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POLITICIZING PHENOMENOLOGY WITH HANNAH ARENDT

POLITIZOVANJE FENOMENOLOGIJE SA HANOM ARENT

Sanja Bojanić

PLURALITY IS A *CONDITIO PER QUAM* OF ALL POLITICAL LIFE

ABSTRACT
The book *Phenomenology of Plurality: Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity* is a contribution not only to the phenomenological tradition of thought and Hannah Arendt studies, but also political science and, most importantly, political philosophy. Sophie Loidolt advances an intervention that stands in contrast to contemporary phenomenological research which in certain times have had the tendency to perform depoliticized examination of the self and sociality, actually revealing the intention of *Phenomenology of Plurality* to articulate the numerous elements that comprise the methodological novelty with which Arendt changes the theory of the political.

Differences in the presentation significance, and consequently interpretation of an oeuvre or crucial topics and texts of seminal authors, always lie in the form, that is, in the coherence of method and clarity of execution. As crucial as the content and the accompanying host of conceptual networks woven from the well-known terms and constructions, is the impression of ease and wholeness of accomplishment, suggesting to the reader that what has been written could not have been said differently. Sophie Loidolt's *Phenomenology of Plurality: Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity* enthralls with its precise language and unequivocal thesis, a contribution not only to the phenomenological tradition of thought and Hannah Arendt studies, but also political science and, most importantly, political philosophy – philosophy's foray into the public realm. Along the way, we actually recognize the well-established Arendtian ambition from "Introduction *into* Politics." In a word, the book demonstrated a new twist on a known subject matter for phenomenology as well as understandings of Arendt's political theory. It has the capacity of "leading [us] *into* (*intro-ducere*) genuine political experience".

The topic but also the author's approach are clear from the very title, *Phenomenology of Plurality: Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity*. The endlessly commented and handled notion of plurality is here read from a phenomenologist's perspective, within the framework of a political understanding of intersubjectivity in Arendt's work. Those familiar with the phenomenological

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gesture in philosophy will not be let down, as each segment of text presents certain justified and faithful uses of Husserl, Heidegger, Fink, Merleau-Ponty or Sartre, a series of 20th century thinkers who have given relevance to this philosophical tradition and school of thinking. Equally, Arendt scholars are given a book that will shortly become canonical for students, lecturers, as well as anyone who finds the philosophical and political heritage of this extraordinary figure of 20th century political thinking invaluable.

A glance at the contents hints at the Husserlian ἐποχή, which with surgical precision separates the necessary elements of analysis still grasping the whole and its very essence. A concise introduction follows the description of structure, and offers an overview of a rich and fertile literature on Arendt as well as indicating the author's ambition to wade bravely into thinking of a "new terrain with and beyond Arendt in the context of an autonomous 'phenomenology of plurality'" (Loidolt 2018: 4). Right away, the first half of the book concerns itself with the construction of Plurality and the Political, enriching the transformation of phenomenology; while the second half of the book is dedicated to the actualization of plurality, that is, a detailed examination of elements that comprise the construction of the paradigm of plurality: The We, the Other and the Self in Political Intersubjectivity.

These two large units are further divided into three smaller chapters each, progressively guiding the reader to and then through an analysis of topics given in the titles. Thus, along with the "Emergence of Plurality," two parallel plans of *Arendt's Critique of Existenz Philosophy* and *Classic Phenomenology* are presented, as are the bases of *A New Political Philosophy* and in a specific way presented in *Rethinking the With-World*. In the following chapter, "Basic Phenomenological Concepts," the author places under a microscope the notions of *Appearance*, *Experience*, intentionality, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, but also the *World*, in such a way as to politicize them by varying them through the paradigm of plurality. With an overview and critical consideration of the existing contexts of the enumerated terms and phenomena to which they are tied, Loidolt also advances an intervention that stands in contrast to contemporary phenomenological research which in certain times have had the tendency to perform depoliticized examination of the self and sociality, actually revealing the intention of *Phenomenology of Plurality* to articulate the numerous elements that comprise the methodological novelty with which Arendt changes the theory of the political.

This political appears as paradoxical fruit par excellence of "the human condition of plurality." Or to quote Arendt herself from the introduction of the *Human Condition*, "plurality is specifically the condition – not only the *conditio sine qua non*, but the *conditio per quam* – of all political life" (Arendt 1958: 7). Resisting Heidegger's grounding in existentialia, she indicates the importance of the conditioning of existence. The particularity of plurality that appears in the public sphere manifests in a double-tiered conditionality: not only is it a question of what political life cannot do without, but the condition that makes political life what it is. However, in contradistinction to the rich

phenomenological tradition that, due to its neglect of plurality is nevertheless marked by a given ontological immobile singularity, this reading of plurality ensures *An Enactive Approach to Conditionality*, from which emerge specific *Dynamic Spaces of Meaning*. The philosophical and phenomenological thinking of plurality is contaminated by politics. In action, it acquires a new dimension, which in turn bring it back to the world. The text maps out and manifests the transformative basis of "politicized phenomenology" in Hannah Arendt's oeuvre through the analysis of notions such as "political intersubjectivity," "politicized forms of Being-with" as well as "the with-world in different activities."

Before we continue onto the second part of the book, on actualizing political intersubjectivity of plurality, let us linger a moment to look at the units that thematize a certain "approach to conditionality," as well as specific "spaces of meaning" that mark Arendt's "well-hidden methodology" in which operate her key terms such as appearance, activity, world, conditionality, plurality and the political. It is precisely these two phrases that introduce new elements while breaking up the classical construction sequence of the static ontological argument on the political being in the world. The author recognizes mechanisms that awaken and induce conditional structure, bind themselves to concrete and bodily forms. From the skein of various phenomenological readings, Loidolt selects those elements that are marked as specifically Arendtian, and thus politically engaged. The style, speed and basic dynamics of these movements "vertically/historically and horizontally/relationally" (Loidolt 2018: 110) result in "mutual realization of subjectivities" (ibid: 264) that "enact" or act out human plurality. *Vollzug* (which is, after all, Scheler's term of enactment that greatly determines a person) depends on plurality; better still, performing the intersubjective relation, and then also recognizing the importance of common existence, could not be fully comprehended from without, but only as "enacted" or "acted out".

In that sense, being-in-the-world is not an interior quality characteristic of myself alone, but represents a form of my life, structured such that it cannot be rendered outward or "enacted" or "acted out." This form of enactment ensures an approach to conditionality – which is here understood not within the borders of a "human condition," but precisely as a mechanism that enables this very "human condition." The challenge of the last section of the first part, which gives a detailed account of the novelty of Arendt's phenomenology of plurality, rests in the fact that Loidolt offers a sophisticated and respectful alternative to "phenomenological essentialism" that Seyla Benhabib ascribes to Arendt in *The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt* (Benhabib 2003: 123–171). With the authority of an expert in the phenomenological tradition, to which she herself belongs, the author corrects moments of potential misunderstanding and insufficient clarity in the phenomenologically ambitious account of Benhabib. Also rejecting the strict boundary between private and public, and analogously the distinction between the social and the political in Hannah Arendt, Loidolt really presents a more contemporary Arendt and allows us to consider the phenomenological approach amid current myriad

cacophonous interpretations of the political. "Spaces of meaning" are sorted according to their characteristics, as the awareness of being in the world is always already within a given medium of meaning. These spaces represent the basic structures of lived time and space. In addition to such "quasi-transcendental, fundamental meaning-spaces," Loidolt describes contingent spaces that can be explored, while leaving aside objects of analysis in their "psychological states," and regarding them as "a primary form of orientation and encounter." Such spaces comprise temporalities and spatialities of the world in which, following a rhythm of internal logic, mutuality and exchange, certain forms of intersubjectivity appear. "Conditions of appearance" and possible "forms of intersubjectivity" transform these spaces of meaning. With the achievement of these changes the conditions are met to actualize plurality.

The second part of *Phenomenology of Plurality* is dedicated to the analysis of actualizing plurality. The introductory portion provides a detailed overview of understandings of this term in political theory, ontology and Arendt Studies, referencing Arendt's own definition from *The Human Condition* (Arendt 1958: 7–8). According to that definition, the first elements of plurality rest on "the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world," but also "because we are all the same, that is, human... nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live." At the same time, addressing the issue of equality and difference as well as our inevitable interaction with each other, Arendt opens a broad space for interpretation, which Sophie Loidolt explores within her phenomenological framework for reading plurality.

The chapter on the actualization of the plural "we" maps the relation of special activities of speaking, acting and judging, following their visibility to pay particular attention to public space in which they are manifested. Only through exchange can actualization of activities take place, which can be used to build the plural "we." This "we" allows for the articulation of all those equal/different that appear in public space. Equality and difference become valid forms of appearance of "we" only if the transformation of individuality leads to a certain form of togetherness (*Miteinander*), that is, of a "we" in which all those I's participate willingly. Arendt's theory of action is, to use Loidolt's words, anti-reductionist, intersubjective, and holistic, and means that the "we" is not conceptualized exclusively through intentions or goals or purposes. Action cannot be mere realization of the content of my intentions, since in that case it would reduce the possibility of plurality – in contradistinction to the methodological individualism characteristic of John Searle. Loidolt elaborates on the "we" topic, which has become in the last few decades central to the discussion between phenomenologists and social ontologists and developmental theories.

An exchange with Arendt scholars would also be extremely important because it rests in the notion that the phenomenology of plurality, as the careful dissection of the performative power of "we" in *Phenomenology of Plurality: Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity* shows, arrives at an ethics of plurality, which is precisely the subject of the last chapter of the book. It elaborates an ethics inherent to the actualization of plurality. This is a specific response

to certain objections to Arendt's work, according to which she lacks "moral foundations." Experiences of a plurality of the first-person (such as acting and speaking) have opened entirely specific kinds of possibilities for democratic forms of "we" when some forms of agonic practice (such as debate and in-between processes) exclude or distance antagonisms. An analysis of plurality grounded in phenomenological premises above all points to the fact that the response to what is plurality cannot rest exclusively in political science or structural constructions shaded by Marxism, existentialism or other schools of thought characteristic of the twentieth century. In Sophie Loidolt's book, on the other hand, phenomenology becomes politically engaged in the most representative possible way, through the works of Hannah Arendt.

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Sanja Bojanić

Pluralnost je *conditio per quam* celokupnog političkog života

Apstrakt

Knjiga *Fenomenologija pluralnosti: Hana Arent o političkoj intersubjektivnosti* doprinos je ne samo fenomenološkoj tradiciji mišljenja i studijama Hane Arent, već i nauci o politici i, što je najvažnije, političkoj filozofiji. Intervencija Sofi Lojdolt suprotna je savremenim fenomenološkim istraživanjima koja su u određenim periodima imala tendenciju da depolitiziraju ispitivanje sopstva i društvenosti, zapravo otkrivajući nameru *Fenomenologije pluralnosti* da artikuliše brojne elemente koji sačinjavaju metodološku novost kojom Arent menja razumevanje političkog.

Ključne reči: Hana Arent, fenomenologija, filozofija politike, pluralnost, Sofi Lojdolt

Adriana Zaharijević

SOCIAL ONTOLOGY: BUTLER VIA ARENDT VIA LOIDOLT

ABSTRACT
This short contribution is written on the occasion of the book discussion of Sophie Loidolt's *Phenomenology of Plurality: Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity* (2018) at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory. It presents an attempt to read the two key notions Loidolt elaborates in her book – spaces of meaning and spaces of the public and private – from a critical perspective offered by Judith Butler's taking up of Arendt's work. Offering Butler's conception of social ontology through several major points of contestation with Arendt, I argue against an all too simple reduction of her understanding of the political and normativity to poststructuralist ones.

Judith Butler's engagement with Hannah Arendt's thought is vast. Butler's recent work is almost incomprehensible if one were to neglect Arendt's long-lasting influence. Of course, Butler is not a usual Arendtian scholar and has many open disputes with her, most certainly with the strict division between the public and the private. However, some critical points – *that plurality is at the heart of the political; that plurality is not something that simply is, but essentially something we take up and do; that it actualizes in a space of appearance which is never politically neutral; that agency is performative and not in need of a sovereign subject; that Arendtian 'acting in concert' goes together well with Levinasian 'justice for the other'* – prove to be the touchstones of Butler's newer inquiry.

The italicized points have been excerpted from Sophie Loidolt's "Introduction" to her 2018 book *Phenomenology of Plurality: Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity*. These work as central tenets in Loidolt's own phenomenological elaboration of Arendt's work. One might thus hastily draw a conclusion that Loidolt shares many similar concerns with Butler, if within different methodological frameworks. But, such an inference proves to be wrong. Butler's name appears in the "Introduction", but in a paragraph which acknowledges three different 'continental' approaches to 'the political', where "Arendt now – unfortunately – plays only a marginal role" (Loidolt 2018: 9). More specifically, Butler is categorized under the second rubric of "Foucauldian and Althusserlian theories of 'subjectivation'... that refer to 'the political' within their respective conceptions of a subversive repetition of subjectifying

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orders" (ibid). Throughout the book there are some scattered references to Butler's texts, even if they refer precisely to those works where Arendt seems to be one of Butler's most appreciated interlocutors. And yet, those references do not alter the first description of Butler's work provided in the "Introduction" – which, although not entirely incorrect, is decidedly insufficient to describe Butler's engagement with Arendt. True, one might contend that being a Foucauldian prevents Butler to become a full Arendtian which, nonetheless, says little of the way she incorporated Arendt's thought into her understanding of plurality, performativity, agency – notions conspicuously missing in Foucault.

It is a fact that Loidolt did not write a book on Arendt and Butler or, for that matter, about various ways to exploit Arendt's ideas. She is explicit that *Phenomenology of Plurality* is supposed to fill in the gap in the phenomenological readings of Arendt, and to even persuade phenomenologists that reading Arendt may benefit them. Since Butler is by no means famed for her involvement with phenomenology, she may be scantily referenced or categorized at the beginning as belonging to a strand of thought not typically of interest to phenomenologists, and in effect, be done away with. Although such methodological enclosures are unfortunately extraordinarily common, I argue that they contravene to the true Arendtian way of writing, which strongly resisted disciplinary and methodological closures. What is more, with clear-cut approaches we sometimes tend to lose important linkages that might not fit into our neat methodological distinctions. They nevertheless appear – and they may prove important, or at least interesting to elaborate. One such, I want to claim, would have come to the fore if Butler's engagement with Arendt, through her own elaboration of social ontology, was given more space.

Sophie Loidolt begins her book with a set of questions the answers to which would help us recognize the fundamentality of the political perspective for social ontology. The questions are:

> What does it mean to be a person and a self together with others? How do self-expression and plural expression correlate? What roles do appearance and visibility (in public or in private) play alongside linguistic and narrative elements for being a self, for acting together, and for constituting a group? Why do I need others for my actions to be meaningful? What kind of we-formations do the activities of speaking, acting and judging yield? What kind of sharing comes to pass in the sharing of a common world and space of appearance? (ibid: 3)

From *Precarious Life* onwards, Butler explicitly invokes *social* ontology, one which assumes that an individual (self) is always together with others. She rejects discrete ontology of the person in favour of the notion of interdependency (Butler 2009: 19). This has effects on how the notions of agency and responsibility have been developed ("Untethering the speech act from the sovereign subject founds an alternative notion of agency and, ultimately, of responsibility, one that more fully acknowledges the way in which the subject is constituted in language, how what it creates is also what it derives from elsewhere... agency begins where sovereignty wanes" [Butler 1997: 15–16]; "Indeed, it may

be that plurality disrupts sovereignty" [Butler 2012: 174]); how a 'we' is formed (Butler 2007); how my own actions gain meaning only within a certain 'we', when I am exercising a plural and performative right to appear (Butler 2015), within a space which reproduces and sustains norms of visibility, norms that allocate the right to appear differentially. However, a 'we' shares a common world – a strong Arendtian point – and we are all "the unchosen, but we are nevertheless unchosen together" (Butler 2012: 25), which is what produces a radical potential for new modes of politics and an alternative social ontology Butler strives for (ibid: 174). In that sense, we can say that a very similar set of questions which mobilizes Loidolt's inquiry also animates much of Butler's investigation into how the political frames social ontology.

Disentangling Butler's notion of the political from the subversive repetition of subjectifying orders might bring her concept of social ontology to the fore. This concept, I believe, would have been of use to Loidolt in her own endeavours to explicate the quandaries of the political both in Arendt herself, and in the larger framework of political intersubjectivity. To demonstrate that, in what follows I will focus on Loidolt's explication of the notion of space of meaning, and the fact that we are conditioned as beings who have the capacity to act (and act in concert, that is politically) within spaces of appearance. I will offer possible ways of reading Loidolt's Arendt and Butler together, showing that some fruitful philosophical frames may arise from such an intersection.

When defining human condition in Arendt, Loidolt differentiates between basic quasi-transcendental conditions; the self-made conditions, i.e. the ways we act upon the world; and conditionality itself, the fact that however inventive our actions were, there is no way to abolish our being conditioned as such (Loidolt 2018: 120–122). The human is "on the one hand, a creature dependent on pre-givenness (*Vorgegbenheit*) and, on the other hand, a creature that actively shapes its surrounding and thereby produces its own conditions" (ibid: 122). The first, quasi-transcendental dimension of conditionality – which includes natality, mortality, life, worldliness and plurality – is what structures our appearance as men (as Arendt would have it), or humans (as Butler would insist). Importantly, this is not an absolute structure, but a historically enacted one, enacted with each new life. The fact that we are born into the world, that our existence is finite and exposed to injurability, that we are living as bodies who are inescapably together with other equally born and mortal beings, is what Butler attempts to grasp with precariousness, the notion borrowed from Levinas. Although precariousness is often understood as a primarily ethical concept, I argue that in Butler it has a vital ontological function – "lives are by definition precarious" (Butler 2009: 13, 25). Precariousness is, however, also always social, which impacts greatly on how we appear or fail to appear, and act, and act in concert:

> the social conditions of my existence are never fully willed by me, and there is no agency apart from such conditions and their unwilled effects. Necessary and interdependent relations to those I never chose, and even to those I never knew, form the condition of whatever agency might be mine. (ibid: 171)

In Butler, the space of appearance and any agency which may be produced within such a space, is decisively *social*.[1] It is for that reason that I want to relate her concept of norms and the concept of spaces of meaning, elaborated in Loidolt in great detail. Norms play a key role in Butler's entire work (at first used in relation to gender, later, more broadly, in relation to the human) and are, upon a whole, what makes Butler a Foucauldian. The fact that Loidolt mentions that 'spaces of meaning' can in general be connected to Foucault's concept of *dispositif* (Loidolt 2018: 130) in a way also supports this otherwise unlikely link. My intention, however, is to go further and show that it is from Arendt's thought that a complex relationship between norms and appearance needs to be drawn, a relationship central for Butler's conception of social ontology.

Space of meaning is what makes someone appear as meaningful, that is, intelligible and legible. Loidolt explains it as emerging from conditions, conditioned activity, and experience with this activity (ibid: 126). There is no 'outside' of such spaces, they are basic forms of how lived space and time can be structured. Spaces of meaning are fundamental, but not foundationalist; they are constitutive of who we are and how we encounter and orient ourselves in the world. Crucially, a space of meaning is not a psychological disposition, but an ontological state of being-in-the-world, something which conditions both our behaviours and psychological dispositions. Intersubjectivity – because we are never alone in-the-world – plays a key role in actualizing, maintaining but also altering spaces of meaning. Spaces of meaning *are actualized as lived*: they gain their meaningfulness from the processual nature of living activities, and from experiencing both their liveliness and their repetition which produces them as recognizable and appreciated, as activities. Spaces of meaning *are maintained as shared*: they gain their meaningfulness because they only take place in the context of plurality, and as such produce a reality that is, of necessity, a common one. From the very fact that they are lived and shared, they belong to an intricate entanglement of layers of relations which is always in the process of both sedimenting and opening towards something new.

This description of spaces of meaning can be applied to norms as Butler defines them. While it is true that in Butler's analysis norms do not have a neutral connotation (in *Gender Trouble*, they generally appear as constraints, as rigid, regulatory), it would be misleading to assume that Butler advocates for a world *without norms*. Norms are constitutive as they are the spaces of meaning. But there is something wrong with the norms as they are now – something is meaningless with the spaces of meaning – if the structure or reality

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1   It is a notorious claim that Arendt was somewhat elusive with the terms she used, but that applies to Butler as well. The social in Butler is a strange mixture of the political, the public and the cultural (used mostly during the first phase of her work and almost disappearing in the second), but it also differs, in large strokes, from 'the social' in Arendt (Pitkin 1995). For the sake of brevity, let us contend that the social here implies an impure, historic trace of the intersubjective world which comes to frame our own activities and experiences of those activities. The social is a result of plurality which conditions any of those activities and the ways we experience them.

conditions some of us to be, act and experience ourselves as less real or unreal. That which is wrong or meaningless is a *social* dimension (arising from activity and experiences of that activity). Otherwise, how could we explain that something which is *constitutive for (all of) us as humans* makes possible that *some* humans are left out of the space which allocates humanity – meaningfulness that is lived and shared? How is it possible that some of us live as illegible and unintelligible?

> [T]he 'coherence' and 'continuity' of 'the person' are not logical or analytic features of personhood, but, rather, *socially instituted and maintained norms of intelligibility*. Inasmuch as 'identity' is assured through the stabilizing concepts of sex, gender, and sexuality, the very notion of 'the person' is called into question by the *cultural* emergence of those 'incoherent' or 'discontinuous' gendered beings who appear to be persons but who fail to conform to the *gendered norms of cultural intelligibility by which persons are defined*. (Butler 1999: 23, italics mine)

Thus, the norms are socially established and maintained, they have their cultural elaboration and affirmation, and they are performed by us – they emerge from our conditioned activities and our experiences of those activities. Heuristically, norms could be cleansed from the social (or the cultural), but it remains unclear what would be the meaning of a man, a person, a coherent and continuous entity, a human, in a space of meaning where meaning has not been produced through conditioned activity and experience. For Butler there is no prior ontological level which would be superseded or supplanted by a social or a political one.

In that sense, we may, as Loidolt does in her interpretation of Arendt, differentiate between the *constitutive* dimension of spaces of meaning and an *established* dimension of the intentionally produced spaces of private and public. At the level of analysis, we may agree that spaces of meaning – or norms which define us and define for us what is understandable, viable, and livable – precede the establishment of the spaces where these norms operate. Now, if we were to follow the consequences of Butler's argument against Arendt, it is only at the analytical level that we could maintain this division: to have an ontological status, to appear as ontologically viable being, is precluded for beings who somehow do not conform to norms – who seem to be outside of the space of meaning, although, supposedly, there is no outside to it.

I argue that it is the body that makes all the difference here. Indeed, the body in Arendt is emphatically different from that of an abstract, bodiless transcendental subject. Her 'man' is embodied, but the contingencies that make up the facts of 'his' concrete existence are simply integrated into a structure of quasi-transcendental conditions (a man is bodily, but all else – his gender, skin-colour, the milieu he is born into, etc. – is simply part of 'the' body) (Loidolt 2018: 121; Zerilli 1995: 173–175). Careful not to repeat the vocational difficulty of those trained in philosophy (Arendt being one), Butler never forgets "that 'the' body comes in genders" (Butler 1993: viii) (and, we may reiterate, that also [human] coherence and continuity comes in genders).

On an abstract plane of analysis, a gendered body is 'the body' with a gender, a contingent trait which might have been different (male *or* female *or* something in-between). However, within the spaces of meaning, produced by conditioned activities and by the experiences of these activities, this trait becomes meaningful in a certain way, as lived and shared, as activated and experienced (repetitively, Butler would of course add). The body is something that makes us worldly, living and mortal, but also crucially open to sight (exposed, displayed, impossible to fully hide – thus visible), it makes us 'social'. For Butler, visibility is what of necessity already enters into the definition of precariousness of life, and is not ontologically posterior to it. Therefore, an ontology which has an embodied human at its core is, according to Butler, always a social ontology, because "the body has its invariably public dimension. Constituted as a social phenomenon in the public sphere, my body is mine and is not mine. Given over from the start to the world of others, it bears their imprint, is formed within the crucible of social life" (Butler 2004: 26). That we come as bodies is what enables plurality; that we come as born and mortal, living and vulnerable is what conditions our appearance; that we come in bodies that convey some meaning (gender, skin-colour) is what makes us intelligible in some way. Visibility is part of intelligibility, not something separate from it. We *do not appear* if we are *not visible*, if we do not count as having an intelligible reality.

The public dimension of the body is therefore a crucial point for Butler, something which precludes the differentiation between the *constitutive* dimension of spaces of meaning and an *established* dimension of the intentionally produced spaces of private and public. The body is emergent in the world, it appears when the man/human appears, and its appearance is invested with meanings that mean something only through the body. Therefore, to retain a private/public divide as intentionally erected and fixed is for Butler to retain conditions of appearance that actualize unequally, that justify abject invisibility of some bodies which as bodies participate in the spaces of meaning, but are socially precluded from appearing or produced as non-appearing. To retain a private/public divide is to claim that in an ontological sense there is plurality (because there are bodi*es*), but that in the political sense plurality becomes enacted in a restricted and bodiless ways. This would in effect contradict the basic condition of plurality.

This is then the core of the major dispute between Butler and Arendt. There is no storage room where we could consign the bodies when we step out in the visible spaces of appearance to do politics. If there is, however, such a storage, then it is erected and maintained as a storage for some bodies which are socially allowed to appear as bodiless, as only acting and speaking subjects – where plurality enacts itself as a proliferation of the first-person perspectives. Without bodies, or more to the point, with a depository where we leave them for a spell while we (*some* of us) act and speak, no plurality, as a condition of appearance, can be actualized *as* plurality. What does become actualized is a social (or cultural) inscription in the norm that interferes with, or even defies the conditions of appearance.

In conclusion, let us recall one of the many places where Arendt explicates her understanding of the private and the public:

> [T]he political realm... is public sphere in which everybody can appear and show who he himself is. To assert one's own opinion belonged to being able to show oneself, to be seen and heard by others. To the Greeks this was the one great privilege attached to public life and lacking in the privacy of the household, where one is neither seen nor heard by others. (The family, wife and children, and slaves and servants, were *of course* not recognized as fully human.) In private life one is hidden and can neither appear nor shine. (Arendt 2005: 14, italics mine)[2]

We may say that this quote is just a sign of admiration for the Greeks who, despite their lack of respect for all the bodies that populated what used to be the polis, did have 'the political' Arendt laments has been lost for us forever. We may also try to somehow save Arendt from this divide by saying that its time has happily gone, and we are now wiser and can do politics so that all of us flourish bodiless in one sphere, and are protected as bodily in the other. Whichever strategy we choose, the problem remains with an "of course". In the quoted passage, but also in Arendt's exposition of the political, it serves as a double confirmation of the intentionality and fixedness of the boundaries between public and private, which are for her important precisely as existing, and as existing as sharp and unbreakable. Some spaces are spaces of appearance, where everybody can appear – on the condition that everybody is recognized as fully human. The fully human can show – be visible and audible, seen and heard – because there are spaces which attest to the full humanity. However, this gloomy "of course" is part of the *social* ontology which admits that some will be constituted as meaningless or as those who are unable to convey meaning, to take part in the spaces of meaning (although there is no outside to them) – who will have to remain hidden as humans. This is also why, according to Butler, in the extant social ontology 'the human' operates as a differential norm: "a value and morphology that may be allocated and retracted, aggrandized, personified, degraded and disavowed, elevated and affirmed" (Butler 2009: 76).

Butler urges us to think differently, to strive for an alternative social ontology – one which would diverge from what precludes conditions of appearance to be actualized as equally lived and shared. I argue that her understanding of social ontology owes a great deal to Arendt's notion of plurality (what is constitutive for humans as embodied and appearing), but it also departs significantly from it precisely due to the established nature of a divide that seem to enable some to be political (that is, effectively bodiless) and consign others to

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2   I have decided to put a stress only on this apsect of the private. Loidolt conscientiously differentiates between various ways Arendt seems to have used the term which, as Loidolt pertinently shows, refers to many things at the same time (the darkness of *physis*, bodily functions, drudgery, love, something which is privative, but also intimate, or protected, or shut down in its invisibility) (Loidolt 2018: 135–138).

the sphere where bodies reign, albeit non-politically. This constitutive tension remains one of the cornerstones of Butler's political philosophy, and her later work gives us reasons to believe that the tension derives from Butler's long-standing engagement with Arendt. In that sense, we might say that Butler invites an insurrection at the level of ontology (Butler 2004: 33) as part of striving for a political space of plurality which would cease to be divided along the lines of shining and remaining in the dark forever.

Sophie Loidolt's scrutinous application of phenomenological framework to Hannah Arendt's texts helps us understand not only Arendt's take on the political, but also why that take remains so important and simultaneously so frustrating for Judith Butler. In that sense, Loidolt's elaboration of phenomenology of plurality reads as a fine guide into a thought which has no phenomenological aspirations of its own, but it still is deeply implicated with Arendt's thought. The reverse may equally be true, that Loidolt would have profited from more thorough engagement with Butler's thought, even if this thought refuses to settle itself in strict boundaries, phenomenological or otherwise.

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Adriana Zaharijević

Socijalna ontologija: Batler preko Arent preko Lojdolt

Apstrakt

Ovaj kratak doprinos napisan je povodom diskusije o knjizi *Phenomenology of Plurality: Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity* Sofi Lojdolt na Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju. On predstavlja pokušaj čitanja dva ključna pojma koja Lojdolt izlaže u svojoj knjizi – prostori značenja i prostori javnog i privatnog – iz kritičke perspektive koju Džudit Batler nudi baveći se radom Arentove. Razmatrajući koncepciju socijalne ontologije Batler kroz nekoliko značajnih tačaka njene rasprave sa Arent zalagaću se protiv olake redukcije njenih shvatanja političkog i normativnog na poststrukturalistička shvatanja.

Ključne reči: Džudit Batler, socijalna ontologija, prostori značenja, prvatno, javno

Sophie Loidolt

PLURALITY, NORMATIVITY, AND THE BODY: RESPONSE TO SANJA BOJANIĆ AND ADRIANA ZAHARIJEVIĆ

ABSTRACT
The first part of the text is a précis of the monograph *Phenomenology of Plurality: Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity*, a phenomenological analysis of Arendt's core notion of plurality that unites the fields of phenomenology, political theory, social ontology, and Arendt studies. In the second, larger part, the author responds to the comments given by Sanja Bojanić and Adriana Zaharijević, in order to clarify some key concepts and positions presented in the book.

Précis

Phenomenology of Plurality is an in-depth, phenomenological analysis of Arendt's core notion of plurality that unites the fields of phenomenology, political theory, social ontology, and Arendt studies to offer new perspectives on key concepts such as intersubjectivity, selfhood, personhood, sociality, community, and conceptions of the "we".

The title of the book combines two of its central claims: first, that Arendt is rightfully counted within the phenomenological tradition for having developed her own phenomenology of plurality; and second, that the theme of human plurality harbors philosophical implications that transform the classical phenomenological framework as well as central notions of Western philosophical discourse.

The book aims to show that Arendt's notion of plurality requires a phenomenological in-depth explanation to be fully understood in its significance and consequences. Hence, instead of portraying Arendt's philosophical background as a mixture of idiosyncratically interpreted influences from Aristotle, Kant, Heidegger, or others, one central thought that Arendt pursues through her entire life, is closely and systematically developed: *the actualization of plurality in a space of appearances.* One of the main organizing ideas of the book is to show that the hidden methodology that allows Arendt to conceptualize plurality in this explicit framework derives from the phenomenological tradition. At the same time, doing so transforms this methodology along with its

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central notions such as intentionality, appearance, first-person-perspective, subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and world. Thus, without trying to frame Arendt as a phenomenologist exclusively, *Phenomenology of Plurality* promotes a new understanding of the concept of plurality by contextualizing it within the phenomenological tradition.

This also entails an enactive approach to plurality, another central theme of the book: The claim here is that plurality is not something that simply *is*, but essentially something we have to take up and *do*. Therefore, it manifests itself only as an *actualization of plurality in a space of appearances*. This figure is taken to be the "core phenomenon" that presents the key to Arendt's related concepts of action, freedom, and the political, as well as to her new understanding of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and a distinct form of the "we" in a political sense.

After an exposition of the overall approach in the introduction, the first part of the book (Part I) starts out with a short overview of how the topic of plurality emerged in Arendt's work in the context of Existenz philosophy (Chapter 1). It then proceeds to a systematical analysis of the major phenomenological concepts that are involved in and transformed by its further elaboration: appearance, experience, and world (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 continues to spell out explicitly the "hidden methodology" that is at work in Arendt's main philosophical work, especially through a reading of *The Human Condition*. Arendt's analysis of the dynamic relations between basic conditions (i.e. life, worldliness, plurality) and basic activities (i.e. labor, work, action) is interpreted as an analysis of "dynamic spaces of meaning". This also involves a treatment of her phenomenological theory of the spaces of the public and the private along those lines (Chapter 3). All these issues relate to the actualization of plurality and thus, the political. The second part of the book hence explicitly turns to this topic and maps the terrain for a phenomenological theory of political subjectivity and intersubjectivity (Chapter 4). In a close investigation of Arendt's privileged activities of speaking, acting, and judging, the architectonics of "actualizing a plural we" are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Finally, the book closes by proposing an ethics of actualized plurality (Chapter 6), which understands itself as a political ethics and contests the oft-raised argument that Arendt's philosophy lacks "moral foundations". Usually, this alleged lack is compensated by correcting Arendt's approach to Kantian themes like reason and judgment with a Frankfurt-school interpretation. The book takes a different direction: The argument is that Kantian themes are important for Arendt, but precisely in terms of a transposition into a phenomenological-existential framework. Freedom, spontaneity, judgment, and humanity are given a reading by Arendt that translates them into the domain of appearances, including also the dimension of withdrawal within appearance. This opens up a different ethical perspective than the reason- and discourse-focused Habermasian approach to Kant, and brings Arendt in a possible dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas' alterity ethics.

By highlighting these aspects, this book proposes a third productive way of profiting from Arendt's work beyond the two dominant contemporary directions

of Habermasian and poststructuralist approaches. While an overly aesthetic or postmodern take on Arendt misses her deep concern with political ethics and thus the true intentions of her "care for the world", a modernist interpretation too close to discourse ethics fails to make good on the inventive potential of Arendt's phenomenological reflections. The book intends to overcome both shortcomings by systematically developing a phenomenology of plurality that binds together the features of first-person perspective in the plural, the narrative, interpersonal and interactive emergence of personhood, and a shared space of appearance that has its own logic and rationality.

Responses to Sanja Bojanić and Adriana Zaharijević

Let me first express my sincere thanks to Sanja Bojanić and Adriana Zaharijević for engaging so thoroughly and thoughtfully with my work. While I entirely agree with Sanja Bojanić's perceptive analysis of placing plurality into the philosophical tradition (Bojanić 2020), I also very much appreciate the link to Judith Butler's work elaborated by Adriana Zaharijević (2020). It is true, as Bojanić works out, that my main focus lies on the dialogue with phenomenological approaches with the clear aim to "politicize" it as much as possible – and to go beyond it with Arendt (or sometimes also without her) where this is not possible anymore. Interestingly, it seems that Judith Butler's early work is also marked by a deep examination of the writings of the French phenomenological and existentialist tradition, first and foremost Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jean-Paul Sartre (cf. Butler 1986, 1987). Butler is hence not only a careful and critical reader of Hannah Arendt, but also of a much broader range of texts of the phenomenological tradition and, given that she even repeatedly alludes to Emmanuel Levinas' work in her recent texts dealing with vulnerability and alterity (cf. Butler 2004), would make an investigation into her differentiated relations with phenomenology over the development of her work an interesting topic.

In my book, I've limited myself to some allusions and footnotes. It is true, as Zaharijević notes, that I present a phenomenological reading of Arendt in its differences with respect to a poststructuralist conception of subjectivity, action, and the political. But I hope to have made clear that I very much have complementary or communicative differences in mind. While the poststructuralist approach focuses more on how discourse and institutions "form" subjects, the phenomenological approach looks at how these structures are experienced and lived, without denying that such formations take place, and without claiming that a sovereign subject is master over all meaning-constitution (in fact, I think that Husserl never claimed that either). I think that much has been done in this direction already under the heading of "critical phenomenology", and I would hope that my book on Arendt could further contribute to that kind of discourse. I'm convinced that it is important to integrate the insights into subjectivation and subject-formation by poststructuralist authors such as Foucault and Butler into the phenomenological discourse, in order to make phenomenology

sensitive to power-structures. At the same time, I think that if we want to conceptualize action properly and politically in an Arendtian sense, we also need to hold on to the first-person perspective, in the singular as well as in the plural.

As for Butler's later work, I have only alluded to how her notion of vulnerability could connect to a more benevolent reading of the role of the givenness of the body in Arendt's writings. Again, important work has been done here already by Peg Birmingham (2006) and Serena Parekh (2008) who have both argued (with different nuances) that Arendt does explicitly care about a protection of life in all its vulnerability. I have added to this line of thought, arguing that if life is the dark ground from which we rise into the brightness of the world—without ever "departing" from that ground but rooting and dwelling in it—then it is an explicitly *political* issue to foster and protect this vulnerability of life in all its potentials to unfold (cf. Loidolt 2018: 145). In my case, this interpretation is probably more indebted to a Levinasian perspective I deliberately read into Arendt than to a Butler-inspired take on the issue. But of course, it connects to Butler's works. I prefer to take my path via phenomenology, simply because it has not entirely become clear to me where and how these seemingly ontological elements of vulnerability (or of a "social ontology" as Zaharijević repeatedly mentions) emerge in Butler's thought and how they connect to her earlier work. One further complication – which I also regard as a fruitful one – is that in Butler's work, the Hegelian elements of "desire" and "recognition" play an important operative role. It is remarkable, however, that Arendt completely avoids any recognition-talk with respect to plurality (cf. Markell 2003). These are definitely further topics to think about.

Another topic I would like to focus on here in my response, since both Sanja Bojanić and Adriana Zaharijević have thankfully addressed it, is that of "spaces of meaning." I have tried to create this term (with several references to phenomenological debates and authors) in order to establish a more differentiated reading of the interrelational and dynamic meaning-constitution in Arendt's (not always clear) talk of "activities" and "conditions". As Zaharijević notes, I have myself offered to read this as a phenomenological counterpart to the conception of the dispositive. Normativity, as she rightly demands, is integrated into that concept, often as a lived and operative one. My aim is to show that normativity is not only discursive but also forms the spaces in which we meaningfully move. At the same time, I draw on Arendt to show that activities, and especially activities done together, also contribute to the formation of such spaces of meaning: they alter them and bring them into a certain dynamic. There is, however, a stronger sense of normativity in Zaharijević's reading of spaces of meaning than I intended it to be. I rather use it as a descriptive tool to demonstrate certain inherent normativities. How, for example, does the space of meaning of "indifference," or that of "addiction" look like? (I just use one keyword of a "constellation" here which would have, of course, to be differentiated into many different aspects of this formation.) Not conforming to norms hence, in my opinion, does not throw people out of spaces of meaning and makes them unintelligible, but rather includes them in a peculiar, "queer"

(let me just shortly point to Sara Ahmed's [2006] work with this allusion), maybe harmful way. I recognize that this could be elaborated further, and confess that I did not go into the direction of what would be a "right life" in the "wrong space" or the "right space"—or which kind of space it would demand at all, for that matter. The only hint I give in an Arendtian vein is that the actualization of plurality is one form of creating a space where the qualities of plurality can unfold, in acting, speaking, and judging, in forgiving and promising. As fragile as they are, and as apparently "luxurious" in comparison to the urgent needs of life, only they can guarantee that life is not measured and brought under economic, utilitarian, and ultimately totalitarian conditions.

Zaharijević rightly points to the conditions to enter that space, to discrimination on basis of gender or other factors, and to the related question of the public and the private. I have made clear in the book that I think one would need to go beyond Arendt in her setup of the political, if rooted in quasi-essentialist conceptions of "the public" and "the private". However, I think that Arendt can be read in a much more dynamic way. Spaces of meaning can change and can be changed. That women and slaves have been banned to the household is not an essential truth neither of women nor slaves, nor of households. Rather, its consequences speak to the correlation of a diminished space of appearance with the status as a human being: *"Of course"* women and slaves are not fully recognized as humans if they are locked in the household and are denied participation in the public; and *"of course"* we do not recognize refugees as fully human if we let them vegetate in detention centers where they are in a limbo of everything: legal status, having a home, and political participation. I don't read Arendt's "of course" as an affirmation of the situation but rather as a bitter form of stating facts about how appearance granted in a society directly correlates with political, personal, and human status (and the discomfort with this wording might have to do with Arendt's "tone," unavoidable for herself but a problem also for readers of her Eichmann-book, as she states in the famous interview with Günter Gaus, cf. Arendt 1994).

As for "bodiless acting," however, I have tried to show that this really goes against a consequent reading of Arendt herself (maybe even against her own grain). Instead, I have argued that all these borders between public and private, life and plurality, run *through* ourselves, since we are *bodily beings in a world and together with others*. It is simply impossible to separate these aspects from one another, they are always there concomitantly. Only in analysis, and for the sake of the clarification of different intentionalities (and consequently for a dynamics of spaces of meaning in the intersection of these different intentionalities), does such a separation make sense. But as much as I think that Arendt undertakes this analysis, I do not think that she wants to say that these spheres are separated in "real life". This might be a political intention, but all intentions in the world cannot change the fact that we, e.g. get tired after some time of acting together, that we have aging bodies even as highly important public figures, and still different voices in private, even as highly unimportant and non-publicly appearing figures.

I claim that "visibility spaces" can enhance or diminish forms and characters of appearance, but not that they "create" them in an essentialist manner. Furthermore, I see Arendt not as someone who wants to deny that we have a body when we act politically but rather as someone who wants to put things in the "right order", since the fragile actualizations of plurality would otherwise be totally overrun by all urgent needs of life (and be treated in the form of "masses".) One can, of course, also criticize this normatively loaded approach (a normativity that grounds, as I try to show, in a certain phenomenology); but it is something different to claim that the body is not relevant at all or to claim that every bodily/social/economic need has to be integrated with the demands of actualizing and upholding plurality.

Finally, I also think that plurality has an anarchic component, and that it is "always already" there – if it is not totally attacked, suppressed, and destroyed as, for example, in the concentration camps. Plurality does not wait for a space to be built for it, according to the plans of philosophical reasoning – or political theory, for that matter. This is why, as Bojanić rightly states, plurality cannot be captured fully by any political schools of thought. It happens as people demand that space, as something new spontaneously emerges.

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Sofi Lojdolt

Pluralnost, normativnost i telo: odgovor Sanji Bojanić i Adriani Zaharijević

Apstrakt

Prvi deo teksta je *précis* monografije *Fenomenologija pluralnosti: Hanah Arent o političkoj inter-subjektivnosti*, fenomenološke analize pluralnosti kao središnjeg pojma kod Arent koji ujedinjuje polja fenomenologije, političke teorije, socijalne ontologije i studija o Arent. U drugom i dužem delu, autorka odgovara na komentare Sanje Bojanić i Adriane Zaharijević kako bi razjasnila neke od ključnih pojmova i pozicija predstavljenih u knjizi.

Ključne reči: Hana Arent, fenomenologija, politička filozofija, pluralnost, intersubjektivnost

II

STUDIES AND ARTICLES

STUDIJE I ČLANCI

Sergey N. Borisov
Viktor P. Rimsky

HERMENEUTICS OF TRANSLATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF VIOLENCE

ABSTRACT
The philosophical definition of violence today is "incomplete" and leaves a "gap" between the phenomenon and the concept. This is due to the fact that the concept of "violence" was/is strangely included in the general philosophical categorial line. In domestic and Western discourse, the problem field of violence contains, above all, political and ethical meanings. The problem is intuitively resolved in its appeal to the concept of "power", which turns out to be philosophically lost in modern philosophy. Only exceptionally do we find "traces" of this concept in philosophical works. Among them are the works of Aristotle, which need to be freed from modern, distorting interpretations. Thus, in the translations of Aristotle, the Greek δύναμις, used for the traditional transferring the category of possibility, lost its meaning of force (movement, ability, function); in its turn, "force" lost relation to "violence" (βια) and "necessity". Violence is understood as a kind of necessity, which is associated with the suppression of one's "own decision", freedom, something that "prevents desire" and contrary to "common thinking," as well as the absence of "good". Violence is presented not only in an ontological sense, but also existentially, as the opposite of "good" and of one's own "desire". Force remains in the shadow of "necessity" as "possibility", "potential energy" and "movement", and violence loses the opposition that has arisen in an ontological mode.

Initially, we turned to the hermeneutics of Aristotle's texts in the existing Russian translations, trying to give our own understanding of violence in the modern philosophical context because of its categorical insufficiency. Philosophical categorization presupposes an initial definition of the phenomenon to be interpreted, but the existing conceptual forms turned out to be "insufficient". These forms left a certain "gap" between the phenomenon and the concept of "violence", giving rise to an obvious semantic and conceptual uncertainty in understanding violence.

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It was intuitively clear that the categorical links "human beings – violence", "violence – being", "violence – non-violence" are implicitly contained in the historical and philosophical categorical context. Not only in the Russian but also in Western public (and scientific) discourse, *the problematic field of violence* was burdened primarily with *political and ethical meanings*: political apology or ethical critique of violence. In post-Soviet philosophy, after the victory of the first Russian "velvet" revolution in August 1991 in the area of the Garden Ring and the White House, and the suppression of the first subcultural "colored" ("red-brown") revolution in 1993, "violence" turned out to be conceptually connected with "non-violence" and ethical exposure of these concepts (Гусейнов 2011: 9). In this respect, the concept of violence by A.A. Guseinov was a representative for those times. It was developed in the spirit of the ethics of non-violence, containing certain formal and logical contradictions. He rightly connected "violence" and "non-violence" with "force", distinguishing them (ibid: 79). Guseinov interpreted "non-violence" as "positive, constructive force" and "violence" as "destructive and self-destructive force". In addition to the concepts of "violence" and "non-violence", there was a positive presence of the concept of "force" (as marginal one), which unfortunately resided in the space of ethical connotations. And it remained unclear: are "violence" and "power" always "evil"? Is "nonviolence" a "force" or not?

There has clearly revealed some unconscious political rationalizations, which are often found in ethical doctrines of violence and non-violence. To show all the contradictions in the definitions of the concept of "violence" through the concept of "non-violence", a concept that is even more burdened with metaphorical, existential, political and ideological meanings, is fraught not only with the danger of "moralizing", but also with a radical going beyond boundaries of scientific and philosophical categorizations.

We tried to proceed from the meanings of our native Russian language, but here we also found out that in common usage the term "*nasilie*" often carries a "negative assessment load", but its language meanings are not exhausted – in living and historical languages it is becoming more and more difficult. In *Vladimir Dahl's Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language* we will find an understanding of such terms as *nasilit, nasilovat, nasilivat*, which imply the following meanings: to force, to compel, to force something, to constrain. There are also terms *nasilie* and *nasilstvo*: *coercion, captivity, need of force, illegal and arbitrary action*. And also: *arbitrariness, life under oppression, control or keep in submission by force (violence)* (Даль 1905: 1218). We have singled out those meanings which already initially contain some *intuitive philosophical connotations*. First, it is obvious that negative assessments do not prevail here. Second, there remains the meaning of "coercion" and "unfreedom" (captivity). Third, there is a connection with *everyday resentment* and "constraint", "*illegality*" and "*domination*" (life under oppression), and, finally, with pragmatic *management*. As we can see, the "great and mighty" Russian language as the "house of being" (Heidegger) contains many concealed meanings and at the same time it opens up a large space for our categorization.

In English, some semantic work was done earlier by H. Arendt, who wrote: "It is, I think, a rather sad reflection on the present state of political science that our terminology does not distinguish among such key words as 'power', 'strength', 'force', 'authority', and, finally, 'violence' – all of which refer to distinct, different phenomena and would hardly exist unless they did. (...) *Force*, which we often use in daily speech as a synonym for violence, especially if violence serves as a means of coercion, should be reserved, in terminological language, for the 'forces of nature' or the 'force of circumstances' (*la force des choses*), that is, to indicate the energy released by physical or social movements" (Arendt 1970: 50, 52, 53, 54). However, we were embarrassed here by the technological and instrumental understanding of violence and its identification solely with power. Even Foucault, despite his Nietzschean passion for "power", demarcated "violence" and "power" (Фуко 2006: 180), recognizing as the main sign of violence the objectification of any influence as opposed to free, subjective existence.

In the aspect we are interested in, H. Hofmeister quite consistently tried to connect the interpretation of violence with the concept of "force", starting with the problematization of the meaning of the concepts presented in "The German Dictionary of the Brothers Grimm", and ending with the Indo-European and ancient origins. He wrote, noting the connection between violence and "force", which "acts as violence only under certain conditions": "The German word 'violence' (*Gewalt*), which is derived from the Indo-Germanic root *val* – 'to be strong' – implies 'to have the ability to dispose'. Initially, i.e. in ancient German language, the word 'violence' was not a legal term: it was used in an area of freedom where there was no place for law. Later on, 'violence' was used to translate such Latin notions as *violentia* (riot, unrestraint), *vis* (power, might) and *potestas* (power, potential, domination). Since in the Middle Ages the word *potestas* was most often translated by the German word 'power', 'violence' received a stronger meaning *violentia*" (Хофмайстер 2006: 31–32). Here, there appear some different meanings from the Russian ones: might (although *moshch* in Russian also means both *might* and *ability to do something*) and, most importantly, *potential*. The latter is very important, because it is from this categorical *point of view of potentiality*, the path of violence into the *reality* of human existence begins.

Thus, we find ourselves in difficulty, because we intuitively feel the generic load of the concept of "power", which is constantly being either marginal or *philosophically excluded*. The new appeal to Russian linguistic thesauruses has shown that in the *Vladimir Dahl's Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language* the spectrum of meanings of the term "power" turns out to be wider, including also "violence" (Даль 1909: 152–154), and even more diverse than in the dictionary of the Grimm brothers: it contains both numerous connotations related to "natural forces and causes" and "vital forces", and spiritual ones – *sila dukhovnaja* (spiritual force), *sila uma* (mental force), *sila voli* (willpower), *sila nravstvennaja* (moral force), *moch* (might), *moguta* (ability), *sposobnost* (potential). And, equally important, it points to the ontological aspects of "power": ways, means, essence of the concept, etc. There are also very important meanings of

"power" – *vlast* (might), *mogushchestvo* (potency), *vlijanie* (influence), *vladychestvo* (domination), *vojsko* (army), *armija* (forces), *rat* (warrior host); this suggests that power itself may include power phenomena, which also constitute a wider class of phenomena than violence in general, and the more so legitimate violence.

As a generic concept of "power" in relation to "violence" I. A. Ilyin for the first time clearly indicated in his "apprentice" article "Concepts of Law and Power (Essay of Methodological Analysis)" (1910), which also received European recognition. In this article, he gave a subtle philosophical concept of "force", different from Hegel's one in the *Philosophy of Right*, but based on the history of philosophy (although he also allowed for the Kantian logic) (В. П. Римский, О. Н. Римская, Мюльгаупт 2018). I. A. Ilyin noted the ontological status of the power of *Kraft* in contrast to the gnoseological *Macht*, relying on Leibniz, Spinoza and Fichte (Ильин 1994). The *ontology of power* as an ability, i.e. *potency*, he clearly ascended to Hegel, and through his works to Aristotle.

Hegel in his historical and philosophical lectures wrote, highlighting a special, actually original place in the Aristotelian discourse of the categories of *potency* (dynamis, ability, possibility, strength) and *energy* (act, realization of force, activity, necessity, expediency, reality): "To proceed, there are *two leading forms*, which Aristotle characterizes as that of *potentiality* (δύναμις) and that of *actuality* (ενέργεια); the latter is still more closely characterized as *entelechy* (εντελέχεια) or free activity, which has the end (το τέλος) in itself, and is the realization of this end. These are determinations which occur repeatedly in Aristotle, especially in the ninth book of the Metaphysics, and which we must be familiar with, if we would understand him" (Hegel 1894: 138). Although Hegel further reduces the hermeneutic tension of the "dynamis" concept: "With Aristotle δύναμις does not therefore mean force (for force is really an imperfect aspect of form), but rather capacity which is not even undetermined possibility; ενέργεια is, on the other hand, pure, spontaneous activity. These definitions were of importance throughout all the middle ages" (ibid: 138–139). I. A. Ilyin, criticizing the Hegelian understanding of "power", both in his early article and in the book "On Resisting Evil by Force" (Ильин 1996), developed his own meanings of force and violence, coercion and non-resistance, etc.

All of this allowed us to join thesis of H. Hofmeister: "Power is not violence and authority, but in turn, neither violence nor authority can be thought of without power" (Хофмайстер 2006: 34, 36). And then he had interesting references to antiquity, to Aristotle.

The understanding of the phenomenon of violence in ancient culture and philosophy, in our opinion, should be preceded by the understanding that the usual meanings of many concepts used by modern researchers in their interpretation, were developed in the modern era. It should be taken into account that they are a kind of background for perception of this problem when analyzing and interpreting other historical epochs and cultural and civilizational worlds. In our case, it was necessary to identify cultural paradigms and philosophical images of violence not so much to reveal their authentic meaning inherent in antiquity, as to *find the boundaries of the meaning field* of the phenomenon

itself outside its cultural and historical variability, taken in its universality as an *archetypical meaning* in human life.

In the classical antique polis, we have completely new, *syncretic cultural practices of regulating the "zoon", the "naked life" of a person*, the practice of integrating it into the *"bios", into the good, "nomothetic" solidary life of the polis*, which do not exclude "polytheistic" forms of violence (freely accepted legitimate violence) and the authoritative control of the life of "free multitude," which implies the emergence of moral-legal and religious-moral public forms of freedom and polis solidarity, "solidarity practices," as conditions of personal "practices of self" (Foucault), new forms of man's cognition of himself and self-control. In classical antiquity, the basic principles of opposing the practices of *legitimate violence* to "practices of self", non-violence in the face of a universal "person" of the state and incipient legal violence are affirmed, which retains its cultural and cognitive value today. Not abstract "non-violence", but legitimate *practices of power* tame *illegal violence*.

A symbolic event that influenced the ancient understanding of violence and non-violence in human life and the ancient polis was the execution of Socrates, who not only became a personified archetype and image of ancient thought (*νοῦς*), conscience and freedom, but also a "sacred figure of violence", along with Jesus Christ, in the history of Western culture and philosophy. Socrates could have avoided death, as it was customary in the "legal practice" of the ancient polis, by persuading the court to expel himself from the polis: "Exile? for perhaps you might accept that assessment" (*Apol.* 37c) (Платон 1997). And he chooses death and rejects expulsion by "free decision". Why? Because for a free citizen of polis to be in exile meant not only the loss of some sentimental "motherland" or "fatherland" (female and male versions of the policy nomination, which bothered Heidegger so much), not just the acquisition of the status of a metic with no rights in the "other's polis", and not even a return to "naked life", but the transformation into a *homo sacer* (Agamben), which could not even be sacrificed, but anyone could have simply killed him. This is how Socrates perceived his possible "exile", who had not left his "homeland", had not left his "homeland", preferring to constantly fly from "naked life" (private) to *βίος*, "political life" (public), annoying the Athenians as a gadfly, and urging them to return to the path of "self-care" (*Apol.* 30b, 30e, 36e–d).

The hermeneutics of the texts of ancient philosophers makes it possible to draw a conclusion (В. П. Римский, О. Н. Римская, К. Е. Мюльгаупт 2019) that the concepts of "violence" and "coercion" (or similar in meaning categories and images) are often used by them as synonyms and not only axiologically, but also ontologically. "Non-violence" as such is virtually absent in their texts, but close meanings could probably be defined in the analysis of the phenomenon that "freedom" was in antiquity. Special translation and interpretation procedures are needed to avoid modernizing ancient meanings, but this is only possible in a special, separate study.

The reference to Aristotle's philosophy is of the greatest interest to us in terms of philosophical and ontological understanding and theoretical resolution

of the dichotomy of violence and non-violence. Aristotle was credited with being the first in ancient philosophy to consider the category of "power" as "ancestral" to both "violence" and "non-violence" (a point that was actually missed by both Hegel and contemporary authors). Why is it in Aristotle's philosophy that the problem of violence arises in ontological terms? It is because it is in the life of polis that ethic and legal and political practices act for the first time as an effective force regulating violence and *asserting non-violence in the solidarity life of "free multitude".*

This is how Aristotle, or rather *Russian translations and interpretations of Aristotle*, found themselves in the hermeneutics of violence and non-violence, violence and power.

Let us start actually with the first "Russian Aristotle", or rather with the Russian reading of Aristotle, which made a contribution to the young V. V. Rozanov after the publication of his treatise "On Understanding", still not recognized as hermeneutic and invaluable. In a letter to N. N. Strakhov dated February 15, 1988, Rozanov writes: "For the last 2 years, looking at different works, (...) I came to the conviction, perhaps, to the guess that the root of the case, the key to solving a lot of issues, which for me – either to solve or not to live, lies with Aristotle" (Розанов 2001: 153). N. N. Strakhov, in his correspondence, was somewhat sceptical about Aristotle's Russian relevance and topicality, although Rozanov's translation was perceived as some cultural act, having assisted in its publication. And, nevertheless, already in the 1913 note to N. N. Strakhov's letter of February 23, 1988, as if continuing the dispute, Rozanov notes: "And I still think that Aristotle cannot be replaced by anyone" (ibid: 9).

It also contains a very remarkable opinion of Rozanov about the place of *dynamis* and *energeia* in Aristotle's category: "[T]he concepts of δύναμις and ενέργεια in their Latin terms *potentia* and *actus* (I do not really understand only *actus*; in my work, I always spoke about the potential and reality; it is true that it corresponds to my 'forming existence', but we did not reach it in *Metaphysics*) are the key to understanding the most complex and deepest systems of philosophy. In them, as in mysterious symbols, the whole system of thought is expressed, and it became clear thus-and-so (the main thing is the change)" (ibid: 154). And in the next letter of March 2, 1988, about his translation and interpretation of Aristotle, he continues his thought: "I want to get acquainted with his works in order to get acquainted with his notions of *potentialities* (this is the most important thing), which he was the first to introduce into philosophy and has probably already developed well" (ibid: 160). In the preface to the publication of the translation of *Metaphysics* Rozanov wrote: "Amazing thing: after two millennia, which separate us from the time of Aristotle's life, science is worried about the concept, as recently acquired, and, of course, more scientifically arranged, but which, however, was first discovered by Aristotle: we understand the concept of physical energy, which now replaces so long dominant concept of force and was first established by Aristotle in immortal terms *δύναμις* and *ενέργεια*, possibility and reality, tension and action." (ibid: 25) No one has really appreciated this Rosanov's hermeneutics of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*

yet, although it is very important for the actual understanding of the ancient meanings of the phenomenon of violence, among other things.

Therefore, we were surprised by Aristotle's new translations, which reduce the flexibility of the ancient Greek language, which is related to Russian and German, to a primitive modernizing analytic approach. So, for example, A. V. Markov, quite consciously, not only limits the meanings of Aristotle *δύναμις* and *ενέργεια*, but simply distorts them, as well as other categories: "Therefore, let the reader not be surprised that I often translate 'logos' as 'formula' (and 'proportion' sometimes, in Kubitsky's case it is 'definition'), 'atom' as 'individual', 'genesis' as 'production'; I explain 'art' as 'cooking' several times; I translate 'energy' only as 'reality', and after the poets and prose writers of the Russian XX century I prefer the word 'existence' to the word 'essence'" (Аристотель 2018: 8). It is natural that Markov's translation of Aristotle *Metaphysics* received fair criticism from specialists (Юнусов 2018). Trying to actualize Aristotle's dictionary and preserving its identity at the same time, as if bringing it closer to the language of "Mandelstam and Pasternak, Platonov and Nabokov", Markov does not understand that it is impossible to combine the innovative Nabokov language or avant-garde Pasternak language with the consciously archaized style of Platonov or Mandelstam. As it is difficult to combine the actualization of Aristotle language with the restoration of its archaic primordial meanings.

M. Heidegger will speak and write on the actualizing reading of Aristotle with the simultaneous restoration of the original identity (but only after Rozanov for almost thirty-five years!). Heidegger's "romance with Aristotle" began early: even at the time of his studies at the theological faculty. But it was in lectures at the faculty of philosophy that he urged students to turn to Aristotle from the present and to return to the ancient meanings of his concepts, which did not mean, however, some modernization of ancient philosophy. Rather, it meant archaizing modern (relevant) philosophy, searching through the restoration of the original meanings a specific philosophical language lost by modernist philosophy and translation modernization. And then he translates *δύναμις*, meaning in modern German *Vermögen*, *Kraft*, *Fähigkeit* (ability, power, opportunity), as *das bestimmte Verfügenkönnen über; Bereitschaft zu ...* (a certain ability to control; readiness for ...) (Хайдеггер 2012: 210). One can be amazed at how bizarre Heidegger translations are, but at the same time he solved the mystification tasks of constructing his adequate philosophical language by reading the thesaurus of the philosophy of antiquity, but he did not impose any modernizing meanings or avant-garde translations on the ancients language.

No, we are surprised by another fact: how the Greek *δύναμις*, used for the traditional translation of the Aristotelian interpretation of the category of *opportunity*, has lost the connotations of *power* (movement, ability, function); in turn, "power" has lost touch with "violence" (*bia*) and "necessity". An appeal to the categorization of violence and power by Aristotle, we believe, should begin with reading his treatise *Physics* (Аристотель 1981a), where we find such an initial categorical disposition and connection *δύναμις* as *power with motion*. An appeal to the treatises *On the Heavens* and *Metaphysics* (Аристотель 1981c;

1981b; 2006) allows us to expand the Aristotelian connotations δύναμις not only as "opportunities", but also as "forces", and in the interpretation of ἐνέργεια to get away from its understanding as only "reality", connecting both with "action", "necessity", and with "violence." At the same time, supposedly "outdated" Russian translations do not bother us.

In his treatise *On the Heavens* Aristotle, criticizing the Pythagorean "string theory", writes: "But if the moving bodies are so great, and the sound which penetrates to us is proportionate to their size, that sound must needs reach us in an intensity many times that of thunder, and the *force of its action must be immense*. Indeed the reason why we do not hear, and show in our bodies none of the effects of *violent force*, is easily given: it is that there is no noise" (*De Cael.* II, 9, 291a, 2-7; italics ours). And further he makes a conclusion that none of the "stars" "moves neither as an animal, nor violently, *by force*" (II, 9, 291a, 2-7; II, 14, 296 b, 25-30; italics ours). Strength and violence are discussed here in an inseparable connection with "naturalness" as well as with "necessity".

But what meanings does Aristotle put into "violence" and "forced movement"? The movement "as an animal" obviously presupposes some kind of "organicity", "self-movement", but "violence" means "unnaturalness" and "coercion". This is also confirmed by other texts.

Here is a detailed Aristotelian understanding of naturalness: "The necessity that each of the simple bodies should have a *natural movement* may be shown as follows. They manifestly move, and if they have no proper movement they must *move by constraint*; and the constrained is the same as the *unnatural*. Now an unnatural movement presupposes a natural movement which it contravenes, and which, however many the unnatural movements, is always one. (...) The same may be shown from the fact of rest. Rest, also, must either be *constrained* or *natural*, constrained in a place to which movement was constrained, natural in a place to which movement was natural. Now manifestly there is a body which is at rest at the centre. If then this rest is natural to it, clearly motion to this place is *natural* to it. If, on the other hand, its rest is constrained, what is hindering its motion? Something, perhaps, which is at rest; but if so, we shall simply repeat the same argument; and either we shall come to an ultimate something to which rest where it is natural, or we shall have an infinite process, which is impossible. (...) For to traverse an infinite is impossible, and impossibilities do not happen. So the *moving thing* must stop somewhere, and there rest *not by constraint* but *naturally*" (*De Cael.* II, 14, 300a, 20–30; 300b, 5–7; italics ours) (Аристотель 1981c). But the Russian word *est-estvennoe* (natural) carries the meanings of "existence", "being", "what *exists*", and the opposite *protivoestestvennoe* (unnatural) means "what does not exist", "*non-existent*", which obviously leads us to negative attributes of violence, to its non-existence, *not-being*, and *destruction*.

In this sense, unnaturalness is again associated with an action, activity or movement, the nature of which is revealed by the reading and interpretation of *Metaphysics*: "We call the necessary (1) that without which, as a condition, a thing cannot live (...). The compulsory and compulsion, i.e. that which impedes

and hinders contrary to impulse and choice. For the compulsory is called necessary (...). And compulsion is a form of necessity (...). And *necessity* is held to be something that *cannot be persuaded* (as a Fate) – and rightly, for it is contrary to the movement which accords with choice and with reasoning (...). For as regards the *compulsory* we say that it is necessary to act or to be acted on, only when we cannot act according to impulse because of the compelling force, – which implies that necessity is that because of which the thing cannot be otherwise; and similarly as regards the conditions of life and of good, when in the one case good, in the other life and being, are not possible without certain conditions, these are necessary, and this cause is a kind of necessity" (*Met.* V, 5, 1015a, 20–34; 1015b, 1–8; italics ours).

Violence is understood here as such a necessity, which is connected with the suppression of freedom ("one's own decision"), something "hindering desire" ("realization of one's own will") and contrary to "common sense", as well as the absence of "good". Violence is not only presented as "necessity" in the ontological sense, but also existentially, as the opposite of "good" and "desire". And "necessity" acts as fatal and inevitable, like the goddess of Destiny or Destiny itself. Further, Aristotle (in Book V, Chapter 12) considers "suffering" in connection with "ability" or "opportunity" (*dynamis*) as "scarcity", "deprivation" and "lack of ability". It is unclear why the translator chose to translate *dynamis* here as an "possibility" rather than a "power"? Power remains in the shadow of "necessity" as "possibility", "potential energy" and "movement", and violence loses the resulting opposition in ontological meaning.

Let us turn to Chapter V of *Metaphysics*, translated by P. D. Pervov and V. V. Rozanov, and compare them. And here we will see the meanings already revealed by us earlier. "(I)t *has something,* sometimes because it is deprived of something; but if *privation* is in a sense having, everything will be capable by *having something,* so that things are capable both by having something, i.e. a principle, and by having the privation of the positive principle, if it is possible to have a privation; and if privation is not in a sense having, things are called capable homonymously); and a thing is capable in another sense because neither any other thing, nor itself qua other, has a capacity or principle which *can destroy it*. Again, all these are capable either merely because the thing might chance to happen or not to happen, or because it might do so well. (...). *Incapacity* is *privation of capacity* – i.e. of such a principle as has been described – either in general or in the case of something that would naturally have the capacity, or even at the time when it would naturally already have it" (*Met.* V, 12, 1019 b, 5-20; italics ours). The used phrases "desroy", "privation of capacity" again turns out to be close with *nasilie* (violence) as something that is *ne/sushchee* (something that does not exist), *nebytie* (not-being) and *gibel* (death). Once again, there is a certain "not-being", but there is no power as a characteristic of being, which is necessary not even for the second position, but for the first one in this categorical pair of power – violence.

These meanings and the need for "power" as coming from possibility to reality arise further (*Met.* Book IX, Chapter 1). Aristotle himself refers to these

meanings (*Metaphysics*, V, 12), but the translator again does not use the word "сила" (power) persistently, although Stagirite writes: "We have pointed out elsewhere that 'potentiality' and the word 'can' have several senses" (*Metaphysics*, IX, 1, 1046a, 5). Whereas *moch* (or *moshch*) in Russian means "power" (*vozmoch* – to be able to do something, and *prevozmoch* – to overcome, to pass to the reality). Such a reading, which implies the power of a stronger category of force, makes it obvious that the dialectics of force and violence are revealed through the opposition of ability/inability; violence/non-violence.

Thus, we can find all the meanings we are interested in from Aristotle, among which the category of *dynamis* can be interpreted as a force, and the category of power as violence (*bia*) which is associated with the categories of opportunity and necessity. Possible power as an ability in the context of naturality (*prirodnost*) and necessity is put into the context of naturalness (*estestvennost*) as strength and unnaturalness as violence; they are two *equally possible* aspects of being. Unnaturalness is such a being, which is connected with necessity as *coercion*, distortion of natural, natural good or some "capturability" of force. As a result, there is a collision between "action" (*energeia*, power) and "counter-action" (violence) as a "natural" or "free" force and an "usurped" force, violence itself as an usurpation of "own decision".

Of course, the "Russian reading" of Aristotle should be supplemented with new translations and actualizing interpretations, similar to what Rozanov did in his time, and, if it is possible, to what Heidegger did in the twenties of the last century, as well as the retrospective analysis of the Greek text through the use of the modern thesaurus, "clouds" of actual today's meanings, texts and authors. So Walter Benjamin, who has once again become popular today with his concept of "divine violence", raises the question whether Aristotle's play of power and opportunity has something that does not include violence and is absolutely "non-violent".

And Aristotle answers him: "Now some things owe their necessity to something other than themselves; others do not, while they are the source of necessity in other things. Therefore the necessary in the primary and strict sense is the simple; for this does not admit of more states than one, so that it does not admit even of one state and another; for it would thereby admit of more than one. If, then, there are certain *eternal and unmovable* things, *nothing compulsory* or *against their nature* attaches to them" (*Met.* V, 5, 1015b, 9–15; italics ours). Only God is not subject to violence as he is the most "simple", "simple force", "primary power" and "first cause": "And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's essential actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this *is* God" (*Met.* XII, 7, 1072b, 25-30). God as a true being is violent/non-violent absolute. There remains one step to Walter Benjamin (Беньямин 2012: 8) with his "divine violence".

<div style="text-align:right">Translated by M. A. Maydanskiy</div>

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Hermeneutika prevođenja i razumevanje nasilja

Apstrakt

Filozofska definicija nasilja danas je „nepotpuna" i ostavlja „jaz" između fenomena i pojma. To je slučaj usled činjenice da je pojam „nasilja" (bio) uključen u opštu filozofsku kategorijalnu liniju na čudan način. U domaćem i Zapadnom diskursu problemsko polje nasilja sadrži pre svega politička i etička značenja. Problem se intuitivno rešava apelovanjem na pojam „moći" za koji se ispostavlja da je filozofski izubljen u modernoj filozofiji. Samo u izuzetnim slučajevima pronalazimo „tragove" tog filozofskog pojma. Među njima su Aristotelova dela koja se moraju osloboditi modernih izobličavajućih tumačenja. Dakle, u prevodima Aristotela, grčko δύναμις, koje se tradicionalno koristilo za prenošenje kategorije mogućnosti, izgubilo je svoje značenje sile (kretanje, mogućnost, sposobnost, funkcija); zauzvrat, „sila" je izgubila svoju vezu za „nasiljem" (βια) i „nužnošću". Nasilje se tako shvata kao oblik nužnosti koji je povezan sa potiskivanjem „sopstvene odluke", slobode, nečim što „sprečava želju", i u suprotnosti sa „uobičajenim mišljenjem" i kao odsustvo „dobra". Nasilje je predstavljeno ne samo u ontološkom smislu, već i egzistencijalno, kao suprotnost „dobru" i nečijoj vlastitoj „želji". Sila ostaje u senci „nužnosti" kao „mogućnosti", „potencijalne energije" i „kretanja", i nasilje gubi opoziciju koja nastaje u ontološkom modalitetu.

Ključne reči: hermeneutika, mogućnost, sila, moć, realnost, akcija, nasilje, nužnost, prisila, Aristotel, V. Rozanov, I. Iljin, M. Hajdeger

Chaslav D. Koprivitsa

THE CONCEPT OF ENGAGEMENT

SUMMARY
In this paper, we illuminate the basic features of the concept of engagement, which has only become possible in the secular world, with the emergence of the modern individual deprived of any stable, eternal order or hierarchy of values. Still, engagement is not only individual but also collective, as the lack of certainty about the truth affects not only the community and society but also motivates them to follow the same paradigm as the individual – themselves at stake, without knowing where it could possibly lead, but with the intention to produce some tangible and stable socio-cosmic structures that could alleviate man's uncertainty and thus insecurity. The necessity of engagement stems from the circumstance that man lives in a context saturated with meanings that call him out in advance and influence him. Therefore, engagement means actually acting back to the being-exposed to meanings and structures that have already affected man and his situation. One section of the text deals with an understanding of engagement in the contemporary, "postmodern" era.

Introduction

The real basis for the coinage of the term, which first emerged in social discourse and then, in theory, is the daily use of the corresponding word in French and afterwards in other languages. The word begins to crystallize as a concept parallel to the emergence of theoretical thoughts on engagement, which did not exist before the XIX, although it peaked in the XX century. Engagement, as an *epochally typical paradigm of existence* (private and public, as well as individual and collective) comes to the focus of attention only in late secularity, when man, as being deprived of "eternally" valid cosmic order by the course of history itself, was confronted with the task to rearrange social reality, independently, solely relying upon himself, and to find (out) a new, widely acceptable hierarchy of values, which should determine an individual and collective way of life.

Until that moment, one could in his orientation rely upon generally well-known, but not necessarily reflected cosmo-social markers. Of course, in earlier times too, one could not know all that was important for him to be acquainted with. Yet, when we put aside the for centuries unchallenged rule of the Christian world picture, in which an *autonomous knowledge* could not be

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the leading epistemic paradigm, in antiquity it was believed that theory is basically capable to deal with life practice. Thus, theory and practice form a functional circle: practice "raises" *real* questions, to which theory gives her answers – with a reliance on the emerging practice of (life) theory. In a relatively well-ordered and norm-dependent world picture, there was room for a paradigm of the practical mind – as an expression of confidence in the possibility that human practice can be regulated by *ratio*.

By overcoming the previously self-contained world picture, the independent search for truth and the normative becomes not only a possibility but also, in a way, a necessity – both for individual and for the collectivities. Karl Marx was among the first to feel and announce that the modern era not only provides an opportunity for active action to achieve certain social goals but that history has entered a stage in which the future largely depends on active social engagement. The background of Marx's famous 11th thesis on Feuerbach is that the truth – about man, social reality, history – is known as a product of (Marxian) *thought of liberation* and that then it is all about shifting it into reality. This announced not only that humanity entered into the *era of ideologies* but also, at the same time, the future time's *necessity of engagement*.

However, the concept of engagement could not be simply reduced to engagement *for* an ideology. It turned out that the confidence of Marx and the others in the ability to ascertain, if not the ultimate, then at least the epoch-relative truths – was premature. Opening up the space for the paradigm of (social) engagement did not in itself mean that in a post-theocentric world picture one could easily reach reliable truth-certainties. Moreover, the then-man experienced a shortage of reliable truths and safe instructions for daily action:

> Therefore, to engage in some direction, for some subject, means to commence acting, not necessarily knowing where one is going to, not even knowing whether that which is to be done good or not, whether its goals will be achieved or not. That is why we can often engage, as the saying goes, as if "head through the wall". (Makowiak 2005)

Thus, "[u]rgency of engagement" – both individual and collective – "the absence of a calculation of consequences, goes hand in hand with its unpredictability, with the accepted unpredictability ..." (*ibid.*) In one of the most brilliant philosophical dialogues of the XX century, the author, using dramaturgical mimicry puts the following words to one of his heroes' mouth: "The French are supposed to be the most logical thinker in the world, but I think only you Russians, Ivan, are crazy enough to act on the basis of a cogent chain of reasoning, *no matter where it leads*." (Suits 1978: 69; our emphasize). Here, however, this is not about any specific "national character", but rather of the modern human's situation, regardless of personal and/ or national, civilizational mentality. The man simply found himself in the middle of epochal structure which stands for the tendency of *suspension of phronesis*.

Therefore, in a preliminary approximation, it should be concluded, that engagement is an expression of the *necessity to act because of the lack of certainty*

or the preconditions for acquiring it. One must engage due to an acute absence of certainty; one acts not out of knowledge on reality and on the practically necessary, but precisely thanks to their absence. Still, such a way of acting can hardly eliminate the initial state of uncertainty. To be engaged means inevitability of acting out of uncertainty – *into uncertainty*. Under such circumstances, an engaging action could even be equated with a brave daring, which means a shift towards *life-practical decisionism*, because the engaged person is obviously not a sovereignly acting "subject". However, due to the fundamental lack of theoretical certainty prior to taking action, it is usually expected to achieve a certain harmony of speaking/writing and acting, since the integration of publicly stated intention of an act and its effect is nevertheless considered to be a *compensatory modality for truth-attaining* through practice, instead of through theory. But even so, the "truth" could be reached neither in this way.

Therefore, engagement, epistemologically speaking, must be "emerging knowledge that is only gained through action", ie. one form of *faire(-a)-savoir* (Makowiak 2005) The need to make a decision in a factual life situation and when things are not clear in advance is the reverse side of a lack of knowledge so that the *coercion necessity of decisionism* stems from uncertainty and finally from insecurity. Then knowledge, or what is, under the circumstances, possibly the closest to it, is sought to be obtained by "provoking" the environment through action so that the manifestation of the consequences of a particular provoking act is to lead to *factual truth*, which should be a prerequisite for (further) action.

In this sense, Sartre's theorem is crucial for discerning the relationship between theory and practice peculiar to our time: "the real world is revealed only by action" (Sartre 1988: 65). According to him, "[t]he prose-writer is a man who has chosen a certain method of *secondary action* that we may call action by disclosure. [...] He knows what to reveal is to change and that one can only reveal by planning to change" (ibid: 37; our emphasis). The very last statement is a dubitable one. For him, it is impossible to take a not-interested attitude towards the truth, which excludes personal involvement, i.e. being-already-involved. The notion of "secondary action" is also noteworthy. It has an *experimental* character – to intentionally make reality to manifest itself, which needs to increase the degree of certainty necessary for acting *actually*. The secondary action precedes the primary one, the one by which an acting person actually wants to accomplish something. Secondary action, which is a form of engagement particularly important in illuminating its nature, means to act *for the sake of practical certainty*, which is a prerequisite for an action aiming to something. This kind of action is, therefore, a preliminary action, which should provide a basis for further "actual agency".[1]

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1   Besides, engagement, as a modus operandi of *integrated search* – both for the true and practically expedient – is the inversion of the model underlying the pragmatic theory of meaning. If for the latter the meaning of some views is embodied by the practical patterns adhered to by the people who follow them, then by the "engaged notion of truth" the meaning is rendered based on action.

In the absence of a way to reach the truth, so to say "straightforwardly", and feeling at the same time need for it, even more strongly than ever before – because man does not live in a "raw" reality, but in the field of the established, recognized, considered as such and such, i.e. in a medium of language, therefore in the realm where it is all about truth[2] – he decides to take a radical step: *to put himself at stake*, in order to possibly come to some sort of provisional, *situational certainty*, or at least to diminish a present level of uncertainty. Engagement is therefore a sort of personal decisionism forced by epochal circumstances. "To engage means to pledge one's own person" (Makowiak 2005); and precisely this pledging, has in common two basic semantic-conceptual branches of this term: action, or (self)commitment by, mostly, although not exclusively, own or other's word, act, emotion, contract...

As the study of the historical etymology of the French word *engagement* indicates, it derives from *gage* (guarantee / pledge), which is "a material variant of [being-]hostage"[3]. If in the Middle Ages a material pledge was a substitute for self-pledging – for the sake of some debt or some another sort of guarantees, then in the modern condition, in an altered form, an immaterial form of (self) pledging is restituted – but no longer by pledging own body, but as practical pledging (of content, values, meaning ...) of one's own person. He is a hostage again, but not of someone else's, but a *"hostage" of absent truth*, which he must always try to, so to say, "redeem" – by provoking acts of engagement.

Thus, a modern man appears here in a threefold role: a. the one who pleads himself, b. who provokes to know, and c. who radically bears the consequences of own acting/provocation – by receiving back from the provoked reality a raw, factual – hitherto only embedded, but from now on "dis-embedded" truth. *Provocatio realitatis* becomes the leading practically-hermeneutic modality of the existence of the human. The modern era made him explicitly *finite* and therefore forced to engage oneself, as a direct answer to the situation.

In modern times, it took place a fundamental change in the understanding of place, nature, and even the sense of truth. When it comes to the surrounding reality, it is either impossible to establish the truth concerning it without provoking her by engagement – personal and/or collective – which obviously changes it, or that the reality is not even valuable enough, finally *is not true*, which raises the question of the purpose to search the truth on such a reality. Hence the wrong can be not only a statement about reality, a theory about it – but even reality itself can be "faulty". Based on this, it is even imaginable to develop not only a hatred attitude towards social reality, or some its parts, but also to urge establishing a more correct, *true reality*, and correlatively – a *true*

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2   Husserl speaks of man's "self-understanding as being in being called to a *life of apodicticity*" (1970: 340; original emphasis). And the purpose of this demand is determined as follows: "But all this speculative knowledge is meant to serve man in his human purposes so that he may order his worldly life in the happiest possible way and shield it from disease, from every sort of evil fate, from disaster and death." (ibid: 284).

3   Bernard Cerquiglini, https://balises.bpi.fr/langues/savez-vous-a-quoi-lengagement-engage (accessed: September 15th, 2019).

man. Moreover, assuming a certain social determinism, in theory, it is possible to take point of departure from the fact that a true man can emerge only if surrounded by the true reality. Then the radical transformation of reality – i.e. revolution, becomes a social-historical first-class task.

And the psycho-emotional pretext for revolution: hatred of the real, i.e. towards to current social reality, tacitly equated with reality in general, it was completely unimaginable, and theoretically and practically impossible, until the modern age, when the European man gave himself the right and task to stands as a measure of all things and of all reality. If Plato introduced an *ontological comparative* by which ideas, for example, were more true than sensually observable objects, then in the modern situation, the criterion of the attributively re-interpreted truth of the real becomes its correspondence to human projections, i.e. to his *creative imagination*, which came to be the origin of compensatory truthfulness. So truth as correspondence, in an epochal sense, began to become obsolete.

Instead, to provide statements that correspond to the current (flawed and untrue) reality, the most important thing became the activity that was to *create the truth* – the true world and the true man, either through a constant, regular engagement that should lead to continuous progress – both, anthropological and social, or through extraordinary engagement for radical change – revolution. The latter solution becomes a historical option when one experiences a failure in attempts to change the world evolutionarily in accordance with one's own intentions. So the praxis of engagement could conceptually be determined as *the effort of truth-creation – within of a currently truth-less world*.

The forerunner of this turn from the conception truth as primarily epistemic to the existential category was Kierkegaard. According to him, the individual should ask himself personally about the truth, striving to reach personal truth with his existence – since there is no general truth, as well as that it has no systemic or even predominantly theoretical character. Instead of a firmly bound "circle" composed of theory and practice, as, perhaps ideally, it was presented at the beginnings of European philosophy, there remains only an auxiliary function for the thinking in the self-activities of existence. The basis of action cannot be in thinking, but it is rather compelled to try to produce its ground in and by itself – ultimately in a *radical decision*. Because of this a decision making individual can only by means of his life – when faced with its consequences – empirically determine whether his previous decision produced the *effect of foundation*.

Under presuppositions of the *engaged decisionalism*, one can only afterwards, by reflecting on one's consequent life practice, determine whether what one has committed oneself to is eligible to become his foundation. All of this is to point out that Descartes proclaimed the search of European man for the *fundamentum inconcussum*, which is the historical demarcation line between the modern and the pre-modern, with an existential turn towards engagement was altered in a few ways. The foundation of knowledge is no longer sought, but the foundation of existence and knowledge has lost its founding function

for human life, while the thought is overwhelmingly absorbed by life practice – as an *existential reflection*. There took place, so to speak, an epochal *fall into practicalism* – through a "short circuit" between what was previously called "practice" and "theory", so that the latter, at least in an existential context, becomes essentially epiphenomenal.

We sketched the connection between engagement and the modern epoch. Still, it would be an exaggeration to say that a pre-modern man could not engage. As a matter of fact, the human world was never so well-organized that it could not and/ or should change in something. On the other hand, a man of high civilizations was never totally absorbed by his world(-picture), and therefore he was not completely devoid of the possibility to choose and act. Therefore, Gehlen is right in saying that "human life has the paradoxical feature that it *must be engaged* [*eingesetzt*]" (Gehlen: 2016: 300; our emphasis). As being endowed with reason, o human makes decisions, choices, has preferences, etc., and he cannot put aside all that even in the most difficult situations, albeit fighting for bare survival, for instance. Therefore, in some sense it could be stated, that [pre-societal] "engagement" for survival is a kind of *engagement avant lettre*.

Historical Background and the Core of the Concept

The reality in which man lives is organized as a series of circumstances and states of affairs that for him carry the hermeneutic sign of *as* (Aristotelian *he*) – i. e. they are defined as certain so and so things, and in so far as they can be explicitly interpreted. This series is not a set of individual data, but it always produces a *living environment* (Diltheyean *Lebenszusammenhang*) whose individual elements should not be viewed separately. It is even more important that circumstances are not only internally related, but that they are *here for the corresponding entity* (one I, or We), whose all-encompassing "objective" correlate is my/ our situation. "It [situation] contains no static moments, but 'events'. [...] Events 'happen to me'. [...] What happens has a relation to me; it radiates into my own I" (Heidegger 2000: 173, 174). But this does not mean that human has an interpretative, let alone factual, power to determine the "essence" of circumstances at his discretion; the interpretative reference of circumstances to man is rather a consequence of his ontological co-determination by them.

The truth about human and truth about (surrounding) reality are inseparable, so this *situational determination of truth* – both on the "subjective" and "objective" side – finds its expression in another, secondary correlation: of what *is*, or what is *interpreted*. In these circumstances, interpretation is always qualified as a, at least *potential*, act, which is exercised over the interpreted state of affairs. This is possible only because the factual, speechless "interpretation" has previously been exposed to the real influence of the circumstances. So the connective member of being and (interpretative) speech is action, effect. The human activity is not primarily relevant as a kind of *Ersatz*-reality, but rather its exposure to the "impact" of circumstances. Human's indispensable commitment to act means actually, in return, *acting back* to his prior exposure to

personal and impersonal influences, which already took place. Moreover, engagement is a necessity that one must not avoid unless one wishes to be equivalent to just a passive outcome of his circumstances. Finally, a person can provoke reality, influence it, etc., only because it previously excitated him, and this always in a far more powerful and far-reaching way that surpasses his capabilities to cognize the given and to act (back). That is the essence of human's *condition of finiteness*.

However, the fact that an interpretation or the speech is an act-related does not mean that we are dealing with conceptually determined *performative acts* – such as, for example, institutional acts when a statement or gesture creates a new state of affairs. Unlike such acts, which *with certainty* produce a change in an area of purely symbolic reality, when it comes to engaged acts, one can mostly speak on *uncertainty about their outcomes*, i.e. whether the intended effect will be accomplished within (existential and/or social) reality. On the other hand, the intentional performativity is not even necessary in engagement, since it is possible for a human not only to be engaged when he does not know and/ or do not want to, but he can also engage even when he is not aware of, since his acts "as such" serve as a tacit, although involuntarily invitation to others to follow them, i.e. to act in the same manner in similar situations. Understanding the inevitability of a *condition of commitment*, where engagement does not exclusively coincide with action, is represented by Sartre, admittedly, without reflecting on epochal typicality of the problem by himself:

> If I [...] choose to [...] I am not committing myself alone [...] my action commits all mankind. Or [...] if I decide to marry and have children [...] I am nonetheless [potentially – Ch. K.] committing not only myself but all of humanity, to the practice of monogamy. I am therefore responsible for myself and everyone else, and I am fashioning a certain image of man as I choose him to be. In choosing myself, I choose man ['as such' – Ch. K.]. (Sartre 2007: 24–25)

It is not only man's "being" inseparable from his situation, but his situation "belongs" in a way potentially to the others, and same goes for each and every person. My situation could possibly be ascribed to other people; it is not characterized with Heideggerian *Jemeinigkeit* ("mineness").

A few years after Sartre, Gehlen, it seems more thoroughly, touched on the core of the *condition*, in which the human has already lived for a certain time:

> When major political and real changes in a highly differentiated society have no longer a common focus, they brake, tease and collide with one another – insecurity becomes universal. *Then one has to make experiments with what lies at the very core* [...] A many of publicly expressed opinions emerge, and they make the underground current into which can fall almost everything – *since in this constellation, any statement appears as a possible action*. (Gehlen 2016: 48; our emphasizes)

Uncertainty, it turned out, provokes insecurity. For modernity typical insecurity of human's situation compels him to experiment, not only with something

interesting that arouses his curiosity – as in modern exact sciences – but also with the "essential", which is until then being considered immutable, and, ultimately, even with oneself. That experimentation is not a matter of mere play, or, inversely: the modern man *must play* an utterly serious "game" – with himself and his world. The point of this experimental engagement is to re-satisfy the "basic need for being grounded and established" (ibid), the absence of which is one of the key problems of modernity. In so doing, engagement, as the *existential modus operandi of human existence in a secular world*, carries a teleological moment – as *engagement for self-fulfillment*: "By engagement, we understand the concrete acceptance of responsibility for the work of future [self-]fulfillment, for man's directing attempts to shape [own] future" (Landsberg 1998: 119).

In such a constellation, man is not only compelled to experiment with the until then "essential", but he does so even when he is not aware of it, since "any statement appears as a possible action" and a(n) (public) action could "commit all of humanity". Not only can the reflection lay far behind what is actually, but the reflection could even turn out to be something more than what originally is – since, for Gehlen, she "can be understood as a trial acting" (Gehlen 2016: 12–13). In short, a very strange mixture of statements, thinking, acting and their receptions ensued, and uncertainty concerning their meaning produces human's existential sense of insecurity. Then becomes sometimes unclear whether an action will emerge from the mixture, or whether it will remain merely a speech or even just a reflexive act, as is it unclear whether that action will sink back into the ephemerality of everyday life the very moment after it was performed, or whether it will perhaps affect all the humanity, with unprecedented consequences. "Trivial" and "epochal" are being "cooked" together in one pot, and their "essential" difference can become clear only afterwards, *ex eventu.*

To be engaged means firstly to be strongly "receptive" to the circumstances, and that is because of his, to some extent, being handed over to them, without being able to throw them away. This is why they stand as something "given" within my situation. Human's determination by circumstances is never absolute. If the case, it would have made any engagement in advance impossible or meaningless. "Engagement", as being called by to the given that press, provoke, etc., but does not chain me – this is the starting point for the active engagement, which *acts back to the circumstances*. Engagement is possible only in the conditions of non-absolute and non-irrevocable determination. A creature that would have been completely free, non-conditioned, deprived of nothing important, could not even possibly engage. For example, God, as, by definition, non-conditioned and non-restrained, cannot be "engaged", because he makes his Will and/or Thought directly real, without the necessity to make any effort with uncertain consequences, perfectly in accordance with his creative intention. All this is, of course, reversed by (human) engagement. Needless to say, but still – a notion of "animal's engagement" would bare of any sense.

When engaging, one is not only limited in one's ability to act, but also in capability to see reality properly. Therefore, he reckons in advance that his

vision of reality is constrained and may prove wrong, as well as that his actions may be unsuccessful and may produce completely unintended consequences. All of these three internally related features belong to the situational finiteness of the engaged agent. His relative determination by the given and the relative openness for the possibility of practicing one's own freedom are two theoretically and practically inseparable and complementary concepts: "being free means being able to live in the direction of my own shaping, means being able to constantly fight against all obstacles that resist my actual personal life" (Landsberg 1998: 121). Finality and engagement are two faces of a structure that typologically occupies the middle ground between the absolute predetermination of life by circumstances, on the one hand, and the possibility of a 'sovereign', pseudo-divine govern of own life, on the other.

An engaged human is the one who, opposite early modern optimism, has realized that he is not an *alter Deus*, master of the world and the measure of all things. On the other hand, he will not and cannot return to those life roles and ways of shaping life practices that were largely predetermined by closed cosmo-social structures, as in pre-modernity. An engaged man is not only in the middle between complete powerlessness and omnipotence but also between inactive thinking and reckless, ultimately irresponsible, acting. He is therefore neither a "powerless intellectual" standing for an "excess" of reflection but a complete lack of action or its effectiveness, nor an "irresponsible thug" (Landsberg 1998: 122), representing an "excess" of (self-interested) activity, but a total lack of self-reflection and awareness of own responsibility. An engaged person is, therefore, one in which inseparable thought and action, as well as interest and responsibility.

Human's exposure to the given is not only a consequence of external conditionality, but the potential for it carries within himself; his situationality does not only stem from the external environment. Namely, "to live humanly" means to be "inserted into space and time", to be "tied to the contingency of the body" and thus "rooted" in the situation (Ladrière 1969: 650). Moreover, thanks to our physicality, we "receive the ability to be situational" (ibid). To have a flesh, or rather: being-flesh (which is, according to Helmuth Plessner, quite different from animals' mode of corporeality) – it is the germ of a person's situational engagement, of his being-already-committed. Only by departing from his physical situatedness, as being "planted" oneself somewhere within the space through own body, can human afterwards become actively engaged, by word, mental, physical, symbolic, institutional… act. Passive engagement (i.e. flesh-dependent situationality) precedes – both temporally and conceptually – not only active engagement but is also its direct precondition. Moreover, the latter is a form of reciprocation, of a "polemic" – between my being "caught" in a situation and my endeavour to not only conceptualize it, but also to overcome, or at least relativize, the initial state of my *being thrown* into a situation randomly "assigned" to me. In the engagement, if put to the extreme, it is always at work an *active resistance* to my own unchosen, accidental and, as it were, senseless being-assigned to a situation which is supposed to be me

mine. By doing this, I should try to make sense of the mere fact of being here and then, as such and such, surrounded by those and those...

My physicality is an a priori condition for my capability of reception of external physicality – enjoying it, feeling threatened with it, or being indifferent towards it. Physicality is in and around me. Hence Merleau-Ponty's question: "Where are we to put the limit between the body and the world, since the world is flesh? [...] The world seen is not 'in' my body, and my body is not 'in' the visible world ultimately: as flesh applied to a flesh, the world neither surrounds it nor is surrounded by it." (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 138) There is a relationship of mutual conditioning between "internal" and "external" physicality: "The flesh of the world is not explained by the flesh of the body, nor the flesh of the body by the negativity or self that inhabits it – the 3 phenomena are simultaneous." (ibid: 250)

A given could be of different kinds – given of experiences, effects, my/our past life, social situations, historical situations... – but all of them are possible on the ground of the original form of the givenness – and this is one's own flesh. Human, however, is not only surrounded by the given, not he just incorporates, but also produces it. Even something he created is further received by him as a given, as something whose meaning and being he cannot possess and determine. That is why for Levinas "every work is a failed act" (Levinas 1998: 29). Due to the initial predominance of being-situated/committed over my agency, alienation from the agent's intentions is immanent to its actions' effects, so that their consequences are not solely *my creation*, but instead, they also bear the mark of something essentially *other*, a given which is not mine. However, the given of which I am the (co)author is, in its genuine sense, a residual of my intentional acting back to the world as many of already existing given. In any case, engaging in one important sense is always *counter-engaging* – a response to the realm of the factual realities already being here.

The actual meaning of intentional engagement is to relativize the pressure exerted on me by the realm of givenness – by creating an alternative, *my* own landscape of existence, where I could recognize the environment as friendly, like the one I/we created, where, as far as possible, the dispute between the self and his situation will be settled. However, what is done tends always to alienate itself from its author, to "behave" as a (new) state of affairs which is alien to him, rather than being his expression; in short, it serves not as an occasion for his self-recognition but *disidentification*. That is why the agent's latent-unconscious ontological desire of all engagement must always generally remain: to make his own situation, and consequently his own identity, solely his own creation. Nevertheless, this is impossible, so the "fall" in the condition of finiteness even in the case of the most "successful" life engagement – is ultimately irrevocable.

In a concrete act of engagement, therefore, it is never a question of creating the ideal situation, but it always presupposes the tacit assent to imperfection. It could be said, that engagement even requires "certain decisions for imperfect things" (Landsberg 1998: 119). The same author emphasizes that

it is difficult to decide for an imperfect thing [...] but the value of engagement lies in the fruitful tension between the imperfection of the thing [for which one is engaged] and its irrevocable character. Due to the awareness of imperfection, fidelity to a thing will be protected from bigotry, i.e. from every conviction that one lives in the possession of complete and absolute truth. (ibid)

The last statement in the quotation provides the external regulatory principle of engagement, which, however, does not stem from its very "nature", which explains the fact that unfortunately engaged people are not often guided by it.

Personal engagement is framed by a situation that is not only mine, nor the situation of the few I know, with whom I regularly keep up a face-to-face relationship, but, in an important sense, the situation of many, to me, largely unknown multitude. That is why self-engagement is in principle – though not necessarily always in each case – inseparable from collective or social engagement. This moment, in broad strokes, is sketched again by Landsberg:

Thrown into a world full of opposites, each of us often experiences the need to withdraw from the game and to posit oneself above the events, as a separate observer. The motive behind such an escape from the world is not sheer egoism, but rather a desire for the possibility of establishing a meaningful life in one's personal and isolated sphere, to become in line with oneself. [...] However, we soon realize that this attitude does not fit our true *situation*. [...] [o]ur human existence is so entangled in the collective destiny that our lives can never reach their meaning beyond participation in the history of the collectives to which we belong. (ibid)

Thus, it turns out, that something that commences as a personal engagement gets its social component as well. However, social engagement is not only a complement to personal engagement, but rather there is a circular relationship between the two – in that personal engagement can also be seen as contributing to the goals of a particular community or, by extrapolation, of all humanity. Social engagement should be perceived just as an extension of existential engagement also because, for example, a personal existential situation is not limited to an "immediate" environment. Engaging for others, that is, for us (the "other plus me"), is just as legitimate a modality of engagement as engaging for oneself. Ideally, the one who works on himself, to fit his situation to his goals, is also engaged in the domestication of *our* present life circumstances, which adds to his personal engagement a social dimension. Viewed in the opposite direction, the "self-embedding" of individual existence into collective existence might redeem meaning and value to the former that it could not produce or attain if relying just on oneself.

The difference between social and existential engagement does not coincide with the difference between public and private engagement – neither in extension nor in intensity. Although most of the social engagement is public, and much of existential engagement is private, there is also existential public engagement – say the preacher, who with his own words publicly testifies the

truth he stands for, and the same could go even for a professor in humanities. Again, private engagement needs not only to be just about one's existence – although existential engagement may involve "significant others". Loving-emotional engagement, raising children and engaging in a friendly relationship is private engagement.[4] And besides, each of these sub-segments must not necessarily be relevant to the question of who I actually am, or who I want to be, i.e. for the existential engagement in the narrow sense. Social engagement, on the other hand, does not have to be public, as in case not only of secret societies but also when it comes to behind-the-scenes arrangements, where narrow, publicly unknown circles decide on matters of social importance. Often, contrary to Kant's provisions, precisely that "private use of the mind" can be more influential in dealing with public affairs than its public use.

Existential and societal engagement may differ in scope, and public and private in form. This, however, does not exhaust the typology of essential forms of engagement. There is a possibility of "engagement for values" (Ladrière), which by its very nature is aimed at enabling a "normal" praxis. Namely, its sense is not to achieve some goals, but rather to enable or re-create the conditions for a dignified personal and/or communal life. Thus, such an engagement has a *corrective-regulatory* function, and, obviously, stands in direct analogy with what Sartre called a "secondary act." Such an engagement is relevant in the general field of practice since the commitment to universal and unconditional self-worth (Justice, Truth, Good) should create the preconditions for expedient and dignified individual and collective (primary) engagement. However, it is also important as an (at least) attempt at (compensatory) production of the structure of objective meaning in the modern world, devoid of a transcendent order, and can therefore also be regarded as a *cosmological engagement*.

Due to its "pedagogical" relevance, such engagement is mostly linked to the public space. However, it does not have to be exclusively publicly performed. Even in the private circle, it is possible to push for the highest values – friendship, loyalty, love, truthfulness, patriotism ... – without disclosing outside of an intimate circle of persons. Furthermore, from the individual attitude to one's own particular, so to say, "axiological" engagement depends on where and in which way one's own private and public engagement will be separated and where will they not. Besides, this shaping of attitude towards own engagement is also an additional type kind of engagement – *engagement towards engagement*, namely, which points to the *engagement's reflexivity*, already indicated concerning secondary acts, or, if rephrased: *metaengagement*. Finally, from this conceptual exposition, we can so far conclude that the various forms of engagement do not constitute a conceptual whole whose individual cases fall under a single, overarching notion of engagement, but are rather linked by the pattern of "family resemblance".

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4   Therefore, it is not sustainable that "the sphere of engagement is always public" (Makowiak 2005). Not every manifestation is public, and not every exteriority of the acting subject is the public.

Speaking about engagement's taxonomy, it can, in short, be divided into individual, intersubjective, group and institutional – concerning its degree or scope. As for the first type, it does not imply any manifest interaction with the others, but it might involve *latent* affective, emotional or rational intentionality directed towards the others, which remains unknown to them. Intersubjective interaction involves the exchange between persons being in close contact so that their interaction involves I-thou-relationship. In a collective interaction, however, such a personal relationship is rare and is not representative of its nature and outcomes. Furthermore, it is possible to divide the engagement into *passive* (being-committed) – be it voluntarily or unchosen – and active, i. e. intentional engaging. Individual and intersubjective engagement is *mostly* space where existential engagement is performed, while group-collective and institutional engagement is a space for practicing social engagement. But contrary to what might be expected, intersubjective engagement can also be public (for instance in so-called "talk-show"), as well as group engagement can remain private, for instance in case closed groups insisting on their separation from the rest of society (such as in religious sects). Finally, engagement can be sub-divided by its format: engagements related to the dynamics of the (un)conscious, behaviour, act and deed.

Engagement in a "Postmodern" Environment

In recent years, even decades, new technologies have led to the expansion and internal multiplication of the space of the life-world, so that the virtual becomes the ever-important co-scene of life practice, which, in addition, causes both – multiplication and atomization of forms of engagement. An individual could emerge as an engaged agent in many different roles, which do not necessarily have to converge towards the regulatory criterion of achieving the unity of the overall individual's practice. In each of these roles – as professionally, economically, politically, friendly, emotionally, scientifically ... engaged – it is possible to undertake a variety of *micro-engagements*, i.e. separate actions or to experience short-lived sequences, also in the virtual sphere. The recent experience confirms that this area is not just another field of engagement, but a sphere that also mediates and, more or less, changes all known, "traditional" (i.e. technologically non-virtualized) forms of engagement. This type of experience, in addition to the easy and simplified possibility of "acting", is – in comparison with the "real" world – distinguished by the atypical looseness of the linkage between acting, its effects, and consequences. While in the non-virtual sphere, the agent almost immediately feels the consequences and the factual weight of what he has done, which constantly reminds him of his responsibility for it, this feeling is fairly relativized in the virtual realm. However, the virtuality contains one important moment similar to the pre-virtual reality: it is not only a field of heightened, excessive freedom but also an area where also new type realities and their respective relationships could emerge.

The growth and hypertrophy of the mechanisms of technological mediation of the whole, both non-virtual and virtual reality are followed by an increase of different types of relationships and the degree of mutual dependence and co-referentiality of the agents while enhancing the number and types of roles in which an individual emerges in everyday life. For example, a man from the time before the invention of motor vehicles could simply move through settlements, without being obliged to carry institutionally recognized, i.e. imposed role of "traffic participant", be it driver or pedestrian. Being a priori attributed with this possibility [*Können* – Adolf Reinach] means to be included in the corresponding circuits, ie. he is *engaged* as a traffic participant, and therefore has a duty to take note of it and to act in accordance with the respective, positive rules. Thus, one realized technological possibility imposed on him an obligation that he could not ignore – if he did not want to be held legally, in some case even morally responsible, i.e. to endanger himself and other people.

There are many such roles, and they are partly "active" (as an opportunity to get new institutional possibilities) and partly "passive" (as a duty, obligation): voter, taxpayer, bearer of health insurance, public transport user, a user of bank services/cards, the "holder" of personal accounts on various websites ... Today's man has, thus, become overburdened with all these innumerable roles – and above all, with passive commitments, which lulls him with the obligation to constantly, often simultaneously, respond to them. If one takes into account the degree of individual's exposure to information and sensory impacts in the public and private space is getting emerged, a clear picture of the real danger that due to the burden of expanding sensory-cognitive material,[5] which excites and seduces his, and because of growing multiplication of the roles he must play at the same time – his ability to constitute himself as an *engaging subject* and to remain so is markedly diminished.

If at the (modern) beginnings of what we called the condition of commitment engagement was a standard form of the human relationship to the world, nowadays it is increasingly becoming something to be fought for. Inflationary (*passive*) *commitments* – despite the abundance of opportunities offered today – is inversely proportional to (*active*) *engagement* and, moreover, seriously questions it. It is, therefore, necessary to somehow "clear" (not remove, which is impossible) the abundance around us (and in ourselves), to re-organize it so that, instead of being merely a passive recipient – which we essentially remain even when driven by the abundance of possibilities at hand, have the illusion of out active agency – we become a truly active agent, again. If Sartre speaks of secondary engagement, which is to enable my true ("primary") acting through

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5   The idea of enslavement of the mind is well-known, but newly has been insisted upon the concept of sensory enslavement. For Berleant, "those capacities of human sensibility have been deliberately appropriated and distorted in mass consumer culture in at least four distinct ways: by gastronomic co-optation, technological co-optation, emotional co-optation, and psychological co-optation. By appropriating, controlling, and impairing the capacities of human perception, these forms of co-optation undermine the free sensibility." (Berleant 2017: 4)

the acts that I wish to pursue a certain state of affairs, then nowadays emerges the necessity of, so to speak, "tertiary engagement," which will give me the opportunity to become aware of the nature of my commitment, and to regain my cognitive-practical[6] status as a subject capable of engaging.

The multiplication of possible types of engagement is not the only novelty of human's condition of commitment in the postmodern era. An utter abundance of the possible, as a matter of fact ever more disproportionate to its existential, and not least biological finiteness, is by some felt like an occasion to *experiment with own engagement(s)*. Thus instead of the "traditional" (existentialist) projection of convergence of all particular cases and types of one's engagement towards the unity of one's practice, and hence the unity of one's identity – the individual of today is often rather inclined to practice *intentionally divergent engagement(s)*, whose "purpose" lies not in a kind of self-realization, but in experiencing ever new, as numerous as possible opportunities. Thus, due to the exponential expansion of the field of possibilities, whose bearers, performers, "users" are in many cases increasingly difficult to identify, former individual's ambition of bringing the multitude of things into the unity of life practice is resigning, and he tacitly accepts a different, two-sided life-practical imperative: *experience for the sake of experience*, or: *(logical) possibility as equal to (practical) opportunity*. Instead of an intention towards the unity of the multitude, to attain identity, as a correlate of the final, well-rounded outcome of existence, this sort of behaviour establishes a pattern of *counter(self) realization*, which now occupies the place of self-realization. The human is, namely, eager to try out ever new possibilities, which do not have to create a narrative, let alone "higher" type of unity with his earlier life.

As part of such alternative, experimental engagement, it is also possible – even for the sake of sheer "play" – to apply patterns from one field of engagement into another one, which is one way of exploring and discovering new (fields) of opportunities for engagement. In this sense, a typical phenomenon of contemporary hyper-individualistic life-practice is the *entrepreneurial attitude* of the individual towards own life (not only of his professional aspect), but also, for instance, towards the body – as a means of taking risks, but also as a way of alternative counter-realization – within a framework where one's fluid, in infinite distance lying "identity" is greatly reduced to physicality. "The body, whose shape changed after intense training, has become the most important part of the subject – it is a *visible social form of personality*." "Being-fit becomes a program of the 'right' lifestyle."[7] "Fit" actually means well-adapted, or, more accurately: willing to *actively adapt* oneself, fitting to the social imperatives of today – and not being always just physically well-prepared. This

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6   An engaged man, of course, is not only reduced to cognition: "An engagement act is a 'total act', since it is not only an act of isolated intelligence, or of an isolated will, but is "an act of an *integral* man in which the intellect and the will mix." (Landsberg 1998: 120)

7   Alkemeyer 2007: 17 (emphasized by Ch. K.).

adjustment is made based on "free choice", as an ideological catalyzer of "active living". Here, however, there is not about actually active living – as it was, in a self-congratulating manner, "labeled", since in such a practical constellation the form of the life goal, if there is awareness of such a thing, is already more or less predetermined. Such *pseudo-engagement*, living in the false appearance of freedom and activity, follows the pre-accepted and critically unreflected guidelines of life practice, strictly conformed to a technologically mediated social system, which, in effect, turns out to be a totalitarian. Thus, ostensibly, the creative-exploratory extension of the field of the exercise of own personal freedom (for), has as her reverse side, a tacit consent to the individual-collective imitation of the existing social order and the demands of leading, increasingly anonymous forces within it.

Instead of engagement's, as previously, being shaped as acting back to the primary being-committed, it turns into seemingly active, but, in the core, ideologically repressive repetition of existing structures of *illegitimate* power. Thus, if seen from the angle of individual, who tacitly "agreed" with its con-formation to the environment, the *permanent crisis*, caused by the of the secular largely unfinished and therefore questionable cosmosocial image, *is being ideologically normalized*. The absent cosmosocial truth in advanced postmodernity is compensated by its successfully effective appearance. Thanks to this maneuver, one who tacitly agrees to such an arrangement – offered to him through epistemically-practically-normatively charged social structures – ceases to be as a forcedly engaged "hostage" of (absent) truth. Human's "engagement" is no longer a consequence of truth's absence, but it is rather a permanent confirmation of ideologically stabilized pseudo-truth of the current System.

The essence of the System is anonymous, uncontrolled power, which becomes a key feature of the "solution" of the problem of truth in our epoch (of so-called "post-truth") only in advanced postmodernity, when emerge – either spontaneously generated, or purposefully invented – socio-psychological mechanisms of finding, embedding and stabilizing ideological substitutions of truth. Then, since the (public) problem of truth is supposedly closed, there is no need for genuine engagement, where almost everything essential for the human is at stake. Even more, the guardians of post-truth watch carefully after her, to prevent the raising of reasonable demands for re-opening social discussion on truth. The only risk that the contemporary, hyper-activist, highly fitted individual is exposed – is the *social* failure, in the game of competition for the (re)distribution of individually or group-specific power, but not the failure of one's own practical projection of truth, as the basis for the fulfillment of own life practice. The hyper-conformed individual already "knows" the whole, "Truth", because he is anesthetized with a socio-psychological structure, within which any explicit asking the question about the truth is rendered as superfluous, strange, even dangerous, in advance. Therefore, the age of the so-called "Post-truth" also becomes the age of "post-engagement".

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Časlav D. Koprivica

Pojam angažovanja

Apstrakt

U ovom radu osvjetljavamo osnovne crte koncepta angažovanja, koji je postao moguć tek u sekularnom svijetu, s pojavom moderne indvidue lišene bilo kakvog stabilnog, vječnog poretka i hijerarhije vrijednosti. Ipak, angažovanje je pritom nije samo individualno nego i kolektivno, budući da izostanak izvjesnosti o istini ne pogađa samo zajednicu i društvo nego i njih motiviše da slijede istu paradigmu kao pojedinac – da sebe stave na kocku, ne znajući kuda će to voditi, ali s namjerom da na koncu proizvede opipljive i stabilne socio-kosmičke strukture, koja bi mogla ublažiti neizvjesnost, a time i nesigurnost. Nužnost angažovanja potiče od okolnosti da čovjek živi u kontekstu zasićenom značenjima koja ga već unaprijed prozivaju i utiču na njega. Stoga angažovanje znači uzvratno djelovanje izloženosti značenjima i strukturama koja su već uticala na čovjeka i njegovu situaciju. Jedan odjeljak teksta posvećen je razumijevanja angažovanja u savremenoj, „postmodernoj" epohi.

Ključne reči: angažovanje, egzistencijalna situacija, neizvjesnost, filosofija konačnosti, sekularnost, postmoderna

Mark Losoncz

THE ARISTOTELIAN ARCHE-DECISIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF PERISHING

ABSTRACT
The paper deals with Aristotle's concept of corruption. First, it reconstructs Aristotle's debate with the pre-Socratics and then it focuses on the candidates for entity that can perish: form, matter, and substance. The text argues against the widely accepted thesis according to which substance is a *corruptio simpliciter* without further ado. The paper intensely relies upon ancient and medieval commentators of Aristotle. Finally, special attention is devoted to the dimension of time and the problem of actuality.

"...why some things are capable of passing away while others are incapable of passing away, no one says."[1]

(*Met*. 1075 b 13–14).

"...how could an eye that is corruptible see the incorruptible sun?"

(Duns Scotus 1997: 192)

One of the philosophers who made a series of arche-decisions[2] with regard to perishing was Aristotle. In that regard, he had at his disposal the thoughts of the philosophers before him, whom he could strictly criticize, and, on the other hand, a rich and diverse commentary literature appeared in the wake of his works. First of all, *On Generation and Corruption*, the *Metaphysics* and the

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1   We will use the *Metaphysics* in the translation of C. D. C. Reeve (Aristotle 2016).
2   Every teaching, and every metaphysical teaching, is relying upon certain arche-decisions. Such decisions determine the framework of the investigations, the possibilities, the walkable roads. They are a beginning before the beginning, a choice before the choice, an "always already". They offer ready answers before anybody could have raised any questions. They trace out a field or a metaframe in which a problem can emerge as a problem at all. We can witness this kind of functioning in fact in the entire philosophy, even with regard to philosophy itself. It delineates what should be divided into to

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Physics deserve our attention, but we should also draw attention to some other works within the field of natural philosophy or logic. His most far-reaching decision is certainly the one that has to do with the simple insight that there is perishing. Even with this decision, he confronts his predecessors, those who denied or relativized the possibility of perishing. Thus, we can ascribe to Aristotle an ontological commitment that stands for the existence of perishing. However, on the other hand, we will see that he also had conceptual decisions

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the pre-philosophical, everyday sphere, and what is unworthy of being the object of a philosophical investigation. It a priori eliminates something or qualifies it as relevant or irrelevant. It has blind spots, but also certain obsessions. We already tried to show, by focusing on Descartes' example, what kind of consequences can follow from certain arche-decisions with respect to the later evolution of a certain philosophy (Lošonc 2011). We could see that a certain philosophy can try to make a bridge over the gap or the demarcation line between pre-philosophy and philosophy, however, finally, it is condemned to exclude something. What will it banish, ignore or degrade as something unimportant? François Laruelle rightfully draws our attention to the "radical contingency" of the philosophical decision (Laruelle 2010: 196–224.). For instance, the way that the arche-decision divides the sphere of the empirical and the transcendental, is full of arbitrariness. Laruelle himself thinks that instead of this we should keep in mind what is not like a decision or what is not decidable – either because as an undecidable it slips out of the possibility of decision, or because its being is so robust and it offers itself as being ready, so that the choice with regard to it cannot even emerge. We can extend this perspective even to the critiques of philosophy. When Marx or Lacan conceptualize their critique with respect to the philosophical practice in general, they also must rely upon certain arche-decisions. The arche-decision can refer to pre-philosophy, just as to philosophy, or to post-philosophy that has – allegedly – a higher rank. However, one might ask if the authentic philosophical practice is not precisely rethinking the frames, the reframing of the frames, the care about hesitation? The arche-decisions can be reconsidered, we can take one step back. We can return to the beginning before the beginning and renew the coordinates. If it is true what Derrida suggests, that the moment of decision – by necessarily facing something undecidable – always have to be "mad" and beyond reasons, that is to say, it must emerge as a leap of faith (Derrida 1995: 65, 80), then one might also raise the question whether the leap could be different. Through a different leap we could open an entirely different horizon. This is how Bergson raises the question if humanity could take another path if it would, instead of the substantialist theories, focus on temporality, events, and action (Bergson 1919: 80–82). Let us add that Bergson himself sometimes spoke of substantiality affirmatively, for instance when he claimed that motion preserves itself by acummulating itself. (See: Lošonc 2018: 207–209). Thus, by starting from different arche-decisions, it could think of what is fluid and changeable easier. Bergsonian philosophy with great fondness demonstrates how the "Eleatic" presuppositions determined and limited thinking, from Plato to Einstein. The aim is to get rid of this attitude and choose another one, to commit oneself to a different way of seeing, to something that takes into consideration duration. If we can do away with the already given frames, a new creativity might start. However, we might ask even with regard to Bergson if the reframing of frames might be fruitful even in his case: while he was inclined to describe the durability of being as an avalanche that is gathering its past, sweeping up snow and not loosing a single snowflake, we might ask if, instead of this model of self-accumulation, we could take into consideration perishing as well. Hegel also starts from certain arche-decisions in *The Science of Logic*. The most general and most empty category of pure being is followed by the category of

that served the relativization or – according to some tense interpretations – denied perishing. Graham Harman claims that the pre-Socratic philosophers "all tend to think of their chosen ultimate thing as eternal or at least as indestructible, which remained a typical prejudice in Greek philosophy until Aristotle finally allowed for destructible substances" (Harman 2017: 46, cf. De Landa and Harman 2017: 16). Well, without any doubt, Aristotle took over his position as opposed to the majority of his predecessors when the perishing in general was at stake. Most of the pre-Socratic thinkers found their way to question the

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nothing, they become the same. Being becomes nothing, and vice versa, they disappear in each other as opposites ("being has passed over into nothing and nothing into being – 'has passed over', not passes over, ... *each* immediately vanishes in it opposite" [Hegel 2010: 59–60]). Their unity receives the name "becoming" *(Werden)* and thus we already have a frame, with its limits and barriers. It seems that this process contains perishing as well, not only creation (see: Carlson 2007: 21). Without the aspect of negation, the process could not be dynamic, in fact, it would stick in the mud already at the start. This arche-decision is the condition of fact that through the further evolution of categories the sublation *(Aufhebung)* can function. This example also shows how the initial choice with regard to perishing determines the further movement of thinking. But we could even leave behind the Western coordinates and question back differently. Tom J. F. Tillemans draws our attention to the fact that Indian and Tibetan philosophers gave an important role to negative philosophical argumentation, that is to say, they wanted to demonstrate that there are no entities of the sort *F*, or that things do not have *F*-properties (Tillemans 2018: 87). We can find in Buddhist philosophy many analyses that focus on the insight that entities do not have a substantial essence *(svabhāva)*, or as wholes, they do not have a holistic surplus with regard to the parts, or that the self as a substantial, separate and autonomous essence does not exist. Instead of being, the starting point is non-being or transience – the arche-decision with regard to this always already determines the framework of the possible investigations. Our aim is not to reconstruct a comprehensive Western metaphysical paradigm or discourse (patterned after Heidegger, Derrida, Agamben and others), which could have a certain unity, and from whose starting insights all the others might be deduced. There is no historical *Seinsschicksal* or signature that would have dominated or would still dominate the horizon. Certainly, one might not say that Western metaphysics in general ignored the question cessation and transience. However, we can reveal those arche-decisions because of which perishing has been in the background, arche-decisions that made the order of problems so that the whatness of perishing was hardly thought of. There is no single all-encompassing arche-decision, but there are arche-decisions that determined the standpoints with regard to perishing for centuries, by specifying the frames that enabled pro and contra opinions – without questioning the frame itself. Perishing was often analysed so that at the end of the investigation it was somehow eliminated: either so that they relativized perishing (that already has had a secondary role) by introducing entities that cannot perish, or, through mereological argumentation, they claimed that even though our everyday experience perceives certain objects as perishable, the elementary beings are in fact unperishable (and neither can they be generated), or so that they saved things from perishing by a temporal horizon that gathers the past, persists as presence without further ado or functions as eternal. As if those who reflected on perishing were regretting what they are doing, and they wanted to offer their condolences. But even if we accept Adorno's suggestions that the task of philosophy is to heal the wounds that thought causes to itself (Adorno 1995: 131), should not we come to the conclusion that transience and cessation are a wound that has to be ripped up without any mercy?

possibility of cessation. On the one hand, they – even independently from the concrete naturalistic analyses – presupposed that being has to be an eternal One that by itself makes perishing impossible, given that in case of perishing only the One could cease to exist, that is to say, the One would not be itself anymore. This insight might be joined by the – otherwise independent – thesis that everything that exists cannot perish, because this would lead to a contradiction, in the suspension of the tautology of "is": we cannot assume of what exists that it is not or that it becomes a non-being. Finally, it was widely accepted that cessation (or creation) in the absolute sense is not possible because the elements are eternal – we can only speak of their separation or aggregation. Parts can be transformed, but they cannot be generated or annihilated, and the whole remains simply self-identical. To sum it up, the denial of perishing has different ways: a monist one, one that is based on pure existence, and one that is inspired by mereological arguments. They can stand up by themselves, but they were even more convincing when they were somehow combined. While he was criticizing all of them, Aristotle himself also introduced certain arguments that might have raised some doubt with regard to perishing.

One of Aristotle's basic moves is that he carefully separates generation/corruption from other phenomena. First of all, he makes a distinction between generation/corruption and motion (qualitative motion, quantitative motion, or growth and diminution, and the change of place). Even though both are changes, they differ essentially, because while generation and corruption result in being or non-being, motion presupposes the continuous persistence of something. The other distinction is almost just as important, namely, the one that he makes between generation/corruption and accidental change. While the former has to do with the very being of things, the latter has no effects on their (non)being – Socrates remains Socrates even if he is not handsome anymore, but his death would be a substantial change. Even though the polysemy of language enables to describe the change of place as generation from somewhere to somewhere else (or we could simply describe motion as creation), or to describe the loss of an accident as perishing, we should keep in mind what is at stake in the case of these conceptual distinctions. Thus, we can speak of what was named in the Middle Ages – of course, in the wake of Aristotle – as *generatio vero et corruptio simpliciter.*

We are already witnessing a debate with the monists, because the distinction between generation/corruption and motion serves for Aristotle precisely to separate his standpoint from those who claim that creation (and cessation) is the same as becoming-different. Given that the monists think that the bearing matter remains as an unchangeable element, they cannot accept the fact of creation (and cessation) in its true sense. It seems that the thought of perishing is always already a great challenge for monism. The monism that claims that there is exactly one concrete object (existence monism) can hardly explain how could this object perish. But the difficulty is not less serious for the monism that accepts the doctrine that there is a whole that is prior to all its proper parts (priority monism). If we look over the history of philosophy, we can see that

monists were struggling with the question of cessation, and, finally and most-ly, they gave a negative answer. If one would raise the question of perishing, Spinoza might answer in the following way: "What we are calling the annihi-lation of B is not, strictly and metaphysically speaking, a going out of existence of a thing. Rather, it is an alteration – a qualitative change in something that remains in existence throughout" (Bennett 1980: 395–396, cf. Bennett 1984: 102–103). It is no coincidence that one of the interpreters of the monistically committed F. H. Bradley came to the conclusion that "for Bradley, there is no becoming and perishing" (Leemon 1992: 57). It is almost needless to say that monists who are committed only to the monism of an underlying whole, can accept without further ado that the parts can change, however, they presuppose a whole that cannot itself perish. Aristotle who was debating with the monists, was first of all taking into consideration the "Eleatic paradigm". Parmenides' poem claims that being, that is to say, what is exists, is one and continuous, "wherefore looseth not her fetters to allow it to come into being or perish. ... How could what *is* thereafter perish? And how could it come into being? For if it came into being, it is not, nor if is going to be in the future. So coming into being is extinguished and perishing unimaginable." (Fr. 8, Simplicius *Phys*. 145, I., Kirk and Raven 1957: 273). As G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven remark, Parmenides could find it obvious that an argument against perishing might be elaborated without any problem, similarly to the argument against coming to being. The Parmenidian perspective excludes non-being and becoming non-existent in general, and finds them unthinkable. What is "motionless ... is without be-ginning or end" (Fr. 8, 1. 26–31, Simplicius *Phys*. 145, 27., Kirk and Raven 1957: 276). Sometimes it seems that with regard to cosmology or the analysis of ill-nesses Parmenides accepts the monism of an underlying whole, that is to say, he admits the destructing nature of certain forces, but this does not change his insight that what exist, simply *is*, and cannot come into existence or go out of existence – only mortals think otherwise. Melissus who continued the "Eleatic paradigm" argues similarly when suggesting that what exists, has always exist-ed and will always exist, "without either beginning or end, but infinite" (Fr. 2, Simplicius *Phys*. 29, 22, 109., Kirk and Raven 1957: 299). What is thus eternal cannot become bigger or lose anything. What does not exist cannot come into existence or perish. If it would be created, it would also perish, and this would be absurd. Melissus finds the transformation of the One impossible, given that it would involve generation or corruption. But it is even more interesting that he finds this valid even for the hypothetical multiplicity: if they would exist, they could not transform themselves either – they would also be unperishable (Fr. 8, Simplicius *de caelo*. 558, 21., Kirk and Raven 1957: 305).

Taken altogether, our impression is that Aristotle's criticism with regard to the "Eleatic paradigm" is double: he refuses that there is only one unchange-able being, and, differently from this position, he argues for the multiplicity of substances that persist in spite of changes, and, on the other hand, he claims that there are contingent beings (Hoffman 2012: 145). Even though we can take into consideration a possibility just as Thomas Aquinas' commentary does,

namely, that for Parmenides being is fire and non-being is earth (Thomas Aquinas 1: 59, 69) (and this could be understood in such a way that the creation of fire from earth is absolute creation, while the reverse process is absolute cessation), however, such speculation would not change the fact that, according to the "Eleatic paradigm", "does not exist" cannot be thought of, and, in general, it "either is or not". Aristotle accepts that we cannot say of the same thing that it exists and that it does not exist at the same time (contradictory propositions are not tenable[3]), but he does not think that becoming existent or non-existent would be impossible (cf. Algra 2004: 91–123). What is more, in the *Metaphysics* he suggests that "there is always an intermediate, so that as between being and not being there is coming to be, so too the thing that is coming to be is between the thing that is and the thing that is not" (*Met*. 994 a 25–30). When he states that being is said in many ways, he adds that the perishing of substance or privation also have to be understood in the spirit of polysemy (*Met*. 1003 b 5–10). In a certain sense, in the sign of the denial of substance, as a meaningful tautology, one could say that even a not being is not being (*Met*. 1003 b 10), and, furthermore, one could say what is not being in many ways (*Met*. 1089 a 15–20). Without any doubt, these insights could enable us the meaning of becoming non-existent. Aristotle tries to make the fixed categories more flexible, in order to make possible the thought of perishing as well. In a nutshell, his answer to monism is pluralism, persistence in spite of changes, and contingency.

The debate with the monists comes together with the criticism towards the pluralists. Aristotle's critical analysis is first of all focused on Empedocles (or at least on the Empedoclians), and on Leucippus and Democritus. Empedocles made a distinction between four elements: earth, water, air and fire (together with the movers six ones). He was convinced that they always remain existent and that they can only grow (by merging) or decrease (by being separated) (see *Met*. 983 a 5–10). That is to say, without any doubt, there is change and multiplicity, but without generation and corruption. As *On Nature* suggests, we can tell about the elements that "besides these nothing else comes into being nor ceases to be; of if they were actually destroyed, they would no longer be; and what could increase this whole, and whence could it come? And how could these things perish too, since nothing is empty of them? Nay, there are these things alone, and running through one another they become now this and now that and yet remains ever as they are" (Fr. 17., 1. 14., Simplicius *Phys*. 158, 13., Kirk and Raven 1957: 328). Similarly to Parmenides, Empedocles flogged the mortals who are – by misunderstanding mixture, separation and transformation – convinced that there is generation and corruption, "fools ... who fancy that that which formerly was not can come into being or that anything can perish and be utterly destroyed" (Fr. 11, Plutarch adv. Colot. 12: 1113., C., Kirk and Raven 1957: 323). As if Empedocles extended this insight to human death when he described as the lack of wisdom the thought that mortals can be annihilated by decomposition. By habit, they call it destiny, but they are wrong.

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3   Similarly, there is no intermediary between generation and corruption (*Met*. 1012 a 7–8).

He says that it is always where it has always been. According to Plutarch, this means that our existence extends beyond our "death". As for Aristotle's critique of Empedocles, it is elaborated on more levels: it contains the critique of the doctrine that action takes place through pores, but he also discusses the theory according to which the elements cannot be transformed into each other, and he thinks that Empedocles misunderstands the nature of growth and change. In principle, those who claim that matter consist of more elements should make a distinction between qualitative change and generation, however, their propositions contradict to this. *On Generation and Corruption* states the following: "it is not clear, for instance, how, on the theory of Empedocles, there is to be 'passing-away' as well as 'alteration'. In the philosophy of Empedocles ... it is not clear how the 'elements' themselves, severally in their aggregated masses, come-to-be and pass-away"[4] (*De Gen. et Corr*. 325 b 15–25). It seems that when, for instance, the elements meet each other in the right proportion, generation is possible. Aristotle is also uncertain whether Empedocles thinks that the one is the underlying one or the multiple. The debate with Empedocles reaches its peak in the following sentence: "the cause in question is the essential nature of each thing – not merely to quote his [Empedocles'] words: 'a mingling and a divorce of what has been mingled'" (*De Gen. et Corr*. 333 b 10–15). Here it is clear that the doctrine of generation (and corruption) has to be in a different way, namely, it does not have to be imagined as the proportional mixture of elements (in fact, as their juxtaposition). Empedocles is unable to grasp what Aristotle himself describes as formal cause and final cause (Williams 1982: 171). To sum it up, Aristotle thinks that the Empedoclian idea of action and transformation is not inappropriate in order to understand perishing. As we can read in the comment made by C. F. J. Williams: "Empedocles could account for the corruption and alteration of composite bodies in terms of the dispersal or replacement of the elementary particles which compose them. But the elementary bodies themselves, fire and all the others (325b23-4), are not decomposable into more elementary components, nor can they lose the properties that are their permanent characterizing features: fire, for example, can never lose its heat. Empedocles in this way fails to account for phenomena that Aristotle regards as evident to perception: water can be 'corrupted' by turning into air, and can 'alter' by becoming hot instead of cold" (Williams 1982: 131). That is to say, in the final instance, Empedocles is not only unable to grasp generation and corruption, but he is even unable to conceptualize qualitative change (cf. *Met*. 988 a 25–30). Empedocles has a further teaching which can be connected to the doctrine of mixture and separation, namely, the theory of love/ friendship and strife. This distinction is not at all evident, since sometimes – even according to Empedocles himself – love / friendship separates and strife unites (*Met*. 985 a 25–30, 1000 a 25–29, *De Gen. et Corr*. 333 b 20). When love/ friendship connects things, it destroys them. Alexander of Aphrodisias states in his commentary on Aristotle that for Empedocles this is one of the ways to

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4   We are using the translation by Joachim 1970.

conceive corruption (and generation) – however, Empedocles still thinks that love / friendship and strife themselves are unperishable (and the same goes for the elements) (Alexander of Aphrodisias 1992: 68. [219, 25–30]). Taken altogether, we can say that monism is not the only way to deny or relativize perishing. A mereologically supported pluralism can contest the possibility of corruption without further ado: either by insisting on the idea of the unperishable whole (while accepting the plurality of changing parts), or without presupposing a totalizable whole, thus, by describing the remaining elements as being unable of being transformed, and by denying that they can ever perish.

The view that appears in Leucippus' and Democritus' philosophy is very similar to that of Empedocles. They all start from multiplicity and want to explain the way that action and influence functions. However, On *Generation and Corruption* emphasizes that "Democritus dissented from all the other thinkers and maintained a theory peculiar to himself. Not one of them penetrated below the surface or made a thorough examination of a single one of the problems. Democritus, however, does seem not only to have thought carefully about all the problems, but also to be distinguished from the outset by his method" (315 b 1), and that "the most systematic and consistent theory, however, and one that applied to all bodies, was advanced by Leucippus and Democritus: and, in maintaining it, they took as their starting-point what naturally comes first" (325 a 1). It seems that for the atomists the question whether motion is eternal was extremely important. However, this insight was joined by the idea that uncountable worlds are created and cease to exist, simultaneously or successively, in the infinite space. According to Leucippus and Democritus these uncountable worlds are "...supposed to be coming-to-be and passing away for an infinite time, with some of them always coming-to-be and other passing away; and they said that motion was eternal" (Simplicius *Phys*. 1121, 5., Kirk and Raven 1957: 124). Hence, corruption (and generation) had an important role in the worldview of the atomists, but one might raise the question what kind of role could it have within the world. We can conclude that they interpreted the meaning of this process in a peculiar and narrow way, that is to say, as the decomposition (and composition) of atoms, as breaking-up by means of the void. This is not an essential motion, but much more a restructuring that can be defined in a mereological manner. For Aristotle it was not acceptable that the atomists wanted to describe the bodies by referring to the void and indivisibility. He thought that there are no ultimate atoms that cannot be divided, however, ha was convinced that the bodies cannot by divided everywhere, because "the body could be divided at all these points and dissolved away into nothing; whereas it has potentially an infinite number of points, none next to another" (Ross 1995: 101). In principle, according to Democritus and Leucippus plurality is infinite, that is to say, the worlds consist of the infinite multiplicities of the bodies – the composite things come into existence from them, and the various atoms with different shapes join together in differently structured compositions. In that respect, one can describe the difference between qualitative change and generation/corruption: "they explain coming-to-be

and passing-away by their 'dissociation' and 'association', but 'alteration' by their 'grouping' and 'position'" (*De Gen. et Corr*. 315 b 5–10). According to this, the entry of a single thing in the mixture or the change of a single component can result in the restructuring of the whole. The parts are self-identical even if the composition is still different – just as tragedy and comedy are different, although they consist of the same letter. While according to this standpoint the atomic division, composition, mutual contact and the following structure determines the state of things, Aristotle thinks that the body "is liquid – and again, solid and congealed – uniformly all through" (*De Gen. et Corr*. 327 a 20–25), that is to say, change goes on in the entire body, and not – only gradually and by the change of shapes – in the parts. What is at stake is "the change of a thing 'from this to that, as a whole,' change affecting not only a thing's qualities but the formal and the material factor which together make it what it is" (Ross 1995: 101). In general, Aristotle extends these mereological insights to mixture as well. While some philosophers denied the possibility of combination (because they either thought that the constituents are annihilated or that they survive – thus, taken altogether, they are not combined), Aristotle was convinced that the chemical combination which results in homogenity is possible, a combination in which the constituents remain what they are potentially. This is also about the generation of a whole that cannot be reduced to the transformation of the parts. Aristotle agrees with the atomists that generation and corruption are not qualitative change, but he refuses to understand them as a mere restructuring of atoms: instead of this, he focuces on the whole body, and on the mutual influence of formal and material causes, on the generation and corruption (or some other change) of substances that can persist in spite of intrinsic change, even if certain parts are being separated. Furthermore, while Democritus (and perhaps Leucippus) held the view that only those bodies can effect each other that are similar, Aristotle argued for the transformations into contrary states. Finally, we can add that while the atomists – in that respect, staying close to the path of Parmenides according to which what exists cannot perish (or come into existence) – put emphasis on the difference between being and non-being, that is to say, between the atoms and the void, Aristotle prioritized the polysemy of being and non-being, and thus, he admitted that the becoming non-existent of being (and the becoming existent of non-being) is also possible. To sum it up, in the case of Democritus and Leucippus it is hard to find a text in which they would openly define atoms as being without generation and corruption, however, this is implicated by the description of atoms and voids as elements and principles. In short, they can speak of corruption (and generation) only in a relative manner. Let us remark that the insights of the atomists reappeared in a new form in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period, and we can see them once again in the contemporary debates, namely, in the theories of those who claim that reality is nothing more than the composition of elementary parts in a mosaic.

Taken altogether, pre-Socratic philosophers are usually presupposing a basic entity (water, air or something else) that remains unchanged, and cannot

come into existence or cease to exist. Even if they find the corruption of any entity possible, they think that it can take place only on a derived level. For instance, we can discover such insights in the case of Anaximander. "And the source of coming-to-be for existing things is that into which destruction, too, happens" (Simplicius *Phys.* p. 24, 13 Diels [DK 12 A 9]., Kirk – Raven 1957: 107). So it may be that uncountable worlds are created and annihilated (in that regard the interpreters of Anaximander are uncertain), however, matter does certainly not perish, and the underlying Indefinite remains existent – while things can be destroyed into it. Furthermore, it is possible that generation and corruption will be infinite, given that infinite is that from which they are "separated" – however, the infinite itself remains unmolested. "Did motion come into being at some time... or did it neither come-to-be nor is it destroyed, but did it always exist and will go on forever, and it is immortal and unceasing for existing thing, being like a kind of life for all natural objects?" (*Phys.* VIII 1: 250 b 11., Kirk and Raven 1957: 127) – as Aristotle reminds us once again of the doctrine of Anaximander. We can find similar argumentation in the case of Anaximenes who stated "that air is the principle of existing things; for from it all things come-to-be and into it they are again dissolved" (Aetius I 3, 4., Kirk and Raven 1957: 158). Xenophanes found it possible that all people will perish when the earth sinks into the sea, and this way, a new creation will start (Kirk and Raven 1957: 177). Even for Heraclitus, whose views are described with the image of a relentlessly changing river, according to whom "nothing remains the same", "the unity of the river as whole is dependent upon the regularity ... of the balance of constituents in the world" (Kirk and Raven 1957: 198). Let us continue the analysis: even though Anaxagoras confronts his predecessors in many ways, with regard to the remaining and underlying thing, he follows them: "The Greek are wrong to recognize coming into being and perishing; for nothing comes into being nor perishes, but is rather compounded or dissolved from things that are. So they would be right to call coming into being composition and perishing dissolution" (Fr. 17, Simplicius Phys. 163, 20., Kirk and Raven 1957: 369). In the original mixture everything is ready, thus, perishing (and creation) can be eliminated without further ado or at least they can be reduced to mereological relations. The number of similar things remain the same, given that there is no numerical change and thing do not become existent or non-existent. Diogenes of Apollonia followed the same path when he thought that by perishing things return to the same thing from which they were created. This unchangeable underlying "thing is both eternal and immortal body, but of the rest some come into being, some pass away" (Fr. 7, Simplicius *Phys.* 153, 19., Kirk and Raven 1957: 436). It is no coincidence that Aristotle describes his predecessors as concordant – for them, with regard to the elements, there is no coming into being or going out of existence, only in a derived, limited way (*Met.* 984 a 1–16). Let us remark that not even Plato is an exception in that respect. At least the Platonicians wrongly presuppose "that there are certain natures beyond those in the heaven as a whole, and that these are the same as perceptibles, except that they are eternal whereas the

latter pass away" (*Met*. 997 b 5–10). So the conceptual framework is the same as in the case of the Presocratics: they assume an eternal, underlying thing (or, more precisely, things), and differently from it, the derived beings can perish, for instance through separation (at least this is what Plato suggests according to Aristotle: *De Gen. et Corr*. 325 b 25–28) or through the loss of forms (*De Gen. et Corr*. 335 b 10–15). What makes a difference between Plato's teaching and that of Leucippus, is that while Leucippus defines the indivisible things as spatial and describes them by referring to infinitely many shapes, Plato thinks that things are countable, finite planes – however, they both speak of indivisible entities and they both define them as shapes. Therefore, they both explain generation and corruption by referring to these things – according to Leucippus, the changes can happen in two ways, partly by means of the void, partly through contact (because everything is divisible at the contact points), while Plato is convinced that motion is possible only through contact, because he thinks that there is no void. Even though *ousia* comes from Plato, Aristotle modified it in an essential way, and this has serious consequences with regard to perishing as well. To put it simply, Aristotle held a quite different position from that of Plato, namely, that *ousia* itself can also perish. As Syrianus claims in his commentary on the Metaphysics: maybe things "are constantly coming to be and passing away, but enjoy permanence as a whole by virtue of their formal cause, as Plato would have it" (Syrianus 2006: 63 [104, 20]). It seems that Plato thinks that motion is possible only with the help of eternal and unperishable motion (*Phaedr*. 245 C5–E [cf. Beere 2009: 323]). While Plato makes a distinction between essence or forms and changing things, for Aristotle the challenge consists precisely of grasping essence within the changing things (Politis 2004: 314–315). Taken altogether, our impression is that Aristotle elaborated a position that was unprecedented.

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Aristotle starts from the claim which is not at all evident, namely, that there is corruption, and that there are things that perish (and come into existence) by nature. However, his standpoint would not be original if it would consist of only of this statement. We could see that his predecessors accepted the possibility of perishing, at least on a derived level. Aristotle's aim is to describe perishing possible not only with regard to a limited layer of being (which is finite, mixed, which consists of parts, etc.), but even with respect to the fundamental entity that serves as an underlying basis for all the other categories. For Aristotle, the question of corruption (and generation) is so important that it seems as if he wanted to classify all the entities on this basis. At certain points of his lifework, for instance at the beginning of Λ book of his *Metaphysics*, he defines one type of substances as changeable and perceivable, and the other type as unchangeable and unperceivable (obviously, theology focuses on such immaterial and autonomous beings). With regard to the first type, he makes a distinction between those which are perceivable and changeable,

but still eternal and cyclically moving (and which always realize their aims), such as the stars, and those which can perish, that is to say, those which are parts of the sublunary world. The latter are mostly the object of natural investigations, but this does not mean that we cannot have metaphysical propositions about them. Corruption belongs to the "bad things" (*Met.* 1051 a 19–21). To put it simply, what has the possibility of becoming non-existent, cannot be considered to be eternal – that would be contradictory (as if this was a debate with Plato's *Timaeus* according to which the celestial beings do not perish, however, they have the possibility of being destroyed (Beere 2009: 323); similar insight appeared in Avicenna's philosophy [Giovanni 2014: 68]). The division can be made even more subtle, for instance by stating that the mathematical things cannot be separated from matter, more precisely, they are not independent from it, however, they are not changeable. Furthermore, it is also important that – differently from what the predecessors presupposed – the elements are not eternal, that is to say, they can be created from each other or destroyed into each other (see for instance *De Caelo*, 305 a 14-32). We can classify things based on their distance from eternal things. For instance, the perishable things are imitating the moved movers, and thus even corruption (and generation) is an imitative "heliolatry" that is adapted to the cyclical motion of the sun (Broadie 2009: 240). For instance, in his commentary *On Generation and Corruption*, John Philoponus suggests that the entities that are far away from the eternal beings cannot remain numerically identical, because they only desire to be eternal, but they are not able to realize it and, thus, they try to "cheat their perishing" by trying to acquire eternity in species and by imitating the celestial bodies (Philoponus 2005: 90 [296, 30]). In fact, the eternal (which does not involve potentiality) is the condition of every generation and perishing, it is far ahead of perishing entities. Perishable entities would not be possible without the eternal ones (if they would perish, everything else would also cease to exist), however, the contrary is not true. Given that in the Aristotelian worldview there is no space for infinite regress, perishable things cannot be reduced *ad infinitum* to other perishable entities, namely, they have to have eternal beings that serve as causes and underlying principles. Aristotle also mentions the aporia whether the principles of perishable and eternal things are the same, and whether the principles of perishable things are themselves perishable (*Met.* 1000 a 5–10, 1060 a 20–35).

Hermann Bonitz rightfully raises the question that Aristotle's argumentation might be circular: as if he stated that the eternal causes cannot perish because the impossibility of perishing implies eternity (we modified Bonitz's remark, that is to say, we adapted in to the commentary of Alexander of Aphrodisias: Alexander of Aphrodisias 1992: 44). At this point, it is more important that the possibility and impossibility of corruption itself (and generation) serves as a basis for classifying the whole reality, according to which the entities can be divided into a hierarchy (and those who followed Aristotle, gladly classified the predicates on this basis: *necesse est, corruptibile alique corruptibilitate relative, simpliciter incorruptibile...* [Duba 2014: 479]). This is a method that is practiced

even today. In his book which serves as an introduction to metaphysics, when he is defining concrete particulars, Michael Loux claims that they have a temporally limited being, that is to say, they come into existence at a certain time and their being is extended to a certain time, and after that "they pass out of existence at a time" (Loux 2002: 85). Accordingly, as Loux adds, concrete particulars are contingent being: things that exist, but whose non-being is also possible – that is to say, things that can perish. Here, the metaphysics of the layers of being is at stake: obviously concrete particulars can be defined with regard to the possibility of perishing because the same is not true for other beings, such as abstract entities or universals. So the perishable/unperishable binarity can serve as the most general basis of classifying the entities. Let us also remark that certain contemporary metaphysicians (for instance Daniel Deasy and Timothy Williamson) recommend us to ask which entities can go out of existence (or come into existence), instead of asking which entities do exist or not. This approach enables us to separate the eternal entities, but also to introduce a fruitful distinction, for instance between permanentism (according to which nothing ever comes into existence or goes out of existence) and transientism (according to which sometimes something begins to exist and sometimes something ceases to exist). Taken altogether, the fact that Aristotle is classifying the entities according to perishing and eternity is not an outdated approach, but serve as an inspiration even today.

In general, we can say that Aristotle's works mention corruption mostly in the shadow of generation. He mostly analyzes it when generation is also conceptualized, and sometimes we can come to conclusion regarding corruption only in a mediated way, by relying upon what is said about generation. As we suggested, Aristotle is trying to clearly separate corruption (and generation) from qualitative change, that is to say, from becoming-other. He does not accept that only the becoming something from something is possible, he explicitly claims that becoming non-existent (or becoming-existent) can also happen: "a thing changes, from this to that, as a whole" (*De Gen. et Corr.* 317 a 20–25). He does not contest the idea that the dissociation or the association of things can contribute to their corruption, however, he does not think that corruption is simply the – mereologically describable – restructuring of the entities. If "passing-away and coming-to-be never fail to occur in Nature" (*De Gen. et Corr.* 318 a 10), we have to raise the question what is exactly perishing, and what kind of novelty is offered by Aristotle's philosophy in that respect. Given that in the sublunary sphere, namely, in the world of perishable things everything is material, of course, matter itself is one of the candidates when we search for the perishable entity. Even if the immaterial entity cannot perish but the material can, then this seems to be a logical conclusion. We could see that Aristotle's predecessors were convinced that matter is what the things are made of, and "into which they pass away in the end" (*Met.* 983 b 6–10). Therefore, this is the final nature from which things are created and in which they perish, while this entity itself persist. Is the novelty of Aristotle's philosophy in claiming that matter itself is also perishable? Not at all. In fact, in this

respect, he follows the path marked by his predecessors: "there must be a matter that underlies what comes to be and changes" (*Met.* 1068 b 9–10, *Phys.* 192 a 25–34). Almost needless to say, this insight was especially important in the commentary literature. As William E. Dooley and Arthur Madigan claim by completing Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary, "matter itself, as the ultimate substrate, persists throughout all changes" (Alexander of Aphrodisias 1992: 44). Of course, this framework does not imply that every kind of matter is unperishable. So does Thomas Aquinas claim that the concept of underlying matter from which things are made of should be separated from "that kind of matter which is totally corrupted in generation. For example, bread is the matter of blood, but blood is not generated, unless the bread from which it is generated passes away" (Thomas Aquinas 2: 3).[5] Thus, matter basically cannot perish, only in a derived sense (for instance, in the case when it is not anymore what contained some kind of privation). As for Aristotle himself, we know it very well that his theory on substance went through a certain evolution. In the *Metaphysics* it is not merely a primary substance, an individual entity, but an entity composed of form and matter. Our problem has to do with the question whether the material aspect of substance is perishable. Our answer is no. To quote the formulation of Frank A. Lewis: "prime matter by definition itself has no matter – as prime matter, it is not itself a compound of form and matter – so it cannot be subject to generation or destruction" (Lewis 2009: 179). Or as Pierre Aubenque puts it, "matter is what persists when thinking wipes out every possible predicate, both the essential ones and the accidental ones, it is what remains as the *sine qua non* of every predication" (Aubenque 2009: 202–203, cf. Bostock 2006: 19, 23, 27, 34). Aristotle wonders whether matter can be identified with substance, but at the end he comes to the conclusion that it would be impossible because matter is not independent or separable, it is undetermined and lacks essence (it needs form). In itself, matter cannot be known and it is amorphous. The *hypokeimenon* is "the subject that ensures permanence throughout change" (Aubenque 2009: 215)[6]. Aubenque emphasizes that we have to be careful because if we absolutize the permanent and persistent character of matter, we can easily make the mistake that we turn it into an absolutely autonomous and fully valid entity, that is to say, into a substance. However, we would also make a mistake if we would overemphasize its indeterminacy and formlessness because that way we would consider it as a non-being, we would annihilate it – we would miss its positivity, the fact that matter is "stability and continuity which is analogous with the permanence of home *(hestia)* whose keeper is the woman. It is the present, that is to say, presence itself" (Aubenque 2009: 217). Therefore matter the *materia prima* is what ensures an underlying and persisting basis in spite of the changes, including corruption (and generation). It is the primary substrate that can persist without

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5   We are using the translation made by Gyula Klima.
6   On Aristotelian corruption in the context of feminity: Milutinović-Bojanić 2013: 35–49.

any qualification and which persists in every final result. Matter itself does not perish, but the perishable things perish owing to it. It receives the forms, things are made of it, it is a passive principle of being, a possibility. So we have to be careful when we read in Ross' interpretation that "the material cause – that which makes generation possible – is 'that which can be and not be,' i.e. transient mutable substance" (Ross 1995: 107). Without any doubt, it is true that matter is the condition of the possibility of corruption (and generation), however, it is only a condition which itself cannot perish, only in a derived way. Matter is *ex hypothesi* infinite, and not finite (Alexander of Aphrodisias 1992: 2–3, 46). Basically, "new matter is never created, or old matter destroyed, either 'out of or into nothing' or by 'increasing or decreasing' the quantity of matter already there" (Bostock 2006: 44). Matter is for Aristotle first of all a *materia permanens*, and not a *materia transiens* (cf. Libera 2010: 77, with regard to the difference between *transiens* and *permanens* see: Thomas Aquinas 2: 2). Given that it seems that matter is not perishable, we might raise the question whether form is the entity that can cease to exist. However, our hypothesis cannot be verified. Without any doubt, the Aristotelian form is not the same as that of Plato (or at least as that in Platonism) which is opposed to corrupted (and generated) things as an eternal entity. The Aristotelian form is not an arche-paradigm, although it is what matter as a substrate "needs". Let us be clear that "form – or whatever we ought to call the shape that is in the perceptible thing – come to be, and the essence does not come to be either" (*Met.* 1033 b 5–6), and, what is more, we can say that "some things are and are not without coming to be or passing away – for example, points, if indeed they are, and in general the forms" (*Met.* 1044 b 21–23). The form can manifest itself in any matter, but its contribution to matter or its dissociation from it does not seem to be generation or corruption. Form is, first of all, a guarantee for permanence, for instance by keeping the body united (as *De Anima* suggests). Even if it contributes to matter or becomes separated from it, thus, contributing to its individuality as well, it undoubtedly causes change, but form itself does not have to change in order to realize its effects. As a formal cause, it is responsible for change, but itself persists as unchanged. By its nature, it has a persistence-grounding function. It is the integrative entity that we can say about matter in terms of predicates. Taken altogether, it seems that in the case of substance, whose basic property is persistence, "form and properties [are] remaining constant while matter and accidents are subject to change" (Lowe 2012: 233). But this is more than a contribution to mere persistence: form cannot be generated or corrupted. As Vasilis Politis puts it, according to Aristotle "the process of generation of a particular material thing (e.g. Socrates, when Socrates is generated in his mother's womb) does not involve a process of generation of the form of that thing. He concludes that the form of a changing, material thing is not subject to generation and destruction, and in general it is changeless" (Politis 2004: 222–223). Or, in the words of Walter E. Wehrle: „form *per se* does not contain matter, and so it cannot be either created or destroyed" (Wehrle 2000: 118). The latter remark is especially important because

there is a subtle distinction in its background: even though matter itself is also unperishable, there has to be something material in order to realize a kind of perishing – and this is not true for the form. The integrity of forms is a guarantee for the consistency and persistence of the world and of the things. Form cannot come into existence, "the form must always be preexistent" (*Met.* 1034 b 12), furthermore, a house is ready in the head of the builder before the very process of building (*Met.* 1034 a 23–24), and during the birth of a living being the form is already present in the parent (*Met.* 1033 b 30–32). Therefore, "what is said to be the substance as form does not come to be" (*Met.* 1033 b 18), and there is no reason to presuppose that the going out of existence of the form could be possible. Forms can appear and disappear, however, "the *eidos* cannot be created and cannot perish" (Aubenque 2009: 217). In the commentary literature, for instance, in Avicenna's works, it was mentioned that maybe being and non-being contribute to the eternal essence only in an accidental way (through generation and corruption), and some were even convinced that the mixture of being (or non-being) with essence is simply impossible (Kok 2014: 523). Of course, the more a commentary on Aristotle was Neoplatonic, the more it claimed that form is unperishable.

At this point, it is worth taking into consideration a further aspect. Since the time that Aristotle's works are available, it is much debated how the forms can be exactly defined. Either way, it is undoubtedly true for the forms as universal natures that they cannot perish. That is to say, as the medieval commentary literature suggested, "if all the individuals belonging to a certain substantial species were annihilated, the species would keep on being as a mere metaphysical possibility *(esse indeterminatum et in potentia)*" (Conti 2014: 574, cf. Philoponus 2005: 2.5–11, 91 [297, 10]); in this regard, see Buridan's arguments against this position: Kok 2014: 524). However, it was widely debated whether forms in general are universals, and whether in a concrete case the form of a given substance is a universal or a particular version of a universal. Many interpreters thought that forms are particular forms or essences (Wilfrid Sellars, Edwin Hartman, T. H. Irwin or Charlotta Witt), but others (Michael Woods, G. E. L. Owen, Alan Code, Michael Loux, Frank A. Lewis, and others) were convinced that forms are universals (with regard to the summary of the relevant literature see: Cohen, internet). Both positions have good arguments. From our perspective, only the question of perishing is important. In this regard there is no doubt: the more we consider form to be a universal or a sortal essence, the more we strengthen the idea of what we suggested earlier, namely, that forms cannot perish. To put it briefly, our impression is that the cessation of individually instantiated variations does not affect the universal form. Of course, it is not impossible to imagine an approach according to which form is still perishable in a certain sense. In his commentary *On Generation and Corruption*, Thomas Aquinas sketches the possibility according to which certain intermediate corruptions can take place: such as the form of a dead body, then the form of a putrefied body, and so on (Thomas Aquinas 1: 60). However, there is no reason to understand this possibility as the possibility of the corruption

of form in general. Taken altogether, the distinction between perishable and unperishable forms is very rare among the interpreters of Aristotle (one of the examples: Wehrle 2000: 159). Almost needless to say, beyond them it is even more widely accepted that form cannot perish. As Manuel DeLanda formulates it after having praised the realist Aristotle: "Aristotelian essences are, by definition, ahistorical, untouched by corruption and decay, as he would say" (De Landa and Harman 2017: 16).

Given that we came to the conclusion that neither form, nor matter can perish (or come into existence), that is to say, they can be transformed only with regard to their potentiality, *in virtue*, only one possibility is left: that matter and form are perishable only together, namely, as substance, so "what is capable of not being can pass away ... – 'unconditionally' is 'with respect to substance'" (*Met.* 1050 b 16–17). The composition is singular and perishable, or, according to a different formulation, the form individualized in the matter. We are right away facing the following difficulty: if neither matter nor form is perishable, how can the entity composed of them still cease to exist? In fact, the answer is very simple: if matter is associated with a new form, a new substance is created, and if this composition goes out of existence by the dissociation of the form and privation is generated, the substance itself also ceases to exist. It is especially important that substance is even nowadays defined as opposed to transitoriness: substance is a guarantee of diachronic persistence in spite of becoming-different and intrinsic changes (this is what separates it, among others, from Democritean-Leucippean atoms which do not undergo intrinsic changes). They can persist for a long time, they are stable and they can receive even contrary properties (for instance, they can be either hot, or cold), and during the passing of time we can have different predications about them. Thus, Aristotelian hylomorphism reaches its peak in the "transtemporal unity" (Marmodoro and Mayr 2019: 39, cf. 17–18) of substances. Even though it is suggested that substance can perish, one of the basic properties of substance is "resistance" to cessation. Paradoxes such as the ship of Theseus can be raised precisely because substance is in general defined on the basis of its stability and its temporally extended persistence. We know it very well, that the concept of substance has a lot of followers even today, within the field of metaphysics. Similarly to the substrate theories, the substance theory holds that there has to be a raw particular which is both basic and primary, and which cannot be further reduced, however – as opposed to the former position – this particular is not an unknowable underlying principle, but a well-structured entity which instantiates natural kinds and which clearly has certain properties. Differently from the bundle theory, the substance theory suggests that substance can persist in spite of changes. While the follower of bundle theory thinks as an ultraessentialist, namely, he is convinced that every property is essential, and thus is inclined to presuppose that the change of any accident results in a new entity, the follower of substance theory as an essentialist can come to the conclusion that if the essential properties persist, the perishing of accidental properties do not cause the cessation of the substance, on the contrary, it remains numerically

the same – that is to say, change *secundum quid* or *per alium* is not change *simpliciter*. For instance, Guillaume de Champeaux was inclined to say in the 11–12th century that we are speaking of different versions of Socrates according to the variations of the accidents: different is the Socrates who is swimming in the sea from the one who is running in the forest (Libera 2010: 37). Or, to use the example from the *Atlas of Reality*: if Jumbo the elephant suddenly becomes angry, that is to say, it becomes different from the placid Jumbo, we can come to the conclusion that the angry Jumbo is annihilated (Koons and Pickavance 2017: 184). Bundle theories have certain strategies in order to avoid this counter-intuitive conclusion: such is the nuclear, the four-dimensional and the evolving bundle theory (ibid: 184–187, cf. Van Cleve 1985). What interests us is the fact that the advantage of the substance theory is precisely that it speaks of an entity that persists in spite of the change of the properties, that is to say, it argues for substantial stability as opposed to accidental perishing from the beginning. This is the reason why nothing can be substantial what is instantaneous and transient, for instance an event or a fleeting impression. This model itself can be specified in different way. For instance, it seems that Thomas Aquinas comes to the conclusion that within substance it is prime matter that particularizes and grounds existence and in other cases it is the individual essence that unifies and serves as a basis for persistence (Koons and Pickavance 2017: 197). Or as Jean-François Courtine puts it by referring to the Stoics, *substantiam habere* is nothing else then "having a solid substrate that is precisely the guarantee for consistency and permanence" (Courtine 1980: 58). The permanence of substance can be thought of in many ways.

The original meaning of substance is "that which lies under". Its aforementioned properties completely meet this criterion. "For something to change, it must exist before, during, and after the change, and so must survive it. Only so can we say it changes, rather than that it was created, replaced by something else, or destroyed. The subjects of change thus 'outlive' whatever ceased to be at the change (the state or accident of the substance)" (Simons 2009: 588). Thus, it is no coincidence that the followers of substance theory are inclined to endurantism, that is to say, to the thesis that substance is entirely present in every moment of its being (Macdonald 2005: 80, cf. 102–106). Without any doubt, the secondary substances or the universal aspects of the entities can contribute to the stability of primary substances. What is important, is the "substantial permanence" in spite of the changes, or as Aubenque claims, "the priority of the Aristotelian substance makes it possible to recognize the core of permanence in experience, and compared to it the other transient properties can only reach the status of contingent accidence" (Aubenque 2009: 395., cf. 214). Such a worldview, says Aubenque, makes it difficult to think of what is fluxlike and mobile. The eternity of substance does not follow from the permanence of substances, however, it is not difficult to extrapolate to extrapolate to the thesis – as Leibniz does, partly following the path of Aristotle –, that every property of the entity is essential and part of its nature, and that the monad itself is eternal (Harman 2014: 237). Even Whitehead, who is quite

critical of the Aristotelian doctrine of substance, can accept the concept of the stable, robust and enduring substance. Whitehead introduces "a reformed version of the doctrine of substance" (Zycinski 1989: 765). That is to say, despite his insights concerning events and processes, he insists on the persistence of substance (therefore, we do not think that Whitehead simply eliminated the substance: Hoffman 2012: 144).

The original meaning of the Aristotelian *ousia* is property and wealth that remains in the hand of the owner, and it consists of storing of goods. It was needed, among others, because old Greek did not have a word that would have fitted the meaning of "thing". Property began to refer to the attribute of something, and finally, it meant essence, namely, "essence that has a true being (as opposed to the phenomenal forms that come into existence and go out of existence)" (Steiger 1993: 601). The Latin *substantia* is a loan translation of hypostasis (while *ousia* itself was also translated as *essentia*). In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle developed his substance theory elaborated in the *Categories*, by offering different candidates for the role of substance: the essence, the universal, the genus and the one that lies under. Although there is a lot of debate with regard to his decision, taken altogether, we can say that while in the *Categories* substance referred to the individual substance that persists in spite of changes (namely, the variations of the accidents), in the *Metaphysics* the analysis also contains the hylomorphic character of the underlying singular substance, that is to say, its substance consisting of matter and form (it seems that Aristotle thinks that form is much closer to substance than matter). The perceivable substance is also "separated", it is self-preserving in its permanence, even though it is not is own cause (it that case it could not perish). However, as we stated, Aristotle does think that substance can come into existence (or go out of existence). The kind of perishing that is at stake is not merely the corruption of accidents[7] but the change of a whole, for instance, when water comes fire or earth becomes air (in this case both the cold and the wet, and both the cold and the dry perish), and not as in the situation in which the musical man becomes tone-deaf. As Thomas Aquinas formulates it, following Aristotelian lines: there is "corruption in an absolute sense, and corruption with qualification. Generation and corruption absolutely speaking are only in the category of substance, while those with qualification are in the other categories" (Thomas Aquinas 2: 1, cf. *Phys*. V. 2–3, *Met*. 1026 b 22–25, 1059 a 1–3). Absolute corruption *(phthora, corruptio)* is therefore change with regard to substance, a transformation into non-being, and even accidental change is possible only with respect to substance. Given that there are no accidents without substance, what remains after perishing cannot be a quality, a quantity or a "where" (*De Gen. et Corr*. 318 a 15–16), or any other accident – or at least it cannot persist as the accident of the perished substance (cf. Thomas Aquinas 1: 54). Aristotle states that perishing is possible, and maybe he even thinks what is called gappy existence – even though he is

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7   Augustine raises the question whether the disappearance of accidents is annihilation, and not merely perishing. Duns Scotus 1997: 521.

convinced that a living being cannot return as self-identical and alive after the event of perishing (Kirby 2008: 57–60). We do not see why could not he find possible the reversibility in other kinds of substances. Almost needless to say, according to Aristotle, certain kinds of perishing are possible, but other kinds are not. A boy can become a man, but not vice versa. Similarly, the corruption of relative beings is impossible, given that they are the least real beings (*Met*. 1088 a 28–30, cf. Duns Scotus 1997: 532, regarding the possibility that certain beings are annihilated without perishing: Alexander of Aphrodisias 1992: 188). The perishing of the cause in itself also does not involve the perishing of the effect, and if knowledge perishes, what can be known does not necessarily perish. Even if a bird can build a nest, it does not follow that it is capable of destroying it (ibid: 2009: 77). Neither is it easy to the tell if a bridle is still usable or it has been destroyed regarding its functional being (Beere 2009: 86). We have to be careful if we would like to map what is perishable and what is not. In general, Aristotle is so much committed to the possibility of perishing that he mentions even the question why not the whole world disappeared given that corruption is continuous: "if, then, some one of the things 'which are' is constantly disappearing, why has not the whole of 'what is' been used up long ago and vanished away – assuming of course that the material of all the several comings-to-be was finite?" (*De Gen. et Corr*. 318 a 16–19, cf. *Phys*. 318 a 1–18)? Well, the answer is very simple: it is so because change is continuous, because "every coming-to-be is a passing-away of something else and every passing-away some other thing's coming-to-be" (*De Gen. et Corr*. 319 a 5–7). Among others, Aristotle mentions the example in which the generation of fire is also the corruption of earth. However, substance does not come into existence *ex nihilo*, neither does it go out of existence *ad nihilum* (see Brentano's analysis: Brentano 1978: 49–50). A substance is always generated from another substance, that is to say, "the destruction of one substance is the generation of another. Generation and destruction are the two sides of a single transformation of substance into substance" (Ross 1995: 102). The generation of perceivable substances is always already corruption as well, and vice versa, therefore, this is not a cyclical process, but much more a simultaneous event that is continuous and necessary, which never fails. What comes into existence has to persist at least for a while in order to perish, "and the natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be occupy equal periods of time" (*De Gen. et Corr*. 336 b 8–10). However, in a certain sense we can still speak of the "circular structure of the chain" (Bognár 1988: 295)[8] of generation and corruption, given that they are adapted to the elliptical motion the Sun: when the Sun comes closer to some point of the Earth, it provokes generation, and when it distantiates then it causes corruption. This also affects the evolution and perishing of plants and animals, just as the change of seasons. Thus, it is no coincidence that *On Generation and Corruption* describes these two processes, or, more precisely, the sides of the same coin as having to do with the hot and cold, wet

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8 Thomas Aquinas also spoke of circularity: Thomas Aquinas 1: 57.

and dry properties (according to the status of positivity and privation), and also with the doctrine of the transformation of elements. What perishes does not fall into nothingness, it just becomes different. It becomes non-being, owing to the fact that it can be non-existent by its nature, but what happens to it, even if it is a violent, unnatural perishing (in this regard the following commentary could be revealing: Philoponus 2005: 2.5–11, 87 [292, 18–20]). cannot be described as annihilation. Ultimately, there is no *tendere ad nihilum*. Even if we "say that a thing has been completely ruined and completely destroyed" (*Met*. 1021 b 26–28), this is certainly not annihilation. Without any doubt, "a thing does not persist in the processes of unqualified coming-to-be or passing-away" (*De Gen. et Corr*. 321 a 22–23). Nonetheless, only substance ceases to exist. Matter merely gets rid of a form and receives another, and it can even instantiate contrary essences. Even though there are philosophers who think that becoming non-existent is simply becoming unperceivable and invisible – they are wrong. Because in many cases the substance coming into existence during perishing is very visible, and what we might describe as mere air or wind is in fact – precisely as air and wind – an entity with a form. And in general, "if something is passing away, there will be something that is" (*Met*. 1010 a 19–21, cf. 1068 b 9–10) – this is obviously a *crux commentatorum*.

It is time to summarize our conclusions. Without any doubt, Aristotle confronts his predecessors with regard to perishing, as far as he does not start from the underlying matter or the element which cannot go out of existence (and, in that case, all the other perishing things are only derived as compared to it). As opposed to this approach, Aristotle raises precisely the question whether the being that has a certain metaphysical priority can also cease to exist. Taken altogether, we can say that in his works corruption appears almost exclusively in the shadow of generation or together with it. We showed that it is not simple to tell what is exactly perishing according to the Aristotelian framework. With respect to form and matter, we can explicitly come to the conclusion that they cannot perish. However, there are many difficulties even regarding their combination, namely, substance, given that Aristotle from the start defines it as opposed to transitoriness, as something that persists in spite of changes. The possibility of defining substance as unperishable is a possibility within the Aristotelian framework. Even if substance ceases to exist, it necessarily implies the creation of another substance. Even though "there is understanding of a thing that has passed away" (*Met*. 990 b 15–17), it is hard to find a place for non-being and cessation. It is worth taking into consideration some other aspects. As László Tengelyi says, "even though being carries within itself the possibility of its own non-existence, this never happens 'when it exists (because in that case, it is actually a being)'. What follows is that the reality of being excludes the non-existence of this being. ... Aristotle ... attributes necessity to the general, that is to say, to the contingent being, as far as it is not only possible but real as well" (Tengelyi 2017: 22). Thus, what persists has a hypothetical (and not logical) necessity – what exist, necessarily exits. As Tengelyi demonstrates, Thomas Aquinas makes similar arguments (following

the path of Aristotle), namely, that the existence of the world is contingent, however, it is still true that it could have always existed. The necessity of being real, the internal teleology overwrites contingency. A further aspect has to do with the question of the dimension of time. "The now" as a limit "does not admit of coming to be or passing away either, yet it seems to be always something distinct nevertheless, because it is not a sort of substance" (*Met*. 1002 b 7–10). Even though we use to say that things perish within time, in fact, time cannot be responsible for this: it is merely accidental that perishing happens within time (*Phys*. 221 a 30–b 3, 222 b 24–7). Time can be connected to extinction and decay at most as far as it has to do with motion (Roark 2011: 210), or as far as there has to be a wider plane of time in which things do not exist yet or do not exist anymore (*Phys*. 221 b 23–229 a 9). In fact, "if they [substances] are all capable of passing away, everything is capable of passing away. But it is impossible that movement either came into being or passed away (for at every point it was), or that time did" (*Met*. 1071 b 5–9, cf. *Phys*. 250 b 13–15) (cf. Philoponus 2005: 2.5–11, 143). As we can see, it is hard to find any useful reference with regard to perishing in the Aristotelian works. In fact, only substance can cease to exist, but even this is true only in a limited sense. As it is well-known the Aristotelian substance was intensively criticized and relativized during the history of philosophy (with the help of Locke, Hume, Kant, Quine and others), and it got back its dignity only a few decades ago. However, we can see that in the 20th-century history of philosophy the Aristotelian doctrine of substance persisted as a ghost, either as a paradigm that has to be followed or as a debate partner.[9] Thus, Aristotle is still present spectrally, and he will probably stay with us for a long time.

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9   As an example, let us mention Bertrand Russell's *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* where he states the following in the context of acquaintance: "I compared particulars with the old conception of substance, that is to say, they have the quality of self-subsistence that used to belong to substance, but not the quality of persistence through time. A particular, as a rule, is apt to last for a very short time indeed, not an instant but a very short time. In that respect particulars differ from the old substances but in their logical position they do not" (Russell 2010: 32.). For Russell the problem of the perishing of a particular is both an epistemological and a metaphysical problem – and he approaches this question partly by relying upon the Aristotelian doctrine of substance and partly by having a debate with it. Our other example is Niklas Luhmann who noticed that during the Middle Ages many thinkers paid a lot of attention to the problem of *annihilatio*, and some of them came to the conclusion that only complex entities can cease to exist. Within his own theoretical framework, Luhmann emphasizes that it is impossible for the complex system to be autopoetic only a little bit: man either lives or not. Luhmann himself offers a radical conclusion with regard to perishing: he claims that "there is the destruction of the system by the environment, but the environment does not actively contribute to the maintenance of the system. This is precisely the point of the concept "autopoiesis. ... What is excluded may very well affect the system causally, but only negatively" (Luhmann 2013: 85). That is to say, what is irritation and perturbation, namely, what the system cannot integrate as intrasystemic through its structural couplings or, in other words, what the system cannot interpret as being within the system, is ultimately embodying the potential perishing of the system. However, this means that

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the external influence of the system, the external danger of perishing can contribute to the system's self-affirmation: "evolution can survive such destruction because there are always other possibilities to develop the autopoiesis of life via structures in the direction of higher complexity" (ibid: 94). In fact, we can say that the complex system can cope with mediums that are more stable than the ephemeral generation of forms: noise disappears, but we can hear something else instead of it. One of the Luhmannian *opus magnum*s, namely, *Social Systems* focuses on the problem of perishing even more. He claims that the non-structured complexity would be mere entropic complexity, that is to say, it would be destroyed into chaos. At this point, he adds a crucial remark: "the formation of structure uses this disintegration and constructs order out of it. Out of the disintegration of elements (i. e., the necessary cessation of every action), it draws the energy and information to reproduce elements that therefore always appear within existing structural categories yet still always appear as new" (Luhmann 1995: 282). Furthermore, he says that "not even the interchangeability of elements .... grasps the temporal reference radically enough. ... Because a social system (like all other temporalized systems, including life) exists as elements that are events, it is confronted at every moment with the alternative of ceasing or continuing. Its 'substance' continually vanishes, so to speak, and must be reproduced with the help of structural models" (ibid: 290, 347). In order to grasp the continuous persistence and the gradual disappearance of the complex system, Luhmann carefully uses the expression "substance", namely, under quotation marks. In the case of complex systems, the environmental influence that is not processed intrasystemically, is always destructive, however, this kind of danger can inspire the system to become even more self-affirmative. On the other hand, the condition of the possibility of complex systems is the continuous perishing of the intrasystemic elements – otherwise, the redefinition of the systemic structures, the persistence of complexity would not be possible. The persistence of the systems is not possible in spite of the danger of cessation, but precisely owing to it. Thus, Luhmann comes to the conclusion that we do not have to operate with the binarity of persisting and perishable, but, as he puts it, with the "mixed relations of flexible couplings". "Substance" is appropriate to fill in this double role because, as we could see, it is both transient and persistent.

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Mark Lošonc

Aristotelove praodluke i izazov nestajanja

Apstrakt

Ovaj rad tematizuje Aristotelov pojam nestajanja. Prvo, rekonstruiše Aristotelovu raspravu da predsokratcima, zatim se fokusira na pojedine kandidate za entitete koji mogu da nestanu: formu, materiju i supstanciju. Tekst pruža argumente protiv široko prihaćene teze da je supstancija *corruptio simpliciter* bez ikakvih rezervi. Rad se o velikoj meri oslanja i na antičke i srednjovekovne komentatore Aristotela. Na kraju, uzima se u obzir i dimenzija vremena, odnosno aktualnosti.

Ključne reči: Aristotel, nestajajnje, predsokratovci, materija, forma, supstancija, vreme

Maroje Višić

IVORY TOWER AND BARRICADES: MARCUSE AND ADORNO ON THE SEPARATION OF THEORY AND PRAXIS

ABSTRACT
The events of 1968/69 initiated a dispute between Adorno and Marcuse over the (alleged) separation of theory and praxis. While Marcuse "stood at the barricades" Adorno sought recluse in the "ivory tower". Marcuse and German students perceived Adorno's move as departure from fundamental postulates of critical theory as laid down in Horkheimer's 1937 essay. Adorno died amidst the process of clarifying his differences with Marcuse and thus the "unlimited discussions" between the two remain unfinished. This paper sets to examine how both Marcuse and Adorno remained dedicated to the unity of theory and praxis, albeit in different ways. I argue that Adorno did not separate theory and praxis; instead, he perceived the gap between critical theory and concrete historical situation. Adorno rejected simple and unreflective translation of theory into praxis. Hence his attempt to recalibrate critical theory. Marcuse's and Adorno's differences lie in their different evaluation of the student movement and this (mis)evaluation was context related. My second argument is that Marcuse/Adorno disagreement is partly caused by the absence of the two from the concrete historical context.

Introduction[1]

Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse were among the prominent representatives of the Institute for Social Research (commonly referred to as the Frankfurt School). The trio closely collaborated on the project called critical theory. They influenced each other to the point where Horkheimer couldn't distinguish his own thoughts from Adorno's (and vice versa) and Marcuse gave them carte blanche to sign his name to whatever the Institute publishes. They seemed to be inseparable just like theory and *praxis*. However, one should avoid any idealization of their personal and professional relationship. Besides philosophical disagreement over theory and *praxis* there existed a dose of personal tension. Adorno tried to "win over" Horkheimer and in doing so seemed to be sometimes jealous of Marcuse (Sünker 2007: 130). Perhaps the germs of Adorno/Marcuse disagreement could already have been found as early as 1935 when Adorno

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1 I thank Professor Heinz Sünker from Bergische Universität Wuppertal for suggesting me to write a paper on this topic.

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wrote about Marcuse's fascist proclivities: "He is motivated by the prospect of a placement at the Institute for Social Research: (...) and it shouldn't come as any surprise to you that it saddens me that you are philosophically allied to a man whom I would consider a fascist were it not for his Jewish background. For he could neither have any illusions about Heidegger, to whom, according to the preface of his book on Hegel, he is indebted, nor could he have any illusions about his publisher, Mr. Klostermann..." (letter to Horkheimer dated May 15th 1935, p. 65 quoted in Sünker 2007: 130). Their philosophical and perhaps personal tensions would never be – to use a dialectical term – sublated. Teddy eventually succeeded in "winning" Horkheimer over. They returned to Germany while Marcuse remained in immigration for the rest of his life.

The events of 1968/69 started the whole question over the unity and separation of theory and *praxis*. If one has to depict students' perception of Adorno and Marcuse, the two slogans come to mind: "Marx, Mao, Marcuse" and "Adorno as institution is dead". While Marcuse remained committed to the revolution and supported students, Adorno was perceived as having resigned from *praxis* in favor of theory. This paper sets to examine whether this perception is justified. Has Adorno abandoned the partisanship of theory and *praxis* which according to Horkheimer was the *differentia specifica* between traditional and critical theory? Was Marcuse the only member of the Frankfurt School who remained loyal to radical *praxis* and critical theory?

I argue that Adorno didn't resign on *praxis* or separate it from theory. Rather he perceived that the social circumstances have decisively changed and that reinterpretation is necessary before proceeding to *praxis*. Hence, Adorno attempted to re-calibrate critical theory so that it can reflect more accurately on the (pseudo)praxis of late modernity. The cause of the mutual disagreement evident in Marcuse/Adorno correspondence was primarily due to Marcuse's and Adorno's absence from respective societal context. This is not to say that it was solely post-war "German context" that conditioned Adorno's skepticism towards praxis. This would go against Adorno's own argument that *praxis* should not (decisively!) guide theory. Rather, it was the mixture of Adorno's fundamental theoretical premises (firstly outlined in the *Negative Dialectics*, a work co-written with Horkheimer during their stay in the United States) coupled with Germany's social and political peculiarities of that time. Adorno (justifiably) feared the undiminished restorative charge present in Adenauer's Germany. Christian Democratic Activists from the Association of Christian Democratic Students (RCDS) were perhaps "lesser known" (at least to Marcuse) 1968ers who rose in opposition to Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS). Streets of Germany filled with student protesters, exuded what part of West Berliners felt like a fascist atmosphere. This was a concrete and crucial difference between German and American context that is relevant for the two theorists' different views on theory and praxis. And to a certain extent this is what partly contributed to their mutual disagreement. A critical theorist by definition has to be actively engaged in the struggles, but this engagement is always engagement in the concrete historical situation. Being an ocean apart Marcuse couldn't relate

(the way a critical theorist has to relate) to the situation in post-war Germany. Furthermore he informed himself through media reports that were often biased. Thus besides differences in theoretical premises, Adorno and Marcuse had different, context related, views on the methods of radical *praxis*. Or to put it differently: Marcuse's and Adorno's different (theoretical) views on the relation of praxis to theory were more contexts related than context dependent. Regardless of differences, both Marcuse's and Adorno's standpoints were in line with the programmatic task of critical theory. Hence, to support my argument I'm discussing Horkheimer's, Marcuse's and Adorno's conception of critical theory. In the second part I'm focusing on the Marcuse/Adorno correspondence.

Horkheimer: What is Critical Theory?

In the essay *Traditional and Critical Theory* (1937) Horkheimer embarks on rethinking the direction towards which various theories were moving and at the same time on defining and positioning critical theory by making it distinguishable in the theoretical landscape. The *differentia specifica* of critical theory is its subversiveness towards established reality. Horkheimer uses the word "traditional" as an umbrella term for theories that are favorable to reality or whose task is to systematize and organize facts and knowledge into an existing paradigm. It should be mentioned, as Macdonald points out, that Horkheimer and Marcuse were not against traditional theory's empirical commitment, but rather for "... a critical empiricism which is guided by the commitment to radical transformation, and which assumes it performs a role in that very transformation itself. In opposition to critical theory, traditional theory ultimately performs a radical distinction between the subject and object, value and fact, and thereby initiates a stance of passivity toward the unfolding of the social and political world" (Macdonald 2017: 8). In the "traditional" form of theorizing a theorist is alienated from the "product of his/her labor" and the consequence is that the theorist is alienated from the world of political struggles. As Horkheimer proclaims: "This alienation, which finds expression in philosophical terminology as the separation of value and research, knowledge and action, and other polarities, protects the savant from the tensions we have indicated and provides an assured framework for his activity" (Horkheimer 2002 [1937], 208–209). Horkheimer's project was influenced by Marxian philosophy and hence every activity (including solitary activity such as theorizing in one's own library) is at the same time a social activity that takes place in the medium of the social being and, for that matter, for the benefit of social being.

What was required was a clear demarcation between "traditional theory" driven by "value neutrality" and critical theory; between the "savant"[2] and critical theorist. Horkheimer (2002 [1937]) sharpens the distinction between critical and "traditional" theory by stating how critical theory runs counter to dominant habits of thought, how it has no material accomplishments and

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2   Term "savant" refers to theorists and scientists of traditional theory.

finally how in spite of being opposed to mainstream thought and having no material evidence to offer, it nevertheless urges the transformation of society by the intensification of struggle.

Horkheimer's project of formulating and positioning critical theory can be divided into the following topics: who are critical theorists; their task and relation to society, what is critical thinking and who the subject of critical theory is. The relation between critical theorist and society is marked by tension that necessitates sublation. A critical theorist uses economic categories (e.g. labor) in the same manner as commonly used. However, in the interpretation of those categories critical theorist applies the dialectical method by searching for internal contradictions and the necessity of sublation.[3] As Horkheimer argues: "The identification (...) of men of critical mind with their society is marked by tension, and the tension characterizes all the concepts of the critical way of thinking. Thus, such thinkers interpret the economic categories of work, value, and productivity exactly as they are interpreted in the existing order, and they regard any other interpretation as pure idealism. But at the same time they consider it rank dishonesty simply to accept the interpretation; the critical acceptance of the categories which rule social life contains simultaneously their condemnation" (Horkheimer 2002 [1937]: 208). Thus, critical thinking becomes specific mode of activity that is in inseparable connection with social being. It becomes radical transformative *praxis* hostile to the established reality. Horkheimer captures the transformative character of the critical theory: "Critical thinking (...) is motivated (...) by the effort really to transcend the tension and to abolish the opposition between the individual's purposefulness, spontaneity, and rationality, and those work-process relationships on which society is built. Critical thought has a concept of man as in conflict with himself until this opposition is removed (...) Its subject is rather a definite individual in his real relation to other individuals and groups, in his conflict with a particular class, and, finally, in the resultant web of relationships with the social totality and with nature" (Horkheimer 2002 [1937]: 210–211).

The dedication of critical theory to a radical transformative *praxis* is further enhanced by its commitment to a revolutionary subject of emancipation. With the diminishing of the proletariat as a revolutionary force, critical theory embarks on a constant quest of finding the revolutionary subject: "Even to the proletariat the world superficially seems quite different than it really is. Even an outlook which could grasp that no opposition really exists between the proletariat's own true interests and those of society as a whole, and would therefore derive its principles of action from the thoughts and feelings of the masses, would fall into slavish dependence on the status quo" (Horkheimer 2002 [1937]: 214). The subject of critical theory is a definite individual in his totality and in his concrete historical existence.

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3   On this topic Marcuse's 1933 essay *On the Philosophical Foundations of the Concept of Labor* is very instructive. Marcuse intends to construct a new concept of labor that will be central in his critical theory.

Marcuse: Concrete Philosophy and Critical Theory

In the same year and following Horkheimer's two pieces[4] Marcuse published his essay *Philosophy and Critical Theory (P&CT)*. Marcuse supports and further enhances much of Horkheimer's arguments and shares a similar theoretical position.[5] Marcuse joins in the critique of positivism shared by Horkheimer and Adorno. Four years after *P&CT* Marcuse's second book on Hegel was published. In *Reason and Revolution (R&R)* Marcuse (1986) remains critical to positivism and dedicates a whole chapter to the minute discussion and criticism of positivism from Saint-Simon to Lorenz von Stein: "Positive philosophy was going to affirm the existing order against those who asserted the need for 'negating'" (Marcuse 1986: 327). Positivism is, in Marcuse's view, counterrevolutionary because it channeled social antagonisms into means to achieve harmony. Due to its affirmative relation to the established reality positivism represents a theory of the ruling class. For Marcuse (1986) it means the neutralization of the dialectical method. It warned, even more importantly, that critical theory can lose its fundamental premise of the tension between essence and appearance whose sublation has the character of necessity.[6] Marcuse's book (and especially the chapter on *Phenomenology of Spirit*) received criticism, but surprisingly the most vocal criticism came from his colleagues with whom he shared a

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4   *Traditional and Critical Theory* and *Postscript*.

5   As Jay points out: "Once Marcuse joined the Institut, the influence of Horkheimer on his work became pronounced (...) Even so, Marcuse never engaged in the type of empirical work that the Institut strove to combine with its theorizing. Of all the figures in the Frankfurt School he remained most exclusively concerned with theoretical issues (...) In discussing the function of the concept of essence in various Philosophical systems, Marcuse followed Horkheimer in situating each doctrine in its historical setting..." (Jay 1973: 76).

But there never publicly existed a (nurtured) perception of "Horkheimer Adorno and Marcuse" as was "Horkheimer and Adorno". In the *Eclipse of Reason* Horkheimer affirms that Adorno's and his is one shared philosophy: "These lectures were designed to present in epitome some aspects of a comprehensive philosophical theory developed by the writer during the last few years in association with Theodore W. Adorno" (Horkheimer 2004: vi).

Sünker notes: "In contrast to the first volume of the correspondence, some changes surface here. They deal with Adorno's exile in the US and consequently with the personal closeness to Horkheimer; an intimacy that made letters concerning common theoretical work almost redundant. They incidentally allude to the plan of a book on dialectics, from which the Dialectic of Enlightenment would come into being" (Sünker 2007: 132).

Hence, I argue that Marcuse remained an outsider; he certainly didn't belong intimately to the inner circle of Adorno and Horheimer. This becomes strikingly evident after Horkheimer's and Adorno's return to Germany and after the incident with students.

6   Cf. Marcuse's essay *The Concept of Essence*. Marcuse attempted to preserve the meaning of revolution precisely on this tension which determines the historical image of reality in the shape of universal social contradiction (Marcuse 1936: 48).

theoretical platform.[7] Hence, the differences between the three of them that will culminate in 1968-69 have already emerged in 1941: "...[*R&R*] fails adequately to highlight the unique features of Marcuse's Hegelian Marxism, which had a somewhat different orientation than Adorno's and Horkheimer's both to the dialectic and to politics; this difference already was visible in 1941. Marcuse's Hegelian Marxism of 1941 helps us to anticipate one aspect of his work in the 1960s as well: his public return to a variant of the left revolutionary politics that his Frankfurt School colleagues Adorno and Horkheimer abandoned after the early 1940s" (Anderson 1993: 256–257).

Even though Marcuse's essay is written as a companion to Horkheimer's piece, it certainly isn't a simple reiteration of Horkheimer's arguments or Marcuse's first commentary on critical theory and *praxis* (Višić 2017). It is already in *On Concrete Philosophy (OCP)*, an essay from Marcuse's phenomenological-Marxism phase, that he formulated the key ideas that will echo throughout his complete works as well[8] (Višić 2017). "Concrete philosophy" is grounded on historical materialism and its task is to care for being and being's actualization of the possibility to have a happier existence in a more humane world. Economic relations are at the center of critical theory and only a shift in economic relations can lead to a more just society (ibid). Hence, in *OCP* Marcuse sketches the task of practical philosophy that later serves as the programmatic task of critical theory (although after joining the Institute Marcuse would lose Heidegger's terminology): "Concrete philosophy can thus only approach existence if it seeks out Dasein in the sphere in which its existence is based: as it acts in its world in accordance with its historical situation. In becoming historical, concrete philosophy, by taking the real fate of Dasein upon itself, also becomes public. (...) Concrete philosophy will exist in the public realm, because only by so doing can it truly approach existence (...) In such cases the

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7   In the preface to Negt's book Horkheimer and Adorno strikingly accuse Marcuse of latent positivism in *R&R*: "'the latent positivism implicit in the Hegelian construction of social reality, something which one would not expect because of Hegel's own hostility to positivism'" (Negt [1963] 1974: 8 quoted in Anderson 1933: 255).

In the Introduction to *ODM* Kellner offers an explanation that: "... in the 1940s there were two tendencies within Critical Theory: (1) the philosophical-cultural analysis of the trends of Western civilization being developed by Horkheimer and Adorno in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, and (2) the more practical-political development of Critical Theory as a theory of social change proposed by Marcuse and Neumann. For Marcuse and Neumann, Critical Theory would be developed as a theory of social change that would connect philosophy, social theory, and radical politics— precisely the project of 1930s Critical Theory that Horkheimer and Adorno were abandoning in the early 1940s in their turn toward philosophical and cultural criticism divorced from social theory and radical politics. Marcuse and Neumann, by contrast, were focusing precisely on the issue that Horkheimer and Adorno had neglected: the theory of social change" (Kellner 1964: xxii-xxiii).

8   In her recent book *Per una filosofia concreta: Alle radici del pensiero di Marcuse* Bascelli (2018) successfully argues that the necessity for a concrete philosophy is present in Marcuse's work from the early writings up to later ones.

individual is no longer the point of departure, but rather the goal of philosophy, because individuality itself must first be made possible again." (Marcuse 1929: 47–51). This position, although in different terminology, is also voiced in Marcuse's designation of critical theory: "This situation compels theory anew to a sharper emphasis on its concern with the potentialities of man and with the individual's freedom, happiness, and rights contained in all of its analyses. For the theory, these are exclusively potentialities of the concrete social situation. They become relevant only as economic and political questions and as such bear on human relations in the productive process, the distribution of the product of social labor, and men's active participation in the economic and political administration of the whole" (Marcuse 1937: 105).

What distinguishes critical theory from philosophy,[9] according to Marcuse, is the fact that philosophy delegated freedom to the spiritual realm while leaving intact the realm of material production and reproduction: "For here, unlike in philosophical systems, human freedom is no phantom or arbitrary inwardness that leaves everything in the external world as it was. Rather, freedom here means a real potentiality, a social relationship on whose realization human destiny depends (...) Like philosophy, it opposes making reality into a criterion in the manner of complacent positivism. But unlike philosophy, it always derives its goals only from present tendencies of the social process (...) The obstinacy that comes from adhering to truth against all appearances has given way in contemporary philosophy to whimsy and uninhibited opportunism. Critical theory preserves obstinacy as a genuine quality of philosophical thought" (*ibid*: 105–106). Critical theory builds criticism on the analysis of economic relations that determine social consciousness. However this doesn't put critical theory in line with political economy. Critical theory goes rather beyond mere economy: "From the beginning the critique of political economy established the difference by criticizing the entirety of social existence. In a society whose totality was determined by economic relations to the extent that the uncontrolled economy controlled all human relations, even the noneconomic was contained in the economy. It appears that, if and when this control is removed, the rational organization of society toward which critical theory is oriented is more than a new form of economic regulation. The difference lies in the decisive factor, precisely the one that makes the society rational – the subordination of the economy to the individuals' needs" (ibid: 106).

Confronted with the disappearance of the proletariat as the revolutionary agent[10], Marcuse reflects on new challenges that critical theory and radical

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9   Marcuse rejects idealism on the basis that this philosophy is more driven by justifying the established order of things. This is revealed in its conception of subject whose autonomy and freedom are possible only by referring to the subject alone, as an individual isolated from the society (ibid: 102).

10   Throughout his life Marcuse will continue to seek revolutionary agents. Hence, the New Left, student movements, Women's Liberation Movement appeared to Marcuse as potentially new "revolutionary" subjects. For more information about Marcuse's engagement, his advising of *Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)* and to what extent

praxis faces: "At its origins in the first half of the nineteenth century, when it elaborated the first concepts of the alternatives, the critique of industrial society attained concreteness in a historical mediation between theory and practice, values and facts, needs and goals (...) In the capitalist world, they are still the basic classes [the bourgeoisie and the proletariat]. However, the capitalist development has altered the structure and function of these two classes in such a way that they no longer appear to be agents of historical transformation (...) In the absence of demonstrable agents and agencies of social change, the critique is thus thrown back to a high level of abstraction. There is no ground on which theory and practice, thought and action meet. Even the most empirical analysis of historical alternatives appears to be unrealistic speculation, and commitment to them a matter of personal (or group) preference" (Marcuse 1964: xlii–xliii).

Adorno: Resignation from *Praxis* and Fidelity to Theory?

Reflecting on the historical situation of the day,[11] Adorno writes in the intro to *Negative Dialectics* (1966): "Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed. The summary judgment that it had merely interpreted the world, that resignation in the face of reality had crippled it in itself, becomes a defeatism of reason after the attempt to change the world miscarried (...) Having broken its pledge to be as one with reality or at the point of realization, philosophy is obliged ruthlessly to criticize itself" (Adorno 1973: 3). Hence, Adorno claims that *praxis*[12] is delayed for the time being. The new situation that Adorno succinctly summarized poses an insurmountable (if not even foundational) problem for the Frankfurt School whose whole theoretical effort and program revolved around revolutionary *praxis*.[13] In other words, almost thirty years after Horkheimer's inaugural essay, the question what is critical theory rises again. As Adorno notes: "The liquidation of theory by dogmatization and thought taboos contributed to the bad practice; the recovery of theory's independence lies in the interest of practice itself (...)

Marcuse's works have influenced movements of the time see chapter "Marcuse's Mentors: The American Counterculture and the Guru of the New Left" in Wheatland 2009.
11   Namely to the failed proletariat's revolution which remained in servitude precisely on the basis of its integration into the affluent society.
   However this suggests that Adorno was convinced that revolution had its chance: "... he is thinking here of the period from the Russian Revolution and the later stages of the First World War to fascism taking power in Italy, Germany and Spain and the show trial in Moscow" (Freyenhagen 2014: 4).
12   *Praxis* has at least six meanings in Adorno's writings: 1) as activity (*Tätigkeit*); 2) as productive labor; 3) as revolutionary activity; 4) as resistance and not joining in (*Widerstand* und *Nicht-Mitmachen*); 5) as *Aktionismus* and 6) as activity in a liberated society (Freyenhagen 2014: 6).
13   Hence Adorno called for revisiting Marxian theory: "The remaining theoretical inadequacies in Hegel and Marx became part of historical practice and can thus be newly reflected upon in theory, instead of thought bowing irrationally to the primacy of practice. Practice itself was an eminently theoretical concept" (Adorno 1973: 144).

with theory paralyzed and disparaged by the all-governing bustle, its mere existence, however impotent, bears witness against the bustle. This is why theory is legitimate and why it is hated; without it, there would be no changing the practice that constantly calls for change. Those who chide theory anachronistic obey the *topos* of dismissing (...) and the target is theoretically missed" (ibid: 143).

According to Adorno (1989) the reasons for theory falling behind bad practice is that Marx's emiseration thesis[14] proved to be wrong. The proletariat, whose historical task was to bring up the revolution, integrated into mass society and culture[15] thus leaving a void to be filled by "other" revolutionary agents. Finally socialism in the USSR, China and Asia presented a barrier to liberation. Hence, everything fits perfectly into the equation for the failure of critical theory as revolutionary theory: practical misgivings of Marx's theory, disappearance of the class that represented the immanent negation and contradiction and the defeat of the actually existing socialism as a desirable alternative to capitalism.

Being aware of the social and material conditions of late modernity, Adorno advocates the idea of right living and ethics of resistance.[16] Adorno proposes that one should adopt a defensive stance of resistance against the bad forms of life that late modernity structurally produces.[17] Although Adorno abandons revolutionary ethics, his idea of right living contains transformative potential that can be exerted through a democratic process: "We might even say that the quest for the good life is the quest for the right form of politics, if indeed such a right form of politics lies within the realm of what can be achieved today" (Adorno 2001: 176). However, Adorno is aware that even resistance is not completely harmless and that it can be turned easily into its opposite despite the noble cause of those involved: "A minimum is sufficient to turn the resistance to repression repressively against those who, as little as they wish to glorify their individual being, nonetheless do not renounce what they have become. The much invoked unity of theory and praxis has the tendency of slipping into the predominance of praxis" (Adorno 1998: 290). Adorno warns that even if resistance doesn't involve repression it can still provoke it.[18] Adorno clarifies this in the letter to Marcuse: "I would have to deny everything that

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14   Marx (1995 [1867]) derives the emiseration thesis from an undertaken analysis of the economic development of capitalism. See section *The General Law of Capitalistic Accumulation* on p. 480.

15   Marcuse oriented himself to criticism of technology arguing that the integration into society was possible precisely on technological basis. Adorno (2002b [1947]) was, contrary to Marcuse, more concerned with "culture industry" that functioned as an integrative force.

16   "Wrong life cannot be lived rightly" (Adorno 2005, aphorism no. 18).

17   But it also refers to the experience of fascism: "Concrete possibilities of resistance nonetheless must be shown. For instance, one should investigate the history of euthanasia murders, which in Germany, (...), was not perpetrated to the full extent planned by the National Socialists (...) All political instruction finally should be centered upon the idea that Auschwitz should never happen again" (Adorno 1998: 203).

18   E.g. the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg. The police officer who shot him was acquitted of charges!

I think and know about the objective tendency if I wanted to believe that the student protest movement in Germany had even the tiniest prospect of effecting a social intervention. Because (...) it cannot do that its effect is questionable in two respects. Firstly, inasmuch as it inflames an undiminished fascist potential in Germany, without even caring about it. Secondly, insofar as it breeds in itself tendencies which (...) directly converge with fascism" (Adorno 1969: 131).

Although such a conclusion might be drawn, Adorno doesn't advocate withdrawal from the public sphere into the private nor is he a proponent of subjective inwardness. On the contrary, subjective inwardness makes one complicit in pseudo *praxis*: "Whatever an individual or a group may undertake against the totality they are part of is infected by the evil of that totality; and no less infected is he who does nothing at all (...) The individual who dreams of moral certainty is bound to fail, bound to incur guilt because, being harnessed to the social order, he has virtually no power over the conditions whose cry for change appeals to the moral *ingenium* (...) Without recourse to the material, no ought could issue from reason; yet once compelled to acknowledge its material in the abstract, as a condition of its own possibility, reason must not cut off its reflection on the specific material" (Adorno 1973: 243).

Critical theory suffers also from the same "illness" as (pseudo) *praxis*. And this "illness" revealed immanent problems in critical theory. Its theoretical assumptions are challenged and put to risk. Adorno is aware of this: "There is much to indicate that a knowledge crippled temporarily, at least, in its possible relation to practical change is not a blessing in itself either. Practice is put off and cannot wait; this is what ails even theory. But when a man can do nothing that will not threaten to turn out for the worst even if meant for the best, he will be bound to start thinking..." (ibid: 245). To respond to problems that critical theory is facing, Adorno gives precedence to theory over *praxis*,[19] and, thus, separates the unity of theory and *praxis* that was an emblematic feature of critical theory: "The Archimedian point—how might a nonrepressive praxis be possible, how might one steer between the alternatives of spontaneity and organization—this point, if it exists at all, cannot be found other than through theory" (Adorno 1998, 274). Actually, Adorno on numerous occasions rejected the idea that theory should directly inform *praxis*.[20] In *The New Manifesto*: "We

19   Adorno argues that this is the case with Marx as well: "Marx's *Theses on* Feuerbach cannot be correctly understood in abstraction from the historical (and societal) dimension but rather only in the context of the expectation of the revolution. Once this failed to realize, Marx retreated himself to a study (Adorno 2000 [1993]: 150).

20   Although Adorno and Marcuse share similar views about unmediated translation of theory into *praxis*, this, however, becomes a point of dispute in their *Correspondence*.

In the letter written to Adorno on April 5th Marcuse is explicit on this matter: "You know me well enough to know that I reject the unmediated translation of theory into praxis just as emphatically as you do" (Marcuse 1969: 125). However, Marcuse continues in disagreement: "I do believe that there are situations, moments, in which theory is pushed on further by praxis—situations and moments in which theory that is kept separate from praxis becomes untrue to itself. We cannot abolish from the world the

are not proposing any particular course of action" (Adorno & Horkheimer 2010, 46). Then again in an interview given to *Der Spiegel* on May 5th 1969 Adorno says: "In my writings, I have never offered a model for any kind of action or for some specific campaign (...) my thinking always has stood in a rather indirect relationship to praxis (...) I believe that a theory is much more 'capable of having practical consequences owing to the strength of its own objectivity than if it had subjected itself to praxis from the start. Today's unfortunate relationship between theory and praxis consists precisely in the fact that theory is subjected to a practical pre-censorship (...) I still believe that one should hold on to theory, precisely under the general coercion toward praxis in a functional and pragmatized world" (Adorno 2002a: 15–16).

Another reason why Adorno advocates the primacy of theory is its capability to reflect upon itself. While *praxis* may be blind, unreflective, (actionism that "devours its children"), theory has a unique feature of reflecting on itself. In a case of blocked revolutionary praxis precedence of theory over *praxis* is justified because: "If I have the concept of reflection, the concept of practice implicitly postulates that of theory (...) What makes theory more than a mere instrument of practice is the fact that it reflects on itself, and in so doing it rescinds itself as mere theory. It can achieve that only by targeting true practice" (Adorno and Horkheimer 2010: 57–58). This, of course, puts theory on a distance from violence[21]: "Only those who unreflectingly vented their hate and aggression upon them are guilty. One must labor against this lack of reflection, must dissuade people from striking outward without reflecting upon themselves. The only education that has any sense at all is an education toward critical self-reflection" (Adorno 1998: 193). Hence, a theorist who engages into critical examinations of given facts becomes part of resistance: "By contrast the uncompromisingly critical thinker, who neither signs over his consciousness nor lets himself be terrorized into action, is in truth the one who does not give in" (ibid: 292). What role does a theorist play in the resistance movement? In Adorno's view, a theorist becomes a scholarly activist, a public intellectual, who uses the means of mass media to reach wider audiences.[22] And hence a theorist acts more educationally and pedagogically rather than revolutionarily. [23] This puts Adorno at odds with Marcuse who would rather be among

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fact that these students are influenced by us (...) I am proud of that and am willing to come to terms with patricide, even though it hurts sometimes" (ibid: 125).

　　Adorno replied on May 5th asking for further discussion on this topic: "I know that we are quite close on the question of the relation between theory and practice, although we really do need to discuss this relationship thoroughly some time..." (Adorno 1969: 127).

21　　However, Adorno permits violence aimed at combating fascist regimes.

22　　Adorno's scholarly activism (as form of resistance) in Germany included frequent appearances on radio and television, examination of future teachers, etc.

23　　One should remember that according to Marcuse (1929: 48) the philosopher's true nature is exemplified in Kierkegaards stepping out into the public sphere. In contrast to Marcuse, Adorno "...kept his ruthless critique of all things existing to the confines of the classroom and was quite uncomfortable with the idea of standing at the barricades,

students than on television and/or radio[24]: "On the other hand, it is certainly not at all superfluous to fortify this group with enlightened instruction against the non-public opinion. On the contrary, one could easily imagine that from this group something like cadres could develop, whose influence in the most diverse contexts would then finally reach the whole of society (...) the work of enlightenment will not be limited to these groups (...) it would be necessary to educate the educators themselves (...) It is absolutely imperative that universities strengthen a sociology (...) pedagogy should set itself the task *re-education...*" (Adorno 1998: 100).

Hence, the task of the "new" critical theory, as Adorno conceives it, is to create a new subjectivity[25], to liberate subjects from their immersion into *pseudo-praxis* and to enable a change in the consciousness of the agents: "Pseudo-reality is conjoined with, as its subjective attitude, pseudo-activity: action that overdoes and aggravates itself for the sake of its own publicity, without admitting to itself to what extent it serves as a substitute satisfaction, elevating itself into an end in itself. People locked in desperately want to get out. In such situations one doesn't think anymore, or does so only under fictive premises. Within absolutized praxis only reaction is possible and therefore false. Only thinking could find an exit (...) The situation can be changed, if at all, by undiminished insight. The leap into praxis does not cure thought of resignation as long as it is paid for with the secret knowledge that that really isn't the right way to go" (ibid: 291).

Although Adorno "divorced" the theory/*praxis* couplet by giving precedence to the former, he still holds that both don't stand at opposite ends. In Adorno's

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even as a public intellectual. One could say that Adorno was amiss in this personal shortcoming, in terms of pressing critical theory beyond the ivory tower (...) In many ways, Marcuse *acted on critical theory* in ways that Adorno never wanted to and never could" (Macdonald 2018: 534–535).

24   This signals, as *Der Spiegel* observed, an unnatural move by critical theory, a return to the ivory tower to which Adorno replied: "I am not at all afraid of the term 'ivory tower.'" (Adorno 2002a [1969]: 15).

Adorno's statement could be explained from the fact that he maintained that division of labor yields better results. Hence, revolutionists and theorists should stick to their own specialties. Adorno offers an example: "The theory that is not conceived as an instruction for its realization should have the most hope for realization, analogous to what occurred in the natural sciences between atomic theory and nuclear fission; what they had in common, the backtracking to a possible praxis, lay in the technologically oriented reason in-itself, not in any thoughts about application" (Adorno 1998: 277).

25   Adorno notes the collectivization of subjectivity in consumerist society: "The concept of personality cannot be saved. In the age of its liquidation, however, something in it should be preserved: the strength of the individual not to entrust himself to what blindly sweeps down upon him, likewise not to blindly make himself resemble it (...) The force of the 'I', which formerly was contained in the ideal of personality (...) and now threatens to vanish, is the force of consciousness, of rationality. It is essentially responsible for reality-testing (...) Only if the individual incorporates objectivity within himself and in a certain sense, namely consciously, adjusts to it, can he develop the resistance to it" (ibid: 165).

view the common denominator that binds both together is that both are a form of activity: "A consciousness of theory and praxis must be produced that neither divides the two such that theory becomes powerless and praxis becomes arbitrary (...) Thinking is a doing, theory a form of praxis (...) Thinking has a double character: it is immanently determined and rigorous, and yet an inalienably real mode of behavior in the midst of reality" (ibid: 8, 261). The point of dispute between Marcuse and Adorno was precisely the relation between theory and *praxis*. Marcuse and Adorno's students accused him of betraying his own theory, of closing himself off into the ivory tower. However, this accusation is not completely founded. Adorno can't be reproached for abandonment or deviation from the fundamental postulates of critical theory. Adorno was aware that both theory and *praxis* must be and act in unity. For the transition to occur from pseudo reality into reality one has first to analyze and interpret the social order. Adorno was against blind and unenlightened actionism[26]: "The neediness of the object is mediated via the total societal system; for that reason it can be determined critically only by theory. Praxis without theory, lagging behind the most advanced state of cognition, cannot but fail, and praxis, in keeping with its own concept, would like to succeed. False praxis is no praxis. Desperation that, because it finds the exits blocked, blindly leaps into praxis, with the purest of intentions joins forces with catastrophe. The hostility to theory in the spirit of the times, the by no means coincidental withering away of theory, its banishment by an impatience that wants to change the world without having to interpret it..." (ibid: 265).

The End of Utopia and the Return to the Old Institute

In the first part of the paper I have attempted to outline Horkheimer's, Marcuse's and Adorno's conception of critical theory and *praxis*. I have, then, proceeded to demonstrate how both Marcuse and Adorno remained, in different ways, dedicated to their common project. Adorno noticed that changed historical circumstances required adjustment of critical theory. Hence Adorno's efforts were directed to preserving critical theory by keeping it in constant check with reality. Marcuse undertook an identical effort with the same goal in his philosophical inquiry into Freud. Although the causes of disagreement should be sought in crucial differences (if there were any) between Adorno's and Marcuse's understanding of theory and *praxis*, the necessary complement to this endeavor is offered in the letter exchange between the two. Here one can see how besides their different paths in developing critical theory, context related content added to their mutual disagreement. Commenting on the publication of the correspondence between Adorno and Horkheimer, Sünker explains how revealing the letters are for better understanding critical theory:

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26 An example of blind and unmediated actionism was the importing of guerilla tactics into Western democracies: "Models that do not prove themselves even in the Bolivian bush cannot be exported" (ibid: 269–270).

"Publication of the first two volumes of the correspondence between Adorno and Horkheimer in the years between 1927 and 1944 is a significant contribution to the history of the early development of critical theory (...) The editors' commentary offers important insights into historical and theoretical contexts as well as into the personalities of the people who feature in these letters" (Sünker 2007: 129). Hence, in this part of the paper the focus switches to the Marcuse/Adorno correspondence.

The period in which Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse collaborated and "co-signed" publications came to an end.[27] Around 1950 Horkheimer and Adorno returned to West Germany where they formally reestablished the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, while Marcuse remained in the U.S. One might argue that this topographical (and more importantly contextual) separation of the trio ignited the whole (wrongly perceived) "controversy" over the separation of theory and *praxis*. From this point on the two will part in the understanding of critical theory and its relation to *praxis*. However, as I have attempted to argue, their positions on critical theory were not on opposite poles. The disagreement between them was partly the result of contextual abstraction. Should *praxis* push forward theory or should it be postponed – the question that shaped the letter exchange - was to a certain extent context related.[28] In the letter to Marcuse dated May 5th Adorno emphasizes the importance of knowing the context in order to form an opinion: "It seems to me that it is virtually impossible to form an opinion about the affair from six thousand miles away..." (Adorno 1969: 126). The (historical) situation in Germany could not be translated unmediatedly into the U.S. or vice versa. Hence, critical theory needed to be revised. It should be mentioned that Marcuse still harbored the hope of the three of them reuniting in Germany.[29] However, Marcuse would remain in exile for the rest of his life, and probably, as he felt it, in exile from their "Old Institute". After Adorno and Horkheimer's homecoming and Marcuse's stay in exile, tensions started to build slowly. First they had a mild disagreement about the Cold War that took a more serious tone in the case of the Vietnam War. However, what marked a turning point in the Marcuse-Adorno relationship were the events with the student's movements in Germany.

Students were convinced that critical theorists had become critical only on paper while remaining largely conformist in *praxis*.[30] Leslie notes: "Students

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27   In the 1960 Marcuse said that he considers everything written by Horkheimer as co-signed by him (Siegel 2012: 407).
28   It should be mentioned that in their works Marcuse and Adorno use context-transcendent concepts. It was not only the experience of the Holocaust or World War II that affected Adorno's position on theory and praxis but also the level of sophistication of social domination in late capitalism.
29   Marcuse expressed his wish to return in numerous letters to Horkheimer. And this wish grew stronger after Marcuse lost his wife (Siegel 2012: 400).
30   A leaflet distributed by sociology students in December stated: "Frankfurt Schülers, 'left idiots of the authoritarian state', had become 'critical in theory, conformist in practice' (...) and it quoted Horkheimer's *Dämmerung* from 1934: 'A revolutionary career

versed in critical theory were demanding that theoretical critique turn into practical political action. Theory was a brake on the movement, alleged some, as they denounced fellow students—mocked as Adornites and Habermice—for promoting theory for theory's sake and disregarding their professors' function as a left alibi for bourgeois society" (ibid: 119).

Marcuse was heralded as the official prophet of the student movement. He was proclaimed to be the father (and sometimes called grandfather) of the New Left. It was to be expected that across the ocean Adorno would assume a similar position at the forefront of the students' movements enjoying the same god-like status as Marcuse. Yet, while Marcuse was celebrated, Adorno has fallen from grace. He became the target of a series of attacks (on a personal and institutional level) and was subjected to students' criticism by performative actionism.[31] Adorno's obituary was written on leaflets distributed by a radical wing of sociology students: "Adorno as institution is dead [Adorno als Institution ist tot]" (Kraushaar 1998: 418). The campaign even went further to accuse Adorno of being a supporter of capitalism which, of course, was perceived as betrayal of the programmatic orientation of critical theory: "Whoever gives dear Adorno control will preserve capitalism for the rest of the life [Wer nur den lieben Adorno läßt walten, der wird den Kapitalismus sein Leben lang bewalten]" (Kraushaar 1998). Hence, the magazine *Konkret* declared Marcuse to be "the only remaining member of the Frankfurt School who supports those who want to realize the goals of critical theory..." (ibid: 432).

Surprisingly Adorno received the most voiceful and ardent criticism from his PhD student and member of SDS Hans-Jürgen Krahl. In the paper *The Political Contradiction in Adorno's Critical Theory* Krahl accused Adorno of deviating from the foundations of critical theory and of separating theory and *praxis*: "But his critical option, that any philosophy if it is to be true, must be immanently oriented towards the practical transformation of social reality, loses its binding force if it is not as well capable of defining itself in organizational categories. Adorno's dialectical concept of negation moved more and more away from the historical necessity of the partisanship of theory, which had once been part of Horkheimer's specific differentiation between critical and conventional theory, when he postulated the 'dynamic unity' between the theoretician and the oppressed class" (Krahl 1975: 832).

On January 31st 1969 Adorno called the police who arrested 76 students in an attempt of occupying the Institute.[32] Marcuse saw this as siding with the oppressive apparatus. In the letter dated April 5th 1969 he writes to Adorno:

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does not lead to banquets and honorary titles, interesting research and professorial wages. It leads to misery, disgrace, ingratitude, prison and into the unknown, illuminated by only an almost superhuman belief" (Leslie 1999: 119).

31   E.g. Adorno's lectures were interrupted by a performance of female students who exposed their naked breasts to him and forcefully tried to kiss him.

32   This was in line with Dutschke's and Krahl's views on the changed function of the university that could act as the urban guerilla shelter for the Außerparlamentarische Opposition, ApO (Leslie 1999: 120).

"To put it brutally: if the alternative is the police or left-wing students, then I am with the students..." (Marcuse 1969: 125). That event and subsequent repercussions became the focal point of Adorno's and Marcuse's disagreement on theory, *praxis* and the use of violence. In the letter to Adorno dated April 5th Marcuse stresses how significantly things have changed for him: "Since my last letter, the situation has changed decisively for me: for the first time, I have read more detailed reports about the events in Frankfurt, and I have also received a face-to-face report from a Frankfurt student who 'was there'" (*ibid*). Albeit, the discussion (that otherwise could have yielded fruitful ideas on rethinking critical theory in changed social circumstances) took place in letters and thus were completely devoid of any context related peculiarities such as two opposing students' movements in Germany: the RCDS and the SDS. Marcuse experienced happenings in Germany only through writings and he was lacking first hand experiencing the atmosphere that surrounded students' movements. Hence, the cause of disagreement between the two rests - to use Marx's term – in the alienation from social beings (Marcuse's from Germany and Adorno's from U.S.).[33]

Marcuse had a pending invitation to come to Frankfurt and to give a lecture. However he insisted on speaking with students as well, to which Adorno objected claiming that he has to put the Institute's interests first (adding the emphatic reminder "old"). In the letter dated May 5th 1969 Adorno writes: "...I have to look out for the interests of the Institute—our old Institute, Herbert—and these interests would be directly endangered by such a circus, believe me..." (Adorno 1969: 126–127). Marcuse was certain (and perhaps this certainty came from the fact that he was offended by not joining Horkheimer and Adorno in Germany and resuming work on their common project) that the "old Institute" doesn't exist anymore, that there is a significant difference compared to the Institute of the 1930s. Marcuse writes in the letter dated June 4th 1969: "No Teddy, it is not our old Institute, into which the students have infiltrated. You know as well as I how essential the work in present-day Germany is" (Marcuse 1969: 128–129). According to Marcuse the essential difference in the work of the Institute is abstinence from taking concrete political positions. Marcuse explains this in the same letter: "You know that we are united in the rejection of any unmediated politicization of theory. But our (old) theory has an internal political content, an internal political dynamic, that today, more than ever before, compels us to concrete political positions (...) in order to still be our 'old Institute', we have to write and act differently today than in the thirties" (ibid: 129). If one has to extract one main reason of Adorno/Marcuse disagreement, then this issue certainly is the leading cause. In other words, this has to do with the unity of theory and *praxis*.

As I have already mentioned in the first part of the paper, Adorno didn't bluntly separate theory and *praxis*. Adorno (rightly) thought that *praxis* was blocked for the time being and that there wasn't any (true) revolutionary agent.

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33   With whom critical theory was always inseparably connected and to whom critical theory was dedicated.

Marcuse firmly believed the opposite.[34] In the letter to Adorno dated July 21st 1969 Marcuse was adamant in his conviction: "I certainly do believe that the student movement does have the prospect of 'effecting a social intervention'. I am thinking here mainly of the United States, but also France (my stay in Paris reinforced that once again) and South America" (ibid: 133).

One can note that throughout the Adorno/Marcuse correspondence Marcuse cited examples from the U.S. to support his claim that the revolution is possible while Adorno was more preoccupied with the situation in Germany. In this fact rests the error: the two contexts can't be compared. And neither can an unmediated and simple translation of methods from one into the another be expected. As Jeffries wittingly writes: "While Marcuse dreamed of utopia in America, Adorno despaired in Europe" (Jeffries 2016: 286). Adorno indeed had a justified reason for desperation. He was constantly vigilant for the return of fascism. Hence, Adorno's public appearances, his defense of liberal democracy (to which Marcuse had objections), his insistence on education and critical pedagogy, his views on the students' movements; all this should be understood as an effort to prevent the return of fascism onto the European soil. Even Krahl was aware that the experience of fascism shaped Adorno (and I may add Marcuse as well[35]): "The fascist terror (...) also injures the subjectivity of the theoretician and reinforces the class barriers to his ability of theoretical perception (...) He shared the ambivalence of the political consciousness of many critical intellectuals in Germany who imagine that socialist action from the left is actually arousing the potential fascist terror from the right against which it is fighting" (Krahl 1975: 831–832). Yet Krahl's comment should not be taken lightly or taken against Adorno as Krahl did. Adorno was a dialectician and he witnessed too many times: "...the indifference of each individual life that is the direction of history. Even in his formal freedom, the individual is as fungible and replaceable as he will be under the liquidators' boots" (Adorno 1973: 362).

As a dialectician Adorno was aware that every movement can turn into its opposite. In the letter to Marcuse dated May 5th 1969 Adorno comments on Habermas' expression "left fascism" and voices his fears about German student movements: "...might not a movement, by the force of its immanent antinomies, transform itself into its opposite?" (Adorno 1969: 128).[36] But not only can a movement end in its opposite, it can also provoke a counter-movement. This was the case in Germany. Hence, Adorno's fears, arguments and theoretical

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34   And this is perfectly in line with Marcuse's constant search for the revolutionary subject and his constant dream of revolution (Višić 2017).

However, both Marcuse and Adorno have agreed that the situation is far from a revolutionary one. In the letter dated 5th April 1969 Marcuse writes: "We know (and [students] know) that the situation is not a revolutionary one, not even a prerevolutionary one" (Marcuse 1969: 125).

35   E.g. Marcuse's 1965 essay *Repressive* Tolerance should be understood in light of suppressing movements with fascistic tendencies.

36   And Marcuse replied in the letter dated June 4th 1969 that not every contradiction is dialectical.

positions were justified.[37] Note how Marcuse mentions only left students while being completely unaware of other 1968ers (namely RCDS[38]). The main reason for Marcuse's unawareness was biased media reports. Immediately after writing report to Marcuse about the incident with the police, Adorno warns him that: "The propaganda is presenting things entirely back to front, as if it were we who grasped at repressive measures, and not the students who yelled at us that we should shut our traps and say nothing about what happened. This is just to put you in the picture, in case rumors and rather colorful accounts should filter through to you" (Adorno 1969: 124). However, the media's one-sided reporting wasn't limited only to the incident in Frankfurt. Rather it seems to have been the general media policy. As Goltz argues: "Most accounts portray the events in West Berlin as having been characterized by confrontations between the leftist student movement, on the one hand, and a conservative press and generally hostile, older, urban population, on the other" (Goltz 2017: 8). RCDS rose in opposition to SDS: "Instead of expressing gratitude to their American protectors, radical students now routinely criticized and defied the United States, whose forces still occupied the city (...) Christian Democratic students (...) had a drastically different sense of what political commitment ought to entail in a city encircled by a socialist dictatorship" (Goltz 2017: 91). It wasn't only Adorno (1969: 131) who thought that the left student movement can ignite the fascist potential in Germany without giving it a second thought. Rather, the view that SDS failed to notice totalitarian similarities between fascism and communism was shared by RCDS as well: "Instead of recognizing the parallels between Nazism and Communism, which were so clearly apparent to him [Wohlrabe], they were focused on political repression in far-flung places and no longer cared about the fate of Germans to the east of the Iron Curtain" (Goltz 2017: 96).

Instead of Conclusion: weitermachen!

What was first intended to be an "unlimited discussion" ended without an epilogue. Marcuse and Adorno never got a chance to discuss their differences in person. Adorno died on the same day that he sent his last letter to Marcuse.

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37   There was a real sense of fascism returning to the streets of Germany: "Thousands of left-wing activists from across the globe came together to voice their opposition to the war in Vietnam, which had reached its bloody zenith with the beginning of the Tet Offensive the previous month. At a protest march following the event, thousands of young activists marched through the city's streets to animated shouts of "Ho- Ho-Ho Chi Minh"—a new and provocative display of direct action that many ordinary West Berliners perceived as menacing and reminiscent of the 1930s" (Goltz 2017: 106).

38   Goltz argues: "Christian Democratic activists are portrayed in most histories of the student movement as marginal—and often simplistic—characters that enter the scene sporadically to express their 'reactionary' views" (ibid: 90). This may also be the case with media coverage. According to Goltz student movement from the right was underestimated. In 1967 SDS had 2500 members and RCDS only 200 members less (ibid: 91). Perhaps Adorno knew better (from his experience) not to underestimate them.

Davis (2005) said that the important lesson she got from Marcuse is that being an activist and a scholar doesn't necessarily preclude each other. In its most exceptional and radical form activism meant, for Marcuse, being at the barricades and allowing theory to be further pushed by *praxis*. Adorno thought that theorizing in the ivory tower is also a form of activity. However, this would be a crude oversimplification. Accusations raised against Adorno have no merit. Adorno didn't separate theory and *praxis* and thus detached himself from Horkheimer's conception of the critical theory. Adorno perceived that *praxis* was currently blocked and that theory needs to be recalibrated and adjusted to fit more precisely to the context in Germany.[39] Furthermore Adorno feared that the student movement could end in its opposite or that it can provoke more violence. Marcuse, however, remained dedicated to the radical *praxis* of liberation. However, he was unaware of the countermovement in Germany which had different views on *praxis* than their left counterpart. The whole Marcuse/Adorno debate over the separation of theory and *praxis* is defined by contextual abstraction. If Marcuse had managed to come to Germany as planned and to be engaged in the context, he might have changed his mind and perhaps resumed working on revisiting the critical theory alongside Adorno and Horkheimer.

Since the definite closure on the Adorno/Marcuse debate is missing, one can only "carry on". Today one continues to witness the re-emergence of radical social movements that refuse that which negates "us". Hence, Marcuse's thought and his activist version of critical theory seems to be relevant to the renewal of a radical *praxis* and "great refusal". The *praxis* of resistance carried by the "great refusal" is directed against the system of a total domination that negates the human being. However, in the context of the *praxis* of (blindly) refusing everything,[40] it would be worthwhile to remember Adorno's suggestion that the world must first be (re)interpreted before it can be refused and negated in *praxis*. Theory can reflect on itself while *praxis* lacks this capability and it can often be driven by instincts rather than by reason. This is perhaps the most important lesson from Adorno. Otherwise there is a danger of falling into a blind and unmediated actionism that, instead of refusing pseudo reality, contributes more to the preservation of the established "reality principle". It is in the tradition and legacy of Adorno and Marcuse that contemporary radical *praxis* and critical theory should "weitermachen!" until such a thing as a "society of aesthetic ethos" becomes a new "reality principle".

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39   It should be pointed out that although Adorno's letters to Marcuse might display a particular dose of sensitivity for "the German context", Adorno's later works do not attach importance to particular nation-state context – they deal with capitalism as a global and "totalizing" phenomenon. One can argue that Adorno seems to operate on two different levels of abstraction: a higher one in his works and a lower one evident in the correspondence.

    Even in his letters to Marcuse, Adorno's perspective is significantly shaped by his later works that, broadly speaking, could be understood as elaboration of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.

40   That would be undialectical.

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Maroje Višić

Kula od slonovače i barikade: Markuze i Adorno o razdvajanju teorije od prakse

Apstrakt

Događaji iz 1968/69. su inicirali raspravu između Adorna i Markuzea oko (navodnog) odvajanja teorije od prakse. Dok je Markuze „stajao na barikadama" Adorno je težio da se osami u „kuli od slonovače". Markuze i nemački studenti su Adornov potez videli kao odstupanje od osnovnih postulata kritičke teorije kako ih je Horkhajmer postavio 1937. godine u svom eseju. Adorno je preminuo tokom procesa razjašnjavanja svojih neslaganja sa Markuzeom, te je „neprestana diskusija" između njih ostala nedovršena. Ovaj rad teži da ispita kako su Markuze i Adorno ostali posvećeni jedinstvu teorije i prakse ali na drugačiji način. Tvrdiću da Adorno nije odvajao teoriju od prakse. Umesto toga on je video jaz između kritičke teorije i konkretne istorijske situacije. Adorno je odbacivao jednostavno i nerefleksivno prevođenje teorije u praksu. Dakle, Adorno je pokušao da rekalibrira kritičku teoriju. Razlike između Markuzea i Adorna leže u njihovim različitim procenjivanjima studentskog pokreta, a to (pogrešno) procenjivanje je vezano za kontekst. Moj drugi argument će biti da je rasprava između Markuzea i Adorna delimično uslovljena njihovim odsustvom iz konkretnog istorijskog konteksta.

Ključne reči: Markuze, Adorno, Horkhajmer, prepiska, kritička teorija, praksa, akcionizam, 1968, 1969, studentski pokret, Frankfurtska škola

Miloš Ćipranić

THE WORK OF ART AS *FICTIO PERSONAE*

ABSTRACT
The article investigates how and why we treat works of art as persons. From rhetoric to jurisprudence, various disciplines have dealt with the practice of attributing human features and abilities to insensate objects. The agency of works of art acting as fictitious persons is not only recognized at the level of aesthetic experience, but also outside it, because there have been cases in which they were subject to legal liability. Personhood is not reducible to individual human beings. However, since works of art lack senses and consciousness, there is ultimately a limit to the personifying metaphor.

Although the term "persona" is believed to have originated in the world of art, its meaning has transcended the narrow sense of play and mimesis. By becoming part of the legal vocabulary, it marked an individual who is not a thing, and continued to carry within itself the aspect of covering whoever is behind that designation or role. Today, persons are human beings, but also legal subjects, which means that the word does not have to correspond to a human or even a living being. It is enough for it to personify certain objects due to features recognized in them.

There seems to be no one who has not felt, standing before a work of art, as if they were in the presence of a person, in at least one of the possible meanings of this claim. In a museum, cinema and similar private and public spaces, meeting people who only exist there fictitiously can further intensify the experience and real emotions resulting from the inextricability of the effect that works of art produce and from our attitude towards them. Sometimes they make us happy and content, completely fulfilled, giving us a feeling of something that verges on intimacy, like good companion conversation. Finally, after a museum visit or watching a movie, it is not an unusual sight to find passers-by addressing pets while walking around the city. As soon as the effort to establish verbal communication exceeds the level of the obedience command, which happens often, a strong affection for the animals we live with becomes apparent. In both cases, one participant is not a human being but the difference between them is far from insignificant and negligible.

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To begin with, paintings, novels, sculptures, buildings have no senses, and thus do not react to stimuli that come from the world around them or the changing circumstances in which they find themselves. However, artistic creations definitely share intentions with us and are able to act in a very subtle way. Given their particular limitations, the following observation by Maurizio Ferraris from the book *La Fidanzata Automatica* will be a starting point for investigating the genealogy of the idea which it presents:

> Like the Automatic Girlfriend, works of art are things that pretend to be persons, but only pretend. (Ferraris 2007: 200–201)

The suitability and effectiveness of this metaphor are supported by the fact that in Italian the word "work" is a feminine noun (*opera*). This, of course, is not the case with all languages, but it is with those that originate from Latin. If we move from a strictly linguistic level to the domain of sexual differentiation, it is possible to imagine a work of art not only as a girlfriend or fiancée but also as a boyfriend, depending on the subject taking pleasure. The question remains as to why the masculine and feminine gender are assigned to entities that are not living beings or to things that do not have the biological characteristics of "natural" persons.

There is a thesis about the archaic nature of the tendency of human beings to project their qualities outwards in order to take over the encountered phenomena, things or their surroundings. The ultimate goal of such attempts would be to establish oneself as the ruler of the world and all of life, someone who could subdue the universe. In the *New Science*, Vico formulates an axiom on the basis of which he notices that man "makes things out of himself and becomes them by transforming himself into them" (§ 405) (Vico 1948: 117). Those objects that are part of his everyday life are perceived and understood according to his own image. There is a spontaneous humanization of what is not in itself human. In that sense, Freud's remarks in *Totem and Taboo* on the attribution and extension of life and soul to inanimate entities, as well as the efforts "to obtain mastery over men, beasts and things", which once strongly characterized the psychic life of "primitive" peoples, are also instructive (Freud 1958b: 77–78). Everything, including impersonal forces, must be systematically subordinated to human will. Such a position was interpreted as a consequence of the narcissistic attitude. Reflecting on the development of humanity or one person, both Vico and Freud include at least three successive stages, the first of which is related to the attitudes and acts in question.

The intention to make the still largely unknown world more familiar and to subjugate it takes place through giving life to insensate objects.[1] What lies

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1   Vico observed an inclination that occurs spontaneously at an early stage of an individual's development, namely, "it is characteristic of children to take inanimate things in their hands and talk to them in play as if they were living persons" (§ 186) (Vico 1948: 64). According to the proposed axiomatic point, the childhood of an individual and the childhood of humanity, revealed in poetry, actually coincide. Is the continuation of

at the bottom of this kind of projection? Ignorance, narcissism or perhaps something else? Two inventions made an initial contribution to enabling such attempts – animism, as a system of thought, and metaphor, as a linguistic device. The animistic way of thinking implies the existence of spirits that inhabit all things, as well as the principle of analogous transposition of the soul into living and non-living entities. A number of remnants and traces of that conception of the world have remained to this day, "either in the debased form of superstition or as the living basis of our speech, our beliefs and our philosophies" (Freud 1958b: 77). The psychoanalyst notes that the main manifestation of animism, associated with the accomplishment of wishes and infantile in nature, is still evident in the arts.

On the other hand, the use of metaphors is a feature sought in the primeval poetic impulses of civilized communities. One type of this trope is especially emphasized: "in all languages the greater part of the expressions relating to inanimate things are formed by metaphor from the human body and its parts and from the human senses and passions" (§ 405) (Vico 1948: 116). The same paragraph further lists some words used in a figurative sense, such as "mouth" for openings, "lip" for the rim of vases or "handful" to denote a small number or quantity of something, or the wind "whistling". Such a list could go on almost indefinitely. Regardless of whether it is an animistic or metaphorical gesture, the ability to make images – real or verbal – is what enables their emergence.

Appropriation of objects through linguistic acts, which at the level of perception carries the risk of their deformation, does not always have the same degree of justification. If we focus our attention on physical objects, there is a difference between those classified as natural and artificial. While the human race has no role in the creation of the former, but finds them given, the latter are still its product.[2] Artists are even ready to look upon their works as their "children". Based on this causal relationship, artistic creations are somehow "more natural" and closer to us than mountains, rivers, etc. From this point of view, the anthropomorphizing of product of human hands and mind seems justifiable. The facade of a building, for example, is seen as its face, as evidenced

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using what is subsequently designated as a poetico-rhetorical figure in adults a trace and a distant echo of their early behavior and intense experience of reality? It is certainly true that both old and young treat insensate objects around them *come si fussero... persone vive*. And that they often do it out of pleasure or fascination.

2   There are, of course, natural objects of large dimensions, which humankind, having encountered them, sought to conquer and "civilize" – mountains that are extremely high, seas that occupy large areas. Humans have not, therefore, been choosing and determining their size, which is not the case with their creations. It has been rightly noted that a novel of hundreds of thousands of pages, a sculpture several tens of kilometers high, or a musical composition that lasts longer than the average age of an individual would be completely meaningless from a human standpoint (Ferraris 2007: 43–50). It is possible to make a house whose front door would be ten centimeters wide, each stair leading to the first floor five meters high. The argument from hyperbole indicates that human measure is normally required of such works. Their size, length or duration adapts to whoever makes, uses and enjoys them.

by the word's etymology. It follows that buildings look like people and they are perceived in that way. However, one should be cautious regarding the imposition of oneself on non-human entities: even if such an act occurs spontaneously, it does not mean that it is neutral in nature.

Personification is closely tied to the metaphorical utterance. The reason for their relatedness can be found already in Aristotle's *Art of Rhetoric*. A metaphor is when one "speaks of inanimate things as if they were animate" (*Rhet.* 1411b) (Aristotle 1926: 407). Through such a tropological act, any lifeless object gets what it does not have and becomes ἔμψυχος. The examples given are arrows and spears, which are breathed life into through poetic images as if they were things that fly and feel like birds and people.

Roman rhetoricians take this definition of metaphor in their manuals, but rather than use the Greek, employ the word *translatio*. Both technical terms basically contain the idea of transfer – a word that signifies one object or action is taken over and applied to another according to a certain similarity observed by the one who connects them. The Latin corpus also notes that this trope is used on *pro animali inanima* principle. In the *Institutio oratoria*, the power of this technique manifests "when we give action and soul to insensate things (*rebus sensu carentibus*)" (Quint. VIII, 6, 11). Of course, transfer is not limited exclusively to establishing the relationship between an object that does not have a soul or life and one that does, but this combination is decisive in the constitution of the idea of works of art as persons and therefore we place it here in the foreground.

Vico's *Art of Rhetoric*, written many centuries later, testifies to how long such a formula has lasted in the European tradition, gaining canonical status. The huge temporal distance did not prevent the adoption, preservation and continuation of the basic rhetorical definitions, thus ensuring and confirming duration and stability. Now, the focus is not on Vico's originality but on the claims that were recorded and further transferred by his work. In the immediate wake of the classical heritage, this rhetorical treatise emphasizes the special value of metaphors "which give to inanimate things animation and movement" (§ 40) (Vico 1996: 139). Then, the very same section points out that it is metaphors based on verbs or adjectives and not nouns that achieve a special effect. There is a reason for such a claim and in order to grasp it more comprehensively, it is necessary for us to return once again to the origins of rhetoric as a discipline.

According to Aristotle, a particularly strong impression and memorability is the result of a metaphor that signifies a certain *act*. In other words, one that does not express a similarity through static images. This opinion is illustrated by a series of verses dominated by participles, which refer in a figurative way to the qualities of living beings. The power of metaphors by which the *acti* are expressed is pointed out in the Latin register as well. Vico's observation, formulated more on the level of linguistic terminology, is complementary to that of the ancient writings because, by the nature of things, verbs are the most suitable modality for showing the actualization of potency and action.

When discussing the use of this trope, Aristotle gives an example that refers to a process of trial in Athens. As the accused is a person to whom a statue was previously erected in the city as a public expression of gratitude, his advocate wisely refers to that monument. The publicly displayed figure was given the role of a defense witness who points to the defendant's virtues. With regard to the posture of the unpreserved bronze figure of the accused – according to one source, with his knee resting on the ground – it is said that he was expressing an appeal to judges. The statue "pleads" for the one it represents (*Rhet*. 1411b). Is a statue actually able to do that? No, since a non-living object has no soul. Moreover, the choice of how the body of the distinguished citizen will be represented has nothing to do with the act of a plea, even if it, by all accounts, recalls it.

Simply put, the potential of the kneeling figure was used by erasing the basic meaning of his posture, with which the Athenians must have been familiar. It is the lawyer who makes an inventive turn, aiming to stir the emotions of the listeners, effective only in this one specific occasion, which as such must be spatio-temporally limited. Instead of representing a defensive act on the battlefield, an image of a call for the release of the accused military leader is made by another person. The lawyer or the statue? *Someone's* plea belongs to the court scene until a final verdict is reached. The statue was erected because of what the military leader had achieved and, in doing so, the city thanked him during his life. It can be said that this monument "testifies" to his accomplishments, which would be a yet another personification introduced in the already started chain of sequences and multiplications.

Aristotle's illustration from the *Rhetoric* undoubtedly affirms the idea of the art work as a person. However, it should be added that the cited example of the trope from judicial oratory here primarily refers to a mimetic representation of a man, who, as such, in fact has the ability to speak and make codified gestures, and not so much on the strategy of attribution to a physical object of an act that distinguishes human beings. Indeed, the free-standing statue, apart from the pedestal or accompanying accessories such as a shield in this case, corresponds in a strong sense to a human figure, which is a coincidence that enhances the strength of the analogy that is the subject of this exposition.

The desire for things to speak like persons need not only be realized metaphorically. The attribute of "speech" was attached to non-living figures directly by the words written next to them. Such practice appeared in the relatively early stages of the development of Greek sculpture, at the origins of European art and culture. The literal attachment of sentences to physical objects is evident on funerary monuments. Graves with artistic representations were made either in the form of a statue or a plate containing a relief. Many were discovered in Athens, especially in the area of the ancient Kerameikos cemetery. Inscriptions follow and complement the figures they stand next to, as if speaking, even though their words are actually the work of someone else.

Not all funerary objects were conceived and made in that way but some significant examples were. Within this group, epitaphs above or below the persons represented include phrases such as "I am the grave of...", "my name

is…”, “here I rest…” (Peek 1960). Sometimes such sentences of epigrammatic character only have an informative function and do not require the presence of another person in a strong sense, while there are those that involve an act of addressing. Even dialogue, complete with questions, can be found.

Athenian stelae with the representations of Ampharete and Nikarete, created around Aristotle’s time, are very impressive and famous. The inscriptions, formulated in the first person singular, accompany both female figures made of marble. These epitaphs are structured on the basis of the antithesis between life and death. The abrupt transition from one world to another is accentuated by the sharpness of the contrast that at the same time separates and connects the beginnings and ends of the verses. However, the statue of Phrasikleia, excavated in the region of Attica and today kept at the National Archaeological Museum in Athens, stands out due to its good condition and age. The special strength in her posture comes from the right hand that grasp the dress. What exactly does this visually marginal but striking gesture express? In addition to explicitly “informing” us about her name and the artist who carved it, the figure, revealing herself, says the following:

> I will always be called maiden,
> because instead of marriage
> the gods gave me this name. (ibid: 61)

In the preceding paragraph, I intentionally did not put the verb “say” in quotation marks, because the piece includes a synthesis of the art of language and space, in addition to the physical connection of the three-dimensional human form and the base with the funerary inscription. In this type of epigram, we can often encounter the phrase “mute stone” (κωφή πέτρη), whose silence the accompanying words tend to overcome. In this way, we get the impression of a person who does not address the observers but the listeners.

For at least two reasons, Ferraris cites a famous sentence that Michelangelo allegedly uttered in front of another statue: “Why do you not speak?” The imagined scene ends with a furious strike on Moses’ knee, as he did not respond to his question. Putting these words in the mouth of the Renaissance artist probably indicates the preoccupation of men of letters with the problem of the relationship between art and nature, reality and fiction. In any case, it is the work of art that is in the foreground and not the one who made it, because it generally seems that it is the former that “wants to say something”, “and not the author” (Ferraris 2007: 58). Artists can always act as advocates for their work but their products are autonomous objects. Moreover, in comparison with the obsession of forcing something that is not alive to speak, connecting the verb *parlare* to such entities only makes sense if it is done figuratively or if words are written next to them. The very question posed by Michelangelo implies that the marble refuses to do so. Whether it was his or someone else’s question does not really matter for the argument.

We will stay for a moment with this statue. One analysis demonstrates the phenomenon and limits of the “behavior” of an art work. In this case, the

statue entirely corresponds to a human figure, more precisely, a certain person. Freud's "The Moses of Michelangelo" is worth returning to for several reasons. The author of the study, fascinated by the mystery of the statue from a Roman church, seeks to provide a meticulous description of it and discover the intention of the artist who carved it. The text does not hide reservations about the thesis proposed, and it indicates cyclically, in waves, that it does not have absolute certainty, although it is defended all the time.

A large part of the essay is dedicated to a review of previous interpretations of Michelangelo's Moses. They are often opposed to each other, which is not only the result of incorrect observations, understandings or descriptions, but also a consequence of the fact that it is a work of non-discursive nature. The sovereign figure in a sitting position welcomes every word with equal indifference, in silence that does not settle his gestural ambivalence. And I am aware that I am here adding another metaphorical utterance.

In that sense, art works have been viewed as agents from the very beginning of Freud's text. Literary works, paintings, musical compositions and the like are treated as entities capable of affecting those who read, look, or listen to them: "Nevertheless, works of art do exercise a powerful effect on me, especially those of literature and sculpture, less often of painting" (Freud 1958a: 211). However, in the field of the spatial arts, the work whose name is in the title of the text takes special place: "For no piece of statuary has ever made a stronger impression on me than this" (ibid: 213). From that aesthetic judgement, colored with admiration, arises, therefore, the interest in deciphering it. What do the facial expressions of the prophet and the gestures of his body refer to? What does he "say"? Yes, the very verb is used: "There have even been some for whom the Moses of Michelangelo had nothing at all to say, and who are honest enough to admit it" (ibid: 215). If this statue does not express anything significant, then such an opinion represents an end point; on the opposite side of which is the position that carries the risk of overreading or excess, the surplus added by interpreters. What is important in the context of this analysis is precisely the choice of that word.

Particularly striking and instructive are the sections describing the scenes of the direct encounter between Freud and the statue that would become the subject of his study. The visitor of the church has the impression that Moses is really looking at him from one of the aisles, that he feels his gaze full of rebuke, as if he were an idolater. Elsewhere, the impression gained after facing Michelangelo's work is shared with the reader. Two people sitting opposite each other:

> And, indeed, I can recollect my own disillusionment when, during my first visits to San Pietro in Vincoli, I used to sit down in front of the statue in the expectation that I should now see how it would start up on its raised foot, dash the Tables of the Law to the ground and let fly its wrath. Nothing of the kind happened. Instead, the stone image became more and more transfixed, an almost oppressively solemn calm emanated from it, and I was obliged to realize that something was represented here that could stay without change; that this Moses would remain sitting like this in his wrath for ever. (ibid: 220–221)

Relying on the psychoanalytic method, Freud focuses on details which may seem irrelevant in order to arrive at the overall meaning of what is viewed as one scene from the life of Moses. Here too, he emphasizes – seemingly without rhetoric – the dilemma of whether the applied method is correct, that is, whether attention is paid to something that could be trivial. Looking at the elements, such as the tablets and the right hand of the prophet, specifically the index finger, he finally reaches a conclusion about Michelangelo's goal – to portray the moment of suppression of anger and rejection of the violent action that should follow. It is truly a "moment" from the life of Moses because, by its nature, a sculpture can only present a single moment. This does not prevent Freud from recalling the events preceding it, the movements that lead to the one that still lasts.

It is pure coincidence that this statue, like the one representing Phrasikleia, is intended for a tomb. Although both funerary figures are made of cold marble, it has not prevented their introduction into a world governed by words – as if they were alive. In the case of the Greek decedent, it is certainly more visible and material than in the scenes with the Jewish prophet but this nuance does not violate the basic intention. One could think that a piece of carved stone acquires personhood through speech or at least its imitation.

As mentioned before, Aristotle's treatise contains the postulate for the constitution and shaping of personification as a figure. More precisely, it can be found in his consideration of metaphor, which contains the potential for extracting or generating the separate poetico-rhetorical device, as dependent on the former as it is different from it. According to the corpus of ancient rhetorical and pedagogical writings, what is called προσωποποιία in ancient Greek applies to human beings as well as things. This trope attributes *orationes fictae* to both. In other words, a person or non-personal object starts to talk, when they are in fact not talking.

In the first case, the speaker lends his body and voice to another person who thus speaks through him. Gender or age does not matter – a man can identify himself with a woman, an old man or a child. Both real and fictional people talk through this kind of transference. The absent becomes present, even the radically absent one – in the case of the dead, who appear or return through an idolopoetic act. This type of prosopopoeia is recommended for court proceedings and is used in forensic oratory, because it enables one to make an emotional impact on one's audience, to be persuasive. In resolving a legal case in court, the lawyer turns into his client through his discourse. In the second case, personification in the strong sense, speech is given to *res muta*, an entity incapable of speaking, but which thus acquires this ability. There is a well-known and repeated example that through the mouth of a speaker, for example, the country is given voice, as a subject who can expresses itself. The city is not excluded either. In the *Etymologies, or Origins*, an attempt at a synthesis of classical heritage, the following exemplary definition of personification is found: "Prosopopoeia occurs when personality and speech are invented for inanimate things" (*Etym*. II, 13, 1) (Isidore of Seville 2006: 74). Therefore,

unlike metaphorical expression, it is not enough to figuratively vitalize things, phenomena or ideas, but they should also be given a certain human quality.

Within the world of social reality, different kinds of objects are therefore spontaneously given human characteristics and this tendency in rhetoric has a name and definition. However, this practice is not just present in everyday speech and literature, deriving from the originality of an individual or simple reproduction of existing phrases. Treating non-human objects as persons is also an institutionalized phenomenon. Evidence of this can be found in the legal discourse and laws that are currently in force.

According to philosophy of law, a person does not necessarily correspond to human individuals. However, even when we ascribe personhood to one thing – for example, a temple – it cannot be done without their presence and involvement (Gonella 1959: 201–202). Certain entities do not literally have to have a head, eyes, hands, consciousness; it is enough for them to be declared subject of rights and obligations in order to have personhood. The fact that historically not all individuals automatically had this status further proves that human and person are not synonymous in this domain. As we know, systems in which certain people were not holders of legal personhood are found in ancient societies. In the *Institutes* of Gaius, slaves were included in the *ius personarum* (*Inst.* I, 9), although they were not persons in the legal sense of the word, but rather *res corporales*, someone's property (II, 13). The same text informs us about the second century constitution that restrained masters from treating their slaves extremely inhumanely. In these cases, the slaves escaped to temples and sought protection from statues of Emperors, as if beseeching the rulers themselves for help, and not their images (I, 53). Certainly, persons have also been viewed as things, and not just the other way around.

At the level of regulating the forms of social interactions, Roman law offers an indication of what will be developed later, namely, the attribution of personhood to something that is not in itself a human being. A decisive contribution to the consideration of this problem are the opinions of the medieval jurist Sinibaldo Fieschi, which he formulated as Pope under the name Innocent IV. There is a comment related to the tractate *Apparatus* according to which it is possible to imagine a corporation as a person (*fingatur una persona*) (*Appar.* II, 20, 57). At the same time, remaining in the domain of the ecclesial, Fieschi claimed that this type of organization is not subject to certain sanctions, because it does not possess the main characteristics and abilities of individuals, and it is only a *nomen iuris* (V, 39, 52). At the same time, such reasoning has provided material for their treatment as fictitious persons. The application of this formula has gone beyond the scope and subject of canon law. The fact is that corporations have long been recognized as entities that have will, intentions, interests, ability to engage and act, even if, at the same time, they have been viewed as legal fiction.

Unlike humans, corporations and works of art as fictitious persons do not have a limited lifespan or duration. To speak of their "life" is to speak metaphorically of their own histories, which can be extremely long. By their structure,

they have the potential to transcend the finitude of the participants in their creation or maintenance. Just as corporations are able to survive through the centuries, there are works of art thousands of years old, which have therefore far outlived their authors. The transgenerational functioning of corporations provides a smooth and necessary replacement – the arrival or departure – of the individuals involved in their functioning. In the case of art, proportional to the temporal remoteness of the epoch they belong to, the names of those who made them are less known, to the point of their complete oblivion.

One issue in particular regarding their similarity is subject to discussion, namely, the status and limits of their responsibility. If we start from the premise that they are capable of doing something wrong, then the question arises as to who is ultimately responsible for the consequences of their actions? Personification both reveals and hides the real culprit. If a corporation commits a crime, who bears the burden of liability – the organization or its legal representative? A similar circumstance is found in the world of art. If an artistic creation violates the moral rules of a given society or insults the feelings of a certain group, either the work or its author and patron will suffer sanctions. Does the intention lie with the work of art or one who made it?[3] Through a metonymic transfer, it is possible to direct guilt in one of two directions, towards both social actors – the fictitious and natural person. From there, various dilemmas and answers arise. In any case, the corporation within which the illegal act was committed and the institution within which the work is exhibited, such as a museum or gallery, will also suffer damage.

The terms *fictio personae* from rhetoric and *persona ficta* from law are linguistically very close. However, this is not the end of the attempt to establish a relationship between these two, for it is not of a purely external character. These terms actually refer to the same figure applied in two different disciplines, between which there is strong affinity. The thesis according to which this legal term is taken directly from the rhetorical register should not be ruled out in advance as unconvincing. Further, the way of looking at things called "personification" is not a theoretical invention. It is a matter of a natural or at least a very old and nurtured human inclination.[4] Works of art and corporate bodies are non-humans, but the mentioned impulse to count them as such because human qualities are noticed in them, and the fact that they cannot exist

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3   Michelangelo's mural "The Last Judgement" is one example of the target of such attacks. On the eve of the Council of Trent, the monumental fresco from the Sistine Chapel was criticized for its abundance of nudity, and during the Counter-Reformation obscene parts were covered by painted draperies. The Catholic Church could accuse the Popes who initiated and supported the project or even itself, which would be absurd, but this institution certainly shares with the artist the responsibility for the creation of the composition. Yet, the work remained the primary object of condemnation.

4   Phrases that come from rhetoric, law, and aesthetics and belong to different historical epochs, such as *inanimalium et persona et sermo fingitur*, *collegium in causa universitatis fingatur una persona*, *personam facimus e non persona*, *le opere sono cose che fingono di essere persone*, contain the same operation or formula, because it is a matter of the capacity of the human mind and not the exclusive property of any single discipline.

outside society as we create these objects for our own enjoyment or benefit, are reasons in favor of perceiving and treating them as humans.

Over a long period of time and within multiple civilizational frameworks, history has provided many cases in which insensate objects have been legally recognized as persons. In this regard, in his book *Friends of Interpretable Objects*, Miguel Tamen reflects on cases that have emerged from a very tenacious tradition that manifests itself through hostility, destruction and punishment of works of art. The crucial criterion is the way society experiences artifacts, not some intrinsic characteristic. Relationality is the condition by which their features are constituted.

> The fact remains that objects endowed with intentions (but not with a soul), and, presumably, with language (as they were considered to be in a certain sense nonmute), used to be sued, tried, convicted (but probably not acquitted), exiled, executed, and rehabilitated. (Tamen 2001: 79)

If we focus on sculpture, the book tells of a second century statue in Thassos of an athlete convicted for falling on his rival and thrown into the sea as punishment. According to an autobiography from the beginning of the Renaissance, another statue was "lacerated" in mid-fourteenth century Siena and buried outside its territory as a result of the belief, presented at a meeting of the city council, that it brought misfortune in war. In both cases, the punishment was the maximum physical distance of the dangerous objects from the communities of which they were part, that is, the depth of water or earth. Those were places where they could no longer be seen and from which they would not be able to do any harm. Therefore, not only was it normal to look at a statue as if it really had flesh and skin, but the institution of idolatry or a remnant of animism led to the belief that it could do something beyond giving an aesthetic experience. A piece of bronze was capable of committing murder, but we can also see, inter alia, that they were indeed considered to be quasi-persons on the basis of law and not merely in the consciousness of individuals.

Who, then, and – even more polemically – *what* can have the status of a person? Obviously, works of art as well, which, along with corporations, show that the reduction of legal subjectivity to human beings is not always valid, although such definitions of tangible or intangible entities still carry the echo of anthropomorphism. Here the classical distinction between *res* and *personae*, established at least since Gaius, is again problematized and relativized, although from a different perspective. While the slave is seen as a thing, identification now takes place in the opposite direction. A statue is capable of committing a crime, something that ordinarily characterizes only human behavior. In both cases, legal reality is no different from fiction, but as such it remains in force and governs intersubjective relations within a particular society.

Artifacts do not only have to be subject to criminal liability, but are also rights holders. Can a soulless object suffer? Outside of Europe, such a practice has been documented in relation to what conditionally corresponds to a "work

of art". An example would be a well-known case in Calcutta from the first decades of the twentieth century (Duff 1927). Namely, the issue was whether one family idol could be transferred from one place to another. In accordance with Indian customs, the sculptural image had legal personality, meaning that its interests, and even its will, had to be respected. Of course, a judge "would have been surprised if the idol had moved a hand or nodded its head to express its will; and would have put down to indigestion any dream in which this *persona* appeared to him and explained what it wanted done" (ibid: 44). Putting aside such an impossible scenario, the High Court chose a *prochain ami* of this house idol, who would speak and act on its behalf. It is clear from the opinion of the Council that the position of such an object of worship oscillates between being the master to be served and a child to be cared for.

That the question of the parallelism which is the subject of this text is not only a matter that falls within the domain of the practico-normative and law, but also within reflections that tend more towards theoretical philosophy, can be seen from the article by Virgil Aldrich entitled "Pictures and Persons: An Analogy". The two share at least one similarity: at the ontological level, they significantly surpass the corporeality or thingness of their, let us say, "vehicles". Both are something more than physical objects that can be dealt with at a glance.

"Picture" is a word that can have two meanings, and the choice between one of them is contextually conditioned. The question "Did you see the picture?" refers either to the physical thing or to what it represents. When we think of its content, then it is a configuration that transcends the material traces left by the artist on a certain surface, just as we do not see the letters as we read sentences, but the meaning obtained by their sequence. And vice versa – letters and words come to the fore when we do not understand the language in which they are written. In an analogous way, when an unknown man or woman is seen, it is natural to notice at first glance his or her appearance, distinguishing characteristics of their bodies, or the clothing they are wearing, but that first and superficial impression is not yet sufficient to understand their personalities. It is necessary to look deeper into someone's eyes, words or gestures in order to have a fuller understanding of who they are. The difference between "look at" and "look into" turns out to be crucial:

> You are *then* in one another's presence, in the strictest sense. Then you see and share her "inner life". That is, you see how she feels, her intentions; and her speaking bodies forth and details all this, including what she is thinking. Thus does her body come alive with her soul, as the picture comes alive for you when you see what is *in* it, or what it expressively portrays. (Aldrich 1975: 600)

One thought experiment shows two meanings of the term "picture", that is, the distinction between the perceptual and aesthetic experience. In order to perform it, we need to introduce an animal into the scene. A dog, beaver, cat, ox, both domestic and wild animals, are able to perceive a painting only as a physical object; they do not see it as a piece of art, and its artistic nature

goes unnoticed. This also supports the claim made by Ferraris, that the work of art is a social object and therefore exists only in the human world, and by no means outside it, where it is degraded to a mere thing among others.

Aldrich's descriptions and analysis are illustrated by a perhaps imaginary painting. It is a portrait of a man sitting on a stone, with his head bowed and staring at his folded hands.[5] The philosopher's choice of illustration implies an analogy between a person and the content of the painting, and not the work of art as such. So, the last step in this phenomenologically intoned metaphysics, which would lead to their further connection, is missing.

This article does not miss the opportunity to make a distinction between paintings and persons. In the everyday sense of the words, the former is artificial, while the latter is natural. The relationship between painted pictures and what is represented in them is arbitrary. It should be added that if a photograph were chosen instead of an oil painting, it would raise the question of stability of the thesis. Any given object could be artistically treated in an almost infinite number of ways. No solution would be better than any other. This observation, of course, does not correspond only to the art of painting. However, human individuals are inseparable from the bodies through which they express and manifest themselves. The embodied soul is always someone's, mine is not yours. At the same time, the portrayed figure is not able to move the painting to whose space it belongs, since for this to happen it would require some kind of external causality, whereas the human person, as long as he or she is alive, does not need it. Phrasikleia did not walk into the museum or make a decision that her statue should be placed there. Moses will not rise angrily, as Freud expected or imagined.

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5   Mimetic representations in the arts, as has been said, support, but also deform, the view of works as persons. If a human or some other figure occupies the largest or most important space of the composition, then such centrality of the subject functions at the expense of everything else. The identification of the main character with the whole work happens easily with biographical novels or autobiographies. When some part is taken instead of the whole, it is a metonymical approach. This trope also allows for a different naming strategy – moving from the efficient cause to what is produced. When I say: "I saw Michelangelo in San Pietro in Vincoli.", it, of course, does not mean that he met me *en personne* or that I saw his spirit floating in the Roman church. That works of art are a paradigm of the metonymical reduction is explicitly stated in Vico: "Again, the name of the thing signified is given to the signifier, as a statue or picture is named for the person which it represents" (§41) (Vico 1996: 141). Portrait is a genre in which the substitution is evident, in that the title of the work corresponds to the *nomen* of the person portrayed.

The analysis of the polysemic phrase "my picture" is particularly instructive for demonstrating the distinction between a work of art and a person related to it. In itself it can have three meanings: I possess the picture, I am portrayed in it, or both (Aldrich 1975: 601). A picture that is "mine" is the one that I bought, received as a gift, or inherited, and in that sense, it should be understood as something I own on the basis of relevant papers. In the second sense, I am only represented in it. Hypothetically, after making the portrait, the painter or photographer decides not to give it to me, as he has the right to keep it for himself. If we return to the animistic conception of the world, it can be said that the picture possesses me, not the other way around.

Why such things do not happen can suitably be explained in the following manner. In his treatise *On the Soul*, Aristotle describes the internal relationship between a living being and the soul through an analogy with the eye and the power of seeing. Essential to the eye is that it is an organ of sensory perception. If it were hypothetically considered as a separate living being, then this power would be its "soul". Without this source of life, it would be reduced to a pupil or a mere body that cannot move by itself and perform its function – "if seeing were absent, there would be no eye, except in an equivocal sense, as for instance a stone or painted eye" (*De An.* 412b) (Aristotle 1935: 71). In other words, being soulless, it would not be able to visually perceive anything or anyone around it and respond to stimuli, because its potentiality would not be realized. That is why we have the impression that a sculpture or painting looks at us with its "dead" eyes, which from an artistic point of view does not mean that they are empty, lifeless and inexpressive. Lines, surfaces and volumes form a configuration through the synthesis of imagination and appear as something that actually does not exist. Painted or carved eyes share only their name and shape with real ones.

Explaining the problem of movement or causation between body and soul, the philosopher illustrates a claim by referring to a comedic play (*De An.* 406b). A piece of fiction mentions a statue of Aphrodite moving, as if she were alive. In a certain way, the soul is breathed into this physical object, and because of that injection it behaves like an *automaton*. The motif of the moving statues was already a part of Greek literary and philosophical discourse. How did this "vivification", or rather "animation" come about? Quicksilver was poured into the wooden figure of the goddess of love. So, the invention is based on the mechanistic principle.

To what extent have dichotomies such as natural and artificial, living and dead, spontaneous and automatic, lost some of their force today is shown in Ferraris' book *Anima e iPad*. Were the emphasis not placed on a metaphor of the epoch we live in, a tablet, the book could easily bear the more elementary title "anima e automa" (Ferraris 2011: 8). In the mechanics of social systems as such, structured on the basis of abstract and impersonal relations, not only does the individual have to have a pre-arranged place for society to continue to function, but on a more immediate level, our daily life is full of repetitive acts and verbal automatisms. We often sound like a broken record, one that is constantly being played from the beginning or from some other point. This common phrase, which, being exactly what it is, is mechanically transmitted and used, carries an analogy from the world of technology and indicates the fact that in such moments, not at all rare or exceptional, we resemble automata or even become them. This is not negative in itself, but rather a necessity of the rhythms of existence.

For a person who likes to go to the theater on a regular basis, practicing that affinity takes place primarily through acts of repetition. If there is a preferred theater, they most often take the same way from home to that place and back. When leaving, they lock the door or say goodbye to someone and,

while travelling to the destination, regularly follow certain rules that transport requires. As usual, they buy the tickets at the box office, in an impersonal exchange with the ticket seller. And all this without any special consideration of each step or move. On the other hand, the actors themselves have had to repeat sentences, movements and gestures that the roles they play require, almost countless times. If it is a premiere, then at least at rehearsals. Answering the question, "How did you like the play?" how many times have we said the most conventional expression, like "Nothing special." or "It really moved me." There is, therefore, no alienation in all these, quite normal, situations. These are just some of the things we do almost every day and in the same way, but when one play or performance makes a special impression on us, that day or event remains in our personal memories.

Our attitude towards works of art really includes some kind of love and a sense of happiness. Paintings, novels, sculptures, poems evoke certain feelings in those to whom they mean something. Such affection leads us to look at them as friends and partners. However, when I say "our relationship", I underscore that such an attitude does not apply to this class of insensate objects' relation towards us. Not only to us as art lovers, but also simply as humans. In other words, it is a question of reciprocity. Do these objects share and respond to what we give them, or do they, asymmetrically, offer no answer.

A person cannot marry themselves, since law does not recognize self-marriage. An intimate relationship, whether or not legally registered, requires two persons. The problem, however, remains as to what the designation of "person" can entail, because, as has been shown, this term does always correspond to individual human beings. The wife of an artist or writer could be jealous of his works to the point that she begins to hate them, because her husband spends most of his time working in the atelier or at the desk. She perceives them as her competition, as if they were real women.

An objection to the claim that works of art love or care for us as unique beings would be that in their automatism or lack of interest they do not distinguish our individualities, while we are able to make a distinction between each work based on formal or other characteristics. So, we react to a piece of art in its uniqueness. It does not have the same effect on all the people who face it, but there is always an individualized interaction. Since works of art are insensate, in dealing with them, we have to count on the phenomenon that can be called "responding-without-receptivity". As such, artistic creations do not know who is addressing them, but they will play their part whenever the opportunity arises.

The beginning of *Friends of Interpretable Objects* and the end of *La Fidanzata Automatica* make pivotal and opposing claims about whether some kind of love relationship is possible between works of art and human beings. One position is more Aristotelian than the other. The introduction to the first book points to the indubitable existence of the "affection for notoriously unresponsive objects, splendidly instanced by many kinds of contemporary societies of friends (from art critics to animal-rights activists)", that is, groups or professions

that make them "in places such as churches speak" (Tamen 2001: 4). The last pages of the second book, however, emphasize that in such friendship, a person "must recognize me", which works of art do not do, and, no matter how much we love books, for example, they end up behaving like "the most monstrously ungrateful friends one can imagine", while we, in turn, often treat them as "slaves" (Ferraris 2007: 200, 201). The scope of these remarks goes beyond the realm of art: what applies to animals and books is also true for artistic creations.

Unlike Aldrich, Tamen and Ferraris seek a point of convergence between works of art and persons in a linguistic act. The starting point of both positions is that such artifacts seem to be able to say something and this feature contributes to the recognition of them as actors, at least in the experience of the individuals. The meaning of the verbs "to say", already noted in Freud's essay, or indeed "to answer", turn out to be decisive in trying to understand the effect that the products we make leave on us. These are not persons who are our interlocutors and their language does not always consist of words. Even when they imitate everyday speech and include phrases that we use in the most common situations, something hidden or unspoken remains incorporated in them that provokes further thinking.

In the case of works of art and insensate objects in general, we still speak of attribution, empsychosis, metaphorical transfer of uniquely human ability. According to one classical remark, since works of art lack senses and consciousness, while still possessing the quality of aestheticity, they are nevertheless characterized by the absence of spontaneity. They always act in a direction set in advance, which does not tolerate any meandering or turning conditioned by opportune moments and the flow of exchange. Although they are deaf, communication with them is not one-way, but they repeatedly provide a response-without-receptivity. They can be very talkative, since certain meanings and intentions are sedimented and inscribed by the hand of the artist, poet, or writer.

In order to determine how good a metaphor is, it is necessary to list the risks that arise in its making and use. According to the rules of rhetoric developed and transmitted from Aristotle to Vico and beyond, the basic defect is imprecision. Simply, a metaphorical expression fails to reach the essence of a thing. In that case, the desired mark is either not reached or is overshot, and a discrepancy between the intention and its fulfillment occurs. The transfer, characterized by a far-fetched analogy, also turns out to be a failure. The desired effect is also not achieved when the reader or listener finds that the trope is random, inappropriate or too general. Although revealing a similarity between two objects or acts is necessary, what is required is lucidity rather than triviality.

Is the claim that works of art are able to "say" something a defective metaphorical utterance? Works of art – this is evident – cannot literally behave like persons. And yet, such a verb is found both in everyday conversations and in theoretical writing. The statues of Phrasikleia and Moses *tell* us about ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy. This, of course, also applies to literature. A novel tells us something about a certain historical epoch, a poem about the state of the author's soul, his experience of the world and the like. Is the power

of metaphors in not being noticed by the reader or listener? The affinity between "saying" and "being about something" is indeed indisputable, and thus overlooked. Ultimately, the difference between them seems to be lost for better or for worse.

Whether works of art are seen as a source of emotion or knowledge, the economics of aesthetic experience show that they give back as much as is invested in them, and perhaps even more. Of course, the exact measure is hard to determine. Their indifference always brings us back to ourselves, which is why we respond in their name. It takes ventriloquism to "hear" them. That does not mean we do not get what we want.

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Umetničko delo kao *fictio personae*

Apstrakt

Članak istražuje kako i zašto tretiramo umetnička dela kao osobe. Od retorike do filozofije prava, različite discipline bavile su se praksom kojom se neživim objektima pridavaju ljudske osobine i sposobnosti. Moć delovanja umetničkih dela kao fiktivnih osoba nije prepoznata samo na nivou estetskog doživljaja, već i izvan njega, jer su zabeleženi slučajevi u kojima su bila podvrgnuta krivičnoj odgovornosti. Ličnost nije svodiva na pojedinačna ljudska bića. Međutim, pošto umetničkim delima nedostaju čula i svest, na kraju krajeva personifikujuća metafora ima granicu.

Ključne reči: fiktivna osoba, umetnost, personifikacija, retorika, pravo, estetika, Migel Tamen, Mauricio Feraris

III

REVIEWS

LUCIEN CALVIÉ, *LA QUESTION YOUGOSLAVE ET L'EUROPE*, ÉDITION DE CYGNE, PARIS, 2018.

Ivica Mladenović

Plus de deux décennies après la destruction de la Yougoslavie socialiste, les questions de son émergence, de ses caractéristiques fondamentales, ainsi que des causes de sa disparition continuent d'attirer une assez grande attention dans l'opinion publique française. Ces dernières années, plusieurs importants livres et articles scientifiques ont été publiés sur le même sujet. Il semble y avoir deux raisons principales à cet intérêt : premièrement, la France est le pays où l'on constate la plus grande mobilisation des intellectuels au moment de la tragédie yougoslave, de sorte que toute analyse portant sur l'engagement intellectuel dans l'histoire récente inclut nécessairement « l'affaire yougoslave » ; deuxièmement, étant donné que dans une partie de l'espace public français la Yougoslavie est considérée comme un précurseur de l'UE, le renforcement actuel des forces centrifuges en Europe soulève inévitablement la question de savoir si l'expérience yougoslave peut nous apprendre quelque chose. Le livre de Lucien Calvié, professeur émérite à l'Université Toulouse-Jean-Jaurès, « La question yougoslave et l'Europe », semble en partie motivé par ces deux raisons.

Le livre est structuré par une introduction, une conclusion et six chapitres systémiques : « De la question allemande à la question yougoslave » ; « La destruction de la Yougoslavie (1991-1992) ; « Le socialisme yougoslave et les socialistes français » ; « L'épuration ethnique » ; « Bosnie-Herzégovine et Kosovo : contradictions occidentales » ; « La question serbe » ; « La voie yougoslave dans l'histoire ». Le lecteur est immédiatement surpris par l'ordre disons « inhabituel » des chapitres. Car, en effet, il est difficile de défendre la structure de l'étude dans laquelle le premier chapitre analyse la destruction de la Yougoslavie ; le second se concentre sur les rapports historiques des socialistes français à l'autogestion yougoslave ; les troisième et quatrième chapitres analysent les représentations de la guerre yougoslave dans l'espace médiatique et intellectuel français ; tandis que les cinquième et sixième examinent les faits historiques qui ont conduit à la guerre dans les Balkans. Il nous semble que jusqu'à la fin, l'auteur n'a pas réussi à nous convaincre de la justification cognitive de ce cadre de son étude.

Malgré le titre prometteur, Lucien Calvié n'a pas consacré beaucoup de place à la question des liens entre les

événements yougoslaves et l'Europe, mais lorsqu'il l'aborde dans une partie du premier et du troisième chapitre, il le fait de manière très convaincante et originale. En général, le livre est écrit dans un langage facile à lire – en se situant à la frontière entre un ouvrage destiné au grand public et un ouvrage universitaire – et sa plus grande valeur réside sans doute dans l'analyse du rôle de l'Allemagne dans les guerres sur l'ensemble balkanique. Cela n'est pas surprenant étant donné que l'auteur est un germaniste bien connu en tant que fondateur du Centre d'Études et de Recherches Allemandes et Autrichiennes Contemporaines et de la revue Chroniques allemandes. Aussi, le premier chapitre révèle non seulement une connaissance approfondie de l'histoire et de la politique allemande contemporaine, mais aussi, d'autre part, un intérêt non dissimulé pour les événements en Yougoslavie – pays envers lequel, comme beaucoup des hommes de gauche française de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, l'auteur avait beaucoup de respect et de sympathie. D'ailleurs, il admet lui-même ouvertement que son intérêt à la destruction yougoslave a été motivé par le fait qu'il devait une partie de sa formation politique au socialisme yougoslave (p. 46).

Le positionnement à gauche de l'auteur est également visible dans sa thèse – très courageuse mais insuffisamment étayée – selon laquelle les États capitalistes occidentaux ont participé à la destruction de la Yougoslavie simplement parce qu'elle était le seul État en Europe qui, même en 1991, rejetait l'idée d'une ouverture complète de son économie et conservait certains éléments du socialisme autonome (dont la particularité étaient d'être pleinement compatibles avec les libertés individuelles et l'initiative sociale). Le capitalisme victorieux n'aurait pas pu permettre l'existence d'un État au cœur de l'Europe avec un modèle alternatif d'ordre social réussi. Lucien Calvié a donc écrit ce livre en hommage à la Yougoslavie, qui selon lui, aurait pu être préservée avec le soutien économique et institutionnel décisif de l'UE naissante. Bien qu'il ne l'ait pas clairement formulé comme une idée élaborée, l'auteur nous indique à plusieurs reprises que – par son attitude subordonnée envers l'Allemagne, voire ses intérêts de créer *Mitteleuropa* – l'UE a abandonné la Yougoslavie, scellant ainsi peut être son propre destin.

Si le livre est truffé d'observations et d'illustrations brillantes qui déconstruisent de manière convaincante l'image noir et blanc du conflit yougoslave, ainsi que l'hystérie anti-serbe qui a dominé l'espace public français dans les années 1990, l'auteur n'échappe pas pour autant, vingt ans plus tard, à un cadre d'interprétation un peu réducteur. Notamment, sa critique justifiée du rôle de l'Allemagne dans la destruction de la Yougoslavie et du comportement destructeur des élites politiques slovènes et croates, est bien accompagne par un sentiment évident de serbophilie. Dans cette perspective, Milosevic a été quasi idéalisé comme un moindre mal, un défenseur de l'idée yougoslave et antifasciste, avec une relativisation vraiment incompréhensible – pour un chercheur d'un excellent niveau, comme Lucien Calvié – du rôle du nationalisme serbe dans la tragédie yougoslave. Malgré ces lacunes, et en dépit du fait que le livre ne nous offre pas de perspectives nouvelles sur les événements dans les Balkans à la fin du XXe siècle, le lecteur qui voudrait comprendre la vision française hétérodoxe de cette période ne sera certainement pas déçu par le contenu de ce livre.

BARBARA HERMAN, *MORALITY AS RATIONALITY: A STUDY OF KANT'S ETHICS*, ROUTLEDGE, ABINGDON AND NEW YORK, 2016.

Milica Smajević

In her book *Morality as Rationality: A Study of Kant's Ethics*, Barbara Herman set a clear goal: to show that the central claims of Kant's ethics can be properly understood only if we accept the thesis that morality is a form of rationality. In other words, Herman argues that within Kant's practical philosophy all moral principles are rational and when we act in accordance with them we act rationally. In order to justify her main thesis, she focused primarily on two aspects of Kant's ethics (volition and imperatives) and divided her book into six chapters: the first offers introductory remarks, the second provides an explanation of Kant's understanding of maxims, the third is devoted to hypothetical imperatives, and the last three chapters deal with different formulations of the categorical imperative. This book offers a very detailed and systematic account of Kant's theory of moral motivation and represents the result of a careful and lengthy analysis of Kant's ethical theory. Offering at the same time an innovative and faithful interpretation of Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,* Herman introduces us to new possible ways of understanding Kant's argument.

In the introductory chapter, the main focus is on the analysis of the relationship between volition and imperatives in Kant's ethics. Herman shows that the notion of volition that Kant uses leads us to the notion of imperatives as objective principles of rational willing. To have a will is to have the ability to be moved by the laws and principles of the reason. Imperatives express the relationship between will and objective principles of reason; they command the will to follow the laws of the reason. The author emphasizes that will is the core of practical rationality, and that our actions can be characterized as rational or irrational only because of the fact that we, as human beings, possess the will. When assessing the rationality of an act, we must interpret that act as it stems from the will.

Given that the volition is one of the main subjects of inquiry in Herman's book, it is understandable why she devoted the entire second chapter to the analysis of maxims – subjective principles of action. She believes that the existing accounts of maxims are incomplete and that even Kant himself does not offer a clear and precise definition of this term. For this reason, the author tries to provide an adequate account of

maxims. In her opinion, each maxim must contain a description of the act, the relevant circumstances, the agent's motives and the expected outcome. If it is too general, the maxim cannot perform its function – it cannot be used to assess the rationality of an action. Herman emphasizes that determining the agent's motives are very important for specifying the maxim of an action.

The hypothetical imperatives, which are the main topic of the third chapter, offer the answer to the question whether the subjective maxim is at the same time objective. In order to determine whether an agent's action is rational, it is necessary to assess her maxim via the hypothetical imperative. The author critically examines the nature and correct method of application of hypothetical imperatives and seeks to show how these imperatives govern our actions. Herman thinks that Kant places the source of the authority of hypothetical imperatives in the nature of human rational will. She analyzes the relationship between maxims and hypothetical imperatives and tries to determine how that relationship fits into the account of human volition that she attributes to Kant.

Although interpreters most often emphasize the differences between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, Herman believes that pointing out similarities between the two types of imperatives is of great importance. It is usually said that hypothetical imperatives prescribe what we need to do if we want to achieve a specific goal, while a categorical imperative prescribes what we should do regardless of the goals we set. While this is true, the author thinks that such an explanation of imperatives does not show what their similarities are and does not point out that both types of imperatives are the principles of rational volition. To give us an insight into the relationship between the two types of imperatives, after analyzing the hypothetical imperatives in the third chapter,

Herman devotes the second part of her book to the examination of the categorical imperative. In this way, the author follows the order of argument presented in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.

The goal of the fourth chapter (the first of the three devoted to the categorical imperative) is to introduce and explain the concept of the categorical imperative, as well as its first formulation – the Formula of Universal Law. Herman shows how Kant comes to the first and most popular formulation of the categorical imperative, and how he defines it in the light of previously introduced concepts, such as maxims, volition and hypothetical imperatives. She tries to explain why Kant claims that there is only one categorical imperative, and at the same time offers us different formulations of this imperative. Herman does not address the question of whether Kant succeeded in proving that a categorical imperative is possible, but rather tries to show that Kant's notion of a categorical imperative is coherent. In her opinion, the two basic features of the categorical imperative are independence from the agent's ends and identification with practical law.

After analyzing the basic features and the first formulation of the categorical imperative, the author pays attention, in the next chapter, to the second formulation of the categorical imperative – the Formula of the Law of Nature. Herman argues that the introduction of the Formula of the Law of Nature is plausible and is a necessary supplement to the first formula – the Formula of Universal Law. Another important topic of this chapter is the derivation of duties from the categorical imperative as a source of moral principles. If this derivation can be performed, then the notion of a categorical imperative can help us to explain the notion of duty.

The last chapter is devoted to the concluding remarks and the examination

of the main objections addressed to the notion of the categorical imperative. Herman argues that the primary function of this imperative is to assess proposed actions rather than to prescribe one particular action. This imperative has clearly moral content that is closely related to the agent's moral motives. In addition to analyzing the proper conditions of employment of the categorical imperative, the author tries to show that the objections raised to this principle regarding the consequences of actions are not adequate. The general conclusion that Herman draws is that if there is to be a connection between rationality and morality, it must be evident in the various formulations of imperatives. If there are imperatives, then there are rational principles which provide norms of action that are independent of the goals that the agent has set.

It is noticeable that the author referred to surprisingly few relevant books and texts from the secondary literature devoted to this topic. The reason for this is twofold: first, at the time the author was writing her book, there was incomparably less literature devoted to Kant's moral theory than today, and second, Herman emphasized that in order to provide a faithful interpretation of Kant's ethical doctrine, she wanted to devote most attention to Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Her methodology relies on interpreting Kant's original text, not on analyzing and comparing existing interpretations of Kant's ethics. It is significant and interesting to note that the author's view is that the arguments made in the *Groundwork* are more convincing and stronger than the arguments Kant offered in his other ethical works. Therefore, we cannot say that this book is a work that provides a complete historical account of Kant's ethical theory, nor a comprehensive review of previous interpretations, but we can say that the author tries to resolve one of the major concerns of Kant's ethics: the relationship between morality and rationality. For a correct and complete account of Kant's conception of morality, it is necessary to understand what were Kant's assumptions about rationality. If we try to interpret Kant's account of morality by using, for example, Hume's understanding of rationality, we will be on the wrong track and this is something we must always be aware of. Barbara Herman's book provides us with a comprehensive insight into all the factors that, according to Kant, influence human actions such as the circumstances of the agent and the motives that move her to act. This book undoubtedly represents a valuable contribution to the understanding and interpretation of Kant's theory of moral motivation offered in the *Groundwork*. This study is most useful for students of philosophy, but also for anyone who wants to deepen their understanding of Kant's ethics.

RADOSŁAW ZENDEROWSKI (RED.), *MIELIŚMY SWÓJ DOM, W KTÓRYM BYLIŚMY SZCZĘŚLIWI… KONFLIKTY ETNICZNE NA TERYTORIUM BYŁEJ JUGOSŁAWII W NARRACJACH MIGRANTÓW Z PAŃSTW POSTJUGOSŁOWIAŃSKICH MIESZKAJĄCYCH W AUSTRII*, WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE UKSW, WARSZAWA, 2019.

Juraj Marušiak

Od početka 90-ih godina XX veka bili smo svedoci opadanja interesovanja u zemljama srednje Evrope za problematiku jugoistočne Evrope, prevashodno zbog njihove usmerenosti na unutrašnje transformacije i integracije u evro-atlantske strukture. Ovo je posebno bilo izraženo u Poljskoj, gde je područje Balkana dugo ostajalo izvan sistematskih proučavanja istoričara i drugih istraživača društvenih nauka, koji se tradicionalno usredsređuju na regione sa kojima njihova zemlja ima istorijski najintenzivnije, ali i najkomplikovanije odnose – državama bivšeg Sovjetskog Saveza i Nemačku.

Profesor Radoslav Zenderovski sa Katedre za međunarodne odnose i evropske studije Univerziteta Kardinala Stefana Višinjskog u Varšavi (Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie – Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw) formirao je tim usmeren na istraživanje zemalja bivše Jugoslavije. Istraživačka grupa, kojim rukovodi Zenderovski, objavila je ranije obimnu koautorsku monografiju posvećenu odnosu etničke i verske identifikacije u regionu Preševa, zasnovanu na intervjuima sa predstavnicima lokalnih institucija (samouprave, medija, prosvete, religije i sl.) (Zenderowski 2012).

Knjiga koja je predmet ovog prikaza i čiji naslov u prevodu glasi *Imali smo svoj dom u kome smo bili srećni… Etnički konflikti na teritoriji bivše Jugoslavije u narativima migranata iz postjugoslovenskih država u Austriji* predstavlja rezultat rada interdisciplinarnog istraživačkog tima: istoričara Bartoša Bekiera (Bartosz Bekier), sociologa Rafala Višnjevskog (Rafał Wiśniewski) i Izabele Bukalske (Izabela Bukalska) i politikologa Radoslava Zenderovskog (Radosław Zenderowski). Terensko istraživanje obavljano je u Beču među migrantima sa područja bivše Jugoslavije, a s fokusom na njihova sećanja na period oružanih sukoba 90-ih godina XX veka. Istraživanje je bilo zasnovano na dubinskim intervjuima sa 53 sagovornika starosti od 28 godina do 72 godine, stanovnika Austrije poreklom iz zemalja nekadašnje Jugoslavije (konkretnije: iz Srbije, Kosova, Bosne i Hercegovine,

Hrvatske i Makedonije)[1], različitih socijalnih i profesionalnih kategorija. Istraživanje je obavljano početkom 2014, kao i na prelomu 2015. i 2016. godine. Intervjue su vodili studenti bečkog Eksternog odeljenja Gornjošleske više trgovačke škole Vojćeha Korfantog iz Katovica u okviru predmeta „Etnički konflikti u centralno-istočnoj Evropi". Iskazi su bili raspoređeni na osnovu deklarisane etničke pripadnosti sagovornika (srpska, hrvatska, albanska, bošnjačka), kao i na osnovu njihove zemlje porekla, zatim pola i starosti. U knjizi, međutim, nedostaje ključan podatak: na kom jeziku su obavljani razgovori. Može se pretpostaviti da su razgovori bili na nemačkom jeziku, s obzirom na to da su ih vodili studenti poljske nacionalnosti koji – isto kao i njihovi sagovornici – žive u Austriji.

Beč u dužem vremenskom periodu predstavlja cilj migracija stanovnika jugoslovenskog i postjugoslovenskog područja, što je posebno postalo izraženo od 60-ih godina 20. veka radnim migracijama tzv. gastarbajtera. Neposredno posle ratova 90-ih godina prošlog veka, migranti iz bivše Jugoslavije su 2001. godine sačinjavali 45,4% od ukupnog broja imigrantske populacije u ovom gradu. U to vreme u Beču je živelo oko 80.000 Srba, više od 20.000 Bošnjaka i više od 16.000 Hrvata (str. 61). Broj migranata sa postjugoslovenskog prostora se u narednim godinama povećavao, ali njihov udeo u ukupnom broju stanovnika Beča više nije bio toliko izražen kao na početku veka. Prema najnovijim podacima (od 1. januara 2017), imigranti iz zemalja bivše Jugoslavije, koji su u tim zemljama rođeni i/ili imaju njihovo državljanstvo, sačinjavaju približno 9% od ukupnog broja stanovnika Beča. Sa stanovišta porekla, Srbi predstavljaju najbrojniju imigrantsku zajednicu; njih je u Beču više od 100.000 i sačinjavaju 5,4%

njegovog ukupnog stanovništva. Imigranata poreklom iz Bosne i Hercegovine je u Beču više od 40.000 i oni sačinjavaju 2,2% njegovog stanovništva, dok iz Hrvatske potiče više od 26.000 ljudi, tj. 1,4% stanovnika Beča. U dostupnim statističkim izvorima nisu posebno evidentirani kosovski Albanci, kao ni stanovnici poreklom iz Makedonije. Imigranti iz Bugarske i Rumunije zastupljeni su tek 1%. Navedeni podaci ukazuju na to da je na Balkanu rođeno više od 11% sadašnjih stanovnika Beča, što je približno jedna četvrtina od ukupnog broja stanovnika imigranata koji žive u Beču (City of Vienna 2017). Broj ljudi u Beču koji ima porodične i kulturne veze sa zemljama bivše Jugoslavije znatno je veći, budući da statistikama nisu obuhvaćeni potomci imigranata koji su rođeni u zemlji prijema i imaju austrijsko državljanstvo. Zbog toga, kao i zbog zastupljenosti srpskog, hrvatskog i bošnjačkog jezika, vizuelna prisutnost stanovnika poreklom iz bivše Jugoslavije u Beču je mnogo veća nego što to evidentira zvanična statistika. Na to ukazuje i sajt grada, koji je dostupan ne samo na nemačkom i engleskom jeziku, već ima verziju i na bošnjačkom/hrvatskom/srpskom, kao i na turskom jeziku. I ovi podaci govore o bliskoj istorijskoj, političkoj i kulturnoj povezanosti država Dunavskog regiona, odnosno srednje i jugoistočne Evrope, a u skladu sa tim, i o potrebi intenzivnije saradnje istraživača društvenih i humanističkih nauka zemalja ovog područja.

Istraživanja posvećena posleratnim migracijama iz zemalja nastalih raspadom Jugoslavije fokusirana su na partikularne dijaspore (na primer, radovi Hariza Halilovića o bosanskoj dijaspori – Halilovich 2011). Doprinos ove koautorske monografije je u tome što su njeni autori istraživanjem obuhvatili migrante iz različitih postjugoslovenskih zemalja. Ovakav pristup omogućava komparaciju rezultata s obzirom na zemlju porekla migranata i njihovu etničku pripadnost (up. metodologiju istraživanja Dragane

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1   Ovde su navedeni nazivi država onako kako su dati u knjizi koja se prikazuje.

Kovačević Bielecki – Kovačević Bielecki 2018). Iako knjiga nije obimna, ona donosi značajne uvide i rezultate.

Koautorsku monografiju otvara poglavlje Bartoša Bekiera (Bartosz Bekier), posvećeno istorijskom kontekstu etničkih konflikata u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, genezi i transformaciji jugoslovenske ideje i njenom odnosu prema ideji velike Srbije (str. 11–62). Važno je naglasiti izbalansirano napisan deo o genezi oružanih sukoba 90-ih godina 20. veka. Bekier se distancira od rasprostranjene crno-bele optike sagledavanja navedenih konflikata, a u zavisnosti od političke, ideološke i geopolitičke perspektive pojedinih autora. S druge strane, autor nije uzeo u obzir pojedine važne istorijske momente, kao, na primer, usvajanje Bečkog književnog sporazuma iz 1850. godine o stvaranju zajedničkog srpskohrvatskog književnog jezika, a koji je dopunjen 1854. godine Novosadskim dogovorom. Autor takođe ne razmatra Ustav SFRJ iz 1974. godine, na osnovu kojeg se Jugoslavija transformisala u federaciju s konfederalnim elementima. Federalne republike su tada pojačale svoje kompetencije, što je vodilo porastu nacionalističkih tendencija i prećutnoj, ali postepeno sve otvorenijoj podršci njihovih komunističkih predstavnika, koji su nominalno deklarisali privrženost jedinstvu Jugoslavije. Osim toga, nije pomenut Memorandum SANU, tj. njegova nezvanična verzija, iako se ovaj nacrt dokumenta često uzima kao simbolički početak promene stava o ulozi Srbije u okviru jugoslovenske federacije (Memorandum SANU 1986; Greenberg 2004: 72). Oružane sukobe ovaj autor interpretira kao „jugoslovenski građanski rat" i kao „konflikte među zemljama naslednicama" (str. 31). On pokazuje dualni karakter konflikta: s jedne strane, u okviru postojeće SFRJ, a s druge – unutar pojedinačnih država naslednica, onako kako su one od 1991. godine bile postepeno priznavane od strane međunarodne zajednice.

U ovom kontekstu potrebno je pomenuti rad Arbitražne komisije Konferencije o Jugoslaviji, osnovane 1991. godine pod rukovodstvom predsednika Ustavnog suda Francuske Roberta Badintera, koja je definisala karakter oružanih sukoba u Jugoslaviji i način njihovog rešavanja (Pellet 1992). Zaključci Badinterove komisije nisu bili uzeti u obzir u slučaju rešavanja konflikta na Kosovu i priznavanja jednostranog proglašenja nezavisnosti ove srpske pokrajine 2008. godine od strane većine zemalja Evropske unije. U zaključnom delu prvog poglavlja monografije dati su statistički podaci o izbegličkim talasima iz Hrvatske, Bosne i Hercegovine i Srbije u periodu od 1991. do 1999. godine (str. 57–61). Reč je o veoma važnim podacima, ali smatram da bi problem istraživanja bio bolje osvetljen da su oni dobili mesto u metodološkom delu.

Sledeće poglavlje ove monografije posvećeno je metodološkim izazovima istraživanja etničkih sukoba u narativima žrtvi, autora Rafala Višnjevskog (Rafał Wiśniewski) i Izabele Bukalske (Izabela Bukalska) (str. 63–86). Autori polaze od rezultata istraživanja konflikata u vanevropskim zemljama sa fokusom na istraživanja u uslovima rata, zatim po njegovom završetku, kao i u situacijama kada je od ratnih sukoba prošao duži vremenski period. Među autorima iz bivše Jugoslavije razmatraju rezultate istraživanja Ivane Maček (Maček 2011) i Marije B. Olujić (Olujic 1995). Ovo poglavlje jeste opsežno, ali nedostaje mu čvršća povezanost sa samim predmetom istraživanja, kao i refleksija o izazovima sa kojima su se tokom istraživanja suočavali članovi istraživačkog tima.

Treće poglavlje autora Radoslava Zenderovskog napisano je na osnovu rezultata samog istraživanja (str. 95–111). U iskazima sagovornika ispoljavaju se razlike u određivanju uzroka oružanih sukoba, a u skladu s razlikama u njihovoj etničkoj pripadnosti. Sagovornici se

uglavnom pridržavaju nacionalističkih interpretacija, kreiranih od strane političkih elita jugoslovenskih republika. Posle gotovo četvrtine veka od završetka ratnih dejstava, kod sagovornika se ne primećuje izraženije odstupanje od navedenih interpretacija. Razlike u traženju uzroka ratova još dugo će deliti pripadnike etničkih zajednica u Srbiji, Hrvatskoj i Bosni i Hercegovini. Zbog toga možemo s pravom postaviti pitanje: da li je savremeno stanje – stanje mira ili bi možda pre trebalo govoriti o stanju bez rata. Zanimljiv je nalaz da religijskim razlikama sagovornici nisu pridavali suštinski značaj; u većini odgovora one nisu bile pomenute. Prema mišljenju pojedinih sagovornika, uzrok rata jeste bio izbijanje etničke mržnje zbog vere, dok je, prema mišljenju drugih, vera služila samo kao izvor političke mobilizacije (str. 109). Kao glavne uzroke konflikta sagovornici su navodili nacionalističke ideologije i ekonomske razlike među republikama, ali i spoljašnje, geopolitičke razloge. Bez obzira na zemlju porekla i etničku pripadnost, sagovornike povezuje idealizovana slika jugoslovenske prošlosti i međuetničkih odnosa u periodu posle Drugog svetskog rata. Takva slika je ponuđena i u nazivu monografije: „imali smo svoj dom, u kome smo bili srećni". Sagovornici su, bez obzira na svoju etničku pripadnost, govorili o tome da su bili iznenađeni izbijanjem rata i naglim promenama do kojih je došlo u međuljudskim odnosima, naročito među pripadnicima različitih etničkih grupa (up. Zlatanović 2018: 296). Oni su, bez obzira na svoju etničku pripadnost, na isti način opisivali proživljene ratne traume, srušene domove, etničko čišćenje, glad, bežanje u skrovišta pred bombardovanjem, stradanje dece, ali i izbeglištvo i traženje novog doma – ratnu i posleratnu svakodnevicu na koju su bili prinuđeni da se naviknu.

Iako tema istraživanja otvara mnoga pitanja kojima se autori monografije ne bave, kao, na primer, integracija prinudnih migranata u državu prijema, i da li je i na koji je način identifikacija imigranata i njihovih potomaka povezana sa zemljom porekla, ona u mnogim aspektima daje značajan doprinos.

Stanovnici srednje Evrope od 1945. godine žive u miru; već nekoliko generacija nema neposredno iskustvo s ratnim dešavanjima. Narativi imigranata iz bivše Jugoslavije su važni i s obzirom na dugotrajni optimizam stanovnika srednje Evrope da ratnih sukoba u njihovom regionu nema i da ih neće biti. Iz intervjua koje su poljski studenti obavili u Beču jasno se vidi da su takva ubeđenja 1990. i 1991. godine imali i građani bivše Jugoslavije, koji su u periodu od 1945. godine živeli u miru. Rezultati istraživanja su naročito važni i s obzirom na narastajuće nacionalističke i dezintegracione tendencije u Evropi.

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JOVO BAKIĆ, *EVROPSKA KRAJNJA DESNICA 1945-2018*,
CLIO, BEOGRAD, 2019.

Jovica Pavlović

U savremenoj društvenoj nauci, koju u sve većoj meri karakteriše usko-specijalistički pristup unapred teorijski jasno određenim fenomenima, retke su one vrste monografskih studija koje se usuđuju da na sveobuhvatno istorijsko-sociološki način sagledaju kompleksne i neizmerno široke fenomene poput krajnje desnice u Evropi. Umesto naslova koji glasi „Evropska krajnja desnica 1945-2018", danas se češće može pročitati rad pod nazivom „Uporedna analiza izbornog ponašanja desnih partija u Švedskoj i Danskoj" ili „Nacionalni front na parlamentarnim izborima 2012. i 2017. godine." Drugim rečima, većina naučnih radova koji se bave krajnje desnim strankama (ili političkim partijama i pokretima uopšte) – bili oni monografske studije ili akademski članci – oslanja se na postojeće teorije kako bi polju istraživanja doprinela empirijskim nalazima.

Nasuprot tome, Bakić gradi sopstveno teorijsko poimanje fenomena koji proučava, već u uvodnom delu predstavljajući – može se slobodno reći – eksplanatorno-teorijski okvir razvoja i delovanja evropske krajnje desnice; okvir koji je zasnovan na tradiciji levičarske političke misli u širem smislu. Nakon uvodnog dela posvećenog

uspostavljanju teorijsko-metodološkog okvira istraživanja, autor se okreće ne samo stručnjaku, već i običnom čitaocu, što je za pohvalu. Primenjuje jedan gotovo udžbenički, čak literarni pristup, ali ipak ne odstupa od akademske metode. U tom poduhvatu on se oslanja na najrelevantniju literaturu, nizom citata potkrepljujući svaki pažljivo promišljeni argument, dok ujedno pruža i politikološko-komparativni uvid u sličnosti i razlike stranaka koje deluju na krajnje desnom spektru unutar različitih zapadnoevropskih zemalja.

Knjiga, dakle, iako obimna, ni u jednom trenutku ne postaje suvoparna i zamorna. Začinjena je važnim primerima kojima se misaoni niz upotpunjuje i koji argumentaciju čine dostupnom široj javnosti. Zato se može reći da Bakić stvara uspešnu sintezu naučnog i opisnog, koja poziva čitaoce da se dublje upoznaju sa fenomen krajnje desnice, da prepoznaju njegove instrumente manipulacije, da se upute u neiskrene interesne politike i otvorene laži stranaka krajnje desne orijentacije, ali i da razumeju suštinski imoralne motive njihovih politika, kako bi ih mogli prepoznati, suprotstaviti im se i od njih se odbraniti.

Pored koherentnosti i čitljivosti Bakićevih teza, takođe su vredne pohvale i

direktnost i otvorenost kojima on iden-
tifikuje relevantne pojmove. Na primer,
Bakić već u prvoj rečenici predgovora
politička uređenja zapadnih zemalja
opisuje kao stare/ustaljene oligarhije,
kasnije kritikujući društvene nauke –
pre svega politikologiju – koje upotre-
bom reči „demokratija" prilikom opi-
sivanja političkih sistema pomenutih
država zanemaruju činjenicu da demos
danas sve manje učestvuje u političkom
životu, odnosno da sve manje utiče na
političke odluke koje se u njegovo ime
donose.

Nakon uvodnog pojmovno-teorij-
skog dela knjige, autor pažljivo prati
proces opadanja nivoa i kvaliteta de-
mokratije u zapadnim zemljama tokom
perioda pomenutog u naslovu kako bi
ostvario primarni cilj rada; a to je ana-
liza, raslojavanje i razumevanje proce-
sa koji je raznolike tradicionalno desno
orijentisane partije (od ekonomsko-de-
snih neoliberalnih stranaka do rasistič-
kih i ksenofobičnih neofašističkih orga-
nizacija) pretočio u – po svom diskursu
i delovanju slične – izborno uspešne
stranke krajnje desnice.

Tako primećuje da su ekstremne de-
sne stranke (u njihovom procesu pre-
obražaja iz marginalnih u mainstream
partije), nakon pada Berlinskog zida i
slabljenja tradicionalne socijaldemo-
kratske i radikalne levice lukavo od so-
cijalista preuzele diskurs i politike koje
se tiču prava radnika i radničke klase.
Ksenofobiju su donekle ublažile, ma-
kar u marketinškom smislu i u javnom
nastupu, u onoj meri u kojoj je to bilo
neophodno radi napuštanja margina po-
litičkog života i stupanja na glavnu dnev-
nopolitičku scenu. Antisemitizam su
zamenile društveno prihvatljivijom isla-
mofobijom, ali su logika mržnje „onog
drugog" i njen *modus operandi* ostali isti.
Izdvajaju se primeri Nacionalnog fronta
Francuske, Flamanskog interesa u Bel-
giji i Švedskih demokrata, koji se obra-
đuju u vrlo temeljno pisanim poglavlji-
ma posvećenim pomenutim zemljama.

Pored nekada ekstremno desnih
stranaka, Bakić temeljno pristupa i pre-
obražaju ranije klasičnih neoliberalnih
partija u stranke krajnje desnice. Pre-
ma bakiću, neoliberali – koji su se po
svom pogledu na ekonomska pitanja
uvek nalazili desno na političkom spek-
tru – nakon okončanja Hladnog rata i
ekonomsko-političke podele neolibe-
ralizma prave i kulturološki zaokret u
desno, jer su primetili da umerena doza
islamofobije, koja se po potrebi može
smanjiti ili uvećati, daje bolje rezultate
u miljeu u kom socijalisti više nisu glav-
na pretnja i politički neprijatelj. Ujedno,
primećuje Bakić, dolazi i do radikaliza-
cije konzervativaca i seljačkih stranaka.
Možda je primer partije Pravih Finaca,
sada poznate kao Partije Finaca, u tom
smislu najbolji.

Međutim, iako svakako predstavlja
naučno delo vredno pomena, ono što
monografiji donekle nedostaje jeste de-
taljnije objašnjenje opadanja politič-
kog značaja levo orijentisanih stranaka,
pošto se taj pad određuje kao jedan
od glavnih uzročnika rasta popularnosti
krajnje desnice (kao i jedan od primar-
nih uzroka prestrojavanja različitih de-
snih stranaka u okvire onoga što naziva-
mo krajnom desnicom). Navodi se da su
– nakon pada Berlisnog zida – evropski
socijalisti i socijaldemokrate jednostav-
no izgubili volju za bilo kakvim temelj-
nim i dalekosežnim društvenim ekspe-
rimentima u cilju oslobađanja građana
od socijalnih hijerarhija, da su teme rad-
ničkih prava izgubile na značaju zbog vi-
sokog nivoa zaposlenosti i zbog drugih
tekovina države socijalnog staranja, pa
i to da je kao posledica tih faktora po-
litički diskurs pomeren u desno. Ipak,
taj rezon zvuči donekle apologetski. Kri-
vac se više pronalazi u eksternim čini-
ocima, nego u samoj ideologiji levice i
njenim mogućim manjkavostima. Jedan
od uzroka svakako se može tražiti i u
nedostatku privlačnosti internacionali-
zma kao jedne od sastavnih ideoloških
pretpostavki levice. Možda su ljudska

bića, građani, po svojoj prirodi okrenuti onom „svom", onome što im je blisko, a ne naizgled apstraktnim ideološkim i političkim idejama poput globalne solidarnosti. Možda je upravo ta nemogućnost „prevođenja" svojih ideja na jezik običnih građana jedna od prepreka koju isuviše normativno uzvišena socijalističko-internacionalistička misao nikad nije uspela da savlada; prepreka koju je desnica uspela da iskoristi, pretočivši je u lako razumljiv jezik tribalizma i to retorikom o suverenizmu, povratku patrijarhalnim vrednostima, naciji, povratku „nama", onim pravim „nama". Imena pojedinih partija kojima se Bakić bavi, poput pomenutih „Pravih Finaca", upravo ukazuju na takav razvoj događaja.

U ontološkom smislu, monografiji takođe nedostaje i jasniji otklon od ideološkog idealtipskog egalitarizma. Drugim rečima, nije dovoljno naglašeno njegovo jasnije razlikovanje od vere u potrebu za postojanjem društvene jednakosti, iako to razlikovanje u određenoj meri postoji. Takođe, još jedan problem leži u tome što se hijerarhija u knjizi napada kao fenomen koji je po svojoj prirodi iskvaren, a može se čak zaključiti i zao, ali bi valjalo priznati da ona donekle jeste nužna, ako ne i neizbežna. Kao takva, ona se treba i mora regulisati, jer njeno otimanje kontroli svakako jeste opasno, ali je i težnja njenom potpunom otklonu uzaludna, a možda i totalitarna, na šta nam ukazuju grandiozno koncipirati komunistički projekti dvadesetog veka. Neophodno je, dakle, zastupati jednakost, ali ne i jednakost u smislu istog ishoda za sve, već jednakost u smislu postojanja jednakih šasni da se do željenog ishoda dođe.

Ipak, pomenute zamerke odnose se više na Bakićevo čvrsto levičarsko predubeđenje – po kome je on široj javnosti poznat i na koje u potpunosti ima pravo – nego što se iznose na račun njegovog sociološkog akademskog pristupa. Svakako, mora se primetiti da delo „Evropska krajnja desnica 1945-2018" ne bi bilo potpuno bez oba pomenuta apekta, levičarskog i sociološkog, jer ga upravo njihova srazmerna kombinacija čini unikatnim izdanjem ne samo na našem govornom području, već i šire. Kao što je i sâm Bakić jednom prilikom napomenuo, „na sociologu je da vidi, a na levičaru da osudi." On u svojoj najnovijoj monografiji upravo čini i jedno i drugo, i to vrlo uspešno.

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U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov teksta pod navodnicima, naslov časopisa u italiku, godište časopisa, u zagradi broj sveske u godištu ukoliko paginacija nije jedinstvena za ceo tom, dvotačka i broj stranice. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. Ne stavljaju se skraćenice „str.“, „vol.“, „tom“, „br.“ i slične. U napomenama, članci se citiraju isključivo na skraćeni način.

Primeri:

U literaturi: Miller, Johns Roger (1926), „The Ideas as Thoughts of God“, *Classical Philology* 21: 317–326.

Hartman, Nikolaj (1980) „O metodi istorije filozofije“, *Gledišta* 21 (6): 101–120.

U tekstu: (Hartman 1980: 108).

U napomeni: Hartman 1980: 108

10. ZBORNICI

U spisku literature: prezime i ime priređivača, u zagradi skraćenica „prir.“, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov zbornika u italiku, mesto izdanja, izdavač i strana po potrebi. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomenama, zbornici se citiraju isključivo na skraćeni način.

Primer:

U literaturi: Espozito, Džon (prir.) (2002), *Oksfordska istorija islama*, Beograd: Clio.

U tekstu: (Espozito 2002).

U napomeni: Espozito 2002.

11. TEKSTOVI IZ ZBORNIKA

U spisku literature: prezime, ime autora, u zagradi godina, naslov teksta pod navodnicima, slovo „u“ (u zborniku), ime i prezime priređivača zbornika, u zagradi „prir.“, naslov zbornika u italiku, mesto izdanja, izdavač, dvotačka i broj stranice (ako je potrebno). U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. Skraćenica „str.“ dopuštena je samo u spisku literature.

Primer:

U literaturi: Nizbet, Robert (1999), „Jedinične ideje sociologije“, u A. Mimica (prir.), *Tekst i kontekst*, Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, str. 31–48.

U tekstu: (Nizbet 1999: 33).

U napomeni: Nizbet 1999: 33.

12. ČLANAK IZ NOVINA

U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina, naslov članka pod navodnicima, naslov novina u italiku, datum, stranica.

Primer:

U literaturi: Logar, Gordana (2009), „Zemlja bez fajronta“, *Danas*, 2. avgust, str. 12.

U tekstu: (Logar 2009: 12).

U napomeni: Logar 2009: 12.

13. INTERNET

Prilikom citiranja tekstova s interneta, osim internet-adrese sajta na kojem se tekst nalazi i naslova samog teksta, navesti i datum posete toj stranici, kao i dodatna određenja ukoliko su dostupna (godina, poglavlje i sl.).

Primer:

U literaturi: Ross, Kelley R., „Ontological Undecidability“, (internet) dostupno na: http://www.friesian.com/undecd-1.htm (pristupljeno 2. aprila 2009).

U tekstu: (Ross, internet).

U napomeni: Ross, internet.