Filozofija i društvo, godište XXX, broj 1
izdaje / published by
Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
Kraljice Natalije 45, Beograd, telefon: +381112646242
Email: institut@instifdt.bg.ac.rs
www.instifdt.bg.ac.rs

Prilozi objavljeni u *Filozofiji i društvu* indeksirani su u Web of Science (ESCI), Scopus, ERIH PLUS, Philosopher's Index, EBSCO, PhilPapers, ResearchGate, Genamics JournalSeek, Google Scholar, J-Gate, ProQuest, ReadCube, Europeana Collections, Journal Index, Baidu Scholar

Dizajn: Milica Milojević

Lektura: Edvard Đorđević

Grafička obrada: Sanja Tasić

Štampa: Donat Graf, Beograd

Tiraž: 300. Časopis izlazi četiri puta godišnje.

Cena 350 dinara; godišnja pretplata 1200 dinara.

Objavljivanje časopisa finansijski pomaže Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije.

Univerzitet u Beogradu
Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju

FILOZOFIJA I DRUŠTVO
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY

broj 1 2019.
godište XXX

Beograd 2019.
YU ISSN 0353-5738 UDK 1+316+32

REVIEWS
PRIKAZI

FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE
IZ RADA INSTITUTA

I

REFLECTIONS ON AESTHETICS FROM THE EUROPEAN OCCIDENT

REFLEKSIJE O ESTETICI SA EVROPSKOG ZAPADA

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY
VOL. 30, NO. 1, 001-196

EUROPE: THE SPACE AND TIME OF REFLECTION

On the Complutense Research Group *La Europa de la Escritura*

We are currently witnessing a moment in which the emergence of new circumstances in Europe from which to address cultural heritage requires the scientific community to engage in deep reflection. For centuries Europe was the space of reference for the development of knowledge. Over the millennia its soil amassed the successive contributions left behind by the different fields of knowledge like traces of mankind's intellectual passage. The various cultures that exist today all over the planet are either rooted in Europe or were recognized, studied, assessed and even challenged or subjugated in Europe. It is to this intellectual space that people keen to further and increase their knowledge flocked from all over the world until only recently.

However, the socio-political transformations that took place in Europe and the rest of the world throughout the 20th century brought changes with wide-ranging repercussions on how cultural interest is now experienced and, above all, on how concern for knowledge is felt and valued. The new generations no longer view in Europe as an unquestionable cultural reference; on the contrary, somewhat to the dismay of people and institutions, knowledge and the achievement of the soundest and most effective specializations are no longer pursued in Europe but in other geographical areas, in technologically developed countries like the United States, China, Japan and Canada whose huge economic potential applied to scientific research enables creativity to be developed effectively and what were until only recently unthinkable scientific objectives to be attained.

In view of this change of attitude and the indubitable beckoning effects which fertile soil, that of the highly developed countries, has on technological and scientific research for young generations, the countries that make up today's unified Europe have embarked on the long but inexorable path towards educational convergence in order to fight against the exile of the youngest generations by adopting a similar educational model and devoting sizeable aspects, but it can also be viewed as the confirmation of a defeat, as the shedding of a necessary attitude of self-esteem in respect to aspects in which Europe has been and cannot cease to be unavoidable space of research. We are referring to the field of the humanities. Thirst for scientific and technological competitiveness is tipping the scale, one of whose arms should bear Europe's historical heritage *par excellence* – that of humanistic tradition, that of art and the nascent civilisations which, although deposited on European soil, could end up being studied outside Europe if European universities neglect it, leading to the departure of a boat of young philologists, philosophers, archaeologists, historians and others who, having completed their training outside Europe, would return to perform their work in places or documentations

centers holding the resources for their own specialities. It would be particularly painful to see the future of the humanities, sacrificed for the sake of scientific progress on account of its scant immediate profitability, shift to countries which, on account of their economic potential, would be capable not only of giving impetus to science and technology but also to all the fields of knowledge that have an impact on anthropological development, on the cultivation of the inner self, that is, on giving impetus to the humanities. By banishing from European soil those who wish to know and develop the studies that precisely stem from and are rooted in that European soil, Europe is squandering its most valuables assets, its intellectual heritage and its wealth.

It is necessary to look beyond short-term profitability, to shed the double yardstick when taking an interest in scientists or humanists, and recognize the need for thought as well as for knowledge, shying away from competitive goals and choosing formulas that involve collaboration. Only then will long-term profitability balance the imbalances and will it be possible to speak of a European Union which above and beyond political union and economic union, has succeeded in achieving cultural union, recognition of the similarity of interests that are conductive to respect, knowledge and preservation of the most diverse cultural values, which is basically the very essence of democracy. The European space of research can furthermore be shaped as an open, interdisciplinary space based on intercommunication and the pooling of efforts, which stimulates the flow not only of students and teachers but also of knowledge and concerns. And these, in our opinion, are some of its most positive aspects and most refreshing attractions.

In 1998 this atmosphere of intellectual effervescence became the backdrop to the first meetings of Spanish, French and Italian researchers interested in embarking jointly on a project based on studying the relations between writing and image. In addition to a series of meetings at Paris 7 University and the Faculty of Philosophy of the Universidad Complutense in Madrid, this project led to the establishment of a *Seminario Permanente sobre Escritura e Imagen* (Ongoing Seminar on Writing and Image) whose subtitle, *La Europa de la Escritura* (The Europe of Writing), was intended to express the concern of the time and a prospective intent.

In the year 2005, the journal *Escritura e imagen* (ISSN 1885-5687) appears, directed by Ana María Leyra Soriano, Professor in Aesthetics, and then the research work carried out since 1998 gets consolidated through the constitution of the Complutense Research Group *La Europa de la Escritura* (Ref. 930196), first co-directed by Profs. Ana María Leyra Soriano (Faculty of Philosophy) and Javier de Prado (Faculty of Philology), both of the Complutense University of Madrid. Since 2010 Prof. Javier de Prado retires. Prof. Lourdes Carriedo (Faculty of Philology) takes over the co-direction of the journal until the present day.

La Europa de la Escritura focuses its research on reflection on the material character of writing and the analogies between image as "text" and writing as "graphism". Several lines of research can be considered within this framework: historicity of writing and notation; relationship between visual and virtual; image as intermediary device of the literary work; artistic-literary hybridation in contemporary narrative; writing of intimity and memory. Lastly, the activities of the group *La Europa de la Escritura* have given place to a wide number of international meetings, whose

papers have been published by editorial houses both Spanish and international. We mention here those ones celebrated in the last years and some publications:

Jornadas-homenaje a Ramón Gaya en el centenario de su nacimiento (Homage to Ramón Gaya in the Centenary of his birth) Faculty of Philosophy, 2010.

La irrupción de la imagen en la narrativa contemporánea. Imagen pictórica, fotográfica y cinematográfica (The Irruption of Image in Contemporary Narrative. Pictorial, Photographic and Cinematographic Image), Faculty of Philology, 2011.

Homenaje a Eduardo Chillida. Caminos de encuentro entre el pensamiento y el arte (Homage to Eduardo Chillida. Paths of Encounter between Thought and Art), Faculty of Philosophy, 2012.

La irrupción de la imagen en la narrativa contemporánea II. Imagen pictórica, fotográfica y cinematográfica (The Irruption of Image in Contemporary Narrative II. Pictorial, Photographic and Cinematographic Image), Faculty of Philology, 2015.

La irrupción de la imagen en la narrativa contemporánea III. Imagen fotográfica y fílmica (The Irruption of Image in Contemporary Narrative III. Photographic and Filmic Image), Faculty of Philology, 2017.

Entre escritura e imagen. Lecturas de narrativa contemporánea. Carriedo, L., Picazo, M.D. (Dir.) Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2013.

Entre escritura e imagen II. Imágenes fijas, imágenes cinéticas. Carriedo, L., Reboul, A.M., Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2018.

Ana María Leyra Soriano, Professor in Aesthetics
Faculty of Philosopy
Universidad Coplutense, Madrid

UDK: 111.852
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1901006S
Original Scientific Article
Received: 17.11.2018. Accepted: 20.01.2019.

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY
VOL. 30, NO. 1, 001-196

Julián Santos Guerrero

REPRESENTATION, REAPPROPRIATION: THE BODY OF THE IMAGE IN THE MYSTICAL TEXT OF TERESA OF AVILA

ABSTRACT
What follows is but the attempt to draw the lessons from the mystical and visionary text of Teresa of Ávila in order to consider today issues that concern us, questions that are asked of Aesthetics, and not only as theoretical discipline that theorises on the arts and considers the beautiful, but as a reflection on *aísthesis*, of sensitivity, of the sensitive edge exposed by a constituent relationship which installs the human in a world. Consideration, then, of the happening, of entering the world, creative experience. This essay seeks to consider the relationship between the image and the body via the visionary discourse of the mystics, because their writings question and lend shape to a large number of formulae of thought that can help us better understand the questions facing us today. Let us imagine that the mystics made of their body a frontier or a support where what by definition has no place could take place. Place: part of space occupied by a body (Newton), the boundary of a containing object (Aristotle). This then is what is addressed here, a question of boundaries.

KEYWORDS
Image, Body, Mystical Text, Teresa of Ávila, Limit

A poem is always a cross between body and image, between the heard, spoken word, and an imagination that represents it, a rhythm too that passes between the body and the written image, a cadence of accents and sounds, a transition fragmented into verse, broken.

The verses below have a visionary content. They were written by Teresa of Jesus, the mystical Carmelite nun who lived in Spain between her birth in 1515 and her death in 1582:

Soul, thou must seek thyself in Me
And thou must seek for Me in thee.
Such is the power of love's impress,
O soul, to grave thee on My heart,
That any craftsman must confess
He never could have the like success,
However superlative his art.
[...]
And if perchance thou knowest not
Whither to go in quest of Me,

Julián Santos Guerrero: Professor, Faculty of Philosophy, Complutense University of Madrid; jsantosg@filos.ucm.es.

Go not abroad My face to see,
Roaming about from spot to spot,
For, soul, in thee I am confined.
("Búscate en mí", *Poesías*, 4) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 1162)

For the moment I shall highlight only the spectacular play of images. Christ speaks and says to the soul: "Soul, thou must seek thyself in Me / And thou must seek for Me in thee". What follows is but the attempt to draw the lessons from a mystical and visionary text in order to consider today issues that concern us, questions that are asked of Aesthetics, and not only as theoretical discipline that theorises on the arts and considers the beautiful, but as a reflection on *aísthesis*, of sensitivity, of the sensitive edge exposed by a constituent relationship which installs the human in a world. Consideration, then, of the happening, of entering the world, creative experience.

This essay seeks to consider the relationship between the image and the body via the visionary discourse of the mystics, because their writings question and lend shape to a large number of formulae of thought that can help us better understand the questions facing us today. Let us imagine that the mystics made of their body a frontier or a support where what by definition has no place could take place. Place: part of space occupied by a body (Newton), the boundary of a containing object (Aristotle). This then is what is addressed here, a question of boundaries.

The articulation of Christianity begins with the presence of Christ, of the Messiah, of the Son of God who assumes mortal shape at a historical moment; but at the same time, that event points to an absence, that of Christ, who abandons earth after his resurrection, leaving mortal men as orphans without his body. Henceforth, the sentence "*Hoc est enim corpus meum*" turns out to be the mechanism of symbolic (and real for the believer) appropriation by means of which the Absent One is re-presented, while still maintaining a semblance of absence, an impossible appropriation that marks Christianity with the horizon of the search for a body. The chain of substitutes grows and grows, and thus "Host", "Mystical body", "Ecclesiastical body", "Doctrinal body", "Temple of the body", etc., all pursue the same goal: provide the spirit with a body. All the substitutes obey one single horizon of search.

Well, as Michel de Certeau comments:

> The production of a body plays an essential role in mystics. What is termed a rejection of the "body" of the "world", ascetic struggle, prophetic rupture, is but the necessary and preliminary elucidation of a state of affairs at which point begins the task of offering a body to the spirit. (De Certeau 1982, I: 108)

And that task begs the initial question that is the obsessions of the mystic discourse in general, and in particular of mystic discourse in the 16th century: *what is a body?*

The Question of the Body

Besides the varied, perhaps infinite possible answers to this question, it could be said that the writings of Teresa of Ávila in this respect follow two main vectors or directions. One, which sees the body as a symbolic structure that refers to an

outside oneself, another self. And two, the direction that is inward-looking. The body as support or as edge of the world where spiritual life on earth, the body that contains the soul, takes place.

1. Let us consider the first, outward, vector: the body, like nature in general, is something the origins of which are not to be found in itself; its entity is derived, secondary, and acquires ontological status insofar as it is the footprint of its creator, to which logically it must refer. However, on occasions we may neglect or even stray from that reference. Thus a body of writing exists, which evidences a clear separation between what the body is and what the body says. In the 16th century it is obvious that words are already disconnected from things.[1] This in a way is the drama experienced by the mystic: the divorce between the original and the representation, between God and the world. Hence the inconsolable nostalgia for origin and the imperious need to return there. To return is to again identify words with the world of facts, to recover the lost language that links creature with creator, image with origin. Which explains why the forms of prayer of each Teresian foundation seek to re-establish that lost order, reduce that difference.

Continuing in this direction we could call the body body-sign or body-image, which implies an ontological need (the body can only be image, derivation, shadow), and an ontic contingency (nonetheless, independent body, shadow that can no longer refer to its origin). However, the same thing that permits the schism, the wandering of images without any "correct" reference, that which permits error or fall, also makes possible return, redemption or re-appropriation, return to one's own reference.

If the body, and the world in general, is image, in other words, if it consists of an outside *itself* that renders it body-image, then that outside itself does not demand a guaranteed reference. Being an image means, then, being *an image of*, which does not mean, strictly speaking, that that of which it is an image is mentioned unequivocally. The Holy Scriptures is a body-image that speaks of God; the world or nature are too, but it is necessary however to listen, hone one's vision, learn a language to find the meaning of that reference. Otherwise, the error nested in that distance between original and representation may reveal itself. For Spanish mysticism the case of the Protestant Reformation is but an example of this. Prayer, on the other hand, is that language which teaches about differences and how to address them,[2] and the Roman Catholic Church is the only teacher.

The bond is no longer clear, in fact, it is broken, and this calls for the implementation of a complex restorative technique ranging from textual hermeneutics to the way of looking at images, engravings, paintings, or of seeing the world and

1 The reference to nominalism is essential here.

2 "Now it seems to me that, when God has brought someone to a clear knowledge of the world, and of its nature, and of the fact that another world exists, and that there is a great difference between the one and the other, the one being eternal and the other only a dream, [...] and what the Creator is and what the creature, and many other things which the Lord teaches to those who are willing to devote themselves to being taught by Him in prayer, [...] then one loves very differently from those of us who have not advanced thus far." (*Camino de perfección*, 6, 3) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 681)

acting upon it.[3] It is a question of making a "living book"[4] and of recovering lost unity. However, as there is an interval, a fracture, there is room for an entity that falsifies or mystifies the correct adaptation, a creature of deceit and inappropriate appearance: the devil.

The world and the devil constitute one and the same front. The world short-circuits the correct reference, rendering the image independent of the reference, transforming everything within it into a "dream" or a "mockery"[5], into a drifting spectacle, devoid of sense or truth. The devil meanwhile confuses the reference, puts before one's eyes what it is not, a false reference of things and images; makes the human believe via a great illusion[6] what it is not: a self-serving mockery intended to render impossible redemption, the return to the origin.

And that is where there is separation between being and saying or, put another way, between image and origin, room for loss, error, inversion, deviation, mystification or deceit. The tropic moment takes hold of that body-image in uncontrolled fashion.

In short: bodies are images of the transcendental, their meaning is outside themselves. They are as such *outside themselves*. The error is, then, to invert direction of the vector, claiming that images, shadows that are bodies, themselves have meaning; even that they are real. In other words, to err is to "dwell on them" instead of relating them to their original reality. The essence of the error is, ultimately, not correctly performing the hermeneutic transfer:

> Those whom God brings to this state are, I think, generous and royal souls; they are not content with loving anything so miserable as these bodies, however beautiful they be and however numerous the graces they possess. If the sight of the body gives them pleasure, they praise the Creator, but as for dwelling upon it for more than just a moment – no! When I use that phrase "dwelling upon it", I refer to having love for such things. If they had such love, they would think they were loving something insubstantial and were conceiving fondness for a shadow. (*Camino de perfección*, 6, 4) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 681)

Given its imaginary condition, a body is something always unresolved, a complex that keeps precisely in its necessary outside itself the very impossibility of its resolution in the present. A body is not, then, a "body present", and although it demands an outside itself, it never saturates that reference. Consequently, error is consubstantial to life, and therefore to the body; hence the permanent vigilance. Living is keeping watch: "Ya no durmáis, no durmáis, / pues que no hay paz en la tierra." (*Poesías*, 24) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 1180) She does not express the vigil in

3 "I was able to think of Christ only as man. But so it was; and I never could form any image of Him to myself, though I read much of His beauty, and looked at pictures of Him. I was like one who is blind, or in the dark, who, though speaking to a person present and feels his presence [...], does not see him." (*Libro de la Vida*, 9, 6) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 52)

4 "Our Lord said to me, 'Be not troubled; I will give thee a living book.'" (*Libro de la Vida*, 26, 6) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 170)

5 "Everything I see with my bodily eyes seems to be a dream and a mockery." (*Libro de la Vida,* 38, 6). (Ibid)

6 "He (the devil) traps us in a thousand ways." (*Las Moradas*, I, 2, 12) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 848)

search of peace on earth as the goal of mankind, rather the categorical asseveration of an impossibility: *there is no peace on earth*.

2. Let us now consider the other direction, inwards. According to Teresa the body contains a dark interior, opaque to the light of understanding. Physical intimacy is an enigma in itself. It continually surprises us because it does not allow itself to be controlled or governed in terms of any knowledge. The body is capricious, disrespectful of meaning and recalcitrant in its manoeuvres of concealment. In its opacity it eludes any formula of comprehension and, unpredictable, always keeps an insoluble conundrum in its interior. This places it, in the eyes of Teresa of Jesus, in a situation of radical mistrust. The body is not to be trusted because its desire is to free itself of the government and the ownership of the spirit (the sole sphere of ownership that is conceived). Its tendency is none other than the prevention or, even, the annihilation of all spiritual life, and with it, of all light and all truth.

This could in a strict sense be described as a "prison" body, within which is confined what is no longer a concealed meaning, hidden and awaiting revelation, but a meaninglessness, deficiency, the absolutely irreducible to terms of presence or evidence; accessible to neither senses nor intellect. In the body there is something inscrutable, and insofar as it resists and hinders any appropriation, any ownership, it assumes for Teresa the names of what is devalued, of the miasma: "rubbish", "mud"; of the opaque and stubborn resistance to light: "veil", "shadow"; or of the suffering separation from a real, eternal, true life: "irons", "place of exile", "prison", "death", etc. Body as prison and body as tomb: body as crypt, therefore.

In the Carmelite mystic's texts the body appears as something heavy that carries death within it. From this inward-looking vector, the body endures a loss and manifests an internal absence, a separation from itself and from any selfhood. Thus, a body is always a dead support, a dead person's body. According to Teresa, that renders this life a permanent mourning: "La vida terrena / es continuo duelo; / vida verdadera, / la hay sólo en el cielo." (*Poesías*, 10) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 1168)

Yet, as in the case of all mourning, the feeling of suffering is twofold: love and fear.[7] The loss of the loving object and, consequently, the desperate search for the missing loved one. The attraction to and fascination with the body and what it has of the impossible, the corporality of the body, its most secret interior, that otherness of the body: a cryptic, hidden *otherness* (*krúpto*: I hide). Love for the absent body that slides towards the body of the Other, of the great absentee: desire for body (Christianity as desire for body, for the body of the Anointed One, of the One Marked by stigma or the sign of the secret, *Christós*). The crypt indicates the place of the dead, places within reach of their impossibility, their inaccessibility. Hiding them however gives them a place, a space of secrecy and love amongst the living.

Fear too in mourning, fear of the dead, terror at the ungovernable nature of the body, torchbearer of impropriety and insecurity. Hence the dread of being infected by the miasma, by death. A crypt offers protection from the dead, from their

7 These two words are the keys that Teresa gives her nuns as laws of life: "Show us, then, O our good Master, some way in which we may live through this most dangerous warfare without frequent surprise. The best way that we can do this, daughters, is to use the love and fear given us by His Majesty." (*Camino de perfección,* 40, 1) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 798)

impurity, imprisons them, literally. The crypt is this, the place of difference, the border zone, the support of what has no place; a placelessness, a frontier before what has no place. Every crypt is a driver of fiction.

In Teresian language the fear of the body resembles fear of eternal death, of damnation and of sin, fear of being forever separated from Christ and the truth. The origin of all this is the finite body or, put another way, the finiteness of the body, its deficiency, its radical, inaccessible limitation, *the otherness of the body*. Meanwhile love is presented in the text as love of death, desire for death and, accordingly, love of bodily limitation. Love that is fascination with that otherness of the body in the body, an attraction to intimate death, to bodily collapse. In other words, desire for that limitation of the body contained in or supported by the body-crypt: "I die because I do not die." (*Poesías*, 1) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 1159)

All of this is followed by a sensation of pleasure produced by physical death which, of course, is corroborated with the amorous virtual oneness with Christ beyond earthly life. A life identified with the absence of the Absentee and which leads once it is over to the actual representation of Christ. The desire for body comes to mean this: crossing, passing the limit. And the pleasure this conveys is the pleasure of going beyond the limit, the immensity of its infinitisation, of its passage into the infinite. Pleasure of excess:

Who fears the body's death
If one then gains
A pleasure so great?

And then we read:

¡Oh yes: in living,
You forever, my God!
Longing to see you, I wish to die.
(*Poesías*, 10) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 1168–1169)

We should understand that the body-crypt, the body-support, is accompanied by the impediment to union with death; it provides a place for the dead, for the secret; but at the same time keeps it at a distance, in meaninglessness, sheltered from both sensitive appropriation and intelligible meaning. Hidden from the light of understanding, from the radiance of truth. The body is the border that impedes identitary ownership, amorous, mystical union, and also the subject's union with itself: *ego cogito*[8]. The body crypt, like the body image before, far from being a space of ownership, it is one of remoteness, of uncertainty and of alienation.[9]

8 In this respect see Derrida 1985 and Nancy 2007.

9 Thus is explained in chapter 20 of the *Libro de la Vida* the experience of "rapture": "The effects of rapture are great: one is that the mighty power of our Lord is manifested; and as we are not strong enough, when His Majesty wills it, to control either soul or body, so neither have we any power over it; but, whether we like it or not, we see that there is one mightier than we are, that these graces are His gifts, and that of ourselves we can do nothing whatever; and humility is deeply imprinted in us." (20, 7). (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 121) On this notion of the crypt effect see Derrida 1982.

The Question of the Soul

The question now is how to render liveable that mourning which is the body crypt, how to endure the mourning that is accompanied by the body support of impossibility. Well, the way in which this mourning is rendered liveable is also the way in which the mourning is rendered interminable. Rendering it liveable, bearable, is to render it interminable. The solution is the re-appropriation of the deceased, in other words, move them to the inner self, take them with you; but this time neutered of their miasmas, of their bodily characteristics. Or in other words, purify it by means of a manoeuvre of idealisation that transforms into selfhood that otherness that the limit of the body turns out to be. Ultimately: separate from it without discarding it; transform the alien into one's own death; own, in other words, *of* somebody, and governable through an ownership, by an idea.

To idealise it is to transform it into an idea, an aspect, an "interior image"; render it controllable via an ideal surrogate transparent to meaning and, thereby, eliminate its obtuse silence, its alien character, its foreignness or its impropriety. To idealise it is to take it over, neuter and swallow it or, put another way, turn it into a sacrificial offering, into the host; surrendered, then, to transformation, to "transubstantiation". This is what Christianity does with the Body of Christ, and this is how the mystic author understands the soul: the cryptic interior of the body, the crypt that, idealised now, re-appropriated, becomes invulnerable to finite time and extensive space. An interiorised image of the body, impervious still to all bodily form of the senses; but intelligible now and, in principle, transparent to the intellect.[10]

The soul is the intimate alienation of the body, the limit that the body supports and imprisons, its estrangement and its outside itself, the image that singularises it. However, that otherness, that alienation of the body which nonetheless animates and constitutes it, even though it can be neither seen nor felt, that untouchable aspect of the body, its most intimate entrails and the source therefore of its being, is no longer body, it is an "unbeing" body of the body, its alienation: it is soul. The border folded back towards the interior of the body, the limit of the inward-looking vector and also, as we shall see, of the one that looks outwards. That is the soul: pure limit, limit of the body.

In fact, in Teresa of Jesus's texts, the soul repeatedly appears as a receptacle, as a place. That is its most striking characteristic, which in *Las Moradas* is specifically referred to as "interior castle" or keeper of the secret. Thus begins the first chapter of *Las Moradas*:

> While I was begging our Lord to-day to speak for me, since I knew not what to say nor how to commence this work which obedience has laid upon me, an idea occurred to me which I will explain, and which will serve as a foundation for that I am about to write. I thought of the soul as resembling a castle, formed of a single diamond or a very transparent crystal, and containing many rooms, just as in heaven there are many mansions. (I, 1, 1) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 837)

Before analysing this paragraph in greater depth one needs to realise that the body is the outer limit of that castle and, thus it represents the interior limit of that enclosure, as limit of the limit. The process of knowledge as mystic process is an

10 On this thinking see Nancy 2003.

inward pull, which starts at that limit which is crossed. From what I have termed the "overflowing" of the crypt body. A little later in the same chapter we read that: "Todo se nos va en la grosería del engaste o cerca de este castillo, que son estos cuerpos." (*Las Moradas*, I, 1, 2) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 838)

Thus, everything that follows these first moments of Las *Moradas* occurs within the enclosure, within the soul, which in turn is inside the body. The soul is the place of the placeless, as I said, the internal limit of the edge that is the body, *the otherness* of the place in the body or, perhaps, as will be seen later, the place of the Other:

> Soul, thou must seek thyself in Me
> And thou must seek for Me in thee.

A Logic of the Limit

The soul will be the link between the two vectors of the body that we have observed; the mystic will work on the soul to adapt the original to the image and also to "clarify" the opacity of the body crypt; but will assemble within it what is excluded: mix in its interior the internal meaninglessness of the body (crypt) with its necessary reference to the other, image. Internal, secret, stubborn, mute opacity; and the deviant, errant, lost condition of the exterior image. For, having swallowed the dead, the miasma is already within. In fact, in every mansion there are "many legions of demons". (*Las Moradas*, I, 2, 12) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 847)

Ultimately, the soul is the limit of the body, its beyond or its outside itself, and the work of the mystic is a work of limits. It is therefore advisable to describe in detail its structure, continue the work of that limit which, let it be said, brings together the opposites: place of encounter but also of exclusion and loss. That work of the limit in turn governs the image and the support, the two figures of the body. After all, the castle is a specular and labyrinthine structure, a place of detour that guards an incomprehensible secret, inaccessible to all reason. Like every labyrinth, its centre is a place of passage to another order, a space of transformation:

> Although I have only mentioned seven mansions, yet each one contains many more rooms, above, below, and around it, with fair gardens, fountains, and labyrinths. (*Las Moradas*, Conclusión, 3) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 997)[11]

And elsewhere:

> in the centre, in the very midst of them all, is the principal chamber in which God and the soul hold their most secret intercourse (*Las Moradas*, I, 1, 3) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 838)

That part of the soul, its "centre and midst", is different from what at the time the mystics called the powers of the soul. That "centre" is a means of communication with the secret, it is the place of spiritual matrimony, the summit for Teresa of the entire mystic process. She calls it *spirit*, and it is the superior and most intimate part of the soul and, therefore, its limit. Moreover, it is the furthest from the body ("here there is no memory of the body") (*Las Moradas*, VII, 2, 3) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 979) and from itself: distance, extreme spacing. There the soul may "rise

11 On the labyrinth and its interpretation see Leyra 1995: 101–119.

above itself"[12], she writes. There it may overflow itself and thus render impossible self-reflection. The spirit is the name that the author gives, then, to that capacity of the soul to leave itself and to leave the body ("That little bird of the spirit seems to have escaped this misery of this flesh and prison of the body" [*Cuentas de conciencia*, 54, 9] [Teresa de Jesús 1994: 1051]), which in a sense is a form of death. A death by overflow.

Here, in the placeless place of the secret, the Teresian text becomes awkward and the difficulties of expression mount up. There are expressions such as: "Well, I do not know what I am saying", or "I know not how to say it", or "I do not know what it is called", etc; but, in any case, one has to conclude that the lack of meaning is not a shortcoming or a negativity, but the outburst of an endlessness. It is the endlessness of the limit that is unfathomable, the edge of the limit, the limitation of the limit, the limit of the limit, and therefore not the absence of limit. Rather the impossible placement of the limit, its place without a place. Also the between, the middle, the "centre and midst", "which is where the most secret things occur"; in other words, that element of the limit that cannot be appropriated in terms of one shore or the other: neither here nor there, neither exterior nor interior, neither perceptible nor intelligible. The third even that is entirely limit. What the limit has of limit, of fissure, of rupture, of discontinuity, there where there is no longer one shore nor the other: the limit of the limit.

There (if indeed it is still possible to employ these adverbs of place), the limit is fragmented, interrupted in its selfhood by a difference, and inasmuch as Teresa's text considers the limit, her very writing is governed by that difference. In taking to the limit the commonplace notions of soul, body, perceptible, intelligible, reality or illusion; in strictly considering the edges, the "overflowing" is irretrievably imposed upon the Teresian text, beyond the author's own will. An interruption, perhaps a "deconstruction", is in progress.

The soul then is fractured, broken. The soul, the limit between the here of the body and the there of the divine, is outside itself within, in its innermost inside, its deepest part, its spirit:

> there is a positive difference between the soul and the spirit, although they are one with each other. There is an extremely subtle distinction between them, so that sometimes they seem to at in a different manner from one another, as does the knowledge given to them by God. It also appears to me that the soul and its faculties are not identical (*Las Moradas*, VII, 1, 11) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 977)

Only there, in that fraction of indefinite endlessness, in the infinite expansion of the limit, can "las cosas de mucho secreto" take place, what mystic theology formalised in its own way as spiritual matrimony with Christ.[13] If we had to formalise

12 "I have often wondered whether, just as the sun does not leave its place in the heavens yet its rays have power to reach the earth instantaneously, so the soul and the spirit, which make one and the same thing, may, while remaining in its own place, through the strength of the warmth coming to it through the true Sun of Justice, send up some higher part of it above itself. Well, I know not of what I speak." (*Las Moradas*, VII, 6, 9) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 938)

13 "The soul, I mean the spirit of this soul, is made one with God." It is the closest to God because he too is spirit: ("Who is Himself a spirit, and Who has been pleased to show certain persons how far His love for us extends." (*Las Moradas*, VII, 2, 3) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 979)

this operation of fragmenting the limit, of infinitisation of the *finis*, we would perhaps have to resort to the mathematical concept of fractal, that is, those virtual geometric shapes finite in surface but containing an infinite number of elements.

Support of the Union

We have not left the body; we have merely continued on its journey to the limit. And we have not left, because the interior of the body already contains an outside itself. Body is contamination by the other, by the otherness, the place of the other as outside of me, of all of me, internal fracture that, nevertheless, is promised to endlessness. Strictly speaking, a body is always on its way, never finished, ended and, precisely due to its limitation, its status as limit. ("Soul, thou must seek thyself in Me, and thou must seek for Me in thee").

By recourse to vectors I have sought to avoid a definition of the body, and have done so because, in this case of the body a definition that delineated the limits or the boundaries of the object defined would not give an account of that "going beyond" which is the body. Consequently, indefinable in the strict sense of the word, it gives rise to the clearest form of definition, the expression of its external limit: *the body is image and, precisely due to its finitude, supports an infinitude.* Its finitude overflows,[14] and the challenge when considering the body lies in thinking of that limit as the overflowing itself, as indefinition. From this perspective, terms like vector, *traction*, *relation* or *direction* lead to better comprehension of the subject that has brought us here and permit a more thorough treatment of the network of nomenclatures that abound in visionary scripts, namely: transfer, conveyance, detachment, flight, rapture, momentum, outburst, touch, whistle, silence, suspension, etc. By means of these, the mystical text describes and qualifies those ways of working with the limit of the body which are the forms of prayer. It is clear that the body is not regarded as a substance, but as a route of passage, a transit, not only from one life to the other, not only between here and there, but as a spacing that operates by crossing, through the workings of the limit or of the difference.

The driving force behind mystical-visionary writing is always that crossing (transfer, be transferred, etc.). This composes a scene of the body that acts in writing as *ex-perience*. She does not write, says the author, if it is not from experience, from crossing the limit, *ex-peri*, that the writing itself drives, writing *of* the mystical experience.

All asceticism, and there is no doubt that this is what writing is for her (hence her continual complaints about work, pain in the body or the head and constant recourse to the obedience to which she refers so often in her writings), is directed towards producing a body capable of enduring what is unbearable, the presence of the Absentee: body of writing, religious body or order, fleshly body. A body capable of enduring the absolute heterogeneity of the body, body-image of Christ, temple-crypt of Christ. Only thus can the body attain ownership, only thus is knowledge of the body, its crossing also experienced. And thus, irretrievably, the body is shed, because disappropriation is the condition of the body-limit. Let us be clear: the soul is the *ex-perience* of the body.

14 For more detailed development of this reasoning see Nancy 2002.

The task of the mystic is to join at the limit, in the soul, those two vectors that I have described, the body-image, the body outside of which is itself as a mere shadow given to the other; and the body-crypt, which guards within an inscrutable secret. She wants to identify the definition, the *finis*, with endless, with the bottomless or, put another way, identify the image with the support. The mystic seeks to construct a body that is at the same time the faithful image of divinity (so faithful that it identifies with the latter), hence her desire to live an earthly lifer whose model is evangelical Christ and, in the same body, be the mansion of God, receptacle of the infinite, host, living tabernacle.

This identification involves the soul, involves, therefore, the work of difference. She is at one and the same time "image" of God and "interior castle" for Him. Within her takes place the union with God; within her the support is identified with the image, because she is pure limit: finitude, edge, and image; and at the same time infinitude, absolute receptacle. The dual face of the limit. What happens is that when the mechanism of identity is set in motion, the endless mechanism of the identical, of the footprint, of the image, this does not work without the impossibility of the mechanism, without the conditionless infinitude of the support (other philosophers would call it destiny, "sky of destiny", says the Nietzsche of Zaratustra), without the expansion of that otherness that expands to the edge, a structural interruption in every form of system or order.

Understandably, when support and image are identified with one another in the soul, the inversion is absolute, if God is support, the soul is image, if God is the image, and the soul is support. Well, this "infinite" inversion, this endlessness of images, can only be considered from a distance, across an unbridgeable space, via an impossible unity, work of difference which leads the mystic to say at the end of the seventh *Las Moradas*, even after the spiritual marriage: "siempre se ha de vivir con temor" (VII, 3, 13) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 988), because there is always a maybe, an indetermination a "podrá tornar la guerra primera, si nos apartamos de Dios". This, which has been understood as self-censorship or excessive distrust, even as doctrinal disobedience, is no more than the most exhaustive thoroughness: work of difference. We could call such a special inversion the emotional catastrophe:

> Soul, thou must seek thyself in Me
> And thou must seek for Me in thee.

The Soul's Catastrophe

When the reading of the Teresian texts appears to be leading to a final reference beyond representations, when as readers fascinated by that final presentation, by that apocalypse finally revealed, we expect to encounter an ultimate substance, support of ownership whose relationship with the image is unequivocal, it turns out that we find another detour. We had been warned, because we have seen that there can be no limit without overflow. And so, the absolute reference, which seemed to be that Christ within the soul, turns out to be the same image, the image of "our soul", image of image whose selfhood involves the other.

We read in chapter two of the seventh *Moradas* in reference to a mirror in which only sin prevents us from seeing ourselves:

> It is we who fail by not disposing ourselves fitly, nor removing all that can obstruct this light, so that we do not behold ourselves in this mirror wherein our image is engraved. (VII, 2, 8) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 981–982)

To which mirror does she refer? This is really no more than the development of what she had written in chapter 40 of the *Libro de la vida*:

> Once, when I was with the whole community reciting the Office, my soul became suddenly recollected, and seemed to me all bright as a mirror, clear behind, sideways, upwards, and downwards; and in the centre of it I saw Christ our Lord, as I usually see Him. It seemed to me that I saw Him distinctly in every part of my soul, as in a mirror, and at the same time the mirror was all sculptured – I cannot explain it – in our Lord Himself by a most loving communication which I can never describe. (40, 5) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 296)

And later:

> Let us suppose Divinity to be a most brilliant diamond, much larger than the whole world, or a mirror like that to which I compared the soul in a former vision, only in a way so high that I cannot possibly describe it; and that all our actions are seen in that diamond, which is of such dimensions as to include everything, because nothing can be beyond it. (40, 10) (Teresa de Jesús 1994: 298)

Christ is the mirror that reflects the soul and in the soul is reflected Christ. We perceive a double mirroring, a mirror facing another mirror. The interior is but the reflected exterior that it is but the reflected interior. Here the image is no longer the representation of a body, but the image of another image. It is what we might call the infinite reflection of the image or the catastrophe of the image, its permanent inversion that renders each an image of the image, let us recall: "nada hay que salga fuera de esta grandeza". What is stated here with astonishing clarity is the closure of the imaginary space: there is only image, and no longer representation understood as unnecessary duplication that takes place in an imaginary or representational space, representation of what its own self has in another real space, autonomous and independent of the representation, original, one could say.

This closure signifies that the image has been freed of any reference that is not in turn image that is not included in the imaginary space. Strictly speaking, this is an "atheism of the image" (Deleuze 2002: 18), since none refers to a particular meaning beyond representation. Yet, by the same token, neither does there exist an image that is not broken beforehand, that is not an image by virtue of a fragmentation or an internal interruption which, just as it imposes upon it repetition (every image is repeatable), denies it identification with itself, interrupting the order of the finite, of the limited of the image. The imaginary space is fractured or, in other words: there is but image; but not *the* image as such. In each image there is more than one image and, of course, a beyond the imaginary. The imaginary space is interrupted, contains a beyond the imaginable: literally an *unimaginable*.

> Such is the power of love's impress,
> O soul, to grave thee on My heart,
> That any craftsman must confess
> He never could have the like success,
> However superlative his art.

The body support, the pure support, ownership, the body of the image, is unimaginable, and the image is the infinite reflection of the body, its intimacy crossed, an outward crossing of which it is composed. Thus, the image does not have its own meaning, not even that of its support, because at its limit it reveals but the infinity of the body: always of this particular body. The image exposes the most intimate part of the body, its constitutive impropriety. The image, as I said, is the catastrophe of the body and not its representation, in any case the presentation of the unimaginable of the body. Seen in this light, every body is an imagined body, especially for itself.

References:

De Certeau, Michel (1982), *La Fable Mystique*, Vol. I. Paris: Gallimard.
Deleuze, Gilles (2002), *Francis Bacon. Logique de la sensation*, Paris: Editions du Seuil.
Derrida, Jacques (1985), *La voz y el fenómeno*, P. Peñalver (trans.), Valencia: Pre-textos.
–. (1982), *L'oreille de l'autre, otobiographies, transferts, traductions: textes et débats* (avec C. Lévesque et C. McDonald), Montréal: vlb Editeur.
Leyra, Ana María (1995), *Poética y transfilosofía*, Madrid: Fundamentos.
Nancy, Jean-Luc (2007), *Ego sum*, J. C. Moreno Romo (trans.), Barcelona: Anthropos.
–. (2003), *Corpus*, P. Bulnes (trans.), Madrid: Arena Libros.
–. (2002), *Un pensamiento finito*, J. C. Moreno Romo (trans.), Barcelona: Anthropos.
Teresa de Jesús (1994), *Obras Completas*. Madrid: Editorial de Espiritualidad.

Hulijan Santos Gerero

Reprezentacija, reaproprijacija: telo slike u mističkom tekstu Tereze Avilske

Apstrakt

Ono što sledi samo je pokušaj da se izvuku lekcije iz mističkih i vizionarskih tekstova Tereze Avilske, kako bi se danas razmotrili problemi koji nas interesuju, pitanja koja se postavljaju pred estetiku, ali ne tek kao pred teorijsku disciplinu koja teoretiše o umetnostima i razmatra lepo, već kao refleksiju o *áisthesis*, čulnosti, čulnom rubu koji je izložen kroz konstitutivni odnos kojim je čovek postavljen u svet. Prema tome, razmatranje o događaju, ulasku u svet, kreativnom iskustvu. Ovaj esej nastoji da razmotri odnos između slike i tela kroz vizionarske diskurse mistika, jer njihovi spisi propituju i daju oblik velikom broju misaonih formula koje mogu da nam pomognu da bolje razumemo pitanja sa kojima se danas suočavamo. Zamislimo da su mistici od svog tela načinili granicu ili oslonac na kojima se ono što po definiciji nema mesto događa. Mesto: deo prostora koji zauzima telo (Njutn), granica sadržanog tela (Aristotel). To je, dakle, ono o čemu se ovde govori, pitanje granica.

Ključne reči: slika, telo, mistički tekst, Tereza Avilska, granica

UDK: 7.01:111.852
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1901019L
Original Scientific Article
Received: 14.11.2018. Accepted: 15.01.2019.

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY
VOL. 30, NO. 1, 001-196

Ana María Leyra Soriano

MAKING IMAGES TALK: PICASSO'S *MINOTAUROMACHY*

ABSTRACT

We can say that Picasso's images speak to us, and, as writing, speak to us from that space in which any text – far from being reduced to a single sense – "disseminates" its "truths". Using the figure and the story of the Minotaur, Picasso devoted himself to one of the great themes of his pictorial work. The word "labyrinth" connotes, to the European mind, Greece, Knossos, Dedalus, Ariadne and the Minotaur. However, the Greek formula already represents a mythic and poetic outcome thoroughly developed from an imagery forged in the remotest eras of our evolution. The relationship between the image, the spiral, and the word, labyrinth is also linked to the perception of a drilled earth, excavated, with numberless tortuous tunnels which, in our imagination, provoke concern because they lead to the world of the *inferi*, the unknown depths of the realms of the dead. Juan Larrea, a little-known essayist in the sphere of philosophical studies, although, from the outset of international renown for Picasso's work, he gives what is perhaps the best interpretation of *Guernica* and consequently also sheds much light on the engravings immediately preceding the execution of this painting, the *Minotauromachy* among them. The artist is not a prophet. He is not foreseeing what the future holds for humanity, but he does possess a heightened sensitivity that drives him to minutely scrutinise the conditions of the time that he has had to live, and he has a transforming eye for the symbols that constitute the deepest threads in the fabric of his culture.

KEYWORDS

Labyrinth, Archetypes, Spanish Civil War, *Minotauromachy*, *Guernica*, Aesthetics.

In Plato, the images and writing are silent. They do not answer our questions. But we now know that the images and writing can talk, and that an approach to them consists above all in "allowing for a reading". This border area which, in Plato, makes artistic images and writing a *phármakon*, simultaneously a toxin and a cure, in these latter days enjoys its own ontological status: the image remains just an image and its effectiveness does not lie in representing something or somebody. As a result, the image has to be taken and assessed on its own basis. It is in this sense we can say that Picasso's images speak to us, and, as writing speaks to us from that space in which any text – far from being reduced to a single sense – "disseminates" its "truths", what is shown by means of images likewise gives rise to multiple possibilities of sense and interpretation. Our purpose consequently consists of giving voice to one of the most interesting series of engravings in Picasso's iconography, the *Minotauromachy*, and delving deeper into the meaning that the mythical image

Ana María Leyra Soriano: Professor, Faculty of Philosophy, Complutense University of Madrid; aleyra@filos.ucm.es.

of the Minotaur held – not only for the painter, but also for his era, the first half of the century elapsed, as well as for European culture down to our days.

When Picasso made his first engraving in Barcelona in 1899, he was nineteen years old. The engraving is a small print depicting the figure of a *picador*, the man charged with executing one of the lances in a bullfight. The image depicts his outline carrying an implement, the pike held in his left hand, by which he is known as "*El zurdo*" (the left-handed one). This name is printed on the only proof of his figure known and has been said to have been placed there by Picasso himself. In some cases, it has been thought that the reason for the name related to the way the image appears, holding the pike in his left hand, but majority of art critics presume it more likely that the picador was indeed left-handed and that Picasso drew him as he was. Picasso began his career as an engraver at the onset of the twentieth century and would continue to produce engravings up to some months before his death, when he exhibited a series of a hundred and fifty-seven of them at the Leiris gallery.

His interest in the figure of the Minotaur began in Picasso when Skira founded the magazine, *Minotaure*, in the circle of surrealists. In this context, and given these relationships, Picasso created a Minotaur for the first magazine cover, plus eleven engravings between 17 May and 18 June 1933. In all these drawings, the formal language is classical. After 1933 he continued to be interested in making works with mythological figures: centaurs, minotaurs, fauns. Spanish art critic and scholar Palau i Fabre defines them as products of his imagination because, as in Greece, they fulfilled a need to express intimate aspects of the human being, in this case the Picasso human being (Palau i Fabre 1968: 53). In 1933, Picasso was fifty-two, at a complicated time in his life. He met Marie Thérèse Walter, who gave him a daughter, Maya, in 1935. This was the period of the *Sculptor and Model* engravings and he had been doing works commissioned by Vollard, the collector with whom he worked. The entire set would come to be known as the *Vollard Suite*. The works chosen by Vollard number a hundred; a part of them revolves around the *Sculptor and Model* theme and another part around the theme of bulls and the Minotaur... blind, beaten, winged, dying, playing or raping. Using the figure and the story of the Minotaur, Picasso devoted himself to one of the great themes of his pictorial work. A drawing from as early as 27 March 1928 represents a bull-man, and we have fifteen engravings of the Minotaur and the blind minotaur. One of the last aquatints included in the series by Vollard is the *Faun Unveiling a Woman*. In 1935, he executed an etching, the *Minotauromachy*, of which we know five proofs serving to track the development of the creative process, throughout which the artist progressively introduces nuances. In studying the history of engraving, we find no artist as prolific in number, technical richness and theme as Picasso. Over two thousand prints of his have been catalogued and, in the opinion of experts, we can rate them as high as to degree of perfection as those of Dürer, Rembrandt, Piranesi or Goya. It may thus be concluded that Picasso is undeniably the artist of greatest importance in twentieth-century engraving.

He also illustrated texts, but the value of his works and achievements are at the same level in text illustrations such as Ovid's *Metamorphosis* or Balzac's *Unknown Masterpiece* as in his stand-alone prints, the themes of which correspond to given moments in his own personal interests and inspiration. He keeps investigating,

experimenting, although he may not have considered his works as results of experimentation because he always said, *when the things I wanted to represent required another form of expression, I never hesitated to appropriate it. I have never rehearsed or experimented. Whenever I wanted to say something, I have done so in the manner I felt it should be said* (Pablo Picasso 1974). Picasso was always open to new trials using new textures and new elements; the process of searching was of more interest to him than what he might find in the end.

The engravings he made commissioned by Vollard represent a decisive step in his pictorial iconography. His interests progress from the image of the *Painter and Model* to that of the *Sculptor and Model*. Picasso learned with every step he took. Sometimes he worked with lines; at others, he used more pictorial techniques, such as black etching or the sugar-lift aquatint process he was taught by Roger Lacourière, one of the most outstanding French engravers at the time. Lacourrière went to both Picasso's studio in Paris and to his home on the Côte d'Azure. While working on the *Minotauromachy*, Picasso practically stopped painting. This is a large etching with scrapings, the existence of which we know from five artist's proofs, on the basis of which we are able to study the changes he introduced into the artwork. In the first proofs, the space is divided into two halves, and in the last proofs the final result is the unification of the space. The blacks heighten the night-time atmosphere of the work. The outcome of all the work on the *Minotauromachy* is that it practically enables us to follow the entire creative process step by step up to the final state. However, the evolution of his techniques is not the aspect that will engage our greatest interest in this work (Balada 1982).

A point of maximum interest in the *Vollard Suite* is represented by four works executed from September to November 1934, in which the character of the Minotaur reappears in the form of the Blind Minotaur. The monster here is a pained creature, much less threatening, even deserving of compassion and support. The novel idea it poses is the relationship between the little girl and the Minotaur, the woman and the horse. As though Picasso's preoccupation at the time lay in the relationship between rationality and irrationality, instinct and sexuality, or the hybrid nature of the human being as beast and man at once. As did the painter Goya, who portrayed the family of Charles IV without a shred of pity as to the plainness of king and court, all the while respecting the beauty and candour of infancy in the children, Picasso, by including children's figures in his series, seems to point at our aspiration to tame those facets where blind and brutal nature bows before innocence and beauty.

Upon the outbreak of the Civil War, Picasso executes two etchings in which he sequentially describes the campaigns of a being, at once monstrous and ridiculous, producing a kind of comic about the Spanish tragedy that combines the grotesque features of a dictatorial figure, Francisco Franco, in his brutality. We perceive in this period that there is a strong influence of engraving on painting; to be specific, of these series in relation to the *Guernica*. From this time onward, Picasso commits himself politically, and after the Second World War, joins the Communist Party and collaborates with his work in international movements. In 1949, the poet Aragón chooses one of his works – the lithograph of a softly-plumed white dove executed in Paris – which becomes the poster announcing the first of several peace conferences.

Interpreting, Dreaming and Creating: The Figure of the Minotaur in Picasso's Engravings

The name Minotaur was given to a monster with the head of a bull and the body of a man. His real name was Asterio or Asterion. He was the son of Pasiphaë, the wife of Minos, and a handsome bull that Poseidon, god of the sea, had sent as a gift to Minos, as king of Crete. The bull from Poseidon was so princely that Minos did not send it to be sacrificed but kept it among his herds; but Pasiphaë fell in love with it, and from this unnatural union was born the Minotaur. So that the monster's existence would not put him to shame, king Minos ordered a palace to be built, the intricate halls of which would hold the strange creature within. Daedalus, a great architect who lived in court, took charge of constructing a palace, which was called the *Labyrinth*. The word "labyrinth", according to some interpretations, comes from the root *labrys*, the double-axe, and *labyrinth* meant "the palace of the double-axe". It seems that the word and the utensil originate from the works in the mines, from among the instruments that drilled into the earth and filled it with underground galleries, through which it was authentically hard to find one's way. This image of the Labyrinth is contained in the way that the labyrinthine form has been conceived throughout the ages. On another hand, the *labrys* – the two-sided axe – from the most remote ages of prehistory, has been a ritual symbol that mythologies give different interpretations for, one of them being the unified representation of the male and the female as vital principles. As a result, images of the two-sided axe appear in very numerous representations.

Every nine years, the city sent seven youths and seven maidens to the heart of the Labyrinth to be given over to the Minotaur. Theseus, one of the many heroes whose adventures are narrated in the myths, mingled with the youths and, helped by a ball of string that Ariadne had given him, was able to find his way out from the centre of the Labyrinth and return, after defeating and killing the Minotaur.

According to the anthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan, we can find traces attesting to the evolution of human imagery in man's vestiges. From his point of view, the decisive factor characterising human action is the domestication of time and space. What, then, do we mean in speaking of domesticating time and space? First of all, that the world is perceived in two ways. One way is dynamic, and consists of exploring space while being aware of it, actively experiencing it through exploration and discovery – this dynamic exploration provides us with an image of the world based on an itinerary. Land animals share this with humans. It involves a route engaging muscular and olfactory capabilities. The other, static way, is what enables us, through immobility, to reconstruct a space of circles using ourselves as a starting point up to the limits of the unknown; to combine the images of two opposing surfaces – heaven and earth, which meet at the horizon – and, moreover, to organise this by means of a vertical line or axis. This vision, produced by the second, static way, is radial, circular; we share it with birds and it is associated to a highly-developed vision (Leroi-Gourhan 1972: II, 157).

These two modalities coexist and are interrelated in human beings. We find their vestiges wherever human evolutionary development has left its imprint. Communities of hunters and food-gatherers created mythologies populated by itinerant routes. This is how the travelling paths of the stars have fed the images of myth,

from the mythography of the travelling sun in Val Camonica to the descriptions of the sun in its nocturnal journey to the realms of the dead. On another hand, the stories of civilising heroes – none other than the commanders and organisers of the world – also show that basic structure, mapping out a path where deeds happen, one after the other.

In analysing prehistoric myth – the oral context of which we have lost and thus cannot fully understand– in the images of Altamira or Lascaux, for instance, we find figures organised in a linear manner, appearing repeatedly. We are thus shown the model of a world-view representing an impression of itinerant space. At first, the images from prehistoric caverns were considered arbitrarily arranged, without logical order. We now know this is not the case, and that such arrangements accord with a path, an itinerary, a layout that establishes a kind of "journey" from the outside of the cave to the inside, through its twists and turns. It was therefore the impression of the nomad that configured all images of paths, wanderings and journeys since the dawn of humanity.

In contrast, radial space yields the typical model originating from the sedentary farmer who constructs a circular world around the walls of his granary. In the world of the origins, Paradise is thus shaped as a space situated at the foot of a mountain, between rivers, where grows a tree of knowledge – the world axis and the link between the two spheres, terrestrial and celestial. In it, things exist after having been named by man, after having been fixed and made stable, subject to space and time, situated between an eminently genesis before and after. This is the space that favours the shaping of the origins. The hunter-nomad has become a farmer, foresighted and sedentary; he has known the future apart from the past without a time and the immediate present. Both linear-erratic nomadic imagery on the one hand and circular-temporal sedentary imagery on the other express the stages of a human spatial and temporal appropriation in relation to the elements. Consequently, we can affirm today that what Jungian terminology would refer to as archetypes were formulated in this way, understanding an archetype to be, not a single image, but a series of images summing up the ancestral experience of human beings in the face of typical situations; i.e., in circumstances not specific to single individuals, but that may come to be imposed on each and every individual, widely shared. It is from this perspective that we propose to remark on some aspects of the spiral form as an archetypal image of the labyrinthine path.

Any catalogue of rock art will provide us with abundant illustrations of a widespread form, the spiral. Prodigally used as an element for ornamentation, the spiral form triggers the type of dynamic association that generally transmits the idea of movement, displacement, along with a sensation of what is tortuous, not straight, and therefore folded inwards or entangled.

Karoly Kérenyi studied these kinds of representations seen in rock art and preserved at later times in European art, both Mediterranean and Nordic, relating them to tablets from the Babylonian culture on which spiral representations appear. Some show inscriptions; others have none at all (Kérenyi 1984: 45). The inscriptions revealed that the spiral forms represented entrails – to be specific, intestines of animals sacrificed for purposes of divination. Archives of entrails were thus discovered, the representation of which took the prototypal form of the spiral. Some of the inscriptions refer to a certain "palace of entrails" *êkal tirani*, alluding

to a mythological realm of the dead, an underworld or world of *inferi*. We are thus confronted by the fact that a form that is, in principle, silent – the simple drawing of a spiral – provokes in the human beings contemplating it an empathic reaction, a projection of emotional contents conferring life to inert forms, and granting them the possibility of conveying several ideas:

- In the first place, the idea of movement. The idea of an itinerary that is not linear, moving from one point to another, but a tortuous path with no exits, moving in spirals and, in principle – albeit not always – moving downwards.
- The idea that this path, like the entrails of an animal or human being, may evoke the passage of food from the mouth up to its transformation into waste may also call up a similarity with life as a passage from birth to death, up to transformation into mortal remains.
- The spiral thus acquires the sense of a schematic image of the labyrinth as a symbol for human existence. The path it represents is a closed map, from birth to death, with a set, implacable origin and destination.

Certainly, the word "labyrinth" connotes, to the European mind, Greece, Knossos, Dedalus, Ariadne and the Minotaur. However, the Greek formula already represents a mythic and poetic outcome thoroughly developed from an imagery forged in the remotest eras of our evolution. The relationship between the image, the spiral, and the word, labyrinth, is also linked to the perception of a drilled earth, excavated, with numberless tortuous tunnels which, in our imagination, provoke concern because they lead to the world of the *inferi*, the unknown depths of the realms of the dead. Thus, we see how the image of the labyrinth, in its most schematic form as a spiral, relates to a type of path associated to distant experiences of anxiety at loss, the feeling of "being lost", and, finally, the sensation of life as an experience "with no exit" or "with no other exit" than that which death provides towards a "beyond", "another world", or however we want to call it, though it be certainly not experienced and therefore unknown.

Theseus defeats the Minotaur thanks to a ball of string that Ariadne gives him, and through this stratagem manages to return and leave the island. From here on, we shall resort to a philosopher-ball-of-string, Gaston Bachelard, to serve as a guide through the twists and turns of Picasso's labyrinth. There is no need to say we agree on the fact that the images Picasso devotes to the figure of the Minotaur, the way he presents it, the different scenarios in which he turns it into a protagonist or a companion, belong to the personal imagery of the painter. Were Picasso before us, we could certainly interrogate him, and perhaps he would answer or perhaps no, because not even he himself would know how to clearly respond to the question about his remotest concerns. The fact that an artist may not explain his work , does not justify that we do not want to question ourselves about it. To ask questions and to try to answer them is, in my opinion, the cornerstone of the communicative element that is the artwork, because the artwork is, above all, communication, the means through which we leave our closed individual world and participate in the world of others, share something in common. This entails acknowledging in this manner the socialising value of art, its power to break the individual's isolation and situate him in relation to others.

It is in this sense that the words of the philosopher Bachelard become revealing. He tells us that he claims "the right to dream", but what does exercising "the right to dream" mean to us? Bachelard explains this briefly and directly by describing himself not as a busy philosopher but as a dreamer, or even better: as a thinker who grants himself the right to dream. Consequently, this entails acknowledging the exercise of thought, referring in this case to images more as a creative process, in which the creative imagination puts us in touch with an entire universe of collective archetypes, of originary certainties in which myth speaks to us about ourselves, than as a detective's task in which investigations and, afterwards, incontrovertible proof, can lead to the demonstration of truth. With Picasso's images and his Minotaur, we venture into an interpretative game in which the artist himself imposes the rules enabling us to enter with him into his innumerable labyrinths in order to share them.

Gaston Bachelard broadly analyses the image of the labyrinth based on what he called images of *la terre et les reveries du repos*. There he characterises the labyrinthine path as a path on which sensations of angst and narrow spaces hard to find a way out from, along with an added and very palpable anxiety on feeling lost, are always provoked. This is not an anxiety about loss, but a reflex angst, an angst directly befalling the trapped and disoriented subject:

> In our night-time dreams [he says] we unconsciously represent the life of our travelling ancestors. It has been said that, in man, "everything is a road"; if referring to the most distant of the archetypes, we must add: in man, everything is a lost road. Systematically applying the feeling of being lost to all unconscious wandering is rediscovering the labyrinth as an archetype. (Bachelard 1948: 213)

Backtracking to the ancestral inception of our imagery, the images and metaphors with which art peoples its most diverse manifestations find in the labyrinthine the most straightforward model for expressing the emotional atmosphere of angst in the face of total disorientation. There is no road less known than the mysterious path of our existence, and at the same time, no certainty more frightening than the known end of the path, death, and the unknown beyond that awaits us.

Who is this character, half-human, half-beast, who evokes his lair, his house, his labyrinths in the images of Picasso? It is in that Minotaur, lubricious, pleasure-loving, threatening at times and helpless at others, that the artist portrays himself, and us along with him. We are all, in moments of contemplation, at once weak beings and threatening beasts. We all feel lost and seek someone to guide us, who can lavish sweetness and consolation upon us when we are as lost along the way as Picasso's Minotaur. We are all alone and at the same time accompanied and observed from windows as in the *Minotauromachy*. And that sinuous, labyrinthine road on which the Minotaur, lost and blind, seeks guidance, assistance, is shown to us as a climb, an ascent, a human effort – here and there are men and women. Loss also leads us to a universal aspiration: towards ascent, the rising movement, the climb by means of the ladder. Night and the stars shape the background in which this aspiration appears.

There are, in addition, a series of drawings in which Picasso shows us the figure of the blind Minotaur being led by a little girl. Sometimes his figure is silhouetted against a starry night sky to which he turns, as though trying to see them. A blind

Minotaur seeing the stars? We could not be more concise; this could not be stated more directly. The *Blind Minotaur* dates from 1934. A few years later, in 1939, the great Spanish playwright and Cervantes Awardee, Buero Vallejo, wrote his play *In the Burning Darkness*, where he expresses a similar desire in words. The action takes place in an inpatient facility for the blind, where we find the quotation:

> And now the stars are shining, [...] Those distant worlds [...] within reach of our sight, if we had it. (Buero Vallejo 1994:126)

For Buero Vallejo, the finite human being aspires for the impossible. For Picasso, the *Blind Minotaur* series and the *Minotauromachy* itself also express a painful reality: they show the limitations of the human being as well as an impossible aspiration: to reach the light, despite blindness, and here the little girl carries a light, a guide for the weak and monstrous Minotaur. The times set the stage for both minds, since the war of Spain marked both artists: Picasso, exiled in France, and Buero Vallejo, sentenced to die in a Spanish prison. It is not a coincidence that a similar aspiration is couched in terms that are also similar; in Buero Vallejo, a playwright who wanted to be a painter, and in Picasso, a painter who was so and had always wanted to be so, as in both of them reappears the ancestral motif of the human tragedy that the myth of Oedipus Rex illustrates. Oedipus also wants to know, wants to see and be seen, desires the light of knowledge; he who sees that he is blind and that only on blinding himself can he come to see himself and perceive the human being. This Oedipus, a conqueror of monsters like the Sphinx, from the beginnings of our western culture, has been the embodiment of our intimate conflicts as human beings. Violence, the light of knowledge, the desire to see and to know... And Picasso perceives this all too well: in that last engraving, the Minotaur is the Sphinx; it is the mystery, it is time, it is the threat of time that we delude ourselves into believing we have defeated. The Sphinx in Greece was a monster attributed the face of a woman, the body of a lion and the wings of a bird of prey. The Oedipus story recounts that it asked all wayfarers for the animal that walked on four feet first, then on two, and lastly on three. When the person asked did not know the answer, it cast him into a ravine. Only Oedipus on his way to Thebes knew the answer: man. The monster symbolically represented time. But on this occasion, in the image of that Minotaur-Sphinx recreated, what Picasso shows us is a mirror-image: the face of the Sphinx is now no longer a woman's face, but has been substituted here by a humanised Minotaur turned into a new archetype, at once beast and human. The painter portrays himself and represents everybody. The mystery now continues to be time, but not just time; the mystery on this occasion is, in addition, man himself. The eyes of the Minotaur see through time.

Juan Larrea: Guernica and Picasso's Dove

We have been establishing an entire series of relationships between the images that appear in the *Minotauromachy* and the constellations of symbols that, in some way, can help us understand the depth and projection of the work of this exceptional artist. Our attempt is, to a certain point, legitimised when we approach works about Picasso's *Guernica* as fascinating as those done by his friend and compatriot,

Juan Larrea (Bilbao 1895 – Cordoba, Argentina 1980). A poet and essayist, Larrea was one of the many intellectuals forced into exile after the dramatic event of the Spanish Civil War and the long period of dictatorship that followed it. Very early in 1921 onward, he participated in cultural tasks as Secretary of the National Historical Archive of Madrid, Secretary to a cultural relations delegation under the Spanish Embassy in Paris, and, in 1937, creator of the Indies Museum and Library in the University City of Madrid. Once he was established in Paris, the city to which he had travelled in 1926 to join the poets Vicente Huidobro and César Vallejo, in 1937 he began a close friendship with Pablo Picasso, to the point of publishing an album of etchings, *The Dream and Lie of Franco*, and accompanying Picasso from day to day as he painted *Guernica*. Juan Larrea is a little-known essayist in the sphere of philosophical studies, although, from the outset of international renown for Picasso's work, he gives what is perhaps the best interpretation of *Guernica* and consequently also sheds much light on the engravings immediately preceding the execution of this painting, the *Minotauromachy* among them.

> Only in a restricted sense [Juan Larrea tells us] can the studies for *Guernica* be understood to have begun on 1 May 1937. In a broader sense of the truth, it would be more fitting to sustain that Picasso's entire oeuvre constitutes a succession of trials, diagrams and spectrographs, the general justification for which lies in this portentous enigma. [...] Even in the event that one would wish to see in this painting a premonition of the contemporary cataclysm, it must be admitted that such cataclysm had been in gestation in the painter's innermost self since his younger periods. [...] On another hand, he is credited with works of calmer pathos, albeit extremely close to *Guernica* in their representation, above all that incomparable *Minotauromachy*, where more or less the same elements abound: the convulsive horse; the bull; the four women, one of them bare-breasted; the man; the light; the sword; the dove; and even the flower, here represented by a peaceful olive branch that has sprouted from the hand that wields the broken sword ... The similarity is so profound that *Guernica* could never reasonably be understood as this same painting in black and white without that reference point. (Larrea 1977: 30)

For Juan Larrea, the day on which the small town of Guernica in the Basque Country was bombarded provoked astonishment and shock all over the civilised world, and the appearance of the painting by Picasso turned *Guernica* into the most European of all the paintings that were known. Because what occurred in the town of Guernica in Spain, caused by the Nazi Luftwaffe, was the prelude to the horror and devastation that was to take place very soon after in Europe, with the entire extent of the European continent a desert of ruins. Still, the painting does not only speak of Spain; it not only expresses feeling for the ruins and the pain of war, firstly in Spain and afterwards in Europe. According to Larrea's interpretation, *Guernica* is a picture of crisis, a deep spiritual and social crisis, in the images of which the painter portrays the end of a cycle, the end of a time, and glimpses in its background an Apocalypse by which the European cultural universe – that which, since its origins, had laid the foundations for its symbols – disappears. If, at a remote moment in history, Europe had stood up to Asia in sphere of influence and as a land of aspirations, the appearance of *Guernica* points to a new land and to the end of a bleeding Europe, auguring the beginnings of a time when the west, open to an ocean leading to new lands and new continents, had already signalled the beginning of a new cycle.

One last symbol remains for analysis. This is the dove, a symbol we find in many of Picasso's works. When remarking on the frequent appearance of the dove in the works of the painter, Larrea provides us with an interpretation full of spirituality:

> the statement "I am the Alpha and the Omega" alludes mystically to the Spirit. [...] The reason, doubtless taken from certain Gnostics, is that in the Greek numeration system, the letters alpha and omega add up to eight hundred and one, which is the same that the letters of the word *peristerá*, meaning "dove" in Greek. (Larrea 1977: 94)

The dove, which is present in the *Minotauromachy* and in *Guernica*, the painting that the former precedes the closest according to Larrea, is not merely a symbol of peace in times of war, but also becomes a symbol in which a cycle ends, in which a crisis becomes explicit through the images that the painter's sentiment selects to embody the effects that the events of an era of political, social and anthropological transformation have provoked in him. The artist is not a prophet. He is not foreseeing what the future holds for humanity, but he does possess a heightened sensitivity that drives him to minutely scrutinise the conditions of the time that he has had to live, and he has a transforming eye for the symbols that constitute the deepest threads in the fabric of his culture. Let us once more relate the experience of the painter Picasso to that Sphinx-Minotaur we analysed previously, whereby the humanised face of the beast, the Minotaur, belongs to the body of a mythical animal, the Sphinx, a calendar symbol: an image of time in Mediterranean cultures, now expressing – due to the transformation that the artist performed – the image of a humanised time, of a view in which mythic past and artistic fantasy "talk" to the viewer about a future, which, although unknown, is intuited.

References

Bachelard, Gaston (1948), *La terre et les rêveries du repos: essai sur les images de l'intimité*, Paris: Librairie José Corti.

Balada, María & Rosa Vives (1981–1982), *Picasso y el grabado*, Barcelona: Ayuntament de Barcelona.

Buero Vallejo, Antonio (1994), *Obras Completas*, Madrid: Espasa Calpe.

Kérenyi, Károly (1984), *Nel Labirinto*, Corrado Bologna (ed.), Torino: Paolo Boringhieri.

Larrea, Juan (1977), *Pablo Picasso, Guernica*, Madrid: Cuadernos para el Diálogo en colaboración con Alejandro Finisterre.

Leroi-Gourhan, André (1972), *Le geste et la parole*, Vol. II, *La memoire et les rhythmes*, Paris: Éditions Albin Michel.

Pablo Picasso (1974), *Das graphische Werk*, Stuttgart: Verlag Gerd Hatje (ed. Castellana Gustavo Gili, 1982).

Palau i Fabre, Josep (1968), *Doble ensayo sobre Picasso*, Barcelona: Editorial Gustavo Gili.

Ana Marija Lejra Sorijano

Učiniti da slike govore: Pikasova *Minotauromahija*

Apstrakt

Možemo reći da nam Pikasove slike govore i, kao pismo, da nam govore iz prostora u kome bilo koji tekst – daleko od toga da bude sveden na jedan smisao – "diseminira" svoje "istine". Koristeći figuru i priču o Minotauru, Pikaso se posvetio jednoj od velikih tema svog slikovnog dela. Reč „lavirint" konotira, evropskom duhu, Grčku, Knosos, Dedala, Arijadnu i Minotaura. Međutim, ta grčka formula već predstavlja mitski i poetski ishod temeljno izveden iz imaginarijuma stvorenog u najdavnijem dobu našeg našeg razvoja. Odnos između slike, spirale i reči, lavirint je takođe povezan sa izbušenom zemljom, prokopanom, sa bezbrojnim vijugavim tunelima koji u našoj imaginaciji izazivaju nelagodnost, jer vode u svet koji čine *inferi*, nepoznate dubine carstva mrtvih. Huan Larea, malo poznati esejist u oblasti filozofskih studija, iako, od samog početka, međunarodnog ugleda za Pikasovo delo, daje verovatno najbolje tumačenje *Gernike* i posledično u velikoj meri rasvetljava grafike koje neposredno prethode izradi ove slike, među njima i *Minotauromahiju*. Umetnik nije prorok. On ne predviđa šta budućnost donosi čovečanstvu, ali ipak poseduje pojačanu osetljivost da detaljno sagleda stanja vremena u kome mora da živi i ima preobražavalački pogled za simbole koji čine najdublje niti od kojih je satkana njegova kultura.

Ključne reči: lavirint, arhetipovi, Španski građanski rat, *Minotauromahija*, *Gernika*, estetika

ON MUSIC: CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES

O MUZICI: SAVREMENI FILOZOFSKI PROBLEMI

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The first question that may come to the minds of those who, for the first time, stumble upon a stack of writings on the "philosophy of music" might, quite expectedly, be the following: "what is the philosophy of music?" A question that will unavoidably be bundled with this other one: "why does it matter?" And an answer to these will vary, with the same degree of expectedness, in accordance with the practitioner's own view of what philosophy itself is. But whatever that may be, it will definitely include questions such as "what is music?", "what is a musical work?", "what kind of value does music hold for us?", "can music represent non-musical things?", "what does it mean to say that music is expressive of something?", "what is it to listen to a musical sequence with understanding?", etc., and so, provisionally, we can then say that "philosophy of music" is what happens when, somehow furnished with one or more questions of that kind, one endeavors to answer them – an effort which invariably comprises imagination, reasoning, argument, thought-experiment –, though shared across the several nuances in the understanding of what we are doing when we do philosophy of music is the fact that such answers cannot be decided empirically, be it in the way of the sociologist, the psychologist, or the historian.

One way to represent the scope of philosophical questions is to picture it as a "no man's land" between two other realms: that of the strictly empirical and that of the strictly formal. Philosophy combines formal and empirical elements, while it identifies with neither, in terms of method or substance. This will be the case regardless of other "divides", such as that of "continental" versus "analytical", and others. What this all comes down to is: if you want to know what kinds of musical notations or instruments existed, you inspect documents or archaeological evidence; if you want to know why humans use mostly musical scales of five and seven notes, you need psychology and biology to help you there; but if you are wondering why a painting can be stolen (though there is certainly a *moral* problem in, say, smuggling Cézanne's *Card Players* out of the Louvre, there is no metaphysical mystery about it) while it seems impossible to steal a musical work (*what* on earth would have to be taken, from where, and how?), there is no empirical inspection, of any kind, and no formal procedure one could perform, that would give us an answer or disprove any of the hypotheses we may have imagined for an answer.

Three of the four papers we present in this issue of *Philosophy and Society* are about the *ontology* of music, and one about the problem of whether music has *meaning* and, if it does, what kind of meaning is it and how it all comes to be so. And what, one may wonder, is this business of the ontology of music? Well, here is one short and somewhat dogmatic answer (but dogmatic only because there is no space for us to engage in meta-ontological questions in this brief presentation) – a starting point, like any other: the reader may notice the resemblance between the questions "what is music?" and "what is a musical work?"; but this resemblance is misleading, for these are elliptical formulations for quite distinct questions. The former asks what are the features in virtue of which something counts as music, while the latter asks what kind of *thing*, within the realm of musical things there are, a musical work is (e.g. is it concrete or abstract, physical or mental, or is our

talk about "musical works" a mere fiction? Can a musical work be *destroyed*? How many changes can we make to a musical work until it is no longer *that* particular musical work? Etc.). Both our previous questions are questions in the *metaphysics* of music, but *ontology* is that part of metaphysics that is concerned with the most general categories into which we can divide all things. And that is our short, dogmatic answer. Of course, to wonder what exactly we are doing, and whether we should be doing something else, when we do this, is also a part of the philosophy of music.

Vitor Guerreiro's paper, "Are Musical Works Sound Structures?", does not defend or attack a specific ontological theory of musical works, but rather poses a challenge to theories that identify musical works with (mind-independent) *things*, whether these "things" are conceived as *abstracta* or *concreta*, and the usual candidates for such "things" in the literature are the so-called "sound structures". Just as Arthur Danto concluded that artworks are not strictly identical with the "mere real things" that serve as their "vehicles", so here the author tries to convince us that there is much more to being a musical work besides the sonic vehicles that *embody* them. Despite this terminology, the result is not like the proposals known in the literature as "historical individuals" theories of artworks (e.g. Guy Rohrbaugh). Instead, we are invited to delve into the nature of artifacts, the kinds of functional properties an artifact can have, and also into the notion of *institutions* and how they relate to other "culturally emergent" entities.

Problems in the ontology of music are also addressed in Nemesio Garcia-Carril Puy's essay, "Musical Works' Repeatability, Audibility and Variability: A Dispositional Account". The main question in this paper concerns the repeatability of musical works; more specifically, the question of whether two or more performances of music are to be thought of as repetitions, as occurrences of one and the same musical work. Puy's approach to the matter stresses the implications of repeatability – among which we find the properties of audibility and variability of musical works – resulting in these properties being considered as ontologically substantive features of musical works. Puy's view on the question is that these three features are non-aesthetic and dispositional properties of musical works. According to Puy, the dispositional account offers a homogeneous account of the nature of repeatability and its implications.

Hugo Luzio's paper, "The Ontology of Rock Music: Recordings, Performances and The Synthetic View", presents some ontological issues in the specific case of *rock* music. Namely, since Western classical music is the musical tradition whose ontology is more widely investigated in the literature, problems of the ontology of rock music present us with an interestingly fresh angle on these ancient quandaries. The most obvious and, also, the most important issue for an ontology of rock music is the basic question of what counts as *the* work in rock music? Is it the recorded *track*, or the *live performance* – or, perhaps, both? Is it plausible to think that rock songs' lyrics and narratives are ontologically irrelevant? Luzio is considering these problems with regard to the views of Theodore Gracyk, Stephen Davies and Andrew Kania, concluding – against Gracyk and other recording-centred ontologists – that recordings are distinctive, though not the primary focus in rock music.

Finally, Una Popović's essay, "In the Defense of Musical Meaning", stands for another focus of contemporary philosophy of music – namely, the musical semantics (and semiotics). The main issue here is whether there is such a thing as musical

meaning at all, and, if so, how should it be interpreted with regard to the language model of meaning? Popović argues for musical meaning as distinctly aesthetic in character and of a non-verbal kind. She considers the sounds of music and language with respect to their meanings, attempting to show the autonomy of musical meaning by means of comparison: sounds of music, she argues, are essentially bound to the musical meaning they convey. Nonetheless, music is able to communicate other, non-musical meanings – but when that is the case, such non-musical meanings supervene on the musical one.

Vitor Guerreiro
Una Popović

UDK: 78.01
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1901036G
Original Scientific Article
Received: 18.10.2018. Accepted: 15.12.2019.

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY
VOL. 30, NO. 1, 001-196

Vitor Guerreiro

ARE MUSICAL WORKS SOUND STRUCTURES?

ABSTRACT
This paper is about the dilemma raised against musical ontology by Roger Scruton, in his *The Aesthetics of Music*: either musical ontology is about certain mind-independent "things" (sound structures) and so *music* is left out of the picture, or it is about an "intentional object" and so its puzzles are susceptible of an arbitrary answer. I argue the dilemma is merely apparent and deny that musical works can be identified with sound structures, whether or not conceived as abstract entities. The general idea is this: both Platonism and nominalism about musical works are a kind of fetishism: musical works are not "things", in Danto's sense of "mere real things"; they rather involve complex relationships between objects, events, and different kinds of functional properties. For this, I draw on Levinson and Howell's notion of *indication*, combined with Searle's approach to institutional reality... with a little twist of my own.

KEYWORDS
musical ontology, Platonism, nominalism, artworks, types.

Introduction

A spectre haunts the ontology of music – the spectre of abstract sound structures, conceived of roughly as a sort of Platonic universal: entities tokened by material objects while lacking spatial existence themselves, existing eternally (for they enter not causal relations nor have spatial parts), as well as temporally and modally inflexible. Such entities are appealed to in order to explain the phenomenon of musical works' repeatability: spatiotemporally distinct sound events counting as occurrences of the same work *W*, in virtue of a connection with an abstract entity, connection which is not causal, but rather described in terms of *instantiation* – the same relation that would hold between all physical inscriptions of the word "vociferant" and the word itself, considered as a Platonic type (so that five inscriptions of the word "vociferant" count as five token-words, but there is only one type-word involved). The main difference between types, under this notion, and properties in a realist ontology about universals is that the former are subjects of predication, individuals, not being themselves predicated of other things, unlike properties (we apply to musical works the property referred to by the predicates "strident" or "delicate", but we don't predicate, in turn, the musical work of something else).

A good deal of musical ontology consists of a clash of intuitions for and against the identification of musical works with entities similar to Platonic universals (the

Vitor Guerreiro: Instituto de Filosofia, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto; vitorguerreiro77@gmail.com.

most popular among them being the theory of musical works as *norm types*, proposed by Julian Dodd (Dodd 2007: 32)), following other contemporary musical Platonists such as Peter Kivy and Nicholas Wolterstorff); or with some sort of concrete entity: from classes and mereological fusions to "homeostatic property clusters" (Magnus 2013: 109) – a particular version of the theory of "historical individuals" (Rohrbaugh 2003) – among several other theories. Other proposals in theoretical space consist in identifying musical works with *action kinds* (Currie 1989), which are *abstracta* but contrast with musical Platonism's *types*, which are types of sound event; and also with token actions (Davies 2004). There are also theories identifying musical works with abstract entities but defending that these are *sui generis*, capable of being created and destroyed (Thomasson 1999), unlike more traditional views on abstract entities. The situation in musical ontology has been described by some writers, such as Thomasson or Kania, as "an embarrassment of riches" (Kania 2008: 20) of theoretical proposals.

I don't wish (nor would that be feasible) to make an exhaustive inventory of extant theories and their several versions, together with arguments against those theories, followed by the defence of an additional proposal. The difficulties raised by each theory have been widely explored in the literature. What I shall do is more akin to arguing for a framework, desirably plausible and productive, to conceive the ontological status of musical works in what they have peculiarly, as products of intentional human activity, that is, to conceive their status qua *musical* works and qua musical *works*. For what concerns us, I shall consider three kinds of ontological theory about musical works, without focusing on the specificities of any example of this or that kind in particular: 1) theories which identify musical works with sound structures, conceived of as Platonic entities, 2) theories which identify musical works with sound structures, conceived of nominalistically, and 3) theories like Jerrold Levinson's, which identify musical works with indicated types, or *sound-structures-S-indicated-by-composer-C-in-historico-musical-context-M* (Levinson 1980; 2011; 2013). Although Levinson himself views a sound structure *S*, partly constitutive of a musical work, as an abstract entity, we can easily imagine a version of that theory in which all statements about *S* are given nominalist paraphrases, while the rest of the theory remains the same. The idea is to suggest that to identify musical works with previously given "things" in the world, independent of intentional states, coordinated beliefs and systems of representations, whether those "things" are concrete or abstract, is a form of fetishism[1] that has skewed the ontological debate on musical works (and other "culturally emergent" or "socially constructed" items [Margolis 1974]), specifying a necessary though not sufficient element for the world to include such entities.

I dislike the idea of abstract entities. To say of two concrete things that they "instantiate" the same universal seems to me the same as a prolonged noise which, in the end, merely expresses the following: "There is this ubiquitous phenomenon we refer to as the 'sharing of properties': the world seems to contain repeatable things, the language we use to describe it seems to denote repeatable entities, and

1 I use the term "fetishism" as a deferential allusion to John Dilworth's paper "How to Reform Danto's Vehicle Fetishism", although I give it a slightly different purpose and don't follow Dilworth in viewing all artworks as abstract (in his own peculiar manner).

we don't know how that works nor how to describe it without raising a host of difficulties." Two things, *x* and *y*, share clusters of properties, and in virtue of that they count as two things of the same type. There is a sense in which those properties that *x* and *y* possess are unique things, distinct from one another, as everything in space and time, and a sense in which they are the same thing, despite their being spatiotemporally discontinuous. We can hardly make sense of the world without appealing to this repeatability in our discourse. But to describe that phenomenon in terms of a non-causal relation of "instantiation" of abstract entities by concrete ones seems to add absolutely nothing of true explanatory value, besides giving sophisticated names to what we ignore.

However, my aim here is not to argue against any realist or Platonic ontology, nor to argue for a nominalist one. In fact, I think it is not at that "fundamental" level of our ontology that our characterization of things like musical works is played out. Conceiving ontology as a "layer cake", in which at the most fundamental layer we deal with the "brute facts" about the world, for instance, the option of dividing the world between concrete particulars and universals, and at the upper layers deal with more complex entities, we also see that entities such as artworks or musical works will not figure in that more fundamental layer, independently from complex connections with intentional states, functional properties imposed on objects and events, contextual settings, systems of representations allowing this whole apparatus to work, and so on. At the end of the journey, I hope at least to have given a clear image, if not of the way to characterize musical works ontologically, then of how they shouldn't be so characterized.

A Scrutonian Dilemma for Musical Ontology

In *The Aesthetics of Music*, Roger Scruton asserts, about the ontological puzzles raised by musical works, that these concern either the metaphysical status of an "intentional object", in which case they are susceptible of an arbitrary solution, or they concern the sounds in which the musical work is heard and are nothing but a special case of problems about the nature and identity of events (Scruton 1997: 108). (That is, nothing special would be added by the fact that these are musical entities, as well as artworks.)

My proposal may be understood as a way of accepting the first horn of this apparent dilemma – questions of musical ontology are not about an object existing independently of the intentional states of beings like us – rejecting the consequence that any ontological description we may adopt of such entities is arbitrary or that they are all equivalent.[2] What happens is that most ontological descriptions of musical works (those that fall under 1 and 2 above) share the problem I characterized as a form of fetishism inhering in the expectation of identifying musical works with "things" we can place in a description of reality as it is, independently of us; "things" that one or other philosopher, according to his/her sensibility, tends to identify with either concrete or abstract objects.

2 The idea that ontological theories of music are equivalent, because equally adjusted to the empirical facts, and we may adopt any one of them without affecting what really matters to us in music was defended by James O. Young (Young 2011; 2014).

Platonic shadows and their material doubles

That great ideas always start with basic everyday matters may be illustrated (somewhat imaginatively) by the fact that Socrates' father, Sophroniscus, was a sculptor. How tempting to imagine little Socrates in his father's workshop, observing a figure slowly gaining shape in the stone, at each strike of the chisel. Suddenly, one blow doesn't come out as intended and, with subsequent touches, the final shape will have to be adjusted, adapted, so as the intervention of the unexpected doesn't result in an obvious imperfection. Hence, an idea (not an Idea) begins to dawn on little Socrates' mind: the material world forever aspiring to reach the condition of the ideal Form, while always falling short of it; things we can see and hear as shadows of the genuinely real objects, impassive dwellers of a world where no skewed blow of a chisel can affect them, forever indifferent to the transformative intrusion of causation. There they lie (whatever sense one can make of "there" in this context), awaiting discovery by inquisitive minds, sufficiently discerning to catch a glimpse of them.

Still under the analogy with sculpture, we find an echo of such idea in a remark by Samuel Alexander about a famous set of unfinished statues by Michelangelo:

> In Michelangelo's unfinished statues of slaves in the Academy at Florence we can feel the artist not so much making the figure as chipping off flakes of the marble from the figure which is concealed in it, and which he is laying bare *(vivos ducunt de marmore voltus).* (Alexander 1988: 73)

This idea is all the more intriguing in virtue of being about that which is, together with painting, one of the paradigmatic singular artforms (those in which works have only one token: the *original*). In this sense, hewn sculpture and painting are traditionally contrasted with music and other multiple artforms (those in which works can have an endless multiplicity of tokens), to the extent that in them the artwork is intuitively identified with a physical object. However, observations such as the preceding suggest that, with an effort of the imagination, all artforms can be conceived as multiple. If the artist discovers the figure hidden in the stone, and we identify the sculptural work with such a figure, then we must conclude that the work precedes the creative action of the artist, who, strictly speaking, doesn't create something that wasn't already there. Besides, nothing ties the figure hidden in the stone essentially to that stone in particular – it can be equally "hidden" in another stone. Only our conventions make it the case that hewn sculpture and painting are singular artforms, that is, our practice of privileging the first token of the figure as the original. We don't do this with music, though we could imagine alternative scenarios where we would.

The idea that artists discover forms in the physical material rather than create something new finds vigorous expression in the musical Platonism defended by philosophers such as Kivy and Dodd. Like in Alexander's imaginative exercise about Michelangelo's unfinished statues, musical Platonists hold that composers discover "sound structures" in the logical space of tonal combinations. They see musical composition as a process of eliminating candidates, analogously to the idea of the sculptor removing fragments of stone with his chisel, to reveal the figure hidden in the stone. Hence, the "sculpture" was not introduced in the world, but was already

there, merely concealed by the material that prevented the apprehension, through the senses, of the true object of appreciation and aesthetic enjoyment.

However interesting this imaginative exercise, it flies in the face of one of our most deeply rooted intuitions about artworks, not just in sculpture and painting, but also, and especially, in the case of musical works: that these are essentially creations of their artists. Something new is introduced in the world, over and above the concrete instantiation of a possible structure or pattern. In particular, philosophers hostile to Platonism insist that the same structure, realized in different circumstances or contexts, acquires different aesthetic and artistically relevant properties, and that such difference determines a difference in identity, which would prevent a work from being identical with any structure whose instantiation may be involved in its production. When we appreciate a work, we don't appreciate it merely as a realization of a possible structure, thought we certainly could, somewhat like we appreciate the beauty of stalactites and other geological formations. The fact that we don't is one of the persistent facts about our relationship with art. In particular, we appreciate works for what they reveal about its production, the achievement it represents. This idea was expressed with remarkable clarity and power of synthesis by Gregory Currie:

> An interest in the aesthetics of artifacts is, for those cases where the distinction is a real one, an interest in something that unites both factors [activity and product]: an interest in the product-as-outcome-of-activity. That is why the aesthetic appreciation of nature as genuinely natural is so different from the aesthetic appreciation of art. (Currie 2009: 18)

Here is one of the marked differences between appreciating natural forms and appreciating art: artefacts, but not natural structures, have *styles*, something they can only have through their connection with human minds and specific historical circumstances. The same object, against the background of different styles, exhibits different properties. An example of this, used by Robert Howell, is that of a musical work composed by Erik Satie, exhibiting the same "sound structure" of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony: such a work would be

> an uncharacteristic, parodic freak, not the Fifth Symphony once over again, a work displaying the dramatic progression of *Sturm*, *Drang*, and ultimate resolution that is present in that symphony. (Howell 2002: 106)

Though this example appeals to something incredibly unlikely, there is nothing metaphysically impossible about it, not to mention there are in the actual world examples of things sufficiently suggestive of the same (e.g. when a composer adopts a "conservative" neoclassical style after a sequence of bold and revolutionary works).

To be traced back to artistic intentions, susceptible of being recognized in the object, rooted in different and varying contexts of production, alters the essential properties of the object which is the artwork, even if it doesn't alter a mere possible structure embodied in it, so that the same structure can be embodied in objects that differ essentially, to the extent that there are essential properties those objects have, properties that depend on something beyond mere structure.

Consider the following verbal sequence in James Joyce's *Finnegan's Wake*:

> Vociferagitant. Viceversounding. Namely, Abdul Abulbul Amir or Ivan Slavansky Slavar. In alldconfusalem. As to whom the major guiltfeather pertained it was Hercushiccups' care to educe. (Joyce 2012: 355)

In a possible world where there wasn't an individual named Percy French (1854-1920), who, in 1877, wrote a parodic song about the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, titled "Abdul Abulbul Amir", this verbal sequence imagined by Joyce could not contain an *allusion* to the song, mentioning the names of the two characters who, in the story there narrated, fight each other in mortal combat, ending in mutual destruction. Reading the first two words of the sequence, the line "the din it was heard from afar" in French's song would not resound in the reader's mind. But allusions in a work are an essential property of it, as essential as the very word sequence. So, a work must always be more than any structure it exemplifies.

Now, if any property is essential to an artwork, it is a fair supposition that artistically relevant properties are. These include semantic or representational properties, which may bear on a work's aesthetic character, which shouldn't happen were we to consider it as but the instantiation of a pattern. Structurally similar or even qualitatively identical stylistic features, in different artistic traditions, can have profoundly different functions and meanings, as is the case with golden backgrounds in a Byzantine mosaic and in a Japanese *rinpa* painting. A "structure" formed by the sum of features such as these will always vary in artistic properties, depending on the context and artistic categories (Walton 1970) to which the work belongs.

The notion that different works can share the same structure was notoriously explored by Borges in his short story "Pierre Menard, author of the Quixote" (Borges 1999: 88–95) and applied to the philosophy of art by Arthur Danto, who converted the thought experiment in a peculiar method of analysis by indiscernible replicas, with a view to demonstrate precisely this idea. And the idea is nicely captured in Currie's words: the artist's activity brings something new to the world, not reduceable to the structure that the material object, the work's vehicle (that is, the bearer of aesthetic, semantic, and other properties) instantiates, whether this object is a marble sculpture, the inscription of a literary text or the performance of a musical work.

The idea I am reaching for, and that I shall defend in the following sections, is that artworks (and musical works *qua* artworks) are complex functional entities, whose ontology is neither adequately captured by straightforward Platonism nor nominalism. Structures or patterns, whether conceived as Platonic entities or through the most ingenious nominalist paraphrases, perform but a limited role in the fact that the world contains artworks. While being a part of what is indispensable for the presence of artworks in the world, they are not the whole story, and surely not identical with the works themselves. The works are more than the sum of all the things indispensable to their presence in the world. Using here for my own purposes the words of Chris Small,

> Music is not a thing at all but an activity, something that people do. The apparent thing "music" is a figment, an abstraction of the action, whose reality vanishes as soon as we examine it at all closely. This habit of thinking in abstractions, of taking from an action what appears to be its essence and of giving that essence a name, is

> probably as old as language; it is useful in the conceptualizing of our world but it has its dangers. It is very easy to come to think of the abstraction as more real than the reality it represents. (Small 1998: 2)

"Music is not a thing at all", in the specific sense that it is neither identifiable with a material object nor with an "abstract object", such as a sound structure or pattern. In "fundamental" ontology we look for "things" – either concrete or abstract – and we try to place in that "conceptual map" those entities we wish to identify, e.g. events, actions, persons, properties, and whatever else to which we systematically refer in our discourse about the world. We want to "carve the world at its joints", to know its structure, as it is independently of what we think, but there are things in our discourse and our experience of reality that don't fit this image, because, in part, they depend on relations between a diversity of elements and also our coordinated beliefs. The relation between all those things produces something that is more than the sum of the related parts, so that we cannot place them adequately in a conceptual map that merely describes the world in terms of "things" and brute facts. What we need is an understanding of the continuity between the level of things and brute facts and those more complex emergent entities, such as artworks are.

Properties, Patterns and Types

One of the distinctions that seem to me most important in musical (and art) ontology was introduced by Robert Howell (2002). It is the distinction between properties, patterns and types. In his paper, Howell undertakes a defence of the Levinsonian idea of "indicated types": temporally initiated entities (by contrast with Platonic types), that result from an act of indication, by a composer, in a specific musico-historical context, of a sound structure that, in virtue of that contextualized act of indication, acquires properties that no Platonic type can possess. The view against he is arguing is that of Julian Dodd, who identifies musical works with norm types, conceived as Platonic entities, corresponding to what for Jerrold Levinson is but an ingredient of musical works – the so-called sound structures (which Levinson also conceives as abstract entities). There is a technical difference between Dodd's types and sound structures, in the sense that, for Dodd, types have no structure, given that they have no spatial parts, but this detail can be ignored: Dodd can accept to describe his norm types as "sound structures", as long as we tacitly apply the idea of "analogical predication" he takes from Wolterstorff: when we say that the sound structure contains a B flat in the fourth measure, we are not saying that the type contains measures or notes sequentially, in the same sense that its tokens have them, but something like the type being such that all its well-formed tokens contain those things in the prescribed order.

Howell's attack on Dodd proceeds in two fronts. On the one hand, he argues that not all properties are eternal. He does this by appealing to the notion of impure properties, that is, properties that "essentially involve" contingent entities, such as the property *being a son of Lincoln* or *being an Elizabethan playwright*. The idea is that those properties only start to exist when the entities they essentially involve themselves start to exist. So, if a type essentially involves an impure property, this type cannot exist eternally. On the other hand, Howell invokes a distinction

between patterns and types, aimed at blocking Dodd's argument, even if we conceive all properties as eternally existing. The idea is that the mere possibility of a pattern specified by certain properties doesn't suffice for us to conclude that a given type exists. For natural kinds, it is required that the patterns have a place in "actual causal chains" (Howell 2002: 117), and for cultural kinds, such as works of music, it is required that the patterns are actually used by a community, in a certain way (Idem: 110). Only as part of an actual practice of a community of agents with coordinated beliefs about the use of patterns can the latter underlie the existence of types which are actually present in the world.

In this conception, cultural types such as *Finnegans Wake* and the words of which it is made, the musical work *Fantasia on a Theme by Thomas Tallis* by Vaughan Williams, the sea shanty *Haul on the Bowline*, the Game of *Tabla* (*tavla* or backgammon[3]), the painting *Mud Bath* by David Bomberg, among countless other examples of such things, are not Platonic entities, whether or not our basic ontology includes *abstracta* of some sort, such as properties and patterns.

To clarify this idea, we can make use of an example Howell himself doesn't employ. This is an example reminiscent of Danto's method of "indiscernible replicas" to show that artworks are not to be confused with the "mere real things" that serve them as vehicles, as in the thought experiment opening *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, where eight perceptually indiscernible red canvases are placed side by side, which canvases not only include distinct works of art but also objects that are not artworks (Danto 1980: 1–2). The purpose is to show that specifying a pattern is not sufficient to determine certain types, even if it is for some of these (e.g. having four right angles is sufficient to determine Square Thing).

Consider the word sequence CANE NERO MAGNA BELLA PERSICA. Read in Latin, that sequence means "Sing, Oh Nero, the great Persian wars"; read in Romanesco dialect it means "The black dog eats a fine peach".[4] Now, here we have two sentences and only one underlying perceivable "pattern", and the difference between both – what individuates them as sentences – resides not in the underlying pattern but in the connection between the pattern and the coordinated beliefs of humans using the pattern. The pattern itself is insufficient to determine any of the sentences. In fact, the very same pattern, if produced in a way that is wholly non-intentional, by natural erosion on a rocky surface, or by a row of ants, would not constitute a sentence at all. Only against a background of systems of representations, sustained by coordinated beliefs, could any pattern determine a sentence. Besides words, Howell gives the example of the graphic pattern of the swastika, common to a pre-Colombian symbol for, among other things, fire, and the Nazi party symbol. And from here we can extrapolate to countless other examples.

To mention just another example, given by Joseph Margolis, in a paper defending precisely that the relation between a work and its "occurrences" or "tokens" is not the relation of instantiation but the relation of "embodiment":

3 Tavla is the Turkish name for the same game denoted by the Slavic word "tabla" and the English "backgammon".

4 Another known exemple of such na ambiguous word-sequence is "I VITELI DEI ROMANI SONO BELLI" – Latin: "Go, Vitellius, the gods of Rome call to arms"; Italian dialect: "The calves of the Romans are beautiful".

> Looking at an array of great stones I can speak of and attribute properties to the Japanese stone garden embodied in it only by reference to a suitable cultural tradition; but the garden will be identified by identifying the set of stones in which it is embodied. The reason, once again, we don't confuse the two is because (since they are different) not all the properties attributed to the one can be truly attributed to the other and because (since art is culturally emergent) not all the kinds of properties attributed to the one can be coherently attributed to the other. (Margolis 1974: 191)

The type Japanese Stone Garden is not an abstract structure instantiated by spatial configurations of rocks, but a more complex entity, which finds a place in the world only when configurations of this sort find a place in relations between humans in an appropriate context, that is, when socially coordinated agents attribute to a configuration *X* certain functions *Y* in an appropriate context *C*.[5] What results from this connection between the elements *X*, *Y* and *C* is more than each of those things taken by themselves, or conceived in abstraction from actual social practice. It is that relation between the different elements (not the relation of instantiation between a Platonic universal and its tokens) that operates the transition from the mere pattern (element *X*) to the type.

The connection between the pattern and the type, that is, the relation in virtue of which coordinated agents can use patterns to generate types, would be the same to which Levinson refers with the term "indication", in a wider sense than the mere "pointing towards": in specifying a sound pattern on a score, or presenting a paradigm performance of it, a composer indicates a musical work, thus creating a new type. "Indication" refers an intentional action, which in turn presupposes a background of coordinated beliefs, making it intelligible. That is, in indicating a sound pattern, the composer is not merely selecting acoustic properties in isolation, but also applying the conventions in use within the artworld. The previous paragraph seeks, so to speak, to provide a glimpse into the structure of that relation of indication, which, in Levinson, is perhaps still excessively linked to the individual intentions of an agent.

There is a structural resemblance between these cases and other cases of institutional entities, e.g., the fact that this metal disc in my pocket, with a certain graphic pattern stamped on its surface, is a coin or currency. It is an objective fact that this disc of metal in my pocket is a coin, but what makes it so doesn't reside simply on the metal or the stamped pattern. It is required a system of coordinated beliefs so that any object in the world, including stamped discs of metal, count as money or can perform the function of being a means of exchange. The fact that I have a stamped disc of metal in my pocket is a brute fact; the fact that I have currency in my pocket is not only a social fact but also an institutional one. Coins are more complex objects than stamped discs of metal. We can employ here the idea of "levels of description", corresponding to layers in our ontological "layer cake", such that there is a layer where we can have stamped discs of metal but not coins, these being possible only when we introduce agents and coordinated beliefs, as it happens with Danto's indiscernible replicas: the "mere real thing" that constitutes

5 "X counts as Y in C" is the formula used by John Searle (Searle 1995; 2010) to represent the structure of institutional facts. In the final section I explore the application of his ideas to the subject of art a bit further.

the "vehicle" of the artwork is not sufficient to determine the fact that there is an artwork. It is also required that which Danto calls an "interpretation" and an "atmosphere of theory" (Danto 1964: 580), in the absence of which nothing can be conceived as art and, therefore, nothing can function as art, for the functional properties of something depend on the connection to intentional states of humans and a specific context of cooperation between them.

Dodd's Argument in Favour of Platonic Types and a Howellian Answer

To conclude this limited exploration of one aspect of the recent literature in musical ontology, I reproduce Dodd's argument, in a brief rendition of it by Andrew Kania (Kania 2008: 23), for the idea that all types are eternally existing Platonic entities:

> (1) The identity of any type *K* is determined by the condition a token meets, or would have to meet, in order to be a token of that type.
> (2) The condition a token meets, or would have to meet, in order to be a token of *K* is *K*'s property-associate: *being a k*
> So (3) The identity of *K* is determined by the identity of *being a k*.
> So (4) *K* exists if and only if *being a k* exists.
> (5) *Being a k* is an eternal existent.
> So (6) *K* is an eternal existent too.[6]

As is evident from what has been said above, Howell counters Dodd's argument by attacking premises 4 and 5. What he says about "impure properties" is aimed at refuting 5, and his distinction between properties, patterns and types is intended to undermine 4.

An "impure" property is a property that "essentially involves" (in Howell's phrase) one or more contingent particulars, such as *being a son of Lincoln* or *being an Elizabethan playwright*. The idea is that such properties cannot exist while the contingent items they essentially involve do not themselves exist exist.

Dodd's answer to this kind of argument is that properties such as *being a son of Lincoln* must exist before the entities they supposedly "involve" do (Dodd accuses Howell of obscurity as to the notion of a property "involving" contingent particulars) for instance, in 1066 it was true that no one alive was a son of Lincoln, although that truth was not epistemically available to anyone at that time. Now, that truth, according to Dodd, presupposes the existence of the property. Thus, for Dodd, even "impure" properties are eternally existing and the presence of any such properties in the world determines the existence of any types of which they are the "associated properties", regardless of what beings such as us think or do. Consequently, even if a musical work is an "indicated type", involving a reference to contingent particulars, Dodd believes that it raises no obstacle to the existence of the type, previously to the existence of the particulars it involves.

Premise 4 is a biconditional asserting that if a type exists, then the associated property also exists, and if the associated property exists, then the type also exists. Howell's distinction is intended to neutralize the biconditional by falsifying the

6 See Dodd 2007, especially sections 3.3 and 3.4, where Howell's paper is discussed.

second conditional comprised by it. The idea is that although the existence of the type entails the existence of the properties by which we identify it (the associated property, which can be a complex property or conjunction of simpler properties), the reverse is not true: the mere fact that certain properties occur in the world doesn't determine, by itself, the existence of types. What Howell does is to interpose, between properties and types, a third item: patterns. Any combination of properties determines a pattern (e.g. the property of having alternate bright and clear squares determines the pattern of the checkered board – common) but this is insufficient, according to Howell, to determine a a type (e.g. Chessboard), or at least to determine cultural types, "indicated and intiated", that is, essentially tied to coordinated intentional states of humans (though not all initiated types are indicated types).

Thus, a cultural type such as the game of *tabla* involves patterns: the graphic display of the board, the patterns formed by all possible moves, etc. But the mere presence of those patterns in the logical space of possibilities doesn't determine the actual existence of a type (namely, *Tabla*), even one lacking instantiations. This type only figures as an item in the world when all those patterns I mentioned stand in a certain relation with coordinated beliefs of humans. In other words, the existence of the type presupposes some "thing" (the patterns) and a relation of indication, that consists of its actual use by a community, in a certain way. This example allows me to bring into evidence an aspect of indication which is not usually addressed: when Levinson first proposed his theory of indicated types (Levinson 1980), he made explicit his intention to account for musical works in a certain period of music's history, leaving open the possibility of the theory not being applicable across the board. This was related especially with the essential connection, proposed by Levinson, between musical works and their composers. But maybe not all musical entities, for any time or musico-historical context, are essentially connected to an individual composer, assuming any are. Now, some cultural types such as the Game of *Tabla* are not at all bound to an individual "creator". Even if the origin of the game was attributable to a specific individual, that would not be part of the identity of the game, and, nonetheless, the type *Tabla*, like all games, is an indicated type. This raises questions about indication being variable for different kinds of indicated types – what is the criterion? The answer to this implies a more thorough approach to the notion of *indication* than the terms in which Levinson has expounded the concept, namely, in terms of an individual *making his (or her) own* a certain pattern.

Elsewhere I defended that a fruitful path to explore would involve combining the notion of indication, such as we find it in Levinson-Howell, with John Searle's approach to the structure of institutional facts. If we observe carefully, each of the elements entering the game of *tabla* has an institutional status. A *tabla* piece is not simply a slice of wood. It is not enough to have a certain shape to be a *tabla* piece. What is required here is something similar to what makes the event of a ball hitting a net *count* as a goal in soccer. The purely physical event of a ball hitting a net is insufficient to make it the case that the world contains things such as goals, though there is no *separate* physical event here. We need a shared system of representations for the world to include something as palpable and objective as a goal in a soccer match. The same is true of what counts as a piece, a point, a

board or a legal move in *tabla*. Each of these, and many more, is an *institutional* fact: perfectly objective *and* dependent on human belief. In the absence of such connection, none of the patterns associated with any game determines the game itself, just as no graphic or acoustic pattern is sufficient for something to count as a sentence in a language.

Dodd's reply to the distinction drawn by Howell resembles his answer to contextualist arguments based on thought experiments of distinct works that are also musical *doppelgänger*, that is, works that share the same sound structure though differing in aesthetic and artistic properties. Dodd argues that such properties, supposedly of the work (like *virtuosity*, *originality*, etc.), are in fact properties *of the composer's action*, not of the work. (Though plausible for some situations, this kind of answer is unsatisfactory, as is clear in the case of allusions, for instance.) In answering the idea that types only exist when patterns acquire the essential property of *actually* being used, Dodd asserts that it is not the type itself that must have that property, but rather its *tokens*, so as being able to count as tokens of the type. So, the reply is that Howell incurs in a type-token confusion, just as contextualists in general would be confusing properties of the work with properties of the compositional action. For instance, to the argument that the graphic/phonetic pattern "glank" doesn't correspond now to a (type)word actually existing in English, though contingently non-instantiated, that it rather doesn't exist at all as a type, Dodd answers that not being a word in English doesn't entail that the (Platonic) type is non-existent, but only that no token satisfies the conditions set by the type (to be used as a noun, in order to refer such and such, being spelled and uttered in this or that way, etc.), so one could say that the (type)word has entered a language (e.g. English). Dodd appeals to the idea that one and the same word may enter more than one language (as is the case with *Schadenfreude* or *chic*, for instance, which are used in English, though originating elsewhere) and that the implausibility of attributing (type) words to particular languages illustrates what is wrong in Howell's argument. In producing tokens of the type, the speakers of one or several languages make it the case that the (type) word enters that language, but they don't cause the type to exist, which type, as a Platonic entity, exists eternally. For Dodd, examples such as that of the word sequences ambiguous between different sentences (in Latin and Romanesco dialect), or the geometric patterns shared by distinct symbols (the pre-Colombian symbol and the Nazi swastika), are correctly described in the following manner: the (eternal) property *being-a-graphic/phonetic-sequence-ϕ-used-to-signify-P*[7] is the associated property of a (Platonic) type, which it determines, and the (eternal) property *being-a-graphic/phonetic-sequence-ϕ-used-to-signify-Q* is the associated property of another (Platonic) type, which it determines.

How plausible is this answer? To me it is as plausible as asserting that "glank" has a place in a private language *before* it is part of any known natural language. To say that a word exists, with "incorporated" meanings, in the form of conditions that any token must satisfy to be an occurrence *of that* word is to lose sight of the fact that actual use by a community is *constitutive* of what a word is. It is a sort of regression to an Augustinianism about how words mean – the idea that words already have meaning, that is, that they *are* words, *outside* of "language games" in

7 Substitute *inscription-ϕ* for *graphic/phonetic-sequence-ϕ* wherever necessary.

which they take place, as if previously given "things" then inserted into the game, rather than "equilibrium points in coordinated action" (Zangwill 2014: 144) – except that in the type-token view we are placing them in a sort of Platonic purgatory, rather than in the private mental world of a speaker.[8]

The Platonist may be suspicious of such an answer. And the reason why he will be suspicious of it, I suspect, lies in conceiving the *possibility* of "glank" being a word in one or more natural languages in terms of the eternal existence of the "associated property" of the type GLANK (*qua* word), in the same way that he conceives the truth, in 1066, that no human being alive is a son of Lincoln, in terms of the truthmaker of that thought entailing the existence of the property *being a son of Lincoln*. But this seems to ignore that the truthmaker for any proposition *denying* the existence of instances of types whose "associated property" is an incoherent cluster of properties (that is, a type that has no possible instantiations) cannot plausibly depend on that associated property actually existing, for the property is incoherent. However, the negative existential is true.

Likewise, the proposition "No human being is a son of Lincoln" is true, though epistemically inaccessible, in 1066, because no human being alive at that time was in a (causal) relation of descendancy with the individual born in 1809 in Hodgenville, Kentucky, USA, assassinated in 1865 in Washington D.C., who was the 16th president of that country, and not because the "Platonic purgatory" contains the eternal property *being a son of Lincoln*, which no human being instantiates in 1066. Here the Platonist will doubtlessly feel tempted to reply: "Yeah... Relation... Universals!", although the point, as Howell has remarked, is whether the impure property *being a son of Lincoln* is a Platonic type, and not whether the filial relationship is conceived as a universal. Dodd (Dodd 2007: 74) protests that to conceive the first as a non-Platonic impure property amounts to "ontologize" the complexity of the relation involved (which includes a contingent particular), but this doesn't seem, at the outset, a sin greater than the ontologization he himself incurs, when he thinks of truth conditions for propositions: Dodd infers that the property has to exist, because there is in 1066 a condition something must satisfy in order to be a son of Lincoln, but here he incurs in an implausible "ontologization" of what the truth conditions a proposition must satisfy for it to be true are, turning those conditions into properties in a "Platonic purgatory" (hovering over the material world, but always under the promise of not remaining forever there, uninstantiated).

The Twofold Functional Character of Musical Works (qua Artworks)

In the beginning of this paper I said I was not going to argue for a particular ontological theory, but for a possible framework, desirably both plausible and fruitful, to conceive the ontological status of musical works *qua* musical works and *qua* musical works. The shifting emphasis allowed us to catch a glimpse of how to eliminate the seeming redundancy, but now I would like to finish with a few words on this distinction between a work *qua* musical entity and a musical entity *qua* work. To

8 See the comments by Jim Stone (Stone 1994: 439– 440), in a paper that addresses the nature of games.

do it will allow me to throw a little more light on what I have characterized as the complexity of acts of indication, without which no type genuinely emerges from a pattern or combination of patterns available in "logical space". What I shall do here is to sum up a few conclusions I have reached elsewhere, thinking about the nature of music and the contrast between functionalist and proceduralist theories about the nature of art. Such an exploration is out of the scope of the present paper, in virtue of which this will assume a somewhat dogmatic character. Its function here is merely to give the reader a notion of how vast the territory that the ontological contextualist about musical works sets out to map, equipped with the concept of "indication", is.

The musical Platonist, as we have seen, treats the concept of "work" as if the "metaphysical baggage" that concept carries were minimal: repeatability and audibility. This approach to the concept of work pushes the Platonist towards sonicism about the individuation of works (the thesis that musical works are individuated by acoustic properties only), and occupying that position concerning the individuation question makes either Platonism or its nominalist "double" inescapable: once established the equivalence between "work" and any *sonic repeatable*, we are left with the task of isolating the "thing" in the world, with which we will identify it – the "sound structure" – the genuine target of our propositions about works.

In the view I adopt, however, the concept of "work" carries a somewhat heavier metaphysical baggage. And the distance between it and a mere sonic repeatable is the Howellian distance between a mere pattern and a genuine type. Nonetheless, that distance too is sensitive to contextual variations, in a way that no specific individuation theory can guarantee its application across the board, to all musical works in art history. What does this mean?

The distance between a pure sound pattern and a genuinely musical entity lies in the *functional* character of what it is for something to be music. Nothing is music *only* in virtue of mind-independent acoustic properties. Birdsong seems like *singing* to us because it reminds us of *our* singing, though in itself it is as musical as a bark or meow. And if a bizarre atmospheric phenomenon was to produce a sequence of pitched sounds, indiscernible to our ears from a Balkan melody, say, as played by a shepherd with the *frula* (a kind of flute, traditional of Serbia), it would not actually be music in virtue of it, just as if, by a miraculous chance event, erosion on a rocky surface were to produce a pattern indiscernible, to our eyes, from a series of decorative motifs, that reason alone would not suffice to make it the case that the pattern was indeed a certain example of decorative art. Only things that would bear the same *functions* as that specific decorative pattern, or maintain the same appropriate causal-historical links with those patterns, could *count* as such. Nature has no *styles*. The difference between two indiscernible instantiations of a pattern, such that one embodies a style and the other doesn't, is a difference in *functional properties*. The decorative pattern, to start with, has the function of exhibiting its continuity with other patterns that *count* as tokens of the type, and of generating a certain kind of experience, intelligible only when one has the type has a background, as well as other stylistic properties of which it is distinct. We don't appreciate it merely as a bearer of certain aesthetic qualities, in the way we appreciate natural formations. We appreciate it as a convergence point of "historical-artistic" intentions, or as

something that is deliberately envisaged for a mode of attention entirely distinct from that which is appropriate to rocky formations produced by erosion.

There are two elements here we should distinguish: appreciation of the pattern as an intentional vehicle of aesthetic qualities, and appreciation of the pattern as representative of the particular style at issue. There is a core of formal properties (dynamics, balance, elegance, etc.) whose presence doesn't crucially depend on conventions *about* such properties. Someone who completely ignored the style could experience the congruence, dynamism, balance, elegance, etc., of the pattern. But nothing *counts* as a representative, say, of a decorative *Iznik* pattern independently of conventions about the style itself, in the same way that nothing counts as a representative of the Persian musical style *radif* or, while we're at it, as a representative of a symphonic movement in sonata-form, independently of there being conventions about how to *count* such things. The distinction I am drawing is, thus, the distinction between things that count as representatives of a type *T* in virtue of conventions, and things that count as representatives of a type *S* in virtue of something they *do*, independently of conventions. Searle has signalled this distinction between types of functional properties with the terms "causal-agentive function" and "status-function". Our ability to impose functions of the second kind on objects is what makes institutional facts and entities possible. We have seen above, concerning the example of the Japanese stone garden, the basic structure that coordinated beliefs must have for there to be functions of the second kind: "*X* counts as *Y* in *C*", in which *X* stands for "things", events or even persons, *Y* stands for a function or functions the thing will perform in virtue of collective recognition, and *C* stands for the appropriate context in which all of this can really work. Two relevant properties of this structure are *indefinite vertical iteration* and *indefinite horizontal interlocking*. What are these properties? The former means that any *Y* element in such a structure can become the *X* element of a further structure (that is, to be a thing with a certain status-function can be a part of the conditions something must satisfy to be a candidate for attribution of a further *Y* function); the latter tells us there is an "horizontal" combination of an indefinite number of these structures, such that anything with a certain status-function makes part of the context *C* of another structure, or other applications of the same structure, so as to generate further status-functions. For instance, a certain wooden object, with a certain shape, counts as a *tabla* piece in an appropriate context, and a certain configuration of pieces counts as the *closing of a point* in *tabla* (a point cannot be closed by using anything that is not a *tabla* piece). Part of the context in this example of vertical iteration is the *point* itself, which only counts as such in the appropriate context (the graphic pattern on the board is not sufficient, since a board with more or less than six points per quadrant would not *count* as a *tabla* board).

The structure for the attribution of causal-agentive functions differs from this one: an agent or agents have an intuition that certain functional properties *F* will be sustained by certain physical properties *P* (e.g. a certain acoustic configuration will be listened to as a sequence of *tones*, with a certain set of aesthetic qualities) and the agent or agents produce objects or events bearing in mind the realization of these functions. The fact that the object or event performs such functions will not depend on a convention about what such function itself is.

Returning to the idea of the distinction between a work *qua* musical entity and a musical entity *qua* work, this involves the distinction between two types: Musical Entity and Musical Work. The distinction is then explained in terms of *functions*: to be music *simpliciter*, a sound event must have certain causal-agentive functions; to be a musical work, that sound event must also be a bearer of status-functions. Something can be music in the absence of conventions for musical works – in an alternative scenario where all musical *performances* are spontaneous improvisations, never to be repeated, there are no "works" in the sense in which we use that concept – but nothing *counts* as a musical work in the absence of conventions for musical works. As in the case of *tabla*, the presence of a mere repeatable pattern is not sufficient: it is required that such pattern figures as an element in a structure of coordinated beliefs.

To conclude this digression in dogmatic register, the functions one attributes to a musical entity *qua* work can *vary in thickness*, that is, according to the context, functions performed by musical works may include or exclude essential reference to a specific composer or a set of specific performance means. As such, no individuation theory, such as sonicism or instrumentalism, will apply across the board to the whole of music history, but will depend on conventions which vary according to context. In some cases, musical works may be more like the type *Tabla*, and in other cases they can be more like the paradigmatic works of *Sturm und Drang* romanticism. Thus, how *fine-grained* the individuation of a musical work must be will depend on conventions (which is different from them being simply arbitrary) and not on inherent properties of "sound structures", independent of the way we conceptualize works.

The difficulty faced by most theories in the literature, giving them the air of arbitrariness pointed out by Scruton, lies in the attempt to treat musical works somewhat like we treat natural kinds, ignoring the metaphysical baggage of the concept "work" and reducing it to the notion of a mere sonic repeatable. Sonic repeatables are, in fact, independent of us and our beliefs, but the ontological level (or level of description) at which they exist, whether as *concreta* or *abstracta*, is not the level at which we can find artworks or musical works *qua* art.

Conclusion

The seeming dilemma Scruton raises against musical ontology is but an appearance of such. If we accept that metaphysical questions about music concern not its mere "acoustic vehicle" (the sonic repeatables in which musical works are "embodied") we are not, in virtue of that fact, confined to a range of merely arbitrary solutions for metaphysical puzzles. Some answers are more illuminating or explanatorily powerful than others, even though we cannot guarantee their truth in every detail – they *point* us toward paths that are more or less fruitful. Specifically, theories that avoid the "fetishism" of the sound structure, conceiving works as complex functional entities, as emergent wholes that are more than the sum of parts standing in the relations that sustain them (a pattern of tones, the agents who "indicate" it, the shared beliefs that make it possible to speak of musical styles, forms and traditions, etc.) in a way that much resembles how certain institutional entities

"emerge" from a configuration of elements which are not susceptible, taken each in itself, of being identified with *the* entity at issue.

The reader can now imagine a club of *tabla aficionados* (who are also perhaps addicted to philosophical puzzles) this entity, "the club", is not to be identified with any particular building that may host its head office, with a specific set of members and officials, nor with official documents establishing its "legal personality", though each of those things "embodies" the entity at issue, in the way a score, a performance, ideas in the minds of agents, etc., embody a musical work. Nor is the club a Platonic type, that would *actually* exist previously to the coordinated, causally interconnected actions and beliefs that constitute the "life path" of the club in the concrete world. The club exists when those actions and beliefs exist, and not simply because the existence of such entity or of those actions and beliefs is an open possibility in the world. Something new *is* introduced in the world when humans *create* things such as clubs of *tabla aficionados* addicted to philosophical puzzles, just as something new is introduced in the world when there is coordination of beliefs about what *counts* as a piece, point, quadrant, board and legal moves in *tabla*. Neither *tabla*, nor Vaughan William's *Fantasia*, nor Joyce's *Finnegans Wake*, nor Bomberg's *Mud Bath* existed before the actions that caused those entities to emerge from merely possible patterns took place.

References

Alexander, Samuel (1988), *Collected Works of Samuel Alexander*, *British Idealism Series*, John Slater (ed.), London: A&C Black.

Borges, Jorge Luis (1999), *Collected Fictions*, Andrew Hurley (trans.), London: Penguin Books.

Currie, Gregory (1989,) *An Ontology of Art*, Glasgow: Scots Philosophical Club.

Currie, Gregory (2009) "Art for Art's Sake in the Old Stone Age", *Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics* 6(1).

Danto, Arthur (1964) "The Artworld", *The Journal of Philosophy* 61(19): 571–584.

Danto, Arthur (1981), *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Davies, David (2004), *Art as Performance*, Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Dilworth, John, "How to Reform Danto's Vehicle Fetishism", (internet) available at: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ce53/a21519888d4475a75dc71bbc04a2b30ad611.pdf

Dodd, Julian (2007), *Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Howell, Robert (2002) "Types, Indicated and Initiated", *British Journal of Aesthetics* 42(2): 105–127.

Joyce, James (2012), *Finnegans Wake*, Oxford: Oxford World Classics.

Kania, Andrew (2008), "New Waves in Musical Ontology", in Kathleen Stock and Katherine Thomson-Jones (eds.), *New Waves in Aesthetics*, New York: Springer, pp. 20–40.

Levinson, Jerrold (1980) "What a Musical Work Is", *Journal of Philosophy* 77(1) 5–28.

Levinson, Jerrold (2011), "What a Musical Work Is, Again", in Jerrold Levinson (ed.) *Music, Art and Metaphysics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 215–263.

Levinson, Jerrold (2013), "Indication, Abstraction and Individuation", in Mag Uidhir (ed.), *Art and Abstract Objects*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 49–61.

Magnus, P. D. (2013), "Historical Individuals like *Anas platyrhynchos* and 'Classical Gas'", in Mag Uidhir (ed.), *Art and Abstract Objects*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 108–124.

Margolis, Joseph (1974), "Works of Art as Physically Embodied and Culturally Emergent Entities", *British Journal of Aesthetics* 14 (3) 187–196.
Rohrbaugh, Guy (2003), "Artworks as Historical Individuals", *European Journal of Philosophy*, 11(2): 177–205.
Scruton, Roger (1997), *The Aesthetics of Music*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Searle, John (1995), *The Construction of Social Reality*, New York: Simon and Schuster.
Searle, John (2010), *Making the Social World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Small, Christopher (1998), *Musicking, The Meanings of Performing and Listening*. Middletown; Wesleyan University Press.
Stone, Jim (1994) "Games and Family Resemblances", *Philosophical Investigations* 17(2): 435– 443.
Thomasson, Amie (1999), *Fiction and Metaphysics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Walton, Kendall (1970), "Categories of Art", *Philosophical Review* 79(3): 334–367.
Young, James O. (2011), "The Ontology of Musical Works: A Philosophical Pseudo-Problem", *Frontiers of Philosophy in China* 6(2): 284–297.
Young, James O (2014), "The Poverty of Musical Ontology", *Journal of Music and Meaning* 13: 1–19.
Zangwill, Nick (2014), "Metaphor as Appropriation", *Philosophy and Literature* 38(1): 142–152.

Vitor Gererju

Da li su muzička dela zvučne strukture?

Apstrakt

Ovaj rad posvećen je dilemi u vezi sa ontologijom muzike, koju je u svom delu *The Aesthetics of Music* izneo Rodžer Skruton: ili se ontologija muzike bavi određenim „stvarima" nezavisnim od uma (zvučne strukture), u kom slučaju je sama *muzika* isključena, ili se ona bavi „intencionalnim objektom", te su stoga njeni problemi podložni arbitrarnim rešenjima. Naš je stav da je u pitanju prividna dilema, te da se muzička dela ne mogu izjednačiti sa zvučnim strukturama, bilo da ih razumemo kao apstraktne entitete ili ne. Načelno, ideja je sledeća: i platonizam i nominalizam u pogledu muzičkih dela su vrste fetišizma – muzička dela nisu „stvari" u Dantoovom smislu „pukih realnih stvari". Naprotiv, ona podrazumevaju kompleksne veze između objekata, događaja i različitih vrsta funkcionalnih svojstava. U tom pogledu, oslanjam se na Levinsonov i Hauvelov pojam *indikacije*, kao i na Serlov pristup institucionalnoj realnosti... uz mali zaokret sa moje strane.

Ključne reči: ontologija muzike, platonizam, nominalizam, umetnička dela, tipovi.

UDK: 78.01:111.1
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1901054G
Original Scientific Article
Received: 19.10.2018. Accepted: 16.12.2019.

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY
VOL. 30, NO. 1, 001-196

Nemesio García-Carril Puy

MUSICAL WORKS' REPEATABILITY, AUDIBILITY AND VARIABILITY: A DISPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT

ABSTRACT
This paper is devoted to face recent views in the ontology of music that reject that musical works are repeatable in musical performances. It will be observed that musical works' repeatability implies that they are audible and variable in their performances. To this extent, the aim here is to show that repeatability, audibility and variability are ontologically substantive features of musical works' nature. The thesis that will be defended is that repeatability, audibility and variability are dispositional non-aesthetic properties of musical works. The plausibility of the dispositional account of musical works' repeatability, audibility and variability will lead us to the conclusion that they are ontologically substantive features of musical works' nature, and consequently, any suitable explanation of the ontology of musical works must not ignore them.

KEYWORDS
ontology of music, musical works, musical performances, repeatability, audibility, variability, dispositions, musical medium, common ground, contextualism.

Introduction

Musical works are said to be repeatable to the extent that they can multiply occur through musical performances in different places either simultaneously or across time (cf. Goodman 1968; Wollheim 1980; Wolterstorff 1980; Levinson 1980; Kivy 1983; Rohrbaugh 2003; Dodd 2007). Beethoven's *5th Symphony* was premiered in Vienna in 1808, and it was performed again by the New York Philharmonic in 2015. By means of these performances, this work is taken to occur in Vienna and New York at different times. These performances are not copies but occurrences of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* in which we can hear, encounter, experience and appreciate the very same thing composed by Beethoven in 1808. Accordingly, musical works' repeatability implies their audibility. Musical works are said to be audible insofar they can be heard through their performances. It is assumed that we can hear a musical work by means of hearing a properly formed performance of it, either in an analogical or in a derivative sense (cf. Dodd 2007: 11; Wolterstorff 1980: 40; Davies 2009). In addition, musical works' repeatability implies their variability. A musical work is said to be variable to the extent that its 'multiple instances can differ from one another in artistically relevant respects' (Davies 2012: 643). Since musical performances are sound-sequence events, and events are bound to a specific space-time location, a work's performances are always different. Even in the

Nemesio García-Carril Puy: Filolab – Department of Philosophy I, University of Granada; nemesio@ugr.es.

extreme case that two performances of a work were sonically indistinguishable, they would be different for the mere fact that they were produced at different places and times. Therefore, assuming that musical works are repeatable commits us to assume that they are audible and variable.

Despite the general agreement about the repeatable character of works of music, some sceptical views about it have recently arisen. Lydia Goehr (2007) and Alessandro Bertinetto (2016) have questioned the repeatable character of works of music, arguing that it is a belief that has emerged from a socio-historical conception about music, rather than a fact concerning musical works' ontological nature. These authors argue that musical works' repeatability is a belief suggested by an aesthetic an aesthetic ideal (the *Werktreue*) of a particular historical period (the classic-romantic period). According to the *Werktreue*, what makes a performance valuable is its fidelity in reproducing the work's score performed. The *Werktreue* claims that the valuable relation between a work and its properly formed performances is a relation of correspondence or matching: the performance must match the features of the work's score. This aesthetic value has suggested, according to these authors, the belief that musical works are repeatable. However, Bertinetto argues, this is an aesthetic ideal historically located in the classic-romantic period that does not apply beyond that era. In turn, Christopher Bartel (2017) has argued, on the basis of an experiment, that the intuition that musical works are repeatable is not as broadly shared in our musical practices as philosophers have usually taken it to be. Accordingly, ontologists have overestimated the relevance of such intuition in proposing their accounts for musical works' nature. Meanwhile, Allan Hazlett (2012) has offered an argument showing that the intuition that musical works are repeatable is inconsistent with the intuition that musical works are modally flexible entities –i.e. that they could have been different in other possible worlds. He takes the latter to be a strong intuition that ought to be preserved at the sacrifice of the intuition that musical works are repeatable.

The aim of this paper is to explore the plausibility of a factual account of musical works' repeatability, audibility and variability. The goal is to find an ontologically substantive account of the repeatable, audible and variable character of musical works that may face those accounts that aim to dismiss the relevance of these features concerning musical works' nature. The thesis that will be defended here is that repeatability, audibility and variability are dispositional non-aesthetic properties of musical works. This factual character of musical works' repeatability, audibility and variability will suggest that they are features that must not be superficially ignored by an adequate view of musical works' ontological nature. For this purpose, this paper is divided into four sections. In the first section, Jerrold Levinson's taxonomy of musical works non-aesthetic properties will be introduced. In the second section, it will be shown that musical works' repeatability does not satisfy the conditions to fall under any of the three kinds of non-aesthetic properties identified by Levinson. It will be argued that this situation does not imply that our claims about musical works' repeatability are not ontologically substantive. To this extent, it will be provided a dispositional account of repeatability that regards it as a dispositional non-aesthetic property of musical works. The third and fourth sections will follow the same strategy concerning audibility and variability, respectively, showing that they are dispositional non-aesthetic properties of

musical works. The conclusion that will be achieved is that repeatability, audibility and variability are ontologically substantive features of musical works' nature that must be accounted by an appropriate view of the ontology of musical works.

1. The Non-Aesthetic Properties of Musical Works

The features that can be ascribed to a musical work from a non-aesthetic point of view are of a wide diversity. For instance, Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* is said to be polyphonic, tonal, orchestral, symphonic, original, composed by Beethoven, influencer, in C minor, 1554 measures length, etc. There are two traits that, according to Frank Sibley, distinguish aesthetic from non-aesthetic attributions. The former but not the latter involve the exercise of taste and are non-condition governed (cf. Sibley 1959; Matravers 1996). Accordingly, there can be sufficient conditions for a non-aesthetic attribution to a musical work, regardless our aesthetic sensibility or taste. In this way, it is generally accepted that non-aesthetic uses of predicates are descriptive. When we apply a predicate in a non-aesthetic use to a musical work, we are typically describing the work's possession of a property independently of our affective responses to it. This view can be associated, on the ontological level, to a kind of realism (cf. Budd 2007: 336). It is reasonable to think that Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* is for orchestra, independently of our affective responses when we experience those works. A lover of Gregorian chant and a fanatic of Bach's fugues for four voices are able to recognize in the same way that Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* is for orchestra. When we judge that Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* is for orchestra we are describing a feature that the work possesses whether or not we feel pleasure or emotion in hearing it. This sort of realism *prima facie* fits Sibley's distinction between the aesthetic and non-aesthetic attributions. According to Sibley, 'it would be ridiculous to suggest that aesthetic sensitivity was required to see or notice or otherwise perceive that something is, say, large, circular, green, slow, or monosyllabic' (Sibley 1965: 135). Accordingly, realism and the descriptive character of our talk about non-aesthetic properties of musical works will be assumed in this paper. For this reason, I will speak indifferently about non-aesthetic predicates or properties.

An attempt to classify the heterogeneity of non-aesthetic properties of musical works –and of artworks in general– has been offered by Levinson. Levinson has identified three different kinds of non-aesthetic properties: structural, substructural and relational (Levinson 2011: 135). Structural properties are perceivable intrinsic features of musical works. Examples of them are *being polyphonic, monodic, contrapuntal, polyrhythmical, orchestral, atonal, tonal, high-pitched* or *low-pitched*. All these properties can be identified by hearing a properly formed performance of a work. In audition, we get all we need to judge that *De Angelis* Gregorian Mass is monodic, given that it is constituted only by the voice of the melody, that Mozart's *Horn Concerto K495* is polyphonic, since its texture is generally an accompanied melody, and that Bach's fugues are contrapuntal, for simultaneously different melodic lines with their own personality can be perceived. A trained listener is able to distinguish in a mere audition that Mozart's symphonies are tonal while Schönberg's *Pierrot Lunaire* is atonal. Therefore, structural properties are perceivable manifest non-aesthetic properties of a musical work.

Substructural properties are defined as physical features of a work that cannot be discerned in direct perception of a work's performances (Levinson 2011: 135). *Having 600 bars of 4/4, having exactly 2556 crochets* and *being in E flat major* are examples of substructural properties of musical works. It is impossible to determine in audition the exact number of crochets of Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony*. The difference between *having exactly 2556 crochets* and *having exactly 2557 crochets* cannot be discerned by hearing a performance of it. We need to resort to the work's score and counting one by one the crochets of the piece. Or, alternatively, in audition, we would need the additional non-perceptual information of the equivalence of one crochet in real time. A similar thing happens with the property of *having 600 bars of 4/4*. In a direct perception, the difference between *having 600 bars of 4/4*, *having 601 bars of 4/4* and *having 600 bars of 4/4 and one silent bar of 2/4* cannot be discerned. Moreover, there is a sense in which typical structural properties, as *being in E flat major*, can be taken to be substructural ones, even for those listeners having perfect pitch. In audition, a perfect-pitch listener is only justified to say that the work is in a major tonality whose fundamental pitch corresponds to a frequency around 311 Hz. However, there are two major tonalities compatible with this frequency as fundamental sound: E flat major and D sharp major. Deciding in which of these tonalities the piece is placed requires additional non-perceptual information to be obtained from an analysis of the work's score.[1] Therefore, substructural properties are non-straightforwardly perceivable non-aesthetic properties of a work.

Finally, contextual properties are relations of the work to elements of its context of composition. Examples of contextual properties are *being original, being composed by, being influenced by or being in a certain genre*. By contrast with structural and substructural properties, contextual properties are not monadic, but at least dyadic ones, i.e. they have at least two argument places. One of the places is always filled by the musical work, and the other(s) is saturated by an element of the context of composition. This is easy to see in predicates as '*x* being composed by *y*': the *x* place is filled by a work (ex. The *Fifth Symphony*) and the *y* place by a composer (ex. Beethoven). However, this is not so obvious in cases like 'being original'. This predicate seems to have only one argument place ('*x* is original') to be filled by the musical work at stake. Nevertheless, when we say that the *Fifth Symphony* is original, we do not mean that this piece is original *simpliciter*, but relatively to the set of musical works composed until that moment, or to other set of pieces relevant in the conversational context. Accordingly, predicates as 'being original' have a hidden argument place to be filled by the relevant set of works in the conversational context. A musical work is said to be original only in relation to other pieces. Therefore, contextual properties are relational non-aesthetic properties of a work.

1 For an interesting discussion regarding this topic, see Davies 2001: 48–54. According to Davies 2001: 51, and concerning tonal music, 'pitches are named, *indirectly* or directly, with regard to their scalar position' (My emphasis). His point is that, firstly, the identity of pitched tones depends on their place within sequences of intervals but not on their frequencies, due to the variability of the relation between them; and secondly, the identity of intervals depends on their place in tonally structured sequences (Davies 2001: 53). Additionally, I claim that the identity of tonality depends on its place in the general structure of the piece and on its relation to the other tonalities, if any, involved in the piece.

According to Levinson, structural, substructural and contextual attributes exhaust the sort of non-aesthetic properties of an artwork upon which its aesthetic properties depend (Levinson 2011: 136).[2] However, Levinson's taxonomy does not exhaust the kinds of non-aesthetic properties that musical works have. Levinson is interested only in those non-aesthetic properties that stand in a relation of dependence with the aesthetic ones. To complete the analysis of the non-aesthetic properties of musical works, an additional kind of non-aesthetic properties has to be considered. This kind of properties is different in nature from the three sorts considered by Levinson, and it is the one to which musical works' repeatability, audibility and variability belong. None of these features can be classified into the three groups of non-aesthetic features identified by Levinson. However, as we shall see, there are good reasons to take them to be factual, and hence, substantive features of musical works. In what follows, I will address each one of these features trying to show the plausibility to take their nature as that of dispositional properties.

2. Repeatability as a Disposition

As introduced previously, musical works are said to be repeatable in the sense that they *can* occur through their performances in different places and times (cf. Dodd 2007: 9 and ff.; Rohrbaugh 2003; Howell 2002). The repeatable character of musical works consists in a one-to-many relation: we hear, encounter, experience and have access to a same musical work in its different properly formed performances. There is something in common to these performances, namely, the musical work they perform. If repeatability is a property of musical works, then it is a non-aesthetic one, in the sense pointed in the introduction of this paper. Attributions of repeatability to musical works satisfy none of the two conditions set by Sibley for aesthetic attributions. Firstly, repeatability is a feature that we attribute to musical works regardless our reactions and attitudes towards them. I say that Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* is repeatable just by noticing that there is something in common between some musical performances, something that does not require any emotional response relative to my aesthetic taste. Secondly, there are sufficient conditions to say that Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* is repeatable: the existence of musical performances that fully satisfy the score's prescriptions. Therefore, if repeatability is a musical works' property, it is a non-aesthetic property. The goal of this section is to explore whether the general claim that musical works are repeatable, or particular claims such as 'The *Fifth Symphony* is repeatable', are substantive from an ontological point of view, i.e. if they describe musical works as possessing repeatability as a real property.

The first task is to explore whether musical works' repeatability satisfies the conditions to fall under any of the different sorts of non-aesthetic properties distinguished by Levinson. The first thing to note is that 'being repeatable' is a monadic predicate. When I say that the *Fifth Symphony* is repeatable, my claim is that the *Fifth Symphony* is repeatable *simpliciter*, not relatively to any other parameter. Consequently, since contextual properties are not monadic but relational

2 Levinson only assumes this exhaustivity, while recognizing that it is not proved.

ones, musical works' repeatability does not satisfy the conditions to be a contextual non-aesthetic property of musical works. It does not satisfy the condition to fall under this sort of levinsonian non-aesthetic properties.

Musical works' repeatability also fails to be a substructural non-aesthetic property of musical works. The examples given by Levinson of substructural properties are the following: *having a straight line 5.005 centimetres long, exemplifying the ratio 999/2000, containing an angle of 60° 30', being scored for exactly 105 violins in unison*, and *containing 12,345 h's* (Levinson 2011: 114–116). All these properties have in common that they specify measurable features of artworks. However, repeatability is not a property that specifies the measure of any feature of musical works. Moreover, one of the reasons adduced by Levinson for taking *being scored for exactly 105 violins in unison* to be a substructural property is that one will not detect in a work's performance audition a change from 105 to 104 violins. In the same way, *having a straight line 5.005 centimetres long* is a substructural property because one is not able to detect in seeing a painting the change from 5.005 to 5.006 centimetres. However, this phenomenon does not happen concerning musical works' repeatability. There is no alternative feature from which repeatability cannot be discerned in the audition of a work's performances. The only alternative is non-repeatability, i.e. the negation of repeatability, but this is not the point of Levinson's reasoning. Consequently, musical works' repeatability does not fit these two characteristics of substructural properties' nature. Therefore, it cannot be classified as a substructural non-aesthetic property.

Nonetheless, it might be argued that repeatability is a structural property of musical works. It might be claimed that I know that a musical work is repeatable in listening to, at least, two performances of it. If these performances accomplish the work's score, we perceive in hearing them that the work has been performed more than once. Accordingly, repeatability would be a perceivable feature of musical works and, consequently, it would fall under the class of structural non-aesthetic properties. As Levinson notes, 'an attribute is perceivable in a work if the work can be determined to have the attribute through appropriate experience of the work' (Levinson 2011: 113).[3] Consequently, it seems that, knowing what 'repeatability' means, I could determine by perception alone that a musical work is repeatable in the same way as, knowing what 'monodic' means, I can determine by perception alone that a work is monodic. If this view were right, I would be able to know non-inferentially that a work is repeatable only by what I perceive in an audition of it, and hence repeatability would be a structural non-aesthetic property of musical works.

However, this view is not right. I need additional information to the one provided by perception alone to determine if a work is repeatable. There is a notable difference between repeatability and structural features as monodic, contrapuntal or atonal: while the latter can be noticed in a single audition of a piece, I need, by definition, to listen to a work at least twice in order to ascribe the property of repeatability to it. But even disregarding this difference, I need additional information

3 Levinson himself acknowledges that the term 'appropriate' is vague and that 'what counts as *appropriate perception* for one work of art is very different from what counts as such for another' (My emphasis).

not given in aural perception to determine if a piece of music is repeatable. I need to know the relation holding between the two performances that I have attended. To grasp it, I need to know, among other things, that these two performances are both properly formed performances of the work and that between them holds an enough degree of similarity. This is a kind of information that is not given in direct perception, involving elements of the context of composition and reception of the piece that require inferences to be obtained. By contrast, additional information to perception is not needed in the case of 'monodic' because, if I know what 'monodic' means, I obtain through my ears all what I need to discern if a piece is monodic. That is, in aurally registering just a single melodic line with no musical accompaniment, I need nothing else to describe the piece as monodic.

Therefore, it seems that musical works' repeatability does not satisfy the conditions to fall under any of the three kinds of non-aesthetic properties identified by Levinson. Repeatability is neither a structural nor a sub-structural nor a contextual non-aesthetic property of musical works. Accordingly, we might plausibly conclude that our claims about musical works' repeatability are not ontologically substantive. By means of these claims, we would not be ascribing any real non-aesthetic property to musical works. We would not be describing anything about musical works' ontological nature. However, that would be a too fast conclusion if we attend more closely to the reasons adduced in the previous paragraph for rejecting that repeatability is a structural a non-aesthetic property of musical works.

The epistemic differences involved in the adscription of the predicates 'monodic' and 'being repeatable' to musical works do not necessarily lead us to consider that the former but not the latter is a real non-aesthetic property of musical works. The epistemic difference in the adscription of such predicates might be regarded as a consequence of the different nature of the properties referred by means of those predicates. While former is a manifest property of musical works, the latter is a power that musical works have. This different nature explains the differences in the epistemic access we have to them. According to Hume, we cannot infer from direct perception the powers a thing has:[4]

> It must certainly be allowed that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles, on which the influence of these objects entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of bread; but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities, which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body (Hume 1748: E 32–33).

In the same way as Adam, at the very first and with his cognitive skills in perfect working, cannot infer from the fluidity and transparency of water that it can suffocate him (Hume 1748: E 27), we cannot infer the repeatability of a work in merely hearing two performances of it. Audition alone does not suffice to ascribe to a work the property of being repeatable. Following Hume's view, what we obtain in

4 This does not imply that Hume's view is that no concept of power can be applied. It would be needed an additional assumption, the *Thesis of Deductivism*, according to which 'any judgement is rationally supported only by that which entails the truth of the judgement' (Molnar 2003: 119). However, the assumption of this principle would lead us to many counterintuitive ontological consequences (cf. Molnar 2003: 121-4).

perception is not the work being repeated in two performances, but only two performances presenting similar set of manifest properties –as the structural properties of *being polyphonic, monodic, contrapuntal, polyrhythmical, orchestral, atonal, tonal, high-pitched* or *low-pitched*. Therefore, the analysis above suggests that, although repeatability does not fall under any of the sorts of non-aesthetic properties distinguished by Levinson, it may be regarded as a dispositional property of musical works.

Dispositions are properties directed to certain manifestations, individuated by their directedness to such manifestations, but not ontologically dependent on their manifestations. Typical examples of dispositions are fragility, solubility or elasticity (cf. Armstrong 2010; Mellor 2012; Mumford 2009). A glass is said to be fragile. This property is directed to its manifestation, namely, the glass shattered. However, the glass possessing the property of being fragile does not ontologically depend on its actual ravage or in having been shattered in a previous time. The glass possesses the property of being fragile even if its manifestation never arises. As Armstrong acknowledges, it is not unusual particulars having dispositions that never manifest during their history (Armstrong 2010: 49). Moreover, according to Molnar (2003: 58), dispositions are intrinsic to their bearers, in the sense that the bearer's having the disposition is ontologically independent of any other thing wholly distinct from the bearer (cf. Molnar 2003: 39, 40). Due to the force of gravity on Earth, a glass tends to break when dropped off. Alternatively, the force of gravity on the Moon is significantly lower, so that the same glass does not have the tendency to break when dropped off there. However, the glass still has the disposition of being fragile even in the lunar ecosystem. It is generally assumed that the adscription of dispositions is closely linked to counterfactual conditionals (cf. Choi & Fara 2016). These counterfactual conditionals determine the suitable conditions for the manifestation of the property. For instance, sugar is said to have the disposition of being soluble. The solubility of the sugar is closely linked to the counterfactual conditional '*x* quantity of sugar would dissolve if put into *y* quantity of water'. Dissolution is not the normal state of sugar, but a state that sugar will adopt if certain conditions hold. Similarly happens with the glass. Shattering is not the normal state of the glass, but one that the glass will adopt if certain conditions hold, ones that do not actually hold in the moon.

If repeatability is a dispositional property of musical works, it must satisfy the definitory features of dispositions introduced in the last paragraph. First of all, musical works' repeatability is directed to an occurrence of the work, or more precisely, to the work occur again by means of a musical performance or a reproduction of a recording of it. Beethoven's *5*th*Symphony* occurring again by means of a musical performance is a manifestation of its repeatability as a dispositional property. New York Philharmonic's performance of the *5*th *Symphony* on 31st October of 2015 was a manifestation of the repeatability of this work. In this performance, the audience of the concert encountered the very work composed by Beethoven and had access to it. The *5*th *Symphony*'s repeatability is individuated by this kind of manifestation. This is what distinguishes it from other dispositions, as solubility. Both solubility and repeatability can be powers an object has. However, while solubility is directed to that the object be dissolved, repeatability is directed to a new occurrence of an object.

In addition, a work's repeatability is not dependent on its manifestation. A work that has never been performed, or that has been performed only once, is not precluded of being repeatable. For instance, Antonio Florian's *Por Tripicado*, a minimalistic piece for brass quintet, was premiered by the Proemium Metals on 26th November 2015. This piece has not been performed again, but if suitable conditions hold –as the Proemium Metals programing the piece for a concert and performing accurately its sound structure to an appropriate audience– the work will take place again by means of a properly performance of it. Derek Bourgeois'*Brass Quintet No. 2* was composed in 1972 for the Philip Jones Ensemble. However, the British group declared the piece impossible to play due to its very high technical difficulty, and it remained unperformed until April 2014, when it was premiered by the Proemium Metals. Since the composer declared the piece finished in 1972 and he delivered the work in an institutional act to the group that commissioned it, it would be mistaken to claim that the work does not exist prior to April 2014. Moreover, it would be mistaken to take the Philip Jones Ensemble's declaration that the piece was impossible to play as entailing that the work was not repeatable at that time. Instead, the piece was repeatable, at least, since the composer finished and deliver it in 1972, but the suitable conditions for the manifestation of its repeatability did not hold until April 2014. These two real examples of our musical practices illustrate that a work's repeatability is not ontologically dependent on the manifestation of such property.

As other dispositions, musical works' repeatability is associated to a counterfactual that specifies the suitable conditions for its manifestation. The canonical analysis of dispositions in counterfactual terms adopts the following form: an object is disposed to M when C iff it would M if it were the case that C (cf. Choi & Fara 2016). For instance, sugar is disposed to dissolve when put into water – i.e. sugar is soluble – *iff* it would dissolve if it were put into water. The corresponding counterfactual for musical works' repeatability can be formulated as follows:

> A work W is repeatable in a musical medium M iff W would occur if it were the case that W's sound structure is performed or reproduced in M.

The counterfactual determines as suitable conditions for the manifestation of a work's repeatability a performance or reproduction of the work's sound structure in a specific musical medium. For instance, if the sound structure of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* were performed by The Hallé Orchestra at the Bridgewater Hall Manchester to an audience compounded by the subscripts to the orchestra's 2017/18 season, *Beethoven's 5th* Symphony would occur again. The musical medium consists of the place in which the reproduction of the sound structure is made, a time, the professional musicians of the orchestra and a qualified audience. The notion of artistic medium has been characterised as the 'shared understandings upon which the artist draws as to the specific implications of particular manipulations of the vehicular medium for a work's artistic content' (Davies 2011: 49). The people gathered in the Bridgewater Hall – musicians and audience – shares certain understandings about music. This set of shared understandings can be regarded as a *common ground*, what for Stalnaker is a context, who defines it as a 'a body of information that is presumed to be shared by the parties to a discourse' (Stalnaker 2014: 2). In this case, the body of information is compounded by musical theories

and knowledge regarding the practices of classical music Western tradition. The performers presuppose this body of information in a pragmatic sense when they are reproducing the sound structure of Beethoven's *5th Symphony*. They take for granted the truth of this body of information and assume that the others involved in the context –other artists, critics, and listeners – do the same, analogously to what happens in ordinary conversational contexts (cf. Stalnaker 2014: 3–4). When the sound structure of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* is performed in a musical medium like this, the work's disposition to occur again is manifested.

Of course, a radically different cultural community from the one described above –one whose members lack the concepts of musical work, composition, authorship, score and authenticity– is conceivable. The musical medium of this different culture is one in which there are only performances: people play and hear music regardless anything else beyond the actual sounds being produced at the moment of that performance. In this community, a reproduction of the sound structure of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* would not count as an occurrence of this work. However, this fact does not entail that Beethoven's *5th Symphony* is a fiction and that musical works are not repeatable. Instead, the point is that the repeatability of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* never manifests in this community. The work possesses the disposition of being repeatable, but it remains unmanifested in this culture because this culture does not provide the suitable conditions for the manifestation of musical works' repeatability. However, even in this medium, the work possesses the disposition of being repeatable, although unmanifested.

An analogy between repeatability and fragility may illustrate the point introduced in the previous paragraph. Fragility is defined as 'a disposition to break when easily dropped' (Mumford 2009: 476). Glasses are typically said to be fragile. For instance, if a glass were dropped on Earth, it would break. Earth's gravity satisfies the suitable conditions for the manifestation of the glass' fragility. However, if the very same glass were dropped on the Moon, it would not break because Moon's gravity does not satisfy the suitable conditions for the manifestation of the glass' fragility. Although the glass' fragility remains unmanifested in the Moon, the glass possesses this disposition even there. If, suddenly, Moon's mass increases 81 times, the suitable conditions for the manifestation of the glass' fragility would hold and, if it were dropped, it would break. Analogously, if some of the shared understandings in the abovementioned musical medium were removed to accommodate the concepts of musical work, composition, authorship, score and authenticity, the suitable conditions for the manifestation of the repeatability of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* would hold. The case of the glass shows the intrinsic character of dispositions: the possession of the disposition by the glass is ontologically independent of any other thing wholly distinct from that glass. Its possession is not ontologically dependent on the medium in which the glass is. The glass is fragile in both media, Earth and Moon. By contrast, the manifestation of its disposition is ontologically dependent on the medium – indeed, it is an unmanifested disposition on the Moon. Analogously, the possession of repeatability by Beethoven's *5th Symphony* is ontologically independent of the medium in which its sound structure is performed. The work is repeatable in both media, the Western musical tradition and this alternative culture. Only the manifestation of the disposition is ontologically dependent

on the medium – repeatability is an unmanifested disposition of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* in the alternative culture.

Therefore, the manifestation of musical works' repeatability is a fact of the medium of Western musical tradition. This fact is explained in dispositional terms: repeatability is a dispositional property of musical works whose manifestation arises when suitable conditions hold. Accordingly, repeatability is neither a false aesthetic ideal (Bertinetto 2016), nor an intuition to arbiter between musical practices (Bartel 2017), nor a theoretical feature that we ascribe to musical works from assigning to them the ontological category of abstract objects (Hazlett 2012). It is not an ideological feature. Repeatability is a substantive feature of musical works' ontological nature. It is a dispositional property of them. The phenomenon that musical works bear the dispositional property of repeatability is a fact of our musical practices that must not be ignored by an appropriate explanation of musical works' ontological nature.

3. Audibility as a Disposition

As noted in the introduction, musical works' repeatability implies their audibility. Given the factual character of repeatability as a dispositional property of musical works, it seems plausible that a similar phenomenon arises for their audibility. This is the item to be explored in this section. Let us recall that musical works are said to be audible to the extent that, through their performances, we can hear them. As happens with repeatability, if audibility is a property of musical works, it is a non-aesthetic one. The attribution of audibility to musical works does not satisfy, at least, one of Sibley's conditions for aesthetic attributions. Audibility is a feature that we attribute to musical works regardless our emotional reactions in an audition of them. I attribute audibility to Beethoven's *5th Symphony* independently of my affective reactions when hearing a properly formed performance of that symphony. Therefore, if audibility is a musical works' property, it is of a non-aesthetic kind. The relevant question is, again, to determine whether musical works' audibility is substantive from an ontological point of view. To this extent, the task is to ascertain whether the property of being audible falls under any of the sorts of non-aesthetic properties pointed by Levinson, or it is of a dispositional nature, as musical works' repeatability. Accommodating musical works' audibility in one of these two cases would provide us with a factual and ontologically substantive account of it. If so, there would be good reasons to regard audibility as a feature of musical works' nature.

In the first place, it might seem that I can determine that a musical work is audible in an aural perception of it. If I go to a concert and hear a performance of Beethoven's *5th Symphony*, I am justified to attribute to this piece the property of being audible. It might be thought thus that audibility is a structural non-aesthetic property of musical works. However, there is a notable difference between audibility and structural properties such as monodic, contrapuntal or atonal. What I detect non-inferentially in an audition of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* is that it is polyphonic and for orchestra, that its first movement has a music cell that repeats all time, or that it starts in a minor tonality. However, as in the case of repeatability, I do not

detect non-inferentially, i.e. in direct perception, that Beethoven's *5th Symphony* is audible. At least, I have to make the very simple inference that Beethoven's *5th Symphony* is audible since I hear it by hearing a performance of it. In a broader sense of perception, we can rightly think that the involvement of such inference is not enough to deny the perceptual character of audibility. However, Levinson's characterization of structural properties seems to be extreme, in the sense that he claims that a structural feature is 'anything composing the object on a fundamental level of observation' (Levinson 2011: 135). It is doubtful that we can accommodate such inferences at the *fundamental level of observation*. But even if we do so, audibility is not something *composing* Beethoven's *5thSymphony* as pitches, tonalities or timbres do. According to the definition of composition, $x_1, ..., x_n$ compose y if and only if $x_1, ..., x_n$ are parts of y, and for every z, such that z is a part of y, there is some x_i (where $1 \leq i \leq n$) such that z overlaps x_i (Caplan & Bright 2005: 62). It seems that some pitches, tonalities and timbres are parts of the *Fifth Symphony*, and that for every other thing being a part of Beethoven's *5thSymphony*, it overlaps some of these pitches, tonalities and timbres. However, audibility is not, in any sense, a part of the *Fifth Symphony* and then, no relation of overlapping holds between audibility and any other part of the symphony. Therefore, the nature of audibility seems to be different from the nature of structural properties.

In the second place, it might be argued that there are grounds to consider audibility as a contextual feature, taking it to be a relational property. Following this view, when I say that Beethoven's *5th Symphony* is audible, my claim is not that it is audible *simpliciter*, but relatively to beings equipped by an appropriate perceptual mechanism. Nevertheless, this relativity of audibility does not make it a contextual property in the levinsonian way, since the domain of the relata is not restricted to the context of composition of the work to which this property is ascribed. When I say that the *Fifth Symphony* is audible, I do not mean that is audible *only* for Beethoven's contemporaries, but for all beings from any time equipped by the appropriate perceptual apparatus. In addition, and more relevant, although the description of a property might involve the reference to other things – in the case of audibility, the reference to beings equipped by an appropriate perceptual mechanism –, the property itself does not need to be relational.[5]The other elements alluded in the description of the property are, rather, the suitable conditions for the manifestation of the property. As in the case of repeatability, audibility can be regarded as a dispositional property associated to a counterfactual specifying the suitable conditions for its manifestation. This counterfactual can be specified as follows:

> A work W is audible in a musical medium M iff W would be heard if it were the case that W's sound structure is performed or reproduced in M.

The musical medium in which musical works are typically performed is compound by human beings having a perceptual apparatus that allows musical works to be heard by an audience. The perceptual apparatus of the human beings involved in the musical medium of Western musical tradition satisfies the suitable conditions for the manifestation of the audibility of musical works. By contrast, if Beethoven's *5th Symphony* were performed in a community of deaf people, it would

5 I am very grateful to Derek Matravers on this point.

not be heard. The audibility of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* remains unmanifested in this community because it is a musical medium that does not satisfy the suitable conditions for its manifestation. Nonetheless, the suitable conditions that a musical medium provides for audibility are not only constrained to the selection of an audience having an appropriate perceptual apparatus. The shared understandings of the musical medium allow a performance of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* sound structure to be perceived *as* a performance in which the work itself can be heard by the audience. In the same way as the shared understandings of an artistic medium allows a brushstroke in a canvas to be artistically meaningful (cf. Davies 2013: 225–227), the shared understandings of the musical medium of Western musical tradition allows a reproduction of the *5th Symphony*'s sound structure not to be perceived as mere noise, but as a performance in which a musical work is heard. Therefore, rather than a contextual property, audibility is a disposition of musical works. As in the case of repeatability, the possession of this disposition intrinsic to musical works, but its manifestation is dependent on external factors satisfying certain conditions.

Against the dispositional view of musical works' audibility, it might be objected that it is a substructural non-aesthetic property. It might be assumed that the property of *being audible* can be reduced to the property of *being in the hearing range* or *having a frequency range between 20 Hz and 20 kHz*.[6] Since every audible thing is audible in virtue of *having a frequency range between 20 Hz and 20 kHz, being audible* seems to be grounded on the property of *having a frequency range between 20 Hz and 20 kHz*. Then, we might think that both properties are coextensional and equivalent, at least in our actual world. Following this line of reasoning, if *having a frequency range between 20 Hz and 20 kHz* is a substructural property of musical works, *being audible* would be also a substructural one, since it can be reduced to the former property.

However, this view does not support the idea that audibility is a substructural property for two reasons. Firstly, there is a sense in which being in the hearing range, or *having a frequency range between 20 Hz and 20 kHz*, is a perceptual property. One can perceptually detect a change from being between 20 Hz and 20 kHz and being between 20 Hz and 21 kHz. While in the first case all the pitches of the work can be heard, in the second case there are pitches of the piece that cannot, namely, those falling between 20 kHz and 21 kHz. This is a perceivable difference and, consequently, *having a frequency range between 20 Hz and 20 kHz* is a structural property in this sense. However, we have seen previously that audibility is not a structural, and hence, directly perceivable property of musical works.

Secondly, there is another sense in which *having a frequency range between 20 Hz and 20 kHz* is a non-perceptual property, motivating its accommodation as a sub-structural property. One cannot perceptually detect a change from *having a frequency range between 20 Hz and 20 kHz* and *having a frequency range between 21 Hz and 19'999 kHz*. However, from the fact that *being audible* and *having a frequency range between 20 Hz and 20 kHz* are coextensive, it does not follow that they are equivalent (cf. Cohen 2002). The former has causal powers that cannot

6 This view would be to hold a *categoricalist* about properties as Armstrong, according to which all true properties are non-dispositional (cf. Armstrong 1997: 80).

be reduced to the causal powers of the latter. By contrast with *not being audible*, *not having a frequency range between 20 Hz and 20 kHz* does not entail *per se* that people will not enjoy of the sound of all melodies in the audition of a piece possessing that property, or that a performer will decide not to study some passages of the work because nobody will hear if he is playing them right, wrong, expressively or awfully, and so on. Conversely, people will enjoy of all the melodies, and the performer will decide to study the piece, because it *is audible*, not because it *has a frequency range between 20 Hz and 20 kHz*. The shared understandings of a musical medium, associated to the conditions for the manifestation of audibility as a disposition, confers causal powers to the property of being audible that are absent for the property of *having a frequency range between 20 Hz and 20 kHz*. These shared understandings explain the motivations for the audience's audition and for the performer's performance. The shared understandings are precisely what make a reproduction of a sound structure to be perceived as a performance in which a musical work is heard. They play a role in the manifestation of *being audible*, but they play no role in the manifestation of *having a frequency range between 20 Hz and 20 kHz*, granting a series of causal powers to the former that are absent for the latter. Therefore, being audible cannot be reduced to *having a frequency range between 20 Hz and 20 kHz*. Consequently, audibility is a musical works' non-aesthetic property whose nature is different from structural, substructural and contextual ones.

Therefore, as it happens with repeatability, we have good reasons to conclude that audibility is a dispositional property of musical works whose manifestation is a fact of the musical medium of Western musical tradition. We go to concerts in which the *5*th *Symphony* is programmed, reproduce recordings of it and play its melodies because we want to hear this work. This fact is explained in dispositional terms: audibility is a dispositional property of musical works whose manifestation arises when suitable conditions hold. Accordingly, audibility is a substantive feature of musical works' ontological nature. The phenomenon of musical works being audible by means of its performances is a fact of our musical practices that the ontology of music must not ignore.

4. Variability as a disposition

It has been noted at the beginning of this paper that musical works' repeatability does not only imply their audibility. It also implies their variability. A musical work is said to be variable, let me recall, to the extent that its 'multiple instances can differ from one another in artistically relevant respects' (Davies 2012: 643). It is broadly assumed that two performances can vary in tempo, dynamics, timbre, and balance, and however be legitimate occurrences of the same musical work (Dodd 2007: 2; Davies 2003: 33). In addition, it is also broadly accepted that a musical work can occur in performances having some wrong notes (cf. Davies 2003: 33). Performances having wrong notes are not perfectly formed performances of a work, but they can be regarded as occurrences of it. Therefore, when we say that the *5*th *Symphony* is variable, we are saying that it multiply occurs in different manners. In the same way as repeatability and audibility, if variability is a property of musical works, it is a non-aesthetic one. Our attributions of variability to musical works

do not satisfy, at least, one of Sibley's conditions for aesthetic attributions. There are sufficient conditions to judge a musical work as variable. Given that the premiere of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* in 1808 and the performance of the New York Philharmonic are different in nuances, timbre and tempo, if they are regarded as properly formed performances of the *5th Symphony*, this is enough to say that the *5th Symphony* is variable. Therefore, audibility cannot be considered as an aesthetic property of musical works. Accordingly, the point is to explore whether it can be accommodated within any of the three sorts of levinsonian non-aesthetic properties or within the dispositional account offered for repeatability and variability. If that were the case, there would be good reasons to consider variability as a factual feature of musical works' ontological nature.

Since variability attributes the possibility of differences between occurrences of a same musical work, the description of variability involves the reference to at least two occurrences of a work. Accordingly, variability might be characterised as a relational property, and the doors are open to classify it as a contextual non-aesthetic property of musical works. However, as in the case of audibility, this is not a plausible option because the domain of the relata is not restricted to the context of composition of the work. If variability were a relational property in the levinsonian sense, it would have as relata occurrences of the work and also some relevant features of the context of composition of the work. However, contexts of performance –and not the context of composition– are the contexts that determine the limits of the variability of musical works in performance. They determine the degree of similarity to be satisfied by the properly formed performances of a work by determining how a composer's instructions in a score are to be understood. Consequently, the scope of a musical work's variability can vary from context to context. For instance, in a festival of historical performances, a performance of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* on modern instruments would not be regarded as an occurrence of that piece. By contrast, it would be accepted as an occurrence in the context of the audience of the 2017/18 season of the Bridgewater Hall Manchester. Another case: let us consider a warming and brilliant performance of Beethoven's *5th Symphony* having a wrong note on the 1st movement horn solo –the horn soloist performed by mistake a C instead of a B flat as the first note of the solo. In the context of a concert hall, this performance will be regarded as an occurrence of the *5th Symphony*. Meanwhile, in the context of a recording studio, this performance will be rejected to be included in an album because it would not be regarded as an occurrence of it. Therefore, variability does not satisfy Levinson's characterisation of contextual non-aesthetic properties: it would be a triadic property and none of the relata has to do with the work's context of composition.

Accordingly, given the apparent relational character of variability and that it does not fall under the category of Levinson's contextual properties, let us explore the plausibility of a dispositional account for it. In this sense, some similarities between audibility and variability can be noted. As in the case of audibility, although the description of the property of being variable involves the reference to other things different from the property –for instance, the reference to at least two occurrences of the same work–, the property itself needs not to be relational. The possession of this property by a work is not ontologically dependent on the existence of at least two occurrences of it. The example of Bourgeois' *Brass Quintet*

Nº2 illustrates how an unperformed piece has the power of being properly performed in different artistically relevant respects in the future. This phenomenon does not make variability to be a structural or a sub-structural non-aesthetic property. Rather, variability would be better characterised as a dispositional property of musical works, and the external issues involved in the description of the property are part of the suitable conditions for its manifestation. For instance, the suitable conditions for the manifestation of the variability attributed to Beethoven's *5th Symphony* requires this piece to be repeatable in multiple performances. As in the case of repeatability and audibility, variability can be associated to a counterfactual specifying the suitable conditions for its manifestation in the following terms:

> A work W is variable in a musical medium M at time $t_1$and t_2 iff W would occur at t_1 and at $t_2$if W's sound structure were performed or reproduced in different artistically relevant respects in M at t_1 and t_2 (being $t_1 \leq t_2$).

The counterfactual determines as suitable conditions for the manifestation of a work's variability that the following facts arise: 1) at least two musical performances or reproductions, either temporally coincident or separated in time; 2) that these two performances or reproductions to be of the same sound structure; 3) an appropriate musical medium. The musical medium determines the scope of manifestation of a work's variability in an analogous way than the natural medium determines the scope of manifestation of the glass' fragility. Since Mars' mass is substantially lower than Earth's mass, the scope of situations in which a glass is broken on Mars is more reduced than on Earth. Analogously, since a festival of historical performances only admits as occurrences of a work those performances implemented on historical instruments, the scope of admissible differences between properly formed performances of a musical work is more reduced there than in an open-minded musical medium admitting any class of instruments for performance. But, even, there are contexts in which the scope of the manifestation of a work's variability reduces to an absolute minimum. The cultural community whose members lack the concepts of musical work, composition, authorship, score and authenticity would be one not satisfying the suitable conditions for the manifestation of variability, for it is a culture in which musical works are not taken to occur more than once. The *5th Symphony* cannot be performed in different artistically relevant respects in that context of performance because the work does not occur more than once. Variability is an unmanifested disposition of musical works in that musical medium, as fragility is an unmanifested disposition of a glass on the Moon.

The dispositional account of variability, including the musical medium as part of the suitable conditions for the manifestation of the property, accommodates Davies' idea that 'the range of acceptable variations' of a work is 'constrained by the norms of the intended performing community' (Davies 2012: 652). In this sense, Davies claims that 'it is through the practices and norms of a performative and receptive community that the proper understanding of the composer's prescriptions is given' (Davies 2012: 653). However, the dispositional account of variability shows that the nature of musical works is not ontologically dependent on the shared understandings or the tacit conception of the musical medium. The existence of the work and its possession of the property of being variable do not depend on a particular set of beliefs shared by the members of a specific musical context. The

tacit conception of the musical medium plays an important role by providing the conditions for the manifestation of a work's variability. However, the role of such tacit conception does not consist in determining the nature of musical works. The dependence of the manifestation of musical works' variability on a musical medium does not make the nature of musical works to be determined by what we think about them in such medium. Consequently, the dispositional account of variability offers a characterization of our musical practices that acknowledges the relevance of the role played by the tacit conception while leaves open, at the same time, the possibility of metaontological realism for musical works.

Therefore, as it happens with repeatability and audibility, the variability of musical works is a fact of the musical medium of Western musical tradition. This fact is explained in dispositional terms: variability is a dispositional property of musical works whose manifestation arises when suitable conditions hold. Therefore, the phenomenon of musical works being variable is a fact of our musical practices to be accommodated by any account aiming to explain the ontological nature of musical works.

5. Conclusions

In recent debate, some views that deny that musical works are repeatable – and derivatively that they are variable and audible – have emerged. The aim of this paper was to respond to these views by showing that repeatability, audibility and variability are ontologically substantive features of musical works to be explained by the ontology of music. Firstly, Levinson's taxonomy of the non-aesthetic properties of musical works has been introduced. It has been noted that this taxonomy is not exhaustive of all sorts of non-aesthetic properties of musical works. It is just exhaustive of those non-aesthetic properties upon which aesthetic properties depend. For this reason, it was not problematic that musical works' repeatability, audibility and variability do not satisfy the conditions to fall within any of the three sorts of non-aesthetic properties identified by Levinson. It does not imply that they are not real properties of musical works. To this extent, it has been shown that the nature of musical works' repeatability, audibility and variability can be satisfactorily explained by means of a dispositional account of properties. In addition, since repeatability implies audibility and variability, the fact that these two latter features can be explained by a dispositional account theoretically reinforces the idea that musical works' repeatability is a dispositional property. The dispositional account offers thus a homogeneous account of the nature of repeatability and its implications. Accordingly, it has been concluded that repeatability, audibility and variability are dispositional non-aesthetic properties of musical works, and hence, ontologically substantive features of musical works' nature that must not be ignored but explained by any appropriate ontological account of works of music.

References

Armstrong, David M. (2010), Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics, New York: Oxford University Press.

–. (1997), *A World of States of Affairs*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bartel, Christopher (2017), "The Ontology of Musical Works and the Role of Intuitions: An Experimental Study", *European Journal of Philosophy* 21: 348–367.
Bertinetto, Alessandro (2016), *Eseguire l'inatteso: Ontologia della musica e improvvisazione*, Roma: Il Glifo.
Budd, Malcolm (2007), "The Intersubjective Validity of Aesthetic Judgments", *British Journal of Aesthetics* 47: 333–371.
Choi, Sungho and Michael Fara (2016), "Dispositions", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* Edward N. Zalta (ed.), (internet) avalible at: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/dispositions/>.
Cohen, Jonathan (2002), "On an Alleged Non-Equivalence between Dispositions and Disjunctive Properties", *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 53: 77–81.
Davies, David (2013), "Categories of Art", in Berys Gaut and Dominic Lopes (eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics*, New York: Routledge, pp. 224–234.
–. (2012), "Enigmatic Variations", The Monist 95: 644–663.
–. (2011), "Medium", in Theodor Gracyk and Andrew Kania (eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 48–58.
–. (2009), "Works and Performances in the Performing Arts", *Philosophy Compass* 4: 744–755.
Davies, Stephen (2003), *Themes in the Philosophy of Music*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–. (2001), *Works and Performances: A Philosophical Exploration*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dodd, Julian (2007), *Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goehr, Lydia (2007), *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goodman, Nelson (1968), *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols,* Indianapolis: The Hobbs-Merrill Company.
Hazlett, Allan (2012), "Againts Repatable Artworks", in Christy Mag Uidhir (ed.), *Art and Abstract Object,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 161–178.
Howell, Robert (2002), "Types, Indicated and Initiated", *British Journal of Aesthetics* 42: 105–127.
Hume, David (1748), *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, London: A. Millar.
Kivy, Peter (1983/1993), "Platonism: A Kind of Defense", in Peter Kivy (ed.), *The Fine Art of Repetition: Essays in the Philosophy of Music*, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 35–58
Levinson, Jerrold (2011), *Music, Art and Metaphysics: Essays in philosophical Aesthetics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–. (1980), "What a Musical Work Is", *Journal of Philosophy*, 77: 5–28.
Matravers, Derek (1996), "Aesthetic Concepts and Aesthetic Experiences", *British Journal of Aesthetics* 36: 265–277.
Mellor, Hugh (2012), *Mind, Meaning and Reality. Essays in Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–. (1974), "In Defense of Dispositions", *Philosophical Review* 83: 157–181.
Molnar, George (2003), *Powers: A Study in Metaphysics,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mumford, Stephen (2009), "Laws and Dispositions", in Robin Le Poidevin et al. (eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics*, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 417–479
Rohrbaugh, Guy (2003), "Artworks as historical individuals", *European Journal of Philosophy* 11: 177–205.
Sibley, Frank (1965), "Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic", *The Philosophical Review* 68: 421–450.
–. (1959), "Aesthetics Concepts". *The Philosophical Review* 74: 135–159.
Sibley, Frank (1965), "Aesthetic and Nonaesthetic", *The Philosophical Review* 68: 421–450.
Stalnaker, Robert (2014), *Context,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wollheim, Richard (1980), *Art and Its Objects*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wolterstorff, Nicholas (1980), *Works and Worlds of Art*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nemesio Garsija-Karil Pui

Ponovljivost, audibilnost i varijabilnost muzičkih dela: dispozicionalni pristup

Apstrakt

Ovaj rad bavi se recentnim stanovištem u ontologiji muzike koje odriče da se muzička dela ponavljaju u izvođenjima muzike. Pokazaćemo da ponovljivost muzičkih dela podrazumeva da su ona audibilna i varijabilna u svojim izvođenjima. U tom pogledu, naš cilj je da pokažemo da su ponovljivost, audibilnost i varijabilnost ontološki supstancijalne odlike prirode muzičkih dela. Branićemo tezu da su ponovljivost, audibilnost i varijabilnost dispozicionalna i neestetska svojstva muzičkih dela. Plauziblinost dispozicionalnog pristupa ponovljivosti, audibilnosti i varijabilnosti muzičkih dela vodi zaključku da su u pitanju ontološki supstancijalne odlike prirode muzičkih dela, te da ih, posledično, nijedno adekvatno objašnjenje ontologije muzičkih dela ne sme zanemariti.

Ključne reči: ontologija muzike, muzička dela, izvođenja muzike, ponovljivost, audibilnost, varijabilnost, dispozicije, muzički medijum, zajedničko tlo, kontekstualizam.

UDK: 78.011.26
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1901073L
Original Scientific Article
Received: 21.10.2018. Accepted: 26.12.2019.

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY
VOL. 30, NO. 1, 001-196

Hugo Luzio

THE ONTOLOGY OF ROCK MUSIC: RECORDINGS, PERFORMANCES AND THE SYNTHETIC VIEW

ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the state-of-the-art dispute over the ontological question of rock music: what is the work of art, or the central work-kind, of rock music, if any? And, is the work of rock music ontologically distinct from the work of classical music, which is the only musical tradition whose ontology is vastly studied? First, I distinguish between two levels of inquiry in musical ontology: the fundamental level and the higher-order level, in which comparative ontology – the project in which someone engages by considering that there is ontological variety among works of distinct musical traditions – falls. After addressing two general questions about rock music, I turn to Theodore Gracyk's ontological account of rock music, according to which the primary focus of critical attention in rock music are recordings, or recorded tracks. This view has the consequence that 'recordings' is a fundamental concept of philosophy of music, necessary for us to understand rock music. Stephen Davies objected that Gracyk's account fails to assign appropriate value to a valuable practice with which rock audiences are committed, live performance, and argued that the works of rock music are of the ontological kind *for studio performance*. Finally, Andrew Kania synthetized both views: rock recorded tracks are at the centre of rock as an art form, thus being the rock works. For, different reasons, none of these views is deemed satisfactory.

KEYWORDS
Comparative Ontology, Rock Music, Recordings, Performances, Songs, The Synthetic View.

1. Introduction: Musical Ontology and Rock Music

We should begin by distinguishing between two levels of inquiry in the field of musical ontology, which studies the kinds of musical things there are, and the relations that hold between them (Kania 2008: 20). At the fundamental level, there is the traditional – and, of course, traditionally philosophical – project of accounting for the nature of musical works, whose goal is pursued by answering three questions. First, what is the basic ontological category to which musical works belong? In other words, what kind of existents are musical works? Someone addressing this question – the *categorial* question – is engaged in a project of ontological categorisation. However, the statement that musical works are a certain kind of thing, e.g., abstract types, leaves a question about their ontological status unanswered: when are two musical works numerically identical? What are their individuation properties of

Hugo Luzio: Language, Mind and Cognition Research Group (LanCog), Faculty of Letters, University of Lisbon; hugo.luzio@campus.ul.pt.

musical works? Someone addressing this question – the *individuation* question – has to provide a non-trivial and appropriate criterion of identity for musical works, of the form 'musical work W = musical work W^* if and only if □'. Finally, it is additionally necessary to determine the conditions in which musical works come to existence and cease to exist. Are musical works creatable? Do musical works persist through time when they are performed? And, are musical works destroyable? This final question is, non-surprisingly, the *persistence* question (Dodd 2007: 1–2.).

A performance of a given musical work is an event in which *that* work is authentically produced. But, when are two performances of the same musical work genuine performances of *that* work? Which are the conditions that a performance of a musical work must met, in order for it to be an *authentic performance*, that is, a performance of *that* musical work? Note that agreement about the categorial nature of musical works does not imply agreement about when they are properly instantiated in performances (Ravasio 2018: 15). As such, there is a further standalone question concerning the instantiation relation between musical works and performances. The authenticity of performances is arguably the most widely discussed higher-order issue in the literature of musical ontology. This issue is *higher-order*, in virtue of working at a higher degree of generality than the *fundamental* questions described before. It problematizes a relation, of which musical works and performances are *relata*, independently of whatever turns out to be their fundamental nature. These levels of inquiry are, in principle, logically independent.[1]

Now, though there are no *prima facie* reasons for restricting the applicability of any of these questions to a particular range of candidates belonging to a certain musical tradition, it is important to notice – mostly for our purposes, though – that the prime examples in their discussions are the works and performances of Western classical music, with emphasis given to the canonical repertoire that goes approximately from 1700 to 1950. Despite all its value and importance, classical music is, nevertheless, only a musical tradition among others. And, just as there may be ontological variety between works of classical music belonging to distinct historical periods, musical works belonging to other musical traditions beyond classical music may also deserve distinct ontological accounts. There are different appreciative focuses across musical traditions, as evidenced by their practices. So, do these differences warrant different ontological accounts of the works of those traditions (Ravasio 2018: 13)? The project of comparative ontology, in which this paper engages, aims at giving an ontological account of the work of art, or the central work-kind, of both non-Western and Western musical traditions other than classical music, such as jazz and rock. This paper discusses the ontological question of rock music: what is the work of art, or the central work-kind, of rock music, if any? And, is the work of rock music – if there is one – ontologically distinct from the work of classical music (Ravasio 2018: 1)?

In the following section, I discuss three influential accounts of the ontology of rock music, which are due to Theodore Gracyk, Stephen Davies and Andrew Kania. For different reasons, I shall conclude that each of these accounts is unpromising. It is important to notice that this discussion is neutral with regard to the

1 For a radical objection to the project of higher-order ontology, see Brown 2011. The exchange continues in Kania 2012, and Brown 2012.

fundamental nature of musical works and performances. This means, in particular, that the existence of creatable pieces and recordings, but, as well, of performances and playback events that instantiate them, are taken for granted.

Rather, are the relations between these things, and the roles they play in the practices of rock music, that matter being disputed (Kania 2008: 32). Before engaging with the ontology of rock music, let me address two preliminary, general questions about rock. What is its historical and geographical location? That is, when did rock became a musical and a cultural category?

It is uncontroversial that rock did not exist before 1950. There are, however, different musicological views about this matter. If Elvis Presley's early recording sessions at *Sun Studios* count as its starting point, then rock emerged in the mid-1950s. It may also be slightly older, if earlier forms of *rhythm and blues* and *swing* are considered rock stylistically (Cf. Peterson 1990; Everett 2009). If, otherwise, one takes the advances made particularly by John Lennon, Paul McCartney, Bob Dylan and Ray Davies as essential contributions to the beginning of rock, it emerged in the mid-1960s – the role of the *British Invasion* of American cities in 1963-1964 is also crucial to this story (Moore 2011: 416). Whichever is the right view, there was definitely a time before which rock was not a part of the cultural experience. So, as philosophers, we should ask: *what* is it that did not exist prior to its originating era? As Moore nicely emphasises, declarative statements of the form 'rock is □' are bound to fail, for the term 'rock' describes a set of discrete ways in which music works (Ibid: 416). Even if it primarily describes a musical *style*, with many sub-styles, such as punk or indie rock, it also describes, at least, a musical *genre*, a musical *practice* and a musical *repertory*. Although these senses may often operate together, they are not necessarily coextensive (Ibid: 416). Rock's most distinctive characteristic may, in fact, lie at the realm of ontology.

2. Recordings, Performances and the Synthetic View

Recordings, that is, recorded tracks, are of a unique importance in rock music. In the tradition of classical music, however, such is not evident. The works of classical composers tend to be compositions created for live performance. Compositions are arguably the focus of critical attention in such tradition. Although there are recordings of classical music, these recordings are not attributed the status of *classical works* by classical audiences. Rather, they are simply documents of important live performances of compositions. Classical recordings are not usually intended to be works in their own right, though they document performances of classical works. The role of recordings in the classical tradition is evidently less important than the roles of composition and performance. They contribute for classical performances of classical compositions to be, rightly, disseminated, but they are not classical works. This contrasts drastically with the role of recordings in the tradition of rock music, in which they are sometimes purported as works of art in and of their selves, commonly containing features unfound in songs or performances (Burkett 2015: 1).

The dominant ontological account of rock music is Theodore Gracyk's (Cf. Gracyk 1996). Rock is, in Gracyk's view, "popular music of the second half which is essentially dependent on recording technology for its inception and dissemination"

(Ibid: 13). This conception is justified with a version of the first type of musicological view described before: the beginning of rock coincides with Elvis Presley's early recording sessions at *Sun Studios*, and found stability in Bob Dylan's first electric albums, and *The Beatles*' shift of focus from live shows to the recording studio (Ibid: 1–17). In a slogan: rock employs recording as its primary medium (Ibid: 13). In simple terms, rock works are the primary focus of critical attention in rock music. According to Gracyk, recorded tracks are rock works. Recorded tracks are brought into existence by recording processes – the process of making a recording. Recording is, thus, the primary means for rock works to be created. We might also wonder whether this account is circular: if rock music is a tradition in which recordings are primary, it is not surprising that the thesis that recordings are the mediums of rock comes out true (Fisher 1999: 486). However, I think that undermining this particular musicological view would not undermine Gracyk's ontological thesis.

So, what makes recordings *the* works of rock music? As stated, recordings of classical music document performances of compositions, thus being not classical works. Classical recordings are *veridic*, for they can be regarded as being true to performance (Fisher 1998: 115–117). They document live extended musical events which are treated, in the studio, according to a regulative idea of how that live performances should sound, as established by the conventions for listening to performances of that sort of music. Playbacks of veridic recordings – and so, playbacks of classical recordings – are meant to sound as much as possible as the live performances of which they are documents would sound, if we were listening to them in front of us, and not through the mediating tracks that resulted from their capture. Veridic recordings are regarded as products of a neutral registration process: recording technology ought to make them sound *not* like recordings of performances, but like performances.

Rock recordings are not generally documents of unmediated and temporally unified performances (Ibid: 115). There surely are recordings of live performances of rock songs. But, they are not the primary focus of attention in rock music. It is uncommon, if not unseen, for rock bands to record a *new* live *album*. Documenting live performances is not the appropriate way to produce a new rock work. These may be *rock* recordings, stylistically, but they are *veridic* recordings nonetheless, and thus not works themselves. Another way to put it is that rock works do not purport to be documents of live performances. Instead, they are created in the recording studio, through a recording process. The production of a rock recording articulates complex processes of multi-tracking, sound overdubbing, signal processing, editing, mixing, mastering, and so on. In this sense, rock recordings are *constructive*, thereby reflecting largely the way in which electronic signals are generated and treated. These features are not only acceptable, but truly essential to the works of rock music (Ibid: 120). And, they clearly undermine the principle of veridicality to performance (Bruno 2013: 66).

Those who take part in the recording process – the musicians, the sound engineers and, perhaps, the musical producers – collaborate in the creation of a rock work, which may not be disentangled from the created recorded track. It is distinctive of rock music that "the musical works do not exist apart from the recording itself" (Gracyk 1996: 13). Rock recordings are musical works in their own rights. Their sound is as relevant as any other aspect of the interpretation of those works.

This does not mean, however, that recordings are the only recognised works in rock music. Gracyk thinks that rock recordings exemplify, at least, two musical works: the autographic track, which are encoded on the recordings, and the allographic song, which recordings frequently manifest, even though they are not performances of that song (Ibid: 17–18). The constructivity of rock recordings suggests that many of the properties of recorded tracks are not determined by the songs they manifest (Bruno 2013: 66).

It is useful to use Stephen Davies' well-known distinction between musical works, in terms of their relative 'thickness' or 'thinness'. Davies says: "The thicker the work, the more the properties of its sounded instances are essential to its character. A piece that is specified solely as a melody and chord sequence, leaving instrumentation, elaboration, and overall structure up to its performers, is thinner in constitutive properties than one in which those features are also work-determinative. Generally, the more a work's instances can differ while remaining equally and fully faithful to it, the thinner that work is" (Davies 2003: 39). On Gracyk's account, rock songs are *thin* sound structures, individuated "by little more than chord progression and basic melody" (Gracyk 1996: 21, 36). The thinness of songs opposes to the saturated thickness of recorded tracks, which are individuated by "precise detail of timbre and articulation" (Ibid: 32). Recordings of rock songs 'obliterate' previous interpretations by erasing any distinctions between performances of rock songs and rock songs themselves (Ibid: 14). The precise details of recordings are precisely the artistically primary features of rock music: subsequent live performances imitate recordings, thus showing their priority. The work of rock music is therefore not a thin sound structure to be instanced in different performances, as in classical music, but a thick sound structure, encoded on a recording, and properly instanced through playback (Kania 2006: 2–3; Gracyk 1996: 1–98).

As mentioned, rock recordings are not documents of performances. Nonetheless, rock audiences often seem to experience rock recordings as if they were recordings of unified performances (Fisher 1999: 469). Though recordings are constructive, they are often experienced veridically. It is often on the basis of something like the experience of listening to a rock recording *qua* a recorded live performance, that we judge the band or artist we are listening to, and that we decide whether or not to support their live shows. We have good reasons to do precisely so. Many rock bands or artists chose to record live performances in the studio, through a single take, with every musician playing at the same time. And, those bands often choose to do so, because they intend their recordings to have *that live feel*, so as to approximate the experiences that rock audiences obtain when they listen to their recordings and see their live shows. Is this evidence in favor of the primacy of live performances over recordings? I am not certain. But, at least, I think it is evidence for the inexistence of a sharp cleavage between veridicality and constructivity, in Fisher's senses.

Gracyk is aware of this. He concedes that rock recordings are not usually regarded as non-objective, non-referential works, similar to pieces of electronic music. Rather, they seem to be regarded as documents of virtual or imaginary performances. So, what is primary, the recordings or the imaginary performances presented by them (Ibid: 469)? I agree that recordings are *distinctive* works of rock music. This may explain why they are distinctively valued by rock audiences, and occupy a distinctive position in the configuration of rock music. But, I doubt them to

be *the* work, or *the* central work-kind, of rock music. There is a problem concerning the status of unrecorded rock songs, which Dan Burkett presents as follows:

> In the 2011 documentary *Back and Forth*, Dave Grohl, lead singer of the *Foo Fighters*, describes how the song *Enough Space* was written and introduced into the band's repertoire mid-tour to cater to the European mosh pits. The song became the *Foo Fighter*'s concert opener and was performed live for many months before being recorded. Much energy and experimentation were spent on the song's conception, and it subsequently became a focus of critical attention by fans and commentators alike. Despite this, a track-centred ontology would hold that until the song was recorded it failed to qualify as a work of rock music by the *Foo Fighters*. (Burkett 2015: 3)

I agree with Burkett. This seems wrong. Stephen Davies also presents an interesting objection to Gracyk's ontological account of rock music, according to which it fails to assign appropriate value to performative skills in the tradition of rock music. Rock musicians pride themselves on their live performance skills, and rock audiences, which are committed to live performances, expect them to be able to play live shows to a standard commensurate with the playing that is heard on the record (Bartel 2017: 145). Davies says, rightly, that "more groups play rock music than ever are recorded; almost every recorded group began as a garage band that relied on live gigs; almost every famous recording artist is also an accomplished stage performer; although record producers are quite rightly acknowledged for the importance of their contribution, they are not usually identified as members of the band" (Davies 2001: 32).

Gracyk's ontological account has the strange consequence that the groups who play rock music, without ever being recorded – either because no recording deals were offered or because they cannot afford the recording expenses – do not create rock works. This problem, which was baptized by Burkett as the *no works* problem, also applies to hypothetical cases in which recording technology never appeared in the first place, and, thus, no rock works would ever be created, or dystopian future scenarios in which recording technology is abolished, and, thus, no rock works will ever be created again. An alternative ontological account, which aims at minimising the differences between classical and rock music, was offered by Stephen Davies. First, Davies distinguishes, among musical works, between those works that are for performance and those that are not.

Works that are not for performance, like electronically generated pieces, are stored as encodings, and qualify as works for playback. As stated, Gracyk thinks of rock recordings, the works of rock music, as works for playback. However, classifying rock recordings as works for playback ignores the fact that some rock recordings are re-recordings of previous recordings – or, more simply, covers. The practice of covering songs suggests, according to Davies, that rock musicians operate within a performance tradition, the differences between two recordings of one and the same song being appreciated for their subtle nuances (Ibid: 31–32). The idea is that cover versions are more like new interpretations of existing works, that is, more like performances, than like new works in their own rights (Kania 2006: 403). As in classical music, works of rock music are created for performance. Nevertheless, whereas classical works are works for *live* performance, rock works are works for *studio* performance (Davies 2001: 34–36).

Works for studio performance are "special kinds of performances that involve the electronic manipulation and sculpting of sound to achieve effects that, typically, cannot be achieved live. Multi-tracking, collaging, filtering, mixing, and other interventions are central to the presentation of such works. The result, which is issued on disk, is what I call a virtual performance. It is virtual in two respects. No continuous performance event of the kind that seems to be represented on the disk need take place and the "performance" occupies an aural space unlike any present normally in the real world. A work for studio performance is like a work that is not for performance in being issued on disks that are themselves for playback, not performance. The difference between the two is not apparent either in the disk or in the reliance in both cases on the resources of the studio. It is apparent in the attitude to re-recordings or "covers", should they occur. When William Shatner recorded "Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds", he produced a new performance of the Beatles' song, not a distinct but related work that is not for performance" (Davies 2003: 37).

An important feature of works for studio performance is that they can be presented live, the normative conditions for these performances deriving from what is displayed on the recorded track, and not vice-versa. By their turn, those works which are for live performance, "such as Beethoven's Fifth, can also be issued on studio recordings the making of which does not involve continuous real-time playing. I call what is on such a recording a simulated performance. They mimic the sound of a live performance, though no seamless performance, such as seems to be represented on the disk, took place. The normativity conditions for such recordings differ from those of works for studio performance. Large chunks of what is on the disk should have been played continuously in the recording studio – though the order of sections need not be respected and multiple takes will be standard – and the performers should be capable of giving the recorded work in performances that are live" (Davies 2003: 38).

As Kania underlines, "Davies's claim is not that there are classical works and rock works, of some common ontological kind, and that the classical ones are intended for a certain sort of performance, while the rock ones are intended for a different kind of performance. The claim is that classical works are of the *ontological kind* work-for-live-performance, while rock works are of a different ontological kind: works-for-studio-performance" (Kania 2006: 403). Unrecorded songs, like "Enough Space", will be considered rock works to the extent that they are created with the intention of eventually being performed in the recording studio (Burkett 2015: 3). But, this ontological account also suffers from a version of the *no works* problem. By replacing the reliance on recording by a reliance on the intention to perform a song in the recording studio, Davies makes his works for studio performance seem to necessarily require a sound engineer. But, Kania notices, "although many garage and pub bands may hope to be recorded one day, it is not clear that they write their songs with a part for a sound engineer even implicitly in mind. [...] These bands seem to think they are providing audiences with fully authentic performances of their songs, not with performances missing" (Kania 2006: 404).

Davies also considers the possibility that rock recordings may present more than one work of art, in particular, "an electronic piece that is replete with constitutive

properties, and [...] a realisation of a much thinner song" (Davies 2001: 33). Songs are, however, ontologically thin, consisting of little more than a simple melody, harmony, and lyrics (Ibid: 31; 180). And, this possibility is rejected in virtue of songs' under-determination: "very thin works, such as songs [...] are usually not of much interest in themselves, and the prime candidate for appreciation is the performance. As pieces become thicker, they become more worthy of interest" (Ibid: 22). The last of Davies' ideas seem to confound an ontological question concerning the relative thinness and thickness of musical works, with a value question concerning the worth of interest of musical works. Yet, songs are, for that reason, not considered the main object of interest in the rock tradition. Instead, it is the "fine details of the recorded sound [that is, of the studio performance, that] are of vital interest to an appreciative audience" (Ibid: 34). And, this is a further point of agreement between Davies and Gracyk. Songs do have some artistic value, but "more interest is taken in the details of the studio performance or interpretation than in the [song] itself" (Ibid: 34).

Is there a view that accepts rock recordings as the primary focus of critical attention, while also accommodating the importance of live performances? Could such be a plausible view? Andrew Kania's synthetic view is the middle point. First, Kania rejects Davies's claim that rock songs are works created for studio performance. Rock songs are neither works, nor for anything in particular (Kania 2006: 404). Notice that Kania defines a work of art as an object that "is of a kind that is a primary focus of critical attention in a given art form or tradition, and is a persisting object" (Ibid: 413). Songs are ontologically thin sound structures of "melody, harmony and lyrics", which are manifested in both recordings and live performances (Cf. Gracyk 1996: 18). However, they are not written for either recording or performance. Moreover, songs "are not the, or even a, primary focus of critical attention in rock, and thus are not musical works" (Kania 2006: 413). Kania thinks also that "we compare cover versions without thinking of them as performances of the songs they manifest." Drawing an analogy with cinema, and thinking that "remakes and covers are quite uncommon in the worlds of cinema and rock", Kania concludes that narratives and songs are insignificant (Ibid: 409).

Rock recorded tracks, on the other hand, are ontologically thick sound structures that "are at the centre of rock as an art form", thus being the musical works of rock music (Ibid: 411). That recorded tracks are the primary focus of critical attention in rock music is also evidenced by the "asymmetric dependence of live rock practices on recorded rock practices" (Ibid: 403; Gracyk 1996: 69–75). Live rock performances "look to" rock recordings, in the sense that the sound of a live performance is dependent on the sound of the recorded track (Bartel 2017: 145). In live performances, rock musicians can either choose to recreate the sound heard on the record or not. But, importantly, rock audiences are aware of this choice and attend to the similarities and differences directly (Kania 2006: 407; Bartel 2017: 145). Despite the central importance of tracks, songs may also be manifested in live performances. In simple terms, songs are a sort of basic framework that may be instantiated later as either an audio track or a live performance. It is only tracks, however, not performances, that are legitimate musical works (Burkett 2015: 4).

As Burkett emphasizes, "Kania's privileging of tracks as the musical 'work' of rock does not necessarily entail that songs and performances receive no critical

attention. Instead, the track-centered ontology is best understood as implying that while songs and performances may receive some critical attention, they are not the primary focus of critical attention in the rock tradition" (Ibid: 10). Despite their differences, recording-centred ontologies share the following claims, highlighted by Franklin Bruno (2013: 67). Songs are ontologically thin, individuated by, at most, melody, harmonic progression and lyric text. The thinness of songs renders them incapable of supporting distinctively artistic forms of appreciation and evaluation. Given these claims, an account of the appreciation and evaluation of rock music must appeal to properties of thick recordings, rather than those of the thin songs that may underlie them. Christopher Bartel also highlights two ideas that "help to diminish the status of song writing and live performance within rock." (Bartel 2017: 145).

First, all the accounts hold that the construction of tracks is of central importance in rock. Bartel thinks that this claim leads to a view of what happens in the song writing process, according to which "recording technology is utilised in the song writing process in such a way that changes the very nature of the song writing process." Second, live performance practices depend somehow on recording practices. Kania defends this point explicitly. Similarly, Davies claims that "rock stage acts are measured against their recordings, and not vice versa" (Davies 2001: 30), and, while Gracyk allows that "live performance is unlikely to become obsolete", he also speaks of performance as a matter of "packaging" (Gracyk 1996: 78). Thus, live performance is secondary to the importance of recordings. If recording-centred ontologists are right, the concept of 'recording' should be included in the basic text of philosophy of music: it is a fundamental concept, necessary for us to understand rock music. But, were it a fundamental concept of rock music, it ought to be that, if the recording technology necessary to produce recordings was never developed in the first place, then no rock bands would have produced any rock work. This is a really strange conclusion. Similarly, if, one day, no more recording technology is available, rock works will never be produced again. May the work of rock music be temporary, in this sense? If such scenarios happened in our world, I do think that rock would still evolve as a music tradition. Rock bands would still create songs. Rock audiences would still enjoy them at live performances. And, those rock bands would still be thrilling their path on the basis of performances of songs. Fortunately, our world is not like this. But, recordings are *distinctive*, not *primary* in rock music.

References

Bartel, Christopher (2017), "Rock as a Three-Value Tradition", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 75(2): 143–154.

Brown, Lee (2012), "Further Doubts about Higher-Order Ontology: Reply to Andrew Kania". *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 52: 103–106.

–. (2011), "Do Higher-Order Music Ontologies Rest on a Mistake?", *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 51(2): 169–184.

Bruno, Franklin (2013), "A Case for Song: Against an (Exclusively) Recording-Centered Ontology of Rock", *The Journal of Aesthetic Criticism* 71: 65–74.

Burkett, Dan (2015), "One Song, Many Works: A Pluralist Ontology of Rock", *Contemporary Aesthetics*, Volume 13.

Davies, Stephen (2003), *Themes in the Philosophy of Music*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–. (2001), *Musical Works and Performances: A Philosophical Exploration*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dodd, Julian (2007), *Musical Works: An Essay in Ontology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Everett, Walter (2009), *The Foundations of Rock*, New York: Oxford University Press.
Fisher, John (1998), "Rock n' Recording: The Ontological Complexity of Rock Music", in Philip Alperson (ed.), *Musical Worlds: New Directions in the Philosophy of Music*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 109–123.
Gracyk, Theodore (1996), *Rhythm and Noise: An Aesthetics of Rock,* Duke University Press.
Kania, Andrew (2012), "In Defense of Higher-Order Musical Ontology: A Reply to Lee B. Brown", *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 52(1): 97–102.
–. (2008), "New Waves in Musical Ontology", in Kathleen Stock and Katherine Thomson Jones (eds.), *New Waves in Aesthetics*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 20–41.
–. (2006), "Making Tracks: The Ontology of Rock Music", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 64: 401–414.
Moore, Allan (2011), "Rock", in Theodore Gracyk and Andrew Kania (eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Music*, New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, pp. 416–426.
Peterson, Richard (1990), "Why 1955? Explaining the Advent of Rock Music", *Popular Music* 9: 97–116.
Ravasio, Matteo (2018), "Analytic Perspectives in the Philosophy of Music", *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
Ray, Robert (1991), "Tracking", *South Atlantic Quarterly* 90(4): 771–784.

Ugo Lusijo

Ontologija rok muzike: snimci, izvođenja i sintetičko stanovište

Apstrakt

Ovaj rad razmatra najnovije rasprave povodom ontološkog statusa rok muzike: šta je umetničko delo rok muzike, ili šta je osnovna vrsta dela rok muzike, ako takvo šta uopšte postoji? Dalje, da li je delo rok muzike ontološki različito od dela klasične muzike, koja predstavlja jedinu muzičku tradiciju čija se ontologija uveliko proučava? Najpre, u istraživanju ontologije muzike razlikovaćemo dva nivoa: osnovni nivo i nivo višeg reda, gde spada komparativna ontologija – projekat u koji se upuštamo kada razmatramo ontološku različitost dela zasebnih muzičkih tradicija. Nakon što postavimo dva opšta pitanja o rok muzici, posvetićemo se ontološkom razmatranju rok muzike Teodora Grejsika, prema kom su primarni fokus kritičkog ispitivanja rok muzike snimci, odnosno snimljene numere. Ovo stanovište za posledicu ima da „snimci" postaju osnovni pojam filozofije muzike, nužan za razumevanje rok muzike. Stiven Dejvis prigovorio je da Grejsikovo stanovište ne pridaje dovoljno značaja važnoj praksi koju rok publika ceni – nastupu uživo, te je tvrdio da dela rok muzike pripadaju ontološkoj vrsti studijskog izvođenja. Napokon, Endrju Kanja spojio je obe perspektive: snimljene rok numere su u srži roka kao vrste umetnosti, što ih čini delima rok muzike. Iz različitih razloga, ni jedna od ovih pozicija nije zadovoljavajuća.

Ključne reči: komparativna ontologija, rok muzika, snimci, izvođenja, pesme, sintetičko stanovište.

UDK: 781.1:159.9
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1901083P
Original Scientific Article
Received: 21.10.2018. Accepted: 26.12.2019.

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY
VOL. 30, NO. 1, 001-196

Una Popović

IN THE DEFENCE OF MUSICAL MEANING

ABSTRACT
This paper is about the musical meaning and its relation to verbal meaning. My aim is to show that musical meaning should be sharply differentiated from the verbal one, that it should not be understood as a subspecies of verbal meaning, or as a meaning of a verbal sort whatsoever. I will address this issue starting with the sounds of music and language, and working my way up from those: by comparing these sounds and the way they relate to their meanings, I will show that musical sounds are strongly connected with musical meanings, that they have token-like qualities. Resulting from this is a suggestion to redefine the way we use the concepts of meaning and articulation, so that they would allow for the concept of non-verbal, musical meaning. Additionally, my suggestion is that musical meaning *per se* should be differentiated from the non-musical meanings music can communicate and convey – one does not exclude the other.

KEYWORDS
musical meaning, verbal meaning, sound, type/token, articulation.

Introduction

The main problem I will address in this paper is the problem of musical meaning. The problem is well formulated in the words of Leonard Meyer:

> The controversy has stemmed largely from disagreements as to what music communicates, while the confusion has resulted for the most part from a lack of clarity as to the nature and definition of meaning itself (Meyer 1956: 32).

To this I would like to add that there is further confusion, namely concerning the meaning of the concepts 'musical semantics' and 'musical semiotics' (Ross 2017: 5-6). Jean-Jacques Nattiez's words show it clearly:

> we will call "*semantic*" any sort of *extrinsic* association with music, and we will call *musical semantics* the discipline that deals with explicit verbalizations of these associations, associations that (in current experience) most often remain in the state of latent impressions. (Nattiez 1990: 104)

In my view, the problem of musical meaning – that ancient and venerable conundrum in the philosophy of music – should once again be queried, and in a very low key. Namely, a large corpus of philosophical material addressing this subject and many debates around it – for example, between Peter Kivy and Stephen Davies, between formalists and anti-formalists, etc. – have lead us to the point where

Una Popović: Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad; unapopovic@ff.uns.ac.rs.

some issues are taken for granted in view of more minute and refined concerns. The most important of those, I believe, is that of the linguistic nature of musical meaning, which is tied to implications of concepts like 'semantics', 'semiotics', and 'meaning'. Although some scholars have advocated a similar point to what I would like to express here, namely that the concept of musical meaning implies a broader, non-linguistic and non-discursive understanding of meaning, I believe that their arguments are still very much under the shadow of the language meaning paradigm. As such, in this paper I would like to place the question of musical meaning in a context that would avoid such suppositions, and hopefully to show the legitimacy of musical meaning from a more aesthetical than linguistical perspective.

So-called musical semiotics or semantics obviously connects music with the domain of language: namely, when we speak about music in terms of its meaning, the very choice of words is suggestive of the way in which we usually think of language and thoughts. Words have meanings, as well as thoughts do. Moreover, it is a commonly held notion that words have meanings only because they express thoughts, that it is the thoughts that are truly meaningful, while words merely convey the mental meanings, as some sort of vehicles (information model) for them; a string of sounds we recognize as words does not have meaning *per se*. One may follow a similar line of reasoning to say that music can have meaning: instead of words, there are musical sounds – just as words, musical sounds could convey mental meanings, that is, they could express thoughts (Kühl 2007: 23). Just as words, musical sounds can be heard and they progress in temporal fashion; just as words, musical sounds can be written and visually symbolized, crossing the boundary between the audible and the visual domains of experience. Just as words, once written, musical sounds can be repeated, in the same order, over and over again.

However, the basic intuition concerning the difference between words and musical sounds in this respect is that words have particular, specific meanings, that they are able to convey definite and concrete thoughts. In contrast to that, musical sounds do not convey any meaning that could be defined in a verbally articulated manner (Raffman 1993: 61). Even when we use words in trying to express or describe the sounds of music, there is a strong feeling that such descriptions, no matter how articulate or eloquent, always leave out something – that they cannot do justice to the actual experience of music (Kramer 2002: 12). In the context of musico-theoretical descriptions of music, there is what Seeger calls *the bias of speech* (Seeger 1977: 50), and Nattiez *metalanguage* or *metamusical discourse* (Nattiez 1990: 150, 153). As Ole Kühl puts it:

> While it is possible to speak about musical syntax in a manner comparable to language (as music will always be organized according to some principle), the case for semantics is different. In language, words have highly specified meanings: we say that a word denotes something; whereas in music, the meaning of a musical event is less specified, more vague or maybe even transient. (Kühl 2007: 37)

In my view, this problem is not to be solved by any further development or refinement of such verbal descriptions of the experience of music, since the source of the problem lies elsewhere – it springs from the difference in the experience we have while listening to music and while listening to the verbally articulated speech, grasping its meaning.

My point is, thus, to focus on the experiences of music and of verbally articulated speech, and further on the problem of musical meaning, as much as it can be analyzed from this perspective.[1] Consequently, I here equate music with what can be heard and recognized as a musical piece – as a song, symphony, etude etc. For example, I believe that we would not encounter the same problem if we were to question whether it is possible to verbally articulate musical scores, written signs of music, because 'notational systems are a mixture of discursive and non-discursive symbol systems; that is to say, of verbal and non-verbal "instructions"' (Howard 1971: 216). In this case, I believe, one could easily verbally describe the shapes of graphic signs for music, their order, the meaning a sign like # or *ff* has, and so on. Such description could take some time and space, if put on paper, but I believe it could in principle be done without anything important for musical scores being lost. My example is, of course, a trivial one, but it nevertheless makes a good point: there is a significant difference between *reading* music from music sheets and *listening* to music. Moreover, spontaneously, we are more inclined to consider music heard than music written as music *strictu senso*.

Of course, the equation of music heard – the aural experience of music – with music in the proper sense of the word is hardly a satisfactory solution to the ontological problems music raises; it merely ignites a series of further questions. As is shown in many recent debates, music heard implies a single event, which we understand as an instantiation of some musical piece, say Kalinnikov's *Symphony no.1*. The problem is often addressed in terms of a type/token distinction: „a musical work is a type whose tokens are sound-sequence-events" (Dodd 2007: 8). Tokens constitute such musical events as particular performances of Kalinnikov's *Symphony no.1* - as the one given by the Russian Symphony Orchestra under the baton of Veronika Dudarova, in 1992, for example, while Kalinnikov's *Symphony no.1* 'as such' would itself be a type - that which can be performed in several occasions, by several different orchestras, and under the baton of different conductors. What should count as this music 'as such', as Kalinnikov's *Symphony no.1* 'as such', and what kind of relations are adequate for describing the type/token matrix is, of course, a question still open for debate. Still, it is the central question in the ontology of music. In this paper, however, I would like to address another problem – namely, that of musical meaning, and I would like to start with the above mentioned idea that the aural experience of music is our genuine starting point, allowing us to think and speak about music. In other words, the content of the aural experience of music is what should be taken as music *strictu senso*, whatever the true description of musical pieces' ontology turns out to be.

My point here is a rather modest one. I wish to show that there is musical meaning in a certain acception of the term, and that it can be the subject of philosophical

1 "What is the meaning of a piece of music? It is whatever it is that we understand when we (can be said by others to) understand a musical work aesthetically; it is what interests us and what we value in musical works. On the phenomenological level, a typical understanding response to music is the experience of hearing the way one series of notes gives rise to another. It is to recognize that a musical continuation makes 'sense' (or does not make 'sense') as a consequence of what preceded it, even where the continuation might not have been predicted on hearing the antecedent passage." (Davies 2003: 121)

debate – not merely a matter of personal and subjective articulation of music heard (here follow Zangwill's argument against the privacy of aesthetic properties; see Zangwill 2015). In this respect, I believe it is important to address two issues: firstly, the very concept of meaning, in this case, as it applies to music. Namely, the concept of meaning has pervaded the debate on music from the vantage point of the linguistic domain, be it the science of linguistics or the philosophy of language. In my view, this is something to be questioned, for it may well lead philosophical analysis of musical meaning through paths more appropriate to non-musical, language meaning structures. Which brings me to my second point: the other issue that should be addressed here is the idea that musical meaning is essentially different from the meaning we ascribe to words in language (Ross 2018: 7). In this respect, I believe that, if there is anything like musical meaning at all, it must be shown to be essentially musical – it should not turn out to be some kind of indefinable verbal meaning or a verbal meaning in lesser degree.

To summarize, I think there is, in fact, a musical meaning that relates music to extra-musical reality, that music can be meaningful in the sense of being able to be about things (to have contents) other than music itself. However things turn out to be, though, I believe that musical meaning differs essentially from verbal meaning. Quoting Meyer again: 'Both designative and non-designative meaning rise out of musical experience, just as they do in other types of aesthetic experience' (Meyer 1956: 33). In what follows I shall attempt to make that view as plausible as I can.

2. Is There a Musical Meaning at All?

In addressing previously stressed points, I would like to start from the mentioned problems about verbally articulating the aural experience of music. Suppose we would like to express or describe some musical experience, say, the experience of listening to Kalinnikov's *Symphony no.1*: surely, we don't intend by that to use sounds of words in order to repeat or mimic musical sounds previously heard. If anything, by that we intend to use the meanings of words to express or describe what was experienced while listening to this particular musical piece. Thus, whatever is grasped while listening to music, it should, with this translation into language, find its expression in the meanings of words, not in their bare sounds. The problem is thus shown in its full measure: the translation should not follow the musical-audible/verbal-audible line but rather transform the musically audible into the verbally meaningful, that is, to convert something that can be heard and grasped in music, into something that can be captured and expressed, clearly and distinctly, through words in a language.

The basic implication of such analysis is that musical sounds, the musically audible, are bearers of something that could in fact be translated in that manner – that there is in music an analogue of verbal meanings, something of the same sort as them. Consequently, we speak of musical meanings - and we do it in the terms presented above: as with language, musical meanings somehow transcend the sounds of music and are, at the same time, instantiated in them. As with language, they can be expressed in written form - that is, they can be transposed from their instantiation in sounds into their symbolization in visual graphic sings. Nevertheless,

even if one accepts such a picture of musical meaning, with no further theorizing on its nature, the problem of translation would still remain: even if we are given something meaningful in music to be translated into verbal meanings, why is it that those verbal expressions and descriptions of our musical experience still strike us as imprecise and inadequate with respect to our intentions?

The solution seems to be rather simple: if there is verbal meaning on the one side, and musical meaning on the other, the problem of translation lies in their difference – words and verbal meanings cannot fully convey musical meanings, because those two meanings are of a different kind, although meanings to start with. To be more precise: it seems that words cannot convey the musical meanings supposedly encapsulated in musical sounds, because musical meanings are just too particular and too specific to be expressed by words that, in principle, have meanings of a more general sort. In other words, it seems that musical meanings differ from verbal ones as much as the medium of words and the medium of musical sounds differ from each other: words are in principle to be used repeatedly, as a sort of common currency, while musical sounds are always part of some particular musical performance, and therefore tokens in the above described sense.

However, if we take a closer look at the medium of language, we'll see that it does not differ so much from the medium of musical sounds, that 'the semantic content of spoken utterances can be affected by pitch, rhythm, tempo, accent, phrasing, attack, and decay' (Davies 1994: 2). Namely, if the words are spoken, we can listen to them in much the same manner we listen to the musical sounds. As I have mentioned before, the same goes for the written versions of words and music – both are translations of initially aural experience into the domain of spatial relations of graphic symbols. Moreover, given the graphic expression, we can repeat both the order of words and the order of sounds over and over again, creating the sound sequences that will be almost identical.

Now, the difference is to be noticed: two separate readings of some alignment of words could prove to be 'almost identical' – but not completely identical – because they would, for example, differ in tempo of the speech, or in its tonality. In such case, we would consider the differences between two readings to be less important: what is important in the case of words is that no word is missing and that they are aligned in the exact same order in which they are written and graphically presented (Kutschera 2012: 7). If these conditions are met, we would say that we are listening to the same text being read, that we grasp the same meaning being conveyed. However, in the case of music it is not so: even if the same conditions are met, we would still find the difference in tempo or in tonality of sounds to be of much greater importance. In fact, we would not consider the two 'almost identical' sequences of sounds to be identical at all. Perhaps we would finally decide that they are very similar; but even in that case we would speak about two different, although similar interpretations, two different, but similar performances of the same musical piece. The fact is that even the slightest changes in these purely audible qualities of musical sound sequences would present the sufficient reason to assign them specific identities – as if we are defining them as specific entities.

Again, the same does not apply to the sound sequences we recognize as verbal ones. Although it is well known that the changes in tempo or tonality or dynamics

or accentuation of words will in fact produce some changes in their meaning, still there is a strong inclination to disregard those in most of the cases and to behave as if nothing was actually changed (Ebersole 2002: 114–115). For example, if I was to whisper 'Don't do that', I would express a different meaning than if I was to scream the same sentence in a very high tone. In the first case I would express my disagreement and merely suggest that something should not be done; in latter case I would express a demand for it not to be done – and the difference between those two cases is to be easily understood by anyone who is familiar with the common usage of language.

Now, the case described is rather extreme one; usually, the differences in dynamics and other more 'musical' aspects of the ordinary speech are not that intensified and they are not perceived as causing the change in the verbal meaning (for a different example see Ebersole 2002: 121). To be more precise, we can confirm at least some cases in which such difference in more 'musical' aspects of the word sequence uttered would not cause the difference in its meaning. In the case of music, however, any such difference noticed would amount to the difference in musical meaning, to the difference of the entities of musical sound sequences in the sense described above.

The fact that in most cases we are ready to dismiss the changes in these 'musical' aspects of speech as irrelevant with regard to the meaning the word sequences are to convey hangs upon the way we understand language: we do not consider its aural and written/visual side as defining its meaning (Kutschera 2012: 20–21). What defines the meaning of spoken words lies elsewhere – in our thoughts, traditionally speaking. In other words: we only recognize and perceive certain sounds as words, if we connect those with certain thoughts – certain meanings (Jespersen 2013: 85–86). Stripped from those, the sounds of words and word sequences may well be grasped as musical *stricto sensu* – as having their own rhythm, melody, tonality and dynamics. Stripped from meanings, words and word sequences could well be listened to in the same manner we are used to listen to the music.

Now, it is easy to see that this cannot apply to the music and musical meanings. If there is such a thing as musical meaning, it is surely not to be found in some realm divorced from the musical sounds. This is not to state any kind of formalism or the prominence of the medium of the arts yet; this is merely to confirm that in the case of music one cannot simply differentiate between the musical meaning (if there even is one) and musical sounding. Since Eduard Hanslick (and Konrad Fiedler in the case of visual arts), formalism implied that we should not search for the meaning of music (or any other art) in any other domain than the one which defines that specific art. Therefore, if there is to be any musical meaning at all, it should not be defined in terms of musical sounds denoting outer physical objects or inner emotional and/or propositional mental states (Zangwill 2015: 60-61); not even in terms of external reference that is strictly musical, referring to another musical piece. According to this position, musical meaning should be inherent in music – that is, inherent in the relations between the sounds, a sort of Clive Bell's *significant form*, a form that has meaning inherently (Caroll 2010: 38–39; Caroll 2003: 35, 45). Any referential relation here should be connecting different aspects of the same domain, one sound with the other. According to formalists, musical

meaning is thus created by the inner relations between musical sounds, and to create those means to create music.

Both referential models that are discarded in formalism – the one relating sound to a physical object and the one relating sound to a mental state – seem to be adequate descriptions of the relation between words (articulated verbal sounds) and their meanings. Namely, words do in fact designate – and they designate either some objects in realty, or some inner mental states, which they may or may not properly express. Of course, words can also follow the self-referential pattern of music, as proposed by formalists; words can designate words. However, it seems that such self-reference could not be the proper and primary referential function of language, but only its derived and special case: the meanings we convey in ordinary language-usage situations are mostly not about the words themselves, but about our mental states or objects in reality. We can conclude that formalistic philosophers are, at least partially, led by the intention to make a clear distinction between the musical and the verbal meaning – or to point out to their differences, since 'formalism suggests that representional content is strictly irrevelant for appreciating artworks *qua* artworks' (Caroll 2003: 45).

Now, if we accept that there is a strong connection between musical sounds and musical meaning, as described above, we are not yet bound to the formalistic solutions concerning the musical meaning. That is, the strong connection does not necessarily imply the self-referential model of musical meaning, typical to formalism (Zangwill 2018: 73–74). Depending on how we chose to understand this musical meaning, it is possible to conceive other solutions; strictly inner tonal relations are merely one of candidates for it. Despite that, our previous conclusion obliges us to the other formalistic thesis, the one concerning the fundamental difference between verbal and musical meanings. In other words, if there is such a thing as musical meaning at all, we should not think of it in terms of verbal meaning, or interpret it as a subspecies of the verbal meaning.

To be more precise: if we accept the possibility that music can express or convey some special kind of meaning, then we should not define it with regard to the models of reference adequate to the language. Musical meaning should not be considered as a sort of undefined verbal meaning, a sort of 'rough' meaning 'material' with no proper shape or form – as a sort of inarticulate sounding. However, 'the emancipation of music from language' doesn't have to be its 'alienation from meaning' (Kramer 2002: 12). Music is not inarticulate sounding: although the sounds of music do not convey verbal meanings, they are not inarticulate, because they do convey some other kind of meaning:

> Music, like language, is an articulate form. Its parts not only fuse together to yield a greater entity, but in so doing they maintain some degree of separate existence, and the sensuous character of each element is affected by its function in the complex whole. This means that the greater entity we call a composition is not merely produced by mixture, like a new color made by mixing paints, but is *articulated*, i.e. its internal structure is given to our perception'. (Langer 1953: 31)

Moreover, these sounds could not be inarticulate if that means that they are undefined, since they are in fact rather strictly defined in their own musical domain: as we have seen, even the slightest change in sounding could amount to the

change of musical meaning, and to the impression that we are listening to 'something else'. Of course, musical sounds cannot have any verbal definition; this is the problem from which we've started in the first place. However, the fact that the musical sounds could not have proper and comprehensive verbal definitions does not necessarily imply that they are undefined completely, or that they lack meaning. As Lawrence Kramer puts it, it is wrong to suppose that 'because the elements of musical expression lack the capacity of words to form propositions and make specific references, musical compositions cannot have meaning in the same way that verbal ones do' (Kramer 2002: 14).

Namely, if we relate the concept of articulation primarily with words and verbal meanings, as well as oppose it to the non-verbal sounds, the case of music does not belong in such scheme. We cannot simply say that music is inarticulate and equate the musical sounds with other non-musical and non-verbal sounds in this respect, for then any non-verbal sound would be perceived as a melody - or neither one of non-verbal sounds would be perceived as music, which is not the case. The difference between the sounds that we would describe as inarticulate and the sounds of music could rather be found in the fact that inarticulate sounds do not convey any meaning, although they may suggest that there is a meaning to be articulated, while the sounds of music do convey meaning, even if the meaning in question is not the verbal one.

Rather than to the language as such, the concept of articulation is related to the concept of meaning - so the difference between articulate and inarticulate sounds is to be made with regard to the presence or the absence of the intention to convey meaning using sounds. Therefore, any sound conveying any kind of meaning is to be interpreted as an articulate sound; however, this does not imply that there should be only one mode of articulation, only one possible articulation/meaning model. Consequently, the concept of meaning should be understood as broader than the concept of verbal meaning; apart from verbal meaning, we can now also accept the musical one.

3. Verbal and Musical Meaning

The concept of musical meaning, as used above, presents us with another problem – namely, with the problem of differentiating between two kinds of meaning, verbal and musical ones. I've already mentioned that the concept of meaning has sprung out of the theory of language and that it relates to the mental states; by introducing the concept of musical meaning I wish to propose a change in understanding of this more general concept, so that it would a) encompass more than just verbal meanings and b) not necessarily imply the expression of any mental states whatsoever. My suggestion is the following: if we accept the concept of meaning to designate whatever is conveyed during the experience of listening to the music, then a) we are not obliged to accept that such meaning is of a verbal kind and b) we are not yet obliged to identify this musical meaning with any mental states *per se*.

My first suggestion was already presented to some extent, but it should now be further developed. Formalistic approach could prove to be useful here: musical meaning is not an undefined, opaque, unfinished, incomplete verbal meaning - it

should not be defined with regard to the verbal meaning at all. Namely, if we try to define musical meaning with regard to the verbal one, we could reach the conclusion that the meaning expressed or conveyed by musical sounds is less clear, less distinct and less precise than the meaning expressed or conveyed by the sounds of words. Such conclusion would rest heavily on the fact that what is heard in music cannot be fully put into words, without something being lost in the translation. In Kramer's words, 'Underlying this anxiety, perhaps, is a desire to create hermeneutic security by keeping meaning in constant touch with consensual, preestablished, "intersubjective" understanding' (Kramer 2011: 22).

Since the difference between the two kinds of meaning is thus confirmed, the question of their relationship arises. If this question is to be resolved in terms of hierarchical ordering, and if the language is accepted as the true domain of meaning and articulation, then music can only be evaluated as less meaningful and less articulate. In this scenario, musical meaning is the meaning that cannot find its proper word, cannot be defined properly; therefore, it is merely an undergrown meaning.

However, the true question here is why should the language be a primary domain of articulation and meaningfulness? Why should we accept the hierarchical ordering of different types of meaning, verbal and musical ones? Is it possible to think of musical meaning outside of language perspective, not counting on already existing and defined models of meaning and reference, at the same time avoiding the formalistic idea of self-referential model of musical meaning? Is it possible to speak of musical meaning as different from the verbal one, and not define this difference with regard to the verbal meaning?

I've already spoken about the reasons for the primacy of the verbal meaning, often implied in philosophy of music, even in cases when not openly advocated: in opposition to musical meanings, verbal meanings can be clearly defined, distinctly differentiated and fully articulated. In comparison to verbal ones, musical meanings always imply some kind of ambiguity, some lack of proper criterion for discerning what is it that was actually 'said' with particular musical piece; this is what Kühl calls *the fluidity of musical meaning* (Kühl 2007: 37). Of course, such description is easily revealed as hanging upon the very point it was supposed to prove, since there is no reason to suppose that there is anything 'said' with music – here, as in other examples mentioned before, the perspective of language is influencing our interpretation of music and musical meaning. Therefore, if music is not supposed to say anything, then there is no ground for the comparison between two 'utterances', verbal and musical ones; consequently, there is also no ground for hierarchical ordering of musical meaning as less clear or less articulated than the verbal one.

However, if that is so, is there a common ground here at all, a common ground allowing us to compare language and music and speak of meaning in both cases, however different those two kinds of meaning may be? I believe that such possibility is justified; the problem is not to misinterpret it for the primacy of language in this respect. In my view, the question should be posed out of more aesthetical than linguistical perspective, starting with sounds. In other words, we should ask what is it that differentiates sounds we perceive as musical and the sounds we perceive as words. Similar goes to the problem of their common ground, but that one I've already explained: in this case the question is what is it that differentiates the

sounds we perceive as words and music from those we perceive as inarticulate, mere sounds. As we have seen, what is common for the sounds of music and the sounds of words is the fact that we find them articulating some meaning, conveying something; the same does not apply to just any sound.

The concept of articulation here is to be taken in a broader sense, I've presented before, similar to the concept of meaning. To be more precise, by articulation I mean the following: if we perceive sounds as more than mere sounds, as conveying something that cannot be reduced to tones, then we can designate the concept of meaning to that 'something' which is conveyed and which cannot be reduced to mere tones, and the concept of articulation to the relation between that 'something' and sounds through which it was grasped. The concepts of meaning and articulation are, therefore, applicable to both language and music, without the implication that the articulation of musical meaning is of linguistic character. Working with this terminology, we could equally state that every verbal articulation is essentially musical in its nature.[2] However, my point is another one: I do not wish to inverse the primacy of language for the primacy of music, but to account for the concepts that would allow for the musical meaning to be analyzed without reference to the verbal meaning.

The primacy of verbal meaning is also depending on another trivial issue. Namely, if the clarity of the verbal meaning, which is what gives it the primacy over a musical meaning, is to be found in the fact that verbal meanings can be defined verbally – by pointing out to other words, then it is clear that musical meanings would be considered less definable and therefore less clear, since they do not belong to the realm of words. To put it differently, to define a verbal meaning, one does not have to leave its verbal domain; to define a musical meaning, one has to make a translation from musical to verbal domain, which always leaves something unsaid and undefined. Therefore, the clarity of verbal meaning is just a consequence of the fact that the primacy of verbal meaning over the musical one was accepted in advance, that it is not the objective criterion of their evaluation.

Verbal meanings can be defined and consequently differentiated and articulated through words themselves, which presents us with an almost self-sufficient model of language. Such idea of language also presents us with another view on the clarity: in an ideal case, every word should have a precise meaning, defined by relations with other words – by definitions. Actually, in an ideal case, every word should have only one meaning which, once grasped and learned, allows us to recognize the sense expressed by it, to differentiate it from other words and meanings and to avoid misunderstandings. To put it differently, although this is almost never the case, the idea of verbal meaning's clarity rests upon the simplicity of imagined one-on-one model of verbal reference: one word – one meaning. In this context,

2 Such conclusion, which I do not advocate, can also lead to thesis that 'structures of our felt musical experience underlie our conceptual systems and thus shape the language we use to describe and theorize about music' (Johnson 1997–1998: 95). However, I would be more receptive for the Jonson's idea that 'dimensions of aesthetic experience (such as we see in patterns of musical meaning) are the very heart and soul of meaning general' (Jonson 1997–1998: 100), although I do not endorse his implicit claim that latter implies the former.

the clarity is guaranteed by the fact that there is one and only one proper meaning of the word, and that the word in question is to be used with the strong reference to exactly that particular meaning. Of course, such ideal of 'pure word essences', pure meanings like Platonic forms, is never to be found in the realty of language and its usage. In the real language – the one which is not artificially constrained by the so called technical terminology of sciences – words have more than one meaning; not only being is said in many ways.

However, the relation of words and their verbal meanings - and the variability of such relation - is rather different than the one belonging to the musical meaning and the sounds of music. In the case of music, meaning is strongly connected with its sound – the slightest change in sound amounts to the change in musical meaning. In the case of music, the referential link is so strong, that it cannot be loosened or broken without the loss of musical meaning. In the case of words, the multiplicity of meanings connected to a word clearly shows that their connection is of a different sort. To put it plainly – musical sound has one and only one meaning, it cannot be 'said' in many ways. In an ironical twist, it seems that only music can fulfill the task once imagined for the words: to be univocal.

Of course, one could argue that the proper musical meaning is not to be primarily related to the musical tokens – particular performances of Kalinnikov's *Symphony no.1* for example, but rather to their type. In this respect, that I will not further address here, we would have to consider the Platonic issue of ideal meanings of musical character in relation to their particular instances, relying much on the ontological type/token debate. However, no matter how should this particular question be solved, I believe that it has to be solved starting with the particular cases, that is with tokens - with music heard (Raffman 1993: 55). In my opinion, if there is something like a type of musical meaning (not simply of musical piece), it is only to be found through its tokens, through particular musical meanings of particular performances, as instantiated in them – because there could be no music which was never to be listened to, nor is there a possibility to grasp a musical meaning, type or token one, without listening to music. Since my focus is on defending the autonomy of musical meaning against the verbal one, I will leave this debate aside; for my purposes, it is enough to point out to the differences between token musical meaning and the verbal meaning as such. Whether there is a type musical meaning or not is not relevant here since, even if there is one, it would also be a musical – and surely not a verbal meaning, and consequently it would have to differ from the verbal one in much the same manner the token musical meanings do.

The obvious difference between words and musical sounds with regard to the problem of articulation - to the problem of relations between the sounds and the meaning they convey, is the 'propositional' nature of musical meaning, 'the intimate connection of syntax and semantics' (Lippman 1981: 184). By this 'propositional' nature I mean the following: while the relation between the word and its verbal meaning is actualized on monadic level – meaning that one single word and its sound can have one concrete meaning – in the case of music one sound is deprived of musical meaning, it has no musical sense. One sound is still merely a tone, audible sense datum which can, but does not have to become a part of a musical melody, which can but does not have to become music.

> Music emerges from the auditory stream. What exists at the level of the auditory stream is not music, it is humanly structured sound, which only becomes music through the perception of a human perceptual system,

as Ole Kühl says (Kühl 2007: 25). It seems that the music implies some structure, even if it is the most simple one – interconnection between at least two tones, which 'adds' something transgressing and surpassing the fact that we hear two tones in succession or simultaneously. The connection between the tones is what counts as music and in this respect we could say that the 'logic' of music is the propositional one.

Of course, stating this does not imply that musical structures do in fact have a propositional character in the sense that the relation between two tones represents something like subject/predicate relation (Davies 2003: 123–125; Nattiez 1990: 127–128). Nevertheless, this 'propositional' nature of music can explain formalistic idea of self-referential character of musical meaning, as well as reveal it in its dependence from the language paradigm. Namely, although particular words and their meanings can be analyzed as specific functions, as specific parts of larger structures – namely the propositions, it is nevertheless the fact that they can also be analyzed as monadic entities, as separate meaning-wholes that are combined in various ways. The same can be said of tones, but not of musical sounds. In those terms, to speak of self-referential meaning of music means to try to compress the basic structural character of musical meaning to a non structural, monadic point, more adequate to the verbal meaning. In this scenario, the basic structure of musical meaning is a) presented as relational/referential and b) is reduced to a non structural model of mathematical points. The only possible solution for such an impossible task is to explain the musical meaning in the form of identity - that is, in the idea of self-reference as the expression of the identity. Therefore, formalists allow only for the reference between the tones and musical sounds, the reference within the musical piece.

My point here is the following: the monadic model of meaning, exemplified in vocabularies as well as in definitions and so called 'pure meanings' of traditional logic and metaphysics, presents us with the idea of meaning as a semantical 'content'. Given its 'purity' and the ideal of univocality, such verbal meaning always has the upper hand of being applied to various less pure cases, concrete instances – it functions as something general and common to many. The musical meaning is, however, of another sort; it has no 'purity', it cannot be applied to many, and it cannot be common. The meaning we hear while listening to a musical piece is radically particular meaning – meaning that persists in exact and given constellation of sounds, like the one produced by Symphony Orchestra of Russia playing Kalinnikov's *Symphony no.1* under the baton of Veronika Dudarova in 1992.

If that is so, then we can explain the missing pieces that are shown in verbal descriptions of music and musical meaning. Namely, if that is so, then such verbal description is never really a description, but a transformation of one kind of meaning into another (we are to avoid the word 'translation' here, because it would impose the linguistic structure to the music and musical meaning). Since musical meaning is fundamentally different from the verbal one what is actually the case is just the transformation of one kind of meaning into another; however, musical meaning

cannot actually be transformed into a verbal one, and therefore there could be no proper translation. There is a gap between the two kinds of meaning, and there could be no isomorphism between a musical meaning heard and the verbal articulation of it. There could be no isomorphism, because musical meaning is of structural ('propositional') and highly individual character, while verbal meaning has a monadic character and is applicable to many.

4. Concluding Remarks: Concerning the 'Content' of Musical Meaning

In this paper I tried to offer an analysis that would not go beyond what is actually given within any encounter with music and what can be proven by anyone's personal experience with music. Therefore, I spoke only about the inner structure of musical meaning, about the difference between sounds and what is conveyed by sounds, about the fact that the sounds of music are strongly connected with musical meanings. What could it be that constitutes the inner nature of musical meaning is a different question, but still one that relates to my previous findings.

Namely, it is well known that both traditional idea of art as the imitation (*mimesis*) of world objects and events and romanticistic idea of art as an expression of inner emotional and mental states are criticized from formalistic positions. Claiming formality of music, Hanslick also proclaimed the absence of its contents: the contents of music were to become its very musical forms, and therefore formalism accepted self-referential model of musical meaning. Now, the question to be posed is whether the musical meaning is referential at all, whether we should think of musical meaning as if it was some kind of content of musical forms? To put it differently, following the formalistic critique: if it is wrong to suppose that music is a sign for some designated world object or inner emotion, then it is also wrong to suppose that the meaning of music consists of this referential relation - that music gets its meaning out of such relation (Meyer 1956: 33). Formalists decline such possibility, but they do accept the link between meaning and reference. In formalistic approach, the self-reference of musical tones, the referential relation within the musical piece as such is what amounts to the meaning of music, instead of emotions being expressed.

I already tried to show that the musical meaning is of structural and individual character. By its structural character I mean the mentioned fact that one tone does not make up for music – the phenomenon of music demands for more than one tone. The relations between two or more tones is what is perceived as music, and since we've defined musical meaning as that what is conveyed by musical sounds, but cannot be reduced to mere tones, then musical meaning is to be found exactly in these relations of tones; thus, the musical meaning is always structural. Musical meaning is, however, also completely individual – it is bound to the exact sounds that convey it.

I would like to avoid here the usual ideas of non-linguistic, musical meaning being interpreted as information or as a symbol. That is, I would like to remain critical with regard to these possibilities as much as with regard to the possibility to identify musical meaning with emotions. In the first case, I believe, the problem is still solved with reference to linguistic meaning model: both information and

symbol are primarily understood in terms of language, although they were conceived as models of meaning differing from it (Howard 1971: 218; Lippman 1981: 183–184; Ross 2018: 8–9). In the second case, I believe that anti-formalism is too hasty to accept emotions as 'content' of musical meaning; to deny that musical meaning is strictly bound to sounds and their relations does not necessarily imply that it is about expressing emotions. I wanted to analyze musical meaning starting with musical sounds and comparing those with other sounds we experience; also, I've wanted to exclude any suppositions that would lead my understanding of meaning and therefore of musical meaning in advance.

In my opinion, meaning could be defined in relatively formal terms, as I tried to do by saying that the concept of meaning is referring to the 'surplus' we detect and experience as transcending plane sense data, the tones or sounds *per se*. Such definition still does not imply any thesis concerning the nature of meaning and musical meaning, but it does allow for the concept of meaning to be applied to both musical sounds and the sounds we comprehend as words and language. Such definition also allows for my further thesis, namely that musical meaning is closely bound to musical sounds and their progression (which would amount for a formalist or 'absolutist' position), at the same time being able to convey other kinds of meaning, like those we connect with emotions or other mental states (which would reflect position of 'referentialists').[3] In other words, such definition would allow for a complex understanding of musical meaning, encompassing both the idea that musical meaning is strictly musical in character and the idea that musical meaning can be experienced as conveying some non-musical meaningful content.

Such complexity of musical meaning could be explained as follows: in its strict sense, musical meaning is exclusively musical – it can be detected in audible experience of music, in relations of sounds and tones, as a 'surplus' instantiated in those, but not reducible to them. Therefore it has structural and individual character, it cannot be repeated exactly, it differs from one musical token/performance to the other. However, since music is not an entity divorced from human consciousness, it can also appear as conveying some other kind of meaning – non musical one, like emotions of joy or sadness; in this respect musical meaning can be designative or referential.[4] Such non-musical meaning would then supervene on the musical meaning, but not define it: even if a composer or a musician playing some musical piece actually intended to convey a particular emotion, there is no causal relation that would guarantee that some person listening to music would in fact experience the same emotion.[5] It is well known that two different people can in

3 Terminology of 'absolutists' and 'referentialists' is Meyer's (Meyer 1956: 1).

4 Similar propositions are already given by number of scholars. For example, Meyer speaks about *designative* and *embodied* meaning, Jean-Jaques Nattiez about *instrinsic* and *extrinsic* reffering, etc. Koopman and Davies are arguing in favour of the difference between *formal* musical meaning and *experiential formal* (nondiscursive) musical meaning, stressing that formal meaning of a musical piece is not to be taken as linguistic or semiotic in a linguistic sense: 'The relationships between parts of a musical work are relationships of implication that should not be conflated with the linguistic or semiological notions of reference, denotation, or signification' (Koopman and Davies 2001: 262).

5 To secure such causal relationship one would need to rely on language and verbal meanings, as shown in Raffman 1993: 45.

fact experience the same music as conveying different emotions, even to the degree that one would find it cheerful, and another one not.

However, the supervenience thesis does claim that causal link is present in the relation of musical and non-musical meaning. Namely, given that musical meaning is highly individual, it can convey non-musical meanings only in such highly individual manner. Therefore, music will not convey the emotion of joy as such, but it will convey some specific quality of being joyous. This is true even in the cases of one and the same musical piece: for example, I find the opening chords of the first movement of Kalinnikov's *Symphony no. 1* joyful, but rather different from the chords of its third movement, which I also find to be joyful.

In my opinion, this is what explains the fact that we are, both philosophically and in ordinary life, usualy relating music with emotions, since the emotions we experience are always very specific. In words of Stephen Davies: 'Musical reference to emotions is natural rather than conventional. Music does not constitute a symbol system; the means by which music is expressive are importantly unique to each piece. There are conventions in music, but they are formal and stylistic rather than semantic' (Davies 2003: 128). In those terms, it is likely that we would consider music to be more adequate expression of emotions than words and language in their ordinary use (not, for example, as used in poetry). The vocabulary we use to designate emotions is much more restricted and less rich than the actual variety of emotions experienced, and the reason for that is exactly the fact that verbal meaning is, in its nature, monadic and applicable to many. Verbal meaning intensifies the meaning conveyed, to use Baumgartenian terminology; its model is one-on-one.

By stressing the connection of emotions and musical meaning I do not want to claim that emotions are the only possible non-musical meaning supervening on musical meaning *per se*. On the contrary, I would rather claim that all sorts of non-musical meanings can be conveyed in this way. In fact, I believe that the 'proper' non-musical meaning conveyed by the musical one is to be found in the way we relate to the world and in our experience of the world, which is always meaningful – parhaps, showing patches of the absence of meaning only in details. The verbal or highly verbal articulation of such world understanding, of such world-meaning (to be found in theoretical thinking, for example in philosophy), presents us with only one way of making it more comprehensible. Musical meaning, or the meaning conveyed by any other art, would in my opinion present another such posibility, not less important or less infomative than the former one. And to finish with Sussane Langer's words: 'Music has *import*, and this import is the pattern of sentience—the pattern of life itself, as it is felt and directly known' (Langer 1953: 31).

References

Caroll, Noël (2010), *Art in Three Dimensions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

–. (2003), 'Four Concepts of Aesthetic Experience', in *Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 41–62.

Davies, Stephen (2003), *Themes in the Philosophy of Music*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

–. (1994), *Musical Meaning and Expression*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Dodd, Julian (2007), *Works of Music. An Essay in Ontology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ebersole, Frank B. (2002), *Meaning and Saying: Essays in the Philosophy of Language*, Bloomington: Xlibris.
Howard, Vernon A. (1971), "Musical Meaning: A Logical Note", in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 30(2): 215–219.
Jespersen, Otto (2013), *Philosophy of Grammar*, London: Routledge.
Johnson, Mark L. (1997–1998), "Embodied Musical Meaning", *Theory and Practice* 22/23: 95–102.
Koopman, Constantijn and Stephen Davies (2001), "Musical Meaning in a Broader Perspective", in *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 59(3): 261–273.
Kramer, Lawrence (2011), *Interpreting Music*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
–. (2002), *Musical Meaning: Toward a Critical History*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kutschera, Franz von (2012), *Philosophy of Language*, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Kühl, Olle (2007), *Musical Semantics*, Bern: Peter Lang.
Langer, Sussane K. (1953), *Feeling and Form. A Theory of Art Developed from* A *Philosophy in a New Key*, New York: Charles Schribner's Sons.
Lippman, Edward A. (1981), "The Dilemma of Musical Meaning", in *International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music* 12(2): 181–189.
Meyer, Leonard B. (1956), *Emotion and Meaning in Music*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Nattiez, Jean-Jacques (1990), *Music and Discourse. Toward a Semiology of Music*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Raffman, Diana (1993), *Language, Music, and Mind*, Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Ross, Barry (2018), "The Causal-manipulative Approach to Musical Meaning", in *International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music* 48 (1): 3–17.
Seeger, Charles (1977), *Studies in Musicology 1935–1975*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Zangwill, Nick (2018), *The Metaphysics of Beauty*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
–. (2015), *Music and Aesthetic Reality: Formalism and the Limits of Description*, London: Routledge.

Una Popović

U odbranu muzičkog značenja

Apstrakt

Ovaj rad posvećen je muzičkom značenju i njegovom odnosu prema verbalnom značenju. Cilj nam je da pokažemo da muzičko značenje treba strogo razlikovati od verbalnog, da ga ne treba razumeti kao podvrstu verbalnog značenja, niti kao značenje verbalnog tipa u bilo kom smislu. Obradu ovog pitanja započećemo polazeći od zvukova muzike i jezika, a dalju argumentaciju izgradićemo na tom osnovu: poredeći ove zvukove i način na koji se oni odnose prema svojim značenjima, pokazaćemo da su muzički zvukovi bitno povezani sa muzičkim značenjima, da imaju svojstva poput tokena. Shodno tome, tvrdićemo da je potrebno redefinisati način na koji upotrebljavamo pojmove značenja i artikulacije, tako da oni mogu obuhvatiti i pojam neverbalnog, muzičkog značenja. Konačno, smatramo da bi muzička značenja kao takva trebalo razlikovati od nemuzičkih značenja koje muzika može da komunicira i prenese – jedno ne isključuje drugo.

Ključne reči: muzičko značenje, verbalno značenje, zvuk, tip/token, artikulacija.

III

STUDIES AND ARTICLES

STUDIJE I ČLANCI

UDK: 321.01:141.7 Hegel
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1901101K
Original Scientific Article
Received: 16.10.2018. Accepted: 05.12.2018.

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY
VOL. 30, NO. 1, 001-196

Zdravko Kobe

THE INTERFACE OF THE UNIVERSAL: ON HEGEL'S CONCEPT OF THE POLICE

ABSTRACT
The article provides a tentative reading of Hegel's police as a concept that constitutes a crucial test for the rationality of Hegel's state and that actually played a very important role in the formation of his model of rationality. It starts by considering some significant changes in Hegel's approach to the subject in the Jena period, especially in reference to Fichte and Spinoza; then, it presents Hegel's conception of the police as the interface of the universal in his mature political philosophy, together with his treatment of the disturbing problem of poverty and the rabble; and to conclude, it adds some general remarks on Hegel's police, then and now.

KEYWORDS
G. W. F. Hegel, J. G. Fichte, political philosophy, social philosophy, political economy, civil society, police, welfare state, corporation

In the *Elements of Philosophy of Right*, Hegel closes his highly original treatment of civil society with a section called "Police and Corporation." But unlike the corporation, which has managed to gain substantive scholarly attention in recent years, Hegel's conception of the police is rarely discussed.

Two reasons can be adduced to explain this strange absence. On the one hand, and despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Hegel is still often associated with the repressive state he allegedly supported in the case of Prussia. Thus, while the recent political developments helped to renew genuine interest in his corporations, designed, precisely, to curb the disintegrative tendencies of modern markets, the very fact that he accorded a prominent place in his state to the police seems to validate the perception of him as an enemy of the open society. On the other hand, and in accordance with the practice of his time, Hegel used the term "police" in a much wider sense than is common today. Nowadays we tend to forget that even for early Smith, for instance, police included everything relating to "the opulence of the state" (Smith 1896: 3), and that his famous example of the pin-factory was first presented under the heading of "police." What is more, since the semantic shift in this case was so significant, it was a longstanding habit to translate Hegel's "Polizey" as "public authority," so that at least in English there was no Hegel's police to examine at all.

Zdravko Kobe: Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana; zdravko.kobe@guest.arnes.si.

In the present article, we intend to show that this neglect was false. Whatever the words, we will try to demonstrate that for Hegel, the police must be treated as a concept—a concept that, in a sense, constitutes a crucial test for the rationality of Hegel's state and that actually played a very important role in the formation of his model of rationality. In what follows, we will first consider some significant changes in Hegel's approach to the subject in the Jena period, especially in reference to Fichte and Spinoza; then, we will present Hegel's conception of the police in his mature political philosophy; and finally, we will conclude with some general remarks on Hegel's police in relation both to other treatments of the subject in his time as well as to problems that appeared in this respect in ours.[1]

I

In his treatment of the police, Hegel could benefit from the rich tradition of *Polizeiwissenschaft*, which stretched back to at least von Justi. But it was especially his immediate predecessor Fichte who elevated the police into a prominent philosophical theme. In the *Foundations of Natural Right* Fichte asked, "What is the police?" and tried to "deduce its concept" (Fichte 2000: 254). His first answer was that it constitutes "a special connection link between the executive power and the subjects" (ibid.). As we shall see, Hegel in a sense subscribed to this definition. However, when the question of the specific "duties and limits" of the police is raised, a huge difference between the two philosophers emerges right from the beginning.

In Fichte's well-ordered state, the police turns out to be omnipresent. It is not merely that, as he famously proposed, every person should carry an identity card with his or her picture inside, so that the police could identify anyone on the spot, or that bills of exchange should be printed on special paper accessible exclusively to state authorities, which would make counterfeiting virtually impossible. In order to protect citizens from crime in an effective way, the police should, Fichte claims, also put major emphasis on the prevention of transgressions and direct its activities not only against actual injuries but also against their very *possibility*. "Police law prohibits actions that, in and of themselves, do not harm anyone and appear entirely neutral, but that make it easier for someone to injure others" (Fichte 2000: 256). Fichte's typical example was street lighting, which prevents darkness, which, as we know, fosters all kinds of dubious activities. The final objective of police regulations is thus to establish a transparent order that would render unlawful actions *materially impossible* (see Chamayou 2015: 8).

> In a state with the kind of constitution we have established here, every citizen has his own determinate status, and the police know fairly well where each one is at every hour of the day, and what he is doing. Everyone must work and has, if he works, enough to live on ... In such a state crime is highly unusual and is preceded by a certain unusual activity. In a state where everything is ordered and runs according to plan, the police will observe any unusual activity and take notice immediately. (Fichte 2000: (262–263)

1 I would like to thank Luca Illetterati, Pierpaolo Cesaroni, and Petar Bojanić for valuable comments on the first draft of this paper.

Hegel, for his part, held a different view. Even before he definitely formed his own conception of the police, he was clearly opposed to so tightly ordered a society. In his very first publication in 1801, he attacked Fichte's "preventive intellect and its coercive authority, the police," together with its tendency to engage in "endless determinations" (GW 4: 56; Hegel 1977: 146–147), and openly ridiculed Fichte's control freakiness in a long footnote: "In Fichte's state every citizen will keep at least another half dozen busy with supervision, etc., ... and so on *ad infinitum*" (GW 4: 57; Hegel 1977: 148). Later, in the unpublished fragments on the German constitution, probably written in 1802/03, he commented in a similar vein:

> It is ... a basic prejudice of those recent theories which have been partially translated into practice that a state is a machine with a single spring which imparts movement to all the rest of its infinite mechanism, and that all the institutions which the essential nature of a society brings with it should emanate from the supreme political authority and be regulated, commanded, supervised, and directed by it. (GW 5: 174; Hegel 1999: 22)[2]

In direct opposition to Fichte's "pedantic craving to determine every detail," Hegel claimed that the state should rather establish a clear distinction between what is essential to its existence and unity and what can be left to chance and arbitrary will. When the "universal political authority demands of the individual only what is necessary for itself," then, Hegel continues, it can in another respect "grant the citizens their living freedom and individual will and even leave considerable scope for the latter" (GW 5: 167; Hegel 1999: 17–18). Indeed, the state must allow for the largest possible sphere under the exclusive discretion of its citizens:

> The center, as the political authority and government, must leave to the freedom of the citizens whatever is not essential to its own role of organising and maintaining authority ... and ... nothing should be so sacred to it as the approval and protection of the citizens' free activity in such matters, regardless of utility; for this freedom is inherently sacred. (GW 5: 175; Hegel 1999: 23)

This, then, could stand as our first finding: Fichte, a philosopher of the *Thathandlung*, who elevated freedom into a fundamental ontological principle, designed a political system of meticulous policing of everyday life, while Hegel, at least in this respect, advocated minimal police.

It is worth noting that in Hegel's view, Fichte's regulation frenzy was a necessary consequence—that is, a symptom—of his fundamental ontological dualism. Because he constructed an unbridgeable divide between the realm of nature and the realm of reason, he was unable to conceive how reason could be effective within nature itself, and was consequently forced to treat the not completely rational beings as essentially irrational. Because he could not rely on their immanent rationality, he was forced to prescribe the demands of reason as something imposed on them from the outside. In this way, the task proved to be infinite, involving ever more pedantic regulations, as "there is simply no action at all from which a consequent understanding of this state could not calculate some possible damage to the

2 The translation into practice obviously refers to the French Revolution. Indeed, a large part of the critique of the French revolutionary project that Hegel presents in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* can be read as a summary of the argument against Fichte's police.

others" (GW 4: 56; Hegel 1977: 146). And in this way, the state was inevitably converted into nothing "but a machine" (GW 4: 58; Hegel 1977: 149)—the characteristic of the mechanism being that everything in it is determined by a foreign law.

Indeed, as we were already able to observe, Hegel typically criticized Fichte's conception of the state as mechanistic[3] and initially even rejected the state as *inherently mechanical*. In the Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism, composed together with his romanticizing friends Schelling and Hölderlin in 1797/98, he wrote that the ideas of freedom and the state exclude each other. "Every state must treat free human beings like mechanical work; and it should not do that; therefore it should *cease*" (GW 2: 615; Behler 1987: 161). At that point, Hegel was convinced that the ideal political organization was actually realized in the city-state of antiquity, where every individual was animated by the spirit of the community so that the particular and the universal purely and simply coincided.[4] In his idealized view, the Greek *polis* was *living*, it was *organic*, not mechanical, as every citizen existed only within the whole and for the whole; and it was *beautiful*, as there was no outside constraint needed, and everyone did what was required spontaneously, out of immediate feeling and without having to rely on general prescriptions.

However, after Hegel moved to Jena this ideal of beautiful totality soon lost its luster. If in the *Differenzschrift* he still alluded to "the true infinity of a beautiful community" (GW 5: 55; Hegel 1977: 146), he later gradually came to realize that the Greek beauty was possible only on condition that individuality was suppressed. In the happy freedom of the Greeks, Hegel now observes,

> no protesting takes place there; everyone knows himself *immediately* as universal; that is, he renounces to his particularity, without knowing it as such, as *this* self, as the essence. (GW 8: 262)

The beautiful classical *polis* was premised on the refusal of particularity.[5] For that reason, it was not only beautiful but also *fragile*. As soon as a subject appeared in its midst, a subject prepared to insist on her particularity all the way down, as was the case with Antigone, the beautiful totality was bound to disintegrate. And this was no deplorable coincidence that could be avoided, but a manifestation of what Hegel now considered an inherent weakness of Greek ethical life. Hegel liked to observe that in a state where no law was ever broken, one could never tell if it was valid at all. Perhaps it just happened that no one bothered to do something against it. This explains why a venerable and apparently solid institution may sometimes all of a sudden fall to pieces. Again, the law proves its existence only when, upon

3 Following Lauth's seminal book, it has become commonplace to remark how partial, even distorted Hegel's early critique of Fichte was. This reservation, however, does not seem to apply to Hegel's early critique of Fichte's *political* philosophy: there are very few studies on Hegel's critique of Fichte's police and they tend to side with Hegel (see, for instance, Vieweg 2018). This may not be trivial.

4 For a closer presentation of Hegel's early conceptions of harmonious Greek community, see, for instance, Avineri (Avinieri 1972: 20f.).

5 "Confronted by this idea, his own individuality vanished; it was only this idea's maintenance, life, and persistence that he asked for, ... Only in moments of inactivity or lethargy could he feel the growing strength of a purely self-regarding wish" (GW 1: 368; Hegel 1971: 155).

being violated, it affirms its consequences against infringements and thus verifies its validity. Similarly, a political body establishes its effective strength not by keeping its original unity intact, but by allowing for inner divisions and still being able to sustain them.

But anyhow, once the principle of subjective particularity has managed to assert itself in the modern society, the Greek ideal of the harmonious whole definitely lost its appeal. For Hegel, this was the historical accomplishment of Christianity, especially in its protestant variety (indeed, in the ancient *polis*, no *protesting* took place). The Greek ideal is now irrevocably gone. There is no way back. The only option left, Hegel claims, is therefore to integrate this "obstinacy that does honour to human beings" into the very structure of the political organization; to open the space for the divides and conflicts brought about by the principle of subjective particularity and turn them into an animating drive of political life; and to tame the destructive forces of the particular by pitching them against one another for the greater benefit of the universal.

To formulate this project, Hegel could draw on the work of Schiller, who was well-nigh haunted by the idea of building a middle ground between sensibility and reason. In *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, for instance, he designed an apparatus of esthetic conditioning that would, as it were, mechanically produce moral effects. However, of even more valuable importance was probably the fact that at that point, namely around 1802, and partly even before, Hegel engaged in a close reading of political economists, in particular Steuart, Ferguson, and Smith.[6] Not only did this "science of our time" show him how under the mass of seemingly chaotic events the observing understanding can nonetheless discern stable regularities, it also taught him how, by following only their own particular interests, the independent market actors nonetheless produce a result that is supposed to be universally desired. In what Smith called the "invisible hand," Hegel immediately detected the decisive conceptual lesson that there is understanding immanent to the actions of finite rational beings—and transformed it into the figure of the "cunning of reason."

This could constitute our second observation. If Hegel initially conceived of social organization along the lines of *organic unity* exemplified by the Greek *polis*, in Jena he soon abandoned this frictionless ideal for the right of subjective particularity that demanded an independent ground *against* the universal. According to Hegel, Plato was acute enough to detect the imminent irruption of this dimension into Greek ethical life, and it was for this reason that, in his ideal state, he made a special provision for a class freed from the burdens of the universal in exchange for its "political nullity" (GW 4: 458; Hegel 1999: 151). Although such an inclusion of "the non-frees" was bound to fail, it was, Hegel argues, actually a sign of Plato's modernity. This is significant because he had to confront the proponents of an organic community where everyone would be "steadfastly united with the *sacred bond of friendship*" and everything would be done "spontaneously" (GW 14: 9; Hegel 1991: 15) even in Berlin. In Hegel's view, it was this idea of political organization,

6 For Hegel's reading of the Scots, see the classical study on the subject by Waszek 1988. For an authoritative treatment of Hegel's conception of the market, see Herzog 2013.

defended for instance by Fries in his "mush of 'heart, friendship, and enthusiasm'" (GW 14: 10; Hegel 1991: 16), that was outdated and dangerous.

It is interesting to note that Hegel's infatuation with the beautiful ethical life coincided at least in part with his defense of the metaphysics of absolute identity, which he and Schelling jointly developed in the early Jena years. In the unpublished *System of Ethical Life*, for instance, probably composed in 1802, Hegel writes:

> Thus in the ethical life the individual exists in an eternal mode; his empirical being and doing is something downright universal; for it is not the individual which acts but the universal absolute spirit in him. Philosophy's view of the world and necessity, according to which all things are in God and there is nothing singular, is perfectly realized for the empirical consciousness, since every singularity of action or thought or being has its essence and meaning simply and solely in the whole. (GW 5: 314; Hegel 1979: 143)

"Philosophy's view of the world and necessity" obviously refers to the metaphysical doctrine of Spinoza, which, as Hegel implies, also embodies true organic freedom. From this perspective, therefore, Spinoza coincides with the beauty of the Greeks! Hegel was soon to abandon this Spinoza-inspired philosophy of identity, however. And surprisingly enough, everything suggests that this happened precisely under the peculiar influence of Spinoza. As it was convincingly demonstrated by Chiereghin, in 1802 Hegel happened to read both the *Tractatus theologico-politicus* and the *Tractatus politicus*.[7] He became acquainted with a different Spinoza, who, while inquiring into human actions "in the same unfettered spirit as is habitually shown in mathematical studies" (Spinoza 2002: 681) and even daring to identify right with might, still explicitly warned against zealous regulation and vehemently affirmed that the state should—in its own interest, to be sure—leave substantial room for its citizens' autonomy.[8] Since this is not the place to go into the details, let us just remark that the influence of Spinoza's political thought transpires from every page of the last part of the *German Constitution*.[9] Our third observation would thus be that Hegel's distancing himself from Spinozist metaphysics corresponded to his accepting some basic tenets of Spinoza's political philosophy.

All tree moves—the definite rejection of Fichte's conception of the police, the abandonment of the Greek ideal of beautiful political totality, and the disavowal

7 For a detailed argument see Chiereghin 1980: 96–108.

8 "It must therefore be granted that the individual reserves to himself a considerable part of his right, which therefore depends on nobody's decision but his own." (TTP, ch. 17; Spinoza 2002: 536) "He who seeks to regulate everything by law will aggravate vices rather than correct them. What cannot be prohibited must necessarily be allowed." (TTP, ch. 20; Spinoza 2002: 569)

9 For instance, the very insistence on the *unity* of the state reveals a characteristic feature of Spinoza, who defined the state as a *multitudo una veluti mente ducta*. And in addition to the examples already quoted: "We therefore regard a people as fortunate if the state allows it considerable freedom in subordinate activities of a universal kind, and we likewise regard a political authority as infinitely strong if it can be supported by a greater spirit of freedom, unattained by pedantry, among its people" (GW 5: 178; Hegel 1999: 25). The expression "glückliches Volk" no longer refers to the Greeks, where the individual vanished, but to a system in which the maximum possible sphere was accorded to her free initiative.

of Schelling's philosophy of identity—display a similar structure and took place at roughly the same time. What exactly was the inner dynamism of this major turn towards Hegel's characteristic standpoint remains a subject of discussion. No doubt, the reasons involved were varied and complex. But on the basis of our three observations it seems rather safe to assume that an important role in Hegel's metaphysical turn was played by political themes, in particular those related to the new science of economy and Spinoza's political philosophy.

This thesis has some interesting consequences. It implies, for instance, that Hegel turned away from Spinoza precisely under the sway of Spinoza: it was Spinoza's political philosophy that convinced him of the necessity to treat individuals as independent actors and thus prompted him to abandon Spinoza's system of one universal substance (see Chiereghin 1980: 107). It also implies that Hegel's philosophy is *essentially political*—political not only according to its content, but on account of its very conceptual form. Hegel the metaphysician became Hegel by incorporating the political into the structure of his concept! And since one of the major thrusts in this transfiguration came from his considerations on the proper role of the police, it may be further claimed that for Hegel, the police is not merely a concept among concepts. It rather constitutes one of those crucial points where the fate of Hegel's conceptuality as a whole is at stake.

Let us add that the question of the police is closely related to the proper conceptualization of the organism and the mechanism. We have seen that the young Hegel rejected the state for being inherently mechanical and claimed that we should instead think of society as an organic whole. But we have also seen that Fichte's state and Greek ethical life, both of which pretended to be spontaneous and organic, actually produced results that were equally rigid (and in this sense *mechanic*), unable to digest any divergence from the prescribed order, and that they were fragile and bound to perish. The recent defeat of the French revolutionary project and the historical demise of the Greek *polis* contained a conceptual lesson for Hegel. In this way, it may be said, he realized that a community could be live and organic only to the extent it was able to include an aspect of the mechanical. This, however, not only requires a different concept of the organic, one that would not merely cease to stand in opposition to the mechanical, but also demands a completely reworked theory of the mechanism itself. The latter task proved to be the most demanding, and it seems that Hegel continued to struggle with it even after the publication of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. In the end, Hegel conceived the mechanical object as an underdetermined contradiction, which was finally resolved only in the conceptual figure of absolute mechanism, which turned determination by an external other into self-determination. Only if the mechanism is overcome in its own field can the organism incorporate it as its own element. And what mechanism is to organism, civil society is to the state.[10]

10 The importance of mechanism for Hegel's political philosophy was vigorously defended by Ross: "Thus my thesis is that the logical argument concerning how the *mechanical object* transforms itself into an element of *absolute mechanism* provides the argumentative schema and justification for Hegel's account of the way in which an individual is to find concrete freedom within the institutions of modern social and political life" (Ross 2008: 61). See also the contribution by M. Skomvoulis in Buchwalter 2015: 13–34.

II

Hegel presented his treatment of the police as part of the theory of civil society. With him, the latter is an old name for a completely new disposition located in between the family (as an immediate ethical community) and the state (as a political community in which individuals can only lead a universal life). By introducing this middle term Hegel seeks to answer the characteristically modern question: How to secure the individual's right to her particularity without thereby undermining the sphere of the universal, or the state (as was the case in the Greek *polis*)? To this effect, he resorted to the figure of *self-sacrifice of the universal*, which was first put forward in his Jena essay on natural right.[11] The idea is that the universal, or the state, surrenders a part of itself and hands it over to the exclusive authority of the particular. Civil society is thus a sphere of the non-political within the political, a sphere of the merely particular within the universal—a space where individuals are allowed the rare privilege not to care for the universal and can devote themselves entirely and exclusively to pursuing their own particular interests. By this, the universal opens a space for the free deployment of the negativity that is required for its material existence and, keeping it within the boundaries of civil society (see GW 4: 454; Hegel 1999: 146), contains its effects so that they may not destabilize the universal.

In civil society, then, the individual acts as an independent self-serving being who meets other equally selfish individuals and enters into relations of free negotiation and exchange. For that reason, civil society is best described as a realm of economic activity whose laws are exposed in the new science of political economy. This civil society is also, and Hegel acknowledges this from the start, a realm of arbitrariness and external contingency, which in its opposites "affords a spectacle of extravagance and misery as well as the physical and ethical corruption" (EPhR, § 185).[12] Hence he calls it "the stage of difference," describes it as "the *world of appearance* of the ethical," and openly speaks of "the loss of ethical life" (EPhR, § 181). But according to Hegel, this is the price to be paid for the particular to get its due, and that which actually constitutes the infinite power of the modern state—"which allows the *opposition* of reason *to develop to its full strength*, and has overcome it" (EPhR, § 185R). The only condition is, however, that the particular must not be allowed to develop to such a degree that it would threaten to destroy the very frame of the state. Whatever is by nature negative must remain in the negative, as Hegel once observed (GW 4: 450; Hegel 1999: 141).

In addition to opening a space for selfish individuals to indulge in themselves, civil society performs at least two other functions. First, it *assures the material conditions* of the ethical community. As a system of needs wherein individuals satisfy their particular wants through the division of labor and mutual exchange, civil society produces "*universal and permanent resources*" (EPhR, § 199), which provides for the subsistence of its members. Hegel did not advocate complete wealth

11 The figure was first introduced under the label of "the tragedy within the ethical" (GW 4: 458; Hegel 1999: 151).

12 For practical reasons, Hegel's *Elements of Philosophy of Right* will be cited by paragraph numbers only. The English translation is taken from Hegel 1991.

equality, to be sure. That would go against the principle of particularity inherent to civil society, as well as against the condition that the satisfaction of one's needs should be mediated by one's own contribution. In Hegel's view, a member of civil society enjoys rather the *possibility* of sharing in this universal wealth, so that her actual share or her own particular resources are always conditional—conditional, that is, "upon one's own immediate basic assets (i.e. capital)," "upon one's skills," but also on "contingent circumstances" (EPhR, § 200 and § 237). But in spite of this unequal distribution, civil society provides for the material basis, which is in principle open to all.

And second, as "a system of all-around dependence," civil society performs a *formative task*, a task to educate the individuals originally attached to their particularity alone and bring them up towards the universal.[13] It is not merely that a member of civil society can participate in the production of universal resources only if she disposes with certain practical and theoretical knowledge. Of even greater importance is the fact that within this system of general dependency both the needs and the work to satisfy them are inherently abstract. In civil society, need is no longer the immediate natural need as exemplified in living beings in general, it is always a need mediated by the other's opinion; and its satisfaction, too, is similarly possible only to the extent that it is offered on the market, that is, acknowledged by others. In this manner, a tendency to imitate emerges—a tendency commonly known as fashion, which, however, as Hegel argues, is no mere sociological phenomenon, but rather manifests a structural feature of the very system of needs. The consequence is that both in their needs and their work, individuals turn out to be completely dependent on this system of all-around dependence: they can realize their particularity "only in so far as they themselves determine their knowledge, volition, and action in a universal way and make themselves *links* in the chain of this *interconnection*" (EPhR, § 187). The system of needs profits from their selfishness, and riding on their particularity, polishes their particularity away. This is the "hard work" of cultivation (see EPhR, § 187R) carried out by civil society for the state.

After these preliminaries, let us now turn to police proper.

As already noted, the role of Hegel's police is similar to Fichte's: the police serves as a kind of intermediary between the state and civil society, it is a mode in which the universal is present within the particular.[14] Both in Fichte and in Hegel it excludes the administration of justice, which, although it occupies an analogous place, is focused more on juridical procedures in the strict sense. The reasons for such a division are no doubt traditional as well as conceptual. In Fichte, for instance, it could be said that the administration of justice deals with the actual violations of law, while the police takes care of the possible ones. But the proper goal of Hegel's police is quite different from that in Fichte: it is determined by the fact

13 For a closer assessment of *Bildung* performed by civil society, see A. Buchwalter, "'Die Sittlichkeit in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft': Entzweiung Bildung und Hegels Aufhebung der Aporien der sozialen Moderne" (Schmidt am Busch 2016: 125–151).

14 Using a similar formulation, Bojanić has emphasized the symbolic dimension of the police as "the symbol of power of the universal," and insisted on the need to see it as an instance of society's self-organization. For him, it is the "cause of the police" that holds people together; see Bojanić 2018.

that while Hegel, on the one hand, conceived of civil society as a sphere of subjective freedom, operating according to the logic of the market, he, on the other hand, and in sharp contrast to Smith, did not believe the market was a self-regulating device. On this point, Hegel rather aligned with Steuart, the author of *An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy*, who thought that modern markets were fragile mechanisms similar to "watches, which are continually going wrong" (Steuart 1767: 250). "Sometimes," he continued, "the spring is found too weak, the other times too strong for the machine: and when the wheels are not made according to a determined proportion ... then the machine stops ... and the workman's hand becomes necessary to set it right" (Steuart 1767: 251). Against the myth of the invisible hand, Steuart consequently emphasized the need for intervention by the visible hand of the statesman. "In treating every question of political economy, I constantly suppose a statesman at the head of the government, so as to prevent the vicissitudes inherent to the market from hurting the commonwealth" (Steuart 1767: 120; see also 274). This is not to say that Steuart's statesman occupies himself with every minute detail and determines their right proportions according to some centralized plan. In fact, it could be claimed that his main concern is to ensure the necessary conditions for market competition to reach a balance by itself, and to intervene only when market "excesses" and "violent convulsions" threaten to destroy the very framework for the free deployment of market forces (see Steuart 1767: 207, 344). Moreover, while he encouraged the intervention of the statesman's caring hand in the market, Steuart was also careful to add that he spoke only "of governments which are conducted systematically, constitutionally, and by general laws" (Steuart 1767: 249). In the end, his conception of the statesman's regulative activities thus turns out to be very close to the view held by German ordoliberals.

For his part, Hegel justified the role of the police by considering that the system of needs provides individuals merely with the possibility to satisfy their needs. This immediately implies that their satisfaction is contingent, and that they sometimes do and sometimes do not get satisfied. However, since there are some needs that are not contingent, but rather necessary—"no man lives on the mere possibility of satisfaction," notes Hegel (GW 26: 992)—it is mandatory that at least with respect to such needs their safe satisfaction be guaranteed. In this sense, the police is a body whose task it is to limit the sway of contingency in civil society, to fight "precariousness" (see GW 26: 994), to secure the personal welfare of individuals—not as a manifestation of compassion, but rather as their positive "right" (EPhR, § 230).

The affirmation is strong! Why should, in civil society, "*particular welfare* be *treated as a right* and dully *actualized*"? At first, this could be explained as yet another sign of Steuart's influence.[15] In accordance with the cameralist tradition,

15 And, of course, of *Fichte's*. In Fichte, property rights are established to give the subjects a sufficient external sphere to perpetuate their free activity (that is, essentially, to satisfy their needs), and they are founded on the social contract in which everyone is given what is his. "Each person possesses his own property, only insofar as, and on the condition that, all citizens are able to live off what belongs to them. If all are not able to do so, then each person's property ceases to be his own, and becomes the property of those who cannot live on their own." Therefore, Fichte concludes, "the poor ... have an absolute right of coercion to such assistance" (Fichte 2000: 186).

Steuart assigned to the political economy within the state a task similar to the one performed by the house economy within the family: it is supposed to care for the well-being of all of its members. "The principal object of this science is to secure a certain fund of subsistence for all the inhabitants, to obviate every circumstance which may render it precarious" (Steuart 1767: 2). However, even if we assume that this is indeed the objective of this science, no right corresponds to it on the side of those it relates to. If political economy fails to deliver, no one's right is thereby violated.

While Steuart's view may support Hegel's reasoning, a different argument is therefore needed. It lies in the fact that, for Hegel, civil society is set in a comprehensive normative system of the actualization of freedom. On the one hand, Hegel defines right as the "*existence* of the *free will*" (EPhR, § 29), to which the free will is absolutely entitled; on the other hand, civil society represents a special realm within the system in question (EPhR, § 4) that is supposed to give existence to the free will in its particularity. "Actuality of freedom is the purpose of civil society" (GW 26: 138). Insofar as the free will has a right (and, actually, a duty) to exist as particular, the free will has a right to be part of civil society. Civil society is *its right*. And insofar as civil society is justified only in relation to it, the free will also has *rights in relation to it*, namely in the sense that civil society must be constituted in such a way as to facilitate its existence.

More specifically, the individual releases himself from the bonds of the family, in which he figured primarily as a member immersed in a natural ethical substance, and now enters the sphere of civil society as a self-relying being to realize his particularity. But instead of gaining his independence, it turns out that he has thus become completely dependent on this system of all-around dependency. In civil society, as we have seen, the individual can do nothing on his own; he can manifest his particularity and satisfy his needs only by finding a slot within this system, which stands against him as a vast blind mechanism he can only accommodate to. In other words, he now falls into the same *dependence* on civil society he used to find himself in in relation to the family. "Thus, the individual becomes a *son of civil society*," observes Hegel, "which has claims upon him as he has rights in relation to it" (EPhR, § 238).

As a consequence, Hegel calls civil society "a *universal family*" (ibid.). In the first instance, this designation obviously refers to the care that civil society is obliged to provide for those children whose families fail to attend to them properly. But as we have seen, there is more to this term: if every member of civil society is its son, then, conceptually speaking, civil society constitutes their family, the universal family of them all. At the same time, the term aptly illustrates at which point the structural deadlock of the police as the visible hand of the universal family is going to manifest itself. For family is *inherently particular*; it is the realm of closeness, attachment, and love. The universal family thus clearly stands as a contradiction in terms. Moreover, their respective modes of operation are opposite as well: while family relations are immediate, particular, and unconditioned, in civil society they are inherently mediated, general, and conditioned. This seems to exclude in advance that civil society could successfully accomplish the task of the family on its own. Indeed, as we shall see, the police is not enough.

Let us take a closer look. The sphere of activity of the police is in principle defined by its general goal and mode of operation. Its goal is to ensure the smooth operation of civil society and to secure its members from contingencies that are inconsistent with it. It proceeds in a systematic, "universal," and "external" way (GW 26: 989), displaying no particular attachment. Accordingly, its activities could be arranged into five loosely defined categories, which more or less correspond to the modern state administration and welfare system.[16]

The first task of the police is to establish the general framework of civil society. This category comprehends maintaining public order and safety, both of persons and property, which also includes the prevention and prosecution of crime. This is the segment of activities the police has retained up to the present day.

The second task is to secure the special framework required for the proper functioning of civil society. This category comprises those activities that are in the general interest, but either cannot be organized according to the logic of pure market exchange or are such that it is simply more effective for all to be provided by one. This includes services that, due to their specific nature, have to be provided necessarily and consequently cannot be exposed to market volatilities (such as water, food, and energy supply), then infrastructure projects (for instance, roads and public lighting), and the determination and supervision of standards that reinforce trust and simplify circulation (systems of measurement, minimal standards, various certificates, etc.). "These *universal functions* and arrangements of *public utility* require oversight and advance provisions on the part of the public authority," notes Hegel (EPhR, § 235). Education and healthcare may as well belong to this category.

The third group of police activities concerns the economic policy. The primary task that falls under this heading is adjusting the "differing" and potentially conflicting "interests of producers and consumers," (EPhR, § 236), that is, supervising and regulating the functioning of the market. Hegel acknowledges that in the long run and "on the whole," the correct balance may indeed be established automatically.[17] However, the same also holds true for the plague: "it eventually stops," settles down by itself, "yet in the process hundreds of thousands die" (GW 26: 1401). Similarly, Hegel claims, in the event of economic fluctuations the police should closely monitor all developments and, by resorting to market interventions, prevent instabilities from turning into full-fledged economic crises that could endanger the existence of entire industries. This includes, above all, appropriate counter-cyclic measures and, most importantly, a finely tuned employment policy wherever the greatest dangers loom—all with the purpose to ensure a sustainable economy, as it

16 For illustration, the Grimm Dictionary, edited in the middle of the nineteenth century, comments as follows: "In the most general sense the police is the concern of a state or a community (under state authority) for the common good by the means of authority compulsion; according to its range and scope of action, it is divided into a state or provincial police, community or local police ... administrative, welfare, security, health police, road and construction police, etc.; the purpose of the police is actually comfortable living of the members of a state."

17 "When it is said: in general, the balance will always settle itself, this is therefore right. But here it is as much about the particular as about the universal; the matter should not be made only in general, but the individuals as particularities are the purpose and have entitlement" (GW 26: 992).

is now called. It must be considered, however, that according to Hegel—and Steuart before him—the markets are permanently on the verge of collapse, especially when they are dependent on "external circumstances and remote combinations whose implications cannot be grasped by the individuals" (EPhR, § 236). Hegel's police would therefore be heavily engaged in this field.

The fourth group of tasks can be subsumed under family policy. This category refers to the care and protection of family members, primarily children, in the event that the family fails to attend to them properly. When the family lacks the required resources, its role is assumed by civil society. This is not all, however, for according to Hegel, civil society has to intervene for the benefit of children also in other cases when their interest is in jeopardy – intervene, that is, *against their parents*. Hegel's justification for this is astonishingly modern. In his view, children are not the property of their guardians, who are therefore not free to dispose with them according to their opinion. On the contrary, children are the future members of civil society and the state, and are in this capacity entitled to be equipped with everything needed to perform their future roles. On this ground, they have the positive right to obtain proper education, to be nourished and medically treated in their best interest, to be vaccinated against dangerous illnesses, and the like. If their guardians act against these rights, the state is obliged to intervene and protect them "in the face of *arbitrariness* and contingency on the part of *the parents*" (EPhR, § 239).

In addition, the police is also entitled to look over the rational expenditure of family resources. As "resources" are no mere "property," but property endowed with the purpose to provide durable and safe means for the needs of all family members, they have to be spent accordingly, in their best interest. So, if the person who legally disposes with this property happens to use it for his particular interests, or in general, and by his "extravagance" destroys the "family's livelihood," the state has to intervene to protect the family assets.

Finally, there is the welfare policy. Under this category falls the obligation to provide for all those who are unable to take care of themselves through no fault of their own, be it due to health, age, or any contingent circumstance, such as unemployment. Hegel's provisions in this respect are substantial, comparable indeed to the standards of the modern welfare state. For instance, he maintained that the state should guarantee employment for everyone willing to work, and if it fails to do so, the affected person is fully entitled to adequate compensation. Nonetheless, a structural deadlock famously emerges here in the case of the long-term unemployed, a deadlock that may lead to "the creation of a rabble" and ultimately bring civil society to the verge of collapse. For that reason, one of the major tasks of the police is to suppress poverty and, in particular, prevent the poor from turning into the rabble, that is, into a condition characterized by having lost any attachment to the norms and values held by the public, by the "splitting of the mind with civil society" (GW 26: 498).[18]

The problem is, famously, that it is precisely on Hegel's account that the development in question is extremely hard to block. On the one hand, poverty is not a

18 "There is the rich rabble too," says Hegel (GW 26: 1390). But although the question is by no means trivial, in some respects it is even more acute since the rich rabble might be a widespread phenomenon in the well-off civil society of today, we will not go into it. For a closer discussion, see Vieweg 2012: 331f.

contingent phenomenon, a consequence of some disruption in the proper operation of civil society; in Hegel's view, it appears precisely "when the activity of civil society is unrestricted" (EPhR, § 243), as a byproduct of its very thriving. "The emergence of poverty is in general a consequence of civil society and on the whole arises necessarily out of it" (GW 26: 496). On the other hand, all the measures taken by the police to prevent it eventually fail: Hegel claims that if the state provides jobs for the poor by financing their employment, for instance by engaging in public works, it thereby only increases overproduction, which caused the layoffs in the first place; and if the state assumes the burden of supporting the poor directly, this violates "the principle of civil society" that satisfaction should be conditioned on personal contribution and further dishonors the beneficiaries as unable to stand on their own—which gives rise to the inner indignation against civil society, that is, to the very rabble mentality it was supposed to prevent. Hegel bitterly concludes that,

> despite an *excess of wealth*, civil society is *not wealthy enough* – i.e. its own distinct resources are not sufficient – to prevent an excess of poverty and the formation of a rabble. (EPhR, § 245)

In the next paragraph, Hegel adds that "this inner dialectic" of civil society "drives it … to go beyond itself" (EPhR, § 246). And since occasionally he even seems to suggest that the best solution to this "disturbing problem which agitates the modern society" is simply to leave the poor to their fate, these claims were often read as a confession of Hegel's manifest failure to construct a rational state. "This is the only time in his system where Hegel raises a problem—and leaves it open," many scholars observed (here, typically, Avineri 1972: 154; recently also Ruda 2011: 31).

It is our contention that such a reading is profoundly flawed. The so-called inner dialectic driving civil society beyond itself definitely includes colonization. Yet contrary to what is often assumed, it does not stop there. This imperialistic expansion is only the first or immediate remedy for *this specific society*, which only displaces the contradiction in question but otherwise leaves it unchanged. This "higher deficiency in the concept" of civil society (GW 26: 504) consequently cannot be solved in this external manner, and Hegel knew it. It is rather "the concept" that has to "go beyond civil society." This conceptual beyond of civil society is "the universal" or the state. In this sense, the rabble merely makes manifest the necessity of the conceptual transition of civil society towards the state, which alone has the strength to sustain its contradiction.[19]

Besides, we believe that Hegel was actually too severe in passing his judgment, since, as we see it, corporations and the police had quite effective means at their disposal to suppress poverty and prevent the poor from developing the rabble mentality.[20] To conclude this section, let us therefore briefly review the measures in question.

19 It may well happen that a particular state is not able to solve the contradiction in question. According to Hegel, the state is not a work of art, but stands in the world, and as such it is subject to all the usual vicissitudes of the objective world. It is up to history to pass the final judgment, as Kervégan pointed out (see Kervégan 2007: 231).

20 This may appear confusing. On the one hand we claim that civil society necessarily sublates itself, but on the other hand we maintain that the police and corporations can, at least in principle, contain its destructive forces. In order to dispel the confusion we have

"Corporation" is once again an old name for a new concept. In Hegel, it does not have much in common with the medieval guild, but rather stands for an association that an individual may join freely on the ground of some substantial or durable aspect, usually on the basis of a shared professional identity. This common feature, the fact that the members of a corporation pursue the same goals, gradually establishes a certain bond among them, so that they no longer constitute a universal family, but rather "a *second* family" (EPhR, § 252), as Hegel once again puts it with extreme precision.[21] In this way, corporations abolish the equidistance that characterizes anonymous members of civil society, they create small circles within the great circle of civil society, and by developing a sense of solidarity, shared values, and a certain closeness among their members, they at least in part check the atomism inherent to civil society. For Hegel, corporations are of the utmost importance as they mark the first reappearance of the ethical life within what was called the loss of ethical life. But above all, corporations are supposed to enable him to provide for the poor in way that is free of the rabble effect. As we have seen, the problem with the police was that it was bound to act in a universal and external way, so that the support given to the poor was perceived as a humiliation. In corporations, Hegel contends, this is no longer so. For now it is not the universal but the particular that helps the particular, so that the support given includes a sense of equality and even intimacy, just as in the family.[22]

Free corporations, which not only give material support but, more importantly, also facilitate social inclusion, thus at least in principle do offer a promising solution to the disturbing problem of poverty. However, already at the level of the police there are some rather capable measures that we think Hegel failed to consider adequately—in part, no doubt, because of the important changes in the economic structure of society, especially in relation to the enormous growth of the public sector compared to Hegel's times. In this respect, let us mention but two such measures.

First, we have seen that in civil society the production of common resources is essentially public, what is private is only the mode of sharing in them. This private distribution of commonly produced wealth is usually carried out on the model of market transaction, for instance through wages and payments. However, since the market is by no means a natural phenomenon but requires a complex set of regulative and institutional conditions, which in turn affect the allocation of resources

---

to remind ourselves that, for Hegel, there is an important difference between an element taken in isolation, as for instance within a judgment, and the same element integrated into a syllogistic mediation. As a mediating middle term of a syllogism, the element is modified by the extremes and changes its nature accordingly. Consequently, we have to distinguish between civil society as such and civil society as part of the mediating whole that includes the state. In fact, Hegel used precisely this example to illustrate the syllogistic mediation of the absolute mechanism (see GW 12, 144–145). For a closer examination, see Ross 2008.

21 There is, of course, a conceptual analogy between second family and second nature that cannot be discussed here. For a closer reading, see especially Schülein's article "Die Korporation als zweite Familie in Hegels Theorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft" (Ellmers & Herrmann 2017: 101–116).

22 "Only those who live in the articular can take over the care for the particular," Hegel notes (GW 26: 505). The comments by Gans (see Gans 2005: 197f.) make it clear that Hegel most likely referred to trade unions, which, at that time, were largely prohibited.

achieved in this way, no such distribution can be considered *natural*. In this case, too, the result cannot be separated from the common framework that made it possible. Similarly, since according to Hegel the allocations achieved by market transactions include an element of contingency the extent of which is impossible to specify,[23] it is equally impossible to maintain in any significant way that the market distribution is *just*, that it gives to everyone his or her *fair share*. On both accounts it follows that other modes of sharing in the universal resources could be designed which, while still in accordance with the basic principle of civil society, would nonetheless achieve a more equal distribution of wealth and guarantee subsistence to every one of its members.

Such a modified mode of distribution could become only more plausible once the obvious failures of the existing one are taken into account. For instance, since the most important factor in the production of universal resources lies in *cooperation*, that is, in the division of labor and therefore in the work as common, the existing market distribution disproportionally favors those who have, as a peculiar case of private-public partnership. We should also consider that non-remunerated work can nonetheless contribute to the production of public wealth; for that reason, a kind of universal basic income might well represent, in Hegel's view, a *deserved* and therefore *not* humiliating reward for the socially useful work done by each member of civil society outside the market sphere. If someone would protest that such a provision might enable free riders to cheat society, this can be more than compensated by the element of contingency that is freely allowed for in the existing market order.

It has to be emphasized, again, that the above measures are not a matter of wealth *redistribution*. In order to be able to speak of re-distribution we would first need to have a system of distribution free of added elements, which would thus provide a *neutral* starting point. But as we have seen, in the economic field, the pure given is a myth.[24] The arrangements leading to a more equal distribution therefore do not infringe upon the existing system, but simply constitute a different one. In this respect, a particular role would have to be assumed by a well-designed system of taxation. Although Hegel does not speak much of taxes, they represent police material of vital importance. In our view, it is imperative to cultivate public awareness that taxes constitute the material infrastructure of the shared world and that those who seek to avoid paying taxes (Apple, for instance), even if this may be done in compliance with the letter of the law, thereby attack the very foundations of our living together.

And second, as we have seen, partaking in the system of needs also has formative effects. Since in civil society the needs are no longer natural, but abstract and always already socially mediated, they mold the individual in the direction of the universal. Required to be equal, the members of civil society imitate one another and actively "make themselves like others" (EPhR, § 193). If, therefore, the police is the face that, already on the level of civil society, the state shows to its members, then fashion (as the concrete form of the mores) is the face that its members turn towards the state, also already on the level of civil society. In this sense, fashion

23 "This is subject to a complete entanglement of contingency of the whole" (GW 8: 244).
24 See, on this account, Murphy's and Nagel's *The Myth of Ownership*: "We cannot start by taking as given ... some initial allocation of possessions—what people originally own, what is theirs, prior to government interference." (Murphy & Nagel 2002: 9).

constitutes an inverted complement of the police. This phenomenon demonstrates that the members of civil society are not completely separated after all, that they do constitute a kind of homogenized body with shared characteristics, and that they act *una veluti mente ducti*, as Spinoza would say, already at the level of the system of needs. This unity is ambiguous, to be sure, since it is in principle a unity of atomized selfish individuals.[25] It does, however, furnish an objective reality that may facilitate the creation of a common way of thinking. In this way, the mere external mechanism of civil society could sublate itself into the absolute mechanism of the second family, which would thus alleviate the problem of the rabble mentality.

III

Hegel was not alone in conceptualizing the police in his time. Alongside German philosopher Fichte, there was also the Scottish merchant Colquhoun, who wrote extensively on the "municipal police" and made himself famous by founding the first regular police force in England. Colquhoun was equally preoccupied with the problem of poverty and shared similar concerns with respect to what Hegel called the rabble. For instance, in his *Treatise on Indigence*, published in 1806—the year Hegel composed the *Phenomenology of Spirit*—Colquhoun initially stressed the need to draw a distinction between poverty, that "state and condition in society where the individual has ... no property" and consequently "must labour for subsistence" (Colquhoun 1806: 7), and indigence, that "condition in society which implies *want*, *misery*, and *distress*," when the individual is "destitute of the means of subsistence, and is unable to labour" (Colquhoun 1806: 8). "*Indigence* therefore," Colquhoun observes, "and not the *poverty*, is the evil." He acknowledges that the barrier between the two conditions is often "slender," but it should be narrowly guarded all the same, since "every individual who retrogrades into indigence becomes a loss to the body politic" (Colquhoun 1806: 8). The proper task of the police is therefore to use "judicious arrangements" to prevent the poor "from descending into indigence."

It is not hard to see that Colquhoun's description has much in common with Hegel. This, however, is bound to make Hegel's conception of the police suspicious, for in Colquhoun's case it is quite obvious that its task is not only to maintain, but to properly *fabricate* the social order. Furthermore, this order happens to be a very peculiar one, tailored according to the specific demands of capitalism. Colquhoun openly states that poverty is "a necessary and indispensable ingredient of society," something desired, indeed, since "it is the source of *wealth*," and without it "there would be *no riches*, no *refinement*, no *comfort*" (Colquhoun 1806: 8). Therefore, if the proper task of the police is as much to prevent the poor from descending into indigence as to keep the poor in poverty, then its main objective is actually to create conditions where individuals would be forced to work,[26] that is, to make the *capitalist* system run.

25 The ambiguous nature of formation within civil society was already emphasized by Ferguson, one of Hegel's key references in political economy. See Varty 1997: 35–37.

26 It is worth noting that—on different grounds, but nonetheless—something similar holds for Fichte as well. In his well-ordered state of understanding and necessity there would be no "chevaliers d'industrie" (Fichte 2000: 262).

Accordingly, Neocleous reads Colquhoun as the truth of Hegel's police and speaks of "Colquhoun's and Hegel's joint commitment" to the modern commercial system and the demands of private property (Neocleous 2000: 59). The parallel is indeed disturbing. Yet, while it might be convincing in the case of late Foucault, as Neocleous equally suggests, in Hegel's case it clearly misses the point.[27] For Hegel, civil society was the sphere of individuals realizing their freedom as particulars. It constituted a sphere of freedom actualized. Yet, since there, in the sphere of equivalent exchange, poverty implied the inability to start anything, to be poor meant simply that the "right had no existence." Contrary to Colquhoun, Hegel designed his police provisions with the explicit intention to *eliminate* poverty, and if it still existed, the poor were *justified* in their indignation against society. For Hegel, as we have seen, property was not untouchable. Likewise, the purpose of the state was not to secure the safety of person and property—indeed, to claim something like this would mean to confuse the state with civil society (see EPhR, § 258R). Hegel explicitly conceived civil society as a sphere of the unpolitical *within* the political. Accordingly, civil society is not an end in itself that would dictate the conditions of a depoliticized state; quite the contrary, in Hegel, it is rather the *political* state that ultimately determines the concrete form of the framework that market economy has to adjust to.

In spite of this, we have to finally admit that the question of the police persists. Due to the substantial change in the composition of civil society since Hegel's times, at least two major problems have emerged. One relates to corporations. In order to overcome the atomism of civil society Hegel introduced these small circles of solidarity that were based, primarily, on a shared professional identity. In present-day society, however, profession and work in general have lost their centrality in the individual's life and thereby also the ability to forge one's identity. Nowadays, one typically does not have a stable profession anymore, but drifts from one occupation to another, and work has ceased to constitute the privileged field of his or her activities. It is no longer unusual that personal convictions, ways of life, consumer choices, and even hobbies offer the traits used to determine our identity (see Ellmers & Hermann 2017: 14, 22; Ellmers 2015: 80, 151). But if this is so, then the present-day individual not only suffers from indeterminacy, as Honneth put it, but also lacks any stable ground to even join a corporation. It does not seem that consumer behavior could replace a shared identity, as some have implied; yet contrary to other suggestions, for instance to form closer associations relying on the same place of residence (see e.g. Vieweg 2012: 337f.), this proposal at least seeks to solve the problem of civil society within its proper boundaries. In short, nowadays it is hard to see what could possibly perform the function that Hegel ascribed to free corporations.[28]

27 Neocloeus' estimation of Hegel is rather strange, since he is one of the very few who actually read Hegel's treatment of the police closely. See Neocleous 1998.

28 It seems that nowadays, due to the specific mode of subjectivation, the corporation needs to be non-exclusive, in the sense that an individual may have multiple memberships, and non-permanent, in the sense that one may easily change one's affiliations. The problem is, however, that the very advantage that made the corporation instrumental—namely

The second problem refers to the relation between civil society and the state. Hegel, who lived in the Westphalian world order of sovereign nation states, spoke of civil society as if its members and state citizens were the same persons—that is, as if civil society and the political state, the state of understanding and the state of reason, physically coincided. Only in this way was it possible to use the notion of public authority in the sense of a common framework that included both realms at the same time. The problem is, again, that this joint has disintegrated: civil society and the political state have drifted apart. At least for the periphery it may be said that while the state is local, civil society is global (see Vieweg 2012: 327; Ellmers 2015: 163). The framework order that regulates the functioning of civil society is increasingly determined outside the given state, even outside any state; similarly, the formative effects of civil society, its fashions and its upbringing towards the universal, no longer lead to the given political state, but somewhere else.[29]

As a consequence, the state no longer disposes with devices needed to regulate civil society and does not induce the attachment that once derived from the formation process of civil society. In short, the state withers away. What remains is civil society pure, and its police. We are left with a police without a state, with a police that has assumed the role of the state. The interface of the universal without the universal, the police as a state—this is the disturbing problem that should agitate our society.

References

Avineri, Schlomo (1972), *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Behler, Ernst (ed.) (1987), *Philosophy of German Idealism. Fichte, Jacobi, and Shelling,* New York: Continuum.

Bojanić, Petar (2018), "Stražar (*Schlidwache*): O 'simbolu moči občega' pri Heglu", *Problemi* 52(9/10): 31–46.

Buchwalter, Andrew (ed.) (2015), *Hegel and Capitalism,* Albany: SUNY Press.

Cesaroni, Perpaolo, "Polizia o corporazione. Abitudine, istituzione e governo in Hegel", *Politica & società* 6(3): 443–464.

Chamayou, Grégoire (2015), "Fichte's Passport: A Philosophy of the Police", *Theory & Event* 16(2): 1–17.

Chiereghin, Franco (1980), *Dialettica dell'assoluto e ontologia della soggettività in Hegel. Dall'ideale giovanile alla Fenomenologia dello spirito,* Trento: Verifiche.

Colquhoun, Patrick (1806), *A Treatise on Indigence [...] with Propositions for Ameliorating the Condition of the Poor, etc,* London: Hatchard.

---

its ability to make the individual into something substantial—is thereby lost. In this respect, the corporation and marriage face similar challenges in the contemporary world.

29 Cesaroni emphasizes the "qualitative diversity" of the governmental logic of the police and the corporation, respectively, furthermore claiming that they are in inverse proportion: "The more there are institutions, the less there is the rabble; the more there is political government, the less there is the police" (Cesaroni 2017: 460). His observation is in a sense correct. However, we would add that, first, for Hegel, the police and the corporation do not exclude each other; there will always be the police, and rightly so. And second, that police regulations can assume different concrete modes and produce different effects, depending on the specific framework, which is, in principle, determined by the state; the question of the police is a political question.

Ellmers, Sven (2015), *Freiheit und Wirtschaft. Theorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft nach Hegel,* Bielefeld: transcript.
Ellmers, Sven, Steffen Herrmann (eds.) (2017), *Korporation und Sittlichkeit. Zur Aktualität von Hegels Theorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft,* Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink.
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (2000), *Foundations of Natural Right According to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre*, F. Neuhouser (ed.), M. Baur (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gans, Eduard (2005), *Naturrecht und Universalgeschichte*, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friederich (1999), *Political Writings*, L. Dickey and H. B. Nisbet, H. B. Nisbet (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–. (1991), *Elements of Philosophy of Right*, A. W. Wood, H. B. Nisbet (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–. (1979), *System of Ethical Life (1802/3)*, H. S. Harris and T. M. Knox (ed.), Albany: SUNY Press.
–. (1977), *The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of* Philosophy, H. S. Harris & W. Cerf (trans.), Albany: SUNY Press.
–. (1971), *Early Theological Writings,* T. M. Knox (trans.), Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
–. (1968f.), *Gesammelte Werke*, hrg. von Nordrhein-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Künste, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag [cited as GW].
Herzog, Lisa (2013), *Inventing the Market. Smith, Hegel, & Political Theory,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kervégan, Jean-François (2007), *L'effectif et le rationnel. Hegel et l'esprit objectif,* Paris: Vrin.
Neocleous, Mark (2000), *The Fabrication of Social Order. A Critical Theory of Police Power*, London, Sterling: Pluto Press.
–. (1998), "Policing the System of Needs: Hegel, Political Economy, and the Police of the Market", *History of European Ideas* 24(1): 43–58.
Ross, Nathan (2008), *On Mechanism in Hegel's Social and Political Philosophy,* New York, London: Routledge.
Ruda, Frank (2011), *Hegel's Rabble. An Investigation into Hegel's Philosophy of Right,* London: Continuum.
Schmidt am Busch, Hans-Christoph (ed.) (2016), *Die Philosophie des Marktes: The Philosophy of the Market,* Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
Smith, Adam (1896), *Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms, Reported by a Student in 1763*, E. Cannan (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Spinoza, Baruch (2002), *Complete Works*, M. L. Morgan (ed.), S. Shirely (trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
Steuart, James (1767), *An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy,* London: Millar & Cadell.
Varty, John (1997), "Civic or Commercial? Adam Ferguson's Concept of Civil Society", *Democratizaton* 4(1): 29–48.
Vieweg, Klaus (2018), "Das 'erste System der Freiheit' und die 'Vernichtung aller Freiheit': Zu Hegels kritischen Einwendungen gegen Fichtes Freiheitsverständnis", *Fichte-Studien* 45: 181–199.
–. (2012), *Das Denken der Freiheit. Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, München: Wilhelm Fink.
Waszek, Norbert (1988), *The Scottish Enlightenment and Hegel's Account of "Civil Society",* Dodrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer.

Zdravko Kobe

Međusklop opšteg: o Hegelovom pojmu policije

Abstract

Članak pruža probno čitanje Hegelove policije kao pojma koji predstavlja ključni test za umnost Hegelove države i koji zapravo igra veoma bitnu ulogu u formiranju njegovog modela umnosti. Na početku se razmatraju neke značajne promene u Hegelovom pristupu toj temi u jenskom periodu, posebno u vezi sa Fihteom i Spinozom; članak, zatim, iznosi Hegelovo poimanje policije kao međusklopa onog opšteg u njegovoj poznoj političkoj filozofiji, zajedno sa njegovim obrađivanjem uznemiravajućeg problem siromaštva i ološa; i u zaključku, članak dodaje neke generalne primedbe o Hegelovoj policiji, nekad i sad.

Ključne reči: G. V. F. Hegel, J. G. Fihte, politička filozofija, socijalna filozofija, politička ekonomija, građansko društvo, policija, država blagostanja, korporacija

UDK: 159.942:177.72
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1901122R
Original Scientific Article
Received: 17.08.2018. Accepted: 08.10.2018.

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY
VOL. 30, NO. 1, 001-196

Bojana Radovanović

ALTRUISM IN BEHAVIOURAL, MOTIVATIONAL AND EVOLUTIONARY SENSE

ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the relations between three forms of altruism: behavioural, evolutionary and motivational. Altruism in a behavioural sense is an act that benefits another person. It can range from volunteering to a charity and helping a neighbour, to giving money to a non-profit organisation or donating blood. People often dedicate their material and nonmaterial resources for the benefit of others to gain psychological, social and material benefits for themselves. Thus, their altruistic acts are driven by egoistic motivation. Also, the final goal of an altruistic act may be the increase in the welfare of a group or adherence to a certain moral principle or a social norm. However, at least sometimes, the welfare of others is the ultimate goal of our actions, when our altruistic acts are performed from altruistic motivation. In evolutionary sense, altruism means the sacrifice of reproductive success for the benefit of other organisms. According to evolutionary theories, behaviour which promotes the reproductive success of the receiver at the cost of the actor is favoured by natural selection, because it is either beneficial for the altruist in the long run, or for his genes, or for the group he belongs to. However, altruism among people emerges as a distinctly human combination of innate and learned behaviours. Not only do we benefit the members of our own group, but we are capable of transcending our tribalistic instincts and putting the benefit of strangers at our own personal expense as our ultimate goal.

KEYWORDS
altruism, behaviour, motivation, gen-culture co-evolution.

Introduction

The term altruism, which introduced by Auguste Comte, comes from the Latin and it means "for the other" (Kolm 2006). In its broadest sense altruism means promoting the interests of the other (Scott and Seglow 2007). There are three different usages of the term altruism in the literature of today: behavioural, motivational and evolutionary.

In a behavioural sense altruism is an act that benefits other persons from which there is no expectation of reward (Music and Wilson 2008). Thus, altruism in a behavioural sense is the close to prosocial behaviour, which "occurs when one acts in a manner that benefits another person or group of people" (Snyder and Dwyer 2013: 467). This action is intended to improve the situation of the person that receives help and is not done out of professional obligation (Bierhoff 2002). Altruistic

Bojana Radovanović: Research Associate, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade; radovanovic@instifdt.bg.ac.rs.

behaviour is costly for the one who performs it, since it takes time, effort, and often material resources to engage into activities beneficial for other individuals.

In the motivational sense, altruism is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another's welfare (Batson 2011; Elster 2006). It is opposite to egoism, which is a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing one's own welfare. An act beneficial to others can be performed because one truly cares about the well-being of the other, but it can also be undertaken with the final aim of increasing one's own well-being, or a group's welfare, but also to adhere to a moral principle or a social norm (Batson et al. 2002).

Finally, an evolutionary sense, altruism means the sacrifice of fitness (reproductive success) for the benefit of other organisms (Bowles and Gintis 2011; Simon 1983; Sober and Wilson 1998). An act can be altruistic in a motivational sense, but not in terms of evolution and vice versa (Sober and Wilson 1998). For example, being solely motivated by his own safety, an individual wants to make a fort (ibid). However, the fort provides everyone in the group with defence against predators. This individual is not altruistically motivated, but his action is altruistic from the evolutionary perspective, since it increases the reproductive success of the members of the group the actor belongs to.

This paper focuses on the three aspects of altruism and their relations. In the first section, the forms of altruistic behaviour and its various motives will be outlined, while the evolution of altruism will be examined in the second section.

Altruistic Behaviour and Its Motives

Ann donates money to shelter for homeless. Omar pays for a language school his nephew attends. Steve gives money to a homeless person on the street. Mina babysits her friend's children. Jovana contributes to the medical treatment of a sick child she has heard about in the media. David volunteers his time at a local church. Sarah donates her blood to the local clinic. These and similar gestures, beneficial for the others and costly for the actor, are forms of altruistic behaviour.

All over the world, people give their material and non-material resources for the benefit of others (Butcher and Einolf 2017, Moody and Breeze 2016, Smith et al. 2016, Wiepking and Handy 2015). However, the way altruistic behaviour is channelled is not uniform. In some countries, there are high rates of giving to charitable and non-profit organisations, while in others, people support each other directly (Butcher and Einolf 2017; Ilchman et al. 1998; Jung et al. 2016; Wiepking and Handy 2015). Historical, cultural and political forces determining the predominant forms of altruistic behaviour in any society are out of the scope of this paper. Thus, when Ann donates money to a shelter for homeless, thus to an organisation, and when Steve gives directly to a homeless person, they are both performing altruistic acts towards strangers, with or without an intermediary organisation. This section focuses on behaviour of individual actors and motives that drive their actions.

To be motivated to do something requires that we have a desire to achieve a certain state and a belief about how to achieve that state (Sober and Wilson 1998). Motives are goal-directed psychological forces in a given situation (Batson et al. 2002; Batson 2011). We will examine each part of this definition.

Motives are goal-directed, which means that they urge us to achieve a desirable change in the experienced world. This desirable change in the experienced world might be tiny, such as having a sandwich (when feeling hungry), but it can also be of a greater magnitude, such as improving the living conditions of refugees. A goal may be, and most often is, consciously set. For example, Pitter's goal is to enjoy classical music and therefore he goes to a piano concert. However, we may act without really being aware of the goal we want to attain. Thus, the goal may be unconsciously set. For example, we internalise norms of appropriate behaviour in our society and behave in accordance with them, without really being aware of the goals of such behaviour.

Motives are psychological forces, meaning that they are desires that push us to attain the goal. To have a desire means wanting to have something or wishing for something to happen (Sober and Wilson 1998). The concept of desire does not necessarily include feelings and sensations, but they are sometimes accompanied by feelings. Mary may feel pity for a homeless person, and this feeling may induce a desire to help him. Alternatively, she might not feel empathy for his suffering, but she may think that it is her duty to help the needy, which then triggers a desire to help the beggar and give him some money.[1]

Finally, motives are not unidimensional, in a sense that whatever one does cannot be reduced to one motive. They are often different in different situations. Although Pit is motivated by his own welfare when negotiating a business contract, when he takes care of his sister's children while she is on a mindfulness course, his sister's well-being is his goal. Moreover, the same person, in relatively similar situations, may be moved by different motives. On one occasion Pit is motivated by his sister's well-being, on another he may be willing to take care of her children out of the pleasure he gets playing with them.

Goals can be instrumental or ultimate. While an instrumental goal is a means towards something else, an ultimate goal is an end in itself. For example, Susan's ultimate goal may be to gain a reputation for being a generous person and therefore, she donates to an organisation supporting the poor. Thus, the well-being of the poor is an instrumental goal, while gaining a good reputation is an ultimate goal here. In any given situation, we can have different goals, and thus various motives, which can complement or conflict with each other. Mina, for example, has conflicting motives. She wants to buy a new toy for her child, but at the same time, she wants to buy a toy for a child in an orphanage. Supposedly, she can only afford to buy one toy. Although she is aware that a child living in an orphanage would be better off with a new toy than her own child who already has a lot of things to play with, her motherly feelings prompt her to favour her own child. As another example, Jan participates in an activity of an informal group because he is concerned about the welfare of the group that he belongs to and at the same time, his own welfare. Thus, his motives are complementary.

Apart from goals, each action may also have unintended consequences. For example, Oliver's goal may be to increase the well-being of the homeless and because of that he volunteers with a shelter for the homeless. However, volunteering also

1 This example is adapted from Sen (1977).

produces a feeling of joy and satisfaction. These sentiments are unintended consequences of the act of volunteering and not the ultimate goal in this case. However, on some other occasion, Oliver's goal may be to experience this feeling of satisfaction, and he volunteers purely for the pleasure this induces.

What kind of motives drive altruistic behaviour? The so-called 'altruism hypothesis' (Sober and Wilson 1998) maintains that people sometimes have altruistic motivation, meaning that one dedicates her material and non-material resources for the benefit of others because she really cares for them, sometimes even at the risk of significant harm to her own well-being. When the ultimate goal of our behaviour is the well-being of the other (individuals or group), then our motivation is altruistic. The welfare of others becomes goal that leads our action when we have affections towards someone (usually those dear to us), or when we feel sorry for the distress of the other, or when we perceive ourselves strongly linked to others through a shared humanity (Batson 2011; Kolm 2006).

When we feel strongly about someone, when we love a person, we want what is best for her, and we set her welfare as a goal that leads our actions. Affection towards family members, friends and colleagues may influence us to help them, to give our support in various ways (Kolm 2006). In the same way that we react to people we know, we can also have emotions towards unknown individuals. When we see a homeless person on the street in ragged clothing on a cold winter day, we may feel sorry for him. These emotions urge us to act and we give him money. In this situation, altruism is induced by empathy for the suffering of another. Batson defines empathy as the "other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need" (Batson 2011: 11). According to Batson, empathy involves feelings towards another such as "feeling sympathy for, compassion for, sorry for, distress for, concerned for, and so on" (ibid).[2] These feelings may prompt us to act in order to help a person who we perceive is in need.

Thus, improving the well-being of distressed and vulnerable individuals is often prompted by empathic concern (Batson 2011; Kolm 2006; Marsh 2016; Oliner and Oliner 1988; Schokkaert 2006; Sen 1977). This is shown in experiments (Batson 2011), but also in natural settings (Oliner and Oliner 1988). In their analysis of motivation for rescuing Jews during the Second World War, Oliner and Oliner (1988) found that "an empathic reaction aroused more than a third (37%) of rescuers to their first helping act" (ibid: 189). A direct encounter with a person in distress was sometimes enough to provoke helping in the observer. As well as through a direct encounter, empathic feelings can be aroused through indirect contact, such as when we see on television the sufferings of those injured during an earthquake, or hear stories depicting the misfortunes of others.

Apart from empathic concern, one can set the welfare of others as the ultimate goal out of a particular world view, the so-called altruistic perspective - perception of oneself as strongly linked to others through a shared humanity (Monroe 1996). Such a perspective maintains that "each individual is linked to all others and to a world in which all living beings are entitled to certain humane treatment merely by virtue of being alive" (Ibid: 206). When one has this way of seeing the world,

2 The term *empathy* has various definitions even within psychology (See Batson 2011). Here I will use Batson's definition.

setting the welfare of others as an ultimate goal results from the recognition that on the one hand the actor is human and therefore required to act in a certain way, and on the other that a person in need is human and therefore entitled to certain treatment. It is interesting to consider how some people came to have such a perspective, while others do not. It might be innate, but more plausible is that it is gained through socialisation and learning from their parents and pears.

Another study on heroic acts of rescuing Jews during WWII has shown that all rescuers who participated in the study had an altruistic perspective (ibid). When facing the person in need, rescuers had a feeling that they had no choice concerning whether to help, even if it meant risking their lives for strangers. Many reported that they did not even think, but reflexively helped. Such feelings and reactions were firmly entrenched in their perspective on themselves in relation to others which gives rise to an instinctive response that guides their actions in saving others and makes even life and death decisions nonconscious (ibid). It is interesting that those who endangered their own life and the lives of family members to help a stranger believed that they were acting normally, that there was nothing extraordinary about their behaviour. Having such expectations about what constitutes as normal behaviour may explain why rescuers so often have a feeling that their behaviour is reactive, not the result of a conscious process. Not only in such extraordinary situations, but also in everyday life those who have an altruistic perspective set goals to increase the welfare of others, known and unknown, and dedicate their resources to reach such goals.

However, this is only a part of the picture about the motives behind the altruistic acts. Sometimes we benefit others to gain psychological, social and material benefits for ourselves, when our motivation is egoistic (Batson et al. 2002; Andreoni 1990; Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a; Bekkers and Wiepking 2011b). Also, the ultimate goal of an altruistic act may be the increase in a groups' welfare, when she is driven by collectivism (Batson et al. 2002). Finally, we often act altruistically towards others in order to adhere to a certain moral principle or a social norm. Such motivation is called principlism (ibid).

There is plenty of evidence that helping others produces positive psychological consequences (rewards) which are called *empathic joy* also known as *the joy of giving* or *warm glow effect* (Andreoni 1990; Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). There are several possible explanations why people may have psychological rewards from altruistic acts. They may alleviate feelings of guilt, or feel good for acting in line with a social norm, or feel good for acting in line with a specific (altruistic) self-image (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). However, these psychological benefits may just be *unintended consequences* of altruistic behaviour and not the main motivational factor. The fact that a psychological benefit can be foreseen does not mean that achieving it was the goal of the action (Marsh 2016).

Another egoistic motive may lie in obtaining *social benefits* (Kolm 2006; Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). For example, Linda helps a colleague in order to increase his *positive opinion* and build a *good reputation* about her rather than because she truly cares for the colleague's well-being. Since giving is seen as a positive thing to do, people who give are respected by their peers. Numerous studies show that a good reputation or a positive opinion is a very important factor that induces giving

(Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). Some studies find that people who are asked to give by a relative or a friend donate a larger percentage of their income (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011b). For example, people generally prefer their donations to be known about by others. Thus, face-to-face solicitations are more effective than solicitations made over the telephone (ibid).

Altruistic behaviour may also be induced by *material benefits* (Bekkers and Wiepking 2011a). For example, donors to organisations of sport and recreation may benefit from using the services of these organisations. Also, one may volunteer in order to increase the chances of getting a job or for the attainment of greater success in an existing job.

Apart from altruistic and egoistic motivation, the ultimate goal of altruistic behaviour may be the increase in *the welfare of the group to which one belongs*. One can perform acts for the benefit of one's neighbourhood, colleagues, basketball club, nation, etc. A person's willingness to participate in both informal groups and formal organisations in order to address certain needs within a community may be driven by this motive called *collectivism*. Although, as a member of the group, one enjoys the benefit of her act, it would be in her narrow self-interest to free-ride, thus collectivism is different from egoism. It is also different from altruism since the actor cannot be excluded from the benefits of her act.

Finally, the ultimate goal of altruistic behaviour can be adherence to a certain principle or a norm, when motivation is called *principlism* (Batson et al. 2002). One can give her material or non-material resources for the benefit of others, not because she empathises with their situation, or has an altruistic perspective of a bound humankind, nor does she give to gain some sort of personal benefits or to contribute to the community, but because it is the *right course of action. Principles* may be moral and social (Kolm 2006). Moral norms address relations between people, they regulate social life and in a broader sense of the term, they are *social*. However, there is a difference between the two. While *social norms* may differ between societies, *moral norms* claim to be universal. In addition, the two may be in conflict in a certain society. To understand better the distinction between the two norms, we can look at the example of the rescuing of Jews by fellow citizens in Poland during WWII. In pre-Second World War Poland, there was animosity towards the Jews, and the predominant *social norm* would not induce giving to Jews. However, the request for universality of *moral norms* and treatment of all people as equals may, even in such societies, induce helping people from deprived groups, which is noticed in the case of the Poles who rescued Jews during the War (Oliner and Oliner 1988). The above-mentioned empirical study of Oliner and Oliner shows that most rescuers (52 %) performed their first act of helping because they felt an obligation to a *social referent group* (*social norm*), while 11% of rescuers were inspired to action by moral principles (*moral norm*).

In short, though often moved by other kinds of motives (egoism, collectivism and principlism), at least sometimes, people dedicate their material and nonmaterial resources for the benefit of others with the ultimate goal to increase the welfare of that other, when altruistic behaviour comes from altruistic motives. A question that arises is how we have evolved to be capable of altruistic acts and altruistic motives.

Evolution of Altruism

According to Darwin's theory of natural selection, living beings produce more offspring than the limited resources can support and therefore there is a struggle for existence. Individuals in a population have different genes, traits and behaviours (variants). Variants which are best adapted to their environment (conditions of life) are more likely to survive and reproduce, which is known as the survival of the fittest. Variation is heritable, and the offspring of survivors resemble their parents. Thus, variations of individuals who are more likely to survive and reproduce spread through a process of natural selection. In short, the inherent dynamic forces of nature allow only the fittest, the most adaptable, to survive and prosper.

Altruism in evolutionary terms means the sacrifice of fitness for the benefit of other organisms (Bowles and Gintis 2011; Simon 1983). The acts of those who benefit others at a cost to themselves, do not seem to be in line with the theory of natural selection. Here, cost is defined as the degree to which behaviour reduces the reproduction of the genes of the individual performing the altruistic act ("the altruist") and benefit is the degree to which the behaviour increases the rate of reproduction of the genes of the recipient. Nevertheless, organisms do scarify their fitness for the benefit of others. How has such behaviour evolved?

Kin altruism and reciprocal altruism can be explained by the theory of natural selection (Dawkins 2006; Richerson and Boyd 2005; Trivers 1971). Altruistic behaviour towards those with whom we share genes is called kin altruism. Altruism toward kin can be favoured by selection because of the genetical similarity between kin. Making a sacrifice for a child favours the survival and reproduction of one's genes. Thus, an altruistic act towards one's kin, despite the cost borne by the altruist, benefits the reproduction of his gene set. However, for selection to favour kin altruism, benefits should be higher than costs. Evolutionary biologist Hamilton made a calculus of the cost-benefit ratio necessary for the kin selection to work (known as Hamilton's rule). Siblings share half of their genes and one can help the other sibling as long as the benefits are twice the costs, while more-distant relatives require a higher benefit-cost ratio. Apart from humans, kin altruism is common among many other organisms, an example of which is a suicidal barbed sting of the honeybee worker. However, unlike other species, humans often behave altruistically towards non-relatives.

Altruistic behaviour that can be expected to be reciprocated also fits well the theory of natural selection. In small groups, when the chances for interactions between the same pairs of individuals are high, natural selection can favour altruistic behaviour (Trivers 1971). However, certain conditions should be met. First, the cost of an altruistic act is lower than its benefit. Then, the chances that the two individuals will interact in the future are high and the altruist expects that the receiver will reciprocate. If a receiver does not reciprocate an altruist responds to this by denying him all altruistic acts in future. Thus, free riding has negative effects on a free rider's life and when the benefits of lost altruistic acts are higher than the costs of reciprocating, then selection favours altruists to free-riders. In other words, under certain conditions, natural selection favours reciprocal altruistic behaviour because in the long run it benefits the organism performing the act (ibid).

We argued that altruistic behaviour towards one's kin and towards people from whom one may expect a reciprocal activity is consistent with the theory of natural

selection. However, people help complete strangers, and they also practice activities for the benefit of others when it is not likely that their behaviour will be reciprocated. In such cases, if the individual were to refrain from helping others his fitness or other payoffs would be higher. Why has such behaviour evolved?

As it has already been pointed out, parental care has a genetic base. The question is whether parental nurturing may be the origin of altruism towards strangers. Darwin pointed out that sympathy for others is linked to instinctive love based on parental and filial affections (Batson 2011). Thus, caring for others is an extension of kin altruism. This argument could be found in psychological theories a century ago, when it was abundant (ibid). Today, in line with this, Pinker argues that care for those with whom we share genes is instinctively triggered and extended to our fictive kin, such as brothers in arms, occupational and religious brotherhoods, crime families, fatherlands, etc. (Pinker 2012). In other words, artificial families are created through metaphors and myths and thus altruistic behaviour is extended to this fictive kinship. However, from an evolutionary point of view, such 'extension' reduces one's fitness since there are no shared genes with the fictive kin. Then, why does it not get 'weeded out'? The explanation of how we evolved to become a species whose members help one another lies in the gene-culture coevolution and cultural-group selection (Bowles and Gintis 2011; Green 2013; Hodgson 2013; Richerson and Boyd 2005).

In order to regulate altruistic and cheating tendencies in individuals, a complex psychological system has evolved (Bowles and Gintis 2011; Green 2013; Trivers 1971; Richerson and Boyd 2005). These psychological mechanisms are often called social instincts (Richerson and Boyd 2005). Strong positive and negative emotions regulate our interactions with others. We care about our fellow human beings and sympathise with their misfortunes. When we provide help to those in need we often feel satisfaction and other positive emotions. Shame and guilt are emotions experienced when we have failed to provide support for those in need or when we take a free ride. We recognise other individuals and remember how we have treated and been treated by them, feeling gratitude to those who have helped us and anger towards those who have exploited us. Our negative reactive emotions such as anger motivate us to punish uncooperative individuals. We are willing to reward those who cooperate and punish people who do not. We do this even when we do not gain anything from this and even when the costs are higher than the benefits.[3]Our self-esteem and our reputation depend on what others think of us, where altruistic behaviour is praised and cheating despised. Finally, we perceive the social world as divided into competitive groups and we have predispositions to learn and internalise norms of the group we belong to. These "social instincts" allow the individual to reap the psychological benefits of an altruistic exchange and it also protects him from free-riders.[4] How have these emotions and traits evolved?

3 *Altruistic (moralistic) rewarding* – a predisposition to reward others for cooperation and *altruistic (moralistic punishment)* – a propensity to impose sanctions on those who violate norms and omit to reciprocate are well documented in many experiments (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).

4 It should be noted that these psychological benefits are not the reasons of an altruistic act. They are rather its by-products.

Our psychological capacities and dispositions are the products of a gene-culture coevolution. A coevolution of genes and culture is dynamic whereby genes affect cultural evolution and culture affects genetic evolution (Richerson and Boyd 2005).[5] Here culture is defined as information (any kind of conscious or unconscious mental state) that affects individuals' behaviour, which is acquired through social learning (ibid). Words like idea, knowledge, belief, value, skill, and attitude are usually used to describe this information. Culture is acquired, stored and transmitted by a population (group) of individuals. As with other species, humans acquire knowledge through genetic transmission and individual learning, but unlike other animals, humans also learn from one another, which is known as the process of social learning or cultural transmission (Hodgson 2013; Richerson and Boyd 2005). People in culturally distinct groups behave differently, mostly because they have acquired different skills, beliefs, and values. These differences persist because people learn from their parents, other adults and their peers.

The concept of gene-culture coevolution implies that a culture is a part of the environment where genes are selected, while genetic bases influence the cultural evolution. Although it is intuitively conceivable that the way we think and behave is shaped by our biology, that is our genes, it is less easy to imagine that our culture influences our genes. How does this work? An example of gene-culture coevolution is the evolution of adult lactose digestion (Richerson and Boyd 2005). Milk has always been food for mammal babies. Since lactose only occurred in mother's milk, adult mammals had no need for the enzyme necessary to digest lactose. The majority of people can digest milk as infants but not as adults. However, some human adults can digest lactose. This is because they possess a certain gene that controls adult lactose digestion. This gene evolved as a result of an adaptation to the habit of milk consumption. People have kept cows and consumed fresh milk in some parts of the world (e.g. northwest Europe) for a long time. Calculations indicate that there has been plenty of time for this gene to evolve since the origin of dairying (ibid). Once it is spread it encouraged even more milk consumption.

As with the culture of milk consumption and lactose digestion, a gene-culture coevolution explains the origins of altruistic behaviour found among humans. As it has already been pointed out, humans, like other organisms, behave altruistically towards their kin and in small groups when the reciprocation of the altruistic act is expected, but unlike other organisms, people often act altruistically towards complete strangers. In order to understand the process by which natural selection favours altruistic behaviour among unrelated humans, we need to introduce the concepts of multilevel selection and group selection. We can think about natural selection occurring at a series of levels: among genes within an individual, among individuals within a group, and among groups (Richerson and Boyd 2005). This process was introduced by biologist Price, who described the process of multilevel selection through a mathematical formalism called the Price covariance equation. Using Price's method, kin selection is conceptualised as occurring at two levels: selection within family groups favours free-riders, because defectors always do

5 In biology, the term *coevolution* refers to "systems in which two species are important parts of each other's environments so that evolutionary changes in one species induce evolutionary modifications in the other" (Richerson and Boyd 2005: 192).

better than other individuals within their own group, but selection among family groups favours groups with more helpers, because each helper increases the average fitness of the group (ibid).

Group selection is a mechanism of evolution when natural selection acts at the group level. In this concept, groups are adaptive and those, which better adapt to their environment reproduce and prosper, while those that do not adapt disappear.[6] Group selection favours traits that maximise the relative fitness of groups, rather than that of individuals (Sober and Wilson 1998). For group selection to work, there is a need for a conflict and a heritable variation between groups with the corresponding variation in fitness (Richerson and Boyd 2005; Sober and Wilson 1998). There are two concepts of group selection: genetic group selection and cultural group selection. Although the group is the object of selection in both concepts, they differ because they focus on separate levels and mechanisms of inheritance (Hodgson 2013). In the genetic group, genes are causes of variation, while cultural and informational mechanisms (such as individual habits and social customs) are the sources of variation in cultural group selection (ibid). In order for the genetic group selection to work, there is a need for the restriction of intergroup migration and the limitation of genetic mixing. When variation between groups is based on genetic material, then even very small amounts of migration are sufficient to reduce the variation. Although evidence on the intergroup migration among early humans is lacking, based on the evidence among primates, we can conclude that migration between groups occurred (ibid). This makes genetic group selection an unimportant force in evolution (Richerson and Boyd 2005). However, migration between culturally different groups does not result in a decrease in between-group variation. This is due to the conformist bias – a propensity to do what the majority does and altruistic (moralistic) punishment – inclination of group members to punish individuals who violate group norms (ibid). These two mechanisms, which evolved to assure group cohesion, induce migrants to adhere to the rules of behaviour (norms) in the group they migrated to.

Our Pleistocene ancestors lived in communities where different groups competed for material sources. Different groups adapted to their specific environments, which resulted in behavioural variations among groups. These variations are heritable since the way people think and behave is acquired through social learning. Cultural differences affected the group's competitive ability. Groups whose members were predisposed to cooperate and uphold the norms of sharing and caring for each other tended to survive and expand relative to other groups (Bowles and Gintis 2011; Hodgson 2013; Green 2013). An environment of between-group conflict favoured the evolution of the social instincts to assure within-group cooperation (Richerson and Boyd 2005). Docility, the propensity to behave in socially approved ways, became the basis for altruism in society (Simon 1983). Group selection favoured the evolution of social instincts, which bring a competitive advantage to groups, such as fairness and sympathy. Individuals who did not possess these social instincts were denied the goods of the group and mating partners.

6 It should be noted that a disappearance of a group does not necessarily mean that all its members are killed. They are rather assimilated, absorbed by the other, more successful group.

It has been argued that, through the process of gene-cultural coevolution, humans have developed psychological mechanisms and constructed social norms that have secured high levels of within-group cooperation, which in turn has favoured the survival of the group as an entity. It should be noted that human genetic features have changed very little in thousands of years, while culture evolves at a much faster pace (Hodgson 2013). Our innate social psychology is probably the same as that of people in Pleistocene (2,588,000 to 11,700 years ago). Evolution in our culture, of the way we think and behave, happens at much faster paced than the evolution in our genes. This is exactly why, according to the evolutionary biologists, culture emerged in the first place. Culture arose because it can evolve adaptations to a changing environment that could not be done by genes alone.

The same psychological traits and social norms that have made us predisposed to favour group benefits over our own interests, often prompt us to favour our group members' or our group's interests over the benefits of the members of other groups. This is why we are often parochially altruistic or tribalistic (Green 2013). However, we do benefit individuals outside of our social groups, although perhaps not to the same extent as we favour our own group members. This is possible because our behaviour is led by both emotions and reasoning (Green 2013). On the one hand, we have emotions. They are automatic processes that, based on the lessons of past experience, exert pressure on behaviour. This past experience comes in three different forms. First, our emotions are shaped by our genes, then by cultural learning, and finally by personal experience. On the other, we are capable of reasoning. Reasoning involves the conscious application of decision rules. When we behave based on reasoning we know what we are doing and why. We have conscious access to the rules on which we base our decisions. Although our emotions often prompt us to favour our group members, regardless of whether the group is perceived in terms of ethnic origin or social status, since we are capable of reasoning and imagining we can go beyond the limits of one's group and engage in activities which benefit complete strangers.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that altruism in a behavioural sense is an act that benefits another person, while it is altruistically motivated when the ultimate goal of such act is the welfare of that other. In evolutionary sense, altruism means the sacrifice of fitness for the benefit of other organisms.

According to the evolutionary theories of altruism, behaviour which promotes the reproductive success of the receiver at the cost of the altruist is favoured by natural selection, because it is either beneficial for the altruist in the long run, or for his genes, or for the group he belongs to. Thus, in line with Trivers, it can be argued that "models that attempt to explain altruistic behaviour in terms of natural selection are models designed to take the altruism out of altruism" (Trivers 1971: 35).

Indeed, people often dedicate their material and nonmaterial resources for the benefit of others to gain psychological, social and material benefits for themselves. Also, the ultimate goal of an altruistic act may be the increase in the welfare of a group or adherence to a certain moral principle or a social norm. In other words, altruistic behaviour can be driven by various motives.

However, altruism among people emerges as a distinctly human combination of innate and learned behaviours. Not only do we benefit the members of our own group, but we are capable of transcending our tribalistic instincts and putting the benefit of strangers at our own personal expense as our ultimate goal. Thus, at least sometimes, we act altruistically from altruistic motivation.

References

Andreoni, James (1990), "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving", *The Economic Journal* 100(401): 464–477.

Bekkers, Rene and Wiepking, Pamala (2011a), "A Literature Review of Empirical Studies of Philanthropy: Eight Mechanisms That Drive Charitable Giving", *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 40 (5): 924–973.

–. (2011b), "Who Gives? A Literature Review of Predictors of Charitable Giving. Part One: Religion, Education, Age and Socialisation", *Voluntary Sector Review* 2(3): 337–365.

Batson, C. Daniel (2011), *Altruism in Humans*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Batson, C. Daniel, Nadia Ahmad and Jo- Ann Tsang (2002), "Four Motives for Community Involvement", *Journal of Social Issues,* 58 (3): 429–445.

Bierhoff, Hans Werner (2002), *Prosocial Behaviour*, Hove: Taylor & Francis Group.

Bowles, Samuel and Gintis, Herbert (2011), *A Cooperative Species: Human Reciprocity and Its Evolution*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Butcher, Jacqueline and Einolf, J. Christopher (eds.) (2017), *Perspectives on Volunteering: Voices from the South*, Cham: Springer International Publishing AG.

Dawkins, Richard (2006), *The Selfish Gene,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Elster, Jon (2006), "Altruistic Behaviour and Altruistic Motivations" in Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier (eds.), *Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity*, Volume 1, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 183–206.

Green, Joshua (2013), *Moral Tribes,* London: Atlantic Books.

Hodgson, Geoffrey (2013), *From Pleasure Machines to Moral Communities: An Evolutionary Economics Without Homo Economicus,* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Fehr, Ernst and Urst Fischbacher (2003), "The Nature of Human Altruism", *Nature*,425(23): 785-791.

Ilchman, Warren, Stanley Katz and Edward Queen II (eds.) (1998), *Philanthropy in the World's Traditions*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Jung, Tobias, Susan D. Phillips, Jenny Harrow (eds.) (2016), *The Routledge Companion to Philanthropy*, London: Routledge.

Kolm, Serge-Christophe (2006), "Introduction to the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity" in Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier (eds.), *Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity*, Volume 1, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 4–114.

Marsh, Abigail (2016), "Neural, Cognitive, and Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism", *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science* 7(1): 59–71.

Monroe, Kristen Renwick (1996), *The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of Common Humanity*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Musick, Marc and Wilson John (2008), *Volunteers: A SocialPprofile*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Oliner, Samuel and Pearl Oliner (1988), *The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe*, New York: The Free Press.

Pinker, Steven (2012), "The False Allure of Group Selection", *Edge*, 18.06.2012, https://www.edge.org/conversation/steven_pinker-the-false-allure-of-group-selection , as of 23 January 2014.

Richerson, Peter and Robert Boyd (2005), *Not by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Schokkaert, E. 2006, The empirical analysis of transfer motives in Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity in Serge-Christophe Kolm and Jean Mercier Ythier (eds.), *Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity*, Volume 1, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 128–176.
Scott, Niall and Seglow, Jonathan (2007), *Altruism*, Open University Press, Berkshire: McGraw-Hill Education.
Sen, Amartia (1977), "Rational Fools: A Critique of The Behavioural Foundations Of Economic Theory", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 6(4): 317–344.
Simon, Herbert (1983), *Reason in Human Affairs*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Smith, David Horton, Robert Stebbins and Jurgen Grotz (eds.) (2016), *The Palgrave Handbook of Volunteering, Civic Participation, and Nonprofit Associations*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Snyder, Mark and Patrick C. Dwyer (2013), "Altruism and Prosocial Behaviour", in Theodore Millon, Melvin Lerner and Irving Meiner (eds), *Handbook of Psychology, Volume 5: Personality and Social Psychology,* New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., pp. 467–485.
Sober Elliott and David S. Wilson (1998), *Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behaviour*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Trivers, Robert L. (1971), "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism", *The Quarterly Review of Biology* 46(1): 35–57.
Wiepking, Pamala and Femida Handy (eds.) (2015), *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Philanthropy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bojana Radovanović

Altruizam u bihejvioralnom, motivacionom i evolutivnom smislu

Apstrakt

Ovaj rad govori o odnosima između altruizma u bihejvioralnom, evolutivnom i motivacionom smilsu. Altruizam u smislu ponašanja je radnja u kojoj akter snosi trošak (materijalni ili nematerijalni) a od koje benefit ima druga osoba. Može da se kreće od volontiranja za neprofitne organizacije i pružanja pomoći osobama u nevolji, do davanju novca u dobrotvorne svrhe ili doniranja krvi. Ljudi često posvećuju svoje materijalne i nematerijalne resurse u korist drugih kako bi stekli psihološke, socijalne i materijalne koristi za sebe. Tada su njihova altruistična dela vođena egoističnim motivima. Takođe, krajnji cilj altruističnog čina može biti povećanje blagostanja grupe ili poštovanje određenog moralnog principa ili društvene norme. U evolucionom smislu, altruizam znači žrtvovanje reproduktivnog uspeha u korist drugih organizama. Prirodna selekcija favorizuje ovakvo ponašanje kada je ono ili korisno za altruistu na duži rok, ili za njegove gene, ili za grupu kojoj pripada. Međutim, altruizam među ljudima se javlja kao jedinstvena kombinacija urođenog i naučenog ponašanja. Ne samo da postupamo s ciljem povećanja sopstvenog blagostanja i blagostanja članova grupe kojoj pripadamo, već često postupamo u korist potpunih stranaca, imajući kao krajnji cilj njihovo blagostanje, kada naše altruistično ponašanje proističe iz altruistične motivacije.

Ključne reči: altruizam, ponašanje, motivacija, koevolucija gen-kultura.

UDK: 165.1:159.97
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1901135L
Original Scientific Article
Received: 05.09.2018. Accepted: 22.11.2018.

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY
VOL. 30, NO. 1, 001-196

Kristina Lekić

COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND AUTISM: AGAINST THE EXCLUSION OF THE "SOCIAL MISFITS"

ABSTRACT
The paper aims to shed light on Searle's notion of collective intentionality (CI) as a primitive phenomenon shared by all humans. The latter could be problematic given that there are individuals who are unable to grasp collective intentionality and fully collaborate within the framework of "we-intentionality". Such is the case of individuals with autism, given that the lack of motivation and skills for sharing psychological states with others is one of the diagnostic criteria for Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD). The paper will argue that exclusion of individuals with autism is not a threat for Searle's notion of collective intentionality, as the notion can be read as merely a biological disposition that all human beings share. Furthermore, the paper proposes the extension of Searle's concept of CI so it can include behaviors of individuals who have the disposition towards CI, but which was not evolved through ontogenesis; namely, for individuals with autism.

KEYWORDS
Searle, collective intentionality, autism, imitation, cooperation, rule-governed behavior

Introduction

In *The Construction of Social Reality*, John Searle (1995) proclaims collective intentionality – thoughts and intentions of a group - as a defining feature of social reality; an ability all human beings share. Collective intentionality is commonly defined as a joint intentional behavior of a group directed towards some collective goal. People diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorders lack the ability and motivation to engage in collective intentional behaviors and actions. Thus, I prompt the question of whether the collective intentionality is, according to Searle, a defining feature of human beings, and, consequently, does it withdraws the exclusion of autistic individuals from the society. In what follows, I shall argue that Searle would not embrace the exclusion of autistic individuals from the society, as well as the restrictiveness of the notion of collective intentionality. Rather, I shall claim, collective intentionality can be interpreted as a biological disposition that has not been evolved in all human beings, even though all share the disposition in question. Once the first threat to Searle's view is cleared, I raise my concern on exclusion of autistic individuals from collective intentional actions, due to their social impairments. I propose the extension of Searle's notion of collective intentionality by recognizing behaviors that individuals with autism are capable of performing, and

Kristina Lekić: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Rijeka; klekic1@ffri.hr.

which can be acknowledged as both collective and intentional. The structure of the paper is following. The first chapter draws upon the terminology of John Searle; the second chapter problematizes the biological primitiveness of the collective intentionality, while the third provides conceptual framework for Autism Spectrum Disorders. Given that individuals with autism do not follow typical developmental pathway of social engagement, the fourth chapter proposes the broadening of Searle's concept of collective intentionality.

Searle's Account of Collective Intentionality

Given that collective intentionality is a building block of all social phenomena, in this section, I shall investigate what are the defining features of collective intentionality and what makes it qualified to be a necessary precondition for social reality.

Searle's notion of collective intentionality is based on twofold intuition: first, a collective intentional behavior is not equal to the summation of an individual behavior, and second, the existence of mutually shared beliefs (even about intentions of other group members) is not sufficient to ensure cooperation. The first part of intuition – the irreducibility of collective intentionality to individual intentionality – is found in cases where I am doing something as a part of a group doing something. The example Searle extensively uses throughout the book is a football game: collective intentionality can be seen in offensive lineman's blocking of the defensive end. This action is only a part of team's execution of a pass play, even though it is only an offensive lineman that is performing the action. However, if the action lineman performed was not a part of the team's goal (execution of a pass play), then it would merely be an individual act. Same actions can thus, on one occasion, be an individual act and, on another, a collective act. To make this distinction clear, Searle offers the following examples:

> Imagine that a group of people sitting on the grass in various places in a park. Imagine that it suddenly starts to rain and they all get up and run to a common, centrally located shelter. Each person has the intention expressed by the sentence "I am running to the shelter". But for each person, we may suppose that his or her intention is entirely independent of the intentions and behavior of others. In this case there is no collective behavior; there is just a sequence of individual acts that happen to converge on a common goal. Now imagine a case where a group of people in a park converge on a common point as a piece of collective behavior. Imagine that they are part of an outdoor ballet where the choreography calls for the entire corps de ballet to converge on a common point. We can imagine that the external bodily movements are indistinguishable in the two cases; the people running to the shelter make the same types of bodily movements as the ballet dancers. Externally observed, the two cases are indistinguishable, but they are clearly internally different. (Searle 1995: 402–403).

In the example of a group performing an outdoor ballet choreography, the intention of each group member (the individual "I intend") derives from the collective intention of the group ("we intend"). Moreover, Searle argues that we-intentionality is irreducible to I-intentionality, claiming that "we simply have to recognize that there are some intentions whose form is: "We intend that we perform act A, and such an intention can exist in the mind of each individual agent who is acting as

part of the collective'" (Searle 1990: 96). In this manner, collective intentions cannot be analyzable in terms of a set of individual intentions. The same follows for the attempt of analyzing collective intentions by considering a set of mutual belief about the group actions. This is the second part of Searle's intuition about collective intentionality, according to which beliefs that members of a group share do not ensure the intention to cooperate. Without this intention, collective intentionality does not exist within a group. Searle continues by stating that "all the intentionality needed for collective behavior can be possessed by individual agents even though the intentionality in question makes reference to the collective" (Searle 1990: 407). The idea is that what makes an action or a behavior collective and intentional is a specific type of mental state – *we-intentionality* – which differs from the mental state one has during individual intentional behavior. Having this mental state, one intends to cooperate with another in terms of sharing a collective goal. We-intentionality is shared by all humans and is rooted in biology.[1] The biological foundation of collective intentionality is expressed through the feature of primitiveness. It is argued that collective intentionality is irreducible to individual intentional behavior, i.e. that it is logically primitive in means that it cannot be logically analyzed in term of other concepts. The logical primitiveness will not be of interest in this paper[2]. Rather, it is the feature of the biological primitiveness of collective intentionality that is put into a spotlight as it underlies that human beings, in general, possess the capacity for collective intentionality. The latter is problematic due to the fact that some individuals (such are individuals with autistic spectrum disorders) do not possess the level of collective intentionality.

The Biological Primitiveness of Collective Intentionality

> Collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon that cannot be reduced to or eliminated in favor of something else. (Searle 1995: 24)

Notice that Searle's assertion about the biological element of the collective intentionality is quickly followed by a claim about the impossibility to analyze collective intentionality through individual behavior or mutual beliefs of the group. The same maneuver Searle repeats once again when claiming that "the capacity for collective behavior is biologically innate, and the forms of collective intentionality cannot be eliminated or reduced to something else" (Searle 1995: 37). I hold that this is the reason why the discussion about the primitiveness of the collective intentionality is often focused only on the Searle's non-summativist account, while the biological notion is put aside. So what does it mean that collective intentionality in Searleian sense is biologically innate[3] and primitive? As Searle remarks, the capacity to engage in collective intentional behavior is a trait that has evolved through natural selection and evolutionary adaptation and is now immanent in

1 "...what sort of being are we that we have the capacity to form such [we-] intentions? Ultimately the answer to that has to be biological." (Searle 1995: 413).
2 For debate on logical primitiveness, see Mejers 2003; Pacherie 2007; and Salice 2015.
3 The term "innate" is used to mean "shared by all members of the species". (see Mameli and Bateson 2006: 173)

human nature[4]. However, he continues, it is the underlying capacity of collective intentionality that is crucial for collective behavior, i.e., "something like a pre-intentional state of "the other" as an actual or potential agent like oneself" (Searle 1990: 413). Therefore, it seems that behind the biological primitiveness of collective intentionality stands a notion of "the sense of the other" as a part of the community I am engaging into. One acquired this "sense" through ontogenetic development[5], and it is because of it that humans have a natural tendency to look upon others as candidates for collective intentional activity. According to this conception, we must suppose that

> the others are agents like yourself, that they have a similar awareness of you as an agent like themselves, and that this awareness coalesce into a sense of us as possible or actual collective agents. (Searle 1990: 414)

Searle insists that collective intentionality presupposes a "sense of the other as candidates for cooperative agency" (Searle 1990: 414). This presupposition of the other as a co-agent is biologically innate, and in this sense, the question arises*: Is the capacity for collective intentionality a feature that applies to all human beings in general?* Or better yet, does the capacity to engage in collective intentional behavior define our species, in a way that one needs to have it in order to be counted as a human being? While most people possess the ability to engage in collective intentional behaviors, there are some individuals who lack both the capacity and the motivation to encounter with others in intentional activity. Empirical findings suggest that children and adults with autistic spectrum disorders[6] (ASD) perform very poorly in joint attention and cooperative activities (Colombi et al. 2009: 143–163). The reason is, studies showed, to be found in their inborn inability to share mental states with others in the process of group intentional agency.

It is almost self-evident that Searle would not claim that autistic persons are not human beings. Thus, a different interpretation of the biological primitiveness of collective intentionality imposes. I propose that Searle's intention is to assert that all human beings have a biological predisposition for engaging in collective intentional activities and behaviors by accepting others as co-agents. The idea is that all humans have an increased chance of developing a pattern of behavior (in this case collective intentional behavior) based on the genes we inherited. While most people have developed a disposition toward collective intentionality, there are cases where the activation of the disposition does not occur. If we accept capacity for collective intentionality as a biological disposition all humans share, then the first threat to Searle's theory is discarded.

The second threat for Searle's theory follows from the assertion that collective intentionality is the defining feature of society in general. Given that individuals

4 "The selectional advantage of cooperative behavior is, I trust, obvious. Inclusive fitness is increased by cooperating with conspecifics." (Searle 1995: 38).

5 "What sort of beings are we that we have the capacity to form such intentions? Ultimately, the answer to that has to be biological." (Searle 2002: 103)

6 Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) are a group of related developmental disorders that are characterized by impairments in social interaction, language development communication, as well as stereotyped motor behaviors. ASDs include Autistic Disorder, Asperger's Disorder and Pervasive Developmental Disorder – Not Otherwise specified (PDD-NOS).

with ASD do not possess the capacity to understand and perform the intentions embedded into collective actions, there is a potential threat to Searle's theory of embracing Husserlian exclusion of anomalous subjects from the society. Husserl asserts that the world is a constitutive accomplishment of rational, adult, mature and sane – normal – human beings. Children, the insane, the mentally impaired, the old, those with severe disabilities, and other "abnormal" subjects are excluded by Husserl from the collective of co-constitutors.[7] Is the lack of the capacity for engaging in collective intentional behavior a criterion for exclusion from society? I gather that Searle would not accept the exclusion of the autistic children and adults from the society. Namely, in relation to general population, there is only a small number of individuals whose disposition towards CI has not been evolved, so Searle could accept that society can function even if not all members share the capacity for collective intentionality or even engage into collective intentional actions. However, we need to strive to include such individuals into society by recognizing the behaviors and actions that they can engage into.

The next section will consider the background of autistic individuals engaging in collective intentional behaviors, and examine what are the features that avert them to enter fully into society and make them a part of the group of "the social misfits".

Autism and Its Defining Features

Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is defined as a
subcategory of neurodevelopmental disorders, characterized by impairments in social communication and restriction in interests and behaviors (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, 5th edition 2013: 299.00; F84.0). The term "spectrum" indicates variations and heterogeneity of the autistic conditions that range from people with severe developmental delays to high functioning savants. However, all people with ASD share the triad of impairments: (1) impairments in language and communication, (2) impairments in social interaction and (3) repetitive or restricted interests and behaviors. The most distinguished aspect of ASD is difficulty within the reciprocal, social interactions. From an early age, autistic children have impairments in using and understanding eye-contact, gestures, face-expressions, and cooperation. Social interaction in autism spectrum disorder is exhibited through impairments in non-verbal behaviors, failure to develop peer relationship and lack of sharing interests and goal with others. With respect to the latter, one of the most enduring psychological theory tends to expand the triad of impairments by adding key deficit all autistic individuals share – the impaired "theory of mind" (ToM), or a condition of "mind-blindness". This account can explain why children with autism have difficulties with simple behaviors such as joint attention[8], pretend-play and telling lies.

7 "[...] excluded are the children, and also mentally ill and sick in general, insofar as they live in the anomality [...] Only the mature as normal human persons and in the unity-nexus of their communicative lives are subjects for the world which is their world [...] Also, the old [...] are counted as anomalies here, as well as the sick." (Husserl: 178, cf. 618)

8 Joint attention or indicating behaviors "involve the use of procedures (e.g. showing a toy) to co-ordinate attention between interactive social partners with respect to objects or events in order to share an awareness of objects or events" (Mundy et al. 1986: 657).

Theory of mind (ToM) is a cognitive capacity to attribute mental states to self and others (Goldman 2012). Namely, by "theory of mind we mean being able to infer the full range of mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions, imagination, emotions, etc.) that cause action" (Baron-Cohen 2001: 174). The most famous empirical discovery about the development of the ToM is the discovery by Wimmer and Perner (Wimmer and Perner1983) of a cognitive shift in children between three and four years. The research showed that children at the age of three fail false-belief task, whereas, at the age of four, children tend to succeed on the test.[9] Difficulty in understanding other people's beliefs, intentions and emotions is a core cognitive feature of autism spectrum disorders. Some studies have shown that autistic children, regardless of the IQ[10], are "mind blind", meaning that they are "blind" when it comes to understanding other people's intentions. Studies have shown that most autistic children fail false belief tasks (Happe and Frith 1996: 1377–1400), do understand the distinction between appearance and Reality, and do not understand complex causes of behavior such as beliefs (Charman et al. 1997: 781 – 789). The ToM is closely related to Searle's notion of collective intentionality, as it is counted as a capacity that allows us to understand and predict another agent's behaviors and thoughts.

However, not all research argues that mindblindness is the key mechanism underlying the social interaction impairments seen in ASD. The degree of understanding of intentional behavior in autistic children is thus uncertain, as experimental results do not match: one research stream claims that "autistic individuals are relatively unable to understand", (Gallese, Eagle, and Migone 2007: 152), the intentions behind one's action, while the other stream shows that the majority of children with autism understand that others have intentions and behave toward achieving them. These studies conclude that what autistic children lack are not the skills to understand the intentional behavior of others, but the motivation and capacities for sharing psychological states with others. The latter is one of the diagnostic criteria for ASD, given that the capacities for intention-reading and the motivation to share psychological states with adults or peers interact during the first year of life. Thus, it is claimed that autistic children understand other people's intentions, but lack the skills and motivation for sharing mental states, as well as the interest in other person's psychological states. For example, a study performed by Carpenter et al. (2002) showed that autistic children imitated adult's unconventional actions

Children with autism exhibit stronger deficit in indicating skills than normal and mentally retarded children, which makes this deficit a strong diagnostic feature of autism. The ongoing hypothesis of social impairments in autistic children suggests that the deficit in joint attention behaviors in autistic children is associated to a disturbance in more basic psychological mechanisms, namely, in affective sharing (See Kasari et al. 1990: 87–100).

9 The classic false belief test, the "Sally-Anne test" shows Sally placing a marble in a basket and leaving the room. While she is away, Anne removes the marble from the basket and hides it in a box. Participants are then asked, "Where will Sally look for the marble?" The participants exhibit their cognitive capability of mindreading if they answer that the Sally will look in the basket. The participants who answered correctly understand that Sally's belief does not represent the reality of the situation, as she does not know that Anne moved the marble. This understanding of other people's beliefs is called first-order belief attribution.

10 Autistic children's ToM difficulties cannot be attributed to low IQ, as children with Down's syndrome have similar or lower IQ scores, but perform significantly better on false belief tests (see Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith 1985: 37–46).

(such as turning the light with the head), but also that they understand the intentions of the unconventional actions (they looked at the light with anticipation). Thus, it can be concluded that what autistic children do not understand is not the intentions themselves, but is the decision-making process behind the intentional activity. This implies that autistic children and adults have some basics of a theory of mind (i.e. they are not completely "blind"), but have difficulties in using it appropriately within social engagements.[11] Social interactions with others are not completely absent in autism, but they are deviant, as autistic children are unable to develop socially in order to make social relationships (see Torres 2013: 7–32.). With regard to cooperation, children diagnosed with autistic spectrum disorders have very weak cooperative abilities and do not engage in cooperative activities with their peers or with adults. The motivations and skills for participating in collective intentional behavior are woven into the earliest stages of human ontogeny. However, I shall show in the following chapter that even though autistic children do not follow the typical human developmental pathway of social engagement, they are able to participate in cooperatively grounded behavior if adequately trained. In the following three chapters I will suggest an extension of Searle's account of CI.

The Extension of the Collective Intentionality Behaviors

The first level of the CI I suggest is "doing-as-the-model-does" level. Imitation plays an important role in social learning and development and is considered to be one of the fundamental means of acquiring new knowledge on how to engage in social and emotional exchanges with others. In typical infants, imitation emerges in early developmental phase and plays a crucial role in the development of the cognitive, as well as social and communication behaviors, such as language, pretend play, and joint attention (Rogers and Pennington 1991: 137–162). It is through this reciprocal imitation process that infants show a social interest in the other agent (Nadel and Guerini 1999: 209–234), i.e. the caregiver, develop a sense of shared experience (Malatesta and Izard 1984: 161–206), and engage in communication (Trevarthen, Kokkinaki and Fiamenghi 1999: 127–185). Reciprocal imitation can also be of great help in learning conventional actions (Kuczynski, Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow 1987: 276–282), and in peer interactions. Thus, imitation plays a crucial role in the development of more sophisticated social skills and group intentional behaviors. With 10 months, infants begin to imitate caregivers' action with toys, making the play between them more object-oriented (Uzgiris 1999: 186–206). Through this strategy, the child learns conventional actions with toys, and later on, conventional actions with other objects, which leads to "proto-referential" imitation – a process in which imitation begins to be used as a mechanism for learning about how objects work. This type of imitation learning is proven to develop a theory of mind capacities in autistic individuals (Meltzoff and Gopnik 1993: 335–366). While for

11 While there is a vast amount of research on mind-blindness in autistic children, less attention has been devoted to the question of compensation of the theory of mind deficit. Baron-Cohen recognized this issue and in his studyhe concluded that there are methods which may be powerful tools for bypassing the theory of mind deficit. For more, see Swettenham, Baron-Cohen 1996: 73–88.

most infants imitation comes naturally, for children with ASD, imitation requires direct teaching. Sigman and Ungerer (1984) were among firsts to conducted research on the relationship between imitation and autistic traits. They found that children with ASD have deficits in vocal and gestural imitation. When it comes to deficits in exhibiting imitative behavior, we need to stress the difference between two types of imitation: meaningful, goal-oriented and goal-less imitation. The goal-directed theory of imitation (GOADI) suggests that one can imitate only when she creates a cognitive hierarchy of goals for the action during observation, and then repeats an imitative action based on those goals. Contrary, in goal-less imitation, repetition of the movement style itself is the goal. The study conducted by Hamilton et al. (2007) found that participants with ASD exhibit some difficulties goal-directed imitation, but can imitate correctly to some extent. On contrary, the ability to imitate goal-less or meaningless actions is completely impaired. The reason for their poor imitation skills lies mostly in their low interest in behaviors around them. Nevertheless, this does not mean that they are unable to *learn* to imitate. Ingersoll (2008) proposes an imitation method designed to teach the social use of imitation in young children with autism – *the reciprocal imitation training* (RIT). This approach is designed to increase social responsiveness and intrinsic motivation by practicing the contingent imitation between one adult and one child. The adult imitates the child's action and vocalizations at the same time as the child, with a goal to increase coordinated joint attention and to prepare the child to imitate the model. During this imitation process the adult, by using very simplified language, describes the action he and the child are performing. Once the child becomes aware of adult's imitation (i.e. the reciprocity), the child is taught to imitate the perceived adult's behavior. If the child does not spontaneously imitate, the model uses physical guidance to encourage the child to imitate. The imitation starts with familiar actions; once the child begins to imitate the familiar actions, the novel actions are introduced. The goal of this type of imitation is for imitation to become spontaneous. Therefore, the demonstrator does not use "Do this" principle, but verbal markers and descriptions of the modeled action (for example, the description "Vroom" or "The boy is driving" when modeling the play with car toy). This kind of highly structured learning environment helps children with ASD to maintain the imitation in different situations, to imitate spontaneously and, finally, to generalize the behaviors learned by imitation. In the earlier study, Ingersoll and Schreibman (2006) found that teaching imitation skills to young children with autism increases coordinated joint attention, and suggest a relationship between imitative performances and other social skills. It is important to notice that the imitation is not the process in which the observer blindly mimics the action of the other, but "that the observer attempts to reproduce the intentional actions of the other, including the goal toward which they are aimed" (Tomasello et al. 2007: 33). Ultimately, the imitation is, therefore, a type of social learning and it requires an understanding of others and oneself as intentional agents. This is why I suggest that the first level of collective intentionality should be "doing-as-the-model-does" level – the goal-directed imitation.

Recall Searle's example of the outdoor ballet choreography where the intention of each group member derives from the collective intention of the group. Let us

suppose that one member of the dance group is autistic. She cannot read the intentions of the other dance members, nor can she fully grasp what is shared intentional cooperative activity. However, through imitation learning and declarative simple verbal instructions, she will be able to spontaneously repeat the dance choreography on a common point. The key element of this imitation learning process is the explanation of intentions embedded into imitated actions and, more importantly, the explanation that these intentions are shared. If we recall that the main problem concerning shared intentionality in individuals with autism was the lack of their "reading intentions" skill (the lack of theory of mind), then the solution to this problem would be the explicit explanation of intentions of others as the intentions all group members share. Also, recall that individuals with autism are efficient when it comes to performing a goal-directed imitative action. Thus, the autistic dancer may not be able to fully grasp that the choreography is a result of we-intentionality, she will act towards achieving a common goal by imitating both the goal and intention of the model. The second example of engaging autistic individuals in the collective intentionality through the process of imitation is object imitation. By engaging in the imitation process while observing the demonstrator using an object, autistic individuals learn object function (proto-referential imitation learning), or as Searle puts it, the knowledge that "this object can be used to do X in context C". In this manner, individuals with autism learn observer-relative features[12] of the object in the imitation. For example, when the demonstrator is using a five-dollar bill to pay coffee in a coffee-shop, the observer learns that the five-dollar paper bill (the object) can be used to pay coffee (the purpose) in the coffee shop (the context), and that the five-dollar bill has a status function that differs it from blank paper or kid's fake dollar bills.

The goal of imitation is for the autistic individual to continue to conduct the imitated behaviors in absence of direct instructions and model. Once an autistic individual achieves this level, he would memorize the instructions of the model and turn them into rules. It is commonly known that individuals with autism prefer highly stable environments, as well as rule-guided activities, thus this shift from performing simple actions to turning them into rules does not come as a surprise. Likewise, autistics perform relatively well when guided by external prompts, and face almost no difficulties in familiar social situations. This can be traced in the ability of high-functioning children with autism to interpret and anticipate social intentions of schoolmates and teachers on the basis of identifying school routines and rules (Ochs et al. 2004: 147–183). In accordance with this, the second level of collective intentionality I propose is the *rule-governed collective intentional agency*.

Baron-Cohen's empathizing-systemizing theory (Baron-Cohen 2004) proposes that alongside having a deficit in ToM, individuals with ASD have a surplus of hyper-systemizing. The function of systemizing is to find the governing laws of the system in order to learn how to act in particular events. The hypersytemazing theory explains the repetitive or restricted interests and behaviors seen in ASD,

12 Searle makes distinction between intrinsic and observer-relative features of the world. Intrinsic features are features that exist independently of conscious observers and their representations of the world. Observer-relative features, on the other hand, exist only relative to the intentionality of conscious observers.

directed towards systems with well known governed rules. Rule-governed behavior is acquired as a result of stated rules. The rule, the antecedent, specifies a behavior and a consequence. However, one can follow the rule without having to experience the consequences, i.e. without having to directly contact contingencies. For example, one follows the rule "If you drink bleach, you will die" without ever having to engage in drinking bleach. Tarbox et al. (2011) conducted the study on establishing rule-governed behavior in individuals with autism. They taught their participants to respond to simple rules (e.g. If this is a cookie, then jump), through multiple-exemplar training (MET). The MET technique is based on using multiple examples when teaching and is proven to be efficient when teaching children with ASD. The participants of the study were trained on a number of rules, followed by generalization probes conducted to determine whether participants could respond to novel rules. Although some participants required extensive training, all participants eventually demonstrated an accurate response to a variety of untrained rules. Searle, explaining what collective intentionality is, provides two examples that can be transliterated to the suggestion of rule-governed behavior as a second level of the CI. The first is Searle's example of a football game and the offensive lineman's blocking of the defensive end as a part of the collective action. The offensive lineman in the pass play of the football team can easily be person diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. Her action of blocking the defensive end can still be performed as a part of the team's goal of executing a pass play. However, in order to engage in a shared activity, rather than an intentional one, she needs declarative instructions on her part of the activity and to embrace those instructions as rule. Once she embraces the rule in form of *If you block the defensive end, your team will execute a pass play,* she can accept that she and her teammates are performing an action of a pass play together, i.e. she accepts teammates as his co-agents and shares the same goal with them. In order to provide the opportunity to individuals with ASD to achieve the latter, it is important to provide them with simple straightforward instructions, and use some visuals to help break down the information (e.g. football tactical board). Nevertheless, it is not sufficient to provide instructions on how to execute the play, but also instructions and guidance that the act they are performing has one goal that they all share.

Individual with ASD who follows the rule "*If you block the defensive end, your team will execute a pass play"* can: 1) act as a part of the group in a controlled settings and stable environment; 2) learn that all participants of the group including oneself have same intentions; 3) learn that his act is a part of a group act.

However, individuals with ASD cannot fully understand collective intentional behavior they engage in. Likewise, they cannot engage in collective intentional behavior without prior training and learning the rules of the action. I claim that full understanding of, and engaging in, collective intentional behaviors without prior training is the third and the highest level of the CI. Searle himself understands the structure of human institutions as a structure of constitutive rules, and claims that people are typically not conscious of these rules, but follow them unconsciously. To explain how we relate to rule structures without knowing the rules and following them consciously, Searle appeals to the notion of the *Background* – the set of non-intentional or pre-intentional capacitates that enable the functioning of intentional states. The Background capacities have a task to cope with social phenomena:

> Instead of saying, the person behaves the way he does because he is following the rules of the institution, we should say just, First (the causal level), the person behaves the way he does, because he has a structure that disposes him to behave that way; and second (the functional level), he has come to be disposed to behave that way, because that's the way that conforms to the rules of the institution. In other words, he *doesn't need to know*the rules of the institution and to follow them in order to conform to the rules; rather, he is just disposed to behave in a certain way, but he has acquired those unconscious dispositions and capacities in a way that is sensitive to the rule structure of the institution. To tie this down to a concrete case, we should not say that the experienced baseball player runs to first base because he wants to follow the rules of baseball, but we should say that because the rules require that he run to first base, he acquires a set of Background habits, skills, dispositions that are such that when he hits the ball, he runs to first base. (Searle 1995: 144)

Therefore, according to Searle, the relevant behavior is not controlled by rules, but the psychological mechanism which underlies background capacities. We often act without applying rules consciously or unconsciously; we just know how to act. When we go to a coffee shop and buy a coffee with five dollar bill, our behavior is not controlled by constitutive rules of the money, but the knowledge and ability to use money as a medium for exchange. In the case of autistic individuals, this does not follow. Unlike most people, autistics need to know the rules of the institution in order to conform to them, and they need to learn them on the explicit and straightforward level. Autistics do not evolve a set of dispositions sensitive to the rule structures; they can learn the rules, but because of the lack of this disposition (i.e. background capacity) they cannot grasp them completely. For a person with autism, five-dollar-bill, or a football game is a set of learned rules that control their behavior in a specific context (e.g. in a coffee shop or at a stadium). Thus, even though individuals with autism can learn to participate in intentional collective behaviors by using the reciprocal imitation training and multiple exemplary training, they cannot fully understand collective intentionality. (Tomasello et al. 1993) concluded that while most people have evolved skills and motivation for collaborating with one another in activities involving shared goals, children with autism do not follow the typical human developmental pathway of social engagement with other persons. Even though Tomassello does not use this term, I believe that the evolved skills and motivation for collaboration autistic children have not gained through developmental pathway is Searle's notion of the background capacities.

Conclusion

The capacity to engage in collective intentional behaviors has evolved through evolutionary adaptation and became innate to all humans. It is linked to the pre-intentional state of the other as a potential agent, which is a part of the Background capacities. Autistic people, alongside of having deficit in recognizing mental states of other agents (i.e. "mindblindness"), lack the Background capacities and the capacity to engage spontaneously in collective intentional behaviors. This is why I proposed the extension of Searle's notion of collective intentionality so it could also refer to collective behaviors autistic persons are capable to perform. More specifically, I call for levelling collective intentionality from mere imitation of collective

intentional behavior, over learning how to engage in collective intentional behavior though rule-governed behaviors, to full understanding of collective intentionality that includes the Background capacities.

References:

American Psychiatric Association (2013), *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition*, Washington, DC.

Baron-Cohen, Simon, Alan Leslie and Uta Frith (1985), "Does the Autistic Child Have a 'Theory of Mind'?", *Cognition,* 21: 37–46.

Charman, Tony et al. (1997), "Infants with Autism: An Investigation of Empathy, Pretend Play, Joint Attention, and Imitation", *Developmental Psychology* 33(5): 781–789.

Colombi, Constanza et al. (2009), "Examining Correlates of Cooperation in Autism: Imitation, Joint Attention, and Understanding Intentions", *Autism* 13: 143–163.

Firth, Una (2008), *Autism: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gallese, Vittorio, Morris Eagle and Paolo Mignone (2007), "Intentional Attunement: Mirror Neurons and the Neural Underpinnings of Interpersonal Relations", *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 55(1):131–176.

Goldman, Alvin Ira (2012), "Theory of Mind", in: Eric Margolis, Richard Samuelsand Stephen Stich (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 402–424

Hamilton, Antonia, Rachel Bridley and Una Frith (2007), "Imitation and Action Understanding in Autistic Spectrum Disorders: How Valid Is the Hypothesis of a Deficit in the Mirror Neuron System?", *Neuropsychologia* 45: 1859–1868.

Happe, Francesca and Uta Frith (1996), "The Neuropsychology of Autism", *Brain* 119: 1377–1400.

Ingersoll, Brooke and Linda Schreibman (2006), "Teaching Reciprocal Imitation Skills to Young Children with Autism Using a Naturalistic Behavioral Approach: Effects on Language, Pretend Play, and Joint Attention", *Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders* 36: 487–505.

Ingersoll, Brooke (2008), "The Social Role of Imitation in Autism Implications for the Treatment of Imitation Deficits", *Infants & Young Children* 21(2): 107–119.

Kasari, Connie et al. (1990), "Affective Sharing in the Context of Joint Attention Interaction of Normal, Autistic and Mentally Retarded Children", *Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders* 20: 87–100.

Kuczynski, Leon, Carolyn Zahn-Waxlerand Marian Radke-Yarrow (1987), "Development and Content of Imitation in the Second and Third Years of Life: A Socialization Perspective", *Developmental Psychology* 23: 276–282.

Malatesta, Caroline Zender and Carroll Izard (1984), "The Ontogenesis of Human Social Signals: From Biological Imperative to Symbol Utilization", in Nathan Fox and Richard Davidson (eds.), *The Psychobiology of Affective Development*, Hillsdale: Erlbaum, pp. 161–206.

Mameli, Matteo and Patrick Bateson (2006), "Innateness and the Sciences", *Biology and Philosophy* 21(2): 155–188.

Mejers, Anthonie (2003), "Can Collective Intentionality be Individualized", *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 62(1): 167–183.

Meltzoff, Andrew and Allison Gopnik (1993), "The Role of Imitation in Understanding Persons and Developing Theory of Mind", in Baron-Cohen, Simon (ed.), *Understanding Other Minds: Perspectives from Autism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 335–366

Mundy, Peter et al. (1986), "Defining the Social Deficits in Autism: The Contribution of Non-Verbal Communication Measures", *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry and Allied Disciplines* 27: 657–669.

Nadel, Jacqueline et al. (1999), "The Evolving Nature of Imitation as a Format for Communication", in Jacqueline Nadel and George Butterworth (eds.), *Imitation in Infancy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Ochs, Elinor et al. (2004), "Autism and the Social World: An Anthropological Perspective", *Discourse studies* 6(2): 147–183.

Pacherie, Elisabeth (2007), "Is Collective Intentionality Really Primitive?", in Micheal Beaney, Carlo Penco and Massimiliano Vignolo (eds.), *Mental Processes: Representing and Inferring*, Cambridge Scholar Press, pp. 153–175.

Rogers, Sally and Bruce Pennington (1991), "A Theoretical Approach to the Deficits in Infantile Autism", *Developmental Psychology* 3: 137–162.

Salice, Alessandro (2015), "There Are No Primitive We-Intentions", *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 6 (4): 695–715.

Searle, John (2002), *Consciousness and Language*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

–. (1995), *The Construction of Social Reality*, New York: The Free Press.

–. (1990), "Collective Intentions and Actions", in Cohen, Philip, Jerry Morgan and Martha Pollack (eds.), *Intentions in Communication*, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, pp. 405–415.

Sigman, Marian and Judy Ungerer (1984), "Cognitive and Language Skills in Autistic, Mentally Retarded, and Normal Children", *Developmental Psychology* 20(2): 293– 302.

Swettenham John and Simon Baron-Cohen (1996), "What's inside Someone's Head? Conceiving of the Mind as a Camera Helps Children with Autism Acquire an Alternative to a Theory of Mind", *Cognitive Neuropsychiatry* 1(1): 73–88.

Tarbox, Jonathan, Carrie Zuckermann and Melissa Olive (2011), "Rule-Governed Behavior: Teaching a Preliminary Repertoire of Rule-Following to Children with Autism", *The Analyisis Verbal Behavavior* 27(1): 125–139.

Tomasello, Micheal, Ann Cale Kruger and Hillary Horn Ratner, (1993), "Cultural Learning", B*ehavioral and Brain Sciences* 16: 495–552.

Tomasello, Micheal, Melinda Carpenterand and Ulf Liszkowski (2007), "A New Look at Infant Pointing", *Child Development* 78 (3): 705–722.

Trevarthen, Colwyn, Theano Kokkinaki and Geraldo Fiamenghi (1999), "What Infants' Imitations Communicate: With Mothers, with Fathers and with Peers", in J. Nadel and G. Butterworth (eds.), *Imitation in Infancy*, pp. 127–185

Torres, Elisabeth B. (2013), "Autism: The Micro-Movement Perspective", *Front. Integr. Neurosci*ence 24: 7–32.

Uzgiris, Ina (1999), "Imitation as Activity: Its Developmental Aspects", in J. Nadel and G. Butterworth (eds.), *Imitation in Infancy,* pp. 186–206.

Kristina Lekić

Kolektivna intencionalnost i autizam: protiv isključenja „društveno neprilagođenih“

Apstrakt

Članak teži da osvetli Serlov pojam kolektivne intencionalnosti (KI) kao primitivan fenomen koga dele sva ljudska bića. Ovo poslednje može biti problematično, pošto postoje pojedinci koji nisu sposobni da razumeju kolektivnu intencionalnosti u potpunosti sarađuju unutar okvira „mi-intencionalnosti“. Ovo je slučaj sa pojedincima koji boluju od autizma, pošto je nedostatak motivacije i veština za deljenje psiholoških stanja sa drugima jedan od kriterijuma dijagnoze Spektra autističkih poremećaja (ASD). Ovaj članak tvrdi da isključivanje pojedinaca sa autizmom nije pretnja za Serlovo shvatanje kolektivne intencionalnosti, jer se ona može tumačiti kao prosta biološka dispozicija koju sva ljudska bića dele. U nastavku, članak predlaže proširenje Serlovog shvatanja KI tako da uključuje ponašanja pojedinaca koji imaju dispoziciju za KI, ali koja se nije razvila kroz ontogenezu: naime, pojedinaca sa autizmom.

Ključne reči: Serl, kolektivna intencionalnost, autizam, imitacija, kooperacija, pravilima vođeno ponašanje

UDK: 323.233(497.11)"1968"
https://doi.org/10.2298/FID1901149P
Original Scientific Article
Received: 30.08.2018. Accepted: 21.10.2018.

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY
VOL. 30, NO. 1, 001-196

Aleksandar Pavlović
Mark Losoncz

BELGRADE 1968 PROTESTS AND THE POST-EVENTAL FIDELITY: INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL LEGACY OF THE 1968 STUDENT PROTESTS IN SERBIA[1]

ABSTRACT

Even though Belgrade student protests emerged and ended abruptly after only seven days in June of 1968, they came as a cumulative point of a decade-long accumulated social dissatisfaction and antagonisms, as well as of philosophical investigations of the unorthodox Marxists of the Praxis school (*Praksisovci*). It surprised the Yugoslav authorities as the first massive rebellion after WWII to explicitly criticize rising social inequality, bureaucratization and unemployment and demand free speech and abolishment of privileges. This article focuses on the intellectual destiny and legacy of the eight professors from the Faculty of Philosophy close to the Praxis school, who were identified as the protests' instigators and subsequently expelled from the University of Belgrade due to their "ethico-political unsuitability". Under both international and domestic pressure, they were later reemployed in a separate research unit named the Centre for Philosophy and Social Theory, where they kept their critical edge and argued for political pluralism. From the late 1980s onwards, they and their colleagues became politically active and at times occupied the highest positions in Serbia – Dragoljub Mićunović as one of the founders of the modern Democratic Party and the Speaker of the Parliament, former Serbian President and Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica and former Prime Minister late Zoran Đinđić. Still, while some members became strong anti-nationalists and anti-war activists, other embraced Serbian nationalism, therefore pivoting the intellectual split into the so called First and Second Serbia that marked Serbian society during the 1990s and remained influential to this day.

KEYWORDS

1968 Belgrade student protests, Case of eight professors, Belgrade Faculty of Philosophy, Praxis, Korčula Summer School, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Josip Broz Tito, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Introduction: The Elusive Legacy of Belgrade 1968 Rebellion

This article argues that Belgrade's June 1968 student protests left significant intellectual and political legacy by augmenting intellectual forces that criticized the Yugoslav regime and played a prominent role in the establishment of the multiparty

1 The paper is a part of research project no. 43007, funded by Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development – Republic of Serbia.

Aleksandar Pavlović: Research Associate, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade; aleksandar.pavlovic@instifdt.bg.ac.rs.
Mark Losoncz: Research Associate, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade; losoncz@instifdt.bg.ac.rs.

system in Serbia and its politics after the breakup of Yugoslavia.[2] We focus here on its intellectual legacy and the events that amplified public relevance of several critical intellectuals; being pushed and pulled out of the faculty's classrooms during the 1970s and 1980s, these scholars such as Dragoljub Mićunović, Vojislav Koštunica and others pursued political careers and thereby largely marked the late Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav period in Serbia.

In the narrow sense, Belgrade student rebellion emerged and ended abruptly after only seven days in June of 1968. Certainly, it did not arise ex nihilo, and should rather be perceived as a focal or cumulative point of an accumulated dissatisfaction and antagonisms stretching for a decade, marked with rising social inequality, bureaucratization and unemployment.[3] The direct cause could be easily labelled as "the banality of rebellion" – in the evening of June 2, there was a popular show at the Workers University in New Belgrade, called "The caravan of friendship", featuring folk and pop singers from the former Yugoslavia. There were not enough seats for the students, and hence they clashed with the brigadiers who had privileged entrance, and security who prevented them from entering, and continued the clashes with the police who came to intervene. The following day, the students organised themselves, formulated their demands and attempted to organise a walk from New Belgrade to the Assembly to present it. They were stopped and many brutally beaten by the police. Over the next few days, the students focused on protesting at their Faculties. They renamed the University of Belgrade – Red University "Karl Marx", voiced their discontent and demanded free speech and abolishment of privileges.[4] A number of prominent public figures such as their professors, writers, actors and artists supported their demands. On the evening of June 9, in a public speech broadcasted live, President Tito essentially declared that the students were right, that their concerns should be taken on board, and fatherly advised them to continue their studies. The students took this as their victory, celebrated it long into the night and the next day decided to stop the blockade of the University.

These protests certainly had significance in several ways – this was the first mass student rebellion in the socialist Yugoslavia; it demanded profound changes, accused the leaders of creating an unjust society, exposed police brutality that

2 This article benefited from the material that Aleksandar Pavlović used during his research stay at The Vera and Donald Blinken Open Society Archives in Budapest, for which he is much indebted to the Visegrad Fund and OSA friendly staff. The authors are also grateful to their colleagues Vladimir Zorić, Igor Cvejić and Milivoj Bešlin who provided a number of relevant information, comments and suggestions.

3 Such view of the Belgrade 1968 as a consequence of a long period of antagonism spurred by industrialization and socialist reforms, is often promoted in both domestic and foreign scholarship (see: Kanzleiter 2009, 2011; Popov 2008, esp. Ch. 4 and 5, 110–210).

4 Some of the most vocal slogans used during the protests were: "Down with the Red Bourgeoisie!", "We Want Socialist and Social Reforms!", "International unity of proletariat and progressive intelligentsia", "Freedom to Criticize and True Self-Management", "Long Live Comrade Tito and the Party", "We Want our Place in the Society", "We Want Work" etc., and the University got renamed into the "Red University Karl Marx" (According to Dragoljub Mićunović, it was his proposal that Ljubomir Tadić voiced in order to counter the proposal that the University changes its name to "Red University Josip Broz Tito" [Mićunović 2013: 227]).

seemed unnecessary and counterproductive, amplified some critical voices and prompted a number of public figures to support the students and their demands for comprehensive and profound reforms.

Still, it appears that its direct influence on the Yugoslav politics remained relatively modest. In a nutshell, with all the sympathies for the students, their rebellion did not question the existing ideological and political framework; on the contrary, they demanded the return to the original Party doctrine and did not question Tito's authority. Secondly, while the force of the protests certainly unpleasantly surprised the authorities, recent historians rightfully pointed out that they were far less troubled by this than they were with the Prague Spring; in any case, Tito resolved this rebellion routinely (see: Bešlin 2009: 58). Thirdly, the somewhat reformist course undertaken by the Yugoslav communists was already under way for a couple of years before the protests broke out (Ibid, 58).

Among the more solid achievements of the protests, one could point out that some of the student demands were soon inserted nearly verbatim into the League of Communists of Yugoslavia's new *Guidelines* (*Smernice*), conveniently published on June 9, that is, the day the demonstrations ended;[5] yet, this eventually amounted to not much more than another grand public gesture, comparable to Tito's speech to the students. In addition, students' standard, living and studying conditions were certainly improved in the following years. Still, when it comes to a profound ideological and social reform that actually constituted the essence of students' demands, it was never actively pursued. Quite the contrary – the following years rather brought the opposite trend: dismissal of the less rigid and reform-oriented politicians in Serbia and Croatia as "liberals", purge of the so-called nationalists from the office in Croatia and Serbia, and sharp increase in sentencing intellectuals for years-long prison sentences for voicing their opinions (see: Gruenwald 1979: 1-15). As younger historian of Yugoslavia Milivoj Bešlin claims, when one looks at the context of political and social processes that followed, "in essence, the premise about the '68 students movement as a historical turning point holds no ground" (Bešlin 2009: 61).[6]

On Spontaneity and Responsibility

So, if Belgrade 1968 rebellion was not politically so turbulent and ground-breaking, and if Tito and the party were not so worried about it, what were they concerned about? As we claim, their primary concerns were to maintain the ideological monopoly on *truth*, that is, to secure the students' continuing fidelity to the political ideology promoted by the party. In order to do so, they needed to silence their potential ideological adversaries, and from that perspective we will approach

5 The official explanation of the Party was that the *Guidelines* were already adopted in May, i.e. over a month before the protests started. While the Party certainly did not produce the entire document during the week of protests, in some important respects the *Guidelines* clearly responded to the student's requests. Thus, they emphasized the need for employing and giving more prominent role to educated youth and young experts as a prerequisite for a successful reform, claimed that housing funds have been increased and that workers self-management over the funds has been strengthened (Smernice 1968: 1).

6 Unless stated otherwise, all translations from Serbian into English are ours.

the infamous case of the expulsion of the eight critically minded professors from Belgrade University.

In his public speech on June 9, Tito made sure to emphasize that this revolt rebellion broke out spontaneously among the students, and that ninety percent of them are loyal socialists who do not fall prey to revisionist and anti-socialist ideas (Popov 2008: 101). This intervention was to refute any ideas that any organisation, especially foreign one, nor the international wave of protests, was behind the student's movement.[7]

Behind closed doors, however, Tito and other leaders did actually worry about "bad" influences the students were exposed to and did put the blame on certain professors. One of the leading Serbian communists of the time, Draža Marković, wrote down in his diary on June 16, 1968 that it is "a surprising fact that some philosophers – scholars (M. Marković, Z. Pešić, S. Stojanović, V. Milić etc.) are not so much devoted to science, but that they showed great talent for concrete political action, which they continue and have great influence on student organisations" (Marković 1987: 73). More importantly, Tito himself insisted on punishing the hostile professors on several occasions from 1968 to 1971. For instance, in a meeting of the Presidency of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in late 1971, he criticized the too liberal Serbian leaders for their weakness towards those elements that turn the youth into a wrong direction. We knew precisely, added Tito, who actually caused and who was actually the protagonist of the student rebellion. Similar accusations Tito repeated the following year, when the said "too liberal" Serbian establishment personified by Mirko Tepavac, Marko Nikezić and Latinka Perović, was removed from the office, merging their fate with the case of the said professors and thereby turning it into a major political question:

> "I stated my view on the television. I didn't reveal everything. But I said what I thought, and I still that now.
>
> Those that we had business with at universities and before the student protest showed up. These are several professors, some philosophers, various Praxis members and other dogmatists, including those that performed various defamations in the Security Service and so on. All that somewhat united today. Each of them, of course, is working for himself, and yet they are united in their efforts to create among us some chaos and bring shady business. We need to resist them vigorously, resolutely tell them NO. [...] There's no place for them, not even for where they're now. Should such persons educate our children at universities and schools? That's no place for them. [...] So, we need to disable such persons, and we'll disable them if we realize where they are now, if we resolutely prevent their actions. And, in the last instance, sometimes it'll require taking administrative measures."
>
> (Tito's 1968 speech to the Congress of Yugoslav Trade Unions, see: Mićunović 2013: 241–242)

7 As well to refute the connection of their demands with the previous critique of Yugoslav socialism, as exposed by the said Milovan Đilas – Đilas' *Nova klasa* from 1961 identified the emergence of the privileged layer of socialist bureaucracy that he called the new class. The students' slogans such as "Down with the Red Bourgeoisie", rather resembled this critique, and hence Tito did not forget to refute these links and influences.

> "Those elements that [...] drive our youth into a direction that is not favourable to our development. [...] what did we do there so far? We didn't replace a single man. At Belgrade University, for example, we knew exactly who caused and who was actually the protagonist of those well-known student protests.
>
> I've been telling for years now that there are professors at Belgrade University and Zagreb University who are raising our youth in such a manner that they'll be absolutely alienated from our socialist system. And I've been talking that we need to hold these professors responsible and disable them to work at our universities. By now, I achieved nothing. I openly said who these persons are, and here today I have a list with their names [...]. So, comrades, these are the things that irritated me very much."
>
> (See: Bešlin 2009: 58)

To be sure, certain Belgrade professors of philosophy were influential in at least twofold manner. First, they were members of the Praxis group and attendees of the Korčula Summer School; these internationally recognized intellectual group gathered prominent Yugoslav and international philosophers (such as Bloch, Habermas, Marcuse, Goldmann, etc.), all of which worked on a strong, leftist critique of all social phenomena (*Kritika svega postojećeg*). Still, while the majority of Praxis professors from Zagreb remained relatively detached from the student movement and rebellion in Zagreb in 1968, Belgrade professors were quite active, providing assistance and ideological guidance to the students. For that reason, recent historian Hrvoje Klasić describes the Belgrade 1968 "as much a professor rebellion as it is a student rebellion" (Klasić 2012b).

By all accounts, the said professors were not direct instigators of the rebellion, which, as mentioned, actually broke out as a clash with the brigadiers to turn into something else. True, they were among those who took the walk the next day and witnessed the violence, but so were some prominent politicians and many university staff. Namely, the professors attended an early morning plenum of all university and local political representatives, where they all decided to come together to the Student city prior to the walk (Popov 2008: 38-39).

Still, if one follows the communist doctrine, there is perhaps not such a huge contradiction between Tito's publicly proclaimed spontaneity and internal claim for responsibility. For, spontaneity featured as an important concept among the communist thinkers. Revolutionary spontaneity or spontaneism is a belief that the revolution will – and in fact should – come from below, without a vanguard role of the leading party. As the most vocal advocate of spontaneity and social movements and protests coming from below, Rosa Luxemburg in her analysis of the 1905 Russian revolution famously proclaimed that "spontaneity plays such a prominent role... because revolutions allow no one to play schoolmaster with them" (Luxemburg 1971: 245). This at the time led to the claims that she diminishes the role of the Marxist party as the leader of class struggle and overestimates the role of the unorganized working class and denies the importance of premeditated and organized political action. Yet, as scholars emphasize, "it would be more accurate to say that for Luxemburg spontaneity and organization are not separable or separate activities, but different moments of a single political process – that one does not exist without the other" (Schulman 2016: 22).

"But there is spontaneity and spontaneity" says Lenin in his critique of spontaneism and his particular understanding of spontaneity. Lenin was fiercely against spontaneism, and believed that workers need to be led and that there is no spontaneity without a good preparation. "The 'spontaneous element', in essence, represents nothing more nor less than consciousness in an embryonic form" (Lenin 1966: 74). From this vintage point, the Yugoslav communists identified the group of Belgrade professors perhaps not as the real instigators by means of actually plotting the rebellion or personally setting it off directly, but precisely in the Leninist way as bearing this consciousness whose embryonic form they recognised in the 1968 protests.[8]

Intellectual Legacy: The Case of the Eight Professors and Their Pre-1968 Philosophical Background

In the remainder of this article, we shall look at the case of the eight professors from the Faculty of Philosophy who were identified as the protests' instigators and subsequently expelled from the University of Belgrade due to their "ethico-political unsuitability", as one of the most prominent legacies of the Belgrade 1968 protests (one could as well call it a side-effect).

Namely, an historical fact regarding the Belgrade *soixante-huitards* that obviously needs to be interpreted is that its key intellectual actors, who suffered from the sanctions imposed by the Yugoslav state in the greatest extent, were almost exclusively philosophers or at least exponents of social theory. It is not only that their career institutionally extended from the Philosophical Faculty in Belgrade to the post-1968 Centre for Philosophy and Social Theory, but their theoretical work and public engagement were largely embedded in the intellectual currents that were characteristic of the epoch. What is more, as it has been shown, the state apparatus, including Draža Marković and Tito himself, often referred to them simply as "philosophers" or, in a more subtle way, as "members of the Praxis school [*praksisovci*]". It is no coincidence that a well-known ironic poster in 1968 presented the image of Socrates as someone "wanted dead or alive". Although it would be exaggeration to say that philosophy or theory as such served as the key "militant tool" for those participating in the mass demonstrations, one can hardly deny their

8 In addition, it is worth reminding ourselves that the communists always had somewhat loose standards when it comes to proving guilt in the court of law, to say the least. Hrvoje Klasić claims that the Korčula Summer School and Praxis philosophy were tolerated as it was believed that they were irrelevant, without significant social impact and readership (Klasić 2012b). Moreover, Tito and the political elite actually welcomed the early works of the Praxis school, inasmuch as these brought a critique of the Soviet thinkers as "Stalinist Marxism" for their doctrinarian approach to Marxism, thereby providing a theoretical justification for Tito's split with Stalin and the superiority of the Yugoslav unique self-management way of socialism. The problem occurred when the students apparently applied their theory in practice. At that moment, Klasić claims, political elite woke up and saw the potential that the Praxis philosophy has (Klasić 2012b). Since the Praxis school continued exposing negative phenomena in the Yugoslav society, such as bureaucratization, class differentiation between the party leaders and workers, personality cult etc. (see, for instance, Stojanović 1972: 375-398, republished in English in *Praxis International* the following year [Stojanović 1973: 311–333]), their clash with the ruling elite seemed inevitable.

significance for the intellectual dimension of Belgrade's 1968. Roughly speaking, just as Western Marxism was associated with the New Left in the 1960s and with its culmination in the protests of 1968, the Praxis school might be treated as one of the theoretical and ideological forerunners of the Yugoslav 1968.

The roots of this significance can be traced back to the philosophical debates of the 1950s. Apart from the general role that Marxist theories played in Eastern Europe after World War II in modernizing intellectual discourse and making its terminology as coherent as possible, Marxist theories also served as a decisive battlefield where many key symptoms of large-scale social conflicts appeared (for instance, the shifts in Stalin's philosophical writings in many ways reflected the concrete changes in Stalinist *Realpolitik*). In the case of Yugoslavia, after the Tito–Stalin split in 1948, philosophy was one of the main registers that staged the tensions between those faithful to the earlier Stalinist setting and those seeking for a different framework, including new conceptual tools. The struggle between these opposite tendencies culminated in the conference held in 1960 in Bled where, according to the commonly accepted interpretation, the politically mostly post-Stalinist, but ideologically still Stalinist-inspired "dialectical materialists" suffered defeat from those who were insisting on a Marxist theory that gives central importance to *praxis* as an ontologically specific social activity, embedded in the freedom of individuals. Within the latter framework, social reality is not reduced to being a field of always already overdetermined and necessary relations, but it is also interpreted as a horizon that can be freely produced and transformed by the actors. Consequently, Praxis philosophers rejected so-called reflection theory according to which human epistemological capacities are limited to the passive representation of previously given material processes. As Mihailo Marković, one of the leading members of the Belgrade wing of the Praxis school put it: "first of all, it [reflection theory] ignores the complete experience of German classical philosophy and returns to the dualism of the material object *in itself* and the spiritual subject from the 18th century; secondly, it implicitly and dogmatically claims that the decisive characteristic of the mind is reflection – how could we then criticize the products of the intellect if they are *per definitionem* the reflections of reality, that is to say, if they are simply true? And thirdly, this theory is false because it is factually so that the mind does not merely follow and copy the passive material processes, but often anticipates and conceptualizes material objects that do not exist yet." (Marković 1975: 22) Moreover, these conceptual insights were followed by certain historical-philological tendencies, namely, by reorienting the emphasis from the late Marx (who was, allegedly, inclined to economistic determinism) to the young Marx who laid down the humanistic-anthropological foundations of Praxis philosophy *avant la lettre*. In that regard, it is worth mentioning that the works of the young ("real") Marx were published in Sarajevo in 1955 (Marx–Engels 1953), accompanied by an introductory text by the Praxis philosopher Predrag Vranicki and an article on the Marxist theory of alienation, written by another Praxis philosopher, Rudi Supek (Supek 1955). Thus, the Praxis school not only contributed to the growing pluralism of Marxism in Yugoslavia[9] and to the undoing of the monopoly of the

9 It is worth mentioning here that the Korčula Summer School and the *Praxis* journal were open even to non-Marxists such as Eugen Fink and Gustav A. Wetter.

Party with regard to philosophical issues, but in a certain way also joined the wider tendencies of Western Marxism whose main exponents, in parallel to the decline of revolutionary movements in Western Europe, mostly ignored the critique of political economy for the benefit of general ontological or ideological-cultural topics (Anderson 1976). The same insight can be applied to the Budapest School (Ágnes Heller, Mihály Vajda, György Márkus and others), whose members aimed to reinvent Marxism (hence the expression "the renaissance of Marxism") and reject its Stalinist forms in the name of an ontological and anthropological-ethical theory that returns to the "real" Marx and stresses, *inter alia*, the everyday needs of the individual (that are suppressed or ignored by "real socialist" states as well).[10]

Similarly, when the members of Praxis school insisted that workers' self-management had been introduced in Yugoslavia with serious limitations, their arguments were much less based on economic analyses than on all-embracing ontological theses on the potential freedom of the human individual and, correspondingly, on the need of "humanizing society" (and, less emphatically, nature). Interestingly, the individualistic tendencies in Praxis philosophy were so strong that Danko Grlić, one of its exponents, even concluded in 1968 that "every type of creation is the work of a personality and of a lonely individual, and not a collective act" (as cited by Koltan 166).

10 The Budapest School cooperated with the Praxis school in many ways. Firstly, Ágnes Heller and György Lukács were members of the international advisory board of the *Praxis* journal. Secondly, members of the Budapest school attended regularly the Korčula Summer School. As Heller emphasizes: "I got in touch with the world in Korčula" (as cited by Köhler 2012: 307). The experience of Korčula impressed the members of the Budapest school so much that they even considered the possibility of creating a similar institution in Keszthely, Hungary. In the decisive year of 1968, there were six Hungarians in Korčula: Ágnes Heller, György Márkus, Mária Márkus, Zádor Tordai, Vilmos Sós and Ferenc Tőkei. In her lecture on Marx's theory of revolution and the revolution of everyday life, Heller self-consciously referred to the ideas of the New Left, including the new vision of sexuality. As this Korčula Summer School coincided with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the participants of the School formulated a declaration in sign of protest. As Hungarian soldiers contributed to the invasion, the Hungarian participants of the School found it convenient to formulate their own letter of protest in which they expressed their demand for real socialist democracy or for "socialism with a human face" (all of them signed the letter except from Tőkei). It was in this moment that Heller was reading the protest letter of the Hungarian delegation and Ernst Bloch came up to the stage in order to kiss her enthusiastically. After they returned to Hungary, they were called "the Korčula petitioners" (*korčulai aláírók*) and severe sanctions followed. According to Heller, "in 1968 in Hungary the signing of the Korčula declaration was the real dissident gesture" (Heller, internet). Similarly to the members of Praxis school, in the post-1968 course of events (more precisely, in 1973) the members of the Budapest School were expelled from their workplace (the Institute for Philosophy and the Sociological Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party stated that "the Korčula declaration harmed the party discipline" (as cited by Köhler 2012: 310). Similarly to many of their Yugoslav colleagues, the members of the Budapest school sought the solution in leaving Hungary (this was allowed for them in 1977). Without going into details, it is worth noting that the articles written by the members of the Budapest school were still published in Hungarian as well, owing first of all to the journals (Új *Symposion, Létünk, Híd*) of the Hungarian nationality in Yugoslavia that had their own affiliations with the 1968 events (Szerbhorváth 2005, Vékás 2017: 126–129).

Undoubtedly, these aspects significantly contributed to the fact that the members of the Praxis school played a crucial role in the protests of 1968, especially in Belgrade. In that historical context, the theoretical conclusions regarding the spontaneity of the human individual could be transformed into the affirmation of a social movement, with special emphasis on the call for the freedom of speech and the full acceptance of ideological pluralism, as well as the demand for the extension and deepening of self-management as the condition for the self-cultivation of the individual. One might claim from a retrospective point of view that the stress given to the role and freedom of the individual, and, accordingly, the ignorance regarding class (and, more generally, economic) analysis and the category of the proletariat, also served as a continuity factor – from this position, it was relatively easy to transform humanist Marxism into a dissident liberal discourse that was more or less indifferent to the critique of capitalism, but became an important factor in criticizing Slobodan Milošević's authoritarian regime in the 1990s. However, the very same conceptual configuration made possible a different route as well: that of the intellectual who does not undermine or ignore internationalistically engaged class categories for the benefit of the free individual, but for the ideology of ethnic community. Both strategies appeared after the 1968 protests.

The Aftermath: Expulsion and Redemption

Meanwhile, Tito's aforementioned speeches set off a chain of events that bind together the destiny of reformist Serbian politicians and the eight professors accused of inspiring the students to mutiny. Namely, even though Tito immediately demanded their removal, the professors kept their posts for years. To some extent, this was due to the mild reaction to these claims of the then Serbian party leadership, which by early 1972 completely fell out of his favour. Somewhat paradoxically, it proved easier to remove from the office these so-called liberals such as Nikezić, Perović and Tepavac, who withdrew already in late 1972 after being pressured by Tito and the Communist Party. But the professors did not want to resign and, time and again, procedures triggered at removing them from the Faculty of Philosophy proved inefficient. Namely, as Yugoslavia was a workers' state, and a relatively liberal one in comparison to the countries of the Eastern Bloc, dismissing someone from his/her post required a rather complicated procedure. According to the principles of Yugoslav self-management, the professors could be fired only by the decision made by the self-managing organs of their Faculty. At the time, Faculty of Philosophy and University of Belgrade consisted of several bodies where power and influence resided. Each could have been used as a vehicle for punishing the disobedient lecturers and/or the Faculty's management. In addition to the standard Faculty's Council (i.e. *Teaching Scientific Council – Nastavno-naučno veće*), as the highest self-managing of the Faculty, authority comprising some 150 lecturers, there was also Workers Assembly (*Radnički savet*), which included all the employees; however, while in factories and companies Workers Assemblies were important, at the Faculty they had little influence compared to the Faculty's Board. More important was the Faculty's branch of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, gathering only those employees which were members of the party. Once the

attack on the disobedient professors started, the expectation was first to have the Faculty's League of Communists of Yugoslavia branch to condemn them. Such decision would not mean their immediate removal from the Faculty, but would have had ethical and symbolical significance, proving that the said professors departed heavily from the Party line and the official doctrine. This would have discouraged their colleagues of backing them up and would thus open the door for their removal from the Faculty through other bodies. This attempt failed completely. Party members from the Faculty refused to accuse their colleagues, and thus the University's Party Committee disband its Faculty's branch altogether in 1973. What is more, in July 1974 the Faculty Council unanimously (150 votes in favour and only one abstention) supported the professors' right to voice their views without suffering consequences (see Antić 1974: 1–4).

Throughout this turbulent period, Praxis members continued publishing articles and kept their critical edge, and continued attending the Korčula Summer School. This only widened the already growing rift between the Party officials and *Praxis*. To name but a few most prominent examples of such rift in the 1970s, public funding for *Praxis* became delayed and reduced, several issues of the journal were temporarily banned by court decisions in 1971 and 1972 (Zabrana "Praksisa" 1971: 6; Sisak: Privremena zabrana "Praxisa" 1972: 5) and the critiques from highest party officials progressed from mildly commending them for "deviationism" (word used in 1968 by the then Croat Communist Party leader Mika Tripalo, see: Antić 1968) to full-fledged accusations of being "totally anti-socialist and anti-Marxist" (1972 words of the leading communist leader of Croatia Josip Vrhovec) (see Stankovic 1972: 1). Simultaneously, the smear campaign in the Yugoslav press intensified, with the Praxis school being dismissed as "false Marxists" and the eight professors being described as "anarcho-liberals" hungry for political power (Ibid.).

Finally, after years-long cat-and-mouse game, Yugoslav authorities managed to expel the professors from classrooms through a series of legislative moves that blatantly broke all the principles of self-management on which the Yugoslav society allegedly resided. In order to increase political influence on the University, they changed the composition of the Belgrade University Council, which previously comprised solely of lecturers, by reducing the number of lecturers only to half, while having the other half being elected by external bodies. Furthermore, a special law – *lex specialis* – about "ethico-political suitability" was passed on the Federal level in 1973, to open the door for firing these professors on the grounds of their "unsuitability", but even that proved insufficient to have the professors banned from teaching. Then, in late 1974, another legal measure was introduced – giving the Serbian Assembly rights to "put at disposal" ("*stave na raspoloženje*") i. e. to remove from classrooms "unsuitable" lecturers, which in practice meant to be suspended from work but to receive certain financial compensation. Such a measure was not only in stark contrast with the self-managing principles, but had also been passed only in Serbia and not on the Federal level, and the professors complained that it was unconstitutional. Finally, on January 28, 1975, the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Serbia issued a decree about "putting at disposal" the eight professors of the Faculty of Philosophy: Mihailo Marković, Ljubomir Tadić, Miladin Životić, Zagorka Pešić-Golubović, Svetozar Stojanović, Dragoljub

Mićunović, Trivo Inđić and Nebojša Popov. Most of them spent the next six years on visiting lectureships or study visits abroad, and hence this period only consolidated their already respectable international reputation.[11] Unsurprisingly, *Praxis* journal and Korčula Summer School soon followed their fate: with all funding to *Praxis* being denied, the editors sent a letter to their readership in March 1973, informing them that the journal effectively seized to exist (Lešaja 2014: 61, 73). The last Korčula Summer School took place in 1974, as no further funding was approved for it henceforth (Ibid: 85–88).

Once they were effectively expelled from the classroom, further measures were made to remove them completely from work. Still, they did not fall down without a fight – with the assistance of liberally minded lawyer and human rights defender Srđa Popović, they vigorously fought a legal battle to annul the Assembly's decree, even appealing to the International Labour Organization. The establishment responded by abolishing the problematic decree about "ethico-political suitability" and by limiting the duration that a person could remain "at disposal"; hence, in 1981, several professors found themselves unemployed in a country with officially no unemployment. As Mihailo Marković later wrote in his memoires: "that was I guess the first time that the two members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences (Ljuba Tadić and myself) register themselves at the Bureau of Unemployment" (Marković 2008: 167).

After another appeal, the eight professors were finally employed at the Institute for Social Sciences, at the separate department called the Centre for Philosophy and Social Theory,[12] where they kept their critical edge and argued for political pluralism. This Centre was clearly a dissident institution: "all original founding members of the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory were 'Belgrade Praxis members' and active participants of the Korčula Summer School", and some of them were the most notable professors who supported the 1968 Belgrade student protests (Mihailo Marković, Ljubomir Tadić and Svetozar Stojanović) (Cvejić, Nikolić and Sladeček, in manuscript).

From the late 1980s onwards, they and their colleagues employed in the meantime, became politically active and at times occupied highest positions in Serbia. Dragoljub Mićunović was one of the founders and the first president of the Democratic Party, and later the Speaker of the Parliament; Vojislav Koštunica left the Democratic Party to found his own party in 1992, and was Serbian President from 2000 to 2003 and Prime Minister from 2004 to 2008; Zoran Đinđić replaced Mićunović as the leader of the Democratic Party and was subsequently Serbian Prime Minister from 2001 until his assassination in 2003. Kosta Čavoški, who was also among the founding members of the Democratic Party, late embraced a right-wing course and became a fierce Serbian nationalist. Ljubomir Tadić was among the founders of the Democratic Party and remained influential in the party, and

11 Other repressive measures against them were also used; for instance, the professors were occasionally deprived of their passports (according to Mićunović, he was unable to travel for six years, see: Mićunović 2013: 258).

12 The negotiations took place between Milan Dragović, Serbian Executive Council's Vice-president and Serbian Secretary for culture and education Milan Milutinović. A reconstruction of that conversation can be found in Marković 2009*:* 167–168).

his son Boris Tadić later led the Party and acted as Serbian President from 2004 to 2012. Vesna Pešić was a long term leader of the Civic Alliance of Serbia (*Građanski savez Srbije*) and influential politician during and after Milošević's era. Mihailo Marković wrote the political programme of Milošević's socialist Party and was considered to be its ideologue prior to his resignation in 1995. He also embraced nationalist views. Svetozar Stojanović – also had nationalist ideas, and acted as the special advisor during Dobrica Ćosić's short presidency of Yugoslavia. Nebojša Popov, the founder and President of UJDI, a pro-democratic and pan-Yugoslav party that advocated the survival of Yugoslavia. Several other, lesser known colleagues, such as Trivo Inđić or recently deceased Aleksandar Nikitović, were long-term advisors to Serbian presidents Boris Tadić and Vojislav Koštunica. Our guess is that probably half of the Institute's staff occupied high or highest political positions in Serbia in the 1990s and 2000s. Ideologically speaking, they positioned themselves broadly, advancing far-right to far-left views, with some being fierce nationalists who vigorously defended the Serbian cause, while others acted as fierce anti-war liberals who accused the regime for atrocities and insisted on the recognition of Serbian guilt and Serbian crimes committed during the 1990s.

1968 and the Post-Evental Fidelity

According to the philosophy of Alain Badiou (Badiou 2009), events are intervening in historical situations by introducing universally relevant ideas that cannot be reduced to the "inconsistent multiplicities" in which they appear. Badiou elaborated a typology of post-evental subjectivity that might be summarized as follows: 1. the faithful subject (characterized by fidelity to the truth of the event); 2. the reactionary subject of denial (who suggests that nothing happened); 3. the obscure subject (who leads a counter-attack in the name of preventive counter-revolution); 4. the resurrected subject (who revitalizes the truth of the event after a certain while). Slavoj Žižek added two types of subjects to Badiou's list: 5. the subject of reactive reintegration (who seemingly affirms the event but in fact betrays it); 6. the subject who forces the truth of the event without taking into consideration its possible tragic consequences (Žižek, internet). This seemingly abstract typology might be very useful in interpreting post-1968 subjectivities. First of all, there is certainly a reactionary subject according to whom nothing essential happened in 1968 – it was merely an Anti-Oedipal protest of hysterical teenagers, a street carnival. As Alexandre Kojève famously formulated it: nothing serious happened because nobody died (see Tamás, internet). From the viewpoint of reactive reintegration, 1968 was mainly a turning point in Western(ized) lifestyle, a globalized event of "sex and drugs and rock 'n' roll" or the affirmation of corporeal hedonism, but certainly not, for instance, a politically relevant protest against state authoritarianism and state capitalism. The reactive subject often claims that the students misunderstood their position by relying upon a radical leftist scenery – what they really did is that they anticipated the liberal pluralism of the following decades, and, what is more, their usual demand for workers' self-management is today satisfied by post-Fordist teamwork. There is also an attitude that might be called obscure: according to the exponents of "neoconservative counter-revolution", 1968 is to be blamed for

contemporary nihilism and relativism, for the crisis of authority, moral behaviour and "traditional values" (one of the main representatives of this post-1968 subjectivity is certainly Nicolas Sarkozy – see Samuel, internet). However, one might also come to the conclusion that it is typical for the obscure subject to appropriate certain *soixante-huitard* ideas, namely, the anti-etatist and anti-institutional ones, but in a distorted way, for the benefit of the ideology of free market.

To our purpose, it is of great importance to pose the question whether there are any aspects of the Yugoslav 1968 that make it relevant as an event with a universal and, at least in a certain way, original message. In that respect, Boris Kanzleiter's research demonstrates (Kanzleiter 2009, 2011) that the Yugoslav 1968 functioned as a kind of synthesis of the 1968 rebellions despite their plural character. That is to say, 1968

> in Yugoslavia represented neither the longest nor the most spectacular, and not even the most massive experience, and yet in it one could find the condensation of its global essence. ... For, the Yugoslav 68' was at once a critique of the mechanisms of alienation and the exploitations of the market (this was in fact its reaction against the deadlocks of the Yugoslav market reforms) and also a critique of the technocracy as well as the party state and the state party, respectively. The document drafted by the Belgrade students ('3000 words') very precisely illustrates the point in question: 'Briefly, the ideal of the students is a democratic socialism'. It is symptomatic that the Belgrade students protested hand in hand against the repression in Warsaw as well as the intervention in Czechoslovakia, but also against the repression of Western-German students. What happened in Yugoslavia in fact represented a synthesis of the whole of 68', and this is the proof that that year ultimately does not succumb to false dichotomies such as East/West, market/state, etc.: on the contrary, it was ubiquitously harnessed against state-capitalism which bases itself not only on welfare but also on conformism and paternalism. (Losoncz 2015: 56–58)

More locally, post-Yugoslav scholars argued that, if the League of Communists of Yugoslavia followed the true reformist course and did not remove the liberals from the office, the new leadership would keep Yugoslavia alive or, at least, prevent its violent dissolution. New age Yugoslav historians, such as Hrvoje Klasić, seem to continue such currency by considering that the Belgrade student protests of 1968 were among the most emancipatory drivers that occurred in Yugoslavia, due to their universalist and pro-democratic claims. This goes in line with the historical interpretation of 1968 generally. As Geoff Eley puts it: "The movements of 1968 provided the flashes of a future still being shaped" (Eley 2002: 363).

Perhaps, after decades of dissolution, conflicts and economic turmoil in what was once Yugoslavia, it is now worth reminding ourselves of this legacy that professes the possibility of the ideological alternative, of socialism with a human face, of egalitarian society beyond liberalism, capitalism and real-socialism. In today's ideologically and intellectually apathetic and sterilized Serbian society, nurturing this legacy about the possibility of an ideological alternative is our best chance – if not the last resort.

Bibliography

Anderson, Perry (1976), *Considerations on Western Marxism*, London: Verso.
Anonim. (1974), „"Praxis" Supporters in Yugoslavia Sentenced, "'Praxis' Supporters in Yugoslavia Sentenced", 3 October 1974. HU OSA 300-8-3-11027; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
Anonim. (1972), "Sisak: Privremena zabrana 'Praxisa'", *Vjesnik*, 26 July 1972, p. 5.
Anonim. (1971), "Zabrana 'Praksisa'", *Politika*, 11 August 1971, p. 6.
Anonim. (1968), "Smernice o najvažnijim zadacima Saveza komunista u razvijanju sistema društveno-ekonomskih i političkih odnosa", *Politika*, 14. June 1968, p. 1.
Antić, Zdenko (1968), "Publication of 'Praxis' to be Stopped?", 22 April 1968. HU OSA 300-8-3-10136; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
Badiou, Alain (2009), *Logics of Worlds: Being and Event 2,* London: Continuum.
Bešlin, Milivoj (2009), "Uticaji 'juna '68.' na političku situaciju u Jugoslaviji", in: Tomić, Đorđe and Petar Atanacković (eds.), *Društvo u pokretu: novi društveni pokreti u Jugoslaviji od 1968. do danas*, Novi Sad: Cenzura, pp. 49–63.
Cohen, Robert S. And Mihailo Marković (1975), *Yugoslavia: The Rise and Fall of Socialist Humanism*, Nottingham: Spokesman Book.
Ćosić, Dobrica (2000), *Piščevi zapisi (1951–1968)*, Beograd: Filip Višnjić.
Cvejić, Igor Olga Nikolić and Mihal Sladeček, *Istorija instituta za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju*, in manuscript.
Eley, Geoffrey (2002), *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gruenwald, Oskar, "Praxis and Human Rights in Yugoslavia", Prepared for presentation at the 75th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington Hilton Hotel, August 31–September 3, 1979.
Heller Ágnes, "1968", (internet) available at: http://www.c3.hu/scripta/beszelo/97/11/13.htm (viewed 29 August 2018).
Kanzleiter, Boris (2011), *"Rote Universität": Studentenbewegung und Linksopposition in Belgrad 1974-1975*, Hamburg: VSA.
–. (2009), "1968. u Jugoslaviji: tema koja čeka istraživanje" in: Tomić, Đ. and P. Atanacković (eds.), *Društvo u pokretu: Novi društveni pokreti u Jugoslaviji od 1968. do danas*, 30–49.
Klasić, Hrvoje (2012a), *Jugoslavija i svijet 1968*, Zagreb: Ljevak.
–. (2012b), "Raspad Jugoslavije se vidio još 1968. godine", https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/klasic_raspad_jugoslavije_se_vidio_jos_1968_godine/24534252.html (page accessed 1.5.2018.)
Koltan, Michael (2012), "Filozofija 'Praxisa' i studentski prosvjedi 1968. godine", in Olujić Dragomir Oluja and Krunoslav Stojaković (eds.), *Praxis*, Belgrade: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, pp. 148–173.
Köhler, Matthias István (2012), "Korčulanska letnja škola i 'Budimpeštanska škola'", in Olujić D. O. and K. Stojaković (eds.), *Praxis*, pp. 301–317.
Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1966), *Essential Works of Lenin: "What is to Be Done" and Other Writings*, New York: Dover Publications.
Lešaja, Ante (2014), *Praksis orijentacija, časopis Praxis i Korčuljanska ljetna škola (građa)*, Beograd: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.
Losoncz, Márk (2015), "Šta li će biti sa tobom, postjugoslovenski svete..? / Qu'est–ce que tu seras devenu, monde post–yougoslave...? / Was wird aus dir geworden sein, post–jugoslawische Welt ...? / What will have become of you, post–Yugoslav world...?", *Anachronia* 13: 51–81.

Luxemburg, Rosa (1971), *Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg*, New York and London: Monthly Review Press.
Maliqi, Shkelzën (2008), "Kosovo 1968: eine Gegenbewegung zu Belgrad", in Kanzleiter Boris and Krunoslav Stojaković (eds.), *"1968" in Jugoslawien: Studentenproteste und kulturelle Avantgarde zwischen 1960 und 1975; Gespräche und Dokumente*, Bonn: Dietz, pp. 73–78.
Malavrazić, Đorđe (prir.) (2008), *Šezdeset osma: lične istorije (80 svedočenja),* Beograd: Službeni glasnik.
Marković, Mihailo (2008), *Juriš na nebo,* I-II, Beograd: Prosveta 2008.
Marković, Dragoslav Draža (1987), Život i politika 1967–1978, I, Beograd: Rad.
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels (1953), *Rani radovi*, Zagreb: Naprijed.
Mićunović, Dragoljub (2013), Život u nevremenu, Beograd: Arhipelag.
Popov, Nebojša (2008), *Društveni sukobi: izazov sociologiji,* "Beogradski jun" 1968. Beograd: Službeni glasnik, 2008.
–. (1988), *Contra Fatum: Slučaj grupe profesora filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu 1968-1988*, Beograd: Mladost.
Samuel, Henry, "Nicolas Sarkozy blames the generation of 1968", (internet) available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3557797/Nicolas-Sarkozy-blames-the-generation-of-1968.html (viewed 29 August 2018).
Schulman, Jason (2016), "The Mass Strike and Rosa's Theory of Spontaneity", in Ehmsen Stefanie and Albert Scharenberg (eds.), *Rosa Remix*, New York: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, pp. 22–24.
Stanković, Slobodan, "Zagreb 'Praxis' against Stalinist Dogmatism", 27 July 1972. HU OSA 300-8-3-10711; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
Stojanović, Svetozar (1973), "From Post-revolutionary Dictatorship to Socialist Democracy", *Praxis: International Edition* 9(4): 311–334.
–. (1972), "Od postrevolucionarne diktature ka socijalističkoj demokratiji (jugoslovenski socijalizam na raskršću)". *Praxis* 9(3–4): 375–398.
Supek, Rudi (1955), "Značaj teorije otuđenja za socijalistički humanizam", *Pregled* 37(1): 51–58.
Szerbhorváth György (2005), *Vajdasági lakoma*. Pozsony: Kalligram Könyvkiadó.
Tamás Gáspár Miklós, "Miért éppen Hobsbawm?", (internet) available at: http://valasz.hu/publi/miert-eppen-hobsbawm-55610/ (viewed 29 August 2018).
Vékás János (2017), *Utak 2.* Zenta: VMMI.
Žižek, Slavoj (2006), *The Universal Exception*, London: Continuum, 2006.
–., "On Alain Badiou and Logiques des mondes", (internet) available at: http://www.lacan.com/zizbadman.htm (viewed 29 August 2018).

Aleksandar Pavlović
Mark Lošonc

Beogradski šezdesetosmaši i naknadna vernost Događaju: intelektualno i političko nasleđe studentskih protesta iz 1968. godine u Srbiji

Apstrakt

Iako su beogradski studentski protesti izbili i završili se u junu 1968. godine posle svega nedelju dana, oni predstavljaju zbirnu tačku nagomilanog decenijskog društvenog nezadovoljstva i protivrečnosti, kao i filozofskih istraživanja neortodoksnih marksista iz Praksis škole (*Praksisovci*). Protesti su iznenadili jugoslovenske vlasti kao prva masovna pobuna nakon

Drugog svetskog rata koja je eksplicitno kritikovala rastuću društvenu nejednakost, birokratizaciju i nezaposlenost, i zahtevala slobodu govora i ukidanje privilegija. Ovaj članak fokusira se na sudbinu osmoro profesora sa Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu bliskih Praksis idejama, koje je režim identifikovao kao podstrekače protesta i kasnije ih proterao sa fakulteta zbog njihove „moralno-političke nepodobnosti". Nakon međunarodnih i unutrašnjih pritisaka, oni su kasnije ponovo zaposleni u zasebnoj istraživačkoj jedinici nazvanoj Centar za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, gde su zadržali svoju kritičku oštricu i zagovarali politički pluralizam. Od kraja osamdesetih godina prošlog veka, oni i njihove kolege iz Centra postaju politički aktivni, nalaze se među osnivačima i kasnije liderima Demokratske Stranke i povremeno zauzimaju najviše položaje u Srbiji – Dragoljub Mićunović kao predsedavajući Narodne skupštine, bivši srpski predsednik i premijer Vojislav Koštunica i nekadašnji premijer Zoran Đinđić. Međutim, dok su neki članovi osmorke i Centra postali čvrsti anti-nacionalisti i antiratni aktivisti, drugi su prigrlili srpski nacionalizam, tako predvodeći intelektualni razdor na Prvu i Drugi Srbiju koji je obeležio srpsko društvo devedesetih godina prošlog veka, i ostao uticajan do danas.

Ključne reči: Beogradski studentski protesti 1968, slučaj osmoro profesora, Beogradski Filozofski fakultet, Praxis, Korčulanska letnja (ljetna) škola, Centar/Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Josip Broz Tito, Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija.

IV

REVIEWS

PRIKAZI

VIVIAN LISKA, *GERMAN-JEWISH THOUGHT AND ITS AFTERLIFE: A TENUOUS LEGACY*, BLOOMINGTON, UNIVERSITY OF INDIANA PRESS, 2017.

Lazar Atanasković

Vivian Liska's monograph *German-Jewish Thought and Its Afterlife* is a book on parables and fables. Approaching German-Jewish critical modernity the author reveals to a reader one of the rare places in the recent history of thought, defined by the power of allegory. At the same time, Liska is committed to drawing of the maps of the paths and passages through which motives of German-Jewish thought have reached landscapes of subsequent thought. The intriguing contribution of Liska's study lies in the vigilant actualization of topics originating in the tradition labeled as past and obsolete. The author succeeds to pinpoint the critical potential not only of the modern Jewish critical thought but also of the elements of the Jewish tradition in general. Any reader of this monograph should bear in his mind that ambiguous meanings of parables and fables could easily end procrastinated as close to things heretical and rebellious – as magic and trickery of most dangerous and subversive kind.

Therefore, who are the magicians? Also, this was a concern of the Polish-Jewish author I. B. Singer. Yasha Mazur, the main protagonist of Singer's novel *Magician of Lublin,* never practiced any magic and still, he was a *magician*. Then, how is it possible to be a *magician* deprived of any *magical practice*? Concerning only words and semantics, Yasha was not a magician in the meaning of Hebrew *Chartom,* as a diviner and a man of a great occult knowledge, neither he was a practitioner of almost forbidden *practical Kabbalah* (*Kabbalah Ma'asit*). Instead, he was a mere illusionist capable of producing fraudulent tricks and amusing masses. However, this was not Yasha's choice, much more it was a consequence of the fact that *Chartoms* were no longer possible.

Still, this lack of the possibility of believing in the existence of *magicians* has not emerged because of their obsoleteness and backwardness. No, it appeared as a consequence of the one of most fundamental, and still most enigmatic features of modernity: That it is an epoch shaped by the interruption in the tradition. In the words of Hannah Arendt, modernity is defined "... as a time when tradition can no longer reach us 'because' the process of transmission has irrevocably been interrupted" (p. 17) With interruption in the main streams of tradition, its subversive elements were altogether interrupted – and this has led to the metamorphosis of subversive practices into trickery and show.

Nevertheless, Yasha Mazur was a magician, not only an illusionist – provided that some illusionists are only exiled magicians. In that light, there is something

recognizably exilic in the figure of Singer's *Magician*: He is longing for the land of his fathers, for their *Halakha* and prayers, but he could not get back there. Yasha was condemned to wander around his world as a figure of joy for the eyes of strangers and their *Witzwetzung* (To borrow Martin Buber's neologism.). In the end, he will enclose himself in a brick hut and devote himself to unreachable depths of the tradition – and he did it against the advice of a local Rabbi.

There is some unsettling similarity between the position of Singer's *Magician* and that of seminal figures of Jewish *critical modernity.* In the works of Franz Kafka, Walter Benjamin, Gershom Sholem, Hannah Arendt and Paul Celan, the motive of interruption in *transmission* of the tradition is decisive. Even though, instead of turning themselves away from the uncertainties of modernity, as well as of the remnants of the tradition – those authors have tried to articulate answers to questions and challenges of modernity by turning themselves to this very *interrupted tradition*. How these answers were formed, how they have related between themselves, and how they have overstepped boundaries of their original context, is the subject of Liska's minutely detailed readings.

Specifically, the book begins with Kafka, the writer whose work is permeated with the motive of interruption. Liska begins with Kafka's short story titled *Imperial Message.* In the story, a dying emperor sends his emissary to deliver a message of unprecedented importance to one of his subjects in the distant imperial province. Nevertheless, the message, the content of which remains concealed to the reader, never reaches its destination. The path of the messenger is too crowded and impossible to traverse, he reaches only out of the gates of the imperial city, just to get lost in its streets. Liska interprets this story as a parable that "describes the fate of tradition in modernity. Thousands of years, an intractable distance, and insurmountable obstacles lie between the modern individual and the source of an authoritative, perhaps divine, message." (p. 1). *Perhaps divine*, perhaps *only* rumors of the true things as Benjamin once remarked (p. 2). Nevertheless, precisely these fragments of decaying wisdom could hide unsuspected critical potential. As Liska remarks regarding "... theology passed on by whispers dealing with matters discredited and obsolete...." this "…. game of relayed whispers, nevertheless, continues apace, both in Benjamin's time and in ours. Starting from the historical moment when Kafka wrote his parable and Benjamin coined his metaphor, it continues, with exponential unreliability. These uncertainties generated by this disrupted transmission of residues from the Jewish tradition not only arouse melancholic longing but also spur major German-Jewish authors...." (p. 2)

In that respect, it is not the fact of minor importance that Jewish mysticism, as one of the matters paradigmatically *obsolete and discredited,* was the central topic of Scholem's research. Moreover, as Arendt remarked: The kinship between Scholem's choice of *Kabbalah* and Benjamin's interest in *German Baroque* is more than telling – both topics were at a time „downright disreputable" (p. 18) However, as Liska underscored, this *disreputableness,* and the character of these topics as „untransmitted and untrasmissible", for Arendt was not a failure or exoticism, but rather: "….these qualities were precisely the evidence of such topics' liberating potential, grounded in the awareness of the rupture of tradition in modernity." (p. 18).

Such is the example of *Aggadah and Halakha* – In two Talmuds and Midrash there is the law, namely *Halakha*, but apart from it, there are stories. Some of these stories are historical, some fictitious, and some practical. This smaller part of Jewish oral and later written tradition is called *Aggadah* (narrative, or story). Status of *Aggadah* is ambiguous – in the midst of the commandments, we could find stories and advice, not always obviously associated with these commandments. The text of the law appears as imbued with the stories about life. Perhaps, this was a strategy of that very life to protect itself from the penetrating influence of the ever-present

law. Therefore, the function of *Aggadah* was not only in the legitimization of the law, much more it was a one of a subversion, of a *raised mighty paw*, to borrow a phrase from Benjamin (p. 63–63) This might be the reason why the Jews were not afraid of the law. Contrary to the enlightened beliefs that Jewish obedience to the law stemmed from the mere positivity of Judaism, this obedience was possible only on the ground of the subversive elements incorporated into the tradition.

Nonetheless, there are fears and phobias. As Liska mentions, Benjamin was concerned about the legal violence, about the fact that at one point the law becomes "indistinguishable from life itself." (p. 59.) In Kafka's stories, we could find a depiction of this life imbued with the law and turned into the lawless state of exception. If this is an accurate description of the modernity, then hope lies only in consummation and banishment of every law. If lawlessness of the law could be interpreted only as a real event, then Neopauline visions are last remaining. Therefore, as for Giorgio Agamben, in Liska's words "the messianic task of Kafka's students no longer lies in practicing or observing the law, but in studying it in order to deactivate it and ultimately drive it into oblivion." (p. 51.)

However, what if this picture of *lawful lawlessness* is a form of *Aggadah* pointing towards *Halakha?* Still, such an *Aggadah* could not willingly strive towards the law and its author must be afraid of such a possibility. Nevertheless, as long as it is *Aggadah*, it must inevitably land itself in front of *Halakha* – it will come *Before the law*. (p. 64–65.) In that regard, it may be that *Aggadah* is all that is left for Kafka's students. The Aggadic commentator like Kafka, as Scholem has suggested, is a commentator who has *lost his Holy Scriptures.* Since scriptures are lost, there remains a question regarding the subject of his commentaries (*Benjamin and Scholem, Correspondence*, 237.) Remaining *Aggadah* then leads the path around the state of *lawful lawlessness,* it deprives it of any claims on unquestionable reality, and it completes this task by the simple act of telling a story about it. Therefore, it protects the *place of the law* in the situation of its utter untrasmissibility.

Of course, Kafka is not the lonely new *Aggadic commentator.* Jewish critical modernity shares his task – and Liska's book tempts the reader to go through its texts as a form of a new *Aggadah.* However, there is a possibility that distinction between *Halakha and Aggadah* is irretrievably shattered and that at some point texts have lost their ability to distinguish themselves as legal texts, commentaries, parables or advice, as translations and originals. Let us then imagine a writer of *Aggadah* realizing that his *story* is not pointing towards the *law*, but that it has become the *law itself.* Terror invoked by this realization does not touch upon the Jewish tradition only, it also touches upon the inherent power of texts to lay down their own laws and claim the power for themselves. This power shows itself in all its might when tradition becomes interrupted. The extent of the consequences of the interruption *in a tradition* stays an open question in Liska's book. There is a free space for a reader to conjure the incalculable consequences and possibilities of a disappearance of the distinctions that were once present in an uninterrupted tradition. After reading this book, we could permit ourselves to imagine the thoughts of the *recipient* from Kafka's *Imperial Message.* These *dreamy* thoughts might not be only about the content of the *message* and the vain hope in its delivery. Rather *recipients imagination* might be anxiously preoccupied with the dreams about the unpredictable consequences of the impossibility of such a delivery.

In the end there are conjectures, specifically: *Conjectures about Angels* – "In the Midrash, two rabbis discuss the biblical passage featuring the angel who, after having wounded Jacob, asks the latter to release him: 'Let me go, for the day breaketh'....Debating possible meaning of this request, one of the rabbis surmises that God creates new angels every day: They utter one song of praise and then depart forever." (p. 164). At the end of her book, before the *Epilogue* titled *New Angels,* Liska

reads Geoffrey Hartmann's essay from the *Third Pillar,* which speculates about the function of the idea of perishable angels in the Midrashic discussion. This apparently *obsolete* question appears as the question of the utmost importance for modernity: What if some of the angels are perishable?

There is a painting by R. H. Quaytman on the front cover of Liska's book. Quaytman's painting is the replica of the famous Paul Klee's *Angelus Novus* – only without *Angelus*: "The background of Klee's *Angelus* is still recognizable in Quaytman's painting, but the angel has vanished. The painting jolts our visual memory into projecting the angelic figure onto the voided surface and invites us to imagine the angel's flight." (p. *ix*) However, there is an addition to the original monoprint: One more frame, which somehow intrudes into the original picture while blending in its original frame and pointing *out of it*. This additional frame Quaytman colored blue, perhaps even *Tekhelet,* which is the Divine color in Judaism. However, this *Tekhelet* gate is not positioned inside the depths of the picture, behind the back of *Angelus.* This gate does not stand on the road to paradise, but it provides to *Angelus the* passage out of the original frame – with divine assistance it enables its flight. Still, there remains a question where could have *Angelus* fled? Could it be that this blue gate was the gate through which the Messiah has come and that *growing pile of rubble* and misery is altogether gone? Likewise, it is not impossible to imagine that storm has not blown from paradise. Of course, there was a storm in *Angelus' wings*, but *paradise* as a place of its origin was just a conjecture, one of these well-known rumors about the true things. Therefore, it is not impossible that *Angelus* was one of these perishable angels discussed by rabbis, but his song was mute. Was there any flight then? The wish of *Angelus* to flee might appear as one of those well-known rumors and conjectures.

In the end, it might be that conjuring about the possible fate of missing *Angelus* hides messianic potential if the heap of rubble is still growing. The questions about "angelus' genealogy" which inspired generations of theoreticians and artists (p. 167) may be supplemented with the question regarding *Angelus'* departure. All these conjectures, Jewish or Neopauline, secular or theological, have a starting point at the top of the heap of rubble which relentlessly pushes forward. Together with the Liska's comparison of the *Angelus* with the owl of Minerva (p. *ix*), concluding words of her book are more than indicative:

> .... These piles of wreckage block the path between angel and Paradise, between the man at the window and the palace of the emperor. In modernity, wholeness has turned into scattered fragments and truth into mere rumor. But rumors of true things persist and the backward gaze in Kafka's and Benjamin's texts suggests that they still sought spurs and splinters from an obstructed inaccessible origin. For the German-Jewish thinkers discussed in this book, the fragments of the divine message – its language, its law, and its promise of messianic redemption – are part of the debris from the past that can no longer be transmitted as truth at this late stage of history. It is through the true rumors of literature – Benjamin's allegory, Kafka's parable – that this message can be envisioned as in a dream, when the evening comes. The evening of the Jewish dimension in modernist thought may well have arrived. In Judaism, however, the falling dusk begins a new day, and as Benjamin reminds us, the Jews are not permitted to investigate the future. (p. 169.)

HOWARD G. SCHNEIDERMAN, *ENGAGEMENT AND DISENGAGEMENT: CLASS, AUTHORITY, POLITICS, AND INTELLECTUALS*, NEW YORK, ROUTLEDGE; 2018.

Sanja Petkovska

There is perhaps no topic more pressing than social and political engagement, especially in relation to social hierarchies and to the role of intellectuals. Yet the development of the topic and the mode of argumentation found in this book are quite unexpected. While this book should probably be considered in the context of its origin in contemporary American sociology, it strikingly poses many questions shaking the essence of the social sciences and their role in imagining, legitimating and/or advocating certain model of social relations and social change. It seems that the times we are living in are in fact a time in which the tradition of engagement related to challenging given structures of power are being quite unpopular. Rather, scientific authority is employed to claim that the status quo is not only factual but furthermore almost an ideal and desirable state in which only certain social arrangements are to be produced. A premise of this bias as presented in this book is that current debates and theoretical opponents are mostly simply ignored, and the authorities that bear the stamp of "classics" of political and social theory, such as Max Weber or Alexis de Tocqueville are invoked most frequently to support claims and interpretations. The book itself is composed of seventeen essays including the introduction, some of which are co-authored by E. Digby Baltzell. Those essays are seemingly written in a more narrative than argumentative manner, many of which have been previously published elsewhere and most of which are focused on offering new light on the work of the colleagues Schneiderman appreciates or with whom he has closely cooperated. From the introduction, but also from the titles of the chapters and their content, it is obvious that the main focus of the book is on a supposed "crisis of leadership and authority", so it might also be suggested that the title may not reflect the content of the book in the best possible way, except for if the engagement is to be understood as the engagement of elites in relation to leadership positions.

The author of the book, Howard G. Schneiderman, is a professor of sociology at Lafayette College in Easton, Pennsylvania. His main research field is intellectual history, especially the topics of charisma and authority in relation to religion. His work does not appear to attract massive attention and polemic, and he seems to be barely known outside the United States. This book is supposed to offer his most serious attempt at a significant academic contribution, but the author simply chooses to concentrate almost exclusively on

authors from at least several decades ago, which constitutes a quite specific perspective, what could be understood also as advantage and specificity of this book. Thus the purpose of the book is not to attempt to make an original scientific contribution, but rather to provide us with insight into a specific perspective on the nature of society and social relations that the author has gained by studying the work of other authors. And the basic supposition of that perspective is clearly defined in the introduction: "authority and social stratification are indispensable to social organization", and revolutionary organizations also seem to be very authoritarian and hierarchical, increasing egalitarianism while the quality of leadership is declining (p. 2). Besides egalitarianism, the other reason for the "crisis of leadership" Schneiderman focuses on is the "ethos of radical individualism" which actually has its origin in democracy and undermines social integrity. The author clearly holds the position of functional necessity of social stratification, referring to the Davis-Moore hypothesis, but without much attempt to notice or respond to more contemporary criticisms of it, what could help him in building the stronger argumentation. The highest matter of democracy for the author appears to be that oligarchic elites are drawn from all social classes and accountable to the rest of society, in other words that there is "definite aristocratic culture" based on honor. Schneiderman holds that because of radical individualism, democratic societies have a problem with authority and tend to be suspicious towards it – viewing it as something undoubtedly bad or undesirable. All the essays in the book are simply illustrations and repetitions of these given assumptions of the author in different contexts. However, the main value of the book seems to be that it could spark a further debate over the nature and necessity of authority and unequal distribution of power and wealth in American society.

The first essay in the book is supposed to build on important names of social theory from the main strongholds of Western academy and demonstrate "value-neutral social science theories on authority". What likely makes them "value-neutral" is the fact that they see authority as a constitutive, indispensable part of society. Those "value-neutral" theorists are allegedly not focused on justifying or condemning authority, but on accepting and understanding it. It remains unclear why the authority is to be accepted even prior to justification, but also why we as social scientists should not also accept the fact that opposition to and the request for legitimacy of the authority exist, seeking to be explained and understood. The following chapter provides an analysis of how charisma and religion influence leadership and authority patterns in Puritan society in Connecticut on the one hand, and on the other hand in the Rhode Island elite of Quaker and Baptist background. While the first one valued greater hierarchy and provided more figures of public authority, the second was more individualistically oriented and contributed privately oriented individuals. These findings are based on an analysis of biographies of elites in the US, although we are not provided with more details of the survey's methodological background. However, the pattern of authority derived from the biographies was uncovered and it is suggested that it demonstrates the influence of religion, followed by the conclusion that Puritan society is superior because it empowers social integration.

The following chapters firstly provide us with the story of the concept of the American dream under which mobility is understood to be based on hard work. Subsequently, there is an analysis of the radical movement of Jacobins as given in the work of Brinton from 1930, again based on biographies. Schneiderman compares this revolutionary movement to the racist movement of the Ku Klux Klan and claims that its origin is in literary and Masonic societies with which it has some organizational similarities. Allegedly free masons were stated to be among the founders of the first Jacobin clubs, but no supporting evidence is provided for these claims. With the concept of the "circulation of elites",

every aspect of the revolutionary potential and idea of the Jacobins was diminished, stating that they simply replaced aristocrats in positions of authority and have become the elite themselves. The next chapter offers a critique of political sociology since it appeared relatively late in the US and did not fight back against threats to the political values of Western civilization, among which Schneiderman mentions revolutionary nationalism, anarchism, and even nihilism and political messianism; political sociologists were claimed not to be so good at predicting political catastrophes and to started to write on intriguing phenomena of terrorism significantly late. The explanation of why political sociology emerged in Europe and not in America is that in Europe, unlike in America, politics overwhelmed institutions and civil society, since the state and society are to be understood as competing to occupy the same position. In the early 19th and 20th century the place of politics was occupied by civil society in America, and this was also a relatively peaceful period with a focus on community and consensus, while in Europe this was a turbulent time focusing on the state, conflicts, power and revolutions. The insights into the relation between society and politics which are differently conceptualized in America compared with Europe and relatively pacified within the concept of civil society seem very useful in understanding why it is less likely that social problems could be articulated as political in the American context. The power inequality is simply mediated by religious and philanthropic activities.

In the following chapter/essay Schneiderman first offers his interpretation of the work of Irving Louis Horowitz who according to him was falsely accused of transitioning from a radical to a conservative position, while he allegedly was and remained an "old-time liberal committed to reason and truth from the start" (p. 111). Subsequently, the work of E. Digby Baltzell is presented along with some biographical information, especially his work on the theory of the establishment and WASP (white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant) developed under the influence of Weber and Tocqueville. The ruling aristocracy elected democratically is the best possible solution for Schneiderman and he sees no tension between the two concepts, while disturbing the class distinction could be dangerous according to him. While success is highly valued in American life, that is not the case with authority. Then Schneiderman goes on to prove that American presidents from a high social class background have performed better and been more effective in office than presidents from lower class origins, although we cannot see how the success and the effectiveness of the presidents were defined and measured. The same thesis is then also applied to those in the justice system, with the conclusion that the chances of the lower classes entering the Supreme Court have increased. The role of the Protestant establishment or WASP as a force in American history is especially important for Schneiderman, explaining that hegemony and elitism are necessary for the well-being of society and protection of freedoms (p. 208–210). Schneiderman also intends to shed new light on some other issues from American history by bringing to the table the book "In Search of Nixon" by Bruce Mazlish which was considered to be underrated even if relevant because of the anticipation of what will happen, and the use of psychohistory to explain Nixon's behavior.

The last chapters discuss the democratic dilemma of diffused power, that leads to fewer individuals being ready to take on the responsibility for governance by evoking the work of Lord Bryce on civic duty, defending William Graham Sumner as not conservative, elaborating the work of Aldous Huxley once again with the help of bibliographical data, and discussing historical peculiarities relating to Das Max Weber Haus at the University of Heidelberg. The book ends surprisingly without a summarizing or concluding chapter, thus leaving these fragmented stories to stand for themselves, and leaving us to draw and generalize some conclusions of our own.

Except for conservative readers from the US and eventually abroad who will

likely enjoy it, this book has little to offer other readers interested in social theory aside from those with an interest in certain peculiar specificities, mostly biographical, of certain American sociologists, mostly from the second half of the 20th century. Many problematic claims are insufficiently supported. To support his claims that authority is a necessary functional part of society, Schneiderman even refers to the essay "On Authority" written by Friedrich Engels, but with a rather biased interpretation. In this essay Engels does claim that authority is needed as a kind of strategy, but in his view this authority is clearly linked to democratic political procedures of being outvoted as a mechanism for the subordination of someone's will to political leadership, rather than to any kind of charismatic, aristocratic or irrational authority. Furthermore, in the conclusion Engels clearly indicated that authority is planned to be abandoned in his vision of a future communist society, despite the fact that he does not greatly elaborate how. This kind of approach based on denial that other sides or theoretical and political opponents exist, that opposition and disagreement are also real existing phenomena, not simply some unscientific speculation of philosophers, even falsely using claims of authors that belong to the conflict and critical tradition of thought to prove his own assumptions seems to be rather worrying for the future of engagement and disengagement, and for the power of imagining social change that will bring a more equal and just society.

RITA CHIN, *THE CRISIS OF MULTICULTURALISM IN EUROPE: A* HISTORY, PRINCETON, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2017.

Péter Vataščin

It is reasonable to assume that many interested readers in today's Europe are eager to find thorough and well-written books about the continent's ethnic and cultural diversity on the ground and its political implications. Especially since the so-called refugee-crisis of 2015, the topic seems utterly unavoidable in private and public debates. The need for new literature written by scholars is huge, but the task is not an easy one, as it can be really tricky to grasp the general trajectories of multicultural societies and multiculturalism in Europe. Rita Chin's historical account of European multiculturalism is a positive example by all standards. It focuses mainly on the cases from Western European states, Great Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland in particular. Her general approach is chronological, though this can slightly change in some chapters (especially the last one entitled *The 'Failure' of Multiculturalism*) where the reasoning demands a looser structuring of the content.

The preface (p. ix–xiv) is a rather personal insight into the topic. Chin not only gives credits to all the contributors who helped her during the research and writing, but she provides the reader with a deeply private background, since in her childhood she and her parents were forced migrants as well (they are originally from Malaysia, and they left the country in the late 1960s). The mentioning of this biographical fact comes as no surprise, because during the reading it is more than obvious that Chin, contrary to the historical "standard" of European immigrant policies, is a protagonist of a more inclusive and deeply democratical integration when it comes to migrants in Europe. However, her barely implicit stance does not damage the scientific value of the book, since her reasoning is founded on carefully chosen and processed historical facts.

The *Introduction* (p. 1–22) deals with the basic and necessary historical and theoretical background of the book. Short, yet profound, this chapter provides us some essential sketches which will be illuminated from many viewpoints during the main body of text. The historical part is about the very structure and nature of the "multicultural question". The theoretical paragraphs are, understandably, about the very concept of multiculturalism which has its origins in the early 20th century. Chin outlines the history of the idea and mentions Stuart Hall as her most significant reference point in the theoretical part. She underlines that the term can be quite a messy one, but it is by no means unusable because by this ubiquity it contains a very valuable critical space in which we can discuss the issues of sociocultural diversity.

Europe is, as Chin swiftly points out, in a way always harbored multiple cultures. However, the politically most influential Western European states witnessed a shift after the Second World War, when the discourses about cultural variety slowly began to revolve around the concept of multiculturalism. The first major chapter, *The Birth of Multicultural Europe* (p. 23–79), carefully evaluates and traces this process which was driven by imperial legacies and man-power shortage. All the cases of the previously mentioned European countries are presented in detail. It is worth to highlight here that Chin masterfully summarizes her arguments and observations at the end of each chapter (in the present case p. 78–79).

1973 marked the end of the post-war prosperity, and at that time guest work, which was interpreted as something temporary up until that period, definitely began to resemble long-term immigration. This prolonged change prompted a series of policies in Western Europe, as it is discussed in *Managing Multicultural Societies* (p. 80–137). Britain (Race Relations Act, p. 83–102) and the Netherlands (the process of pillarization, p. 102–112) were the only ones that implemented state-sponsored inclusive multicultural policies, and these measures are the sole examples of such measures even today. In contrast for instance, French policy relied heavily on a unique approach (p. 112–124), that is, on the political and cultural assimilation of migrants on individual level. These contrasting examples are thoroughly discussed, which is of crucial importance, since through them it is possible to understand not just the differences between states, but between inclusive and exclusive policies as well.

The biggest shift in public discourse took place at the end of the 1970s, and it is safe to assume that today's usage of language and ideas directly has its roots in this period. *Race, Nation, and Multicultural Society* (p. 138–191) is a stunningly written chapter on this shift, which begins with Margaret Thatcher's thoughts from 1978 about immigrants who "swamp" Britain. Chin's careful argumentation convincingly shows that the British prime minister's usage of words, and the discursive upheaval in Europe about cultural belonging was nothing more than replacing the directly racist set of concepts with more positive arguments about cultural *and* national belonging. Especially interesting is the way by witch both the French leftist and conservative streams, through the resurgence of republicanist ideas, accepted Marie Le Pen's notion that immigrants pose a threat to the French national community. However, the key part of this chapter is an analysis of the well-known Salman Rushdie affair (p. 178–191), by which the immigrant problem, while thematically revolving around the issue of free speech, transformed into a monolith Muslim "problem" regardless of the very fact that European Muslims with an immigrant background have had different national origins. Although Chin does not use this interpretation explicitly, this antagonism can easily be characterized as a major boundary between "us and them". Finally, another feature deserves to be highlighted: the author's highly sensitive contextual thinking. A good example is her exploration of the West German case where the burden of the so-called Nazi heritage was enormous and it made the responses of the immigration policies highly specific (p. 154–166).

The Rushdie affair was not the only case concerning Muslims, as the issue of headscarves, involving questions about individual freedom and sexual democracy, literally exploded in France in 1989. All major details of the subsequent series of events is discussed in *Muslim Women, Sexual Democracy, and the Defense of Freedom* (p. 192–236). It was in these cases when "immigrant women" turned into "Muslim women" who should be "civilized" and "liberated". Especially important is the shift in which even leftist thinkers began to abandon the ideals of cultural relativism while championing sexual democracy. Chin's reasoning, while visibly critical of this change, is very clear on the whole process.

The last main chapter called *The 'Failure' of Multiculturalism* (p. 237–286) first

guides us to the 2010s, citing Angela Merkel, David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy's different but at the same time deeply similar remarks on the "failure" of multiculturalism, only to present one more crucial layer of the historical background. Around 2010 and even today, as Chin highlights, the object of the debates was not a rather narrow topic of cultural difference, but the very nature of European societies. What is particularly interesting here is that the author not only points out the direct background of the recent crisis, but she digs deeper into the historical roots of the "failure". The part (p. 240–264) which examines the ground-level and grassroot approaches in managing multiethnic communities in Britain and in France are of crucial importance, since these programs and efforts have never had proper and permanent support of the wide public or the political elites. The final part of this chapter deserves to be emphasized (p. 271–286), because it provides us with probably the clearest train of thought about the inherent cultural logic of the "mass cultural optics", which resulted in sweeping judgements about "us and them", that is, between Europeans and Muslims.

The epilogue of the book is entitled *The Future of Multicultural Europe?* (p. 287–305). Firstly, here we can read some conclusions with a critical view on liberal values and their narrow interpretation among conservatives and liberals alike. By drawing upon the consideration of Karl Polányi, Chin states that it was especially Western European leftists who abandoned a more collective notion of freedom. Secondly – and this forms the ending of the book – Chin provides us with "critical lessons and tools for self-reflection" (p. 297), that is, with the essential conditions for a more effective engagement with European sociocultural diversity. The most important fact of all, perhaps, is that the multicultural populations of Europe will not vanish and "go away", therefore in order to avoid highly risky outcomes, the old continent's leaders and societies must search for new policies and attitudes by drawing upon their democratical heritage. One of Chin's most important conclusions is that "we need to uphold both liberal conceptions of individual freedom and pluralistic communitarianism" (p. 303).

It is important to emphasize that the *Notes* (p. 307–346), the *Suggestions for Further Reading* (p. 347–352) and the *Index* (p. 353–363) provide us with useful material for further thinking and orientation in the topic. The careful editing of these additional parts makes them even more user-friendly than in other similar publications.

It is without doubt that the present work can be a useful guide for a wide variety of readers, not solely scholars. Thick and thorough, the book manages to find a proper central line among the lurking dangers of summarizing inquiries. One might argue that 300 pages about this topic are not enough, but this argument seems unfounded. Chin's work is rather a premier example of how to summarize a really complex issue avoiding superficiality and overwriting at the same time. If someone needs an introduction into the problematics of European multiculturalism, then this volume can easily be characterized as one of the must-read scholarly works.

MOLLY FARNETH, *HEGEL'S SOCIAL ETHICS: RELIGION, CONFLICT, AND RITUALS OF RECONCILIATION*, PRINCETON, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2017.

Slobodan Golubović

In the first part of the 20th century, Alexandre Kojève stands out as one of the key interpretors of the social dimensions of *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and more precisely, of the idea of reciprocal recognition: the heart of Hegel's social ethics. By opposing Kojève's interpretation of this question, Molly Farneth is trying to paint a different picture: one where reciprocal recognition does not end stuck in a permanent state of masterdom and servitude, but where this state can be overcome through confession and forgiveness. The figures of that process are not two consciousnesses striving for recognition from which the paradigmatic figures of Master and Slave appear, but the wicked and judging consciousnesses which come to terms with each other by means of "rituals of confession and forgiveness through which their ongoing conflict might be mediated" (p. 58). From this point of view, Hegel's ethics finally arrives at the point where conflicts can be solved not through domination and submission but mutual recognition.

The book is divided into seven chapters, which can be (as the author points out at end of chapter one) separated into three parts. The first part (chapter one, entitled "Social ethics in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*") serves as the introduction to the main goals of the book and explores the stances and contradictions in the different earlier readings of Hegel. The author attempts to introduce Hegel's social ethics as something not secondary to his epistemological project but, quite the opposite, essential to its understanding.

The second part (chapters two to five) is an attempt of re-reading certain parts of Hegel's *Phenomenology* (on Antigone, Faith and Enlightenment, Wicked and Judging consciousness) in a new way. Chapter two, "Tragedy and Social Construction of Norms", and chapter three, "Culture War and Appeal to Authority", both discuss the shapes of spirit that "collapse under the inadequacies of its beliefs and practices" (p. 97). "Rituals of Reconciliation", chapter four, deals with the relationship between the figures of *wicked* and *judging consciousness*, as well as analogies between Lutheran theology and Hegel's account of confession and forgiveness. The next chapter, "Religion, Philosophy and the Absolute", further reflects on the relationships between social practices and norms.

Finally, the third part (chapters six and seven, "Commitment, Conversation, and Contestation" and "Democratic Authority through Conflict and Reconciliation") have a more "practical" purpose: it explores how we can apply this interpretation of Hegel's social ethics in mitigating conflicts,

contradictions or problems in societies of today's world (such as the abortion debate or religious differences inside communities). There is no avoidance of conflict nor perfect and just laws that will free us from the burdens of politics (p. 128). Instead, Farneth recommends, as an alternative, the dialectic of democracy: an endless mediation without closure that cultivates the practices of reciprocal recognition and that avoids, by recognizing each other as the *loci* of authority, the burdens of partisan conflict, culture wars and tragedy. Such a reading not only sheds new light on Hegel's social ethics but also gives valuable insights to new ways through which we can attempt to overcome conflicts in today's diverse societies.

NIKOLA SAMARDŽIĆ, *LIMES: ISTORIJSKA MARGINA I POREKLO POSEBNOSTI JUGOISTOČNE EVROPE*, BEOGRAD, HERAEDU, 2017.

Milivoj Bešlin

Egzistencija na istorijskoj margini, uslovljena graničnim geografsko-političkim položajem evropskog jugoistoka, odredila je i njegove ključne karakteristike i razvoj. Nova knjiga beogradskog istoričara i profesora na Filozofskom fakultetu, Nikole Samardžića, istražuje svu polivalentnost limesa (granice), kao determinante pod čijim se dominantnim uticajem razvijao prostor Jugoistočne Evrope. Znalački struktuirana u jedanaest tematskih krugova (poglavlja) monografija zahvata širok hronološki obuhvat moderne i savremenosti – od 16. do 21. veka. Granice imperija i civilizacija, čak i kada su konstrukti, kao i evropska ekonomska i politička periferija, uticali su na oblikovanje kultura, običaja, mentaliteta stanovnika Jugoistočne Evrope, smatra autor. Istorijska sinteza nesporne originalnosti nudi istoričan i verodostojan pristup istoriji Balkanskog poluostrva, predstavljući istinski interpretativni iskorak ne samo domicilnih istoriografija. Središnja tačka Samardžićeve kompleksno struktuirane monografije svodi se na traganje za uzrocima siromaštva, zaostajanja i istorijske regresije jugoistočno-evropskih društava. Istražujući zanemarene i potisnute fenomene društvene istorije, istorije svakodnevice, ispitujući mentalitetske obrasce, političku i vojnu istoriju, ekonomski položaj Balkana u ranokapitalističkom razvoju, Nikola Samardžić gradi složenu konstrukciju koja traga za dubinskim i suštinskim uzrocima geneze i identitetskih specifičnosti fragilnog balkanskog prostora.

Naslanjajući se na savremene trendove zapadnoevropskih istoriografija, varirajući centralni motiv monografije – granicu, njen uticaj i značaj u kompleksnim istorijskim zbivanjima, autor je stavlja u red procesa dugog trajanja uporedo sa klimom i reljefom kao strukturnim determinantama razvoja i dinamike u prošlosti. Koristeći vlastita široka znanja o evropskoj istoriji modernog doba, zasnovanim na višedecenijskoj istraživačkoj platformi, Samardžić analizira i interpretira u širokim potezima, praveći paralele identitarnih istorijsko-regionalnih specifičnosti Jugiostočne Evrope sa teritorijalno-političkim strukturama izraslim na Apeninskom i Pirinejskom poluostrvu. Već u uvodnim razmatranjima, autor se pita, primenjujući holistički pristup istraživanju evropske prošlosti, „kako su jedni postali bogati, srećni i optimistični, a drugi, u širokim društvenim osnovama, zastali u prethodnim fazama razvoja?“

Smeštajući istoriju sveta na početke moderne u 15. i 16. veku i uzimajući pomorsku ekspanziju evropskih trgovačkih centara kao katalizator konstituisanja globalizovanog sveta, autor kao centralni evropski istorijski uspeh smatra činjenicu da je uspela da „globalizuje svoje kulturne norme i kodove“. Tako nastaje pojam *sveta*

u istorijskom smislu, kroz savladavanje starih komunikacionih obrazaca i izgradnju novih u razdoblju u kojem evropski Zapad uspostavlja dominaciju nad ostatkom sveta. Čak ni u navedenoj konstelaciji najmanje razvijeni region Evrope, jugoistok, iako naslonjen na Sredozemlje kao „kolevku zapadne civilizacije", nije uspeo tokom posmatranog perioda da iskorači iz pozicije „geografske i kulturne periferije", ostajući na margini preobražaja koji su nosili humanizam, renesansa, geografska otkrića, reformacija, racionalizam, prosvetiteljstvo, industrijska revolucija, tehnološki i urbani razvoj. Podstaknut tim zaključkom autor traga za uzrocima „istorijskog neuspeha", postavljajući problem – zbog čega je Balkan zadržao „pogranični i provincijalni karakter"? Moderni Balkan, piše Nikola Samardžić, primer je „nasilnog, neutaživog nacionalizma", ali i društvenih monopola, klijentelizma, korupcije, kastinskih razlika, verske netrpeljivosti, kao i suficita u „proizvodnji identiteta i razlika". Ipak, u svemu tome granice koje ga presecaju bile su konstanta: između Rimskog carstva i varvara, istočnog i zapadnog hrišćanstva, hrišćanskog i islamskog sveta, najzad u savremenosti – između sovjetskog socijalizma i zapadnog kapitalizma.

Analizirajući strukture, Nikola Samardžić posmatra Dunav kao paradigmu brodelovskog dugog trajanja, kao zaštitini pojas i „liniju Limesa". Da bi utvrdio „poreklo samoće" Balkana potrebno je njegov istorijski i antropološki prostor posmatrati od ranog srednjovekovnog doba i doseljavanja Slovena. Istorijske uzroke zaostalosti autor pronalazi u anahronom, neefikasnom i petrifikovanom institucionalnom ustrojstvu Vizantije, čiji su politički, ekonomski i civilizacijski model preuzeli i balkanski narodi, uključujući i Srbe. U osvit modernog doba, kada se zapadnoevropski vladari orijentišu na pomorsku ekspanziju, kreirajući obrise globalnog sveta, evropski jugoistok postaje deo Osmanskog carstva. Autor podseća da su se granice osmanske države, koja je u velikoj meri usvojila vizantijske običajne i institucionalne obrasce, stabilizovale u „širokom domenu nekadašnjeg rimskog Limesa". Samardžić posebno ističe procese otuđenja ruralnog nasleđa od gradova u kojima od 16. veka prevladava muslimanska većina, zbog čega nastaje ideološki sukob – iz ruralne vizure, „gradovi su ostali tuđi i tuđinski".

Nikola Samardžić traga i za uzrocima i genezom pojma „balkanizacije" Jugoistočne Evrope tokom 18. i 19. veka, kada je on označavao „prezir jednog zatvorenog, zaostalog sveta sklonog beskrajnim i besmislenim svađama i obračunima". U to doba Balkan postaje predmet stereotipa, kolonijalnih predrasuda i diskvalifikacija koji su se „urezivali i u logiku domaćih lokalnih partikularizama", reprodukujući obrasce zaostalosti i isključivosti. Samardžić posebno ističe istorijske procese u kojima su identitetski modeli na Balkanu konstituisani na marginama modernizacijskih procesa, renesanse, reformacije, racionalizma, prosvetiteljstva na periferiji kapitalističkog sistema i trenda urbanizacije. U sukobima Osmanskog, Habzburškog carstva, Venecije i drugih zainteresovanih sila, na evropskom jugoistoku su se prožimali militantni i klerikalni uticaji, lišeni reformatorskog karaktera, smatra Samardžić. Preskočivši prosvetiteljski 18. vek, Jugiostočna Evropa je determinisana devetnaestovekovnim procesima nacionalne samoidentifikacije čiji je važan katalizator bio kult narodnog, govornog jezika, konstatuje autor. Konstituisanje novih nacionalnih država na Balkanu, od kojih je svaka imala mitske i megalomanske aspiracije, odvijalo se, kako smatra Nikola Samardžić, „u nedostatku prethodnog istorijskog iskustva u domenu razvoja kompetencija i institucija". Tako su autoritarna politika i autarhična ekonomija zadržavale monopole kreirajući i specifičan vid političke kulture u ovom delu Evrope. Takođe, nekongruentnost državnih granica i nacionalnog rasprostiranja generisala je frustraciju intenziviranu (pre)dugim trajanjem Habzburškog i Osmanskog carstva na obodima Jugoistočne Evrope.

Nakon tragičnog iskustva Prvog svetskog rata, u međuratnom periodu, iako je prekoračen mitski limes, Balkan je ponovo – bedem prema intencijama poraženih revizionističkih sila, ali i sanitarni otklon od revolucionarnih i ekspanzionističkih

težnji novostvorene sovjetske države. Unutar nestabilnog evropskog jugoistoka, opterećenog istorijskim diskontinuitetima, tek konstituisana Jugoslavija postala je „prva moderna država koja je bila potencijalno u stanju da prevaziđe tradicionalne podele" karakteristične za balkanski prostor, integrisavši raznolike etničke, verske i kulturne grupe i kreirajući jednu sasvim osobenu pluralnu konstrukciju. Ipak, prednosti koje su je činile važnim istorijskim iskorakom, na razmeđu vekovnog limesa, učinile su Jugoslaviju privremenom, piše Samardžić. Najzad, posleratni period druge polovine 20. veka reafirmisao je ideju graničnog karaktera Jugoistočne Evrope u atmosferi novih podela interesnih sfera i postojanja „gvozdene zavese" i stvarnog i imaginativnog zida između Istoka i Zapada.

Posebne delove knjige Nikola Samardžić posvećuje sintezi i interpretacijama istorije jugoslovenske države i društva. Minucioznim analizama Jugoslavije ne izmiče sud autora da je jugoslovenska ravnoteža na relaciji Istok – Zapad i na razmeđu limesa bila nepostojana, rastrzana između nacionalnog pluralizma (i separatizma) i ideološkog monizma. Za Samardžića, Jugoslavija je pre svega bila „poslednja državna i kulturna zajednica balkanskih različitosti". U tom kontekstu, autor zaključuje da su granice i borba za njih generator svih balkanskih antagonizama. Borba za granice i njihovo širenje držale su narode Jugoistočne Evrope „na granici, na margini, sa one strane razvijenog evropskog prostora", smatra Samardžić. Svi navedeni činioci generisali su nacionalizme i autoritarne političke težnje nasuprot alternativi „demokratskog i kulturnog pluralizma".

Monografija Nikole Samardžića zasvođena je svojevrsnom istorijom sadašnjice – razmatranjima posvećenim političkim i kulturnim identitetima istočne i jugoistočne Evrope u posthladnoratovskom kontekstu. Uključivanje u procese integracije i demokratizacije bilo je, ne samo u simboličkom smislu, „povratak Evropi". Mnoštvo najreferentnijih svetskih studija, nesporna erudicija i kritička interpretacija, retka sposobnost uopštavanja i izvođenja istorijske sinteze čine knjigu Nikole Samardžića nezaobilaznom u izučavanju i promišljanju Jugoistočne Evrope, njenih osobenosti, identitetskih karakteristika, istorijskih aberacija i zaostajanja. Ipak i nešto više – monografija, *Limes: istorijska margina i poreklo posebnosti Jugoistočne Evrope*, primer je ne samo kako se istorija *čita* i piše sa dubinskim razumevanjem već i najbolja paradigma, na našim prostorima tako retka, originalnog, multiperspektivnog i pluralnog promišljanja prošlosti u globalnom kontekstu.

V

FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE

IZ RADA INSTITUTA

PREGLED TRIBINA I KONFERENCIJA U INSTITUTU ZA FILOZOFIJU I DRUŠTVENU TEORIJU U 2018.

Olga Nikolić, Deana Jovanović i Igor Cvejić

TRIBINE

mart

Predrag Krstić, "O nasilju kritike", sreda 14. mart

Julio Prieto, "On Eielson's Visual Poetry: Knot–Poetics, Not–Objects and Intercultural Topology", utorak 27. Mart

april

Vladimir Safatle, "Another Kratos for the Demos", utorak 3. april

Petar Bojanić, "O urgentnoj akciji", sreda 11. april

Aleksandar Fatić, "Simbolički sadržaj psihoze: osnovi interpretativne psihoterapije", utorak 17. april

maj

Adriana Zaharijević, "Zenica oka: nasilni kadrovi i kritička oduzetost" (godišnji seminar "Nasilje i kritika"), sreda 9. maj

Ádám Takács, Istorija i temporalni materijalizam", petak 18. maj

Rastko Jovanov, "Zašto angažman nije akcija? Prilog metodologiji studija angažovanosti", sreda 16. maj

Željko Radinković, "O projektu. Vreme kolektivne intencionalnosti", sreda 16. maj

Jovana Timotijević i Iva Čukić, "Aporije zajedničkog: izazovi urbanih zajedničkih dobara", ponedeljak 21. maj

Patrick Dove, "Los territorios del mal: Literature, Evil and the Question of History", ponedeljak 21. maj

Monika Betzler, "The Relational Value of Empathy", ponedeljak, 21. maj

Gregor Moder, "Hegel's Orient and the Concept of Europe", petak 25. maj

Okrugli sto: Šta je kritičko mišljenje *danas?*, Učesnici: Adriana Zaharijević, Dušan Ristić, Gazela Pudar Draško, Marjan Ivković, Predrag Krstić i Mark Lošonc, utorak 29. maj (Omladinski centar CK13)

jun

Lev Kreft, "Da li Aristotel može učiniti Bradbury–a?", petak 7. jun

Uglješa Grušič, "Rat i građansko pravo: ratovi u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, Iraku i Avganistanu u uporednom građanskom pravu", četvrtak 13. Jun

Dodela godišnje nagrade "Miladin Životić": Judith Butler, "Interpreting Non–Violence", ponedeljak 18. jun (Hrvatsko Narodno Kazalište Ivana pl. Zajca, Rijeka)

septembar

Ana María Leyra Soriano, "Making Images Talk: Picasso's *Minotauromachy*", petak 21. septembar

Mrđan Mlađan, "Značaj solidarnosti za uspeh ekonomske tranzicije u vreme Maršalovog plana", utorak 25. septembar

Sara Nikolić, "Utabanom stazom, mimo trotoara. Alternativno mapiranje Novog Mjasta", utorak 25. septembar

Matthias Bormuth, "Ambivalence and Engagement – Max Weber's Idea of Plurality in a Disenchanted World", sreda 26. septembar

Razgovor o knjizi Sophie Loidolt *Phenomenology of Plurality: Hannah Arendt on Political Intersubjectivity*, četvrtak 26. septembar. Učesnici: Adriana Zaharijević, David Schweikard, Sanja Milutinović Bojanić i Sophie Loidolt.

oktobar

Ana Dimiškovska, "Možemo li racionalnim sredstvima rešiti duboke nesuglasice?", sreda 3. oktobar

Bojana Radovanović, "Volontiranje, aktivizam i društvena angažovanost: granice i preklapanja", sreda 3. oktobar

Aleksandra Lazić, "Komunikacija i kooperacija: stavljanje normi u fokus", sreda 3. oktobar

Okrugli sto *Mesto filozofije u obrazovnom sistemu.* Učesnici: Zoran Dimić, Veroljub Ilić, Miloš Jeremić, Slobodan Kanjevac, Predrag Krstić, Aleksandar Milanković, Jadranka Pešti, Una Popović, Suzana Spasić, Aleksandar Stevanović, Tijana Milojević i Olga Nikolić.

Milica Bakić–Hayden, "Smrt, umiranje i religijske slobode u Indiji", sreda 10. oktobar

Srđan Prodanović, *"Pragmatički uvid u zdrav razum, angažman i društvenu promenu"*, ponedeljak 15. oktobar

Mark Devenney, "Thinking the Limits of Populist Politics", sreda 17. oktobar

Lea Ypi, "On Dominated Dominators", sreda 22. oktobar

Okrugli sto *Emocije i kritika: Osećaji u savremenom društvu*, Učesnici: Mark Lošonc, Predrag Krstić, Olga Nikolić, Marko Konjović i Igor Cvejić, ponedeljak 29. oktobar (Omladinski centar CK 13)

Predrag Milidrag, "'Unutrašnji dijalog' o Kosovu: pregled i ocena", sreda 31. oktobar

novembar

Horhe Arocha, "Freedom Necessity and the Other: Introduction to the Cuban Philosophy", utorak 6. novembar

Anđelka Badnjar Gojnić, "Dijagrami Centra za stanovanje IMS i artikulacija stambene izgradnje u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji", utorak 6. novembar

Christoph Brunner, "Activist Sense: The Politics of Aesthetics in Social Movements", petak 9. novembar

Vasileios Syros, "Cosmopolitanism in Pre–modern Islam and Judaism", petak 9. novembar

Vladimir Cvetković, "Pol, rod i stvaranje hrišćanskog identiteta", četvrtak 22. novembar

Promocija knjige Mareka Mikuša *Frontiers of Civil Society*, Učesnici: Danilo Vuković, slobodan Naumović, Dušan Spasojević, Srđan Đurović, Marina Simić, Jelena Vasiljević i Marek Mikuš, sreda 28. novembar

decembar

Tina Bilban, "Understanding Context, Understanding Science: Husserl, Bohr, Fleck", sreda 3. decembar

Razgovor o knjigama Marka Lošonca *Vreme, svest i kompleksnost*, odnosno *Slepilo i kapital*, Učesnici: Vladimir Gvozden, Una Popović, Dragan Prole i Mark Lošonc, ponedeljak 3. decembar (Gradska biblioteka, Novi Sad)

Catherine Colliot–Thélène, "Democracy, Between Powers and Rights", petak 7. decembar

Michaël Fœssel, "To Be a World Citizen: Political Horizon or Abyss?", petak 7. decembar

Debata: *Demokratija i kosmopolitizam za sutra*, Učesnici: **Catherine Colliot**–Thélène, Michaël Fœssel i Igor Krtolica, petak 7.decembar (Francuski institut u Beogradu)

Miloš Ćipranić, "Slikar i zalog tišine", ponedeljak 10. decembar

Jelena Ćeriman i Irena Fiket, "Angažman unutar porodice? Studija o akademskim radnicama Univerziteta u Beogradu", sreda 12. decembar

Aleksandra Bulatović, "Otpornost i nasilje", četvrtak 13. decembar

Marija Milojković, "Filozofske osnove korpusne stilistike", četvrtak 13. decembar

Ljubiša Bojić, "Psihometrija u istraživanju društvenih mreža", petak 14. decembar

Igor Cvejić i Olga Nikolić, "Angažman i zajednička perspektiva", ponedeljak 17. decembar

Mark Losoncz i Szilárd János Tóth, "(Neo) republikanizam i angažman", utorak 18. decembar

Debata *Jugoslavija: Prvih sto godina*, Učesnici: Dubravka Stojanović, Hrvoje Klasić, Amir Duranović, Petar Todorov, Srđan Milošević, Vlatko Sekulović, Milivoj Bešlin i Adriana Zaharijević, ponedeljak 24. decembar

SEMINARI I KONFERENCIJE

8–11. februar

NEKO JE REKAO FEMINIZAM? FEMINISTIČKA TEORIJA U SRBIJI DANAS.

četvrtak 8. februar

Rod i književnost

Ana Kolarić, "Feministička pedagogija i studije književnosti"

Jelena Milinković, "Feminizam čita književnost"

Aleksandar Pavlović, "Rodno čitanje srpske epike: seksualno nasilje kao znak rađanja Nacije"

Vladislava Gordić Petković, "Feministička poetika Svetlane Slapšak"

Nasleđe, pamćenje i feministički i identiteti

Ervina Dabižinović, "Naših dvadeset i sedam godina aktivizma"

Svenka Savić, "Centar za rodne studije Univerziteta u Novom Sadu: 15 godina posle"

Eni Gajanova, "Slovakinje u Vojvodini kao primer Drugog u sopstvenoj državi kroz kratak istorijski pregled"

Karolina Lendák–Kabók, Petra Bakoš, "Feminizam, etnicitet i rod: prepleteni identitet u Vojvodini"

Kako promišljamo istoriju?

Kristina Jorgić, "Pitanje ženske emancipacije između marksizma–lenjinizma i prakse KPJ"

Ana Stolić, "Ženska/rodna istorija i feministička teorija: pretpostavke zabavljenje istorijom feminizma u Srbiji (Jugoslaviji)"

Ivana Pantelić, "Kako promišljamo i (re) konstruišemo žensku prošlost: mestoistorije žena u istoriografiji u Srbiji od 1990. do 2017. Godine"

Krisztina Rác, "Žene u kriznom štabu: Slučaj Duhovne republike 'Zitzer'"

Feminizam u kulturi

Iva Nenić, "Feminizam 'u' kulturi"

Lada Stevanović, "Ženska i dečja emancipacija stiže iz Diznijevog studija: Zaleđeno kraljevstvo i Grdana"

Biljana Kosmogina, "Kako se živi feminizam: ženske prakse na području Balkana"

petak, 9. februar

Deca, roditeljstvo i brak: feminističke perspective

Marina Simić, Ivan Simić, "Država i materinstvo: (dis)kontinuiteti u politikama javne brige u deci u socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji i savremenoj Srbiji"

Jelena Ćeriman, "Porodica i roditeljstvo u savremenoj Srbiji: Ko tu kri(ti)zira?"

Irena Fiket, "Rodna podela rada u domaćinstvu, lično koje i dalje nije političko"

Feminizam u pedagogiji, feminizam kao pedagogija

Marija Bulatović, Stefan Milutinović, "Nove – juče, danas, sutra"

Svetlana Tomić, "Feministička proučavanja istorije srpskog društva I književnosti. Da li stvaramo novu "crnu pedagogiju"?"

Jelena Stefanović, Saša Glamočak, "(Ne) stereotipano predstavljanje likova u nagrađenim romanima iz književnosti za decu"

Savremeni problemi u feminističkoj teoriji 1

Jelena Vasiljević, "(Nova) razmišljanja o solidarnosti: od etike zajedništva do političkog principa zajednice"

Olga Nikolić, "Organizovanje za društvenu promenu: za i protiv prefigurativne politike"

Zorana Antonijević, "Nekoliko nevidljivih saveznika: muškarci i feminizam u Srbiji"

Kristina Stevanović, "Kome trebaju kritičke studije maskuliniteta? Ka po–etici kritičkih studija maskuliniteta"

Sanja Petkovska, "Da li će se pojaviti kritika postsocijalističkog uma i hoće li je napisati žena?"

Jezik kao političko pitanje/praksa

Margareta Bašaragin "Jezik kao političko sredstvo ne_diskriminatorne prakse: jedno shvatanje roda u nemačkom jeziku profesx Lan Hornšajt"

Smiljana Milinkov, Maja Sedlarević, "Upotreba maternjeg i rodno osetljivog jezika u profesijama"

subota, 10. februar

Feministička teorija i praktične politike

Jelena Vidojević, Natalija Perišić, "Rodni mejnstriming u Srbiji – transfer koncepta u socijalnoj politici"

Tanja Ignjatović, "Uticaj (anti)feminizma na politike i prakse prema muškom nasilju protiv žena – globalna i lokalna perspektiva"

Dragana Pejović, "Značaj rodne perspektive u pravnoj nauci"

Zorica Mršević, Svetlana Janković, "Uticaj feminističke teorije na učešće žena u oružanim snagama Srbije"

Feministička teorija umetnosti i pitanje reprezentacije

Emilia Epštajn, "Tragom feminističkog postupka na primeru Muzeja afričke umetnosti u Beogradu"

Sanja Kojić Mladenov, "Diskursi o rodu u umetnosti: konstrukcija profesionalnog identiteta umetnica u oblasti novih medija"

Milan Radovanović, "Slika *Kosovka devojka* Uroša Predića i reprezentacija rodnih razlika"

O filozofiji iz feminističke perspektive

Katarina Lončarević, "Čemu (još) feministička filozofija?"

Sanja Milutinović Bojanić, "Ne budi autoritet dok ne prija!"

Kristina Bojanović, "Agir–femme/parler–femme: o jeziku i jezikom polne razlike"

Miloš Kovačević, "Feministička rekonceptualizacija lične autonomije"

nedelja, 11. februar

Savremeni problemi u feminističkoj teoriji 2

Milesa Milinković, "Od feminističke teorije invalidnosti ka feminističkoj praksi: doprinos feminističke teorije položaju žena sa invaliditetom"

Lidija Vasiljević, "Feministički pristup u psihoterapiji – transgeneracijsko rodno mapiranje u terapijskom radu, edukaciji i supervizijji"

Lara Končar, "Studije turizma kao izazov za feministička istraživanja"

Ana Radojević, "Prostitucija kao rad i borba prostitutki za radna prava"

Feminističko istraživanje periodike

Jelena Lalatović, "Kontrakultura, kontrajavnost(i) i kontraistoriografija – uloga žanra ženskog portreta u zasnivanju ženske istorije"

Milena Dragićević Šešić, Rada Drezgić, "Sećanje i rod: naučne i kulturne prakse"

Žarka Svirčev, "Studije ženske/feminističke periodike i žensko autorstvo"

Zorana Simić, "Otpor zaveri nečitanja: ginokritičko proučavanje književnosti u kontekstu Srbije"

Savremeni problemi u feminističkoj teoriji 3

Adriana Zaharijević, "Da li je teorija teška? Misliti sa Džudit Batler"

Petra Mitić, "Jednaka i različita: feminizam kao radikalni humanizam"

Melanija Lojpur "Uloga emocija u politikama identiteta"

Jovana Timotijević, "Kvir (i) feministička čitanja Platonovog prostornog pojma chôra"

Feminizam vs. kapitalizam

Maja Solar, "Polna podela rada: borba za pojmove"

Alpar Lošonc, Vladimir Gvozden, "Feministička politička ekonomija i sinteza biopolitike i klasne perspektive u krizi"

Zorica Ivanović, "Postoji li "neoliberalni feminizam"? Nekoliko napomena o odnosu feminizma i neoliberalizma"

Tatjana Đurić Kuzmanović, "Feministička ekonomija u postsocijalističkoj Srbiji"

Okrugli sto: *Deset godina od objavljivanja knjige "Neko je rekao feminizam"*

Učesnice: Jana Baćević, Mirjana Mirosavljević Bobić, Hana Ćopić, Vera Kurtić, Milica Ležajić, Jelena Miletić, Iva Nenić, Ksenija Peršić, Sanja Petkovska, Paula Petričević, Marina Simić, Lidija Vasiljević, Ivana Velimirac, Jelena Višnjić

* * *

četvrtak 1. mart

Seminar o knjizi Bojana Kovačevića Europe's "Hidden Federalism: Federal Experiences of European Integration"

Učesnici: Boris Begović, Zoran Čupić, Radmila Nakarada Aleksandar Milošević, Milorad Stupar, Slobodan Samardžić, Boško Mijatović, Časlav Koprivica, Alpar Lošonc, Đorđe Pavićević, Slobodan Divjak, Tanasije Marinković, Marko Simendić i Bojana Kovačević.

* * *

petak 23. mart

Seminar o knjizi "Kritička teorija Aksela Honeta", Marjana Ivkovića

Učesnici: Predrag Krstić, Adriana Zaharijević, Igor Cvejić, Marjan Ivković

* * *

sreda 28. mart

Seminar o knjizi "Holocaust, War and Transnational Memory: Testimony from Yugoslav and Post–Yugoslav Literature" Stajna Verveta

Učesnici: Adrijana Marčetić, Milovan Pisarri, Predrag Krstić, Aleksandar Pavlović, Stijn Vervaet.

* * *

ponedeljak 16. april

Seminar o knjizi "Slobodan Jovanović – teorija" Boris Milosavljevića

Učesnici: Petar Bojanić, Vojislav Pavlović, Jovica Trkulja, Slobodan Marković, Mirjana Stefanovski, Miša Đurković, Zoran Mirković, Slobodan Samardžić, Vojislav Božičković, Slobodan Kanjevac, Ilija Vujačić, Miloš Ković, Aleksandar Fatić, Vladan Petrov, Irina Deretić, Mile Bjelajac, Bojan Jović i Boris Milosavljević

* * *

19–21. april

ENGAGEMENT FOR SOCIAL CHANGE: MOVING BEYOND RESISTANCE

sreda, 18. april

Panel discussion Kosovo: Moving Beyond Resistance to Where? (Media center Belgrade)

Moderation: Aleksandar Pavlović

Participants: Čedomir Antić, Đorđe Vukadinović, Sonja Biserko, Vesna Pešić

četvrtak 19. april

Stef Jansen, "Otherwise Engaged"

Hans–Jörg Trenz, "Collective Mobilization and New Forms of Citizens' Engagement Through Social Media"

Thinking of engagement

Sotiria Ismini Gounari, "Thinking Engagement for Social Change: Intentionality and Affect"

Olga Nikolić, "Organizing for Social Change: Pros and Cons of Prefigurative Politics"

Igor Cvejić, "Intersubjectivity, Emotions and Social Movements: 'Phenomenal Coupling' and Engagement"

Francesca Forle, "Rythmòs in Acting Together. A Tool to Improve Stability and Orient Power Hierarchies"

Constructing the engagement narrative

Lura Pollozhani, "A Tale of Two Cities: Mobilizing across Ethnic Lines in Macedonia"

Orli Fridman & Katarina Ristić, "Online Transnational Memory Activism and Commemorations: The Case of the White Armband Day"

Piotr Goldstein, "Activism without Resistance? View from the Margins of Social Engagement"

Ognjen Kojanić, "Flipping the Transition Script: How Various Actors Shaped Mediatized Narratives of Social Struggles in the Case of ITAS Prvomajska"

Striking back at neoliberalism

Deana Jovanović, "Social Justice and Public Utilities: Infrastructural Engagements across Post–Yugoslav Region"

Ana Vilenica, "Housing Struggles and the Role of Art: From Art–Activism to Art and Radical Organizing"

Maja Korolija, "Militant Movement from 'Below' as a Response to the Effects of Neoliberal Reforms in Transitional Eastern European Societies"

Balša Delibašić, "Against Modern Football: What Can We Learn from Fan Groups?"

The power of (re)naming: case studies

Igor Stipić, "Negotiating Identity: Micro Politics of Mixing Apples and Pears in High School of Jajce"

Jorge Ramos and Diego Checa, "BDS Movement: The Global Struggle from and for Palestinian People"

Michiel Piersma, "Sistem te laže!" The Revolutionary Rejection of Reified Ethnicity in Bosnian Education"

Sara Nikolić, "Fieldnotes. From Communis to Communication"

Panel discussion *Where Is Europe Heading to? Resistance to Change – Change of Resistance* (Cultural Centre Belgrade – Art)

Moderation: Vedran Džihić

Participants: Erhard Busek, Ursula Koch Laugwitz, Giuseppe Mastruzzo, Danijela Dolenec, Milan Zivkovik, Jelena Vasiljević

petak 20. april

Donatella della Porta, "Movements in Institutions: When Contentious Politics Meets Electoral Politics"

Activism and Academy: From Indifference to Engagement

Inga Hajdarowicz, "Solidarity with Refugees without Refugees? Initiative 'Welcome to Krakow' and Its Relation with Academia"

Sanja Petkovska, "The Revolutionary Potential of Nomadic Academic Proletariat/Precariat in the Context of Post–socialism"

Tamar Katriel, "Knowledge–Based Practices as Activist Engagement"

Caterina Bonora, "Professionalization of Activism: Is There a Way back? Examples from the Post–Yugoslav Space"

Public Sphere Revisited

Judith Vay, "Welcome Initiatives in Germany as New Actors in Civil Society"

Cisem Gunduz–Arabaci, "Deliberating in Difficult Times: Lessons from Public Forums in Turkey"

Jelisaveta Petrović, "Digitalizing Urban Movements – The Case of The "We won't let Belgrade D(r)own Initiative"

Waldemar Bulira, "A Possibility of Social Change and the Problem of Redefining of the Political by Media"

Yes, We Can('T): Women's Engagement

Mónica Cano Abadía, "Risking Vulnerability in Feminist Activism: The #metoo Case"

Anna Bednarczyk, "Safer Cites as Women's Movement Agenda. Case study of Córdoba, Argentina

Kathleen Zeidler, "But It Is up to Us now..." – Making War Time Rape a Crime Under International Criminal Law"

Polona Sitar, "Menstrual Movements and Feminist Spirituality: The Red Tent Case Study"

Workshop on the book *Where did revolution go? by/with Donatella della Porta*

Chair: Gazela Pudar Draško

Participiants: Danijela Dolenec, Barbara Turk Niskac, Tiziano Toracca, Filip Milačić, Jelena Vasiljević, Srđan Prodanović, Marjan Ivković, Irena Fiket

Workshop *Environmental movements: step by step towards sustainable societies*

Chair: Deana Jovanović

Participiants: Ratko Kadović, Darko Nadić, Marko Vujić, Vladimir Đurdjević, Jelisaveta Petrović, Iva Marković, Predrag Momčilović, Damjan Rehm Bogunović

Panel discussion *Where Did 1968 Go? Paradigm of (Un)successful Change in ex–Yugoslavia* (Cultural Centre Belgrade – Artget)

Moderation: Milivoj Bešlin and Predrag Krstić

Participants: Borka Pavićević, Trivo Inđić, Dragomir Olujić, Đorđije Uskoković, Latinka Perović, Tanja Petovar

subota 21. april

Ugo Mattei, "Social Movements as Legislators. The Making of Bottom up Institutions of the Commons"

Capturing resistance

Aleksandra Milovanović, "Documentary Films and Resistance: From Actual to Symbolic and Subversive"

Dragan Batančev, "The Birth of a People: A Ukrainian Documentary Film"

Sapir Huberman, "Choreography of the Unexpected Event"

Changing the changers: actors and impact

Nazli Konya, "Inappropriable People: Gezi Resistance, and Destituent Power"

Tamar Karaia, "From Mass Protest to the Activity of Social Groups – Transformation of Protest in Georgia"

Veselin Mitrović, "Inverse Nostalgia among Serbian Politicians: Risks and Paradox of Social Mobility"

Aleksandra Lazić, "New Avenues for Vaccine Advocacy: A Social Dilemma Perspective"

Film *Other Side of Everything* (Cultural Centre Belgrade – Cinema)

Discussion *(R)evolutions in Serbia: Moving beyond Resistance*

Moderation: Irena Fiket

Participants: Igor Štiks, Lilijana Čičkarić, Mila Turajlić, Author of the Film "Other Side of Everything", Robert Kozma

* * *

20–27. april

SVJEDOČANSTVO – ISTINA ILI POLITIKA. KONCEPT SVJEDOČANSTVA U KOMEMORACIJI JUGOSLOVENSKIH RATOVA

petak 20. april

(Filozofski Fakultet, Univerzitet u Sarajevu)

Pamćenje–sjećanje i zajednica

Ljupka Mandić Kelijašević, "Kulture i politike sećanja u Bosni i Hercegovini"

Tomislav Tadić, "Religija između subjektivnog pamćenja i "licencirano zapamćenog" u iskustvu etničkih zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine"

Dino Šakanović, "Nenacionalna kultura sjećanja na žrtve rata u Tuzli"

Salih Fočo, "Suočavanje žrtve sa izvršiocima zločina"

Svjedočanstvo i društvo

Jacqueline Nießer, "Alternativna istina – svjedočanstvo u „Komisiji za istinu",

Vedad Muharemović, "Internaliziranje svjedočenja i intersubjektivno djelovanje. Mogućnost korektivnog društvenog djelovanja i društvene činjenice?"

Marija Dimitrovska, "Kulturna trauma kao predmet društvene reprodukcije: slučaj Makedonije"

subota 21. april

Istorija i pamćenje–sjećanje

Edisa Gazetić, "Manipuliranje sjećanjem u/izvan književnog teksta"

Ana Dević, "Dajte šansu 'prekomernom' antifašizmu: Suprotstavljanje istorijskim revizionizmima u post– jugoslovenskom prostoru"

Smilja Janković aka Brawn "Poklapajući se sa sobom

Cornelia Gräbner, "Svjedočanstva o kontinuiranom nasilju u Evropi 21. stoljeća: kontraverzni govor Erri de Luca protiv TAV–a i njegovog pištoljdžisjkog socijalnog iscrpljivanja"

Duhovi i mašine kao svjedoci

Ramiz Huremagić, "Proganjanje duha: krvavi korijeni koncepta modernog blagostanja"

Zoran Vučkovac ''Da ponovo čujemo zvuk mašina'' – radnici DITA–e od samoupravljanja do okupacije fabrike"

Bogdan Golubović "Zbog čega svedočimo? Za šta svedočimo? O čemu svedočimo? – Uspostavljanje društvenog (odnosa) arhiva svjedočenja "

ponedeljak 23. april

Svedočenje i posredovanje

Iulian Alexandru Muraru, "Negiranje, mistifikacija i politička instrumentalizacija početkom devedesetih. Rumunski slučaj političke rehabilitacije maršala Iona Antoneskua i negiranje irazaranja mesta masovnih ubistava. Studija slučaja Pogroma u Jašiju"

Nevena Daković, "Posredovano sećanje novosadske racije: Holokaust ili ne?"

Senadin Musabegović "Upotreba simbola i mitova"

Sylvian Lazarus "Memorije i istorija, posvećeno Mosesu I. Finleyju",

Iskustvo kao književnost i performans

Đokica Jovanović, "Komemorativno kao ideologija"

Andrea Lešić–Thomas, "Od otvorenosti iskustva do čvrstog Gestalta: književnost, stereotip i traumatsko pamćenje"

Darija Davidović, "Reprezentacija rata u scenskim *umetnostima i različite forme svedočenja*"

utorak 24. april

Žaljenje prošlosti i otvaranje prema budućnosti

Andrew Redden, *"Muzika nade: Dokumentarna istorija nenasilne, muzičke kontrakulture u regionu Bajo Lempa, Salvador, 1970–2020*

Peyman Amiri, "Svjedočanstvo i "suočavanje sa prošlošću"

Mišo Kapetanović, "Postsocijalističke transformacije i aproprijacije spomenika Korčanica"

Michael Eskin, "Sjećajte se budućnosti: Nenasilna komemoracija kao predviđanje zajedničkog života"

Pedagogija i proizvodnja društva

Shkëlzen Gashi, "Kosovski rat tokom 1998–1999. u udžbenicima istorije na Kosovu i Srbiji"

Dragomir Olujić Oluja, "Svedočenje o nastanku kapitalizma u Jugoslaviji – Fenomenologija (pre)vladanja srednje klase ili malo/građanizacije Jugoslavije"

četvrtak 26. april
(Centar za kulturnu dekontaminaciju)

Svedočenje i blagostanje

Michael Eskin, "Sećajte se budućnosti: Nenasilna komemoracija kao predviđanje zajedničkog života"

Cornelia Gräbner, "Tuning In, Tuning Out and Tuning Past: Svedočenje i rezonancija na Tom Satu McCarthyju "Satin Island" i Erri De Luca "Zločin vojnika"

Iulian Alexandru Muraru, "Negiranje, mistifikacija i politička instrumentalizacija početkom devedesetih. Rumunski slučaj političke rehabilitacije maršala Iona Antoneskua i negiranje i razaranja mesta masovnih ubistava. Studija slučaja Pogroma u Jašiju"

Ramiz Huremagić, "Proganjanje duha: krvavi korijeni koncepta modernog blagostanja"

Komemoracija i proizvodnja društva

Jacqueline Nießer, "Alternativna istina: svedočanstvo u 'Komisiji za istinu'"

Zoran Vučkovac, "Da ponovo čujemo zvuk mašina'' – radnici DITA–e od samoupravljanja do okupacije fabrike"

Dragomir Olujić Oluja "Svedočenje o nastanku kapitalizma u Jugoslaviji – Fenomenologija (pre)vladanja srednje klase ili malo/građanizacije Jugoslavije"

Svedočenje, demokratija i budućnost humanističkih nauka

Sara Guyer

petak 27. april
(Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju)

Budućnost komemoracije

Andrew Redden "Muzika nade: dokumentarna istorija nenasilne, muzičke kontrakulture u regionu Bajo Lempa, Salvador, 1970–2020"

Edisa Gazetić "Manipuliranje sjećanjem u/izvan književnog teksta"

Peyman Amiri, "Svedočanstvo i "suočavanje sa prošlošću"

Senadin Musabegović, "Upotreba simbola i mitova"

Pedagogija i revizionizam

Marijana Kardum, "Svjedokinje Drugoga svjetskog rata: dnevnička svjedočanstva hrvatskih intelektualki"

Shkëlzen Gashi, "Kosovski rat tokom 1998–1999. u udžbenicima istorije na Kosovu i Srbiji"

Ana Dević, "Dajte šansu 'prekomernom' antifašizmu: Suprotstavljanje istorijskim revizionizmima u post–jugoslovenskom prostoru"

* * *

petak 11. maj

Seminar on Luigi Caranti's book "Kant's Political Legacy: Human Rights, Peace, Progress"

Participants: Bojan Kovačević, Miloš Marković, Olga Nikolić, Aleksandar Fatić, Igor Cvejić, Rastko Jovanov, Luigi Caranti.

* * *

utorak 22. maj

Seminar with Monika Betzler – Collegial Relationships

Participants: Marko Konjović, Petar Bojanić, Rastko Jovanov, Željko Radinković, Srđan Prodanović, Marjan Ivković, Aleksandar Fatić, Olga Nikolić, Mark Losoncz, Igor Cvejić, Monika Betzler

* * *

23–24. maj

ACTIVE CITIZENSHIP AND DEMOCRACY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

sreda 23. maj

Vedran Džihić. "Western Balkans as (Non) periphery of Europe"

Democracy with(in) Institutions

Participiants: Nenad Markovikj, Klodiana Beshku, Biljana Đorđević, Lutjona Lula

Glance to/from the Past

Participiants: Dejan Jović, Adnan Prekić, Srđan Milošević, Jelena Vasiljević

četvrtak 24. maj

Identity Cleavages and Struggle for Democracy

Participiants: Valida Repovac Nikšić, Filip Milačić, Sead Turčalo

Technology and Politics Behind the Curtain

Participiants: Emir Vajzović, Sanja Bojanić, Jelisaveta Petrović

Active or Activist Citizenship in WB

Participiants: Jovana Mihajlović Trbovc, Irena Fiket, Ivan Cerovac, Đorđe Pavićević, Aleksandar Pavlović

* * *

petak 8. jun

Seminar o knjizi Časlova Koprivice "Homo maximus. Elementi filosofije sporta"

Učesnici: Lev Kreft, Milan Brdar, Višnja Knežević, Milosav Gudović, Igor Cvejić, Mark Lošonc, Miloš Ćipranić, Predrag Krstić, Balša Delibašić i Časlav Koprivica

* * *

16–19. jun

Closed workshop "*The Critique of Violence Now"*

* * *

18–22. jun

CRITIQUE OF VIOLENCE NOW: FROM THINKING TO ACTING AGAINST VIOLENCE

Guest Lectures: Judith Butler, Herve Le Brass, Peter Fenves, Alexis Nuselovici–Nouss, Astrid Deuber–Mankowsky, Marc Crépon

(Sveučilište u Rijeci)

* * *

četvrtak 27. septembar

Seminar *The Socratic Adventure of Plurality: Hannah Arendt and the Challenge of the Philosophical Dialogue* with *Matthias Bormuth*

Participants: Monica Cano Abadia, Petar Bojanić, Sanja Milutinović Bojanić, Igor Cvejić, Olga Nikolić, Srđan Prodanović, Željko Radinković, Đurđa Trajković, Adriana Zaharijević.

* * *

27–9. septembar

SHARED COMMITMENT IN CRISIS. SOCIAL ONTOLOGY, ENGAGEMENT, AND POLITICS

četvrtak 27. septembar

Raimo Toumela, "Social Corporations as Social Institutions"

Katja Crone, "What We-Perspectives Are Grounded in"

Magali Bessone, "The Social Ontology of Racialized Groups: Political, not Metaphysicial"

Niels de Haan, "A Taxonomy of Prospective and Retrospective Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts"

Francesko Guala, "Rescuing Ontological Individualism"

Mark Losoncz, "Being Connected – Being Engaged?"

Akos Sivadó, "Fictional Communities? Social Ontology and the Mental

petak 28. septembar

Hans Berhard Schmid, "Aristotle on Collective Well–Being"

Rastko Jovanov, "*Espirit de Corps* and Collective Engagement"

David Schweikard, "The Reach of Commitment: The Normative Structure of International Cooperation"

Petar Bojanić, "What is an Act of Engagement?"

Maj Toumela, "Rational Social Trust"

Igor Cvejić, "Engaged Acts and Plural Agency: An Example of Compassion"

Chaslav Koprivitsa, "How to Think the Identity of Sports Teams"

Sophie Loidolt, "Hannah Arendt on Plurality, Action and Forms of the 'We'"

Marjan Ivković/Srđan Prodanović, "Commitment and Complex Domination: The Emancipatory Potential of Contigency"

* * *

četvrtak 18. oktobar

Seminar with *Mark Devenney Rethinking Democratic Politics*

Participants: Igor Cvejić, Biljana Đorđević, Irena Fiket, Marjan Ivković, Mark Lošonc, Olga Nikolić, Aleksandar Pavlović, Srđan Prodanović, Željko Radinković, Đurđa Trajković and Adriana Zaharijević.

* * *

petak 26. oktobar

Seminar with *Michael Zürn* – The Struggle over Borders*: A Political Sociology of Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism*

Partcipants: Adriana Zaharijević, Irena Fiket, Michal Sladeček, Marta Stojić Mitrović, Biljana Đorđević, Jovica Pavlović.

* * *

5–6. novembar

STUDIJE ANGAŽOVANOSTI U KONTEKSTU POSTJUGOSLOVENSKOG PROSTORA

Filozofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Banjoj Luci

ponedeljak 5. novembar

Igor Cvejić, "Angažman i zajednička perspektiva: primjeri neuspješnih i pseudo angažovanih akata"

Petar Bojanić, "Šta je angažovani akt"

Hajrudin Hromadžić, "Izgledi za angažiranost s početka 21. stoljeća: primjer postjugoslovense regije"

Ana Miškovska Kajevska, "Premošćavanje jaza između aktivizma i akademije: izazovna neophodnost"

utorak 6. novembar

Željko Radinković, "Projekat kao konstitutivni element zajedničkog djelovanja"

Ivan Cerovac, "Mračna strana civilnog društva u Hrvatskoj"

Roswitha Kersten-Pejanić, "Nedostatak građanske volje svladavanja konflikta u jezičnim krajobrazu postkonfliktnog prostora Hrvatske"

Jelena Ćeriman, "Savremene demokratske prakse na evropskoj poluperiferiji: dometi građanske neposlušnosti"

Gorana Mlinarević, "Da li nam borba za javna dobra može biti mobilizirajući faktor u borbi protiv neoliberalizma ili smo već zakasnili_e"

Aleksandra Lazić, "Politička društvena angažovanost kao funkcija brojnosti: motivacija i manipulacija"

Olga Nikolić, "Izazovi prefigurativne politike"

Željko Šarić, "Angažman kao transgeneracijski primjer – slučaj Grlić"

Miloš Ćipranić, "O (dez)angažovanom aktu u vizuelnim umetnostima"

* * *

sreda 14. novembar

Seminar *Emocije i društvena teorija*

Učesnici: Igor Cvejić, Jelena Ćeriman, Aleksandar Fatić, Nebojša Grubor, Amra Latifić, Una Popović, Jelena Vasiljević i Olga Nikolić

* * *

sreda 5. decembar

Dekonstrukcija na delu: Filozofsko nasleđe Milorada Belančića

Učesnici: Petar Bojanić, Jovan Čekić, Novica Milić, Latinka Perović, Branko Romčević, Obrad Savić, Adriana Zaharijević, Aleksandar Zistakis, Ivan Milenković i Predrag Krstić.

* * *

subota 8. decembar

ISTORIJA IDEJA I POLITIČKA ISTORIJA VOJVOĐANSKIH MAĐARA (1945–1989)
(Dom omladine, Temerin)

Učesnici: Katinka Beretka, Márk Losoncz, Krisztina Rácz, Viktória Toma Zakinszky, Szilárd János Tóth, Árpád Kocsis, György Szerbhorváth, Oszkár Roginer, Melinda Szarvas, Péter Vukman, Erik Palusek, Klaudió Német.

* * *

ČITALAČKE RADIONICE:

Martin Hajdeger – Biće i vreme, Željko Radinković, petak 19. oktobar

Artur Šopenhauer o predstavi: izabrani pojmovi kao seme kasnije filozofske prakse i psihoterapije, Aleksandar Fatić, utorak 4. decembar

SUBMISSION INSTRUCTIONS

All submissions to Filozofija i društvo must conform to the following rules, mostly regarding citations. The Referencing Guide is the modified Harvard in-text referencing style. In this system within the text, the author's name is given first followed by the publication date and the page number/s for the source. The list of references or bibliography at the end of the document contains the full details listed in alphabetical order for all the in-text citations.

1. LENGTH OF TEXT

Up to two double sheets (60.000 characters including spaces), abstracts, key words, without comments.

2. ABSTRACT

Between 100 and 250 words.

3. KEY WORDS

Up to 10.

4. AFFILIATION

Full affiliation of the author, department, faculty, university, institute, etc.

5. BOOKS

In the bibliography: last name, first name, year of publication in parentheses, book title, place of publication, publisher. In the text: last name in parentheses, year of publication, colon, page number. In a comment: last name, year of publication, colon, page number. Books are cited in a shortened form only in comments.

Example:

In the bibliography: Moriarty, Michael (2003), Early Modern French Thought. The Age of Suspicion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

In the text: (Moriarty 2003: 33).

In a comment: Moriarty 2003: 33.

6. ARTICLES

In the bibliography: last name, first name, year of publication, title in quotation marks, name of publication in italic, year of issue, in parentheses the volume number within year if the pagination is not uniform, colon and page number. In the text: last name in parentheses, year of publication, colon, page number. In acomment: last name, year of publication, colon, page number. Do not put abbreviations such as 'p.', 'vol.', 'tome', 'no.' etc. Articles are cited in shortened form only in comments.

Example:

In the bibliography: Miller, Johns Roger (1926), „The Ideas as Thoughts of God", Classical Philology 21: 317–326.

In the text: (Miller 1926: 320).

In a comment: Miller 1926: 320.

7. EDITED BOOKS

In the bibliography: last and first name of editor, abbreviation 'ed.' in parentheses, year of publication in parentheses, title of collection in italic, place of publication, publisher and page number if needed. In the text: last name in parentheses, year of publication, colon, page number. In a comment: last name, year of publication, colon, page number. Collectionsare cited in shortened form only in comments.

Example:

In the bibliography: Harris, John (ed.) (2001), Bioethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press

In the text: (Harris 2001).

In a comment: Harris 2001.

8. ARTICLES/CHAPTERS IN BOOK

In the bibliography: last name, first name, year of publication in parentheses, text title in quotation marks, the word 'in' (in collection), first and last name of editor, the abbreviation 'ed.' in parentheses, title of collection in italic, place of publication, publisher, colon, page number (if needed). In the text: Last name of author in parentheses, year of publication, colon, page number. In a comment: last name of author, year of publication, colon, page number. The abbreviation 'p.' is allowed only in the bibliography.

Example:

In the bibliography: Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret (1981), „You can have Sex without Children: Christianity and the New Offer", in The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, Ethics, Religion and Politics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 82–96.

In the text: (Anscombe 1981: 82)

In a comment: Anscombe 1981: 82.

9. NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINES ARTICLE

In the bibliography: last name, first name, year in parentheses, title of article in quotation marks, name of newspaper in italic, date, page.

Example:

In the bibliography: Logar, Gordana (2009), „Zemlja bez fajronta", Danas, 2 August, p. 12.

In the text: (Logar 2009: 12).

In a comment: Logar 2009: 12

10. WEB DOCUMENTS

When quoting an online text, apart from the web address of the site with the text and the text's title, cite the date of viewing the page, as well as further markings if available (year, chapter, etc.).

Example:

In the bibliography: Ross, Kelley R., „Ontological Undecidability", (internet) available at: http://www.friesian.com/undecd-1.htm (viewed 2 April, 2009).

In the text: (Ross, internet).

In a comment: Ross, internet.

UPUTSTVO ZA AUTORE

Pri pisanju tekstova za *Filozofiju i društvo* autori su u obavezi da se drže sledećih pravila, uglavnom vezanih za citiranje. Standardizacija je propisana *Aktom o uređivanju naučnih časopisa* Ministarstva za prosvetu i nauku Republike Srbije iz 2009. U *Filozofiji i društvu* bibliografske jedinice citiraju se u skladu s uputstvom *Harvard Style Manual*. U ovom uputstvu naveden je način citiranja najčešćih bibliografskih jedinica; informacije o načinu citiranja ređih mogu se naći na internetu.

1. VELIČINA TEKSTA

Do dva autorska tabaka (60.000 karaktera) s apstraktom, ključnim rečima i literaturom; napomene se ne računaju.

2. APSTRAKT

Na srpskom (hrvatskom, bosanskom, crnogorskom...) i jednom stranom jeziku, između 100 i 250 reči.

3. KLJUČNE REČI

Do deset.

4. PODACI O TEKSTU

Relevantni podaci o tekstu, broj projekta na kojem je rađen i slično, navode se u fusnoti broj 1 koja se stavlja na kraju prve rečenice teksta.

5. AFILIJACIJA

Puna afilijacija autora, odeljenje i fakultet, institut i slično.

6. INOSTRANA IMENA

Sva inostrana imena (osim u bibliografskim jedinicama) fonetski se transkribuju u skladu s pravilima pravopisa, a prilikom prvog javljanja u zagradi se navodi njihov izvorni oblik. Imena geografskih i sličnih odrednica takođe se fonetski transkribuju bez posebnog navođenja originala u zagradama, osim ukoliko autor smatra da je neophodno.

7. CRTA I CRTICA

Kada se navode stranice, od jedne do neke druge, ili kada se to čini za godine, između brojeva stoji crta, *ne crtica*.

Primer:
33–44, 1978–1988; ne: 33-44, 1978-1988.

8. KNJIGE

U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov knjige, mesto izdanja, izdavač. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomenama, knjiga se citira isključivo na skraćeni način.

Primer:
U literaturi: Haug, Volfgang Fric (1981), *Kritika robne estetike*, Beograd: IIC SSO Srbije.

U tekstu: (Haug 1981: 33).

U napomeni: Haug 1981: 33.

9. ČLANCI

U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov teksta pod navodnicima, naslov časopisa u italiku, godište časopisa, u zagradi broj sveske u godištu ukoliko paginacija nije jedinstvena za ceo tom, dvotačka i broj stranice. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. Ne stavljaju se skraćenice „str.“, „vol.“, „tom“, „br.“ i slične. U napomenama, članci se citiraju isključivo na skraćeni način.

Primeri:
U literaturi: Miller, Johns Roger (1926), „The Ideas as Thoughts of God“, *Classical Philology* 21: 317–326.

Hartman, Nikolaj (1980) „O metodi istorije filozofije“, *Gledišta* 21 (6): 101–120.

U tekstu: (Hartman 1980: 108).

U napomeni: Hartman 1980: 108

10. ZBORNICI

U spisku literature: prezime i ime priređivača, u zagradi skraćenica „prir.“, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov zbornika u italiku, mesto izdanja, izdavač i strana po potrebi. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomenama, zbornici se citiraju isključivo na skraćeni način.

Primer:
U literaturi: Espozito, Džon (prir.) (2002), *Oksfordska istorija islama*, Beograd: Clio.

U tekstu: (Espozito 2002).

U napomeni: Espozito 2002.

11. TEKSTOVI IZ ZBORNIKA

U spisku literature: prezime, ime autora, u zagradi godina, naslov teksta pod navodnicima, slovo „u“ (u zborniku), ime i prezime priređivača zbornika, u zagradi „prir.“, naslov zbornika u italiku, mesto izdanja, izdavač, dvotačka i broj stranice (ako je potrebno). U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. Skraćenica „str.“ dopuštena je samo u spisku literature.

Primer:
U literaturi: Nizbet, Robert (1999), „Jedinične ideje sociologije“, u A. Mimica (prir.), *Tekst i kontekst*, Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, str. 31–48.

U tekstu: (Nizbet 1999: 33).

U napomeni: Nizbet 1999: 33.

12. ČLANAK IZ NOVINA

U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina, naslov članka pod navodnicima, naslov novina u italiku, datum, stranica.

Primer:
U literaturi: Logar, Gordana (2009), „Zemlja bez fajronta“, *Danas*, 2. avgust, str. 12.

U tekstu: (Logar 2009: 12).

U napomeni: Logar 2009: 12.

13. INTERNET

Prilikom citiranja tekstova s interneta, osim internet-adrese sajta na kojem se tekst nalazi i naslova samog teksta, navesti i datum posete toj stranici, kao i dodatna određenja ukoliko su dostupna (godina, poglavlje i sl.).

Primer:
U literaturi: Ross, Kelley R., „Ontological Undecidability“, (internet) dostupno na: http://www.friesian.com/undecd-1.htm (pristupljeno 2. aprila 2009).

U tekstu: (Ross, internet).

U napomeni: Ross, internet.

CIP – Каталогизација у публикацији
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд

1+316+32

FILOZOFIJA i društvo = Philosophy and society / glavni i odgovorni urednik Rastko Jovanov. – Knj. 1 (1987)– . – Beograd : Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 1987– (Beograd : Donat Graf). – 24 cm

Tromesečno. – Drugo izdanje na drugom medijumu: Filozofija i društvo (Online) = ISSN 2334-8577
ISSN 0353-5738 = Filozofija i društvo
COBISS.SR-ID 11442434