# FILOZOFIJA I DRUŠTVO
# PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY

4

SADRŽAJ CONTENTS

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ENGAGING INSTITUTIONS

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# INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE PARADOX OF (RESTITUTION AND) RESTAURATION OF THE INSTITUTION

**ABSTRACT**
My intention in this text is to present the most significant contribution of some French philosophers and anthropologists to the notion of reconstruction and advancement of institutions. The paradox of change, reform or transformation of the institution – is an entirely new institution possible? How do institutions die? – lies in the difficulty or even impossibility to change something that manifests what we are as a group. If institutions really present or represent the relations among all of us, how can they be changed in the first place? Whence the capacity for change? What allows for the idea of the "new"?

I would like to explore the notion of reconstruction of our institutions, that is, that our institutions (European as well as others) are in poor shape and in need of revitalization. What is this ability to detect their state and whence the feeling that we deserve better ones? What is it that has changed for the institutions to now be bad and overtly violent? How is the asymmetry even possible between the innumerable entities we ourselves produce through our mutual social acts and our attitudes towards them? Is it possible to speak meaningfully about that which we produce in relation with and to others, which lies between us (the public, the common good), and which can most straightforwardly be designated as concerning the institution?

This body of questions refers to corrections and amendments to institutions we, in conjunction with others, have created or inherited. How can we change institutions? Can old institutions stand simultaneously with new ones? How do institutions even die? If institutions serve to ensure and safeguard a specific set of transactions among ourselves, who ought to be and who can possibly be the subject of this change?

Yet all these complex questions are preceded by two other ones regarding the institution of institutions and institutional analysis: What is it that initiates or is the condition for any and all thematization of the institution? What is the preamble of any possible institutional analysis? In his 1930 *Autobiographie*, Marcel Mauss says that he is above all interested in common work, being part of a team

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(group), and in following the belief that collaboration with others brings much more than pretentious solitary and isolated search for originality (Mauss 1979: 209–210). If we reconstructed all of Mauss efforts and projects, from the various ritual, collective acting or institutions to the grandiose project of overcoming capitalism and competition through engagement for cooperatives (commons), we would see that his interest is always connected with the "act of a collective nature [*acte de nature collective*]" or "individual acts of a collective nature [*les actes individuels de nature collective*]". Which is further to say, his interest is always for the largest form of collective activity, "the nation or the very meaning of the social [*la nation ou le sense du social*]".[1] We can compare his critical and engaged project, with the various great collective critical projects and actions from the past: from Madame de Staël, Saint-Simon and Marx through International Associations, Paul Otlet, the Institute for Social Research, the Praxis School, to critical and social engagement of scholars applying for European humanities grants and the International Consortium of Critical Theory Programs. My own interest is certainly to reconstruct projects of intellectual association, that is universal, non-violent, urgent and obligation-producing (i.e. engaged: von Jhering uses a potentially analogous term in 1886, *die active Solidarobligation* [1969: 409–464]). And European. Among the diverse conditions implied by critical practice – resistance, negation, the concrete, totality ("ruthless criticism of all that exists"), change, decision, judgment, project, the radical, subversion, the universal, public, confrontation or "pseudo-activity" and resignation – engaging in critique always assumes the existence of a group, its urgent formation and the obligation of the group's members to participate in the articulation of collective critical action as a plural subject. Here is a sketch of a proposal for the reconstruction of the idea of collective intellectual work in three steps (each contributing to the introduction into any potential institutionalism):

existence of the group

a) critique is collective and it can only be efficiently conducted by the group of subjects. Transfer of agency from subject to critically engaged subjects, and then to the group as subject determines whether something is critique or not; that is, it is critique only if it is structured as 'our plan' (*unser Plan*) and can become, as Marx wrote to Ruge, 'our affair' (*unsere Sache*) (Marx 1982 [1843]: 486–489);

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1    Long before Husserl and Adolf Reinach, Mauss is practically the first to thematize "*l'acte sociale*". "Ultimately, without being obligatory, magic rites are nevertheless social. Obligation properly speaking is not for us the distinctive characteristic of things, of social acts and sentiments. We still regard the illicit magic act as social, without contradiction. This act is social because it retains the social form, which would not have meaning without it [*Enfin, sans être obligatoires, les rites de la magie sont néanmoins sociaux. L'obligation proprement dite n'est pas pour nous le caractère distinctif des choses, des actes et des sentiments sociaux. L'acte magique illicite reste pour nous social, sans qu'il y ait là contradiction. L'acte est social parce qu'il tient sa forme de la société et qu'il n'a raison d'être que par rapport à elle*]" (Hubert & Mauss 1908: 186).

urgency

b) critique is urgent: crisis demands an urgent reaction by individuals to rapidly constitute themselves as a group and mitigate a crisis. If the crisis occurs as a combination of negative social acts and dispersed individual critiques, true critique, "as central motif of spirit" (*als zentrales Motiv des Geistes*) (Adorno), is the answer of the group that forms itself at the moment it announces "the crisis event" (Adorno 2003: 785–793);

engagement

c) critique consists of engaged acts when it obligates to urgent action. It obligates not only members of the group, but all future, inactive members/parts of the human community ("global commitment," J. Butler).

Marcel Mauss' thematization or reconstruction of the 'institution' is philosophical-anthropological and of course precedes Malinowski's and that of Mary Douglas, whose writing on the institution is also inspired. It implicitly contains all these mentioned steps,[2] but also carries several important and probably first models for understanding the institution today. It is, in other words, entirely current. I will list the models as well:[3]

Institutions depend on one another [*Les institutions dépendent les unes des autres*] (Fauconnet-Mauss 1901: 167–168).

Comparative history of law and religion has revealed the idea that certain institutions in combination with institutions comprise a system, and that none can be transformed without the others also transforming" [*L'histoire comparée du droit, des religions, a rendu commune l'idée que certaines institutions forment avec certaines autres un système, que les premières ne peuvent se transformer sans que les secondes se transforment également*] (Fauconnet & Mauss 1901: 167).

It is clear that the connections among the wills of individuals rule over individuals.

Such interdependence of phenomena would be inexplicable as the product of particular, more or less capricious, wills; the interdependence is explained, on the contrary, as the product of impersonal forces that dominate the individuals [*Cette interdépendance des phénomènes serait inexplicable s'ils étaient les produits*

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2    In "La magie", Mauss continues: "We seek first of all to understand the institutions, that is, the rules of public conduct and thought. In sacrifice – the public face of the institution – the collective nature of the act and its representations is quite clear [*Nous nous proposions au début de nos études, surtout de comprendre des institutions, c'est-à-dire des règles publiques d'action et de pensée. Dans le sacrifice, le caractère public de l'institution, collectif de l'acte et des représentations est bien clair*]" (Hubert & Mauss 1908: 187)

3    They are in an early text authored with Paul Fauconnet (Fauconnet & Mauss 1901: 165–176).

*de volontés particulières et plus ou moins capricieuses; elle s'explique au contrai-*
*re s'ils sont les produits de forces impersonnelles qui dominent les individus eux-*
*mêmes*] (Fauconnet & Mauss 1901: 168).

The institution is always connected to coercion.

A rule to which an individual is considered submitted cannot be the work of that
individual: for all obligation implies a higher authority to the obligated subject,
which inspires respect in him, an essential element of the feeling of obligation.
Excluding interventions by supernatural beings, it is impossible to find, outside
and below the individual, any source of obligation other than society, or rather
the totality of societies to which he belongs [*Une règle à laquelle l'individu se
considère comme soumis ne peut être l'œuvre de cet individu : car toute obligation
implique une autorité supérieure au sujet obligé, et qui lui inspire le respect, élé-
ment essentiel du sentiment d'obligation. Si donc on exclut l'intervention d'êtres
surnaturels, on ne saurait trouver, en dehors et au-dessus de l'individu, qu'une
seule source d'obligation, c'est la société ou plutôt l'ensemble des sociétés dont il
est membre*] (Ibid.).

The institutional precedes the individual or individuals.

[...] all forms of acting and thinking the individual finds pre-established and
whose transmission is conducted most often by way of education are social [*sont
sociales toutes les manières d'agir et de penser que l'individu trouve préétablies et
dont la transmission se fait le plus généralement par la voie de l'éducation*] (Ibid.).

The name for social facts is institution.

It would be good if a particular word designated these special facts, and it seems
that the word institutions would be most appropriate. After all, what is an in-
stitution if not the totality of acts or ideas, all presenting themselves to, and
imposing themselves more or less on individuals? There is no reason to exclu-
sively reserve, as it is customarily done, this expression to fundamental social
arrangements [*Il serait bon qu'un mot spécial désignât ces faits spéciaux, et il
semble que le mot institutions serait le mieux approprié. Qu'est-ce en effet qu'une
institution sinon un ensemble d'actes ou d'idées tout institué que les individus
trouvent devant eux et qui s'impose plus ou moins à eux? Il n'y a aucune raison
pour réserver exclusivement, comme on le fait d'ordinaire, cette expression aux
arrangements sociaux fondamentaux*] (Ibid.).

The institution, however, is not the past; it lives. Institutions transform.
"Nothing comes from nothing [*Rien ne vient de rien*]" (Fauconnet & Mauss
1901: 169).

But, one might say, the institution is in the past; it is, by definition, a fixed en-
tity, not a living one. [...] Nothing comes from nothing: new institutions cannot
be made but from older ones, for those are the only extant. [...] True institutions
live, which is to say, change incessantly [*Mais, dira-t-on, l'institution est le passé;
c'est, par définition, la chose fixée, non la chose vivante. [...] Rien ne vient de rien
: les institutions nouvelles ne peuvent être faites qu'avec les anciennes, puisque*

*celles-ci sont les seules qui existent.* [...] *Les institutions véritables vivent, c'est-à-dire changent sans cesse*] (Fauconnet & Mauss 1901: 168–169).

There is nothing outside institutions.

The only facts one might without reason consider social, yet which would nevertheless be difficult to place within the definition of institutions, are those produced in societies without institutions. Yet the only societies without institutions are social aggregates, unstable and ephemeral (such as a mob of people), or else those undergoing formation. In neither case do we have societies properly speaking, but only societies in becoming [*Les seuls faits que l'on pourrait non sans raison regarder comme sociaux et qui, cependant, rentreraient difficilement dans la définition des institutions, sont ceux qui se produisent dans les sociétés sans institutions. Mais les seules sociétés sans institutions sont des agrégats sociaux ou bien instables et éphémères comme les foules, ou bien en cours de formation. Or des unes et des autres on peut dire qu'elles ne sont pas encore des sociétés proprement dites, mais seulement des sociétés en voie de devenir* ] (Fauconnet & Mauss 1901: 169).

We find these basic designations of the institution in the classic text co-authored by Mauss and Fauconnet. They could once again be classified and reduced to a few directions. Institutions are under constant change, and change is their first characteristic (they transform, they are dynamic and living; as such, they represent a collection of acts or actions, etc.); institutions possess and produce strength and power, yet are resistant to violent protocols that stand at their origin (it is probably easily possible to justify this hypothesis from Hume); and institutions are a primarily European thing or a European philosophical thing. This last claim, which opens a whole slew of questions, refers to philosophy or possibly "European philosophy" that can amend itself, and with itself institutions. Sundry philosophers of various schools of thought would comfortably and convincingly claim that philosophy follows institutions and vice versa, that institutions are always bespoke to thought, that is, that they are but a mirror of '*thinking*'. And yet the collision or discord between philosophy and institutions is additionally complicated by the attribute 'European' (in the phrase "European philosophy"). It seems to me that this attribute distances us (even further) from other continents and thus from other kinds of understandings of institutions or real institutions: Jewish philosophy or Indian philosophy perhaps or probably suit the institutions of Israel and India, and it is difficult to speak of their institutional distinctions compared to institutions of any sovereign country of Europe. Furthermore, this attribute distances us from the imperative (a philosophical imperative, no less) that different institutions, cities or states should always be compared. Is not Hume already built into the very foundations of "European philosophy?" And what is more, is it not a basic fact that without Hume, we would have no "European theory of institutions" or "institutional epistemology?" (Hume awards considerable importance to institutions, much more than Hobbes who reduces the meaning of the noun 'institution' to the verb 'to institute'.) Indeed, without Hume, it

would be impossible to imagine living French republicanism and institutionalism. Without Hume, to put it bluntly, there is no Gilles Deleuze.[4]

I would like to briefly show how this paradox (using Rousseau's phrase "*le moment de l'institution*") (Rousseau 1990: 186) of change or restauration of the institution(s) has been thematized or problematized in the history of European thought or philosophy (along the axis of French institutionalism: Montesquieu, Rousseau, Madame de Staël, Saint-Simon, Mauss). To do so, I would like to posit an unconditional condition of any possible institutionalism. These thinkers, each in their own way, have confirmed this condition of all conditions, which today (or especially today) is neither obvious nor straightforward. In it resides the chief contrast between Hume and Hobbes, but also among the various German, Italian or French philosophers in history and today. This axiom, perhaps the first axiom for, if you will, a "European philosophy," could be formulated as follows: violence or force produces nothing or is not transformed into anything (does not produce right, justice, freedom, order or institutions). In contrast to Hume, this is clear to Montesquieu, Rousseau and Mauss. Thus, for them, any potential notion of protest or amending institutions or of restauration of institutions refers to the elimination of conflict, violence, and aggressive strategies that always already reside in institutions. In *De la littérature considérée dans ses rapports avec les institutions sociales*, M. Germaine de Staël writes:

> Military spirit runs equally through all ages and countries. It is not particular to any nation, nor binds a people to some given institution: it ought to defend them all equally. Rhetoric, love of literature and art, of philosophy can make a homeland of a territory by giving to that nation similar tastes, habits and sentiments. But force speeds past time and bypasses the will. Yet, by this very manner, it can establish nothing among men. It was often repeated during the French revolution, that tyranny was needed to establish liberty. Words of opposite meaning were thus put together into a mere phrase, which changed not one bit the truth of things. Institutions established through violence might imitate liberty in every way except in its natural course. It is thus like a doll that might scare you

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4    It seems to me that there is no "conflittualismo anti-istituzionale ereditato dal post-strutturalismo francese" (Esposito 2019) and that Michel Foucault's anti-institutionalism is a completely marginal phenomenon of no importance whatsoever to structuralism's or 'poststructuralism's' institutionalism or counter-institutionalism (*contre-institution* is both Saint-Simon's and Derrida's term). I have written about this in a text that analyzes 'uses' of the institution in Roberto Esposito (Bojanić 2015). Foucault is the origin and perfect example of this, if you like, neoliberal theater, because he is only concerned with his own engagement (similarly Sartre, although he sometimes vacillates). For him, there is no notion of collective work, collective action or collective change. Could anyone imagine Foucault writing applications, formulating budgets, writing final reports of projects or even simply asking for money for conferences, for joint work or for others… Foucault works for himself, and uses his perfect political connections, throughout the various periods of his life, quite well for his own positioning. I am even unconvinced that his role is particularly important in the construction of the University of Vincennes.

with its resemblance: you will see in it everything but life [*L'esprit militaire est le même dans tous les siècles et dans tous les pays; il ne caractérise point la nation, il ne lie point le peuple à telle ou telle institution: il est également propre à les défendre toutes. L'éloquence, l'amour des lettres et des beaux-arts, la philosophie, peuvent seul faire d'un territoire une patrie, en donnant à la nation qui l'habite les mêmes gouts, les mêmes habitudes et les mêmes sentiments. La force se passe du temps et brise la volonté; mais par cela même elle ne peut rien fonder parmi les hommes. L'on a souvent répété, dans la révolution de France, qu'il fallait du despotisme pour établir la liberté. On a lié par des mots un contre-sens dont on a fait une phrase; mais cette phrase ne change rien à la vérité des choses. Les institutions établies par la force imiteraient tout la liberté, excepte son mouvement naturel; les formes seraient comme ces modelés qui vous effrayent par leur ressemblance: vous y retrouves tout, hors la vie*] (De Staël 1800: 29).

In addition to life, since it is already incorporated within institutions, and is not (as the anti-institutionalist mantra goes) opposed to them, Madame de Staël insists on time: force speeds it up, introducing a false and uncertain short-term process. And she insists on will (elsewhere in her writing, the appearance of new institutions implies a new spirit of freedom and desire [*désir*]) (cfr. De Staël 1800: 24). She repeats, modifies and affirms as crucial, four models of "French institutionalism". First, entirely original, that above all literature, new linguistic forms and new expressions could disrupt the asymmetry between thought and institutions (writing, putting pen to paper brings forth something new, and thus new institutions). Second, also never before formulated as succinctly as this, that it is possible "to judge institutions philosophically [à juger philosophiquement les institutions]" (De Staël 1800: 148).[5] Otherwise, "philosophy is but a frivolous pastime of countries in which no enlightenment pierces the institutions [*la philosophie elle-même n'est qu'une occupation frivole dans un pays où les lumières ne peuvent pénétrer dans les institutions*] » (De Staël 1800: 262); the third model is inherited from Montesquieu and Rousseau (Saint-Simon also adopts it later): that it is necessary and certainly possible to compare institutions across cities and states. A comparative model of study presents differences among institutions and can advance them. Finally, the last idea Madame de Staël thematizes refers to observing institutions in time, their transformation, transience, obsolescence, and death. Here is how she writes of *chevalerie*:

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5   "Recall yet again the meaning I have given to the word philosophy throughout this work. Philosophy for me is inquiry into the principle of all political and religious institutions, analysis of characteristics and historical events, and finally, study of the human heart and natural rights of man. Such philosophy takes liberty as its guiding goal [*Il faut rappeler ici de nouveau le sens que j'ai constamment attach*é *au mot philosophie dans le cours de cet ouvrage. J'appelle philosophie, l'investigation du principe de toutes les institutions politiques et religieuses, l'analyse des caractères et des évènements historiques, enfin l'étude du cœur humain et des droits naturels de l'homme. Une telle philosophie suppose la liberté ou doit y conduire*]" (cfr. De Staël 1800: 144).

Any institution that is good at a given moment, but not for eternal reason, becomes incorrigibly onerous, having corrected previous wrongs. Thus, *chevalerie* was necessary to palliate military savagery through femininity and religious spirit. However, the order or rank of *chevalerie*, just like anything that divides instead of reuniting men, had to come to be seen as dreary as soon as it ceased to provide necessary remedy [*Toute institution bonne relativement à tel danger du moment, et non à la raison éternelle, devient un abus insupportable, après avoir corrig*é *des abus plus grands. La chevalerie était nécessaire pour adoucir la férocité militaire par le culte des femmes et l'esprit religieux; mais la chevalerie, comme un ordre, comme une secte, comme tout ce qui sépare les hommes au lieu de les réunir, dut être considérée comme un mal funeste, dès qu'elle cessa d'être un remède indispensable*] (De Staël 1800: 131).

This construction shows well how a given convention is initially established and regulated, enabling and ensuring transactions among members of a community and reducing militarism; and it shows how it degrades over time. If an 'institution' (is it now perhaps a little clearer what this noun designates or hides?), ceases to be a conduit and becomes an obstacle "that divides instead of uniting men [*qui sépare les hommes au lieu de les réunir*]", then urgent change is necessary. And indeed, there is something urgent in this diagnosis of the institution that has suddenly become dreary (*un mal funeste*). Yet, it is also entirely implicit that Madame de Staël indicates where the problem lies or where knowledge of the problem begins, and how to solve it. The diagnosis is simultaneously an urgent call to cooperation and action sent out to all members of the community.[6] If we say that an institution must ceaselessly institutionalize itself (so as not to become pacified), what that means, in my opinion, is that a group of individuals ought to produce an entirely different kind of act (individual and group social act) that might renew the unity of the group and ensure its transition into an institution (some new institution or counter institution). These I call engaged acts.[7] My premise is that a novel reconstruction of engagement (and related terms)[8] could introduce or advance or ease the shift into 'social freedom' (a term of A. Honneth). Furthermore, as in the case of Madame de Staël's chevalier, this is another negative example that confirms the necessity of certain conditions, or strictly speaking norms (even if they alone are insufficient), for something to be labeled a 'European Value'. For example,

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6    I think that the significance of cooperation for the institution could be Eloi Laurent's important distinction between collaboration that embodies association of usefulness and aims at efficiency. Cooperation, by contrast, is a sharing process of employing common knowledge (*connaissance communes*). Cfr. Laurent 2018.

7    Cfr. Bojanić 2019.

8    Two years ago, *La Stampa* published a lecture by Norberto Bobbio from 1997 about the relation of the intellectual and power. Interestingly, Bobbio makes simultaneous use of the words 'impegno' and 'l'engagement'. "Bobbio: filosofi e tecnici, meglio tenerli separati," *La Stampa*, 22.05.2017: "Il termine 'impegno' può sembrare inadatto a designare il rapporto tra l'esperto e il potere, giacché fa pensare a un'azione volontaria del soggetto che la compie, mentre il contributo che il tecnico dà al politico è quasi sempre richiesto da chi se ne serve".

'European values' does not refer to characteristics specific to Europeans, such as their willingness to urgently mobilize into a group and, for example, help one who is in harm's way or simply resolve some problem. European values would be twofold and concern something else: 1) normativity, since individuals *must* be together in order to be able to *have to* help one (or ones) in trouble; 2) although engagement precedes the norm, it nevertheless constitutes it if and only if there is 'communal engagement', which is to say if the engagement is free or willed (this is a specific aspect of obligation). Absent these acts of communal engagement, there can be no shift from group to institution, and thus no norm. If I say, for example, that the institution is actually a *repertorium* (*répertoire* is a relatively recent French word that means a set or list of elements), this assumes that the institution comprises diverse content and that it is potentially defined as a collection of acts – institutional acts.

My problem lies with the status of negative or perhaps even violent acts (better still, non-institutional, non-social or a-social, non-collegial acts, or "non-cooperative behavior"). Apart from that, I would like to try to imagine some kind of "institutional act" that could potentially be, at least partially, in disjunction with "negative acts". Although such acts might render a group or institution "simply bad" (M. Gilbert), I am not certain that it is possible to eliminate them. However, it might be possible for "engaging acts" or some kind of "provocative acts" (which I would like to provisionally outline) to improve the institution or further institutionalize it. Not only this. My position is precisely that "engaging acts" institutionalize a group (or transform a group into an institution) by reducing or removing negative social acts (which coincide with negative freedom). The more engagement, the more solid the institution. This paradox, which appears already in Montesquieu and Rousseau, is formulated more clearly by Madame de Staël.

When is the right moment for an institution? When and how begins, and when and how is it decreed that something ought to last and be preserved from time and in time? It seems to me that Montesquieu could help in determining what Rousseau calls "*le moment de l'institution*", concerning the beginning and founding of the institution. Rousseau thinks that an entry in Montesquieu's *Considérations sur les causes de grandeur des Romain et de leur décadance* is the paradigm the beginning of every institution should satisfy. In *Du contrat social*, Rousseau is paraphrasing the following statement.

> At the birth of societies, it is the heads of republics who found institutions; from then on it is institutions that form heads of republics [*Dans la naissance des sociétés, ce sont les chefs des républiques qui font l'institution, et c'est ensuite l'institution qui forme les chefs des républiques*] (Rousseau 1990: 380).

I would leave aside the heads who found the institution (here in the singular). I am interested in the way Rousseau tries to transform this already shifted causality in Montesquieu's sentence. The head makes something that will constrain and limit him. Norms form the one who declares or establishes them. An institution is an institution only if it satisfies the following condition: it must

form those who have the capacity to establish it, and this only after it itself has been established. Otherwise, it is not an institution and no institutional establishing has taken place. Rousseau takes another turn, indelibly disrupting the linear causality with an opaque scholastic combination. In the following passage, the people is sovereign (the head), but this time, the result of laws and institutions, the consequence to the people has to precede the institutional act. Thus, the people must already be formed prior to the establishing of laws and institutions. Rousseau's motivation here is still an attempt to purify the establishment of institutions and sovereignty of any form of violence:

> For a newly formed people to feel the reasonable rules of politics and follow the fundamental reasoning of the State, the effect needs to become the cause, the social spirit which ought to be the result of the institution needs to preside over the institution itself, and men need to already be that which the law would make them become. In that way the Sovereign could use neither force nor rationalization, he would have to turn to an authority of a different order, one that could lead without force and persuade without convincing. [*Pour qu'un peuple naissant put goûter les saines maximes de la politique et suivre les regles fondamentales de la raison d'Etat, il faudroit que l'effet put devenir la cause, que l'esprit social qui doit être l'ouvrage de l'institution présidât à l'institution même, et que les hommes fussent avant les loix ce qu'ils doivent devenir par elles. Ainsi donc le Législateur ne pouvant employer ni la force ni le raisonnement, c'est une nécessité qu'il recoure à une autorité d'un autre ordre, qui puisse entraîner sans violence et persuader sans convaincre*] (Rousseau 1990: 383).

Such constructions are quite rare in the history of European thought, as they seem to correspond very well to the complications we all encounter with restauration of institutions and with a universal theory of institutions. Rousseau tells us that "the communal spirit that ought to be the result of institutions precedes the institution itself, and requires that men be before law what the law is to make of them [*que l'esprit social qui doit être louvrage de l'institution présidât à l'institution même, et que les hommes fussent avant les loix ce qu'ils doivent devenir par ells*]". Fifty years later, Saint-Simon writes down his vision of "the institution of Europe", but relies on Montesquieu's formula to do so. Were we to confirm and take up Saint-Simon's idea that philosophy of the 21st century ought to be organizational, with a very strong power to institutionalize and protect various institutions, and were we to reorganize and amend Saint-Simon's vision of Europe, we would immediately encounter two paradoxes. The first dilemma or problem would regard the existence of two parallel kinds of institutions, the old and new, and whether such a state, that can sometimes be a state of violence on everyone's mind and lips, is something truly transitory. Regardless of Saint-Simon saying that old institutions disappear, the new European institution only partially and occasionally takes their place and limits them. How is this possible? The second paradox, that Saint-Simon mentions, and I would call fatal, refers to a line from Montesquieu, that "the institution forms people" (*c'est l'institution qui forme les hommes*). How is possible, then, for those same people, at the same time to create

some new and different institutions? Here is the passage in which Saint-Simon presents this difficulty:

> It is the institution that forms men, says Montesquieu. Thus, a penchant for extending patriotism beyond the bounds of the homeland, a practice of considering the interests of Europe, rather than national interests, would be a required result of those who would compose the European parliament. This is true. Yet, it is also men who form institutions, and the institution cannot be established if it does not find them already completely formed, or at least prepared to be so [*C'est l'institution qui forme les hommes, dit Montesquieu; ainsi, ce penchant qui fait sortir le patriotisme hors de bornes de la patrie, cette habitude de considérer les intérêts de l'Europe, au lieu des intérêts nationaux, sera pour ceux qui doivent former le parlement européen, un fruit nécessaire de son établissement. Il est vrai : mais aussi ce sont les hommes qui font l'institution, et l'institution ne peut s'établir si elle ne les trouve tout formés d'avance, ou du moins préparés à l'être*] (Saint-Simon 1998: 36).

If Europe, that is, the European institution, forms people (Europeans), then this penchant or practice (*ce penchant*; *cette habitude*) of the institution forming people has as a consequence that patriotism surpasses the borders of states, and that European interest has replaced national interest. Surpassing the borders of nation states in this passage implies at least two new protocols: a greater openness of national states and hospitality for all citizens of Europe, and of course, the process of expansion of Europe by opening its new future borders beyond any European patriotism. The problem occurs in the second sentence of this fragment by Saint-Simon. Since it is people who form the institution, and the institution forms people as they are forming and constructing it, Saint-Simon assumes that the idea or form of this new institution already pre-exists in the minds of those who are soon to form it. In other words, the institution can be formed only if it "finds" people already prepared and educated to make it (or at least ready to make the institution and be formed by it as they form it). The problem or paradox of the institution as a subject of this second sentence, the institution that can already find (*trouver*) people who are *ad hoc* formed by the very institution (without it even existing yet), returns us, yet again, to the idea of dual or parallel institutions. Only once does Saint-Simon use the phrase "*doubles institutions*," in the very fragment that interests us, where he also only the one time uses the phrase "*les contre-institutions*".[9]

Here then are the various protocols initiated by a restauration of institutions.[10] Their differentiation is in the perspective of the actors' actions: indi-

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9    Cfr. Bojanić 2016.
10    The 18th century, already the century of revolution is also always the century of institutionalization and restauration. What is 'restaurant'? Originally, food, "meat-based consommés intended to 'restore' a person's strength." Such strength or institutional capacity is, as we know, ultimately very limited. Institutions die. The mortality of those who feed is trivial. However, not trivial is that "a person's strength" is restored by eating together or in others' presence. We should always return to the group which implies restitution and vice versa.

viduals, sets or aggregates of individuals, or acts of the group as such. First, restauration always concerns an attempt at removal of violence from institutions by way of engaging everybody in the *esprit social*. Second, the relation between old and new institutions poses the problem of double institutions and counter-institutions. Third, the discovery of the institution of Europe as counter-institution, simultaneously coexisting with any institution, allows for the limiting of direct influence of institutions on one another and reduction of the possibility of conflict.

<div style="text-align:right">translated by Edward Djordjevic</div>

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Petar Bojanić

## Institucionalna promena i paradoks (restitucije i) restauracije institucije

### Apstrakt

U ovom tekstu mi je namera da pokazem najvažniji prilog nekih francuskih filozofa i antropologa u vezi sa rekonstrukcijom i poboljšanjem institucija. Paradoks promene, reforme ili transformacije institucije (da li je moguća potpuno nova institucija i kako umiru institucije?) zasniva se na teškoći ili nemogućnosti da se promeni nesto što manifestuje ono sto mi kao grupa jesmo. Ako institucije predstavljaju ili pokazuju zapravo relacije koje postoje između svih nas, kako je moguće menjati ih? Odakle kapacitet za promenu i kako je uopšte moguća ideja „novog"?

Ključne reči: institucija, angažman, promena, restauracija, Evropa

Rastko Jovanov
Marija Velinov

# CONSTITUTIVE JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

**ABSTRACT**
In order to show the validity of here proposed conception of social ontology and its advantages over descriptive theories of social reality, which in the analysis of the socio-ontological status of human rights find only legally understood normativity as present in social reality, we will first (1) lay out Searle's interpretation of human rights. In the second step, we will (2) introduce the methodical approach and basic concepts of our socio-ontological position, and explain the structure of the relationship between justice, law, morality, social institutions and collective intentionality. At the end (3) we will show how our theory of social ontology is better than Searle's legal positivism in examining the ontological status of human rights. At the end, (3) we show in what ways such a theory of social ontology more intuitively and with wider arguments explains the ontological status of institution of human rights than Searle's legal positivism.

## 1  Searle's Theory of Social Reality

Searle's social ontology project is characterized by three elements: collective intentionality, status functions and constitutive rules. In the social field, Searle analyzes human agency in two directions: as (a) cognitive ability that attaches functions and status determinations to other objects and members of the same group; and as (b) social acts through which people collectively accept these ontological statuses as ontologically real and consider them facts in the outside world. Ontological social dimension is, thus, essentially determined by collective intentionality that produces social facts. Such type of intentionality is further characterized by the ability of people to share their own intentions within a group, which in turn is constituted as a group only through such collective intentionality and collective acceptance of the status and functions which are jointly attributed to other members and social institutions. In this

way, according to Searle, institutional facts as ontological objects are created in social domain, to which we attribute a status functions in a particular context, that they inherently do not contain. Searle describes this process with the famous formula 'X counts as Y in C'. For example, in the context of a traffic accident, a man wearing police uniform, through which he acquires current position and status of certain power, has a certain social deontological authority and power over other participants in a traffic accident. But, when his working hours expire and he removes the uniform, that same man loses in the context of traffic accident his status determination and deontological power. The latter is crucial for the constitution of new institutional facts. This is because the existing constitutional rules attribute to other human beings or social objects "deontic powers" through which the interpersonal relations within a group are regulated. In this way, Searle introduces a *normative* element into his social ontological theory (duties, obligations, rights, etc.). Nevertheless, he hasn't developed in a deeper manner the normative side of his theory, limiting it thus to institutional normativity arising from legal positivism, which is evident in his understanding of human rights in the book *Making the Social World* (2010).[1]

If the attribution of the new status to social objects by means of collective intentionality becomes a daily routine in the context of a particular group, then this attribution acquires *normativity*, which can create new constitutive rule. According to Searle, this is the situation with human rights as social constructions: "[o]n my account all rights are status functions and thus human creations. We do not discover human rights in nature as we discover human chromosomes. But if human rights are created by human beings, then what rationally compelling justification can we give for the creation of universal human rights?" (Searle 2010: 139–140) Human rights therefore are not ontologically objective, but they are ontologically subjective and institutional, i.e. created by human conventions and thus intentionally relative. But from Searle's claims – as Corlett noticed – does not necessarily follow that human rights cannot be *both* institutional and moral (non-institutional), for "a person might possess that same non-institutional (moral) right to potable water even if there existed global (socially constructed) laws denying such a right" (Corlett 2016: 16). The very institutional understanding of human rights, as Searle argues, cannot reject counter arguments that a certain society can (and could, as we learn from the recent past) socially construct the category of human rights on a nationalistic basis, i.e. by exclusion of some other groups and by genocidal *plan* (i.e. by a social act that involves the collective intentionality) against some other group. Searle does not pay much attention to such arguments that are based on the necessity of the moral foundation of human rights and remains firmly on the ground of legal positivism.

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1    In his 1995 book *The Construction of Social Reality* Searle commented on the problem of human rights just in passing and on one page only: "Perhaps the most amazing form of status-function is in the creation of *human* rights." (Searle 1995: 93)

Searle's neglect and non-insistence on the study of complexity of normative structures of human community life must be wondered at, since according to him norm is an integral part of intentionality, so that "all intentionality has a normative structure" (Searle 2001: 182). But this type of normativity in his social ontology is limited to simple ability of the mind to provide for itself rights and obligations, i.e. to recognize the existing constructed rights and obligations within the given context and joint life in a society. Consequently, only deontic powers, inherently contained by status functions, provide an individual orientation in the world and reasons for his/her action. If Searle's theory contains at all any *moral* dimension of social institutions, then it is understood only as *socially constructed and collectively recognized*. That is why Smith and Zaibert can rightfully criticize Searle that in his theory of institutional reality there is no room for moral normativity, i.e. that Searle's understanding of normativity arises only from the constitutive rules that regulate subjective acts of individuals by providing them with desire-independent reasons for action.[2]

The second issue that remains unresolved by Searle is the issue of *legitimacy* of social institutions, as institutional facts are perceived only in a self-referential way (Searle 1995: 32–4, 52–3). The fact that the process of legitimation of institutions is at the end based on the belief, stops his project of social ontology precisely at the moment at which the original philosophical questions arise. It is necessary to entertain this issue in more details, since it represents a crucial problem for Searle. It seems that the most important role of status functions is explaining legitimacy and authority of *other* human beings and existing institutions. For example, we recognize that Tramp is the person who has the function and public authority in the USA to order a nuclear attack by the fact that he is the president of this country. The latest claim is explained by the fact that he won the presidential elections and under the existing constitution he is the legal president of USA. But how can we legitimize the existing constitution? There now arises the above-mentioned self-referentiality: The constitution is justified because *we accept and believe* that it is justified. But is it really so? Are all existing institutions based on legalistic beliefs in their justification? Do people not turn to other sources of legitimation of existing normative orders: faith in revelation, conviction in the correctness of different ideologies, moral justification, etc.?

## 1.1  Searle on Human Rights

This problem becomes very clear when we start to analyze the ontological status of human rights. The 'Declaration of Human Rights' (1948) starts by claiming 'All persons possess natural and equal human rights'. But is it not so that collective declarative beliefs, with their guaranteeing mind-world adequacy, constitute social institutions? In that case the 'Declaration of Human Rights' should guarantee the adequacy of the mind-world fit and translate a catalog of

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2   Cf. Zaibert & Smith 2007: 159 ff., who call this type of normativity 'soft normativity'.

human rights into positivity of the institutional network. But we all know that is not so. No human right can be resolved through the declarations, or through countless amendments and appendix to the original declaration.

So, how does Searle perceive human rights? I shall here only take into account the last chapter of the *Making the World Social* which analyzes human rights as status functions (Searle 2010: 174-199). Status 'human', who is the holder of the rights and obligations, represents a status function, but which directly refers to *pre*-institutional fact 'of being human', i.e. what we believe that is the essence of this 'being human'. Searle, therefore, must agree that "the justification for human rights cannot be ethically neutral" (Searle 2010: 130). According to this, certain status functions must be *ethically justified*, they cannot be merely legitimized as a conventional institutional fact and something that is widely accepted in the context of a given society. Nevertheless, regardless of the ethical beliefs that underline human rights, for Searle they still remain a mere convention, and only with respect to a particular society. Hindriks has rightly observed that there is a gap between Searle's thesis that human rights require the collective recognition of its existence and his claim that they continue to exist even when they are not recognized (Hindriks 2011).

It seems that the only solution to this problem lies in an introduction of a different, *non-institutional* justification of human rights. Indeed, Searle goes this way when he takes into consideration the category of *human nature*. But even then, he stops at *biological* understanding of human beings and does not take into account normative ethical beliefs of individuals about their nature as ingredient of a social ontology. In a few pages only (Searle 2010: 190-192) Searle seems to be hesitating which way to go and, apparently falls into ambiguity, if not in a contradiction in his view on human rights. What is it all about? Since human rights - and the constitution as the highest social institution - fall into the self-referentiality, because the status functions of human rights "do not derive from some other institution" (Searle 2010: 192), *justification* of human rights that are "assigned to beings solely in virtue of being human will have to depend on our conception of what a human being is" (Searle 2010: 192). Searle then immediately adds that such assessment of human nature includes only "certain biological characteristics of human beings" (Searle 2010: 192). However, only two pages earlier, he emphasizes that "*the justification for human rights cannot be ethically neutral. It involves more than just a biological conception of what sorts of beings we are; it also involves a conception of what is valuable, actually or potentially, about our very existence*" (Searle 2010: 190). Such justification Searle limits to a "certain set of values" (Searle 2010: 198), with no consideration at all for the counter argument that human rights are fundamentally moral, not merely institutional rights.

We believe that Searle's claim that *certain* status functions are not ethically neutral must be deepened and must include a much stronger concept of normativity in the sphere of social reality than the one he only allows. However, such a project requires a different social ontology, which does not limit the complexity of social life to institutionally reduced normativity. In the

next chapter we shall present a basic draft of such social ontology and show that it can better explain the problem of human rights by drawing attention to *pre*-institutional constitution of groups, collective intentionality and institutional network of social world. In order to show this, we shall introduce a broader understanding of social ontology, which will not only include a descriptive analysis of what *is* in the social sphere, but will necessarily involve a wider range of human agency, which cannot be reduced to descriptive terms.

## 2  Towards Normative Account of Social Ontology

Unlike Searle, here presented theory of social reality is primarily characterized by the *dual* position. Namely, social ontology must also include moral normativity of human agency in order to be able to thoroughly encompass the whole complexity of the social sphere. In other words, in addition to social institutions (and rights as a fundamental institution of human intersubjectivity) social ontology is necessarily addressed to the issue of the relation of normativity to collective intentionality, which is neglected in current discussions. Having said that, the research should also respond to the requirements of the test of moral normativity within the domain of institutional reality (we will call this type of normativity – *strong normativity*), not just legal normativity (the only type of normativity that Searle allows, and which we will call - *weak normativity or soft positivism,* since this type of normativity can avoid examination of the problem of 'objectivity' of legal norms in its understanding of the rights as status functions, i.e. as institutional facts).

Apart from the objectivity of the institutional order within the very possibility of community life, human being *per se* has the power of judgment and justification of both, his own actions and justness of social life. Social reality is therefore taking place simultaneously on two levels: *objective-institutional level* and *normative-deliberative level.* Searle admits that only the first level is constitutive of social reality, and that collective intentionality - although it is familiar with the notions of obligation, rights, duties, etc. – is in no way related to the 'fact' of normative *justification* of existing institutions. But, it is indeed one of the basic social *facts*, for how could we otherwise put into question the *justification* of the existence of groups (corporations, societies, states,...) with whose members we share the same collective intentionality? We believe that in addition to the institutional order, the fact of its *constant and everyday* justification represents a *constitutive* part of community life. How can we live in a world of social facts without noticing when someone else (some other member, some other group) violate the 'rules of the game' and endangers the entire existence of communal life? Or when the same social institutions corrode and survive only on the reification of collective intentionality of the majority of members of a group?[3] In order to be able to respond to these questions, it is necessary to add to descriptive institutional life normativity that adorns

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3   Cf. Thompson 2017.

subjectivity as such, i.e. the ability to reason and rationalize, which is inherent to such animals that are human beings.

This issue is certainly not new in contemporary social ontology. The problem lies in the fact that not enough attention is paid to it, and current social and ontological theories stop halfway when trying to explain how the normative side of human agency belongs to social ontology. Unlike natural life, social ontology includes also the normativity inherent to human beings. In order to more specifically set forth our position, we will start first with the objective-institutional level of social life, which does not challenge Searle's basic program.

## 2.1  Objective-Institutional Level of Social Reality

Social reality is, like the objects of the natural world, already given to human beings. Humans first learn to use the objects of social reality, to recognize the status functions that are attached to them, to use them to orient themselves in a given world through desire-independent reasons for their actions. The fundamental structure of the relationship mind-world – which we find in human perception and practices – is a core concept in social ontology, which Husserl called 'intentionality', and by using this category influenced the further development of social philosophy in the 21st century.

We will analyze the form of intentionality characteristic of objective-institutional level only with regard to the law as a fundamental social institution. Pervading nature of the law in the social world was analyzed in 1870 by Jhering in his book *Die Jurisprudenz des täglichen Lebens*.[4] With a series of examples from everyday life Jhering shows in a masterful way how the individual always find themselves and their actions already within a given legal institutional network. Legal intentionality – in terms of connecting with other people and objects of the social world – is given on the level of human practice in a non-explicit way and prior to any reflection. For example, when we buy a ticket on the train and give it to the conductor to validate it and thus legitimize our journey, we already find ourselves in a legal institutional network. Our action is already regulated by the existing rules, which we share with other members of a community or a group. Acting in an objective-institutional level is, therefore, impossible without taking the *first-person plural perspective,* i.e. 'we-mode' intentionality. At the objective-institutional level we-mode intentionality functions as a habit, as a human 'second nature'. Agents do not have in their minds explicit intentional purposes of their practice (later we will show that the theoretical reflection necessarily belongs to we-mode intentionality on normative-deliberate level of social reality). Within the institutional network an individual without prior theoretical reflection takes the perspective of the

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4    Rudolph von Jhering, *Die Jurisprudenz des täglichen Lebens. Eine Sammlung an Vorfälle des gewöhnlichen Lebens anknüpfender Rechtsfragen*, 11. Auflage, Verlag von Gustav Fischer, Jena 1897. The book has been translated into English 1904 (*Law in Daily Life. A Collection of Legal Questions Connected with the Ordinary Events of Everyday Life*, Clarendon Press, Oxford)

group agent, i.e. first-person plural perspective. For example, when we check in our ticket at the airport in order to book a seat on an airline flight, our action is in accordance with other actors within the same context as the joint action is already at work here. With our intention to travel from Belgrade to Vienna, our acts need to be in compliance with the existing institutional rules, i.e. they are executed in the sphere of mutual obligations: we are obliged to follow the line leading from the check-point, through passport control, to the gate that is assigned to our flight, while at the same time expecting from others (customs officers, stewards) to synchronize their acts with a common intention that we share. Thus, in the we-mode intentionality our actions are determined by the expected goal of the shared intention (travel) and expected acts of others, who are obliged to work with us in order to achieve the shared purpose.

All actions that carry out the institutional network are guided by the perspective of the group agent and the first-person plural. That is why we call the action of an individual in everyday life, the *institutional act*, because it is impossible for an individual to successfully orient his action in the outside world without expectation and trust[5] that others will act in accordance with the existing rules, but also without his own intention which takes group agency mode. But that would not be possible unless law as a fundamental institution of objective-institutional level of social reality is previously *given*. The problem of understanding this lies in the complexity of the way in which law is manifested as an objective fact: events, borders, lines, mutual obligations, joint expectations etc. We think that the old word 'order' (despite the problematic tradition of its use that it carries as a burden) still best describes the way in which human beings are imbued with legal institutions. This is because this term also shows the fundamental *limitation* which faces an individual at the objective-institutional level. In fact, there is no order that does not inherently contain a binary position inclusion/exclusion related to membership in a group. We shall not dwell on this issue, which we consider one of the fundamental problems of the philosophy of law, it is enough to point out that this issue indicates that it *potentially* contains the capacity of genocidal act - as the most radical form of the binary position, because the affirmation of one's own group in this radically negative social act is happening through the destruction of others or other groups.[6]

Normativity contained in the objective-institutional level is an expanded version of legal normativity. Modern analytical social ontology, insisting on ontological descriptivity, recognizes only that type of normativity. In contrast to the current trend in social ontology, we consider that a moral normativity must be taken into consideration if one uses such concepts as belief, conviction, trust, etc. In the next chapter we will present a draft of normative-deliberate level of social reality.

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5    Schmid argues that 'interpersonal trust', as a special kind of joint attitudes, combines cognitive and normative elements of shared intentional activity (cf. Schmid 2013).
6    On negative social acts, including the genocidal acts, cf. Bojanić 2015.

## 2.2 Normative-Deliberate Level of Social Reality

There is widespread consensus in current social ontologies that it is not possible to think normativity without human building of institutions. As a human act, normative order on the objective-institutional level of social reality foremost enables the personality of subjects, and the related notions of property rights, civil liberties, etc. At the very dawn of the industrial age Hegel correctly understood that the institutions do not limit, but *enable* human actions (cf. for example Zabel 2014). Only through involvement in various institutions an individual becomes a person subject to *universal* norms. However, in addition to legal norms, intersubjectivity of human life is also subject to the jurisdiction of moral norms, which also require the universality of their validity.

We mentioned earlier that the legal normativity of objective-institutional level of social reality and we-mode intentionality that is taken by group members in their shared agency is enacted eminently in the field of human *practice*. We-mode intentionality, however, inherently contains the moment of *judgment* of existing institutions and the necessity of their *justification*. This is why we want to introduce a distinction between *understanding and acceptance* of existing institutional facts and their *judgment and justification*. (Through this difference, we will later try to overcome the gap observed by Hindriks in Searle's theory – between the thesis that human rights require the collective recognition for their existence and the thesis that they continue to exist even when they are not recognized.) Transfer from the practical moment of collective intentionality onto the theoretical reflection as its ingredient necessarily entails the *transformation of agency*. An individual, as a member of a group or a society, guides his actions in certain situations also with regard to the moral norms that constitute (or should constitute) an integral part of existing institutions. As long as the community life takes place in the mode of habitus, and institutions successfully and without interruption offer desire-independent reasons for action, moral norms remain in the mode of individual intentionality, i.e. 'I-intentionality' (to use a distinction introduced by Tuomela). Only with the corroding and reification of institutions or with major social changes that alter the structure of the group, moral norms get included in the set of collective intentionality. In this case, the intentional structure of the mind-world relation is not immediate (as in objective-institutional level), but is mediated by principles of justice and moral norms.[7]

At this moment – in which the group itself is transformed during the transformation of individual members and their agency – moral standards, in particular the principles of justice, have a *constitutive* significance for the social reality. For, if constitutive rules cause institutional facts, in what way do the constitutive rules arise and what constitute their background? Why is this

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7    It is understandable that perverted notion of justice can also be an intentional object. Let us remember that the nazi jurists and philosophers worked together on the project *Erneuerung des Rechts*, which remains the biggest philosophical project in Europe. Cf. Rastko Jovanov's book *Hegel and National Socialism* (2017, forthcoming).

*primal sphere of constituency* of social institutions neglected in modern theories of social ontology at the expense of the regulatory nature of legal norms? The answer probably lies, on the one hand, in overstressing the role of game theory in the social reality, and on the other hand, in the difficulty which is inherent to the term of original constitution. In his response to the problem of *first constitution* Searle stands at the point of self-referentiality, and thus remains on the ground of positive law, on the ground of regulation, rather than constitution. However, according to Kelsen's classical definition, the establishment of the law, i.e. the establishment of *new* order never happens by means of positive law. (Kelsen 1967: 154-155) A true law-maker is a law-breaker.[8] With the introduction of the principle of *constitutive justice* as the object of the collective intentionality in the formation of a group or, as we will soon show, with the introduction of new legal institutions, social ontology acquires a tool to extend Husserl's intentionality project to the domain of the *ontological constituency*, which was actually Husserl's intention.

## 2.3  Constitutive Justice Thesis

The issue of constitutive justice is the question of the *constitution* of our social world. Unlike justice, law belongs to the institutional network, but it also enables it at the same time (enabling thus human action as well) by regulating and protecting an order. Therefore, law is always positive and related to the institutional network of the existing order. Unlike law, the concept of justice is negative, corrective. Naturally, certain just principles can become norms and enter the corpus of fundamental rights or the legal canons. But, the essence of the *idea* of justice tell us also that the justice always partially lies in the absence, in the intended object of consciousness that has yet to be realized.[9] But, what is then the ontology of justice? It is precisely in human association, in the fact that people unite for the sake of collectively intended purposes. Or, in other words, the place of justice in the social reality has to be found in the collective intentionality which forms new groups and new social orders, sometimes through agreement and sometimes through struggle between different social groups.[10] That is why the idea of human rights could have been born. If it was

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8    NB – *Personal remark*: We did not include the chapter on authority and representation within a group. It was left for another paper.
9    Another moment that the notion of justice contains in itself, which is difficult to distinguish from positive law, is that justice is *procedural* and has its topos in the procedures through which the ruling group brings new laws and legal institutions. This moment of justice will not be analyzed here.
10    It is always one group, with corresponding collective intentionality, that constitutes government in a society. It seems that the modern understanding of politics is one of the reasons that the government in modern states is seldom occupied by a group which can and want to expand its collective intentionality to the largest possible number of citizens who are under its authority, because the group that comes to power is the one that is politically the fittest and morally the most ruthless. It is therefore necessary for politically and socially engaged groups that would be willing to come to

only the question of positive law and existing institutions, the idea of human rights could never have been documented in the form of the Declaration in 1948 and could not have historically continued to evolve.

However, in order for us to talk about justice in the social-ontological sense, it is necessary to first provide the definition of *freedom*, because without it there is no justice. Social-ontologically speaking, freedom may be defined as the ability to *achieve the just purposes – by collective intentionality – which would become ingredients of the social institutions*. Here we have of a sort of *mutual constitution of freedom and justice*: Freedom that characterizes human beings as such, precedes logically, but not historically, the principles of righteousness, moral norms and enables the constitutionality of justice to constitute freedom in the institutional network of a certain legal order.

In this regard, law should be *self-reflexive*, in the sense to always take into account its social foundation so that justice can be applied fairly and equally. Regarding socio ontological approach to justice, the notion of law should be treated as *responsive law* (perhaps very similar to what Perelman, Coleman and Marmor thought about the nature of law), in the sense that law's foundational conventions have the force to obligate other members of a group to shared intentions and cooperative actions that are not only responsive to the constitutional role of just intentions, but also to the "intentions and actions of others", as Coleman notices (Coleman 2001: 90–92).[11] Moreover, our proposed constitutive justice theory gives priority to relations between social groups – and to the *prescriptive* nature of the social ontology as a kind of quasi contract binding, on the one hand, the collective intended constitutive principles at the foundation of the groups and, on the other, its members (which also determinates a vocabulary that group members use in their interpersonal communication) – through which a society is constituted as just. The essence of the constitutive argument is that justice and its constitution cannot be separated from the totality of the social contexts in which it is produced. It is an open-ended

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power, to be formed in a different way. We shall call this the *theory of group agency organization*: organized groups instead of acting at the level of sovereign states (which are usually closed and formed by a party) or local communities (where their territorial effect would small and with no major consequences for the general population) – the form of the group and its agency that we suggest would try to infiltrate into the international structures and centers of financial and political power. They would necessarily have to consist of academic people, financial center and labor strategists. They would not necessarily have to be groups of the same kind or research groups: they would be interdisciplinary and would require wide publicity (in terms of what Perelman calls "universal audience" [Perelman 1980: 105]) for their actions and their justification; they would try to have their demands represented in the highest bodies of international law. Because in today's world, human rights and the 'policy' of their implementation also have their sovereign. When the time comes for this to end, enforcement of human rights on a global level, i.e. establishment of global justice, we will be able to better ensure the implementation of these stakeholders.

11    Cf. Murphey, 1986; cf. Marmor 2006: 365: Unlike 'surface conventions', 'deep conventions' are "responsive to [...] deep aspects of human society and human nature..."

approach proposing that human beings are responsible for actively creating their *own* world with others, the world which simultaneously acts back, shaping their own identity. Regarding that, the concept of *collective action*, which should actualize the just principles, should include the following taxonomy: *plural self-determination* (opposite to coercion), *we-mode intentionality* (opposite to blind reaction), *sociality* (opposite to privatized nihilism), *creativity* (opposite to sameness) and *rationality* (opposite to blind chance).[12]

## 3  Constitutive Justice and Human Rights

At this point we would like to examine how our proposed theory of social ontology refers to the problem of human rights, and whether it can provide a more complex account of the way in which human rights exist in our social reality.

Human rights belong to the domain of justice – when considered from a moral standpoint; but also some of the human rights belong to the institutional network – when considered from a legal point of view. When a positive law of one group codifies certain corpus of human rights, then those rights become fundamental rights, which are recognized and institutionalized as inherent to each group member as a human being. Thus, they also meet Searle's requirement for a universal obligation, but, like the positive law, only within some particular group. As long as they are not codified and recognized by the group as fundamental rights, i.e. inherent to a human being as such, human rights remain in the realm of moral rights, which yet *ought* to be established in a positive and legal manner. They therefore also represent the criteria for assessing the legitimacy of the existing legal institutions of a certain legal order. A similar distinction between is put forward by Alexy with his introduction of 'dual thesis' which claims that "law necessarily comprises both a real or factual dimension and ideal or critical one," which is defined by 'moral correctness' (Alexy 2012: 3). A similar distinction, which allows the introduction of moral norms in the context of conventional understanding of law as a social fact, is made by Lindahl, distinguishing between 'legal understanding' and 'legal interpretation' (Lindahl 2013). However, both of these proposed distinctions fail to take into account the key, and for social ontology the most important characteristic of moral norms – namely, their role in the *constitution* of new institutions. It seems that Searle's concept of the 'background' allows such strategy towards greater acceptance of the role of moral normativity in social ontology. A significant step in this direction made Schmid by introducing the concept 'plural pre-reflective self-awareness', which represents background condition of collective intentionality. As "normative pressure that drives us towards a unified *shared* perspective with a coherent set of attitudes that commit us, jointly" (Schmid

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12    The establishment of the concept of collective action in Marxist philosophy was the one of the characteristics of Yugoslav Praxis school, which through its insisting on concepts of practice, intentionality and sociality lies close to the proposed definition of collective action (Cf. Marković 1974).

2014: 18), it is possible through plural self-awareness to understand why individuals could act at all on the basis of normative standards as the objects of their shared intentionality. If joint attentions, thus, "is a background awareness of plural selfhood" (Schmid 2014: 18), committing oneself to shared beliefs and shared goals can inhabit the just perspective of the normative foundations of groups and institutions. Moreover, although the role of the human rights and the constitution of new institutions would be *artificial*, it does not necessarily mean that it would be *arbitrary*, as Hume properly argue. (Hume, 2000: 311ff.)[13] Even though human beings can subsist only through shared communality, the principle of justice – which "takes its rise from human conventions [...] intended as a remedy to some inconveniencies, which proceed from the concurrence of certain qualities of the human mind with the situation of external objects" (Hume 2000: 317) – is necessary to coerce the forces of egoism in a society, which can jeopardize collective actions and shared intentionality directed towards just foundations of a society. However, in regard to this point made by Hume, it is necessary that joint epistemic attitudes are not "limited largely to joint *perceptual* beliefs", as Schmid rightly notice, because joint beliefs about human rights belongs "to non-perceptual or inferential beliefs" of a more complex kind, which need "some form of joint commitment" (Schmid 2012: 416).

Thus, the other members of the group are considered to have normative reasons to stand in joint intentions under the obligations of protection and active promotion of human rights. As supporting elements of the structure of the new institutions, human rights, as the basic form of justice, would truly be normative in the sense of reason-giving and obligation-grounding. However, it would certainly be wrong to interpret all kinds of groups that are characterized by shared collective intentionality[14] as groups whose we-mode intentionality is based on deep constitutional conventions, which can be justified only by reference to the moral normativity. Nevertheless, although the institutional fact of 'corporation' could be interpreted as self-centered and not on moral norms established group – which is almost agonistic in facing the other groups in the same context of unity – it would still be wrong to view such groups as immoral communities that are characterized only by a legal normativity.[15] Because within these groups too it is necessary to have a certain moral code that maintains these groups in existence, and, perhaps most importantly, does not allow collective intentionality of the group to collapse due to mere selfish interests of individual members. Therefore, we think it can be argued that moral

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13    For a discussion on Hume's reconstruction of objectivity of justice and natural law 'without debating moral realism', cf. Westphal 2016.
14    In our project of social ontology, we discuss only groups that are built on the normative and institutional network of mutual obligation, and leave out what we call *natural* groups (family) or *existential* groups (happenings, movements, rallies, Occupy movement, etc.).
15    One of the authors has defended this position in one of his previous papers (cf. Jovanov 2015). Now he admits that it is clearly wrong if one allow the existence of purely immoral groups.

normativity and principles of justice are at least co-constitutive for the identity and interests of any existing group.

And this is true for human rights as well. Each member of any group that is formed on the legal and moral normativity as an integral part of the collective intentionality expects that other members of the group act in accordance with the expected outcome, and of which the individual member of the group becomes aware when in her/his actions s/he takes the first-person plural perspective. As a rational animal, to every human (provided that he is capable to autonomously, i.e. without the help of others, leads his activities in the society) belongs a feeling that he has the 'right' to certain rights: freedom of speech, not to be disturbed by others, the right on private property, etc. These fundamental rights are implicit in the core of every we-mode intentionality, i.e. in the core of every existing social institutions (except in societies that are under the dictatorship of one group, for example, in the case of North Korea). And most importantly, they remain valid even if they are not immediately recognized. Because a human being is capable to, through forces of reason, but also on the basis of the level of civilization reached by modern states, *judge* whether human rights within some groups are threatened or not, i.e. to judge whether the existence of the group is still justified. Therefore, we believe that positive law should be *responsive* and reflect the just foundational conventions which must be the basis of each group.[16] For, only in this way positive law could have introduced some of the basic human rights in the constitution as the highest legal institution. That means that law's validity can only be correctly measured against the moral standards that are present and recognized. Accordingly, human rights can be recognized as universal because moral normativity is present in the basic and *non-explicit* conventions on which modern society is built. However, if we consider human rights only from the legal-institutional manner as Searle do, the problem of universal obligations will remain reserved for members of one group only in which human rights are introduced into the positive legal institute. The problem of universal obligation for human beings as such, that human rights, by definition, require, cannot be resolved by any theory of social ontology if it fails to include into its considerations those deep conventions that *precede* each institution and whose normativity cannot be reduced to the legally understood norms. As a result, such social-ontological projects are forced to reject as irrelevant any issue of the rights that resist reduction to 'game rules'. But they do not recognize at the same time the problem and the question: Do such rights constitute the 'game' as such?

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16     The position we are advocating here is clearly directed at the current rigorous formalization of rights (which is clearly visible in the structures of the EU), and it was noted by Weber when he described the law as a technological medium, which enforces social order by strictly regulating interpersonal relations (Weber 1954: 63)

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Rastko Jovanov
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### Konstitutivna pravda i ljudska prava

**Apstrakt**

Da bismo pokazali valjanost ovde predložene koncepcije socijalne ontologije i njene prednosti u odnosu na deskriptivne teorije društvene stvarnosti, koje u analizi socijalno-ontološkog statusa ljudskih prava nalaze samo pravno shvaćenu normativnost kao prisutnu u društvenoj stvarnosti, na prvom mestu (1) iznosimo Serleovo tumačenje ljudskih prava. Zatim (2), uvodimo metodski pristup i osnovne pojmove našeg socijalno-ontološkog shvatanja i objašnjavamo strukturu odnosa pravde, zakona, morala, društvenih institucija i kolektivne intencionalnosti. Te na kraju (3) pokazujemo na koji način ovde iznesena teorija socijalne ontologije intuitivnije i sa opširnijim argumentima objašnjava ontološki status institucije ljudskih prava od Serlovog pravnog pozitivizma.

Ključne reči: konstitutivna pravda, kolektivna intencionalnost, ljudska prava, socijalna ontologija, Džon Serl

Luka Glušac

# ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: THE CASE OF OMBUDSMAN

**ABSTRACT**
In this article, I examine the relationship between engagement and political institutions by using the example of the creation and development of the ombudsman institution. The article starts with the short introduction to key theoretical views about institutions, political institutions and institutionalization. Then, I concentrate on how political institutions change, i.e. whether they can be changed through social engagement and whether and when we can actually say that they are originally created by an engagement. By using the case of ombudsman, I explore if political institutions can engage themselves and under what conditions, that is, whether are institutions characterized by in-built permanent reflexivity possible.

Both engagement and political institutions can be considered essentially contested concepts. In case of political institutions (at least in their contemporary form), such debate lasts for decades, while "engagement" is still in its academic childhood. However, both concepts are characterized by "openness towards infinite debate, endless interpretations of meaning and the valence of the given term" (Sladeček 2008: 8; see Gallie 1956). While citizens and social groups regularly engage with political institutions, the opposite is not that usual. The former often seek change, while the latter are most comfortable with status quo.

Politics is at the heart of engagement as its inalienable and necessary feature. That is why we intuitively connect engagement with external changes of political institutions. However, one may decide to engage with the institutions, "from within the system, with the aim of bettering or battering it" (Zaharijević 2016: 314). With this article, I aim to problematize this thesis. My intention is to offer one possible way of thinking about engagement and political institutions. Taking into account the scope of the article, my plan is to examine the link between political institutions and engagement by using the example of the ombudsman institution.

The article starts with the short introduction to key theoretical views about institutions, political institutions and institutionalization, bearing in mind a full plethora of different definitions and their interpretations. I then concentrate

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on how political institutions change, i.e. whether they can be changed through social engagement and whether and when can we actually say they are originally created through an engagement. By using the case of the ombudsman, I explore if political institutions can engage on their own and under what conditions, i.e. are institutions characterized by in-built permanent reflexivity possible? (IFDT, internet).

## Institutions in Social Sciences

If institutions are regarded as central in a social science discipline, it is in political science. However, frequency of the usage of that term in political science is in disproportion with the number of attempts to define them. Political scientists sometimes act like the meaning of this term is self-evident and that we recognize an institution as soon as we see one. This is even more curious because, as noted by Rothstein, "whichever story political scientists want to tell, it will be a story about institutions" (1996: 134–135).

Political science publications in early post WWII period did not even mention the term „institution". As observed by Truman in 1962, "the word [institution] does not have a meaning sufficiently precise to enable one to state with confidence that one group is an institution whereas another is not" (1962: 26). Interestingly, behaviorists during their wave in 1960s and 1970s had not denied that institutions had had a role. However, they introduced "broader" notions of structure (Almond and Coleman 1960) or system (Easton 1965), without abandoning the usage of "institutions" and by avoiding to define institutions in the first place. Not even Sartori's "Social Science Concepts" from 1984 nor Finer's three-volume "History of Government" from 1999 offered a clear definition of institution.

March and Olsen have transformed the debate about institutions with their "The New Institutionalism" (1984) and "Rediscovering Institutions" (1989). Their goal was "to explore some ways in which the institutions of politics, particularly administrative institutions, provide order and influence change in politics" (March and Olsen 1989: 16). Nevertheless, they have successfully avoided to define those institutions and opted only to list some concrete examples of institutions.

If we try to compare the meaning of institutions in political science with those in economy and sociology, it appears to be a dimension, with economics and political science at the two extremes and sociology somewhere in the middle (Blondel 2008: 722). Sociologists see them as both organizations and activities; political scientists look at them almost exclusively as organizations, while for economists they are mostly procedures. For instance, North opens his influential study "Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance" by saying „institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (1990: 3).

Economists are primarily concerned with solving the problem of individual choice; thus, they focus on rules. The individuals are the agents of the economic

"machine" and cannot be expected to achieve their goals unless there are rules that determine how they are to relate to each other (Goodin and Klingemann 1996: 11). The situation is different in larger society, as individuals form different associations which constrain them. Institutions cannot just be based on rules; they have to include the way collective arrangements affect the behavior of individuals. Social analysis has to be based both on the choice of individuals and on what might be regarded as the "pressure" of the groups to which these individuals belong (Blondel 2008: 722). This is why looking at institutions as both organizations and procedures is particularly important.

If we take that politics is essentially a process of decision-making, it should be noted that such process takes place not between individuals but in communities and is applicable to those who belong to these communities, whether they participated or not in the decisions or indeed even agreed to them. This is why Easton underlines that politics has to be an "authoritative" process of decision-making (1953: 135–41).

Given that decisions are mostly being made within organizations, they are of utmost relevance for political science's approach to institutions. However, that does not mean that institutions seen as rules and procedures are irrelevant for political science. Rules are part of institutional process, but in politics those rules and procedures are applied, mainly, through organizations, because they have to be applicable to large numbers who have not participated in the decision-making process. To that end, only if rules and procedures are "legitimized" by an organization whose "authority" the individual is prepared to recognize can they be also recognized (Blondel 2008: 723).

North observes that "[b]roadly speaking, political rules in place lead to economic rules" (1990: 48). Similar applies to the social field, as well. Some small social groups may function and operate rather independently of wider political processes, i.e. without having to call on the "authority" of the state. Nonetheless, in politics, the recourse to authority is continuous and universal; only in politics are organizations always on the front line, as rules and procedures, however important, have to be defended and supported by organizations (Blondel 2008: 723).

## Institutionalization

Even if we manage to offer some kind of definition of institutions, the next question is almost self-posing: how do they emerge? Do political, social, or economic "arrangements" become institutions automatically and immediately? Or do they develop in institutions after time passes?

In fact, the issue of institutionalization has concerned political scientists even more than institutions as such. Huntington devoted considerable time on this question. He defined institutions as "organizations and procedures which acquire value and stability"(1968: 13). With that, he indicated that this process takes place over time, i.e. it cannot be immediate.

In literature, institutionalization is mostly studied as "internal process". Huntington sees time as a critical factor for the maturity of an institution. To

him, that process is more or less linear, i.e. time is viewed as being by itself one of the "causes" of institutionalization (1968: 13). In other words, "the longer an organization or procedure has been in existence, the higher the level of institutionalization" (Huntington 1968: 13–14). Huntington thus sees this process as exclusively internal. He is not alone in observing institutionalization only from the perspective of internal problems. Goodin and others in "The Theory of Institutional Design" (1996), published almost thirty years after Huntington's work, also neglect external influences of institutional breakdown. Here, I particularly think of those who are in a way dependent on some institution, but have lost confidence and trust in it.

Support is important for political institutions and is one of the reasons why institutionalization as a process can hardly be looked exclusively as linear. In fact, external influences can reverse institutionalization as well. It is hard to deny that some support at least is necessary for political institutions to be maintained. Such support is indeed subject to fluctuations.

Blondel rightly observes that while the introduction of support in the equation renders the analysis of institutionalization in politics more realistic, it seems to complicate further the question of a definition of institutions in the political context. This is because the question arises as to whether political institutions can be examined independently from the support which they might enjoy, i.e. is a political organization or procedure still an institution even if it does not have support or has only very little support? (2008: 728)

While support is important, it should be not seen as precondition to the very existence of political institutions, particularly if we define them as organizations or procedures characterized by "stable, valued, recurring patterns of behaviour" (Goodin 1996: 21). Support seems both extraneous and irrelevant to these characteristics. The way in which the institutional arrangement is shaped is not dependent on external support for such arrangement. Moreover, if support is brought into the picture, since support is never "total," the question arises as to what is the threshold below which the extent of support would be too small for the arrangement to be an institution. Governments, parliaments, political parties and constitutions all exist as institutions even if they enjoy very little support and have to rely on coercion to survive. However, it is also doubtful as to whether, in the extreme case of the near-complete collapse of such bodies, one can still refer to them as "institutions". In circumstances when the government of a regime on the verge of collapse, it is clearly "de-institutionalized. As Blondel argues, such a government seems therefore to be no more than a "pseudo-institution" (2008: 728).

## How Do Political Institutions Change

As indicated, majority of scholars see institutions as relatively enduring characteristics of political and social life (rules, norms, procedures) which structure behavior and cannot be changed easily. Gérard Roland introduced a classification of "slow-moving" and "fast-moving" institutions (2004), which might be

useful for our discussion. The former generally change slowly, incrementally, and continuously, whereas the latter are more given to rapid, discontinuous change in large steps (2004: 116). The latter can be changed overnight. Roland uses an earthquake as an analogy to explain the difference between two. Pressures along fault lines build up continuously but slowly, then suddenly provoke an earthquake that abruptly changes the topography of a given area. Slow-moving institutions are the equivalent of these tectonic pressures; fast-moving institutions are the equivalent of the topography (2004: 117).

According to this scholar, social norms are an example of slow-moving institutions. While some social norms and values can change very rapidly in historical terms (e.g. a society's tolerance for cigarettes), in general, social norms and values change slowly. An important reason why social norms and values are changing slowly is the fact that they cannot be changed by an authoritative decision. To that end, legal systems tend to be faster-moving institutions than social norms but slower-moving than political institutions. A given law can be changed overnight, but the effectiveness of the legal system and the enforcement of laws depend on their acceptance and legitimacy in society and on the expectations of many actors (Roland 2004: 116).

The degree of centralization and power concentration has important implications not only for institutional experimentation but also for the nature and speed of political change. Roland underlines that political institutions that concentrate power in the hands of a few tend toward patterns of infrequent and abrupt change because, relative to institutions in which power is more dispersed, institutions with concentrated power leave more room for discretionary behavior and abuse of power by those holding office (2004: 122). Consequently, the high economic stakes of political power in centralized regimes tend to translate into a more pronounced temptation to resort to coercive methods to retain power (Roland 2004: 122).

For further discussion about relationship between political institutions and engagement, it is significant to note that so-called new institutionalism, as well as different approaches that developed from and in relations with it, start from an assumption that political institutions are moderately conservative, because they have reserves towards the changes that do not align with their goals (Vranić 2012). Institutions are autonomous, whereas the nature of their changes is external, while at the same time resistance towards any change is inherent characteristic of institutions (Vranić 2012: 249). Put differently, institutions can change from both internal and external factors, which gives us a solid foundation to further explore whether they can be changed as a result of an engagement.

## Engagement

For the purpose of this article, my starting position for defining engagement is the one that looks at it as a collective action characterized by the following "double movement": 1) reflection on the existing social norms and rules, and consequently, 2) acting upon or against their modification or change (IFDT, internet).

If we compare definitions of institutions presented in first part of this article and this starting definition of engagement, we can even go that far to say that every engagement is essentially oriented towards institutions, because the notion is about reflection over existing social values, norms and rules, which together create the substance of an institution as a term. When these somewhat abstract elements of an institution are embodied, i.e. when they are given a formalized shape, we actually get an institution in the form of organization. In that sense, engagement is oriented towards the change of or preservation of an institution as both procedure and organization, depending on a concrete case.

In addition to the view that engagement has to be a collective action, I will also test a hypothesis that engagement can be expressed through individual action as well. In other words, I accept that social engagement exists when there is 1) reflection on the existing social norms and rules, and consequently, 2) personal or joint acting upon or against their modification or change.

While I think that engagement does not have to be a collective practice, I do accept that a reflection and call for the inclusion of others for the sake of fulfilment of the goals is indeed most often embedded in the engagement, i.e. action is "oriented towards inclusion of other in specific line of activity without commitment or previous agreement" (Fiket and Ćeriman, 2018).

This upgrade of the definition of engagement is worthwhile because it specifies that it involves a specific line of activity, but without commitment. Here, it is important to specify what we consider under "commitment", because, for instance, some sociologists, such as Howard Becker, actually define commitment as "consistent line of activity" (Becker 1960). If we would accept Becker's definition of commitment, our thesis would be anulled.

I do agree that engagement is not the same as commitment, i.e. social engagement is not a synonym for joint commitment, as defined by Margaret Gilbert. Both concepts concur in underlining the importance of the will, given that joint commitment is in fact "*commitment of the will*", while the will is the driver and the necessary prerequisite of engagement. However, they are not synonyms, since in Gilbert's conception an individual cannot free himself/herself of joint commitment; that has to be done by other members, because they have all committed by publicly expressed will. In that sense, joint commitment is indeed a context for loyalty and its antithesis, betrayal (Gilbert 2013).

In terms of freeing of commitment, engagement is closer to individual (personal) commitment, in which an individual is in a position to free him/herself from his/her commitment simply by changing his mind (Gilbert 2013). The same case is with engagement, as there is no conditionality or limitation to an individual to simply change his/her mind.

The second notion of high relevance for both engagement and commitment is accountability. Gilbert underlines that the parties are accountable to one another for any behavior that deviates from the course to which they are committed by virtue of the jointness of the commitment (Gilbert 2013). I believe that accountability is also embedded in engagement. When we present

some topic as one of public interest or common good, we actually call others to engage, we call them to act, for the well-being of community as such, we call them to join the fight for or against something. In that sense, engagement is indeed characterized by antagonism, or as put by Zaharijević, "substantial antagonism seems to be the core politicality of engagement"(2016: 314). Hence, if we say that engagement does not imply commitment in formal (legal) terms nor commitment to stay in that specific line of activity, then accountability is also not constituted in the same way as in joint commitment. Nonetheless, the call for action does contain subtext of essential obligation of politically conscious being to react; such call is indeed meant to influence willingness of others; it appeals to Kantian duty to oneself as such (ger. *Pflicht gegen sich selbst*), as reminded by Bojanić and Djordjević (2016: 451). The crucial difference is in the nature of such commitment, which is almost an integrated part of the call for action, but does not transform in guaranty of survival of joint engagement.

For something to be characterized as joint and not personal engagement, it has to be based in reciprocity. To that end, I see every engaged act as, in essence, a social act, as defined by Husserl, and not Reinach.[1] Following Husserl, I insist on the importance of reciprocity for the creation of joint engagement, i.e. social act is an act, if one is doing something hoping that other will notice one's intentions, and reply in their own way. For social act to be an act, there has to be a process of chaining, not mimesis (Bojanić and Ćipranić 2018: 31). Further on, engagement in every case asks for devotion and publicity, i.e. social engagement presupposes certain commitments to goals one sets to achieve (Cvejić 2016: 334). However, the question is what is the nature of those goals?

Fiket and Ćeriman in their research on academic female workers employed at the University of Belgrade emphasized that the orientation of engagement is always towards the common good (Fiket and Ćeriman, 2018). While in general, I agree with this view, I do have one dilemma. Is the common good a goal of engagement or is the common good necessary starting motivator of engagement? Or are both necessary? In other words, where do the common good stand in the engagement equation; on which side of the equality sign – left or right? Or on both? Does the engagement exist when someone publicly and transparently express his/her goals as those of public interest (or as the common good) or when at the end of engagement, public interests are indeed achieved?

If we accept that the engaged act is characterized as such by the researcher, *post festum*, then one may ask where the common good has to be placed? We can think of situation when the engaged act was not originally motivated by the common good, but has ultimately resulted in the common good. Similarly, it is possible to think of situation when an engaged act was indeed oriented towards the common good, but such common good was ultimately not achieved or it was warped during the engagement. Put differently, is the change of the nature of engagement from personal to common or vice versa possible during

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1    See more on this difference in: Bojanić and Ćipranić 2018.

the engagement? Is that the same engagement or not? This dilemma seems to be particularly relevant for the engagement oriented towards the creation or the change of political institutions.

## When Can Political Institutions Be Created by Engagement

If we say that some political institution is created by reflection of an individual about existing norms, rules and organization of state power; and where that reflection was followed by successful action oriented towards their change, can we then say that such institution was created by engagement? This case is about individual initiative, which can be characterized as personal social engagement, in sense that it is result of a private (single) evaluative perspective, as described by Cvejić (2017: 43).

If we add that above-mentioned individual was in fact a monarch – king, does that change anything? This situation is actually a description of the birth of the ombudsman institution.

At the end of the 17th century, Sweden was a major power in Europe with control over the Baltic Sea. In 1700, Russia, Denmark and Poland formed an alliance to defeat Sweden. The military prowess of Charles XII (ruled 1697–1718), a young inexperienced king, took the members of the alliance by surprise and, after his stunning victory, he earned the nickname 'the Swedish Meteor' (Dash 2012). After that surprising victory over Peter the Great at the Battle of Narva in 1700, Charles dismissed requests by his allies to discuss peace treaties. After year of war, in 1709 Charles was ultimately defeated by Peter the Great at the Battle of Poltava, and his army was decimated. Wounded, Charles and his remaining men took refuge in the village near Bender, in present-day Moldova, at the invitation of the rulers of the Ottoman Empire, who were also enemies of Peter the Great. Having left Sweden in 1700 and having been away at war for nine years, Charles remained in Turkey and continued to rule from abroad while struggling to negotiate diplomatic and financial terms to ensure his safe return to Sweden (Lang 2011: 58).

During Charles' exile in Turkey, Sweden was in crisis, suffering from poverty, plagues, depletion of resources, danger of ongoing war and widespread corruption (Lang 2011: 59). Well aware that Sweden was in dire straits and guided by a coterie of advisors, Charles initiated a series of extensive policy and administrative reforms resulting in the decree for a major administrative reorganization signed on October 26, 1713 (Hatton 1968). The reforms included a decree creating the institution of the King's Ombudsman. According to Hatton, among many reforms recommended and implemented by Charles and his advisors, only one has endured: The Ombudsman (Hatton 1968).

His Majesty's Ombudsman reported directly to Charles and was charged with ensuring that judges, civil servants and military staff acted in accordance with the law and the King's wishes, with the power to initiate legal proceedings (Lang 2011: 62; Wieslander 1999: 13). This early version of the ombudsman was not an idea deliberately conceptualized to protect the rights of individuals, but

was born out of a crisis of governance and with the goal to preserve the King. To that end, we do not consider the creation of this institution as an act of engagement, because its goal was not acting in public interest, neither it has in this phase resulted in the common good nor the public interest was ultimately met. While the establishment of the ombudsman at this stage contained some seeds of an attempt to improve administration, it was predominantly aimed at helping the survival of the King, and had not contributed to increased accountability, transparency or democratization of the state power.

However, further evolution of the ombudsman institution in Sweden suggests that the second phase of its development may indeed be a result of engagement. During the 18th century the Ombudsman was subjected to different transformation; its name and organization were changed multiple times. For instance, in May 1719, it was renamed the Chancellor of Justice (*Justitiekanslern)* and became an institution of Parliament rather than of the King. When, however, the King again became absolute ruler in the latter part of the 18th century, the institution returned to being associated with the executive (Orton 2001: 2 in McKenna 2011). King Gustav IV, who ruled from 1792 to 1809, paid the price for his absolutism, and was overthrown in a military coup. The coupists brought to power his uncle, who became King Charles XIII. The King committed to introduce the parliamentary system in Sweden and to limit his own powers. As a result, new Swedish Constitution was introduced in 1809, and included the Parliamentary Ombudsman as an office independent of the Parliament. The position was established in connection with the adoption of the Instrument of Government and was influenced by Montesquieu and Locke's ideas about the division of power, as well as some uniquely national influences (Wieslander 1999). A new constitution was introduced to balance executive power with the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament). It was determined that a Parliamentary Ombudsman (*Justitieombudsman*) would be elected to oversee public administration enacted in accordance with the law. With that, the Ombudsman's role was transformed to oversee the legality of work of administration and judiciary in the name of Parliament, and to contribute to legal, more fair and accountable state administration.

The same applies to further evolution of the ombudsman concept in Europe in second part of the 20th century. Context of the establishment of ombudsman on Iberian Peninsula and post-socialist Europe was very similar to that in Sweden, despite the fact they are separated by 150 years. Public intellectuals, civil society and political opposition called for the introduction of an ombudsman as an additional mechanism for oversight of the state authorities, and as one of guarantees of transition from authoritarian to democratic society.

Today, comparatively the most spread ombudsman model is the one that explicitly has a mandate for the protection and promotion of human rights (so-called hybrid model), in addition to fighting maladministration.[2] This model originated from the Iberian Peninsula, as part of efforts to establish accountable

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2    More on ombudsman models, see in: Glušac 2016.

democratic governance during 1970s after the breakdown of authoritarian regimes and adoption of new constitutions. In Portugal and Spain ombudsmen[3] have been created within the framework of big constitutional reforms in the process of democratization. They have had double role: to protect and promote human rights in young and fragile democracy, and to serve as an important actor in its defense and prevention of return to authoritarian society (Glušac 2018a: 313).

In postsocialist Europe, ombudsmen have been developed as a democratic request in the process of transition. Integral element of democratic changes was transformation of existing and introduction of new institutions, such as ombudsmen. In the ombudsman context, that process started with the creation of the Ombudsman in Poland (1987), and was concluded with the election of the first Protector of Citizens (Ombudsman) in Serbia in 2007. The common characteristic of these institutions is that they have been designed as hybrid ombudsman models. Such combination was expected, given that all countries in transition have strived to establish efficient and accountable public administrations, and to strengthen institutional guarantees for the protection of human rights, which are often violated by state and para-state structures in the past. It should be mentioned that the introduction of ombudsman in political and legal systems of post-socialist countries was not synchronized nor easy. It was marked by noticeable resistance of all three traditional branches of power (Glušac 2018a: 314). Only under pressure from the public, academia, civil society organizations and international instances had the states adopted legislation giving the ombudsman a broad and strong mandate. The executive had struggled to accept that independent mechanisms for oversight of its work has been established, as the public administration was not used to such scrutiny, while the judiciary in some states had perceived the ombudsman as competition, which is certainly not the case. In states where the ombudsman was given the right to oversee the judiciary, in terms of the respect of the set of rights to access to justice (as in Poland), the resistance of the courts was even stronger (Glušac 2018a: 314).

The evolution of the ombudsman institution confirms the thesis that system seeks self-sustainability and provides almost a reflexive resistance to any change, especially structural. The establishment of the ombudsman, and especially its constitutionalization, has changed the existing institutional architecture, and therefore elements of the existing system. Thus, following the development of the ombudsman institution, we can say that although the motive (goal) of its original establishment was personal, its final outcome is public, social. Its existence is in public interest. Efficient ombudsman is indeed the common good, in sense that this institution does not work in the interests of the rulers. On contrary, the institution has been transformed so as to control them.

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3    The term Ombudsman is gender-neutral, as the 'man' suffix itself is gender-neutral in original Swedish. That is, it applies correctly whether the Ombudsman is male or female. Following that, we use 'ombudsmen' in plural throughout this article.

## Whether and under which Conditions Can Political Institutions Be Engaged Themselves

Zaharijević asks where do the engaged stand, spatially and temporarily? Do they stand in the streets, in the Parliament, at the pulpit, in the factory? (2016: 315) She adds that the issue of 'where' also relates to the issue of inside/outside, and to the issue of capacities to be and remain outside, where 'outside' remains an almost entirely positive designation (referring to non-corruptedness, un-orthodoxy, powerful powerlessness) (2016: 315).

Syntagm "*powerful powerlessness*" which is related with those that stay "outside", got me thinking in what terms can we describe those who are "inside", i.e. within the system. I take "powerful powerlessness" to be something emancipatory, a raw power of the will to change something, but also as the absence of a monopoly of force to produce (implement) this change.

How can we label the power of so-called fourth branch of government, particularly of an ombudsman? It seems they have "*powerless power*". Ombudsman has the power because he is anchored in the system, high positioned as a state authority of constitutional rank. He has power because he has exclusive competence to oversee, *inter alia*, those who have monopoly of force (state violence), such as army, police and intelligence.[4] His power rises also from his capacity and formal legitimacy to introduce important changes in the way entire state administration functions, because he can contribute to the change of values, promotion of social diversity, and advancement of legal and practical position of vulnerable groups. At the same time, given his decisions, i.e. recommendations, are not formally binding nor executive, his power is indeed designed as powerless.

The nature of this powerlessness is in many ways dependent of the level of (maturity of) democracy in the state he operates in. In strong democracies, the government sees institutional critics of the ombudsman as an instrument to enhance its work, while autocracy-prone government often neglects or labels such critic as political opposition, avoiding to respond to it with arguments (Glušac 2018a: 322). In weak states, the government sees critical voices of its own work as a critic to the ruling political party, ignoring the standard constitutional principle according to which political parties may not exercise power directly or submit it to their control. At the same time, authoritarian government marginalizes the ombudsman, i.e. implementing his recommendations either sporadically or concentrating on those on small cases of mala-administration, and ignoring those of systematic nature. In such context, the powerlessness of ombudsman's power comes under the spotlight. The ombudsman should be an institutional opposition to the authoritarian government, given that the reasons of its establishment goes directly against the nature of the authoritarian government.

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4    Ombudsmen usually have mandate to oversee the work of entire public administration, including security apparatus. For more discussion on that, including the exemptions, see Glušac 2018b.

In that sense, ombudsman is engaged, because he fights for the greater good, for citizens' rights, for administration as citizens' service, but all that without having the prerogatives of force. In those efforts, ombudsman actually relies heavily on two actors, who are engaged almost by definition - public intellectuals and civil society, while he uses the media as the megaphone of his warnings.

As the power of the ombudsman is derived from the power of his authority, and not the authority of power, he constantly moves on the boundary between "inside" and "outside", between powerless power and powerful powerlessness. Executive branch is, on the other side, increasingly characterized by worrying "*powerful power*". Finally, despite numerous public protests across Europe and the world, there is still a large number of citizens who are characterized by "*powerless powerlessness*", because they choose to remain passive and uninterested in wider social and political processes.

## When Institutions May Serve as Mechanisms for Channeling and Realization of the Goals of Social Engagement

The state administration system should be designed to be visible, accessible and available to citizens. However, as this is often not the case, antagonism arises, expressed through mistrust, corruption and it ultimately results in huge distance between the administration and citizens. For most citizens, the State is represented almost exclusively by the public administration, as they have the most frequent contact with it. Thus, any structural problems in the functioning of democracy are manifested directly through its work. The centralization of the power of executive branch, which results in its *de facto* "dominance" over the parliament, triggers the collapse of the entire system of division of power, including through the normative and factual blocking of independent functioning of the judiciary and oversight bodies, as well as through making the participation of civil society in designing public policies obsolete. In such circumstances, there is no substantive oversight of the executive. When, in such circumstances, citizens or social groups want to express their dissatisfaction, to which political institutions can they turn to, not necessarily in terms of solutions, but for institutional support, in order to see is there an understanding of the problems "inside" the system as well? What political institutions can serve as mechanisms for channeling and achieving of the goals of social engagement?

Independent (oversight) institutions are logical address, provided they have managed to maintain factual independence in such a context. They can indeed be characterized by in-built permanent reflexivity over their actions, when their leaders truly want to achieve the purpose of their mandate. Precisely because the effectiveness of independent state oversight institutions – primarily the ombudsman - is notoriously difficult to measure, and because his (ombudsman's) decisions are not binding, he must constantly revise his strategy of action, must adapt to the changes, both external and internal. On the other hand, if the ombudsman wants only to rigorously pursue formal procedures,

does not want to think and act outside the box, does not want to be proactive, does not want to be brave and tackle difficult issues, but remains inert, procedural and marginalized, then he is everything but engaged.

If we look at some other independent oversight authorities, our expectations are similar. If, for example, personal and/or confidential data in the possession of state authorities are published in the media, or if state authorities refuse to provide information of public importance to citizens or the media, then the competent independent institution (e.g. commissioner or similar institution) should be a channel for the protection of these rights, but may also serve to channel initiatives of engaged citizens and groups.

Furthermore, citizens can, individually or acting through civil society organizations, actually engage to support independent institutions and focus on engagement that would have the aim of not changing, but preserving the institution. An example is the action "I want a Commissioner, not a yeasayer!" initiated by the CRTA (Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability) in Serbia, to draw attention to the fact that the process of selecting the Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection must be started and that the criteria of transparency, openness and integrity must be respected in the vetting and appointment process. Through a dedicated web site, all interested citizens had had the opportunity to send a letter to the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia with the proposed transparent criteria compiled by more than 80 civil society organizations.

## Conclusion

This article discussed the relationship between the engagement and political institutions through the prism of the emergence and development of an ombudsman. It was demonstrated that its original form was not aimed to serve the public interest, but the maintenance of the King of Sweden in power. However, a later stage of its development brought a strategic shift, in sense that it was transformed into an institution that had indeed served to control the government, and not to maintain the King in power.

This article noted that the ombudsman has powerless power. Ombudsman has the power because he is anchored in the system, high positioned as a state authority of constitutional rank. He has the power because he has exclusive competence to oversee, inter alia, those who have monopoly of force (violence), such as army, police and intelligence. His power rises also from his capacity and formal legitimacy to introduce important changes in the way entire state administration functions, because he can majorly contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights. At the same time, given his decisions, i.e. recommendations, are not formally binding nor executive, his power is indeed designed as powerless. As the power of the ombudsman is derived from the power of his authority, and not the authority of power, it was pointed out that he constantly moves on the boundary between "inside" and "outside", between powerless power and powerful powerlessness.

It was emphasized that the ombudsman's strategy, but also the way he is perceived both by other state authorities and citizens, depends largely on the context in which he operates. The ombudsman should be an institutional opposition to authoritarian rule, because the reasons for its establishment and the very mandate go directly against the nature of authoritarian regime. In this sense, the ombudsman is engaged, because he is fighting for the common good, for citizens' rights, for the public administration as citizens' service, at the same time with the absence of a prerogative of (physical) power. It was also underlined that in these efforts, the ombudsman actually relies mostly on two actors, who are engaged almost by definition - public intellectuals and civil society.

The Ombudsman can fulfill his mandate and maximize his influence only through in-built permanent reflexivity over his actions and strategies, especially when operating in fragile democratic environment. Precisely because his efficiency and effectiveness are so difficult to measure, he must constantly revise his strategy of action, must adapt it to the changes, both external and internal. If he does not want to do that and opt to be inert, procedural and marginalized, then he is everything but engaged; in fact, he then does not serve his purpose.

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Luka Glušac

## Angažman i političke institucije: slučaj ombudsmana

### Apstrakt

U ovom radu se na primeru nastanka i razvoja institucije ombudsmana propituje veza između angažmana i političkih institucija. Tekst započinjem kratkim osvrtom na glavna teorijska viđenja institucija, političkih institucija i institucionalizacije. Potom se koncentrišem na to kako se političke institucije menjaju, da bi fokus potom bio usmeren na to da li se one mogu menjati društvenim angažmanom, te da li se i kada može smatrati da političke institucije nastaju angažmanom. S tim u vezi, korišćenjem primera ombudsmana proveravam da li i pod kojim uslovima političke institucije i same mogu biti angažovane, odnosno da li su moguće institucije kojima je svojstvena kontinuirana refleksivnost spram sopstvenih normi delanja.

Ključne reči: angažman, institucije, političke institucije, institucionalizam, institucionalizacija, kontrolna tela, nezavisna tela, ombudsman

## II

STUDIES AND ARTICLES
STUDIJE I ČLANCI

Siyaves Azeri

# HUME'S THEORY OF SOCIAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

**ABSTRACT**
Hume distinguishes between the self of thought and imagination and the self of the passions. He is criticized for contradicting himself as he allegedly attributes fictitiousness to the self in book one of the Treatise but later reintroduces the self in books two and three. Hume's account of the idea of the self, however, is not contradictory: he shows the impossibility of a pure associationist-empiricist account of the self. Instead, he proposes a social account of the constitution of the idea of the self and consciousness. In doing so, Hume's account of the self anticipates social-historical theories of the self.

## The Humean Riddle

Hume, in his *Treatise*, distinguishes two aspects of the self: "[P]ersonal identity, as it regards our thoughts or imagination…. and as it regards our passions or the concern we take about ourselves" (2006: 165).

Hume is usually criticized for accepting the existence of an idea of the self at the beginning of Book 2, whereas earlier he denies having any such idea. Conceptualization of identity, despite the fact that people are constantly changing, seems almost contradictory. According to Penelhum (2000), Hume's account of personal identity is confusing because he "ascribes to the self (in Book 1) a tendency to confuse invariance and succession in telling us how we come to generate the fiction of continuing identity; such a story seems to ascribe a continuing reality to the mind in the very process of showing how the belief in it can come to exist where there are only successive perceptions to constitute it." Penelhum maintains that the source of unattainability of a solution to Hume's account of personal identity is Hume's mistaken supposition that taking a succession of similar impressions to constitute the identity of a thing is contradictory (2000: 29-30). For instance, as is with the case of a musical theme made of successive notes, the theme is a single entity made of parts. However, there still remains the problem, which Penelhum apparently ignores: how do we attribute identity to the theme? How do we, at the first place, attribute identity to a note? Hume suggests that if an atomistic logic is

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adopted, then we cannot attribute any identity to any entity. Penelhum seemingly assumes the existence of a factor that is responsible for unity and identity of things, but he does not provide any account of it. He thus attributes to Hume the view that a thing remains identical to itself only if the thing remains unchanged (2000: 30). However, Hume's comparison of the state and human's identity of the self, shows that he is aware that we do correctly attribute identity to things despite the changes they undergo. His question is how do we do this? What is the source of idea of identity in general and idea of an enduring self in particular?

Epistemologically, Hume shows that a number of questions cannot be resolved properly within the associationist framework. Causality and the idea of the self are among them.

The emergence of the idea of the self, on Hume's account, is not a process of the socialization of an individual atomic self; human beings are social entities from the outset; they have to be differentiated and individuated as selves against a social background. The view that considers the negative epistemological account of the self in Book 1 and the social-passionate accounts of the self in Books 2 and 3 contradictory ignores this aspect: Hume's account of epistemology is based on his account of society and history; epistemological and metaphysical questions are questions that belong to humans only and humans are social entities; they are concrete beings and not personifications of an abstract human essence or substance. In this, Hume's social model anticipates cultural-historical and socio-historical approaches to the concept of the self.

Hume, presumably, shows that a "pure" epistemological account of identity and many other epistemological problems is not attainable; but this does not exclude the possibility and desirability of a resolution of such problems socio-psychologically. Identity is conceptual, but this does not make it less real. If the social and psychological genesis of concepts and conceptual frameworks is accounted for, then the real source of idea of identity is determined.

The idea of the self is caused by the passions; it is constituted socially via language and the exercise of sympathy. Hence, in the following, Hume's social theory of constitution of the self will be reconstructed within the wider context of his general philosophy pertaining to his views on concept-formation (ideas), language, sympathy, and the passions. According to Hume, pride and humility are indirect passions and their object is one and the same: the self (2006: 182). Although pride and humility are possible only with regard to the self, and despite the fact that the self is the object of these passions, it is not their cause. Pride and humility are passions that are located between two ideas. The first idea, which is the productive principle, causes pride and humility. The second idea is the self, which is the object of these passions and is produced by these passions (2006: 183). Hume enumerates a number of qualities as the causes of pride and humility, such as imagination, judgment, memory, etc., which are not confined to the mind, but also pertain to the body (2006: 183). The social nature of all these qualities is worth noticing; they are realizable and meaningful in a community of shared beliefs, customs and value-judgments. Thus,

Hume includes country, family, children, relations, and property among such qualities (2006: 183). These passions and the related qualities are not mere abstractions, but are related to us materially. For instance, speaking of beauty, Hume states: "Beauty, consider'd merely as such, unless placed upon something related to us, never produces any pride or vanity; and the strongest relation alone, without beauty, or something else in its place, has as little influence on that passion" (2006: 183). Beauty is not conceivable unless it is a property of some object. This object has to be related to us where such relatedness requires that the object is in a world that is defined by beliefs, customs, habits, value judgments etc. Knowledge, even in its purest epistemological sense, is acquirable only within these social relations. Thus, differentiating between the so-called "epistemological" and "instinctive" ("passionate") selves seems artificial.

The notions of the "epistemological" and the "passionate" selves do not signify two distinct selves, but different continuous stages of a single self. For instance, when deducing the idea of causality through making an analogy with will power, and with reference to pure epistemological data based upon raw impressions of the individual person, Hume argues that our command over our mind has certain limits—we cannot claim total sovereignty over it. Moreover, it is not possible precisely to fix the boundaries of our authority—meaning the boundaries of our individual selves—unless we consult experience: "In short, the actions of the mind are, in this respect, the same with those of matter. We perceive only their constant conjunction; nor can we ever reason beyond it. No internal impression has an apparent energy, more than the external objects have" (2006: 108).

Hume argues that there is no absurdity in reflecting the principle of distinctness and separability of impressions onto external objects (2006: 398). However, the reflexive perception of one's own self consists of one or more perceptions and what is perceived reflexively is but perceptions. The idea of the self signifies the reflexive consciousness of those perceptions:

> We can conceive a thinking being to have either many or few perceptions. Suppose the mind to be reduced even below the life of an oyster. Suppose it to have only one perception, as of thirst or hunger. Consider it in that situation. Do you conceive anything but merely that perception? Have you any notion of *self* or *substance*? If not, the addition of other perceptions can never give you that notion. (2006: 399)

A more accurate account of the Humean theory of the self would be as follows: Hume rejects the essentialist account of identity. On the other hand, in Books 2 and 3 of the *Treatise*, he explicitly proposes the existence of an idea of the self which is not necessarily unchanging. Hume's reference to the alterability of the self in both space and time is strong evidence that he is working with the strange, paradoxical, and conflicting idea of a changing yet identical self. He dismisses the existence of a substantial self as the basis upon which the idea of an unchanging self is formed; however, he discovers and explains, in a rudimentary way, the idea of a socially constituted self.

Despite efforts to reconcile the seemingly contradictory conceptions of the self in the *Treatise*, many scholars seem to dismiss the question, concentrating on personal identity either as it regards thought, or as it regards passions. Jamie Ferreira (1994) focuses on the latter and dismisses the question of the metaphysical self, touching on the question only briefly, when she tries to define the imagination's role with reference to sympathy. Similarly, Tony Pitson (1986) focuses upon Hume's view concerning other selves as if it is a question in Cartesian tradition: "are the bodies that surround me mere bodies or do they have minds?" Pitson tries to relate the issue of other minds to the question of the content of perception in order to reconcile the two aspects of Hume's consideration of the self. Jane McIntyre (1989) tries to reconcile these two aspects by claiming that the principle of identity, which is discussed in Book 1, does not exhaust the question of personal identity. Donald Ainslie (1999), on the other hand, tries to overcome the tension by drawing a parallel between Hume's "skeptical" account of objectivity and his view on the formation of belief with regard to other selves. Robert Anderson (1966) relates the above-mentioned tension to two Humean principles or premises: 1) "[w]hatever is conceivable is possible" and 2) "[w]hatever is different is separable by thought or by imagination" (3). Conceivability requires clarity and distinctness, where this clarity and distinctness is supposed not to involve any contradiction. Since we have an idea of our self, we should assume that we have an impression of it, even if it is perceived at a time that we are not aware of. The presence of an impression of the self signifies the existence of the self as a distinct entity. Yet another inference is possible: if we do not have an impression of the self, then the idea of our own self must be an illusion, a mere fiction because the lack of an impression of the self signifies its non-existence. Eugenio Lecaldano (2002) addresses the problem of the relation between the epistemological and passionate selves and admits that, in recent Humean scholarship, the interpretation that these two notions are contradictory is no longer tenable (175). Nevertheless, in agreement with Baier and Purviance, he states that Hume abandons the notion of the self as a bundle of perceptions (Book 1 of the *Treatise*) and introduces a new notion of self (Book 2) (2002: 180). However, such a claim, instead of addressing the question that pertains to the relation between these two conceptualizations, aims at eliminating the question by giving up one of the notions.

For Hume, the self is nothing but the bundle of perceptions meaning that the self has no reality over and beyond the series of perceiving acts. It is a bundle of activities, but it does not require an already existing agent. The agency is constituted as the act is actualized. This is to say that the formation of the self as a consequence of perceptual acts is a process of the individuation of the human person, which at the outset is born into social surroundings. It is not the transporting of perception onto an internal realm but the building of the internal realm through and with the perceptual activity. It is a process of interiorization. Meaning that, there is no stage or place prior to *act* of perception upon which the perceptions are located. Rather, the activity and the making of the self are one and the same. Penelhum is right in saying that the

making of the self or the constitution of personal identity is not a logical construction (2000: 112). Yet, this does not mean that Hume simply dismisses the self or considers it a mere fiction. It may be said that Hume tries to show the impossibility of providing a satisfactory account of the self that is solely based on an empiricist, associationist epistemology. He resolves the riddle of the self with reference to passions, sentiments and to social processes. Thus, we do add something to "mind's survey of the sequence of our perceptions that is not in the objects surveyed but has the mind's survey of them as its source" (Penelhum 2000: 112), but this is not a consequence of associative mechanisms. Associative mechanisms are unable to explain how the mind comes to perceive an individual perception as one particular perception, which will later resemble another distinct but similar perception. In other words, associative epistemology cannot explain how the very first perception takes place so that the train of resembling perceptions begins.

## The Bundle of Perceptions

In the *Treatise* Hume introduces the idea that internal perceptions are not always simple but are often compound and complex (2006: 157). Hume relates self-identity to perceptions in general, i.e., the mind is supposed to be nothing but a bundle of perceptions. There is no essence to the mind. Hume states, "mankind … [is] nothing [but] a bundle or a collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." He also maintains that there is no impression from which the idea of the self is derived; hence there exists no idea of the self. Our existence depends upon our perceptions without which we may be said not to exist (2006: 165).

For Hume, the perceiving self is not a passive construction of random perceptions and impressions. In the *Appendix*, he states: "[T]he annihilation, which some people suppose to follow upon death, and which entirely destroys this self, is nothing but an extinction of all particular perceptions; love and hatred, pain and pleasure, thought and sensation. These therefore must be the same with self; since the one cannot survive the other" (2006: 399). There is no real constancy and identity of the self; rather, there is an ability or force, which must be involved, for the emergence of the idea. Imagination, by mistaking the resemblance between the successive perceptions for sameness, produces the idea of a substantial, identical self.

Imagination is not alone in creating such an idea; it works together with sympathy:

> But this is still more remarkable, when we add a sympathy of parts to their *common end*, and suppose that they bear to each other, the reciprocal relation of cause and effect in all their actions and operations. This is the case with all animals and vegetables; where not only several parts have a reference to some general purpose, but also a mutual dependence on, and connexion with each

other. The effect of so strong a relation is, that tho' every one must allow, that in a very few years both vegetables and animals endure a *total* change, yet we still attribute identity to them, while their form, size, and substance are entirely altr'd. (2006: 68)[1]

The question, then, is whether the multitude of perceptions is really unified by the so-called identity of the mind, or these ideas are only associated by imagination to construct an identity. Hume goes on: "Identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together, but merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them" (2006: 169). This unity is based upon three principles: resemblance, contiguity, and causation. The most important ones are resemblance and causation.

Hume explains the relationship between the sympathetic and epistemological selves by emphasizing that the formation of impressions requires a value-laden ground that transcends the self:

Whatever other objects may be comprehended by the mind, they are always consider'd with a view to ourselves; otherwise they wou'd never be able either to excite these passions, or produce the smallest encrease or diminution of them. When self enters not into the consideration, there is no room either for pride or for humility. But tho' that connected succession of perceptions, which we call *self*, be always the object of these two passions, 'tis impossible it can be their CAUSE, or be sufficient alone to excite them. (2006: 182)

The nature of the self is changeable and inconstant. For Hume, every perception is a different existence, and he admits that there is no perception of a real connection between these different existences. The self cannot confine itself to one passion only. As Hume states, "[h]uman nature is too inconstant to admit of any such regularity. Changeableness is essential to it" (2006: 186). There is something that organizes the sequence of perceptions without which one is nothing and relates it to the perceptions of external objects. There is a parallel between the external object and the internal self. The apparent constancy of the internal or the mental, i.e., the constancy of the self, is based upon the apparent constancy of the external goods and the perceptions one possesses of these external objects.[2] We should note that other subjects too could be considered sources of the idea of stability. External subjects bring together perception and sympathy as the necessary basis for an idea of the self.[3]

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1    See also 2006: 169.

2    Annette Baier (1979), states: "It is reasonable to expect that attention to external objects, to the heap of possessions of one possessor, will be needed before one can discern an enduring stable person in the continual revolutions of perceptions."

3    Capaldi introduces the precognitive self as the unifying element that keeps the fluctuating self together and refers to it as Hume's great philosophical discovery. "The unity of consciousness as the preconceptual condition or content of conceptualization emerges as a fundamental discovery in Hume" (1985: 278).

Another basic feature of the idea of the self is that it resembles itself. Even though it is in a state of perpetual flux, the idea of the self is associated with itself. This resemblance is based upon certain properties of human nature.[4] Resemblance and contiguity are necessary conditions for the existence of the self. Something which is not presented to us "has no manner of influence on our vanity" (2006: 198). The formative impact of the relationship between sense perception and the perceived object is a reciprocal one; each requires the existence of the other: "Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing: For which reason we must turn our view to external objects; and it is natural for us to consider with most attention such objects as lie contiguous to us, or resemble us" (2006: 221).

## The Passions and the Individuation of the Self

Hume states that "ourself is intimately present to us, and whatever is related to self must partake of that quality" (2006: 274). Intimacy is not one's immediate access to one's own self. Rather, it is the expression of the existence of the self in a particular space, namely concrete bodily existence, and a particular succession of moments, namely imagination. Hume then states:

> [T]he imagination can never totally forget the points of space and time, in which we are existent; but receives such frequent advertisements of them from the passions and senses, that however it may turn its attention to foreign and remote objects, it is necessitated every moment to reflect on the present. (2006: 274)

One's access to the self, thus understood, is as mediated and external as one's access to any object. Our concern about our self is the result of spatial contiguity that we have with our body, since "[c]ontiguous objects must have an influence much superior to the distant and remote" (2006: 274). This spatial proximity to one's own self adds to one's idea of identity in time because, as mentioned above, distance in space is more influential in determining the vivacity of ideas of objects than distance in time.

The idea of space is the expression of coexistence of certain parts in a certain order, whereas the idea of time consists in the succession of these parts so that not all of them are present to one's senses simultaneously. This incompleteness provokes the participation of the imagination when the identity of objects in time is at stake. Yet, imagination's role in forming the idea of identity is not a fantastic one, but a consequence of the logical passing from a present idea to an idea in the future. So, the identity of the self in space and time is determined by the same rules that determine the relation between ideas and impressions in general, because "ourselves [are] existent in a point of time interpos'd betwixt the present instance and the future object" (2006: 276).

We form the idea of ourselves based on the idea of others, through forming the impressions of another's self. As Hume states: "Every human creature

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4  For the explanation of these properties see 2006: 185–186.

resembles ourselves, and by that means has an advantage above any other object, in operating on imagination" (2006: 232). The formation of ideas requires proximity and contiguity together with resemblance. The only place where these conditions can be fulfilled is in society, since there can be no such thing as an impression of my own self, independent of others. In order to form an idea of myself, I need the other to reflect the impressions resembling myself that result in the idea of my own self. As Hume puts it, "[i]n general we may remark, that the minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each others' emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sentiments, and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay by insensible degrees" (2006: 236). The object of the perception of self can be another subject as well as one's own self. One knows oneself through others.[5] Sympathy, in this respect, is a lively idea that one has about the other's self, which has been turned into an impression of the self (2006: 248).

A particular self is different from all others due to the fact that it represents a unique bundle of perceptions. The whole critical standpoint of the Humean notion of the self is based on the rejection of any type of essentialism.[6] Hume's answer to this question more or less resembles Locke's consideration of the matter, where Locke addresses the question of the identity of *man*, whose identity consists in the preservation and continuance of the same life (1975: 321-322). The non-substantialist consideration of the self may be named formal-existential: the existence of a particular thing (be it an object or a person) requires the appearance of that thing in a certain form, so that it can be differentiated from all other things. The uniqueness of the particular thing suffices to define the particularity of that thing from all others. As Capaldi puts it, "what Hume needs to be able to use in the accounts of the indirect passions and the mechanism of sympathy is primarily the idea of oneself as distinct from others. This means that Hume has to take for granted that there is some answer to the problem of individuation" (1985: 87). It seems that Hume starts with other selves and that individuation happens only against such a background.

Baier states that "In Book Two [Hume] seems to realize that the best picture of the human soul is the human body, so he can speak of 'qualities of our mind and body, that is self'" (1991: 131). The notion of the body signifies the plural nature of the self. We cannot propose a satisfying answer to this question if we insist on basing our notion of personal identity entirely upon a solipsistic account. Such an account results in an irresolvable tension.[7] The question is as follows: Is there a possibility of forming a notion of the self if I am *the only* existing entity? Unless one presupposes the existence of a substantial self, one cannot claim that one has an impression, hence an idea of the self. It seems that to proceed from a bundle of perceptions towards the formation of the notion of the self is impossible.

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5    See also Capaldi 1985: 279.
6    For a detailed discussion, see Capaldi 1975, chapter 7.
7    See Anderson 1996, chapters 4 and 9.

Reflexive impressions or passions that raise sentiments precede the formation of any judgment concerning oneself; they even precede the formation of the idea of the self. So, the line of reasoning that reduces the love for the other into a derivative of self-love proceeds in the wrong direction, since it is only through the reflexive impressions and passions that love is first exercised. One's love always has to be directed towards "some sensible being external to" oneself (2006: 214). In other words, oneself, if taken by itself, is not a truly sensible being but an abstraction only. The common mistake of most people is to consider the self and the other as simple binaries. In such an approach, either the "I" is reduced to the other, or the other is reduced to the "I". However, in such a case, we cannot escape the vicious circle of the absolute dissolution of the self or of the other empathetically. One does not identify oneself with the other; rather he or she constitutes oneself in resemblance to the other; one acts as if the other's perceptions were one's own.

In the section on virtue in Book 3 of the *Treatise*, Hume speaks of the influence of morals over actions and passions. Contrary to morals, reason has no such influence. Hume concludes, "the rules of morality are not conclusions of our reason" (2006: 294). Morality is active, whereas reason is inactive. The inactivity of reason means that it does not exert any power upon passions and actions. All shapes and appearances of reason share this inactivity (2006: 294).

Hume compares vice and virtue to sound, color, heat and cold, pointing that these latter qualities do not reside in the object but belong to the human mind. Like physical qualities that are not produced but only discovered by reason, moral qualities are not produced but are feelings that can only be distinguished. However, like the qualities attributed to objects, these feelings are sentiments that are felt by humans. Vice and virtue are objects of feeling and not objects of reason (2006: 301). This is more evidence for the priority of passions over sensation and reason. This priority, in turn, means that impressions of passion are actualizations of impressions of sensation and reason. Unless actualized, impressions of sensation are mere abstractions that are devoid of any concrete content and meaning. This is another way to explain the tension between reason and the passions, which according to Hume, is responsible for the diversification of a self with regard to others, and for the alterability of that self with regard to itself (2006: 280).

## Impressions of Sensation and Impressions of Reflection

Hume divides impressions into original and secondary. This corresponds to an earlier division of impressions into "impressions of sensation" and "impressions of reflection". The former arise directly from perception, whereas the latter proceeds from the former. All impressions of the senses belong to the former; all passions and emotions belong to the latter. Yet, in the final analysis, all impressions are impressions of passion, even those impressions that Hume calls impressions of sensation or direct impressions. This means that even the purest epistemological activities of the human mind are determined

by humanity's social being. For instance, when it comes to the ideas of cause and effect, Hume rejects the view that these ideas are perceptible per se. To the contrary, he introduces experience as particular human experience, and as that factor that makes the understanding of the ideas of cause and effect possible:

> 'Tis only from experience and observation of [the] constant union [of different objects], that we are able to form this inference [that causality exists]; and even after all, the inference is nothing but the effects of custom on the imagination. We must not here be content with saying, that the idea of cause and effect arises from objects constantly united; but must affirm, that 'tis the very same with the idea of these objects, and that the *necessary connexion* is not discover'd by a conclusion of the understanding, but is merely a perception of the mind. (2006: 261)

Hume maintains that human nature is insufficient by itself, not only for physical survival but also for the actualization of human skills and abilities. Without society, human nature would fail to provide the lively sensations and passions that agitate the spirit. Others communicate their actions and ideas to us and in this way these ideas participate in producing passions that belong to one's own. An idea of a passion is more agreeable than any other idea "because such an idea becomes a kind of passion, and gives a more sensible agitation to the mind, than any other image or conception" (2006: 228). Passions that are agitated by others, and actions that have become habitual due to continual acquaintance and repetition, strengthen the conception of any object. Hume further explains the active role of human interaction by reference to the role of education (2006: 229). This also shows the social aspect of Hume's conceptualization of the notion of the self, which is the object of passions.

In the section "of malice and envy" of the *Treatise*, Hume maintains that human impressions and ideas are not mere epistemological abstractions. He asks the question: how similar impressions and ideas can result into the rise of different judgments concerning the same object? (2006: 240) He is aware that the relation between impressions and objects of impressions, or to put it more clearly, the relation between perceiver and the perceived, is not a simple mechanical reflection of an object upon the mind. Hume admits that the variation of judgments should in principle be caused by some variation in impressions, but the variation of impressions is caused by the variation in reflexive impressions that accompany every impression and idea. In other words, impressions of perception are subordinate to impressions of reflection. Hume states, "no object is presented to the senses, nor image form'd in the fancy, but what is accompany'd with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion'd to it" (2006: 240).

## A (Probable) Humean Theory of Language

Paul Árdal (1977) criticizes Hume's so-called official view to the effect that the meaning of words is a mental image. (Cowley (1968) interprets Hume's view of language along these same lines.) A consideration of Hume's rudimentary

account of language will show that the depiction of Humean philosophy as a kind of individualist atomism is not plausible. In the chapter of the *Treatise*, 'Of Abstract Ideas,' Hume clearly rejects the view that meanings or words are private mental images (Árdal 1977: 53-54).

Even though Hume maintains that ideas are images of impressions, and that there are ideas that are images of other ideas, we should note that the word "image," as used by Hume, does not necessarily signify eidetic entities. That ideas are images of impressions is more likely to mean that they are reflections of, and derived from, impressions. As Hume writes,

> [T]he principle of the priority of impressions to ideas must be understood with another limitation, *viz.* that as our ideas are images of our impressions, so we can form secondary ideas, which are images of the primary; as appears from this very reasoning concerning them. This is not, properly speaking, an exception to the rules so much as an explanation of it. Ideas produce the images of themselves in new ideas; but as the first ideas are suppos'd to be deriv'd from impressions, it still remains true, that all our simple ideas proceed, either mediately or immediately, from their correspondent impressions. (2006: 10) [8]

The expression "image," as it is used here, designates the priority of impressions over ideas.

For Hume the correspondence between simple impressions and ideas shows that they depend on one another. "Such a constant conjunction [between impressions and ideas], can never arise from chance; but clearly proves a dependence of the impressions on the ideas, or of the ideas on the impressions" (2006: 9). This adds to the evidence that, for Hume, perceiving is not a passive process where objects influence the mind. Rather, the mind plays an almost equal role in perceiving the objects, by forming impressions and ideas of the object of perception. The causal connection, which the human mind draws between impressions and ideas, is based on the empirical awareness of the precedence of the former over the latter. However, it is not reason that produces the relation of cause and effect between objects. Hume argues that although reason is aided by past experience and continuous conjunction of objects, passing from one object to the belief about the existence of another is not determined by reason. Rather, different objects are united in the imagination so that causality "depends solely on the union of ideas" (2006: 64). This is to say that, it is participation of the mind via imagination that gives rise to the idea of cause and effect. Hume maintains that causation, as the basis of reasoning, is not a philosophical relation but a natural one (2006: 65); in other words, the idea of causation is rooted in human nature. Similarly, in the section "Of the Causes of Belief" Hume makes the social basis of the formation of the idea of cause and

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8    Hume goes on to say that "We may observe, that in order to prove the ideas of extension and colour not to be innate, philosophers do nothing but shew, that they are conveyed by our senses... Now if we carefully examine these arguments, we shall find that they prove nothing but that ideas are preceded by other more lively perceptions, from which they are derived, and which they represent." (2006: 10)

effect even clearer, by claiming that belief adds a structural strength to, and enlivens, ideas. Belief changes the form of conceiving of ideas; and it does so with the aid of custom or habit. Belief is founded on a present impression that will become a custom through repetition. Therefore, every belief is rooted in custom. Thus, belief is described as a more vivid and intense conception of an idea, which proceeds from relation to a present impression (2006: 71). Belief, in this sense, is reflexive, since it is an enlivened and enforced idea, and ideas belong to the mind. The whole process of conceiving not only impressions but also notions and ideas is also of a reflexive character. Custom and habit operate upon imagination and other faculties whenever conception and apprehension takes place. Martin Bell (2005) states that, although Hume seemingly aims at founding all knowledge on experience, he is aware that experience as such is not sufficient to account for empirical beliefs. As Hume remarks: "Objects have no discoverable connexion together; nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another" (2006: 72). Yet, Hume admits the precedence of objects of perception over formation of ideas, since it is always the impressions that appear first and then ideas (2006: 9).

Hume argues that "general ideas are nothing but particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them" (2006: 17). In this Hume attributes a regulating role to language; i.e., language is depicted here as a tool that facilitates discovering regularities and generalizations in the world and communicate them to others. Hume's "instrumental" formulation of language conceptualizes language as an auxiliary symbolic system that facilitates manipulation of the external world and the subject's own behaviour. Moreover, Hume's differentiation between ideas and words can be interpreted as an initial effort to depart from a "naturalist" stance that reduces knowledge and action to immediate responses to stimuli and conditioned reflexes.

Language is an apparatus of socialization and humanization. Hume (1998) introduces justice and language as rooted in human convention. By "convention" Hume means "a sense of common interest; which sense each man feels in his own breast, which he remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, in concurrence with others, into a general plan or system of actions, which tends to public utility" (Hume 1998: 172). Language is supposed to be a tool – a "general plan or system" (1998: 72) – that functions for the utility of society. In this, the larger structure should not be ignored; "every man, in embracing that virtue, must have an eye to the whole plan or system" (1998: 72). Hume gives the examples of system of exchange and speech and words and language as activities that are organized through human convention:

> Thus, two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention for common interest, without any promise or contact: thus gold and silver are made the measures of exchange; thus speech and words and language are fixed by human convention and agreement. (1998: 172)

This linguistic model signifies a structure – a shared world – that is the historical consequence of particular linguistic acts performed by individual participants. This structure is not only the genetic result of such actions, but is also the common ground upon which new linguistic acts can be performed and against which they can be verified. Moreover, the resulted structure is not a purely formal architectonic, but an open-ended totality that functions with reference to public criteria and social utility.

In a letter to Joseph Spence (1932) Hume argues the case for the forming of ideas that are not directly rooted in sensory impressions. Hume's position suggests a linguistic mediation that makes formation and association of ideas possible. Hume speaks of Mr. Blacklock, a blind poet (1932: 200). In answer to Hume's question whether he has an idea of light or colors, Blacklock says that in his reading of numerous books and poems, and in many conversations, he has met so often with terms expressing colors that he has formed some "false associations" of an intellectual kind. Hume, thus, makes a link between linguistic abilities, verbal thinking, and the formation of meaning and ideas: "I believe, in much of our thinking, there will be found some species of association. *It is certain we always think in some language*, viz. in that which is most familiar to us; and it is but too frequent to substitute words instead of ideas" (1932: 201). Thus, thinking, for Hume, does not require having non-verbal images. The limit of thinking is not set by the limits of imagination. Moreover, it indicates that Hume assumes a regulative function for language when it comes to thinking and the formation of ideas.

Hume states that every idea is annexed to a word that in turn produces the idea upon utterance. Once the word is uttered it is impossible for the mind to prevent the emergence of the idea annexed to that word. Moreover, the relation between the idea and the word is not one of remembering a past experience, or a simple association of a symbol with former experiences, but is one of signification actualized by the mind through imagination to produce the corresponding idea (2006: 65).

Apparently, Hume is aware that the relation between the word and the idea or the entity it denotes is initially contingent and conventional; however, it turns into a necessary relation so that the word, once uttered, as Hume notes, immediately picks out the particular idea or entity it has been annexed to. The meaning of the term is fixed only with the participation of imagination. Imagination in this regard functions as the mechanism that is responsible for the formation of concepts, the essence of which is the unity of word and meaning.

In the section "Of Abstract Ideas" Hume discusses the nature of general and abstract ideas and concludes that the common view, which attributes a general form of existence to abstract ideas, is erroneous. Abstract ideas, like any others, are particular and are finite in number. Thus the question arises, how are such particular and finite ideas general in their representations? Custom is responsible for such a general functioning (2006: 21). Moreover, when discussing the difficulties of attributing a general form of existence to abstract

ideas, Hume emphasizes the symbolic/semiotic nature of such ideas. Considering the idea of the self as a non-substantial concept, or to be more precise as an abstract idea, we can thus infer that the Humean notion of the self refers to some semiotic-ideational entity. Hume, furthermore, underlines the societal aspect of such a semiotic nature when refers to the habitual constitution of such a symbolic order. Hume states,

> [W]e have several instances of habits, which may be revived by one single word; as when a person, who has by rote any periods of a discourse, or any number of verses, will be put in remembrance of the whole, which he is at a loss to recollect, by the single word or expression, with which they begin. (2006: 20)

Hume asserts a close link between the progress of thought and language; he also supposes ideas, abstract or particular, to be those elements that thought and imagination use for their development. Consequently, Hume's supposed system of language is a semiotic one that consists of signs signifying abstract and general ideas that are formed in the realm of impressions of passion. Language not only serves to communicate ideas, but due to its symbolic structure, serves the association of ideas and impressions. As far as the idea of the self is concerned, language assists the sympathetic communicating of ideas and impressions that are constituent elements of such an idea (See 2006: 21).

## The Function of Sympathy

According to Hume, sympathy is a feeling we have for those that are similar to us. Sympathy involves entering into the sentiments of others. Therefore we sympathize with those that most resemble us, physically and intellectually. In this sense, sympathy presupposes the existence of the "I" and of others as embodied, intellectual beings that are capable of communicating and conveying their sentiments to each other and understanding one another's states.

David M. Levy and Sandra J. Peart (2004) argue that Humean sympathy is similar to empathy. They base this on Hume's claim that self-love is one of the sources of sympathy. However, empathetic feeling is only one of the moments of sympathy. Sympathy is not only rooted in the passions of pride and humility, but in the opinion of others. What is at stake is not only my own self, as I perceive it internally, but my name as perceived by others. Hume explicitly states that "[o]ur reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others" (2006: 206). Sympathy is not a one-way street from one's self to the other. Through sympathy the "I" acquires the sentiments of the other as moments of the constitution of itself. The ideas that are raised due to sympathy, and which are converted to impressions gain such a degree of vivacity and force that they can replace the original passions themselves and produce affections equal to the original emotions.

Hume explains the intensity of sympathetic sentiments as a function of familiarity acquired by habit. The subjectivity of others is necessary for my subjectivity. Hume states that "[t]he stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of our own person" (2006: 207). The more I am exposed to the sentiments of others, the more likely it is that I will be affected by their particular ideas and passions; thus the more likely I will constitute an idea of my own self in the image of others.

Familiarity and habit indicate that the other does not signify a conceptual abstraction but an empirically existing human subject. Hence, the other's opinions and judgments become important to me along with the degree of the importance that I ascribe to them. Thus Hume writes that "[t]he judgment of a fool is the judgment of another person, as well as that of a wise man, and is only inferior in its influence on our own judgment" (2006: 209).

Susan James' interpretation of the origin of Humean notion of sympathy bases it on the experience of gravity, which in turn affects the imagination (2004: 115–118). In this way, she suggests a naturalist formulation concerning the emergence of the moral and value judgments in Hume. However, she ignores the distinction that Hume draws between objects of one's perception and other selves as one perceives them.[9] Hume does not treat the force of gravity (or any other natural phenomenon) in this way. Moreover, attributing such values to natural and cultural objects, e.g., to mountains or building blocks, happens only after such values have already emerged as the consequence of sympathetic interaction between human selves. Therefore, the effect of the experience of gravity on the imagination is not qualitatively different than the effect produced, for example, by the perception of a huge building; to the extent that their axiological effects are concerned, both influence the mind figuratively and metaphorically and both are byproducts of feelings of pride and humility.[10]

Hume's considering of the influence of imagination on the passions provides further evidence regarding the social determination of passions, impressions, and the human subject. Human beings do not choose different actions due to general, abstract maxims. Rather, they make decisions in accordance with their forms of life. Hume states that "[a] pleasure, which is suitable to the way of life, in which we are engag'd, excites more our desires and appetites than another, which is foreign to it" (2006: 273). Appetites, desires, and intentions are not set once and for all. They change due to human beings' life activity. As Hume states:

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9    James notices that "the admiration of other people reinforces our pride while their contempt undermines it, we cannot single-handedly sustain the feeling we have about our own condition and depend on the opinion of others to augment or diminish them" (2004: 114).

10    It is true, as James maintains, that Hume intends to provide a scientific account of human nature (2004: 107). However, such a scientific account does not have to be of a mechanical-Cartesian character.

> We may of ourselves acknowledge, that such an object is valuable, and such another odious; but 'till an orator excites the imagination, and gives force to these ideas, they may have but a feeble influence either on the will or the affections... The bare opinion of another, especially when inforc'd with passion, will cause an idea of good or evil to have an influence upon us, which would otherwise have been entirely neglected. This proceeds from the principle of sympathy or communication; and sympathy, as I have already observ'd, is nothing but the conversion of an idea into an impression by the force of imagination. (2006: 273)

The idea of the self is not based on impressions of sensation. Rather it is based on an impression of reflection; the factuality of the self follows from the sympathetically formed idea of the self.

Sympathy is a function, the content of which is material; i.e., it is determined by the material conditions of life, namely human activity, arts, industry etc. For instance, while discussing the scope of certain rights and the idea of justice, Hume attributes beneficence, humanity, friendship, gratitude, natural affection, and *public spirit* and tender sympathy to human nature (1998: 79). Similarly, in his first *Enquiry* (1999) he defines human beings as "reasonable," "sociable," and "active" beings, who have to submit to business and occupation (1999: 89). Hume rejects the Hobbesian idea of a natural state of war of all against all (1998: 87, n.11), because "Men are necessarily born in a family-society" (1998: 88). Hume discusses a thought experiment: suppose humans confront rational, but weaker beings, both in bodily and mental terms; dogs, for example. He concludes that the resulting intercourse between the two cannot be called society, as the latter supposes a degree of equality. Rather, it would be a relation of absolute command and servitude. So it would be natural that these rational but lesser beings would be deprived of the right to property. The difference between human nature and that of this inferior animal species prevents the full functioning of sympathy (1999: 107).

For Hume, when more advanced communities confront less advanced ones, a similar "temptation" to consider their members "lesser beings" is at work, leading the members of the former to consider themselves superior to the latter. He maintains that this is also the situation, in many nations, regarding the female sex and thus females are deprived – perhaps unjustly – from certain rights. Yet the similarity of their make-up as human persons eventually gives way to the growth of the idea of justice, so as to embrace them too. This happens, however, only as the consequence of material production, art, industry and the intercourse between humans and human communities, which compose and determine sympathy:

> [S]everal distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage, the boundaries of justice still grow larger, in proportion to the largeness of men's views, and the force of their mutual connections. History, experience, reason sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of human sentiments, and in the gradual enlargement of our regards to justice, in proportion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of that virtue. (1998: 89)

In his essay "Of National Characters" Hume (1985) sets out to explain the affinities among members of the same community. He rejects outright any role to air and climate, and emphasizes that human social activity is the only factor in determining national character. In animals the common characteristics may be attributed to biological and geographical dynamics. However, when humans are at stake, it is human activity and sympathy, political and social assemblage, and common language that is responsible for such sameness. It also makes the nature of sympathy as a function clearer.

> The Human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men to converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, and communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues. The propensity to company and society is so strong in all rational creatures; and the same disposition, which gives us this propensity, makes us enter deeply into each other's sentiments, and causes like passions and inclinations to run, as it were, by contagion, through the whole club or knot of companions. Where a number of men are united into one political body, the occasion of their intercourse must be so frequent, for defence, commerce, and government, that, together with the same speech or language, they must require a resemblance in their manners, and have a common or national character, as well as a personal one, peculiar to each individual. (Hume 1985: 202-203)[11]

Hume presents the idea of the freedom and necessity of human actions in an analogy with rules that govern the movements of material bodies. In order to explain the uniformity and cohesion of human action, he explicitly refers to civil society and the social nature of human existence:

> We must certainly allow, that the cohesion of the parts of matter arises from natural and necessary principles, whatever difficulty we may find in explaining them: And for a like reason we must allow, that human society is founded on like principles; and our reason in the latter case, is better than even that in former; because we not only observe, that men *always* seek society, but can also explain the principles, on which this universal propensity is founded. (2006: 258)

Hume is aware that particular human activities differentiate humans in their manners, behaviors and, in a general sense, their perceptions. Thus he writes: "The skin, pores, muscles, and nerves of a day-labourer are different from those of a man of quality: So are his sentiments, actions and manners" (2006: 259). It is the process of interiorization of these external determinations that identify human beings as members of society who belong to different ranks and classes. This process follows certain universal regulations and is applicable to all humans in a similar way. Thus Hume states that "[m]en cannot live without society, and cannot be associated without government" (2006: 259). Yet, the determining factor that guarantees uniformity of human life is external

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11    Hume furthers this line of the reasoning as to include the difference between animals: "Even the difference of animals, he adds, depends not on climate" (1985: 202, n. 4).

to individual agent's mind; this factor is the totality of human activity that is governed and regulated by the state:

> Government makes a distinction of property, and establishes the different ranks of men. This produces industry, traffic, manufactures, law-suites, war, leagues, alliances, voyages, travels, cities, fleets, ports, and all those other actions and objects, which cause a diversity, and at the same time maintain such an uniformity in human life. (2006: 259)

Human beings become aware of one another's passions and sentiments by sympathy. They are social animals. Without others there could be no enjoyment. With the aid of imagination, we produce ideas resembling impressions of others' and partake in their pleasure and satisfaction. This is possible because our minds "are mirrors to one another" (2006: 236).

## The Texture of the Self

Hume's idea of substance anticipates his rejection of the idea of substantial self. Hume asks whether the idea of substance is an idea of sensation or reflection. He reasons that if it is an idea of an impression, then it should be a color, a taste, an odor, or a sound etc. However, it seems obvious that substance is neither of the aforementioned. Thus he concludes "the idea of substance must therefore be deriv'd from an impression of reflection, if it really exists" (2006: 16). Since impressions of reflection are resolvable to passions and emotions there can be no immediate and purely perceptual representation of any substance. Thus, Hume concludes, the idea of substance is nothing but a collection of particular qualities.

Although the idea of substance does not correspond to an existing thing, it signifies something real as the representation of a collection of qualities. Moreover, Hume provides the basis for answering the question how atomic impressions or sensations are to be related: the association of impressions and ideas are possible only based on impressions of reflection. Impressions of sensation are only resolvable to atomic perceptions. The idea of a totality, such as an idea of a particular object, that makes associating of particular sensations into an idea of that particular object possible, emerges only in realm of impressions of reflection. In this sense, all impressions are derived from impressions of reflection. Thus, Hume states, "The idea of substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection" (2006: 16).

Hume rejects the idea of the self as a purely epistemological entity that is based on impressions of sensation. However, the self as a product of passions and sentiments, and as a moral agent, is affirmed. For Hume, the self is the product of passions of pride and humility, and the moral existence of the self is reinforced by sentiments through sympathy. Epistemologically, Hume

distinguishes between understanding, imagination, and the passions. However, these faculties are conjoined in the science of human nature which Hume intends to construct. It is important to distinguish between different levels of abstraction where Hume addresses a particular issue. For instance, the rejection of the idea of an epistemologically constructed self is not in tension with admitting the existence of the self as a product of the genetic processes rooted in the social and moral environment. What Hume rejects is the possibility of an associative construction of the idea of the self out of raw, distinct, atomic sense-data. There is no substantial and qualitative difference between perceptually acquired impressions that enable us to conclude that the idea of the self refers to such impressions. Therefore, the existence of the self must be rooted elsewhere. The empirical fact of, say, Hume's own standpoint that criticizes the idea of a pure epistemological self signifies the existence of a totality, which in this particular case designates Hume's personal self. The existence of the idea of the self is already affirmed through the negation of the idea of the self via a particular self (in this particular case, via David Hume's self). The existence of an empirical (social and moral) interpretive self is a necessary condition if any meaningful criticism of the idea of the self is to be realized. Hence, Amelie Rorty's (1993) characterization of Hume's philosophical project in the *Treatise* as a "British proto-version of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*".

Hume's non-Cartesian dualism also helps us to appreciate his rejection of the idea of a substantial self. The incorporeality that he attributes to mind does not denote the mind as a different substance but signifies the "ideal" texture of its composition. This "ideality" signifies the unity of thinking and bodily activity of human as the psycho-physical unity.

In the essay, "On the Immortality of the Soul," Hume argues that what is designated by the term "soul,"—that is, consciousness and memory—definitely undergoes change. The mind, with the body, is generated, degenerated, corrupted, and eventually vanishes into nothingness (1985: 591–592).

In order to justify his argument Hume makes a number of assertions: First, substance, be it material or ideal, is a composition of different qualities, i.e., it is a *name* that signifies a particular totality of a number of qualities. Hume accentuates this line of reasoning in the *Appendix* of the *Treatise* stating, "Philosophers begin to be reconciled to the principle, *that we have no idea of external substance, distinct from the ideas of particular qualities*. This must pave the way for a like principle with regard to the mind, *that we have no notion of it, distinct from the particular perceptions*" (2006: 400). That is, the mind or soul just is a composition of ideal properties. Moreover, this composite mind or soul is closely related to the individual body. Both are subject to change. By analogical reasoning, therefore, the soul is not immortal. It changes and vanishes just as the body dies, and as the person ceases to be. The alleged independence from activity (perception) attributed to the idea of the self, thus, is just an abstraction of mind, just as the idea of substance independent from determinate qualities is such an abstraction.

The immateriality of the soul follows from the impossibility of reducing mind or consciousness to a *simple* substance. This form of immateriality can only be conceived in terms of action and activity. It is the social composition of the human species that determines the degree of development of consciousness. Hume considers mind (soul) and body neither identical nor contradictory. In this, he comes close to monism holding that body vs. mind or body vs. thinking is a fallacious abstraction. It is the human body *itself* that thinks. Thinking is always an action performed by a natural and so by a spatially determined body. It follows that it is an action expressed/realized spatially.

Hume's account of the mind is a response to both substantialist and physiological approaches. The soul cannot be reduced to the sum of physiological or mechanical bodily movements. There is a correspondence between certain bodily states and consciousness. However, the two are not identical, since consciousness is not physical in its texture.[12]

There is no substance to the mind; there is no substratum that holds the perceptions together. Rather, the mind is a system the content of which is determined by the passions.[13] The passions are not mere reactions to external forces. They are the primary source of action. The idea of the self vis-à-vis the passions is therefore real and expandable so that it determines the idea of the self with regard to thought and imagination. Passions are determined socially and so are their outcomes. Moreover, there is no opposition between the passions and reason; on the contrary, the two are complementary and reason is limited by the sentiments and therefore it is determined socially and in praxis. As Rorty puts it, "unless [reason] is supported by sentiment, habit and custom, [it] can only provide a criterion to determine the propriety of the intentions of the will: it is too general to command specific actions, indeed too general to provide specific intentions" (1993: 179). Reason discovers the idea of the self, as is with the case of reason discovering the relation between ideas (2006: 295-296). So, the existence of the self with respect to thought and imagination is constituted. The existence of the epistemological self is not based upon immediate, atomic impressions. The idea of the epistemological self is not rooted in the formality, vivacity, and immediacy of impressions but is an abstraction based on the idea of a passionately constructed self that is continually enforced via sentiments and through sympathy.

## Conclusion: The Paradox of the Self, the Intimate Externality

Hume's theory of the self can be considered a prototype of a historical-genetic approach that defines the self as an "ideal". The non-substantiality of the Humean self designates not the unreality of its being but this distinguishing texture. As an ideal, the self is not only a part of reality but reflects and

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12   This conclusion is also found in the *Appendix*. See the quote above in section 1 of this paper, 2006: 399.
13   See 2006: 414.

refracts reality by assuming a unique position in it. By definition, the self has a meaning that signifies something other than itself with the use of signs. The system of signs the self uses as a mean of signifying the real is basically verbal and linguistic.

Traditionally, philosophy locates mental phenomena *in* consciousness; by committing the same error of localizing mental phenomena in consciousness, and studying the latter in isolation from the real conditions of their being, both idealism and empirical psychologism reduce the study of the self to the study of isolated consciousness and its laws. In this way, they treat consciousness either as transcendental or as an amalgamation of empirical data. In the former case, consciousness appears everything; in the latter, it amounts to nothing.

We can interpret Hume's rejection of substantial being of the self as a first formulation of the process of the formation and emergence of the idea of ideational self or the reflexive consciousness. Hume's treatment of the self in Books 2 and 3 of the *Treatise* hints towards a possible solution of the question concerning the self as a social and objective, but non-substantial phenomenon.

Consciousness requires an objective and real medium for actualization and the word (language) provides consciousness with that reality. Therefore the problem of consciousness appears as the question concerning the inner word.

When setting up the psyche or human consciousness as an object and as a part of external reality, the question arises how to define the inner experience in external, objective terms. The basis of the answer is that the reality of the psyche, the inner experience, is the reality of the sign and human activity. The psyche is not reducible to physiological and nervous processes. The subject, the consciousness or the psyche, resides in the borderline area that separates the organism from its surrounding world. This is the paradoxical mode of the existence of the self which is also designated by the Humean notion of the self: the internality of the self or consciousness is based upon external reality. Although there is no immanent substance of the self, and although the self is totally based on external reality and experience, there is, nonetheless, a sense of intimate access to the self. In fact, there is a self, even though not internally and intimately founded, that is internally and intimately accessible. The riddle of the self that is put forward by Hume can be interpreted as a variation of this problem.

The connecting point between the self of Book 1 and the self of Books 2 and 3 is the paradoxical structure of the self as an entity that is constituted externally but is accessible to the person intimately. The negative position of Book 1 aims at rejecting the notion of the self as a substantial being prior to any action or activity. Meanwhile, this negative conclusion signifies a positive resolution of the matter put forward in Books 2 and 3. The self, by its constitution, does not need an internally and inherently existing core or substratum; the self is rooted elsewhere, that is, in the external world, in our social surroundings. In the absence of such an environment, the idea of the self cannot be conceived through associating ideas in the abstract. This is not due to some shortcoming in the cognitive faculties of the agent of perception, but to a particular kind

of sense-perception that is required for the constitution of the idea of the self. Such impressions cannot be achieved at the highly abstract and formal level of epistemology as Hume indicates it in Book 1 of the *Treatise*. Unless both the difference and interconnection between these two realms is admitted, and the social-moral constitution of the self is properly considered, the resolution of the Humean riddle seems impossible.

The concluding remarks of Book 2, part 3, section 8 of Hume's *Treatise* not only show that all impressions are reducible to impressions of reflection, and that the passionate self is also the basis of the so-called epistemological self, but also provide a condensed explanation of the formation of sympathetic self and its differentiation from itself and from others in time and in space. Hume clearly explains that both passions and reason are affections of the mind; the former is a violent passion and the latter a calm one. We had formerly been said that passions yield the idea of the self, and, that the causes of passions, being different from their object – the self – are variable. Notwithstanding the fact that difference between calm and violent passions is a difference of degree rather than a difference of quality, these passions can change into one another. The tension between reason and passion explains the diversity of human selves as well as the diverse nature of one particular self. Hume states: "Upon the whole, this struggle of passion and of reason, as it is call'd, diversifies human life, and makes men so different not only from each other, but also from themselves in different times" (2006: 280).

Thus, the fictitiousness of the idea of the self with regard to thought and imagination, in contrast to the factuality of the idea of the self with regard to passions, is a reflection of the aforementioned tension between calm and violent passions that results in differentiation of human beings with regard to each other and themselves. Moreover, this tension and diversification represent the paradoxical being of the self as something subject to great and small revolutions, yet supposed to have spatio-temporal identity. Unless the objectivity of the self is admitted, the paradoxical existence of the self cannot be conceived and the tension between the epistemological and passionate selves will not disappear. Since the self is external to itself, it is subject to the same logical rules that direct the passing from one idea to another, regardless of how close or distant in time and in space these ideas might be. It is through this passage that the identity of the self in space and time is attained. These diverse and numerous ideas that are caused by calm and violent passions can be related to each other as elements of an unfinalized whole to assume an identity called "the self". Therefore, what guarantees the identity of the self and makes intelligible the idea of the self, is the paradoxical mode of the existence of the self as something objective, yet apprehended as if intimately.

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Sijaveš Azeri

## Hjumova teorija društvene konstitucije sopstva

**Apstrakt**

Hjum razlikuje sopstvo misli i uobrazilje i sopstvo strasti. Kritikuje se jer protivreči sebi zbog toga što navodno pripisuje fiktivnost sopstvu u prvoj knjizi *Rasprave*, a kasnije ponovo uvodi sopstvo u drugoj i trećoj knjizi. Hjumovo razmatranje ideje sopstva, međutim, nije protivrečno: on pokazuje nemogućnost čisto asocijaciono-empirističkog razmatranja sopstva. Umesto toga, predlaže društveno razmatranje konstitucije ideje sopstva i svesti. Čineći to, Hjumovo razmatranje sopstva anticipira društveno-istorijske teorije sopstva.

Ključne reči: Hjum, svest, sopstvo, subjektivnost

Slobodan Perović

# TEAM AND PROJECT COMPOSITION
# IN BIG PHYSICS EXPERIMENTS

**ABSTRACT**
Identifying optimal ways of organizing exploration in particle physics mega-labs is a challenging task that requires a combination of case-based and formal epistemic approaches. Data-driven studies suggest that projects pursued by smaller master-teams (fewer members, fewer sub-teams) are substantially more efficient than larger ones across sciences, including experimental particle physics. Smaller teams also seem to make better project choices than larger, centralized teams. Yet the epistemic requirement of small, decentralized, and diverse teams contradicts the often emphasized and allegedly inescapable logic of discovery that forces physicists pursuing the fundamental levels of the physical world to perform centralized experiments in mega-labs at high energies. We explain, however, that this epistemic requirement could be met, since the nature of theoretical and physical constraints in high energy physics and the technological obstacles stemming from them turn out to be surprisingly open-ended.

## 1. Organizing Experimental Science: Epistemological Approaches

What are the best ways to organize big scientific communities and big scientific networks, big physics experiments, in particular?[1] The organizational issues common to modern large physics laboratories were not common in a typical physics laboratory the size of a house basement at the beginning of the 20th century. There was, of course, a network of different laboratories that communicated, so organizational issues appeared at a higher level of organization. Today, however, there are a hundred times more professional physicists than before WWII (Kragh 2002, Ch 2). This is a staggering increase, much larger than the increase in the overall population of the respective societies. In addition, vastly more resources are invested in physics experiments today than in

[1]    This work was presented at the 4th LOGiCIC international workshop at the University of Amsterdam, November 26–28, 2015. (https://logicicworkshop2015.wordpress.com/programme/) It was also presented at an international conference *How to Act Together: From Collective Engagement to Protest* held in Belgrade in November 19–21, 2015, under the title "Epistemic and Social Networks in Big Science".

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the age of small laboratories (Ibid.). The latest result of these trends is the Large Hadron Collider at CERN, which houses about ten thousand professionals, including thousands of physicists. Discovery papers coming out the laboratory are sometimes signed by thousands of collaborators. Several obvious questions emerge. How should communities of this sort be organized? Has this kind of organization been implemented anywhere? And can large laboratories be organized into networks in optimal ways?

There is often a political element to such questions, especially when funding agencies enter the picture. Is organizing science best left to scientists? Or should funding agencies be the ones to determine organization? The default response among academics seems to be to let scientists do their work because that is how they will perform best. To ensure results are advantageous to society, the argument goes, funding agencies should not interfere substantially with the way scientists want to plan and perform their research. Yet this is a vacuous answer. To respond properly, we need to know what happens once the agencies grant the money to scientists and let them organize the way they do science.

In fact, all sorts of outcomes can and do happen. Institutional inertia frequently shapes long-running research (Torrisi 2014), or the funding structure can influence decisions and determine the organizational structure of research (Hallonsten and Heinze 2012). Both can be harmful to productivity and to the efficiency of research. The politics at all levels inevitably shape large research operations, often adversely (Chompalov et al. 2002; Greenberg 1999). One example is the organization of CERN; during the first 15 years of its existence, it consistently performed worse than labs in the US. One of the main reasons was that at CERN, the quota of representatives of each donor nation was mandated. This prevented hiring based on merit alone. A strong top-down hierarchical organization was required to oversee the process (Herman et al. 1987).

Thus, while we agree that the science is best left to the scientists, we argue that this is only true if they approach the organizational issues as meticulously as they approach the subject of their research. But is there an optimal way of organizing teams and projects in large laboratories, i.e. an optimal organization that provides optimal epistemic conditions for generating experimental knowledge? If so, can we identify it, and how?



Diagram 1: Epistemological approaches to the organizational structure of scientific networks.

We can approach the question in two different ways (Diagram 1). The first approach is formal and makes use of mathematical modeling and computer simulations. Philosophers, science policy analysts, computer scientists and others have used this approach to address similar questions. For example, computer simulations utilizing graphs have been used to examine how networks of various structures – centralized, loosely connected, or decentralized – affect efficiency and accuracy in performing certain kinds of tasks (Zollman 2007). Modelling techniques typically used in economics, utilizing, for instance, decision theory, have been used for the same purpose (Charn et al. 1978). The second approach employs case-based analysis: a historical or data-driven analysis of particular cases can be performed to examine the networks in question (Perović et al 2016; Maruyama et al. 2015; Cetina 1999).

There are strengths and weaknesses to both approaches, so ideally we should do comparative analysis as well. On the one hand, when relying on case-based analysis, we rarely arrive at succinct or formalizable conclusions. Thus, we can combine those sorts of insights with modelling and simulations to improve understanding. On the other hand, the parameters in simulations and abstract formal models are usually not connected in obvious ways with actual cases, so case-based studies can help establish this relationship in a direct and informed manner.

## 2. Efficiency and Structure of Scientific Networks

There are two sets of questions that these two approaches can address in our discussion of organizing science: quantitative and qualitative. First, what is the optimal team composition in terms of the number of researchers? How many members does an efficient research group require, and what is the optimal number of researchers in the laboratory, given a certain task? Second, in terms of the optimal project composition, what is an optimal division of researchers into groups (sub-teams)? Project leaders and managers have to grapple with these quantitative and qualitative questions and solve them under time constraints while having only a vague idea of how the actual research will unfold. If there are too few researchers per team, it is easy to end up with like-minded approaches to the problem, and the required diversity is lost. If there are too many, communication may not be effective. There is also a problem of inertia that sets in if the team has been working together for too long; this is a major issue in long-lasting experiments.

These questions have been studied extensively by science policy scholars (Cook et al. 2015; Carillo et al. 2013; Maruyama et al. 2015; Torrisi et al. 2014), as they are of a general epistemological interest as much as they are a matter of practical concern. A recent example is a public debate among biologists on the optimal number of team members in a typical biology laboratory (Cook et al. 2015). In fact, these issues come up in other kinds of organizations, especially in industry where they were studied systematically in various ways

much earlier than in science. The answers are naturally context-specific, although we may find an organizing rule or two that is epistemically beneficial across contexts.

The question about the size of scientific networks and their ability to solve problems or make accurate predictions about natural phenomena is closely related to the question of the role of cognitive diversity in groups. Industries are interested in exploring diversity as a way to increase the efficiency of their operations. Scott Page (2007) says: "Diversity matters because it can increase the bottom line by introducing more perspectives, heuristics, interpretations, and predictive models. Diverse cognitive tools can, in turn, improve an organization's ability to solve problems and make accurate predictions." He has developed a theorem (Page 2011) to capture the idea that a group will be better off if a new member is somehow different than the existing members, while the value of the contribution of each new member of the same type will keep diminishing with each addition. The theorem is applicable under the assumption of the law of diminishing returns, a standard assumption in Utility Theory and in the assumption of the absence of interactions (interactions can be destructive). This abstract theorem is meant to be a baseline – and to provide motivation, as it were – for studying the impact of diversity across various contexts and as a general argument for the benefit of cognitive diversity.

## 3. Big Physics and Epistemic Norms

In our case, the question is how to optimally organize a large laboratory when attempting to discover a fundamental particle. How many researchers should work on a project and how should they be divided? How many laboratories will most efficiently result in discovery? Can a demanding discovery be made with only one laboratory?

A recent quantitative study addressed the effect of team composition on efficiency in one of the major particle physics mega-laboratories, Fermi National Laboratory (Fermilab) (Perović et al. 2016). Efficiency was measured by determining the weighted citation counts in 12 categories. Using citation counts in this case was an accurate measure of the significance and fruitfulness of experiments because the usual troubles of bibliometric analysis were absent. First, the field is very isolated, so only the experts working in the field read and cite (or fail to cite) the papers. The citations do not come from outside the group. Furthermore papers producing the same results will not be overlooked because only a handful of labs do research on the subject; thus, physicists cannot fail to take them into account. In short, the bibliometric data pretty much reflect peer agreement on the adequacy of experiments and the importance of their results.

To analyze the data, the study used data envelopment analysis, a standard way of assessing efficiency of units in an organization (e.g. bank branches) (Cooper et al. 2011). The method identifies efficient and inefficient units based on the same inputs and outputs. In this case, inputs were the number

of researchers and research teams for each experiment (a unit), and the output was the above-characterized citation counts. It turned out that all efficient experiments were comparatively small, and all inefficient experiments were comparatively large.

A preliminary conclusion of this study and the conclusion of similar studies across various fields of science (Bonaccorsi and Daraio 2005; van der Val et al. 2009; Campion et al. 1993) is that it is generally better to organize a number of small experiments and smaller teams. Moreover, at least in the cases similar to the ones studied, scientists should introduce diversity at some level, preferably very early on, when teams pick the hypotheses they will test and when they design the experiments. Small groups avoid hierarchical and atmospheric issues, as flat structures tend to be less hierarchical and provide more direct communication (Ibid.).

Do such studies have a normative value? In other words, the conclusions of the analyses may be sound but it may be impossible to change much in organizational terms, so they may only offer insight into the limitations of real scientific networks. The logic of discovery in high energy physics, for instance, pushes us to build large laboratories. The discovery of fundamental particles requires collisions at high energies, and this, so the argument goes, requires large experimental machines. Eventually, "in science, as in war, big science becomes unavoidable" (Rescher 1999).

In fact, there is no indication of sharp limits as experimental approaches to desired phenomena in fundamental physics do not have very specific, but rather general requirements to start with. We can test the Standard Model in a number of ways that do not require high energies achieved by large colliders and in much smaller laboratories.

The background physical theories (Quantum Field Theory and Quantum Electrodynamics) define possible physical phenomena within a very wide range of energies and processes. The general constraints are then defined at the level of Model Theories (in agreement with the background theories; e.g. the Standard Model or Super Symmetry – SUSY) defining the "particle signatures" (i.e. kind decays desired particles ought to produce) to be detected. The actual physical constraints affecting actual experiments are shaped only at the level of phenomenological theories which tell us, for example, what sort of intensity of gamma radiation we may expect in a certain kind of detector for presumed particle decay. This is the level of theory at which the choice of the processes to detect happens. This is where energy domains are determined and particles of interest and the expected observable outcomes of the postulated processes are defined. And these offer a wide range of direct and indirect ways of reliable and substantial detection.

In fact, detection of particles that decouple at high energies and their properties does not necessitate production of such high energies at all. Thus, we can observe cosmic rays that harbor high energy particles instead of producing them in accelerators. Detection of this sort is an unstable process and the parameters cannot be controlled the way they can in particle colliders. This led

to its early sidelining in the development of High Energy Physics. Yet recent developments, due to a staggering increase in computing power, mean that the symbiosis of simulations and observation, enabled by new detecting techniques, has become a potent tool – perhaps as potent as controlled experimentation.

Similarly, astrophysics of high energy events can provide insights that even colliders cannot, as transient events at much larger energies in observational astrophysics are inaccessible to accelerators. Moreover, in the so called neutron guides, "testing basic principles of physics does not necessarily require a high-energy accelerator" (Geltenbort 2013). Neutrons are susceptible to all four basic physical forces. As they are electrically neutral, they cannot be guided and bunched by electric currents as protons in hadron colliders. But in 1959, Y. B. Zel'dovich realized that if they are super-cooled, neutrons can be slowed down (to 2m/s) and bunched. A phenomenological theory explains how this can be achieved. A neutron in a gravitational field can be used to test for the existence of the fifth force, the existence of which both the Standard Model and Super Symmetry theory predict. The decay time of neutrons is also relevant, as decay is based on weak force. Finally, neutrons are composed of $u$ and $d$ quarks with opposing fractional charges. If the charges do not exactly coincide, the neutron is characterized by such an Electric Dipole Moment which would imply the violation of Charge Parity and Time reversal symmetries. The shortcoming of the Standard Model is that the violation of Charge Parity in weak force is insufficient to explain the dominance of matter to anti-matter. The alternatives to the Standard Model propose a small Electric Dipole Moment. These alternatives can all be tested in neutron guides.

Alternatively, we could employ a very different strategy and improve the situation by creating favourable epistemological conditions at an early stage of experimentation. For example, instead of investing a large sum in a collider with the current technology, we could conceivably invest in pioneering developments of technologies that will eventually decrease the price of experimenting at desirable energies. If we opt for a portfolio strategy of diverse investing across laboratories, our innovating in experimentation across energies may bear fruit. In fact, an example of the potential for this strategy to work in experimental particle physics is the development of the detecting techniques and accelerating tools (magnets and superconductors, above all) for linear colliders. These colliders provide a much clearer picture of particle interactions than circular ones, since they can collide leptons – particles that are not composed of more elementary parts (quarks) and, thus, do not produce a large number of background interactions – at the requisite high energies. When the decision was made to build LHC at CERN, technology for linear collisions at sufficiently high energies for testing the Higgs boson hypothesis was not available, but building a giant circular hadron collider was an achievable goal (Panoffsky 1994). In the meantime, even with a comparatively small investment, the length of the linear collider performing at sufficiently high energies was reduced by 50%, and the detecting problems these colliders initially faced were solved by investing in techniques at much lower energies (related to the

magnets, criogenics, and detecting techniques).[2] But the granted lump sum (of about ten billion dollars) was already spent on building the LHC, so the linear collider that would provide much more precise insights into relevant particle interactions could not be built.

How far would physics have advanced if the money had been spent on the development of diverse technologies for linear collisions? There are, of course, political and funding reasons why physicists need to invest in technology that will produce results within a set time span with high certainty. But that only means funding agencies are enforcing a less efficient strategy of organizing experimentation, not that there are clear technological and physical limits pushing physics to develop against the epistemologically beneficial norms. Institutional inertia and the traditional way of organizing established during WWII and the Manhattan project may go against these norms as well.

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2    See all the technical data at http://www.linearcollider.org/.

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Slobodan Perović

## Struktura timova i projekata u velikim eksperimentima u oblasti fizike

### Apstrakt

Identifikovanje optimalnih načina organizovanja istraživanja u mega laboratorijama fizike čestica je izazovan zadatak koji zahteva kombinaciju studija pojedinačnih slučajeva i pristupa formalne epistemičke analize. Studije zasnovane na podacima ukazuju na to da su projekti koje izvode manji master timovi (manji broj članova, manje pod-timova) znatno efikasniji od onih većih u različitim oblastima nauka, uključujući eksperimentalnu fiziku čestica. Manji timovi takođe prave bolje izbore projekata na kojima će raditi od većih, centralizovanih timova. Pa ipak, epistemički opravdani zahtev sa što manjim, decentralizovanim i raznolikim timova je u suprotnosti sa često naglašenom i navodno neizbežnom logikom otkrića koja prisiljava fizičare koji istražuju osnovne nivoe fizičkog sveta da izvode centralizovane eksperimente u mega-laboratorijama na veoma velikim energijama. Naš je argument, međutim, da bi taj epistemički zahtev mogao ipak biti ispunjen, jer su priroda teorijskih i fizičkih ograničenja u fizici visokih energija i tehnološke prepreke koje iz njih proizilaze iznenađujuće otvoreni.

Ključne reči: socijalna epistemologija, mreže, nauka, fizika, tehnologija, inovacija

Predrag Slijepčević

# ANTHROPOCENE, CAPITALOCENE, MACHINOCENE: ILLUSIONS OF INSTRUMENTAL REASON

**ABSTRACT**

In their seminal work, *Dialectics of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno interpreted capitalism as the irrational monetization of nature. In the present work, I analyze three 21$^{st}$ century concepts, Anthropocene, Capitalocene and Machinocene, in light of Horkheimer and Adorno's arguments and recent arguments from the philosophy of biology. The analysis reveals a remarkable prescience of the term "instrumental reason", which is present in each of the three concepts in a profound and cryptic way. In my interpretation, the term describes the propensity of science based on the notion of physicalism to interpret nature as the machine analyzable and programmable by the human reason. As a result, the Anthropocene concept is built around the mechanicist model, which may be presented as the metaphor of the car without brakes. In a similar fashion, the Machinocene concept predicts the emergence of the mechanical mind, which will dominate nature in the near future. Finally, the Capitalocene concept turns a perfectly rational ambition to expand knowledge into an irrational obsession with over-knowledge, by employing the institutionalized science as the engine of capitalism without brakes. The common denominator of all three concepts is the irrational propensity to legitimize self-destruction. Potential avenues for countering the effects of "instrumental reason" are suggested.

*The melancholy science from which I make this offering to my friend relates to a region that from time immemorial was regarded as the true field of philosophy, but which, since the latter's conversion into method, has lapsed into intellectual neglect, sententious whimsy and finally oblivion: the teaching of the good life… Our perspective of life has passed into an ideology which conceals the fact that there is life no longer.* (Adorno 2005: 15)

## 1. Introduction

Is it possible to analyze capitalism in light of biology? Provided that the question is understood as a philosophical question, a positive answer to it is identifiable in the works of the first generation philosophers of the Frankfurt School. In *Dialectics of Enlightenment* (DE) Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno interpreted

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capitalism as an irrational monetization of nature (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002). Here is a metaphor, which explains the relationship between capitalism and nature in the manner close to the Adorno-Horkheimer style of thinking.

Let us imagine that capitalism represents a form of a car. The driver of the car is the entire humanity via its socio-economic activity (Hawken et al. 1999; Soete et al. 2015; Schwab 2016). The car has the functioning engine and the functioning mechanism for speed enhancement controlled by the gas pedal. However, the car differs from standard car models in that it lacks the brake. It is not programmed to stop, slow down or reverse back because the economic recession is not computed in the car model. Instead, the car is modeled on the assumption that the global economy must grow – the pressure on the gas pedal is constant. If, for some reason, the car enters the unfavorable territory such as an uphill path, which leads to it slowing down (recession), the car is programmed to immediately search for solutions as to how to avoid such a path and return to the state of acceleration again (Soete et al. 2015).

In the language of cybernetics, the car without brakes as a metaphor for capitalism means that modern humanity constantly self-enhances positive feedback. All natural systems are exposed to two types of regulatory pressure. One type of pressure is the positive feedback loop (Camazine et al. 2003: 15–28) – the accelerating car metaphor. The alternative type of pressure is the negative feedback loop (Camazine et al. 2003: 15–28) – the brake metaphor. Constant balancing of positive and negative feedbacks, acceleration and brake, is the source of natural systems' stability or homeostasis.

The sources of positive feedback in natural systems such as plant or animal populations, for example, are their capacities to multiply through sexual reproduction and to maintain the scale of population growth through exploiting nutritional and other resources available in the ecosystem (De Angelis et al. 1986: 5–14, Schoener 2011). The sources of negative feedback include their natural predators, lack of nutritional and other resources in the ecosystem, various diseases and ecological catastrophes (De Angelis et al. 1986: 5–14, Schoener 2011). The biosphere itself is the super-system which (i) integrates numerous sub-systems produced by 9 million extant biological species[1] (Mora et al. 2011) and (ii) maintains its own homeostasis (Lovelock and Margulis 1974).

Modern humanity, as a natural system, defeated all predators, eradicated all major infectious diseases and invented technologies for the ecosystem alteration, thus eliminating important natural sources of negative feedback (Bateson 2000, Schwab 2016). This enabled capitalism, as the dominant human socio-economic form, to become the conquest of nature (Hawken et al. 1999, Moore 2017, 2018). Nature is seen as an unlimited source of cheap capital. The only requirement is the identification of the means by which the capital

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1    Estimates of the species number vary. The most recent one (Larsen et al. 2017) suggests that the total number of species is 1-6 billion, with the 70%-90% of the species range representing bacteria. The estimate by Mora et al. 2011 excludes microbes (bacteria and archaea).

hidden in nature can be released. In the conquering attempt of this sort, any form of brake becomes an obstacle.

Given that a reliance on the positive feedback generates an enormous risk to the system as a whole (De Angelis et al. 1986: 5-14, Bateson 2000: 486–496, Camazine et al. 2003: 15–28), humanity must discover a form of a negative feedback loop. The self-imposed negative feedback loop could enable stabilization of the damaged ecosystem. In other words, without the functioning brake, the accelerating car is doomed to a crash, sooner or later, because the super-system eventually punishes the lack of negative feedback (Bateson 2000: 486–496, De Angleis et al. 1986: 5–14, Camazine et al. 2003: 15–28). Modern humanity has already entered the ecological disaster of its own making, known as the sixth mass extinction of species (Ceballos et al. 2015) or biological "annihilation" (Ceballos et al. 2017) which reduces biodiversity required for the long-term survival. Other manifestations of existential risks due to the lack of negative feedback include climate change, potential loss of control over technologies and vulnerabilities of human systemic technologies to external insults (Rees 2003). Thus, the invention of the brake on the imaginary car of capitalism becomes a necessary civilizational requirement.

In this paper I will argue that the greatest contribution of the Critical Theory of Frankfurt School, primarily Adorno and Horkheimer, to the modern philosophical, sociological and scientific discourses is demonstration, in an indirect way, that the invention of the brake on the accelerating car of capitalism constitutes an anti-barbaric act and thus a necessary civilizational advance, or more precisely an antidote against self-destruction. I will use the concept of Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000, Lewis and Maslin 2015: 171) and its more recent derivatives, Capitalocene (Moore 2017: 597; Moore 2018: 2) and Machinocene (Price 2016), as the ground for analysis. In the next section, I will outline the investigative platform on which this study is based and explain terminology. In subsequent sections, I will develop new analytics of modernity based on several recent developments in biological sciences.

## 2. Investigative Context and Definitions of Terms

The purpose of this section is to (i) outline the investigative framework on which this study is based and (ii) explain terms Anthropocene, Capitalocene and Machinocene. The main text that forms the investigative basis of the study is DE, first published in 1944. The concepts of Anthropocene, Capitalocene, and Machinocene, all invented in the 21st century, are predictable in principle, by the argumentation expressed in DE.

The starting point in constructing the investigative framework is the exposure of the accelerating car of capitalism metaphor (ACM in the rest of text) to the spirit of DE arguments, with a view to merging them together. One of the key concepts of DE is "instrumental reason" explicable by the criticism of the foundation of science. Scientific world-view, which dominates western civilization since Enlightenment, is based on the mechanistic understanding of nature.

In Galileo's mathematization of nature, *nature itself* is idealized on the model of the new mathematics... Thought is reified as an autonomous, automatic process, aping the machine it has itself produced, so that it can finally be replaced by the machine. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 19).

Interpretation of nature as a mechanical system, the machine, can only be invented by a form of reason that becomes irrational – "instrumental reason".

ACM reflects mechanicism that permeates the scientific world-view dominated by physicalism (Barbieri 2016: 2). In brief, physicalism is the notion that all sciences are reducible to the mechanics of physics (Wächtershäuser 1997, Stoljar 2017). (I will argue later that nature cannot be reduced to mechanistic arguments of physicalism; see the Machinocene section). The shiny and fast car, which we drive, is a mechanical invention par excellence, with all attributes of progressivism. The fuel for the car is science and technology, also recognized by the acronym R&D (research and development) – the humanity's collective laboratory, turned-fuelling-station, which interprets the entire nature as the source for fuel extraction (Hawken et al. 1999, Soete et al. 2015, Moore 2017, Moore 2018). Everything seems perfectly rational in this laboratory. An army of 7.8 million scientists producing 1.5 million research papers and millions of patents per annum works on generating the fuel for the car in the most ingenious ways by applying powerful inventions based on the scientific method (Soete et al. 2015: 14–18).

However, the irrationality of the dominant scientific world-view manifests as the inability to see (blindness) that a car without brakes is doomed to a crash. There are enough signs to recognize that the car has already started colliding with its natural habitat. One of the signs is a recently reported phenomenon of "biological annihilation", which may damage the biosphere irreversibly (Ceballos et al. 2017: E6089). However, there is no mechanism on the car or within the car, which can detect the crash, the same way the mechanism for braking is non-existent. As a result, the global scientific laboratory-turned-fueling-station, continues to work unabated. The option of stopping the car to assess damage to itself and its habitat is not available. Instead, humanity continues to accelerate the car by using ever more powerful types of fuel leading to ever greater damage–a clear sign of irrationalism of "instrumental reason". The ACM model is further rationalized by suggesting that there is no need for inventing brakes (Hawken et al. 1999: 1–21). Instead, nature should undergo voluntary enslavement to capitalism by opening its avenues long enough and wide enough, so that the need for the brake on ACM is eliminated.[2]

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2    This is the key message of the influential book (Hawken et al. 1999: 4). The authors identify four forms of capital: human, financial, manufactured and natural. The first three forms of capital use the fourth form (natural capital or the entire nature) as the material for creating "cars, highways, cities, bridges, houses, food, medicine, hospital and schools." The estimated value of the natural capital is $ 400 – 500 trillion in total, or $ 30 trillion annually (the equivalent of the world economic output).

The merger of ACM and the spirit of DE arguments thus represent the investigative framework summarized in Table 1. The merger is formally facilitated by selecting relevant quotes from DE and pairing them with the rationalist and irrationalist components of ACM outlined above (Table 1). This framework will serve as the basis for analysis in subsequent sections of the article. Before starting the analysis it is important to define the terms Anthropocene, Capitalocene and Machinocene.

**Table 1.** The investigative framework of the study constructed by combining relevant quotes from DE and the ACM metaphor discussed in the text.

| | DE | ACM |
|---|---|---|
| **Argument for rationalism** | Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 1) | Human technological progress is deceptively rational: a perfect mechanism for enhancing positive feedback. |
| **Argument for irrationalism** | Yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 1) | Human technological progress is hopelessly irrational: it lacks negative feedback required for balancing its potentially deadly over-drive. |

All three terms express, each in its own way, forces of domination which humanity is trying to exert over nature. The term Anthropocene, coined by a Nobel Prize winning chemist, Paul Crutzen, and his colleague Eugene Stoermer (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000) is summarized by the following quote:

...humanity replaced nature as the dominant environmental force on Earth (Rudimman et al. 2015: 38).

This message, in the context of the scientific world-view, is the logical consequence of the growth of scientific knowledge governed by physicalism.

Knowledge, which is power, knows no limits either in its enslavement of creation or its deference to worldly masters. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 2)

However, the physicalist message was countered long before the term Anthropocene was invented:

What human beings learn from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and human beings. ...Only thought which does violence to itself is hard enough to shatter myths. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 2)

Thus, DE reminds us that the roots of the Anthropocene concept are in "instrumental reason" but not in science. The origins of "instrumental reason"

precede science and can be traced to the territory of human culture we call mythology. Given that mythology is an ever-present part of human culture, at least since the origin of languages, the inevitable conclusion is that roots of "instrumental reason" may be in the human nature, as argued by biologist Edward O. Wilson (Wilson 2012:56). Science is nothing but a tool in hands of "instrumental reason" which becomes the victim of mythologization (see below).

The Capitalocene concept is a recent variation on the Anthropocene theme developed by Jason M. Moore (Moore 2017; Moore 2018). It represents a powerful criticism of the Anthropocene concept. Its critique is focused on how Anthropocene misinterprets its historical and philosophical roots. The key argument is that the Anthropocene concept represents a product of philosophical reductionism based on the Cartesian split. The Cartesian split turned humanity into an independent subject and nature into a passive object. This gave a license to the subject to dominate the object. However, humanity and its institutions are an integral part of nature. Moore used the phrases "humanity-in-nature" and "nature-in-humanity" to contrast the Cartesian stance of humanity and nature as separate and independent entities. Thus, Moore defines capitalism as the global ecology, which combines the quest for power and coproduction with nature into an organic whole. Whether this organic whole has any long-term future is a different matter.

The value of the Capitalocene concept is in highlighting important omissions that make Anthropocene almost untenable in the context of new developments in foundations of biology (see below). Also, it helps refine the ACM model. Even though the car is driven by the entire humanity through the acceptance of international regulations for the global capitalist economy (world-ecology) the ACM model itself is (i) invented by the minority and (ii) imposed by the minority on the majority without any explicit approval. Such approval was not required simply because at the time of the origin of the model (Europe around 1450 according to Moore) institutions for approval did not exist. This poses an important question of whether the imposition without approval is part of "nature-in-humanity".

The term Machinocene, used in a recent essay (Price 2016) expresses the view that AI (Artificial Intelligence) will dominate nature in a not so distant future (the end of the 21st century). The expectation is that some form of machine superintelligence may become autonomous and supersede human intelligence (Bostrom 2014). The Antropocene as the force dominating nature will be replaced by the mechanical mind of Machinocene. This view is based on the mechanistic understanding of nature and as such, it represents a powerful expression of "instrumental reason".

## 3. Analysis

Developments in biological sciences in the last several decades suggest that biology may not be fully reducible to physics (Bateson 1979, 2000; Rosen 1991, Capra 1997; Elsasser 1998; Maturana and Varela 1998; Kineman 2011; Slijepcevic

2018a). This is not to say that laws of physics are not applicable to biological systems; or that biological systems do not obey the laws of physics. Instead, it may be possible that the behavior of living organisms is not reducible to physicochemical causality. Here is an argument put forward by a mathematician and theoretical biologist Robert Rosen (Rosen 1991: 13):

> Why could it not be that the "universals" of physics are only so on a small and special (if inordinately prominent) class of material systems, a class to which organisms are too general to belong? What if physics is the particular, and biology the general, instead of the other way around? If this is so, then nothing in contemporary science will remain the same.

Some of the relevant developments in the biological sciences, which constitute a powerful argument against physicalism, and support the framework outlined in Table 1, will be explored in detail. Given that the physicalist outlook is at the heart of the Anthropocene and Machinocene concepts, I will next outline a critique of these concepts based on the Table 1 framework. The Capitalocene concept, which is closer to the DE style argumentation, will be refined in light of the framework.

### 3.1 Criticism of the Anthropocene Concept

#### 3.1.1 Mythologization of Science or How to Justify the Progressivism of ACM

According to Walter Elsasser, we live in the post-rationalist world. His analysis of Enlightenment parallels DE:

> The period of Rationalism, in its early phases usually called the "Enlightenment," began, roughly, around 1600 and lasted nearly 350 years, its last ripples being rather rudely terminated by history, through two world wars and, at the end of the second, by the knowledge then acquired of nuclear reactions which makes possible a sudden catastrophic termination of men's activities. Nothing less "rational" can readily be thought of. (Elsasser 1998: 127)

How can irrationalism of Enlightenment and its product, science, be justified? The answer of Horkheimer and Adorno was powerful. Irrationalism can only be justified by resorting to mythology:

> Humans believe themselves free of fear when there is no longer anything unknown. This has determined the path of demythologization ... Enlightenment is mythical fear radicalized. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 11).

ACM reflects a belief that humanity will conquer the territory of the unknown and therefore free itself from fear. The means for conquest is science based on the notion of physicalism. It is widely accepted by the scientific community that all sciences are reducible to physics. This view is best summarized by a Nobel Prize-winning molecular biologist and the intellectual force behind the Human Genome Project, James Watson:

There is only one science, physics. The rest is social work (cited in Rose 2005: 83).

The pro-physicalist attitude of modern science is further expressed by the title of a popular book, *What Remains to Be Discovered*, by a former editor of the leading science journal, Nature (Maddox 1999). The assumption on which the book is based is that nature represents a mechanical system. The logic of any mechanical system suggests that the number of steps required to fully understand it is finite and achievable by the human reason.

Similarly, modern physics assumes that a scientific theory integrating all physical forces is achievable. Speculation about this theory, known as "Theory of everything" (Barrow 2007), found its way into the Hollywood mythology through an eponymous movie. Thus, science in the form of physicalism is being mythologized.

The origin of mythologization of science can be traced to the aphorism usually attributed to the father of physicalism, Sir Isaac Newton:

If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants (Merton 1993: 1).

We can find the most recent attribution of the aphorism to Newton in the title of an eponymous book, which identified five giants of science: Copernicus, Galilei, Newton himself, Kepler and Einstein (Hawking 2003). However, according to Robert K. Merton, it seems that the Enlightenment's memory stops with Copernicus, Galilei, Kepler, and Newton. In his book, *On the Shoulders of Giants*, also known by the acronym OTSOG, Merton powerfully argued that the aphorism precedes science and Enlightenment and it is wrongly attributed to Newton by his followers (Merton 1993: 8–11). This discrepancy exposed by Merton indirectly agrees with the DE notion of mythologization of science. By adopting the OTSOG aphorism attributable to the father of physicalism, and by ignoring thinkers who used the aphorism long before Newton, science has been mythologizing physicalism since its beginnings (Cunningham and Williams 1993: 427).

The view of nature as a mechanical system, which can be conquered by human knowledge, as well as the notion of OTSOG, are challenged by a biological theory known as evolutionary epistemology (EE). EE is a programme of research in biology and philosophy of science based on three principles: (i) living systems are knowledge systems, (ii) evolution is the process of gaining knowledge, and (iii) there are features shared by all forms of knowledge gain (Plotkin, 1982: 3–13; Bradie 1986: 404, Slijepcevic 2018a: 24). The nature-wide quest for knowledge is practiced by all living systems, from bacteria to humans (Slijepcevic 2018a: 26). One of the proponents of EE was Karl Popper who memorably argued that there is little difference between Einstein and amoeba in their quests for knowledge (Popper 1979: 24–25). Similarly, Robin Dunbar likened science to natural hypothesis testing: all organisms are engaged in testing different possibilities, or natural hypotheses, based on their understanding of local environments (Dunbar 1996: 75).

The natural quest for knowledge has its own hierarchy (Figure 1; see also Slijepcevic 2018a). The founders of the knowledge-seeking quest are first living organisms –bacteria. Thus, Bacteriocene must have the primacy over Anthropocene (Figure 1). By the same logic Florocene (or Plantocene) and Insectocene, which emerged long before Anthropocene, must have primacy over it (Figure 1). Thus, the process of life is an epistemological process – epistemology naturalized according to Quine (1969) – coupled with its ontological counterpart into an epistemological-ontological unity (Plotkin 1982: 3–13; Bradie 1986: 404). Humanity is a late actor in the knowledge-seeking theatre of evolution. We are present in this theater, not as the main character, but rather as a background actor or an extra. If the entire process of biological evolution is condensed into an imaginary play or a movie, we only appear at its end, virtually in the last second.



**Figure 1.** A nested evolutionary hierarchy of organisms capable of altering the environment (the suffix "cene" is used as in Anthropocene). Capitalocene and Machinocene are derivatives.

The fallacy of the Anthropocene concept, according to which humanity dominates nature, is exposed through the term Cyanocene (Sagan 2017). This term reflects the fact that photosynthetic cyanobacteria radically altered the Earth's atmosphere, by polluting it with oxygen, three billion years before all animals and plants emerged in the evolution. How can humanity (the Anthropocene) dominate nature when it depends on the ecological waste created by Cyanocene?

It is now clear that bacteria possess intelligence, which some philosophers call "bacterial cognitive tool-kit" (Lyon 2015: 4; Lyon 2017: 444–445). Furthermore, our quest for knowledge is dependent on bacteria. For example, our bodies, and the bodies of all plants and animals have accompanying populations of bacteria, which outnumber human cells 10 to 1. These conglomerates

of bacteria, known as microbiota, turn our bodies into complex ecological systems consisting of 37 trillion human cells (themselves formed by bacteria and archaea) and 400 trillion bacterial cells. The scientific name for meta-organisms (all plants and animals) is holobionts – ecological communities of bacteria and their hosts (Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 2008: 723). An integral part of this ecological relationship is the microbiota-gut-brain axis (Smith 2015: 314). Bacteria present in our gut drive intestinal cells to produce the neurotransmitter serotonin, which then circulates in the blood (Smith 2015: 314). This leads to altruistic behavior of the host, which benefits bacteria long-term, indicating that the ecological relationships within the holobiont proper, and effects of this relationship on the ecosystem, are complex (Levin-Epstein et al. 2017).

Thus, if the concept of Anthropocene is to be taken seriously it must acknowledge that it is standing on the shoulders of Bacteriocene and Florocene. As a matter of fact, the entire biosphere is standing on the shoulders of "invisible dwarfs"– bacteria (Figure 1). The OTSOG thus becomes OTSOID (On the Shoulders of Invisible Dwarfs).

The OTSOID shatters the concept of Anthropocene by challenging the notion of physicalism in a major way. Nature is not a mechanical system because we live in an environment dominated by living systems invisible to our eyes. Bacteria are the founders of, and the main player in the planetary biosphere (Margulis and Sagan 1997). The biomass of bacteria exceeds the human biomass (Whitman et al. 1998, Kallmeyer et al. 2012). Given that our environment is biological and it consists of living systems (Okasha 2005), we will never be able to conquer it (Ben-Jacob 1998). The reason for this is that living systems are not mechanical systems, which are exhaustible by physicalist knowledge. Gregory Bateson argued that living systems are indeterministic and aesthetic systems, resistant to the conquest by mechanistic science (Bateson 1979; 2000). He famously likened nature to a giant mind beyond our reach. Bateson thought that our propensity for the ecological violence is the consequence of the epistemological error committed by the Western civilization – domination of mechanistic or physicalist epistemology.

Walter Elsasser openly challenged physicalism. Elsasser coined the term "biotonic laws" to highlight the notion that the behavior of living systems cannot be reduced to physicochemical causality (Elsasser 1958; Elsasser 1998). The school of theoretical biology known as relational biology provides detailed argumentation in support of this thesis (see the section on Machinocene). The key message of relational biology is that living systems may not be computable (Rosen 1991; Elsasser 1998). In other words, living systems are beyond physicalist science.

### 3.1.2. The Motivation for Building the Car

The previous section outlined arguments for mythologization of science. It is worth repeating that the roots of mythologization of science may be in human nature (Wilson 2012), rather than in science itself. Mythologization of science is partly responsible for justification to build the car without brakes (ACM)

driven by the entire humanity or the Anthropocene. The aim of this section is to outline the key motive for building the car. This motive, again, may be part of our biology.

*Homo sapiens* belong to a rare group of species practicing the highest form of social behavior known as eusociality (Wilson 2012). Other practitioners of eusociality are rare species of social insects: ants, termites, and bees (Crespi and Yanega 1995, Wilson and Hölldobler 2005). The consequence of eusocial behavior is the emergence of the social collective termed the superorganism in the case of ants, termites, and bees (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009). The equivalents of the human superorganism are modern states (Gowdy and Krall 2013). In the social structures of modern states individual freedom is formatted by the function of the collective:

> The power of all the members of society, to whom as individuals no other way is open, is constantly summated, through the division of labor imposed on them, in the realization of the whole, whose rationality is thereby multiplied over again. What is done to all by the few always takes the form of the subduing of individuals by the many: the oppression of society always bears the features of oppression by a collective. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 16)

Let us search for an explanation of the phrase *oppression by a collective* within the phenomenon of eusociality. Eusociality is recognized by three features: (i) several generations within the social group, (ii) care for the young and (iii) division of labor including reproductive labor (Crespi and Yanega 1995; Wilson and Hölldobler 2005). In eusocial insects, the above three features of eusociality are easily identifiable (Crespi and Yanega 1995; Wilson and Hölldobler 2005). By contrast, one aspect of the third feature, namely the division of reproductive labor, may not be present in human societies leading some scientists to dispute the notion of human eusociality.

For example, ant and bee workers are sterile. The only reproductive worker in their societies is the queen. In human societies, all members are fertile from puberty to middle ages. However, women lose fertility not because of ageing but in a biologically programmed fashion known as the menopause. Research shows that the function of the menopause, also known as *grandmother effect*, is to help inexperienced daughters raise the young. Thus, the menopause in women may represent a form of reproductive division of labour in human societies (Foster and Ratnieks 2005). Other forms of reproductive division of labour in modern societies may be the surrogate motherhood (Teman 2008) and same-sex marriages, which require either the surrogate motherhood or specialized reproductive technology for raising a family (Eskridge 1993). According to Edward O. Wilson, *Homo sapiens* is a truly eusocial species (Wilson 2012).

Therefore, what Horkheimer and Adorno termed *realization of the whole* may represent the emergence of the human superorganism – the modern state governed by the physicalist science (Gowdy and Krall 2013; Soete et al. 2015; see also next section). In a further leap of social integration, states form unions (e.g. EU – European Union; ASEAN – Association of South East Asian Nations;

UNASUR or Union of South American Nations etc.), which eventually form the global socio-economic union (Soete et al. 2015). The new global union cannot function without the international monetary system. Thus, ACM is regulated by a set of internationally approved norms (Soete et al. 2015).

A key question becomes how the human superorganism exerts the function of *subduing of individuals* or *oppression of a collective.* Is the oppression of an individual by a collective a necessary biological manifestation of eusociality? A neurobiologist Thomas D. Seeley argued in his book, *Honeybee Democracy,* that this is not the case (Seeley 2010: 218–231). He presented arguments that honeybee societies practice a form of eusocial behavior, which prevents domination of the collective over individuals by allowing each individual worker to participate in the collective decision-making. For example, the influence of the queen as the elite individual is completely suppressed. To demonstrate her value to the collective the queen emits certain pheromones, which are constantly monitored by workers. Once the workers sense that the quality of the signal emitted by the queen is not worthy to the society as a whole, they simply replace the queen in the process of swarming. A large group of honeybee workers splits from the superorganism, raises the new queen by feeding a worker by the queen jelly and collectively searches for the suitable territory for a newly emerging superorganism. Decision-making in the process of the territory search is truly democratic. The group sends hundreds of scouts to identify the most suitable natural habitat for the new superoroganism. Each scout reports back her findings to the collective. The decision is made through a complex process of debating each find and assessing its merit for the collective.

The honeybee democracy is based on three principles: (i) all members of the superorganism show mutual respect and have united interests which exclude domination of the queen over the collective, (ii) the "thinking" of the society is a truly collective thinking which identifies multiple solutions to any given problem faced by the society, and (iii) the collective wisdom of the society identifies the best solution which is in the interest of all members of the society. It is important to stress that social insects are not automata lacking individuality. Recent research suggests that eusocial insects possess individuality and yet remain part of the eusocial collective (Robinson et al. 2014, O'Shea-Wheller et al. 2017).

The way in which modern human superorganisms, or states, practice democracy is in disparity with the principles of the honeybee democracy. First, the elites, who control the capital show little respect towards other members of society suggesting a disparity of interests (Klein 2007). Second, there is no truly collective thinking, which is in the interest of all members of the society. For example, the decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003 was not in the interest of all American citizens, but only in the interest of the elite (Seeley 2010: 223). Third, in societies in which there is a disparity of interests, there can be no collective wisdom (Klein 2007).

Differences in principles of eusocial democracy practiced by modern human states, relative to honeybee superorganisms, may be a consequence of the

dominant "instrumental reason" in the case of humans (Table 1). It is clear from previous arguments that "instrumental reason" may be involved in preparing the ground for the emergence of the ACM socio-economic model practiced by the entire humanity. But this model was imposed on the human collective by a small group of its influential members for their own interest (see the Capitalocene section). This small group, the few, then orchestrated the distribution of responsibility on the entire collective. This is reflected in the Anthropocene concept – the entire humanity, or Anthropos, is willingly behind the imaginary dashboard in our accelerating car (ACM). The manipulatory triumph of the few is hidden in the collective pride – the Age of Man – trumpeted from the pages of leading scientific journals (Monastersky 2015).

Interestingly, there is evidence that eusocial insects are naturally protected against the practice of "instrumental reason" as a form of natural epistemology. In other words, they possess the brakes on their equivalent of the car – they may be naturally programmed to avoid the ACM-type models. Eusocial ants made a social conquest of Earth millions of years before humanity (Wilson 2012). Their global superorganism, which may appropriately be called the Insectocene, can generate enough ecological pressure to seriously damage the environment. For example, leafcutter ants, from the genera *Atta* and *Acromyrmex*, harvest fresh leaves from South American forests on the large scale and thus create the ecological pressure (Costa et al. 2008). However, they seem to "know" when to stop cutting leaves to allow trees to recover (Hölldobler and Wilson 1990: 623, Strassen 2018) and by doing so avoid serious damage to their natural habitat. Recall the imaginary theater of evolution, as the process of natural epistemology, mentioned earlier. If the play in this theater is condensed into 1.5 hours, eusocial ants appear in it for the entire last minute. By contrast, our time in the play is 500 times shorter, only 0.1 second. Within such a short time span we made irreversible damage to the ecosystem. In other words, we committed an epistemological error which, hopefully, is not irreversible. By contrast, ants live in harmony with the ecosystem. Are their superorganisms resistant to manipulation by the few, like the honeybee superorganisms?

### 3.1.3. Tool for Building the Car

The previous section outlined the key biological motive for building the car – human eusociality. The next question is: what is the tool for building the car? In other words, is there anything within the phenomenon of eusociality responsible for generating such a tool? Horkheimer and Adorno suggested, without being aware of eusociality, that this tool is technology:

> Kings control technology no more directly than do merchants: it is as democratic as the economic system with which it evolved. Technology is the essence of this knowledge. It aims to produce neither concepts nor images, nor the joy of understanding, but method, exploitation of the labor of others, capital (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002:2).

Interestingly, Horkheimer and Adorno equated science and technology and identified them as a unified tool available to "instrumental reason" in its model building.

> Power and knowledge are synonymous. For Bacon as for Luther, "knowledge that tendeth but to satisfaction, is but as a courtesan, which is for pleasure, and not for fruit or generation." Its concern is not "satisfaction, which men call truth," but "operation," the effective procedure (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 2).

Francis Bacon is singled out as the inventor of the physicalist scientific method. The establishment of the Royal Society in 1660 represented institutionalization of Bacon's method, which was taken over by the state as its own tool. The main concern of this institutionalized tool was not *the "truth," but "operation," the effective procedure*.

If we accept that technology is the tool for building the car, the question is whether technology constitutes a natural consequence of eusociality. For example, Horkheimer and Adorno suggested that *the realization of the whole* may represent the means by which the human superorganism exerts its power. The question can be answered by investigating the collective behavior of eusocial insects. If indeed, eusocial insects show obligate technological behavior then the answer may be affirmative.

Let us use Richard Li-Hua's concept of technology to start answering the question (Li-Hua 2013). His concept is a synthetic attempt to unify all definitions of human technologies. According to Li-Hua, all human technologies have four components: (i) technique, (ii) knowledge, (iii) organization of the work process and (iv) the product (Figure 2 A).

The technique is a group name for instruments (tools and machines), materials and the way in which instruments and materials are brought into a common function. The knowledge has forms of applied science, skills and intuition. The organization of the work process is the combination of the technique and knowledge with the aim of achieving a certain result. The result is recognizable as the fourth component of technology – the product. The product is the ultimate result of the association of the previous three factors, the technique, the knowledge and the organization of the work process (Figure 2 A).

When the collective behavior of eusocial ants from the genera *Atta* and *Acromyrmex* is assessed through the Li-Hua's technological prism (Figure 1 A), all four components of technology are identifiable in the practice of ant agriculture (Figure 1 B; Table 2). The source of food for leafcutter ants is the fresh green leaf biomass, which their digestive system cannot process. To overcome this biological barrier leafcutter ants made a symbiosis with a fungus and thus invented their version of agriculture, which is one of the first technologies in animals (Table 2, Mueller et al. 2005, Slijepčević 2018b).

The ants bring pieces of fresh leaves to the nest, chew them, and store them in gardens on which a fungus is planted. They fertilize gardens with their own faeces. The fungus processes all the leafy biomass and turns it into food for

**Figure 2.** A. Synthetic definition of technology according to Richard Li-Hua (Li-Hua 2013). For details see the text. B. Analysis of ant agriculture as a form of technology using Li-Hua's definition as a model. (See also Table 2). C. Institutionalized global science as a form of technology (modeled on Soete et al. 2015). OWP – Organization of the Work Process.

the entire colony. The ant agriculture meets the above four requirements of technology (Figure 2 B, Table 2, Slijepčević 2018b).

Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that technology may constitute a consequence of eusociality – the division of labour within the superorganism generates a collective behavior that becomes an ecological force (Slijepčević 2018b). Furthermore, it may be argued that food production is an obligate requirement for highly eusocial animal collectives (Mueller et al. 2005). The most common way for collective food production is the practice of agriculture identifiable in ants, termites and humans (Mueller et al. 2005). Honeybees produce food through a different technological process: chemical modification of the ready-made plant material. As a result, there may be two forms of eusociality:

**Table 2.** Ant agriculture as a form of technology. Sources: Mueller et al. 2005, Wilson 2012, Slijepčević 2018b.

|  | Technique | Knowledge | OWP | Product |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| The technology of eusocial ants from genera *Atta* and *Acromyrmex*. | *Instruments (Tools & Machines):* (i) Sharp jaws controlled by powerful muscles. Ant jaws represent a vibrating knife or microtome. (ii) Ant bodies act as transport vehicles. *The material* used by ants is the green leaf mass and the fungus. | *Instinct-based knowledge:* (i) how to cut leaves, (ii) how and when to transport pieces of leaves (iii) how and when to form new fungal gardens and (iv) how and when to cure the gardens from infection. | Leaves are cut, transported from the cut-off site to the nest and surrendered to other workers. Specialist workers chew the pieces of leaves and turn them into a pulp. The pulp is stored in fungal gardens, fertilized, inoculated by fungal seeds and processed through the agricultural practices. | The product is food for the ant colony. The green pulp is completely processed by a symbiotic fungus into an edible product. This is an obligatory process (there is no eusociality without agriculture). |

ultra-eusociality in which collective food production is obligate (ants, termites, honeybees and humans) and ordinary eusociality in which it is not (Gowdy and Krall 2016: 181; Slijepčević 2018b: 202).

However, humanity achieved a technological leap beyond agriculture. The practice of human agriculture generated an economic surplus (primitive capital), which transformed the agricultural technology into a global technological conquest of nature (modern capital) (Diamond 1991, Mithen 1996, Hawken et al. 1999). The cultural framework for the conquest was the institutionalization of science and adoption of the scientific method by European states. For example, English and French academies of sciences were established in 1660 and 1666 respectively, under state protectorates. Similar practices were employed by other European states soon after. The new practice allowed European states to (i) gradually eradicate the populace's reliance on magic, which was widespread in the pre-Enlightenment Europe and (ii) set humanity on the course of exploitation of nature via institutionalized science (Ferguson 2012).

However, DE revealed a weak spot of institutionalized science based on physicalism (see sections 3.1.1. and 3.1.2). Furthermore, modern institutionalized science, a globalized process according to UNESCO, conforms to Li-Hua's criteria of technology (Figure 2 C, Slijepčević 2018b). The global scientific community and its institutions in the form of universities, institutes, and techno-corporations, created and embraced by modern states as the key generator of the capital (Hawken et al. 1999; Soethe 2015) represent the global laboratory

turned-fueling-station for ACM (Table 1, Figure 2 C). This means that institutionalized science as a form of technology employed by global humanity may be a consequence of eusociality (Slijepčević 2018b: 222). The problem, according to DE, is that humanity has so far been unable to recognize that the product of institutionalized science – the conquest of the territory of the unknown by physicalist science (Figure 2 C) – is irrational (see below).

Thus, the key element that links the practice of human eusociality with modern capitalism is the propensity of the few (the elite in European states responsible for the exploitation of physicalist science) to associate an extra value with the fourth component of technology, the product (Li-Hua 2013, Moore 2017, Moore 2018). The product, as the final component of the eusocial technological process, may be equated with the concept of capital.

## 3.2. Critique of the Machinocene Concept

Let us start this section with a relevant quote from DE, used earlier. The consequence of "instrumental reason" is that nature is interpreted as an automated system, or the machine:

> Thought is reified as an autonomous, automatic process, aping the machine it has itself produced, so that it can finally be replaced by the machine. (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 19)

The phrase *aping the machine* is a particularly illustrative description of "instrumental reason". It can be interpreted as an attempt of "instrumental reason" to force nature to succumb to its rules, which are the rules of science based on physicalism. This is in line with the Anthropocene's principle according to which humanity, not nature, is the dominant ecological force on Earth (see above). The logical continuation of this type of reasoning is the concept of Machinocene – the emergence of the mechanical mind in the form of the machine superintelligence constructed by mechanistic science based on physicalism (Price 2016). Some philosophers and scientists argue that the new mechanical mind may become autonomous – it may not require the human input after a certain point known as a technological singularity (Bostrom 2014, Price 2016). However, the machine autonomy may be an example of flawed reasoning in light of arguments from biology outlined earlier (e.g. Rosen 1991, Elsasser 1998) but also new arguments, which will be outlined below.

A school of theoretical biology, known as relational biology, offers a powerful challenge to the concept of instrumental reason and the Machinocene concept, in particular, their mechanistic bases, which are insufficient to fully understand complex systems such as organisms, ecosystems and the biosphere as a whole. If the organizational principles of the biosphere, including the concept of natural mind in the sense used by Gregory Bateson (Bateson 1979, Bateson 2000), cannot be fully grasped by the mechanistic science, it seems likely that the anticipated machine's mind dominance over nature– the Machinocene – may be a case of gross misunderstanding, or Batesonian epistemological error.

Nevertheless, this misunderstanding is a perfect opportunity for mechanistic science to expand the practice of "instrumental reason". The words of the founder of cybernetics, Norbert Weiner, sound prophetic and in unison with ACM:

> Let us remember that the automatic machine...is the precise economic equivalent of slave labor. Any labor which competes with slave labor must accept the economic conditions of slave labor. (Weinner 1989: 162)

The founder of relational biology was a theoretical physicist Nicolas Rashevsky. The school's most influential proponent was Robert Rosen, who established philosophical and mathematical foundations of relational biology. Even though Rosen has not mentioned DE in his writings, he identified a version of "instrumental reason": he thought that the mechanistic foundation of science is irrational (Kineman 2007). Here are two relevant quotes from Rosen's book *Life Itself* which sum up his stance towards the mechanistic understanding of living systems:

> The question "What is life?" is not often asked in biology, precisely because the machine metaphor already answers it: "Life is a machine." (Rosen 1991: 23)

> It may perhaps be true that the question "What is life?" is hard because we do not yet know enough. But it is at least equally possible that we simply do not properly understand what we already know. (Rosen 1991: 17)

Let us briefly outline Rosen's understanding of the differences between the organism and the machine. This will bring Rosen's thought in line with the DE argumentation and provide a powerful refutation of the Machinocene concept. Rosen postulated that all living systems are anticipatory systems. He defined the anticipatory system as a natural system that contains an internal predictive model of itself and of its environment. The predictive model allows the system to change the state at an instant in line with the model's prediction.

An outline of the anticipatory system is shown in Figure 3. Every organism from a bacterium to an elephant must contain information about self, about species and about the environment, encoded into the organization of the living system. This information acts causally on the present behavior of the organism based on the modeling relations projected to be applicable in the future (Figure 3). The relationship is primarily epistemological. In the natural epistemological process organisms or Natural Systems (NS) generate internal models of themselves called Formal Systems (FS). The links between NS and FS is one of the epistemological-ontological unity in which the natural "glue" holding the relationship together is natural information (for details see the legend for Figure 3).

Thus, the behavior of Rosen's anticipatory systems at any present instant involves aspects of past, present, and future, because the internal model serves to pull the future into the present. By contrast, physicalist science admits only Reactive systems – those systems that react in the present to changes that have already occurred in the causal chain. Rosen's "Zeroth Commandment" is a

**Figure 3. A.** The relationship between the natural entity or NS (Natural System – any organism from a bacterium to an elephant) and knowledge of it or FS (Formal System – a species-specific information processing system). Mapping in the model, which is category-theoretic mapping (based on mathematical category theory), is informational in nature. Information, as a process of encoding and decoding, is a "glue" holding NSs and their environments together. "Encoding" or abstraction is a set of qualities or quantities (epistemological and ontological) from a NS for use in the FS or a model. Senses employed in a species-specific manner are equated with natural abstractions. Such abstractions reflect what is usually meant by the term biological "structure" (see panel **B**). On the other hand, "decoding" (in the epistemological and ontological sense) is best described by Bateson's notion of information as "a difference that makes a difference" or "patterns that connect" (Bateson 1979). In other words, "decoding" is associated with the concept of biological "function" as shown in panel **B**. Thus, structure and function are emergent properties of the modeling relationship "representing the empirical world emerging from the ontological". Adapted from Rosen (1991) and Kineman et al. (2007).

critique of the dogmatism of mechanistic science, which obeys the so-called objective causality:

> Thou shalt not allow future state to affect present change of state. (Rosen 1991: 49).

One of the postulates of mechanistic science is that the true objective causality cannot argue from final causes. By contrast, living organisms (Figure 3 A) are capable of constructing an internal surrogate of time as part of the modeling relations (Rosen 1985) that eventually produce anticipation.

Using the mathematical category theory, which allows mapping of relations between NS and FS (Figure 3) Rosen identified a key difference between the organism and the machine. The machine is not capable of constructing the closed causal loop, whereas every organism, from a bacterium to an elephant, is (Rosen 1991: 241). This roughly means that machines cannot have autonomy as they are not constructed through the principles of self-organization or

autopoiesis – a process behind the construction of organisms or anticipatory systems, which effectively closes causal loops (Maturana and Varela 1998, Capra 1996). The machine thus remains an automaton lacking the capacity of anticipation and entirely dependent on its creator.

Therefore, if there is no closed causal loop in the machine, as Rosen's work based on the category theory suggests, then the concept of Machinocene– an autonomous mechanical mind – may be invalid. Even though Rosen's theories have been criticized by proponents of the mechanistic world-view, the way for refuting the criticism may be in integrating Rosen's theories with the principles of autopoiesis of Maturana and Varela (Maturana and Varela 1998), Bateson's version of natural mind (Bateson 1979, Bateson 2000) and principles of EE (Slijepcevic 2018a).

## 3.3. Refining the Concept of Capitalocene

As stated earlier, the Capitalocene concept shares significant similarities with the DE style of argumentation. Therefore, what follows cannot be called a critique of the Capitalocene concept, but rather an attempt to refine certain points within its structure.

Similarly to Horkheimer and Adorno, who identified technology as the key force behind generation of the capital (see above), Jason W. Moore (Moore 2017; 2018) argued that the notion of *technics*, as used by Lewis Mumford (Mumford 1934: 26), allowed integration of tools and knowledge in a new world praxis – capitalism – capable of opening the doors of nature in the search for cheap capital. The key point, according to Moore, is that humanity is an integral part of nature: "humanity-in-nature" or humanity in the web of life. The phrase "web of life" is attributed to Chief Seattle:

> Man did not weave the web of life;
> He is merely a strand in it.
> Whatever he does to the web,
> He does to himself.[3]

Thus, capitalism silently becomes a way of organizing nature through the technological activity of one of its numerous strands: man. The hierarchical organization of human superorganisms, or states, allows implementation of the practice of "instrumental reason" through the imposition of concepts invented by the few, on the entire collective (see above). The collective becomes a slave executor of the will of the inventors.

This line of reasoning is in contrast with the reasoning of the Anthropocene concept which is Cartesian: there is an artificial split between humanity and nature. Humanity acts as an artificial external force, which interprets the web of life as a passive foreign territory open to a massive conquest. The identity

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3    Adapted by Ted Perry.

of true instigators is hidden and deliberately masked through the practice of "instrumental reason" – subduing the collective by the few (see above).

Lewis Mumford argued that non-European civilizations (Chinese, Greek, Arab etc.) differed from their European counterpart in one important respect. Non-European civilizations were technological civilizations but did not interpret nature as a source of cheap capital. As Mumford commented: *They had machines but they did not develop "the machine".* In other words, only the European civilization followed the mechanistic path of Newtonian science based on physicalism. Similarly to Horkheimer and Adorno, who singled out Francis Bacon as the founder of this path, Moore's colleague Justin McBrein (McBrein 2017: 125) used the general concept of the scientist as "a gunslinger in a sidereal wild west, an imperialist fantasy that would overcome the contradictions of capitalist surplus extraction."

Thus, the Capitalocence concept and DE singled out the European civilization as the founder of capitalism and modernity that is affected by irrationalism. For Horkheimer and Adorno, the irrationalism was caused by the Enlightenment's fear of the unknown, which turned a perfectly rational ambition to expand knowledge into an irrational obsession to over-know by taking the map for the territory (Table 1). For Moore, irrationalism is the abstraction of man and its replacement by a new artificial species: the capital or the fourth component of the natural technological process – the product (Figure 2). This new species can be interpreted as collective humanity in its mechanicist vehicle with no brakes fueled by the physicalist science (ACM). As Justin Mc'Brien (Mc'Brien 2017: 116) put it:

> Capital is the Sixth Extinction personified: it feasts on the dead, and in doing so, devours all life. The deep time of past cataclysm becomes the deep time of future catastrophe; the residue of life in hydrocarbons becomes the residue of capital in petrochemical plastics. Capitalism leaves in its wake the disappearance of species, languages, cultures, and peoples. It seeks the planned obsolescence of all life. Extinction lies at the heart of capitalist accumulation.

Here is an outline of developments in biology, which support Moore's concept of "humanity in the web of life". Humanity is just one of 9 million species estimated to inhabit the planet (Mora et al. 2011). All our activities, including the socio-economic organization, are formatted by our experiences of being a part of the natural collective from which we emerged in the process of evolution. There is nothing special about us in a biological sense. For example, if the biological success is measured by the contribution to the biomass of the entire biosphere, then the most successful organisms are plants. Their biomass exceeds the animal biomass 1,000 times. As one botanist commented we only exist in traces compared to plants (Mancuso and Viola 2015).

Furthermore, we are not special even in the phenomena of technology, as mechanistic science would like us to believe. The inventors of technology among animals are insects (Mueller et al. 2005, Slijepčević 2018b). The first evolutionary form of technology was insect agriculture (Figure 2 B). Our techno-science

is nothing more than an evolutionary derivative (Diamond 1991). Even modern human technologies such as the Internet and future technologies such as the Internet of Things may have equivalents in bacteria which we do not usually take as intelligent (Margulis and Sagan 1997, Slijepcevic 2017). There is a large body of specialist literature supporting the notion of animal technical intelligence (summarized in Schumaker et al. 2011). Therefore, Moore's argument of humanity being an integral part of the web of life, not only in the material sense but also in the functional sense, which eventually generates a form eusocial practice we call capitalism, is correct.

Given the destructive potential of Capitalocene and its deadly effects on the biosphere in the form of biological annihilation (Ceballos et al. 2017), also dubbed the Necrocene (McBrien 2017: 116), an important question is why only the European civilization invented capitalism even though other civilizations had basic technological means at their disposal to develop it long before Europeans. This is the question that begs a comprehensive analysis. Horkheimer and Adorno provided a clue: propensity to over-know or degeneration of Enlightenment. The consequence of this propensity is the ACM model imposed on the entire humanity as a result of the irrational ambition of the few to legitimize potential for self-destruction (Table 1).

## 4. How to Counter "Instrumental Reason"

There are three avenues that can be explored to reduce the negative effects of "instrumental reason" or even to fully eliminate it. First, given that science based on physicalism most likely interprets nature in a wrong way – a mechanical system or the machine, which can be fully understood by physicalist science – a reform of foundations of science may reverse this epistemological error. Many scientists and philosophers argued that the biosphere is a cognitive system with the epistemological-ontological unity (Lovelock and Margulis, 1974, Bateson 1979, Bateson 2000, Capra 1997, Maturana and Varela 1998, Nicholson and Dupre 2018). The biosphere is not an organism, but a super-system composed of organisms so that organisms form epistemological-ontological unities with their environments consisting of different kinds of organisms. This holarchy[4] of systems must be explored by a form of science that should suspend the primacy of physicalism, at least temporarily, to allow biology to take the lead. Anticipatory systems (Rosen 1985, Rosen 1991), mind and nature (Bateson 1979, Bateson 2000, Capra 1997, Maturana and Varela 1998), holarchy (Koestler 1981), symbiogenesis (Sagan 1967, Margulis 1970), nature of biological intelligence (Slijepcevic 2018a), processual biology (Nicholson and Dupre 2018) and a range of other questions in biology must be explored from the new perspective which should confirm, or not, the validity of physicalism. Philosophically, this is a sound approach. The foundation of science is not a given. There is no reason as to why the foundations of physicalism cannot be

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4    The term used by Arthur Koestler related to his concept of the holon.

challenged by right arguments. One of the components of physicalism ripe for criticism is reductionism. As Karl Popper (Popper 1982: 171) argued: "None of these reductionist efforts explain the creativity of the universe: life, and its incredible intricacies and wealth of forms."

Second, a greater emphasis on investigating natural phenomena such as eusociality and technology would allow identifying elements in our ultra-eusociality, which predispose us to the practice of "instrumental reason". By the same token, identifying elements of ultra-eusociality in insects, which make them resistant to the development of "instrumental reason", as a form of natural epistemology, would be useful. For example, ants could be a good role model for humanity in the search for breaks on the collective car (Slijepčević 2018b). Their biomass is roughly equivalent to the human biomass (Wilson 2012). Yet, ants live in the ecological harmony with the planetary ecosystem. By contrast, the Capitalocene may have already altered the ecological balance of the biosphere irreversibly.

One of the most pressing questions is why only the European civilization invented capitalism as the world ecology. Earlier civilizations, Arab, Chinese, Greek, and others, had technological means at their disposal and yet they did not move in the direction of technology dominated by science. Jared Diamond argued that the pre-agricultural humanity was the only form of human superorganism in harmony with nature (Diamond 1991).

Finally, the third avenue is the appreciation of the aesthetics of nature as argued by Gregory Bateson (Bateson 1979: 18):

> Observe, however, that there have been, and still are, in the world many different and even contrasting epistemologies which been alike in stressing an ultimate unity and, although this is less sure, which have also stressed the notion that ultimate unity is aesthetic. The uniformity of these views gives hope that perhaps the great authority of quantitative science may be insufficient to deny an ultimate unifying beauty.

Bateson's view parallels views of Elsasser (Elsasser 1998: 4), who thought that biology must take account of the creativity of nature. Nature's creative act is ultimately aesthetic. This is in line with the concept of biophilia (Wilson 1984), the love for living organisms, as the powerful contrasts for the notion of mechanophilia (Slijepčević 2018b: 273), or love for the machine, which typifies the modern world.

## 5. Concluding Remarks

In this study, I attempted to expose the three 21st century concepts to the arguments from DE constructed roughly 60 years earlier in a different historical background, that of the biggest destruction in human history in the form of two world wars and the creation of nuclear weapons as the means for mass destruction. In the post-rationalist world of modernity (Elsasser 1998), the capitalism as the world ecology (Moore 2017; Moore 2018), or ACM in my interpretation (Table 1), become the new means for mass destruction in the form

of biological annihilation (Ceballos 2017). Thus, the peak of "instrumental reason" is the irrational attempt to legitimize self-destruction.

The inevitable conclusion is that DE arguments did not lose any of their philosophical and sociological appeals. It can be argued that DE can help us refine the analysis of modernity by integrating its own style of argumentation with the thoughts of scientists critical of the dominant scientific world-view (Bateson 1979; Elassser 1998, Rosen 1991) rooted in the physicalist science. This new framework requires a deep analysis of human eusociality in light of "humanity-in-nature" and "nature-in-humanity" (Moore 2017, Moore 2018).

Some philosophers and scientists think that the emergence of an autonomous machine superintelligence may constitute a qualitatively new phenomenon never experienced before in the human existence and in the existence of the biosphere (Bostrom 2014; Price 2016). This is a bold assumption, which may not be entirely justifiable given the criticism of mechanistic science outlined above. Therefore, there is a pressing need to discuss the concept of "instrumental reason" in a truly democratic fashion and assess its future risks. To paraphrase Robert Rosen, we cannot rely on yesterday armies to fight future wars.

## Acknowledgments

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Predrag Slijepčević

## Antropocen, kapitalocen, mašinocen: iluzije instrumentalnog razuma

### Apstrakt

U svom uticajnom delu *Dijalektika prosvetiteljstva*, Horkhajmer i Adorno su tumačili kapitalizam kao iracionalnu monetarizaciju prirode. U ovom radu analiziramo tri dvadesetprvovekovna koncepta, antropocen, kapitalocen i mašinocen u svetlu Horkhajmerovih i Adornovih argumenata i skorašnjih argumenata iz filozofije biologije. Analiza otkriva izvandredno prisustvo pojma "instrumentalnog razuma" koji je pristuan u sva tri koncepta na duboko zagonetan način. Naša interpretacija je da pojam opisuje sklonost nauke zasnovane, na shvatanjima fizikalizma, da tumači prirodu kao mašinu podložnu analiziranju i programiranju od strane ljudskog uma. Rezultat toga je da je koncept antropocena izgrađen oko mehanicističkog modela, koji može biti predstavljen metaforom automobila bez kočnica. Na sličan način koncept mašinocena predviđa nastanak mehaničkog uma koji će dominirati nad prirodom u skoroj budućnosti. Konačno, koncept kapitalocena pretvara savršeno racionalnu ambiciju za širenjem znanja u iracionalnu opsesiju prekomernim znanjem putem institucionalizovane nauke kao motora kapitalizma bez kočnica. Zajednički sadržalac sva tri koncepta je iracionalna sklonost za legitimacijom samouništenja. Potencijalne mogućnosti za suprotstavljanje efektima "instrumentalnog razuma" su predložene.

Ključne reči: instrumentalni razum, antropocen, mašinocen, kapitalocen

Željko Radinković

# DIE PHÄNOMENOLOGIE EDMUND HUSSERLS ALS EIDETISCHE WISSENSCHAFT

**ZUSAMMENFASSUNG**
Der Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit Husserls Lehre von der kategorialen An-
schauung als einem der wichtigsten Momente seines Versuchs der Grund-
legung der Phänomenologie als eidetischer Wissenschaft. Ausgehend von
Husserls phänomenologischen Kritik an Versuchen einer Naturalisierung
des Bewusstseins, werden insbesondere die Probleme der Bedeutungs-
intention und -erfüllung, des Unterschieds zwischen sinnlicher und kate-
gorialer Anschauung, der kategorialen Formung und der sog. Wesens-
anschauung erörtert. In diesem Zusammenhang geht es auch um die
Abgrenzung des Husserlschen transzendentalphilosophischen Ansatzes
von der transzendentalphilosophischen Axiomatik Immanuel Kants.

## Die Lehre von der kategorialen Anschauung

Eine der zentralen Anliegen der Husserlschen Phänomenologie ist die Frage
nach der Geltung der logischen Gesetze. Oder anders ausgedrückt, wie das
Verhältnis zwischen der Bedeutungs- bzw. Urteilsidentität und den konkre-
ten kontingenten Akten des Bedeutens bzw. des Urteilens zu denken ist? In
den ‚*Prolegomena*' der *Logischen Untersuchungen* (Husserl 1975: Pr/B 1-257)
formuliert Husserl dies folgendermaßen: „Wie kommt der begründende Ge-
dankengang, der nur unter gewissen psychischen Umständen eintritt, zu dem
Anspruch, die bezügliche Schlussform als schlechthin gültige auszuzeichnen?"
(Husserl 1975: Pr/B 104)

Husserl zufolge steht eine identische Bedeutung in einem Verhältnis zu den
vielen einzelnen „bedeutungsverleihenden" Akten[1] so wie eine Spezies zu ei-
nem oder mehreren Einzelfällen: „So wie der Fluß der empirischen Farben-
inhalte und die Unvollkommenheit der qualitativen Identifizierung nicht die
Unterschiede der Farben als Qualitätsspezies tangieren, so wie die eine Spezies

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[1]    Gemeint sind die konkret vorkommenden Akte in denen die Bedeutungen ‚konsti-
tuiert' werden. Unter der Bezeichnung ‚Akte' meint Husserl die ‚Bewusstseinserlebnis-
se' und zwar hauptsächlich solche, die sich auf einen Gegenstand beziehen, d.h. die in-
tentionalen Erlebnisse. (Husserl 1975: LU V/ B1 369)

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ein ideal Identisches ist gegenüber der Mannigfaltigkeit möglicher Einzelfäl-
le (die selbst nicht Farbe, sondern eben Fälle dieser Farbe sind), so verhält es
sich auch mit den identischen Bedeutungen oder Begriffen in Beziehung auf
die begrifflichen Vorstellungen, deren ‚Inhalte' sie sind." (Husserl 1975: Pr/B
101) Inhalte eines Aktes können reell und intentional sein. „Unter dem reel-
len phänomenologischen Inhalt [...] verstehen wir den Gesamtinbegriff seiner
gleichgültig ob konkreten oder abstrakten Teile, mit anderen Worten, den Ge-
samtinbegriff der ihn reell aufbauenden Teile." (Husserl 1975: LU V/B1 397)
Der intentionale Inhalt bezieht sich auf den „intendierten Gegenstand, so wie
er intendiert ist" und den „Gegenstand, welcher intendiert ist". (Husserl 1975:
LU V/B1 400) Bezüglich des intentionalen Inhaltes unterscheidet Husserl noch
die Aktmaterie und Aktqualität. Die Aktmaterie legt vollkommen die Weise
des Gemeintseins des Gegenständlichen im Akte fest. Die Aktqualität unter-
scheidet zwischen vorstellenden, begehrenden, urteilenden, wollenden usw.
Akten. Das ‚intentionale Wesen' bezeichnet die Einheit von Aktmaterie und
Aktqualität. Die Identität zweier Urteile gründet in dem ‚intentionalen Wesen'
des Aktes: „Zwei Urteile sind wesentlich dasselbe Urteil, wenn alles, was vom
beurteilten Sachverhalt nach dem einen Urteil (rein auf Grund des Urteilsin-
halts selbst) gelten würde, von ihm auch nach dem anderen gelten müsste und
nicht anderes. Ihr Wahrheitswert ist derselbe, und er ist es offenbar, wenn ‚das'
Urteil, das intentionale Wesen als Einheit von Urteilsqualität und Urteilsma-
terie dasselbe ist." (Husserl 1975: LU V/B1 419)

Nach dem Befund der ‚*Prolegomena*' (oder des ersten Bandes) der *Logischen
Untersuchungen* stellt Psychologismus diese Auffassung von der Bedeutungs-
identität auf den Kopf und führt die logischen Gesetze auf die Gesetzmäßigkei-
ten der psychischen Denkprozesse d.h. auf die Gesetze realer Vorgänge zurück.
Der nominalistische Reduktionismus läuft somit auf eine Naturalisierung des
Bewusstseins und dieser auf einen skeptischen Subjektivismus hinaus. Anstelle
der Identitäts- wird eine empiristische Abstraktionstheorie postuliert, womit
sich das Problem der Begründung nicht nur als eines der Logik sondern auch
der Philosophie erweist. Als Subjektivismus, so Husserl, kann kein empiristi-
scher Ansatz den objektiven Erkenntnisgehalt zur Geltung bringen. Alle Arten
der psychologischen Begründung der Logik kommen laut Husserl darin über-
ein, dass sie die „logischen Gesetze mit Urteilen, im Sinne von Urteilsakten,
[...], also die *Gesetze als ‚Urteilsinhalte*' mit den *Urteilen selbst*" verwechseln.
(Husserl 1975; Pr/B 66) Z. B. der psychologische Logiker schließt im Falle des
Satzes vom Widerspruch von der idealen Unverträglichkeit zweier Sätze, der
„*Nichtzusammenwahrseins* der *Sätze*" auf die „*reale Unverträglichkeit*" der ent-
sprechenden *Urteilsakte*". (Husserl 1975 : Pr/B 81)

Hier setzt der zweite Band der *Logischen Untersuchungen* an und fragt nach
dem Verhältnis zwischen dem subjektiven Erkenntniserlebnis und dem objek-
tiven Erkenntnisgehalt d.h. dem Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Husserls Ziel ist
es, vorerst zu erweisen, dass auch die idealen logischen Gegenstände, wie z.
B. Sätze, Vorstellungen und Bedeutungen, eine spezifische Gruppe der inten-
tionalen Gegenstände bilden. Der Husserlschen Kritik an der empiristischen

Abstraktionstheorie zufolge sind diese idealen Gebilde als Gegenstände der sog. generellen Intentionen nicht auf die individuellen, sich bloß auf die einzelnen Gegenstände richtende Intentionen reduzierbar. Für diese Auffassung über die Autonomie der idealen Gegenstände haben sich bei Husserl verschiedene Bezeichnungen gebildet, wie etwa „logischer Absolutismus" bzw. etwas passender der „logische Objektivismus" usw.

Den Grund für die psychologistische Vermengung des Idealen und Realen sieht Husserl in der mangelnden Einsicht in die Natur der Intentionalität bzw. der intentionalen Erlebnisse. Die verschiedenen Komponenten des intentionalen Gegenstandsbezugs werden nicht deutlich voneinander geschieden. In den psychologistischen Erkenntnistheorien vermengen sich die Akt- und Bedeutungsanalyse mit genetischen Untersuchungen oder der Akt wird für den Aktinhalt gehalten usw. (Rinofner-Kreidl 2000: 52) Die richtige Einsicht in diese Strukturen bestätigt auch die Möglichkeit der originären Gegebenheit der idealen Gegenstände. Husserl sagt dazu: „Ein Gegenstand (der Erkenntnis) kann ebenso wohl ein Reales sein wie ein Ideales, ebenso wohl ein Ding oder ein Vorgang wie eine Spezies oder eine mathematische Relation, ebenso wohl ein Sein wie ein Seinsollen. Dies überträgt sich wie von selbst auf Ausdrücke wie Einheit der Gegenständlichkeit, Zusammenhang der Sachen und dergleichen." (Husserl 1975 : Pr/B 229)

Es gilt aber, so Husserl, nicht eine originäre Gegebenheit des Idealen zu behaupten, sondern auch die Möglichkeit der anschaulichen Erfüllung der auf die idealen Gegenstände bezogenen Intentionen aufzuweisen. Denn, das Problem der anschaulichen Erfüllung betrifft nicht nur die sinnlich gegebenen Gegenstände, sondern auch die „kategorialen objektiven Formen bzw. die ,synthetischen' Funktionen in der Sphäre der objektivierenden Akte, durch welche sich diese objektiven Formen konstituieren, durch welche sie zur ,Anschauung' und demgemäß auch zur ,Erkenntnis' kommen können". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 128)

## Bedeutungsintention und Bedeutungserfüllung

Eine der Charakteristiken der intentionalen Erlebnisse ist laut Husserl ihre Tendenz zu Erfüllung. Die intentionalen Erlebnissen können die Erfüllungsverhältnisse fundieren, worunter Husserl „alle zu engeren oder zu weiteren Sphäre des logischen gehörige Akte" zählt, „darunter auch die Akte, die in der Erkenntnis zur Erfüllung anderer Intentionen berufen sind, die *Anschauungen*". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 39)

Prinzipiell an allen Formen der intentionalen Erlebnisse ist das Verhältnis von Bedeutungsintention und Bedeutungserfüllung festzustellen. Schon auf der Ebene der Gegenstandswahrnehmung wird das, was an einem Gegenstand nicht gesehen wird, mitgemeint, und zwar nicht auf die beliebige Art und Weise, sondern in einem auf die Identitätsstiftung orientierten Gehalt. Darauf, dass Wahrnehmung ,symbolisch' ist, deutet die gleich jedem Akt innewohnende Dualität vom Signitiven und Intuitiven. Wenn die Gegenstandswahrnehmung

in der Formel $\mathbf{i} + \mathbf{s} = 1$ vorgestellt wird, wobei 1 Gegenstandsidentität wäre, $\mathbf{i}$ der intuitive (anschauliche) und $\mathbf{s}$ der signitive (symbolische) Gehalt wäre, dann würden sich laut Husserl ideell zwei Grenzfälle ergeben:

$$\mathbf{i} = 0 \qquad \mathbf{s} = 1$$
$$\mathbf{i} = 1 \qquad \mathbf{s} = 0$$

"Im ersten Fall hätte die Vorstellung nur einen signitiven Inhalt: von einem intentionalen Gegenstande bliebe keine Bestimmtheit übrig, die sie in ihrem Inhalte zur Darstellung brächte. [...] Im zweiten Fall enthält die Vorstellung gar keinen signitiven Inhalt. Alles an ihr ist Fülle; kein Teil, keine Seite, keine Bestimmtheit ihres Gegenstandes, die nicht intuitiv dargestellt, keine die bloß indirekt mitgemeint wäre." (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 81) Anschauliche Erfüllung liegt also dann vor, wenn das signitive, d.h. bloß gedanklich Gegebene, eine Entsprechung in dem Angeschauten findet. Ein Gedachtes kann anschaulich enttäuscht werden. Das, was man sich gedacht hat, wird nicht in der Anschauung bestätigt. Das Enttäuschen kann partiell, wie dies in der Wahrnehmung der Fall ist, oder vollständig geschehen. Der Prozess der Erfüllung ist in drei Schritte zu teilen: a) ausgegangen wird von einer signitiven Bedeutungsintention (Vorstellung, Behauptung), b) es wird dann ein Anspruch erhoben, dass das signitiv gemeinte auch eine anschauliche Entsprechung hat, und c) in einem dritten Akt ('identifizierende Synthese') kommt es zum Vergleich zwischen der Bedeutungsintention und dem als Inhalt eines anschaulichen Bewusstseinsaktes gegebenen realen Gegenstandes. Daraus erfolgt dann die Einsicht in die Identität oder etwa Differenz. Die Einsicht in diese Entsprechung nennt Husserl Evidenz. Dabei ist die Frage nach der Identität nicht von den Vollzugsmodi der bedeutungsverleihenden Akte zu denken.[2] Erfüllungsintention und Erfüllungsgeschehen gestalten sich mit gewissen Unterschieden in den jeweilig begehrenden, wollenden oder etwa objektivierenden Akten.

Das Hauptproblem der Husserlschen Anschauungstheorie ist die Frage nach der Möglichkeit der Erfüllung der idealen Gegenstände, wie Spezies oder formal-logische Verbindungen. Denn, das philosophische Problem der Anschauung konzentrierte sich traditionell um die Frage nach der Bestimmtheit der Erkenntnis. Der Anschauungsbegriff erlangte also seine Bestimmtheit hauptsächlich durch die Klärung seiner Funktion in dem Komplex der erkenntnistheoretischen Fragen. Die meisten Klärungsversuche stimmen wiederum darin überein, dass Anschauung etwas mit der Unmittelbarkeit zu tun hat. Genauer, die Anschauung wird in dem Gegensatz zu der vermittelten

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2   In *Erfahrung und Urteil* schreibt Husserl dazu: „Jeder Akt hat in seinen reellen Eigenheiten wohl seine individuelle Weise, wie er den Satz bewusst hat, z.B. der eine in immer klarer, der andere in mehr dunkler Weise, der eine Akt mag ein Akt der sogenannter Einsicht sein, der andere ein sogenannter blinder Akt. Aber der Satz selbst ist für alle diese Akte und diese Aktmodalitäten Identisches als Korrelat einer Identifikation und nicht Allgemeines als Korrelat einer vergleichenden Deckung." (Husserl 1985: 315f.). Zum Thema Identitätsbegriff bei Husserl siehe Heffernan 1983.

Gegenstandsrepräsentation durch Begriffe gedacht und folglich mit der Rolle der unvermittelten Gegenstandsrepräsentation versehen. Die Probleme der Bestimmung der Anschauung sind demnach auch die Probleme der Bestimmung und Definition der Begriffe innerhalb der Begriffslehre. Die meisten Unterschiede der diversen Auffassungen der Anschauung sind deshalb auf die Einschätzung des Verhältnisses zwischen den Begriffen und der Anschauung zurückzuführen. So wird die Anschauung etwa dort in einem starken Gegensatz zu der Diskursivität der Begriffe gedacht, wo sie eng mit dem Begriff der Wahrnehmung gekoppelt ist. Die Anschauung steht hier vor allem für die bedingungsspezifische Apriorität der Aposteriorität der Wahrnehmung.[3] Mit seiner These von der Möglichkeit der kategorialen Anschauung verwischt Husserl die Grenze zwischen Denken und Anschauen. Die Frage, von derer Klärung die Wahrheit dieser These abhängt, lautet, ob und wie sich die anschauliche Erfüllung der idealen Bedeutungsintentionen aufweisen lässt.

## Sinnliche und kategoriale Anschauung

Die Aufrechterhaltung des im dritten Kapitel der sechsten *Logischen Untersuchungen* (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 64-101) formulierten Ideals der vollständig angemessenen anschaulichen Erfüllung der Bedeutungsintentionen wird im Hinblick auf das Problem der Erfüllung der sog. kategorialen objektiven Formen erneut fraglich. „Was soll und kann", so formuliert Husserl diese Frage, „den Bedeutungsmomenten, welche die Satzform als solche ausmachen und wozu beispielsweise die Kopula gehört - den Momenten der ‚kategorialen Form' - Erfüllung verschaffen?" (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 129) Die einfache Analogie zu der Erfüllung der Eigenbedeutung in der schlichten Wahrnehmung reicht hier nicht aus. Der Eigenname etwa meint in seiner Eigenbedeutung genau den Genannten, unmittelbar, so wie „der Eigenname *Köln* in seiner Eigenbedeutung dieselbe Stadt ‚direkt', sie selbst, so wie sie ist" meint. (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 130) Also, nur in dem Akt der Wahrnehmung d.h. ohne Zuhilfenahme weiterer auf sie gebauter Akte kann sich in solchen Fällen die Bedeutungsintention vollständig erfüllen. Die Wahrnehmung bringt den gemeinten Gegenstand zur Erscheinung. Aber schon die einfach gegliederten Ausdrücke können solche anschauliche Erfüllung durch schlichte Wahrnehmung nicht erfahren und zeigen einen Überschuss an Bedeutung. Aufgrund einer und derselben Wahrnehmung können verschiedenen Aussageformen gemacht werden. Die Aussage, so Husserls Beispiel, *dieses weiße Papier* ist eine attributive Ausdrucksform. *Dieses Papier ist weiß* hat aber eine prädikative Ausdrucksform. Wichtig in diesem Zusammenhang ist, dass dieser Unterschied nicht wahrnehmbar ist, d.h. dass der hier vorhandene Bedeutungsüberschuss nicht durch die Wahrnehmung veranschaulicht werden kann. (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 131) Selbst die

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3    Über die Bestimmung der Anschauung als apriori reiner Form der Sinnlichkeit siehe Kapitel ‚Transzendentale Ästhetik' in Kants *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Kant 1976: B33-B73).

einfache Aussage *weißes Papier* bzw. die Intention des Wortes *weiß* kann nur eine partielle Deckung mit dem Farbmoment des erscheinenden Gegenstandes ereichen, denn „es bleibt ein Überschuss in der Bedeutung, eine Form, die in der Erscheinung selbst nicht findet, sich darin zu bestätigen. Weißes, d.h. weiß *seiendes* Papier". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 131) Damit ist auch jedem Verdacht, die Phänomenologie bzw. die Intentionalitätslehre Edmund Husserls mache erkenntnistheoretisch von einer verkappten Abbildtheorie Gebrauch, der Argumentationsboden entzogen.

Die Einsicht, dass das Sein kein reales Prädikat ist, hat schon Kant vertreten. Wie oben gezeigt wurde, vertritt im Rahmen seines phänomenologischen Ansatzes auch Husserl diesen Standpunkt. Das Sein betrifft weder ein reales inneres (Form, Qualität, Intensität, Figur) noch ein reales äußeres Merkmal und ist schlechthin nicht wahrnehmbar. Die Farbe (Weiß) kann gesehen werden, das *Farbig-sein* jedoch nicht. Dies bezieht sich genauso auf die anderen kategorialen Formen der Aussagen, wie etwa das *Ein*, das *Das*, das *Und*, das *Oder*, die Qualitätsformen usw. Das ‚ist' kann sich erfüllen oder enttäuschen, unabhängig davon, ob sich die sinnlichen Bedeutungsmomente eines Satzes erfüllt oder enttäuscht haben. (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 138)

Nun stellt sich die Frage, wie die Formen bzw. die angesprochenen kategorialen Formen die Erfüllung finden können. Vorausgesetzt, unter Wahrnehmung wird nur die sinnliche Wahrnehmung verstanden, so finden darin nur die stofflichen Bedeutungsmomente die Erfüllung. Darin ist eine „wesentliche Gleichartigkeit der Erfüllungsfunktion" sichtbar, die darin liegt, dass sowohl im Bezug auf stoffliche als auch auf die kategoriale Bedeutungselemente immer von einem Akt ausgegangen werden muss, der prinzipiell in beiden Fällen eine funktionelle Übereinstimmung zeigt.. Wie im Falle von Erfüllung der stofflichen Bedeutungselemente geschieht die Erfüllung der Formen nur in der „Weise der bestätigenden Selbstdarstellung" d.h. in einem strukturell dem Akt der Wahrnehmung nachgebildeten Akt. Somit, so Husserl, ist eine Erweiterung der Begriffe Wahrnehmung und Anschauung erlaubt, und jeder in der Weise der bestätigenden Selbstdarstellung erfüllenden Akt als Wahrnehmung sowie jeden erfüllenden Akt als Anschauung und sein intentionales Korrelat als Gegenstand zu bezeichnen. (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 142)

Husserls Beteuerung, dass auch die kategorialen Bedeutungsmomente eine Erfüllung in der Wahrnehmung finden, d.h. ihre Gegenstände angeschaut werden können, bedeutet aber nicht, dass ihre gegenständliche Korrelate sinnlich wahrgenommen werden können, sondern lediglich dass die kategorialen Formen nicht in ihrer Signifikanz, in ihrer symbolischen Funktion verharren müssen, sondern sich auch ihren Gegenstand präsent, in diesem Fall in seiner kategorialen Formung, machen können. Der kategoriale Gegenstand „sei nicht bloß gedacht, sondern eben angeschaut bzw. wahrgenommen". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 143)

Dabei ist dieser Zusammenhang zwischen sinnlichem und kategorialem Anschauungs- bzw. Wahrnehmungsbegriff nicht nur aus der Sprachnot entstanden, sondern hat einen festen sachlichen Hintergrund. Zumindest lässt

er sich in der Abgrenzung zu den Akten der signifikativen und der bildlichen Vergegenwärtigungen vorläufig feststellen. Denn diese schließen das Gegenwärtigsein bzw. das „selbst gegebene" Erscheinen aus. Die sinnlichen und kategorialen Akte dagegen erfassen den Gegenstand in seiner Selbstgegebenheit und aktuellen Präsenz. (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 143f)

Weitere Bestimmungen sollen aber deutlicher die Unterschiede zwischen sinnlicher und kategorialer Anschauung zeigen. Um eine Möglichkeit der Anschauung der nichtsinnlichen Sachverhalte aufrechtzuerhalten, soll sich der erweiterte Begriff der Wahrnehmung bzw. der Anschauung in weiterer Differenzierung der fraglichen Bereiche des Sinnlichen und des Kategorialen bewähren.

In den Akten der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung erscheint das Wahrgenommene „in einem Schlage, sowie unser Blick darauf fällt" d.h. in der Art des schlichten Gegenwärtigseins. ‚Schlicht' besagt hier, dass die Präsenz des Wahrgenommenen nicht in anderen Akten gründet, nicht also aus der höherstufigen Synthesis anderer Akte hervorgeht. Aber auch die Wahrnehmungseinheit ist eine schlichte Einheit, die lediglich durch die „unmittelbare Verschmelzung der Partialintentionen und ohne Hinzutritt neuer Aktintentionen" entsteht. (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 148) Die einzelnen, partiellen Wahrnehmungen eines Dinges fundieren das Kontinuum der Wahrnehmung nur als Teile eines Ganzen, nicht aber in der Weise, dass dabei ein neuer Aktcharakter entstünde. Die kontinuierliche Wahrnehmung hat denselben Aktcharakter wie die sie aufbauenden Teilwahrnehmungen. Z. B. die in diesem Fall zustande gekommene Einheit eines Aktes der Identifizierung soll nicht mit der Einheit der Identifizierung vermengt werden. Denn in jenem Fall wird die Identifizierung vollzogen, nicht aber die Identität gemeint. Ein Akt der Identifizierung meint Identität, das Wahrnehmungskontinuum aber niemals etwas Neues sondern immer einen und denselben sinnlich wahrgenommenen Gegenstand. (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 150)

Die in der kontinuierlichen Verschmelzung entstandene Einheit der Wahrnehmung kann aber explizit betrachtet werden. Erst in dem Fall werden die Teile *als* Teile erfasst und zueinander in Beziehung gesetzt. Das Verhältnis von Teilen und dem Ganzem wird thematisiert bzw. die Teilverhältnisse in einem neuen, höherstufigen artikulierenden Akt „als neue Objekte" erst konstituiert. Der höhere Akt ist in den schlichten Akten insofern fundiert, als er diese notwendig voraussetzt. Die schlichten Wahrnehmungsakte finden in ihm aber eine neuartige Einheit. Das Verhältnis vom Teil und Ganzen etwa kann erst in einem höherstufigen Akt *als solches* erkannt werden. In der schlichten Wahrnehmung enthält das Ganze implizit die Teile in sich, in der höherstufigen Synthesis wird das Enthaltensein, das Ganze *als* das Teil in sich habend erstmal erfasst. (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 153)

Derselbe Befund kann ferner auch an den Beispielen anderer synthetischer Gegenstandsformen wie etwa Kollektiva und Disjunktiva aufgezeigt werden. Husserls Beispiel dazu: „Ich kann A malen und B malen, kann beide auch im selben Bildraume malen; aber das *beide*, das A *und* B kann ich nicht malen" (Husserl 1975: LU/B2 160).

Diese Funktion der synthetischen Akte, wodurch die Gegenstände der schlichten, fundierenden Wahrnehmung ideell zusammen begriffen werden, bezeichnet Husserl als einen allgemeinen Charakter der synthetischen Akte überhaupt und nennt sie ‚Inbegriff'. Dieser Charakter macht sich aber erst deutlicher bemerkbar, wenn wir den Bereich der einfachen synthetischen Akte verlassen und uns der Gruppe kategorialer Akte zuwenden, deren Intention nicht direkt auf die Gegenstände der fundierenden Wahrnehmung mitgerichtet ist d. h. „bei denen die Gegenstände der fundierenden Akte in die Intention des fundierten nicht miteintreten und erst in beziehenden Akten ihr nahes Verhältnis zu demselben bekunden". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 162) Es handelt sich nämlich um die sog. allgemeinen Anschauungen, deren Fragwürdigkeit Husserl durchaus bewusst war. Denn, die allgemeine Anschauung sei, so Husserl, „ein Ausdruck, der manchem freilich nicht besser klingen wird als hölzernes Eisen". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 162) Die Schwierigkeiten dieses Übergangs haben nicht nur die Zeitgenossen veranlasst sich von Husserl abzuwenden, sondern stoßen auch heute auf Kritik. So vermutet Hans-Joachim Pieper hier eine „verunglückte Terminologie", die aus einer zu weit getriebenen Analogie zur sinnlichen Anschauung entsprungen ist, so dass der „Vorwurf, Husserl postuliere hier eine höchst erstaunliche, mysteriöse Zugangsweise zu einem besonderen Gegenstandsgebiet, ein neues Sinnesorgan gewissermaßen, durchaus berechtigt erscheint. Vielleicht wird man sagen müssen, er operiere mit dem Anschauungsbegriff auch hier, um eine Denktheorie zu umgehen, in dem Glauben, die an eine Theorie des Denkens geknüpften Schwierigkeiten damit vermeiden zu können". (Pieper 1993: 13) So etwa nennt Husserl im § 1. der *Ideen I* „gewisse Anschauungen" als die „Urquelle der rechtsausweisenden Begründung" und bezieht sich dabei auf die „gebende Anschauung der ersten, ‚natürlichen' Erkenntnissphäre und aller ihrer Wissenschaften", die er in der Wahrnehmung als „originär gebende[n] Erfahrung" sieht. (Husserl 1967: 7) Obwohl die darin erfahrenen Gegenstände als „zufällig" zu bezeichnen sind, haben sie, in ihrer Zufälligkeit einen korrelativen Bezug zur Notwendigkeit. Denn, „zum Sinn eines jeden Zufälligen gehört, eben ein Wesen, und somit ein rein zu fassendes Eidos zu haben, und dieses steht unter Wesenswahrheiten verschiedener Allgemeinheitsstufe". (Husserl 1967: 9) Damit wird, so Pieper, die individuelle Wesenschau unkritisch als zur natürlichen Erfahrung gehörig postuliert. Eigentlich wird auf die Anschauung hier zurückgegriffen, weil die Anschauung eine Letztbegründungsfunktion erfüllen solle: „Da eine Begründungskette, in der Urteile stets durch andere Urteile begründet werden, prinzipiell unabschließbar ist, Husserl jedoch absolute, somit letztbegründete Erkenntnis intendiert, bedarf es der Anschauung als derjenigen Instanz, die – ohne selbst ein Urteil zu sein – einer Kette von Kausalbestimmungen oder Prädikationen sachhaltigen Grund gibt, nämlich den zu bestimmenden Gegenstand selbst in der ihm eigenen Weise von Gegebenheit". (Pieper 1993: 11) Bei der Anschauung handelt es sich um ein „operatives, selbst nicht weiter hinterfragbares methodisches Konzept", das sich eher einer Forschungsintention als einer kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit dem Problem der Erkenntnis verdankt. (Pieper 1993: 11)

Die allgemeinen Anschauungen bezeichnet Husserl als die Akte der allgemeinen Bestimmung. Diese sind zwar auch wie die einfachen Synthesen im Sinnlichen fundiert, vollbringen aber ihre ideierende Leistung nicht durch die bloße Hervorhebung eines unselbständigen Merkmals an einem sinnlichen Objekt, sondern schaffen eine völlig neue Art von idealer Gegenständlichkeit. Diese neue Art von Objektivität nennt Husserl ‚Idee'.[4] Ihre neue Qualität zeigt sich daran, dass sie unabhängig davon ist, auf welche Art der fundierenden Akte sie sich bezieht. Die fundierenden Akte mögen hier perzeptive oder imaginative, setzende oder nichtsetzende sein, die allgemeine Anschauung wird sich nicht daran differenzieren. „Das *Rot*, das *Dreieck* der bloßen Phantasie ist spezifisch dasselbe wie das *Rot*, das *Dreieck* in der Wahrnehmung." (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 163) In der Idee *Rot* verwischt sich der Unterschied zwischen Bild und Original. Eine und dieselbe Idee, der Gegenstand überhaupt, kann auf der Grundlage der Imagination, der Wahrnehmung usw. gewonnen werden.

Inwiefern Husserl diese Bestimmungen von der ‚allgemeinen Anschauung' in die ‚Wesenschau' der *Ideen I* übernommen hat, lässt sich an folgenden Äußerungen feststellen: „Zunächst bezeichnete ‚Wesen' das im selbstständigen Sein eines Individuum als ein Was Vorfindliche. Jedes solches Was kann aber ‚in Idee gesetzt' werden. Erfahrende oder individuelle Anschauung kann in Wesenserschauung (*Ideation*) umgewandelt werden – eine Möglichkeit, die selbst nicht als empirische, sondern als Wesensmöglichkeit zu verstehen ist. Das Erschaute ist dann das entsprechende reine Wesen oder Eidos, sei es die oberste Kategorie, sei es eine Besonderung derselben, bis herab zu voller Konkretion." (Husserl 1967: 10)

Es scheint aber so, als würde Husserl in den *Ideen I* (§ 3) schon als bekannt voraussetzen, dass es eine Anschauung sowohl vom Individuellen als auch vom Allgemeinen geben kann. Das Einsetzen des Ausdrucks ‚Wesensschau' für die allgemeine Anschauung in den Ideen, so vermutet Ernst Tugendhat, ist auf die *Logische Untersuchungen* zurückzuführen. Das Hauptproblem sieht Tugendhat jedoch nicht etwa in dem Terminus ‚Wesensschau', sondern eher darin bestehen, dass durch die in den *Ideen I* bezeugte Selbstverständlichkeit der Rede von der ‚Wesensschau' die eigentliche Problematik in den Hintergrund gerückt wird und „sich nach außen der Eindruck verstärke, in der phänomenologischen Wesensschau handle es sich um eine bodenlose mystische Intuition". (Tugendhat 1967: 108f.)

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4    Laut Dahlstrom besteht die Besonderheit der allgemeinen Anschauungen darin, dass „man oft nicht die vereinzelten Fälle einer bestimmten Art, das heißt, die Instanzen in ihrer Individualität oder Unterschiedlichkeit, sondern gerade als Instanzen in Betracht zieht; das heißt, man konzentriert sich allein auf die diese Fälle und ihre Unterschiedlichkeit übergreifende Art. [...] Indem man etwas als ein Haus wahrnimmt, hat man die Idee von Haus miterfaßt und zwar als etwas Allgemeines, für das eine beliebige Instanzierung gleichgültig ist. [...] Was Husserl mit ‚ideierende Abstraktion' nennt, ist das Herausheben einer solchen Idee aus ihren mannigfachen Vereinzelungen." (Dahlstrom 1994: 83).

## Kategoriale Formung

Die Aufdeckung des anschaulichen Charakters des Bereichs des Kategorialen stellte das Verhältnis von Denken und Anschauen auf einen neuen Boden und bestimmte die Erkenntnis als die Erfüllungseinheit. Laut Husserl vollzieht sich diese Einheit sowohl auf der Grundlage der schlichten als auch der kategorialen Akte. Den einen wie den anderen entsprechen die Bedeutungen, „ihre möglichen idealen Gegenbilder", die potenziell eine Erfüllung in der Anschauung haben können. Dabei ist zu beachten, dass auch die kategorialen Akte nach all jenen Gesichtspunkten - wie Qualität, intentionale Materie (Auffassungssinn), Form der Repräsentation – analysiert werden können. Dies ist um so wichtiger, da oben gezeigt wurde, dass die allgemeinen Anschauungen unabhängig von dem fundierenden Akt sind. Der fundierte Akt kann sich nach der Qualität[5] und Materie[6] völlig von den ihn fundierenden schlichten Akten unterscheiden. (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 166)

Aus diesem Grund soll eine reine Formenlehre der Bedeutungen die Klarheit über den gesamten Möglichkeitsbereich der kategorialen Gegenständlichkeit bringen. Dieser ist, so Husserls Behauptung, schier unbegrenzt: „Die verschiedenen Formen fundierter Akte, in welchen sich statt der schlichten, sinnlich anschaulichen Gegenstände vielmehr die kategorial geformten und synthetisch verknüpften konstituieren, gestatten mannigfache Komplikationen zu neuen Formen, sofern kategoriale Einheiten immer wieder (und zwar auf Grund gewisser kategorialen Gesetzmäßigkeiten apriorischer Art) zu Gegenständen neuer verknüpfender, beziehender oder ideierenden Akte werden können." (LU VI/ B2 181) Die reine Formenlehre der Bedeutungen hat die Aufgabe den Bereich des Denkbaren zu differenzieren, verschiedene Komplexitätsstufen der Synthesen der allgemeinen Gegenstände sowie die apriorische Gesetzmäßigkeiten der Bildung dieser Formen aufzuzeigen. Die Gesetzmäßigkeiten dieses Typs sind aber nicht mit den Gesetzen der adäquaten Erfüllung zu vermengen. Die reine Formenlehre der Bedeutungen ist von der reinen Formenlehre der Anschauungen zu unterscheiden, d. h. sie sagt nichts wie diese über die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der adäquater Erfüllung. (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 182)

Die Differenzierungen innerhalb des Bereichs des Kategorialen betreffen zunächst die Aufteilung in die reinen und sinnlichen (mit Sinnlichkeit bemengte) Verstandesakte bzw. in die Kategorien und die sinnliche Begriffe[7] sowie die gemischten Formen dieser zwei Gruppen. „*Farbe*, *Haus*, *Urteil*, *Wunsch* sind

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5   Z. B. es kann in einem höherstufigen Akt über das Vorgestellte geurteilt werden.

6   Es „hat nicht nur jeder unter den fundierenden Akten eine Materie, sondern der fundierte bringt eine neue Materie, wobei der Satz gilt, dass die neue Materie, oder wofern sie die Materien der Grundakte erschließt, das Neuhinzukommende in ihr, in den Materien der Grundakte *fundiert* ist". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 166)

7   Über den Grund dieser Aufteilung schreibt Rinofner-Kreidl: „Da die Operation zur Bildung empirischer Begriffe ebenso Formmomente einschließen (z. B. die Form der Prädikation), muß auch die Bildung gemischter Begriffe den kategorialen Akten zugerechnet werden." (Rinofner-Kreidl 2000: 92).

rein sinnliche Begriffe, *Farbigkeit* (Farbig-sein), *Tugend*, *Parallelenaxiom* u. dgl. sind kategorial vermischte, *Einheit*, *Mehrheit*, *Beziehung*, *Begriff* sind rein kategoriale." (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 184) Die rein kategorialen Begriffe haben in ihrer anschaulichen Grundlage nichts sinnliches, beziehen sich sonach nur auf die reine Beziehungsformen. Als solche Begriffe bezeichnet Husserl „alle logischen Formen und Formeln, wie *alle S sind P*, *kein S ist P*, usw.", die keine sinnliche, sondern nur kategoriale Elemente[8] enthalten. (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 184)

Vom Standpunkt der kategorialen Formung gesehen, bestehen scheinbar unbegrenzte Möglichkeiten des Vergleichens, des Unterscheidens, des Kolligierens oder des Zerlegens der sinnlichen Komplexionen. Wir können etwa dieselben Glieder solcher Komplexionen einmal als Subjekt und ein anderes Mal als Objekt einsetzen. Die sinnlichen Einheitsformen dagegen entbehren diese Freiheit der Synthesis vollständig. Sie sind, so Husserl, „durch die wesentliche Natur der zu verknüpfender Teile gesetzlich bestimmt und bei voll genommener Individuation dieser Teile absolut bestimmt". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 187) In solchen unveränderbaren realen Einheiten und realen Gesetzlichkeiten ist keine der kategorialen Formen anzutreffen. Sie kommen erst hinzu im Zuge der Synthesis der realen Inhalte. Die Tatsache aber, dass jede kategoriale Form letztendlich in solchen sinnlichen Einheitsformen fundiert ist, legt auch der kategorialen Formung eine Reihe der gesetzlichen Schranken auf: „Wie wäre auch sonst von kategorialer Wahrnehmung und Anschauung die Rede, wenn sich jeder beliebiger Stoff in jede beliebige Form bringen, also die fundierenden schlichten Anschauungen mit den kategorialen Charakteren beliebig zusammenknüpfen ließen." (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 188) Es steht uns völlig frei, die beliebigen Verhältnisse und Verbindungen der sinnlichen Elemente zu denken, nicht aber ist möglich, alles aus solcher bloßen Signifikation auch wirklich zu vollziehen. Wir können den sinnlichen Stoff in beliebiger kategorialer Form denken, ihn aber nicht beliebig anschauen. Die idealen Möglichkeiten finden in ihrem aktuellen Vollzug auf Grund bestimmter schlichter Anschauungen eine gesetzliche Begrenzung. Die Gesetze, die bestimmen, welche dieser Variationen des Stofflichen zulässig sind, haben wiederum einen idealen Charakter, „gehören zu den kategorialen Formen *in specie*, also zu den Kategorien im objektiven Sinne". Denn, „[d]ie idealen Bedingungen der Möglichkeit kategorialer Anschauung überhaupt sind korrelativ die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände kategorialer Anschauung und der Möglichkeit von kategorialen Gegenständen schlechthin". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 189) Sie umgrenzen also apriori den Bereich der idealen Möglichkeiten der neuen Formen, sagen aber nichts darüber, mit welchem Stoff diese Formen ausgefüllt werden sollen.

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8    „ [...] denn die Buchstaben *S*, *P* u dgl. sind bloße indirekte Anzeigen für ‚gewisse', unbestimmte und ‚beliebige Begriffe [...]. Wie die gesamte reine Logik, so ist die gesamte reine Arithmetik, die reine Mannigfaltigkeitslehre, kurz die *reine Mathesis* in allerumfassendsten Sinne, *rein* in dem Sinne, dass sie in ihrem ganzen theoretischen Bestande keinen sinnlichen Begriff enthält". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 184)

Die besagten Gesetze sind Gesetze der kategorialen Anschauung, von Husserl auch als Gesetze des „eigentlichen Denkens" bezeichnet.

Die kategorialen Anschauungen wiederum „fungieren im theoretischen Denken als wirkliche oder mögliche Bedeutungserfüllungen, bzw. –enttäuschungen, und verleihen je nach ihrer Funktion den Aussagen den logischen Wert der Wahrheit bzw. Unwahrheit". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 191) Der Wahrheitsanspruch der bloß signitiven Akte, die Erfüllung des bloß intentional bedeutungsmäßig Gedachten hängt also von der nach bestimmten Gesetzmäßigkeiten verlaufenden kategorialen Anschauung ab. Das „eigentliche Denken" ist demnach die durch die Anschauung erfüllte Bedeutungsintention. Da sie ursprünglich aus der Fülle korrelaten Anschauungen entstammen, können etwa die einfachen d.h. nicht zusammengesetzten Bedeutungen auch nicht unerfüllt bleiben. Ähnlich verhält es sich mit einigen einfachsten Synthesen. Z. B. der Und-Form unterstellt Husserl eine sichere Erfüllung in der Anschauung. Während die Bedeutungsform *ein zugleich A und nicht A Seiendes*, weil unmöglich, keine Erfüllung findet, ist *ein A und B* immer möglich d.h. hat einen „realen" Sinn. (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 192)

Der uneigentliche Denkakt wäre aber nicht derjenige, der, weil widersinnig gar keine Erfüllung in der Anschauung finden kann, sondern derjenige, der nur als Bedeutungsintention fungiert. Alle bloß signifikativen Akte sind demnach uneigentliche Denkakte. Der eigentliche Denkakt wäre die adäquate Erfüllung der in dem uneigentlichen Akt zu findenden Bedeutungsintention. Natürlich, vorausgesetzt, dass dieser Bedeutung überhaupt etwas ‚reales' entspricht. Der Bereich der bloßen Signifikanz, des uneigentlichen Denkens untersteht, so Husserl, nur den ‚reinlogisch-grammatischen' Gesetzen. Es sind Gesetze „Komplikation und Modifikation", die helfen, den Sinn von Unsinn zu unterscheiden. „In der uneigentlichen kategorialen Form sind wir frei, sofern wir nur nicht die Bedeutungen unsinnig konglomerieren." (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 194) Um aber an einer Parallelität der Bedeutungsintention und der sie erfüllenden Anschauung festzuhalten, müssen wir den Bereich des uneigentlichen Denkens stark eingrenzen. Von der Parallelität der Bedeutungsintentionen und der Anschauungen kann nur gesprochen werden, wenn wir den Bereich des reinlogisch Möglichen auf die Sphäre der objektiven Möglichkeit einschränken. Die reinen Gesetze der Bedeutungsgeltung sind mit den kategorialen Gesetzen der Anschauung nicht gleichzusetzen, „aber sie folgen diesen, auf Grund der Gesetzmäßigkeit, welche die Zusammenhänge von Bedeutungsintention und Bedeutungserfüllung regelt, getreulich nach". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 195)

## Das Erfüllungsgeschehen der kategorialen Formen als aktueller Vollzug der Synthesis

Jede Bedeutungsintention, sowohl die sinnliche als auch die kategoriale muss – wenn sie nicht ein leeres Meinen bleiben sollte – die anschauliche Erfüllung erfahren. Die sinnliche Gegenständlichkeit kommt intuitiv als sinnliche

Präsenz zur ursprünglichen Gegebenheit. Analog dazu dürfte dann der ideale Charakter des Kategorialen die Erfüllung in einer entsprechenden idealen Gegenwart finden. Die intuitive, anschauliche Gegebenheit des Kategorialen hat jedoch einen wesentlich anderen Charakter als die Gegebenheit der sinnlichen Gegenwart. In der sinnlichen Anschauung erfüllt sich der signitive Akt dadurch, dass die reellen Bewusstseinsinhalte gegenständlich aufgefasst werden. Etwas in dieser Weise gegenständlich auffassen, würde demnach heißen, die Empfindungen etwa zu Repräsentanten des gemeinten Gegenstandes zu machen. Die Eigentümlichkeit aller signitiven, unerfüllten Akte ist die Abwesenheit der sog. eigentlichen Repräsentanten.[9] Sie „sind es, welche den Unterschied zwischen 'leerer' Signifikation und ‚voller' Intuition ausmachen, ihnen wird die ‚Fülle' verdankt, weshalb sie gerade den einen Wortsinn von Fülle bestimmen". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 171) In einem Erfüllungsgeschehen, in einem intuitiven Akt der Anschauung fasst der Repräsentant die „Auffassungsform als das Analogon oder als das Selbst des Gegenstandes" auf. (Ebd.)

Durch welche Repräsentanten soll aber der für die kategoriale Anschauung charakteristische Bedeutungsüberschuss repräsentiert werden? In der sinnlichen Anschauung haben die Empfindungsinhalte die Rolle der Repräsentanten. In der kategorialen Anschauung soll laut Husserl diese Funktion durch das „psychische Band" bzw. durch die „psychische Verbindungsform" übernommen werden. Anstelle von Empfindungsinhalten kommt nun die Repräsentation durch eine bestimmte sinnliche Konstellation der fundierenden Akte. Sie ist aber nicht als ‚vorhanden' zu deuten, sondern als eine bestimmte Form von Aktualität der sich vollziehenden Synthesis. Kategoriale Gegenständlichkeit bzw. die Selbstgegebenheit derselben ist nur im Hinblick auf diesen aktuellen Vollzug der Synthesis, in dem sie sich konstituiert, zu verstehen; die Konstellation des Sinnlichen ist also gegenständlich aufzufassen. (Tugendhat 1967: 122) Dementsprechend wird die kategoriale Anschauung in der Folge von Husserl auch als der „wirkliche Vollzug"[10] der Synthesis bezeichnet. Aufgrund, so Husserl, der fundierenden Anschauungen aller Art sind die betreffenden

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9    Die sog. uneigentlichen Repräsentanten sind diejenigen, die in einem unerfüllten Denkakt vorkommen können, repräsentieren aber nicht den darin intendierten Gegenstand, sondern irgendeinen anderen. In einem unerfüllten fundierten Akt etwa sind die uneigentlichen Repräsentanten die Gegenstände des ihn fundierenden Aktes. Z. B. zwei Gegenstände können durch Empfindungen eigentlich repräsentiert sein, d.h. in einer erfüllten sinnlichen Anschauung gegeben werden, ein etwa denkbarer Kausalzusammenhang zwischen ihnen ist aber dadurch nicht eigentlich repräsentiert, sondern kann noch unausgewiesen, bloß signifikant gemeint bleiben.

10    Vom ‚wirklichen Vollzug' der Synthesis als aktuellem, d. h. eigentlichem, spricht Husserl schon in der IV. Untersuchung: „Wollen wir uns ‚klarmachen', was das Wort *gleich* bedeutet, so müssen wir auf eine anschauliche Gleichheit hinblicken, wir müssen eine Vergleichung aktuell (‚eigentlich') vollziehen und auf ihrem Grunde einen Satz der Form *a=b* zu erfüllendem Verständnis bringen. Wollen wir uns die Bedeutung des Wortes *und* klarmachen, so müssen wir irgendeinen Kollektionsakt wirklich vollziehen und in dem so zu eigentlicher Vorstellung kommenden Inbegriff eine Bedeutung der Form a und b zur Erfüllung bringen. Und so überall." (Husserl 1975: LU IV/B1 314)

kategorialen Synthesen und die sonstigen kategorialen Akte „wirklich vollzieh-
bar". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 190) Die Feststellung aber, so die Bemerkung
von Tugendhat, dass der intuitive, erfüllende Akt durch die Aktualität seines
Vollzuges gekennzeichnet ist, besagt nicht, dass der signitive Akt nicht auch
ein aktuell vollzogener Akt sein kann. Denn im Wesentlichen kommt es nicht
auf die Aktualität (etwa des Intendierens) als solche, sondern auf den aktuel-
len Vollzug der *Synthesis* an. In einem signitiven Akt kann die Intention ak-
tuell vollzogen werden, die darin intendierte Synthesis bleibt aber ‚bloß ver-
meint', d. h. nicht aktuell vollzogen. Z. B. wie wenn wir etwa ein „vollständiges
Bedeutungsgebilde (wie ‚A ist p und zugleich nicht p') [...] vage-aufnehmend
‚verstehen' ohne schon die Synthesis, auf die es verweist, einheitlich zu voll-
ziehen". (Tugendhat 1967: 123)

Wie für die sinnlichen ist also auch für die kategorialen Bedeutungselemen-
te eine Differenz des Signitiven und Intuitiven nachweisbar. Die Erfüllung, der
Übergang von der unerfüllten Sachferne zu der erfüllten Sachnähe bestehe in
diesem Fall aber nicht in der sinnlichen Gegenwart der Sache, sondern in dem
Vollzug der Synthesis. Dabei ist zu beachten, dass die Erfüllung der kategoria-
len Formen funktionell immer von der fundierenden sinnlichen Anschauungen
und ihrer sinnlichen Gegenwart abhängig bleibt. In der sinnlich gemischten
kategorialen Gegenständlichkeit kann sogar von einer vollständigen Abhän-
gigkeit gesprochen werden. Nur wenn die Gegenstände sinnlich präsent sind,
könne auch etwa die Identität dieser Gegenstände vollzogen werden.

Die Betonung der Fundiertheit des Kategorialen im Sinnlichen hat aber zu
einigen begrifflichen Unklarheiten bei Husserl geführt. Indem gelegentlich,
so die Bemerkung Tugendhats, auch bei der kategorialen Form die signiti-
ven, perzeptiven und imaginären Gegebenheitsweisen unterschieden werden,
kommt es zur Verwischung der Grenze zwischen Sinnlichem und Kategoria-
lem. Als Folge davon kann es zu einer ‚horizontalen' Verwischung der Grenze
zwischen Signitivem und Intuitivem bei den kategorialen Formen kommen.
Denn bei diesen Formen kann nur von zwei Gegebenheitsweisen die Rede
sein, nämlich von der signitiven (Meinung der Synthesis) und von der intuiti-
ven (Vollzug der Synthesis). Das Kategoriale ist zwar stark von der sinnlichen
Grundlage abhängig, kann aber nicht in einer „unkritischen Analogie" zu die-
sem verstanden werden. Im Sinnlichen sind auch die Zwischenmöglichkeiten
denkbar, wie etwa wenn der Gegenstand nicht leibhaftig präsent sei, sondern
nur vergegenwärtigt (z. B. imaginiert) wird. (Tugendhat 1967: 123)

Der Vollzugscharakter der Erfüllung kategorialer Bedeutungsformen so-
wie die Fundiertheit derselben in der sinnlichen Anschauung verleiten zu der
Annahme, dass der Ausdruck ‚kategoriale Anschauung' ein von Husserl doch
unglücklich gewählter Terminus ist. ‚Anschauung' suggeriert, dass es sich hier
um etwas Gegenständliches, das angeschaut wird, handelt. Die Analogie zur
Anschauung eines sinnlich gegenwärtigen Gegenstandes bringt die Gefahr
mit sich, die idealen Gegenstände zu verdinglichen, und unter der Anschau-
ung auch eine schlichte, jedoch nicht-sinnliche, ja übersinnliche Schau zu
verstehen. Pieper etwa spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von einer in der

Husserlschen Lehre von der kategorialen Anschauung zustande gekomme-nen „Hypostasierung allgemeiner Begriffe zu Gegenständen". (Pieper 1993: 14) Dies kann aber, so Tugendhat, unmöglich von Husserl gemeint sein, weil die kategoriale Anschauung als immer gegenstandsbezogen bestimmt wird. Der aktuelle Vollzug der Synthesis bedeutet, eine Synthesis zwischen zwei vorge-stellten Gegenständen zu vollziehen. Dabei ist man notwendig auf eben diese Gegenstände gerichtet. Der Gegenstandsbezug ist also auf diese Weise auch in einer kategorialen Anschauung gewährleistet und „daher ist auch das syn-thetische Moment (das ‚ist', das ‚identisch mit' usw.) zu den Gegenständen ge-hörig, obwohl an ihnen nicht sinnlich vorzufinden, sondern eben nur im Voll-zug erfahrbar". (Tugendhat 1967: 127) Ob diese Mittelbarkeit der Konstitution der idealen Gegenstände noch den Gebrauch des Wortes ‚Anschauung' in die-sem Zusammenhang zulässt, ist eine berechtigte Frage. Tugendhat hält es für völlig ausreichend, wenn an dem Unterschied zwischen intendierter Signifi-kanz und intuitiver Erfüllung festgehalten wird. Im Bereich des Kategorialen soll dann nicht irreführend von Anschauung, sondern lediglich von Erfüllung gesprochen werden. Denn die Misverständnisse in Bezug auf den Ausdruck ‚Anschauung' würden sich nur häufen. Vor allem im Fall seiner Verwendung bezüglich der aussagenlogischen Verbindungen und Quantoren wäre seine Ver-wendung äußerst problematisch: „So bestünde z. B. die Erfüllung des ‚alle' in einem universalen Urteil ‚Alle Schwäne sind weiß' in der unendlichen Aufga-be, alle einzelnen Fälle auf das behauptete Prädikat hin intuitiv zu prüfen. Die Prüfung jedes einzelnen Falles ist natürlich als Anschauung zu verstehen, aber diese betrifft nur die implizierten ‚fundierenden' Erfüllungen, während die Er-füllung des ‚alle' selbst, das universale Durchlaufen des ganzen Umfangs, ein ‚aktueller Vollzug' ist, dessen Auffassung als ‚Anschauung' zumindest sehr ge-künstelt wäre". (Tugendhat 1967: 128) Es wäre demnach für jeden Bedeutungs-typus eigens zu prüfen, „was seine Erfüllung jeweils besagt, in welche Weise also etwa das ‚alle' und das ‚kein' das aussagenlogische ‚und' und ‚oder' zu ‚ur-sprünglicher Gegebenheit' kommen". (Tugendhat 1967: 128)

## ‚Wesensanschauung' und das Problem des Apriori in der Phänomenologie

Das Problem der apriori synthetischen Wahrheit wird in den *Logischen Unter-suchungen* nur sporadisch und ansatzweise behandelt. Die *Logischen Unter-suchungen* (vor allem die LU VI.) kreisten vorwiegend um die Frage der ana-lytischen, rein logischen Wahrheit. Dass aber auch eine apriori synthetische Erkenntnis einer adäquaten Erfüllung bedarf, liegt in der Konsequenz der bisherigen Husserlschen Analysen zum Thema Anschauung. Wie die ‚ma-terialen' Bedeutungselemente, die logischen ‚Stoffe', zur Selbstgegebenheit kommen können, wird unter dem Begriff ‚Wesensschau' erst in *Ideen I* behan-delt. Tugendhat zufolge fehlen den Analysen der zweiten *Logischen Untersu-chung* (LU II.), die sich mit den allgemeinen Gegenständen beschäftigen, die

Ausführungen über die Erfüllbarkeit der ‚materialen' Bedeutungselemente. Dies hätte in der sechsten *Logischen Untersuchung* (LU VI) ausgeführt werden sollen. Dort wird aber nur die formal-kategoriale Anschauung abgeschlossen behandelt. (Tugendhat 1967: 137)

Die Frage, die sich aber auch in bezug auf die allgemeinen Gegenstände stellt, lautet: wie die bloß signifikant gemeinten allgemeinen-synthetischen Gegenstände, die ‚materialen' Bedeutungselemente, zur ursprünglichen Gegebenheit kommen können. Dass sie als solche *gemeint* sein können, bestreiten auch die Empiristen nicht. Ob sie aber *sein* können, ist eine andere Frage. Der empiristisch-nominalistischen Position zufolge, lassen sich alle Vorstellungen der allgemeinen Gegenstände auf sinnliche Vorstellungen reduzieren.[11] Diese Ansicht aber, so Husserl, unterliegt einem starken Vorurteil über die ursprüngliche Gegebenheit, das nur das sinnlich Gegebene als das unmittelbar Gegebene zulässt.[12] Eine phänomenologische Zugangsweise soll solche Voraussetzungen umgehen und sich jeder Gegebenheit und d.h. auch derjenigen des Allgemeinen direkt zuwenden können. Die ursprüngliche Gegebenheit der allgemeinen Gegenstände wird erst gerechtfertigt, wenn ein „synthetischer Akt ausgewiesen wird, in dem sich diese Gegenstände ‚konstituieren' und der sich seinerseits in sinnlichen Vorstellungen fundieren lässt. Dieser Akt aber wäre eine ‚Anschauung' der Spezies, eine Wesensanschauung". (Tugendhat 1967: 139) Dass die Fundiertheit im Sinnlichen nicht zugleich die Reduziertheit des phänomenalen Gehaltes der allgemeinen Gegenstände auf das Sinnliche nach sich ziehen muss, ist für das Verständnis der Husserlschen Konzeption der kategorialen Anschauung von entscheidender Bedeutung. In einer Wendung gegen die sog. Aufmerksamkeitstheorie von J. S. Mill stell Husserl folgendes fest: „So erfassen wir die spezifische Einheit ‚Röte' direkt, ‚selbst', aufgrund einer singulären Anschauung von etwas Rotem. Wir blicken auf das Rotmoment hin, vollziehen aber einen eigenartigen Akt, dessen Intention auf die ‚Idee', auf das Allgemeine gerichtet ist". (Husserl 1975: LU II/B1 223) Die Allgemeinheit der ‚ideierenden Abstraktion' unterscheidet sich also von der Allgemeinheit der sog. Aufmerksamkeitstheorie durch ihre ausdrückliche Ausrichtung auf die Idee. Während diese durch die Hervorhebung des unselbständigen

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11    Vor allem bezieht sich Husserl dabei auf J. S. Mills Abstraktionstheorie, die hier stellvertretend für alle empiristischen Positionen angenommen wird: „Zwar gibt es, sagt man, weder allgemeine Vorstellungen noch allgemeine Gegenstände; aber während wir individuelle Konkreta anschaulich vorstellen, können wir eine ausschließliche Aufmerksamkeit oder ein ausschließliches Interesse den verschiedenen Teilen und Seiten des Gegenstandes zuwenden. Das Merkmal, das an und für sich, nämlich losgetrennt, weder wirklich sein noch vorgestellt werden kann, wird für sich beachtet, es wird zum Objekt eines ausschließlichen und somit von allen mitverbundenen Merkmalen absehenden Interesse. So versteht sich der doppelte, bald positive, bald negative Gebrauch des Wortes Abstrahieren." (Husserl 1975: LU II/B1 137)

12    „An diesen und ähnlichen Darstellungen fällt uns zunächst auf, dass trotz aller Ausführlichkeit eigentlich gar kein Versuch gemacht wird, das deskriptiv Gegebene und das zu Klärende genau zu bezeichnen und beides zueinander in Beziehung zu setzen." (Husserl 1975: LU II/B1 139)

Moments an einem sinnlichen Objekt zustande kommt, bringt jene die ‚Idee' dieses Moments zum „aktuellen Gegebensein". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 162) Die ‚Idee' steht hier, wie Tugendhat zu Recht bemerkt, lediglich für das, was die Logik schon immer unter dem allgemeinen Namen verstanden hätte, nicht also für einen „besonderen Tiefsinn" oder etwa – wie in Adornos Interpretation der ‚ideierenden Abstraktion' – für das konkret Allgemeine. „Das einzige, was Husserl beansprucht, ist, dass im ‚aktuellen Vollzug' einer solchen anschaulich fundierten ‚ideierenden Abstraktion' das allgemeine Wesen, die identische Spezies zu ‚ursprünglicher Gegebenheit' kommt, im Unterschied zu einem leeren, bloß signitiven Meinen von demselben." (Tugendhat 1967: 141)

Die Analogie zu der kategorialen Anschauung des analytischen Typus ist unübersehbar. Das Kategoriale ist auch hier in dem sinnlich Einzelnen fundiert und konstituiert sich nur in einem aktuellen Vollzug der Synthesis der sinnlichen Elemente. Die Spezies als ‚Gegenstand' ist nur in einem Bezug auf diesen Vollzug des synthetischen Aktes denkbar. So wie beim analytisch-kategorialen Typus treten die Gegenstände der fundierenden Akte auch hier in die Intention des Fundierten nicht ein. Sie bekunden „erst in beziehenden Akten ihr nahes Verhältnis zu demselben". (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 162) Die Spezies kommt zwar an einer oder mehreren sinnlichen Individualfällen zur ursprünglichen Gegebenheit, sie wird aber „nicht als die Spezies gerade dieses, sondern aller möglichen Einzelfälle von demselben spezifischen Inhalt gemeint". (Tugendhat 1967: 142) Entscheidend ist hier die Möglichkeit, die ‚ideierende Abstraktion' an irgendwelchen sinnlichen Gegebenheiten vollziehen zu können. Die Spezies ist ‚wahr', wenn anschaulich gezeigt wird, dass sie möglich ist. Dabei ist zu beachten, dass die synthetisch-kategorialen sich nicht von der Art der fundierenden Akte bestimmen lassen d. h. gleich gut auf der Grundlage der Phantasie wie der Wahrnehmung vollzogen werden können. (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 163) Als im Vergleich zu der Wahrnehmung weiterreichendere wird die Phantasie für diesen Typus der kategorialen Anschauung sogar bevorzugt, und die empirische Relevanz der Spezies auch dort bestätigt, wo sie keine wahrnehmbare sondern nur imaginierte Einzelfälle umfasst. (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 115; Husserl 1967: 16f., 160ff.)

Das Entscheidende im Falle von synthetisch-kategorialen Bedeutungen ist, dass die Vereinbarkeit der kategorialen Inhalte sich in einem aktuellen Vollzug als durchführbar zeigt. Es ist zu beachten, dass diese Vereinbarkeit sich auf die ‚materiale' Einstimmigkeit der Teilinhalte bezieht, nicht also die formale Vereinbarkeit zu einer Bedeutung meint, sondern die ‚reale' Vereinbarkeit, d.h. die Verträglichkeit der ‚Stoffe' betrifft. Das bedeutet ferner, dass, „wenn z. B. die Momente ‚Röte' und ‚Rundung' einmal vereint gefunden worden sind, [sowie] nun durch ideierende Abstraktion eine komplexe Spezies gewonnen und somit gegeben werden kann, welche die beiden Spezies ‚Röte' und ‚Rundung' in ihrer ebenfalls spezifisch gefassten Verbindungsform umschließt", auch unzählige gleiche Paare vereinbar sind. „Die ideale ‚Existenz' dieser komplexen Spezies ist es, welche a priori die Vereinbarkeit von Röte und Rundung in jedem denkbaren Einzelfalle begründet, eine Vereinbarkeit, die somit ein ideal

gültiges Verhältnis ist, ob in aller Welt empirische Einigung vorkommt oder nicht." (Husserl 1975: LU VI/B2 105) Die Notwendigkeit der Geltung bestimmter ,materialer' Gesetzesaussagen für einzelne empirische Fälle betrifft also nur die entsprechenden Wesenszusammenhänge. Das ,So und nicht anders' der Wesenszusammenhänge hat keine Wirklichkeitsgeltung. Es begründet lediglich die Möglichkeit aller unter diesen Begriff fallenden Gegenstände, es besagt also nicht, dass alle solche Gegenstände notwendig realisiert werden müssen. (Rinofner-Kreidl 2000: 103).

Unklar bleibt dennoch das Verhältnis der formal-apriori zur material-apriori Erkenntnisform. Den bisherigen Ausführungen zufolge operiert Husserl mit zwei Arten von idealen Gegenständen: kategorialen Formen und *Species* (Wesen). Kategoriale Formen entstehen durch die kategoriale Abstraktion und die darauf bezogenen Aussagen betreffen formale Ein- und Ausschlussverhältnisse („Wenn g ein *Teil* von G ist, so ist G ein *Ganzes*, ohne dessen Existenz g nicht existieren könnte und g ein Teil, ohne dessen Existenz G nicht existieren könnte"). Die formal-apriorischen Urteile drücken also die Verhältnisse zwischen den abstrakten (unselbständigen) Inhalten aus, die vollständig formalisierbar sind. Das bedeutet, dass die Klarheit über solche Verhältnisse auch ohne die Berücksichtigung der sinnlichen Fundierungsverhältnisse gewonnen werden kann. In solchen Urteilen treten ausschließlich die sog. einseitig fundierten abstrakten Inhalte in Beziehung. Wie z. B. ,*a* ist kleiner als *b*'. Einseitig fundiert ist dieses Urteil, weil *a* und *b* auch voneinander getrennt vorkommen können. Anders verhält es sich im Falle von z.B. den abstrakten Inhalten Farbe und Ausdehnung. Andere Beispiele wären Tonqualität und Tonintensität oder etwa Ausdehnung und qualitative Überdeckung. Sie sind die sog. wechselseitig fundierten Inhalte, da sie voneinander getrennt nicht denkbar sind. Deshalb ist diese Beziehung nur durch die Berücksichtigung auch der nicht-formalen d.h. der nicht vollständig formalisierbaren Momente möglich. Husserl redet diesbezüglich von „materialen, synthetischen Notwendigkeiten".[13] Die synthetischen Gesetze a priori „sind Gesetze realer Synthesen, die notwendige Zusammengehörigkeit der unselbständigen Momente in der Einheit sinnlicher Objekte regelnd, und in den Gattungen dieser Momente gründend". (Husserl 1979) Apriorische Erkenntnis der Spezies oder der Sachverhältnisse ist also nicht wie die Formal-apriorische an beliebigen sinnlichen Gegenständen vollziehbar. Dies bedeutet aber nicht, dass sie keine unumschränkte und notwendige Geltung für die beliebigen realen und individuell sich realisierenden Exemplare ihres Sachbereichs hat. Nur die Realisierung solcher Sachverhalte ist zufällig, also a posteriori gegeben.

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13   Eingehend behandelt Husserl das Problem der Unterscheidung zwischen ,analytisch' und ,synthetisch' in LU II/III §§ 10-17 sowie LU II/IV §§ 7-14. Vgl. dazu auch Rinofner-Kreidl 2000: 98.

## Die synthetischen Urteile apriori als Grundlage materialer Ontologien. Abgrenzung zu Kant

Um die Tragweite der Unterschiede des Kantschen und Husserlschen transzendentalphilosophischen Ansatzes zu verstehen, sollen einige zentrale Themen der Phänomenologie einer Untersuchung unterzogen werden. Vorerst ist zu klären, inwiefern Kant und Husserl verschiedene Begriffe von dem Apriori verwendet haben. Es ist oft die Meinung vertreten worden, dass sich die Husserlsche und Kantsche Unterscheidung synthetischer und analytischer Urteile nicht in allen ihren Facetten deckt. Rinofner-Kreidl spricht sogar von dem „quasi-synthetischen Charakter der materialen apriorischen Urteile der Phänomenologie". (Rinofner-Kreidl 2000: 104) Wie von Iso Kern zutreffend bemerkt, beruht Husserls Begriff des Apriori auf seinem Verständnis vom Eidos. (Kern 1964: 55) Diesbezüglich verweist Kern auf diverse sich auf das Thema Eidos beziehende Stellen in Husserls Werk, unter anderem auch auf die *Formale und transzendentale Logik*. (Husserl 1981) Dort bestimmt Husserl Eidos als „den einzigen der Begriffe des vieldeutigen Ausdrucks ‚a priori', den wir philosophisch anerkennen. Er ausschließlich ist gemeint, wo je in meinen Schriften von ‚a priori' die Rede ist". (Husserl 1981: 219) Eidos ist bei Husserl das allgemeine Wesen, das durch die allgemeine Anschauung (Ideation) erfasst wird. Apriori sind seiner Meinung nach die Wesensgesetze d.h. die notwendigen Beziehungen, die zwischen den allgemeinen Wesen bestehen.

Der Unterschied zu Kant wird dort deutlich, wo die Beziehung des Apriori zu der Empirie bestimmt wird. Für Kant geht das Apriori der Erfahrung logisch voraus und ist deshalb von dieser unabhängig. Für Husserl gründet die Unabhängigkeit des Apriori auf der Möglichkeit, die Wesen und die Wesensgesetze auch aufgrund der „bloß einbildenden Anschauung" zu erfassen. „Der Eidos", so Husserl in *Ideen I*, „kann sich intuitiv in Erfahrungsgegebenheiten, in solchen der Wahrnehmung, Erinnerung usw., exemplifizieren, ebenso gut aber auch in bloßen Phantasiegegebenheiten. [...] Damit hängt wesentlich zusammen, Setzung und zunächst anschauende Erfassung von Wesen impliziert nicht das mindeste von Setzung irgendeines individuellen Daseins; reine Wesenswahrheiten enthalten nicht die mindeste Behauptung über Tatsachen, also ist auch aus ihnen allein nicht die geringfügigste Tatsachenwahrheit zu erschließen." (Husserl 1967: 16f.) Die Existenzunabhängigkeit des Apriori von der Erfahrung jedes Individuellen betrifft aber nur den „phänomenologisch-statischen Standpunkt" nicht jedoch den „phänomenologisch-genetischen". Denn Husserl leugnet keineswegs die Möglichkeit, den Ursprung, die Genese des Apriori phänomenologisch aus der Erfahrung abzuleiten. Die Beziehungen zwischen den sachhaltigen Wesen, das materiale Apriori also ist erfassbar ohne den Rekurs auf die Empirie, nichtsdestoweniger liegt sein Ursprung in der originären individuellen Wahrnehmung. Das materiale Apriori ist genetisch fundiert in der schlichten Anschauung.

Für Kant ist jedes Apriori vollkommen rein von jeglichen inhaltlichen Zutaten und der Begriff des materialen Apriori somit ein Widerspruch in sich. Dies

stört Husserl jedoch nicht, die synthetischen Urteile Kants a priori im Sinne seines materialen Apriori zu deuten. In dem Sinne wirft er auch Kant nicht vor, das materiale Apriori überhaupt nicht zu kennen, sondern lediglich sein Umfang und Wesen nicht richtig bestimmt zu haben. Wie in den Ideen dargestellt, bestimmt Husserl die synthetischen Erkenntnisse a priori als ‚regionale Axiome'. Synthetische Wahrheiten sind Husserl zufolge Inhalt der regionalen Ontologien. Aus dem „regionalen Wesen" als der zu einem Konkretum zugehörigen obersten Gattungseinheit bestimmen sich die „'synthetische' Wesenswahrheiten, d.h. solche, welche in ihm als diesem Gattungswesen gründen, nicht aber bloße Besonderungen formal-ontologischer Wahrheiten sind". (Husserl 1967: 36) Die durch die regionalen Axiome umgrenzten regionalen Kategorien, sind also nicht der Ausdruck der „'analytischen' Notwendigkeiten". Sie sind nicht „frei variierbar", so dass „die Ersetzung der bezüglichen bestimmten Termini durch unbestimmte" ein formal-logisches Gesetz ergeben würde. (Husserl 1967: 36f.) Die regionalen Begriffe drücken in „eidetischer Allgemeinheit" d.h. apodiktisch und notwendig aus, „was einem ‚individuellen Gegenstand der Region ‚a priori' und ‚synthetisch' zukommen muß". (Husserl 1967: 37) Die Zahl der Regionen und dazugehörigen regionalen Grundbegriffe bestimmt Husserl zufolge auch den Umfang der synthetischen Erkenntnis a priori. Kants engeres Verständnis des synthetischen Apriori führt dazu, die synthetische Apriorität vieler Gebiete zu übersehen. (Kern 1964: 58) Die verfehlte Bestimmung des Wesens der synthetischen Urteile a priori durch Kant sind, so Husserl im ersten Teil von *Erste Philosophie* (Husserl 1956), auf die Relativierung ihrer Geltung auf die Menschen (Subjekte) zurückzuführen. Kant bezeichnet zwar die synthetischen Urteile a priori als allgemein und notwendig, relativiert sie aber zugleich auf ein faktisches Subjekt. Die apriorische Gesetzmäßigkeit der transzendentalen Subjektivität kann somit „nur die Bedeutung eines allgemeinen anthropologischen Faktums" haben. (Husserl 1956: 199) Die Gültigkeit des synthetischen Apriori aber, so Husserl, soll ausnahmslos gelten d.h. auch für Gott. Sie schöpft sich aus dem objektiven Gehalt, aus dem Eidos der Urteile und ist nicht etwa ein Hinweis auf die synthetische Leistung der transzendentalen Subjekte. „Nein, das echte Apriori hat mit der Frage, ob das Subjekt affiziert ist oder nicht, ob es Vermögen hat oder nicht, gar nichts zu tun." (Husserl 1956: Beilage XXI, 402) Die Leugnung eines synthetischen Urteils a priori soll genauso wie im Falle eines formal-analytischen Urteils ein Widersinn sein. Kant habe, so Husserl, dies nur für das Formal-analytische gelten lassen wollen.

Dabei verfällt Kant nicht nur einem Anthropologismus, sondern gewinnt auch nicht die rechte Einsicht in den Grund der Gültigkeit der formal-analytischen Urteile. Kant habe sich nämlich mit der Begründung dieser Erkenntnis durch den Satz vom Widerspruch begnügt. Die Einsicht in das Eidos dieses Apriori hat er aber nicht gewonnen. Sein traditionsgemäßes, auf Christian Wolff zurückzuführendes „rationalistisches Vorurteil", demzufolge nur der analytischen Erkenntnis eine wirkliche Rationalität zugesprochen wird, verwehrte Kant die Einsicht in den Geltungsgrund des Satzes vom Widerspruch. Andernfalls hätte Kant einsehen müssen, dass auch das „Gesetz vom Widerspruch nur

darum als ein berechtigtes und berechtigendes Prinzip gelten kann, weil es im Wesen der rein logischen Ideen gründet, die es konstituieren". (Husserl 1956: Beilage XV, 354) In einigen Äußerungen Husserls entsteht der Eindruck, dass die Grenze zwischen analytischen und synthetischen Urteilen sogar verwischt: „Urteilen wir z. B. über reine Zahlen, wie in der Arithmetik, so sind Sie bei den ‚Sachen'. In der Relation auf diese Sachen kann das Urteil sowohl analytisch wie synthetisch sein, während es in Hinsicht auf die realen möglichen Einheiten der angewandten Arithmetik unter allen Umständen analytisch ist". (Husserl 1979: 198f.) Rinofner-Kreidl sieht hier den Beweis für eine Verdoppelung der analytisch-synthetischen Unterscheidung bei Husserl. Genauer genommen handelt es sich um eine Doppelung der Auffassung des Analytischen. Die analytischen Urteile können somit eine reine Analyse der Begriffsinhalte sein, wobei das Prädikat im Subjekt enthalten ist (Kant), oder sie können so verstanden werden, dass der Prädikatenausdruck das Subjekt erweitert ohne direkten Rekurs auf die Wahrnehmung d. h. apriori. Dies wären die Kantschen synthetischen Urteile apriori. Diese Sätze aber führt Husserl als spezial Fälle analytischer Urteile ein. Denn insofern in den analytischen Sätzen die Bedeutungsgegenstände (z. B. Zahlen) als ‚Sachen' beurteilt werden, sind sie Husserl zufolge synthetisch. (Rinofner-Kreidl 2000: 105f.) Streng genommen sind die Husserlschen synthetischen Gesetzte apriori wie die analytischen die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit, denn, da sie methodisch aus freier Variation entstammen, können sie „natürlich keinen Umfang von Tatsachen, von empirischen Wirklichkeiten haben, die sie binden, sondern nur einen Umfang von reinen Möglichkeiten". (Husserl 1985: 426) Freilich sind sie nicht auf die formalen sondern auf die materialen Möglichkeiten bezogen d. h. sie binden den „ganzen Möglichkeitsspielraum einer Spezies". (Tugendhat 1967: 163) Da dies jedoch nicht heißt, dass die wirklichen Einzelfälle dieser Spezies auch realisiert werden müssen, haben Tugendhat zufolge die synthetischen Gesetzte apriori (genauso wie die analytischen) in bezug auf die Wirklichkeit nur einen hypothetischen d.h. keinen universalen Charakter. Eine solche Universalität wäre nämlich gewiss „nicht in einer bestimmten Sachhaltigkeit [Husserl], sondern, wie bei Kant und Fichte, aus dem Wesen der Subjektivität selbst begründet". (Tugendhat 1967: 164) Das materiale Apriori soll Husserl zufolge zwar an den jeweiligen Sachzusammenhängen ausgewiesen und nicht etwa aus dem Wesen des Ich „regressiv" begründet und somit zugleich „anthropologisch" verengt werden. (Hua VII 354f., LU III 198) „Was Husserl jedoch nicht so recht beachtet hat, ist, dass in demselben Umstand, der seinem Apriori gegenüber demjenigen Kants die weitere Gültigkeit verleiht, sein hypothetischer und dadurch in anderer Hinsicht wesentlich engerer Charakter begründet ist. Kants Apriori ist zwar relativ auf das menschliche Ich, aber für dieses gilt es universal, während Husserls Apriori an sich zwar absolut gilt, aber nur relativ auf die jeweilige Sachhaltigkeit, die selbst nicht notwendig ist."

(Tugendhat 1967: 165) Beim späteren Husserl reift laut Kern allerdings die Idee einer „allgemeinen Reallogik, welche allererst zur Austeilung der Seinsregionen innerhalb des universalen Alls der Realitäten überhaupt führt". (Kern

1964: 141) Eine Weltontologie d.h. eine universale sachhaltige Ontologie soll ein sachhaltiges und universales Apriori ermitteln, „das alle sachhaltig-apriorischen Sondergebiete in eine Totalität zusammenbindet, [...] das für ein mögliches Universum des Seienden die apriorische sachhaltige Form vorzeichnet". (Husserl 1981: 134) Von da aus stellt sich die Verengung der synthetischen Urteile a priori durch Kant als eine solche, die sich auf die materielle Natur beschränkt, die also nur das materiale Apriori einer Region gibt, nämlich der Region der materiellen Natur. Laut Husserl gilt es jedoch für alle Weltregionen das synthetische Apriori zu ermitteln. So wird in der *Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften* (Husserl 1962) aus diesem Vorhaben die Suche nach dem Apriori der Lebenswelt.

Einen weiteren Einwand gegenüber Kant machte Husserl bezüglich der Vermengung von Noema und Noesis. Man erinnert sich, die Vorwürfe, die Husserl dem Psychologismus machte, betrafen diesen – phänomenologisch betrachtet – argumentativen Mangel. Kant unterläuft genau dort derselbe Fehler, wo er das intentionale Erlebnis vom gegenständlichen Sinn nicht trennt. So etwa in einer Bemerkung zu den Kantschen Raumargumenten: „Unter dem Titel reine Anschauung tritt bei Kant nicht auseinander das reine Anschauen, d.h. das gebende Bewusstsein der Ideation, in dem wir uns die Idee Raum auf Grund der kontinuierlichen Wahrnehmungs- und Phantasiemannigfaltigkeit (Grenzenlosigkeit im Fortgang des Anschauens) zur Gegebenheit bringen, und diese Idee selbst. [...] Dem ‚Gemüt' wohnt bei nicht die Idee des Raumes, sondern das Raumvorstellen, das Raumschauen, das Wahrnehmen oder Quasiwahrnehmen (genannt Phantasieren)". (Husserl zitiert nach Kern 1964: 65) In dem der Raum bei Kant als die subjektive Bedingung des Anschauens und nicht die Wesensform des Dinges selbst aufgefasst wird, entsteht eine Vermengung zwischen dem Erscheinen und dem Erscheinenden selbst. (Kern 1964: 77) Ähnliche Einwände finden sich auch bezüglich der transzendentalen Analytik. Die Folge dieser Vermengung ist laut Husserl Kants Orientierung am Noematischen, dem Gegenständlichen. Kant habe die „systematische Durchführung eines korrelativen konkret anschaulichen Studiums der leistenden Subjektivität" nicht vollzogen, das Anliegen der transzendentalen Philosophie zu sehr eng gefasst, d. h. das Bewusstsein nicht nach allen seinen korrelativen Seiten hin ausreichend untersucht zu haben. (Husserl 1985: Beilage XX, 387)

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Željko Radinković

### Edmund Huserl's Phenomenology as Eidetic Science

**Abstract**

The article deals with Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition as one of the most important aspects of his attempt to establish the foundation of phenomenology as eidetic science. On the basis of Husserl's phenomenological critique of attempts to naturalize consciousness, the problems of meaningfulness and fulfillment of meaning, the difference between sensory and categorial intuition, categorial formation, and so-called intuition of essence are discussed in particular. In this context, it is also a question of the delimitation of Husserl's transcendental-philosophical approach from the transcendental-philosophical axiomatics of Immanuel Kant.

**Keywords:** phenomenology, Husserl, categorial intuition, intuition of essence, transcendental philosophy

## Fenomenologija Edmunda Huserla kao ejdetska nauka

**Apstrakt**

U članku se govori o Huserlovoj doktrini kategorijalnog pogleda kao jednog od najvažnijih aspekata njegovog pokušaja utemeljenja fenomenologije kao ejdetske nauke. Polazeći od Huserlove fenomenološke kritike pokušaja naturalizacije svesti, posebno se razmatraju problemi smisla i ispunjenja značenja, razlika između čulnog i kategorijalnog pogleda, kategorijalnog formiranja i takozvanog pogleda na suštinu. U tom kontekstu, takođe se postavlja pitanje razgraničenja Huserlovog transcendentalno-filozofskog pristupa od transcendentalno-filozofske aksiomatike Imanuela Kanta.

**Ključne reči:** fenomenologija, Huserl, kategorijalni pogled, pogled na suštinu, transcendentalna filozofija

Miloš M. Jovanović

# EINE HERMENEUTISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG DER SPRACHLICH-HISTORISCHEN APRIORITÄT

**ABSTRACT**

Die vorliegende Arbeit berücksichtigt die Philosophie und Poetik der Geschichte und der Sprache a priori im poetischen und literarischen Werk von Peter Handke, in seinem poetologischen Essay *Ich bin ein Bewohner des Elfenbeinturms* und seinem Drama *Die Fahrt im Einbaum oder das Stück zum Film vom Krieg*, und zwar im Ausgang von der kantianischen Idee der Apriorität der Geschichte. Die Geschichte a priori ist, laut Kant, möglich, „wenn der Wahrsager die Begebenheiten selber macht und veranstaltet, die er zum voraus verkündigt". Die identische Idee vom Subjekt, das vor der Geschichte besteht, finden wir auch im poetischen Werk von Peter Handke, sowohl in seinen poetologischen Schriften, als auch in seinem dichterischen Werk. Das Ziel der Arbeit ist, durch eine immanente, phänomenologisch-hermeneutische Deutung der Werke des Philosophen und des Schriftstellers die unumstrittene enge Beziehung zwischen ihren geschichtsphilosophischen, bzw. – poetologischen Ideen aufzuweisen und einen allgemeinen philosophisch-dichterischen Rahmen für die Erklärung aller Geschichtsphilosophien ohne Ausnahmen zu geben.

**SCHLÜSSELWÖRTER**

Sprache und Geschichte a priori, philosophische Hermeneutik, Philosophie, Literatur

Schon die ersten Paar Zeilen des programmatischen poetologischen Essays „Ich bin ein Bewohner des Elfenbeinturms" (Handke 1972: 19) des gleichnamigen Buches von Peter Handke, einer Sammlung von kritischen literarischen Essays über das Wesen der Dichtkunst, Literatur-, Film- und Kinorezensionen sowie einigen „politischen Versuchen", geben deutlich und offensichtlich zu erkennen, dass die Handkesche Teilung der Wirklichkeit auf die literarische Wirklichkeit, der Handke ja immer Vorschub leistet, und die („sogenannte") wirkliche Wirklichkeit auf die romantische Dichtungsauffassung zurückgeht, wobei gleichzeitig ihre (sowohl immanent literarische als auch tatsächliche) dialektische Vermittlung und die Verschmelzung zu einem höheren Ganzen nicht ausbleibt. Es ist also bei Handke gar nicht so, dass die literarische Wirklichkeit wie in einer typischen L'art pour l'art-Kunst zu einer 'versicherten', 'unumstößlich' abgekapselten Sphäre der Daseinsflucht wird und dem Menschen eine Art Eskapismus vor aller wirklicher, unter anderem auch der gesellschaftlichen,

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Wirklichkeit gewährleistet. Bei Handke geht es in seiner Literatur weder um die Erfindung noch um die Phantasie, denn jede auf sich selbst beruhende und sich selbst genügende Phantasie scheint ihm etwas Beliebiges, Unüberprüfbares und Privates zu sein, sie wirkt, laut Handke, auf den Menschen ablenkend von der wirklichen, situationsgebundenen Geschichte und unterhaltend und führt ihn durch seine Fiktion in eine Selbst- und Weltvergessenheit. Die Wirklichkeit der Literatur, die typischerweise für jeden eigentlichen Dichter und auch für Handke gleichsam höheren Grades in Bezug auf die außerliterarische Wirklichkeit ist, mache den Menschen „aufmerksam und kritisch für die wirkliche Wirklichkeit", sie kläre ihn über ihn selber auf und über das, was um ihn vorgehe. (Handke 1972: 19) Diese zwei ‚Wirklichkeitssphären', sowohl die in einem Einzelnen Stehende (‚subjektive') und die um ihn Vorgehende (‚objektive') als auch die literarische (die dem dichterischen Subjekt entsprungene, aber auf keinen Fall ausschließlich auf es herabzuführende) und die außerliterarische, sind grundsätzlich zu unterscheiden und gehören zugleich gemeinsam und verschmelzen bei Handke immer zu einer höheren, übergreifenden, allumfassenden, sich ständig im Ausbilden verhaltenden und so auch zu verstehenden Wirklichkeit. Die *differentia specifica* eines literarischen Kunstwerkes gegenüber allen anderen Wirklichkeiten besteht, laut Handke, aber darin, dass es immer eine Neuigkeit in sich birgt, zumindest eine Erwartung von etwas Neuem im Subjekt erweckt, etwas, das ändernd auf den Menschen einwirkt und „eine noch nicht gedachte, noch nicht bewußte *Möglichkeit* der Wirklichkeit bewußt macht", eine neue Möglichkeit des Sehens, Sprechens, Denkens und Existierens. (Handke 1972: 19–20) Die Möglichkeit der Literatur, neue und noch nicht gedachte Möglichkeiten zu schaffen, erwächst aus der Grundverfassung des menschlichen Daseins und des Seins überhaupt, das sich in seiner Unendgültigkeit als ein ständig änderndes (fortschreitendes oder nicht) und sich anders und zu einem anderen machendes Wesen begreift. (vgl. Handke 1972: 20) Die Literatur sei immer eine neue Darstellung der Welt durch immer neue Darstellungsmöglichkeiten und -modelle, wobei die Möglichkeit der Nachahmung dieser Möglichkeiten und Mittel für Handke grundsätzlich ausgeschlossen ist. (Handke 1972: 20) Die Literatur ist, also, wie das Dasein selbst, einmalig, weil sie aus der Einmaligkeit der immer neuen, ungewöhnlichen Möglichkeiten emporwächst. Demzufolge bezeichnet Handke jeden Versuch der Wiederholung und Nachahmung der bekannten Modelle als eine bloße Variation und Manier. „Ich erwarte von der Literatur ein Zerbrechen aller endgültig scheinenden Weltbilder", (Handke 1972: 20) schreibt Handke diesen Satz, fundamental für das richtige Verständnis des anhand der Geschichtsphilosophie von Immanuel Kant erst später im Laufe dieser Arbeit zu interpretierenden Phänomens der Geschichte und Sprache a priori.

Die realistische Kunst-, Literatur- und die ihnen zugrundeliegende Wahrheitsauffassung, die davon ausgeht, dass zwischen den sprachlich-künstlerischen Gebilden und den außersprachlichen Gegenständen eine restlose, absolute ‚Übereinkunft' („adaequatio") bestehen soll, „dass ‚Dinge", also, wie Handke für die realistische Darstellungsweise sagt, „beim Namen genannt werden"

können, sodass die 'Richtigkeit' und die Angemessenheit der Wörter nach den Maßstäben der außersprachlichen und außerliterarischen, aufzählbaren und datierbaren Wirklichkeit gemessen werden können, wirft Handke als den Überrest einer positivistischen (man kann sagen auch einer marxistischen) und in hohem Maße trivialisierten und die Kunst selbst trivialisierenden Auffassung ganz ab. Eine solche Methode des Realismus, die die exakte Darstellung der konkreten gesellschaftlichen, politischen Wirklichkeit „mit handelnden oder nichthandelnden Personen" verlangt und voraussetzt, „um dem Autor Bewältigung der Wirklichkeit[1] attestieren zu können", scheint für Handke verbraucht und überwunden zu sein. (Handke 1972: 24) Sie halte an der „Genauigkeit der Daten" im oben beschriebenen, realistischen Sinne fest und übersehe dabei, bewusst oder unbewusst, gezielt oder nicht, das Subjektive, die „subjektiven Reflexe und Reflexionen auf diese Daten" und den „Zwiespalt zwischen der subjektiv, willkürlich erfundenen Geschichte, die sie von der Literatur immer noch erwartet, und der dieser erfundenen Geschichte notwendig angepaßten, damit schon verzerrt gezeigten gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit". (Handke 1972: 24–25) Sie übersehe auch, „dass es in der Literatur nicht darum gehen kann, politisch bedeutungsgeladene Dinge beim Namen zu nennen, sondern vielmehr von ihnen zu abstrahieren". (Handke 1972: 25) Literatur ist, also, nicht eine bloße realistisch-naturalistische Nachahmung, Imitation der Dinge, die beim Namen genannt werden sollen. Solches Beim-Namen-Nennen bezeichnet Handke auch als einen Stilbruch. Und die Namen, die Wörter seien keine bloße Bezeichnungen für die Dinge, die für diese Wörter stehen sollen, sondern „Dinge für sich", die in Bezug auf die außersprachliche Wirklichkeit Abstand nehmen können und dabei die „festgesetzten", gewöhnlichen, gesellschaftlich bedingten Bedeutungen dieser Wörter zerstören können. (Handke 1972: 25) Wenn Handke in der Fortsetzung behauptet, dass es ihn als Autor überhaupt nicht interessiert, „die Wirklichkeit zu zeigen oder zu bewältigen", sondern dass es ihm darum geht, seine eigene Wirklichkeit[2] zu zeigen, (Handke 1972: 25) so heißt das eigentlich nicht die Reduzierung der Literatur auf ein simples Medium einer unter vielen anderen, relativen subjektiven Selbstaussagen und Selbstäußerungen des subjektiven Ichs, sondern es bedeutet den Anspruch der Literatur auf die Aussage über eine neue, mögliche, 'nichtwirkliche Wirklichkeit', die mit der gesellschaftlichen oder irgendeinen anderen realen Wirklichkeit absolut nichts zu tun haben muss. Handkes beiläufige, an dieser Stelle in Klammern stehende Behauptung, er wisse gar nicht, was Wirklichkeit sei, bedeutet nicht den Standpunkt eines Agnostikers, der an die prinzipielle Unerfahrbarkeit und Unerkennbarkeit aller und letzter Dinge glaubt, sondern sie deutet wieder hin auf jenen romantischen Credo an die im Grunde genommen Unmöglichkeit einer absoluten, rationalistischen, vom wissenschaftlichen Diskurs der Aufklärung her gekennzeichneten Grenzziehung zwischen

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1    Es ist da ausschließlich die sogenannte wirkliche, außerliterarische und außersprachliche, gesellschaftliche Wirklichkeit gemeint.
2    Im Text sagt er in der ersten Person, kursiv gedruckt: „*meine* Wirklichkeit".

der subjektiven und der objektiven Wirklichkeit. Und dass er nichts von den Floskeln hält, „die etwa sagen, dass ein Gedicht mehr über die Wirklichkeit[3] (oder was weiß ich) aussage 'als so mancher dickleibige wissenschaftliche Wälzer'", (Handke 1972: 25) stellt den literarischen Ausdruck einer für Handkes Zeit und auch der Gegenwart typischen, allgemeinen Tendenz und den Versuch dar, die übertrieben schroffe, künstliche Grenze zwischen Wissenschaft und Literatur zu überbrücken und eine in einem höheren, allgemeineren Horizont zu erringende Annäherung und den Einklang der anscheinend unterschiedlichen Diskurse herzustellen, unter der Voraussetzung der gleichzeitigen Bewahrung ihrer Differenzen als des wahrsten Unterpfands für die Möglichkeit einer Harmonisierung.

Handkes neue Methode des literarischen Schaffens und der Weltdarstellung im Medium der Literatur beruht auf der Diskontinuität zu den alten, üblichen Methoden der Geschichte, auch zu denjenigen, die als Teil der besonderen narrativen Strategien des Schriftstellers die Geschichte durcheinandergebracht zu machen beanspruchen. Die neuen Methoden sind für Handke diejenigen eines „Bewohners des Elfenbeinturms", eines „Formalisten" und „Ästheten", (Handke 1972: 26) wobei etwas Konkretes zu ihrer umfassenderen theoretischen Explikation bei Handke fast im Ganzen ausbleibt, es sei denn so, man müsste immer eine neue, die Geradlinigkeit und Gewohnheit der rutinierten Anwendung der üblichen Darstellungsweisen und –wege überwindende Methode suchen und so die Einmaligkeit (oder zumindest den Schein derselben) eines jeden literarischen Kunstwerkes schaffen.

Die *differentia specifica* der literarischen Wirklichkeit gegenüber der nichtliterarischen lässt sich bei Handke aus der grundsätzlichen Unterscheidung zwischen Sprache und außersprachlichen Gegenständen ableiten. Dass die Worte für die Gegenstände als die Gegenstände selber genommen werden bedeutet für Handke nichts anderes als die Verkennung der Tatsache, „daß die Literatur mit der Sprache gemacht wird, und nicht mit den Dingen, die mit der Sprache beschrieben werden". (Handke 1972: 29) Das Messen der Wirklichkeit der 'sprachlichen Gegenstände' an der Wirklichkeit der außersprachlichen Gegenstände bedeutet Rückfall in die alte, aufklärerische, antiromantische Wahrheitsauffassung, nach der die Wahrheit der Literatur üblicherweise daran gemessen wird, „ob die Gegenstände[4] 'der Wirklichkeit entsprechen'." (Handke 1972: 30) Innerhalb einer solchen Auffassung von der Sprache wird aber als ihre letzte, endgültige Konsequenz die Sprache oft auf ein bloßes Kommunikationsmittel reduziert, dessen Funktion sich in einem leeren Sprach-Benützen ausschöpft.

Um die Natur der Sprache und somit auch indirekt die der Literatur zu beschreiben weist Handke auf Jean-Paul Sartres Vergleich der Sprache der Prosa mit dem Glas hin.

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3    „[...] (oder was weiß ich)". Also, wiederum eine in Klammern stehende Kennzeichnung der Wirklichkeit.
4    Es sind da sprachlich vermittelte und gestaltete, im Medium der Sprache, der Sprachbedeutungen dargestellte Gegenstände gemeint.

Man glaubt also naiv, durch die Sprache auf die Gegenstände durchschauen zu können wie durch das sprichwörtliche Glas. Dabei denkt man aber nicht daran, dass es möglich ist, mit der Sprache buchstäblich *jedes Ding zu drehen* [kursiv – von mir]. (Handke 1972: 30)

Was unter diesem Drehen der Dinge bei Handke konkret verstanden werden soll, lässt sich aus dem Textzusammenhang seiner poetischen Schrift allein nicht schließen, obwohl es möglich wäre, aufgrund seines immanent literarischen Werkzusammenhangs von zwei disparaten Wortsinnen zu sprechen, axiologisch einerseits von einem im immanent literarischen Bereich positiven Sinn, der als Handkes literarische Darstellungsweise gilt, und andererseits einem im politischen Bereich von Handke immer wieder angegriffenen und bloßzustellenden negativen Wortsinn. Auf der einen Seite bedeutet dieses Dingedrehen als Drehen und zweckhafte Darstellung der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit (z. B. vonseiten der Medien) die Manipulierbarkeit der Sprache zu vielfältigen gesellschaftlichen, politischen und individuellen Zwecken, und in diesem Sinne, wie Handke behauptet, sollte „das 'Glas der Sprache' [...] endlich zerschlagen werden" (Handke 1972: 30), also, z. B. die wahren Absichten der oft politisch instrumentalisierten Monopolinhaber der öffentlichen Wahrheit durch die literarische Darstellung entschleiert und bloßgestellt werden, was man als ein literarisches Drehen, Hinterfragen des medienpolitisch Gedrehten bezeichnen könnte. Auf der anderen Seite bedeutet das Drehen der Dinge im Bereich der Dichtkunst die auf dem Drehen (Hinterfragen) des gesellschaftlich Gedrehten und Drehen der außersprachlichen Objekte Darstellung einer neuen, möglichen Wirklichkeit, einer sprachlich vermittelten und im positiven Sinne gedrehten Wirklichkeit. Denn

[d]urch die Sprache kann nicht einfach durchgeschaut werden auf die Objekte. Anstatt so zu tun, als könnte man durch die Sprache schauen wie durch eine Fensterscheibe, sollte man die tückische Sprache selber durchschauen und, wenn man sie durchschaut hat, zeigen, wie viele Dinge mit der Sprache gedreht werden können. (Handke 1972: 30)

Im Unterschied zum Engagement als, laut Handke, einem unliterarischen Begriff, dessen „Eindeutigkeit", „Zweckbetonung" und „Ernst" dem Wesen der Kunst von Grund aus widerspsrechen, ist für Handke die Kunst „weder eindeutig noch mehrdeutig", sie hat in sich „nicht zählbare, nicht begrenzbare Bedeutungen", sie hat überhaupt „keine Bedeutung über sich hinaus", denn „sie *ist* Bedeutung". (Handke 1972: 43-44; vgl. Frank 1985: 230) Die Kunst habe mit zweckbetonten Formen des Handelns oder Denkens nichts zu tun, sie sei „nicht ernst und nicht direkt" und nicht auf etwas außerhalb sich selbst gerichtet, „sondern eine Form und als solche auf nichts *gerichtet*, höchstens ein ernsthaftes Spiel". (Handke 1972: 44) Für Handke ist die Literatur romantisch in dem Sinne, dass sie sowohl die sprachliche Wirklichkeit als auch die außersprachliche zu Spiel macht, sie ist für ihn im Ganzen, und sogar auch die sogenannte engagierte Literatur, „unwirklich", „unrealistisch", „romantisch". (Handke 1972: 50)

## 1. Immanuel Kant: Philosophie der Geschichtsphilosophie

Im zweiten Abschnitt des „Streites der Facultäten in drei Abschnitten" von Immanuel Kant, im „Streit der Philosophischen Fakultät mit der Juristischen", berücksichtigt Kant die sehr wichtige geschichtsphilosophische Frage nach dem Sinn und Wesen der Menschengeschichte in einem alles andere nur nicht üblichen Sinne des betreffenden Wortes. Wir möchten also, bevor wir zum Auslegen des Begriffs der Geschichte a priori in Anlehnung an Kant hinübergehen, noch einmal deutlich hervorheben, dass Kants Position keine Geschichtsphilosophie unter vielen anderen in historischer Folge ist, sondern eine 'Meta-Geschichtsphilosophie' ist, die ausnahmslos alle anderen Geschichtsphilosophien ihrem Wesen nach als a priori erkennt und erklärt.

Üblicherweise definiert man Geschichte als einen politischen, kulturellen und gesellschaftlichen Werdegang, Entwicklungsprozess eines bestimmten geographischen, kulturellen o. Ä. Bereiches, wobei alle gängigen, üblichen, durchschnittlichen wissenschaftlichen Definitionen, und insbesondere die aufklärerischen und die des Historismus des 19. Jahrhunderts, vor allem die Vergangenheitsbezogenheit der Geschichtswissenschaft hervorheben und auf diese Weise die Geschichte auf nur eine mögliche Dimension einschränken, die Dimension der in sich geschlossenen, fest umgrenzten und vonseiten einer solchen Wissenschaft vergegenständlichten Vergangenheit, die gegenüber dem aus einer Gegenwart verstehenden Subjekt als ein gesicherter, unwandelbarer 'Gegen-Stand' untersucht und entdeckt zu werden gilt. Eine solche vergegenständlichende, aufklärerisch-positivistische Einstellung zur Geschichte ist im Kreis unserer philosophisch-hermeneutischen Position nicht von Belang.

Eine Menschengeschichtswissenschaft kann nicht nur die Wissenschaft von der vergangenen (wie das heutzutage allerorts als vulgär empfunden wird), sondern auch, wie bei Kant, der zukünftigen Zeit sein,

> mithin eine v o r h e r s a g e n d e, welche, wenn sie nicht nach bekannten Naturgesetzen (wie Sonnen- und Mondfinsternisse) geführt wird, w a h r s a g e n d und doch natürlich, kann sie aber nicht anders, als durch übernatürliche Mitteilung und Erweiterung der Aussicht in die künftige Zeit erworben werden, w e i s s a g e n d (prophetisch) genannt wird. (Kant 2001: 351)

Es wäre natürlich komisch und fehl am Platze, die Worte des Philosophen vulgär in die Richtung irgendwelchen Prophetentums gleich am Anfang zu mißdeuten und von der „weissagenden" Geschichte als von einer vom Propheten zu entschleiernden zu sprechen. Kant distanziert sich natürlich von allen solchen Mißdeutungen. Seine Rede vom Prophetischen ist ironisch gemeint. „Wer ins Wahrsagen pfuschert (es ohne Kenntnis oder Ehrlichkeit tut), von dem heißt es: er w a h r s a g e r t; von der Pythia an bis zur Zigeunerin." (Kant 2001: 351)[5]

Wie ist aber eine Erkenntnis der Zukunft überhaupt möglich, geht man von der Grundtatsache aus, dass das Bevorstehende in keiner konkreten

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5    (Anmerkung im Text bei Kant).

tatsächlichen, empirisch überprüfbaren Wirklichkeit wurzelt, außer dass es in begrenztem Maße unter dem Vorbehalt aufgrund von unmittelbar zugänglichem und greifbarem Vergangenem und Gegenwärtigem immer möglich wäre, nur immer annähernde Prognosen über die bevorstehenden historischen Ereignisse zu wagen?! Einfach gesagt: wie ist es überhaupt möglich, in die Zukunft hineinzuschauen, ohne eine solche Wagnis als eine bloße Wahrsagerei an den Pranger zu stellen?!

Kant sagt dazu Folgendes:

Als wahrsagende Geschichtserzählung des Bevorstehenden in der künftigen Zeit: mithin als eine a priori mögliche Darstellung der Begebenheiten, die da kommen sollen. – Wie ist aber *eine Geschichte a priori* [kursiv – von mir] möglich? – Antwort: *wenn der Wahrsager die Begebenheiten selber* m a c h t *und veranstaltet, die er zum voraus verkündigt* [kursiv – von mir]. (Kant 2001: 351)

Also, das wäre Kants Hauptdefinition der Geschichte a priori.

Die „Geschichte a priori" hat Kants Bestimmung zufolge nichts mit der tatsächlichen, realen Geschichte zu tun im Sinne von der bloßen Beschreibung der tatsächlich sich ereignenden Begebenheiten, auch nicht mit nur einer möglichen Prognose der bevorstehenden, zukünftigen Begebenheiten, sie ist unabhängig von jeder empirischen Tatsache, sie läuft, Kant zufolge, als „eine a priori mögliche Darstellung der Begebenheiten" allen Tatsachen als eine im Voraus konstruierte, erdachte, mögliche Vorhersage, Verkündigung der historischen Ereignisse entgegen, die der Vorhersager, Wahrsager auch macht und veranstaltet, ergo, diese nach dem eigenen vorgefassten Plan auch immer in Kraft setzt, realisiert.

Es ist auch unserer Meinung nach durchaus möglich, dass der Wahrsager oder, besser gesagt, der A-priori-Historiker selber die Ereignisse 'rückläufig' macht und veranstaltet, also, dass er die Vorstellung von vergangenen Begebenheiten verändert, umgestaltet, modifiziert, indem er die Geschichte zu bestimmten Zwecken falsifiziert und ideologisch uminterpretiert, den Geschichtssinn den eigenen ideologischen Maßstäben und Zielen anpassend. Einen solchen Fall der Geschichte a priori nimmt Kant nicht in Rücksicht. Sie alle oder zumindest die typischen aufzuzählen und eingehender unter Lupe zu nehmen ginge über den begrenzten Untersuchungsgegenstand unserer Arbeit weit hinaus. Deshalb fokussieren wir uns im Laufe der Arbeit auf die von Kant und Handke thematisierten Fälle.

Kant gibt auch ein Paar Beispiele als Illustrationen seiner Konzeption der Geschichte a priori. Wir lesen bei ihm Folgendes:

Jüdische Propheten hatten gut weissagen, daß über kurz oder lang nicht bloß Verfall, sondern gänzliche Auflösung ihrem Staat bevorstehe; denn sie waren selbst die Urheber dieses ihres Schicksals. – Sie hatten, | als Volksleiter, ihre Verfassung mit so viel kirchlichen und daraus abfließenden bürgerlichen Lasten beschwert, daß ihr Staat völlig untauglich wurde, für sich selbst, vornehmlich mit benachbarten Völkern zusammen, zu bestehen, und die Jeremiaden ihrer Priester mußten daher natürlicher Weise vergeblich in der Luft verhallen; weil

diese hartnäckicht auf ihrem Vorsatz einer unhaltbaren, von ihnen selbst ge-
machten, Verfassung beharreten, und so von ihnen selbst der Ausgang mit Un-
fehlbarkeit vorausgesehen werden konnte. Unsere Politiker machen, so weit
ihr Einfluß reicht, es eben so, und sind auch im Wahrsagen eben so glücklich.
(Kant 2001: 351–352)

Kant gibt auch ein sehr interessantes, fassbares Beispiel der Geschichte a
priori im Bereich der Religion. Da lesen wir bei ihm folgende Zeilen:

Auch Geistliche weissagen gelegentlich den gänzlichen Verfall der Religion,
und die nahe Erscheinung des Antichrists; während dessen sie gerade das tun,
was erforderlich ist, ihn einzuführen, indem sie nämlich ihrer Gemeine nicht
sittliche Grundsätze ans Herz zu legen bedacht sind, die geradezu aufs Bes-
sern führen, sondern Observanzen und historischen Glauben zur wesentlichen
Pflicht machen, die es indirekt bewirken sollen; woraus zwar mechanische Ein-
helligkeit, als in einer bürgerlichen Verfassung, aber keine in der moralischen
Gesinnung erwachsen kann: alsdenn aber über Irreligiosität klagen, welche sie
selber gemacht haben; die sie also, auch ohne besondere Wahrsagergabe, vor-
herverkündigen konnten. (Kant 2001: 352)

Die vermeintliche bevorstehende Erscheinung des Antichrists, in allen Zei-
ten des vermeintlichen religiösen Verfalls ohne Ausnahme, wird als eine blo-
ße Idee, Vorstellung von der Kirche zum Zwecke der Festigung des Glaubens
beim Pöbel buchstäblich hergestellt, gepackt und instrumentalisiert. Also, die
Kirche führt den Antichrist in die kollektive Vorstellung ein, um damit durch
die Verbreitung und Festigung der Furcht vor dem Verfall zugleich die Verbrei-
tung und Festigung des Glaubens zu erzielen und so die Masse zu manipulie-
ren und über sie Herrschaft herzustellen. Die Festigung des Glaubens erfolgt
üblicherweise nicht, indem der Glaubensgemeinde die sittlichen und mora-
lischen Grundsätze als das wahre positive Vorbild des sittlichen Verhaltens
vor die Augen geführt werden, sondern indem sie durch den Teufel von allem
'Negativen' abgeschreckt wird. Die von den Geistlichen selber künstlich her-
gestellte Irreligiosität dient dazu, von den Geistlichen auch angegriffen und an
den Pranger gestellt zu werden, um damit die auf bloßer Furcht vor dem Anti-
christ beruhende Religiosität herzustellen, die auf gar keiner wahren religiösen
Einstimmigkeit gründet, sondern auf bloßer „mechanischer Einhelligkeit". Alle
'Religiosität' geht demzufolge aus der Irreligiosität hervor.

Trotzdem negiert Kant in keinem Moment die für ihn selbstverständliche
Grundtatsache einer aus der Aufklärung hergeleiteten Auffassung, dass die
Menschen als freihandelnde und aus der eigenen „selbstverschuldeten Un-
mündigkeit" auszugehende Wesen in der Auswahl ihrer Entscheidungsmöglich-
keiten im Prinzip frei seien, „denen sich zwar vorher d i k t i e r e n läßt, was
sie tun s o l l e n, aber nicht v o r h e r s a g e n läßt, was sie tun w e r d e n".
(Kant 2001: 355)

Der über alle menschliche Weisheit hinausliegende Standpunkt der Vor-
sehung ist, laut Kant, im Prinzip eben durch die Freiheit des Menschen ein-
geschränkt, diese Freiheit ist, Kant zufolge, eben die Hauptursache der Kluft

zwischen jenem Diktieren des Sollens einerseits und Vorhersagen des Werdens des Menschen andererseits. (Kant 2001: 355-356) Freie Handlungen des Menschen können dieser Auffassung Kants zufolge vom Standpunkt der Vorsehung vom Menschen gesehen,

> aber mit Gewißheit nicht v o r h e r g e s e h e n werden (für das göttliche Auge ist hier kein Unterschied), weil er zu dem letzteren den Zusammenhang nach Naturgesetzen bedarf, in Ansehung der künftigen f r e i e n Handlungen aber dieser Leitung, oder Hinweisung, entbehren muß. (Kant 2001: 356)

Die Vorhersage des Fortschreitens der Menschheit zum Besseren als einer besonderen Form der Geschichte a priori wäre Kants Auffassung nach nur dann möglich, wenn der Mensch „einen angeborenen und unveränderlich-guten, obzwar eingeschränkten Willen" besäße. (Kant 2001: 356)

Trotz dieser Einschränkungen und Modifikationen des eingangs beschriebenen Begriffs der Geschichte a priori besteht, so Kant, die prinzipielle Möglichkeit einer wahrsagenden Geschichte der Menschheit darin, dass diese Geschichte immer an irgendeine Erfahrung anknüpft, um möglich vorhersagend zu sein, wobei die vergangenen Ereignisse nur als hindeutende „G e s c h i c h t s z e i c h e n (signum rememorativum, demonstrativum, prognosticon)" verstanden werden sollen. (Kant 2001: 356–357) Damit ist aber nicht die am Anfang besprochene Geschichte a priori gemeint.

## 2. Die Geschichte und die Sprache a priori am Werke

Zwei Regisseure, der Amerikaner John O'Hara und der Spanier Luis Machado, treffen sich, um die Darsteller, „Helden und die Schurken [...], Historiker, Ideologieforscher, Religions- und Kriegswissenschaftler, Spezialisten für schwarze Löcher, für Leute mit zwei Köpfen und halben Herzen" (Handke 1999: 11–13), für einen geplanten europäisch-amerikanischen Film vom ein Jahrzehnt zurückliegenden Krieg zu bestimmen.

Im Laufe des Gespräches zwischen Machado und O'Hara treten zwei Arten von „Historikern" auf die Szene auf: der erste sei ein Amateur, der sein ganzes bisheriges Leben in der Kriegszone verbracht habe, „eine Art Heimatforscher auf eigene Faust", und der andere ein „echter Wissenschaftler". An dieser Stelle im Stück findet man zum ersten Mal eine Andeutung auf eine neue Auffassung von Historikern, die wir auf der Spur der Geschichte a priori von Immanuel Kant als A-priori-Historiker bezeichnet haben. Der verschwundene Autor, den man am Anfang des Stücks nur beiläufig erwähnt, hatte vor, vom „Bewusstseinswandel der Historiker" zu erzählen. Unter diesem Bewusstseinswandel verstehe man die Veränderung der Grunderkenntnis des Historikers, „der Abstand seiner Wissenschaft" sei nicht „gleichbedeutend mit einem Sichheraushalten aus der Aktualität", sondern solle ihm „den Anstoß geben zum Eingreifen", (Handke 1999: 24) sodass der anfangs „reine" Geschichtswissenschaftler, dessen Aufgabe sich üblicherweise und definitionsgemäß im vorurteilslosen

Erzählen von historischen Ereignissen ausschöpft, seine primäre Aufgabe darin erkennt, diesmal als aktiv Handelnder aufzutreten.

> Vorschlag des verschollenen Autors: der Historiker entschließt sich, wie einst der Advokat Abraham Lincoln, im Lauf der Geschichte Politiker zu werden und den Völkern hier den Weg zu zeigen – . (Handke 1999: 24)

Der Historiker ist demzufolge nicht nur ein bloß Denkender, sondern auch und vor allem wird er zu demjenigen, der handelt und als aktiv Handelnder auf die Begebenheiten Einfluss auszuüben trachtet, oder, konkret mit Kant zu sagen, „die Geschichte macht und veranstaltet". Und es ist höchst eigentümlich, wie sich der „Heimatforscher" oder „Ortschronist" bezeichnet: als einen unsichtbaren Chronisten, der nur in seiner Schrift sichtbar sein sollte und seine Schrift erst lang nach seiner Zeit sichtbar werden lassen sollte, wobei in der Schrift nicht seine „spezielle Hand", seine sonderbare Schreib- und Ausdrucksweise, „kein ausgefallener Ausdruck, kein Schnörkel", der das Individuelle der Person entschleiert, sichtbar werden sollte. (Handke 1999: 25)

Im Laufe der Disputation mit dem Chronisten entschleiert der Historiker seine versteckte, wahre Natur, indem er den Chronisten im Gegensatz zu sich selbst spöttisch einen „Volksmystiker" nennt und eine scharfe Grenze zwischen Mystik (und Mythos) und Geschichte (und Logos, begriffen als auf Vernunft fortschreitende Geschichte) zieht. Die Mystik als der Sammelbegriff für Tradition und Vergangenheit, sogar für das Kulturerbe überhaupt, erscheint demzufolge als eine altertümliche, irrationale Kraft, ein Gebilde *sui generis*, das die fortschreitende, auf Vernunft der zivilisierten und zivilisierenden Welt beruhende Geschichte als eine übergeordnete Instanz nicht revidieren darf. Und die Geschichte sei nichts als eine Tätigkeit der „Menschheitskarawane", die im großen Hintergrund des Geschehens ihre „Ewigkeitsspirale" ziehe. Nochmals ein a priori Moment in der Auffassung der Geschichte.

Von der fortschreitenden Entzauberung der modernen Welt als dem Hauptgesetz der Modernisierung und Entwicklung der modernen Gesellschaft schrieb als einer der ersten Max Weber. Um den Gegensatz und die herangewachsene Kluft zwischen Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, mutatis mutandis zwischen Mythos und Logos, Mythos und Historie, zu erklären, greift Weber zu einem alten Mythos bei Plato, nämlich, dem bekannten Höhlenmythos aus seiner *Politeia*. Der Geflohene ist, laut Weber, der Philosoph, und die Sonne die Wahrheit der Wissenschaft, die zum wahren Sein strebt. Der Mythos könnte aber auch so weitergedeutet werden, dass die Erreichung des wahren Seins die Abwerfung des Schattenreichs, der „Mythelei", wie der Historiker in Handkes Stück sagt, voraussetzt. Überträgt man dieses Mythosparadigma auf die Erklärung des auf dem Fortschritt beruhenden Zivilisierungsprozesses als des Hauptgesetzes der Entwicklung der Zivilisation von ihren Anfängen bis heute, so ergibt sich daraus sofort jene schroffe Dichotomie auf die 'Zivilisierten' (die für sich auch die Rolle der Zivilisierenden übernehmen), die das Licht der höchsten Wahrheit schon längst erreicht haben, und die 'Unzivilisierten', die durch den

allmählichen Zivilisierungsprozess von ihrer, wie in Handkes Stück gesagt, „archimittelalterlichen hypernationalen Paramystik" und „Privatmythelei" erst zu befreien sind, was eine Kultur- und Zivilisationstheorie darstelle, die eine tiefe Kluft zwischen Kultur als dem spezifisch Nationalen und der Zivilisation als dem Übernationalen mache und in letzter Konsequenz zu totalitären Machtsystemen der Gegenwart führe. (vgl. Elias 1997)

Hans-Georg Gadamer spricht von der Überwindung, sagen wir auch Aufhebung, des Mythos durch den Logos als der Haupttendenz der abendländischen Zivilisation, die, so Gadamer, in der Antike ihre ersten Wurzeln schlug, setzte sich fort durch die christliche Überwindung der Vielgötterei und gipfelte in dem neuzeitlichen (natur)wissenschaftlichen Aufklärungsprojekt der Überwindung jeder Form des mythischen Denkens. (Gadamer 1993: 163-169, 170-173)[6]

Eine der grundlegendsten und schärfsten Kritiken an der Zivilisation, deren Hauptgesetz der geschichtlichen Bewegung von den Anfängen bis heute die Aufklärung darstelle, findet man in Horkheimers und Adornos Studie *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, einer kompromißlosen, konsequenten Auseinandersetzung mit dem Aufklärungsprozess und unmittelbar aus ihm hervorgegangenen Auswirkungen. Laut Horkheimer und Adorno besteht kein Zweifel darüber, dass die Freiheit in der Gesellschaft vom aufklärenden Denken unabtrennbar ist, und jedoch glauben sie,

> dass der Begriff eben dieses Denkens, nicht weniger als die konkreten historischen Formen, die Institutionen der Gesellschaft, in die es verflochten ist, schon den Keim zu jenem Rückschritt enthalten, der heute überall sich ereignet. (Horkheimer, Adorno 2011: 3)

Die Ursache des Rückfalls der Aufklärung in die Mythologie ist, Horkheimers und Adornos Ausführungen zufolge, in der aufklärerischen Logik eines unaufhaltsamen zivilisatorischen Fortschrittsprozesses selbst zu suchen, nicht – wie das, ihrer Meinung nach, heute allerorts der Fall ist – bei den nationalistischen, heidnischen, imperialistischen und anderen modernen Mythologien. Die moderne romantische Verabsolutierung der Vergangenheit und aller mythischen Denk- und Lebensformen beruht – wie wir das bei Gadamer gesehen haben – auf demselben Paradigma wie die moderne Aufklärung, und das ist das Gesetz der Überwindung und Aufhebung des Mythos durch den Logos, der Prozess der „Entzauberung der Welt" (Weber). Die ersten Ansätze dieses Aufklärungsprozesses findet man laut Adorno und Horkheimer in der Überwindung und Verbannung der alten chthonischen Götter in die Hölle vonseiten der solaren Lichtgottheiten und dasselbe Paradigma der Überwindung und Aufhebung alles Irrationalen, Inkommensurablen, Einzelnen, Mythischen usw. durchzieht den gesamten Lauf der Zivilistaion bis heute. (Horkheimer, Adorno 2011: 19) Aus der totalitären Logik ihrer Lieblingsnummer Eins erfolge im Allgemeinen als die letzte Konsequenz die Ausrottung all derjenigen Lebens- und Denkformen, Kulturen, Traditionen, Weltansichten, Ideologien usw., die

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6    Gadamer 1993: „Mythos und Vernunft" (1954), „Mythos und Logos" (1981).

sich in das System einer einheitlichen, homogenen, universalen Zivilisation nicht hineinfügen lassen. (Horkheimer, Adorno 2011: 19)

Auch „der Schuldige" in Handkes Stück, der vermeintliche Kriegsverbrecher sei in einem Gefüge a priori schon im Voraus beschuldigt. Im Gespräch des „Ansagers" mit der „Fellfrau" stellt man Mechanismen und Strategien dar, die den „Irrläufer" seiner Verantwortung entziehen. Durch sein Gerede gelinge es dem Irrläufer, dem Beschuldigten, die Aufmerksamkeit von seiner vermeintlichen Verfehlung und Schuld abzulenken. Und „daß er und seinesgleichen mit ihrem typischen Gestammel daherkommen, ist schon das Indiz, sie haben etwas auf dem Kerbholz". (Handke 1999: 54)

Die typischen, allgemeinbekannten rhetorischen Strategien der Ablenkung der Aufmerksamkeit richten sich gegen den „Schuldigen", um seine angebliche Schuld zuerst herzustellen, dann nachzuweisen und schließlich aus dem Ganzen des Guten zu verbannen oder zu eliminieren. Im Hintergrund des gesamten Absichtensystems steckt ein a priori Moment, den Interessen des A-priori-Historikers dienend und seine tatsächlichen Handlungen verdeckend. Es genüge dabei nicht nur, dass der Beschuldigte beschuldigt und bestraft werde, sonder auch und vor allem, dass er seine „Schulden" auch eingestehe. „Er ist bestraft. Aber er schuldet noch ein Schuldeingeständnis. Er soll sagen: Ich bin schuldig. Man will ihn Klartext reden hören." (Handke 1999: 54)

Hinter diesem „Man" (Heidegger 2006: 126-129)[7], von dem schon Heidegger schrieb, versteckt sich dabei die gesamte Maschinerie der Herstellung jenes A priori. Es sei, so liest man weiter in Handkes Stück, „die Welt", „die Öffentlichkeit", „die internationale Gemeinschaft", „der Okzident", „der Internaut", der/die aus dem Hintergrund die „Ewigkeitsspiralen" der Geschichte ziehe.

Das Eingeständnis, so lesen wir weiter in Handkes Stück, schließe auch ein, der Beschuldigte habe den Krieg sogar ausgedacht, erfunden, nicht nur zu ihm beigetragen und ihn schließlich zu einem Massenmord entflammt.

Im Stück von Handke lesen wir auch über die Natur der Sprache und die Sprache zu dem Krieg. Den drei „Internationalen" gehöre auch die Sprache zu dem Krieg. Und jeder öffentliche Auftritt und die Stellungnahme zum Krieg werde auch von den „Internationalen" im Voraus bestimmt. Über den Krieg könne nur so gesprochen werden, wie die „Internationalen" über ihn gesprochen haben und weiterhin sprechen werden. Eine andere, ihnen entgegengesetzte Sprache zu Krieg wäre eine „Verhöhnung der Opfer". Die Lieblingsnummer der „Internationalen" sei – wie in der Aufklärung und aufgrund dessen, was man in *Dialektik der Aufklärung* liest – die Nummer eins: es gebe nur eine Wahrheit, eine Sprache, eine Öffentlichkeit, eine öffentliche Meinung, ein Bild von der Wahrheit, die Bilder-Geschichten als das Alleruniversalste. Die Bilder-Geschichte läuft der „tatsächlichen" Geschichte voraus. Die Voraussetzung der realen ist eine ideale, vorgefasste, vorbegriffene Geschichte. So erweist sich

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7    Vrgl. auch seine Bestimmung des Apriori in den *Beiträgen zur Philosophie*: „Das *Apriori* meint immer künftig in der Metaphysik, entsprechend deren Ansatz bei Plato, die Vorgängigkeit der Seiendheit vor dem Seienden". (Heidegger 2003: 222).

diese ideale Bilder-Geschichte sogar als eine realere als die angeblich reale Ge-
schichte selbst. Und so kommen wir zu dem mehr oder weniger Hauptsatz des
Stücks. Der „erste Internationale" spricht prophetisch klingende Worte aus:

> Die Sprache ist doch die Nebensache. Da in diesem Krieg die Politik versagt
> hat, ging es um Wichtigeres: die Wunde offenzulegen. Wir müssen das Welt-
> gericht sein. *Denn wir müssen vor der Geschichte bestehen können* [kursiv – von
> mir]. So komm zur Hauptsache, Freund. (Handke 1999: 76)

Dieser Satz ist der Stützpunkt der Poetik der Geschichte von Peter Handke
und bedeutet genau – auf der Spur von Immanuel Kants Philosophie der Ge-
schichte a priori – jene Tätigkeit des Wahrsagers, der „die Begebenheiten sel-
ber macht und veranstaltet, die er zum voraus verkündigt". Die Geschichte als
bloßes Mittel zum Zweck wird buchstäblich produziert und weiterfabriziert,
aber – und da kommen wir auf den Punkt – als so vorgedachte auch weiter in
Kraft gesetzt, vorgemacht, vorgefertigt. Es geht da nicht bloß um Falsifizierung
und Relativierung der Geschichte, um verschiedene mögliche Standpunkte be-
züglich ein und desselben historischen Ereignisses, obzwar – wie wir schon
eingangs erklärt haben – auch eine solche Position des A-priori-Historikers
möglich wäre. Nein. Hier geht es buchstäblich darum, dass man (oder besser:
jenes berüchtigte „Man", hinter dessen Maske sich die sogenannte öffentliche,
von Medien vermittelte Wirklichkeit und öffentliche Meinung verbirgt) zum
Zweck der Verwirklichung der eigenen Absichten und Ziele die historischen
Ereignisse von Anfang an, im Voraus vorbestimmt, versteinert, sodass dem
'Gegner', jenem schon auch im Voraus Beschuldigten und aus dem Ganzen von
vornherein Ausgeschlossenen, im Krieg nichts weiteres übrigbleibt, als sich in
diesen vorgefertigten, unveränderbaren Entwurf, diese Schablone restlos hin-
einzufügen oder einfach aus dem Machtspiel verdrängt zu sein und herauszu-
fallen. In einer solchen nur formalen „Konstellation" gibt es nur eine dirigie-
rende Seite, die die Regeln und Maßstäbe immer im Voraus vorschreibt und
den Gegenspieler von Anfang an aus dem Gefüge ausschließt. Die Geschichte
ist, wie der Grieche, eine der Personen in Handkes Stück, im weiteren Verlauf
des Stücks behauptet, eine „Zwangsveranstaltung".

Eine besondere Form der Geschichte a priori ist die Gerechtigkeit a priori
als eines der Hauptinstrumente der Produktion der Geschichte. Die Richter
und die Ankläger des „Internationalen Friedens- und Strafgerichts", so lesen
wir im Stück weiter, erfinden die Gerechtigkeit und auch mittelbar die neue
Geschichte, indem sie „unbeirrbar" (ironisch!) anklagen und verurteilen. Die
„zweite Internationale" erkennt das Gemeinsame zwischen dem stillen, aqua-
riumgleichen Tribunalraum und der Camera Obscura des Meisters von Delft:

> [...] Genau wie er mit seiner Bildschachtel arbeitete auch unsere internationale
> Rechtskammer da an einer Gegenwelt – ihr ruhiges internationales Recht-Schöp-
> fen entsprach auf den Tupfer den Bildschöpfungen Vermeers! Auch unser Tri-
> bunal erfand, wie einst unser Maler, mit Hilfe einer leeren Schachtel – der Ge-
> richtsraum – und einer Linse, Camera Obscura!, den Frieden, schuf sublim, wie

unser Maler, Ordnung und brach so ohne Zweifel den Zyklus von Rache und Widerrache! (Handke 1999: 89)

Man findet am Ende des Stücks von Handke die Rede von der Entzauberung der Welt, einem großen, erstmals, wie schon gesagt, bei Max Weber besprochenen Thema. Der Regisseur spricht da von den drei großen Entzauberungen, die die Geschichte der Menschheit heute auf der ganzen Erde bestimmen. Die erste ist in der Behauptung enthalten, dass die Lebenszeit des Einzelnen („meine Lebenszeit") nichts sei im Vergleich mit der Ewigkeit oder Universalzeit, und eine solche Ansicht geht aus dem Moment der Universalität der Zeit, die in Kollision mit dem Vergänglichen steht und alles Einzelne und Begrenzte einfach zu überwinden und aufzuheben trachtet. Die zweite Entzauberung spreche von der Verlorenheit der Menschen im Raum auf der Erde und erhebt somit auch Anspruch auf jene alles Einzelne verschlingende Universalität. Die dritte Entzauberung schöpft der Dichter aus dem Denken von Hobbes.

„Wir Menschen sind, und das ist endgültig, untereinander an die Falschen geraten, jedes System ist entzaubert; der Mensch ist dem Menschen Wolf, das Volk ist dem Volke Wolf. Kein Himmel mehr wird je den Gerechten tauen. Die Drachensaat der Geschichte ist aufgegangen und besetzt, ineinander verbissen, lückenlos die Erde." (Handke 1999: 124–125)

Der innere Zusammenhang zwischen den Ideen der Philosophie der Geschichte von Immanuel Kant und derjenigen der Poetik der Geschichte und der Sprache von Peter Handke ist unbestritten. Das hat unsere immanente, phänomenologisch-hermeneutische Deutung zu zeigen versucht. Die Apriorität der Geschichte und Sprache bedeutet auf der Spur der Ideen des Philosophen und des Schriftstellers eine Art Kolonisation, Eroberung der Dimension des Zukünftigen und dessen Festlegung, Versteinerung. Die Aufgabe der Philosophie und Literatur ist die Entdeckung und Destruktion, das „Zerbrechen" dieser Apriorität.

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Miloš M. Jovanović

## A Hermeneutical Investigation of Historical and Language Apriority

Based on the strict immanent, hermeneutical-phenomenological interpretation of literature and philosophy, the paper is an attempt to make a connection between the ideas of language and history such as they appear in Peter Handke's poetological essay *Ich bin ein Bewohner des Elfenbeinturms* and his literary work *Die Fahrt im Einbaum oder das Stück zum Film vom Krieg*, on one side, and Immanuel Kant's idea of history a priori in his essays on anthropology and philosophy of history, on the other side. According to Kant's anthropology and philosophy of history a priori, which is possible when the one who predicts history makes and arranges history in advance, the idea of apriority of language in Handke's poetological work presents the language as some sort of an a priori frame which forms the pictures of history and reality of subjects in advance, such as the history a priori in his literary work is obvious when the hidden creator of history exists before the history itself and arranges it in advance. The idea of philosophical and language apriority developed in this paper is a wide, all inclusive frame which gives a wide platform for proper understanding and interpreting of all philosophies of history without exception.

Keywords: language and history a priori, philosophical hermeneutics, philosophy, literature

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## Jedno hermeneutičko istraživanje jezičko-istorijske apriornosti

### Apstrakt

U radu se razmatraju filozofija i poetika istorije i jezika *a priori* u poetičkom i književnom delu Petera Handkea, u njegovom poetološkom eseju *Ja sam stanovnik kule od slonovače* i njegovoj drami *Vožnja čunom ili komad za film o ratu*, i to polazeći od kantovske ideje apriornosti istorije. Istorija a priori je, prema Kantu, moguća „kada predskazivač sâm stvara i priprema događaje koje unapred navešćuje". Identičnu ideju o subjektu koji postoji pre istorije nalazimo i u poetičkom delu Petera Handkea, kako u njegovim poetološkim spisima, tako i u njegovom pesničkom delu. Cilj rada je da se jednim imanentnim, fenomenološko-hermeneutičkim tumačenjem dela filozofa Kanta i književnika Handkea pokaže neosporna tesna povezanost između njihovih filozofsko-istorijskih, odn. filozofsko-poetoloških ideja i da se na taj način stvori jedan opšti filozofsko-pesnički okvir za objašnjenje svih filozofija istorije bez izuzetaka.

Ključne reči: jezik i istorija a priori, filozofska hermeneutika, filozofija, književnost

Jugoslav Vuk Tepić

# ETHICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF KIERKEGAARD'S PERCEPTION OF FREEDOM

**ABSTRACT**
Starting with the point of freedom being one of unavoidable ideas of existential philosophy, as well as philosophy in general, we shall consider ethical and ontological aspects of contemplation of freedom in Kierkegaard's philosophy. We deem that existential philosophy, "contemplated" in all its variations, represents the very horizon or manner of philosophical comprehension of freedom phenomena, where freedom is integrally observed, thus allowing us to talk about unique bliss of ontological and ethical dimension, both of those appearing to be equally important. Therefore, freedom dominates the Kierkegaard's determination of individual, co-determines all its leap stages but also continually makes possible the sense of human existence.

## Specificity of Kierkegaard's Contemplation of Freedom

Syntagma stating that *self-imposed limitations represent realisation of my freedom* (Svendsen 2014: 242)*,* discloses the frame or advice for perceiving freedom nowadays. Subjectively accessing just small number of thinkers, consciously and deliberately, Svendsen considered freedom in its three *manifestations*, ontological, political and ethical, thus desiring to *approximate* his own consideration to readers with no philosophical education (background). In our opinion, this o*pens* Svendsen towards the horizon of existential comprehension of freedom, woven on individual self-structuring in the atmosphere of never-ending process of defining the term freedom.

Kierkegaard's philosophy, summed up as *a score of various life forms* (Zimmer 2011: 151)*,* poetically speaking, represents *the most vivid* horizon of contemplation of freedom. Generally observed, in the context of existential thinking, one could say that the freedom appears simultaneously with truth, and that as those faithful topics that permeate philosophy from its beginning. At the same time, they can be talked about as terms treated by the philosophical thinking the most, and consequently the most emptied of meaning that could be denoted as existentially conditional, i.e. life denoted area of understanding. The reason for it is certainly the fact that those terms are dealt by the philosophy

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as its foundations and without them one cannot speak about serious thinking, i.e. one cannot talk about man's reality.

The thought situation is somewhat more favourable when it comes to *truth* (Filipovic 1989: 155–157)*,* but not in a sense that philosophy ended up with truth, on the contrary. Spectrum of philosophical paradigms devoted to truth ranges from antique, i.e. classic theory of adequacy or correspondence to theory of record and coherence, and if wishing to think historically, then the very pluralism of truth, as a characteristic of post-modern thinking, points out to an unfinished matter as life is, poetically speaking: i.e. to each curious spirit, the consideration of truth is revealed as a necessity of overrunning the actual situation. Without explaining in details, we could say that, in this context, the consideration of truth is revealed in more favourable situation, due to the denotion that existential thought places truth alongside with freedom which is nothing else then man's ownness, the Kierkegaard's individuality which is actually ontological oppositeness between individual and crowd. We make remarks about truth so the freedom does not come down to subjective and voluntarist line because, as ontologically and ethically as we may observe the freedom validity area, along with the truth it has to be truthful to the extent that can be understandable for another man, even if the extent is possibility of accepting the other man's freedom. Since it seems that Kierkegaard's conceptual determination for an individual, not the subject, is based on this thinking bliss, we shall say something about that too. Firstly, Kierkegaard is misaligned with ruling philosophical "ideology" in every way, primarily with that of Hegel, so his individuality hides what an abstract subject cannot possess: he is not allowed, for the general, higher cause. Secondly, individual stands in the midst of a crowd, opposite and despite of it, draining freedom as a condition and possibility of self in that very relation. Because the aim in existentialism is individual human situation just because it is presented in the form of climate appropriate for becoming an individual and, for a thinking man and his existence, that individuality is presented as an objective thing within subjectivity, solid soil and inseparable feature from the essence of a being itself. Therefore, freedom is limited boundlessness of a being. And it seems to have been like that forever, with certain boundaries caused by the diversity of time, experience and space. It could even be argued that perception of freedom is irrelevant, in metaphorical and ontological key, if the task is only conceptual description. Because with *elders* (Filipovic 1989: 304–306), or two of the greatest, we find familiar twinning of the term of freedom which forks in two, visible in each subsequent contemplation of freedom. According to Plato, freedom is defined within an idea of justice realised by an ideal state, therefore such ideal determination of freedom is reflected in a thought that everyone does what is his belonging capability; hence the freedom is presented as an internal determination within the man's infatuation with an ideal. Aristotle perceives freedom in a more systemic way, in dialectic three-steps, differentiating ontological determination of freedom according to which a man lives for his own sake and is determined by self-purpose, and ethical, leaned against

ontological where the choice of good and realistic things for a man matters. The frame of political determination is also determined in his contemplation of freedom, considered through actualisation of ontological and moral freedom as a social system in which an individual achieves the greatest fulfilment and it also seems that Hegel's receptive determination of state is not far from this syntagma. Therefore, if the freedom, at one level, is an ontological term that "describes" the very essence of a man, then, on the other level, ontic or factual level freedom[1] (Reese 1996: 242–244) may be represented through at least four ways that cover the variation in one of implementation areas what is also shown in several tens of various theories within these four ways. This "goes" simply because a man is the only being in the nature who is not complete in his inner, deepest determination, or at least significantly, a being determined by the necessity of the outer, laws of nature, but realises himself in the openness and the harmony with the outer world. Besides all other conclusions, this reveals what could be identified as a common feature which is nothing but conceptual elusiveness of freedom.

## Ethical Dimension of Freedom

Starting from the previous section, to us it seems advisable that, instead of an attempt to determine the freedom by a definition, what is mainly pointless, to set our presentation of freedom thinking through the *Kierkegaard's Copernican turn* (Aumann 2008: 169)*,* visible due to diffuse use of pseudonym. Let us remind that the purpose of pseudonym is, inter alia, determined as a way of overcoming the inability to communicate the subjectivistically located truth to another[2]. Since this is where the hint is for solving the truth subjectivity riddle that could be comprehended by another individual, the situation is partly explained in the following attitude: "*Kierkegaard understood the world as the sphere of the creative activity of God. He took very seriously the fundamental biblical theme that God creates the universe through speech. Everything that exists does so because God is speaking it into existence. The human soul is that unique place in all of nature where the voice of God can be heard and responded to consciously*" (Bellinger, internet).[3] Therefore, the turn here refers to the problem of understanding the truth, meaning the *equivalence* between a man and freedom, as a subjective source of truth inside the relation which is necessarily directed towards the absolute but only a part of that relation; therefore, the truth is inside an individual, in the *spirit* transcended by God, but

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1   Terms *freedom* and *liberty* are separated in meaning lately so the first one refers to the situation of choice, whereas latter covers political-social area with no limitations and which is as such acknowledged to the members of society.
2   For more details see Preface of Kierkegaard's *The Sickness Unto Death*, Serbian edition (Kjerkegor, Seren (1980), *Bolest na smrt*, Beograd, Mladost). I think that Zurovacs stance is mainly directed to this basic ontological news in relation to traditional philosophy.
3   Bellinger's essay „Kierkegaard: Copernicus of the Spirit".

inside-me who understands myself as another towards the general crowd which is subsequently *the origin* of truth  as a result of Individual's self-appointment. Hence, Kierkegaard finds the outcome of truth in self-appointment as an Individual thus pointing at the truth determination turn as a problem of conveying that truth to another (besides that gnoseological location of truth within the subject) but also as a problem of comprehending the source of freedom. Generally speaking, this is hereby implied as a core determination with a hint of dominance, ideas of freedom as identified with a man-individual, by no means through leaning on the sophistic source of the well-known measure of all things, out of which everything would subsequently end in an unreachable ideal of a man-standard, but as a determination that the man himself is freedom. Besides the fact that Kierkegaard nohow belongs to the circle of *western relativism,* one should bear in mind that he, in his idiomatic way, nominates matters of thinking significantly different with the request that the sense of the world must be measured by freedom and individual's self-awareness, that of a specific individual, thus diagnosing the crisis of a contemporary man and his world expressed in the syntagma of turning the existing way of thinking "upside down". This is yielded by the thesis that the basis for the aforementioned relativism lies in the statement *that there are two opposite statements in every matter*. So the freedom thinking is ultimately diffusely determined, what is more clearly visible in ethical than ontological treatment of freedom. Kierkegaard's consideration of freedom phenomena is placed within the complete opus as one *implied* thinking concept of freedom of an individual. Hereby is emphasized that the freedom was subject to philosophical thinking since its beginnings, but not so passionately and with such a cry for sense as it was done in existentialism. It can be said that is *locus* of freedom placed in individual. Therefore, naming freedom perception implied, means to us freedom of thinking as a constituent of an individual in all its states; or as a determination that separates the individual, in the existence, from any other being; or as an existence itself within the deepest determination of an individual.  If knowing that Kierkegaard *resented* to Hegel *freedom as recognition of necessity,* what is nothing more than reconciliation of an individual with the fact the he is not the end purpose but abstract historical process, we hereby meet the very moment where the freshness of his perception of freedom arises. I.e., the intersection point refers to the ontological unity of the person that is not a true person if not a free person, so it is not an individual but an abstract subject in the World spirit network. There, where the necessity rules, no freedom resides; necessities we recognise in the nature or logic are not opposed to the freedom of personality because they simply do not reside in the same place. In an anagogic way, Kierkegaard contemplates the truth of a being by responding to the classic abstract idealism, later scientific, constantly systemic, with the request *...it should immediately be borne in mind that the issue is not about the truth of Christianity but about the individual's relation to Christianity* (Kierkegaard 1992: 15). If it wasn't like this, the delusions of the system would remain, i.e. the Christianity developed alongside and got established as a system that

neglects the truth so sought after by Kierkegaard. In his most general meta-phor, the place of truth is thereby shown, hence the individual in its search for the truth as an inner relation, whereas the existential thinking uses terms basic for idealism, but with one key difference. Therefore, we quote Kierkegaard:

> The term being in those definitions must, then, be understood much more ab-stractly as the abstract rendition or the abstract prototype of what being in concreto is as empirical being. If it is understood in this way, nothing stands in the way of abstractly defining truth as something finished, because, viewed abstractly, the agreement between thinking and being is always finished, inas-much as the beginning of the process of becoming lies precisely in the concre-tion that abstraction abstractly disregards. (Kierkegaard 1992: 190)

It is totally understandable that word *disregard* comprises nothing but con-ceptual generalisation of life, elimination of determining and unpredictable moments that disturb dialectic regularity of the System, all thought to be, by Kierkegaard, opposition of freedom because it is necessity for an individual and thus freedom opposite.

As it is clearly indicated in each of his records, Kierkegaard places the area of freedom inside the personality, amongst personal choices and commitments, where Hegel's *dialectic mediation* bears no power since it rules *fantastic beings* (Kierkegaard 1992: 191)[4], therefore his dialectics of inside has no denial nature in its development; so if wanting to speak "more freely" we shall say that, as for Kierkegaard, assumption, sometimes assumptions, or the preceding one, retain in existence by following the regularity *remembering the future observed in the past* since his perception of freedom retains existential character of a being meaning that every existence is personal for a man. So, as an example or a situation that creates the atmosphere of understanding for the reader, he uses what is the oldest in European man's memory, a Bible with its tales; on the other hand, he explains himself by means of Socrates. He links freedom to the original *liberation* of Adam from the natural all-union, unawareness of the own being that reaches the humanity being through such a dramatic fate as the original, forefathers' sin; because that is when a man attains possibili-ty of freedom as, up to that moment, asleepness of spirit through detachment from fore-unity, fore-awareness. That Kierkegaard's perception of freedom is on the other side of every historical movement's necessity, where objectiv-ity of the very thought has no utter sense; the internal sphere created by en-deavour to realise complete and identity being. That gives the hint of kind of freedom. Being presented as *same-by-itself,* between freedom and personal-ity, through the realised moment, but also as insufficiency of the becoming, we come to freedom as a need for constant *becoming*, realisation of infinity in finite.  Hence, generally speaking, it is possible to say that Kierkegaard's free-dom is *implied*, since it is present along with the truth, i.e. its omnipresence

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4    Here is more explicit *criticism* of the purpose of Hegel's books from we took cer-tain part, paraphrased.

is initially shown as *human being's dream*, as a selection which is a condition for every future choice an individual makes. Therefore, in order to show livelihood of the choice, it is being thoroughly, *pseudonymously and logically* (Kierkegaard 1987: 431) thought within the category of *choice* (he himself would say it was his only category) showing that, when an individual makes a choice, it is the absolute choice because the choice is not this and that materialistically, but absolute *own self in an eternal validity,* i.e., *the choice* can be understood *as a solution for possibilities that ultimately have the same argumentation value* (MacIntyre 1998: 140). Thereby we come to the ontological unity of my own self and freedom. Reasonableness, or something by which this unity means retention from both in the third, i.e. freedom in its emphasis as eternity of possibilities, is Kierkegaard's most abstract matter in thinking of freedom. At the same time it is the most specific thought of freedom at the moment of realisation. I.e. freedom as the realisation in the *same-by-itself* of myself and the absolute; I am when I choose myself, because *I choose in the absolute sense, and I choose absolute just with what I chose, I do not choose this or that and absolute is my own self in an eternal validity* (Kierkegaard 1987: 432). Further on, Kierkegaard speaks about one significant difference between the aesthetic and ethical individual, *main difference that everything revolves about,* difference that explains it all and that is simplicity handed out to the reader, with anticipated caution, over anonymous pseudonym. That significant bauble is that *ethical individual is transparent to itself and does not live "randomly", as it is the case with aesthetic individual* (Kierkegaard 1987: 578). Placing all this in a debate called *Equilibrium Between the Aesthetic and the Ethical in the Composition of Personality*, Kierkegaard actually subordinates all individual's abilities to that unique objective, complete personality who is inside itself same as the freedom.

## Ontological Dimension of Freedom

It would be hard to shed light on freedom in an ethical sense, just conditionally or temporarily differentiated from ontological, without describing the previous condition, or better to say state, but of the kind recognised as *setting*. In fact, freedom, as hidden man's essence just briefly grazed as ultimate ideal in every day's perception, remains condition aspired to by a man in a peculiarly confusing way, ambiguously, actually as irony has the thought relate to pure thoughtfulness. So, freedom fits a man, surely as a value of an abstract ideal that cannot be reached, or hardly reached, by means of revolution; and then it stands wrong, although it serves as a proof of effort, general aspiration or omnipresence and, thereby, haziness of freedom. Hence it is harder to find conventionality in Kierkegaard's perception of freedom, but as a confirmation of omnipresence, one can find similar banality of preceding state, opening for freedom efflux. There is a special setting in place for his perception of freedom, special inner relation expressed in certain existential character of a sinner. That condition, setting, is anxiety shown in his psychological work, called "The Concept of Anxiety". The whole debate is based on the postulate

that points out to the basics, that Kierkegaard's man *is the synthesis of infinity and finite, transient and eternal, freedom and necessity, in short: synthesis* (Najdanović 2009: 69). That synthesis appears to be a problem for existential determination, which is not surprising because anxiety is considered a state, present in both of man's united poles as an *insinuated* state which is announced as potential before as well as after opening the possibility, so it can be treated as a warning, signalling feature of a man's inside. Therefore, anxiety points towards the possibility of freedom, towards its appearance. *Possibility,* now as a category with reference to category of choice, is of another kind, therefore, after psychology makes an initial step in elaboration of anxiety, we enter dogmatism, although we are only interested here in the part that concern freedom; and awareness of oneself, self-awareness. For him, to be educated in possibility means to be prepared for communication which is relation with self as an absolute; to be ready to open self towards the absolute is turning towards the eternity, which is nothing but freedom of individual from delusions of the World, realisation of oneself as Existence. Equality of faith and thought is self-explanatory, but as a *passion. One who is formed by possibility, is formed by its eternity* (Kierkegaard 1980: 138). With Kierkegaard, one should be aware of the specific environment due to dialectic line, the unity attained by interfluence and interlacing of anxiety, possibility and eternity, which, as a dialectic triad which is not that because *the previous* is not denied, points to the *victim* direction. As it will turn out, Kierkegaard's relation towards the concept of the victim is self-denying, even in the sense that his thinking denies, puts the thinking, reasonable part of the personality in the second place. Therefore, one who is formed by anxiety, is formed by possibility and only he is formed by his eternity. Hereby we notice possessive-reflexive adjective *one's own* as a passing point towards understanding what has been said, because eternity is primarily understood as a general category, feature of Absolute or God so it is necessary to pay attention and attempt to see what personal, *one's own* eternity is in the matter. Since the first characteristic of possibility is that *everything is equally possible in possibility* (Kierkegaard 1980: 139). They are between nothing and reality. Being of possibility is that it can always be but only if it can be borne by the internal potential of personality. This is not outside of reflection on freedom, on the contrary. One may say that, instead of constantly aspiring to *repack the world* that would create chaos, a man should direct himself to the truth travelling through personal self-realisation because personality becomes that unique absolute, and hence the free personality is its own goal. So, the personal self-realisation is the base point from where we can change the world, whereas free personality is only true reality and there somewhere is the constant or basic truth that Kierkegaard conveys to us.

If perceived historically, with Kierkegaard, realisation of freedom rests on life, experienced moments, biographic reminiscences he uses to shed light on most of his concepts. It is also the case with freedom in the context of his beloved Regina, who is so much more significantly important for Kierkegaard than their engagement can be spoken about as a biographical reminiscence from

two people's lives, even in cases when it leaves a deep trace in souls. Regina is actually as important as the paradigm of father, as seeking the true Christianity; to be more specific, significance is shown in experiencing the possibility to renounce something valuable for the most precious value. It is so in perception of freedom, because freedom reveals itself in renunciation, i.e., victimisation that leads towards the absolute. The thought of such renunciation without experiencing is manifested as pointless in many Kierkegaard's sentences. Hereby we shall only point out to some, more vividly and lively communicated. So, *My relation to her* is one small paragraph we find in *Diary* (Kierkegaard 2013: 188–189). Even before that paragraph he endlessly *contemplates and unwinds* each moment, each encounter, gesture, different acts within same situation; comprehensiveness. However, in this paragraph he speaks of *major guilt for pursuing her and dragging her along.* Any ordinary man would say about himself that regret occurred, however, through five cycles Kierkegaard here elaborates particular significant *relational* moments of cognition and emotions, emotional self-development and immediacy of interior through suffer with no hint of an end. Dialectically, he speaks of "her" in seven episodes; two of which are augmented, one as an *ultimatum,* second one as a *crucial step.* Ontologically, relation is shedding light on inner being, reaching unmediated reflection. Existentially, it is about sacrificing ethical for religious. There is indirect speech used on another place (Kierkegaard 2013: 118). Johannes writes to Cordelia, and as he does that, he is already *aestheticizing.* Thereby the *female existence is existence for another,* and it reflects in *maiden* which is such *only in relation to a man.* This is ontological matter by all means, i.e., by determining existence, whereas empirically, thus ethically, there is confusion because *seldom one finds a woman who would be something else.* Simply, breaking an engagement for Kierkegaard is a sacrifice same as the one, standard-like, that Abraham, once upon a time, left to a man, but a man to whom Kierkegaard allocates a mission thus making him newly-revealed type; not some new, still non-existent man, super-man, but the very existing one, concrete, with a sacrifice mission, the one who builds own self through despair and anxiety thus making it possible to exist in one new, self-awareness-full meaning.

And every time when it comes to contemplation of freedom, there is a discussion on choice, either-or, which in philosophical perception of time, does not see oppositeness as a problem because philosophy treats time as past time, history, which is future for freedom, still non-existent but determining as a possibility not to be if missing a choice. *My either-or firstly means a choice that is chosen by, what* is chosen comes second, i.e. choosing between two suggestions is less significant in relation to *choosing volition* (Kierkegaard 1987: 431). The thing is that two spheres have been usually equated, speculative thinking and freedom, hence many difficulties arise in presenting freedom as reality, i.e. part of existence. A specific man is "not interested" in Hegel's sphere of necessity, which is reasonable because it is part of world's mind, where oppositeness does not create problem, i.e. where mediation has its place; Kierkegaard's directs us towards the inner sphere of personality where either-or has determining

meaning, where historical necessity has no influence on the freedom of an individual because *freedom is eternal and arises from nothing* (Kierkegaard 1980: 94). With Kierkegaard *necessity* is reflected through *sin,* and the aim is on unrealised essence of a being as the greatest sin, since it blocks other constitutive characteristics of an individual, from freedom to truth. Further on, in his book "The Concept of Anxiety" he contemplates sin, another non-philosophic category, very systematically, thus unusual for his opus, bringing immediate presentation of freedom as a subject of contemplation for psychology as "competent" discipline with its own, certain legalities related to the psychological sphere. Surely, as it is clearly noted in *Introduction,* psychology is here in Kierkegaard's conceptual scope and understanding the subject, so, inter alia, for this reason, this book is marked as *filled with philosophy* (at least by Heidegger) and it is usually marked as the most difficult book (Bertman 1990: 117). *In an anxiety everyone is returning to own relation to Absolute,* so the anxiety could not be observed conventionally psychologically, but for Kierkegaard *it is as Mind or Logos are for Hegel* (Kierkegaard 1980: 37). Psychological finds limit and inability in a specific *setting* where *anxiety is vertigo of freedom that appears because the spirit wishes to continue synthesis, and freedom, infatuated with its own possibility, catches that moment of infinity and clings onto it* (Kierkegaard 1980:59). Sartre points out that Kierkegaard in this work presents the essential difference between various types of anxiety, such as: anxiety as a fear of unknown patness of my being, anxiety of future, as a field full of un-lightened past and anxiety as bare, plain fear which is not a true anxiety because it refers to immediate and objective danger. Accepting determining Kierkegaard's attitudes in contemplation of anxiety, Sartre calls the first one *anxiety from oneself,* whereas fear, but not ordinary ever-day fear, is different because it determines the feeling of a *being in the world* (Sartre 1966: 29).

Definition of freedom is affirmed, definition which is not that in the strict sense of perception, as a *possibility of the possible, but also the power of being able to do so, because if the freedom is really motion of reflection in itself, then these two possibilities of freedom are actually only one and the same possibility-like itself and the mirror image of reflection* (Todorović 2001: 105). We distance from this statement, i.e. to define freedom here would mean to remain at conceptual which does not open the very possibility of doing, leap that turns eternal possibilities into possible, current and becoming. Simply because an individual man, Kierkegaard's contemporary, with his incorporation into the existing forms of human existence, meaning social and individual occurrences, he is *opposed to* free personality, existent being that chooses itself. Kierkegaard aims at individuality that is courageous to accept itself truly, seemingly in a way that rejects temptation, "Adam-like" example that opens qualitatively new possibility from *Nothing* through elimination of natural. That certainly implies revolution as true elimination of the existing order, which is natural in its *fore-sample* and rational in all latter cases. There is no way it could be achieved by disintegration of the current order by some social, politically induced revolutions, this is primarily about the personal and rare courage to start

and enlighten processes inside an individual that would lead to the essential reconstruction of a being, cease of unhuman living. That is primarily conditioned by questions of the truth of a being and simultaneously its freedom. Kierkegaard's question of truth is primarily a question of existential truth which means it is not about historically cognitive knowledge, but about ways of existence, *confessions,* through which an individual does not necessarily debate any factual, historical consistencies but significantly differently conveys *the way of his search for the sense of own life and the way of illuminating those facts through this search* (Životić 1973: 44). So it is clear that Kierkegaard's truths are *illuminating* and not explanatory what doesn't means that he doesn't controvert or contemplate objectivity and materialism as frame of existence for a free man, but, as we have indicated, he emphasizes specific, always personal dimension, effort to be made in the direction of discussed despair and omnipresent anxiety through which an individual gains its absolute of using freedom, which is proportional to potential, incognitive and immanent to an individual man. The special emphasis is on bilateral relation between us and the truth, created in the simultaneous attention that objective truth, if detached from my existence, could not be spoken about because it simply cannot be in such way, and on the other hand, my inner, spiritual life must be connected to outer, objective world so it isn't insanity, just like even greater insanity is the objective one, not linked with the spirit.

Kierkegaard wrote many pages in order to "disclose" traditional philosophical abstraction of a man; it primarily refers to Hegel's magnificent work named System, hence System with capital S, cause Kierkegaard takes it personally, everything other in traditional philosophy is less *clumsy* or more human related to inexcusable deed to create pan-logical scientific system out of antique love for wisdom. The truth in the System is process-historical, mediated, triad dialectic and presented as senior and essential, so the attention of Kierkegaard is directed to pointing out to excessive objectivity and unbiased concern; because what is this philosophy that eliminates a man, not caring about his entire being. Therefore, Kierkegaard seeks grounds in well-known places, at least for Christians (as an exponent and denial of a trapped man), for which he, maybe, too often used to use biblical syntagmas and motives as a well-known surrounding for his reader. If he was to use the same language to communicate to everybody, he would not be understood not even to the least extent, and understanding *him* is opinion of the reader about *own self* so the philosophy in his thinking should be a tool for our own being or it itself is nothing, i.e. it is then totally useless and hence his great effort would be meaningless. So, there where the necessity rules instead of freedom, where the truth is objective, necessary and mediated instead of unmediated, subjective-life aware, then individual *is not being* and there is no existence without it. That explains Kierkegaard's passionate opposition to Hegel's contradiction in which the final being has a role of a "tool" in realising the objective purpose of the truth and calling it all philosophy of freedom. Questioning himself and us about freedom as a condition of truth, and vice versa, Kierkegaard firstly asks if a man may

put his head on the block for the truth? The question arises as the preceding one, but simultaneously as a hypothesis he uses to involve us in a discussion on the relation between a man and truth, as a necessary situation testing process thus testing an individual. In his usual style, Kierkegaard here, using concepts that are not really concepts from the philosophical point of view, actually puts the reader in a position to be involved in a discussion what makes his initial questioning resemble Socratic method, also known as maieutics. Although, one should bear in mind an opposite option, such as Životić's final remarks, illustrational for the logic they use. Hereby we mean a kind of return to Hegel that seems to be an unusual verdict to the existential thinking. "*Kierkegaard wanted free individual without free community. Hence an individual can only remain in the world of necessity without real possibility to express own personal strengths, without possibility to get realised as a free being.*" (Životić 1973: 48). Therefore, in the sense of disagreeing with the previous assessment, the starting point of Kierkegaard's philosophy could be an assumption that freedom is not attainable philosophically since every argumentation would then be "caught in the network" of logical necessity thus reaching direct contradiction with freedom, exclusively attainable through spiritual endeavour through such state of mind in which anxiety pervades the whole being, explained in Kierkegaard's psychology as own subject and which opens up possibility for freedom. Still, philosophical is partly interwoven with Kierkegaard's psychological, at least as an auxiliary tool but also as logically necessary reason. Therefore, Kierkegaard devotes his work, philosophical in teaching, poetical in language and form, to anxiety, because an individual does not exist without freedom which *is not* such without anxiety as a precondition in which seeker exercises for the final self-cognition.

## Conclusion

What could be ending words at this article when we know that Kierkegaard, by denying philosophical path, actually denies the conceptual exclusiveness as an "addle" way to illuminate something belonging to each man? Kierkegaard's thought teaches us- necessity of freedom is possible without philosophical, whereas vice versa does not make sense. In that atmosphere, we deem that making conclusions about freedom can be done in the horizon of basic orientation of existential thinking as primarity of existence over essence, where freedom appears such us deepest truth of Individual. Therefore, primary for a man is whatever is lively, existential, pervasive, of flesh and blood, breath embraced, recognised through freedom, comprehended as freedom. Freedom as a feeling, atmosphere and suffering of existence or freedom as a paradox of a being that lives limited existence as becoming with inner projection of limitless and unfinished as always in-motion, im-perfect finalisation of the own purpose. Hence inability to separate and differentiate ethical and ontological in Kierkegaard's philosophy.

**Resume:** Ethical and ontological dimension of contemplation of freedom in Kierkegaard's philosophy direct towards the unique horizon of self-appointment of an individual. Just like the existential philosophy generally represents the specific form of philosophical perception of freedom in which the freedom is comprehensively considered, also with Kierkegaard these two dimensions cannot be observed separately. Ethical dimension of freedom is presented not only in the ethical manner of existence, but as a capability of generalisation and relation to the world.  Ontological dimension is not only in the question what is the essence of an individual but also in what needs to be done to become an individual. Hence it was necessary to present key aspects of Kierkegaard's perception of freedom through systemic thinking and Christianity, on one hand, and inside his contemplation of an individual, on the other. Both dimensions imply constant questioning of conditions set before a man with the purpose of making him an individual, and within the paradox of existence as limited boundlessness.

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Jugoslav Vuk Tepić

### Etičke i ontološke dimenzije Kjerkegorovog poimanja slobode

**Apstrakt**

Polazeći od stava da je sloboda jedna od nezaobilaznih ideja egzistencijalne filozofije, ali i filozofije uopšte, razmatraćemo etičke i ontološke aspekte promišljanja slobode u Kjerkegorovoj filozofiji. Smatramo da egzistencijalna filozofija, promišljana u svim njenim varijantama, predstavlja onaj horizont ili način filozofskog poimanja fenomena slobode, u kome se sloboda misli integralno, pa se onda može govoriti o jedinstvenom patosu ontološke i etičke dimenzije, gde se one pokazuju podjednako važnim. Sloboda tako dominira Kjerkegorovim određenjem pojedinca, sa-određuje sve skokovite etape ali i neprestano čini mogućim smisao čovekovog bivstvovanja.

Ključne reči: etičko, sloboda, moral, ontološko, pojedinac, egzistencijalna filozofija, poimanje slobode

# III

## INTERVIEW
INTERVJU

Matthias Bormuth

# AN INTELLECTUAL AFFAIR – MEETING HANNAH ARENDT
## An Interview with Richard Bernstein[1]

**New York, February 2017**

**Bormuth:**  Richard Bernstein, You are teaching at the New School of Social Research for over four decades. It is known as a famous university where many German immigrants were finding their place after 1933 as scientists and intellectuals. Hannah Arendt was one of them. You got to know her personally and closely during her last years. She was encouraging your beginnings as an intellectual whose first book *Praxis and Action* caught Arendt's attention. So it is wonderful that you take your time for talking with me about your way of becoming a philosopher and encountering Hannah Arendt. How did everything start?

**Bernstein:**  I came from a Jewish home of immigrants in Brooklyn. My family came from Russia around 1900 and was not particularly intellectual. After high school, I had the chance to go to the University of Chicago, a remarkable institution at that time. I did not know anything about philosophy before I went to college, but fell in love with it in my first two years.

**Bormuth:**  What made you want to become a philosopher at that time?

**Bernstein:**  The College of the University of Chicago was a unique place where every undergraduate student had to take a required curriculum that was very philosophical. I had the impression that we read Plato or Aristotle in almost every course. Therefore, philosophy became a discovery for me and I wanted to continue my studies more intensely.

**Bormuth:**  And where did you go after your early years in Chicago?

**Bernstein:**  I went back to New York and studied at Columbia University for another two years. I studied a variety of subjects, mostly Philosophy and

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Comparative Literature. However, I wrote my PHD dissertation at Yale, which was a genuinely pluralistic philosophy department. There I took a course in Hegel's *Phenomenology* which terrified me first. Then I had to report on the section on *Antigone* and experienced a break through. Ever since Hegel has had a deep influence on me.

**Bormuth:**   What was the result emerging from this encounter with Hegel's thoughts?

**Bernstein:**   My book *Praxis and Action* is an interpretation of 20th century philosophy presenting it as different reactions towards themes raised by Hegel. The chapters, which discuss Marx, Existentialism, Pragmatism, and Analytic Philosophy, begin with a reflection how they are reactions to something in Hegel's philosophy, and particularly to his *Phenomenology*. Hannah Arendt contacted me when she read my book.

**Bormuth:**   How did this happen?

**Bernstein:**   The editor sent a copy of my book to Hannah Arendt. She took the opportunity to contact me when she visited Haverford College (where I was teaching) a year later to give a lecture. I remember very vividly where we met and how long we were together. It was at the Haverford Hotel at about 8 o'clock, and we talked until two o'clock in the morning. We argued fiercely because I was very critical of her readings of Hegel and Marx. It was astonishing how openly she discussed issues with me. She was quite distinguished at this time while I was just a beginner, not well known. However, it made no difference to her. She thought I was trying to do something original in my book. That tells a great deal about Hannah. She might have asked: "Why didn't you write about my work? I'm dealing philosophically with the same issue of action." However, she did not. She was more interested in what I was saying. Later she invited me to the estate of William Jovanovich her publisher. There we had lunch with him and Mary McCarthy her best friend, a well-known writer and member of the New York Intellectuals. At the end of a lovely afternoon Jovanovich said, I want to publish your next book. This was because of Hannah. It always seemed to me to have been a wonderful and intense intellectual affair meeting her.

**Bormuth:**   What was it like to become member of the faculty at the New School?

**Bernstein:**   The New School was originally founded in 1919. In 1933, the president, Alvin Johnson, decided to found a new branch, The University in Exile for scholars fleeing from Nazi Germany. In 1972, she wanted me to join the philosophy faculty at the New School, but there was some opposition to my appointment. Arendt wrote me a letter that says a lot about her critical attitude towards the academic life: "I do not think that the opposition was due to Byzantine intrigues as such. The reason as I see it, is very simple. I just reread your book *Praxis and Action* which I also use to discuss Marx in the seminar

and was again struck by the freshness and originality of your thought. The first reaction of the academic milieu to somebody who quite obviously strikes out on his own is always negative. And a number of doctoral students, not all, react the same way as a faculty. Glenn Gray who was here and is as you probably know a friend of mine admires it and is very much in favor of your employment. He told me that he found among the general reaction to your book either great enthusiasm or a certain hostility." And then she goes on to say: "I know the situation very well, because I was for a very long time the object of similar reactions. And I must say that I find this only natural. One shouldn't be bitter about it and one should not acquire persecution complexes. All academic writing whether right, left, or middle, is conservative in the extreme. Nobody wants to hear, what he hasn't heard before." I joined the faculty of the New School much later in 1989.

**Bormuth:**   These words are wonderful. They must have been a great encouragement for you while establishing at the New School as a philosopher?
**Bernstein:**   I share this letter with my graduate students who encounter resistance when they attempt to write something fresh and original.

**Bormuth:**   What fascinates you on Arendt's thinking?
**Bernstein:**   Certainly, I think that Hannah Arendt has developed the finest phenomenological description of tangible worldly public freedom that anybody has ever given. Her understanding of action, natality, plurality, and power are striking and has deeply influenced my own work. I also think she has a deep sight into genuine thinking. I am always learning something new from her thoughts.

**Bormuth:**   What do you think about her idea of political freedom?
**Bernstein:**   Hannah Arendt did not believe in democracy as simply majority rule: it is the idea of the republic where the plurality of voices is possible and necessary. It is the basic idea of participation, of citizens participating in the political life with their peers. Moreover, since Trump and his administration are in office there is a great renewed of interest in Arendt.

**Bormuth:**   Her thoughts seem to me to have a clarifying impact on recent argument of alternative truths which arose in your country.
**Bernstein:**   And it seems as if her thoughts on irony which come close to my own written down in a little book are also relevant today in academic life as much as they were in here times. Arendt provides in her essay "Thinking and Moral Considerations" a beautiful description of Socrates and his irony when talking of him metaphorically as a gadfly, ray or midwife which sting, irritate and help our thinking. She, like Socrates, indicates that we encourage independent thinking by infecting others with our own perplexities.

**Bormuth:**    There is also the early lecture on Socrates from the 1950s focusing on the question of thinking, opinion and the challenges and limits of public truth.

**Bernstein:**    I am waiting for someone to write on Socrates' significance at various stages of Hannah Arendt's thinking. Socrates seems to be crucial for her thought throughout her life.

**Bormuth:**    You were writing on two socratic aspects of friendship, its agonal and erotic character. One might guess that this is connected to the experiences you had with Arendt.

**Bernstein:**    It is not just her, although she was a decisive experience of agonal and erotic moments in my intellectual life. I consider myself very lucky, because many of the people that I have the highest respect for intellectually, became my friends. That is true of Gadamer. That is true of Habermas. That is true of Arendt and Derrida. In addition, I should also mention Richard Rorty and Charles Taylor – some  of the most significant thinkers, in my opinion, of the 20th century, and they were all friends and, in each case, there were both, agreements and arguments between us.

**Bormuth:**    What do you think can be seen as the secret of making them your friends?

**Bernstein:**    We all belonged to the generation that made its way in the post-World War 2 period. Hannah Arendt's years of intellectual formation happened a generation earlier. It was still a period when philosophy was strongly connected to the Life of the Mind. It was not a profession in a dry sense confined to the ivory tower But things changed rapidly. In addition, right now we have to face an age of extreme academic professionalization and bureaucratization at the universities, a process that does not leave the character of philosophy departments unchanged. There is a wonderful statement by Hannah Arendt, when she said: "You know I can live without acting but I cannot live without understanding." There are many independent thinkers like Arendt today.

**Bormuth:**    What is the role of philosophical friendship in this horizon?

**Bernstein:**    It should encourage the possibility of friendly disagreement. There is a point when one can ask: "What do I accept and what do I reject of his or her thoughts?" The challenges of plurality, freedom, discourse and openness come along with it.

**Bormuth:**    And would you think this ability of being in dialogue with other philosophers who appear with different opinions is something that is missing nowadays in the philosophical discourse?

**Bernstein:**    Oh, yes. I think the need for both hermeneutic generosity and agonistic disagreement is necessary. However, I am not very optimistic that we find it in academic philosophy today. With the purely analytic style of philosophy, we approach more or less a legal form of exchange of arguments. However, I have also had the experience of friendly agonistic dialogue in my philosophical

conversations with Jürgen Habermas whom I first met in 1972. He became interested in American pragmatism while my passion grew for Hegelian Marxism. We have had many discussions and arguments over the years.

**Bormuth:**   Would you say that Habermas' idea of communication is connected to Arendt, who developed specially in her friendship with Jaspers her own idea of communication.

**Bernstein:**   Habermas was surely fascinated by Arendt's idea of political friendship. He met her during his first visits to the New School in the 1960s. Habermas described his visits to the New School as entering into the spirit of the Weimar Republic. Everybody at the New School was speaking German. However, there are striking differences between Arendt and Habermas – especially concerning the role of a rational consensus. She was always worried about unity of the opinion, claiming differences. In other words, if I am going to have an argument with you, it is not just common ground; there is also difference between us. This is fundamental for her idea of plurality. That agonal aspect of philosophizing was her strength while Habermas stressed the ability to achieve certain agreements.

**Bormuth:**   In Arendt's essay on Lessing the polemic and pluralistic perspective is enlightened and friendship is seen as a means for political discourse. What do you think of that?

**Bernstein:**   For Arendt, there can't be a public, unless there's a shared world and the world is not just a matter of objects, you know, but a matter of exchanging opinions in a world that has some stability and permanence. A shared world means shared opinions. I think it is important to keep these themes alive. One of the exciting things about Hannah Arendt is her understanding of the American Founding Fathers who created a new republic. Arendt sought to keep alive the lost treasure of the revolutionary spirit where tangible public freedom comes alive.

**Bormuth:**   Are the universities responsible to lead young people on this way?

**Bernstein:**   Yes. Certainly, this was Arendt's viewpoint. She was very alarmed in the 1960s that the student rebellion against the university would destroy the university, would destroy the only possibility for real thinking and seeking for truth. Another danger nowadays is that our academic life becomes more and more specialized and professionalized.

**Bormuth:**   It was always impressive for me that Hannah Arendt somehow stayed in certain distance to institutions.

**Bernstein:**   Hannah was never really an academic. She did not even have a full-time position until the 1960s. She taught at Princeton and Berkeley, but never identified with these institutions. Reading the essay on Lessing we can say in his words she was a *Selbstdenker* – an independent thinker. That's what she really was.

# IV

## REVIEWS
PRIKAZI

CATHERINE ZUCKERT, *MACHIAVELLI'S POLITICS*,
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO & LONDON, 2017.

Maja Korolija

It is important to point out from the start that the author of *Machiavelli's Politics*, Catherine Zuckert, borrows, in her work, heavily from the hermeneutics of philosopher Leo Strauss. Strauss' method of text interpretation, one which distinguishes between exoteric and esoteric layers of meaning, although sometimes methodologically questionable, manages in certain cases to contribute to a fuller understanding of the analyzed work. The strength of Zuckert's book is in the skillful usage of the Straussian method of reading that is complemented by a good familiarity with the historical context in question as well as with an approach which tries to take into account the totality of Machiavelli's work.

Zuckert tends to settle some of the interpretative quandaries in academia regarding Machiavelli's writings. The main problem in that field is the perceived incoherence of his quite diverse work. Zuckert tries to show how narrative methods used in many of them are related. In his historical and political works Machiavelli takes one position, then examines its critiques and alternatives, after which he comes to a provisional conclusion which he then subjects to critique. In his fictional writings,

Machiavelli presents different characters with different understandings of what is important and how something should be done in order to get good results, and then he shows which of those characters succeeds, and which fails, and why. Zuckert notes that in all of Machiavelli's works human beings are acting on the bases of their fears, hopes and passions. Machiavelli also thinks that, in their tendencies to satisfy their needs, people would end up in violent conflicts without some form of government. Zuckert is trying to show that the principles praised in his works, taken together as well as individually, present a coherent whole.

> No one who reads Machiavelli can deny that he emphasizes politics more than philosophy, religion, or literary form (although these are all relevant aspects of his work). In the following study I have therefore sought to emphasize, first and foremost, what Machiavelli sought to teach his readers about politics, not merely in his immediate context, but most importantly in order to improve human life in the future. (Zuckert 2017: 24)

According to Strauss (whose opinion Zuckert shares) the value of Machiavelli

is that he is a universal political thinker: "It [his thought] concerns, and it is meant to concern, all thinking men regardless of time and place" (Strauss).

When discussing *The Prince,* Zuckert rightly presents Machiavelli's approach to politics as completely new and revolutionary. Machiavelli is explaining to a prince in Florence how to acquire, keep, and expand power. He is not interested in describing the ways to rule from the point of justice, common good, divine right etc. Machiavelli only hints at the institutions and laws that are necessary to enable that selfish actions are directed toward common good, and not against it. In the *Discourses on Livy* he describes these institutions in more detailed way.

When discussing the *Discourses on Livy*, Zuckert is drawing a close connection between Machiavelli's "debunking of traditional notions of virtue" from *The Prince* and his advocacy for the main task of government and its republican institutions to provide for the security of the people, their liberties, and the property of most citizens. Therefore, commentators who perceive advocacy of the amoral political analysis and tyranny in *The Prince* are wrong, as they do not see that the goal of this government, which Machiavelli supports, is the common good. More precisely, their impression is blurred by Machiavelli's advocacy of the means that are not acceptable in the traditional moral sense.

Some commentators tried to show that *The Mandrake* is relevant when discussing Machiavelli's topics and opinions regarding public affairs, while others think he has written this work because he was disappointed with the reception of his previous work, and wanted to have some fun with a light comedy. Flaws could be found for both of these interpretations. But, what nobody denies is that *The Mandrake* presents a retelling of the ancient story of the rape of Lucretia. Zuckert is again trying to resolve this issue by applying the Straussian methodology, and underlines that in our analysis we should pay special attention to the differences between several versions of the story. Zuckert finds the main moral principles of *The Prince* in *The Mandrake* as well, but then again stresses that it would be wrong to conclude that Machiavelli didn't note the difference between the private and the political sphere.

In *The Art of War*, which Zuckert discusses in *Machiavelli's Defense*, Machiavelli presented his opinions regarding the raising and training of military. Machiavelli praised the concept of armed citizenry and the idea of employing and training the army in which soldiers are one's own countrymen. A ruler who leads this kind of army will be the lord of country. Zuckert notes that, through the voice of Fabrizio, Machiavelli explains how all people can become soldiers and that only princes are to be blamed if soldiers are acting in an unacceptable manner.

Machiavelli's advice to the ruler is that when diplomacy fails, they should be ready for war, as an extension of politics. Zuckert shows that Machiavelli is trying to point out that soldiers are ideal citizens because of their love for peace, and because of their stronger belief in God. Machiavelli critiques modern views that soldiers' lives are incompatible with civil life, and traces them to Christian religion that, according to him, makes people hate the army.

Many scholars thought that the purpose of this work is to show, with examples, Machiavelli's understanding of the role of fortune and virtue in gaining of political influence. But, Zuckert, while dealing with *The Life of Castruccio Castracani,* claims that this kind of straightforward reading is not the right choice. In reality there is a great difference between Castruccio as Machiavelli painted him and Castruccio as the historical person (he was only a petty tyrant). Machiavelli, Zuckert concludes,

did this on purpose, to be able to show that he can critique by praising.

When dealing with *Clizia* Zuckert again claims that the code for Machiavelli's messages is in a detailed comparison of the original story, the play *Casina* written by the Roman playwright Plautus, with his *Clizia*.

Here Zuckert notices that Machiavelli, unlike Aristotle, does not trace the origin of the political association to the family, which is constituted in the framework of the procreation between men and women and the master's control of the slave. Machiavelli feels that these elements cannot be a part of a stable community, as they are only expressions of *eros*, which is changeable. What is constant for human beings, according to Machiavelli, is their attachment to property, their lives, and their reputation. Therefore, those should be the constitutive elements for building a community.

Zuckert points out that Machiavelli is, in his *Florentine Histories*, warning his readers about the dangers which the community will face if it allows some popular leader to rise without contest. Machiavelli notes that the path that leads to tyranny is one in which electoral laws do not encourage competition for popular favor.

Zuckert feels that Machiavelli expresses his attitude against "sectarian partisanship," but again Machiavelli does not think that partisan conflicts could cease to exist. Accordingly, the solution to this kind of problems are laws, which should enable that ambitious individuals can and should compete for public favor to achieve their goals, but to do it in such a manner that mutual control exists, so that civil laws are not violated. That is key for the foundation and the preservation of a free republic. According to Zuckert, Machiavelli applies this to politics because of the idea that a true republic must never depend on aristocracy or a hereditary monarch, nor on those who are rich enough so that they do not have to work because they can be independent from government.

In the conclusion, Zuckert is underlining the significance of Machiavelli's thought for modern politics. Machiavelli redefined the goal of the government and confronted political questions that we are still facing today. The author is restating Machiavelli's definition of his role: not to praise certain leaders, but to enable those who read his works to do better than the leaders he describes in his works. Zuckert agrees with Strauss' assessment that Machiavelli was "a man of the people" (Strauss) and also shares Strauss's opinion that one of Machiavelli's specifics is that, unlike later democratic theorists, he does not postulate that democratic means are always the best for achieving democratic ends.

THEODORA VETTA, *DEMOCRACY STRUGGLES: NGOS AND THE POLITICS OF AID IN SERBIA*, BERGHAHN, NEW YORK, 2018.

Sanja Petkovska

Even though the issue of the non-governmental (third, voluntary, non-profit) sector is a very current and an intriguing one, its role in contemporary society and its transformations has mostly remained unexplained and only very superficially tackled. A global rise of non-profit institutions which occupy the space between the state, the market and the household and which appear to be an unstable type of an organization of flexible governance is one one of the main traits of the period of post-capitalism that followed the fall of Berlin Wall. This type of an organization has been previously heavily promoted by international developmental agencies and their ascend has marked the redefinition of the geopolitical power structures shaped during the Cold War period; until recently, this phenomenon somehow has remained self-explanatory and has been taken for granted. Initial research projects about Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have been done within developmental studies, but since there is an obvious similarity between the activities of NGOs and anthropologists, it is somewhat expected that among the first analyses of the role of NGOs will be likewise accomplished by anthropologists. Theodora Vetta, a social

anthropologist, does precisely this: she analyses the non-profit sector in post-2000 Serbia. One may wonder, however, why Serbia is an attractive case study for doing this kind of research on the non-profit sector.

Judging from the framing of the chapters and from their content, it seems that NGOs themselves are not the real focus of this book; rather, the focus of the book appears to be a general discussion of the transformations of the political space of post-socialist Serbia and the global modernization conjuncture followed by notion of civil society shaped within liberal democracy. Some of the chapters are too specific and lack some pieces of information about the structure and the concrete actors of the non-profit sector in post-2000 Serbia. The book itself consists of three main chapters and from time to time it looks like most of the popular notions of contemporary politics and transition are more or less taken for granted, such as the formation of civil society, political aspects of culture and good governance. Only occasionally and sporadically some critical and reflective remarks on these notions are given. Therefore, the book leaves you with a general impression that it does not even attempt to re-examine

in any serious way the contemporary global development.

The introductory chapter explicates the leading concept of the book. This is the changing relationship between the state and citizens which was previously understood as the "third wave of democratization" by Samuel P. Huntington and labelled as "associational revolution" by Lester M. Salamon (p. 2). The causes of these processes are thought of as a response to the different needs of citizens on the one hand (since hitherto existing structures were not capable of covering citizens' needs anymore) and as ideological on the other hand – the promotion of the global consolidation of capitalism and liberal democracy. There are two main objectives of the book: 1) to contribute to the more dynamic understanding of post-socialist transformation and 2) to complement ethnographic insights with political economy analysis.

The notion of civil society is a crucial term for post-socialist transformation and the topic of the rising third sector. This term is described in the introductory section of the book as "a conceptual umbrella," a kind of "new political culture" and a sort of "global axiom" which applies to the transforming political, social and economic structures of former socialist countries. This umbrella term is generally understood as emancipatory and progressive (p. 22). Around sixty NGOs from Serbia were included in this fieldwork (though the full list is not disclosed), but a more close or intensive connection is not made with any of them since it could prevent the author to establish a good and neutral connection with the others. From the content of the chapters it is more than obvious that the entire project simply lacks a concrete focus and includes too much raw fieldwork material, while of the promised more serious analysis we can find only fragments from time to time.

The book consists of three parts, each with two interconnected chapters.

The first part of the book, "Civil Society in the Making", consists of a very dense, or "thick," description of a training that happened in Serbia and that was supported by the Robert Bosch Foundation. It was actually a one-week seminar organized in an unnamed small town in Serbia in 2010. The main question of this chapter is what constitutes a civic society building program which should, ideally, expose "Balkan apathetic personalities" to "democratic civic awareness" and result in them being more active and engaged as political subjects. The description of this training involves a very rough dichotomy between the assumed inadequacy of Balkan culture and the advanced EU civility and the main problem of Balkan countries is thought to be poverty only. This neglects, however, the lack of global importance of Balkan countries and their marginalization. The argument that people were forcefully during the socialist period while now even the entire machinery of "associational revolution" is not capable to motivate them simply is contradictory and does not make much sense. In the end of this part, the author claims that trainers on this seminar were successful in avoiding the "cultural imperialism of the West" but we simply cannot see anything but an attempt to make them to unconditionally accept the most superficial version of it.

The first part of the book also explains the relationship of the non-profit sector with donors, their legitimacy and the "authenticity" of these initiatives which are often motivated by profit. Thought Vetta concludes that associational revolution is a struggle for liberal democracy and capitalism, she does not devote much attention to the question how this could bring any kind of development into the periphery (p. 76).

The second part of the book, "The Politics of Culture", offers an analysis of how the "NGO-ization" of the governing infrastructures of periphery countries,

such as South-Eastern European (SEE) countries, also de-radicalizes their social struggles which go against the doxa of Europe: cosmopolitanism and overcoming local determinism. However, it remains quite unclear how the transformations of a certain type of cultural identity, no matter how composed, might bring any kind of development. What is the actual point of making citizens of SEE loyal global personalities framed by cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism? The main obstacle for this is the lack of civility, the author claims, caused by cultural determinism that is geopolitically grounded. The other issues that are raised in this chapter are the class aspect of NGO culture and the changing conditions of work happening simultaneously with the associational revolution, especially within the non-profit sector. This part of the book also considers if the people working in the non-profit sector are forming a separate class – a group with similar habitus or *projectariat*. Finally, this part offers a short summary of nationalism where the author argues that radical nationalists in Serbia (especially the Serbian Radical Party) offered the most serious critique of capitalism while democrats in fact promoted neoliberal capitalism. This interpretation is, however, quite simplified since the radical nationalist arguments against EU are assumed to be dominantly culturally and not economically grounded.

The third and last part of the book is concerned with "good governance." Its main focus are the developmental programs initiated by US NGOs, especially USAID which are applying the "community-based approach" since the Community Revitalization through Democratic Action (CRDA) project that started in 2001. This kind of projects aim to reconfigure the governing structures and the public sector institutions. The scheme of interventions initiated by the US-funded organizations is characterized as the "revolt-revolution-standardization" (p. 141). What is quite surprising is that this kind of intervention is counterpoised to socialist mobilization as independent because it does not seem the author of the book is exposing this quite contradictory fact about the way democratization works under the conditions of associational revolution. Furthermore, the results of these projects in terms of real potential for mobilizing the people are much weaker than the results of socialist mobilization and observed as "abstract for people's concerns" (p. 154). This approach of liberal capitalist democracy, however, does not combat dependency in any sense at all; on the contrary, it is a conditioned and a forced way of engineering and manufacturing citizens to be actively engaged in their quite harsh economic and technological subjugation. The final chapter questions the role of the state in the developments related to the non-profit sector and the assumed dichotomy between the two. The public sector is actively transferring its duties on the third sector which happens via the globally omnipresent policy discourse. Even if the non-profit sector is assumed to be very critical towards state institutions themselves, collected fieldwork material demonstrates that the non-profit sector quite often works as a substitute for public service and is actually an active part of a new neo-liberal governmentality.

The conclusion of this ethnographic project, which is composed of a few separate smaller projects, is that the growth of local NGOs in Serbia did not consolidate a vibrant civic society nor did it create some kind of new liberal subjectivity that can produce active citizens for the future of global capitalism. Despite being a ground-breaking attempt in this field, the book is obviously lacking a conceptual consistency and a clear focus on non-profit institutions as an institutional sub-system. The ethnographic material is used more

to illustrate some of the claims, rather than to provide any kind of proof for some of the tendencies within the non-profit sector in Serbia. Since the author is a social anthropologist it really comes as surprise that the argument which bounds together colonialism, aid and development is not much more explored within the study. This direction of research on the third sector has been especially developed by Laëtitia Atlani-Duault and it also comes as a surprise that she is not even referred to in this book. Although the author is often critical towards (neo)liberal democratic developmental capitalism, many of the concepts and notions are used without much critical reflexion. However, because of the courage to initiate this type of research and open the debate on the nature of change that the non-profit sector brings to peripheral countries, this book should certainly be welcomed as a ground-breaking piece.

# LIK BOLTANSKI I NENSI FREJZER, *DOMINACIJA I EMANCIPACIJA*, PREV. OLJA PETRONIĆ, MEDITERRAN PUBLISHING, NOVI SAD, 2018.

Srđan Prodanović

U Grenoblu je 2012. godine održana debata pod nazivom „Dominacija i emancipacija: prilog obnovi kritike" u kojoj su učestvovali vodeći društveni teoretičari, Nensi Frejzer (Nancy Fraser) i Lik Boltanski (Luk Boltanski). Rezultate ove izuzetno podsticajne i nadasve aktuelne intelektualne rasprave koju je moderirao eminentni sociolog, Filip Korkif (Philippe Corcuff) domaća publika može da pročita u knjizi čija je očigledna ambicija da na izrazito jezgrovit i skoro intuitivan način podstakne nov pristup inače veoma komplikovanom odnosu između dominacije i emancipacije koji pak sobom povlači i jedan drugačiji pogled na nacionalnu državu, nove forme kapitalizma, institucije, kritiku i (radikalnu) društvenu promenu.

Knjiga je podeljena u tri celine: uvodni deo, dijalog između Frejzer i Boltanskog i zaključnog post-skriptuma. U uvodu Korkif obeležava neke od ključnih instanci otpora neoliberalnom režimu, poput Indignadosa ili *Occupy Wall Street* pokreta, kako bi ukazao na izazove sa kojim se susreće savremena kritika neoliberalne dominacije. Korkif tako uočava da danas sama artikulacija kritičke misli koja želi da zagovara emancipaciju nema jasan način da utvrdi koji stepen autonomije je akterima

„dozvoljen" ukoliko težnja ka sveobuhvatnoj sistemskoj promeni treba da ostane njen krucijalni sastavni deo. Na ovom mestu započinje „dijaloški" odeljak knjige, budući da ostvarivanje „epistemološke otvorenosti" i osporavanje svake vrste paternalizma prilikom artikulacije društvene kritike predstavlja istrajni ideal teorijskih razmatranja Frejzerove i Boltanskog.

Dijalog započinje izlaganjem Nensi Frejzer o socijalnoj zaštiti, jednom od velikih dostignuća države blagostanja koji je ujedno večito na meti različitih mera štednje u okviru različitih neoliberalnih režima. Nakon finansijske krize iz 2008. godine sve je uvreženija nostalgija spram vremena „socijalne sigurnosti" koja je, po mišljenju Frejzerove, pogrešno ishodište za kritiku modernih formi društvene dominacije. Pre svega, ova vrsta zaštite je po prirodi etatistička zbog toga što implicira „predneoliberalnu" nacionalnu državu kao svog garanta, te utoliko podložna drugačijim – ali jednako pogubnim – kodovima „ugnjetačkih prinuda" (str. 31) kao što su heteronormativnost i ekspertokratija. Pored toga, po mišljenju Frejzer, važno je problematizovati i sam nacionalni okvir usled činjenice da globalnu ugroženost i prekarnost ljudi ne možemo otkloniti

preuskim rešenjima koja često skrivaju pravu prirodu migracija, delokalizacije radnih mesta, nejednake raspodele bogatstva između globalnog Juga i Severa i drugih aktuelnih instanci globalne nepravde. Boltanski takođe smatra da razumevanje današnje situacije nalaže povratak proučavanju odnosa između države i kapitalističkih oblika društvene reprodukcije. Tako je po njegovom mišljenju u predneoliberalnom periodu postojala određena autonomija socijalno ugroženih kategorija građana iskazana pre svega u formi borbe za radnička prava ili prava u potrošnji novca koja je postepeno menjana za sigurnost koju je nudila mreža institucija u okviru države blagostanja. Ipak, sofisticirani oblik kompleksne (menadžerske) dominacije koji je nastao tako što je „kroz kapitalistički mlin" (str. 37) provučene teme iz ⬜68 suštinski je razorio samu institucionalnu realnost države blagostanja, bez da je povratio autonomiju iz ranijeg perioda. Po mišljenju Boltanskog, ovaj proces je ireverzibilan i u tom pogledu etatizam ne može biti adekvatna polazna osnova za ponovno osmišljavanje sistema socijalne zaštite. Na tom mestu postaje uputno pitanje različitih aktuelnih i potencijalnih modaliteta prevazilaženja naše sumorne neoliberalne stvarnosti koja ne bi upala u očiglednu zamku nostalgijom rukovođenog etatizma. Frejzer u tom pogledu primećuje da se mora naći neka vrsta srednjeg puta između stabilnosti koja je implicirana idejom socijalne zaštite i rizika koju sa sobom nosi dinamičnost emancipacije. Pri tom, još jedna osa balansiranja se tiče lične autonomije i kolektivizma. Drugim rečima, Frejzer smatra da zagovaranje emancipacije mora ostaviti dovoljno prostora za negativnu slobodu. Boltanski sa druge strane upozorava da postoji zabrinjavajuća tendencija da se formuliše diskurs „ni levice ni desnice" koji pod plaštom (lažnog) pomirenja tradicije i antikapitalizma često zapravo pogoduje fašizaciji društva. Ipak, ne

treba pomisliti kako Frejzer i Boltanski u svom dijalogu zanemaruju ili negiraju značaj institucija za dosezanje emancipacije. Naprotiv, Boltanski tako insistira da politika emancipacije mora da pođe od aktera, odnosno od njihove sposobnosti da ostvare refleksiju nad društvenim pravilima. Naime, on smatra da je za delotvornost emancipacije presudno da se razume suptilna distinkcija između duha pravila i slova pravila (str. 60), zbog toga što arbitrarnost u varijaciji pravila predstavlja jednu od najvažnijih alatki socijalne dominacije. Dakle, ideja institucije je izrazito važna, budući da je jedino ona u stanju da pruži dovoljnu količinu „semantičke sigurnosti" koja je nužna za ostvarivanje (radikalne) društvene promene. Nensi Frejzer ovde zauzima donekle drugačiju strategiju. Ona takođe smatra da je nemoguće u potpunosti iskoračiti izvan sveta koje kroje različite institucije, međutim momenti akterske autoemancipacije (str. 64) kontinuirano bi trebalo da budu usmereni ka demontiranju uvek prisutne strukturalne nejednakost. Ipak, po njenom mišljenju projekat emancipacije treba bude „neisključiv", te da na primer ostavi instituciju tržišta kao jedan od okvira društvene interakcije (međutim u jednoj vrlo ograničenoj formi gde tržišni odnosi nikad ne bi mogli da imaju odlučujući uticaj na raspodelu stvorenog viška vrednosti). U post-skriptumu oboje još jednom podcrtavaju koje su po njihovom mišljenju neuralgične tačke kojih se moramo dotaći pri savremenom razmatranju odnosa između dominacije i emancipacije. Tako Botlanski još jednom ponavlja svoj apel da se odnos države i kapitalizma mora osvetliti na nov i inovativan način, dok Frejzer zagovara ambiciozni projekat bespoštedne kritike društvene kritike koji bi pružili osnov za skromniji, to jest inkluzivniji, projekat emancipacije.

Knjiga *Dominacija i emancipacija* svakako predstavlja zanimljivo delo koje postavlja važna pitanja, iako svakako

nema nameru da na njih ponudi konkretan odgovor. Mada bi se moglo tvrditi da je ovaj pristup postavljanja pitanja bez odgovora postao isuviše raširen u savremenoj društvenoj teoriji, sasvim je izvesno da ova knjiga, upravo svojom nepretencioznom svedenošću, pogoduje razvoju istraživačkih intuicija koje pak bude nadu da se ti odgovori mogu artikulisati.

# KSENIJA ŠULOVIĆ, *HOSE ORTEGA I GASET – ŽIVOT I DELO SA BIBLIOGRAFIJOM*, FILOZOFSKI FAKULTET, NOVI SAD, 2019.

Miloš Ćipranić

Knjiga Ksenije Šulović sa Odseka za romanistiku Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu predstavlja rezultat pažljivog popisivanja kako dela Ortege i Gaseta, počevši od „Glosa“, tako i kraćih i dužih radova posvećenih njegovom delu u Španiji, nekadašnjim Jugoslavijama i, uže gledano, Srbiji. Probijanjem kroz „tekstualnu ortegijansku geografiju (str. 69), monografiju upotpunjuje izlaganje Ortegine životne i intelektualane trajektorije.

U predavanju održanom u proleće 1935. godine u Parizu, koje se neposredno tiče tematike o kojoj je reč i kome autorka monografije posvećuje posebnu pažnju (str. 58–60), i sam Ortega i Gaset ističe narastajući problem *orijentacije* u okeanu objavljenih knjiga i periodike. „Isti čovek nauke primećuje da jedna od velikih poteškoća njegovog rada jeste u tome da se orijentiše u bibliografiji vezanoj za njegovu temu.“ Pitanje je da li je madridski filozof ikada naslutio da će se tokom vremena pojaviti isti problem i u odnosu na njegovo delo, koje je postalo predmet brojnih istraživanja na različitim meridijanima.

Ortegu i Gaseta je u prostor našeg jezika uveo Kalmi Baruh člankom „Španski mislilac o Španiji“, objavljenom u *Srpskom književnom glasniku*

1931. godine i preštampanom u njegovoj knjizi *Eseji i članci* (1952). Tekst „Čovjek masa“ se prevodi u zagrebačkoj *Hrvatskoj smotri* pred početak Drugog svetskog rata, a u istom gradu se objavljuje i prevod *Pobune masa* (1941), koga potpisuje Zlatko Gašparović. Iz knjige Ksenije Šulović se vidi da su u razdoblju socijalističke Jugoslavije prevodi i studije o Ortegi prilično oskudniji u odnosu na kasnije decenije, tačnije, njihov broj se od osamdesetih do danas proporcionalno povećavao. Moćan izuzetak u tom relativnom zatišju jeste članak iz *Savremenika* Ksenije Atanasijević „Humanistička misao španskog filosofa Hose Ortege i Gaseta“ (1967). Sa druge strane, prvu monografiju u kojoj se opsežno razmatra Ortegina sociološka pozicija i uopšte njegova misao napisao je Trivo Inđić i ona je štampana 1985. Pionirski značajan gest interpretacije i približavanja njegovih razmišljanja o umetnosti ovdašnjoj sredini jeste temat „Estetika Hose Ortege i Gaseta“ sa prilozima domaćih autora, publikovan takođe te godine u časopisu *Književna kritika*.

Ljiljana Pavlović-Samurović je u tekstu „Hose Ortega i Gaset – bio-bibliografski podaci (1883–1955)“, koji zatvara pomenuti tematski blok, naznačila da

popis radova o ovom filozofu objavljenih u Jugoslaviji ne postoji. Pored prevedenih Orteginih dela, u njemu su navedeni određeni članci posvećeni njegovoj misli (svakako upada u oči odsustvo eseja Ksenije Atanasijević). Monografija Ksenije Šulović ne samo što je najzad ispunila to prazno mesto davanjem iscrpnog bibliografskog popisa, već ga je svojim opsegom daleko prevazišla.

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Up to two double sheets (60.000 characters including spaces), abstracts, key words, without comments.

## 2. ABSTRACT
Between 100 and 250 words.

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In the text: (Harris 2001).

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In the bibliography: Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret (1981), „You can have Sex without Children: Christianity and the New Offer", in The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, Ethics, Religion and Politics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 82–96.

In the text: (Anscombe 1981: 82)

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In the text: (Logar 2009: 12).

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*Example:*

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U napomeni: Haug 1981: 33.

## 9. ČLANCI

U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov teksta pod navodnicima, naslov časopisa u italiku, godište časopisa, u zagradi broj sveske u godištu ukoliko paginacija nije jedinstvena za ceo tom, dvotačka i broj stranice. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. Ne stavljaju se skraćenice „str.“, „vol.“, „tom“, „br.“ i slične. U napomenama, članci se citiraju isključivo na skraćeni način.

*Primeri:*

U literaturi: Miller, Johns Roger (1926), „The Ideas as Thoughts of God“, *Classical Philology* 21: 317–326.

Hartman, Nikolaj (1980) „O metodi istorije filozofije“, *Gledišta* 21 (6): 101–120.

U tekstu: (Hartman 1980: 108).

U napomeni: Hartman 1980: 108

## 10. ZBORNICI

U spisku literature: prezime i ime priređivača, u zagradi skraćenica „prir.“, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov zbornika u italiku, mesto izdanja, izdavač i strana po potrebi. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomenama, zbornici se citiraju isključivo na skraćeni način.

*Primer:*

U literaturi: Espozito, Džon (prir.) (2002), *Oksfordska istorija islama*, Beograd: Clio.

U tekstu: (Espozito 2002).

U napomeni: Espozito 2002.

## 11. TEKSTOVI IZ ZBORNIKA

U spisku literature: prezime, ime autora, u zagradi godina, naslov teksta pod navodnicima, slovo „u“ (u zborniku), ime i prezime priređivača zbornika, u zagradi „prir.“, naslov zbornika u italiku, mesto izdanja, izdavač, dvotačka i broj stranice (ako je potrebno). U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. Skraćenica „str.“ dopuštena je samo u spisku literature.

*Primer:*

U literaturi: Nizbet, Robert (1999), „Jedinične ideje sociologije“, u A. Mimica (prir.), *Tekst i kontekst*, Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, str. 31–48.

U tekstu: (Nizbet 1999: 33).

U napomeni: Nizbet 1999: 33.

## 12. ČLANAK IZ NOVINA

U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina, naslov članka pod navodnicima, naslov novina u italiku, datum, stranica.

*Primer:*

U literaturi: Logar, Gordana (2009), „Zemlja bez fajronta“, *Danas*, 2. avgust, str. 12.

U tekstu: (Logar 2009: 12).

U napomeni: Logar 2009: 12.

## 13. INTERNET

Prilikom citiranja tekstova s interneta, osim internet-adrese sajta na kojem se tekst nalazi i naslova samog teksta, navesti i datum posete toj stranici, kao i dodatna određenja ukoliko su dostupna (godina, poglavlje i sl.).

*Primer:*

U literaturi: Ross, Kelley R., „Ontological Undecidability“, (internet) dostupno na: http://www.friesian.com/undecd-1.htm (pristupljeno 2. aprila 2009).

U tekstu: (Ross, internet).

U napomeni: Ross, internet.