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SADRŽAJ
CONTENTS

REVIEWS

COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND PRE-REFLECTIVE SELF-AWARENESS

KOLEKTIVNA ODGOVORNOST I PREREFLEKSIVNA SAMOSVEST

Edited by Olga Nikolić, Rastko Jovanov

I

Collective Responsibilities of Random Collections
Seminar with Hans Bernhard Schmid

Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade, October 2017

Hans Bernhard Schmid

Holding Random Collections Collectively Responsible – an Introduction[1]

Let me start by stating the main claim I would like to discuss today. There are circumstances under which we are *collectively* responsible even if we are not an organized group. The responsibility in question is for failing to act *jointly.* Sometimes it is true of *us, collectively rather than distributively,* that we are responsible for failing to act jointly, even if we are just a random collection, so that there is no sense in which we already are a proper team. This responsibility is collective rather than distributive because the responsibility is *ours* in a way that cannot be reduced to some structure of responsibility that *each of us* has. If we are collectively responsible for failing to act, some or perhaps even all of us will also be personally responsible for not doing what they, individually, should have done. But it is not the case that our responsibility is "nothing but" this distribution of personal responsibility, and it is possible that *we* are collectively responsible even though *you* (one of us) – are not personally blameworthy in any sense.

So far, my claim – controversial as it is – may not seem entirely original to those of you who are familiar with the current literature on the topic – it has been made by others. My distinctive contribution is, first, in the way I specify the *conditions* of collective responsibilities of random collections, and,

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second, in the way I relate it to collective agency. To put the first point very briefly (and for the special case of retrospective responsibility for failures to act), I argue that random collections are collectively responsible if at the time, they should have *known* what they should be doing. The knowledge in question includes *plural pre-reflective self-awareness.* Only random collections that should know *of themselves, in the right way,* that they should act, can be collectively blamed for failing to act if they fail to act (I am heavily relying on my previous work on plural self-awareness and groundless group self-knowledge here). Secondly, I differ from similar views in the current literature in that I argue that under these conditions, the random collections in question are in fact (non-organized) group agents.

Before presenting the barebones of some of my arguments for this view (for a fuller account, see my "Collective Responsibilities of Random Collections – Plural Pre-Reflective Self-Knowledge among Strangers", forthcoming in the *Journal of Social Philosophy),* let me say a word on the relevance of the topic. Why should you care about this issue at all? Perhaps the idea of collective responsibility does not seem appealing to you – why not say that all responsibility is individual, rather than invoking some mysterious "collective" for the role of the blameworthy agent? If this is your worry, my punchline to defend the basic idea of collective responsibility would be something like this: in order to determine the personal responsibility of individuals, it is often important to understand the responsibility of the organizations within which they act. Blaming, in the right way, the officials of the fire department for their individual failures does not contradict but indeed *presupposes* an understanding of how the fire department, as a collective, failed to act. Looked at in this way, the idea of collective responsibility does not look threatening to, but appears as rather supportive of the aim of determining individual responsibility. But now you might ask: Why isn't it enough to discuss the collective responsibility of organized group agents or corporate agents such as the fire department? Why should we take it to random collections of individuals, too?

Most everybody in the current debate seems to agree that there is such a thing as the responsibility of proper, organized group agents, and that it is an important topic. There is a rapidly growing literature on how exactly group agents need to be organized, how exactly they are, or can be, responsible, and how this entails or constitutes individual responsibility. The responsibility of random collections is less discussed in the current literature, but here are two claims which, if they are true, suggest that it is more important. The first claim: We can understand the kind of responsibility that organized group agents or corporate agents have only once we have understood what it means to *share* responsibility, even in such cases in which we are randomly collected (for those among you who know Christian List's and

Philip Pettit's seminal book on Group Agency, I suggest to read the concluding chapter 9 as showing that for group agents to exist as organized units, the members need to be plurally pre-reflectively self-aware of what they are doing together in exactly the sense that makes them, collectively, a suitable target for blame if they fail to organize themselves in a consistent way; it is thus in virtue of the collective responsibility of the collection of members rather than in virtue of their organizational structure that group agents can be collectively responsible). A second argument for the relevance of the topic goes far beyond the current debate on group agency and collective responsibility. I'm not sure I mention this in the paper, but there is a way of putting the relevance of the topic which is nothing other than the state of nature in classical political philosophy: there are several individuals, there is something they should be doing which they know they can only do together, and the individuals are not an organized team. The assumption is there's a bunch of individuals, and there's something they ought to do, they ought to be doing together. The bunch of individuals is not yet the society, is not yet the social integrate, it's just a bunch of people, a random collection, and yet there's something they ought to be doing together. If this is correct, if this is indeed a scenario in which the random collection is collectively responsible, I would say that, in a sense, what we are talking about here is the most basic issue in political philosophy: Understanding the responsibility of this random collection is understanding a sort of responsibility that is not just individuals' responsibility, and not just some corporation's either, but rather a kind of responsibility that is somehow shared among many: many people, *one* responsibility.

The paradigm case – literally the paradigm in recent research on the responsibility of random collections – is from a 1970 paper by Virginia Held: there is a bully abusing a victim in a subway car. There are passengers A, B, and C with the bully and his victim in the car. No fellow passenger could stop the abuse alone, and would put his or her own health in danger if he or she tried. But they could stop it by acting together. No joint action ensues. Whom should we hold responsible here?

The basic question in the literature is this: shall we go distributive, or shall we hold the random collection responsible collectively? There seems to be a dilemma because both routes seem to be mutually exclusive (the collective reading will entail some distribution of individual responsibility, but is not reducible to it, so either there *is* collective responsibility involved, or there is not), and there is something to say in favor of – as well as apparently strong argument against – each of the two ways.

The individualist view is that when a random collection is responsible, the responsibility is really had by most or each of the relevant individuals,

distributively. This is nice because in this situation, there is no group to blame, but just individuals. The problem is: no individual is to be blamed for not intervening, because *ex hypothesi*, no individual is morally obliged to intervene. If no one is to be blamed, it does not seem to make much sense to say that all or most of them are to be blamed. The obvious individualist move (suggested by Held in her paper) is to move to what has come to be called *collectivization duty* in the recent debate. The view is that while the blame for failing to intervene cannot be distributed, the failure for mobilizing each other, and making it the case that they, together, act, can. To hold Held's random collection of A, B, and C responsible is not to blame A, B, and C, severally, for not intervening, but rather, to blame each of them (perhaps to different degrees) for not making it the case that they, together, intervene.

There are several problems with this view – one which I mention in the text is with Held's aim of reading this as an account of the responsibility *of the random collection,* which raises interesting issues concerning the hypothetical case of A, who does her best to mobilize the others. But the most obvious issue of this account is a different one, and it is that it leaves a *responsibility gap:* it assigns responsibility to people for not making it the case that they, together, act, but it simply cannot account for the real moral issue: it cannot assign responsibility for *their failure to act* (my paper explores the difference between responsibility to make it the case that somebody [perhaps oneself] acts and responsibility for not acting a bit deeper).

This is perhaps the strongest argument for choosing the collectivist view: In order to close the responsibility gap, we need to see the responsibility involved in this case as involving a strong *collective* element. While it remains true that the case involves some distribution of individual responsibility for not making it the case that they act, it is important to see that the responsibility for *not acting* is theirs, collectively. In order to see how exactly they failed, we cannot focus on what each of them did, severally, alone; we have to see them, together, as failing to do what they, together, should have done, and that is how we should blame them: not just distributively, but collectively, too.

 And yet, the problem with this account seems obvious. *Who* are we blaming in addressing a random collection collectively? It seems that there is simply *nobody there.* A random collection cannot, it seems, be responsible, because it doesn't even exist as an agent. How can something that's not even an agent be responsible? My understanding of responsibility is that responsibility is conceptually tied to blame (in the core sense of the term). Wherever there is backwards-looking responsibility for failing to act, there's got to be somebody who can be blamed for not having lived up to his or her responsibility. I don't think it makes sense to speak of this sort of responsibility where there is no blame. Blame is of people for their actions or inaction, blame is

an activity and a reactive attitude, and it targets agents with a focus on what they do or fail to do. However, a random collection is not, it seems, an agent. The practice of blaming may make perfect sense concerning a proper group agent: You call up an office and let them know what you think about what they do or fail to do, but a random collection doesn't have a phone number, doesn't have a representative, there's simply nobody there you can blame, or so it seems.

That's the problem with the collective reading, and it seems to leave us with a dilemma: there are two mutually exclusive views, neither of which seems satisfying or even acceptable.

As announced, I will be defending the collective reading, or, more precisely, a sort of collective reading. My account differs from Sara Chant's solution. Chant basically says that in some cases, the reasons for a collective reading are overwhelming, and that we have got to bite the bullet in those cases and simply accept that there are random collections that are collectively responsible and yet not an agent. This leaves us with the problem of conceiving of a sort of responsibility that is not tied to the practice of blame in a meaningful way. I think we need not go down this route, and that the feeling that there is nobody there on whom we could blame collective guilt is simply due to a misconception of plural agency. If we recognize what it really means for a plurality of people to be jointly active, we will see that it is already there in some random collections, even if it has not resulted yet in a suitable organizational structure. What we need to do is understand joint agency more deeply. It will solve the dilemma. That's why I introduce the idea which has been closest to my heart in my thinking on collective intentionality and joint action for a long time, and that I have been defending for more than a decade now to this particular debate: The idea is that in order to understand how people can share intentional attitudes, we have to account for the participants as a plural subject, and the way in which people are plural subjects is in terms of their being plurally pre-reflectively self-aware of themselves as a plural subject. This is the the account that I'm looking forward to presenting to you in more detail tomorrow.[2]

For now, let me just give a brief account on how I introduce the idea to the context of the debate on responsibility. My point of departure are Virginia Held's remarks on the epistemic conditions of responsibility. Clearly, in order to blame somebody for an omission of his or hers in the responsibility-targeting way at stake here, it has to be the case that we assume that the agent *should have known* what he or she should have done. It is not enough

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2   "The Subject of 'We Intend'"; talk given on Oct. 3, 2017; published version: Schmid, H.B. Phenom Cogn Sci (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-017-9501-7.

that he or she *did not know,* because ignorance can itself be of the culpable kind. But where we blame an agent for an omission not because he or she knew what he or she failed to do, but rather because he or she *should* have known, we do so in virtue of something he or she *did* know, and from which he or she culpably failed to *infer* that he or she should do what he or she ended up not doing. Wherever we blame agents for culpable ignorance, we do so in virtue of knowledge of his or her. Now the crucial point in my argument is that this knowledge needs to be of a special kind. It is not enough for an agent to be blameworthy that he or she knows that he or she should be doing what he or she fails to do. He or she needs to know that *of herself, in the right way: he or she needs to self-know it, pre-reflectively.* One way in which I illustrate this is by means of a morally laden transformation of one of the classic scenarios of lack of self-recognition from the literature on self-knowledge. The original case is Ernst Mach entering a bus and observing a shabby schoolmaster entering the bus from the other side. As Mach fails to realize that he is looking at his own mirror image, there is a sense in which Ernst Mach knows that he is shabbily clothed, but fails to know it in the right way; he knows it third-personally and fails to know it first-personally (similar famous vignettes from the literature are John Perry's sugar trail and David Kaplan's pants on fire). Here is how this difference between kinds of knowledge matters for the question of responsibility. Assume that Mach, while entering the bus, observes how the shabby schoolmaster blocks a struggling elderly person's way, and how he is just standing there instead of moving on. In this case, Mach knows that what he is doing is wrong, but this knowledge is not suitably tied to action because it is of the wrong kind; he fails to know that it is *he* who is blocking the elderly person's way. We might think that Mach is still blameworthy because he *should* have realized that he is looking into a mirror and that it is *him,* but as is well known from the literature, there is no amount of third-personal knowledge that constitutes first-personal self-knowledge, and if we require of agents to know *in the right way* what they are and are not doing, it is in virtue of their knowing themselves first-personally that we do so.

The decisive step in my argument is that the same holds true in the plural. For people to be collectively responsible, they need not be organized in any significant way; it suffices that they have, or should have, the right kind of knowledge of what it is they are or are not doing. This is plural pre-reflective self-awareness, and to illustrate how it works, I construe a hybrid vignette, a mix between the modified Mach case and Held's subway scenario. Here it is:

We are a group of passengers in the subway car, and we're looking out of the window. There is another subway train running at the same speed on the neighboring track. The other subway train is unlit, but as the lights of our

own train are mirrored in the other train's windows, we're seeing what's going on in our own train, thinking it's happening in the other train. Assume that what we're seeing is the bully abusing his victim – and we are outraged at the fellow passengers whom we see looking attentively out of the window instead of coming to the victim's aid. In this case, we are fully "aware of the moral nature of the action", and we strongly condemn what we are doing; but we fail to be aware of the action – or rather, omission – *as ours:* the knowledge, or awareness in question is not of the first-personal kind.

What is missing here is plural self-knowledge: our awareness that *it is us.* I bring this idea in here to account for the way in which a random collection, under some conditions, can be collectively responsible. And the condition is settled by the question of whether or not they were, or should have been, plurally pre-reflectively self-aware of their responsibility as theirs, plurally. So whenever this is the case, it is the collection that is responsible. The collection, I mean the participating individuals together, as a plural subject of their collective obligation to do what they know, in the right way, what they should be doing, it's not an emerging extra agent that's the target of blame here. But it's not a distribution of individuals either, rather, it's the individuals *as one*.

1003

Seminar

Miljana Milojević

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I'm an assistant professor at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, and my background is quite different from yours. I'm mainly interested in the philosophy of mind and cognition, so I do deal with collective subjectivity but from a different perspective, from the perspective of cognitive science and distributed cognition, and so on. I do have some knowledge about the philosophy of law, thanks to Petar Bojanić actually, because I was his assistant when he was teaching philosophy of law at the University. So I have some background on responsibility and on subjectivity, but not together, and in the context of morality. This should be enough for an introduction. Given my different backgrounds, I'm not sure if I'm going to pose a valuable question, but I was just trying to understand what is at issue here.

As I understand, in this case where there is no group beforehand—there is just a random bunch of people—and there is some kind of incentive to act— to help someone, or something like that—I would say that in this case, first we can identify two kinds of responsibility. One is to constitute a group, so first we should constitute an agent who can then act, and then this agent has a responsibility to act in an appropriate manner. And these two kinds of responsibilities are different. The first one would be a kind of distributive, individual kind of responsibility, and the second one is collective. And they are in a special kind of relation, different than simply being individual and simply collective responsibility, right? It's a two-part responsibility, but I think the main question is the relation between these two kinds of responsibility. It reminds me of a case when something bad happens at your home to your spouse or parent, so you cannot help them by yourself, but you have to call a doctor. But do you have a responsibility to call a doctor, because there is a doctor who has the responsibility to help your spouse or parent? So my responsibility is partly also constituted by the doctor's responsibility—my responsibility is rooted in the other's responsibility to help someone. I cannot be attributed this kind of responsibility because I'm not a doctor. There is something similar in these two cases. There is the means-end kind of relation, my calling a doctor or our constituting a group is means to an end of forming an agent or calling an agent who can act. It's producing or inviting an agent who can act. So this is the first part, which I think I get. The connection is very tricky, I think. First of all, we have to have knowledge about the means and ends, and so on. And then it seems like a case of downward causation, there

is something distant which is not happening which is influencing something beforehand. I'm going to explain a bit more and then my question comes.

When everything goes right, it seems ok, we constituted a group, we acted and we could be praised that we did a good thing and we were responsible for saving a person's life. But, when the first thing fails, it seems that everything fails somehow. We fail to constitute a group, so this is the scenario that you are actually describing. So, the first part failed, and what happened is that an agent was not formed. So this responsibility that partly constituted the first responsibility cannot exist now, because there is no agent, and if there is no agent, there is no responsibility to be added. So, it seems that our responsibility rests on a responsibility of a fictitious or hypothetical entity which doesn't exist now. And it seems that we are now absolved, which doesn't seem right. But this means that we were not to be attributed with responsibility in the first scenario either, where everything was going ok, so I think this might help us see that there is something wrong about this kind of connected responsibilities or dependent responsibilities where one responsibility can actually create a different one which should then... So there is a kind of a loop, they are interdependent, and the loop cannot start in the first place because first we have to have an agent... So this is my question: because we are dealing with a hypothetical agent and hypothetical responsibility which should make us act in the first place, to form a group, it seems that in all these cases—in calling a doctor or actually helping a person—there is no additional responsibility of the individual who called the doctor, the responsibility for saving a life which can be afterwards attributed. So the only responsibility of this person was to call the doctor, or the only responsibility of an agent in this situation is just to form a group and nothing else. And if a group is formed, we can talk about this additional responsibility? But how can we have a responsibility of a group to help, since it is dependent on the future responsibility of an agent which doesn't yet exist? My question then is what is the connection of these different responsibilities, are they dependent, is the second one constitutive of the first one or not, and how are they constituted in the first place?

Hans Bernhard Schmid

Many thanks indeed for these remarks! My primary focus is on the distinction between the levels you mention. If we have the distinction right, we can then ask the question of their relation, just as you suggest. Let me try to restate the distinction – I'm not entirely sure that it is of "levels" or "layers". The responsibility of the individuals to alert each other to the situation and to see to it that they form a group is one thing, but the responsibility of the group to act is another. I would like to say that, actually, under normal

circumstances and assuming a sufficient degree of joint attention, the individuals in Held's subway train are a plural subject, so they already have joint agency. This depends a bit on the subway car's design; if it has separate compartments, joint attention might not be achieved. Even if there is joint attention, and thus a plural subject, that agent is still a random collection; it isn't an agent that is organized or has a decision structure, or is anything even close to a group agent in Pettit's and List's sense. Still, these people, in virtue of being plurally pre-reflectively aware of the situation, they share responsibility as a plural subject. If you want to argue for that model, your whole question seems to rest on the assumption that in the first instance, there is the underlying, or somehow metaphysically primary distributive responsibility of the individuals to get their act together, to form a group. And then, only on a second level, there is something like collective responsibility because it presupposes a group, and there was no group. Ultimately, I want to deny that, I want to say, even in this situation they are already in this together as a plural subject of responsibility. Because agents are basically the ability to know what it is you are doing, and that's a special sort of knowledge, that's pre-reflective, groundless belief, has been analyzed in literature, and this also holds in the plural case.

If you distribute the responsibility of a random collection's failure to act, all you can do is blaming individual people (perhaps all of them) for not having formed a group, but you don't blame the group for failing to act. But the primary moral issue is the group's failure to act, not the individual's failure to take individual measures to make it the case that the group acts. There is a difference between the two that needs to be accounted for. I try to elucidate a little bit the difference even in the individual case, it makes a difference whether you blame somebody for not making it the case that he or she acts, or whether you blame somebody for not acting. For a straightforward account of collective responsibility that does not distract from the primary moral issue, you have to account for the feature in virtue of which a random collection can be blameworthy, and I want to argue that it is plural pre-reflective self-awareness.

Aleksandar Fatić

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My query is really about your thoughts about the exact relationship between responsibility and blame. You mention that you think it makes no sense to talk about collective responsibility for a particular action without being able to assign blame for failing to act. As in Virginia Held's case. I'm not so sure about the exact proximity of responsibility and blame. Just to tease you

a little bit on that: look at the legal concept of subjective responsibility in criminal law. I think this is a useful concept because it elucidates some of these controversies concerning the relationship between responsibility and guilt. There is this idea in criminal law that, when I commit a crime, I can be subjectively responsible for that crime, if I could have theoretically chosen not to commit the crime. So I'm theoretically able to decide whether to punch someone on the street or not. So if I decided to punch someone, I'm subjectively responsible for the offence. Now this is not the same as criminal blame, because criminal blame is what is called in criminal law the mens rea responsibility, the guilty mind. In order to be guilty in addition to being subjectively responsible, I must have satisfied the two conditions in acting: I must have known that what I was about to do was wrong, which is the cognitive criterion, the McNaughton criterion, and I must have been able to have acted otherwise, the volitional criterion. So if I was under some kind of compulsion, whether it was internal psychological compulsion, or social compulsion in the case of collectives as agents, then my blame is reduced, the ability of the society to attribute blame to me is reduced, even though my subjective responsibility is diminished.

Now look at the way people behave when they witness someone being victimized in the street. It's been written about a lot. People generally tend to mimic the behaviour of each other. So you see a case of violence in the street, people observe the reactions of other people who do nothing, but at the same time they tend to minimize any signs that they give away that they are observing the others. So they appear to each other as though they are independently making the decision not to interfere and that makes it easier for everyone to say okay, this must be something that doesn't concern me, so I won't interfere. Now, does that reduce blame at all? Do social mechanisms which operate within random collections as agents, are they capable of reducing the blame, like in the criminal law, by creating a sense of compulsion, a sort of compulsion which reduces my individual blame as a participant in a random collection, while at the same time not reducing subjective responsibility as such of such agents for not interfering, because theoretically hey could have and should have interfered, because, as you said in the introduction, all those three principles are satisfied: I know what is going on, I know that I should act but I don't act? But there is a compulsion within the group. Do you think this is able to generate some distance between responsibility and blame?

H. B. Schmid

I haven't thought this through, but it's very interesting and we should discuss your suggestion it in more detail. I have no more than a couple of initial hunches to offer here. My first hunch is that what I'm using here is obviously

the fuller concept of responsibility where there is not only what I think you call subjective responsibility, and I think maybe it's like some causal responsibility in terms of counterfactual sensitivity, so it wouldn't have happened had I not or had I interfered, had I not omitted an act which was open to me. I agree with you: not only legal philosophy, but even ordinary language uses the word responsibility in that sense, where it is not sufficient for blame. Many thanks for this clarification. All of us just do not know what it is, right, and it's in virtue of that lack of knowledge, the other component, that we're not morally responsible.

I want to argue against Virginia Held that not any sort of knowledge is the right one – think of the modified Ernst Mach case, to which I construct a plural parallel in the paper. I argue it's not any kind of knowledge that suffices, but it's got to include self-knowledge - self-knowledge of what it is we are doing or failing to do. Only where this is, or should be, in place, the responsibility we're talking about is of the morally relevant kind. Certainly, I should be clearer concerning the conceptions of responsibility you mention, your suggestion is helpful.

1008

Another word on your suggestion concerning the role of social pressure. I haven't got a clear intuition concerning the case you present, and I'm not sure I got it right: Somebody was being beaten up by a bully, and there are individual bystanders around, but now, in addition, these individuals have this imitation thing going on, and so you, as a participant, you look at the crime being committed, but then the second look is to the next person, and you somehow use mimic, what you perceive that person is doing? Is this the case you describe?

Aleksandar Fatić

The example of domestic violence: for decades, we had a situation where domestic violence was perceived by most as something that we shouldn't intervene in, something that was seen as a conflict which belongs to other people, who had a relationship which we were not a part of, and therefore, had a limited legitimacy in interfering. Then you had a hype-up in the media and in the public and now you had legislation and all kinds of messages in the public sphere which say: interfere by all means and, now, everybody is reporting everyone for real and imaginary cases of domestic violence. This is now the topic of the day, so anybody can now report anyone with eyewitnesses or without witnesses, and it will create a general social pressure for the prosecution, the police and everyone to do something. So depending on what sort of messages we get from society, we will perceive our entitlements to interfere in a particular conflict differently. Where is our blame there?

H. B. Schmid

Interesting, though I'm not fully sure I understand. Looking back into history where people just had different conceptions of the moral obligations placed on them. In hindsight, our judgement is that they were behaving horribly wrong thinking that it was okay. I must admit that I'm often somewhat reluctant to blame them. Of course, it cannot be the case that, unless you accept that you should be acting, you're not responsible, but the further criterion is that you should have known better, so even if you didn't know, you can still be blameworthy if it can be said that you should have known. Take the case of witch hunts. You know, at the time at which Kant was writing his critique of pure reason, and people in Switzerland burnt the last witch. Let's assume that they did so because they believed this is the devil operating on their community. They would have thought that here is something that's so dangerous in their community that really their own lives and lives of their children were in danger by the presence of this evil – not just their lives between birth and death, but their lives in all eternity. Assume that they really believed it, they wouldn't have killed the witch unless they thought that there is evil that justified doing it. They were, of course, totally wrong. But what do we use in blaming them? Is it some good sense, or some moral knowledge that they had or should have had, in their hearts? Or is it rather that at that time – at the end of the eighteen century – they should have been a bit more enlightened, since a lot of sound knowledge was around? They could have read up about witch hunts a bit. At least the local vicar of the Protestant church (it was in the Protestant area), he should have read a bit of the literature. But the further you go from our own horizon, the more difficult it becomes to me to blame. And I assume that there's got to be this limit, an epistemic limit to responsibility. I'm not sure, though, how conformity and imitation plays into this. Let's assume that people just imitate each other. How should this diminish our sense of their responsibility? Would their excuse be that they could not get their act together because as a matter of principle, they are always doing what other people do? I don't think this makes much sense, even in terms of attenuating circumstances. Why would we accept that, who would say well, okay, so I see now, no extenuating circumstances in the adoption of the maxim ''always do what others do''. But I'm not sure: am I addressing your question at all?

Aleksandar Fatić

You are, I'm going to ask another question. We had a case here, I'd like to be very practical because I think your topic is capable of addressing very crafty practical issues. We had a case here, a year or two ago, where a random collection of people, including one man and three or four women of dubious

1009

morality, driving in a miniature Morris Countryman, after a night out, hits a young man who was pushing his car, which had broken down in the yellow lane on a bridge in down-town Belgrade. The victim died and the perpetrator, the driver, the young man hid the car with which the crime had been committed and escaped to China, and was later extradited here and all the media were full of titles. Title pages were using the phrase "the killer", "killer Countryman", "a killer", "the murderer". This was a traffic accident, you see, but the prosecutors were under pressure. I spoke to some of the prosecutors at the time, they were under pressure to implement those new directions, they had perceived that they should pursue this guy in the strictest possible way allowed by the law. And some of them would say: look we don't dare say in public that there is a legal concept which is called the contribution by the victim. This means that being the victim doesn't mean that you are not guilty for what happened. If I meet Mike Tyson in the street and he walks past me and knocks me down, he commits a crime but this crime is a lesser crime if before he knocks me I say him "look you nigger, you idiot", and you now I provoked him.

1010

There is a contribution of the victim, this guy was pushing his car without the yellow rope, without being properly marked in the dark. But nobody dared, no prosecutor dared to argue in public that there was a contribution by the victim, and that the blame of this random collection (and all of them were quite dislikeable because they were wealthy, they were reckless). They were generally reckless with their lives, but they were not necessarily reckless that night. So you see, you say it's not an extenuating circumstance, imagine that you are a prosecutor. We now have laws which are being adopted, and you have them in Austria as well, laws which are the so-called *lex specialis* laws, which basically militate against systemic criminal legislation, and which say, if you assault a member of a minority, you will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, whereas in the normal, systemic legislation the prosecutor has the principle of opportunity, the principle to decide whether and to what extent to prosecute something. So basically your autonomy is very much diminished as a prosecutor. So you do have extenuating circumstances even though, legally you can still say, ok, I will not go along with the current practice. But this practice has normative features, it is a normative practice, right? And we live with the rule of the media and the public pressure, we live under increasing normative pressure by all kinds of sources of norms which are not necessarily officialized.

H. B. Schmid

I'm not an expert in legal philosophy at all, but I hear that in many countries, Switzerland included, there is a tendency to harsher sentencing for reckless

speeding. People are not judged on the base of having acted according to the maxim "I exceed the speed limit knowing and accepting that I might cause an accident", but the assumed attitude for which they are sentenced is, "well, if it happens, so be it". I'm quite certain that later times will look back at our times as a barbaric age at which the loss of lives and shedding of blood on our streets was awful. Historians will look back and observe with astonishment how cool we were with all these deaths on the street, but, yes, I know this is not directly related to the paper, but there are pressures in the legal system and some of which I'm a bit sympathetic towards, like in the traffic case, even though I do think that when there are attenuating circumstances, they have to be taken into account. In other cases, I'm very skeptical, I think that to be way too harsh on some crimes under public pressure, that's also a topic you raised. Public expectations and the huge influence this has, not only on legislation, but also on court proceedings. And that's horrifying, but I'm mostly concerned with moral blame here. Thank you very much.

1011

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Actually, I don't see, at least at first glance, ethical problematic in your paper, but still I'm going to restrain myself on a few remarks. Perhaps, then, we are going to find out that there are still some disagreements between you and me. First of all, you notice that in case that a person that is a part of a random collection, tries to make the other people which are a member of that so-called group to do something when being witnesses of a case of abuse, and still in case that, if that particular person fails to make others react, he or she is still responsible. Unfortunately, I agree with you, but then I'm bothered with the fact that in spite of the effort of that person, to make others to do something, he is objectively responsible, although I would say he is not guilty. And so, from the point of view of your line of argumentation, you are right, but from the point of view of a sense of justice, or what is just, it is somehow not ok with me.

The other point, it came out during your answer to Miljana's intervention, the question is: from which particular moment of time a group of people who are in a subway car, and who witness a case of abuse, from what particular moment do they begin to be a group or at least to be eligible to be considered a group? I would say that when they enter a car, they are just a random bunch of people. But only in case when something happens, and not just anything but the thing, the occurrence that makes them obliged to react, and only from that moment on, if they fail to react, they are responsible. But still, from that moment they are actually eligible to be considered a

group. And then, the third point, you are speaking, somewhere close to the end of your paper, of an effort of, so to say, a person to create a joint attention, which means to make other people who are members of that so-called random collection, to pay their attention to that particular occurrence which is actually going on. But still, it is, when we are speaking, as you do, about a case of brutal violence, it is impossible that somebody sitting or standing in that subway car did not notice that. So whatever he did or thought at the time when the violence started, it is impossible to imagine that he didn't notice that. So I think it is not necessary to make some efforts to get the attention of the others to what's going on, because they are all perfectly aware of that, even if they look away.

So, now, that means that we have, in that situation, a case of collective self-awareness, including those persons who fail or who look through the window, who pretend they didn't notice anything. Just one more remark concerning my first point: something which is quite unusual for me, or unusual from the point of view of common sense, that means to be responsible without being guilty. Are we talking about a duty to be a hero, which means when you try to persuade the other persons to create a reaction group, and if they fail to do so, the only way, according to your argumentation, to avoid the possibility, is to attack the bunch of abusers, and to risk being beaten by them? So are there any other options to avoid responsibility, excluding the one to attack the attackers and be beaten as the victim?

H. B. Schmid

Many thanks for these very interesting points. I'm not sure I got all of them and please jump in whenever I'm misunderstanding you. So, three main points. The point concerning responsibility without guilt. I think I agree with you. I want to say, that if we didn't get our act together and we let it happen, but you're not to blame because you really tried to get us together. There is a sense in which you're still in it, because you're going to say, from your perspective, that *we* failed, even though you personally did what you could. But it's still true of you that you're part of the collective that didn't do what it should have done. You're still part of it, even though you did individually what you could. I want to keep it as concrete as possible. I think for the court proceedings, what matters is that you should be included in some way in the trial, you should be sitting there somewhere, because you were in the group there, you should be sitting there, but you should get full recognition that you did everything you could, and I (a non-cooperating member) should acknowledge *my guilt to you* for undermining your effort of getting our act together. Because I, as a passive member, I wronged you. So in that sense, I think it is in a very concrete way important for the case that you be included

in it – not the least because you will get the recognition for doing what you could, which was right. You were wronged by all of us other members.

So that's how I see the normative infrastructure of that case, but in order to account for this full infrastructure, you have to acknowledge that this is about *us, we* are to blame. Concerning the duty to be a hero – I'm not sure I exactly understand what you mean. Maybe this connects to the third point, where you said that there is something fishy about the scenario. You said that, when this abuse is going on in the subway car, it is inconceivable for people not to notice, right. Everybody is going to notice. I must confess, when you said that, I realized that when I wrote the relevant parts of the paper I had in mind a car which is not an ordinary subway car, but a car with different compartments, more like a train car. In a train car, it is well conceivable that people cannot see each other, or cannot see whether or not others can see what they themselves see. In regular subway cars, it might be inconceivable that somebody wouldn't notice.

1013

I'm going to think about this suggestion. I guess you'll agree that it is conceivable that situations be of the sort under which it is not automatic that everybody's going to notice the abuse that's going on. Also, I could construct the case where the abuse is not so obvious, something along these lines.

Perhaps this relates to the issue you raise of the duty to be a hero. Depending on the subway car design, any attempt even to alert others might attract the perpetrator's attention to you, thus putting you in danger. My intuition would be to say that people are morally obliged to take some risk, but there cannot be a duty, or moral obligation, to be a hero. The very concept of a duty to be a hero sounds like a contradiction in terms to me. There cannot be a duty to be a hero because the hero is an agent who does supererogatory deeds, meaning deeds that cannot be morally demanded of him. He or she does more than just what he or she has to do. If ought implies can, and if it's clear that you cannot subdue the bully alone, then it is not the case that you ought to try to subdue the bully, even if this would be heroic in a sense. Admittedly, trying is a notoriously difficult word. There is a sense in which any doing implies trying. There is a different sense of trying in which trying is a proper action term. The latter is the sense of trying in which you can try to do even what you know cannot be done. In that case the condition of satisfaction of your intention is to do the trying, and not the doing. And I think that even in this "heroic" sense of trying, there is no moral obligation to try.

Let me try to address your very difficult second question: When exactly does a group become a group. My strategy concerning this type of question – when does the group come into being, is usually a negative one. So it's an

ex negativo reply. First, I'd like to argue against the view that as soon as we've made a decision, we are a group. The problem is that any such decision cannot be just my individual decision and your individual decision. It's got to be decided together, meaning that in order for us to make that decision, we've already got to be a plural agent. For the case of the singular subject, this issue is well studied in the literature about subjectivity in German Idealism. The way we are self-constituted as singular subjects is not by making a decision, because there's got to be the subject of decision already. The same is true in the plural. Margaret Gilbert has this problem: arguing that a plural subject comes into being by means of a joint commitment is circular because joint commitment is something we are undertaking together – something plurally subjective. Thus it seems that every plural subject presupposes a plural subject of the process that brings it about, we are in an infinite regress. The literature about the pre-reflective level in the self-constitution of singular subjects answers to that type of problem, and we urgently need to take it to the plural, as I suggest in my book on *Wir-Intentionalität*. If we are going to be serious about plural subjects, we've got to learn from that problem. So that's *ex negativo*, I'm still not answering when and how, but I'm saying that, you know, you have the concept of a plural subject, but yours is insufficient, and I can tell you why, and how to make it better. And then, the other move is the turning of the table. Most of you will accept the concept of a pre-reflectively constituted singular subject. But can you answer the question of when and how exactly it came about?

So if you can't answer this question in the singular case, why suggesting that in the plural case, we should not accept subjects unless we know exactly when and how they come into being? I know it's a weak reply, and I can see you're not altogether happy with it, but I do want to argue for a sort of analogy between singular subjectivity and plural subjectivity. Now with the example of a kid, it certainly becomes an agent partly because of you addressing it as an agent. But it cannot be, reactive attitudes cannot be constitutive of agency, it's not that you make an animal a subject by approaching it as one, because you can try it with your cat, it won't work. It's perhaps something like a subject, but it's not a subject in the moral domain. So, I know this is all very defensive and dissatisfying. There's psychological literature which I find interesting, for example in the literature on the development of the capacity for joint attention.

Časlav Koprivica

Excuse me, why is it so hard to imagine that a reaction of some random collection of people could be the point from which they start to recognize themselves as a group?

H. B. Schmid

I would say it's certainly easily imaginable that they come to recognize themselves as a group reflectively. Reflective self-knowledge is different from pre-reflective self-knowledge, and it buils on pre-reflective self-knowledge.

Olga Nikolić

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My question is mainly about plural pre-reflective self-awareness, because you argue in your text that this is actually the condition that needs to be fulfilled in order to attribute responsibility to random collections. So while I was reading this text as well as your other texts about plural pre-reflective self-awareness a number of questions occurred to me. And they are about how this plural self-awareness works. So I understood that you take it to be a basic form of sociality. But my question is, are we always, is it constantly at work, do we always find ourselves somehow plurally pre-reflectively self-aware, and is it at work even when we are alone or only when other people are around? Is it selective, so, does it work in a way to...can I base my judgements and decisions, on which groups to enter into interaction or join, so where do I want to join actions and where do I not, and with whom? Also, what is the content of the plural pre-reflective self-awareness? So is it like some sort of sedimented implicit habitual knowledge of everything we've learned about how people behave, interact, what people should or should not do? This sort of implicit know-how that we have when we interact with other people or join groups. Also how do people perceive us, what kinds of social groups we are eligible to, what kind of social roles are we eligible to, and so on?

1015

Also, I understood that for you it has to exist in plurality. Every individual partakes in plural pre-reflective self-awareness. But the question is do all individuals have to have the same content? Do we have to think of our group participation and what our group should or should not do in the same manner, do we have to be aware somehow of group goals in the same way in order to have this plural pre-reflective self-awareness? And, for example, if we take your train or subway example, what if one person does not find herself or himself morally responsible? What if one person does not share this idea that we should do something about this? What if one person is scared, just wants to escape, there is no pre-reflective moment that this person actually feels that we should all do something about it, but is just scared? Does this exclude this person from plural pre-reflective self-awareness or not? And, finally, does plural pre-reflective self-awareness.involve shared phenomenal consciousness, a kind of 'what is it like for us', experiential sharing of some sort?

H. B. Schmid

Very good. I cannot address all the issues raised in this very rich comment. Let me focus on a couple of issues. How does plural pre-reflective self-awareness work? I had this basic idea in my habilitation thesis that came out in 2005, where I strictly stuck to the mainstream Heidelberg School way of thinking about pre-reflective self-awareness. And there, the claim is you can never say what it is, all you can say is what it is not. All you can do in elucidating the essence of subjectivity is pointing out mistakes about it. Showing how reflective accounts fail. That's how they end up in an infinite regress or *petitio principii*, that's how you can account for the underlying, for what subjectivity is. It need not be an essence, but what subjectivity is. You can characterize it only negatively. Then I kept getting all these incredulous reactions: but *what is it*? Why don't you tell us? I finally decided, let's forget about the Heidelberg school reservations, let's just try. So I thought that maybe a sort of functionalist approach could be worked out. Not functionalist in terms of input-output relations, but functionalist in terms of identifying what it does. And I realized that's not impossible at all to do for the individual case. We can say quite a bit about what that special knowledge we have of ourselves, and only of ourselves, of nothing else, is.

So the basic thing – probably most of you know the argument that there is a sort of knowledge of oneself that's very different from knowledge about anything else. It's not referential, it's self-identifying etc. Thus I identified four functions. It establishes identity, it self-validates, self-commits, and self-authorizes. This is the work of self-knowledge. I'll show tomorrow this works in the plural case. So I think I can give a fuller answer to your question tomorrow.

Now, the question about deciding which group to belong to. Sometimes we leave groups, and sometimes we form groups, and we are part of many groups, so how does this work? I don't think it is always up to us, individually. Sometimes you don't feel like being part of a group any more because you're really fed up with your partners, but you're still somehow in there. Sometimes it's not just enough to say I don't want to be part of it any more, and conversely, it is certainly not enough for two people wanting to be a plural subject that they really are a plural subject. So it seems that this individual sort of decision to be or not to be part of it is at least not sufficient for you being a part of it. Also, sometimes as in the subway car there's not even question of any decision and you're in it.

So it seems that it's not even necessary to make any decision or have any preference even, for you to be in it. So it seems that these attitudes – wanting to be in, wanting to be out - are neither necessary nor sufficient for there to be

a plural subject. As liberal democrats, we'd like to give individual decision a lot of room in how we arrange the social world. And we do not like certain forms of sociality. The one form we particularly like is the voluntary association. Please speak up if you disagree: we like it when people, of their own individual will, gather together for the pursuit of a shared purpose. Every participant wants to be part of it, and that's somehow how it comes to be. And yet, this easily leads to a sort of ideology about what sociality is, the view that it is all based on individual decision. It's a wonderful way of being together, but let's face it: it's not how our sociality is, especially if you want to advocate it from a normative perspective, we should not be ignorant about it not being the normal case. We know how social ontology and normative perspectives or political agendas are intertwined, and sometimes people think it is best to promote an agenda by claiming this is the only possible way for ontological reasons. I certainly don't want to accuse you of ideological thinking, but I guess since individual decision is neither necessary nor sufficient for participation in plural subjects, I think it's not a fundamental point about the ontology of sociality. But normatively, it's important.

1017

Olga Nikolić

Can I just clarify my question a bit? What I was thinking about is, sometimes we decide using our reflection, and thinking about it in advance, then we decide to join a group or not. But when we are pre-reflectively plurally self-aware, do we on this pre-reflective level still make a selection or not? Do we just interact with anybody who is around, or can we somehow make some pre-reflective judgements about who to interact with?

H. B. Schmid

Can you give an example of pre-reflective judgement?

Olga Nikolić

For example, I'm walking down the street and I need to ask for directions, and I see two persons, and I immediately turn to one and ask one person for direction, not the other one. Why did I choose the first person?

H. B. Schmid

Yes, we often choose with whom to associate. We shouldn't forget that this is an obvious phenomenon, that we like to be a plural subject with some, and even if you just ask a person for direction, you are doing something with

that person because there is a plural subject of communication, and that's a joint action; it has to have a plural subject for it to be joint. You may initiate it, but it's only in virtue of my taking it up that it becomes communication, and that's something we are doing together. Of course, individual preferences play a big role in the coming about of plural subjects, in the way that we choose whom to approach, we choose whom to associate with.

Another point in your comment: Does every individual participate in a plural subject? I think there is room for a lot of dissidence in plural subjects. And it is often the case that we are doing something even though I'm not engaged in it. I wouldn't say that active participation has to be distributive, so that each and every member is participating for us to be doing something.

Group goals – I think there is a tendency to overestimate the role of intention in intentionality which has to do with the proximity of the English word intention to intentionality. And if we go back to the phenomenological tradition, there was an equal bias toward more passive forms of intentionality, the paradigm of collective intentionality, or plural subject phenomena in the phenomenological literature, is the *Erlebnis*, experience, it's actually something different, lived experience. Especially if you have an Aristotelian concept of life, *Erlebnis* is a bit better than just intention as a paradigm of sharing, because there is this living together, the Aristotelian idea that the form of our life is a shared form. Currently, I think that we are talking about the current literature, the discussion is sort of preconceived of in Aristotle's work on the political nature of humans. But I might be a bit of an anti-Aristotelian in that I'm open to the possibility of a totally, Aristotle would say it is an *idiotic* human life. An idiot is a person who does not participate in the political, and I'm sympathetic to idiots who don't join in some domains. All of us are idiots, so much of our life is not shared, and I wouldn't say that everything has to be shared, I think sharing can be a terrible hassle, and it's very good that we have private lives. Some authors say, if it's intentionality it's got to be social, and I don't buy that. Once we see how intentional attitudes can be shared, we need not claim that every intentional attitude is somehow social (e.g., along the lines of Habermas who always argued that intentionality is basically just language, and hence public).

I am aware that I addressed only about one fifth of the issues you raised. Let me just, to conclude, address the question of the person who is afraid in the subway car. That person, is he or she part of the plural subject of the intervention? No, but he or she is still part of the group. That person probably thinks we should not because it's too dangerous, so that person judges that the moral nature of the act is such that we should not intervene. Maybe he or she is pathologically phobic. In that case, he or she is off the hook. In the case in which a person is just afraid and does not come to the right

judgement that we should intervene, because she just discounts too much of what's happening to the other person as opposed to what could happen to herself, I think that person is not off the hook, because that person should have, and could have judged differently. Emotions, I take it, are judgments, and there is responsibility for our emotions.

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I would like to make comments relying upon contemporary metaphysics of connections, on the one hand, and upon the theory of complex systems, on the other. This perspective might seem somewhat surprising, but let us re-mind ourselves that Sara Rachel Chant's paper, which is so important for the debate on collective responsibility, also suggests that these questions, I am quoting her, "promote a particular kind of metaphysics". On the other hand, it is obvious that the questions you analyse are of great importance, not only in the case of highly structured organizations, and other incorporated groups, but also for the debates concerning ethics and complex systems as such. What interests me the most is the mechanism through which people can connect to each other. The moment when, according to the Hollywood stand-off, Mr Good, Mr Bad and Mr Ugly hold a gun to each other, or the moment when, according to Virginia Held's example, there are individuals in a subway car that witness a bully.

Let me first introduce certain insights from contemporary metaphysics of connection. From a modal point of view, one might define connection as something that is stronger than dependence but is weaker than internal re-lation. The first distinction is particularly important: if A is connected to B, this connection does not necessarily imply that the existence of A, or one of its essential properties, depends on the existence of B. Still, connection can imply much more than mere ratio existendi. The distinction between con-nection and relation is much more complicated. External relations are exter-nal to the nature of the relata, and that is why they are frequently interpreted as mere mental projections. (For instance, when there is an assertion that A is to the left of B.) Internal relations do depend on the nature of the relata, but, in fact, it would be more precise to claim that internal relation can be reduced to the individual essences of the relata, and therefore it would be redundant to conceive them as *sui generis* entities. For instance, there is an assertion according to which A is brighter than B. Connection is different form relation and from dependence e as well. There is an extremely rich tra-dition of the metaphysics of connection, from Leibniz to Gustav Bergman's nexus, from Whitehead's concrescence to Barry Smith's mereotopological

1019

connections. What is common to these concepts is that they point to a certain emergence, certain productivity. For example, the connection between the subject and the predicate results in new meaning. In the case of a non-formal, material connection, where the locomotive is connected to the wagons, a new level of emergence arises.

There are a few important characteristics of connection. It is non-reflexive, A can be connected to B, C and so on, but not to itself. Connection is non-transitive, if A is connected to B, and B is connected to C, it is not necessary that A is also connected to C. And finally connection is weakly anti-symmetric, that is to say, if A is connected to B, it is not necessary that B is also connected to A. It is important to emphasise that connections can result in new entities, that is to say A and B can form together a new C entity. But it is also possible that the connection itself is the only new phenomenon, there are no new entities, but the connection implies something productive which has not existed before. Connections can make mere aggregates, and mereological sums, but they can also form couplings, new holistic entities, in which they depend on each other, but they remain separated. And also, new unities in which they lose their distinct existence. So, this is a kind of typology: aggregates, couplings and new unities in which they lose the distinct existence. It seems to be self-evident that social connections cannot form unities in which they – as connected entities – completely lose their distinct existence. But the distinction between aggregates and couplings is surely crucial.

Sara Rachel Chant argues that in the case of the Hollywood stand-off, there is collective, non-distributive responsibility without collective agency. I suppose that the existence of collective responsibility assumes at least a minimal level of emergence beyond individuals. We can model the Hollywood stand-off as a connective situation. There is no reflexivity, none of the participants holds the gun to himself, there is no necessary transitivity, the fact that Mr Good holds the gun to Mr Bad and that Mr Bad holds the gun to Mr Ugly does not imply that Mr Good holds the gun to Mr Ugly. Finally, there is weak anti-symmetry, the fact that Mr Good holds the gun to Mr Bad does not necessarily imply that Mr Bad also holds the gun to Mr Good. And such is precisely the case with the Hollywood stand-off. And, as we have seen, it is completely legitimate to speak of truly productive connections, that cannot be reduced to the connected relata without assuming that the entities connected to each other necessarily form a new unity. Perhaps it would also be useful to interpret joint attention as connection, given the fact that attention is weakly anti-symmetric and non-transitive. Joint attention, as a new level of emergence with respect to individual attention is obviously not mere external or internal relatedness, neither is it dependence. It is about being connected, certain togetherness, as a new level that produces couplings beyond

mere aggregates. Of course, it depends on the specific situation whether joint attention can be formed.

And the final remark, there is a very modest tradition of elaborating the ethics of complex systems. These philosophers try to conceptualize a new ethics that takes into consideration the characteristics of complexity. What interests me is whether we can attribute any responsibility to complex systems themselves, for instance to the legal system as a complex system. Complex systems are not based on mere randomness, they are highly determined, they consist of interconnected parts, or, more precisely, they are distributed across a component part, and there is self-similarity, that is to say, there are partly shared similarities across each scale of the systems' levels. It is a commonplace to claim that the systemic whole is more than the sum of its parts, and, on the other hand, there is no individual agent in the system who takes everyday actions by taking into consideration the whole system. To put it differently, the wholeness of the system, the quasi-togetherness of its parts, can be individually thematized only through some kind of external observation. But it is also claimed that the system constantly thematizes the difference between itself and its environment and its own subsistence on a more abstract level. What interests me is whether we can speak of responsibility of complex systems, can we blame them and in which sense?

1021

H. B. Schmid

This is a very rich and challenging comment. And it contains a clear objection: you are saying that we need not conceive of the Good, Bad, and Ugly together as a subject, rather we should conceive of them as connected, interconnected individuals. I want to argue that no, we need the subject account, there's got to be one subject. It is a subject in virtue of plural pre-reflective self-awareness, and of course this is a form of unity of a mind. Now part of what you are saying is news to me, this metaphysics of connection, and I'm not competent, but I'm very interested. You are saying that connection is stronger than dependence but weaker than a relation? Ok. I haven't thought it through obviously, because I'm not familiar with the connection literature. We need metaphysical stuff here. My hunch is that finally what I'm going to argue is that you want to account for the way people are together when they are plural subjects. I cannot say people are related because it's already favoring one metaphysical view of it. I probably will argue that whatever the conception of that, I cannot avoid the word relation here, but I do not mean it in terms of internal or external, or any specific concept of relation.

Let's define relation as whatever connections, dependencies, and external, internal relations are versions of. You want to argue that we can fully account

for the way individuals are related in that newly defined sense, without conceiving of them as a subject, if we recognize that relations are actually of the form of interconnection. My hunch is that you're going to find forms of interconnection that are obviously not relevant to the case, and forms of interconnection that are relevant to the case, and that you simply cannot distinguish for the particular form of interrelation that's happening between the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly. So that you still need to account for the way interrelation in that case is relevant to responsibility. And I'm going to argue then - this is just a plan for a future reply to your comment - I'm going to argue, well, that feature you still need to account for in order to make your metaphysics of interconnections work, that is plural pre-reflective self-awareness. So what I will do, reading your comment, is that I'm going to find a case where every condition you specify for something to be interconnected is fulfilled, but still no collective responsibility. And I challenge you to make the task difficult for me without resorting to one or another version of plural pre-reflective self-awareness.

Now these are empty words, but this is my hunch. I haven't a clear understanding of your conception of interconnection yet, but I suspect that there are certain instances of interconnections of your sort being the case without there being the relation that makes two subjects partners in joint action. And then I'm going to argue, well, the missing feature you still need to account for is what I offer you. I could then say that while your conception of interconnection is interesting and useful, it isn't really doing the job.

I cannot claim I figured out the metaphysics of the plural subject. I found myself initially attracted, and I haven't followed up on it, to collection - as-identity theory. Because this resounds with what Rousseau says about the ontology of the collective. Rousseau says weird things, and he says things that do not agree with what you say about connection being non-reflexive, because obviously, and as you know, there is a relation in Rousseau's thinking between me as *citoyen* with me as a *bourgeois*. That's the way he aims to preserve the idea of freedom in the transition from individuals to the collective. The weird thing about collection as identity is that in this view, the collection is ontologically the numerical identity of its parts rather than some interconnection thereof. And this resounds with all these accounts in the history of thoughts of many being one in the collective. The way we are related in that general sense in the plural subject is token identity. And that's weird, because we are obviously qualitatively different, so how can we be numerically identical, when I'm almost bald and you have so much hair, and there are all sorts of qualitative difference, how can we be one? What's qualitatively different cannot be numerically identical. But then there are these theories of identity being relative. In this view, we can be identical with regards to X but different

with regards to Y. This might be the way to go, understanding the way members in plural subjects are related to each other, in metaphysical terms.

I'm really just talking a bit metaphysics here, without really having an elaborated idea. I'm very interested in your concept of connection. I've got a strategy to oppose the objection that this makes superfluous the idea of a plural subject. I guess I have more questions to ask you than you probably have to ask me.

Aleksandar Fatić

I have one small question: do you think that systems theory might help with you account?

H. B. Schmid

Oh yes, I forgot that part, the second part of your question. I spent a lot of time reading all that Luhmann stuff. What I found is that ultimately, the system is just a reformulation of the subject. The subject is whatever it is in virtue of itself. That's the idea of the subject, Kantian Self-determination, Fichtean *Selbstsetzung*, or Korsgaardean self-constitution. The subject is not produced by anything other than itself, it's self-made. Obviously, there is this idea of *autopoiesis* in Luhmann, and this account of the difference between itself and others, that's how it is related to itself, by distinguishing itself from others, and that's totally the good old subject. Then the question in virtue of what a unity is: it is a unity in virtue of that very relation. So I'd say, yes, systems theory is relevant, if system is not just what Talcott Parsons thought it to be, only an analytical tool, a selection of entities, a system the analyst decides on, a heuristic tool. This is not how systems theory in Luhmann's sense understands systems, obviously it's not a sense in which you understand the system. You think it's really out there, and it is what it is in virtue of it distinguishing itself from what it is not. Welcome to subject theory.

1023

Igor Cvejić
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I would not like to talk so much about the mere possibility of collective responsibility, I mostly agree with your general argument. I have a question more about the precondition and location and about more complex situations, I would like to pose a general question about the role of values, the difficulty of sharing values in these situations. The examples that you give are pretty easy examples, which is perfectly fine when we speak about the possibility of moral responsibility. Usually there are complicated situations,

and I think this is particularly important for collective responsibility because we can easily speak only about what single person evaluate, but if persons share values, we have to add question in which manner do they share them? As far as I understand in your talk, when you mention joint attention, you don't mean the pure cognitivist approach, but also one involving some shared values and joint emotional engagement. Just to give one different example: we are in a train car with five other persons, strangers, who are from different cultural background, and we have some not so clear situation. For example, domestic violence, so we will have five different reactions, that follow from different learned norm procedure and every person see differently the adequate reaction to those situations. Particularly I will now have the need to have some relation to the other persons, their reactions and expressions, to see if I can make such attitude needed for the practical knowledge. Or a more extreme situation, the bully harming an innocent victim is actually a neo-Nazi activist harming an immigrant, but then I realize that five other people sitting with me are neo-Nazi sympathizers. We have some joint focus, looking at the same situation, have the same cognitive input, but this event is totally different from your example. So, I certainly could have thought we should do it, but it is certain that I could not make that same attitude shared among all of us who are sitting in the train car.

So, my brief question is what do you think about the role of shared values in this example, and the second question is about the joint emotional engagement. The third question is probably a little more complicated, does pre-reflexivity involve some primary I-thou relation because, in some way, I need to have an I-thou relation with those persons to see their reaction and make them have the same attitude? My fourth question is from the perspective of two persons who will blame this group as responsible. How can we ascribe collective responsibility to that group, because, again, in this situation about harming innocent victims, it is easy, but if we need to have insight about how these persons share values, or are there shared values, it is very hard to blame some group as collectively responsible?

H. B. Schmid

Thank you very much. So what if there's a Nazi beating up a victim, and you are sitting there, and you realize they are all Nazis. I would say - just a gut feeling - I still would say you've got to try to, you've got to approach the other people, even if you know they are Nazis, and try to appeal to their better senses. There's certainly still something you'd have to do. Now, I wanted to argue in the original case, that you should be in the trial even if you did all you could, you should be sitting together with the others. Would this still be the case in your version? You, the non-Nazi, would have to sit together with

the other Nazis who didn't do anything. And I guess, most of you would say no, you don't have to sit with the Nazis, and you're totally right, but only if it is possible to assume that what was going on was Nazi abuse which somehow implicates, as a guilty party in the act, all of the others. If there is reason to assume that the bully, the Nazi bully is actually acting on behalf of the others, then certainly you wouldn't have to sit in the trial. But if it just so happens that in a society, half of the people are Nazis and they have their badge, there's one Nazi, and it is not necessary to assume that he is acting on behalf of this group, I still would say, yes, well you, the non-Nazi, and the other Nazis failed to prevent this act from happening. Now, what I want to say really depends, all of these stories are always abstractions from real life, whose interpretation highly depends on normal assumptions about what is going on in society, and this also extends to this case.

Sharing values, I don't really have an elaborate understanding of what a value is, other than a formal object of an attitude. In my mind, a lot boils down to intentionality, and so does the concept of value. Value is whatever makes it rational to have an attitude of a certain kind towards the object that is seen as having that value. So, a proposition's being true makes it adequate to believe it, so truth is a value. Whatever is good, makes it rational or even intelligible to desire it or to want it, or to intend it, so the good is a value. Whatever is great makes it rational to admire it, so greatness is a value, and so on. With negative values, e.g., danger - what is dangerous makes it rational to fear it. If that's the concept of value, sharing an intentional state is always sharing a value. If that's not your concept of value, we'll have to discuss.

1025

Igor Cvejić

Helm's theory of value, of a notion of the import of significance. When you speak about motions in Heideggerian terms as "for-meness" or "for-usness", I think it is more like this than like just an object of belief. So having a significance for me that it is enough to value it.

Aleksandar Fatić

There is the theory of emotions, according to which values are what makes us react emotionally, positively or negatively to certain stimuli, not rationally, emotionally.

H.B. Schmid

Oh yes, I fully agree. What I mean is the idea of the formal object, which was introduced basically by Thomas Aquinas and elaborated on by Anthony

Kenny. More recently, Ronny De Souza presented this view of emotions as having a formal object. But I would extend it a little bit: it's not just emotions that have a formal object but all attitudes. And insofar as they have formal objects, this is the value. The value is whatever makes it appropriate, understandable or rational to have an attitude of the kind of attitude it is. E.g., danger is what makes it rational, appropriate, and intelligible to fear. Take an Aristotelian approach: there isn't a conflict between reason and emotion, but rather it is rational to have emotions in the right circumstance toward the right object in the right amount on the right occasion. And what makes this the case for the fear of a dog is its being dangerous, and if something is evil, it is correct to hate it. If something is true, it's adequate to believe it. I guess if this is the concept of value, then any sharing of an attitude is the sharing of a value. It's the same thing.

(Aleksandar Fatić clarifies the main point of Igor's question, unclear).

1026

I didn't make any commitment as to whether values are out there objectively, or whether values or formal objects are properties that are just assigned by an attitude. I have no commitment concerning whether the entire set of values is subjective or objective. The thing about appropriateness that I want to say, is just that, insofar as, e.g., greatness is assigned, it would be irrational not to admire. There is a conceptual link between greatness and admiration. And even though it might be that people do not have the value of greatness, this just means they don't assign greatness to anything, they don't admire. But if they assign greatness, they have to admire, because greatness is captured or is seen, is perceived in admiration, and through no other means. So, the emotional domain is different from cognition or practical attitudes in that it seems that about every emotion has its own formal object. And then, there are these two big formal objects for cognition and volition, truth and the good.

Igor Cvejić

My problem with this example is that we could have the same focus with the same cognitive input, but actually different formal objects. The same event that I see as dangerous the Nazi can see as pleasant.

H. Schmid

Absolutely, I agree. Then we target the same material object, to use Aquinas' term, but not the same formal object, and thereby we do not share the same attitude. But if we share the attitude, we share a value. I'm not quite sure whether I want to say the opposite that if we assign the same formal object to the same material object, we thereby share the attitude. I'm not quite sure

because I might see the doughnut on the table as delicious and want it, and you might see it as delicious and want it, but we probably do not want it together, because I want it for myself. So, same values, but it actually brings us into opposition rather than bringing us together. In the domain of the emotional, I very much like the structure that's a bit more complicated than just formal object. In formal objects, there is focus and there is concern. And the concern rationalizes the relation between the formal object and the focus. So, even in fear of the dog, it's dangerousness to me, or dangerousness to you that's rational in this wide sense in terms of concern for my or your safety. The concern - I think this is very much what Heidegger had in mind with *Sorge*, this is a triadic structure, so the target, formal object, focus, and behind it the concern, that binds the package together. And maybe the concern is what we are, I guess that's what Heidegger wants to say, and it is quite in line with Helm's views. Do you agree?

1027

Igor Cvejić

My problem is, I have these problems with the particular case implications for the question how we could actually blame someone, and how we could ascribe to someone collective responsibility, could we do it in the same way? Six persons are having actually shared values, and shared attitudes, then I can make this same attitude, that we should engage. But in the case we are probably looking at the same event and not having the same formal object or concerns, could we actually speak about collective responsibility? Intuitively, you could in the same way say that a group or person sitting in a train car is to blame because they didn't help.

H. B. Schmid

Something that Held says in her paper, and that I'm just taking from there, is that you have to be aware of the moral nature of the act in order to be responsible. This is obviously insufficient because in many cases we blame people even if they weren't aware of the moral nature of the act, because they *should have* been aware of the moral nature of the act. This is relevant in our Nazi case. These people might ideologically think there is something good going on. Their belief is mistaken, and we hold them responsible even though they didn't know the moral nature of the act because they thought it was something different. Why? Because they should have known. In that case, we are going normative about the epistemic requirements. I guess we would do this in the plural case as well, even though what you think is going on is very different from what the others think is going on, because you were right, and they should have thought differently. And, in a sense,

subjectivity is a normative phenomenon. It doesn't depend on what any-body thinks. Sometimes we say "you should have been aware". And that's enough for assigning responsibility. But it is also true that in many cases there are excusable errors. And in these cases, your not having known is at least an attenuating circumstance. We still assign some blame because you should have known.

Predrag Krstić and Srđan Prodanović

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Thank you for the inspiring lecture. Our remark refers, we would say, to the strongest side of your argument: namely, its formalism. In the paper you convincingly explain that there are collective actions –or their absence - in which accountability can be attributed to random collections, without being distributed to its members, that is, you maintain that the "collecting responsibility is of the collective rather than the distributive sort" and that this type of responsibility therefore implies a certain "plural self-aware-ness". The latter is not a "collective singular," but rather "something individ-uals have, not someone else over and above their heads" and "they have it only together, as a group". In this sense we can understand your claim that "even unorganized random collections can be plurally self-aware of what should be done as a collection of own collections of the sort that consti-tutes responsibility".

However, one might ask what could, actually or potentially, members of these random collections in fact be "morally required to do"; that is, should any provisional set of beliefs –"shared moral outlooks", as you call them – be shared by aforementioned members? There is no need for thought experi-ment in order to illustrate the issue. Namely, your example – a bully harasses someone in the public transportation – this sounds like a clear and, so to say, self-explanatory type of demand that a moral instance puts before us. But, let's further complicate and problematize this example: this year a passen-ger hit a fellow traveller on a bus in Istanbul because she was wearing shorts during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. It seemed to him that she was not dressed properly and that she consequently offended the public moral. Following your claims, we do not see a way out of the argument that in this case the passenger acted responsibly in regard to his own understanding of moral responsibility, and that, furthermore, we could even blame other travellers for disobeying a rule prescribed by one type of moral intuition? It seems like this moral reasoning would be at least as right as, on the other side, blaming the attacker, who in fact ended up receiving a substantial sen-tence, or the co-travellers for failing to defend the attacked women.

Of course, all of this is done from another framework of value. But, that's precisely the point: are those frameworks, or systems, or regimes that decide on what constitutes a moral wrongdoing equal? And are they commensurable at all? In short, how, or perhaps from which vantage point, do we decide on responsibility of a random collection? Of random collection, let's say, if you allow one more example, tourists that have found themselves in a part of the world where it is not only legal but obligatory to stone women who have "misbehaved"? In short, that random collection could or should (?) be responsible for what?

H. B. Schmid

What are the details of the situation you are referring to? How strong was the bully? Let's assume there were other people on the bus. I'm inclined to say that nowadays everybody should know that this is not okay, and that whoever was on the bus constitutes a group that's collectively guilty for not intervening. If the bully was of average size, I would say even just an individual should have intervened. In German this is called *Hilfeleistung*. I don't know the English term, but you are obliged to intervene, if it's not at too great a risk to yourself. To approve of a beating because of the way a person is dressed is clearly unacceptable. As said before, I'm not so sure with regards to older systems or secluded corners of the world.

Let's try to enter such a person's head, and try to think of something that makes it understandable that that person beats up that woman. Of course, it may just be misogynistic aggression, that person just takes that moral view as an excuse to beat her up, because that person is hateful, and wants to beat someone up anyway, just looking for victims, and takes the ideology as excuse. I think there are good chances that this was the case in your example. In any case, the "secluded corner" excuse does not work in a location such as Istanbul. There's a lot of information there. But if you take a case from a remote village, and incredible beliefs that are around, and there is a serious belief that the way you dress is directly connected to the well-being of the whole community, you really believe that, then maybe the case is different. But, as I said, I'm not an expert in normative ethics, and the basic aim behind the paper is to show that this issue about plural pre-reflective self-awareness has consequences for normative issues. And I'm a bit naïve about the normative issues themselves, I just took Virginia Held's paradigm and tried to show that in order to understand that better, you have to have the concept of plural pre-reflective self-awareness. So I'm operating far beyond my sphere of expertise, if I'm now passing a normative judgement about actual people sitting in Istanbul in a bus. There are normative ethicists, and I'm not one of them.

Petar Bojanić

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I'm going to try to change the perspective and make an analogy. Maybe it's not a question, it's rather a need to put forth a request to you to once again explain this phrase "plural pre-reflective self-awareness". I know your different texts, but in this text, in the context of collective responsibility, as I understood, your main effort was to show us that someone is responsible if there exists some kind of pre-reflective self-awareness. This is the condition, unconditional condition. First of all, when I prepared for our meeting today and tomorrow, I read a little Waldenfels, on *Aufnehmung*, and you remember there is nothing about collective awareness, but in Natalie Depraz, in her book from two years ago, *Attention e Vigilance*, she speaks of conjoined intersubjective attention. And as you know, as phenomenologists we can say

1030

this is always an object that implies attention. There is no attention without object, and in your case this object could be a situation. For example, the collective responsibility involved with any random collection of strangers in situations that demand a multilateral action, I am interested in the relation of this plural pre-reflective self-awareness. Yesterday I found in Nida-Rümelin, he is using this *Korporativverantworvung* and *Kooperativeverantwortung*, but you know that for him there is only individual responsibility. *Kolektivverantwortung* is figurative. Plural pre-reflective self-awareness and the relation of this to time or temporality of the existence of a group - I'm interested in responsibility that constitutes a group. That's why I use the analogy. I hope you remember the text of Moritz Schlick from 1930, "Wann ist der Mensch Verantwortlich?"(When is the Man Responsible?), and one of the main conditions is consciousness. Much more importantly, the question when a man is said to be responsible, is that of when he himself *feels* responsible. I think this is a bit of a challenge that there is no responsibility if someone does not have consciousness of responsibility, but only if the individual feels responsible. In that case, it would be good to explain whether there exists some kind of a *cogito* of the group, not just an analogy individual-collective, because that could be an awareness of responsibility.

And the other example is also a complete change of perspective. This summer, one evening in one restaurant in Greece, a young American was beaten to death by some 12 persons in a span of some 20 seconds. They, perpetrators, have all been apprehended. Some of them knew each other, while others joined when the situation, or object in that case, arose. Since there is no more object, there is no group either. When, then, does the responsibility of the group exist? Does the fact that they were all Serbian nationals in that case, satisfy this plural pre-reflective self-awareness? And is that enough? Or is the object, in that case, that American, enough for the constitution of

the group? They will confirm that they acted at the same time, but are they a group or not? And, where can you find this plural pre-reflective self-awareness in that case? Because, they acted. This is a completely different example: they were very active, and we could still not say that they were a group.

H. B. Schmid

The way I imagine this American case is this: clearly they were a group and they knew what they were doing. So then, the knowledge involved, the knowing what it was they were doing, the form of that self-knowledge is plural. The object is the victim on which harm is inflicted by means of their beating up that person together. And the feature in virtue of which this is an intentional joint action is the plural pre-reflective self-knowledge of the agent, and the agent is the individuals together, a plural subject. So they together knew what they were doing, and knew it in the right way, and that's the feature in virtue of which they did it intentionally. So the subject of the act is *them*. Not an extra entity, not an additional subject, but they together. They as one. That would be my description of the situation. Of course, it has nothing to do with nationality, background, just the intention, the feature in virtue of which the act is intentional, that's plural. Let me state the ontological claim. This knowledge is what groups are. This is an ontological claim about subjectivity, that groups are plural pre-reflective self-awareness in the very way in which individual subjects are singular pre-reflective self-awareness. That's how you are a subject, you are a subject in virtue of your being self-aware of your attitudes as yours, under suitable circumstances. I want to argue that there is plural pre-reflective self-awareness, and I would claim there is no awareness without self-awareness. If you are aware of a cup of coffee, there is something inbuilt, and some people say that in deep meditation there is awareness without self-awareness. Maybe experiences of depersonalization are similar, but apart from such phenomena I would say that self-awareness is a feature of any awareness. And if it's plural, it is a group's. Have I understood you and Moritz Schlick correctly, that the claim is that there is no responsibility without feeling responsible? Because that strikes me as a rather untenable claim. I have plenty of examples where there is responsibility without the subject, the perpetrator, feeling responsible.

Željko Radinković

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Ok, zu Heidegger. Ich möchte diese Gelegenheit nicht so vergehen, um Sie diese Frage zu stellen, die ich auch zu Dan Zahavi gestellt hat. Die betrifft

dann die Zentralen Thesen und Voraussetzungen Ihrer Intenzionalitäts-
theorie, auch der Frage der Kollektivenverantwortung aber, vor allem, der
Kollektivenintenzionalität. Also, in diesem Zussamenhang möchte ich die
Frage nach dem Subjekt, oder eigentlich dem Selbst, vor allem, nach dem
Selbst der Intentzionalität und damit auch der Kollektivenwerantwortung
aus seine Form der Intenzionalität stellen. Meine These ist damit um den
Phenomenologischen Gebot zu dem Sachen selbst gerechtzuwerden, schlage
ich zusammen mit Heidegger vor, nicht bei der Wahrnehmung oder An-
schauung, bei der Gegebenheit, oder wie auch immer verstandende Präsenz,
sondern bei der Absenz, um der Sorge anzusetzen. Sorge im Heidegger, stim-
men Sie. Sie haben das zwar in einem Aufsatz schön, also die Probleme dieses
Heideggerschen Fürsorge Konzepts herausgearbeitet, dass gefiehl mir sehr.
Nur meine Idee ist dass mann diese Sozialedimension der Heideggersher
Philosophie, vor allem der Existenzialenontologie, vor seinem Temporal-
itätskonzept. Also Zeit ist das Konzept (nejasno). Natürlich ist Fürsorge und
Mitsein, dass sind die Zentrale Punkte, darauf beziehen sich alle, wenn es um
die Soziale Dimension oder die Wichtigkeit der Heideggerscher Theorie für
diese Soziale Wissenschaft, überhaupt Gesellschaftstheorie geht, also dann
bezieht mann sich auf die Mitsein, auf die Fürsorge, doch ich meine, Sie sollte
das gesamte Konzept betrachten. Dass heist, wenn wir die Frage der Inten-
zionalität, wenn es um diese Frage geht, dann sollte es auch seine Zukun-
ftskonzept, ich bedachte. Also, ich komme...also, nicht wie bei Husserl, von
der Selbstwarhnemung, Selbsgegebenheit, eigentlich der Selbstevidenz, wie
auch immer, sondern vor der antizipativen zukunftsorientierte Selbstsorge
auszugehen. Die Frage lautet also ob sich so etwas wie Gegebenheit, Präsenz,
ursprünglich selbstkonstituieren kann, oder ob es eher dem Zukunftsbezug,
also dem Entwurf, der eigentlich Heidegger-gesprochen Seinsentwurf, dass
der Primat der Frage der Konstituzion zukommt? Also uberhaupt ist der In-
tenzion? Ich wollte ursprünglich vom Levinas sprechen, jetzt haben wir keine
Zeit...Aber da ich diese These auch gestellt habe, nur betonen dass es auch
hier vom eine Art vom Absenz geht, die konstitutiv ist. Also, beziehungs-
weise, eine absolute Differenz im Hinblick auf dem Anderen. Also, absolute
Transzendenz, voraus sich danauch eine Absolute und eine absolute Assyme-
trie der Verantwortung ausgibt. Also, die Zentrale Funktion des Wahrnemu-
ngsbegriffs scheint hier auch ein Probelm zu sein. … Also, ist diese Zukun-
ftsbezug ursprünglich konstitutiv? Ich würde das bejahen.

H.B. Schmid

Thank you very much. I guess the basic question is, is there some *Zukun-
ftsbezug* in intentional states, and how does it play out in the collective case.
And, as an additional challenge: aren't Dan Zahavi and I too much commit-
ted to this metaphysics of presence, and aren't we ignoring the constitutive

role of absence, for whatever is at stake here. I would say that obviously, for intentional attitudes such as desires or intentions, there is some temporality in the very having of the attitude because these are conditions of satisfaction which have to be met in the future, which cannot be seen as already being fulfilled in the present. If you intend to do something, there's got to be the sense that it has not already been done. So in order to intend, you have to live in time in some sense. I'm not sure, though, concerning cognition, because there are these authors, and, as I realize, you are very liberal here concerning unusual positions. So let me quote another unusual position here: some theologians from the Christian tradition have the concept of the angel, and the angel is a subject, but the only attitude it has is the admiration of God. That's all there is. Now, how is this temporal, is there a sense of death here? Obviously not. It's still an attitude, and maybe angels actually exist, I haven't got any reason to assume that it's a priori impossible for angels to exist, as you seem to assume with your account of the temporality of intentional attitudes. But maybe I misunderstood you.

The issue of time is interesting for the case of plural subjects, and this is a promising new topic of investigation. I sense that Heidegger's analysis of ''being-there'' is actually a good starting point. This *Sorgestruktur*, all of that's quite rich and relevant in terms of structure. So how is being-there of the plural kind temporal? How does a group project itself in the future and understand itself from the past? An obvious difference between singular and plural being-there concerns death. Some institutions seem to be premised on the assumption that they are not going to die at all. For example, the Catholic church, *ecclesia militans*, is an idea of being, certainly it's going to end at some point, but it then becomes *ecclesia eterna*. So these people seem to think that the way in which they are together is, in a core sense, really forever. No *Vorlaufen in den Tod* here. And, of course you may now criticize them and say, well, this is like the teenage Sartre who believed he was never going to die.

But I have a somewhat different reading of what Heidegger means to say about death. My reading is the following: What's important about death, about your going to die - and that's the only way in which, according to Heidegger, we are authentic together, that's the only thing we should be saying to each other, everything else is inauthentic - the important thing about death in Heidegger is that it is, in his view, the one possibility in which it is undeniable that you are not replaceable. Somebody can die for you, but nobody can die your death. My interpretation of this, what I think makes this somehow intuitively attractive is – and then he says, that's awareness that you are actually dying right now. And that means, whatever it is that you are doing, it is *your* doing. Somebody may take over your social role, or act on your behalf, but nobody can do your doing. The issue is the indexical singularity of your intentions and actions – and that's quite a formal feature – and

you can explicate this without referring to death. If I am right, what Heidegger wants to point out is that if you're transparent concerning what you are, you know reflectively that your actions are yours and that you are irreplaceable in what it is you are doing. And that's it, that's what makes obvious philosophical sense about Heidegger's thinking on death. And that, I think, plays a big role in the plural case, too. Groups have to come to awareness, an awareness that their actions are theirs. Transparency, reflective transparency means good politics and a knowing what it is we are doing. Because we are doing it anyway, but the knowing of it is important because it's the only way by which we can jointly deliberate and change our ways of life. That has to run through reflective transparency. So how are we going to change our ways? That's reflective transparency. First we have to account for what it is we are doing, and that it is *us* who are doing it.

Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness and Experiential Selfhood: Singular and Plural
Seminar with Dan Zahavi

Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade, June 2017

Dan Zahavi

Introduction

Research on self-consciousness and intersubjectivity has been a main concern of mine for many years. Whereas my PhD was primarily focused on exploring the link between intersubjectivity and objectivity, my Habilitation dealt with the nature of self-consciousness. During the ensuing 15 years, my work continued to be engaged with both topics. What is the nature of selfhood? What is the relation between experiential subjectivity and the first-person perspective? How do we come to understand each other? What is the role of bodily engagement and face-to-face interaction? About 5 years ago, however, I also started getting interested in the link between the I, the you and the we. What is the link between social cognition and collective intentionality? How might the I-thou relation impact or perhaps even enable forms of collective intentionality? How does one come to experience oneself as 'one of us', and how does group-identification modulate the first-personal senses of agency and ownership? Are genuine we-phenomena compatible with a wide variety of different models of self, or should the existence of the former make us reject overly solipsistic and disembodied accounts of the self?

1035

Given my interest in questions like these, I couldn't help being intrigued by some recent texts by Hans Bernhard Schmid, where he argues that a proper understanding of collective intentionality and we-identity requires a convincing account of the "sense of 'us'", that headway can be made regarding the latter by drawing on classical theories of self-awareness, and that plural pre-reflective self-awareness plays the same role in the constitution of a common mind as singular pre-reflective self-awareness plays in the case of the individual mind. In a recent text that constitutes the background for our common discussion, I try to assess these claims.[1] How helpful is the appeal to

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1   Zahavi, D., "Collective intentionality and plural pre-reflective self-consciousness", *Journal of Social Philosophy*, in press.

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pre-reflective self-awareness when it comes to an understanding of we-intentionality, and might the differences between the singular and the plural case ultimately overshadow their similarities?

To summarize my conclusion, I agree with Schmid that a convincing theory of we-intentionality has to factor in the experiential dimension. I endorse the idea that what individuals think and feel when they do it together is not independent of their relation, and I also think it is very important to account for pre-reflective we-relationships, i.e., we-relationships that are lived through rather than being thematically observed or reflectively articulated. I do, however, also think that a closer study of singular and plural pre-reflective self-awareness will reveal that the differences dwarf the similarities. One of our significant disagreements concerns the question of whether a proper account of we-intentionality and communal being-together requires an account of how individuals are experientially interrelated. On my view, any plausible account of the we has to factor in the embodied face-to-face relationship. Schmid by contrast has repeatedly denied that the we is founded upon an other-experience and in any other way involves or presupposes some kind of reciprocal relation between self and other. Furthermore, on my view, singular pre-reflective self-awareness and plural pre-reflective self-awareness do not have the same explanatory power since they are not equally fundamental. If one accepts the standard account of singular pre-reflective self-awareness, which considers it a constitutive feature of phenomenal consciousness as such, it does not depend on and presuppose plural pre-reflective self-awareness, but is rather a condition of possibility for the latter.

1036

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Intersubjectivity may have been at the heart of Husserl's project, as you convincingly suggest. Husserl's project thus can be plausibly interpreted as a sophisticated philosophical account that is not confined to general Cartesian assumptions concerning the nature of the human mind, as usually thought. Yet, looked at from our historical distance, his methodology, and in fact the methodological framework of the debate among phenomenologists, is in some important respects a mirror-image of those in the traditional analytic philosophy of mind. Thus, in both of these strands of the philosophical study of the mind one assumes that adequate categories and general distinctions characterizing consciousness, as well as mental properties in general, can be devised through a step-by-step conceptual deliberation. Intersubjectivity thus enters the analysis as yet another concept that is expected to be slickly conceptually delineated in the web of other relevant concepts, e.g. by

distinguishing various types of emotional co-engagement of subjects (a project started by Scheler), or rather assimilated by a concept in Heidegger's case.

Yet, I contend, figuring out how exactly, and at what exact points of psychological, biological, and evolutionary trajectories, various (including conscious and pre-reflective) aspects of mind become embodied, enacted, or extended into and with the world, must constitute a carefully empirically informed quest, coordinated with the studies of diverse mental experiences across diverse cultures. The task is indeed daunting, yet in a way that Husserl may not have anticipated it. The challenge is then to find ways of adequately employing phenomenological analysis in this comprehensive approach, as a generator of fruitful models and directions for the study of mind, rather than as a foundational account. Thus, a phenomenologist suggests, rather than discovers, adequate mental categories that could be further studied in the above-characterized interdisciplinary way. The question is whether and exactly how, in broad terms, your phenomenological account can fruitfully respond to this challenge and whether it is one of its priorities at all.

1037

Dan Zahavi

Thank you for these questions. Let me respond in a twofold manner. First, what is the best way to characterize the relationship between the methodological framework of the phenomenologists and that of traditional analytic philosophy of mind? Are they really mere mirror-images of each other? I am not so sure. First of all, I do not think that one can talk about analytic philosophy in the singular, as if it was really a well-defined school of philosophy. I think one should rather view 'analytic philosophy' as an umbrella term covering a lot of diversity and heterogeneity. For the same reason, there is not one way that consciousness is being investigated and treated by analytic philosophers. If we consider the way consciousness has been approached by classical analytic philosophy of language, the difference to phenomenology is certainly striking. More generally speaking, however, one might also consider the difference between an analysis that tries to stay close to the messy details of the phenomena and one that proceeds by a priori reasoning.

Now, in response it might be pointed out that analytic philosophy of mind during the last 20-30 years has increasingly opted for a more naturalistic approach, where armchair philosophizing has been replaced by a more interdisciplinary approach. I think there are both advantages and disadvantages to such a move, but I would actually also argue, and this brings me to the second part of my reply, that this openness to empirical research is by no means alien to phenomenology. Indeed, as I have argued in the past, if a naturalized phenomenology means for phenomenology to engage in a fruitful dialogue with empirical science then we should welcome such a naturalization. It will

be beneficial to both sides of the debate. Phenomenology can question and elucidate basic theoretical assumption made by empirical science, just as it might aid in the development of new experimental paradigms. Empirical science can present phenomenology with concrete findings that it cannot simply ignore, but must be able to accommodate; evidence that might force it to refine or revise its own analyses of, say, the role of embodiment, the relation between perception and imagination, the link between time-consciousness and memory, or the nature of social cognition. So yes, to conclude, I would welcome your proposal. I want to retain the difference between philosophy and empirical science. I don't think the former should be absorbed in or replaced by the former. But that doesn't mean that philosophy shouldn't interact with the sciences. Indeed, I would be slightly suspicious of philosophical analyses and distinctions that entirely lacked relevance for and impact on empirical science.

1038

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My question has to do with two research results from developmental psychology.

The first one concerns the case of children with autism. Currently, the criteria for defining and diagnosing autism are closely tied to behavioural problems in three important areas of human functioning: social interaction, social communication, and imagination. These three are known as the triad of impairments (Wing, 1992). What this basically means is that children with autism mostly have trouble reading other people's minds: they have trouble inferring how other people feel and what they think and usually do not know how to communicate their needs to others. Also, they do not get social cues and have a hard time learning what socially acceptable behaviour in a particular situation is. These social impairments are often accompanied with the delay in pretend play, role play, and language development. However, even when children with ASD do develop language sufficiently, the way they use language is rigid, literal and lacks pragmatic function. Their ability for imaginative and abstract reasoning remains limited throughout their life.

Do you think that the case of autism could support your thesis that there could be singular pre-reflective self-awareness without plural self-awareness? In other words, could it be that children with autism lack pre-reflective we and hence don't engage in social orienting, social referencing, and joint attention which further compromises their language acquisition? Or you think that there would be a way for Schmid to respond?

The second research result concerns self-regulation. The world in which the child is born is intrinsically social as the child needs a caregiver if she is to survive. The caregiver needs to be there for the child not only to feed her but to regulate her arousal states so that the child gets enough sleep as well as enough external stimuli that are necessary for normal physical and psychological development (see e.g. Shanker 2013). The child at birth does not have the required regulatory systems in place so the caregiver serves as a sort of the external regulating brain (Tantam 2009) to a child.

Can these insights about development of self-regulation bring some new angle to the discussion on singular pre-reflective self-awareness and plural self-awareness? Would it be easier to interpret them as more compatible with Schmid's or your thesis? Or would you treat the whole issue as irrelevant?

Dan Zahavi

I think you are absolutely right when wondering about whether the case of autism might not constitute a challenge to Schmid's theory. I would even want to develop the challenge a bit further. Consider the case of a young adult with autism who reports that he only realized that there were other people when he was around 7 years of age, that he still doesn't really know what to do with other people, and that he could never have a friend. If we assume that this indicates an impaired ability to adopt and maintain a we-perspective, i.e. plural pre-reflective self-awareness, is there then also reason to think that this goes hand in hand with an impaired ability to have singular pre-reflective self-awareness? Is it accompanied by a lack of phenomenal consciousness and subjective experience? Well, some theory-theorists such as, for instance, Carruthers, have actually defended such a view and have argued that individuals who lack a theory of mind also lack an access to their own mental states and therefore also lack phenomenally conscious states. I would however consider this a *reductio ad absurdum* of the position in question. Furthermore, according to Schmid, social cognition is not a relevant precondition for plural pre-reflective self-awareness. Indeed, if anything it is the latter that is supposed to explain the former. But such an account makes it rather inexplicable why individuals with autism do have difficulties with adopting a we-perspective. An account like my own, which by contrast wants to insist on the importance of second-personal engagement for group-identification and we-membership, will have a much easier time. It is precisely because individuals with autism have impaired social cognitive skills, that they also have difficulties with collective forms of intentionality.

When it comes to your second question, I think we need to distinguish two different claims. It is one thing to argue that we *de facto* live together with others in a public world from birth onwards. It is something else to argue

that first-personal experience is constitutively dependent upon social interaction. To put it differently, we need to distinguish an acknowledgment of the *de facto* co-existence of singular selfhood and intersubjectivity from a claim concerning their constitutive interdependence. I can see plenty of empirical evidence supporting the former view. Indeed, the famous cases of hospitalism discussed by Spitz, suggests that we might not survive in the absence of proper caring and affection, even if we do receive sufficient nutrition. But even such extreme cases fall short of showing that experience, i.e. phenomenal consciousness is constitutively dependent upon social interaction.

Janko Nešić

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1040

I agree with much of your criticism of Schmid's theory of the „we" and would like to add some points. As I see it, phenomenology of subjectivity shows us that pre-reflective self-awareness always points to one self or one dimension of subjectivity, one unifier or bearer of experiences; a single experiencing subject. On the other hand, Schmid's „we", points to many, though these are not fused into one subject or self, as is made explicit by Schmid. Therefore, plural pre-reflective self-awareness is very different from singular pre-reflective self-awareness, contrary to Schmid's claim. If there is only one feeling of sorrow in a group, then „we" is one as a whole, and only as one subject could it have this experience. In that case two people cannot be separate subjects. Pre-reflective self-awareness („me") seems to be irreducible unlike its plural counterpart, the „we", if it is understood in the way Schmid understands it. The phenomenological and the ontological cannot be dissociated as Schmid would want them to be. His account could, perhaps, work if there was only one „we-subject". It is more plausible to claim that there is *pre-reflective other-awareness*, co-subjectivity, co-subject awareness, that is, being pre-reflectively aware of others as subjects in the „we", but there is no fusion of such subjects into a singular „we-subject".

In the light of this comment on Schmid's plural self, I would like to ask a more general question: what is your view on the relation between ontology and phenomenology? Can phenomenological datums of consciousness help us shape our metaphysical theories of consciousness, selfhood and experience? Could we get to metaphysical conclusions about the nature of the self from phenomenological findings?

Dan Zahavi

Your question touches upon a much debated and controversial issue, one that goes far beyond the current focus on individual and plural selfhood. The question is controversial not only because of conflicting views about what

phenomenology has to offer, but also because of persisting disagreements about the relation between Husserlian phenomenology and post-Husserlian phenomenology. Some authors have argued that whereas Husserl's phenomenological project entails a suspension of questions concerning being and reality and a focus on how things appear and what meaning they have for me, later phenomenologists all abandoned this methodological restriction and were quite explicit about their own ontological commitments. As Heidegger famously wrote, "there is no ontology *alongside* a phenomenology. Rather, *scientific ontology is nothing but phenomenology.*" In my view, however, the Husserl interpretation in question is mistaken, and so is the alleged claim concerning a radical difference between Husserl's thinking and that of later phenomenologists. Rather than making reality disappear from view, the aim of Husserl's phenomenological method is precisely to allow reality to be investigated philosophically. This certainly also holds for the reality of consciousness and selfhood. Indeed, when dealing with these topics the absurdity of a non-metaphysical reading of phenomenology should be particular evident. If we for a moment assume that Husserl's method is indeed not concerned with reality but only with an analysis of meaning and that his phenomenological investigation has consequently no implication for what exists, then his rich exploration of consciousness should in principle be compatible with eliminativism about experience. I think that conclusion is absurd. Now, affirming that phenomenological analyses of consciousness can help us shape our metaphysical theories of consciousness, selfhood and experience is, of course, not to say that phenomenological findings are infallible, or that we are always justified in making the move from what seems to us to be the case to what is the case. But just as I think we are entitled to posit the reality of consciousness based on the fact that we are experientially acquainted with it, I think we are entitled to affirm the reality of (experiential) selfhood on the basis of our self-experience.

1041

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Meine Frage schließt sich in etwa an das an, was Sie zuletzt gesagt haben und die Frage der Metaphysik und der Phänomenologie betrifft. Das bezieht sich vor allem auf die Funktion des Wahrnehmungsbegriffs, auch des Anschauungsbegriffs. Meiner Meinung nach, scheint das hier aus phänomenologischen Sicht ein Problem zu sein. Und möglicherweise ahnen Sie schon aus welcher Perspektive diese Kritik kommen könnte – aus heideggerschen wahrscheinlich. Zusammen also mit Heidegger gesprochen, handelt es sich hier um einen phänomenologischen Ansatz, der nicht ganz metaphysikfrei ist. Wie gesagt, hier ist vor allem Husserls Begriff der Anschauung ausschlaggebend, der, wie wir aus den *Logischen Untersuchungen* wissen, oft mit dem

Wahrnehmungsbegriff vermengt wird. Dem würde ich hinzufügen, dass er nicht nur mit dem Wahrnehmungs-, sondern auch mit dem Urimpressions-begriff vermengt wird. Das war also die erste Bemerkung.

Zum zweiten: Um dem phänomenologischen Gebot „zu den Sachen selbst" gerecht zu werden, schlage ich zusammen mit Heidegger vor, nicht bei der Wahrnehmung oder Anschauung bzw. bei der Gegebenheit oder (wie auch immer verstandenen) Präsenz, sondern bei der Absenz und der „Sorge" anzusetzen. Also nicht bei der Selbstwahrnehmung, Selbstgegebenheit, son-dern bei der antizipativen, zukunftsorientierten Selbstsorge. Die Frage laut-et, ob sich so was wie Gegebenheit, Präsenz ursprünglich selbstkonstituieren kann, oder ob eher dem Zukunfstsbezug, dem Entwurf (Seinsentwurf) das Primat bei der Frage der Konstitution zukommt. Man kann auch fragen, was Gegebenheit ist, wie und warum etwas uns gegeben ist. Marion etwa operi-ert auch mit dem Begriff der Gegebenheit. Mir ist aber nicht ganz klar, wie diese Art der Evidenz (der Gegebenheit) zu rechtfertigen ist.

1042

Dann zur dritten Bemerkung: Verweilen wir doch noch bei dem angespro-chenen Anschauungsbegriff von Husserl. Dieser scheint mir nämlich wenig differenziert zu sein. Korrigieren Sie mich, falls ich bei Ihnen doch etwas falsch verstanden habe. Wie wir und bestimmt auch Sie, da Sie darüber ges-chrieben haben, aber aus den *Logischen Untersuchungen* wissen, stellt sich die Sache mit dem Anschauungsbegriff dort etwas komplizierter dar, als man es am Anfang vermutet. Es wird stets von der Gegebenheit, der Wahrnehmung, der Präsenz gesprochen, doch wenn es um die Husserlsche Auffassung der kategorialen Anschauung geht, wird die Sphäre der schlichten Wahrneh-mungsakte überschritten. Denn ausgehend von den schlichten Wahrneh-mungsakten, werden im Zuge der eidetischen Variation die kategorialen Inhalte konstituiert. Und das ohne reflexive Momente. Husserl spricht in die-sem Zusammenhang nicht von der Reflexion. So handelt es sich bei der Kon-stitution des kategorialen Inhaltes "und" um die Verbindung zweier schlichter Wahrnehmungsakte. „Und" ist ein kategorialer Inhalt, der in der schlichten Wahrnehmung nicht gegeben ist. Es wird aber auch keine Kategorie voraus-gesetzt, über die wir dann sich reflexiv auf die Wahrnehmung beziehend eine solche die Wahrnehmung überschreitende Verbindung konstruieren. Und wenn Sie von der Selbstgegebenheit des Selbst sprechen, und dabei etwas mehr als nur einen schlichten Wahrnehmungsakt meinen, wäre interessant zu sehen, wie dieses Selbst konstituiert wird, insofern es bereits kategori-ale Momente beinhaltet. Oder andersrum: Wie kommt ein Selbst zustande, wenn wir innerhalb von dem Konzept der eidetischen Variation verbleiben.

Nun kehren wir zum Schluss wieder zu Heidegger und zu der Frage nach der Zukunft, der Absenz und der Antizipation zurück. Wenn wir also an der An-nahme von dem konstitutiven Vorrang der Zukunft - nicht also der Präsenz

und der Gegebenheit – festhalten, dann bleibt immer noch die Frage, ob sich auch die kollektive Intentionalität mit diesem radikalen Zukunftskonzept (Sein zum Tode, Sein zum Ende) in Einklang bringen lässt. Oder: Lassen sich Kollektive und ihre Intentionen aus dem radikalen Sein zum Ende konstituieren. Man muss schon zugeben, dass der Heideggersche Ansatz gewissermaßen in der Tat solipsistisch ist, so dass davon ausgehend nicht ganz klar wäre, wie sich ein Kollektiv aus der Möglichkeit seines Endes konstituieren könnte. Wie „stirbt" ein Kollektiv, wenn die Formulation erlaubt sei. Ungeachtet dieser Schwierigkeiten mit dem Gedanken der radikalen Endlichkeit in Bezug auf die Kollektive und die kollektive Intentionalität, würde ich mich doch für diese Annahme einsetzen und die Möglichkeit bejahen, und zwar indem ich nicht wie bei Heidegger der Fall die phänomenale Aufweise einer „Todesgewissheit" liefere, sondern indem ich diese Annahme von dem konstitutiven Vorrang der Zukunft in gewisse Weise operationalisiere: denn womit haben wir bei der Differenzierung der kollektiven Intentionalitäten zu tun, wenn nicht mit der Differenzierung im Hinblick auf den Umgang mit den gemeinsamen Seinkönnen. So unterscheidet sich ein kollektives Wir (Selbst) etwa einer Liebesbeziehung von einem kollektiven Wir (Selbst) einer Geschäftsbeziehung nicht aufgrund einer in der Selbstwahrnehmung evident gegebenen Differenz zwischen diesen zwei Gestalten der kollektiven Intentionalität, sondern aufgrund unterschiedlichen Bezugs zu den eigenen Möglichkeiten. Hier geht es um die modalen Unterschiede: der Möglichkeitshorizont einer Liebesbeziehung ist ein anderer als jener einer Geschäftsbeziehung.

1043

Dan Zahavi

Just one word of clarification. The notion of metaphysics is of course very ambiguous, and when I was talking about how phenomenology might have metaphysical implications, and when we now hear about how Heidegger was accusing Husserl's phenomenology of having certain metaphysical presuppositions, we are dealing with two different notions of metaphysics. I guess the main way to understand Heidegger's criticism is that Husserl's phenomenology, on his view, has certain implicit, tacit presuppositions; presuppositions coming from the history of philosophy that have not been sufficiently scrutinized. Of course, this is not what I had in mind when I was talking about the metaphysical implications of phenomenology.

But back to the main issue. I would basically question your whole setup, because you kept saying that I have talked about self-perception and self-intuition, but I've never used those terms. I talked about self-awareness, I did not talk about introspection nor did I talk about self-perception. You seem to be arguing that Husserl and I are understanding self-awareness on the basis of perceptual acts. But I would dispute that. I just don't think it is correct, even though it is a classical criticism, and it is also a criticism that von

Herrmann for instance has been promoting. I really think it's a misunderstanding to view Husserl's investigations as just taking all the insights coming from his discussion of how we perceive perceptual objects and using them to understand the way in which we are aware of our own minds. As I see it, the whole point of Husserl's investigation into self-consciousness, primarily as you find it in his investigations of inner time-consciousness is to try to describe phenomenologically a relation that is utterly different from the kind of act-intentionality that he started out describing in the *Logical Investigations*. So, I would dispute that part of the criticism.

Then there is another criticism which initially might seem more true: it could be that even if self-consciousness is not about *Selbstanschauung*, *Selbstbeobachtung* or self-introspection, perhaps there has been a privileging of presence, of *Urimpression*. And is that not somehow missing out on the importance of temporality, the importance of the future? Just to complicate matters, consider the very different criticism that Husserl has been exposed to by Derrida on the one hand and Michel Henry on the other. They are trying to push Husserl in two completely different directions when it comes to this notion of presence. So, Derrida famously argued, continuing the Heideggerian criticism, that Husserl was a metaphysician of presence, that he was operating with a naïve understanding of self-giveness and that what a proper phenomenological account should recognize would be the priority of absence. Compare that to Henry's criticism, which is the complete opposite. Henry has been criticizing Husserl for putting too much emphasis on absence in his discussion of inner time-consciousness, and has basically argued that Husserl was never able to really capture the full self-presence of immanence, because he kept understanding that self-presence in temporal terms, thereby introducing absence into the very structure of that presence. There seems to be a disagreement within phenomenology about how exactly we should understand Husserl's reflections on this matter. My own view would be that Husserl recognizes the equiprimordiality of presence and absence. I think on his account (this is something I have addressed in one of my previous books) self-consciousness really has to do with this presence/absence interplay. There is no naïve prioritization of a kind of uncontaminated presence, but nor is there a clear prioritization of absence, as if absence can explain presence. Rather, I think that Husserl wants to say that presence and absence go together. One way to understand that is by saying that he precisely took time seriously. Of course, I think that there is still a difference between that view and Heidegger's view, because this is not to say that future is suddenly what is most important. So, I don't think that there is no difference between Husserl and Heidegger. But I do think the claim that Husserl naively prioritised presence, is a misreading. So, I do think that for him time and absence play a role in his account of how *Selbstgegebenheit* has to be understood.

Then there was this issue of categorial intuition. I am not sure, I fully understand your point. I don't think there is any categorial intuition at play in the most fundamental levels of inner time-consciousness. But, of course, those first levels are only the beginning. Husserl would never say that everything important about selfhood and personhood could be captured through an investigation of the infrastructure of time-consciousness, just as I would never argue that everything worth knowing about selfhood and personhood could be understood simply by focusing on pre-reflective self-consciousness or the minimal self. There is a much, much, richer story to be told, which Husserl also discusses, of how personal identity is constituted through commitment to values and norms, how it's constituted within an intersubjective horizon. I think in order to start considering those levels, of course the future would play a role, as well as categorial structures.

The final thing was this issue about whether Heidegger might be able to account for collective intentionality given this appeal to the importance of future. I think you're right, he might be able to do that, but I couldn't quite see why that was supposed to be a criticism of my view, and of my highlighting of the importance of the face-to-face relationship. To take an example, I go to the cinema, I sit next to somebody that I've never met before. We are seeing the movie together and somehow we end up enjoying the movie together, in the sense that I am having an enjoyment that I wouldn't have had just by myself and vice versa. This would have been a very small, very brief, joint collective emotion. Of course, even that has a certain diachronic structure, it's not entirely synchronic, so to that extent even a short-lived emotion has temporality. But I don't see why it should necessarily involve long-term plans for the future. So again, I don't see why your reference to Seinkönnen and the future, why that should be an objection to anything I have said. If the claim would be that each and every shared emotion necessarily has to incorporate long-term future plans, then I would say I don't find that convincing. I think there can be very short-term dyadic interactions that can also give rise to certain shared experiences.

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First I would like to mention that without bodily experience we cannot establish that in fact pre-reflective self-awareness genuinely exists. For example, if someone asks me today whether I have been drinking water or writing on my Mac or listening to the discussion, my answer is based on a clear sense of what I have been doing. That is, I think, the only argument that phenomenology can give us in favour of pre-reflective self-awareness.

Thus, it is clear that pre-reflective self-awareness is 'non-objectual', 'non-objectifying', 'non-observational', 'non-thematic', 'non-conceptual', 'intrinsic', 'implicit' or 'tacit'. But if we think this 'sense of us' as 'sense of agency', then that is the sense that I am the one who is causing an action. For example, that I am the one – as your colleague Gallagher said once – who is generating a certain thought in my stream of consciousness. Bearing that in mind, we could make a distinction between, let's call it, a 'feeling of agency' and a 'judgment of agency', i.e. between pre-reflective self-awareness, which is based on sensorimotor processes, and reflective self-awareness, or belief-like processes.

That's why I believe that you are right in criticizing Schmid's introduction of normativity in his notion of plural pre-reflective self-awareness. For sure, it is not plausible at all how Schmid can successfully defend his thesis that, I quote, "[p]lural self-awareness is the normative pressure that drives us towards a unified shared perspective with a coherent set of attitudes that commit us, jointly." – Especially if plural pre-reflective self-awareness is also based on sensorimotor processes.

As I already mentioned, I'm working right now with Schmid on my thesis on the constitutive account of social ontology, and I believe that only a constitutive account can help us to form a proper understanding of group agency or collective intentionality, because groups are constituted by normative principles and entertain normative relations to others. At least that is true for large groups – corporations, universities, political parties and so on. Institutions need a normative identity – mainly through founding (written or non-written) acts and constitutional norms – that direct their practices. For example, a decision to launch a company, establish a cartel, found a university are all examples of forming group agents. I think that Bernhard Schmid tied his notion of plural pre-reflective self-awareness more to the way in which Margaret Gilbert is doing her social ontology, that is more to the notion of joint commitment, and to small, dyadic groups.

But if one bases social ontology on the analysis of joint commitment within small groups, one cannot show the experiential fact that we can still identify ourselves with a group even when we have reasons to criticize its ways of acting. Social reality often entails that we are members of particular groups — but in doing so, we have to ask ourselves whether this makes sense, not only from the perspective of us as a part of the group agent, but also from our individual perspective. Surely, you are acquainted with how Edith Stein began with the analysis of *Einfühlung* and ended in the Abteilung "Individuum und Gemeinschaft" in her *Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften* with the analysis of leaders of groups, with some kind of authoritarian social ontology. I quote „Das Vorhandensein einer Führerschaft aber ist konstitutiv für die Gemeinschaft…

Ein einziger starker Führer kann ausreichen, um eine Gemeinschaft zusammenzuhalten..." I do not think that Schmid`s notion of plural subjects could comprehend this, or Gurwitsch`s objection that *Einfühlung* is not enough for properly describing the 'sense of us', which also entails different kinds of hospitality (what you mentioned yesterday).

To summarize, Schmid`s concept of plural pre-reflective self-awareness is more suitable for small, dyadic joint commitment groups, than to large groups, which are also and perhaps essentially constructed through a group agent's normative self-understanding, self-conception and through founding legal acts and documents. This in turn drives us more to the political sphere of social life, and to plural subjects without pre-reflective self-awareness, but with the constitutive normative self-determination.

Igor Cvejić

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1047

I have three brief questions. First question is very general, about your understanding of other-directedness and empathy. I am coming here from the perspective of affective intentionality *sui generis*, defended today mostly by Peter Goldie, Jan Slaby and Bennett Helm. You used this term, intentionality *sui generis*, referring for example to Edit Stein. So my question is: why do you use this term, and what is the typical mark of we-intentionality, why is it *sui generis*? For example, some of the most obvious marks used to describe affective intentionality *sui generis* are that how something is felt constitutes intentionality, but also that affective intentionality is directed practically, that we have direct engagement with the world. These notions are very important also when you refer to what Husserl says about affectivity, motivation, life, and so on. Where I was a bit confused was when you followed Husserl, and went back to the perception in the question of empathy and other-directedness. Would you say that perception would be some cognitive part of empathy, but that there is also something irreducible to cognition in it, specifically when we speak about motivation and different kinds of empathy, one kind being when we are recognizing the other, having perception of the other, but being passive, whereas in the other cases we have shared feelings with others and we are engaged in a "mutual play"?

My second question, related to the text, is about affective self-awareness mostly as defended by Jan Slaby. It is important for example for Peter Goldie, for the integration of phenomenal consciousness and the feeling theory, so that phenomenal consciousness is actually constituted and is constitutive for the intentional content. For Jan Slaby, briefly, when he speaks about affective self-awareness, it is important that it is at the same time the consciousness of the object

and of the world. For example, when I am afraid of something, it is not only accompanied by me feeling myself vulnerable, but being afraid of something is constituted by me feeling myself vulnerable. We cannot differentiate these parts: we have affective self-awareness and at the same time we have objective directedness to the world. So, my question is related to this fourth requirement: the difference condition. It is not a problem with your objections to Schmid, but I am just confused with respect to how easy the object and the question of object-directedness have just disappeared at some point from the question about the relation of emotion and experience and the we-awareness. To put this another way: when Slaby speaks about object, of course he almost always means situation. When we have affective pre-reflective self-awareness, we are dependent on the situation we are in, and then he speaks about feelings as at-mosphere. I don't think this is in general a critique of your thesis, I think it could be very much in line with your argument, but I just needed a better argu-ment of how the object, or rather the situation, disappeared from the question.

1048

My third very short question is about what you said yesterday at the lecture, and about something that we are doing here: how empathy can become a so-cial act? The important thing here is that, briefly, someone else is conscious of me looking at him, conscious that I am conscious of him, and so on. I think the difficult problem in social ontology, but also if we want to understand social change, is the intersubjective relation, when the other is not here or when we have to mobilize or invite someone, to create an intersubjective relation with a wider range of people. So, could this argument be used to say that what we are doing if we are socially engaged is inviting the other to be conscious that we are consciously engaged in inviting them and that we are changing ourselves in response to how they react to our engagement?

Dan Zahavi

Let me start with two comments to the first speaker. I am not in disagreement about the importance of embodiment and the reason why it might not have featured so prominently in my *Self and Other* book, as in some of my previ-ous books, was not, of course, that I had dropped the idea that embodiment is important, Rather, as I point out in one section, I was trying to present the notion of minimal self in such a way that it would stay neutral vis-à-vis the embodiment question, in the hope of making the argument appealing also to people who might be aversive to a strong embodiment claim. So that's the reason why embodiment doesn't feature prominently in my most recent book, but it's not that I am in any way denying the importance of embodi-ment for experience and self-consciousness.

Then you very briefly mentioned that the only argument one might give as phenomenologist for the existence of pre-reflective self-awareness was this

ability to somehow recall on one hand what one had been doing in the past. This is the kind of argument you also find in Sartre: had I not been aware of the experience when it happened, I would not be able to recall it subsequently. That's one argument, but it is not the only argument. Another argument would be of a more indirect kind, it would be an argument by elimination, where the point would be that all the other accounts of self-awareness fail. (There might then be a methodological question of whether this is really a phenomenological argument or whether it is more an argument phenomenologists might employ.) But in any case, the idea would be to say that we need something like pre-reflective self-awareness if reflection is to be possible, because reflection cannot ground itself. I think this is also an argument for the existence of pre-reflective self-awareness, which is very different from the argument you are making. So, I think there might be different strategies one could pursue. The argument from memory is not the only one available.

Then, before commenting on the main issue about agency, I just want to mention one thing *a propos* your reference to Stein and the importance of the *Führer*. I think it must have been a question of the time these discussions were taking place in, because you find a comparable discussion in Gurwitsch. In the final part of his book that I was referencing yesterday, Gurwitsch discusses fusional or charismatic groups. Yesterday, I only mentioned two kinds of groups: partnerships and communities, but Gurwitsch actually mentions a third kind, which is a group that is somehow centered around a charismatic leader, some kind of sect basically, where you give up your identity and fuse with other members, and where this process gravitates around the charismatic leader. When you read his text today, this final part seems a bit odd. The difference between society or partnership on the one hand, and community on the other is fairly straightforward. But to claim that fusional groups are equally fundamental, and not simply a rare occurrence, is surprising. Perhaps one reason for Gurwitsch's inclusion of this group formation, and perhaps the reason for Stein's reference to the Führer as well, is that they both reflect the political situation in Germany.

1049

But now to the final issue about group agency. I guess one way to reply is that if we exclusively understand we-intentionality in terms of group agency, then I can better understand why there are these references to the importance of coherence, normativity, etc. But I would have a problem with defining we-formations exclusively as agents. Why is there not a passive dimension to groups as well. What about affective sharing? I don't see why something like enjoying a movie or sunset together should not qualify as a shared experience, even though we are not doing something, trying to accomplish something. I think it has been a major problem in recent discussions that the focus has been so exclusively on joint action, rather than also considering, say, the role of affectivity. I think Schmid would be on board with this,

since he is certainly also interested in emotional experiences. But then we are back to the question of why normativity has to play such an important role.

As you point out, there might be a need for a very different analysis when it comes to smaller groups *vis a vis* corporations, but as far as I know, Schmid has recently been talking about corporations. There are these examples he gives of General Motors regretting their past environmental policies, so he certainly has examples featuring big corporations. He is not only focusing on the commitments of small groups.

(To Igor Cvejić) I am not sure I got the second question unfortunately, but the first question was this issue of to what extent empathy can be classified as a *sui generis* act, when perception somehow seems to be a precondition…

Igor Cvejić

1050

Is perception crucial, or is something that is *sui generis* emotional crucial?

Dan Zahavi

The way I have presented it in some of my articles is that empathy shares certain features with perception, but that it also in important ways differs from perception. Consider Husserl's classical distinction between different modes of intentionality, you can think about the Eiffel Tower, see a photo of the Eiffel Tower, or you can stand in front of the Eiffel Tower. These are three different ways of intending the same object: signitive intention, pictorial intention and perception. The question is then, where should we fit empathy? Is it more like signitive intentions, is it more like pictorial intentions or is it more like perceptual intentions? My argument would be that I think there are important differences, but if we had to choose between those three, I think empathy has most in common with perception. Why is that? Because I think one of the classical arguments Husserl provides for the primacy of perception when it comes to act-intentionality is that perception presents us directly with the object itself in propria persona. If I am looking at a photo of the object by contrast, there is a clear way in which I can get epistemically closer to the object, namely by perceiving it. When it comes to empathy, you can contrast empathy as a way of understanding others with far more indirect and inferential ways of understanding others. For example, imagine that you are paying a visit to a friend of yours, who is not at home. When you enter his office, you see that all his letters from his ex-wife have been torn to pieces and spread around the room. You infer: "My friend is upset about his divorce". This manner of coming to understand the other is a very inferential, indirect way. Contrast that with the case where you are sitting in front of your friend, you are talking about the divorce and

suddenly he starts crying, and you then have an understanding of him being distressed about his divorce. I think the latter for Husserl would be a case of empathy. The claim would be that that is the most direct way you can come to grasp the others' distress; it is a much more direct way than to infer the other's distress because you see all the torn letters. That's what makes empathy more perception-like. There are of course also important differences, one of them concerns the issue of elusiveness. Empathy provides us with an understanding of the other, but it's a way that also preserves the otherness of the other, because we can never grasp the experience of the other in the same way as that experience is given to the other. So, I think empathy might have something in common with perception, but it cannot be reduced to perception, and it cannot be accounted for by simply adding something else to perception. In short, I don't think it's possible to reductively explain empathy. The only question one could then still ask is this: Assume that you were blind and deaf and paralyzed, etc., in short, imagine that you were deprived of all your perceptual abilities, would you then be able to empathize with somebody else? I would say no, because you cannot engage in a face-to-face interaction with somebody else if you have no sensory faculties. That perhaps seems to suggest that even if empathy is irreducible, it still has perception as a certain precondition.

1051

The last question had to do, if I understood it correctly, with whether some of the insights coming from the discussion of the relationship between empathy and social acts involving bidirectionality, mutual reciprocity, recognition, whether that model could be expanded to also include interaction between groups of people who are absent. Can we scale it up? I think we need to recognize the presence of some important differences here, which is why I don't think one could simply scale it up. Imagine for instance that you are the U.S. president and that you are signing a law giving equal rights to all Americans, despite their different skin color, ethnic background etc. That act could certainly be seen as amounting to a recognition of a certain group. But even so, it is an act of recognition that differs dramatically from what is at stake in the face-to-face interaction. In the latter case, there will be a constant feedback from the addressee, there will be a constant calibration: I am doing something, you are reacting, that is somehow influencing me and vice versa…You will not have this real-time reciprocity when you are engaged in acts of recognition vis-à-vis absent groups. But I don't think that is to say that an investigation of these larger-scale situations should completely dispense with small-case scenarios, because I think it would be very unlikely that you would be able to engage in large-scale acts of recognition, had you not been exposed to and engaged in the small-scale ones. I think we acquire certain capacities and certain interpersonal understanding in those dyadic, triadic, small group encounters that we are drawing on when we want to engage in

large-scale ones. So I think we have to recognize the difference, but I would also want to say that small scale interaction is a precondition for large scale policies. I think there is a founding relationship.

I just couldn't understand the question about the object disappearing…

Igor Cvejić

If self-awareness presupposes interdependence with situation, then one could argue that plural self-awareness is constituted by the same situation we are in. For me it wasn't that understandable how the problem that they are in the same situation, that they intend the same object, easily disappeared.

Dan Zahavi

1052

Now I understood it much better. I think it's one thing to argue that self-awareness is not objectifying in the sense that the experience in question isn't taking itself as object in order to be given. To say that is not to deny that there might be objects or situations present in order for self-awareness to occur, because what we have to remember is the kind of experiences that are self-aware in the first place. These are typically intentional experiences, so it's my perception of the bottle that is self-aware, and there wouldn't be a perception of the bottle if there were not an object for that perception to target. So, all this talk about pre-reflective self-consciousness being non-objectifying is not supposed to entail that it doesn't involve a relation to the world. In fact, to think that we somehow cut the link to the world and retreat into an enclosed subjective sphere when we focus on pre-reflective self-awareness is a misunderstanding. We are world embedded, but that goes hand in hand and is fully compatible with the presence of a non-objectifying form of self-consciousness. Now, I think one could say something similar about plural self-consciousness, and this is actually something that Schmid has highlighted, but which you can also find already in Schütz. What Schütz says on some occasions is that a we-experience is primarily pre-reflective in nature in the sense that it is not something we thematize. Now, what does he mean by that? I think one way to understand it is as follows: if we are standing in a dyadic relation, where we pay attention to each other, this is actually something of an anomaly, because normally when we do or experience something together, our focus is not each other, but on the shared context. Schütz says that the moment we start to reflect upon the we-relationship, we are actually already living it, we are already engaged in it, and that the very reflection might actually disrupt it. What this highlights is the question of whether we-relationships should primarily be viewed as dyadic, or as triadic. And I think I would agree, they are triadic, they do involve the world. But these kinds of triadic we-relations are, in my view, possible on the basis of certain dyadic relations, whereas Schmid

seems to say: forget about dyadic relationship, because issues pertaining to social cognition, to interpersonal understanding, to the I-Thou relationship are all just a red herring, and are not going to help us understand the nature of we-intentionality. I would disagree with that, I think that the reason why we can engage in these specific triadic interactions very much depend on specific processes playing themselves out in the dyadic relations.

Srđan Prodanović

Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory
University of Belgrade, Serbia

I am a sociologist, so my question will be somewhat directed from my discipline, although I think that phenomenology and sociology had great influence on each other in the constitutive period, and also later. Firstly, I would like to consider some epistemological implications of your social ontology. Namely, coming from the pragmatist tradition, I am very much inclined to agree both with your skepticism regarding those types of accounts of we-intentionality that advocate some sort of "phenomenal fusion", as well as with your proposition that, following Husserl, we must preserve plurality within our sense of togetherness. However, I was wondering in which way does your defense of this plurality influence efforts of social scientist (and especially sociologists) to understand social reality? For example, if we experience oneself as one of us thanks to our everyday social interactions, then, phenomenologically founded scientific explanation would have to, if we follow Schütz for example, take very seriously common-sense understanding and cannot reject as easily as for example positivism can common-sense norms, common-sense intersubjectivity, culturally given common-sense categories. Furthermore, does this plurality mean that in order to scientifically understand collective action I must in some way follow theoretical cues from Schütz, Goffman or Garfinkel and study the way in which institutions are reproduced in concrete everyday situations? This, I think, raises some old questions and old skepticism regarding phenomenological sociology and its methodological individualism. That is, we cannot consider for example power relations in the emergence and development of institutions, of large structures of we-intentionality.

Second, I would like to hear your thoughts regarding an issue, that many of my colleagues find intriguing, and that is the intersubjectivity of social change. Let me start with a quote from your paper "Intersubjectivity, sociality, community" where you explain Husserl's take on the communicative engagement:

Both of us, you and I, "look each other in the eyes", you understand me, is aware of me, just as I am simultaneously aware of you. I then address you and seek to influence you. For instance, I might call your attention to a common

object by pointing at it. If successful, your attention will shift from my expression to the intended object. In this way, my intention is realized in you (Husserl 1973b: 167-168).

I was just trying to explicitly ask the following question: can this attention to object be directed at something that is negative, for example, can I say look at that injustice, look at that bad practice, socially constructed bad practice? And could that act of engagement then constitute a new kind of institution that could bring some kind of radical change, that could go beyond given, concrete social, cultural facts that are commonsensically understood?

Marjan Ivković

Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory
University of Belgrade, Serbia

1054   My question elaborates a bit on Srđan's question. I am also a sociologist and I am also largely interested in your view on the logic of social change and social dynamics. So, I would like to keep focusing on the problem of communication, and I'd like to ask what would be your position with respect to Schmid's argument, namely that communicative action cannot establish shared meanings because it has to rest upon the more fundamental plural pre-reflective self-awareness? Basically, I understand that this is a direct criticism of Habermas and his notion that communicative action generates radically new meanings basically, and that the logic of social change and historical progress is the one of rational expansion of…

Dan Zahavi

So, just to be sure I understood, do you mean Schmid's criticism of Habermas?

Marjan Ivković

Schmid's criticism, of course, and my question is what is your position with respect to Schmid's argument. So, basically Habermas's argument is that over the course of history more and more aspects of social reality become transformed on the basis of communicative action, primarily the political system, which becomes more rational, more reasonable, more prone to questioning. Let me just expand a bit on this, because there is the so called third generation of critical theory, Axel Honneth primarily and also some other authors who have tried to go beyond Habermas, tried to expand this perception of social change. Honneth argues that there is such thing as a normative surplus in social reality, rather than semantic surplus of institutionalized norms of action, and that the way social change occurs is by way of actors experiencing the existing social order as unjust or as insufficient in any respect, and on the

basis of this experience developing what he calls a shared semantics, a kind of new vocabulary which would enable individual actors to develop shared normative orientation and try to institutionalize their new viewpoint within a social system. What I think of Honneth's perspective in light of Schmid's and your arguments, it seems to me that the concept of experiential sharing becomes very important. So, in a way, Honneth would be in agreement with Schmid more than with Habermas, that it is the pre-discursive experience of injustice that is the key factor behind social change. But then there is a question of how does this experience of injustice translate into normative claims. There seems to be a missing link there because if we presuppose that linguistic communication cannot generate radically new meanings, shared meanings, then we have to locate the normative innovation within the realm of experience. Now, this comes much closer to some strands of neo-pragmatism, for example to Richard Rorty, who argues that the way social change occurs is that individual actors start using radically new linguistic terms. And this is the result of some idiosyncratic factors and then gradually their language starts to resonate with the language of some other actors. There is no general theory of how this happens, but people start speaking in a way first actors started to speak and this is how what he called metaphors or radically new terms become internalized, become routinized and generalized within this new social reality. Now, my question is first of all, what is the relation to Schmid's argument about the epiphenomenal nature of communication, and second, how you see these attempts to theorize the normative surplus and experience of injustice and what would be your position?

Olga Nikolić

Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory
University of Belgrade, Serbia

First of all, I would like to say that I agree with the basic thrust of your critique of Schmid, I think that there is no plural awareness before singular awareness, but I do think that some points where you are criticizing Schmid can actually make some sense, so I would like to suggest how I can see that they make sense and to hear your thoughts on this. First of all, the phenomenal fusion, I think that in some cases it can actually be a good way to describe certain situations. For example, I think that the concert hall example is maybe not a good one. A better example would be a group of friends, talking, interacting, having a good time, enjoying themselves. This situation actually consists of many individual acts, individual I-Thou relations and we could say that they are somehow fused together, many interchanges are happening, that create some sort of singular mood in which all are participating in their own individual way. So, this is kind of the way I can understand this phenomenal fusion. The other thing is I can also understand Schmid's comparison

1055

of plural pre-reflective self-awareness and singular, how they can work in a similar way because, let's take the situation with a group of friends, we are not reflectively aware of each other, we are not reflecting on ourselves as a group, but this experience in which we are pre-reflectively aware of each other makes it possible to later reflect upon. So, this experience actually enables us to reflect, and to say "we really had a good time, that day" and so on. I wouldn't go further in stressing the similarities between plural and singular case. This is the first question, so what are your thoughts on this?

The second is, I find it interesting to think about how many various forms of we-intentionality there are actually, and how many different ways that the we-intentionality is constituted. There are some that require a feeling of togetherness and some that don't require a feeling of togetherness, just a shared common goal, instrumental rationality, or joint commitment but not this emotional bonding. So, there are many different ways to act as a group, to form a group. And this made me think that maybe there are many ways that we empathize. Maybe there are different kinds of empathy, different ways to empathise, maybe I am empathizing in a different way with a member of my family than with somebody I barely know?

Then, maybe we should also take into account temporal dimension when we are making this distinction, so in the example with the mother and father, their common past actually enables them to have experiential sharing, while on the other hand in the example of the concert hall, I don't think you could say that we have experiential sharing in this strong sense. Maybe the performers, I could understand how the performers could have this joint emotion, this emotional sharing, but the audience, this seems more as an aggregate of many singular experiences plus emotional contagion.

Finally, what about social meanings that are circulating within a community? They can actually affect the way we immediately react to a person and immediately form an I-Thou relation. For example, I can immediately perceive a person in a particular way pre-reflectively, based on what that person is wearing. There is some sort of immediacy here but it's not empathy. Can that influence the way I empathize or the way I form the I-Thou relation?

Dan Zahavi

I think I will start with the last question and then move to the more sociological questions subsequently. So, just to make it clear, when Schmid is talking about phenomenological fusion, he is not talking about states where there is no longer differentiation. Even though you might think that that is actually what he has in mind, he is very explicit about that not being the case. He clearly rejects the idea that a We is simply a kind of bigger scale I. So Schmid

does preserve plurality, he is completely on board with that. Then, of course, you might wonder if that's what he means, isn't it then a bit unfortunate to use the term phenomenological fusion, because fusion seems to indicate that there is no longer any differentiation. But I think this is really a terminological issue, rather than a substantial one. So, I would agree with you, and so would Schmid, that we can be together in ways where there is a preservation of plurality. You then also say that the fact that pre-reflective plural self-awareness precedes reflective plural self-awareness is an area where there is a clear similarity to the relation between singular pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness. Now, I am of course not denying that, the question is merely whether that similarity is sufficient in order to substantiate the more substantial claims of Schmid, i.e., when he claims that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes the unity of the mind in a similar way in both the singular and the plural case.

Let me move on to the question concerning different forms of togetherness. Perhaps one way to think about it is to consider Walther's talk of *gefühlende Zusammengehörigkeit*. Gurwitsch took this notion to involve an emphasis on the *Gefühl*, such that the social formation is characterized by a specific emotional component. But perhaps one can interpret Walther in such a way that the focus is not on the emotion but on the togetherness, and where the best interpretation would be one that took her to be targeting a specific *sense* of togetherness. If that is the case, then I am not sure it is that easy to find counter-examples, i.e., group formations that do not include it. You mentioned joint commitment, but I don't understand what a joint commitment is, if it lacks this sense of togetherness.

Olga Nikolić

It is based on some norm that we are all committed to.

Dan Zahavi

Yes, but I think it is important to differentiate between us doing something in parallel because we are all committed to same norm, and us doing something together. I might be convinced that in order to be healthy I have to run 20 km every day. Ten thousand other people in Denmark have been convinced by the same idea, and have embraced the same norm; they also run every morning, so we are all following the same norm, but I don't think this is a joint commitment in any interesting sense of the term. I don't think we would be collectively doing something together.

Having said this, I do of course want to acknowledge that there are importantly different group-formations. Think for instance about the question of

whether we empathize differently with family members and in-group members. Here one question is what exactly we mean by empathy. If you by empathy mean compassion and sympathy, which is how it's often used, then I think it's clear that we have positive biases *vis a vis* family members and in-group members. Indeed, there is plenty of social psychology literature in support of that. So that's kind of uncontroversial. But what if we offer a more deflationary notion of empathy, where empathy is about grasping the psychological significance of expressions? Are there also differences there? The answer seems to be affirmative. We might indeed have an easier time decoding the emotional expressions of in-group members.

Ljiljana Radenović

There is a number of experiments done by Walker-Andrews, on the development of recognition of facial expressions in infants. The results show that the infants start recognizing facial expressions initially in their mom, but only when it comes together in all modalities, when the kid sees the mom, hears the mom, the mom touches the kid. And only later on the kid starts to be able to differentiate facial expressions only by singular modality, so when the kid sees the mom smiling, but no touching, no vocalisations. So, it goes along this line, so it's not really that weird that we can actually recognize quickly facial expression of in-group members. So, that's interesting.

Dan Zahavi

Let me add two more things. In my book *Self and Other*, I introduced a distinction between the *that*, the *what* and the *why*. There is a clear difference between recognizing the other as sad, or angry or fearful, and recognizing *why* the other person is sad, angry or fearful. Obviously, there are many situations where we can realize the first without yet having any clue about the second. Some phenomenologists would say that these are two different levels of empathy. One level has to do with a recognition of *what* kind of state the other is in, and then there is a richer notion that includes an understanding of *why* the other is in that state. In order to understand why, we need to understand the context, what preceded or what follows, etc. But you could potentially also argue for the distinction between the *what* and the *that*, where the claim would be, in some cases I might think I recognize that you are sad, and then subsequently I realize that you were not sad, you were just nostalgic or absent-minded, so I might have been wrong in assigning this specific emotional state to you, let alone understanding why you were in that state. But even in those cases, when I misattribute a specific emotional state to you, I am still completely correct in ascribing mindedness to you. So, to put it differently, I might misattribute specific emotional states to people with minds,

I don't misattribute specific mental states to bottles. So, even in those cases where I might be wrong about *what* state you are in, I am typically correct about you being in some kind of state in the first place. I think the only cases where we might be wrong about this would be, for instance, if we go into a panopticon and you think this is a statue, but it's actually a guard or *vice versa*. In short, there are of course some limit situations, but they are rare. So the question would be if this recognition of mindedness constitutes the most elementary level of empathy, which if you want to have a naturalistic explanation, would probably concern understanding of animacy and perhaps biological movement. If it does, then we can return to the question of whether there on this very basic level are cultural differences, differences pertaining to ingroup/outgroup differences. I am not convinced there are.

What about typifications? Schütz has done a lot of work there, showing how, in our interaction with all kinds of people, very soon we are beyond the dyadic relation, we are drawing on certain types, typifications that facilitate our social engagement, so every time I type a new person, I do not have to start from scratch. So, if I meet a new person, say in the academic context, there are all kinds of presuppositions involved that facilitate my engagement with him or her. Of course, I might be wrong, but normally these presuppositions aid my understanding, and might also affect the employment of higher levels of empathy.

Let me finally try to address the sociological questions, which are more foreign to me. I think we need to distinguish between the claim that an investigation of micro-sociological structures has is own merits and the claim that any kind of more complex sociological phenomenon can be understood on the basis of an investigation of such structures. If you want to understand systemic power hierarchies, it might be difficult to see how investigations of very concrete encounters can help there. I do think you will need diverse models, but what I would keep insisting upon, is that first of all, the respect for this diversity also has to go the other way. One should in short avoid assuming that a focus on macro-structures can explain everything that needs to be explained concerning micro-structures. Secondly, I would ascribe a certain primacy to the micro-sociology. I find it doubtful that one can really carry out an exhaustive investigation of the macro-structures without some understanding of individuals and of dyadic interpersonal relations.

You referenced a quote from Husserl. I think it's a very clear example of what psychologists would classify as a move from dyadic to triadic attention. I think that's basically what he is describing. I don't think you can without further ado take that very basic structure and then talk about how social change might occur. Husserl is interested in how we shift our focus of attention from the two of us to an external object. If you want a model accounting

1059

for and addressing societal change, I think we need a completely different set of tools. This is not simply about moving from the dyadic to the triadic case.

(To Marjan Ivković) So I guess one question one could ask *vis a vis* Schmid's view that any communication basically presupposes shared ground, is the following: if that's the model you are committed to, where does change occur, where do new ideas come from, how do new group formations occur? Because it all somehow seems to be presupposed from the very outset, and that somehow does not strike me as a very appealing theory. It seems to remain a very static model. To say that communication doesn't really change anything is difficult to accept. Even if I want to argue that pre-linguistic communication and pre-linguistic interaction have a very important role to play, we should recognize that the moment linguistic communication enters the picture everything gets so much more complex and sophisticated. To say that this is just an extrapolation of existing structures, and that it basically merely articulates what was already there, is hard to accept.

1060

But then there was this issue of Honneth, you were saying that he might side more with Schmid than with Habermas, in so far as Honneth is prepared to accept the importance of the pre-discursive dimension. I agree with that, but I also think there are some elements in Honneth's view that seems to align his view with mine. In *Reification*, Honneth talks about the importance of a kind of recognition that takes place at a very basic level, even prior to recognizing and ascribing specific properties to others. I take that to be somewhat reminiscent of empathy on the *that* level, where we are not yet ascribing specific mental states to others, but simply recognizing each other as co-subjects. Schütz talks about a *Du-Einstellung*. In so far as Honneth wants to make room for that kind of recognition on the pre-discursive dimension, I think that moves him much closer to my position than Schmid's position since this recognition, this reciprocal dyadic relation, is precisely something I am emphasizing, whereas Schmid seems to consider it to be of no real importance. In fact, he clearly says that the I-Thou relation is a latecomer, and that it doesn't play a formative role for we-intentionality. In any case, I certainly see Honneth as representing a development of the Frankfurt school that is much more open to phenomenology than Habermas.

STUDIES AND ARTICLES

STUDIJE I ČLANCI

II

Snježana Prijić – Samaržija
Inka Miškulin

Epistemic Justice as a Virtue in Hermeneutic Psychotherapy

Abstract   The value turn in epistemology generated a particularly influential new position – virtue epistemology. It is an increasingly influential epistemological normative approach that opts for the intellectual virtues of the epistemic agent, rather than the truth-value of the proposition, as the central epistemic value. In the first part of this article we will attempt to briefly explain the value turn and outline the basic aspects of virtue epistemology, underlining the diversity of epistemic attitudes associated with this approach and their positive impact on expanding epistemological horizons. The second part will be focused on the virtues of epistemic responsibility and epistemic justice as particularly appropriate for evaluating social processes such as, for example, testimony and conversational practices in general. In the third section we will show how the psychiatric and psychotherapeutic communicational act can be more efficiently analyzed and evaluated from the perspective of the virtue of epistemic justice, than from the traditional epistemic approach based on a monist concept of truth. The fourth and fifth section synthesize the discussion by introducing the concept of hermeneutic psychotherapy as a therapeutically and epistemically favorable framework for evaluating communicational acts in psychotherapy.

Keywords: virtue epistemology, epistemic responsibility, epistemic justice, philosophy of psychiatry and psychotherapy, testimony, hermeneutic psychotherapy

1063

1. Introduction

Truth has been traditionally considered the fundamental and principal epistemic value and goal, analogously to the role of good/right in ethics, the significance of justice in political philosophy or of beauty in aesthetics. However, increasingly intense debates regarding epistemic values and intellectual virtues within the last two decades have resulted in the introduction of plural epistemic goals and virtues as an alternative to the traditional value monism of truth (Kvanvig 2005, Haddock, Millar and Pritchard 2009)

Discussions regarding epistemic values are partially related to different understandings of epistemology as a philosophical discipline and of the scope of its research topics. If epistemology is narrowly understood as a theory of knowledge, then it is natural to define the truth-value of beliefs as the fundamental epistemic goal and limit the role of the epistemologist to defining

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the conditions of justification and conceptually analyzing knowledge in general (David 2001). However, if we define the goal of epistemology as an inquiry into the very process of acquiring knowledge – into different ways of forming beliefs, distinct cognitive products such as assumptions and working hypotheses, doxastic attitudes such as trust or belief revision, and various kinds of cognitive accomplishments such as attributing meaning to empirical data and finding solutions to problems – then it is possible to propose different epistemic values. Following the latter understanding of epistemology, its central aim becomes not only to define and determine the conditions of knowledge, but to critically assess the cognitive processes of making decisions and acquiring beliefs, the doxastic attitudes of evaluating, retaining or revising beliefs, and the influence of society on epistemic processes and their outcomes[1]. Successful acquisition of knowledge does not necessarily need to be evaluated in terms of true beliefs, but can rather strive towards adjusting beliefs to experience, achieving coherence with evidence and empirical adequacy, promoting understanding, nurturing theoretical wisdom, producing rational assumptions and promising working hypotheses, or at conducting epistemically responsible research (Kvanvig 2005, 2010)

It is possible to simultaneously accept the list of epistemic values suggested by Jonathan Kvanvig and to consider truth the only, ultimate and primary epistemic goal, as long as we reduce the aforementioned values to instruments which indicate that certain beliefs, hypotheses and assumptions have a chance of being true, or that certain processes have a chance of successfully leading to truth[2]. In this sense, the final acquisition of true beliefs would render all these additional epistemic values less important. If I have a true belief about the proper route leading to the cathedral, it is no longer relevant whether this belief is congruent with my experience or whether it is based on reliable evidence[3]. Faced with this value problem, Kvanvig argues that epistemic value is not reducible to external success, or the formation of true beliefs, and that certain internal components of the the process of

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1   Such an understanding of epistemology coincides with John Locke's original definition of epistemology as the study of the possibility of attaining true beliefs, the processes of cognition and the scope of knowledge (Locke 1690). An extensive account of epistemology that acknowledges the epistemic properties of social processes and institutions is, for example, also fully accepted by Alvin I. Goldman (Goldman 2010).

2   Such a monist or reductionist perception of truth as the only intrinsic epistemic value is defended by, for example, L. BonJour, W. Alston and A. I. Goldman, (BonJour 1985, Alston 1988, Goldman 2002.)

3   This is referred to as the swamping problem: if the only value of evidence lies in its relationship to a certain goal (truth), then the achivement of that goal disables us from addressing the instrumentally valuable features of beliefs (for example, the fact that they are based on evidence). For more information, refer to: Kvanvig 2003.

acquiring beliefs retain their autonomous value[4]. For example, knowledge (justified true belief) surpasses true belief in being a kind of intellectual agency that entails additional value (access to reasoning and evidence makes a belief more coherent with other beliefs, facilitates understanding, and like). This attitude is shared by numerous proponents of virtue epistemology, who argue that intellectual success – true beliefs formed by utilizing intellectual virtues (wisdom, understanding, epistemic responsibility or like) – can be considered more valuable than mere true beliefs (especially if their acquisition is accidental) (Greco 2003, 2010, Sosa 2003, 2007a, 2007b, Riggs 1998, 2002, 2009). In short, many virtue epistemologists embrace the pluralism of intellectual virtues due to its ability to enrich and improve one's intellectual life (Zagzebski 1996, Riggs 2003, Sosa 2003, Greco 2004).

Kvanvig, on the other hand, not only questions the monist view of truth or reductionism (the reduction of all values to the acquisition truth or the evasion of fallacies), but also claims that every cognitive success entails independent value, and that knowledge, understanding, wisdom, rationality, empirical adequacy, or like, ought to be regarded as separate epistemic values instead of being dismissed as instrumental or supplementary. Similarly, cognitive successes such as finding meaning in the course of an experience or being epistemically responsible can be elaborated without reference to truthfulness: for example, the empirical adequacy of a belief can have independent value in the context of the epistemic duty to base beliefs on empirical proof, reasons, evidence, or similar standards of epistemic consistency. In this case, epistemic duty is less related to truthfulness than to the goal of not being perceived as intellectually shallow, inconsistent, lazy or like.

1065

However, this article does not aim to side with either monists (reductionists) or pluralists in the discussion regarding epistemic values, nor does it strive to analyze the assets of different pluralistic approaches, such as the pluralism of additional values or the pluralism of intrinsic epistemic values. Our key goal is, above all, to emphasize the possibility, significance and necessity of broadening our understanding of epistemology to include its analyses of widely understood doxastic states, cognitive processes, acts and events. Secondly, we aim to demonstrate that such an extensive approach requires a broader definition of epistemic success and clearer relations between specific epistemic values and cognitive activities. The final goal of this article is to show how this extensive approach aids the epistemic evaluation of cognitive processes and intellectual activities (such as, for example, communicational acts between patients and psychiatrists), which would otherwise be exempt from epistemic inquiries. Finally, it is crucial to realize that this approach

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4   Refer to: Kvanvig 2003, 2005, 2010., and also to: Zagzebski 2003.

improves the epistemic value of cognitive activities and results in more effective solutions to problems.

2. The virtue of epistemic responsibility

The numerous strikingly different epistemological positions which are currently developing under the auspices of virtue epistemology – despite their divergent definitions of virtue and attitudes towards the epistemic relevance of certain issues – all share two fundamental stances. The first stance is the basic thesis of traditional epistemology (and especially emphasized within standard analytical epistemology) which defines epistemology as a normative discipline. Thus, in focusing on the normative aspect of epistemic evaluation, virtue epistemology does not consider normative standards or values conventional or relativistic, but presumes them to have a sort of objective validity[5]. The second stance, on the other hand, substantially deviates from the definition of the object of epistemological inquiry as a proposition, belief or doxastic state whose truthfulness, justification or rationality ought to be determined. Virtue epistemologists turn the focus of evaluation to epistemic intellectual agents (which include collective agents such as groups, communities, social systems, institutions or like). For example, an epistemological inquiry now tackles the question of whether an intellectual agent is capable of understanding her situation (despite possibly not having a true belief) or whether she was epistemically responsible in basing her beliefs on careful observation, inference, selection between particular hypotheses, consideration of available evidence, or like. Intellectual virtues are the qualities of an agent which support her intellectual growth and fulfilment or that, simply, characterize her as a virtuous epistemic agent[6]. This explains why epistemologists who accept this approach, despite their emphasis on normativity, remain willing to explore empirical data (psychological, social, political, historical, etc.). The essential feature of this approach is its focus on analyzing the epistemic agent, her cognitive processes and general intellectual character, in order to promote intellectual development and welfare. In other words, this theory is aware of the practical benefits derived from its distinction of

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5   Goldman treats this particular feature as a central quality of the approach to epistemology capable of distinguishing actual epistemological projects from epistemological revisionism, a stance usually exemplified by various forms of social constructivism, postmodernism and like. See: Goldman 2010.

6   This makes it clearly evident that virtue epistemology is analogous to virtue ethics in focusing on agency and assessing the achievements of the individual (in this case, epistemic) agent with the aim of encouraging (in this case, intellectual) fulfillment. Moreover, authors like Linda Zagzebski emphasize the significance of this analogy in the context of their neo-Aristotelian approach to epistemology. See more in: Zagzebski 1996, 1998, 2003a, 2003b, and in: Brady and Pritchard 2003.

intellectual virtues and flaws, and the consequent critical attitude towards different cognitive processes and their outcomes.

The advocates and sympathizers of virtue epistemology belong to two large and roughly defined camps[7]: (i) epistemologists who relate intellectual virtue to the cognitive capacities and dispositions of the epistemic agent (perception, reasoning, memory, etc.) by, for example, describing reliable cognitive capacities as virtuous because they lead to truth or knowledge[8], and (ii) epistemologists who hold that intellectual virtues are (personal) characteristics subject to individual responsibility in the sense that each intellectual agent can and should deliberately develop virtues that support her intellectual achievements - virtues such as intellectual conscientiousness or openness to new knowledge[9]. In both cases, the epistemic goal can be found in promoting intellectual or cognitive development. There is an additional distinction between the conventional and the alternative approach: while conventionalists focus on standard questions of contemporary Anglo-Saxon epistemology such as the definitions of knowledge, skepticism, justification or like[10], the alternative approach focuses on the issues of deliberation, discussion, inquiry, understanding and wisdom, taking into account the psychological, social, ethical and political aspects of forming beliefs[11]. Given that virtue epistemologists often find points of agreement or manage to reach compromise, it is particularly important not to regard these distinctions as rigid or final. For example, it is possible to argue that the epistemic responsibility of an agent is a personal disposition that responsibly leads towards truth (Greco 1999) or that justification and knowledge are states attained by practicing intellectual virtues such as wisdom (Zagzebski 1996).

For the purposes of this article, we will focus on the epistemologists who highlight the virtue of epistemic responsibility, regardless of whether it is perceived as a condition of intellectual development or a means of attaining the epistemic goals of truth or justification. Irrespective of whether epistemic responsibility is understood as a personal disposition or a character trait, there is certain consensus that this generic concept facilitates the definition of other intellectual virtues. Epistemic responsibility primarily emphasizes the active role of the epistemic agent and the element of choice (motivation) integral to intellectual agency. Thus understood, epistemic responsibility implies intellectual conscientiousness and the motivation to

1067

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7   For more information, see: Greco 2011.
8   See more in: Sosa 1980, 1991, 2003, Goldman 2002, Greco, 1992, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2011.
9   See more in: Zagzebski 1996, 2003a, Code 1987, Fricker 2007, Montmarqet 1992, 1993, Roberts and Wood 2007.
10   See more in: Sosa 1980, 2003, 2007a, 2007b, Zagzebski 1996, 2003a, 2003b.
11   See more in: Kvanvig, 2003, 2005, 2010, Riggs 1998, 2002, 2006, 2009, Fricker 2007.

reach truth, or other epistemic values such as intellectual impartiality, openness, willingness to exchange ideas, awareness of personal fallibility, a cautious and balanced approach to reaching conclusions, intellectual curiosity and courage, intellectual humility and kindness, or like. The generic term of epistemic responsibility leads to the definition of epistemic justice as reflexive critical openness towards assessing the credibility of one's own judgments (hermeneutic justice), as well as the credibility of others (testimonial justice) (Fricker 2007). The notions of generalized epistemic responsibility and epistemic justice encourage the evaluation of cognitive processes and achievements such as scientific research and analyses, the formation of hypotheses, the allocation of trust in communicational acts, decision-making and like, by evaluating the agents' personal conduct. For example, a curious scientist aware of her own fallibility and the influence of present values and theories on her judgments is shown as responsible towards her epistemic task of scientific research, thus being more likely to arrive at a true conclusion. Likewise, an epistemically just person who judges another person's credibility by remaining aware of her own stereotypes and prejudices about the other person's social group has greater chances for acquiring and distributing knowledge. Virtue epistemology thus provides a normative framework for evaluating communicational acts, such as psychiatric sessions or psychotherapy, whose epistemic successes or failures cannot be fully described or evaluated from the perspective of truth. From the perspective of the psychiatrist/psychotherapist as an epistemic agent, the goal of psychiatric/psychotherapeutic communication is not to attain true beliefs (form true beliefs on the basis of testimonies made by patients), but to understand the client and solve the problem which led to that particular communicational act.

3. Epistemic justice and communicational acts

The virtue of epistemic justice, first introduced by Miranda Fricker, has proven to be a generally important epistemic normative for evaluating communicational acts. Fricker focuses on those epistemic acts which are fundamentally social in involving other people and society as a whole[12]. According to Fricker, in order to understand the virtue of epistemic justice, one has to be aware of the wider context of forming and distributing beliefs within a community. Individuals have the general ability to direct their agency

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12   Standard analytical epistemology mainly dealt with questions of the reliability of individual cognitive processes such as observation, reasoning, memory and like. Social epistemology, which has been intensively developing within the analytical approach in the last two decades, is becoming increasingly receptive to the epistemic evaluation of social practices, institutions and even social systems (such as, for example, the epistemic justification of democracy). See more in A. I. Goldman, (Goldman 2010). Miranda Fricker thematically belongs to the field of social epistemology, (Fricker 2007).

towards influencing others and demonstrating a kind of social power. Fricker suggests a definition of social power as the (practically and socially contextualized) ability to control the behavior of others. This power can either be (actively or passively) manifested through the actions of individuals or can manifest itself on a purely structural level[13]. In short, each individual possesses a kind of social power that allows/enables her to control or influence other people. For example, this ability to influence or control can be manifested in deliberately assigning or denying other people credibility, in consciously dismissing them as reliable interlocutors, or like. By exercising this power, an individual can not only affect the other's social status or inhibit their self-respect, but the deliberate denial of trust can also hinder their employment, stifle the development of their career or result in unjust legal proceedings. According to Fricker, the allocation of trust and credibility primarily depends on shared, socially imagined concepts of the social identities of certain groups. For example, an individual is likely to assign more trust to rich, privileged and male members of a certain society, or to exclusive religious and ethnic communities. These imaginary concepts of social identities which influence personal agency and the usage of social power are nothing other than stereotypes.

1069

However, agents do not need to consciously accept these stereotypes as true because the manifestation of social power (related to belonging to a certain collective identity) fully operates on the level of imagined social identities. If a stereotype about a certain group identity (women, African-Americans, the poor, the mentally ill or like) embodies a negative prejudice towards the speaker (for example, the perception of women as irrational, African-American as lazy, the poor as incompetent, the depressed as unreliable, or like), the hearer underestimates the speaker's credibility and their ability as an epistemic agent. This subjects the speaker to epistemic testimonial injustice. For example, someone can (consciously or unconsciously) underestimate the competence of women, the honesty of the poor, the credibility of the mentally ill, or like, and thus affect the course of their lives. Another form of epistemic injustice, hermeneutic injustice, occurs when an important feature of an individual's social experience is exempt from socially imagined concepts and, consequentially, from collective understanding. Hermeneutic injustice occurs in all situations in which an epistemic agent, due to society's inability to understand them, incorrectly interprets their own experience. For example, a person with a history of mental illness can perceive themselves as unsuitable for a particular job due to the stereotype that dismisses them as a

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13   As suggested by Michael Foucault, power appears on a purely structural level when it is so thoroughly dispersed through the social system that no particular agent is needed to embody it. In such situations, people act only mere "mediators" of power. For more information, see: Dreyfus and Rabinov 1982.

chronically maladjusted and incompetent individual. The continuous practice of this social injustice results in persistent and all-encompassing hermeneutical marginalization of such individuals.

As previously emphasized, both testimonial and hermeneutical injustice have a practical effect on the "victim" of injustice by depriving them of epistemic self-confidence and socially disabling them from becoming who they might have been had they not been subject to such injustice. Within a psychiatric/psychotherapeutic communicational act, the virtuous nature of epistemic justice lies in the neutralizing of prejudice and the stereotypes of negative valence, in the necessity of nurturing understanding and thus encouraging the feeling of *epistemic* self-confidence which contributes to successfully solving the patient's problem. We will proceed to explain why we argue that epistemic justice is one of the key epistemic values in the communicational act of psychiatry/psychotherapy.

1070

4. Philosophy of psychiatry and epistemic justice

Instead of limiting it to the acts conducted by a licensed psychotherapist, this paper broadly understands the term 'psychotherapy' as a communicational act carried out by psychiatrists, clinical psychologists and psychotherapists with the aim of resolving/easing the mental suffering of their patient. Likewise, the role of the psychotherapist in a communicational act can be carried out by a psychiatrist, a psychologist or a psychotherapist. The aim of the communicational act initiated by the patient is not (or is not primarily) to attain true information from the patient or to establish a true diagnosis, but to resolve the patient's mental suffering. Namely, this communicational activity is exempt from traditional testimonial forms, which are aimed at providing the psychiatrist/psychotherapist with true information, in being a certain *testimonial pathology* that strives to resolve the patient's problem through dialogue[14]. However, despite entailing pathological qualities inherent to similar cases of testimonial pathology, this communicational act has numerous epistemological features, such as the assessment of the speaker's credibility and the justification of trust, reflecting on one's own fallibility, cultivating understanding, and like, which can and should be appropriately evaluated[15]. As we have previously argued, the best approach to the epistemic evaluation of such communicational acts is provided by virtue epistemology and, more precisely, by assessing the epistemic responsibility and epistemic justice of the psychiatrist/psychotherapist (in her role of the hearer in the testimonial situation).

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14   For further information about the pathology of testimony, see: Coady 2006.
15   The epistemic properties of the pathology of testimony are further discussed in Prijić-Samaržija and Vidmar, 2012.

The foundations underlying this attitude can be found within recent debates in the philosophy of psychiatry regarding the implausibility of objectively diagnosing mental disorder and the growing awareness that psychiatric classifications of mental disorders may not accurately correspond to the real state of affairs. These approaches underline the essential role of subjective interpretations in defining the true nature of mental disorders (Bolton 2008, Glover 2014). For example, Derek Bolton emphasizes the controversial unsustainability of the assumption that certain prescribed medial norms or standards (DSM-5) of mental disorders correspond to the actual state of affairs (Bolton 2008).[16] Moreover, he emphasizes the vague and incoherent nature of the definitions of mental disorders, the stigmatization and disqualification of normal behaviors and the medicalization of personal and societal values. The 'harmfulness' and 'dangerousness' associated with mental disorders are often reducible to their detrimental effect on perceived social security – much like Fricker's imaginary social concepts which are based on stereotypes – rather than being a reflection of the actual state of affairs. Jonathan Glover wonders whether an allegedly objective mental disorder such as autism is truly a disorder or a neural anomaly, whether anti-social behavior is a disorder or crude amorality, and whether addictions are mental illnesses or moral failures (Glover 2014). Bolton explicitly concludes that a mental health professional should not exclusively aim to establish a true diagnosis, but to respond to the patient's articulated problem and their desire to receive help.

Following these discussions in the philosophy of psychiatry, it may seem as if psychiatric communicational acts can only be perceived as a certain epistemological 'pathology' under the assumption that all epistemic acts have the solitary goal of reaching truth. However, we have shown how, in the light of recent scientific discussions, the value turn inherent to virtue epistemology provides us with a theoretical and normative framework of approaching this act by evaluating its epistemic properties (with the aim of improving the epistemic properties of the communicational act and its impact on the patient's well-being). We will proceed to elaborate the implications of epistemically evaluating communicational act in psychotherapy.

The psychotherapeutic communicational act potentially caters to both aforementioned kinds of epistemic injustice – testimonial and hermeneutic injustice. Psychotherapy places testimony in a very specific social setting. The psychotherapist and the patient undertake the roles of both the speaker and the hearer, perceiving each other in a particular social context. However, the epistemic responsibility of the psychotherapist necessitates them to be both

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16   The fifth edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-5* was published in 2013 by *APA*, the *American Psychiatric Association* as a general guideline for psychiatrically classifying and diagnosing mental disorders.

a reliable source of information and interpretation (making them hermeneutically just), and a responsible hearer capable of creating a context of mutual trust (demanding their just evaluations of testimonies and just assessments of the credibility of their patient). It ought to be emphasized that psychotherapy places the psychotherapist in a *position of power*. This type of power derives from the social perception of psychotherapy as a communicational act aimed at resolving psychological problems and difficulties. A person who enters a psychotherapeutic relationship hopes that the psychotherapist can improve their health, personal relationships and future prospects. The interpretations provided by the psychotherapist's power to analyze their client's experience can significantly affect the patient.

In psychiatry/psychotherapy, the role of common imaginative concepts is assumed by widely accepted psychiatric/psychotherapeutic theories that attempt to explain a patient's behavior by using pre-defined psychopathological explanations and classifications. The common imaginative concepts of these theories define, for example, the behaviors associated with neuroses, phobias, anxiety and depression, and describe the broadly understood position of the patient within a psychotherapeutic encounter. In short, the epistemic responsibility of the psychotherapist requires their sensible approach to pre-defined norms and interpretations, and a reflexive attitude aimed at avoiding the stereotypes and prejudices which may hinder the correct perception of their patient's credibility. Due to their possibly detrimental influence on the speaker/patient, it is extremely important to raise awareness about the common areas of epistemic injustice within a psychotherapeutic communicational act. As a specific type of epistemic injustice that is necessarily based on prejudice, testimonial injustice harms the speaker as an epistemic agent[17]. Any stereotypical interpretation and categorization of a patient can be a result of prejudice: the hearer (in our case, the psychotherapist) may disregard their patient's testimonies as the irrelevant and confounding musings of a person undergoing mental suffering. The patient is then treated as cognitively unreliable in a way that excludes their interpretations from epistemic consideration by rejecting them as irrelevant pathological symptoms or approaching them with distrust.

One of the fundamental causes of epistemic injustice is the prejudice that the patient is inherently incapable of understanding themselves. This early assumption that the patient can only be properly understood by a psychotherapist

1072

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17   Fricker distinguishes the concept of 'innocent mistakes' for which the agent is neither ethically, nor epistemically culpable. These are the cases of unfortunate epistemic mistakes when the hearer simply falsely assesses the speaker's reliability. Given that, in these cases, stereotypes and prejudice play no role in assessing the speaker's realibility, Fricker doesn't treat innocent mistakes as examples of testimonal injustice. (Fricker 2007).

is widely accepted in, for example, psychoanalytical descriptions of human behavior as an expression of unconscious pathology[18]. A psychotherapist equipped with such a mind-set approached the communicational act by treating their patient as an untrustworthy epistemic agent. Such a psychotherapeutic communicational act creates a social context founded on systematic epistemic injustice. While the speaker is always less reliable, the hearer assumes the privileged (and more powerful) position of epistemic reliability. Considering the psychotherapist's role of an expert in mental health, they can seriously hamper the societal perception of their patient's social identity by epistemically underestimating them[19]. Let us note that such a testimonial situation is analogous in all aspects to the situations which Fricker defines as epistemically unjust.

By contrast, an epistemically just psychotherapist subjects the client's testimony to epistemic consideration and accepts it as epistemically authoritative. Testimonial injustice can only be avoided through the neutralization of prejudices about the patient's unreliability. Moreover, as an epistemic agent with the virtue of being epistemically just (the virtue of justly assessing testimonies and the virtue of hermeneutic justice), the psychotherapist can only reach an epistemically valuable judgment if they interpret the patient's words in a hermeneutic climate void of structural prejudice. Within the practical context of the psychotherapeutic process, a virtuous psychotherapist will be able to create a hermeneutical or interpretative context by engaging the patient in appropriate dialogue. An appropriate dialogue requires that the psychotherapist addresses their potential prejudices by assuming that the patient's statements are their genuine experience and attempting to determine the patient's existing resources for achieving set psychotherapeutic aims. A

1073

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18   While this originated as the fundamental idea underlying psychoanalysis, many psychotherapeutic theories, such as psychodynamic and transactional analysis, have later assumed the idea that a psychotherapist is an expert in understanding their patient. Freud's theory of psychoanalysis, for example, treats interpretation as a mere instrument of informing the client about their personal features which they are inherently incapable of grasping (Freud 1915).

19   In short, all situations in which an epistemic agent is underestimated as a reliable source of information due to having characteristics that incite social prejudice, can be regarded as examples of epistemic injustice in psychotherapy. One such example is the experience of a patient who sought a psychiatrist following a suicide attempt. The patient was born without the final knuckles on four of her fingers (partial syndication). Musically gifted and persistent, she completed a musical academy as a piano player. Her attempt to convey this information to her psychiatrist made him consider her psychotic and consequently misdiagnose her. All of the patients' subsequent attempts to explain that she really was a piano player were unsuccessful and considered as further proof of her psychosis. Her resulting treatment with antipsychotics significantly hampered her recovery. (This experience was consensually shared by a patient of Inka Miškulin's psychotherapeutic practice).

virtuous psychotherapist will show respect for their patient's self-knowledge and perceive their testimony as an account of their understanding of self. By approaching their testimony with conscientiousness, the psychotherapist makes their patient feel worthy of respect, rendering the mutual epistemic benefits clearly evident: while the psychotherapist remains open to relevant information necessary for solving the problem, the speaker gains self-confidence and becomes receptive to new knowledge.[20]

5. Hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy

There are various criteria for differentiating psychotherapeutic approaches. This paper stresses the criterion of differentiating psychotherapeutic approaches proposed by Hakam Al-Shawi (Al-Shawi 2006). He distinguishes the standard psychotherapeutic approach, the cognitive-behavioral approach and the hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy. The standard psychotherapeutic approach includes all psychotherapeutic practices that are equipped with a comprehensive theory and aim to provide the patient with insights into their mental states. While the cognitive-behavioral approach does not perceive insight as a curative method, it is also founded on a theory that provides a unified methodology of finding solutions to problems. The hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy, on the other hand, equips the psychotherapist with knowledge necessary for properly understanding the patient and perceiving them as a unique individual. However, there are significant differences to the dominant perceptions of psychotherapy inherent to individual psychotherapists or psychotherapeutic doctrines. For example, psychotherapeutic literature includes numerous psychoanalytically oriented authors who have accepted a hermeneutic approach to defining and understanding the psychotherapeutic process[21]. We will therefore not limit ourselves to particular psychotherapeutic approaches or doctrines, but will instead emphasize the distinction between two radically different, and even contradictory, approaches to practical psychotherapy: namely, the objectivist and the hermeneutical approach.

1074

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20   Fricker encourages the union of intellectual and moral virtues within the concept of hybrid virtues. It should be noted that there is a moral dimension the act of trust. Having an epistemically valuable attitude towards a speaker implies a moral stance of appreciation, so perceiving a speaker as honest and reliable promotes a sense of trust. In other words, a sensible and reflexive attitude towards one's own prejudice, or those produced by different psychotherapeutic approaches, should be considered both an epistemically and a morally valuable stance (Fricker 2007.).

21   For example, refer to Storolow, Brandshaft and Atwood's account of intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis, the illusion of a neutral therapist and the need for the psychoanalyst and their patient to build a relationship of mutual trust, (Storolow, Brandshaft and Atwood 1987).

Research has shown that therapeutic effectiveness is not produced by the psychotherapeutic theory itself, but by the development of mutual understanding between the therapist and their client. Explorations and meta-analyses of the success rates of different approaches to psychotherapy have shown that the common features of effective therapy surpass the frameworks defined by particular doctrines, methods and techniques, and thus cannot be reduced to the implementation of procedures related to a certain psychotherapeutic school (Lambert, Hansen, Umphress, et al. 1996, Lambert and Barley 2002)

Regardless of the variety of factors and numerous different perceptions of their importance in effective psychotherapy, all research accentuates the critical role of the relationship between the therapist and their patient. More recent research has further diminished the importance of particular psychotherapeutic methods; the specific type of psychotherapeutic approach warrants for only 1% of the efficacy of the psychotherapeutic process; instead underlining factors such as jointly defined goals, empathy, therapeutic connection, positive affirmations, congruence and the character of the therapist (Laska, Gurman, Wampold 2014). In their works, Messer and Wampold conclude that shared factors ultimately prevail over specific methodological procedures in ensuring effective psychotherapy (Messer and Wampold 2002, Wampold 2001). The ratio of variability related to shared factors such as the placebo effect, productive relationships, therapeutic connections and the competence of the therapist far surpasses the variance entailed by specific methodological components. Research also suggests that all psychotherapeutic approaches share the factor of mutual understanding between the therapist and their patient (Tracey et al., 2003).

1075

In psychotherapy, understanding is developed through a hermeneutical process of being receptive to new modes of interpretation in order not to succumb to outmoded patterns of understanding or harmful assumptions. While assumptions often lead to misunderstandings and false impressions, psychotherapy aims to provide both the therapist and the patient with knowledge unavailable to them prior to the therapy. The hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy considers every psychotherapeutic encounter a hermeneutical act, treating interpretations as means of fulfilling therapeutic goals, rather than as objective accounts of the patient's condition. Namely, a therapeutic approach that postulates psychotherapeutic theories as objective knowledge entails the implicit epistemology of perceiving subjective interpretations as true claims about the patient's mental state.[22]

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22   New psychopathological research on psychotherapeutic theories and the concepts of mental disorders (Bolton 2008.) shows that there is no objective standpoint that would not put the patient in a therapeutically detrimental position of epistemic asymmetry.

Despite receiving the education of a psychoanalyst, Storolow is a proponent of the hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy, who has repeatedly shown that the concepts of a neutral (or objective) psychotherapeutic act and an objectively grounded therapist are unsustainable. He has argued for replacing the ideal of an analytical therapist with the concept that a therapist ought to focus on, as far as possible, opening, illuminating and transforming the patient's subjective world. It is entirely commonsensical that a therapist cannot avoid using interpretations as a legitimate method of understanding their patient's experience and advancing towards therapeutic aims. However, these interpretations must strive to facilitate mutual understanding instead of attempting to explain the patient's experience by subjecting it to a presumably appropriate theoretical framework. Therefore, Storolow suggests that the principle of a neutral therapist should be reformulated to describe a therapist who directs their interventions to opening, illuminating and transforming the patient's subjective world (Storolow, Brandshaft, Atwood 1987.) This request could be defined as a demand for the usage of the hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy, correctly recognized by Storolow as a beneficial contribution to the effectiveness of the psychotherapeutic process.

This implies that effective psychotherapeutic practice is not the product of a potentially counter-productive objectivistic approach, but of a hermeneutical approach which caters to the development of understanding between the therapist and their patient, thereby increasing the likelihood of accomplishing all relevant psychotherapeutic aims.

6. The psychotherapeutic encounter as an epistemic situation of testimony

The definition of a communicational act generally includes both verbal and written statements, as well as non-verbal communicational cues such as nodding or shaking one's head, waving one's hand, or like. In order for an exchange between agents to be classified as a communicational act, it ought to involve an exchange of information. The exchanged information can be either perceived[23] or explicitly communicated. Therefore, not every communicational act can be considered, in the epistemic sense, a situation of testimony. While every expression can be evaluated as a communicational act, testimonies are a specific kind of communicational acts in which the speaker deliberately conveys information that the hearer uses to form a particular belief.

Whereas Duncan Pritchard defines testimonies as deliberate verbal exchanges of information, Jennifer Lackey lowers the requirements by defining them

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23   Certain information can be attained through an individual's perception, e.g. information about the vocal tone of a singer.

as the hearer's acquisition of information through written or spoken words regardless of the presence of deliberate intent (Pritchard 2004, Lackey 2006). Testimony can be broadly understood as mere dialogue, the realization of certain conversational contributions, the ability to learn from listening or, in the broadest sense, as 'general communication' (Fricker 1995, Prijić-Samaržija 2007, Prijić-Samaržija, Vidmar 2012). It can also be understood as a speech act conducted with the clear intention of transferring information or as an expression of personal thoughts and beliefs which may be directed towards everyone or to nobody in particular. Regardless of what definition we may choose to rely on, and the complexity of the chosen definition, we might agree with the claim that every psychotherapeutic encounter involves the deliberate transfer of beliefs between two people - a therapist and their patient.

It is crucial to note that, within a psychotherapeutic communicational act, testimonies do not lead to truth understood as the formation of true beliefs or the acquisition of knowledge about the world. As previously mentioned, communication that qualifies as a testimony ought to meet the condition of enabling the hearer to form true beliefs. It is emphasized that these beliefs must satisfy the epistemic condition of truth. As we have already argued, the aim of a psychotherapeutic communicational act that is initiated by the patient is not (or is not primarily) to equip the patient/therapist with true information or to define a true diagnosis, but to resolve the patient's mental suffering and reach subjectively defined therapeutic aims. Namely, the specificity of this communicational activity lies in its deviation from the traditional testimonial aim of equipping the therapist with true confessions or providing the patient with a true account of external reality, but to ease the patient's suffering. Psychotherapy could thus be understood as a certain deviation from the usual understanding of testimony, due to its focus on resolving problems through communication between a therapist and their patient, rather than on the formation of true beliefs. Since testimonies in psychotherapy do not necessarily lead to the kind of true beliefs attained through, for example, education, they could be treated as a deviation from classical testimonies, but not as the 'pathology' of testimony. Given that truth is not the final aim of testimonies in psychotherapy, should we wonder whether a psychotherapeutic encounter that doesn't strive towards truth deviates from usual testimonies in a manner similar to that of, for example, a lie? Undoubtedly, psychotherapeutic encounters are not about transmitting propositional knowledge from one person to another, but rather about conveying beliefs, lived experiences, emotional responses and even personal imaginings. We could state that a psychotherapeutic communicational act involves the transmission of immediately available subjective beliefs such as personal mental states. It seems commonsensical to assume that everyone can be a reliable source of such beliefs. If the very definition of a testimony makes

1077

it epistemically valuable for the hearer, that is, if a communicational act has to comply with its epistemic duty of providing a source of true and justified beliefs in order to be considered a testimony, then psychotherapeutic encounters in which true beliefs are based on the patient's true account of their immediate experience ought to be regarded as representative examples of testimonies. However, the psychotherapeutic context often provides us with testimonies that cannot be considered true beliefs. This is best illustrated by delusions, or untrue beliefs about external reality, such as reliance on scientifically unproven methods of treating malign illnesses or intense states of grief when a person who has undergone personal loss believes that they can still communicate with their loved one. Such a patient perceives their experience as true despite lacking the epistemic competence of recognizing truth. However, the patient is not lying. In other words, since their words cannot be disqualified as a lie, it would be inaccurate to speak of a proper 'pathology of testimony' (Coady 2006.). Not even the therapist taking part in a psychotherapeutic communicational act has to regard truth as the ultimate aim of the testimony. As already mentioned, the fact that the beliefs expressed by the therapist can determine the outcome of therapy compels the therapist to direct their behavior towards the patient's welfare, rather than towards mere truth. However, it is important to note that, in order to achieve mutual trust, the patient must want to honestly convey their experience and the therapist must want to openly understand it. In either case, both parties act as epistemically responsible participants of a communicational act. Therefore, although a psychotherapeutic encounter can be defined as a certain deviation from exemplary testimonies or paradigmatic communicational acts, it possesses considerable epistemic value. Despite the psychotherapist's liberty to use their imagination in order to reach the defined therapeutic aims, the therapist's choice of words is deliberately attuned to the patient's rules of rationality and coherence in order to make their statements comprehensible within the patient's mental framework. This provides the basis for assessing the epistemic competence of the psychotherapist. Recollecting Coady's description of lying within a testimony as a 'pathological intention', the psychotherapist's intention cannot be disregarded as 'pathological' in being epistemically irresponsible deliberate deception (Coady 2006.). The psychotherapist is not deceiving the patient, but rather using the rules of dialogue defined by the psychiatric profession in order to enable the patient to appropriately respond to their claims. A psychotherapeutic communicational act leaves no room for lying and deliberate deceptions, from either the therapist's or the patient's side, as the patient strives to honestly convey information and the therapist aims to fulfill therapeutic goals. The psychotherapist strives to simultaneously provide the patient with so-called functional beliefs or beliefs capable of resolving their problem and address the formal

demands of preserving the patient's autonomy, self-confidence and self-respect, thus expanding their perceived personal freedom.

We may relate this to Prijić-Samaržija and Vidmar's inquiry about the fictional testimony where author does not intend to convey the truth, "but to make the audience imagine possible situations or sequences of events, thus making the reader's attitude towards fiction more akin to imagination than belief…the fact that a work is fictional does not discount the truthfulness of its contents" (Prijić-Samaržija, Vidmar 2012: 69). It is important to approach the relationship between imagining and believing by taking into account the audience's different attitudes towards fictional and non-fictional content. Therefore, "when speaking of non-fiction, the audience expects true information or an account of the world that they can consider true. In the case of fiction, the audience accepts the presented content while remaining fully aware that its main aim is to fulfill, generally speaking, artistic goals" (Prijić-Samaržija, Vidmar 2012: 69). Analogously, the patient expects the testimonies spoken during the psychotherapeutic encounter to fulfill their pragmatic function of producing beliefs capable of resolving their initial problem, i.e., of achieving the set therapeutic goals. For example, a therapist who offers their patient an account of another therapist's successful treatment of depressive states through dialogue and physical exercise, may encourage the patient to seek similar recovery or develop beneficial new habits.

1079

Let us recall once more Prijić-Samaržija and Vidmar's reflection on fiction "everyone involved in this venture clearly understands that the author does not intend to lie or deceptively misrepresent falsehoods as truths. The author's intention respects the imperative of the social 'game' to provide their audience with what it expects." (Prijić-Samaržija, Vidmar, 2012: 72). Likewise, the patient doesn't intend to lie, the therapist tries to direct their patient's existing resources towards reaching the goals defined by psychotherapy as a socially recognized method of resolving psychological, emotional and behavioral problems. Encouraging a patient to visualize a version of themselves that has already reached the therapeutic aims of, for example, self-confidence and tranquility, by describing an appropriate future narrative, is a common psychotherapeutic procedure based on the fact that the very act of imagining oneself as, for example, self-confident and tranquil, can produce feelings of self-confidence and tranquility, thus making them seem as a realistic prospect. Despite the fact that such a narrative cannot be considered a transfer of current truths due to its dependence on imagining and reference to the future, its therapeutic effect is derived from acknowledging true information about the patient, their social circumstances and the likelihood of achieving therapeutic aims. The psychotherapist's testimony must have the qualities of conscientiousness, rationality and coherence. A patient's testimony of their

personal experiences is comparably truthful in their desire not to deceive the therapist. The achievement of therapeutic goals always necessitates a certain change to the patient's self-perception. We can therefore conclude that the epistemic responsibility of neither the psychotherapist nor the patient can be considered compromised in a manner similar to Coady's description of pathologies (Coady 2006). The psychotherapist is obliged to satisfy the epistemic criteria of clarity, consistency and compliance with the patient's epistemic habits, and is required to possess epistemic competence proportional to the statements offered during the psychotherapeutic encounter. In that sense, we might call for some kind of epistemic justification of the psychotherapist's claims. Furthermore, it is extremely important to emphasize that a valid psychotherapeutic communicational act cannot include the intention of either the psychotherapist or the patient to misrepresent a falsehood as a truth, or the desire to ascribe epistemic justification to an unjustified claim. We can therefore conclude that a psychotherapeutic communicational act is not an example of a pathological misuse of testimony, unlike Coady's description of deliberately misrepresented lies as pathologies.

Given that Prijić-Samaržija and Vidmar's account has shown us that the epistemic benefit of forming true beliefs isn't the key criterion of distinguishing non-pathological from pathological testimonies, a testimony expressed during a psychotherapeutic communicational act remains epistemically valuable despite deviating from traditional testimonies (Prijić-Samaržija, Vidmar 2012.). It is essential for the patient to benefit from the exchange by forming beliefs about themselves/external reality capable of leading to psychotherapeutic goals. This can undoubtedly be considered the epistemic value of such testimonies. Namely, a psychotherapeutic communicational act is unique in the patient's intention to change their current state by engaging in dialogue with their therapist. It is reasonable to assume that the patient hopes for the therapeutic dialogue to alter their current beliefs and produce better future beliefs. The patient listens to their therapist's statements, claims and beliefs with the hope that some of them may inspire a change in their own beliefs. It is irrelevant whether these beliefs refer to the patient's self-perception or their account of external reality. The patient engages in therapy lacking a certain belief p, defines it as a therapeutic goal and believes that therapy may allow them to attain the belief p. For example, a patient can opt for therapy due to feelings of misery and inadequacy or a belief that they do not deserve to enjoy their life. They simultaneously believe that these beliefs can be altered in some yet unknown manner that will later allow them to feel more deserving of joy. The latter belief might have been encouraged by hearing positive feedback from earlier patients, trusting the authority of psychotherapists or various other personal attitudes towards psychotherapy. These reasons might cause them to believe that, despite the fact that they do

not currently believe p, they are capable of believing p within a year. In that sense, the patient trusts the psychotherapist to be a reliable, credible and responsible epistemic source of their future belief p.

We can therefore conclude that a psychotherapeutic communicational act is not a pathology of testimony, but that it deviates from traditional communication in not evaluating epistemic benefits in terms of true beliefs. Given that a psychotherapeutic act breaches the epistemic responsibility of neither the therapist nor the patient, we cannot speak of it as a pathology of testimony. The evident epistemic benefits can be evaluated from their instrumental role in providing curative effects that would have been unreachable without such communication. Furthermore, a psychotherapeutic communicational act complies with the conditions of assessing speaker credibility and creating an environment of mutual trust. The hearer's perception of the speaker's trustworthiness in discursive exchanges related to personal understanding, such as psychotherapy, can be described as a demand for conscientious interpretations, rather than for true claims. This description is the inevitable outcome of the hermeneutical attitude that multiple true interpretations are always possible and that the patient's interpretation can be treated as their personal truth. In a hermeneutical context, the hearer exercises their epistemic responsibility by attempting to conscientiously interpret the speaker's testimony in proportion to its consistency and coherence. Given that a valid psychotherapeutic communicational act cannot involve the intention to deceive, its testimonies possess undeniable epistemic value. Moreover, a therapist who takes part in a hermeneutic psychotherapeutic communicational act doesn't approach their client's testimony with the intention to subject it to classification, but instead treats it the starting point of further communication. On the contrary, the objectivistic approach to psychotherapy requires the therapist to classify their client's testimony in accordance with certain normative and theoretical settings. Since the therapist dismisses the client's claims as irrelevant to further communication, we cannot describe them as a testimony. While the objectivistic approach automatically disregards the patient as an epistemically irrelevant interlocutor, it places the therapist in a position of expertise and epistemic power. As only the therapist has access to information, we can conclude that they are in a privileged epistemic position. Having accepted the notion that the therapist's understanding of the patient is superior to the patient's own self-perception, all subsequent classifications, interpretations and their underlying theoretical foundations become the only possible relevant knowledge within a psychotherapeutic communicational act. The patient's knowledge becomes a mere 'polygon' for classification, rather than an epistemically relevant contribution to continued psychotherapeutic dialogue. Such an approach automatically epistemically devalues the patient and excludes them from a relationship of epistemic trust.

1081

The differences between the objectivistic and the hermeneutical approach to psychotherapy coincide with the introductory distinction between traditional monist approaches to epistemology and virtue epistemology's emphasis on individual intellectual virtue, rather than the truthfulness of a belief, as the main epistemic aim. This article attempted to demonstrate the importance of epistemic responsibility and epistemic justice – in forms of both testimonial and hermeneutical justice – as vital epistemic norms. Without explicitly scorning epistemic approaches focused on truth (or only truth), we have attempted to emphasize the relevance of the approaches which divulge epistemic value from an individual agent's epistemic justice. A psychotherapist who exercises epistemic justice in a psychotherapeutic communicational act is deserving of epistemic praise, regardless of the truth-status of their beliefs.

1082

We have attempted to show that, even though the value turn in epistemology and the introduction of virtue epistemology have enabled the expansion of epistemic evaluation beyond the scope of exchanges of true beliefs, they have managed to maintain its significant epistemic value and focus on epistemic benefits. Likewise, hermeneutical psychotherapy has proven to be the optimal framework for implementing this kind of epistemological evaluation. While the objectivist approach reflects the traditional epistemic focus on a monist account of truth, the hermeneutic approach perfectly corresponds to virtue epistemology. Moreover, we hold that the hermeneutic approach is not only epistemically justified within this new system of epistemic evaluation, but is also more likely to result in successful psychotherapy.

7. Conclusion

The expansion of the scope of epistemological topics was partially caused by a value turn which has enabled epistemological discussions to surpass the narrowly set framework of analyzing the concept of knowledge and the necessary conditions of its acquisition. Amongst other projects which have emerged from these new epistemological tendencies, the approach of virtue epistemology offered a theoretical and normative framework for the epistemic evaluation of various epistemic processes and activities (which had previously been entirely beyond the scope of epistemological focus). Communicational acts, such as the dialogue between a psychiatrist/psychologist and their patient, had previously been entirely exempt from any sort of epistemological analysis and were only assessed by narrow evaluation of psychiatric/psychotherapeutic 'objective' appropriateness and efficacy. Once virtue epistemology had shifted its focus to the intellectual virtues of epistemic agents (rather than the truth-value of the proposition), all communicational acts and their participants became legitimate objects of evaluation: their epistemic success was now measured also in terms of virtues such as

epistemic responsibility, intellectual consciousness and openness, self-reflex-ivity, and sensitivity to stereotypes, prejudice and unjustified generalizations. We have attempted to show that the epistemic success of a communicational act between a psychiatrist/psychotherapist and their patient lies in the ther-apist's epistemically responsible attitude towards the patient's problems, or, more precisely, their epistemically just avoidance of socially produced ste-reotypes and prejudice. Our attitude was largely influenced by recent dis-cussions within the philosophy of psychiatry, such as the newly introduced concept of hermeneutical psychotherapy. These discussions have underlined the difficulty (or sheer unlikelihood) of defining what is true in psychiatry/ psychotherapy due to the absence of an uncontroversial, objective or fully factual basis for diagnosing mental disorders.

Along these lines, we have attempted to illustrate the relevance of applying epistemology to concrete issues and to show that it can provide a norma-tive framework and terminological foundation for evaluating highly specific epistemic processes, (Bishop and Trout 2005). Having opted for virtue epis-temology as the normative framework of evaluating the epistemic benefits of psychotherapy, we have demonstrated that the objectivistic approach to psychotherapy cannot be considered a suitable basis of effective psychother-apeutic practice due to its potentially detrimental and counter-productive effects. Conversely, the hermeneutical approach caters to the development of mutual understanding between the therapist and their patient and increases the likelihood of achieving all defined psychotherapeutic aims.[24]

1083

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24   This article is a continuation of the research work published in the article, Prijić – Samaržija. S. and Inka Miškulin, I. 2015. Epistemička pravednost: epistemička vrlina i filozofija psihijatrije (Epistemic Justice: Epistemic Virtue and the Philosophy of Psychi-atry), *Filozofska istraživanja*, 35(2): 307-322.

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1085

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1086

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Epistemička pravda kao vrlina u hermeneutičkoj psihoterapiji

Apstrakt

Vrednosni obrt u epistemologiji generisao je jednu posebno uticajnu poziciju – epistemologiju vrline. Radi se o narastajuće uticajnom epistemološkom normativnom pristupu koji se odlučuje za intelektualne vrline epistemičkog agenta, pre nego za vrednost istinitosti propozicije, kao centralne epistemičke vrednosti. U prvom delu ovog članka pokušaćemo da kratko objasnimo taj vrednosni obrt i da ocrtamo osnovne aspekte epistemologije vrline, ističući raznovrsnost epistemičkih stavova povezanih sa ovim pristupom i njihov pozitivni uticaj na proširenje epistemoloških horizonata. Drugi deo će biti usredsređen na vrline epistemičke odgovornosti i epistemičke pravde kao posebno podesnih za procenjivanje društvenih procesa kao što su, na primer, svedočenje i konverzacione prakse uopšte. U trećoj sekciji pokazaćemo kako psihijatrijski i psihoterapeutski komunikativni akt može biti učinkovitije analiziran i procenjen iz prespektive vrline epistemičke pravde, nego kroz tradicionalni epistemički pristup zasnovan na monističkom pojmu istine. Četvrti i peti odeljak sintetišu diskusiju uvođenjem koncepta hermeneutičke psihoterapije kao jednog terapeutski i epistemički pogodnog okvira za procenjivanje komunikativnih akata u psihoterapiji.

Ključne reči: epistemologija vrline, epistemička odgovornost, epistemička pravda, filozofija psihijatrije i psihoterapije, svedočenje, hermeneutička psihoterapija.

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The Inextricable Entanglement of Argumentation and Interpretation in Law

Abstract   At the basis of tireless efforts to explain the nature of law lies the question of how judges should decide cases. Therefrom arises a need for a theory that would clarify the role of the courts and, moreover, provide guidance to them on reaching judgments. The history of legal theory abounds with various attempts to offer a generally acceptable answer to the question raised. The fervor of debate and the perpetual dissatisfaction with offered solutions prompted the thought of untamable arbitrariness of judges. In the contemporary debate the significance of argumentation is particularly emphasized as a link of the court procedure which provides reasonableness and therewith justification and persuasiveness of the decision.

Before going into the matter, I will indicate in broad strokes which areas of legal theory do argumentation and interpretation belong to. The purpose of setting a conceptual framework is to prevent losing sight of the whole as well as to limit the scope of discourse to a certain section of legal issues. The second part deals with the concept of argumentation in general and some specific features of the argumentation in law. The third part examines the role of legal interpretation and draws a clear distinction between the interpretation as a process and the interpretation as a result. At the end of the discussion I shall put forward a thesis that the interpretation as a process is argumentation, while the interpretation as a result is an argument in the justification of judgment.

Keywords: Law, Argumentation, Interpretation, Interpretive argumentation, Interpretive conclusion

1087

1. A Conceptual Framework of Law

A thoughtful explanation of the interpretation´s and argumentation´s role in law necessitates an adumbration of the fundamental problems in legal philosophy.[1] To set a conceptual framework, although an unavoidably imprecise one, is of exceptional importance because it contributes to a better understanding of the more concrete issues due to their interconnectedness. This is supported by the fact that every formulation of fundamental issues

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1   "The reflection about law, its ways of functioning, about lawyers, their thinking methods and their scientific apparatus, leads to fundamental, essential questions. Every lawyer should have them recognized and plausibly answered, if he wants to work sensibly and responsibly in his professional field." (Rüthers et al. 2015: 16)

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raises a claim to completeness in the sense that an insight into every aspect of the law is gained by providing an answer to them.

The arising difficulty consists in the disagreement among legal philosophers as to which issues are considered fundamental. Comparing different views would certainly provide a more complete insight into the set of core legal topics. However, the slender similarities considering formulations of relevant issues, the ever more precise subdivisions of concrete problems and their mutual interdependence make every attempt to draw parallels between the various conceptual frameworks almost impossible in a work of limited extent. In the light of such a vast diversity a focus is needed on a particular representative approach. In this paper the reference point shall be an instance of a three-dimensional approach.[2]

1088

In the course of centuries legal philosophy has produced three fundamental questions about law (Rüthers et al. 2015: 3). At the very beginning of endless discussions, the fascination for this seemingly unfathomable social phenomenon was given expression in question about the essence or the nature of law: What is law? The relentless controversy between legal positivists and legal non-positivists over the relationship between law and morality has led to the limitation of the first question to the criteria of the validity of law and the separation of the second question about the normativity of law: Why does law (not) obligate? The gap between the principle of legal certainty and the inherent indeterminacy of language, in which all law is expressed, led to the division into formalist and skeptical viewpoints and brought the methodological problem to the fore: How to apply law correctly?[3] While the first

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2   In opposition to the three-dimensional framework, some authors make difference only between two fundamental questions: "What is law?" and "What is the law in a concrete case?" The first question concerns the essence or the nature of law, while the second question refers to the application of law. In such a two-dimensional framework the whole legal theory is divided in an abstract and a concrete level. The question about the nature of law further decomposes into the question about validity of law and the question about normativity of law. Therefrom arises an assumption that in the two-dimensional framework the question about legal normativity has a conceptual character, which means that all legal norms are either always obligatory or never obligatory. In contrast, in the three-dimensional framework a legal norm can, but must not possess normative strength. In other words, the question about normativity of law has to be solved in each case separately. See: Marmor, Sarch, internet.

3   In a two-dimensional framework at the concrete level some authors make difference between two questions. First, "What is the law in a concrete case?" that is "What does the law say in a concrete case?" Second, "How should a judge solve a case?" that is "What should the judgment say in a concrete case?" Kelsen, Hart and Raz consider those two questions as different, which means that their explanations of law and their explanations of adjudications are not one and the same. That means that non-legal reasons may play a role in reaching a judicial decision. Judges must have discretion in order to interpret unclear legal provisions, to correct legally valid, but particularly immoral norms or to fill

two issues are of a particularly theoretical nature, the third issue belongs to more practical spheres of jurisprudence.

Numerous authors seek to focus their research of law on a particular field and thus make the greatest possible contribution to legal philosophy due to the precision of methods, though at the cost of the generality of subject matter. In contrast to such a diversification, there is an understanding that in principle three fundamental issues cannot be solved separately. With extraordinary skillfulness Dworkin strives to interweave each of the three fundamental questions in the network of his comprehensive theory.[4] Starting from the thesis that judges do not enjoy discretion and thus can never overstep the bounds of law, it was necessary to extend the narrow conception of law beyond the enacted regulations and to bring the answer to question about the nature of law into accordance with the assumptions about its application. For this reason, Dworkin introduced legal principles in addition to legal rules and defined them as "requirement(s) of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality" whose origin as "legal principles lies not in a particular decision of some legislature or court, but in a sense of appropriateness developed in the profession and the public over time" (Dworkin 1977: 22, 40). The presence of a moral element in the solution of the remaining two fundamental problems inevitably led to providing at least partial answer to the question of the normative power of law.

1089

Dworkin's stance teaches us that the dividing lines in law should not be drawn too sharply. Answering any of the fundamental questions has inevitable consequences for the conception and solution of the remaining two issues. This is, among other things, shown by the fact that for a long time all the inquiry about law boiled down to just one all-encompassing question: What is law? However, the distinction between the fundamental issues emphasizes various aspects and provides an insight into the complexity of legal phenomenon. The peculiarities of a legal theory arise precisely from the fact which question is given priority and therefore answered first of all.

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gaps where the law is undesignated. On the contrary, Dworkin treats the two questions as equal. Accordingly, the problems of ambiguity, immorality or incompleteness of law do not emerge, so that the judges do not resort to non-legal reasons in making their decision. All the reasons for the judgment represent necessarily a part of law. See: Dickson, internet.

4   Although Dworkin accepts to a certain extent the differentiation between the question about the essence of law and the question about the obligatoriness of law, in the sense that the legal philosophy investigates the "grounds of law" (criteria of legal validity), while the political philosophy is interested in the "force of law" (obligatory character of law), he explicitly claims that an exclusive debate about one problem is only possible at the high level of abstraction and on the basis of a sufficient agreement about the other problem. Dworkin 1986: 108–113.

Since the three fundamental problems have struck strong roots in contemporary theory of law, it is advisable to abide by the set conceptual framework. Legal argumentation and interpretation belong to a more practical sphere of jurisprudence.[5] Therefore, the discourse on relationship between legal interpretation and argumentation falls into the third section of legal issues.

2. Law and Argumentation

Lawyers argue. Judges are moreover under the obligation to legally justify their decisions. Attorneys as representatives in criminal or civil matters try to convince the judge of the valid legal grounds for the raised claims respectively. The course of the court proceedings evidently shows that the function of lawyers has an argumentative character. At the same time, the arguments put forward before the court have specific features that make them legal arguments. In order to explain legal argumentation, it is necessary to become acquainted with the concept of argumentation in general, and then to establish the connection between law and argumentation.

2.1. The Concept of Argumentation

Legal argumentation is a type of argumentation. The basic question expected to be answered when explaining the argumentative nature of the legal practice concerns the concept of argumentation. At first glance, it is surprising that in many works devoted to the problem of argumentation in law it is rare to find an explicit definition of argumentation in general. One of the exceptions is the simple definition given by MacCormick in his article *Argumentation and Interpretation in Law*: "Argumentation is the activity of presenting arguments for or against something." (MacCormick 1993: 16) A definition in that manner can be considered in the light of Agrippa's trilemma: 1) If the concept of argument were to be explained by reference to argumentation, a circular definition error would be committed; 2) The definition of argument as a reason for or against something would leave unresolved the pressing question about the essence of reason; 3) The assumption that the concept of argument is self-explanatory also leaves room for doubt. The offered definition can be justified by MacCormick's primary intention to distinguish between theoretical and practical argumentation, as well as to attribute practical character to the legal argumentation. Be that as it may, in his article MacCormick did not take on the task to construct a comprehensive definition of argumentation that would serve as a basis for the explanation of its role in law.

1090

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5   "Legal interpretation is a means for the realization of the practical task of jurisprudence. It ultimately consists in that to say what is legally required, prohibited and permitted in concrete cases." (Alexy 1995: 79)

Considering that legal theorists avoid an explicit and concise definition of both legal argumentation and argumentation in general, the question arises as to whether the argumentation can be defined and whether there is a need for a definition. One of the important lessons for jurisprudence was Hart's attitude towards the problem of definition in law (Hart 1994: 13–17). The classic form of definition *per genus proximum and differentiam specificam* is distinguished by its simplicity. In addition, it offers a set of words that can always replace the relevant term. The elegance of such a definition is flawed by the fact that it is often impossible to meet its conditions.[6] According to Hart the problems involved are sometimes too different from one another and too fundamental to be resolved by means of a definition. The absence of a definition clearly indicates that such an attitude prevails among legal theorists with respect to the concept of argumentation.

In contrast, a glimpse on the situation in the theory of argumentation provides an insight into a generally affirmative attitude towards the definition of basic concepts.[7] Under the strong influence of classical and post-classical rhetoric and dialectics, different approaches are established which offer a vast array of arguments (Van Eemeren 2001: 12–17). The main problem consists in the fact that each of those approaches starts from a different point. In order to properly understand any offered definition of a fundamental problem such as argumentation, it is necessary to gain insight into the basic assumptions of the relevant approach.

Bearing in mind the difficulties that arise in the analysis of the fundamental legal concepts and drawing on the contribution made by the theory of argumentation, I consider that a provisional definition of argumentation with a necessary explanation of some additional aspects would be instructive.[8] Argumentation can be defined as a process of convincing that a particular standpoint is correct by giving reasons.[9] A difference can be drawn

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6   According to Hart there are three main obstacles to this type of definition: 1) the generic concept may be unclear; 2) all words have a penumbra of uncertainty; 3) the meaning of word depends on the context. See: Hart 1994: 13–17.

7   "A definition of argumentation suitable to be used in argumentation theory as an academic discipline should, in our view, connect with commonly recognized characteristics of argumentation as it is known from everyday practice." (Van Eemeren et al. 2014: 3)

8   Alexy appeals to the same kind of reason in order to justify his definition of philosophy. It should only serve as "a starting point for an answer to the question about the nature of legal philosophy. (W)e need, indeed, an understanding of the general nature of philosophy only as a first step and not as a final and complete basis on which our understanding of the nature of legal philosophy rests, like a house on its foundations." (Alexy 2004: 157)

9   For the sake of comparison a definition from the argumentation theory follows: „*Argumentation* is a verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a certain opinion by advancing one or more propositions designed to justify that standpoint." (Van Eemeren, Henkemans 2017: 1)

between the pro and contra arguments depending on whether the reasons affirm or deny the relevant standpoint. From the concept of argumentation follows its interactive, communicative and rational character. In order for a particular position to be considered correct, it must be reasoned (argued).

Argumentation has an interactive character. It is part of a dialogue, not a monologue. Arguments are presented when one is supposed to convince the other of the correctness of a particular point of view. Interactivity consists in the intended change of attitudes of the addressee. Opinions on an issue must be originally divided in order to start arguing at all. The argumentator adopts a certain standpoint in advance and seeks to show the other party that it is correct by giving reasons. The listener or reader either advocates the opposite view or has not yet taken a stance on the relevant issue.[10] Argumentation can be symmetrical or asymmetrical depending on whether both sides advance and advocate opposite views, or the audience has yet to gain insight into and take a stand on a problem (Rescher 2007: 26).

1092

Argumentation has a communicative character. As a rule, the arguments are formulated in words. Nonetheless, the reasons may be expressed by using a variety of symbols. [11] Anything that can be a bearer of meaning can be a bearer of argument. Still, having in mind that the other symbols can always be reformulated into the signs of language, and given that language is a regular means of communication, it is plausible to say that argumentation has a verbal character.[12] After all, the use of language is often implicit in the reconstruction of the argumentative procedure.

Argumentation has a rational character. Giving arguments means referring to rationality. The argumentator always starts from the implicit assumption that the listener or reader will act as a rational critic when judging whether the reasons offered are valid or invalid.[13] The necessary premise of

10   If the convincement about the correctness of a certain standpoint could be graduated, then arguments could be used not only to create a new or qualitatively change the present opinion of another party, but also to quantitatively weaken or strengthen the convincement about the correctness of an already accepted standpoint. In that case the argumentation could also take place between the subjects who share the standpoint about certain question. Nonetheless, the regular assumption underlying argumentation is a discrepancy between the standpoints or an absence of standpoint on the side of the audience.
11   "Although these communicative moves are usually verbal, they can also be wholly or partly nonverbal, e.g., visual." (Van Eemeren et al. 2014: 5)
12   "Argumentation is a verbal activity that can be performed orally and in writing." Van Eemeren, Henkemans, 2017: 1.
13   "(Argumentation) is aimed at convincing the addressee of the acceptability of the standpoint by making them see that mutually shared critical standards of reasonableness have been met. Trying to convince the addressee by means of argumentation relies on the idea that the other party will approach the argumentation constructively, judging its soundness reasonably." (Van Eemeren et al. 2014: 6)

argumentative activity states that the subjects of argumentation, that is, human beings as such, are, in principle, capable of distinguishing good from bad reasons for accepting substantial statements (Alexy 1995: 120). The task of the argumentation theory is to determine which criteria should be met for the argumentation to be labeled reasonable. Different argumentative areas contain different criteria of rationality (Alexy 2000: 7).

2.2. Legal argumentation

One of the main causes for the growing interest in legal argumentation is a change in the understanding of the roles allotted to legislator and judge (Feteris 1999: 5). In the 19th century the prevailing opinion on the role of lawyers rested on Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers. The legislative function consisted in the formulation of clear and precise laws, while courts were meant to apply rules literally in concrete cases. In the 20th century, as the opinion prevailed that it is impossible to conceive all future cases or reliably foresee changes in social relations and moral attitudes, the theory of the strict separation of legislative and judicial powers was abandoned. The legislator´s task was narrowed to the formulation of a general norm, the meaning of which in difficult cases judges have to choose and justify their choice.

1093

Legal argumentation can be analyzed from a normative and a descriptive perspective (Feteris 1999: 14). A normative theory seeks to determine the criteria of rationality, that is, the criteria of correctness of legal argumentation. The task of a descriptive theory consists in an analysis of argumentative techniques that are effective in persuading a particular legal audience.

Over the last 40 years three more or less consistent normative approaches to legal argumentation have evolved (Feteris, Kloosterhuis 2009: 312–318). The longest tradition in the study of legal argumentation has the logical approach. From the logical perspective the formal validity is emphasized as a criterion of the rationality of legal argumentation. The logical consistence of argumentation is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition, since it is required that the arguments put forward comply with the legal norms. On the contrary, by denying almost any importance to the form of argumentation, the rhetorical approach brings the content of the arguments to the fore. From a substantial perspective, the rationality of argumentation depends on the effectiveness, i.e. persuasiveness of arguments. In the rhetorical approach a paramount importance is attributed to the context, as it determines the success of an argument. In response to the one-sidedness of previous approaches, a discursive approach was founded on the basis of logical, rhetorical and communicative aspects of argumentation. Argumentation has a rational character when it is conducted in accordance with certain procedural criteria. Discursive approach prevails in contemporary theory of law (Alexy 1995: 95).

The argumentation process takes place in different legal contexts. These include discussions of legal theorists, legal counseling, peaceful resolution of a dispute, proceedings before the court, debates in the parliament, assessment of issued judgments in the media. The types of legal argumentation differ in terms of whether they are institutionalized, whether they are limited to a certain period of time, whether a binding decision is made at the end (Alexy 1991: 262). The least confined type represents a legal theoretical discussion, while the most restrictions are present in the court proceedings. What is common to all different types of legal argumentation and what distinguishes them from moral argumentation is their attachment to valid law (Alexy 1991: 262). Therefore, legal argumentation can be defined as a process of convincing that a legal standpoint is correct by giving (legal) reasons.[14]

The court proceeding undoubtedly constitutes a paradigm when explaining the relationship between law and argumentation.[15] The subject of court proceeding is a dispute. The reason for bringing forward arguments before the court is the need to eliminate the dispute by a third unbiased and disinterested party decision. Thus, a conflict of interest is the reason to reach for arguments in a legal context.

Arguments, however, are not the only means available to help resolve a dispute. There are different ways to make the other party give up its interest. Fraud, as well as any form of coercion, such as threat or force, are the very opposite of argumentation. Fraud consists in giving deliberately false arguments, that is to say, in adducing nonexistent reasons in order to convince the other party to believe the correctness of a standpoint. Coercion, on the other side, is not at all concerned with the correctness of a standpoint. The appeal to force represents a logical error in the wider sense, "because no logical justification of expressed opinion is offered, although it can be a rhetorically effective means of persuading the audience" (Van Eemeren 2001: 146–147). Fraud involves untrue, and coercion unsound arguments, which is why they fall into the category of prohibited argumentative moves.[16]

Furthermore, conflicts of interest do not have to be solved by legal arguments. One side in the dispute can try to convince the other one of the correctness

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14   „Everybody who advances a legal standpoint and wishes this standpoint to be accepted by others, will have to present justifying arguments." (Feteris 1999: 1)
15   „When other participants – say, legal scholars, attorneys, or interested citizens – adduce arguments for or against certain contents of the legal system, they refer in the end to how a judge would have to decide if he wanted to decide correctly." (Alexy 2002: 25)
16   Although coercion is normally considered to be an irrational means to solve a conflict, the way law functions gives cause to ask about exceptions. If the affected party does not accept the judgment, the state threatens with the application of force and ultimately implements the decision by force. A doubt in the rationality of the state power calls into question the justifiability of the monopoly on violence.

of a standpoint by giving moral reasons, and vice versa. If any of the parties is successful in that endeavor, the dispute between them ceases to exist. However, as soon as any of the parties invokes the law, the argumentation takes on a legal character. The legal claims raised suggest the proximity of the state´s coercive apparatus, which is going to enforce the court decision independently of the will of the affected parties. Argumentation that takes place before invoking the law can be designated as non-legal, while afterwards it becomes a legal argumentation.

A dispute is solved when one party completely abandons its interest or when both parties partially climb down. In the first case, one party is triumphant over the other, while in the other case, both sides reach a compromise. When a dispute is to be solved by argumentation, each party tries to persuade the opposite party to believe the correctness of a standpoint, wherefore it gives reasons for its own, and against the opposite standpoint.

1095

Court proceedings represent the main setting in which legal argumentation takes place. However, this is not the only possible way to eliminate the conflict of interest by legal means. Parties may put forward legal arguments and try to resolve their dispute among themselves with or without the help of attorneys. If no party succeeds in convincing the other one of the correctness of its standpoint, then there is nothing left but to initiate a court proceeding. The first type of argumentation could be designated as extrajudicial and the second one as judicial. Out of court each party seeks to persuade the other one, whose interest is also at stake in the dispute, while before the court both parties seek to convince the judge, who plays the role of a disinterested decision maker.

It is instructive to draw a distinction between a passive and an active model of judicial argumentation. According to the active model, after hearing the arguments parties put forward referring to the legal grounds of their claims, it is up to the court to assess whose argumentation is more convincing. The judge´s task exhausts itself in the choice between the alternative justifications offered. By contrast, according to the active model, the court is supposed to form its own opinion on the legal ground of the conflicting claims. Although parties to a dispute may suggest which arguments are relevant in their particular case, the judge is not bound by their proffered opinions. Which model of judicial argumentation shall be accepted is a matter of legal policy. The active model seems to be better suited for the protection of public interest, while the passive model would be more appropriate in private law cases. Indeed, court proceedings can be molded by combining both models depending on the type of issue at stake.

The purpose of legal argumentation is to justify a legal judgment as an individual case of normative proposition (Alexy 1991: 273). The court pronounces

its judgment and informs parties of the reasons for its judgment in order for them to accept the correctness of the court's decision. The judgment rationale enables higher-instance judges to verify whether the judgment rendered is correct and lower-instance judges to ensure the uniformity of law. In addition, a justification is subject to public appraisal: the judgment rationale forms the basis for evaluation of the judgment in legal discussions and law journals.

The structure of argumentation in law is, unlike its purpose, a subject of numerous disputes. According to a widely accepted understanding a difference exists between an internal and an external justification of judgment. A court's decision is internally justified if it logically follows from a legally valid norm and a statement of facts (Alexy 1991: 18). Premises of legal syllogism represent direct arguments in support of the judgment. The internal justification is contextually sufficient, because it is limited to material that was originally accepted as legal (Aarnio 1990: 75). The external justification consists in the justification of the premises. Arguments in favor of or against the premises used in legal syllogism are indirect arguments in relation to the judgment. In view of the normative and the descriptive premise in legal syllogism, external justification involves two types of argumentation: interpretive argumentation and evidentiary argumentation.

2.3. Legal Argumentation and Interpretation

The basic characteristic of legal argumentation is its attachment to valid law. This means that the reasons which can be given in favor of or against a judgment are not unlimited. Therefore MacCormick draws a distinction between substantive arguments as reasons carrying practical weight independently of authority and authoritative arguments as reasons referring to the authority of lawmaker (MacCormick 1993: 17–18). Despite a somewhat different terminology, Alexy introduces an identical distinction between institutional arguments which are possible solely within the institutional framework of a legal system and general practical arguments which draw their power exclusively from their own substantial correctness (Alexy 1995: 87–89).

Opinions of legal theorists as to the exclusiveness of authoritative (institutional) arguments are divided (MacCormick 1993: 18). The strong thesis claims that authoritative arguments constitute the only acceptable arguments in law. The court cannot invoke norms of morality in the judgment rationale. On the contrary, the weak thesis requires the use of authoritative, while allowing the complementary use of substantive arguments. This means that authoritative arguments do not have an essential, but only a necessary character in the field of law. The answer to the question about the correctness of the depicted theses depends on whether it proceeds from a positivist or a non-positivist concept of law. Thus, both strong and weak thesis must

be addressed in the light of the dilemma of legal non-positivism. [17] Alexy and MacCormick expressly accept the weak thesis as the correct one (Alexy 1995: 88; MacCormick 1993: 18).

Irrespective of the question as to their exclusiveness, authoritative arguments are inevitable in law. A reference to the authority of lawmaker implies a reference to a particular legal text. This is explained by the fact that all laws are expressed in language. This does not mean that every legal norm is necessarily enacted, but that each can be formulated as a particular legal proposition. There is no law beyond language.[18] According to Hart, the legislation and the precedent represent two basic means to communicate general standards of conduct. The first of them makes use of words as much as possible, while the other requires minimal use of language.

In order to apply the law to a particular case, the established facts must be subsumed under an appropriate legal norm. The main problem of legal syllogism is the gap that regularly yawns between the words of the legal norm and the words of the statement of facts.[19] Starting only from the dissonantly formulated normative and descriptive premise it is impossible to draw a logically correct conclusion about the applicability of the relevant norm to the given case, and thus to internally justify the judgment. Language gap can be overcome by reformulating the legal norm so that it corresponds to the description of the factual situation. The reformulation of the norm must remain true to its original meaning. In fact, it represents the determination of the norm´s meaning with respect to the facts of the case.

1097

The role of interpretation in law is an inevitable consequence of the significance attributed to authoritative reasons in rendering judgments (MacCormick 1993: 19). Justification of a judgment necessitates authoritative arguments. Authoritative arguments involve a reference to certain legal texts. Therefore, in order to justify a judgment, it is necessary to determine the meaning of a legal norm expressed in language. It follows that interpretation, as a process in which the meaning of a statute´s text or a judicial precedent is being determined, is an inevitable part in the process of justifying a judgment.

The consideration of authoritative arguments throws light on the inextricable link between interpretation and law. Interpretation is a necessary element of argumentation when justifying a judgment. The question as to the role of argumentation in determining the meaning of legal regulations

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17   About the dilemma of the legal non-positivism see: Alexy 2000: 15–16.
18   "Even those who conceive a law as preceding the language – in the sense of "legal perception" or "legal awareness" – have to reach for the language in order to express the conceived or experienced contents and enable their effectiveness." (Rüthers et al. 2015: 101)
19   The problem of how to state facts and formulate the descriptive premise is here left aside.

remains, however, unanswered. Does the legal interpreter have to engage in argumentation just as the legal argumentator has to resort to interpretation?

3. Legal Interpretation

Legal interpretation is a type of interpretation. Since the term "interpretation" is ambiguous, it is advisable to learn about its possible meanings so as to establish order in the analysis of the role interpretation plays in law.

With regard to the subject, a distinction can be drawn between a general and a language interpretation (Alexy 1995: 71–73). The general interpretation is interpretation of any symbol, a sign made with intention to convey a meaning. The language interpretation is interpretation of linguistic symbols. With regard to the doubt, a difference can be made between interpretation in a broad and a narrow sense (MacCormick 2005: 121). Interpretation in the broad sense encompasses every case of understanding a symbol. Interpretation in the narrow sense includes the presence of a doubt about the correctness of understanding a symbol and its resolution through a choice based on reasons. Interpretation in the narrow sense corresponds to what is usually called construction (Alexy 1995: 73). At the heart of numerous legal discussions lies the problem of language interpretation in the narrow sense.

However, the term "interpretation" contains yet another ambiguity. The third ambiguity matches the linguistically plain difference between judging and the judgment. Judging is an activity, while the judgment represents the outcome of that activity. Analogously, the term "interpretation" could refer either to the interpretive process or the result of that process. In order to resolve such equivocation, it is prudent to draw a distinction between interpretive argumentation as a process and interpretive conclusion as its outcome.

Interpretive conclusion as an outcome of interpreting represents an interpretive assertion (opinion, standpoint). As an assertion it necessarily raises a claim to correctness (Alexy 1995: 77). In order to demonstrate the correctness of an interpretive conclusion, it is necessary to offer reasons for and refute reasons against it. It follows that interpretation as a process actually represents argumentation.[20]

The introduced distinction sheds light on the fact that not only the interpretation as a result is important for argumentation (in rendering a judgment), but also argumentation is important for the interpretation as a process (in

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20   In a similar way a line can be drawn between judging and a judgment. Judging is an activity, while a judgment represents the outcome of that activity. A judgment is an assertion which necessarily raises a claim to correctness. In order to demonstrate the correctness of the judgment, the judge has to bring forward arguments for and refute arguments against it. Therefore, judging is an argumentative activity.

choosing a meaning) (Compare: MacCormick, 1993: 20). It is important to note that interpretation and argumentation in law are linked by the authority. Starting from the weak thesis, the significance of interpretive conclusion as an argument in favor of the judgment can be expressed in the following way:

1) In order to legally justify its judgment, the court must use at least authoritative arguments.
2) In order to use authoritative arguments, the court must interpret regulations.
3) In order to legally justify its judgment, the court must interpret regulations.

The significance of arguments in choosing a meaning of legal regulations can be expressed as follows:

4) In order to interpret regulations, the court must justify the choice of a particular meaning.
5) In order to justify the choice of a particular meaning, the court must use arguments.
6) In order to interpret regulations, the court must use arguments.

From the explanation of the structure of legal argumentation, it follows that the judgment is the outcome of direct argumentation, while the interpretive conclusion is the outcome of indirect argumentation. An interpretive conclusion is, in fact, the major premise of legal syllogism, which must be justified by indirect arguments in support of the judgment.

Methods of interpretation are arguments. Interpretive arguments can be classified in different ways. The first known systematic debate on legal interpretation in England dates back to 1567 (Frankfurter 1963: 60). Canons of interpretations were and remain the subject of numerous discussions in German theory of law from Savigny's work in 1840 (Rüthers et al. 2015: 423–427). Countless elaborated theories require us to focus our attention on contemporary authors. MacCormick distinguishes linguistic, systemic and teleological arguments.[21] Alexy introduces a distinction between institutional arguments, which include linguistic, genetic, and systemic, and general practical arguments, which include deontological and teleological arguments.[22]

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21   At the outset MacCormick included both teleological and deontological arguments in the interpretive arguments. However, later he retained only the teleological argumentation in law as an expression of the consequentialism. MacCormick 1993: 25; MacCormick 2005: 132.
22   Alexy initially discriminated between semantic, genetic, historical, comparative, systemic and teleological interpretive arguments in law. Subsequently he will subsume the historical and comparative argument under the systemic one, and moreover introduce the distinction between institutional and general practical arguments. Alexy 1991: 289; Alexy 1995: 85–89.

4. Conclusion

Legal interpretation as a process represents an argumentation in which reasons are given in favor of or against a certain understanding of the relevant legal norm. In relation to the judgment interpretive arguments are indirect, because they justify the choice of the major premise in legal syllogism. It follows that interpretation as a process is argumentation.

Since law is expressed in language and a legal judgment requires authoritative arguments, the legal interpretation as a result is used in the justification of judgment. An interpretive conclusion represents a direct argument in favor of the judgment. In fact, it constitutes the major premise of legal syllogism. It follows that interpretation as a result is an argument.

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1101

Miloš Marković

Nerazmrsivi splet argumentacije i interpretacije u pravu

Apstrakt

U temelju neumornih poduhvata da se objasni priroda prava počiva pitanje kako sudije treba da rešavaju slučajeve. Otuda proističe potreba za teorijom koja bi rasvetlila ulogu sudova i štaviše pružila im smernice prilikom donošenja presuda. Istorija pravne teorije obiluje raznovrsnim pokušajima da se na postavljeno pitanje ponudi opšteprihvatljiv odgovor. Vatrenost rasprave i stalnu nezadovoljnost ponuđenim rešenjima podsticala je misao o neukrotivoj proizvoljnosti sudija. U savremenoj debati se naročito ističe značaj argumentacije kao karike sudskog postupka koja obezbeđuje razumnost i time opravdanost i ubedljivost donete odluke.

Pre ulaska u meritum stvari naznačiću u opštim crtama kojoj oblasti teorije prava pripadaju argumentacija i interpretacija. Smisao postavljanja misaonog okvira jeste da se predupredi gubljenje iz vida celine, a da se istovremeno ograniče dometi izlaganja na određeni deo pravne problematike. Drugi deo rada je posvećen pojmu argumentacije uopšte i specifičnostima argumentacije u pravu. U trećem delu se razmatra uloga pravne interpretacije i povlači jasna razlika između interpretacije kao procesa i interpretacije kao rezultata. U zaključku rasprave izneću tezu da je interpretacija kao proces argumentacija, dok je interpretacija kao rezultat argument prilikom obrazlaganja presude.

Ključne reči: Pravo, argumentacija, interpretacija, interpretativna argumentacija, interpretativni zaključak

Janko Nešić

Against Deflation of the Subject

Abstract   I will argue that accounts of mineness and pre-reflective self-awareness can be helpful to panpsychists in solving the combination problems. A common strategy in answering the subject combination problem in panpsychism is to deflate the subject, eliminating or reducing subjects to experience. Many modern panpsychist theories are deflationist or endorse deflationist accounts of subjects, such as Parfit's reductionism of personal identity and G. Strawson's identity view. To see if there can be deflation we need to understand what the subject/self is. One aspect of consciousness left unexplored and unappreciated by panpsychist theories is pre-reflective self-consciousness/self-awareness. Theories of the self, inspired by phenomenology, that are serious about subjectivity, could be of use in arguing against the deflationary reductionism of the experiencing subject. These theories show that there is more to the subject of experience than just its experiences (qualities). Even without arguing for any precise account of the nature of the self, it can be shown what phenomenology of subjective character of consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness contributes to the combination problem debate.

Keywords: deflation, subject of experience, panpsychism, combination problem, pre-reflective self-awareness

1102

1. Introduction

There has been a resurgence of interest in self-consciousness and panpsychism in contemporary philosophy of mind. Nevertheless, importance of subjectivity or pre-reflective self-consciousness in experience has been neglected in panpsychist accounts of consciousness.[1] I will argue that we should look to phenomenology in order to better understand and be able to solve or dissolve the combination problems that are encountered in panpsychism. As an extension of materialism, panpsychism holds that physical matter doesn't generate consciousness, but is already endowed with it. The view harbors some combination problems: how consciousness from lower levels generates our level consciousness, how subjects sum to yield a new subject or how experience makes a unified subject of experience.

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1   Strawson has explicitly expounded the significance of self-experience for subjects, though still he has no notion of self-awareness in the sense of persistent mineness. Keith Turausky 2014 has argued for unreduced subjects. He defends a theory of phenomenal subjectivity which takes "for-me-ness" to be a *haecceity*: „an essential, individuative, non-qualitative, non-duplicable phenomenal property".

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The concept of *subjectivity* or *subjective character* of consciousness[2] has been underappreciated in modern analytic panpsychist theories of consciousness. Others have argued for the project of phenomenological contribution to the philosophy of mind and to the general mind/body debate: "Philosophical phenomenology can offer much more to contemporary consciousness research than a simple compilation of introspective evidence" (Zahavi 2005: 5). Phenomenology thus construed is not just introspective analysis of experience. Subjectivity has always been one of the main interests of phenomenological investigations and it is only natural to use such theories when trying to understand problem of the nature of subjects in panpsychism. Phenomenology could help us understand what a subject of experience is and only then could we hope to resolve the unity of consciousness, the boundary problem and the subject-summing problem of panpsychism. It would be beneficial if the contemporary debate on deflationism in panpsychism would be more thoroughly informed by the phenomenological concepts of subjectivity/mineness/pre-reflective self-awareness. Specifically, the problem of consciousness unity will be addressed and a different solution based on the first-person givenness account offered. I will discuss how inclusion of pre-reflective self-consciousness affects these matters.

1103

First I will lay out the subject combination problem that plagues panpsychism (section 2). One way to answer the subject combination problem is the *deflation of the subject* (section 3). I will examine Strawson's deflationary account (Sections 3.1 i 3.2). Alternative phenomenological theories of the self/subject will be called upon (Section 4). It will be demonstrated how phenomenology of pre-reflective self-awareness can contribute to the understanding of the unity of consciousness (Section 5), nature of the self and ultimately, what consequences this has for the plausibility of deflation and solving the subject combination problem (section 6).

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2   Pre-reflective self-consciousness/awareness, mineness, me-ness, for-me-ness - there are many different concepts conceived by different philosophers and they don't necesseraly signify the same phenomenon, but they all circulate in the literature as pertaining to subjectivity, that is pointing to a subject or having something to do with a subjective point of view. Mineness and subjective character are sometimes meant or stand for the pre-reflective self-consciousness of the phenomenological tradition. That there seems to exist something like self-consciousness in the pre-reflective and pre-conceptual sense is hold as highly plausible by many phenomenologists and philosophers of mind. This self-awareness is not of the cognitive kind, deployed in I-thoughts, but minimal, non-reflexive; what many have defended as pre-reflective self-consciousness. Mineness can be misleading. What this notions are pointing to is the presence of the subject in experience. Problem seems to be that all this concepts are about properties or aspects of consciousness. For discussion and criticism of some uses of these terms see Siewert 2013, Nida-Rümelin 2014, Guillot 2016. They have shown what lies behind these notions and how we should work towards developing better concepts that more accurately describe our phenomenology.

2. Panpsychism and the Combination problems

One way to define panpsychism would be to say that everything in nature is endowed with a modicum of consciousness. Panpsychism, though it may sound counter-intuitive or even downright crazy, is endorsed in order to overcome the deficiencies and problems of both physicalism and dualism. Motivation behind the modern revival of panpsychism is the failure of mainstream reductive physicalism to account for and explain consciousness, being thus unable to solve *the hard problem of consciousness*. If properly understood it could prove to be the synthesis of materialism and dualism that rises above the shortcomings of both positions.

As it is argued in most contemporary works on panpsychism, the constitutive form of panpsychism suffers from a significant problem, that of combination. Constitutive panpsychism posits that macroconsciousness is grounded in microconsciousness, macroexperience just has those microexperiences as parts and it inherits their properties, „they add up to yield macroexperience" (Chalmers 2015: 253). This is the most attractive form of panpsychism because it gives the promise of mental-physical isomorphism[3] in accordance with the Russellian monism[4] and it avoids emergentism. Combination problem for constitutive panpsychism arises when we try to understand how o-consciousness (that we pre-theoretically know as ourselves) comes from fundamental microconsciousness if we are on a position of panpsychism, the thesis that everything has mentality in some way is or has some kind of consciousness. The problem is especially hard when it relates the combination of micro-subjects (if these exist) into macro-subjects (or *o-subjects*[5]) of human beings.

Coleman (2013) has pointed out that there is an "internal tension" in panpsychism and he argues against the possibility of subject-summing. Constitutive panpsychism was driven by an aversion to emergentism[6], but in the end it seems that has to yield to some kind of emergence in order to account for the production of high-level subjects. He argues that if panpsychism resorts to emergence then classic physicalism could prove to be more plausible. Accepting emergence could be taken as a betrayal of original intentions of panpsychism.

The combination of subjects seems to be an insurmountable problem for constitutive panpsychism. More than that, it could be insoluble in principle.

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3   See Mørch 2014: 50.
4   The usually prefered interpretation of panpsychism.
5   Phillip Goff's term.
6   Nagel's famous argument for panpsychism includes a *Non-emergence* premise: „P4. Non-emergence: All high-level properties of a composite intelligibly derive from properties of its constituents plus their arrangement." (Nagel 1979: 181-182).

Goff (2009) argues that a set of subjects does not *a priori* entail the existence of another subject, we cannot see how this happens, though there is a possibility open that it might happened in some to us, presently unknown, way[7]. Coleman, while acknowledging Goff's argument, goes on to strengthen the claim that it is metaphysically impossible to combine or assemble subjects to yield new subjects and this as, a consequence, rules out constitutive panpsychism. If this would be the case, some kind of *brute* emergence would be involved and panpsychists don't want this, because it is a position that they originally tried to avoid. This is why Coleman ultimately denies the plausibility of constitutive panpsychism and argues that panpsychists should become neutral monists. Coleman takes what he thinks is a golden middle way between orthodox physicalism and full-fledged panpsychism and defends panqualityism, position in which ultimates are *qualities*.

The combination problem is actually a whole family of related problems. Chalmers distinguishes three different aspects of phenomenal states (subjective character, qualitative character and structural character) that yield three different combination problems: *the subject combination* problem, *the quality combination* problem, and *the structure combination* problem[8], but there are also the grain problem, the palette problem, the unity problem. The hardest of all problems is *the subject combination problem* or *subject-summing*.

1105

3. Deflation

Deflationist views about subjects of experience dominate the landscape of contemporary literature on panpsychism. Deflationary subjects of experience are not persistent through time as we pre-theoretically conceive of them. They are not diachronically unified, though they can have synchronic unity. Deflationary views were defended by Hume (1739-40), James (1890), Parfit (1971). Modern panpsychist accounts of Roelofs (2015), Mørch (2014), Strawson (2009), Coleman (2013), Seager (2010) all have deflationist traits.

Chalmers (2015; 2016) shows that one possible reaction to the combination problem is to *deflate the subject*.[9] *Prima facie* it is an appealing strategy. But it seems that deflationism about some of the main concepts of panpsychism (subjects, awareness) cannot on itself be a solution to any of the combination problems, though it can help us get to those solutions (together with phenomenal bonding, for example). "Either denying that experiences must have subjects at all, or at least denying that subjects are metaphysically and

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7   Like the phenomenal bonding solution.
8   See Chalmers 2016.
9   Other options would be to endorse emergent panpsychism instead of contitutive panpsychism or to identify macro-subjects with micro-subjects (Chalmers 2015: 270).

conceptually simple entities" (Chalmers 2015: 271). Though he sees it as a conceptual truth that experiences must have subjects who have them, he finds the second denial untenable. Opting for deflation seems like a natural choice in compositional panpsychism/panprotopsychism.

Deflation garners special attention when it comes to the possible solution to the subject combination problem. If we deny the deflation of the subject, there can be no combination. Deflation can range from denying that subjects are metaphysically primitive entities (reduction) to complete eliminativism of such entities. Given deflationism, there is greater plausibility in the composition of subjects from other subjects and composition of subjects from experience. Are we primitive subjects of experience, *Edenic Subjects*? Should we imbue our Subjects with sedulous subjectivity? If we are something like Edenic subjects, this would eliminate constitutive pan(proto)psychism.

Eliminativism of subjects can be found in some neutral monist views, like in theories of Russell, Mach and James. Eliminativist views face combination problems and even less extreme forms of deflationism that view subjects as composite and derivative still have the subject-summing problem (Chalmers 2016). There is also deflation of awareness. James is eliminativist about such relation and Coleman (2013) defends a reductive, functional analysis of awareness.

Panqualityism is subject to the "nonsubject/subject gap" problem (Chalmers 2015: 272) and tries to "patch it up" with deflation. On such a view, quiddities of microphysical properties are qualities. When there is awareness of qualities, they become phenomenal properties. In panqualityism subjectivity is not essential to qualities. Some panqualityists reject subjects of experience altogether (eliminativism), while others think they are constituted by qualities in certain relations as with Coleman's solutions and *the higher-order thought theories of consciousness*. Panqualityism of Coleman, in which the basic, intrinsic properties are qualities as „unexperienced qualia" harbors the conceivability of *awareness zombies* (Chalmers 2016). Attempts to „functionalize" awareness eventually eradicate the phenomenology of awareness, as is the case in in panqualityism.

What all this comes down to is the problem od radical emergence. The hard problem of consciousness originated as a result of the unintelligibility of radical emergence of experiential from physical (as completely non-experiential). Panpsychism came as an answer, assuming that the experiential can only come or emerge (in a non-problematic way) from experiential (*No-Radical-Emergence Thesis*).[10] But the explanatory gap reappears in panpsychism's

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10   See Strawson 2006.

and panprotopsychism's combination problems. There seem to be problems of radical emergence of subjects from qualities, of subjects from experience and of subjects from other subjects.[11] In this paper I will not be concerned with eliminativist positions, only with deflationist ones, particularly with those that reduce subjects to experience.

So, there is an explanatory gap between subjects and experience and some views try to answer it with deflationism, by reducing subjects to experience. If we argue against deflationist reduction, on the ground that there is something like unreducible subjectivity, this could push us towards giving up constitutive panpsychism. We should be wary of reduction in these matters, because we might not know well that what is being reduced, to take cue from Nagel (1974). I think the deflationist reductive approach can be challenged by appealing to the first-person givenness of experience and this is what I will argue for.

Let us examine several representative deflationary views of the self/subject that are endorsed by modern panpsychists. Parfit's theory, though it is not panpsychist in nature, presents a reductionist account of personal identity and of the self (subject). Mørch (2014) cites Parfit's and Strawson's deflationist accounts that are of use in solving the combination problem. In next sections I will make apparent the shortcomings of several deflationary positions and offer a better solution.

One of the reasons we think of ourselves as subjects in a strong sense is the intuition about persistence of *personal identity*. Cases of personal identity breakdown are taken to support deflationary views of subjects and Parft's thought experiments contribute to subject reductionism. I will consider one examplary panpsychist deflationist theory of the self.

3.1. Thin sesmets

We find Strawson's position on the question of the subject somewhere in the middle, between pro-selfers and anti-selfers. Strawson expounds the transience view of the self. He argues that there are no persistent subjects. He can be called a panpsychist, or in his terms a *real materialist* (real physicalism) and not just a *physicSalist*.

Strawson shows that subjects have experience of themselves, they have *self-experience*. It is the necessary and sufficient condition for having a self, he claims. There can't be any subject without subjectivity; "subjectivity" can be put in place of "subject". On his account that means a subject is an episode

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11 Chalmers 2015 claims there is an explanatory gap between qualities and awareness and a gap between qualities and experience, on account of the conceivability argument.

of subjectivity and "the existence of *s* (this particular episode of subjectivity) is really nothing over and above the existence of *c* (this particular episode of occurrent living content)" (Strawson 2009: 414).[12] Subject, as an episode of subjectivity is *identical* to an episode of experience. Strawson endorses *the identity view* between experience and subjects of experience.

The real subjects for Strawson are the "thin" ones. "Thin subjects"[13] are synchronic unifiers of co-conscious qualities, though not diachronic unifiers. "There's a fundamental and immovable sense in which one can't experience the self as multiple in the synchronic case" (2009, 90). Strawson thinks that we have short streams of consciousness. They are brief pulses of experience which can last up to about 2 or 3 seconds, although this is disputable. James called this temporary selves "'perishing' pulses of thought". When there is am experiential gap between them, no subject exists. Strawson thinks of subjects as real mental things. He dubs them SESMETs (short for "subject-of-experience-as-single-mental-thing"). Subject is a *single*, but only synchronically, for him: "The unity or singleness of the (thin) subject of the total experiential field in the living moment of experience and the unity or singleness of the total experiential field are aspects of the same thing" (Strawson 2010: 81). According to Strawson, James held a similar position on subject persistence: "Successive thinkers, numerically distinct, but all aware of the past in the same way, form an adequate vehicle for all the experience of personal unity and sameness which we actually have" (James 1892: 181).[14] Long-term continuity is here only in a "bundle theory" sense; there are in fact many consecutive, numerically distinct selves or "Thoughts". Thin subjects are best described as: "essentially-subject-involving-experiences, briefly flaring neural synergies" (Strawson 2009: 359).

Strawson is taking into account only *episodes*, as if for every particular experience there is a subject of that experience. One great problem of combinationist (constitutive) panpsychist views is that if we (as macro-subjects) are made up of many subjects as parts, then we cannot say for sure who of those subjects we really are. This is the dreaded Problem of *Self-Identification* (see

1108

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12   See also Strawson 2009: 274.
13   Strawson 2009 argues that Descartes, Fichte, Hume, Husserl, James, Nozick among others hold the „thin subject" view.
14   James reserves the word „me" for the empirical aggregate (empirical ego, *the self as known*), the „identity of the whole", as an objecitve self, and the „I" for the present, momentarily parcel of the stream, "Thought" (pure ego, *the self as knower*). "This me is an empirical aggregate of things objectively known. The I which knows them cannot itself be an aggregate; neither for psychological purposes need it be considered to be an unchanging metaphysical entity like the Soul, or a principle like the pure Ego, viewed as 'out of time.' It is a Thought, at each moment different from that of the last moment, but *appropriative* of the latter, together with all that the latter called its own" (James 1890: 400-1).

Roelofs 2015: 265-304) that seems to seriously undermine combinationism. On the combinationist view we "refer to a multitude of subjects" when we ask "who is talking now?" Roelofs contends:

> Combinationism renders self-identification impossible relative to the set of our experientially equivalent parts, and probably also relative to the set of our cognitively sophisticated parts. Rather than showing how self-identification is still possible, combinationists have to bite the bullet and claim that self-identification is not important: knowing which set of harmoniously-connected overlapping parts we belong to is all we need. (Roelofs 2015: 303).

Strawson's theory seems to suffer from a problem of *self-reference*, though diachronically. Which of these subjects is me? Am I a human being, a human head or medulla oblongata, one might wonder in constitutive panpsychism? Similar questions could be asked of Strawson's pearle view.

When we of talk of subject/experience identity what *experience* exactly should we take into consideration? First of all, experience is holistic – the experiential field is a whole prior to its parts. Phenomenal holism is a very plausible thesis.[15] Distinct experiences are „carved out" later. Holism could be defined in this manner:

> Phenomenal holism – this is the view that, within a person's total psychical whole, the nature of a single identifiable experience […] is essentially determined by the other experiences occurring along- side it – synchronically – within the whole (Basile 2010).

We could rightfully ask how are all of these thin subjects woven together into a stream of consciousness. Strawson explains: "The 'stitching software' that underwrites our sense of being a single persisting subject—and delivers a sense of the flowing continuity of experience (for those who have such experience)—is as remarked extremely powerful" (Strawson 2009).

What is it exactly that stays the same in all experiences? If there are as many thin subjects as episodes of experience then Strawson needs to postulate some kind of phenomenal bonding relation to serve as the "stitching software", holding these subjects together diachronically. This seems like an unparsimonious posit. Strawson's view is problematic in light of phenomenal holism. Subjects cannot be identical to single identifiable experiences. Since synchronic experiential field as a whole is prior to its parts, there is only one holistic experience to which a subject is identical to.

Dainton also points out Strawson's claim that we are identical to episodes of our experience. How do we survive sleep and unconsciousness? This is

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15   Similar to priority monism in Schaffer 2010.

the *problem of continuity* (of a stream of consciousness). If Strawson is right, then we are identical to episodes of experience, we do not *have* experiences (Dainton 2012: 185), this is no ownership. Dainton would claim that overlapping chains of diachronic co-consciousness make up the stream of consciousness. The problem with subject's persistence is how to account for the *diachronic unity*. This involves solving the problem of continuity of a stream of consciousness that has gaps in the form of unconscious states and dreamless sleep. For Dainton the unity of consciousness comes from primitive inter-experiential relationships. He also denies there is something like mineness or non-reflective self-consciousness (Dainton 2008: 242–3).

There is no flow of the stream of consciousness in Strawson's account, there are insurmountable gaps between short-term subject-experience-episodes. Certain worries are then raised against such an account. Since we cannot have experience of unconsciousness states, how can we know anything about them, even that there are such states? Zahavi asks why should our phenomenal field be fragmentary, because there always seems to be some kind of "phenomenal background" of experience. Or at least there is the constant sense of mineness? Strawson's sesmet account also entails that the difference between successive "thin subjects" is as deep as between completely different selves or streams (Zahavi 2005: 234-235). Why would all of my thin subjects be *mine* and not somebody else's? What makes "me" is that there is something invariant to all these sesmets in my stream of consciousness. What is the same is self-experience (in Strawson's terms). The stream of consciousness is really a *stream of subjectivity*, if it is streamlike at all (as James argued). The answer to these worries lays in the mineness or first-person givenness of experience.

Not just compositional panpsychists are opting for deflation. Mørch (2014) uses Strawson's identity account and expounds a *hylomorphic* account of causation in her emergent panpsychism.[16] She treats experientiality as "a general determinable" and reduces subjects to forms of experiential matter with the help of Strawson's identity view and Parfit's fusion. She endorses the identity view and Parfitian fusion/fision in order to make the experiential combination intelligible (Mørch 2014: 219-220). On her view subjects are transitory forms of fundamental experiential matter. And in the vein of Strawson's theory of sesmets it is concluded that "the subject as something that is supposed to persist through time is reduced to a series of momentary total experiential fields connected by similarity and causation" (Mørch 2014: 216). But Strawson himself has written about equating energy with experientiality: "energy is experientiality; that is its intrinsic nature" (Strawson 2006: 243).

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16   She defends a *diachronic fusion* account of combination. See also Seager 2010.

Strawson also briefly deals with combination of sesmets (subject combination or subject-summing) when he says: "Sesmets are either single ultimates, then, or made up of a plurality of ultimates in a certain synergetic relation—if they exist" (Strawson 2009: 295) though he gives no detailed arguments for such combination nor he explains the nature of this "synergetic relation". On a different occasion he notes that he finds no problem in a plurality of subjects forming or generating a new subject. Again, there is an attempt to make subject-summing intelligible by deflating subjects themselves.

4. Minimal self

The concept of subjectivity doesn't seem to be a central part of these panpsychist accounts. Mostly there is talk of experience. [17] This dates back to Eddington who wrote in *The Nature of the Physical World* (1928) that the stuff of the world is the *mind-stuff*. As it is often argued, phenomenally conscious mental states have a *qualitative* character and a *subjective* character (Kriegel 2005). [18] Subjective character of a conscious state is something it's like to be in that state for the subject and qualitative character of a conscious state is what it's like to be in that state. If I am having a blue experience, then there would be a qualitative aspect to that experience, the blue aspect and a subjective aspect, the for-me aspect. Conscious experience intrinsically involves having a "point of view", first-person perspective.

1111

All experience is somehow bounded and unified together in the subject's phenomenal space. James explains it in the following paragraph:

> No thought even comes into direct *sight* of a thought in another personal consciousness than its own. Absolute insulation, irreducible pluralism, is the law. It seems as if the elementary psychic fact were not *thought* or *this thought* or *that thought*, but *my thought*, every thought being *owned*. Neither contemporaneity, nor proximity in space, nor similarity of quality and content are able to fuse thoughts together which are sundered by this barrier of belonging to different personal minds. The breaches between such thoughts are the most absolute breaches in nature (James 1890: 221). [19]

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17   One of those who point out the significance of subjectivity is Keith E. Turausky. He argues for the thesis that the *individuative* subjective character of consciousness "requires the invocation of haecceities: non-qualitative, non-duplicable properties that uniquely individuate objects (and, in this case, subjects)" (Turausky 2014: 249).

18   We need to be careful when using the umbrella term "subjective character", because it can designate very different things. Nida-Rümelin 2014 shows there are three interpretations of „subjective character": *basic intentionality, primitive awarenes and awareness of basic intentionality*. Only in the third sense are we speaking of some sort of *pre-reflexive self-consciousness*.

19   Similarly Shoemaker 1996, Nagel 1986.

Thoughts are always part of some mind, there is no experience of a "no-body's thought". Why is this so? How do experiences hold themselves together? Such questions increase our phenomenological need for subjectivity and experiencing subjects.

It seems that there are good reasons to take the mineness of experience as the constant and not experientiality. What I find in introspective observation of myself is a persistent sense of this "for-me-ness" of experience. Subjectivity has a *self-intimating nature* (Levine 2001: 109). I think we should be appropriative of phenomenologist's insights on subjectivity and with such knowledge could shed some light on present matters. We should try to understand and solve problems of combination that are part of panpsychism while being self-conscious about *mineness* or *first-person givenness* of experience. With this notion of subjectivity, as it will be argued, we can also answer the shortcomings of both Parfit's and Strawson's accounts.

1112

Consider, for example, Zahavi's (2005, 2014) view of the self. Like Strawson's and unlike some of the other previous views discussed, Zahavi's *experiential self* is a "thin subject" account of the self, though it is not reductive. This for-me-ness of experience makes a difference to subject's phenomenology. My first-person perspective is a *phenomenological fact*, even the pre-reflective first-person givenness of experience. Though we can imagine *qualitative* Perfect Twins, there is a further fact that is not entailed by those qualities, and that makes them distinct: their respective individuate first-person perspectives.[20] That I have these experiences does not in any way entail that I should have this first-person perspective. Deflationism in panpsychism is due to a lack of clear notion of subjectivity. But a "thin subject" theory of the self can still include subjectivity. Turausky (2014) notes that Zahavi does not posit subjects as such, just subjectivity as first-person givenness, but I think it is safe to assume with Strawson (2009) that when something has subjectivity it is *a subject*.[21]

5. Pre-reflective self-awareness and unity of consciousness

Let us track back to the problems of boundedness and unity of subjects and make sense of them in new light of subjectivity. Briefly I will discuss how the unity of consciousness problem would look if a phenomenological theory of subjectivity is assumed. This will show us in what way deflation could be wrong.

Chalmers and Bayne (2003) define *The Unity Thesis*: "Necessarily, any set of conscious states of a subject at a time is unified". To answer the boundary

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20   See Zahavi 2014 and Turausky 2014.
21   Subjectivity entails a subject (Strawson 2009: 274).

problem is to answer the unity problem, there is a deep connection between this issues. They are not the same, but seem close, because notions of unity and boundedness are close. In terms of phenomenology, I regard subjectivity of experiences as what sets the boundaries of subjects. Both the unity and boundedness are explained by the metaphysical fact that they belong to the same bearer, the same subject that has them and mineness and first-person givenness and pre-reflective self-awareness point to this.

One proposed solution to the subject-summing problem is the *phenomenal bonding relation* strategy (Goff 2009) positing a special kind of relation *between* subjects, that seems to unite subjects into a composite subject, though the bond is unknown to us. It is such because we can only introspect within a subject. Perhaps, the intrinsic nature of physical relations is the phenomenal bonding relation.

Although phenomenal bonding is an intersubjective relation, it is often framed as a problem of *intrasubjective* relations. Chalmers (2016) claims that phenomenal bonding is "co-consciousness", the relation of the unity of consciousness. But what co-consciousness relation really is? In itself it is empty, undefined. This notion doesn't seem to explain much, it just states that some phenomenal states are experienced together, conscious together, phenomenally unified. And why are they experienced together? James writes on the co-consciousness relation:

1113

> The conjunctive relation that has given most trouble to philosophy is *the co-conscious transition,* so to call it, by which one experience passes into another when both belong to the same self. About the facts there is no question. My experiences and your experiences are 'with' each other in various external ways, but mine pass into mine, and yours pass into yours in a way in which yours and mine never pass into one another. (James 1912, 47)

Different selves are related in various ways through external space, but experiences are "with each other" in the inner space of the self. Chalmers has pointed out that there is a question if the co-consciousness relation is transitive or not. Dainton (2011) imagined how a nontransitive view of co-consciousness could make the combination problem coherent. But it has to be the case that co-consciousness is transitive and all experiences (states) are co-conscious in a total state of consciousness of a subject. That they belong to one subject tells us when the transitivity stops, so to speak. It shows where the boundary of consciousness is. Just look at the James paragraph, it states that experiences are co-conscious "when both belong to the same self", not the other way round. Bayne and Chalmers (2003) argue that the unity thesis cannot be explained by starting from "our concept of a subject". Their argument does not go through because it assumes the bundle theory of the self, which is not the only available option on the subjects of experience metaphysical market.

So how to explain the phenomenal unity? One possibility that is worth exploring is that *self-consciousness* accounts for the unity of consciousness (Bayne 2004). Bayne explores renditions of unity based on self-consciousness. The *psychological constraint* on co-consciousness states that "experiences can be co-conscious only if the subject of those experiences is aware of them as their own" (2004: 229). The robust account of the unity of consciousness of this sort would take that self-consciousness *explains* the unity of consciousness, though Bayne doesn't defend such a strong account, he just claims that self-consciousness *constrains* the unity. I think that a more robust account can and should be argued for. Bayne tries to argue against the psychological constraint based on the considerations of thought-insertion, depersonalization and Cotard delusion cases. These patients have a phenomenally unified perspective but they lack a *sense of ownership* ("the bare sense of being the subject of an experience" in Bayne's terminology). So any defender of self-consciousness account of unity will have to show that in these cases sense of ownership is preserved.

One could say that experiences are unified in the self as in a kind of space (subjective space).[22] Subjectivity is the foundation of experience, the space where experience is manifested, relation of the subject to the experience could be the same as spacetime is related to its material objects. This way the "spatial relations" between experiences are just relations of the subjectivity space. Experiences are unified because they belong to the same one space of subjectivity. That they are co-conscious is grounded in their shared subjectivity, the same first-personal givenness. This is why co-consciousness relation may be misleading.

Fasching views the first-personal givenness as a *dimension*, and as such it is not the result of relations between experiences, "but is what makes them possible":

> 'one awareness' (the togetherness of the manifold synchronically co-conscious experiential contents) is not a result of any relations between the experiential contents, of some synthesis of them… the character of a dimension in which the contents, with all their relations, have their presence in the first place (Fasching 2009: 143-144).[23]

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22   Talk of the field-like characteristics of subjectiivity is not new, "field of first-personal givenness of experience" (Zahavi).

23   This would be to conceive of a self as a phenomenal space. But, even if self is imagined as a kind of space that holds the experiences, it would have a substantivalist interpretation, or so I would argue. Dainton has considered and rejected the notion of a „subjective space" (Dainton 2008: 141-145). He equates it with A-thesis or pure awareness thesis. He denies that selves are identical with phenomenal spaces, as proposed by Stephen Priest, because such a phenomenal space would have to be substantial rather than relational and this can't be the case. Dainton thinks that for it to be substantial it has to „have some introspectively discernible qualitative phenomenal features of a recognizably

Self-consciousness and subjectivity that unifies experiences is the pre-reflective first-personal givenness of experience, mineness or *ipseity* (Zahavi 2005; Nagel 1974). For Zahavi, this is the the experiential ("minimal") self. Self is not something detachable from its experiences. This is the middle way of "the phenomenological proposal", a view posited between regarding the self as an entity distinct, separated from experience and a view that the self is a manifold or a bundle of experiences; neither can it be detached nor it can be reduced to experiences (Zahavi 2014: 18). And as Zahavi explains in his discussion on *act-transcendent identity of the self* in Husserl, the self cannot be given as identical in just one act, it is known as identical to itself in the synthesis of the manifold of experiences that come and go (Zahavi 2005: 131).[24] Thus, self/ego is the abiding dimension of first-personal experiencing, as Zahavi sometimes formulates it.

Authors like Zahavi and Fasching seem to argue against an account of a subject as substance that is oversimplified and not the only one possible position that one can assume towards the nature of the subject. As Zahavi has himself noted the no-no-self view also comes in a variety of different flavors and strengths. Zahavi's notion of experiential self is too thin and deflationary because he puts too much emphasis on the first-personal character and this hides the subject or ego as a "mental thing", a something, and not a way a thing is, ego as an individual substance and not a mode of a substance or a mode without a substance. In the end I think some of these authors are arguing against the "bare particular" view of the subject (but also against the bundle view, such is Parfit's).

Eventually, it is a category mistake to claim, as Zahavi does, that mineness, as a feature or property of the experience, *is the experiential self*, (pointed out by Siewert)[25]. On the other hand, we can safely claim that mineness implies an experiential self. Mineness, as Zahavi understands it, could indicate that there is something more than experiences and their relations to a subject of experience. In a recent paper Marie Guillot (2016) proposes that subjective character refers to several distinct notions that are being confused by some authors: *for-me-ness* (a relation of awareness between a subject and an experience), *me-ness* (a reflexive relation of awareness a subject has to itself) and *mineness* (a relation of awareness between subject and a fact that it owns the experience) and all these are about relations of awareness between a subject and its experiences. What Zahavi seems to have in mind when he talks about *mineness* is actually *for-me-ness*.

spatial kind" and he argues that it does not have such a phenomenal feature, that there is no mineness (Dainton 2008: 101-145).

24   *Contra* Strawson's identity between subjects and episodes of experiences.

25   Siewert, C. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, Remarks on Zahavi's Self and Others, (PowerPoint presentation).

Nida-Rümelin (2014) shows there are three interpretations of „subjective character": *basic intentionality, primitive awarenes and awareness of basic intentionality*. Only in the third sense are we speaking of some sort of *pre-reflexive self-consciousness*. She argues that awareness of basic intentionality cannot have the structure of basic intentionality and so is not itself experiencing. Subject is not a part or an element of the stream of consciousness, it is not „in it" to be experienced as an object (Nida-Rümelin 2014: 271). What this means is that in pre-reflective self-awareness we are aware of ourselves as entities (things) that unite experiences and are their bearers; the owners of such and such experiences. If this is our nature as subjects, then we are aware of this aspect or characterization of our nature, and we are aware of ourselves as unifiers of experiences. This is the „general concept" we have of an experiencing subject.

As Nida-Rümelin also argues, *self-awareness based conceptualization* of the fact that „simultaneous instantiations of experiential properties are instantiated by one and the same subject" (2016a, 76) is also *nature-revealing*. What this conceptualization reveals is *the simple view*. The simple view states a metaphysical fact that simultaneous experiential properties are instantiated in one subject. To be aware of simultaneously having experiences is to be aware of oneself as the one having them, as the one unifing them.

There seems to be no phenomenological datum to "co-consciousness", but there is to mineness and pre-reflective self-awareness, in the sense explained in previous sections. Phenomenological datum of pre-reflective self-awareness points to the metaphysical fact that all experiences are had by one subject which unites them (as bearer). Perhaps, there is no phenomenological fact that corresponds to the unity of consciousness, the feeling of unity, but there is a feeling of mineness (or pre-reflective self-awareness) in every experience that a subject experiences. What does it mean for two mental states to be co-consciouss? It is for them to be the states of the same subject, to be instantiated in the same subject (bearer). So, co-consciousness is explained by there being a common subject to many experiences.

6. Back to deflation

Since most phenomenologists endorsed the existence of pre-reflective self-consciousness we should appraise such theories of the self. Phenomenology is too broad, there are too many phenomenological theories of the self to consider them all in the course of this paper. I will concern myself with more recent phenomenology-inspired theories but also those that criticize phenomenological theories, though they are similar in spirit. To make the contrast clear I will consider egological and non-egological theories. In any case, it is of paramount significance that panpsychists consider theories

that are serious about subjectivity (namely, pre-reflective self-consciousness). To argue against deflation of the subject/ego we need to understand what the subject is and so examine other theories of the self. What all these authors agree on in their theories is that there is an abiding dimension of giveness, presence, witnessing or openess: "field of first-personal givenness of experience" (Zahavi), "dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences" (Fasching).

Those who defend panpsychism, should take into consideration phenomenological theories of subjectivity, and acknowledge that there is ubiquitous pre-reflective self-consciousness and that there is an experiencing subject that it points to. If there is such awareness then the subject combination problem and the unity problem are to be resolved in accordance to that fact. Pre-reflective self-consciousness gives us the explanation why the subject combination problem is intractable and how we could solve it, but also why the unity of experience is based in the experiencing subject, as their substratum, or bearer. Perhaps, different inferences on these panpsychist problems could be reached depending on the different understanding of pre-reflective self-consciousness. It would depend of whether one is maintaining an *egological or non-egological theory of self-consciousness*. Some philosophers of subjectivity that are influenced by phenomenological tradition see this self-awareness as individuating and that it points to the existence of an ego (egological theories). Endorsing such a view of self-awareness is more likely to lead to the conclusion that there is no plausibility in subject combination and that unity is to be explained by the presence of the ego. Others (The Heiledberg School, Sartre and Gurwitch) argue for non-egological theories of self-consciousness and for the anonymity thesis. Taking up such a stance on the pre-reflective self-consciousness could prove to be more compatible with the deflationist position in panpsychism. Panpsychists should have this in mind and base their solutions to the aforementioned problems on these phenomenological theories. Panpsychists should not ignore the importance self-consciousness if they are to construct good theories of consciousness.

Resolution of panpsychist metaphysical problems depends on how they understand the concept of the experiencing subject (deflationary/non-deflationary) and phenomenology has a lot to say on the "subject". There is something like pre-reflective self-consciousness but it can be understood in different ways (egological/non-egological) so this, too, has repercussions for panpsychist theories. [26]

1117

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26   I think that an argument from phenomenology could be made to the conclusion that the subject is a substance (substantivalist calim). Exercising this argument in full length would go well beyond the scope of the present paper, but I have defended this substantivalist position in a different paper (manuscript). In short, drawing on modern

If there is one individual mineness or pre-reflective self-awareness pertaining to a subject, or pointing that there is one subject in question, the combination of such subjects seems less plausible. If the dimension of mineness is anonymous (Fasching), self-awareness does not point to any individual subject (non-egological theory) and there are only experiences connected in a bundle by co-consciousness relation, plausibility of subject combination (subject-summing) is increased. Therefore, all this has important repercussions in the subject combination debate among panpsychists. Philosophers of self-awareness (Guillot, Siewert, Nida-Rümelin) have argued that such properties as mineness or me-ness (and pre-reflective self-awareness) point to a relation between an *experience* and a *subject* of experience. And this subject seems to be the same one in many synchronic and diachronic experiences. If it is to be judged by the phenomenology of self-awareness and mineness, the deflation of subjects proves to be an invalid strategy, one that cannot be justified. Accounts of Zahavi, Strawson and Fasching, though not panpsychist, are also deflationary, but as it was argued, phenomenology of pre-reflective self-awareness seems to point to a more inflationary position when it comes to the nature of the self. Zahavi and Strawson, in the end, present very unstable positions.

Zahavi moves from an epistemic to a phenomenal and a metaphical thesis, „from the „self-manifestation" of experience (*for-me-ness*) to a phenomenal access to the self (me-ness)" (Guillot 2016: 50). He makes this leap because he conflates *for-me-ness* with *me-ness*. Zahavi makes an illegitimate move based on an unjustified assumption of an equivalence and ends up commiting a category mistake, claiming that a *property* of an experience *is the experiential self*. The problem of Zahavi's "thin" or minimal self account seems to be, that it puts the self and experience too close, without making the necessary phenomenological and metaphysical distinctions. If it is not to be judged by metaphysical reasons that the experiencer and experiences are not identical, then this can be infered from phenomenological datums of self-awareness and content of experience-awareness. Zahavi's *for-me-ness* seems to encompass several different notions, and this problematic *for-me-ness* leads him to conclude that there is a minimal self. Not making a clear distinction between *for-me-ness* and *me-ness* (or *mineness* of Guillot 2016) in phenomenology gives

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philosophical accounts of mineness (from Zahavi to Guillot), pre-reflective self-consciousness (Nida-Rümelin) and acquaintance (Gertler, Goff) I think it can be shown that if one is acquainted with oneself, that is if one has self-acquaintance and acquaintance with one's experiences (so one has self-awareness and awareness of experiences), one acquires introspective knowledge that oneself is a substance. To do this one would have to demonstrate that if the subject is self-acquainted then this revelation of its nature in self-awareness gives him justified introspective (phenomenal) knowledge that it is an experiential subject which has experiences (experiential properties) and so is of the substantival kind.

way to the minimal self theory in metaphysics, which is marked by the problematic identity view (Strawson 2009). To put Guillot's mineness terminology aside, one could say that Zahavi conflates two kinds of awarenesses into one, his *for-me-ness.27* If these two awarenesses are not kept apart and seen as distinct, problems arise, I would argue. I think that a better theory of the self should make a distinction between *awareness of the self* and *awareness of the experience* (without fusing these into one *for-me-ness*). Making this distinction would help one attain a more stable position. One could then argue for subjects having experiences, and not for subjects being identical to an aspect or a property of the experience, and without commiting a category mistake, as one does by adopting a deflationary view.

Phenomenology of self-awareness can gives us introspective knowledge about the nature of subjects and this, in turn, would have important consequences for the plausibility of constitutive panpsychism and for deciding on the possible solutions to the subject combination (subject-summing) problem. The route to subject-summing is indirect, but valuable. Namely, if pre-reflective self-awareness shows us that we are individual substances, deflation of the subject would not look very promising as a strategy of a would-be panpsychist for solving the combination problems. And if the deflation is not plausible, then the viability of subject-summing is also put into question. In that case, the main strategy that paves the way for subject combination in panpsychism, is also brought down.

1119

7. Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to show that panpsychists should include more considerations on pre-reflective self-awareness and mineness (subjective character of consciousness in general) in future building of their metaphysical theories. Even if one is not persuaded that the self is a substance of some sort, there is an aspect or a dimension of mineness that needs to be reckoned with by panspychist theories of consciousness, especially when it comes to the problem of subject combination. In the end, this could challenge the commonly assumed reaction strategy to the combination problem – deflation of the subject. Panpsychists seeking a way to or overcome the subject combination problem would benefit from exploring the phenomenological theories of selfhood and pre-reflective self-awareness.

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27   Take into consideration Zahavi's latest vindication of minimal selfhood where he tries to answer Guillot's criticism (Zahavi: forthcoming).

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1121

Janko Nešić

Protiv deflacije subjekta iskustva

Apstrakt

Argumentovaću da teorije subjektivnosti i prereflektivne samosvesti mogu biti od koristi onima koji zastupaju panpsihizam u boljem razumevanju prirode subjekata iskustva, a posredno, i pri rešavanju problema kombinacije. Na problem kombinacije subjekata, koji se stavlja pred panpsihistu, obično se odgovara "deflacijom", subjekt se eliminiše ili svodi na sama iskustva. Mnoge moderne panpsihističke teorije su deflacionističke i zauzimaju reduktivno stanovište prema subjektivnosti. Značaj prereflektivne samosvesti, kao aspekta svesti, nije dovoljno priznat od strane panpsihista. Teorije sopstva, inspirisane fenomenologijom, koje brane postojanje subjektivnog aspekta svesti, mogu biti od značaja u argumentaciji protiv mogućnosti redukcije subjekata iskustva. Pokazaću kako fenomenologija subjektivnog karaktera svesti i prereflektivne samosvesti doprinosi debati o problem kombinacije subjekata u panpsihizmu.

Ključne reči: deflacija, subjekt iskustva, panpsihizam, problem kombinacije, prereflektivna samosvest

Snežana Vesnić

What Is an *Architectural* Concept?
The "Concept" of Deleuze and "Project" of Eisenman

Abstract   Two great theories – one in philosophy, one in architecture – emerge nearly simultaneously in the twentieth century: Gilles Deleuze's understanding of the "concept," that is, defining philosophy as an activity that produces concepts, and Peter Eisenman's idea of the "project" as a platform, "position," or "theory" of an architect. My intention is to suggest and problematize the idea of the concept as "capacity" or "potentiality" implying the production of a multitude of "concepts" or varying "conceptions." Deleuze's great significance for architecture of this century allowed for the construction of the "concept" as "author's potential," the source of activity and creative architectural acts. An *architectural* concept, determined in the course of the text, and thanks to which architectural terminology is redefined, could potentially be quite useful in philosophy and theory of the subject.

Keywords: notion, concept, conception, architecture, philosophy

1122

> We had never stopped asking this question previously, and we already had the answer, which has not changed: philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts.[1] (Deleuze 1994a: 2)

Philosophy as the art of production of concepts, in the sense suggested by Deleuze-Guattari, is projected completely and consistently into architecture. Allow me to paraphrase a sentence section: "architecture is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating architectural concepts." Both clauses of this claim carry equal importance: "is the art" and "forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts." Although at first glance the two phrases achieve balance (of the claim), they actually problematize both the method and the presence of the subject. However, not all creation is art, nor does all art produce "concepts." Therefore, the claim that the creation of concepts is *art* implies that the concept is the product only of a special act or such "creative" activity that allows for or enables the possibility of concepts. The idea of formation, construction or production of concepts clearly points to the existence of a subject, through whose subjective action something is produced. Deleuze-Guattari thematize the potential of the subject or subjectivity by

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[1]   *"Et nous n'avions pas cessé de le faire précédemment, et nous avions déjà la réponse qui n'a pas varié: la philosophie est l'art de former, d'inventer, de fabriquer des concepts."* (Deleuze 1991: 8).

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constituting *personages conceptuelles* – figures that contribute to defining concepts. (Deleuze 1991: 8) In the first place, it is the philosopher who offers the possibility of making concepts: "the philosopher is the concept's friend; he is potentiality of the concept… philosophy is the discipline that involves *creating* concepts." (Deleuze 1994a: 5) Thus, the philosopher "has the capacity" to create concepts, making the philosopher "the potential" for the existence of the concept. Aside from the conditionality of subject and process, Deleuze-Guatari's second significant intention is to relativize the concept in relation to the problem before it. Concepts in philosophy take the place of the problem, and as such, every concept refers to the problem to which it is tied and which gives it meaning. (Deleuze 1994a: 16-17) The procedure allows the concept to simultaneously recognize and resolve the problem, while paradoxically, the problem itself 'holds' and articulates the concept the entire time. In such a way, the concept takes up the position between creative activity of the subject and the very problem that it (the concept) problematizes while also creating it. Deleuze explained at length, drawing on Bergson, how, in establishing a problem, the problem is also invented, and that the basic goal is not the solution of a problem, but its discovery, that is, its formulation. (Deleuze 2001: 7) The third important characteristic of the concept is the multiplicity in unity. The concept is a 'whole'. Although fragmentary by nature (Deleuze 1994a: 16)[2] – regardless of how well organized its elements or in what processes of dissolution or mitosis they end up – the concept always has the capacity to totalize its parts. The potential acquired through a specific fragmentation of the whole allows the concept to take place in the (in) consistent unity of philosophy. Which is what Deleuze-Guattari declare the plan of immanence (*le plan d'immanence*). Finally, and I feel most importantly, Deleuze-Guattari offer the concept the possibility to alter its identity, that is, the capacity to transform from the role of subject into the role of object:

> In fact, if the other person is identified with a special object, it is now only the other subject as it appears to me; and if we identify it with another subject, it is me who is the other person as I appear to that subject. (Deleuze 1994a: 16)

It is important to note here the possible architectural value of this idea of translation and transformation of the subjective into the object and object into subject. The comprehension of the problem through the concept could have a purely functional architectural value in initiating the *desire* for the object. Although at first glance, for Deleuze-Guattari the relation of the subject (freedom) and the object (finitude) is not central, there is nevertheless a certain intention for the presence of the subject and a sort of 'expectation' of

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2   "The concept is a whole because it totalizes its components, but it is a fragmentary whole." (Deleuze 1994a: 16)

object (in absence). The question is then twofold: how is the concept created (and what creates it) and what does the concept create (and how)?

The "Concept": Deleuze's "Project"

Despite potential pitfalls and reservations, I will try to distinguish 'notion' (*Begriff*) and 'concept' (*concept, Konzept*).[3] There is no philosophical or linguistic precisely defined relation between notion and concept. I insist on the existence of their difference because it seems to me that its elucidation could also reframe numerous philosophical doubts. Christian Wolff defined notion (*Begriff*) as a representation of a thing in thought ("*Was ein Begrif ist. Einen Begrif nenne ich eine jede Vorstellung einer Sache in unseren Gedancken*"). (Wolff 1713: 123) I draw on Wolff because by designating 'notion' (*Begriff*) as *representation of things in thought*, indirectly he gives a simplified distinction between 'notion' and 'concept': notion is exhausted in representations, images, cognition or drawings.

1124

The problem with concept arises due to its double role. First, concepts constitute philosophy, in which they also simultaneously emerge, thus establishing internal relations that then later reflect beyond philosophy. Second, concepts examine a comprehensive configuration, a framework of fundamental elements and 'philosophical configurations'. A theory of concepts is complicated by unresolved traditional distinctions between concept/*Begriff* and concept/conception. 'Concept' derives from the Latin *conceptus, concipiere*, allowing for concept to always be tied to creation of mind (literally, *conceptus* is the product of *interior pregnancy*). The semantic base (*con-capere* means together to take) points to the possibility of joining into a *single whole* that leads to generalization. In this sense, the meanings of 'concept' and 'notion' begin to overlap and correspond one to another. This etymology points to the formation of a group from a multiplicity of elements (an entirely Deleuzian idea) into a single whole with a determined degree of generality. Perhaps the ultimate (mis)understanding of the concept lies precisely in its intrinsic semantic-etymological (a)symmetrical ambivalence. Alterations of the concept, both in the sense of meaning and with regards to *action*, open complex fields of transgression and a morphogenesis of concepts.

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3   Colloquially, the German verb *begreiffen* designates an understanding on an intellectual level – the meaning of the intellectual 'reach' of a thing or idea (*begrieffen* includes echoes of the verb *greifen*, from whence English ultimately derives grasp) and points to an approach of 'encompassing' things or ideas. The word *Begriff* is interpreted in various ways in philosophy, and transformed asymmetrically in epistemologies. Gottlob Frege directed the meaning of this word to the psychological, but still kept a portion of the original meaning: "Frege maintains a naturalness in the use of *Begriff* that is probably lost in later English translations and the most contemporary uses of 'concept'." (P. Büttgen, M. Crépon and S. Laugier in Cassin 2014:93).

Although the issue of translating or carrying the 'concept' into '*Begriff*' varies in Kant's and Hegel's uses of the words,[4] the relationship of 'concept' and 'idea' seems much simpler. It seems to me that in developing a strategic relation between the notions of *difference* and *repetition*, Deleuze gave a parallel interpretation (or simultaneously developed a parallel concept) of the transition of the idea into concept.

> In every case repetition is difference without a concept. But in one case, the difference is taken to be only external to the concept; it is a difference between objects represented by the same concept, falling into the indifference of space and time. In the other case, the difference is internal to the Idea; it unfolds as pure movement, creative of a dynamic space and time which correspond to the Idea. The first repetition is repetition of the Same, explained by the identity of the concept or representation; the second includes difference, and includes itself in the alterity of the Idea, in the heterogeneity of an 'a-presentation'. One is negative, occurring by default in the concept; the other affirmative, occurring by excess in the Idea. (Deleuze 1994b: 23)

Such a projection of the idea and concept – a construction of *one* (concept) and *other* (idea) – is significant (and not only architecturally) because it explains how a concept produces objects that recur, whereupon both the object and repetition are determined by the identity of the concept, while the alteration of the Idea leads to interior difference (concept). The resolution of this relation presented in *Difference and Repetition*, the grounding of the concept and its role in philosophy, culminates in *What is Philosophy?* with a twofold, radical, and precise theory of the concept and theory of philosophy. The repletion and beauty of these theories, paradoxically, is located in their ephemerality: any definition of the concept melts into a definition of philosophy, allowing, in turn, the creation of new concepts.

Although emerging from multiplicity, the first significant characteristic of the concept is its wholeness, which, for Deleuze-Guattari, originates from its character (or strength) to render the *portions* inseparable within itself.

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4   Colloquially, the German verb "*begreifen*" designates an understanding of intellectual order or an intellectual understanding of a thing or idea. For Kant, *Begriff* had, in a strict sense, a function of understanding, while Hegel gives an entirely different interpretation of the word. For him, *Begriff* is an independent figure of knowledge moving towards absolute knowledge. Frege brings a psychological redefinition: "The term "concept" (*Begriff*) has several uses; it is sometimes taken in the psychological sense, and sometimes in the logical sense, and perhaps also in a confused acceptation that mixes the two." (P. Büttgen, M. Crépon and S. Laugier in Cassin 2014: 93) The various interpretations of *Begriff* and *begreifen* in Kant and Hegel can be seen in grammatical particularities: the nominative, *Begriff* and verb *begreifen* can be found in Kant, while Hegel uses the singular and plural *Begriffe*. Kant examines the limits of the verb *begreifen*, while Hegel is interested in the noun.

Like the wholeness (of physical form) as understood by the architect Peter Eisenman, it is not a matter of a single element reflecting the simple representation of the whole or of unity, but rather the wholeness determining the relative size of the portions within itself. The specific character of the concept is developed in actions of unification of a fragmented multitude of individual wholes or elements. The identity of its endo-consistency simultaneously sustains a dependence (passion of belonging to the whole) and independence of the elements (resistance to joining others). There is a cohesion of diverse parts or elements: by achieving the status of the individual, they all constitute a whole. Based on this position and fact that the concept is created, we mark the place "of overlap, condensation and accumulation of its own parts" – the place of achievement of interior strength, representing the first place of stability of concept. It would appear that the concept becomes embodied or is achieved in bodies. The crucial place where we encounter "the intensities" – true evidence of the existence of concepts – are precisely those places or positions, or projections of concepts, which are not identical with its original state. (Deleuze 1994a: 21)

We encounter an analogous situation in architecture, since the unified concept, as purely original intellectual content (an idea of an object, project or object), is never entirely equal or in agreement with what it implies. Following Eisenman then, although conceptual, architecture is intentionally directed toward an object, since the conceptual aspect of architecture is ultimately thought through the object that embodies (actualizes) the concept. It is important to point out that in architecture, the object is not only what has been built, but also includes the "idea of the object," as an equally objective reality of the architectural concept – it contains both the *conceptual* and the implicitly physical presence. More specifically, a concept in architecture "materializes" in different formations – in the idea of the object, in the *ideal object*, the project or the material object. According to Eisenman, it is important for the conceptual aspect to be visible, regardless whether material or immaterial. It therefore seems to me important to establish a parallel between Deleuze-Guattari's realization of concepts in bodies and Eisenman's necessity of object. We can say that the objectivization (or transposition) of concepts into (philosophical) bodies and (architectural) objects determines its absolutism and relativism, in the sense presented by Deleuze-Guattari. At once absolute and relative, the concept is determined by its manifold consistency, simultaneously positing and creating both itself and its objects. In architecture, absolutism of the concept determines how it is positioned and how it exists in the 'outside world', that is, how it is contextualized.

For Deleuze, the concept is a singularity because it is always specifically and individually a philosophical creation. (Deleuze 1994a: 7) On the other hand,

1126

for Eisenman, singularity always assumes *the other*, the different. (Eisenman 1993: 40) It is a unified individuality with the capacity and *material* for authentic objectivization. What is important is that the concept as singularity is not only unified, but that with its authentic constitutive power it determines a unified architectural reality. In other words, the identity of the concept is exhausted in the possibility of self-positing – *"[it] posits itself in itself – it is a self-positing."* (Deleuze 1994: 11) This is the first *reality* of the concept: in its independent and necessary self-positing, the concept precisely becomes functional and 'engaged'; in this activity it constitutes (a philosophical and/or architectural) reality. The simultaneous self-positing within "itself" and disclosure or revelation of the *subjective* through the production of the object essentially allows for various existences of concepts in its objective reflections.

"Project": the "Concept" of Peter Eisenman

I would like to reconstruct what ought to be Peter Eisenman's "concept of the project" by using an analogy with three particularities of Deleuze's "concept:" relational question of the subject and problem, (post)structure: diagram and idea, and third, the fragmentary multiplicity of the whole. My aim is to connect Deleuze's *plan of immanence* and Eisenman's *meta-project*, for which I will use a mediator, Corbusier's idea of the plan as generator.

Two "Eisenman presences," both real, the theoretical authority and professional practical activity in the studio, institutionalize one another within the (a)symmetric frame of a single architectural 'figure'. The question regarding "the Work and the Project" or "the Work against Project" is analogous to the paradox of the relation of architectural deed and project of Peter Eisenman. My question is whether it is possible to think *the work* as an architectural work, practice or material architectural object without *the project* or *idea of the project*? More specifically, is *the idea of the* project consistently interpreted, perceived or felt throughout Eisenman's work? An attempt at grasping the concept in 'the work' and/or 'the projects' (of Peter Eisenman) is a challenge of 'gleaning' (conceptualizing) the overall wholeness of an architectural philosophy and practice, of a single subject and *myriad* projects. The issue, then, above all, is the subject. It is clear that, just like Deleuze's *conceptual personnage* that allows for concepts, Eisenman also speaks of architects who "have a project" or who "practice a project." The way in which he demonstrates this is a specific diagrammatic process that moves the subject: "The diagrammatic process will never run without some physical input from a subject…The diagram does not generate in and of itself." (Eisenman 2010: 103) Such an operation implies the freedom to insist on the difference between the 'phenomenological' and 'conceptual', in which phenomenology is left to deal with the literal figuration of architectural reality, thus directing

1127

the project as *conceptual* to deal with metamorphosis. Architecture explicitly insists on ideas that come to be built or realized.[5]

How can we define project within the philosophical 'order' and architectural 'thought' of Peter Eisenman? Project is essentially what has a concept. In order to understand, but then also problematize Eisenman's ostensibly simple concept – *the concept of the project* – it is necessary to distinguish the notions of 'project' and 'design', and thus attempt to reconstruct the potential of these 'protocols' to completely overcome their ontological status. *Disegno* or *design* is one of the main notions of Renaissance art theory, meaning at once design and project, drawing and intention, discovery, the idea in the speculative sense, and refers exclusively to intellectual activity. In the mid-18th century, the French word *dessein* split into *dassin* and *dessein*, that is, 'design' and 'drawing' (the arts of *dessin* were taught, but not of *dessein*.) (J. Lichtenstein 2014: 224-226)[6]. *Disegno*, then, is a notion that, in addition to 'drawing', which is equated with representation and the sign (*disegno*), also encompasses the project, intention and thought. The notion of 'design' as a unit of project or as drawing, meaning as mere translation of the notions of *disegno* and *dessein*, ultimately guides Anthony Ashley Cooper, 1st Earl of Shaftsbury. According to Shaftsbury, design serves to form the project and "…that after I had conceived my notion such as you see it upon paper, I was not concerned with this, but fell directly to work; and by practice, and by hand of master-painter brought it into practice, and formed a real design." (Shaftesbury 1712: 396) The specific origin and character of the word design as an intellectual project or thought will in later iterations and modifications move further away from its Italian root *disegno*, moving toward drawing as procedure or representation, ignoring the specific form of thinking that is accompanied in the execution of design or the realization through design.[7] Historians and art theorists have attempted to preserve the notion of *disegno* without translating the word, leaving it the meaning assigned by Raphael or Vasari.[8] Giorgio Vasari emphasized that aside from drawing (as *the manual*

1128

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5   The conceptual in architecture serves to enable the transfer from the virtual to the actual, from the illusory to the real. The ultimate aim of architecture is to identically see and conceptually think an architectural object. It is for this reason that Manfredo Tafuri impresses upon Eisenman the necessity of building: "Peter, you have to build because ideas that are not built are simply ideas that are not built." (Bojanić, Djokić 2017: 12)

6   From which time these two semantic fields, unified in *disegno*, come to diverge in French, as well as English and German.

7   Many languages today contain an analogy of use of *design*, which refers to the drawing, plan or project in the purely material sense, but it does not refer to intention or intellectual project.

8   Using the notion of '*ciconscrizione*' to designate the contour (which is to be found in Alberti), historians and art theorists underscore that design is not merely drawing, but a mental representation, the form that represents thought and the imagination of the artist.

expression), design ought to reflect the artist's philosophy. He believed that the artist ought to possess a clear "conception of idea," which would be the basis of what the artist described in their work. "Conception" – for Vasari *concetto* – is a philosophical idea that stands behind any *work of art* (Vasari 1586: 490) and emerges through grasping (*cognizione*) all the relations, the whole and its parts, but also all the parts among themselves.

It is intriguing that, despite the deep understanding and interest in the Renaissance, Eisenman adopts the French-English tradition of the notion of 'design', which describes, displays, stylizes and simplifies. Paradoxically or not, Eisenman adopts 'project' (the notion of more severe origin), building his architectural philosophy around it. The origin of the word 'project' is tied to the blueprint, the schema, issuing from the Latin *proiectum* (something thrown forth, stretch out), but also meaning what is thought out, a mental plan with a function of specific exploration. Apart from the intention of remaining in the domain of purely architectural terminology, it seems that Eisenman's use of the 'project' is an intuitive reflection of some of Derrida's conceptions, emerging in turn from his reading of Husserl's ideas regarding the "origins of geometry." For Husserl, thought must first exist as *project*, and then as realized: "Successful realization of a project is, for the acting subject, self-evidence; in this self-evidence, what has been realized is there, *originaliter*, as itself." (Derrida 1978: 159-160) Husserl connects the process of realization of a project – process of projecting with the successful realization of meaning and sense that dwells within the subject – "the subject of the inventor." (Derrida 1978: 160) The 'project' is what gives the subjective "*originaliter*" a wholeness of thought, which will, in the very next instance, appear as a new form in the entirety of its content. Similarly, for Eisenman, the idea as the (possible) *original*, initiates the creation of mental space as a necessity for the development of an original conceptual structure:

1129

> A conceptual structure is that aspect of the visible form, whether it is an idea, in a drawing, or in a building, which is intentionally put in the form to provide access to the inner form or universal formal relationships. (Eisenman 2004: 15)

The question of the project for Eisenman is the question of intention in architecture. The conceptual base of the project authentically places the idea, creating internal relations, as well as defining the overall specific context in which the idea 'materializes' as conception, and not merely as design or else pure technical production of the project. The second question of the project, within Derrida's thematization of continuity, is the essential question of contingency of the 'new' in "new project,"[9] and the simultaneous integration of all that came before.

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9   "…a scientific stage is not only a sense which "in fact comes later," but the integration of the whole earlier sense in a new project." (Derrida 1978:60)

> Also, what is true of the Living Present is true of what supposes it as its ground, the historic present; the latter always refers more or less immediately to the totality of a past which inhabits it and which always appears under the general form of a project. At every moment each historic totality is a cultural structure animated by a project which is an "idea." (Derrida 1978: 58)

Finally, the third question of the project is a question of the pure 'philosophic act': for Eisenman, it is organized in the construction of the *diagram* that permeates the complete intellectual map of (architectural) thought. The diagram precedes any beginning of (architectural) activity or act, any creation, that is, any reality. Through transgression, overstepping and deconstruction of vital architectural 'maps', the methodological capacity of the diagram is to generate new theoretical and practical platforms of the individual project, as well as architecture as a whole. In that sense, Deleuze's idea of superimposition, in contrast with Eisenman's conception of superposition of the diagram (Eisenman 2010: 96), seems to allow for a conclusion that the nature of deconstructing diagram of (architectural-philosophical maps) always seeks to be twofold.[10] Deleuze's definition of the diagram as a flexible set of connections between forces (Eisenman 2010: 92-96) coincides with what Eisenman calls the architectural interior and meaning. We are dealing here with the establishing – with each new project – of a dynamic relation between (visible) space and (invisible) relations, amorphous, formless matter, unformalized and incomplete functions. Resisting finality and completion, the diagram itself generates new fragments and new "diagrams of diagrams" (Vidler 2006: 153), such as Corbusier's villas that emerge from the Dom-Ino diagrams, while at once sharpening and effacing it with "their own diagram." These processes result in complex (manifold) conceptual (post)structures, the basis for any individual and new process of projecting.

Eisenman builds the (conceptual) whole around *the idea of a project*, whose conceptualization enables him 'to have a project'. 'Not having a project', does not only mean *not being animated by concept*, but also not having 'a desire for project', not having a platform for the 'possibility of project'. The significance of the (architectural) project is essential for its power to use critical reasoning of the discipline in order to shape the world, and, according to Eisenman, an architect who "has a project," defines the world around him with that project, as opposed to an architect who "does not have a project" and allows himself to be defined by the world.

1130

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10   According to Deleuze, the diagram is different to the structure (Eisenman 2010: 93): "A diagram is the spatialisation of selective abstraction and/or reduction of concept or phenomenon. In other words, a diagram is the architecture of an ideal or entity." (Garcia 2010: 18)

From a meta-position Eisenman introduces the construction of 'meta-project', as the meta-formation of continuous creation of an architectural philosophy. (Eisenman, internet) They at once form the discipline and historical order. By pure transformation of reality and using critical mechanisms, they posit new concepts and conceptions of architecture and the world it (architecture) defines.[11] However, even though he places it primarily in a historical context, it would appear that the significance of Eisenman's introduction of the meta-project is an insistence on a meta-position of the architectural discipline as invention and positing of the new, what is to come, what is awaited, or even what we desire architecture to be. Part of the 'project' that "[opens] history to invention, which is in fact what the basic part of project is about for me," (Eisenman 2017: 161) also opens and invests the very project as potential for the creation of the desire for the new. Similarly, Corbusier saw the potential of the 'plan' to overcome (spatial) explanations of traditional 'geometry': "The great problems of tomorrow, dictated by collective necessities, put the questions of 'plan' in a new form."[12] (Le Corbusier 1993: 46) Corbusier's plan is a formation that shapes the discipline: "a plan calls for the most active imagination. It calls for the most severe discipline also. The plan is what determines everything; it is the decisive moment."[13] (Le Corbusier 1993: 48) In the same way, Eisenman's project defines the world. The plan, a strict abstraction, is what 'determines and fixes ideas'. Corbusier's 'plan', Eisenman's 'meta-project' and Deleuze 'plan of immanence' are all formations through which the concept and concepts shape the world and architectural and/or philosophical reality:

1131

> The plane of immanence is neither a concept nor the concept of all concepts. If one were to be confused with the other there would be nothing to stop concepts from forming a single one or becoming universals and losing their singularity, and the plane would also lose its openness. Philosophy is a constructivism, and constructivism has two qualitatively different complementary aspects: the creation of concepts and the laying out of a plane (Deleuze 1994a: 35-36)

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11   Eisenman's six meta-projects: Vitruvius' 10 books, Leon Battista Alberti, Claude Perrault (with his French translation of Vitruvius), Giovanni Battista Piranesi, synthesis of disciplinary theory and history at the French Academy in the first decades of the 19th century, and finally, Corbusier's project of autonomy and new conception with the Dom-Ino House: prefabrication, repetition, recurrence, new awareness of what modern life could be. (Eisenman, internet)

12   *"Le plan est le générateur. Sans plan, il y a désordre, arbitraire. Le plan porte en lui l'essence de la sensation. Les grands problèmes de demain, dictés par des nécessités collectives, posent à nouveau la question du plan. La vie moderne demande, attend un plan nouveau pour la maison et pour la ville."* (Le Corbusier 1925: 33)

13   *"Le plan nécessite la plus active imagination. Il nécessite aussi la plus sévère discipline. Le plan est la détermination du tout; il est le moment décisif."* (Le Corbusier 1925: 37)

For Corbusier, the plan is the generator. "The plan is the key of evolution." (Le Corbusier 1993: 45) Deleuze-Guattari's "plan of immanence" is a pure generator, much like Corbusier's. Deleuze speaks of the idea 'disciplined' by the plan, allowing it to become executable and coherent, just like Eisenman speaks of conceptualization of the idea that will acquire the possibility of realization with the project. Thus emerge projects of architecture and architectural concepts. The plan or project become abstract thought architectural situations, and their functioning, like a medium, allows for the transposition of the idea into a *physical model of reality*. If projects or meta-projects define the world and discipline, *concepts* determine what Eisenman calls 'architectural philosophy'.

Conclusion: "Architectural Concept" and "Philosophical Project"

1132

> So, the question of philosophy is the singular point where concept and creation are related to each other. (Deleuze 1994a: 11)[14]

The problem of architecture is posited at the point of connection of architectural concept and creation. Architectural creation is grounded in architectural conceptual thought, which in turn arises from architectural creation. This is an architectonic *dislocation* of the architectural subject and object. Eisenman wrote about the *complex architectural act of dislocation*, that is, the particularity of architecture as the discipline that, paradoxically, always dislocates what it has just located, above all its own object. Without calling into question the presence of the concept or conceptual, Eisenman defines the particularity of the architectural discipline through the 'object': *the architectural idea* implies the presence of an object, that is, "demands the idea of an object presence," (Eisenman 2004: 15) regardless whether the architectural object is material or immaterial. On the other hand, Deleuze designated all of philosophy through concepts it creates through which it is created. Creation and self-positing of concepts are the two things, according to Deleuze, that make the concept powerful. Much as this Deleuzian reciprocity that exists between creation and self-positing of the concept (that is, *the more it is created, the more it is self-posited*), the entire architectural design capacity of the concept turns the *interior* into the *exterior* (of architecture). The strength of the concept, in other words, is reflected in its potential objective projection. In the case of architecture, the more precise, authentic, compact the concept, the greater the intensity of its dynamic positioning. The condition for the creation of concepts in architecture, that Deleuzian *free creative activity*, which allows for the *self-positing in itself, independently and necessarily*, is in

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14   *"Ainsi donc la question de la philosophie est le point singulier où le concept et la création se rapportent l'un à l'autre."* (Deleuze 1991: 16)

fact occupied by the desire for the subjectively idealized object. Architectural concepts are thus creations that generate moments when "the most subjective will be the most objective." (Deleuze 1994a: 11) In fact, the concept, in a twofold, two-sided, ambivalent manner, between two subjects, seeks out the moments when its *subjective and objective reality both become illusory*.[15]

The concept is created, it is the product of creative activity, but this creation is not a purpose in itself, just as the 'concept-object' is not the origin of this process. The essential value of the 'concept' for architecture (as for philosophy) is its pure creative, inventive potential for new creation, production of new concepts and new conceptions. If we take potentiality as the *potential not to cross into the real, the actual*,[16] if we determine it temporally, then this 'moment' for something to be realized or actualized becomes the architectural (perhaps philosophical too) creative ground. It is this that constitutes the *difference* between project and architectural concept: project is the realization (of the concept or a portion thereof); architectural concept contains thought, thinking and 'multiplicity' that always surpasses its realization or objectivization (into another concept, conception, project or object). The content of the concept always allows for the possibility – the time and space – not to be actualized, not to pass into the finite. Eisenman's 'formation of the project' is always a project of something, defining specific spatial and temporal conditions (definition in architecture means finitude, actualization, transposition into form…), while architecture necessarily implies constant shifting of borders, not only 'defining worlds', that is, reality. Architectural concepts create the very potential for the new and authentic, although always with a critical relationship towards the past and the extant. The concept is the invention of the problem, posing the question and the problem, while the project is one of the formations of the operationalization of the concept. The concept can and must appear and disappear, without necessarily being realized in a project. The project in Eisenman's sense must always have a specific spatial and temporal context, while the architectural concept defines all that could comprise context. The potentiality of the architectural concept always surpasses its own 'materialization'. The 'project' for Eisenman implies a kind of finitude or complete actualization (like an 'idea in conceptualization', 'concept in diagram'). In a sense, the project is fulfilled in itself, binding itself,

1133

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15   According to Theodor Adorno, "the separation of object and subject are both real and illusory." (Ruth Grof 2014)

16   According to Giorgio Agamben, potentiality, following the Aristotelian tradition of conception, can be differentiated into 'existing potentiality' that is different from 'generic potentiality'. Potential does not only exist in the actual: "[…].for Aristotle, [it] will be the key figure of potentiality, the mode of its existence as potentiality. It is a potentiality that is not simply the potential to do this or, the thing but potential to not-do, potential not to pass into actuality." (Agamben 1999:79)

spatially and temporally, to a specific context. For Eisenman, the "project has nothing to do with looking forward. It has to do with an attitude towards space and time that is much more akin with poststructuralist thought and linguistic thought than it is with certain aspects of phenomenology." (Eisenman 2017: 161) The architectural concept achieves specific relationships with the spatial and temporal dimensions in which it appears, making it always ontologically directed at the past, ever holding on to the capacity to not pass completely into reality, thus generating what we yet expect to appear in the future. In that sense, 'the project' can be a form of actualization of the architectural concept, or else, it is its *first* actualization. In this way, the architectural concept has the capacity to generate architectural conceptions. The directedness of the architectural concept towards its own (conceptual) projection in *architectural objects*, reveals to us a particular closeness between architecture and philosophy. Much as architecture, philosophy is ultimately directed at 'its objects' – concepts. When possibility becomes real in the true sense of the word, the architectural concept is fulfilled in a new concept, in conceptions or architectural object; whereas the philosophic concept actualizes in a new philosophical theory, the new virtual, in which *the virtual is not something lacking in reality* (Deleuze). Thus, philosophy operationalizes the possibility of defining the world and reality through 'philosophical projects', which are, like architectural ones, essentially paradigmatic, hierarchical, and referential. Philosophical projects organize concepts, plans, platforms, theories, thus 'liberating always new forms of thought and new combinations of concepts. Architectural concepts reconstruct particular intellectual acts, thus generating the concept and new conceptions. The essence of Eisenman's 'project' is the grounding of architecture as a discipline, which uses the *concept of the project* to define the reality and world around it. The architectural concept as 'capacity' or as 'potentiality' creates authentic and new values of space, time, but also thought as such.

1134

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1135

Snežana Vesnić

Šta je *arhitektonski* koncept?

„Koncept" kod Deleza i „projekt" kod Ajzenmana

Apstrakt

Dve velike teorije – jedna u filozofiji, jedna u arhitekturi – pojavljuju se skoro simultano u dvadesetom veku: Žil Delezovo razumevanje „koncepta", odnosno, definisanje filozofije kao aktivnosti koja „proizvodi" koncepte, i Piter Ajzenmanova ideja „projekta" kao platforme, „stanovišta", ili „teorije" (jednog) arhitekte. Moja namera je da predložim i problematizujem ideju koncepta kao „kapaciteta" ili „potencijalnosti", implicirajući proizvodnju mnoštva „koncepata" ili „koncepcija". Delezov veliki značaj za arhitekturu ovog veka omogućio je konstrukciju „koncepta" kao „autorskog potencijala", izvora aktivnosti i stvaralačkih arhitektonskih akata. *Arhitektonski* koncept, koji se određuje u ovom tekstu, i zahvaljujući kome se redefiniše arhitektonska terminologija, potencijalno može da bude veoma koristan u filozofiji i teoriji subjekta.

Ključne reči: pojam, koncept, koncepcija, arhitektura, filozofija.

Dušan Z. Marković
Mrđan M. Mlađan

Značaj znanja za blagostanje društva u savremenom svetu

Apstrakt   Proces globalizacije učinio je da se današnji sistem razvoja dominantno bazira na različitim vrstama znanja umesto na posedovanju fizičkih resursa. Stoga je od suštinskog značaja za blagostanje društva postala njegova sposobnost da usvaja postojeća i stvara nova znanja. Ovaj rad nastoji da utvrdi odnose između obrazovanja, stvaranja znanja, ekonomskog rasta, kao i materijalnog i nematerijalnog blagostanja društva. U njemu još i identifikujemo potencijalne probleme koji sprečavaju društva da maksimiziraju korist od truda koji njihovi članovi ulažu u sticanje znanja. Problem neuspeha nacionalnih tržišta obrazovanja kao i globalnih migracija koje dovode do odliva znanja ka visoko razvijenim zemljama su posebno analizirani. Ovi problemi na dugi rok dovode do pada nacionalne konkurentnosti, i različitih aspekata nematerijalnog blagostanja društva. Osnovu za rešenje konkretnog problema baziramo na kombinaciji ekonomske teorije i koncepta solidarnosti razvijenih i manje razvijenih država, kao i pojedinaca i društava iz kojih potiču, a uz uvažavanje slobodne volje pojedinca.

Ključne reči: Globalizacija, znanje, obrazovanje, blagostanje, konkurentnost, migracije

Uvod

Značajne promene su se dogodile kada je savremeni talas globalizacije uzeo maha u poslednjih nekoliko decenija: velike privrede zemalja u razvoju su se otvorile za međunarodnu trgovinu i protok kapitala, mnoštvo država je sa planske prešlo na tržišnu privredu, a razvijene privrede su dobile konkurenciju čak i u mnogim privrednim oblastima u kojima su bile neprikosnovene. Istovremeno, neke industrije koje „nose" novu tehnološku revoluciju razvijaju se podjednako i u starim i u novim industrijskim privredama.[1] Visok nivo međunarodne trgovine i pokretljivosti kapitala čine da se domaći radnici i vlasnici kapitala suočavaju sa konkurencijom iz inostranstva, čak i onda kada ostaju u svojoj zemlji. Naime, mnoge fabrike su preseljene u

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1   Kineska politika postepenog otvaranja ka inostranstvu i ekonomskih reformi otpočela je krajem sedamdesetih, u Indiji je sličan proces krenuo devedesetih, kao i u istočnoj Evropi procesom tranzicije na tržišnu privredu posle pada „Berlinskog zida". Danas su kineske kompanije među liderima u industriji računara i pametnih telefona, dok indijske kompanije uspešno konkurišu u softverskoj industriji.

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inostranstvo gde je radna snaga jeftinija, što čini još oštrijom konkurenciju na međunarodnom tržištu robe, usluga i rada. U uslovima zaoštrene konkurencije na tržištu rada, kvalitetno obrazovanje sa ciljem sticanja znanja i veština postaje veoma važno kako za pojedinca, tako i za društvo.

Mnoštvo teorijskih i empirijskih studija potvrđuje da duže i kvalitetnije obrazovanje predviđa više stope ekonomskog rasta na nivou država. Istovremeno više studija pokazuju da pojedinac koji ulaže u sopstveno obrazovanje u proseku ostvaruje i viša primanja na tržištu rada. Ovde uočavamo saglasnost između interesa pojedinca i društva, jer trud i istrajnost tokom ličnog obrazovanja ostvaruju korist kako za pojedinca tako i za društvo u kojem živi. Takva korist nije samo materijalna, jer školovanje može da oplemeni kako unutrašnji doživljaj spoljašnjeg sveta tako i, posledično, sveukupne društvene odnose. Da bi školovanje dalo kvalitetna znanja koja će potom doprineti kako materijalnom, tako i nematerijalnom blagostanju društva, potrebno je, međutim, prevazići niz problema karakterističnih za savremeni svet. Ne daje svako školovanje korisna znanja, dok pitanje izbora kako struke, tako i obrazovne institucije postaje još složenije kada velika tražnja podstaknuta ličnim nadanjima nailazi na ponudu mnoštva novih, još neproverenih, obrazovnih institucija. Zatim, način na koji znanje utiče na nacionalnu konkurentnost se komplikuje, kako odnosima između preduzeća iz različitih delova sveta, tako i migracijama radne snage, koja sa sobom iz svoje zemlje odnosi i znanje i talenat.

1137

Cilj ovog rada je zato dvojak. Pre svega, koristeći uvide iz postojeće literature, pokušavamo da razumemo zakonitosti koje određuju odnos između školovanja, znanja i, kako materijalnog tako i nematerijalnog, blagostanja u savremenom svetu. Potom, koristeći koncepte iz ekonomske teorije, nastojimo kako da ukažemo na smetnje koje u današnjem svetu sprečavaju da lični i društveni trud dovede do korisnih znanja, a ista do materijalnog i nematerijalnog blagostanja, tako i da predložimo rešenja za uklanjanje tih smetnji. Dok ekonomska teorija može da ponudi rešenja za navedene probleme, uviđamo da spremnost da oni budu rešeni zavisi pre svega od nadahnuća koje prevlada kod pojedinaca, u nacionalnom društvu, pa i u svetu. Po našem mišljenju, ključ za uspešnu budućnost je zato u solidarnosti: društva sa pojedincem koji se trudi da se obrazuje i kome će njegov trud potom koristiti, pojedinca sa društvom koje mu je omogućilo školovanje, a koje može da izgubi njegovim iseljavanjem i prekidom veza sa maticom, kao i između država koje daju i koje primaju migrante.

Ostatak rada se sastoji od nekoliko celina koje su mogu prikazati slikom 1. Strelica 1 na slici pokazuje da je rast znanja pretpostavka ekonomskog rasta, strelica 2 pokazuje kako ekonomski rast i nivo znanja utiču na materijalno i nematerijalno blagostanje društva, a strelica 3 još i da se materijalno

i nematerijalno blagostanje međusobno podstiču. Zato se u okviru prvog dela rada razmatra odnos između znanja i ekonomskog rasta kao uzročnika blagostanja savremenog društva. Strelica 4 pokazuje kako obrazovni sistem unapređuje znanje unutar države, koje potom kroz ekonomski rast i podizanje nivoa blagostanja unutar društva dalje osnažuje obrazovni sistem. Pitanje o tome koji preduslovi moraju biti zadovoljeni da bi taj ciklus mogao biti zatvoren se zato razmatra u drugom delu rada, sa naročitim osvrtom na neuspeh savremenih tržišta obrazovanja i uticaj tog neuspeha na stvaranje znanja. Dvosmerna strelica 5 pokazuje da se domaće znanje unapređuje kroz strane direktne investicije, privlačenje povratnika iz inostranstva, kupovinu licenci i slično, dok se umanjuje kroz emigraciju visokoškolovanih. Konkurentskim odnosom između društava i država, kao i naročitoj ulozi znanja u određivanju tog odnosa, se zato bavi treći deo rada. Uzimajući u obzir uvide iznesene u prethodnim delovima rada, naposletku iznosimo zaključak.

Slika 1. Uticaj znanja na blagostanje društva unutar države

Izvor: Autorski originalni prikaz.

Znanje i ekonomski rast

Ekonomski rast, odnosno povećanje ukupne proizvodnje nacije tokom vremena (Kaličanin 2010: 173), omogućava društvu da sebi priušti više materijalnih dobara. Takva dobra su poželjna jer, dok stanovništvo može da ih upotrebi u svakodnevnom životu, država može da ih iskoristi da poveća fizičku i materijalnu bezbednost svojih građana. Dok je, dakle, jasno da ekonomski rast može da podigne nivo materijalnog blagostanja društva, treba naglasiti da on može da utiče i na nematerijalno blagostanje koje dovodimo u vezu sa unutrašnjim zadovoljstvom članova društva. Naime, materijalna dobra se mogu koristiti i za ulaganje u obrazovanje i kulturu koji oplemenjuju kako doživljaj stvarnosti svakog pojedinca, tako i njegovo stvaralaštvo i

društvene odnose. Obrazovanje, kroz znanje koje daje, još i povećava međunarodnu konkurentnost privrede, dok kultura doprinosi očuvanju i razvoju ličnog i nacionalnog identiteta u savremenom svetu. Potreba za ulaganjem u očuvanje i razvoj kulture je još veća u savremenim uslovima života u nuklearnim, umesto proširenim porodicama sa više generacija, gde je prenošenje nacionalne kulture i sećanja teže izvršiti u okiru porodice, te je neophodna pomoć kulturnih i obrazovnih institucija i medija. Iz navedenih razloga, pitanje kako dostići visok ekonomski rast predstavlja jedno od najznačajnijih pitanja u ekonomskoj nauci.

Određivanje toga da li, i u kojoj meri, određeni faktor utiče na ekonomski rast predstavlja metodološki problem koji nije trivijalan. Razlog za to je ograničenost broja zemalja u svetu sa jedne, i potencijalna neograničenost broja faktora koji bi mogli da utiču na razlike u ekonomskom rastu među tim zemaljama, sa druge strane. Problem se sastoji u sledećem. Recimo da dve zemlje imaju istu površinu, iste prirodne resurse, isti broj stanovnika koji su iste vere, narodnosti, školovanosti i, uopšte uzev, po svemu su iste, osim po otvorenosti privrede i ekonomskom rastu. Dok jedna zemlja slobodno trguje sa svetom i ima niske carine, druga je pod trgovinskim sankcijama. U tom slučaju, vrlo je verovatno da je razlog za razliku u njihovom ekonomskom rastu upravo stepen otvorenosti privrede. Ako se, sa druge strane, razlikuju ne samo po otvorenosti privrede već i po, recimo, etničkom sastavu stanovništva i rasprostanjenosti malarije, teško je reći koji od navedena tri faktora, i u kojoj meri, uzrokuje razliku u njihovom ekonomskom rastu.

1139

Salaimartin, Depelhofer i Miler (2004) se suočavaju sa navedenim problemom tako što uvode u upotrebu bajesovsko usrednjavanje klasičnih estimatora (BUKE)[2]. To je metod koji izračunava prosek koeficijenata iz mnoštva regresija koje koriste metod običnih najmanjih kvadrata (ONK), gde svaka od pojedinačnih ONK regresija koristi kao nezavisne promenljive samo jedan deo od ukupnih faktora koji bi mogli da utiču na ekonomski rast. BUKE dakle ocenjuje parcijalnu korelaciju mnoštva faktora sa dugoročnim ekonomskim rastom. To nam kazuje koji su faktori značajno češće izraženi u zemljama sa višim rastom, dok pitanje u kojoj meri oni uzrokuju ekonomski rast, a u kojoj meri ekonomski rast uzrokuje njih, korišćenjem ovog metoda ostaje otvoreno i podložno interpretaciji istraživača. Od 67 promenljivih koje su koristili da objasne razlike među stopama ekonomskog rasta različitih zemalja, pronašli su da 21 promenljiva stoji u vezi sa ekonomskim rastom[3], merenim kao prosečna stopa rasta bruto domaćeg proizvoda (BDP) u periodu 1960–1996.

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2   Bajesovsko usrednjavanje klasičnih estimatora (engleski: Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates – BACE).
3   Tih 21 promenljivih, prema značaju veze koju imaju sa stopom ekonomskog rasta, se rangiraju sledećim redom: indikator da se zemlja nalazi u Istočnoj Aziji, procenat dece

Za predmet našeg istraživanja je značajno da se među tom 21 promenljivom koje stoje u značajnoj vezi sa ekonomskim rastom nalaze i dve koje mere obrazovanost i posedovanje znanja naroda te zemlje. Prema sposobnosti da objasni što veći deo varijacije između zemalja u stopi ekonomskog rasta, na visokom drugom mestu stoji procenat dece školskog uzrasta koja pohađaju osnovnu školu. Procenat stanovništva koje govori strani jezik je takođe značajan i stoji na 21. mestu.[4]

U kojoj meri je znanje značajno za ekonomski rast? U veoma citiranoj studiji na tu temu Baro (1991) koristi uzorak od 98 zemalja i pronalazi da je ekonomski rast u periodu 1960-1985 pozitivno korelisan sa ljudskim kapitalom (Pirsonov koeficijent korelacije iznosi 0,73), koga meri kao procenat stanovništva odgovarajuće starosne dobi koje pohađa osnovnu ili srednju školu. Na ovaj način predviđena razlika u godišnjoj stopi ekonomskog rasta između najneobrazovanije i najobrazovanije zemlje je oko pet procenata. Korelacija ipak nije isto što i uzročno-posledična veza. Naime, ukoliko zemlje koje imaju veći ekonomski rast više ulažu u obrazovanje, može se pronaći pozitivna korelacija između obrazovanosti stanovništva i ekonomskog rasta čak i ako znanje ne podiže ekonomski rast. Bils i Klinov (2001) koriste rezultate iz oblasti ekonomike rada o uticaju obrazovanja na primanja pojedinca kao i podatke UNESKO-a o obrazovanosti stanovništva širom zemalja u svetu da bi kalibrisali model ekonomskog rasta radi utvrđivanja u kojoj meri obrazovanje *uzrokuje* ekonomski rast. Oni pronalaze da uticaj obrazovanja na ekonomski rast može da objasni ne više od trećine odnosa između dve proimeljive koji pronalaze studije kao Baro (1991), što je i dalje ekonomski značajno.

Sada kada znamo da znanje stoji u značajnoj vezi sa ekonomskim rastom, ostaje da pokušamo da još bolje razumemo na koji način se ta veza ostvaruje. U nekim modelima ekonomski rast stvara akumulacija ljudskog kapitala

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školskog uzrasta koja pohađaju osnovnu školu, relativna cena investicija, početni nivo bruto društvenog proizvoda po glavi stanovnika, procenat zemljišta u tropskom pojasu, gustina stanovništva u obalskom pojasu, rasprostranjenost malarije šezdesetih godina, očekivani životni vek 1960. godine, procenat stanovništa koji ispoveda konfučijanstvo, indikator da zemlja pripada Africi, indikator da zemlja pripada Latinskoj Americi, procenat bruto društvenog proizvoda koji pripada rudarstvu, indikator da je zemlja bila španska kolonija, broj godina u uzorku tokom kojih je privreda bila otvorena, procenat stanovništa koji ispoveda islam, procenat stanovništva koji ispoveda budizam, etno-lingvistička frakcionalizacija stanovništva, udeo državne potrošnje u ukupnoj potrošnji šezdesetih godina, gustina stanovništva 1960. godine, distorzije realnog kursa i procenat stanovništva koje govori strani jezik.

4   Istovremeno, zanimljivo je da, u ovoj studiji, procenat stanovništva sa visokim obrazovanjem, kao i udeo u BDP-u potrošnje na obrazovanje u državnim obrazovnim institucijama, niti uspevaju da objasne značajan deo varijacije u stopama rasta među zemljama u datom uzorku, niti je njihov izmereni efekat otporan na uključivanje drugih kontrolnih promenljivih u model.

tokom vremena (npr. Lukas 1988), što odslikava ulogu ljudskog kapitala kao samostalnog faktora proizvodnje, dok u drugim dolazi od postojeće zalihe ljudskog kapitala koja stvara ili prihvata inovacije (npr. Romer 1990). Kriger i Lindal (2001) sistematizuju rezultate literature koja proučava uticaj obrazovanja na primanja pojedinca kao i na ekonomski rast na nivou države. Oni navode da većina studija koje pokušavaju da objasne ekonomski rast na nivou države pronalaze da je za razlike u rastu između zemalja značajan početni nivo ljudskog kapitala a ne njegova promena. Na primer, Benhabib i Špigel (1994) podržavaju Romerovu (1990), a ne Lukasovu (1988) interpretaciju. Međutim, Kriger i Lindal (2001) pregledu postojeće literature dodaju i sopstvenu analizu i pokazuju da, kada se umanje greške u merenju obrazovanja, ne samo početni nivo već i promene u nivou ljudskog kapitala stoje u pozitivnom odnosu sa ekonomskim rastom, osim kada je period vremenske promene veoma kratak, odnosno samo 5 godina dug. Drugi rezultat velikog broja studija koje pokušavaju da objasne razlike u ekonomskom rastu između država je veći uticaj srednjeg i univerzitetskog obrazovanja na ekonomski rast nego osnovnog, za razliku od rezultata do kojih dolaze Salaimartin, Depelhofer i Miler (2004).

1141

Da bismo bolje razumeli značaj obrazovanja, odnosno znanja koje obrazovanje daje, važno je sagledati i njegovu jedinstvenost u odnosu na sve druge faktore koji dovode do ekonomskog rasta. Pre svega, ono se odlikuje po tome što ga je moguće menjati, što nije slučaj sa mnoštvom drugih faktora kao što su geografski položaj, posedovanje rudnog bogatstva ili klimatski uslovi. Šta više, za razliku od onih faktora na koje može da utiče samo državna vlast – kao na otvorenost privrede, državnu potrošnju, ili politiku valutnog kursa – obrazovanje je nešto što je u velikoj meri u rukama svakog pojedinca. Tačno je da država često propisuje broj godina obaveznog obrazovanja, ali je ukupno znanje koje se u tom periodu stekne, broj godina obrazovanja preko propisanog minimuma, kao i ovladavanje stranim jezicima, zanatima i veštinama, u velikoj meri proizvod lične inicijative i posvećenosti.

Uticaj znanja na materijalno blagostanje je specifičan još i po usaglašenosti ličnih i nacionalnih interesa. Naime, ne samo da obrazovanje doprinosi ekonomskom rastu, već ono istovremeno podiže i primanja osobe koja ulaže, bilo vreme ili novac, u sopstveno obrazovanje. Dokazi o tome da obrazovanje tako značajno povećava primanja pojedinca su potvrđeni mnoštvom analiza[5] (Kriger i Lindal 2001). Jedna dodatna godina obrazovanja u proseku podiže primanja pojedinca za oko 10 procenata, izračunato koristeći savremene podatke iz čitavog sveta (Patrinos 2016). U Evropi je taj broj nešto niži,

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5   Ove analize po pravilu koriste Minserovu jednačinu: $\ln(W_i) = \beta 0 + \beta 0 S_i + \beta 2 X_i + \beta 2 X_i 2 + \varepsilon i$. U njoj W_i predstavlja platu pojedinca, S_t godine školovanja, dok X_i predstavlja godine radnog iskustva (Mincer 1974).

oko 8 procenata, ali je i dalje veoma visok. Šta više, imamo razloga da očekujemo da obrazovanje pojedinca ne utiče na ekonomski rast privrede samo kroz povećanje ličnih primanja, već i kroz niz pozitivnih efekata prelivanja na ostatak društva. Više obrazovan pojedinac dobija veća primanja od manje obrazovanog samo u onoj meri u kojoj ostvaruje barem toliko veću korist za preduzeće u kojem radi od svog manje obrazovanog kolege. Ostatak koristi zadržavaju vlasnici kapitala preduzeća, kao i država kroz poreze koje ubira. Dodatno obrazovanje manje školovanog sloja stanovništva bi još moglo da smanji i stopu kriminaliteta, smanji korišćenje socijalne pomoći, kao i dovede do svesnijeg glasanja na izborima. Kod visoko školovanih, dodatno obrazovanje može da ubrza tehnološki napredak, bilo kroz brojnije izume bilo kroz brže preuzimanje tehnologija razvijenih u drugim delovima sveta. Možemo zaključiti da opisana usaglašenost ličnih i nacionalnih interesa u dostizanju kako materijalnog tako i nematerijalnog blagostanja kroz obrazovanje poziva na solidarnost društva u celini sa ljudima koji se trude da steknu nova znanja, i njegovu materijalnu i svaku drugu podršku njihovim nastojanjima.

Jasno je da analize koje mere uticaj obrazovanja na primanja pojedinca nisu u stanju da izmere te dodatne pozitivne efekte obrazovanja na materijalno blagostanje čitavog društva. Upravo posmatranje stope ekonomskog rasta čitave zemlje bi trebalo da uzme u obzir kako efekte obrazovanja na pojedinca tako i na društvo u celini. Kriger i Lindal (2001) se oslanjaju kako na pregled rezultata iz literature tako i na sopstvenu dodatnu analizu i pokazuju da je uticaj promene u nivou obrazovanja na rast prihoda na nivou države barem toliko veliki koliko i stopa prinosa na obrazovanje koju daju studije koje razmatraju pojedince. Pod određenim pretpostavkama, koje uzimaju u obzir moguću grešku u merenju obrazovanja (za razliku od Benhabib i Špigel 1994, i Baro i Salaimartin 1995), promena u prosečnom broju godina provedenih u školi ima još veći efekat na ekonomski rast zemlje nego na rast plate pojedinca, što bi moglo da posluži kao dokaz dodatnih pozitivnih efekata obrazovanja na društvo. Kohen i Soto (2007) takođe pronalaze da je efekat obrazovanja na ekonomski rast privrede u skladu sa onim koji pronalaze studije iz oblasti ekonomike rada za uticaj na primanja pojedinca.

Ono što znamo o uticaju obrazovanja na ekonomski rast nas ne uči samo o potrebi solidarnosti društva sa ljudima koji se trude da se obrazuju, već i značaju solidarnosti među grupama stanovništva sa različitim sposobnostima. Recimo, Hanušek i Vosman (2012) koriste rezultate dvanaest različitih testova iz matematike, prirodnih nauka i čitanja koji su zadavani učenicima osnovnih i srednjih škola širom sveta da bi objasnili razlike u stopi ekonomskog rasta između država.[6] Oni pokazuju da su i udeo stanovništva sa osnovnom

1142

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6   Od testa „First International Mathematics Study" 1964. do „Program for International Student Assessment (PISA)" 2003. godine.

pismenošću (udeo sa rezultatom na testovima iznad nivoa od jedne devijacije ispod proseka OECD zemalja) kao i udeo izuzetno intelektualno sposobnog stanovništva (udeo sa rezultatom na testovima iznad nivoa od jedne devijacije iznad proseka OECD zemalja) nezavisno značajni za ekonomski rast. Isti autori pokazuju da postoji i sinergijski efekat postojanja obe grupe stanovništva – osnovna pismenost ima veći uticaj na ekonomski rast u prisustvu izuzetno uspešne manjine, odnosno izuzetno uspešna manjina više doprinosi ekonomskom rastu kada je okružena manjinom sa makar osnovnom pismenošću. Uticaj znanja na privredni rast može da zavisi i od dostignutog nivoa ekonomskog razvoja. Tako Hanušek i Vosman (2012) pokazuju još i da je osnovna pismenost slične važnosti za ekonomski rast kako siromašnih tako i bogatih zemalja, dok je važnost za ekonomski rast udela izuzetno sposobnog stanovništva veća u siromašnijim zemljama. To se može objasniti time da siromašnije zemlje ekonomski rastu imitirajući tehnološka dostignuća bogatijih, dok je za uvođenje u upotrebu tih dostignuća neophodna dovoljno velika manjina visoko sposobnih. Možemo dakle zaključiti da privreda može brže da raste i svima može da bude bolje ako grupe stanovništva sa različitim sposobnostima podrže jedna drugu u ostvarenju svojih potencijala.

1143

Uprkos mnoštvu studija koje ukazuju na značaj obrazovanja, i znanja koje ono pruža, na ekonomski rast, nije neophodno da zemlje sa stanovništvom koje je u proseku provelo više godina u školi rastu brže. Videli smo da, na primer, Salaimartin, Depelhofer i Miler (2004) pronalaze da procenat stanovništa sa visokim obrazovanjem, kao i učešće potrošnje na obrazovanje u društvenim institucijama u bruto društvenom proizvodu, nisu značajne u predviđanju razlike u stopi ekonomskog rasta između zemalja. Najverovatniji razlog za to su razlike u kvalitetu obrazovanja. U idućem poglavlju ćemo zato razmotriti neke probleme savremenih tržišta obrazovanja, i pokušati da odgovorimo na pitanje kako obezbediti da obrazovanje zaista pruža znanja koja podižu blagostanje, kako pojedinca tako i društva.

Neuspeh savremenih tržišta obrazovanja usled asimetrije informacija

Ekonomski razvoj zemlje povećava i potrebu za raznovrsnošću znanja i veština koje poseduje radna snaga. Njega zato prati i rast broja obrazovnih institucija i programa. Mogućnosti se ne razlikuju samo po profilu struke, već i po vlasničkoj strukturi obrazovne institucije (npr. državna ili privatna), ceni studija, načinu studiranja (npr. studije na daljinu ili klasične) i kvalitetu obrazovanja koje pružaju. Širina izbora je po pravilu veća što je nivo obrazovanja viši, dok odluka pred učenicima i studentima o izboru odgovarajuće obrazovne institucije postaje utoliko složenija baš u životnom trenutku u kojem najviše utiče na buduća primanja.

Iako očekujemo da bi konkurencija među mnoštvom obrazovnih institucija trebalo da dovede do kvalitetnijeg obrazovanja, na žalost upravo takva raznovrsnost ponude stoji i u vezi sa nizom problema sa kojima se maturanti i diplomci susreću na savremenim tržištima rada. Mnogi mladi se za univerzitetsko obrazovanje opredeljuju iz želje za isplativim poslom. Istina je da univerzitetska diploma u proseku donosi značajno uvećanje očekivanih primanja – preko 10 procenata po godini studija u proseku za Evropu i Srednju Aziju (Jamada 2015) – a u poslednje vreme i veći prinos nego osnovno ili srednje obrazovanje (Patrinos 2016). Ipak, ni budući studenti ni njihovi roditelji često nisu svesni toga da to ne mora da važi za svakoga (Veber 2014) kao ni za svaki univerzitet, svaku disciplinu, ni na svakom tržištu rada (Jamada 2015). Studije na lošijim univerzitetima, struke sa prevelikim brojem diplomaca u odnosu na potražnju za tom strukom, kao i tržišta rada u slabijim privredama mogu da dovedu i do nezaposlenosti među visoko obrazovanima, kao i prekvalifikovanosti (Jamada 2015), ali i nekvalifikovanosti (Kupec 2015) za poslove koje će u budućnosti zaista obavljati.

Nesklad između broja i profila visoko obrazovanih i stvarnih potreba na tržištu rada može da bude još veći u zemljama u tranziciji. S obzirom da se u privredama u tranziciji istovremeno menja i struktura privrede, struke za koje školuje postojeći obrazovni sistem postaju prevaziđene (Kupec 2015), dok za one koje pružaju mogućnosti za brzo i isplativo zaposlenje nema dovoljno kadra (Stojkov 2016; N1 2016). Nesklad između ponude i potražnje poslova po strukama uvećava i visok nivo nezaposlenosti, zbog kojeg vreme provedeno na univerzitetskim studijama nema vrednu alternativu na tržištu rada. Zato se mladi još lakše opredeljuju za dalje studije, čak i kada nije izvesno da će to kasnije dovesti do bolje plaćenog posla, što pogoduje i razvoju svojevrsnog balona akademskih programa i institucija. Problem izbora obrazovne institucije i struke je još složeniji u zemljama koje prolaze ili su nedavno prošle kroz tranziciju, naročito ukoliko je mnoštvo privatnih univerziteta sa novim obrazovnim smerovima tek nedavno stvoreno, a njihov kvalitet tek treba da se dokaže u godinama koje dolaze. Konkurencija pojačana ulaskom novih institucija na tržište obrazovanja bi mogla da primora svaku pojedinačnu instituciju na trud i napredak. Ako međutim budući studenti ne znaju pravu vrednost pojedinačnih struka na tržištu rada, a u odlučivanju pri izboru univerziteta značajnu ulogu igraju stereotipi – recimo o prednosti državnih nad privatnim institucijama – ili marketinška aktivnost – recimo o prednosti novih nad starim institucijama – pojačana konkurencija neće na žalost neophodno dovesti do mudrijeg izbora obrazovne institucije i poboljšanja kvaliteta obrazovanja. Upravo razlika u kvalitetu obrazovanja može da objasni zašto međunarodna poređenja kognitivnih sposobnosti pokazuju veću razliku između zemalja nego poređenja po godinama obrazovanja stanovništva (Hanušek i Vosman 2008).

Problem savremenih tržišta obrazovanja koji je upravo opisan predstavlja dakle problem neuspeha tržišta usled asimetrije informacija između vlasnika obrazovnih institucija i poslodavaca sa jedne strane, i studenata i njihovih roditelja sa druge strane. Naime, naročito se u zemljama koje su nedavno prešle sa planske na tržišnu privredu, zbog razočaranosti prvom i neiskustva sa potonjom, često previđa da će tržište bez državne intervencije dovesti do efikasne raspodele dobara, usluga i faktora proizvodnje samo ako na svim tržištima vlada savršena konkurencija (Mlađan i Marković 2016). Neefikasna[7] raspodela koja nastupa kao neuspeh tržišta usled nedostatka savršene konkurencije međutim znači da bi, preraspodelom postojećih resursa, bilo moguće barem nekoga učiniti srećnijim pritom nikoga ne oštetivši. Uopšte uzev, neuspeh tržišta nastupa usled narušavanje savršene konkurencije iz sledećih razloga (Pindik i Rubinfeld 2001: 591): tržišne moći, eksternalija, javnih dobara ili nepotpunih informacija.

Sam problem nepotpunih informacija na tržištu obrazovanja se može ogledati u sledećem. Ako ne poznaju dobro stvarnu situaciju na tržištu rada, studenti bi mogli da izaberu struku sa kojom će im biti teško da nađu posao, ili će takav posao biti manje plaćen nego što su očekivali. Slično tome, zato što nisu svesni stvarnog kvaliteta obrazovnih institucija, mogli bi da se opredele za lošiju instituciju koja koristi savremena marketinška sredstva pre nego za bolju koja marketinški zaostaje, ne uvidevši razliku pre nego što dospeju na tržište rada. Opisana raspodela je neefikasna, a ispravljanje neuspeha tržišta bi dovelo do boljitka na sledeći način. Zamislimo da su umesto toga studenti i njihovi roditelji znali o stvarnoj situaciji na tržištu rada isto što i profesori i vlasnici obrazovnih institucija i poslodavci. U tom slučaju bi se možda opredelili za zanat umesto za univerzitetske studije, ili za univerzitetsku struku koja bi im dala bolje izglede za zaposlenje, ili za instituciju koja bi im ponudila kvalitetnije obrazovanje. Njima bi u životu bilo bolje, kvalitetne obrazovne institucije bi bile nagrađene, a dobitak koji bi i studenti i čitava privreda ostvarili bio bi više nego dovoljan do kompenzuje gubitak obrazovnih institucija i smerova koji bi posle promene bili zanemareni.

Kako, dakle, obezbediti da studenti i njihovi roditelji imaju ispravne i potpune informacije? U slučaju asimetrije informacija, državna intervencija bi mogla da ispravi neuspeh tržišta. Na primer, odgovarajuće regulatorno telo bi moglo da učini proces prikupljanja podataka o sopstvenim studentima zahtevom za dobijanje i održavanje akreditacije obrazovnih institucija. Takve informacije bi mogle da uključuju podatke o profilu primljenih studenata (recimo, o uspehu u prethodnom školovanju), o uspehu tokom školovanja u samoj instituciji (o trajanju studija i proseku ocena), o usmerenju

1145

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7 Neefikasna, odnosno Pareto neefikasna (Pindik i Rubinfeld, 2001, str. 567).

posle završenih studija (koji deo nastavi studije, i na kojim institucijama, a koji deo se uputi na tržište rada), i o ishodima na tržištu rada (recimo, vremenu potrebnom do pronalaženja posla, o slaganju između struke školovanja i posla, trajanju radne nedelje, kao i zaradi po satu). Cilj učešća države bi bio još i da obezbedi pouzdanost i uporedivost podataka, po potrebi direktnim sakupljanjem istih radi provere, jer same obrazovne institucije imaju interes da ih predstave sebi na korist. Predstavljanje takvih podataka na jednom mestu zajedno sa ponudom i potražnjom za različitim strukama na tržištu rada – trenutnom i projektovanom budućom – bi koristilo i poslodavcima, i to kako pri odabiru tako i pri podsticanju razvoja kvalitetnog kadra. Da bi mnoštvo informacija budućim studentima bilo bliže i razumljivije, moglo bi da koristi uvođenje institucije obrazovnih savetnika koji bi obilazili škole i pomagali učenicima pri odluci gde da nastave studije. Možemo da zaključimo da bi obezbeđivanje nedostajućih informacija omogućilo puno korišćenje podsticajnih efekata konkurencije na razvoj portfolia obrazovnih institucija, programa i njihovog kvaliteta, ispunjujući nade koje je u zemljama u tranziji probudio, a zatim često izneverio, proces prelaska na tržišnu privredu.

Uloga znanja u sticanju nacionalne konkurentnosti tranzicionih i zemalja u razvoju

Nacionalna konkurentnost i znanje

U prethodnim poglavljima smo govorili o tome kako obezbediti da konkurencija između institucija obrazovnog sistema usavrši iste ne bi li znanje koje pružaju dobilo na kvalitetu, i o tome kako znanje povećava kako primanja pojedinca tako i ekonomski rast na nivou države. U savremenom svetu se međutim preduzeća kao nosioci ekonomskog rasta susreću i sa međunarodnom konkurencijom. Ako uvažimo činjenicu da ekonomski prosperitet zavisi od međunarodne konkurentnosti nacionalnih industrija, postavlja se pitanje kako znanje utiče na sticanje takve konkurentnosti.

Pitanje uticaja znanja na nacionalnu konkurentnost i prosperitet je poslednjih decenija istraživano sa različitih aspekata, često parcijalnih. Rad koji je uveo novine u analizu nacionalne konkurentnosti je rad Majkla Portera koji ovom problemu prilazi sa aspekta strategijskog menadžmenta i u fokus stavlja kompanije kao glavne kreatore znanja i nacionalne konkurentnosti (Porter 1990). Porter je identifikovao četiri međusobno povezana faktora čiji odnosi utiču na nacionalnu konkurentnost: 1. raspoloživost faktora proizvodnje 2. karakter tražnje 3. povezane industrijske grane i 4. strategija kompanija, struktura grane i stepen konkurencije u grani i dva egzogena faktora 1. delovanje države i 2. slučajnost. Porter nacionalnu konkurentnost

prati na nivou grana, a meri je tržišnim udelom domaćih kompanija na svetskom tržištu. Odnos navadenih faktora je prikazan na slici 2.

Uticaj raspoloživosti faktora proizvodnje na nacionalnu konkurentnost je razmatran još u tradicionalnim teorijama o međunarodnoj trgovini[8], ali se Porterov doprinos ogleda u tome što uvodi hijerarhiju među faktorima. Porter pravi gradaciju između bazičnih faktora (prirodni resursi, klima, lokacija...) i unapređenih faktora (telekomunikaciona infrastruktura, veštine stanovništva i naučno istraživački centri) (Grant 1991). Porter ističe da se nacionalna konkurentnost ostvaruje samo visokim investicijama u održiva i specijalizovana znanja (Porter 1990).

Slika 2. Dijamant nacionalne konkurentnosti

Izvor: Porter (1990)

Osetljivi i zahtevni domaći kupci se navode kao faktor koji podstiče kompanije da konstantno inoviraju kako bi odgovorili na njihove prohteve. U cilju servisiranja domaće napredne tražnje kompanije kreiraju nova specijalizovana znanja koja doprinose rastu produktivnosti.

Konkurentnosti pojedine grane doprinosi i stepen razvijenosti pojedinih pratećih industrija. Za kompanije je značajno olakšan nastup na svetskom tržištu ukoliko postoje klasteri u kojima su članice povezane po horizontalnoj i vertikalnoj osnovi (Dejvis 2000). Na ovaj način dolazi do kreiranja

1147

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8   U teoriji apsolutnih prednosti Adama Smita, teoriji komparativnih prednosti Davida Rikarda kao i Hekšer – Olin – Semjuelsonovom modelu komparativnih prednosti.

novih znanja, i kontrolisanog i nekontrolisanog prelivanja znanja između članova klastera.

Poslednji faktor u dijamantu nacionalne konkurentnosti čini strategija kompanija, struktura i stepen konkurencije. Iako je u današnjim uslovima globalizacije veoma mali broj grana određen konkurencijom u nacionalnim okvirima, Porter stepen domaće konkurencije smatra glavnim pokretačem stvaranja novih znanja i preduslovom za uspeh na domaćem i svetskom tržištu (Fos 1996). Stoga je kao glavnu ulogu države Porter video podsticanje konkurencije, minimalnu intervenciju i sprečavanje stvaranja monopola.

Porterov model nacionalne konkurentnosti je privukao veliku pažnju među istraživačima. Kao glavni kvalitet istican je dinamički karakter modela i da se konkurentnosti pristupa sa tri aspekta: nivo preduzeća, grane i nacionalne privrede (Grant 1991). Sa druge strane veliki broj istraživača iz oblasti međunarodnog menadžmenta je isticao da je međunarodna dimenzija konkurentnosti i sticanja znanja zanemarena (Rugman i D'Kruz 1993; Dauning 1993; Mun, Rugman i Verbeke 1998). Isticano je da je model možda primenljiv za velike visoko razvijene zemlje, dok je za manje, naročito tranzicione i zemlje u razvoju, neophodno povezivanje dijamanta nacionalne konkurentnosti sa dijamantom konkurentnosti velike privrede sa kojom je uspostavljena intenzivna ekonomska saradnja.

Po našem mišljenju, Porterovo viđenje preduzeća kao glavnih kreatora znanja koja doprinose nacionalnoj konkurentnosti, iako daje mnoštvo korisnih uvida, je nepotpuno. Direktni nosioci ekonomskog rasta svakako jesu znanja primenjena u poslovnom procesu. Uslov za razvoj novih primenjenih znanja međutim vidimo u kadru koji je prethodno stekao fundamentalna znanja u kvalitetnom obrazovnom sistemu. Kvalitetan obrazovni sistem naime pruža i fundamentalna znanja, koja predstavljaju poznavanje i razumevanje činjenica i teorijskih pojmova (Boulet 2015), i praktična znanja ili veštine, koja daju stručnost da se nešto napravi ili uradi (Laubi 2013). Nova primenjena znanja potom nastaju u sadejstvu fundamentalnih znanja i iskustva u njihovoj primeni, kao što je prikazano na slici 3.

Dok nije svaki pojedinac u stanju da temeljno savlada fundamentalna znanja, obrazovni sistem koji ne poseduje institucije koje takva znanja pružaju nadarenijim pojedincima dugoročno slabi nacionalnu konkurentnost. Istina je da obrazovanje koje se svodi na obuku u praktičnim znanjima omogućava svršenim studentima da brže budu od koristi na radnom mestu. Međutim, ono i ograničava sposobnost pojedinca da kroz radno iskustvo i dalje učenje razvija i usvaja nova znanja i veštine. Samo zaposleni koji poseduju fundamentalna znanja su u stanju da u okviru preduzeća razvijaju kako nova primenjena znanja, tako u pojedinim slučajevima, najčešće kod velikih preduzeća, čak

Slika 3. Uloga obrazovnog sistema u stvaranju znanja

OBRAZOVNI SISTEM

EKONOMSKI RAST

FUNDAMENTALNA ZNANJA

ISKUSTVO

PRAKTIČNA ZNANJA

NOVA PRAKTIČNA ZNANJA

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Izvor: Autorski originalni prikaz.

i nova fundamentalna znanja. Zato je, po našem mišljenju, kvalitetan obrazovni sistem, koji pruža i fundamentalna i primenjena znanja, preduslov da preduzeća budu u stanju da steknu međunarodnu konkurentnost.

Međunarodni aspekti kreiranja znanja i njegovog doprinosa nacionalnoj konkurentnosti tranzicionih i zemalja u razvoju

S obzirom da smo opisali značaj znanja za sticanje i održavanje konkurentnosti nacionalne privrede nameće se pitanje na koj način i u kojoj meri znanje iz inostranstva može da utiče na nacionalnu konkurentnost. Uopšte uzev, proces globalizacije je doveo u pitanje osnovnu pretpostavku Porterovog stava da je nacionalna konkurentnost dominantno definisana nacionalnim elementima. Zato ćemo u ovom delu teksta detaljno objasniti uticaj međunarodnih aktivnosti na svaki element dijamanta nacionalne konkurentnosti, kreiranje i širenje znanja, sa posebnim akcentom na tranzicione i zemlje u razvoju.

Kako bi resursi doprineli stvaranju konkurentske prednosti neophodno je da budu vredni, retki i teški za imitiranje (Barni 1991). Resursi su vredni ukoliko doprinose povećanju prihoda ili smanjenju rashoda preduzeća. Međutim, ukoliko ne zadovoljavaju druga dva uslova resursi mogu samo da doprinesu konkurentnskoj ravnopravnosti. Fizički resursi retko mogu da zadovolje ove uslove, tako da su u današnjim uslovima to uglavnom nematerijalni resursi, odnosno različite vrste znanja. Tradicionalne teorije o internacionalizaciji

poslovanja podržavaju ove stavove ističući da multinacionalne kompanije (MNK) poseduju specifične nematerijalne resurse koje nastoje dodatno da eksploatišu u inostranstvu. (Dauning 2000; Rugman i Verbeke 2003).

Ove teorije impliciraju da samo razvijene zemlje poseduju sposobnosti da kreiraju nova znanja. Manje razvijene zemlje sa druge strane u najboljem slučaju poseduju kapacitete da usvajaju dokazana i „zrela" znanja i kombinuju ih sa svojim sposobnostima o proizvodnji po niskim troškovima (Vernon 1966). Međutim, poslednjih godina smo svedoci ekspanzije MNK iz tranzicionih i zemalja u razvoju, prvenstveno Kine, Indije, Rusije i Brazila. Porterov pristup i tradicionalne teorije o internacionalizaciji ne daju odgovor na rastući značaj ovih preduzeća. Naime, ova preduzeća koriste internacionalizaciju poslovanja ne da bi eksploatisali već postojeća znanja već da bi sticali nova (Luo i Tang 2007). Jedan od načina je kupovina znanja i resursa kojima se relativno lako može trgovati na svetskom tržištu (Barnard 2010), a koji u kombinaciji sa postojećim znanjima i resursima doprinose smanjenju konkurentskog jaza.[9] Drugi kanal je preuzimanje inostranih preduzeća koja poseduju znanja i nematerijalne resurse kojima je relativno teško trgovati na tržišnoj osnovi (Marković, Rakita i Filipović 2015: 192).[10] Jasno je da su međunarodne aktivnosti preduzeća iz tranzicionih i zemalja u razvoju u velikoj meri usmerene ka usvajanju novih znanja što značajno unapređuje prvi element Porterovog dijamanta nacionalne konkurentnosti.

Nastanak sve većeg broja „globalno rođenih" preduzeća doveo je u pitanje Porterovu tezu o domaćoj tražnji kao generatoru novih znanja i pokretaču inovacija. „Globalno rođena" preduzeća od svog osnivanja imaju za cilj ne da opslužuju pojedina nacionalna tržišta već globalne tržišne segmente. Dobar primer za razvoj takvih kompanija su informatička industrija u Indiji i mašinska industrija u Kini. Obe grane su se razvile na bazi tražnje generisane u visoko razvijenim zemljama. Zarada od plasiranja robe i usluga na inostranim tržištima dovela je do značajnog rasta potrošnje domaćinstava u tranzicionim i zemljama u razvoju. Recimo, u periodu od 2005. do 2015. godine, potrošnja domaćinstava u SAD i Japanu je porasla za 11% odnosno 7%, dok je potrošnja kineskih domaćinstava porasla za 118%. Zato su mnoge MNK iz razvijenih zemalja razvile proizvode i usluge namenjene tranzicionim i zemljama u razvoju, koji se prodaju po niskim cenama, ali sa i dalje prihvatljivom funkcionalnošću i kvalitetom (Prahald i Hamond 2002). Stoga su pojedine MNK svojim filijalama u manje razvijenim zemljama dale

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9   U pitanju je kupovina tehnoloških licenci i angažovanje pojedinaca iz inostranstva sa specifičnim znanjima.

10   Preuzimajući preduzeća investitori stiču pristup korporativnoj kulturi, celokupnim centrima za istraživanje i razvoj, menadžerskim i marketinškim znanjima, a kojima je teško pojedinačno trgovati na otvorenom tržištu.

slobodu da razvijaju inovacije koje će odgovoriti na potrebe ovog segmenta potrošača (Imelt, Govindarajan i Trimble 2009). Sa početkom globalne ekonomske krize porasla je tražnja za ovim proizvodima i u razvijenim zemljama, tako da su ove inovacije našle svoju primenu i na razvijenim tržištima. Iz ovoga vidimo da inostrana tražnja, kako bogatijih tako i siromašnijih potrošača, može podsticati nastanak novih praktičnih znanja.

Treći element u Porterovom modelu nacionalne konkurentnosti predstavlja razvijenost povezanih grana, koje se često vezuju za formiranje klastera. Klasteri predstavljaju geografsku koncentraciju ekonomski povezanih kompanija i institucija[11] na određenom prostoru. U okviru klastera se formiraju partnerski i konkurentski odnosi, koji međusobno doprinose kreiranju inovacija i znanja. Delovanje klastera doprinosi rastu konkurentnosti kroz rast produktivnosti, uticaj na kreiranje inovacija u okviru postojećih industrija i kreiranje potpuno novih industrija (Porter 1998). Produktivnost u okviru klastera raste putem deljenja informacija, dostupnošću komplementarnih resursa i pristupa zaposlenima sa specifičnim znanjima. Porter dozvoljava mogućnost da se klasteri formiraju i van nacionalnih granica, ali smatra da su dominantno nacionalno određeni.

Uključivanje preduzeća iz tranzicionih i zemalja u razvoju u globalne lance vrednosti pojedinih industrija aktuelizovalo je značaj klastera za sticanje znanja i sticanje konkurentnosti. Naime, postajući deo poslovne mreže koju čine glavne MNK, ključni dobavljači, kupci, ne poslovne institucije (instituti, fakulteti, stručna i druga udruženja) i pojedini konkurenti sa kojima je uspostavljen strateški odnos, ova preduzeća stiču pristup delu znanja koje nastaje u okviru mreže, ali i delu znanja koje poseduju strateški partneri (Rugman i D'Kruz 1995). Poseban značaj za ova preduzeća predstavlja neformalizovano i nekontrolisano prelivanje znanja u okviru mreže (Beata 2004). Kao članovi globalnog lanca vrednosti i poslovne mreže preduzeća iz tranzicionih i zemalja u razvoju stiču znanja koja im omogućavaju: 1. unapređenje kvaliteta i performansi proizvoda, 2. unapređenje efikasnosti procesa, 3. obavljanje dodatnih funkcija u lancu vrednosti i 4. obavljanje iste ili slične aktivnosti u nekoj drugoj industriji (Pananond 2015: 98). Postajući deo globalnih lanaca snabdevanja preduzeća iz tranzicionih i zemalja u razvoju postepeno, uz podršku nacionalnih vlada, formiraju klastere koji doprinose kreiranju novih znanja. Ono što je veoma značajno je da ovi klasteri postaju interesantni i velikim MNK koje u okviru klastera formiraju svoja predstavništva kako bi imali pristup lokalno nastalom znanju (Meir 2015: 221). Prisustvo velikih MNK doprinosi iniciranju novog ciklusa inovacija i rastu reputacije klastera, što se potom odražava na širenje klastera.

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11   Na primer, fakulteti i naučni instituti iz određene oblasti.

Postajući delovi globalnih lanaca snabdevanja, preduzeća iz tranzicionih i zemalja u razvoju imaju očigledne koristi, ali se suočavaju i sa određenim rizicima. Naime, MNK nastoje da ova preduzeća zadrže na sredini lanca snabdevanja, gde se stvara najmanji nivo vrednosti. Sa druge strane za sebe su sačuvale ulazni tok (*upstream)* lanca vrednosti, koji se bazira na znanju u oblasti istraživanja i razvoja, i izlazni tok (*downstream)* lanca vrednosti koji se bazira na znanjima u oblasti marketinga, a koji generišu najveći deo vrednosti (Mudambi 2008). Ova situacija je karakteristična za male zemlje kao što je Srbija. U Srbiji filijale MNK nisu bile spremne da značajnije investiraju u lokalnu mrežu dobavljača, tako da su izostali efekti kreiranja znanja po ovom osnovu (Marković 2017: 196).

Stepen i način konkurencije u nacionalnim okvirima, kao poslednji element dijamanta nacionalne konkurentnosti, Porter je smatrao veoma značajnim za podsticanje inovacija i sticanje konkurentnosti. Međutim, stav da će slobodna konkurencija na nacionalnom nivou omogućiti stvaranje inovacija je krajnje pojednostavljen, i predstavlja posmatranje problema iz ugla visoko razvijenih zemalja sa velikim domaćim tržištima. Usled razlike u efikasnosti institucija pojedine poslovne strategije koje se smatraju prevaziđenim u razvijenim tržišnim privredama su se pokazale veoma uspešnim u manje razvijenim zemljama (Ramahandran, Manikandan i Pand 2013). Pored toga u ovim privredama uticaj državnih organa i međunarodnih konkurenata na stepen konkurencije je mnogo veći nego na razvijenim tržištima.

Državni organi na stepen konkurencije u ovim zemljama često utiču tako što finansijski i nefinansijski podržavaju domaće kompanije koje za cilj imaju sticanje strateške nematerijalne imovine u inostranstvu, iako se efekti po osnovu njenog korišćenja mogu očekivati tek u dugom roku (Luo, Kvizhi i Binđi 2010). Takođe, državni organi svojim merama podstiču konsolidaciju u pojedinim granama za koje su procenile da imaju strateški značaj, kao na primer auto industrija u Kini. Na ovaj način vlada nastoji da minimizira dupliranje napora u kreiranju neophodnih znanja i ostvarenje ekonomije obima. Cilj je da se formiraju dve grupe konkurenata od po pet kompanija, grupa prvoklasnih koji imaju kompetencije da kreiraju inovacije neophodne da se izazovu lideri u grani, i grupa konkurenata niže klase koji imaju lokalna znanja neophodna da servisiraju i dalje veliko domaće tržište manje kvalitetnih vozila (Buz and Ko 2010).

Vlade tranzicionih i zemalja u razvoju ponekad insistiraju na formiranju zajedničkih ulaganja stranih investitora sa lokalnim preduzećima, što utiče na intenzitet i karakter konkurencije. Ovakva državna politika za cilj ima da doprinese prelivanju znanja na lokalna preduzeća koja ne poseduju kompetencije da izađu na globalno tržište. Praksa je međutim pokazala da ovakav vid intervencije može da bude veoma rizičan, jer domaća preduzeća postaju

zavisna od transfera inostranog znanja i ne razvijaju sposobnost kreiranja sopstvenih inovacija (Linč i Jin 2016). Drugi kanal preko koga strane investicije utiču na konkurentnost lokalnih preduzeća su efekti „prelivanja i ugledanja". Efekti stvaranja znanja usled nekontrolisanih prelivanja i ugledanja kod stranih investicija su dugo predmet istraživanja u ekonomskoj literaturi. Rezultati su krajnje oprečni, čak i kod analize efekata za iste zemlje. Pojedina istraživanja su pokazala da efekata prelivanja u okviru iste industrije nema (Jongbok, Biung i Pervez 2013), da su prelivanja jasno uočljiva (Mejer i Sinani 2004) ili da zavise od apsorpcionih kapaciteta lokalnih preduzeća (Mingjong, Šujiun i Kun 2006).

Proces integrisanja u globalne lance snabdevanja i međunarodne ekonomske tokove ne garantuje da će u zemljama u razvoju biti toliko radnih mesta za visoko obrazovane, koliko te zemlje imaju kako školovanih stručnjaka tako i talentovanih studenata. Povezani rizik sa kojim se zemlje u razvoju susreću je zato i problem odliva znanja, kroz migracije, ka razvijenijim privredama. On je još izraženiji u zemljama u tranziciji, gde postoji značajan broj visoko obrazovanih (Šeksnia 1998), a mogućnosti zaposlenja su ograničene zbog procesa promene strukture privrede. Tokom procesa tranzicije došlo je do propadanja pojedinih privrednih grana, što je delimično posledica i ekonomskog otvaranja ka inostranstvu, za koje obrazovni sistemi datih država i dalje uspešno školuju stanovništvo. Prethodno i novo školovani zato odlaze u inostranstvo u potrazi za poslom. Proces odliva mozgova, iako nesumnjivo ima i neke pozitivne efekte, stvarajući izvor doznaka i korisnu mrežu sunarodnika koji se nalaze na svetskim izvorima znanja i privrednih inovacija, dugoročno može da ugrozi budućnost zemlje (Skeldon 2005). Ostajući bez ljudi i znanja, zemlje postaju ekonomski i bezbednosno slabije, ostvaruju niži ekonomski rast i zaostaju za drugima. Odnos između zemalja koje daju i koje primaju migrante se zato može predstaviti koristeći diagram tipa „peščanog sata" , prikazanog na slici 4.

Diagram pokazuje da su povratnici iz inostranstva, koji se sa novostečenim znanjima vraćaju u zemlju porekla, element koji može da uspori ili zaustavi ovaj proces. Pitanje kako ih privući i integrisati zato postaje pitanje od prvorazrednog značaja za mnoge tranzicione i zemlje u razvoju.

Odliv znanja iz jedne zemlje istovremeno predstavlja dodatnu korist za zemlju primaoca, zbog čega bismo mogli zaključiti da zemlje emigracije i zemlje primaoci imaju suprotstavljene interese. Ipak interesi zemlje primaoca i zemalja iz kojih potiču obrazovani emigranti ne moraju biti u potpunosti suprotstavljeni, već postoji prostor za saradnju na obostranu korist i na osnovama solidarnosti. Zemlje iz kojih migranti dolaze mogu da budu zahvalne zemljama sa razvijenijom privredom zbog mogućnosti za zaposlenje nekih svojih građana i pomoći od koje bi emigranti potom mogli biti zemlji iz koje

1153

Slika 4. „Peščani sat" odliva znanja i ugrožavanja nacionalne budućnosti

Izvor: Autorski originalni prikaz.

dolaze. Zemlje u koje migranti dolaze treba da budu zahvalne zemljama iz kojih dolaze na talentu koji donose, i treba da preuzmu deo odgovornosti za pomoć tim zemljama, kako iz moralnih načela tako i iz interesa. Naime, zemlje primaoci i njihova preduzeća imaju u pojedinim slučajevima interesa da stimulišu povratak visoko obrazovanih emigranata. Naime, povratnici mogu postati zastupnici njihovih interesa u matičnoj zemlji (na primer, prilikom odlučivanja čija će se oprema korisiti prilikom nekog investicionog projekta) ili olakšati realizaciju neke strane investicije u matičnoj zemlji (usled posedovanja lokalnih marketinških znanja i mreže kontakata). Pored toga povratnici mogu da utiču pozitivno na reputaciju zemlje u kojoj su

boravili kod lokalnog stanovništva. Konačno, razvijene zemlje imaju interesa, poštujući slobodnu volju pojedinaca, da ne „usisaju" celokupno znanje iz manje razvijenih zemalja. Bez neophodnih znanja i liderskih i vizionarskih sposobnosti visoko obrazovanih preti opasnost da ove zemlje upadnu u spiralu ekonomskog nazadovanja, što povećava rizik od unutrašnjih nemira i ratnih dešavanja. Nestabilnost u ovim zemljama bi mogla da ugrozi političke i ekonomske interese visoko razvijenih zemalja, pa čak i da pokrene talas političkih i ekonomskih kriza u zemljama primaocima znanja.

Zaključak

U ovom radu smo pokušali da damo odgovor na dva pitanja: u kojoj meri je znanje značajno za blagostanje društva u savremenom svetu, i kako obezbediti da trud koji pojedinci i društva ulažu u sticanje znanja bude što potpunije iskorišćen za ostvarenje njihovog blagostanja. Uvideli smo da mnoštvo studija svedoči da duže školovanje, kao mera stečenog znanja, predviđa kako viša primanja za pojedinca na tržištu rada tako i višu stopu ekonomskog rasta na nivou države. Objasnili smo i da stečena znanja oplemenjuju pojedinca i društvo, kao i da materijalna dobra koja potiču od primene znanja u poslovanju mogu da podrže razvoj elemenata nematerijalnog blagostanja, kroz očuvanje i razvoj kulture i podizanje kvaliteta obrazovnog sistema. Pokazali smo još i da u uslovima globalizacije pristup znanju iz inostranstva radikalno doprinosi promeni razvojne perspektive tranzicionih i zemalja u razvoju. Ukazali smo još i na dve značajne prepreke punom iskorišćenju truda uloženog u sticanje znanja, kao i iskorišćenju već postojećeg znanja u društvu, za ostvarenje lično i društvenog blagostanja. Prva je problem neuspeha tržišta obrazovanja usled asimetrije informacija, za koji smatramo da je moguće prevazići državnom intervencijom koja bi obezbedila budućim studentima punu dostupnost informacija o stvarnim šansama i ishodima na tržištu rada po završenim studijama, a za svaku struku i obrazovnu instituciju ponaosob. Drugi je problem „odliva" znanja, putem migracija visoko obrazovnih, iz tranzicionih i zemalja u razvoju ka visoko razvijenim zemljama. Ukazali smo da taj problem može biti i toliko intenzivan da predstavlja objektivnu prepreku daljem razvoju, zbog čega strateški pristup privlačenju visoko obrazovanih povratnika predstavlja imperativ pojedinih zemalja. Ostaje nam da primetimo da je ukazati na problem jedno, a rešiti ga nešto sasvim drugo. Smatramo da rešenje ovog problema zavisi pre svega od nadahnuća, kako pojedinaca tako i čitavih društava. Takođe smatramo da punom iskorišćenju truda uloženog u sticanje znanja najbolje može da doprinese solidarnost, kako između pojedinca i društva iz koga je ponikao, tako i između društava čije se privrede nalaze na različitim mestima svetskog proizvodnog lanca, ali koja u savremenom svetu u vekoj meri zavise jedna od druge. Uvereni smo da jedino solidarnost može da obezbedi skladan razvoj pojedinaca i društava, podižući sveukupno blagostanje svih.

1155

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1157

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Dušan Z. Marković
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The Importance of Knowledge for Wellbeing of Society in the Contemporary World

Abstract

Following the recent wave of globalization, the possession of different types of knowledge became even more important for economic development than the possession of physical resources. The ability of a society to adopt existing and create new knowledge thus gained fundamental importance for its wellbeing. In this paper, we identify important aspects of the relationship between education, creation of knowledge, economic growth, as well as both material and immaterial wellbeing of a society. We describe potential problems that prevent societies from maximizing the benefit from the effort its members invest in acquiring knowledge. The problems of failure of the national markets for education as well as the global migrations which lead to drain of knowledge towards economically highly developed countries are especially analyzed. In the long run, they lead to a decline in both national competitiveness and different aspects of the immaterial wellbeing. As the basis for solving these problems we propose a combination of economic theory and the concept of solidarity between more and less developed countries, individuals and societies of their origin, respecting the free will of individuals.

Keywords: Globalization, knowledge, education, wellbeing, competitiveness, migrations

1159

Maja Korolija

Relacija nauke i političke ideologije na primerima iz oblasti nauke i obrazovanja u odnosima SSSR i FNRJ

Apstrakt   Namera nam je da sagledamo pitanje odnosa nauke i političke ideologije na primeru dinamike odnosa FNRJ i SSSR, odnosno njihovih naučnih politika. U tom smislu analiziraćemo istoriju saradnje, te praktične posledice prekida 1948. godine na obrazovni i naučni sistem FNRJ, sa osvrtom na ekonomsko-političku transformaciju u kontekstu hladnog rata. Prikazaćemo kako je u naučno-obrazovnom polju u FNRJ takođe započeta transformacija u skladu sa liberalnim zaokretom, koji je u ideološkom smislu društvo vodio u novu vladajuću paradigmu – Titoizam. U odnosu na dotadašnju marksističko-lenjinističku poziciju, zbog koje se Jugoslavija i u pitanju naučne politike i organizacije nauke ugledala na SSSR, fokus se sa teze o potrebi preplitanja nauke i društvenih potreba sada pomerio na ideju o naučnoj „suverenosti“. Opipljive posledice upliva ovih liberalnih ideoloških elemenata u nauku i obrazovni sistem bile su udaljavanje od društvenih problema i atomizacija u naučnoj organizaciji, a na obrazovnom planu, između ostalog, i smanjenje procenta opismenjenih. Analizirajući naučno-obrazovnu društvenu poziciju u kontekstu ovih političkih promena, nameće se zaključak da je ovo polje, baš kao i ostala društvena polja, u manjoj ili većoj meri bilo podređeno tržišnim potrebama.

Ključne reči: Nauka, naučna politika, politička ideologija, Jugoslovenski akademski savet, FNRJ, SSSR

Saradnja FNRJ i SSSR

Četrdesete godine važe za najdramatičniju dekadu dvadesetog veka. Njihov početak obeležen je Drugim svetskim ratom, a kraj otpočinjanjem hladnog rata, koji se nastavio sledećih četrdeset godina. Nauka, baš kao i ostale intelektualne delatnosti, bila je „pogođena“ ovim ratovima, u kojima je i sama igrala važnu ulogu.

> Njena postignuća – radar, antibiotici, računari, kao i novi sintetički materijali – imala su vrlo uočljiv doprinos u savezničkoj pobedi. Nauka je regrutovana u vojnu službu i postala je državni prioritet, naučne institucije i osoblje su se značajno umnožavale, koristeći velik deo nacionalnih resursa i ljudskih snaga. Drugi svetski rat je zvršio transformaciju nauke koja je započeta pri smeni vekova: Velika nauka je sada bila u potpunosti rođena. (Krementsov 1997: 94)

Proizvodnja atomske bombe je značajno doprinela uočavanju relevantnosti nauke u političkoj borbi. Ona tada postaje od ključnog značaja za bezbednost

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država. Zahvaljujući tome tokom hladnog rata nauka je predstavljala moćno oružje u obračunu SSSR-a i SAD-a, odnosno tzv. istočnog i zapadnog bloka. Uloga koju je nauka igrala u tom kontekstu uticala je na to da se naučne aktivnosti širom sveta posmatraju u novom političkom svetlu (Krementsov 1997). Drugim rečima nauka je, baš kao što ju je i Marks (Karl Marx) video, imala ulogu „istorijski dinamične i revolucionarne sile u društvu" (Marks prema Bernal 1952: 47).

Nakon Drugog svetskog rata, usled ovog shvatanja društvenog i političkog značaja nauke, u Jugoslaviji je pokrenut ubrzan naučni razvoj, pre svega oslonjen na pomoć SSSR-a. U tom periodu Jugoslavija je država još uvek u fazi formiranja i postavljanja jasno okvira marksističko-lenjinističkog ideološkog sistema. U oblasti nauke i obrazovanja zaživela su brojna gostovanja uglednih predavača iz Sovjetskog Saveza, kao i odlazak jugoslovenskih studenata i stručnjaka na studiranje i usavršavanje u SSSR. U pitanju je bio jedan od načina stvarnog pospešivanja razvoja nauke na ovim prostorima, ali i instrument širenja sovjetske hegemonije.

> Taj vid saradnje odvijao se u okviru intenzivne kulturne i prosvetne saradnje i negovan je paralelno sa vojnim, spoljnopolitičkim, međupartijskim, ideološkim i ekonomskim vezama novih jugoslovenskih vlasti sa Sovjetskim Savezom tokom posleratnih godina. (Bondžić 2010:1)

U vreme kada pada početak hladnog rata, odnosno sukob između kapitalističkih i državno-socijalističkih sistema, čiji su najreprezentativniji predstavnici bili Sjedinjene Američke Države i Sovjetski Savez, jugoslovenski komunisti su, u skladu sa svojim proklamovanim ideološkim pozicijama, ulogu nauke u Sovjetskom Savezu smatrali progresivnijom od one u kapitalističkim društvima.

> Svemu tome treba dodati još i jednu gorostasnu činjenicu, koja se mogla ostvariti samo u zemlji socijalizma. To je puna, stvarna demokratizacija nauke. Nauka nije više svojina samo jedne odabrane intelektualne elite. Ona je izišla izvan zidova instituta i laboratorija i sišla u mase, da bi postala svojina miliona. ... U društvu sebičnjaka nauka će uvijek biti zloupotrebljavana u sebične ciljeve. Nauku u službi najširih slojeva radnog naroda, nastalu iz potreba cijele zajednice i pristupačnu svima, jednom riječju – demokratsku nauku, može da ima samo ono društvo u kome se teži dobru najširih slojeva, napretku zajednice, jednom riječju – demokratsko društvo. (Gligić 1946: 7–10)

Među institucijama i organizacijama koje su učestvovale u sprovođenju ovakve politike u nauci su bili i Komitet za školu i nauku Vlade FNRJ, Komitet za kulturu i umetnost Vlade FNRJ, Narodni front Jugoslavije, Ujedinjeni savez antifašističke omladine Jugoslavije, Antifašistički front žena (AFŽ), Društvo za kulturnu saradnju Jugoslavija – SSSR, sindikati itd. (Bondžić, 2010).

1161

U izdavačkoj delatnosti su dominirali prevodi sa ruskog, iz različitih oblasti, najčešće beletristike i marksističke literature, ali preko pojedinačnih izdanja i biblioteka kao što su „Nauka i život“, „Pedagoška biblioteka“, i sl., vršena je i popularizacija pojedinih grana sovjetske nauke (tehnike, poljoprivrede, biologije, itd.). (Bondžić 2010: 6)

Dnevna i periodična štampa imale su ključnu ulogu u propagiranju sovjetskih teorijskih i naučnih priloga. Podaci o dostignućima u oblasti nauke u Sovjetskom Savezu u ovim prilozima često su neopravdano i preuveličavani. Ruski dom i Kolarčev univerzitet u Beogradu bili su posećeni od predavača iz Sovjetskog Saveza kao što su Boris V. Ognjev (Борис Владимирович Огнев), profesor medicine, Vadim I. Lisovski (Вадим Иванович Лисовский), profesor prava, i slavista Nikolaj Deržavin (Николáй Севастья́нович Держáвин). Kroz Jugoslaviju je u cilju naučnog istraživanja putovala i grupa sačinjena od etnologa, arheologa i istoričara iz Sovjetskog Saveza, profesora sa Moskovskog i Lenjingradskog univerziteta. Sa druge strane, u Jugoslaviji su se pravili spiskovi na kojima su se nalazili studenti i aspiranti izabrani za odlazak na studije i usavršavanje u Sovjetski Savez. Većina izabranih za odlazak u SSSR tokom 1946. i 1947. godine bili su članovi KPJ, uglavnom muškarci, zainteresovani više za prirodne i tehničke nego za društvene nauke (Bondžić 2010).

1162

Na osnovu analize dokumenata iz arhiva Jugoslavije u periodu (neposredno) pre prekida političke, pa samim tim i naučne saradnje, u Jugoslaviji je primetno da je poželjan model naučne organizacije gotovo identičan organizaciji nauke u SSSR-u. Očigledno je da se teži tome da Savet Akademija nauka postane „Generalštab nauke“ (Ичикава 2011):

[E]videncija naučnog, istraživalačkog i umjetničkog rada u FNRJ treba da pripadne Akademijama nauka. *One treba da rukovode i budu nadzorni organi naučnog i umjetničkog rada u čitavoj zemlji.* Radi koordiniranja tog rada u čitavoj zemlji trebalo bi pri Saveznoj Vladi organizirati Savjet Akademija nauka u koji bi ušli delegati svih Akademija. Savjet Akademija bio bi: Savjetodavni organ Savezne Vlade u svim pitanjima naučnog i umjetničkog rada od saveznog značaja; Koordinacioni organ naučnog i umejtničkog rada svih triju Akademija; Organ preko kojeg će naša država biti zastupana pred međunarodnim naučnim i umjetničkim organizacijama. ... Savet opšti neposredno sa Predsedništvom Vlade i njegov se budžet nalazi u budžetu Predsedništva Vlade. ... Jugoslovenski Akademski Savet davao bi svoje mišljenje Saveznoj vladi o svim naučnim i stručnim pitanjima za koje je Saveznoj Vladi potrebno imati naučno i stručno mišljenje. Ali bi J. A. Savet bio dužan i pokretati pitanja pred Saveznom vladom o potrebi rešavanja kakvog problema važnog za narodni život ili o potrebi usavršavanja metoda rada ili popravljanja nedostatka rada gde god ga ima. ... J. A. Savet će imati pod svojom upravom ili pod upravom naučnih saveta ili drugih tela koje on organizuje: institute, zavode i sl. ustanove. Iako su u određenoj meri u pitanju autonomna tela, ona se sada nalaze prvenstveno pod

opštim rukovodstvom Saveta. U granicima odobrenih budžeta oni imaju organizacionu i operativnu samostalnost; ali za celokupni rad odgovaraju Savetu. Svaka će naučna jedinica imati od Saveta propisani poslovnik. [1]

Telo koje je u SSSR-u imalo ovako značajnu ulogu bila je Akademija nauka, koja je tridesetih godina dvadesetog veka prebačena iz Lenjingrada u Moskvu. Osim promene lokacije usledila je i promena njene uloge u skladu sa ideologijom marksizma-lenjinizma, a samim tim došlo je do organizovanja nauke u skladu sa principom demokratskog centralizma. Akademija nauka je, hijerarhijski gledano, postala ključna naučna institucija koja se nalazila pod direktnom jurisdikcijom Saveta narodnih komesara. Univerziteti i druge institucije bile su medijatori između Akademije nauka i društvenog života, dok je naučni rad (iako u određenoj meri autonoman) prvenstveno planiran i rukovođen od strane Akademije. Akademije saveznih republika predstavljale su afilijacije Akademije nauka SSSR. Cilj ovako centralizovane i planirane organizacije je bila koordinisanost naučnih institucija i usklađenost i saradnja „čiste" nauke sa praksom. Na primer, zahvaljujući istraživanjima od strane hemičara u SSSR-u nastale su neke industrije (Guins 1953).

1163

> Planiranje u socijalističkoj izgradnji Sovjetskog Saveza nije se zaustavilo samo na materijalno-ekonomskom sektoru. Ono je nužno moralo preći na duhovnu oblast, na oblast nauke i teorije. Stari odnos između teorije i prakse, između takozvane „čiste" nauke i praktičnog života radikalno se izmijenio prije svega, teoriski naučni rad nije mogao ostati privatna stvar u rukama pojedinaca; njega je takođe trebalo postaviti na plansku, organizovanu osnovu i uključiti ga u opšti plan socijalističke izgradnje zemlje. Čitava mreža naučnih zavoda i ustanova širom cijele zemlje, sa ekipama stručnih umnih radnika, funkcioniše kao povezana, organizovana cjelina, sa zajedničkim ciljem podizanja produktivnih snaga zemlje. ... U isti mah nauka ostvaruje neslućeni polet. Porast sovjetske industrijalizacije omogućuje snažan razvitak fizičkih i hemiskih grana nauke. Razvitak socijalističke poljoprivrede, njene tehničke izgradnje u prostranim oblastima, po veličini ravnim čitavim državama evrope, uslovio je intenzivni polet bioloških nauka i poljoprivredne tehnike. (Gligić 1946: 6–7)

Neki od svetlih primera jugoslovenske nauke tokom perioda saradnje su Aleksandar Belić, lingvista, filolog i slavista i Pavle Savić, fizičar, predratni komunista, partizan, potpredsednik i poverenik za prosvetu Antifašističkog veća narodnog oslobođenja Jugoslavije (AVNOJ) i član Vojne misije Narodnooslobodilačke vojske Jugoslavije u Moskvi. Belić, koji se školovao u Rusiji krajem devetnaestog veka, postao je i počasni profesor Moskovskog univerziteta „Lomonosov". U periodu posleratne Jugoslavije, otvoreno se diveći nauci u SSSR, radio je na primeni iskustava koja je tamo stekao.

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1 Sastanak delegata triju akademija FNRJ, 1948, AJ-55, br. fascikle 1, br. jed. opisa 1.; AJ-55, br. fascikle 1, br. jed. opisa 2. *Kurziv dodat.*

[D]onet je zakon, osnovani su instituti, formulisani zadaci i ciljevi i započet intenzivan i razgranat naučno-istraživački rad, koji je blisko povezivan sa zahtevima društva, države, privrede u okviru Prvog petogodišnjeg plana. (Bondžić 2010: 20)

Pavle Savić odlazi u Sovjetski Savez 1944. godine i započinje svoj naučno-istraživački rad u Institutu za fizičke probleme Akademije nauka SSSR, kao i saradnju sa njihovim istaknutim fizičarem Pjotrom L. Kapicom (Пётр Леонидович Капица) i njegovim saradnikom Aleksandrom J. Šaljnikovim (Александр Иосифович Шальников). Predmet Savićevog zanimanja je bio problem tečnog helijuma na niskim temperaturama. Međutim, na poziv Josipa Broza Tita u oktobru 1944. godine Savić prekida svoj rad i vraća se u Jugoslaviju. On ponovo dolazi u Moskvu 1945. godine i biva izabran za starijeg naučnog saradnika Akademije nauka.

Pored rezultata u naučnom radu i uspostavljanja veza sa sovjetskim naučnicima, Savić je uspeo da pridobije Kapicu da Institut i sovjetska vlada pruže pomoć u obuci kadrova, tehničkom materijalu, projektovanju i osnivanju Instituta za fiziku u Jugoslaviji. (Bondžić 2010: 21)

Sve ovo je uticalo i da se akademije nauka u FNRJ temeljno reorganizuju po sovjetskom modelu. Međutim, u junu te godine kontakti sa Sovjetskim Savezom su prekinuti. Povod je bila Rezolucija Informbiroa.

Liberalni zaokret

U rezoluciji Informbiroa Jugoslavija se, između ostalog, optužuje za nacionalističke tendencije. „Informacioni biro osuđuje ove antisovjetske koncepcije rukovodilaca KPJ, koje su nespojive s marksizmom-lenjinizmom i koje priliče samo nacionalistima" (Rezolucija Informacionog biroa komunističkih partija o stanju u Komunističkoj partiji Jugoslavije, 28. juna 1948). Uloga koja se daje državi, kao bitnom elementu marksističko-lenjinističke strategije, pa makar ona bila i „proleterska" i nominalno internacionalistički orijentisana, predstavlja važnu metu mnogih kritika koje su sa leva upućene ovoj ideologiji. Segment tih kritika odnosi se i na to da je svaka državna forma, bez obzira na proklamovanu ideologiju, inherentno nacionalistička (Rocker 1997). Ovaj oblik ustrojstva osim što održava klasne odnose u samom društvu, podrazumeva i dominaciju partikularnih interesa u međunarodnim odnosima. Prevlast ovih interesa može se videti upravo na primeru Jugoslavije i njenog prekida saradnje sa SSSR-om. Umesto da se potčini principu stroge hijerarhije, kao „poslušna sovjetska satelitska država" (Krleža, 1969: 311), Jugoslavija se odmetnula od njegovog glavnog oslonca. Prema Josipu Brozu Titu politika koju je vodio Sovjetski savez pokazala se na delu kao „nesocijalistička, imperijalistička politika velike sile, politika zaštite i hegemonije ruskih

velikodržavnih interesa, maskirana interesima međunarodnog proleterijata“ (Josip Broz Tito VI kongres 1952 prema Imširović 1991: 53).

> Ta politika svela je druge komunističke partije, sem jugoslovenske, na obič-
> ne agenture Moskve i na, izuzimajući još donekle italijansku i francusku,
> politički beznačajne sekte. Ranije nezavisne istočnoevropske države pre-
> tvorene su u sovjetske kolonije, i to metodama i sredstvima koje su i vodeće
> kapitalističke sile već napustile. Vojnom silom i policijskom represijom azi-
> jatskog tipa tzv. narodnim demokratijama nametnut je istovetan unutraš-
> nji režim kao i u sovjetskom društvu, uz gubitak nacionalnog i državnog
> suvereniteta (Josip Broz Tito VI kongres 1952 prema Imširović 1991: 53).

Ovaj prekid se unutar komunističkog pokreta vidi kao revizija njegove po-
litike, i reakcionarno pomeranje od marksističko-lenjinističke linije (Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) and Hongqi (Red Flag), 1963, internet).

1165

Ovde je možda zanimljivo pomenuti razgovor iz Savićeve knjige (1978) izme-
đu njega i Josipa Broza Tita, prilikom jedne diplomatske posete 1946. godine. Dok su Sovjeti jugoslovenskoj delegaciji predstavljali dostignuća komuni-
stičke nauke, Tito je, krišom od svojih domaćina, prišao Pavlu Saviću i doša-
pnuo mu: „Hajde, Pajo, vrati se ti u zemlju da mi pravimo naš institut.“ (Savić, 1978: 306). Nakon čega je Savić napustio Moskvu i vratio se u Jugoslaviju u kojoj je ubrzo počela da se proklamuje suštinski liberalna ideja „suvereniteta nauke“ (Ristić, 2013: 342). Ta ideja podrazumeva samobitnost nauke, odno-
sno njenu nezavisnost od spoljnih, društvenih uticaja. Prema marksističkoj filozofiji uloga nauke na ovaj način postaje beg od svakodnevne stvarnosti ili puko licemerje. Radi se o tome da je u kapitalističkim društvima, zbog ekonomski zavisnog položaja naučnog radnika u odnosu na njegovog gaz-
du, na ovaj način nemoguće izbeći to da se nauka koristi za interese koji su u suprotnosti sa društvenim progresom (Bernal 1939).

Mada Jugoslavija u tom periodu nije bila klasično kapitalističko društvo, ova-
kvo shvatanje nauke nesumnjivo se kosi sa marksističkim stavovima. Klasični marksizam vidi nauku kao dinamičnu, istorijsku pojavu čiji položaj i uloga zavise od materijalnih društvenih odnosa, pa samim tim ideja o njenoj sa-
mobitnosti, osim što je neostvariva, unosi konfuziju onemogućavajući raci-
onalnu organizaciju naučne zajednice (Bernal 1939). Takođe, zanemarujući i nepromišljajući socijalnu važnost nauke, olakšava se njena zloupotreba, što predstavlja dodatnu opasnost po samo društvo.

Isto tako vredi obratiti pažnju i na borbu za obrazovanje u Jugoslaviji nakon rata. Preduslov naučnog, kulturnog, društvenog, ekonomskog i političkog napretka u FNRJ bila je i borba za suzbijanje nepismenosti. Potrebno je bilo obračunati se sa predrasudama, sumnjama i strahovima, koje drže ljude u

stanju međusobne otuđenosti u feudalnim i kapitalističkim društvenim sistemima (Bernal 1954/1969).

> Lakše je držati u pokornosti ljude zaplašene „strahom božjim", ljude koji i bolest, i pomor, i glad, i rat smatraju kaznom uvrijeđenog i razgnjevljenog božanstva zbog ljudskih grijehova. Nauka i njena primjena za dobro čovijeka krčila je put teškom mukom. Ako je neki pronalazak i bio upotrebljen u borbi protiv prirodnih sila, to su povlašćeni slojevi zadržavali samo za sebe, kao i sva ostala zemaljska dobra. (Gligić 1946: 10)

U FNRJ i u SSSR radilo se na tome da znanje bude dostupno svima bez obzira na pol, godine i društveni položaj. U kapitalizmu većina stanovnika bila je obrazovana samo u domenu pružanja usluga samom sistemu. Visoko obrazovanje bilo je uglavnom rezervisano samo za vladajuću klasu. Za razliku od kapitalističkog sistema obrazovanja, sistem obrazovanja u FNRJ i SSSR vodio se Lenjinovom (Влади́мир Ильи́ч Улья́нов Ле́нин) tezom da „[s]vaka kuvarica mora da zna da upravlja državom" (Lenjin prema Bernal 1954/1969: 1188). Samim tim nije neobično što je u FNRJ datum njegovog rođenja 22. april. proglašen danom borbe za suzbijanje nepismenosti (Bondžić 2010). Prema podacima Saveta za nauku i kulturu FNRJ (1952) od 1945. do 1950. godine u Jugoslaviji je opismenjeno oko 1.901.287 lica, što je, usled teške situacije nakon rata, predstavljalo veliki uspeh.

1166

> Međutim, iz statističkih podataka je zaključivano da se rad analfabetskih tečajeva kretao uzlaznom linijom do 1948. godine, kada je doživeo vrhunac i počeo da opada i krajem 40-ih jenjava. Uočavano je da je efikasnost tečajeva opala sa početnih skoro 70% na svega 50% 1949. U izvorima i literaturi iznošeni su različiti razlozi tog jenjavanja: smatrano je da je opadao početni entuzijazam; da je u početku opismenjeno mlađe stanovništvo koje je imalo veću ličnu motivaciju za uključivanje u društveni i privredni život; da je dolazilo na red starije stanovništvo kojem opismenjavanje nije davalo velike mogućnosti za društveno napredovanje; da je privreda posustajala; nerazvijeni školski sistem je ostavljao nove nepismene, itd. (Bogavac 1980, 51–55; Dimić 1988, 133; Doknić, Petrović, Hofman 2009, knj. I: 326–327). Smatrano je da je u suštini do takvog razvoja događaja doveo sukob sa Informbiroom i SSSR-om 1948. godine. (Bondžić 2010: 100)

Ovakve tendencije – posebno u kontekstu hladnoratovskih odnosa – predstavljaju zaokret od ideja marksizma-lenjinizma. Karakter tog zaokreta na vojnom nivou najbolje se vidi u formiranju brane od sovjeta – Balkanskog pakta, 1953. godine. Ovaj pakt, formiran od dve države članice NATO – Grčke i Turske – i navodno nezavisne Jugoslavije, omogućio je jugoslovenskom režimu da obezbedi operativnu saradnju sa NATO bez formalnog pristupanja tom savezu.

Nesumnjivo je da je ovaj politički zaokret doprineo dizanju kvaliteta života stanovnika Jugoslavije. U početku je ono bazirano na velikoj pomoći

zapadnih sila, a kasnije na profitiranju iz balansiranog i u nekim segmentima zaista nezavisnog položaja države na međunarodnom planu (Unkovski-Korica 2016) Naučnici i studenti u Jugoslaviji mogli su da se usavršavaju i školuju širom zapadnog sveta, jer su tamo svuda bili dobrodošli. Pedesetih godina dvadesetog veka, oko 440 nuklearnih naučnika i inženjera je otišlo na usavršavanje u inostranstvo. Većina ovih stručnjaka se nakon obuke vratila u zemlju. Među povratnicima su se nalazile i veličine svetskog nivoa, poput nuklearnog stručnjaka Dragoslava Popovića. On se uprkos tome što mu je kao vrsnom znalcu ponuđen stalan posao u Norveškoj, vratio u Jugoslaviju, kako bi radio na Institutu za nuklearne nauke „Vinča" (Hymans 2012).

> Što se ekonomija u većoj meri integrisala u svetsko tržište, to se kasnija kompetitivna logika unutar Jugoslavije otvorenije ispoljavala, izazivajući pri tom trvenje među radnicima, dovodeći u pitanje legitimnost vladajućih aparata. (Unkovski-Korica 2016: 13)

Jedan od primera za jačanje liberalnih tendencija u Jugoslaviji njenim uplivom u tržišnu ekonomiju jeste upravo i nauka, odnosno promene koje su se u njenoj organizaciji odigrale u skladu sa ovim ekonomskim zaokretom. Na sastanku uprave Akademskog saveta FNRJ 1959. godine odlučeno je da Savet Akademija nauka prestane da rukovodi i bude nadzorni organi naučnog i umetničkog rada, i da savetuje i analizira naučna pitanja za Saveznu vladu. Drugim rečima, on više nije „Generalštab nauke", kako je predviđeno marksističko-lenjinističkom ideologijom u Sovjetskom savezu (Ичикава 2011), na koji se na sastanku predstavnika triju Akademija 1948. FNRJ još uvek ugledala. Savetu Akademija nauka ostaje samo uloga prezentacije u inostranstvu i koordiniranja između akademija, od kojih će dobrim delom zavisiti i njegovo finansiranje[2]. Na sastanku je odlučeno i da se radi finansiranja izvođenja naučnih poslova Savet Akademija nauka treba obratiti Saveznom savetu za naučni rad. Dakle, više se ne podrazumeva da će svi poslovi biti finansirani iz saveznog budžeta (što je 1948. bilo odlučeno na sastanku uprave sve tri Akademije). Takođe odlučeno je da u finansiranju učestvuju i same Akademije nauka.

> Za održavanje aparata i administracije Saveta akademija nauka FNRJ svaka od akademija izdvaja sredstva (0, 5 od svog budžeta svaka). Savezni organi takođe će dodeljivati određena sredstva za održavanje Saveta (1/4). [3]

Savet je prestao da bude glavno telo u organizaciji nauke, odustao je od svoje uloge savetodavnog organa Savezne vlade, i izgubio je finansijsku nezavisnost. Jedna od posledica lišavanja Saveta moći, ukidanjem njegovih primarnih funkcija, smanjivanjem obima zadataka i stavljanja u podređeni položaj,

1167

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2   AJ-55, br. fascikle 14, br. jed. opisa 77.
3   AJ-55, br. fascikle 14, br. jed. opisa 77.

jeste i atomizacija u samoj organizaciji naučne delatnosti. Ova atomizacija je dobar primer toga kako promene u ekonomskoj bazi utiču na nauku. Odustajanje od planske ekonomije i prihvatanje tržišta dovodi do promene i u naučnoj politici, usmeravajući samu nauku u pravcu „suverenosti", dakle u pravcu liberalnog shvatanja pozicije nauke u društvu.

Zaključak

O odnosu političkih ideologija i sistema obrazovanja i nauke najbolje se uči „na primjerima onih društava gdje dinamičnost situacije slobodno dolazi do izražaja" (Ben-David, 1986: 223). Odnosi FNRJ i SSSR u datom istorijskom i geopolitičkom kontekstu predstavljaju jedan takav slučaj, nesumnjivo vredan, kada je u pitanju uloga i organizacija nauke u društvu. Razmatranje ovog pitanja je od neprocenjive važnosti za budućnost, jer ispravno razumevanje tog odnosa nesumnjivo doprinosi uvećanju naučnog znanja, koje nesporno igra veliku ulogu u transformaciji čovekovog života i njegovog pogleda na svet.

1168

> Njezin utjecaj započeo je s napuštanjem biblijske i klasične astronomije, koja je Zemlju stavljala u središte svemira, i nastavio se sa odbacivanjem shvaćanja o postanku Zemlje i čovjeka. Utjecaj je znanosti možda danas najjači zbog sve uspješnijeg liječenja bolesti; ona tako uklanja jedan od stalnih izvora strahovanja i nadanja oko kojih su se isprepletala razna vjerovanja. Znanost je također odgovorna za stvaranje moćnog oruđa kojim se iskorištava energija i mijenja prirodna okolina; *stalni strah od bolesti zamjenio je novi strah od potpunog uništenja čovječanstva, ali i nada u ovladavanje svemirom i čovjekovim nasljednim osobinama*. (Ben-David 1986: 224, *kurziv dodat*)

Pomenuti strah i nadu, kada je uloga nauke u pitanju, jedino je ispravno sagledati u kontekstu političkih ideologija i njihove međusobne borbe. Politička ideologija koja ima hegemoniju je ta koja ima zadnju reč kada su položaj i uloga nauke u društvu u pitanju. Na primeru razmatranog odnosa FNRJ i SSSR stekli smo uvid u posledice koje po položaj i ulogu nauke u jugoslovenskom društvu imaju dva suprotstavljena svetska ekonomsko-politička sistema tog perioda, kapitalizam i državni socijalizam. Jugoslovensko pomeranje ka tržišnoj, nasuprot planskoj ekonomiji, nesumnjivo je na praktičnom nivou uticalo na položaj i ulogu nauke u jugoslovenskom društvu, kao i na obrazovni sistem. Procenat opismenjenih se smanjio. Došlo je do atomizacije naučne organizacije, i nastupio je proces njenog udaljavanja od prakse. Zastupnici liberalnih stavova u domenu naučne politike uvek će insistirati na suverenitetu, tvrdeći da je on, naročito kada je nauka u pitanju, neophodan uslov za njen razvoj; kao i to da nauka ne treba da bude „sluškinja društva", kako se netačno predstavlja marksistički pogled na ulogu nauke u društvu. Međutim, „suverenitet" koji prema liberalnim teoretičarima pripada nauci, očigledno postoji samo na papiru. On u praksi podrazumeva ništa drugo

nego (u manjoj ili većoj meri) podređenost naučnih, kao i obrazovnih potreba, tržištu (Mikulinski, Richta ed. 1983).

Međutim, kako se nauka pod uticajem liberalne ideologije udaljava od društvenih potreba, a naučnici od društvenog angažmana, sama nauka gubi kontakt sa dinamikom društvene stvarnosti, pa samim tim njena uloga u raščaravanju sveta, kao i sopstvene uloge u njemu, u znatnoj meri slabi. Vođeni principima nepostojeće suverenosti i vrednosne neutralnosti naučnici završavaju u zabludi da je moguće i poželjno birati između društvene angažovanosti i naučne istine; a birajući istinu, njihov politički „neangažman" pretvara nauku u sluškinju tržišta, poziciju koja je često košta upravo naučne istine. Ipak, istorija je pokazala da i nekritičko zastupanje naučne politike državno-socijalističkih društvenih uređenja takođe nije srećno rešenje, budući da ni ona, iz čitavog niza razloga, nisu bila lišena zloupotrebe nauke u dnevno-političke svrhe. Ovde nam je prvenstvena namera da na primeru naučne politike FNRJ analiziramo neke efekte upliva i širenja elemenata liberalne ideologije, koji su vodili napuštanju do tada vladajuće marksističko-lenjinističke ideologije, te otvaranju prostora za novu vladajuću paradigmu – Titoizam. Namera nam je da pomognemo sagledavanje uloga nauke u različitim društvenim uređenjima, i da pružimo još jednu perspektivu na prirodu odnosa prema nauci koju sa sobom nosi ideologija hladnoratovskog pobednika.

1169

Nameće se zaključak da, ukoliko krećemo od namere da nauka treba da ostane važna progresivna sila u transformisanju civilizacije, postaje neophodno među naučnim delatnicima proširiti svest o socijalnim implikacijama njihovog rada, kao i potrebi da se položaj i organizacija nauke promene. Kristališe se stav da „vrednosno-neutralna" i „suverena" nauka zapravo ne postoji, te da ideologija prožima sva društvena polja, pa i naučno-obrazovno (Altiser 2009). Možda je onda moguće zaključiti da je nauci upravo potrebna hegemonija političke ideologije koja bi joj omogućila da ostvari svoje potencijale i ne završi kao puko oruđe u rukama manjine koja ima moć. Ona mora biti vodeća stvaralačka snaga čitavog društva, čemu na putu u ovom trenutku očigledno stoje problematično postavljeni društveni odnosi i eskapizam naučne zajednice.

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Maja Korolija

Relation of Science and Political Ideology with Examples from Science and Education Field in Relations between USSR and FPRY

Abstract

Our intention is to consider the relation between science and political ideology in the case of the dynamics of the relation between the FPRY and the USSR, i.e. their science policies. In that sense, we will analyze the history of cooperation and the practical consequences of the break in 1948, in the field of the educational and scientific system of the FPRY, while considering economic and political transformation in context of the Cold War. We will show that in the scientific field in the FPRY, a transformation has also begun in accordance with this liberal turn, which in ideological terms led the society to the new ruling paradigm – Titoism. In relation to the previous, Marxist-Leninist position – due to which Yugoslavia, in terms of science policy and organization of science, as well as other fields, was modeled after USSR – the focus now has been moved from the thesis of interweaving science and social needs to the idea of „sovereignty" of science. Tangible consequences of the influence of these liberal ideological elements in science and the educational system were a departure from social problems and atomization of scientific organization, while in the educational field, among other things, a decrease in the literacy rate is noted. Through this analyses of the scientific and educational social position in the context of these political changes, the conclusion can be drawn that this field, just like other social fields, was more or less subordinated to the market needs.

Key words: Science, Science policy, Political ideology, Yugoslav Academic Council, FPRY, USSR.

1171

KRITIČKI OSVRT
REVIEW ESSAY

III

Jelena Vasiljević

Reflecting on the Principles and Problems of Solidarity

Arto Laitinen and Anne Birgitta Pessi (eds.), *Solidarity: Theory and Practice*, **Lexington Books, Lanham, 2015. / Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (eds.),** *The Strains of Commitment: the Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies*, **Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017.**

Abstract   This review essay takes a critical look at two recently published edited volumes, both focusing on the notion and problems of solidarity. *Solidarity: Theory and Practice* (Laitinen and Pessi, eds.) attempts to unpack the complex idea of solidaristic practice by looking at a whole range of related concepts, such as the social brain, collective intentionality, empathy, work, and voluntary organizations. *The Strains of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies* (Banting and Kymlicka, eds.), on the other hand, focuses on a concrete problem: the generation and maintenance of redistributive solidarity within societies marked by diversity. Still, both volumes take a thorough and systematic look at existing scholarship on solidarity, and by encompassing both the theoretical and the empirical, mark a significant step forward in deepening our understanding of the role and place of solidarity in general social theory.

Keywords: solidarity, political community, communalism, internationalism, social justice, pro-social behaviour, redistribution.

1175

Introduction

Solidarity seems to be *in vogue* these days. The recent economic crisis, the withering away of welfarism, and massive waves of migration that have been triggered by wars in Syria and the Middle East have made us think anew about what holds societies together, about what kinds of mutual assistance, recognition, and rights we can and should offer to one another – within groups, and across different groups – as well as what constitutes the "we" of a group and how a group's boundaries are formed and re-formed (and how firm or open these boundaries are and should be). Yet, it is puzzling that a notion so widespread, in both academic and vernacular use, has rarely been thematised as a focal problem of social theory; a fact that is nearly always mentioned by authors trying to reverse this trend (Bayertz 1999, Scholz 2008, Alexander 2014, Vasilev 2015, Rakopoulos 2016).

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Admittedly, solidarity is not the easiest concept to define and theorize about, for at least two interrelated reasons: 1) it is hard to situate solidarity in its proper slot between empathy and general pro-social behaviour, and 2) it remains an open question as to whether we are discussing one and the same phenomenon when describing/prescribing intra-group solidarity, inter-group solidarity, communal solidarity, or international humanitarian solidarity. It is no wonder then that some classification of the notion usually precedes any analysis, and indeed both volumes reviewed here establish their own parameters for solidarity along with referring to older classifications, especially those of Scholz and Bayertz (Scholz (2008) writes about civic, social and political solidarity; Bayertz (1999) distinguishes between four uses of solidarity: the universal bond between all members of humanity, attachments that bind people together in concrete communities, the political bond uniting people with same interests, the bond between citizens of a modern welfare state that legitimizes redistribution mechanisms).

This essay will take a critical look at two recently published edited volumes – *Solidarity: Theory and Practice* (Laitinen and Pessi 2015) and *The Strains of Commitment: the Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies* (Banting and Kymlicka 2017) – that seem to be making the case for theoretical, empirical, comparative, and historical in-depth research into solidarity, which is recognized as a major problem for social and political theory and the social sciences. The aim here is not to compare the two volumes (although some comparative remarks will inevitably emerge) given that they assume very different approaches and starting premises. *Solidarity* examines "us together," where "solidarity requires a presumption of reciprocity and *perhaps* shared group membership…" (Laitinen and Pessi 2015: 2, emphasis added). *The Strains of Commitment*, on the other hand, is interested solely in group-bounded solidarity, namely solidarity "on a social level" – which is mostly viewed in the context of a nation or state throughout the book – and within this frame, explores the concrete problem of redistribution. In other words, the scope of solidarity constitutes one of the research problems in *Solidarity*, whereas in *The Strains* it is pre-determined. Also, Laitinen and Pessi mostly understand solidarity as (prosocial) *behaviour*, while Banting and Kymlicka take interest in solidarity as a set of *attitudes*.

Below, I will briefly present each volume, though in slightly different ways. In reviewing *Solidarity*, I will take the "usual" approach and discuss individual chapters, as the diversity of the subjects and theoretical angles they present are a defining feature of this book. *The Strains of Commitment* is a much more coherent volume since the editors determine the scope of analysis and the working definition of solidarity at the outset, in a lengthy and elaborate introductory chapter that could be read as a working theory of redistributive

solidarity. For that reason, I will concentrate my analysis on this introductory chapter, at the expense of presenting the individual chapters more thoroughly. Finally, I will close with some remarks about the status and prospects of researching solidarity as a social-political problem.

Solidarity: Theory and Practice (Laitinen and Pessi, eds.) – collective intentionality and pro-social behaviour

The very title of this book suggests that it aims to treat solidarity in an all-encompassing way, without a pre-set framework or particular context to be explored. In fact, the editors explain in their introductory chapter that, "The purpose of this book is to offer tools for conceiving the world from the perspective of solidarity" (16). They acknowledge different expressions of solidarity and distinguish between four contexts, or rather four group-defined spaces in which solidarity emerges as a cohesive and ethical force: 1) concrete and small communities, where solidarity goes hand in hand with exclusivity; 2) solidarity on a societal scale, where the notion becomes almost inseparable from the question of just distribution and, in this respect, becomes an institutional question; 3) "fighting solidarity," or what Sally Scholz (2008) would call political solidarity in a narrow sense, where solidarity has a fighting cause at its core and is characterized both by intra-group solidarity and solidarity with others (usually with a group considered repressed or facing injustice); and 4) solidarity of all humanity, or humanitarian solidarity, which is mostly a hypothesis or utopian political project. The book is not divided into thematic sections, instead presenting individual chapters that move the reader's focus from general conceptual problems, to problem-specific analyses, to empirical studies of different instances of pro-social behaviour.

1177

The opening chapter of *Solidarity* is by **Siegwart Lindenberg**, whose work on solidarity as a broad cognitive and behavioural concept is cited frequently throughout the volume. In this chapter, he discusses *the norms* of solidarity from an evolutionary approach, taking as a starting point Dunbar's revolutionary concept of "the social brain." One of the most important recent findings about human evolutionary history is that our frontal lobes have evolved to allow humans to derive adaptive advantages from living and cooperating in groups. In Lindenberg's account, biological and social evolutionary processes are inseparable, as the adaptive advantages from living in groups will "facilitate explicit prosocial behaviours and the development of norms in general and solidarity norms in particular" (32). He defines solidarity as a set of established norms that enhance a group's ability to produce *collective goods*; or in his words: "norms are a kind of codification of group goals, and solidarity norms in particular are the codification of norms that pertain to jointly creating collective goods in the group" (36). In other words, he

assumes a highly functional approach to solidarity. Further, he argues that unlike other social norms, which differ from one group to another, solidarity norms are identical in all groups, as they are linked with the biological advantages of living in groups, and "emerge in every group in which people perceive common goals … that enable groups to be useful to its members" (37).

The universal norms of solidarity outlined by Lindenberg – cooperation, sharing, and helping – are supported by "added norms of solidarity," which help strengthen groupness and signal an individual's commitment to common goals, which are: the effort to understand and be understood, trustworthiness, and considerateness. However, where evolutionary psychology converges with social and political theory in this account is where Lindenberg argues that to remain important and guiding elements of human behaviour, especially in bigger and more complex societies, solidarity norms must be supported by social and institutional conditions. It is this shift from an evolutionary-social argument to a socio-historical one, and the claim that informal solidarity in smaller groups evolves into state-administered solidarity, that I believe inevitably raises many questions. First, how exactly does this shift occur? How do we transition from the lived experience of cooperation – inspired by the norm enabling its continuation – to institutionalized cooperation that no longer has to be lived as cooperation? And if cooperation becomes institutionalized, legitimized in functional terms only, and separated from the lived experience, do we still speak of the phenomenon of solidarity? Second, what if these institutions cease to promote and foster solidarity, as could be argued is the case with the dismantling of welfare institutions?

The next chapter, by **Mikko Salmela**, follows the previous in a very literal way; it is written as a comment and addendum to Lindenberg's work. It argues for better recognition of the role emotions play – especially *collective emotions* – in stabilizing a normative *solidarity frame*. Here he refers to Lindenberg's account of framing, as a cognitive mechanism that guides our perception and interpretation of situations, and hence, influences our course of action. Salmela argues that "people experience emotions about matters of collective concern, and that these shared emotions contribute to the emergence and maintenance of social groups" (62). Additionally, he emphasises *collectively intentional* shared emotions, noting that "a collective mode of feeling an emotion is to feel the emotion *as* a member of a relevant group, not as a private person" (68, original emphasis). While Lindenberg's previous chapter does suggest that solidarity is primarily a feature of groups, rather than a universal humanistic value, Salmela seems to be sealing this view without explicitly claiming so, with his insistence on the importance of the *awareness* that other members are feeling the same emotion; which implies that solidarity can take place only within rather small groups featuring an

intimate history of mutual inter-relations. However, the problem of scale is not explicitly addressed.

The chapter that follows, by **Kristen Renwick Monroe**, treats the issue of solidarity implicitly, through a question: why do we treat others the way we do? What compels the variety of responses to human suffering – from compassion, to help, to indifference, to cruelty? She claims that the critical factor is *psychological* – that our "ethical perspective" derives from how we see ourselves in relation to others. This argument relies on her previous work and a database of interviews with over 100 people who lived through WWII, whom she categorized as bystanders, rescuers, or Nazi supporters. Monroe found that members "belonging" to each of these groups seemed to share the same worldview within groups, claiming that: "…self-image and identity … delineate the range of choice options we find available, not just morally but cognitively" (90).

1179

However interesting it might be to include personal narratives in an attempt to theorize solidarity, I find it full of obstacles as well – especially with narratives of past events, as they do not necessarily reveal the true motivations of actors, let alone the socio-material conditions from which individuals acted. The complexity and inconsistency of human behaviour warns us against falling for the notion that one's worldview and belief system can be captured in a single story. And, while it may be possible to accept the idea that Nazi supporters share a worldview among themselves, it is difficult to believe that every *bystander* shared another one, and all the *rescuers* yet another, distinct and relatively homogenous. However, the interesting insight of this chapter is that solidarity can also be seen as a negative idea, as part of a worldview that emphasizes our place within and with "our" group first and foremost. In a way, Monroe responds to suspicions that might arise after reading the first two chapters, which imply that solidarity is primarily a group-bound notion.

In the next chapter, **Simon Derpmann** precisely focuses on the problem of universality vs. partiality of solidarity. From the perspective of moral philosophy, he attempts to unpack the nature of the *moral idea* of solidarity "and, in particular, a specific form of partiality that is arguably contained in solidarity relations" (106). For solidarity to have a distinct place within moral philosophy, Derpmann argues, it needs to be understood as communal, not universal; if *communal obligation* – "obligations *towards* others, and not merely obligations *with regard to* others" (112) – is central to solidarity, then this communality requires partiality, meaning that solidarity cannot be understood as universal (114). This universality of moral obligations is incompatible with the "communal partiality that can be argued to be distinctive of solidarity" (114). He claims that "solidarity is an idea that grounds moral obligation neither in personal ties on the one hand nor in formal

recognition on the other, but in *meaningful commonalities* like a shared history, a joint struggle, a common ideal of a good life, or social utopia" (116, 117, emphasis added).

Yet, I would ask: what is it that renders a commonality *meaningful*? And how does "shared history" become meaningful: through concrete lived experience or through institutionalized and ideologized narratives? Is shared history something that a group of people actually have in common or are they convinced and educated to believe it is so? This is an extremely important question, especially if the author is right to claim that "solidarity establishes a morally significant 'we'" (118). Is this moral significance a given commonality or a field for (political/ideological) struggle?

The chapter by **Arto Laitinen** that follows continues to reflect on communalism and/or the universalism of solidarity. He proposes thinking about solidarity as a phenomenon that combines different forms of mutual recognition, so as to connect "the thin principle of universal mutual respect, and the thicker relations between people, more sensitive to their particular needs and contributions" (126). He distinguishes between different kinds of solidarity: "universal *moral* solidarity, *political* solidarity of social struggles and revolutions, and *social* solidarity of the normal evolutionary phases of society" (127, original emphasis). He then argues for the combination of thin and thick aspects of solidarity, or for the connection of the three ideas pertinent to solidarity: mutual *respect* (thin solidarity), and mutual *aid* and *support* (thicker features of solidarity). When elaborating the difference between moral and normative issues related to solidarity, his arguments touch upon the question of community and expose several problems. "While there are normative issues of who is entitled to express criticism against whom … concerning *moral* issues third parties are always already in principle included, as members of the relevant all-inclusive community, and indeed have related duties as witnesses and preventers of crimes" (140 original emphasis). In a similar vein, he notes that "a violation against anyone is at the same time a violation against the norm which it is everyone else's task to sustain." But here we could ask what defines a *relevant all-inclusive community*? What makes it relevant (as opposed to not-so relevant)? Is any community all-inclusive?

At the very end of his chapter, Laitinen lightly touches upon a topic that is of central importance in the other edited volume reviewed here – the problem of societal diversity and solidarity. Laitinen's assertion is that solidarity does not presuppose sameness or homogeneity, although he admits that "a certain type of normative likemindedness can be experienced as a kind of unity," and adds shortly afterward that "cultural, ethnic, national identities – they are a powerful force." Still, the questions of the relationship between different kinds of communities (and the related question of identity),

1180

degrees of normative like-mindedness, and thinner and thicker versions of solidarity remain largely open.

Nicholas H. Smith constructs his argument, in the next chapter, around the idea that solidarity is intricately related to work; in a way, his chapter suggests, that is largely ignored in contemporary literature. He contends that progressively associating solidarity with the public sphere and simultaneously developing ideas about the public sphere as separate from work systems (referring to the Habermasian contrast between lifeworld and system) has obscured from sight the fact that the work sphere requires some forms of solidarity to remain operational. He argues that the activity of working is inescapably social (working is always working with others and for others), and must rely on some normative dimensions with an ethical basis, invoking solidaristic norms of reciprocity. He elaborates on the *expressivist* account of work, which centres on the need of workers to express themselves through work activities that in turn regulate these activities at least to a certain degree, as they have to rely on cooperation and mutual trust. Though it is refreshing to see the sphere of work returned to the very centre of the debate on solidarity, it is doubtful to me that this particular notion is pertinent to the discussion of whether the necessary cooperation and coordination that maintains work processes should be thought of in terms of solidarity.

1181

Hauke Brunkhorst is among the authors most recognizable, and rightly so, for work related to the notion of solidarity (Brunkhorst 2005). However, his chapter in this volume, while insightful and rich in lucid arguments, offers little to the debate on the "theory and practice" of solidarity. It is by far the longest chapter in the book, and although it carries "solidarity" in its title, any references to the concept come at the very end in concluding remarks. The chapter elaborates on the evolutionary development of European constitutional law and structural problems of legitimization, which are now becoming manifest in "existential crisis of legitimization." Brunkhorst offers an excellent account of the constitution as an evolutionary universal – from revolutionary constitutionalization to gradual constitutional evolution – with a specific emphasis on the history of the European "inchoate revolutionary constitution" (190).

Some of his core arguments about current economic predicaments in Europe are summed up here: "The idea of decoupling the economic constitution from the state was progressive and regressive at once. It was *progressive* insofar as it led to the *establishment of a constitutional regime beyond and above the states*, and it was *regressive* because it *reduced* constitutionalization beyond the state to the *economic sphere,* and *decoupled constitutionalization from democratization* – with sweeping consequences" (198, original emphasis). In other words, it was the demand of the common market for legal norms that drove the development

of European constitutionalization ("structural coupling of law and economy" 201). So today, the EU has high functional integration backed by procedural democratic structures, and low social integration exemplified in post-democratic, technocratic politics that are producing complex crises of legitimization. Whereas the argument and structure of Brunkhorst's chapter is impressive, the conclusion is a bit vague, referring to solidarity very broadly as a new "mental revolution of reframing the European mindset" that, he hopes, can be initiated by "the academically educated precariat" (220).

The next chapter, by **Juho Saari** and **Anne Birgitta Pessi**, treats solidarity in rather reductive but concrete terms, mostly equating the concept with helping others and defining it as comprising the "sentiments of communality and prosocial acts" (239). More precisely, the chapter presents the results of a comprehensive survey capturing people's attitudes toward solidarity in EU states, which aimed to study the impact of both official institutions and unofficial social norms on the attitudes of citizens. The findings show that citizens in EU countries with better economic indicators have greater concern for helping others, which the authors interpret as an indicator that: "social cohesion between people … creates social bonds – a prerequisite for a culture of shared responsibility. Solidarity promotes further solidarity." Similar arguments, supported by empirical findings, can be found in other articles (in both of the volumes reviewed) as well, and the impact of state institutions on the willingness of citizens to be in solidarity with their fellow citizens can hardly be overestimated. Of course, this emphasis on a top-down perspective, as well as on a (nation) state-bound framework for researching solidarity as a concept and a practice, has its problems.

Arto Laitinen and **Pessi**, again, follow this in the next chapter by examining the helping behaviour and attitudes of Finns, remarking that "some helping behaviour is demanded by solidarity, whereas some helping behaviour exceeds the demands of solidarity" (272). As in the previous chapter, their focus is on solidarity between members of a group. The theoretical part of this chapter repeats and summarizes some of the points laid out in previous, more explicitly theoretical chapters: "Solidarity at its purest requires a normative attitude emphasizing *our* perspective… However, solidarity as we-centred thinking can be separated from not only I-centred egoism but also from you-centrism such as altruism, sympathy, caring, or Christian charity" (277, 278).

Empirical findings revealed an interesting relationship between the question of who we (the Finns in this case) are most willing to help and with whom we feel the greatest sense of togetherness. For example, social norms were found to play an important role, and helping relatives or helping neighbours is regarded as highly important; though it is not followed by subjective feelings

1182

of closeness. Similarly, even though Finns express greater feelings of togetherness with other Europeans than with the rest of the world, global solidarity is valued more (than solidarity with other Europeans), which is probably linked to assumptions about who is in greater need. These findings suggest that the "we" in solidarity is not the same as the "we" in a social group, as the normative demands are different and must be taken into account when assessing solidary attitudes and behaviours.

The last two chapters also focus on Nordic states, and both share a thematic focus on volunteering and voluntary organizations. **Heikki Hiilamo** contributes a chapter that reconfirms the importance of state institutions – especially welfare institutions – in sustaining and promoting solidarity. He analyses the interplay between voluntary organizations, especially the church, and the welfare state in alleviating poverty in Finland. The next chapter, by **Bente Blanche Nicolaysen**, is a case study of a Norwegian voluntary association and its disbursement of funds outside of Norway, as an example of transnational solidarity, which maintains the idea (previously laid out by Gould 2007) that solidarity should not be thought of in generic terms; rather, we should think of it at once in a narrow and a transnational sense.

1183

The Strains of Commitment: The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies (Banting and Kymlicka, eds.) – exploring the sources of solidary motivations and attitudes

The carrying title of this book, borrowed from John Rawls, is suggestive in its own right; however, the subtitle leaves no doubt that this collection sets out to study solidarity in a very concrete framework, in relation to specific problems and contexts. This volume is not driven by a desire to examine the many sometimes contradictory meanings and modes of usage of the notion of solidarity, but to examine its place and role as a cohesive element in societies marked by high degrees of diversity. In fact, the anchoring is even stronger as, throughout this volume, the terms "societies" and "societal" almost always imply the (nation) state, and "diversity" is a stand-in for *ethnic* diversity (even when discussed in terms of religious, linguistic, or the broader and never entirely comprehensible "cultural" diversity, in the way in which all these discourses are ethnicized; see Brubaker 2009: 25–28; 2015: 28–35). Additionally, the two other coordinates helping orient the direction of this book are *citizenship* and the *welfare state* (and the effects of its demise on solidarity), which immediately recalls the 2006 collaboration between these same editors, *Multiculturalism and the Welfare State: Recognition and Redistribution in Contemporary Democracies*.

Of course, citizenship is a special area of expertise of the editors, and *The Strains of Commitment* features chapters by some of the most prominent

scholars of citizenship, like Rainer Bauböck, but also David Miller. Solidarity in this context becomes part of the question typically asked in relation to citizenship: "what binds citizens together into a shared political community?" (Beiner 1995: 3), but with an additional sub-question: What makes citizens comply with the politics of inclusive redistribution? The introductory chapter, written by the editors, is lengthy (58 pages) and elaborates quite thoroughly on the approach taken to solidarity in the chapters that follow; outlining what are understood as the problems regarding political uses and values of solidarity in modern liberal democracies, and at the same time providing a sketch of the theory of the notion. For this reason, it deserves a special attention.

Firstly, Banton and Kymlicka assert that solidarity and social cohesion are treated primarily as a *political* problem and process viewed in the context of three levels: political communities, political agents, and political institutions. The question is how these levels – of organizing and managing the political, one could say – sustain and/or produce solidarity? And, is diversity truly a threat to social cohesion and solidary bonds? Already, the authors reveal their orientation toward a top-down perspective, where solidarity is primarily seen as produced and sustained by institutions, policies, and related actors. However, the notion itself is defined in purely subjective terms, as *attitudes and motivations*, rather than behaviours. The authors strongly argue that "solidarity does not emerge spontaneously or naturally from economic and social processes but is inherently built or eroded through political action" (3). It remains a bit unclear, though, why the spheres of economy and "social processes" are separate from the sphere of political action, and why political action stands in opposition to "natural" action; in other words, why the political is confined to the state-institutional level.

Similar to other scholars (Scholz, Bayertz) who have classified different types (or uses of the notion) of solidarity in order to concentrate on one, Banton and Kymlicka differentiate between *civic*, *democratic*, and *redistributive* solidarity, focusing on the latter. The nature of this classification further cements their focus on state-level analysis (even though they frame the scope of their interest as the *societal level*), and we can easily replace the word solidarity in this context with (state) *citizenship* – democratic and civic citizenship, as promoters of tolerance and democratic values; and redistributive citizenship, as a sum of social rights in the Marshallian sense (Marshall 1949), resting on and further enhancing intra-national solidarity.

The principle research motivation behind this edited volume is not to examine the assorted and sometimes ambiguous meanings of solidarity, but to understand how solidarity works within a state, where it comes from, how it is sustained and what threatens to dissolve it. Therefore, international

solidarity or inter-group solidarity is not thematised here at all. Instead, the focus is on "bounded solidarities" within the modern, democratic-liberal, welfare (at least in principle) state: "This, then, is the crux of our understanding of solidarity: it is attitudinal in nature and societal in scope. We are interested in attitudes of mutual acceptance, cooperation, and mutual support in time of need, which transcend ethno-religious differences, operate at a societal scale and have civic, democratic, and redistributive dimensions" (6).

The reasoning put forth for the growing interest in solidarity is its inherent connection with social, egalitarian justice (where Habermasian perspective becomes obvious), which again justifies "the societal level" of analysis.[1] It could be argued that the normative stance of the authors is built around *social justice* – seen in this respect as a primary social good to be pursued – whereas the role of solidarity is mainly functional: it is a precondition for fairness. Solidarity is not seen primarily as an intrinsic need of humans for cooperation and mutual help, nor as a force that can produce political effects or change the nature of political communities, but as a *political effect in itself* – a kind of "social glue," the presence or absence of which depends on political institutions, actors, and policies. Admittedly, the relationship between solidarity and social redistributive justice is not treated uniformly across all the chapters, with some authors arguing that just redistributive policies and institutions can exist without solidaristic feelings (Jackob Levy, for instance).

1185

The reason diversity is another key notion in this volume is that it has peculiar effects on solidarity conceived as a group-bound phenomenon. Namely, solidarity rhetoric can have exclusionary effects on those seen as a threat to resources that are supposed to be shared in solidarity, *between members of a group*. Of course, the key issue here is what defines a group, and how the failure of redistributive mechanisms – the demise of a welfare state – is actually connected with growing diversity. Indeed, many chapters in this volume warn that what is crucial about this relationship is how it is *perceived*; that is, how narratives about diversity and social rights are mediated by media, politicians, etc. With this in mind, Banton and Kymlicka suggest "that rather than looking for universal patterns regarding the impact of diversity on

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1   Also, when briefly discussing global solidarity, authors claim that national solidarity precedes and, in fact, enables global solidarity (another justification for societal level analysis): "A study of 'global good Samaritans' showed that, in many cases, the impulse to global concern was rooted in national identities: acting globally was a way of expressing one's identity as a 'good Swede' or a 'good Canadian' … The fact that countries with the highest levels of domestic redistribution also have the highest level of foreign aid also suggests that 'the achievement of justice at home in fact sustains justice abroad' … and that 'individuals project their values from home abroad' … This suggests that a commitment to global justice often grows out of national solidarities, rather than the suppressing of national solidarities (45)."

solidarity, we need to ask more fine-grained questions about how specific dimensions of diversity affect specific types of collective identities, under specific political conditions" (12). Especially interesting is the modern trend of paradigmatic separation of (multi)cultural tolerance (civic and, to a certain degree, democratic solidarity) and protection of social rights (redistributive solidarity). The authors rightly observe that, "In some countries, these seem to be the two main choices on offer: a neoliberal multiculturalism that secures civic solidarity at the price of the hollowing out of democracy and redistribution, and a welfare chauvinism that secures redistributive solidarity at the price of civic solidarity towards minorities and newcomers" (14).

Their sketch of a normative theory of *solidarity in diverse societies* – built step-by-step by prioritizing the group-bound approach, the top-down perspective, institutionally-supported diversity, and intra-national solidarity as necessary for attaining inter-national solidarity – is rounded out with an argument advocating *multicultural nationalism*. And here, the usual critique of liberal multiculturalism could be applied again; though, I wish to highlight one thing specifically: a perspective that could be said to support a quasi-historical/evolutionary perspective in which nations/states are expected for to go through certain phases in "achieving" liberal multicultural nationalism, which is allegedly most suitable for containing and justifying solidarity on a societal level. Related and problematic is an understanding of the cultural as something pre-political: "In many contexts, a common national identity emerged within a core ethnic group before the society developed into a liberal-democratic constitutional order… the nation preceded the democratic order" (17, 18). Admittedly, discussing empirical studies and the importance of complementing political theory with social science-based empirical research, the authors state that: "The distinction between 'political' and 'pre-political' sources of national identity may seem clear and important to political theorists, but may be more difficult to disentangle and to measure in empirical research" (20). I am not sure if it is clear in theory either, as the notion of cultural, ethnic, religious etc. identities and groups as pre-political has long been criticized extensively, along with warnings about the many problematic implications this entails (see, for example: Sahlins 1976, Spivak 1987, Archer 1988).

To summarize, *The Strains of Commitment* rests on the premise that inclusive solidarity, that is *just redistribution within diverse societies*, should be thought of as a political process and a project to be built and maintained through a universal welfare state, impartial public institutions, and multicultural policies. State and institutional frameworks are crucial here: "The idea that state policies can influence identities and collective imaginaries is hardly a new theme. In many countries, nation-building projects in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were state led… In the contemporary period, the

1186

challenge is to shape the identities inherited from these earlier nation-builders to help normalize diversity in modern life" (34). The role state institutions play in establishing, legitimizing and even normalizing solidarity should in no way be underestimated, but what seems to be missing here is a take on globalization processes that are continually diminishing and shrinking the power and effectiveness of sovereign states and their institutions. Their power in shaping and managing identities (and diversity) cannot be compared to nineteenth century nation-building.[2]

The volume is organized into three parts. The first part discusses the political theory of solidarity; the second presents research on public attitudes on solidarity and diversity; and the third examines the concrete policies and politics of diversity and solidarity, concluding with a final chapter by Philippe van Parijs – who reflects on the implications of these various studies for the future of solidarity in diverse societies. The volume is not only coherent, in terms of following and being guided by the arguments and propositions outlined in the editors' introduction, but presents a nice balance of theoretical and empirical chapters.

1187

The first chapter, by **David Miller**, reviews some theories of solidarity, but with an emphasis on how to sustain solidarity rather than on how to generate it in the first place. Solidarity is primarily seen as functional, offering instrumental benefits to a collective. Miller defines its features as: a sense of groupness (the "we"), a sense of mutual concern, a sense of collective responsibility, and a social force that exerts limits on inequality. **Rainer Bauböck** looks, in the next chapter, at the important and sometimes overlooked fact that many political processes take place "below" or "above" the nation-state level. He offers one fruitful way of thinking about the three dimensions of solidarity (outlined in the introduction), by linking them with three levels of political community (and here, Bauböck differentiates between polity and political community, the latter referring to "identity shared by the citizens of a polity" 80): the local level (civic solidarity of co-residents), the state level

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2   To quote Brunkhorst, from the previous volume (whose general remarks on the increasing importance of supranational and international organizations and institutions in relation to national institutions is not particularly noted in either of the volumes reviewed here): "These organizations no longer simply *complement* but increasingly *substitute* more and more classical functions of the state (see only as a striking example the present role of the IMF)… To be sure, the national state still plays a constitutive role in the dissonant concerts of the world society, and the state plays its important role as the only power that is able to *enforce binding decision*. But the state has become itself deeply transformed by its own globalization" (Laitinen and Pessi 2015: 191, original emphasis). States were able to distribute wealth because one of their primary functions was to collect taxes; they certainly continue to do so, but as the major paradigm today is *indebted state*, the tax money is increasingly going to debt collectors – the true agents regulating the direction of redistribution policies in a highly globalized world.

(redistributive solidarity of co-citizens), and the regional level (promoting democratic solidarity among different polities). The chapter that follows, by **Jacob Levy**, complements this bloc nicely with a dissenting argument that democratic politics do not and should not be grounded on solidaristic belonging. Partisan politics, he reasons, is a much better way to ensure just distribution, and to simultaneously avoid turning cultural difference into disloyalty.

Céline Teney and **Marc Helbling** contributed the next chapter, in which they interpret the results of a survey conducted among German elites regarding their attitudes toward redistributive solidarity. They conclude that the assumption that cosmopolitanism strengthens civic solidarity (by embracing a 'citizen of the world' worldview) but diminishes redistributive solidarity is not entirely true. First, there are differences among the types of elites (business, union, or intellectual); and secondly, attachments to cosmopolitan and national identity have dynamics of their own. The chapter that follows, by **Richard Johnston, Matthew Wright, Stuart Soroka,** and **Jack Citrin** analyzes a similar survey of public attitudes, in this case toward national identity, with separate samples for the United States, English speaking Canada, and Quebec. The results showed that thicker forms of nationalism, which involve more than the national pride of being born in the country, tend to be exclusionary and hostile toward the idea of expanding redistributive solidarity. But another interesting finding is that in cases where nation- and society-building processes were followed by the strengthening of the welfare state, support for redistribution policies forms an intrinsic part of feeling a national pride. In the next chapter, **Tim Reeskens** and **Wim van Oorschot** present a comparative study of public opinion data from the 2012 Round 6 wave of the European Social Survey, which focused on evaluating citizenship rights and tolerance toward newcomers (immigrants). Their findings reconfirm something that authors from the first volume reviewed here have also argued: in societies (states) where people have difficulties obtaining social rights, hostility toward the expansion of those rights is more likely to emerge; conversely, when citizens feel their social rights are provided, they tend to be more open to the inclusion of newcomers.

Peter A. Hall opens the third part of the book in a chapter that explores how ideas of solidarity are concretely mobilized in public debates and policy regimes. Hall disagrees with the notion that "national identity" best captures the feelings of obligation toward others. "Cultural imaginaries" or "cultural frameworks" are broader containers of notions about who belongs and what the value or deservingness is of other people – a combination of national identity and social justice. Historically, these imaginaries have largely been shaped by institutions, meaning that solidarity has been strengthened top-down, and supported by social democratic parties, trade unions, and similar

actors that now see their role and prominence in public life declining. In the chapter that follows, **Zoe Lefkofridi** and **Elie Michel** take up this question in a discussion of how right-wing parties are positioning themselves as the new champions of a welfare state – of course, in an exclusionary manner. Next, **Edward Koning** explores the debate over whether the rise of such parties should be seen as a cause or effect of anti-immigrant sentiment. Focusing on the phenomenon of Pim Fortuyn List in the 2002 elections in the Netherlands, Koning discusses the "contagion effect" on other political parties and, in line with the previous chapters, affirms the decisive role of political actors and agents.

Bo Rothstein follows with a chapter that adds another layer of complexity to this argument by making the case that support for redistributive and equality-enhancing policies on the part of citizens depends on their "forward-looking predictions" about the behaviour of their co-citizens. And these predictions, in turn, are linked to how citizens evaluate their public institutions – if citizens see them as impartial and non-corrupt, effective and fair, they will display a greater support for inclusionary and redistributive mechanisms aimed at helping co-citizens; conversely, if state institutions are perceived as corrupt and ineffective, this results in diminished support for egalitarian policies. In the next chapter, **Irene Bloemraad** reviews the effects of multiculturalism on inclusive solidarity and suggests that it has had positive effects on civic and democratic solidarity, but that it is difficult to assess its impact on redistributive solidarity. Still, when looking at equality-enhancing policies in the US and Canada, she argues, they have historically emerged as a result of the political struggles of minorities; in other words, they were obtained through processes of political contestation, and then legitimized and safeguarded through political institutions, rather than rooted in pre-existing solidarities. **Karin Borevi** compares the different national "philosophies of integration" in Denmark and Sweden in the next chapter. Both these countries are examples of welfare states, but with rather different approaches to immigration and integration, where Denmark has traditionally been less hospitable to immigrants' claims than Sweden. Borevi suggests that this may result from different perspectives on welfare: the welfare state of Denmark has been built through a "society-centered" approach which means that "social cohesion and cultural homogeneity are perceived to be the causal prior," whereas in Sweden, "a state-centered approach instead prevails where the welfare state is rather seen as a potential promoter of social inclusion" (379). The next chapter, by **Patrick Loobuyck** and **Dave Sinardet**, is about Belgium, and makes the case for a weak nationalist thesis. In Belgium, a shared national identity is promoted, but simultaneously, two competing "nested nationalisms" thrive in Flanders and Wallonia. In a way, the authors treat Belgium as a test case for liberal nationalism, with a

1189

distinctive dynamic between national identity, nation-building projects, different policy regimes toward immigrants, and different solidarity strategies.

Finally, concluding remarks by **Philippe van Parijs** close *The Strains of Commitment* nicely, with a short but interesting take on solidarity and justice. He reminds us that, between bounded solidarity and unbounded humanitarianism (terms used in the introduction), lies the "civilizing force" of deliberative democracy – a demand that power be justified to all those affected by it. This "justificatory community" transcends, goes beyond or cuts across "traditional" communities: "Starting from the local level, one can so hope to create and constantly recreate a municipal patriotism, an urban fraternity, a sort of fellow feeling that may remain more fragile and shallow than a strong sense of national belonging but may still be sufficient to help sustain the sense of an 'us' required by motivational solidarity and therefore most welcome for the stability of institutional solidarity" (424).

1190

Concluding remarks

The importance of both *Solidarity* and *The Strains of Commitment* for the study of solidarity is hard to overstate. Especially valuable is the balance, in both volumes, of theoretical and empirical research, which will surely inspire further inquiries into the intertwined nature of the conceptual and lived dimensions of solidary attitudes and behaviours.

Solidarity is not the easiest notion to define, and for that reason is typically approached through strategies of differentiation and classification, with the aim to position solidarity between or beyond, or in partnership with empathy, altruism, cooperation, and pro-social behaviour in general. Efforts are made to distinguish between social, civic, and political solidarity, or inter- and intra- group solidarity; to argue for the difference between solidary attitudes and emotions on one hand, and behaviour and collective action on the other. However, some defining features are agreed upon and these are, most importantly and most broadly: symmetry, equality, and social justice. Needless to say, much room still remains for further definition, theoretical frameworks, and analysis of different forms of solidarity.

The question of the nature and function of solidarity is also left open, with opposing views as seen in the volumes reviewed here. Whereas *Solidarity* presents many chapters that argue solidary behaviour is part of our biological predisposition, and in any case, something that *precedes* the political and *enables* political communities in the first place; *The Strains of Commitment* insists that solidarity "does not emerge naturally from economic and social processes" but is inherently built (or eroded) though political action. Despite this contrasting approach, chapters in both volumes accentuate the

importance of (political, state) institutions for maintaining social solidarity. The conclusion of many empirical studies is that the willingness of citizens to "share" social rights, benefits, and resources with others is stronger if institutions are perceived as functioning, fair, and reliable.

Finally, I wish to conclude by highlighting some of the issues I find particularly relevant to thinking about solidarity today, but which are strangely absent from both of the volumes reviewed above. Though migration and immigration policies – from assimilationism to multiculturalism – are widely discussed in both, the current refugee crisis and responses to it, from the bottom-up solidarity of ad hoc voluntary groups to the outright hostility displayed by both official and unofficial institutions is left buried. Of course, this may be a consequence of the timing, as the refugee crises reached its peak in 2015; but it certainly represents a salient topic for future solidarity researchers, and invites us to pay attention to bottom-up solidary mobilization. Another issue is the Greek economic crisis, which of course overlaps with the refugee crisis, since Greek islands were the first European soil contacted by many refugees. But also, harsh austerity measures and the sudden impoverishment of a vast population urged people to turn to solidary mechanisms to replace crumbling state institutions – a trend that has caught the attention of some anthropologists, looking at solidarity, again, as primarily a bottom-up phenomenon ("solidarity networks", "solidarity economies", see Rakopoulos 2014). In this vein, it would be interesting to read about rising social movements, such as Occupy, Indignados, Nuit Debout, etc., the discourse, actions, and programmes of which often make reference to solidarity. All this testifies to the importance of the topic and to the growing rhetorical relevance of solidarity, but also to the need to study it bottom-up, as a potential driver of the establishment of new institutions and not merely as their effect.

1191

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1192

Jelena Vasiljević

Promišljanje principa i problema solidarnosti:
Kritički osvrt na zbornike *Solidarity* (prir. Laitinen and Pessi)
i *The Strains of Commitment* (prir. Banting and Kymlicka)

Apstrakt

Ovaj tekst donosi kritički osvrt na dva recentna zbornika koji se fokusiraju na problemske aspekte pojma solidarnosti. *Solidarity: Theory and Practice* (prir. Laitinen and Pessi) razmatra kompleksnu ideju solidarnih praksi kroz čitav niz pojmova kao što su društveni mozak (social brain), kolektivna intencionalnost, empatija, rad, dobrovoljne organizacije. *The Strains of Commitment: the Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies* (prir. Banting and Kymlicka) se, pak, usredsređuje na konkretan problem: kako kreirati i održati redistributivnu solidarnost unutar diverzifikovanih društava. Ono što je zajedničko za oba zbornika jeste temeljan i sistematski pregled postojećeg naučnog znanja o solidarnosti, kao i nastojanje da se, obuhvatanjem kako teorijskih tako i empirijskih istraživanja, načini značajan korak ka boljem razumevanju uloge i mesta pojma solidarnosti u društvenoj i političkoj misli.

Ključne reči: solidarnost, politička zajednica, komunalnost, internacionalizam, socijalna pravda, prosocijalno ponašanje, redistribucija.

REVIEWS

PRIKAZI

IV

Thaddeus Metz: *Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013.

Aleksandar Fatić

Thaddeus Metz is an influential Research Professor of Philosophy at the University of Johannesburg, the author of many incisive philosophical texts, and an authority on issues of transitional justice and reconciliation. His book on *Meaning in Life* is a natural continuation of his applied work in philosophy in the analytic tradition, and the way in which he captures philosophical theories of meaning in life is both original and practically exceptionally helpful to an array of applied fields in the humanities, including philosophical practice and philosophical counseling.

Metz's central question in the book is whether life as a whole can be said to be meaningful as opposed to more or less 'meaningless', or whether it is specific parts of its, experiences, attitudes, events and relationships which are meaningful and, by extension, make one's whole life meaningful. He examines various philosophical theories which he divides into 'part life' and 'whole life theories', critically and, in a number of places in his argument, touches key general philosophical questions such as that of coherence versus substantive quality of our beliefs as criteria which bestow quality on those beliefs, whether it is truthfulness or meaningfulness. For example, Pedro Tabensky's 'coherence view' of the meaning of life suggests that it is the way in which our particular attitudes, values and beliefs are unified in a single subjecthood which allows us to say that, whatever we do, believe or experience, in an important sense, 'we are one'. This view is similar to a coherence theory of truth, which implies that a proposition is true if it convincingly fits with the other accepted truths in a single worldview or a view on a particular matter of fact. Metz rightly points it out that coherence in one's beliefs and attitudes is an important element of one's overall rationality, and the more rational one is the more likely one is to find ways to make one's life meaningful, however Metz notes that the coherence view omits a crucial element of meaning which arises from the substantive value of specific beliefs and propositions one holds or adopts. At least theoretically, it is possible to hold an array of mutually highly coherent, yet dysfunctional, depressing or destructive views, just as it is theoretically possible to hold positive, energizing and optimistic beliefs which, while insufficiently systematically organized, make one's life relatively meaningful. Metz thus suggests a kind of balance between the various extreme positions on the matter, suggesting that all the various elements of the proposed

sources of 'meaning in life' have relative value to our overall quality of life and thus should be factored in a sound philosophical conceptualization of 'the good life':

> It is fair to think that the content of ends is a different dimension by which they admit of rational appraisal, one logically distinct from the way in which ends are organized in relation to one another. For instance, I have suggested that at least some ends are meaningful and give us good reason to pursue, merely insofar as they involve the exercise of intelligence with regard to the good, the true, and the beautiful. It would follow, then, that insofar as a life is rational, it, at least to some degree, realizes ends with a certain content, independent of how these ends bear on the realization of other ends. (Metz 2013: 57)

1196   Metz's own theory of meaning of life is what he calls 'the fundamentality theory of meaning', namely the view that what confers meaning on our lives is our search for meaning: the more critically and with greater focus we search for meaning, our life becomes more sharpened through the values which become crystallized in the process: it becomes clear what is the most important to us through the sacrifices we are willing to make to realize those values: the family, justice, beauty, etc. Our search for meaning extends beyond the realm of immediate satisfaction and typically includes a desire to 'leave a mark' after we are no longer alive. Metz points it out that some of the greatest human achievements in history have been motivated by thus conceptualized search for meaning, but also some of the most abhorrent projects in history, such as the racist, supremacist or genocidal projects we are only too aware of. Most of these projects were motivated by a projection of an idea: one people, one leader, equality and justice (as in Marxist revolutions), etc. It seems that what drives our search for meaning is a zeal for the transcendence of our immediate existence.

A consequence of Metz's fundamentality theory is that philosophy has a highly practical role in helping us shape and manage our search for transcendence: by employing philosophical concepts and tools, one's search for meaning may become a better life, a happier one, and one which more successfully develops one's sensibilities and values, as well as one's ability to appraise one's own life. All of this together, according to the fundamentality theory, makes life more meaningful.

Metz's theory is unpretentious and exceptionally well argued based on existing philosophical theories of meaning in life; it is a simple theory with wide-ranging ramifications for the future development of philosophy as a practical discipline able to bring its enormous theoretical legacy to bear on helping concrete individuals achieve higher quality of life by developing more meaningful lives.

Jan-Werner Müller,
What is Populism?,
University of Pennsylvania Press,
Philadelphia, 2016.

Michal Sládeček

Now that marginal, populistic rhetoric have entered into the public discourse of long-term democracies and states with mature political cultures, it cannot be said anymore that populism is an anomaly or the characteristic of unstable peripheral states. Populism is one of the concepts which have marked political debates during the last few years and it is no surprise that confusion has emerged regarding the meaning of this concept. Populism has been associated with Trump and Sanders, Brexit and the British Labour Party since 2015., Syriza and Golden Dawn, Occupy and Tea Party Movement, Mélenchon and Marine Le Pen, and Putin and Chávez. When xenophobia, anti-elitism, nationalism, anti-globalism, critiques of austerity politics, claims to participatory democracy and the more equal distribution of wealth are all inserted into the same rubric, there is the threat that every appeal to the public good and confronting status quo politics is identified with populism.

The good news is that Jan-Werner Müller's book *What is Populism?* has been published just in time, and to considerable extent clears this confusion, sheds light on the character of populistic movements and parties (chapter one), explicates the modus operandi of populistic regimes (chapter two) and offers instructions for democratic responses to such politics (chapter three).[1] The very title of the introductory chapter "Is Everyone a Populist?" suggests that it needs to be determined what or whom the concept of populism refers to. One of the basic characteristics of populistic movements is the critique of elites as "alienated" from the people, but anti-elitism as such is not characteristic of populism only, nor are populist parties non-elitists unconditionally. The critique of elites as "alienated" from the people is one of the main traits of populist movements, albeit not sufficiently distinctive condition of populism, considering not all critiques of elite is in a name of the fiction of "real" people. Moreover, populist leaders can claim that they reject *the* elites which are acting against the people's interests, dissociate themselves from the people and do not hear their voice. The very same leaders of such movements are quite often part of these elites, as well rival elites are denounced as unrepresentative, corrupt, untrustworthy, and treacherous. In contrast, non-populist critiques

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1 The addendum of the book consists of Müller's concise summary, that is the main tenets of the book in the form of seven theses on populism.

of elites advocate replacement of political representatives without labelling them as morally corrupt or deviant. While the latter critique is aimed at minority which does not respect the common good but advocates particular interests, and thus opposes the demands and interests of the majority and other social groups, the former critique stigmatizes the representatives of legislative, executive and juridical power as enemies.[2]

Populism promises the impossible and oversimplifies the complex issues, which is the reason why it is often used interchangeably with "demagoguery" (p. 11). Also, it generally coalesces with nationalism, as both of them are negatively charged: any positive politics, if they are elaborated at all, could be brought about only through "negative" politics oriented against particular groups. As the primary aim of nationalism, demagoguery and populism is deliverance from and neutralization of somebody (contested elite, racial, ethnic or any other social group), psychologically they express "fear", "anger", "frustration" and "resentment".

Müller, however, avoids identifying populism exclusively with these negative psychological stances, as well as with politics which exclusion is the only content, such as xenophobia and nationalism. The latter two are the most toxic embodiment of populism, but not the only ones. In the sense in which populism is "positive", it is "a particular moralistic imagination of politics" (p. 19), which assumes moral purity of the people. Intruders' inauthentic influences, along with alienated political and professional elites, are obstacles to "people's will". The singularity of this will is the basic premise of populism, as it always has a firm anti-pluralistic stance. The populists claim that they and only they represent the true people (p. 40), but this claim presupposes the existence of "the people" with a homogeneous will. Therefore, the imagined object as ontologically unified and axiologically affirmative precedes empirical determination of what or who the people are as a social or political group, which values this group endorses, whether their interests are mutually compatible etc. The populists argue they are symbolic representation of "the real people" (p. 27, 102), and as a consequence

they are prone to nullify any electoral success by rival party and to ascribe its victory to manipulation. If the rival party gains a majority of vote, that only means that it gained it by deception and fraudulence and, as that party does not represent the "real people", its legitimacy is null and void notwithstanding the number of votes.

But populism shares a symbolic construction of "the real people" with National-socialism and Stalinism which envisaged a singular nation in the form of Ein Volk or a working class coalesced with the party. Nevertheless, populism can comfortably use democratic procedures and all democratic means without their abolition. Rigged and unfair elections do not imply that the system has diverged towards totalitarianism as long as the opposition's accession to power is not precluded systematically. This is the reason why a situation where populistic leadership aims to change the constitution or electoral rules and consistently restrict freedom of the media is more sinister than in populist regimes which are reluctant to do so.[3]

The fact that makes populism more elusive is the absence of a codified doctrine on which it might rely, so it is more akin to an assembly of eclectical practices than to a coherent political stance (p. 10-11). As has been said, the opponents of political pluralism are prone to accept democratic rules, and therefore the threat to democracy does not come from a theoretical conception or ideology which renounces democracy and abjure the idea of parliamentary representation (in contrast to Nazism and fascism, there is no populists' Carl Schmitt or Giovanni Gentile), but from within – from politicians and parties appealing to the very ideals of democracy, arguing that existing parties

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2   The pro-brexit *Daily Mail*, which can be marked as a populist newspaper, denounced on its front page judge's ruling there should be parliamentary oversight of Brexit as "Enemies of the people", a term which is unusual in debates between opponents in democratic societies and which appears to be more an invitation to lynch than a statement.

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3   Populistic regimes are reluctant to slip into plain authoritarianism – to suspend all separation of power, independent oversight of the government and all democratic procedures – not only fearing the loss of international reputation, as Muller assumed (p. 50), but also because of the fact that democracy is the overwhelmingly accepted normative condition of legitimacy of governance. In virtue of fear of losing the justification of its governance, populist regimes are constrained to abide by the rules of democracy, notwithstanding their unwillingness to accept the rules and attempts to circumvent them. In scrutinizing the fall of Milošević and his regime as a result of uprising on 5th October 2000, the fact of his previous losing the election on 24. September – which was procedurally correct albeit far from being conducted in fair conditions – is often overlooked. The consequent mass demonstrations just complemented and completed the change of power, and so-called Fifth of October revolution was a revolt against the populist regime's attempt to subvert democratic rules.

and elites actually suppress bottom up potentials and the desire to change of the people.

Furthermore, not all anti-pluralism is also populism. Bolsheviks and religious fanatics do not claim that the majority or the people are morally impeccable, likewise they are not in favor of democratic rules. In contrast to them, populists, as Müller argued, are not against representative democracy, as long as it represents the right people (p. 25). But, the idea of representation in parliamentary democracy consists principally of the fact that what is represented is a particular group of people, not the whole nation or people as such. The representatives of an agrarian community would not have the same standpoint, interests and aspirations as the representatives of an urban district; the representatives of an area which is ecologically in peril most likely would be in conflict with those of business orientated city and so on. These examples might look like platitudes, but they reveal the absurdity of the idea that some person or group can have the ability to harmonize all those interests perfectly. Consequently, the idea of democracy endorsed by populists is different from the representative version and is akin to a consensus of unencumbered persons stripped from their particular stances.

This lead us to the paradoxical position of populism: it promulgates unification on the one hand, and unbridgeable polarization into "us" and "them" on the other. This confirms Müller's thesis that the unity of the people is not empirical, but fictitious "moral unification" or "corpus mysticum", and, in addition, goes along with the quest for internal enemies who distort the preestablished unity. This leads some critics to conclude that unconstructivity and contradictions of populist politics have, as a consequence, the inability of populist parties to govern. In the second part of the book this thesis has been reconsidered by examining the questions could those parties govern, even write a constitution, and operate within the scope of a democratic framework. Although Müller's answer is affirmative, considering that populists in some cases are not opponents of the separation of powers and representative democracy (simultaneously attempting to rig the system to their advantage as much as possible), he denies the democratic character of populist parties and movements. Because populism is anti-pluralistic by its nature, the term "illiberal democracy" does not denote populist regimes adequately: populism fundamentally distorts democracy (p. 49-60).

Even when it attempts to play by rules, it is not the friend, but the foe of democracy: populism is neither corrective of liberal democracy, nor a path to participation in politics (p. 102, 103.).

Prior to their ascent to power, populist parties emphasize the "people's will" which preexists alongside political processes but, because of manifold impediments (although less "objective" concerning existing laws, institutions or constitutions, and more "subjective" such as the usurpation of the elites or particular groups), this will has not been affirmed; and when it gains power, a populist party acts as if this party leadership is representative of the people's will. The authoritarian character of the populist party stems almost inevitably from the claim to represent 100 % of the people. As long as pluralism is denied and disagreement excluded, the good for all must be recognized in a unique way. The subject who recognizes it is the leader (p. 32-38). Consequently, it is very difficult to disempower the party claimed to be infallible and the same leadership (most often one person) tends to be in power for the long term. As the leadership is personalized, along with leader's losing power, the whole political system collapses.

The claim of the populistic parties to more direct democracy and political participation of the masses could appear as justified, but those claims are only rhetorical: in reality, populism rejects full representation of different social groups, as well as the principle of supersedence of government. According to Müller, populism should be treated as a symptom of the crises of democracy and the treatment of the voters for populist parties as irrational, lead by frustration, xenophobic, bigoted and resentful is inappropriate for a liberal-democratic approach. In the same vein, by the very exclusion of populistic groups or parties from the public sphere, this approach falls to one more contradiction: pluralism is negated in the name of pluralism (p. 83). In this way problem with the treatment of illiberal minorities in liberal societies are perpetuated: if illiberal minorities should be excluded, that implies liberal group's tolerance can be applied only to the groups which are alike them, which is in collision with the definition of tolerance.

The avoidance of the paradox means we should be under "an obligation to engage them /populists/" (p. 84), as populism is, metaphorically speaking, the permanent shadow of modern representative democracy, and a constant danger to it (p. 11, 15,

1199

101). As it is impossible to escape one's own shadow, populism is inevitable, but it can be of the greatest importance in pointing to antidemocratic and antirepublican impulses stemming from it, in which Müller's analysis, as well as practical instructions on how to deal with populism, is highly useful. It is always necessary to warn of the point at which populism is converted to autocracy: controlling the media, adjusting the constitution, marginalizing genuine opposition and establishing fictitious ones (which are loyal to the government), constraining the right to demonstrate, spreading fake news, threatening the independent media and intellectuals, banning non-government organizations, overt plain "politics of enmity".[4] Populism operates in the "grey zone" in which it is occasionally difficult to discern what are fair democratic process, and what is just appreciation of procedure in biased conditions, what is freedom of the media, and what is their abuse, what is participation of the citizen, and what is manipulation of voters. With Müller's books we are getting up-to-date critique, the response to the challenges which now emerge in almost every elections in almost every democratic society. Although those who are looking for remedies or political solutions will remain disappointed: as Müller shows on numerous examples, populism will not be refuted by pointing to its theoretical flaws, but it could be discredited through disentanglement of its assortment of vacuous promises, pompous rhetoric and shoddy practices.

1200

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4   Maybe this tendency to authoritarianism, which is inherent to populism, could resolve tension in Müller's analysis, when he claims that "National Socialism and Italian Fascism need to be understood as populist movements" (p. 93) and "populism is only thinkable in the context of representative democracy" (p. 77).

Milan M. Ćirković, *Opšta teorija žirafa*, Heliks, Smederevo, 2016.

Predrag Slijepčević

I

General theory of giraffes. An intriguing title. Associations are immediately palpable: Lamarck, Darwin, theory of evolution. So the title is begging further inquiry. The publisher is Heliks, a Serbian publishing house specializing in popular science. Author is Milan Ćirković.

I wonder whether Ćirković is aware of the provocative nature of the title in light of new winds in biology, which few decades ago existed only as winds in making, but today threaten to transform into a storm which could change the entire landscape?

American professor Michael K. Skinner, would certainly wonder what's behind the title. I will reveal reasons for his potential interest later. On his website Skinner has two "scientific mottos". One reads "Neither hope nor despair". The second one is more relevant to the subject of being provocative in a healthy sense. "If you are not doing something controversial, you are not doing something important". I am secretly hoping that Milan Ćirković will be bold enough to act as an innovator, provocateur (in a healthy sense) and populariser at the same time, by exposing "sails" of his "ship" to the new "winds".

Otherwise, the title may remain a stereotype in conformity with Neo-Darwinism, also known as Modern Synthesis (MS). This is a famous research programme initiated by three Englishmen (Ronald Fisher, Julian Huxley and John Haldane) and one American (Sewall Wright) in the first half of the 20th century. The programme had solid backing and it attracted empirical biologists, theoretical biologists, mathematicians and philosophers. W. D. Hamilton strengthened the basis of the programme with an elegant mathematical model.

The programme had a smooth ride for decades. However, with time problems emerged. Some scientists noticed that empirical results could no longer fit the mathematical model. In the simplistic language, the neo-Darwinian basic tenet that the gene is the fundamental unit of natural selection, so famously popularized by Richard Dawkins in "The Selfish Gene", started losing ground. New trends, including group selection started to take-off. The result was the birth of a new concept known as the multi-level selection theory (MLS) popularized by David Sloan Wilson. The mathematical grounding for MLS was provided by George Price and later acknowledged by W. D. Hamilton.

However, E. O. Wilson (not related to David Sloan Wilson), veteran biologist and formerly supporter of MS, made the most radical and surprising move. In collaboration with the Harvard mathematician, Martin Nowak, he published a paper in the prestigious journal Nature in which the basis of MS was refuted mathematically (Nowak et al. 2010). This provoked a strong reaction from the MS camp on the pages of Nature. The most vitriolic attack came from Dawkins in his review of a book by E. O. Wilson. To add further excitement to this science drama, E. O. Wilson decided to strike back in an equally vitriolic way. In an interview to the BBC widely watched programme, the Newsnight, E. O. Wilson downgraded Dawkins to the rank of a journalist and refused to consider him a scientist worthy of having disagreement with.

So Milan Ćirković is unwillingly in the middle of a battlefield thanks to a provocative title. One side of the frontline is reserved for neo-Darwinists. Their opponents on the other side include new forces (see later), MLS proponents, E. O. Wilson and freelancers such as Michael Skinner, capable of introducing new empirical arguments. As in any battle surprises are inevitable. The most notable surprise is the transformation of the great heretic, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, from the figure of ridicule to the figure of at least some respect. Of course, the classical Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characters is wrong. However, a somewhat softer form, which Skinner calls neo-Lamarckism, may not be.

It is interesting to note that one of the most vocal opponents of MS was late Lynn Margulis, a famous constructive rebel of modern science. If she is alive today, Margulis would almost certainly participate in the battle. Readers may want to watch a historic programme at the Voices from Oxford (http://www.voicesfromoxford.org/) recorded in Baillol College in 2009. Margulis was a visiting professor at Oxford University couple of years before her untimely death. It is interesting to watch exchanges between her and Dawkins, which looked civilized, unlike some of their encounters couple of decades earlier.

II

Let us consider the book. *General theory of giraffes* is a collection of essays which Ćirković published on various Serbian websites, and two unpublished essays. The book is divided into three parts: Strategy of science, Strategy of arts and Ages of

catastrophes. The style of writing is accessible. The text is highly informative and useful for anyone interested in history and philosophy of science. Most importantly from the perspective of a popular science book it is easy to read. Ćirković is probably the best popular science writer in Serbia. I am not aware of any other author who shows the breadth of erudition, the capacity to discover old texts and transform them, almost magically, into living wonders.

This is how Ćirković characterizes the essence of the book:

> The guiding idea behind all experiments in this book suggests that the intuitive and so called common-sensical outlook on the world is not a good guide towards truth and success neither in science, nor in art, nor in questions which go beyond borders of science and become key societal questions of the 21st century (such as climate change and other risks from global catastrophes), so it seems appropriate to start from that "impossible" giraffe.

This summary reminds me of a much older text written by a well-known British scientist and writer Lewis Wolpert. In his book *The Unnatural Nature of Science* Wolpert said exactly the same almost a generation earlier. Here is Wolpert's summary of his own book (Wolpert 1993: Introduction, page xii):

> The central theme presented in this book is that many of the misunderstandings about the nature of science might be corrected once it is realized just how 'unnatural' science is. I will argue that science involves a special mode of thought and is unnatural for two main reasons... Firstly, the world just is not constructed on a common-sensical basis. This means that 'natural' thinking - ordinary, day-to-day common sense - will never give an understanding about the nature of science. Scientific ideas are, with rare exceptions, counter-intuitive: they cannot be acquired by simple inspection of phenomena and are often outside everyday experience. Secondly, doing science requires a conscious awareness of the pitfalls of 'natural' thinking. For common sense is prone to error when applied to problems requiring rigorous and quantitative thinking; lay theories are highly unreliable.

So Ćirković is not saying anything new in *General theory of giraffes*. However, I can understand his motivation given that the text is in Serbian, and as such it targets the local attitudes which are probably tougher than those targeted by Wolpert, given Serbia's recent turbulent past which resulted

in resurrection of quasi-values rooted in the dark ages. As far as I am concerned, Ćirković should be lauded for his valiant efforts to explain the "unnatural nature of science" to his Serbian audience.

However, problems for Ćirković originate from a different source. In my opinion the way Ćirković constructs the metaphor is problematic. As far as I can understand it, the giraffe from the title represents a metaphor. The giraffe-metaphor hides a question. How to explain the origin of giraffe's exceedingly long neck? The "impossible" giraffe probably reflects inability of the intuitive common-sense to explain the origin of the giraffe's long neck. Ćirković gives the unenviable role of the intuitive common-sense to one of the most prominent heretics of science, Jean Baptiste Lamarck. Lamarck infamously thought that acquired characters are heritable. In the case of giraffes it is enough that mums and dads stretch their necks in the search for leaves on high trees and their offspring will all have longer necks than parents, so reasoned intuitively and common-sensically this infamous Frenchman. On the other hand, the role of a successful discoverer of truth in the metaphor, is given to Darwin or Darwinism – the patient and counter-intuitive (in Wolpert's vocabulary "unnatural") manner of natural selection, which after many generations discovers the only "possible" counter-intuitive giraffe with long neck.

At the first sight the metaphor is brilliant and amusing; the perfect symbol for a popular science book fighting "scientific illiteracy" by playing the heretic Lamarck against his opposite Darwin. However, the fierce battle raging in modern biology threatens to shatter the brilliance of the metaphor. Actually, the metaphor becomes an innocent collateral victim. Ćirković unwittingly took the side in the battle. In the further text I will expose the metaphor to the vision of the opposite side. One of the surprises on the battlefield is not in line with Ćirković's vision – the birth of Lamarck's legitimacy. After 200 years Lamarck gains some respect. It is not the full respect, but respect it is. (Actually Darwin himself thought that Lamarck was right).

III

While working at St Andrews University towards the end of 1990s I was trying to measure the length of telomeres, physical ends of chromosomes. Telomeres represent a biological chronometer, which reflects cellular replication history. Some researchers think that telomere length can also serve as a proxy for the human biological age. Three American scientists received Nobel prize for Medicine in 2009 for discovery of telomeres and the enzyme telomerase. To measure telomere length I used a novel technique called Q-FISH (quantitative fluorescence *in situ* hybridization), which was the most sophisticated technique at the time. I was developing the technique together with Peter Lansdorp a medical professor from the University of British Columbia at Vancouver. Our analysis was pioneering in some respects. Measurements showed a remarkable regularity in the distribution of individual telomere lengths. It turned out that our measurements were in line with the theory of "chromosome field", developed by Antonio Lima-de-Faria, Professor of genetics from Lund University. Lima-de-Faria is a well-known name in genetics. His book from 1984, *The molecular evolution and organization of the chromosome*, is a classic even by the modern standards. I contacted the respected Professor and we entered into a discussion, which lasted for several months. I also published a paper in which my measurements of telomeres were interpreted in light of the theory of "chromosome field". More importantly for the present context, I learned from Professor Lima-de-Faria details from the history of genetics, which shed some light on the dichotomy Lamarckism-Darwinism.

Lima-de-Faria told me about his collaboration with Conrad Waddington. In 1969 Lima-de-Faria was a visiting Professor at the Edinburgh Institute directed by Waddington. Waddington was a geneticist, embryologist and philosopher; one of the most brilliant minds of British science in the after-war period until his death in 1975. In 1940s Waddington coined the term "epigenetics" which is today one of the most recognisable terms in the professional parlance. On the basis of his own research on the fruit fly Waddington thought that Lamarck was unfairly treated as a figure of ridicule. Waddington's results were in line with the inheritance of acquired characters (see below) or epigenetic inheritance, which gives a far greater role to the environment in shaping the organismal phenotype than the neo-Darwinism would recognise. Here is an excerpt from a paper published by Waddington (1960):

> Evolutionary theories had, of course, been put forward some time before Darwin wrote Origin of Species. The most famous of these earlier discussions is that associated with the name of Lamarck. It has suffered a most surprising fate. Lamarck is the only major figure in the history of biology whose

name has become, to all intents and purposes, a term of abuse. Most scientists' contributions are fated to be outgrown, but very few authors have written works, which two centuries later, are still rejected with an indignation so intense that the sceptic may suspect something akin to an uneasy conscience. In point of fact, Lamarck has, I think, been somewhat unfairly judged.

At least two new lines of research in modern biology agree with Waddington. The first one is the new evolutionary synthesis known as EES (Extended Evolutionary Synthesis), a research programme which emerged as a result of MS's or neo-Darwinism's inability to explain many biological phenomena. EES is a collaborative effort by scientists from the following Universities/Institutes: St Andrews, Lund, Clark, Indiana, Stanford, Cambridge, Southampton and Santa Fe. An additional team of 22 unaffiliated scientists participate in the EES programme. According to EES "acquired characters can play evolutionary role and participate in heritability". EES has a dedicated website (http://extendedevolutionarysynthesis.com/). For those interested in the real science behind EES a good introductory text is a short paper published in Nature (Laland et al. 2014) in which basic EES principles were set against the conventional neo-Darwinian view. A philosopher Massimo Pigliucci, an EES member, cited Max Plank's words in an EES blog post alluding to the battle lines between EES and MS outlined in part I:

> A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.

Independently of EES, Michael K. Skinner developed a new theory based on his work on "transgenerational inheritance" using mouse as a model, which absolved Lamarck from his unenviable status of a lowly heretic and promoted him into a much more respectable figure through what Skinner calls Neo-Lamarckian inheritance. For those interested in science behind it I recommend Skinner's paper published in the prestigious journal Science (Anway et al. 2005). Here is an excerpt from Skinner's popular essay on the topic:

> The question is this: if natural selection isn't acting on genetic mutations alone, then what molecular forces create the full suite of variation in traits required for natural selection to finish the job? One clue came almost a century after Darwin

proposed his theory, in 1953, just as James Watson and Francis Crick were unravelling the mysteries of DNA and the double helix. In that year, the developmental biologist Conrad Waddington of the University of Edinburgh reported that fruit flies exposed to outside chemical stimulus or changes in temperature during embryonic development could be pushed to develop varying wing structures. The changes the scientists induced in that single generation would, thereafter, be inherited by progeny down the lineage. Waddington coined a modern term – 'epigenetics' – to describe this phenomenon of rapid change. Notably, before Watson and Crick had even revealed their DNA structure, Waddington recognised the potential impact his discovery could have on the theory of evolution: the single-generation change in the fruit-fly wings were supportive of the original ideas of the heretic Lamarck. It appeared that the environment could directly impact traits.

Now back to Ćirković's stance on Lamarckism. He paints it in a black and white fashion. Here is a relevant excerpt:

> Of course, the history of modern biology has clearly shown that the Lamarckian conception of inheritance of acquired characters is untenable, irrespective how much is the idea about fast evolution attractive to many, often for non-scientific reasons, it is not founded in reality.

This is an oversight on Ćirković's part. It is likely that many biologists would not disagree with Ćirković. However, this is primarily for the reasons of ignorance. Unfortunately, Ćirković did not do his research properly. Of course, Ćirković is partially right – the original 19th century Lamarckism is wrong. However, Ćirković's metaphor lacks the subtlety of having the full set of relevant facts and the capacity to use facts in an impartial way. If one takes into account the Skinner's results favouring Neo-Lamarckism it would not be possible to categorically say "the Lamarckian conception of inheritance of acquired characters is untenable". In addition, concrete research results generated by the EES programme, at the minimum, show serious doubts in the categorical rejection of the possibility that the environment plays a role in shaping organismal phenotypes. Otherwise, Professor Kevin Laland from St Andrews University, one of the founders of EES, would not be able to obtain funding for his research from the most respectable British funding agencies. Similarly, dozens of other EES members receive funding from relevant institutions in a competitive manner. It

is also likely that research in Skinner's laboratory is funded by the US National Institute of Health.

The thesis that Lamarck's idea could be attractive for non-scientific reasons to professional scientists is also without any ground. Waddington simply published his research results in an honest way, in the same manner Skinner or EES proponents do the same today. They are all careful scientists and Skinner takes precaution to clearly distinguish between the 19th century Lamarckism and Neo-Lamarckian epigenetic inheritance.

The thesis that Lamarckism is not grounded in reality is only partially right because Neo-Lamarckism clearly is. It is regrettable that Ćirković did not consult the full set of relevant references. It is very easy to get open access papers from Google Scholar published by Skinner. The same is true in the case of many EES papers, or even some old papers published by Waddington. In the absence of scientific papers respectable digital magazines, which publish new ideas could have been consulted. One such magazine is AEON whose partners include academic publishers, Oxford University Press, Princeton University Press and others, but also research Institutes like the Center for the Study of Existential Risk. I specifically singled out AEON because it recently published Skinner's popular essay, "Unified Theory of Evolution". Below the title the publisher inserted a single-sentence summary of the essay, which reads: "Darwin's theory that natural selection drives evolution is incomplete without input from evolution's anti-hero: Lamarck".

A proper fact checking is not only the responsibility of an author but also an editor in a publishing house, which specializes in popular science. No one expects that an editor should be an expert. However, the job of the editor is to select qualified reviewers who may correct the author and by doing so protect the reading public from being exposed to only a partial set of facts, instead

of a full set. I do not wish to sound too harsh here, but all professional scientists know how harsh the peer review process may be. The same standards, if not higher, should be in place for popular science publishing.

In his defence Ćirković says that both Lamarckism and Darwinism are only theories. This is a good way out from the pitfall that he unwittingly created for himself. True. All theories are temporary and will eventually be replaced by more successful ones. However, the metaphor intended for the general audience must be free from all major interpretative problems, at least in the time window in which it can realistically last. Unfortunately, the metaphor is problematic for the reasons outlined above. Individual essays may be brilliant and fun to read. I certainly enjoyed reading them. However, the sharpness of the collective sword of the book, as a weapon for fighting conspiracy theories and similar nonsense, is significantly compromised by a somewhat unfortunate choice of metaphor.

1205

Interestingly, Ćirković unwittingly makes his own diagnosis of the quality of the metaphor-turned-title:

> We all know that a good title may make wonders by saving an otherwise average book (and vice versa).

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1206 Biljana Albahari, *Pisanje stradanja: knjiga o knjigama. Vodič kroz publikacije o Holokaustu*, Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd, 2017.

Predrag Krstić

Kao što je verovatno slučaj sa svakom neobičnom i pažnje vrednom knjigom, naslov može da zbuni ili zavara. *Pisanje stradanja* lako bi moglo asocirati na neku borhesovsko-ekovsku prozopopeju ove ili one pogibelji, a dodatak „knjiga o knjigama" upućivati na postradale biblioteke, imaginarne ili stvarne. I to ne bi bilo sasvim pogrešno. Tek treći deo naslova, međutim, preciznije ili sasvim precizno kazuje o čemu je reč: „Vodič kroz publikacije o Holokaustu". Pa čak i tu je potrebna još jedna specifikacija: reč je naime o navigatoru kroz one publikacije koje su napisane ili prevedene „u okvirima jugoslovenskog i srpskog izdavaštva" i koje su pokušale da „posvedoče, istraže, prouče, proniknu u jedan jedinstveni užas" (str. 5).

A onda se ispostavlja da ono što je sasvim precizno rečeno nije i dovoljno rečeno. Vodič se, doduše, pokazuje kao „iscrpni katalog ili mapa tih nastojanja" i sasvim onakvim kakvim je autorka obećala ili se nadala da će biti: na jednom mestu pregledno klasifikovani svi bibliografski zapisi „domaćih" knjiga koje se odnose na Holokaust. Ali se ne ostaju na tom hvale vrednom, takoreći rudarskom poslu bibliotečkih i, više od toga, bibliofilskih istraživanja – mada bi već i to zasluživalo neuporedivu pohvalu. Ti izdašni ali uvek ponešto svedeni zapisi ne ostaju tek „signature" već su najave one tekstualne i likovne opreme koja ih prati: opsežnih i uputnih referenci na „segmente" Holokausta koje „zapisana" knjiga obrađuje, u što je većoj meri moguće ilustrativanih prikaza pristupa koji njen autor zauzima – bilo da je reč o fragmentima njegovog dela, bilo o reprezentativnim izjavama drugih o njegovom karakteru i značaju, bilo, gde god je to moguće, oba.

Knjiga o knjigama o Holokaustu je, dakle, potkrepljena, zasnovana i obuhvatna knjiga. Ona ni ne pomišlja da bude tek knjigovodstvo svega objavljenog što obuhvata izabrana tema već se, pre svega, oseća odovornom da uputi na okoliš koji je određuje. Zbog tog poštovanja konteksta i, uostalom, čitalaca, ona uvodi, na jedan, rekli bismo, i obrazovno dragocen način, u pojmovnu i istorijsku dimenizju Holokausta: nudi uputne odrednice šta je Holokaust, bogato ilustruje primerima i fotografijama zakone nacističke Nemačke vezane za Jevreje, da bi potom predstavila i znamenito spaljivanje knjiga na berlinskom *Opernplazu* 1933. godine i zaključila ovaj pregled ili genealogiju pogroma sa Kristalnom noći kada se, prema znamenitoj i neizostavnoj Hajneovoj slutnji, spaljivanje knjiga počelo da pretvara u spaljivanje ljudi.

Takav uvod tek označajava ona mesta stradanja koja se nakon toga nižu. Iza tih „tužnih zborišta" – sabirnih centara, stratišta, logora… - koja detaljno mapiraju „geografiju pogibelji", ipak ostaju zapisi. Knjige preživljavaju spaljivanje. Posvedočeno je, pisano je i na našem jeziku je dostupno više publikacija nego što smo mogli misliti, i o Aušvicu i o Jasenovcu, naravno, ali i o Kladovu, Subotici, Starom sajmištu, Novom Sadu, Pirotu, Šapcu, Nišu, Pančevu, Banatskom Brestovcu, Alibunaru, Banatskim Karlovcima, Beloj Crkvi, Kovačici, Debeljači, Padini, Uzdinu, Kovinu, Deliblatu, Opovu, Plandištu, Velikom Gaju, Vršcu, Mokrinu, Jaši Tomiću, Perlezu, Srpskoj Crnji, Borskim rudnicima... – tim toponimima koji su postali lozinka patnji i nepočina.

Toponimi pretočeni u šifre, razložno se netom upozorava na opasnost koja ovde uvek vreba, nisu međutim presudni. Oni mogu da zamrače, makar i užasom koji bude, ono što je važnije: ljudske sudbine. Nisu brojke koje se vezuju za njih, zaprepašćujuće brojke streljanih, umorenih, mučenih, transportovanih, ono što se broji. Svi ti brojevi su „toliko ogromni, da postaju apstraktni, usled čega se lako zaboravi šta oni stvarno znače": „Zato treba nastojati da se shvati da iza svake brojčice u tim brojevima postoji jedno ime, jedno lice, jedna voljena osoba, jedna izgubljena budućnost. Deca, roditelji, rođaci..." (str. 167). Tim „ličnim i porodičnim", ali neizostavno potresnim pričama, posvećeno je čitavo jedno poglavlje. *Dnevnik Ane Frank*, razumljivo, zauzima posebno mesto: većina nas nije znala da je toliko njegovih izdanja i u tolikim tiražima već objavljeno. Ali tu su i svedočenja preživelih, domaća i inostrana. Upečatljivost odlomaka koji oni nude može se meriti jedino onim „golim činjenicama" koje ih okružuju i izazivaju zanemelost.

Te gole činjenice, ali sada sa zaleđem upozorenja na ono što stoji iza njih, počinju same sobom da znače, da odjekuju bez potrebe za daljim objašnjenjem, da bole. Njima se daje prostor u sledećem odeljku *Pisanja stradanja*, prikladno nazvanom „Dokumentovanje užasa: istoriografski arhiv". Tu uviđamo da je onaj brižljivi rad istoričara, za koji je jamačno bio potreban dobar „stomak", uspeo da prikupi, sakupi, evidentira i arhivira zavidan broj dokumenata. Stoga se niko više ne može pozvati na neznanje, na neobaveštenost, makar kada je reč o karakteru i dimenzijama Holokausta. Ali vidimo i da takav rad otrzanja od zaborava, koji već sam sobom uopšte nije mali, istovremeno niukoliko ne mora biti lišen empatije. Naprotiv.

Pa ni tu nije kraj. Nastavak priče o pisanju Holokaustu, kao i nastavak Holokausta, prema jednoj klasifikaciji kojom nas je autorka zadužila, odvijao se kroz njegove posledice: kroz knjige o nikada na odgovorajući način nezadovoljenoj pravdi, ili uopšte nezadovoljenoj pravdi, o otkrivanju količine i veličine nacističkih zločina i o „lovu na naciste" koji je usledio. Takve knjige su intrigantna i više ne ni toliko potresna koliko, čini se, porazna svedočanstva o nedostižnosti primerenog iskupljenja.

Sudbine zlikovaca, srećom, imaju i svoje, takođe (is)pisano, naličje. Ono daje izvesnu nadu. Postoje naime i „pravednici", čije je „diskretno herojstvo" tokom više nego rizičnog spasavanja Jevreja tokom njihovog progona zaslužilo nekoliko knjiga i posebno poglavlje u „knjizi o knjigama". Kao što je poznato, „Pravednik među narodima" je najviše izraelsko priznanje kojim se odlikuju nejevreji koji su, ugrožavajući vlastitu bezbednost, spasavali Jevreje od istrjebljenja. U svetu ih je već preko dvadest tri hiljade, a saznajemo da ni Srbija nije inferiorna u tom pogledu: ponajpre Subotica, sa čak šest pravednika.

1207

Nada koju oni pružaju, međutim, ne ukida osnov i za beznadežnost. Jer, nije (više) toliko pitanje ispravljanja krivde, kazne za krivce, odmazde, osvete, izravnavanja računa, koliko onespokojavajućeg osvećivanja da je „tako nešto uopšte bilo moguće". I da to „tako nešto", uprkos višedecenijskim naporima komentatora, ostaje neobjašnjivo ili makar nikad do kraja objašnjeno, da štaviše u „tome nečem" ni takozvani „posmatrači" nisu bez krivice, da uloga njih ili nas koji smo to dopustili ili koji to dopuštamo može govoriti u prilog svojevrsnog saučesništva ili čak široko rasprostranjene i pravilno raspodeljene zločinačke i poslušničke prirode. Knjige koje to tematizuju, knjige o „tumačenju zla", o „društvenoj i humanističkoj teoriji nehumanog", takođe nisu malobrojne ni na našem jeziku. Ovde su pobrojane, predstavljene ispisima i tužno stoje kao steći nevolja mnoštva nastojanja da se razume, zahvati i shvati ne(za)mislivi užas i, istovremeno, kao izraz neophodnosti da se teorijskom interpretacijom koja daruje kakav-takav smisao odgovori na nesmanjeni izazov koji Holokaust i dalje upućuje teoriji.

U tom kolopletu obesmišljenosti i nezamislivosti, biće da nisu najmanje važni, a sigurno im nije najlakše, oni koji kroje, a još manje, oni koji izvode školske programe. Malobrojni su ali nisu beznačajni, naprotiv, i pokušaji da se u knjigama i priručnicima izađe na kraj sa mukama pedagogije vezanim

za Holokaust i iskuša njegovo „preda(va)nje" na različitim uzrastima – bez ogrešnja ni o njega ni o polaznike. Dragoceno je, najzad, da na jednom mestu imamo i popis takvih pokušaja i fragmente o njihovim strategijama. Te knjige praktične namene, svojevrsna aplikacija istorije i terije Holokausta, naizgled je od sekundarne važnosti ali, samo na prvi pogled paradoksalno, možda i više nego druge knjige iste „problematike" svedoče o istrajnosti uvek ponešto polisemičnih sećanja na Holokaust i njegovih razumevanja, kao i o, srećom ili ne, budućnosti koja u tom pogledu teško da išta može promeniti. O knjigama, ukratko, koje pretiču i posle Holokausta, odnosno posle onoga što je i njih zadesilo i što, najzad, Holokaust na starogrškom i znači: potpuno spaljivanje. Jer, „Knjige stradaju, možda čak i prve, skupa sa onim što zastupaju. I knjige o(p)staju, i posle stradanja i uprkos njemu" (str. 5).

Ali, ovog puta, kada je reč o *Pisanju stradanja*, na jedan poseban način uopšte ne pretiču „samo" knjige (kao da bi to bilo malo). Naime, Biljana Albahari je, kao vrsni i posvećeni bibliotekar, takoreći sudbinski vezana za knjige. Njeni objavljeni radovi „Bibliografija izdanja Instituta društvenih nauka" i „Pregled sadržaja časopisa Filozofija i društvo", koji izdaje Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, popunili su golemu prazninu i značajno doprineli struci. Radila je u oba narečena Instituta i zaslužna je što je i nekada referentni a onda devastirani fond tih naučnih institucija pre svega opstao, a onda i ostao sređen. Ali osetljiv status akademskih biblioteka u našoj zemlji, a naročito periodike u njima, nije joj dao mira i proširio je njena interesovanja. O situaciji i preporukama za prevazilaženje nimalo veselog stanja u njima svedoče članci Albahari u prestižnim stručnim časopisima: „Pregled 'domaće' filozofske periodike u bibliotekama Srbije – retrospektiva" i „Visokoškolske biblioteke: informativno glasilo Zajednice biblioteka univerziteta u Srbiji". A onda je prešla u Narodnu biblioteku Srbije i našla vremena da se posveti svojoj dugogodišnjoj strasti: jevrejskoj periodici u Srbiji. Posle

1208

nekoliko izlaganja na konferencijama i tekstova i pregleda koji obrađuju jevrejska štampana izdanja do i posle Drugog svetskog rata, ove godina je u njenoj sada matičnoj kući otvorena izložba „Listanje vremena: jevrejska periodika u Srbiji: 1888-2016", koja je odlično primljena, propraćena i posećena. I koju je pratio autorkin „katalog izložbe" – koji ima odlike samostalne knjige.

Potonje u još većoj meri važi za *Pisanje stradanja*. Zato kažemo da nije reč samo o knjizi (o knjigama). Naime, Regionalni naučni centar Instituta za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju organizovao je u Novom Sadu od 18. do 21. aprila 2017. godine seriju događaja „Sećanje na Holokaust", koja je sadržavala koncert hora Jevrejske opštine Novi Sad – „Hašira", konferenciju „Holokaust i filozofija", tribinu istoričara „Jevrejski identitet, antisemitizam i Holokaust", potom jedan školski dan o Holokaustu „Lekcije za budućnost" i simpozijum „Učiti o Holokaustu: utopija ili šansa – obrazovne prakse i pedagoški izazovi". A čitavo događanje otvoreno je izložbom priređenom u novosadskoj Sinagogi: „Pisanje stradanja: vodič kroz publikacije o Holokaustu" autorke, naravno, Biljane Albahari i dizajnerke Ornele Rezinović. Izložbu je takođe pratio katalog. Ali bogato opremljena knjiga *Pisanje stradanja* koju prikazujemo, nešto je više i od jednog i od drugog, i od izložbe i takođe od iscrpnog kataloga iz kojih je proizašla. Ili oni iz nje, kao dopuna u drugom i možda prijemčivijem mediju. Nisam siguran ni da bi autorka znala šta je čemu prethodilo. Još manje da je to uopšte više važno.

Tek, jedna knjiga o knjigama, nešto već samo sobom metaknjiško i hiperreferentno, našlo je i svoju vizuelnu inscenaciju. I Knjiga o knjigama, i knjiga o knjigama o Holokaustu, nadživljava tako ne samo svojom neprolaznim temom i akribijskim odlikama, nego čak i ona vanknjiška iskušenja vremena neblagonaklonog prema knjigama uopšte, te pokazuje kako knjige mogu biti ne samo deo, nego i subjekt multimedijalnosti. Doduše, samo one, ili samo ovakve, izuzetne knjige.

Monografija *Identitet Španije* jeste proizvod namere da se iznova sintetički obuhvati i promisli sudbina jednog geoistorijskog prostora u dugom kontinuitetu njegove prošlosti. Od prapočetaka i pojave ljudskih zajednica do iskušenja sa kojima se čovek susreo početkom XXI veka na teritoriji današnje Španije, od praistorijskih kultura, kao što je Magdalenijska, do epohe postfrankističke tranzicije i demokratizacije, stotine i hiljade godina ljudske istorije utisnule su više slojeva različitih, često i međusobno suočenih ili sukobljenih, identiteta unutar ovog osobenog evropskog prostora. Nikola Samardžić u svojoj knjizi razmatra i obrađuje više vrsta identitetskih konstituenata španske civilizacije, od geografskog, preko istorijskog, do jezičkog i političkog.

Na nekoliko važnih mesta u knjizi izloženi su načelni stavovi bitni koliko za Samardžićevo ishodište, toliko i uopšte za probleme teorije istorije. U uvodnom poglavlju, naslovljenom „Pristup", data je jedna generalna konstatacija vezana za esenciju španskog identiteta: „Španija gotovo da je nesaznatljiva. Njena grandiozna prošlost prožeta je tajnama pred kojima se troše i iscrpljuju generacije posvećene istraživačkoj hispanistici. Ona je mističan doživljaj istorijskog iskustva." (str. 7-8) Na osnovu navedenog iskaza, ali pri tome uzimajući u obzir i bogatstvo narativnog materijala artikulisanog u monografiji, može se primetiti da je nemoguće napisati jednu definitivnu i sveobuhvatnu sintezu povodom predmeta o kome je reč, ma koliko projekat njenog pisanja bio iscrpan. Postoje slojevi hispanskog identiteta koji zahtevaju neprestano traganje i koji nisu čisto racionalistički objašnjivi.

Istoričar Hose Antonio Maravalj je u članku „Aktuelna situacija nauke i nauke o istoriji" iz 1958. godine, čiji sadržaj i danas ostaje uputan, ukazao na zabludu sa kojom onaj ko istražuje fenomene društvene i istorijske stvarnosti može da se suoči ako se drži određenog metodološkog načela u pristupu temi koja ga zanima:

> Stari princip merljivosti celokupnog stvarnog kao kamen opterećuje sve napore istoričara i svih istraživača istorijske stvarnosti, osuđujući unapred svaku pretenziju za dostizanjem znanja o čoveku u ovom pravcu. Ostavljena je stvarnost svedena na fizički svet, a čak je i ovaj sužen na izvestan tip odnosa koji su uvedeni u domen nauke. Sve ostalo preobraćeno je u predmet imaginacije manje ili više blizak nestvarnim objektima umetnosti ili poezije. [...] Može, dakle, da postoji stvarnost koja ne bi bila merljiva i, prema tome, čitavo polje činjenica koje

Nikola Samardžić, *Identitet Španije*, Admiral Books, Beograd, 2014.

Miloš Ćipranić

1209

ne mogu biti samerene i koje zbog toga ne prestaju da budu stvarne. (*Teoría del saber histórico*, Madrid: Revista de Occidente 1958, 48-49.)

Ako „mistično" na koje referiše Samardžić ulazi pod „nemerljivo" o kojem govori Maravalj, onda se dijahronijski data slika oblikovanja ali i preobražaja identiteta Španije ne može redukovati na snop prostih merljivih činjenica, odnosno na prozirni hronološko-statistički pregled istorijskih procesa. Iako knjiga obiluje dragocenim egzaktnim podacima, Nikola Samardžić je svestan da takav ugao posmatranja jedne fenomenološki složene strukture, kakava je identitet Hispanije, ostaje suštinski nedovoljan i prekratak. Totalitet španske istorije privlači autora upravo zbog odsutnosti njegove apsolutne transparencije, što je jedno stanovište koje nalaže stalno propitivanje materije koja čini predmet monografije: „Jedna od privlačnih snaga istorije je, verovatno, nepostojanje, i odsustvo smisla, apsolutne objektivnosti. Ona je i u nemogućnosti saznanja totaliteta svake prošlosti." (str. 227)

Sedimentirani identitet Španije u njegovim bogatstvima i protivrečnostima, koji istorijska disciplina u svojim nastojanjima jeste u stanju da, koliko je to moguće, obuhvati, kao objekat istraživanja ne da se klasifikovati kao već pomenuta „materia de imaginación más o menos próxima a los irreales objetos del arte y de la poesía". Jasno je da bi u ovom kontekstu svako takavo nastojanje istoričara bilo označeno kao čista iluzorna apstrakcija, kao kretanje u prostoru koje nema utemeljenje u stvarnosti činjenica. Protiv jedne takve primedbe kao da odgovara misao iznesena na samom kraju glavnog dela teksta knjige: „Možda su identiteti samo imaginarne, ideološke konstrukcije. Ali su u tom smislu postojeći. Njihova moć je takođe stvarna, u čitavom prostoru između dobra i zla." (str. 283)

Identitet, ili bolje rečeno, identiteti Španije prelomeljni su u monografiji u horizontu istorije i sa više tačaka gledišta. Brojne kulture, poput rimske, vizigotske ili arapsko-berberske, vremenom su na iberijskom tlu utiskivale i ostavljale različite materijalne tragove i iznova rekonfigurisale njegov prostor. Nakon predmoderne, i dugotrajni tokovi moderne istorije dodatno su obogatili novim sedimentima hispanski prostor. Pored aspekata kakvi su geografski, istorijski, verski ili politički, ovom izrazito složenom totalitetu danas bi falila bitna dimenzija ako bi unutar njega umetnički aspekt bio ignorisan, ili barem skrajnut. Čini se da je u monografiji veći prostor analize mogao biti posvećen vizuelnim i prostornim umetnostima.

Umetnički identitet Španije, koliko god bio razuđen, jedan je od njenih temeljnih identiteta, jer ih bitno upotpunjuje i jer po sebi radikalno prevazilazi granice umetničkih medija u kojima je oblikovan. Nema sumnje da dela nediskurzivnih vrsta umetnosti, poput slika, skulptura i građevina, mogu da posluže kao istorijski izvor za poznavanje civilizacija u okviru kojih su nastali, ali u samom zapažanju da ona ne mogu da „govore", budući da primarno nisu sačinjena od reči, postoji metodski rizik da budu posmatrana kao svedočanstvo inferiornije vrednosti u odnosu na izvore diskurzivne prirode. Usredsrediti se na statue kao što su *Dama de Elche* ili *Dama de Baza* iz IV vek pre n. e., što autor i čini u 1. poglavlju monografije pod naslovom „Iberija i Hispanija", imalo bi smisla i pod uslovom da su narativni izvori za proučavanje antičke iberske kulture znatno bogatiji, a ne veoma oskudni, što jeste u stvari slučaj.

Kao ni ostale značajne figure iz španske istorije, ni njeni veliki slikari nisu tek bitni za razumevanje suštine identiteta Španije, oni su i sami aktivno doprineli njegovoj konstituciji. Budući da su do današnjih dana ostali izrazito važni za oblikovanje hispanskog identiteta kao takvog, začuđuje činjenica da im je veća pažnja posvećena u knjizi *Istorija Španije*, nego u *Identitetu Španije*.[1] Velaskezove *Dvorjanke* možda „elokventnije" reflektuju i plastičnije oslikavaju krizno vreme i mutnu atmosferu vlasti Filipa IV, nego mnogi dokumenti neumetničke i narativne prirode tog doba. Istina je da *Koplja,* slikovni primer pomenut u monografiji o kojoj je reč, ilustruju jedan od pojedinačnih Filipovih uspeha, kao što je zauzeće Brede 1625. godine, ali *Las meninas* na moćno sažet i suptilan način vizuelnim putem sublimiraju sunovrat imperijalnog identiteta Španije, o kome autor sa pravom govori u V i VI poglavlju svoje monografije. Sa druge strane, Gojini *Kaprisi*, objavljeni 1799. godine, trajno svedoče o problemima sa kojima se špansko društvo

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[1] Između ostalih, u prvoj monografiji o Španiji nailazim na veoma lepe i meditativne redove koje je Nikola Samardžić posvetio navedenom pitanju:

> Verovatno da dugo prisustvo ljudskih zajednica ispunjava prostor nekim posebnim osećanjem koje nije dostupno neposrednim čulima, i verovatno nije slučajno opsednutost iskonskom, mističnom snagom svakodnevice, bila nadahnuće i slikara Altamire, i Goje i Pikasoa. Od pećinskih zidova, koji su postali univerzalno dobro, ne zaboravljajući planetarnu ekspanziju hispanske imperije, začetu upoznavanjem novih svetova, do pojave nekoliko pokolenja španskih umetnika koji su tokom XX stoleća dospeli do globalne slave i važnosti, kao da je zatvoren jedan ogroman krug. (*Istorija Španije*, Beograd: Plato 2003, 601.)

1210

suočavalo tokom perioda u kome je nastojalo da postavi temelje svog modernog identiteta. *Los caprichos*, kao istinski kulturno-umetnički spomenik u kome su ocrtane granice prosvetiteljskog projekta u Španiji, upečatljivo figurišu kontradikcije jedne epohe, kojih su i više nego svesni bili i Kampomanes, Floridablanka i Hoveljanos.

Na kraju, *Gernika* se 1937. godine ispostavila kao nemi, ali snažan krik umiruće Druge španske republike, kao amblem neostvarene identitetske transformacije države, ali i, kako je sa razlogom naglašeno, kao „krik umirućeg čovečanstva". (str. 236) Događaji koji su usledili u evropskoj i svetskoj istoriji nakon 1939. godine potvrdili su univerzalnost Pikasove poruke, koja je kao takva nadmašila granice, usko shvaćenog, geografskog i istorijskog prostora španskog identiteta, i dobila globalnu, opšteljudsku dimenziju u jednom užasnom vremenu.

Posebno interesantan segment knjige čine stranice posvećene uporednoj analizi sličnog, ali nikada identičnog, istorijsko-političkog iskustva Španije i Srbije. Već su u monografiji *Istorija Španije*, na samom njenom kraju, kratko naznačeni i, može se sada reći najavljeni, odeljci *Identiteta Španije* u kojima je skicirana komparativna slika sudbina Španije i Srbije kroz istoriju, naročito u 20. veku. Komparativna analiza različitih istorijskih pojava, procesa i tendencija jeste legitimna metoda, što dokazuje postojanje uporedne politike, jedne od osnovnih poddisciplina politikologije, čiji je predmet empirijski usmereno upoređivanje različitih političkih sistema. Unutar nje nalazi se kategorija „binarne studije", što je pristup koji je primenio Nikola Samardžić. Međutim, u obe monografije o Španiji je izričito istaknuto da istorija ne dopušta analogije, da podudarnosti u stvarnosti ne postoje. Ono što je pri tome bitno reći jeste da njihova sugestivna uverljivost i bogatstvo ipak nisu u potpunosti osporeni.

Odmah na početku *Identiteta Španije* izložena je u širokim ali dubokim potezima slična istorijska sudbina Iberijskog i Balkanskog poluostrva, dva regiona na oprečnim krajevima Evrope, i, uže gledano, Španije i Jugoslavije, odnosno Srbije. Potom je u XIV poglavlju, „Izazovu modernih identiteta", dalje razvijena uporedna analiza. Načelno gledano, sve sličnosti između dve zemlje poticale su prevashodno iz komplikovanosti njihovih identiteta koji su se postupno i slojevito izgrađivali. U prošlom

veku i Španija i Jugoslavija su imale surovo iskustvo građanskog rata (1936-1939; 1941-1945), nakon toga po približno četiri decenija diktatura proizašlih iz građanskih obračuna, sprovođenje modela planske privrede i održavanje autoritarnog kulta ličnosti (Franko i Tito). Posle sloma dva režima usledila su suočavanja sa etničkim i kulturnim izazovima, problemom udeonih zajednica i perifernih nacionalizama, kao i procesi demokratizacije, ali sa različitim ishodima.

Naučni skup *Demokratska tranzicija u Španiji i Srbiji: iskustva i paralele*, organizovan od strane Instituta za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju i održan 19. novembra 2016. godine u Novom Sadu, u značajnoj meri je bio inspirisan navedenim uočenim sličnostima. Na tom događaju istaknuti su problemi koje su u ne tako davnoj prošlosti delile dve države, poput fenomena traume gubitkom teritorija, posedovanja institucionalnog kapaciteta za demokratsku transformaciju i izlazak iz autoritativnih političkih sistema, donošenja modernih demokratskih ustava (španskog iz 1978. godine, srpskih iz 1990. i 2006.), konačnog nacionalnog pomirenja između levih i desnih nakon građanskih ratnih sukoba, pojave terorizma (ETA u Baskiji, OVK na Kosovu), pitanja tzv. „unutrašnjeg kolonijalizma" koga sprovode bogatije regije i centri nad onim siromašnim. Posebna pažnja posvećena je temi samopreispitivanja španskih intelektualaca tokom 20. veka povodom pitanja evropeizacije Španije, koja su na izvestan način pripremila teren za njen ulazak u Evropsku ekonomsku zajednicu 1986. godne. Činilo se da izrečene ideje i stavovi španske inteligencije povodom uključenja njihove države u glavne evropske tokove, ponovo istaknuti i saopšteni, mogu da budu korisni i dragoceni u odnosu na situaciju sa kojom se Srbija danas suočava povodom njenog ulaska u Evropsku uniju, za čije je članstvo zvanično podnela kandidaturu 2009. godine.

U *Identitetu Španije* Nikola Samardžić iznova ističe reči Hose Ortege i Gaseta da je Španija problem, a Evropa rešenje. Madridski filozof je u martu 1910. godine u Bilbau izrekao sledeći zaključak: „Verdaderamente se vio claro desde un principio que España era el problema y Europa la solución." Da li bi bilo valjano umesto „Španija" staviti „Srbija" i danas reći da je Srbija problem, a Evropa rešenje? Da li Srbija treba da se okrene sebi ili treba da se integriše u Evropu? Da li u stvari jedan proces tu isključuje drugi?

1211

1212 Ana Russell-Omaljev, *Divided we Stand: Discourses on Identity in 'First' and 'Other' Serbia*, Ibidem Verlag, Stuttgart, 2016.

Aleksandar Pavlović

Ana Rasel Omaljev u ovoj knjizi najavljuje analizu procesa formiranja identiteta u post-Miloševićevskoj Srbiji, i to onako kako to predstavljaju intelektualne elite u njihovim javnim debata oko pitanja kao što su nacionalni identitet i evropske integracije. Konkretnije, Rasel Omaljev želi da, po njenim rečima, „prouči specifičnosti 'Prve' i 'Druge' Srbije kao frakture mogućnosti nacionalnog identiteta" i „rasvetli strukture moći" u post-Miloševićevskoj Srbiji (str. 32). Njen ambiciozni, dublji cilj jeste da transcendira ovaj „naizgled složeni izbor tako što ćemo dekonstruisati dualističku logiku koju koriste Prva i Druga Srbija i razotkriti način na koji su ove pozicije prema Evropi oblikovale, i još uvek oblikuju, srpske nacionalne, političke i kulturne identitete" (str. 6).

Od kada ga je ranih devedesetih godina prošlog veka uvela grupa kritički nastrojenih intelektualaca koja je želela da se distancira od dominantne proratne i pro-miloševićevske atmosfere u Srbiji, pojam „Druga" Srbija i njegov parnjak „Prva" Srbija, zadobili su određenu frekventnost kao simboli dve suprotstavljene ideološke i političke pozicije koju su zauzimali različiti akteri na javnoj sceni Srbije. Za diskurs „Prve" Srbije, među čije zagovornike autorka ubraja autore poput Dobrice Ćosića i Matije Bećkovića i patriotski orijentisane političke stranke, karakteristična su pitanja srpske nacije, tradicije, pravoslavlja, evroskepticizam ili otvoreni anti-EU stavovi, dok na suprotnoj strani političkog spektra Rasel Omaljev identifikuje „teške" liberale poput intelektualaca i aktivista za ljudska prava Nataše Kandić, Sonje Biserko, Srđe Popovića i drugih, LDP-a i nevladinih organizacija poput Žena u crnom, koji su insistirali na srpskoj odgovornosti za zločine počinjene tokom devedesetih godina prošlog veka i neophodnosti da se srpsko društvo suoči sa njima i procesuira ih. U autorkinom viđenju, „Drugoj" Srbiji takođe pripadaju i „meki" liberali kao nekada vladajuća Demokratska stranka, čiji su lideri prozapadno orijentisani ali takođe skloni i temama vezanim za srpsku naciju i njene interese i tradiciju, a posebno osetljivi na pitanje Kosova.

Argumentacija izložena u ovoj knjizi teče kroz šest istraživačkih poglavlja uokvirenih uvodom i zaključkom, koji se fokusiraju na najvažnije događaje u post-miloševićevskoj Srbiji kao što su ubistvo premijera Đinđića 2003. godine, (samo)proglašenje kosovske nezavisnosti 2008. godine, kandidatura Srbije za članstvo u Evropskoj uniji iz 2011. kao i na najvažnije javne debate o odgovornosti

za zločine i (ne)patriotskoj ulozi srpskih intelektualaca iz 2002, 2003. i 2008. godine. Preciznije, prvo poglavlje sadrži teorijski okvir i konceptualni rečnik za kasniju diskurzivnu analizu; polazeći od ideje da je izgradnja nacionalnog identiteta relaciona, u njemu se predlaže pristup kojim bi se videlo kako ove dve Srbije konstruišu jedna drugu. Drugo poglavlje daje istorijski i politički kontekst iza prve i druge Srbije i sažima istorijske događaje u proteklih nekoliko decenija. Razmatranja od trećeg do šestog poglavlja obuhvataju noseći deo ove studije i sadrže glavni empirijski materijal koji se odnosi na ključne debate koje su zaokupljale srpsko javno mnjenje od ranih devedesetih godina dvadesetog veka do kraja 2012. godine. Tačnije, treće poglavlje prati poreklo Prve i Druge Srbije personifikovane kroz njihove vodeće javne intelektualne figure, i zastupa stanovište da je pitanje odgovornosti za zločine protiv čovečnosti predstavljalo ključnu tačku razdora između elita Prve i Druge Srbije posle 2000. godine; četvrto poglavlje skicira vodeće narative u vezi sa konstrukcijom i percepcijom Evrope i antagonizmom oko spajanja ili uklapanja srpskog identiteta sa evropskim vrednostima; peto poglavlje posvećeno je u celosti dvema debatama – prva, nazvana *Tačka razlaza*, vođena je mahom na stranicama nedeljnika *Vreme* 2002. godine, i pokazala je pukotine pa i razdor oko pitanja krivice, odgovornosti, žrtava i počinilaca u nekada ujedinjenom anti-miloševićevskom bloku. Druga, takozvana debata o „Misionarskoj inteligenciji", vođena je 2003. godine o tome ko su patriote i izdajnici među srpskim intelektualcima, a njen povod bio je istoimeni članak Slobodana Antonića, takođe objavljen u nedeljniku *Vreme*. Najzad, šesto poglavlje ima za predmet kako je nastao i razvijao se specifični „srpski auto-šovinizam" nakon 2000. godine.

Ukupno uzevši, knjiga Rasel Omaljev trezveno identifikuje glavne diskurzivne strategije koje su cirkulisale u srpskoj javnoj sferi, i uspeva da omeđi ideološki spektar srpskog društva svodeći ga na dve antitetičke pozicije. Ipak, utisak je da je njen širi i ambiciozniji cilj da se rasvetle strukture moći i transcendira ova dualistička logika i identitetsko-tvorački princip ostaje neispunjen. Ovo je prevashodno posledica njene metodologije, jer lingvistički utemeljena analiza diskursa koju sprovodi autorka može identifikovati diskurzivne strategije koje koriste obe grupe, ali ne može pružiti pun uvid u strukture moći bez nekakvog zalaženja u burdijeovsku analizu intelektualnog, kulturnog i političkog polja koja bi obuhvatila

njihova glasila, uticaje, položaje koje zauzimaju u društvu i slično. Stoga, njene analize u krajnjoj liniji završavaju u antitetičkim dijalektičkim opozicijama između dve Srbije.

Dalje, dok je suprotstavljanje Prve i Druge Srbije iz analitičkih razloga i zarad jasnoće opravdano, takođe postoji tendencija da se one predstave kao „dve glavne političke frakcije" (str. 222), što mi se čini manje opravdanim. Čitalac je mogao biti bolje obavešten o nejednakim pozicijama koje proponenti ove dve ideologije zauzimaju. „Prva" Srbija je bliska dominantnom diskursu i, smatram, dosta raširena među onima koji zauzimaju istaknute javne položaje u akademskoj i društvenoj sferi, a pogotovo u političkim partijama. Oni bi sebe, stoga, pre identifikovali jednostavno sa samom Srbijom, bez apozicija ili razlikovanja u odnosu na druge. „Druga" Srbija, sa svoje strane, prevashodno predstavlja pojam koji je koristila grupa antiratnih intelektualaca i aktivista od 1992. do 1995. godine, i njegova kasnija upotreba bila je pre simbolička i, čak, pežorativna kada je reč o njihovim oponentima. Prosto rečeno, danas bi bilo teško naći bilo koga u Srbiji sklonog da se identifikuje kao „Drugosrbijanac". Sve u svemu, ovi intelektualci su bili, a delimično i ostali, na margini – naravno, uz kratak rast političkog autoriteta kroz Građanski Savez Srbije u prvim godinama nakon pada Miloševića i njegovog režima.

Takođe, čini se da je primena ove binarne, relacione logike navela autorku da implicira kako sva pitanja imaju istu težinu – samo, naravno, suprotno značenje – za obe Srbije, i stoga da preceni značaj nacionalnog identiteta za „Drugu" Srbiju. Naime, ona tačno identifikuje kako se „Druga" Srbija konstituisala kroz „građanske vrednosti" i „kroz negiranje nacionalizma" (str. 176) i opravdano zapaža kako „akteri Druge Srbije ne govore i ne pišu u ime 'nacije' niti se obraćaju 'naciji' " (str. 119). Stoga, očekivalo bi se da među takvim autorima inicijalno istraživačko pitanje o stvaranju nacionalnog identiteta zauzima sporedno mesto i da se oni time bave u najboljoj meri samo lateralno i indirektno.

Sasvim sigurno, ova knjiga ume da prepozna suptilnosti novije srpske društvene i intelektualne istorije – tako, u više navrata, Rasel Omaljev ističe da je „Druga" Srbija „prevashodno grupa labavo povezanih intelektualaca" (str. 215) ili pojašnjava „da ambivalentnost pojmova Prva i Druga Srbija dodatno akcentuje fluidnost stavova koje oni opisuju, a koji nisu fiksni i, zapravo, mogu znatno varirati

1213

tokom vremena" (str. 23). Ukoliko čitalac ima ovo na umu i posmatra dve Srbije kao konceptualne metafore pre negoli kao empirijske dokaze o manihejsko-dualističkom stanju srpskog društva, i uz to ne očekuje da ovde nađe konačno rešenje pitanja modernog srpskog identiteta, ova knjiga predstavlja korisno i prijatno štivo, pogotovo za strane studente i čitaoce bez širokog poznavanja savremenog srpskog društva.

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Hartman, Nikolaj (1980) „O metodi istorije filozofije“, *Gledišta* 21 (6): 101–120.

U tekstu: (Hartman 1980: 108).

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U napomeni: Espozito 2002.

11. TEKSTOVI IZ ZBORNIKA

U spisku literature: prezime, ime autora, u zagradi godina, naslov teksta pod navodnicima, slovo „u“ (u zborniku), ime i prezime priređivača zbornika, u zagradi „prir.“, naslov zbornika u italiku, mesto izdanja, izdavač, dvotačka i broj stranice (ako je potrebno). U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. Skraćenica „str.“ dopuštena je samo u spisku literature.

Primer:

U literaturi: Nizbet, Robert (1999), „Jedinične ideje sociologije“, u A. Mimica (prir.), *Tekst i kontekst*, Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, str. 31–48.

U tekstu: (Nizbet 1999: 33).

U napomeni: Nizbet 1999: 33.

12. ČLANAK IZ NOVINA

U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina, naslov članka pod navodnicima, naslov novina u italiku, datum, stranica.

Primer:

U literaturi: Logar, Gordana (2009), „Zemlja bez fajronta“, *Danas*, 2. avgust, str. 12.

U tekstu: (Logar 2009: 12).

U napomeni: Logar 2009: 12.

13. INTERNET

Prilikom citiranja tekstova s interneta, osim internet-adrese sajta na kojem se tekst nalazi i naslova samog teksta, navesti i datum posete toj stranici, kao i dodatna određenja ukoliko su dostupna (godina, poglavlje i sl.).

Primer:

U literaturi: Ross, Kelley R., „Ontological Undecidability“, (internet) dostupno na: http://www.friesian.com/undecd-1.htm (pristupljeno 2. aprila 2009).

U tekstu: (Ross, internet).

U napomeni: Ross, internet.