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TOWARDS A HARMONY OF EPISTEMIC AND POLITICAL VIRTUES

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TOWARDS A HARMONY OF EPISTEMIC
AND POLITICAL VIRTUES

KA USKLAĐENOSTI EPISTEMIČKIH
I POLITIČKIH VRLINA

Ivan Mladenović

DELIBERATIVE EPISTEMIC INSTRUMENTALISM, OR SOMETHING NEAR ENOUGH

ABSTRACT

In her book *Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues*, Snježana Prijic Samaržija advocates a stance that not only political, but also epistemic values are necessary for justification of democracy. Specifically, she mounts defense for one particular type of public deliberation on epistemic grounds. In this paper, I will discuss the following issue: What connects this type of public deliberation to the wider context of (epistemic) justification of democracy? I will attempt to explain why Prijic Samaržija's stance can be understood as a version of deliberative epistemic instrumentalism and to discuss the role played by the public deliberation within this framework.

KEYWORDS

democracy, procedure,
epistemic values,
public deliberation,
democratic system

In her book *Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues*, Snježana Prijic Samaržija advocates a stance that not only political, but also epistemic values are necessary for justification of democracy. Specifically, she mounts defense for one particular type of public deliberation on epistemic grounds. In this paper, I will discuss the following issue: What connects this type of public deliberation to the wider context of (epistemic) justification of democracy? In the first part of the paper, I analyze the meaning of the term democracy and introduce a distinction between proceduralist and instrumental justification of democracy. The second part of the paper introduces and discusses the distinction between proceduralist and epistemic justification of democracy. The third part explores the conception of deliberative epistemic instrumentalism that, in my view, underlies the conception of the public deliberation procedure advocated by Prijic Samaržija.

1.

Various types of justification have been furnished in connection with democracy. The problem however is that they also pertain to various types of defining

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democracy. Let us start with the basic definition of democracy as a collective decision-making procedure (Dahl 1989: 5):

Democracy =_{df} The procedure of binding collective decision-making.

Considering that democracy is conceived of procedurally, it is possible to further specify what is a democratic procedure. Brian Barry thus says that democratic procedure is “a method of determining the content of laws (and other legally binding decisions) such that the preferences of citizens have some formal connection with the outcome in which each counts equally” (Barry 1991: 25). The discussions concerning justification of democracy mostly pertain to democracy as a procedure of collective decision-making treating all citizens equally (Christiano 2008). In connection with justification of democracy, two questions arise. The first question is whether democracy is justified in the sense that it should be preferred over non-democratic forms of decision-making.¹ The second question is whether justifiedness of democratic decision-making procedure is sufficient or justification of democracy also has to include procedure-independent values. Even if the first question is answered positively, there can still be a disagreement among those who conceive of democracy as a fair procedure enabling all to have an equal possibility of influence on the outcome of decision-making and those who conceive of this procedure as a means for arriving to good outcomes or the best results.

In the first case, we speak about proceduralist justification of democracy and in the second case, about instrumental justification of democracy. According to the instrumental conception, a fair procedure is not sufficient for justification of democracy, instead, some procedure-independent standards are also required, on the basis of which outcomes can be assessed. This conception attaches decisive importance to consequences ensuing from the decision-making procedure (Arneson 2003: 130). Thus even if the question whether democratic decision-making procedure should be preferred over non-democratic decision-making is answered positively, the question remains whether justification of democracy should be purely procedural or instrumental.

The instrumental type of justification points to a broader conception of democracy according to which it is not only a procedure of collective decision-making, but also a set of institutions and practices that can be termed a democratic system. According to this type of justification, if additional institutions such as a constitutional court could contribute to correct the results of a collective decision-making procedure so as to make them more in keeping with the procedure-independent standards (fundamental rights and freedoms), then such institutions are also justified. A narrower understanding of democracy as a collective problem-solving is also possible that does not necessarily pertain to a specific formal procedure of collective decision-making or any specific institution. So, both institutional and non-institutional democratic

¹ In this paper, I shall not consider the first question and instead a positive answer is already assumed. For the arguments, see: Dahl 1989, Estlund 2008.

problem-solving is possible. In any case, it is important to point out that justification of democracy usually pertains to democracy conceived as a procedure of collective decision-making. As such, it must be differentiated from justification of a democratic system and justification of democratic problem-solving.

In order to see the differences between these conceptions, let us start with the democratic system. Within a democratic system, it can be justified that a greater role should be given to those who are more competent in order to ensure arriving to better outcomes (as in the case of decisions by a constitutional court when laws are overturned that do not abide by the constitution). This does not necessarily mean giving up on usual fair decision-making procedures that serve to enact laws in the parliament, but complementing them with other institutions in order to ensure better functioning of a democratic system.

However, conceiving of a democratic system in line with instrumental type of justification can go much further than that. Arneson even holds that if “severe competency requirements”, should lead to best results, then giving up on equal voting rights should not be problematic (Arneson 2003: 130). The obvious problem with this more strongly instrumentalist stance, however, is that in this case, fair procedures are not at all necessary for a democratic system. Moreover, in this conception, a democratic system can be justified even if a fair decision-making procedure treating all citizens equally is fully rejected (Arneson 2003: 130). This, however, begs the question what makes such a system democratic.

In terms of problem-solving, it is usually also assumed that those who are more competent have a greater chance to contribute to best solutions. In this context, however, a question arises what makes democratic problem-solving justified? Aristotle held that multitude of people, combining their knowledge, can in some domains possess greater knowledge than experts (Aristotle 1998: 83).² However, democratic problem-solving does not necessarily preclude the possibility that experts should take part, as long as citizens are also included in the process.

In any case, it should be clear that justification of democracy is distinct from justification of a democratic system and justification of democratic problem-solving. Let us illustrate this point by taking into account a particular procedure of collective decision-making. Given that laws in representative democracies are usually enacted by elected representatives, fair voting procedure is considered necessary for election of these representatives. Even if within a democratic system it can be justified that an institution should be able to correct laws enacted by representatives if they conflict with basic constitutional elements, it cannot be justified that any person or institution should decide in the name of citizens who elected representatives should be or that anyone should be treated unequally in that process. This is precisely what justification of democracy essentially refers to. On the other hand, justification of democracy is also distinct from justification of democratic problem-solving. Namely,

2 For reaffirmation of this stance in the contemporary context, see: Landemore 2012.

the basic role of citizens in electing representatives can hardly be viewed as problem-solving. Even if democratic problem-solving is in some domains justified, it does not have the necessary connection with justification of democracy conceived as a collective decision-making procedure.

2.

Justification of democracy can be either proceduralist or epistemic. According to proceduralist conception, democracy is justified because it provides free and equal access to a collective decision-making procedure to all citizens. Proponents of epistemic justification criticize this conception for not furnishing any criterion for differentiating correct from incorrect outcomes of democratic decision-making. In any case, epistemic conception of democracy usually presupposes a procedure-independent standard of correctness for assessing outcomes (Cohen 1986: 34). A classical stance in this respect is epistemic instrumentalism. According to this view, a procedure of democratic decision-making is valuable because it leads to correct outcomes. It has usually been argued that majority voting is one such procedure. So classical epistemic instrumentalism presupposes not only that there is a procedure-independent standard, but also that majority voting is fully reliable procedure for the realization of that standard.

Even though democracy is mostly associated with the majority rule, our starting definitions of democracy and democratic procedure include the possibility to specify it as a procedure of public deliberation or a combination of public deliberation and voting. More recently, a stance has gained ground that some kind of deliberative democracy is necessary for democratic legitimacy (Cohen 1997; Manin 1987). If citizens themselves have the possibility to discuss laws that affect them, then it seems that such a procedure is justified to a greater extent than the one in which they only have the right to vote. Obviously, the procedure of public deliberation in addition to free and equal access to a decision-making forum should also satisfy the reasonableness requirement, namely be based on the exchange of reasons for or against the proposal being debated (Cohen 1997). Even though it had initially been defended on procedural grounds, deliberative democracy is increasingly becoming an epistemic conception (Martí 2006). According to an epistemic conception of deliberative democracy, if the exchange of reasons is to make sense, it must be assumed that some reasons are better than others, which again assumes that there is a procedure-independent standard of correctness (Estlund 1997: 179).

But this does not mean that conception of epistemic instrumentalism is necessary for an epistemic justification of public deliberation. Unlike the classical stance of epistemic instrumentalism, the framework of epistemic proceduralism can be more adequate both for epistemic justification of democracy and for epistemic justification of the public deliberation procedure. Namely, it is not necessary for epistemic justification of democracy that the procedure be fully reliable means for achieving procedure-independent values; what suffices is that it should have a tendency to lead to correct outcomes (Estlund 2008:

8, 107). One of the consequences of epistemic proceduralism is that the public deliberation procedure (or a combination of the public deliberation procedure and voting) can be expected to have the tendency to lead to correct outcomes or at least avoid some very bad outcomes to a greater extent than alternative democratic procedures.

What has been said so far could be summarized in the following way. First, justification of democracy refers to whether democracy - understood as a collective decision-making procedure - is justified to a greater extent than non-democratic ways of decision-making. Even if we presume that it is, the question still remains whether for its justification intrinsic fairness of procedures themselves should be essentially important or it should only be important that they are means for achieving some procedure-independent values. The answers to the second question are usually differentiated into proceduralist and instrumental justification of democracy, which, of course, does not preclude the possibility of combining these two stances. We have seen that justification of democracy can also have an epistemic dimension, by holding that independent standards as well as procedures of democratic decision-making can have epistemic value. A classical type of justification in this regard is epistemic instrumentalism. Critics have rightly pointed out that epistemic instrumentalism is too epistemic for the purpose of justifying democracy and its authority. Unlike epistemic instrumentalism, the stance of epistemic proceduralism does not require that correctness of outcomes is the necessary and sufficient condition for democratic legitimacy and authority of democracy (ibid: 98).

Second, once we have answered the question what makes democracy i.e. a collective decision-making procedure justified in principle, it remains to answer the question which particular decision-making procedure is the most adequate in the normative sense. The view most commonly held was that the majority voting was the most adequate procedure both in purely proceduralist and in epistemic regard. However, this dominant view has been challenged recently and significance of the public deliberation procedure is being increasingly emphasized. As we have seen, the importance of public deliberation is defended both on proceduralist and epistemic grounds.

3.

In her book *Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues*, Snježana Prijic Samaržija defends the view that can be termed deliberative epistemic instrumentalism.³ In her view, justification of democracy must

³ It is noteworthy that at one point in her book, Prijic Samaržija distances herself from the stance of epistemic instrumentalism (ibid: 152). However, given that she rejects both pure proceduralism and epistemic proceduralism and accepts the importance of procedure-independent epistemic values and that the procedure must be a fully reliable device for realization of these values, the only possibility left is to understand her stance as the one of epistemic instrumentalism or something near enough.

have an epistemic dimension. She maintains that in this regard it is necessary to take into account some procedure-independent epistemic values and epistemic significance of the decision-making procedure. However, in contrast to epistemic proceduralist view, but also in contrast to classical epistemic instrumentalism, Prijic Samaržija propounds a view that basic procedure-independent value that has to be taken into account for epistemic justification of democracy is truth. On the other hand, in contrast to epistemic proceduralism, and in keeping with classical epistemic instrumentalism, she argues in favor of a view that procedures must be fully reliable means for arriving to truth. In her view, only one such stance can adequately account for epistemic dimension of justification of democracy, without reducing epistemic to political values.

However, it should be pointed out that Prijic Samaržija defends her version of epistemic instrumentalism in the context of justification of certain type of deliberative democracy, that is, certain procedure of public deliberation. For that reason, I termed this conception deliberative epistemic instrumentalism. She claims that her “primary aim is to determine which forms of deliberative democracy and public debate optimally support the production of epistemically desirable decisions while being ethically/politically justified” (Prijic Samaržija 2018: 101). We have seen that in the framework of justification of the public deliberation procedure, special significance is attached to purely procedural values of freedom, equality and reasonableness. However, we have also seen that some procedure-independent standards of correctness were necessary in order to make a difference between good and bad reasons. Prijic Samaržija makes several proposals for justifying the type of public deliberation she advocates. First, the basic procedure-independent standard is truth (even though other standards such as correctness or problem-solving can also be taken into account as epistemic values).⁴ Second, the balance between epistemic value of truth and political values of freedom and equality, is struck through the public deliberation procedure. Third, in order to achieve a proper balance of these values and to make the procedure of public deliberation a fully reliable means for arriving to truth, a division of labour must be made between experts and citizens. In short, citizens are the ones who should define goals, while experts should bring decisions about the best possible means for their realization (ibid: 112).

Considering that Prijic Samaržija defends such public deliberation procedure in the context of justification of democracy, the question arises which meaning of democracy she takes into account. If we revert to various types of justification of democracy, we have discussed in the first part, it seems that her version of deliberative epistemic instrumentalism pertains to a specific procedure of public deliberation, and not a procedure of collective decision-making more generally. It seems to me that this type of the public deliberation procedure

4 Prijic Samaržija says that “deliberative democracy, in order to be epistemically justified, must generate beliefs, judgments and decisions that are true, truth-sensitive or truth-conducive” (ibid: 18).

can be considered either a part of instrumental epistemic justification of a democratic system or a type of justification of democratic problem-solving. Namely, the conception of a democratic system may hold the role of a joint decision-making of citizens and experts justified, so as to arrive to better results where expertise is necessary (Christiano 2012). It seems that the public deliberation procedure proposed by Prijić Samaržija is particularly relevant for more recent conceptions of deliberative democracy that align it with a model of a deliberative system, which take the democratic system in its entirety and seek solutions how to make it more deliberative and able to arrive at high quality decisions (Mansbridge et al. 2012).⁵

On the other hand, it is clear that the proposed public deliberation procedure offers a kind of a mechanism for democratic problem-solving. One such procedure can have its significance in certain domains. For example, in the domain of environmental protection at a local level, it can be appropriate that citizens should identify the main problems and that experts should be consulted in connection with the most appropriate means for solving such problems. Considering that it presupposes participation of citizens, one such decision-making mechanism can be a form of democratic problem-solving. In any case, as we have seen, justification of democratic problem-solving means that citizens should be included in the problem-solving process.⁶

Prijić Samaržija does not give a definite answer whether the public deliberation procedure she propounds should be viewed as a part of justification of a democratic system or as justification (or a part of justification) of democratic problem-solving. In some places, she refers to a democratic system. On the one hand, Prijić Samaržija claims that “this book aims solely to discuss epistemic properties of democracy as a social system” (Prijić Samaržija 2018: 42). In the same vein, she also stresses “the necessity of the epistemic justification of democracy, or the stance that the legitimacy of all institutions and systems – and particularly democracy as a comprehensive social configuration – must be based on adequate evidence that they, as social structures, maximally cater to the formation of high quality epistemic beliefs or decisions” (ibid: 100). On the other hand, she claims that “the general aim is to justify application of epistemology to real-life situations by exemplifying how such topics pertain to and directly contribute to improving societal epistemic processes” (ibid 2018: 12). She thus emphasizes that the reason for inclusion of experts in public deliberation is to arrive to “the outcomes that resolve the problems of interested citizens” (ibid 2018: 161). The dilemma remains to what exactly the public deliberation procedure advocated by Prijić Samaržija pertains – whether it is a part of (epistemic) justification of a democratic system or justification (or a part of justification) of democratic problem-solving.

⁵ For the role of experts within a deliberative system, see: Mansbridge et al. 2012: 12–17.

⁶ For justification of an alternative version of democratic problem-solving through public deliberation that includes only citizens, see: Landemore 2012: 260–261.

We have said that her public deliberation procedure can be viewed only as a part of justification of a democratic system. To see why, our starting assumption is the following definition of a democratic system:

A political system is democratic if and only if it is a system in which citizens have equal political power. (Goldman 2015: 236)

Goldman emphasizes that within a democratic system, not all citizens necessarily have equal political power in all domains. For example, representatives who enact laws have greater political power than other citizens, because in addition to the possibility to vote in elections like other citizens, they also have the possibility to vote for laws. However, Goldman maintains that this kind of unequal power does not pose a problem as long as in the fundamental sense a democratic system rests upon equal political power. He therefore says that democracy understood as a democratic system “requires such (approximate) equality only at the *fundamental* level. By ‘fundamental level’ I mean the level of elections in which political representatives are selected” (ibid 2015: 246). If Goldman’s stance is correct, then even a democratic system in its entirety requires the existence of a basic collective decision-making procedure that treats all citizens as free equals. However, this implies that justification of a democratic system entails in the first step justification of democracy as a collective decision-making procedure treating all citizens as free and equal.

Conclusion

I think that epistemic dimension is important for justification of democracy and that the stance of epistemic proceduralism is the most adequate theoretical framework in this regard. Furthermore, I indicated that epistemic proceduralism provides the most adequate normative framework for epistemic justification of the public deliberation procedure (or a procedure consisting of public deliberation and voting) that treats all citizens as free and equal. However, in this paper I have not argued in favor of these stances, but have discussed an alternative proposal of deliberative epistemic instrumentalism defended by Prijic Samaržija in her book *Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues*. In this paper, I attempted to explain why her stance can be understood as a version of deliberative epistemic instrumentalism and to discuss the role played by the public deliberation within this framework.

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Ivan Mladenović

Deliberativni epistemički instrumentalizam, ili nešto što je blizu tome

Apstrakt

U svojoj knjizi *Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues*, Snježana Prijić Samaržija zastupa stanovište da su ne samo političke, već i epistemičke vrednosti nužne za opravdanje demokratije. Da budem precizniji, ona brani određenu vrstu javne deliberacije na epistemičkim osnovama. U ovom radu razmotriću pitanje kakva je veza ove vrste javne deliberacije sa širim kontekstom (epistemičkog) opravdanja demokratije. U radu ću nastojati da objasnim zašto se stanovište koje zastupa Snježana Prijić Samaržija može razumeti kao verzija deliberativnog epistemičkog instrumentalizma, kao i koja je uloga procedure javne deliberacije u okviru te koncepcije.

Ključne reči: demokratija, procedura, epistemičke vrednosti, javna delibaracija, demokratski sistem

Elvio Baccharini

PUBLIC REASON AND RELIABILITY DEMOCRACY

ABSTRACT

The article starts with a sketch of Prijic Samaržija's hybrid theory. After that, it provides an overview of the virtue epistemology theory, to which she attributes a relevant influence on her own position, as well as that of reliability democracy which constitutes her view about democratic legitimacy. Secondly, her proposal is discussed and confronted with a slightly amended version of the leading liberal democratic theory of democratic legitimacy, formulated and defended by John Rawls.

KEYWORDS

Expertism, Prijic Samaržija, public reason, social epistemology, Rawls

It is an enormous pleasure to discuss Snježana Prijic Samaržija's book that offers a deep and thoughtful contribution to (one of) the actual problems of legitimacy of democracy.

The era of fake news and pseudoscience is visible and in front of us all. Disinformation comes from authoritative sources, and not only from those outside the mainstream (which does not mean that the latter do not possess strong influence). As we can read in *The Washington Post* in an article that shows data updated on October 9th, 2019, the President of the USA, Donald Trump, has misinformed the public 13,435 times, at the 993rd day of his presidency.¹ I skip on details that regard cases of pseudoscientific misinformation, health, etc.

Such misinformation represents a serious trouble for the legitimacy of democratic decision-making. Apart from misinformation, there is a problem of the competence of citizens to express their will and influence public decisions on matters that require high level of expertise, like climate changes, vaccination, etc. The question is: how can we ensure legitimacy of democracy, as well as its efficiency, when citizens have insufficient competence, and, further, they are

1 (*The Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/14/president-trump-has-made-false-or-misleading-claims-over-days/>). *The Guardian* speaks about analogous behaviour of the UK PM, Boris Johnson (*The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/nov/18/boris-johnson-lying-media>)

under the pressure of misinformation? It seems that after almost 150 years we are still in troubles that J.S. Mill denounced at the dawn of democracy in his *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861/1977). Such are the risks of absence of knowledge and competence as threats to democratic decisions.

Snježana Prijic Samaržija is concerned with this issue. Specifically, the problem she deals with is: how is it possible to respect equal rights and warrant the epistemic quality of public decisions at the same time? Her hybrid conception is based on a balance between epistemic and political values (Prijic Samaržija 2018). I welcome this proposal as one of the contributions which enriches the range of reflections about the proper balance between operationalization of equality in the process of political decisions (democracy), other political values (basic rights, liberties and opportunities), and epistemic values.

In the present paper, I start with a sketch of Prijic Samaržija's hybrid theory. After that, I present an overview of the virtue epistemology theory, to which she attributes a relevant influence on her own position, as well as that of reliability democracy which constitutes her view about democratic legitimacy. These are the elements of her book that are in the focus of my analysis.

Secondly, I comment on her proposal, and confront it with an interpretation of the leading liberal democratic theory of democratic legitimacy, formulated and defended by John Rawls (Rawls 2005). Specifically, I put forward a slightly amended Rawlsian proposal.

By employing Rawls's theoretical framework, I change the focus of the discussion, in order to highlight cases when it can be legitimate to enforce truth, while Rawls's primary attention was on situations where this is not legitimate. Rawls has explained which conditions determine when it is not legitimate to enforce truth. My focus is on showing that in his terms, there are cases when such conditions are not present and, consequently, it can be legitimate to enforce truth.

I put in relation the Rawlsian theory of legitimacy of public decisions with virtue epistemology (Prijic Samaržija 2018: 65–69; Zagzebski 1996; 1998; 2003). In my view, virtue epistemology represents a complement of Rawls's proposal, although he did not refer to it.

Despite the remarkable merits of Prijic Samaržija's book, I argue for the superiority of this Rawlsian conception of legitimacy on the basis of two merits: (i) a better distinction between cases where it is well founded to enforce policies by appeal to truth, or to the best (victorious) justificatory reasons, and the cases where we must recognize and manage a condition of persistent reasonable pluralism, as well as (ii) a more coherent relation with virtue epistemology.

1. As Prijic Samaržija points out, public decisions must be assessed through moral and political values (fairness, equality, etc.), as well as epistemic virtues (Prijic Samaržija 2018: 69–73; 90–95). “Just like abstract epistemic assessments cannot address all important aspects of social practice or decisions, isolated ethical and political evaluation are an equally inappropriate exclusive criterion for their acceptance or rejection” (ibid: 70). Thus, she offers a hybrid theory of justification the legitimacy of public decisions.

Let us see an illustration that explains Prijic Samaržija's thesis. Imagine that there are people far more skilled than others to find proper answers to public issues, for example, because they have better education. It would be epistemologically justified to attribute to them the exclusive legitimacy of making public decisions on these public issues. However, let us assume that such a practice would cement a strongly non egalitarian social hierarchy. Then, we would have, on the other side, political reasons to establish a more egalitarian process of public decision-making. In Prijic Samaržija's view, the two sets of evaluative standards must be balanced.

The moral and political side of the hybrid assessment of public decisions is represented by values and ideals, like respect of equality of citizens. This is visible, for example, in Prijic Samaržija's discussion of Miranda Fricker's theory about epistemic injustice (ibid: 72–81), and other discussions as well (ibid: 81–84). I focus, now, on the explanation of epistemological assessment of public decisions. What concepts and criteria can be employed in such assessment? Importantly, when Prijic Samaržija describes virtue epistemology, she indicates several epistemic values.

She emphasises that “although epistemic value is generally understood as epistemic success and expressed in terms of truth, it can also subsume the concepts of epistemic responsibility, consciousness, problem solving, empirical adequacy, understanding and like” (ibid: 73).

Here, Prijic Samaržija relates her view to virtue epistemology, which represents one of the basic inspirations of her theory. Virtue epistemology extends classical concerns of epistemology from traditionally central themes, like truth and justification, to the virtues of the epistemic agent. “An epistemic or intellectual virtue is the property of an epistemic agent that supports their intellectual growth and fulfilment, or that simply defines them as virtuous epistemic agent” (ibid: 66).

Virtue epistemology places its focus on whether the agent develops understanding, and not mere knowledge, whether she is epistemically responsible, i.e. makes careful observations and valid inferences, analyses evidence and a variety of hypotheses (ibid: 66), is ready to exchange ideas, to deal with their own fallibility, to cultivate intellectual humility, etc. (ibid: 68). Prijic Samaržija does not diminish the importance of truth. As she says just a few sentences after the previous quotation, the epistemically virtuous agent is praised because she has a greater chance to produce true outcomes. “For instance, an innately curious scientist aware of his own fallibility and the possible influence of his preconceptions on future research seems to approach his epistemic task of research with responsibility, and thus has a greater chance of producing true outcomes” (ibid: 69). However, the epistemic agent is praised even if she does not achieve the goal of truth. “Virtue epistemology thus provides an optimal normative framework for discussing the topics of social epistemology inasmuch as it allows us to attribute cognitive successes or failures to individuals, groups or institutions - even when it would be dubious or downright impossible to assess their agency in terms of truth” (ibid: 69). Thus, virtue epistemology “renders

possible to praise the epistemic attitude [of epistemic agents] applauding their epistemic caution and conscientiousness even if it is not possible to assess their final judgment as either true or false” (ibid: 68). Importantly, Prijic Samaržija here admits the possibility that we are not able to assess persons’ judgments as true or false, but we can, nonetheless, praise them.

A specific merit of such an epistemological approach is that it is well suited to combine moral and epistemological considerations in order to assess agents’ virtue (ibid: 69), and this is, in fact, the path Prijic Samaržija coherently follows in her hybrid proposal. However, in my view, in her theory of democratic legitimacy, she does not fully coherently follow the potentialities of virtue epistemology for founding a theory of democratic legitimacy and does not attribute a proper normative role to reasonable pluralism. Instead, in her democratic conception, she focuses exclusively on the epistemic value of truth.

Prijic Samaržija builds her democratic conception on Alvin Goldman’s veritism (ibid: 199–218). This is a social epistemological conception which evaluates institutions on the basis of their epistemological reliability, i.e. their capacity to generate true beliefs (ibid: 201). This is the final criterion for the epistemological assessment of institutions. Thus, some criteria, like consensus of epistemic agents, or employment of expertise, are recommendable only if they are truth-conducive (ibid: 204). In fact, Prijic Samaržija positively assesses both consensus as well as expertise: discursive conciliations and confidence in experts are the most promising existing candidates for the status of reliable procedures that generate epistemically valuable beliefs (ibid: 204). The institutional paradigmatic model of epistemic virtue is represented by scientific institutions, that, despite various forms of criticism, are still the best that we have for the goal of producing truth-conducive beliefs and theories (ibid: 203). In the political domain, the discussion results in the formulation of a hybrid theory that founds a democratic conception which places great importance on epistemic reliability and properly balances the epistemic values and political values (instantiated through the respect of equal rights) without an a priori advantaged position of any of them, while affirming the role of experts in the decisional procedure. This is reliability democracy. “Proponents of reliability democracy assume the stance that the qualities of democratic systems shouldn’t only be defended in terms of equal rights, but also in the context of their ability to generate epistemically valuable political decisions” (ibid: 207). An implication of the role of experts may be that public decisions can be legitimate, even when ordinary citizens are not aware of their justification (ibid: 213–214). If I interpret Prijic Samaržija correctly, an additional condition is that some citizens are not only unaware of the justification, but it is also not accessible to them. This is, for example, the case of public policies, like those that regard vaccination or climate changes, which are justified on the basis of reasons that require a high level of expertise (but Prijic Samaržija does not attribute the status of experts only to natural scientists, because she speaks about experts in politics, as well) (ibid: 218, 238). However, following Thomas Christiano (Christiano 2012), Prijic Samaržija affirms that a strong externality

of justification is not a necessary consequence of the role of experts. Citizens and politicians trust experts on the basis of reasons that confirm the positive epistemological role of their expertise (Prijic Samaržija 2018: 215–216). Thus, she says: “the internalist approach I am proposing stresses that it is necessary for citizens and policy-makers to understand why it is rational to bestow reliance and trust to expertise and reliable democratic procedures (ibid: 216). For the legitimacy of political decisions, it is not needed that citizens can access the complex justification behind them. It is sufficient that citizens have evidence of the reliability of procedures that experts follow.

At this point, I remark the crucial divergence between Prijic Samaržija’s proposal and a great deal of contemporary political philosophical discussions on legitimacy. The divergence does not consist in employment of epistemological criteria as part of the conception of legitimacy (as I show below, epistemological considerations are part of, for example, the Rawlsian conception of legitimacy). Instead, it stems from the limits of the appeal to truth, as well as the focus on reasonable pluralism. This is, in my view, a surprising outcome, because it seems to me that, in this way, Prijic Samaržija renounces to attribute the proper role to her adherence to virtue epistemology that represents a strong resource to explain and ascribe legitimacy to reasonable pluralism.

The strong role of truth in the conception of legitimacy is affirmed, for example, when Prijic Samaržija discusses theories in the epistemology of disagreement. She criticizes the view that recognizes a persistent condition of reasonable disagreement, i.e. a situation where we persistently cannot adjudicate between competing positions and we declare several of them as legitimate expressions of reasonable pluralism. “While the pluralism of standpoints and the concept of reasonable disagreement can initially seem like the right candidate for a socially desirable and politically correct approach, this attitude is untenable because it ultimately generates a defeatist stance about the redundancy of insisting on true solutions – rendering it ineffective in solving problems and making decisions” (ibid: 227).

Truth is thus in Prijic Samaržija’s view a necessary component of legitimacy that has to be balanced with political values constituted by equal rights in order to achieve the final legitimacy of decisions. Truth is also a needed criterion for resolution of disagreement, in cases where we have to reach a decision. Merely surrendering to the pluralism of reasonable disagreement is not an option under real life pressure. Therefore, Prijic Samaržija says that “maintaining a reasonable disagreement can be a solution in the abstract domain of philosophical discussions, but not in urgent situations of climate intervention, judicial decision-making, economic rescues and bankruptcies” (ibid: 231). In such conditions, we must do cognitively better. Cognitive agents do not need to remain anchored to the beliefs they have in disagreement with others. By doing better we overcome such beliefs and, thus, disagreement (ibid: 234–235).

2. The focus of my analysis of Prijic Samaržija’s theses is on her insufficient attribution of importance to reasonable pluralism in public issues. Although

she is aware of the possibility of reasonable disagreement, in my view, her flaw is represented by a too optimistic view about the possibility to overcome it. In the same way as political philosophical theorists that she criticizes (I focus on the Rawlsian theory) I do not deny in an absolute sense the possibility to overcome reasonable disagreement, nor do I assume a view which is “blind to central epistemic values” (ibid: 240). As I show below, epistemic values are important in the Rawlsian view (although not sufficiently discussed and elaborated in detail). In the Rawlsian conception of legitimacy, it is important to appeal to the epistemic authority of some cognitive agents, as well as of their beliefs and research methods. But, in some cases, even responsible and well-intentioned epistemic agents cannot overcome their disagreements. Such persistent reasonable disagreements are visible in general questions, like general moral doctrines (virtue theories, deontological theories and utilitarianism), theories of social justice (egalitarian liberalism, libertarianism, etc.), and particular moral disputes (abortion, physician assisted suicide, questions of enhancement, etc.). In such cases the appeal to truth is of no immediate help in assessing the legitimacy of public decisions. It is of no help to appeal to experts as well, because leading experts disagree. Thus, ordinary citizens can reasonably disagree about attribution of reliability to them (remember that in Prijčić Samaržija’s view ordinary citizens’ attribution matters for the legitimacy of public decisions as well). The recommendation to do better is certainly welcome in prospective. But in the present, we must deal with reasonable pluralism about many issues. When in ethics and politics we will have a Newton, we will attribute legitimacy to public decisions differently. Until then, we cannot pretend that we have overcome, or are close to overcoming in the near future, reasonable pluralism. With this, I do not deny that there can be reasonable pluralism in sciences, inclusive of natural sciences, as well. I only assume that they have better resources and less burdens and challenges in overcoming disagreement, and there are paradigmatic cases of this happening.

3. In virtue of its proper consideration of reasonable pluralism, the Rawlsian proposal (slightly reshaped here in comparison to Rawls’s original formulation), represents, in my view, the best balancing of epistemic and political values. This is not a view shared by Prijčić Samaržija. She says that “for Rawls, the acts of engaging public [reason], postulating widely acceptable reasons and conducting rational debates in a plural society are primarily oriented towards political goals such as the formulation and maintenance of a just society (all participants *functionally* partake in the debate as equals) irrespective of the epistemic goals of achieving true or high-quality decision” (ibid: 170). Rawls is indeed primarily concerned with the questions of justice and legitimacy, and not with truth. However, his discussion of legitimacy of public decisions is inspired by conditions of persistent reasonable pluralism and it is not deprived of respect for epistemic values. On the contrary, epistemic considerations are part of what establishes legitimacy. Namely, a legitimate society is a society ruled by reasonable principles of justice (dissenting from Rawls, I add various

kinds of evaluative standards to principles of justice). Reasonable principles of justice are those that we can justify to reasonable persons (thus, what matters for legitimacy is not mere consensus among actual real-life citizens, but consensus among their reasonable idealised versions). Reasonable persons are defined through political, as well as epistemic values. I skip on the description of moral and political components of reasonableness (which are, at least broadly speaking, shared by Pribić Samaržija), and I focus on the epistemic ones.

We see a part of the epistemic component of reasonableness in Rawls's list of valid public reasons, which does not only include political values. Among valid public reasons are "the methods and conclusions of science when those are not controversial" (Rawls 2005: 224). To put it in Pribić Samaržija's scheme, this warrants the expertist side of the conception of public justification. Where we have clearly identifiable experts, as well as conclusions shared by them, as it paradigmatically happens in natural sciences, we have valid public reasons which are epistemologically validated.

An important epistemic component of Rawls's theory of legitimacy is represented by the ideas of burdens of judgment and reasonable pluralism. Burdens of judgment are described by Rawls as difficulties that we encounter "in the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and judgment in the ordinary course of political life," (ibid: 56). On some issues, because of burdens of judgment, disagreement can be persistent, even though agents properly employ their epistemic capacities. Thus, we have reasonable pluralism (ibid: 54–58). This is the result of disagreement among agents who cannot arrive at consensus on some matters, not because of their faults, but because of burdens of judgment.

The concept of burdens of judgment can be taken as the negative side of the epistemic part of description of reasonable agents. It indicates that epistemic imperfection is not necessarily the fault of epistemic agents. Specifically, in Rawls's terms, this is not the fault of reasonable persons. This negative side can be complemented by a positive side, by description of epistemic merits of reasonable persons. This complement can be provided by virtue epistemology not included explicitly in the original Rawls's proposal.

As we have seen, virtue epistemology extends considerations from those primarily oriented to beliefs, like truth or justification, to those oriented to agents (Pribić Samaržija 2018: 66; Zagzebski 1996; 1998; 2003). Thus, epistemically virtuous agents are those that we praise for their epistemic merits, even if they do not reach the truth (but they have virtues that tend to lead to truth). In coherence with Rawls's theory, we can qualify such agents as reasonable agents, and attribute to them a moral status which puts an obligation on others that they justify public decisions to them. Thus, in Rawls's view, a political decision (in the proper domain) is legitimate when it is justified through reasons for which we can reasonably expect that they will be endorsed by reasonable agents, those that endorse certain political values and express epistemic virtue. This is a strong constraint on democratic decisions. Basically, legitimacy is disconnected from the acceptance of real-life agents and is instead related to

the acceptance of properly idealized agents. It is possible that the majority of citizens accept a decision, but that it is, nonetheless, not legitimate, and, then, for example, it can be legitimately overruled by the Supreme Court.

In what follows I remark the main advantages of the Rawlsian conception of legitimacy, over Pribić Samaržija's proposal.

4. Firstly, the Rawlsian conception properly highlights the distinction between the space of reasonable pluralism and the space that is not characterized by reasonable pluralism. It seriously takes in consideration the fact of persistent reasonable pluralism, and it makes a proper political use of this fact and this demarcation. Secondly, it can make a more coherent use of the resources of virtue epistemology than Pribić Samaržija.

I share Pribić Samaržija's fear of ignorance in politics, as well as of the violent implications that it may have (Pribić Samaržija 2018: 11). Relativization of truth and of epistemic values is a dangerous possible source of harms. This is why I warmly welcome her engagement in favour of democratic decision-making respectful of epistemic values. However, I remark a parallel fear, the one related to political processes that are inspired by alleged epistemic superiority and possession of truth in conditions of persistent reasonable pluralism. This worry represents the focus of public reason theorists, like John Rawls, and is also well represented by Gerald Gaus (1996; 2011).

He explains the deleterious effects of enforcing policies justified through alleged epistemic superiority and possession of truth in conditions of reasonable pluralism. In such situations, each individual pressures for the enforcement of her view about truth, or at least wants to be able to disrespect prescriptions that are enforced and she sees as wrong. "This was precisely Kant's understanding of the state of nature, where each claims the right to do what seems just and good to him, entirely independently of the opinion of others" (Gaus 2014: 569).

The important teaching is, as Gaus says, that enforcing truth in conditions of reasonable pluralism is enforcing only alleged truth with disruptive effects for social cooperation and reduction of society to a condition corresponding to the state of nature. Social harmony is lost, inimical relations in society are favoured, the door of repression and disrespect of citizens' rights and liberties is opened. Further, the status that reasonable agents (that are qualified in this way because of their political and epistemic virtues) deserve is neglected, because decisions are merely enforced over them by appeal to alleged truth, bypassing their merits and, importantly for the present discussion, the epistemic virtues values that they achieve.

However, there is a difference between attributing a decisive role for defining legitimacy to reasonable pluralism and attributing such a role to mere pluralism. We must not accept all beliefs as equally valid, and dismissing experts is not reasonable. Reasonable disagreement is not always present. The Rawlsian theory of legitimacy of public decisions distinguishes among conditions of reasonable pluralism and those where it is not present.

Reasonable pluralism might not be present for two reasons. On the one hand, there can be a possible decision that is supported by the best available reasons, and that is accessible to each reasonable agent. Refusing such a decision is simply unreasonable. Reasonable pluralism is fully excluded and in such a case it is legitimate to enforce such a decision. An example is represented by social issues that can be resolved on the basis of scientific evidence. Imagine that an issue is whether there is an obligation to vaccinate children, and the public dispute concerns whether vaccines are beneficial or harmful. We do not have reasonable pluralism here, because we have methods and conclusions of science which resolve the issue, as Rawls says when he attributes to these the status of valid public reasons. Obviously, the justificatory reasons are not directly available to each reasonable person but all of them have accessible reasons for establishing the reliability of scientists and scientific institutions, as Pribić Samaržija points out (2018: 215–216).

On the other hand, there are reasons that are conclusively defeated through reasons accessible to each reasonable person, like the thesis about the link between vaccination and autism (NHS, <https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/vaccinations/mmr-vaccine/>, accessed on December 28th, 2019). They cannot constitute public reasons and therefore proposals justified through them are legitimately dismissed as unreasonable. Such reasons cannot defeat proposals justified through valid public reasons, but reasonable pluralism can remain. This is not visible in the previous case, that offers an either / or alternative but it is visible in other cases. For example, imagine that we have defeated a conception of the good devoted to violence, disrespect of other persons, etc. as unreasonable. We have established that such a conception of the good does enter the space of reasonable pluralism, but there can still be other conceptions of the good that remain in this space.

These are possibilities admitted by the Rawlsian theory. In such cases, enforcing truth, or the best reasons, as well as declaring some proposals ineligible, can be legitimate. There may be moral considerations in favour of abstaining from doing this, as Pribić Samaržija claims by employing her hybrid view. She does not go all the way down the path of correctness view of public legitimacy, i.e. the view that public decisions are legitimate merely if they correspond to truth or are justified through the best reasons. This view is supported by Richard Arneson, who says that “It is not wrongfully disrespectful or morally illegitimate, *per se*, to impose state policy on me – even a coercive state policy, for that matter – when the policy is justified and my opposition is unjustified” (Arneson 2014: 133). Even in such cases, Pribić Samaržija says that epistemic reasons must be balanced with political values represented by equal rights. In fact, Arneson thinks that the correctness theory is respectful of political values. He says that no right is denied or harmed by the enforcement of decisions supported by truth or by the best reasons. In such cases, no citizen is entitled to object. Pribić Samaržija’s hybrid theory is opposed to this view of legitimacy (Pribić Samaržija 2018: 14, 93–95). In some cases, it can be legitimate to give up epistemic optimality for the sake of respect of equal rights.

I agree with balancing political and epistemic values (although I think that it deserves some further elaboration). The Rawlsian proposal, however, differs from Prijic Samaržija's for two reasons. First, the epistemic value which is part of the balancing does not necessarily have to be truth. In some cases, we do not know the truth or do not have accessible conclusive reasons that support any of the competing proposals. This is why the Rawlsian paradigm adds reasonableness (as the attribute of plural proposals in the set of eligible decisions) to truth, making these the epistemic values which have to be balanced for the legitimacy of public decisions.

Secondly, the Rawlsian paradigm also indicates epistemic reasons, and not only political and moral reasons, to deny the legitimacy of enforcing truth, which Prijic Samaržija considers legitimate. An example of this is the concept of reasonable pluralism which is explained based on the concepts of reasonable disagreement, burdens of judgment and virtue epistemology. As we see, the theory does not neglect epistemic merits. On the contrary, they are properly assessed.

In order to respect reasonable pluralism, public decisions (in Rawls's view, public decisions that regard human rights and liberties and matters of basic justice) must be justified through reasons that all reasonable citizens can accept (Rawls 2005: 137). These reasons represent the justificatory consensual basis in Rawls's theory.

At this point, a problem highlighted by Prijic Samaržija appears. Sometimes we can suspend decisions, or we can postpone them, or we can leave them to the freedom of citizens. In other cases, we need immediate public decisions. Prijic Samaržija's (at least, *pro tanto*, in virtue of her hybrid theory) recommendation is to do epistemically better, overcome reasonable pluralism, and enforce the decision that corresponds to truth (Prijic Samaržija 2018: 231). This sounds good, but unfortunately, in some cases doing better can still require a long time before finding answers that overcome reasonable pluralism, and therefore reasonable pluralism persists. What is the Rawlsian alternative?

In such cases, the Rawlsian view attributes legitimacy to choosing through a fair procedure among proposals that are in a set of eligible decisions (proposals in the space of reasonable pluralism). This view is respectful of epistemic considerations in a balanced way. It denies eligibility to epistemically defeated proposals, while it properly respects the plurality of reasonable proposals. The fair procedure of choice among eligible proposals is democratic and inclusive, without dangers of serious epistemic flaws. First, such dangers are already eliminated because only reasonable proposals are eligible. Second, they are excluded in virtue of a reason that Prijic Samaržija indicates when she speaks about the competence of agents. Even when the agents are not directly competent to evaluate the complex justification of proposals, citizens are competent to recognize the merits of experts (*ibid*: 215–216). It is thus not an easy task to exclude their participation in the final decision-making procedure. In fact, I think that there are not victorious reasons for doing this.

5. The Rawlsian conception of legitimacy is respectful, in a balanced way, of epistemological values, and offers a theory of legitimacy of public decisions that is both sensible to reasonable pluralism, as well as to conditions for overcoming it (although its focus is originally on situations of reasonable pluralism).

This conception is more in conformity with virtue epistemology, as it is described in the initial part of Prijic Samaržija's book. As we have seen above, "Virtue epistemology [...] allows us to attribute cognitive successes or failures to individuals, groups or institutions - even when it would be dubious or downright impossible to assess their agency in terms of truth" (ibid: 69). Thus, virtue epistemology represents a good model to define reasonable pluralism and eligible proposals. Reasonable pluralism is a condition where we can attribute epistemic merits to agents, even when we cannot confirm the truth of their claims.

Because of its merits in conceptualizing reasonable pluralism, in my view, virtue epistemology represents an important complement to Rawls's theory of legitimacy that properly instantiates its epistemological message in the political domain. On the other hand, the political normative implications of virtue epistemology, are somewhat lost in the final part of Prijic Samaržija's book, or at least I believe so.

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Elvio Bakarini

Javni um i demokratija pouzdanosti

Apstrakt

Članak započinje skiciranjem hibridne teorije Prijić Samaržije. Nakon toga, nudi se pregled teorije epistemologije vrline, kojoj Prijić Samaržija pripisuje relevantan uticaj na njen vlastiti položaj, kao i one demokratije pouzdanosti koja je u temelju njenog viđenja demokratskog legitimiteta. Nadalje, njen predlog se raspravlja i suočava s donekle izmenjenom verzijom vodeće liberalne demokratske teorije demokratske legitimnosti, koju je formulisao i branio John Rawls.

Ključne reči: ekspertizam, Prijić Samaržija, javni um, socijalna epistemologija, Rawls

Kristina Lekić Barunčić

BIOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE RELIABILITY DEMOCRACY

ABSTRACT

In this paper, I shall present the theoretical view on the reliability democracy as presented in Prijić Samaržija's book *Democracy and Truth* (2018), and examine its validity through the case of the division of epistemic labour in the process of deliberation on autism treatment policies. It may appear that because of their strong demands, namely, the demand for rejection of medical authority and for exclusive expertise on autism, autistic individuals gathered around the neurodiversity movement present a threat to the reliability democracy.

KEYWORDS

reliability democracy,
Autism Spectrum,
epistemic injustice,
biological citizens,
experts

Introduction

Snježana Prijić Samaržija's most recent book, entitled, *Democracy and Truth*, provides us with an overview of the model for adequate institutional decision-making. Such model, called *the reliability democracy*, recognizes that the most optimal way to generate truth-oriented decisions in the democratic procedures is through the division of epistemic labour between experts and citizens. Each party in the decision-making process has an important role: citizens set goals for society, experts find the best ways to reach those goals. In such interaction, the emphasis is put on exhibiting trustworthiness to experts, who, given their education, training and experience, are most adequate to deliver epistemically optimal decisions.

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the reliable democratic mechanisms could be applied to deliberative practices that are less-formalized than policy-making practices, namely to practices of deliberating on autism treatment. In such deliberation, there are two parties: citizens who are diagnosed with autism and medical professionals as experts. The autistic citizens in question are those who are on the higher-scale on autism spectrum, meaning that their autistic condition is not severe as they properly function without or with small amount of assistance. Such individuals are the driving force behind *the neurodiversity movement* - a type of civil rights movement that raises awareness on autism, strengthens autistic voices and advocates for autism

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acceptance. Moreover, the movement seeks to de-pathologize autism by rejecting the medical practices that consider it to be disorder. Rather, the neurodiversity advocates call for re-interpretation of autism as a valuable difference in human genome pooling that must not be eradicated, but celebrated (Ortega 2009: 425–445). Following the activistic path of biological citizenship project which insists on self-expertise of individuals with specific biological conditions, neurodiversity advocates reject the authority of medical professionals and claim expertise on autism. Considering the disagreement on autism expertise and the lack of trust between neurodiverse citizens and experts, it may appear that there is no room for division of epistemic labour in the process of deliberation on autism treatment policies. Thus, the question that this paper posit is the following: *Is the neurodiversity movement a threat to the reliability democracy as presented by Prijic Samaržija (2018)?* I claim that the answer is negative, and will present it as follows.

In the first section of the paper I shall state general remarks on the problem between democratic and epistemic justification of democracy and present Prijic Samaržija's (2018) solution to this tension, namely, the reliability democracy theory. Once showed how division of epistemic labour functions in theory, I will explore how it works in practice, namely on the example of the division of labour between medical professionals and neurodiverse biological citizens. Therefore, in the second part of the paper, I will elaborate two distinct projects: *neurodiversity* and *biological citizenship* projects. The neurodiversity movement is an activist project aimed at strengthening autism rights and raising awareness of autism as a difference, a natural human variation. Biological citizenship, on the other hand, is a formation behind the project of creating new types of citizens - biological citizens - who share the same biological states and advocate for better position in the society. Since both movements are based on identification with the biological condition on the basis of which the person seeks special treatment, resources and policies, in this paper I use the notion of *neurodiverse biological citizens*. The latter notion refers to autistic persons who accept the principles of the citizenship project, and call on their adherents to develop a skepticism about the postulates of the medical profession, considering that autistics are, on the grounds of possessing experiential knowledge, the real experts who should demand monopoly in terms of the policy-making related to their medical conditions. The latter is based on patient activism movements rebelled against the myth of the infallible expertise of doctors and medical professionals. However, such practices are not without their cause. As will present in the third section of the paper, the reasons for exhibiting distrust to experts is to be found in the systematic mistreatment of people with autism throughout history, with their voices being systematically silenced and excluded from the discussions on autism. Once we understand what are the reasons behind such practices, we could try to reconcile the tensions between autistic individuals and medical professionals. This reconciliation is possible through the strengthening of communication between autistic individuals and medical professionals, valuing autistic lived experience, and

inclusion of both medical professionals and neurodiverse biological citizens in the division of epistemic labour.

1. Reliability Democracy – In Theory

Social systems have a causal influence on the formation of beliefs. Systems like science and education have the primary goal of producing beliefs that are true rather than false, providing an epistemic, truth-determining aspect. It seems that the truth, even in some systems which do not have it as their primary goal, presents an important part of the sustainability and justification of such systems. Likewise, the justification of democracy, alongside political, should be epistemic, considering its aim of producing epistemically optimal mechanisms for producing beliefs, judgments or making decisions. One of the themes of social epistemology targets towards reconciliation of political – equality of all citizens – with epistemic values – generation of truth-oriented political decisions. Where exactly lies the tension between political and epistemic values? The latter can be portrayed as following: equality, on the one hand, ensures citizens a place in the decision-making processes, but, on the other hand, not all citizens have equal competence to make informed and critical judgments regarding different political issues. Thus, even though citizen participation is a fundamental political value, it seems that its preservation does not assure epistemically optimal deliberation. Bearing this discrepancy in mind, we may claim that it is better to rely on the experts and their professional knowledge.

Citizens have different interests and specialize in different fields, inevitably becoming more competent than others and gaining expertise. This is why we cannot expect every citizen to be equally informed or competent to make an epistemically optimal decision. Therefore, it appears that the only way we can generate decisions of optimal or high epistemic quality is to accept the fact that there are persons who are epistemically more capable and qualified to make decisions than others, i.e., who are experts.¹ Concerning different types of expertise, the process of collective decision-making calls for the intellectual division of labor depending on the matter of discussion. Admittedly, if we bring experts into the deliberation process, it seems that although we have increased the possibility that the decision will be truth-oriented, we have neglected the democratic value of equality. The concern that follows is, as Thomas Christiano formulates, a question of “how can we enjoy the advantages of division of labor and politics while treating each other as equals?” (2012: 28). According to Prijčić Samaržija, neither the mere consensus nor the sheer inclusion of experts can guarantee the preservation of both epistemic and political justification

1 Alvin Goldman (2001) defines an expert as someone who (1) has an amount of true beliefs that in a great manner differ from the amount ordinary citizens have and that meets threshold with respect to (a) the subject matter in a domain, and (b) the ideas and arguments within the community of experts, and (2) a set of skills them to test the ideas and arguments.

of democracy; we need truth sensitive procedures, i.e., procedures that presuppose the division of epistemic labor between citizens and experts, which strive to unite epistemic desiderata with equality and freedom. She finds that the approach which could guarantee both epistemic and democratic quality is *the reliability democracy*, a concept introduced by Alvin Goldman (2010). Reliability democracy is “a position wherein it is claimed that institutions, social practices, and systems are justified if they involve reliable procedures – methods or mechanisms that produce epistemically valuable beliefs and decisions” (Prijic Samaržija 2018: 18). As Goldman explained, in order to set up such reliable procedures, we need to set the exact roles and obligations for both experts and citizens who are involved in the division of epistemic labor.

The role of the citizens is triple: (i) citizens collectively choose the aims of the society and all the goals they wish to achieve, (ii) they are the sources of different and competing research programs in various expert domains, and (iii) they are the evaluators of the pursuit of aims to whom the rest of society is accountable (Prijic Samaržija 2018: 213). The reliance citizens have on experts is based on an epistemic need derived from epistemic dependence and lack of expertise. The notion of expert, on the other hand, includes relevant epistemic authority in that they are comparatively the best available guides to truth (or the avoidance of epistemic errors), due to their education and training. Thus, the role of the expert should be determining how to implement, using their special expertise, the goals proposed by citizens. In this manner, the role of citizens is to decide about social/political priorities and aims, while the role of experts is deciding about the methods of attaining these goals. Experts in specific areas present relevant epistemic authorities whose judgments, most commonly, lead to truth, and ensure higher epistemic quality. Citizens simply do not have the same level of expertise that would allow them to appraise the content of expert’s beliefs, judgments, and decisions. Our reliance, as non-experts, on experts derives from epistemic dependence, but, even if we cannot have comprehensive understanding, our trust “would be epistemically justified as long as they have enough evidence about the reliability of procedures through which experts make their decisions” (ibid: 216). Thus, as Prijic Samaržija strongly stresses, the insufficient level of expertise or experience does not automatically withdraw that citizens’ trust should be blind or even gullible, nor that citizens are forced into deferring their beliefs to experts. Citizens must have, she continues, relevant epistemic access to decisions, which reinforces their position within the division. The position that she advocates is the internalist approach, the one which stresses the necessity of more participation of citizens and policy makers to decisions.

They have to participate in the decision making procedure in an epistemically more active and responsible way: their confidence in experts and reliable democratic procedures needs to be based on awareness of their epistemically dependent position and, consequently, on an epistemically conscientious rationale behind relying upon experts and democratic mechanisms that ensure the truth-sensitivity of decisions. (ibid: 215).

Instead of blindly believing in experts, citizens have to rely on experts based on reason – understanding why is it rational to rely on experts, and evidence – to appraise the trustworthiness of experts. Empowering the role of citizens in the division of epistemic labor, Prijic Samaržija insists that they should be the ones assessing which expert deserves trustworthiness and whether reliable mechanisms truly succeed in preserving it. She thus enhances the role and importance that citizens play in deliberative democracy processes, preserving their position of the drivers of the society. Nevertheless, for some citizens the increased role in the decision-making process is not satisfactory. Such citizens want autonomy in making decisions that affect their lives, with the belief that those in a position of power (i.e. experts) do not understand their needs. Specifically, the case of the former is found in the emerging formations of the two projects – *biological citizenship* (also called *bio-citizenship*) and *neurodiversity movement* – that call on their adherents to develop a skepticism about the postulates of the medical profession, considering that patients are, on the grounds of possessing experiential knowledge, the real experts who should demand monopoly in terms of the policy-making related to their medical conditions.

2. Neurodiverse Biological Citizenship

Ariana Petryna, an anthropologist that coined the term, defines *biological citizenship* as “a massive demand for, but selective access to, a form of social welfare based on medical, scientific and legal criteria that both acknowledge biological injury and compensation for it”. (2002: 6). Thus, what is at the core of the biological citizenship project is a demand for particular protection, for particular policies and/or actions and access to special resources. In this manner, biological citizenship is to be understood as an active form of citizenship that produces new identities, claims to expertise and access to resources oriented around biological claims related to their condition. Hernan Venzuela and Isabel Zamora (2013) recognize the emphasis on the active role of biological citizens and defines the term as an active political identity that re-interprets patients’ relationship with their biological bodies as citizens, and through which citizens frame their political demands and challenge authorities. Consequently, the citizenship has a collectivizing moment through biosocial grouping, i.e. collectivities formed around a biological conception of a shared identity, which even includes a kind of activist grouping, as opposed to the passive patienthood (Rosa and Novas 2005: 143). The latter is somewhat of the driving force of the *neurodiversity movement*², an activist movement “that implies that neurological difference is best understood as an inherent and valuable part of

2 Within the era of brainhood, even not directly tied to it, the neurodiversity movement, a movement for the acceptance of neurological pluralism, emerged. Interestingly, the extent of neurological pluralism was soon linked to the civil rights movement, making the quest for neurodiversity recognition and acceptance expanded to some sort of new form of a minority group.

the range of human variation, rather than a pathological form of difference” (Dyck and Russell 2019: 170). In this paper, I am specifically interested in what I refer to as *neurodiverse biological citizens*, i.e. a group of biological citizens gathered around their specific biological condition called autism spectrum conditions, who accept the postulates of both the neurodiversity movement and the bio-citizenship project.

Autism spectrum conditions present a spectrum of lifelong neurodevelopmental disorders whose main diagnostic criteria are (1) impairment in behaviors within social/communication domain and (2) sensory issues and/or repetitive restrictive behaviors.³ Autism involves a wide spectrum from low-functioning autistic disorder to high-functioning autistic conditions (formerly called Asperger’s syndrome). The specificity of this disorder is precisely its heterogeneity, which makes it difficult to set an adequate diagnosis. Essentially, the diagnosis depends, alongside medical observation, on the person’s descriptions, often on the testimonies of the person who is not a patient, that is, a person suffering from an autistic disorder, but on a testimonies of a person who is not on the spectrum, that is, caregivers or parents. This is where the setting of “spoiled identity” occurs as the process by which a patient is marked or stigmatized to the point where stigma disqualifies a stigmatized individual from full social acceptance (Fitzpatrick, 2008: 294). The neurodiversity movement recognizes the problems of stigmatization of the autism, as they claim that “people with autistic spectrum disorders are not victims of autism, they are victims of society (...), they suffer from prejudice, ignorance, lack of understanding, exploitation, verbal abuse – all this and more from the sector of society which considers itself socially able.” (Hewson 2001) This is why neurodiversity advocates refer to the social model of disability, which understands disability as a socially constructed phenomenon. According to the social model (also referred to as “the minority model”), the society is the one that disables people with impairments, given that the “the physical and social environment impose limitations upon certain categories of people” (Oliver 1981: 28). Supporters of the neurodiversity go a step further by arguing that autism should not be described in terms of medical diagnostics at all, since it is not a pathology, but such a type of normal variation of the human population, in terms of different brain wiring.⁴

Changing the paradigm of autism, neurodivergent biological citizens demand a change in policies related to autism, raising their autistic voices. As Rose and Novas affirmed: “biological citizenship requires active political engagement – it is a manner of becoming political. A certain amount of education and technical administration is required to make one’s individual and collective voice heard” (2005: 454). The activism starts with neurodiverse biological citizens

3 American Psychiatric Association 2013, 299.00; F84.0.

4 Autism self-advocates claim that autism is not a pathology, but that their brains are ‘wired’ in an atypical way, differing from the neurotypical brain. See. Dyck and Russell, 2019:167–187.

themselves and their identification with their condition, which is evident in the claims for the inseparability of the person from the disorder. Proponents of the neurodiversity movement insist that autism is an integral part of a person, making up a large part of their identity.⁵ The second step is the acquisition of scientific competence, which will help a neurodivergent biological citizen to gain a better understanding of her biological condition, but also to engage in the process of biomedical self-shaping and re-shaping the public image the biological condition in question. One of the goals of education is collectivizing, that is, it is about disseminating information, raising awareness, campaigning for rights and combat stigma, and sharing experiences with other citizens with whom they share a specific biological condition. However, the ultimate goal of the processes of education and self-education is to “demand their own say in the development and deployment of medical expertise” (Rose and Novas 2005: 144). Thus, once self-shaped and self-educated, the neurodiverse biological citizens shape health policies and form the so-called *patient expertise*⁶. In this manner, active neurodiverse biological citizens exhibit distrust of the medical professions, as they claim that lived experiences of autistic persons are more insightful and more complex than any clinical assessments. Namely, this can be traced in the motto of the neurodiversity movement “Nothing about us, without us”, which calls for equal access of neurodiverse biological citizens into a pooling of information and policy-making processes.

Given that autistic individuals have the experience of living with autism, and education through the processes of informing about their condition, neurodiverse biological citizens claim autism expertise, positioning as more informed and more competent for questions related to autism than medical experts. The idea behind reclaiming expertise can be associated to Foucault’s “knowledge of the oppressed or subjugated”, a theory that the subjected knowledge can create new epistemological space, and even be a form of resistance as it has a different relation to the social power than the dominant knowledge.⁷ Foucault does not use the subjugated knowledge as naive and beneath the required level of cognition in pejorative terms, but rather, to express the position of the disqualified discourses from the dominant ones. Through education, self-education, attending scientific conferences, acquisition of scientific language,

5 Autism activists insist on the identity first language, as a way of referring to a person emphasizing their disability as their identity. (URL: <https://www.autismacceptancemonth.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/AAM-Identity-First-Language.pdf>).

6 The term “expert patient” first appeared in the UK Parliament in 1999 as an initiative to help deal with chronic illness, based on “developing the confidence and motivation of patients to use their skills and knowledge to take effective control over life with a chronic illness” (Tattersall 2001: 228).

7 “...I believe by subjugated knowledge one should understand something else, something which is a sense in altogether different, namely a whole set of knowledge that has been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated; naive knowledge, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity.” (Foucault 1980: 82).

and reading scientific literature, active neurodiverse biological citizens aim at presenting themselves, Epstein (1995) recognizes, as *representatives*, i.e. the legitimate, organized voice of people with certain biological states.⁸

Referring to their autistic identity, advocates of neurodiversity position find that their autistic rights are violated by treatment or any medical or psychological intervention. They believe that the differences and uniqueness of autistic individuals should be, not only tolerated, but celebrated as the differences of any minority group. For the most extreme neurodiversity advocates, the search for a cure or adequate therapies that would reduce autistic characteristics presents the intolerance toward diversity and the promotion of eugenics policies. Therefore, they demand that autistic persons be treated as the only experts on autism, as evidenced by a petition made by autistic self-advocates to the United Nations in 2004, asking to be recognized as a “minority social group” deserving protection against the “inhuman treatment” made by professionals (Ortega, 2009: 429). It is evident that autistic persons do not trust the experts, that is, medical and psychiatric professionals. Before we try to sort out the problem of distrust, in the next section, I shall investigate what socio-epistemic deviations influenced the development of distrust in the first place.

3. The Raise of Autistic Voices

In her book, Prijic Samaržija insets a valuable debate about the dynamics between social power and knowledge. She relies on Miranda Fricker’s definition of social power as an agent’s (individuals or groups) ability to change or influence the state of affairs in the social world. Fricker (2007) recognizes that such practice heavily depends on the collective concept of social identity related to prejudice and stereotypes towards the specific social group and their social status, with the power of generating social and epistemic marginalization of the vulnerable social groups (Fricker 2007). Fricker emphasizes that this relation between social power (associated with stereotypes and prejudices) and *epistemic injustice* (a wrong done to an individual or a group specified in their capacity as a *knower*⁹) is one of the most important epistemological problems. In the context of the tension between citizens and experts, it is interesting to examine more closely the consequences of epistemic injustice, especially of *testimonial injustice*, a subtype of epistemic injustice that occurs when the testimony of a person is given less credibility than it deserves due to a prejudice of a person’s group. As I claimed elsewhere¹⁰, autistic persons are victims of

8 Epstein (1996) offered an analysis of techniques for establishing credibility and suggests that “certain particular kinds of social movements, when pursuing certain distinctive strategies, can acquire credibility within certain specific domains of scientific practice”.

9 In our everyday life, we recognize a person as a knower if she “participates in the sharing of information” (ibid: 144–145).

10 Details omitted for the reviewing process.

persistent and systematic testimonial injustice. Many experts in the position of power completely ignore autistic voices and treat their testimonies as less valuable or completely silence them based on prejudice that autistic individuals cannot make sense of their experience. Such treatment has led to the development of mistrust not only for medical professionals but also for a society that reinforces autistic stereotypes and deepens the stigmatization and marginalization of such individuals. In such circumstances, neurodiverse biological citizens demand respect and recognition, whilst pointing out how medical, psychological, political and educational elites of experts entirely exclude autistic perspectives, giving the privilege to parents, caregivers and medical experts as if the autistics' testimonies are untrustworthy. Needless to say that non-autistics' (parents and caregivers) understandings of needs and lived experiences of persons on the autism spectrum are often poor and sometimes even inadequate, which can reflect in challenges in accessing appropriate treatments.

The strongest criticism of neurodivergent biological citizens directed at experts is that they fail at exhibiting trustworthiness towards autistic individuals. In other words, experts fail to treat autistic people as authentic sources of knowledge.¹¹ Autism advocates claim that an autistic testimony needs approval and validation from a neurotypical person, and too often it has been rejected completely, provoking misunderstandings and stereotypes about autistic identity. Thus, the ultimate goal is to reclaim trustworthiness, alter the public image of autism as a devastating tragedy and converse from "victims" into "activist-experts" who take part in the decision-making processes. By taking a seat at the decision-making table and entering into discussion, activist-experts want their testimony as people with lived experience to be considered essential, to reclaim their positions of representatives, and to have a prominent role in the decision-making processes related to their conditions. In this context, the question is whether the role of citizens as emphasized by Prijjić Samaržija is sufficiently compelling to neurodiverse biological citizens, or will they require greater involvement in decision-making processes? I argue for the first, considering that with the empowerment of citizens, Prijjić Samaržija offered a legitimate reconciliation between neurodiverse biological citizens and experts, simultaneously preserving epistemic and democratic values of deliberative democracy. The latter will be presented in the following section.

4. The Reliability Democracy – In Practice

Can neurotypical persons be experts on autism matters? is the epistemological problem that underlies the neurodiverse citizenship versus experts debate. On the one hand, we can reasonably assume that medical professionals who have adequate education, training, and experience (alongside resources and body of evidence) can legitimately claim autism expertise. However, on the other

¹¹ To trust another person simply means to treat her as a source of knowledge (Faulkner 2002).

hand, we can also reasonably assume that the lived experiences and testimonies of autistic individuals are an integral part of the knowledge about autism and its manifestation. Although the two presumptions seem separate and opposing, reconciliation might be reachable if we consider the possibility of social mechanisms and procedures that will include neurodiverse biological citizens, their testimonies, claims, and needs. Such practices involve strengthening communication between experts and citizens, one that does not do epistemic injustice but treats all participants in the conversation as equals with equally valuable, albeit different, knowledge. In this case, I believe it is necessary to apply mechanisms of the reliability democracy that will divide the epistemic labor and establish the basis for equitable participation in the production of knowledge and in making epistemically optimal decisions.

How can this be applied to the problem between neurodiverse biological citizens and experts? First of all, I strongly suggest that both parties must be guided by intellectual virtues, in particular, open-mindedness and intellectual humility, in order to properly take into account the views of the opposite party.¹² It seems irrational to question whether a doctor who has proper education, experience in interacting with autistic persons and has a specific body of evidence on the medical features of autism, is, in fact, an expert. Likewise, I claim that the neurodiverse biological citizens who demand exclusive expertise posit their claims on irrational grounds. Namely, recall that Prijić Samaržija argued that citizens must have to rely on experts based on reason - understanding why is it rational to rely on experts, and evidence - to appraise the trustworthiness of experts. It seems that neurodiverse biological citizens do not understand that it is rational to presuppose that there are experts who are more informed, more educated and more competent to make optimal epistemic decisions, as they are the best available guides to truth. Clearly, disagreements among neurodiverse biological citizens and experts on whether autism is a disorder or an identity and consequently whether autism should be cured or accepted as a difference will vary depending on what conception of autism one acknowledges. In this manner, Ortega (2009) recognizes that not all autistic individuals agree that autism should not be treated, referring to those who are on the lower end of the spectrum, i.e. those who have severe autism, with severe behavioral problems or suffering. Considering the heterogeneity of the autism spectrum, it seems very hard, and even impossible, to establish who has the authority to speak on behalf of all people with autism.

It is clear that the raise of the distrust towards the community of experts results from the systematic discrimination against autistic persons regarding their credibility and the ability to understand their experiences and their states. The upsurge of autism activism and the neurodiversity movement strive for empowerment, but such empowerment of the autistic community must focus

12 Evidently, there is a strong correlation between the psycho-social dimension of intelligence that recognizes the possibility of effects like stereotype threat and the development and expression of the intellectual virtues.

on establishing a doctor-patient relationship in which patients will not take the position of either an expert or a passive patient. Rather, by applying Prijic Samaržija's proposition, neurodiverse biological citizens, must carry out the role of assessing which experts deserve trustworthiness and whether reliable mechanisms truly succeed in preserving it. It is up to them and to other citizens to establish to whom will they acknowledge expertise, which knowledge claims are to be accounted as credible and to collect enough evidence about the reliability of procedures through which experts will make their decisions. Experts, on the other hand, need to consider the testimonies of autistic persons as valid and relevant to decision making processes.

When talking about autistics' credibility, a certain caution is advised. Given that autism is a specific condition because of its heterogeneous spectrum, it is false to claim that all autistic individuals are trustworthy and that all cases of distrust are cases of epistemic injustice. Individuals with lower-functioning autism may not be included in the process of information exchange, based on the valid reasons of his or her current individual medical conditions and abilities. What is important, however, is for experts who enter into testimonial exchange with a neurodiverse biological citizen not to hold prejudice of any kind, but to estimate the trustworthiness of an autistic speaker without their assessment being infected by prejudices and stereotypes about autism.

On top of the roles that Prijic Samaržija discusses, I believe it is necessary to emphasize the strengthening of communication as an additional role shared by both experts and citizens. The AIDS community activism can serve as an example of a requirement for such a practice. Specifically, once allowed to enter information pooling, AIDS activists urged experts to reconsider previously established treatment practices and drug regulation (Epstein 1996). The role of citizens must be active rather than passive, especially in communicating with experts and setting goals. Equally, not only do I see room for such collaboration between neurodiverse biological citizens and experts, but I find such practice to be present. Namely, it was the activism of the neurodiversity movement that advocated for the recognition of cognitive strengths and abilities related to autistic conditions (some of which being abilities for hyper-systemizing, detail-oriented perception, local information processing, etc.), which was further investigated and adopted in the form of policies practiced by medical professionals, psychologists, caregivers, and educational workers (Baron-Cohen et al. 2009).

5. Conclusion

One of the goals of the book *Democracy and Truth* is discovering the optimal division of epistemic labor in the deliberative procedures that will not be consistent in some philosophically idealized world but will properly function in the real world society. This emphasis on the current state of affairs and the improvement of cooperation between experts and citizens in the real world, is, I feel, the most valuable contribution of this book.

In this paper, I have tried to show how Snježana Prijic Samaržija's proposal works in the real-world example, namely in the division of labor between experts and neurodiverse biological citizens. Although it may appear that because of the strong disagreement on who deserves to be treated as experts on autism, the neurodiversity movement could present a certain difficulties for the reliability democracy, I conclude that this is not the case. I hope that I have been able to present how, by empowering communication and adopting intellectual virtues, alongside respecting the mechanisms of the reliability democracy, experts and citizens can work towards the better achievement of set goals and, ultimately, a better society.

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Kristina Lekić Barunčić

Biološko građanstvo u demokratiji pouzdanosti

Apstrakt

U ovom ću radu predstaviti model demokratije pouzdanosti kako ga razumije Prijic Samaržija (2018) te ću ispitati njegovu valjanost kroz slučaj podele epistemičkog posla u procesima donošenja odluka o terapiji i lečenju autističnih poremećaja. Rad analizira na koji način demokratija pouzdanosti može pomiriti neurodivergentne, biološke građane koji se zalažu za odbacivanje medicinskih autoriteta i autonomiju u pogledu donošenja odluka koje se tiču njihovih života, s jedne strane, s profesionalnim ekspertima na polju autizma, s druge strane.

Ključne reči: demokracija pouzdanosti, spektar autizma, epistemička nepravda, biološki građani, eksperti

Ivana Janković

EPISTEMIC FEATURE OF DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF EXPERT IN DEMOCRATIC DECISION MAKING

ABSTRACT

In her book *Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues*, Snježana Prijić Samaržija advocates that a purely procedural justification which defines the authority and legitimacy of democracy only in relation to the fairness of the procedure itself is not enough for a full justification of democracy. Some epistemic values should also be included. This epistemic quality of democracy depends on the quality of the decisions that the democratic procedures produce. In that sense, the author is advocating a hybrid theory that secures harmony between political and epistemic values, favoring deliberative procedure for this purpose, and thus promotes equal respect for both democratic values. In doing so, she is advocating the specific type of division of epistemic labor that I will attempt to critically re-examine here, as well as to bring into question the privileged role of the experts in democratic decision-making.

KEYWORDS

epistemic democracy,
cognitive diversity,
bounded rationality,
deliberative democracy

The book *Democracy and Truth* gives good insights and an overview of social epistemology and theories about epistemic justification of democracy, especially deliberative democracy. It has in focus a recent discussion on epistemic values of democracy¹ – the potential of its procedures to produce epistemically valuable decisions – as addition to a more traditional, purely procedural justification that defines legitimacy and authority of democracy only in relation to fairness of its procedures, regardless of the outcomes they produce. This book deals with an alleged opposition between *democracy as a system that enables and protects moral and political values* (such as fairness, equality, freedom, dignity, autonomy etc.) and *truth*, arguing in favor of a hybrid position that respects both values. In this text, however, I'd like to raise several issues concerning concerning the last chapter of the book – “Reliability Democracy and the Role of Experts in a Democratic Society”. In this chapter the author promotes a hybrid

1 David Estlund was first to argue that the normative concept of democratic authority must include an epistemic dimension (Estlund 2008).

approach that aims to develop truth-sensitive procedures that presuppose the division of epistemic labor between citizens and experts and at the same time preserve political values. The author concludes that we can say that there are experts in the domain of politics, that citizens should trust their experts and that involvement in political decision making ensures higher epistemic quality.

The author supports the solution for (alleged) conflict between political and epistemic values of democracy, proposed by Thomas Christiano, which (in order to keep both) implies the necessity of division of the epistemic labor. According to his view, we need to be aware of the distinction between the moral and the technical knowledge (Christiano 2008). We can say and (mostly) agree on who the technical experts are, but we can't agree so clearly about moral expertise. We cannot simply give more political power or political authority to those who are well educated and "know better" (Estlund 2008, Christiano 2008), as Plato suggested (Plato 2000). But this doesn't mean that expertise is irrelevant or that in politics everyone is equal in terms of knowledge. So, the author agrees with Christiano that there should exist some division of epistemic labor between the expert and the citizens, which would secure both values – the demand for political equality and the epistemic reliability of democratic decision making. In this sense, the role of citizens is to choose the aims of the society they live in and to evaluate whether the socially valuable and desirable goals are met or not (through deliberation). The role of the citizens is to identify problems, choose aims and evaluate experts, politicians and their proposed ways to reach those aims and values. On the other side, the experts are those that possess the necessary knowledge that ordinary citizens do not, and so they are, in the end, those who solve problems and find the best means to fulfill the aims that the citizens have agreed upon.

1.

I would like to bring into question this presupposed trust we should have in experts. The reason for that is not because they are not better at knowing things. They are. The reason is the cognitive functioning of all human individuals, including experts. As a matter of fact, the extensive and very significant empirical literature generated over the last three decades shows that the actual decision-making process often deviates from the normative assumptions of a theory that starts from an ideal decision maker who has all the information, who can calculate with perfect precision and who is completely rational. Herbert Simon and his colleague, the political scientist James Marsh, have developed the thesis of "bounded rationality", which departs from the assumptions made by neoclassical economics – perfect rationality assumed by models of *homo economicus* (March & Simon 1958). This limited rationality assumes not only that an individual may not have all the information he or she needs, but that even if they did, they would not be able to process them adequately. The human mind necessarily limits itself. The expert's mind as well.

Today's dominant approaches to the study of decision-making, judging and reasoning have convincingly demonstrated the existence of numerous errors that are, more importantly, systematic, identical and predictable to most members of our species. These phenomena have been termed cognitive illusions or biases, and everyone is prone to them - from "ordinary people" to experts (they are not truly objective and "neutral" and they also suffer from various cognitive limitations). According to argumentative theory of reasoning, this unquestionable fact about our cognitive functioning causes the reasoning to work best within the group (Mercier & Sperber 2011). According to this theory, group decision-making can compensate for the limitations of individual decision-making, judging and reasoning. Their model indicates that during public deliberation, when discussing diverse opinions, group reasoning outweighs individual, no matter who that individual is. In other words, this bold assumption leads to the conclusion that not only is cognition not damaged by social processes and social needs, but rather that all the cognitive illusions we are systematically inclined to come precisely through the use of reason in isolation, i.e. out of group.

2.

These findings are consistent with deliberative democracy assumptions and epistemic justification of deliberation. Helen Landemore, referring to the results obtained by Hong and Page argues that democracies and democratic decisions satisfy both conditions of legitimacy (procedural and epistemic), because what enables democratic decision-making, under certain conditions, to be of greater epistemic value than any other alternative form of decision making is the existence of cognitive diversity within a political decision-making group (Landemore 2013; Hong & Page 2004, Page 2008).

Cognitive diversity implies the existence of different perspectives, heuristics, interpretations, predicative models. But, Page says that his model of cognitive diversity can be applied to economic and democratic decision making only for the cases where group jointly solves problems or predicts an unknown outcome (deliberation and aggregation). However, there are conditions under which a group of diverse members achieves better outcomes than individuals or a small group of like-minded people, even if they are also its best members (experts). Their findings suggest that in the case of opinion aggregation, cognitive diversity is just as important as individual ability. However, for a better quality of collective response in the context of deliberation, i.e. problem solving, cognitive diversity is more important than individual ability. In other words, when it comes to problem solving, and certain conditions are satisfied, diversity trumps ability (Page 2007, 2008). The logic behind this claim is that large or randomly formed groups are more likely to be diverse, while a small group made up of those who meet a certain criterion (expertise, education, material status etc.) will often be made up of people who think alike.

In other words, individuals who are identified as the best at solving problems (experts) will most likely have similar perspectives and heuristics and so likely to be “stuck” in the same places (Landemore 2012).

Of course, this will not always work. One of the conditions that Page and Hong define is that this diversity must be relevant, that is, there must be some kind of competence of decision makers (Hong & Page 2004; Page 2008). This condition is not strict as in the case of Condorcet’s Theorem (Condorcet 1785), but only requires that citizens can understand the problem in question and that they can distinguish better from worse decisions. So, when talking about the problem of competence of ordinary citizens, it is necessary to distinguish between the (non) possession of factual knowledge and their cognitive ability to solve political problems when they are provided with relevant information and knowledge. And, as many deliberative experiments suggest, the problem with the lack of factual knowledge can be solved with the help of certain deliberative institutional mechanisms. This is important because the theorists who have argued anti-democratic conclusions have generally focused on the incompetence of ordinary citizens in terms of the knowledge and information they (don’t) possess.

So, according to Page and Hong findings, when the problem is complex and involves conditions of uncertainty (and most political problems in contemporary societies are just like that), the group’s epistemic performance will transcend the abilities of the individual. For the group to be better than any individual or any few people, even the smartest ones, individuals in it have to be relatively smart (minimal competence) and cognitively diverse.

I have claimed that the proposed way of division of cognitive labor may be reconsidered. When thinking about the competence of ordinary citizens, it is necessary to distinguish between (non) possession of factual knowledge and their cognitive ability to solve political problems when information and knowledge is presented to them (Landemore 2012). Individual competence will be defined by an individual’s ability to critically examine different arguments, with different reasons and evidence, and tell the difference between good and bad decisions. Regardless of their exposure to the same set of arguments (that are different among themselves), each individual has different cognitive “tools” to help her look at the problem in different ways, from a different perspective, focus on different dimensions of the problem, etc., allowing to satisfy the condition of independence. We can use the deliberative practice and institutions to increase the competence of ordinary citizens on issues that need to be solved, without disrupting the group’s cognitive diversity. Deliberative democrats showed that the ordinary citizens, when they were given the chance to become better informed through the process of public deliberation, can truly contribute to finding solutions even for issues and problems that are specifically technical (Fishkin & Lushkin 2005). Comparing the pre-deliberative and post-deliberative survey, it is evident that in the deliberation process, citizens become more informed about the discussed political issues (Ackerman & Fishkin 2005; Fishkin 2009; Fishkin, Luskin & Jowell 2000).

Concerning all said, my question is, then, why limit the role of the public only to decisions about *which* experts will make good political decisions and solve common problems? If we doubt the competence of ordinary citizens, if we say that they lack knowledge about complex issues which are essential for political problems resolution, how do citizens evaluate which experts are effective and who should be trusted and who will make best decisions? I am not arguing we don't need experts or that there are no experts in particular fields, but only that they shouldn't be the only ones who make decisions about complex common problems. Bearing in mind the proposed arguments based on idea of collective intelligence, more involvement of ordinary citizens in every stage of decision-making process can, as we saw, be epistemically beneficial, under the right conditions. Inclusive deliberation may thus increase both political and epistemic values of democratic decision making. Not because every single member of that group is smart (or all are equally knowledgeable) but because they all, as a group, can come to better solutions.

Conclusion

If we consider the thesis about the importance of cognitive diversity for the quality of decisions, then the very fact that the same group of people – professional politicians and experts, who become more and more alike in their attitudes and actions through time – identifies problems of the wider community, creates a political agenda and makes final decisions that are binding for all, leads to the conclusion that we should include a larger number of (cognitively diverse) people in the democratic decision-making process. In that sense, I would argue for more deliberation between citizens and experts, that would maintain the diversity assumption in all stages of democratic decision making - defining best and most realistic social goals and values and creating the best solutions for problems. And, it is not because the experts don't possess a greater knowledge than lay people – they do and that knowledge is crucial for good decision making – but because they are not impartial, don't have all a information and perspectives and suffer from cognitive biases, like the rest of us. – they do and that knowledge is crucial for good decision making - but because they are not impartial and have cognitive biases, like the rest of us. Given the complexity and uncertainty that exists in the realm of political decision making, we agree with Aristotle that the assumption that there is someone who is wiser than everyone else and whose decisions would be better than those of any other individual member of the community is not inconsistent with the fact that those decisions would be even better if that individual would include in problem solving someone (even) less wise, and then someone else and then someone else (Aristotle 1988).

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Ivana Janković

Epistemička odlika demokratije: uloga eksperta u demokratskom donošenju odluka

Apstrakt

U svojoj knjizi *Demokratija i istina: sukob između političkih i epistemičkih vrlina*, Snježana Prijic Samaržija se zalaže za stanovište po kom čisto proceduralno opravdanje, koje definiše autoritet i legitimnost demokratije samo u odnosu na pravičnost same procedure, nije dovoljno za potpuno opravdanje demokratije i da, stoga, treba uključiti i neke epistemičke vrednosti. Ova epistemička vrednost demokratije zavisi od kvaliteta odluka koje demokratske procedure proizvode. U tom smislu autorka se zalaže za hibirnu teoriju koja obezbeđuje sklad između političkih i epistemičkih vrednosti, favorizujući deliberativnu proceduru za tu svrhu, i na taj način promovise jednako poštovanje obe demokratske vrednosti. Pri tome, autorka zagovara specifičnu vrstu epistemičke podele rada koju ću ovde pokušati da kritički preispitam, a samim tim i izolovanu ulogu eksperata u demokratskom odlučivanju.

Ključne reči: epistemička demokratija, kognitivni diverzitet, ograničena racionalnost, deliberativna demokratija

Marko-Luka Zubčić

SOCIAL EPISTEMIC INEQUALITIES, REDUNDANCY AND EPISTEMIC RELIABILITY IN GOVERNANCE

ABSTRACT:

In this paper I argue that social epistemic inequalities, exemplified by expert structures and their introduction into various social and political processes, may be a collective epistemic virtue only if they are discovered under the conditions of free possibility of redundant disagreement. In the first part of the paper, following Snježana Prijić Samaržija's work in *Democracy and Truth*, I explicate the epistemic value of social epistemic inequalities, and address the epistemic defectiveness of both the complete social disregard for any expertise (flat epistemology) and the rule of experts. In the second part of the paper, I argue that social epistemic inequalities governing a large and complex population of epistemically suboptimal agents may be a collective epistemic virtue, reflective of discovery of epistemically reliable processes, if they can be contested and, in principle, withstand redundant disagreement.

KEYWORDS

institutions, experts,
disagreement, virtue,
governance

1. Introduction

The present paper provides an account of the following claim: social epistemic inequalities, exemplified by expert structures and their introduction into various social and political processes, may be a collective epistemic virtue only if they are discovered under the conditions of free possibility of redundant disagreement.

These days the public and the media appear particularly concerned with the matters squarely falling under the rubric of concerns in social and, particularly, institutional epistemology, the study of epistemic merit of system-level institutional arrangements (Anderson 2006). The ubiquity of disinformation campaigns and the wild, unsurveyable complexity of the 21st Century media landscape have given rise to a mood akin to epistemic panic. Under this uncomfortable and unpredictable polyphony, the old fears about the epistemic quality of democratic decision-making have been creeping up across the population (Foa and Mounk 2016). While perhaps some of us are wary of our own ability to make good decisions, it appears that we are more strongly concerned about the ability of others, those with which we disagree, to do so. On

the other hand, however, the suspicion towards experts has been steadily petrifying. They resemble “elites” that hold too much power, and have plans concerning us in which we don’t have a say. A considerable number of members of populations have just recently discovered that experts may be wrong or have vested interests, and their reaction to this sudden insight has not been exclusively sophisticated. Some appear to have accepted that the experts are good as long as they are *our* experts. In some cases, politicians have gleefully encouraged “throwing the baby out with the bathwater” and gorged on epistemic destruction, betting on disinformation warfare and epistemically detrimental attacks on facts, science, knowledge, common understanding and governance.

In such times, the discussions of epistemic reliability in democracy, and more broadly governance, appear timely. Snježana Prijic Samaržija’s project in *Democracy and Truth: The Conflict Between Political and Epistemic Virtues* (2018) is complex, but for our purposes here may be described as deflating the “continuous dread” (Prijic Samaržija 2019: 184) that finding a “unique place” (ibid: 145) for experts within the political process presents to democracy. I will of course not engage here with all the manifold, astute and fine-grained arguments that Prijic Samaržija develops to defend the hybrid approach, the harmonization of political and epistemic virtues, within the framework of reliability democracy. I will focus on two particular points in her argument – 1) that experts may have a unique place within the epistemic labour of the population, including the political processes; and 2) that their authority must be derived from an epistemically reliable process. I will argue that the fundamental reliable process is withstanding redundant pluralism.

The plan of the paper is as follows.

In Section 2 I will give a coarser defense of the claim of experts’ unique place, purely finding that social epistemic inequalities may be a collective epistemic virtue, and offer two pertinent clarifications – firstly, that if we define experts as those epistemic agents that are more likely to attain knowledge, “the people” may be regarded experts in certain epistemic tasks (for instance, those of governance), and secondly, that delegating the totality of epistemic labour to experts is as epistemically void as is denying all expertise.

I will then in Section 3 provide a robust systemic precondition for the *derived* authority of recognized experts (ibid: 190–191) – that their epistemic reliability as well as their unique place in governance hinge primarily on their capacity to in principle¹ withstand the free possibility of redundant disagreement. In a population in which disagreement is impossible, no expertise is possible. I will furthermore provide brief remarks on the interpretation of this understanding for the purposes of applied institutional epistemology.

1 As I will note in the next Section, epistemic agents are necessarily epistemically sub-optimal, and therefore, there is no guarantee that reliable social epistemic inequality will *actually* withstand disagreement – *epistemically suboptimal agents might, obviously, make a wrong decision*. However, I will argue that precisely in order to keep their sub-optimality “in check”, their commitments (in this case, for instance, decisions) must be made under the conditions of free possibility of disagreement.

My aim in this paper is to show that the search for knowledge in a population requires both the formation of social epistemic inequalities and the freedom to contest them. This does not entail that any objection to the found social epistemic inequalities has the same or relevant weight, and that they must immediately crumble under any pressure – quite the contrary, it entails that those social epistemic inequalities which withstand contest may have epistemic merit. Those that are protected from any contest, on the other hand, are highly epistemically dubious.

2. The Unique Place for Experts in the Epistemic Labour of the Population

2. 1. Social Epistemic Inequalities are a Collective Epistemic Virtue

While the sociological aspects of contingent historical expert structures are surely of interest for epistemological investigations (it is most certainly relevant to explore, for instance, which social and non-epistemic conditions are at play in the real-world expert communities, and how can we mitigate their epistemically defective features), the focus and the target of Prijic Samaržija's argument are experts in a strong sense – those member of the population that practice “epistemic virtues better than others” and are “comparatively the best guides to truth, or at least to avoiding false and detrimental solutions” (ibid: 189). I will likewise refer to and concern myself here with experts in a similar sense, namely according to the following “philosophical definition of experts”:

Within a population of epistemic agents, “experts” are those agents that are more likely to attain knowledge.

This strong definition of experts allows us an epistemological inquiry into their social epistemic standing which cannot be undermined by the objection that real-life expert structures are riddled with epistemically suboptimal and at times purely anti-epistemic social tendencies. Surely there is broad class of cases in which some epistemic agents, exemplified here by human individuals, are wrongly recognized as experts.

Furthermore, there are certainly cases in which rightly recognized experts are still wrong – but the definition lightly survives those, claiming merely that these agents are more likely, but by no means guaranteed, to attain knowledge. One of the founding insights in institutional epistemology (IE), the study of system-level institutional arrangements in terms of their conduciveness to knowledge, is Friedrich Hayek's finding that all possible epistemic agents are epistemically suboptimal (Hayek 1978). They do not have access to the totality of relevant evidence, make inferential mistakes and errors, and are prone to conserving suboptimal strategies in the search for knowledge. This is a strong constraint on the design of social epistemic systems. It follows that experts may be wrong.

It does not follow however that all agents are equally ignorant regarding all possible matters. Some agents are more likely than others to be right in some cases. Those more-likely-to-be-right agents may be such because they are better acquainted with processes which are more likely to produce a good epistemic outcome. Or, in other cases, there are process which are more likely to lead to the recognition of those agents which are more likely to be right. In both cases, the agents recognized as more likely to be right are such due to particular processes which exhibit epistemic reliability. In both cases, moreover, the population does feature agents which are more likely to be right.

Institutional arrangement which fails to harvest expert knowledge for purposes of problem-solving or decision-making, as well as the one which fails to allow for the expert structures and reliable processes to form in the first place, is most certainly, quite evidently, and perhaps most importantly *trivially*, epistemically defective. Some processes, and some social and inferential norms, are more likely to produce good epistemic outcomes. Some agents following these norms are more likely to attain knowledge. In this broad understanding, with regards to the totality of epistemic labour in the large and normatively complex population, this appears to be quite a non-controversial stipulation.

I will refer to the formation of expert structures and such discriminative epistemically reliable processes as “social epistemic inequalities”. Social epistemic inequalities are an epistemically sound and necessary development within any large and normatively complex population of epistemic agents – they are a collective epistemic virtue in the sense that they may be conducive to knowledge. Given the epistemic suboptimality of the population, social epistemic inequalities need not necessarily bring about knowledge – but their opposite, the “flat epistemology” within which it is held that all agents are equally likely to attain knowledge in all areas, undermines the division of epistemic labour as the possibility of diversification of strategies in the search for knowledge and makes it impossible to track the more successful strategies. It specifically undermines *learning*.

Lastly, I would like to add to this understanding a particular argument with regards to the *anti-social* definition of epistemic autonomy which appears when political matters are involved. As Prijic Samaržija makes masterfully clear in her analysis (Prijic Samaržija 2018: 218–221), delegating a part of epistemic labour to a reliable epistemic authority is not at odds with epistemic autonomy. Not only can I *autonomously* decide to delegate parts of epistemic labour to those that (I believe) know better than me, but in a variety of situations I would be quite epistemically challenged if I were to do otherwise. As John Stuart Mill notes, “(n)o one but a fool, only a fool of a peculiar description, feels offended by the acknowledgement that there are others whose opinion, and even whose wish, is entitled to greater amount of consideration than his.” (Mill 1861: 166–167) It may appear that when political decision-making is involved, the epistemic autonomy is defined by retaining authority, but this need not be so. While for instance Mill’s scholocracy may be politically and epistemically problematic (which is something I will not examine here), it does not follow

that any inclusion of experts in political or governance processes results in a moral, political, social or epistemic catastrophe. As I will point out later, under the “philosophical definition of an expert”, I as a member of “the people” may as well be an expert when it comes to democratic decision-making. I may however delegate decision-making on my behalf in a certain political matter to agents I believe to be more likely than me to make the right call. In a complex socio-political system and taking into account my limited epistemic capacities, it may be quite wise of me to do so. Crucially, my autonomy is not violated by this act – it is asserted. Furthermore, this delegation of authority may be a reliable epistemic action, and a responsible one. If those I have given my confidence to fail to deliver, I will certainly think twice before giving them the power of decision next time.

Thus, social epistemic inequalities may be a collective epistemic virtue. They make it possible for us to organize and diversify the strategies in the search for knowledge, and they allow for the discovery of the better or less bad ones. It is epistemically sound to find some strategies, and some agents better at those strategies, reliable and refer to them when particular problems are to be solved.

I will now further explicate two relevant aspects of the present account of social epistemic inequalities – firstly, that under the philosophical definition of experts “the people” may be recognized as expert at some epistemic tasks, and secondly, that neither flat epistemology nor the rule of experts have epistemic merit.

2. 2. The Philosophical Definition of an Expert Allows for “The People” and Other Democratic Institutions to be the Most Reliable Knowledge-producer at Some Epistemic Tasks

While particular trained individuals may be experts at some tasks, “the people” may be more likely to attain knowledge in other and particularly certain political tasks. Various aggregative procedures perform in an epistemically reliable manner (Sunstein 2006). Hélène Landemore has shown how inclusive deliberation and majority rule outperform rule of the few because the inclusion is the function of epistemically instrumental introduction of more cognitive diversity into collective decision-making (Landemore 2013; Landemore 2014). Elinor Ostrom argued, with regards to the governance of common resources (Ostrom 2005: 263–265), that the inclusion of all affected by the regime in the governance procedures exhibits considerable epistemic benefits.

As in the case with all other experts, the knowledge of “the people” needs to be harvested through appropriately designed, reliable, problem-solving and decision-making processes. Likewise, if “the people” are wrongly recognized as experts at some tasks this may be epistemically detrimental – as is the case with any other wrongly recognized expert involved in an epistemically unreliable process. The exhaustive description of institutional arrangements most conducive to knowledge would certainly feature both a variety of public deliberations and a variety of voting procedures to harvest collective intelligence.

2. 3. Neither Flat Epistemology “Democracy” Nor the Rule of Experts are Epistemically Justified

It is largely a fantasy that we must choose between flat-epistemology democracy or delegating the totality of epistemic labour to experts (rule of experts) in our design of social epistemic systems. There is a variety of complex institutional arrangements between those two extremes, and the epistemic situations are complex, non-unitary and in real world “always leave room to revisions” (Prijić Samaržija 2018: 234). More to the point, both of those two extremes are epistemically defective.

Flat epistemology, where there are no social epistemic inequalities, disallows the formation of reliable epistemic processes and makes it impossible to harvest the collective and individual intelligence from the population. It is not the case that everybody’s contribution has immediately the same weight, and it is not the case that every possible disagreement is as epistemically valuable as any other. However, democracy, and institutional epistemology in general absolutely, need not refer to any flat epistemology. Since it is not uncommon to encounter a strawman argument to the contrary, neither public deliberation nor voting need to, or should at all, be justified by the equal epistemic value of every possible contribution.

The epistemic value of public deliberation as a feature of democratic politics has never been justified by invoking flat epistemology. If anything, its precise epistemic merit is in weeding out those reasons which do not withstand public and expert scrutiny, however suboptimal it may be given our design constraints. The lack of scrutiny resultant from prohibiting the imperfect game of giving and asking for reasons among diverse agents would lead to considerably more epistemically distortive developments than does the burden of comparatively more suboptimal agents providing stupid dissent. While it appears that certain decision-making procedures require particular design of deliberative situations to make them more likely to be conducive to better outcomes (Sunstein 2006), this does not deny the epistemic value of public deliberation. Freedom of speech is epistemically instrumental (Fricker 2015, Mill 1859), particularly if we were to regard it as an exercise fundamental to the constitution of an epistemic agent (Talissee 2009). As noted, the ability to participate in solving a problem one is invested in, as well as mere cheap talk, can be of impressive benefit in certain critical epistemic situations (Ostrom 2005). Furthermore, as Elizabeth Anderson shows, the possibility of disagreement after the decision has been made is an epistemically relevant feature of democratic politics (Anderson 2006) – it allows for the feedback on the tested policies. The continued disagreements may also allow for piecemeal improvements of all positions concerned (Gaus 2018).

The epistemic value of one vote per individual in periodical elections is also not justified by such flat-epistemological claims. This particular democratic procedure however certainly has considerable epistemic merits – just to name a few, 1) it harvests the information on the preferences of the population, 2)

it protects against epistemically detrimental tyrannies of unaccountable decision-makers, 3) it makes it possible for the diverse pool of voters to find the best solution through the aggregation in which their errors in judgement cancel each other out (Anderson 2006, Landemore 2012). I do not wish here to claim that investigations into any potential reform or upgrade of this particular procedure should be abandoned – we may yet find that certain tweaks to it may produce even better results, both politically and epistemologically (if we are to take these as distinct). The research into this is beyond the scope of this paper. However, one person-one vote in representative democracy is certainly a social innovation and an epistemic discovery of considerable quality, particularly when opposed to the rule of few².

The experts we have recognized through our currently arguably most reliable processes are prone to a variety of suboptimalities (Gaus 2008) – however, even if our processes were more, or most (if such a state were recognizable) reliable, their suboptimalities would still have to be kept in check. The rule of experts is subject to suboptimal epistemic lock-in – those that are more likely to attain knowledge are not guaranteed to attain it and delegating the totality of epistemic labour to them leaves us without the institutional mechanism for avoiding them getting stuck following a suboptimal strategy. Under the rule of experts, there are no real experts because their expertise are derived from an epistemically unreliable process – the one which cannot stave off the threat of conserving the suboptimal strategy in the search for knowledge. If a particular set of agents from the population are recognized as experts, moreover, it simply cannot respond to Hayek’s challenge of harvesting and utilizing the dispersed knowledge in the population – these “experts” are clearly then not real experts since they fail to develop and follow epistemically reliable processes of harvesting collective intelligence. However, if we were to follow the philosophical definition of experts, we might recognize “the people” as an expert. The absolute rule of “the people”, the delegation of the totality of epistemic labour to them, would then be subject to the same objection.

The totality of epistemic labour in politics cannot be delegated to experts. Neither the people nor the particular trained individuals should be the exclusive epistemic authority in the totality of political decision-making and problem-solving. However, it would also be wrong to deny them the unique place, and not delegate a part of epistemic labour to them. There can be reliable epistemic processes in politics from which we derive epistemic authority. Some of them involve particular trained individuals, some the people. Democracy as a governance type of epistemic merit may as well include both types of procedures, and it is more likely to discover the reliable ones if the search for them takes places under the constitutional guarantee of freedom to disagree. I will offer further explication of this understanding in the next Section.

2 For further investigations into restricting suffrage, see also Kuljanin 2019.

3. The Unique Place for Disagreement in the Epistemic Labour of the Population

Prijic Samaržija emphasizes that experts may be in disagreement and this need not devalue their authority – the fact of disagreement certainly does not necessarily point to an epistemic defect in the process (Prijic Samaržija 2018: 240). She also notes, rightly, that disagreement is a non-desirable state from the individual perspective – we are “naturally inclined to” (Prijic Samaržija 2018: 234) and, moreover, *invested* into resolving disagreement. But is disagreement a non-desirable state from the system point-of-view?

I would propose that an institutional arrangement conducive to the discovery of reliable epistemic processes must retain a distinct unique place for institutionalized redundant normative pluralism, and thus free possibility of redundant disagreement.

3. 1. Withstanding Redundant Pluralism is the Foundational Reliable Epistemic Process

It is the institutionalized conditions for disagreement provided by the democratic order which allow for the reliable norms to be discovered, and from which the minimal justification of authority of social epistemic inequalities, particularly in the matters of governance, may be derived.

Investigations in the division of epistemic labour and institutional epistemology provide a unique place for disagreement within the epistemic projects of populations. To have a clearer understanding of the epistemic value of freedom to disagree, it is crucial to stress that collective epistemic virtues are irreducible to individual epistemic virtues (Mayo-Wilson et al 2011). It is in the epistemic interest of the collective that certain agents pursue alternative strategies, both conflicting with the dominant ones and altogether distant (investigating some other area of problem space). The central reason for the epistemic benefit of redundant investigators is that they provide the “hedge” against the suboptimal strategy lock-in of the dominant investigators. For instance, Zollman (2010) shows that even when pluralism is transient (and thus a single correct decision is to be made), a prolonged redundant disagreement is epistemically beneficial because it hedges against “jumping to conclusion”. His modelled scientific community benefits epistemically from groups which conserve strategies even after presented evidence to the contrary. Epistemically reliable processes require utilizing and maybe even incentivizing *individual* epistemic vices (Kitcher 1990, Mayo-Wilson et al 2011). Furthermore, Scott Page (2008) shows in his seminal work in IE that redundant pluralism of non-experts is more epistemically beneficial for the task of solving complex problems than is delegating the task to experts. In his and Hong’s research, experts have the right “toolbox” for a particular set of problems. However, when the problem is complex inasmuch as nobody has the right “toolbox” for it, in their model, the expert toolbox is particularly badly equipped because it

lacks the diversity of perspectives, interpretations, heuristics and predictive models.³ Diversity Trumps Ability because ability leads to a suboptimal lock-in where diversity allows for “building upon” a variety of local peaks and thus is *more likely* to avoid suboptimal lock-ins.

Knowledge is moreover conditioned on withstanding pluralist pressures. As John Stuart Mill (2003) argued, being exposed to the free possibility of disagreement is the fundamental practice required for the justification of a true belief. Expanding this argument, Miranda Fricker argues that the universal possibility of Epistemic Contribution, as a possibility of agents to give into the pool of shared epistemic resources, is epistemically instrumental (Fricker 2015). Knowledge must withstand the possibility of being contested, and thus some, at epistemic tasks such as governance presumably considerable, disagreements.

The distinction between *globally sustained and locally transient* pluralism within problem space must be made. Globally sustained pluralism allows for the conditions of free disagreement and thus institutionalizes the justification “compulsion”. Globally – at the level of the totality of problems, and thus large-scale governance – sustained normative pluralism is epistemically instrumental. The freedom to disagree is deeply conducive to knowledge within a population of suboptimal epistemic agents in a wicked learning environment, where the proximity to knowledge is indeterminable, as exemplified regularly by social and governance problems (Rittel and Webber 1973). Locally, at the level of particular problems, pluralism *may* be transient – it would be epistemically void otherwise, primarily because it would disallow the formation of social epistemic inequalities and thus globally sustained redundant pluralism. The pool of agents and norms solving the problem need not always include *all possible* disagreements. Certain norms may not withstand disagreement and certain norms may become institutionalized. Moreover, and crucially, specific normative communities – groups of agents following sufficiently similar norms – should be able to exclude according to some epistemic standards. This is precisely the possible development of social epistemic inequalities which the globally sustained pluralism should “pressure” into reliability. However, even at the level of particular problems redundant disagreement need not be quickly stifled to form beneficial epistemic procedures. Incentivizing groups pursuing an alternative strategy, and accommodations to disagreements in epistemic protocols of groups – adversarial procedures – have fundamental epistemic value. They, again, protect against a lock-in on a suboptimal epistemic strategy. It is instructive both at the global and the local level that Anderson (2006) recognizes Dewey’s account of democracy *epistemically* superior to all others precisely because it allows for disagreement before the decision-making, at the point of making a decision through majority rule and after the decision

³ Somewhat similarly, when each new level within an organization features problems different from those at previous levels, promoting random members may be conducive to better organizational performance than would promoting the best member from the previous level be (Pluchino et al 2010).

has been made. Disagreement at the scale of a population (or any grouping of communities) does not entail impossibility of decision-making. Majority rule, Anderson argues, makes decision-making possible while preserving disagreement – if consensus were necessary, the disagreement would likely be socially suppressed by the urgency of a response to the problem for which the decision is required. And, moreover, making the decision is crucial for harvesting the feedback on its effects and consequences, and thus, in the experimentalist account, for learning.

Lastly, certain problems are unsolvable from the perspective of Reason-as-such (Case 2016) – and some continued disagreements, as has been recently recognized by researchers in “New Diversity Theory”, allow for continuous upgrade of normative strategies of all involved (Gaus 2018). Even where a single solution is impossible, the conditions of redundant pluralism are, again, crucially, conducive to learning.

Free possibility of disagreement, and thus redundant normative pluralism, is the minimal protection against getting “stuck” at a suboptimal epistemic lock-in and the minimal condition for the discovery of knowledge. I will now lastly provide brief and tentative remarks on the “expression” of epistemically instrumental pluralism for the purposes of applied institutional epistemology.

3. 2. Remarks on Pluralism in Applied Institutional Epistemology

Interpreting these insights for application in policy and institutional design should surely not be reduced to referendums. It would build on investigations into democracy, common pool resource arrangements, polycentric experimentalist learning systems, open source policy-making and a diversity of mechanisms for harvesting the unique information from populations and communicating epistemic content across diverse normative communities. Epistemic injustice, both in its testimonial and hermeneutic variant (Fricker 2007), harms our collective *epistemic* capacities by denying us the resource of deep expertise distributed among our neighbours and our strangers – and a thorough and comprehensive systemic inclusion of agents historically subject to oppression (and similar forms of collectively epistemically detrimental social disadvantage) is the highest priority for any applied institutional epistemology. More broadly, the protection of redundant investigators through universal access to sustenance, epistemic resources and the possibility of Epistemic Contribution should, I strongly believe, be pursued. The complex properties of superadditivity of “toolboxes” of diverse investigators should be studied in applied institutional epistemology (AIE) (Page 2008), or even specifically, their intractability and nurture.

Furthermore, these understandings of the epistemic value of pluralism might be of particular relevance when it comes to situations of crisis. As noted earlier, redundant disagreement does not deny the possibility of making a decision. Democracy is epistemically valuable because it can allow for dissent after the decision has been made – and thus the feedback is possible in the

experimentalist account. Certainly there are crisis situations in which we must make a decision and stick to it. However, the intuitiveness of such a response to a crisis situation may be misleading. If we understand the crisis as a problem of provision and management of common good, Ostrom's work (2000, 2005) shows that redundant teams of designers and providers are epistemically beneficial, and on the other hand, and more to the point, that highly centralized "serial" systems are extraordinarily fragile and *more risky*.

Our intuitions about reducing complexity and pluralism in situations we recognize as crisis may lead to epistemic catastrophe (Heinrich 2009). Prijjić Samaržija's deeply relevant insight is that epistemic situations are non-unitary and "always leave room to revisions" (Prijjić Samaržija 2018: 234). The mitigation of threats to epistemic development and progress cannot be reduced to a panacea. Climate breakdown as a case of crisis, for instance, requires i) policies which can "fit" into lives of the population, and thus the proper recognition of experts (for instance, a gasoline tax may fail to take into account the unique information and *expertise* of lower middle class citizens); as well as ii) a diversity of epistemic developments and investigators with regards to scientific, technological and social innovations. While the scientific consensus is crucially informative, and the epistemic reliability of climate scientists may easily withstand contest, there is no single set of experts to which we can delegate solving all the wicked problems we face.

Epistemic governance in the times of climate crisis should surely not panic, stifling disagreement, centralizing the power structures, and draining the pool of possible Epistemic Contributions. A *learning* population must be inclusive – regulatively, since the identity of the problem-solver is always unknown, there are always too few learners for any wicked problem. If the population is to learn, it must protect redundant investigators. (Also, if the individual-level advice should be given, we should all perhaps occasionally mistrust our experts more than others.) The complex and dynamic systems of social learning, particularly in wicked environments, should be studied. Enduring common pool resource institutions should be of interest, as well as varieties of experimentalist and polycentric political economies. A robust *infrastructure* of epistemic inclusion, particularly that of constitutional liberal democracies with efficiently declining transgenerational poverty and social exclusion rates, should be exhaustively examined to appropriately respond to the threat of epistemic degradation. Given the scope of the crisis, it certainly appears we can hardly afford getting stuck pushing a defective strategy in our troubled search for knowledge.

4. Conclusion

An agent may find that certain agents which disagree with them are particularly unlikely to attain knowledge or move away from absolute ignorance. An agent may find that actual real-world disagreement with those particular terribly stupid agents is epistemically undesirable waste of resources. This is most certainly an *epistemically valuable* discretion of normative communities

(including the group of inquirers the agent belong to in this scenario) – it would be epistemically distortive to deny the formation of expert structures or normative communities in this way. However, these normative communities may be wrong – and if they and their norms and procedures are to be recognized as reliable, they must be formed within the *system* which does not foreclose redundant pluralism.

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Marko-Luka Zubčić

Društvene epistemičke nejednakosti, redundantnost i epistemička pouzdanost u upravljanju

Apstrakt

Centralna teza ovog članka je da društvene epistemičke nejednakosti, oprimerene stručnjačkim strukturama i njihovim uključivanjem u razne društvene i političke procese, mogu biti kolektivne epistemičke vrline samo ako su otkrivene pod uslovima slobodne mogućnosti suvišnog neslaganja. U prvom dijelu članka, slijedeći rad Snježane Prijic Samaržije u *Democracy and Truth*, ekspliciram epistemičku vrednost društvenih epistemičkih nejednakosti te pritom poseban fokus posvećujem razradi teze jednake epistemičke defektivnosti vladavine stručnjaka i potpunog društvenog neuvažavanja bilo kakve ekspertize (tzv. *flat* epistemologija). U drugom delu članka argumentiram da društvene epistemičke nejednakosti u kontekstu upravljanja velikom i kompleksnom populacijom epistemički suboptimalnih agenata mogu biti kolektivna epistemička vrlina, koja reflektuje otkrivanje epistemički pouzdanih procesa, tek ako te nejednakosti mogu biti izazvane i, u principu, „preživljavaju“ suvišno neslaganje.

Ključne reči: institucije, eksperti, neslaganje, vrlina, upravljanje

Snježana Prijić Samaržija

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DEMOCRACY: THE EPISTEMIC VIRTUES OF DEMOCRACY

ABSTRACT

The new and vibrant field of the epistemology of democracy, or the inquiry about the epistemic justification of democracy as a social system of procedures, institutions, and practices, as a cross-disciplinary endeavour, necessarily encounters both epistemologists and political philosophers. Despite possible complaints that this kind of discussion is either insufficiently epistemological or insufficiently political, my approach explicitly aims to harmonize the political and epistemic justification of democracy. In this article, I tackle some fundamental issues concerning the nature of the epistemic justification of democracy and the best theoretical framework for harmonizing political and epistemic values. I also inquire whether the proposed division of epistemic labour and the inclusion of experts can indeed improve the epistemic quality of decision-making without jeopardizing political justification. More specifically, I argue in favour of three theses. First, not only democratic procedures but also the outcomes of democracy, as a social system, need to be epistemically virtuous. Second, democracy's epistemic virtues are more than just a tool for achieving political goals. Third, an appropriate division of epistemic labour has to overcome the limitations of both individual and collective intelligence.

KEYWORDS

epistemology of democracy, epistemic justification of democracy, social epistemology, virtue epistemology, epistemic value pluralism, the division of epistemic labor

1. The Epistemic Justification of Democracy

To immediately dispel any uncertainty about the philosophical discipline or research field where my book, *Democracy and Truth: The Conflict Between Political and Epistemic Virtues*, belongs, I must say it is epistemology: my research focuses on the question of the epistemic value of different doxastic attitudes, such as beliefs, decisions, or opinions. However, since we aren't dealing with the epistemic properties of the beliefs held by individuals, which traditional (individual) epistemology used to do, but with the features of democracy as a system, it is clear this topic transcends the boundaries of traditional epistemology. The research field in question is social epistemology, which has legitimized inquiry into the epistemic features not only of individuals, but of groups, institutions, and systems (Goldman 1999; 2010). Up until recently, this topic was shunned as foreign to "real" epistemology, and as a question

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that we, eventually, ought to assign to some social sciences. Due to this attitude, many have concluded that “real” epistemology does not need to exist, have proclaimed the death of epistemology, and embarked on the journey of post-modern philosophy and sociology of knowledge, which focus primarily on the social conditions of forming beliefs and knowledge (Rorty 1979, Hollis and Lukes 1982, Foucault 1991). In contrast to these trends, I hold that epistemology is very much alive and that the epistemic analysis of democracy is a legitimate and relevant epistemological question. At the very least, if we have epistemology of testimony and the epistemology of disagreement, domains that have already extended the traditional epistemological approach, then we can legitimately speak also about the epistemology of democracy.

Since the justification of democracy is a topic that was tackled primarily by political philosophy, the epistemology of democracy and any inquiry about the epistemic justification of democracy necessarily encounter concepts and theories that don’t belong to the epistemological vocabulary, but to that of political philosophy. Such encounters can result in confusion and misunderstandings that arise from specific disciplinary presumptions, aims, and terminologies. These disputes are precisely the reason why such interdisciplinary endeavors can alarm both epistemologists and political philosophers. Political philosophers were the first who, within their discussions in political philosophy, assumed attitudes related to the epistemic features of democracy, such as epistemic proceduralism (Estlund 2008a; 2008b, Peter 2008, 2013). Within the field of epistemology, philosophers assumed their position much later, locating their discussion in the space of the epistemic theory of democracy. This new category emphasized they weren’t offering a political theory and avoided delving deeper into the political justification of democracy (Goodin and Spiekermann 2018). Cognizant that the field of epistemology of democracy is cross-disciplinary and (still) somewhat ambiguous, I nonetheless hold that, from the perspective of epistemology, it is both valuable and vital to attempt to offer not only an epistemic justification of democracy as a political system but to explain the relationship between the epistemic and the political justification of democracy. Political justification alone, a rationale that neglects the epistemic, but also epistemic justification alone, cannot provide a comprehensive answer to the question of whether democracy can be justified as a system of solving problems through collective decision-making and collective belief, i.e., to the question what forms of collective decision-making/collective beliefs best solve the citizens’ issues. In real life, and concerning real issues, democracy is either good, or it is not; it is either justified, or it is not – if we are seeking real benefits, it is worthless to say it is politically justified but not epistemically, and *vice versa*.

A democratic system can be politically justified without generating epistemically valuable decisions. Another arrangement could be epistemically efficient while entailing unacceptable political consequences for the democratic rationale. In the first case, we can imagine a fair system where all citizens are treated as free and equal but lack epistemic maturity and valuable beliefs, so these perfectly politically justified democratic procedures would result in low-quality

decisions that would harm everyone. Such a democratic system of collective decision-making cannot be justified. The experience of populist forms of collective reasoning gives us the right to question the exclusivity of political justification precisely because, due to the poor quality of its decisions, it generates humbling effects on human rights, freedoms, the level of democratic values, and public equity. On the other hand, within the democratic context, it is possible to assign the right to decide to academic groups of experts who are epistemically efficient and rarely make mistakes but do not care about solving citizens' problems, and do not deal with applied research, but, instead, with their research priorities, which do not affect citizens. Or, even worse, experts who use their epistemic reputation for personal gain, harming civic interests. Either way, to be justified, democracy must be both politically and epistemically justified. Despite possible complaints that the discussion is not epistemic enough, or that it is not political enough, I have embarked on this project with the explicit aim of harmonizing the political and epistemic justification of democracy.

By endorsing the stance that democracy is a system, to be legitimate, must be both politically and epistemically justified, I advocate for a hybrid view and, consequently, for hybrid justification: democracy must be, to the broadest possible extent, both politically and epistemically justified. The hybrid perspective allows for harmonization by, under specific circumstances, letting us optimally calibrate political and epistemic gains (Fricker 2007). Despite the fact this endeavor – due to its cross-disciplinarity and hybrid perspective – might be challenging, we have attained the final goal of philosophical analysis if we have created the preconditions of a (thorough) review and evaluation of real phenomena, and for their improvement. That is precisely the reason why I characterize this project as applied, and my philosophy is a real-world epistemology. Moreover, we can embrace Wolff's vocabulary, and speak not only about real-world philosophy but about engaged philosophy: a philosophy that transcends existing theoretical and disciplinary boundaries, and that, aiming for social improvement, deals with real relationships, systems, and phenomena (Wolff 2019).

Finally, within the research that I have dubbed the epistemology of democracy, I endorse the stance of reliability democracy, as opposed primarily to epistemic proceduralism or consensualism (Estlund 2008, Peter 2008, Kitcher 2011). In my opinion, despite its label of being "epistemic", epistemic proceduralism lacks the tools to, among different procedures of fair collective decision-making, select that which is epistemically better, primarily because it rejects the existence of procedure-independent epistemic value. If we reduce the epistemic justification of democracy to the stance that fair procedures have the tendency to generate epistemic quality, we are left with the question of whether epistemic justification is reduced to the political, the procedural. Consensualism, on the other hand, further sacrifices the epistemic value of decision to the goal of resolving disagreements and attaining consensus that, despite its political significance, entails no inherent epistemic value. By themselves, procedures and agreements do not generate epistemic quality unless some other

preconditions have been met. Only if we assume the beliefs we are harmonizing and introducing into fair procedures are already sufficiently epistemically valuable, their results can be epistemically justified. On the contrary, if the beliefs have no initial epistemic value, neither the fairest procedure nor the most unified consensus will provide a final decision of any epistemic quality. Epistemic justification is not just a supplementary and welcome side-effect to the fundamental political quality (a procedure or consensus), but it must be an integral part of our evaluation. With the goal of harmonization, we are seeking the best balance of epistemic and political quality, which allows us to, in particular contexts, callibrate the final benefit or reduce the political for the epistemic, and *vice versa*.

I propose reliability democracy as an approach that contains the essential epistemic criteria that allow us to, among different kinds of democratic collective decision-making, procedures, and conciliations, detect those that will most reliably generate epistemic quality and, consequentially, best solve the citizens' problems (Goldman 2010). We can attain the highest degree of reliability that a system will make epistemically valuable decisions/beliefs through the division of labor between citizens and experts (Kitcher 2011, Christiano 2012). Although experts are conventionally excluded from democratic procedures out of fear of epistocracy, or of undemocratic elite privilege, I hold that the exclusion of experts is a conscious sacrifice of epistemic quality, and, consequently, of the best democratic decisions. If epistemic justification is required for justifying democracy, then excluding experts is just as undemocratic as excluding citizens.

The questions and comments raised by my esteemed colleagues refer precisely to the aspects of my book I have briefly reviewed. They question the nature of the epistemic justification of democracy, the best theoretical framework for harmonizing political and epistemic values, and the question of whether the proposed harmonization of epistemic labor and the inclusion of experts, can indeed improve the epistemic quality of decision-making without threatening political justification. Each article has its integrity and complexity, and, with its relevance and value, transcends the aim of commenting on my book. My reply will focus on those aspects of their articles that contribute to furthering the debate, leaving further and broader discussions about some of the questions raised for another occasion.

2. Democracy, as a Social System, Needs to be Epistemically Virtuous

Ivan Mladenović (2020) valuably refers to the difference between justifying democracy as a procedure of collective decision-making and justifying democracy as a system that solves citizens' problems. Equally important is the assertion that the justification of democracy as a system presumes a broader definition of democracy as a set of institutions and practices, rather than just

as a procedure of collective decision-making. He calls the other (broader) kind of justification – the justification of democracy as a system that solves problems – instrumentalist, to differentiate it from the first, which is procedural. Moreover, Mladenović stresses that the instrumentalist approach, as a consequence, reasonably includes the question of the level of expertise and competence required for solving problems. In contrast, from the procedural perspective, such issues are not only secondary, but it is immediately apparent that any distinction between citizens (and particularly the practices of privileging experts or groups who get to decide for others) will be qualified as antagonistic to democratic procedures. Mladenović classifies my approach to justification, due to my focus on epistemically justifying deliberative democracy as a system, as deliberative epistemic instrumentalism. While he acknowledges the need for epistemic justification, he, unlike my approach, deems the position of epistemic proceduralism better suited for justifying democracy. The critical feature of epistemic proceduralism is the attitude that the focus of justification is on democratic procedures, and that justified democratic procedures of public deliberation in collective decision-making will also generate epistemic quality. Epistemic quality, in this sense, is not something external and procedure independent, but an inherent feature of democratic processes.

I have to agree that, within such a classification, Mladenović is entirely correct regarding several points: (i) my research indeed focuses on *the epistemic features of democracy as a social system* (institutions and practices), and questions the potential of a deliberation-based democratic system to generate epistemically valuable beliefs or decisions, (ii) the *epistemic value of democracy is not reducible to the political fairness* of the collective decision-making procedure, which is central to the political justification of democracy, (iii) democracy will be epistemically justified in virtue of the epistemic value of its beliefs/decisions/solutions to problems, i.e., in *virtue of its consequences and results, rather than its procedure*. Resolving citizens' issues is a manifestation of "truth," a concept that I do not use in its strict epistemic meaning, but, instead, explicitly use as a "shortcut" or a mark of epistemic value. As a generic concept of epistemic quality, "truth" does not only refer to solving problems, but also to other epistemic accomplishments such as truth-conduciveness, truth-sensitivity, empirical adequacy, accuracy, understanding, correctness, or like. It is these particular stances that determine my attitude within the epistemology of democracy, and they stem from the assumptions of social epistemology, virtue epistemology, and the pluralism of epistemic value (according to which truth monism does not register other notable epistemic accomplishments).

Unlike Mladenović and other epistemic proceduralists (Estlund 2008, Peter 2008; 2013), I do not think that ensuring that a procedure is fair will necessarily lead to epistemic quality. Such a stance strikes me as some kind of epistemic optimism, or even an epistemic idealism, a groundless hope that political virtue will somehow generate the epistemic. Of course, regarding the proceduralist position, there is the question of what we consider the target of epistemic quality – the procedure, or the final decision. In either version, I hold those

epistemic proceduralists, who negate the existence of procedure-independent epistemic value, also deny the autonomy of epistemic value and epistemic virtues, reducing them to the political value of the procedure. I consider Estlund's epistemic proceduralism, which Mladenović mentions as an acceptable position, inconsistent because he negates procedure-independent epistemic value, but still speaks about some kind of tendency in procedures to generate correct decisions. How can we call a decision correct if there is no epistemic value to define what correctness is? More consistent is Fabienne Peter's pure epistemic proceduralism, where all epistemic value is explicitly reduced to the fairness of the procedure. However, I consider both versions of epistemic proceduralism unacceptable because they neglect the intrinsic epistemic virtue of democracy. This consequence is precisely the reason why I characterized epistemic instrumentalism as a politically instrumentalist position, which instrumentalizes or sacrifices epistemic values to the political. I criticize both political and epistemic instrumentalism, which, on the other hand, instrumentalizes and sacrifices autonomous political virtue to the epistemic. Moreover, I hold that epistemic proceduralism is an elitist and undemocratic position. It is evident that I assign the term "instrumentalism", a different meaning than Mladenović, which might give rise to possible confusion.

However, regardless of terminology, I acknowledge the importance of Mladenović's objection that insisting on epistemic value or the quality of outcomes already somehow privileges epistemic justification. Simply put, he objects that I might have fallen into the trap of sacrificing the political rationale for democratic procedures to the epistemic quality of their outcome. I hold that the value of political justification, understood as the act of justifying democracy as a collective decision-making procedure where all citizens are treated equally, is beyond dispute. Even so, I simultaneously hold that the question of the epistemic quality of the outcomes of democracy is legitimate if we are interested in the desirability of democracy as a system. The appropriateness of democracy, however, is not just a question of political philosophy, but the much broader question of civic interests – who care equally about the fairness of the system as about its capacity to generate correct decisions that resolve their problems. By inquiring about the justification or desirability of the outcomes of democracy, I might transcend the disciplinary field of political philosophy and political justification, but I do not bring it into question. I am certainly not trying to uproot political justification nor the democratic rationale. But neither will I sacrifice the epistemic rationale of outcomes.

3. The Epistemic Virtue of Democracy is more than an Appropriate Tool for Political Goals

Elvio Baccharini (2020), like Mladenović, endorses the stance that epistemic justification is crucial to the justification of democracy, but also the stance that we ought to find the correct balance between political and epistemic justification. However, instead of the epistemic proceduralism that Mladenović located as

the optimal option for harmonizing political and epistemic justification, Baccarini proposes Rawls' conception of the legitimacy of democracy (Rawls 2005). Although he states that Rawls focuses primarily on political justification, Baccarini firmly endorses his sensitivity towards the epistemic rationale, which can be found in his stances regarding "reasonable persons", "valid public reasons", and "burdens of judgment", which refer to the epistemic virtues of epistemic agents. In Baccarini's view, it is virtue epistemology, which shifts the normative focus onto the epistemic agent, that allows us to understand the properties of reasonableness and the validity of public reasons as epistemic virtues: in doing this, virtue epistemology enables us to fully apply Rawls' proposal to the epistemic justification of democracy. If we fulfill certain preconditions – such as public deliberation among reasonable persons who respect valid public reasons and the state of reasonable plurality – Baccarini holds that a democratic system will be epistemically justified, and its generated decisions of the highest epistemic quality. Setting the truthfulness of decisions/beliefs as the criterion of epistemic quality, according to him, is not only unnecessary but can threaten reasonable pluralism. Namely, there is generally no need to subject the epistemically desirable state of reasonable disagreement to a pointless quest for the ostensible truth. What is more, disputes about moral doctrines, theories of social justice, or ethical arguments (about abortion, medically assisted suicide or moral enhancement) are inevitable, and every attempt to force the resolution of these disagreements is, according to Baccarini, a politically and epistemically unjustified attack on reasonable pluralism.

It is precisely social epistemology (Fricker 1998, Goldman 2010) and virtue epistemology (Zagzebski 1996, Greco 2002, Sosa 2007, Roberts and Wood 2007) that provide us with an appropriate theoretical framework for assessing the epistemic features of a system such as democracy. We can inquire whether a democratic system – and its institutions, practices, and procedures – have epistemic virtues in addition to the political, whether they solve the citizens' problems, whether they generate beliefs/decisions that are truth-conducive, truth-sensitive, correct, accurate, empirically adequate, or like. Baccarini endorses a certain simplification and relaxation of epistemic demands and ties them exclusively to the virtue of reasonableness. Given the pluralism of epistemic values that I support as an alternative to truth monism, the proposal that reasonableness is a kind of generic epistemic virtue can be acceptable. There are epistemic accomplishments – such as reasonableness, the reliability of processes, understanding, problem-solving capacity, and epistemic responsibility – that can be considered an indication of epistemic quality. As I have already noted, I use the concept of truth as a generic marker of epistemic quality, because I want to stress that, although we are talking about a plurality of epistemic values, I nonetheless assume the existence of objective epistemic value. In doing this, I distance my approach from post-modern and other theories that negate the objective, trans-historical, and universal value of truth, and which I consider a certain kind of epistemic revisionism or nihilism (Rorty 1979, Hollis and Lukes 1982). In other words, although social epistemology and virtue

epistemology, and my rejection of truth monism, allow us to evaluate different epistemic accomplishments (Kvanvig 2005), I still distance myself from all kinds of relativism concerning objective epistemic quality, or the stance we can have various equally valuable truths, or that opposing stances can have equal epistemic value. Although virtue epistemology focuses on the epistemic virtues of the epistemic agent, and only derivatively concerns the concept of truth, it is certainly not an approach that endorses relativism, revisionism, or nihilism regarding truth.

The reasonableness and validity of reasons, therefore, can only be epistemically justified if it refers to an objectively valuable epistemic property. Reasonable pluralism is undoubtedly methodologically epistemologically helpful because it relates to epistemic diversity, inclusiveness, openness to opposing attitudes, perspectives, evidence and arguments, and mutual respect. These are procedures that can enhance the final epistemic quality. If, however, we set reasonable pluralism or reasonable disagreement as our final epistemic aim or the ultimate epistemic value, then this entails a relativization and rejection of the notion of objective epistemic value. Although states of disagreement are natural and even conducive to the better quality of final decisions, beliefs, or solutions to problems - they cannot be deemed an epistemic accomplishment, because this would mean that conflicting attitudes can be of equal objective epistemic value. In that vein, I hold that reasonable disagreement and reasonable pluralism, as I note in my book, are certainly a political value since they establish respectful stability between disagreeing parties. However, political value does not automatically generate epistemic value, and endorsing this attitude is a political instrumentalization of epistemic virtues.

The epistemic value of reasonable disagreement is, as I have noted, procedural or methodological, and includes the notion of truth as a regulative epistemic aim. In that sense, Rawls' proposal, even in the manner Baccharini enhances it, is still primarily in the realm of political justification, or at least still prioritizes the political to the epistemic. The epistemic virtue of reasonableness is in the function of valuable and long-lasting political stability, which is undoubtedly very important. From the perspective of political radicalization and the deteriorating quality of civic agency, which is how Baccharini opens his article, the value of reasonable persons, valid public reasons, reasonable plurality, and the state of reasonable disagreement, cannot be disputed. However, from my perspective, it is not sufficient for an appropriate balance between political and epistemic virtues. Epistemic quality requires beliefs/decisions/solutions that do not only tame present tensions and prevent political disasters, but that also solve problems, and are correct, truth-sensitive, and truth-conductive. Finally, I ought to stress that, in the goal of harmonizing the highest political with the highest epistemic quality, it is possible to "negotiate" or to sacrifice "truth" to urgent political values. It is possible, in critical situations, to achieve to mere political functionality of democracy, to endorse reasonable disagreement as a satisfactory epistemic value, but it cannot be the ultimate epistemic virtue of democracy.

4. The Division of Epistemic Labor, or how to Overcome the Limitations of Individual and Collective Intelligence

Once we inquire about the epistemic quality of democracy, or, precisely, about the epistemic quality of democratic outcomes, solutions to problems, beliefs, and decisions, it is natural to wonder about the best way of achieving them. In introducing the division of epistemic labor, which assigns a unique role to experts, there is the question of privileging a minority elite, which Mladenović had implied from the position of epistemic proceduralism (Peter 2016). However, on the other hand, there is the question of whether experts genuinely possess the necessary expertise to solve the citizens' problems, and whether there is a better way to resolve issues. Here, I defend the stance that a division of epistemic labor between citizens and experts best balances the preservation of democratic and epistemic values, by neutralizing the limitations of individual and collective intelligence. Kristina Lekić Barunčić (2020), Ivana Janković (2020), and Marko-Luka Zubčić (2020), each in their unique way question the efficiency of the proposed division of epistemic labor.

Janković and Zubčić, upheld by careful arguments, emphasize the epistemic potential of collective deliberation in resolving complex problems. Both hold that, under specific conditions, groups will provide better answers to problems than individual – or even conjoined – experts. Although they both respect the importance of expertise and factual knowledge in resolving issues, they simply ask whether the proposed division of labor and the inclusion of experts is indeed the best avenue towards attaining knowledge and solving problems. According to them, citizens can resolve complex problem, rather than only participate in defining the problems, choosing the experts whom they will trust, and overseeing whether the issues have been solved but in resolving the problems.

Janković quotes empirical findings that show the individual expertise of professionals is inferior to collective intelligence. Namely, the citizens' random diversity, due to a real and spontaneous combination of perspectives, interpretations, evidence, experiences, and like, guarantees more valuable decisions than those made by isolated experts constrained by their specific professional field. Even if they formed their own decision-making groups, experts cannot attain the level of diversity exhibited by random groups of citizens, because the very fact of their education, similar material status, and belonging to a group of peers, constrains their perspective. Janković does not dispute the fact experts exist, or that they possess superior factual knowledge, but still claims that – with the appropriate institutional framework of forming groups and informing citizens, while acknowledging their cognitive abilities and the capacity of diversity – a deliberative democratic process of collective decision-making would yield better results. Zubčić provides further evidence for the potential of collective intelligence and situational circumstances, and speaks of the institutional arrangements that can improve the reliability of citizens' decisions. He highlights the epistemic potential of social epistemic inequalities, and of free and redundant disagreement during decision-making. If our goal is the

highest possible epistemic quality, according to Zubčić, we need to empower our problem-solving expertise, which has thus far wrongly focuses on experts, rather than on the collective epistemic virtues of the people. Zubčić analyses the epistemic features of collectives or groups that insure civic expertise – epistemic inequality, diversity, inclusiveness, pluralism, and the freedom to form and remain in redundant disagreement. It seems that Janković and Zubčić's stance rests on Mill's idea of the free market of ideas, epistemic potential of *laissez faire*, or the free flow of ideas that trumps the epistemic strength of experts (Mill 1859, Goldman and Cox 1996). Both augment Mill's view by stressing the desirability and necessity of institutional regulation, acknowledging that the mere invisible hand of free public deliberation will not automatically derive quality from the pluralism and diversity of epistemically sub-optimal agents.

I almost completely agree with assumption that at the foot of their arguments: the key to epistemic quality is not in experts, but in finding a system of procedures that most reliably solve the citizens' problems. That is the very essence of reliability democracy. However, while I hold that experts are a necessary part of the procedures that satisfy the condition of reliably solving problems, Janković and Zubčić range from the strong stance that it citizens rather than experts, to the milder attitude that experts do not always deserve their role in the division of labor.

The division of epistemic labor that I endorse is not rooted in the stance that groups of citizens have no cognitive potential, or that they are incapable – even with the right education or information, the appropriate affective stance towards opposing opinions, and with a proper institutional arrangement – of making decisions as good as those of experts. I have tried to underline the circumstances where the potential of diversity, pluralism, and inclusiveness will generate the highest benefits for resolving problems, and concluded that these circumstances are the moment of detecting the urgency of the issues, of choosing the relevant experts, and of overseeing whether the proposed solution genuinely resolves their problems (Goodin 2006, Zollman 2010). These tasks are part of the epistemic labor of citizens. The inclusion of experts in the division of labor is based on empirical findings concerning the limitations of collective intelligence – not just during majority voting, but during deliberation (Ahlstrom-Vij 2012; 2013). These constraints include the *hegemony of common knowledge* (Prelec, Seung, McCoy, 2017), the *common knowledge effect* (Gigone and Hastie 1993, Sunstein 2006), the *Dunning-Kruger effects* (Dunning and Kruger, 1999) as well as the social conditions of the distribution of information, such as informational filters, echo chambers, informational bubbles, and like. Non-experts, who are not involved in a specific field, usually lack the time, maturity, and factual knowledge needed to absorb expert information, and there are no institutional capacities to neutralize these social and cognitive barriers to resolving problems. The wisdom of crowds, that Janković and Zubčić appeal for, rests on the idea that plurality and diversity can make up for the individual limitations of experts, but it does not acknowledge the fact experts can neutralize our collective weaknesses. My proposal of the division

of epistemic labor should – in the context of our search for epistemic quality – offset the limitation of both collective and individual decision-making. This reason is why I don't think that experts should assume the entirety of epistemic labor, but, instead, just those aspects that will generate the highest epistemic quality. Part of the work belongs to citizens because they can neutralize the individual limitations of experts, and even of groups of experts.

Janković and Zubčić argue we should neutralize these collective limitations through institutional interventions and regulations, but they also believe citizens can resolve complex problems without resorting to expert assistance. The role of experts, in this argument, needs to be as small as possible to ensure the most valuable result, and political justification. The form of reliability democracy I propose is neither expertism nor epistocracy, but a position that favors those decision-making procedures that most reliably lead to epistemic quality. Reliability democracy rests on five *veritistic* criteria that guarantee the epistemic quality of a procedure: (i) *reliability*, or the ratio of true and false decisions generated by this procedure; (ii) *power*, or the strength of the procedure that produces these decisions; (iii) *fecundity*, or the strength of the procedure to solve the problems of interest citizens; (iv) *efficacy*, or the cost-benefit ratio of the procedure; (v) *speed* or the duration/time required for the procedure to solve the problem (Goldman 1999, Prijic Samaržija 2000). In other words, according to reliability democracy, if a different division of epistemic labor, including the one that assigns everything to citizens, is a better fit for these criteria, then it should be implemented. My opinion is that in our sub-ideal epistemic circumstances, which do not meet the minimum epistemic and affective standards that would guarantee the quality of citizens' beliefs (Kitcher 2011), we need to entrust part of the labors to experts (Prijic Samaržija 2017). This proposal of the division of epistemic labor best combines the individual and collective epistemic virtues that guarantee the best solutions.

Finally, Kristina Lekić Barunčić raises the interesting question of whether the division of epistemic labor between citizens and experts can be implemented in real-world circumstances. The question is whether the model of reliability democracy, where citizens identify and define their problems, and oversee whether they are resolved efficiently, while experts address the issues, can function in real life. In her example, autism treatment policies showed that proponents of the neurodiversity movement did not trust the delegated experts, and concluded they could form better strategies by themselves. One of the reasons for this mistrust, and this refusal to accept the division of epistemic labor with experts, were their bad experiences derived from unsuccessful and discriminatory expert attempts to treat their illnesses. I hold that this discussion points to two essential challenges concerning the division of epistemic labor. The first is the question *when* citizens are justified in granting experts their trust. The second is the inquiry about whether citizens *can* assess when they should split their labor with experts.

In my book, I endorse the idea of a *derived* authority of experts, rather than a *fundamental* authority, which would require the citizens' blind trust

or deference to experts. The experts' authority should be derived from their status of objective experts, rather than from their reputation. In other words, the experts' trustworthiness should be grounded in the fact the citizens have witnessed their authority, i.e., their ability to solve complex problems through truth-revealing situations efficiently. The stance the experts' authority is not fundamental and does not stem from their mere status rests on the demand for the citizens' political and epistemic autonomy, and on the conditions for justifying trust. If citizens lack the evidential basis that would support an expert's epistemic competence, their credulity would be neither justified nor epistemically responsible. Whether the citizens do possess sufficient evidence to recognize objective expertise in an epistemically responsible way is a separate problem that I talk about at length in my book. Still, my final stance is there are social mechanisms that do allow non-experts to recognize expertise (Goldman 2001). The division of epistemic labor between citizens and experts under the condition of rationality can function even in sub-ideal epistemic circumstances.

However, there are real social situations that do not satisfy the minimum epistemic and affective conditions of epistemic agents, nor the preconditions of the public use of reason. On the contrary, they exhibit a dominance of will over reason, and intellectual and moral egoism. It is possible that the citizens will decide there is no better expert on specific questions than themselves alone, that their truths – given they are theirs and based on their right to be treated as free and equal – are as epistemically valuable as those of experts, and that no expertise is neutral and objective, but, instead, is always tied to some non-epistemic goals, or is contaminated by their personal values and epistemic background. It is this resistance to expertise and experts, and to science and rational debate, sometimes referred to as the culture of ignorance or the cult of amateurism, that marks our time more than any time past (DeNicola 2017, Nichols 2017). Movements such as the anti-vaxxers are the most radical example. Should we, then, allow citizens and civic campaigns to make decisions about topics where there are people whose expertise surpasses theirs? Kristina Lekić Barunčić endorses the stance about improving communication to ascertain whether there are the conditions for establishing evidence-based trust. This approach is undoubtedly one of the ways to create the epistemic and affective preconditions for the public use of reason. However, what should we do when there is no such will, when extremist attitudes are born and developed within echo chambers that stifle all communication with their resistance to opposing beliefs, which they consider dangerous and harmful? It is a considerable challenge for the question of the feasibility of any division of epistemic labor. However, it must be said that the subject of the citizens' political and epistemic autonomy must not be confused with their political and epistemic egoism. While the first is desirable, the second is undoubtedly blameworthy, and is not a manifestation of democracy, in particular when it assumes the form of radicalism or extremism.

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Snježana Prijić Samaržija

Epistemologija demokratije: epistemičke vrline demokratije

Apstrakt

Novo i vibrantno područje epistemologije demokratije ili istraživanje epistemičkog opravdanja demokratije kao društvenog sistema procedura, institucija i praksi nužno, kao interdisciplinarni poduhvat, povezuje epistemologe i filozofe politike. Uprkos mogućim prigovorima da ovakva vrsta diskusije ili nije dovoljno epistemološka ili da nije dovoljno filozofsko-politička, ovaj pristup upravo obeležava nakana usklađivanja političkog i epistemičkog opravdanja demokratije. U ovom se članku bavim nekim temeljnim izazovima vezanim uz prirodu epistemičkog opravdanja demokratije kao i pitanjem koji je najbolji teorijski okvir za usklađivanje političkih i epistemičkih vrednosti. Takođe, posebno važnim smatram pitanje može li predložena podela epistemičkog posla i uključivanje stručnjaka doista poboljšati epistemički kvalitet odlučivanja bez pretnje za političko opravdanje. U članku argumentujem u prilog tri teze; (i) ne samo procedura, već i ishodi demokratije, kao društvenog sistema, treba da budu epistemički vredni, (ii) epistemička vrlina demokratije više je od prikladnog sredstva za političke ciljeve, (iii) podela epistemičkog posla u demokratiji treba da nadiđe kako ograničenja individualne i kolektivne inteligencije.

Ključne reči: epistemologija demokratije, epistemičko opravdanje demokratije, socijalna epistemologija, epistemologija vrline, pluralizam epistemičkih vrednosti, podela epistemičkog posla

II

STUDIES AND ARTICLES

STUDIJE I ČLANCI

Ekaterina Cherepanova

JUSTIFICATION OF ATEMPORAL VALUES IN ALEXIUS MEINONG'S THEORY OF OBJECTS

ABSTRACT

In the history of philosophy, Alexius Meinong's interest in axiology has traditionally been seen as confined to his earlier works. However, if we analyze his writing after 1917, in which Meinong discusses timeless values, it becomes clear that he became increasingly disinterested in psychology. Moreover, since the theory of the object, in Meinong's view, could not be a part of metaphysics, he had to deal with the additional methodological difficulty of proving that the good exists independently of human subjectivity. The article discusses A. Meinong's understanding of the object of desire, the object of a value-feeling and the connection between ethical values as objects of consciousness and time. It is shown that, according to Meinong, language is where values actually reside and only through language can their reality be explained.

KEYWORDS

Meinong's value theory, subject of desire, subject of axiological feelings, existence of absolute values, psychologism

Alexius Meinong's theory of objects was brought to the forefront of public discussion owing to a debate initiated by Bertrand Russell and, to a certain extent, owing to the logical interpretation proposed by the former's disciple and successor Ernst Mally (Mally 1912). Though Russell thought highly of Meinong's works, his theory of objects came under criticism for being inconsistent and unpromising on the grounds that analytical philosophy cannot deal with non-existent objects (Russell 1923, Russell 1973). In the 1970s and 80s, revitalization of the theory of non-existent objects (Lambert 1974, Parson 1974, Routley 1973, Smith 1975) brought renewed interest in Meinong's philosophy, while in the same period Gilbert Ryle published his work "Intentionality – Theory and the Nature of Thinking", which provoked further reconsideration and debate regarding Meinong's theory (Ryle 1972: 1973). Ryle claimed that Meinong was outdated and had nothing to contribute to the development of modern philosophical thought. Rudolf Haller, one of the leading experts on Austrian philosophy, however, questioned Ryle's conclusions and pointed out the significance of the epistemological and axiological aspects of the theory of objects. "Let us agree that for a long time there was a common misconception

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that what Meinong was destined to enjoy was some kind of ‘reflected immortality’ – being known through Russell’s critique – and that Meinong’s own achievements in the sphere of cognition theory and ethics did not receive any public recognition or, at least, any further development. This was, however, a deceptive impression: it has been proven wrong many times and has already experienced multiple transformations.” (Haller 1979: 37–38). One cannot but agree with this opinion since Meinong’s theory continues to excite considerable interest at least among the historians of philosophy who find traces of his influence on contemporary philosophers (for example, Seliverstov 2018: 109–122). Thus, although the theory of objects re-emerges from time to time, the problem of values continues to be ignored. “Attention is paid primarily to the first, psychological stage of Meinong’s value theory while the second, ‘objectivist’ one, remains outside scholarly interest” (Wolf 1968: 46).

Initially, Meinong envisioned his theory of objects as a general theory that would be equally significant for all fields ranging from economics to aesthetics. He expected this theory to play a methodological role because the concept of object is universal and can be applied to all mental facts. The object is given for any form of cognitive process. Karl Wolf, an Austrian scholar, contended that “as opposed to Edmund Husserl, who considers his ‘essences’ as correlates of pure consciousness and thus comes very near to transcendentalism, Meinong asserts the principle of objects being independent from the mind as the main point of objectivism” (Wolf 1968: 33). This indicates the difference of Meinong’s theory from that of Husserl, another famous disciple of Franz Brentano. Thus it is impossible to interpret the theory of objects in the light of Kantian idealism, a feature of all Austrian philosophy.

Therefore, we can discern here that Austrian philosophers distrusted Kantian apriorism and were more inclined to empiricist and positivist principles in philosophy. Meinong emphasized that the ‘empiricism’ of Austrian philosophers in the late nineteenth century prevented them from prescribing the nature of its laws, when instead it would “be more reasonable to try to explore them” (Meinong 1988: 53). It is important to highlight that Meinong saw his theory of objects as an approach that would allow us to solve many complex philosophical problems rather than something purely scholastic or detached from reality; it would address precisely those issues about which philosophers of language would advise to keep silent (Mauthner 1980, Wittgenstein 2014).

Psychology, Logic, Cognitive Theory or Metaphysics?

All mental acts such as experience, feelings, desires, understanding, are intentional; that is, they always have an object at which they are directed. The existence of these objects can have a different status. In some cases, objects are not real but it does not mean that they are non-existent. Regardless of whether the object is or is not perceived, it is given and is represented in the mind. It is evident that cognition always has an object but similarly ‘*Gegenstand*’ (‘what

stands against') is perceived by the subject of the mental act. The object is not created in the process of cognition but precedes it, it is given on the logical and psychological plane. "Each inner experience, at least an elementary one, has such an object and, since experience *is expressed through* words and sentences of the language, this expression normally correlates with the meaning, which is necessarily its object" (Meinong 1988: 68).

Meinong was influenced not only by Brentano but also by David Hume and his theory of association. In his autobiography "Self-Presentation" ("Selbstdarstellung") (Meinong 1988: 57), Meinong points out that his early work on Hume's philosophy was focused on the problem of abstract ideas and concepts (Meinong 1969a).

Meinong maintains that Hume more fully developed Locke's version of empiricism and advanced his principles of association of ideas, considering them to be mental phenomena (Meinong 1969a: 61). One of the three principles of association is the principle of resemblance: "if we named an object and then met a similar one, then we would reproduce... the first object and the word we introduced for this purpose... If we hear names, then in our mind associated individual representations spring up, and precisely those that arise from the coincidence of association. How does this correspond to other ideas associated in the same way? They do not appear to us as real, but only as possibly present. When, however? From the moment the name was invoked?" (Meinong 1969a: 51). Thus, Meinong emphasizes the elements of Hume's theory that are of special interest to him in order to pose the question of the existence of mental objects and the methods of subjecting them to analysis.

Although he studied mental phenomena, Meinong indicated that the theory of objects did not fall within the domain of psychology, though it could contribute to the development of psychology. Meinong, like the majority of Austrian philosophers at the turn of the twentieth century, believed that psychology was able to synthesize experiment and theory. He recalled conducting lessons on psychology in 1880 in Vienna, during which he demonstrated some simple experiments. Although he lacked the illustrative resources to improve the course, he believed that his work was crucial for the opening of the first Austrian Institute of Experimental Psychology (Meinong 1988: 58).

Meinong asserts that, strictly speaking, the theory of objects focuses not on mental processes as such but on the objects at which these mental processes can be directed, therefore, the approach applied cannot be defined as psychological but rather as a more general and theoretical one (Meinong 1969b: 501).

In a similar way, the theory of objects does not belong to the domain of logic, though it deals with the questions that are related to the subject matter of logical reasoning. In these arguments, Meinong refers to Husserl's "Logical Investigations" (Husserl 2013) and emphasizes that Husserl's critique of psychologism in logic is quite justified. An epistemology that aims at a more fundamental study of cognition than what is accessible by logic is not yet identical with the theory of the object in its content. Although epistemology supposedly deals with self-cognition and the cognized object, we should not exclude from

the range of objects those at which our extra-mental experiences are directed (Meinong 1969b: 495).

Meinong takes a stand against metaphysics, which was characteristic of Austrian philosophy, as it has been noted above. The theory of objects can be a philosophical discipline but it by no means belongs to metaphysics since the latter studies the totality of what is real (*Gesamtheit des Wirklichen*). The point is that the range of mental objects could include those that do not exist. Taking into consideration the special place of the theory of objects, it cannot be expected to rely on empirical methodology in its analysis of the objective world. This is where Meinong differs from Brentano's late philosophy and reveals his affinity to Bernard Bolzano's theory of proposition-in-itself (*Satz-an-sich*) (Johnston 1972: 300).

Objects of Value-Feeling and Objects of Desire

For Meinong it was important to address the perennial axiological question: do universal human values actually exist? It was the period in philosophy when the Neo-Kantian movement initiated new ways of exploring values: are they real? are they objective or subjective?

Meinong maintained that for philosophy it is essential to preserve its methodological role in this sphere and believed that the theory of objects could provide philosophers with the necessary distance from practical issues, which had to be addressed by such sciences as economics and ethics (Meinong 1988: 96). It was not by chance that he referred to economics since the question of values was raised by Carl Menger's critique of the labor theory of value. Menger's law of 'diminishing marginal utility' explained the connection between the utility and supply of a particular good and showed why the value of a good depends exclusively on its marginal utility. Menger was supposedly also influenced by Brentano's "Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint" and, therefore, paid much attention to the problems of consumption psychology (Johnston 1972: 83). Meinong attended Menger's lectures on national economy and believed that his theory would underpin the economic understanding of value.

His [Meinong's] writing also reveals the influence of the Austrian school of national economic value theory, which he thoroughly modifies: on the one hand, value is subjectively constituted: it is ingrained in our memory as subjective representation rather than as a real attribute of an object. On the other hand, Meinong argues for the objective character of value, which is given through its presence in our emotions (Kampits 1984: 141)

Meinong emphasizes that in his theory of objects the place of the 'Supreme Good' is not discussed in the hierarchy of values. First of all, we need to explain how the individual and the universal are connected in value objects, which would further enable us to demonstrate the relationships between values, needs and interests in a wide range of fields, including economics.

Value as the key concept cannot be reduced to utility or biological need, the cost of labor or a commodity. Meinong persistently analyzes the contradictory relationship between value and utility, value and need, which are conflated in the usage of these concepts: people often attach more value to objects whose utility is not so obvious and less value to such vitally important things as air or water (Meinong 2006: 9). Value must be understood as something more universal and it is necessary to systematically analyze psychological and other more general theoretical aspects of value.

Among mental objects, value has constant significance:

... and my thoughts and even more so my feelings do not always agree with what is the most valuable thing for me; yet that has nothing to do with value itself. [...] For a school pupil it is obviously important to learn to write but in his ignorance he does not consider it in the least bit valuable. Similarly, a thing about whose properties I am poorly informed or misinformed can seem lacking in value to me but this does not diminish its actual value, even if it remains unacknowledged” (Meinong 2006: 24).

Therefore, values exist firmly and independently of a particular person, though formed from his/her individual experience, and are universal in relation to his/her subjectivity. Meinong asserts that “if a thing has value for me, it has value for me not only over the limited period when I am thinking of it” (Meinong 2006: 67).

It must be understood that value is an object of the subject’s value attitude (*Werthhaltung*), which is a core concept for Meinong’s value theory. This means that values for a person vary in their content and their importance (Meinong 2006: 73–75).

A distinguishing feature of Meinong’s philosophy is his discussion of the problem of the so-called value-feeling and the question about the reality of objects of value-feelings, desires and forms of their existence. Emotional acts reveal a person’s attitude to ethical and aesthetic values, which sometimes are not fully rationally and verbally defined, but their givenness in the mind manifests itself through emotions and in language, respectively. In general, we can agree that “Meinong, like Brentano before him, considered emotions to be a source of objective cognition” (Wolf 1968: 49).

A person experiences multiple feelings of different kinds but at a fundamental level these elementary acts of experience can be described as different states of sensory pleasure or displeasure.

Pleasure and displeasure could be determinative attributes of content as equally as affirmation and negation (Meinong 1988: 90).

Meinong also points out that feelings can be classified according to two criteria: feelings based on representations and feelings based on mental experiences. It should be noted that value feelings stem from mental experiences that can manifest themselves through judgements or assumptions.

Describing the experience of the object's value, Meinong highlights the subjective nature of this feeling. It is remarkable, however, that the subject becomes aware of this feeling in the presence of values that are logically prior and are founded on lower-order objects of perception and representation. Emotions cannot replace cognition and, although value feelings represent an object, they are limited as a way of cognition, just as perception is (Meinong 1988: 95).

Desire is an active elementary experience and it is intentional, that is, it is directed at a certain object that prompts this feeling. This feeling is equivalent to judgement in the intellectual sphere. It should be noted that, when discussing the object of desire, Meinong did not mean attraction, instincts and so forth. In accordance with Herbart's psychology, which was widely known in Austria, Meinong distinguished between such distinct mental acts as desire (*Begehren*), wishes (*Wünsche*), urges (*Triebe*), longings (*Sehnsucht*) and volition (*Wollen*) (Herbart 2003: 189). Therefore, the desires (*Begehren*, *Wollen*) that Meinong speaks of are given first in emotional experiences, and then in representations and concepts, while their unconscious vital core should be analyzed not by the theory of objects but by psychology alone.

It cannot be said that a person feels desire only in relation to existent objects or that the theory of objects must deal only with such objects of desire. According to Meinong's general methodological framework, mental objects can be existent or non-existent and objects of desire share this characteristic. Meinong points out that a person can imagine, for instance, the desired end of the romantic story they are reading about (Meinong 1988: 94). A reader knows that the events described in the book are fictional, but when immersed in this imaginary reality, they want the main character to survive and the loving couple to reunite.

However, in the case when we are dealing with volition (*Wollen*) rather than elementary desire, the object of desire has to be only what is possible.

True desire, and volition (*Wollungen*) in particular, are characterized by a peculiar relation to reality, which is similar to the relation between a judgement and a fact: what is unachievable cannot be an object of volition (at least in a normal way). For instance, I do not desire something that, in my opinion, I already have, I cannot desire something that actually does not exist: only what is possible can be desirable (Meinong 1988: 94).

An object can exist without being desired, but when it becomes an object of desire, in our thought it acquires the quality of 'being-thus' (*Sosein*) and 'being-with' (*Mitsein*) (Meinong 1988: 93). An object of desire is not as simple as it may seem. Meinong thought that desire not only ascribes being or nonbeing to the object of desire but also actualizes the fact of desire experienced by the subject, who feels the value of the object of his/her desire. In other words, apart from the object of desire, which is the target and the 'embodiment' of such attitude, objects include value which determines the depth of the feeling of desire, since, according to Meinong, "it is actually impossible to desire something to which you are indifferent" (Meinong 1998: 93). The content of

the object of desire – desiderative – is revealed in the opposition between duty and its dereliction, purposefulness and aimlessness. This means that the object of desire is the target which has value and which the subject of desire seeks to achieve.

Atemporal Values

Objects of value are perceived by the subject who values them in an emotional experience; it is this value-feeling that makes possible an appreciation of anything. Respectively, comprehension (*Erfassen*) makes this value-feeling conscious, which implies determinacy and clarity. Therefore, the apprehension of the object of value in our mind oscillates between thought and feeling, between rational comprehension and emotional experience. Emotional experience of the object prefigures in a way its value-feeling, which enables personal and impersonal value attribution. A diverse universe of value-objects of different scales is interpreted by Meinong in such a way as to let axiological and psychological aspects of cognition stay open to the verification of the objective existence of values and to ensure its empirical verification.

In his early works (i.e., “Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth-Theorie” (1894) and “Über Werthaltung und Wert” [1895]), Meinong does not give a detailed account of impersonal values. These evidently exist in the mind and determine the basis upon which a subject of cognition justifies and evaluates his reasoning. However, in his attempt to distance himself from psychologism, Meinong had to present a more elaborate theory (“Für die Psychologie und gegen Psychologismus” [1912]).

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Meinong highlights the fact that value attribution relies on value-feeling, in our *speech acts* we are already detached from emotional experience and perceive values as impersonal and even absolute. “Value judgement consummates the process of comprehension (*Erfassen*) of value just as the judgement about senses consummates the process of sensual perception” (Wolf 1968: 49). Thus, the methodological problem is solved: absolute values are given foundation beyond the limitations of classical transcendentalism. It is the language where values truly exist; it is the foundation that accounts for their reality.

In 1917 Meinong goes back to writing his theory of value-objects (*Über emotionale Präsentation*, [1917]). His posthumously-published work “Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie” (1923) expounded his theory of values in a comprehensive and systematic manner and combined his early and more

elaborate views on ethics. In his typology of objects Meinong now discerns ‘basic’ classes: objects of emotional acts and objects of desire. The objects that are experienced by an individual can be intellectually or emotionally represented. Intellectual representations produce objects and objectives, while emotional representations produce objects of appreciation (*Dignitativ*) and objects of desire (*Desiderativ*).

They are more akin to objectives than objects, since they belong to a higher order of objects ... Among dignitatives one should point to the old trinity – truth (in as much as no mere comprehension is at stake), beauty, the good, and probably pleasure should be added. Among desideratives duty and purpose should be named (Meinong 1988: 76).

For example, an individual posits truth as a value, which is represented in its effect through judgement. Truth in this case is not an eternal value, which exists in the realm of absolute universals, but it is a determinate object present in mental act of an emotional relation to the process of understanding. In other words, a subject of cognitive relation seeks the truth, not as a mere outcome of cognition, but also as a value. One could infer that, for Meinong, desideratives, or the objects of desire are manifested as purposes, which determine the actions, volitions, while the object of desire is present in the mental act as the valuable, necessary or objectively mandatory.

The relation between the objects of mind and time, or more precisely, the presence of these objects in time Meinong analyzes with respect to distinction between objects and objectives. Since objectives are present constantly and are considered only in relation to the present time, at a specific moment, they are timeless (*zeitlos*) (Meinong 1910). Dignitatives and desideratives, as objects of a higher order, are more akin to objectives and therefore are timeless. Thus, the foundation for impersonal, absolute values is established.

Ethical Values: Metaphysical Challenge

In the Foreword to the posthumous edition of his book on the foundations of the theory of objects, his widow observes that at the center of Meinong’s reflection lies not only the theory of objects but also ethical questions (Meinong 1923). In the 1920s, his focus settled on the prospects of science because the separation of academic ethics from political interests, which used to be evident prior to the war, had become undermined. Meinong explains that this separation was merely a ‘public preaching’, or as he writes in his autobiographical “Self-presentation” (*Selbstdarstellung* 1988), it was a ‘moralizing veneer’ (Meinong 1988: 119). It will be possibly replaced by spiritual hunger. The thematization of ethics in its metaphysical aspects forces Meinong to look back on his justification of values from his theory of objects. Atemporal values must be conceptualized determinately in a situation when ‘time changes’ (*Wandels der Zeiten*) and ethics is in crisis (*ibid*).

Aesthetic and ethical value differ according to their respective relation to reality. While looking at a rose, the individual sees red, but also appreciates its beauty and sometimes covets it. This simple example demonstrates the complexity and multidimensionality of the universe of mental objects. It is clear judgements on the beautiful and the necessary are grounded in specific objects. In a great number of judgements, the impersonal existence of objects which engender values can be observed. For instance, in a discussion about the originality of a painting the judgment "That is not art!" refers to an objectively present and absolutely conceived notion of art. If asked what art is, our critic will usually invoke an example of 'true art', a masterpiece, which is universally acknowledged. A. Meinong alerts us to the fact that aesthetic values lose their normativity in subjectivist and relativist discourses; yet the works of art given us in our experience, or in Meinong's words "the presentation of the aesthetically valuable in space" (Meinong 1988: 99) invigorates the value in subject's mind.

Unlike aesthetic values, ethical ones cannot be embodied in reality, be represented in the form of a work of art. There exists a tradition within philosophy to ground ethical values in sentiments which the subject of a value relation experiences, such as pleasure or pain, joy or sadness. As was mentioned above, moral sentiments represent the object of a value relation, but cannot reveal the content of an object, that is reveal the content of value. This tradition is also hardly capable of justifying the universality of ethical values. A utilitarian interpretation of ethical values leads to similar kind of relativism, in Meinong's view. However, judgements in which the human behavior is evaluated in categories of right and wrong, bad and good, confirm the existence of impersonal values.

Ethical relation presupposes that a subject in their action takes into account the presence of value, which confers obligation. Thus, personal value coincides with impersonal value, whereas the object of desire, if it is ethically valuable, is presented as obligatory and impersonal. When impersonal value is understood as obligatory, it is conceived of as a norm. Ethical imperative, which is so often invoked, cannot refer to anything other than this obligation (Meinong 1988: 98). Because the object is present in the mind and not created in the process of cognition, ethical value, in the same vein, is not created by the subject, neither in cognition, nor in the ethical relation.

Conclusion

In comparison with his mentor Franz Brentano, Alexius Meinong approaches the problem of values from a more psychological perspective, which allows him to discuss the existence of values in different aspects. Analysis of values from the theory of objects can be also discovered in axiology of Christian von Ehrenfels, who, in his "System der Werttheorie" (1897), insists on bridging the problem of values with the psychological study of desire. However, in his approach the emphasis is placed on desire and it is desire that dominates the

value consciousness. Thus, “definition of value for Ehrenfels does not stem from the object” (Reinhard 2005: 966). Nevertheless, Alexius Meinong’s and Christian von Ehrenfels’s axiological views give Karl Wolf sufficient reason to say that they seek

“to reconstitute the unity of reality and values. It was this project that defines originality of the Graz philosophical school and its theory of value” (Wolf 1968: 47).

Researchers usually distinguish two phases in the development of Meinong’s theory (Dölling 1999: 13), which are quite different in their conceptualization of values. It is clear that Meinong’s resolution to overcome the limitations of psychologism and to justify the existence of impersonal, atemporal values was motivated by the existential challenges of his time.

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Ekaterina Čerepanova

Opravađavanje atemporalnih vrednosti u teoriji objekata Aleksijusa Majnonga

Apstrakt

U istoriji filozofije se Majnongovo interesovanje za aksiologiju tradicionalno videlo kao vezano za njegova ranija dela. Međutim, ako analiziramo njegove radove posle 1917. u kojima Meinong razmatra vanvremenske vrednosti, postaje jasno da se prestao interesovati za psihologiju. Štaviše, pošto teorija objekta, po Majnongovom viđenju, ne može biti deo metafizike, morao se pozabaviti dodatnom metodološkom teškoćom dokazivanja da dobro postoji nezavisno od ljudske subjektivnosti. Članak razmatra Majnongovo razumevanje objekta želje, objekta osećanja vrednosti i vezu između etičkih vrednosti kao objekata svesti i vremena. Pokazano je da se, prema Majnongu, vrednosti u stvari nalaze u jeziku i mogu se objasniti samo kroz jezik.

Ključne reči: Majnongova teorija vrednosti, subjekt želje, subjekt aksioloških osećanja, postojanje apsolutnih vrednosti, psihologizam

Miroslav Milović

IUS SIVE POTENTIA: PAUL AND SPINOZA

ABSTRACT

This article is a part of a research project entitled *Law as Potency*, that, broadly put, investigates the relation between law and ontology. I argue, starting from St. Paul, that an ontological perspective can be understood as the possibility of justice, in a sense of a liberation of the human being. Thus, this paper offers an analysis of the concepts of potency and universality. Even though the term 'universalism' is not explicitly mentioned, it is present in St. Paul's thinking and brought onto its practical consequences. In addition, Spinoza's reading of St. Paul opens up a possibility to challenge this concept to a concept of modern teleology. Therefore, I discuss the consequences of this confrontation in regard to law, politics and economics. This leads to an articulation of another modernity, where, perhaps, the universal appears as the affirmation of difference.

KEYWORDS

St. Paul, Spinoza,
potency, ontology,
universalism

1. Introduction

This article is a part of an ongoing research project *Law as Potency* that investigates the relationship between law and ontology, present in works of St. Paul, Spinoza, Deleuze, Agamben, Negri and Derrida. As a starting point, I offer a brief discussion on Paul and Spinoza.

When we take into consideration Paul's work, it seems that, the possibility of justice could be understood in the sense of a general liberation of the human being. The concepts of potentiality and the universal appear throughout in a meaningful and explicit way. But the question is what kind of rupture does Christian thought provide in order to enable us to think on presence of metaphysics in Paul? And, moreover, why, as we talk about a possible metaphysical rupture, we want to save ontology in Paul? Even though, the term itself is not mentioned, universalism is present within Paul's thinking, and he brings it to its ultimate and practical consequences. Through the comparison and juxtaposition of Paul's *Epistles* and the works of contemporary philosophers devoted to the readings of his *Epistles*, I propose an ontological reinterpretation of the relation between law and justice, and of Right as potency.

On the other hand, we can ask ourselves why do we need to go back to Spinoza in order to discuss teleology, if modern teleology is much more explicit in Hegel. The answer to this question seems obvious: In order to understand

Spinoza's thinking we need to start from teleology. Or, rather, everything that Spinoza champions seems to be a possibility of a confrontation of this concept and the entire world that is grounded in it. So, the question of substance appears immediately, from the very beginnings of his philosophy, as well as the possibility to think the potentiality of substance as *causa sui*, as something that is not determined by any transcendental structure. Therefore, this paper explores the possibility of another modernity brought to the fore by Spinoza: I give a certain advantage to an ontological interpretation of his thought *vis-à-vis* the Western tradition, elaborating its consequences and political limitations, as well.

2. The Paul's Ontology

It seems that metaphysics always went along with the history of philosophy: within the ancient Greek context, it unfolds itself as a question of the grounding (*die Erdung*) of the world; in the modern context, it becomes the question of the subjective grounding of theory and practices. Even in the context of the discussions about the critique and possibilities of overcoming of metaphysics, it appears a rupture within the question on the new grounding that is directly connected to the question of our authenticity. Here, according to Heidegger, this rupture will be called ontology and not metaphysics. What we want instead, therefore, is to grasp one possible ontology in St. Paul.

But, what any of this has to do with the readings of Paul's Christianity? The term ontology is missing. Moreover, having in mind his unfortunate encounter with Greek philosophers, we can argue that regardless of our readings of St. Paul, none of them is going to be philosophical. Nobody understood no one during these encounters. But what seems to appear, though, is the question concerning a possibility of Christian metaphysics. What kind of rupture do we have in Christian thought if we reconsider Paul's metaphysics? And, moreover, why, discussing this possible metaphysical rupture, we want to save ontology at all costs?

Is there any possibility of bringing his position closer to the modern metaphysical era? I argue that there is a notion of subjectivity in his thought, even though the question of subjectivity itself belongs to the late modernity. Not even Descartes discussed the matter. Taking this into account, isn't it rather obvious that we can interpret Paul not only as our contemporary, but as a modern thinker, too?

Once again, is there a possibility to speak about ontology in his thinking? He, himself never uses this term, as mentioned previously. Nevertheless, I would like to trace back this absence and explore further the possibility of Paul's ontology, following Heidegger, who indicates that ontology represents a critique of metaphysics, creating the rupture for the possibility of our authenticity. Thus, would Paul be contemporaneous? Ultimately, he talks about the universalism, and, perhaps, this is the point where he goes beyond his time; perhaps he is our guide, telling us something about ourselves now.

In addition, what I would like to examine and scrutinize is whether the Paul's thought has its practical consequences. At least, the *Epistles* indicate this much. Yet, how can we trust Paul's politics if, for instance, even when condemning slavery, he does not invite us to overthrow it, but to stay passive? "Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called." (1 *Cor.* 7:20)¹ Would be there, nevertheless, a political articulation that goes in this direction? Is Paul's *Amor Mundi* a possibility? How can we offer a legal reading of this position? Paul dedicates many passages to discussion of justice and laws. Paul and metaphysics, Paul and *Amor Mundi*. Paul and the question of justice.

Let's try to start from the beginning, yet again. Everything begins on his way to Damascus, when suddenly a heavenly light strikes him and Paul falls from his horse. Then he hears a voice: "Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?" And Paul asks back: "Who are thou, oh Lord?" And the answer was: "I'm Jesus, who you persecute". This is, in sum, the very first conversion in Christianity. Saul will even change his name, and instead of the name of a great king of Jews (Saul), he will start presenting himself as Paul, as someone insignificant and worthless. This is the beginning of the one of the most important narratives of humankind; it departs from the Aramaic version, where he "starts speaking Greek, penetrating definitively the Greco-Roman cultural world" (Holzner 2008: 100) and arrives to us. As a project or a task, perhaps.

2.1. Greeks and Christians

But why should we follow Jesus? We already have Greek guidance. What is the point of questioning the Greek heritage? Ancient Greek metaphysics follows the world, not men, not even one man. The Greeks are humble; they want to understand the world and their very own place in it. But Paul is humble too; someone who thinks of himself as insignificant, as the change of names indicates. Moreover, he puts all his hope in the perspective of following Jesus.

"But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness." (1 *Cor.* 1:23) Or, speaking from the Christian standpoint: "For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God [...]" (1 *Cor.* 3:19). The wisdom of the philosophers does not reveal the potentiality that is proper to man. Tied to wisdom until today, we remain bonded to what is given, and not to what the possible human world could be. For that reason, there shall be faith and not the shred of evidence related to wisdom. Therefore, to follow Jesus.

Of course, there is a difference between Greek and Christian receptions of metaphysics. For Greeks the search for the ground is the question of reason. Even *Eros* appears as an attempt of actualization, of fulfilment of oneself, perhaps only cognitively. But reason appears as spiritless, as it is not the place of the encounter, of others. Paul, thus, found Athens cold, a place where no one understands him. That is why the Christian way differs: it is not about *Eros*, but about *Agape*; it is the path of love for the divine; it is an emotional relationship.

1 All translations in English are mine, if not indicated differently.

It is not the Reason, but the Spirit, *Pneuma*. Therefore, we can ask ourselves what could be the meaning of the *Pneuma*? This difference between Reason and Spirit will remain present for a very long time, inspiring Hegel's philosophy. But here, however, this difference is at the very beginning of the attempt of re-constructing Christianity.

Why, again, follow Jesus? Adam, as we know, is the first man (ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος) and Jesus the second one (ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος). But Adam is the first man on earth (ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς) and Jesus the first of heaven (ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ οὐρανοῦ). Here, perhaps, there is the difference. Does the Spirit, *Pneuma*, has its distinctive mark only for being heavenly? This is, rather, common or too literal reading of the spiritual that appears to be something different from the natural, something merely given. Thus, being of heavenly origin does not suffice to open the possibility of the spiritual. The Bible confirms this. The Spiritual happens with the resurrection. Only through it we can talk about *Pneuma*. Spirit is what makes life (πνεῦμα ζωοποιον). "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." (1 Cor. 15:22)

In other words, not only to survive, but to accomplish something proper to the human, beyond the mere fact of being alive. "[...] where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." (2 Cor. 3:17) Thus, the Spirit is the possibility of Freedom. This is, perhaps, the meaning of human life. But how this can be accomplished? Everything is foretold and depends on praying? We only liberate ourselves in the monasteries or only by following the religion? If Paul is at the beginning of Christianity, we need to know what has happened. Perhaps Christianity has not fulfilled itself yet.

Perhaps not even through resurrection the Spirit fulfills itself. We need something more. An intrusion, perhaps. An intrusion from the very human being. For, only through intrusion the Spiritual may appear. It means that the Spiritual depends on the human being. Hegel follows this line of interpretation. Because, ultimately, resurrection is a gift of the divine and the Spiritual is not only found in this gift, but in something that still needs to be done. Done by the human being, maybe? Maybe the Spiritual is the (only) possibility of the human? Is it Freedom, bounded to the Spiritual, still a possibility waiting to happen? There are three essential parts of Christianity: the redemptive death, the resurrection and the return of the Holy Spirit. (Holzner 2008: 322.) When will Jesus come back? This is the question of *Parousia*, and maybe as such, it is the question of possibility or potentiality of the very human being.

But, how to understand this potency? At this point I propose a different path: to follow the difference between law and justice; Right and the question of potency. In my opinion, this is a great message: Paul sees that the laws are unjust; they killed Jesus. So, the laws do not bind us to the possibility of our own potency. They connect us with objects. Or, rather, they connect our desires to objects and express the conditions for their satisfaction. This is the meaning of the laws. They treat us almost like animals, as Hegel laments in the *Phenomenology of the Mind*.

Therefore, how to think the possibility of our assertion beyond this reification? We are at the threshold or the beginnings of a possible Paul's ontology. This ontology is marked by crucifixion. Or better, its beginning is in the cross. "For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to everyone that believeth." (*Rom. 10:4*) Justice appears only beyond the laws; Justice outside the law, *outlaw justice*, as suggested by the brilliant interpretation of Theodore Jennings (2013.).

2.2 Law and Justice

We need to closely examine this possibility. If, in the end of the laws stands the possibility of death, which, in fact, ensures them, we can expect a reinvention of life. If, the laws appear in relation to objects, from the ontological standpoint, the Others appear, too. This is, at least to the certain extent, the assertion (affirmation, contention) of (the) Others. Paul's word for this assertion is love: Love is the possibility of this ontological rupture, of this life in Jesus. "Love is the fulfilling of the law." (*Rom 13:10*)

Hence, the possibility of justice does not stem from the laws. Paul does not identify justice with the laws, as it was the case until Cicero. Justice comes from the divine generosity, from this opening to Others, perhaps as slaves. "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus." (*Gal. 3:28*) A promise of the universal that had never appeared as such before. "Justice is the affirmative experience of the arrival of the Other as Other", contends Derrida (2002: 104). The assertion of the contingency of the Other. Therefore, it is called love and it is not some kind of rational procedure.

Welcome Others! This is the message. Will it fulfill itself? What would be the messianic dimension of this opening and this politics? And why here, of all places, the potentiality of the very human being would appear? "For the Son of God, Jesus Christ, who was preached among you by us, even by me and Silvanus and Timotheus, was not yea and nay, but in him was yea." (*2 Cor. 1:19*) The performative Derridean 'yes' is clustered in this ontological opening; here the human being appears.

"For we are laborers together with God [...]" (*1 Cor. 3:9*) The project is ours. Yet, why God did not appear, for example, in Auschwitz? The answer is simple: because he is not responsible for evil. He cannot help us, but we need to help him. We are his co-workers (σύνεργοι). Weak, perhaps, without knowledge, without support from the legal order. But in this weakness, Paul claims, in this determining absence of power, lays potency. "[...] Strength is made perfect in weakness." (*2 Cor. 12:9*) And also: "[...] for when I am weak, then am I strong." (*2 Cor. 12:10*)

Agamben will return to this revolutionary reading of the concept of potency in Aristotle (Caputo, Alcoff: 2009). The messianic is not the place of strength or power, but of weakness, that perhaps creates the world. In later readings, the concept of potency was almost lost. For instance, Thomas Aquinas, in his identification of essence and existence, sees potency in acts. According to him,

there is no potency that does not fulfil itself. We will need to wait for Spinoza to reinvent the concept of potency, connected to a metaphysical reading as well. In Paul, God waits for us to say “yes”, to hear the call and act (ibid: 156). There are no transcendental places that secure the way to the divine. Here, perhaps, we may talk about the immanence of the ontological way.

And what is arriving? What the *Parousia* would be? The return of Jesus? “For all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this; Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” (*Gal.* 5:14) But also: “[...] for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law.” (*Rom.* 13:8) This is a direction that leads us to the core fundamentals of the laws. “Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid: yea, we establish the law.” (*Rom.* 4:31) There is an acknowledgment of the law that can be justified. “Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law: for by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified.” (*Gal.* 2:16) The law that acknowledges itself is the law that justifies itself. The law can be legal, but unjust, even according to our ‘informal’ understanding. The law that is acknowledged here is the law that is bounded to justice.

We may remind ourselves that, from modernity onwards, we acquired a positivistic perspective which dismisses the need for this legitimacy from justice. What matters is legality, to stay within a system. And this Paul’s justice, understood here as an opening to the Other, is a sign, perhaps, of the possible democracy. In the end, to study law is to understand its very own democratic postulates.

This ontological opening, this assertion of the Other, is the question of justice, the postulate of the laws. Therefore, “we are no more strangers and foreigners, but fellow citizens with the saints, and of the household of God.” (*Eph.* 2:19) Co-citizens (*συμπολίται*) or citizens of the new world community bounded by mutual greets.

3. Another Modernity

St. Paul provides us with the opportunity to understand the possibility of justice as the possibility of general liberation of human being. Potentiality and the universal explicitly appear. But the question is how this subject is addressed within the modern context? Or, differently: What is the potency of modernity and what can be universalized through it? Having these questions in mind, we can now turn to Spinoza.

There is a Hegel’s remark that the Modernity accomplishes us and that it represents the fulfilment of freedom for all. The question is now why go back to Spinoza, if the modern responses became explicit only in/with Hegel? After all, Hegel presents himself as a specific modern self-consciousness, as an elaboration of the truth of the modern world. Why, again, return to the question that concerns the modern truth and, even more so, to the question of modernity itself *via* Spinoza?

Hegel gives credit to the works of Spinoza, first and foremost, for thinking the absolute (Hegel 1986: 157–197). However, for Hegel, Spinoza only thinks it as Substance, and not yet as a Subject, an error that, from Hegel's standpoint, leaves room for many questions. What does this mean? Hegel's critique unfolds and becomes apparent when he discusses the consequences of the Spinoza's position in relation to particular, concrete things. Hegel thinks that Spinoza misunderstood the concrete, that is, he understood only one dimension of it, showing its differences only in relation to other concrete entities. In other words, Spinoza understood only the negation related to the concrete, but not the double negation which involves the concrete in its own process of actualization. Therefore, Spinoza did not understand, according to Hegel, the possibility of overcoming the concrete, the negative, and of accomplishment of its own potentialities. Thus, the concrete, the particular, does not even appear. Everything would be encapsulated and lost in the metaphysical identity of the Substance. Life itself disappears in the name of this identity that, perhaps, Spinoza only repeats.

For Hegel, Spinoza only arrives at an elaboration of the world in relation to our understanding (*Verstand*), but not to our Reason (*Vernunft*) that would show the dialectical overcoming and the final accomplishment of the world. Understanding knows only the first negation, whereas Reason knows the process through which the negative is surpassed, meaning, it knows the process of the double negation. This negation of a negation, in Hegel, remains related to the discussion of the possibility of the Subject. The Subject ultimately accomplishes something that nature cannot. When all is said and done, Spinoza had only the idea of Nature and not the idea of Subjectivity. And this Subjectivity, following Hegel, creates the conditions for mediation and change in the world. What appears here is, first, the possibility of the specific human world and second the endpoint of universal freedom for all. Therefore, Subjectivity and universal Freedom articulate the potentiality and the truth of the modern world. We have, thus, all reasons to remain linked to this modern project.

Why, again, go back to Spinoza when modern teleology is clearly more explicit in Hegel? Here appears the term from which we can begin to understand Spinoza's thinking: Teleology. Or, better, everything that Spinoza advances regarding the possibility of a conflict of this word and the world that is grounded in it. The question of substance appears here, from the very beginning of his philosophy. Or, differently: to think the potentiality of substance as *causa sui*, as something that is not determined by any transcendental structure. The transcendental disappears in Spinoza, that is, there is a disappearance of all the traditional assumptions of philosophy, which includes, for example, the later assumptions of German idealism as well. The world is the affirmation of its own immanence and not the accomplishment of transcendental and/or teleological structures. Hegel's critique becomes very concrete, or better, includes the dialectical fulfilment, if seen as the affirmation of the Substance's potency only. The concrete, thus, does not accomplish something beyond itself. In

other words, the concrete is the affirmation of this ontology of potency and not the deontology of the accomplishment of the transcendental.

I will discuss further how this ontology seems to appear in Spinoza regarding the questions of law, politics, and economy. Within this context, what becomes apparent is a possibility for another modernity, or, for a world beyond modernity. From this perspective, we cannot forget the initial terms previously mentioned as essential to a discussion with Spinoza: potency and the universal. In this sense, a perspective to confront Hegel is now clearer – the question is: Is it possible to talk about the idea of the Subject along with Spinoza? Consequently, this is the point where Deleuze would pursue a Nietzschean reading, to contest a particular Hegelian heritage in psychoanalysis and to reinvent possibility of potentiality in the contemporary context (Deleuze 1962).

3.1. Spinoza and Law

Let's follow here the practical implications of Spinoza's rupture with the metaphysics of the transcendental. In the beginning there is a question on *jus naturalism* articulated in the *Theological-Political Treatise*. The postulate of *jus naturalism* is the idea of nature related to natural rights, the social contract and the conditions of articulating the State. What Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau have in common is the notion of natural freedom that appears also as the difference between authoritarian, liberal and democratic State. Therefore, the question about *jus naturalism* articulates the possibility to reconstruct the historical road of modernity.

Whereas the German Idealism defies *jus naturalism*, something that already could be found in Kant's difference between nature and freedom, Spinoza's contesting entails a different relation between nature and freedom. Spinoza will go along the lines of the affirmation of the potentiality of being, which, as a consequence, is related to the human being and its practices. In other words, freedom will remain linked to nature and to a specific inclination towards the preservation of one's own being. This is what Spinoza calls as *conatus*. This interpretation of the preservation of one's own being resembles Hobbes. However, this reading is different. While in Hobbes the contract will require the abandonment of natural rights in favor of security in the authoritarian State, Spinoza opposes to this idea of contract. Following this line of inquiry, we will understand better the very place of the human being within the context or framework of immanence in nature.

"No one transfers his natural right to another" (2016: 287), says Spinoza, elaborating the conditions of coexistence within a society, "all remain equal, as they were before in the state of nature." (ibid: 287) This is a point of departure from Hobbes. In fact, Hobbes speaks about the conditions of security that animate all contracts, creating the conditions for our survival. However, for Spinoza what is important isn't survival. The point is "to liberate the individual from fear, so that he can live as much as possible in security, that

is, preserving as much as possible, and without damages to other, his natural right to exist and act.” (ibid: 347) In this sense, Spinoza brings together right and natural laws: Right is related to the ontology of being, and it represents an affirmation of being; it does not imply mere following of the given norms. Right, in this sense, is the concretization of this ontology of being.

3.2. Spinoza and Politics

What we can see is that it would not be any metaphysical stratum between nature and freedom, as in the Aristotelian or Hegelian interpretations. Hegel would agree with this critique of the social contract, for it requires a thinking of the dignity of the State as something independent of human decisions, as something that ends this historical teleology. But, for Spinoza, there is nothing final here: The State accomplishes only its own nature. Therefore, the finality of the State can only be freedom (ibid: 347).

Modernity did not abandon the metaphysics of identity manifested in our knowledge. We can draw a line from Hobbes to Hegel. This identity has a teleological sense, in accordance with the lines of interpretation of nature in Hobbes, or the Spirit in Hegel. It seems that within the Spinoza’s dispute with this modern teleology or this modern identity, we can look for a possibility of another modernity, where human being could be understood not as deficiency, but as potentiality.

Here we arrive at the issue concerning a possible Subjectivity in Spinoza and the question of democracy. As we have seen, Spinoza’s metaphysics indicates the affirmation of immanence in being. Yet, if everything would be the process of immanence, there wouldn’t be any necessity for us to do anything whatsoever. That is, anything beyond contemplating of the world. On the contrary, we are witnesses of the powers which do not affirm any potency. Would capitalism be the example of the immanence of being? In this sense, we need to know what are the principles (*arche*) of our world, so that we can follow the way of immanence. Hence, Spinoza’s *Ethics* is a continuation of the readings on *Physics*. *The Ethics* follows the process of affirmation announced at the beginning of his metaphysics (Deleuze 1968: 251). Knowledge brings us closer to the understanding of the structure of being, to the possibility of agreeing with nature. How can we understand this? One possible answer is – through the question of democracy.

“As men are subjected to passions, one cannot say that they agree in nature”. (Spinoza 2018: 32) What we see here, in fact, is the matter of reason in Spinoza. Reason is no more representative (element) as in Aristotle, nor constitutive, as in Hegel. Reason simply speaks to us, asking us to comply with nature. “Only as men live through the conduct of reason, men agree, always and necessarily, in nature.” (ibid: 35) In *Corollary 1*, Spinoza points out that the thing most useful to man, among singular things, can only be a man that lives on the condition of reason (ibid: 35). That is, ‘there isn’t anything more useful to man, between the singular things, than a man.’ (ibid: 35)

This intersubjectivity, that appears when Spinoza speaks of multitude, is a possible dimension of subjectivity in his philosophy. It starts with the idea of *conatus*. Thus, subjectivity is not transcendental or constitutive; it expresses and articulates itself in a relation, therefore, Subjectivity in Spinoza is relational. Or, as Balibar argues, the condition of the subject in Spinoza has as its ground in the conditions of coexistence with others, of citizenship which develops itself in the democratic State (Balibar 2005: 45). Democracy is, therefore, a project which agrees with nature. In other words, it is the immanence of nature. This is why we can say that Spinoza is not so much a thinker of difference; he is the thinker of the possibility of the understanding of immanence. Through the agreement with nature, we arrive at the universal dimension of democracy; to the common, not the public world. So, Spinoza is the thinker of the common world, not the public one. This difference between the common and public becomes clearer through the reconstruction of the problems of the economy in Spinoza.

3.3. Spinoza and Economy

In order to shed some light on the problems of economy we will start with Marx, who will search the truth of the modern world *in* the economy. According to him there is nothing more profound for understanding of modernity than the economy. Or differently, we cannot go beyond the conflictual relation between capital and labor to understand our world. The modern truth is economical; in the background of modernity stands economy.

Now, Spinoza dedicates only a couple of lines to the discussion of economy. On the final pages of the *Ethics*, the book IV, he writes: “But money has furnished us with a token for everything: hence it is with the notion of money, that the mind of the multitude is chiefly engrossed: nay, it can hardly conceive any kind of pleasure, which is not accompanied with the idea of money as cause.” (Spinoza 2018) Can we say, then, that Spinoza understood modernity as undervaluing the economy? Is it possible to do such a thing? If this is true, how can we bring Spinoza and Marx closer? In order to address this issue, we need to return to the text that perhaps inspired Spinoza, namely Aristotle’s *Politics*, chapter III.

For Aristotle economy stays within the private sphere (it concerns domestic, household affairs), and, as such, it has nothing to with the public one. Also, for the Greeks economy was not an ontological question. Maybe, we are about to face a problem in their thinking: the problem of ontology and economy. Maybe the relation between ontology and economy could be seen only as modern one, as utterly Marx’s realm, for he was the first one to grasp it?

Going back to Aristotle, we can ask ourselves why he dedicates one of the first chapters of his *Politics* to the economy, if economy remains irrelevant for his thought? There is a type of art of acquisition “which by nature is a part of the management of a household” (or domestic economy, [*Politics*, 1256b: 1997]). For us, this is not a problem at all. Ultimately, not even for Marx, even though

he criticizes the economy as such (the Greek economy, for instance). The point of his critique is the question of economy in modernity. Maybe Aristotle already got close to this kind of reading. There is, as we have seen, an art of acquisition which is ‘natural’, “given by nature” (to use Aristotle’s expression), and that plays its part in “the satisfaction of the proper necessities of man” (1257a). But there is another way of wealth acquisition, contrary to nature, related only to money, an art, if we may say so, of wealth-getting. (1257b) Here, richness is the goal and not the natural teleology. The economy that departs from this natural teleology creates certain risks. Aristotle claims: “Hence usury is very justifiably detested, since it gets wealth from money itself rather than from the very thing money was devised to facilitate.” (1258b), that is, the natural necessities. And he concludes: “Hence of all the kinds of wealth acquisition this one is the most unnatural.” (1258b) That is why he even uses another word, *Chrematistics*, to emphasize the difference between the economy given by nature from its not-natural counterpart.

What Spinoza criticizes, in the passage commented earlier, is the economy that became *Chrematistics* in the modern epoch. For him, the economy is not that much of the importance, because he does not let social reproduction to be bounded to an identity, in this case to the economic one. At this point, maybe we can argue, along with Spinoza, for the common and not the public, because the public arises from the modern affirmation of economy. Common world should be the affirmation of potentiality, of plurality, and not something related to the teleological reproduction of identities.

It becomes clearer why Spinoza does not belong to the liberalism and the economical roads of modernity, nor republicanism: He confronts the modern idea of the teleology of the State, which finds its ultimate consequences in Hegel.

Following this line of argumentation, Marx will claim that we cannot accomplish universality in modernity. Modernity is the conflict between capital and labor, and not the possibility to overcome an accomplishing of the affirmation of universal. The truth of the modern world is not universal, but a mere abstraction. Since the beginnings of modernity, labor is transformed from a standpoint of capital to a standpoint of abstract value of exchange, not even the concrete value of (some) use. For Marx this transformation of labor to capital is a sign that we cannot conquer the universal in modernity.

4. Concluding remarks

Parousia, therefore, is the invitation for a change, for a mutual recognition with/of Others. The divine gift is a possibility, an invitation of/for this change. *Parousia* concretizes itself in a universal and messianic community. Politics is not grounded in the identities of a social and legal community. (Arendt comes to mind along with Paul following the idea of *Amor Mundi*).

What is at the bottom of politics? Differences? Differences quite often result in creating new identities. The debates on sex and gender show us at least that much: Each party defends its own truth. But, if truth exists, it must be

universal. This is the point of Badiou's reading of Paul (2009). Therefore, the alternative to identity politics is not difference, but the universal; the possibility of being to be treated as a human being.

But what about the question of the universal in Paul, when it seems that he disputes Jews, Greeks, and Romans alike? He is against Jewish legalism, Greek reason, and the Roman imperial power. Thus, what could be universal in this context? Perhaps the universal is in this militancy, in this confrontation with the identities and this possibility of opening for the others. An explicit militancy, it seems, because the world of Paul was a world of slaves.

Martin Scorsese's movie *The Silence* offers us a useful illustration: Why the Christian missionaries go to Japan? Nobody wants them there. The Japanese, from their side, do not send missionaries to conquer the souls of Europeans. Thus, all sympathies are on their side. If we support this line of thinking, how can we defend the universal, of Christianity presented in Pauline readings? It could mean: To save Japan from suffering, and social exclusion, to affirm the Other, to affirm Change, and to be free (Beings). "Stand fast therefore in the freedom wherewith Christ hath made us free." (*Gal.* 5:1) Or: "[...] where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom." (*2 Cor.* 4:17)

Therefore, *Amor Mundi* manifests itself as love for freedom. The resurrection of Christ, a singular event, appears as universal, as the possibility of (for) humankind. The Pauline universal, thus, represents a specific connection between the singular and the universal. This is the message we receive and it is much stronger in the face of the neoliberal culture of new identities, which excludes life and the others in the name of the market. Is there anyone who feels alive in Capitalism? We, the zombies of globalization. Maybe this resembles a draft of Pasolini's movie, which he never made, that places Paul not in Galilee, Attica, and Lazio, but somewhere between Europe and the United States.

In the epistle to the Galatians, Paul contends: "For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision means anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature." (*Gal.* 6:15) This is a quasi-Nietzschean message. Nietzsche is the one who did not understand Paul because of the recurring question of universalism. For Nietzsche, Christianity, even the Pauline one, is a form of a cultural nihilism. Contrary to Nietzsche, the new being, claims Paul, is the rupture in the very being, so Christianity may yet happen.

We see, from the beginning, that Paul confronts the Jewish, Roman, and Greek orders. This represents an opening to/for our potentiality: the creation of another world. On the one hand, I understand Paul as a forerunner of the process of the destruction of metaphysics. This destruction remains a contemporary project. It also seems to be a possibility of understanding the relationship between right and its principles, between laws and justice.

On the other hand, Spinoza still seems to believe in universal, thinking about democracy and not revolution. But, arguing with Spinoza, we need to act here and now, in the empirical-transcendental sense, as Deleuze would say, instead of waiting for the teleological possibility of a subjectivity that, perhaps, may never accomplish itself. Indeed, this is the reality of the working class today.

Perhaps there are no more subjects, as Deleuze claims, following Spinoza, but only anonymous forces linked to individuals (Deleuze 1981: 172).

“To become what one is” is the Nietzschean message that Deleuze follows. Return to oneself, beyond all teleologies. And affirm our own desire, which does not have its object. The project, therefore, begins with the affirmation of the concrete, then follows the framework of ontological immanence. Here, perhaps, we can read Marx and Spinoza alongside one another, on the issue of the confrontation of the reification of desire in the modern world (Lordon 2015). Even practical struggles, according to Deleuze, should not articulate a dialectical negation, in Hegelian or Marxian sense, but entail a return to “difference and its potency of affirmation.” (Deleuze 1988: 935) This affirmation of the concrete, the Deleuzian project of the empirical-transcendental affirmation, might be the possibility of another modernity that starts with Spinoza.

This affirmation of difference could create a context for thinking of the very idea of the universal to which Spinoza was committed. At the end of the *Political Treatise*, Spinoza asks: “whether it is by nature or by convention that women are subject to men. For if this is due solely to convention, I have excluded women from the government without any reasonable cause. However, if we consult actual experience, we shall see that it is due to their weakness.” (Spinoza 1983) And he concludes that: “we shall easily see that it is impossible for men and women to govern on equal terms without great damage to the peace.” (ibid) From this standpoint, along with Spinoza and against him, Deleuze will begin his project of becoming-woman. The universal appears, therefore, as the affirmation of difference. What is affirmed, thus, can become our common ground of immanence, or our equality.

translated by Ricardo Martins Spindola Diniz

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Miroslav Milović

Ius sive Potentia: Pavle i Spinoza

Apstrakt

Ovaj članak je deo istraživačkog projekta pod nazivom *Zakon kao potencija*, koji, u širem smislu, istražuje odnos prava i ontologije. Tvrdim, polazeći od Sv. Pavla, da se ontološka perspektiva može shvatiti kao mogućnost pravde, u smislu oslobađanja ljudskog bića. Stoga ovaj rad nudi analizu koncepata potencije i univerzalnosti. Iako termin „univerzalizam“ nije izričito pomenut, on je prisutan u mišljenju Sv. Pavla i doveden do svojih praktičnih posledica. Pored toga, Spinozino čitanje Sv. Pavla otvara mogućnost da se ovaj koncept iskuša konceptom moderne teleologije. Stoga raspravljam o posledicama ovog sučeljavanja u pogledu zakona, politike i ekonomije. To dovodi do artikulacije druge modernosti, gde se, možda, univerzalno pojavljuje kao afirmacija razlike.

Ključne reči: Sv. Pavle, Spinoza, potencija, ontologija, univerzalizam

Srdan Maraš

THE EROTIC/AESTHETIC QUALITY SEEN FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEVINAS'S ETHICAL AN-ARCHAEOLOGY

ABSTRACT

This paper emphasizes the place and the role of the aesthetic quality and the role of the erotic in Levinas's project that deals with ethical an-archaeology. Despite Levinas's categorical statements that there are irreconcilable differences between ethics and aesthetics, i.e. between ethics and the erotic, above all, it is emphasized here that these differences do not represent a stark or sharp contrast, but quite contrary, they often constitute a subversive ontological element. On the other hand, somewhat unexpectedly, with its ethical anti-aestheticism Levinas's "noncontemporary" thought appears to be, at the same time, both significant and critical, elementary, emancipatory and contemporary in relation to present-day reactionary reactualization and revitalization of the aesthetic quality which mechanically proceeds to develop on the margins of Levinas's emancipatory past.

KEYWORDS

the erotic, aesthetics, phenomenology, ontology, ethics, an-archaeology

Introduction

Discussing the role of the *aesthetic quality* in Levinas's ethical project is particularly intriguing for two reasons. First, the aesthetic quality has to be determined by ethical reasons and has to develop primarily on the horizon of contemporary and yet archaic thought which *openly and directly opposes any aestheticism*. Second, in the spirit of some kind of modern artistic avant-garde, this contemporary and yet archaic thought accuses the aesthetic quality of being immoral and of corrupting the truth. So, insisting on alternative, ethical humanism, at the same time, shows paradoxically all the weaknesses already expressed by *revolutionary artistic trans-aesthetic avant-garde* that, with its radical and modern anti-aestheticism, fails to distance itself from the significant influence of the aesthetic quality. This alternative ethical humanism could be seen as increasingly important in context of modern and *humanistic anti-aestheticism* (which is known to have been defeated in the meantime and to have been subject to ideological aesthetics), manifesting itself as a rigid, non-dialectical and insufficiently reflective thinking which readily makes a pact with pre-modern traditions. On the other hand, Levinas's "non-contemporary" thought with its ethical anti-aestheticism, at the same time, somewhat

unexpectedly, imposes itself as something that can still be considered significantly critical, elementary, emancipatory and modern. It can also be seen as something that is in an abstract and general sense opposed to the present-day ideological and reactionary aesthetics of repetitive mimetism. In general context which is increasingly burdened with profound class differences and differences in material circumstances, the orientation towards the aesthetic quality is thought to be an essential part of a systematic ideology which uses the aesthetic quality for its manipulations and turns it into its instrument used to deviate from the truth and from the beauty that even the ancient Greeks associated with the truth and with a meaningful existence. Therefore, in an attempt to oppose that ideology, one welcomes any thought that is skeptical in relation to the existing unrestrained and irrational power of the aesthetic quality and that is very much interested in strengthening and developing the potential of universal reason, even if that thought is old-fashioned and conceived with precocity just like Levinas's thought partly is.

The Erotic, Aesthetics and Ethics

In pursuit of pure, sovereign and non-ontological *ethics*, Levinas's thought refuses to be intertwined with any form of thought or judgement which belongs to *ontology*. According to this philosopher, *aesthetics* occupies a key position since it immediately and directly points to the horizon of being: to the way it emerges, appears, reveals and manifests itself, and overall to the material world that witnesses the birth of being and to the way in which that being reveals and shows itself. Therefore, the author became distrustful of *phenomenology* although he felt its strong presence during his formative years and he cannot escape its influence since phenomenology always speaks about everything that constitutes the very excellence of being. Phenomenology is always interested in what is, in some way, the most essential part of being. *Aesthetics* and *phenomenology* are naturally interdependent and lead directly to *ontology* since they formed and developed in its shadow. After all, it is no coincidence that in the modern phenomenological tradition that dates back to Husserl's school of thought, the *aesthetic dimension* soon became the basic field of phenomenological research and phenomenology acquired its inevitable *aesthetic trait*.

However, as far as methodology and subject-matter are concerned, Levinas's thought forms an alliance with phenomenology and aesthetics despite the fact that Levinas reaches for highly unusual means and solutions with the aim of developing one single ethics which is at the same time both *non-phenomenological* and *trans-phenomenological*, i.e. both *anti-aesthetic* and *trans-aesthetic*. If one looks at it closely and if one is at liberty to say that, Levinas's thought never denied their dominant presence at any stage of its development. Levinas always keeps to a phenomenological method of analysis and in the subject field he pays attention to those subjects and topics that dwell on the edges of phenomenological experience and that were studied by phenomenology. Suffice it to say that the question of the Other, as one of the central and fundamental

themes of his philosophy, exists as an essential theme in Husserl's opus and as such it directly influenced Levinas's specific view on alterity. As far as aesthetics and the aesthetic quality are concerned, it is known that Levinas's thought was very much influenced by *art* and *literature* in particular. On numerous occasions, Levinas himself emphasized that literature had revealed to him the possibility to arrive at a *special ethical meaning* which stood in total contrast to an ontological one (Levinas 1982: 16–17). In his various works, he openly and directly refers to the way art points to *personal ethics* and to the way in which personal ethics becomes part of art.¹

Levinas is simply convinced that the aesthetic dimension of art at the same time conceals and reveals its ethical meaning². One regrets his inability to perceive in the realm of beauty the meaning that surpasses its purely aesthetic horizon just like one regrets his complete disregard of nature and everything that remains on the outside in relation to man and his world and that equally or even more shows the signs of a certain *transcendence*. Being fascinated by the importance he attaches to interpersonal relations, he remains blind to everything that transcends man and everything that critically influences man's destiny. His humanism, begins to take shape of Nietzschean diagnosis that says "human, too human" and displays all the weaknesses of the thought which were noticed by Aristotle long time ago when Aristotle claimed that human beings were not by far the most sublime in the universe since celestial bodies surpass man in terms of divine nature. Many thinkers and philosophers called into question and doubted this Levinas's idea and considered it to be unsustainable. Despite the importance attached to human relations, it is, after all, an outdated and obsolete idea that abstract interpersonal relations, deprived of any concrete social quality, can be seen as "the site of transcendence".

However, when one reads Levinas's work first and then discusses aesthetics, one notices that the erotic is not directly linked to aesthetics at the early stages of Levinas's work. Although the link can usually be established between the two since the erotic itself displays some aesthetic elements as much as it is a deliberate variation of raw sexuality and a reflexive and critical deviation from its coarseness embodied in a sexual act. Not only does Levinas fail to establish that direct link, but he also tries hard to distance the erotic from the aesthetic quality because of the ethical meaning of the erotic. Despite the fact that, at first, the aesthetic quality appears to be absent and invisible, it cannot fail to come to the forefront and to come to the surface of the erotic imbued with ethical principles. If it is examined more closely, it can be easily seen that the aesthetic quality shows up in places where *the ethical meaning* of the erotic is being constructed. According to Levinas, woman escapes man and remains

1 When one studies Levinas's works which treat art as a special subject, three works particularly come to mind: *Reality and Its Shadow*, *Proper Names*, *On Obliteration*.

2 The way Levinas interprets the work of Vasily Grossman is well-known just like it is well-known that he often found in Grossman's work the examples which illustrated his concept of personal ethics. See Levinas 1991: 253–264.

distanta the very moment when she seems so close and available to him. That moment marks the beginning of a *game* which is undoubtedly aesthetic in one of its aspects. Even though Levinas does not see it that way, the game of *attraction and repulsion* is certainly aesthetic in every sense of the word. The game is being played here on the margins and its participants are playing with liminal space and its meaning. It is understood that even *belated ethical responsibility* possesses the aesthetic quality as much as it reflects the peculiar forces of attraction and repulsion between I and the Other. It is obvious that the aesthetic quality cannot be cancelled and removed without any trace from one such erotic which has an emphatically ethical structure.

After all, when Levinas develops one extreme and rigid ethical idealism which takes the form of an abstract utopia that categorically opposes the existing reality, he looks at the matter from another angle, seriously running the risk of turning his thought into aesthetics as its polar opposite, or to be more precise into the aesthetic quality, which is the last thing he wants. Without underestimating the significance of other moments of the situation when the aesthetic quality becomes prominent, one can say that his work, designed to assume the form of the already mentioned abstract utopia, is in stark contrast to the existing reality.³ His work tends to become something highly aesthetical when it comes to a particular *abstraction which is isolated and separated from real trends in the contemporary social reality and from life seen in its entirety and when it comes to a Kantian abstraction that does not deal with the very existence and its problems, but focuses on special characteristics and particular qualities*. There is no doubt that Levinas's work does not deal with the existing social, political and economic problems which are directly related to human existence and which determine and define that existence. His work also does not dwell on the problems of the survival of human race bearing in mind that it is not highly unlikely that humankind and other living beings will disappear from the face of the earth. In addition to that, it should be mentioned that the future of the planet earth is obviously in jeopardy. There are strong indications that in the realm of politics, Levinas's work becomes opportunistic and that it is freely associated with a predominant neo-liberal, neo-imperialistic and capitalistic system and various doubtful regimes as the Zionist regime is.⁴ In this regard, his work stands at the opposite end of the spectrum to Fromm's work which is also dedicated to love and which sees love from a rationalistic perspective and talks about its disintegration in contemporary Western society in which the narcissistic form of love prevails.

Therefore, Fromm has every right to state that the principle of capitalism and the principle of love are incompatible (Fromm 1956: 83–107). Symptomatically,

3 One usually talks about *utopia* with reference to the thought of E. Levinas who undoubtedly uses it in many different places. He does it in such a way that it contrasts our own idea of utopia. See the text "Le lieu at l'utopie" in Levinas 1984: 153–159.

4 See "Dialogue sur le penser-à-l'autre" in Levinas 1991: 237–245. Compare with „Etat d'Israël et religion d'Israël“ in Levinas 1984: 323–330.

Levinas work does not take part in the discussions related to ecological, geostrategic and other issues that affect the entire planet and thus his work is limited to certain subjects and has limited importance. When compared to the concept of responsibility that Hans Jonas develops that incorporates other aspects of responsibility besides the ethical aspect, Levinas's understanding of this term seems to be superficial and not fully developed (Jonas 1990). So, if one sticks to the idea that his work is seen as some sort of "abstract utopia that is in stark contrast to the existing reality", one cannot help feeling that his work is easily incorporated into every doctrine which *only* cares about some ethical emphasis and *particular* and *out-of-the-ordinary* aesthetic nuance.

The Erotic and Ethical Responsibility

At the later stage of his work Levinas somehow overlooks the fact that he himself previously established a close connection between the erotic and ethics. In the meantime, when he draws a sharp line of distinction between the erotic and responsibility, he tends to overestimate the motive of ethical responsibility and the novelty that it could bring and thus he essentially underestimates the erotic and disregards the crucial and important ethical characteristics that he earlier attributed to it. Therefore, a significant dilemma arises whether one such subversive act can be justified and explained especially at the time when *ethical* responsibility is seen in contrast to *ontological* and *aesthetic* aspects of the erotic as it is interpreted at the later stage of Levinas's work.

In his youth Levinas was lucid enough to notice that the erotic and responsibility are interdependent. Even then it was out of the question for Levinas to assume that the erotic could become responsible at a certain moment and at a certain point in context of some development and he immediately and directly treated the erotic as something ethical or more precisely as something fundamentally ethical. If Levinas was even then prudent enough to come to a conclusion that *ethics primarily appeared* in form of the erotic and if he was intelligent enough to see the erotic as a genuine champion of ethical energy, it is strange that he could have given up on the erotic at a later stage in his life when he intended to develop a radical ethical responsibility. It would have made more sense to him if he had connected closely the erotic and responsibility at this very stage, prompted by his previous experiences and his insight into internal connection between ethics and the erotic. He was on his way to become an intermediary between the meaning of the erotic and responsibility and the erotic and ethics and to attain the attitude that says that the erotic and responsibility represent different sides of one and the same behaviour and endeavour, if only he stayed on the path that he had embarked on in his youth when he, without any hesitation and inhibitions, was able to see the significance of *interdependence between ethics and the erotic*. Had he stayed on that path, it would not have been difficult for him to reach the conclusion that responsibility itself was led by the erotic and that it was essentially determined

by the erotic and that it reflected libidinal energy which represented a wide and general energetic potential.

But, it is well-known that Levinas does not appreciate enough either libidinal potential of the erotic or its instinctive nature or its tendency to find pleasure and satisfaction or its power to become a tyrannical force. But, there is that inability of his to see the *development* of the erotic or to recognize the different stages in the development of the erotic which always set it apart. He almost absolutely distrusts the erotic in Plato's work. He finds repulsive that interdependence and intertwining between the erotic, aesthetics and ethics and between the erotic, dialectics and philosophy. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that in his anti-dialectic mood he is not able to gain an insight into the fact that at its peak ethics still presents itself as a fundamentally defined aesthetics and the precisely differentiated erotic. In Plato's work, the erotic reaches its peak and becomes genuine at the level of ethics and philosophy. There, it becomes prominent and reveals its true nature. Finally, the opinion that ethics is nothing more than a moment in an internal development of the erotic is not so far from Levinas's idea, particularly from his early idea which never says with certainty that ethics comes before the erotic and that ethics is a generic term which incorporates the erotic and takes precedence over it, but it is legitimate to claim as many commentators do that the erotic is the source of ethics.⁵ The *belated anarchic responsibility* represents some kind of *love* as much as it shows that *the erotic comes first*.

It was said here that in an ethical sense this concept of love was formed by a particularly designed concept of *alterity*. This concept of alterity, together with the concept of plurality, asymmetry and transcendence which are constituted in a singular way, helps intersubjectivity to acquire a recognizable and highly unusual non-ontological meaning which points to that responsibility for the Other in contrast to responsibility for oneself.

In addition to that, it should be mentioned that Levinas with his insisting on the concept of the Other, regardless of our interpretation of his concept of the absolute Other and of his own views and despite himself, partly helps us understand the essential importance of the Other in the process of subjectivization and the process of formation of a certain prominent intersubjectivity. Connecting his central ethical concept of the Other with the concept of love that he holds in high regard, Levinas, at the same time, tries to establish the phenomenon of love. It is of crucial importance to do it at the time when the phenomenon of love is replaced by its surrogates such as the aestheticized forms of love. It seems that Levinas can take a great credit for it in view of the fact that his thought does not want to make compromises and to trade in the space of the modern ontological thought. In his own way, Levinas also relentlessly keeps on pointing to the ideological effects of the attempt to aestheticize

5 One points out to the influential ideas of J. L. Thaysse who deals with this issue and who questions the hypothesis that the erotic is derived from ethics in many places in his work dedicated to Levinas. See Thaysse: 1998: 299–315.

the phenomenon of love. Even on an elementary, but essential level, with his own efforts Levinas takes a critical and emancipatory contemporary stand although it can be easily seen that his concept of love is far from being a precisely defined one. Levinas does not make a distinction between different forms of love. Like Stendhal (Stendhal 1937), Ortega y Gasset (Ortega y Gasset 1957) and Roland Barthes (Barthes 1997), Levinas does not attempt at differentiating and examining the different modalities and obviously different historical and structural forms of love. These forms perceived by these authors through contemplation stem from one basic definition of love. Even in this isolated place in ethics, his concept of love does not seem to be broad enough. For example, unlike Levinas, Fromm, understands that if one wants to have love, one needs to be responsible, to exercise, to work on oneself, to be patient and particularly to respect the other (Fromm 1956: 7–38). Levinas does not take into account the particular qualities of the other, he reduces those qualities to the abstract and general identity of the other. Badiou says that *duration* is a key characteristic of love while Levinas does not even mention it (Badiou 2009:17–23).

It is no wonder that some authors like Badiou question even the very concept of *love* (Badiou 2009: 10–16) when ethics with its general rigid concept of love reduces it to a certain sacrificial and moral experience which is neither erotically motivated nor aesthetically defined. The dilemma is how to ask that question whether love can be totally reduced to one's *moral obligations and duties to others*. The dilemma is by no means resolved by the fact that Levinas thinks that we are not dealing with morals here. According to him, ethics allegedly deals with something entirely different. Ethics is undoubtedly listed in the moralistic register and it even becomes a prominent representative of extreme moralism. After all, if love is seen from a designated ethical angle, it degenerates beyond recognition and it almost takes one of its pathological forms. Being obsessed with some other person, feeling fatal attraction for some other person and all the other forms of love, which demonstrate love as some kind of imposed or mandatory affection, bear much resemblance to Levinasian paternalistic and allocentric love.

Conclusion

Finally, it is becoming difficult to present Levinas's interpretation of love as something credible and true. Although his interpretation and its abstract endeavors cannot be replaced in the fight against a powerful ideological and aestheticized opponent, his interpretation is full of contradictions because it is both *non-historic* and *at the same time* it invests all its hopes in *history*, i.e. in one *particular ancient period* in history. A serious suspicion arises that this theory has any right to appeal to history and its events to provide reasons which would support its claims⁶ since this theory approaches the phenomenon of

6 A quote from *Totalite et infini* is given here as an illustration and a warning: "... Nous nous proposons de décrire, dans le déroulement de l'existence terrestre, de

love in a non-historic way without relying on a historical development of love in any way. This theory also underestimates modern historic phenomena and modern manifestations of history. Once it has done it, another serious suspicion arises, closely related to the fact that allegedly *universal* model of love is found in *an ancient Jewish tradition*. What rouses the suspicion is the fact that *this model of love is found in that very tradition* and the belief that this model is to be *universal*. The strongest suspicion is roused by the belief that the offered universal model of love represents some kind of *pure love absolutely devoid of any sexual pleasure*. Since this love is understood as *an unconditional sacrificial and ethical experience*, it is removed from its libidinal source and embedded in the *abstract surface of interpersonal relations* as the *only* place where such love can be born. When love becomes nothing more than *a duty and obligation towards the Other*, it loses its recognizable features and takes a highly unusual form. The last suspicion refers to the dilemma whether *this form* of love deserves to be called *love* at all.

On the horizon where Levinas's entire theory of love is called into question to a certain extent and where its major concepts, premises and primary goals become subject to radical skepticism, one can hardly expect of this theory to provide an insight into the critical, socio-historical and emancipatory potential of the erotic. At the same time one does not ignore the fact that on the abstract and critical level this theory sheds some light on all the ideological attempts to aestheticize this phenomenon. However, as much as his theory is subject to a historical and dialectical "reinterpretation", it can also become somewhat important because of its phenomenological aspects that are rather similar to dialectical actions. Levinas's phenomenology much more than any other phenomenology stands in close proximity to dialectics and not only in a formal sense which represents the other side of his phenomenology. More importantly, one can say here that his phenomenology develops the erotic as something *radical, idealized, aestheticized and spiritualized* which takes transerotic forms and modalities that remain *very much* distant from the *immediate sensual erotic*. In that regard, it certainly represents the continuation of that thought that was born in Plato's time and that reached its maturity through its concept of sublimation in psychoanalytic theory. Both Plato's erotic and Freud's

l'existence économique comme nous l'appelons, une relation avec l'Autre, qui n'aboutit pas à une totalité divine ou humaine, une relation qui n'est pas une totalisation de l'histoire, mais l'idée de l'infini. Une telle relation est la métaphysique même. L'histoire ne serait pas le plan privilégié ou se manifeste l'être dégagé du particularisme des points de vue dont la réflexion porterait encore la tare. Si elle prétend intégrer moi et l'autre dans un esprit impersonnel, cette prétendue intégration est cruaute et injuste, c'est-à-dire ignore Autrui. L'histoire, rapport entre hommes, ignore une position du Moi envers l'Autre où l'Autre demeure transcendant par rapport à moi. Si je ne suis pas extérieur à l'histoire par moi-même, je trouve en autrui un point, par rapport à l'histoire, absolu; non pas en fusionnant avec autrui, mais en parlant avec lui. L'histoire est travaillée par les ruptures de l'histoire où un jugement se porte sur elle. Quand l'homme aborde vraiment Autrui, il est arraché à l'histoire." (Levinas 2000: 44-45.)

erotic reach a certain stage in their development when they become transerotic and stop being the sensual erotic. Although Plato's transerotic form of the erotic and Freud's transerotic form of the erotic maintain a close contact with the sensual erotic, Levinas's transerotic form of the erotic loses any touch with the sensual erotic. In the absence of dialectics that keeps an eye on what is obsolete, it is logical and normal that his ethics loses its touch with its erotic background and at the same time lacks any erotic quality. Therefore, this ethics can become a modern respectable critical thought provided it becomes subject to a socio-historical dialectical intervention and provided that it becomes an introduction to further thinking and provided there is possibility for one such process to occur. Otherwise, in our opinion, it loses any significance, merely manifesting itself as a developed religious thought.

What makes the process of idealization of the erotic genuine is the insistence on a social dialectalization of this process. What shapes the theory of the erotic and also makes it genuine is insistence on the opposite dialectical process of materialization of the erotic that shows that the erotic with its extreme subliminal forms is still essentially connected to the immediate sensual erotic. It all actually proves that in all its sensuality, the erotic is *autonomous* and that with its direct meaning it creates laws that prove to be crucial for ethics and aesthetics as the transerotic levels of reality.

It is clearly seen even in the work of Plato and Freud who are representatives of the erotology that idealizes the erotic. Both authors do not ignore the *sensual erotic* and particularly *instinctive nature* of the erotic which features prominently in psychoanalysis. While Plato sees both the relationship between philosophy and ideas and the relationship between lovers from the same angle, Freud thinks that at its peak subliminal social reality has the libidinal structure similar to the structure of a genuinely instinctive bipolarism.

However, this aspect of the analysis cannot be found in Levinas's work. He hardly points to any feedbacks and pure sensual reactions. Levinas ignores and keeps quiet about sensual reality in which he could discover the laws that regulate his ethical reality and the laws that define all forms of his responsibility for the Other.

As one-sided erotology that completely ignores the material side of the erotic and stresses its ideal side, Levinas's theory simply cannot manage to impose itself as a theory that is substantiated enough. In the end, what makes this theory of love limited and restrictive is the absence of socio-historical dialectics on the level of the idealization of the erotic and the absence of entire materialistic dialectics from the erotic. We have our reservations as to whether this suggested reinterpretation is possible. When we think of Hegel's and Marx's opinion that dialectics can be applied within the system, we are convinced that the suggested interpretation, that follows a certain direction and dialectical impulses found in Levinas's work, makes room for his philosophy to be transformed beyond recognition, giving his philosophy firm boundaries and a limited and abstract value.

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Srđan Maraš

Erotsko/estetsko u perspektivi levinasove etičke an-arheologije

Sažetak

U ovom članku naznačuje se mesto i uloga onog estetskog u Levinasovom projektu etičke an-arheologije, kao i status koji erotika ima u tom projektu. Naglašava se u prvom redu da uprkos autorovim izričitim postavkama o nepomirljivosti etike i estetike, odnosno etike i erotike, ta opozicija ne funkcionira kao oštar i rezak kontrast, nego se, upravo obrnuto, neretko pokazuje kao subverzivna ontološka sprega. S druge strane, u odnosu na današnju re-akcionarnu reaktualizaciju i revitalizaciju estetskog, koja se tek mehanički odvija na rubovima njegove emancipatorske prošlosti, Levinasova „nesavremena“ misao se svojim etičkim antiestetizmom, donekle neočekivano, ipak ujedno ukazuje kao jedno još uvek bitno kritičko i elementarno emancipatorsko savremeno mišljenje.

Ključne reči: erotika, estetika, fenomenologija, ontologija, etika, an-arheologija

Miloš Bogdanović

PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MORRIS' SEMIOTIC THEORY

ABSTRACT

The subject of this paper is Charles Morris' semiotic theory that has as one of its major projects the unification of all sciences of signs. However, since the above project has proven to be unsuccessful, we will try to examine here the reasons that led to this. Accordingly, we will argue that to transcend the particularities of individual disciplines that he wanted to unify, Morris had to make certain ontological assumptions, instead of theoretical and methodological ones, that they could share. However, because the 'sign' as an ontological category could in our view only be established if we follow the principles of the pragmatic philosophical tradition, we will try to show that the reasons for this failure should be primarily sought in different effects that consistent application of the pragmatic principles has in each of them (primarily in linguistics and the philosophy of language). On the other hand, this should enable us to draw several important conclusions regarding Morris' project: namely, that his failure does not have to mean giving up semiotics as a potentially key discipline in approaching some fundamental philosophical problems, but also that it would demand return to the original semiotics developed in Peirce's works.

KEYWORDS

semiotics, semantics, syntactics, pragmatics, ontology, pragmatism, sign, semiosis, linguistics, philosophy of language

1. Introduction

Morris' semiotic theory is an offshoot of pragmatic philosophical tradition, and although we could speak of two aspects of Morris' theory that rely equally on pragmatism, this paper will primarily deal with Morris' semiotic theory in the strict sense. In other words, we will not focus on the details of what is known as Morris' pragmatic-behavioural theory of meaning, but on his attempt to lay the foundation for a unified theory of signs on pragmatic grounds.

The idea of a unified theory or science of signs was known before Morris, and the founder of modern linguistics Ferdinand de Saussure saw it as a special field of a more comprehensive science that he called semiology. However, unlike Saussure who anticipated it but never really tried to lay the foundations for this science, Morris really embarked on this project, although he thought that the best way to do it would be to develop not Saussure's but Peirce's ideas, or the discipline that this philosopher had established and which is known as semiotics.

Therefore, if Morris took from Saussure the idea of a comprehensive science of signs, it could be said that he adopted the means for its implementation from Peirce. However, Morris' efforts greatly exceeded both Peirce's and Saussure's.

Namely, unlike the first, Morris believed that, once established to its full extent, semiotics should not remain just one of the sciences, but the Organon of all sciences; in contrast to the second, he nurtured a vision that disciplines with essentially different aims and methods than linguistic ones could be subordinate to this science. In other words, despite the differences among them, Morris thought that achievements of the disciplines such as linguistics and the philosophy of language could be translated into a unified theory of signs, which means that he – which is basically our thesis – tacitly assumed a relative ontological unity among them.

Although it was convenient that Morris's approach was halfway between the methodology of linguistics and the philosophy of language – as evidenced by the fact that we will point out in this paper, that he used quite freely segments of both conceptual apparatuses – a comprehensive science of signs has never achieved a firmer theoretical and methodological unity, and despite Saussure's anticipation and Morris' efforts, it has not been constituted as an independent discipline. However, although today it could be rightly said that Morris' project has failed, we consider it to be very significant and so this paper will attempt to investigate the reasons for this failure, hoping it will lead us to some conclusions that might be relevant.

For this purpose, we will argue that the main obstacle to Morris was the pragmatic theoretical position that mainly inspired his thought and which, given the specificity of the process of semiosis, had to be included in some way in a comprehensive science of signs. Accordingly, in order to defend our thesis, we will primarily strive to set forth some insights related to the later development of the disciplines that Morris tried to unify, which could indirectly point to the philosophical implications of his (comprehensive) theory of signs. In other words, we will try to show that the implementation of some basic pragmatic principles proved to be significantly different in each of them, meaning that the gap that existed among them was insurmountable from the beginning, and that Morris unjustifiably assumed that they shared a common ontology.

2. Basics of Morris' Semiotics

As in similar occasions, it would be wise to approach the subject matter cautiously and avoid reaching conclusions lightly. Namely, we could, as stated in the introduction, share Morris' opinion that it would be quite normal to expect that a unified science of signs includes all specific ones, but it should be said that it is not easy at all to determine which sciences would be sciences of signs. Accordingly, in the introductory chapters of the work to which we will mainly refer here, in determining the most important tasks of his semiotics, Morris suggests the following list of disciplines that should be included in it: "The significance of semiotic as a science lies in the fact that it is a step in the

unification of science, since it supplies the foundations for any special science of signs, such as linguistics, logic, mathematics, rhetoric, and (to some extent at least) aesthetics” (Morris 1944: 2).

However, although he talks about the unification of all special sciences of signs as one of his most important objectives, and which sciences would that be exactly, Morris ignores an important fact, that none of these sciences is *per se* a science of signs. In fact, the only two disciplines that are explicitly addressed as such are semiotics and semiology, but since semiotics should become this unifying science, it seems that we are left only with semiology, which, as we have seen, Morris does not even mention. Reasons for this should not be sought elsewhere but in the fact that semiology has always been strongly linked to linguistics that, compared to it, succeeded in establishing more solid theoretical and methodological grounds. This, however, was not the case only in Morris's time, but also today to a great extent; in other words, every discussion about the achievements of semiology is still to a large extent about the achievements of linguistics, which will in no way improve Morris's position because linguistics is not a science of signs, but primarily of language.

Therefore, since Morris's suggestion about which sciences should be included in his semiotics does not seem particularly convincing, and by referring to semiology we have not succeeded in improving his position substantially, in order to preserve the plausibility of Morris' standpoint on this issue – and therefore, the plausibility of his whole project – it seems that we have no other choice than to try to assume that, instead of similarities in terms of their subject matter, Morris has noticed a certain ontological similarity between these disciplines, which encouraged the idea of the possibility of their unification.

One could get the impression that, by shifting the discussion to ontological level, we would significantly and unjustifiably reformulate the problem, primarily since Morris has not explicitly stated his view on ontological issues.¹ On the other hand, even if we succeed in showing that ontology of the disciplines that Morris wanted to unify is actually one and the same, this unification might seem not a goal to which Morris or anyone else could strive, but a result of this simple fact. However, for us it is favorable that Morris also does not engage in any systematic attempt of reduction, which would be expected, having in mind his goals. Namely, Morris acts as if, given his other observations are correct, this reduction is guaranteed, and even though he has not expressed it in appropriate terms, he seemed to have tacitly assumed just what we ascribe to him here – that the disciplines that should be unified actually share the same ontological base. If this is the case, as we will try to show, then

¹ This, however, is not particularly unusual because, on the one hand, it should be noted that at the time when Morris presented his thesis, these questions had yet to come into focus of philosophical interests (primarily through Carnap's and Quine's attempts to answer questions like “What is there?” or “What exists?”), and on the other, addressing them systematically has never been a special characteristic of pragmatic tradition to which he belonged.

Morris' thesis on *which are the sciences of signs*, in spite of all obvious weaknesses, still retains a certain value.

In other words, although the sciences that Morris mentions are undoubtedly not the sciences of signs, with appropriate interventions, they just might be reinterpreted *as such*, which was in fact Morris' intention.² All this, however, should be examined in more detail, which is why it is necessary to briefly outline the main characteristics of Morris's intellectual heritage that are also the fundamentals of his theoretical position.

As we have said, Morris' approach to semiotic issues is decidedly pragmatic in spirit, and Morris is in this respect a true follower of his great predecessor and founder of the pragmatic doctrine Charles Sanders Peirce. However, although they are the basis of his approach, the ideas that Morris took from Peirce are not numerous, and they basically come down to two.

The first is the idea of the so-called semiosis that signifies every process in which something figures as a sign, and that it is one of the central concepts of semiotics in general can be seen from Peirce's definition of it as a "doctrine about fundamental nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis" (Peirce 1998: 413). Another important achievement of pragmatism in this area that Morris adopts is the notion of the sign as a triadic relation. Peirce defines this triadic nature in the following way: "A sign is a thing which serves to convey a knowledge of some other thing, which it is said to *stand for or represent*. This thing is called the *object* of the sign; the idea in the mind that sign excites, which is a mental sign of the same object, is called an *interpretant* of the sign." (Ibid: 13).

Thus, for the semiosis process to be actualized, there must be an object that indicates something else than itself for an interpreter, which is in this case a sign.³ However, although Morris will leave this central semiotic concept intact, he will modify to a great extent or, more precisely, further develop Peirce's thesis on the sign as a triadic relation.

Namely, Morris accepts Peirce's thesis on the triadic nature of the sign, but for him this triadic nature consists in relations in whom it stands 1) to objects 2) to persons or interpreters and 3) to other signs. Therefore, we can note that Morris introduces a type of relation that Peirce has largely neglected, and it is the relation of the sign to other signs. Another important difference is that Morris strives to point out the specificity of each of these relations, which enables him to abstract a number of dyadic relations (three in total), studied by three separate disciplines within semiotics itself.

In other words, the novelty that Morris brings is that, within semiotics, three separate disciplines or sub-disciplines can be distinguished, which have

2 "In the development of semiotic the disciplines which now are current under the names of logic, mathematics and linguistics can be reinterpreted in semiotical terms" (Morris 1944: 55).

3 Peirce is a pioneer in this area and his thought is unusually complex and he has developed it in a long period, which makes it difficult to present it in more detail in such limited scopes. However, what is significant is that, despite many modifications of his own views, he has never significantly deviated from the definitions presented here.

a clearly defined domain of research, since each one would be dedicated to the study of one of the three dimensions of semiosis that he differentiates: “One may study the relations of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable. This relation will be called the *semantical dimension of semiosis* (...) and the study of this dimension will be called *semantics*. Or the subject of study may be the relation of signs to interpreters. This relation will be called the *pragmatical dimension of semiosis*, and the study of this dimension will be named *pragmatics* (...) and since all signs are potentially if not actually related to other signs, it is well to make a third dimension of semiosis co-ordinate with the other two which have been mentioned. This third dimension will be called the *syntactical dimension of semiosis* and the study of this dimension will be called *syntactics*” (Morris 1944: 7).

Generally speaking, this modification of Peirce’s thesis on the triadic nature of sign that, as we have seen, will enable a new and rigorous systematization, is today considered to be Morris’ most important achievement, because it is thought that Morris succeeded here in unifying, within the same research program, philosophical traditions that were until then believed to have little in common. These are pragmatism on the one hand, and empiricism and logical positivism on the other, and Morris is considered to be “the first who recognized similarities between them, showing that, at the same time, their differences does not make them contradictory” (Posner 1987: 24). However, unlike his interpreters, it is interesting that Morris did not attach any particular importance to this fact, which is due to, in our opinion, at least two reasons.

First of all, although Morris may have succeeded in, as claimed, unifying three of the most important philosophical traditions of his time,⁴ it was not his main goal at all, but to establish a comprehensive science of signs that would integrate all the specific ones. Secondly, although, as we shall see, Morris adopted virtually all the positive results of research conducted within these traditions, he was also well aware of their inadequacies for the task he set himself. This can be best seen in the case of syntactics, or more precisely, logic syntax that positivists dealt with, because in spite of the significant achievements in this field that, in Morris’s words, ‘make syntactics the most developed of all semiotic disciplines’, logic syntax “cannot be equated with syntactics as a whole. For it (as the term ‘sentence’ shows) has limited its investigations of syntactical structure to the type of sign combinations which are dominant in science, namely, those combinations which from a semantical point of view are called statements, or those combinations used in the transformations of such combinations. Thus on logical positivist’s usage commands are not sentences, and many lines and verse would not be sentences. ‘Sentence’ is not, therefore, a

4 This unification would consist in the fact that each of these traditions would cover one dimension of the semiosis process. Thus, since it studies the relation of the sign to the interpreter, pragmatics is closely related to pragmatism; syntactics, on the other hand, which deals with relations between the signs is related to the tradition of logical positivism and logical syntax research, while semantics, which studies the relation of the signs to the objects, is empiristic in its spirit. For more detailed information, see: Posner 1987.

term which in his usage applies to every independent sign combination permitted by the formulation rules of language – and yet clearly syntactics in the wide sense must deal with all such combination” (Morris 1944: 16).

Therefore, Morris points out that syntactics, as part of a comprehensive science of signs, should itself be much more than can be found in the works of logical positivists, or that “there are syntactical problems in the fields of perceptual signs, aesthetic signs, practical use of signs, and general linguistics which have not been treated within the framework of what today is regarded as logical syntax and yet which form part of syntactic as this is here conceived” (Ibid.). However, the situation is similar in the case of semantics and pragmatics, because although these disciplines are “components of the single science of semiotic but mutually irreducible components” (Ibid: 54), one should bear in mind that, in Morris’ opinion, their subject covers only one of the three dimensions of semiosis process, which is why, ultimately, they should not be regarded as independent of each other.⁵

Thus, in order to be complete, the research results in each specific area would have to be supplemented with those from the other two areas, and we could say that Morris’ view was that each of these disciplines – and consequently, semiotics in general – would make the most efficient progress only if it was in constant dialogue with the other two. However, while on the one hand he points out the peculiarities of each of them, and on the other, the necessity for their synthesis, we should point out something that is in our opinion quite certain, that syntactics, semantics and pragmatics are not and cannot be, in Morris’ view of semiotics, in a quite equal position. Namely, although he defines their individual inadequacies quite accurately by pointing out how “none of them can define the term ‘sign’ and, hence, cannot define themselves” (Ibid: 52), it seems that this does not apply to pragmatics because it is precisely through this discipline that the concept of semiosis is introduced, and therefore, the notion of sign defined.⁶

5 “The intimate relation of the semiotical sciences makes semiotic as a science possible but does not blur the fact that the subsiences represent three irreducible and equally legitimate points of view corresponding to the three objective dimensions of semiosis. Any sign whatsoever may be studied from any of the three standpoints, though no one standpoint is adequate to the full nature of semiosis” (Morris 1944: 53).

6 That the pragmatic dimension is the most important dimension in semiosis can be seen from the following lines: “Syntactical rules determine the sign relations between sign vehicles; semantical rules correlate sign vehicles with other objects; pragmatical rules state the conditions in the interpreters under which the sign vehicle is a sign. Any rule when actually in use operates as type of behavior, and in this sense there is a pragmatical component in all rules” (Ibid: 35). Also, it should be noted here that Morris refers to the behavior of the subject as something that, given it is conditioned by it, reveals the character of the sign, from which another, the third important concept that he took from Peirce originated. It is the concept of habit; however, although fundamental to Morris’ pragmatic and behavioral theory of meaning, this concept is not directly relevant to what we called Morris’ semiotic theory in the strict sense, so we will not discuss it any further.

In a word, we believe that in Morris' conception the pragmatic dimension has an obvious dominance over the other two, so the question remains whether one can speak, in Morris' case, of a unification of these traditions, or whether Morris succeeded in subordinating the achievements of empiricism and logical positivism – which we will from now on call the achievements of the philosophy of language (and we believe there is no need for some special explanation here) – to those of pragmatism? As this other thesis seems more convincing, in what follows we will try to show what Morris had to do in order to implement this reduction, hoping that it will enable us to approach the problem that we consider to be the most important one, concerning establishment of a comprehensive science of signs.

3. Ontological Assumptions of Morris' Semiotics

Although we do not intend to insist on an absolute correspondence – all the more so because we are aware that they serve very different purposes – there is no doubt that there are a number of concepts used both by semiotics and the philosophy of language among which we can identify certain analogies.

First of all, there are concepts such as sense and nominatum (reference), introduced in the philosophy of language by its founder, Gottlob Frege, which correspond with Morris' concepts of designatum and denotatum: “The regular connection between a sign, its sense and its nominatum is such that there corresponds definite sense to the sign and to this sense there corresponds again a definite nominatum; whereas not one sign only belongs to one nominatum (object). In different languages, and even in one language, the same sense is represented by different expression” (Frege 2008: 218). In Morris, we come across the following formulation that could justify our thesis: “A sign must have a designatum; yet obviously every sign does not, in fact, refer to actual existent object (which in that case, would be its denotatum – *An*)” (Morris 1944: 5).

Thus, it seems that we succeeded in detecting similarities on the level that semiotics implies, since sense and reference, or, in Morris' case, designatum and denotatum are obviously related terms and can be brought under the title of semantics, a discipline that studies the relationship of signs to objects. However, this is not the end of analogies, because in addition to semantic level, they are also evident on the syntactic level.

When it comes to syntactics, there is, as we have said, the relation of sign to other signs, and we know that this type of relation existed in the philosophy of language, and was, moreover, extremely important from the appeal of its founder for the validity of the so-called context principle, according to which words acquire meaning only in the context of a sentence: “We should never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition, because only in it words have the meaning” (Frege 1964: 60).

Therefore, it seems that the reason why Morris does not attribute to himself the merits that others will do lies, among other things, in the fact that semiotics and the philosophy of language already shared too many things for their

unification to be declared as some kind of a first-class success. On the other hand, Morris was undoubtedly aware that this fact still does not make semiotics what he wanted to make of it, a comprehensive science of signs, because for it to be that, it is necessary for semantics, pragmatics and syntactics to absorb not only the achievements of the philosophy of language, but also of disciplines such as rhetoric, aesthetics and – above all – linguistics. Anyhow, it seems that there are now sufficient grounds for trying to move the discussion to the ontological level, as we have suggested, or to set forth, based on detected similarities between the conceptual apparatus of semiotics and the philosophy of language, the thesis about ontology that could be called, for the sake of clarity, the ontology of sign.⁷

It is not particularly important what name we will give to this ontology or even what kind of entities it would ultimately recognize, but it is certain that its distinctive feature would be that it would have to recognize one type of entities, and that would be the signs. However, it is necessary to point out a few additional remarks to prevent possible misunderstandings.

Namely, the fact that traditional philosophy of language lacks a component concerning the relation of the sign to the interpreter (*viz.*, pragmatic component) does not in any way undermine the thesis that Morris succeeded in subordinating all research conducted within this tradition to semiotics by integrating them into semantics and syntactics. However, this fact nevertheless tells us something important, namely, that the sign is primarily a semiotic concept and that we could succeed in establishing it on ontological grounds only if we follow the principles of this discipline. In a word, since adding a pragmatic component in no way undermines, but only expands the ontological landscape, for an entity such as sign to exist, it seems it would have to possess all three dimensions differentiated by semiotics: semantic, syntactic and pragmatic.

Therefore, although the traditional philosophy of language research does not know of the pragmatic component of the sign, there is no reason why we should not keep attempting to talk about it in ontological terms; what would undoubtedly support the thesis that by establishing ontology such as the ontology of sign it could be possible to unite otherwise disunited disciplines, is that even at first glance it is clear that the relationship of linguistics to semiotics is much more consistent than that of the philosophy of language, because besides syntactic and semantic dimension, in linguistic theses we can find what we would like to call the pragmatic dimension of the sign. However, while

7 In support of this, we will note that Frege also used the term ‘sign’, and although it will largely lose its significance in the later philosophy of language – and in Russell’s case even be replaced by the term ‘symbol’, which is completely inconsistent with traditional semiotic (pragmatic) terminology – it is important to note that its use in its founder’s work is indisputable. Similar fate will affect some other Frege’s notions, but whatever form they would get in further shaping up of the conceptual apparatus, it is an indisputable fact that Frege laid the foundations for all subsequent research both in the field of semantics and in the field of logical syntax, which will give its best results in Russell’s, Carnap’s, and Tarski’s works.

Morris' connection with the philosophy of language is much easier to trace,⁸ those with linguistics, aesthetics and other disciplines that he thought should be subordinate to semiotics are less clear. Nevertheless, although it is primarily a science of language, for Morris it is convenient that linguistics also uses the notion of the sign (linguistic sign) with the difference – which will be discussed later – that the class of entities that would fall into this category would be somewhat different than in other disciplines.

Namely, for the founder of modern linguistics Ferdinand de Saussure, the notion of linguistic sign has an undeniable theoretical value, and it consists of two components, signifier and signified. However, since the nature of this relation is such that there is no motivation between the physical form of the signifier (that is, 'acoustic image', as Saussure calls it) and the notion it is connected with, Saussure will claim that the linguistic sign is arbitrary: "The linguistic sign is arbitrary. A particular combination of signifier and signified is an arbitrary entity. This is a central fact of language and linguistic method" (Culler 1976: 19).

In other words, Saussure holds that there is no existential connection between linguistic means on the one hand, and ideas or objects signified by them on the other, and this thesis is one of the central principles of his approach to the subject. However, a more important thing for us than the arbitrary nature of the sign is the fact that, for Saussure, it consists of signifier and signified, which allows us to isolate the semantic level in linguistic theses where the concept of signified would, contingently speaking, correspond to the concepts of denotatum in Morris, and nominatum in Frege. On the other hand, its arbitrary nature is something that can be associated with pragmatic dimension.

Namely, since "every means of expression used in society is based, in principle, on collective behavior or – what amounts to the same thing – on convention" (Saussure 1959: 68), the relationship of the sign to the interpreter or its pragmatic dimension becomes more than clear, because what else can be concluded from these Saussure's words except that, thanks to the linguistic convention he is using, what would be a sign of something for one interpreter, for the other not only does not have to be a sign of the same thing, but it need not to be a sign at all. In other words, the impression is that by emphasizing the arbitrary nature of the sign, that is, the conventional character of the relationship between signifier and signified, we come across pragmatic dimension in linguistic research, and it is almost certain now that, since all ontological commitments are met, we can speak of an ontology that would enable Morris to eliminate all disciplines that deal with signs in one way or another, and to subsume all examination under the examination within the above three. Unfortunately, the matter is complicated by the syntactic dimension that is found in linguistic research.

8 Namely, Morris maintained close contacts with few of its prominent representatives (above all, with members of the so-called Vienna circle), and in general, felt strong sympathies both for empirism and logical positivism. On the other hand, this affinity for the above philosophical programs will, as we shall see below, prove to be decisive when it comes to his own views.

Namely, since according to Saussure, the connection between signifier and signified is unmotivated one, it follows that, “since the sign has no necessary core which must persist, it must be defined as a relational entity, in its relations to other signs” (Culler 1976: 36). However, these are by no means the relations that Morris and philosophers had in mind.

In fact, although he adopts the concept of language as a social convention, and unlike Peirce focuses only on linguistic entities as relevant mediators in the process of semiosis,⁹ the relationship between its individual units or the syntactic dimension that Morris has in mind is not the linguists’ one, but essentially Fregean. This difference, however, will have profound consequences that will initially be reflected in a completely different understanding of “What is the language?”, which we come across in Morris and linguists; because while for Morris “a language (...) is any intersubjective set of sign vehicles whose usage is determined by syntactical, semantical and pragmatical rules” (Morris 1944: 35), for linguists it is “a system of signs that are intercorrelated so that the value of one sign is conditioned by the presence of others” (Ivić 1996: 107).

In other words, “the language system is based on oppositions, that is, on mutual opposing of language signs” (Ibid.), which means that the context in which a word acquires a meaning, or in which, if we may say so, it becomes a sign, is not the sentence as the smallest unit of meaning (Frege), but the whole system. It is clear now that syntactic relations discussed by linguists are not relations that Morris and philosophers of language have in mind, and the consequences of this difference in our opinion diminish any possibility of establishing a kind of ontology that we assumed at the beginning of this paper in order to eventually save Morris’ project.

4. On the Impossibility of Establishing the Ontology of the Sign

Let us recall how Morris complained that commands and verses are not sentences for logical positivists, or that for them the term ‘sentence’ does not include any sign combination allowed by linguistic rules of formation, which is why syntactics, as the most developed of all semiotic disciplines, could not progress any further and realize all its potentials. Now, it seems that linguistics should be the science that would contribute to a fruitful expansion of syntactics that Morris hoped for, because it seems that precisely this discipline, rather than any other one, has to deal with all ‘sign combinations allowed by linguistic rules of formation’.

This is true in a sense, as we shall see; however, although in linguistics there is quite a unity in defining the conditions that should be met for an entity to be a sign, the problem is that these conditions do not correspond to the ones

⁹ In other words, Peirce thought that mediators in the process of semiosis could be both linguistic and nonlinguistic entities, which is evidenced by his famous classification of signs into icons, indices, and symbols, where only the last would be linguistic in character. See: Peirce, Charles Sanders, *What is a sign*, in: *The essential Peirce, Vol II*.

set by Morris. On the other hand, we shall see that these conditions are met by the classes of essentially different entities, which implies different approaches to the question “*What are ‘sign combinations’ that would be the subject of research in this discipline?*”

Namely, while in Morris' conception a sign is an entity that has three dimensions, which is, as in Peirce's case, a key factor in the actualization of semiosis process, in linguistics its identity *as a sign* is conditioned solely by the presence of other signs. Although based on this we might conclude that there is a syntactic dimension in linguistic postulates, in structural linguistics, however, we come across something that does not exist even in semiotics, let alone in the philosophy of language, and that is the postulated phenomenological priority of the entire system *that is language* over its individual manifestations. This is a key fact that entails that the research subject of this discipline would be only the one whose identity is indicated, or *dependent* on the entire linguistic system that sentences are not, which is why, as we shall see, they are not included in the class of linguistic entities.

In fact, in addition to the thesis that the relationship between signifier and signified is unmotivated, and that the sign is primarily a relational entity, one of the most important principles of the structural approach to language concerns the distinction that structuralists make between *langue* (language) and *parole* (speech), where, somewhat generally speaking, *langue* would correspond to the paradigmatic dimension of language, while *parole* would belong to the so-called syntagmatic dimension. However, although the syntagmatic dimension is the one that refers to individual speech acts, in which, for this reason, we can find all those sign combinations that should be included in Morris' syntactics, since it concerns the area in which it is ‘extremely difficult to determine what is relevant and what is irrelevant’ (Culler), structural linguistics excluded it from the domain of its interests, and focused on *langue*: “*La langue*, Saussure argued, must be the linguist's primary concern. What he is trying to do in analyzing a language is not to describe speech acts but to determine the units and rules of combination which make up the linguistic system” (Culler 1976: 30).

Thus, just as there is supremacy of the pragmatic dimension in Morris' case, expressed in semiotic terms, in the case of structural linguistics there is supremacy of the syntactic dimension. However, since the syntactic dimension in structural language research is sufficient for specifying what would be the pragmatic and semantic side of its individual elements (primarily signs), semantics and pragmatics could not in that case achieve any autonomy as independent disciplines, even the relative one, which is why it is not clear why they would be introduced into the conceptual framework of this science at all. In a word, the application of semiotic categories on the linguistic subject seems inappropriate, which is best evidenced by the fact that linguistics has developed its own sub-disciplines that are, by aims and methods, substantially different from the ones in semiotics. Moreover, in one of them we come across a considerable expansion of the area covered by the concept of sign, which still does not include syntax as a significant concept in any sense.

Namely, because “in all languages phonemes relate to one another as if they are members of a single, organized whole – a system” (Ivić 1996: 113), adherence to the main principles of the structural approach to language led to the emergence of a discipline in which the phonemes, or individual sounds are treated as entities to which Saussure’s principle of priority of the (language) system over its individual manifestations is applied. This discipline is phonology, whose founder Nikolai Trubetzkoy started from the fact that a phoneme is already a sign, because, although it does not have the meaning component which we customarily identify with semantic, it still “serves to recognize the meaning of words and therefore it cannot be replaced by other language signs without consequences for the meaning” (Ibid.).¹⁰

Thus, it could be said that the way of understanding what language is a largely entails the interpretation of *what would be the subject of language research*, which in the case of structural linguistics does not include the syntax, because it does not have a property that is essential in this respect, that is, a property of relational entity. Nevertheless, one should not for this reason think that the history of this discipline does not know of the research on the level of syntax (sentence), but this fact, however, will not contribute to the extension of syntactics that Morris hoped for.

Namely, the break with structuralists that Noam Chomsky made by introducing his transformational-generative grammar in the middle of the last century, also marked the break of continuity with the tradition of interpreting linguistically relevant objects as only those that possess a differential value. However, although this break enabled Chomsky to bring back the sentence, or so to speak, the syntagmatic dimension of language in the center of linguistic interests, he did not adopt the conception of the sign that we attributed to Morris and philosophers.

In other words, in order to analyze them, Chomsky does not decompose sentences into a set of interdependent parts, but tries to discover through them the principles governing our linguistic competence, or the principles that enable us to form and understand virtually unlimited number of sentences by using a limited number of grammar rules. For this purpose, Chomsky introduces the concepts of surface and deep structure, where the transformations observed on the level of the first, or the structure of actual sentences that we come across in everyday speech, should point to the latter as the more *fundamental* ones, which, being formal in character, enable these transformations: “Syntactic theories developed in structural (taxonomic) linguistics could be succinctly characterized as theories based on the assumption that deep and surface structures are actually one and the same. The central idea of transformational grammar is that they are mainly distinct, and that the surface structure is determined

10 “Meanings exist only because there are differences of meaning, and it is these differences of meaning which enable one to establish the articulation of forms. Forms can be recognized, not by their persistence in a representational or historical continuity, but by their differential function: their ability to distinguish and thus produce distinct meanings” (Culler 1976: 70).

by the repeated use of certain formal operations, called “grammar transformations” on objects of a more elementary kind. If this is true, then the syntactic component has to generate deep and surface structures for every sentence and to interconnect them” (Chomsky 1979: 97).

Thus, it is clear that, whatever the results of syntax research that Chomsky obtained, they could not be added to syntactics as Morris imagined it, for although he dealt with the language combinations that logical positivists failed to cover, we saw that he was not really interested in those that would only be surface structures as such, but in the principles that enable their transformation. Nevertheless, given that the ability of understanding and linguistic competence of the subject are here at the forefront, in support of the thesis on a certain similarity with Morris, we will note that the pragmatic component is also dominant in Chomsky’s postulates. However, since the concept of the sign in this type of research does not play any role, it remains to be seen what the pragmatic dimension we talk about is.

Namely, we said that for the process of semiosis to be actualized, an object that indicates something else instead of itself should mediate, which would, in that case, be a sign. However, since it does not know of the concept of sign, Chomsky’s transformational-generative grammar *ipso facto* does not know of the concept of semiosis as defined by pragmatism. Nevertheless, we think that it is important to preserve this concept so we could speak of the pragmatic component in Chomsky’s research, which is, in our opinion evident and implies a radical methodological turn. This turn concerns above all the fact that, if we assume the pragmatic component in Chomsky’s theses, it would imply a break with the traditional concept of meaning *as a property of an object*, replacing it with the concept of understanding as a central one, which would, *as a property*, belong to the subject or interpreter.

Thus, since instead of the sign, the abstract principles that enable subject’s understanding would mediate in it, the process of semiosis, although substantially modified, would in Chomsky’s case retain some important features that are, above all, the mediation factor, and the role of interpreter.¹¹ Nevertheless, it might seem that, by excluding the semantic dimension, we irreversibly lose the pragmatic one, since nothing can be the subject of someone’s interpretation and understanding if it does not have the meaning component itself. However, it is precisely opposition to this way of thinking that is the general and most prominent feature of pragmatism in this area, and the best example is pragmatism in the work of late Wittgenstein. In fact, if it is appropriate at all to speak of an ontology in this context, our thesis is that it would be the ontology established by the philosophy of language, more precisely by its founder,

¹¹ In favour of the use of semiotic terminology in this context, that is, the legitimacy of speaking of the pragmatic component in Chomsky’s research, there is, among other things, the fact that in this period linguistics has largely adopted the conceptual apparatus of semiotics and the division into semantic, syntactic and pragmatic research of language, and the precondition for this was, as we have seen, a break with the structural tradition: See: N. Chomsky, “Syntax and Semantics”, in Chomsky 1989.

which was, in our opinion, fully adopted by Morris, and brought down completely by Wittgenstein.

Namely, we can ascertain that Morris' ontology is Fregean on the basis that he accepts the same assumptions about where, in the analysis of language, the justification regress ceases, which is the same as in Frege, at terms.¹² On the other hand, since for Frege terms (words) acquire meaning only in the context of a sentence – and syntactics that Morris has in mind is limited to syntax – a sentence would represent another class of entities that we could include in this ontology inventory. However, since it would not recognize all the sentences that formation rules of the language allow, but only those for which it is possible to construct the higher-order sentences, i.e., sentences that we could use instead of words to talk about their names, this ontology would include languages too, more precisely, two categories of them; the first, which would include languages that belong to the object-level, and the second in which we find the meta-level languages. The essence of the difference between these levels is specified by Frege in the following way: “When words are used in the customary manner then what is talked about are their *nominata*. But it may happen that one wishes to speak about the words themselves or about their senses. The first case occurs when one quotes someone else's words in direct (ordinary) discourse. In this case one's own words immediately name (denote) the words of the other person and only the latter words have the usual *nominata*. We thus have signs of signs” (Frege 2008: 218).

Recognition of the hierarchical relationship between languages has proven to be a methodological necessity both for the logical syntax research, and for the formal semantics one, and that it existed in Morris is evidenced primarily by the following lines: “ ‘Fido’ designates A, where ‘Fido’ ‘denotes’ ‘Fido’ (i. e., the sign or the sign vehicle and not a nonlinguistic object), while ‘A’ is indexical sign of some object (...) ‘Fido’ ‘is thus a term in metalanguage denoting the sign ‘Fido’ in the object language” (Morris 1944: 22). However, since it is clear by now that these would in no case be languages in terms of the ‘systems of signs that are interconnected so that the value of one sign is conditioned by the presence of others’, in our opinion it would be more appropriate to speak, instead of languages, of words and sentences of object-level and meta-level. On the other hand, since the practice has shown that for each of these sentences, no matter what level it belongs to, it is possible to construct a sentence of higher order (level), this approach has, at least for pragmatism, an entirely unacceptable consequence of falling into an infinite regress. Nevertheless, this unfavorable effect is completely neutralized as soon as the realistic concept of meaning is replaced with the above pragmatic concepts of understanding and use, for which there is no better example in recent philosophy than the one given by late Wittgenstein.

12 At one point we said that for Frege, sentence is the smallest unit of meaning, which contradicts to what we are saying now, that they are individual words and terms. However, although they do not possess the meaning, words and terms in Frege have the sense, and as such would satisfy the condition of being a special class of entities.

Namely, our ability to use language is, in Wittgenstein's opinion, completely determined by our ability to follow certain rules. However, as these rules do not have some rational foundation, but are dictated by circumstances or life activities – or, as Wittgenstein says, 'forms of life' – they are woven into language games and cannot be viewed independently of them: "The whole, consisting of a language and the actions into which it is woven I will call the "language game" (...) the term that is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life" (Wittgenstein 1980: § 7; 23)).

The idea of the so-called language games rests on Wittgenstein's thesis on the impossibility of reducing the normative to non-normative, on the basis of which he will, already at the time of *Tractatus* (that is, at the time he largely accepted semantic realism and shared many common beliefs with Frege) oppose the construction of meta-languages as an acceptable methodological procedure. However, definitely abandoning the realistic principles and adopting the pragmatic ones will later enable Wittgenstein to reach a completely new and coherent interpretation of the unacceptability of this strategy, which could be summarized so that, instead of words and sentences that would be in hierarchical order, we would now deal with different language games, and the only condition for playing them would be knowing the rules.

The impossibility of reducing the normative to non-normative lies for Wittgenstein in the fact that for every action, no matter how irrational it may seem, it would ultimately be possible to find a rational explanation (that is, to bring it into line with some rule), just like it could be shown for the most rational ones that they actually have no rational basis. In the case of language and 'actions into which it is woven', this thesis would, in our opinion, testify to the impossibility of differentiating the rules of language game from the language game itself, because, by eventually explicating them (rules), we would only get another language game and so on, *ad infinitum*. In other words, instead of an infinite number of languages that are in hierarchical order, we would now have an infinite number of language games, but because of the impossibility of reducing the normative to non-normative, there would be no hierarchical order between them, and therefore, no regress.

Thus, with the catchphrase that "to understand a sentence means to understand a language, and to understand a language means to be a master of a technique" (Ibid: § 199), although he does not adopt its terminology, it is clear that Wittgenstein adopts pragmatic methodology and applies it uncompromisingly to oppose semantic realism and the ontology based on it. However, we should not think that what Wittgenstein does is just to replace one ontology with another, where instead of words and sentences, there is now just one type of entities – language games. Namely, to postulate an ontology, apart from observational concepts – which would constitute its content – we would also need to have theoretical concepts in order to talk about them, such as sense, meaning, truth, falsehood, etc., in the philosophy of language. However, in Wittgenstein's case we would not have this, which stems from the fact that he

rejects Frege's central ontological distinction object/concept, so it follows that all concepts known in the philosophy of language would be absorbed and finally lost in the concept of language games. This is, of course, a view we are not obliged to accept and there might be some strong arguments against it, but it is significant that it has been brought about by a consistent, although not explicit application of pragmatic principles that shift the focus from investigating meaning and truth to actual language practice, its conditions and consequences.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, because as Quine says, he adopted the same "domain of variables to quantify over" as the philosophers of language, which would therefore include words and sentences of object and meta-level, in an attempt to establish an ontology, it seems that we succeeded in identifying another ontology that we could relate to Morris' project. However, this would by no means be the ontology of the sign, because in order to establish the sign as an entity, that is, in all its three dimensions, it would be necessary to break down the wall that Saussure constructed between paradigmatic and syntagmatic dimensions of language, which, in our opinion, has survived to this day and is in many ways the same one that exists between linguistics and related disciplines on the one side, and the philosophy of language and Morris' semiotics on the other side of the theoretical spectrum.

In other words, since he remained on the side of the theoretical and methodological spectrum for which the influence of pragmatic principles has proven to be particularly destructive – Wittgenstein's work served as an example for this – Morris' pragmatism remained in one important sense only on paper. This is not surprising in a sense, because if Morris had consistently applied pragmatism in practice, apart from advocating it, given other assumptions he adopted it would not have taken him any further than late Wittgenstein. However, since from the pragmatic perspective that Wittgenstein offers, which divides the use of language primarily into efficient and non-efficient one we do not need any additional assumptions like "What is language?", "What are its units?" and so on, not only for the philosophy of language, it would seem that the effects of this approach would be equally destructive for linguistics too, in short, for any ontology in the traditional sense of the word.¹³ Nevertheless, we have seen that consistent application of pragmatic principles has, besides this one, another outcome, and pointing out precisely the difference between them is, in our opinion, the most important implication of Morris' failure to establish a comprehensive science of signs.

13 Recently, echoes of these effects that, unfortunately, we cannot address here in more detail can be found in Davidson's work and his thesis about the non-existence of such thing as language, "not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned, mastered, or born with" (Davidson 2008: 595).

Namely, the application of pragmatic principles in the latter case leads to the research of the so-called innate ideas that we had in Chomsky, who, by studying transformations on the level of surface sentence structures, strived to discover the deep ones as more 'fundamental', because they govern those transformations and our linguistic competence in general.¹⁴ Although the real subjects of such research may not have a clear ontological status – which is why, among other things, they successfully resisted criticism such as Wittgenstein's – these studies nevertheless have a rich and long past that could be traced back to Plato, whose germs can be found even in structural linguistics that Chomsky openly distanced himself from, that is, they have already been sown with Saussure's thesis about the dominance of paradigmatic over syntagmatic relationships: "The syntagmatic relation is *in praesentia*. It is based on two or more terms that occur in an effective series. Against this, the associative relation unites terms *in absentia* in a virtual mnemonic series" (Saussure 1959: 123).

Thus, despite not small differences in their theses, we saw that there is already a thesis in Saussure that is quite explicit in Chomsky – that the language and the modes of its functioning are something predominantly unconscious. In our opinion, this does not require any special explanation, since the knowledge of the language that Saussure has in mind is the knowledge of the entire language system, therefore, *totalitarian*, so it seems that it has to belong to the sphere of the unconscious. Within the structuralist tradition, this idea will find fertile ground for development in structural anthropology, where, using a model taken from structural linguistics Levi-Strauss intended to discover the unconscious principles of functioning of the human mind in general. In this respect, we think that it might be useful to draw attention at the very end to certain similarities that Levi-Strauss shares with Chomsky.

Namely, given that, apart from the role of interpreter one could also isolate the mediation factor in Levi-Strauss' theses, which would, like in Chomsky, consist of some abstract principles that in his case would not be deep structures but systems of binary oppositions, the concept of semiosis would, in our opinion, be also applicable to Levi-Strauss theses. However, the fact remains that this concept would be significantly *different* from the one found in Morris, because instead of a behavioral, it would have a predominantly cognitive sign. On the other hand, since the problems of perception and abduction are closely related to Peirce's semiotic research in general, the above transition from the behavioral to cognitive paradigm in Levi-Strauss' and Chomsky's works would seem to be completely in line with the spirit of Peirce's semiotics. This return to the original semiotics and Peirce would, in our view, be the second important implication of the Morris' semiotic theory failure: "To understand how knowledge is acquired according to rationalist view that Peirce outlined,

14 "I am at least more intrigued with the possibility that we might discover, through the study of language, abstract principles that govern its structure and use, principles that are universal due to biological necessity rather than mere historical coincidence, and which originate from mental properties of the mankind" (Chomsky 1979: 275).

we must penetrate the mysteries of what he called ‘abduction’ and we must discover that which ‘gives a rule for the abduction and so puts a limit upon admissible hypothesis’. Peirce maintained that the search for the principles of abduction leads us to the study of innate ideas, which provide the instinctive structure of human intelligence” (Chomsky 1979: 256).

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Miloš Bogdanović

Filozofske implikacije Morisove semiotičke teorije

Apstrakt

Predmet ovog rada će biti semiotički teorija Čarlsa Morisa koja kao jedan od svojih najvažnijih projekata ima ujedinjenje svih nauka o znacima. Međutim, pošto se pomenuti projekat pokazao kao neuspešan, ovde ćemo pokušati da istražimo razloge koji su do toga doveli. S tim u vezi, zastupaćemo tezu kako je, ne bi li prevazišao osobenosti pojedinačnih disciplina koje je želeo da ujedini, umesto teorijsko-metodoloških Moris bio obavezan da pretpostavi određene ontološke pretpostavke koje bi im bile zajedničke. Međutim, pošto se ‘znak’ kao ontološka kategorija po našem mišljenju može uspostaviti samo ako sledimo načela pragmatističke filozofske tradicije, pokušaćemo da pokažemo kako bi razloge ovom neuspehu pre svega trebalo tražiti u različitim efektima koje dosledno sprovođenje pragmatističkih načela ima u svakoj od njih (pre svega u lingvistici i filozofiji jezika). Sa druge strane, ovo bi trebalo da nam omogući iznošenje nekoliko važnih zaključka u vezi sa Morisovim projektom: naime, da njegov neuspeh ne mora da znači i odustajanje od semiotike kao potencijalno ključne discipline u pristupu nekim fundamentalnim filozofskim problemima, ali i da bi za tako nešto bilo neophodno vratiti se originalnoj semiotici razvijenoj u Persovim radovima.

Ključne reči: semiotika, semantika, sintaktika, pragmatika, ontologija, pragmatizam, znak, semioza, lingvistika, filozofija jezika

III

FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE

IZ RADA INSTITUTA

PREGLED TRIBINA I KONFERENCIJA
U INSTITUTU ZA FILOZOFIJU I DRUŠTVENU TEORIJU U 2019.

Olga Nikolić i Igor Cvejić

TRIBINE

Januar

Sarah Szerny, "Making Milk, Making Persons: An Account of Milk Production in the Rijeka Region", petak 25. januar

Februar

Martin Tamcke, "Eastern-Ghoutha and the Christians", Ciklus: *Religija, podela i društvene promene*, četvrtak 7. februar

Ivica Živković, "O duhovnim razlozima religiozno inspirisanog nasilja i ekstremizma", utorak 12. februar

Carlos Salamanca, "Violence(s) and Spatial Justice Debate in Latin America", sreda 20. februar

Jelena Višnjić, "Novo vrijeme, stare dileme: medijska proizvodnja roda", Ciklus: *Promišljanja roda*, četvrtak 28. februar

Mart

Damir Čičić, "Da li propust može da bude direktna manifestacija slobode volje", petak 1. mart

Andrea Perunović, "Ka razmatranju pojma vrednosti van okvira poverenja", sreda 6. mart

Božidar Filipović i Aleksandra Marković, "Analiza časopisa *Sociologija* (1997-2017)", sreda 13. mart

Marija Ratković, "Teorija afekta i biopolitičke regulacije privatnih praksi", Ciklus: *Promišljanja roda*, petak 15. mart

Luka Glušac, "Angažman i političke institucije", četvrtak 21. mart

Kristina Bojanović, "Trag Druge: Aspekti feminističke kritike Levinasovog pojma ženskog", petak 22. mart

Milan Antonijević, "Institucije, nezavisne i nadasve korisne", petak 22. mart

Vesna Pavlović, "MixTape", sreda 27. mart

Filip Ivanović, "Sokratova smrt i demokratija", Ciklus: *Religija, podela i društvene promene*, četvrtak 28. mart

April

Ivan Milenković, "Makijaveli i posledice", sreda 3. april

Tanja Ignjatović, "Nasilje prema ženama u Srbiji - od standarda međunarodnih ugovora do državne politike i prakse", Ciklus: *Promišljanja roda*, petak 5. april

Ana Katić, "Pojam fikcije u nauci i književnosti", sreda 10. april

Miloš Marković, "Pobeda i fer plej: stavovi sportista o nekim etičkim pitanjima", sreda 17. april

Davide Tarizzo, "Political Grammars: The Unconscious Foundations of Modern Democracy", sreda 24. april

Maj

Cyril Hovorun, "Evil and Freedom", Ciklus: *Religija, podele i društvene promene*, ponedeljak 6. maj

Maja Maksimović, "Umetnost u obrazovanju i pedagogija feminističkog novog materijalizma - primeri obrazovnih praksi", Ciklus: *Promišljanja roda*, ponedeljak 6. maj

Balša Delibašić, "Sport i angažman", utorak 7. maj

Marjan Ivković, "Modaliteti angažmana u kritičkoj teoriji: alternative ili komplementi?", Godišnji seminar: *Angažman i dominacija*, sreda 15. maj

Tamara Plečaš, "Stoičko shvatanje priateljstva", četvrtak 16. maj

Thomas Szanto, "The Politics of Ressentiment: From Value-Illusion to False Solidarity", ponedeljak 27. maj

Marc Crépon, predavanje povodom knjige *Smrtonosno ćutanje*, sreda 29. maj

Jo Shaw, "'Shunning' and 'Seeking' Membership: Rethinking Citizenship Regimes in the European Constitutional Space", petak 31. maj

Jun

Aleksandra Bulatović, "Otpornost i *human flourishing*", ponedeljak 3. jun

Jovo Bakić, "Beograd na vodi: uobičajena urbanističko-kriminalna priča s periferije svetskog kapitalističkog sistema", četvrtak 6. jun

James Trafford, "Migration as Political Movement", petak 7. jun

Dragan Stanojević, "Novo očinstvo u Srbiji, sociološka studija praksama i identitetima očeva", sreda 12. jun

Ljiljana Pantović, "Privatno u javnom: pregovaranje porođaja u Srbiji", sreda 12. jun

Selena Radović, "S one strane seksualnosti: ambivalentna pozicija žene",

Ciklus: *Promišljanja roda*, četvrtak 13. jun

Vera Mevorah, "Od predstavljanja do komunikacije: Holokaust danas", četvrtak 13. jun

Željko Radinković, "Tehnika", Tribina: ključni pojmovi i tekstovi, utorak 25. jun

Septembar

Alona Fisher-Kamm, sreda 25. septembar

Oktobar

Judith Butler, *Dodela počasnog doktorata*, sreda 9. oktobar, Rektorat Univerziteta u Beogradu

Karlo Kralj, "Držanje distance: Kvalitativna analiza protivstranačkih stavova među nevladinim organizacijama u Hrvatskoj", četvrtak 10. oktobar

Ivan Vejvoda, "Budućnost Evrope", ponedeljak 14. oktobar

Boris Jokić, "Od podruma do prosvjeda! Horizonti demokratizacije reformskih procesa u obrazovanju – Slučaj obrazovne reforme u Hrvatskoj", Godišnji seminar: *Horizonti angažmana*, ponedeljak 14. oktobar

Dušan Reljić, "Politika proširenja EU proizvela je seobu stanovništva jugoistočne Evrope na severozapad kontinenta i umanjila izgled za demokratski preobražaj regiona: O tome zašto sveštenici iz Srbije idu za vozače u Nemačkoj", petak 15. oktobar

Mrđan M. Mladan, "Moralni kapital kao element tranzicione pravde", ponedeljak 28. oktobar

Milica Smajević, "Dedukcija moralnosti i slobode u Kantovoj etici", sreda 30. oktobar

Miloš Bogdanović, "Morisove semiotičke teorije", sreda 30. oktobar

Novembar

Milica Popović, "Etnički ekstremizam, mediji i oblikovanje svesti mladih u Srbiji", ponedeljak 4. novembar

Anthony Faramelli, „Horizons of Desire“, Godišnji seminar: *Horizonti angažmana*, ponedjeljak 4. novembar

Luka Nenadović, „Mašinsko razumevanje jezika, semantika i veštačka inteligencija“, sreda 6. novembar

Nina Krajnik, „Strast antinomije – Lakanovska psihoanaliza između politike i filozofije“, četvrtak 7. novembar

Tatjana Kecojević, „Reproducible Research with R“, utorak 12. novembar

Marija Petrović, „Implikacije upotrebe veštačkih materica na bioetičku raspravu o abortusu“, sreda 13. novembar

Colin Crouch, „Feminism and xenophobic nationalism: the central antagonists in contemporary political identity struggles“, Godišnji seminar: *Horizonti angažmana*, sreda 27. novembar

Decembar

Burkhard Liebsch, „Unconditional responsibility in the face of disastrous violence. Thoughts on the history of human mortality“, subota 7. decembar

Sunnie Rucker Chang, „Balkan Racial Discourse“, sreda 11. decembar

Marija Velinov, „Fotografije Sonderkommandas kao neposlušni akt videnja“, ponedjeljak 16. decembar

Josip Guć, „Cjelovit (bio)etički pristup ne-ljudskim živim bićima“, ponedjeljak 16. decembar

SEMINARI I KONFERENCIJE

26. januar

Radionica Retorika: ponovno promišljanje uticaja humanistike

27. februar

Skup *Otuđene ili „otete“ institucije u Srbiji*

Učesnici: Adriana Zaharijević, Božidar Filipović, Dalibor Petrović, Dejana Dedović, Dušan Spasojević, Jelena Kleut, Jelisaveta Petrović, Ljubica

Slavković, Nikola Mladenović, Rastislav Dinić, Tara Tepavac, Vladimir Cvetković i Vujo ilić.

Moderatori: Srđan Prodanović, Gazela Pudar Draško.

11. mart

Predstavljanje knjige: Zsófia Lóránd, *The Feminist Challenge to the Socialist State in Yugoslavia*

Učesnice: Katarina Lončarević, Ana Panić, Dubravka Stojanović, Adriana Zaharijević i autorka.

13. mart

Seminar sa Stavrosom Stavridesom *Rethinking Housing as Urban Commons*

Učesnici: Stavros Stavrides, Mina Petrović, Iva Čukić, Jovana Timotijević, Danilo Čurčić. Moderacija: Sara Nikolić.

18. mart

Religija i javna sfera: razgovor o ulozi, položaju i mestu religije u javnom i političkom životu

Učesnici: Aleksej Kišjuhas, Marko Božić, Slobodan Sadžakov, Vladimir Cvetković.

Moderacija: Marko Konjović.

20. mart

Razgovor o knjigama Marka Lošonca *Vreme, svest i kompleksnost: temporalnost u Bergsonovoj i Huserlovoj filozofiji i Slepilo i kapital*

Učesnici: Olga Nikolić, Predrag Krstić, Ivan Milenković i autor. Moderacija: Igor Cvejić.

22. mart

Razgovor o knjizi Luce Irigaray, *Etika polne razlike*

Učesnice: Sanja Milutinović Bojanić, Kristina Bojanović, Đurđa Trajković, Tatjana Jovanović i Adriana Zaharijević.

25–29. mart

Letnja škola *Around 1800/2000 – Aesthetics at the Threshold* (Inter University Centre Dubrovnik)

Keynotes: Jörg Gleiter, Dierich Neumann, Paul Guyer, Igor Cvejić.

12. april

Razgovor o knjizi *Holokaust i filozofija* (prir. Mark Lošonc i Predrag Krstić)

Učesnici: Predrag Krstić, Mark Lošonc, Vera Mevorah, Ivan Milenković, Aleksandar Pavlović i Igor Cvejić.

Moderacija: Milena Đordijević.

18. april

Razgovor *Šta nam je ostalo od postmoderne? Povodom godišnjice Liotarovog Postmodernog stanja*

Učesnici: Adriana Zaharijević, Predrag Krstić, Alpar Losoncz i Stevan Bradić.

Moderacija: Mark Losoncz.

22–23. april

MEĐUNARODNA NAUČNA
KONFERENCIJA:
ЧТО ЭТО СООБЩЕСТВО?

22. april

Demokratizacija odozdo – razgovor o rezultatima istraživanja

Učesnici: Balša Delibašić, Sara Nikolić, Jelena Vasiljević, Irena Fiket, Vujo Ilić.

Moderacija: Gazela Pudar Draško.

25. april

Seminar sa Davidom Tarizzom *Political Grammars: The Unconscious Foundations of Modern Democracy*

Učesnici: Igor Cvejić, Marjan Ivković, Srđan Prodanović, Olga Nikolić, Đurđa Trajković, Marija Velinov, Milan Urošević i autor. *Demokratizacija odozdo - razgovor o rezultatima istraživanja*

25–26. april

Radionica *Values at Stake: Revisiting Normative Horizons for Southeast Europe* (Sveučilište u Zagrebu)

10–11. maj

MEĐUNARODNA NAUČNA
KONFERENCIJA:
MISAO I MISIJA SVETOG JUSTINA
POPOVIĆA

10. maj

Otvaranje konferencije i uvodna obraćanja

Prof. dr. Ivanka Popović
Prof. dr. Aleksandar Fatić
Doc. dr. Aleksandar Đakovac
Prof. dr. Dragiša Bojović

Plenarno predavanje

Bogdan Lubardić, "Fr Justin Popović and Anglican Theologians: Critical Reflections on a Complex and Multifaceted Encounter"

Panel 1: Dogmatika, liturgika i egzegeza Justina Popovića

Predsedava: Aleksandar Fatić
Jovan Purić, „Otac Justin – Tumač Svetog Pisma“

Dorđe N. Petrović, "Eucharistic Joy in Justin Popović's Dogmatics: A Reflection of an Protagonist"

Aleksandar Đakovac, „Dogmatika oca Justina Popovića u kontekstu Pavle Kondić, Mitra i skufija Justina Čelijskog“

Panel 2: Justin Popović, Dostojevski i religijska filozofija

Predsedava: Ivica Živković
Slađana Ristić-Gorgiev, „Filosofija i nje-
no značenje u delu oca Justina Čelij-
skog“

Sunčica Denić, „Simboličko i lirsko u delu Svetog Justina Popovića“

Sladana Aleksić, „Ava Justin Popović: Estetika duhovnih spoznaja na osnovu dela Dostojevskog“

Nemanja Škrelić, „Justin Čelijski i Dostojevski – problem ljudske determinisanosti i slobode“

Panel 3: Antropologija Justina Popovića: Od dna pakla do trećeg neba

Predsedava: Sladana Ristić Gorgiev

Aleksandar Fatić, „Moralno terapeutski smisao dijalektike bogocentričnosti i čovekocentričnosti kod Sv. Justin Popovića“

Aleksandar Petrović, „Putevi ka zemlji živih Ave Justina Popovića: kroz podvig raskrivanja čovekovog samopoznanja“

Slobodan Prodić, „Otac Justin (Popović) i monaštvo“

Marko Šukunda, „Ava Justin i učenje o nečistim silama“

Panel 4: Justin Popović između ekumenizma i komunizma

Predsedava: Tomas Bremer

Zdenko Širka, „Protestantism as a Pan-heresy: Would Justin and Luther understand each other?“

Julija Vidović, „Svejerer ekumenizma“ prema svetom Justinu Popoviću“

Neven Vukić, „The Church and the Red Star – the Serbian Orthodox Church and the communist persecution in Yugoslavia“

Vladimir Cvetković, „St Justin Popović on Papacy“

11. maj

Plenarno predavanje

Tomas Bremer, „Justin Popović viden iz rimokatoličke perspektive“

Panel 5: Justin Popović i Evropa

Predsedava: Zdenko Širka

Bogoljub Šijaković, „Justinovo svetosavlje vs. evropski humanizam“

Ivica Živković, „Kritička misao arhimandrita Justina Popovića i hrišćansko vaspitanje danas“

Dragan Šljivić, „Hristova Vojska i vojska sa Hristom: Sv. Justin Čelijski, Sveti Nikolaj Ohridski i Žički i vojnički etos“

Pavle Botić, „Ava Justin o idolopoklonstvu“

Panel 6: Duhovništvo Justina Popovića

Predsedava: Bogdan Lubardić

Illarion Đurica, „Delotvornost učenja vere pod duhovnim staranjem prepodobnog Justina Novog: lično iskustvo“

Ljubiša Kostić, „Ontološka osnova u besedništvu prep. Justina Čelijskog“

Dragiša Bojović, „Ko su učenici oca Justina?“

Pavle Jović, „Srbi o Svetom Justinu Popoviću“

Panel 7: Asketika i teologija ličnosti Justina Popovića

Predsedava: Dragiša Bojović

Svilen Tutekov, „Sveti Justin Novi Čelijski i asketski ključ teologije ličnosti“

Svetlana Marjanov, „Pojam ličnosti u delu Justina Popovića“

Aleksandar Mihailović, „Svetost između asketizma i Liturgije u misli Svetog Justina“

Predrag Vukić, „Pismo arhimadrita Justina Popovića (sv. Justina Čelijskog) igumanu ostroškog manastira Lukijanu Zečeviću na Vaskrs 1964. godine“

Panel 8: Valorizacija i recepcija Justina Popovića

Predsedava: Vladimir Cvetković

Dimitry Tribushny, „Saint Justin of Celije as an Original Thinker“

Stephen C. Headley, „St Justin on Providence: Sources and Consequences“

Dionisios Skliris, „I love therefore I know”: The Critique of Western Philosophy According to Saint Justin the New (Popović) to and its Patristic Presuppositions“

Phillip Calington, „Reception and Importance of St Justin and His Works Among Converts in the West“.

20. maj

KOMEMORATIVNI NAUČNI SKUP:
ZAGORKA GOLUBOVIĆ: HORIZONTI
ANGAŽMANA

Učesnici: Srđan Prodanović, Marjan
Ivković, Ivana Spasić, Isidora Jarić,
Đorđe Pavićević, Ivan Zlatić.

22. maj

MEĐUNARODNA NAUČNA
KONFERENCIJA:
HEGEL'S UNIVERSALISM TODAY
(FILOZOFSKI FAKULTET U LJUBLJANI)

Učesnici: Jean-François Kervégan, Klaus
Vieweg, Pierpaolo Cesaroni, Petar Bo-
janić, Zdravko Kobe.

27. maj

Seminar o knjizi Maxa Bergolza *Na-
silje kao generativna sila. Identitet,
nacionalizam i sećanje u jednoj bal-
kanskoj zajednici*

28. maj

Seminar sa Thomasom Szantom *Can
Hatred Ever be Appropriate?*

Učesnici: Olga Nikolić, Igor Cvejić,
Đurđa Trajković, Srđan Prodanović,
Mark Lošonc, Marko Konjović, Ra-
stko Jovanov.

18. jun

Promocija zbornika *Holokaust i filo-
zofija*, Jevrejska opština, Subotica

Učesnici: Mark Lošonc, Predrag Krstić,
Vera Mevorah, Igor Cvejić i Aleksan-
dar Pavlović.

20. jun

Seminar o knjizi Snježane Prijić Sa-
mardžije *Democracy and Truth: The
Conflict Between Political and Episte-
mic Virtues*

Učesnici: Petar Bojanić, Igor Cvejić,
Vedran Džihić, Biljana Đorđević,

Aleksandar Fatić, Marjan Ivković,
Ivana Janković, Marko Konjović, Ivan
Mladenović, Srđan Prodanović, Boja-
na Radovanović, Smail Rapić, Marko
Luka Zubčić.

Moderacija: Marko Konjović i Bojana
Radovanović.

21-22. jun

MEĐUNARODNI KOLOKVIJUM
SA AKSELOM HONETOM
DEMOCRACY, SOCIALISM AND
ENGAGEMENT: AXEL HONNETH
AND CRITICAL THEORY TODAY

i dodela Godišnje nagrade Instituta za
filozofiju i društvenu teoriju za kritički
angžman „Miladin Životić“.

21. jun

Smail Rapić, „Honneths Marx-Kritik
in *Die Idee des Sozialismus* – eine
Entgegnung (Honneth's Critique of
Marx in The Idea of Socialism – a
Response)“

Charles Djordjevic, „Recognizing
Expressions of Pain: Honneth, Witt-
genstein, and the Normative Under-
pinnings of the Social World“

Petar Bojanić, Welcome address
followed by the Ceremony of the In-
stitute for Philosophy and Social The-
ory's Annual Award for Critical Enga-
gement “Miladin Životić”

Axel Honneth, Award Lecture: „De-
mocracy and the Division of Labor.
A blind spot in political philosophy“
Comments on Axel Honneth's Award
Lecture: Smail Rapić, Snježana Pri-
jić-Samaržija, Marjan Ivković

22. jun

Zdravko Kobe, „Transformation of Pu-
blic Knowing: Some Hegelian Re-
marks in Honneth's Mode“

Marco Solinas, „The Actuality of Marx's
Errors. Neoliberalism and Honneth's
Idea of Socialism“

Seminar sa Axelom Honnethom o knjizi *Die Idee des Sozialismus: Versuch einer Aktualisierung*

Učesnici: Željko Radinković, Predrag Krstić, Aleksandar Fatić, Rastko Jovanov, Marjan Ivković, Srdjan Prodanović, Jelena Vasiljević, Adriana Zaharijević, Igor Cvejić, Mark Lošonc, Olga Nikolić, Đorđe Pavićević, Simon Pistor i autor.

26. jun

Seminar o knjizi Damira Smiljanića *Atmosfera smrti*

Učesnici: Olga Nikolić, Igor Cvejić, Mark Lošonc, Željko Radinković, Irina Deretić, Davor Lazić, Mihajlo Stamenković i autor.

30. jun–7. jul

MEĐUNARODNA LETNJA ŠKOLA:
ENGAGEMENT FOR FRIENDSHIP:
CHANGING POLITICAL CULTURE
IN THE BALKANS

Predavači: Stefano Bianchini, University of Bologna (Forli), Goran Filić, Columbia University / University of Bologna (Forli), Eltion Meka, University of New York (Tirana), Ilir Kalemaj, University of New York (Tirana), Pero Maldini, University of Dubrovnik, Davor Pauković, University of Dubrovnik, Maja Savić-Bojanić, Sarajevo School of Science and Technology, Sabina Čehajić-Clancy, Sarajevo School of Science and Technology, Jelica Minić, European Movement in Serbia, Aleksandar Pavlović, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade, Srdan Prodanović, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade, Rigels Halili, University of Warsaw, Hana Semanić, Central European University.

23–24. septembar

MEĐUNARODNA RADIONICA
POVRATAK NASILJA: SAVRMENE
ANKSIOZNOSTI ZAJEDNICE

23. septembar

Opening of the workshop: Petar Bojanić, Nuria Sánchez Madrid and Adriana Zaharijević, *Why Violence? Why Community: Serbia and Spain*

Igor Cvejić, *„The Collectivization of Anxiety“*

Srdan Prodanović, *„Post-Metaphysical Articulation of Collective Anxiety“*, Clara Navarro Ruiz, *„Against Reductionism. Violence, Social Reproduction and Feminist Resistance“*

Olga Nikolić, *„Can Political Violence ever be Justified?“*

Nasilne slike: razgovor, učesnici: Miloš Čipranić, Nuria Sánchez Madrid, Roberto Navarrete Alonso, Adriana Zaharijević i Đurđa Trajković, Instituto Cervantes de Belgrado

24. septembar

Petar Bojanić i Gazela Pudar Draško, *„(When) Is the Police Violent? On the Degradation of an Institution. On its Necessary Reconstruction.“*

Sara Ferrira Lago, *„Caesar dominus et supra grammaticam. The Problem of the Definition of Violence“*

Miloš Čipranić, *„Position of the Deaf“*
Nuria Sánchez Madrid, *„Violence of Values/Values of Violence. The Cultural Struggle as Drive of Global Neofascism“*

Adriana Zaharijević, *„A Violent Return to Invulnerability. At What Societal Cost?“*

Đurđa Trajković, *„The End of Tragedy. Genre of Violence Today?“*

Roberto Navarrete Alonso, *„National Delay and Community Violence. On Helmuth Plessner’s Critique of Social Radicalism“*

Željko Radinković, „The Affirmative Notion of Authority. On the Constructive Aspect of Power“

Marjan Ivković, „Ideological Uses of the Fear of Violence“

27. septembar

Okrugli sto povodom izlaska knjige *Građenje jedne kontrainstitucije. Istorija instituta za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju* (Igor Cvejić/Olga Nikolić/Michal Sladeček)

Učesnici: Latinka Perović, Vladimir Goati, Sonja Liht, Radivoj Cveticanin, Dragoljub Mićunović, Milivoj Bešlin, Predrag Krstić, Petar Bojanić, Olga Nikolić i Igor Cvejić

9. oktobar

Panel diskusija *Sužavanje prostora za kritičko mišljenje i delovanje*

Učesnici: Judith Butler, Ivan Vejvoda, Athena Athanasiou, Sanja Milutinović Bojanić i Adriana Zaharijević

14. oktobar

Panel diskusija *Obrazovanje? Reforma koje deformacije za kakvu formu?*, KC Magacin

Učesnici: Boris Jokić, Jelena Čeriman, Ljiljana Levkov, Nada Banjanin Đurišić, Nemanja Đorđević i Predrag Krstić.

16. oktobar

Predstavljanje knjige Jove Bakića *Evropska krajnja desnica (1945–2018)*

Učesnici: Gazela Pudar Draško, Irena Fiket, Jelena Čeriman, Marjan Ivković, Srđan Prodanović, Dušan Spasojević, Jovica Pavlović, Rajko Petrović, Dušan Ilić, Sonja Dragović-Sekulić.

21. oktobar

Seminar o knjizi Latinke Perović *Za-tvaranje kruga*

Učesnici: Olga Manojlović Pintar, Dragan Đukanović, Aleksandar R. Miletić, Srđan Milošević, Gazela Pudar Draško, Milivoj Bešlin, Petar Žarković, Balša Delibašić i autorka.

22. oktobar

Okrugli sto *Epistemologija Sv. Justina Popovića u tumačenju Evandjelja po Jovanu*

Učesnici: Jovan Čulibrk, Slobodan Prodić i Aleksandar Fatić

5. novembar

Seminar sa Asgerom Sørensenom o knjizi *Capitalism, Alienation and Critique*

Učesnici: Igor Cvejić, Željko Radinković, Predrag Krstić, Đurđa Trajković, Olga Nikolić, Srđan Prodanović, Gazela Pudar Draško, Bojana Radovanović, Jelena Vasiljević, Marjan Ivković i Milan Urošević

8 – 9. novembar

MEĐUNARODNA RADIONICA
DRUGI POL – SEDAMDESET GODINA
KASNIJE

Keynotes: Claudine Monteil, Genevieve Fraisse.

Izlaganja: Sanja Milutinović Bojanić, Biljana Dojčinović, Dušan Maljković, Katarina Lončarević, Brigita Miloš, Mirjana Stošić, Đurđa Trajković, Adriana Zaharijević, Ivica Živković.

9. novembar

Okrugli sto *Pad Berlinskog zida iz Jugoslovenske perspektive*

Učesnici: Budimir Lončar, Ivan Ivanji, Mihajlo Kovač, Tvrtko Jakovina i Milivoj Bešlin

14. novembar

Seminar o knjizi Ivana Mladenovića *Javni um i deliberativna demokratija*

Učesnici: Milorad Stupar, Đorđe Pavićević, Petar Bojanić, Michal Sládeček, Bojana Radovanović, Ivana Janković, Dejana Glišić, Miloš Kovačević, Mi-ljan Vasić i autor.

22-23. novembar

PRVA ENTAN KONFERENCIJA
NON-TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AS A
FORM OF PLURINATIONAL DEMOCRACY:
PARTICIPATION, RECOGNITION,
RECONCILIATION

Keynote: Ephraim Nimni

Učesnici: Aleksandar Pavlović, Bratislav Marinković, Losoncz David, Ivan Dodoski, Jaco Dahl Rendtorff, Stipe Buzar, Assaf Derri, Piet Goemans, Artur Bohač, Alina Romanovska, Tomasz Studzieniecki, Remi Lager, Erella Shadmi, Tudi Kernalegenn, Vladimir Benedik, Martin Klatt, Joanna Kurowska-Pysz, Hynek Bohm, Mariyan Tomov, Lilyia Raycheva, Bojan Božović, Branko Bošković, Flavia Lucia Ghencea, Mihnea Claudiu Drumea, David J. Smith, Robert Isaf, Laura Patache, Octav Negurita, Emil Drapela, Andrius Puksas, Dangis Gudelis, Balazs Dobos, Marina Andeva, Svetluša Surova, Andrea Elena Matić, Egdu-nas Raciuss, As'ad Ghanem, Amneh Badran, Moshe Behar, Meital Pinto, Joost Jorgenden, Cengiz Gunes, Rosa Burc, Konstantinos Tsitselikis, Kyriaki Topidi, Anita Stasulane, Janis Priede, Immaculada Colomina Limonero, Olivera Injac, Guido Franzinetti, Roni Gechtman, Aleksandra Figurek, Una Vasković, Anatoly Goncharuk, Marcos Sibler, Stefan Moal, Steve Coleman, Eamon O Closain, Rico Valar, Kay Schweigmann-Greve, Vincenzo Pinto.

26. novembar

KONFERENCIJA
UDRUŽENE ZA ZNANJE

Rektorat Univerziteta u Beogradu

3. decembar

Predstavljanje knjige *Otpornost-asimetrija makro diskursa i mikro procesa*

Autorke: Olivera Pavićević, Aleksandra Bulatović i Ljeposava Ilijić

8. decembar

Seminar sa Burkhardom Liebschom *Biti izložen: Revizija ljudskog stanja u svetlu skorašnje istorije nasilja*

Učesnici: Željko Radinković, Petar Bojanić, Rastko Jovanov, Igor Cvejić, Marjan Ivković, Aleksandar Fatić, Časlav Koprivica, Una Popović.

20. decembar

Panel diskusija *Big data: resurs društva ili elite*, ICT Hub

Učesnici: Mihajlo Popesku, Mirko Savić, Ljubiša Bojić i Jelisaveta Petrović

26. decembar

Razgovori *Kako prepoznati prosvetnog kritičkog intelektualca?*, Polet Art District

Učesnici: Gazela Pudar Draško, Predrag Krstić, Ivan Milenković, Đurđa Trajković, Srđan Prodanović i Aleksandar Pavlović

ČITALAČKE RADIONICE

O pristupu zasnovanom na sposobnosti, Bojana Radovanović i Marko Konjović, 11. mart – 22. april

Ekonomika finansijskih kriza, Mrđan Mladan, utorak 4. jun.

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Up to two double sheets (60.000 characters including spaces), abstracts, key words, without comments.

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Between 100 and 250 words.

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Example:

In the bibliography: Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret (1981), „You can have Sex without Children: Christianity and the New Offer“, in *The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe*, Ethics, Religion and Politics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 82–96.

In the text: (Anscombe 1981: 82)

In a comment: Anscombe 1981: 82.

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In the bibliography: Logar, Gordana (2009), „Zemlja bez fajronta“, *Danas*, 2 August, p. 12.

In the text: (Logar 2009: 12).

In a comment: Logar 2009: 12

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In the bibliography: Ross, Kelley R., „Ontological Undecidability“, (internet) available at: <http://www.friesian.com/undecd-1.htm> (viewed 2 April, 2009).

In the text: (Ross, internet).

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Primer:

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Primeri:

U literaturi: Miller, Johns Roger (1926), „The Ideas as Thoughts of God“, *Classical Philology* 21: 317–326.

Hartman, Nikolaj (1980) „O metodi istorije filozofije“, *Gledišta* 21 (6): 101–120.

U tekstu: (Hartman 1980: 108).

U napomeni: Hartman 1980: 108

10. ZBORNICI

U spisku literature: prezime i ime priređivača, u zagradi skraćenica „prir.“, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov zbornika u italiku, mesto izdanja, izdavač i strana po potrebi. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomenama, zbornici se citiraju isključivo na skraćeni način.

Primer:

U literaturi: Espozito, Džon (prir.) (2002), *Oksfordska istorija islama*, Beograd: Clio.

U tekstu: (Espozito 2002).

U napomeni: Espozito 2002.

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Primer:

U literaturi: Nizbet, Robert (1999), „Jedinične ideje sociologije“, u A. Mimica (prir.), *Tekst i kontekst*, Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, str. 31–48.

U tekstu: (Nizbet 1999: 33).

U napomeni: Nizbet 1999: 33.

12. ČLANAK IZ NOVINA

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Primer:

U literaturi: Logar, Gordana (2009), „Zemlja bez fajronta“, *Danas*, 2. avgust, str. 12.

U tekstu: (Logar 2009: 12).

U napomeni: Logar 2009: 12.

13. INTERNET

Prilikom citiranja tekstova s interneta, osim internet-adrese sajta na kojem se tekst nalazi i naslova samog teksta, navesti i datum posete toj stranici, kao i dodatna određenja ukoliko su dostupna (godina, poglavlje i sl.).

Primer:

U literaturi: Ross, Kelley R., „Ontological Undecidability“, (internet) dostupno na: <http://www.friesian.com/undecd-1.htm> (pristupljeno 2. aprila 2009).

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