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DEMOCRACY AND ETHICAL VALUES
DEMOKRATIJA I ETIČKE VREDNOSTI

I

Edited by Michal Sladeček

Editor's Preface

The articles from this issue were in its initial form presented at the series of lectures of *Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory* the “Democracy and Ethical Values”, which intention was to give an overview of current debates in political philosophy, ethics and social theory on the problems of the moral justification of democracy, that is, its ethical legitimacy. The discussion revolves on rethinking the relations between ethics and politics in conditions of increasing tendency of reducing democratic processes to legitimization of the political group's mandate to rule, or to procedure of party elites' assumption of authority. Democracy, in order to be justified, is in need of an independent values, in as much as purely procedural justification of political authority through intrinsically fair democratic processes may have an outcome in which equal status of citizens, as well as their basic rights, has been threaten. Thus the concept of democracy which is implied in the title of this issue has robust and distinctive normative content – its meaning is not exhausted in mechanisms of election and ruling within legal framework, but it also include moral justification of the institutions, as well as citizens' specific ethical values which democratic type of political action constitute.

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The frequent faux pas in comprehension of tendencies in recent democratic processes was partially caused by applying the type of political analysis which is oriented towards voters' rational choices and which regard individuals as self-interest machines. Beside survey of people's rational articulation of interests, an analysis of democracy cannot overlook judgments about values with its emotional weight which make political arena more sharply divisive. Agents in political debate opt for a particular set of values, the choice of which is not purely rational, and yet in order to avoid destructive conflicts they have to agree on impartial and open to all procedure in which they can defend and promulgate their values. The exploring of the relation between democracy and ethics points to distinctive ethos in conditions of pluralism of values, identities, interests, beliefs, etc., in which citizens have to, despite all differences, mutually regard themselves as equal and treat each other as legitimate participants in social life. In this sense, the central question is how and to what extent contemporary democratic processes uphold values such as tolerance, solidarity, personal autonomy, equal respect and common good, and the articles in this issue endeavour to shed light to the sphere of values as indispensable in democratic deliberation.

Finally, I am very grateful to Milan Podunavac, Ivan Mladenović, Aleksandar Dobrijević, Bojan Vranić and Đorđe Pavićević (whose lecture has been published in previous number of this journal) for accepting the invitation to participate on this series of lectures.

Bojan Vranić

Democratic Values, Emotions and Emotivism

Abstract The aim of this paper is to explore the relation between democratic values and emotions. The author argues that democratic values and emotional judgments are inter-reducible: political agents use emotional judgments to reflexively evaluate normative paradigms of political life. In the first part of the paper, the author describes the state of emotions in contemporary political philosophy and identifies Charles Stevenson's ethical conception of emotivism as the first comprehensive attempt to neutrally conceptualize emotions in moral and political thinking. The second part of the paper explores the shortcomings of emotivism and finds an adequate alternative in Martha Nussbaum's concept of emotional judgment as the one that contains beliefs and values about social objects. In the final part of the paper, the author identifies that moral and political disagreements emerge in democracies from ranking of the importance of political objects. The evaluation criteria for this type of ranking is derived from democratic values which are reducible to agents' emotional judgments.

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Keywords: *democracy, emotivism, emotional judgments, moral disagreement*

Introduction

After losing the 2013 elections in Australia, former labor prime minister Julia Gillard published an article in *The Guardian*, in which she analyzed the election defeat.¹ There is an intriguing message in the heart of this text: when a politician loses political power, it feels like an emotional upheaval of her or his world (Gillard, Internet). In the aftermath of the defeat, Gillard (Internet) remembers that she had “waves of sensations” that manifested themselves “like a pain that hits you like a fist, pain so strong you feel it in your guts, your nerve endings.” The situation was similar in the labor election camp where one could talk only about “the guilt” (Gillard, Internet) and that she felt that her colleagues shared this upheaval feeling with her. Gillard concludes the text with a notion of hope that from collective “grieving” there should spring a new “purpose” of the labor party: “To protect those who need us to shield them. To empower through opportunity. To decide what future we want for all our nation’s children and then build it” (Gillard, Internet).

1 The paper is a part of research project no. 179076, funded by Ministry of education, science and technological development – Republic of Serbia.

How should a political philosopher understand Gillard's message and its normative content? To answer this, a political philosopher should take into consideration at least two additional questions: (1) Why does Gillard describe the feeling of the loss of power as emotional upheaval and (2) what specific emotions form a cluster of that upheaval? If one looks at the mainstream theories of contemporary political philosophy, it is particularly worrying how empty the basket of analytical tools that can be used for understanding emotionally upheaval situations in political life is. Even if one manages to acquire such a tool, it is usually used for describing the behavior triggered by emotions. As Robert Solomon (1976: 129) argued, emotions (or passions) in social thought are usually taken for an irrational part of human nature which leads to suffering and inactivity.

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However, it is encouraging that in the last several decades, philosophers (Solomon 1976; Nussbaum 2004; Gilbert 2014; Freedman 2014) started to question this dominant paradigm about emotions. The hypothesis that appears in various forms in their works can be summarized in the following question: do our emotions have a structure of a judgment? If we return for a moment to Gillard's quest for a new purpose for the Australian labor party, that quest might have emerged from her emotional state, but it cannot be inferred from this state that such a quest is irrational. To set new political ends when a politician loses an election is a rational move. In Gillard's case, that move was derived from an emotional judgment, the one that she describes as collective grieving.

Mainstream political philosophers often ignore the emotional state of political actors and deduce rational behavior from impartial principles that are, *per definitionem*, deprived of subjectivity. One of the best critiques of the current state in political philosophy comes from ethics:

"In ethics, for example, moral knowledge has become equated with the elaboration of highly formalized and stylized decision procedures, with extremely general 'first principles,' and with manipulating the logical implications of hypothetical cases whose occurrence in daily life is either impossible or improbable. The result is the production of a kind of knowledge that has no valence, that does not speak to human needs, fears, and aspirations, and thus cannot attract the assent of the biographical self, but only a kind of purely logical assent. The further result may be, as Annette Baier claims, that the morality endorsed by many moral theorists 'is seriously endorsed only in their studies, not in the moral education they give their children, nor in their reflective attitude to their own past moral education, nor even in their attitude to how they teach their own courses in moral philosophy'" (Calhoun 2004: 112).

In this paper, I want to explore the relationship between emotions and democratic values. Democracy is a suitable subject for this kind of exploration

because it is a political arena where participants are in permanent contest over the meaning of values. I argue that political agents use emotional judgments to reflexively evaluate the normative paradigms of political life. Consequently, values as a traditional means of evaluating of political systems (primarily in political science but also in political philosophy) are reducible to emotional judgments. By explicating this reduction, I hope to shed new light on the role of emotion in political philosophy.

In the first part of the paper I will briefly analyze contemporary context and explain the lack of usage of the concept of emotions in political philosophy. I turn then to the first major attempt to solve this problem found in Stevenson's ethical conception of emotivism. In the second part of the paper I analyze the thesis of Robert Solomon who argues that emotions are purely subjective emotional judgments and Martha Nussbaum's account that emotional judgments are closely related to the values of a society. I conclude the paper with a description of the nature of the relation between emotional judgments and values.

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Political philosophy, impartiality and emotivism

The conflict between political philosophers who find that passions are an indiscernible part of politics and those who want to liberate political concepts from irrationalities reached its peak in the mid XX century. The critics of classical ethical and political thought of that period strongly argued against the normative dimension of moral judgments: in the best case scenario, the strength of moral judgments is in their emotional appeal.

This conflict turned into warfare between moral cognitivists and anti-cognitivist (Stojanovic 1968). Albeit cognitivist ethics won in this conflict, there were severe casualties, especially in the field of political philosophy. This is why the passion is dispelled from contemporary political philosophy, establishing the monopoly of the *ratio* that is supported by a new political science paradigm taken from economics. In a recently published text, Jon Elster (2004: 160) argues that the problem of passions and emotions lies in the probability calculus of political actions or inactions, i.e. that emotions need to be calculated two times in the account: firstly, as a variable that is dependent on an actor's motives and secondly as an ex-ante variable. Put differently, to take emotions into account in political behavior is to disregard the principle of elegance of a theory, i.e. the requirement that theses of a scientific theory should remain simple.

This account portrays well the dominant attitude toward emotions in political science. The problem with this kind of attitude is taking for granted that political behavior is causal. When Julian Gillard (Internet) lost her power as Australia's prime minister, she asked the following question: "Are election

victories the only measure of political success? (...) But surely our national story is written in more than statistics of election night. Our national story is shaped by what endures from the government as well as what is rejected.” What follows from Gillard’s assumption is that the measurability of political success is rational and economical, but the means that political agents use to evaluate political acts are inferred from *cultural* context. Therefore, one’s view of political success consists of rational and emotional components.

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A good way to start a quest to find an analytical means of evaluation in political context is by exploring the ethical doctrine of emotivism. Although it is considered to be vastly misunderstood and anachronistic today (Sattris 1982: 128), Charles Stevenson’s work *Ethics and Language* is a treasure house of analytical tools for analyzing non-rational moral judgments. My reason for opting for Stevenson’s work is twofold. Firstly, Stevenson’s analysis is a good example of how logical analysis can be applied to emotions and therefore has an introductory function to the argument for emotion as types of judgments. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1967: 671) described Stevenson’s theory as the one that “combines emotive and cognitive meanings of all sorts and fuses subjectivism with most types of objectivist naturalism.” Secondly, Stevenson takes a specific moral situation as his subject-matter, the one that implies an existence of moral disagreement between agents. This type of situation is especially important for democracy, because democracy represents a social context where moral disagreements are recognized as a “natural state.”

Stevenson’s main argument is that moral judgments consist of a recommendation for accepting a behavior *P*. This recommendation “involves something more than a disinterested description, or a cold debate about whether it is already approved, or when it is spontaneously going to be” (Stevenson 1958: 13). The structure of moral judgment has a rational basis (“disinterested description” and a “cold debate”) which Stevenson (1958, 3) terms as *attitudes* and defines them as beliefs (that are necessarily connected with objects in the world) which form relations that are verifiable or falsifiable. Attitudes provide information about expected behavior and serve as truth function to moral judgment, since there cannot be an agreement or disagreement on a non-belief (Stevenson 1958: 12). Therefore, this verifiable/falsifiable part of a moral judgment is a weak support for moral thinking and it cannot be considered as a sound ground for ethics.

This is why Stevenson claims that moral judgments need to involve something more that would have the function of a supporting beam for moral behavior. This kind of support Stevenson terms as *emotive meaning*.² This

2 The nature of the concept of emotive meaning is such that it is not reducible to rational part of a judgment. Emotive and rational part of a moral judgment support

concept is key to understanding why emotivism was the most popular ethical doctrine in the mid XX century but, more importantly, why it eventually failed. Stevenson (1958: 33) defines this concept in the following manner: “The emotive meaning of a word is the power that the word acquires, on account of its history in emotional situations, to evoke or directly express attitudes, as distinct from describing or designating them.” I will analyze two parts of the definition which are important for my argument, i.e. accumulation of power and the use of that power.

I will start with the latter. Stevenson makes a distinction between emotions and emotive meaning. Emotion is a subjective and internalized state, which is reflected in certain behavior when one is in a certain context (Stevenson 1958: 39). The use of emotions in this manner is something that the subject learns from his or her environment. Stated in this way, Stevenson’s theory is significantly distinctive from the James-Lange theory of emotion, because it puts emphasis on a socially dependent meaning of emotions. As Errol Bedford (1964: 83) argues, the consequence of this “social context” dependency is that “statements about emotions cannot be said to describe behavior; they interpret it.” That is to say that emotive meaning has a different logic than that which one uses when evaluating attitudes.

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I will explicate this view with an example. Suppose that Schrödinger used my cat, Steven, for his experiment. The outcome of the experiment as well as the paradox that sprang from it are well known. However, for me, as the emotionally involved party in this experiment, the question has a different emphasis and priority than solving the paradox of quantum mechanics: Is it justifiable to use Steven the cat for this kind of experiment? Put differently, I am using a different kind of logic while evaluating the justifiability of the experiment and its results. This becomes clear when reflecting the seemingly (or partly) paradoxical moment when Steven the cat was alive and dead at the same time. If I were to use rational means to explicate this situation, the fact that Steven is my cat would not change the outcome of the experiment: it is still a paradox. With emotive meaning, the logic of the evaluation changes: my emotion is a cluster³ of joy and sorrow, and behavioral reaction is *crying* over Steven the cat’s fate to be the guinea pig for an experiment that involves radioactive substances. Is this an *emotional paradox*? The answer is certainly negative. Everyone *knows* at least one situation where they were at the same time sad and happy (weddings, divorces, job changing etc.). Emotional meaning is socially dependent and therefore has a crucial role in moral disagreement.

each other. As Stevenson (1958: 80) argues, it is very difficult to find a judgment that is only rational or just emotive.

3 This cluster is probably consisted of several more emotions (excitement, horror, resistance, etc.), but they do not make a difference to the argument.

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Following this example, it becomes clear that crying (or lack of it) is a *learned* reaction to maltreatment of a living creature (this is even more emphasized when there is an emotional relationship with that creature, i.e. when the cat is your pet). Although it seems *prima facie* that it is sufficient to assert “x cries; x is witnessing a maltreatment of his pet” to infer “x is sad”, it is still not a necessary conclusion. In a given social context, where the experiment is inconclusive whether the cat is alive or dead at a certain moment, the emotional meaning of crying can also be a joyous reaction. Also, if one uses the descriptive method in order to conclusively infer the emotive meaning of crying, that wouldn’t be of great help. Stevenson (1958: 249) argues that the function of description is only to determine whether a behavior is rational or irrational: if the attitudes of a moral agent contain some epistemic fallacies, then it is a case of irrational behavior (e.g. I believe that Steven the cat is in the box, when in fact the box is empty). Irrational behavior is therefore a question for epistemology and not ethics. This is connected with the fact that moral disagreements can endure even after all epistemic difficulties were removed (e.g. I can keep worrying that next time, Steven the cat will indeed die in Schrödinger’s box).

This example demonstrates that Stevenson’s notion of “use of power” of a moral word has the function of solving disagreements by changing the logic of a situation, from a rational to an emotional one. Emotive meaning is socially and culturally dependent.⁴ Still, it remains to be explored what does it mean that a word has a *power* which charges it with emotional meaning. This can be best explicated by evoking Stevenson’s argument (1958: 60) that the meaning of a moral attitude remains solid even after the meaning of object that is connected to that attitude had changed. Therefore, the use of concept of power in Stevenson’s account fits the notion of *disposition*.

The concept of power comprehended as a disposition is not new in ethics. In *De Anima*, Aristotle (2008: 116, 433a-15) found that emotions (i.e. passions or desires) are a significant part of human behavior. However, he explicitly used the term disposition when defining the relation between passions/desires and the object of passion in book seven of *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle (1980: 37, 1105b-1) argued that this relation is a constant that follows one’s behavior when he or she is near the desired object, i.e.

4 Stevenson only briefly mentions that emotive meaning is learned through socialization. He argues that moral judgments are formed through a specific type of practice that extends to a lifetime and is also depended from situations in which these judgments are stated (Stevenson 1958: 91–92). Only several decades later, the thesis of emotional socialization took its form. For TenHouten (2006: 191), emotional socialization is a way for people to emotionally season through lifetime, developing more or less sensitivity towards other people’s attitudes. This led some authors (Baron-Koen 2013) to connect certain forms of emotional behavior, such as empathy, to the nature of evil.

in a condition to feel something about that object. Prior to explicating the nature of the relationship between disposition and the concept of power, it is important to analyze the question whether desire itself is a disposition (not only the relation between desire and the desired object)?

The answer to this question is negative. To state my argument, I will modify Aristotle's example from *De Anime* of a physician and his motivation to treat a patient. Aristotle (2008: 116, 433a-5) claimed that physician does not treat a patient due to the fact that he is skilled in the art of medicine. Formal knowledge of the art is a necessary condition for him to be in a social context of practicing medicine, but it is not sufficient. Both necessary and sufficient conditions are met only when the patient is actually in front of the physician, i.e. when they are socially interacting. The years of training in the art of medicine take the form of the *desire* to help and cure the patient. As Hannah Arendt (1978: 58) argued, in Aristotelian ethic it is necessary for the reason to include some kind of "calculation" in order to actualize the desire. Arendt (1978: 58) found that this type of calculus ethics (exemplified in the notion of *phronesis*) is deduced from the meaning of the concept of "*oregō*" which "indicates the stretching out of one's hand to reach for something nearby", and which Aristotle used as a synonym for a desire (*orexis*). In the example with the physician, his knowledge does not have the power to heal a patient; this power derives from the physician *acting*. This example shows that *acting* and *disposition* are synonyms, and disposition and desire are not.

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Aristotelian doctrine is very much present in Stevenson's theory of emotivism. The result of Stevenson's analysis (1958: 73) is an argument for a distinction between belief (knowledge, practices) and dispositions. The purpose of belief is in applying descriptive meanings of words used in a moral judging, while the purpose of dispositions is in evoking learned emotional meanings. For Stevenson (1958: 44), there is no equivalence between emotions and dispositions; emotions are reduced to behavioral reactions that are more or less morally appropriate in certain social contexts. The moral judgments, however, are independent from and irreducible to emotions.

This antireductionism and an escape from naïve subjectivism was the reason for the popularity of Stevenson's theory in the mid XX century. The greatest debates about emotivism were concentrated on the relationship between emotion and emotive meaning. The latter does not need to be followed by any kind of emotion. The function of emotive meaning is to *evaluate* whether an act and situation are congruent from society's point of view. If not, there need to be changes, whether in an agent's behavior or of social norms. In this sense, emotive meaning is both evaluative and *normative*. The twofold function of emotive meaning further dispels subjectivism but, at the same time, because of the premise of its social dependency,

emotivism dismisses universal moral principles and reduces them to socialization of cultural norms. Emotivism is not subjectivism but it has nevertheless been followed by psychological determinism.

This was the main reason why emotivism eventually declined. I will analyze this problem in detail and try to determine how emotivism can be modified to avoid the problem of psychological determinism. The overlap of emotive meaning and acting would be a simple process if it weren't for what Stevenson (1958: 90) designates as a consequence of the ambiguity of natural language.⁵ To avoid this kind of ambiguity, Stevenson designs a procedure for the formalization of ethical meanings that consists of a series of definitions that sharpen the meaning of the word and which he terms "the first pattern analysis" (1958: 89). The distinction between formal definitions and everyday usage of the word is purely analytical: the meaning is determined by language practices which assert what is good and just and what is corrupted and evil. The first pattern analysis serves to indicate the historical meaning and changes of the moral word and to isolate the emotional surplus of that word.

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This is a useful tool for explicating the social context and emotional history that is prior to interaction between moral agents. The result of the first pattern analysis is twofold: the description of the correct application of disposition within a context and a judgment that consists of assertions "I approve" or "I disapprove", which has a special behavioral function to arouse the emotive interest of the hearer (Stevenson 1958: 93). If this interest is not evoked, then one of two cases is true: either the word of which I approve/disapprove lost its emotional appeal or it has no meaning (the object to which it refers no longer exists or the hearer has lost any recollection of it).

The arousal of emotive interests is not necessarily related to both cognitive and affective elements. It is sufficient that only one of them is affected, in order to start the communication between moral agents. Castañeda (1967: 673) argues that this is one of the constitutive elements of the Stevenson's theory and terms it *the ethical-core thesis*:

"The characteristically ethical meaning of an expression, to be called its ethical core, consists of both the expression's emotive meaning and the expression's cognitive meaning consisting of its denoting some natural property or other. The statemental components F₁, . . . , F_n may vanish; in such a case the ethical meaning of the word in question conforms to the

5 This relation between moral word and natural language led some moral theorists to put emotivism into the basket of moral relativism. As Asher Moore (1958: 377) argued, emotivists spent more time in defending from these accusations than developing their thesis about emotive meaning of moral terms.

first pattern of analysis. The autobiographical component may vanish; in such a case the ethical meaning of the expression in question conforms to the second pattern of analysis" (Castañeda 1967: 673).

Castañeda's formalization of the thesis demonstrates well that the function of the first pattern analysis is the removal of ambiguities that the use of a *word* can lead to, especially when not all of the natural features of the object that the word connotes are known. The removal of ambiguities is not a morally contested process, because it is done by purely formal rules of analysis. What if, however, the "autobiographical components" of an agent's attitude are not communicable? If that is the case, then the analysis of the whole *assertion* is required in order to find the emotional meaning of the attitude (Castañeda 1967: 673). In this part of the analysis, the focus moves from the historical meanings to *persuasions*. Put differently, when the ambiguities are removed, and moral disagreement still persists, the only thing that agents can do is to try to persuade each other that the moral conception that they are respectively opting for is the best one. This is the part of Stevenson's second pattern of analysis.

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Stevenson (1957: 139) argues that persuasion is the ground of deliberation when all rational means for resolving the disagreement are exhausted. Persuasion is not irrational, but a non-rational way to settle a moral disagreement. Stevenson (1957: 221) infers that in a moral situation which cannot be solved via rational means, one can only apply the lexicographic sorting principle on the meaning of moral terms and then evaluate them on a ranking scale. This scale is not objective but subjective and for this reason, moral terms remain emotionally charged. Evaluation groups moral terms by their "family resemblances" (Stevenson 1957: 221) and ranks them by the strength of their emotional appeal.

If one is willing to sacrifice the universality of moral principles, and reduce them to social interactions between moral agents and their power to persuade one another, Stevenson's theory is an adequate basis for the analysis of moral thinking. When moral agents have accurate descriptions of the moral terms that they are using, the moral disagreement is to be settled by the agent's readiness to get emotionally involved in the matter. This would be rational behavior, if Stevenson's first pattern analysis should achieve its purpose. Stevenson's behavioral definition of emotion is too narrow. The problem can be summarized in the following question: if the emotion is reduced only to perceivable behavior, and it is not connected to the reflection of moral words and concepts, how is the evaluation in the second pattern of analysis possible? In order to see "family resemblances", one needs to know the criteria for family grouping, i.e. to be able to *conceptualize* emotions, not just show them. The criteria are blocked by psychological determinism which is generated by behavioral reduction. Finally,

to state that emotional meaning is the criteria for evaluation would be a vicious circle, because the disagreement started because of the emotional meaning of the attitude.

I will try to remove the problem of psychological determinism from the first pattern analysis by redefining the role of emotions in moral disagreement. I will argue that emotions have an active role in structuring values that form the agent's moral thinking.

Evaluative function of emotional judgments

In the previous several decades, philosophers and moral philosophers have been exploring the possibility of emotions having a regulative function in the life of an individual. The pioneering work in this field was Robert Solomon's book *The Passions* (1976). Solomon's work is also the first major break from the traditionally negative relation of philosophy to emotions, as well as from once very influential behavioral theory.

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Solomon explicated his stand on emotivism only recently and argued that the main problem with this ethical doctrine is the removal of rationality from emotive judgment (2007: 205). However, this was already implied in *The Passions*, where he stated that agents should strive to comprehend the logic of emotions:

“But it is also true that most emotions are shared in common by all people, whatever their differences in languages, customs, religion, etc. The logic of the emotions is in no case simply ‘the one’s own’; in every case the logic of emotions, once its parameters are known, is a public affair... Logic dictates the course that emotions will take, and that is where we expect them to go. Similarly, we criticize our own emotions, in reflections or retrospect, for their foolishness and stupidity, for their lack of justification and unreasonableness, and such criticism make sense only on the basis of an objective logical structure which we expect our emotions to follow” (Solomon 1976: 257).

Solomon's view is different from Stevenson's emotivism in at least two ways: (1) the emotions are not learned behavioral reactions – they are *autonomous* in their own logic; (2) the rational and emotional are different *ways of thinking*, both derived from the same objective basis.

To justify its cause, Solomon (1976, 180) introduced the concept of intention into his account: “To say that emotions are *intentional* is to say that they *essentially* have logical connections with the objects of our world... Emotions are not ‘mental states’... An emotion is a structure linking ourselves and the objects of our world which provide the structures of our world.” By introducing intentionality into an account about emotions, Solomon puts more emphasis on reflections. Emotions are not just a means of

communication; they have an autonomous role in converging a subject's world view with an objective one: "An emotion is a basic judgment about our Selves and our place in our world, the projection of the values and ideas, structures and mythologies, according to which we live and through which we experience our lives" (Solomon 1976: 187).

Solomon's subjectivism dispels the difference between emotions and emotional meaning and converges them into *emotional judgments*. For an agent, emotions have both structural and semantic roles by giving sense and meaning to the objects in the world.⁶ However, Solomon modified his original account to remove surplus intellectualism from emotions (Solomon 2007: 204). Solomon later argued that emotional judgments are inherently connected with acting about and not conceptualizing the world. To make this clear, Solomon (2007: 206) gave a useful example: Imagine that you are strolling down the street. Every step of the way you are making judgment about your direction (e.g. should you continue walking or stop by the window). Do you *think* about the judgment? No. If you, however, trip and fall, and when it comes to a disturbance in the structure of the walking-plan that you made, then you will stop, think and evaluate what had happened. Put differently, in situations of some sort of crisis, the emotional evaluation process increases, while in "normal" condition, thinking and evaluating our actions are in a "sleep mode."

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Solomon's account is very useful for analyzing emotional judgments in this kind of context and it can serve as a good basis for dispelling the problems of emotivism. When the theory of emotional judgments is applied to Stevenson's first pattern analysis, it broadens the role of emotions. Historical recollections are an important part of an emotional judgment but still just a part. For Solomon (2007: 257), emotional judgments create a network between internal moral world of agents and the world around them. The concept of network also changes Stevenson's idea on the use of power (disposition). The power of moral agents is a result of their ability to conceptualize a network between their emotions and the social world through acting.

The concept of emotional judgments is the first step in correcting emotivism. Is it now possible to argue for universality and normativity of moral judgments in the context of moral disagreement? Solomon (2007: 206) stated that emotions would be unintelligible if it were not for universal moral judgments that are irreducible to persuasions. However, due to the subjectivism of Solomon's account, universal moral judgments are still just a

6 Empirical research in issues of nationalism and national identity (Pantic 1995, Kecamanovic 1999), verify this thesis. Societies that are in a deep social crisis are often followed by value regression which manifests itself twofold: internally, through subjective disorientation as a consequence of demise of values, and externally as an absence of emotions that are important for maintaining a group cohesion.

psychological support for emotional judgments. Therefore, this universality is more like a communicability, i.e. it has the function of making the agent's emotional judgments communicable. If the theory can somehow justify that these moral judgments are not just communicable but universal, then emotions (transitively) would be equivalent to values. The structural consequence of this equivalence would be the inter-reducibility of emotions and values in moral theories.

734 I find that Martha Nussbaum's account offers justification for the idea that emotions and values are equivalent. Nussbaum (2004: 190) argues that emotions are not reducible to emotional judgments; they are a part of each other identity. This conclusion is inferred from four premises (Nussbaum 2004: 187–189): (1) the domain of an emotion has at least one object (the concept of “aboutness”); (2) the relation between emotion and object is intentional and it is linguistically expressed by propositional attitudes; (3) the emotions contain beliefs and perceptions about objects; (4) emotions bind objects and values together where emotional judgment has the role of the mediator.

Premises (3) and (4) are inferred from (1) and (2). The difference between these “groups of premises” is analytical, but very important. The first group of premises (1–2) are connected with authentic interpretation of objects by an agent. From the definition of intentionality, it follows that emotions have a crucial role in selecting objects that are important for an agent. Similar to Solomon's account, Nussbaum seems to argue that emotions have both structural and semantic roles. The difference is that Nussbaum deprives emotions of the feature of world-structuring and limits them to object-selecting (via intentionality). This unties the normative function of emotions from psychological grounds. The second group of premises (3–4) are means of agents' communication that are dependent on beliefs built within the first two premises. Nussbaum (2004: 189) argues that beliefs “are essential to the identity of the emotion” because they constitute the axis of disagreement between agents as well as the way to settle them.

If premise (3) identifies the disagreement, premise (4) identifies that the nature of disagreement lies in values. It should be stressed that inter-reducibility of emotions and values cannot be inferred solely from connection between objects and values. What can be inferred is that value disagreement was triggered by emotions. There are two processes that need to be taken into account when explicating value disagreement. Firstly, emotions make intrinsic values of an object communicable by relating them to social values. This feature of the premise (4) is derived from premise (2). Secondly, during that process, emotions necessarily select some intrinsic values and rank them on the basis of the agent's value system which does not need to be congruent with social values. This is derived from premise (1). This sheds

light on a consequence that was not *prima facie* clear. Due to their evaluative function, emotions have *the power* to make some objects more valuable than others by making them “ultimately finer and more discriminating than that made explicit in our earlier evaluative judgments” (Helm 2007: 228).

Nussbaum (2004: 193) argues that in a social context where some sort of disagreement persists, the emotions are preceded by a more or less intensive upheaval of the agent’s system of beliefs. This is connected to those emotional judgments that emotionally (re)select objects. The key change that Nussbaum brings to the discussion about emotional judgments is that this connection is *not a necessary one*.⁷ Nussbaum (2004: 194) finds that it is the natural language that is deceiving agents into believing that the connection is a necessary one since it is represented as a causal relation. It is plausible to imagine a context where a change is caused by disappearance of an object, that an agent had a strong emotional reaction to it, but that his or her belief system stays sound.⁸ To test the authenticity of emotions and the system of beliefs connected to them, Nussbaum (2004: 193) introduced the concept of upheaval: only when the emotion is strongly related to an upheaval, it is justified to argue that the agent is in a process of reevaluating his or her system of beliefs and harmonizing or conflicting it with a new social value system.

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The concept of upheaval is connected with emotions, but disagreement and its settling is a subject-matter of emotional judgment. This follows from premise (3), i.e. that the disagreement is always about agents’ beliefs. Emotional judgments have a *normative addition* which is not case with emotions. Albeit emotional judgments are a vital part of the identity of emotions, their form (propositional attitudes) limits the possibility that all features that are connected with the former are true for the latter, *salva veritate*. What is blocking the reduction is the agent’s need for a continuity of emotional relations in order to sanitize damage from the emotional upheaval. This implies that in some cases, beliefs are founded solely on the collective memory of an object that no longer exists (e.g. the

7 Stevenson asserts a similar conclusion, stating that descriptive and emotional meaning are in “constant interplay” (1957: 72). He points to the case of the feelings of most Americans toward the democratic political system as an example (1957: 73). According to Stevenson, Americans have a recollection of what democracy is and that they maintain this set of attitudes via the laudatory meaning of democratic values. What is important is that this recollection is not necessarily in congruence with the factual state of American democracy, which can bring change to the laudatory meaning of democracy or the democratic system itself.

8 Example: The nostalgia for social benefits of the communist state is a common emotion in post-communist societies (Kecmanovic 2008: 76), and yet, as empirical evidence shows (Diamond 1999: 178–183) it does not necessarily relate negative values with democratic system.

founding myths of a nation). But the converse can also be the case: one can have strong emotions about an object whose existence is an offence to all that society stands for, and still the normative order of the society can remain relatively solid (e.g. the case of representative democracy that respects the rights of minorities to an authentic value system). For this reason, the emotions and emotive judgments in Nussbaum's account are important for each other's identity, but this is not a logical type of identity. Reduction is false if all elements cannot be reduced to the same basis. In the case of emotions and emotional judgments, reducibility is impossible due to a strong network that exists between the latter and the normative order of the society. The existence of this network allows me to conclude that emotional judgments and values are inter-reducible. Emotional judgments are knotted into the normative order of the society once the agents settle at least one of disagreements. Emotional judgments, therefore, have normative features.

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Concluding remarks: democratic values are emotional judgments

My analysis has shown that the plausible version of emotivism is the one consisting of the first pattern analysis that describes both the form and the meaning of moral terms in use, and the second part of the analysis that maps the network of emotional judgments that are to be used in the settling of moral disagreements. This modified emotivism does not damage Stevenson's basic idea that emotions are at the core of moral disagreements. The advantage of the modified emotivism is that it determines the relations between emotions and values and finds that their overlapping point is emotive judgments, i.e. value inferences derived from propositional moral attitudes.

Is this modified emotivism verifiable? In order to answer the question, I need the context where disagreeing is a natural state for actors. As stated previously, this context is to be found in democracy.

It is a truism that political decisions in democracies are reached by a consensus among all participating parties. What is contestable is the nature of this consensus, i.e. whether it is rational. One of the key points of emotivism is that purely rational conceptions of resolving moral disagreement are essentially incompatible with the ways that actors actually behave, which is both rational and emotional. To put this differently, political decisions in democratic processes is value-oriented and, due to the emotional nature of values, *partial*.

The term "partiality" should be used somewhat cautiously because, in this case, its purpose is merely technical. Partiality here emphasizes the fact

that agents choose to use one cluster of values in democratic debates over an other, and that nature of this choice is often not rational. In his most recent book, Michael Freeden (2015: 87) argues that emotions play a vital role in agents' *ranking* of the objects that they value the most and adjust them to the existing order of the social values. When partiality is comprehended as ranking, it becomes clear that this term is closely related to the concept of the freedom of choice as an inherently democratic value. In the context of democratic decision making, ranking is a purely political act. Therefore, it is true *per definitionem* that the emotional judgments that one uses to rank political objects are a political act as well.

This enables me to conclude that values (at least political ones) are reducible to emotional judgments. That is to say that a political philosopher, when justifying political principles and decisions, needs to take into account both rational and emotional elements of actual (i.e. socially and culturally dependent) behavior. As Margaret Gilbert (2014: 23–24) stressed, in order for an emotion to be a collective one, i.e. to be found as valuable by most, there must be a joint commitment of population P to be a body of emotion E; and for this commitment to be true, there must be *sufficient reason* for that. Since sufficient reasons for E are synonymous to justification for accepting E as a collective emotion, joint commitments can be defined as a “network of emotional judgments that forms the consensus.”

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Every political act, if it is to be morally justified and legitimately recognized as intrinsically democratic one, it must be supported by an emotional judgment. Since emotional judgments are to be accepted as collective emotions only when they contain sufficient reasons for those emotions, it follows that emotional judgments and values are inter-reducible.

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Bojan Vranić

Demokratske vrednosti, emocije i emotivizam

Sažetak

Cilj rada je da istraži odnos između demokratskih vrednosti i emocija. Autor tvrdi da su demokratske vrednosti i emocije međusobno svodljivi: politički akteri služe se emocionalnim sudovima kako bi refleksivno ocenili normativne paradigme političkog života. U prvom delu rada, autor opisuje stanje u savremenoj političkoj filozofiji u vezi sa emocijama i identifikuje etičku koncepciju emotivizma Čarlsa Stivenzona kao prvi celoviti pokušaj neutralne konceptualizacije emocija u moralnom i političkom mišljenju. Drugi deo rada istražuje nedostatke emotivizma i nalazi adekvatnu alternativu u konceptu emocionalnih sudova Marte Nusbaum, kao one koja uključuje verovanja o društvenim objektima i njihove vrednosti. U zaključnom delu rada, autor tvrdi da su moralni i politički sporovi u demokraciji rezultat rangiranja političkih objekata po važnosti. Kriterijum evaluacije takvog tipa rangiranja je izveden is demokratskih vrednosti koje su svodljive na emocionalne sudove aktera.

Cljučne reči: demokratija, emotivizam, emocionalni sudovi, moralni sporovi.

Ivan Mladenović

Justifying Democracy and Its Authority

Abstract In this paper I will discuss a recent attempt of justifying democracy and its authority. It pertains to recently published papers by Niko Kolodny, which complement each other and taken together practically assume a form of a monograph (Kolodny 2014a, Kolodny 2014b). It could be said that Kolodny's approach is a non-standard one given that he avoids typical ways of justifying democracy. Namely, when a justification of democracy is concerned, Kolodny maintains that it is necessary to offer a kind of an independent justification. It is not so much that he insists that the usual approaches are wrong as much as that an independent justification is necessary in order to discern what it is that gives them their significance. Kolodny's independent justification of democracy is based on the idea of social equality. In this paper I will try to reconstruct and critically assess Kolodny's approach by paying special attention to the question of democratic authority.

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Keywords: democracy, instrumental justification, intrinsic justification, equal opportunity for influence, democratic authority

When justifying democracy it is necessary to adduce certain values such as freedom, equality, justice, dignity.¹ The basic idea is that democratic decision making is to a greater extent than other forms of decision making in accordance with these values. However, “in accordance with these values“ can have a twofold interpretation. First, it can be assumed that it concerns values which are independent of democratic decision making; democratic procedure is then justified to the degree to which its outcomes advance or at least do not conflict with these independent values. We then speak about instrumental justification of democracy because democratic procedures are justified to the extent to which they contribute to preservation or advancement of values that are independent of the procedure itself. Second, it can be assumed that certain values are integral to the very procedure of democratic decision making. In that sense, we say that procedures which guarantee free and equal access to the process of decision making are intrinsically fair. We then speak about intrinsic justification of democracy because democratic procedures themselves are justified on the basis of their intrinsic characteristics.

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Therefore, a theorist attempting to provide a normative justification of democracy encounters two dilemmas. The first dilemma concerns the most adequate way of justifying democracy. The second dilemma concerns the values that should be given precedence when justifying democracy. If the first dilemma is concerned, a justification of democracy can be either monistic or dualistic (Christiano 2004: 266). If we opt for one of the aforementioned types of justification, then our justification is monistic, which means that it is either purely instrumental or purely procedural. But a justification of democracy can also be dualistic, if we maintain that it is necessary for this task to take into account intrinsic fairness of procedures, but also some values which are independent of procedures. When the second dilemma is concerned, an approach can also be either monistic or pluralistic. Namely, an attempt to justify democracy can either be based on only one value (for example, equality or autonomy) or on an entire set of values, seen either independently or as a part of a democratic decision making procedure. Therefore, when justifying democracy we usually adopt either monistic or dualistic approach in terms of the type of justification and we usually adopt either monistic or pluralistic approach in terms of values.

It is noteworthy that a justification of democracy must not necessarily imply a justification of its authority. The justification of political authority primarily refers to the question about the source of political obligation. An answer to this question can also be either monistic or dualistic. I think that an answer to the question about the source of democratic authority must necessarily be dualistic. Namely, both instrumental and purely procedural justifications of democratic authority encounter familiar problems. A purely instrumental justification faces the problem of indeterminacy. If outcomes of an undemocratic way of decision making largely contribute to preservation or advancement of independent values, then this way of decision making should be given precedence over democracy. Therefore, the very source of political obligation remains indeterminate. A purely procedural justification of democratic authority encounters the problem of indistinctiveness. Namely, no matter how unfair outcomes of a democratic decision making may be, citizens equally bear political obligations, given the intrinsic fairness of democratic procedures. It seems to me that dualism is necessary in order to address problems of indeterminacy and indistinctiveness. In brief, a solution for the problem of indeterminacy consists in adducing intrinsic fairness of procedures which distinguish democracy from other forms of political decision making. The solution for the problem of indistinctiveness consists in adducing an independent value that enables an independent assessment of outcomes of democratic decision making. If procedures are intrinsically fair and if their outcomes at least do not undermine independent values (such as freedom and equality), then we also have an adequate justification of democratic authority, which obviously has

to be dualistic. An interesting question which has not been sufficiently discussed is whether a justification of democratic authority should be monistic or pluralistic in terms of values. Without further reflection on this issue, I will assume that when justifying democratic authority, one can also adopt either monistic or pluralistic approach in terms of values.

In this paper I will discuss a recent attempt of justifying democracy and its authority. It pertains to recently published papers by Niko Kolodny, which complement each other and taken together practically assume a form of a monograph (Kolodny 2014a, Kolodny 2014b). It could be said that Kolodny's approach is non-standard given that he avoids typical monistic ways of justifying democracy, consequently not juxtaposing it to a dualistic alternative. Namely, when a justification of democracy is concerned, Kolodny maintains that it is necessary to offer a kind of an independent justification. It is not so much that he insists that the two usual monistic approaches are wrong as much as that an independent justification is necessary in order to discern what it is that gives them their significance. Kolodny's independent justification of democracy is based on the idea of social equality. Considering that it is based on only the value of equality, employing previously explained terminology one can say that it is monistic in terms of values. In the remainder of this paper, I will try to reconstruct and critically assess Kolodny's approach. I will begin with Kolodny's definition of a democratic decision making:

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What is it for a political decision to be “democratically” made? As a more or less stipulated starting point, I say that a political decision is democratically made when it is made by a process that gives everyone subject to it equal or both equal and positive, formal or both formal and informal opportunity for informed influence either over it or over decisions that delegate the making of it. (Kolodny 2014a: 197)

Obviously, the essential thing about democracy according to the definition is an equal opportunity for influence. However, as can be seen, this opportunity for influence can be only equal or both equal and positive and can be only formal or both formal and informal. If an only equal opportunity is concerned, then a democratic decision making also includes lottery which gives to everyone an equal, but not a positive opportunity for influence, because a decision of each individual participant does not necessarily have to be reflected in the outcome, as is the case with voting. In the case of voting, an opportunity for influence would be both equal and positive. To safeguard this, a formal equality regarding an opportunity for influence is necessary. It includes a universal voting right but also an assumption that each vote is weighted equally. The opportunity for influence is equal not only in formal but also in informal sense when resources necessary for an informed participation in a democratic process have been distributed on an egalitarian basis.

Kolodny thinks that there are the three questions to which a justification of democracy should provide a solution:

1. Institutions: Why should we want, or establish, or maintain democratic institutions? Why do we, in general, have reason to try, over the long run, to make political decisions democratically?
2. Authority: Why does the fact that a political decision was made democratically contribute, *pro tanto*, to my being morally required, as an official or a citizen of the relevant polity, to implement or comply with it?
3. Legitimacy: Why does the fact that a political decision was made democratically contribute, *pro tanto*, to its being permissible to implement it, even despite its treating me, as a citizen of the relevant polity, in distinctively “political” ways that, at least in other contexts, are objectionable, such as using force against me, threatening to use force against me, or coercing me? (Kolodny 2014a: 197)

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Now Kolodny suggests the following strategy of justification of democracy. Considering that democracy has been defined as an equal (or both equal and positive) opportunity for influence over decision making, the first step is to look for an independent justification of such a view of democracy. Once an independent justification for an equal opportunity for influence over decision making has been provided, on these foundations all three questions related to justification of democracy are to be resolved. In this paper I shall particularly focus on his solution to the question of Authority. However, before I proceed to discuss the first step of Kolodny’s strategy of a justification of democracy, another clarification regarding his approach is in order.

Namely, Kolodny distinguishes between interests in correspondence, interests in influence and substantive interests (Kolodny 2014a: 199). These are different kinds of interests which citizens have in connection with political decision making in a society. At first glance, considering that democracy has been defined only in terms of influence, adducing two other kinds of interests seems superfluous. However, it seems that Kolodny introduces these two additional kinds of interests in order to suggest that there are some difficulties in usual ways of justifying democracy. In a nutshell, interests in correspondence pertain to the fact that outcomes of political decision making are in accordance with our preferences and judgments. Interests in influence pertain to an opportunity for our preferences or judgments to positively influence the final decision. Substantive interests pertain to realization of some substantive values in outcomes of political decision making (for example, that decisions contribute to the achievement of freedom, welfare, justice etc).

What is the problem with interests in correspondence? Obviously, a democratic decision making is not necessary for interests in correspondence to be satisfied. A benevolent despot could bring a decision that would satisfy preferences of a large number of citizens even though they have not had the opportunity to express their preferences in a decision making process. For example, Mill maintained that the chance that a benevolent despot could know the preferences of citizens better than citizens themselves were very slim which is why democracy should be given precedence over other forms of political decision making (Mill 1861/1977: Chapter III). The question however is whether this is an argument in favor of interests in correspondence. The opportunity for people to express their preferences in a process of democratic decision making does not mean that these preferences would necessarily be reflected in an outcome of decision making. Therefore, Mill's argument should rather be understood as related to interests in influence.

Kolodny points to additional problems with interests in correspondence. Namely, a statistical sample could show which preferences and judgments a majority of citizens hold. If it is so, interests in correspondence could be satisfied if a decision is brought on the basis of consulting this statistic sample. However, such a decision would hardly be considered democratic (Kolodny 2014a: 207). What this argument suggests is that interests in influence are essential for a democratic decision making. Furthermore, an additional problem concerns what kind of preferences should be met. Do any preferences a person currently holds have to be taken into account or only informed preferences? This gives rise to a dilemma whether an inferior decision that takes into account preferences of each person as they are should be accepted or a superior decision that requires a person to revise her preferences in the light of information and reasons offered by other people (Kolodny 2014a: 207). In any case, it is not clear whether satisfying interests in correspondence requires that others adjust to a given person or that she revises her preferences in the light of a better argument.

What is the problem with substantive interests? Obviously, the idea of substantive interests suggests instrumental justification of democracy. An instrumental justification of democracy first presupposes that there are substantive interests which are independent of the process of political decision making. It subsequently argues that democracy, in general, is a more reliable way over the long run to protect and advance substantive interests than any other form of political decision making. Kolodny gives two arguments which show what the problem with substantive interests in political decision making is and consequently also with an instrumental justification of democracy. The first problem is that the fact that a democratic decision making, in general, leads to better outcomes regarding substantive interests does not provide a solution to the issue of Authority and Legitimacy in each individual application of a democratic procedure. In other words,

that democratic institutions are, in general, justified does not guarantee legitimacy and authority of democracy in each particular case. Kolodny terms this problem the Bridging Problem (Kolodny 2014a: 201). The second problem is that if it is some elite that would bring a decision that would satisfy substantive interests better than a democratic decision making, it still makes sense to raise a question why would anyone be excluded from a process of decision making. The decision making by an elite rejects what Kolodny terms the Equality Constraint in line with which “if a procedure gives anyone a say, it should give everyone an equal say” (Kolodny 2014a: 202). Since we cannot adduce substantive interests, it is necessary to look for some other foundation of the Equality Constraint. And it is only the interests in influence that remain at the disposal for this purpose.

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The previous reconstruction of Kolodny’s standpoint could be summed up in the following way. Democracy is largely defined as an equal opportunity for influence over political decision making. The justification of democracy includes two steps. The first step is to offer an independent justification for democracy, that is, to solve the issue what the foundation of an equal possibility for influence over decision making is. The second step is to answer the questions of Institutions, Authority and Legitimacy. In addition to interests in influence, Kolodny also introduces interests in correspondence and substantive interests, ascertaining that they are not adequate for a justification of democracy, which leaves us only with interests in influence. Considering that an instrumental justification of democracy which is based on substantive interests encounters two problems, the Bridging Problem and the impossibility of deriving the Equality Constraint, the question is raised whether these problems can be solved if interests in influence are taken into account. If it could be shown that there is an independent justification for an equal opportunity for influence over decision making, then this solution could lead to the second part of justification which pertains to Institutions, Authority and Legitimacy. Or at least this is what Kolodny assumes.

I have already suggested that the first step in Kolodny’s justification of democracy is based on the idea of social equality. The basic idea is first to show that social equality is the basis of an equal opportunity for influence over political decision making. Kolodny points out that examples of a slave or a servant manifestly illustrate social inequality. Our rejection of slavery suggests an attitude that permanent social relations should be based on social equality. It implies that social relations should be such that there is anyone else who would be above us but also that there is anyone else who would be below us. Or, as Kolodny puts it, social equality implies an idea about “a society in which none rules over any other” (Kolodny 2014a: 196). He claims that social inequality is actually based on three things: power, *de facto* authority and greater consideration (Kolodny 2014b: 295–296). Namely, if

some have greater power and others do not have any right to limit it or if some have a position of authority which others also do not have any right to limit or if some have greater consideration on the basis of some properties such as wealth or race, then we have an asymmetrical relation which is typical of social inequality. Social inequality can be reported in either a political or a non-political domain, for example at work or in the family.

Kolodny, however, maintains that the following characteristics of political decision making suggest that decision making in this domain should be in accordance with social equality: “that subjection to them is not voluntary, that they are treated as having final authority, and that they involve the use of force” (Kolodny 2014a: 226). In order to avoid asymmetry of power and authority in the political domain, it is necessary that regarding power and authority all citizens have an equal opportunity for influence. It is thus avoided that any person should have greater consideration when making a decision. Since democracy has been defined as an equal opportunity for influence over political decision making, it means that it is an important integral part of social equality. Or as Kolodny says “the thesis, then, is that it is a particularly important component of relations of social equality among individuals that they enjoy equal opportunity for influence over the political decisions to which they are subject” (Kolodny 2014b: 308). He interprets the phrase “a particularly important component” as implying that without an equal opportunity for influence over political decisions, full or ideal social equality is not possible, and that even when full social equality cannot be attained, an equal opportunity for influence brings us closer to this ideal (Kolodny 2014b: 308–309). This completes the first part of a justification of democracy, that is, an independent justification of democracy on the basis of social equality.

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However, the first objection to Kolodny’s justification of democracy can be made here. Namely, it is not entirely clear how one arrives from social equality to democracy. Let us call this the original bridging problem. I think that any justification of democracy either in terms of justice or equality has to show how the given conception of justice or equality establishes democracy (Christiano 2008). Therefore it is not a coincidence that usual devices for solving the original bridging problem include either actual or hypothetical consent. Or more recently public reason or some criterion of acceptability (Estlund 2008: Chapter III). The solution of the original bridging problem according to these conceptions leads to solving what Kolodny terms the Bridging Problem because it provides a foundation for a solution to the questions of Authority and Legitimacy. Since Kolodny does not show how to proceed from social equality to arrive to democracy, the original bridging problem remains unresolved. In that regard, his claim that social equality implies an equal opportunity for influence over political decision-making is not of great avail (Kolodny 2014a: 227). This claim

actually presupposes what has to be proved, namely that democracy is an important constitutive part of social equality.

Let us proceed to the second part of a justification of democracy which provides solution to the questions of Institutions, Authority and Legitimacy. In what follows, as I have already suggested, I will focus only on the question of Authority. This is how Kolodny thinks that previous discussion could help us answer the question of Authority:

If I were to disregard the democratic decision, then I would be depriving others of equal opportunity to influence this very decision. For influence over the decision, in the sense relevant in this context, is not simply influence over what gets engraved on tablets or printed in registers; it is influence over what is actually done. Insofar as relations of social equality are partly constituted by precisely that equal opportunity for influence, I would be, by depriving others of that equal influence, relating to them as a social superior, at least in that instance. If others have a claim on me to avoid relations of social superiority, then they have at least that claim on me to implement the democratic decision. (Kolodny 2014b: 315)

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As we can see, Kolodny maintains that the foundation of democracy on the idea of social equality can help us resolve the Bridging Problem (by assuming that the first step in justification established what Kolodny terms the Equality Constraint). Namely, according to this view, we have political obligations because disrespecting decisions of democratic decision making process would imply that we do not consider that every citizen has an equal opportunity for influence over political decision making, which means that we reject the idea of social equality. But since the idea of social equality is something we accept independently of democratic decision making, as well as that an equal opportunity for influence is an important constitutive part of social equality, we do have an obligation to comply with outcomes of democratic decision making. Therefore, democratic authority also has a foundation in social equality, and it requires that in each case of a democratic decision making we adhere by the given decision. Thereby the Bridging Problem is resolved, at least when the question of Authority is concerned.

It seems however that the second part of justification of democracy, at least when the question of Authority is concerned, also encounters certain problems. We have previously emphasized that Kolodny's justification of democracy is monistic in terms of values because it is based only on the value of social equality. We are now in the position to see that Kolodny's justification of democratic authority is also monistic in terms of values. However, this relying on monism in terms of values, that is, exclusive aducing of the value of equality creates certain problems similar to those with which pure proceduralism is faced when it comes to justifying democratic authority. Namely, according to this view, we have the obligation to

comply with decisions which ensue from democratic procedures because these very procedures are intrinsically fair. The problem for this view is that it is not clear whether there are any limits to authority of democracy. The problem of indistinctiveness here equally applies. It turns out that there is no difference regarding political obligations between decisions which are fair and those which are deeply unfair, which for example suspend some fundamental rights and freedoms. We have consequently argued that certain type of dualism which includes an intrinsic fairness of procedures but also independent values is necessary for a justification of democratic authority. Kolodny's justification of democratic authority also encounters the problem of indistinctiveness. Namely, decisions may be such that an equal opportunity for influence has been fully acknowledged and that decisions are nevertheless deeply unfair, for instance suspending some fundamental rights and freedoms. The requirement of social equality requires that such decisions be equally respected as other fair decisions. But then it cannot be seen what the limits of democratic authority are. It seems that what creates a problem is monism in terms of values when justifying authority of democracy. Therefore, analogous to rejection of monism in a justification of democratic authority, monism in terms of values when justifying authority of democracy should also be rejected.

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In this paper I have considered a significant recent attempt of justifying democracy and its authority. Namely, in his papers, Niko Kolodny has offered a justification of democracy and its authority which is based on social equality. The first step in that endeavor is to offer an independent justification of an equal opportunity for influence over political decision making on the basis of the idea of social equality. The second step implies that the Equality Constraint can help us provide a solution to the questions of Institutions, Authority and Legitimacy. The solution to these issues, according to Kolodny, enables us to solve what he terms the Bridging Problem, that is, suggests why using democratic procedures, which are in general justified, generates legitimacy and political obligations in particular cases. I have concluded that both steps of Kolodny's justification of democracy encounter serious problems. The first step in the justification encounters the problem which I have termed the original bridging problem. In short, Kolodny has not demonstrated how to arrive from social equality to democracy. The second step in the justification encounters the problem of indistinctiveness. In short, the fact that Kolodny's justification of democratic authority is monistic, that is, is based only on the value of social equality, raises the problem that some deeply unfair decisions which, for instance, suspend some fundamental rights and freedoms, equally generate political obligations. I have suggested that this problem can be avoided by providing a dualistic justification of democratic authority and by rejecting monism of values in this type of justification.

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Ivan Mladenović

Opravdanje demokratije i njenog autoriteta

Apstrakt

U ovom radu diskutovaćemo jedan skorašnji pokušaj opravdanja demokratije i njenog autoriteta. Reč je o nedavno objavljenim tekstovima Nika Kolodnjija (Niko Kolodny), koji se međusobno dopunjuju i uzeti zajedno skoro da imaju oblik monografije (Kolodny 2014a, Kolodny 2014b). Moglo bi se reći da je Kolodnjijev pristup nestandardan s obzirom da on izbegava tipične načine opravdanja demokratije. Naime, kada je reč o opravdanju demokratije, Kolodnji smatra da je potrebno ponuditi neku vrstu nezavisnog opravdanja u odnosu na uobičajene pristupe. Ne insistira se toliko da su dva uobičajena pristupa pogrešna, koliko da je potrebno nezavisno opravdanje kako bi se uvidelo ono što im uopšte daje bilo kakav značaj. Kolodnjijevo nezavisno opravdanje demokratije zasniva se na ideji o društvenoj jednakosti. U radu ćemo nastojati da rekonstruišemo i kritički procenimo Kolodnjijevo stanovište posvećujući posebnu pažnju pitanju autoriteta demokratije.

Ključne reči: demokratija, instrumentalno opravdanje, intrinzično opravdanje, jednaka mogućnost za uticaj, autoritet demokratije

Aleksandar Dobrijević

The Dualism of Practical Reason and the Autonomy: Sidgwick's Pessimism and Kant's Optimism

Abstract The question this paper is concerned with is: what if Immanuel Kant found a solution to the problem of the dualism of practical reason before Henry Sidgwick even came to formulate it? A comparison of Sidgwick's and Kant's approach to the problem of the dualism of practical reason is presented only in general terms, but the author concludes that this is sufficient for grasping the advantage of Kant's solution to the problem.

Keywords: Henry Sidgwick, Immanuel Kant, the dualism of practical reason, autonomy, pessimism, optimism

An amusing and persistent anecdote that had followed Henry Sidgwick for decades – namely, that he is the most famous philosopher that no one has ever heard of – cannot really be associated with his name any more.¹ To become aware of this one needs only to take a look at the monographs written in the past several years about or inspired by his ethics.² Surely, in professional academic circles Sidgwick's book *The Methods of Ethics* (1981 [1907]) has been acknowledged since its first edition (1874) as one of the most important achievements in the history of ethics, as a classic work – and it's still recognized as such.³ However, even those who proclaim the book to be an unsurpassable study in philosophical ethics admit that it is sometimes dull (Parfit 2011: xxxiii), written in the style of a complicated, technical treatise (Singer 2000: xiv). Hence it shouldn't come as a surprise that it was mostly experts in philosophical ethics who took on the task of studying this undoubtedly important and difficult book and that it couldn't engage the interest of philosophers with different philosophical orientations,⁴ let alone a broader audience.

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2 See: Schultz (2004), Nakano-Okuno (2011), Philips (2011), Parfit (2011), Lazari-Radek and Singer (2014), Hurka (2014), Crisp (2015).

3 Cf. Broad (1930:143), Parfit (2011: xxxiii).

4 After reading the book Alfred North Whitehead was even deterred from engaging in ethics at all (Harrod 1951: 76). On the other hand, some moral philosophers gladly acknowledge Sidgwick as the "philosopher's philosopher" (Singer 2000: xiv).

Regardless, all experts and interpreters of Sidgwick's ethics agree on one thing: namely, that he formulated a fundamental problem of practical philosophy⁵ that, by his own admission, he didn't succeed in solving, and which has apparently remained unsolved within his own, in the broader sense, consequentialist theory. This problem – known as the “dualism of practical reason” – represents Sidgwick's genuine legacy: just about all of his successors have tried to come up with a rational solution (that is, with a justification of the rational insolubility) to the problem, or, if they are his critics, to declare it a badly formulated problem that as such should be dismissed. However, our intention here isn't to assess the cogency of all of the offered suggestions, since that requires their comparison and, quite certainly, a lot more space. Likewise, given the limited number of pages we won't go into detail about Sidgwick's complex theory of dualism. Still, there is one comparison we don't wish to avoid: the one between Sidgwick's and the so-called Kantian approach to the problem of the dualism of practical reason.⁶ The comparison shall, of course, be quite simplified, at the risk of leaving out some important details, whose elaboration requires a larger study.

But before we make a closer comparison of these two approaches it seems appropriate to ask the question: to what extent did Sidgwick engage with Kant's ethics? Marcus Singer (Singer 2000: xlii) noted that Sidgwick – although an author of several essays on Kant's metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mathematics – had barely and, so to speak, incidentally written about Kant's ethics.⁷ We tend to agree with Singer's remark that Sidgwick's lack of a more adequate engagement with Kant's ethics may reveal the most serious deficiencies of his own approach (Singer 2000: xlii). In other words, what if Kant, in his own distinct manner, had solved the problem of the dualism of practical reason before Sidgwick, in his own distinct manner, even came to formulate it?

5 Although Sidgwick would, following Joseph Butler, rather say that he *reformulated* it: “Butler's express statement of the duality of the regulative principles in human nature constitutes an important step in ethical speculation; since it brings into clear view the most fundamental difference between the ethical thought of modern England and that of the old Greco-Roman world... [i]n Platonism and Stoicism, and in Greek moral philosophy generally, but one regulative and governing faculty is recognised under the name of Reason – however the regulation of Reason may be understood; in the modern ethical view, when it has worked itself clear, there are found to be two, – Universal Reason and Egoistic Reason, or Conscience and Self-Love” (Sidgwick 1931 [1886]: 197-198).

6 We assume that Kant, like Sidgwick, could have been familiar with Butler's conception of the “duality of the regulative principles” (see footnote 4).

7 A few pages in the *Outlines of the History of Ethics* (Sidgwick 1931 [1886]: 271-278) and an essay about Kant's understanding of the freedom of the will, which was later reprinted as an appendix in *The Methods of Ethics*.

The phrase “dualism of practical reason” appears three times in *The Methods of Ethics* (1981 [1907]: xii (preface to the second edition), xxi (preface to the sixth edition) and 404, n. 1). However, the whole closing chapter of the book is dedicated to the nature of the problem, which Sidgwick understands as “the most profound problem of ethics” (1981 [1907]): 386, n. 4). In an important article “Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies” (Sidgwick 2000 [1889]: 43) this problem is alternatively named “the dualism of rational or governing principles”. To put it briefly, Sidgwick is worried, to a level of gloominess and pessimism (cf. Mackie 1992), about the possibility of an irreconcilable conflict of moral normativity and the normativity of prudence. Regarding the two equally rational and ultimate ends of our practical reason, according to Sidgwick – our own good and universal good⁸ – this conflict is presented in three forms: between interest and duty, between personal and general happiness, and between the two methods of ethics (utilitarianism and egoism, i.e. impartial reasoning and rational egoism). Sidgwick’s pessimism consists in his belief that one can’t always expect *success* when it comes to solving a possible conflict between the concern for our own good and the concern for universal good.⁹ Since practical reason has at its disposal two equally justifiable rational and ultimate ends, which may at times lead to a suspension of decision-making, it cannot as such rely on its own capacities “to frame a perfect ideal of rational conduct” (Sidgwick 1874: 473). Because of its inherent inability or lack of capacity, it’s as if practical reason evokes some kind of an external impartial instance (God), the only thing which could provide a congruence of that what we ought to do on the grounds of prudence and that what we ought to do on moral grounds. Even if the separate demands of morality and prudence often coincide in our experience, the unprovability of the existence of a just warrantor of their congruence is proof of its contingency and incompleteness (cf. Sidgwick 1981 [1907]): 506-509; McLeod 2000: 276; Orsi 2008: 19), which means that practical reason can sometimes prescribe mutually exclusive courses of action.

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8 “The rationality of self-regard seemed to me as undeniable as the rationality of self-sacrifice” (Sidgwick 1981 [1907]: xx); “It is... reasonable for an individual to make an ultimate sacrifice of his happiness for the sake of the greater happiness of others, as well as reasonable for him to take his own happiness as ultimate end... [T]he fulfilment of Duty [is] ultimately reasonable for the individual no less than the pursuit of self-interest” (Sidgwick 2000 [1889]: 45-46); cf. Parfit 2016: 169-170.

9 Exactly the opposite – the only thing we can expect, given the equal strength of the demands of morality and the demands of prudence, is *inevitable failure* – those are the words in which Sidgwick ends the first edition of *The Methods of Ethics* (Sidgwick 1874: 473).

There are three dominant ways of understanding the relationship between the realm of morality and the realm of prudence in the history of ethics:¹⁰

1. between these two equally valid normative realms there exists a harmonic or collaborative relationship – didn't Plato and Aristotle repeatedly say that to live morally is to live according to our own interests, i.e. in accordance with rationality?; this understanding is certainly in line with Joseph Butler and Thomas Hobbes, as well as contemporary Hobbesians such as David Gauthier and Gregory Kavka; what the defenders of this understanding have in common is the opinion that a reconciliation is achievable in case of a possible conflict between the two normative realms;
2. considering the initially equal rational power of our own demands, in case of a conflict between the two normative realms there is rather a disharmonic relationship; this "dualism of practical reason" demonstrates how impotent the practical reason is when it comes to solving the conflict, which ultimately leads to the "triumph of skepticism" (Sidgwick 1874: 472) regarding the "rational authority of morality" (cf. Brink 1992: 203-204); since prudential and moral reasons can be compared in terms of their rational power, Sidgwick allows for the possibility of calling into the question the authority of morality if at some point prudential reasons become stronger;
3. between the two normative realms there is no relationship of equality (in terms of strength) but rather of hierarchy; morality, namely, with regard to prudence, always has an overriding strength. Kantians are not the only ones who hold this view, but also some utilitarians whose writing are inspired by both Kant and Sidgwick such as, for example, Richard Hare (cf. 1981: 24); within the framework of this understanding the question of the dualism of practical reason shouldn't even be asked, since any possible conflict or lack of coincidence between the prudential and moral demands would be automatically solved for the benefit of the latter.

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From what has been said so far it is clear that we are advocating the third interpretation of the relationship between the realm of morality and the realm of prudence, although we won't be referring only to the concept of overridingness but will try and demonstrate that the difference between these two realms lies in different sources of their normativity, which ultimately undermines Sidgwick's utilitarian presumption that practical reason is entirely maximizing.

The problematic nature of Sidgwick's theory of dualism originates from his emphasis on egoism as a method of ethics,¹¹ which gave the final shape to

¹⁰ The most precious synoptic outlook on this typology of understandings is given by Owen McLeod (2001: 269-271).

¹¹ It was already Sidgwick's student G. E. Moore who headed towards rejecting egoism as a theory of *ethics* (cf. Moore, 1993: 150ff).

his moral axioms. Since utilitarianism and egoism have in common two presumptions – that only happiness is a value in itself and that it should be maximized – both theories support the argument that practical reason must be a maximizing one. And since both egoism and utilitarianism assert the same source of reason (happiness) and the same type of reason (maximizing, promoting) it cannot be demonstrated that utilitarianism is easier to justify than egoism (cf. Hills 2003: 316, 326). Thereof Sidgwick’s moral axioms have the following form: there exists a self-evident axiom that one ought to maximize one’s own happiness, just as there is a self-evident axiom that one ought to maximize the general happiness (cf. Sidgwick 1981 [1907]: 386-387; 418; Sidgwick 2000 [1889]: 44). However, he notices that from this there seems to follow “an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct” (Sidgwick 1981 [1907]: 508).

Three problems emerge from this fundamental contradiction: one practical and two epistemological (cf. Orsi 2008: 20-21). The practical problem consists in that neither of the two axioms can’t have a preponderance over the other. If this were the case than practical reason would be divided against itself, which could entail a deadlock in decision-making and governing – we simply wouldn’t be able to prescribe to ourselves how we ought to act. The first epistemological problem consists in the following: even if the two axiomatic maxims can be mutually exclusive, they can’t both be intuitive, i.e. self-evident, because “[t]he propositions accepted as self-evident must be mutually consistent” (Sidgwick 1981 [1907]: 341).¹² The second and more far-reaching epistemological problem Sidgwick formulates as follows: “I do not mean that if we gave up the hope of attaining a practical solution of this fundamental contradiction, through any legitimately obtained conclusion or postulate as to the moral order of the world, it would become reasonable for us to abandon morality altogether: but it would seem necessary to abandon the idea of rationalizing it completely” (Sidgwick 1981 [1907]: 508).

This more far-reaching, epistemological, inclusive and practical problem (that blocks decision-making and thus undermines the concept of autonomy) presents a real challenge to the Kantian ethics. Although there are many structural and historical impediments to an adequate comparison

12 However, if John Mackie’s interpretation of Sidgwick is right, this epistemological problem can be discarded: “[W]e are left with the competing apparent intuitions that it is rational for a man to seek his own happiness and that it is rational for a man to seek the general happiness. These are not in themselves contradictory: A contradiction arises only when we add to these two intuitions the factual statement that what best promotes a man’s own happiness does not always coincide with what best promotes the general happiness. It is the facts that decide whether the two intuitions come into practical conflict or not” (Mackie 1992: 170).

of Kant's and Sidgwick's ethics that shouldn't prevent us from highlighting some relevant differences. Firstly, contrary to Sidgwick, whose ethics ends on a gloomy note with the unsolvable dualism of practical reason, Kant's ethics starts from this dualism and the thesis that solving it is possible strictly under the condition of a complete rationalization of morality. Kant's optimism consists precisely in this possibility.

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If we consistently follow Kant's dualistic or dichotomic descriptions (duty/inclination, autonomy/heteronomy, will/desire, anthroponomy/anthropology, etc.) we'll see that he presupposes two different types of values – namely, moral value (the intrinsic value of the good will) and prudential value (the instrumental value of happiness).¹³ These types of values have various, heterogeneous origins. Certainly, this axiological dualism is associated with the general duality of reason (a priori, intelligible) and sensibility (a posteriori, empirical) which underlies the whole of Kant's philosophy. In the realm of practical philosophy the dualism is expressed through two types of normativity (morality as a motivational superposition of acting out of duty, and prudence as a motivational subposition of acting out of interest or self-love), and two types of imperatives (categorical/hypothetical, reason-based/materially determined reasons for action). One could say that morality understood as a type of normativity is supernormative, while prudence is subnormative. Moral value is an anthroponomically-based unconditioned good (of a volitive origin in reason), while prudential value is anthropologically-based, conditioned good (of empirical, pathological origin) (cf. Kant 1996: 534; Bader 2015: 175). Although Kant admits that happiness is a necessary demand of every rational but needy being (cf. Kant 1996: 159), the material conditionality of the value of happiness¹⁴ demonstrates how prudence, understood as a subnormative source of demands for happiness, can be overcome when conflicted with duty understood as supernormativity, as moral action based on a priori reasons.

It's precisely Sidgwick's ahierarchical understanding of these two types of values which prevents their satisfactory ordering and assessment. We already know the outcome: morality and prudence can produce conflicting demands, if left without the instance that would resolve the conflict and privilege one over the other. Practical reason is left in an irresolvable conflict whenever morality and prudence demand different action, threatening thus to undermine the coherence of practical reason (Bader 2015: 177), wherefore, according to Sidgwick's famous metaphor, "Cosmos of Duty is thus really reduced to a Chaos" (Sidgwick 1874: 473).

13 In the description that follows we mostly pursue and repeat the brilliant interpretation of Ralf M. Bader (2015).

14 Which is "based on the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, which can never be assumed to be universally directed to the same objects" (Kant 1996: 159).

Kant's treatment of the dualism of practical reason enables us to overcome this threat. According to him, it is precisely the conditionality of happiness (interest) which allows us to avoid the conflict between morality and prudence, hence the situations in which practical reason is faced with incompatible demands. The instrumental demands of prudence, in order to be allowed, must be compatible with the good will as an intrinsic value. Ralf Bader illustrates this quite convincingly in his important essay:

“When the action that makes one happy is impermissible, the condition of the value of happiness would be undermined by performing this action. Though happiness results from the action, no value is thereby realized. Since the action does not produce anything of prudential value, there is no prudential reason to perform it. That is, given that the normative force attaching to hypothetical imperatives derives from the value of the end that is to be realized, it follows that if the condition of the value of the end fails to be satisfied, then no value will result from the realization of the end, which implies that one does not have any reason to take the means. Because the value of happiness is conditional, the claims of prudence that are based on this value will also be conditional. In this way, the claims of prudence can be silenced by the requirements of duty” (Bader 2015: 185).

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Sidgwick's doubt about the possibility of a consistent rationalization of morality (the epistemological problem), and his preference for heteronomy over autonomy (the practical problem) – under the guise of rational coercion – means for Kant just another unjustified pretension of a content-based ethics. Hence, to choose between Sidgwick's pessimism and Kant's optimism in respect to the solution of the problem of dualism of practical reason may just be another false dilemma.

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Aleksandar Dobrijević

Dualizam praktičkog uma i autonomija:
Sidžvikov pesimizam i Kantov optimizam

Apstrakt

U ovom tekstu postavlja se pitanje šta ako je Imanuel Kant rešio problem dualizma praktičkog uma pre nego što je Henri Sidžvik uopšte stigao da ga formuliše? Komparacija između sidžvikovskog i kantovskog pristupa problemu dualizma praktičkog uma ovde se pruža tek u opštim crtama, ali autor zaključuje da je i to dovoljno kako bi se uvidela prednost Kantovog rešenja tog problema.

Ključne reči: Henri Sidžvik, Imanuel Kant, dualizam praktičkog uma, autonomija, pesimizam, optimizam

Michal Sládeček

Second-order Impartiality and Public Sphere

Abstract In the first part of the text the distinction between first- and second-order impartiality, along with Brian Barry's thorough elaboration of their characteristics and the differences between them, is examined. While the former impartiality is related to non-favoring fellow-persons in everyday occasions, the latter is manifested in the institutional structure of society and its political and public morality. In the second part of the article, the concept of public impartiality is introduced through analysis of two examples. In the first example, a Caledonian Club with its exclusive membership is considered as a form of association which is partial, but nevertheless morally acceptable. In the second example, the so-called Heinz dilemma has been reconsidered and the author points to some flaws in Barry's interpretation, arguing that Heinz's right of giving advantage to his wife's life over property rights can be recognized through mitigating circumstances, and this partiality can be appreciated in the public sphere. Thus, public impartiality imposes limits to the restrictiveness and rigidity of political impartiality implied in second-order morality.

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Keywords: Brian Barry, first- and second-order impartiality, justice, moral justification, public sphere

1. Introduction

The initial stance of modern ethical theories is that local morality, or ethical relations between mutually close persons does not cover the entire span of moral assessments and duties at all.¹ Moreover, overcoming the ethics of interpersonal relations, that is, traditional ethical particularism which determines obligations through the social roles of persons becomes a challenge: morality should include relations which do not belong to the face-to-face category, and thus include both relations towards distant persons in a public sphere as well as relations to strangers and those with whom we have nothing in common but humanity. It cannot be reflected in how people should act only from the context of mutual relations in a family, neighborhood or among friends. These interpersonal relationships include both the justified and unjustified partiality which people display towards each other and persons have the acknowledgment of the rights of giving priority to members of their family, friends, neighbours or colleagues in

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certain situations. On the other hand, it is argued that the public sphere should contain objectivity, equal treatment and non-favoring any person or group and thus any form of partiality or discrimination on a certain basis is morally dubious to say the least.² Moral dubiousness, but not proscription is mentioned because forcing impartiality (as well as narrowing its scope to the level of political relationships) is often problematic: does a society, state or public have legitimate authority to impose an institutional moderation for relations between members of a club, to determine ethical boundaries of freedom of association and regulate inclusion or exclusion of membership or to, for example, leave relations between an employer and employee in the sphere of personal preferences, mutual consent and direct agreement?

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In political philosophy, when examining public and political impartiality, the almost inevitable point of reference is distinction between first-order and second-order impartiality, elaborated by Brian Barry, primarily in his book *Justice as Impartiality*. This distinction will serve as the basis for consideration of questions of impartiality in the public sphere. Therefore, the first part of this article contains an exposition of certain of Barry's important standpoints, that is, the theory of justice as the second-order impartiality, while the second part of the article problematizes and further examines relations of such impartiality and the public sphere.

Polemics between advocates of impartiality and its critics had been amongst the most vibrant in ethics over the past few decades, where, roughly speaking, on one hand there are defenders of various consequentialist and deontological ethical conceptions, while on the other hand there are philosophers such as Bernard Williams, Cottingham and Scheffler,³ who claim that morality must take into account the specific role of subjects and their relationships – according to this conception, in certain circumstances, such as when people depend on us, impartiality towards personal projects or fellow persons is morally unjustifiable. Some utilitarian-consequentialist and Kantian-deontological ethics argue that the good of each individual is equally valuable and that moral obligations with their bindings are not determined by a subject's personal interconnections and his/her relationships with others, thus it is not morally valid to favor any person no matter how strong our affiliation to the person is. Justice is one and it is uniform: if a stranger suffers a greater injustice than I do or a member of my family, I

2 On this occasion, we will set aside political impartiality which should be restrictive regarding any partiality at least when it comes to the relation of institutions towards the citizens, and thus it is considered that institutions, although they prioritize citizens' rights and interests, have "negative" duties towards non-citizens, such as fulfilling basic moral considerations and not causing harm.

3 Cf. Williams 1981; Cottingham 1984; Scheffler 2010.

have to, due to justice, endeavor to correct the injustice to this person regardless of my own needs or the demands of my fellows. Unlike 'conventional' morality, universal morality determines rights and duties which are in force no matter which context we are speaking about, and in this case general duties cannot be affected by heteronomous and particularist motives, instead they should have priority in relation to particular obligations stemming from previous connections and affections.

On the other hand, those who advocate moral impartiality claim that there are ethical reasons why it is justifiable that an individual leans towards certain people with whom he/she has a special relationship. Parenthood, friendship, coworkers' relations, neighborhood, etc. carry a legitimate right as well as the obligation of a biased behavior. Moreover, these are paradigm cases of actions when there is an obligation of partiality: we have a duty to take care of our parents or children, and not of those of others, we have a strong duty to help a friend, but not a distant stranger. Characteristics and intensity depend on the type of relationship with another person, and since the specific nature of relationship brings a specific partiality, it can be claimed that there cannot be a general pattern of partiality – just like connections, affiliations and commitments are specific, partialities have their *sui generis* characteristics too. Relations such as friendship, parenthood, coworkers' relations, club membership, as well as relationships between persons sharing the same nationality, religion or ethnicity can however be compared with one another and in this way there can be acquired a conception of properties and limits of legitimacy of partiality, but each of these relationships requires a special justification. For example, paternalism is an inseparable part of raising a child, but not of relations between coworkers, thus it would be inappropriate for a boss to have the right of examining social lives of employees. We do not have the same obligations towards distant people of our nationality (presuming that we have it), as we do towards our friends.

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2. Two Levels of Impartiality

Still, in its extreme either-or form, neither morality of partiality nor morality of impartiality are common, that is, both philosophical analysis and everyday moral judgment most often justify partiality or impartiality depending on the domain and context, supposing that partiality in some way must be incorporated in general moral demands, that is, that morality has shortcomings if it eliminates agent-oriented demands. Barry rejects substantial moral universalism as well as its criticism by such as communitarianism, ethical particularism and ethics of care and the following paragraphs will tell more about his solution which leads onto the distinction between the first-order and second-order impartiality.

The source of a persistent conflict between morality based on impartiality and ethical demands resulting from special connections is found, according to Barry, in the confusion of various moral domains, levels or spheres, where there are different types of partiality and impartiality. More precisely, the first-order impartiality is expressed in the sphere of everyday interaction, that is, in interpersonal relationships. Barry states that morality in this sphere implies actions which incorporates the impartial norms in the form of moral recommendations – utilitarianism and deontological theories are such conceptions of the first-order, since they directly set and validate norms and proscribe the scope and limits of the behavior of the individual. Therefore, being impartial in this sense means not being motivated by personal reasons nor personal motives, hence a person would refer to demands of other people in the same way as to his/her very own demands or those of his/her close friends or family. It is legitimate for an individual to take care of their own children and not the children of others, but in case where a person is selected to be a judge in a competition in which his/her child is participating, then the person is expected to be impartial. Also, it would be rather morally appalling if a parent should favor one of his/her children over the another, even if the parent has a better relationship with the first child or if they have more in common. In certain contexts, motives resulting from affection can be a justification when it comes to one's own children and not children of others', but not when it comes to unequal treatment of one's own children.

Second-order impartiality operates on a different level – it could be said that it covers rules, principles and institutions which refer to first-order impartiality. While the first-order morality gives directions regarding how a person should act, second-order morality answers the question of what the meaning of morality itself is. Or: within first-order morality we ask what kind of friends we should choose, whereas within second-order morality we ask the question of how the practice of free non-imposed choice of friends should be justified, that is, it refers to a set of rules or norms necessary for individuals or groups to have the possibility of choice. We have to seek for a justification of our practices in terms accessible to all, which leads us towards second-order morality.⁴ While in personal relations partiality, as well as impartiality are legitimate depending on the context, second-order impartiality is crucial for the political sphere because it is assumed that unbiased treatment, which does not favor anyone regardless of social status, gender, race, ethnicity or cultural and confessional belonging, is in fact the first characteristic of justice. When led by impartiality, the principles of justice cover rules which enable societies to avoid violent conflicts, since well-formed principles of justice imply that no one has a reasonable

4 Barry 1998: 255.

objection regarding him/her being treated with bias, that they are discriminated against or that they suffer unequal treatment.

Problems occur if, within substantial ethical theories (which Rawls calls comprehensive) such as certain abovementioned consequentialist and deontological theories, there is a tendency to constitute the universal first-order impartiality which would be judgmental towards partial behavior in relation to fellow persons in every context.⁵ Such universal impartiality is an easy target for critics of moral impartiality, but there is still the question of whether they hit that target, because most consequentialist and deontological conceptions endeavor to justify partiality from their own positions, that is, to formulate basic principles which would allow it. For example, a more complex utilitarianism assumes that it is extremely valuable, or that it create a significant good, if an individual has a right to prioritize his/her projects, their personal relationships or freedom to form ethical conceptions, as well as that the state in which this right is respected is more valuable than the one where such rights do not exist.⁶

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Barry still doubts that utilitarian or Kantian perspectives may properly formulate the principles of second-order impartiality, agreeing with Rawls' stance that adequate formulation requires a conception of justice which is not based on a substantial or comprehensive conception of good. Contractualist theories, such as Rawls' and Scanlon's, which Barry quotes, should be considered as second-order constructs which describe actions of justification and rational constituting of principles which are at the level of

5 Scheffler and Nagel make this mistake as well, because they emphasize the importance of ethical partiality and reject impartiality assuming that the entire impartiality is the first-order impartiality (Barry 1995: 247). In Barry's conception of two level moral theory one level is not opposing the other as a critical instance revising ordinary or substantive moral reasons, as it is claimed in Hare's two-level moral theory. (Hare 1981) When it comes to similarity with Frankfurt's distinction between first and second order desire, Frankfurt argue that I and others have the "capacity for reflective self-evaluation", which is the predisposition of having second-order desire (Frankfurt 1971: 7), as well as the existence of second-order impartiality. However, Frankfurt's analysis refers to the level of individual ethical action, while Barry has in mind the forming of principles which regulate life with others. Barry's concepts of first- and second-order impartiality owe a lot to Rawls' distinction between justification of individual acts and justification of the very moral practice (whereas these justifications are not interchangeable) which he mentions in "Two Concepts of Rules". For example, if in a utilitarian moral theory we do not differentiate morality of first and second order, it could lead to a the conclusion that persons have the liberty to judge every particular act according to a general utilitarian position. In that case, people have the rights to break a promise when breaking it leads to a greater good. (Rawls 1955: 18)

6 Cf. Arneson (1998: 81): „So if individual discretion is highly productive of good consequences, a society ruled by concern to maximize good consequences will make ample room for individual discretion.“

the first-order complex and conflicting. Even though Barry's position is unspecific regarding whether the principles of justice are mediators or a balance when it comes to conflicting conceptions of good and whether as such they should be neutral regarding their content, that is, whether they are concerned with neutrality between conceptions of good or with the impartial right for their advocacy,⁷ it is important that the principles of second-order impartiality are formed in a manner which avoids irrevocable conflicts which, among others, occur if there is one conception of good that is promulgated as binding for a society as a whole.⁸

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Unlike the conception of justice as impartiality based on the independence of principles of justice from visions of the good life, substantial or comprehensive ethical conceptions presuppose the existence of the integrated set of principles of first and second order. Utilitarianism can thus continue to apply utilitarian moral principles on the justification of institutional order. According to contractualist theories, utilitarianism, as well as some similar conceptions, such as the explanation of justice as the mutual advantage that individuals acquire when they accept and hold on to certain principles, are insufficient at explaining principles of second order. Rawls argues mutual advantage principles are considered to be *modus vivendi* principles which, when applied to the basic structure of society, lead towards the state in which every interested group tends to change the principles of justice for their own interests in a situation that is different from the original where they were formed and accepted. Let us imagine that a certain institutional arrangement establishes the creation of citizens of the first and second order in accordance with criterion of ethnicity. This arrangement openly disagrees with justice as impartiality and – in line with the Scanlonian thesis on the unacceptability of principles of justice if certain individuals or groups have got a justifiable reason for their rejection – we can assume that members of some groups will not accept to be discriminated against and tend either to (eventually) separate themselves from the institutional frame, or to change the given principles setting up the definition of equality of persons. In the case of imposing a special status, the principles of impartiality are better means of establishing civil equality than principles which are justified on the basis of mutual advantage: the latter leads to an unstable coalition between ethnic groups, which is undermined when one group estimates that by abolishing of coalition and resorting to violent means can achieve a more favorable situation.⁹ Impartiality integrates the

7 Barry 1995: 12, 29-30, 76. Cf. Sládeček 2016.

8 Barry asks: Is there a conception of good which would deserve collective pursuit, which no reasonable subject could reasonably reject? He concludes that no positive or first-level conception of the good could pass this test, thus no one can expect special advantage for their own conception of good. (Barry 1998: 234; 1995: 160)

9 Barry 1995: 114.

moral aspect with the political one, unlike the other key theoretic concepts such as overall utility, balance and stability, which provides feasible social cooperation and coordination on closely equal terms for all, but they do not ensure the satisfying moral justification.¹⁰

Second-order impartiality assumes that there is agreement around the principle of discretionary right (that is, that there is no reasonable rejection of these principles) within which partiality is justified. Just as they demand their rights, persons accept the right of others to follow their own projects, independently raise their own children, decide who their friends are going to be and, most important for public impartiality, to form associations based on principles and criteria which they autonomously choose, and to individually or collectively follow their own conceptions of the good. Second-order impartiality does not provide instructions on how people should live, instead it tells us how to live along with other people: it provides a framework of this co-living, a certain set of norms, rights and duties which prohibit certain things, allow others, and leave some to the discretionary rights of each person. According to Scanlon's test which Barry often quotes, people would reasonably reject any principles of justice which includes significant violations of right to discretion in person's own affairs and interests.¹¹

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It should be noticed that this conception draws a lot from Rawls' theory of justice as fairness.¹² In this theory, the impartiality does not refer to certain specific moral cases, but to the 'basic structure of a society'. This is a political and, in a wider sense than that, public impartiality: it does not refer to the ethical principles of the actions of individuals in a private domain, instead it is applied to the norms of actions of institutions, or moral norms of justice necessary for a social cooperation of individuals and groups. Apart from assessing moral justification of a legal and economic order, it also regulates the coexistence of individuals and groups which mutually differ based on race,

10 One of those concepts is agreement, which stems from utility and mutual advantage through following rational self-interest. Agreement enables stability, but the stability can be supported with bad moral reasons. (cf. Nielsen 1994: 515-516.) In some situations where unequal bargain power is sustained, for individuals cooperation with the stronger, with those who degrade them and exploit their weakness, is rational if non-cooperation leads to their comparatively worse position. For the sake of stability, or to maintain civil peace and order, individuals can hand a significant portion of their facilities or a portion of their time to other people, and in that way be on the brink of slavery.

11 Cf. Scanlon 1998: 153; Barry 1995: 192, 200.

12 Barry agrees, too: „And finally, I point out that Rawls's theory of justice is (like mine) a two-level theory that requires impartiality only at the point at which principles are to be chosen.” (Barry 1998: 246) Just like in Rawls's case of fairness, impartiality is a condition for political morality which should be publicly approved: „Impartiality is here /among supporters of impartiality/ seen as a test to be applied to the moral and legal rules of a society; one which asks about their acceptability among free and equal people.” (Barry 1995: 194.)

religion, ethnicity, culture, etc. while at the same time it assesses whether individuals or groups display justifiable or unjustifiable partiality. What appears beyond its reach is the individual way of living and life projects, as well as ethical character of friendship, family relations, relations within religious communities and similar (of course, except where the internal relationships, such as oppression and exploitation, are morally unacceptable in a general sense). Due to the fact they ensures equal discretionary right for all individuals to follow freely selected reasonable conceptions of the good, principles of public impartiality are incompatible with endeavor to impose certain ethical or religious conceptions as dominant and mandatory for all members of the society.¹³

3. Public Sphere and Partiality: Two Examples

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Inadequately determined limits of principles of second-order impartiality in the public sphere would cause a situation where they would regulate either too much or too little – in the first case it would jeopardize freedom of association and the right to follow conception of the good, whereas in the second case when scope of impartiality is too limited, such as in libertarian political morality, it would tolerate relations of dominance in family relations or relations between employers and employees, insisting on the public or institutions not having any right to influence relations between family members or business associates.

As has been said, justification of partiality and impartiality varies depending on the circumstances and characteristics of associative relationships. Some cases, such as choice of friends, parental care and criteria of club membership are examples in which individual, couple or group have thier discretionary right to favoritism. Moreover, the imposition of universal impartiality on the first two cases would be immoral, as it would jeopardize not only autonomy and freedom of choice, but also the human need to trust and rely on somebody, and also would lead to neglecting the significant needs of children. In the third case freedom to assemble, or person's

13 Rawls claims that citizens who are supposed to choose the principles of justice have a burden of judgments emerging from the fact of pluralism, that is, from the existence of non-identical but still reasonable conceptions of the good, the variety of which results in part from the distinct perspectives of citizens. (Rawls 1993: 58) Barry also emphasizes equal representation of interests which should be examined in order to determine whether the actual societies approximate to the “circumstances of impartiality”. Societies which articulate the interests of all relevant groups are closer to circumstances of impartiality than those where these interests are suppressed. This does not refer only to groups determined by identity such as ethnicity, gender or race: the society where business is well organized, whereas unions are weak is farther from circumstances of impartiality than those where the interests of employers and employees are on an equal footing. (cf. Barry 1989: 347-348.)

right to form associations on condition chosen by herself and voluntarily join a partnership or union which she considers valuable will be infringed.

However, the state and all its institutions, such as the judiciary and bureaucracy, are obliged to act neutrally and not give advantage to any individual or group. Non-discrimination should be mandatory in restaurants, shops, theatres, schools (although it is debatable if public schools funded by confessional organizations are neutral, in as much as they implement religious agendas). Formally speaking, the non-discriminatory character of association can be regarded as a prerequisite for licencing and recognition as a public association.¹⁴ However, some association, such as clubs, which are legally allowed in certain western liberal-democratic states, set special requirements as conditions for the membership, such as ethnocultural background, and therefore it is disputable whether and in which way second-order morality can tolerate the exclusivity of the membership of this kind.

One of the clubs in which the question of public impartiality and its limits can be raised is the Caledonian Club in London, which is defined by its ethnocultural mark. As such, this club can be classified as impermissibly discriminative, however ethnicity or Scottish origin is not an exclusive requirement, as numerous other ties with Scotland and Scottish heritage suffice to gain club membership.¹⁵ In that way, discrimination become much less strict, and conditional membership is intertwined with voluntary membership, as considerable significance is given to enthusiasm to join, notwithstanding no meeting outlined requirements.

This type of association is legitimized through preserving culture and cultural ties, which does not imply discrediting or threatening other cultures, so in this regard exclusivity is not morally unacceptable. Therefore, the important consideration is a moral threshold and the question whether or not it has been overstepped. Having in mind relative openness and legitimacy

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14 The exception is strictly private clubs which are not open to the public, and they are subjected to restrictions from which registered club are exempted – for example, private clubs in the USA cannot claim tax exemptions. In the same country, anti-discriminatory rules are applicable to social clubs which are engaged in commercial activities. Some cities, according to a U. S. Supreme court rule, may force large private clubs to admit minorities and women. In the UK, Equality Act 2010 ruled that all associations with more than 25 members are subject to anti-discrimination act. However, from the standpoint of second-order impartiality it may be considered as intriguing why clubs are allowed to discriminate on the basis of social standing, as numerous clubs do.

15 Some of the additional conditions are: being closely associated with a multi-national employer's Scottish interests, having been educated in Scotland and having been resident in Scotland for at least five years. Even those loose requirements are not definitive, because it is also stated that „if you are suitably qualified (by being a Scot or having a close association or empathy with Scotland) you can apply.” (Caledonian Club, internet)

of association, explicit exclusion of collectives – in particular some historically oppressed and disadvantaged groups – is repugnant. But why, in this particular case, is racial exclusivity not permissible, while ethnocultural exclusivity is tolerated? The reason can be found in history of racial inequality which even nowadays lives on in the memory of oppressed group, and marks current generations. It could be imagined that the Holocaust and racial discrimination had not existed, strictly Christian clubs or maybe even racially exclusive clubs will be more tolerable from the standpoint of public impartiality. On the other hand, in hypothetical situation in which an English minority in Scotland was oppressed and treated with contempt, the exclusiveness of Caledonian Club would be inappropriate.

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From the standpoint of public impartiality, there is no moral reason to ban the Caledonian Club. Taking into account permissibility of forming such an association, it can be stated that impartiality is, as an indispensable part of justice, the main trait of political morality, but not public morality as such. The freedom to associate, however, is not absolute and right to partiality or favoritism, if aspire to be in the public sphere, should be subject to restrictions. The claim that this right is limited by moral reasons does not imply that association needs moral approval to be acceptable, but that no individual or collective could object reasonably that exclusivity was inherently unjust.

As an example of an implausible attack on second-order impartiality Barry examines Kohlberg's widely discussed hypothetical Heinz's dilemma.¹⁶ As Barry argues, the key subject of political justice (above all Rawls', to whom Kohlberg occasionally refers) is not related to the agent's moral dilemma and his consideration on the correctness or wrongness of his action on particular occasion, but it refers to the institutional arrangement, along with its political morality, in which certain rights and duties can be considered as just. Again, in this famous example impersonal demands of second-order morality have been conflated with duties in interpersonal relationships in first-order morality, without discerning their different domains of validity.

As it is stated in Kohlberg's example, Heinz's wife is seriously ill and the only way to her to be saved is to take the medicine, which local pharmacist is selling, but who has priced the medicine at ten times its real market value. Heinz has saved only half a sum which the pharmacist is asking for, but druggist will not agree to sell the drug for the amount of money Heinz offers. Consequently, Heinz decides to break into the pharmacy and steal the drug to save his wife. Kohlberg's conclusion is that Heinz's act is morally justified from the utilitarian standpoint, because the good of saving his wife outweighs the good which the pharmacist would gain by selling the product. More importantly, from the standpoint of Kantian universal

16 Kohlberg 1979; Barry 1995, ch. 10 (40)

morality as the sixth, post-conventional level of moral development, Heinz's act is legitimate because in general the right to life is more important than profit or owning property.

On the level of an isolated act, the rightness of the act is quite straightforward. But the Kantian standpoint imply universalisation, which leads to difficulty in vindicating the act, as the only slightly higher price than that which Heinz is able to pay will be sufficient to encourage stealing, that is, any loss of money which the chemist suffers would be legitimate inasmuch as the result of stealing is considerably more worthwhile. Therefore, in a respectable number of cases the theft will be permitted. Also, if the neighbor should have the medicine, the universalisation should justify stealing from him as well, as saving a life is not only more valuable than the chemist's profit, but also more valuable than neighbor's property. Consequentialist reasons for sentencing Heinz could also be stated, as it may be assumed that, if a court adjudicates that this type of theft is excusable, the chemist will presumably, as act of protest, withdraw the drug from distribution. Also, he and every other chemist would lose any economic incentive for producing the medication, and would stop all further research and development which might have considerably improve treatment of disease.¹⁷ Thus, Heinz's case fail these tests of moral sustainability, and it does not demonstrate adjustability of partiality to second-order moral principles or to institutional impartiality (and *vice versa*). The maxim of permissibility of theft in extremely important cases does not concern constitution of social order, civic equality, non-violent resolution of conflicts or established principles of social cooperation approved by all reasonable citizens. On the other hand, let us assume that second-order impartiality permits or excuses theft by no means. Does this imply that this kind of impartiality condemns Heinz's act regardless of his good intentions? Barry's answer is that we should not jump to this conclusion, because second-order impartiality is related to institutional structure, albeit not to a person's concrete action.¹⁸ The institutional order in Kohlberg's example is defective. The fact that Heinz is compelled to steal the drug indicates that the social order is established wrongly, and in such an order a seriously ill person cannot avoid suffering or death if she, the members of her family or any other person cannot afford to obtain medical treatment. According to justice as impartiality, this order, in which universal social security and health care is not provided, and in which medical aid is available only to affluent members of society, is deeply unjust.

Claiming that conclusion about Heinz's guilt is far-fetched, Barry, as it seems, accepts strict dichotomy of two levels of impartiality by contrasting the

17 Barry 1995: 242-243.

18 Cf. Barry 1995: 244.

eventual vindication of the particular act to subjecting the same act to sentencing in accordance with the norms of second-order morality. Such a position is paying the price of a curse of dualism of two-world theories, which refer to each other, but are at the same time are to be kept at a distance from each other, not managing to communicate between themselves, which stems from their separate aims and leads to the justification of contrary outcomes. Although Kohlberg's example cannot lead to the conclusion that Heinz's acting is unequivocally justifiable from the moral point of view, the example, however, suggests that the distance between two levels of impartiality is lower than Barry is willing to concede. One of the aims of the adequate moral theory is to give an elaborated and sound explanations of the relation between first-order morality or everyday ethical principles, and the demands of institutional order with its publicly endorsed moral norms. It is possible that the court is punishing Heinz, but at the same time „recognize“ his duty to steal by taking into consideration motivational force and relevance of substantive morality, that is, the relevance of the kind of partiality to which Kohlberg refers to. The taking into consideration of mitigating circumstances (and the existence of the institution of probation) indicates that in legislative, as well as in everyday morality, it is accepted that identical or similar acts, depending on the circumstances, do not have the same significance and therefore have to be treated differently. In this way, the public morality of a society and its institutional articulation can justify, or can demand to be taken into account in adjudication, first-order moral reasons. This can be understood as the confirmation of Hegel's thesis on the offender's right to be punished: the judiciary should recognize Heinz's position and award him a lenient sentence, while Heinz himself should accept the fact that he will be sentenced whenever he should be caught. It can be hypothetically assumed that he broke the law being aware that he would be prosecuted and punished, and he would accept the sentence (except if draconic and the highest stipulated penalty), as well as it can be assumed that dismissal of taking into consideration the relevant particular occasions will be interpreted by the public as a manifestation of incompetence by the judges stemming from their lack of common moral sense and reasonableness in adjudication.

As Rawls' theory in exploring the principles of justice implies their pertinence to the basic structure of a society, Barry points out that Kohlberg's referring to the theory of justice is misleading. Rawls' conception is not concerned with justification of the violation of unjust laws, except in the case of civil disobedience. Yet this disobedience is public, and it is the subject of public reason, whereas Heinz's act, according to Barry, is a case of concealment of an offense. Rawls would advise Heinz to launch a campaign for national health care, but he cannot be supportive of his act of theft.¹⁹

19 Barry 1995: 245.

However, this stance still needs to respond to the example of the right to be punished, because if Heinz turn himself in immediately after giving medicine to his wife, confesses offence and is ready to suffer legal consequences, his act should not be treated as concealment. If we assume this, his act can be interpreted – regardless of his actual intentions in which the wider picture is not explicated – as a protest against a defective national health system, against rules of licencing, the rights to medical distribution, or as a protest against an excessively powerful pharmaceutical industry which is abusing its monopolistic position. In any case, Heinz's act might have as an effect, if not instigation of the reform of public health service, then at least provoking public debate about the purpose and extent of care which citizens have in particular public health system, and their vulnerability in conditions of the prevailing commodification of health services.

Barry's standpoint on Heinz's case is inclining to duality of justice, according to which theft is justifiable from the standpoint of the agent when Heinz is obliged to act on behalf of his wife, yet, from the standpoint of institutionalized justice and political morality he has no right to commit theft. The existence of mitigating circumstances and a person's willing acceptance of the risk of being convicted are premises on basis of which duality in Heinz's case can be resolved. In the same way, the priority of saving the life of fellow person does not equalize all theft of this sort as morally permissible: public impartiality would dictate more severe punishment if money had been stolen from a neighbour, because the neighbour is a third party, not involved in the dispute between Heinz and the chemist (or pharmaceutical industry) who has overpriced his product. Nor the objection that in this way the stealing of medicine (or anything else) which will contribute to recovery of an unknown person (or any person) is plausible: there is no reason why Heinz in particular is obliged to help an unknown person by an illegal act, whereas, on the other hand, he has a responsibility towards his own wife.

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However, it can still be objected that justification for an isolated act of giving advantage to the wife is generically different than justification of public moral norms. In line with the second kind of justification parochialism of *vis-à-vis* relations should be transcended and different ethical and moral requirements should be stated. But example of Heinz does not have to be interpreted as a limiting case in which moral duty stemming from a relationship supersedes impartiality of justice, but as a situation in which second-order norms have to take into account an individual's moral motivations. Therefore, it is problematic if impartiality which imposes an identical sentence on both Heinz and the person whose reason to steal the medicine is profit from reselling, would be just.

It can be stated that second-order morality stands in need of reasonableness, rather than in need of subsuming moral dilemmas to general principles. The

moral treshold between partial and impartial actions should be set in such a way that it leaves enough scope for other moral considerations.²⁰ Whereas justice as impartiality is not arbitrarily imposed from Mount Olympus, flexibility and adaptability of norms endorsed by institutions is guided by shared understandings of limits both of impartiality and favouritism, which correspond to needs and values existing in a given society. Ill-structured second-order impartiality may involve excessive restrictiveness, rigidity of rules and ultra-regulation of social relationships and would lead to violation of freedom of assembly and association, to a considerable narrowed scope of permissible partiality, as well as to imposing excessive demands on the individual.

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20 Brink 2001: 171.

Michal Sládeček

Nepriistrasnost drugog reda i javna sfera

Rezime

Prvi deo teksta razmatra distinkciju između nepriistrasnosti prvog i drugog reda, zajedno sa Berijevom (Brian Barry) temeljnom elaboracijom karakteristika i razlika ovih nepriistrasnosti. Dok se nepriistrasnost prvog reda odnosi na nefavorizovanje bliskih osoba u svakodnevnim odnosima, nepriistrasnost drugog reda se ispoljava u institucionalnoj strukturi društva i njenom javnom i političkom moralitetu. U drugom delu članka uvodi se pojam javne nepriistrasnosti kroz analizu dva primera. Prvi primer jeste Kaledonijski klub sa svojim ekskluzivitetom članstva i razmatra se kao oblik udruženja koje je pristrasno, ali je ipak moralno prihvatljivo. Drugi primer predstavlja takozvana Hajncova dilema, pri čemu autor daje svoju reinterpetaciju slučaja i ukazuje na pojedine slabe tačke Berijevog tumačenja, smatrajući da se kroz postojanje olakšavajućih okolnosti može prihvatiti Hajncovo pravo da daje prednost svojoj supruzi u odnosu na prava vlasništva i da ova pristrasnost može biti prihvaćena u javnoj sferi. Na taj način javna nepriistrasnost određuje granice restriktivnosti i rigidnosti političke nepriistrasnosti koja je implicirana u nepriistrasnosti prvog reda.

Ključne reči: Brajan Beri, nepriistrasnost prvog i drugog reda, moralno opravdanje, pravda, javna sfera

JEAN-LUC MARION AND THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF GIVENNESS

ŽAN-LIK MARION I FENOMENOLOGIJA DAVANJA

II

Edited by Mark Losoncz

Introductory Note

Temat je osmišljen sa ciljem da ponudi niz perspektiva koje bi osvetlile filozofiju Žana-Lika Mariona, sa posebnim osvrtom na njegovu fenomenologiju. Neposredni povod za ovaj temat je Marionovo gostovanje u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju 4-5. decembra 2015. godine. Pored Marionovog predavanja *Granice fenomenalnosti* objavljujemo i transkript seminara koji je posvećen njegovoj knjizi *Erotski fenomen*. Nadalje, tekst Klaudije Serban se usredsređuje na Marionov odnos prema Dekartovoj filozofiji tela, a Igor Krtolica analizira status jezika u fenomenologiji erotskog fenomena. Intervju Mark Lošonca sa Marionom pod naslovom *Donation, tradition et interprétation (Davanje, tradicija i interpretacija)* bazira se na razgovoru koji je vođen aprila 2014. godine u Parizu.

Žan-Lik Marion, rođen 1946. godine, član je Francuske Akademije i počasni je profesor na Univerzitetu Pariz-Sorbona. Marion predaje i na Univerzitetu u Čikagu i rukovodilac je Dominikanske katedre Dibarl na Katoličkom univerzitetu u Parizu. Objavio je brojne knjige o Dekartu, fenomenologiji i teologiji (između ostalog, *Dieu sans l'être* [1982], *Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes. Constitution et limites de l'ontothéologie cartésienne* [1986], *Réduction et donation. Recherches sur Husserl, Heidegger et la phénoménologie* [1989], *Étant donné. Essai d'une phénoménologie de la donation* [1997], *Au lieu de soi, l'approche de saint Augustin* [2008]). Marionova filozofija se može shvatiti i kao radikalizacija fenomenološkog načela „Ka samim stvarima!“. U svojoj filozofiji davanja (*donation*) Marion zaključuje da dosadašnje fenomenologije nisu u dovoljnoj meri uspele da zahvate način na koji nam se daju oni fenomeni (primera radi: vreme, lice, ljubav ili smrt) koji se ne mogu svesti na našu subjektivnost. U tom smislu se može reći da se osnovna namera Marionove filozofije sastoji u tome da se ostane veran bogatstvu iskustva koje nužno prevazilazi kapacitete čoveka. Marion iz ove perspektive reinterpretira klasične filozofske autore (Avgustin, Anselm, Toma Akvinski, Dekart, Spinoza...), ali je zahvaljujući takvoj pojmovnoj prizmi uspeo da revitalizuje i hrišćansku teologiju, s jedne strane, i da pokaže relevantnost istorije filozofije kao filozofske discipline za postmetafizičko mišljenje, s druge.

Žan-Lik Marion

Granice fenomenalnosti

Apstrakt Ovaj tekst se bazira na predavanju koje je Žan-Lik Marion održao gostujući u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 4. decembra 2015. godine u Beogradu. Tematizujući „granice fenomenalnosti“, Marion analizira ono što prevazilazi kako horizont predmetnosti, tako i okvire subjektivnosti. Oslanjajući se na istaknute filozofe iz istorije (post)metafizike (Aristotel, Dekart, Lajbnic, Kant, Niče, Huserl i Hajdeger), Marion ukazuje na mogućnost alternativnog puta, fenomenologije davanja koja se usredsređuje na zasićene fenomene.

Cljučne reči: fenomenalnost, konačnost, objekt, saturirani fenomen, Kant, Dekart, Hajdeger.

I Granice i konačnost

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Filozofija ima tu osobenost, koja je istovremeno i privilegija i stalno iskušanje, da nema nijednu određenu granicu, za razliku od svih drugih nauka i disciplina. A u stvari, kako bi i imala kad je na njoj da ih utvrđuje i priznaje umesto drugih? Jer ona sama ima obavezu da se, u ime drugih, bavi univerzalnim i bezuslovnim, zato što jedan diskurs mora biti završen tako što će se, na sopstveni rizik i opasnost, a za dobrobit svih, prihvatiti nesumnjivo neizvodljivog zadatka razgraničenja i arhitektonike znanja. Ali samim tim, filozofija, kad mora da se suoči sa zadatkom određivanja sopstvenih granica, ne može a da ne ostane sama i bespomoćna.

Dakle, u svakoj eposi, na ovaj ili onaj način, filozofija mora da odluči o onome šta može da sazna, tačnije o onome o čemu može da nastoji da misli, da ga sazna ili pak ne sazna, tako što joj se nameće da odluči o onome šta može želiti da nazove istinskim *saznanjem*. Tokom svoje povesti filozofija zapravo nije prestajala da o tome odlučuje, sledivši različite formulacije, u zavisnosti od toga da li granica prolazi između nepokretnog i kretanja (za Platona [Πλάτων], Aristotela [Αριστοτέλης] i Plotina [Πλωτίνος]), večnog i vremenitog (za Svetog Augustina [A. Augustinus], uz Tomu Akvinskog [Th. de Aquino]) beskonačnog i konačnog (od Dunska Skota [D. Scotus] do Lajbnica [G. W. Leibniz]), nemogućeg i mogućeg (od *ontologije*, Klauberga [J. Clauberger], Volfa [C. Wolff] i Kanta [I. Kant] do Šelinga [F. W. J. Schelling]), da bi završila u eksperimentalnom i neeksperimentalnom (s modernim pozitivizmom, ali i s Ničeom (F. Nietzsche) i Huserlom (E. Husserl), zatim i celokupnom fenomenologijom), itd. Ali ona je uvek,

pod različitim imenima: „prva filozofija“, „metoda“, „metafizika“, „kritika“, „naučna doktrina“, „sistem“ i „stroga nauka“, pokušavala da zauzme i održi transcendentalni stav. Drugim rečima, prema Kantovoj definiciji, ona je nastojala da odredi uslove mogućnosti predmeta iskustva, pre nego (i da) bi saznala same te predmete: „[t]ranscendentalnim nazivam svako saznanje koje se ne bavi predmetima, već našim saznanjem predmeta ukoliko ono treba da je moguće a priori.“ (KrV B25)

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Ali šta bi značila mogućnost predmeta iskustva ako na taj način ne bi konačno zahvatala njihovu usaglašenost sa uslovima samog iskustva, budući da su, prema Kantu, „apriorni uslovi mogućeg iskustva uopšte istovremeno (*zugleich*) uslovi mogućnosti predmeta iskustva“. Međutim, ono suštinsko i dalje ostaje s druge strane – jer šta se podrazumeva pod „uslovima mogućeg iskustva“, za koga i s obzirom na šta oni uslovljavaju iskustvo? Ista Kantova rečenica nastavlja i precizira da se radi o „uslovima mišljenja u njegovom mogućem iskustvu“ (KrV A158 / B197). Ali opet, kakvog mišljenja? Mišljenja koje, da bi mu predmet bio dat, ima potrebu da „utiče na njega na izvestan način“, to jest čulnim opažajem (prostor i vreme); jer ono definiše mogućnost iskustva „barem za nas, ljude (*uns Menschen wenigstens*)“ (KrV B33). Uslovi predmeta iskustva ne padaju s neba, niti su urezani u mermer večnosti; oni su ustanovljeni dimenzijama i konačnošću našega duha. Dekart (R. Descartes) nije tvrdio ništa drugo kad je rekao da su večne istine (logičke i matematičke) takođe stvorene kao i naš duh i da mu tako jasno odgovaraju samo zato što dele istu konačnost. Ustanoviti granice filozofije, samim tim granice iskustva, a samim tim i granice nauke, po pravilu se može samo prepoznavanjem i određenjem čovekove konačnosti. To je upravo zato što ova konačnost unapred uslovljava celokupno iskustvo, iz kojeg možemo makar da izvučemo ovu negativnu ali pritom zaista transcendentalnu korist: da predvidimo *a priori* ono što nikad neće moći da postane predmet saznanja za nas, jer prevazilazi granice onoga što možemo da primimo i podnesemo. Naime, transcendentalni stav ne određuje uslove mogućnosti, ukoliko ne pretpostavi, s ove strane sebe samog, ontički uslov u sopstvenoj epistemološkoj mogućnosti. Tako se konačnost pojavljuje kao mogućnost temelja uslova mogućnosti iskustva uopšte, a samim tim i samih predmetā. Neka temelj i uslov ovde budu pleonazam koji nije besmislen, već koji jasno potvrđuje udvostručavanje same transcendentalne mogućnosti, i to posredstvom mogućnosti konačnosti – ili pre posredstvom same konačnosti kao mogućnosti.

Otuda postaje presudno razmatranje statusa konačnosti. Povest filozofije se možda nije sastojala ni u čemu drugom do u produbljivanju i univerzalizovanju pojma konačnosti. Počev od strogo negativnog grčkog značenja, proste neodređenosti (odsustva ishoda, definicije), ona najpre postaje svojstvo čoveka kao stvorenja suočenog s pozitivnom beskonačnošću Boga.

Potom je, na osnovu ove definitivne i ograničavajuće konačnosti, Dekart mogao ustanoviti *ego cogito* kao zatvoreno i postojano tle i zasnovati prvu transcendentálnu situaciju. Kant je zatim (u direktnom produžetku Dekartovog „stvaranja večnih istina“) mogao radikalizovati konačnost transcendentálnog *javstva* u konačnost uma, definitivno obeleženog konačnošću čulnog opažaja. On je osigurao transcendentálnu karakter celokupne filozofije, prešavši s metode na kritiku, da bi promišljao fenomen kao sam predmet. Hajdeger (M. Heidegger) je onda (verno nastavljavajući kantovsku konačnu fenomenálnost) mogao ne samo da opiše analitiku konačnosti *Daseina* [tubića] nego i da, pošto je putem *Daseina* ustvrdio ogoljenost bića bivstvujućih, razvije konačnost *samog bića*. Stoga više ne možemo izbegavati pitanje *dokle* se sama konačnost može radikalizovati. Jer ona se, u stvari, koncentriše i radikalizuje na način da ne može da se definiše, a bez sumnje ni da se okonča; šta bi značila konačnost koja je sama određena – ako ne protivrečnost? Po definiciji, konačnost se ne može okončati. Kao činilac koji povlači granicu filozofije, ona se samo može nastavljati do suštinske neodređenosti.

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II Ono što se saznaje kao predmet

Dakle, razmotrimo konačnost, koja nam pruža pristup predmetima nauka. Prema svojoj primeni, a ova podela je bez sumnje pojednostavljujuća ali isto tako i zasnovanija, nauke se dele na egzaktne i neegzaktne. Egzaktne (takozvane stroge) nauke sadrže iskaze koji se mogu opovrgnuti, ali i verifikovati, bilo formalnodeduktivnim dokazom, bilo produkcijom, a samim tim i reprodukcijom procesa koji se određuju empirijskim testiranjem, pri čemu i jedan i drugi put završavaju u nespornim dokazima. (Primetimo da kritika merila dokaza, iako aktuelna, nema smisla, jer dokaz možemo kritikovati samo drugim dokazom, koji je navodno još više *index sui* [pokazatelj sebe] od prethodnog). S druge strane, nauke koje su nekada nazivane „humanističkim“ a sada „društvenim“, čak iako ponekad pretenduju na navodno uvaženiji rang „kognitivnih“, i čak iako počivaju na empirijskim podacima koji su često opsežni i prilično kvantifikovani, ipak ne mogu da postignu iste rezultate kao prethodne. One se u stvari ne odnose na predmete koji se mogu proizvoditi, a samim tim ni reprodukovati pod istim uslovima, u smislu proizvoljno dostupnih, a samim tim kvazi-permanentnih predmeta, već se odnose na stanja kontigentnih stvari, celina koje nisu odveć stabilne, koje su privremene i uvek u se nalaze u procesu procenivanja. Pri razlučivanju ovih dveju vrsta nauka (ako zadržimo jednoznačnost termina, koja je, uostalom, u oba slučaja sporna) ne držimo toliko do egzaktnosti postupaka niti metoda dokazivanja, nego još radikalnije, do suštinske razlike vremenitosti. „Stroge“ nauke mogu da neutralizuju kontingentnost svojih predmeta reprodukujući ih pod istim uslovima (u načelu i barem površinski), upravo zato što uspevaju da ih proizvode na iscrpan način, dok druge nauke moraju da se bave predmetima koji nikad nisu

međusobno identični, a pre svega ni sebi samima, identični: *podaci* koji ih potvrđuju učestvuju ne samo u beskonačnim brojevima nego iznad svega u okolnostima koje se uvek razvijaju i promenljive su, na način da ne možemo, osim provizorno, tvrditi identitet predmeta. Jedna gotovo povesna vremenitost uvek ostaje na delu, i ona zabranjuje dovršenje opredmećenja.

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Na taj način pronalazimo još poteškoća svojstvenih naukama o kontingentnosti, poput one koju je opisivao Aristotel i zbog čega je odbio da nauči *physis* (ne našoj fizici) dâ naziv „prva filozofija“. Uvek se nalazeći u promeni, bivstvujuća *physei* ne prestaju da trpe neodređeni uticaj *hyle*, koja igra ulogu „uzroka koji je potreban da bi se ono slučajno ponašalo drugačije nego inače – to će stoga biti načelo slučajnoga, tako da ništa drugo nije uzrok njegovog nastanka.“ (Met. E, 2, 1027 b 13-14) Sebi nejednako, neprestano promenljivo, bivstvujuća *physei* nikad ne dostižu postojanost predmeta izvesnog saznanja. Ova teškoća je vekovima zadržavala svaki pokušaj da se lokalne promene (kretanje fizičkih tela) interpretiraju u matematičkim uslovima, i zabranjivala kvantifikaciju materijalne prirode uopšte, zato što je privilegija matematike – saznanje postojanih idealiteta koji se mogu produkovati i reprodukovati – plaćala cenu njihove fizičke irealnosti i toga što je njihova primena na bivstvujuća *physei*, usled *hyle*, bila upravo protivrečna njihovom istovremeno fizičkom i neodredivom karakteru. Kao što znamo, bio je potreban ništa manje nego zaobilazni put preko hrišćanske teologije stvaranja da bi se preokrenula, ako ne i poništila, ova glavna poteškoća, dakle, ništa manje od nasilnog čina koji su, kao takav, preuzeli Kepler (J. Kepler) i Galilej (G. Galilei), a to je pripisivanje geometrizacije fizičkog sveta samom Bogu. „Bog uvek stvara geometrijski“ (ovu formulu Kepler preuzima od Plutarha koji je pripisuje Platonu [*Quaestiones Convivales* VIII, 2] u *Mysterium Cosmographicum* II [Kepler 1939a: 26], i u *Harmonice Mundi* V, 3 [Kepler 1939b: 299]), drugim rečima, prema Lajbnicu, *Cum Deus calculat et cogitationem exercet, fit mundus* (Leibniz 1875: 199). Tražeći ekonomičnije i lepše rešenje, Dekart će najpre odbaciti ovu zbrku, odbijajući da matematičke istine određuju i mišljenje Boga (pa bila to i teza o stvaranju večnih istina), čime bi se *dopustilo* da se ljudsko mišljenje smatra ovlašćenim da geometrizuje fiziku i samu *hyle*. Ono što mu omogućuje da, umesto teološkog, razvije strogo epistemološki nasilni čin jeste pretpostavka da saznati, po definiciji, znači saznati sa izvesnošću, dakle shodno matematičkoj paradigmi, do trenutka kad u nekom domenu bivstvujućeg koje pokušava da se sazna, ne uspeva da postupi kao ona [matematika], koja u svojem *predmetu* ne pretpostavlja ništa što bi iskustvo učinilo nezvesnim (*objectum ita purum et simplex versantur, ut nihil plane supponant quod experiential reddiderit incertum* [AT X, 365]). Drugim rečima, uvek se radi, čak naročito u domenu fizičke promene, o poništavanju neodređenosti *hyle*, čime se razvija način saznanja koje čini apstrakciju same materije, a samim tim savladava neodređenost koju ova izaziva. Matematizovanje,

ili tačnije, matematički interpretiranje fizički bivstvujućeg vraća nas na *dematerijalizovanje* stvari u predmet, koji će biti izvestan u obrnutoj srazmeri s prisustvom materije u njemu. Naime, nasuprot onome što primena ponavlja, za Dekarta po pravilu nije reč o unapređenju matematizacije prirode, već o njenom opredmećenju. Ubuduće će biti reči samo o saznanju *predmetā* a time pre svega o njihovom *proizvođenju*.

Ova radnja se sastoji upravo u konstituisanju predmeta, uz stavljanje stvari u zgrade, da bi se isključila *hyle* i da bi se iz njenog iskustva zadržali samo elementi koji zadovoljavaju jedinstveni uslov izvesnosti. Kartezijanski rečeno, dva kriterijuma odlučuju o onome što se mora zadržati iz stvari da bi se konstituisao predmet: *ordo* (poredak) i *mensura* (mera). Pod merom ne treba podrazumevati samo ono što se realno meri (što je već i po sebi upisano u tri dimenzije euklidovskog prostora), već sve ono što se može svesti na meru po analogiji, transpoziciji, imaginaciji ili nekom drugom transkripcijom: na primer, vreme, brzina koja kombinuje ovo vreme s prostorom, ubrzanje koje kombinuje brzinu s vremenom, gravitacija, masa, ali i sva druga svojstva koja se mogu verifikovati na skali itd. U ove brojne dimenzije (Dekart tako imenuje ove mere koje nisu neposredno prostorne), danas smo skloni da dodamo mislive parametre, uključujući iznad svega one koji mere *nematerijalne* faktore (kao u psihologiji, sociologiji, ekonomiji i *ekonometriji*, naukama o trgovini i finansijama itd). Pod *poretkom* ne treba podrazumevati prirodni poredak (ili navodno takav) samih stvari, već uređenje parametara i elemenata predmeta, tako da se oni organizuju s najvećom mogućom evidencijom za nas i da se tako konstituišu sledeći logiku svoga isticanja. Dakle, reč je o onome što danas nazivamo *obrascima* predmeta (ili „koncepta“ tehnološkog i komercijalnog proizvoda). Možemo sugerisati da će Kant preuzeti ovaj moto, ograničavajući se na njegovu izmenu. Parametri (Dekartova mera i dimenzije) odnose se na prostor (i samim tim na vreme, unutrašnji smisao) i sprovode kategorije kvaliteta, a još više kvantiteta i relacije; dok obrazac (*ordo*) pretpostavlja pre svega vreme (i shematski metod) organizovanja konstitucije parametara u celini. On, dakle, sprovodi pre svega kategorije modaliteta – upravo one koje vraćaju predmet u duh koji ih konstituiše. A zahvaljujući Kantu – treba li to isticati? – odluka koju je Dekart doneo o uslovima opredmećenja, proširila se na celokupno savremeno mišljenje: transcendentalnu fenomenologiju, pozitivizam (bio on logički ili nekakav drugačiji), analitičku metafiziku itd. U svakom slučaju, obrazac i parametri unapred i *a priori* definišu ono što bi, u iskustvu same stvari (u njoj samoj), moglo da zadovolji zahtev izvesnosti i da se završi prelaskom u predmet. Naime, predmet se fundamentalno razlikuje od stvari: ne samo da on *svodi* iskustvo u meri onoga što izvesnost toleriše u pogledu kontingencije, već iznad svega on *zamenjuje* u samoj stvari ono što parametri i poredak omogućuju da se ponovo uspostavi. Dakle, predmet ne obezbeđuje izvesnu verziju stvari, prečišćene jedino

„na nivou uma“ (AT VI, 14), nego joj nadoknađuje ponovno uspostavljanje (rekonstituciju), do kojeg dolazi počev od redukcije iskustva nametnutog putem kriterijā izvesnosti, koja uvek mora da se razumeva kao izvesnost za naš duh i njegove moći saznanja. Zapravo, ako sledimo Kantovu „koper-nikansku revoluciju“, predmet saznajemo kao izvestan samo – doslovno: – u meri u kojoj se „...kao predmet značenja, upravlja prema (*sich richtet nach*) konstituciji naše moći opažaja“ (AT VI, 62). Ono suštinskije je pre u predmetu nego u stvari, nalazi se u njemu, tačnije *izvan njega*, a to je moć saznanja koja ga konstituiše kao saznatljivog – moć transcendentnog *Ja*, i to već od onog *ego cogito* koje je takvo da nas ljude uspostavlja „kao go-spodare i posednike prirode“ (AT VI, 62). Samo otuđenje stvari u službi saznanja koje je izvesno omogućuje da se konstituiše predmet. Predmet ne zauzima mesto stvari, nego se podrazumeva – budući da savršeno pristaje svom otuđenju u odnosu na *ego* ili *Ja*, dok se stvar, ostajući po definiciji u sebi i na svome „što se mene tiče“, njemu opire. Zapravo, govor o stvari po sebi ne iskazuje ništa drugo do pleonazam; stvar po definiciji jeste po sebi, dok je predmet posredstvom drugog, otuđuje se u drugom – putem služe-nja izvesnosti. Razlika između predmeta i stvari, otuđenog i onoga *po-se-bi*, počinje kad saznanje nametne drugačiji poredak od egzistencije: „treba smatrati stvari kao uređene prema našem saznanju osim ako govorimo o istim tim stvarima pod uslovom da zaista postoje“ – *aliter spectandas esse res singulares in ordine ad cognitionem nostram, quam si de iisidem loqua-mur prout revera existunt* (AT X, 4181–1). Predmet se ne određuje prema istinitosti egzistencije, već prema sprovođenju dokaza.

Jedino ovaj prelazak sa stvari na predmet omogućuje razvoj navedenih, egzaktnih nauka, jer samo zamena stvari po sebi za otuđeni predmet omo-gućuje da se zadovolji zahtev za izvesnošću, isključujući upravo sve ono što se kao *hyle* suprotstavlja kontingentnošću. Ali ovaj prelazak, koji povesno omogućuje svakoj egzaktnoj nauci da se konstituiše, upućuje filozofiju da ga promišlja i opravdava, a ne bilo koju od ovih egzaktnih nauka, koje o tome jedva da brinu, budući da su zauzete svojim stvarima. Zapravo, eg-zaktna nauka ne zaboravljaju da bi filozofija još mogla da sačuva preten-zije na njih, te s oprezom (a ponekad i nervozno) brane svoju autonomiju od svakog povratka takvog imperijalizma. Ali upravo je filozofija ta koja sebe zaboravlja zaboravljajući da uslovi mogućnosti egzaktnih nauka ne zavise od nauke, čak ni od najegzaktnije, nego od filozofije u njenom me-tafizičkom obliku – želele to nauke ili ne želele – i da savremena filozofija još može da to promišlja, ili da pak to ne čini. Pojam predmeta i pravila opredmećenja proizilaze iz filozofije, a naučne prakse ponekad ne vide više da svoju racionalnost duguju ustanovljavanju (*instauratio magna*) koje je filozofskog karaktera, ali to ništa ne menja. Ni one ga ne promišljaju, jer „nauke ne misle“, već kalkulišu i opredmećuju. (Treba li podsećati, nasu-prot neznavenom ogorčenju, da u ovim rečima nema ničeg uvredljivog ili

iracionalnog, već da one naprosto opisuju i ponavljaju ono što su nauke, s pravom, uvek zahtevale kao svoju *privilegiju*).

Kad sama filozofija zaboravi filozofsku odluku koja upravlja opredmećivanjem koje primenjuju egzaktno nauke, preostaje da ona pravi dvostruku, ako ne i višestruku grešku. Pre svega, ona sama organizuje sopstvenu marginalizaciju, čineći sebe uvek zakasnelom i često površnom ili anegdotskom komentatorkom naučne prakse samih egzaktnih nauka (Minervina sova uzleće još kasnije nego u filozofiji nauke). Zaokupljena rezultatima koje je prekasno prikupila, koje teško da može razumeti (utoliko više što ih oni koji ih proizvode sami jedva razumeju), za koje zna da su možda nemogući za sintetizovanje, filozofija je uvek *svedena na oprez*: ona više nema vlastito područje ispitivanja, ni istraživanja, a u domenu koji nije njen (niti je ikada bio), ona u svojim očima gubi sav autoritet, makar on bio samo hermeneutički. Regrutujući se kao dodatak vojsci koja je ne priznaje, filozofija je sebe osudila na beznačajnost komentatora koji nije siguran u ono što govori i kojeg niko nema potrebu da sluša. Česti pokušaji da se filozofija utemelji u „strogim naukama“, odnosno samo u „naučnoj teoriji“, po pravilu su propadali. Za to bez sumnje postoje dobri razlozi – filozofija dopušta egzaktno nauke, ali pod uslovom da ne pretenduje da postane jedna od mnogih (još manje da prihvati *diminutio capititis* da postane jedina nauka). Ali ova prva greška filozofije odnosi se na nju samu. Nalazimo i drugu, ozbiljniju, zato što se tiče razumevanja i organizacije samih nauka. U stvari, filozofija od Dekarta, a možda i od Platona (povrh aristotelovske zabrane koja je matematici negirala rang prve nauke) do Huserla i Karnapa (R. Carnap) nije prestala da se oslanja na privilegiju matematike – dematerijalizaciju – da bi uspostavila svoju paradigmu svake nauke koja je izvesna. Budući da ona sama potvrđuje redukciju znanja na nauke o predmetu, filozofija mora da preuzme posebnu odgovornost promišljanja njihovog statusa, a naročito posledica. Drugim rečima, ako je zahvaljujući filozofiji status paradigme ponajviše bio u skladu s opredmećujućim naukama, ako ova paradigma utiče na sve druge nauke, čak i neegzaktno, a iznad svega ako ova paradigma ograničavanje znanja na otuđeni predmet danas dodiruje njene granice, filozofija bi takođe imala prioritetnu obavezu da je objasni i da sebe iz nje objasni.

Dakle da se ispituje onaj modus konačnosti koji zastupa projekat i prvenstvo predmeta.

III Ono što se ne saznaje kao predmet

Egzaktno nauke s izvesnošću saznaju ono što iz iskustva mogu da konstituišu u predmetu shodno modelu *ordo i mensura* (obrazac i parametar) što svaka od njih sprovodi svojim metodom i u vlastitom polju. Ne može a da se ne pojavi pitanje: šta sa onim što ne može da se konstituiše kao predmet, sa onim što se protivi opredmećenju?

Ne možemo izbeći ovo pitanje ako ga naprosto isključimo. Posebno ne možemo da zaključimo da uopšte ne znamo ono što ne možemo konstatirati kao predmet ni u jednoj egzaktnoj nauci, dakle da to apsolutno ne možemo uzeti u obzir, i da samim tim nema teškoće, jer nema razloga da se govori (i misli) ni o čemu. Pre svega, filozofija je dugo mislila ne prilagođavajući se zahtevima objektivnosti, mada nećemo tvrditi da uopšte nije mislila. Ali, pre svega, mi ne propuštamo da stalno i mnogo ispitujemo čak i ono što ne dopušta da se konstituiše kao predmet. To činimo utoliko bolje što se pojavljuje ovo neobjektivno, kao ostatak nesvodiv na dematerijalizaciju, višak u opredmećenju koji se nalazi na rubu svakog poznatog predmeta. Naime, *upravo* u meri u kojoj *physei on* dopušta da bude zamenjeno i konstituisano kao predmet, pojavljuje se, na prvi pogled u nepreciznom obliku, a najčešće s tragom aporije, ono što ne može da se konstituiše kao predmet, sopstvo same stvari, *sopstvo* stvari po sebi. Ovde se ne radi o privremenim pojavama koje bi trebalo pokušati još jednom svesti na objektivnost, niti o predmetima koji se u načelu ne mogu konstituisati, nego o efektu otpora onog po-sebi kojim ne vlada sama stvar. Primeri nisu daleko, jer najbolji proističu iz toga što je metafizika, u smislu *metaphysica specialis*, pokušala da konstituiše kao svoja tri privilegovana *predmeta*, dostižući ih bez ostatka.

Svet stvari i okolni svet moraju za nas da se iscrpu u totalitetu (iako nepotpunom) predmeta koje egzaktne nauke mogu da konstituišu, to jest predmeta koje industrijska tehnološka sredstva mogu da produkuju i reprodukuju. Ovaj svet predmeta sâm mora da se ostvari u opštem predmetu, bez ostatka. Međutim, svet koji zaista ispitujemo premašuje ovo opredmećenje, o čemu svedoči ekološka pretnja: svet predmeta ne zamenjuje se svetom stvari nego ga preplavljuje ili savladava industrijskim otpadom koji proizvodi, pri čemu stvari ne mogu da ga prime, apsorbuju i *naturalizuju*. Gomilanje nepovratnog i nenadoknadivog potvrđuje da opredmećenje kao proizvodnja ne brine ni o istinski svetskim stvarima, nego ih udvostručuje, remeti i protivreči im. Na ovo gomilanje sasvim koherentno odgovara gubitak. Istrošenost starih prirodnih resursa zapravo dokazuje da kontingencija ostaje nesvodiva, što ide dotle da nameće istoričnost, čak i događajnost istoričnosti, a koje uskraćuju večni rast beskrajne proizvodnje tehničkih predmeta. Ova dvostruka ekološka pretnja paradoksalno potvrđuje da se unutarsvetske stvari, ili bolje: svet stvari po sebi, opire njenoj prekrivenosti predmetima.

Metafizika je takođe delimično obradila božanski predmet, Boga svedenog na svoj pojam, pod sledećim prikladnim nazivima – *causa sui*, *ens summe perfectum* i „moralni Bog“. Ova obrada, upravo zato što Boga vodi do jednoznačne racionalnosti pojma, završava se u idolu, kojeg je kao takvog identifikovao Niče: jer „smrt Boga“ ne objavljuje nikakav rat protiv Njega, niti izjavljuje da smo razrešeni bavljenja time; ona, naprotiv, konstatuje da

idol, to jest predmet koji je metafizika konstituisala pod tim imenom, ne može, ili u svakom slučaju ne može više da nosi težinu i slavu božanskog, koja međutim ne prestaje da nam dosađuje, i to sada u još nekontrolisanim i anonimnijim oblicima. Naime, vreme „smrti Boga“ u filozofiji (dva stoleća nihilizma koji je objavio Niče) (Nietzsche 1970: 431) podudara se, u našim ponekad zaprepašćenim očima, s povratkom nekontrolisanog žara Božje stvari po sebi, koju je metafizički sekularizam bojažljivo priznavao pod imenom „religijski čin“ – što je najmanji idol. To nezadrživo oživljavanje božanskog svedoči da ono što ne mislimo kao predmet i što je mrtvo kao takvo ne prestaje da nam nameće svoje iskustvo.

Čovekovo sopstvo je najzad sâmo konstitusano u predmetu posredstvom *metaphysicae specialis*. Primetimo, međutim, da se ovo opredmećenje ne odnosi samo, čak ni prevashodno, na empirijsko *jastva*, koje za metafiziku, fiziologiju, psihologiju, kognitivne nauke itd. ima status predmeta. Ono se još suštinskije odnosi na ono što je pojam *jastva* učinilo empirijski mogućim – na samu razliku između mislećeg *Jastva (je)* i mišljenog *Mene (moi)*. Ova razlika se u stvari ne podrazumeva i ostaje nedokučiva, ako ne vidimo da proishodi direktno iz nametanja *samom čoveku* uslova opredmećenja. Ono što ne prestaje da se površno (i bezuspešno) odaje pod imenom dualizma između duha i materije zapravo zavisi od suštinskog dualiteta između nauke, koja zahteva samu izvesnost povodom sopstva saznanja, i samog tog sopstva. Dakle, misleće mišljenje se na delu opire svojem opredmećenju sebe kao mišljenog mišljenja. Ovaj otpor proizlazi iz dokaza koji je jači od dokaza predmeta: da ja (kako god me zvali) nisam ravan duelu opredmećujućeg i opredmećenog; ja se doživljavam iskusivanjem svoje ploti; jer moja plot omogućuje ne samo da osetim ono što nije ja, nego i da osetim da osećam, dakle da osećam svoje izvorno osećanje nje same i posredstvom nje mi pruža pristup svojoj samopobuđenosti. Jednom rečju, moja plot mi se potvrđuje kao sopstvo, nesvodivo na predmet, računajući i moj vlasiti.

Na taj način ekološko pitanje, „religijski čin“ i plot sopstva dovode u krizu ništa manje nego tri opredmećenja *metaphysicae specialis*. Ali to nije sve. Nije reč samo o jednoj od kriza među izvesnim predmetima saznanja, nego o krizi celokupnog saznanja kao saznanja predmeta; a otpor opredmećenja proširuje se na sve ono što *metaphysica generalis* svodi na objektivnost – na sve stvari. Ono što se tematizuje kao „kraj metafizike“ ne sastoji se u neuspehu njenog delovanja – opredmećenja, *prevodenja* bivstvujućih u mnoštvo predmeta – nego u tako potpunom *uspehu* njene tehnologije da zauzvrat ona izaziva otpor samih stvari opredmećenju. „Povratak samim stvarima“ zapravo bi mogao da znači ovaj otpor sopstva stvari njihovom otuđenju u predmetu. „Donji svetovi“ koje prokazuje Niče, ne tiču se samo moralnih zapovesti nego vrednosti uopšte, dakle prevashodno metafizičkih pojmova i kategorija (jer kod idola je reč o subjektu, kauzalnosti i slobodnoj volji

– *Sumrak idolā*). A *Lebenswelt* (svet života) poznog Huserla ne suprotstavlja se svetu nauke drugačije do utoliko što uspostavlja predmete i najzad sebe ponovo uspostavlja kao predmet. Nihilizam, ako se uzme ozbiljno, ograničava se na ustvrđivanje da se najviše, a stoga i najradikalnije vrednosti pojmova metafizike, to jest opredmećenja bivstvujućeg, umanjuju – drugim rečima više ne deluju i više ne dopuštaju racionalnost. Nihilizam se ograničava na beleženje činjenice da opredmećenje ne sprovodi racionalnost, već dovodi do njene krize.

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Dakle, nalazimo se na granici transcendentale situacije. U zaključku *Transcendentalne analitike*, Kant kao krajnje postavlja razlikovanje predmeta na fenomene i noumenone. Sve što se misli – misli se u horizontu opredmećenja, ali saznavaju se samo oni predmeti koje ispunjava, održava i izvodi na scenu čulni opažaj. Ova razlika se će tako savršeno nametnuti da će se uskoro svesti na sažetiju suprotnost između predmetā, to jest na same fenomene obdarene čulnim opažajem, i ne-predmetā, to jest na noumenone lišene čulnog opažaja, dakle na stvari koje njihovo *sopstvo* upravo čini nesvodivim na iskustvo, budući da se razumeva u smislu onoga što opredmećenje otuda apstrahuje – *ordo i mensura*, obrazac i parametri. Stoga može biti da, osim što prelazi u nihilizam, potvrđujući aporije opredmećenja, Kant propušta da razmotri drugo fundamentalno razlikovanje – ne više razlikovanje svih predmeta na fenomene i noumenone, nego svih fenomena na predmete i *ne-predmete*. Drugim rečima, potrebno je proširiti um s one strane granica opredmećenja, i to u dvostrukom smislu, ali ga takođe i osloboditi. Bez sumnje, čineći to, čini se da ignorišemo Kantovo ozbiljno upozorenje: „[t]emeljni principi kojima spekulativni um zamišlja da prekoračuje svoje granice, nemaju za rezultat proširenje (*Erweiterung*) nego, ako pobliže pogledamo, neizbežno, sužavanje (*Verengung*) naše upotrebe uma“ (KrV B XXIV). Međutim, za odupiranje ovom autoritetu on pronalazi druge rezultate. Naime, u jednom od svojih posljednjih nastojanja, Huserl razmatra hipotezu da „je područje logike mnogo veće (*viel größer*) od onoga kojim se tradicionalna logika do sada bavila“. Ovaj „širi i obuhvatniji smisao“, ovaj „obuhvatni (*umfassender*) pojam logike i logosa“ (Husserl 1964: 3), odjekuje, u svakoj razlici, uz Ničeov zahtev za proširenim umom u *Zaratustri*: „[k]ažeš 'Ja' i ponosan si na tu reč. Ali veće je ono što ne želiš da veruješ – tvoja plot i njen veliki um (*dein Leib und seine grosse Vernunft*), koji ne kazuje 'Ja', nego ga čini“ (Nietzsche 1968: I, 4).

IV Filozofija kao „veliki um“

Status pitanja, dakle, vodi do osporavanja ključne Kantove odluke. On u stvari tvrdi da, ako u klasičnoj metafizici, od Skota do Volfa, moguće (u paru s nemogućim) tvori „*der höchste Begriff*“ (najviši pojam), onda transcendentale filozofiji treba dodati još više (*noch ein höherer*), naime, više

predmeta (KrV A290). Da li imamo dobre razloge da prevaziđemo sâmo prvenstvo predmeta? Da li bi trebalo preokrenuti njihov odnos i, shvatajući mogućē u radikalnom i nemetafizičkom smislu, postaviti ga iznad predmeta i njegove otuđene stvarnosti – shodno veoma zagonetnoj Hajdegerovoj primedbi: „*Höher als die Wirklichkeit, steht die Möglichkeit*“ [Od stvarnosti je viša mogućnost]? (Heidegger 1977: 35) Međutim, ne samo što nam ne nedostaju razlozi da to pokušamo nego smo već počeli da to činimo, i to na mnoštvo načina.

Širenje racionalnosti proizlazi pre svega iz *horizonta* koji pripisujemo fenomenalnosti (ili što ona sama sebi pripisuje). Ali, ono što se pojavljuje zapravo iz horizonta ne proizlazi uvek iz njegove transcendentalne konstitucije kao predmeta; potrebno je da se pojavi kao bivstvujuće koje se pokazuje kao takvo od sebe samog. Tako fenomen, barem prema Hajdegeru, označava „ono što sebe u sebi pokazuje, otkrivenost – das *Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende, das Offenbare*“ (*Sein und Zeit*, §7,28₃₅). Jedino se tako mogu otkriti bivstvjuća koja se ne mogu opredmetiti – pre svih *Dasein* ili svet kao *In-der-Welt-sein*, u horizontu koji više nije opredmećujući već ontološki – barem u smislu ponavljanja pitanja bića posredstvom analitike *Daseina*, upravo nasuprot metafizičkoj interpretaciji bića (*ens*) kao mislivog (*cogitabile*), predmeta za *ego cogito*. Međutim, sâmo ovo širenje pretpostavlja da se ono što se pokazuje – pokazuje od samog sebe, umesto da se otuđuje podvrgavajući se konstituisanju koja dolazi spolja, od *ega*. Ali kako fenomen može da raspolaže sobom, ako u sebi ne raspolaže nijednim *sopstvom*? Kako shvatiti sopstvo fenomena koji već nije *ego*? Na ovo pitanje se ne može odgovoriti sem napuštanjem ne samo horizonta predmeta, nego i horizonta bića i prelaskom na horizont datosti. U stvari, fenomen ne može da se pojavi po sebi (kao stvar) osim ako dospe do vidljivosti počev od sebe (kao događaj); a od *sebe* polazi ako se najpre dâ. Sve što se pokazuje (u strogom smislu pokazivanja počev od sebe) mora najpre da se dâ iz *sebe* samog. Samo ono dato raspolaže sobom i jednim *sopstvom*. Sâm Hajdeger svedoči o ovome prevladavanju horizonta bića kad insisitira da ni vreme ni biće *ni-su* (jer samo bivstvjuća jesu), te da za njih treba reći „*ima ga – es gibt*“, da se oni događaju dajući se (to je teza koja se nije pojavila samo 1962, u *Zeit und Sein* [Vremenu i biću], nego i 1927, u *Sein und Zeit* [Biću i vremenu], §§43–44). Zapravo je Huserl bez sumnje načinio odlučujući korak ka datosti, na svoj način, počev direktno od predmetnosti predmeta i, takoreći, bez prolaska kroz biće, kad je formulisao „princip svih principa“: „*sve što nam se izvorno nudi u 'intuiciji'* (takoreći u svojoj telesnoj stvarnosnosti), *mora se naprosto preuzeti, jer se daje (als es sich gibt)*, ali samo u granicama u kojima se daje (*nur in den Schranken in denen es sich gibt*)“ (Hua III: 52). Fenomeni, svi bez izuzetka, pre nego se suprotstave *Jastvu*, pre nego budu bivstvjuća suočena s ništavilom, događaju se počev od sebe samih kao onih koji se daju, takoreći kao događaji koji se zbivaju počev od svojeg

sopstva. Upravo to se može reći za događaj (kolektivni i povesni, ali i pojedinačni), idol, moju plot i lice drugog, koji se svi pojavljuju na sopstvenu inicijativu, a nikad na moju, i tako izmiču opredmećenju; ali koji više ne postoje, bar u smislu trajnog prisustva, čak ni upotrebljivog bivstvjućeg, jer ja ne mogu uvek, zapravo gotovo nikad da ih vidim kao stabilna, trajna, neutralna i javna bivstvjuća. Ovo određenje fenomena kao datosti može se dokazati jednako izvorno kao što predmeti u strogom smislu, u krajnjem slučaju, mogu da ponovo dovedu do datosti koje se daju. Zapravo, obrasci i parametri, čak reprodukovani pod istim uslovima, ne mogu u celosti da se apstrahuju od svojeg nepovratno jedinstvenog, samim tim kontingentnog, reprodukovanju nepodležućeg upisivanja u prostor i vreme. Najzad, oni uvek ostaju događaji, pripisujući svemu jedno *ovde* i jedno *sada* putem kojih moraju da se daju. Ovde postaje moguća jedna hermeneutika; ona nastoji da ponovo upiše sve fenomene koji se na prvi pogled smatraju predmetima (ili bivstvjućima) u izvorno date fenomene, budući da se daju *po sebi*. Ova hermeneutika horizonata vrši prvo širenje fenomenalnosti.

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Kad smo jednom identifikovali horizont datosti, možemo da načinimo drugi korak ka širenju fenomenalnosti. Ako se svaki fenomen pokazuje i, ako, da bi se pokazao, mora najpre da se dâ, vršilac davanja, dakle, uvek najpre ostaje opažaj. Opis zasićenosti fenomena posredstvom njihovog viška intuicije/opažaja čini drugo širenje fenomenalnosti. Zapravo, ništa se ne daje izuzev u opažaju i posredstvom njega, na način da svaki fenomen pretpostavlja barem delimično ispunjenje svoga pojma (ili značenja) putem dajućeg opažaja. Naime, opažaj ne proizlazi samo iz datosti („*Vorstellung, die vor allem Denken gegeben sein kann*“ [predstava koja može biti data pre svakog mišljenja] [KrV B132]), već vrši to davanje. Ona nije toliko data koliko je dajuća: „[b]ez čulnosti nijedan predmet ne bi bio dat (*kein Gegenstand gegeben würde*), a bez razuma, nijedan ne bi bio mišljen.“ Ili: „[p]rvom [receptivnošću čulnosti, intuicijom], predmet nam je *dat* (*ein Gegenstand gegeben wird*), drugom [spontanošću rasuđivanja, pojmom] mišljen je [...]“ (KrV A50/B74). Ova dva termina omogućuju, između ostalih, Kantu i Huserlu, da zadrže klasičnu definiciju istine kao adekvatnosti (*adequatio*), ne više stvari s duhom, nego opažaja s pojmom. Kad u izuzetnim slučajevima opažaj bez ostatka ispunjava pojam, onda se govori o evidenciji, punom subjektivnom iskustvu istine; u većini drugih slučajeva, priznaće se da je samo delimično ispunjenje pojma opažajem dovoljno da potvrdi saznanje, shodno opštem ustrojstvu fenomenalnosti. Ali i Kant i Huserl su, čini se, propustili treći oblik odnosa između opažaja i pojma: slučaj koji je, uostalom, i sâm moguć i misliv, u kojem opažaj premašuje eksplikativni kapacitet pojma, umesto da mu ostane jednak ili podređen. U ovom slučaju, trebalo bi više govoriti o formalnom fenomenu, ne o fenomenu koji je oskudan u pogledu opažaja (dematerijalizovani predmet, lišen *hyle*), niti o opštem fenomenu (koji delimično potvrđuje nedostatak opažaja), nego o

fenomenu *zasićenog* opažaja. Ali takvi fenomeni, iako njihovu fenomenalnost karakteriše izuzetni višak (opažaj je ovde *izuzet* iz granica pojma), u našem iskustvu poseduju samo nešto opšte i učestalo. Možemo razlikovati barem četiri vrste takvih fenomena. Prvo, događaj, koji se zbiva u obilnoj intuiciji povesti, pri čemu nijedan pojam nije predvideo njegovu mogućnost i mislivost, što može ići dotle da i posle svog stvarnog dolaska može ostati nedokučiv, nemisliv i, u strogo metafizičkom smislu termina, nemoguć (njegovim usvajanjem bavi se i neokončiva hermeneutika istoričara i romansijera). Drugo, idol ili višak čulnog svojstva koji premašuje ono što organi percepcije, ili bilo koje od pet čula, mogu da prime i obrade, izazivajući vizuelni ili zvučni blesak (ovde se u prvom redu misli na slikarstvo i muziku). – Treće, plot, tačnije *moja* plot, utoliko što iskustvujem osećanje osećajući sebe samog, to jest više ne iz fizičkog tela (koje osećam a da ono ne oseća mene i koje mi samim tim ostaje spoljašnje) nego iz samopobuđivanja (u kojem osećam da se osećam i osećam sebe kako osećam) koje izaziva iskustvovanje sebe, iskustvo *sopstva*. Moja plot više ne priznaje nijedan pojam, niti ulazi u odnos ni sa čim drugim osim sa sobom samom, jer se ona identifikuje sa sobom i putem sebe same (ovde se odigravaju fenomeni koji su prilagođeni „životu“, a samim tim smrti i patnji, individualnosti i nesvesnosti sebe). Najzad, lice drugoga (ili obraz), takvo da izmiče inertnoj vidljivosti predmeta koji postoji u svetu, čak u upotrebljivom prisustvu bivstvujućeg dostupnog za moje ciljeve, to jest takvo da postaje nevidljivo (ne nudi ništa na videlo mojem intencionalnom pogledu), nego mi govori, jer me izaziva i poziva obrnutom intencionalnošću koja odsad ide od njega k meni. Obraz tako otvara prostor etičkoga, ali bez sumnje i druga mesta – sva ta mesta gde ne mogu da upravljam fenomenom, ali ih, u najboljem slučaju, primam kao zapovest.

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Ovo širenje se ovde ne sastoji više samo u hermeneutici već vidljivih i primljenih fenomena (čime bi objektivnost bila upisana u događajnost), već i u *izumevanju* dosad nepoznatih zasićenih fenomena, u smislu njihovog viška evidencije. Začuđujuće, ono što čini zasićene fenomene teškim za prihvatanje ne proizlazi iz teškoće da se ispitaju (jer ko nije iskusio događaj, sopstvenu plot, i lice koje govori drugome?), nego naprotiv iz obilja opažaja koji čine nedelotvornim pojam, njegovo razgraničenje i njegovu konačnu racionalnost. Ovi fenomeni skrivaju se u blesku koji izaziva njihov opažajni višak. Pod bleskom ovde podrazumevamo ne samo bol u očima koje više ne mogu da gledaju u preteranu svetlost nego i dokaz da se dajući opažaju više ne može pripisati pojam, čak ni identitet – intuiciju koja zapravo ne daje ništa više do sebe samu (kao što na Tarnerovoj slici svetlost rastvara obris stvari i apsorbuje sve forme u svoju preplavljujuću nejasnost), tako da, kad se napokon povuče, ništa ne ostaje iza nje, nijedan određen oblik bilo čega. Zasićeni fenomen se, na taj način, ne nudi nijednom direktnom iskustvu, jer ne obezbeđuje nijedan *predmet* iskustva

(dakle, u slučaju obraza ili lica), a često čak ni neprekidno prisutno *bivstvjuće* (naročito u slučaju događaja ili moje ploti). U najboljem slučaju, on omogućava protiviskustvo. Protiviskustvo znači iskustvo, ali indirektno: iskustvo povlačenja opažaja prema meni, prikrivajući u samom ovom povlačenju identitet i formu onoga što se povlači i što se može saznati jedino otporom koji nameće meni i mojem intencionalnom pogledu, koji je od sada lišen bilo kakvog intencionalnog predmeta, bilo kakvog ciljanog značenja. Zbog toga protiviskustvo utoliko bolje potvrđuje stvarno prisustvo zasićenog fenomena koje čini njegov pojam nedokučivim. Nikad nije moguće da sumnjamo u činjenicu zasićenog fenomena upravo zato što za nas nikad nije moguće da ne sumnjamo u njegovo značenje. A ovi paradoksi još jače se pokazuju kad se kombinuju četiri vrste zasićenih fenomena da bi se približila fenomenalnost fenomena otkrovenja (i samim tim iznova vratilo, više ne metafizički nego *fenomenološki* u novom smislu, pitanje objave božanskog, odnosno Boga).

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Izvan hermeneutike i izumevanja zasićenosti, možemo još razmotriti treće širenje fenomenalnosti: domen *negativnih izvesnosti*. Zapravo, temeljni motiv ograničenja saznanja u polju predmeta sastoji se, videli smo, u privilegiji koja je data izvesnosti. Ali ova privilegovani položaj ne nameće nijedno ograničenje polju saznanja ako se, izvornije, nije radilo o konačnom – našem – saznanju. Budući konačno, naše saznanje ne dostiže intuiciju, osim pod uslovom da može proizvesti predmete umesto i na mesto stvari. No, kako se takva proizvodnja ne može ostvariti svuda i u svim slučajevima, naročito kad se derealizacija (dematerijalizacija) pokaže neizvodljivom (na primer, u slučaju opažajnog viška, zasićenih fenomena), polje izvesnosti takođe je ograničeno. Konačnost saznanja, tačnije konačnost saznanog, vodi do ograničenja izvesnosti. Ili pre, ona se smatra izvesnošću, kakva god da je, pozitivna ili negativna, široka ili ograničena, jedino ako je sama konačnost čini mogućom. U ovoj situaciji mogu se postaviti dva pitanja. Najpre možemo pitati da li se podrazumeva da svako saznanje mora da nastoji da postane saznanje koje je *izvesno* i da li, u suprotnom, brojna saznanja ne samo da ne mogu da dostignu izvesnost nego i ne moraju, jer bi ona protivrečila onome o čemu je reč u saznavanju. To je tako kadgod je reč o saznanju onoga što kao takvo implicuje suštinsku neodređenost. Na primer, saznanje drugoga, najzad, nikad ne mora da pretenduje na izvesnost, jer drugi implicuje neodređenost svoje slobode, u nedostatku koje se više ne bi mogla ispuniti uloga mog obraza drugog (i upravo zato se govori, pogrešno ali stalno, o aporiji intersubjektivnosti, mada se tamo radi, naprotiv, o kraljevskom putu svakog pristupa drugom kao meni). Isto je i sa saznanjem sopstva (čovjek po definiciji izmiče svakoj definiciji i izgubiće svoju ljudskost ako definisanjem ona bude izložena vlastitom poricanju), odnosno sa saznanjem Boga (koji, po definiciji, implicuje nedokučivost, što ide dotle da dokučivi Bog odmah pada na rang očiglednog idola). Takva

saznanja se mogu opisati kao ne-izvesna (*non-certaines*), ali se ne smatraju ne-pouzdanima (*in-certaines*), jer ovde neodređenost igra ulogu *pozitivnog* svojstva onoga o čemu je reč u saznanju, i ne upada u isključivanje njegovog načina saznanja. Jednom rečju, izvesnost ponekad čini *prepreku* istinskom saznanju izvesnih fenomena.

Pod pretpostavkom da zahtev za izvesnošću ne trpi ni izuzetak, ni osporavanje, jednako se postavlja drugo pitanje: da li je uvek, da bi se sa izvesnošću saznávalo, potrebno iskazati afirmativni sud? Ne nalazimo li takođe izvesnosti u negativnom saznanju? Postoji barem jedan odličan razlog da se u filozofiju uvede pojam *negativne izvesnosti* – transcendantalni status samog saznanja. Naime, ako konačno saznanje istovremeno određuje konačne uslove mogućnosti (a samim tim i nemogućnosti) predmeta saznanja, onda postaje ne samo misljivo nego i neizbežno *a priori* odrediti ono što se može i što se ne može saznati, čak i pitanja na koja se ne može i na koja se nikad neće moći *a priori* dobiti odgovor. Pitanja *nužno* lišena odgovora ne moraju (i ne mogu) uvek da budu isključena kao loše postavljena; naprotiv, ona su postavljena veoma ispravno, te sama čine da se načelno pojavi nemogućnost i najmanjeg afirmativnog odgovora. Stalno uvažavanje pitanja lišenih smisla na koja ne pronalazimo nijedan odgovor često svedoči ne samo o savršeno lošoj nameri nego i poriče konačnost, koja protivreči očiglednom zahtevu za skromnošću i skepticizmom. Naprotiv, ako nije tačno da „krivicom duha, već zato što mu se suprotstavlja sama priroda teškoće ili ljudskog stanja (*non ingenii culpa, sed quia obstat ipsius difficultatis natura, vel humana conditio*)“ izvesno (*certo*) ne možemo da odgovorimo na jedno pitanje, onda ovo saznanje „nije manje saznanje od onog koje otkriva priroda stvari po sebi (*non minor scientia est, quam illa quae rei ipsius naturam exhibet*)“ (AT X, 393, 15–21). Načelno, svaka nemogućnost da se odgovori na dobro osmišljeno pitanje, iz konačnog razloga, potvrđuje negativnu izvesnost. A budući da sama ova negacija zavisi od izvesnosti *a priori*, ona stvara *negativno* i *realno* širenje granica saznanja. U suštini, ostaje da se tek sprovedu otkrivanje i analiza negativnih izvesnosti, ali ne može se sumnjati da smo pronašli brojne primere njih.

Tako, na temelju neodređenih širenja racionalnosti, konačnost se samopotvrđuje kao neodređena, tačnije kao pozitivno beskonačna. Otkrivanje takve *beskonačne konačnosti* predstavlja primarni zadatak filozofije, ukoliko ona želi da prevlada nihilizam u sebi.

Prevela s francuskog: Kristina Bojanović

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Jean-Luc Marion

The Borders of Phenomenality

Abstract

This text is based on the lecture held by Jean-Luc Marion at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory (University of Belgrade), on December 4., 2015. By thematizing the “limits of phenomenality”, Marion analyzes what exceeds the horizon of objectivity and the framework of subjectivity. By relying on some of the most important philosophers of the history of (post)metaphysics (Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger), Marion offers an alternative way, namely, a phenomenology of givenness that focuses on saturated phenomena.

Keywords: phenomenality, finitude, object, saturated phenomenon, Kant, Descartes, Heidegger.

Mark Losoncz

Donation, tradition et interprétation. Entretien avec Jean-Luc Marion

Mark Losoncz : La phénoménologie que vous avez élaborée, la phénoménologie des phénomènes saturés et de la donation, peut être interprétée comme une sorte de synthèse des phénoménologies de vos prédécesseurs, mais aussi comme une extension ou un élargissement de la phénoménologie. Comment situez-vous votre philosophie dans la tradition phénoménologique ?

Jean-Luc Marion : D'abord, je pense qu'il y a bel et bien une *tradition* phénoménologique, bien que je sache que, parmi ceux que je situe dans la tradition phénoménologique, tous n'accordent pas qu'il y ait une telle tradition phénoménologique. Par exemple, Derrida revendique dès le début sa rupture avec Husserl, plus encore qu'avec Heidegger, ou même Lévinas. Mon sentiment est qu'il y a au contraire dans la phénoménologie un cas exemplaire de tradition, parce que, si l'on s'en tient aux résultats essentiels, il y a un effet cumulatif. On peut en effet être déconstructionniste et husserlien. Il n'y a même aucune nécessité à dire rompre avec Husserl quand on accepte un certain héritage de Derrida. Et je reste persuadé que, malgré les apparences, Lévinas reste profondément heideggerien (et husserlien, bien sûr). Je l'ai compris à l'époque où j'écrivais *Réduction et donation*, en faisant la (re)découverte de l'unité profonde de la phénoménologie. C'est ce qui fait sans doute la principale différence entre la phénoménologie et la philosophie analytique.

Ainsi, lorsque j'ai découvert d'une certaine manière (ou cru découvrir) la donation, je n'ai en fait pas du tout innové. En critiquant la critique derridienne des *Recherches logiques* de Husserl, j'ai seulement retrouvé chez Husserl un concept fondamental, qui méritait d'être mis au fondement plus qu'auparavant – à savoir la *Gegebenheit*. En effet, ce concept essentiel chez le premier Husserl, était essentiel aussi dès avant Husserl, dans l'École de Marbourg (chez Natorp), mais aussi chez Meinong et d'autres. Aussi traversait-il en fait toute l'histoire de la phénoménologie. Chez Husserl naturellement (sous les titres de *Gegebenheit*, *Hingabe*, etc.), mais aussi chez Heidegger (sous la forme de *es gibt*, *Gebung*, etc.), et ensuite chez Lévinas, comme dans beaucoup de thèses soutenues par d'autres phénoménologues. Quand j'ai ensuite entrevu la possibilité du phénomène saturé, j'ai découvert du même coup que la deuxième (ou la troisième) génération de la phénoménologie en France (Ricoeur, Lévinas, Henry et Derrida) s'inscrivait dans le cadre des différents types de phénomènes saturés (respectivement

l'événement, l'icône, la chair et l'idole). Je suis donc profondément convaincu qu'il y a bien une tradition phénoménologique. Il y a d'ailleurs plusieurs motifs à cela. D'abord, les meilleurs résultats des différents phénoménologues s'avèrent compatibles, car ce ne sont pas tant des thèses que des opérations (l'herméneutique consiste aussi en une opération, l'expérience éthique aussi bien). Cette pratique constitue la plus grande force de la phénoménologie : elle atteint une capacité à décrire les choses elles-mêmes, parce qu'elle interagit avec elles ; et elle interagit avec les choses mêmes, parce qu'elle opère. Donc, disons ce que disait Heidegger : « Je ne m'intéresse pas à la phénoménologie, mais seulement à ce à quoi la phénoménologie s'intéresse ». La phénoménologie *in fine* consiste en des descriptions (du phénomène érotique, de l'idole, de la peinture...). Alors il y a une possibilité pour la phénoménologie d'utiliser toutes les armes de guerre.

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ML : Kant décrit la philosophie comme une sorte de guerre dans la préface de la *Critique de la raison pure*...

JLM : Je pense aussi qu'il y a une forme de violence dans la philosophie, qui consiste à dire aux gens (comme depuis Socrate) : « Vous croyez savoir ce que vous dites, mais en vérité vous ne savez absolument pas ce que vous dites ». Ce qui ne peut s'éprouver, chez l'interlocuteur, que comme une violence. C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi (remarque en marge) un philosophe doit faire attention à ne pas être trop ou trop vite connu et reconnu, à ne pas devenir un écrivain à succès, parce que, à vouloir devenir et rester un auteur à succès, vous devez dire ce que les gens veulent entendre, ce qu'ils s'imaginent déjà savoir, et penser. Or, vraisemblablement, cela ne sera pas, ne pourra pas relever de la philosophie, encore moins de la bonne philosophie. Il faut donc que le philosophe reste, autant que faire se peut, quelqu'un qui lit et écrit des choses qui semblent d'abord incompréhensibles – quelqu'un qui ne commence pas à dire ce que les gens espèrent entendre, mais qui continue de parler des choses mêmes, aussi déplaissantes ou surprenantes soient-elles. C'est presque une règle d'éthique professionnelle des philosophes.

ML : Vous avez mentionné la guerre, la tradition et la philosophie analytique. Il y a quelques historiens de la philosophie qui ont montré que la philosophie analytique et la phénoménologie ont des sources communes (autrichiennes et allemandes). Pensez-vous qu'il est possible de combiner ces deux types de philosophie et de dépasser cette guerre (si c'en est une) ?

JLM : Bien entendu, l'origine « autrichienne » (et marbourgeoise) commune aux deux écoles a été démontrée, définitivement. Aujourd'hui et dans le passé récent, le conflit porte sur des disputes entre écoles, et surtout sur le contrôle des départements de philosophie. C'est une chose classique et habituelle. Cela fait environ vingt-cinq ans que j'enseigne aux États-Unis

et je ne sais toujours pas exactement pourquoi ce conflit perdure. Une différence cependant me semble patente : la phénoménologie constitue indiscutablement, encore et toujours, une tradition cohérente et cumulative, tandis que la philosophie analytique n'est plus une tradition réelle. Et puis il y a d'autres différences ; ainsi, en phénoménologie on lit des textes des anciens phénoménologues et de la tradition philosophique générale (et dans les langues d'origine) ; tandis que dans la philosophie analytique, la plupart du temps, on lit peu ou pas – on lit des traductions, des extraits, des *hand out*, etc., pour se concentrer essentiellement sur l'argumentation très formelle et bornée aux débats de la contemporanéité la plus étroite. En fait, je ne suis pas sûr qu'une réconciliation soit possible, ni même qu'elle soit nécessaire. Je pense que les deux courants jouent leur jeu. Pour moi la philosophie analytique est certes assez utile, car il s'y trouve quelques résultats que l'on peut utiliser. Mais la réciproque n'est pas vraie : les philosophes analytiques ne lisent pas sérieusement la tradition phénoménologique, et la méprisent à la mesure de leur ignorance, qui est grande.

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ML : Vous avez en effet élargi ou précisé la phénoménologie de la donation. Paul Ricœur vous a dit un jour, qu'il était presque impossible de faire une liaison entre la phénoménologie de la donation et le phénomène du don. Ce dernier est aussi un concept critiqué par Jacques Derrida et Dominique Janicaud. Pourriez-vous expliquer l'importance de cette liaison entre le don et la donation et reconstruire votre réponse à ces critiques ?

JLM : La remarque de Ricœur reposait sur une constatation évidente. D'une part, la question de la *Gegebenheit* reste une question phénoménologique, consistant à savoir si l'intuition seule est donatrice ou s'il peut y avoir une donation non intuitive (comme le dit Husserl : une donation des significations). Il s'agit donc d'un problème qu'on trouve d'abord chez Kant, repris ensuite par Husserl (et Ricœur lui-même : car, dans une note de sa traduction d'*Ideen I*, il se demande si, pour Husserl, c'est l'intuition qui donne la chose ou si c'est la chose qui se donne elle-même). D'autre part, la question de la donation diffère évidemment du problème du don, qui ne devient un problème philosophique qu'à travers la sociologie. Pour Marcel Mauss en effet, le don reste une simple forme d'échange, mais où l'argent ne joue cependant pas le rôle d'intermédiaire. En fait, le don n'est pas un don, mais un mode gratuit de l'échange. Mon essai consista à remonter du prétendu don sociologique à un véritable don, qui ne soit plus un simple échange. J'insiste sur le fait qu'il convient de procéder à une réduction du don à la donation en lui. Et de découvrir que le don est possible sans que personne ne le donne et aussi bien sans que personne ne le reçoive, voire sans que rien de matériel ne soit donné. Alors, ainsi réduit, un tel phénomène ne satisfait ni au principe de raison suffisante ni au principe d'identité, tout en devenant pourtant absolument effectif, tel que tout le monde le connaît

et le constate. Telle fut la première étape de la question. – Puis il y a eu une critique importante faite par Derrida, argumentant que le don est impossible. Ce qui est exact, mais ce qui n'interdit pourtant pas au don de se faire effectif. Ce paradoxe m'a retenu, car il montre clairement qu'on ne peut pas décrire le don dans les termes de la métaphysique (ici les catégories de la modalité), mais le don est effectif de multiples autres façons. – Il y avait encore une autre objection, beaucoup plus faible, qui était celle de Janicaud. Il craignait que, la mise en rapport du don et de la donation conduise nécessairement à admettre un donateur de tous les phénomènes, donc un dieu *causa* universelle. Évidemment, cette polémique superficielle n'avait pas bien entendu le problème de la donation. D'une certaine manière, parmi ces trois objections la plus sérieuse venait de Ricœur : si on traite la donation en phénoménologie, il faut la mettre en jeu dans une réduction, sinon on en perd la visibilité en l'isolant du don. D'autant plus de réduction, d'autant plus de donation, le principe s'imposait d'emblée : à mon avis, si l'on médiatise la donation et le don par la réduction, on trouve un tel rapport.

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ML : Votre phénoménologie décrit beaucoup de formes de la donation : le visage, l'œuvre d'art, l'événement, la chair, Dieu, la mort, etc. Vous soulignez que la donation est exceptionnelle, imprévisible et irréductible, mais en même temps vous dites qu'il s'agit d'une expérience quotidienne. Y a-t-il une concurrence entre les différentes formes de la donation ? D'un autre côté, votre phénoménologie décrit-elle la sédimentation de l'expérience de la donation, à savoir la période qui survient après l'événement de la donation ?

JLM : Vous posez ici des questions assez complexes. Je peux au moins confirmer que je tiens la donation pour la forme fondamentale de la phénoménalité. Tout ce qui se montre se donne, même si tout ce qui se donne ne se montre pas. Il y a donc une multiplicité de figures de la donation. Selon Aristote, l'être se dit de diverses manières, et l'on pourrait dire que la donation se montre de diverses manières. Et en chacune de ses manières, la donation varie aussi en intensité. Il y a au moins quatre types de phénomènes saturés : l'événement, l'idole, la chair et l'icône (le visage, autrui). Mais je pense désormais que tous les phénomènes saturés portent, à un degré ou à un autre, la marque de l'événement. En effet, parce que le phénomène saturé surpasse son concept par l'excès d'intuition, il arrive sans être prévu ou compris à l'avance – ce qui caractérise l'événement. L'événement se fait effectif sans avoir été d'abord possible, au sens où la possibilité se définit métaphysiquement par la non-contradiction dans le concept. Et tous les phénomènes saturés arrivent comme un événement, tous les phénomènes saturés *adviennent*. Par exemple, je ne peux pas *pré-*voir le visage d'autrui, que je vois pourtant. Enfin, il y a une combinaison possible des types de phénomènes saturés : par exemple, je pense que la

révélation biblique combine les quatre formes de phénomènes saturés. Mais surtout il y a un point très important que vous avez indiqué justement, ce dont je vous remercie : le phénomène saturé n'a rien d'exceptionnel, car il intervient dans la quotidienneté. Plus : un même phénomène peut être vu comme pauvre la plupart du temps et comme saturé dans certains cas et pour certains regards. C'est une expérience très courante – à certains moments le phénomène banal peut apparaître comme un phénomène saturé. La littérature en fournit maints exemples (Proust est un grand spécialiste des phénomènes banals qui deviennent des phénomènes saturés).

ML : Je me souviens de la critique de Lévinas par Maurice Blanchot, disant que le phénomène du visage n'est pas nécessairement quelque chose dans lequel le Bien s'incarne. En effet, le visage peut aussi être mauvais, méchant. Pensez-vous qu'il y a un danger similaire dans la phénoménologie de la donation ?

JLM : L'objection de Blanchot était faible. Bien entendu, pour Lévinas le visage peut contenir une menace ou un jugement ; mais, pour que le mal devienne possible, il faut justement qu'il y ait quelque chose comme un visage. C'en est même la condition éthique. Au regard de la donation, l'objection reste absolument neutre, puisque je soutiens que même la mort et le néant se trouvent aussi donnés. Non seulement la mort se donne d'elle-même (événement), mais nous pouvons donner la mort (meurtre). Le mal offre aussi une forme de la donation, par exemple dans certaines formes du phénomène érotique. En un mot, la distinction du Bien et du Mal demande beaucoup plus qu'une interprétation objective du monde.

ML : Vous avez renouvelé la théologie contemporaine, notamment avec votre livre *Dieu sans l'être*. Êtes-vous un héritier de la théologie négative ?

JLM : À mon avis, il n'y avait jamais eu de théologie négative isolée. Car, dans la « théologie mystique », la *via negativa* reste un moment, le second, dans un ensemble qui comprend trois voies. La thèse la plus traditionnelle de la pensée chrétienne consiste à commencer par dire comment Dieu est Dieu positivement ; puis on découvre qu'on connaît mieux Dieu en disant ce qu'il n'est pas. Mais ensuite s'ouvre une troisième voie, qui ne consiste plus à ne pas parler *au sujet de* Dieu (comme si Dieu était un objet de parole dans d'un usage prédicatif du langage), mais à parler à Dieu (car, quand on parle à quelqu'un, on ne parle pas à son propos, mais à cette personne). Quand il y a une vraie parole adressée à quelqu'un, on peut, on doit parler pour ne rien dire, pourvu qu'on le dise vraiment à elle. Car dire quelque chose de quelqu'un reste un usage faible et dérivé du langage. Lévinas a bien expliqué que le langage a d'abord la fonction de s'adresser à quelqu'un. J'ajoute que dans ce cas, il est parfois meilleur (et requis) de ne rien lui dire, de parler pour ne rien dire. Quand un homme

veut séduire une femme (et réciproquement), il ne lui parle pas de quelque chose (d'autre qu'elle-même) – il lui parle d'elle, à elle. Analogiquement, le langage à l'égard de Dieu ne consiste donc pas à parler de Dieu (pour lui dire quoi qu'il ne sache déjà ?), mais d'abord à Dieu. Donc la théologie positive – kataphatique – et la théologie négative – apophatique – ne sont que des niveaux élémentaires de discours de la théologie, qui s'avère une *confessio*, voie d'éminence, non prédicative, mais de louange, discours à Dieu. C'est ce qui se passe dans la Bible, où le croyant est celui qui parle à Dieu et qui écoute Dieu, mais ne sait pas son essence. Évidemment, je sais que Dieu existe, je sais pourquoi et comment Dieu existe, mais ce n'est pas la question. Lors de mon débat avec Derrida sur la question de « ne pas parler de Dieu », ce fut le point central : Derrida ne voulait pas admettre ce troisième mode du langage.

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J'utilise l'expression « Dieu sans l'être », d'abord pour souligner que l'être n'est advenu à Dieu comme son premier nom qu'à une époque assez récente (au XIII^e siècle), lorsque la métaphysique commençait à se constituer en système. Car auparavant les théologiens pensaient Dieu à partir soit de l'*agapé*, soit du Bien, soit de l'Un. Le penser à partir de l'être, ce fut une révolution, où la philosophie s'imposa à la théologie. À mon avis, le problème de la théologie est qu'elle est souvent trop philosophique, sans le savoir, sans réfléchir à ses présupposés philosophiques. En fait, mon message implicite aux théologiens revenait à leur dire : « Vous n'êtes pas assez théologiens, mais bien trop philosophes et philosophes non-critiques ». Les théologiens ne devraient pas commencer avec la question de l'être ; or beaucoup trop le font par mauvaise imitation de la philosophie, que dis-je ?, de la métaphysique.

ML : Laissez-moi citer les Évangiles : « *Vendez ce que vous possédez, et donnez-le en aumônes* ». Évidemment, il s'agit d'une éthique active de la donation. Or c'est la passivité (la réceptivité, l'appel) qui joue un rôle central dans votre philosophie. Dans un entretien avec Dan Arbib vous dites que vous avez compris l'erreur de l'engagement et que vous êtes devenu opposé à toutes les formes d'action quand vous étiez jeune. Quant à votre philosophie, le phénomène saturé peut nous rendre actif et il est important que nous soyons ouverts, que nous nous exposions à la donation. Il y a donc, au moins implicitement, une certaine activité. Pensez-vous que la philosophie de la donation rende possible une pensée de l'action apostolique ? La philosophie de la donation peut-elle nous encourager à donner aux pauvres ce que nous possédons ?

JLM : Soyons précis : j'étais devenu réticent envers ce qu'on a appelé l'« engagement » politique, contre l'idée de se faire le « militant » d'un mouvement organisé avec des buts politiques, tel qu'il produit des mensonges et de la violence ; mais je n'étais pas pour autant opposé à l'action.

Deuxièmement, que signifie donner activement ? Il faut certes donner aux pauvres, mais à *tous* les pauvres. Or les pauvres ne sont pas seulement les gens qui manquent d'argent, ce sont aussi ceux qui manquent d'idées et ceux qui manquent de cœur – ce sont les vrais pauvres, riches peut-être matériellement, mais en fait profondément pauvres. Face à cette situation, il faut savoir non seulement donner ce qu'on a, mais il faut aussi donner tout ce qu'on n'a pas. Or donner ce que j'ai est (relativement) facile, parce que ce quelque chose que j'ai n'est justement pas moi. Ce qui est vraiment difficile est de donner ce que je suis, parce que c'est moi, justement. Donc il faut apprendre à donner ce que nous ne possédons pas : le temps, la vie, la parole, le corps, l'amour, la paix et même la mort. Et si l'on peut donner ce que l'on est, c'est parce qu'on l'a d'abord et préalablement reçu (contre cette idée folle de la philosophie de l'autonomie, selon laquelle ce que je suis m'appartient). La donation et le don apparaissent ainsi comme le stade ultime : loin que l'être les embrasse, son domaine s'y trouve d'emblée déjà compris. L'opposition entre activité ou passivité, ces catégories de l'étant, n'est donc pas la question.

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ML : De nombreux phénoménologues ont élaboré des philosophies aux conséquences politiques et sociales (par exemple Michel Henry, de même que Lévinas, a élaboré une phénoménologie du tiers et de la justice). Il me semble que vous utilisez beaucoup d'expressions implicitement politiques ou sociales, par exemple : « il faut que le spectateur obéisse au tableau pour le voir », « l'inégalité de l'apparition du don », « l'asymétrie du non-retour du don ». Mais je ne suis pas sûr que l'on puisse déduire de telles expressions une philosophie sociale de la donation. D'un autre côté, vous critiquez la quotidienneté du monde technique, la société obsédée par la sécurité, le consumérisme, le nihilisme et la logique du marché. La question qui m'intéresse est de savoir si cette *Kulturkritik* procède directement de votre philosophie et comment elle est possible.

JLM : En règle générale, j'ai décidé d'éviter la philosophie politique. Je suis extrêmement sceptique sur les philosophes qui ont des positions politiques. Il y a eu tant de grands philosophes qui ont dit des bêtises politiquement ! Je restais dans ce sentiment. Cela ne m'empêche pas de penser la façon dont la politique s'organise réellement en ce moment. Mais je ne me sens pas qualifié pour donner des indications positives sur ce qu'il faudrait faire.

Je ne critique pas la société contemporaine, mais je critique le discours que l'on tient sur la société contemporaine. C'est un peu différent. Je pense que ce discours est largement idéologique. Il ne décrit pas les choses comme elles sont, il décrit les choses comme on voudrait qu'elles soient, voire des choses qui n'existent pas. C'est une position politique forte de dire que le discours politique ne parle de rien. C'est cela que je fais, particulièrement dans mon livre *Certitudes négatives*. Je pense que la politique est trop

importante pour être abandonnée à un discours politique profondément nihiliste. Le discours politique parle de ce qui n'est pas encore et de ce qui devrait être (utopie), alors que nous sommes dans ce qui est vraiment. Une grande partie de l'activité économique et politique consiste à s'occuper de ce qui n'existe pas. Cela nous fait croire que ce qui n'existe pas est plus important que ce qui existe. Je suis méfiant à l'égard de la philosophie politique parce qu'elle ne critique pas son langage, pourtant profondément métaphysique. Elle se contente d'une définition faible de l'égalité, de la liberté, etc. Les concepts restent extrêmement déterminés par l'histoire de la métaphysique. Même Foucault garde le vocabulaire de Rousseau ou de Hobbes. Les philosophes qui font de la philosophie politique devraient lire beaucoup plus Nietzsche.

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Je suis entré en philosophie à l'époque où la bataille idéologique se concentrait sur la lutte entre le communisme orthodoxe et les communismes non-orthodoxes. C'était l'horizon naturel dans lequel nous parlions. Après, il y a eu un retour du libéralisme, qui est aussi devenu un horizon naturel. Dans tous les cas, le dictionnaire de la philosophie politique restait inadéquat. Il l'est encore aujourd'hui. Heidegger a dit que « la science ne pense pas ». On pourrait aussi dire, avec moins de risque, que « la politique ne pense pas ».

ML : Nous n'avons pas mentionné encore votre travail sur l'histoire de la philosophie. Il me semble qu'il y a un lien essentiel entre votre travail phénoménologique et ce que vous avez fait dans le champ de l'histoire de la philosophie. Par exemple vous lisez Descartes comme un phénoménologue et votre lecture est largement influencée par Heidegger...

JLM : J'étais introduit à l'histoire de la philosophie par Jean Beaufret (qui était un ami de Heidegger) et Ferdinand Alquié (à la Sorbonne). Ils avaient en commun la conviction que les textes disent parfois autre chose que ce qu'ils veulent dire, c'est-à-dire que les textes d'un philosophe sont d'autant plus intéressants que leur sens n'est pas immédiatement visible. Gueroult pensait au contraire que les philosophes disent exactement ce qu'ils veulent dire et que les systèmes sont toujours cohérents ; mais Alquié insistait sur le fait que la position d'un philosophe peut varier sur une même question. D'un autre côté, Beaufret soulignait qu'il faut comparer ce que les philosophes disent avec ce que d'autres philosophes avaient dit avant eux et que seul cet écart faisait comprendre la nouveauté d'un philosophe. J'ajoute qu'il faut aussi comprendre ce qu'on dit de lui après lui ; car les successeurs qui ne sont pas d'accord avec un philosophe en sont de très bons lecteurs. Si on veut comprendre Descartes, il faut comprendre Kant. Et si on veut comprendre Nietzsche, il faut comprendre Husserl. Si on lit simplement Descartes, on ne comprend rien.

ML : Et Descartes a lu Nietzsche et Heidegger.

JML : Voilà, c'est ce que demandait Beaufret à ses élèves : « Alors Aristote a-t-il lu Descartes ? » Et il avait raison. Il y a aussi un autre rapport. Tous les phénoménologues se réfèrent à Descartes pour en dire du bien ou du mal.

ML : Vous avez évidemment déconstruit le concept heideggerien d'histoire de la philosophie, par exemple lorsque vous avez montré que, chez certains penseurs, il n'y a pas d'onto-théologie. Mais y a-t-il une histoire englobante de la philosophie marionienne ?

JLM : En fait, j'étais très frappé par la justesse de l'hypothèse onto-théologique. Je pense qu'elle fonctionne très bien d'un point de vue historique, à condition de la compliquer, de la modifier. C'est une herméneutique très puissante qui permet de comprendre que la philosophie est largement devenue métaphysique, mais je pense qu'il y avait beaucoup de philosophes qui n'étaient pas métaphysiciens. C'est toujours intéressant de voir lesquels. Par exemple Saint Thomas n'est pas encore métaphysicien, mais Duns Scot l'est résolument. Spinoza et Malebranche sont infiniment plus métaphysiciens que Descartes. Et l'on voit bien que, par exemple, Husserl reste sur la frontière, comme Nietzsche. La métaphysique n'a pas échoué, elle ne cesse au contraire de triompher dans la globalisation technologique du monde. Le principe d'identité et le principe de raison suffisante ont totalement accompli l'équivalence entre le *wirklich* et le rationnel. Nous sommes donc sur le chemin de la métaphysique qui interdit tout qui n'est pas métaphysique, et c'est notre catastrophe. C'est pourquoi la philosophie est une chose sérieuse *politiquement*.

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ML : Heidegger a parlé de *Seinsvergessenheit*, mais il a aussi mentionné les penseurs exceptionnels qui n'ont pas oublié l'être. Il me semble que vous parlez également des philosophes qui n'ont pas oublié les phénomènes saturés, par exemple lorsque vous dites que Descartes a pensé l'infini comme un phénomène saturé, que Kant a parlé du sublime et que Husserl a parlé du temps d'une manière similaire. Peut-être y a-t-il une histoire de la philosophie alternative et hérétique...

JLM : Oui, bien sûr. Je pense que l'interprétation de l'histoire de la philosophie n'est métaphysique que partiellement. Il y a des penseurs qui ont essayé de résister au tournant métaphysique de la philosophie : Kierkegaard, Nietzsche et les autres. Je pense même que tous les *grands* philosophes ont aussi résisté à la métaphysique que parfois ils rendent possible. L'histoire de la philosophie devrait être réécrite. Il faut chercher ce qui n'est pas métaphysique dans la conceptualisation philosophique. Les gens les plus intelligents de ma génération ont fait cela (Boulnois, Carraud, Brague, Courtine, de Libera, Franck). Ils font tous une histoire alternative de ce qui n'est pas métaphysique dans la philosophie.

Claudia Serban

L'érôs ou le corps devenu chair

Réflexions sur *Le Phénomène érotique* de Jean-Luc Marion

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La distinction entre chair et corps a reçu un sens philosophique particulier dans la philosophie française du XX^e siècle dans l'horizon de la réception de la phénoménologie allemande et plus particulièrement de l'œuvre de Husserl : il suffit de mentionner en ce sens l'ouvrage de Didier Franck : *Chair et corps. Sur la phénoménologie de Husserl* (Franck 1981). C'est en effet pour répondre à la difficulté que Natalie Depraz nommait, en 1997, une *crux phaenomenologica*, à savoir la traduction du terme allemand *Leib*, que le vocabulaire de la chair a commencé à s'imposer (même si ce vocabulaire est loin d'avoir été adopté à l'unanimité dans les traductions), pour connaître ensuite une destinée propre dans certaines philosophies du corps, comme celle de Merleau-Ponty ou de Michel Henry. Plus précisément, c'est pour rendre la distinction allemande entre *Leib* et *Körper* que le binôme « chair et corps » a pu paraître particulièrement adéquat. En effet, là où le *Körper* désigne le corps matériel comme corps physique, le *Leib* nomme quant à lui le corps vivant, le corps vécu, le corps propre, le corps de chair donc (autant de traductions alternatives possibles), fût-il le mien ou celui d'autrui.

Il semblerait donc que ce soient la langue et la philosophie allemande qui auraient requis de donner un sens philosophique à une distinction – chair et corps – qui n'avait pas jusque-là de vraie signification technique pour la philosophie française. Le dernier ouvrage que Jean-Luc Marion a consacré à *La pensée passive chez Descartes* (Marion 2013) invite cependant à remettre en question cette évidence et ce présupposé en les attaquant pour ainsi dire à la racine, à l'aune de l'hypothèse suivante : et si Descartes avait été le premier à découvrir et entériner une distinction entre le corps physique et le corps propre, donc finalement entre le corps et la chair ? Cette hypothèse a incontestablement quelque chose de très audacieux, voire de provocant, dans la mesure où Descartes pourrait très bien apparaître ici comme le philosophe qui a réduit la corporéité vivante à la *res extensa* que le corps propre partage avec le corps physique, donc comme celui contre qui la distinction entre *Leib* et *Körper* est essentiellement dirigée. En inscrivant sa lecture davantage dans l'horizon de l'exégèse cartésienne que dans celui des problèmes conceptuels et de traduction qu'a posés la réception de

la phénoménologie allemande, Jean-Luc Marion nous livre une démonstration de la pertinence qui revient à la distinction entre chair et corps chez Descartes lui-même. Dans ce qui suit, je vais dans un premier temps restituer de façon condensée son argumentation, pour me livrer ensuite, en me référant aux analyses du *Phénomène érotique*, à quelques réflexions critiques à propos de cette transformation inattendue de Descartes en phénoménologue du corps et de la chair.

C'est, pour commencer, sur le terrain de la *Sixième Méditation métaphysique* que Jean-Luc Marion entame son exploration des raisons qui conduisent Descartes à briser l'homogénéité et l'uniformité de la *res extensa* pour reconnaître un privilège inattendu au corps de chair. La difficulté de la dernière *Méditation* de Descartes a été abondamment soulignée à la fois par les contemporains du philosophe et par ses exégètes, ainsi que par les philosophes postérieurs qui ont parfois remis en doute la validité de la démonstration cartésienne de l'existence du monde extérieur. Cette difficulté, comme le souligne Jean-Luc Marion, est donnée dès le titre qui indique que la *Sixième Méditation* a un objet double et ambigu dans sa duplicité : *De rerum materialium existentia et reali mentis a corpore distinctione*. Quel rapport en effet entre ces deux affaires qui ne se superposent pas : l'existence des choses matérielles et la distinction réelle de l'esprit avec le corps ? Avant de tenter de répondre à ces questions, Jean-Luc Marion souligne la faiblesse démonstrative de la preuve de l'existence des choses matérielles que propose la *Sixième Méditation*, preuve qui aboutit à produire « un chiasme brutal et strictement renversant : les choses matérielles ne sont plus sensibles, le sensible n'est plus matériel » (Marion 2004: 45). Mais il souligne en même temps que ce constat est loin d'enlever tout intérêt philosophique à la démarche propre à cette *Méditation*, car « Reste à savoir si l'objectif de la *Meditatio VI* consistait (et consistait d'abord) à démontrer l'existence des corps extérieurs » (Marion 2004: 55). C'est en ce point que Jean-Luc Marion introduit sa propre perspective interprétative : on voit en effet, à la fin du premier chapitre de son ouvrage de 2013, le centre de gravité se déplacer et l'ordre des matières se renverser, dans la mesure où c'est l'union de l'âme et du corps (cette union que le titre de la *Sixième Méditation* donnait à penser d'abord comme distinction) qui occupe à présent le devant de la scène et devient l'instance directrice de la discussion portant sur l'existence des choses matérielles. Cela signifie qu'il est nécessaire d'opérer une distinction, voire de reconnaître une opposition entre « les corps et ma chair ».

Il y a en effet, pour la démarche de la *Sixième Méditation*, « au moins un corps dont l'existence ne fait pas question » (Marion 2004: 59), « *corpus ipsi intime praesens, ac proinde existens* » (AT VII, 72, 3) : « Ainsi, une existence corporelle précède la démonstration de l'existence des 'choses matérielles' »

(Marion 2004: 60). Cela signifie que « la distinction entre la *mens* et le corps [...] s'ouvre sur une différence plus essentielle entre, d'une part, les corps du monde matériel et, d'autre part, mon corps de chair » et que « tandis que l'existence des corps reste à prouver, celle de mon corps de chair ('*quod habeam corpus*') s'impose déjà et sans détour comme une certitude » (Marion 2004: 61). La démarche de la *Sixième Méditation* tout entière s'inscrit donc dans cette équivoque qui frappe le concept de corps. En même temps, la mise au jour de ce double régime de la corporéité n'est pas sans rapport avec l'autre objet de la *Sixième Méditation*, la distinction de l'âme et du corps, ou plutôt leur union : « ce qui fait du *corpus meum* autre chose qu'une parcelle d'étendue [...] tient à ce qu'il se trouve uni à l'*ego*, entendu comme *mens*. L'union à la *mens* offrirait le seul principe d'unité de ce corps, qui ne devient mien (*meum corpus*) que parce que je l'ai (*habeam corpus*) » (Marion 2004: 63). Cela veut dire que ce qui distingue donc le *meum corpus* des autres choses matérielles est aussi, finalement, ce qui le distingue de l'*ego* : sa dépendance foncière à l'égard de la *mens*.

L'union de la *mens* et du *corpus* est même tellement étroite qu'elle est décrite par Descartes, dans la *Sixième Méditation* comme dans les *Réponses aux objections*, comme étant presque un mélange : « *ab unione & quasi permixtione mentis cum corpore* » (AT VII, 81), « *unio ac quasi permixtio* » (AT VII, 437). Mais quelle est, plus précisément, l'expérience que l'on fait de l'union ? La réponse que la *Sixième Méditation* donne à cette question est incontestablement remarquable, et Jean-Luc Marion a raison de souligner son importance : il s'agit de l'expérience de la douleur ou de la souffrance que le corps de chair fait sous la forme de la faim et de la soif. C'est par ces expériences que, d'après Descartes, « la nature nous enseigne que nous avons un corps où ne nous sommes pas logés comme le pilote dans son navire, mais auquel nous sommes très étroitement conjoints et tellement confondus et mêlés que nous composons un seul tout avec lui » (« *Docet etiam natura, per isto sensus doloris, famis, sitis, etc., me non tantum adesse meo corpori ut nauta adest navigio, sed illi artissime esse conjunctum et quasi permixtum, adeo ut unum quid cum illo componam* », AT VII, 81).

Arrêtons-nous sur cette thèse selon laquelle « je connais ma corporéité parce qu'elle me fait souffrir » (Marion 2004: 70), ou plus précisément, selon la formulation de Descartes, selon laquelle je sais que j'ai un corps « qui a mal lorsque je ressens de la douleur, qui a besoin de manger ou de boire quand je ressens de la faim ou de la soif » (AT VII, 80). Jean-Luc Marion insiste sur le privilège que détient ici la souffrance et qu'il traduit en privilège de la passivité : « La passivité de l'expérience sensible d'autres corps [...] ne devient possible que sur le fond de la passivité plus originelle de cette souffrance de soi, de l'expérience du soi comme souffrance » (Marion 2004: 70). Mais outre la conclusion radicale et surprenante qui s'ensuit :

« La souffrance constitue le privilège de l'âme » (Marion 2004: 70), qui revient à entériner malgré tout la dépendance du corps de l'ego à l'égard de l'âme de l'ego, on peut aussi souligner ici que l'expérience de la douleur dont parle Descartes est l'expérience d'une passivité et d'une souffrance bien particulières : la souffrance générée par les besoins qui marquent la dépendance du corps vivant à l'égard du monde extérieur. C'est finalement dans son indigence plus que dans sa passivité, ou dans une passivité fondée dans son indigence, que l'ego fait cette expérience de la douleur par laquelle la nature l'enseigne justement qu'il a un corps de chair. On comprend ainsi également en quoi et pourquoi l'épreuve du *meum corpus* ouvre sur le monde extérieur : ce dernier est de prime abord (même si Descartes ne le dit pas *expressis verbis*) objet du besoin. C'est dans le monde et parmi les choses extérieures que je vais chercher la nourriture qui me manque et dont mon corps ressent douloureusement le manque : dans cette perspective, le monde extérieur serait pour moi d'abord (pour parler comme Levinas) un monde de nourritures.

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Mais la lecture que Jean-Luc Marion nous propose de la *Sixième Méditation* choisit d'explorer une autre voie, pour exhiber, tour à tour, dans la description de Descartes, un « moment husserlien » (§ 9) et un « moment heideggérien » (§ 10). Le moment husserlien est celui du sentir et de l'affection, selon lequel « La chair ouvre seule sur un champ de sensation, donc d'expérience du monde » (Marion 2013: 74) et « Le monde [...] extérieur ne s'ouvre qu'à ma chair » (Marion 2004: 76); autrement dit, c'est le moment qui correspond à l'intention de Descartes d'obtenir une « preuve certaine (*certum aliquid argumentum*) » de l'existence des choses corporelles à partir de ce mode de la *cogitatio* qui s'appelle *sensus* (AT, VII, 74). Mais où chercher quelque chose comme une certitude sensible alors que, on le sait depuis la première *Méditation*, les sens ne font le plus souvent que nous tromper ? Précisément, dans la certitude intime de la douleur ; car, comme le reconnaît Descartes, il n'y a rien de plus intime que la douleur (« *quid dolore intimius ?* », AT VII, 77, *apud* 77-78). Et la douleur ne trompe pas : soit elle est ressentie, soit elle ne l'est pas.

Le « moment heideggérien » que Jean-Luc Marion identifie dans la démarche de la *Sixième Méditation* correspond au fait que les choses extérieures ne sont plus perçues comme des parcelles d'étendue, mais comme des sources d'affections agréables ou désagréables : *commoda vel incommoda*. C'est dans la relation à l'extériorité que le *meum corpus* institue pour autant qu'il peut souffrir et qu'il a faim ou soif, que les choses extérieures agissent sur moi et m'affectent de prime abord : cela signifie que « le premier rapport que j'entretiens avec ce qui m'affecte relève de l'usage, commode ou incommode, et non pas de la connaissance » (Marion 2004: 81). En tant qu'elle se rapporte donc au *meum corpus*, l'affection des choses extérieures n'est

pas neutre, mais se laisse qualifier selon le « critère de la commodité et de l'incommodité » (Marion 2004: 80). Comme le montre Jean-Luc Marion, la présence et l'importance de ce critère dans la démarche de Descartes permet de transposer, au sein de son analyse, la distinction heideggérienne entre deux manières d'être de l'étant ou de la chose : la *Vorhandenheit* (qui relève du rapport théorique) et la *Zuhandenheit* (qui relève du rapport d'usage). On peut néanmoins se demander ici si le critère de la commodité qu'invoque Descartes peut vraiment être reconduit à la *Zuhandenheit* heideggérienne. Certes, Descartes fait référence à un rapport aux choses qui n'est pas un rapport de connaissance ; mais ce n'est pas non plus, d'après moi, un rapport d'usage à proprement parler. Les choses qui se présentent au *meum corpus* comme commodes ou incommodes me semblent en effet se distinguer de l'outil heideggérien (ou de l'usuel en général) de la façon qu'exprime l'ancienne distinction entre l'*uti* et le *frui*, entre le rapport d'usage proprement dit et le rapport de jouissance ou fruition. Le monde des choses qui se découvrent dans la *Sixième Méditation* comme commodes ou incommodes n'est pas tant, me semble-t-il, le monde heideggérien des outils, mais plutôt, je l'ai déjà suggéré, le monde levinassien des nourritures (je fais bien sûr référence aux premières analyses de *Totalité et infini*).

C'est en revanche un argument supplémentaire en faveur du privilège de la douleur dans l'expérience du *meum corpus* qui se laisse finalement dégager de ce « moment heideggérien » de l'analyse. C'est donc « la douleur, figure ultime ou première de la *cogitatio* sur le mode du *sensus* » qui est l'« indice absolu de ma chair », au même titre qu'elle est au principe de l'« expérience de l'extériorité » (Marion 2004: 87). Mais pourquoi la douleur plutôt que le plaisir – que l'on pourrait décliner à la fois comme plaisir de la vue ou comme plaisir de la satiété (voire, si l'on fait le pas vers le phénomène érotique, comme jouissance)? Le privilège de la douleur n'a finalement rien de si évident : j'y reviendrai.

Mais faisons d'abord un pas en arrière. Nous avons vu que c'est le sentir qui fournit chez Descartes l'argument par lequel s'atteste l'indubitabilité de la chair. Le sentir, pourtant, nous le savons dès la *Deuxième Méditation*, est un mode de la *res cogitans*. Et c'est parce que l'âme ne sent que parce qu'elle est unie au corps que le *sensus* pourra être considéré comme étant la modalité passive de la *cogitatio* ou le mode de la pensée passive : sentir, c'est « penser passivement en tant que chair » (Marion 2004: 127). Cette passivité foncière du *sensus* est comprise par Jean-Luc Marion comme auto-affection, dans l'horizon du *videre videor* et de l'interprétation qu'en a donnée Michel Henry dans sa *Généalogie de la psychanalyse* : le sentir en tant que modalité passive de la *cogitatio* désigne ainsi « l'auto-affection de la *mens* par elle-même » (Marion 2004: 132). C'est donc dans l'auto-affection de la *mens* par elle-même que surgit le *meum corpus*. Tout le problème

est alors de comprendre le décalage ou cet excédent de l'*ego* par rapport à son corps qui se nomme âme ou *mens*, et qui seul fait du *meum corpus* un corps de chair différent des autres corps du monde.

Ce problème devient cependant caduc si l'on emprunte le chemin de la transformation de la troisième notion qu'est l'union en première notion primitive. Comment comprendre dès lors le caractère primordial de l'union ? Jean-Luc Marion en cherche l'attestation sur le terrain des passions de l'âme : ainsi, « L'union devrait [...] rendre manifeste sa priorité de première notion primitive par le primat de la douleur sur tout autre affect » ; mais cette hypothèse est aussitôt contrariée par le fait que « Descartes postule, tout à l'inverse, que 'la première passion a été la joie' » (Marion 2004: 152). Or on peut tout simplement se demander s'il est légitime de situer la douleur et la joie sur le même plan. La douleur dont parle le Descartes de la *Sixième Méditation* et dans laquelle le *meum corpus* s'atteste en tant que tel est, nous l'avons vu, en premier lieu la douleur qui se rapproche des sensations de faim et de soif, une douleur qui est donc, somme toute, sensation, et non pas affect : une douleur qui n'est pas encore, ou pas immédiatement souffrance. En situant la douleur et la joie sur le même plan, au lieu de reconstituer les couples correspondants de contraires : douleur – plaisir et joie – tristesse, n'est-on pas en train de laisser dans l'indistinction la sensibilité et l'affectivité ? Les passions comme la joie ne relèvent-elles pas du registre de l'affectivité, là où la douleur nous renvoie d'abord au champ de la sensation et de la sensibilité ? Ou bien s'agit-il de reconduire ces deux registres (qui ne sont certes pas séparés de manière étanche) vers leur racine commune ? Quoi qu'il en soit, en formulant notre interrogation, nous finissons par servir la cause de la démonstration de Jean-Luc Marion, qui requiert ici de montrer qu'il n'y a « pas de contradiction entre le privilège symptomatique de la douleur et la priorité de la joie » (Marion 2004: 153) : le fait de souligner, comme je viens de le faire, qu'elles ne se situent pas sur le même plan est aussi une manière de lever leur apparente contradiction.

Le parcours cartésien proposé par Jean-Luc Marion dans *La pensée passive* nous a conduits donc du *meum corpus* de la *Sixième Méditation* à la passivité de la passion et du sentir entendue comme auto-affection. Quelle consistance a-t-on donné par là à la distinction entre chair et corps ? Le *meum corpus*, c'est le corps sentant et se sentant ; mais il s'agit en même temps d'un corps auquel la racine vitale propre au *Leib* husserlien semble faire entièrement défaut : il est plutôt le corps de la pensée que le corps de la vie ; et c'est un corps que j'ai, et non pas un corps que je suis : le décalage entre l'*ego* et son corps, donc entre la *mens* et le corps subsiste toujours. Ensuite, même si la mienneté, ici, n'est pas seulement possession et maîtrise, mais aussi souffrance et passion, c'est un corps qui reste mien et qui ne saurait s'attribuer à autrui. Or, faire la distinction phénoménologique

entre chair et corps, c'est justement ne pas confiner la chair au *meum corpus*, mais pouvoir rendre compte de la chair d'autrui ; c'est là par ailleurs le mouvement de la *Cinquième Méditation cartésienne* de Husserl, qui n'a pas d'équivalent chez Descartes : la chair d'autrui semble demeurer à jamais inapparente et inaccessible derrière les chapeaux et les manteaux de la *Deuxième Méditation métaphysique*.

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Le *habeam corpus* de Descartes ne peut donc pas être identifié sans reste au *Leib* husserlien, ni au « Je suis mon corps » de Gabriel Marcel que reprend Merleau-Ponty. Pourtant, comme le rappelle Jean-Luc Marion à la toute fin de son ouvrage, Merleau-Ponty « avait bien vu et reconnu » que Descartes ne reste pas insensible à la question du corps propre, dans la célèbre note de travail du 1^{er} février 1960, intitulée « Corps humain Descartes », où il va jusqu'à affirmer que « l'idée cartésienne du corps humain en tant qu'humain non fermé, ouvert en tant que gouverné par la pensée – est peut-être la plus profonde idée de l'union de l'âme et du corps ». Le caractère « ouvert » du corps humain, tel que le conçoit Descartes, n'est cependant pas encore synonyme de l'ouverture au corps d'autrui et de la possibilité de l'erôs. Pour finir, j'aimerais donc simplement formuler la question de savoir si l'on peut parler de chair (plutôt que de corps) là où le phénomène érotique fait selon toute apparence défaut.

Dans le cadre de sa conception du phénomène saturé, Jean-Luc Marion ménage comme on le sait une place importante à la chair, et ce dès *Étant donné*. Je mentionnerais en particulier le chapitre IV de *De surcroît* : « La chair ou la donation du soi », où la caractérisation de la chair comme phénomène saturé est introduite à partir d'une analyse de Descartes qui préfigure sur nombre de points celle que livrera sous une forme beaucoup plus développée l'ouvrage *Sur la pensée passive*. Jean-Luc Marion y avance déjà l'hypothèse selon laquelle « le corps sentant serait antérieur et non pas postérieur à la *cogitatio* » (Marion 2010: 104) et que par conséquent « le sentir devient le mode originaire de la *cogitatio* » (Marion 2010: 123). Mais si « avec la chair, il y va du premier et du seul phénomène saturé, qui livre l'ego à lui-même » (Marion 2010: 121), il me semble que c'est seulement par la mise en avant du phénomène érotique (dans l'ouvrage éponyme) que la phénoménologie de Jean-Luc Marion accomplit une véritable percée dans sa compréhension de la chair. Or la prise en compte du phénomène érotique révèle à mes yeux *per a contrario* pourquoi Descartes n'est pas, malgré tout, un phénoménologue du corps propre et de la chair. *Le phénomène érotique* invite en effet d'entrée de jeu à reconnaître l'insuffisance du *habeam corpus* : « ma chair – je n'ai pas une chair, je suis ma chair et elle coïncide absolument avec moi » (Marion 2004: 178). La prise en compte de l'erôs montre en effet que « le véritable problème {que Descartes ne semble jamais se poser} réside dans l'accès de ma chair non plus

à d'autres choses du monde, mais à une autre chair » (Marion 2004: 182). L'une des fonctions de la distinction phénoménologique entre chair et corps est précisément de rendre compte de la chair d'autrui, comme le montre la démarche de la *Cinquième Méditation cartésienne* de Husserl. La thèse de Jean-Luc Marion à cet égard dans *Le phénomène érotique* est, on le sait, radicale : « Sans érotisation, la chair d'autrui devient problématique, en fait inaccessible » (Marion 2004: 215) ; ou encore : « sitôt que l'érotisation cesse, je perds donc le seul critère phénoménologique sérieux pour distinguer tel corps physique comme une autre chair » (Marion 2004: 214). Le privilège de l'érotisation est aussi le privilège du plaisir (plaisir de l'érotisation comme plaisir de la prise de chair) qui s'accompagne par ailleurs d'une disqualification de la douleur : « la douleur me prive de ma chair, comme le plaisir me la donne » ; car « ma chair en souffrance [...] se rétracte [...] s'endurcit » (Marion 2004: 189). Passer de la douleur au plaisir, du corps que j'ai au corps qui est celui du « tu » qui est en face de moi : autant de pistes pour explorer l'impensé de la *Sixième Méditation* de Descartes, et qui indiquent une fois de plus pourquoi il reste malgré tout nécessaire de dépasser Descartes en phénoménologie.

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Igor Krtolica

Vers une mystique sans Dieu

Retour critique sur *Le Phénomène érotique* de Jean-Luc Marion

La lecture du *Phénomène érotique* de Jean-Luc Marion soulève une question à la fois marginale et centrale : celle du langage adéquat à la rationalité érotique et, plus largement, aux phénomènes saturés. Marginale, parce que cette question n'est abordée dans l'ouvrage que pour s'y trouver aussitôt déplacée, voire remplacée ; centrale pourtant, parce qu'elle touche au cœur du problème qui se déploie dans le livre en même temps qu'elle concerne la conception que M. Marion se fait de la philosophie.

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Le Phénomène érotique est traversé de part en part par un double problème : d'une part, comment parvenir à la réduction érotique, de telle sorte qu'autrui me donne à moi-même ? ; et d'autre part, une fois parvenu à cette réduction, comment la fixer dans un signe qui n'en perde rien, ou ce qui revient au même, qui en conserve l'essentiel ? Dans la Quatrième méditation (« De la chair, qu'elle s'excite »), M. Marion montre en quel sens la première question implique nécessairement la seconde : c'est que l'érotisation de la chair est grevée d'une « finitude intrinsèque », qui me condamne à répéter sans cesse la réduction érotique. Au § 27, il écrit ainsi : « La chair s'avère définitivement finie en tant même qu'elle s'excite : aussi loin qu'aïlle le processus d'érotisation, il arrive toujours un moment où il cesse. [...] La chair ne peut s'érotiser à l'infini. [...] Il s'agit là d'un fait qui a force de loi : pas plus que la chair ne peut se confondre avec un corps permanent au présent, elle ne peut s'érotiser sans fin, comme en un état où durer. [...] Cette finitude ne me condamne pas à renoncer à la réduction érotique, mais seulement à la répéter sans cesse » (Marion 2003 : 240–241). Devant cette nécessité de répéter la réduction, M. Marion demande néanmoins s'il existe un moyen de surmonter ce caractère nécessairement provisoire et fini de l'érotisation, et de sauver ainsi le serment des amants *une fois pour toutes*. « L'amant, dont l'avance s'accomplit dans le serment, veut l'infini (“une fois pour toutes” et que cela dure sans cesse), tandis que l'érotisation des chairs croisées reste par principe finie » (Marion 2003 : 254). Mais y a-t-il un moyen de résoudre le paradoxe ou l'aporie de l'érotisation, c'est-à-dire de surmonter la différence de principe entre la finitude de l'érotisation et l'infinitude réclamée par l'amant ?

Dans la Sixième et dernière méditation (« Du tiers, qu'il arrive »), M. Marion montre que ce problème trouve sa solution avec l'advenue de l'enfant. Il revient en effet à l'enfant d'incarner dans sa chair le rôle du tiers qui témoigne de ce que la réduction érotique a été accomplie *au moins une fois*. Simplement, dans la suite de cette méditation, M. Marion montre que, par définition, l'enfant ne peut assumer cette fonction que de manière provisoire, transitoire ou finie : son départ inévitable l'empêche de témoigner *une fois pour toutes* pour la réduction érotique, qu'il ne peut fixer dans sa chair. M. Marion peut alors conclure : « Le serment se trouve donc renvoyé à lui-même, une nouvelle fois condamné au devoir de se répéter. Le tiers survit dans le temps, le serment doit faire de même et tenter de recevoir une autre re-production – d'attendre une autre fin, un autre tiers provisoire » (Marion 2003 : 337). Et plus loin : « Le phénomène amoureux s'impose donc de se répéter pour espérer se sauver, puisqu'aucun tiers ne se maintient assez pour en témoigner une fois pour toutes » (Marion 2003 : 344). La solution du problème se trouve donc à nouveau différée. L'érotisation de la chair est condamnée à se répéter *chaque fois encore une fois*, que ce soit dans l'érotisation directe des corps (l'acte sexuel) ou dans l'advenue de l'enfant (le tiers témoin), mais elle est incapable de se fixer *une fois pour toutes*.

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À cette redoutable difficulté, les ultimes paragraphes du livre apporteront une éclatante solution (§ 40-42) : la révélation de Dieu comme premier et meilleur amour, dont l'amour éternel et infini nous précède et nous transcende, et qui le désigne une fois pour toutes comme la condition et le témoin de tout amour.

Quelle que soit la force de cette solution finale, on remarquera qu'une autre solution s'esquissait à la toute fin de la Quatrième méditation (§ 35). M. Marion montrait que, si l'érotisation de la chair est condamnée à se répéter sans cesse, il existe également une « érotisation libre », une érotisation qui ne passe plus par l'entrelacement de ma chair avec celle d'autrui mais par la parole et le langage. Il est manifeste que cette érotisation libre joue ici un rôle analogue aux opérations qu'en psychanalyse Freud nomme « sublimation » et « symbolisation ». En effet, dans la vocabulaire psychanalytique freudien, la sublimation désigne la déssexualisation de l'énergie érotique, c'est-à-dire la substitution d'un but non sexuel à un but sexuel (opération qui conditionne l'exercice de la pensée), tandis que la symbolisation y désigne l'investissement psychique de cette énergie déssexualisée dans le langage, c'est-à-dire la production d'une représentation de mots valant comme formation substitutive (opération qui assure cette fois la transmutation de l'énergie déssexualisée dans la pensée pure). Or, dans *Le Phénomène érotique*, tout se passe comme si le rôle du tiers pouvait être assumé par ce mécanisme où le langage assure la relève de l'érotisation de la chair.

De la plus simple conversation amoureuse jusqu'aux œuvres littéraires les plus profondes en passant par toutes les amours épistolaires, les exemples d'une telle érotisation libre ne manquent pas. Pensons tout particulièrement à la magnifique correspondance amoureuse de Joë Bousquet, aux *Lettres à Poisson d'or* et aux *Lettres à une jeune fille*, où coexistent ces trois dimensions du langage amoureux : conversation libre, relation épistolaire, œuvre littéraire. Bousquet, que la paralysie avait condamné à la chasteté, n'aurait sans doute pas renié les formules que M. Marion emploie à propos de l'érotisation libre : « Je fais l'amour *d'abord* en parlant : je ne peux le faire sans parler et je peux le faire rien qu'en parlant – l'ancien usage du français entendait d'ailleurs ainsi "faire l'amour" » (Marion 2003 : 302–303). Pourtant, d'une part, la question reste néanmoins posée de savoir jusqu'où peut porter l'érotisation libre. En conclusion de la Quatrième méditation, M. Marion déclare ainsi : « Il reste à mesurer jusqu'où peut s'étendre et s'appliquer l'érotisation libre. À l'évidence, [...] elle ne se limite pas à l'exercice sexuel de la croisée des chairs. Devant elle s'ouvre donc une immense carrière – elle permet de donner (et de recevoir) une chair érotisée là où la sexualité n'atteint pas. [...] En elle se reconnaît sans doute aussi la *chasteté*, la vertu érotique par excellence. » (Marion 2003 : 305). Mais jusqu'où s'étend cette immense carrière ? Autrement dit, la parole peut-elle assumer jusqu'au bout la tâche de surmonter la finitude propre à l'érotisation de la chair ? Et d'autre part, la question demeure aussi de savoir sous quelles formes se manifeste la capacité du langage à fixer et à sauver la réduction érotique. Dans quels types de discours cette possibilité est-elle réalisée ? Par exemple, comment la littérature, la philosophie et la théologie assument-elles chacune pour son compte cette possibilité de l'érotisation libre ?

Si cette perspective n'est pas développée dans *Le Phénomène érotique*, on sait qu'elle l'est dans d'autres textes, et notamment dans *De Surcroît*, au chapitre intitulé « Au nom ou comment le taire ». M. Marion y rappelle que la théologie s'est historiquement distribuée en trois voies distinctes : une voie affirmative, qui prétend déterminer la nature ou l'essence de Dieu par ses attributs (« Dieu est... ») ; une voie négative, qui prétend qu'il est impossible d'attribuer le moindre prédicat positif à Dieu (« Dieu n'est pas... ») ; et enfin une voie hyperbolique ou mystique, qui refuse la réduction de Dieu à l'être au motif que l'on ne peut pas concevoir l'essence de Dieu mais seulement comprendre que nous ne pouvons pas le connaître. Cette troisième voie, qui trouve son origine dans la théologie mystique et que M. Marion nomme « voie de l'inconnaissance », entraîne une double transformation du discours : une transformation de son paradigme et une transformation de son but. Une transformation de son paradigme d'une part, puisque le discours mystique ne trouve plus son modèle dans la proposition prédicative (que ce soit sous sa forme négative ou affirmative), il le trouve désormais

dans *la louange et la prière*, dans une parole qui n'est plus tentative de nommer ou d'attribuer mais qui est invocation et adresse – comme c'est également le cas dans la conversation amoureuse. Ou comme M. Marion l'écrivait déjà vingt ans plus tôt, dans *Dieu sans l'être* : « Ici, la prédication doit le céder à la louange – qui, elle aussi, tient discours » (Marion 1991 : 154). Une transformation de son but d'autre part, puisque l'exigence de connaissance de l'être ou de l'essence des choses laisse maintenant sa place à une approche « pragmatique » ou « performative » du langage, laquelle vise moins à attribuer un prédicat à un substrat qu'à *provoquer effectivement l'érotisation de la chair*. Or, si cette troisième voie trouve d'abord son sens dans une réflexion sur les noms divins, il est manifeste qu'elle reçoit un sens plus large dans l'œuvre de M. Marion. Pour ce dernier en effet, Dieu constitue dans sa possibilité formelle le phénomène saturé par excellence, en tant qu'il est sans concept adéquat mais non pas sans intuition donatrice. La réflexion sur la voie de l'inconnaissance permet donc à M. Marion de déterminer le type de discours adéquat aux phénomènes saturés, ces phénomènes qui sont caractérisés par un surcroît d'intuition sur le concept. Et il faut en dire de même, *a fortiori*, du phénomène érotique, où Dieu se révèle comme amour, à la fois condition et témoin de la réduction érotique (Marion 2003 : 242–252).

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La lecture du *Phénomène érotique* soulève ainsi une série de questions qui rejaillissent sur l'ensemble de l'œuvre de M. Marion. 1°) D'abord, dans quelle mesure le langage est-il capable de sauver sans reste et une fois pour toutes ce qui, de la réduction érotique et des phénomènes saturés, échappe au concept ? Autrement dit, le langage peut-il assumer le rôle du tiers définitif qui sauve la donation ? Dans cette perspective, l'usage pragmatique ou performatif du langage qui se manifeste dans la louange et la prière représente-t-il le paradigme commun aux discours théologique, philosophique et littéraire ? — 2°) Mais à l'inverse, y a-t-il une spécificité du discours philosophique par rapport aux autres ? Y a-t-il un équivalent de la voie de l'inconnaissance qui serait propre à la pensée philosophique et qui définirait sa rationalité élargie ? Ou bien l'impuissance du concept à appréhender les phénomènes saturés implique-t-elle une abdication de la philosophie devant la théologie mystique, un effacement du discours conceptuel derrière la louange adressée à Dieu ? — 3°) Enfin, la relative indétermination du partage entre théologie et philosophie dans la pensée de M. Marion n'est-elle pas liée à un double présupposé qui traverse *Le Phénomène érotique* de part en part : le désir ou la volonté de fixer la réduction érotique une fois pour toutes, et la position d'un amour infini, éternel et divin comme condition des amours finis, provisoires et humains ? Ce double présupposé n'est-il pas le symptôme d'un gigantesque effort pour refouler la possibilité d'une tout autre voie ? Sur cette voie, celle d'une « mystique sans Dieu » ou « hérétique » obstinément explorée par Joë

Bousquet (Nelli 1950 : 180 ; Robbe-Grillet 1961 : 93), le désir amoureux ne trouve-t-il pas sa condition dans un champ qui ne lui ressemble pas, *un plan non-érotique ou an-érotique* ? Le langage ne promet-il pas un salut immanent, une œuvre à accomplir *chaque fois et pour toutes les fois*, et non pas une fois pour toutes ?

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Seminar o *Erotskom fenomenu* Žan-Lik Mariona

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Dragan Prole

Meditacija u erotskoj redukciji

Erotski fenomen Žan-Lik Mariona (J.-L. Marion) je knjiga koja nema citate, ali je izuzetno bogata referencama. Svakom pažljivom čitaocu, koji se oprobao u tradiciji fenomenologije lako su prepoznatljiva mesta koja upućuju na filozofske motive Huserla (E. Husserl), Hajdegera (M. Heidegger), Levinasa (E. Lévinas) i Mišela Anrija (M. Henry). Ono što se čini kao posebnost profesora Mariona, što bi moglo da se okarakteriše kao njegov doprinos savremenoj filozofiji ogleda se u jedinstvenom misaonom tkanju sačinjenom od teološki inspirisanog čitanja Dekarta (R. Descartes) i najbolje tradicije fenomenologije. Za razliku od standardnih interpretacija Dekarta, koje u njemu vide oca moderne racionalnosti, ili ključnu figuru u metodološkom disciplinovanju novog tipa naučnosti, Marion u njemu vidi nešto drugo. Pri tom se prevashodno oslanja na istraživanja Etjena Žilsona (É. Gilson), Anri Gujea (H. Gouhier), Ferdinanda Alkijea (F. Alquié).

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Praćenje teoloških tragova prilikom tumačenja Dekarta u specifičnom horizontu fenomenološkog mišljenja biva olakšano ukoliko se usredredi na problem meditacije. Poput Dekartovih *Meditacija o prvoj filozofiji*, i Marionov *Erotski fenomen* donosi šest meditacija. Ta podudarnost nije nimalo slučajna. Premda status meditacije u Marionovoj knjizi nije problematizovan, treba najpre reći da tradicija koju započinju Etjen Žilson i Anri Guje vraća izvorni, hristijanizovani smisao meditiranja. Naime, svi znamo da je jedna od vodećih namera Dekartovog meditiranja da pronađe čvrst, neupitan temelj celokupne zgrade prve filozofije. Tragajući za *fundamentum inconcussum* Dekart je nedvosmisleno pokazao da je svrha njegovog meditiranja saznanje, i to ne bilo kakvo, nego saznanje u najsnažnijem smislu reči, neborivo saznanje, saznanje koje ništa ne može dovesti u pitanje, niti opovrgnuti. Tome nasuprot, Etjen Žilson reafirmiše praktičan smisao meditacije, kao i njen značaj u intimnom iskustvu vernika. U staroj hrišćanskoj tradiciji meditiranje nas ne sučeljava s teorijom koju treba razumeti nego, budući da je ravnopravno s molitvom i čitanjem svetih spisa, predstavlja svojevrsnu vežbu koju valja praktikovati.

Za razliku od Dekarta, kod kojeg je meditacija po prvi put upotrebljena za demonstraciju apstraktnih istina, Žilson iznova afirmiše prikladnost meditativnih praksi u odnosu na zahteve religioznog egzistiranja, uključujući

i njihov kapacitet da odgovore potrebama verujuće duše. Kako god da ih razumemo, meditacije izvorno podrazumevaju otklon od telesnosti, pri čemu Dekart cilja na nužnost otkrivanja istine u razdvojenosti od ploti. S druge strane, Žilson insistira da Dekartov programski otklon od Aristotela (Αριστοτέλης) i sholastičke tradicije nužno upućuje na približavanje tradiciji platonizma. Nasuprot sholastici, prema kojoj fizika nužno prethodi metafizici, Dekartovi principi fizike bivaju harmonizovani s uvidima prve filozofije i daju se iz njih dedukovati. Napokon, otklon od Akvinskog (Th. de Aquino) prema Žilsonu označava približavanje platoničkim motivima kod Avgustina (A. Augustinus), od kojih posebno mesto zauzima meditativno približavanje božanskom izvoru, i to ne radi bilo kakve spoznaje, nego radi ostvarivanja *jedinstva s Bogom u ljubavi*. Meditacije su i kod Dekarta tematski upućene na Boga, ali im je svrha bila da pruže ontološki dokaz njegovog postojanja. Tome nasuprot, hrišćanski meditativni put takođe ukazuje na Boga, ali ne da bi pružio dokaz ili ponudio neku teoriju, nego da bi se sjedinio s njim zahvaljujući nenadmašnoj, beskonačnoj božanskoj ljubavi.

Ovu interpretativnu nit važno je pratiti da bismo razumeli zbog čega je Bog za Marionu najbolji ljubavnik. Poslednja reč Dekartove metafizike, čiji su tragovi prepoznatljivi i kod Marionu sastoji se u uvidu da konačnost nekog bića ne može biti shvaćena sama sobom, nego je neophodno da ona pristupi sebi posredstvom beskonačnosti. Beskonačnost Boga se tako uspostavlja kao medijum samorazumevanja konačnosti. Erotske meditacije Žan-Lik Marionu imaju svoju ontološku zasnovanost na takvom razumevanju odnosa konačnog i beskonačnog. Ilustracije radi, potrebno je da se podsetimo Marionovog jednoznačnog pozivanja na Šelinga (F. W. J. Schelling) u ranom delu *Bog bez bivstvovanja* (1982), na čijim uvodnim stranicama se čitaocu razjašnjava da razmatranje koje sledi biva lišeno ontologije bivstvovanja jer se tek pod tim preduslovom približava „slobodi Boga koja je u skladu s njegovom istinskom suštinom“. Ako Bog bez bivstvovanja ima za nezaobilaznu temu slobodu Boga, onda se na osnovu toga lako može zaključiti da i ljubav bez bivstvovanja, o kojoj govori *Erotski fenomen* ima slobodu čoveka kao svoju povlašćenu temu. Sledstveno, Marionove erotske meditacije se situiraju s one strane postojećeg sveta, kao i bilo kojeg zaokruženog lika subjektivnosti. Sloboda beskonačnog Boga im uprkos tome nije nepoznata i tuđa, nego bliska i dostupna. Sredstva koja Marion pri tom koristi ne potiču iz filozofskog arsenala Žilsona ili Gujea, nego ih ispostavlja fenomenološka filozofija, razume se ne kao celina, nego brižljivo odabrana i tumačena u skladu sa prethodno uspostavljenim koordinatama koje su određene zahvaljujući teologizovanom čitanju Dekarta.

Prateći Huserlovu metodologiju, i Marion pravi razliku između prirodnog stava u susretu s erotskim, zahtevajući u poznatom fenomenološkom maniru da se on stavi u zgrade i da se sprovede erotska redukcija. Radikalnost

erotske redukcije u odnosu na Huserlov fenomenološki povratak transcendentnoj svesti sastoji se u tome što se erotski fenomen ne može spolja opisati, budući da kao takav ne raspolaže vlastitim bivstvovanjem. Zbog toga, strogo uzevši, ne može biti bilo kakve teorije o erotskom. Jednostavno rečeno, ako se prilikom fenomenološke redukcije vraćamo na transcendentnalnu svest kao apsolutni izvor celokupnog svesnog života, sa erotskom redukcijom se ne vraćamo na nešto što već postoji i deluje, ali ga mi pre toga nismo bili svesni. Prirodni stav se u stvarima erotskih iskustava zadržava u okvirima uživanja u sebi posredstvom drugog. Erotski doživljaji su prirodnom stavu dragoceni zbog toga što pružaju visok stepen zadovoljstva. To drugim rečima znači da je spontani, prirodni erotski odnos blizak uspostavljanju autoseksualnog odnosa. Erotski čin stvara iluziju intenziteta vlastite životnosti i snage, koja je praćena uverenjem o moći i vlasti koja se ostvaruje nad telom drugog. S obzirom na erotsku redukciju ja osetim drugog tako što najpre osetim svoju plot, osećajući pri tom da mi se neko telo, za razliku od drugih svetskih tela koja mi se opiru, zapravo podaje i predaje, ne pružajući nikakav otpor.

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Za razliku od Huserlove fenomenologije, posebnost erotske redukcije se ne sastoji u usmeravanju istraživačkog pogleda na ono subjektivno. Dok osnivač fenomenologije u transcendentnalnim izvorima svesti pronalazi apsolutni oslonac i osiguranje istinske naučnosti, nakon erotske redukcije se suočavamo sa iskustvom koje našu sigurnost ne pronalazi zahvaljujući nama samima, nego je stičemo tek zahvaljujući drugom. Nasuprot zadovoljstvu u sebi koje pospešuje osećaj samopouzdanja i hrani egoizam, erotska redukcija isprva otkriva naše biće kao nedovoljno i nepouzđano, kao čisti nedostatak. Pitanje svih pitanja u erotskoj redukciji utoliko nije vezano za zabrinutost da li smo voljeni, nego da li volimo.

Ukoliko sigurnost dobijamo posredstvom drugog, to nužno znači da se samoodnos u erotskoj redukciji neminovno susreće s vlastitom nesigurnošću. Lišeni drugog, u erotskoj redukciji praktično bivamo lišeni i samih sebe. Na osnovu tog uvida Marion dolazi do teze o unilateralnom karakteru ljubavi u erotskoj redukciji. Za nju nije presudno da li sam voljen, nego da li volim. Zbog toga njegov pojam ljubavi ne podrazumeva uzajamnost nego, poput Levinasovog odnosa prema drugom, misli fundamentalnu asimetričnost. Premda je različitim varijacijama na temu idealne ljubavi zajednička predstava o idiličnoj, bezrezervnoj uzajamnosti, u kojoj volim bez rezerve i kalkulacije, ali sam pri tom na isti takav način i sam voljen, Marionov pojam ljubavi izričito raskida sa zahtevom da i sami budemo voljeni.

Imajući u vidu da ljubav bez bivstvovanja misli slobodu čoveka, bilo bi zanimljivo da se podsetimo da Anri Guje govori o Dekartovoj aristokratskoj metafizici, naglašavajući da intelektualna ljubav stoji u osnovi meditacija. Otuda nema govora o tome da je ljubav moguće reflektovati kao nekakav

spoljašnji fenomen, jer je ona u korenu meditiranja. S druge strane, Guje vidi aristokratski pečat meditacije u usrdnoj predanosti unutrašnjem životu na osnovu koje stupamo u dodir s meditativnim korenima u vidu intelektualne ljubavi. Zove ga aristokratskim zbog nespremnosti većine ljudi da se odupru zahtevima čula.

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U srodnom duhu bi se i Marionov pojam ljubavi takođe mogao nazvati aristokratskim. Pri tom on ipak ne upućuje natrag na unutrašnjost, nego nas odvodi ka drugom, u spoljašnjost, izvan nas samih. On ne implicira bilo kakvu trajnost, niti temporalnost koja bi se zasnivala na vernosti, pošto radikalnost erotske redukcije ljubavi ne dopušta puko ponavljanje. Verni subjekt naime uvek polazi od svoje apriorne predanosti onome koga voli, a u takvoj vrsti podrazumevajućeg predavanja Marion bi bio sklon da prepozna ostatke prirodnog stava. Poput Huserlovog apsolutnog početnika, i Marionov ljubavnik uvek iznova započinje ispočetka, nastojeći da napusti konačnost bića posredstvom zadobijanja sebe iz čistog nedostatka, u potpunoj bestemeljnosti, bez objašnjenja i opravdanja. Ukoliko bez ljubavi nije moguće započeti s meditiranjem, onda oni lišeni ljubavi, zatočenici prirodnog stava, ne mogu ni započeti s procesom meditiranja. Za razliku od Dekarta, koji je navodno sumnjao i za svoje čitaoce, Marion nije u mogućnosti da erotsku redukciju provede za svoje. Ispitujući vlastitu slobodu na polju asubjektivne fenomenologije, Marionov *Erotski fenomen* se u svojim aristokratskim obeležjima ipak opredelio za put savremenosti, uprkos celokupnoj tradiciji teološkog čitanja Dekarta koja mu je toliko značajna i na koju se toliko oslanja.

Mark Lošonc

Aporije fenomenologije davanja

Polazna tačka mojih komentara je fenomenologija Žan-Lik Mariona – fenomenologija davanja (*phénoménologie de la donation*). Ova fenomenologija prevashodno tematizuje zasićene (saturirane) fenomene koji nas radikalno prevazilaze: npr. lice Drugog, živo telo / plot (*chair*), ili istorijski događaj se ne mogu svesti na našu subjektivnost, niti se mogu tretirati kao objekti ili bića. Drugim rečima, sa zasićenim fenomenom se uvek daje nešto što je suštinski eksces u odnosu na naše sposobnosti, kapacitete. To znači da nas zasićeni fenomen kao eksteriornost decentrira. Preciznije, zasićeni fenomen prethodi našim intencijama, a naša intencionalnost prema zasićenom fenomenu postoji samo kao protiv-intencionalnost (*contre-intentionnalité*). „Ja“ je samo svedok, dakle ne može da anticipira šta će da se desi – zasićeni fenomen ima privilegiju iniciranja, tako je npr. pogled Drugog uslov mog

pregleda. U početku bejahu interpelacija i responzivnost. U stvari, zasićeni fenomen ne samo što prevazilazi subjektivnost, već upravo on proizvodi subjekte, subjektivnost. Ne postoji više „Ja“ koje bi konstituisalo iskustvo, već zasićeni fenomen konstituše subjekta.

U *Razgovorima sa Danom Arbibom* Žan-Lik Marion veoma oštro osuđuje ona shvatanja prema kojima postoji samostalnost „Ja“ ili nekog aspekta subjektivnosti: „za mene je autonomija sinonim za samoubistvo“. Shodno tome, Marion često govori o superiornoj, izvornoj ili intimnoj pasivnosti. Štaviše, pojavljuju se i izrazi koji inače imaju zanimljive političke ili društvene konotacije: poslušnost, nejednakost, asimetrija, heteronomija...

Ukupno uzevši, prema fenomenologiji davanja, subjektivnost je konstituisana na performativan način, zahvaljujući izloženosti davanju. Subjekt je *adonné*, dativno „Ja“: „dar se ne daje od mene“ (*le don ne se donne par moi*). Utoliko se postavlja pitanje kako u okviru ove fenomenologije možemo da dođemo do prakse onoga „ja dajem“, odnosno do onoga „mi dajemo“? Čini da se da uprkos tome što je Marion skeptičan prema etičkom univerzalizmu i apstraktnim praktičnim načelima, u njegovoj filozofiji je ipak prisutan izvestan preskriptivni stav. Iako je očigledno da zasićeni fenomen kao takav nije nužno „dobar“, često se zahteva da promenimo naš stav prema fenomenima. To bi podrazumevalo izvesnu otvorenost, izloženost, ili sposobnost receptivnosti u odnosu na fenomene koji nisu objekti, a možda čak ni ne postoje. Na ove uvide se kod Mariona nadovezuje i svojevrsna kritička teorija društva, uključujući kritiku konzumerizma i kalkulativnih ekonomskih odnosa.

Međutim, šta bi značila pomenuta otvorenost, strogo gledano, iz perspektive fenomenologije davanja? Kako je ta otvorenost moguća s obzirom na to da onaj kome se davanje daje *per definitionem* ne može da ima moć iniciranja? Ovo pitanje može da se hiperbolizuje: na koji način ćemo u ovom pojmovnom okviru doći do prakse onoga „ja dajem“ ili „mi dajemo“? Ili još radikalnije: do onoga „dajem, dakle postojim“ i međusubnog davanja (*inter-donation*)?

Poznata je rasprava između Žan-Lik Mariona i Žaka Deride (J. Derrida) u vezi sa darom i davanjem. Dok je Derida pokušao da dekonstruiše dar ukazujući na njegovu nemogućnost, Marion je nastojao da pokaže da se samo davanje ne može dekonstruisati, te da davanje prevazilazi svoje aspekte: onoga koji daje (*donateur*), onoga kome se nešto daje (*donataire*), a čak i ono što se daje (*don*). Iz toga proističe da davanje nadmašuje razmenu i recipročnost. Međutim, ukoliko mora da se primi ono što se daje, te ukoliko se davanje konstituše na performativan način, nisu li recipročnost i izvesna razmena ipak nužne? Ne dajem li i ja nužno nešto („znak“, u najmanju ruku)? Štaviše, ukoliko moja otvorenost i izloženost predstavljaju uslov mogućnosti davanja, nije li onda ujedno moguće da ja iniciram davanje, bez obzira na recipročnost i razmenu?

Upravo je u ovom kontekstu revelativan *Erotski fenomen* jer Marion u ovoj knjizi naglašava da „Ja“ inicira, bez obzira na mogućnost recipročnosti. Reč je o odluci, riziku i mogućem nedostatku razmene. U jednom delu se Marion čak oslanja na Žorža Bataja (G. Bataille), a možda delimično i na Ničea (F. Nietzsche) – reč je o suverenoj moći davanja i darivanja, investiranoj energiji, samožrtvovanju i rasipnosti.

Iako se naglašava da je i prvi ljubavnik samo rezultat erotske redukcije, čini se da se u suštinskim aspektima odstupa od osnovnih zaključaka Marionove fenomenologije davanja. Naime, tvrdi se da mogu da volim uprkos tome što još ništa nisam dobio od onoga koga volim, tj. da *amare amare* zavisi od mene. Utoliko se može reći da sam pravi suveren, te da se još nalazim s onu stranu razmene i recipročnosti. Možda ti uvidi otvaraju put ka fenomenologiji koja će imati u vidu mogućnost onoga „ja dajem“ i „mi dajemo“.

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Una Popović

Fenomen erotskog fenomena

Nedavno objavljena knjiga *Erotski fenomen* Žan-Lik Mariona delo je koje za našu filozofsku scenu otvara niz interesantnih mogućnosti recepcije. Sama tema, erotski fenomen, nudi fenomenološku analizu problemskog polja koje obeležava interes savremene filozofije poslednjih decenija. U ovo problemsko polje, uz pomoć fenomenološkog metoda, uključeni su i problemi razlike, Drugog, identiteta, kritike subjektivnosti i slični, koji su na osnovu Marionove analize u svojim osobenostima istinski vidljivi tek s obzirom na horizont koji otvara analiza odabranog odlikovanog, erotskog fenomena. Kao takva, ova knjiga otvorena je za niz različitih interpretativnih fokusa, te sugerise niz jednako opravdanih čitanja.

Jedan od takvih pristupa, koji se možda pojavljuje i kao najsamorazumljiviji, no samim tim i zakriven konkretnim analizama, jeste i u naslovu naglašeni problem fenomena kao takvog, odnosno problem fenomena kao erotskog fenomena. Drugim rečima, ukoliko je *Erotski fenomen* delo izvedeno prema fenomenološkom načinu mišljenja, te ukoliko je to delo koje izdvaja jedan fenomen – erotski fenomen – kao odlikovano mesto takve analize koja, kako smo već naveli, tek omogućava vidljivost svih ostalih tema koje se takvom analizom pokazuju, onda se s pravom može postaviti i pitanje o pretpostavkama na kojima celokupan ovaj projekat počiva, odnosno o samom fenomenskom karakteru erotskog fenomena. Takvo pitanje, svakako, prekoračuje granice koje zacrtava sam *Erotski fenomen*, te zadire u sam manir Marionovog mišljenja, kakvim se on otuda pokazuje.

Pitanje koje se nameće čitanju je zašto je erotski fenomen odabrani i odlikovani fenomen, onaj putem kog se iznova, na nov način prezentuju pitanja i problemi tradicionalne i savremene filozofije, problemi koji su svoju obradu često imali i unutar same fenomenologije? Nije li erotski fenomen višak, izlišno ponavljanje već rečenog i mišljenog, ili ponavljanje radi ponavljanja, ponavljanje kao modus mišljenja savremene filozofije? Nije li erotski fenomen, kao onaj o kome filozofija skoro uopšte ne govori – kako kaže sam Marion već na prvoj strani svog dela – samo još jedan od zaboravljenih, tradicijom prikrivenih fundamentalnih aspekata ljudskog postojanja, koje treba otrgnuti od zaborava i time podsetiti filozofiju na nju samu?

Ne čini se da je u celosti tako. Zapravo, čini se da je odabir erotskog fenomena, upravo kao na prvi pogled samo jednog od (novih) fenomena analize, istinski novum ovog poduhvata – novum koji treba da svedoči ne samo o onome što se sa filozofijom do sada nije činilo, već koji treba da osvetli uslove mogućnosti sopstvene datosti, odnosno da zadre i u sam odabrani fenomenološki postupak. Tišina ljubavi odjekuje Marionovim analizama i ovaj višak ljubavi nameće kao višak filozofskog mišljenja, kao plenum od kog se mora započeti.

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Nesumnjive su Marionove reference na niz mislilaca od kojih polazi i sa kojima se suočava. Fenomenološka tradicija Huserla, Hajdegera i ne manje Merlo-Pontija prva je takva referenca, ali se dominacija fenomenologije bitno remeti već podnaslovom dela, koji priziva Dekarta, a preko njega i hrišćansku teologiju. Erotski fenomen se tako postavlja kao mesto posredovanja, samokritičkog ogledanja Marionove misli, ali time ne manje i kao istinski problematičan fenomen. Drugim rečima, tišina kojom je obavijen filozofski govor o ljubavi nije slučajna, te tematizacija erotskog fenomena sama po sebi tvrdi više od svoje puke datosti.

Marionova strategija u pogledu pristupa erotskom fenomenu, njegovom fenomenskom oslobađanju za vidljivost, na prvi pogled je posve fenomenološka: Marion ne računa ni na šta sem na sam fenomen, „čije pojavljivanje i eventualni opis dopušta erotska redukcija“. Drugim rečima, ukoliko treba filozofski analizirati ono erotsko i ljubavno, onda se moramo uzdržati od svih prethodno usvojenih pristupa koji bi takvom predmetu analize nametnuli bilo šta što tom predmetnom polju ne pripada. U takve svrhe istaknut je i osoben metodski postupak, erotska redukcija, kao pandan Huserlovoj redukciji prirodnog stava nauka i zdravog razuma.

Erotska redukcija, međutim, ipak nije redukcija prirodnog stava, već u izvesnom smislu ponovno uspostavljanje prirodnog stava spram fenomena erotskog. Već ova inverzija svedoči o pomeranju koje Marionu nameće predmet analize koji je odabrao, o krajnje neobičnom fenomenskom karakteru ovog fenomena. Pomeranje o kom je reč jednako je vidljivo i na proširenju

pojma redukcije van granica fenomenologije, na filozofiju Kartezija (Cartesius), jer Marion tvrdi da je sa njom ostvarena prva, epistemička redukcija, da bi tek naknadno, u okvirima fenomenološko-egzistencijalističkih projekata zaživela i druga, ontološka redukcija.

Redukcija, dakle, ovde ne oslobađa prosto neki fenomen, već pre određeni način viđenja fenomena. U skladu sa tim, svakako, i sami fenomeni postaću vidljivi, ali oni će to biti na tačno određeni način: utoliko „smena“ različitih redukcija signalizira nove i nove horizonte smisla. Ono što erotska redukcija treba da oslobodi je, izvesno, sama vidljivost erotskog fenomena, odnosno mogućnost da se on zahvati onakvim kakvim se od sebe i pokazuje. Međutim, rezultati sprovođenja ove redukcije ni malo nisu reduktivni, već u fenomenско polje koje se oslobađa za analizu uvode preobilje datosti, takvo da može biti karakteristično samo za neposrednost iskušavanja ljubavi, odnosno takvo da se na osnovu njih erotski fenomen pokazuje kao jedan od temeljnih fenomena uopšte.

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Drugim rečima, kada se pokaže kao fenomen, ljubav se ispostavlja kao onaj horizont koji se u svom smislu i važenju ne temelji na nekoj fundamentalnijoj strukturi, već obezbeđuje fundiranje drugih fenomena: utoliko je Marionu i moguće da svojom analizom erotskog zahvati i već navedene ključne probleme tradicionalne i savremene filozofije. U tom smislu pojavljuje se i pitanje da li se erotski fenomen ovde pojavljuje kao Marionov zasićeni fenomen – kao fenomen takvog obilja (datosti) da prevazilazi mogućnosti svog intencionalnog akta, obezbeđujući mu tako uvek nove sadržaje i ispunjenja.

Takav zasićeni fenomen odgovara inverziji redukcije, kakvu smo videli na primeru erotske redukcije: umesto da otkloni višak sadržaja intencionalnosti, koji bi trebalo da zamagljuje pogled na sam fenomen, redukcija u Marionovom tumačenju pojačava sadržajnost datosti, potencira višak. Višak koji redukcija pokazuje potenciran je pomenutom „smenom“ redukcija, jer se jedno i isto polje datosti pokazuje na nove i nove načine, u novim horizontima smisla i razloženo na nove fenomene. U tom smislu treća, erotska redukcija predstavlja radikalizaciju prethodne dve, epistemičke i ontološke, te samim tim i nudi više fenomenске datosti od njih. Utisak neposrednosti o kom je prethodno bilo reči samo je odsjaj tako oslobođenog fenomena, koji se na primeru ljubavi naročito jasno vidi usled posvemašnje filozofske tišine povodom ljubavi i posvemašnje prenaplašenosti govora o ljubavi i erotskom u svakodnevnicima naše savremenosti.

Da li je onda erotski fenomen zasićeni fenomen Marionov? Ili se on može shvatiti kao temeljni fenomen, primer putem kog se može razumeti i osnovni karakter fenomenološkog mišljenja, njegov uslov mogućnosti – sama datost, na čije zahvatanje se i cilja sa zasićenim fenomenom? Razgovor sa profesorom Marionom povodom ovog pitanja sugerisao je da je u pitanju druga od ponuđenih opcija, te bi utoliko čitanje *Erotskog fenomena*, ne

ponajmanje i u pogledu verbalne artikulacije njegovog fenomenolog polja, trebalo da ponudi i nov uvid u same osnove fenomenološkog mišljenja. U meri u kojoj je ovakvo filozofsko držanje i dalje živo, ono živi od fenomenolške datosti sa kojom se suočava: utoliko je knjiga Žan-Lik Mariona ponudila i osoben metodski meta-komentar na samu fenomenologiju.

Napokon, mogućnosti teorijske artikulacije i fenomenološke eksplikacije ovako zadobijenog polja fenomena naročito su inspirativna tema koju otvara Marionovo delo. Budući da je za fenomenologiju veza između metoda i jezika filozofije izvanredno bliska, te da se fenomenološki pojmovi uglavnom i pojavljuju kao nosioci načina držanja spram fenomena, pre nego kao nosioci mentalnih sadržaja, misli, nije teško zaključiti da i erotski fenomen zahteva erotskoj redukciji primerenu verbalnu artikulaciju. Njihova veza u delu nije tematizovana, već je ponuđena konkretnim analizama; ipak, ono njima ostvareno može i samo postati predmetom analize nekog budućeg čitanja ili fenomenološkog reflektovanja.

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I u tom pogledu, kao i u mnogim drugim slučajevima, Marion implicitno diskutuje sa (fenomenološkom) tradicijom kojoj pripada: njegovo insistiranje na nemogućnosti da se erotski fenomen eksplicira putem kategorija, na primer, nalikuje Hajdegerovom uvođenju egzistencijala. Nekategorijalni karakter eksplikacije erotskog fenomena, međutim, jednako je i svedočanstvo o izmeni pogleda na fenomenologiju, o njenoj promeni u Marionovom viđenju, te se može uzeti i kao mesto provere legitimnosti njegovog projekta.

Konačno, veza odavno poznatog fenomenološkog metoda i veoma recentnih filozofskih tema koje se putem njega obrađuju pokazuje osoben Marionov filozofski pečat, koji staro i novo kombinuje u jedinstvenu i provokativnu celinu. U slučaju Žan-Lik Mariona svedočimo o filozofu od formata, rigoroznom u svojim analizama, radikalnom u zaključcima, a *Erotski fenomen* delo je koje jednako komunicira kako sa stručnom filozofskom, tako i sa širom publikom.

Željko Radinković

Erotska redukcija i transcendentalfilozofski karakter pitanja o biću

Marion razlikuje tri vrste redukcije: epistemičku, ontološku i erotsku redukcije. Epistemička redukcija teži izvjesnosti i „od jedne stvari čuva samo ono što u njoj preostaje kao ponovljivo, trajno i što prebiva pred budnim okom duha (jedno „ja“ koje postoji kao objekt ili kao subjekt)“ (Marion

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2015, 34). Ontološka redukcija ima za cilj izvjesnost „bivstvjućeg usmjerenog ka svom postojanju (...) sve dok se u njemu ne razazna i samo biće (ja kao Dasein, bivstvjuće u kojem će se nazirati biće)“ (Marion 2015, 34). Erotska redukcija treba da na vidjelo iznese onaj, prema Marionu, u zapadnjačkoj filozofiji zapostavljeni fenomen ljubavi, odnosno to da najizvornije čovjekovo samorazumijevanje ne potiče ni od svijesti (paradigmatski predstavljenoj u kartezijanskoj izvjesnosti) ni od bića (u fenomenološkom ontologizovanju kartezijanske postavke pitanja), nego od nedijalektičke i nedijaloške predanosti ljubavnog odnosa. (Marion 2015, 34ff.)

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Međutim, upravo činjenica da Marion u ontološkoj redukciji prepoznaje prije svega fenomenološko ontologizovanje kartezijanske postavke pitanja, tj. primjenu kriterijuma izvjesnosti na evidentnost bića u fenomenalnoj datosti bivstvjućeg, zanemaruje razliku pitanja o biću u Huserlovoj i Hajdegerovoj fenomenologiji. Marionov argument o indiferentnosti izvjesnosti egzistencije spram pitanja suočavanja sa spoljašnošću mogao bi da u određenoj mjeri bude validan u pogledu na Huserlovu ejdetiku, ali ne i na Hajdegerovu egzistencijalno-ontološku postavku pitanja. Naime, upravo Hajdeger najradikalnije destruiše pitanje o opštosti bića, i to najprije preuzimajući tezu o analogiji bića, tj. da najviša opštost bića nije opštost neke najviše vrste, koju potom radikalizuje utoliko što biće razumijeva kao apsolutni, bezuslovni transcendens, mada ne kao osnovno određenje svakog bivstvjućeg, kao nešto što nužno pripada svakom bivstvjućem, nego kao nešto što je otključeno prije svake datosti i razumljivosti bilo kojeg bivstvjućeg. Utoliko je, prema Hajdegeru, biće tubića (*Dasein*), kao bivstvjućeg koje može da razumije biće, istinski transcendens, transcendens nad transcendensima, jer u samoodnosu konstitutivno uključuje i ono egzistencijalno *Woraufzu* kao neindiferentni telos prekoračenja.

Poput Levinasovih, Rikerovih i Valdenfelsovih fenomenoloških afirmacija konstitutivne uloge transcendentálnih entiteta (Drugi, Strano) i Marionov koncept ljubavnog odnosa i transcendentnosti erotskoga duguje razjašnjenje ontološkog statusa transcendentnog relata, odnosno transcendentálnog statusa same relacije. U fenomenološki modifikovanom transcendentálno-filozofskom smislu pitanje o biću mora da prethodi, tj. da bude konstitutivno za svaku, pa i onu Marionovsku erotsku relaciju.

Žan-Lik Marion

Odgovor Draganu Prole, Marku Lošoncu,
Uni Popović i Željku Radinkoviću

Da li erotski fenomen omogućava diskurs, dakle govor o sebi? U stvari, niko ne može da govori o erotskom fenomenu spolja, već samo polazeći od

njega sâmog. Erotski fenomen je konačan i ograničen: primera radi, erotska intuicija je isključivo čulnog karaktera, a erotizovana plot je takođe konačna. Nadalje, erotski fenomen je nešto ponovljivo i kontingentno. Ukupno uzevši, erotski fenomen stvara situaciju u kojoj se mišljenje onemogućuje. Drugim rečima, erotski fenomen ne može da se „samoteoretizuje“, te ne može da se distancira od sebe (napomenimo da to važi i za ostale zasićene fenomene). Ipak, davanje i zasićeni fenomen uvek već pretpostavljaju izvjesnu hermeneutiku. S obzirom na to da, fenomenološki rečeno, zbog bogate varijacije noematskog noema ne može da se definiše, nužan je put od konstitucije do hermeneutike – zasićeni fenomen nema definiciju, ali ga možemo interpretirati. Zasićeni fenomen nije objekat i prevazilazi konstituciju, prema tome, ne može da se opiše pomoću kategorija (koje su bile prihvaćene od Aristotela do Huserla). Međutim, već je i Aristotel imao u vidu onu vrstu *logos*-a koji ništa ne tvrdi ni o čemu, npr. u slučaju molitve. Hajdeger, Levinas i teoretičari govornih činova su takođe pružali primere za nekategorijalni govor. Sasvim sažeto, moguća je intencija čija je svrha upravo da se ništa ne kaže o nekom „predmetu“ – tako je kada razgovaramo sa drugom osobom. Nije reč o izvedenom aspektu jezika, već o njegovom izvoru. U početku beše odgovor. Takav govor nije ni istinit, ni neistinit, što važi i za erotski jezik. Filozofi su retko pokušavali da zahvate erotski fenomen zato što je metafizika bila usredsređena na opis objekata.

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„Ja“ se kod Dekarta i Kanta pojavljuje u nominativu, a kod Levinasa u akuzativu. Za razliku od njih, u mojoj fenomenologiji naglašen je dativ, dakle „Ja“ kome je nešto dato (koji je *adonné*). Dok se tokom povesti filozofije često isticalo da „Ja“ kao primalac prethodi činu davanja, u davanju o kojem ja govorim *ego* predstavlja rezultat sâmog davanja. Primera radi, već je i rođenje takvo „strano iskustvo“: primam svet prvi put, „dolazim na svet“. To je jedan od paradoksa davanja: ja sâm sam taj koji se daje – „Ja“ prima sebe u davanju. Ovo „Ja“ ne prethodi iskustvu. Valja pomenuti da i Kant, koji govori o našoj pasivnoj i konačnoj intuiciji, opisuje *Gemüt* (duševnost) kao nešto što je uvek već prisutno. Što se tiče Dekartove filozofije, čini se da je *ego* uvek aktivan (u sumnji, u volji, u imaginaciji...), ali i Dekart govori o pasivnom *modus cogitandi* (modusu mišljenja) koji je možda izvorniji od svih ostalih stanja. Slično je i kod Ničea koji je analizirao aktivnost volje za moć, ali ju je u stvari opisao kao nešto što se povećava kroz aficiranost. Otuda proističe da je izvor aktivnosti volje za moć u pasivnosti. Ukratko, onaj kome se nešto daje je dvostruko pasivan: nešto mu se daje u iskustvu, a i on sâm kao „Ja“ se daje. Da li sam sposoban da dâm...? Mislim da bi odgovor trebalo da bude pozitivan. Onaj kome se nešto daje jeste aktivan, ali on to nije u prvom licu. Naime, on se uvek nalazi u situaciji odgovora, u responzivnom stanju. Često su mi prigovaraju da apsolutna, asubjektivna pasivnost onoga kome se nešto daje podseća na kvietizam ili budizam. Međutim, „Ja“ kome se nešto daje nije osuđeno na pasivnost,

upravo suprotno, jer i primanje i preuzimanje davanja podrazumeva aktivnost. Primera radi, kada igramo tenis ili fudbal, mi „preuzimamo aktivnost“. Ukupno uzevši, trebalo bi biti oprezan sa kategorijama aktivnosti i pasivnosti. Nadalje, nema primanja bez odgovora – i pružanje otpora (ili ćutanje) je jedna vrsta responzivnosti. Kao što je iskustvo jezika prevashodno iskustvo odgovora (setimo se načina na koji smo naučili da govorimo), tako je zapravo čitavo iskustvo fenomenalnosti iskustvo odgovora: onaj kome se nešto daje je aktivan na način responzivnosti. Umesto da govorimo o binarnosti aktivnosti i pasivnosti, trebalo bi da govorimo o pozivu i odgovoru. Nužno je da u pružanju poziva i mi sâmi dajemo nešto zauzvrat. I dar je u banalnom smislu te reči (davanje pomoći, socijalna pomoć, itd.) odgovor na neki poziv. Priznajem da ovde ima izvesne protivrečnosti. Iako govorim o tome da smo aktivni samo kroz odgovor, konstatujem da ljubavnik ima i anticipirajuću funkciju. Prema mom mišljenju, za razliku od čoveka, Bog savršeno poštuje pravila erotskog fenomena. Don Žuan nije sposoban da voli večno. Prema tome, kada tvrdim da ljubavnik ima anticipirajuću funkciju, onda pre svega mislim na Boga. Kako apostol Pavle sugerije, Bog nas je prvi voleo. Izvorno davanje potiče od Boga.

Predrag Krstić

Eros, znanje i racionalnost: komentari nadahnuti Erotskim fenomenom Žan-Lik Mariona

Pre svega bih želeo da se zahvalim akademiku Marionu na prilici da prođemo njegove „erotske meditacije“. Verujem da je malo onih koji se ne bi složili sa procenom da je njima i u njima on učinio (makar) jednu za filozofiju neprocenjivu dragocenu stvar: ukazao je na njen možda i intimniji skandal od onog „Kantovog“ da ne može da dokaže postojanje spoljašnjeg sveta; izvođenjem je prikazao ogrešenje koje je na svoju štetu ona počinila potiskujući, odgurujući ili previđajući mogućnost pojmovnog zahvatanja ljubavi.

Komentari koje bih ponudio bili bi opšteg karaktera, takoreći naivni, i nastojali bi da učine ono što je Žan-Lik Marion hotimice, razložno i uostalom obrazloženo izostavio u svojoj knjizi. Oni se ne bi ticali toliko onih prepoznatljivih ili skrivenih referenci na koje nije izrekom ukazano, koliko onih konkurentskih ili disparantnih filozofskih orijentacija koje možda nisu bile na tragu izlaganja, a čini se da bi imale šta da kažu o pitanjima koja su u njemu pokrenuta ili dotaknuta.

Prvi krug takvih tema odnosio bi se na status znanja. Njime nekako i otpočinje rasprava (Marion 2015: 17). Ukazuje se na samorazumljivo prevashodstvo znanja nad neznanjem, na našu sklonost da uvek radije izaberemo prvo nego drugo. Taj naizgled benigni uvid se međutim raspliće u nimalo bezazleni nalaz da nema neke autonomne ili plemenite vrednosti u saznavanju, nego da je saznavalac presudan – bilo da saznajemo da bi nam objekti bili raspoloživi bilo zbog zadovoljstva koje taj proces prati. Za protokole naučnog i metafizičkog saznavanja se ispostavlja da uzaludno ili samo delimično uspešno, odnosno samo kada je reč o onome što nije presudno važno, praktikuju svoju potragu za izvesnošću. Jasno je da je funkcija takve elaboracije bila da uvede u temu, da naglasi izvesno kardinalno neznanje ili uputnost pokušaja saznavanja onoga do čega se veli da nam je jedino stalo: nas samih. Tome se onda pristupa – pitanje je da li na jedino ispravan način? – svojevrsnom analitikom fenomena erotskog.

Šta se međutim zbilo sa znanjem, odnosno kakva bi se status i domet njemu mogli pripisati mimo ove funkcionalne uloge koju je odigralo u otvaranju knjige, a unutar one celine koju njeni nalazi predstavljaju? To ostaje neizrečeno. Neosporno je osporeno ono što Aristotel u *Metafizici* kaže – i time se zadovoljava – da je znanje po prirodi i poslovično bolje nego neznanje (Met. 982 b 11-19). Ali da li se to pobijanje ogirava u onom smislu ili u onom registru u kojem je Niče to već učinio s početka svoje *S onu stranu dobra i zla*: „Šta u nama zapravo hoće »istinu«? Zaista smo dugo zastajkiivali pred pitanjem o uzroku te volje, sve dok – najzad – nismo potpuno stali pred još suštinskijim pitanjem. Postavili smo pitanje o vrednosti te volje. Pretpostavljamo da hoćemo istinu, ali zašto ne bismo radije hteli neistinu? I neizvesnost? I neznanje?“ (Nietzsche 1967: 6). I da li bi se viđenje znanja iz perspektive centriranosti na fenomen erotskog zaključilo u toj liniji njegove kritike kao manje ili više (ne)skrivena volje za moć, linije koja od Ničea vodi do Fukoa (M. Foucault) i sada se već specijalizuje za razotkrivanje dominacije ili igre odnosa moći u verovatno svim oblastima gde uopšte postoje ljudski odnosi? Da li bi se, dalje, jedna fenomenologija erotike koja se predlaže i prilaze zadovoljila tim ukazivanjem i „stavila u zagrade“ svako ličnim erosom neprožeto saznanje – što se povremeno čini da je slučaj, s obzirom na usvajanje samo one paradigme naučnog znanja koja pretenduje na izvesnost svojih saznanja zarad puke raspoloživosti objekata?

Druga rekonstrukcija mogućeg položaja znanja u kontekstu njegove kritike koja se preduzima u *Erotskom fenomenu*, rekonstrukcija koja ne isključuju nužno onu prvu, govorila bi u prilog jednog opovrgavanja poželjnosti znanja uopšte i otvorenog nagovora na neznanje. Na prvi pogled nije verovatno da bi autor zastupao ovu nimalo novu i niukoliko oskudnu tradiciju, ali na drugi pogled nije jasno ni kako bi mogao neutralisati radikalne posledice obezvređivanja znanja koje ona povlači i na koje na obavezujući način

ukazuje. Povremeno se čini da bi „erotski“ pristup mogao možda ne toliko da stane iza te linije mišljenja koliko da joj, recimo, prethodi. Ta tradicija zastupanja neznanja u osnovi je prostekla iz jednog „zdravorazumskog“ uvida u destruktivnost znanja, u to da ono unesrećuje, otežava život, baca u depresiju, vodi gubitku pouzdanog oslonca i dezorijentiše. U (za)pisanom vidu ona se pruža makar od Knjige Propovednike (1: 18): „Jer gdje je mnogo mudrosti, mnogo je brige, i ko umnožava znanje, umnožava muku“, a nastavlja se u novovekovlju, kao u trećoj knjizi Montenjove (M. de Montaigne) *Odbrane Rejmona Sebona*, još intenzivnijim ukazivanjem da je znanje sobom uzaludno, da je vazda isprazno i neutemeljeno, da se mukotrпно stiču beskorisna protivrečna učenja, ne doprinoseći ni sreći ni zdravlju saznavaoa, da raspomamljeno naukovanje predstavlja samoproždiruću spiralu saznavanja i da se od toga valja odbraniti apstinencijom, odustajanjem od njega, povratkom blaženom neznanju, koje je neuporedivo uputnija strategija ako valja dosegnuti onaj mir i spokoj uma koji se saznanjem upravo priziva, odnosno da istinska mudrost leži tek u priznanju „neznanja i slabosti ljudskog razuma“, koju uvek iznova posvedočuje, za razliku od božje objave, vazda „konfuzna i nepouzdana nauka“ (Montaigne 1959: 40–51). Verovatno je poznatiji primer istog zastupništva Prva rasprava Rusoa, gde se takođe ukazuje da nas je „večna mudrost“ ostavila u „srećnom neznanju“, ali da smo preduzeli „ohole napore“ da izađemo iz njega i počeli da se bavimo „uzaludnim istraživanjima“, slaveći „taštinu i ništavilo“ ljudskog znanja – umesto da odustanemo od njega: „Svemoćni Bože, ..., oslobodi nas od prosvetećenosti i kobnih umetnosti naših otaca i vrati nam neznanje, nevinost i siromaštvo, jedina dobra koja mogu da nas učine srećnim i koja su vredna u tvojim učima“ (Ruso, 1993: 196, 203–204). U tom ključu samosvojne odbrane vere, verovatno na najdosledniji i za svaku buduću tematizaciju uputan način, čini se da ne tako davno Lav Šestov (Л. Шестов) u ime života, odnosno onoga što naziva „slobodom neznanja“, „slobodom od znanja“, takoreći „znalački“ kritikuje znanje, odnosno „okove“ znanja (Šestov 1996: 92; Šestov 1990: 173). *Erotski fenomen* se čini da nije sasvim lišen tragova ovakvog mišljenja, a da opet ni intencijom ni intonacijom ne (bi da) nosi njihov beleg.

Drugi tematski krug pitanja koji *Erotski fenomen* nameće, ili ih provocira ostavljajući ih bez jednoznačnog odgovora, u vezi je sa prvim, možda je još opštijeg karaktera i u svakom slučaju odnosi se u većoj meri na savremenost. Reč je o problemu određenja i, sledstveno, lociranja „erotske racionalnosti“ ili one „stroge logike erotske redukcije“ koja se više puta na različitim mestima teksta pominje. Jasno je da je čitava knjiga jedini odgovor na pitanje o njenom karakteru. Ali nije jasno kakva je njena veza ili kakva bi mogla biti njena veza sa drugim oblicima neinstrumentalne racionalnosti koji su u ponudi na aktuelnom filozofskom tržištu. Da li bi, recimo, erotska racionalnost bila vrsta, ili možda pre osnova, one Veberove (M.

Weber) vrednosne racionalnosti? Da li bi potpadala pod Habermasovu (J. Habermas) komunikativnu racionalnost ili bi je omogućavala? Ili bi u oba slučaja bila s onu stranu formalnologičkog odnosa prema njima, odnosno neuporediva? Kako bi se odnosila, ako bi ikako, prema takozvanoj mimetičkoj ili estetskoj racionalnosti u, recimo, njihovim možda najprodubljenijim obradama Adorna (T. Adorno) ili Sloterdajka (P. Sloterdijk)? To su, naravno, naknadna smeštanja u niz, koji se ipak čini da ne bi vređao autora. I to su, naravno, interpretativne strategije koje ne obavezuju interpretiranog, makar dok forsira svoje ostvarenje. Sama mogućnost asociranja sa tolikim značajnim pokušajima problematizacije i tematizacije racionalnosti, ili asociranja na njih, čini se da je, međutim, pouzdano svedočanstvo inspirativnosti i značaja mišljenja na tragu *Erotskog fenomena*.

Časlav D. Koprivica

Šta je, dakle, ljubav?

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Odlomak iz ogledanja s Marionom

U onome što slijedi daćemo nekoliko zapažanja uz Marionovo djelo *Erotski fenomen*. Počecemo s jednom od temeljnih Marionovih, levinasovski inspirisanih shvatanja: „Ljubavnik voli bez zadržke, jer voli bez čekanja i očekivanja da će biti prvi voljen, ne puštajući da mu se drugi otkriva prvi i preuzimajući rizik da prvi započne. Ali eto, on voli bez očekivanja bilo čega zauzvrat – bez očekivanja stvarno uzvraćene ljubavi, a i mogućnosti začinjavanja bilo kakve nade da bude voljen.“ (Marion 2015: 94) Prema njemu, naime, „stanovište uzajamnosti“ (Marion 2015: 90) je „strogo trgovačko“ (Marion 2015: 95).

No zahtjev za uzajamnošću inherentan je ljubavi, nije nikakva trgovina. Ljubavni zahtjev je moja intencija ka drugome ka njegovom biću preobraženom mojom ljubavnom imaginacijom, čije ispunjenje zavisi od njega. To nije trgovina, već je inherentno prirodi uzajamnosti koja je ugrađena u srž logike ljubavnog odnosa. Ne samo što ljubavi nema bez drugoga nego je drugi taj koji uvijek odlučuje o sudbini moje ljubavi – bilo time što je prihvata, čime se otvara put za zajedničku ljubav, bilo tako što je ignoriše, odbacuje ili jednostavno, iz ko zna kojega razloga, nije u stanju da je prihvati, čime zahtjev za ljubav ostaje u stanju osujećenosti, kao okrnjena, neispunjena, neostvorena ljubav. Reći da uzajamnost znači trgovinu znači uključiti u događanje ljubavi, koje, kao svoj suštinski moment, obuhvata i uzajamne perspektive ljubavnikā – sa njime nesamjerljivu i ljubavi nepripadajuću perspektivu trećeg lica, dakle, „objektivno“ stanovište neuključenih

u konkretni lični ljubavni angažman, koji uvijek podrazumijeva samo perspektivu prvog i drugog lica.

Ljubavnim zahtjevom ja sebe dajem, izručujem svoje biće drugome, da bi me on, kao prihvaćenog, svojom ljubavlju preobraženog, meni samome vratio. Neprijatnost obznanjenog, voljenom drugome upućenog ljubavnog zahtjeva – a neprijatnost se sastoji u iščekivanju, strepnji od odbijanja – ukida se ljubavnim uzvraćanjem, jer tada više nijesam na čistini samopredatosti drugome, zavisnosti, potrebe, koja traži ispunjenje, smirenje u uzvraćanju ljubavi, čiji je *ontološki* smisao vraćanje, kao potvrđenog, mojeg bića meni samome.

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U ljubavnom odnosu nije ključna sigurnost, kao što bi se moglo pomisliti kada se pomene „trgovački odnos“ uzajamnosti, već je uzvraćenost *uslov samog utemeljenja i ostvarenja ljubavi kao ljubavi*. Kasnije se na to može nadovezati strah od nestanka ljubavi, koji je u vezi s time što se ulaskom u ljubavni odnos temelj svojeg bića predaje drugome. Upravo to moje ljubavno bivanje (samim sobom) na osnovi koju je meni dao pristanak drugoga može biti razlog da se ponekad, kada druga strana u ljubavnom odnosu uskrati svoje svakodnevno prećutno prihvatanje mojeg ljubavnog zahtjeva, koji je jednom u prošlosti prihvatila (ovo treba zamisliti analogno Renanovom [E. Renan] svakodnevnom plebiscitu *za svoju naciju*) – dolazi do „izgubljenosti“ onoga čija je ljubav odbačena. Zato je zahtjev voljenom/voljenoj za uzvraćanjem moje ljubavi, u krajnjem, ravan zahtjevu za priznanjem mojeg *suštinskog* prava na postojanja – na koji ja, kao, uostalom, nijedan pojedinac, ne može odgovoriti pozitivno bez oslonca na neku drugost. Zato samo pozitivan odnos drugoga i drugosti, a ponajviše ljubavni odnos prema meni, koji je najviši i najpotpuniji oblik priznanja mene kao takvoga, a time i najснаžnije *Da* mojem postojanju, može biti pouzdana predohrana protiv suočavanja mojeg bića s rušilačkim pitnjem Čemu?, naime: Čemu *uopšte* ja sâm?

Dakle, jedan od paradoksa ljubavi jeste što njome ljubljени dobija priznanje kao onaj koji jeste, sa svojom takvoćom (*Sosein*), iako je ljubavni odnos vjerovatno najnepogodniji za nepristrasnu uzajamnu procjenu u njega uključenih. No s druge strane, možda jedino iz takvog, posve pristrasnog odnosa i može poteći snažno i svebuhvatno priznanje toga šta ja jesam, a naposljetku – i toga da imam pravo da budem, da uopšte jesam, da činjenica mojeg postojanja nije neopravdana. Jasno je, s druge strane, da u ljubavnom odnosu upravo nema, niti može biti, intencionalnog procjenjivanja voljenog/voljene u pogledu njegovih/njenih objektivnih kakvoća i vrlina. No bez obzira na to, objektivnoontološki smisao ljubavnog odnosa jeste *priznanje* bića voljenoga kao dragocjenoga, vrijednoga, opravdanoga. Baš zato uskraćivanje ljubavi nije samo emotivni udarac, *ontički* gledano – nestanak nekoga i nečega što je bilo sastavni dio prisne životne prakse,

već predstavlja uskraćenje jednom datog *ontološkog* priznanja mene kao mene, toga da ja *zapravo* opstojim. („Dakle, ja jesam u meri u kojoj mi neko želi dobro ili loše, u meri u kojoj mogu iskusiti da sam prihvaćen, voljen ili omrznut“; „Budući da ja jesam utoliko što volim i što me vole.“ [(Marion 2015: 37; 214)])

Ljubavni drugi se zato može posmatrati i kao moj „pomoćnik“ u nastojanju da postanem ono hajdegerovsko *ja-sâm* (*Ich-selbst*), koje je poteklo iz odgovora na neotklonjivi zahtjev koji uvijek proističe iz mojeg nedovršenog, nepotpunog, kontingentnog bića, na koji rješenje, izvjesno, ja ne mogu pronaći pošavši isključivo od samoga sebe. Tu nemamo u vidu trivijalnu činjenicu da je svaki pojedinac upućen na druge utoliko što je od njih zavisna, tj. egzistencijalno je neodrživ kao usamljenik, već je važna okolnost da niko, ukoliko u svojem bivanju i samoodnošenju polazi isključivo od samoga sebe, sebe ne može autonomno ontološki zasnovati. Ljubavni odnos je, dakle, posljedica nesupstancijalnosti, nesuštastvenosti svakog činjeničnog Mene, dakle, toga što je on uvijek i nakon svega jedno konačno *ens contingens*.

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Ljubav, međutim, nije slabost, nije nešto što me tobože čini zavisnim i podređenim, jer putem nje samo izlazi na vidjelo ono što uvijek već važi – da je moje biće kontingentno, neutemeljeno, lomno, slabo, i da mu je suštinski neophodna podrška spolja, nešto što će mojem postojanju pružiti osnovu – iako ne ni apsolutnu, niti zajamčeno trajnu, a time dati podstreka uspješnom esencijalizovanju mogega konačnoga opstojanja. Dakle, veličanstvenost ljubavnog „uzdizanja“ naličje je čovjekove manjkavosti koju on sam iz sebe ne može ispraviti. Ljubavni *višak* posljedica je inicijalnog ontološkog manjka.

Ovo sugeriše da ni moj lični *egzistencijalni projekt*, koji, doduše, uračunava druge, ali koji je, nakon svega, samo *moj projekt*, kao takav ne može dospjeti do cilja, do onoga zbog čega mu se uopšte i pribjeglo, a to je nastojanje da sebi, kao činjenici da jesam, pribavim utemeljenje. Eventualno nedostatnost svakog mogućeg *mojeg projekta* mogla bi se izravnati *našim projektom*, ljubavnim „projektom“ (mada *ljubav kao ljubav* upravo ne smije biti nikakav [*ciljnoracionalni projekt*]), kojim se ne suspenduje moj projekt kao Ja-projekt, već se dopunjava i čak možda izdiže na viši nivo, kao Ja-i-Ti-projekt. („Ljubavnik ne postaje on sâm nikako drugačije do zato što drugi, drugi ljubavnik, njemu osigurava njegovo sopstveno značenje.“ [Marion 2015: 213])

Nadalje: „Ne mogu se osloboditi i ne mogu postati ja sâm osim dodirujući drugu plot, kao što se ulazi u luku, jer jedino druga plot može da mi ustupi mesto, da me dočeka, ne da me otera, niti da me odbije – da odobri moju plot i da mi je otkrije čuvajući mesto u sebi. A gde druga plot ustupa

mesto mojoj, ako ne u sebi? [...] Ulazeći u plot drugoga, *izlazim iz sveta* i postajem plot u njegovoj ploti, plot njegove ploti.“ (Marion 2015: 137–8)

Drugi mi svojom ljubavlju, koja je stvarno oličena njegovom ploću, pruža *transmundani zavičaj*. Ako egzistencijalni projekt, koji je izrazito (unutar) svjetski Ja-projekt, ne može da se ostvari, i da mi utoliko obezbijedi *ontološko* utočište, onda to može ljubavni „projekt“, koji je zapravo manje projekt, i čak manje fenomen, a više Događaj. Njime se nadilazi ne samo načelna nedostatnost insularnog jastva, koje se u svijetu uvijek iznova susreće sa negostoljubljem (prema sebi), nego se mijenja i akter, koji je sada jedno Ja-i-Ti, koje, doduše, vazda može da prestane da postoji, ako u nekom trenutku izostane prećutni uzajamni *Da*-odgovor na *svakodnevni plebiscit* zajedničke ljubavi. To Ja-i-Ti – ili bolje: *Ja-Sa-Tobom*, zavičaj nalazi u svojem (Ljubavnom) „svijetu“, tj. u jednom, gledano spram zajedničkog svijeta u kojem se ukrštaju „svjetovi“ svih insularnih jastava – protivsvijetu; ne-svijet, zapravo nad-svijet ljubavi odgovor je na vjerovatno nepopravljivu osujećenost ja-svijeta, koji uvijek, kao svoju strukturu, kako to postavlja Hajdeger, nosi i sa-svijet (*Mitwelt*) – da postane moj zavičaj, dakle mjeste utemeljenog, opravdanog i zato, na koncu, i „srećnog“ prebivanja.

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Zašto je, međutim, kako maločas rekosmo, ljubav transmundana? Iako smisao ljubavi, tačnije prihvatanja ljubavnog zahtjeva, ontološki posmatrano, nalazi ishodište u priznanju vrijednosti i smisla bića upućivača ljubavnog zahtjeva, sama priroda ljubavnog fenomena, koji Marion (pre)imenuje kao-/u erotski fenomen, u svojem krajnjem dometu nadilazi logiku bića, a *mutatis mutandis* i logiku svijeta. Kod Huserla, fenomen je put da se razumije stvarnost, ali ne kao stvarna, već kao ona koja *važi kao stvarna* – ukoliko se pojavljuje mojoj svijesti. Pošavši od činova svijesti na kraju, prije u formi predodžbe o asimptoti, dotiče se odgovarajuće bivajuće – kao ispunjenje u kategorijalnoj intuiciji. Kod erotskog fenomene, ili bolje: *kontra-fenomena*, toga nema; njegova intencija nije da dopre do nečega što je stvarno, jer ploti *kao* ploti, koja je materijalizacija ljubavnosti, ima samo kada se suspenduje režim („obične“) stvarnosti. Plot nikada nije objektivno realna („Dakle, možemo reći da ništa realno nije nestalo, jer je samo nestala plot – koja ne zavisi od realnosti, niti pripada svetu stvari.“ [(Marion 2015: 155)]), već predstavlja prolaznu pojavu nadstvarnosnog, erotskog suviška nad stvarnom, unutarsvjetskom tjelesnošću. Nad-realna plot je, vrlo uslovno kazano, *suštinski epifenomen tjelesnosti*, prolazni bljesak autentičnosti koji ne može zabljesne pošavši isključivo od faktičkog ishodišta samostalno vodene, kao takve neispunjive i stoga, u svojem ishodu, apriorno ne-autentične individualnoegzistencijalne projekcije vlastitog bića. Zato, uostalom, i kraj ljubavnoga odnosa znači *pad (natrag) u svijet*. Nasuprot hrišćanskom „sumnjičenju“ plotne ljubavi, istinski ljubavni odnos kao takav predstavlja nadilaženje svijeta, izmicanje pavlovsko-luterovsko-hajdegerovskom

podlijevanju svijetu. Stvarni svijet, kakav god bio, istinskoj ljubavi zapravo ne može ništa, jer ona je nadišla njegovu dimenziju.

Erotski „fenomen“ nije samo vansvjetski već i svjetoisključujući, marionovski „zasićeni“ fenomen – nasuprot ostalim fenomenima koji su, kao fenomeni, ne samo spojivi sa svijetom nego i od njega iskustveno-konceptualno međuzavisni. Erotskō, a to je doživljajna aktualizacija ljubavi, ukoliko se posmatra iz ugla unutar-svjetskih relacija, dovodi do privremenog zaborava svijeta izazvanog prolaznom apsolutizacijom erotskoga Ovdje i Sada, čime se okolna, odnosno dotadašnja, preerotska situacija suspenduje. Tačnije erotskom aktualizacijom dolazi do sažimanja tekuće situacije u bezuslovnost erotskog Ovdje-Sada; ono postaje jedina „stvarnost“ koja se opaža, kao i jedino „čulo“ putem kojega se opaža. „Biće“ i „Mišljenje“ (ovdje prije čuvstvo) stapaju se, dakle, u događaj *lične*, moje-i-tvoje Parusije – apsolutne prisutnosti u kojoj prisutnō („stvar“-nost) i prisutnī (čovjek, „svjedok“) čine nerazdruživi, relativizovanju nepodložni sklop. Privremenost suspenzije uobičajenog svjetskog režima za erotski režim je bezuslovna. Ako Husserl kaže da se apsolutnom može smatrati samo svijest, tada je i za erotsko ti-i-ja-„jastvo“ apsolutna sama erotska „situacija“. Ukratko, svjetski režim i erotski svjesno-iskustveni režimi su nesamjerljivi. Erotska „situacija“ je lišena horizonta, kao daljine mogućegā, čak je i svako njeno Još-ne nekako već, u modusu bremenitosti situacije, tu i izvjesno je.

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Igor Cvejić

Fenomenološka struktura osećaja ljubavi

Žan-Lik Marion u svom delu *Erotski fenomen* pokušava da osvetli fenomen ljubavi, u svojoj posebnosti, i utoliko ukaže na značaj erotske redukcije nasuprot epistemičke i ontološke redukcije koje se odnose na izvesnost unutar-svjetskih objekata (Marion 2015: 34). U ovom kratkom komentaru želim da se osvrnem na pitanje koje, smatram, nije u dovoljnoj meri obrađeno u samom delu, a to je pitanje intencionalnosti samog *osećaja* ljubavi, odnosno pitanje o fenomenološkoj strukturi osećaja ljubavi.

Intencionalnost osećaja (i emocija) je tema koja poslednjih tridesetak godina zauzima sve značajnije mesto u savremenoj filozofiji. Radi jednostavnosti u radu ćemo samo predstaviti neke od zaključaka Beneta Helma (B. W. Helm), i pokušati da ukažemo da bi uzimajući u obzir intencionalnost osećaja ljubavi erotska redukcija mogla dovesti do drugačijih rezultata.

Intencionalnost osećaja

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Helm u svom objašnjenju koristi trostruku karakterizaciju objekata emocija. To su: meta, fokus i formalni intencionalni objekat (Helm 2009a: 57–58). (Tu trijadu pojmova zapravo je uveo Ronald de Sousa. [Sousa 1987: 107–141]) *Formalni intencionalni objekat* nekog osećaja je način na koji je neki predmet za nas bitan. On određuje kojoj vrsti osećaj pripada. Na primer, tako se strah može razlikovati od ljutnje, jer se u strahu predmet oseća kao opasan, a u ljutnji kao napadan, itd. Formalni intencionalni objekat bi u ovim slučajevima bila opasnost, napadnost itd. *Meta (target)* nekog osećaja je neki predmet na koji se osećaj neposredno odnosi, ili preciznije ono što je u svesti dato sa evaluativnim svojstvom definisanim formalnim intencionalnim objektom, ono opasno čega se plašimo i sl. *Fokus* nekog osećaja je pozadinski objekat koji je za nas od značaja na taj način da čini smislenim da meta ima svojstvo definisano formalnim objektom. Formalni intencionalni objekat se, prema tome, može objasniti i kao odnos mete spram fokusa, odnosno kao vrsta relacije koju meta ima naspram fokusa (npr. opasnost). Iznosimo to i jasnije na primeru: „Ja mogu biti uplašen kada dete iz komšiluka baci loptu koja zamalo da slomi moju vazu. U ovom slučaju meta mog straha je lopta, koja se u osećaju (*emotion*) daje u svesti sa pripisanim formalnim objektom – da je opasna; fokus mog straha je vaza, jer s obzirom i na značaj koji vaza ima za mene i odnos koji lopta ima prema vazici (da je potencijalno slomi) lopta se smisleno smatra opasnom.“ (Helm 2009a: 58).

Takođe je neophodno primetiti da ne moramo reflektivno biti svesni, ili znati, fokus naših osećaja. Na primer, ja ne moram da znam da mi je vaza značajna (*to have import*), ali mogu naknadno da primetim, kada se uplašim lopte, da je moja briga za vazicu stvarna, te da je, iako samo pre-refleksivno, vaza jedna vrsta intencionalnog objekta (fokus) mog straha (Helm 2009b). (Problem pre-refleksivne svesti u slučaju osećaja, kao osećaja prema svetlu, zapravo je uveo Piter Goldi (P. Goldie) oslanjajući se na Sartrov (J.-P. Sartre) model pre-refleksivne svesti o svetlu [Goldie 2000: 50–72]).

Pored toga, želim da uvedemo još jedan bitan pojam – fokalne privrženosti (*focal commitment*) (Helm 2009a: 59). Fokalna privrženost označava to da jedan određeni fokus, nastavlja u narednim situacijama da bude od značaja. Na primer: ukoliko se nadamo da ćemo ostvariti neki cilj, onda se s obzirom na fokalnu privrženost, može očekivati da ćemo osećati nezadovoljstvo, ako nas nešto u narednom koraku u tome sprečava, ili razočarenje kada se sve izjalovi. Fokalna privrženost u tom smislu možda nije nužna pojava, ali predstavlja jedan bitan deo racionalnog sklopa emocija, u smislu u kome se za objekat koji je za nas značajan (*have import to me*) može racionalno podrazumevati fokalnu privrženost (Helm 2009b).

Intencionalnost osećaja ljubavi

Karakterizacija strukture osećaja ljubavi je svakako tema koja prevazilazi ovaj kratak komentar, pa ćemo se samo osvrnuti na neke od osnovnih Helmsovih uvida. Ukoliko govorimo o ljubavi prema nekoj osobi, onda osećaj ljubavi svakako treba shvatiti kao osećaj fokusiran na neku osobu. Dakle, kao osećaj čiji je fokus neka druga osoba, ili preciznije, kao fokalna privrženost nekoj osobi. Međutim, druga osoba takođe ima svoje fokuse, odnosno objekte koje su za nju od značaja. Na taj način, ukoliko brinemo za neku drugu osobu, fokusi koje druga osoba ima, imaju značaja i za mene kao moji sub-fokusi. Istovremeno dolazi do određene identifikacije sa drugom osobom, odnosno do deljenja značajnosti (importa), onoga što je za nju značajno, jer one stvari koje su relevante za tu osobu, postaju relevantne i za mene. Drugim rečima, to podrazumeva da osećamo strah, sreću, radost ili nezadovoljstvo, samo zbog toga to što određeni objekti ili događaji nekoj drugoj osobi čine radost ili nezadovoljstvo, itd. (Helm 2002)

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I u ovom slučaju to ne znači da moramo zaista i znati da smo fokalno privrženi nekoj osobi, da bi imali emotivnu privrženost prema nekoj osobi, i da bi intencionalnost osećaja ljubavi bila na delu. Na primer, mogu da osetim veliku radost zbog uspeha neke osobe, iako još ne reflektujem svoj odnos prema njoj, a tek naknadno zaključim da sam bio radostan upravo jer tu osobu volim – odnosno jer sam bio fokalno privržen toj osobi kao takvoj (Helm 2009b).

Intencionalnost osećaja ljubavi u *Erotskom fenomenu*

Žan-Lik Marion u knjizi *Erotski fenomen* zaista se obazire na pitanje intencionalnosti ljubavi, počevši sa tim da je ljubav prema nekom uvek radikalno intencionalna (Marion 2015: 114). Međutim korak u erotskoj redukciji, koji treba da označi prelazak sa individualnosti ka drugome, jeste zapravo označen sa dva velika povezana problema ove intencionalnosti kao afektivne: problemom fiksiranosti objekta ljubavi i problemom učešća drugoga u ovom intencionalnom sklopu.

Marion na nekoliko mesta navodi nefiksiranost afektivne intuicije ljubavi: „Nestabilnost ljubavnog fenomena [...] proizlazi [...] iz moje nesposobnosti da joj [intuiciji] dodelim precizno, individualizovano i stabilno značenje“ (Marion 2015: 115); „[...] afektivni tonalitet voljenja da se voli istovremeno potvrđuje intencionalnu intuiciju drugoga i bez doznačivog drugoga – intencionalnu intuiciju, ali bez intencionalnog objekta“ (*ibid*); „[m]oja erotska intuicija – voljenja da volim, voljenja *kao da* – takva je da nema fiksiranu intencionalnost“ (*ibid*: 130).

Takođe, na istim mestima Marion karakteriše povezani problem da se u ovoj intencionalnoj strukturi fenomen drugoga još ne pojavljuje u svom potpunom značenju: „[...] pokušaj još ne otvara fenomen drugoga, čije značenje i dalje nedostaje [...]“ (*ibid*); „Intuicija me dotiče razoružavajućom drugošću, koja mi se događa bez ikoga drugoga.“ (*ibid*); „[Afektivna intuicija] čini moju ljubav prema voljenom [...] iznad svega fenomenološki nesposobnom da izvede na scenu i drugog koji se i najmanje može identifikovati.“ (*ibid* : 115).

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Ne ulazeći na ovom mestu u način kako se dalje odvijaju koraci erotske redukcije u Marionovom delu, želim samo da ukažem da je možda moguće ove probleme rešiti već na nivou karakterizacije same strukture osećaja. Što se tiče prvog problema, nefiksiranosti intencionalnog objekta, bitno je primetiti da to što, u strogom smislu, „ne znamo“ objekat ne mora da znači da objekat nije fiksiran. Objekat osećaja može biti fiksiran, i po pravilu jeste, upravo fokalnom privrženosti, kao objekat ljubavi, ili kao osoba koja je za nas značajna. Fiksiranost objekta kao fokusa osećaja, čak i ako je samo pre-refleksivna, već omogućava da razlikujemo osobe prema kojima nešto osećamo od onih prema kojima smo ravnodušni. Tako na primer, već i tinejdžerska zaljubljenost u neku nepoznatu osobu ima svoj fiksirani objekat – jer će se taj tinejdžer možda lako prevariti o svim osobinama ove osobe, ali će se teško prevariti u pogledu toga da je baš ta osoba ona u koju je zaljubljen. Dakle, objasniti, na nivou fenomenološke strukture osećaja da je neki intencionalni objekat fiksiran ne čini se kao veliki problem. (Ovaj problem se može radikalizovati u problem zamenljivosti (*fungibility problem*)). Dakle, problem može biti da li je objekat ljubavi zamenljiv (potencijalno i bilo kojim drugim objektom). Helm na ovaj problem pokušava da odgovori modifikujući pitanje – pod pitanjem zamenljivosti uvek moramo pretpostaviti pitanje: da li je osoba koju volimo zamenljiva *bez gubitka*. Ukoliko je drugi svojim specifičnim značajem koji ima za nas konstitutivan za našu intencionalnost, onda se njegovo „mesto“ ne može zameniti bez gubitka, iako ne možemo ovde dalje da ulazimo u taj problem. [Helm 2009a: 175–210])

Međutim, mnogo veći problem je da se objasni i kako se taj drugi pojavljuje kao konstitutivan u fenomenološkoj strukturi ljubavi, za šta nije dovoljna samo fiksiranost objekta. Ipak, ukoliko pratimo Helmovu karakterizaciju fenomenološke strukture osećaja ljubavi, onda se pokazuje da ne samo da je moguće da drugi u osećaju stupa na scenu kao drugi, već je ljubav prema osobama tako struktuirana da je drugi uvek već deo ove intencionalne strukture. Naime, pošto struktura ljubavi prema nekoj osobi podrazumeva takvu fokalnu privrženost prema nekome kao osobi, da njeni fokusi postaju moji sub-fokusi, dakle da delim značaj objekata sa tom osobom i preko te osobe, ova fenomenološka struktura uvek mora da podrazumeva drugog

kao njen nerazdvojni deo – u tom smislu osećaj ljubavi prema osobama je uvek već struktuiran uzimajući u obzir drugoga. Na primer, već osećaj radosti, i kada je razlog za nju samo pre-refleksivan, samo zbog toga što se neka druga osoba nečime raduje, a prema čemu bih inače bio ravnodušan, u sebi pokazuje drugog kao voljenog i kao konstitutivnog za moju intencionalnost.

Uzimanje u obzir intencionalnosti osećaja ljubavi utoliko bi možda moglo da ponudi jednostavnije rešenje problema koje je Marion postavio, istovremeno i ukazivanje na mogućnost prelaska sa egoistične težnje (da se voli), na ljubavna i socijalna osećanja koja uključuju druge. Na taj način moguće je i da bi koraci erotske redukcije koji slede dobili drugačiji oblik. Pre svega, otvorila bi se mogućnost da se mnogo više da za pravo osećaju ljubavi, i da rezultat erotske redukcije pre bude osvetljavanje fenomena osećaja, ali takav poduhvat svakako bi zahtevao više nego što je namera ovog komentara.

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Nikola Tanasić

O diskontinuitetu savremenog i antičkog shvatanja poimanja erotskog

Rizikujući da se opsežnom i temeljnom delu profesora Žan-Lik Mariona pristupi u dvostrukom smislu trivijalno – sa jedne strane ulazeći u terminološke i prevodilačke rasprave, a sa druge strane komentarišući naslov dela umesto njegove bogate sadržine – postavlja se pitanje smisla pojma „erotskog“ u savremenoj filozofskoj terminologiji, i ništa manje kontroverzno prevodilačko povezivanje ovog pojma sa srpskim terminom „ljubav“. Iako može izgledati kao da je reč o jednom običnom sporu oko reči, kako u internacionalnom pojmu „erotskog“, tako i u srpskom pojmu „ljubavi“ dolazi do ambivalencija koje su delimično izazvane različitim hermeneutičkim horizontima unutar kojih se razvijaju francuska (odnosno latinska) i srpska (odnosno slovenska) filozofska terminologija. Sa jedne strane ovaj problem se manifestuje u izvesnom „ideološkom šumu“ koji okružuje upotrebu pojma „erotsko“ u naše doba, a u drugom se manifestuje kroz „kulturološke“ razlike koje postoje u francuskom i srpskom poimanju „ljubavi“.

Prevodioci *Erotskog fenomena* uzimaju (u skladu sa uobičajenom upotrebom pojma) da francuskom *amour* odgovara srpsko ljubav, a da oba pojma odgovaraju starohelenskom έρος. Istovremeno, u skladu sa latinskom tradicijom, temeljni hrišćanski pojam άγάπη na francuski se prevodi kao *charité* (što odgovara prevodu *caritas* iz latinske Vulgate), što se opet na

srpski prevodi kao milosrđe. Međutim, za konstituisanje pojma ljubavi u srpskom jeziku, nastalom na slovenskoj terminologiji, koja je opet svoje pojmove preuzimala neposredno iz grčkog, ključan je upravo hrišćanski pojam ἀγάπη, a ne antički pojam ἔρως. Dok latinsko *amor* (*amour*) u sebi, pored ljubavne sadrži i komponentu „žudnje“ odnosno „strasti“ (lat. *passio*), pa je samim tim, u skladu sa antičkim uzorima, povezana i sa seksualnošću, srpski pojam ljubav (rus. любовь, crkv. slov. любленіе) neposredno se temelji na hrišćanskoj ἀγάπη, i samim tim ne podrazumeva nužno seksualnu, ili „erotsku“ komponentu (npr. ako govorimo o „ljubavi majke prema detetu“, „ljubavi prema slobodi“ i sl.). Razlika je na nivou savremenih jezika možda beznačajna, ali u okviru filozofske rasprave reč je o ipak različitim značenjskim intuicijama, koje dovode do toga da srpskom (odnosno slovenskom) čitaocu veza između „erotskog“ i „ljubavi“ nije samorazumljiva u istoj meri, u kojoj je ona, možda, samorazumljiva francuskom čitaocu.

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Reč bi bila o najobičnijem jezičkom kuriozitetu, da u ovoj specifičnoj upotrebi pojma „erotsko“, bremenitij istovremeno i antičkim i hrišćanskim smislom ljubavi, nije sadržana jedna od centralnih intencija profesora Mariona – da se izolovanost i solipsizam Dekartovog *ego cogito* prevaziđe upravo preko pojma erotske ljubavi, sa svim implikacijama koje ona sobom nosi. Insistirajući na distinkciji između „tela“ (lat. *corpus*, fr. *corps*, en. *body*, nem. *Körper*, crkv. slov. тѣло) i „ploti“ (lat. *carnis*, fr. *chair*, en. *flesh*, nem. *Leib*, crkv. sl. плоть), on prevazilazi jaz između *res cogitans* i *res extensa* ukazujući na plot koja nije prosto „moje telo“ (*habeam corpus*), već je – u jednom izuzetno intimnom i nedvosmislenom smislu – ja. U tom kontekstu on uvodi sopstveni pojam „treće“, odnosno „erotske redukcije“, koja bi trebalo da sledi za fenomenološkim postupcima Dekarta („prva“, odnosno „epistemološka redukcija“), odnosno egzistencijalista („druga“, odnosno „ontološka redukcija“), sa ciljem da se prevladaju problemi sa kojima su se oni suočavali. U tom postupku, autorov pojam ljubavi je krajnje ambivalentan – on mu istovremeno pripisuje „prizemnost“ upućenosti na plot kao suštinske komponente ljudskog bića koje „voli i želi da bude voljeno“, ali i univerzalnost i metafizičku „težinu“ hrišćanske ljubavi koja transcendirira ljudsku pojedinacnost i konačnost i uzdiže ga ka Bogu.

Problem nastaje u tome, što ove dve različite komponente savremenog pojma ljubavi – uslovno govoreći „erotska“ i „agapička“ – naizgled jedna drugu poništavaju i ukidaju, i to upravo u kontekstu svog odnosa prema ploti. Dok je plot neizostavni aspekt savremenog poimanja erotskog (koji uz to igra, kao što smo videli, fundamentalno važnu ulogu u Marionovoj fenomenološkoj redukciji), u pojmu hrišćanske ljubavi za nju ne samo da nema mesta, već se ona čak tradicionalno tumači, ne samo kao nešto nisko, efemerno i ovostrano, već kao greh i prepreka na putu do transcendencije.

Ako uzmemo u obzir Platonovu interpretaciju erosa iz *Gozbe*, videćemo da ni on nije daleko od ove pozicije. Iako on Erosu kao božanskoj sili priznaje, uslovno govoreći, „nečistu“ i „demonsku“ prirodu, dopuštajući posredno njegovu „plotsku“ (odnosno „čulnu“) prirodu, uloga ove „niže“ ljubavi predstavlja tek nešto više od stepenice koja se mora preći na putu do spoznanja ideje „večne i božanske Lepote“. Naravno, nije sporno da se ovo Platonovo učenje kasnije hristijanizovalo, ali uprkos tome teško je pozivati njega u odbranu savremenog shvatanja erotskog kao primarno seksualnog fenomena.

Žan-Lik Marionu ova napetost svakako ne promiče, i u svom promišljanju ovog problema on u više navrata otvoreno apeluje na hrišćansko shvatanje univerzalnosti, čistoće i fundamentalnosti ljubavi kao centralne i konstituisuće „energije“ (u antičkom smislu „odelotvorenja“) ljudskog bića. On naglašava da savremena seksualizacija i profanisanje erotskog (kako na nivou pojma, tako i na nivou pojave) zapravo predstavlja njegovo prostituisanje i pornografizaciju, istovremeno ističući da naša civilizacija sa svojom prenaglašenom seksualnošću pre „suberotizovana“, nego „erotizovana“. Marion se poziva na „erotsko“ u jednom izvornom, antičkom smislu – pre svega kao na jedan duhovni fenomen, ali fenomen jednako udaljen od obestrascenosti sholastičkog stremljenja prema Bogu, koliko i od praznog intelektualizma vulgarno shvaćenog kartezijskog *cogitare*.

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Pa opet, postavlja se pitanje da li je odabir izraza *ερως* dovoljno razumljiv u savremeno doba, da bi mogao da se probije kroz nametljive slojeve profanizacije i seksualizacije, i uspostavi jednu neposrednu vezu sa antičkom filozofijom, istovremeno ne otuđujući i ne istiskujući suštinski važnu hrišćansku *ἀγάπη*. Da li je hrišćanski pojam ipak bogatiji, snažniji i plodniji kada govorimo o čovekovom duhovnom prevazilaženju sopstvene situacije? Uostalom, problem sa kojim se suočavaju Dekart i njegovi moderni sledbenici u jakom smislu ne postoji u okvirima hrišćanske filozofije, između ostalog i zato što se čovekovo ego ne svodi isključivo na njegovo *cogitare*, već se oslikava u čitavom nizu energija, koje ne samo da uspostavljaju njegovo mesto u svetu i njegove duhovne veze sa drugim ljudima, nego mu istovremeno omogućavaju da svoju situaciju u potpunosti prevaziđe, i uzdigne se ka transcendentom. Ili, ako je pojam *ἀγάπη* previše bremenit hrišćanskom verom za savremenog sekularizovanog pojedinca, da li su možda starohelenski pojmovi ljubavi poput *φιλία* (koja u Antici ima čak i jako metafizičko utemeljenje), odnosno *στέργειν* (koji predstavlja jedan religijski neutralan pojam ljubavi koja nije primarno seksualna), prigodniji za zahvatanje Marionovog „erotskog fenomena“? Njegov odgovor je jasan – njegovo poimanje erotskog u sebi već sadrži sve ove različite kontekste, a priori isključuje sve ideološke šumove, i to je jednostavno način na koji on taj pojam koristi.

Tu, međutim, iskršava drugo pitanje, manje formalno i suštinskije od prethodnog. Van konteksta hrišćanskog Otkrovenja, da li erotski fenomen zaista zauzima toliko centralno mesto u samokonstituisanju ljudskog *ego* i fenomenološkom utemeljenju sveta koji nas okružuje? Ili, pravilnije rečeno, da li je uloga erotskog kao ljudske „energije“ isključiva, ili se ona može zameniti i izvesnim „drugim energijama“. U kontekstu estetike možemo govoriti o čovekovom samoispoljavanju kroz stvaralaštvo u smislu veoma nalik na smisao u kome Marion govori o ljubavi. Nije li (umetničko) stvaranje takođe izvesno uspostavljanje intimnog i neposrednog odnosa sa spoljašnjim svetom, koji transcendirira odnose *res cogitans* i *res extensa*, odnosno „ja“ i „ne-ja“? Ako Marion Huserlov pojmovni par νόησις/νόημα sa uspehom zamenjuje pojmovnim parom ἐρώσις/ἐρώμενον, zar nije moguće učiniti isto, očuvavši sve neophodne relacije i implikacije, sa parom ποιησις/ποίημα? Ili, ako se poetsko može svesti na erotski fenomen, da li isto važi i za marksistički shvaćene pojmove rada i proizvoda? Uostalom, nije li i samo antičko θεωρεῖν podrazumevalo uspostavljanje intimne (metafizičke) veze između mislioca i onog što se promišlja, baš kao što je πρᾶξις u sebi sadržala kako intimno ispoljavanje *ego*, tako i njegovo neposredno spoznavanje i interakciju sa spoljašnjim svetom i drugim ljudima u njemu, na način znatno kompleksniji od mehanicističke interakcije *ego cogitans* i *res extensa*?

U tom kontekstu, pitanje mogućnosti savremenog razumevanja erotskog svodi se na stari hermeneutički problem horizonata razumevanja savremene i antičke civilizacije. Insistiranje na povratku na antičko, ili greko-hrišćansko poimanje ljubavi kao na izlazu iz epistemičko-egzistencijalnog ćorsokaka u koji je zapala savremena filozofija i civilizacija svakako daje upečatljive rezultate, ali unekoliko zaklanja pomalo banalnu činjenicu da se povratkom na pozicije antike istovremeno ukida i niz filozofskih nedoumica i problema, koje naše vreme smatra za nepremostive. Na taj način povratak na izvorni, antički filozofski pojam ljubavi sa jedne strane zaista omogućuje da prevladamo dualizme i nedostatnosti savremene filozofske scene, ali istovremeno ukida probleme i dileme koje su nas uopšte navodile da tragamo za ovakvom vrstom izlaza. A ako, nasuprot tome, pristanemo na sinhronijsko, savremeno razumevanje pojma erotskog, ono može da se pokaže kao aksiološki ispražnjeni i obezvređeni surogat za civilizacijski izgubljene antičke i hrišćanske pojmove, pa samim tim i kao nedoraslo zadataku koji je pred njega postavljen. Zadatak koji sebi u *Erotskom fenomenu* postavlja Žan-Lik Marion jeste upravo da se ponovo zadobije pojam ljubavi koji neće biti beznađežno profanisan, i koji će iz duha našeg vremena moći da korespondira sa svojim filozofskim istočnicima, bez upuštanja u filozofske anahronizme koji vrebaju na svakom koraku.

Žan-Lik Marion

Odgovor Predragu Krstiću, Časlavu D. Koprivici, Igoru Cvejiću i Nikoli Tanasiću

U *Erotskom fenomenu* govorim o sujeti da bih opisao istorijsku situaciju u kojoj se nalazimo, a koja se može okarakterisati kao epoha nihilizma. Kao što je Niče nagovestio (a kasnije su to potvrdili mislioci poput Huserla), u nihilizmu istinitost nije dovoljna da bi se opravdao neki iskaz. Isto tako, to što je neko delanje dobro ne znači da se za njega treba zalagati umesto moralno lošeg delanja. Nadalje, izvesno znanje nije dovoljno da bismo ustanovili istinu, niti za to da se znanje pretvori u pravila. U takvoj epohi se nalazimo i to su razlozi iz kojih autoritet nauke više ne postoji. Za razliku od toga, u epohi metafizičke racionalnosti, prosvetiteljstva i progressa se pretpostavljalo da je ono istinito ujedno dobro i lepo – a nihilizam nije ništa drugo do raskid sa ovim ekvivalencijama. U stvari, pitanje ljubavi je od suštinskog značaja u nihilizmu. Naime, postavlja se pitanje da li racionalni subjekt može da prihvati totalitet sveta, a da se pritom odrekne mogućnosti da voli i da bude voljen? I ovde nije reč u sporednom etičku problemu, već o centralnom pitanju.

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Što se tiče recipročnosti, ona nije nužna za ljubav. Preciznije, nije nužno da budete voljeni da biste voleli. Štaviše, često se kaže: „volim te, uprkos tome što me ti ne voliš“. Ukoliko računate na recipročnost, rizikujete da nećete biti voljeni. Na paradoksalan način, kada ste „unilateralno“, jednostrano zaljubljeni onda se i vi sami nadate da će vas druga osoba jednostrano voleti, ne očekujući nikakvu recipročnost. Ne želim da me druga osoba voli samo zato što je ja volim, već želim da me voli onakvog kakav jesam – želim da me voli čak i ako ja nju ne volim. Ljubav nije razmena, niti nekakva komercijalna radnja, niti je fenomen pravde ili pravednosti. Drugim rečima, ljubav je jednostrana, proizvoljna, nepravedna i opasna, uvek sa izvesnom zabrinutošću. Stoga je uvek jača i od smrti – ne može da se racionalizuje, te prevazilazi recipročnost, trgovinsku jednakost i razmensku simetriju.

Ukoliko postoji „fokus“, nema objekta. Erotski fenomen iznenađuje objektivirajuću intencionalnost i nadmašuje je. U tom smislu govorim o radikalnoj intencionalnosti, s onu stranu fiksiranosti.

Često se postavljalo pitanje koja reč najviše odgovara ljubavi izvorno, da li je to *ἔρως*, *ἀγάπη* ili nešto drugo... Primera radi, Sveti Avgustin je pravio razliku između *amor*, *dilectio* i *caritas*. On na odličan način interpretira 21. glavu jevanđelja po Jovanu (u kojoj Isus tri puta pita Petra da li ga voli – „ljubiš li me?“), i pritom naglašava da se na ovom mestu grčka i latinska verzija u velikoj meri razlikuju. Sa moje strane, ja sam u potpunosti indiferentan prema ovim pitanjima. Pokušavam da pokažem da postoji univokno

značenje ljubavi, uprkos raznolikosti termina. U stvari, ovo je umnogome teološko pitanje. Grčki crkveni oci (među prvima Atanasije Aleksandrijski) su uvideli da se može spasti samo ono što se prisvaja [assumer]. Bog se ote-
 lovljuje ne bi li spasio telo. Isto važi i za odnos između Boga i čoveka: mora
 da postoji univokna ljubav ne bi li Bog mogao da spasi čoveka, odnosno
 ne bi li čovek mogao da radi isto što i Bog radi. Postoji samo jedan način
 ljubavi, s tim što božanska ljubav prethodi ljudskoj. U tom okviru se može
 govoriti i o radikalno vremenskom karakteru ljubavi. Ljubav, erotizacija se
 može ponoviti. Ipak, to ne znači da ljubav nema pristup jednoj vrsti več-
 nosti. Do večnosti kao – aristotelijanski rečeno: – savršenosti *energeia*-e se
 dolazi kroz vremenitost. *Energeia* je erotskog karaktera; čovek nije u kon-
 taktu sa „mišljenjem mišljenja“, već sa erotskim aspektom večnosti. Tu ima
 dodirnih tačaka i sa Ničeovom filozofijom.

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STUDIES AND ARTICLES

STUDIJE I ČLANCI

IV

Olga Nikolić

Husserl's Theory of Noematic Sense

Abstract After Husserl's transcendental turn and the discovery of the correlation between consciousness and the world the concept of the noema becomes one of the constant leitmotifs of Husserl's philosophy. My paper will be devoted to the clarification of this concept and its implications for Husserl's theory of sense. The leading question will be: How can the noema play the role of both the sense and the objective correlate of the intentional act? I will start with presenting the problematic of sense in Husserl's phenomenology from the Logical Investigations to the Ideas I. The central part of my paper will be devoted to the influential debate regarding the interpretation of the noema. Finally, I intend to point out the most important ways in which the notion of the noema becomes enriched in later Husserl's philosophy, as well as the difference between linguistic and non-linguistic sense, based on the Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. I hope to show that Husserl's phenomenological theory of sense offers a valuable alternative to the exclusively language-oriented theories of sense.

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Keywords: Husserl, noema, sense, correlation, transcendental phenomenology

Introduction

Studying intentionality as the essential characteristic of consciousness is the main task of phenomenology, according to Husserl.¹ Moreover, as we become aware in the phenomenological reduction, intentionality is itself a structure composed of noesis and noema – intentional act and its objective correlate. It is through these notions that Husserl in his mature period deals with complex problems of how consciousness bestows sense on objects.

My paper will be devoted to clarifying Husserl's notion of noema and its implications for his theory of sense. The leading question will be: How can noema play the role of both the sense and the objective correlate of the intentional act? Also, I intend to point out the most important ways in which the notion of the noema becomes enriched, remaining at the same time the constant leitmotif after Husserl's transcendental turn and the discovery of the correlation between consciousness and the world. In this way I hope to outline the general theory of sense that Husserl's phenomenology leaves us with as the task for the future.

1 This paper is the abridged and reworked version of my Master's Thesis ("Husserl's Notion of the Noema: The Phenomenological Theory of Sense") defended at KU Leuven in January 2016.

I will start with presenting the problematic of sense in Husserl's phenomenology and its evolution from his early theory of intentionality of the *Logical Investigations* (1900/1901) to the transcendental phenomenology and the discovery of the phenomenological reduction in the *Ideas I* (1913). These considerations will set the stage for the central part of my paper, devoted to the influential debate regarding the interpretation of the noema. In chapter II, I will present two alternative views on the noema and measure the arguments of both sides against Husserl's text from *Ideas I*. The questions left open by the debate will lead me to examine the role of non-linguistic, perceptual sense and linguistic, conceptual sense in constituting the identity of the intentional object, as well as the role of context in the constitution of sense. With this aim, in chapter III I will consider later Husserl's notions of pre-predicative sense and the life-world, as developed in *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis* and *Crisis of European Sciences*, respectively. I will show how Husserl's theory of sense in *Ideas* becomes in important ways supplemented by Husserl's analyses of the inner and outer anticipatory horizons and the life-world as an all-encompassing horizon of all actual and possible objects. In this way, I hope to show that Husserl's phenomenological theory of sense offers a valuable alternative to the exclusively language-oriented theories of sense.

I The Problematic of Sense in Husserl's Phenomenology

Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1900/1901), the work that marked the breakthrough of phenomenology, appeared in a philosophically turbulent period. Among the most urgent philosophical questions were those of the character of scientific knowledge, the foundation of *a priori* disciplines and the correct delimitation between natural and human sciences. Psychology, understood as a natural science, was increasingly seen as capable of providing the foundation for other sciences, notably for logic and mathematics. In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl vigorously criticized logical psychologism for confusing the ideal and necessary laws of logic with the empirical and merely probable psychological judgements about our mental states. Husserl's initial interest in studying sense derives from his attempt to clarify meanings of logical laws and concepts and thus offer foundations for logic. With this task in mind, Husserl undertakes his investigation into the sense-giving activity of consciousness in general, in line with a concept his teacher Brentano introduced as the defining characteristics of mental phenomena: intentionality.

In his major work, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, Brentano argued that psychology could be established as a rigorous science with the task of identifying, classifying and describing mental acts and their essential parts. By means of reflecting on our own mental life we discover that

mental phenomena (i.e. acts of consciousness such as judgments, beliefs, perceptions, wishes, hopes, fears, etc.) are always somehow directed to an object in a certain manner: “In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.” (Brentano 2009: 68) Intentionality is this peculiar directedness of acts of consciousness towards the objects intended in them. Brentano’s theory is often characterized as the object-theory of intentionality, because it apparently explains intentional directedness by introducing a new sort of object with a special ontological status, distinct from objects actually existing outside the mind. Namely, his notion of intentional inexistence of objects in consciousness implies that intentional objects are somehow contained within the acts which intend them, and depend on them for their existence (Brentano 2009: 68).

Brentano’s discovery that all conscious mental processes had to be in some way intentional was Husserl’s main starting point in the development of his own phenomenological approach. However, dissatisfied with Brentano’s explanation of intentionality in terms of intentional inexistence of objects in consciousness, Husserl began to formulate his own view on intentionality, which he would continue to develop and modify for the rest of his life. Criticizing Brentano’s idea that intentional objects are somehow present in consciousness, Husserl insists that “only one thing is present, the intentional experience” and that a relation to an object is achieved solely in virtue of the essential characteristics of this intentional experience itself, regardless of the existence of any intentional object (1984: 386).² In other words, components that make an act intentional are immanent to it, but the object itself is transcendent to it. The former Husserl calls ‘intentional content’, and the latter ‘intentional object’.

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In the *Vth Logical Investigation*, Husserl outlines the basic structure of intentionality in terms of the real (*reell*)³ phenomenological content of intentional experience and the ideal, intentional content, in order to explain how intentional acts refer to their intended objects. For Husserl of the first edition of the *Logical Investigations*, phenomenology was supposed to describe essential immanent (*reell*) moments of the conscious experience itself, i.e. the phenomenological content of intentional experience, a study for which any reference to actual (*real*) intended objects must be completely irrelevant. With this task in mind, Husserl introduced the notion of intentional content: that moment of the phenomenological content comprising

2 All references to Husserl’s works cite the Husserliana edition. The translation I used is indicated in bibliography.

3 Husserl uses *real* to refer to actual worldly relations, things and states of affairs, and *reell* to refer to the essential immanent component parts of conscious experience: acts and sensuous material.

everything that essentially belongs to the intentional experience as intentional. Husserl disambiguates between several meanings of the notion (Husserl 1984: 413), most important of which for our purpose is intentional content as intentional matter.⁴ In his analysis of the immanent content by means of which an act is directed to an object, Husserl makes an essential distinction between the quality and the matter of an act: “the distinction between the general act-character which stamps it as being presentative, emotional, judgmental, etc. and its content which stamps it as presenting this, judging that, etc.” (1984: 425–426) The former is the quality, the latter is the matter of an act. The union of quality and matter of an intentional act is called by Husserl the intentional essence, in opposition to the inessential moments of intentional experience, such as sensuous content.⁵ Intentional matter can be shared by various intentional acts and “is that element in an act which first gives it reference to an object, and reference so wholly definite that it not only fixes the object meant in a general way, but also the precise way in which it is meant.” (Husserl 1984: 426) Thus, matter seems to be both the immanent moment of the act and the determination of the object intended in the act. The question imposes itself: what is the ontological status of this peculiar component of phenomenological content which remains identical in many individual acts of consciousness and where exactly does its identity come from? Husserl’s turn away from the object and towards the immanent (*reell*) make-up of the intentional experience in accounting for intentionality makes it impossible for the identity of intentional matter to be attributed to the identity of the intended object itself (1984: 427). On the other hand, it cannot be explained by the peculiarities of individual acts either, for matter is precisely that in virtue of which particular acts intend the same object in the same determinate manner. The identical intentional matter has explanatory priority over individual acts and their intentions. Husserl’s position on this is best understood if we compare his considerations regarding the meaning-conferring acts constitutive of the meaning of linguistic expressions in the *Ist Logical Investigation*: “(...) an expression only refers to an objective correlate because it means something, it can be rightly said to signify or name the object through its meaning. An act of meaning is the determinate manner in which we refer to our object of the moment.” (Husserl 1984: 54) Meaning itself is a determinate logical content, a presentation (concept) of an object or a judgement about a relation, which remains identical in the multiplicity of acts directed to it, i.e. it is an ideal species instantiated in the multiplicity of acts. (Husserl 1984: 102–105). Intentional directedness is thus

4 The other two are intentional content as intentional object and intentional content as intentional essence.

5 Sensuous content (e.g. colors, sounds, odors, etc.) is inessential, because it is always changing and is different in every particular act.

explained in virtue of ideal content of an act, mediating between an act and an object that the act intends. Intentional matter is the general name for this sense-component of an act whose identity is that of an ideal species (Husserl 1984: 430).⁶ Thus, for Husserl of the *Logical Investigations* sense is distinguished from object as an ideal entity enabling acts to refer to objects and Husserl treats it according to the model of linguistic meanings. The greatest problem with this view is whether it really explains the intentional directedness of consciousness towards objects, or simply postulates a class of third realm Platonic entities somehow mysteriously related to acts on the one hand and objects on the other hand (Drummond 2002: 36).

Similar structures as just described reappear in Husserl's mature theory of intentionality, although in a modified form, due primarily to Husserl's discovery of the phenomenological reduction as the authentic method for doing phenomenology. The way we understand Husserl's transition from the theory of intentionality offered in the *Logical Investigations* to the transcendental phenomenology developed during Husserl's Göttingen years, is crucial for the correct assessment of his theory of sense. *Ideas I* (1913) marked the transcendental turn in Husserl's philosophy, introducing Husserl's theory of the constitution of objects in consciousness and the correlation between consciousness and the world. It is within this new transcendental framework that Husserl advanced the notions of the noema and noesis for the first time in order to account for the fundamental structure of intentionality.

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The phenomenological reduction designates a methodological turning away from the actual world of our everyday experience (the world of natural attitude) in which the proper field of phenomenological research becomes revealed. As phenomenologists we abstain from our claims about the outside world, we don't use any theories that presuppose existence of objects of the outside world. Thus the new phenomenological attitude is opened to us: consciousness loses its empirical sense of something belonging to the world, and gains a new sense of an absolute sphere of 'immanental' being. "We have not lost anything but rather have gained the whole of absolute being which, rightly understood, contains within itself, 'constitutes' within itself, all worldly transcendencies." (Husserl 1976: 107) Husserl points us towards the study of the pure, absolute, self-contained and world-constituting transcendental consciousness, and to the question of how the world is constituted in consciousness as the central phenomenological problem.

According to Husserl, it is only by performing the reduction that we come to understand the essential intentional correlation of noesis and noema,

6 On the ideality of meanings in the *Logical Investigations* see also Drummond 2002: 35–37 and Rump (web) on the similarity between Husserl's early theory of sense and Frege's notion of *Sinn*.

intentional acts and their objective correlates. Intentional act, the noesis, is 'the sense-bestowing' activity of consciousness: "To have sense' or to 'intend to something', is the fundamental characteristic of all consciousness which, therefore, is not just any mental living whatever, but is rather a mental living having sense, which is noetic." (Husserl 1976: 206) Both noetic acts as well as sensuous data (color, touch, tone, pleasure and pain, etc.) that serve as the material for their sense-bestowing activity (Husserl 1976: § 85) belong to the real (*reell*) immanent parts of the stream of consciousness, what Husserl of the *Logical Investigations* called 'the phenomenological content'. Thus, in the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl was exclusively interested in the noetic side of intentionality, intentional acts with their quality and matter. However, Husserl now recognizes another essential component in the structure of intentionality, namely the noematic component, the non-really inherent (*Irreelles*) moment of intentional experience. Husserl also uses other terms interchangeably with 'noema': 'intended as intended', 'intentional Object' (in inverted commas) and 'sense' (Husserl 1976: 203). Still, the noema cannot be outrightly equated with Husserl's earlier notion of sense as intentional matter, because it is consistently characterized, not as intentional content, but as the objective correlate of the intentional act.

This in turn suggests that what remains left over in the sphere of pure immanence opened up by the phenomenological reduction is not simply a collection of the real (*reell*) components of conscious experience, but the entire intentional correlation between this experience and the object intended in it. On the other hand, designating the noema as the sense of intentional act implies that the noema is in some way abstract and distinct from the ordinary intended objects, even if not in the same way senses of the *Logical Investigations* are. The question arises therefore of how to bring together Husserl's noticeable shift of interest towards a description of the intentional correlation, rather than noetic description only, with the theory of noemata as senses proposed in the *Ideas I*. Does the introduction of the noesis-noema correlation imply a shift in Husserl's theory of sense as well?

Immediately after clarifying the distinction between the really inherent and the non-really inherent components of intentional experience, Husserl offers an extremely important exemplary analysis of the perceptual noema in order to distinguish between it and the objects we encounter in the natural attitude. Husserl's famous example is that of regarding with pleasure a blossoming apple tree in the garden. When we perceive an apple tree in the natural attitude, we see the tree as a material, spatio-temporal object, as a real object in the world. Only in the phenomenological attitude do we become explicitly aware of the noema of the tree. The tree that we experience as real (*real*) in the natural attitude loses its character of reality, or more precisely its reality becomes bracketed and through this bracketing

the noema emerges for us. Even though whilst we are in the phenomenological attitude we don't posit the actual existence of the tree anymore, still the act of perception remains the act of perceiving something, it still has its objective correlate – its noema. Husserl makes a very clear distinction here between the noema and the object *simpliciter*, which seems to imply an ontological distinction between the two: “The tree *simpliciter* can burn up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense — the sense of this perception, something belonging necessarily to its essence — cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties.” (Husserl 1976: 205) However, at the same time, Husserl points out that even the phenomenologically reduced perceptual mental process is a perceiving of “this blossoming apple tree, in this garden,” so that “everything remains as of old” (1976: 204). What makes the crucial difference is the change in attitude in which the object undergoes a radical modification of sense, allowing us to focus on the ‘perceived as perceived’, the ‘appearing as appearing’, to ‘something given in its essence’: the noema. Whereas it is clear that the object as intended is in fact the object of our intention, it is not completely clear whether in the natural attitude we intend the noema or not. The passage cited above strongly suggests that the noema is an abstract entity which we do not intend in the natural attitude. This poses question as to the relation between the noema and the object *simpliciter*.

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Regarding the structure of the noema, Husserl distinguishes between the noematic core, the ‘meant Objectivity as meant’, the ‘pure objective sense’, the ‘noematic What’ on the one hand and, on the other hand, various noematic characteristics (modes of givenness of an objectivity corresponding to the peculiarities of individual acts, e.g. differences in kinds of act, differences in attention, etc.)⁷, all founded upon the central core. Like senses of the *Logical Investigations*, the noematic core is something identical in different intentional acts, all intending the same thing (Husserl 1976: 210–211). E.g. we can perceive, remember, detest or enjoy, the same book. The something identical (the book) in these essentially different acts is the noematic core. Husserl refers to the core component as the sense proper. Nevertheless, not only the core, but the noematic characteristics as well, are essential for the composition of a full, concrete and particular noemata of each particular intentional act.

Reflecting back on his earlier one-sidedly noetic approach, Husserl suggests that we should understand noematic core as the noematic correlate of the notion of intentional matter from the *Logical Investigations*.

7 For example, there is an entire array of essential differences between objects of remembering and perceived objects (making for example the former more doubtful and less precisely presented than the latter). See § 91 of the *Ideas I*.

Correspondingly, we should understand characteristics as the noematic correlate of intentional quality, and “the full noesis related to the full noema as its intentional and full What” (Husserl 1976: 298).

Further investigation reveals that the core itself has a complex structure. The central noematic moment, also called ‘content’ by Husserl, is the pure X, abstract point of identity which functions as the bearer of changing predicates, also belonging to the noematic core (Husserl 1976: 301).

Sense as the noematic core fixes the identity of the object in the multiplicity of acts in which it is presented. The full noema can also be understood as sense, and each individual act can be regarded as having a concrete, particular sense, but this particular sense is grounded in the identical core-sense.

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Unlike the *Logical Investigations*, where the transcendent objectivity didn't have a place in the phenomenological investigation at all, Husserl of the *Ideas I* is interested not only in the essence of the acts and other real component parts of consciousness, but in the essence of their objective correlates as well. On the other hand, the problematic of identity remains of central importance for Husserl's theory of sense both in the *Logical Investigations* and the *Ideas I*. Thus we see that one of the most important questions for Husserl turns out to be how it is the case that we are able to intend the same thing in various intentional acts. The problem of sense for Husserl is essentially related to this question.

I wish to point out several open questions concerning the noema, with which I will deal in the following chapter. 1. How should we interpret the enigmatic relationship between the noema and the intended object, whereby everything remains the same, yet becomes radically different? 2. How should we understand the identification of the noema both with sense and with the objective correlate of the act? 3. Finally, how are we to account for the identity of the noematic sense throughout various intentional experiences?

In the next chapter we will investigate how these questions were answered by the two opposed interpretations of the noema. In confronting and comparing the arguments, I hope the clear answer will emerge.

II The Noema Debate

In this chapter I want to focus on the debate revolving around the interpretation of the noema, which represents two opposing views on the noema and consequently two opposing views on intentionality. One of the main motives behind the debate is to understand how the noema is the sense of intentional act. With respect to this, two of the most important questions are 1. What is the ontological status of the noema? 2. What is

the role of the noema in intentionality? One side of the debate (sometimes called ‘West Coast’, or Fregean interpretation), inspired by Føllesdal, with Dreyfus, Smith and McIntyre as prominent figures, claims that the noema for Husserl is a new sort of object: an intentional object, ontologically distinct from the intended object, whose role is to mediate the relationship between acts of consciousness and their intended objects. For example, according to this view, if I am perceiving a table, there are three elements in play, (1) the noetic element: my act of perception, (2) the intended object: the table itself which I am looking at (3) the noema, which is the sense of the table, by means of which our consciousness is intentionally directed to the table itself. The other side of the debate, whose main proponents are Aaron Gurwitsch, John Drummond and Robert Sokolowski (sometimes called the ‘East Coast’ interpretation), claims that the noema is in some way identical to the intended object, that there is no ontological difference between the object of intention and the noema, and that intentionality has two elements – an act and an object, without a third mediating element. I will begin the exposition of the debate with the Fregean interpretation, and then move on to the ‘East Coast’ interpretation.

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A. The Fregean Interpretation

Føllesdal begins his influential paper “Husserl’s Notion of the Noema” with Brentano’s theory of intentionality and his unsatisfactory solution to the problem of non-existent intentional objects (e.g. centaurs, golden mountain, etc.). Namely, Brentano solves the problem by arguing that all intentional objects are immanent to consciousness, even if they do not exist in the real world. But then what about really existent objects of intention? The undesired consequence of such object-theory of intentionality is that it reduces even the really existent objects to the immanent content of consciousness.

According to Føllesdal, Husserl’s theory of intentionality solves this problem by strictly separating consciousness from its intended objects and introducing a third entity, the noema. “When we think of a centaur, our act of thinking has a noema, but it has no object; there exists no object of which we think. Because of its noema, however, even such an act is directed. To be directed simply is to have a noema.” (Føllesdal 1969: 681)

Føllesdal (1969) puts forward 12 theses on the noema, the most important of which are:

Thesis (1): “The noema is an intensional entity, a generalization of the notion of meaning (*Sinn, Bedeutung*).” (681)

Thesis (3), stating that the noematic *Sinn* mediates the relation between consciousness and the object (682).

Thesis (4): “The noema of an act is not the object of the act (i.e., the object toward which the act is directed).” (682)

Thesis (8), stating that noemata are abstract entities, i.e. that they are non-real, non-spatial and non-temporal. As the textual support, Føllesdal refers to the previously mentioned distinction in *Ideas I* between the noema and the object *simpliciter*. (684)

Thesis (12), stating that the noema consists of two components, a complex conceptual pattern of determinations that makes sensuous data be the appearance of one identical object on the one hand, and various noematic characteristics on the other hand. (687)

If noema is a mediator, how are we to understand such mediation? According to this interpretation, in a way similar to Fregean senses.

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We should note that an analogous dilemma to the one Føllesdal found in Brentano and Husserl, exists in the analytic tradition. It concerns the question of how we can have meaningful expressions about non-existent objects. This is the problem that Frege tried to solve in his classical paper “On Sense and Meaning”. The paper was written in 1892, a short time before the publication of the *Logical Investigations*. Its main topic is the problem of non-trivial statements of identity. Namely, Frege asks how we are to account for the fact that when we state the identity ‘a=a’ this is trivially true in virtue of *a priori* laws of logic, but when we state the identity ‘a=b’ this is a non-trivial *a posteriori* truth that can have added cognitive value.

His answer is that “a difference can arise only if the difference between the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of the thing designated.” (Frege 1984: 158) According to Frege, a mode of presentation is the sense through which the thing is presented by a particular sign. Thus, besides having reference, signs (e.g. names) also have a sense. This allowed Frege to claim that sentences that refer to non-existent object can still be meaningful, because even though they don’t have a referent, they still have a sense.

Sinn is objective and non-mental, strictly distinguished from ideas, which are merely subjective. We cannot share ideas, but we can share *Sinn*. Sense is not in the head, but neither is it somewhere in the external world. Rather it belongs in the third Platonic realm. Thus, for Frege senses are ideal, non-spatiotemporal, ontologically distinct entities that mediate the relationship between a name, a concept, or a proposition and its referent (Frege 1984: 160–161).

Returning to Føllesdal, we can now sum up his position in the following way: the noema is not a real object, but it is not a component of the intentional act either, so it must be something else, an abstract entity mediating

the relation between the act and the object. Furthermore it is ontologically very similar to Fregean senses, as an ideal content of consciousness (an intensional entity). In addition, Husserl can explain how intentional acts can intend non-existent objects in the same way Frege does: because the noema enables acts to refer to objects, thus giving them their intentional character, an act does not need to intend a real object in order to be intentional. Because of these similarities, noemata are probably in important ways analogous to linguistic meanings.

This position was subsequently developed in greater detail by Føllesdal's students, Smith and McIntyre. Going back to Husserl's early theory of intentionality, Smith and McIntyre see Husserl as offering a 'content' theory as opposed to the object theory in order to explain "how the content of an experience can succeed in relating it to an entity of some ordinary sort, such as a physical object." (Smith and McIntyre 1982: 15) They stress that intentionality for Husserl is not to be explained by some peculiarity of intentional objects, as if these were some special sort of objects, unlike objects of our everyday experience. On the contrary: "Husserl's view is that the intentionality of an act is determined by the act's own intrinsic character, and for this reason it does not depend on what is actually true of the intended object or even its existence." (Smith and McIntyre 1982: 92) Since acts have intentionality independently of the existence of their intended objects, the directedness of consciousness should be explained in virtue of the internal structure of the act itself. Accordingly, Smith and McIntyre understand the phenomenological reduction as an 'inward turn', away from the intended objects, in which this internal structure of intentional experience is revealed. This reminds us of the early Husserl's theory of sense, in which intentional matter, an essential moment of the internal structure of intentional acts, played the role of directing them towards their intended objects.

Indeed, one of the important claims Smith and McIntyre defend, on which legitimacy of their interpretation depends, is that the noematic sense is the mature version of Husserl's notion of intentional matter from the *Logical Investigations*. Like intentional matter, the noematic sense is an ideal meaning-component of the act. The major change they see in Husserl's theory of intentional content is that this meaning-component is no longer considered to be an essence instantiated in the multiplicity of individual acts, but an abstract particular entertained by the act:

"In *Ideas*, however, noemata are not act-essences, or universals, but abstract entities of a different sort. As we shall see later, Husserl's description of the inner structure of the specific *Sinn*-component of the noema seems to indicate that *Sinne* are a kind of abstract particulars; in particular, the *Sinn* of a direct object act is quite like the sense of a definite description on a Fregean theory of meaning." (Smith and McIntyre 1982: 124)

Like Føllesdal, Smith and McIntyre conceive of the relation between the intended object and the noema in analogy with the way linguistic meanings prescribe objects to which they refer. According to them, every linguistic meaning is a noematic *Sinn* expressed and every noematic *Sinn* is in principle expressible and therefore a linguistic meaning (Smith and McIntyre 1982: 182–184).⁸ From this they draw the conclusion that noemata are in fact identical with the meanings of linguistic expressions and that when expressed in language they mediate the relation of words and referents in the manner of Fregean senses. The way a noematic sense, i.e. the determinable X and its predicates, determines an object can therefore be understood by comparing its structure with the structure of linguistic meanings. Smith and McIntyre find it most suitable to explain X as prescribing the object in the manner of direct reference, similar to the meaning of demonstratives such as ‘this’ and ‘that’, and the predicates as prescribing properties that the object is intended as having (1982: 213–214). However, the meaning of demonstratives is determined by the context of the utterance, and the *Sinn* of perception by the physical context of perception. According to Smith and McIntyre, Husserl cannot account for this contextual factor involved in intentionality because his notion of sense is limited only to the “abstract and eternal noematic content” of experience (1982: 216 – 219).

B. The East Coast Interpretation: John Drummond

The East Coast interpretation opposes the view defended by the Fregeans, that the noema has a mediating role between consciousness and its intended object. In discussing the East Coast interpretation I chose to focus on Drummond’s book *Noema and Object: Husserlian Intentionality and Non-foundational Realism*. I believe Drummond’s work to be representative of this side of the debate, because it comprehensively and uncompromisingly confronts the Fregean position on all the important points of the debate.

The argumentative line of this interpretation is centered on the claim that the noema is the phenomenologically reduced object, or in Drummond’s words: “The reduction merely changes the attitude with which we focus presumptively existent objects – rather than focusing some hidden class of intensional entities.” (Drummond 1990: 7) Noema is the object itself, modified by the phenomenological reduction. Drummond claims that Husserl defends a radically new version of the object theory of intentionality and that there is no ontological difference between intended and intentional objects. He supports his claim by several arguments.

First of all, the Fregean interpretation of the noema is motivated by the early Husserlian view of meaning and by the similarities of this view with Frege’s

8 See also, *Ideas I*, § 124.

theory of sense and reference. However we are not justified in transposing without reservations the views of early Husserl to the views of mature Husserl, because Husserl significantly changed his view by the publication of *Ideas I*. Drummond does not deny that Husserl's theory of the noema is an assimilation of his earlier theory of intentional content. However, he argues against the Fregeans that Husserl of the *Ideas I* introduced the intentional object in the sphere of phenomenological research. This allowed him to make the intentional object itself the bearer of identity in his explanation of how a multiplicity of acts can share an identical sense, the role previously played by the ideal intentional matter (Drummond 1990: 41–42).

Namely, Husserl consistently identifies the noema both with the intended object as intended and with the sense of intentional act. We should remind ourselves that precisely in those passages where Husserl distinguishes between the real object and the noema, he claims that even the phenomenologically reduced mental process is the perceiving of this apple tree with all the same characteristics as in the natural attitude. Everything remains the same only modified. “The inverted commas surrounding ‘lovely’ and ‘attractive’ within this text call upon us to consider these expressions as denoting sense-elements within the noema, but Husserl’s language clearly suggests that sense-elements are in some manner the Objective properties themselves considered only insofar as they appear within this perception or act of liking.” (Drummond 1990: 117) Fregean interpretation runs into problems in explaining Husserl’s identification of sense and object in *Ideas I*. Fregeans simply argue that Husserl uses a misleading terminology. (Drummond 1990: 114, Smith and McIntyre 1984: 176) Drummond on the other hand, thinks that this identification indicates an important change in Husserl’s theory of sense. This change can only be correctly appreciated if we grasp the sense of Husserl’s transcendental turn and the true novelty of the phenomenological reduction.

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By bracketing the existence of an object we can recognize the object as something belonging inseparably to the essence of this experience. That is also how the noema is distinct from the object *simpliciter*: it is the intended object, viewed in the phenomenological attitude, with respect to its essential correlation with consciousness. We don’t have to make an ontological distinction between noemata and objects in order to understand the abstract character of noemata. The noema is abstractly considered object, object considered in the phenomenological reduction, as the correlate of experience and apart from our positing or negating of its existence within the natural attitude.⁹

9 Consider also Drummond’s critique of the notion of abstract particular in Drummond 1992: 89–110.

However, Husserl does claim that the object is given in or through the sense.¹⁰ In order to explain why, Drummond appeals to Husserl's use of the notion of 'noematic intentionality', as distinguished from the noetic one. Husserl mentions noematic intentionality in several places when he discusses the noemata which have multiplicity of strata founded one on another. Noetic intentionality, Husserl says, "goes clear through the line of noematic intentionality." Also: "The Ego's regard goes straight through the noemata of the sequence of levels, until it arrives at the Object of the ultimate level beyond which it cannot go, but upon which, instead, it fixes." (Husserl 1976: § 101) When Husserl mentions givenness of the object through sense he speaks in the context of the structure of the noema, and especially with respect to the relation of the full noema and its innermost moment: the pure determinable X. The noematic sense itself includes a reference to its most fundamental noematic component. Husserl does not speak here of an abstract noema being directed to an external object (Drummond 1990: 135–138).

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According to Drummond the sense of the act for Husserl is the object itself as it is given in the act. The sense of a particular concrete act then would be the full, concrete noema, complex acts would have layers of sense, composed of many objectivities all united in one identical object. Also, we can view noemata in abstraction from the kind of act in which they are presented: this is when we regard the noematic core which can be identical in different acts, so that we can say that these acts all intend the same object. In conclusion, Drummond describes sense as the significance of the object for consciousness. "The noema, therefore, is the intended objectivity just as intended with all its significance for us, in its relation to our animating interests and concerns, but apart from our participation in the general belief characteristic of the natural attitude, i.e. apart from the naïve acceptance of the factual existence of these objectivities and the validity of our judgments and evaluations thereof." (Drummond 1990: 106)

C. What is the Noema?

The main support in favor of the Fregean interpretation is to be found in Husserl's separation of the noema and the intended object in § 88 of *Ideas I*. Together with the fact that an act can intend a non-existent entity, and the similarity in the structure of the noema and that of the intentional essence of the *Logical Investigations* (Husserl himself compares sense-core and noematic characteristics with matter and quality of the *Investigations*), this leads Fregeans to conclude that the noema is an abstract, ideal entity,

10 "The noema in itself has an objective relation and, more particularly, by virtue of its own 'sense.'" (Husserl 1976: 296) "Each noema has a "content" that is to say, its "sense," and is related through it to 'its' object." (Husserl 1976: 297)

ontologically distinct from the thing intended, mediating between act and object, thus making intentional directedness possible.

Drummond replied by stressing the role of the phenomenological reduction – the change of attitude that makes it possible to grasp the object as the noema: the objective correlate of the act. Textual evidence in favor of Drummond's view is also pretty strong. Husserl frequently calls the noema 'intended object as intended', object put in inverted commas, in parentheses, and consistently contrasts the object *simpliciter* in an unmodified sense with the noema as the object modified by the phenomenological reduction. All this points to the understanding of the noema as the phenomenologically reduced object.¹¹

In my opinion, Drummond's interpretation has more credibility for several reasons.

First, it is misguided to suppose that shortcomings in Brentano's explanation of how non-real objects are intended led Husserl to introduce a new entity. I don't think that Husserl's motivation for introducing the noema is an attempt to account for the cases where there is no real object of intention. Husserl has no problem stating that we can grasp non-real objects, i.e. essences we grasp in eidetic intuition, numbers in corresponding arithmetical attitude, we have phantasized objects as objects of phantasyzing act, and so on. Husserl even states that an object is always somehow posited, even when its existence is negated (1976: 244). Husserl's task is to carefully describe how each kind of object is given in its corresponding kind of act. This suggests that Husserl has a very different approach to the problem of intentionality than the one posed in the analytic tradition, of how to explain meaning of expressions without referent. For Husserl there are no intentional acts without objects. Therefore, it is a mistake to claim that, according to Husserl, "when we think of a centaur, our act of thinking has a noema but it has no object". I believe that it would be more in line with Husserl's view to say that the object of intention in this case is a centaur, posited in the particular act of imagining. But the same centaur is the noema of this act, when viewed with respect to the essential correlation between the act and the object. Fregeans are struggling to understand what it means to disregard the existence of objects, for they think that this must automatically lead us inward, to a consciousness without objects. In a sense they are demonstrating how difficult it can be to abandon the natural attitude, for instead of *disregarding* the existence and non-existence of objects they are *arguing from* the non-existence of objects that the structure of intentional experience must involve some sort of abstract

11 One of the clearest formulations in favor of this interpretation can be found in § 97 of the *Ideas I*.

mediating sense. But the point is to phenomenologically describe the differences we encounter when we intend something existent and when we intend something non-existent, as well as when something we intended as existent becomes doubtful, confirmed, etc. or *vice versa* when something we intended as non-existent turns out to be existent after all. Although Husserl attempted to explain intentional directedness solely in virtue of really inherent moments of intentional acts in the *Logical Investigations*, later he moved towards a theory that stresses the correlation of the act and object. Thus I agree with Sokolowski when he says: "Smith and McIntyre want to use the noema as a device that would explain how consciousness becomes intentional. But Husserl's philosophy is not explanatory in this way; it does not provide devices, it merely describes." (1987: 527)

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We see how by relying too much on the *Logical Investigations* Fregeans risk to neglect or misinterpret the role of the phenomenological reduction in understanding the notion of the noema. Smith and McIntyre argue that the *epoché* brackets the existence of objects, which is correct, but they continue to claim that Husserl made a turn inward in which only the content that belongs to consciousness is revealed. Consequently they interpret Husserl as an internalist, interested only in the structure of acts of consciousness, independently of their intended objects. This interpretation does not square well with the transcendental turn. Fregean interpretation fails to appreciate the entire moment of the correlation between consciousness and object, whereby the world, although bracketed, remains as a pure phenomenon for consciousness. We don't turn away from the world in order to reveal something that has nothing to do with it, we are performing the *epoché* precisely in order to see that the world of our everyday natural attitude is constituted in the transcendental consciousness.

Finally, I don't agree with the linguistic interpretation offered by Smith and McIntyre, for two reasons. First, I don't think it has confirmation in the text of *Ideas I*. The expressibility thesis, as Drummond also points out (1990: 189–191) does not imply that noemata are ontologically identical entities with linguistic meanings. Rather it simply means that the same object intended in a non-expressive act can become an object of a new, expressive act. This can even indicate that objective senses of non-expressive acts serve as grounds for the meanings of linguistic expressions, for we need first to have an object in an act of intuition in order to be able to formulate a concept and express it in language. Second, I don't think that anything is accomplished if we explain the noema by reducing it to Fregean senses, because what remains is an equally mysterious third realm. This does not really explain even linguistic meanings. In other words, we are back to the problems *Investigations* left us with. Fregean interpretation, with the noema as an abstract particular, does not solve this problem. It leaves us in

the dark equally as Husserl's early theory as to the nature of the relation between the noema and the act. It is different from the *Investigations* only because now senses are in some other unexplained way related to the act, not as essences, but as correlates. In the following chapter I will attempt to outline what I believe to be Husserl's alternative to the exclusively linguistic theory of sense, the one that regards sense as a general phenomenon, but that nevertheless includes linguistic sense under its scope.

What is the noema? The time has come to answer the three questions posed at the end of chapter I:

1. Regarding the relationship between the noema and the intended object I agree with Drummond that the noema is the intended object itself when we regard it, not simply 'taking it for granted' the way we do in everyday natural attitude, but in the phenomenological attitude, i.e. when we pay attention to the object as intended in the act.

2. The noema is the meaningful object constituted in the activity of consciousness, in its endeavor to make sense of the world. The objects we encounter are meaningful in virtue of us giving them the sense they have for us. Sense is a constitutive element of objects themselves, but all objects are always objects for consciousness. The objects in the world can have various senses for various subjects and with respect to various intentions. For example, they can have practical sense if they can be used to achieve practical goals, or theoretical sense when we are using them to build theories. Fundamentally, things always have sense of identical objects of our many intentions. If it weren't for sense-bestowing acts that constitute them as identical, things wouldn't have sense of things anymore.

3. However, the question of the constitution of this identical noematic core remains open in the *Ideas I*. I am picking up on this question in the following chapter in the context of the later Husserl's analyses of sense-constitution. At the same time, we will see that this question is in an important way linked to the question of the relation between the non-linguistic perceptual sense and the linguistic, conceptual sense. Are we supposed to understand the perceptual noemata and sense-bestowing acts as the 'labor of the concept', such is Føllesdal's pattern of determinations or demonstrative reference coupled with predicates, as Smith and McIntyre suggested, or is the perceptual experience essentially different from the activity of determining objects by means of concepts?

The change in Husserl's approach to intentionality is usually described as his development from static (*Ideas I*), to genetic (*Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Syntheses, Formal and Transcendental Logic*) and finally generative phenomenology (*Crisis*). After the *Ideas I* the phenomenological

reduction led Husserl to study the origins of sense at a passive, pre-cognitive and pre-predicative level of consciousness and the manner in which sense-bestowing activities of consciousness are grounded in the surrounding life-world. Following this trail will also allow me to respond to the previously mentioned critique of Husserl for his alleged failure to take into account contextual factors in accounting for intentionality. We will see that Husserl's phenomenology gives us a useful theoretical tool to study the contextual dimension of sense.

III Linguistic and Non-linguistic Sense

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In the 1920s Husserl held series of lectures on transcendental logic, widely known as the lectures on passive synthesis. These lectures mark Husserl's development from static to genetic analyses of consciousness and anticipate his late generative phenomenology (Steinbock 2001: xvi). Throughout the lectures Husserl devotes special attention to the passive syntheses in perception as constitutive of the fundamental sphere of pre-giveness: a necessary foundation for all the higher acts of consciousness.

When perceiving an external, spatio-temporal object, we always see the object only from one side. However, even though the whole spatio-temporal object is not given genuinely in the present perception, other sides are always emptily co-intended with the side that is genuinely perceived, so that the full thing, not just a side of it, is the objective correlate of our perception:

“Noetically speaking, perception is a mixture of an actual exhibiting that presents in an intuitive manner what is originally exhibited, and of an empty indicating that refers to possible new perceptions. In a noematic regard, what is perceived is given in adumbrations in such a way that a particular givenness refers to something else that is not given, as what is not given belonging to the same object.” (Husserl 1966: 5)

External perception is not simply an originarily presentive act, it essentially includes empty, indeterminate anticipatory intentions, which nevertheless “prescribe a rule for the transition to new actualizing appearances.” (Husserl 1966: 6) The full perceptual noema is not simply the thing that we perceive in the present moment. Of necessity, the latter must fit in with the possibilities of sense prescribed by its inner and outer anticipatory horizons: constantly changing patterns of possible new determinations of the thing, as well as of its relations to other things, in which it is more or less vaguely predetermined which appearances can function as further determinations of the thing, and which cannot. Because our perceptual experience is essentially incomplete, perceptual object (perceptual noema) is never a fixed, stable unity – it always has horizons of possible new senses.

Explanation of intentional structure of external perception and the role of intentional horizons in it requires temporal analysis. Horizons are the work of a constant process of anticipating intentions, always directed towards a system of new, not yet determined moments of a given object. At the same time, horizons anticipate what can appear in the surrounding background of the momentarily intended object. Sense becomes fulfilled in time, and empty inner and outer horizons point to what can be integrated concordantly in the progressive fulfillment of sense. Along with the anticipation continuous retention is at work, so that previously fulfilled intentions are retained in the present one as well. In other words, in passing over to a new perception of an object, we don't forget what we earlier perceived. Perception is a flux, extended in time, "where appearances concordantly pass into one another and form the unity of coincidence corresponding to the unity of sense." (Husserl 1966: 8)

But there is also the possibility of a break in this series of fulfilling acts. Such 'disappointment' occurs when our anticipations unexpectedly fail, i.e. when a new appearance of an object does not fit in with its pre-determined horizons of sense. Occurrence of disappointment further determines the sense of the entire object, since the new, non-anticipated determination becomes integrated in the totality of the sense of the object (Husserl 1966: 26). Anticipatory horizons of perception related to this object are accordingly modified and the sense of the whole is 'reinterpreted' on a passive level so as to conform to the new occurrence. Thus even the horizons themselves are temporally constituted in the course of experience.

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The perceptual horizons are not concept-like patterns of determinations, however. They are much more fluid and indeterminate. Only later some of these passively intended and rather vague determinations become conceptually fixed. The ideal and linguistically expressible conceptual senses constituted in the higher level acts, such as judgement, also play crucial role in the constitution of objective sense. Even though conceptual senses are made possible on the basis of fluid acts of constitution on the perceptual level, it is these that really enable us to recognize identical objects in the multiplicity of appearances. As Sokolowski explains:

"A fixed sense which has the consistency and solidity to reappear in different acts as the same ideal entity appears for the first time in judgment. We might say that "concepts" arise only in judgments. Before the categorical act of judging takes place, there are only the fluid anticipations of meaning or sense, but such anticipations are not the same as fixed senses. They are only the "lived" pre-conceptual or pre-categorical foreshadowing of the type of object we call a sense, and they can be understood only teleologically, that is, in function of the terminal sense they anticipate. There is no crystallized meaning in pre-predicative encounter." (1970: 172)

I slightly depart from this explanation of the relation between the perceptual and the conceptual dimensions of experience, in that I find that perceptual experience already relates us to the perceived object in a meaningful way, even if we still have no concept of it. The perceptual noema is already a meaningful object. Its identity is fluid, but the sense-bestowing activity of anticipation and retention has already begun. On the other hand, admitting that only concepts can give us fixed identical senses is not a return to the mediator theory, because the relation between perceptual object and intentional act is not necessarily mediated by a concept enabling an act to refer to its object. Even if the concepts are actually incorporated in our perceptual experience, which is often the case (e.g. we perceive houses, dogs, cats, etc. without having to go through the entire process of constitution of concepts for each individual house, dog or cat), the perceptual sense includes much more than the concept prescribes. The entire perceived object with its ever changing inner and outer horizons of sense is the full noematic correlate of the perceptual act.

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Unlike the noema of the *Ideas I*, the objective sense is now understood as becoming constituted in time. Husserl replaces the static analysis of essential structures with the dynamic analysis of the very process of sense-constitution. This change however should be understood as building upon previous grounds, where previous results are further explored, rather than rejected.

In response to the analysis of the intentionality of perception offered by Smith and McIntyre, we can bring ourselves to see that for Husserl perception does not refer in the manner of an empty demonstrative 'this'. It intends its object by 'articulating' content given in the perceptual experience, according to the laws of the passive temporal and associative synthesis. Perceptual sense is also not to be equated with conceptual sense. Although conceptual sense is the sense in the pregnant meaning of the term, the identical unity in the multiplicity of acts, perceptual sense constitutes the ground for the conceptual sense. Our activity of conceptual determining, of attributing concepts to things, runs parallel with a different and more original mode of experience, that of immediate intuition. Husserl's considerations aim to show that we have a pre-conceptual and pre-linguistic recognition of objects around us on the basis of passive synthesis, an intentionality that unifies, distinguishes, associates, determines, recognizes, retains and anticipates without us being explicitly conscious of it.

Finally, in response to the critique by Smith and McIntyre, arguing that Husserl cannot account for the contextual element of intentionality, I wish to briefly point out another important moment in the constitution of sense, the one Husserl explores in his latest work, *The Crisis of European sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. The sense-bestowing, noetic activity is multifarious, not only because there is an immense plurality of ways in

which subjective consciousness can have objects for itself, but also because it is the matter of intersubjective constitution of sense in the pre-given life-world, the world of everyday life and praxis. Objects are meaningful even when we don't pay attention to the correlation at all, when we are simply engaged with them. Their sense is partly pre-given, for we are born into the already meaningful world, and we appropriate the network of senses already constituted in our community. Every sense of a particular thing, every sense-bestowing activity of particular acts of consciousness are made possible only against the background of already pre-given horizon of possible senses that is the life-world. Each of us is a transcendental ego, constituting the world, each of us has the multiplicity of horizons of various worldly objects, all grounded in the totality of the one world-horizon. In living together, our horizons overlap, mutually support and correct each other. The world in which we live is therefore the correlate of the transcendental intersubjectivity (Husserl 1962: 171).

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After everything that has been said so far, I don't think I should dwell on this point for too long: study of inner and outer horizons as well as the study of the life-world is the study of context. Partial horizons and the unifying horizon of the world as a whole provide a constant orientation for our meaningful activities. The study of context can be applied in all the fields with which we are meaningfully engaged, in order to disclose the hidden presuppositions that enable this particular domain to acquire its sense. Once again we see how inappropriate it is to reduce horizons of meaningfulness to conceptual patterns, or sets of possible descriptions of object. The possibility of these descriptions and conceptualizations is itself grounded in the life of consciousness, in the sedimented past experience, as well as in the anticipation of further experiences, whose dynamic interplay constitutes the all-encompassing, changing horizon of the world.

Conclusion

From the early beginnings in the *Logical Investigations* to his latest works, the central concern of Husserl's phenomenology is the theory of sense. Husserl made a long way from his original theory of senses as ideal meanings instantiated in intentional acts. The transcendental turn and the phenomenological description of the essential correlation between consciousness and object opened the possibility of a more general, more fundamental theory of sense than the study of linguistic meanings could ever offer. Husserl kept enriching his transcendental-phenomenological theory of sense to include a theory of sense-constitution on the pre-predicative level of perception, the role of the anticipatory horizons in providing framework for all meaningful encounters of consciousness and the world and the life-world as the most general horizon of sense. Husserl's phenomenology sets before

us a theoretical task to develop further a theory of sense that would be more encompassing than the linguistic theory of meaning, but that would on the other hand also take into account the essentially linguistic dimension of our experience.

Language has great importance in the constitution of sense. Indeed, regarding the general question 'how words mean something?' fruitful encounters are possible between phenomenology and analytic philosophy, which undoubtedly makes great progress in various domains of language analysis. However, as I tried to show, the sense should not be understood solely as the meaning of words and sentences, nor exclusively as the accomplishment of consciousness that thinks with concepts. I would like to suggest that Husserl's decisive contribution to the theory of sense is to be found in the focus he places on the study of sense as it is constituted in all the multifarious interrelations of consciousness and the world, which go far beyond the linguistic phenomena. For example, the sense of a certain monument for a certain local community is constituted in that community with respect to the sense of a historical event that the monument marks, in the horizon of the past in which this event played a significant role in their common life-world (as a triumph, a tragedy, a beginning of a revolution, etc). The sense somebody's letter has for me extends beyond the meaning of words and sentences written in it, encompassing my relationship with that person whether it is a long-lost relative, a friend sending me a postcard, or simply somebody advertising his products to me. In everyday life we constantly encounter meaningful things and engage in meaningful activities. We could say, our lives are constantly meaningful in virtue of us constituting it as such, even if for the most part we are not even aware of this constant sense-bestowing activity. The most general question of the theory of sense inspired by Husserl's phenomenology is: what makes it possible for us to enter in all these meaningful relations with the world around us? This can include various particular studies of what makes it possible for us to recognize particular types of things in the world with the particular types of sense they have, use them for various activities, feel something about them, set goals for ourselves or with others, etc. Included within this general theory of sense are also the problems I discussed in the previous chapter with respect to the perceptual sense of the objects, how it makes possible the conceptual sense and how, on the other hand, the perception itself takes over the conceptual content. Also, Husserl's phenomenological theory of sense opens the possibility to study the sense of historical processes, intricate changes in the way we relate to things in the world and other human beings in the course of our lives and in the course of generations. We should also mention the phenomenological study of the sense of scientific concepts and methods by explicating their ground in the activities of the life-world and our lived experience.

Whenever we ask about sense in the manner indicated above, whichever particular investigation we choose to engage into (needless to say, those indicated above do not comprise the full list), we should ask about subject for which an object has such-and-such a sense and how this sense becomes constituted for the subject. In the *Ideas I* Husserl made a breakthrough from the theory of meanings as mediators towards a general study of sense. The decisive step enabling Husserl to do this was his theory of the correlation between intentional acts (noeses) and their intended objects (noemata). The lesson I think we should learn from Husserl's phenomenology is that the category of sense should be kept separated from that of linguistic meaning. *Sinn* should be understood as something different from *Bedeutung*, because we can truly understand *Bedeutung* only on the basis of the more general study of *Sinn*.

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Olga Nikolić

Huserlova teorija noematičkog smisla

Apstrakt

Nakon transcendentalnog obrta i otkrića korelacije između svesti i sveta (*Ideje za čistu fenomenologiju i fenomenološku filozofiju*) pojam noeme postaje jedan od stalnih motiva Huserlove filozofije. Moj rad će se baviti razjašnjenjem ovog pojma i implikacijama koje on ima za Huserlovu teoriju smisla. Vodeće pitanje će biti: zašto Huserl shvata noemu istovremeno kao smisao i kao objektivni korelat intencionalnog akta? Najpre ću predstaviti problematiku smisla u Huserlovoj fenomenologiji od *Logičkih istraživanja* do *Ideja I*. Centralni deo rada biće posvećen uticajnoj debati o interpretaciji noeme. Nakon toga ću istaći najvažnije momente Huserlovog kasnijeg shvatanja noeme, kao i razlike između jezičkog i nejezičkog smisla, pre svega u *Predavanjima o pasivnoj i aktivnoj sintezi*. Na taj način nameravam da pokažem da Huserlova fenomenološka teorija smisla predstavlja vrednu alternativu isključivo jezički orijentisanim teorijama smisla.

Ključne reči: Huserl, noema, smisao, korelacija, transcendentalna fenomenologija.

Ivan Nišavić

Disappearing knowledge

Abstract Following the exposition of the basic standpoints of contextualism in relation to invariantistic position, which takes the concept of knowledge in its rigorous and fixed meaning, the text continues to deal with the analysis of the concept of knowledge offered by David Lewis, with a goal to solve common epistemological problems, one of those being the lottery paradox. Accepting fallibilism as the only plausible option regarding the possibility of acquiring knowledge, Lewis claims that, with the postulated rules that allow us to properly eliminate alternative possibilities, it is possible to resolve the previously mentioned paradox. If we want to base knowledge on probability, and not on certainty, and to directly stipulate it with the context in which it is being imposed or expressed, than it is obvious that knowledge will depend on whether the requirements for knowledge are high or low. Thus, in one case it might occur that we have knowledge, and in the other that we do not, even though nothing is changed except the conversational conditions that are already "in the game". Such, elusive knowledge, that gets lost, De Rose labels "now you know it, now you don't" and considers it to be a direct consequence of Lewis's analysis. As such, the analysis should not be accepted.

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Keywords: contextualism, eliminations of possibilities, probability, non-existence of knowledge, lottery paradox

Contextualism and invariantism

Contextualism, as a contemporary approach to solving traditional epistemological problems, such as the problem of scepticism, lottery paradox and Gettier problem, allows the change of meaning of the concept of knowledge, as well as semantics of the sentence, depending on context in which we want to ascribe (not) knowing the particular statement, that is: "S (does not) knows that P". Invariantistic solutions, which consider the concept of knowledge in rigid and unchangeable form, completely independent from the context, put us in a paradoxical position. If we use the term "knowledge" in absolute sense, i.e.: if it has a fixed meaning, as Anger suggest¹, than that term in completely unusable. On the other hand, if the standards for determining truth conditions of particular statement are observed throughout the prism of possible alternatives that affects the truth-value of the proposition, we have a problem, too. Namely, if we ascribe knowledge

1 Cf. Unger (1978): 321-325.

to someone according to the relevance of the possible alternatives, which was Drecke's solution,² it leaves us with a vast ambiguity and arbitrariness in formulating the criteria or the relevance degree of the alternatives that may be accomplished. Accordingly, if we are on the side of Angers analysis, when we claim that 'X knows that the classroom is empty', we know that that the proposition is not true, even though there isn't anyone in the classroom, nor even the tables and chairs, but after all, there are remains of the dust or just the air; so in that sense, the classroom can never be *absolutely* empty. Anyway, if we are accepting Drecke's point of view, this kind of standpoint is completely clear. The confusion could arise in two ways, namely (1) if someone to whom we are ascribing the knowledge has different interests, in comparison to us, regarding the classroom. In fact, if the statement 'the classroom is empty' for us means that there are not students or professor in it, but only the janitor, then the statement can mean something else – he has to bring in tables and chairs and to enable proper teaching to happen.

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On the other hand, (2) confusion will be obvious if we would prefigure possible alternatives to someone who claims that he knows that the classroom is empty, in such a way that: (a) someone was inside the classroom few minutes ago, so you must be sure if he has left the room, or (b) the door which looks like the real door are just a well-painted picture on the wall, or (c) as all of us are brains in a vat (BIV), students or the furniture inside the classroom (thus, the classroom itself) are just projections in our minds, triggered by neuroscientist with super-computers. Alternatives³ ranging from those fully probable and verifiable (a and b) to those entirely unbelievable, unverifiable and far-fetched (c) can be qualified as relevant or irrelevant, without a clear and unambiguous confirmation why it is so, other than the common sense attitude that alternative (c) is completely incredible and practically impossible, especially since the elimination of this alternative cannot be done. In that sense, alternative (c) is irrelevant to ascribe to X any kind of knowledge about the classroom. From traditional, invariantistic perspective, the meaning of the concept of knowledge is unchanged, it remains fixed, and if X had eliminated the possibilities of error (alternatives a and b), than we can ascribe knowledge of that proposition to X. In that case, alternative (c) is considered as irrelevant. This is an issue for the invariantistic position. Namely, if by insisting on the constancy of the concept of knowledge we arbitrary declare alternative (c) as irrelevant, then we are not handling the problem of scepticism properly,

2 Cf. Dretske (1981).

3 For the coherent and more precise insight of those problems, we shall assume that those three alternatives are the only possible as an opposition to the proposition 'X knows that the classroom is empty'.

i.e. we are leaving it aside. Ignoring the particular problem does not imply that it is solved.

Furthermore, and especially important for us: if we take the approach for finding the solution to this problem in a way previously described (by relying on the (im)probability of such scenario), whose potential actualization is much closer to improbability rather than probability, under which circumstances we declare an alternative (c) as irrelevant, we completely ignore the so-called lottery paradox, which will be explained additionally.

In contrast to insisting on the constancy of meaning of the term “knowledge”, contextualistic understanding of this term is similar to the understanding of the concepts such as “tall” or “empty”. The relativity of those concepts is related to the context in which they are applied, so that it can be said for the same person that he or she is tall if she or he is on a parade of combat aircraft pilots, and that he or she is short if they are in a company of basketball players. In one of the contexts, the standards for ascribing tallness are lower, while in another the standards are higher. These standards may vary from situation to situation and, what is especially clear with regard to tallness, they can be comparable, so it is easy to acknowledge when we apply higher and when lower standards. Furthermore, we have high and low standards for ascribing knowledge to someone, relative to the context. Thus, the proposition ‘X knows that the classroom is empty’ interpreted and understood from contextualistic position will be entirely dependent on conversational factors that are in ‘the game’. As DeRose says: According to contextualistic theories of knowledge attributions, how strong an epistemic position X must be in with respect to certain proposition for A’s assertion to be true can vary according to features of A’s conversational context.⁴

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Conversational factors suggest psychological states of all participants taking part in conversation, such as their preferences, requirements or intentions. According to those factors, we may formulate the criterion under which it is possible to assert knowledge of a particular proposition. If we suppose that someone says that X knows the proposition mentioned above and, at the same time, another person says that X does not know the same proposition, according to contextualism, both speakers might be speaking the truth.⁵ So, if we are presented with two alternatives, (a) and (c), a contextualist (taken in a broad sense) would argue that X in the first case knows that the classroom is empty, but in the second case he does not know the same proposition. That is because she is taking into account different

4 DeRose and Warfield (1999): 185.

5 Cf. Kohen (1999): 57.

conversational standards. In the first case ones that are lower in the sense that they can be reached and verified, and the other ones that are higher and hardly possible to satisfy. If this is the case, than the same proposition can express two different statements and have different meaning in diverse contexts. This is to say, standards that we demand for person X to satisfy in order to ascribe knowledge in the case (a) are low, while in the case (c) are unattainably high. Changing standards for ascribing knowledge depends on the set of alternatives or possibilities of error, which in that way become relevant in a given situation and which have to be removed or eliminated. As more remote and far-fetched alternatives are included in the set of alternatives that we consider relevant, the standards upon which we ascribe knowledge become higher. The sceptic is exactly the one who uses such a mechanism of presenting the possibilities that are not in accordance with our initial cognitive propositions, and as it is impossible for us to dispose of them, we cannot ascribe knowledge. Semantic sensibility of context, namely the possibility of the concept of knowledge to change the meaning relative to the context, which is reflected in change of the conversational factors concerning persons involved in a conversation, is a way of attempting to solve the sceptical and other epistemological problems.

A favourable position for the majority of epistemic contextualists is reflected in the so-called fallibilistic thesis, i.e. in accepting the probability of knowing the statement, if it was not entirely certain. That means that knowledge could be mistaken, i.e. that X can know proposition *p* even though *p* is not certain. Cardinal positions, complete certainty and absolute uncertainty are replaced with the degree of probability, so (un)certainty can be more or less approached, but never fully reached.

In the first part of this paper, we shall, excluding all other issues,⁶ present a detailed analysis of contextualistic position that was best represented by David Lewis, with specific insight in the solution of lottery paradox. We shall see what are the consequences of that position and what objections has Keith DeRose raised. So, let us start from the beginning.

Lewis's contextualism

In his contextualistic manifesto, the article titled "Elusive knowledge", Lewis proposes the following definition of knowledge: *S* knows that *P* if and only if *S*'s evidence eliminates every possibility in which not-*P* – *P*sst! – except for those possibilities that we are properly ignoring.⁷

6 The problem of skepticism and Gettier type problems will be considered just as much as it is necessary for this paper.

7 Lewis 1996: 560.

To get a clearer understanding of what Lewis wanted to say, definition previously suggested needs further analysis. Firstly, there is always one possibility that is actualized, i.e. the one that evolves at a given moment for the subject. Uneliminated possibility is every possibility in which subject's experience is equivalent to the one in the actualized possibility (situation). Clearly, there can be many uneliminated possibilities, so the term 'every' should be understood not as every *imaginable* possibility, but as every possibility contextually *relevant* to us. When we say that every glass is empty and that it is time for a new round, which is Lewis's example, we are not referring to every glass in a restaurant or on all the glasses in the world, but rather on the glasses on our table. Quantifiers, such as 'every' are restricted to a certain domain, and everything that is not inside or doesn't belong to this domain, can be neglected and rendered as irrelevant for the uttered proposition. In that way, when Lewis says 'all uneliminated possibilities', he ignores some of the possibilities that are not in a domain that is relevant in terms of authenticity of what he had previously said. If the statement 'X knows that the classroom is empty' is offered with the usual skeptics' argumentation – that X is BIV, Lewis would ignore that possibility, but only in ordinary and every-day context, when standards for ascribing the knowledge are low; whereas in epistemological context, when standards for ascribing the knowledge are very high and rigorous, that possibility has to be eliminated. However, since it is impossible to do so, he would appreciate skeptic's position and admit that we cannot ascribe knowledge to X.

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In order to avoid the arbitrary elimination and ignoring of possibilities, Lewis has formulated *rules* for proper elimination of possibilities. Such mechanism, which would help us distinguish relevant from irrelevant possibilities of error, Hawthorne⁸ identifies as kind of a 'recipe book'. This 'book' should specify what characteristics of particular context are sufficient to make any possibility relevant for the particular case of ascribing knowledge. Hawthorne also claims that such a 'recipe book' still does not exist and it hardly ever will, yet those Lewis's rules are something closest to it. There are eight rules, four of which are permissive and tell us what possibilities we can eliminate properly (rule of reliability, rules of method and rule of conservatism), while the remaining four are restrictive and tell us which possibilities must not be ignored (rule of actuality, rule of belief, rule of resemblance and rule of attention). Proper ignoring of a certain possibility is valid only if it is conducted in accordance with these rules, so if a certain possibility is not properly eliminated, ascribing knowledge to a person X is not possible. The combination of rules is allowed and desired, as it creates a more rigorous and precise criterion for the classification of possibilities.

8 Hawthorne 2004: 61.

Only some rules are important to us at this stage, so we will focus on them. In addition to the rules of actuality and rule of resemblance, which are, in Lewis's opinion, relevant to the solution of the lottery problem, it is important to consider the rule of belief, which demands that a possibility, when a subject *believes* it can happen, is not properly ignored. "A possibility that the subject believes to obtain is not properly ignored, whether or not he is right to so believe."⁹ This kind of formulation of the rule of belief might be too broad, but given that beliefs can be graded, we should rephrase this rule: the possibility cannot be properly ignored if the subject believes in it with a high degree of probability. How high should the degree of probability be, is a question whose answer, among other things, depends on the stake that is in the game. If the stake is high, only a small number of possibilities can be properly ignored, while, on the other hand, if the price for ignoring the possibility is not too high, then most of them can be ignored. Rapid blinking of a fuel indicator in a plane can be properly ignored when the pilot only wants to move his plane from the terminal to a hangar, whereas, if he intends a long-hour flight over the ocean, ignoring the possibility that indicator is malfunctioning is wrong, faulty and above all, risky. In the first case, when the risk is lower, ignoring the possibility that the fuel lamp malfunctions can be correct, but in the other case, in the context of transoceanic flight, when the stakes are much higher, ignoring given possibility would be wrong. Namely, if the mistake is fatal, only few possibilities can be properly ignored.

Combination of two rules, the rule of actuality and the rule of resemblance, as mentioned previously, provides Lewis with the solution to lottery paradox. The rule of actuality forbids us to ignore any possibility that is actualized, i.e. the possibility that actually evolves. On the other hand, the rule of resemblance states that if we have two or more possibilities that are *saliently* similar to each other, either all of them may be properly ignored, or neither of them. Exactly how is all of this important for the lottery paradox remains to be seen, but before we do that, we need to present the lottery paradox in its original form.

Lottery paradox

One of the starting assumptions of conversational contextualism is the fallibilistic position, which is best represented by the possibility of ascribing the knowledge of proposition *p* to person *X*, even though there is a probability, no matter how small, that proposition *p* is not true, or to put it simply, that there is the possibility of error. It is exactly the high degree of probability which is condition that allows us to ascribe knowledge of proposition *p* to

9 Lewis 1996: 556.

subject X. In addition, the more we are likely to be right, the possibility of error is smaller and we can say that X knows p in the case when the probability that proposition p is true is high enough (but still can be less than 1).

Problem that arises from this position we can figuratively present if we make an analogy with the lottery. Namely, assume that the lottery drawing is held with total amount of 100,000 lottery tickets, one of which *must* be drawn as a winning ticket. Person X (one previously described, who we claimed knows that the classroom was empty) bought one ticket. X's ticket has a 0,00001 % probability of being drawn as a winning ticket and 0,99999 % probability of not being drawn, that is – probability of losing. It also has to be taken into account that we cannot know the results of lottery drawing before it really happens. Very high probability that X's ticket is a losing one does not allow us to be certain that his ticket will be a losing one, although the probability is so high that it almost reached certainty (especially if we have in mind X's great expectations of this ticket). The only thing we can say is that it is *highly likely* that X's ticket is the losing one, and not that we know it.

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Furthermore, let us assume that the results of the lottery came out in tomorrow's newspapers and that, while looking at them, we realize that the winning ticket is not the one that X was holding. At that moment it seems to us that we are inclined to claim that we *know* X's ticket is the losing one, rather than to say that it is *highly likely* that X's ticket is a losing ticket. Let's say, for the sake of the argument, that the daily circulation of those newspapers is 100.000, probability that there will be typographical error can be greater than the probability that the X's ticket is a winning one (newspapers can be wrong more than 1 time in 100,000 copies). In former case the possibility of error of 0,00001 % does not allow us to ascribe knowledge, while in the second case, where the possibility of error may be much higher, we are willing to ascribe knowledge.

Clearly more precisely formulated problem looks like this:

- (L1) X does not know that the ticket P is the losing one just on the basis of lottery ticket numbers.
- (L2) Probability V_1 that the ticket P is losing is very high.
- (L3) X knows that ticket P is a losing one because he read it in newspapers.
- (L4) Probability V_2 that newspapers are wrong is higher than V_1 .
- (C) There is a problem in the fallibilistic idea.¹⁰

10 Filipovic 2014: 95.

John Hawthorne¹¹ offered us a wider version of an argument:

- (i) S knows that S will not have enough money to go on a safari this year.
- (ii) If S knows that S will not have enough money to go on a safari this year, than S is in a position to know that S will not win a major prize in a lottery this year.
- (c) Hence, S is in a position to know that S will not win a major prize in a lottery this year.

Formulated like this, this argument is broader, i.e. it may concern every knowledge for which we have statistical reasons. However, the basic version of lottery paradox is sufficient version that applies only to cognitive propositions regarding the positive or negative result of lottery drawing.

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It is important to mention several methodological or formal remarks that can be useful for the complete understanding of the basics of the problem. Besides that, it helps us avoid widening the paradox by introducing new facts that could affect the formulation of the problem, thus neglecting its structurally essential goal – shaking up fallibilistic position. Firstly, each ticket participating in the draw has equal value and equal opportunity to be the winning one. Furthermore, the key to the problem is not the value of the main prize, if there is a prize at all. Of course, if there is no prize, in the form of some value, usually monetary, it can be said that the winning ticket is not ‘the winner’, since the owner of the ticket did not get the award in any tangible merit or benefit. Regardless of that, such addition does not represent an obstacle, since the winning ticket is actually the winner – because it is drawn, no matter whether or not it carries a material or palpable reward. In addition, it is not necessary for an actual winner to exist, since it is conceivable that some form of lottery draw takes place long enough so that a winner is not drawn every time (example: lotto). Even in that case, we can claim that there would be the winner if he had played an appropriate combination, i.e. if the combination drawn is a winning combination. In addition, it is possible for a lottery (bingo, for example) to require the presence of the winning ticket owner, so the ticket is valid. Nevertheless, these circumstances do not apply to the lottery paradox, since it was assumed that the winning ticket was drawn, although it may happen that the owner for some reasons was unable to attend the draw. Such and similar cases, like, eventually, if the ticket was lost etc., fall as well under the corpus of factors and circumstances that may affect the outcome of the lottery, but not in the sense relevant for us.

Crucial question that emerges is – why is it that, in the lottery context, we cannot claim we know the proposition (that the ticket is a losing one), while in other, non-lottery context, we are inclined to claim that we do

11 Hawthorne 2004: 2-3.

know the same proposition, even though its probability in the second case does not have to be higher?

Overview of Lewis's way of solving the lottery paradox

The main reason for Lewis taking the contextualistic position lies in the fact that his proponents were convinced that it was the most effective way for solving the crucial epistemological problems where invariantistic approach did not offered adequate response. In a similar fashion, Lewis thought, that he had provided a valid solution of lottery paradox, thanks to the epistemic position of (semantic) contextualism. As previously said, Lewis' solution is a combination of two rules, the rule of actuality and the rule of resemblance. The first rule does not allow us to ignore or eliminate the option that is *de facto* happening, i.e. a possibility that actually obtains, while the other rule suggests us that, if there were more possibilities that were saliently similar to one another, either every one of them may be properly ignored, or none may.¹² Put it in other words: if we cannot eliminate one possibility, than we cannot eliminate others, if they are saliently similar. Salient similarity is something we should pay attention to, since it is something that allows Lewis to claim that X cannot know that his ticket is a losing one. Namely, in lottery drawing, one ticket must be drawn as a winning ticket, and, on the other hand, chances for drawing any other ticket are the same as for the winning ticket. According to that, possibility for any other ticket to be the winning one is saliently similar to each other, so either all possibilities may be ignored or none of them. However, if we know, according to the rule of actuality, that one of the possibilities is actualized, while keeping in mind that actuality cannot be properly ignored, then neither of the possibilities cannot be properly ignored.

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It appears that this solution is not getting straight to the point, i.e. it just explains or analyzes the problem to the extent that at the moment, we know why we are not, in the context of lottery, inclined to ascribe knowledge that the ticket is a losing one. What we are missing out and what remains an issue is why do we, in the other, non-lottery contexts, tend to ascribe knowledge, even though the probability for mistake is if not greater, then at least the same as the probability of error in the context of lottery? It is evident that standards for ascribing the knowledge are different. In the first case they are very high, while in the other case, they are lower. That differentiation between the standards is explained by saliently similar possibilities, which are obvious in the lottery context, unlike the contexts in which they are not, similar to the context of obtaining information about the lottery results through daily newspapers.

12 Lewis 1996: 559.

“Now you know it, now you don’t” knowledge

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Although we have only scratched the surface of the problem of the lottery paradox, this road puts us on a different path – following the consequences of Lewis’ standpoint, which, as it seems, were not acceptable to Keith DeRose. The format of the probabilistic analysis of justification, as one of the necessary conditions for knowledge, is acceptable for Lewis because it enables us not to insist on the complete and absolute conclusiveness of justification for the assertion of some factual propositions. Demand for absolute conclusive justifications leads us directly to scepticism. As sceptical arguments demonstrate, no matter how detailed the available evidence (*e*) regarding any factual (contingent) proposition *p*, possibility of error is always conceivable, that is, there is always an alternative *q* that is conceivable and coherent with *e*, but incoherent with *p*. The most we can expect is that *e* makes *p* true to a sufficient extent.¹³ Put it in Lewis’s words, possibility *W* is uneliminated if and only if subject’s perceptual experience and memory of *W* matches exactly his perceptual experience and memory in actuality.¹⁴ As we have several options that are not compatible to each other, while our experience, perception and memory are exactly the same for each incompatible option, then it seems to us that the ascribing of knowledge directly depends on conversational standards (which we apply at any given moment). In ordinary contexts, when we are facing low standards for knowledge, we tend to ascribe the knowledge of proposition *p* to subject *X*. On the other hand, when the standards for knowledge are higher, like in epistemological context, we are not in a position to ascribe knowledge. *Maybe epistemology is the culprit. Maybe this extraordinary pastime robs us of our knowledge. Maybe we do know a lot in daily life; but when we look hard at our knowledge, it goes away.*¹⁵ Volatility or elusiveness of knowledge occurs as a result of changes of standards upon which we claim that someone knows something. It could easily be seen that at some point we know something and that in the very next moment, faced with the large number of possibilities that have to be eliminated, we get in a position to withdraw the claim that one knows or does not know certain proposition, i.e. we are in a situation when we ‘subtract’ or take away the knowledge. From this point of view, Lewis’ knowledge that disappears into the fog lifted by demanding standards of knowledge looks like a serious objection, even though many¹⁶ insisted that such complaint, although common, is wrong. Namely, if *S* has lower standards for knowledge than *T* does, then *S* ends up knowing more than *T* simply due to the difference in their standards, and not to a discrepancy in their epistemic skills. To think that contextualism has this consequence

13 Lazovic 2014: 19.

14 Lewis 2006: 553.

15 Ibid, 550.

16 Cf. Hawthorne 2004: 53-61; DeRose 2000: 96-101.

is to forget the ascriber-dependence of relevance: what I should take you as knowing depends upon my standards, not yours.¹⁷ This is one of the ways to avoid an unacceptable implication of contextualism – the existence of two or more different corpuses of standards can make the ascriber claim that subject X does not have the knowledge; while on the other hand, the same subject X may consider to have the knowledge according to own standards.

Keith DeRose (2000) thinks in a similar way when he tries to confront the opponents of contextualism (and its proponents, too) who accept an unusual consequence of this position, which is that knowledge is lost, disappeared, stolen or deprived from us. It is Lewis himself who draws these conclusions, which, at least, are not pleasant for the contextualist understanding of the concept of knowledge. If, during the conversation, standards for knowledge change from low, that X manages to reach, to high, so X cannot even approach them, it seems that we can say that X ‘lost’ knowledge. When we say ‘lost’, it means that at some point previously X has possessed something that is lost now. Strangeness of the sentence that X would have to say: ‘I knew before but now I do not know now’ is something that DeRose does not like at all. The absurdity of this position depicts now famous Dretske’s case with the zoo and zebras. Suppose a person A and person B observe person C from the distance. Person C is watching an indifferent and calm zebra in the zoo. A’s and B’s conversation goes like this (C is not part of their conversation nor he can hear them):

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- A: Does C know that it is a zebra?
 B: Yes, he does.
 A: But can he rule out it being a merely cleverly painted mule?
 B: No, he cannot.
 A: So, you admit he doesn’t know it is a zebra?
 B: No, he did know then it was a zebra. But after your question, he no longer knows.¹⁸

The space between them and amazement over zebra’s dull look into the distance does not enable the person C to hear the conversation between A and B, so at this point, C is convinced that the zebra is in front of him. Although the last response of the person B appears absurd, doesn’t it seem to us that, if we accept contextualism, this is the very way that the previous conversation would look like?

According to DeRose, such standpoint would be wrong for several reasons. The question whether the mere mention of some incompatible possibilities makes that possibility relevant in a given context is completely plausible

17 Hawthorne 2004: 59.

18 DeRose 2000: 93.

and in place. Therefore, to be relevant, the alternate possibility has to be adequately supported by additional assumptions that would confirm its possibility of actualization. Hence, if we were in the zoo where it has never happened before that the manager or his employees swap one animal with another of similar characteristics, it is less likely that such possibility is actualized. Even though the very existence of such distant and extremely unusual possibility does not allow us to be certain that it is not and/or will not be actualized in the near future, we will still not consider it as the relevant possibility. So, the person B can avoid taking into account possibilities like that, with an appropriate comment: ‘Come on, what kind of painted mule comes to your mind? Where did you get such ideas? That’s crazy.’ Standards for knowledge would increase only if person A presented adequate reasons for his suspicious assumptions (e.g. he has heard from a former employee that they used to swap the animals if there was the need for that, or similar), and then we would need to eliminate those possibilities if we wanted to have knowledge. That way the context in which the conversation was kept would be more demanding for achieving knowledge.

In addition, Lewis’s contextualistic position, especially the lottery paradox and its solution caused this kind of DeRose’s reaction and a desire to defend the concept of knowledge from this kind of elusiveness. Specifically, allowing for the interpretation of the concept of knowledge from probabilistic perspective is something that permits us to enforce the standards.¹⁹ It results in the process of losing knowledge. In one moment, we have knowledge, but at some point, we are devoid of it.

The argument that leads DeRose to reject Lewis’s contextualism would look like this:

- A1 DeRose claims that “now you know it, now you don’t” knowledge is a bad implication of Lewis’s contextualism.
- A2 Probabilistic approach to the analysis of the concept of knowledge enables “now you know it, now you don’t” knowledge.
- A3 Lewis uses probabilistic approach to resolve the lottery paradox.
- C Lewis’s solution of the lottery paradox enables “now you know it, now you don’t” knowledge.

This argument, even though it seems a bit forced, has at least partially approved plausibility by initial assumptions. A1 appears to be clear, given that such DeRose’s attitude is mentioned and explained several times so far. A2 and A3, although being attractive statements, are less acceptable, and should be additionally elaborated.

19 Of course vice versa is possible, from higher standards to lower, so the knowledge that we ‘don’t have’ becomes knowledge that we have.

Even though Lewis does not accept probabilism directly, he still considers it as an adequate starting point for resolving the lottery paradox, through fallibilistic position. It seems that this hardly noticeable, implicit relation between Lewis and probabilism is the main reason which led DeRose to conclusions that are not coherent with contextualism. Furthermore, Lewis explicitly refers to probability while interpreting the concept of knowledge, and claims that it depends on a certain degree of probability (the rule of belief). Thus, the combination of the lack of an appropriate criterion that would suggest what degree of probability is high enough for us to have knowledge with saliently similar possibilities which cannot be properly eliminated, results in a completely relativized concept of knowledge – in the sense that any possibility, if saliently similar to the actualized one, cannot be ignored, regardless of the degree of probability of its actualization. Considering that it is possible to interpret the probability in the lottery context as well as in non-lottery contexts, we arrive to the moment when it is very easy for our knowledge to disappear or get taken away from us. No matter how high, the probability that we know the proposition p cannot be the confirmation of it. Lewis's position is, in this manner, summarized through DeRose's conclusion that Lewis allows “now you know it, now you don't” knowledge.

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However, as DeRose claims,²⁰ cognitive terms are comparable with contextually dependant terms, such as ‘here’, for example. It is clear that we cannot say that we have been ‘here’ for a moment from the past when we were ‘somewhere else’, although at the moment when we were somewhere else our statement ‘I was here’ was correct. A similar thing can be said for the conclusion of the person B from the previous dialogue, “he knew at first, and now he doesn't”; since contextually dependent factors, such as time and place of the statement utterance, are neglected. More specifically, in the case of the zoo and observing the zebra, the time of utterance is more important. Moreover, in the moment when the statement that the person C knows that it is a zebra is uttered, she certainly does know it. If it turns out that the zebra is just cleverly disguised mule, then the person C has not lost the knowledge. He never had it, in the first place. Therefore, person C does not have anything to lose. It seems that if we interpret the justification for knowledge via probability, then even a very high degree of probability does not allow us to be prone to claim that we know something (because of the lottery paradox). Due to these reasons, Lewis tends to view knowledge as unattainable, volatile or *elusive*.

What has person C lost in the meantime, while the standards for knowledge are increased? Knowledge is not one of those things, since the person C either knew all the time (and still knows) the particular statement or he did

20 DeRose 2000: 97.

not know it at all. Either way, he has not lost his knowledge of *p* and no knowledge has gone away, been destroyed, or been robbed from him.²¹ His epistemic position remains unchanged, and the conditions for his knowledge are increased so he needs to obtain them. Simply put, he never had knowledge dependent of high and rigorous standards, while on the other hand, the knowledge that he has due to lower and more lenient standards is still in his 'possession'. DeRose criticism of Lewis may be understood in two ways. Firstly, the justification as the condition for knowledge allows the existence of two propositions whose content is the same but the truth-conditions are different, and these two propositions are, in fact, different. The variety of truth-conditions is dictated by the change of the standards for knowledge. Another way, which is less evident, but seems plausible, relies on the truth condition that is required to be fulfilled, regardless of any justification that might be there at the given moment. The truth condition as a necessary condition for knowledge is not dependent on the conversational context, and if we look from that perspective it is clear why DeRose claims that we cannot lose the knowledge, but it rather is or it is not there.

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21 DeRose 2000: 101.

Ivan Nišavić

Znanje koje nestaje

Apstrakt

Nakon izlaganja osnovnih stavova kontekstualističke pozicije u odnosu na invarijantističku, koja pojam znanja uzima u strogoj i nepromjenljivom značenju, tekst se dalje bavi analizom pojma znanja koju nam je ponudio Luis (David Lewis) sa ambicijom da riješi uobičajene epistemološke probleme, pa među njima i lutrijski paradoks. Prihvatajući folibilizam kao jedinu plauzibilnu opciju za mogućnost sticanja znanja, Luis, zajedno sa postuliranjem pravila koja nam omogućavaju ispravno eliminisanje alternativnih mogućnosti, smatra da je moguće prenebregnuti pomenuti paradoks. Ako znanje želimo da utemeljimo na vjerovatnoći, a ne na apsolutnosti, i direktno ga uslovimo sa kontekstom u kom ono biva zasnovano ili izrečeno, onda je očigledno da će ono zavisiti od toga da li su uslovi za znanjem visoki i niski. Stoga, u jednom slučaju se može desiti da imamo znanje, a u drugom da nemamo, iako se ništa nije promijenilo sem konverzionih faktora koji su u 'igri'. Takvo znanje, znanje koje je nepostojano, koje se gubi, Diroz (DeRose) naziva 'sad ga ima, sad ga nema' znanje i smatra da je direktna posledica Luisove analize, te kao takvo ne bi trebalo da bude prihvaćeno.

Ključne riječi: kontekstualizam, eliminisanje mogućnosti, vjerovatnoća, nepostojanost znanja, lutrijski paradoks

Marko Simendić

Nature, Civility and Eschatology: Thomas Hobbes's Progress in Three Acts

Abstract This paper argues that Thomas Hobbes's theory contains an account of progressive defragmentation and unification of power, accompanied by the progression in human reasoning capacities. If the consequence of human nature is abandonment of natural condition and subjection to a sovereign, then similar principles should apply to the sovereigns themselves, since Hobbes sees them as continuing to exist in the state of nature. In turn, the relations between sovereigns must also lead to defragmentation of political authority, either by conquest or through peaceful submission. Total defragmentation of power might also have eschatological consequences, as the unified power of one human being over the whole world would remove "external violence" as a cause of "the dissolution of a commonwealth" while the perfection of reason would progressively remove the "internal" causes. This is a hypothetical situation that could relate Hobbes's description of the Kingdom of God from *Leviathan* to his wider political theory by marking the single sovereign representative of now immortal all-encompassing *Leviathan* as the Antichrist and thus announcing the second coming of Christ.

Keywords: Hobbes, progress, determinism, sovereign, world government, antichrist.

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Introduction

In the mid 1650s, Thomas Hobbes engaged in a famous debate with bishop John Bramhall. Hobbes was a determinist and, among other things, denied against Bramhall that men have freedom of will. Men's will and actions are ultimately caused by God's will, as "every act of man's will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continuall chaine, (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes,)" (Hobbes, 1651: 109) God is "the First Mover" and Hobbes (1651: 53, 4) argues that "[w]hen a body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els hinder it) eternally". If this is the case, then in *Leviathan* Hobbes might be telling us a linear story of human progress that starts with the state of nature, follows the creation of the state and ends with its eventual demise. In this paper I will argue that Hobbes's account can be logically divided into three consecutive conditions that correspond to three stages of human development: 1) state of nature; 2) civil condition and 3) the kingdom of God. This causality is a part of Hobbes's wider mechanist philosophical framework that starts with his thoughts on human nature, extends into statehood and ends with eschatology.

There are a number of features of Hobbes's state of nature that compel people to establish "a common Power to keep them all in awe". (Hobbes, 1651: 62) Firstly, there is mechanist philosophical and theological background against which Hobbes's account of the state of nature is developed. If Hobbes identifies God with "the First Mover" and if an object that He sets in motion "moveth (unless something els hinder it) eternally", Hobbes's account has to be considered as profoundly determinist. (Hobbes, 1651: 53, 4) This is certainly true for the laws of physics, but Hobbes's mechanism also extends to the factors that govern human behaviour: reason and passions (among which fear is most prominent). As Hobbes (1651: 64) argues, a human being is placed in the state of nature, "though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason". Both of these motivators are God-given. The laws of nature are the divine "dictates of Reason" (Hobbes, 1651: 80) and the importance of human reasoning as a motivator is unquestionable. On the other hand, people "can have no passion, nor appetite to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is not the cause". (Hobbes, 1651: 147) Since Hobbes mentions nothing that could hinder them, it is safe to assume that both aspects of human nature, if sufficiently developed, actually *guarantee* the emergence of the state. The creation of the state thus becomes more than an option, it becomes a natural necessity. This is also argued by Stanton (2008: 69-71) who compares the structure of Hobbes's and Aquinian arguments and demonstrates that "[o]n Hobbes's view, an agent's voluntary actions, whose object is 'some *Good to himselfe*', always proceed from a prior cause 'in a continuall chaine, (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes)', that is, from necessity".

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Robert Kraynak (1983: 89) rightfully argues that Hobbes's "writings present a coherent and consistent theory of history, the subject of which is the evolution of man from barbarism to civilization." Although I agree with Kraynak on this point, I disagree with his claim that Hobbes's theory of history "lacks the idea of inevitable development toward an end or final stage, and [that] it is, for the most part, a story of retrogression rather than of progress." Hobbes is explicit about the kingdom of God as the final commonwealth on Earth, although he is not as clear about the ways in which the earthly civil society is to be transformed into its heavenly successor. Furthermore, Hobbes does not consider civilization "no better than savagery and in certain respects is a more miserable and degraded condition." (Kraynak, 1983: 94) Although it is obvious that Hobbes was more than aware of the deficiencies of political constitutions of his day, he also considers them a consequence of imperfect reasoning. Therefore we can create the "everlasting constitution" if we work hard at developing our rational faculties and scientific insight into the way societies function. This is a task of political science, which can only flourish within the safety of a commonwealth.

Hobbes's natural condition: passions dominate reason

Hobbes's account of the progression of mankind begins with the state of nature and it can be traced back to *The Elements of Law*. He argues there that "the estate of men in this natural liberty is the estate of war" (Hobbes, 1889: 72). This account is fully expanded in *Leviathan* where Hobbes (1651: 60-63) dedicates the 13th chapter to examining "the NATURALL CONDITION of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery". This condition is defined by the absence of the sovereign authority and it is based on Hobbes's views of human beings' psychological and physical properties. Both kinds of properties are marked by the relative natural equality of human beings. Hobbes (1651: 60) does not deny that there are differences between humans, but they are "not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he." This applies both to physical and mental strengths. They are also equal in terms of their psychology. They have the same desires and the most important of these "ends" is "their owne conservation". (Hobbes, 1651: 61) The strongest of all desires, self-preservation is a consequence of another shared property of men and that is their mortality. Finally, all human beings are endowed by reason, through which they can intuitively comprehend the natural law. In fact, Hobbes (1651: 282) identifies the natural law with "the Precepts of Naturall Reason, written in every mans own heart".

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These internal factors govern human behaviour in the state of nature. However, they are not equally significant. The single most important appetite is the desire for preservation or its counterpart aversion, the fear of death. Hobbes (1651: 25) defines fear as "Aversion, with opinion of *Hurt* from the object". This feeling defines the lives of people living in the state of nature and it should eventually remind them not to disturb the peace established by the sovereign's absolute rule. In Hobbes's (1651: 63) words, "[t]he Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them." Blits (1989: 417) summarises this argument and notes that fear serves a double purpose for Hobbes: "At once the principal cause of war and the principal means to peace, fear is the basis both of man's most urgent plight and of his only possible escape."

Before proceeding any further, we should briefly discuss Hobbes's notion of fear. As Blits (1989: 418) argues, "Hobbesian fear is best understood as primal, indeterminate fear of the unknown". Therefore, a human being in the state of nature lives in constant fear of other people. This feeling is motivated by her or his inability to predict the actions of others and it can be described as an aversion, since "[a]version wee have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us; but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not." (Hobbes, 1651: 24) Endowed only with (as I

will discuss a bit later – imperfect) rationality and primarily motivated by their urge for self-preservation, agents in the state of nature are strongly inclined to take on a distrustful and conservative attitude towards their fellows. Since they lack external guarantees that others will behave cooperatively they simply cannot know when or whether to trust others. This is the state of radical doubt that places people in mutual relationships that Hampton (1997: 42-48) describes as single-play prisoner's dilemmas. As she argues, in such a setup cooperation is rational only if "others in that state are also disposed to perform them". (Hampton, 1997: 47) Furthermore, being creatures motivated by a range of passions (that do not conflict with the primary urge for self-preservation although they might very well conflict with self-preservation of others), agents in the state of nature cannot count on others to act rationally, either. (*ibid.*: 46) Moreover, even if there was strong mutual commitment to acting rationally, people's rational capacities can and do differ significantly. Therefore, one cannot trust even the least passionate of his fellows to act in a (sufficiently) rational manner. The only solution, then, is to endow a single person or a group of people with sovereign authority, thus establishing an external arbiter that will bring relative certainty to people's lives and enable their mutual cooperation. The sovereign, thus, becomes the universal object of fear that effectively replaces the web of particular fears that his subjects feel towards each other. This lesser evil establishes civil order since for Hobbes, as Blits's (1989: 426) suggests, "[t]he common good requires a common fear".

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On the other hand, Hobbesian natural human is without external guidance in the radically unknown and, thus, uncertain world. This individual is self-centred¹ and aware of his own existence, his passions, his urge to live and his rational faculties. On the other hand, although he is able to perceive the world he inhabits, he is profoundly ignorant of its initial cause. The lack of this knowledge makes predicting future very hard, if not impossible, resulting in constant "[a]nxiety for the future time" (Hobbes, 1651: 51), a strong feeling that is only second to his deep distrust towards his peers. Therefore, he can get no external guidance, whether from God as "some cause, whereof there is no former cause", (*ibid.*) or from his fellows, with whom he is roughly equal in his nescience. The only guidance he can receive comes through introspection, by realising that the only rational thing to do is to participate in the creation of a Hobbesian commonwealth. Since it was God who made him fundamentally fearful and endowed him with reason, no action that follows from those natural facts can be in opposition to God's will. This is especially true for the creation of the state, as this is the main consequence of human nature.

1 Individuals in the state of nature are also proud, as "every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himself". (Hobbes, 1651: 61)

Hobbes's civil condition: (the right) reason rules over passions

Hobbes considers reason to be the same for all human beings and believes that people generally do have (some) rational capacity. However, it would be wrong to assert that everybody is equally endowed in this regard. For Hobbes (1651: 18) reasoning is a kind of arithmetic, "Adding and Subtracting [...] of the Consequences of generall names agreed upon, for the *marking* and *signifying* of our thoughts". The same as we use arithmetic as a tool for understanding the laws of physics, we use reasoning to discover the laws of nature. Consequently, not everybody is capable of fully grasping these laws:

"as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors themselves may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive themselves, and inferre false Conclusions; Not but that Reason it selfe is always Right Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain and infallible Art" (*ibid.*)

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However, since "no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it", it is in the interest of peace and safety to appoint the sovereign who will be the arbiter in potential disputes that could come up as a consequence of the inequality between individual rational faculties. (*ibid.*) Hobbes's account of rationality presupposes progressive development of rational capacities, since he believed that some people, like "the savage people in many places of *America*", were still living in the state of nature. (Hobbes, 1651: 63) This is not to say that such people have no rational faculties. Instead, Hobbes suggests that their ability to reason is not developed to the degree in which it is found in his English and European readers. For example, Hobbes argues that his account of natural law is not damaged by the fact that the "Savage people of *America*" exist in the state of nature. By treating reason as universal (and, thus, non-identical to its realisation in particular human beings), Hobbes can effectively distinguish between reason and the imperfect ability to reason.

This effectively leaves room for the idea that reason progresses, both on micro and macro levels. On the micro level, the level of the individual, reason is "attayned by Industry" since it is not "as Sense, and Memory, borne with us; nor gotten by Experience onely, as Prudence is". (Hobbes, 1651: 21) On a larger scale, this is reflected in "imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in proceeding from" them to assertions and connections "till we come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand; and that is it, men call SCIENCE." (*ibid.*) As our hard work pays off and we continue to accumulate knowledge about ourselves and our societies, we may utilise it to improve our constitutions. The process that leads to the creation of the

state and helps the development of its constitution thus parallels scientific development. Both creation and improvement of a well-ordered society is a consequence of the industrious development of our reason and science. Hobbes compares this process to masonry:

“And as the art of well building, is derived from Principles of Reason, observed by industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and the divers effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind began (though poorly) to build: So, long time after men have begun to constitute Commonwealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, there may, Principles of Reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make their constitution (excepting by externall violence) everlasting And such are those which I have in this discourse set forth: Which whether they come not into the fight of those that have Power to make use of them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular interest, at this day, very little.” (Hobbes, 1651: 176)

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The optimal result of masonry and constitution-building is seen in the longevity of states and buildings. Long existence shows that both were built in accordance with the principles of reason, to which their creators came “by industrious meditation”. One’s ability to reason can, therefore, not only be “attained by Industry” but also perfected through “industrious meditation”. This, however, has to be understood as a historical process since a Hobbesian state cannot be created through a mutual contract that would mutually bind just a fragment of people. Instead, large numbers of people in the state of nature must first realise that they need a state and then expend effort in giving it the best constitution they can muster. This does not mean that their constitution will be the best possible. In fact, Hobbes’s argument is based on his view of dangerous shortcomings of contemporary and historical forms of government that can and often do lead to their “dissolution”. At the same time, Hobbes’s attempts at remedying these problems are indicative of his belief that people living in 17th century Western Europe are (or at some point will be) generally able to reason sufficiently well to institute a Hobbesian commonwealth, while, for example, the native Americans lacked the rational ability to create a state in the first place.² This is indicative of Hobbes’s account of progressive development of human rational capacities.

Men’s progress towards unveiling the principles of (universal) reason is primarily reflected in the development of the state governed by an absolute

2 It is more than likely that Hobbes had significant insight in the life of Native Americans, as he was involved in Virginia Company. This is why Malcolm (2003a: 75-76) argues that “he must have been aware, if he had read accounts such as that of Purchas, that some Indian tribes did conform to his model of a commonwealth”. According to Malcolm (ibid.) Hobbes chose to exclude this from his account since “[t]his must have been embarrassing for his subsidiary theory that all the benefits of civilization sprang directly from the leisure provided by secure government”.

sovereign. As Hoekstra (2007: 115-116) notes, Hobbes “says in *De Cive* that the natural condition is the domain of passion, whereas civil society is the domain of reason; and in *Leviathan* he claims that he has shown in chapter xiii that ‘that miserable condition of war . . . is necessarily consequent . . . to the natural passions of men’ without sovereignty”. This, of course, does not mean that passions cease to influence people’s lives in the state of civility. They still do and this is one of the reasons why the sovereign should be obeyed unconditionally. Otherwise, as Hoekstra (2007: 116) shows, “even with natural reason, and even if many or most humans have moderate aims, war will ensue nonetheless.” This is why the laws are needed to limit liberty and, in Hobbes’s (1651: 107) mechanical terms, serve as “externall Impediments of motion” that set external boundaries to human agency that is to large extent motivated by passions. If they are stable and strong, these “Impediments” make subjects’ passions politically irrelevant in a well-functioning sovereign state. The political irrelevance of subjects’ passions thus goes hand in hand with the progressive development of their reasoning faculties. In a brief passage of *De cive* Hobbes (1978b: 91) paints quite an optimistic picture of the progression of mankind, provided that the motivators of human behaviour are known and that the passions are kept under control:

“were the nature of humane actions as distinctly known as the nature of *quantity* in geometrical Figures, the strength of *avarice* and *ambition*, which is sustained by the erroneous opinions of the Vulgar, as touching the nature of *right* and *wrong*, would presently faint and languish; and mankind should enjoy such an immortal peace, that unless it were for habitation, on supposition that the earth should grow too narrow for her Inhabitants, there would hardly be left any pretence for war.”

The state has a distinguished role in directing the progression of humanity away from the sway of passions and towards perfecting their reasoning faculties. Moreover, the very existence of the sovereign’s absolute power and authority is an obstacle to his subjects’ relapsing into the state of nature that is dominated by passions. The reason that eventually conquers everybody’s fears of violent death is the reason of the sovereign, or as Hobbes (1651: 20) calls it – the “right reason”. In comparison to the particular reasoning of his subjects, the sovereign’s reason is the “right Reason”, or “the Reason of [the] Arbitrator” which is decisive in any potential dispute between the subjects. (Hobbes, 1651: 20)³

Another important part of man’s rational development is belief in God. For Hobbes (1651: 51) realisation that God exists is a matter of reason, rather than strong faith, as “it is impossible to make any profound enquiry

3 This, however, is not a consequence of the sovereign’s natural superiority. Hobbes (1651: 18) makes it clear that human reasoning capacities are roughly equal in their fallibility, as “no one mans Reason [...] makes the certaintie”.

into naturall causes, without being enclined thereby to believe there is one God Eternall". Faith in God is thus a consequence of correct reasoning while superstition is a product of ignorant fear as "they that make little, or no enquiry into the naturall causes of things, yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe, of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are enclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, severall kinds of Powers Invisible" (*ibid.*). Polytheism of "the Gentiles" thus was a consequence of them basing their faith on a passion, instead of deriving it from the principles of reason. Hobbes (1651: 53) argues that: "acknowledging of one God Eternall, Infinite, and Omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of naturall bodies, and their severall vertues, and operations; than from the feare of what was to be fall them in time to come." Hobbes therefore centres his account of superstition on fear as the strongest of passions, which was previously discussed as the second constant of human existence. The progressive development of reasoning faculties happens in parallel to the transition from natural to civil condition as well as with the shift from fearful superstition to rational religious belief. Progress is, therefore, an important feature of both faith and reason. The difference is only in the fact that the progress of reason is a necessary prerequisite for the progress of faith – in the same way it is necessary for the progress of science. Indeed, structurally speaking, for Hobbes the progress in faith parallels the progress in science: both developments encompass the development of reason and both rely on reason as a tool for verifying veracity of religious learning and scientific conclusions alike.

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The unbearable lightness of being a sovereign

Sovereigns are only human. Although the sovereign wields augmented power of his subjects, he remains a fallible and frail human being. While the subjects' psychological burden is alleviated by conjuring the commonwealth, the sovereigns remain in the state of nature. Their condition remains marked by potential conflict and mutual mistrust. Sovereigns face two chief dangers: internally, there is always a possibility of a revolt and civil war, and externally, there is a constant threat of foreign invasion. The sovereigns, "Kings, and Persons of Sovereigne authority", exist in a (naturally) hostile world, finding themselves in:

"continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men." (Hobbes, 1651: 63).

As I have argued elsewhere, (Simendić, 2012) Hobbes's sphere of international relations is not dominated by the states' *raison d'État* but by sovereigns' own reason, passions, interests and fears. As any other human being, no sovereign is motivated only by reason: they are jealous, distrustful and afraid of others who share their predicament and threaten them by their "Forts, Garrisons, and Guns". When compared to a person in the state of nature, a sovereign is generally motivated by the exact same set of passions, has the same level of control over his passions and has no superior rational faculty. Therefore, the sovereign's behaviour is determined by the very same set of natural motivating factors. The difference is only in the context. Individuals in the state of nature are surrounded by other natural persons, while a sovereign is surrounded by other sovereigns and their states. And although a sovereign is much more powerful than his subjects, his power is commensurable with the strength of other sovereigns. Finally, Hobbes (1651: 63) argues that "because [the sovereigns] uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men." Indeed, Hobbes's argument is that the subjects are much better off living under a sovereign than in the state of nature. However, the sovereigns are a result of the social contract and not a part of it, so even with the might of their entire commonwealths at their disposal, they remain in the state of nature. The emergence of the state absolves the subjects from fear and uncertainty, which are the two consequences of Hobbes's anthropology in the state of nature. However, by remaining in the state of nature, the sovereign does not experience such catharsis and he is not relieved of his natural existential burden. The sovereign is not relieved of the psychological pressures that drove his very subjects to renounce their natural rights. He is confronted with other agents in the natural condition (most notably other sovereigns) and, although he has no obligations towards his subjects, he can never be absolutely certain of their loyalty, either. Furthermore, although the sovereign and his subjects share the urge for self-preservation, there is one noteworthy difference between them. Because the sovereign continues to live in the state of nature his passions continue to be politically salient. The civil condition, on the other hand, is the state where (sovereign-mediated) reason is supposed to dominate and where the passions of the subjects are held in check by sovereign coercion. Their liberty being unrestrained by external coercion, and unlike their subjects who live in "the domain of reason", the sovereigns are still a part of "the domain of passion". (Hoekstra 2007: 116)

Even though Hobbes does not explicitly suggest any, there are at least two potential consequences of the sovereign being "left behind" in the natural state of radical insecurity and discontent. Firstly, the situation can be resolved through a long series of conflicts that would lead to the rule of a single sovereign. Secondly, as they are not contractually bound to be or to

remain sovereigns, the sovereigns can choose to enter a social contract of their own and pass on the hot potato of sovereignty to a single sovereign. In fact, Hobbes (1651: 102) acknowledges consensual transfer of power when he suggests that a sovereign's "Power cannot, *without his consent*, be Transferred to another". (my italics) Furthermore, in both of these cases the transfer of authority between the sovereigns would not face any resistance from their (now former) subjects because Hobbes (1651: 101-107) clearly states that being a part of a "*Common-wealth by Acquisition*" grants no special rights to rebellion to the subjects, as "the Rights, and Consequences of Sovereignty, are the same in both".

If we now turn back to Hobbes's mechanist and progressivist view of nature and psychology, we will see that the evolution of authority starts in the prepolitical state of nature in which sovereignty is particularised within every individual human being and that it gradually encompasses more and more people (first within families, then cities and states). This historical process is marked by constant extension and defragmentation of power and sovereignty. Indeed, Hobbes (1651: 85) describes this when he discusses the historical enlargement of "dominions" as a transition from smaller to larger sovereign entities: "And as small Families did then; so now do Cities and Kingdomes which are but greater Families (for their own security) enlarge their Dominions". The process starts with initial defragmentation of individuals' natural "right to every thing" (Hobbes, 1651: 65) that gets gradually added up to a total of sovereign power (*summa potestas*). This progressive adding of power might come to its natural end in a very interesting way and merge with Hobbes's views on Christian eschatology. The sovereign who ends up governing the world would thus be the Biblical antichrist, as he would govern the entire Earth instead of Christ.

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It is important to underline that such a sovereign is somebody who is the essence of a commonwealth that is a "*Mortall God*". The distinction between mortal Leviathan and the immortal God is not in the ungodly nature of the former, but in its "mortality". (Hobbes, 1651: 88) This mortality comes from internal and external causes of the "*Dissolution of a Common-wealth*". Therefore, if Hobbes's comparison and equation of the state with God is more than a simple metaphor,⁴ the single unified Leviathan is the equivalent of the single God while its sovereign representative, is a pretender on the throne of Christ who is God's representative on Earth. Such a person is, by definition, the Antichrist as he "usurpeth a Kingdome in this world, which Christ took not on him [and] he doth it *as Christ*" and, not unlike

4 And there are good reasons in favour of believing that such an important claim has to be more than a metaphor, not at least because Hobbes (1651: 14) considered metaphors as something that "deceive[s] others" and that "in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted". (Hobbes, 1651: 21)

Pope, “give[s] Laws to all Christian Kings, and Nations”. (Hobbes, 1651: 305) This potential sovereign of the world would find himself in a situation that is radically different from any other human being’s. His powers would be unprecedented and his will would be the will of the Leviathan who truly has nobody and nothing to fear on Earth. Moreover, the unification of all earthly authority would eliminate all the external threats to the world government. The internal causes of its “dissolution” would also be eliminated with the progression of reason as “may, Principles of Reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make their constitution (excepting by externall violence) everlasting” (Hobbes, 1651: 176). Without the threat of “externall violence” and by establishing the “everlasting” constitution, the “*Mortall God*” rises up to the immortal one, and its sovereign representative becomes the equivalent of Christ, God’s representative on Earth.

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The uncertain path to the Kingdom of God

The arrival of the Antichrist would be the event that immediately precedes the Second Coming of Christ and consequent institution of the Kingdom of God on Earth: “Which second coming not yet being, the Kingdome of God is not yet come, and wee are not now under any other Kings by Pact, but our Civill Sovereigns”. (Hobbes, 1651: 335) It is very important to note, however, that Hobbes never actually mentions the Antichrist in this context. This is not to say that he does not mention the Antichrist at all. In *Leviathan* he discusses at length whether the Pope can be considered an antichrist. Hobbes (1651: 303) discusses both meanings of the word: “one that falsely pretendeth to be *His* Lieutenant, or Vicar generall, but to be *Hee*” and “this speciall Antichrist, [...] (Mat. 24. 15.) [...] that abominable Destroyer, spoken of by Daniel”. In both cases, contrary to the common Protestant view, Hobbes’s answer is negative. It is clear that Hobbes has given significant thought to this issue and this makes the fact that he failed to offer a more elaborate account of Christian eschatology even more striking. What is clearly missing is the discussion about the progression of “human condition” from his day until the Second coming. There are at least two possible reasons behind this omission.

The first reason is both political and methodological. In *De cive* Hobbes argues that “we may not, as in a Circle, begin the handling of a Science from what point we please. There is a certain Clue of Reason, whose beginning is in the dark, but by the benefit of whose Conduct, wee are led as ‘twere by the hand into the clearest light”. (Hobbes, 1978b: 92) He then goes on to describe how he had addressed the issue of natural justice by analysing every concept that belongs to an array of causes and consequences that begins with human nature and ends with natural justice. Eschatology, on the other hand, is descriptive of absolutely certain events that take place in future

and this is not a matter of scientific enquiry as “[n]o man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or *will be*; which is to know absolutely” (Hobbes, 1651: 30; the emphasis is mine). This is why Hobbes can rightfully consider Biblical writings descriptive of the past as truly historical (and thus related to the process of scientific discovery) while discussing eschatological predictions on their own terms, as unrelated to any particular happening of his time. John Pocock (1989: 198) is right to emphasise Hobbes’s distinction between “timeless” eschatology and temporal history and his attack on those who confuse the two and make a case for “spiritual jurisdiction”. Therefore, as we have seen, Hobbes denies that the Pope is the antichrist.

The lack of connection between Hobbes’s discussion of current affairs and his eschatology was uncommon for his time. Not only that the coming of the year 1666 gave rise to a number of millenarian accounts, but also it was quite common in the 17th century England for one to label his opponents as “antichrists”. The latter is especially true for the middle of the 17th century, when it was a common practice for the Parliamentary pamphleteers to label the King and their ecclesial opponents as antichristian, if not antichrist(s).⁵ The danger of such arguments went beyond simple name-calling and terminological “confusion” as they presupposed the superiority of divine over civil right. Hobbes responded by arguing that there is nothing anti-Christian in absolute civil authority and he “had written at length about apocalyptic because this was a necessary means of destroying the spiritual usurpations that England seemed to be overcoming at the end of the Civil Wars”. (*ibid.*) Hobbes’s account differed from such “confused” discussions in one additional aspect. Contrary to the widespread belief in his day, Hobbes did not believe that the Armageddon is at hand. Not only that he does not mention the Second coming of Christ as an imminent event, but he also explicitly states that “that tribulation is not yet come; for it is to be followed immediately (ver. 29.) by a darkening of the Sun and Moon, a falling of the Stars, a concussion of the Heavens, and the glorious coming again of our Saviour in the clouds. And therefore The *Antichrist* is not yet come.” (Hobbes, 1651: 303). The fact that, to use Pocock’s terms, Hobbes distinguished between (historical) “time” and (divine) “timeless” does not mean that the two are mutually inoperable. To an extent they have to be commensurable, not at least because Hobbes believed the Earth to be stage for both history and eschatology. Hobbes does not argue that the two are incommensurable; he just argues that the time for the timeless has not yet come.

5 I am indebted to Christopher Hill for this analysis. Hill (1971: 79) notes that the “[u]se of the phrase ‘Antichrist’s party’ to describe the King’s armed supporters at once opened up propagandist possibilities similar to those which Elizabeth’s government had seen in the equation of Pope and Antichrist”. King himself was referred to as the Beast in a number of pamphlets published after 1643. (Hill, 1971: 86-87)

This leads us to the second reason why Hobbes might have chosen not to take his deterministic account of the state and human nature to its logical conclusion. It seems that Hobbes was very much aware of the (theological problem of) dual nature of political power and authority. On one hand, the sovereign power is a God-given consequence of human nature while, on the other, its continual defragmentation necessarily leads to the (anti-christian) rule by a single sovereign. For Hobbes, emphasising the latter over the former would entail supporting the horrors of anarchy and writing in favour of slowing down the progression of mankind. That alone would be sufficient for any vocal opponent of division of power not to take this route and to choose to leave this aspect out. That being said, the state remains a peculiar beast, not unlike the Biblical leviathan. And leviathan, as Malcolm (2007: 23) suggests, was a common allegory for the Devil, “Antichrist, or [...] other diabolical forces on earth.” Not unlike the state in my interpretation of Hobbes’s eschatology, “leviathan” is characterised as “a mighty creation of God, in the powers of which God seemed to take some pride; however, some of the other passages (notably Isaiah 27:1) suggested a monstrous being with which God must eventually engage in apocalyptic combat” (Malcolm, 2007: 25). Indeed, Hobbes (1651: 168) says that: “there is that in heaven, (*though not on earth*) that [leviathan] should stand in fear of” (my italics). It might be that, comparably to “anti-christ”, Hobbes speaks of *a* leviathan and *the* leviathan where a leviathan is a commonwealth and the leviathan is the entity that has nothing (no other leviathans) to fear on earth. Therefore, there are at least some reasons to believe that Hobbes’s omission of detailed descriptions of progression of mankind towards unified authority that ends in the Apocalypse was deliberate. Hobbes, as someone who vigorously supported absolute authority, never fully explained the reasons behind labelling the state as a demonic beast nor described how the transition into the Kingdom of God might take place. On the other hand, Hobbes is explicit about Christ’s rule happening on Earth and it being exclusive of human sovereignty, as “the Kingdom of God is a Civil Common-wealth, where God himself is Sovereign” and “the Kingdom of God is to be on Earth” (Hobbes, 1651: 241; 219-220).

These developments seem to be fuelled by the progress in reasoning faculties that, in turn, leads to better ability to grasp the universal and God-given natural laws. As I have discussed earlier, at one of the steps of this progression, a rational human being becomes aware of the fact that creation of the world can only be explained through a single cause and that leads him to monotheism. As this realisation alone is not sufficient for him becoming a part of the Kingdom of God, he has to accept the fundamental article of faith, the one that stipulates that “Jesus is the Christ”. Teaching and informing people of this article is exactly what the church is supposed to do: “The work of Christs Ministers, is Evangelization; that is, a Proclamation of

Christ, and a preparation for his second coming; as the Evangelization of John Baptist, was a preparation to his first coming.” (Hobbes, 1651: 270) The final result of this process is the division of mankind into Christians and those who do not believe that “Jesus is the Christ”. From the fragmentation of power that comes as a consequence of Hobbes’s interpretation of Christian eschatology, temporarily arises the new bipolar order after the Judgement that lasts until the Second (Everlasting) Death of the last of the infidels. (Hobbes, 1651: 246) The dividing lines are drawn on Earth, between the Christian subjects of the Kingdom of God and those who are not a part of this realm and are, therefore, the enemies of God, “[f]or without the Kingdom of Christ, all other Kingdoms after Judgment, are comprehended in the Kingdome of Satan.” (Hobbes, 1651: 277) After the Resurrection Christians would become the subjects of God’s Kingdom whose rule would be mediated through Christ, as it was the case with Moses and the Israelites: “he shall be King, not onely as God, in which sense he is King already, and ever shall be, of all the Earth, in vertue of his omnipotence; but also peculiarly of his own Elect, by vertue of the pact they make with him in their Baptisme.” (Hobbes, 1651: 264) They would enjoy “[t]he joyes of Life Eternall”. (Hobbes, 1651: 245) On the other hand, “the Reprobates” would live in the Kingdom of Satan, “The Enemy, [whose] Kingdome must be on Earth also. For so also was it, in the time before the Jews had deposed God. For Gods Kingdome was in Palestine; and the Nations round about, were the Kingdoms of the Enemy; and consequently by *Satan*, is meant any Earthly Enemy of the Church.” (Hobbes, 1651: 244) It is noteworthy that Hobbes’s definition of Satan as “any Earthly Enemy of the Church” corresponds with “another usuall signification of the word Antichrist” as “an *Adversary of Iesus the true Christ*”. (Hobbes, 1651: 304) Therefore, in a general sense, the Kingdom of Satan is identified with the kingdom of Antichrist.

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Conclusion

Regardless of earthly authority being unified before or through the Second Coming of Christ, the antecedent process remains the same. The natural progression that starts from a number of atomised individuals in the state of nature ends with their unity within the state as a single entity. This is accompanied by the transformation from the rule of passions and particularised reason to the rule of universal Reason and followed by the developments in religious belief. Internal motives drive every person in the state of nature to relinquish his fragmented piece of sovereignty (his “right to every thing”) in favour of a single person who becomes their sovereign. For natural persons in the prepolitical state of nature, the only possible (and rationally preferred) outcome is their cathartic conferral of power to a single sovereign that leads to the creation of the state. As I have demonstrated, the

sovereigns remain in natural condition, have no direct duty towards their subjects⁶ and their position is no different than the position of other natural persons. This entails that they share the same psychological burden as their prepolitical counterparts and that they are as strongly inclined to pass the hot potato of sovereignty to others until the single sovereign emerges who has no other sovereigns to fear and whose only concern is to rule in accordance with the natural reason. These transformations occur in parallel with gradual advancement of human reasoning capacities and abilities to grasp God-given universal reason, accept its laws and understand the fundamental article of faith. And this is the point where Hobbes's dynamic anthropological framework might transgress the sphere of international relations and step into the final stages of Christian eschatology. If Hobbes indeed believed that the defragmentation of power leads to establishing a single world sovereign who could be considered as the antichrist, his account of eschatological theocracy that would exist on Earth would not appear at all disjointed from the rest of his political philosophy. This would also give a fuller meaning to his underlying claim about the progression of reason and human knowledge by which "Reason is the *pace*; Increase of Science, the *way*; and the Benefit of man-kind, the *end*". (Hobbes, 1651: 22)

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6 The sovereigns' duties to their subjects (such as working towards keeping them safe) can be described as indirect because they are a result of sovereigns' efforts aimed at ensuring their own self-preservation.

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Marko Simendić

Priroda, građansko stanje i eshatologija:
Hobsova ideja napretka u tri čina

Apstrakt

Argument ovog rada je da teorija Tomasa Hobsa sadrži ideju progresivnog ukрупnjavanja i ujedinjenja moći koju prati napredovanje ljudskog razuma. Ukoliko je napuštanje prirodnog stanja i potčinjavanje suverenu posledica ljudske prirode, slično bi trebalo da važi i za same suverene, pošto Hobs smatra da oni i dalje žive u prirodnom stanju. Prema tome, odnosi među suverenima trebalo bi takođe da vode do ukрупnjavanja političke vlasti, kako osvajanjem, tako i miroljubivom predajom vlasti. Eventualna potpuna defragmentacija moći može takođe imati i eshatološke posledice, pošto bi objedinjena moć jednog čoveka nad celim svetom uklonila nasilje koje je pretilo od drugih suverena kao razlog raspadanja države, dok bi napredak razuma postepeno uklonio njene unutrašnje nesavršenosti. Ova bi hipotetička situacija mogla povezati Hobsov opis carstva Božjeg iz Levijatana sa njegovom širom političkom teorijom: jedinstveni suvereni predstavnik (sada) besmrtnog i sveobuhvatnog levijatana bi se mogao smatrati Antihristom, što bi najavilo drugi Hristov dolazak.

Ključne reči: Hobs, napredak, determinizam, suveren, svetska vlada, antihrist

Snežana Grujić

Može li se izbrisati filozofska svest?

Metafizički aspekti Serlovog neurobiološko-naturalističkog shvatanja slobode volje

Apstrakt U nastojanju da svoja teorijska shvatanja što više usaglasi sa vladajućom prirodno-naučnom paradigmom, Serl (Searle) razvija gledište koje naziva neurobiološki naturalizam, a koje bi trebalo da se u rešavanju bazičnih filozofskih problema oslanja na osnovne činjenice dobijene neuronaučnim istraživanjima živih organizama. Radom se, u kratkim crtama, daje prikaz ove teorije, a potom izvodi argumentacija u prilog postavljene teze da je Serlovo gledište, zapravo, u određenim aspektima, metafizičkog karaktera, a to je upravo ono što je težio da izbegne. Metafizički karakter Serlovog neurobiološkog naturalizma se sagledava na problemu slobode volje, koji proizlazi iz njegovog shvatanja svesti. Argumentacija se zasniva na analizi pojmova jaza i sopstva, kao i mogućih rešenja problema slobode volje (hipoteza 1 i 2).

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Cljučne reči: slobodna volja, svest, jaz, sopstvo, neurobiološki naturalizam

Uvod: Inverzija uloga filozofa i neuro naučnika

Interesantno je da je Džon Serl (John Searle), čiji se bogati filozofski opus kreće od teorije govornih činova, preko etičkog jeste-treba problema, intencionalnog poimanja svesti i kolektivne intencionalnosti kao ključnog pojma za izgrađivanje i tumačenje društvene stvarnosti, u novijim radovima pokazao tendenciju ka prevazilaženju filozofskog pristupa i prihvatanju gotovih prirodno-naučnih rešenja. Stav se naročito očituje u vezi sa problemima svesti, kojima, po Serlu, treba pristupiti uz uvažavanje najnovijih saznanja do kojih je došla neuro nauka. Uloga koju dodeljuje filozofiji u odnosu na prirodne, pre svega neuro nauke, mogla bi da se poredi sa onom koju joj je davno dodelio Toma Akvinski (Thomas Aquinas), mada u odnosu na religiju, a uloga filozofa, sa delatnošću laboranta, jer, kako Serl kaže, on treba da pripremi problem, odnosno, uobličić ga u takvu formu, koja može da bude pogodna za eksperimentalno neurobiološko ispitivanje.

Na ove teorijske pretpostavke je Serl počeo da se oslanja od objavljivanja svoje knjige *Ponovno otkrivanje Duha* (1992), a potom i u svim kasnijim radovima, publikacijama i predavanjima, među kojima su najpoznatiji: *Misterije svesti* (1997), *Svest* (2000), *Problem svesti* (2001), *Razumnost na delu* (2001), *Duh, kratki uvod* (2004), *Sloboda i neurobiologija* (2007). Međutim,

ma koliko nastojao da svoje novo gledište usaglasi sa dva principa koja prepoznaje kao osnove funkcionisanja univerzuma: fizikom i biologijom, Serl zapravo i u radovima posvećenim istraživanju svesti ispoljava „filozofsku naviku“ da izvodi zaključke, kantovski rečeno, i preko granica mogućeg iskustva, naime da formira pojmove, određuje njihov obim i međusobne odnose, koristeći metodologiju koja je više primerena metafizičkom, nego egzaktnom i empirijskom pristupu, kakav bi zahtevalo, bar sudeći po imenu, novoproklamovano gledište.

Ovim radom se postavlja teza da sama Serlova koncepcija slobodne vole, pa i svesti uopšte sadrži metafizičke aspekte koji se ispoljavaju naročito u konstrukciji njegovih pojmova *jaz* i *sopstvo(self)*, prihvatanju već postojećih *determinizam* i *slobodna volja*, kao i korišćenim metodskim postupcima, što sve zajedno čitavoj postavci neurobiološkog naturalizma pridaje metafizički karakter. Savremeni metafizičari nisu mnogo odstupili od tradicionalno utvrđenih zadataka i ciljeva metafizike kao filozofske discipline. O tome Sajder (Sider) piše:

„Ali, metafizičko objašnjenje prirode koja leži u osnovi X, nije usmereno na objašnjenje toga šta mi podrazumevamo pod X kada o njemu govorimo, baš kao što ni kvantna teorija o osnovama prirode jabuka, ljudi i drugih fizičkih objekata nije usmerena da bude teorija o tome šta mi podrazumevamo pod tim nazivima kada o njima govorimo.

Dakle: fundamentalna metafizika nam daje objašnjenje o krajnjoj stvarnosti koja stoji u osnovi običnih činjenica. Ove obične činjenice su one sa kojima smo svakodnevno u dodiru, činjenice koje zdravorazumski uzimamo da bi smo istinito izveštavali koristeći rečenice poput: 'Sto je tvrd' i 'Jabuka je crvena'....zadatak fundamentalne metafizike je da otkrije šta stoji u njihovoj osnovi“ (Sider 2013:157)

Serl, upravo, ispunjava ovaj zadatak metafizike. Tragajući za onim što leži u osnovi pojavnosti stvarnosti, sintetiše elemente neuro kognitivnih saznanja sa sopstvenim pojmovnim konstrukcijama koje nemaju empirijsku saznanost, tvrdeći da se u temelju svih fenomena, pa i filozofskih problema, nalazi jedna ista osnova, koja pritom nije ni materijalna, ni dualna, niti pluralnog karaktera, nego, jednostavno, neuro biološkog i kvantnog.

Neurobiološki naturalizam

Svoju novu teorijsku koncepciju sam Serl naziva *neurobiološki naturalizam*. Kako sam naziv *naturalizam* u filozofiji obuhvata širok spektar teorija i gledišta u različitim filozofskim disciplinama, Serl osobenost svog pristupa povezuje sa aktualnim trenutkom i dostignućima posebnih nauka, što sve omogućava da starim filozofskim problemima pristupi na nov način. Taj nov način podrazumeva korišćenje *osnovnih činjenica*, a ovim izrazom

označava sve naučne činjenice o osnovama ustrojstva univerzuma. Dve osnovne grupe ovih činjenica su iz oblasti atomističke teorije i iz oblasti evolucionističke biologije:

„Dva osnovna principa, od kojih su zavisna sva takva istraživanja, pa i ono na kojem sam ja angažovan, su, prvo, ideja da su najfundamentalniji entiteti u stvarnosti oni koje je opisala atomska fizika; i, drugo, da smo mi, kao biološka stvorenja produkti dugog perioda evolucije, možda dugog pet milijardi godina. Kada jednom usvojite ova gledišta, a njihova poenta nije samo naučna, već je o tome kako svet funkcioniše, i neka od pitanja o ljudskoj svesti će tada podrazumevati jednostavne filozofske odgovore, mada to ne znači da podrazumevaju i jednostavne neurobiološke odgovore“ (Searle 2004:208)¹

Vrlo često se naziv *naturalizam* koristi za ona gledišta koja poriču postojanje fenomena van same prirode, pa je po njima, sve moguće redukovati na neko prirodno svojstvo ili entitet. Tako bi svest ili mogla da bude shvaćena kao fenomen koji može da se svede na neki drugi prirodni fenomen, ili da se negira njeno postojanje. Serl upravo naglašava da on ne razmišlja na taj način:

„To nije smisao naturalizma o kojem ja govorim. Ja tvrdim da je moguće priznati stvarni, intrinzični karakter svesti, razumnosti, jezika, itd. i u isto vreme videti ih kao deo prirodnog sveta. To je sada postalo moguće na način kakav nije ranije bio očigledan.“ (Searle 2007:19)

Svoje gledište ne vidi kao varijantu materijalizma, jer materijalizam najčešće poriče mogućnost svesti kao zasebnog entiteta (eliminativizam), a ponekad je i svodi na neki materijalni fenomen koji može da bude sagledan sa aspekta posmatrača: na ponašanje, funkcionalna stanja organizma, kompjuterski program (redukcionizam). Svest je realno postojeći fenomen i ona nije svodljiva ni na koji drugi entitet. Međutim, Serl sa drugim varijantama naturalizma deli misao o neophodnosti proširivanja svojstva prirodnosti na daleko veći obim entiteta, gotovo na sve postojeće, a razlog kojim to opravdava je stav da sve ima prirodno poreklo: i jezik, i društvo i kultura; oni su, zapravo, manifestacije od prirode dobijenih sposobnosti.

„Baš kao što je ljudska biologija izraz fizike i hemije koje su joj u osnovi, tako je i ljudska kultura, u svim svojim manifestacijama izraz bioloških kapaciteta za jezik, racionalnost i dr. koji su im u osnovi. Pretpostavka da zato što možemo da pišemo poeziju i razvijamo naučne teorije nekako pripadamo odvojenoj stvarnosti i nismo deo realnog sveta u kojem živimo je vrsta mistifikacije.“ (Searle 2007:32)

Svoje opredeljenje za naturalistički koncept, Serl vidi kao neku vrstu nezavisnosti od filozofskih teorija, koje mogu dogmatski da sputavaju dolaženje

1 Svi citati u radu su prevod autorke, S.G.

do istine. Očigledno je da teži da izbegne svaku vrstu mistifikacijskog postuliranja entiteta kao zasebnih stvarnosti, odvojenih od realnosti koju je moguće kvantno i neuro empirijski posmatrati i analizirati. Smatra da novo stanovište može da prihvati samo neko ko poseduje određeni fond naučnih znanja, a pri tom ne zavisi od filozofskih teorija. Svoje napredovanje u sagledavanju problema Serl demonstrira ne samo deklarativnim odbacivanjem poznatih teorijskih modela poput dualizma, kartezijanizma, materijalizma ili epifenomenalizma, već i uobičajenog filozofskog vokabulara, čije mesto zauzimaju termini karakteristični za prirodne nauke. Serl kao da preporučuje da se teškoće u rešavanju filozofskih problema rešavaju napuštanjem filozofije. Ovo zaista stoji kao mogućnost, jer napuštanjem filozofske pozicije, nestaje i veliki deo filozofskih problema, ali se Serl nije dosledno držao ovog svog rešenja. Jer iako izjavljuje da nastupa sa pozicija fizike, njegovo stanovište je još uvek filozofsko. I sam naturalizam je, ipak, filozofsko učenje, a ne pravac u biologiji ili fizici.

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Tradicionalni i neuro empirijski pristup problemu slobode volje

Problem slobode volje je Serl nazvao „skandalom u filozofiji“ (Searle 2007:37), jer, dok se u svim ostalim filozofskim disciplinama nazire napredak u rešavanju, u vezi sa ovim pitanjem, i nakon vekovnih razmatranja, kao da se nalazimo još uvek na početku. Sličnog su mišljenja i drugi savremeni mislioci: Habermas (Habermas), koji stanje u filozofiji, odnosno zainteresovanost za tradicionalne filozofske probleme i na početku novog milenijuma karakteriše rečima: „...osećamo se kao da smo se premestili u 19. vek“ (Habermas 2009:183); dok Kejn (Kane 2005:8) piše da zabrinutost zbog određenih determinističkih objašnjenja ljudskom ponašanju traje i danas, „...a debate o slobodnoj volji postaju usijanije nego ikada“.

Pojam slobode volje, ali i nužnosti kao njene suprotnosti, je prisutan u ljudskoj kulturi još od mitskih vremena, jer se tiče samog identiteta čoveka, njegovog mesta i odnosa prema ostatku sveta i prirode, društvu i samome sebi. Kao takav, tumačen je i istraživan sa aspekata različitih filozofskih i drugih nauka, a tokom istorije filozofije usklađivan sa tada aktuelnim ljudskim znanjima, religijskim ili naučnim, pa je sasvim očekivano da su i savremena neuro naučna otkrića uticala na pojavu objašnjenja slobodne volje u tom duhu. Rešenja problema slobodne volje mogu da se generalno grupišu na dva osnovna: deterministička i indeterministička, a različita tumačenja njihove međusobne spojivosti i isključivosti rezultirala su prelaznim filozofskim rešenjima: kompatibilizmom, inkompatibilizmom, liberalizmom, kao i različitim podtipovima ovih gledišta.

Ponovno zanimanje za, do pre par decenija odbačeno „metafizičko“ pitanje o slobodi volje, podstakla su, između ostalog, i istraživanja u oblasti neuro-nauka, a posebno eksperimenti izvedeni 80-ih godina 20. veka. Naime,

Bendžamin Libet (Benjamin Libet), neurofiziolog je, baveći se ispitivanjima neuronskih aktivnosti i pragovima naših oseta, izveo eksperiment koji je ozbiljno doveo u pitanje ljudsku samouverenu tezu o slobodi odlučivanja, izbora i delovanja, kao i sve druge opcije filozofskog rešenja problema slobode volje, sem determinističke. Dajući ispitanicima jednostavne zadatke motoričkog karaktera, oni su samo bili u obavezi da pritiskanjem tastera označe trenutak kada su doneli odluku da izvrše zadati pokret. Libetova merenja su pokazala, međutim, da je motorička aktivnost već bila počela i pre svesti o donetoj odluci. Iako sam Libet na osnovu rezultata svojih merenja i istraživanja nije tvrdio da treba izvesti zaključak o potpunoj determinisanosti ljudskog ponašanja, već samo to da čovekova svest o sopstvenom htenju ne aktivira moždane aktivnosti zadužene za pokrete, jer su, u ovim slučajevima, oni bili već otpočeli, pojavile su se neuronaučne teorije koje su u potpunosti negirale bilo kakvu mogućnost delovanja čoveka na tokove prirodnog kauzaliteta. Dok je kod Libeta čovekova slobodna volja svedena na svojevrsnog blokatora neprihvatljivih (a možda već započetih kretanja), kod drugih teoretičara, neurologa pre svega, ona je okarakterisana kao čista iluzija. Istraživanja u prošloj deceniji idu dalje težeći da uoče i opišu korelaciju između moralnog prosuđivanja i aktivacije pojedinih regiona moždane kore.

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Sam Serl u svojim radovima upućuje na istraživanja Krika i Koha (Crick & Koch 2008) i njihovu „building block“ teoriju svesti, po kojoj bi, ukoliko bi se našlo objašnjenje za funkcionisanje svesti u jednom bloku neurona, npr. vizuelnom, bilo moguće, putem analogije, lako zaključiti i o ostalim poljima, a samim tim i o svesti u celini, odnosno problemu slobode volje. (Searle 2000:11)

Izuzetno su značajni nalazi Keninga (Koenig) i njegovih saradnika, koji su promatrali neurobiološke procese u mozgu pre donošenja moralnih odluka. Tada postavljena hipoteza da je za određene vrste moralnih dilema, odnosno za prosuđivanje u skladu sa ispravnim i pravедnim, od presudnog značaja funkcionisanje ventromedijalnog prefrontalnog korteksa (VMPC), višestruko je do danas potvrđivana brojnim empirijskim istraživanjima. Neurobiološke studije permanentno dokazuju da se pri moralnom prosuđivanju aktivira oblast za koju se zna da proizvodi emocije, a bihevioralna istraživanja da spoljašnjim intervenisanjem pri određenim afektivnim stanjima može doći do promena moralnih stavova i odluka kod jednog istog čoveka.

„Međutim, neuro ispitivanja ne utvrđuju da li pretpostavljene emotivne aktivnosti jesu uzrok ili posledica moralnog prosuđivanja; ispitivanje ponašanja zdravih pojedinaca ne upućuje na neuralnu osnovu moralnog suđenja; i nijedna klinička studija nije naročito ispitivala moralno prosuđivanje (kao različito od moralnog rezonovanja i ponašanja) pacijenata sa oštećenjima fokalnog dela mozga. Ukratko, nijedno od postojećih

istraživanja ne utvrđuje da delovi mozga koji učestvuju u emocionalnim procesima jesu nužni za stvaranje moralnog prosuđivanja. Kao rezultat nam ostaje kritički jaz u predočenom iskustvu u odnosu na moralno prosuđivanje, emocije i mozak.“ (Koenig 2007:908).

Sam autor time poziva na obazrivost u donošenju konačnih zaključaka, naročito po pitanju kauzaliteta i govori o praznini – jazu koji evidentno postoji u praćenju procesa na neuro nivou prilikom svesnog mišljenja, odnosno, donošenju odluka.

Stavovi koje je Serl izgradio u poslednje dve decenije u vezi sa pitanjima svesti, odnosa duha i tela i slobodi volje u velikoj meri kompiliraju navedena, kao i druga otkrića empirijskih neuro nauka.

Serlovo shvatanje svest

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Analiza metodskog načina pristupa problemu svesti, kao i izboru ključnih intrinzičnih svojstava same svesti, ukazuje da Serlov metod nije empirijskog karaktera, već fenomenološkog; svojstva svesti su otkrivena subjektivnim doživljajem, nazvanim *ontologija prvog lica*. Ključni filozofski problemi, po njegovom izboru: svesti, intencionalnosti, jezika, racionalnosti, slobode volje, politike i etike, objedinjeni su „teorijom nad teorijama“, neurobiološkim naturalizmom, što je, takođe poznati manir metafizičkih filozofskih učenja. Upravo zato Serl upućuje da bavljenje problemom slobode volje podrazumeva da smo već istražili opšti problem svesti, kauzaliteta, naučnog objašnjenja i racionalnosti i da za sve njih postoji zajednički put do rešenja, koji omogućava tačnije, bolje, ispravnije sagledavanje problema, mada još uvek ne i njegovo sigurno rešenje. (Searle 2004)

Pogrešan pristup problemu svesti Serl smatra kardinalom greškom, a ona je evidentna u postojećim teorijskim pristupima. Njegova kritika se odnosi prvenstveno na gledišta Deneta, Čalmersa i Hofštadtera (Dennett, Chalmers and Hofstadter), koji su rešavanje problema odnosa duha i tela, svesti i mozga, po Serlu, odvodili doslovno na stranputicu. Pogrešan pristup je zapravo onaj empirijskog karaktera i može da bude dvojak: bihejvioralni i kompjuterijalni. Svest se posmatra ili kao centar dispozicija za buduće ponašanje ili kao funkcionalno predvidiv niz operacija, analogno kompjuterskom softveru. Serl se nizom svojih radova suprotstavio ovim grubim pojednostavljivanjima fenomena svesti, a njegov najpopularniji argument je tzv. *Kineska soba*. Argumentom se dokazuje, ne da kompjuter ili neki drugi predmet, stolica npr. nisu svesni (što je možda nemoguće dokazati), već da vršenje operacija upotrebe simbola nije dovoljan uslov za pojavu svesti, tj. za zaključak o svesnoj manipulaciji tim simbolima. Kompjuterski programi su sintaksičke strukture, a to nije garant njihove semantičke upotrebe. Poznavanje sintaksičke manipulacije

ne podrazumeva i poznavanje semantike. Otuda, mentalna stanja mogu da postoje potpuno odvojeno i nezavisno od ove kombinatorike iskaznih elemenata. Slično, ponašanje sagledano sa pozicije trećeg lica može da izgleda logički povezano i kao da je praćeno svesnošću aktera ponašanja, a da, ustvari, ništa ne dokazuje njegovu povezanost sa kvalitativnim stanjima i procesima u svesti; svest i ponašanje mogu da se posmatraju kao dva odvojena i nezavisna sistema.

Čestim i velikim propustom pri istraživanju svesti, Serl smatra primenu tzv. objektivističkog pristupa, u skladu sa epistemičkim zahtevima savremene nauke, pristupa koji isključuje subjektivnu perspektivu. Ona se tretira kao svaki drugi predmet istraživanja, odnosno, zanemaruje se fenomenalna dimenzija svesnosti. O svesti ima smisla govoriti i proučavati je samo ako se uzme u obzir doživljavanje svesnosti, aspekt prvoga lica. Svest nije neki tamo spoljašnji objekat o kojem možemo da govorimo samo sa pozicije neutralnog posmatrača – trećeg lica. Pošto stanja svesti, sama po sebi, moraju da budu subjektivna, subjektivnost je njeno osnovno svojstvo. Serl taj pristup istraživanja kroz sopstveni doživljaj naziva *ontologijom prvog lica* ili *subjektivnom ontologijom*. Njen preduslov je da bude doživljena od strane ljudske ili životinjske svesti. Suprotna joj je *ontologija trećeg lica* ili objektivna ontologija, koja podrazumeva proučavanje oblika postojanja koji su nezavisni od svesti bilo kog živog bića, poput planina, drveća, molekula. Na ovu distinkciju u doživljaju svesti prvi je skrenuo pažnju Nejgel (Nagel), koji se, i pored svih empirijskih saznanja o slepim miševima, njihovom načinu života i biološkim karakteristikam – ontološki pristup trećeg lica, opravdano zapitao o samom unutrašnjem doživljaju, kako to izgleda biti slepi miš – ontološki pristup prvog lica.

Jedino ontologijom prvog lica može da se shvati jedinstvo svesti, koja je takođe njeno važno kvalitativna svojstvo. Ono doprinosi da svest fenomenalno doživljava kao celine, a ne odvojena svojstva. Tako, npr. pri vizuelnom opažaju svest ujedinjuje linije, oblike, boju, veličinu, iako su to opazile zasebne oblasti mozga. Jedinstvo svesti je trenutno i uključuje i memorisane saržaje. Svi pređašnji doživljaji, u svakom datom trenutku, učestvuju u oblikovanju sadašnjeg mentalnog iskustva, bilo da smo toga svesni ili ne. Serl navodi primer eksperimenata na oslepelim osobama, koje, iako ne vide pokazane X i O simbole, sa velikim procentom tačnosti odgovaraju na pitanje šta je ispred njih, iako i sami ne znaju u čemu je tajna njihove uspešnosti. Jedinstvo svesti je, tako, bar dvostruko: u pogledu simultanog dejstva svih prethodnih iskustava i u pogledu organizacije naših sadašnjih svesnih trenutaka koji se ne doživljavaju kao zasebni, već kao ujedinjeni u mentalnom doživljaju fenomena. Potpuno drugačiji utisak o tuđim svestima imamo kada su sagledane sa strane, sa aspekta trećeg lica; tada se svest najčešće percipira kao da je parcijalna.

Kvalitativnost svesti se, po Serlu, sastoji u tome što je svako mentalno iskustvo praćeno naročitim kvalitativnim osećanjem. Ono zavisi od sadržaja mišljenja, forme, načina izražavanja, jezika, istinitosti. Iako je svestan da neki filozofi za ovu specifičnost ljudske svesnosti koriste naročit pojam – kvalije, on ga nerado prihvata, jer smatra da se time problem samo udvostručava. Kvalije nisu ništa drugo nego svest sama. Radi se više o terminološkoj razlici. Kvalije su, za Serla, samo prular za svesno stanje.

Kombinacija subjektivnosti, jedinstvenosti i kvalitativnosti čine suštinu svesti kao fenomena. I ujedno osobenosti koje svest izdvajaju kao naročit prirodni fenomen.

Intencionalnost je takođe bitna osobina svesti. Ovaj Huserlov pojam, osmišljen sa namerom da naglasi upućenost svesti na predmet sopstvenog mišljenja, se poput lajt-motiva pojavljuje u svim Serlovim teorijama, naravno, sa donekle izmenjenim i specifičnim sadržajem. Jezik i govorni činovi, društveno konstruisana stvarnost, pa i sama svest koja je u osnovi i sve ih povezuje, odlikuju se univerzalnom osobinom intencionalnosti. On piše da je „intencionalnost „ naziv koji filozofi i psiholozi daju onoj karakteristici mnogih naših mentalnih stanja po kojoj su ona usmerena ka ili o stanjima ili stvarima u svetu. Ako imamo verovanje ili želju ili strah, uvek mora da postoji neki sadržaj tog našeg verovanja, želje ili straha. Oni mora da budu o nečemu, čak i kada to nešto ne postoji ili je halucinacija. Čak i u slučajevima kada potpuno grešimo, mora da postoji neki mentalni sadržaj čije se značenje odnosi na svet. (Searle, 1993).

Ključno pitanje intencionalnosti svesti je, zapravo, kako je ona uopšte moguća. Jer, kako nešto tako apstaktno i eterično poput misli može da teži nečemu van sebe, pri čemu je to nešto sasvim drugačije prirode? Ovom problemu, smatra Serl, treba pristupati na sasvim prizeman način. Pravo pitanje je: kako gladna životinja teži hrani ili žedna vodi? Time se problem demistifikuje, čime se otvara mogućnost rešenja u prostoru biologije životinjskih organizama.

Sem ovih osnovnih – subjektivnosti, kvalitativnosti, jedinstvenosti i intencionalnosti, Serl svesti pripisuje i neke druge osobine: sposobnost razlikovanja i pomeranja centralne i periferne pažnje, doživljavanja iskustva u određenom raspoloženju, doživljaja prijatnosti ili neprijatnosti, reorganizovanja stimulusa u smislene celine, doživljaja prisnosti i u nepoznatim situacijama i td.

U kasnijim radovima, Serl donekle produbljuje, pojašnjava ili precizira šta podrazumeva pod određenim svojstvima, ali ne menja mišljenje u pogledu bazičnih odlika naše svesti. Ono što unosi kao novinu je nov pristup problemu. Sve mentalne fenomene i probleme koji u vezi sa njima proizilaze treba, po Serlu, posmatrati naturalistički. Naturalizam je, tako, ujedinjuća

nad teorija, koja svim esencijalnim pojmovima i entitetima daje smisao u skladu sa svojim postavljenim principima.

Serlova definicija svesti, koja u pojednostavljenoj varijanti, glasi da je svest „subjektivno, kvalitativno stanje osećaja, osećanja ili budnosti“ (Searle, 2007:5) , vremenom je dopunjena važnom novinom: tvrdnjem da su svesna stanja prouzrokovana neuronskim moždanim procesima i da se svest *dogada* u mozgu. Neuronaučna istraživanja su potvrdila da svesna stanja imaju svoje neuronske korelate koje je označila sa NCC. Filozofski problem odnosa duha i tela svodi se, tako na neurobiološki problem objašnjenja procesa u mozgu koji dovode do doživljaja svesnosti, a uloga filozofa na uobličavanje problema u takvu formu koja može da bude pogodna za eksperimentalno neurobiološko ispitivanje. Prednost ovom pristupu Serl daje na osnovu zdravorazumski prihvatljivih činjenica do kojih je najnovija nauka došla, pri čemu preporučuje da se istorija filozofskih pokušaja rešavanja problema odnosa duha i tela ostavi po strani, baš kao i svi, među filozofima omiljeni, hipotetički scenariji poput zombija, afazije, mozga u boci i sličnih.

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„Verujem da u svom filozofskom obliku (mada ne i u svom neurobiološkom obliku), problem odnosa duha i tela ima sasvim jednostavno rešenje. Evo ga: sva naša svesna stanja su prouzrokovana neuronskim procesima nižeg nivoa u mozgu, a oni sami su moždana svojstva. Ovo sasvim očigledno možete da vidite na slučaju bola. Moji prisutni bolovi su prouzrokovani serijama neuronskih impulsa koji počinju u perifernim nervnim završecima, nastavljaju se do kičmene moždine, kroz Lisauerov trakt i ulaze u talamus i druge osnovne regije mozga. Neki od njih se šire do čulnog korteksa, naročito do zone 1, i na kraju ovaj redosled dovodi do toga da osetim bol. Šta su ovi bolovi? Sami bolovi su jednostavno moždana svojstva višeg nivoa. Subjektivno, kvalitativno iskustvo bola , u celini svesnog polja je prouzrokovano neurobiološkim procesima u mozgu i ostatku nervnog sistema, i oni sami su, kao elementi jedinstvenog polja svesnosti, karakteristike neuronskog sistema i drugih ćelija u sastavu ljudskog mozga.“ (Searle 2001:272)

Kada kaže da se svest dešava u mozgu i da nastaje aktivnošću neurona, Serl ne misli da neuroni individualno mogu da dovedu do efekta svesnosti. Pojedinačne i zasebne aktivnosti neurona on svrstava u moždane procese nižeg nivoa. Oni uzrokuju pojavu svesti. Međutim, ona se realizuje tek na višem nivou moždanih procesa koji podrazumeva skupove međusobnih neuronskih dejstava na sistemskom nivou. Kao što osobine neurona i njihovih aktivnosti ne bi trebalo pripisivati svesti kao celini koju oni obrazuju, tako i ono što su odlike svesti koja je sistemska moždana aktivnost, ne bi trebalo dodeljivati elementima nižeg nivoa moždanih procesa. Čitav fenomen je moguće posmatrati i kao logičke greške kompozicije, odnosno deobe. Ove logičke greške zapravo dovode do zaključka o eliminativizmu, odnosno redukcionizmu.

Kada tvrdi da se svest realizuje na višim nivoima moždanih aktivnosti, on ne misli da je svest nešto što se dešava samo na površini mozga. Da bi izbegao pogrešna tumačenja, Serl piše:

„Ranije sam opisivao svest kao osobenost višeg nivoa moždanog sistema. Metafora višeg i nižeg, mada, uobičajena u literaturi (i sam je koristim), mislim da je pogrešna. Ona sugerise da je svest, takoreći, kao lak na površini stola, što je pogrešno. Ideja koju pokušavamo da izrazimo je da je svest karakteristika celog sistema... Važno je naglasiti ovu tačku, jer je suprotna našem kartezijanskom nasleđu koje kaže da svest nema prostornost. Svest je smeštena u određenim delovima mozga i deluje kauzalno u zavisnosti od lokacija u mozgu.“ (Searle, 2001:505)

Sistemski nivo obuhvata, ne samo neuronske aktivnosti, već i njihove sinapse i neurotransmitere. Sve što karakteriše svesnost u nekom datom momentu, isljučivo je, po Serlu, određeno događanjima na mikro nivou, u i među neuronima.

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Serl je svestan da njegovo „jednostavno rešenje“ problema odnosa duha i tela nailazi na otpor kod većine filozofa. Razlog je, po njemu, što oni i dalje mistifikuju problem i sagledavaju ga u svetlu kartezijanskog dualizma. I sam tradicionalni vokabular klasifikuje fenomene na sirove fizičke procese i mistične mentalne entitete. A rešenje je u poimanju i jednog i drugog kao realnih svojstava samoga mozga.

Treba primetiti da epistemički pristup svojstvima mozga izazvanih delovanjem neuronskih procesa sigurno ne može da bude *ontologijom prvog lica*. Jedini put saznanja o neuronima je put objektivnih, empirijskih istraživanja kojima se neuro nauke uobičajeno i služe. Serlovo insistiranje na *subjektivnoj ontologiji*, je pristup karakterističan za istraživanja u savremenoj filozofiji duha. Serl ih u svojoj teoriji sintetiše, ali bez preciznih ograničenja njihovih domena. Stiče se utisak da neuronske aktivnosti višeg nivoa mogu i treba da se sagledavaju sa subjektivnog aspekta, ali kako je između nižih i viših aktivnosti evidentiran jaz, nema pouzdanih pokazatelja da su oni efekti neuronskih aktivnosti nižeg nivoa i kako da niži nivo subjektivno saznajemo.

Problem slobode volje kao pitanje uklapanja

Kontekst zvaničnih naučnih paradigmi: neuronaučnih znaja, opšte atomističke materijalističke teorije i teorije evolucije prema Serlu, pomera težište i filozofskih interesovanja. Kao bazično filozofsko pitanje savremenog trenutka, postavlja se pitanje našeg individualnog odnosa prema svetu interpretiranom u objektivističkom i materijalističkom duhu. Ili, kako Serl jednostavno kaže, kako se mi uklapamo u sve to. Sa jedne strane, mi smo svesni subjekti koji mogu da navedu racionalne razloge za sopstveni

doživljaj slobode, a sa druge, neumitne determinističke naučne interpretacije empirijskih činjenica tvrde da sve u prirodi ima svoje antecedentno dovoljne uzroke. To bi značilo da se stvari dešavaju na osnovu tih dovoljnih uzroka i nezavisno od intervencije naše volje, kao dodatnog antecedensa. Postoji li opravdanost za dvostruko viđenje iste stvarnosti ili je moguće naći jedinstveno objašnjenje koje stoji u pozadini ovih različitih perspektiva?

Doživljaj slobode volje je čoveku toliko upečatljiv, da je on ubeđen da je ona deo njegove ličnosti. Tek po prihvatanju volje kao slobodne, čovek i može da bude ličnost. Takođe, i da uopšte postavi pitanje da li je volja slobodna. Tako da, Serl smatra da u samoj svesti, u ontologiji prvog lica, ništa nije problematično. Ali, nije ni sa aspekta ontologije trećeg lica. Problem se pojavljuje prilikom njihovog korenspondiranja. Pitamo se da li tom doživljaju slobode odgovaraju određeni realni događaji, da li je istinit ili je samo iluzija bez ikakve korelacije sa spoljašnjim svetom. Neurobiološki pristup podrazumeva da, ako sloboda volje nije iluzija, postoji određeno stanje neurona koje izaziva taj doživljaj.

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Ono što, zapravo, rešavanjem problema slobodne volje želimo da otkrijemo je da znamo šta se dešava u trenutku odlučivanja i izboru jedne radnje, a ne neke njoj suprotne. Šta nas opredeljuje npr. kada biramo jelo u restoranu iz menija, jer, kako primećuje Serl, čak i deterministi ne dočekuju kелnera izjavom da su deterministi i da će sačekati da vide šta će dalje da se dešava. I sama ta rečenica je, zapravo, potvrda našeg slobodnog izbora u govoru. Nama jednostavno ideja padne na pamet i onda je i sprovedemo u delo. Detaljnija analiza tog „padanja na pamet“ pokazuje da je naš razum uskraćen za mogućnost praćenja toka od trenutka kada smo postali svesni različitih mogućnosti, razloga koji opredeljuju naš izbor i konačnog donošenja i realizovanja odluke. Kao da smo svesni samo sekvenci, a one su nam dovoljne za doživljaj donošenja slobodne odluke sopstvenom voljom. Sloboda volje je, tako, naše popunjavanje praznina idejom dodatnog antecedenta koji smo mi sami.

Trostruki jaz

Duhovita upotreba izraza „Mind the gap“², koja se povezuje sa Serlovim stanovištem, trebalo bi da skrene pažnju na još uvek neistražena polja kauzalnosti na neuro nivou. Kada govori o uzročnosti, Serl podrazumeva eficientni kauzalitet, a za Aristotela izjavljuje da neopravdano učetrostručuje uzročnosti, jer, svi uzroci su eficientni. Mentalna uzročnost je podvrsta eficientne. Podrazumeva slučajeve kada nešto delujući izaziva određena mentalna stanja i obrnuto, kada mentalna stanja prouzrokuju to

2 Opšte poznato upozorenje u stanicama britanskog metroa koje skreće pažnju na prostor između platforme i voza

nešto drugo. Posebna vrsta mentalne kauzalnosti je intencionalna kauzalnost. Pri intencionalnim stanjima se ili prouzrokuju uslovi za zadovoljenje intencije ili isti ti uslovi prouzrokuju intencionalno stanje. Tako da je intencionalna kauzalnost relacija između intencionalnog stanja i uslova za zadovoljenje intencije. Intencionalnost i voljnost Serl zamišlja kao sliku i njen odraz u ogledalu, a pravce njihovih delovanja kao suprotne u odnosu na osu njihove simetrije – objekat intencije i voljnosti. Pri tome, treba imati na umu da pojmovi: intencija, namera, kauzalnost, odluka, imaju smisla samo ukoliko se svesnost posmatramo celovito, a moždane aktivnosti kao sistemske, dakle oni važe samo za moždane aktivnosti višeg niva. Za niže nivoe neuronskih aktivnosti važe pojmovi: neuron, sinapsa, transmitter. Neuronski okidači na nižem nivou prouzrokuju namere, odluke, ili dejlovanje na višem, ali umesto odgovora na pitanje kako je to moguće, konstatuje se samo praznina. Taj jaz između nivoa moždanih aktivnosti zapravo realno ne postoji, jer:

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„Nema praznina u mozgu.“ (Searle 2001:505)

Takođe, jaz nema ni svoj čulni korelat u percepciji, koja može da teče potpuno sukcesivno. Ali, kako mi nemamo iskustvo, odnosno doživljaj tih stanja koja posreduju između razmatranja, odlučivanja i delovanja, odnosno ne poznajemo dovoljne razloge za prelazak sa jednog na naredni nivo, Serl uvodi pojam „jaza“ kao opšti naziv za ovaj tip nedostataka. Jaz se najpre pojavljuje između razloga za odluku i same odluke, potom između donete odluke i početka delovanja, a onda i između početka i nastavka odnosno dovršetka delovanja. Diskontinuitet se javlja, dakle, na prelasku svesti u narednu fazu, a ono što svakako treba naglasiti je da se jaz pojavljuje unutar same svesti, a ne između svesti i tela. Identifikovanje trostrukog jaza je za Serla od presudnog značaja, jer da nema jaza, ne bi bilo ni problema slobodne volje. Praznina se ne doživljava kao takva, već se jaz manifestuje kao utisak posedovanja slobodne volje. Pitanje slobode volje je problem same svesti, a ne njene relacije prema nečemu drugom, odnosno telu. Na osnovu kartezijanske tradicije dva stanja svesti koja se nalaze na suprotnim krajevima jaza se interpretiraju kao dve zasebne supstancije koje ne mogu da utiču jedna na drugu. Sem doživljaja jaza, za ubeđenje postupanja po slobodnoj volji neophodan je aspekt prvog lica, u pristupu problemu. Samo onaj ko odlučuje može da zna da li je postupao na osnovu slobodnog izbora svoje volje. Nužni uslov ovog racionalnog agensa koji rasuđuje, odlučuje, deluje i promišlja sve to, Serl formuliše kao *Sopstvo* (*Self*):

„Da razložimo ovo detaljnije, nužni elementi za organizam da poseduje sopstvo u mom smislu su: prvo, mora da ima jedinstveno polje svesti; drugo, mora da poseduje kapacitete za odlučivanje i rezonovanje, a ovo ne podrazumeva samo kognitivne sposobnosti percepcije i memorisanja, već i sposobnost upravljanja intencionalnim stanjima kako da stignu do

racionalnih odluka; i treće, organizam mora da je u stanju da inicira i sprovodi u delo radnju (u starom žargonu, mora da ima 'volju' ili 'agensa')“ (Searle 2007:73)

Serl je mišljenja da preciznim navođenjem uslova sopstva sprečava metafizičke interpretacije ovog pojma. Ipak, i sam, da bi ga pojasnio, u trećem kriterijumu kao sinonim koristi stari, metafizički pojam volje, za koji ne daje neku svoju, drugačiju definiciju. Takođe, tvrdi da je sopstvo nesvodljivo na bilo šta drugo. Ontologija prvog lica ne može biti zamenjena ontologijom trećeg lica. Ali, prilikom kasnijeg iznošenja mogućeg rešenja problema slobodne volje (hipoteza2), Serl jasno naglašava da su sve odlike sopstva, u svakom trenutku, određene dešavanjima na neuro nivou. Zašto su onda nesvodljive na neuro nivo? Šta je to što pridolazi kao dodatni antecedens uz zbirno delovanje neurona? Može li se novo kvalitativno stanje jednostavno protumačiti kao svest sama? Zašto se postulira dodatni entitet sopstva, kada su svojstva svesti i sopstva gotovo identična? Sva ova pitanja u Serlovom poimanju sopstva, a time i slobodne volje, ostaju bez jasnog odgovora. Mora se zaključiti da to čitavu teoriju slobodne volje dodatno mistifikuje.

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Dve hipoteze mogućeg rešenja

Klasičan primer čoveka koji se nalazi u procesu premišljanja, odmeravanja razloga i efekata, pre konačnog donošenja odluke i njenog izvršenja je mitološki lik Parisa, koji je dobio zadatak da izbor najlepše među boginjama pokaže poklanjanjem jabuke. Boginje nude primamljive nagrade ukoliko dobiju jabuku, ali Parisov konačni izbor je Afrodita, koja mu obećava da će biti sa najlepšom ženom na svetu. Koristeći ovaj mitski primer kao ilustraciju za praćenje toka svesti pri slobodnom odlučivanju, Serl tvrdi da pretpostavke mogu da idu u dva smera. Izdvaja trenutak t1 u kojem počinje Parisova refleksija i ovaj period odmeravanja razloga traje do trenutka donošenja odluke koji je obeležio kao t2. Moguće je pretpostaviti da: a) pošto u međuvremenu Paris ne dobija nikakve nove informacije, antecedensi koji deluju u t1 su bili dovoljni da dovedu do t2, dakle, efekat, odnosno izbor Afrodite je bio prouzrokovan istim uzrocima, koji su već delovali u t1; b) stanje u t1 nije kauzalno dovoljno da dovede do t2, već je na njega delovao i dodatni antecedens. U prvom slučaju bi smo morali da se pomirimo sa činjenicom da slobodna volja ne postoji, a u drugom bi smo potvrdili njeno postojanje. Serl se, međutim, ne bavi direktnim rešavanjem ovako postavljenog problema, već težište pomera na neuro nivo, na pitanje da li je doživljaj slobodne volje prouzrokovan nekim događanjima u neurobiološkim procesima, pri čemu taj nivo smatra potpuno determinisanim. Analogno iznetim mogućnostima sagledavanja problema formuliše dvostruku mogućnost rešenja: hipotezu 1 i hipotezu 2.

Hipoteza 1 podrazumeva da su stanja mozga u t1 i u t2 identična i da je stanje u t2 potpuno kauzalno određeno stanjem mozga u t1. Iako iz toga proizilazi shvatanje o potpuno determinisanom kauzalnom lancu koji deluje na neurobiološkom nivou istovremeno mora da se prizna i Parisov doživljaj slobodnog izbora. Kako taj doživljaj slobodne volje nema adekvatan korelat u neurobiološkoj procesima mozga, onda mora da se zaključi da je Paris zapravo u iluziji. Moždana stanja u trenucima doživljavanja iluzije slobodne volje su posledica prethodnih moždanih stanja koja su kauzalno delovala na njih. Naše ponašanje je određeno tim moždanim stanjima i nikakvo delovanje van kauzalnog lanca nije moguće, pa je sloboda volje epifenomen koji nam je podarila evolucija. Dakle, neurobiološki determinizam bi trebalo da korespondira sa psihološkim libertanijalizmom, a kako su oni nekompatibilni, neophodno je pretpostaviti jaz koji je već pomenut. Ovoj hipotezi sam Serl navodi, za njegovu teoriju, veoma važan prigovor, a to je da ona zapravo poništava evoluciju i mogućnost da čovekovo racionalno mišljenje i delovanje imaju bilo kakvu funkcionalnu ulogu u životu i opstanku.

Hipoteza 2 podrazumeva prihvatanje sledećih pretpostavki: 1) psihološki osećaj slobode istovremeno prati nepostojanje kauzalnih dovoljnih uslova (za pojavu slobode) na neuro nivou; 2) prelazak iz stanja u t1 u stanje u t2 je moguće samo ukoliko se oni shvataju kao systemske karakteristike moždanih procesa; 3) sve odlike sopstva su u svakom trenutku određene dešavanjima na neuro nivou. Ali, iako je svaki trenutak svesti određen trenutnim stanjem neuro nivoa, dešavanja na neuro nivou nisu dovoljni uslovi za prouzrokovanje prelaska na naredni nivo, pri odlučivanju ili delovanju. Metodom ostatka, onda, Serl zaključuje da mora da deluju još neki uzroci i on ih pronalazi u inicijalnim stanjima racionalnog mišljenja. I iz ove hipoteze proističe jaz, jer mi nismo u mogućnosti da svesno pratimo kauzalne delovanje tih inicijalnih svesnih stanja. A kako je ovo moguće kada je naše telo kontinuirani sistem, bez ikakvih izolovanih delova i diskontinuiranih praznina, a stanja svesti imaju svoje neuronske korelate, trebalo bi objasniti dodatnom analizom neurobioloških procesa. Iz ovoga bi proizlazilo da sloboda volje postoji i da se pojavljuje kao vremenski fenomen. Sloboda volje ima svoj neuronski korelat i ona nije iluzija.

Na pitanje, tj. prigovor, zašto bi hipoteza 1 više od hipoteze 2 ukazivala na epifenomenalni karakter svesti i slobode volje, Serl odgovara da je kriterijum za epifenomenalnost mogućnost činilaca da samostalno funkcionišu kao uzroci. Epifenomenalnost svesti u ovom slučaju je posledica kauzalne isuficijencije za doživljaj iskustva jaza i napora uma da taj nedostatak uzroka nadomesti, što međutim nije dovoljno za otkrivanje šta se zaista dešava. U svakom slučaju, iako mi mislimo da je tok našeg mišljenja poseban kauzalni lanac u odlučivanju, hipoteza 1 to negira i celokupno odlučivanje određuje jedino kauzalnim lancem na neuro nivou. Doživljaj jaza, kao

i utisak racionalnog odlučivanja su kauzalno potpuno irelevantni, i zbog toga i epifenomenalni. Nepopularnost hipoteze 1 je u tome što prihvatanje epifenomenalnog karaktera naše svesti i slobodne volje, znači negiranje mogućnosti uticaja čoveka kao svesnog bića na događanja u prirodi oko sebe, ali i na samoga sebe, na osnovu čega je ova pretpostavka direktno negiranje i teorije evolucije. Razlika u složenosti rešenja ilustruje se konstruisanjem veštačkih mašina po modelima hipoteza 1 i 2. Dok je sasvim moguće na osnovu hipoteze 1 konstruisati veštačku mašinu, odnosno kompjuterski program koji bi funkcionisao na isti način, u slučaju hipoteze 2 to već nije slučaj. Ovde se pokazuje složeni dvostruki lanac kauzalnosti, od kojih je jedan sasvim nepredvidiv i do te mere proizvoljan da može čak i da ne učestvuje u procesu odlučivanja. Zato je bilo teško usaglasiti je sa prirodno-naučnom paradigmom. Navedeni nedostaci prve i izazov ukla-panja sa ostalim naučnim znanjima, Serla zapravo usmeravaju ka drugoj hipotezi, iako se on eksplicitno ne opredeljuje. Ideju za prevazilaženje teškoća u vezi sa hipotezom 2, Serl nalazi u kvantnoj teoriji:

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„Premisa 1. Sav indeterminizam u prirodi je kvantni indeterminizam
Premisa 2. Svest je karakteristika prirode koja ispoljava indeterminizam
Zaključak. Svest ispoljava kvantni indeterminizam“ (Searle 2007:75)

Dakle, pošto je jedini indeterminizam za koji nauka zna kvantni, onda i svest mora da ima, kao uzrok svoje indeterminisanosti, povezanost sa kvantnom mehanikom. Međutim, čak i ako se prihvati teza da se putem kvantne mehanike može objasniti funkcionisanje svesti, otvara se dodatni problem prelaska kvantne neodređenosti u slobodno, racionalno odlučivanje. Jer, kvantna slučajnost ne može da bude isto što i racionalno doneta i izvedena odluka. Serl je i u ovom segmentu objašnjenja svestan mogućnosti zapadanja u logičku grešku kompozicije, jer slučajnost i neodređenost na mikro nivou ne moraju nužno da znače da i na sistemskom nivou treba da zaključimo o istim karakteristikama.

Hipoteze 1 i 2 su mogući putevi rešavanja problema slobodne volje i svesti uopšte. Ono što je njihov nedostatak je da nijedna nije primamljiva, jer nas suočava sa zaključcima na koje nismo računali na početku istraživanja. Prva hipoteza podrazumeva spremnost da se odrekemo slobode svoje volje i bilo kakvog uticaja na svet oko nas. Druga, naizgled stvarnija, ali daleko složenija, problem slobode volje utrostručuje u tri zasebne misterije: slobodnu volju, svest i kvantnu neodređenost. Pri tome, ona nije suprotna prvoj hipotezi; ni ona ne isključuje determinističko rešenje problema, već samo tvrdi da je moguće da su svest i neuronski procesi nezavisni kauzalni sistemi. Ostaje nam da se pitamo, pošto je opšte prihvaćeno i poznato da na neurone deluju eficientni prirodni uzroci, šta ili ko može da bude pokretački uzrok za naše odluke i dela. Serl kao jedinu pretpostavku iznosi da smo to mi sami. Kako to ne može biti jedini i krajnji odgovor, evo odličnog prostora za dalje metafizičke pretpostavke.

Neke teorijski prigovori Serlovom rešenju problema slobodne volje

Jedna grupa prigovora upućenih Serlu se odnosi na njegovo posezanje za kvantnom teorijom pri pokušaju rešenja problema slobodne volje. U tom smislu se navode tumačenja pojedinih fizičara koji Hajzenbergov princip neodređenosti, po kojem ne možemo u isto vreme da znamo i položaj i brzinu čestica, vide kao naš epistemološki propust, a ne ontološku grešku samih čestica. Radi se o našem znanju koje ne može istovremeno da se dobije. Samim tim, analogija sa kauzalnim lancem naše svesti, koja bi se, usled kvantne neodređenosti, neodređeno, odnosno, za Serla, slobodno ponašala, jednostavno ne stoji. (Stapp 2008)

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Dok se Serlovo gledište o odnosu svesti i mozga karakteriše kao jasno, prihvatljivo i potpuno u skladu sa znanjima prirodnih nauka, njegovom kasnijem razvijanju ove ideje na problemu slobodne volje se prigovara teorijska nedoslednost, komplikovanost i mogućnost različitih interpretacija. Razlikovanje neuronskih aktivnosti nižeg nivoa i aktivnosti višeg nivoa unosi tu dodatnu nerazjašnjenost, koju naročito pojačava metafora ogledala (da se voljne i intencione težnje međusobno ogledaju). Moguće je da taj odnos i nije asimetričan, jer ga ništa ne dokazuje, već je Serlova proizvoljna vizija. Kao što ništa ne dokazuje ni da trostruki jaz ima svoje „popunjene“ korelate u neuronskim procesima, moguće je da su i tamo praznine. (Hvorecký 2012)

Najstrožu ocenu Serlovog stanovišta nalazimo kod Honderiha (Honderich 2001), koji je usmerivši kritiku na Serlov rad *Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain*, formulisao pet osnovnih zamerki: 1) neopredelivši se ni za materijalizam ni za dualizam, zapao je u samoprotivrečnost; 2) ideja o jazu vodi do misterioznog kauzaliteta, sopstva; 3) ono što je nazvao „jaz“, što se priznaje kao terminološka novina, već tri veka uspešno prevazilaze kompatibilisti i inkompatibilisti; 4) objašnjenje odlučivanja na dva nivo se odbacuje zbog epifenomenalizma i 5) kulminaciju rada predstavlja gore – dole kauzalno delovanje neurona, a zašto ne levo – desno, koje je prijemčivije za kvantnu mehaniku! Obrazloženja su objavljena u radu pod simboličnim nazivom: *Mind the gaff*.

Zaključni osvrt

Svakako da je nastojanje da filozofija uključuje u svoja objašnjenja i eksplanatorne napore i rezultate posebnih nauka i poželjno i dozvoljeno, mada ona može da egzistira i kao sasvim zasebna, apstraktna misaona struktura. Serlova usmerenost u tom pravcu ocenjuje se kao iskonska filozofska želja za spoznajom sveta. U njegovim neobičnim kombinacijama prepoznata je i svojevrsna želja za originalnošću.

Neurobiološki naturalizam je kao pravac ponudio jednu novu varijantu materijalizma, iako to Serl negira, koja se vraća antičkim, hilozoističkim korenima. Ideja o jedinstvu, međutim, nije dosledno izvedena. Serl se upustio u slobodno, ali po teoriju nekonzistentno, eklektičko spajanje fizikalističkih elemenata u teoriji svesti sa mentalističkim, monizma sa dualizmom, empirijskog sa fenomenološkim. Zbog toga gledište podrazumeva dodatna pojašnjenja i korekcije, koje mogu da budu i teozom pretpostavljenog, metafizičkog karaktera.

Trostruki jaz u kauzalnom nizu razmatranja, odlučivanja i delovanja, Serl postulira kao osnovu za pojavu slobodne volje. Kako je svest bar dvostruko jedinstvo: svih ranijih i svih sadašnjih neuronskih aktivnosti, potpuno je nerealno očekivati neprestani kontinuitet svesti:

„Naime, naše bazično verovanje o funkcionisanju svesti ne implicira da su sve sekvence u toku svesti međusobno povezane razložnim relacijama, bez bilo kakvih privremenih pukotina i prekida, jer tada ne bi bilo moguće ni spavanje, ni snevanje, na primer, što je nonsens. Smisao ove tvrdnje je da je taj da je generalni ili glavni tok jedan razložni proces, spram koga postoje brojna odstupanja ili izmene svesti, u zavisnosti od stepena njene izoštrenosti, njenog obima i kvaliteta, u pojedinim trenucima.“ (Govedarica, 2006:164)

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U tom smislu, zasnivanje pojma slobodne volje na jazu, čije je pojavljivanje nepredvidivo, spontano i reverzibilno, nije najbolji način pristupa ozbiljnom i tradicionalnom filozofskom problemu. Posebnost čini Serlovo viđenje pojma jaza, koje zapravo, kao ni viši i niži nivo neuronskih aktivnosti svesti, nije potkrepljeno relevantnim empirijskim pokazateljima, već je fenomenološka konstrukcija na osnovu pretpostavke subjektivne ontologije. Sama definicija jaza vrednuje ovaj prekid kao nedostatak. Dakle, proizvoljan, negativan pojam, koji kao i sopstvo, ostavlja dovoljno prostora za mistifikovanje i metafizičke interpretacije. Ukoliko sopstvo treba shvatiti kao simultano jedinstvo svih ikada doživljenih sadržaja u svim sukcesivnim momentima svesnosti koje ima svoju osnovu u neurobiološkim procesima mozga, onda je sopstvo svest sama. A ako je sopstvo nešto drugo od svesti i uključuje naš fenomenološki unikatani doživljaj, koji, kako sam Serl tvrdi, nije svodljiv na ontologiju trećeg lica, ostaje fizički nedokučivo i bar za sada, samo metafizički objašnjivo, šta izaziva tu osobenost ontologije prvog lica.

I ne samo u prostoru mogućih interpretacija, već i u osnovnim polazišnim postulatima, Serlovo viđenje ima elemente metafizičkog. Sam determinizam, u svom osnovnom značenju je metafizičko učenje. Ako se pod njim podrazumeva shvatanje da je stanje čitavog univerzuma u svakom određenom trenutku povezano sa prethodnim i budućim stanjima putem kauzalnih zakona, onda su ovo očigledne neempirijske polazne osnove. Dok nauka preispituje ubedljivost determinizma, Serl ga, iako zapravo nije potvrdio

kauzalne veze neuronskih procesa, samouvereno pretpostavlja, ostavljajući samo mogućnost izbora između dve njegove moguće hipoteze. Kao što nije potvrdio ni da se sukcesivna događanja u biološkim procesima neuro-na zapravo deterministički, a ne mehanicistički smenjuju.

Skandal dugovečnosti filozofskih problema, Serl bi da reši lakoćom mehanicističkih kauzalnih objašnjenja, negirajući bilo kakvu potrebu za dubljim, teleološkim filozofskim razumevanjem. Ipak, napuštanje filozofskog sagledavanja problema nije tako lako izvodljivo. Jer, i u Serlovoj svesti su u svakom trenutku prisutni svi prethodni mentalni doživljaji, pa i oni kada je malo više težio da bude filozof.

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Snežana Grujić

Is It Possible to Delete a Philosophical Consciousness?
Metaphysical Aspects of Searle's Neurobiological
Approach of Free Will

Abstrakt

In an effort to adjust his theoretical comprehension to the existing natural-scientific paradigm, Searle develops neurobiological naturalism, an approach which should rely on basic facts obtained from the neuroscience researches of living organisms when solving basic philosophical problems. This paper briefly presents this view's theory leading to the argumentation that Searle's point of view is of metaphysical characteristics which is exactly what he was trying to avoid. The metaphysical character of Searle's neurobiological naturalism has been seen through the problem of free will resulting from his understanding of consciousness. The argumentation is based on an analysis of the concepts, the gap and the self, as well as on possible solutions of the problem of free will (hypothesis 1 and 2).

Keywords: free will, consciousness, the gap, self, neurobiological naturalism

Andrija Šoć

Deliberativna demokratija između moralizma i realizma

Apstrakt U ovom radu ću izložiti debatu između političkih moralista i političkih realista i pokušati da pokažem da je moguće naći srednje rešenje koje istovremeno zadovoljava osnovne zahteve oba pristupa a ne podleže prigovorima koji se upućuju i jednom i drugom stanovištu. U prvom delu izlažem stav koji dele i moralisti i realisti: da je osnovni izazov koji se pred jednu političku teoriju postavlja rešenje problema legitimnosti. Prvo skiciram Rolsov moralistički pristup, da bih potom prešao na realističke kritike takvog moralizma. Uglavnom ću se držati jedne od najdetaljnije razrađenih novijih teorija – Slietove (Sleat) realističke teorije, mada će biti reči i o drugim sličnim razmatranjima. U drugom delu ukazujem na kritike koje bi se mogle uputiti realistima. One su u mnogome slične onim kritikama koje oni sami upućuju moralistima, a svode se na problem subdeterminacije odnosno nedovoljne određenosti političkog delovanja činjenicama. Kako realisti smatraju da je test održivosti jedne političke teorije njena primenljivost, njihova pozicija je utoliko posebno oslabljena jednom takvom kritikom. U trećem delu rada ukazujem na deliberativnu teoriju, koja može da odgovori i na realističke kritike – jer je svojim velikim delom okrenuta načinu na koji se stvari odvijaju u konkretnom političkom životu konkretnih društava – ali i na kritike upućene samim realistima, jer empirička istraživanja sugerišu konkretan put ka rešenju problema legitimnosti – podizanje kvaliteta deliberacije. Takođe, deliberativna teorija zadržava autonomne etičke vrednosti, iako to, za razliku od moralizma, ne čini narušavajući zahtev za autonomijom politike od etike, ekonomije i drugih disciplina. Stoga, na kraju rada, iznosim tvrdnju da takvu deliberativnu teoriju mogu prihvatiti i realisti i moralisti.¹

Cljučne reči: Politički realizam, politički moralizam, legitimitet, demokratija, deliberacija.

1. Politički moralizam i politički realizam

Ovaj rad polazi od jedne jednostavne i neosporne činjenice koja, prema nekim novijim autorima², predstavlja polazište spora između političkih realista i političkih moralista – činjenice da se među individuama, članovima jednog društva, pa i samim državama, često javljaju suštinska neslaganja. Za moraliste, politička teorija i politička praksa treba da budu zasnovane na prethodno uspostavljenim univerzalnim moralnim vrednostima. Jedan primer takvog političkog moralizma predstavlja Rolsova (Rawls) *Teorija pravde*

1 Autor teksta je istraživač na projektu „Logičko-epistemološki osnovi nauke i metafizike“ (br. 179067), koji finansira Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije.

2 Vidi, na primer, Sleat 2014: 315.

(Rols 1998). Naime, Rols veruje da se do principa pravde može doći tako što ćemo pretpostaviti scenario u kojem strane nepristrasno razmatraju različite mogućnosti (Rols 1998: 90-95). Pošto se nalaze pod „velom neznanja“, te strane jedino mogu da se vode pravilima odlučivanja, opštim znanjima i sopstvenom instrumentalnom racionalnošću (Rols 1998: 134-146). Rolsovo duboko ubeđenje, u *Teoriji pravde*, jeste da će u takvoj situaciji svi ljudi odlučiti na isti način i tako doći do principa pravde koji se zasnivaju na shvatanju pravde kao nepristrasnosti i važe za sve ljude, sva društva i sva vremena. Ne moramo ulaziti u detalje ovako ambicioznog poduhvata, kao ni u najrazličitije kritike koje su Rolsu upućene.³ Dovoljno je primetiti da se, po Rolsovom mišljenju, principi pravde mogu nepristrasno formulisati na osnovu dve stvari – racionalnosti individua (građana) i konsenzusa među njima. Drugim rečima, vođeni pravilom odlučivanja *maximin*.⁴ svi koji se nalaze u prvobitnom položaju shvatiće da je za njih racionalno da izbegnu moguće negativne posledice svojih individualnih okolnosti, da je za njih racionalno da budu dovoljno zaštićeni da sačuvaju svoje dostojanstvo i da je za njih racionalno da budu u prilici da, kojem god društvu pripadali, slede svoj životni plan (Rols 1998: 146-148). Principi pravde koji su izabrani na opisan način i koji zadovoljavaju zahteve za racionalnošću i konsenzusom, biće samim tim i legitimni. Kako Rols kaže u *Političkom liberalizmu*:

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Primena političke moći je u potpunosti prikladna *jedino* onda kada je izvršena u skladu sa ustavom za čiju se suštinu može racionalno pretpostaviti da je predmet slaganja *svih* građana kao slobodnih i jednakih i da su se oni oko nje složili u svetlu principa i idealâ koji su prihvatljiviji njihovom zajedničkom ljudskom razumu. Ovo je liberalni princip legitimnosti.“ (Rawls 1993: 147, podvukao A.Š.).

Kritika ovakvog moralizma, koji se često naziva i idealizmom (Sleat 2016), zasniva se na opservaciji da u stvarnim političkim društvima nikada zaista ne dolazi do konsenzusa i da se ne može očekivati da će se svi građani složiti oko jednog tako složenog pitanja kao što su to principi pravde. To je i bila poenta Dworkinove primedbe da Rolsova hipotetička situacija ne implicira bilo kakvu stvarnu obavezu (Dworkin 1975). Štaviše, čitav niz kritičara smatra da je za sva moralistička stanovišta zajedničko to da su neprimenljiva.⁵ Slit (Sleat) ide i dalje od toga kad kaže da za ovakve teorije da se

[N]alaze na suviše visokom nivou apstrakcije da bi mogla da ponude relevantne preporuke usmerene na konkretnu akciju u vezi sa stvarnim problemima sa kojima se suočavamo, ili malo vode računa o postojanju ograničenja u pogledu izvodljivosti koja smanjuju mogućnost da normativne preskripcije budu efikasno pretočene u praksu. (Sleat 2016: 3)

3 Vidi, na primer, Daniels 1975.

4 Pavličić 2007: 53-54.

5 Vidi, na primer, Valentini 2009, Wiens 2012.

Slit dodaje i da ovo znači kako je u najboljem slučaju moralizam nedovoljan vodič za političko delovanje, a da je u najgorem irelevantan, ili čak opasan ako se upotrebi kao plan za političku reformu (Sleat 2016: 3). Ovakva kritika zasnovana je na istom uverenju koje Bernard Vilijams (Williams) izražava kada kaže da je „osnovno političko pitanje obezbeđivanje poretka, bezbednosti, zaštite, poverenja i uslova saradnje“ (Williams 2005: 3). Politički realisti, dakle, smatraju da jedna politička teorija treba da nas dovede do rešenja koja se mogu implementirati i da ona u tome treba da bude vođena činjenicama, a ne idealima. Kako Slit napominje, „što više činjenica inkorporiramo, to će teorija biti realističnija“ (Sleat 2016: 3). Ovakva kritika Rolsa, čije je shvatanje paradigmatički primer moralizma i idealizma, u mnogome podseća na Milovu primedbu da Kant „gotovo groteskno“ ne uspeva da primeni svoj kategorički imperativ (Mill 2003: 183).

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Iako se polazišta moralizma i realizma drastično razlikuju, i jedan i drugi pristup politici usmereni su ka zadovoljavanju onoga što Larmor (Larmore), sledeći Vilijamsa, naziva „osnovnim zahtevom legitimnosti“ (Larmore 2013: 290-291), a to je zahtev da država opravda svoju moć svakom svom građaninu. Ovo ne znači da se svi pojedinci moraju eksplicitno složiti sa demokratskim odlukama jedne liberalne države, ali znači da jedno uređenje (i postupci predstavnika građana) moraju biti takvi da bi se sa njima svako mogao složiti. Ovaj zahtev je utoliko važan zato što predstavlja preduslov za priznavanje državnog autoriteta u političkim odlukama. Pa ipak, prema moralistima, ovaj zahtev je moguće zadovoljiti tek ako se uspostavi pred-politički (ili van-politički) sistem morala, na osnovu kojeg bi se onda ocenjivalo koliko su neki politički postupci opravdani. Realisti na to odgovaraju da u konkretnim okolnostima konkretnih država retko kad imamo priliku da na ovaj način uspostavimo vezu između sistema morala i političkog delovanja. Međutim, to ne znači da realisti žele da tvrde da pravo sledi iz moći, to jest da onaj ko ima moć da nešto učini samim tim ima pravo da to učini. Naprotiv, i realisti žele da naprave prostor za moral u političkom delovanju, ali smatraju da se u tom kontekstu moralni principi moraju shvatati kao sastavni deo političkih principa. Drugim rečima, ne uspostavljamo moral nezavisno od politike, već unutar politike tražimo mesto za moral (Sleat 2014, 2016).

Slit jasno kontrastira realizam i moralizam kada kaže da:

u političkom moralizmu, zahtev za legitimnošću ne proizlazi iz svojstava same politike, kao što je to u slučaju realizma, gde sama priroda političke vladavine podrazumeva da je zahtev u dovoljnoj meri ispunjen, već on proizlazi iz van-političkih moralnih razmatranja. (Sleat 2014: 317)

Posmatrano iz perspektive realista, dakle, najveći problem sa pristupom kakav je Rolsov, ali i moralistički pristup uopšte, sastoji se u tome što preti

da u potpunosti odstrani ono što je karakteristično političko iz politike – preti da je „depolitizuje“.⁶ Uzmimo sada jedno često razmatrano područje političkih sporova kako bismo ilustrovali sukob između realista i moralista, kao i distinkciju između realizma i *realpolitike* – pitanje oporezivanja građana. Ovaj primer je relevantan utoliko što obaveza građana da deo svojih prihoda daju državi veoma jasno zahteva da država pruži nekakvo opravdanje koje bi oni mogli prihvatiti. Ova vrsta konkretnog društvenog pitanja je upravo ono što očekujemo da bude predmet jedne političke teorije. Rols i Nozik (Nozick) su imali suprotstavljena viđenja oporezivanja. Za Rolsa, ono je neophodni deo pravedne distribucije dobara. Prema Nozickovom mišljenju, ono je jedna vrsta prinudnog rada, i utoliko duboko nelegitimno.⁷ Kako se realizam načelno razlikuje od moralizma i *realpolitike* kada je reč o problemu legitimnosti oporezivanja?

Za nekog zastupnika *realpolitike*, država ima apsolutni suverenitet na svojoj teritoriji, neograničenu moć i utoliko neograničeno pravo da vodi poresku politiku kakvu, iz ma kojih razloga, smatra prikladnom. Utoliko, ne postoji nikakav povod da država posebno opravdava svoje odluke građanima kako bi svoju politiku učinila legitimnom. Naravno, ukoliko državni aparat proceni da bi nezadovoljstvo građana moglo da ugrozi stepen naplate poreza, obrazloženje se može ponuditi. Ipak, u takvoj situaciji, jedino je relevantan pragmatički kriterijum. Stepenn prihvaćenosti takve politike ne utiče na njenu opravdanost ili legitimitet. S druge strane, jedan pristalica moralizma ili liberalizma je pre svega zainteresovan za način na koji će država opravdati oporezivanje prihoda svojih građana. Recimo da se godišnji porez na dohodak podiže sa 10% na 20%. Jasno je da će građani inicijalno biti nezadovoljni, bez obzira na to koliki su im prihodi. Jedna moralistička teorija će reći da, radi legitimnosti takve odluke, država mora svakom svom građaninu ponuditi obrazloženje za taj potez. Štaviše, ono mora biti takvo da bi ga (u idealnom slučaju) svaki građanin mogao prihvatiti. Ukoliko je takav hipotetički konsenzus nemoguć, onda se barem moraju pružiti razlozi koje bi mogla prihvatiti većina građana. U suprotnom, sledilo bi da je neopravdano uvoditi višu stopu poreza.

Politički realisti žele da tvrde kako je ovakvo stanovište praktično neodrživo. Kada govore o održivosti odnosno primenljivosti jedne političke teorije, realisti pre svega imaju na umu stav da jedna politička teorija treba da bude i pouzdan vodič za političke postupke. Razlog za neodrživost i neprimenljivost moralizma leži u činjenici da opravdanje za podizanje poreske stope koje država može da ponudi ne mora nužno biti zadovoljavajuće za sve, ili čak za većinu, ali da to ne mora učiniti taj postupak nelegitimnim

6 Vidi Waldron 2013, Sagar 2014: 13.

7 Nozick 1974, 167-169.

ili neopravdanim. Naime, podizanje poreske stope često je izazvano lošom ekonomskom situacijom. Ako država ima ekonomske razloge da poveća porez na prihod, onda je to jedino što se istinski može ponuditi kao opravdanje. Pa ipak, reći da ima premalo novca u budžetu i da se taj problem rešava uzimanjem dodatnih 10% zarade svakoga ko ima nekakve prihode ne mora biti dovoljno da uveri onoga ko gubi tih 10% da je takav postupak u redu. Građani mogu misliti da je rešenje dodatno spoljno zaduživanje, privlačenje stranih investicija, ili čak smanjivanje poreza radi stimulacije domaće potrošnje. Pa ipak, za realistu je neprihvatljivo da u takvoj situaciji smatramo takav potez nelegitimnim. Moguće je da je u postojećoj situaciji to zaista jedino održivo rešenje i da bi u suprotnom država bankrotirala. Prema standardu primenljivosti i održivosti koji realisti zastupaju, vidimo, dakle, da bi sleđenje moralizma dovelo do bankrotstva države, što je upravo razlog iz kojeg se smatra da je moralizam neodrživ i neprimenljiv.

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S druge strane, realisti ne žele da se pitanje legitimnosti svede na pitanje moći. U pomenutom scenariju, za realistu je dovoljno da država ponudi razloge, ali ti razlozi ne moraju biti nužno etički. Oni mogu biti ekonomski (povećanje likvidnosti budžeta), socijalni (pomoć najugroženijima ili sprečavanje potencijalno štetnih štrajkova), politički (zahtev međunarodne zajednice ili usklađenje poreske politike sa zakonodavnim sistemima nekog saveza kojem država teži da pristupi), itd. Za jednog realistu, nezadovoljstvo građana odlukom države ne mora biti kobno po legitimnost konkretnog političkog poteza. Moguće je da će većina koja se isprva ne slaže sa odlukom dugoročno videti korist od povećanja poreza i naknadno prihvatiti neophodnost takvog poteza. Isto tako, malo je verovatno da bi se zbog povećanja poreza od 10% građani pobunili do te mere da stupe u generalni štrajk, rade manje efikasno, i slično. Ukratko, dakle, zastupnici *realpolitike* veruju da je odluka države uvek opravdana i da se pitanje legitimnosti ne postavlja pred onoga ko ima suverenitet i moć. Zastupnici moralizma veruju u to da se opravdanja moraju dati zarad legitimnosti i da ona moraju biti u skladu sa etičkim principima koji prethode političkim razmatranjima i imaju prioritet u odnosu na njih. Moralisti će, drugim rečima, tvrditi da *x* nikada nije politički opravdano ako se ne zasniva na etičkim vrednostima *a*, *b*, *c*, itd. Realisti će kritikovati oba ova stanovišta kao neodrživa i trudiće se da ukažu na autonomiju politike od etike, ali neće smatrati da politika sme biti potpuno amoralna.

Na osnovu svega ovog možemo jasno zaključiti da realisti usvajaju dve važne teze. Prvo, oni veruju da ukoliko jedna politička teorija treba da bude operativna odnosno primenljiva, ona mora da se prevashodno bavi činjenicama stvarnog političkog života u konkretnim političkim zajednicama. Takav pristup izbegava opšte ocene legitimnosti zasnovane na načelnim stavovima o prirodi odnosa države i građana. Umesto toga, relevantne su

konkretne okolnosti u nekom konkretnom društvu. U državi x podizanje poreza može biti opravdano jednim razlogom, u državi y, taj isti razlog ne bi mogao da predstavlja legitimno opravdanje za veće poreze. Jedna država može podići poreze iz ekonomskih razloga, druga iz socijalnih. Da li će podizanje poreza u bilo kojoj od te dve okolnosti biti legitimno, zavisice od procene situacije i u zavisnosti od manje ili više detaljnih političkih, ekonomskih, socijalnih i drugih razmatranja. Tako, jedna realistička politička teorija može nas voditi ka odluci da podignemo stopu poreza. Ukoliko tu postoji mesto za vrednosti, one će morati da budu deo političke teorije jedino u onoj meri u kojoj su deo političkog života o kojem ta teorija govori. Drugo, za realiste je nemoguće bilo kakav kompromis sa političkim moralizmom. Štaviše, izgleda da politički realisti sugerišu kako je nemoguće formulisati bilo kakvu plauzibilnu poziciju koja se ne bi mogla svesti ili na realizam ili na moralizam. U drugom delu rada, pokušaću da ukažem na razloge iz kojih treba da odbacimo ove teze. U trećem delu ukazaću na jednu (uslovno rečeno) kompromisnu poziciju.

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2. Političke činjenice i političke vrednosti

Na početku prvog dela rada, ukazao sam na važnost činjenice o postojanju sporova na svakom nivou političkog života. Kako demokratsko odlučivanje podrazumeva glasanje čiji ishod uvek (ili skoro uvek) rezultira pobeđničkom većinom i gubitničkom manjinom, pitanje legitimiteta demokratskih odluka može se postaviti ne samo u okviru opravdavanja državnog autoriteta kao takvog, ili prihvatljivosti principa na kojima je jedna država zasnovana, već i kada je reč o statusu onog dela građana čija je prva opcija na jednoj rang listi preferencija ostala u manjini. Problem statusa demokratske manjine istakli su i neki od najznačajnijih modernih teoretičara demokratije kao što su Džejms Medison (Madison), Mil (Mill) i Tokvil (Tocqueville). Kako Medison primećuje:

Od velike je važnosti za jednu republiku ne samo da čuva društvo od represije svojih vladara, već i da čuva jedan deo društva od nepravdi koje bi mu mogao načiniti drugi deo. Različite klase građana nužno imaju različite interese. Ako bi većina bila ujedinjena zajedničkim interesom, prava manjine bi bila nesigurna (Madison 1961: 323)

Izrazitu opasnost od onoga što je zvao tiranijom većine, Tokvil vidi upravo u „neodoljivoj snazi demokratije“:

Vlade obično propadaju usled nemoći ili zbog tiranije. U prvom slučaju vlast im izmakne, u drugom im je preotmu. [...] Ne treba brkati stabilnost sa snagom, niti veličinu stvari s njenom trajnošću. U demokratskim republikama vlast koja upravlja društvom nije postojana, jer često prelazi iz ruke u ruku i menja svoje ciljeve. Ali kuda god se usmeri, snaga joj je gotovo neodoljiva.

Ako sloboda ikad propadne u Americi, za to će valjati okriviti svemoć većine, koja manjine može dovesti do očajanja i prisiliti ih da se obrate materijalnoj sili. (de Tokvil 2002: 225)

O problemu tiranije većine Mil govori na možda još efektivniji način:

Ako bi čitavo čovečanstvo, osim jednog čoveka, imalo jedan stav, i ako bi samo jedna osoba imala suprotan stav, čovečanstvo ne bi ništa više imalo pravo da učutka tu jednu osobu nego što bi ta osoba, kada bi bila dovoljno moćna, imala pravo da učutka čitavo čovečanstvo. (Mill 2003: 100)

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Kao što možemo videti, za rane teoretičare demokratije, pretnja tiranije nad manjinom predstavljala veliku opasnost po legitimnost odluka većine. Upravo je to jedan od razloga zašto moralisti čvrsto veruju da je cilj kome treba težiti u legitimaciji demokratije upravo konsenzus, odnosno slaganje *svih*, a ne samo većine, u pogledu principa na kojima se društvo zasniva i odluka koje izabrani predstavnici donose. Pa ipak, kao što je već rečeno, stvarnost je sasvim drugačija, a težnje za idealnom saglasnošću svih samo oduzimaju politici njenu specifičnost i autonomiju. To ne znači da oni odustaju od pretenzija da odgovore na pitanje legitimnosti. Naprotiv, Slit primećuje da će upravo eventualni uspeh (ili neuspeh) političkih realista u pokušaju da razviju koherentno i plauzibilno objašnjenje legitimnosti odrediti sudbinu političkog realizma kao autonomnog pravca u političkom teoretisanju.⁸

Ipak, i pre nego što vidimo u kojoj meri realizam može objasniti zahtev za legitimnošću,⁹ moramo da uzmemo u obzir dve fundamentalne pretpostavke koje realisti usvajaju. Kako sam istakao pred kraj prošlog dela rada, to su pretpostavka o značaju činjenica za operacionalnost (delotvornost) jedne političke teorije i pretpostavka o nespojivosti moralizma i realizma. Problem koji se javlja u vezi sa prvom pretpostavkom može se formulirati u obliku jednog jednostavnog pitanja: Kako možemo očekivati da će jedan skup činjenica o sferi političkog (ma kako on bio širok) ikada dovesti do nekih konkretnih preporuka za efikasno političko delovanje? Drugim rečima, možemo se pitati na osnovu čega treba da očekujemo da će deskriptivnost jedne političke teorije voditi ka preskriptivnosti. Prvo, vrlo je lako zamisliti da ćemo jedan isti opis stanja u društvu moći da na više različitih, a međusobno nespojivih, načina dopunimo predlozima za poboljšanje ili promenu neke situacije. Ako verujemo, kao što realisti veruju, da jedna politička teorija treba, između ostalog, da bude efikasan vodič za političko delovanje,¹⁰ onda je neophodno izbeći ovakvu mogućnost. Subdeterminacija, to jest nedovoljna određenost primene političke teorije raspoloživim i poznatim činjenicama ovde predstavlja veliki izazov. Možda paradoksalno,

8 Vidi: Sleat 2016: 39.

9 Vidi recimo, Horton 2010, Mason 2010, Newey 2010.

10 Miller 2013; Robeyns 2008: 357-358.

upravo nas aktuelni sporovi i duboka razilaženja, na koje se realisti često pozivaju, upućuju na tako nešto. Ako, na primer, uzmemo u obzir debatu koja se vodi o merama za sprečavanje globalnih klimatskih promena, možemo videti da ne samo što se različite strane u toj debati ne slažu oko toga *kako* treba rešiti taj problem, i ne samo što se ne slažu oko toga *da* treba rešiti taj problem, one se ne slažu čak ni oko toga da problem uopšte postoji. Drugim rečima, one se ne slažu ni u pogledu mera za rešenje problema, ni u pogledu činjenica u vezi s njim. Isto tako, da se vratimo na pitanje opozivanja, akteri u političkom životu mogu imati najrazličitije razloge za gotovo bilo koje stanovište – od toga da porez predstavlja krađu i da bi ga trebalo ukinuti, preko toga da je duboko nemoralan, pa sve do toga da se u državni budžet mora slivati toliki procenat godišnjih prihoda da građanima sme da ostane samo onoliko novca koliko je potrebno da mogu da prežive.

Ovakva situacija ponavlja se u gotovo svim instancama u kojima postoji neko duboko neslaganje između dve grupe političkih aktera (ili čak dve grupe ljudi). To je takođe činjenica političke stvarnosti u većini država, ali kakav predlog o tome šta *treba* da se uradi sledi odatle? Štaviše, kako iz činjenica ikada može da sledi neki normativan predlog? Ovo pitanje, koje je još Hjum postavio¹¹, ima čitav niz različitih odgovora. Serl je dao jedno vrlo uticajno, ali i često kritikovno rešenje.¹² Međutim, za ove svrhe nije potrebno ulaziti u detalje rasprave oko toga da li se iz *jeste* može izvesti *treba*. Za političke realiste subdeterminacija predstavlja problem iz dva, možda još osnovnija, razloga. Prvo, standard operacionalne efikasnosti koji oni uzimaju kao merilo uspešnosti realizma naspram moralizma zahteva jednoznačnost predloga. U suprotnom, isti opis činjenica mogao bi voditi do dva suprotna predloga, što je neizvodljivo. Ukoliko je tako, onda realizam gubi svoju osnovnu svrhu. Drugo, sami realisti eksplicitno ukazuju na problem subdeterminacije kad kritikuju moralizam:

Pozivanje na razum je duboko problematično zato što se za razum smatra da značajno subdeterminiše moralna i politička pitanja, te stoga ne može odlučno razrešiti sporove ili zato što ne može da ponudi ništa sem vrlo uskih rešenja za problem nesamerljivosti vrednosti ili zato što epistemička ograničenja ljudskog razuma podrazumevaju da različite osobe mogu doći do različitih, ali i dalje racionalnih normativnih pozicija, kao i zato što racionalnost daje samo delimično objašnjenje motivacija i razloga koji ljude pokreću na delovanje. (Sleat 2016: 5-6)

U istom duhu kao i realisti, možemo se pitati šta da učinimo ukoliko se ljudi ne slažu ni oko specifično praktičnih ili političkih (a ne samo vrednosnih) uverenja, ili šta da učinimo ako politička teorija koja je obuhvatila

11 Hume 2000: III, 1, 1.

12 Searle 1964.

jako mnogo činjenica upućuje na različite, međusobno nesamerljive, načine političkog delovanja. Činjenice nam neće, same po sebi, dati jednoznačan odgovor. Ukoliko želimo da postignemo određen cilj, i ukoliko taj cilj treba da predstavlja nešto politički vredno, neophodno je u jednu političku teoriju ipak uključiti i vrednosnu dimenziju. Drugim rečima, vrednosti koje želimo da uspostavimo, odnosno vrednosti u skladu s kojima mislimo da bi jedno društvo trebalo da bude uređeno, biće ono što će nas voditi u političkom delovanju. Tu, međutim, politički realizam postaje vrlo sporan. Naime, realisti smatraju da politika mora da ima vrednosnu dimenziju, ali da vrednosti ne smeju biti van-političke, tj. etičke. Kako kaže Geus (Geuss), „politika nije, i ne sme nikad postati primenjena etika“ (Geuss 2008: 6). Pa ipak, sačuvati autonomiju politike tako što ćemo eliminisati bilo kakva etička razmatranja znači izložiti se opasnosti subdeterminacije i inherentnoj neodređenosti predloga za političko delovanje, te dakle i neodlučivosti u pogledu toga koji politički potez treba povući na osnovu ove ili one političke teorije. Naravno, to ne znači da smo samim uvođenjem autonomno etičkih vrednosti kao što su sloboda ili jednakost izbegli pomenute probleme. Čak iako etička dimenzija politike nije dovoljna za njihovo izbegavanje, sigurno je da je moramo smatrati nužnom u izgradnji političke teorije. U suprotnom, u opasnosti smo da: 1) osnovne vrednosti na kojima se društvo zasniva tretiramo samo kao političke i 2) suviše veliki akcenat stavimo na političku stvarnost koja je tako raznovrsna i promenljiva da nam, kao što sam već rekao, ne može pomoći u odabiru konkretnog rešenja nekog postojećeg političkog problema. Štaviše, kako je jedan od osnovnih ciljeva političkog realizma rešenje problema demokratske legitimnosti, problemi subdeterminacije i insistiranja na činjenicama o aktualnom političkom životu sugerišu teškoće u ostvarenju tog ciljeva dovode u pitanje i potrebu za takvim pristupom. Kako izgleda, najviše što se može učiniti, polazeći od političkog realizma, jeste opis postojećeg stanja, političkih, ekonomskih i drugih odnosa u jednom društvu.

Kao što vidimo, činjenica da postoje česti i duboki sporovi u većini društava, kao i neuspeh u pokušaju da, držeći se realizma, rešimo probleme legitimnosti i jednoznačnih preporuka za političko delovanje, sugerišu da moramo promeniti pristup. Međutim, to ne znači da realizam moramo u potpunosti odbaciti. Pre svega, moramo uvideti da se osnovna kritika moralizmu sastoji u tome što pokušava da etiku učini fundamentalnijom od politike (i time od politike napravi „primenjenu etiku“). Pa ipak, iz te kritike ne sledi da je jedina alternativa takvom stanovištu insistiranje na onome što je karakteristično za politiku i pokušaj da se kao deo tog korpusa razmatranja uvede etička dimenzija. Naprotiv, iz realističke kritike ne sledi da je nemoguće političkim razmatranjima dopuniti etička, niti da u pokušaju da formulišemo političku teoriju ne smemo da iskoristimo specifično etička razmatranja kako bismo došli do jasnih preporuka za političko delovanje.

Kompromisno rešenje se može pronaći ukoliko usvojimo dvostepeni model izgradnje političke teorije. U prvom koraku, ono što je specifično za politiku činimo primarnim, dok u drugom koraku uvodimo etičke ideje koje koristimo kako bismo na osnovu obuhvatnog opisa političke situacije mogli da razmotrimo kako i pod kojim uslovima se taj opis može efikasno operacionalizovati. Kako ću pokušati da pokažem u sledećem delu, taj model nas vodi ka deliberativnoj demokratiji – kako ka njenom teorijskom, tako i ka njenom empiričkom aspektu.

3. Realizam i moralizam u istraživanju deliberacije

Već sam govorio o problemu tiranije većine u demokratskim društvima. Model demokratije na koji se taj problem odnosi je liberalna, proceduralna odnosno agregatna demokratija. Prvi naziv nam ukazuje na dve osnovne demokratske vrednosti – slobodu i jednakost. Drugi nam ukazuje na činjenicu da je demokratsko odlučivanje proceduralno. Drugim rečima, sve što nam je važno kad govorimo o demokratskim izborima je da je procedura regulisana pravilima i dosledno poštovana. Drugim rečima, ni jedan pojedinac u demokratskom društvu ne može odlučiti ishod procedure. Ishod je odlučan – i tu dolazimo do smisla trećeg naziva – prostom agregacijom glasova, odnosno agregacijom preferencija (koje su se našle na vrhu jedne rang-liste preferencija) onih koji su u glasačkoj proceduri učestvovali. Ona alternativa koja je dobila 50% + 1 glas je pobeđnička. Ako uzmemo u obzir da je moguće da čak 50% – 1 glas bude manjinski, jasno je kako dolazi do problema tiranije većine, a shodno tome i do problema legitimiteta.¹³

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Deliberativna demokratija je u poslednjih nekoliko decenija postala važna alternativa liberalnoj demokratiji. Prema jednom tumačenju, već je Aristotel skicirao jednu verziju deliberativne demokratije,¹⁴ ali je tek Erouova (Arrow) teorema iracionalnosti društvenog izbora učinila ovaj pristup posebno relevantnim.¹⁵ Naime, osnovna razlika između liberalne i deliberativne demokratije leži upravo u shvatanju preferencija. Kako List (List) ističe:

Agregacija i deliberacija se često kontrastiraju kao dva veoma različita pristupa kolektivnom odlučivanju. Dok agregacija predstavlja spajanje sukobljenih individualnih mišljenja u društveni ishod, deliberacija podrazumeva diskusiju o ovim mišljenjima i njihovu moguću transformaciju putem deliberativnog procesa u kom individue učestvuju. (List 2011).

Za teoretičare deliberativne demokratije, preferencije su, dakle, fleksibilne, dok se u liberalnoj demokratiji one smatraju fiksnima. Preciznije, u ovoj prvoj se veruje da pojedinac može promeniti redosled preferencija na

13 Vidi, na primer, Phillips 1997: 150.

14 Wilson 2011.

15 Detaljnije o ovoj teoremi vidi u Pavličić 2007.

rang-listi, ili čak uvesti novu alternativu. S druge strane, Gudín jasno ističe da „liberalne demokrate bez daljnjeg poštuju preferencije drugih“ (Goodin 2005: 49). Naravno, ovo ne znači da se u deliberativnoj demokratiji preferencije građana ne poštuju. Naprotiv, one se poštuju utoliko što građani imaju prilike da o njima diskutuju sa drugima pre nego što pristupe glasanju. U toku deliberativnih diskusija, svaki učesnik ima priliku da izloži svoj stav, da razloge i čuje razloge koje drugi iznose u prilog svojih stavove. Ideal deliberativne demokratije je da će ovakva diskusija, racionalna i civilizovana, samo doprineti konsenzusu među sukobljenim stranama i rezultirati društvenim odlukama koje će, zato što su prethodno dogovorene tokom deliberativnog procesa, biti u punom smislu demokratski legitimne. Kako Elster to formuliše:

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Jezgro [deliberativnog pristupa] ... je da bi, umesto da agregira ili menja preferencije, politički sistem trebalo da bude uspostavljen tako da se one mogu promeniti putem javne debate i suočavanja ... Utoliko ne bi bilo potrebe za mehanizmom agregacije, jer bi *racionalna* diskusija imala tendenciju da proizvede *jednoglasne* preferencije. (Elster 1986; podvukao A.Š.)

Pa ipak, ako bismo ostali na ovom opisu, zastupnik realizma bi s pravom mogao da prigovori da tako shvaćena deliberativna demokratija i dalje ne nudi ništa više od težnje za racionalnošću i konsenzusom koja je duboko nerealistična. Međutim, ono što menja sliku o deliberativnoj demokratiji su empirijska istraživanja deliberativnih diskusija koja su posebno dobila na značaju u poslednjoj deceniji. Kako Štajner pokazuje, postoje mnoge debate o tome kako tačno deliberativni proces treba da izgleda i koja je konkretna uloga koju deliberativna demokratija može da ima.¹⁶ Koji procenat stanovništva treba da učestvuje u deliberaciji? Kako da znamo da će bilo koji procenat biti dovoljno reprezentativan? Koliko dugo deliberacija treba da traje i šta da činimo ukoliko traje toliko dugo da čitav proces postaje neodrživ? Da li eventualne odluke kojima će proces rezultirati treba da imaju obavezujući ili informativni karakter? Da li postupak deliberativnog glasanja treba da zameni ili da dopuni standardno, proceduralno glasanje? Da li je dopušteno za svoja uverenja iznositi samo racionalnu argumentaciju, ili se može dopustiti i pričanje ličnih priča kako bi se određen stav potkrepio?

Teorijski gledano, na svako od ovih pitanja možemo dati različite odgovore, i svaki bi mogao da bude podložan kritici. Utisak koji se nameće je da je jako teško izgraditi efikasan, reprezentativan, transformativan i održiv model deliberativnog glasanja. Pa ipak, upravo na tom mestu, umesto da odbacimo deliberativnu demokratiju kao inherentno nesprovodivu, to jest neoperacionalnu, možemo da se okrenemo empirijskim istraživanjima i

16 Steiner 2012.

vidimo kako tačno funkcioniše jedan deliberativni proces ukoliko se organizuje na različite načine, odnosno u skladu sa različitim odgovorima na gore pomenute dileme.

Tako List i saradnici govore o uspehu u približavanju grupnog odlučivanja saglasnosti. Naime, u svetlu diskusije, učesnici su menjali rangiranje svojih preferencija tako da one konvergiraju u većoj meri nego što je to bio slučaj pre diskusije.¹⁷ Takođe, Štajner ukazuje na čitav niz situacija u kojima se grupe diskutanata približavaju slaganju po određenim pitanjima i postižu veći stepen razumevanja za stavove onih sa kojima se ne slažu kao i veći stepen empatije prema drugim diskutantima.¹⁸ Konkretno, Štajner govori o više istraživanja napravljenih u Kolumbiji, Bosni i Hercegovini, Belgiji i na drugim mestima. Uzmimo za primer diskusije koje su organizovane u Kolumbiji i Bosni. U Kolumbiji su se sastali bivši pripadnici paravojnih formacija i bivši gerlici. Tema diskusija je zahtevala od učesnika da daju svoje predloge za poboljšanje ekonomskog i političkog stanja u Kolumbiji. U Bosni i Hercegovini, jedna od tema diskusije bila je kako rešiti problem pasa lualica. Ova dva primera navodim zato što ukazuju na različite načine na koje se deliberativna diskusija može organizovati. Naime, teme se mogu naći u različitim domenima, mogu imati različite oblike i, utoliko, različite zahteve. Upravo ovakva fleksibilnost empiričkih istraživanja deliberativne demokratije ukazuje na širok dijapazon uslova u kojima se deliberativni procesi mogu odvijati. Kako je deliberativna demokratija predložena kao moguće rešenje jednog velikog problema liberalne demokratije, njen pragmatički, operacionalni aspekt je ključan za odluku o tome da li takav pristup treba prihvatiti i odbaciti.

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Ako gledamo podatke dobijene u poslednjih nekoliko godina, empirička istraživanja jasno pokazuju da je deliberacija efikasna u postizanju veće legitimnosti demokratskih odluka.¹⁹ Prvo, deliberacija uspeva da približi stavove diskutanata. Drugo, čak i onda kada svako ostane pri svom stanovištu, ipak oni koji su u manjini bolje razumeju stavove većine i spremniji su da ih private. Ovo je posebno važno jer se time otklanja problem tiranije većine. Približavanje stavova je, pak, važno ne samo u kontekstu rešenja problema legitimiteta, već i u kontekstu polazišta realizma, koji tvrdi da činjenice o rasprostranjenom neslaganju svedoče o utopijskom i, utoliko, neprihvatljivom karakteru moralizma.

Možda bi, u svetlu onoga što je rečeno, moglo izgledati da je ovako shvaćena deliberativna demokratija u potpunom skladu sa realističkim predlogom, kao i kritikom moralizma. Pa ipak, taj utisak bi bio pogrešan. Deliberativna

17 List et al. 2013.

18 Steiner 2012, Steiner 2016.

19 Vidi rezultate Listovih i Štajnerovih istraživanja u navedenim delima.

demokratija svakako mora da vodi računa o političkim vrednostima koje demokratske institucije treba da otelovljuju. Institucije jednog demokratskog društva biće utoliko razvijenije ukoliko: 1) motivišu učešće građana u glasanju, 2) teže tome da informišu građane, 3) obezbede odgovornost izabranih zvaničnika i 4) uzmu u obzir preferencije manjine.²⁰ Ova četiri zahteva slede iz dve osnovne vrednosti demokratije – slobode i jednakosti članovā jednog društva – i predstavljaju neophodnu dopunu načina na koji se u agregatnoj demokratiji shvata institucija glasanja. Naime, nije dovoljno da svi građani budu slobodni da učestvuju u glasanju; kako bi izabrani zvaničnici zaista reprezentovali građane jednog društva, oni moraju biti izabrani na izborima u kojima učestvuje što veći broj birača. S obzirom na to da sloboda izbora podrazumeva i slobodu da se ne učestvuje u izborima, učešće ne može zakonska obaveza. Pa ipak, to ne znači da je sasvim svejedno da li će na izborima učestvovati 30%, 50% ili 80% birača. Isto tako, odluka na izborima će utoliko biti legitimnija ukoliko birači znaju o čemu odlučuju, ukoliko oni koji treba da sprovede odluke mogu da odgovaraju (barem politički) za svoje poteze i ukoliko i oni koji nisu odlučili kao većina smatraju da su očuvana njihova prava, slobode i jednakost sa pripadnicima većine. Iako se četiri zahteva koja se postavljaju pred demokratske institucije mogu smatrati usko političkim, svakako ćemo reći da su sloboda i jednakost i više od toga. Deliberativna demokratija, tako, pokušavajući da na osnovu rezultata empiričkih istraživanja usavrši deliberativni proces, sledi i specifično etičke, a ne samo političke vrednosti. Na taj način, ona nudi konkretan model za rešenje problema legitimiteta – postepenim usavršavanjem procesa deliberacije, potpomognutim konkretnim empirijskim rezultatima – a usvajajući vrednosti slobode i jednakosti, koje su karakteristično etičke, ona za razliku od realističkih pokušaja, može da izbegne problem subdeterminacije.

Deliberativna teorija može izbeći taj problem tako što će se oslanjati na postojeća ispitivanja deliberativnih procesa. Naime, upravo takva ispitivanja ukazuju na to gde su slabe tačke ovako ili onako organizovanog deliberativnog događaja. Time se smanjuje polje dobrih opcija, a političko delovanje se usmerava ka onim alternativama koje se pokazuju kao najdelotvornije. U svojoj knjizi *Osnovi deliberativne demokratije*, Štajner ukazuje na nekoliko važnih brojki koje govore ne samo o ishodu deliberacije (kao što to čini, recimo, List), već i o njenom kvalitetu. Pogledajmo kako je izgledala deliberacija u Bosni i u Kolumbiji²¹:

20 Vidi i Erman 2012: 2.

21 Steiner 2012: 48, 81.

Kolumbija:

Uopšte nije govorilo: 34%	Nije dalo opravdanje: 36%
Govorilo jednom ili dva puta: 30%	Dato opravdanje sa ilustracijom: 34%
Govorilo 3-10 puta: 28%	Dat razlog, ali ne u vezi sa iznetim mišljenjem: 17%
Govorilo 11–20 puta: 7%	Dat razlog, povezan sa iznetim mišljenjem: 10%
Govorilo 21–30 puta: 1%	Više od jednog razloga, povezani sa mišljenjem: 3%
Ukupno učesnika: 100%	Ukupno: 100%

Bosna:

Uopšte nije govorilo: 18%	Nije dalo opravdanje: 79%
Govorilo jednom ili dva puta: 7%	Dato opravdanje sa ilustracijom: 12%
Govorilo 3-10 puta: 18%	Dat razlog, ali ne u vezi sa iznetim mišljenjem: 3%
Govorilo 11–20 puta: 23%	Dat razlog, povezan sa iznetim mišljenjem: 6%
Govorilo 21–30 puta: 15%	Više od jednog razloga, povezani sa mišljenjem: 0%
Govorilo 31–40 puta: 10%	Ukupno: 100%
Govorilo 41–50 puta: 7%	
Govorilo 51 i više puta: 2%	
Ukupno učesnika: 100%	

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Na osnovu ovih brojki lako možemo videti da kvalitet deliberacije u Kolumbiji i BiH nije posebno visok. To nije slučaj sa deliberativnim događajima u Belgiji ili u Finskoj, gde je mnogo veći procenat učesnika govorio i davao razloge za svoje stavove. Jasno je da je za deliberativnu demokratiju kvalitet diskusije od posebne važnosti, i da nije dovoljno samo gledati da li je kroz diskusiju došlo do veće konvergencije u stavovima. Naime, pokazalo se da u diskusijama često može doći do polarizacije grupe, pri čemu jedan manji broj učesnika govori kvalitetno, a ostali samo prihvataju ono što ti aktivniji diskutanti govore, premda sami ili ne misle tako, ili nisu sigurni šta da misle. Jedan od otvorenih problema društvenog odlučivanja javlja se i u vidu „Eblin (Abilene) paradoksa.“²² Ipak, to su problemi sa kojima deliberativna

22 Vidi Pavličić 2007: 446-447. Ukratko, paradoks se sastoji u tome što članovi jedne grupe mogu biti do te mere neskloni diskusiji ili sučeljavanju mišljenja da će rado glasati za prvo ponuđeno rešenje. Oni će se, dakle, odlučiti za predlog x, iako bi x moglo biti na dnu njihove rang-liste preferencija.

teorija i pokušava da se suoči uključujući kao svoj važan aspekt i obuhvatno empirijsko (eksperimentalno) istraživanje deliberativnih procesa.

934 S obzirom na to da je pitanje demokratske legitimnosti vezano ne samo za to šta neko misli, već i za to da je mišljenje potrebno izraziti iskreno, slobodno i autonomno (u suprotnom bi se i represija koja rezultira jedno-glasnošću mogla prihvatiti kao sredstvo dolaska do legitimnosti), gore navedene brojke ukazuju na izrazitu potrebu za podizanjem kvaliteta demokratske diskusije. To je slučaj kako u Kolumbiji i Bosni, tako i u društvima sa razvijenijom i kvalitetnijom deliberativnom istorijom. Uspešno podizanje kvaliteta diskusije značilo bi aktivno učešće što većeg broja ljudi, češća izlaganja svih koji u jednom događaju učestvuju, podizanje stepena razumevanja suprotnih pozicija, kao i veći stepen empatije prema samim govornicima.²³ Na osnovu svega što je do sad rečeno, jasno je da bi kvalitetna deliberacija značila i veću legitimnost tako donesenih odluka. Jedna politička teorija zasnovana na ovakvim empiričkim ispitivanjima i vrednosnim razmatranjima deliberativnih procesa mogla bi, čini se, i da ispita političku praksu i da pruži konkretne preporuke za političko delovanje.

Štaviše, s obzirom na gore navedene političke vrednosti koje demokratske institucije moraju da otelovljuju, s obzirom na specifično etičke vrednosti na kojima se moraju zasnivati, kao što su iskrenost, sloboda i autonomija, lako uviđamo da je za jednu deliberativnu teoriju od presudne važnosti i ono što ističu politički realisti – uključivanje što većeg broja činjenica u teoriju – ali i ono što ističu moralisti – postojanje prostora za specifično etičke standarde. Utoliko se čini da bi i jedni i drugi mogli da prihvate deliberativnu teoriju a da ne napuste osnovna polazišta svojih pristupa. Istovremeno, prihvatajući mesto i za autonomnost etičkog i za autonomnost političkog u svojim polazištima, politički realizam i politički moralizam bi morali da se odreknu ideje o isključivosti i nepomirljivosti.

Zaključak

U ovom radu pošao sam od razmatranja problema legitimnosti koji se postavlja pred političke teorije demokratije. Prvo sam skicirao moralistički pristup koji ukazuje na potrebu da svaka politička teorija pođe od van-političkih etičkih vrednosti. Potom sam ukazao na realističke kritike koje moralizam kritikuju po dva osnova. Prvo, po mišljenju realista, moralisti ne uspeavaju da učine svoje teorije primenljivim. Drugo, moralisti na pogrešan način shvataju samu prirodu politike i utoliko ne uspeavaju da pokažu šta je to što politiku čini distinktnom od etike. Ukazao sam i na to da realisti ne žele da odustanu od vrednosti, ali da pre svega misle da politička teorija

23 Vidi sve parametre Štajnerovog DQI (indeksa kvaliteta diskursa) u Steiner 2012: 268-271.

treba da bude deskriptivna i da obuhvati što veći broj činjenica jer će tek tako moći da pruži preporuke za političko delovanje.

Tvrdio sam, potom, da se i realizmu mogu uputiti ozbiljne primedbe, od kojih je najvažniji problem subdeterminacije. Naime, opisi društvenih i političkih činjenica ne mogu dovesti do jednoznačnih preporuka, već je moguće dati i više međusobno oprečnih predloga. Tako se ispostavlja da je jedan od najvažnijih razloga iz kojih se odbacuje moralizam – neprimenljivost sasvim sličan razlogu iz kojeg bi ovako shvaćen realizam trebalo odbaciti – inherentna neodlučivost. Ipak, kako sam u poslednjem delu rada pokušao da pokažem, možemo pronaći pristup koji kombinuje osnovne stavove moralizma i realizma – potrebu za autonomno etičkim vrednostima, mogućnost obuhvatnog opisa političke stvarnosti, ali i sposobnost za ukazivanje na konkretno političko delovanje. Taj pristup je oličen u empirički zasnovanoj teoriji deliberativne demokratije. Za razliku od moralizma, za ovakvu teoriju se ne može reći da pogrešno shvata smisao političkog ili da narušava autonomiju politike. Naprotiv, deliberativna demokratija upravo ispituje konkretne političke procese, ali to čini imajući u vidu i značajne političke vrednosti na kojima demokratske institucije moraju biti zasnovane, i autonomno etičke vrednosti kao što su sloboda, autonomija i druge, bez kojih ne bismo mogli da odgovorimo na problem legitimnosti demokratskog odlučivanja.

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Pa ipak, neko bi mogao da ukaže na autore koji zastupaju deliberativnu teoriju, ali koji i dalje misle da je ona utopistička.²⁴ Ideja o opštoj, iskrenoj i efikasnoj deliberativnoj diskusiji zaista može i izgledati kao utopija. Taj utisak se, međutim menja čim pogledamo čitav niz empirijskih istraživanja deliberacije. Jedna grupa rezultata ukazuje na efikasnost deliberacije u postizanju konvergencije preferencija.²⁵ Druga grupa rezultata ukazuje na kvalitet deliberacije, kao i na to u kojoj se meri i na koji se način on može popraviti.²⁶ Iako, dakle, još uvek ne možemo uspostaviti sveobuhvatan deliberativni proces u svim demokratskim društvima, imamo jasne naznake da on može da rezultira ishodom koji učvršćuje legitimitet demokratskih institucija. Stoga se on može smatrati utoliko manje utopističkim, a utoliko više realističnim projektom koji uspeva da otelovi i autonomno etičke i specifično političke demokratske vrednosti.

24 Vidi, recimo, Laslett 2003.

25 List 2013.

26 Steiner 2012; Steiner 2016.

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Andrija Šoć

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Deliberative Democracy between Moralism and Realism

Abstract

The topic of this paper is the debate between political moralists and political realists. I will try to show that it is possible to find the middle ground that simultaneously satisfies the main demands of both camps while resisting objections directed against each. In the first part, I start with the view shared by both moralists and realists: that the main challenge lying before a political theory is solving the problem of legitimacy. I first sketch Rawls’ moralist approach. I then move to outline the realist criticisms of such moralism. I will mainly follow one of the most detailed recent theories – Sleat’s realist theory, although I will also draw from other well-known realists. In the second part, I outline objections against realism. They somewhat similar to the same criticisms they themselves direct against moralists. The main issue is, in short, the problem of underdetermination – that is, the insufficient determination of political action by facts. Since realists hold that a political theory has to be applicable, their view is thus considerably weakened by such criticism. In the third part of the paper, I point to deliberative theory as a view that can answer both realist criticism – because its main aspect is dealing with the way things work in actual politics of concrete societies – but it can also answer criticisms directed against realists themselves, because empirical research of deliberation suggests an actual and viable way to solve the problem of legitimacy – by raising the quality of deliberation. Moreover, a deliberative theory retains autonomy of the ethical, although it doesn’t do that, unlike moralism, by encroaching on the autonomy of politics. Thus, at the end of the paper, I claim that such a deliberative approach can be accepted by both realists and moralists.

Keywords: Political realism, political moralism, legitimacy, democracy, deliberation.

Zoran Janković

Novac i zajednica: mjerenje nemjerljivog. Novac kao pravda, vrijeme i lihvarjenje

Apstrakt Razmišljanje o novcu kao društvenoj i ekonomskoj realnosti, konstatuje Levinas, nipošto nije moguće bez ozbiljne analize empirijskih podataka. Razmišljanje o novcu, s druge strane, uvijek uključuje i nešto drugo, tako da novac nikad nije isključivo ekonomska kategorija. U tom smislu, Levinas predlaže jednu refleksiju o nekoliko „dimenzija“ koje novac posjeduje u zapadnoj tradiciji.

Ovaj članak analizira dva teksta, nastala u razmaku od 25 godina, koja Levinas posvećuje promišljanju novca. Nasuprot tradicionalnoj osudi novca, koja uvijek ostaje na snazi – u onoj mjeri u kojoj čovjek i sam rizikuje da postane roba – novac, za Levinasa, nikad nije samo puko postvarenje, nego uključuje i pozitivnu stranu.

Daleko od toga da bi bio samo nešto negativno ili samo neutralno što prekriva ljudske odnose, novac je, naprotiv, uslov zajednice. Novac se ovdje pojavljuje kao mjera nemjerljivog, kao neophodan za genezu socijalnog. U toj perspektivi, bez obzira kako to šokantno i skandalozno zvučalo, novac je ujedno i osnova pravde. Novac omogućava zajednicu, otvara budućnost, ljudi novcem sebi daju kredit: kredit kao vrijeme i kao povjerenje. Oko ove centralne ideje mjerljivosti nemjerljivog, pokušaćemo da propitamo i tematiziramo nekoliko problema koje ova teza implicira, posebno problem odnosa vremena novca i kredita. Na kraju, možda se možemo zapitati nije li – nasuprot Levinasu – ovaj kredit, neodvojiv od suštine novca, uvijek već i lihvarjenje?

Ključne riječi: Levinas, novac, lihvarjenje, pravda, milosorde, zajednica.

„Razmišljanje o ekonomskoj ili socijalnoj realnosti novca, nije zasigurno moguće bez dubljeg empirijskog istraživanja podataka gdje se ta realnost – ili institucija – shvaća.¹ Nije moguće bez uvida u njenu istoriju niti bez analize funkcija koje novac *de facto* vrši u ime dinamizma svojstvenog ekonomiji, tako složenoj u svom planetarnom protezanju...“ Ovako otpočinje Levinas jedan svoj tekst o novcu, no, dodaje odmah da, „možda nije nemoguće niti izlišno pokušati razmisлити o nekolike „dimenzije“ koje novac ocrta, dubi ili otkriva u moralnoj svijesti modenog evropskog čovjeka, čije temeljne crte sežu do biblijskih inspiracija i grčke misli...“.²

1 Ovaj tekst predstavlja sasvim nezatno izmijenjeno predavanje koje sam održao u Institutu za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 23 juna 2015. godine.

2 Levinas, „Socialité et argent“, izlaganje koje je Levinas izgovorio u Briselu povodom dvadesetpetogodišnjice belgijskih štedionica, *Groupement belge des banques d'épargne*. Objavljeno najprije u Burgraeve 1997. Izlaganje je preuzeto u više časopisa i zbornika,

Ali isto tako – treba odmah dodati – jedan takav pokušaj ne samo da nije suvišan, nego čisto ekonomsko razmišljanje o novcu nije ni moguće. Nije moguće promišljanje novca kao isključivo ekonomske kategorije: razmišljanje o novcu je uvijek i razmišljanje o nečem drugom, ono uvijek implicira i neku drugu dimenziju.

Pokušaću jedan komentar ovih Levinasovih razmišljanja o novcu koje on izlaže u svoja dva teksta, nastala u razmaku od više od 30 godina. Riječ je o tekstovima *Ja i totalitet*³, iz 1953 godine i *Socijalnost i novac*⁴ iz 1986 godine. Radi se, zapravo, o nekoliko paragrafa, iz ova dva teksta, koja ću komentarisati.

Novac: između osude i prihvatanja

U najširem smislu, moglo bi se govoriti o ekonomskom, političkom i moralnom aspektu novca. Najprije, ovdje ću se ograničiti da samo tematiziram nekoliko istorijskih momenata koji se tiču moralnog aspekta, i koji mi se čine interesantnim u kontekstu onoga što Levinas kaže o novcu. Dakle, zanimaću me ponajprije moralna dimenzija novca, ili tačnije moralna osuda novca a posebno osuda lihvarstva. Novac oduvijek prati osuda, i podoznje prema novcu ostaje čak i onda kada se novac prihvata i rehabilituje.

U stvari, možda bi najprije trebalo postaviti pitanje kako nešto poput novca, nešto moralno neutralno, može uopšte da ima moralne konotacije. Zašto je „novac kao neutralni univerzalni posrednik“, kao apstrakcija, moralno sumnjiv? Zašto ekonomski neutralan, novac ne bi bio i moralno neutralan? Šta je zapravo problematično u njegovoj neutralnosti i anonimnosti?

Iz bogate i nepregledne istorije osude novca, samo dvije ilustracije, jedna uzeta iz grčke, druga iz hrišćanske tradicije.

Iz Antičkog perioda: Želja za novcem označavana je kao apsolutno neprirodna, kod Epikura je, recimo, klasirana kao apsolutno neprirodna i prazna. Želja koja je već po sebi pretjerivanje. Za razliku od drugih – u Epikurovoj klasifikaciji – ispraznih želja koje su rezultat neumjerenosti u zadovoljavanju prirodnih i nužnih želja, želja za novcem nije rezultat te nesposobnosti da se kontrolišu želje, nije rezultat neumjerenosti, nego je već kao takva sama po sebi neumjerena. Ne može postojati prirodna i umjerena želja za novcem. U suštini te želje jeste upravo to da je nezasita, da želi uvijek više,

a ja ću navode davati prema Levinas, „Socialité et argent“, u *L'argent. Colloque des intellectuels Juifs, Données et débats. Actes du XXVIII Colloque des intellectuels Juifs de la langue française* 1988.

3 Levinas 1991: 25–53. Text je prvobitno objavljen u *Revue de la métaphysique et de morale*, octobre–novembre 1954.

4 Levinas 1997.

ona je sama po sebi već neprirodna jer je uvijek pretjerana, jer je nemoguće ne htjeti uvijek više novca.⁵

Epikur izražava samo na najupečatljiviji način ono što je opšte mjesto Grčke, i što se stalno ponavlja kao opomena i poziv na umjerenost. Ovu osudu novca, u drugom kulturno-istorijskom sklopu i drugačijoj terminologiji, sada označenu kao grijeh, preuzeće hrišćanstvo. Tu osuda bogatstva, sumnjičenje bogatstva i ideal siromaštva, nalaze najčešće potvrdu u uvijek rado navođenim mjestima iz Biblije:

„Opet vam kažem da se lakše kamili provući kroz iglene uši nego bogatašu ući u carstvo nebesko.“ (*Matej, 19.24*)

„Niko ne može služiti dva gospodara: ili će mrziti jednog a voljeti drugog, ili će se vezati za jednog a prezirati drugog. Ne možete služiti i Boga i Novca.“ (*Matej, 6.24*)

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Ova osuda naročito izbija u prvi plan sa idealom siromaštva i jačanjem prosjačkih redova u XII i XIII vijeku – koji upravo nastaju u periodu kada otpočinje intenzivnija upotreba novca.

Negativan odnos prema novcu se potencira sa Franjom Asiškim. Asiški insisira na osudi novca, koji je za osudu ne samo kao predmet naše želje, nego i kao puki posrednik. Odricanje od novca je najprije gesta fizicke odbojnosti – odbojnost prema materijalnosti novca, kovanice, koju svako može da dotakne, opipa i posjeduje. Asiški uspostavlja pravilo kojim zabranjuje svojoj sabračić da primaju novac, i kako kaže zapovijest, oni ne treba da pokazuju veći interes za novac negoli za kamenje i prašinu. Ova zapovijest, na traženje Pape biva ublažena, međutim i dalje ostaje na snazi naredba, vrlo izričita, o zabrani primanja novca, mada je uporedba sa kamenjem izbačena.⁶

Sa ovom osudom – koja ipak nikad nije bila potpuna – išlo je uporedo i postepeno prihvaćanje. Možemo, na primjer, pratiti postepeno prihvaćanje trgovca i bankara, u Evropi u XIII vijeku. Posebno će razvoj trgovine i pojava bankarstva, širenje i sve veća upotreba novca, dovesti u centar pažnje odnos novca i moralnosti. A naročito će lihvarjenje postati omiljena tema propovjednika tog doba⁷.

Lihvarjenje, a to znači naprosto posuđivanje novca uz interes. U tom ću smislu i ja upotrebljavati riječ. Lihvarjenje je svako posuđivanje novca uz kamatu. Ili prema jednoj definiciji koja datira jos iz 9 vijeka: „Postoji lihvarjenje kad se traži da se vrati više nego što se dalo“.⁸

5 Epicure 1977.

6 Le Goff 1999: 186–189.

7 Le Goff 2010.

8 Ibanès 1967: 18.

Ne nedostaju, sigurno, mjesta osude iz Svetog Pisma. Preuzimam, kao ilustraciju, dva veoma često navođena mjesta. Prvo, iz Starog Zavjeta:

„Od brata svoga nećeš tražiti kamatu za novac ni za namirnice ni za bilo koju drugu stvar koja se posuđuje uz kamatu.“ (Drugi zakonik, 23.20)

Drugo, iz Novog zavjeta:

„Ako posuđujete samo onima od kojih očekujete nadoknadu, koja je vaša zasluga?“ (*Luka VI 34-3*)

Tri su razloga za osudu lihvarjenja: lihvarjenje je smrtni grijeh pohlepe (*cupidas, avaritia*,) Lihvarjenje je na drugom mjestu grijeh protiv pravde i na trećem mjestu, lihvarjenje je krađa. Krađa vremena koje pripada samo Bogu. Ovaj posljednji argument mi se čini posebno zanimljiv.⁹

Jacques Le Goff – na čije se radove ovdje uglavnom oslanjam – pokazuje da ako trgovac (bankar) i nije bio univerzalno preziran kako se to obično misli, i štavise, ako ga je crkva, veoma rano štitila i favorizovala, ipak je ostavila veoma dugo sumnju da pritišće njegovu aktivnost. Među najvažnijima pritužbama na njegovu aktivnost nalazimo prijekor da njegova zarada pretpostavlja hipoteku na vrijeme koje pripada isključivo Bogu.

Ovome treba dodati još jedan razlog. Tvrdnju da se naime novac oplodava na neprirodan način, što je argument prisutan još od Aristotela¹⁰. Oplodavanje novca, dakle, kao protivprirodan akt, kao nedozvoljen seksualni čin.

Lihvar koristi vrijeme za profit, upreže vrijeme da bi ostvario dobit; činjenica da sam protok vremena može dati zaradu jeste za osudu. Lihvar ne obavlja nikakav stvarni rad, ne obrađuje zemlju, ne ulaže nikakav svaran trud, nego sam protok vremena predstavlja izvor njegove zarade. On koristi vrijeme koje pripada isključivo Bogu. Lihvar prisvaja, prodaje vrijeme, koje je vlasništvo Boga.

Kako kaže jedan anonimni spis iz tog perioda, koji dobro sažima sve motive ove osude:

Lihvari griješe protiv prirode jer hoće da porode novac na isti način kao što konj porađa konja ili mula mulu. Povrh toga, lihvari su kradljivci jer krađu vrijeme koje im ne pripada, a prodavati tuđe dobro uprkos njegovom vlasniku jeste krađa. Osim toga, budući da ne prodaju ništa drugo nego očekivanje novca, tj vrijeme, oni prodaju dane i noći. A dan je vrijeme svjetlosti, noć vrijeme mira. Prema tome, oni prodaju svjetlost i mir. Stoga, nije pravedno da dobiju vječno svjetlo i vječni mir.¹¹

9 Le Goff 1976: 46.

10 Moreau 1969: 349–364.

11 Le Goff 2010: 103.

To je period kada je strah od pakla vrlo izražen, pri čemu posebnu ulogu igra čistilište. Zapravo, uloga čistilišta, kao nove vizije onostranosti, u 12 i 13 vijeku postaje veoma važna, paralelno sa stalno rastućom opsjednutošću brigom da se izbjegne pakao. Čistilište nudi upravo tu mogućnost: okajavanjem grijehova u čistilištu – gdje je kazna određena srazmjerno broju i težini grijehova – može se trajno izbjeći pakao.¹² Čistilište je kao neka vrsta prijevremenog svođenja računa, privremena onostranost, prije definitivnog suočavanja sa alternativom ili pakao ili raj. To je prilika da se iskupe slučajevi koji nisu nepopravljivi.

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To je ujedno i razlog zašto posebno trgovci i bankari strahuju od čistilišta. A ovaj strah posebno pogađa lihvara, koji je izrazito omražen tako da – kako to bilježi jedan lokalni propovjednik – tek 1220 godine imamo i prvi poznati slučaj jednog lihvara iz Liegea koji je izbjegao trajne muke pakla. Kada je o lihvaru riječ, ne nedostaje uporedba sa životinjama: najčešće ga simbolizira lav koji se ostrvio, prefrigana lisica, izgladnjeli vuk. Pred kraj života, u metaforici kojom se koriste propovijednici tog doba, životinja-lihvar, veoma često gubi krzno. Nepošteno stečeni novac, ukradeno bogatstvo. Time se uspostavlja neka pravda, vraćanje nepravedno zarađenog novca.¹³

Tu je u ovoj metaforici već na djelu neka ekonomija i neka kvantifikacija. Kvantifikacija, kao sravnivanje računa u trenutku smrti, pravda, kao poravnanje računa, kao jedna ekonomska kategorija.

Lihvara stize kazna, lihvar često ostaje bez sposobnosti govora prije same smrti. A to je strašna kazna pošto ne može da se ispovijedi, da se spasi, da poravna račun. Oduzeta mu je mogućnost da razmjenjuje, jer je razmjenom stekao bogatstvo. Ne može da razmjenjuje riječi: oduzeta mu je riječ, kao neka vrsta novca, kao novac. Stiže ga potpuno osiromašenje, mutizam, gori i teži nego potpun gubitak krzna.

Najčešća, i meni najzanimljivija je uporedba sa paukom. Pauk je najomraženiji i najbolje iskazuje suštinu lihvara jer pauk ostavlja iza sebe mrežu, u koju upliće potomstvo. Zlo se prenosi na djecu, na potomke, koji su već samim rođenjem upleteni u mrežu novca. Ovdje me figura pauka i simbolika paukove mreže zanima jer implicira vrijeme, mrežu, budućnost. Paukova mreža kaže se na našem jeziku: mreža, kao socijalna mreža, kao upletenost u vrijeme i ono socijalno. Mreža koja je neizbježnost socijalnog vremena.

Nasuprot ovoj osudi u jevrejskoj tradiciji – što možda nije sasvim bez značaja kada se radi o Levinasu – bilo bi drugačije – gdje, kako navodi Attali¹⁴, recimo, postoje čitave debate o tome da li kamata treba da bude niska ili

12 Le Goff 1981.

13 Le Goff 2010:105–106.

14 Attali 2002: 120.

visoka. Tako na primjer, nalazimo tvrdnju da je posuđivanje novca uz kamatu u stvari u interesu, da ide u korist, onoga koji posuđuje. Štaviše, kamata treba da bude što veća kako bi se potakao racionalan izbor, dok posuđivanje novca bez kamate umanjuje tu sposobnost i zamagljuje ekonomsku računicu.

Uz napomenu da je hrišćanski antisemitizam od početka nerazdvojjiv od ekonomskih denoncijacija, Attali upozorava da se Jevrejima ne zabranjuje pozajmljivanje novca sa kamatom. Zabrana vazi samo za pozajmljivanje novca sa kamatom drugim Jevrejima.

Kako kaže verset: „Strancu ćeš posuđivati uz kamatu, a bratu tvome bez kamate“¹⁵ (*Drugi zakonik*, 23, 20)

Za Aristotela i hrišćanstvo, novac je po sebi sterilan, ne proizvodi ništa, zato postoji zabrana lihvarjenja. Nasuprot toj tradiciji, za koju je to protivprirodno – kaže Attali – za Jevreje, novac je kao stoka, plodno bogatstvo, a vrijeme je prostor koji treba valorizirati.

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U tom smislu, recimo, Maurice Krigel, navodi rabinske tekstove, koji daju argumente u prilog lihvarjenja, a ja izdvajam samo ovaj: Lihvar može da se posveti Bogu u potpunosti, ukoliko ima obezbijeden materijalni život. Lihvar, ne mora da se bavi drugim poslom, drugim zanimanjem koje zahtijeva vrijeme. On može, naprotiv, zahvaljujuci vremenu koje mu daje zarada od kamata da se posveti religioznom proučavanju, „i danju i noću“, kako zahtijeva biblijski verset.¹⁶ Tako on raspolaže onim što nije njegovo ali ga vraća, popravlja tu štetu, time što ga posvećuje Bogu. To vrijeme je u neku ruku vraćeno Bogu. Dan i noć, svjetlo i mir, vraćeni su pravom vlasniku.

U ovom primjeru – kojim se odobrava lihvarjenje – interveniše ideja računanja i neka vrsta ekonomije, kao poravnanje računa i kao pravda. Jednako kao i u samoj ideji čistilišta, gdje bankari i lihvari najviše strahuju da neće moći da budu u dobroj srazmjeri, da ce njihovi grijehovi biti nesrazmjerno preveliki. Oko novca stalno se vrti neka ideja pravde kao mjere i neke kvantifikacije: kvantifikacija, novac i pravda.

Prvi Levinasov tekst koji bih sada komentarisao – *Ja i totalitet* iz 1953 godine – govori upravo o kvantifikaciji, novcu i pravdi.

15 Ovo mjesto Rafael Draï relativizira reinterpetirajući riječ „stranac“, zapravo, po njegovom tumačenju, lihvarjenje je dozvoljeno samo kao izuzetak, u slučajevima gdje je to manje zlo, kao jedini način da se saobraća sa onima koji još nisu prihvatili Toru i koji međusobno praktikuju lihvarjenje. Cf. *Topiques sinaïtiques*, Hermann 2013: 102–104. U stvari, Draï ovom mjestu preuzima interpretaciju koju daje Nelson u svom *The Idea of Usury*, 1969.

16 Krigel 1988: 119.

Kvantifikacija, pravda i novac

Levinas u ovom tekstu tematizira „dimenziju“ kvantifikacije, svojstvene novcu. U ekonomiji, putem novca, vrši se kvantifikacija osoba, kvantifikacija čovjeka. Onog nemjerljivog. Postoji nužnost računanja, kaže Levinas, i u tome leži pozitivna funkcija novca. „Pravda ne može imati drugi objekt nego ekonomsku jednakost“.¹⁷

Uloga novca jeste da kvantificira ono što se ne može kvantificirati. Da omogućava računanje sa onim neračunljivim. Novac je mjerenje nemjerljivog. Drugim riječima, novac otvara mogućnost društva, socijalnog, i onda pravde. Sa novcem, sa ekonomijom, nestaje trampa, subjektivan i neposredan odnos, i ulazimo u domen zajednice i društva.

Ova kvantifikacija, ma koliko to zvučalo šokantno, neophodan je uslov pravde. Neutralizacija putem novca je neophodna jer – pita se Levinas:

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„Šta može da znači pravda i nepravda, kad individuumi poput različitih smislova bitka kod Aristotela, nemaju jedinstvo pojma i kad se mjera pravde nikako ne može dobiti prostim upoređivanjem individuuma“.¹⁸

O kakvoj je ovdje kvantifikaciji riječ? Ne radi se o dodavanju, pukom sabiranju. Ovdje ne važi, kaže Levinas, logika dijela i cjeline. Ovi odnosi ne podliježu zakonima formalne logike. „Osoba, ono ja“, ne povlači svoj identitet iz cjeline u koju se smješta, ne podudara se sa situacijom, sa bogatstvom ili djelom – putem kojih se, ipak, spaja sa cjelinom. Ovo „između nas“, *entre nous*, figurira kao specifičan prostor koji nije isključivo rezultat matematičke operacije. Ovo *mi* nije množina onoga *ja*.¹⁹ U svojoj apstraktnoj dimenziji kvantifikacije, opštosti, novac ipak ne briše individualnost. Naime, ova neutralizacija nužna za postojanje pravde nikad nije potpuna.

Svoj dignitet filozofske kategorije i originalnost – tvrdi Levinas – novac duguje činjenici da je on elemenat gdje se lično (*le personnel*) održava iako se kvantificira. Roba pretpostavlja ličnost i ličnost ostaje neodvojiva neotuđiva u transakciji, čak kad se osoba prodaje.²⁰ Specifičnost kvantifikacije čovjeka putem novca se manifestuje u odnosu prema „totalitetu“: ja sam i unutra i izvan. Izvan, jer posjedujem novac, posjedujem mogućnost posjedovanja; unutar, budući da mogu da budem i prodan, da postanem roba.

Bitan je poredak robe, ekonomski totalitet je poredak roba (*l'ordre de marchandises*) jer pretpostavlja osobe, i uvijek je neodvojiv od osoba, čak i u slučaju roba (*esclave*). Upravo stoga što to nije prirodan poredak, novac nije dakle nešto neutralno ili naprosto postvarujuće što prekriva odnose među

17 Levinas 1991: 50.

18 Ibid., 40.

19 Ibid., 48.

20 Ibid., 51.

osobama, nego je, naprotiv, ključan za njihovo postojanje. On ih pretpostavlja, kvantificira ali ih nikad u potpunosti ne ukida.

S jedne strane novac je apstrakcija, nivelacija, anonimnost, s druge on je uslov pravde: da li je moguće – pita se Levinas – zamisliti pravdu bez kvantiteta i bez reparacije?

Čitam ključni paragraf:

„Ali kvantifikacija čovjeka – takva kakvu dvosmislenost novca omogućava – obznanjuje novu pravdu. Da se radikalna razlika među ljudima (ona koja se ne tiče razlika u karakteru, socijalnom položaju, nego njihovog ličnog identiteta ili kako se kaže sada sopstva) ne prevazilazi kvantitativnom jednakošću ekonomije koja je mjerljiva novcem, ljudsko nasilje bi se moglo reparirati isključivo ili osvetom ili oprostom. Takva reparacija ne okončava nasilje: zlo rađa zlo, a beskrajno praštanje zlo ohrabruje. Takav je hod istorije. Mi smo insistirali upravo na prekidu te istorije gdje se konstituše ovo *Mi*. Novac omogućava da zamislimo pravdu iskupljenja koja zamjenjuje *circulum viciosus* ili pakleni krug osвете ili oprosta.“²¹

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Novac, dakle, omogućava da se prekine istorija kao istorija osveta i oprosta. To što se pravda može kupiti, predstavlja civilizacijski napredak jer daje mogućnost da se razbije vječiti krug osвете i oprosta. Ukoliko to zvuči skandalozno, treba se prisjetiti, napominje Levinas, da kad država traži neku bolju pravdu ona traži upravo to, iskupljenje u doslovnom smislu riječi.

U tom smislu je onda moguće interpretirati Zakon taliona. Tako da mjesto iz *Drugog Zakonika*: „Život za život, oko za oko zub za zub, ruka za ruku“ (*Drugi zakonik*, 19.21) isto tako iz Mateja (5.38-40): „Čuli ste da je rečeno oko za oko, zub za zub, a ja vam kažem da se ne opirete zlu koje vam se želi nanijeti ; nego ako vas neko udari po desnom obrazu poturite mu i drugi“, može da se čita i „oko za novac, zub za novac...“.

Rafael Draï u svom *Le mythe de la loi de talion*²² pokazuje da je u versetu „oko za oko ...“ jedina semantička nepoznanica ovo „za“, *ta'hat*. Ono se može prevesti – zapravo po Draïju bi ga trebalo prevesti – kao *prema*. *Ta hat* se prevodi sa *halaf*, što doslovno znači konverziju, zamjenu jedne vrijednosti za drugu, pa bi se onda ovo „oko za oko“, moglo i trebalo čitati kao „oko prema oku“, odnosno ka mjera, nadoknada, kao vrijednost oka za vrijednost oka: „oko za oko“ trebalo bi čitati onda, „daćeš oko za vrijednost oka“. Dakle, nije smisao verseta osveta, nego isplata odštete, nadoknada, kompenzacija. Verset zapravo zahtijeva da se zadovolji novcem kad se izgubi krv. U tom smislu i Levinas interpretira verset, napominjući – sasvim sumarno – da postoje, talmudski tekstovi koji ukidaju Zakon taliona²³.

21 Levinas 1991: 50.

22 Draï 1996.

23 Levinas 1963: 194–196.

Ovdje bih se kratko osvrnuo na komentar tog istog mjesta koji daje rabin Gueđ.²⁴ Kako upozorava rabin Gueđ, u interpretaciji ovoga „Oko za oko“ koje uključuje vrednovanje, nadoknadu, vrijednost oka za vrijednost oka, koje se odriče osvete, ne može da se prenebregne činjenica da izvorno ne postoji identitet između bića: naime, kako navodi Gueđ, Guemara se pita u slikovitoj formi „...Ako je moje oko veliko a tvoje malo, kako ćemo primjenjivati Zakon taliona?“ Radi se o tome da možda ova interpretacija taliona kao kompenzacije, već pretpostavlja jednakost između bića. Simetriju. Pitanje je, međutim, da li tu uopšte postoji simetrija ili ne. Ako postoji simetrija, onda može da se ili plati ili uzme oko. Simetrija kao kompenzacija ili kao osveta.

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Upravo ova materijalna kompenzacija, „oko za novac“ izvlači iz nasilja i osvete, ali i ukida jedinstvenost, individualnost, jer novac generalizira. Jedinstvenost onog koji je povrijeđen nadoknađuje se novcem koji je po svojoj suštini bezličan. Jedinstvenost drugog nestaje. To je cijena koja se plaća, odricanjem od osvete i uvođenjem prava. I Levinas čini mi se to ima u vidu kad čita ovaj verset; zato može reći „pravda je prva nepravda“.

Ili – u interpretaciji Gueđa – simetrija, u stvari, izvorno uopšte ne postoji: u obje verzije, bilo u doslovnom interpretiranju „moje oko jednako tvom“ bilo „oko za novac“ simetrija se uspostavlja tamo gdje je izvorno nema. Možda bi se trebalo čitati: ne „tvoje oko za moje oko“, nego „tvoje oko ispod moga oka“, jer nista za žrtvu ne može nadoknaditi vrijednost izgubljenog vlastitog oka. Dakle, kao krik žrtve koja zahtijeva neizmjernu osvetu. Nasilje se tako pretvara u osvetu jer povrh jednog dijela tijela zahtijeva čitavu osobu. Dakle, nesrazmjerno nasilje, osveta bez mjere, zahtjev da se za moje oko da čitava osoba. Zašto bi onda jedno nasilje bilo bolje od drugoga, srazmjerno nasilje od nesrazmjernog nasilja, zasto bi „oko za oko“ bilo bolje od ovoga „oko za čitavu osobu?“, I kako onda može da novac bude kompenzacija za nenadoknadivo. Zato je potreban i oprost. Novac nikad nije dovoljan nego žrtva mora i da oprosti, kaze Gueđ.

Oprost je neophodan, kaze i Levinas, jer samo materijalna kompenzacija nikad nije dovoljna. Levinas, kada komentariše ovo mjesto, poziva se na odgovor svog učitelja Chouchania. Na pitanje: „Zašto je rečeno oko za oko, ako oko znači novac? Couchani odgovara: zbog toga što čak i kad smo platili novcem ipak ništa nije izbrisano. To je tako jer onaj koji ima mnogo novca može iskopati oči svima...Rotschild može svima iskopati oči“.²⁵

24 Gueđ 1988: 43–47.

25 „La genèse de *Socialié et argent*. Entretien préparatoire avec Emmanuel Levinas sur l'argent, l'épargne et le prêt“, in Burgraeve 1997. O zagonetnom Levinasovom učitelju vidjeti Malka 1994: 11–114.

Od ove tri moguće varijante: „Oko za oko“, „oko za novac“, „tvoje oko ispod mog oka“, jedino formulacija „oko za novac“ razdvaja, oslobađa počinitelja od žrtve. I možda da dodamo ovdje jedan argument u prilog novca koji Levinas ne navodi: Novac i razdvaja – novac ne samo da izjednačava, nivelise, zbližava, nego, s druge strane, razdvaja, daje integritet. Plaćanjem, naime, zločinac se odvaja od žrtve i novac mu tako pomaže da očuva vlastiti identitet. „Novac je garant integriteta individuuma“²⁶. Zapravo, novac koji je anonimnost i opštost, može da bude i u službi individuacije.

Uostalom, riječ „platiti“, *leshalem*, može se vokalizirati i kao *schlemout* (inegrijet) i kao *shalom* (mir). Dakle, u jednom od svojih značenja riječ „novac“ znači i „mir“. Regulisanje dugova je zapravo način da se ostvari ili zadobije mir; razmjena novca kao način da se izbjegne sukob i rasprava. Novac onda – opet ovdje se pozivam na Draia – znači i zadovoljenje želje na civilizovan način, novcem, plaćanjem, a ne silom. Nenasilno zadovoljenje želje, naravno ukoliko, želja može da se kontroliše.²⁷

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Dva vrjednosna poretka: Zainteresovanost i nezainteresovanost

Levinas, treba to ponoviti, ne dovodi u pitanje prokletu stranu novca, mogućnost da u razmjeni roba i usluga i sam čovjek postane roba. Mogućnost da može biti kupljen i prodan. U tome je dvosmislenost novca.

Novac može dakle uvijek da kupi čovjeka. Ali, i u tome leži originalnost Levinasove pozicije, novac nikad nije samo to: novcem upravljaju dvije različite aksiologije, dva raznorodna sistema vrijednosti koje Levinas naziva – u drugom tekstu koji ću sada komentarisati – *intér-esse-ment* i *dés-intéressement*, zainteresovanost i nezainteresovanost.

Ovo *intéressement* je višeznačno: *inter-esse*, zajedničko biće, zajedničnost, zainteresovanost. Ne treba previdati, da je tu u riječi i interes, kamata. Novac je tako uhvaćen u dva poretka označena terminima koja izražavaju suštinu Levinasove filozofske pozicije. Novac je, s jedne strane, u poretku *inter-essement*, kao glad za bitkom, apetit da se postoji, metafizika, bitak. Tu je Heidegger, sa svojim *Da-sein* i koncepcijom *Brige* (*Sorge*). Zainteresovanost, gdje su upisani i zločin, rat itd. S druge strane je nezainteresovanost, poredak, dimenzija koja je po svemu bliska Levinasovoj ideji o etici kao prvoj filozofiji. Tu su sučeljeni, s jedne strane, koncept *Brige* kod Heideggera, i s druge strane Levinasova teza da treba da se brine prije za drugoga negoli za sebe.

26 Gued 1988: 43–47.

27 Draï 1990.

Čitam paragraf iz drugog teksta:

„Posredstvom novca čovjek bi imao pristup drugom čovjeku u susretu koji nije ni prosto dodavanje osobe osobi, niti nasilje osvajanja, niti percepcija objekta koji se nudi u svojoj istini, nego jedno sve-nasuprot-licu drugog čovjeka koji ga već bez riječi poziva i kojem donosi odgovor: objava mira kao u „*shalom*“ ili želja za onim što je dobro, kao u „dobar dan“. Priznanje bez prethodnog poznavanja. Pozdrav. Odgovor ili izvorna odgovornost, ono „obratiti se“ svakog diskursa. U novcu se nikada ne smije zaboraviti ova međuljudska bliskost, transcendencija i zajedničnost koja je već prožima, od jedinstvenog ka jedinstvenom, od stranog ka stranom, trans-akcija kojoj svaki novac prethodi i koju svaki novac oživljava²⁸“.

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U suštini, Levinas nadopunjuje tezu iz prvog teksta, ali ova mi formulacija izgleda jača, jer je bliža sferi onoga što Levinas naziva ljubavlju, (*charite*), koju karakteriše dualni odnos, odnos ja-drugi, koji ne uključuje društvo. U prvom tekstu iz 1953, kako smo vidjeli, tema je bila veza novca i pravde, dakle podjela, računanje, sfera socijalnog itd., dok je sada tema ljubav i novac, dualni odnos, novac i milosrđe.

Treba najprije napomenuti ovdje, da se Levinas služi izrazom „pravda“ u dvojakom smislu. Upotreba ovog termina je kod Levinasa dvoznačna, tako da izraz „pravda“ pokriva i odnos ja – drugi, jednako kao i odnos prema trećem. „Treći“, izraz kojim se Levinas služi, označava društvo, zajednicu, ili najbolje čitavo čovječanstvo. Pravda je dakle najprije odnos prema drugom, kao odgovornost, odnos koji prethodi instituciji, što kasnije Levinas naziva milosrđe, ili ljubav. To je odnos licem u lice. U drugom značenju, pravda označava instituciju, trećeg, socijalno i uključuje uvijek kalkulisnje. Dakle, pravda kao institucija i država. Recipročnost. Pravda kao nužnost računanja, koje pretpostavlja recipročnost, organizovano društvo.

Ova dva poretka ne treba misliti kao nešto što vremenski dolazi jedno poslije drugoga. Ono socijalno je uvijek već tu, ako ni zbog čega drugog a ono onda jer je odnos prema licu (*visage*) jezički odnos. Ovdje dakle ne treba predstavljati pravdu i ljubav kao dva poretka koja dolaze jedan nakon drugoga, kao sukcesiju; ljubav, (*charité*) i pravda, nisu dvije vremenske dimenzije koje dolaze jedna poslije druge, nego su istovremene i neodvojive, osim ako se nalazimo – kaže u jednom razgovoru Levinas – na pustom ostrvu bez trećeg, bez čovječanstva. Što ipak ne sprječava razlikovanje ovih sfera, niti sprječava Levinasa da tvrdi da je ljubav ipak prvobitna (*originnaire*). Zapravo: pravda je rođena iz ljubavi.²⁹

Dakle, iako neodvojive pravda i ljubav, ipak su različite, dva različita poretka, dva nivoa, dva aspekta – nisam siguran kako bi ih bilo najbolje nazvati.

28 Levinas 1988: 217.

29 Levinas 1991: 125.

Možda je najbolje ovu razliku ilustrovati primjerom koji daje sam Levinas: Sudija izriče presudu, oslobađa nevinog i kažnjava krivca, i opaža da je krivac koji mora platiti kaznu siromašan čovjek, i onda mu on, od svog ličnog novca, nadoknadi kaznu. To su pravda i ljubav, kaze Levinas.³⁰

U suštini – da se vratimo na komentar ovog paragrafa – samo posjedovanje novca, sama činjenica da on postoji, da je u opticaju, otvara me prema drugom, kao trans-akcija. Drugi je tu prije nego što ga poznajem. Priznanje prije poznavanja. Zapravo, ton, i terminologija koju Levinas upotrebljava naginje ka deskripcijama odnosa pred-institucionalnoga (izvorna odgovornost, itd).

Dakle, ne radi se o istini, o aktivnoj percepciji, o predmetu i njegovoj istinitosti. Nije u pitanju istina, nego ono što prethodi razlikovanju istinitog i lažnog, i što nije u domenu nasilja, i što ne pripada odnosu prezenta, predstave, percepcije, objektivnosti i istine predstave. Ova fenomenološka deskripcija bitnih karakteristika novca, ne samo da se približava deskripcijama sfere ljubavi, nego i svim onim pokušajima – koji u fenomenološkoj tradiciji – nastoje da dopru do jednog izvornog, predobjektivnog i predložičkog sloja, nivoa. Zato ovo „pozdrav“, itd... se može razumjeti u analogiji sa svim onim predlozima mislilaca koje bi da nađu neki pred-institucionalni nivo, pred-objektivni sloj. Bilo da se to traži na jednom predjezičkom nivou kao kod Husserla, Merleau-Pontya, bilo na jezičkom kao kod Heideggera i Gadamera³¹.

Poređenje novca sa jezikom ovdje nije slučajno, poređenje uostalom veoma često i neizbježno. Novac kao pozdrav, kao „mir“ ili kao „dobar dan“, kao prethodno uvažavanje – ali uvažavanje koje je univerzalno – i kao univerzalno, želio bih to podcrtati, ipak anonimno i kao takvo nužno preko dualnog odnosa ljubav, ja-drugi, i nužno institucionalno. Novac kao pozdrav, kao „dobar dan“, kao prva riječ. Kao prva riječ koja objavljuje moju raspoloživost drugome.

Novac znači, obratiti se unaprijed, ili biti spreman da se drugi saslušaju, kao u slučaju jezika. Ja prećutno kažem „da“. Zapravo, radi se je o jednoj izvornoj dimenziji jezika, originarnoj, gdje prije nego što se stvarno obratim, ja dajem svoj pristanak. Jedno „da“. „Zusage“, kaze Heidegger, prije bilo kakve konverzacije, ja kazem „da“, „da“ jeziku i dijalogu. Jedno „da“, pristajanje kao sam uslov govora i jezika. Pristanak koji nosi svaku buduću komunikaciju. Novac je jedno „da“, pristanak na socijalni odnos, apsolutna, prethodna otvorenost.

30 Levinas 1982: 129.

31 Kao kod Merleau-Ponty-a – perceptivna vjera, kao magma, element, ili *Urdoxa* kod kasnog Husserla.

Novac kao pravda, kao milosrđe i kao darivanje

Neposredno nakon ovog insistiranja na *désintéressement*, na nezainteresovanosti, Levinas govori o darovanju, mogućnosti da se novac daruje. Levinas smješta darovanje novca u ovu aksiologiju ne-zainteresovanosti, i šire, u sklopu vlastitog filozofskog projekta u domen dobrote i ljubavi. Štaviše, njegov vlastiti projekat, to su njegove riječi, nije ni sinteza ni negacija, nego je dobrota i darovanje.

U ovoj tematici darovanja, kod Levinasa, sve je tu odmah suprotstavljeno Heideggeru. Levinas uzima Heideggera kao najbolji primjer ovog *intéressement*, zainteresovanosti, i brige za sebe svoj vlastiti tu-bitak, Heidegger mu zapravo služi kao skraćunica za svaku ontologiju i istrajavanje u bitku.

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Citiram: „Otuda treba ozbiljno uzeti u obzir potrebe drugoga, njegove zainteresovanosti, i novca koji se daruje. Treba li insistirati na važnosti koja u aksiologiji nezainteresovanosti pripada finansijskoj aktivnosti zaokupljenoj darovanjem?³²“ Riječ je znači, o finansijskoj aktivnosti, koja se stara, brine, oko darovanja kao najizrazitije karakteristike nezainteresovanosti. Dakle, darovanje novca.

Ovdje bih htio postaviti jedno pitanje koje se tiče, dara, darovanja, kod Levinasa. Tačnije, novca i mogućnosti darovanja. Kako se, naime, novac određuje u sklopu Levinasove ideje o pravdi i milosrđu? U kojoj mjeri je novac darovanje, da li je moguće uopšte govoriti o novcu i darovanju? Da li je to moguće, ponajprije u svjetlu onoga što sam Levinas kaže o darovanju i razlici između sfera darovanja i ekonomije, koje on sam uspostavlja?

Vidjeli smo, prvi nivo, kod Levinasa, koji je milosrđe, (*charité*), jeste odnos ja-drugi, dualni odnos, odnos koji prethodi ekonomskom odnosu, instituciji, kalkulisanju. Izvorno novac ne pripada sferi darovanja. Izvorno, novac nije darovanje, kaže Levinas ali, dodaje, on takođe jeste, i darovanje.

Šta je darovanje za Levinasa, pogledajmo u svjetlu dva primjera koja daje sam Levinas, i koje najbolje ilustruju njegovu ideju darovanja:

„Darovanje, inicijalno, tu još nema novca? – postavlja pitanje Levinasov sagovornik u jednom intervjuu. Inicijalno, nema potrebe za novcem – odgovara Levinas. Tu je briga za drugog, milosrđe prema drugom. Ukoliko se to iznova javlja u društvu, onda je to i novac. Inicijalno, radi se o tome da se okonča patnja drugoga, da ga ne pustimo da umre sam. Treba ga hraniti, prodavnica jos nije tu ! Mi smo sami ! Čin darovanja, to je takođe ne pustiti da se umre sam. Ne dopustiti da se umre sam, ne mirno posmatrati nego pohitati !³³“

32 Levinas 1988: 221.

33 „La genèse de *Socialié et argent*. Entretien préparatoire avec Emmanuel Levinas sur l'argent, l'épargne et le prêt“, in Burgraeve 1997: 61.

Znači, „darovanje, to je ne dopustiti da se umre sam.“ Zašto ovdje dar i umirati sam? Upravo stoga što u tom zahtjevu – koji Levinas formulise i drugdje – u zahtjevu da se „uključimo u smrt drugog“, nema trgovine, nema recipročnosti. Asimetričnost je apsolutna. Novac, naprotiv, jeste simetrija. Darovanje, prodavnica još nije tu: prodavnica je moguća samo kad simetrija već postoji, kad postoji razmjena. U smrti kao „ne dopustiti da se umre sam“ nema novca, nema kalkulisanja, nema srazmjernosti. Zahtjev da se uključim u smrt drugoga, dakle apsolutna nesimetričnost: smrt drugoga je prva smrt. Sve potpuno obrnuto od Heideggera.

Upravo u ovom umiranju za drugog, nema iskupljenja – kako insistira Levinas – to nipošto nije povezano sa idejom spasenja. Dakle, ono je izvan uračunljivoga, izračunljivog. Ovdje, kad Levinas još izričito kaže da je izvan svakog iskupljenja, onda opet moramo čuti ovo „kupiti“ u riječi iskupljenje.

Drugi primjer, uzet je iz Biblije, priča o Rebeki i Isaku. Radi se o testu, sluga traži ženu za Isaka i njegova buduća žena treba da odgovori: „Daću ti da piješ, ali ću isto tako napojiti i tvoje kamile“. (*Postanje, 14.14.*)

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Levinas daje objašnjenje: darovati znaci, davati, darovati onima koji ne znaju da traže, i koji još povrh toga nemaju ni potrebu za onim što se daruje. Kako tumači Levinas, kamila nosi vodu sa sobom, ima zalihe, ne samo da ne zna da traži nego joj voda ni ne treba.

Dakle, inicijalno novac nije tu. Sa novcem, naprotiv, stvar postaje roba. Novac je stvar koja se uopšte ne može darivati, ali koja se isto tako može i darivati, dodaje Levinas (*pas du tout donnable, mais donnable aussi*). Darovanje nije inicijalno svijet ekonomije. Ali po Levinasu, ono jeste i to. Ova teza čini mi se već je najavljena u *Totalité et infini*. U *Totalité et infini* dar prethodi; prethodi ali se ne ukida u novčanoj sferi. On je uslov. „Priznati drugog jeste priznati glad. A dar je ukidanje neotuđivog posjedovanja. Prisustvo drugog znači dovođenje u pitanje mog radosnog posjedovanja svijeta. Ovo prvobitno razvlašćivanje uslovljava kasniju generalizaciju putem novca³⁴“.

Ova je dvosmislenost – paradoksalnost – stalno prisutna kod Levinasa: ako, naime, pravda i milosrđe nisu sukcesivne faze, a ono ipak ne bi se mogle brkati. S jedne strane, Levinas govori o mogućnosti darovanja novca eksplicitno, s druge strane, sam podcrtava razliku i nesvodivost između sfera darovanja i ekonomije. Tako recimo kaže: „Sud postoji tamo gdje je na snazi ekonomska interakcija među ljudima i koja nikako nije ona darovanja, nego je interakcija dijeljenja svijeta, izbora, kupovine i prodaje, razmjene.³⁵“

34 Levinas 1961:48.

35 Burgraeve 1997: 60.

Da li darovanje može uključiti i svijet ekonomije? Ovo mi se čini problematičnim. Ovo „*donnable aussi*“, tvrdnja da se novac može i darivati. Čini mi se, dakle, problematičnim darovanje, uzeto ne u uobičajenom smislu riječi, u kome ne samo da se može govoriti o darovanju novca nego se može i konstatovati – kako to pokazuju medijevalisti – da recimo, porast darovanja ide uporedo sa uvođenjem novca u Srednjem vijeku, da se uvećavaju broj i iznosa priloga podudara sa upotrebom novca i favorizira je.³⁶

Međutim, u smislu u kome darovanje razumijeva Levinas, ne vidim kako bi se moglo pomiriti darovanje i novac. Svijet ekonomije nije svijet darovanja ne samo inicijalno nego to ne može biti nikako. I to proizilazi iz same Levinsove filozofije, iz argumentacije koju sam Levinas daje. Novac ne može biti nikako darivanje. Sa novcem, prodavnica je neminovno uvijek već tu. U sferi darovanja, milosrđa, prvobitnog nivoa, darovanje novca nije moguće, u strogom smislu riječi, ukoliko želimo da očuvamo smisao Levinasovih razlikovanja.

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Prije bih zato govorio o isključivosti novca i darovanja. Ili njihovoj nesvodivosti. Pogotovo mi se čini neodrživo njihovo približavanje –izjednačavanje – u onoj formulaciji, kad Levinas govori o darivanju novca i novcu kao nahraniti i napojiti: To je ista stvar, nema razlike. Ja samo čas govorim o novcu, čas o piti i jesti, „*C'est la même chose, il n'y a pas de différence.*“³⁷ Napojiti, nahraniti to je dar. Novac, naprotiv može biti samo posjedovanje posjedovanja. Ne jesti i piti. Jest i piti je nesto određeno i to već ukazuje na sav paradoks Levinasove pozicije. Napojiti i nahraniti, to je prije prodavnice.

Čini mi se da – nasuprot onome što kaže Levinas – ukoliko želimo da zadržimo razlikovanje ljubav – ekonomija onda se dar ne samo transformiše nego se briše u potpunosti u sferi ekonomije. Novac je anonimnost i univerzalnost, jesti i piti, nije ni anonimno ni univerzalno. U novčanom daru, naprosto, brišu se sve karakteristike dara, koje – upravo po Levinasu – dar posjeduje.

Posuđivati, poklanjati i lihvariti.

Novac bi se dakle, po Levinasu mogao darovati. Kakav je status posuđivanja novca ili prodaje, odnosno u staroj terminologiji lihvarjenja? Da li Levinas odobrava posuđivanje uz kamatu?

Da, kaže Levinas, odgovarajući na vrlo direktno pitanje, „ja odobravam posuđivanje uz kamatu“, ali ... to je već institucija. Nelagoda prati ovaj odgovor, i dodaje odmah Levinas, to je anonimno. Čini se da Levinas lakše dopušta ovo posuđivanje uz kamatu – lihvarjenje – kada je bezlično. Kada je institucija,

36 Chiffolleau 1980.

37 Burgraeve 1997: 34.

kada je anonimnost, poput kreditnih kartica u razvijenom bankarskom sistemu. Dakle, posuđivanje novca sa kamatom, nije zabranjeno, kaže Levinas.

Ali jeste među prijateljima. Tu je razlika. Među prijateljima dozvoljeno je samo posuđivanje. Posuđivanje je najprije odnos među braćom, prijateljima. To je akt prijateljstva. Treba razlikovati prijateljstvo i trgovinu „Kad se prijateljstvo plaća, onda je to skandal“, kaže Levinas. I onda odmah pravi razliku između posuđivanja i prodaje: „Prodaja je vlasništvo koje ustupamo, dok je posuđivanje neka, bilo koja stvar, koja se vraća. Inicijalno, posuđivanje je čin među braćom, bratski čin.“³⁸

Prodaja je posjedovanje koje ustupam, posuđivanje je nešto što se vraća. Levinas kaže, posuđivanje, neka, bilo koja stvar, koja se vraća i koja ne mijenja vlasništvo. Međutim, novac nije bilo koja stvar. Novac nije bilo koja stvar, najprije jer je novac posjedovanje posjedovanja. Posuditi čekić i posuditi novac nije isto.

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Novac se ne može posuditi, ne mogu a da ga ne prodam, ne mogu a da ne ustupim vlasništvo; dužnik raspolaže novcem, čekić može samo da upotrebljava. Kad posudim novac ja ga dajem na raspolaganje, znači dajem ga i u vlasništvo i na upotrebu. Ne može se upotrebljavati a da ne promijeni vlasništvo. Dužnik upotrebljava novac jer je njegov vlasnik. Čekićem ne mogu raspolagati, nemam vlasništvo nad čekićem, čekić mogu samo da upotrebljavam. Kad vraćam čekić, vraćam isti čekić, kad vraćam novac vraćam istu količinu novca. U prvom slučaju treba da vratim isti kvantitet nekog dobra, u slučaju posuđivanja čekića ja vraćam to isto dobro. Prijatelju i braću mogu posuditi čekić, ali mu novac dajem u vlasništvo.

Drugo, možda bi trebalo postaviti pitanje zbog čega se, u principu – ne samo dakle zato što vlasništvo nužno ustupam – novac ne bi mogao pozajmljivati? Zašto je posuđivanje novca možda u principu nemoguće? Zašto je tu uvijek već uključena kamata? I onda kad posuđujem bez kamate, moguće je da ja lihvarim. Čini mi se da je tako zbog toga što ne mogu da osiguram da mi bude isto vraćeno.

Prijateljstvo bi bilo, u nekom smislu – ako treba vratiti isto – savršena simetrija. Prava mjera. Zapravo, posuđivanje bi bilo suština novca, mogućnost da se da pravedna cijena, izrazi prava mjera, jednakost. Da se vrati isto. Ista količina. Prijateljstvo kao tačan reciprocitet, primjer pravedne cijene, jedan naspram jedan. Međutim, u prijateljstvu, bratskom posuđivanju već se pojavljuje interes – makar samo na simboličkom nivou. Kad posuđujem ja se odričem aktuelne upotrebe u korist neke buduće, ja podnosim određenu žrtvu. Kad odbijam da to naplatim – to je jedan višak koji ostaje kao

38 Ibid., 42.

dug, koji ostaje i onda kad se vrati posuđeni novac. U svakom slučaju, ja zarađujem na simboličkom nivou. (Ovdje koristim i oslanjam se na ono što Derrida kaže drugdje o daru)³⁹ Zarađujem zahvalnost, osjećaj da sam solidaran. Ne mogu osigurati da mi je vraćeno isto. 1 za 1, zahvalnost, solidarnost je uvijek više. Onaj kome sam posudio, duguje mi uslugu. Dugovanje se ne izmiruje, on mi ostaje dužnik i kad je izmirio svoj novčani dug, duguje mi moje buduće dugovanje. Ja kod njega imam kredit. Imam posuđeno nazad i imam kredit da posudim u budućnosti. Kad posudim – makar samo jedanput – ja nekoga zadužujem: Zaduhujem i preko povratka posuđenog, on mi duguje i kad mi je vratio dug.

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Ovaj dug, kao zahvalnost, važi naravno i za čekić, međutim, razlika je u tome što kad posuđujem novac ja posuđujem vrijeme. Ja posuđujem posjedovanje posjedovanja, i to nije jednostavno posuđivanje čekića. Ja posuđujem vrijeme: raspolaganje vremenom, posuđujem drugom mogućnost da raspoláže vremenom. Dajem mu vrijeme. Posuđivanje novca je posuđivanje posuđivanja. Nasuprot Levinasu, koji za novac kaže da se može prodavati, posuđivati i darovati, čini mi se da može imati samo ovu treću figuru. Novac ne može biti dar, ne može biti posuđivanje, nego može biti samo specifična prodaja. Ne kaže li drugdje i sam Levinas „novac je kupovina?“.

Kad poklanjam novac, ja sam uvijek već u socijalnom, i brišem dualan – asimetričan – odnos darivanja. Kad darujem novac, ja posuđujem, jer već pretpostavljam recipročnost, simetriju, već uključujem trećeg. Kad posuđujem ja lihvarim jer simetrija – sada kada je zahtijevana – nikad nije garantovana, i imam makar simbolički visak. U svakom slučaju, brojanje je uvijek već tu: više, manje, jednako. Ali sve se dešava kao da je novac uvijek više, kao da uvijek unosi neki višak: sa novcem sam uvijek u socijalnom i uvijek u nesrazmjeri. Sa novcem dar se briše, a kad posuđujem već lihvarim.

Ako se novac – kako meni izgleda – ne može darivati, posuđivati nego samo prodavati – a to ponajprije usljed onoga što proizilazi iz same Levinasove filozofije – šta onda znači kad novac samo posjedujem?

Temporalizacija novca: posjedovati, štediti, lihvariti

Novac nije naprosto posjedovanje, on je „posjedovanje posjedovanja“ – kaže Levinas. Posjedovanje posjedovanja, novac pretpostavlja ljude koji raspolážu vremenom, ljude prisutne u svijetu koji traje preko trenutnih odnosa, ljude koji sebi daju kredit i formiraju društvo.

Najprije, novac uspostavlja kredit, mogućnost budućeg zadovoljavanja neke potrebe. Novac je garant neke buduće, eventualne usluge, ili zadovoljavanje

39 Derida 1991.

buduće potrebe, ili odlaganje sadašnje potrebe za neko buduće vrijeme. Novac tako otvara dimenziju budućnosti. Ne radi se više o odnosu koji je neposrednost, ljudi koji posjeduju novac se oslobađaju pritiska sadašnjosti. Novac stvara relacije koje traju preko zadovoljavanja potrebe putem razmjene predmeta. On je svojstven ljudima koji mogu da ostave svoje želje da čekaju. Novac je virtuelno bilo koja upotrebna vrijednost, koju mogu dobiti u posjed bilo kada. Posjedovati novac je posjedovati bilo koji predmet bilo kada: novac je uvijek ono „već plaćeno“.

Novac uspostavlja socijalnu vezu, već kod Aristotela, novac je nešto što nije prirodno, samo ime, *nomisma*, kaže da je ta mjera stvar dogovora, ljudi, institucija. Kao mreža. Novac dakle implicira postojanje ljudi koji sebi daju kredit, kredit u dvostrukom smislu riječi: kredit shvaćen kao međusobno povjerenje i kao vrijeme. Buduće vrijeme. Povjerenje u buduće vrijeme.

Vrijeme je dakle već sadržano u novcu. Novcem kupujem vrijeme, kupujem budućnost, intervenišem unutar protoka vremena. U tom smislu možda je moguće i preokretanje one Franaklinove teze o vremenu i novcu: novac daje vrijeme. Novac je vrijeme.

Ja dajem sebi vrijeme, vjerujem, u budućnost, ovo vrijeme je odmah socijalno vrijeme, *Mitzeit*. Pretostavljam postojanje društva, vjerujem da ću moći kupiti uslugu ili zadovoljenje potrebe, u trenutku kada to odlučim. Posjedujem novac, kao kredit, kao budućnost, kao unaprijed plaćeno. Novac je u tom smislu trans-akcija: djelovanje preko, preko u vremenskom smislu, preko sadašnjeg trenutka, i preko mjesta, preko određenog vrijeme-prostor. Djelovanje na daljinu, vremensku i prostornu, ono je zagarantovano obećanjem ili povjerenjem u postojanje buduće zajednice. Odnos povjerenja ne postoji samo između povjerioca i dužnika. Odnos povjerenja je impliciran samim činom posjedovanja novca.

U toj optici, moglo bi se reći da smo svi – samo pukim posjedovanjem novca – pomalo, u neku ruku, lihvari. Ovaj kredit, posjedovanje posjedovanja, ne nosi li već nesto u sebi od lihvarjenja, uzimanja vremena od Boga, ili je možda, obrnuto, već ovo samo oslobađanje od prezenta nešto specifično ljudsko, specifično ljudsko vrijeme?

Levinas odgovara na poziv belgijske štedionice – i tu, u razgovoru, kaže, štednja „to nije moje pitanje, to me ne interesuje“. Ipak, pitanje je interesantno. Štednja, kada štedim, recimo kod banke, i u tom slučaju, lihvarim. Kad posuđujem banci uz kamatu, instituciji, bezlično – ili pak ako ga posjedujem, ako držim kući, ako ga gomilam, uvećavam, ja uvećavam posjedovanje posjedovanja. Ipak intervenišem, vršim upliv u vrijeme, uzimam vrijeme, preraspoređujem ga, kalkulišem sa vremenom, i možda zarađujem i kad ne kalkulišem neku buduću zaradu. Homogeniziram, gomilam, „zgušnjavam“, vrijeme. Odlučujem kad ću da potrošim vrijeme, kad da ga aktueliziram.

Emeric Deutsch, u jednom tekstu gdje navodi koja sve značenja riječi novac ima u Hebrejskom, kao i različite riječi koje Hebrejski jezik koristi da označi novac, kaže da riječ „*maot*“, novac, novac-kao kovanica, metalni novac može da se vokalizira kao „*meet*“, i onda znači „ono što zavisi od vremena“,⁴⁰ tako da riječ novac znači zahvatanje u vrijeme. Recimo, povjerilac i dužnik ne žive u istom vremenu: vrijeme za dužnika je uvijek kratko, za povjerioca uvijek dugo. Ovo može da važi i za bratsko posuđivanje, a ne samo za lihvarenje.

Darovanje, posuđivanje, lihvarenje, posjedovanje. Uvijek postoji neka intervencija u pogledu vremena, uticaj na vrijeme; u svakoj od ovih figura koje može poprimiti novac, temporalizacija je na različite načine implicirana. Sve se dešava kao da je darovati sa novcem nemoguće, a u svim ostalim figurama se lihvari.

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Već je u samom postojanju novca, naime, izgleda upisano to lihvarenje. Uvijek se posuđuje sa kamatom. Uvijek se štedi sa kamatom. Samo posjedovanje već uključuje kamatu. Kad se radi o novcu, onda možda nije zabranjeno pitati se da li uopšte postoji vrijeme koje ne bi bilo lihvarsko vrijeme.

Sa novcem, uvijek već smo zapleteni u paukovu mrežu, i u nju neumitno uplićemo i potomstvo. Novac brka sfere darovanja, posuđivanja i samog posjedovanja, i čini njihovo razlikovanje možda nemogućim. U tom smislu on ne može biti neutralan, jer uvijek unosi neki višak, jer briše i zamagluje sva ova razlikovanja. „Novac je kao krv, imati i biti“⁴¹. Biće i posjedovanje. Novac je cirkulacija. Način na koji novac daje vrijeme i na koji se temporalizira nikad nije neutralan: Novac nužno brka dan i noć, svjetlost i mir. A bez novca kao mjere i pravde možda ne možemo nikad ni znati kome treba pripasti vječita svjetlost i vječiti mir.

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Zoran Janković

Money and Sociality: Measuring the Unmeasurable Money as Justice, Time and Usury

Abstract

Levinas confirms: a reflection about a money as a social and economical reality is not possible without a serious analysis of empirical data. On the other hand, this reflection always involves something else, so a money is never a merely economical category. In that sense, Levinas proposes an intriguing meditation about some “dimensions” of a money in the western tradition.

Contrary to the traditional moral condemnation of a money – which however remains unquestionable because of the fact that a man always carries a risk of becoming a merchandise – Levinas suggests that money never simply means a reification, but always implies some positive dimensions.

Levinas suggests that a money is not something morally bad or simply neutral covering human relationships, but rather a condition of human community. Furthermore, he claims that a money is a fundament of the justice. A money makes possible a community, he explains, because it opens up the dimension of the future, and implies the existence of human beings who give themselves a credit; a credit understood as a time and a confidence. We shall try to address some problems implied by this thesis, particularly the problem of the relationship between time, money and credit. Finally, we are going to ask whether this credit – inseparable from the very essence of the money – is not always already a sort of usury.

Keywords: Levinas, money, sociality, usury, gift, justice, love

POLEMICS
POLEMIKA IV

November 1, 2016

Dear Editors,

In an article recently published in your journal (Kristen Ghodsee, Kateřina Lišková, “Bumbling Idiots or Evil Masterminds? Challenging Cold War Stereotypes about Women, Sexuality and State Socialism”, *Philosophy and Society*, 27 (3) 2016) the authors presented my work as an example of unsubstantiated “assertions made with no citation to original research or other scholarly literature” (p 491). While I am ready to face well-founded criticism from other researchers, this time the claims of the authors are ill-informed: if they read the whole article it would have been clear for them that in my article on “Disciplining gender and (homo)sexuality in state socialist Hungary in the 1970s”¹ I have in fact presented pieces of empirical evidence on the social existence of sexuality in the context of a system of ‘tolerant repression’ celebrating asexual socialist reproduction; and the quoted statements were part of my findings.

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Clearly, they haven’t really paid attention to the content of the whole article: they have just used two sentences of my article taken out of their original context, and tried to prove their point by trying to distort my scientific credibility. This practice I find not only deeply bothering, but also highly unprofessional and unethical. Therefore I want to turn to you, the editors of the journal that published Ghodsee and Lišková’s piece, and ask you to assist me in seeking a fair solution to this unfortunate scientific malpractice by publishing some sort of corrigendum.

Cordially,

Judit Takács

Research Chair

Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences

1 Judit Takács, “Disciplining gender and (homo)sexuality in state socialist Hungary in the 1970s”, *European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire* 22 (1) 2015:161-175.

Judit Takács

Short Note on the Sexophobic State-Socialist Hobby-Horse of Western Researchers

In the following I will share some of my thoughts on the article “Bumbling Idiots or Evil Masterminds? Challenging Cold War Stereotypes about Women, Sexuality and State Socialism” (Ghodsee – Lišková 2016). I have to admit that I started to write these comments because the authors misquoted one of my articles on disciplining gender and (homo)sexuality in state-socialist Hungary in the 1970s (Takács 2015).

In the (mis)quoted article I have examined various sources of knowledge about the social existence of sexuality, including media representations, experimental school programmes, and a unique research project on sexuality-related value orientation of young Hungarian workers and university students in the 1970s. But clearly Ghodsee and Lišková haven't really paid attention to the content of the whole article: they have just used two sentences taken out of their original context, and presented these as if they were not based on empirical work. Naturally it isn't and has never been my expectation that others interpret the data collected and/or presented by me exactly the same way as I have done it: most of the time there are several interpretational frameworks that can make sense (and sometimes alternative interpretations might make possibly more sense than mine). However, if one refers to this specific article by denying the fact that its findings have been based on empirical data collection, I perceive that as an attempt to distort my scientific credibility and as an act of unprofessional and unethical practice.

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The authors set quite ambitious goals for themselves when trying to detect and unmask those (western?) agents who try to mislead their learned colleagues by presenting unsubstantiated statements on women and sexuality and state-socialism as common knowledge, which “derives, in fact, from western Cold War rhetoric” (Ghodsee – Lišková 2016:489). In this context the authors can be seen as not only able and willing to enlighten the public about the tricks that were used in the process of spreading misinformation but luckily, they are also able to point to good practice (of their own and some others). In the meanwhile, the authors also try to provide guidelines on how (not) to present ‘common knowledge’ in academic writing. They list some alarming examples to avoid – and luckily they are able to present some good practice (including their own), here too.

The article is structured around two main questions: the first one – “What counts as ‘common knowledge’ in general?” (Ghodsee – Lišková 2016:492) – is covered in about one page length, while the second one – “What counts as ‘common knowledge’ about 20th century communism in Eastern Europe?” (Ghodsee – Lišková 2016:493) – is covered more extensively in about seven pages, leading to a one-page Conclusion. These length parameters can already indicate the limited depth of the discussion considering the potentially huge phenomenological, epistemological, historical and geographical scope of these issues.

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However, the most serious problem of the article is of methodological nature: the basis of the authors’ arguments is a selection of quotations, but it is not discussed at all how this selection came about. It cannot be known how these quotations were found. Were there any search terms used; any specific selection criteria, search engines or timelines applied? These questions remain unanswered. In fact, there is no mention of any kind of methodological consideration of data collection and selection at all in the whole article.

However, without these methodological details it is hard to maintain the validity of the main point of the article, which is – I believe – about the existence of the “burgeoning bodies of scholarship demonstrating that state socialist citizens had robust and fulfilling sexual lives” (Ghodsee – Lišková 2016:498). In this sentence there are six references listed, including Lišková’s own article in a Sexualities journal special issue on “The science of sex in a space of uncertainty: Naturalizing and modernizing Europe’s East, past and present”; but more interestingly, the authors here use the short introductory essay of this special issue as a reference, where Renkin and Kościanška briefly contextualize and introduce the four articles of the special issue that “address discourses, practices, and implications of the science of sex in Central and Eastern Europe” (Renkin – Kościanška 2016:161), and if one reads the three other articles besides Lišková’s, it becomes quite clear that their main content is not about the “robust and fulfilling sexual lives” of anyone. Another reference in this list is of Dagmar Herzog’s book on *Sex after Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany*, where she does indeed emphasize the following:

“Reading the evolution of debates about sex in East Germany in turn encourages the revision of assumptions now standard among historians and other social scientists about gender relations in East Germany. The Western feminist master narrative of East German women as lamentably doubly burdened by work force participation and domestic chores despite the formally egalitarian rhetoric of the regime is complicated by attention to the history of sexuality. For instance, there is no question that East German women’s growing economic independence from men profoundly affected

heterosexual power dynamics. Taking sex seriously as a vital, consequential, and complex arena of human activity—as significant a matter as labor relations or political attitudes and, indeed, intricately interconnected with these—helps us see East German women as increasingly confident subjects with strong negotiating power vis-a-vis both their male partners and the state. It allows us as well to bring into view the distinctive egalitarian style of heterosexual masculinity developed among the younger generation in East Germany. Moreover, and crucially, as developments in the GDR in the 1970s and 1980s especially show, sex eventually became a crucial free space in this otherwise profoundly unfree society. Whether this indirectly strengthened the regime’s control or should be read as a genuine democratic achievement is a question that remains open. Perhaps both are true” (Herzog 2005: 187-188).

Herzog very clearly speaks about East Germany in this quotation, while in one of her more recent books on *Sexuality in Europe: A Twentieth-Century History*, she provides an overview of other Eastern Bloc countries, too:

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“...in the Stalinist era (and in this way in profound contrast with the minority of sex-radical Bolsheviks that had tried to set the tone in the 1920s), Soviet Communism relied on an intolerant and negative view of sex. Self-discipline and marital and family stability were demanded for the sake of both the nation and the Communist Party. [...] Over and over, also for Soviet-ruled Poland and Ukraine, commentators retrospectively observe that issues relating to the body and to sexuality were treated as taboo, passed over in silence – not just because sex was considered something problematic and “bad” that required suppression and control, but also because of a more general state hostility to individual autonomy and freedom in personal relations. In addition, as it has been remarked for Hungary, a major aim of postwar social policies restricting access to contraception and abortion was to restore a semblance of prewar normality by restoring gender hierarchies.

This does not mean that the population did not find its own path. [...] already by the 1960s there would be an evident relaxation of popular mores, accompanied also by an increase in debate about sexual matters among medical and social scientific professionals – trends particularly noticeable in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, which had older sex-positive traditions to build on. But there is no question that in the Cold War era the Eastern European and Soviet media were tight-lipped on the subject of pleasure.

Yet a further factor operative in Eastern Bloc countries, especially in the first ten to fifteen postwar years, was the extreme poverty and material privation, coupled with inadequate and extraordinarily overcrowded housing that made privacy and indulgence in extended intimacy all but impossible. From Belgrade to Budapest to Warsaw, multigenerational families packed into tiny, one- or at best two-bedroom apartments, often sharing the WC and kitchen with other families” (Herzog 2011: 100-101).

In the latter book Herzog also quotes the “venerable Soviet sex researcher Igor Kon” (Herzog 2011:100) who pointed out in his work on *Sexual Revolution in Russia: From the Age of the Czars to Today* that the “entire history of Soviet culture, from start to finish, consists of out-and-out campaigns and mandates in which sexophobia plays a leading part” (Kon 1995:68).

These examples clearly illustrate how important it would have been for the authors to apply a more systematic methodological approach: as a more systematic selection of quotes would have revealed not only that describing Soviet type societies as “sexophobic” might not only have been the hobby-horse of western researchers, but also that ‘purposive sampling’, even when applied to fragments of texts, can carry the risk of reflecting more of the authors’ subjective judgment rather than sound scientific results.

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In addition, the subjective strategies applied by the authors to highlight the validity of their argument remotely remind me of what Edward Stein described in the concluding chapter of the edited volume of *Forms of Desire*: “some critics of social constructionism claim that the version of essentialism with which some people contrast social constructionism is a straw man;² essentialism, these critics say, is really a construction of the social constructionists” (Stein 1992: 326). Along a similar vein, the authors tried constructing their own opposing arguments – a straw man, so to say, made of quotations and even misquotations – to underline the alleged originality of their thought.

However, in spite of all these efforts, and precisely because of the article’s substantial methodological shortcomings, the authors’ key message about state socialist citizens’ “robust and fulfilling sexual lives” (Ghodsee – Lišková 2016:498) sounds like one of those incriminating generalizations about sexuality that “cannot be made about all socialist countries in all historical eras” as the authors rightly point out a few sentences later (Ghodsee – Lišková 2016:498-499).

In conclusion, I would like to express my hope that the authors will continue their thought-provoking work in an empirically better supported, methodical way, and will be able to come up with arguments the validity of which does not need to be supported by constructing a straw man of any kind.

2 References can be found at footnote 2 in the original text (Stein 1992: 326).

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Kristen Ghodsee
Kateřina Lišková

A Reply to Judit Takács

In reaction to our paper “Bumbling Idiots or Evil Masterminds?” Judit Takács expressed concerns that we were “trying to distort [her] scientific credibility” by not having “really paid attention to the content of the whole article.” In this brief response, we wish to clarify our position regarding our use of her work. Upon carefully reviewing the article that we cited, and the sources cited by Takács in that article, we feel that our initial intervention was legitimate.

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First and foremost, let us stress that we have great respect for the authors whom we quoted in our original paper. Their texts were often chosen because we considered them as among the most exemplary researchers working in their fields. We deem them influential and their research engaging. In fact, it would make little sense to substantiate our claims with work of less well-renowned scholars. As we made clear in the beginning of our article, we had “no intention of mounting ad hominem attacks on our colleagues and friends.” We quoted them because we are familiar with their work, cite it ourselves in our research, and assign it to our students.

Indeed, Judit Takács’s work brings important and interesting evidence of non-normative sexual lives and permissive attitudes to various forms of non-reproductive sexual behavior in late socialist Hungary. In her paper “Disciplining gender and (homo)sexuality in state-socialist Hungary in the 1970s,” from which we quote, Takács highlights experimental forms of sex education which “debuted in several volunteering primary schools all over the country in the school year 1974/5”. (p.165) While these classes surely were not perfect, according to Takács’s evidence they were not prudish since topics such as masturbation were discussed and „the point that it was too early to discuss the topic of masturbation in the sixth grade (at around the age of 12) was turned down in the following way: ‘[While] there shouldn’t be too much talk on masturbation, it cannot be silenced either, because it exists as an innate part of psychosexual development. In our view, it is not too early to discuss this [topic] in the 6th grade because children won’t start masturbating in the 6th grade after [participating in this] class – this [masturbation] has started already much earlier.’” (contemporaneous experts quoted by Takács on p. 166). Women could find

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important information in the magazine *Nök Lapja* (Women's Magazine): "one of the primary functions of the *Nök Lapja* was to provide information and guidance for women (and men) on important female-specific social and health issues such as modern means of contraception, cures for impotence and sexually transmitted diseases, as well as some questions with gender equality relevance, such as how to cope with the problem of the shortage of places in kindergartens" (p. 167).

Most interestingly, Takács delves into "a unique research project, the first and still largely unexamined empirical sexual-sociological survey, which was conducted by researchers from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest in the early 1970s. The research focused on the sexuality-related value orientation and attitudes of 250 young Hungarian workers and university students, aged 18–24" (p. 167). Respondents had to rank 11 stories about people in various sexual situations including a couple having sex before marriage, unwed mother abandoned by her partner, a woman selling sex, and a homosexual man. Takács reports that "the most-liked characters included the 'free-love' cultivating couple and the single mother (the latter being the absolute favourite of young female workers)" (p. 168) and while the prostitute and the homosexual ranked among the lowest, "there were also a few tolerant views expressed, pointing to the fact that sex work cannot be maintained without clients' demand" or that homosexuality "is an illness that cannot be squarely condemned" or "he has the right [to do it], if he doesn't violate others, and does it with similar ones." (p. 168-169). In the last section of her paper, Takács showcases creative ways in which gay men and lesbians sought sexual and relationship fulfillment in times of silence (but, crucially, no criminalization) surrounding homosexuality.

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All in all, her paper reads like a description of a society, which despite various shortcomings offers space for non-reproductive, joyful sex, be it the same-sex kind, masturbation or pre-marital sexual experimentation. The authorities either condoned such activities (as in the case of teaching schoolchildren about masturbation) or turned the blind eye (in case of practicing same-sex acts as Takács describes in the last section of her paper). In any case, the presented evidence suggests that young Hungarians of late-socialist era viewed sexuality rather permissively, even that of traditional sexual 'others' (unwed mothers, prostitutes, homosexuals).

So what did we write in our paper that Judit Takács found offensive? We stated:

"Another stereotype pervading contemporary scholarship on state socialist countries in Eastern Europe claims that communists were asexual prudes that suppressed the natural flourishing and variation of human sexuality. Once again, we find a plethora of statements asserted with no citation to relevant studies. For example:

[...]

2. [S]tate-socialist morals celebrated a specifically asexual state-socialist reproduction i.e., the party-statebuilding capacities of labour-force reproduction and not pleasure... As state-socialist morals celebrated a specifically asexual socialist reproduction, sexuality was delegated to specifically asexual socialist reproduction, sexuality was delegated to social invisibility and surrounded by hypocrisy (Takács 2015: 165, 174)."

As indicated by ellipses, this was not the full quote. The latter part of the quote comes from the conclusion to Takács's paper and as such is, understandably, without references. The former part reads in its entirety:

"By the early 1970s, the 'totalitarian androgyny'³² of the 1950s, when the private life of citizens became an object of regular supervision and surveillance was replaced by a milder form of authoritarian control in many Soviet-bloc countries – including Hungary – that left some, at least not directly controlled, space for private life. Nonetheless, state-socialist morals celebrated a specifically asexual state-socialist reproduction i.e., the party-statebuilding capacities of labour-force reproduction and not pleasure: 'Sexuality was surrounded by hypocritical silence not only in everyday life but also in the academic circles, reflecting a general impassivity in relation to this field.'³³" (Takács 2015: 165)

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There are two references in this paragraph. The first one, number 32, cites Zdravomyslova and Temkina, "Gendered Citizenship," 98. Yet, Zdravomyslova and Temkina refer exclusively to the Soviet reality. In the cited section, they cite Igor Kan (1997), Gail Lapidus (1977) and Anna Rotkirch (2000) offering the following periodization of "Soviet gendered citizenship": 1918 to the beginning of the 1930s: "political mobilization of women"; early 1930s to mid-1950s: "totalitarian androgyny"; mid-1950s to the end of 1980s: "a new 'soft' approach to the 'woman question'" (Zdravomyslova and Temkina 2005: 98). However, it is not uncontroversial to argue that a reality in one country (the USSR) at one point in time (before the mid-1950s) provides evidence for a reality in another country (Hungary) at another time (the 1970s). We perceived this reference to Zdravomyslova and Temkina as a "statement asserted with no citation to *relevant* studies," which is what we suggested in our original paper. Although we did not go into this level of detail in our initial article due to word limits, we don't believe we have misread Takács's article or taken her quotes out of context.

Takács's second reference, number 33, is a self-citation of "Queering Budapest," 195. This refers to a paragraph in her own work which contains almost exactly the same wording as the one we quote in her later article. Moreover, some of the evidence that follows her discussion of homosexual lives in state-socialist Hungary is the same as in the text we quoted. Providing a citation to a piece of one's own previous scholarship, where a

statement has been asserted as common knowledge, just moves the question back to the original article, which we might have quoted rather than Takács's latter piece.

What is important here is not that there is anything amiss with Takács's scientific credibility. She has not done anything that other scholars (including ourselves) do not also do on a regular basis: asserting claims that we believe constitute "common knowledge." The point of our article is that while editors and peer-reviewers almost always demand substantiation for any claim that makes seemingly positive statements about the state socialist past, those same editors and peer-reviewers allow negative statements and stereotypes to be published either with no citation, with citations to only vaguely relevant studies, or with citations to unsubstantiated assertions in previous published works. Our hope is to expose what we think of as a systematic bias in English-language publishing on the state socialist past, and not to antagonize our colleagues working in this field. In this context, we still believe that the quotes we drew from Takács's article were not taken out of context. Takács's work is an example of surprisingly unconstrained sexual life that people today might not attribute to a socialist country, given the Cold War stereotypes about the supposed Eastern prudishness many of us continue to share.

PRIKAZI
REVIEWS

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Werner Konitzer, David
Palme (Hrsg.) »Arbeit«, »Volk«,
»Gemeinschaft«. *Ethik und Ethiken
im Nationalsozialismus, Jahrbuch
zur Geschichte und Wirkung
des Holocaust*, Campus Verlag,
Frankfurt a.M./New York, 2016.

Miloš Marković

Im Jahrbuch des Fritz Bauer Instituts von 2016 wird der Zusammenhang zwischen Ideologie und Moral im Nationalsozialismus aus verschiedenen Aspekten untersucht und kritisch abgeschätzt. Die von Nationalsozialisten verfassten Ethiken stellen ein ungenügend erforschtes Thema dar, weswegen sie nunmehr unter die Lupe genommen und vielseitig erörtert werden sollten. Der Schwerpunkt des Bandes liegt auf den vorgebrachten Rechtfertigungen von Gräueltaten, die unser Verständnisvermögen zu übersteigen scheinen. Eine Blut in den Adern erfrierende Frage steht zur Diskussion: Konnten die nationalsozialistischen Ethiken tatsächlich das Gewissen der Verbrecher beruhigen?

Der Band besteht aus 14 sorgfältig zusammengestellten Artikeln renommierter Philosophen, Soziologen und Psychologen. Die ersten zehn Aufsätze sind stark philosophisch geprägt. Drei davon haben eher allgemeinen Charakter, denn sie geben einen Überblick über die NS-Normativität (Chapoutot, Böhnigk, Konitzer). Deshalb sollte es nicht wundern, dass sie sowohl am Anfang als auch an Ende der Diskussion stehen. Die übrigen sieben befassen sich tiefgehend mit den einzelnen nationalsozialistisch orientierten Philosophen (Steizinger, Bach, Palme, Schefczyk, Kuchinsky, Kapfinger, Kluck, Jovanov). Dabei geht es nicht nur um die Schilderung und die Einschätzung der entworfenen NS-Ethiken, vielmehr werden manche metaethischen Probleme berührt, wie der Zusammenhang zwischen Nationalsozialismus und Relativismus bzw. Universalismus, was der Vielseitigkeit der Forschung wesentlich beiträgt. Die letzten vier Artikel handeln von den historischen Umständen, unter denen sich die NS-Weltanschauung entwickelt und durchgesetzt hat (Dries, Radonić, Lelle, Kleinhans). Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass die vorliegende Forschung über die NS-Ethiken zwar überwiegend auf der philosophischen Ebene stattfindet, aber zugleich werden die einschlägigen Fragen interdisziplinär überprüft und der historische Zusammenhang immer wieder ins Feld geführt.

Durch das ganze Buch hindurch schwingt der Gedanke mit, dass zahlreiche Quellen von der historischen Forschung über den Nationalsozialismus immer noch viel zu sehr vernachlässigt sind (S. 17, 152, 209, 252). Aus genau diesem Grund knüpft der Band an die historische Grundlagenforschung an, die in den letzten 20 Jahren beträchtliche Leerstellen ausfüllen konnte. Alle bisherigen Nachforschungen in dieser Richtung vermitteln jedoch den Eindruck, dass die

ursprüngliche Absicht, eine endgültige Bilanz zu ziehen, kaum jemals in Erfüllung gehen könnte. Die Diskussion zu entfachen, unberücksichtigte Aspekte hervorzubringen und auf berufene Quellen ein neues Licht zu werfen, verspricht, der beste Weg zu sein, um unsere Kenntnisse über den Nationalsozialismus zu erweitern.

Im Zentrum des Interesses steht die Frage, ob der Nationalsozialismus eine eigene Moral besaß. Schon an diesem Punkt sieht man sich einer anscheinend unüberwindbaren Schwierigkeit gegenüber, nämlich, dass es entweder logisch unmöglich oder mindestens ethisch unzulässig ist, von einer NS-Moral zu sprechen (S. 13, 173, 263). Dabei fällt auf, dass sich die meisten Philosophen lieber anderer Termini, wie „Ethik“ oder „Weltanschauung“, bedienen.

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Alle Autoren geben sich große Mühe, jenem Vorwurf triftige Argumente entgegenzubringen, um das eigene Forschungsprojekt zu begründen. Ihnen zufolge, lässt sich die NS-Weltanschauung nicht verstehen, solange der Zusammenhang nicht ernst genommen, sondern stets brüsk abgewiesen wird. (S. 18, 177, 261, 279) In diesem Sinne wird u. a. darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass die nationalsozialistischen Ideen im ganzen

Abendland stark verbreitet waren: Antisemitismus, Rassismus, Kapitalismus, Imperialismus und Sozialdarwinismus (S. 16). Eine wichtige Rolle spielt auch das Verhältnis zwischen Ideologie und Praxis „im dritten Reich“: mal stimmten sie miteinander überein, mal widersprachen sie einander (S. 21, 197). Überdies ist es von äußerster Bedeutung, dass das NS-Regime nicht selten eine Doppelstrategie durchgesetzt habe, z. B. als es die Enttabuisierung des vor- und außerehelichen Geschlechtsverkehrs befürwortete und dies zu gleicher Zeit leugnete (s. 194).

Die Frage nach einer NS-Moral verdankt ihre unablässige Anziehungskraft dem folgenschweren Gedanken, dass es letztendlich doch möglich sein könnte, auf sie eine bejahende Antwort zu geben. Das würde den Unrechtstätern einen Fluchtweg aus der Verantwortung anbieten, wodurch auch das Gefühl entsteht, dass man damit die Büchse der Pandora öffnen könnte. Die in dieser Idee erkennbare Spannung zieht sich durch den ganzen Band hindurch. Obwohl darin viele anregende Aspekte angeboten werden, die für die eine oder die andere These sprechen, bleibt der grundlegende Widerspruch weiterhin unaufgelöst.

Antonio Campillo, *Tierra de nadie – cómo pensar (en) la sociedad global*, Herder editorial, Barcelona, 2015.

Miloš Čipranić

It can be legitimately said that the concept of *nobody's land*, including the variations of its content through time, reflects many of the neuralgic points of the identity of our European civilization. Today, when the existence of a global society and institutions has long since become reality, one of the possible uses and messages of this concept, recently affirmed, could be appropriate to indicate a just path that should be taken in order to afford a sustainable and dignified future of humanity in general. Thus, with regard to the main idea of Campillo Meseguer's book, the link between its title and subtitle appears to be very reasonably established. The phenomenon of the globalized world presents itself here at the same time as the subject of philosopher's reflection and the circumstance or horizon in which he is reflecting on it. From this specific and, somehow, inevitable global point of view, the negative sides of the process of globalization can precisely be repaired and blocked by the legitimate reaffirmation of this term in public space and its further institutional implementation.

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As Antonio Campillo Meseguer points out, the idea of *nobody's land* contains a very rich historical genesis. Its origin or the first use can be traced back to the tradition of Roman Law – namely in the work *Institutes* by the jurist Gaius – where it was deduced from the concept of *res nullius*. In the epoch of Ancient Rome it signified a land without owner or the legally recognized one, which, therefore, could be occupied, especially if it belonged to the hostile peoples. Later on the continuous usage of concept *terra nullius* was appropriated by the early modern European colonial empires and, in accordance with the effects of the opposition “savage”/“civilized”, this *ficción jurídica* served as justification for occupation of overseas territories and their consequent expansions. As we read in the book, it was ultimately abandoned in international law in 1975 at the request of Morocco in the case of Western Sahara. The opinion of the ICJ was that prior to the Spanish colonization this region was already inhabited by tribes and population with their own social and political organization.

With the formation of sovereign nation states, one of the given meanings to this polysemic term was that it designated borderline disputed territory, generating conflicts and war through its status. Meseguer rightly stresses that today in the world there are many ongoing territorial disputes between neighbouring countries over legal delimitation of their common borders. However, the case

of former Yugoslavia is not directly mentioned in the book. The breakup of Yugoslavia, which started in 1991, when its formerly constituent republics declared independence, has produced many still unresolved border disputes and issues of territorial control. For example, the status of the Gulf of Piran between Slovenia and Croatia, or the islands on the Danube between Croatia and Serbia. It is worth noting that, as a good step forward, on the basis of mutual agreement between the representatives of two states, from 2006 the beaches of the Island of Vukovar have been opened during the summer season to visitors of both countries without passport requirement or transit control.

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The process of building a global society through neoliberal technoeconomic offensive has resulted in growing economic, social and cultural inequality. On the other hand, but correlated with the first contradictory process, as communicability and mobility increase, there is also an increase in legal and political difficulty to move freely from one place to another, from one country to another, with the building of more physical and invisible walls. In a word, the philosopher from Murcia effectively calls this paradoxical situation *la globalización amurallada*. From the middle of the 20th century, the term *nobody's land* has been used to designate border space in the form of walls dividing two states, intentionally built by one of the sides to avoid free transit of persons. Such walled frontiers can also be found inside a country, even within cities (for example, Baghdad or Belfast). Meseguer informs us that in the world today already exist 47 such borderline walls in total length which exceeds 20,000km.

After the constitution of UNESCO and the efforts of this supranational agency, the concept of *terra nullius* has been transformed into the concept of World Heritage of Humanity and has obtained a more affirmative role, surpassing the older one which was generally seen as the *anomalía transitoria*. In an epoch in which economic, political and cultural interdependence between states and regions is becoming stronger and the world more globalized, the intense cooperation between political entities is undoubtedly required more than ever in order to protect public goods, natural and cultural, material and immaterial, in a permanent way. The Castellón Declaration from

1999 finally proposed that care and protection of recognized World Heritage Sites (terrestrial, supraterrrestrial and marine) should be managed under the jurisdiction of the international community. The whole Earth – Meseguer argues – has thus in an implicit manner been given a status of *Tierra de nadie*, a space that should be responsibly protected by everyone as such.

The geometaphor of nobody's land appears to be truly adequate as the starting point for reflection on the transformational status and purpose of philosophy today. Following the new affirmative determination of the concept in question, Meseguer strongly claims that philosophy, as a real *tierra de nadie*, is by its essence a public and common space which cannot be exclusively appropriated by anybody and which, therefore, can be freely accessed by everyone. In 1995, UNESCO's Paris *Declaration for Philosophy* was published and the aim of this strategy has been to proclaim that practicing this discipline should be guaranteed by all democratic states.

But in contrast to, for example, an architectural object recognized as an integral part of World Heritage, philosophy is a reality in constant change, whose past, in addition, has not at all been completely pacifist in nature. In the era of globalized society, the philosophical discipline has to try to mediate between different and often heterogeneous and conflicting idioms, accepting the richness and profundity of philosophical thinking from the East to the West and all other directions of the world and of all historico-philosophical epochs. Using again the terminology of spatial metaphors, its task in the 21st century is to move between different spaces and territories and to maintain and its *cosmo-political-ethical* vocation.

Personally, I was reading *Tierra de nadie* while attending a summer school conference at the University of Rijeka, entitled *Rethinking Politics of Diversity*. There was a certain overlap between topics of the book and the seminars and lectures – a reflection on the actual phenomenon of FRONTEX, “fortified Europe” and its consequences. All the political and historical occurrences to have affected the world we live in, have since resolutely confirmed the growing importance of Meseguer's analysis and diagnosis.

Georg Cavallar, *Kant's Embedded Cosmopolitanism – History, Philosophy and Education for World Citizens*, De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston, 2015.

Jelena Govedarica

Cosmopolitanism is a doctrine in moral and political philosophy, according to which all human beings, regardless of their individual differences, should belong to one community as “citizens of the world”. Different versions of cosmopolitanism define this community and its main characteristics differently. For example, some authors claim that it has to be based on moral norms, others on political institutions or global economic and commerce. We can also discern between thin (weak), moderate, and thick (strong) cosmopolitanism, depending on the value and role philosophers give to the ideal of world citizenship in the justification of political obligations and moral norms. These various types of cosmopolitanism are not mutually exclusive and the majority of contemporary theories include different elements of its basic forms. When analyzing cosmopolitan theories, in *Kant's Embedded Cosmopolitanism – History, Philosophy and Education for World Citizens*, Cavallar emphasizes its three main characteristics: global scope of the cosmopolitan community (all people belong to it), normative universalism (every human being has an equal moral status, usually derived from some essential human characteristics), promotion and understanding of cultures different from our own (p. 14). Although cosmopolitan ideas are one of the oldest ideas in political philosophy, inferred from the idea of natural law and promoted by the sophists in the fifth century BC, philosophers have not lost interest in this subject. On the contrary, torrents of new cosmopolitan theories are constantly emerging and plenty of them advertise Kant as the paradigm for their own views.

Seeing this as a prevalent trend in contemporary cosmopolitan discourse, Cavallar points out that Kant is predominantly understood as a “typical early liberal” (p. 128) and the founding father of contemporary cosmopolitan theories. However, this interpretation of Kant's philosophy is mainly unsubstantiated, oversimplified and controversial. One of the main reasons for these misleading views of Kant's theory, according to the author, is that scholars tend to disregard all ideas which are not coherent with “a homogenized view of the past” (p. 7) and to see only continuity from Kant to the present. Moreover, since many of them do not know enough about the historical roots of Kant's cosmopolitanism, their understanding of his philosophy is frequently biased and one-sided, and what is worse, generally anachronistic. Thus, if we affirm Kant as the key source of contemporary cosmopolitanism, we also have to underline the challenge his ideas pose to the present

cosmopolitan discourse as well as considerable difference existing between the two.

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In order to understand this difference we need, firstly, to “embed” Kant in the eighteenth century context by analyzing his theory with reference to theories of his predecessors, and secondly, evaluate the distinctness of Kant’s approach by comparing it to various forms of contemporary cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, Cavallar emphasizes – thereby presenting his most important claim – that an adequate analysis of Kant’s theory must be focused on its two commonly neglected dimensions: pedagogical and republican, from which it is clear that “Kant’s cosmopolitanism should be understood as rooted in one’s particular community and thus embedded” (p. 12). Namely, from the perspective of positive freedom (the capacity of reason to be practical for itself), all human beings have moral predispositions and the duty to cultivate or develop them, and so the fundamental concept of Kant’s cosmopolitanism is “the vocation (*Bestimmung*) of the individual as well as the human species” (ibid). The development of this “cosmopolitan disposition” (p. 26) is possible only through the proper educational science and the individual accomplishment of persons, and in this process pedagogy must be given a crucial role. Also, because of the ever evolving nature of the cosmopolitan disposition, central in Kant’s teleological and reflective explanation of history and pragmatic anthropology, the author claims that Kant’s conception of cosmopolitanism is dynamic (p. 23). In other words, cosmopolitan values are not passively received, for that would imply the absence of the essential characteristic of human’s will – its freedom; rather, the cosmopolitan disposition can be actualized in a stimulating environment, made possible with what Kant calls “ethical didactics”, only by the agent himself. Cosmopolitan education is, however, only conceivable in a republic, because this form of government can ensure the external freedom of its citizens, which is necessary for people to develop their natural dispositions and moral potentials as autonomous agents. Thus, in Kant’s theory moral and legal cosmopolitanism is incorporated in “the republican patriotism” (p. 107) – citizens’ commitment to political self-legislation, which can lead to improvement of human capacities and realization of moral ends.

Those who are familiar with Cavallar’s works will notice that most of the chapters in this book are revised versions of already published articles.

Opposed to the readers who will be disappointed by this fact, one may consider it to be the book’s greatest value because it offers the final result of many years of research and reflection on the subject of Kant’s cosmopolitanism. What is also extremely valuable is that it contains numerous references to other authors who studied Kant’s political philosophy, with whom Cavallar constantly debates, offering us a rich source of literature for further reading and critical analysis. Additionally, apart from our possible agreement or disagreement with Cavallar’s claims, the fact that this book opposes mainstream interpretations of Kant’s political philosophy, giving us a different perspective and new insights, is one of its most significant contributions to the ongoing debate about cosmopolitanism.

The book itself is divided into eight chapters, the first and the eight being “introduction” and “conclusion”, which are the author’s new contributions to the subject. Owing to the limited space of this review, each chapter will only be briefly presented.

In the introductory part of the book, Cavallar critically examines the most prominent interpretations of Kant’s political philosophy, and by doing that not only does he demonstrate an extensive familiarity with wide variety of influential arguments on this topic, but he also situates his interpretation within already existing ones, enabling us a much better understanding of his main claims. He finds that Kant’s thoughts were frequently misunderstood, that his political philosophy was often perceived as a mere repetition of widely held Enlightenment beliefs, that Kant’s “minor” works, such as writings on religion and history, were not seriously analyzed with respect to ethics and politics, and also, perhaps most importantly, that his pedagogy and pragmatic anthropology were never taken into consideration as an integral part of his political philosophy. Determined to rectify these shortcomings, Cavallar begins his study with the most basic question: “Was Kant really a cosmopolitan?” (p. 19), aiming to discard the accusations that Kant could not have been a cosmopolitan since he had asserted some racist attitudes. In answering it, the author sides with “the developmental interpretation”, according to which Kant believed that “we are not equal in terms of our cultivated prudence, of cultural development, skin colour, talents, perhaps not even in terms of moral capacities. However, we are equal in terms of our humanity or dignity and our moral vocation.” (p. 21)

Hence, Kant must be regarded as a cosmopolitan because he did think that people are intrinsically equal, although they may not be equal in terms of their contingent characteristics. At this point the author affirms three above-mentioned fundamental features of Kant's cosmopolitanism: it is embedded, dynamic and pedagogical. Having asserted these attributes of Kant's thoughts on the world community in the introduction, the author persuasively elaborates the arguments in their favor throughout the book.

The second and third chapters are adjusted versions of previously published articles titled: "Cosmopolitanism in Kant's Philosophy" and "Kant's right of world citizens: a historical interpretation". Both chapters offer an understanding of Kant's cosmopolitanism, intertwined with a strong disapproval of the fact that, when reconstructing and interpreting his cosmopolitan theory, Kant scholars are primarily focused on its legal and political perspective. Cavallar calls our attention to some other types of cosmopolitanism easily discernible in Kant's writings, such as moral, religious and cognitive. For example, although Kant had always been praised for his secular conception of the global world order, the author claims he can also be pictured quite successfully as a representative of Christian cosmopolitanism, by stressing his conception of moral commonwealth explained in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. Furthermore, these different types of cosmopolitanism present in his works are by no means exclusive, and, given the fact that Kant's philosophy must be understood as a system, they are not just compatible, they have to be interpreted in the way that does not exclude either of them. On the other hand, Kant's third integral part of the public right – right of the world citizen, often viewed as the central feature of his cosmopolitanism and his greatest tribute to this subject, is not a good example of his originality. In order to show that this was not an unfamiliar idea at that time, Cavallar offers a historical contextualization of hospitality rights in the international law theories from Vitoria to Kant, claiming that Kant's inventiveness, as well as the value of this type of right for Kant's overall cosmopolitan system, lies in his philosophy of history, or more precisely, in "the spirit of commerce". Thus, Kant's version of cosmopolitan right is significant not just because of the right of people not to be treated with enmity while travelling or residing in a foreign country, or the right to free trade among people from different parts of the world, but because it "opens up a space"

for an intensive exchange of diverse ideas and values, which is in its essence, the author argues, a "thin version of global civil society" (p. 76).

Chapter four: "Educating Émile: Rousseau on embedded cosmopolitanism", examines Rousseau's reflections on the global community, and the fifth one explores two theories which, the author argues, had the most profound influence on Kant's version of cosmopolitanism: "Sources of Kant's cosmopolitanism: Basedow, Rousseau, and cosmopolitan education". In these chapters he comments on traditional picture of the Enlightenment as a paradigm for cosmopolitan era before the rise of nationalism, stressing that "the common feature of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism was that it tried to strike a tenable balance between patriotism and cosmopolitan obligations" (p. 77). Despite the fact that Rousseau was very critical of cosmopolitanism, stating for example that its cultural and economic types are "degenerate, deformed and immoral" (ibid), Cavallar points out that Rousseau's formulation of civic patriotism is quite consistent with his authentic moral and republican cosmopolitanism. By articulating his theory of "the embedded cosmopolitanism" – a synthesis of a thin moral cosmopolitanism and republican patriotism, achievable through the proper education, Rousseau had made a decisive influence on Kant's thoughts. Yet, the author thinks that Kant did not interpret Rousseau's writings accurately, because Rousseau had claimed that it is impossible to overcome "the dilemma of education": either we choose a cosmopolitan education of the *homme* or the patriotic education of the *citoyen*, who considers all foreigners potential enemies (p.93); also, Rousseau had never believed in the possibility of the progress in history, which is one of the most important ideas in Kant's conception of cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, contrary to the impact of Rousseau's theory on Kant which is frequently acknowledged, the author states that the influence of the educational theory of Johann Bernhard Basedow on Kant's formulation of proper education was never analyzed before. In the attempt to explain this connection, in chapter five he offers a comparative analysis of Basedow's and Kant's conceptions of cosmopolitan education, showing that, even though Kant had not agreed with Basedow on some key features of proper cosmopolitan education, they have both believed that "cosmopolitanism was closely connected with religious toleration, open-mindedness, moral education, and political reforms at the level of states" (p. 111).

Having explained the historical roots of Kant's thoughts on education and cosmopolitanism, in chapters six and seven, titled: "Taking a Detour: Kant's theory of moral cosmopolitan formation" and "Res publica: Kant on cosmopolitical formation", Cavallar analyzes Kant's understanding of the connection between moral education, republican form of government and cosmopolitanism in an exhaustive and systematic manner. He argues that one of the most important differences between Kant's theory and contemporary cosmopolitan education is that Kant never postulates or imposes values typical for this doctrine as something that needs to be "simply instilled or inculcated in pupils" (p. 127). In this respect he is always taking a detour: the moral character with cosmopolitan virtues is the result of development of the cosmopolitan disposition, by means of a long-term "moral formation" (*Bildung*). "Kantian cosmopolitan education is education for moral freedom: educators cannot and should not directly influence, manipulate or cause anything in their pupils, because the ultimate goal is that these students themselves become moral beings and adopt a moral disposition." (p. 166). Therefore, the aim of this process can only be moral self-legislation and adoption of maxims that can be universalized, which in turn produces a distinctively cosmopolitan point of view. If our maxims have moral worth, they could be shared by all people, and thus, reflect the necessary provisions for cosmopolitanism. That is why Kant often uses the term "cosmopolitan" when he refers to a proper educational method. Given the aforementioned types of cosmopolitanism, the author argues that Kant's theory of moral formation "especially relates to the moral, political and religious forms of cosmopolitanisms." (p. 113)

In addition, Cavallar insists that often disregarded observation Kant had made in his essay on perpetual peace that a proper moral formation of the people is the result of a good state constitution – the republic (which is constantly striving towards the ideal – *the respublica noumenon*) has an enormous importance for Kant's conception of cosmopolitanism. It implies that Kant believed that a good system of education, essential for morality and virtue, can only exist in a republican form of government, because good laws themselves also have an educational function. If the laws are bad (and laws are always less perfect in any form of government other than republic, for various reasons Kant offered), the education and its consequence – morality of the people, will not

reflect cosmopolitan values. However, Kant had firmly asserted the distinction and separation between legality and morality: while juridical laws can only constrain the external freedom of people, moral laws can also determine our internal freedom; because of this the causal relationship between the republican constitution and moral character of its citizens can only be affirmed, but never proven. Hence, the claim that juridical laws and education can have any impact on people's morality calls for further explanation. With this in mind, Cavallar argues that the dynamic process of cosmopolitan education, which consists in "cultivation, civilization and moralization or moral formation" (p. 131), is possible only because Kant held that these two separate spheres of law (legal and moral) can mutually influence each other. By carefully reconstructing Kant's reasoning, in the last chapter he discusses three possible spheres of influence central for the explanation of the connection between republican form of government and morality of people: "republicanism and peace; publicity and the process of Enlightenment; the pedagogical function of the republican constitution" (p. 134). Although proper moral education is only possible in a republic, citizens' republican patriotism is not incompatible with cosmopolitan values, as the common bonds between citizens are republican principles and not some form of ethnic or national identity. "This way Kant offers a form of embedded cosmopolitanism, with people identifying with the local and the embedded, while also conceiving themselves in terms of universal obligations and rights." (p. 133)

In the last chapter, the author offers a succinct overview of further development of cosmopolitan ideas from Kant to Herbart, evaluating contemporary cosmopolitan and educational theories by comparing them to Kant's views. With this evaluation he aims at both critical analysis of main claims present in subsequent theories, in which either nationalism or some form or more radical moral cosmopolitanism often became a prominent feature, and, more importantly, providing the external standpoint from which he can assess main merits and shortcomings of Kant's theory. Having done this, Cavallar argues that Kant's legacies to the cosmopolitanism have to be located "in his critical epistemology, in particular the power of transcendental arguments, in his search for a shared conception of thin morality, in his attempt to combine patriotism with cosmopolitanism and his ensuing qualified statist cosmopolitanism, and in his strict separation of

moral and juridical forms of cosmopolitanism.” (p. 155) Author’s concluding observations reflect a deep dissatisfaction with the fact that Kant’s greatest cosmopolitan idea – his educational theory – had been thoroughly neglected and undetected by Kant scholars. Even more disappointing is the fact that his theory was never accepted as a

normative framework in any educational system. Contemporary education “emphasize success and usefulness and usually focuses on competences, skills and their evaluation” (p. 163), it is, unfortunately, essentially utilitarian and completely at odds with Kant’s main goal: moral formation of human beings.

984 Heidegger's children:
political theory with a human face

Richard Wolin. *Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Lowith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse*. Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J., 2015.

Dejan Matlak

Heidegger's children, written by Richard Wolin, is a study of a one of the most significant philosophers of the twentieth century, and it has two points of interest: to understand Heidegger's waste intellectual heritage, and to show how his theory and life decisions (during and after Nazi Germany) influenced the interpretations of his work. The author of this book does so by analyzing the life and work of Heidegger's most prominent Jewish students. All of them went to Freiberg University, when he was lecturing and came under the influence of his existential philosophy. The intellectual interaction that occurred between the mentor and his students left a significant mark on their academic careers, as did the fact that their bellowed mentor became a Nazi. The fact that he supported a political fraction that wanted to annihilate them and all that where considered Jewish, made it impossible for them to use his writings without first giving a critique of their mentor's philosophy in the light of his life decisions. But in doing so they made it possible for Heidegger's existentialism to find new grounds in the World post World War II.

Wolin gives an account of Hanna Arendt, Karl Lowith, Hans Jonas and Herbert Marcuse life, student days, and their intellectual work by making unique biographies of the mentioned authors. This account of their lives is not given just by mapping Heidegger's philosophy in the many studies done by his "children", but also by giving the reader exes to their personal lives and correspondences with their mentor, and with each other. This allows the reader to get a glimpse of the era of totalitarian politics in Europe, and the way these events influenced their lives, but above all the way they wrote about the world that was rapidly changing, and had never before seen such wide spread destruction, and such quantities of human life being lost.

I will not attempt to give an account of the details of every chapter in this book, nor will I explain the many questions that Wolin ponders on thru his exploration of Heidegger's significance for the 20th century. Instead I want to give an account of the book as a whole, and to note the dominate themes that are found through the book.

Certain points of interest can be noted through this study, and the author makes a reference to them in almost all the chapters. This gives the book a new dimension; it is not merely concerned with philosophy as such, or its development and different continental traditions. This dimension shows the personal, and political side of philosophy.

First of all, the question of German Jews and the way they perceived their identity is broth to light many times. Most of the authors mentioned in the book perceived themselves as secular German citizen's, and wanted to distance their lives from the traditional Jewish ghetto mentality they were often pushed into because of their ethnic heritage. Each of his "children" had their own battle with this problem, and during their professional lives they gave different solutions or perspectives on the problem of anti-Semitism in the European context before the begging and during the II World War. Their cases were peculiar because the basis of their thinking, or the father of their thinking, was seemingly against their existence. This fact was something they had to come to terms with. Not just because their mentor rejected them, but because the society they perceived they belonged to was rejecting them, and marking them with an identity that made them an enemy of a cloture they felt they belonged to, that they cherished and one can say felt patriotic towards.

Beside the fact that Heidegger sided with the Nazis, his intellectual influence is not absent from his "children's" writings. Wolin suggest that the mentor had an irreversible impact on their lives, and that his "children" newer got free from him, and his existentialism. What one discovers while reading this study is the fact that Heidegger had a mesmerizing presence in the classroom, and that all of his students were struck by his charisma and knowledge. What I understood from reading this emotionally and intellectually stimulating book is that Heidegger acquired a unique position among his colleagues. He was perceived as a sort of "savior of western though". His life style and success in the classroom, added to his mystification. And then after the publication of *Being and Time* he sealed his reputation, and if I may say so, occupied the philosophical throne of Europe (for a short time). What I asked myself while I was reading this book is whether I would have resisted his allure if I had found myself in a similar situation? Have in mind that this was a period when the West had an intellectual crises, and a young thinker found himself in an atmosphere of dissatisfaction with the existing intellectual traditions. What kind of influence and mark could the "savior of western though" leave on you? Well that is all speculation now, but the fact is that he is treated, not just by the mentioned authors, but by many others as a creator of a new train of thought in philosophy.

But this does not make him a figure that cannot be criticized, and one finds that his children were capable of asserting their own stand. Wolin introduces us to four original thinkers, and their intellectual biographies revile not just Heidegger's impact on their lives, or their lives impact on their work. He also shows the concepts that they developed in order to come to terms with the changes that where occurring in the World. They tried to look outside the conventional way of thinking, guided by their mentors instruction to understand the world and not to presume to know it, they developed some of the most stimulating, and controversial, ideas of the 20th century.

Before concluding my review of *Heidegger's Children* I would like to mention another team that is present; it is concerned with the relation of Heidegger's political though (and of the mention authors) and the way the democratic political discourse constitutes our relation to power and governing. Heidegger's political though is rooted in a critique of the World, and the way it is governed. But unlike Marxism that see the solution in a positivistic approach to the problem, Heidegger and his children see the solution in understanding one's self and the meaning of one's life, and existence. The tension with democracy is precisely around the point of how the state of the World is treated, and whether true political action exists in the present political arena. Wolin explains this problem, and gives a critique of both perspectives, but asserts the democratic one more frequently. But he also admits that the point of view taken by them should not be put aside and treated as argumentation in favor of the totalitarian approach to governing. Neither do the authors them self's ever imply this, even though they employ some of the concepts associated with totalitarian rule. What they do is try and explain the political process as something that is routed in everyday life and has a historic dimension that cannot be ignored, this inevitably makes them prone to asking questions about the nature of governing and whether politics is merely a rational in devour.

Wolin offers a unique perspective on the development of political theory. He achieves this by layering five biographies, with historical references and their own intellectual work, and in doing so makes a wholesome account of an age, and a generation of thinkers that developed a separate approach to politics and the question of human existence.

Magdalena Bogustawska, *Obraz władzy we władzy obrazu. Artystyczne konceptualizacje wizerunku Josipa Broza Tity*, Wydział Polonistyki Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego i Wydawnictwo „Libron”, Warszawa – Kraków 2015, pp. 464.

Sanja Zlatanović

Igra reči u naslovu knjige autorke Magdalene Boguslavske sa Instituta za zapadnu i istočnu slavistiku Univerziteta u Varšavi – *Slika moći u moći slike. Umetničke konceptualizacije lika Josipa Broza Tita* – precizno izražava njen fokus na postupke oblikovanja Titovog lika i modela njegove vladavine, kao i na značaj vizuelnog u tom procesu. Knjiga je zasnovana na višegodišnjim istraživanjima na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije, i to prevashodno u Srbiji, Hrvatskoj i Makedoniji, gde se – prema mišljenju autorke – u odnosu prema liku Tita reflektuju dublji identitetski problemi. Najveći deo istraživanja je obavljen u arhivu Muzeja istorije Jugoslavije, kao i u galerijama, među kojima se zanimljivošću materijala posebno izdvojila beogradska galerija „Remont“. Istraživanje je pretežno bilo usmereno na likovnu građu (fotografije, skulpture, slike, filmovi – dokumentarni i igrani). Istraživanje je imalo i terensku orijentaciju: autorka je prisustvovala dešavanjima u Kući cveća, proslavama Dana mladosti i razgovarala sa učesnicima ovih i drugih okupljanja vezanih za sećanje na Josipa Broza. Interesovala se i za širi kontekst popularne kulture, dizajn, oblike upotrebe u javnim prostorima, kao što su kafići. Magdalena Boguslavska je, kao deo istraživačkog tima Etnografskog instituta SANU, boravila u banatskom selu Belo Blato, gde je pronašla sasvim specifičnu likovnu građu, poput ručno veženog goblena Titovog portreta. Upravo zbog terenskog opredeljenja autorke, kao i fokusa na vizuelno, knjiga predstavlja značajan iskorak u odnosu na klasičnu slavistiku, filološki fiksiranu.

Knjiga se sastoji iz uvodnog dela i tri opsežna poglavlja („Prisustvo slike“, „Diktatura slike“ i „Memorija slike“). Interpretacija u prva dva poglavlja je usmerena na istorijsko čitanje biografije Titovog lika, dok u trećem poglavlju ona predstavlja svojevrsnu „nekrografiju“, budući da razmatra život lika posle smrti njegovog nosioca. Interpretacije biografije i „nekrografije“ lika korrespondiraju u širim okvirima „spektakla moći“, „političkog spektakla“, kao i „teatra memorije“. Ovako postavljeni okviri opredeljuju autorku na interdisciplinarnu kombinaciju ključeva političke antropologije, vizuelne antropologije i filozofije kulture.

Slika Tita je produkt umetničkog kreiranja u političke svrhe. Autorka primenjuje pojam *fabrikovanje*, razmatrajući strategije stvaranja lika preko likovnih predstava, kao i postupke kreiranja harizme. Fabrikovanje harizme vladara podrobno su razmatrali autori Bronislav Bačko (Bronislav

Baczko) na primeru Staljina i Peter Burke na primeru Luja XVI, a na čija se zapažanja Boguslavka nadovezuje. Ona ukazuje na to da Titova vlast predstavlja svojevrsan nastavak monarhističkog modela kralja Aleksandra i para-religijskog kulta, premda je ideološka paradigma promenjena. Iskorišćena je ukorenjena predstava kralja, kao i produktivnost postojećeg modela, da bi se na njemu gradio lik.

U knjizi se najpre razmatra uloga umetnika i njihovih likovnih tvorevina u oblikovanju Titovog lika tokom prve faze socijalističke Jugoslavije. Tada su upotrebljavani elementi sovjetskog modela kulta ličnosti, ali i lokalni idiom patrijarhalne harizme, ukotvljene u iskustvu narodne religioznosti. Da bi kult bio prihvaćen, morao je biti zasnovan na nečemu već poznatom. U posleratnom periodu uspostavljanja poretka Tito je prikazivan u vojničkoj uniformi. Na primer, na slici Paje Jovanovića „Portret maršala Tita“ (1947) Tito je u sivomaslinastoj maršalskoj uniformi sa pesnicom na mapi. Paja Jovanović je slikao portrete Karađorđa, kralja Aleksandra, pa Tita. U pogledu kompozicije, slike kralja Aleksandra i Tita su vrlo slične. Titove uniforme kreirali su umetnici, i one su se u celini ili u detaljima menjale u skladu sa promenama modela vlasti. U kasnijoj fazi socijalističke Jugoslavije menjaju se strategije prikazivanja, pa je Tito u belom odelu na putovanjima predstavljenim kao putovanja mira. Filmski i uopšte vizuelni prikazi njegovih putovanja imaju za cilj da predstave njegov uticaj važnijim i većim, nego što on to realno jeste (Tito u egzotičnim pejzažima, sa kosmonautima...), budući da on nije želeo da ostane samo lokalni (jugoslovenski) lider. Naslanjajući se na knjigu Borisa Groysa o Staljinu kao umetničkom delu, autorka ukazuje na to da je Tito autokreator specifične estetike svog lika, koji predstavlja rezultat interaktivne igre ideološkog, političkog i estetskog. Fukoovu postavku o vlasti kao sveprisutnoj pojavi, Boguslavka primenjuje u razmatranju obavezne zastupljenosti Titovih slika u ustanovama, čime se postiže njegova panoptička moć. Time se pokazuje da država – preko slika – ima kontrolu nad društvom, te da je ona glavni distributer moći. Autorka veoma suptilno analizira postupke stalne aktuelizacije Titovog lika, uvodeći u svoja razmatranja i kontekst popularne kulture.

Nove tendencije u likovnim umetnostima dovode do osporavanja Titovog lika, dekonstrukcije mita i pobune. Na primer, u filmu Lazara Stojanovića „Plastični Isus“ (1971), Tito je upoređen

sa Hitlerom i Musolinijem. U knjizi je posebna pažnja posvećena konceptualizmu u umetnosti i načinima na koje on dekonstruiše politički poredak. U konceptualističkom poimanju umetnosti, ona mora biti meta-komentar stvarnosti u njenim društvenim, političkim i moralnim dimenzijama. Konceptualizam u umetnosti odbacuje sliku kao takvu, jer je ikonoklastički – osporava i uništava ikone, dovodeći u pitanje ikonografske predstave vladara, pa i Tita. Konceptualistička jugoslovenska umetnost nije bila, a i nije morala biti antikomunistička; njene teorijske pretpostavke su bile takve da ona osporava tradicionalne vizuelne predstave koje imaju materijalni oblik.

Način upotrebe likovnih formi reprezentacije u periodu posle Titove smrti i nakon raspada Jugoslavije, karakteriše kontinuitet kvazi-religijskog kulta, koji proizvodi jedan oblik devocije i fetišizam, čije predmet je i slika. Nekrofilna devocija već počinje u medijskim izveštajima o Titovoj bolesti, koja se dramatičnije prikazuje uz pomoć partizanske matrice – da je to bitka, njegova poslednja bitka. Devocija legitimizuje titokratiju, koja je u stvari – nekrokratija. Zahvaljujući snazi posmrtnog kulta i posmrtnih harizme Titovog lika, on postaje ključna figura u poretku pamćenja naroda bivše Jugoslavije. Mnogo je više emocija, nego kritičke refleksije u odnosu prema njegovom simboličkom i političkom nasleđu. Popularna recepcija lika i fenomena Tita je prevashodno nostalgična.

Izraze kritičke refleksije Boguslavka nalazi u savremenim umetničkim koncepcijama, koje na subverzivan način komentarišu lik Tita i njegov kult, kao i popularni politički diskurs koji ih prati. Preko fenomena Tita postavljaju se nova pitanja o stanju društva, ali i o stanju subjektiviteta (ličnog, umetničkog...) (na primer, Želimir Žilnik). Osnovne pozicije u odnosu prema liku Tita su nostalgična i puristička (čišćenje prostora od tragova njegovog prisustva), obe zasnovane na emocijama. Postjugoslovenska umetnost je kritička, usmerena na čišćenje, što stvara situaciju *ili-ili*. Realan proces sistemske transformacije zahtevao bi neki treći vid pristupa pamćenju. Pojedini umetnici rade na dekontekstualizaciji, demistifikaciji i redmitologizaciji ovog fenomena, ali bez njegovog odbacivanja. Kao primere pristupa koji uspevaju da izbegnu zamku *ili-ili*, Boguslavka navodi dela Ivana Fijolića, Dragana Srdića, Nemanje Cvijanovića i dr. Oni su kritični prema nostalgiji i memorijalnom fetišizmu, ali i prema umetnosti uopšte, preispitujući vezu između političkog i umetničkog.

Boguslavski ukazuje na to da autori koji razmatraju aktuelnu popularnost Titovog lika, njega opisuju kao izuzetnu, neponovljivu i sasvim autonomnu istorijsku pojavu, što predstavlja vid nobilitacije – pripisivanja posebne vrednosti. U osnovi nobilitacije je kompenzacioni mit. Lokalno područje ima doživljaj provincijalnosti, zaostalosti, periferije, čiju nelagodnost ublažava mitom da je u svojoj istoriji imalo nekog ko je pripadao „velikom svetu“. Referentni okvir na koji se mit odnosi je globalni poredak; poruka se upućuje

strancima. Sa stanovišta političke antropologije, Tito svakako predstavlja veoma zanimljivu pojavu, budući da realizuje lokalni idiom kulture vlasti.

Knjigu Magdalene Boguslavske karakterišu minuciozne i pronicljive analize. Izabrani uglovi posmatranja donose sasvim nove uvide, posebno značajne za čitaoce na post-jugoslovenskom prostoru. Tekst je podrobno dokumentovan i ilustrovan dobro odabranim i detaljno objašnjenim fotografijama.

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8. KNJIGE

U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov knjige, mesto izdanja, izdavač. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora,

godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomenama, knjiga se citira isključivo na skraćeni način.

Primer:

U literaturi: Haug, Wolfgang Fric (1981), *Kritika robne estetike*, Beograd: IIC SSO Srbije.

U tekstu: (Haug 1981: 33).

U napomeni: Haug 1981: 33.

9. ČLANCI

U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov teksta pod navodnicima, naslov časopisa u italiku, godište časopisa, u zagradi broj sveske u godištu ukoliko paginacija nije jedinstvena za ceo tom, dvotačka i broj stranice. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. Ne stavljaju se skraćene „str.“, „vol.“, „tom“, „br.“ i slične. U napomenama, članci se citiraju isključivo na skraćeni način.

Primeri:

U literaturi: Miller, Johns Roger (1926), „The Ideas as Thoughts of God“, *Classical Philology* 21: 317–326.

Hartman, Nikolaj (1980) „O metodi istorije filozofije“, *Gledišta* 21 (6): 101–120.

U tekstu: (Hartman 1980: 108).

U napomeni: Hartman 1980: 108

10. ZBORNICI

U spisku literature: prezime i ime priređivača, u zagradi skraćena „prir.“, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov zbornika u italiku, mesto izdanja, izdavač i strana po potrebi. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomenama, zbornici se citiraju isključivo na skraćeni način.

Primer:

U literaturi: Espozito, Džon (prir.) (2002), *Oksfordska istorija islama*, Beograd: Clio.

U tekstu: (Espozito 2002).

U napomeni: Espozito 2002.

11. TEKSTOVI IZ ZBORNIKA

U spisku literature: prezime, ime autora, u zagradi godina, naslov teksta pod navodnicima, slovo „u“ (u zborniku), ime i prezime priređivača zbornika, u zagradi „prir.“, naslov zbornika u italiku, mesto izdanja, izdavač, dvotačka i broj stranice (ako je potrebno). U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. Skraćena „str.“ dopuštena je samo u spisku literature.

Primer:

U literaturi: Nizbet, Robert (1999), „Jedinične ideje sociologije“, u A. Mimica (prir.), *Tekst i kontekst*, Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, str. 31–48.

U tekstu: (Nizbet 1999: 33).

U napomeni: Nizbet 1999: 33.

12. ČLANAK IZ NOVINA

U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina, naslov članka pod navodnicima, naslov novina u italiku, datum, stranica.

Primer:

U literaturi: Logar, Gordana (2009), „Zemlja bez fajronta“, *Danas*, 2. avgust, str. 12.

U tekstu: (Logar 2009: 12).

U napomeni: Logar 2009: 12.

13. INTERNET

Prilikom citiranja tekstova s interneta, osim internet-adrese sajta na kojem se tekst nalazi i naslova samog teksta, navesti i datum posete toj stranici, kao i dodatna određenja ukoliko su dostupna (godina, poglavlje i sl.).

Primer:

U literaturi: Ross, Kelley R., „Ontological Undecidability“, (internet) dostupno na: <http://www.friesian.com/undecid-1.htm> (pristupljeno 2. aprila 2009).

U tekstu: (Ross, internet).

U napomeni: Ross, internet.

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1987– (Beograd : Colografx). – 24 cm

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