable" form of "dehumanizing hatred" (ibid.: 113) from hatred without dehumanization or "critical hatred".[11] Dehumanizing hatred fundamentally disrespects its targets as fellow human beings and conceives of them as *ab ovo* excluded from participation in the moral community. This type of hatred is typically all-consuming, all-destructive, precisely "inhuman", and "pointless" (ibid.: 92); moreover, it is also irrational, namely in the basic psychological sense that it "interfere[s] with one's ability to function optimally" (ibid.: 39, 112). Interestingly, Brogaard claims that dehumanizing haters dehumanize themselves by virtue of harboring a dehumanizing stance and their according "inability or unwillingness to play by the rules of society". Thus, they "become non-participants in the moral community" themselves and "are in need of sanction, treatment, or training" (ibid.: 93–94).

Markedly different is critical hatred. According to Brogaard it is both morally and socio-normatively appropriate and "helps monitor and safeguard" shared (moral and non-moral) normative ideals and values; if "temperate", it is also reasons-responsive or rational. Brogaard's argument for the appropriateness of such critical hate is based on the following two assumptions: first, she holds that hatred is fitting, when it properly targets and reacts to the hated subjects' "evil", "malevolence", "wickedness" or "depravity" as the source of the wrongdoing in question, and not just to her wronging and wrong *actions* (ibid.: 112–113). Indeed, she argues that only hatred is fitting in the face of extreme forms of agent-depravity – not other reactive attitudes such as anger, blame, indignation or resentment, which would not be a strong enough response. And the reason for that has to do with her second assumption, the claim that the evil or depravity of the targeted agents "reflects" their dehumanizing arrogance and "abdominal beliefs about hierarchies of humans".

Critical hatred, according to Brogaard, functions as an expression of a "form of disrespect for the [evildoer's] arrogance [...] rather than merely being a disapproval of the wrongful act". If the harms are of a dehumanizing kind, issuing

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monuments, violence, or a whole society (ibid.: 80); it is not quite clear whether Brudholm means by this that hatred can be directed not only at *individual* persons, but also at institutional or social entities, which supervene, nonetheless upon (groups of) persons (which is a valid claim in my view; see Szanto 2020), or, whether he means that hatred can be both *issuing from* and *targeting non-personal* institutional entities or social facts (which I would reject). At any rate, as we shall see in the last section, accounting for the possibility of institutional or group agents being proper targets of hatred is of central importance for the appropriateness of hatred.

11 For another influential account of *non*-dehumanizing, but not necessarily critical, forms of hatred and, in particular, misogynistic hatred, see Manne 2017. For careful further work discussing the dehumanization mechanisms at work (and not at work) in hatred, see Brudholm and Lang 2020, and Haslam and Murphy 2020.

from the hatred of the evil perpetrator, any other affective reaction, say, blame, would just "silently approve" them (Brogaard, 2020, 113). Critical hatred is thus an appropriate, and indeed the only appropriate, response to dehumanizing hatred. But Brogaard goes a step further. She holds that even in the face of any "significant" – but not necessarily morally relevant – offense in interpersonal relationships, where clearly no dehumanization takes place, critical hatred may also be appropriate, since it represents a more "effective means of engendering guilt" and behavioral change in the target than blame or resentment (ibid.). Unfortunately, she fails to provide concrete examples for the relevant sort of offenses, and in fact, throughout the book, her numerous real-life examples are only illustrative of the dehumanizing haters that critical hatred, in her view, can best counteract.

The function of critical hatred vis-à-vis *non*-dehumanizing hatred seems also problematic if we follow – as I for one do – a broadly accepted definition of hatred as precisely not aiming at specific corrective measures as other reactive attitudes but ultimately at the social eradication or even physical elimination of its target. Again, it seems to me that hatred thus conceived, and whether or not critical or tempered, risks losing its distinctive nature compared to other, appropriate – and sufficient –reactive attitudes. As we shall see in the next section, hatred is a lingering, often life-long held and little malleable affective attitude, and as such it typically poisons relationships; more often than not, the expression of episodic anger or concrete blame would rather be restorative.

But even if we grant that the proper aim of hatred is to express disrespect rather than a more extreme form of exclusion (which again risks aligning it all-too squarely with other reactive attitudes), there is another, and more deeply problematic assumption in Brogaard's account: the assumption that the targets of appropriate hatred as such, or their character, are deprived, malevolent or evil.

Call this 'the evil agent assumption'. It underlies her more fundamental suggestion to the effect that critical hate is the only appropriate "form of disrespect" towards *dehumanizers'* deep-rooted and total disrespect of others (and which I find otherwise intriguing). To be sure, Brogaard aims, more explicitly than Hampton or Elster, to underscore her evil agent assumption. But, in my view, she fails to do so. After a brief dismissal of the so-called 'situationist' challenge regarding any stable and substantial character traits, without much argument, we end with Brogaard's presumption that there are "good" and there are "bad people", and that the – vague enough – colloquial term 'acting out of character', irrespective of fortunate or unfortunate situations, has a valid sense (ibid.: 110–111). But that there is such a valid sense has been seriously challenged, and not just by situationists or by critics of Arendt's notorious 'banality of evil' discussion, which Brogaard too reviews, to wit, in a subchapter entitled *The Reality of Evil* (ibid.: 169–177).[12]

12 See for overviews of 'evil-skepticism' Russell 2006 and Schmid 2020. Brogaard's argument heavily relies on a variety of social psychological and psychopathological research, purportedly establishing that there are "sinister inclinations of the 10–15 percent of the general population who have dark personality traits" (ibid.: 175) of the kind

3. The Argument from Evil Agents versus Evil Acts

At this point then we face the serious problem, lurking behind the above discussed accounts all along: namely how to account for the perceived 'evil' in hatred of evil. In particular, the issue is how to distinguish between hatred of the evilness of a person or agent as such, and specific evil features or her allegedly evil actions – a distinction that Brogaard too acknowledges.

In his incisive paper, *Hate of Evil*, Schmid (2020) addresses this problem head-on. He starts with the observation that Aristotle and Aquinas viewed hate of evil indeed as "virtuous" or "praiseworthy" (see for references Schmid 2000: 564). But hatred, according to Schmid, unlike, say, anger or indignation, no longer figures among the appropriate condemnations of moral wrongs. We have just seen that not all agree today, but Schmid's point seems still to hold, if we apply the robust conceptualization of hatred of evil that Schmid endorses, and which I share: namely the one which conceives of hatred as an "absolute enmity" that "pushes towards annihilation and eradication" of an "evildoer" (ibid.).

Schmid's sustained argument against hatred of evil, and by the same token moral or critical hatred, proceeds as follows: First, he maintains that hatred, rather than "*recognizing* moral wrongs", only "*makes*" or aggravates evil – indeed, evil is just "the excrescence of hatred" (ibid.). Here, Schmid briefly mentions the classical phenomenologist Scheler, who argues that hatred – rather than having any corrective or retributive function – "ideologically distorts our moral concepts of true righteousness" (ibid.).[13] Moreover, hatred makes

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pathological narcissists, people with borderline personality disorder or psychopaths exhibit, and which, at their most extreme, are manifest in serial rapists, genocidal killers, etc. For obvious reasons, I will refrain here from discussing whether hatred really is an appropriate, let alone the 'best', response to psychopathological disorders of the dehumanizing and violent kind at stake, and instead discuss the issue of hatred of evil from a more general, moral-psychological point of view. Brogaard also provides an extended discussion of (dehumanizing) hate itself as a character trait (chap. 4, 115–156), but this discussion doesn't furnish much independent ammunition to her anti-situationist core assumption regarding the 'reality of evil' either. For more critical remarks on Brogaard's account, see below in the footnotes 28 and 29.

13 It's worth looking at the passages where Scheler shows *why* hatred actually fails to grasp moral wrongs (as the evil they are), a point that he elaborates in his *Sympathy* (1913/26), and not in his *Ressentiment* book (1912/1915). For Scheler, the reason has to do with the specific (lack of) affective intentionality of hatred (and love). According to Scheler, hatred lacks the intentionality of so-called "value-feelings". Rather, hatred is a sort of immediate affective reaction to its object, thus lacking the function of other proper emotions (or value-feelings), namely that of assessing the value of the intentional object or a making a "value-*judgement*" (*Wert*-beurteilung) (Scheler 1913/1926, 151–152). Moreover, Scheler mentions another important reason why hatred poisons moral discourse and behavior. Hatred "remains fixated" (*verharrt*) on its targets and objects, and the attitude will not change, even in the face of eventual praiseworthy actions of the other. This resonates with the idea, stressed also by most contemporary authors, that hatred doesn't aim at correcting others' behavior or character (ibid.: 150). I have discussed this mechanism in Szanto 2020 in terms of the tendency of hatred to 'sediment' and 'habitualize' itself in the affective lives of individuals (and groups).

evil worse, insofar as it continuously devaluates its object or *seeks out* their allegedly hateworthy features. Ultimately, hatred thus leads to what Scheler (1912/19), similarly to Hampton's Nietzschean conception, elaborates as the self-deceptive affective mechanism of *Ressentiment*.[14]

Schmid then critically discusses various attempts in the wake of recent "evil-revivalism" (Russel 2006) to "whitewash" evil. He argues that all attempts to vouchsafe a sense of the concept of evil that is not reducible to other "conceptions of moral wrongs, such as 'bad', 'mean' or 'unfair'" fail (ibid.: 565). Next, Schmid considers Aristoteles' and Aquinas' ideas on the 'generalizing' tendency of hatred, whereby, say, hate of crime, generalizes to hatred of those committing crime. Schmid shows that this idea doesn't help hate of evil defenders either, since such Aristotelian 'generalizing' hatred doesn't target the wrongdoers as (evil) members of an evil kind or class (criminals), but specific *kinds of actions* (criminal behavior) (ibid.: 568–569). Against this background, Schmid suggests taking a closer look at the distinction between *agent*-hatred (or hatred of individual persons) and hatred of *actions*. Could this offer ammunition to defenders of the morality of hate of evil? Schmid's negative conclusion builds on considerations from Kolnai and Augustine, who (like Hampton) concede that this distinction is not always clear-cut. Sometimes people act out of their character or based on 'who they are' (ibid.: 571), and sometimes it is just this that corrupts their actions. But still, what the distinction between agents and their actions shows is that while hating others for what ('evil') they *do* (and pleading for capital punishment on that basis) is a morally altogether different (though not necessarily justified) matter from hating them for whatever features they *have*, or what they *are* (as in racial, etc., hate crime).[15]

I agree with Schmid on all counts in his rejection of morally appropriate hate of evil, and indeed on the indefeasibility of the very concept of a hate of *evil*. In particular, I think that Schmid makes a crucial move in the debate by systematically distinguishing agent- and action-targeted hatred. But Schmid surprisingly sidelines an additional, and I take it, one of the core, reasons why that distinction doesn't provide enough grist for the mill of defenders of moral hatred. I'm thinking of one[16] of the core features of the generalization involved in hatred, namely the global way it devaluates the target as hateworthy or evil. As we have seen, hatred targets not specific, allegedly evil, deeds or characteristics of agents, which it aims to reform or change, but totally condemns agents as unchangeably bad ('evil'), and aims at their elimination.[17] Now, my point is

14 Indeed, as Scheler notes in the *Sympathy*-book (Scheler 1913/1926: 150), the more the other is hated the more her fortune will make the hater despair, a mirror-mechanism of malicious hatred or spite in Ressentiment.

15 On Aristotle, and in particular Aquinas' and Kolnai's, cogent but still different accounts of the collective generalization tendency in hatred, see more in my paper Szanto 2020; see also the incisive analysis in Hadreas 2007.

16 I will discuss another feature of this generalization in the next section.

17 In the next section, I will also specify this feature in terms of the blurry focus of hatred, an aspect of which is that the targets are stereotypically generalized, which Schmid too discusses.

that even if we were to distinguish forms of moral condemnation that are action- from those that are agent-targeted, only the latter would count as hate (granted, as we should, that hatred never only targets specific actions). Still, the general conclusion of Schmid's argument holds: In standard cases, hatred of evil ought be dismissed as an appropriate (moral) concept, since it always "implicates in a particularly problematic stereotypical way" hate of personal agents (ibid.: 572).

As we will see in the concluding section, Schmid doesn't stop short at this negative verdict. Rather, he ponders the possibility of another, morally justified, form of hatred. However, such hatred is not person-directed but rather targets corporate or group agents. But before we turn to the issue of morally justified corporate hatred, I want to discuss why standard (non-corporate) forms of hatred cannot be fitting either.

II. The Fittingness of Hatred, or Why Hatred Cannot Feel Right

1. Emotional Fittingness: The Standard Picture

The fittingness of an emotion, we heard, is orthogonal to its appropriateness in terms of any normative or moral considerations. As we will see in a moment, there are different ways of how to cash out exactly what fittingness is, depending on whether one endorses some realism or neo-sentimentalism about values. In fact, the very motivation of introducing the notion of fittingness of emotions stems from the aim to disambiguate the notion of appropriateness in the core thesis of the metaethical theory of neo-sentimentalism, a thesis that D'Arms and Jacobson call the "response dependency thesis" (RDT). According to RDT, there is an essential normative dependency between evaluative concepts or properties and emotional responses, such that "to think that X has some evaluative property Φ is to think it appropriate to feel F in response to X" (D'Arms and Jacobson 2000b: 729). For example, to think that your behavior is shameful is to think that you, *rightly*, *ought* to be ashamed of it, where 'rightly' means that your feeling ashamed is the appropriate response to your behavior or that it is "merited" and "rational" in the face of it (see D'Arms and Jacobson 2000a: 70).

But, to repeat, independent of one's metaphysical or metaethical credentials (neo-sentimentalist, value-realist or other), and however one spells out fittingness, the assessment of the fittingness of an emotion must be treated altogether separately from the assessment of its morality or normative function. Indeed, as D'Arms and Jacobson put in their stage-setting paper, tellingly entitled *The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions*, it would constitute a "fallacious inference" – i.e., committing the moralistic fallacy – if one were "to infer the claim that it would be morally objectionable to feel F toward X, that therefore F is not a fitting response to X" (D'Arms and Jacobson 2000a: 75). If this is correct–and I initially follow their assumption–hatred could in principle be a fitting attitude, even if we establish that there is

no morally appropriate hatred or that hatred has no normative (retributive, political or other) function.[18]

To begin understanding what fittingness is, it is helpful to revisit the different senses of appropriateness introduced by D'Arms and Jacobson. Above and beyond the distinction between moral appropriateness and non-moral fittingness they distinguish two further notions of appropriateness, establishing a fourfold distinction:

> One can ask a prudential question, whether it is good for you to feel F; or a moral question, whether it is right to feel F; or one can ask the all-in question of practical reason, whether F is what to feel, all things considered. But none of these questions is equivalent to the question of whether F is fitting in the sense relevant to whether its object X is Φ. (D'Arms, Jacobson 2000a: 71)

First, then, we have appropriateness in terms of prudential considerations. For example, you'd better not be overtly amused about your supervisor's embarrassing presentation when you need her support for a hiring process. It's simply not very clever to do so. In a limited instrumental sense, such prudential considerations are considerations in the light of your practical reasoning about your emotional behavior, given specific circumstances and your practical goals. You don't need to listen to full-blown 'reasons of the heart'; it will be enough to appropriately regulate and modulate your emotional experience and maybe just to modulate your emotional expression and still covertly delight in your musings. We have a more robust sense of practical rationality in cases where the question of whether you should better (not) have and express certain emotions goes beyond purely prudential considerations and involve also moral ones. This is the third question from the quote, or whether, all things considered, i.e., moral and prudential 'things', a certain emotion is one you ought (better not) to feel. An illustrative case in point would be to laugh at a funeral

18 Notice that D'Arms and Jacobson don't mention hatred at any point in their paper. They discuss the fittingness of several other emotions and sentiments, including moral and social emotions such as envy or shame, as well as emotions that are responses to evaluative properties that are normally considered to be morally irrelevant, such as being fearsome or funny. In one of their articles, D'Arms and Jacobson (2010c) explicitly state that the fitting attitude theory of values "does not aspire" to account for just any evaluative properties or "to give an all-encompassing theory of value or an account of generic goodness", but rather of very specific ones (listed above) and which they call, because of their essential connection to particular sentiments upon which they depend, "sentimental values" (2010c: 587). (Whether funniness is indeed morally irrelevant or neutral has of course been contested, most recently by An and Kaiyuan 2021). I, in turn, will gloss over the fittingness of particular other sentiments and emotions and focus on hatred, which is, as we shall see, distinctive in being structurally unfitting. It seems that hatred only shares this with Ressentiment. I take Ressentiment, however, not to be an emotion or sentiment, but rather an emotional mechanism transforming certain initial emotions or sentiments (shame and envy) into others, notably into contempt and hatred. For a cognate but different notion of fanaticism as an "affective mechanism", see my paper Szanto forthcoming.

of a common friend, when somebody slips and falls into the grave. If you are inclined to be amused by slapstick, you might find this situation tragicomically funny, but it still seems both wrong to be amused and also not reasonable. At the very least, you will be embarrassed or ashamed of yourself and you might eventually lose your friends, who will likely – and arguably rightly – find you distasteful, disrespectful, immature or uncontrolled.

'Feeling the right thing', morally speaking, sits in-between these two types, purely instrumental and all-things-considered appropriateness. Sticking to the thorny issue of humor and amusement, and following D'Arms' and Jacobson's paradigm, consider a sexist or racist joke. Given ordinary (contemporary liberal, etc.) moral sentiments, it's certainly not appropriate to find such jokes funny, and yet, without being a misogynist or racist, you might do so. It's tricky what that means or what it implies, not just for a theory of the fittingness of emotions, but also for any theory of humor. And our non-misogynist or non-racist flies in the face of a standard neo-sentimentalist view on amusement, according to which a joke is not funny, if one has some (moral or other) reasons not to feel amused by it.[19] But be it as it may, there still seems to be at least something to the intuition that we can, and maybe should, distinguish between the funniness and the appropriateness of a joke (and so for other emotions). It is anyway this intuition that sets the stage for introducing the notion of fittingness for D'Arms and Jacobson.

What, then, is fittingness? For a start, consider what I have said at the beginning: fittingness concerns the question whether an emotion accurately presents its object as having the evaluative properties that the emotion pertains to disclose to the emoter. But this is still almost hopelessly vague. We can be somewhat more precise in following D'Arms and Jacobson and distinguish two dimensions of fittingness, namely concerning the "shape" and the "size" of an emotional reaction.

According to its *shape* an emotion is fitting if the object that the emotion appraises has the specific evaluative features that the emotion pertains to present.[20] According to its *size*, an emotion is fitting or unfitting if the emotional reaction is an overreaction or not. Regarding its shape, envy would be unfitting, for example, if you continue to envy the success of a person, when the success in question turns out to be a chimera of an imposter or the other is regarded unanimously by your peers as less successful than yourself. Regarding its size, the emotion is unfitting if your envy is overconsuming, such that it robs you of properly appreciating any other goods which you otherwise value dearly. Or your burning envy might simply be an "overreaction" in the sense that the

19 See An and Kaiyuan 2021, who provide a helpful critical discussion of D'Arms' and Jacobson's paradigm case of morally inappropriate jokes as cases in point for distinguishing fittingness.

20 Below, I will specify what exactly I mean by 'object' and 'evaluative properties' in terms of the familiar distinction between the target, the formal object and the focus of emotions.

other's success really is just minimally bigger than yours, and your envious ruminations about petty advantages over you is by no means warranted. Now, envy seems to be already a complex enough emotion for assessing its fittingness in such simplified terms (see also D'Arms and Jacobson 2000a: 73–74), but hatred seems even more complex. What, then, could it mean that hatred is fitting according to its shape or size?

According to the standard picture presented so far, hatred would be a fitting response to a person or persons P in shape, if P, as such, as a whole person or group, would have the evaluative property (or, as I will say later, the formal object) of being hate-worthy or evil, and the hateful affective reaction would be proportional in size, as it were, to those properties.

But referring to the fittingness of hatred in terms of its *shape* surely doesn't help us further; not only because, as we have seen, it is highly controversial how to conceptualize the 'hate-worthiness' or 'evil' of a person. 'Evil' seems not to be a valid attribute or an informative ascription to a person as such, as there seems no fact of the matter to decide whether a given person is hateworthy as such. Finally, defining the fittingness of an emotion in terms of the object of emotion meriting the respective emotional response is dangerously circular[21], unless of course we presuppose a robust realism regarding evaluative properties–which then would or would not be instantiated in certain persons, irrespective of any according emotional response. But in the case of hatred, this seems even more problematic than for any other emotional response: it would ultimately boil down to claiming that some people, or people of a certain kind, or of certain types of deeds, etc. (e.g., rapists), have innate or unchangeable hateful properties as character traits, which again is a deeply problematic and unconvincing claim.

Maybe we should then rather focus on the considerations regarding the *size* of the hateful reaction, in order to assess its fittingness, and sidestep considerations of its shape. Unfortunately, this won't help either. Thus, we might, for instance, arguably question whether a burning, all-consuming, life-long harboring of hatred or even a vengeful act of murder are in any way proportional to some insult to one's 'honor' or some other minor harm issuing from the

21 In critically discussing a series of related papers by D'Arms and Jacobson, Salmela (2014: 150–156) makes a similar point: "D'Arms' and Jacobson's recommended strategy to locate reasons of fit by articulating 'differences in how each emotion presents some feature of the world to us when we are in its grip' (D'Arms, Jacobson 2000b: 746) is unsatisfactory. Being in the grip of emotion does not guarantee that the subject is "in the right context with respect to the value in question" (D'Arms, Jacobson 2006: 114). Indeed, this seems to be the case only when the emotion is felt for reasons of the right kind. But if the right context and reasons of fit can be identified only interchangeably, the account remains uninformative and circular, or "elliptical" as D'Arms and Jacobson (ibid.) put it". (Salmela 2014: 156) For a related, succinct critical discussion of D'Arms' and Jacobson's account of fittingness as being ultimately underdetermined and running into analogous problems as perceptualist theories of emotions, when these latter assume that emotional experiences provide reasons to take our emotional evaluations at face value, see also Brady 2013: 114–116.

hated subject. But, in fact, one may wonder whether hatred can ever be proportionally fitting properly speaking, since hatred, as we have seen, ultimately aims for the social or physical elimination of the target. Hatred in this respect is again quite unlike garden-variety or 'simple' emotions such as the fear of a dog, but also unlike virtually all reactive attitudes and socio-moral emotions such as pride, shame, envy, resentment, indignation, hurt feelings, feelings of forgiveness or gratitude. For all these emotions, we can legitimately ask if they are proportional, and if not, readily criticize others' carelessness, oversensitivity, self-indulgence, hybris or other unproportional affective dispositions.

Having said this, as we shall see, an accordingly revised conception of the proportionality of the affective reaction, or fittingness in terms of 'size', will be an important element to consider when evaluating the (un)fittingness of hatred.

2. A Revised, Focus-based Account of Fittingness

Critics of the fittingness account of values and the according conception of the fittingness of emotions have pointed to a number of problems in the account. Chiefly among them figures the complaint that it is uninformative and, in particular, circular.[22] One of the little-mentioned, but I contend serious, worries has to do with the circularity charge; but the worry I have in mind goes beyond the usually mentioned charge that it is not clear how we could ever avoid the circularity in the standard account of fittingness, without covertly presupposing or overtly endorsing a rather robust, and as such metaphysically all-too costly version of value-realism.[23] Obviously, I cannot settle this issue here.

Instead, I want to reformulate and sharpen D'Arms and Jacobsen's notion of fittingness of emotion in a way that doesn't carry such unnecessary metaphysical burden. Against what might be called the 'formal object account of fittingness', I want to bring into relief, in broad-brushed strokes anyway, an alternative version, which might be called the 'focus-based account of fittingness'.

22 See footnote above, as well as reviews of the discussion in Jacobson 2011, Deonna and Teroni 2012 (esp. Chap. 4) and Deonna and Teroni forthcoming.

23 Note that I am not claiming, nor do I want to just allege here, that D'Arms and Jacobson or any other rational sentimentalist would presume any form of value-realism. Quite the contrary, as we have seen, rational sentimentalism aims precisely at providing an alternative to a realist, response-*in*dependent, account of value. All I'm saying is that most attempts to solve the circularity problem of rational sentimentalism are at pains in eluding such realist presumptions, while remaining informative of how to assess the fittingness between our emotions and the evaluative properties they respond to (i.e., providing standards of fittingness), and for that reason, they typically just sidestep the issue. One telling passage of how this issue is side-stepped is a note by Brady (2013: 14) in his otherwise exemplarily thorough account of the epistemic role of emotions, where he raises "the large and difficult question of the nature of values" and value realism with regard to the rational sentimentalism of D'Arms and Jacobson—just to leave it at that. For one of the few helpful critical discussions of the fittingness attitude in relation to value-realism, see Deonna and Teroni 2012, who, to be sure, endorse a robust value-realism.

Specifically, I want to suggest defining the standards of fittingness neither by appeal to the evaluative properties of an emotion being ('objectively') thus-and-so (or 'shape'-fittingness), nor by appeal to the emotion's 'proportionality' in terms of the intensity or grade of the affective response to those properties (or 'size'-fittingness), and, which moreover, are neutral vis-à-vis any (neo-sentimentalist, Schelerian, or other) forms of value-realism.[24]

The general idea of the focus-based account of fittingness is this: In order to assess whether an emotion is fitting, we should not ask whether the object of the emotion has the evaluative properties that the emotion pertains to disclose, as the standard view has it; rather, we ought to assess whether the affective focus of an emotion picks out *those* evaluative properties of *that* object *that really matter to the subject* of the given emotion, to wit, 'matter' in a way that can, in turn, be assessed by looking at the emotional *commitment* that the subject has to the focus of the emotion. This is a subtle, but all-decisive difference, I contend. In order to appreciate the difference between the two formulations, however, we need to get a clear grip on the notion of the 'focus' of an emotion and the so-called 'focal commitment' of an emoter, notions that I borrow from the seminal work of Helm (see esp. Helm 2001, 2009, 2017).

To begin with, the focus of an emotion must be distinguished both from its target and its so-called 'formal object'. The target of an emotion is the object eliciting the emotional reaction (e.g., the hated person or group of persons), while the formal object is the evaluative property attributed to the target, and which individuates the given type of emotion, distinguishing it from other emotions that may be directed upon the same target (say 'dangerousness' or 'threat' in the case of fear, or, more controversially as we have seen, the alleged 'evilness' in the case of hatred). But, surely, not all dangerous objects are feared by all subjects or in all cases, and not all *ought* to be, rationally, feared either. To use the typical, and oversimplifying, toy-example: if the lion is behind bars in the zoo it ought not, and under normal circumstances will not, elicit fear, nor merit a fearful reaction. But formal objects of emotions are only 'formal' and need to gain some affective weight, as it were, so that the target object really *matters* for the emoter, is of emotional *import* or affectively *concerns* her.

And here is where the notion of 'focus' comes into play. The affective weight of a formal object is determined by how the target is carved out against the background of what matters to the emoter, and this is indicated precisely by an emotion's focus. The focus of an emotion can be characterized as the background

24 Salmela helpfully formulates the essential connection between the notion of formal object of an emotion and fittingness and points out how the very notion of formal object of an emotion has been introduced by some precisely in order to provide standards of fittingness. As he concisely puts it: "In order to qualify as a standard of fittingness, a formal object cannot be a property that every token emotion of the same type ascribes to its particular object [...]. Fear, for instance, is fitting only if its object *merits* fear by being dangerous; not merely frightening or fearsome or scary. Therefore, the formal object of fear is the property of being dangerous rather than the property of being frightening".

object of concern that links the evaluative property to the target and, hence, is definitive of the formal object of the emotion. In other words, and viewed from the perspective of *subjective salience*, the focus is what normally renders intelligible how and why the target has the affective significance for the emoter it has, or why the emotion has the formal object it has.

What, then, means 'focal commitment'? Helm developed this original notion together with the notion of the 'rationality of import' of an emotion, or the way in which the given object of an emotion ought to *matter* to the emoter. The basic idea is that emotions place a certain normative, but not necessarily moral, pressure upon their subjects to affectively comply with the concerns that elicit their emotions. In other words, emotions involve a normative commitment to their focus. That implies that if you have a given emotion about an object or event X, you ought to or ought not to have certain *other* emotions that involve the same focus as X. Moreover, being committed to the import that certain emotions have for you, implies that you are *prepared to act* according to the "circumstances [in which] that focus is harmed or benefited in a noteworthy way" (Helm 2017: 39).

A key assumption behind this normative construal of emotions is that there are "rational interconnections" between different emotions with the *same* focus. Emotions are not isolated mental states, but rather holistically embedded into more or less coherent, "rational patterns" of import (see, e.g., Helm 2001: 70). Thus, Helm defines what rationally "warrants" a given emotion, or the standards of fittingness, in terms of these rational patterns that hold between different emotions with the same focus and the according focal commitments: "the broader pattern of other emotions with a common focus defined by the focal commitments is rational in that belonging to the pattern is a necessary condition of the warrant of particular emotions" (ibid.) On the other hand, "a failure to have this pattern of other emotions in the relevant circumstances is to undermine this commitment to import", which means that your emotional response would be unfitting.

To illustrate: if you are genuinely proud of the achievement of your daughter at a certain competition, you *ought* not feel annoyed to go to the celebration of her victory (assuming that the celebration and your presence there is something she values). Otherwise, there would be something rationally and normatively wrong with one of those emotions (pride or annoyance), insofar as they are interconnected by the same focus: the import that the wellbeing of your daughter has for you. You also ought to be prepared to act on this focal commitment and entertain certain desires, say, desiring and making plans to attend her next important tournament and hoping that she wins again.

In summary, we can provide the standards of the fittingness of emotions according to the focus-based account, by the following definition:[25]

25 See for a similar, but less demanding, and indeed somewhat underspecified, definition of the "warrants of an emotion" in Helm 2009: 251. For a recent normative (and anti-representationalist) account of the fittingness of emotions, see Naar forthcoming.

An emotion E is fitting, if and only if

(1) the target, eliciting E is appropriately related to the focus, such that the focus renders the evaluation of the target in terms of the formal object of E intelligible, and

(2) S is committed to the focus of E, such that in circumstances in which the target is harmed or benefited in a noteworthy way S is disposed to feel those and only those other emotion(s) E* that are rationally interconnected to the focus of E.

Fitting emotions, then, are those where the focus renders it clear *that* and *how* the object of an emotion *affectively matters* or has actual import to the subject, so my central claim in this section. In the next section, I will present a brief argument to the effect that hatred, or at least paradigm instances of it, do not meet *either* of these two requirements and hence cannot be fitting according to the focus-based account. As it turns out, an analysis of specific focus of hatred shows that the reason for why hatred is unfitting just mirrors the reason for why it is moral inappropriate. In this respect, too, hatred is distinctive; for no other (antagonistic or pro-social) emotion is there such an equivalence between unfittingness and inappropriateness.

3. The Focus-Based Argument against Fittingness of Hatred

My focus-based argument against the fittingness of hatred capitalizes on the specific affective intentionality, and in particular the specific focus of hatred, which I have elaborated in detail in my paper *In Hate We Trust: The Collectivization and Habitualization of Hatred* (Szanto 2020), and which I will summarize here. In the paper, I have argued that the distinctiveness of hatred is not owing to some especially salient or intensive *phenomenology* of the affective attitude, but rather to its *affective intentionality*. Hatred indeed exhibits a certain personal and existential 'affective investment' in the attitude, an investment that is atypically strong compared to other emotions (Kolnai 1936). It draws one globally into the aversive relation. This mirrors the often-mentioned 'global' evaluation of the target of hatred as hateworthy, which is independent of particular evil features or actions. Yet, there is nothing special, as it were, about what it is like to *feel* hatred. On the contrary, haters don't feel anything *particular* when they hate, or, better, anything particular *towards a particular* target. This is so, I have argued, because the affective focus of hatred is essentially indeterminate or blurred.

Consider, for example, hatred directed towards refugees. Typically, such hatred is not focused on individual refugees, but neither is its focus on heterogeneous refugee-groups. Rather, the focus tends to be on the putatively endangered ethnic or cultural homogeneity of the host country, some readily

For another recent critical discussion of representationalist claims implicitly or explicitly involved in the fittingness of emotions analysis, see Ballard 2021.

invoked 'Judeo-Christian' tradition, or an allegedly unambiguous Western liberal Enlightenment heritage. But even if the focus of hatred is *prima facie* more directly related to specific targets, the connection between what matters to the haters and what the targets allegedly endanger is more apparent than real. This is not only the result of the stereotypical overgeneralization of the targets as evil but also of an overgeneralization of the *threat* to what matters or of the overgeneralization of *our shared concerns*. Think of separating refugees, say, into 'deserving', educated dissidents fleeing war-torn Syria, who can potentially be integrated into 'our' supposedly homogenous value-system, from unwaveringly misogynic, Islamist fanatics, who pose an imminent threat to 'our women'). In any case, the focus seems uninformative as to how the targets (individual refugees or refugee-groups) are related to the formal object (their hate-worthiness).[26] This is what I mean by 'blurry'.

More precisely, there are two correlated mechanisms in hatred that blur the focus: first, the formal object is indeterminate because hatred picks out its targets all-too globally (taken to be 'evil', or 'hateworthy as such'); second, the very targets are not fixed but shifting – namely between individuals, groups, generalized social types, or proxies for groups (*the* refugees, women, Jews, etc.). Thus, the blurriness of the focus correlates with an indeterminacy regarding the attribution of hateworthy properties: they tend to be at once attributed to individuals and stereotyped proxies or social types. The 'locus' of the formal object remains ever unfixed. This is clearest in contexts of intergroup antagonism, but it can also be evidenced when individuals target other individuals in the stereotyped fashion characteristic of hatred (e.g., a justly or prematurely convicted Afghan refugee as a 'born rapist'). I have specified this tendency to overgeneralize the hateworthy properties as a form of 'collectivization', whereby the formal object of hatred oscillates between (stereotyped) individuals and proxies of hateworthy groups.[27]

But if the focus of hatred is blurred, in the sense that the targets are of no clear import for the haters, from where does hatred then derive its extreme force, a force that can motivate its subject even to murder or genocide? I have argued that, short of a clear affective focus, haters derive the extreme affective powers of the attitude not in reaction to any specific features or actions of the targets or from some phenomenological properties of the attitude, but rather from a sheer commitment to the attitude itself; haters simply commit themselves to the aversive attitude. Moreover, particularly in intergroup contexts, what reinforces the individual haters' attitudes and lends them additional affective powers is a sense of togetherness with their fellow haters. Haters turn

26 For an incisive elaboration of further ways in which the target and the focus can come apart in hatred, and in particular the case where the target is not identifying with the group that the hater attributes to her, see Cvejić's commentary in this journal (Cvejić 2021).

27 Again, this is particularly prevalent in political or intergroup contexts, but as suggested in the first part of this paper, there is an analogous overgeneralization also in interpersonal hatred, whenever the target is globally assessed as 'evil'.

to their fellows' commitment to hate. And this is the other side of the 'collectivization' tendency, inherent in hatred. In hating overgeneralized, unspecified others, and thus in default of concrete targets that affectively really matter, we commit ourselves to the attitude *together*. Finally, I have argued that in sharing this commitment to hate with others, hatred often becomes entrenched as a 'shared habitus'.

Now, if this argument regarding the lack of a determinate affective-intentional focus in hatred goes through, hatred cannot be fitting according to my focus-based account. For one, the target eliciting hatred is not appropriately related to the focus, such that the focus renders the evaluation of the target as hateworthy intelligible. In other words, it is not clear why the targets have the affective significance for the emoter they purportedly have (being hateworthy or evil), or why the emotion has the formal object (hate-worthiness) it is supposed to have. Thus, the above standard for fittingness (1) is not met. But the second standard, the focal commitment requirement, is not met either: haters are not, and indeed, given the blurred focus, *cannot* be, properly committed to the focus of hate. Surely, they may, as the requirement (2) states, be disposed to feel certain other emotions if the target is harmed or benefited. For example, haters may maliciously revel in the expulsion of refugees from the country or hope for even stricter immigration laws. But their focal commitment is not determined by the rational interconnections between these emotions. Rather, definitive of their commitment is that they commit themselves to the aversive attitude by simply endorsing or maintaining it (together with others).[28]

Concluding Remarks: Why Hatred of Group Agents Can Be Appropriate

I have argued that hatred can neither be morally appropriate nor fitting. The main reason why hatred cannot be morally appropriate has to do with the reality of evil agent assumption. Defenders of the morality of hate are faced with a dilemma: Either they convince the evil sceptic that there really is such a thing as evil agents, in the face of which only hatred is appropriate; or they bite the bullet and concede that hatred really has no distinctive formal object (namely hateworthy evil agents as opposed to morally wrong acts), and hence hatred can only be at best gradually distinguished from cognate antagonistic emotions such as anger, resentment or contempt. But as far as I can see, we cannot accept either horn of the dilemma and retain a convincing account of the distinctive affective intentionality of hatred. And in this account lies the

28 It should be clear by now that this directly flies in the face of Brogaard's definition of hatred as having a "dual focus": (a) the "target's envisioned past or future evildoing"; and (b) "the target's assumed malevolent character" (Brogaard 2020, 158). Brogaard seems to suggest that hatred is fitting if both these focal aspects are appropriately met. But Brogaard doesn't explicitly distinguish moral appropriateness and the fittingness of emotions, and indeed at places, where she more or less synonymously speaks of the irrationality and the immorality of hatred (e.g., ibid.: 112 and 167), seems to confuse the two.

reason why hatred cannot be fitting either. I have argued that the affective intentionality of hatred is distinguished ironically by the fact that its focus is typically blurred or indeterminate. Hence, given my focus-based account of fittingness, hatred can never be fitting.

Indeed, we can now see how the inappropriateness and unfittingness of specifically hatred are essentially interrelated. Hatred is *not* inappropriate *because* it is unfitting, nor the other way around, and the two issues must be treated separately. However, the main reason why hatred is morally inappropriate (because it targets its objects as globally evil) just mirrors the reason why it is unfitting (because of hatred's collectivizing and overgeneralizing nature). Moreover, appreciating the latter reasons helps clarifying the former.[29]

But is that all there is? Is hatred then never of any (normative, moral or political) avail? I want to conclude this paper by tentatively pointing to a form of hatred that may be fitting and morally appropriate, and in certain cases, indeed be morally required, namely towards certain group agents and corporations. I follow here the lead of Schmid (2020). As mentioned, Schmid doesn't stop short at concluding that hate of evil cannot be appropriate when it concerns individual agents. At the end of his paper, he raises the prospect for a type of *agent*-hatred that might indeed be justified, and in fact "laudable":

> Perhaps there is a point that can be made with regards to some types of deficient *group agents* – there seems to be nothing wrong in putting out of existence corporations and institutions that are systematically geared towards the bad and are organized in a way that makes them unsuited for reform. It might be righteous and laudable to hate *them* – if the members are not implicated in hate of group agents [...]. (Schmid 2020: 572)

I concur with Schmid, but I would go even further and contend that hate of evil group agents of this sort is not only supererogatory ("righteous and laudable"), but we indeed may be morally required to hate certain evil group agents or institutions and corporations that systematically inflict significant harm to individual persons of flesh and blood or groups of such. Given a clear focus (the threatened well-being of those persons), such hatred would arguably also be fitting. All that would be necessary to ensure is, as Schmid highlights, that members "are not implicated" as evil in the global assessment of the group agents or corporation as such. But given robust, non-aggregative or non-summative accounts of corporate agency available (e.g., List and Pettit 2011; cf. Szanto 2014), this is, conceptually at least, not all too challenging.

To sharpen this claim, consider again the diametrically opposing view, held by Brogaard. Brogaard holds that while personal (critical) hatred can be morally appropriate "collective" or "joint hatred" hate typically, though not in principle, is not.[30] Brogaard rightly distinguishes "collective" from "group hate". Group

29 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for helping me to see this point more clearly.

30 Incidentally, Brogaard attributes two claims to my earlier paper summarized above, one of which I do not address in that paper at all (though I do argue for it here), and the

hate, for Brogaard, is "hatred towards oppressed groups", whereas collective hate is based on the "joint commitment to feel" or "to acting as if they would feel something together" (Brogaard 2020: 162–163) and is "of the sort seen in organized hate groups" (ibid.: 160), such as white supremacists. Brogaard's argument against the morality of group hate, however, seems to me utterly unconvincing, though illuminative of the reasons why I, with Schmid, hold the contrary. She claims that "although organized hate groups are disseminating hatred and encouraging violence against the hated group, it doesn't follow that all members of such groups are evil or malevolent". She cites the Nazi Oscar Schindler as "a paradigm example of a member of an organized hate group who wasn't evil" (ibid.: 168). However, this example just shows why hatred of hate groups and other dehumanizing corporations may, *pace* Brogaard, be precisely appropriate. For, why shouldn't we wish and aim for the elimination of the *group* of haters, even if we, just for the reasons Brogaard mentions, should indeed not aim for the elimination of all, and in fact none, of their *members*. To put it differently, why should we exempt the Nazis–as an organized political group or party–from our hate, just because there seems to have been some (arguably very few) just members of the National Socialist party?

This then is a case of group hatred which is, arguably, morally appropriate and fitting: the target, *viz.* the specific (evil) group, is properly carved out relative to the focus, *viz.* the well-being of certain threatened minorities. But in thinking further along these lines, we can readily find cases of group hatred which are fitting, but – from a certain moral point of view – for the wrong reasons (e.g., hatred of specific progressive democratic institutions by far-right activists), as well as cases where, in turn, hating group agents might be morally appropriate – given the political sensibilities of many – but unfitting due to the blurred or overgeneralized focus (e.g., hate of unrestricted global capitalism ruining the lives of hundreds of millions and fueling climate change).[31] This again shows how the issue of appropriateness and fittingness–though interrelated–still need to be clearly distinguished.

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other which I explicitly reject, as should also be clear from the summary. She writes: "Collective hate is not typically a rational attitude either. Contrary to what philosopher Thomas Szanto has argued, this is not because collective hate takes the form of joint commitment and therefore isn't a genuinely affective attitude. Rather, collective hate tends to be irrational because it tends to target marginalized or stigmatized social groups." (ibid.: 168). As should be clear by now (and also by my initial argument in Szanto 2020), I *do* think that hatred is a genuinely affective attitude, even if, what lends hate its affective weight isn't what supposedly (genuinely) matters to the subjects. But I principally agree with Brogaard's view regarding why what she calls "collective hate" is typically unfitting (though, again, I do not speak of the "irrationality" of hatred, neither here nor there). In fact, in Szanto 2020, I make very similar points to this effect. Finally, I should mention that my notion of joint commitment in the 'collectivizing' hatred I discuss here and in Szanto 2020, explicitly and significantly departs from the Gilbertian notion (e.g., Gilbert 2013) that Brogaard draws on.

31 Thanks again to an anonymous reviewer for clarifying these points.

Now, whether *collective* hate in Brogaard's sense, and in particular intergroup hatred could be appropriate (and fitting) is another, more complicated, matter and I can here only conjecture that there might be appropriate cases.

So, what would it mean that groups appropriately commit themselves to hating other groups or corporate agents? To spell out exactly what it would mean, we would need, first, an account of how to delineate collective forms of hatred that targets individual members of groups or (stereotyped) proxies – which, for the reasons provided, cannot not be appropriate – from collective hate of *group or corporate* agents. Secondly, we would need an account of the normativity and appropriateness of collective emotions, an account, I obviously cannot attempt to provide here.[32]

Let me just try to give you an idea of what the appropriateness conditions for collective hatred might be *ex negativo*, by way of stating what would *not* suffice. Joint commitment to hate cannot be appropriate if the affective-normative standards are set only in terms of norms of exclusion, forging hate communities and making them ever more cohesive, by simply bringing them into opposition to their targets.[33] A code of honor is only one obvious form of such an affective-normative standard that facilitates discrimination and exclusion. More nuanced and impactful is what Hochschild (1983) called "feeling rules". Through such internalized norms, we sanction ourselves and control which emotions we feel and when we (should) feel and (should) express. In this context, Hochschild has recently introduced the helpful notion of "deep stories" (Hochschild 2016): internalized narratives about how we (ought to) feel given our political identifications and loyalties to particular sociocultural and political issues. The mentioned lack of an actual *personal* affective concern in the face of the targets of hatred can be readily compensated by drawing on such a nebulous but robust fund of emotion rules of semi-institutionalized hate communities, shared codes of exclusion, and aversive affective narratives. Moreover, such a shared 'obligation' to hate generates a normative order that sanctions the haters themselves if they affectively deviate from their hate community or show too little commitment to hatred. This is what essentially happens in the above-described collectivization and sedimentation of hatred.

In contrast, the least we can say of appropriate forms of collective hate of group or corporate agents is that we ought to jointly commit ourselves to hate in a way that makes it clear why it is of clear import *for our community* to eliminate hateworthy group agents, or in a way that would make clear the affective focus of *our* hatred. In that specific sense, already hinted at by Aristoteles[34],

32 I have provided the bare bones of this latter account in various other publications, generally regarding collective emotions, in Szanto 2015, and, in particular, regarding robust political emotions (collective forms of hatred would be an instance here), in Szanto, Slaby 2020, and Szanto, Osler 2021.

33 Drawing on Ahmed (2004/2014), I have spelled out this dynamic in terms of what I call "negative dialectics", in Szanto 2020 and Szanto 2021.

34 At passages that have received significantly less attention than his brief analysis of the above-mentioned generalizing tendency in hate in the *Rhetoric* (1382a1–1382a16), notably in his *Politics* (1312b19–1312b34) and the *Economics* (1353b20–1353b26).

hatred might not only be appropriate but also qualify as a fitting and, what is more, a truly political emotion.

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Tomas Santo

Može li biti ispravno ili se osećati ispravno da se mrzi. O prikladnosti i podesnosti mržnje

Apstrakt

Šta je zapravo pogrešno u mržnji prema drugima? Bez obzira na dubinu intuicije, literatura je ipak oskudna i konfuzna kada treba da se navedu razlozi za neprikladnost mržnje. U ovom članku pokušaću da budem precizniji razlikujući dva smisla prema kojima je mržnja neprikladna, moralni i vanmoralni. Prvo ću kritički razmatrati glavne savremene pozicije koje zagovaraju mogućnost moralne prikladnosti mržnje u slučaju ozbiljno rđavih ili zlih počinilaca. Pokušaću da pokažem da su svi oni zasnovani na problematičnoj pretpostavci koju nazivam „pretpostavka o realnosti zlih aktera“. Nakon toga ću se pozabaviti problemom vanmoralne emocionalne prikladnosti i ocrtaću novo, na fokusu zasnovano objašnjenje podesnosti. Zatim ću predstaviti karakterističnu afektivnu intencionalnost mržnje, pri čemu sugerišem da mržnja, za razliku od drugih antagonističkih emocija, ima prekomerno uopštavajući i neodređen afektivni fokus. Imajući to u vidu argumentovaću da mržnja ne može da bude podesna. S obzirom na neodređenost svog fokusa mržnja ne može da prati evaluativna svojstva intencionalnog objekta koja bi zaista imala značaja za osobu koja doživljava emociju. Tekst zaključujem s provizornom napomenom o mogućnosti prikladne mržnje prema korporacijskim i grupnim akterima.

Ključne reči: mržnja, moralna mržnja, moralnost emocija, antagonističke emocije, realnost zla, dehumanizacija, emocionalna podesnost, teorija vrednosti podesnog stava, afektivna intencionalnost, korporacijski i grupni akteri

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Mark Losoncz

A CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CONCEPT OF DE-OBJECTIFIED HATRED[1]

ABSTRACT
This paper looks at Thomas Szanto's theory of hatred that suggests that hatred has an indeterminate affective focus and that it derives its intensity from the commitment to the attitude itself. Contrary to Szanto's theses, this paper claims that the hated properties are not necessarily fuzzy. On the contrary, in many cases we can clearly reconstruct the quasi-rational genesis of hatred, by relying on the deep structures behind the social dynamics (as demonstrated by the example of anti-Semitism). Furthermore, the paper states that even though in certain cases hatred is a truly empty of content, these cases are marginal in comparison to other, more important forms of hatred.

KEYWORDS
hatred, structure, intentionality, reflexivity, emotions

The article written by Thomas Szanto entitled *In Hate We Trust* (Szanto 2018) is a truly inspiring and a conceptually rigorous work. In his paper, Szanto seeks to understand the intentionality of hatred, an issue that has been mostly ignored. By relying mostly on phenomenological resources, social-scientific investigations and the analytic philosophy of emotions, he aims to conceptualize hatred as a phenomenon that is overgeneralizing (in other words, it has an indeterminate affective focus), tends to be collectivizing, derives its extreme intensity from the commitment to the attitude itself, and, from the viewpoint of its general social dynamics, it tends to reinforce itself. This commentary will formulate the following questions: (1) Can hatred itself be reflexive? In addition: can one hate hatred itself? If the answer is yes, then the efforts against hatred should be clearly reflective (contrary to the thesis that we need an affective strategy of counter-habitualization). (2) According to Szanto's deobjectifying approach,

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the hated properties care fuzzy. Contrary to this, this commentary argues that the object of hatred is often a – distorted, misunderstood – personification of otherwise entirely objective and identifiable social mechanisms. (3) If the object of hatred is not necessarily fuzzy, we might pose a following question: is hatred against impersonal systemic structures possible or not? (4) Contrary to Szanto's thesis that "hatred is directed towards those towards whom one feels powerless", we will suggest that hatred towards powerless people is also possible. (5) At the end of the paper, we will come to the conclusion that the imaginary object hatred can sometimes be completely empty with regard to real qualities (as demonstrated by the example by the Piréz people), however, it seems that this kind of empty hatred lasts for a short time and it is marginal in comparison to other forms of hatred.

1. The first question is simply whether hatred itself can be reflexive? That is, can one hate hatred itself as it can be – to use the words of *In Hate We Trust* – hatred against "evaluative properties", or, more generally, can we get rid of certain forms of hatred through reflexivity?

Since hatred is, according to Szanto, a habitualized attitude with indeterminacy (Szanto 2018: 463, 466), it is not easy to see how does the relation between hatred and reflexivity function. We feel 'irrationally' helpless regarding hatred because of essential reasons. Still, there are important thinkers who seem to suggest that there can be a connection between reflexivity and hatred.

For instance, Kant claims that hatred is legitimate in at least one case: when we hate sins – including, finally, evil hatred as well (see the analysis of Egyed 2008: 65–66). Sartre even uses the formula or imperative "hatred must be hated", and he also says that "I have to hate the others' hatred towards others" (Sartre 1943: 450–451).

So, this is one part of the question: can hatred be on a reflexive level where it is directed towards itself, namely, towards hatred itself? Can one hate hatred?

The more general part of the question is the following one: if hatred is a habitualized attitude, an attitude that has addictive, non-reflexive features, can we get rid of it through purely reflexive mental acts, or we always need a slow and careful work of dehabitualization or counter-habitualization?

Am I able at all to say to myself: "I must hate person A more", or, on the contrary, that „I shouldn't hate person B at all?" Is this, in its banality, possible, or these would mostly be paradoxical, unimaginable cases?

It is worth mentioning that there are certain ethical traditions that emphasize reflexive work on (against) hatred. For example, the ancient Jewish ethical tradition that rejects hatred towards individuals, but accepts hatred towards total collective enemies, gives special importance to reflexivity (for instance, they use the expression "David's perfect hatred"). According to this tradition, in certain cases you have to get rid of hatred through reflection, but in other cases (when the enemy wants to destroy you and your community) you have to learn to hate – again, this is a reflexive move (Smith 1952; Broshi 1999; Kugel 1987).

There are even thinkers who suggest that the force of reflexivity regarding hatred could be so effective that humanity will soon completely get rid of hatred as such. In his classical *Obsolescence of Humankind*, Günther Anders claims that hatred might soon become an outdated, obsolete, primitively distorted attitude: not only because people will laugh (in an enlightened way) at those who still hate, but also because in our society the technical-calculative strategies take the place of hatred. According to Anders, instead of hatred, today, we have to speak of systematized indifference (Anders 1985). Let us add that the book was written in 1956.

So, to sum it up: the questions we should ask is therefore whether the efforts against hatred should be clearly reflective or we need an affective strategy of counter-habitualization?

2. Szanto suggests that "as an attitude [hatred] derives its effective weight not from the person or from the hated properties which are fuzzy but from the sheer commitment to the attitude itself" (Szanto 2018: 453). I would call this the de-objectification of hatred. Szanto adds that "haters derive the indeed extreme affective powers [...] from the commitment to the attitude itself" (Szanto 2018: 453). He also insists on the "blurred" and "uninformative" character of hatred (Szanto 2018: 43, 471). One might be very skeptical about this kind of conceptualization.

Let us take the example of anti-Semitism. Of course, it is true that there is overgeneralization and stereotypical thinking in anti-Semitism, still, by this kind of conceptualization, one risks losing motivations out of sight. First of all, anti-Semitism in never simply overgeneralizing. On the contrary, it is almost always trying to concretize hatred as much as possible. Hatred against Süss the Jew (Joseph Süß Oppenheimer) in the Nazi propaganda movie, Móric Scharf of the famous Tiszaeszlár affair, Alfred Dreyfus as the victim of the Dreyfus affair, or George Soros as the Jewish-American financier who in involved in currency speculation (and against whom the Hungarian government launched a frontal assault) etc. are not merely mere accidental examples. Hatred is just as concretizing as it is overgeneralizing. We are not simply facing a subsumption of a particular under a universal, but, on the other hand, also a creation of a universal starting from a particular. The object of hatred is not simply a 'floating signifier'. These concrete cases serve as *exemplum*s for haters that not only reinforce already existing hatred, but it can also serve as a starting point to many people. Since nobody is born to hate, and, furthermore, nobody is born as an anti-Semite – certain concrete triggers are necessary.

As for the de-objectifying approach, it seems to define hatred as an almost autopoetic affection that is hardly ever disturbed or influenced by its environment. Or, according to a different conceptual strategy, it seems that the object of hatred merely serves to "establish or reinforce our identity as distinct from others" (Szanto 2018: 472). The hated Other appears as a mere accidence in the dynamics of hatred as if the hater has first of all internal difficulties.

Let us focus on the issue of anti-Semitism. From the perspective of Max Weber and Abraham Leon, modern anti-Semitism appears for two reasons. On the one hand, Jews are identified with 'pariah capitalism' that is free from the limits of natural economies and feudal relations. They were perceived as a *heimatlose* minority, as *apatrides* who are essentially alien to the spontaneous and authentic dynamics of social relations. In an analogous manner, Jews as socialists (anarchists, Marxists etc.) were also perceived as embodiments of 'pariah socialism' (hence *Judäo-Bolschewismus*) that attempts to destroy the very framework of the existing order (see Tamás internet; cf. Losoncz 2013: 173–174).

Let us quote Michael Heinrich in details: "In light of the impositions of capitalism ... there occur time and time again forms of a blinkered negation of fetishism: 'guilty' parties are sought behind the anonymous capitalist machinery that can be made responsible for the misery. Attempts are made to influence their actions; in extreme cases, they are supposed to atone for the misdeeds attributed to them. Thus, in the various capitalist societies, a personalization of fetishistic relations can be observed time and time again. Among such forms of personalization is anti-Semitism. [...] A special form of personalization occurs in anti-Semitism. Here, Jews are accused of an economic orientation toward money and profiteering that is allegedly rooted in their 'nature' or – since the rise of 'race theories' in the nineteenth century – in their 'race', as well as an unconditional striving for power that includes plans for world domination, plans that are alleged to have been already successful to a certain extent. [...] Only in modern anti-Semitism are central constitutive principles of society projected 'outward' onto a 'foreign' group. The projection is also not limited to the economic sphere; rather, cultural characteristics of modern bourgeois society (intellectualism, mobility, etc.) are attributed overwhelmingly to 'the Jews' and simultaneously devalued as decadent. [...] It is the capital fetish, in its most developed form as interest-bearing capital, which is personalized" (Heinrich 2004: 186–190).

Yes, certainly there is a structural "inertia" (Sartre) of hatred, however, it does not seem to be true that " hatred derives its effective weight not from the person or from the hates properties which are fuzzy but from the sheer commitment to the attitude itself" (Szanto 2018: 453). On the contrary, the object of hatred is a – distorted, misunderstood – personification of otherwise entirely objective and identifiable social mechanisms. As long as we understand hatred in a de-objectifying manner, that is, from the viewpoint of neoclassically conceived isolated subjects who arbitrarily change their preferences, we risk losing out of sight the objective-structural determinations of hatred. For instance, the de-objectifying conceptual strategy cannot explain neither modern anti-Semitism, nor the reasons because of which Jews became the eminent objects of hatred. Perhaps the de-objectifying conceptual strategy is blurred, not the reality of hatred itself. Hatred is not a self-inducing process that gains its energy from itself, on the contrary, it is embedded in a complex web of social relations. What is more, it does not seem to be true that "haters derive the indeed extreme affective powers [...] from the commitment to the attitude

itself" (Szanto 2018: 253). I would rather say that haters derive the affective powers from objective (but perhaps wrongly understood) circumstances. Hatred of Serbs from the Republic of Serbian Krajina against Croats was not simply an autopoietic, purely irrational hatred – it had its roots in the past (genocide committed by the ustashas), in the present (discrimination against Serbs within the territory of the Croatian republic) and in the future (as they were frightened of being reduced to second-rate minoritarian citizens), etc. Similar cases could be enumerated with regard to racism against African Americans or with regard to the hatred of those Trumpists who live in the socially backward rust belt. In all these case we are dealing with objective social circumstances that strongly effect the constitution and dynamics of fear and hatred. Accordingly, if we are to conclude that we can reduce hatred through a reflexive de-habitualization, it seems to be obvious that this process could be effective only if we deal with the social causes of hatred as well.

Let us mention one more example. There is an excellent study about anti-Gypsysism in Hungary (Szombati 2018). It patiently reconstructs the way that Gypsies became scapegoats for the Hungarian extreme right. The reasons are manifold: the Hungarian province become socially backward after 1989, and the proletarianized Gyspy masses were often perceived as mere parasites while being identified with the whole underclass that was excluded from the continuity of labor and capital. As the welfare state was increasingly dismantled, intensifying social conflicts were experienced as ethnic-racial conflicts. Without going into details, it is clear that hatred in this case is not merely a result of an 'all-too global evaluation' related to 'an indefinitely shifting target'. Rather the dynamics of hatred should be understood as an ideologically loaded (mis)interpretation of tangible and concrete social processes. The effective weight of hatred does not come from the sheer commitment to the attitude itself – this autopoietic aspect of hatred seems to be merely epiphenomenal in comparison to the real causes of hatred. Szanto claims that "it doesn't matter so much whom one hates or why exactly, but rather that one hates". In this way, we could suppose that hatred is an ahistorical necessity simply because it can self-induce itself any time. Instead of this, I am convinced that every kind of hatred has to be historicized, and the causes and objects of hatred are crucial. The haters might indeed feel something particular, although they could be misled with regard to the characteristics and the precise function of the object of hatred. Perhaps, *pace* Szanto, affectivity does not "come cheap", it is "not for free", on the contrary, it might be the mediated expression of social suffering. It comes cheap only as far as it is not the primary mover of social relations, but appears much more as an affective interpretation of them. I suppose that the empty intentionality (see Losoncz 2017) of hatred might be possible in certain cases, especially when certain people want to blame a social group for their suffering. This kind of hatred is truly de-objectified, but only for a short time, that is, until it is concretized, fulfilled *(erfüllen)*.

Szanto also seems to be suggesting that "hatred involves a certain negative social dialectics, robustly reinforces itself". But why would this be necessary?

As far as the causes (not the objects!) are dismantled, hatred can be certainly reduced. Hatred appears as fatefully self-reinforcing only from the viewpoint of the de-objectified concept of hatred.

2. Szanto's paper claims that hatred "essentializes, abstracts and perdures" (Szanto 2018: 455). On the other hand, it is suggested that there is a "distinction between interpersonal or person-focused hatred, on the one hand, and social-identity- or group-based, or what I call 'collectivizing'" (Szanto 2018: 461). Accordingly hatred targets "only individual persons, social groupings or evaluative properties that are in some sense or other person-centered or person-dependent" (Szanto 2018: 455). I wonder whether this is true.

Let us take the example of capitalism. Capitalism can be conceptualized as a system that is becoming increasingly abstract. Interpersonal relations and personal dependence are minimally important, the crucial thing is the abstract imperative of the self-valorization of capital and the subjection of almost every aspect of life to it (including labor) (see: Kurz internet a, Kurz internet b). Taken altogether, what does the punk expression "fuck the system" means? Let us suppose that it expresses hatred. There is an anarchist parole according which promotes "destroying structures, not people" (Anarchist FAQ internet). Therefore, my question is: is hatred against impersonal systemic structures possible or not?

3. According to Szanto, "hatred typically involves an asymmetric power relation" (Szanto 2018: 456), "hatred is directed towards those towards whom one feels powerless and is yet dependent upon" (Szanto 2018: 456). This can be certainly true in the case of anti-Semitism (at least in its aspect that has to do with "pariah capitalism"), but I do not think that this is generally true. In fact, hatred can just as much target powerless people who seem to be parasites of the society, but who seem to worsen social relations.

4. Finally, I would like to mention an interesting case which might be still unknown in international literature on hatred. In 2006 and in 2007 a survey was conducted in Hungary about xenophobia. The researchers also listed a fictive community that has never existed – they called them the Piréz community (Kakissis internet). One of the questions in the survey was: "the members of which ethnic communities would you allow to enter Hungary as immigrants?" According to the results, about 59% of the respondents claimed that Hungary should not allow the Piréz people to enter Hungary as immigrants. (They will never enter, obviously.) But what is even more exciting, is that this number (59 %) was relatively close to the rejection towards ethnic communities that really exist (and who are rejected the most): Arabs, Russians, Romanians and Chinese. The completely fictive community was almost on the same level as the really existing ones.

Szanto seems to claim that hatred is mostly based on overgeneralization. I think this case might be interesting because, in a certain way, there is no

overgeneralization at all, and no collectivization or essentialization of the target as a further fact. I am sure that almost none of the respondents imagined the Piréz people while participating in the survey, and nobody had a specific feeling of dependence from them. There was no time to construct any stereotype of them.

What happened is that the Piréz people as an empty signifier took the place of the hated object in a complex system of meanings. This mechanism can remind us of the classical structuralist thesis according to which meanings are not substantial entities, but they have their functional role in a structural-differential system. This is why I like the most when Szanto claims that „targets of hatred are hence replaceable by any other individual exemplifying the same stereotyped negative properties" (Szanto 2018: 463). Except from this last remark, I can totally agree. The objects of hatred can truly function as pure, empty, flexible, completely indeterminate and replacable signifiers. And this makes hatred even more dangerous. But does it perhaps also distanciate the theoreticians of hatred from the affective theory of hatred? To sum it up, I do think that in certain cases hatred can be de-objectified. The case of the Piréz people confirms my thesis that sometimes hatred can function according to the logic of what Husserl called empty intentionality. However, I think that this kind of hatred lasts for a short time and it is marginal in comparison to other forms of hatred.

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Mark Lošonc

Kritički osvrt na koncept deobjektifikovane mržnje

Apstrakt

Članak se fokusira na teoriju mržnje kod Tomasa Santa koja sugeriuše da mržnja nema jasan afektivni fokus, te da njen intentizet proističe iz zalaganja za sam intencionalni stav mržnje. Za razliku od Santove teze, članak trvrdi da omražena svojstva nisu nužno nejasna. Naprotiv, u mnogim slučajevim se precizno može rekonstruisati kvazi-racionalna geneza mržnje, oslanjajući se na duboke strukture iza društvene dinamike (kao što pokazuje primer antisemitizma). Nadalje, članak konstatuje da iako je istina da je u izvesnim slučjavima mržnja bez sadržaja, ovi slučajevi su marginalni u odnosu na druge, značajnije forme mržnje.

Ključne reči: mržnja, struktura, intencionalnost, refleksivnost, osećaji

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Igor Cvejić

SOME REMARKS ON UNFOCUSED HATRED: IDENTITY OF THE HATED ONE AND CRITERIA OF ADEQUACY[1]

ABSTRACT
Thomas Szanto has recently argued that hatred could not be a fitting emotion because of its blurred focus. It thus cannot trace the properties of its intentional object. Although I agree with the core of Szanto's account, I would like to discuss two connected issues that might be of importance. First, I want to address whether the unfittingness of hatred has anything to do with the possibility that the hated person does not identify with what they are hated for. I conclude that if the focus of hatred is blurred, hatred does not trace the identification of the hated person or group. Next, I propose a possibility that (certain) criteria of adequacy of hatred (why someone is treated by members of society as hateworthy) are embedded in the cultural and social framework in such a way that they are not necessarily intelligibly justified by their relation to the focus and import it has. Under such circumstances, with hatred still being unfitting, these criteria create quasi-correctness of hatred (actually, they trace properties of someone being hateworthy). If this is correct, it will enable us to keep the thesis that hatred cannot be fitting. At the same time, we could use political vocabulary to tackle hatred that is common in cases when a group will not give up their commitment to hatred and argue that some people or group of people is not to be hated under the hating group's own criteria.

KEYWORDS
hatred, identity, fittingness, criteria of adequacy, appropriateness, emotions

In his recent paper *In Hate we Trust: The Collectivization and Habitualization of Hatred,* Thomas Szanto argued that hatred could not be a fitting emotion because its focus is blurred, and thus it cannot trace the properties of its intentional object (Szanto 2018). Although I agree with the core of Szanto's agrument, I would like to discuss two connected issues that might be of importance. First, I want to address the question of whether unfittingness of hatred

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has anything to do with the possibility that the hated person does not identify themselves with what they're being hated for. This question is inspired by Bennet W. Helm's analysis of how love could be inadequate. According to Helm love cannot be adequate if properties that justify our love are not an important part of the loved person's own identity. So, to conclude within our topic – if the focus of hatred is blurred, hatred will not trace the identification of the hated person or group. This is partially because given the lack of a clear focus, the criteria for why someone is treated as hateworthy are arbitrary. However, the issue is not only that this conclusion seems contra-intuitive, but also that we lose important parts of our vocabulary in tackling hatred.

By following the implications from the previously addressed issue, I will try to propose a possibility that (certain) criteria of adequacy of hatred (why someone is considered hateworthy) are embedded in the cultural and social framework in such a way that they are not necessarily intelligibly justified by their relation to the focus of hatred and its import. Under such circumstances (with hatred still being unfitting), these criteria create quasi-fittingness or quasi-correctness of hatred. They trace properties of being hateworthy. If this is correct, it enables us to uphold the thesis that hatred cannot be a fitting emotion. At the same time, we could use to tackle hatred vocabulary that is common in cases when the group refuses to give up their commitment to hatred and argue that some people or group of people shouldn't be hated under the hating group's own criteria.

The Core of the Szanto's Argument

Szanto's agrument is grounded in the focus-based account of a fittingness of emotion (for more precise clarification of the focus-based account of fittingness, see Szanto in this volume). Following D'Arms' and Jacobson's distinction, Szanto rightly makes a difference between moral (in)appropriateness and (non-moral) fittingness of emotions (D'Arms, Jacobson 2000).[2] The fittingness of emotions is determined by whether emotion properly follows (evaluative) properties of the situation or the object the emotion is directed to. Usually, those evaluative properties are defined by a formal object of emotion (e.g., the formal object of fear is dangerousness). The focus-based account of fittingness highlights the relation of emotion's target to its affective focus. (Focus is a background object of the concern for the subject, while target is the object emotion is immediately directed to, see Helm 2001: 69). Fittingness of emotions, thus, brings the question of whether the target properly affects the focus of emotion in a way that it matters to the subject. Szanto argues that because the focus of hatred is blurred (uninformative as to how target could affect the focus), we cannot establish the relation of the target to the focus, and, consequently,

2 D'Arms and Jacobson introduce the third possibility, the question if emotion is prudential (to us). In addition, Deonna and Teroni argued for a difference between the question of fittingness and that of epistemic standards (Deonna, Terroni 2012: 6–7, 44ff.). For more about possibility of moral appropriateness of hatred see Szanto in this volume.

hatred cannot be fitting. He proposes that we understand hatred as a shared attitude, source of which power is in the community – in the shared commitment of its members.

I will first try to test the implications of Szanto's account on cases in which the hated person does not identify themselves with what they're being hated for. Following Szanto's argument, it seems that it is not possible to make an (intuitive) difference in fittingness of hatred toward someone who is identifying themselves with what they're being hated for and toward a person who *does not* identify themselves so. This is the case because in both examples we lack a clear focus to address the fittingness of these emotions. It is for the same reason that hatred can not be fitting and that we can not argue that hatred toward someone who doesn't identify themselves with what they're hated for is (even more) unfitting. Moreover, it seems that the criteria for why someone is treated as hateworthy are arbitrary. I will propose a possibility that such criteria are embedded in a social and cultural framework and create a quasi-fitting relation of the target and the hatting attitude. With this conclusion we keep the core of Szanto's account – that hatred cannot be fitting, while at the same time we can explain why the targets of hatred are treated as hateworthy.

Identity of the Hated?

Love and hatred are certainly not only opposite but also phenomenologically different emotions. However, something in the question of the adequacy of love is intriguing and could possibly be connected to the question of the adequacy of hatred. Just like hatred, love is an emotion focused on a person as a whole that does not simply trace properties in the way, for example, fear does (Helm 2009: 175–206). Because, if that was the case, we could replace the person we love with another who possesses similar traits, and we would also lose the autonomy we assume we have when loving other people. This does not mean that love is arbitrary or that it can not be inadequate. As Helm argued, by addressing what he calls the question of discernment of love (what makes someone worthy of your potential love or more worthy of that love than others?), love can be inadequate if the loved person does not identify themselves with what we love them for:

> [...] the properties we appeal to in justifying loving someone are an appropriate basis for that love only if they are more or less central to her identity, for otherwise we would not love her for who she is and so would not properly love *her*. (Helm 2009: 191–192)

Now, the question is could a similar conclusion be made for hatred? Could we say that hatred can be adequate or inadequate in the same way? Is it possible that hatred is inadequate because the person we hate does not identify themselves with what we hate them for? And is it possible to make this argument in line with Szanto's account about the unfittingness of hatred?

Let us make an example. Mickey is a passionately committed member of the Serbian Orthodox community from Bosnia that took part in the 90's Yugoslav wars. As a part of his membership in the community, he fosters a long-lasting hatred toward the Muslim community (the other side in this conflict), manifested as a shared commitment to hate Muslims and embedded in his culture through "feeling rules" that regulate their emotional reactions (see Hochshild 1983, cf. Szanto in this volume). This hatred is then directed at individuals who are in any way identified as connected to the Muslim community. It can be argued that this hatred could be characterized as overgeneralizing and thus inappropriate or unfitting precisely in the way Szanto claims. (The hatred cannot be reduced to those who partook in the war, nor to a particular ethnicity, and it remains unclear what the actual focus of his hatred is and what he or his community actually cares for).

Let us take the example further. At some moment in his life, Mickey has immigrated to Sweden for economic reasons (dire socio-economic situation in Bosnia) to support his family financially. After a few years of living in Sweden, during which he has remained committed to his Serbian Orthodox roots (and his hatred), he got a new neighbor – Amar. Amar was born in the Muslim family in Bosnia and has also immigrated to Sweden. This fact has immediately 'activated' Mickey's hatred – now aimed toward Amar, and made him curse the day he got such a neighbor. (He started thinking of moving to a new apartment and also doing irrational things to frustrate Amar). A few weeks later, Mickey learned that Amar did not identify himself as a member of the Muslim community (perhaps thanks to Mickey's wife Mia, who has always found his hatred irrational and has tried to make a friendly neighboring connection with Amar's wife). Not only that Amar did not identify himself religiously or ethnically with the Muslim community, during the war, he helped some Serbs escape certain death. He was trying to be human, avoiding the war-evils from both sides. For this reason, he was partially excommunicated from his own community, and he finally immigrated to forget all about the war horrors. In a word, being a member of the Muslim community is not a part of Amar's identity.

At first, Mickey's reasoning could be distorted by his hatred (see Goldie 2009: 237–238). He could probably try to 'justify' it by arguing that "blood is thicker than water!", that "apple doesn't fall far from the tree" or simply say "it doesn't matter, that he is a Muslim and always will be, and they are all the same". However, rather than just explaining the overgeneralization of his hatred, these additional arguments also reveal an internal conflict Mickey may have in answering himself a question "is Amar hateworthy?".

In Mickey's case, this conflict could be resolved in different ways. Probably, his hatred will prevail, and he will always hate Amar (regardless of Amar's behavior and attitudes); or he could probably give up his hatred toward Muslims in his interaction with Amar (and with the support of his wife Mia); or he could somehow hold to his hatred toward Muslims, but not direct it toward Amar. My aim here is not to address these possible solutions, but to do justice to the possibility of this internal conflict.

The intuition says that Mickey's hate towards Amar is not in the same way (in)adequate or (un)fitting as it would be if directed toward someone who is a passionately committed and self-identified member of the Muslim community in Bosnia – let's say Ibro. On the other hand, following Szanto's account, it could be argued that in both cases, Mickey's hatred is simply unfitting as it would be – because its focus is blurred. However, I find this answer to be unsatisfactory. It is not only that we lose the important part of our critical vocabulary (that will Mia perhaps use to persuade Mickey not to hate Amar), but it could not do justice to the conflict Mickey may have – it cannot explain the difference between the appropriateness of hate toward Amar and Ibro, respectively. The other way to address this problem could be to account for a degree of fittingness. Although Mickey's hatred directed toward Ibro can never be fitting (as Szanto argued), his hatred toward Amar is unfitting to such a degree it is made obvious. In other words, the focus of hatred is blurred in such a way that it could never be a fitting emotion, but not blurred enough to prevent us from saying that particular hatred (toward Amar) is unfitting in a very clear way: hatred toward Ibro is unfitting because the focus is blurred, but hatred toward Amar is also unfitting because it does not relate to the focus. I would not like to go in this direction. This argument will imply that even if the focus is blurred, there are some focus-related properties that could be evaluated. This, in turn, changes the whole argument, for then it should be explained to which degree hatred, in general, could be fitting, and this is something I do not intend to do. Among other reasons, I believe that this would sidetrack the concrete phenomenological argument.

The different view of the problem could be to differentiate between the general unfittingness of hatred and its direction towards a particular target. It means that Mickey's hatred toward the Muslims is unfitting, but we could also evaluate to which degree his hatred toward Amar or Ibro is adequate (do they actually belong to the Muslim community). However, this seems to be a dead-end. There is a conceptual and philosophical problem here. For the same reason Mickey's hatred is unfitting in general, we do not have the criteria to address the fittingness of the hatred directed at Ibro and Amar, i.e., what constitutes the criteria for someone to be a member of the group that Mickey hates in terms of focus-relevant properties – giving a rather pessimistic result we could hardly argue, that Mickey's hatred toward Amar is more unfitting than his hate toward Ibro.

So far, it seems that if Mickey's hatred is generally unfitting, then we have no reasons to argue that his hatred toward Amar is qualitatively more unfitting than his hatred toward Ibro. This solution seems to be in line with Szanto's account that hatred does not trace the properties of the target. But this also forces me to conclude that, as opposed to love, hatred does not trace the identification of its targets. With the focus of hatred being blurred, we cannot determine which properties are relevant (perhaps Mickey also cannot do it for himself), as well as if having 'Islamic genes' is more or less 'relevant' than Amar's self-identification, or even identification of the Muslim community in

general. For example, for anti-Semitism in Germany during WW2, in some cases, it was more relevant if someone had Jewish origins than if this person identified themselves as a Jew. It seems that criteria for directing hatred toward a particular person are so arbitrary and culturally dependent that we could not address the issue purely in terms of phenomenological or epistemic fittingness.

The previous conclusion is not theoretically uninteresting. In the last example, Mickey seems to have some criteria that tell him that he 'should' hate Ibro. These criteria are not entirely fulfilled in Amar's case. This partial (un) fulfillment could be the source of the conflict Mickey might have. The more important point is that such criteria do not need (descriptively, not normatively) to have their sources in the focus of emotion and the relation of the focus to the target. Instead, considering Szanto's proposition, to treat hatred as a shared commitment, these criteria could have their (arbitrary) sources in community.

Criteria of Adequacy

Achim Stephen has recently developed a supplement to the theory of adequacy of emotion, by emphasizing, among other things, the role the *fundamentum in cultu* plays in our emotional response. We could understand the concept of *fundamentum in re* through the question of whether emotions do justice to their object and its (evaluative) properties (e.g. if something we fear is actually dangerous). While *Fundamentum in persona* highlights the question of whether the situation actually has a relevant degree of significance for the emoter, i.e., if the relevant focus is important for them. *Fundamentum in cultu* refers to the emotion's foundation in culture: "[...] for usually members of our (or another) social environment show us whether they find our emotional reactions appropriate and acceptable" (Stephan 2017: 3). *Fundamentum in cultu* could be compared to *fundamentum in persona*, for they both reveal the significant focus or, more precisely – in many cases, *fundamentum in persona* is scaffolded in *fundamentum in cultu* with the focus having its significance for a particular culture, group, or society (Stephan 2017: 7; cf. Colombetti, Krueger 2014; Griffiths, Scarantino 2005). The difference between these two concepts is most visible in situation when cultural criteria are in conflict with person's own concerns. However, according to Stephan, cultural background can also impact the *fundamentum in re*:

> Without doubt, considering the – as we have seen, indispensable – cultural dimension will lead to further intricacies, when discussing the adequacy of emotional reactions. Some emotional reactions seem to have their *fundamentum in re* only against the background of corresponding specific cultural imprints: there, it is the particular cultural framework that establishes and defines the significance of the FOCUS for all members of such an emotionally affected social group and hence for each of its single subjects; and it is this FOCUS that underlies their various emotional reactions (the FOCUS, then, is truly affected by the TARGETS of their emotional reactions, and insofar their emotional reactions have a *fundamentum in re*). (Stephan 2017: 7)

Considering that Szanto explains hatred as a shared attitude with the source of its power in the community, it seems reasonable to argue that hatred has its *fundamentum in cultu*. In other words, hatred is partially justified in being treated as an acceptable and appropriate reaction by other fellow members of our community (inter-subjectively, or intra-subjectively on a level of group agents). If this could provide *fundamentum in re*, as Stephan claims, then it seems that we could give an explanation on how hatred traces properties of its objects. However, Stephan's account, as well as Szanto's, is focus-based, and given that focus is blurred, this will not be the case with hatred – and I tend to agree with that conclusion.

Achim Stephan also introduces another related argument, remarked in the mentioned article (personal correspondence, Stephan 2017: 8). The idea is that criteria of adequacy are socially and culturally dependent. This needs further clarification. The basic idea is the following. The fittingness of emotion depends on the formal object that follows the properties of the target, e.g., the formal object of fear is dangerousness, and fear follows if the object in question is dangerous. There are, of course, obvious situations when something is or is not dangerous. For example, if we ask if it is adequate to fear a dog – probably yes, if it is huge, aggressive, has big teeth, and is infected with rabies; but also probably no, if it is an aching, injured puppy. Real situations we encounter are, however, much more complex. The idea is that our cultural and social framework partly defines the criteria by which something would be treated as, let's say, dangerous enough for us to have an emotional reaction; those criteria also dictate the appropriate intensity of our reaction. Those criteria, of course, intelligibly depend on the import of the focus.

Now, the argument I would like to introduce is that in some cases, those criteria could be clearly defined (to the possible extent) and embedded in the community without having an actual source in the intelligible relation to the focus of the emotion. Let me address Mickey's example for a moment again. Let's say that Mickey shared his concern with his fellows in Bosnia about his hatred toward Amar and after that recognized that Amar "should be" hated. To put it simply, he recognized that someone who has Muslim roots fulfills the criteria of his own community to be treated as hateworthy (that is what others agree upon). Now, let's make this example a bit more complicated. The following year, Mickey came back to Bosnia. He found that a person he knew, Zoran, decided to change his religion, became a Muslim, and now identifies himself with the Muslim community. Mickey and his fellows recognized (without thinking) that he should not be treated as hateworthy because of his Serbian Orthodox roots. They find that being identified with the Muslim community is not a culturally and socially accepted criterion for treating someone as hateworthy while having Muslim roots is (independently of a person's own identification).

The purpose of this example is not to claim that this is actually the case (with Bosnian Serbs and Muslims), nor that there is any rational line to follow in this solution (it might be the other way around as well), but, on the contrary, to show that these criteria are more or less arbitrary. Whether Mickey's

community shares the criteria that someone with Muslim roots or someone identified with the Muslim community should be 'seen' as hateworthy does not seem to follow any logic, nor does it have a relation to the focus, which it cannot due to the focus being blurred. Nevertheless, these criteria could be embedded in the cultural framework and, as such, be well-known to every member of the society (or in some cases, they could be part of emotional patterns and 'feeling rules' individual members are not reflexively aware of, but could become aware).[3]

If this proposal seems right, then those criteria create a quasi-fittingness of hatred. To be more precise, once those criteria are fulfilled, it seems adequate for an emoter to hate the object that has fulfilled those criteria. This quasi-fittingness, of course, is not fittingness in usual terms, for it does not specify how objects affect the focus. However, it might explain how these criteria are embedded in the social framework (as well as hatred as a shared attitude) trace properties of objects which fulfill them. In that sense, hatred can not be fitting, but could still be recognized as (un)fitting by members of a particular community – and that is why I use the term quasi-fitting. Note also that this argument does not propose any fittingness of hatred toward the in this example Muslim community (in general) – the criteria only specify how objects of hatred (individual people who fall under the criteria) could be traced.[4]

Conclusions

In previous passages, I suggested a possibility that the criteria of adequacy of hatred (that defines properties of 'hateworthy' objects) can be embedded in a cultural and social framework. Such criteria could be various, e.g. skin or eyes color, hair or dressing style, the shape of the nose or skull, one's economic status or genetic roots etc. And although these criteria are not intelligibly related to a focus of hatred, they actually trace the properties of its targets in such way that it may make the emoter to feel right in hating persons who possess

3 I would not argue that these criteria are always clear. On the contrary, I believe that they are mostly confusing. Nor do I want to argue that there cannot be ambiguity between community members about the actual criteria they share (see Helm 2009: 266). I have also no intention to argue that these criteria are entirely accidental and meaningless from the perspective of the society: they might be influenced by the way hatred was triggered in a society, how it unfolded and by a complex social dynamic and histories (usually hard to follow). The only thing I propose is that they do not need to follow the logic of relation to the focus, i.e. they might be a result of complex social dynamics in a such way that they need not to be rationally justified by the focus and its import to a group.

4 It could be noted that such criteria are a kind of social norms, or more precisely 'feeling rules'. However, this should not be confused with the question of the moral appropriateness of hatred. Rather than being rules for what is morally (in)appropriate in society, these criteria regulate the relation of hating attitude towards its targets – they regulate the constitution of target evaluative properties as hateworthy and thus as (quasi-)fitting.

such properties – creating, thus, a quasi-fittingness of hatred. If this is correct it enables us to keep Szanto's account that hatred cannot be fitting, while at the same time we can widen our understanding of how hatred unfolds in different communities.

There are several implications of this account which I hope might be fruitful for a further understanding and tackling of hatred. (1) It helps us understand how individual members of a society poisoned by hatred could feel so sure that someone should be perceived as hateworthy, even it doesn't flow from the relation of the object to the (blurred) focus. For example, how Mickey is so confident that Ibro, a passionate member of the Muslim community, is 'hateworthy'. (2) It helps us understand the internal conflict Mickey might have in his hatred directed at Amar. We could now argue that Mickey had this conflict because his community does not have the explicit criteria for treating someone as 'hateworthy' in cases like Amar, although it might have (as Nazis had for people of Jewish origin who do not identify themselves as Jews), but such criteria are much more rare than with the case of Ibro. (3) It might be a fruitful incentive for further empirical research on how hatred unfolds in specific communities. For if this proposal is correct, then we might be able to study the criteria under which specific communities, characterized by some sort of hatred, treat someone as hateworthy. However, this would certainly require further discussion on how such research could be conducted. (4) It could add to the language of social critique we use in political and social life to mitigate the hatred toward a particular group(s) of people (particularly in post-conflict zones). Namely, it is very often the case that members of a group that shares their hatred cannot be persuaded in any way to give up their hatred (because they find it to be an essential part of their identity or because it simply constitutes the social environment they belong to). In such cases, it might be useful to persuade them that their hatred of some people or a group of people is entirely unfitting and that it is so because of the properties those people have or do not have. Then we might say that they do not fulfill their criteria for being hated, and it will be hard to do it if we cannot say that there are some criteria by which hatred is inadequate, even for the group that is the carrier of hatred. (5) It could also give as a 'strategic' edge. In the cases when it is practically impossible to tackle hatred (e.g., hatred towards an 'enemy' – group or immigrants) it might be tactical to do it step-by-step. This account enables us to think about how it could be done, for it might be possible to challenge the legitimacy of criteria for treating someone as hateworthy on a one-by-one basis.

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Igor Cvejić

Razmatranja o nefokusiranoj mržnji: identitet omraženog i kriterijumi adekvatnosti

Apstrakt

Tomas Santo je nedavno uveo tezu da mržnja ne može biti podesna emocija zbog toga što je njen fokus zamagljen, te prema tome ona ne može pratiti svojstva svog intencionalnog objekta. Mada se slažem sa osnovom Santovog argumenta želeo bih nešto više pažnje da posvetim dva povezana problema koja mogu biti važna. Prvo ću se baviti pitanjem da li nepodesnost mržnje ima ikakve povezanosti sa mogućnošću da omražena osoba ne identifikuje sebe sa onim zbog čega je omražena. Zaključiću da, ukoliko je fokus mržnje zamagljen, mržnja neće pratiti identifikaciju omražene osobe ili grupe. Zatim ću pokušati da ukažem na mogućnost da (izvesni) kriterijumi adekvatnosti mržnje (zbog čega se neko tretira kao vredan mržnje od strane članova društva) budu ukorenjeni u kulturalnom i socijalnom okviru na takav način da nisu neophodno opravdani svojom vezom za fokusom emocije i značajem koji on ima. Pod takvim okolnostima, mržnja bi i dalje bila nepodesna, ali bi ovi kriterijumi kreirali kvazi-korektnost mržnje (zapravo bi pratili svojstva koja određuju da li je nešto ili neko vredan mržnje). Ukoliko je to tačno, mogli bismo da zadržimo tezu o nepodesnosti mržnje, a da u isto vreme možemo da koristimo uobičajeni vokabular koji koristimo u slučajevima kada grupa ne odustaje od svoje mržnje i kada je potrebno da argumentujemo da neke pojedince ili grupe ljudi ne treba mrzeti čak ni prema kriterijumima same grupe koja je nosilac mržnje.

Ključne reči: mržnja, identitet, podesnost, kriterijumi adekvatnosti, prikladnost, emocije

II

STUDIES AND ARTICLES

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Siniša Malešević

WARFARE AND GROUP SOLIDARITY: FROM IBN KHALDUN TO ERNEST GELLNER AND BEYOND

ABSTRACT
Ibn Khaldun and Ernest Gellner have both developed comprehensive yet very different theories of social cohesion. Whereas Ibn Khaldun traces the development of intense group solidarity to the ascetic lifestyles of nomadic warriors, for Gellner social cohesion is a product of different material conditions. In contrast to Ibn Khaldun's theory, where all social ties are generated through similar social processes, in Gellner's model the patterns of collective solidarity change through time, that is, different societies produce different forms of social cohesion. While Ibn Khaldun argues that asbiyyah is the backbone of group unity in all social orders, Gellner insists that modern societies are underpinned by very different type of collective solidarity than their premodern counterparts. In this paper I offer a critique of Ibn Khaldun's and Gellner's theories of social cohesion and develop an alternative explanation, which situates the social dynamics of group solidarity in the organisational and ideological legacies of warfare.

KEYWORDS
Ibn Khaldun, Ernest Gellner, group solidarity, war, sociology of violence

Introduction

Both Gellner and Ibn Khaldun were deeply interested in the dynamics of group solidarity. While Ibn Khaldun argued that most forms of solidarity stem from similar social processes Gellner was adamant that diverse social orders generate and are sustained by different modes of solidarity. Hence for Ibn Khaldun strong group ties, which he calls *asbiyyah*, develop through shared experience of hardship and are often created and reinforced in ascetic environment of chronic conflict. In contrast Gellner argues that group solidarity is historically specific as different economic conditions engender distinct forms of group attachment. In particular Gellner differentiates sharply between the agrarian and industrial worlds. In his view the economic structure of agrarian societies fosters deep hierarchies and stratified forms of group solidarity. Thus, aristocrats deploy unique cultural practices and rituals of solidarity to reinforce the

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difference from the commoners. In contrast in industrial societies where the focus is on the continuous economic growth traditional hierarchies are dissolved and the networks of solidarity inevitably expand to encompass much larger population. In this context nationalism emerges as the dominant social glue that binds together different social strata within the industrial societies. While Ibn Khaldun identified war as playing crucial role in the development and transformation of group solidarity, for Gellner economic power was more significant than war or military power. In his only essay that explicitly discusses war and violence Gellner (1992) downplays their significance in the modern industrial era[1].

Drawing critically on both Ibn Khaldun and Gellner this paper offers an alternative explanation of the relationship between war and group solidarity. I argue that despite their obvious explanatory merits neither Ibn Khaldun nor Gellner can adequately explain the long-term dynamics of organised violence and its relationship with the small group unity. While Gellner's theory is too functionalist and economically determinist to account for the role of warfare and military power in the formation of group solidarity through time Ibn Khaldun's model does not work well outside of the North African historical experience. Building on my previous work (Malešević 2010, 2017, 2019) the paper makes a case for situating the development of group solidarity within the organisational and ideological legacies of warfare. More specifically I explore how cumulative bureaucratisation of coercion, ideological penetration, and the envelopment of micro-solidarity shape historical and social dynamics of warfare.

Group Solidarity and Organised Violence in the Pre-Modern World

The concept of solidarity looms large in sociological literature. Both the Durkhemian and Marxist approaches identify solidarity as a key variable in explaining variety of social processes. For the neo-Durkheimians such as Jeffrey Alexander (1997) or Philip Smith (2005) solidarity is a form of collective belonging defined by shared cultural values. Alexander (1997: 115) identifies solidarity with what he calls 'we-ness' which "simultaneously affirms the sanctity of the individual and these individuals" obligations to the collectivity. The solidary sphere, in principle and in practice, can be differentiated not only from markets and states but from such other noncivil spheres as religion, family and science'. In contrast for the neo-Marxists such as Erik Olin Wright (2015) or

1 This essay was later reprinted in Gellner (1995). Gellner has also discussed war in two other publications – his review of Stanislaw Andrzejewski's book *Military Organization and Society* (1954) and his view of violence as a blind spot in Marxist theory (1988b). However, neither of these two publications offers an extensive analysis of warfare and violence. While the 1954 review focuses mostly on the military organisations and the relevance of Andrzejewski's concept of 'military participation ratio' the 1988 book deals mostly with the pitfalls of Soviet Marxism in the 1970 and 1980s where the issue of war is rather a marginal topic.

Slavoj Žižek (1989) solidarity is product of shared class interests. For example, Žižek argues that the capitalist ideology alienates and distorts class solidarity: "the main point is to see how the reality itself cannot reproduce itself without this so-called ideological mystification. The mask is not simply hiding the real state of things; the ideological distortion is written into its very essence... the moment we see it 'as it really is', this being dissolves itself into nothingness or, more precisely, it changes into another kind of reality. That is why we must avoid simple metaphors of demasking, of throwing away the veils which are supposed to hide the naked reality" (Žižek 1989: 24–25).

Nevertheless, despite identifying solidarity as a central concept neither the Durkheimian nor the Marxist tradition offer an in-depth analysis of its historical origins. They also take group solidarity for granted instead of analysing its social mechanics. For one thing both of these influential perspectives tend to focus on the macro level social processes where group solidarity is understood to be a second order reality and is viewed as something defined by external forces such as shared cultural values or socio-economic interests of different class-based groups. For another thing, the neo-Durkheimian and the neo-Marxist approaches make no connections between the group solidarity and organised violence and as such cannot properly account for the long-term development and transformation of social ties.

Both Ibn Khaldun and Gellner offer more elaborate theories of group solidarity which go beyond economic self-interest and shared cultural values. They also explore how solidarity is shaped or transformed by warfare and other forms of organised violence.

For Ibn Khaldun solidarity is forged in shared social action and especially in shared violent action. The political power stems from strong group ties that are created, maintained, and enhanced in the conditions of permanent warfare and hardship. Focusing on the experience of Maghreb tribes in 14th century he identifies group solidarity as a principal social mechanism of political power and social change. In his famous masterpiece *The Muqaddimah* (2005[1377]) Ibn Khaldun introduces the key concept of *asabiyyah* to explain the changing dynamics of power relations between urban and rural settings. In his understanding asabiyyah stands for strong group feeling that is reflected in the heightened group consciousness of individuals sharing strong interpersonal bonds. Asabiyyah is defined by group unity and sense of mutual responsibility among the members of the group[2]. Although this term has historically been associated with the close kin networks, clan ties and tribal descent for Ibn Khaldun asabiyyah is not a product of biology but of shared social action. Hence, he is very clear that the strength of group solidarity does not reside in "blood ties" but principally in the experience of protracted joint action and particularly in the shared memories of fighting. In this sense a comradeship

2 As Irwin (2018: 45) points out this term is derived from 'asaba' which means twisting a thing and 'usbah' the meaning of which is "a party of men who league together to defend one another".

resembles the strong kinship ties: "The affection everyone has for his clients and allies results from the feeling of shame that comes to a person when one of his neighbours, relatives, or blood relation is in any way humiliated" (Ibn Khaldun 2005: 98). Irwin (2018: 187) also emphasises the significance of living in close proximity as was the case with mamluk soldiers who developed close sense of comradeship by living in the same barracks: "In the Ta'rif Ibn Khaldun described how the Ayyubid sultan al-Salih Ayyub boosted the cohesion ('iaba) of his regime by purchasing and training large number of mamluks".

What is also clear in Muqaddimah is that asabiyyah is rooted in the shared emotions: a sense of collective pride, anger, and sadness when a group member dies, a feeling of shame and guilt when a comrade is exposed to humiliation and so on. These intense emotional bonds also contribute to the organisational strength of the tribes as individual members are highly committed to defend each other and even sacrifice their lives for their comrades. As Ibn Khaldun (2005: 289) points out: "Group feeling produces the ability to defend oneself, to protect oneself and to press one's claims. Whoever loses his group feeling [asabiyyah] is too weak to do any one of these things".

For Ibn Khaldun asabiyyah is largely product of shared adversity: nomadic warriors who live in the North African deserts survive through the disciplined, ascetic, and war-centred lifestyles that continuously enhance their group solidarity. Thus, their military power stems from their social cohesion: "Leadership exists only through superiority and superiority only through group feeling" (Ibn Khaldun 2005: 101). The tribal unity is forged in similar frugal lifestyles that contribute to group loyalty and obedience to the tribal chiefs and as such the nomadic tribes possess greater military capacity than the military organisations based in the cities.

This distinction between the urban and rural social conditions is a cornerstone of Ibn Khaldun's cyclical theory of social change. In his interpretation sedentary lifestyle is a precondition for the development of knowledge, skills, systematic belief systems and economic prosperity while the nomadic tribal life is a principal source of political and military might. As the state formation entails presence of both the key issue is the balance between the military strength, economic development, and ideological justification. For Ibn Khaldun the decline of civilization is linked to the periodic disbalances that occur when warriors lose their moral fibre and their martial abilities as they settle into the urban lifestyles. The defining feature of the tribal warrior solidarity is egalitarianism and communal solidarity of ascetic life. The military power of tribes rests on asabiyya that city dwellers simply do not possess. In contrast to the frugal nomadic countryside the cities are characterised by relative opulence, economic prosperity, social mobility, but also deep inequalities and sharp hierarchies. The existing urban order is legitimised by ulema, the religious Islamic authorities, who have the ultimate say on whether the political rulers govern according to the Islamic principles. Since city dwellers are mostly merchants, traders, or artisans they all (together with the religious elites) require military protection that can only be provided by the warrior tribes. Hence the warriors

are often invited to settle into the cities in order to keep them safe from other warrior groups. However once warrior tribe adjusts to the urban life, they gradually lose their ascetic practices which ultimately undermine their strong ties of solidarity. The political power combined with the access to excessive wealth corrupts the warriors and generates new social hierarchies that eventually destroy asabiyya thus making the tribe susceptible to attacks from the other invading warrior tribes. Once the tribal leaders completely succumb to decadence and start oppressing the residents of the city the ulema and the city dwellers withdraw their support while ulema also declare their rule un-Islamic and therefore illegitimate. This paves the way for social change as new tribe is invited to depose the current rulers and establish a new dynasty in power. In Ibn Khaldun's (2005: 296) view this cyclical historical process defines the rise and fall of civilisations: "The goal of civilisation is sedentary culture and luxury. When civilisation reaches that goal, it turns towards corruption and starts being senile, as happens in the natural life of living beings".

In this insightful account the micro-level group solidarity is identified as the key ingredient of the political and military power. Ibn Khadun makes three important points about the character of solidarity. Firstly, group solidarity is neither a cultural or biological given nor something that can be reduced to the economic self-interest of individuals or classes. His approach goes beyond the Durkhemian and Marxist accounts as it locates solidarity in shared collective action. In some respects, this is a proto-Weberian theory of group formation where social ties are not determined by one's origin but entail active involvement of group members. Ibn Khaldun is explicit in his view that asabyya is not rooted in kinship, clan, and tribe as such but is something that only develops between individuals who continuously share the same experience of hardship. He refers to the "closely knit group of common descent" but the feeling of common descent can be both "blood relationship" and "something corresponding to it" (Ibn Khaldun 2005: 98). In other words, "lineages, real or invented, served to reinforce assabiyyah" (Irwin 2018: 56).

Furthermore, almost uniquely among the classical scholars Ibn Khaldun emphasises the emotional dimension of micro-group solidarity. He persistently invokes the notion of 'group feeling' and associated solidarity with variety of collectively experienced emotional responses including pride, shame, anger, sadness, humiliation and so on. Hence asabyya is grounded in the strong emotional ties that are built and reinforced through shared collective action.

Secondly in Ibn Khaldun's theory group solidarity is a building block of organisational power. As he emphasises in the Muqaddimah: "Leadership exists only through superiority and superiority only through group feeling" (Ibn Khaldun 2005: 101). In other words, military and political might reside in the tightly knit bonds of micro-group solidarity. The shared ascetic lifestyles underpin egalitarian practices and principles that keep groups very cohesive. Although these bonds are strong, they can also change. The important point made by Ibn Khaldun here is that the micro-group solidarity changes through time – once nomadic tribal warriors shift to sedentary lifestyle in

affluence their shared social action dissipates and ultimately their solidarity erodes which in the process also undermines the organisational capacity of their military might.

Finally, Ibn Khaldun ties group solidarity to the practice of warfare. The asceticism and egalitarianism of warrior tribes is developed, maintained, and enhanced through the persistent violent conflicts with other similar groups. Hence the intensity of social cohesion is a consequence of continuous warfare and the decline of battlefield experience, which coincides with movement to the urban settings, weakens the social bonds between the group members. Hence for Ibn Khaldun the presence of violent conflicts is a precondition of strong group solidarity.

Ibn Khaldun offers a potent analytical framework of group solidarity but his theory also has some pronounced weaknesses. For one thing this model is too cyclical to account for the long- term social change. As such it leaves no room for the evolution, radical transformation, or demise of social orders. While Ibn Khaldun can explain the periodic power shifts in the context of cities and the countryside this approach has little to say about the social structures that were there before the city-countryside divide and it is also not clear at all what might replace these power structures in the future. In other words, cyclical theories of social change are inadequate at capturing the origins and temporality of long-term social change.

For another thing, Ibn Khaldun's general model of power dynamics is geographically and historically too specific. Gellner, who was a great admirer of Ibn Khaldun's analysis, recognised that this model works very well in the context of North African cities and tribes but cannot translate as well outside of this context. For Gellner (1981: 88) Ibn Khaldun was an excellent deductive sociologist but he was primarily "the sociologist of Islam; notably of Islam as manifested in the arid zone, an environment which encourages tribalism by favouring nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralism and which hinders centralising political tendencies". Furthermore, Ibn Khaldun dissects a specific moment in time of the Maghrebian world, mostly 13th and 14th century North Africa during the rise and fall of the Zayyanid, Hafsid, Marinid and other dynastic rulers who were often prone to violent overthrows. In this sense his general theory of civilisational rise and decline does not really work well in the modern conditions, which he obviously could not anticipate (Malešević 2015: 89).

Finally, while Ibn Khaldun's theory of group solidarity – unlike his general theory of social change – is highly applicable outside the late medieval North African context his superb analysis of the micro-processes does not tie well with the wider macro-organisational and ideological contexts. He focuses on the power dynamics within a city and captures well the micro and even mezzo level processes but there is little analysis of how these changes relate to the organisational capacities of states, ideological discourses and practices that underpin legitimacy strategies (i.e., the role of ulema in his case), or the broader geopolitical transformations (i.e., wars, uprisings, pandemics, and environmental disasters).

Organised Violence, Social Cohesion and Modernity

Unlike Ibn Khaldun who devoted a great deal of attention to war and violence in *The Muqaddimah* and many of his other writings Gellner has rarely studied organised violence as such. In fact, it is only in his 1992 essay 'An Anthropological View of War and Violence' that this topic is discussed extensively. However organised violence plays an important role in Gellner's opus indirectly and particularly in his account of the agrarian world. One of the defining features of his well-known Big Ditch thesis is that with the onset of modernity violence is replaced by production as the dominant organising principle of society. In his interpretation Agraria is a deeply hierarchical and Malthusian world where individuals 'starve according to rank' and where aristocracy and high clergy rely on the physical and ideological force to keep social order. In contrast Industria is characterised by economic vibrancy, social and spatial mobility, and a degree of egalitarian ethics. For Gellner (1988a: 158) this is a world where "Production replaced Predation as a central theme and value of life". Hence unlike the Agraria where rulers would engage in the periodic violent pillaging of their subjects, in the industrial world the rulers could maintain their economic and political dominance by tapping into the surpluses generated by the continuous economic growth and had no reason to abuse their citizens.

Although Gellner emphasises the economic factors as playing a central role in the organisation of all social orders he is also adamant that the economic dominance of aristocracy in the agrarian world is established and preserved with the sword: "violence became pervasive, mandatory and normative. Military skills become central to the dominant ethos" (Gellner 1992: 62). In this account Agraria differs profoundly from its predecessor, Foragia, and its successor, Industria. Although violence is present in the world of foragers these nomadic and mostly egalitarian groups possess no stored surpluses that would attract pillaging of other groups hence violence is here "contingent and optional", but it is not "the central organising principle of society" (Gellner 1992: 62). Although the industrial world is characterised by massive military organisations which can be deployed to appropriate resources from other societies Gellner (Gellner 1992: 69) insists that the balance of power combined with the continuous economic growth prevents such events from becoming a norm: "it was only sustained and unlimited expansion and innovation which finally turned the terms of balance of power away from coercers and in favour of producers. In the inter-polity conflict, no units managed to survive and to continue to compete, if their internal organisation was harsh on producers, and inhabited their activities or impelled them to emigrate". The prospect of nuclear Armageddon made the dominance of production over predation inevitable: "Now, production and trade are not merely a quicker way to enrichment than aggression: they have become the only way" (Gellner 1992: 69). In Gellner's view Agraria differs profoundly from both Foregia and Industria in a sense that violence permeates this social order. In a situation where there is a systematic production of resources which can be stored and where there

is no "technological amelioration" in sight the dominant groups are likely to value predation over production: "Those who control the means of coercion can and do decide more easily and quickly through coercion and predation than through production" (Gellner 1992:63). In other words, in this environment warfare has a larger and more secure pay off than production and trade as the storing of production surplus is likely to invite the predatory attacks.

These three ideal types of historical social orders are also characterised by different modes of group solidarity. As nomadic and egalitarian small groups foragers operate through the close kinship-based ties that are necessary for individual's survival in the hostile environment of persistent hunger and the constant threat of predatory animals. In the agrarian universe solidarity is deeply stratified with the "coercion-and-salvation-monopolising rulers" governing over the hundreds of thousands of peasant micro-worlds. Gellner recognises that there is a variety of forms of social organisation in the agrarian world including feudal and absolutist states, the polities of estates, pastoral nomadic chiefdoms, and segmentary societies. While some of these social orders have a looser structure of governance with wide military participation (i.e., nomadic chiefdoms) the more centralised and hierarchical orders have dominated the historical landscape. In this type of organisation, the patterns of solidarity are linked to one's status at birth. Hence aristocracy and top clergy that dominated the agrarian world were interwoven in networks of patronage, dynastic kinship, and marriage alliances that solidified their ties of solidarity vis-à-vis the commoners. Although aristocratic families constantly fought each other over territory, resources, and dynastic claims they nevertheless developed a strong status-based bonds that separate them clearly from the peasant masses and town dwellers. As Gellner (1992: 66) emphasises "The effectiveness of coercion depends on the cohesion of the agents of coercion" which historically has been established through shared modes of legitimacy. Hence while aristocracy provided coercive power that ensured dominance over the entire social order the clergy furnished the tools of social justification that fostered a bond between the elite groupings: "those who control the symbols of legitimacy, thereby also in some considerable measure control the crystallisation of social cohesion and loyalty, and thus exercise great power, even if they are not themselves direct possessors of weapons or practitioners of coercion" (Gellner 1992: 67). The rest of population was also part of strong networks of social ties, but these networks tended to be socially and spatially very narrow – one's village, clan, kinship, guild, or locality. Furthermore, the agrarian social orders were also characterised by presence of segmentary attachments. Drawing on Durkheim and Masqueray Gellner (1992: 64) sees segmentary forms of solidarity as playing a decisive role in everyday life of ordinary individuals inhabiting Agraria: "it is primarily by defining and controlling access to rites, brides, land and so forth in terms of group membership, that these units perpetuate themselves and make sure of the loyalties of their members". Hence the patterns of group in the agrarian world are not only deeply stratified according to one's social rank but they are also dominated by kinship, clan, tribe, or other

communal groups. In Gellner's view in Agraria one either experiences the oppression of kings and aristocrats or "tyranny of cousins".

In sharp contrast Industria offers an escape from the segmentary communities and inherited hierarchies propped up by violence. With the changed economic organisation of society, the priorities shift towards profit maximisation which fosters the continuous economic development. Gellner sees this economic change as decisive in transforming the social order which now favours investments in science, innovation and technological change which ultimately impacts on greater social and spatial mobility of individuals. While some scholars depict modernity through the prism of rampant individualism and lack of all forms of solidarity Gellner is adamant that Industria engenders new modes of social cohesion. Nevertheless, these new social ties are not, as Durkheim would argue, rooted in the functional interdependence of all members of society that create organic solidarity of shared values. Instead for Gellner new forms of solidarity stem from the changed material conditions: "modern society is not mobile because it is egalitarian; it is egalitarian because it is mobile. Moreover, it has to be mobile whether it wishes to be so or not, because this is required by the satisfaction of its terrible and overwhelming thirst for economic growth" (Gellner 1983: 24). Hence group solidarity is no longer linked to one's social origins (neither kinship nor kingship), but it is framed by one's position in the marketplace and the corresponding lifestyles shared with individuals who find themselves in the same socio-economic position. Furthermore, Industria differs from Agraria not only economically but also culturally. Whereas in the pre-modern world aristocracy and high clergy deployed cultural markers to reinforce the social difference between themselves and the rest of predominantly peasant society in the modern world culture is used to homogenise all citizens into a single network of group solidarity – the nation. In this context the standardisation of vernaculars, increased literacy rates and the introduction of compulsory state-wide education all served to mould relatively uniform cultural and consequently political identities of citizens. Thus, for Gellner the two key pillars of political and social legitimacy in the modern world are the continuous economic growth and national identity.

Although he recognises that warfare is still part of the modern reality, Gellner argues that unlike the agrarian world Industria does not necessitate the presence of organised violence. Whereas in Agraria the patterns of group solidarity are rooted in the coercive character of its economic and political organisation in Industria social cohesion is attained through the non-coercive means, and as such group solidarity is not inherently connected to violence. In this understanding since in both Industria and Foragia violence is optional and not constitutive of the social order, it can in principle become marginal or even obsolete. Moreover, as violence is not essential to group formation and preservation of social ties warfare is not a significant constituent of group solidarity in the modern world.

Gellner (1992: 69–72) acknowledges that this situation can change either through the greater technological asymmetry between the states, through the

possible widespread access of nuclear weapons by the non-state organisations or through the neutralisation of wealth (i.e., the environmental situation or the rise of post-materialist values). If this were to happen Gellner argues Industria will revert to some form of Agraria: "If it does, systematic coercion, and hence its occasional over manifestation ('war') may once again recover its pride of place as the key institution of human society" (Gellner 1992: 72).

There is no doubt that Gellner offers a powerful and elegant theoretical model of social change. Unlike Ibn Khaldun's general approach which is geographically and historically limited Gellner's theory is truly universalist as it aims to trace the long-term transformation of social relations. Furthermore, Gellner also articulates a more historical model of social cohesion that ties the changing patterns of group solidarity to different economic foundations of social order. While Ibn Khaldun focuses almost exclusively on the micro-sociology of group cohesion and the role warfare plays in this process Gellner provides a mezzo and macro-historical approach that links solidarity to structural transformations. However, while Gellner presents a coherent and comprehensive theory that in many ways goes beyond Ibn Khaldun's model, this theory has also some pronounced shortcomings.

Firstly, the staunchly materialist understanding of social change leaves no room for understanding the role of organised violence outside of their economic contexts. Hence in Gellner's account as warfare yields no economic benefits in modernity the rulers are less likely to deploy violence. This line of reasoning cannot explain the historical reality of organised violence. Rather than gradually disappearing from the historical scene warfare has intensified over the last three centuries with the 20th century being often characterised as the 'Earth's darkest period yet' with total tally of human fatalities ranging between 187 and 203 million (Malešević 2017: 127; Braumoeller 2019). The last three centuries have witnessed continuous proliferation of wars, revolutions, genocides, and terrorism and many of these violent events had little or no economic benefits for the perpetrators. To properly understand these developments it is crucial to zoom in on the geo-political, ideological, organisational, and other factors that make organised violence possible. While Gellner recognises that the multipolarity of states that have emerged in early modern Europe has contributed to transition from Agraria to Industria this geopolitical argument suddenly disappears in his account of the modern world. The key issue here is that political power, just as economic power, is an autonomous force with its own logic and as such economics cannot replace politics in modernity (Mann 1993, 2013; Hall 2013). Gellner's theory of history cannot explain genocides of the 20th and 21st centuries as Holocaust took place not only in Industria but also was completely dependent on the technology and organisational and ideological machinery of the modern state apparatus (Bauman 1989; Mann 2005).

Secondly, despite the universalist character of his theory Gellner was also a man of his own time and that is reflected in his overemphasis on the nuclear power as the key deterrent of war in Industria. The possession of nuclear arsenal was certainly important as a geo-political curb on nuclear wars, but

this did not prevent the proliferation of conventional wars from Korea, and Vietnam, to Angola and Afghanistan and hundreds of small-scale proxy wars and military interventions which resulted in over 20 million casualties (Mann 2013: 33). Gellner's approach is also inadequate for dealing with the civil wars which have expanded in modernity and have now become the preeminent form of warfare in the contemporary world (Kalyvas 2006). While Gellner is absolutely right that the organised violence underpins the social structure of Agraria where the aristocratic warriors are the dominant stratum, he seems oblivious to the centrality of coercive power in Industria. However, the economic prosperity, the development of science and technology and continuous economic growth are only possible in the relatively stable environments where nation-states have established a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence over their territory. In this context the coercive power does not decrease in modernity, but it only becomes successfully monopolised by states which can unleash it times of war and other crises (Malešević 2010, 2017).

Thirdly, although Gellner recognises the significance of ideology in agrarian and industrial worlds (religion and nationalism respectively) it seems only in Agraria ideology is linked to war. It is rather bewildering that as the one of the founders of nationalism studies Gellner rarely made direct links between nationalism and war. In his account both nationalism and economic prosperity keep modern social orders together, but he was also adamant that in the developed industrial societies nationalism is bound to become pacified and mostly symbolic (Gellner 1995). Nevertheless, as many scholars of nationalism and war show it is only in modernity that the rulers are able to mobilise millions of individuals to fight or support the (national) war cause (Mann 2005; Malešević 2019; Hall, Malešević 2013; Wimmer 2018). Moreover, nationalism feeds of the shared collective memories and the experiences of previous wars play a pivotal role in the reproduction of nationalist discourses in modernity (Hutchinson 2017). That is one of the reasons why nationalism has not decreased in the late modern era but has proliferated and has become fully embedded in the discourses and practices of state institutions, civil society, and everyday life (Malešević 2019).

Finally, although Gellner advances a more historical theory of group solidarity than Ibn Khaldun his model is still inadequate at capturing the full complexity of collective ties in modern context. For Gellner the traditional forms of solidarity cannot operate in a highly dynamic world of Industria where individuals are distinctly diverse and experience constant spatial and social mobility. The sheer size of modern societies also goes against any attempts to maintain the small-scale group bonds as traditional, all-participating and 'fortifying', rituals cannot include millions of individuals. In Gellner's understanding in the industrial world these traditional modes of solidarity are bound to give way to a "very distinctive and specific kind of organic solidarity" (Gellner 1981: 92) – nationalism. While Gellner is absolutely right that nationalism becomes a prominent ideological discourse in modernity this does not happen at the expense of micro-group solidarities. In fact, precisely because human beings are

emotional creatures that find their sense of ontological security and comfort in small face to face groups nationalism can tap into these micro-groups and as such can thrive in modern conditions (Malešević 2013, 2019).

War and Social Ties: Beyond Ibn Khaldun and Gellner

It is difficult to imagine a society without solidarity. Durkheim noticed long ago that social order would not be possible without the existence of durable collective ties between individuals. Even the hyper-individualised contemporary societies rely on some form of social bonding, often through the unacknowledged but shared reverence of individualist values and practices. The visibility of group solidarities is most apparent in times of profound crises and especially during war. Hence war has often been perceived as the catalyst of intense social bonds. From Simmel and Weber to Coser and many contemporary scholars of conflict it has regularly been observed that the external threat often leads to increased group cohesion. Although many analysists have explored this relationship between war and group solidarity a very few have attempted to identify the origins and social mechanisms that underpin this relationship. Ibn Khaldun was the first social thinker to recognise this link and to pinpoint the key processes involved in the creation and disintegration of asabyya. Gellner builds on Ibn Khaldun and offers a more universalist account that historicises the rise and transformation of group solidarity. In this approach solidarity never evaporates but transitions into a new and more effective forms – from the deep social ties of "coercion-and-salvation monopolising rulers" and segmentary communities of Agraria to nationalism and shared interests grounded in the continuous economic growth of Industria.

Both Ibn Khaldun and Gellner help us understand the significance of group solidarity for functioning of social orders. Nevertheless, these two models do not go far enough in accounting for the changing role of organised violence. Consequently, they cannot explain adequately the persistence of war and its relationship with group solidarity.

Gellner in particular was prone to seeing modernity in an overly sanguine way. In his theory there is little or no place for warfare and other forms of organised violence in Industria. This is often stated blatantly as in his parodying of de Maistre's thesis. Unlike de Maistre (1993) who argues that in modern world the executioner ensures the order and is also the symbol of the modern order Gellner insists that "Industrial society has refuted de Maistre: the washing machine, not the executioner stands at the basis of social order" (Gellner 1981: 93). For Gellner consumerism trumps coercion in modernity.

However, this view omits the fact that the modern social orders only exist within the framework of state structures and that the state apparatuses govern, manage, and control the economic processes (Malešević 2021). Even in societies which pursue the radical laissez-faire financialisation and other neo-liberal policies and limit government's involvement in economy the states still regulate many economic processes and maintain the monopoly on the legitimate use of

violence over their territory. For example, Mann (2013), Hall (2000) and Vogel (1996) show that de-regulation wave that started with Reagan and Thatcher in 1980s and has expended until 2008 crash did not result in the smaller state apparatus or less administrative directives. On the contrary liberalisation of markets often went hand in hand with the expansion of state's coercive apparatuses. For example, despite loud promises to shrink the state and reduce government Reagan increased federal spending which was allocated to defence, policing, state-subsidised agriculture, and high-tech industries (Mann 2013: 150). Despite relative economic prosperity Industria is just as much defined by political and military power as Agraria. Moreover, precisely because modern world fosters development of science, technology, and production it is in position to generate coercive superiority that agrarian rulers could not even dream about. It is no accident that the first scientific and technological breakthroughs were pioneered in the military sector and that the rise of modern technology was fuelled by pre-modern rulers who were principally interested in better weapons and other military equipment (Mann 1986; Giddens 1986). Industrial society has just pushed this process much further.

While Gellner and Ibn Khaldun make important insights on the historical relationship between solidarity and organised violence it is important to go beyond this analysis and zoom in on the three key processes that have framed and continue to shape the social dynamics between group solidarity and warfare: the cumulative bureaucratisation of coercion, ideological penetration, and the envelopment of micro-solidarity (Malešević 2010, 2017, 2019).

Firstly, organised violence cannot be confined to only one period in human history. Gellner is right that the nomadic bands of hunter-gathers were too small, too dispersed, and too egalitarian to rely on violence for the everyday survival. Furthermore, nomadism is not only detrimental to storage of resources but even more importantly it is highly adverse towards building a robust organisational capacity which is a precondition for protracted wars. However once nascent forms of organisation emerge, as with the chiefdoms and pristine forms of statehood, violence becomes a cornerstone of social and political life. This process, which I call the cumulative bureaucratisation of coercion, starts around 10-12,000 years ago and is still the defining feature of the contemporary global order. In this ongoing, but open-ended and reversable process, the states and many non-state entities have continued to increase their coercive organisational capacity and to internally pacify social order under their control. Historical development has for the most part been defined by the rise of complex social organisations that are rooted in well-established hierarchical division of labour, disciplined and effective systems of control and coordination and delegation of responsibility and many other organisational features. The implementation of these organisational goals often entail a degree of legitimacy but more importantly the non-compliance is associated with the clear coercive response – from 'disciplinary actions', loss of job, to financial penalties, legal disputes, imprisonments, slavery, serfdom and in some cases the loss of one's life. One can easily recognise the presence of coercive control in

the state apparatuses such as police, military, security agencies and even court systems but the identical organising principle operates in variety of complex systems that are essential for the functioning of contemporary social life: educations system, health system, business corporations, religious institutions and so on. Nearly all effective social organisations expand through the development of their coercive-organisational capacities. Throughout history the cumulative bureaucratisation of coercion was often fostered and had also fostered the proliferation of war and many other types of organised violence. Although this process is neither teleological nor even evolutionary in a strict sense it has for the most part been cumulative. Although history is littered with many failed, disintegrated and destroyed coercive organisations and some organisations have periodically or permanently experienced decline or were merged into other entities the overall trend in the bureaucratisation of coercion has largely been cumulative. This means that there is much more coercive-organisational capacity today than in any other period in human history. In the last three centuries the cumulative bureaucratisation of coercion has dramatically accelerated which is reflected in the expansion of warfare, revolutions, genocides, terrorisms, and other forms of organised violence. Rather than gradually dissipating in Industria war actually expands and become more destructive than ever before (Mann 2021; Braumoeler 2019; Malešević 2017). In addition, the states and other social organisations have managed to expand their infrastructural reach, social penetration, organisational dominance, and ability to fully control their populations. Hence to continue with the parody one could counter Gellner's claim and argue that in Industria washing machine is the executioner. The ability to produce consumerist goods is rooted in the coercive capacity of states and other organisations.

In modern social orders the cumulative bureaucratisation of coercion is so embedded in everyday life that it becomes unnoticeable and taken for granted. It is only in times of deep crises and particularly wars that this structural process becomes fully visible when millions of individuals are instantly mobilised to fight in or to support the war effort. The total wars of the 20th century were the pinnacle of this mass mobilisation where the citizens were expected and were also willing to sacrifice themselves for their nation-states. Gellner is right that this form of society-wide solidarity can only emerge in the modern contexts and that nationalist solidarity underpins modern social orders. However, he has very little to say about the coercive underbelly of the modern states. The near automatic flare up of nationalist solidarity in times of war is not generated by economic factors but by the long-term and ongoing historical processes such as the cumulative bureaucratisation of coercion.

Secondly while the coercive-organisational capacities enable group solidarities to intensify and became transparent during the wars coercion in itself is not enough to generate sustained experience of group solidarity. Instead, the organisational capacity is regularly accompanied by the process of ideologisation through which states and other social organisations link disconnected pouches of micro-level solidarity into coherent and believable macro-narratives.

Both Ibn Khaldun and Gellner acknowledge that group solidarity is defined by shared lifestyles and the corresponding common values and practices: while the former explores the micro-world of ascetic warrior tribes the latter zooms in on the entire social order. The problem with these accounts is that they do not explain how micro-level attachments are transformed into the shared macro-level narratives. To observe how this happens it is crucial to analyse the social mechanism through which organisations attain legitimacy. All durable social organisations have to deploy some normative codes to justify their existence or their preeminent position. There is a variety of doctrines that have been utilised by different social organisations throughout history to legitimise their position – from mythological tales, religious discourses, imperial creeds, dynastic claims to civilising missions and fully fledged political ideologies. However, whereas the premodern rulers tended to legitimise their actions to their peers (i.e., aristocrats, higher clergy etc) in modernity with the rise and the democratisation of the public sphere the process of justification expands across the entire society. In this new environment ideologies became a cornerstone of organisational legitimacy and nationalism in particular dominates the ideological landscape of state power. Hence to secure continuous legitimacy the states and other social organisations have to devise complex and subtle ideological mechanisms that could tap into the existing micro-worlds and try to successfully tie the inbuilt networks of micro-solidarity into the organisationally generated and institutionally sustained macro-level narratives and practices. In times of war nationalism becomes the key ideological vehicle capable of legitimising the existing social order and also mobilising public support for warfare. Moreover, the ideological penetration within society (via increased literacy rates, compulsory education, nation-centric mass media etc.) contributes to a degree of internalisation of coercive apparatuses of the state. In times of war national solidarity is often attained through undercutting and papering over the existing social divisions within society ('we are all in this together'). In modernity the states also have to compete with the civil society organisations and oppositional forces in terms of who speaks for the nation. In this context national solidarity becomes an object of constant outbidding thus entrenching the nationalist discourses within the public sphere.

Finally, although coercive and ideological powers make group solidarity into a society-wide phenomenon these structural forces cannot create group ties out of nothing. Ibn Khaldun shows convincingly that the small group bonding entails a great deal of protracted collective work. Hence solidarity is never automatic but something that transpires and is maintained in the context of shared collective action. Even small, face to face, groups require continuous social activity that will transform detached individuals into a cohesive unit. The shared experience of fighting together and of being exposed to the constant danger of death and injury has historically played a central role in enhancing group solidarity on the micro level. The scholarship on the behaviour of combatants in wars, revolutions, and insurgencies clearly shows that the continuous threat of violence contributes greatly to the rise and heightening of group

solidarities. Individuals are more likely to fight if they understand their actions in terms of emotional commitments and ethical responsibilities towards the people they care about, such as their comrades in arms, or their close friends and family members (Malešević 2017; della Porta 2013; Sageman 2004). What this research indicates is that even for the very small groups solidarity does not come naturally but entails continuous social action and commitment.

Hence if social cohesion is not automatic even in the face-to-face groups how can one generate solidarity networks that involve millions of individuals? Gellner shows convincingly that such social ties cannot be created at will through simple propagation of shared values or some giant brainwashing exercise. Instead Gellner emphasises rightly that the transformations in the patterns of collective solidarities are rooted in structural changes. Our agrarian predecessors could not create nor sustain society-wide nationalist attachments as the pre-modern world lacked all the socio-economic infrastructure for development of nationalist worldviews. In addition, the large-scale social changes involve the expansion of coercive organisational capacity and greater ideological penetration within society. However, since the all-encompassing social organisations cannot easily generate strong ties between individuals, they have to utilise their organisational power and ideological know how to fuse the already existing pockets of micro-solidarity into the society-wide narratives of belonging. Since humans are emotional beings in search for meaning they are receptive to the macro-narratives that are couched in the language of personalised small group bonds. Thus, modern social organisations regularly deploy the language and practices of micro-level solidarities and project these images onto the macro plain. It is no accident that all modern ideologies use the discourse of kinship and friendship when addressing millions of individuals who now become 'our Romanian brothers and sisters', 'our Muslim brethren', or 'our proletarian sons and daughters'. In times of war these personalised appeals contribute to society-wide social cohesion not only because of the language they use but also because the structural conditions have changed, and all human beings now inhabit the world of nation-states. Hence the large-scale social organisations such as the nation-state are capable of tapping into the micro-worlds only because they already possess the coercive-organisational and ideological capacities to penetrate this micro-world. In this way they become capable of blending the macro-organisational goals (i.e., defeating the competing organisation/nation-state in war) with the micro-personal aims (i.e., defending my family from the merciless enemy). In other words, the micro-solidarities have to be enveloped by the macro-forces of organisation and ideology. Consequently, the pouches of micro-solidarity became transformed into the shared, society-wide, bond of macro-level solidarity. Rather than simply creating these bonds the wars crystallise and foster this process of interconnection and future wars often build on top of already forged structures of social cohesion.

Hence wars do not by themselves create intense experiences of group solidarity. Rather this is a long-term historical process that only culminates in

modernity. Both Ibn Khaldun and Gellner show violence is often central to development of solidarity. Nevertheless, the macro-level solidarity can fully materialise only when variety of structural processes are in motion and most of all the cumulative bureaucratisation of coercion, ideological penetration, and the envelopment of micro-solidarity.

Conclusion

Ibn Khaldun and Ernest Gellner have both developed a powerful and comprehensive theories of group solidarity. While in *The Muqaddimah* Ibn Khaldun understands the rise and decline of group ties through the prism of shared war experiences and the decadence of urban affluence in many of his books Gellner historicises group solidarity by linking it to different economic foundations of agrarian and industrial worlds. Moreover, Gellner associates the pre-modern stratified solidarities with the violent structural conditions of Agraria. Although both of these social theorists have significantly advanced our knowledge on the historical dynamics and social mechanics of solidarity formation, these approaches still cannot account for the historical trajectories of group solidarity and its continuous link with organised violence. In this chapter I have argued that the patterns of group cohesion have historically been and remain shaped by the three long-term processes: the cumulative bureaucratisation of coercion, ideological penetration, and the envelopment of micro-solidarity.

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Siniša Malešević

Rat i grupna solidarnost: od Ibn Halduna do Ernesta Gelnera i dalje

Apstrakt

Ibn Haldun i Ernest Gelner razvili su sveobuhvatne, ali vrlo različite teorije socijalne kohezije. Dok je Ibn Haldun razvoj intenzivne grupne solidarnosti pronašao u asketskom načinu života nomadskih ratnika, za Gelnera socijalna kohezija predstavlja proizvod različitih materijalnih uslova. Za razliku od teorije Ibn Halduna gde se sve društvene veze generišu kroz slične društvene procese, u Gelnerovom modelu obrasci kolektivne solidarnosti menjaju se tokom vremena pri čemu različita društva stvaraju različite oblike socijalne kohezije. Dok Ibn Haldun tvrdi da je *asbija* kičma jedinstva grupa u svim društvenim poretcima, Gelner insistira na tome da su moderna društva oblikovana sasvim drugačijom vrstom kolektivne solidarnosti u odnosu na tradicionalne poretke. U ovom radu nudim kritiku Ibn Haldunove i Gelnerove teorije socijalne kohezije i razvijam alternativno objašnjenje koje postavlja socijalnu dinamiku grupne solidarnosti u organizaciono i ideološko nasleđe ratovanja.

Ključne reči: Ibn Haldun, Ernest Gelner, grupna solidarnost, rat, sociologija nasilja

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Milica Bakić-Hayden

WOMEN'S ACTIVISM IN INDIA: NEGOTIATING SECULARISM AND RELIGION

ABSTRACT
In post-independence India secularism was almost taken for granted as a defining feature of the women's movement with its rejection of the public expression of religious and caste identities. However, already by the 1980s, the assumption that gender could be used as a unifying factor was challenged, revealing that women from different social (class/caste) and religious backgrounds understand and sometime use their identities in ways that are not driven necessarily by some ideology (such as feminism or human rights), but by more immediate concerns and even opportunism. This realization opened up a debate about new strategies to tackle women's activism, especially in light of aggressive political activism of some women associated with right-wing parties in India, which has clearly shattered the perception, held by some, of women as inherently peace-loving, whose gender identity would override their caste and religious belonging.

KEYWORDS
women's movement, India, identity politics, secularism, religious nationalism, communal violence

Within the women's movement in India, that goes back to the colonial era and the struggle for independence (see Ray 2002; Mehrotra 2002), one can observe different forms of participation of women in a variety of socio-economic movements with issues ranging from land reforms to, more recently, environment protection. The movement thus is not monolithic, but consists of a multiplicity of actors that include activists in non-governmental organizations (NGOs), autonomous women's associations, the Women's Initiative, a well-known feminist organization, and a host of other women's organizations including party-affiliated women's organizations.[1] There are also various initiatives at local level, as well as activists in research and documentation centers

1 All major political parties in India have women's wings, most notably, BJP Mahila Morcha of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and All India Mahila Congress of the Indian National Congress (INC). The Communist Party of India (CPI) women's wing is National Federation of Indian Women.

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underscoring the distinction between women's movement and women's studies, but without ruling out that some women have successfully assumed both activist and academic roles.

Religion as an identity marker was not taken as important in early women's organizations. In post-independent India secularism was almost taken for granted to be a defining feature of women's movement with its rejection of the public expression of religious and caste identities. The assumption was that, given the underprivileged and marginalized status of women in a predominantly patriarchal culture, the gender identity would be a unifying factor, irrespective of differences in social, economic, educational and religious backgrounds of women participants. However, already by the 1980s it became clear that for many women religious identity was in fact quite important and a source of empowerment and, furthermore, that there are significant differences in how women understand what 'women's issues' are and what strategies to use to resolve them. In view of that, our task in this essay is to identify what aspects of which religion have served as sources of empowerment for some, while rejected by other women, and why. Secondly, we examine how the recent growth of religious nationalism intersects with gender and class/caste; that is, how manipulation and political (mis)appropriation of gendered religious imagery and symbols continue to impact women's activism in India, arguably, with mixed results.

Women and their Identities

In their wish to consider themselves free from religious and caste identity markings, the early activists in women's movement tended to treat gender almost as a pre-existing category. But it turned out that gender as a source of identity is more complex and harder to mobilize than originally assumed since generally people in India, and women in particular, "are socialized to see themselves as belonging to a religion, a linguistic group, a cultural community, a region, a village/town/city"; but when it comes to gender identity, women "are merely taught a series of roles. To be a woman does not necessarily mean to have an identity of a woman" (Phadke 2003: 4575).

Since initially considerable number of activists tended to be Hindu women from upper castes, they ended up adopting, if only inadvertently, idioms and symbols for mobilizing and empowering women that came primarily from Hindu religio-cultural background (Govinda 2013). The fact that the Hindu pantheon includes some powerful goddesses, when recast in feminist mold, was seen as a potential source of empowerment for Indian women. However, a closer look at the relation between goddesses and women revealed a paradox of the female status in Hinduism: on the one hand, a high status of goddesses on cosmological level, and on the other, subordination and devaluation of women in society (Wadley 1977; Gold 2008). It is true that the female agency plays a crucial role in Hindu religion and philosophy: Shakti (*śakti*), as personification of divine feminine creative power; Prakrti (*prakṛti*), or 'nature', as the

feminine aspect of all life forms, inspired some women in eco-feminist movement; and Maya (*māyā*), an important philosophical concept identified with woman in her capacity of a principle or an alluring power that conceals the true character of spiritual reality. Thus, the question arises: "if female power animates the universe, how is it that the women so often appear to be disempowered in their everyday actions?" (Gold 2008: 179). In other words, where does the agency of mortal women stand in the context of the goddess worship? Here we actually see a certain parallel or correspondence between the two: while the positive qualities are commonly associated with women and goddesses in their wifely or maternal roles, the negative ones tend to be associated with women or the goddesses who act independently of men or male gods respectively.[2] It is no wonder that some women activists saw in the powerful and independent Hindu goddesses, such as Durga and Kali, a potential source for the empowerment of women.

However, this is precisely where the problems for a unified women's movement start. The women from low castes (especially Dalits)[3] and/or some minority religions (especially Islam) have objected to the Hindu heroines and goddesses as their empowerment models because Dalits, for example, massively reject Hinduism because of its caste legacy and discrimination against them that persist to this day. Muslim, Christian or Parsi women[4], for their part, cannot identify with Hindu goddesses either, for obvious religious reasons. As Radhika Govinda aptly notes: "What these activists and organizations had failed to recognize was that the category 'women' was in itself an abstraction, that women have many identities and that, under different circumstances, they may favour one or the other of their identities, at times, even over their gender identity" (Govinda 2013: 624). These complex relationships between religion, class/caste and gender opened up the debate about a necessity to "retheorize gender away from biology and into the realm of social signification" (Reddy 2006: 99). Furthermore, these issues revealed "political differences about conceptualisation of the roots and agents of oppression" and that for the diversity of women in India,

2 There are also exceptions to this type of correspondence: for example, Indira Gandhi, who was married, was in popular imagination compared to Durga incarnate. Or, more recently, the first female officer in Indian Police Service, Kiran Bedi, has also been compared to the goddess Durga and is seen as a role model for young girls and their empowerment.

3 Dalit (in Hindi/ Marathi means 'the oppressed', 'broken') is a term adopted by ex-Untouchables or low castes, to refer to themselves. Mohandas Gandhi called them Harijans, "the children of God", while in official parlance they are also referred to as Scheduled Castes. Their cause was popularized by a reformer and activist, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (1891-1956), a Dalit himself, who converted to Buddhism having found the Hindu caste system with its discrimination of low castes, tribal and other minority groups unacceptable. Ambedkar includes in his definition of Dalits all oppressed people irrespective of their caste and religion.

4 Parsi (or 'Persian') in India refers to ethno-religious group who came from Iran over thousand years ago, to escape islamization of their country. Their religion is Zoroastrianism.

and the complex and changing circumstances within which they are variously located, there cannot be a single strategy or ideological solution (Mehrotra 2002: 58). That is to say, women neither perceive nor, consequently, respond to their predicament in a uniform way just because they are women, and in India, the solutions have to be sought against a backdrop of its specific social and historical contexts. In that sense, the shift has occurred from primarily or solely women's issues to a wider issue of identity politics of class/caste and religion.

Thus, many Dalit and tribal women activists have rejected the claim of "common oppression" of women as women arguing that it "obscures important aspects of women's complicated and diverse social realities", so that, for example, the plight of a Dalit or a Muslim woman in rural areas cannot be compared to that of an upper caste, urban Hindu woman (Garlough 2008, 182). Of course, what is left out in this kind of argument is the fact that the position of a Dalit or a Muslim woman in rural areas is not essentially different from that of a low caste Hindu woman. They are equally underprivileged, regardless of their religion. In any case, to avoid or counteract this type of conflicting issues, some women's organizations have resorted to the use of language typical of human rights. The reasoning behind it being to divert attention away from the arguments about class and/or religion-based gender oppression of specific groups and turn it into the basic human rights issue of women. But as it turns out, invoking these more universal egalitarian principles and recognized rights in a society which continues to be dominated by communal identities with their set boundaries, has not proved to be very productive. Instead, it has added to the ambivalence in pursuing women's agenda.

It became clear that the differential emphasis placed on relations *between* the groups, must also be placed on the gender inequalities *within* the group (Dalit or Muslim), which are hardly monolithic (Vijayalaksmi 2005). Namely, there are Muslims (*Ashrafs*) who are seen as equivalent to upper caste Hindus, and others (*Ajlafs*), who would correspond to some of Hindu lower castes, as well as those (*Arzals*) who are similar to Dalits in their deprivation, occupying the lowest strata of society (Govinda 2013: 640).[5] However, the Dalit women activists, who saw their 'otherness' and subordination as distinct and separate from that of the other (non-Dalit) women, emphasized the importance for their movement to articulate their own experience of marginalization and stigmatization. Furthermore, some Dalit women activists in rural areas have figured that they could use their caste identity to advance their position beyond village-level women's activism and into local electoral politics (Govinda 2006). As some scholars have noted, the problem here is the common misperception of social movements as something uniform and unitary in terms of motivations or even ideology, when their concerns and interests only partly or barely overlap. It follows from this that women's movements like most social movements

5 Even though, in theory, Islam is opposed to this type of differentiation, Muslims in India are divided along various lines: class, caste-like stratification, occupation, language, region.

"are systems of action, coordinating a multiplicity of beliefs and intentions", that need to be articulated strategically for specific purposes that would resonate with particular groups (Rajagopal 2001: 212). Thus, the attempt to create a uniform platform for 'sisterhood' have not met the expectations of many a leading activist but has shown instead that women from different backgrounds understand and sometime use their identities in ways that are not driven necessarily by some ideology (like feminism or human rights), but by more immediate concerns and even opportunism.

Furthermore, it was argued that Indian context, due to its multilayered cultural background, framed within both colonial and postcolonial history, requires homegrown strategies, rather than accepting those from the Western feminists. Those are perceived by some leftist leaning activists as hegemonic, inadvertently trying to mold women around the world in their own (Western) 'image' (Vijayalakshmi 2005). Efforts were made to address specifically Indian women's issues in ways that correspond to the circumstances in which they live. One such local and successful example of women's activism is the use of street theatre by various feminist grassroot organizations. This form of activism, based on performance, goes back to times of struggle for independence, when the message was primarily political and geared towards exposing colonial oppression (Liddle 1986; Segal 1997). In more recent times, this type of performance activism – using the traditional dance form, popular among women especially in rural areas, as well as dramatization of folk stories familiar to them – is meant to draw the attention to the current issues that affect women's lives on daily basis. Some of those issues include violence against women (domestic violence, rape, communal violence), their exclusion from inheritance law, sex-selective abortion; and more generally, their unacknowledged place in history and religion (Garlough 2008). Despite immense complexity and diversity of the audiences in terms of class, caste, gender, ethnicity, religion, or education and political affiliations, some activists remain positive and hopeful that "a feminist message through the proficient presentation of an appropriated women's folk form demonstrates to the audience the ways that a critical perspective may be advanced without outright rejection of one's heritage", that is, of one's cultural and religious belonging (Garlough 2008: 186).[6]

However, the truth is that in practice feminism has often, if not rejected, certainly downplayed the importance of religious belonging as a lived experience of many women – the fact that religious nationalists in particular have caught on. Appealing to women's religious sentiments presented and expressed primarily as a sanctity of domestic and family life, rightwing Hindu organizations have been selectively encouraging women's activism for "Mother India" (Bharat Mata), the personification of India as a mother goddess. Thus, religious

6 The notion that there is "a feminist message" is also recognized as problematic, not only because there is no one "feminist message", but because some women's organizations refuse even to be identified as "feminist" arguing that there is no consensus even among women activists as to what this term as an ideology or practice actually means, to say nothing of what it means to the less educated or illiterate women (cf. Mehrotra 2002).

nationalists have managed to tap into certain segments of women's activism and incorporate it into their political agendas. The use of gendered symbolism (such as Mother India), in what we may call 'matriotic' political context, has a history of its own. In the 19th century, Bengali novelist Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyaya in his influential novel *Anandamath* (1882) wrote a poem in a mixture of Sanskrit and Bengali and called it *Vande Mataram* (I Revere the Mother). By 'vernacularizing' the Sanskrit, Bankim successfully appeals to the authority of tradition, on the one hand, and "the enveloping freshness of current [Bengali] speech", on the other (Lipner 2009: 103). Both were to play an important role in raising national self-awareness in the context of Indian struggle for independence. The poem has nine stanzas the first two, written in Sanskrit, became a 'national song', a hymn of praise to "Mother India" conceived as a 'deity':

> *I revere the Mother! The Mother/ Rich in waters, rich in fruit/*
> *Cooled by the southern airs/ Verdant with the harvest fair.*
> *The Mother—with nights that thrill/ in the light of the moon/*
> *Radiant with foliage and flowers in bloom/ Speaking sweetly,*
> *speaking gently/ Giving joy and gifts in plenty.*[7]

While for many Hindus both the slogan and the poem *Vande Mataram* resonated with their 'matriotic' feelings, Muslims were not in favor of it, and even found it provocative and a sign of a growing Hindu nationalism, at the time when the Hindu-Muslim cooperation in anticolonial struggle was strained. Nehru's Working Committee later deliberated on the status of this poem (song) and concluded that the two stanzas, which had in the meantime acquired "a separate individuality" (from the stanzas with more explicit sectarian connotations) would not be an anthem of free India, but as an "inseparable part of our national movement" it is her beloved "national song" (Lipner 2009: 112–113). Decades after her Independence, though, the 'national poem' of India continues to resonate in the same controversial ways among Hindu and Muslim communities. In the context of our discussion of women's empowerment *via* independent and powerful Hindu goddesses – and their lack of capacity to be the role models for all Indian women – the poem *Vande Mataram* represents yet another example of how the invocation of "Mother India" is empowering for the same (Hindu) women for whom Durga or Kali are the source of empowerment. They may indeed see in these goddesses the 'mother'. Other women may at best see in her "their step mother".

Women's Wing of Political Parties

In post-independence India, while Nehruvian vision of modernity was still echoing throughout this complex society, secular nationalism, "the ideological mainstay" of the then ruling Indian National Congress (INC), primarily sought

7 For the whole poem, see Lipner 2009: 101–102.

to preserve the territorial integrity of the country. However, this vision of India was increasingly challenged (especially from the mid 1980s) by the politics of an aggressive Hindu self-assertion known as Hindutva.[8] The key point of Hindutva ideology is premised on 'Hinduization' of Indian society based on an argument that religious pluralism and secularism embedded in the protection of minority rights, as laid down by India's Constitution, is harmful for national cohesiveness and integrity. Secularism proclaimed by the state, however, is meant not to grant privileged status to any particular religion, because it is in the interest of the state that all religions be kept at "equal distance". This have proved to be problematic because, as Ashutosh Varshney points out, the "equal distance" can also be understood as the "equal proximity" and thus lead to government's deeper entanglement in religion and politics of India's numerous religious communities (Varshney 1993: 249).

The case that highlights this ambivalence is well known as 'the Shah Bano's case' of the mid 1980s. It involved a Muslim woman, who requested alimentation after her husband had divorced her by pronouncing "I divorce you" (in Arabic, *talaq*) three times (Vatuk 2009). Arguing that it was not in accordance with Islamic law (Shari'a), the husband refused to do it. Shah Bano filed her case to the Supreme Court of India arguing that the country's civil law (Art.125 of the Code of Criminal procedure) should override any Personal laws granted to religious minorities.[9] Originally, the court's decision supported Shah Bano's claim but then, faced with the backlash of Muslims across the country against this ruling, the decision was repealed on the grounds that it is an infringement of religious freedoms and that in personal family matters--such as marriage and divorce--it is the Personal law (in this case Shari'a) that prevails.[10] While this decision appeased the feelings of (male) Muslims, at the expense of the female plaintiff, it upset Hindu nationalists. They complained that the government was once again giving in to the demands of a religious minority and

8 Hindu religious nationalism dates back to the 19th century Hindu revivalism that was a response to British colonial rule. It was articulated as *Hindutva* in 1925 by V.D. Savarkar in his book of the same name. Hindutva supporters and their political parties accuse the state of pseudo-secularism, by which they mean that the state shows weakness when it comes to minority religions and at the expense of majority Hindu interests. This kind of attitude was early on in Indian independence epitomized in the tragic assassination of Mahatma Gandhi by a Hindu extremist, whose reasoning and then aggressive action was directly informed by Hindutva ideology. While for certain segments of population Hindutva is currently the matter of belief, for others it is just an idea.

9 After Indian independence, Indian Constitution granted the minorities in India, most notably Muslims, the so called Personal Law, that is, the right to invoke this law in matters such as inheritance, marriage and divorce. Even though a minority, there are 181 million Muslims in India (according to 2001 census), so that after Hinduism, Islam is the second most practiced religion in India. India is the third largest Muslim country in the world (after Indonesia and Pakistan).

10 A year later, Muslim Women Bill (Protection of Rights on Divorce) was passed, exempting Muslim women from the Art.125 of the Code of Criminal procedure, which Shah Bano invoked to protect her rights as a divorced Muslim woman (Vijayalaksmi 2005).

thus allegedly threatening the secular state. The irony is that the concern of Hindu nationalists was not to secure a uniform secular law that would apply to all women irrespective of their religious background, that women's movement pushed for since the 1960s. Rather, it was to enforce their own Hindu hegemony, i.e., apply the Hindu law to *all* Indians, including Muslims. How that played out a few years later became clear in one of the most tragic events in Hindu-Muslim relations in independent India (Govinda 2013).

In December of 1992, a long contested religious site in Ayodhya, claimed by both Hindus and Muslims, witnessed the kind of violence unseen in India since the Partition of British India resulting in creation of India and Pakistan in 1947. The dispute over this site was not new, but after independence Indian government put a lock on it and out of bounds for both communities. The site in question is the Babri Masjid, a 16th century mosque erected by Babur, the founder of Mughal empire, allegedly on the ruins of a temple devoted to the birth of Lord Rama, a divinized hero of the famous epic the *Ramayana*. At different times, there used to be tensions and riots between two communities, but nothing at the scale of 1992 eruption of violence. The alleged pretext for this riot was the torching (by Muslims) of the compartment of a train at Godhra, killing over fifty devotees of Lord Rama who were returning from the pilgrimage in Ayodhya. That resulted in a complete demolition of the Babri mosque within just a few hours by all too zealous Hindu mobs, only to be followed by widespread communal riots that lasted for weeks resulting in over two thousand casualties, thousands of destroyed Muslim businesses and tens of thousands of people who were left homeless after their houses were burnt (Mazumdar 1995; Vijayalaksmi 2005).

What is of interest to us here is the participation of women in these violent events that pitted women from Hindu communities against those of Muslim ones. It was estimated that about one third of the so called 'voluntary workers' (*kar sevaks*) were women. What is it that precipitated such willingness of these women coopted by various rightwing Hindu organizations and political parties (like currently ruling BJP, among others) to take part in the demolition of the mosque and even more so in the riots that followed it? What type of ideological zeal makes some of those women proudly declare that they are the "sparks of fire" ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of their Motherland epitomized in this case in the struggle to (re)build the temple to Rama on the ruins of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya? While the answer cannot be conclusive, "the error of intellectualism" has been recognized by women activist as a culprit revealing that paying greater attention to the activity of the movement's participants and their ideological or other presumptions would help "disclose contradictions that may be instrumental for the movement's functioning" (Rajagopal 2001: 212). Additionally, "[t]he affiliation to political parties also often restrains the coordination between women's organisations as the differences at the political level influence their networking" (Vijayalakshmi 2005: 9).

While in principle women's movement could benefit from their association with political parties by pushing women's issues into the party agenda and/

or by using the party networks, the mobilization of women by rightwing parties and organizations has convinced some *autonomous women's groups*[11] that such association incites the reactionary potential of women within these parties and does not do much to advance women's cause. Rather, the aggressive political activism of women associated with some of the rightwing parties has shattered a perception, held by some in women's movement, of women as inherently peace-loving, whose gender identity would override their ideological differences. The current BJP government and their allies, with their rhetoric crafted to encompass the spheres outside narrowly political (i.e., religious and cultural), are not helping to heal divisiveness and polarization in society, and such social atmosphere has become a matter of grave concern for women's activists and their organizations.

Conclusion

What transpires from this brief analysis of women's activism in contemporary India is that women's movement and organizations are only reflecting the same challenges that Indian society as a whole is currently experiencing. Namely, the foundational principles of an independent India are at stake here: its pluralistic and variously syncretic culture, as it has historically existed, as well as democracy and secularism proclaimed in its Constitution. Given the fact that gender identity has not taken sufficiently deep roots among women across different social groups, the agenda of women's movement based on their disadvantage has been relatively easily circumscribed by the politics of difference, which resulted in divisiveness among the activists and fragmentation of the movement in dealing with issues related to community identity politics – all at the expense of the initial concern about women's oppression and inequality. While the need for plural expression of women's activism is recognized as important, essentializing any particular identity may lead to the loss of shared agenda politics. In that sense, it is necessary to renegotiate the tension that exists between more universal concerns for women's rights and the specific contexts of their particular communal identities. This may require reaching over different dividing lines (caste, religious, political), and a fresh reevaluation of the consequences of women's mobilization for different political causes on the integrity of women's movement. This further requires better understanding of reasons and motivations of women to join different political parties and act within their agendas that may be directly opposed to their own interest and position in society as women.

11 The autonomous women's associations, especially leftist leaning, prefer collaboration with various civil society organizations and movements. Their view is that political parties are by definition androcentric and not likely to support and lobby for women's issues. The objection by other women activists to their apolitical stance in addressing patriarchy is that autonomy does not work if you are marginalized, and that in some cases compromises may be more effective in advancing women's causes and, especially, their political and electoral representation (Vijayalakshmi 2005).

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Milica Bakić-Hajden

Ženski aktivizam u Indiji: pregovaranje o sekularizmu i religiji

Apstrakt

Posle sticanja nezavisnosti, sekularizam je u Indiji prihvaćen skoro kao nešto što se podrazumeva, a odbacivanje javnog ispoljavanja religijskog i kastinskog identiteta smatralo se glavnom odlikom ženskog pokreta. Međutim, već 1980-ih godina pretpostavka da se rodna pripadnost može uzeti kao ujedinjujući faktor ženskog pokreta dovedena je u pitanje pokazavši da žene iz različitih socijalnih (klasnih/kastinskih) i religijskih miljea razumeju, a ponekad i koriste, svoje identitete na načine koji se nužno ne rukovode nekom ideologijom (kao feminizam ili ljudska prava), nego mnogo neposrednijim interesima, pa čak i oportunizmom. Ovaj uvid je pokrenuo raspravu o novim strategijama u okviru ženskog aktivizma, naročito u kontekstu agresivnog političkog delovanja nekih ženskih grupa pri desno orijentisanim političkim partijama. Njihovo delovanje je poljuljalo sliku koju su neki imali o ženama kao suštinski miroljubivim, kao i uverenje da rodni identitet može da prevaziđe kastinsku i religijsku pripadnost žena u Indiji.

Ključne reči: ženski pokreti, Indija, politika identiteta, sekularizam, religijski nacionalizam, međureligijsko nasilje

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Nebojša Grubor

HEIDEGGER'S AESTHETICS. THE PHILOSOPHY OF FINITE HUMAN FREEDOM AND BASIC MOODS AND EMOTIONS[1]

ABSTRACT
The first part of the text poses the question whether for Heidegger's aesthetically relevant thought it is better to use older terms, such as "Heidegger's Doctrine of Art" or "Heidegger's Philosophy of Art", or a more recent term "Heidegger aesthetics"? Does the term "Heidegger's aesthetics" represent an "oxymoron" contrary to the intentions of Heidegger's own philosophy, or does it signify a relevant aesthetic conception that has its own place in contemporary philosophical aesthetics? In order to answer these questions, the text considers Heidegger's understanding of aesthetics as a philosophical discipline and also the problems arising in connection with this designation. It argues that Heidegger's concept of "overcoming aesthetics" represents the (self) interpretation of his own philosophy of art developed in the essay *The Origin of the Work of Art*. The second part of the text follows the thesis that the Heidegger's aesthetics contains the definitions of art and work of art, based on Heidegger's analyses of freedom, basic moods, and emotions. This part of text follows a broader thesis, in which Heidegger's philosophy as a whole can be understood as the phenomenology of freedom. Also, it discusses a special thesis that the concept of strife (*Streit*) of Earth and world in *The Origin of the Work of Art* should be understood only on the background of the primordial struggle between concealment and unconcealment in the truth as the unconcealedness of beings. Further, the concept of strife is linked on a deeper level with the determination of finite human freedom and basic human moods. In light of that, Heidegger's aesthetics is not only the heteronomous aesthetics of the work of art, but also the (relatively) autonomous aesthetics of aesthetic experience articulated with respect to finite human freedom. The conclusion is that Heidegger's aesthetics of truth understood as the philosophy of freedom, basic moods, and emotions, according to their inner intentions, is closer to the tradition of the aesthetics of sublime than the aesthetics of the beautiful.

KEYWORDS
aesthetics, art, freedom, Heidegger, sublime, mood, strife, truth

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Heidegger's Aesthetics – Overcoming as Foundation of Aesthetics

Heidegger's aesthetically relevant thought permeates the entire corpus of his writings (*Gesamtausgabe*). Heidegger's texts on aesthetics could be divided into three basic groups: writings dedicated to poetry (Heidegger 1994a; Heidegger 1967: 61–78; Heidegger 1994b: 269–320; Heidegger 1987b: 244–247; Heidegger 1987a: 207–213; Heidegger 1965b: 9–33, 35–82, 157–216, 217–238; Heidegger 1999: 67–72; Heidegger 1983b: 153–183), texts concerning visual arts (Heidegger 1983a: 119–121, 203–210; Heidegger 2010: 191–206; Heidegger 1965a: 41, 117, 118; Heidegger 1997: 30–40; Heidegger 1976b: 364, 370) and finally, debates in which aesthetic issues are more or less considered in principle (Heidegger 1994c: 59–60, 392, 503–508; Heidegger 1984: 93–94, 177–181, 189-190; Heidegger 1987a, 200–204, 290–291, 301–302, 364–374; Heidegger 1988: 60–64; Heidegger 1990a:191; Heidegger 1992: 263–287, 386–400; Heidegger 1989a: 11–225; Heidegger 1990b: 136–160). Heidegger's main essay dedicated to art *The Origin of the Work of Art* (Heidegger 1994b, 1-74) together with the First Draft of the same paper (Heidegger 2020: 565-593; Heidegger 1989b: 5–22) and comments from his written legacy (Heidegger 2018: 463–537) belongs to the third group of writings.

A series of questions were raised in connection with Heidegger's aesthetically relevant thought and his main aesthetic discussion *The Origin of the Work of Art*. Does Heidegger's essay *The Origin of the Work of Art* contain (von Herrmann 1994: 21) or does it not contain (Pöggeler 1994: 207; Pöggeler 1974: 122) the outlines of the philosophy of art? Should Heidegger's aesthetically relevant thought be understood as Heidegger's doctrine of art (Perpeet 1984: 217–241), Heidegger's philosophy of art (von Herrmann 1994: 21; Kockelmans 1985: 82), or Heidegger's aesthetics? (cf. Thomson, internet) How should it one understand that Heidegger's aesthetics is an attempt to articulate an alternative to the aesthetic approach to art, or that Heidegger's aesthetics is against aesthetics, and for art? (cf. Thomson, internet) Finally, is it justifiable to understand Heidegger's aesthetics only and exclusively as the heteronomous aesthetics of the artwork as a place of exceptional and privileged appearance of truth? (Bubner 1989: 11–13, 108–109) The literature on Heidegger's philosophy of art received answers to these questions on the basis of direct interpretation, and often only on the basis of mere paraphrase of Heidegger's aesthetic writings. Most interpretations of Heidegger's aesthetically relevant thought in the last half century have not taken into account Heidegger's understanding of the systematics of philosophy, the problem of the division of philosophical disciplines and the question of aesthetics as philosophical discipline. For these reasons, the answers to above questions should be sought in an understanding of the *The Origin of the Work of Art*, starting from Heidegger's own self-interpretation in the *Contribution to Philosophy* (Heidegger 1994c: 60, 392, 503–506) and, in general, in Heidegger's understanding of aesthetics as a philosophical discipline (Heidegger 1989a: 91–109). It is the main thesis of this text that Heidegger's aesthetics consists in the conceptualization and systematization of art

and other aesthetic problems based on the theory of basic human moods and emotions and finite human freedom and that Heidegger's aesthetics is, in this sense, the one that overcomes aesthetics in the modern, narrow sense, founding at the same time aesthetics in a wider sense.

The traditional division of philosophical disciplines represents for Heidegger the horizon for the understanding of aesthetics. The division of philosophy into logic, physics and ethics corresponds to the nature of philosophy, but it lacks the right principle[2]. Instead of a traditional distinction between the formal and the material aspects of philosophical disciplines or, Kant's distinction between a priori and a posteriori, the principle of the division of philosophical disciplines should be the explication of human existence as a *Dasein* (Heidegger 1976b: 3–5; Heidegger 1987a: 229, 235). In analogy with logic, physics and ethics, Heidegger determines aesthetics as *episteme aisthetike* , that is, as knowledge of human behavior with respect to *aisthesis*, sensations and feelings, which is in its lawfulness determined by natural or artistic beauty (Heidegger 1989a: 92; Kockelmans 1985: 3). This neutral determination of aesthetics has no negative connotation for Heidegger. Only if aesthetics is understood in this wider, trans-epochal sense, can we say that it is as old as logic (Heidegger 1983b: 140) and that the philosophical meditation on the essence of art and the beautiful already begins as aesthetics (Heidegger 1989a: 94; Harries 2009: 13). As long as art directly addresses us and presents the one essential way in which the truth happens for our historical human existence, we do not need aesthetics, art theory, and the literature of art. On the other hand, it was only when the great era of Greek poetry and fine arts approached its end that Aristotle was able to say something about Greek Art (Heidegger 2010: 192, 197; Heidegger 1989b: 95). When does aesthetics start? Aesthetics as art theory arises at a moment when art stops speaking for itself. Aesthetics as well as ethics, physics, logic, and philosophy itself, arises at the moment when our own human self-understanding, which essentially determines our existence, has been put into question and lost its binding character. The problems of aesthetics as well as philosophical problems are the symptoms of the questionable inherent self-understanding of the finitude human existence (Schnädelbach 1998: 22). If Heidegger is dealing with philosophy at all, or contributes to philosophy, then his discussion of *The Origin of the Work of Art* should be understood as a contribution to aesthetics or as the foundation of aesthetics understood in a neutral sense with the corresponding principle of the discipline explicated in the analysis of *Dasein* and on the basis of the thinking of Event (*Ereignis*). However, the foundation of aesthetics in a wider, neutral and trans-epochal sense is based on overcoming the aesthetics in a narrow, modern sense.

Heidegger takes a negative, critical attitude towards aesthetics as a modern philosophical discipline. Modern aesthetics established in the 18th century

2 "Ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three sciences: physics, ethics and logic. This division is perfectly suitable to the nature of the thing and one cannot improve upon it, except only by adding its principle, in order in this way [...]", Kant 2002: 3.

rests on the foundations of modern philosophy. Although philosophy as a whole had a latent tendency to place human existence at the centre of philosophical enterprises, which is seen in terms such as *nous*, *psyche*, *logos*, modern philosophy has explicitly set up the beings that we ourselves are in the centre of philosophy (Heidegger 1987b: 106, 171). The motive of placing subjectivity in the centre of philosophy consists in the conviction that it is beings, which we ourselves are, to ourselves, that are privileged and remarkable in a cognitive sense. Heidegger, however, thinks that *Dasein*, a being that we ourselves, as beings (ontic) are, are not only close, but closest to us, but that in terms of conceptualization and systematization of the way how we are and what we are (ontological) are not only far, but the furthest from us (Heidegger 1977: 22). The *Dasein* is ontically closest to us, ontologically the furthest, but it is not foreign to us. On the other hand, although modern philosophy puts human existence at the centre of philosophical endeavours it fails to raise the question of the specific mode of existence of human beings (Heidegger 1987b: 171). Modern philosophy should be freed from two misunderstandings (Heidegger 1987b: 91) of the relationship between the human subject placed in the centre of philosophy and the object presented by the subject. The first misunderstanding of the subject-object relationship is the wrong objectification regarding the conviction that independently of each other there is a subject and an object, and the philosophical problem is an explanation of the way in which the relation between the subject and the object is subsequently established. Another misunderstanding of the subject-object relationship is the false subjectivation related to the belief that the subject is closed and encapsulated in the inner sphere of experience, and that the philosophical problem lies in the question how the subject leaves the sphere of immanence and accesses the object. The overcoming of modern aesthetics should be understood as abandoning the misunderstandings that are at the base of modern philosophy and, accordingly, abandoning the conception of aesthetic experience as a subjective experience. The overcoming of modern aesthetics in a narrow sense, whose elements we find in the *The Origin of the Work of Art* represents at the same time the foundation of aesthetics in a wider, neutral and trans-epochal sense. *The Origin of the Work of Art* goes beyond the misunderstanding of the subject-object dichotomy and in accordance with the human basic moods and emotions, and also in accordance with finite human freedom, provides definitions of art, the work of art, receptive and productive aesthetic experience and the category of the beauty.

Heidegger's Aesthetics – Philosophy of Freedom, Moods and Emotions

Heidegger defines art as: the setting-itself-to-work of the truth of beings (Heidegger 1994b: 21). This definition of art is essentially ambiguous because the truth also appears as a subject and as an object of the setting (Heidegger 1994b: 65).

However, this ambiguity arises from the inadequacy of the terms 'subject' and 'object'. Therefore, the true meaning of this definition rests on the overcoming of the subject-object dichotomy and is based on the structure of events as a whole (Heidegger 1994b: 73–74).

In order to understand the real meaning of Heidegger's definition of art as the setting-itself-to-work of the truth of beings, it is necessary to properly understand the term 'beings'. The first possibility is that the beings from the definition of art are understood as beings represented in the work of art. Such possibility is plausible for the representational arts.

Beings, for example, a pair of peasant shoes are represented in Van Gogh's painting. The reliability of the pair of peasant shoes enters into the work of art, i.e. Van Gogh's painting. The task of art does not consist in a more or less faithful reproduction of the beings or the reproduction of the general essence of those beings. Heidegger in the First Draft of the *The Origin of the Work of Art* quite clearly rejects the understanding of art as imitation either in Plato's or in Aristotle's variant (Heidegger 1989b: 14). Another possibility is that the beings from the definition of art are understood as an artwork itself. This feature is relevant for both representational and non-representational arts. A being whose truth is placed in the work of art is exactly the work of art itself. This understanding seems at first glance self-referential and circular: the art is the setting-itself-to work (of art) the truth of the work of art. However, Heidegger's central aesthetic thought does not exclude this possibility (Heidegger 1994b: 50). On the example of Van Gogh's painting, this would mean that the produced work of art first clears the openness of the open into which it comes forth and through which we can understand what the paint is and in what way the painting itself. The Greek temple presents being which clears the openness of the open in which it appears and together with that reverence allows us to understand what and in what way the temple is itself.

The beings represented in the work of art and the work of art that represents the beings in their mutual relationship and their concreteness can be understood only if we were given to us the beings as a whole. Conversely, only if the being as a whole is essentially given to us, we can specifically understand both the work of art and the beings represented. For this reason, the third possibility is to perceive the beings from the definition of art as beings as a whole.

We have been given beings as a whole (*das Seiende im Ganzen*) in the form of basic moods (*die Grundstimmungen*) and emotions. Heidegger's inaugural lecture, *What is Metaphysics?* (Heidegger 1976a: 110–111), speaks of two moods – moods of boredom and anxiety, and about two emotions – emotions of joy (of love) and fear[3]. The founding mode reveals beings as a whole. We are given nothing through the anxiety (*Das Nichts enthüllt sich in der Angst*) and through boredom and joy we are given beings as a whole (*Die Langeweile offenbart das*

3 "Anger, fear, joy, and sadness are therefore emphasized, and for many [...] possibly with the addition of shame and guilt, this represents the complete list of basic or fundamental emotions" (Konečni 2013: 181).

Seiende im Ganzen). Formally observed basic moods and emotions represent the medium in which we aesthetically produce and receive.

Heidegger's definitions of productive and receptive aesthetic experience as creating and preserving the work of art should also be understood in the light of the overcoming of the subject-object relation (Heidegger 1994b: 55). The quest in this context points to a receptive aesthetic act of preserving the work of art. The receptive aesthetic experience understood as preserving the work of art is not only knowledge of beings, but at the same time knowledge of what is one wants to do with beings. It is the knowing that is willing, and the willing that is knowing, both as ecstatic entrance into the unconcealment of beings, and at the same time it is resoluteness (Heidegger 1994b: 55). And the resoluteness of perceiving is not "the decisive action of the subject" (Heidegger 1994b: 55). However, human existence does not imply leaving the enclosed and encapsulated inner sphere in the direction of the pre-existing outer whole, but on the contrary, the essence of human existence consists in the constant standing out amid being as a whole. Both the preservation and creation of the work of art rest on the overcoming of the false subjectivation characteristic of modern philosophy.

On the other hand, Heidegger's thinking of events that represents the thoughtful background of the *The Origin of the Work of Art* relies on several fundamental attunements of thinking: awe (*das Erschrecken*), restraint (*das Verhaltenheit*) as a sort of the presentiment (*die Ahnung*) and, deep awe/diffidence (*die Scheu*) (Heidegger 1994c: 14). The basic moods/attunements have no common name, but their mutual relations are best understood in a particular case of truth (Heidegger 1994c: 14). One such case of truth is the creation and preservation of the work of art. Creation and preservation are the carrying out of the restrain as the fundamental disposition (Heidegger 1994b: 54).

Beauty is for Heidegger one way in which truth occurs as unconcealedness of beings in their being. The essential ground for the beauty is the primordial attunement which consists in joy and awe[4]. The primordial mood in which the experience of beauty is founded represents the unity of joy and fear and can be understood as an aesthetic awe that is characteristic of a sublime, and not a beautiful one[5].

4 "Die Urstimmung als die Innigkeit von Jubel and Schrecken ist der Wesensgrund der Schönheit. Das Schrecken ist als höchste und reinste Beferemdung [...] das Berückende, wodurch alles anders wird, den sonst – das Sonstige der Gewöhnlichkeiten und Üblichkeit wird erschüttert. Der Jubel aber [...] ist das Entrückende, wodurch über das in der Befremdung erst als solches erscheinende Seiende hinweg die höchsten Möglichkeitdes Verklärten aufleuchten" (Heidegger 2013: 74; Heidegger 1999b: 9–15; see Schölles 2011: 103).

5 "Aesthetic awe is considered a unique, and fundamental, emotional product of *fear and joy*, a state as primordial from an evolutionary point of view, and as powerful and memorable, as either of these [...] aesthetic awe (is) the prototypical subjective reaction to a *sublime*" (Konečni 2011: 65).

The work of art is the setting up of a world and setting forth of the earth. The world and the earth are in dispute. With those two essential determinations of the work of art, a series of moods and emotions are associated, such as uncomplaining anxiety, trembling before giving birth, wordless joy, fear of death (Heidegger 1994b: 21). All these moods and emotions are experienced on the basis of Van Gogh's picture of a pair of peasant shoes. In other words, the work of art allows us to experience such moods and emotions and, on the basis of them, enables us to see the beings (a pair of shoes) in its being (reliability).These moods and emotions are not arbitrary subjective projections, but contrary to the product of a subjective projection, they point to the dimension of *Dasein* and event that bear the experience of art (Heidegger 1994b: 21).

The relationship of world and earth in the work of art is characterized as battle between world and earth. This battle is not the destruction of these structural moments. The battle between world and earth signifies their inner dynamics and mutual elevation. This battle is founded in strife between (double) concealment and unconcealment in essence of truth as unconcealedness of beings in their being. To understand beings in their being in one way means, at the same time, that they are not understood in a different way.

The decision how to understand beings in their being is based on human freedom. The finality of human freedom implies that beings can be understood in their being in the final number of epoch-given ways of understanding the being. The leading idea of Heidegger's philosophy is to realize that being in its essence is finite, just as human freedom is finite (Barbarić 2016: 54). The terms 'strife' and 'battle' are expressions of the trouble in which there is a being itself that is in its essence finite. The insight into the inner ambivalence of the being as such enables us to understand the nature of the battle between the world and the earth and the strife between concealment and unconcealment in the essence of truth. The concept of the battle of earth and world in *The Origin of the Work of Art* should be understood only against the background of the primordial struggle/strife between concealment and unconcealment in the truth as the unconcealedness of beings. Furthermore, the concept of strife (*Streit*) is linked at a deeper level with the determination of finite human freedom and basic human moods. Only on the basis of finite human freedom can we understand beings in their being and beings as a whole as the background of this understanding.

The finite human freedom is the *ratio essendi* of truth as unconealedness of beings and at the same time *ratio essendi* of the five ways in which the truth is happening. The first way in which truth establishes itself in the middle of beings is art, "a second way is the act that founds a political state; a third is religious experience; a fourth essential sacrifice; a fifth thinking that confronts being and what renders it so profoundly questionable" (Harries 2009: 145). These five essential ways in which the truth is happening are relatively autonomous and independent and tell us that for Heidegger art is not the unique and exclusive way in which the truth happens as unconcealedness of the beings in their being.

Conclusion

Heidegger's aesthetics contains a systematized and conceptualized essential definition of art, the work of art, receptive and productive aesthetic experience and category of beauty. These definitions are, on the one hand, a result of the overcoming of modern aesthetics and the subject-object relation, and on the other hand they are reached with a view of the thinking of the events and based on the theory of basic moods and emotions and finite human freedom. Beings as a whole from the definition of art are given to us as basic human moods. The earth as determination of the work of art refers to different moods and emotions. The essential ground for the beauty is the primordial attunement which consists in joy and awe. And finally, the essential strife into truth as unconcealedness of beings is linked at a deeper level with the determination of finite human freedom. These definitions are not contradictory with the foundation of aesthetics as a neutrally perceived philosophical discipline. Heidegger's aesthetic definitions based on the theory of basic moods/attunements and emotions and the theory of the finite human freedom can be invoked as a contribution to the foundations of aesthetics as knowledge of human behavior with respect to sensations and feelings, which is in its lawfulness determined by natural or artistic beauty.

Heidegger's aesthetics from the *The Origin of the Work of Art* is not merely the overcoming of aesthetics but also the founding of aesthetics; *The Origin of the Work of Art* is not (only) an attempt to articulate an alternative to the aesthetic approach to art, but at the same time an attempt to articulate the *Dasein* and *Ereignis* based aesthetics; it is not simply against aesthetics, and for art, for aesthetics capable to systematizing and conceptualizing art which determines our historical existence. Heidegger's aesthetics cannot be considered merely as a heteronomous aesthetics of the work of art and truth, but rather as a relatively autonomous aesthetics, which equally conceptually articulates not only the work of art, but also the productive and receptive experience of art founded in the finite human freedom. Finally, Heidegger, in accordance with the main aesthetic tradition, speaks of the basic moods, attunements and emotions that permeate the experience of the beautiful, but his intentions are close to the theory of mixed emotions in which experience of the sublime is described as a combination of pleasure and fear. This research leads us to the insight that Heidegger's aesthetics of truth understood as the philosophy of freedom, basic moods and emotions, according to their inner intentions is closer to the tradition of the aesthetics of sublime than the aesthetics of the beautiful.

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Nebojša Grubor

Hajdegerova estetika. Filozofija konačne ljudske slobode i osnovnih raspoloženja i emocija

Apstrakt

U prvom delu teksta postavlja se pitanje: da li je za Hajdegerovu estetički relevantnu misao bolje upotrebljavati starije termine kao to su "Hajdegerovo učenje o umetnosti" i "Hajdegerova filozofija umetnosti" ili savremeniji termin "Hajdegerova estetika"? Da li termin "Hajdegerova estetika" predstavlja 'oksimoron' suprotstavljen intencijama Hajdegerove sopstvene filozofije ili označava relevantnu estetičku koncepciju koja ima svoje sopstveno mesto unutar savremene filozofske estetike? Da bismo odgovorili na ova pitanja razmatraćemo Hajdegerovo razumevanje estetike kao filozofske discipline kao i probleme koji su povezani sa tim odredjenjem. Stojimo na stanovištu da Hajdegerova koncepcija "prevazilaženja estetike" predstavlja (samo)interpretaciju njegove sopstvene filozofije u raspravi *Izvor umetničkog dela*. Drugi deo teksta sledi tezu da Hajdegerova estetika sadrži definiciju umetnosti i umetničkog dela, koja je bazirana na Hajdegerovim analizama slobode, osnovnih raspoloženja i emocija. U ovom delu teksta sledimo širu tezu da Hajdegerova filozofija u celini može da bude shvaćena kao fenomenologija slobode. Diskutujemo posebnu tezu da bi pojam spora (*Streit*) zemlje i sveta u *Izvoru umetničkog dela* trebalo da bude shvaćen na pozadini izvorne borbe izmedju skrivanja i raskrivanja unutar istine kao neskrivenosti bivstvujućeg. Nadalje, smatramo da je pojam spora na dubljem nivou povezan sa odredjenjem konačne ljudske slobode i osnovnih ljudskih raspoloženja. Posmatrano iz ove perspektive Hajdegerova estetika nije samo heteronomna estetika umetničkog dela, nego i (relativno) autonomna estetika estetskog iskustva artikulisanog s obzirom na konačnu ljudsku slobodu. Rezultat istraživanja predstavlja uvid da je Hajdegerova estetika istine razumljena kao filozofija konačne ljudske slobode, osnovnih raspoloženja i emocija, prema svojim unutrašnjim intencijama, bliža estetici uzvišenog, nego estetici lepog.

Ključne reči: estetika, umetnost, sloboda, M. Hajdeger, uzvišeno, raspoloženja, spor, istina

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Aleksandar Fatić

AN ETHICS-BASED 'IDENTITY-PROOF' OF GOD'S EXISTENCE. AN ONTOLOGY FOR PHILOTHERAPY[1]

ABSTRACT
A resurgence of scholarly work on proof of God's existence is noticeable over the past decade, with considerable emphasis on attempts to provide 'analytic proof' based on the meanings and logic of various identity statements which constitute premises of the syllogisms of the 'proof'. Most recently perhaps, Emmanuel Rutten's 'modal-epistemic proof' has drawn serious academic attention. Like other 'analytic' and strictly logical proofs of God's existence, Rutten's proof has been found flawed. In this paper I discuss the possibility of an 'ethics-based' identity proof of God's existence. Such a proof, the first version of which, I believe, has been offered, indirectly, by Nikolai Lossky, utilizes the form and structure of the analytic proof, but fundamentally rests on the perception of moral values we associate with God and Godliness. The nature of the proof shifts the focus of the very attempt to 'prove' God's existence from what I believe is an unreasonable standard, unattainable even in 'proving' the existence of the more mundane world, towards a more functional, practical and attainable standard. The proof proposed initially by Lossky, and in a more systematic form here, I believe, shows the indubitable existence of God in the sense of his moral presence in the lives of the faithful, at least with the same degree of certainty as the presence or 'existence' of anything else that can be epistemically proven in principle.

KEYWORDS
analytic proof of God's existence, values, identity statements, interpretation of premises, godliness

One of the less widely discussed forms of philosophical proofs of God's existence is the so-called 'identity proof'. The proof seeks to establish a crucial identity between God and something else, the existence of which is either experientially obvious, or can be logically derived from the way we think about God. The proof is of the following logical form:

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P1: God is (said to be identical with) x.
P2: X exists.
C: God exists.
One alternative is:
P1: God is (said to be identical with) Being.
P2: Being exists.
C: God exists.

Prima facie, there are clear problems with this type of proof. While the identity proof may be logically sound, its substantive value depends almost solely on the merits of the initial identity statement. In fact, it is difficult to even imagine what could be identical with God, given that we know so little about what God is. One way forward may be to identify God with the most general logical categories, such as that of 'Being'. If God is identical with Being, and we hold that Being exists, at least as a logical category which we use in our everyday thinking, then one could conclude that 'God exists'.

The proposition that 'God is Being', while seemingly ontologically strong, is in fact vacuous, because it does not specify what 'being' is, or what kind of being pertains to God. Without such specification, it could be argued, it is difficult to understand what 'God is Being' even means, for 'being in general' transcends our experience and our conceptual capacities which we use to organize that experience. The proposition thus appears reduntant. The argument is logically similar to a recent 'modal-epistemic' argument, proposed by Emanuel Rutten, the abridged form of which is the following:

P1. All possibly true propositions are knowable.
P2. The proposition that God does not exist is not knowable.
C: The proposition that God exists is necessarily true (Rutten 2014).

Rutten's argument appears similar to the identity proof of God, however its first premise is question-begging, which reduces the strength of the argument considerably (Wintein 2018). The first premise of the identity proof is similarly question-begging (God is Being).

Unlike Rutten's argument, which, as Wintein has shown, is fundamentally flawed, I believe that the identity proof of God can be saved if the initial premise is specified to 'God is the Perfect Being'. This turns the argument from a modal one to a more classical type of argument from God's attributes and makes it more plausible.

There are two main problems with identity proofs. The first one is that we must first argue the feasibility of the identity (such as in the case of 'God is Being') in order to make the 'proof' even intelligible. The more general the category used for the identity statement, the more difficult it is to elucidate its exact meaning in terms relevant for God's existence so that the argument becomes sufficiently compelling. If 'God is Being' and 'Being exists', this may well logically prove the statement that 'God exists', but it does little in substantive

terms to prove the existence of God without a successful argument that God indeed is (a particular type of) 'Being', and that this (comprehensible type of) 'Being' actually exists in a way which is relevant for our understanding of God. The detached nature of this 'proof' from experiential reality causes the 'proof' to appear vacuous.

The second challenge is that the validity of the 'proof' depends on the interpretation of the identity statement. In the seemingly strange identity proof of the form:

P1: God is I.
P2: I exist.
C: God exists.

if 'God is I' is interpreted as meaning not that God is identical with a particular human person, but that godliness is already in the humans, albeit in potential form, which still needs to be actualized through a virtuous life, then the 'proof' might become more intelligible. Such interpretations, however, depend on too many external assumptions to justify the cryptic logical form 'God is I' being used as a premise in the context of a proof of God.

In this paper, I suggest that identity proofs have considerable potential, but only if the identity statements are not too general, well aligned with experiential reality, and are more informed by *ethical values* associated with God. I thus suggest that a more viable form of identity proofs of God is based on God's identity with absolute values, that is, on ethics. This is a type of argument advanced initially by Nikolai Lossky (Lossky 1994).[2] I believe that Giorgio Agamben has also contributed to the same type of argument, though perhaps inadvertently, in his recent theory of 'effectivity' of God (Agamben 2013). My argument here builds on their two complementary arguments to show how *values* can bridge the gap which is apparent in the more general identity proofs and furnish us with a more useful identity proof of the existence of God.

An example of identity proof based on God's attributes is: 'God is Goodness', or 'God is Mercy'. At least in the Christian faith, there are both dogmatic and mystical legacies which firmly set out God's attributes as values for all who live a Christian life: A Christian tries to be morally 'good' because one wants to approximate in his life God's attribute of (perfect or infinite) Goodness. As Goodness obviously exists, God, therefore, exists. Similarly, being merciful is motivated by the desire to approximate God's perfect or infinite Mercy: as mercy obviously exists, to various degrees, God also exists as he is identifiable with the ultimate or perfect Mercy. Finally, I argue, along with Lossky, that God's effects on our lives change our experience in ways which the Scriptures envisage as God's intent for us; this leaves little doubt as to the 'reality' of Goodness, Mercy, etc., and thus further, indirectly, corroborates the identity proof of God based on his attributes.

2 Year of initial publication in Moscow: 1941.

1. God, Values and Experience

According to Lossky, the existence of God is demonstrated through God's effects on our lives. The question about the 'reality' of 'existence' of the values associated with God or Godliness is in effect the same as the question about the existence of God himself. If one wonders about the 'reality' of beauty as a value, consider the effects beauty has on our lives: according to Lossky, beauty has the capacity to change our experience even in the darkest circumstances; the very idea of something beautiful, or sublime, or inspiring, whether a reminiscence, a specific memory or simply a recollection of the value in our mind, either in general form or as an instantiation in an object or person, may transform our experience, and thus our life, from one of utter despair to one of hope. Such ideas have a real capacity to change the quality of our lives; just as the reality of the experience of suffering is, in a sense, not questionable (suffering is contained in the experience of suffering), the reality of beauty, sublimity, love or mercy is contained in the experience of these values; thus their reality is ultimately not questionable.

Lossky illustrates the practical identifiability of God with his more general attributes, such as Goodness, by elaborating the way in which Goodness is described in Christianity: God's Goodness is general in the sense that it tends to "lend itself to everything", it "gives itself away" if there is will to accept it in the person who is to receive it. Goodness does not deny itself to anyone wishing to receive it. This dialectic is the same as that of God's influence on our lives: God is said to give himself to all those who seek him in much the same way as the virtue of goodness spreads among those who desire to be good without any intermediary steps: wishing to be good is sufficient to welcome goodness in one's life, in the same way as longing for God is sufficient to receive God in one's experience. God, in this sense, is practically identifiable with the values which he brings into our lives: "This is the nature of the good: it strives to give itself away to everything around it. As St. Thomas Acquinas put it: 'The good by its essence tends to spread outside itself [...]'" (Lossky 1994: 323).[3]

Acquinas' and Lossky's views on Goodness as a key attribute of God have correlates in other religions. In Buddhism, too, there is an assumption of (moral) goodness being an element of godliness, while evil and destruction are seen as secondary and more reactive than proactive inclinations which, in a sense, deviate from the path of enlightenment. Buddhism recognizes hatred as one of the root motives for human behavior, however it conceptualizes hatred as inextricably linked with experiences of frustration or desperation. Buddhism takes evil as a deviation from the correct order of things, while Christianity recognizes evil as a separate, self-sufficient principle which opposes the good, and constitutes the polarity within which the human freedom of choice is exercised (God or Devil). The latter view is exemplified in science in Freud's

3 "Такова природа добра: оно стремится раздавать себя всем. Св. Фома Аквинский говорит: 'Добро по существу своему склонно распростра няться из себ [...]'".

conceptualization of the 'death instinct', or spontaneous root evil which moves people to destruction and self-destruction (de Silva, 2014: 53–55).

If Goodness is God's fundamental attribute, and if it is practically identifiable with the presence of God as an experiential reality (the experience of God in life), then the identity statement:

P1:Good is Goodness.
P2: Goodness exists.
C: God exists.

starts to make some viable sense, even if it remains insufficiently compelling to be a proper 'proof of God's existence'.

The experiential context in which Lossky suggests (but stops short of explicitly proposing) this type of 'proof of God' is the particular Christian concept of the human personality and the highly personal relationship between man and God: the human personality is not 'closed into itself'; it is capable of knowing and, in a sense, 'receiving' God, in terms of sensing the godliness of certain values and experiences, thus knowing that such experiences originate from God himself; it is also capable of knowing and receiving other personalities and natural objects (Lossky, loc. cit.). The understanding of God in terms of the values which, imperfectly, exemplify his ultimate goodness (similar to Plato's imperfect experiential ideas approximating the 'perfect forms') allows the obviousness of the existence of the relevant values and experiences (those of the good, or goodness) to serve as 'proof' of the existence of God, whose core attribute is that of 'perfect goodness'. The 'proof' here is compelling only for those who actually conceive of God in terms of perfect goodness; yet God is described as fundamentally good. Perfect evil is how the Devil is described, and the same type of proof could be derived for the existence of the Devil. The existence of evil in our experience points to the assumption of what it is to be 'perfectly evil' (on the basis of which we can only consider the degrees of evil in specific experiences), and thus proves the existence of the Devil. This is the kind of identity proof which can be offered in frequent situations when people question the existence of God by reference to evil experiences. The objection takes the form: "How can there be a God, when there is so much evil in the world", or "Why doesn't God conquer all the evil if he is indeed God?". Lossky's answer to both questions would likely run as follows: Yes, there is God, but there is also the Devil; the existence of the good points to the reality of a perfect Goodness (God), just as the existence of evil presupposes the reality of a perfect evil (the Devil): it is a matter of choice whether one seeks God or Devil, Good or Evil, rather than a matter of which one of them is more real. The argument, or 'proof', thus has practical applications which are not trivial as might seem at first from the form of the argument alone.

Nevertheless, Lossky's argument presupposes a shift of perspective from a purely logical one ("Good is Being", or "God is I" – based on value-neutral statements), to an experiential, value-laden one ('Good is Goodness, Mercy,

Love, etc.'). This shift to experience is 'engaged with life' in a sense which requires a passionate understanding of God and the values associated with him: a perspective which Giorgio Agamben has called "effectivity".

2. The Concept of God's 'Effectivity'

Agamben emphasizes the active, experiential aspect of our relationship to God and of God to us, the human persons, which is characterized by what he calls "special actions". According to Agamben, the living experience and understanding of God can never be merely theoretical: it is a fundamentally active experience which takes place through our understanding of and participation in "special actions" which characterize the relationship between God and man. For the human beings, such actions include the exercise of virtues (for Christians, they include, i.a., humility, obedience, restraint from judging others, solidarity with others in good purpose, etc.) and, most importantly, participation in the liturgy. For Christians, the liturgy is an active union with God where God is not only 'understood' in a contemplative way, but is felt as present, at each liturgy, through the repetition of the experience of the Last Supper: the communion is the ultimate sacrifice which God makes again and again, at every liturgy; it is not a mere *recollection* of his sacrifice which was made a long time ago. According to Agamben, the Christian dogma sees the liturgy as the ultimate 'effectivity' of God's fatherly, self-denying relationship to us:

> The liturgy is, in truth, not very mysterious at all, to the point that one can say that, on the contrary, it coincides with perhaps the most radical attempt to think a praxis that would be absolutely and wholly effective. The mystery of the liturgy is, in this sense, the mystery of effectiveness, and only if one understands this arcane secret is it possible to understand the enormous influence that this praxis, which is only apparently separate, has exercised on the way in which modernity has thought both its ontology and its ethics, its politics and its economy. (Agamben 2013: xii)

The congregation's understanding of God takes place through this special action and through the less dramatic experiences of God's care and involvement in their lives through events which arise from who God is: a caring, but strict spiritual parent. On behalf of the congregation, the special actions that make up their faithful relationship to God, again, are marked by effectivity, by action: they involve prayer, exercise of virtues and an obedience of God's moral commandments. Agamben points it out that our understanding of God is embedded in process, rather than static meanings:

> Operativity and effectiveness define, in this sense, the ontological paradigm that in the course of a centuries-long process has replaced that of classical philosophy: in the last analysis [...] being and acting today have for us no representation other than effectiveness. Only what is effective, and as such governable and efficacious, is real [...]. (Agamben 2013: xii–xiii)

The process-context means that what we perceive as real about God is a performative, rather than propositional content: it is the experience and value of God's presence in our lives that feel real, rather than as abstract definitions of God, or as logical inferences to prove that there is a God. Even if a "mathematical proof of God's existence" (see Robertson 2008) was indeed possible, it would not be what is in fact required for the sense of a true reality of God's existence. A mathematically proven God would not be real to the congregation without his effectivity in impacting the lives of ordinary members of the congregation; conversely, the existence of God's attributes and their performative role in the individuals' lives make the presence of God 'real' with no need for a mathematical proof. The liturgy, as the culmination of the process-understanding of God, is the effective soteriological act and at the same time an act of service, exemplifying the virtue of serving which the Christian God asks of his faithful ones (Agamben 2013: 19). The exercise of the Christian virtues, on the other hand, is what exemplifies or 'proves' one's faith. Just as faith cannot be proven in a propositional manner, so, in the perspective of God's effectivity, any attempt to prove God's existence in a propositional manner is misdirected: faith is 'proven' by living faithfully, and the existence of God is proven by the actual occurrence of God's promised effects on our lives, both those that reward and those that penalize us.

3. The Merits and Limitations or the Identity Proof Based on God's Attributes

One may wonder how a proof from God's alleged attributes can be a proof of God's existence when it does not prove the crucial link between the attributes and God: while goodness, humility, care and self-sacrifice for others undoubtedly exist, could we not claim that they would exist even without God; surely God must be something or someone else, or more than, these values? If God is a person, then the various attributes may apply to him, but he himself would not be identical with his qualities. On such account, it might seem that proving that goodness or any other God's attribute exists would not prove that God exists, even if God is good, because there are other persons who are also good, and goodness does not prove their existence; neither does love, humility or solidarity with those in need. Surely it is one thing to exist, and quite another to have or not have certain qualities. This reasoning underlies the seeming lack of rigor of the identity proof.

It seems to me that this point in the argument is critical for the overall understanding of what a "proof of the existence of God" can do. There are two sides to this critical argument which need attention.

The first aspect of the identity proof based on the attributes that needs to be clarified is that the qualities considered are *absolute* qualities: thus the statement "God is Love" implies that God is perfect, ideal love as he is described in the Scriptures (this does not necessarily prejudice the various conceptions of perfect Love). Love in this context is not a quality: it is the *principle* or the value

by which we judge the ordinary ascriptions of the quality of love to human relationships. The same goes for Goodness, Mercy, or any of the other core attributes of God. The reason the proof rests on particular attributes is that, in a particular religion, God is described in terms of such attributes. We thus prove the existence of this-or-that God as he is described in a particular religion.

The first misconception which makes the proof based on attributes look insufficiently convincing is that the task of the proof is to prove 'God in general'. As God is a transcendent presence which is described to us through the lens of religion all a proof can do is seek to address the way in which religion presents God to us; it cannot venture into 'proving' a transcendent reality.

The proof seeks to show that a belief in God is well-founded in terms of how that belief is defined, namely that the descriptions of God which the religion operates with are valid.

Upon closer inspection of, e.g., the Jewish-Christian Scriptures, one finds that God is nowhere depicted as a substance: the Bible does not say that God is matter, or spirit, or an old man with a beard presiding over the clouds; the only place in the Bible which comes close to depicting God visually is the one where, in the Old Testament, he guides his people, led by Moses, by advancing in front of them as a cloud during the day and as a pillar of fire during the night (Exodus 33:11). The same is the case with the other monotheistic religions that I am familiar with. Thus, based on the way in which God is presented to us by religion, there is nothing to 'prove' in terms of his 'substance', which is mysterious; what can be proven are the *manifestations* of God which religion focuses on and emphasizes.

The second aspect of the seeming lack of force of the identity proof based on God's attributes is connected to the first one: it relates to the degree of expectations that a transcendent, fully 'external' reality can be 'proven'. In fact the limitation to our ability to 'prove' the objective, independent existence of a being such as God applies to any other proof of external reality. This is the old discussion about our ability to truly 'know' the existence of objective reality which is more than our experience and which, supposedly, generally corresponds to our experience. What we work with are representations, not external realities; any 'proof' of external reality is inductive and based on aggregate experiences by various people which contain the same crucial elements: if most people around me experience today as a misty, cold day, I have substantial reason to believe that, if there is indeed a 'day' outside the human representations which we habitually refer to when we talk about 'reality', it is probably a misty and cold day. However I am in no position to 'independently' prove that there is weather or, for that matter, any kind of external reality which would be independent of my experience, much less to prove the exact shape and nature of that reality on a principled level.

Kant has discussed this problem in terms of our ability to distinguish between the 'reality' of our awaken experiences as opposed to the 'unreal' experiences of dreaming. His conclusion is that there is no fundamental, qualitative difference between the two: we are only able to distinguish between

the awaken state and dreams based on the cohesiveness and general mutual congruence between our representations. There is usually a moment, which we can recollect, when our experiences suddenly depart from their long-term pattern (the onset of a dream) and a moment when that temporary sequence of representations comes to an end and the previous longer-term, consistent pattern resumes (we wake up). This is a general problem of knowing the external world which Kant discusses mainly in terms of proving causality, namely how we can possibly prove in principle (or 'know logically', to use his terminology) any claim of 'objective' causality, namely that something (in the outside world) causes something else (whether in the outside world or in our perceptions). Kant is aware of the impossibility of such a proof.

> It is impossible ever to comprehend through reason how something could be a cause or have a force, rather these relations must be taken solely from experience. [...] Therefore, if they are not derived from experience, the fundamental concepts of things as causes, of forces and activities, are completely arbitrary and can neither be proved nor refuted. (Kant 1992: 2, 370, 356)

The problem, of course, arises when we have long dreams. What happens in a hypothetical situation in which we might enter a permanent dream state, a kind of coma with vivid dreamlike experiences? Schopenhauer suggests an experiential answer: "The only certain criterion for distinguishing dream from reality is in fact none other than the wholly empirical one of waking, by which the causal connexion between the dreamed events and those of waking life is at any rate positively and palpably broken off" (Shopenhauer 1969: 16).

On a principled level, one might seek a proof that the idea of God is necessary. The identity proof might serve that purpose by equating God with various ideal values ascribed to God, or a Perfect Being. Our very ability to distinguish between the various degrees of virtue, or value, in our direct experience is only possible if there is an idea of the perfect virtue or perfect value. Such perfect virtues in an agent are only possible in a Perfect Being, and God is the Perfect Being. Thus *the idea of God is an epistemically necessary idea* and is thereby proven in a principled way.

On an experiential level, the identity proof also works, but it can only prove the existence of the experiences which are attributed to God's existence and influence; in this way the identity proof proves the existence of a representation of God, not his transcendent existence beyond our experience. Good's existence as a transcendent being cannot be proven any more than we can prove the 'objective' existence of our own parents or children: we consider it 'proven' that they exist if we have consistent experiences with them and feel that we 'know' them by the impact which they make on our lives and the lives of others. For some reason, the same kind of experiential 'proof' of God is held to be wanting in some respects, despite the fact that no other kind of proof is possible of any type of reality, in principle. Thus the question seems not to be whether the identity proof from God's attributes either in principle, or in its

experiential version is adequate; the more intriguing question is why there has been such a persistent reluctance to consider such proof sufficient.

Why is everything said so far in the way of proving the existence of God relevant to philotherapy, or philosophical practice? The spiritual aspects of everyday experience repeatedly lead the philotherapist, and any serious psychotherapist, to consider experiences which place pressure on the everyday, on our ordinary ways of explaining causation and events in our lives that cause us pain (Fatić 2022, forthcoming). One especially pronounced area where the spiritual aspects of philotherapy are particularly relevant is death. Whilst facing death, or fear of death, or its suddenness or the loss caused by it, or any of the innumerable other aspects of death, is a prominent part of human experience, the theoretical and therapeutic resources for dealing with death that are not couched in spirituality are extremely scarce. Thus the ability to use, or call for, God, as the ultimate resource in explaining some of our transcendent experiences, of which death is the most obvious and most drastic one, may mark the difference between success and failure in psychotherapy. As I believe that philotherapy, and psychotherapy alike, are most effective when they take the form of education and critical discussion, in which the interlocutor is placed in an argumentative position, and I believe God to be an inescapable topic in such education and critical discussion, it seems that adding a brush stroke to the existing proofs of God's existence is in order for a philotherapist.

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Aleksandar Fatić

Etički zasnovan 'dokaz identiteta' Božje egzistencije. Ontologija za filoterapiju

Apstrakt

Tokom poslednje decenije uočljiva je intenziviran rad na izvođenju dokaza o postojanju Boga, sa posebnim naglaskom na takozvane "analitičke dokaze", koji su zasnovani na značenjima i logici različitih iskaza o identitetu, koji predstavljaju premise samog silogizma "dokaza". Možda akademski najuticajniji skorašnji analitički dokaz o postojanju Boga izložio je Emanuel Ruten u formi svog "modalno-epistemičkog dokaza".

Kao i za ostale analitčke i strogo logičke dokaze postojanja Boga, i za Rutenov je utvrđeno da je neispravan. Kroz kritiku Rutenovog dokaza, koju koristim kao uvod, ja u ovom tekstu rahzmatram mogućnost dokaza o postojanju Boga koji bi bio zasnovan na etičkim argumentima. Takav dokaz, Like other 'analytic' and strictly logical proofs of God's existence, Rutten's proof has been found flawed. In this paper I discuss the possibility of an 'ethics-based' identity proof of God's existence. Such a proof, čiju je prvu verziju, po mom mišljenju, već izneo Nikolaj Loski, koristi formu i strukturu analitičkih dokaza, ali se fundamentalno oslanja na doživljaj moralnih vrednosti koje povezujemo sa Bogom ili božanstvenošću. "Etički" dokaz pomera naglasak samog rada na izvođenju dokaza o postojanju Boga sa jednog standarda za koji smatram da je nerazuman i koji se ne može dostići ni kada se "dokazuje" postojanje mnogo manje kontroverznih ontoloških kategorija, kao što su različite kategorije svakodnevnog, "običnog" sveta. Istovremeno, etički dokaz pomera naglasak dokazivanja ka jednom funkcionalnom, praktičnom i dostižnom standardu dokazivanja. Ovaj dokaz, i u formi u kojoj ga je izveo Loski, a i u sistematičnijoj formi u kojoj ga ovde izlažem, pokazuje nesumnjivo postojanje Boga u smislu moralnog prisustva Boga u životima verujućih ljudi. "Izvesnost" takvog dokaza nije ništa manja od izvesnosti bilo čega drugog što se uopšte može epistemički dokazivati.

Ključne reči: analitički dokaz postojanja Boga, vrednosti, iskazi o identitetu, interpretacija premisa, Bog.

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Ondřej Beran

'ENVIRONMENTALISM WITHOUT IDEOLOGY' AND THE DREAMS OF WIPING OUT HUMANITY

ABSTRACT
My aim is to discuss the rhetoric of expertise as objective, and ideology- and value-free, on the example of environmental policy. The first section introduces examples of the common rhetorical figure of expert, ideology-free environmental protection, revealing their presuppositions. The second introduces objects of comparison – the cartoonish proposals of wiping out humanity – with the aim of showing that the two groups of proposals assume an analogous rhetoric. The third section discusses some prominent features of various proposals of 'population control', along with the links to the current surge of so-called eco-fascism. The aim is to show that all these phenomena represent a scale of the idea of ideology-free environmentalism. The concluding section discusses the distorted understanding of expertise, ideology, and politics, central to examples given in the previous sections, as leading to deplorable ignorance or callous cynicism, and therefore, in effect, a moral failure.

KEYWORDS
environmentalism, ideology, expertise, overpopulation

Introduction

The notions of 'expertise', '(expert) knowledge' or 'ideology' are the subject of complex debates in epistemology and the philosophy of science. The focus of this paper is on the twists and turns these notions take, in a common simplified reading, in the debates over environmentalism or environmental ethics.

The common thread I will follow is the particular use of the term 'expertise': a quantified account of the world, which offers a *self-legitimising* action-guidance. Any polemics against its guidance, to the extent that it does not aim primarily at presenting a more accurate quantified factual account of the world, is vulnerable to the charge of being biased by *mere* 'ideology'. These rhetorical figures, featuring often in the public and political discourse, deserve some scrutiny.

For one thing, if this is what it means that something is truly *known* – if you equate knowledge with technical expertise – then you can rely, in

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recommendations of future actions, on expert knowledge only when it comes to operating a predictable, law-governed, effectively mechanical system, however complex. *If* humans do not work like such a system, expertise – wherever humans are involved – needs to give up the ambition of providing self-legitimising action-guidance.

The notion of expertise usually involves the assumption of some epistemic privilege. To the extent that the expertise has a clear field of application, the experts are better positioned than non-experts to know how matters within the application scope are. A part of the rhetoric employed in the debates about environmentalism and environmental policy is the explicit emphasis on epistemic privilege, along with the assumption that environment policy-making is the kind of domain where epistemic privilege stems from expertise, rather than from being a concerned, situated agent. Whether environmental policy-making is this kind of domain is, however, not uncontested.

The rhetorical figure also presupposes the *normative* laden-ness of expertise; not only does expertise alone clearly describe the state of affairs, but it also substantiates the course of actions. This assumption again has far-reaching, and not self-evident, consequences.

In section 1, will first discuss some real-world, apparently plausible, examples of the employment of this rhetoric. In section 2, I will introduce a few cartoonish objects of comparison for this rhetoric. My key point will be that preventing the notion of expertise from becoming allegedly ideology-free may be vital for a humane take on environmental policy. In a context where a rational argument, relying purely on expert data, *can* be developed as supporting genocide, countering arguments classified as relying on ideology must embrace and legitimise rather than shun the label.

Section 3 will further explore the consequences of implicitly presupposing this particular notion of expertise in seriously meant proposals in environmental policy, especially related to the threat of overpopulation, as perceived by some. In section 4, I will argue that, just as with most policies, environmental policy is a part of the political domain, too, and as such cannot be reduced to technocratic decisions. This also suggests that an appropriate defence of the role of expertise in environmental protection, which *is* indispensable, requires a more nuanced and subtler reconsideration of what expertise is. Both the production of knowledge and the meaning and implications of its statements are of a social nature.

1. Expertise and Ideology in Environmentalism

Let us begin by introducing a few real-world examples of the rhetoric around expertise:

> #Environmentalism *without ideology*. We are *not dogmatists*; environment can be protected also without unnecessary restrictions for the people. (Czech Pirate Party's Twitter account, 20 September 2017)

> In a normal world, it is *experts* who make the decisions about such an important topic as climate. *Not activists*, who only exploit a 16-years old girl for reaching their ends. (Facebook post by a politician of the Czech "patriotic" party Trikolóra)

> In order that establishing the committee [which will evaluate the options of the Czech Republic's 'coal exit'] and its work make any sense, its debates must rely primarily *on expert basis* and must be based on the *real needs and capacities* of our country. Its members should debate about the means of producing electricity and heat for households and companies, *on expert basis*. We should absolutely not discuss *opinions that have lost all contact with reality*, opinions of the green fanatics [...]" (a representative of the Czech mining unions)

> [A study conducted by Agora has shown that] Germany will not suffer from the coal withdrawal, neither will the price of electricity rise nor will the country become dependent on importing it. Industry will even save money. This is a cogent answer and *well founded on data* – to all those who think Germans are stupid. What's more, it is the domestic renewable sources that will ensure stable prices and the abundance of electricity. I hope that the Czech coal committee will focus on exactly this kind of *expert material data*, and not on already overcome *myths*."[1] (the chairman of Hnutí Duha, an environmentalist organisation) [My emphasis throughout.]

Despite the differences in their spin, all the above texts work with similar rhetorical figures: there are expert data, facts, resources, figures – and expertise plays, or should play, the determining role in setting environmental policy. On the other hand, there are ideologies, dogmas, myths, activism – only detrimental to a good environmental policy.

There are problems, though. First, the technocratic idea of environmental policy-making. It is a *legitimate* feature of public political debate that in various areas (taxation, education, international politics), *each* proposed policy aims at organising matters of public interest in a *particular* way, and not in other ways. There are various proposed policies aiming in various directions. Does environmental policy, in contrast, have *the* aim – the only legitimate aim – one that we determine "on an expert basis"? Only if environmental policy is thus unique among the domains of policy can it allow for technocratic approach. This ramifies in several directions.

Second, there is hardly ever only one expertise. Experts vie with other experts, not only within one discipline (typically, economists with other economists), but also depending on which discipline they represent. Miners and mining unions do, implicitly, exactly that. At an anti-environmentalist march in 2015 in the Czech Republic, miners held up banners with slogans such as "Green superstitions won't warm our homes" or "Eco-terrorism doesn't warm us".[2] Were they denying the environmentalist protesters any backing expertise?

1 Author's translations.

2 Author's translations. "700 miners in Prague are marching for breaking the mining limits" (Deník.cz, 29 January 2015); https://www.denik.cz/ekonomika/za-prolomeni-tezebnich-limitu-demonstruje-v-praze-az-700-horniku-20150129.html.

From a different angle, they were rather preferring their own expertise. There is macroeconomic expertise claiming tenaciously that coal is a strategic mineral resource, indispensable for energy supply. There is social policy expertise predicting the shifts in regional employment structure, following the end of coal mining and difficult to solve in the short term.[3] There is environmentalist expertise displaying the harmful effects of coal mining and coal-based energy on the landscape and health. How to compare these?

Third, not only are there different areas of expertise, but also there are different *kinds*. Expertise in any area where human behaviour and actions are an influential factor (where the social sciences or humanities are concerned) behaves differently from expertise in, say, chemistry. This expertise is more of the descriptive and understanding type; it does not abstain from predictions altogether, but mostly does not present them as ironclad laws, analogous to the laws of physics. The twists and turns of social developments incorporate unpredictable developments in technology, culture and ideas; and technological advances are just as responsive to the transformations of our ideas, as it is the other way round. The behaviour of people and human societies simply *is* an indispensable part of what needs to be taken into account in environmental policy.

This complicates the interpretation of what the environmental experts say – there may not be anything that would follow from these expert *observations* with a 'moral necessity' that substantiates courses of *action*. Among other reasons, environmental expertise is not self-legitimising because the problem it addresses is not a single, homogeneous and, primarily, *stable* problem. It develops in an interaction with how our ideas about it develop. All of this contributes to the nature of the climate change as a "super wicked problem" (Levin et al. 2012).

Fourth and last, even if there is such a thing as *the* aim of environmental policy, we need to ask what the aim is. To the extent that we rely on expert recommendations, and these recommendations point towards one, clearly identified scenario, it should expectably be the best, or the ideal, scenario. It is here that further questions arise.

2. Enter the Supervillains

The examples quoted in the previous section mostly assume that in environmental protection, ideology is prone to extreme or unnecessary protection measures, while expertise mitigates these excesses with a touch of realism. In such a constellation, it is not difficult to see why expertise can have the air of the more reliable of the two. However, to the extent that the two represent an alleged opposition, it may be useful to consider a handful of examples of

3 "Unions support cancelling of the mining limits in the Northern Bohemia" (iRozhlas.cz, 22 January 2015); https://www.irozhlas.cz/ekonomika/odbory-prosazuji-uplne-prolomeni-limitu-tezby-v-severnich-cechach_201501220909_vkourimsky?fbclid=IwAR19b-5PR5xK6YmJqIZOmyunP-PPbfeyUWLKNjsQZnhOC_-bGNqgeNzC0nTw

a *different* constellation, which may shed a different light on what we tend to think of as expertise and ideology in environmental protection.

A major concern for the environmentalists is humanity's negative impact on the environment. Most of conservation endeavours strive to mitigate it, or, when more optimistic, to stop or reverse it. Every now and then, people attempt to set aside a piece of nature unspoiled by human hands.

Since also 'common people' perceive the importance of this negative impact, understanding it as a problem to be addressed by people with a scientific background, the importance of environmental expertise is thereby promoted. It is these people – climate scientists, ecologists – who embody the expert outlook warranting how we understand the values underlying the scale, the ideal extreme of which could be "nature unspoiled by human hands".

Let us leave aside the idea that real climate scientists do not spend time dreaming about restoring the planet to an unspoiled state. Yet, this is how the relationship between the environment and the relevant scientific expertise is commonly understood and rhetorically reflected. A possible elaboration of this outlook, embodying the value of unspoiled nature and its putative expert endorsement, is this: the ideal outcome in environmental policy is such that would represent a radical lessening of the negative human impact on the environment. One way of achieving this would be removing humanity from the game.

Thence the *locus communis* of many movies featuring supervillains who plan to wipe out humanity. More than one of these characters refer to an "environmentalist" kind of motivation. To quote just one (Agent Smith from *The Matrix*):

> Every mammal on this planet instinctively develops a natural equilibrium with the surrounding environment but you humans do not. You move to an area and you multiply and multiply until every natural resource is consumed and the only way you can survive is to spread to another area. There is another organism on this planet that follows the same pattern. Do you know what it is? A virus. Human beings are a disease, a cancer of this planet. You're a plague and we are the cure.

This is a popular theme, present in many other movies, too, sometimes meant seriously, sometimes less so (for example, Richmond Valentine in *Kingsman: The Secret Service* and Thanos in *Avengers: Infinity War*, to name just a few from some recent blockbusters).

Sure, some aspects won't let you forget the cartoonish nature of these proposals. The characters voicing them are carefully pictured as inhuman: software gone rogue (Agent Smith), a megalomaniac alien (Thanos), a deranged billionaire (Valentine). Only some, such as Smith, are in fact planning a *total* wipe-out of humanity. The logic of their explanations points in the same direction, though: humanity's presence is negative, due to the nature of the human impact on the world; humans are intrinsically incapable of living in equilibrium with the environment. The only way of restoring a natural order is to move towards a state in which the human impact would amount to as if there were no humans.

The reasoning relies on implicitly assumed *expert* rhetoric: there are resources, a clear view of their scarcity, and the question of the sustainability of the system. Insofar as the workings of humanity within a system so framed equate to the workings of a voracious virus, the sustainable rate of its presence may be: zero. All this relies on data that the relevant experts can supply. And there *is* an abundance of data, collected by relevant scientists, on the detrimental impacts on the environment of the human presence.

Consider, on the other hand, the motivations backing the actions of the characters who fight the inhuman environmentalists. An obvious choice of reasons for opposing those plans is not *expert arguments* but particular value standpoints, which some might also call an *ideology*, whether or not intending it as a term of abuse. For example: every single human life is an absolute value in itself, precious in an unquantifiable way. No *alternative evidence* about the system's sustainability – data proving Thanos wrong – is driving the fight of The Avengers.

"You cannot calculate human lives and deaths; every single human life is precious, a value in itself" is not alternative evidence. It may be an opening to a debate about morality, a different kind of debate than a disagreement about a disputed matter of facts – whether something is so-and-so, or so-and-so. Compare: "No, the data do not confirm that humanity is spreading like a virus"; perhaps "they confirm that it is coexisting with its environment in a symbiotic manner". "No, the system's sustainability does not objectively require wiping out all of humanity, or exactly one half"; perhaps "only 21.3%." (Would *this* help much?)

Instead, different moral outlooks clash here. To the initial proposal, "The expert recommendation would be wiping out humanity", the moral counter-argument is simply not that 'real' objective expertise recommends something *a bit* different. A 'partial wipe-out' would not do any more justice to the opening moral motivation.

Disconcertingly, not only cartoonish supervillains are keen on wipe-outs. If you have Facebook friends (or FB friends of FB friends) who have a degree in a STEM discipline (biology, physics, IT), it only takes few lunchtime breaks spent by procrastinating online to get entangled in a real-life analogy of those discussions. Because technically-minded people have usually spent more time than you have on figures and statistics relating to those topics, and will not hesitate to produce them, your chances of outdebating them are slim. But the main worry is not just that they will wipe the floor with you. One feels that there is something wrong with entering the debate as such – with legitimising the topic and the proposed strategy as a relevant alternative to discuss. (They are what Gaita [2006: ch. 17] calls "fearless thinkers" – who may not do full justice to what their own words and suggestions entail.)

This is perhaps what the personal experience of soul-withering in these Facebook shares with the motivation driving the superheroes who fight the supervillains. What one feels is wrong with these proposals is something that makes them, in an important respect, *absolutely* wrong irrespective of what kind

of data their proponents have (most of which are probably right) or whether they update them in details.

'Expertise' suggesting that an ideal scenario might incorporate a full or partial wipe-out of humanity presupposes a moral ideology of its own, too. A moral standpoint immune to arguments such as "every single human life is a value in itself", and open to sacrificing human lives if whatever objective facts apparently require it, points towards a crudely construed utilitarianism. If we suggest that there is something wrong with this kind of thinking *as such* – an intuition that may come from, say, a Kantian moral thinker –, we are not pointing at an error in the data supporting the proposals. Nor does the problem lie in the irrelevance of the data provided by sciences studying the environment. The intuition challenges the way in which the crude utilitarian tends to substantiate the recommendation. It suggests: you cannot measure the self-contained value of a single human life against the background of large quantities of lives or ask about the relative priority of different quantities. Once you have started doing this, something becomes lost to sight.

One might object, though: isn't talking like that exactly a cheap ideology? For decisions *must* be made; facts *need* to be taken into account. Very much so, but the component of the decision that needs to be scrutinised is its other, overlooked source, which has to do with values. We need to see that not only those who criticise the wipe-out proposals rely on something else than mere expert data. Otherwise we end up with all-too-easy arguments, equating claimed expertise with wipe-out proposals. We need to see the underlying ideology, or value arguments, more clearly. One less obvious reason for such an endeavour would be to save the experts from the rhetoric that pictures their findings in such a light that makes it difficult to show where the difference lies between them and genocidal megalomaniacs. After all, experts are called for in decisions about environmental policy, and for reasons that are absolutely relevant.

One way out is by not losing sight of the difference between managerial, administrative issues with one correct solution (and experts who can decide on it) and issues that will always irreducibly concern particular people and their standpoints (whether or not they also have an expert component) and involve negotiation between these standpoints. We need to ask ourselves whether environmental protection is not an issue of this latter kind.

3. Enter the Malthusians

The apparent contrast between the cartoonish Agent Smith-like figures and those who call for strictly expert-based decisions in environmental policy becomes much less striking when we realise that they can be parts of the same continuum, featuring serious and respected academics or public figures, too. The voices I will introduce in this section do not go into the absolutes, as Agent Smith would; their concern is 'only' *overpopulation*. The key idea is: there is an objective quantifiable threshold of population growth, beyond which the system

is not sustainable. Either we are already crossing the threshold or population growth is heading foreseeably in its direction. We need to take such measures that will reduce the ranks of humanity; in one way or another. But, once we settle on getting rid of *some* humans only, which ones, and how?

An obvious predecessor of such considerations is Malthus and his Principle of Population; he claims older inspirations for his work: Hume and Adam Smith, but later also Plato and Aristotle. According to Malthus, the human tendency towards population always exceeds the limits of resources, and either Nature itself steps in (wars, famines, diseases) or humanity must curtail its own growth by taking measures such as celibacy. The unlimited growth of population always leads to poverty, despair and misery for a greater part of the population, which tends to disrupt the society.

This basic insight finds its revival in the influential works of Paul Ehrlich or Garrett Hardin. A disclaimer first: my use of Ehrlich and Hardin as starting points should not obscure the fact that they do not represent the edge of the *current* debate about population. The discussion is still alive, though; contemporary academic arguments for taking overpopulation as a severe threat see e.g. in Kopnina, Washington 2016, or Davis, Arnocky, Stroink 2019. Few people would deny that there is a limit to what the Earth's ecosystem can sustain and that this limit is related to the size of human population. However, the issue seems more complex than mere numbers are. While I cannot directly enter the debate (conducted mostly outside philosophy) about the sustainability of the Earth's ecosystem and overpopulation as a strawman, I can focus on key terms of the moral framing of the debate, as it is conducted outside the strictly academic context. It is exactly as figures of such wide, non-academic influence that Ehrlich and Hardin prove relevant. As non-philosophers, they infused their account with the right degree of the crudeness of moral framing that made it possible even for policy makers or various publicly active personalities to take over this framing – either to develop it further, or to engage in a non-academic polemics against it.

Thus, Ehrlich's influential 1968 book *The Population Bomb* centred round one key prediction: a worldwide famine in the 1970s and 1980s. It did not happen, but this did not prevent the book from going into further revised editions, which contained updated predictions of the collapse.

Hardin, whose notion of the "tragedy of the commons" is still taught in economics schools as a plain fact, was even more straightforward. He who came up with the lifeboat metaphor, noting that it is necessary to think of the solution in its terms: "[A]dmit no more to the boat and preserve the small safety factor". Some may consider this 'unjust', but "[l]et us grant that it is. The guilt feelings will only clear the boat of those who are weak, leaving more space to those who are willing to fight for it and protect it." He observes that "complete justice" only leads to "complete catastrophe" (Hardin 1974).

Hardin's move equates moral concerns with mere sentimentality. As if he was saying: it may be unethical or unjust to do this – but I don't care about it and neither should you. The only thinkable thing to do is what I propose.

This does not mean that their environmentalist concerns are not genuine. Ehrlich's works contain calls for a "fierce defence" of nature. Even *The Population Bomb* clearly follows a more complex agenda, an indispensable part of which involves taking protective measures against pollution (Ehrlich 1988: 102 ff.). Some suggestions are more unnerving, though. He proposes classifying nations into categories by the degree of their food-production subsistence, and letting those that appear not subsistent either starve, or having various forms of *coercion* applied in order to reduce their population (e.g. simply ordering the sterilisation all Indian males with three or more children) (146 ff.).

Ehrlich's suggested measures towards Third World countries are not driven by conscious racism. He observes that pollution affects most bitterly the poor and the ethnic minorities in the U.S. and deplores the failure to tailor environmental measures so that they would not look like a white middle-class hobby interest and these affected groups could embrace them (Ehrlich 1988: 124 ff.). Consider also his passionate critique of "race science" (Ehrlich 1978).[4]

Hardin's case, given his long-time association with racist and anti-immigrant groups, is more troubling. He suggests that the key to survival of the nation is unity, while diversity undermines it, and he attacks the strawman of the "Europhobic" advocates of *exclusively* non-white immigration into the U.S. We don't want these people here, says Hardin – we are not isolationist, but we are interested only in what we can make use of: "ideas and information", but not "wrapped in human form" (Hardin 1991b). And it is difficult *not* to read his concerns such as that "[b]lack became beautiful" (Hardin 1991a), or about how Muslim nations threaten to "outbreed us", as racist.

Perhaps the most telling detail is Hardin's (1974) concession that the pernicious immigration is the *others'* immigration:

> It is literally true that we Americans of non-Indian ancestry are the descendants of thieves. Should we not, then, "give back" the land to the Indians; that is, give it to the now-living Americans of Indian ancestry? As an exercise in pure logic I see no way to reject this proposal. Yet I am unwilling to live by it; and I know no one who is. [...]
>
> Suppose, becoming intoxicated with pure justice, we "Anglos" should decide to turn our land over to the Indians. Since all our other wealth has also been derived from the land, we would have to give that to the Indians, too. Then what would we non-Indians do? Where would we go?

4 Whenever Ehrlich 'classifies' nations and countries, he applies the criteria of culture and economic system, rather than ethnicity. Thus, against immigration into the U.S., he argues that "the world can't afford more Americans". This can be read as a criticism of the American lifestyle, unsustainable worldwide (Ehrlich himself would say that this is his agenda). On the other hand, those arguments are fit for the purposes of xenophobia, and Ehrlich seems more eager to fight overpopulation beyond U.S. borders than the American lifestyle. See Gosine's (2010) critical inquiry into the privileged white scientists' worries about "non-white reproduction".

It is thus not clear whether Hardin's racism-akin ideas are just an accidental attachment to "the lifeboat ethics", or the other way round.[5]

The common denominator of these considerations would be the concern with overpopulation as an objective threat consisting in sheer numbers. Also, sheer numbers are exactly the kind of criterion that points towards Third World countries as the culprit, while the (on average) lower number of children per family in developed countries can be interpreted as a more conscious and less selfish attitude (cf. Davis, Arnocky, Stroink 2019: 95).[6] The threat is of such a kind that it morally legitimises far-reaching countermeasures; in a way, the necessity of these measures follows logically from the quantitative trends of human population. While such a position is not as alive academically as it used to be, its terms still powerfully inform the terms of the non-academic debate.

Thus, murkier cases of public engagement and their underlying "ideologies" show their greater proximity to ideas like Hardin's than to the calm and balanced tone of the UN documents. Overpopulation has become the pet concern for the group of people called, with a hint of irony, 'philanthrocapitalists' – rich tycoons who spend a lot of money on charitable programmes that are subject to no public control and reflect the peculiar composition of their funders' interests and concerns.[7]

The most visible of the philanthrocapitalists, Bill and Melinda Gates, have funded a wide range of projects through their foundation, including such that were fighting overpopulation in Third World countries by means impossible or even untried at home. Contraceptives rejected by medical authorities in the U.S. have been rebranded and administered without fully informed consent in India or in African countries, resulting in years-long or permanent infertility (apart from further health issues). There were forced or uninformed sterilisation programmes in Peru and Tanzania. There are, on the other hand, also programmes encouraging access to contraception and to proper pregnancy and postpartum healthcare, as well as sex education or general education programmes. (See Levich's [2014, 2021] systematic critical overviews of the Gates Foundation healthcare agendas.)[8]

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5 As suggested by the brief (not very charitable) overview of his political engagements, compiled by the Southern Poverty Law Center, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/garrett-hardin

6 There are, however, studies showing that larger families are not simply the result of selfish behaviour, but a strategy of coping with poverty and other hardships, including environmental; cf. Merrick 2002; Gupta, Dubey 2003. While larger families are a factor exacerbating poverty, they do not simply cause it and are, largely, just as much a reaction to it. The poverty of many countries of the Global South, compared to developed countries, is a complex and multifactorial phenomenon.

7 A 12-year-old article in *The Guardian* with a symptomatic title that can now only be read ironically (but may have been meant seriously back then): "They're called the Good Club – and they want to save the world". https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/31/new-york-billionaire-philanthropists

8 The Gateses are not alone in applying shady means of anti-overpopulation warfare, though less attention has been devoted to the others. There are analogous overviews

Certainly, the Gates Foundation does fund respectable humanitarian projects. Notably, though, the common denominator of *all* those mentioned in the previous paragraph would hardly be "humanitarian". Rather, something like "whatever will help reducing the population in Third World countries" (not an exceptional notion; cf. the overview of the history of anti-population interventions in Angus, Butler 2011: 83 ff.).[9] This ambition is not ideology-free.

Let's remember that, for Malthus, a limit to population is a natural law. We should therefore *comply with* the mechanisms of Nature's population check, "We should reprobate specific remedies for ravaging diseases", because people proposing humanitarian actions against epidemics are perhaps "benevolent, but much mistaken". For Malthusians, the fact that people live in poverty, misery and disease has *not* primarily to do with the way the economics of the society is organised (even though, as Chakrabarti [2014] notes, the British Empire of Malthus's age had access to the wealth of its colonies and yet "kept its working class in squalor and misery"). It simply must be so; the number of people requires it.[10]

The language has changed, and few dare to openly reject fighting against epidemics,[11] but the general idea remains. It is an *objective fact* that there are already too many people, and thus it is an *objective fact* that the best thing to do is pursuing the reduction of the world population in various ways. Some of these may involve administering dangerous contraceptives to uninformed Third World women.[12]

In reality, this general idea may mistake the workings of the current economic system, reflecting the very specific interests of a few disproportionally influential players, for natural law. If this is the case, then contemporary

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available also of Warren Buffett's or Ted Turner's endeavours, and while the source (the 'pro-life' Population Research Institute) does not strike me as highly credible, if only a fraction of the claims hold true it is enough to unsettle: https://www.pop.org/the-billionaire-boys-club-the-worlds-plutocrats-at-work-to-decrease-population/.

9 Angus and Butler remark: "[T]he idea that providing the means for family planning to those who don't have access will somehow slow global warming makes no sense. With few exceptions, birth control has long been widely available in the countries that are doing the most to destroy the earth's climate" (42).

10 There are multiple problems with relying on sheer (population) numbers in attempts at any causal explanation. The very concept of 'population' may be questioned, as Marx famously did in his critique of Malthus: "The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed".

11 The first version of this article was written before the COVID-19 pandemics. Its outbreak may have made the truth of this sentence a more complicated matter.

12 From a point of view, the shady warfare against fertility in Third World seems desperate, a risky and borderline criminal activity with negligible results in terms of 'numbers'. Real options of achieving lower fertility (*anywhere*) lie elsewhere. As Spretnak 1990: 12 points out, it should not be surprising that "Third World women [...] are not interested in contraception unless health and economic conditions are improved (studies have shown that when the death rate of children goes down, the birth rate goes down)". The real challenge then lies in finding ways out of poverty that would not rely heavily on fossil fuels etc.

Malthusianism is not 'telling uncomfortable truths' but simply cynicism.[13] There is no point 'arguing' against truths about natural laws. You can only ask experts to explain these laws. But there are good reasons to argue against cynicism. One reason is to show that people sometimes promote worldviews disguised as 'expertise-based' for specific *reasons* rather than simply based on factual expertise. These reasons deserve critical inquiry.

First, this kind of expert rhetoric allows for leaving any *participant* perspective out of game. While 'ideology' is often rightly criticised for bypassing the situation of real people in favour of a top-down application of a principle, much the same can be objected to analogously applied 'expertise'. Feminist, or ecofeminist, criticisms of many mainstream environmentalist agendas often advocate for including a wide diversity of neglected participant perspectives (cf. Sen 2019).

Decades ago, David Harvey (1974: 273) identified the cynicism in the populationists' arguments:

> Am *I* redundant? Of course not. Are *you* redundant? Of course not. So who is redundant? Of course, it must be *them*. And if there is not enough to go round, then it is only right and proper that *they*, who contribute so little to society, ought to bear the brunt of the burden [...] [w]henever a theory of overpopulation seizes hold in a society dominated by an elite, then the non-elite invariably experience some form of political, economic, and social repression.

Harvey backs this observation by a scathing criticism of the alleged inevitability assumed by the overpopulation analyses. For there are in fact at least four alternatives:

> 1. we can change the ends we have in mind and alter the social organization of scarcity; 2. we can change our technical and cultural appraisals of nature; 3. we can change our views concerning the things to which we are accustomed; 4. we can seek to alter our numbers. A real concern with environmental issues demands that all of these options be examined in relation to each other. To say that there are too many people in the world amounts to saying that we have not the imagination, will, or ability to do anything about propositions (1), (2), and (3).

However, he concludes, "nothing of consequence can be done about (1) and (3) without dismantling and replacing the capitalist market exchange economy".

Marxist social theorists have been pointing out, as the real problem, the inequality of access to resources rather than overpopulation. Patnaik (2010) notes that when the sheer numbers of people are combined with the per capita demand for fossil fuels (which is where the threat to what the Earth can sustain really stems from), the real population pressure comes from the most developed countries.[14] Such analyses also often presuppose an insidious intention on the

13 Cf. the criticisms of Malthusianism in Ross (1998).

14 Patnaik points out the importance of the *resources* of poor tropical countries being "sucked out to underpin the high living standards" of developed countries. To this

part of those who run the world, or they see the system itself as that which is to blame. In view of this, "lifeboat ethics" or "overpopulation" concerns may not be more than "privilege-protecting myths" (Barnet 1980: 303).

There needn't be pretence, though. Even when one hates immigrants or people of colour, one can care about the environment and think that there is a link. This combination of concerns, now nicknamed eco-fascism, comes in several varieties. Either you can fantasise about the assigned place to live for every 'race', which is then entitled to consume only its quota (Hardin), or you can think of environmental protection as a specifically white or 'Nordic' cultural value (wherein ecology converges with race science). Both notions can be mixed (see overviews in Biehl, Staudenmaier 1995; Angus, Butler 2011, 113ff; Cagle 2019).

Thus, the popular face of Fox News, Tucker Carlson, notes on his show that immigration "makes our own country poorer, and dirtier", explaining it further by saying:

> I actually hate litter, which is one of the reasons I'm so against illegal immigration. Produces a huge amount of litter [...] and I mean that with all sincerity.

While Carlson is an elite voice of white right-wing supremacism, there are genuinely *grassroots* instances of such a view, too. The 2019 El Paso shooter, Patrick Crusius, states in his manifesto that he is fighting against the Hispanic invasion of Texas, which, however, has as its deeper motivation his concern about the thereby accelerated increase in the population:

> The decimation of the environment is creating a massive burden for future generations. [...] [but] the average American isn't willing to change their lifestyle, even if the changes only cause a slight inconvenience. [...] So the next logical step is to decrease the number of people in America using resources. If we can get rid of enough people, then our way of life can become more sustainable.

Crusius also refers to the 2018 Christchurch attacker, Brenton Tarrant, who also left behind a manifesto (much longer than that of Crusius), in which he devoted a chapter to his idea that "Green nationalism is the only true nationalism":

> There is no Conservatism without nature, there is no nationalism without environmentalism, the natural environment of our lands shaped us just as we shaped it. [...]
>
> For too long we have allowed the left to co-opt the environmentalist movement to serve their own needs [...] whilst simultaneously presiding over the continued destruction of the natural environment itself through mass immigration and uncontrolled urbanization. [...]

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purpose, and to diverting the attention from the real sources of population pressure the story of overpopulation serves well (p. 15).

> There is no Green future with never ending population growth, the ideal green world cannot exist in a World of 100 billion 50 billion or even 10 billion people. Continued immigration into Europe is environmental warfare and ultimately destructive to nature itself.

The voices reported in this section share one common motive: there is an objective limit to what the Earth can sustain, which by definition requires that we do whatever we can to prevent its crossing. Any countering morality is fake, either deluded or sentimental.

There is a particular underlying notion of a moral and humanist action. The only morality and humanism that does not contradict itself has to follow the aim of the survival of humanity. And in this endeavour, it needs to rely on expert data. Such a conception only leaves room for debate if the relevant data are not clear enough; not a debate about what action-guiding recommendation supposedly follows from the data. The idea of the latter kind of debate is simply not inherent to this notion of morality at all. There is thus no real room for negotiation. When the moral action recommended by the claimed expertise seems to be shooting non-white people, the only objection could be that the real Earth's population as of now is not yet the number substantiating this course of action.

It seems easy and right to condemn the 'environmentalism' of Crusius or Tarrant exactly for its *ideology*. I do not feel sure, though, that the difference between them and the philanthrocapitalist or Hardin-like scholarly arguments about overpopulation lies in a special (repulsive) ideology that the shooters *added* incongruently to the expert basis. In fact, they all, albeit in different forms, subscribe to the idea of "environmentalism without ideology" and the moral necessity of doing what it dictates.

4. Expertise vs. Politics

At the end of section 1, I mentioned a few aspects that make the rhetoric of expertise as self-legitimising and sufficient action-guidance problematic. Different areas of expertise can go against each other, depending on their respective backgrounds of discipline and practice. There may not be one goal, *the* aim of environmental policy. Even if there was, to the extent that the road leading to it comprises developments of human societies and ideas, this procedure is not subject to laws analogous to the laws of chemistry. In section 3, I mentioned that we need to consider instead the often overlooked fact that there are multiple alternative solutions to the problem of the (undoubtedly) finite resources that (undoubtedly) cannot sustain an unlimited number of people.[15] The four options sketched by Harvey indicate that, given that there is much greater plasticity in the way in which people might work with options (1) to (3) – greater

15 Some tend to be more optimistic, arguing that human resourcefulness is such that it makes it virtually impossible to determine when population becomes overpopulation. E.g. Church, Regis 2014: 221.

than the Malthusians focusing solely on (4) are willing to consider –, it is not clear at all where exactly a population limit lies.

The choice between those options – all are relevant – cannot be made by expertise alone. Or, more precisely, it is simplistic to rely on such a notion of expertise that can be made serve equally well the fictional calls for wiping out humanity as expertise-based, which would relegate counterarguments to mere 'ideologies'.

The existence of the different notions, sources and areas of expertise that need to interact, but struggle heavily with this need, also shows how environmental policy may represent an interesting testing example for the notion of public reason. The multiplicity of expertise, as well as of possible solutions to population pressure (indicated by Harvey), shows that the political decision will inevitably involve *negotiation*. Much has been written about the mistaken and pernicious tendency to relegate political decisions to experts, assuming that there is one correct solution to any political problem, known by the technocrats (see e.g. Bickerton, Accetti 2017) on the symbiosis between technocracy and populism. This technocratic tendency can itself be understood as a twisted version of the idea of public reason, in the sense that it represents *the* solution to *the* problem, one that every *reasonable* person would embrace.

Ironically, Rawls – the major advocate of the idea of public reason – has a thin and cautious conception, confining public reason to issues such as the right to vote, or equality before the law. He even mentions environmental protection as an example of the kind of questions that are political yet *not* matters of public reason (Rawls 2005: 214). Environmental protection would thus appear to *not* have one privileged, publicly reasonable answer.

Rawls admits the existence of such openly political topics but relegates them to a "less fundamental" position in his account. However, the critics of the idea of public reason would reject the idea of such a hierarchy. For them, not only is there an inevitable pluralism of positions of interest, but we have no right to expect that they can always essentially be reconciled even in the domain of supposedly fundamental political questions (cf. Mouffe 2013: 1 ff., 54 ff.). If questions of environment policy are open to heated debate, this needs not mean either that they are of a secondary political importance or that we overlook the one objectively right solution. They can be *both* of the utmost political importance *and* of an irreducibly politically agonistic kind.

Environmental policy represents, though, a deceptive case, which makes it a particularly important example. There undeniably *is* a massive body of expert information, without which environmental policy-making is impossible, and disregarding it would amount to criminal stupidity. The body of expert information is so massive and overwhelming, and the attempts to build politics on a wilful disregard for it so outrageous and pathetic, that some suggest that *expertise is all that there is*, necessary and sufficient, for the purpose of policy-making. Wherein lies the political aspect, then?

Let us return to the charge of ideology. The word itself circulates in different meanings. Those who plead for "environmentalism without ideology"

often presuppose 'ideology' in the sense of the Marxist critiques of ideology: as a system of false beliefs diverting us from seeing the truth. However, backed by this suspicion comes the dismissive attitude towards anything beyond the putative description of bare facts. A more contemporary and less prejudiced notion of ideology – often embraced by people engaged in any professedly *non*-technocratic politics – has, as its purpose, the rehabilitation of value inputs into our political standpoints. Ideology would then not only be something that is not necessarily wrong and harmful, but may even prove indispensable, as an arsenal of interpretations helping us to understand the facts comprising our political reality and navigate within it (Freeden 2003: 1 ff.).[16]

The suggestions that expertise is everything are exactly what makes the stakes for retaining an open space for 'ideology' in the latter sense so high. Such an ideology seems the best resource to rely on in opposing those expert assessments that recommend lowering the number of 'them'. The redistribution of wealth, changes made to the structure of the world economy, rearranging the patterns of our consumer behaviour – these are options too. No expertise *alone* substantiates a preference for these, but, honestly, there are not only expert reasons behind the philanthrocapitalists' sympathies for "fighting against overpopulation". The same probably goes for our scientifically-minded FB acquaintances. They have an ideology, as do those who want to defend the life of every human being.

Which ideology is better? This is a legitimate question. The irreducible plurality of political standpoints does not mean that ideology makes no difference. Yet, once we rule out extreme scenarios (Agent Smith), practically any other option represents a challenge. None of them can present itself as unburdened by any compromises, and the decision to be made – selecting from those options – is thus not an expert decision. It remains political; in that it calls for opening the question of the *justice* of the considered options. This entry of justice, in the form of *climate justice*, makes the question of environmental policy irreducibly political.

Without going into the details of theories of justice, and merely acknowledging that they are multiple, we can say that hardly any theory considering itself a theory of *justice* could go for "let the poor die" (which is what some populationists say – see the overview in Angus, Butler 2011: 23 ff.). For various reasons, this is not an intelligible way of working with the term 'justice'. In his report for the UN, Philip Alston summarises the ways in which the disproportionally negative impact of climate change on the poor is not simply their fault but is exacerbated by the fact that "[c]limate change is a market failure". Relying on charity organised by the private sector is relying on initiatives that are, in the best case, "essentially toothless". In the worst case, relying on the private sector "poses risks to the rights of people in poverty" and could lead

16 "[W]e are all ideologists in that we have understandings of the political environment of which we are part, and have views about the merits and failings of that environment" (1 f.).

to a "climate apartheid scenario in which the wealthy pay to escape overheating, hunger, and conflict, while the rest of the world is left to suffer" (Alston 2019). Alston's protest is phrased as one of justice.

Why is climate apartheid *not* justice? And, if it is not, how should we take justice into account? Acknowledging that decisions made in environmental policy are *political* amounts to acknowledging that these decisions need to consider how they affect all the different concerned parties; as such they simply *are* about justice (cf. Sen 2014). A politician is typically in the position where every option she has available will affect somebody negatively. Justice needn't achieve a state in which nobody would have to give up anything. However, ignoring that one has made a particular decision that will be more detrimental to some simply because the others (those who benefit more from the decision) are richer, or even accepting it, suggests a blind spot in her view of what justice is.

The above-discussed kind of reliance on 'expertise' is deceptive in that it rules out the variety of situated perspectives and interests, by leaving precisely one 'ideology' invisible. This ideology implicitly tends towards a crudely simplified utilitarian calculus, the forms of which we see in the proposals and strategies of 'directly' fighting overpopulation in Third World countries. It is vital to show that this, too, is just one alternative among many, motivated by its own set of ideological (which I do not mean pejoratively) presuppositions, and especially showing that this alternative provides little justice to the weak and poor.

Environmental issues usually don't strike us as concerning the *irreconcilable* personal interests of individuals. We tend to perceive them as being of public concern with, in a sense, *only one* interested party at the table: *everybody*. One important role that the concern for justice plays is to prevent confusing 'everybody' with the 'survival of humanity'. Not even environmental issues can thus easily be considered as falling outside the domain of the "conflicts for which no rational solution could ever exist" (in Mouffe's words). For one thing, it seems plainly counterintuitive that top-down proposed, region-specific overpopulation warfare would pass for the best solution for *everybody*, upon negotiation. And, more importantly, even if there is only one interested party, what is 'good' for people is never 'objectively' one thing. What affects people's lives in ways that they consider as 'good' (whether deliberately, or spontaneously) is in a non-causal interaction with their *ideas* about life.

Political decisions never make everybody happy. But a politician cannot officially, explicitly subscribe to disregarding somebody's legitimate interests. Even though some interests sometimes cannot be met, this does not render them illegitimate, and it does not make it misplaced to care about the failure to meet them. Thus, a board of the world's political leaders may not know if the problems of poverty, hunger and access to clean water for everybody can be solved worldwide, but the fact that they see no clear solutions now does not mean that they should simply stop further worrying about the problem. Still less are they justified to say: "Since we have secured the survival of humanity, the necessary portion of which will have food and water, we can concede to letting the rest die".

An expert may provide an assessment of the situation: she may, for instance, state that there is *at present* no clear or even predictable scenario of securing food and access to clean water for everybody if the Earth's population grows to 15 billion. If we lose sight of the difference between such an assessment and inferring from it that it is therefore okay not to have it secured (and that it would be harmfully sentimental to put effort into a search for a solution), we will easily slide towards outrageous suggestions. Similarly, unless we retain the notion of the indispensably political component in environmental policy decisions (that concern population), we may end up with nothing to object legitimately to statements like "There are too many people in sub-Saharan Africa. Their number should be lowered by a targeted intervention".

The lesson from the deceptively overwhelming presence of scientific expertise in matters of environmental protection, along with the genuine importance of this expertise, suggests that we should rethink more carefully the standing of expertise. Knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is socially produced, including its system of evidence and error checks, as many have argued (e.g. Longino 1990). While Rawls (2005: 224f) simply considers science a prime instance of public reason, if we look at the public domain from a more agonistic angle, science and knowledge themselves will appear as a matter of difficult, historically, socially and culturally conditioned negotiations. In this sense, even what we know about the environment and the various courses of its protection and their consequences *can* be reclaimed as a matter of expertise, if we opt for an accordingly open-ended, pluralistic, dynamic and conditioned notion of expertise. (Which, as for instance Norton [2017] argues, is exactly what the nature of expertise in environmental policy and protection is like.) One step towards this is to stop separating the expert questions of environmental protection from issues where the worse-off groups' emancipation from the pressure of hegemony (even if masked as consensus), in Mouffe's terms, is at stake. The environmental crisis is acknowledged as *intertwined* with the crisis of agriculture, the crisis of education or the crisis of international debt (Spretnak 1990: 8 ff.). Various forms of expertise are employed in the *political* negotiations over solutions to the last two crises. They should then represent just as organic a part of the politically negotiated solutions to the crisis of agriculture, understood as so intertwined.[17] While expertise in a wholly unprejudiced form may not be possible, expertise that takes into account its own prejudices may realise that there is no reasonable method of 'population control' that could afford not to take into account centrally the local perspectives of interest of the poorest, the marginalised and those who carry the greatest part of the burden of the climate crisis (cf. Spretnak 1990: 12).

17 Cf. examples of ecological research responsive in such a way to its wider contexts, discussed by Di Chiro 2010: 210 ff.

To Conclude

Environmental politics, as an autonomous domain of making decisions, *is* heavily expert-laden and, at the same time, is heavily ethical and political – incorporating the dimensions of (moral) rightness and justice. I would never argue that there is no such thing as expertise or that we should ignore it in environmental decision-making. On the contrary. The neglect of factual expertise is nothing short of criminal here, in ways in which it is often not in personal decisions (should I lie to a friend to cover for another friend?). But it seems equally 'criminal' to neglect what is *not* exhausted by the claim of narrowly construed expertise. Politics, after all, is simply the endeavour of taking into account all that we know about the situation in question, including how everybody is affected, and making the best of it. Determining what 'the best' is needs, of course, further ongoing negotiations, which is why political debates do not only aim at making the decision but also at understanding what it is that we want. We, as citizens, are entitled to expect nothing less than "trying to make the best of it" from ourselves and our representatives.

Many examples of decision-making contexts – cell phones in schools, the permissible age of drinking alcohol, or of consensual sex – combine values (ideological backgrounds) with expertise. But in many of these other contexts, the 'ideological' or perspective-related components are usually so saliently visible as *indispensable*, that the tendency to interpret such a decision as purely expert, ideology- or value-free, is much less striking than in the environmental context. A part of what makes dilemmas in medical ethics perceptibly moral is this salience of the other component of the decisions as one that must not be, not even rhetorically, neglected. By establishing an 'expert hegemony' here, we would clearly lose something of the sense of what makes the decision a moral decision, and thereby fail to do justice to it. The seriousness intrinsic to bioethical dilemmas is clear; they concern particular people, and the possibility of tragic harm being inflicted on them arises in the decisions as irreducibly relevant. Perhaps we need to keep our minds open to the senses in which tragedy can enter the crossroads of environmental policy, too.

The moral risk for environmental debates may thus consist in the endeavour to picture these debates as purely expert and depriving them of their irreducible political dimension. For it is not simply a political failure – a failure of justice – but a moral one: pretending that one's proposals have nothing to do with any political agenda and that the concern for justice is misplaced here. Especially if one does it with the aim of depriving some affected and afflicted parties of their right to voice their concerns.[18]

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Ondrej Beran

'Ekološki aktivizam lišen ideologije' i snovi o istrebljivanju čovečanstva

Apstrakt

Moj cilj je da na primeru ekološke politike preispitam retoriku stručnosti kao objektivne, neutralne i lišene ideologije. Prvi odeljak uvodi primere uobičajenih retoričkih figura stručnjaka, i ne-ideološke zaštite životne sredine, ističući pretpostavke koje one podrazumevanju. Drugi odeljak uvodi objekte poređenja – karikaturalne predloge o istrebljivanju čovečanstva – sa ciljem da se pokaže da obe grupe predloga pretpostavljaju zajedničku retoriku. U trećem delu razmatraju se neke istaknute odlike raznih predloga 'kontrole populacije', dovodeći ih u vezu sa trenutnim porastom takozvanog eko-fašizma. Cilj je pokazati da svi ovi fenomeni predstavljaju skalu ideja ekološkog aktivizma lišenog ideologije. Završni odeljak raspravlja o iskrivljenom shvatanju stručnosti, ideologije i politike, koji su od ključnog značaja za primere o kojima se prethodno raspravljo, a koji vode ka žalosnom neznanju ili neprikrivenom cinizmu, i stoga rezultiraju moralnim neuspehom.

Ključne reči: ekološki aktivizam, ideologija, stručnost, prenaseljenost

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Ana Đorđević

BECOMING AN ETHNIC SUBJECT. CULTURAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION[1]

ABSTRACT
This paper offers an alternative theoretical consideration of ethnic identification in psychology. Mainstream social psychological theories are largely positivist and individualistic. New possibilities of theoretical understanding open up as the relational and symbolic nature of ethnicity enters psychological inquiry. This paper takes culture and self as two conceptual domains of social identification, following a meta-theoretical position of cultural psychology. The central focus is the cultural development of the person in social context of a given culture, specifically their ethnic identification, to which end, it looks at several processual aspects. First, ethnic culture is approached as a guiding principle and practice in everyday understanding and experience of one's own ethnicity. Second, ethnic identification is considered a social and personal act of meaning making, which happens in a given social context, through practical activity and the discursive positioning of a person. Third, since rather than considered a conscious aspect of belonging, ethnicity is assumed and taken for granted, ruptures are considered as destabilizing events that create an opportunity for ethnic meaning reinterpretation and developmental transition. In the meaning making process, symbolic resources are conceived of as primary self-configuring tools, which are also culture-configuring. Ethnic meaning making is theorized as a central social-psychological process through which ethnic culture and a person as an ethnic subject emerge in historical perspective. Finally, the uniqueness of a singular person in the shared ethnic culture is conceptualized based on symbolic distancing from the immediate social context, through the model of knitting personal and socio-historical semiotic threads.

KEYWORDS
cultural psychology, ethnic identification, subjectivity, meaning making, symbolic resource, rupture

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Introduction

The usual theoretical tools for thinking about ethnicity – categorization, identity, difference – are merely particular, and not exceptional tools for conceptualizing the relationship between a person and their ethnic community, a conclusion already reached by contemporary social theory on ethnicity (Brubaker 2002; Brubaker, Cooper 2000). Psychology, however, has remained unaffected by social theory due to its focus on basic psychological processes of social identification (Reicher, Hopkins 2001)[2]. However, there is no necessity to ethnicity being comprehended with the use of these specific tools. This paper thus presents the question: are there other ways of understanding the psychology of ethnicity today? An alternative theoretical conceptualization would illuminate the way for alternative practices.

Theorization of the problem of ethnic identification can be situated in the relationship between culture and self, whereby a person becomes the subject of ethnic socialization. Since the issue of the essentially relational, but also symbolic nature of ethnic identification is highly neglected in mainstream social psychology, the aim of this paper is to elaborate an interpretivist and relationist theoretical position in psychology with regards to this phenomenon, by using an assemblage of theoretical resources from the conceptual repertoire of cultural psychology. The cultural-psychological framework provides a broader perspective on the mutual relation and positioning of a person within culture, from which issue divergent and variable consequences for one's personal experience and relationships with other people.

The paper first gives general remarks about the cultural-psychological perspective, followed by a general account of the relationship between culture and self, as the two main domains of theoretical analysis of social identification. The central part specifies the theoretical considerations of cultural psychology on the problem of ethnic identification: it provides a step-by-step analysis of different aspects of the evolution of ethnic identification within a particular social context, simultaneously taking into account the dynamic relationship between the social and the psychic. Ruptures, symbolic resources, and meaning making processes take leading roles in the emergence of a person as an ethnic subject. Finally, the conclusion is intended to summarize and tie together the main points of the paper.

General Remarks

Cultural psychology represents an alternative psychological understanding of the human condition, which, taking an interpretivist critical approach, stands in

2 Positivism in psychology has been challenged by the group of discursive theorists (Davies, Harré 1990; Harré 1979; Wetherell 2008), some of whom had been members of the original laboratory where the most relevant *Social Identity Theory* has emerged from (e.g., Michael Billig). Not to disrupt the main line of argument in this paper, we decided not to include the overview of such attempts, in preparation of another publication.

opposition to the mainstream positivist trend in psychology. Cultural psychology emerged at about the same time as its mainstream counterpart, but contrary to it, aims at interpreting cultural-historical conditions of socio-psychological phenomena (Barbu 1960; Benson 2001; Cole 1996; Shweder 1991; Valsiner 2007; Vygotsky 1997). This is why cultural psychology can also be qualified as a different paradigm. Its roots reach all the way to Wilhelm Wundt, the founding father of formally recognized and institutionally established experimental psychology, but also of the marginalized and historically repressed cultural interpretivist branch of psychology, known as *Völkerpsychologie* (Jovanović 2019).

The point of differentiation of this psychological reasoning from others is *social context*, not culture in a narrow sense.[3] Therefore, it should not be identified with cross-cultural psychology, but rather with its anthropological variant: its emphasis on social context, practices, and interaction is inspired by works of cultural and social anthropologists, as well as important figures in the history of experimental social psychology, who also recognized the significance of social context for psychological research (Israel, Tajfel 1972; Reicher, Hopkins 2001).

Apart from interest in the social context, from its beginnings, cultural psychology has dealt with *cultural development*, i.e., the development of human beings' interaction with their social environment (Vygotsky 1997). The interactive development of a person occurs as a process of dynamic adjustment,[4] characterized by complexity, non-linearity, disruption, and contradiction, which results in qualitatively new forms of psychological functioning on the higher levels of ontological development. The primary role in facilitating development belongs to linguistically and materially mediated social interaction, through which the caregivers, i.e., the competent others, teach the child how to act in a socially meaningful manner (Rogoff 2003). Gradually, by gaining personal sense, the child's verbal and non-verbal behavior, initially meaningful only to its social environment, become part of the child's psychic world (Vygotsky 1962). These social and psychological processes are called *mediation and appropriation*, and they represent two sides of the same developmental process in which the child simultaneously becomes a socialized and unique person (Rogoff 2003; Wertsch 1985). From this basic standpoint, it follows that a person is actively involved in their own socio-cultural development through the process of cultural-personal co-construction (Valsiner 2012). Consequently, each person is an integral part of shared culture, but is also unique, because there are no two

3 For more on the definitions of culture, see Kroeber, Kluckhohn 1952.

4 What is specific for cultural psychology in comparison to evolutionary psychology is that it considers cultural development qualitatively different from biological and evolutionary development (Vygotsky 1997). What differentiates a human being from other animals is life in a culture which is trans-generationally transmitted, and changeable in biologically unpredictable ways. Social adjustment of a human being is also changeable and unpredictable, and, therefore, insusceptible to natural scientific laws. According to Lev Vygotsky, the key feature of cultural development is revolutionary, not just evolutionary progress (ibid.).

identical cultural developmental processes in the interplay with the cultural environment (Zittoun 2012). Nor is the cultural environment homogeneous, but rather a synthesis of different and changing cultural niches. Additionally, the same cultural content can have different meanings to different persons (Vygotsky 1962), which is the point where psychology meets anthropology.

Cultural psychology as a meta-theoretical position takes an interest in the whole complexity of the human condition, not only particular processes or behaviors, and is, therefore, marked by heterogeneity (Valsiner 2012). The main philosophical influence on cultural psychology comes from symbolic interactionism, pragmatism, and semiotics (Bakhtin 1982; Dewey 1922; Mead 1934; Wittgenstein 1958). Inspired by philosophy, three general directions of cultural psychology can be distinguished (according to Ratner 1999): a symbolic approach, activity theory, and individual approach. Carl Ratner, one of today's most relevant cultural psychologists, elaborates four main, mutually-conditioning principles of cultural psychology (ibid.: 21–25):

1. *Psychological phenomena are essentially cultural.* Psychological processes form through participation of an individual in social life. They embody characteristics of social life forms, and generate behavior that reflects features of social relations. This principle combines sociological and psychological perspectives on the human condition.
2. *The cultural essence of psychological phenomena consists of practical social activity.* Individuals are primarily involved in social life through their participation in socio-cultural practices, which represent culturally and institutionally organized behaviors aimed at fulfilling the practical needs of everyday life (e.g., playing, working, giving birth, learning, managing, being medically treated etc.). The emphasis is on practical activity, rather than on general mental processes. The psyche is thus able to appear multiple, have sundry thoughts, sensations, feelings, experiences and behaviors, always regulated by social rules. This is the main focus of the cultural-psychological studies conducted by Michael Cole, Barbara Rogoff, Yrjö Engeström, etc.
3. *Psychological phenomena are organized through social concepts and symbols.* Symbols, as well as psychological functions, appear on two levels: primarily on the social, and second on the psychological. The transition from one level to another occurs through the process of symbolic mediation. Among the most prominent cultural psychologists with this focus of research are Richard Shweder, James Wertsch, and Tania Zittoun.
4. *Individuals actively make meaningful social activities, concepts, and psychic phenomena.* Individuals have agency, or the capability to act, but only within the limits of available social activities. Active participation and the individual's freedom to act in a cultural world is the main focus of the Danish cultural psychologist Jaan Valsiner, founder of the most current scientific journal for cultural psychology.

Since the renewal of cultural psychology in the nineteen nineties, various lines and aspects of research have developed (Valsiner 2012). Research is carried out using different units of analysis (practical activity, symbolic mediation, social interaction, discursive positioning, cultural objects and resources, personal narratives etc.), and different levels of analysis (micro, mezzo, macro level), but also on different types of cultural development (ontogenetic or phylogenetic). The overall problem is a synthesis of the different approaches, but the general goal is to approach research phenomena as complex ensembles of meaningful units in a dialectic relationship (ibid.). Cultural psychologists agree upon the premise that cultural-psychological phenomena are and should be treated as holistic, relational, complex, and contradictory, but also always contextual and symbolic. The missing piece from this comprehensive account of human conduct is a coherent set of relevant scientific methods, corresponding to complex units of analysis (Valsiner 2009, 2012), as well as research directions that can question the status quo and incite social change (Engeström, Miettinen 1999).

Culture and Self

In cultural psychology, cultural worlds are conceptualized as intentional worlds, inhabited and pervaded by human meanings and purposes (Shweder 1991). These worlds are the products of human agency, which is dynamic and constructive in that it is involved in the cultural production through everyday social interactions. Nevertheless, it is also constrained within a cultural framework. For its part, culture is not conceptualized as homogeneous, stereotypical, and static entity (Adams, Markus 2004), but as "explicit and implicit *patterns* of historically derived and selected ideas and their embodiment in institutions, practices, and artifacts; cultural patterns may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, and on the other as conditioning elements of further action" (Kroeber, Kluckhohn 1952: 357). Therefore, culture is not concerned only with reflexive and conscious institutional patterns, but also with those that regulate and give structure to everyday activities. Cultural patterns are at the same time sedimented products of collective human history and historically contingent. The world people inhabit is always already patterned, yet remains to be forged.

By focusing on subjective cultural features only, there is a risk of culture being seen exclusively as ideological reality that regulates our lives from above (Adams, Markus 2004; Bruner 1990). Inversely, cultural patterns are material as much as they are, so to say, mental, since the two domains are not clearly delimited. The world of objects is saturated by personal meanings, and the mental world is mediated by material objects. Cultural patterns are ideas and their objectifications in the given social structures, practices, institutions, and artifacts we encounter through our daily lives.

Now that we have established the definition of culture suitable for psychological analysis, we turn to the definition of self that is suitable for socio-cultural analysis. In this paper, the self is defined as a situational *position* that functions

as a frame of reference or central point, from which a person can act in their environment, according to variable felling of agency; on the other hand, this position is more or less stable and coherent, given the narrative possibilities for creating autobiography, which correspond to the demands of certain social and historical context (Bakhurst, Shanker 2001; Benson 2001; Harré 1979). That kind of self is conceptualized as variable, fluid, and unstable, but with the capability to act in the social world, and whose possibilities of self-interpretation/ reflection depend upon available resources within the given socio-cultural framework. Resources or tools are the products of culture, which determines and regulates the possibility of self-creation. The primary function of the self is to *locate* us within different fields of experience and quotidian situations, on the crossroads of social possibilities and opportunities. The cultural self is dialogical and extensive, because it is distributed across different aspects that are not only mental or corporeal, but also inclusive of other people, personal belongings and preferences, routines etc. (Benson 2001; Hermans 2001; James 1890). Those aspects are not given outside the self, they are constitutive of it (Mead 1934). The dialogical self represents the potential of the self to be produced through dialogue of its different positions embodied in different cultural practices and narratives (Hermans et al. 1992). Not only is it dialogical, but it is also performative in the sense that it is embodied in practical social activities and essentially *able* to occupy multiple positions that bear differential possibilities (du Toit 1997; Hermans 2001). Therefore, the cultural self is inevitably political and potentially transformative.

Social Identification in Cultural Code

By adopting the cultural-psychological framework, this article aims to understand the way people identify through positioning in discursive interactions (Wortham 2001), as well as the cultural shaping of that positioning, which takes place through symbolic and material mediation (Holland et al. 1998). In other words, people are not carriers of certain social identities; they participate in activities and stories that shape them in certain ways and are intelligible to other people. The socio-cultural interpretive framework provides a perspective on the person as social actor in cultural worlds and events, where they meet and interact with other people (Vagan 2011; Wertsch 1993; Wortham 2001). Cultural elements constrain, and thus define personal identifications through a process of symbolic mediation (Wertsch 2007). Cultural elements are appropriated into symbolic resources for one's self-construction (Zittoun et al. 2003). Myriad cultural artifacts provide people with agency and identity by expanding and restricting human activity (Cole 1996). Therefore, who we are or how we experience our self depends on the practical social activities and interactions in which we participate and on the symbolic resources we use on those occasions.

Now, to be a member of a particular cultural community is to identify with it, to participate in its practices, to be actively involved in the production of

its culture by using its artifacts and languages (Vagan 2011). The usage of artifacts, however, is usually unconscious and implicit, because it takes place daily, through taken-for-granted practices and rituals, such as brushing teeth or saying a prayer before a meal. Cultural mediators determine the degree of freedom of self-construction (Wertsch 2007). There are not infinite ways to identify ourselves because in a given society there are not infinite artifacts to mediate those identifications, nor are they even all equally available to all members. The very foundation of our self-definition is limited by potential cultural worlds of who we *can be* in a given society, in a given period of time, in a given situation, and with certain people (Bruner 1986; Vagan 2011). The domain of the *potential* is defined by available ways of being in a society, given social positions, but also by the way we relate to them (Taylor 1985).

This discussion touches upon the dual nature of cultural artifacts (Cole 1996). On one side, the world is abundant with pregiven cultural artifacts. On the other, we selectively use certain artifacts in the process of interpersonal self-construction and self-positioning. Appropriated or consumed, artifacts are resources organically incorporated into our personal experiences and activities and becoming their integral part (Vygotsky 1997; Wertsch 1993, 2007; Zittoun et al. 2003). Therefore, artifacts are both cultural and personal construction tools.

The most widespread tool is language, which explicitly articulates our experience and our sense of self. Various linguistic tools are used for the process of identification (Hermans 2001), although the primary one is dialogue, as it is only through dialogue that we learn to use other linguistic tools (Nelson 2003). In order to understand what version of self is performed by certain self-referring statements, we need to go behind the verbal statement into the realm of assumed knowledge which underlies the discursive positioning by which we self-identify (Bruner 1986). What frame of reference, meaning dimensions or lay theories are taken for granted in the process of self-identifying? To be able to understand narrative and social activities through which people identify, we need to become familiar with the characteristics of *figured worlds* invoked in their personal stories (Vagan 2011). Those stories are socially constructed realms of interpretation in which only certain actors and positions are recognized, only certain activities have significance, and only certain outcomes are valued (Holland et al. 1998). Figured worlds are cultures whose interpretive repertoires we use in verbalization of our most intimate experience. By participating in those worlds, we gain resources to conceptualize who we are, what our role is in the here and now, what we strive for, and how we can change (Haug et al. 1999; Wertsch 1993).

Undoubtedly, language is the basic symbolic tool for the construction of an individual position in social activity, but different languages are used within the different social communities we inhabit (Hermans 2001).[5] Each person belongs

5 By which we do not mean national languages, but colloquial and conventional languages of various informal communities and cultures. For example, a person can say

to numerous communities or collectives and the languages of all those collectives are at their disposal. In that sense, when we speak about ourselves, we always speak using the language of a given collective and, in fact, that is how the collective speaks through us (Bakhtin 1973, according to Hermans et al. 1992). The significance of belonging to a group does not manifest as a cognitive representation of a group in our minds or a "social identity" (Tajfel 1974), but as a collective language we use in our articulation of who we are. Our self is dialogical by way of speaking multiple collective languages which shape what we (actually) say (Hermans 2001). It is not that each 'I' in society carries a unique inner 'identity', but is rather a polyglot who can take up any number of positions by using various collective languages (Hermans et al. 1992).

Cultural worlds, as well as cultural artifacts, do not only exist in an ideological sphere, but are rather constantly enacted through activities, socially organized around positions of status, impact, and power (Holland et al. 1998). They are always practiced and at the service of people as social actors, who continuously exploit them in their participation in social life. These considerations bring to the fore a radically anti-dualist perspective of cultural psychology and reliance on social context as space of interaction of the social and personal. As such, cultural psychology converges with an interactionist approach to ethnicity (Bart 1997), but it is not limited to processes of recognition and categorization only. Cultural psychology concentrates on the processes of symbolic penetration of the cultural into the individual. Although social context can, depending on the unit of analysis, be approached on macro, mezzo, and micro levels, this paper focuses on micro-genetic analysis in a specific life situation. It analyzes the complex interplay on that level between social and personal identification with social context, cultural knowledge and values, and the concrete cultural activity and social interaction through mediation and appropriation of cultural tools. Unlike mainstream social identity theory in psychology, which generates knowledge on social identity processes as general psychological, i.e., individualistic, processes, this paper aims at a contextually specific theorization about *how* ethnic identification emerges from the *interaction* between a person and their social environment. The premise of the interpretative analysis is the alignment of the general and particular levels, and therefore the cultural content of ethnic identification is treated equally important as psychological processes of ethnic identification (cf. Geertz 1993). The following section applies this general theoretical formulation of the relationship between the cultural and the personal to the specific problem of ethnic identification.

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that he is a "true neutral", unlike his mother who is "lawful good", which is only understandable in terms of Dungeons and Dragons character alignment, i.e., represents a collective language of Dungeons and Dragons fans.

Ethnic Identification: Emerging Subjectivity in the Socio-Cultural Context

Ethnic Culture

In order to *be*, one has to be *somewhere* (Benson 2001). Being or existing means positioning oneself in different spaces – corporeal, social, mental, personal, spiritual, cosmic, semantic, virtual... which all set the stage for one's place in the world. Place is a personal space that defines one's existence. It is not an abstract position, but one determined by coordinates within the system of physical and symbolic relations. Every attempt at designation of that position – the answer to the question "who am I?" – demands a minimal distance from that very position (Zittoun 2012). Therefore, a necessary condition of existence is place; and a necessary condition of identification is symbolic distancing from that place, i.e., symbolic mediation.

As individuals, we are immersed in dynamic conventional networks of meaning; managing them is easier if they are familiar to us, such as the networks we grew up in, or ones in which we feel at home (Bourdieu 1977). Ethnic culture is one such network, residing along *liminality* between the literal and the metaphoric, the real and the imaginary, the permanent and the temporal, the actual and the possible. It represents the system of meanings organized by certain central principles and values, "from which are deduced or to which are attached a large number of more or less explicit rules about how to live a good life" (Dahinden & Zittoun 2013: 5).[6] Those rules regulate the relationships between various groups of people, such as men and women, juniors and seniors, people of different ethnicities. They also regulate how people relate towards objects, such as traditional dress, flags, religious ornaments, and symbols like anthems, emblems, and gestures. Further, daily life is affected by these rules, in particular moments of transition in life and rites of passage. Finally, these rules regulate one's relation to oneself.

These rules or norms become concrete through language enacted in stories, anecdotes, proverbs and sayings, thus remaining meaningful and understandable in content to ordinary people and future generations. For example, conceiving ethnic belonging through the language of 'family', shapes its understanding in terms of health, development, kinship, proximity, ancestry and name, but also in terms of neighborliness, friendship and enmity (Benson 2001). A more specific example from the local context is the so-called Vidovdan narrative, in which Serbianness is defined in terms of loyalty and betrayal[7] (Čolović 2014).

6 The rules and norms can be institutionalized within state apparatus, especially within ethno-national states like almost all post-Yugoslav countries. This can be done through national legislation regarding the status of ethnic membership of the citizens. These formal institutional aspects are not to be confused with ordinary everyday ones. This paper chooses to theorize ethnic rather than national identification.

7 Vidovdan (June 28th by Gregorian calendar) is Serbian national and religious holiday with a special importance for Kosovo mythology, since that was the date when the

Nevertheless, culture is not only established on the level of normative ideals, but is also always enacted (Harré 1998). Through practical symbolic and physical activity in their everyday lives, people (re)activate cultural principles and norms, or folk wisdom (Dahinden & Zittoun 2013). For example, a young man might celebrate Ratko Mladić[8] as a war hero by posting something to that effect on a social network or by drawing graffiti, which is then seen by thousands of other people. A person can mobilize an ethnic element in a narrowly personal sense, without being aware of its social meaning. The mentioned young man might actually not know exactly who Ratko Mladić is or what role he played in history, posting content online about Mladić merely to be closer to his friends, feel more valued and accepted. A person could even mobilize an ethnic element entirely without reflection or any personal attachment to it. Therefore, an ethnic element can be used and reinforced through mere practice, although multiple layers of underlying meanings and use consequences would nevertheless still be reinforced.

It follows from the definition of ethnic culture that it necessarily intersects with other practices and discourses that define other group memberships. In other words, ethnic narratives and practices are in a direct relation with gender norms and practices, national definitions and interests, age-related norms, and educational obligations and roles. For example, in the nationalist slogan "She to bear children, he to protect" ("Ona da rađa, on da brani"), the ethnic and gender dimensions intersect, determining the differences in roles and obligations of a Serbian woman and man. Additionally, this kind of ethnic positioning of a woman is directly related to her body and reproductive capacity, also tied to the political question of demographics. Another example can be found in school curricula, regarding the historical interpretation of the Bosnian War (1992-1995). If a student questions the number of Muslim men killed in Srebrenica in 1995[9], he may be considered not to have appropriately learned the lesson. Opposing ethnic norms institutionalized through the education system becomes part of being seen as "bad student". We can see how the idea of the ethnic shifts with the cultural and institutional framework.

Ethnic Identification

The question arising from previous considerations is, how does an ethnic identification take place? By taking this question at face value and by taking seriously

Battle of Kosovo took place in 1389. The Battle of Kosovo is one of the most prominent symbolic resources that Serbian nationalists have used during the Yugoslav Wars (1991-1999), up until today.

8 Ratko Mladić is a Bosnian Serb, colonel-general of the Army of Republika Srpska during the Yugoslav Wars, and a convicted war criminal since 2017.

9 Questioning the number of victims on each side during the Yugoslav Wars (Serbian, Bosnian, Croatian) is one of the main resources for the relativization of war crimes, since there are many sources of contradictory information, and many victims are still declared missing.

the selection of the term 'identification', rather than 'identity', 'self' or something else, we can infer that ethnic identification is not something a person *is*, but something that *happens* to them in a given context. In other words, ethnic identification is a complex *act* of meaning making which mutually configures the ethnic culture and the subjectivity of a person. It is integrative, relational, practical, and transforms cultural resources into performances (Wetherell 2008: 74). Identification of a person as a member of an ethnic community is the outcome of interactional, seldom reflexive discursive positioning (Davies, Harré 1990). It follows from this definition that ethnic identification is necessarily situational, but only on one level. By a series of repeated similar interactions and a person's positioning within an ethnic culture, they can develop a stable self-narrative about their ethnic belonging. With the definition of self from the previous section in mind, stability and coherence of self-identification over time depends upon the availability of certain cultural resources for the construction of self (Bakhurst, Shanker 2001). The durability, persistence, and stability of the self are conditioned by the possibility of generalization from the situational context, which is dependent on the symbolic resources of a given social context and time, as well as the capacity for personal reflection.

Further, apart from performative and relational, identification is also personal. Even though it is always in symbolic mediation or a process of co-construction (Valsiner et al. 1997), it can appear as utterly subtle, intimate personal experience, even bodily sensation. Therefore, certain sounds, smells, and flavors can be associated with an ethnic culture and can initiate a strong feeling of ethnic belonging. On the other hand, some images, stories, or memory flashes can cause revulsion, disgust, terror, and tears. Again, the possibility of experiencing, as well as the quality of experience are determined by cultural elements and norms in a given situation, and the capability of a person to distance themselves and reflect upon the meaning and relevance of what is happening. For example, there is much less space for negotiation of meaning for self and society in a war, where the events are constantly life-threatening, roles and duties are rigidly defined by military hierarchy, than in a friendly discussion over coffee about whether the war in Bosnia was ethnic or civil. The impact on personal experience is different and can also be left out: not everything becomes personally relevant.

Ruptures and Symbolic Resources

Let us try to be even more specific as we pose the subsequent question: in which contexts does ethnic identification take place? Ethnic culture, among others, is already given, but mostly implicitly. Simply put, in order for our social interactions to unfold smoothly, most of the conventional meanings we use are taken for granted (Bourdieu 1991; Zittoun et al. 2003). In other words, we are not aware of those meanings even though we constantly use them as symbolic resources in the navigation of our social life. Becoming aware of the daily usage of cultural elements calls for a certain *event* to happen, which interrupts

the regular continuity of our experience and requires (re)interpretation. Such events create *ruptures* in the ongoing meaning making and ordinary social interactions (Zittoun et al. 2003). The ruptures can take place at the level of inner experience, when meeting the other person or a strange object, due to physical or imaginary displacement (ibid.: 417). Rupture is a moment of becoming aware of our ethnicity, regardless of occasion. They challenge the process of symbolic meaning making, but also create opportunity for a developmental transition (Zittoun 2006). Symbolic resources stand out as key mediators of the provoked developmental change, as they are used in order to achieve a certain goal in a given social, cultural and historical context (Zittoun et al. 2003). That can be a new interpretation of an event, other people, or oneself. In any case, the new psychic formation implies better adjustment to the social environment. In that case, the symbolic activity of a person becomes mediated in such a way that its features reflect the features of the resource used, and it becomes entangled with a person's interaction with real or imaginary other people, institutions, traditions, who are projected into the here and now (ibid.). Unlike social representations, which transcend the activity of a person (Moscovici 2001), symbolic resources have a concrete actual embodiment in the social activity of a person, and they regulate the person's emotional experience and self-understanding in new ways (Zittoun et al. 2003). The developmental progress does not necessarily imply that a person will be *more* familiarized or identified with their ethnicity, as some other psychological theories propose (Phinney 1993), but rather that the person's relation towards the ethnic culture and community will be *changed*, i.e., qualitatively different than previously, and that they will *feel and act* differently, in accordance with that change. Let us not forget that the choice of symbolic elements used and the specific transformation of one's view on ethnicity does not depend on that person only, but indeed mainly on the socio-cultural constraints within a given context. This includes demands from other people (parents, teachers, peers), social institutions (the state, the school, the media), but also the characteristics of the cultural element itself (whether a gesture, an object, a language), and the psychological capacities of a person (Duveen 2002; Zittoun et al. 2003).

Ethnic Meaning Making

The next question is, what is it that people do when using (ethnic) symbolic resources (Gillespie, Zittoun 2010)? There are at least two answers to that question from the cultural-psychological perspective: they *create meaning* and *establish boundaries* in order to make the world around them readable, valuable, manageable (Bruner 1990; Dahinden, Zittoun 2013). Specifically, creating meanings and setting boundaries make it easier for people to navigate the complex networks in which they are positioned and to live a good and virtuous life. Through the process of meaning making, individual activity becomes involved in the socio-cultural dynamics within a given context. This process makes possible the immediate communication of a person with other people,

by reminiscing about past times and spaces, and imagining future ones (Dahinden, Zittoun 2013). The objectification of ethnic meanings in the available texts, images, gestures around us translate into specific symbolically mediated shapes, colors, smells and other sensations, which provide the basic condition of organizing and understanding the complex and chaotic world around us, but also our own place in it (Bruner 1990; Valsiner 1998; Vygotsky 1962). Thus, ethnic culture or system of meanings, as shared conventions about certain norms and values, become appropriated as personal experience. Only through appropriation of ethnic cultural elements does a person begin to understand themselves as a member of an ethnic community and their place in an ethnic culture. That process is always socially guided practice (Rogoff 2003; Valsiner 1998). And the meanings created can be compared with ones already established, prompted, or constrained by them. The outcome of ethnic meaning making depends upon the already mentioned rupture, which disturbs the inter- or intrapersonal status quo (Dahinden, Zittoun 2013).

On a collective level, ethnic meaning making is part of ethnic history making, where people can have different roles vis-à-vis the usage of ethnic elements. For example, subversive usage of a symbol will more likely problematize than reinforce the symbol. On the other hand, ethnicity is always entangled with the broader game of political and social forces that dictate possibilities and limits of the use of cultural elements: government institutions, national and international legislation, political and ideological movements, mass media – all participate in the production of symbolic repertoires for promoting certain interpretations and practices, while disregarding others (ibid.). Therefore, ethnic meanings are determined in the interplay between the personal, interpersonal, and the cultural, in the complex network of power, through setting boundaries in a dynamic movement between *what is not, what can be, what cannot be* (Valsiner 2007). Ethnic identification is positioning within that game.

The Position of a Subject

Finally, in a configuration of socially contextualized ethnic identification, how does a person emerge? How can we conceptualize the uniqueness of a single person in a shared socio-cultural milieu? If we imagine cultural and social history in constant flux of (re)production of meanings and tensions in which individuals also participate through guided cultural practices (Rogoff 2003; Vygotsky 1997), unique personal subjectivity appears as a *possibility of distancing* from the immediate context, from the *here and now* (Zittoun 2012). Again, in order to answer the basic question of identification – "who am I?" – one has to occupy the position outside the immediate, implicit, taken for granted participation in the production of culture and society. The appearance of such a position is supported by cultural and social discourses, as well as personal experience. Self-understanding in terms of ethnic belonging is constituted through the *knitting model* – continuous creation of personal patterns from the semiotic threads of social and personal history (ibid.).

A dynamic, star-like model (ibid.) represents a viable interpretative path for the current emergence of subjectivity from the social and cultural configurations in a specific situation. In this paper, it has been applied to the phenomenon of ethnic identification. The mutually constituting elements of the star are the specific situation (orientation in time and space), real or imaginary others, the intersection and mutual dependency between personal strivings of a person and social norms activated (the relation of inherent tension), the possibility of the tension resolution by distancing from the situation and creating meaning out of it, and, finally, the activity of a person who leaves traces of their relations with the world. The pattern of traces in time constitutes the unique trajectory of one's life course. The activity of a person, whether reflected or not, conforming to social norms or not, represents the expression of their subjectivity (ibid.: 268).

In a particular time and space, one's personal history, made up from series of interconnected autobiographical events, intersects with the history of an ethnic community, given in the form of relevant cultural elements, actors, institutions, which are structural, but also present in the specific situation. One's personal experience of ethnic identification, as an aspect of one's subjectivity, appears in a unique way of dealing with the present situation. The broader perspective of a series of relevant situations provides an insight into developmental dynamics between a person and their ethnic community. That dynamic is determined by a dialectic relationship between an individual and society, which is characterized by tension and contradiction, and not by linear movement towards accord. Capturing this dynamic requires suspension of identity logic for understanding the relationship between person and society, because neither society nor the person remains the same over time, and an individual is never just a simple exemplar of an ethnic community.

The question of temporality now becomes relevant. The irreversibility of time flow makes each point in a stream of consciousness unique in its present-time position (James 1890). In the very next moment, that point is no longer immediately experienced, its position already subject to transformation in the configuration of past, present, and imagined future (Boyer, Wertsch 2009). A transformation of this kind is necessary for the perception of a society, other people, and self as stable in the constant flux of time. It is provided by the resources of culture we use to mark the events and experiences by leaving traces behind our existence – proverbs, lullabies, tattoos, graffiti, jewelry, photographs (Zittoun 2012). The translation of traces, but also complex systems of meaning, into our minds, enables us to think, feel, understand, create, act, to *live* in a society (Valsiner 2007; Vygotsky 1997).

According to Tania Zittoun, the emergence of subjectivity represents the transformation of a person into subject. It is simultaneously socially constituted and capable of distancing from the constitutive practices, in order to *remember, reflect, and imagine* (Zittoun 2012). The first thread of creation of subjectivity are social and cultural discourses that locate us in certain socio-cultural time and space. The second thread is the sum of our past personal experiences: that

which we have done, felt, suffered, that which we believe in, and hope for. In the knitting produced from these two threads, unique patterns appear. They are unique, based on the fact that there are no two persons with the same socio-cultural encounters, nor are there two persons with the same lifepath.

However, knitting does not unfold by the logic of internal determination. The patterns which constitute unique subjectivity are established on the loops of socio-cultural and personal threads, but also in the *gaps* that enable the visibility of loops and patterns (ibid.). These gaps hold unactualized possibilities, what is repressed, but also present in its absence. Thus, emerging subjectivity is equally the product of creation as of non-realization, actualization as much as possibility, repetition as much as originality.

Conclusion

Theorizing psychology of ethnic belonging is important, at least where ethnicity is a (crucial) part of national politics and everyday life, which is the case in the post-Yugoslav region. Psychological scientific inquiry usually takes what people think, feel, and do as mere evidence, failing to interrogate the mechanisms by which socialization processes lead to certain psychological functioning. Moreover, it fails to interrogate the mechanisms that allow people to participate in society, which consequently results in confirmation and further reinforcement of the status quo (Reicher, Hopkins 2001).

This leads to the conclusion that we now have the theoretical tools to escape conservative theorizing of ethnicity or nationality in psychology. Those tools have been at hand the whole time, remaining intact in the collision between the positivist and interpretivist perspectives in psychology. However, cultural phenomena demand that context be taken into consideration, and psychological research interest calls for a more complex and variegated view on human experience and activity. What people think, feel, and do is the question of social as much as it is the question of personal (lack of) ability.

The new kind of theorization allows us to understand the relationship between a person and their ethnicity as a process of socially guided participation of the person in ethnic culture. It enables us to conceive of the person as the *subject* of ethnic socialization in both senses: as subjected being and the center of (free) activity (Althusser 1994). However, it is also open for various kinds of empirical investigation. Therefore, the very theoretical ambiguity, as well as its connection with contextualized everyday life, unsettles theoretical understanding, keeping it open for reformulation and practical application.

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Ana Đorđević

Postajanje etničkim subjektom. Kulturno-psihološka teorija etničke identifikacije

Apstrakt

Ovaj rad nudi alternativno teorijsko razmatranje etničke identifikacije u psihologiji. Glavne socijalno-psihološke teorije već su razmatrane kao pozitivističke i individualističke. Nove mogućnosti teorijskog razumevanja otvaraju se kada se u psihološko izučavanje uvedu relaciona i simbolička priroda etniciteta. Ovaj rad uzima kulturu i sopstvo kao dva konceptualna domena socijalne identifikacije, koji slede iz meta-teorijske pozicije kulturne psihologije. Glavni fokus rada je kulturni razvoj osobe u socijalnom kontekstu date kulture, specifično njene etničke identifikacije, u cilju čega posmatra nekoliko procesualnih aspekata. Prvo, etničkoj kulturi se pristupa kao vodećem principu i praksi u svakodnevnom razumevanju i iskustvu sopstvenog etniciteta. Drugo, etnička identifikacije se smatra socijalnim i ličnim aktom kreiranja značenja, koji se dešava u datom socijalnom kontekstu, kroz praktičnu aktivnost i diskurzivno pozicioniranje osobe. Treće, s obzirom da se etnicitet ne razmatra kao svesni

aspekt pripadnosti, već se podrazumeva i uzima zdravo za gotovo, rupture se razmatraju kao destabilizujući događaji koji stvaraju prilike za reinterpretaciju etničkih značenja i razvojne promene. U procesu kreiranja značenja, simbolički resursi se smatraju primarnim samo-konstruišućim oruđima, koji su istovremeno konstruišući za kulturu. Kreiranje etničkih značenja se teoretizuje kao centralni socijalno-psihološki proces kroz koji etnička kultura i osoba kao etnički subjekat nastaju u istorijskoj perspektivi. Na kraju, jedinstvenost singularne osobe u zajedničkoj etničkoj kulturi konceptualizuje se na osnovu simboličkog distanciranja od neposrednog socijalnog konteksta kroz model pletenja ličnih i socio-istorijskih semiotičkih niti.

Ključne reči: kulturna psihologija, etnička identifikacija, subjektivnost, kreiranje značenja, simbolički resursi, rupture

III

REVIEWS

JANA NDIAYE BERENKOVA; MICHAEL HAUSER; NICK NESBITT (EDS.), *REVOLUTIONS FOR THE FUTURE: MAY '68 AND THE PRAGUE SPRING*, SUTURE PRESS 2020.

Aleksandra Knežević

Revolutions for the Future is an eclectic collection of essays on the philosophy of May '68 and the history of the Prague Spring written for students and scholars interested in (re)examining the intellectual legacy of these events and their emancipatory potential for the present day.

As the editors of this volume state, the main goal of this book is to reassess and argue against the dominant narrative according to which May '68 and the Prague Spring represent failed revolutions that paved the way for the development of liberal capitalism in the West and the East. Contrary to this narrative, the main premise of this volume is that these events "constitute *unfinished revolutions*", since the ideas that arose before, during and after these revolutions are relevant to – and ought to be analyzed so that one could prepare for – the revolutions to come.

The book is divided into two independent sections that can be read separately. The first section deals with the philosophy and logic of the concept of the *event*. In this section's opening essay, Rancière argues that if an event represents a disruption in the causal sequence of social things, then May '68 *is* an event. By generating a new understanding of politics, May '68 created another causal sequence of social things and thus disrupted the normal one. Namely, this event created new ways of "perceiving, feeling, speaking and acting". In other words, it created new dynamics of action. In the following essay, Jacques demonstrates that a similar understanding of the *event* is present in Gilles Deleuze's and Felix Guattari's thoughts. Contrary to these optimistic views, Balibar shows in which way Jacques Lacan's theory of the "Four Discourses" can be interpreted so that it clarifies Lacan's skepticism regarding the revolutionary potential of the event that took place in Paris in May '68.

In the essays that follow, written by Berankova, Naderi, and Nesbitt, the book takes a different turn. In these essays, the authors discuss the philosophical work of Alan Badiou. In particular, they discuss his work on the concept of *suture*, *model*, and *commodity*, respectively. This subsection can be read independently from other essays considering that it deals entirely with Badiou's philosophy of mathematics. At this point, it seems that the reader is expected to be familiar with Badiou's

views on May '68 in order to grasp how these rather abstract discussions inform this section's analysis of the *event*. In the next section, the book takes a turn from discussing the philosophy and logic of the *event* and moves to a historical analysis of the Prague Spring.

By invoking Rancière's twofold understanding of politics with respect to the Prague Spring (i.e., politics as the "police order" or an activity detached from the citizens that maintains the normal causal sequence of social things vs. politics as an activity in which citizens are engaged and in which they create new causal sequences of social things), Hauser concludes that a revolution is not necessarily an antagonistic act directed against the ruling formations. In other words, Hauser opposes Rancière and claims that the Prague Spring showed that the ruling formations or the "police order" can participate in an emancipatory transfiguration of the socialist state by mediating the creation of new politics. In a similar vein, Kužel provides a historical overview of the development of the workers' councils in Czechoslovakia and argues that there these decision-making bodies belonged to the "police order". Nevertheless, they had the emancipatory potential. Thus, like Hauser, Kužel claims that the workers' struggles during the Prague Spring show that emancipation needs not to be understood as essentially opposed to the state.

In the rest of this section, Kober provides an in-depth analysis of the legal dimension of the Prague Spring that he considers neglected in the existing studies of the legal reforms that took place in the Eastern bloc between the late 1940s and the 1960s. In the following essay, Landa discusses the post-revolutionary theories on the role of science and technology in socialist states. His engaging analysis demonstrates how the thoughtful understanding of dissidents and radical democrats about the role of experts, science and technology in socialist states was replaced by their technocratic implementation that enabled the development of liberal capitalism in the East. Mervart continues with assessing the practices of the Association of the Left during the revolution in Czechoslovakia and the intellectual legacy of its most prominent member Egon Bondy. This section ends with Bielińska's review of the specificities that shaped the revolutions that took place in Poland and socialist Yugoslavia during the second half of the 20th century. In the concluding essay, Feinberg provides a sobering analysis of the ways in which the central concepts of the (allegedly) failed revolution of the Prague Spring were erased and forgotten during the (allegedly) successful revolution of 1989.

Finally, *Revolutions for the Future* offers a new perspective on the theoretical and ideological dimensions of the revolutions that took place in 1968. In a comprehensive manner, it addresses the main actors, concepts and critics of the events that marked the end of the 20th century. The clear and engaging narration of this book has the power to convince even a skeptical reader of the complexity of May '68 and the Prague Spring and their relevance for the contemporary discussions on the nature and scope of socialist democracies. Nonetheless, inexperienced readers should not be intimidated by the philosophy and history contained in this book, since the authors' expertise enables them to smoothly cover and present necessary details. However, some background knowledge of the issues discussed would undoubtedly open up new perspectives and provide a more rigorous understanding of the book's central themes. In sum, by rejecting the claim that the ideals of socialist democracy were erased and forgotten in the circumstances that followed 1989, *Revolutions for the Future* encourages new discussions and brings in new possibilities for future societal development.

EDGAR VIND, *PAGANSKE MISTERIJE U RENESANSI*, FEDON, BEOGRAD, 2019.

Aleksandar Ostojić

Šezdeset godina nakon prvog izdanja, čitaoci u Srbiji, konačno, zahvaljujući izdavačkoj kući *Fedon*, mogu da se upoznaju sa jednom od najznačajnijih studija kada je reč o periodu renesanse. Studija Edgara Vinda nije samo temeljna i dobro poduprta brojnim uvidima u originalne zapise, već je i lucidno pronicljiva. Bilo da ovoj temi pristupate iz polja ikonologije, istorije umetnosti, prateći radove Botičelija, Mikelanđela, Leonarda, literarnih velikana poput Spensera, Šekspira, Koldridža, da pratite uspon medicinske nauke u radovima Paracelzusa i Harvija, ili da istražujete istoriju filozofske misli, mitologije i simbolizma, ovo monumentalno delo nesumnjivo proširuje vidike, najpre tako što menja one postojeće.

Knjiga objedinjuje sve navedene aspekte stavljajući u centralno mesto ove šarolike mreže neoplatoničku filozofiju, odnosno neoplatoničku „mističku" tradiciju. Stvaralačka potencija renesanse tako je vezana za način na koji su unutar nje razumljene, sintetisane i preoblikovane brojne mističke tradicije, koje su za mnoge mislioce ovog perioda bile utkane ne samo u filozofiju neoplatonizma, već i u misao samog Platona, kao što su orfičke misterije, tajne egipatske religije, indijska filozofija, ili jevrejska kabala. Živo i argumentovano čitanje Vinda ne samo da upućuje na značaj neoplatonizma pri nastojanju da se renesansa razume, već nam se čini gotovo neverovatno kako su dominantni klasični prikazi renesanse (uz nekoliko izuzetaka) uspeli u potpunosti da prenebregnu, ili pre zanemare, tako brojne elemente u delima Fićina, Mirandole, Botičelija, Mikelanđela i drugih. Ukoliko je takvim elementima koji su klasifikovani kao „okultistički" i bio dat prostor, njihov uticaj bio je minoran, i svođen tek na često suvišnu dopunu „opštih" mesta. Bez obzira da li te „ekstravagantne mističke predstave" bile uzete za periferni momenat ili kako ova studija pokazuje, za samo srce renesanse, one su nesumnjivo činile izuzetno plodonosno tlo kada je reč o filozofiji i umetnosti, a Vind sa pravom ističe problematiku pomenutog klasičnog pristupa i naglašavanja „opštih mesta" kojim se većina istoričara vodi:

„Ali u meri u kojoj je njihov metod posebno osmišljen za ispitivanje upravo ove problematike, on nije pogodan za proučavanje onoga što je u istoriji izuzetno i čiju moć svakako ne bi trebalo potceniti. Savršena studija obuhvata oba ova aspekta, a jedna od mnogih slabosti ove knjige ogleda se upravo u tome

što ona, osim u jednom ili dva slučaja, ne pokazuje kako neka čudesna misao može da potone u banalnost ili kako samozadovoljstvo i pasivnost mogu da uguše genijalnost." (str. 311)

U skladu sa orfičkim prerušavanjem, ova samokritika autora prikriva suštinsku zamerku tradicionalnih pristupa koja će se dati jasno iščitati kasnije: opšte ili svakidašnje mesto, može se dobiti redukcijom onog izuzetnog, ali izuzetno se ne može shvatiti proširivanjem svakidašnjeg. Jasno je i zašto: značenje izuzetnog koje odudara od opšteg, istovremeno menja njegov smisao. Logički gledano, opšte mesto jeste ono koje zavisi od tumačenja izuzetnog, a ne obratno. Bez nastojanja da se izuzetno razume, opšte mesto i ne postoji.

Knjiga započinje poglavljem „Jezik misterija" , čime se definiše opseg, značenje i upotreba pojma misterija u daljem tekstu, zatim slede brojne analize, motiva Gracija kroz spor Fićina i Mirandole u kojem se preispituje odnos i pitanje primata između intelekta ljubavi i zadovoljstva, smisla slepog boga Ljubavi – Erosa, odnosa Dionizija i Baha, a tu je i analiza preko 80 umetničkih dela (prevashodno iz renesanse) među kojima su Botičelijevo *Proleće* i *Rađanje Venere*, Da Vinčijeve *Lede* i Mikelanđelove skulpture.

Rezultati studije daleko nadilaze polje istorije umetnosti. Tako na primer izučavanje Pikove medalje na kojoj tri gracije predstavljaju neoplatoničko putovanje duše u tri etape, otvaraju brojne teme koje se u kanonskoj filozofiji uzimaju zdravo za gotovo, kao što je Platonov stav prema zadovoljstvu ili blaženstvu; *Voluptas* kao *summum bonum* platoničara, i uloga strasti u dolasku do istog; Značaj *podudaranja suprotnosti* Nikole Kuzanskog; Senekin (stoički odnos) prema uvidima Epikura. Fićinovo gotovo hedonističko, epikurejsko i svakako antiasketsko preoblikovanje platoničke i hrišćanske doktrine. Takvi uvidi, bez obzira što su do danas podržani još brojnijim studijama, i dalje izazivaju iznenađenje, zbunjenost i nevericu, a što ovu knjigu, pored njenih nesumnjivih akademskih vrednosti, čine istinski intrigantnom.

Za kraj treba napomenuti da *Paganske misterije u Renesansi* u izdanju *Fedona* sadrže i reprodukcije fine štampe 102 umetnička dela što omogućava adekvatnije praćenje teksta, kao i krajnje detaljan indeks. Takođe, treba istaći kvalitet prevoda. Ljiljana Nikolić je uz svega par manje srećnih izbora uradila vrlo dobar posao kada je reč o engleskom, a takođe tu su i odlični prevodi i komentari izvornih tekstova na grčkom, latinskom, francuskom, nemačkom i italijanskom jeziku, kojima ova knjiga obiluje.

IV

INTERVIEW

INTERVJU

Ivica Mladenović

WHAT'S THE POINT OF SOCIOLOGY IF IT'S NOT ENGAGED?
An Interview with Michael Burawoy

Michael Burawoy is an internationally recognized British sociologist. Born in Great Britain in 1948, he now teaches at the University of California at Berkeley in the United States. Michael Burawoy has been a participant observer of industrial workplaces in four countries: Zambia, United States, Hungary and Russia. In his different projects he has tried to illuminate – from the standpoint of the working class – postcolonialism, the organization of consent to capitalism, the peculiar forms of class consciousness and work organization in state socialism, and, finally, the dilemmas of transition from socialism to capitalism. Over the course of four decades of research and teaching, he has developed the extended case method that allows broad conclusions to be drawn from ethnographic research. The same methodology is advanced in Global Ethnography, a book coauthored with 9 graduate students, that shows how globalization can be studied "from below" through participating in the lives of those who experience it. No longer able to work in factories, he turned to the study of his own workplace – the university – to consider the way sociology itself is produced and then disseminated to diverse publics. His advocacy of public sociology has generated much heat in many a cool place. Throughout his sociological career he has engaged with Marxism, seeking to reconstruct it in the light of his research and more broadly in the light of historical challenges of the late 20th and early 21st. centuries. He has been President of the American Sociological Association (2003-4); President of the International Sociological Association (2010–14); founding editor of the ISA magazine, Global Dialogue (2010–2017); and locally, Co-chair and Secretary of the Berkeley Faculty Association (2015–2021).

Mladenović: Back in Zambia, where you obtained your master's degree in social anthropology, you were already a Marxist. Did your thesis at the University of Chicago, a place rather hostile to Marxism, which is also the cradle of the famous Chicago school, the interactionist approach and the participatory observation method build in reaction to the ambiance and the structuro-functionalism. It is very interesting that in your thesis, which was published and became the book that made you world famous: *Manufacturing Consent: Changes*

in the Labor Process Under Monopoly Capitalism, you used two competing elements: methodological tools of the Chicago School, and the interpretative framework of the French structuralists, as well as Gramsci, Poulantzas et al. Thus confirming and de facto developing the heterodox Marxist theses. This approach was very original and innovative at the time. You did your research in a factory and closely observed the behavior of the workers in this factory, seeking to answer, among other things, a question: Why do workers collaborate in their own exploitation? The idea of consent was central to your analysis. Could you briefly describe this process of consent manufacturing among the workers that you demonstrated in your thesis?

Burawoy: Yes, I obtained an MA degree in social anthropology from the University of Zambia. I believe I was the first. But you have to understand my teachers were three brilliant Marxists – a Dutch anthropologist trained in the Manchester School, a young Indian anthropologist from the Delhi School, and a renowned South African anthropologist and political scientist, also a committed member of the South African Communist Party in exile in Zambia. They instilled in me a materialist view of the world that was quite consonant with postcolonial Zambia and its reliance on the export of copper. In those days (1968-1972) sociologists in the Third World were as likely to be Marxists as not.

With this baggage I arrived in Chicago in 1972 as a PhD student. I was horrified by the provincialism of the sociology program; its faculty largely ignorant of the world beyond the United States, let alone Africa. With a few exceptions this was all so boring after the exciting seminars at the University of Zambia. As you say the hostility to Marxism in the sociology department was palpable. I began by continuing my research on Africa, especially a Marxist analysis of the then seemingly flourishing racial capitalism of South Africa. Chicago participant observation, such as it was, seemed very backward, still insisting on the insulation of field sites from broader economic and political forces as well as from history. So I was not only opposing the theoretical frameworks of symbolic interaction, but advancing a very different methodology that I had first learned from social anthropologists in Africa – the extended case method. Of course, theory and method cannot be separated, each feeds the other.

I decided to take on the so-called Chicago School on their its terrain. I found a job as a machine operator in a South Chicago factory, the diesel engine branch of Allis-Chalmers. When I arrived on the shop floor – bereft of any relevant skill – I was struck by the intense work pace of my fellow operators. Why were they working so hard to make profit for their employer? By convention Marx and Marxists regarded the economic whip of the market – the fear of losing one's job – as sufficient to drive the expenditure of effort. But with a strong union there was little danger of being fired, even one so dangerously incompetent as myself. Perhaps, it was the economic incentive of the piece rate system that drove people to work hard (as I would later find in Hungary), but again the answer had to be "no" as we were guaranteed a minimum wage. Armed, as you say, with French structuralism cultivated by my political science teacher,

Adam Przeworski, I imported the ideas of Gramsci, Althusser and Poulantzas – ideas revolving around the notion of hegemony and the capitalist state – into the factory. I postulated the existence of an "internal state" – what I later called the production regime – that was responsible for constituting workers as industrial citizens with rights and obligations, allowing them to compete for jobs, on the basis of seniority and experience, in an internal labor market, and coordinating the interests of capital and labor through collective bargaining. These were the conditions of possibility for the organization of consent in the labor process itself.

It is important to note that while I was working at Allis-Chalmers (1973-74), Harry Braverman published his famous book, *Labor and Monopoly Capital*, a revision of Marx's theory of the labor process in *Capital*. Braverman traced the transformation of the labor process over the last century to the separation of conception and execution, the separation of mental labor and manual labor. It was an analysis of objective processes as though the subjective response of workers could be read off from the compulsory relations of work. I showed that this was far from being the case with workers able to exploit inevitable spaces in the organization of work. They – and I too – were creative in constituting work as a game that had its own rewards, simultaneously securing and obscuring the appropriation of surplus labor. Together the labor process and the political apparatuses of production resulted in "manufacturing consent".

Workers actively responded to the alienating character of work by working harder and in that way the day passed more quickly and there were emotional rewards to be had at the end of the shift. Moreover, workers collectively ensured that each followed the rules of "making out", so it was difficult to avoid being incorporated into the game. There I was, like everyone else, keen to "make out", even as a Marxist, I opposed this enthusiastic delivery of profit for capital. Practice trumped theory!

I should add that by a coincidence I had landed in the same factory that one of the Chicago's great ethnographers – Donald Roy – had studied. He, too, had been a machine operator in the same plant thirty years earlier. I was able to compare my observations with his and determined that the plant had moved along the continuum from despotism to hegemony. To explain the changes on the shop floor I "extended out" to changes in state-sponsored industrial relations state and the movement of the plant from the competitive sector to the monopoly sector of the economy. The study was also an "extension" or "reconstruction" of Marxist theory of the labor process, just as it was a critique of conventional sociology of work that was obsessed with the question of why workers don't work harder! Needless to say this methodology that examined the macro conditions of micro social processes was itself very controversial at the time.

Mladenović: How do you see contemporary Marxism on two levels: 1. the one that concerns its relative strengths in relation to other doctrines in the academic sphere – do you see an evolution in recent years in this matter and what are in

your opinion the potential indicators to measure this evolution; furthermore, what is the link between the weight of academic Marxism in the hierarchy of doctrines and the relationship of strength between social forces in class struggles and political forces in political struggles?; 2. The other level is rather that which concerns its theoretical apparatus and its ability to give adequate analytical answers for the understanding and necessary changes in today's social world. In this respect, is a renewal of Marxism perhaps necessary in relation to the evolution of current capitalism and, if so, in what directions?

Burawoy: More difficult questions! The last 30 years has seen a retreat of the Marxist academic renaissance of the 1970s. As the university becomes subject to market forces so pressures are applied to students, teachers and researchers alike that undermine the earlier collective and radical effervescence. One might expect there to be rebellions against the university – and there have been from time to time in many places in the world, not least in France – but in most countries of advanced capitalism the inhabitants of the university have been channeled into the pursuit of individual careers. As at Allis-Chalmers the structures of the neoliberal university have effectively organized consent to privatization and corporatization of the university – a shift from the "university in capitalist society" to the "capitalist university". Marxism has been in abeyance, out of sync with the dispositions of the times, but, of course, it has not disappeared. Marxism remains an inspiration to younger generations who have been involved in social movements – Occupy, Indignados, Arab Spring, etc. – both inside and outside the university. There has been a new flourishing of Marxist periodicals in the US, attracting a new generation.

And where is Marxism heading? Indeed! Influenced by 20 years studying socialism in Hungary and postsocialism in Russia – again as an ethnographer - I have drawn on the ideas of Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* that call attention to processes of commodification rather than exploitation, focusing on exchange rather than production. Marxism has tended to look upon markets as functional for capitalism as a process of intermediation that obscures the true character of production. Too little attention is paid to the experience of commodification, especially the commodification of what Polanyi calls fictitious commodities (labor, nature and money and I would add knowledge) which when commodified in an unregulated way not only lose their use value but destroy society in which they are embedded.

The dynamics of capitalism creates crises of profitability and overproduction that, in turn, drives marketization as a solution. Indeed, I claim there have been three waves of marketization, the latest being neoliberalism that still shows few signs of abatement. The spreading and deepening of marketization – whether we talk of climate change, pandemics, refugees, rising precarity, finance, etc. – is so destructive of human existence that it is more likely to lead to "counter-movements" than the experience of exploitation. Steady exploitation has become a privilege of a contracting labor aristocracy, facing rising precarity. I have proposed the incorporation of Polanyi's ideas into Marxism – rather than the abandonment of Marxism for Polanyi!

Mladenović: With Karl Von Holdt, you are the author of a particularly impressive book on various levels: "Conversations with Bourdieu: The Johannesburg Moment". In the preface, the presenters of the French edition of this book stated that in your scientific career, this book represents an "enigmatic excursus", and that "no other author has been the subject of such strong criticism and such constructive faith". What are the reasons for this? When did you start reading Bourdieu, what does he represent for you sociologically and how do you place him in the history of sociology? He has recently become the most cited sociologist in the world, surpassing Emile Durkheim. What do you think, from a Marxist standpoint, of the links between Bourdieu's critical thinking and the emancipatory struggles, and in this context, why do you think – at least in France – have left-wing academics have chosen in recent decades to claim more of Bourdieu than of Marx?

Burawoy: It has been an "enigmatic excursus" for sure. It began, as so much in my life does, with graduate students knocking on my door. It was the 1990s and they were demanding I take Bourdieu seriously. I had read *Reproduction in Education, Culture and Society* and considered it to be an obscurantist gloss on French structuralism; I had read *An Outline of a Theory of Practice* and considered it a poor recuperation of the Manchester School of anthropology's treatment of social action (without the unfathomable concept of habitus); I read the voluminous tome, *Distinction* which I decided was an elaboration of Gramsci's notion of hegemony, and then to top it off in *Pascalian Meditations* I would discover Bourdieu's idea of the double truth of labor was none other than my own obscuring and securing of surplus! There was nothing new here, just the unrecognized appropriation of ideas from others, most egregiously I might add from Beauvoir's theory of symbolic domination in *The Second Sex*. So I was reluctant to take Bourdieu seriously.

But the pressure from students was incessant and so I asked my colleague Loïc Wacquant whether I could take his "boot camp" course on Bourdieu in 2002. He agreed so long as I behaved like every other student. I couldn't have taken the course from anyone better endowed to present Bourdieu's corpus. As he often boasted he knew Bourdieu better than Bourdieu! And he would defend Bourdieu more rabidly than Bourdieu himself. Loic introduced me to the vast panorama of Bourdieu's writing many of which I had never read. I was seduced. I became intrigued. He was far more interesting than the usual incantations of field, habitus and capital. I fulfilled my side of the bargain by submitting memos – memos that would eventually grow into my "Conversations with Bourdieu". He fulfilled his side of the bargain by ridiculing my memos in front of the students and everyone had a good time.

I realized that in Bourdieu we have a most sophisticated critic of Marxism, especially attuned to a postsocialist world. As I would discover far from being an elaboration of hegemony, Bourdieu's symbolic violence, although like hegemony a form of cultural domination, was the antithesis of hegemony. Where Gramsci was interested in consent to domination, Bourdieu was interested in

the misrecognition, i.e. mystification, of domination; where Gramsci saw good sense at the kernel of working class common sense, Bourdieu saw only bad sense; where Gramsci saw the organic intellectual as elaborating that good sense in the working class, Bourdieu considered the organic intellectual a dangerous illusion; where Gramsci saw the traditional intellectual autonomous from the dominant class as the propagator of hegemonic ideology, Bourdieu the prototype of the traditional intellectual saw himself as an arch-critic of contemporary capitalism, never named a such!

Now I saw the appeal of Bourdieu as a critic of Marxism. With Bourdieu you got your cake and eat it – criticism without utopia, reproduction without laws, domination without emancipation, modernity without capitalism! This was a brilliant retreat from Marxism that could still appeal to social scientists and intellectuals disaffected with their place in the world. From here I could see how Bourdieu often starts out with Marxist questions in order to refute Marxist answers – all of which I laid out in a succession of conversations of Bourdieu with Marx, Gramsci, Fanon, Beauvoir, Freire, Burawoy and Bourdieu himself. And I argued that a counterpart to Bourdieu in the United States was C Wright Mills, albeit writing in an earlier era. Bourdieu was the intellectual's intellectual, representing intellectuals on their own side, claiming to speak for all, advancing their corporate interests as the universal.

Mladenović: When we talk about Marxism today, for example, it is always in the plural, because there have always been many Marxist currents. We remember that even Marx criticized some Marxists in France when he was still alive, saying that if they are Marxists, he himself is not. On the other hand, it is harder to discern sharp distinctions, lines of fracture among the bourdieusians. As a great connoisseur of Marx and Bourdieu, why do you think this is so? Is it because Bourdieu's oeuvre is as much about method as it is about theory building? Or perhaps that it does not contain the explicitly normative and teleological elements of most Marxist thought (one of the things you are disapproving of in Bourdieu's work is that he theorizes domination without thinking emancipation)? Or is there another more appropriate explanation?

Burawoy: That's an interesting question. I know so little of the French intellectual scene – although the last time I was in Paris at the time of the Yellow Vests and just before on the onset of COVID-19, the Bourdieusians seemed to be divided between those interested in reformist policy and those more committed to critical abstentionism. But following from what I was just saying, I might argue that Bourdieu's project is an intellectualist project – intellectuals on the road to class power! – that has broad following among academics, enhancing and justifying intellectual pursuits, especially the sociological variant. At the same time, Bourdieu was paradoxically very much an engaged intellectual, speaking to the people on a public tribune, although he could exhibit intellectualist arrogance if they contested his wisdom. There is a fascinating disjuncture between contempt for popular knowledge on the one side and his

stirring up of social movements for social justice, a contradiction between his theory and his practice, a contradiction that animates us all!

I think you are right, Bourdieu's oeuvre hardly counts as theory and is more a conceptual and methodological scheme. Without a clear theory that can be disputed, it is likely that his followers don't get into interpretive struggles or if they do then it is a reflection of divisions within the academy as much as links to broader political currents. Marxist divisions are far more acute because Marxism is far more attentive and sensitive to political conjunctures, to specific problems in specific countries. Marxism is a truly vibrant and evolving tradition because it seeks to partake in the transformation of the world, calling forth different theories in different times and places. For all their public interventions, Bourdieusians still largely operate from within the relatively protected sphere of the academy. We'll see if there develops a Bourdieusian tradition with different tributaries. I suspect it might follow the path of Parsonsian structural functionalism – perhaps the closest parallel to the reach and influence of Bourdieu - that was trapped and defeated by its own claims to academic imperialism, a universalistic theory that became out of tune with the times, all of which happened before it (structural functionalism) entrenched itself and developed different branches.

Mladenović: Before becoming president of the International Sociological Association, you set up a global sociology project within American sociology, aimed at making American sociology – which was very closed in on itself – more globalized, even in relation to global sociology. In your opinion, what exactly is global sociology? Is it really possible, given the existence of such a diversity of sociological traditions, not only theoretically across national borders, but also when it comes to different geographical areas and even different countries?

Burawoy: Ha! Yes, spending so much time in other countries I could not but become aware of how US sociology defined the parameters of sociology globally by virtue of its control of immense material and symbolic resources – through its powerful (highly ranked!!) universities, its prestigious (very impactful) journals declared to be "international" even though they subscribe to theories and concerns that are peculiar to the US. And, of course, it has the incredible advantage that English has become the lingua franca of the academic world. There have been attempts to pluralize US sociology, and the movement to "decolonize" US sociology have made some inroads. But you are correct that dissolving US hegemony may leave us with factional sociologies with no general coherence. Southern sociology a la Raewyn Connell has its attraction but no theoretically organized center; it exists only as a critique of Northern hegemony.

The question is this: can we pluralize sociology while retaining an inner coherence? Can we include different national experiences to deepen and enrich sociology without fragmenting it? I like to think that the International Sociological Association plays such a constructive role, especially in its many research committees.

We should perhaps distinguish between a global sociology and a sociology of the globe. If we take the ideas of Karl Polanyi seriously then I believe that the response to third-wave marketization has to be of a global dimension. Whereas sociology has conceived of the world through a national lens, as made up of national containers, that will no longer suffice. We can see this most obviously in the case of COVID-19, national solutions can only work so far, but it applies equally to the control of finance capital, refugees, climate change and so much more. The fate of the world is at stake.

Mladenović: You argue that sociology is perhaps the only social science – especially when compared to economic science or political science – that is capable of fighting the dominant ideology because its foundations have always been anti-utilitarian. As a sociologist, I am ready to believe this, and it is clear that among sociologists we may maybe find more heterodox and dissidents than among other researchers, but it seems to me that it is a bit too optimistic to consider sociology as a dissident social science? Since its institutional foundation, the dominant currents in sociology have always been more pro-system than against. It is well known that Emile Durkheim, for example, to whom we are grateful for the institutionalization of sociology, founded his sociological project around the idea of strengthening the theoretical foundations of the Third Republic in France; and he is not an isolated case, it is rather the rule. What, in your opinion, are the main challenges that sociology, or I should say: critical and progressive sociology, should confront?

Burawoy: Yes, Durkheim is conventionally seen as a rather conservative figure. But once Marx was allowed into the canon we got all sorts of radical readings of Durkheim. Suddenly people started reading Book Three of the *Division of labor in Society* through a new lens. There he writes about the three abnormal forms of the division of labor and argues that only by eliminating inequality of unnecessary power (giving workers an independent material existence to establish a relation of reciprocal interdependence with management) and inequality of opportunity (eliminate the inheritance of wealth and that would include cultural as well as economic wealth) can the division of labor lead to organic solidarity! And then if we read the second preface to the same book, we find Durkheim writing about the expropriation of private property and transferring it into the hands of occupational associations. He is proposing a form of guild socialism. Now he may not have been keen on social movements for socialism – they were a sign of a social malaise – but he did have a utopian view of the future, one that goes beyond social democracy, to include what we would today call universal basic income as the only way to assure equality of power between managers and workers. He had a very radical utopian vision of the future. Marxists might well ask about its feasibility and, indeed, its viability, but that would be a case of the pot calling the kettle black!

Weber is a trickier customer. While he is focused on the retention of bourgeois democracy with limited accountability to the demos, still his idea of

"vocation" – pursuit of a goal as an end in itself but without guarantees, does create a space for a measure of self-realisation. He even writes that time and again the realization of the possible only comes about through the pursuit of the impossible. The task of sociology as a vocation is precisely, then, to formulate the impossible that expands the realm of the possible. Indeed, I would say that sociology lies at the intersection of the utopian and the anti-utopian, the pursuit of possibilities within constraints and thereby loosening those constraints.

But I do think that the troika of Marx, Weber and Durkheim needs an injection of something new. For me that would be the life and work of the great African American intellectual, W.E. B. Du Bois (1868-1963), who brings a new vision of sociology. When brought into a conversation with Marx, Weber and Durkheim Du Bois generates a new sociology – global, historical, reflexive, attentive to race and class, rooted in lived experience, utopian as well as anti-utopian. He offers us a rich catalogue of exemplary studies including sociological fiction, historical as well as ethnographic studies. His magnum opus, *Black Reconstruction in America* (1935) was way ahead of its time. In my view he is the greatest public sociologist to have walked the earth. Bringing him into the canon – if canon there be – would make sociology exciting again – as long that is as we think of the canon as defined by antagonistic and dynamic relations among its members rather than some monolithic, imperial project.

Mladenović: Shortly after becoming president of the American Sociological Association (ASA), you started the project for public sociology with the idea that sociology could and should intervene in the public sphere. This sparked a considerable debate within American sociology. Would you say that you are an engaged intellectual? Or is that a pleonasm? In the same way a public intellectual is, a linguistic construction that doesn't even exist in France, for example, because being defined as an intellectual implies being publicly engaged. Could you explain the difference between the American and French type of intellectual?

Burawoy: Actually the public sociology project began when I was chair (together with Peter Evans) of my department at Berkeley (1996-2004). I asked my colleagues what vision of sociology we represent. We came to the conclusion that, in the context of the US, Berkeley sociology was an engaged sociology – my colleagues authored books that captured the imagination of audiences way beyond sociology. Even though I was a Marxist I was certainly not one of those public sociologists, I was a critical sociologist, dangerously veering toward professional sociology. I became an evangelist for public sociology when I was elected President of the American Sociological Association and that, indeed, attracted a lot of attention and controversy that continue to this day.

In my vision of public sociology I was very much inspired by my South African friends and colleagues who developed a distinctively engaged sociology in contesting apartheid and in particular in contributing to the development of an African labor movement through the 1970s and 1980s. With the lifting of the

boycott I returned to South Africa in 1990 for the first time since 1968. It left an indelible impression on my sociological habitus so that when I was President of the ASA I would even write about South Africanizing of US sociology!

Now, of course, as you say, in South Africa as in so many other countries, the idea of a "public sociologist" only leads to puzzlement. What's the point of sociology if it's not public? Sociology, by definition, is public! Well, not in the US, where the discipline is so professionalized that most of us spend most of our time talking sociology to other sociologists, writing sociology for other sociologists. Indeed, to talk of public sociology is very threatening to my professional colleagues who fear it will become "pop" sociology, losing its academic credibility. Others were critical of my endeavor as they thought I was trying to smuggle Marxism into sociology under another name. So, the idea of public sociology is, indeed, a very American idea that competes with professional, critical and policy sociologies. This perhaps reflects the expansion of the US university and the way it is organized but it also speaks to the anti-intellectualism of US publics.

No intellectual in the US would receive the celebration and notoriety of Bourdieu, Sartre, Foucault, etc. in France. Such fame is reserved for Hollywood Stars like Arnold Schwarzenegger. On the other hand, I do recall how Foucault used to loved visiting the Berkeley campus, which he did on a regular basis, because as he used to say, he loved the intellectual engagement which he wouldn't and couldn't find in the more sterile French University system, even in the Grandes Écoles. He probably saw only the best side of the US public university, insulated from a degraded and commodified public sphere.

Although I'm not a regular contributor to the media or an organizer in the trenches of civil society, I do consider myself a public sociologist in my capacity as a teacher of sociology. Here I don't compete with other media or disciplines but have a captive audience of some 200 students. I treat them as a public, that is individuals who are not empty vessels into which I pour pearls of knowledge but students who come with their own theories of how the world works based on their own diverse experiences. Public sociology here develops through a dialogue between students and teacher, through shared texts; a dialogue among students about their divergent and emergent understandings of who they are; and, in the best of all worlds, a dialogue between students and wider publics to whom they bring sociological questions and ideas. That's my idea of what I do, students may have a very different view! Another utopia that has to confront anti-utopianism.

Mladenović: Finally, you have been active in many initiatives fighting for democracy and freedom. One of the last ones was for the Serbian Institute of Philosophy and Social Theory, where you joined the international call for support that brought some positive results. Do you believe that intellectuals can make a difference and if so – what difference is that? I am curious to know what is, in your opinion, the role and place of intellectuals in contemporary societies and in social struggles?

Burawoy: Yes, intellectuals do sign lots of petitions, especially as regards issues of freedom and social justice. There are intellectuals of the right but they are still a minority. It's difficulty to know when such limited participation makes a difference, but one feels compelled to do it whatever the consequences. However, it's often as easy for the powers that be to ignore a petition as it is for dissenting intellectuals to sign one, but they do give moral support to victims of abuse, so that they realize that their fate is being followed across the globe.

I think we can do more than that. In these times when ideas of a feasible and viable alternatives are overwhelmed by the durability of capitalism it is important that sociologists keep open what Erik Wright called "real utopias", concrete imaginations of possibilities that challenge capitalism, potentialities of well-chosen existing institutions and organizations existing in the interstices of capitalism, often generated by capitalism as a means of its survival. Wright scoured the earth and came up with such examples as participatory budgeting, cooperatives, Wikipedia, universal basic income. He would talk to the practitioners, develop an abstract scheme of their principles, contradictions, conditions of possibility and dissemination and then orchestrate public debates that involved academics and practitioners. Here was the best of public sociology in action, forging a global community of real utopians, giving hope to each other as they partake in uphill struggles in the trenches of civil society.

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