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POLITICS OF REMEMBRANCE:
POSTSOCIALISM AND ITS REVISIONS

POLITIKE PAMĆENJA:
POSTSOCIJALIZAM I NJEGOVE REVIZIJE

Edited by Adriana Zaharijević

I

Introductory note

The questions raised in this issue have grown on the exchanges that took place at the panel which opened the conference *Thinking beyond Capitalism*, organized by the Group for Social Engagement Studies in June 2015. Entitled “Politics of History of Eastern Europe”, the panel brought together prominent scholars of anthropology, gender theory, media and citizenship studies, all with a keen interest in the so-called postsocialist/postcommunist Eastern world, a region whose name today’s political and imaginative topographies are still seeking to firmly fix. Posing a number questions across disciplinary boundaries, the panel participants explored problems of memory (how we think back, in reverse, how we store and re-store thoughts we believe ours), uses of memory in thinking differently about the histories of the present and of what is yet to come, as well as uses of history in shaping the im/possibilities of this “beyond”. Placing this conversation in *Eastern Europe* – thereby deviating from the political tags which compartmentalize contemporary European space while also remaining close to dominant pre-Cold War designations – the exchanges provided an opportunity for recovering and redeeming “facts” (potentially erased or falsified), experiences (reduced while still lived), reflections and notions (policed and re-arranged by various means and to disparate purposes). Opening these spaces allowed us to ask: who can speak and think for and instead of us; who can proclaim that something is a revision of history, and how and when does one decide about such an act; and finally, how are we to articulate and re-appropriate imagination in order to imagine differently?

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“Politics of remembrance: postsocialism and its revisions” acts as a continuation of the discussion initiated in Belgrade in June 2015. But it is also a way to return to the histories produced in and by the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory. Namely, twenty years ago, the Institute began working on a project entitled “Individual and Collective Identity in Post-Communism”. The project which gathered some of our most notable social theorists – many of whom were (or still are) active in academia and/or politics – proposed to *construct* a theoretical-conceptual framework that would enable an understanding of “the nature of [post-communist] societies, their socio-economic stratification, possibilities and directions of their economic and technological development, the establishment of a new political system, post-communist ideologies, and the relation of these societies to the international environment” (cf. *Philosophy and Society*, IX-X, 1996, p. 17). In that sense, initiating a theoretical dialogue with our own histories may make us probe the constructions offered in our post-socialist infancy. It may also make us think that other constructions could have been possible.

Stemming from these two intellectual sources, this thematic issue brings together Kristen Ghodsee, Kateřina Lišková, Tanja Petrović and Chiara Bonfiglioli who in different yet interconnected ways discuss the politics of remembering. Their texts interrogate the uses and misuses of revisions of histories and of hidden constructions of “common knowledge” for the purpose of moulding what we know about socialism or, even more importantly, postsocialism. The texts ask not only what we know, but also how we know what we know; how that which we know procured its legitimacy; and how such legitimacy bars understanding of different kinds of agency. Thus also the title of the thematic issue, which interweaves politics with spheres of knowing, remembering and storytelling. Because what we (think we) know and remember is always entangled with what we do or believe is possible to be done. Or, to quote Ghodsee and Lišková from this volume: “the ways we think about the past are vital: not only so that we don’t make the same mistakes, but so we can think more creatively about the future. If in writing about a period that presented an alternate vision of modernity we resort to unsubstantiated clichés, we deprive ourselves of possibilities to challenge and change the world we live in today”.

Kristen Ghodsee
Kateřina Lišková

Bumbling Idiots or Evil Masterminds? Challenging Cold War Stereotypes about Women, Sexuality and State Socialism

Abstract In academic writing, facts about the past generally require the citation of relevant sources unless the fact or idea is considered “common knowledge:” bits of information or dates upon which there is a wide scholarly consensus. This brief article reflects on the use of “common knowledge” claims in contemporary scholarship about women, families, and sexuality as experienced during 20th century, East European, state socialist regimes. We focus on several key stereotypes about the communist state and the situation of women that are often asserted in the scholarly literature, and argue that many of these ideas uncannily resemble American anti-communist propaganda. When contemporary scholars make claims about communist intrusions into the private sphere to effect social engineering or the inefficacy of state socialist mass organizations or communist efforts to break up the family or indoctrinate the young, they often do so without citation to previous sources or empirical evidence supporting their claims, thereby suggesting that such claims are “common knowledge.” We believe that those wishing to assert such claims should link these assertions to concrete originating sources, lest it turn out the “common knowledge” derives, in fact, from western Cold War rhetoric.

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Keywords: Cold War, common knowledge, state socialism, anti-communism, women, family, gender, sexuality, Eastern Europe, communism

There exists an interesting paradox in the way that contemporary Western scholars discuss the state socialist experiments in Eastern Europe during the 20th century. On the one hand, Americans laud themselves on winning the Cold War, having spent decades fighting proxy wars and spending billions of dollars to support communist containment policies across the globe (Leebaert 2002). The United States made Himalayan efforts to defeat Communism, and many American politicians credit these efforts with the demise of the Eastern Bloc, nurturing a spirit of self-congratulatory triumphalism, most famously captured when Francis Fukuyama declared liberal democracy and free market capitalism the “end of history” (Fukuyama 2006).

On the other hand, many Americans also want to argue that communism, and the command economic system in particular, contained inherent flaws

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that doomed it to inevitable failure.¹ This line of argument posits that communist societies were inherently weak and unsustainable in the long run; they would have collapsed under the weight of their own inefficiencies. But if this is true, then why did the Americans expend so many resources to defeat them? Either the communist threat was real, offering a viable alternative to the free-market capitalism and liberal democracies of the West, or it sprung from unnatural and flawed assumptions about human nature, and all the West had to do was wait for it to implode on its own.

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A similar intellectual paradox often occurs in discussions of the situation of women and sexuality in state socialist regimes. As we will explore below, many scholars studying the situation of women and families during the state socialist era assert that the one-party state was omnipresent, invading every nook and crevice of the private sphere to socially engineer the new socialist man and woman. Through education and family policy, as well as through vast networks of agents and informants working for the state security services, the ordinary lives of individuals in communist regimes were pervaded with politics. The socialist state apparently intruded into the most intimate affairs of its citizens with a ruthless disregard for privacy in its quest to destroy vestiges of the bourgeois family and ensure sexual equality.

At the same time, scholars fault socialist states for their inability to live up to their promises regarding women's emancipation. Under state socialism, women still supposedly suffered continued discrimination and were victims of the notorious "double burden" of formal employment and household responsibilities. Although women were formally incorporated into the labor force, patriarchy continued to rule in the home (cf. Funk and Mueller 1993), a gender wage gap persisted (cf. Gal and Kligman 2000b), and few women occupied positions of political power within the highest echelons of the Communist Party (cf. Wolchik and Meyer 1986). If the power of the socialist state had penetrated so deeply into the contours of everyday life, however, wouldn't the communists have been more successful at shaping the gender identities of its citizens? How could patriarchy survive this onslaught of state interference? The omnipotence and omnipresence of the socialist state is belied by its own admitted failures.

How do these contradictions continue to persist in the scholarly literature on state socialism to the present day? In this brief reflection, we suggest that the perpetuation of uncritical Cold War stereotypes at least partially explains these rhetorical tensions. We focus on several key stereotypes about the communist state and the situation of women that are often asserted in the scholarly literature, and argue that many of these ideas uncannily resemble American anti-communist propaganda. When contemporary

1 See for instance, William J. Murray 2016.

scholars make claims about communist intrusions into the private sphere to effect social engineering or the inefficacy of state socialist mass organizations or communist efforts to break up the family or indoctrinate the young, they often do so without citation to previous sources or empirical evidence supporting their claims, thereby suggesting that such claims are “common knowledge.” We believe that those wishing to assert such claims should link these assertions to concrete originating sources lest it turn out the “common knowledge” derives, in fact, from western Cold War rhetoric.

In what follows, we will first discuss the politics of contemporary citation practice and the circumstances under which scholars should or should not cite sources for factual claims put forth in their published work. Then we will provide some representative quotes from contemporary scholarship on women’s issues under state socialism, all of which are assertions made with no citation to original research or other scholarly literature. For each of the stereotypes presented in this literature, we will attempt to suggest a source in American propaganda. Our key claim is that much of what we consider “common knowledge” about state socialist regimes today, especially with regard to the politics of women, sexuality and the family, can be traced back to anti-communist rhetoric from as early as the late-1940s. But Western Cold War propaganda did not end with the Cold War; it continues to inform our shared knowledge as unquestioned assumptions, which influences the way contemporary scholars continue to write about the socialist past.

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Two caveats must precede our discussion of these issues. First, in an article of this short length we cannot trace the path by which U.S. anti-Soviet propaganda in the 1950s and 1960s became common knowledge about the state socialist experience in the second decade of the 21st century. Surely, scholars conducted empirical scholarship in the intervening period, and this scholarship either confirmed, denied, or complicated these stereotypes, depending on the era and the political agendas of the researchers conducting it. Some scholarship has been delegitimized (especially scholarship produced during the Cold War in the Eastern Bloc), while other studies (particularly those conducted by Western researchers) continue to exert an influence on contemporary debates. A genealogical study of present-day stereotypes about socialism requires a book length study, and we hope that this short reflection will be a catalyst for future research.

Second, in providing specific examples of uncited assertions in contemporary scholarship, we have no intention of mounting ad hominem attacks on our colleagues and friends. We understand perfectly well the political economy of scholarly production in the neoliberal university where aspiring academics must publish or perish. Given the limited time and resources available for our research, we all (the present authors included) make assertions in our published writing, particularly when we assume a scholarly consensus around

a particular truth claim. But occasionally we need to stand back and examine these truth claims and the seeming scholarly consensus around them. Our intention is therefore not to call out or criticize any particular authors, but rather to demonstrate the ubiquity of these types of claims, and to ask why editors and peer reviewers do not ask for substantiation when it comes to making stereotypically negative assertions about the communist era. By exposing the pervasiveness of this practice, we hope to re-open a debate about knowledge production in the post-Cold-War era.

What counts as “common knowledge” in general?

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Almost all scholars who conduct historical or social scientific research on the state socialist regimes in Eastern Europe receive some form of academic training in the university where professors teach the rules regarding citation practice as early as undergraduate school. Making assertions about “common knowledge” is a common practice in academic writing, but specific rules govern its use. Since we are focusing on English language scholarship published in scholarly books or journals purporting to uphold academic standards of impartiality and peer-review, we focus on the Anglo-American tradition of how to determine what sorts of knowledge require no citation. For example, consider these instructions from Princeton University:

[I]f you use a piece of information discovered by another scholar in the course of his or her own research, you must cite your source. But if the fact or information is generally well known and accepted—for example, that Woodrow Wilson served as president of both Princeton University and the United States, or that Avogadro’s number is 6.02×10^{23} —you do not need to cite a source. Note that facts are different from ideas: facts may not need to be cited, whereas ideas must always be cited. Deciding which facts or pieces of information require citation and which are common knowledge, and thus do not require citation, isn’t always easy. For example, finding the same fact or piece of information in multiple sources doesn’t necessarily mean that it counts as common knowledge...when in doubt, cite. (Princeton, “When to”)

This passage makes clear that the key exception for not citing a source for a piece of information is when it is considered “common knowledge,” such as a basic fact about who is president or a mathematical concept. In a separate essay on “Not-So-Common Knowledge,” Princeton University clearly states that, “the belief that an idea or fact may be ‘common knowledge’ is no reason not to cite your source” (Princeton, “Not so”). Also worth noting is the idea that a fact does not become “common knowledge” just because it appears in multiple sources. So when does a bit of information become so incontrovertible that asserting it as a statement of fact requires no citation to a source? The Massachusetts Institute of Technology publishes

a handbook on academic integrity where it discusses the issue of “What is Common Knowledge?”

Broadly speaking, common knowledge refers to information that the average, educated reader would accept as reliable without having to look it up. This includes:

Information that most people know, such as that water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit or that Barack Obama was the first American of mixed race to be elected president.

Information shared by a cultural or national group, such as the names of famous heroes or events in the nation’s history that are remembered and celebrated.

Knowledge shared by members of a certain field, such as the fact that the necessary condition for diffraction of radiation of wavelength from a crystalline solid is given by Bragg’s law.

However, what may be common knowledge in one culture, nation, academic discipline or peer group may not be common knowledge in another. (MIT)

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With these definitions in mind, we now turn to the use of “common knowledge” when it comes to discussions of women’s rights and families under the state socialist regimes of the 20th century.

What counts as “common knowledge” about 20th century communism in Eastern Europe

The scholars we will cite in the following paragraphs are well-known figures in the field who have produced fascinating and often foundational research. Yet, when it comes to making generalized claims, they sometimes slip in “common knowledge” assertions, and occasionally these assertions contradict their very own research. It is as if the “common knowledge” about communism somehow trumps the empirical research using demonstrable sources. We believe that this “common knowledge” unconsciously shapes the scholarly debates because scholars are wary to challenge certain ideas about communism that “everyone” supposedly shares.

One of the most striking things about reading post-Cold War scholarship on women’s issues in Eastern Europe is how often socialist “totalitarian” states are judged by a different yardstick than contemporary “free and democratic” states, even when they engage in the same actions. Implicitly (and too often explicitly, as the quotes below will demonstrate) scholars assert as common knowledge that everything that happened during state socialism (i.e. what “the communists” did) was wrong, or motivated by the wrong reasons, or at least suspicious of some wrongdoing. “The Communists” (used almost always in the plural) or “the Communist state” or “the socialist state” is portrayed as an “evil mastermind” capable of manipulating the population for its own ends.

Moreover, scholars ignore differences among various communist states to make broad, unsubstantiated generalizations, homogenizing all of the experiences of different state socialist regimes. And even when the state's supposed "manipulations" resulted in positive outcomes for women, for example, the impure motives of the communist state undermined its recognized achievements. Consider the following claims about the intrusiveness of all socialist/communist states:

1. [T]he socialist state considered emancipation less an end in its own right than a means to achieve other goals, such as the mobilization of female labor force (Brunnbauer 2009: 79).
2. Communist states manipulated both men's and women's participation in wage work. But in the case of women, states also intruded significantly on reproductive lives, in a directly embodied manner (Gal 2000: 8).
3. In most of the communist states of East Central Europe, women were at first primarily defined as workers, a dramatic revision of pre-war imaginings. This was part of the broader commitment to the homogenization and equalization of the populace that intended to eliminate all social distinctions, including gender, in order to construct the 'new socialist man' (Gal 2000: 47).
4. Scholars agree, nevertheless, on some of the broad features of socialist gender orders. There was an attempt to erase gender difference (along with ethnic and class difference), to create socially atomized individuals directly dependent on a paternalist state (Gal and Kligman 2000a: 5).
5. While there were alternative gender constructions being produced, most importantly in the family, the village and the workplace, private lives were often narrowly circumscribed, and privacy was a rare luxury in crowded and collectivized living (Johnson and Robinson 2006: 2).
6. To encourage women's entry into the labor force, the government promoted the establishment of child-care facilities and the socialization of household chores. A welcome side effect of these policies – from the point of view of the state – was that control over the household and children would be assumed by the state (Brunnbauer 2009: 83).

These six quotes, taken from four different books published in 2000, 2006, and 2009, appear without citations to document the source of the claims, yet none of them meet the unambiguous definition of common knowledge. They constitute ideas rather than incontrovertible facts, and they are ideas with a very specific Cold War lineage. Furthermore, all of these quotes recognize some positive effects of state socialist policies to support women's

equality, but always in the same breath as they condemn the communist system more generally, as if these scholars feel that recognizing the positive always requires a restatement of the “common knowledge” about the negative aspects of all communist regimes. Quote number four even asserts that “Scholars agree,” but then provides no footnote or endnote for this claim, listing the scholars who make it. Who are these “agreeing scholars” and when, and within which contexts, did they produce their research? More importantly, how did the scholarly consensus emerge, at least within English language publishing, that generalized claims like these require no citation? These are important questions that might help us to understand the continued influence of Western Cold War anti-communist propaganda in contemporary academic writing.

One interesting experiment would be to try to find some earliest instances of the core ideas embedded in these quotes, e.g. that the “communist state” infiltrated the fabric of everyday life to “create socially atomized individuals,” “to erase gender differences,” or to intrude “significantly on reproductive lives.” In our quest for a genealogy of the “common knowledge” about communist families, we discovered the following quotes, which might serve as sources for truth claims about the invasive nature of the communist state:

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1. A communist government controls much more than the political, agricultural, and industrial activities of a country. It controls people’s lives in many other ways... Communists limit the freedom, mold the thinking, and run the daily lives of the people they rule (*What you should know* 1962: 13).
2. The home, as communists see it, is a place where parents and senior members of the family play an important part in the training of the child in communist morality. Child care and training are only an extension of the activities of the Communist party, and the home is not considered to be the foundation of the society itself as it is generally considered in most non-communist areas. Women play a vital role in the working force, and much of the child’s upbringing is delegated to the nursery school and other state institutions (*Joint Committee* 1962: 12).
3. The aim and object of Communism is always the same – complete control over the human mind and body, asleep and awake, in sickness and in health, from birth to death (*Committee on Un-American Activities* 1949: 35).
4. This is to tell you what the master minds of Communism have planned for your child in the name of ‘Education.’ They mean to take him from the nursery, put him in a uniform with a hammer and sickle flag in one hand and a gun in the other, and send him out to conquer the world (*Committee on Un-American Activities* 1949: 53).

The spirit of these latter quotes proves more hostile and direct than those of the hedged claims of the former collection of quotes, but the kernel of the idea of the pervasive intrusion of the communist state into the realm of private life underpins all of them. But it is the source of these latter quotes that intrigues: the United States government. The first quote comes from a 1962 textbook to teach American schoolchildren about communism, and the second derives from a special guide prepared for those teaching about communism in American junior highs and high schools. The third and fourth quotes come from a series of histrionic, anti-communist pamphlets prepared in 1949 by the United States House of Representatives Communist on Un-American Activities (HUAC), which laid the foundation for the McCarthy-era witch hunts. In all cases, no sources exist for this information about the goals and practices of communist states, but rather these statements originate directly from U.S. anti-communist propaganda. Thus, it could be argued that one source for the “common knowledge” asserted by contemporary scholars studying the histories of women and sexuality in state socialist countries is the U.S. government.

Other examples of these sorts of unsubstantiated claims can be seen with regard to the supposed slavish devotion of state socialist mass women’s organizations to the Communist Party and the socialist state. Despite the acknowledgement of many women-friendly policies that far exceeded those policies available to support women in the western democracies, many Western scholars portray East European attention to the woman question as “emancipation from above” and therefore somehow less legitimate than the emancipation from below supposedly found in the West. For example:

1. Female sociologists and party activists also urged the state to do more to reduce women’s household duties. But their influence was marginal; the Bulgarian Communists subscribed to the view that the woman’s question was part of the class question and, therefore, solved with the advent of socialism.... This granted a highly circumscribed form of autonomy to ‘organized women’, rather than constituting an independent ‘women’s movement’. The issues taken up by organized women under communism included labour force participation and work-life balance, equality in family and partnership relations, women’s living standards and education, and, most of all, childcare (Brunnbauer 2009: 171).
2. The official women’s organisations – the only such organisations permitted under state socialist rule – were... subordinated to, and in effect mere executive instruments of, government policy (Einhorn 2010: 55).
3. While the East German state related to its female citizens and their bodies in terms of the heterosexist norms of motherhood and marriage, it also enforced an ideology of gender equality. This was not

equality based on demands triggered by massive social movements, but planned equality determined by state bureaucrats, and practices introduced and maintained through state-funded social institutions. In addition to guaranteed day care and formal laws that guaranteed equal pay for equal work and equality within the family, there was also the right to abortion without restriction and the right to divorce (Partridge 2012: 46).

Once again, all three statements appear in published books from 2009, 2010, and 2012 with no citation, thereby imbuing these claims with the status of “common knowledge.” (It is also interesting to note that the final sentences of the first and third quotes contradict the stereotype of evil communists proposed in the preceding sentences.) But what is the source of these claims, and can they also be tracked back to American anti-communist propaganda from the early Cold War? In the specific case of state socialist women’s organizations, the Dutch historian Francisca de Haan has argued that the contemporary historiography of international women’s movements has been heavily influenced by Cold War stereotypes, particularly with regard to the leftist Women’s International Democratic Federation and its American affiliate, The Congress of American Women (CAW) (Haan 2010: 548). During the McCarthy era, many American politicians considered women’s organizations as “communist front organizations.” In the political imagination of the American anti-communists (many who were conservative white men) women’s organizations sponsored by or linked to socialist states merely used women’s issues as a ruse to promote communist ideas. For example, a 1949 HUAC report discussing the WIDF and the CAW opined that:

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The purpose of these organizations is not to deal primarily with women’s problems, as such, but rather to serve as a specialized arm of Soviet political warfare in the current ‘peace’ campaign to disarm and demobilize the United States and democratic nations generally, in order to render them helpless in the face of the Communist drive for world conquest... [Their] real aims are discreetly hidden behind a smoke screen of such attractive idealistic bait as equal rights for women ‘in all aspects of political, economic, legal, cultural, and social life,’ the extension of educational and health benefits, [and] child care.... (Committee on Un-American Activities 1949: 1–3).

Anti-communists promoting the idea that state-based or state-sponsored women’s organizations worked (always and exclusively) for their sponsors may underpin the persistent stereotypes that state-based organizations lack legitimacy in their efforts to represent citizen opinion, despite growing bodies of evidence to the contrary (cf. Zheng 2005: 519; Zheng 2010; Ghodsee 2014). Arguments about the unquestioning devotion of the CAW and the WIDF to Moscow resulted in the disbanding of the former (Weigand 2002) and the successful removal of the United Nations consultative status

of the latter (Haan 2012). Moreover, U.S.-based international women's organizations that were sponsored by or cooperated with the U.S. government or the CIA were held to a different standard than state socialist women's organizations because the former were ostensibly independent, non-governmental organizations (Laville 2002: 113). There exists much rhetorical slight of hand when it comes to the stereotypes about state socialist women's organizations, and once again what passes as uncited "common knowledge" in the contemporary scholarship may be traced back to anti-communist propaganda from the early Cold War.

Another stereotype pervading contemporary scholarship on state socialist countries in Eastern Europe claims that communists were asexual prudes that suppressed the natural flourishing and variation of human sexuality. Once again, we find a plethora of statements asserted with no citation to relevant studies. For example:

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1. Puritanism was a striking feature of orthodox Marxism. Marxism was similar to traditional Christian position on sexual matters, while diametrically opposed to all other teachings (Stloukal et al. 1999: 28).
2. [S]tate-socialist morals celebrated a specifically asexual state-socialist reproduction i.e., the party-statebuilding capacities of labour-force reproduction and not pleasure... As state-socialist morals celebrated a specifically asexual socialist reproduction, sexuality was delegated to social invisibility and surrounded by hypocrisy (Takács 2015: 165, 174).
3. Puritanism that placed a taboo on discussion or even recognition of sexuality was a striking trademark of state socialism, although there are differences between the East Central states (Funk and Mueller 1993: 11).

Finally, a passage in the *The Routledge History of Women in Europe Since 1700* also argues that, "interwar communist discussions of sexual liberation and search for pleasure by women were replaced by a communist Puritanism that focused on reproductive sexuality" (Ana Clark in Simonton 2006: 82). It cites Susan Gal as the source of the information, but a quick glance at Gal's 2000 text shows that she cited no source for her own claim (Gal 2000: 54). Thus, statements about the supposed Puritanism of the communists in sexual matters are asserted as "common knowledge," and once again in contradiction to burgeoning bodies of scholarship demonstrating that state socialist citizens had robust and fulfilling sexual lives (cf. Herzog 2005: 184–219; McLellan 2011; Pence and Betts 2008; Spector and Herzog 2012; Renkin and Kościńska 2016; Lišková 2016) .

While it is certainly true that during the Stalinist era in the Soviet Union, the state reversed many of the progressive policies of early revolutionary years, generalizations about sexuality cannot be made about all socialist

countries in all historical eras. So where might we find a source for these stereotypes? Consider, for instance, this quote from a 1956 article in the *New York Times* on “S-x in the Soviet Union.” The author is discussing the discomfort that two Russian visitors expressed after being taken to an American strip club.

[F]or those who know anything about Russian men and their attitude toward Sex with a capital S – in other words the public exploitation of feminine attractiveness – this is not surprising at all. In their own culture Russians encounter this only very rarely. In its presence they are quite uncomfortable and don’t know how to react...I am not implying, of course, that Russians are by any means sexless beings. They have a full complement of normal human impulses and express them. The Russian birth rate is not so high as it used to be but it is still high enough. I am talking here only about manifestations of sex in public. And in this respect Russians can be called prudes (Whitney 1956: SM6)

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“Common knowledge” about Soviet prudes was still alive and well when state socialism was nearing its end. In 1989, Associated Press published a piece about the need for glasnost to reach Soviet bedrooms. AP referred to Soviets as a “nation known for its squeamishness about sex” and continued:

Although the social chill on discussing sex is thawing a bit, sex is still a taboo topic in a country known for its puritanism, where even the Russian language lacks a polite word for love-making (Associated Press 1989).

This 1989 AP article echoes the same language as the 1956 *New York Times* piece quoted above. There, the author also asserted that the Russians were linguistically poor when it comes to sexuality:

There is a Russian word which means “sexual” in an anatomical sense but none meaning what the Anglo-American word “sexy” means. And the Russians, strangely enough, have not even done in this case what they usually do when they lack a native word – borrowed one from abroad. They are left without any way to express the concept (Whitney 1956: SM6).

The idea that not having a word for something means that that thing does not exist, *period*, is suspect. According to this logic, English-speaking people do not “have” *the day after tomorrow* (but Czechs do, it is *pozítří*), while Czechs do not “have” *toes* (Czech expression is *prsty na noze*, literally fingers on foot). In Bulgarian, there is a specific word to denote the relationship between two men who are married to sisters (*badzhanatsi*), where there exists no similar term in English. But it would be absurd to assert on this basis that there exists no relationship between men who married sisters.

Faulty logic notwithstanding, the stereotypes about Soviet prudishness and unsexiness long outlived Cold War. The journalistic assertions of Cold War-era journalists at the *New York Times* become the basis of future claims of future

journalists writing for the post-Cold War *New York Times*. For example in a 2010, the *New York Times* reasserted the idea of Soviet sexual prudishness, unsexy communist women, and the entire society, in public as well as in private, as devoid of sex:

Two decades after government-imposed prudishness ended with the Soviet collapse, Russians still shy away from embracing European-style sexual mores...Sure, sexual innuendo is commonplace: on television and in glossy magazines and in the provocative attire of women on the streets. Advertisements with busty models have long replaced posters of square-jawed women scything wheat... The Soviet government tried to drive all talk of sex under the covers, leaving public life effectively neutered. A lack of private space, especially in the communal apartments of major cities, limited access to sexual encounters even more (Schwartz 2010).

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Although journalists are not always required to cite their sources, and cannot be held to the same standards as scholars, this quote demonstrates the continuity of the idea of sexless Soviets from the post-Stalinist times through the perestroika era and until the present day. Scholars writing about sexuality during state socialism should be more attentive to the lived realities of communism and how it changed over time and space as it was re-negotiated by each society's key social actors (experts such as doctors or psychologists, representatives of the government, journalists, etc.). The trope of communist "puritanism" gets repeated in the scholarship without citation because it has attained the status of "common knowledge" in part due to articles such as those published in the *New York Times*. But this common knowledge is the specific product of American journalism, and should be acknowledged as such.

Conclusion

Painting communists as evil masterminds who shrunk people's private lives, crippled their sexuality and bossed women and their organizations around is at odds with representing the same communists as bumbling idiots who spoiled everything they touched and could not get anything right. This image is not only inconsistent; it is too simplistic. Interestingly, it is not only more recent research that brings out a more complex picture. Frequently, the very work of the scholars we cited shows nuanced realities that defy sweeping gestures of the "communists as masterminds and idiots" trope. Could it be that scholarly authors feel compelled to acknowledge the "common knowledge" about communist states in order to make their work appear ideologically neutral? Or is it that the "truths" they absorbed as young people raised in Western cultures of pervasive anti-communism creep into their scholarship decades later? Would similarly overreaching or indiscriminate statements about our contemporary times be accepted in a peer-review process?

Histories of women and sexuality in state socialist countries require careful nuance and open minded scholarship unburdened by the stereotypes of the past. What we must avoid are preconceived notions attributing this or that state action to “ideology” or “manipulation.” All states actions are contextual, which means they might stem from socialist ideals, capitalist ideals, Islamist ideals, or any others. The actions of all states can be called “ideological” or “manipulative.” But contemporary scholars do not usually use these terms when speaking about Western states. Moreover, some labels carry negative connotations; the label “state socialist ideology” is far from neutral. Choosing words like “intrusion”, or phrases like “state control over people’s lives” implies that socialist states were guilty of something that other states are supposedly free of. But is it possible for states to operate free from ideology? Don’t states always impose control over people’s lives (through taxation, laws, social policies, military service, etc.)? It is not only communist states that deploy ideological justifications for their actions.

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Thus, we believe that preconceived notions about communism and life within it continue to cloud our collective scholarly judgments. Yet the ways we think about the past are vital: not only so that we don’t make the same mistakes, but so we can think more creatively about the future. If in writing about a period that presented an alternate vision of modernity we resort to unsubstantiated clichés, we deprive ourselves of possibilities to challenge and change the world we live in today.

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Kristen Ghodsee
Kateřina Lišková

Nespretni idioti ili zli planeri? Propitivanje hladnoratovskih stereotipa o ženama, seksualnosti i državnom socijalizmu

Sažetak

U akademskim tekstovima navođenje činjenica o prošlosti u načelu podrazumeva i navođenje relevantnih izvora, osim kada se činjenica ili ideja može tretirati kao „opšte mesto“: tada govorimo o podacima ili datumima o kojima među naučnicima postoji široki konsenzus. Ovaj kratki članak razmatra upotrebu „opštih mesta“ u savremenim radovima o ženama, porodici i seksualnosti i načinu na koji su oni iskušavani u istočnoevropskim režimima državnog socijalizma tokom 20. veka. Usredsređujemo se na nekoliko ključnih stereotipa o komunističkoj državi i ženama koji se mogu naći u naučnoj literaturi, i tvrdimo da te ideje neobično podsećaju na američku antikomunističku propagandu. Kada savremeni naučnici i naučnice iznose tvrdnje o tome da su se komunisti mešali u privatnu sferu da bi sproveli društveni inženjering, ili o nedelotvornosti masovnih organizacija u državnom socijalizmu, ili o komunističkim nastojanjima da razore porodicu ili indoktriniraju mlade, oni to često čine ne navodeći ranije izvore ili empirijska svedočanstva kojima bi se potkrepile njihove tvrdnje, čime se sugerise da takvi iskazi spadaju u domen „opštih mesta“. Verujemo da svi koji iznose takve tvrdnje treba da ih dovedu u vezu s konkretnim izvorima, kako se ne bi pokazalo da je izvor tih „opšta mesta“ zapravo zapadnjačka hladnoratovska retorika.

Ključne reči: Hladni rat, opšta mesta, državni socijalizam, antikomunizam, žene, porodica, rod, seksualnost, Istočna Evropa, komunizam

Tanja Petrović

Towards an Affective History of Yugoslavia

Abstract The article discusses the necessity for the diversification of (hi)stories of Yugoslavia, arguing for the importance of incorporating the affects and experiences of Yugoslavia's citizens into the historical narratives. Acknowledging the difficulties emerging from the fact that what is articulated as historical narrative is still part of the experience for millions of citizens of post-Yugoslav societies, the article reflects upon the potential for and obstacles to an affective history of socialist Yugoslavia through the lens borrowed from German sociologist Georg Simmel. It particularly refers to – and makes use of – two sets of Simmel's ideas. The first concerns the *nature of material* and the way we are making a story out of it – more precisely, the relationship between history and experience, life and representation. The second is about the *perspective* from which we look at, approach, and synthesize this material. Simmel's reflections on history and form offer a very useful tool to look at the Yugoslav case and also help de-essentialize and normalize Yugoslav history, making the anxieties that characterize it part of a much broader discussion about history, its nature, and its internal contradictions.

Keywords: Yugoslavia, socialism, history, affect, experience, Georg Simmel

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Introduction: (Im)possible histories of Yugoslavia

The film *Houston, We Have A Problem!*, directed by Žiga Virč, was released in the spring of 2016.¹ Shown as a part of the official program of the Tribeca Film Festival, it immediately attracted significant attention in post-Yugoslav societies.² The film, a docu-fiction, tells the story about a secret space program launched in socialist Yugoslavia that drew on revolutionary ideas about space travel developed by the Slovenian scientist, Herman Potočnik Noordung (1892-1929). In the heyday of the Cold War, Yugoslavs sold the program to the United States, which was desperate to catch up with Russians in the space race. However, once in American hands, it was discovered soon that the program didn't work. This enraged John F. Kennedy and his administration, and posed serious problems for Josip Broz Tito and indeed for Yugoslav foreign policy in general. The film includes

1 Earlier drafts of this article were presented at the workshop "New Historical Writing with Simmel on Form, Image, and Coloration" organized by Nancy Rose Hunt at the Institut d'Études Avancées de Paris, May 28-29, 2015, and at the colloquium of the Centre for Contemporary History in Potsdam on October 29, 2015. I am grateful for all the comments I received during these presentations. I also thank Adriana Zaharijević, Ljubica Spaskovska, and Jelena Vasiljević for their many valuable insights and engaged readings of the text.

2 See Kosmos 2016, Njegić 2016, Stojiljković 2016.

abundant archival footage, highly recognizable images from the history of Yugoslavia and the world from the second half of the twentieth century, and combines it with a fictional plot in which events, narrated from the perspective of the present day, are linked in the manner of a conspiracy theory. Namely, an elderly NASA scientist of Yugoslav origin, Ivan Pavić, returns to Croatia from the United States to meet his daughter for the first time. Ostensibly, he had been forced to leave his pregnant wife in 1957 at the time the Yugoslav space program was sold to the Americans. Together with twenty-five scientists, he had been compelled to move to the United States to try and fix the expensive but non-functioning space program. Had he refused, he would have ended up on Goli Otok, a Yugoslav camp for political prisoners. A car accident was staged on his native island of Pag so that his family would believe he had perished.

According to several media statements by the film's director Žiga Virč, the film aimed to expose the mechanisms of manipulation of the truth engaged in by politicians and the media. This goal was accomplished by combining typical truth-telling visual techniques – such as archival material, testimonies, visits to the abandoned facilities of the space program at the Yugoslav airbase in Željava, Croatia – with the fictional plot about the Yugoslav space program. However, *Houston, We Have A Problem!* does much more than that: it offers a glimpse into history that looks quite familiar, although the film's viewers know full well that it never happened. And yet the fact that this history is not (completely) true does not make it any less real. The viewers may spend the 118 minutes of the film's duration trying to separate the truth from fiction in the story, or they may choose another way to watch the film. (I know that I, and many others, did exactly that.) Taking the fakeness of the film's premise as an unquestionable fact, the viewer may allow to be seduced by a possible history of Yugoslavia. Its underlying fake-ness frees viewers from the obligation of justifying their attachment to that history and allows them to enjoy consuming it without engaging in a dialogue with the dominant interpretations of Yugoslavia's history; they are also liberated from the self-censorship such engagement usually implies. Again, the fact that the story is not true does not make it less real, and does not make it less history than some other stories about the Yugoslav past. Iva Kosmos writes this in her essay on *Houston, We Have A Problem!*

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despite the decision to reject the quest for the truth, *Houston, We Have A Problem!* is not as far away from history as it may seem. British historian Alun Munslow (2006) points to the difference between the past and history – the past is everything that happened before the current moment, while history is a story, a narrative about that past. The mistake of the traditional historiographical discourse is that it equates the past and history. The past is not accessible; all we have are stories about it. And what does Virč do? He takes archival material, interprets it, and creates a story about

the past. Although he says loud that it is not (about) the truth, what he does is not so radically different from what historians do (Kosmos 2016).

Seen this way, Virč's film, and the reactions of its viewers in the societies that used to be parts of socialist Yugoslavia, point to an important symptom of the post-Yugoslav social worlds. They reveal a desire, a longing for the possibility to tell, listen to, enjoy and engage with diverse, real and unreal, possible and impossible histories from the second part of the twentieth century, the period which brought dramatic social and economic changes, and which still represents a part of experienced memory for millions of citizens, but is usually subject to normative interpretations that view socialism as a totalitarian system that invaded all spheres of public and private life, and denied any possibility for citizens' agency (Ghodsee and Lišková, this issue).³ In this article, I take seriously this desire for the diversification of (hi)stories of Yugoslavia, arguing for the importance of incorporating the affects and experiences of Yugoslavia's citizens into the historical narratives.

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Memory, History, and Affect

In April 2012, I attended a guided tour in the Maribor Art Gallery of an exhibition entitled *Unfinished Modernizations between Utopia and Pragmatism: Architecture and Urban Planning in the Former Yugoslavia and its Successor States*. The tour was led by one of the curators who selected the work for the show, a young architect from Zagreb. The tour group was comprised mostly of young people, including some from Great Britain, so our guide spoke English. He took us through several rooms of the Maribor Art Gallery, in which were exhibited photographs and models of recognizable buildings, construction designs for socialist cities and neighborhoods, Yugoslav modernist abstract monuments to the anti-fascist struggle, and the plans for the big projects of Yugoslav companies in other non-aligned countries. Our eloquent guide provided us with a great deal of relevant information about the architectural heritage of the Yugoslav period, sprinkling his talk with irony and jokes about Yugoslavia, its long-serving President Tito, and life in socialist times. It was clear from his attitude and way of speaking that he felt as essential to make a distance between himself and his subject, and irony and humor proved to be effective tool for such distancing. The necessity of emotional distance and "the objective assessment" of Yugoslav modernization was also emphasized in the meta-text of the exhibition. One of the display labels read: "It is not our intention to look nostalgically back at historical events, but to critically read the ways in which modern values and ambitions were

3 For a discussion on the possibility and nature of women's agency in socialism, and the need of diversification of feminist histories in the twenty-first century, see Ghodsee's (2015) response to Funk (2014), as well as a forum in the *Aspasia* journal (De Haan et al. 2016).

interpreted and produced: social justice, the public domain, cultural advancement, social solidarity, and the dissemination and exchange of knowledge”.

One of the visitors on our tour stood out from the others: an elderly gentleman with crutches who slowly followed the group on the ground floor, but could not climb the stairs and patiently waited for us to come down again for the last part of the exhibition. When the group approached the model of Split III, a modernist neighborhood built in the Mediterranean town of Split, our guide gave the floor to the man on crutches. It turned out he was Vladimir Braco Mušič, a Slovenian architect and the creator of several modernist projects in Yugoslavia – among them Split III, and Ruski Car in Ljubljana, the bravely designed and highly functional socialist neighborhood where is currently my home. Mušič did not speak for long, but he did say the following: “You may judge, assess, analyze, and make jokes about what we were doing back then, but I want you to know that when we made Split III and other projects, we truly believed we were doing a good thing and improving the lives of thousands of people. We wholeheartedly dedicated ourselves to these projects.”

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This discrepancy between a distanced, “objective,” historicized narrative of Yugoslavia on the one hand, and the experience of it still shared by millions of people inhabiting post-Yugoslav spaces, resides at the core of the tensions, ambiguities, and difficulties that characterize writing and thinking about socialist Yugoslavia twenty-five years after its demise. This discrepancy and the tensions it produces are extremely visible and strongly felt in any attempt to stage or display Yugoslav history in museum exhibitions,⁴ but they are no less evident in the ways we generally think about Yugoslavia. As Ljubica Spaskovska pointed out: “embedded within the vast field of historical enquiry, all present and future attempts at writing about Yugoslavia essentially strive to answer the question of how to frame and narrate the Yugoslav story in a context where Yugoslav time is historical, while the (post)Yugoslav space and the many people who inhabit(ed) that time and space still exist. One faces the challenge of writing about a phenomenon that qualifies as ‘not-yet-entirely-past’ and ‘partially-still-present’” (2014: 241). How we represent and write about Yugoslavia is an important epistemological, but also political question, as the legacy of Yugoslavia increasingly becomes a site of inspiration for some future politics articulated by new left activists and theoreticians in the region and beyond.

The sphere of the affective – of emotions and senses – has gained enormous attention in the humanities and social sciences in recent years.⁵ In historiographical practice, where the affective and the intellectual appear to be

4 See Mēhilli, 2009, Petrović 2013, 2013a, Popović 2016.

5 See, among others, Cvetkovich 2003, Duyvendak 2011, Hofman 2015, Gregg and Seigworth 2010.

seemingly at odds, we face many serious methodological challenges, as Nancy Rose Hunt (2014) puts it in her discussion of African gender history writing. In the particular post-Yugoslav context and the post-socialist context in general, however, the absence of the affective and emotional from historiographical narratives must be interpreted as an important social, political, and also epistemological symptom. The political importance of affect and emotions, and the political consequences of their absence in the post-socialist context, was singled out by Boris Buden (2009), who writes about social anesthesia as a defining characteristic of post-socialism preventing us from addressing the real social anxieties of post-socialist subjects: “The social contradictions of post-communism – such as the widening gap between rich and poor, the dismantling of all forms of social solidarity, enormous social injustices and widespread suffering – these all remain affectively unoccupied (...) This social anesthesia is one of most salient symptoms of post-communist transformation.”

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The epistemological aspect of this absence is no less significant and also has palpable political consequences. The academic disciplines of history and anthropology have already recognized the epistemic problem, and this recognition has resulted in an increasing attention to and interest in everyday life in socialism – in a number of projects, volumes, articles and museum exhibitions. Oral histories, narratives, and personal recollections have become legitimate sources. Social and cultural history and anthropology take seriously people’s experiences of socialism, their personal sensibilities, showing “respect for their claims of having lived a full and dignified life, in contrast to the claims that all that remains from communism is a collection of exotic memories and the impression that people had at best lived halfway normal lives” (Todorova 2014: 5). The historians of Yugoslavia, particularly those belonging to younger generations, have also recognized the necessity “to ‘normalize’ Yugoslav history, i.e. to open up the discursive space for histories of everyday life and narratives of ordinary Yugoslav” (Spaskovska 2014: 242). Extensive use of the methods of oral history characterizes their work, and in their writings they give voice to the people who lived and made history. While these are enormously important steps towards the inclusion of the experience of socialism into academic, museal, and cultural narratives about history of socialism in Europe, there are still significant lacunae and problems that demand self-reflection and serious consideration.

One of these problems concerns the creation of a clear dividing line between history and memory in studies of socialism. This line has proved to be much trickier than in cases of exploring the past in other geographical contexts. Memories of socialism have attracted a lot of scholarly and popular attention, but they are still treated as selective, unstable, informed (and deformed) by the present state of affairs, and, as such, opposed to “objective” or “neutral” history. This opposition produces telling differences in legitimacy: positive

memories of life and work in socialism are dismissed as nostalgia, while the memories of those who testify about crimes and violence conducted by the communist authorities prevail in media discourses and are taken as objective testimonies with the legitimacy of historiographical sources.

A related problem concerns how socialist subjects are thought of in political terms. In dominant approaches toward the politics of the memory of socialism, the socialist regime and its opponents as clearly opposed forces are given political agency, while the majority of citizens who lived in socialist societies are perceived as apolitical. In general, the history of everyday life seems to take an interest mostly in the non-political aspects of life under socialism. As Thomas Lindenberger (2014) rightfully stresses in his discussion of “salient historical problems of East German life,” there is a symptomatic void: “we know a lot about dissidents and their persecutors on the one hand, and about the normal life of ordinary people seemingly far away from official politics, on the other hand, but very little on how, for instance, the state security and party functionaries intervened in the lives of people who were not dissidents, that is, how authority was executed below the level of systematic repression and tight control.” We also know very little about how these “ordinary people” reacted to that control and how they acted *politically* within the realm of social participation and production provided by the socialist system. The anthropologist Alexei Yurchak (2006) offered an invaluable insight on how people engaged with the socialist authorities, arguing that they were neither opposing nor fully identifying with the system – indicating how limited are the binary oppositions that have provided the primary lens through which the history of socialism is viewed.

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In the prevalent normative view of socialism, which is strongly informed by the narrative of Europe’s two totalitarianisms (Ghodsee 2014), the politics and sensibilities of the majority of people who cannot be classified in one of the two opposed categories (victims/dissidents vs. perpetrators) remain ignored and neglected. This silent majority is presented as manipulated, politically immature masses that actually enjoyed their subordinate position because it offered safety and protection. This representation of citizens and citizenship during socialism has far reaching political consequences. Today, in debates over public space, common and public resources and property, and in the struggle to retain basic elements of the welfare state, citizens are unable to make references to their own experience of different social relations because they are *a priori* delegitimized. Boris Buden points to the paradox that “marks the jargon of the post-communist transition: those who proved their political maturity in the so-called ‘democratic revolutions’ of 1989-90 became children overnight!” (Buden 2015: 123). This paradox is based on “the cynical idea that people who won freedom through their own struggle must now learn how to enjoy it properly” (ibid., 125). The metaphor of post-socialist subjects as children,

similar to the transitional ideology in its totality, does not leave any room for memory: children are “untroubled by the past and geared totally toward the future,” which makes them “the almost perfect subjects of a democratic restart” (ibid., 124).

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The only public realm in which affective, nostalgic engagements with one’s own past is allowed is consumption, and consumerist and popular culture. Consumption has a very curious relationship with socialism. On the one hand, differences in consumption patterns between East and West are frequently highlighted as the most salient feature that defines the distortions and deficiencies of socialism: shortages, waiting in line for basic products, and low quality production, technology, and outdated fashion became the trademarks of socialism (Fehérváry 2013). On the other hand, consumption in socialism is probably the most studied domain of socialist life by both historians (of everyday life) and anthropologists.⁶ It is also the dominant content of museum representations of socialist history. For researchers interested in socialist Yugoslavia, consumption practices are even more interesting because of the “relaxed” or “western” nature of Yugoslav socialism. Studies of consumption and consumerism remain the most numerous studies of everyday life in Yugoslavia.⁷

As the main object of representation of socialism and of research interest in socialist everyday culture, consumption is often seen as the only domain where “ordinary people” engage with their own, socialist past affectively, and this affective engagement is labeled post-socialist/Yugo-nostalgia. The reduction of “ordinary people’s” nostalgia for socialism (usually used as an umbrella term for emotional and engaged recollections of various aspects of life in socialism) to consumerist and consumption practices and relationships is clearly problematic. The anthropologist Svetlana Slapšak (2008) thus sees Yugo-nostalgia as a negative phenomenon that revitalizes only those aspects of Yugoslav culture that were the most accessible, visible, banal, and kitschy. Instead, she opts for another kind of nostalgia: based above all on “the legitimization of longing for Yugoslavia in intellectual circles.” She thus give intellectuals permission to long for Yugoslavia and “its real, productive, and still important achievements, some of which are directly inscribed in the present day world crisis: equality, the right to work, health insurance, gender equality, etc.,” while simultaneously rejecting any possibility that other affectively engaged recollections of socialism may also articulate legitimate, reflected, and politically relevant claims (see also Slapšak 2011: 312).

However, several collective citizens’ actions in recent years suggest the opposite. For example, in February 2014, numerous *plenums* (people’s assemblies)

6 See, among others, Bren and Neuburger 2012, Patico 2008.

7 See Duda 2005, 2010, Luthar and Pušnik 2010, Grandits and Taylor 2010, Paterson 2011.

emerged from countrywide protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These plenums were the first notable attempt to reconstitute a civic form of citizenship after more than two decades of entrapment in ethnically defined politics. *Plenums*, even the name, directly refer to the collectivity and collective agency experienced in socialist times and lost in transition. Another example can be found in the May 2014 floods that hit Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The response of citizens throughout the former Yugoslavia was quick, passionate, and overwhelming. Not only did Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, and Macedonians organize the collection and transport of huge amounts of aid to affected areas, but also people from one part of ethnically divided Bosnia gave assistance to those in the other part, and asylum seekers rescued endangered citizens and helping clean up the debris. Roma women breastfed evacuated babies. Chinese shop owners distributed free rubber boots. This compassion and solidarity was accompanied by references to socialist Yugoslavia and its legacies. Many citizens, young and old, noted on social networks the meaningfulness of training at the defense and protection classes in the schools of socialist Yugoslavia, which, soon after the end of socialism, were ended because they were considered an ideological residue of the totalitarian regime. Even before the waters fully receded, the volunteers had organized in “work brigades” – another reference to Yugoslav socialism – in order to clean up affected areas.⁸

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The reflective and political engagement with the experience of socialism is not reserved for intellectuals, is not the privilege of the elite. It is necessary to take “ordinary people” seriously as political subjects and to seriously consider their affective memories as *historical* narratives. This is not necessarily an easy task, but it is politically, morally, and epistemologically essential. As a first important step towards its fulfillment, I propose the deeper exploration of the aspects that make the task so difficult. To reflect upon the potential for and obstacles to an affective history of socialist Yugoslavia, I borrow the lens from German sociologist Georg Simmel (1858–1918). I particularly refer to – and make use of – two sets of Simmel’s ideas, that he developed in his later writing “The Constitutive Concepts of History” (Simmel [1918] 1980). The first concerns the *nature of material* and the way we are making a story out of it – more precisely, the relationship between history and experience, life and representation. The second is about the *perspective* from which we look at, approach, and synthesize this material.

History and life

The metaphor of the tapestry, which Simmel used to describe the ambiguous and complicated relationships between life, experience, and history, seems applicable to the case of Yugoslavia. “Life as it is experienced,” Simmel says,

8 On floods and the politics of citizens’ response, see Petrović 2014, Zaharijević 2014.

“may be compared to a tapestry. Only short strands of its many threads are visible. The rest of the fabric is woven beneath the surface, continuously weaving together the part of the fabric that can be seen. However this function is concealed by the surface fabric, which is interwoven in the same way. It follows that only a linear arrangement of the threads of the fabric will reveal the design that cannot be identified in any of its individual parts. History, on the other hand, extracts a single strand as if its development were uninterrupted. In consequence, a form of continuity is created, but not a pattern” (Simmel 1980: 155).

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The metaphor of a tapestry has often been used for Yugoslavia because of the country’s multi-ethnic, mosaic-like composition. This tapestry was unwoven in the bloody, violent conflicts of the 1990s. This inescapable fact decisively limits the potential of visible strands when one writes about Yugoslavia. The bloody disintegration of the country became not only “an action understood by reference to its antecedents,” but, even more so, an action understood by reference to its *consequences*. Because of the general anesthetization of the socialist experience (Buden 2009), and the normative ways of writing about Yugoslavia now marked by ethnic conflict, nationalism, and violence, it is almost impossible to bring what still defines the lives of millions of former Yugoslavs to the surface of the tapestry as defined by Simmel: the complex concrete experiences, the confusing experiences of the senses, the vague familiarities, and ambiguous moments of recognition. For years, I have been engaged in research on the experience of the mandatory military service in the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army that still connects men in post-Yugoslav societies across ethnic, social, and cultural lines – the same men who fought and killed each other in the 1990s. Whatever their role was in the 1990s, and whatever their position within the nationalized landscape of post-Yugoslav societies today, the great majority of the men I spoke to viewed military service as a formative and still important experience. The values constitutive for hegemonic masculinity and otherwise universal to all-male communities, values such as male competitiveness and friendship, provide the core of this positive assessment of the military service. At the same time, this shared experience reveals the sentimental and emotional side of post-Yugoslav men and their troubled subjectivities. These strands in the fabric, however, remain firmly concealed under the surface of Yugoslavia’s tapestry. Framing military service as a site of or pretext for male-initiated violence in the dominant narrative of Yugoslavia’s history excludes the emotional ties of a Bosnian man to his Serbian friend from the army, ties that sometimes survived rupture, trauma, displacement, and genocide. It excludes the pride with which a sociology professor from Ljubljana explained how he was able at the age of eighteen to cook for the whole unit of his fellow conscripts in a remote post on the Austrian border. The current historical framing does not provide a space for the anxiety of

a photographer who displayed photographs of army buddies at an exhibition and begged me to track down the people in these photographs. He himself did not dare to do it, as he was too afraid of what he might learn about their destinies after the violence and killing during the war.

The possibility for affective, sensual, and sentimental strands of Yugoslavia's tapestry to come to the surface is additionally hindered by the high amount of (self) censorship that post-socialist subjects apply when they speak or write about socialism, even in cases when they recognize the positive, progressive, and emancipatory aspects of Yugoslav socialism. Two characteristic signals of this self-censorship are contained in the title of the above-mentioned exhibition: *Unfinished Modernizations between Utopia and Pragmatism: Architecture and Urban Planning in the Former Yugoslavia and its Successor States*. First, it employs the term *former* Yugoslavia, despite the fact that the exhibition is about the socialist period;⁹ and second, it speaks about *unfinished* modernizations – a typical way of characterizing Yugoslav modernism and modernization, as if socialist modernization could never be “real” and definite, and as if any modernization is total or finished (cf. also book title *Modernism in-between: The Mediatory Architectures of Socialist Yugoslavia*, Thaler, Mrduljaš and Kulic 2012).

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A more recent and even more telling example comes from the Museum of Contemporary History of Slovenia in Ljubljana, which launched a campaign for collecting “objects of our everyday life” and invited citizens to bring objects to the museum and tell the stories of these objects. Nowhere in this call were either Yugoslavia or socialism mentioned, although it is clear from references to industrial and consumerist objects (the first television set manufactured by Iskra company, a bottle of the Yugoslav soft drink Cockta) that that is the period in question. The call mentions the upcoming “exhibition about everyday life” in a sentence that looks unexpectedly interrupted, as it remains unstated which historical period the exhibition will address. In small print at the bottom of the call, the period is specified as “1945 to 1990,” but again without naming it, as if such naming would make the whole project political, and public representations of everyday life in Yugoslavia need to remain apolitical, stripped of any capacity for the articulation of legitimate claims about the present and the future. Such narrativization shows that avoiding “Yugoslav” and “socialist” has already become a habitual practice in post-Yugoslav, nationalized societies.

“We do not preserve memories, we preserve history,” claimed the leader of the Slovenian partisan choir performing revolutionary songs in Trieste, Italy (Hladnik Milharčič 2011, quoted in Hofman 2015), thus directly opposing the apoliticization of recollections of the Yugoslav socialist past. This

9 For problematic uses of “former Yugoslavia”, see Slapšak 2011: 302.


 MUZEJ NOVEJŠE
 ZGODOVINE SLOVENIJE

PREDMETI NAŠEGA VSAKDANA -

**PRINESI PREDMET
IN POVEJ NJEGOVO ZGODBO**

Morda doma hranite staro stekleničko Cockte? Otroški tricikel ali katero izmed prvih otroških igrač? Embalaže za hrano in čistila? Ženske ali moške konfekcijske obleke, narejene v slovenskih tekstilnih tovarnah? Brigadirsko uniformo? Lesen ležalnik s počitnic ob morju? Morda vstopnico, plakat s koncerta ali katerega od slovenskih glasbenih festivalov? Prvi Iskrin prenosni televizor Minirama?

Muzej novejše zgodovine Slovenije želi skupaj z vami dopolniti muzejske zbirke in podarjene predmete predstaviti na gostujoči razstavi o vsakdanjem življenju. Vabimo vas, da nas obiščete in z nami delite predmete in njihove zgodbe.

Za vprašanja in dodatne informacije so vam na voljo:
 Maketa šteta: 01 300 96 05, maketa.ankic@muzej-nz.si
 Katarina Jurjenčič: 01 300 96 14, katarina@muzej-nz.si
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 www.facebook.com/Muzej-novejske-zgodovine-Slovenije
 #predmeti@muzejnz

Zbiranje predmetov iz obdobja 1945-1990
 bo potekalo do odprtja nove obsežne razstave novembra 2016.



The poster by the Museum of Contemporary History of Slovenia in Ljubljana, inviting citizens to bring everyday objects and tell the stories of these objects (source: Facebook).

sentence also exposes the political relevance of the distinction between history and memory in the case of socialist Yugoslavia. It needs to be read in the context of the intense revisionist processes that have taken place in post-Yugoslav societies (and in post-socialist Europe in general), in which the roles of victims and perpetrators, anti-fascists and fascists' collaborators have become relativized.

In order to become a suitable object of history, Yugoslavia is reduced to a linear and flattened narrative, cleansed of any affective or emotional investments and ruptures, and thus deprived of the capacity to make an intervention in the present. What Yugoslavs believed, their emotional investments, how they perceived themselves becomes irrelevant or "unimportant" (Simmel

1980: 171) in the history of Yugoslavia. This is a history that does not tolerate life, and cannot absorb multiple, often contested roles, sentiments, and relationships into a narrative that bases its claim for legitimacy on the argument of historicity.

The Past and the Future

The narration of the Yugoslav past as history requires the framing of Yugoslavia as a discreet historical fact – with the precise date of its beginning and equally precise date of its end. The title of the exhibition of the Museum of History in Yugoslavia – *Yugoslavia from Beginning to End* – opened on December 1, 2012 illustrated this need. Historians who deal with various aspects of life in socialist Yugoslavia also emphasize temporal discreteness and definiteness of the history they describe: this history “began in one point in time, and officially ended in another” (Duda 2015). To be narrated as history, Yugoslavia thus must be understood as the past and its pastness must be absolute. This is often a strategy aimed at salvaging that past from the revisionists and working against the banalization, hollowing out and falsification of historical facts in order to stigmatize it and discard it as a ‘totalitarian’ deviation. Such strategy, however, ignores the fact that although formally and historically dead, Yugoslavia still lives in everyday encounters, in references, smells, tastes and words, in the fine tunings and epiphanies of people living their everyday lives across the former country. And it is not necessarily a generationally bound experience that renders Yugoslavia still alive. Here is what a young person (who has no or hardly any experience of living in Yugoslavia) wrote on his blog: “Yugoslavia is the only way I refer to the place I’m originally from, where I grew up, but also to the place(s) where most of my friends and family live at the moment. I do realize that it may seem as if I’m trying to recreate or call into existence something that is long gone but for me Yugoslavia is right now and right there. It is not an internationally recognized state, nor is it a state that I need to see restored, it is simply the best name I have for all the things I feel to be familiar and intelligible – the music, the dishes, the ideologies, the cities, the patriarchy, the policies, the words, the concepts, and the people.”¹⁰ To many people Yugoslavia is “immediately present” and constitutes “an actual, palpable reality” (Simmel 1980: 176).

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This life of Yugoslavia ideally fits Simmel’s category of *the form of life*, in that it is intrinsically related to the future. In Simmel’s words: “contents which logically fall within the domain of the past, but which still lie within the consciousness of the present experience, are also oriented to the

10 <http://www.philopolitics.org/being-a-yugoslav-1-marko-simonovic/>, accessed 17 August, 2016.

future.” In the constitution of history, “the conscious interest is to ‘re-present’ the past insofar as it is past, to constitute the past as a content or object.” In history, “the past as such acquires the status of an autonomous value.” Here, according to Simmel, lies the fundamental difference between life and history: “the organic relationship between the past and the future is the exclusive source for the significance of the past for life. History, however, dissolves the relationship” (Simmel 1980: 177). In order to imagine an autonomous and decent future that is an alternative to what is usually presented as the only possible future in transitional, neoliberal ideologies to which the people of the former Yugoslavia have been extensively exposed in the last two decades, the Yugoslav past needs to be the past for life – with all its disorder and elusiveness. It is not unambiguously over and easily locatable, but is capable of intervention into the present and incorporation into future imaginations. This is a kind of past the philosopher Boris Buden describes in the introduction to his book *The Introduction to the Past* that he wrote together with the film director Želimir Žilnik:

“this book derives from an open confession that it does not know exactly what the past is, and even less where to look for it. For a historian, it is self-evident that the past is supposed to be something that has already happened (...) and is always behind us. This book does not accept such an understanding of the past. On the contrary, it derives from the dissolution of unity and disappearance of historical time. (...) The past is something new: it is ubiquitous, present here and now, to everyone and for everybody. The past is more actual than the present and less certain than the future” (Buden 2013: 7).

Many young leftist theoreticians, artists, activists, members of political movements and parties that have emerged from anti-austerity protests in the wider region since 2008,¹¹ return to the Yugoslav past with the aim to discover something new there, something to be used for articulating present and future alternatives. But in these returns to the past, there is a paradoxical moment which significantly defines possibilities for thinking about Yugoslavia at the present moment: to be a constitutive part of future politics, this past must remain an object of life in Simmel’s sense. However, to be a politically legitimate source for creating alternatives, it must become an object of history, because only historical facts may be used as valid arguments in public debates in post-Yugoslav societies characterized by historical revisionism and faced with Europe’s paternalism. This embrace of history and the inevitable erasure of experience in rediscoveries of Yugoslav socialism is not difficult to understand in the post-Yugoslav context: any positive reference to the socialist past, especially if it relies on one’s own experience, is usually dismissed by nationalist elites in the Yugoslav

11 For an overview, see Štikš 2015.

successor states as banal Yugo-nostalgia and, worse, a morally problematic glorification of a legacy that inevitably leads to terror and gulags (Kirn 2014; Petrović 2013b). The paradigm of the two twentieth century European totalitarianisms, in which socialism is equated with Nazism, remains strongly present in the narratives of united Europe, making it additionally difficult to stake politically legitimate claims by referring to the socialist past.¹² Because of this, those who turn to Yugoslavia for inspiration for future political paradigms feel that they must detach the Yugoslav past from the messy and contested experiences of actual Yugoslavs. One way to do that is by reducing that past to the pure essence of the revolutionary moment and its values, and purifying it of all ideological layers that might compromise it. For this reason, the all-female choir *Kombinat* from Ljubljana performs exclusively partisan, anti-fascist songs that were written during the Second World War by members of the partisan movement. In their opinion, only these songs, untainted by the subsequent state ideology of socialist Yugoslavia, are capable of reflecting the “pure” revolutionary values of resistance and solidarity. Those written during Yugoslav socialism cannot be the holders of revolutionary potential as they have been corrupted by the ideological use of the socialist regime (Hofman 2015). Similarly, many theoreticians turn to “genuine” partisan art and its messages, to the “pure” aesthetic value of the modernist monuments dedicated to anti-fascist struggle, etc.

In the process of the transformation of the Yugoslav past from life to history, the past acquires the status of an autonomous value (Simmel 1980: 177), and simultaneously becomes disconnected from those who created it and from those for whom Yugoslavia is, in some form, still part of the present. To feed present desires and accelerate collective affects in post-Yugoslav times, Yugoslavia needs to be emptied of any past desires, visions, and affects. But is such Yugoslavia, emptied of life, capable of making an intervention in the present or in the future? And isn't such rediscovering of anti-fascism without partisans and socialism without Yugoslavs by the new generation of post-Yugoslav leftists disturbingly reminiscent of the historical revisionism of post-Yugoslav nationalists and liberal political elites?

12 American anthropologist Kristen Ghodsee points to another important dimension of equating Nazism and communism on the European level: it is closely connected to and was accelerated by the economic crisis in Europe. The European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism was created by the European Parliament in 2008, and in many former socialist countries monuments to all victims of totalitarian regimes were erected, and museums and institutes devoted to all totalitarian regimes were established. These developments should be seen “against a backdrop of growing social unrest in response to the global financial crisis and Eurozone instability in Spain and Greece” and “in the context of regional fears of a re-emergent left” (Ghodsee 2014; see also Ghodsee 2015).

Instead of a Conclusion

This article highlights the tensions, ambiguities, and uncanny political consequences of attempts to articulate histories of socialist Yugoslavia two and a half decades after its dissolution, in a historical moment when it is still an important part of the life experience of millions of people. This experience is inevitably complex, messy, fragmentary and resistant to flattening into a linear and consistent historiographical narrative. Georg Simmel's reflections on history and form offer a very useful tool to look at the Yugoslav case and also help de-essentialize and normalize Yugoslav history, making the anxieties that characterize it part of a much broader discussion about history, its nature, and its internal contradictions. The article has no intention of moralizing the frameworks of the Yugoslav past employed by various interest groups in their intellectual, cultural and/or political work, nor does it offer any practical solution that would overcome the ambiguities and disorder that emerges from the very nature of experience and life – Yugoslav or any other. On the contrary, it suggests that ambiguity and disorder should be acknowledged and made visible in the production of historical narratives about socialist Yugoslavia, and taken as a productive site for reflecting on modernity, temporality, and the future.

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Tanja Petrović

Ka afektivnoj istoriji Jugoslavije

Sažetak

Članak razmatra neophodnost uvođenja raznorodnosti u (i)storije Jugoslavije, i ističe značaj inkorporiranja afekata i iskustava građana i građanki Jugoslavije u istorijske narative. Uzimajući u obzir poteškoće koje proizlaze iz činjenice da je to što se artikuliše kao istorijski narativ i dalje nerazdvojivo od iskustva ogromnog broja građana postjugoslovenskih društava, članak razmatra potencijal i prepreke za izgradnju afektivne istorije socijalističke Jugoslavije, kroz optiku pozajmljenu od nemačkog sociologa Georga Zimela. To se posebno odnosi na dva skupa Zimelovih ideja. Prvi se tiče *prirode materijala* i načina na koji od njega pravimo priču – preciznije, na odnos između istorije i iskustva, života i reprezentacije. Drugi se odnosi na *perspektivu* iz koje gledamo, pristupamo i sintetizujemo taj materijal. Zimelove refleksije o istoriji i formi pružaju vrlo korisno oruđe u razmatranju jugoslovenskog slučaja, i pomažu u deesencijalizovanju i normalizovanju jugoslovenske istorije, uključujući neizvesnost koja je odlikuje u širu raspravu o istoriji, njenoj prirodi i njenim unutrašnjim protivrečnostima.

Ključne reči: Jugoslavija, socijalizam, istorija, afekt, iskustvo, Georg Zimel

Chiara Bonfiglioli

The First UN World Conference on Women (1975) as a Cold War Encounter: Recovering Anti-Imperialist, Non-Aligned and Socialist Genealogies

Abstract The essay addresses contemporary discussions on women's transnationalism and women's agency by looking at the first conference of the UN Decade for Women held in Mexico City in 1975, and at its specific embedding in Cold War geopolitics. Through an engagement with different feminist and activists voices, and particularly with the less visible anti-imperialist, Non-Aligned and socialist genealogies of women's activism expressed during the meeting, the essay argues that the paradigm of Western feminist knowledge production needs to be revisited, in order to encompass multiple forms of women's political agency that are not expressed through the liberal framework of women's individual autonomy from the state. By juxtaposing Betty Friedan's and Vida Tomšič's stances during the Mexico City event, the paper shows that women's political agency during the Cold War era took different forms, which included both the refusal and the acceptance of women's activism within existing national and international institutions.

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Keywords: Mexico City, UN Decade for Women, Cold War, agency, feminism, state socialism, Non-Alignment, Betty Friedan, Vida Tomšič

Introduction

This paper pursues the strand of scholarly work that uncovers alternative perspectives on the UN Decade for Women (1975-1985), and that underlines the significant contribution of activists from state socialist women's organizations to UN conferences (De Haan 2012; Ghodsee 2010; 2012; 2014; Popa 2009). Through testimonies and documents on the UN world conference on women held in Mexico City in 1975, I wish to recover lost anti-imperialist, Non-Aligned and socialist genealogies of women's activism, with a particular focus on Yugoslav perspectives. Alternative views of women's emancipation have generally been erased in U.S. feminists' accounts of the time, which often denounced the politicization and manipulation of "communist" and "Third World" women, at the expense of a focus on sexism, women's liberation and autonomy from men and the state. Such narratives tended to conflate the International Women's Year keywords of equality, peace and development with the First World, the Second World and the Third World, respectively. Scholars have been recently challenging these representations, notably the idea that representatives from the socialist bloc weren't genuinely interested in women's equality (Ghodsee 2010; 2012; Popa 2009).

On the basis of the case study of the Mexico City conference, I will attempt to demonstrate that Western feminist knowledge production over socialist and post-socialist Europe is in need of a thorough recognition of its partiality, in order to encompass multiple forms of women's agency that do not fit into the liberal framework based on women's individual autonomy from men and the state. Deep-seated anti-communist frameworks and assumptions must also be questioned. As Alexandra Ghit recently wrote: "The relationship between communism and feminism should not be rendered unspeakable. Research on these topics should not have to be part of ritualized condemnations of communism in order to be seen as legitimate" (2016: 165). In order to open up the field of knowledge production, the recent scholarship on women's activism in socialist regimes is deconstructing the widespread figure of the "Manipulated Communist Woman" which originates in the legacy of the Cold War (De Haan 2010), in a manner akin to post-colonial feminist critique and its deconstruction of the victimized figure of the "Third World Woman" described by Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2002).

Both tropes, the "Manipulated Communist Woman" and the "Third World Woman", are deeply rooted in Western academic production, and have much to do with the UN Decade for Women. As Coogan-Gehr (2011) demonstrated, U.S. academic feminism – and its most prominent journal, *Signs* – was founded precisely at a time in which global discussion on women's rights raged as a result of International Women's Year (1975). This field of knowledge was constructed through specific paternalistic mechanisms towards "Third World Women" – who were dangerously leaning towards socialism – as well as through the exclusion of socialist regimes and of state socialist women's organizations as a possible alternative model of women's emancipation. Following Kristen Ghodsee's critique on scholars' ritualized (and unchecked) "common knowledge" about state socialism in this issue, as well as Kelly Coogan-Gehr's (2011) reconstruction of the Cold War embedding of academic feminism in the U.S., the paper aims to demonstrate that definitions and practices of women's emancipation are time and context specific, and cannot be separated from their surrounding geopolitical framework.

As the article will show, women from socialist and postcolonial countries present at Mexico City were keen to stress the interdependency between struggles for women's emancipation and wider struggles against imperialism, racism and capitalist exploitation, while women from Western countries tended to interpret women's emancipation through the lens of new grassroots feminist movements, hence being skeptical or mistrusting of state-based women's activism in the East and in the Third World. The legacy of this approach is still visible within Western academic scholarship on the Cold War era, insofar as socialist regimes are routinely condemned for their faulty emancipation politics in contemporary academic literature (see Ghodsee in

this issue), while the gendered legacy of imperialist and colonial policies is rarely discussed. If we agree on an intersectional feminist perspective that includes nationality, class and race into an account of gender oppression, however, we have to take into account the restrictions to women's agency that were caused not only by the repressive state socialist apparatuses, but also those shaped by imperialism, racism and class oppression in the West itself, as well as in the rest of the world. Both the (post)-socialist and the (post)-colonial historical paradigms contributed to shape gender regimes and forms of women's agency transnationally. Post-socialist studies, however, have failed to obtain the high status of post-colonial studies in Western academic settings, even if both the ex-Second World and the ex-Third World are products of Western modernity and intimately connected (Tlostanova 2011; Chari and Verdery 2009).

With this post-colonial, post-socialist and post-Cold War critical framework in mind, I believe it is necessary to re-embed discussions of women's agency within the "politics of location" (Rich 1986) and "situated knowledges" (Haraway 1988) that are at the base of contemporary feminist theory. Throughout this article I strive to account for the competing loyalties, epistemic paradigms and discourses through which women's agency was differently expressed throughout history. As I will show through the case of the Mexico City conference, both Western feminists' stance on women's autonomy from men and the state, as well as Yugoslav representatives' emphasis on equal geopolitical relations as a precondition for women's emancipation, were rooted in specific historical experiences embedded in Cold War geopolitics, which in turn shaped, enhanced and restrained women's agency. They were also embedded in the opposition between post-war Marxist frameworks of women's emancipation based on economic modernization, historical progress and national sovereignty, and new emerging, transnational feminist paradigms of women's emancipation and liberation based on a politicization of sexuality and the private sphere (Salvatici 2009).

The first section will contextualize the event of Mexico City, through witness reports of the time, but also through some of the documents contained in the online database *Women and Social Movements, International*, which contains original material from the official UN conference and from the NGOs' Tribune. Secondly, I will proceed to analyze the documents published in the course of the conference and in its immediate aftermath by two prominent actors, U.S. Jewish feminist Betty Friedan, a crucial figure of the second wave best known for her book *The Feminine Mystique*, and Yugoslav representative Vida Tomšič, a former partisan and state official in charge of women and welfare politics, who was also engaged in Non-Aligned connections with the global South. The writings of Friedan and Tomšič will be used to show how discussions on women's emancipation were fundamentally

embedded in Cold War mental maps and divisions, and to highlight how both figures expressed their political agency through different epistemic, historical and geopolitical paradigms of women's emancipation.

"Who speaks for whom?" at women's world conferences

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Several scholars (Olcott 2010; Ghodsee 2010; Zinsler 2002) have reconstructed the political dynamics and controversies at the core of the UN world conference of women in Mexico City, taking place from June 19th to July 2nd, 1975, and of the following conferences organized within the framework of the UN Decade for Women in Copenhagen (1980) and Nairobi (1985). These conferences oftentimes became a Cold War battlefield, with Soviet Bloc representatives stressing their achievements in terms of women's legal equality and access to education and labour, while the newly decolonized countries federated in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 emphasized the connection between women's emancipation and development, demanding more equal economic relations on a global scale in the form of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The United States and other Western countries, in the meantime, were fearing the instrumental politicization of women's issue for anti-Western purposes (Ghodsee 2010). In Mexico City, in fact, delegates from the Second and the Third World supported the final Declaration, which linked women's emancipation to the world struggle against social and economic inequalities, and in particular to the struggle against the oppression caused by "colonialism, neo-colonialism, zionism, racial discrimination and apartheid"¹. Beside controversies over the issue of Israel-Palestine, and over the South-African apartheid regime, the toppling of the democratically elected Allende regime in Chile by the United States in September 1973 was also a prominent cause of anti-imperialist resentment among participants, together with the recently ended Vietnam War. References to zionism and apartheid, as well as paragraph 29 condemning foreign interventions and supporting national sovereignty (Ghodsee 2010:6), led to several reservation among Western countries, with the United States and Israel voting against the final Declaration of Mexico.

Another major faultline at the Mexico City conference was located between the official delegations taking part in the UN conference, which counted over 2000 delegates reunited in the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and over 6000 delegates who attended the parallel Tribune reuniting international NGOs (Papanek 1975; Ghodsee 2010: 5; Olcott 2010). The Tribune was geographically placed on the opposite site of the megalopolis

1 Report of the World Conference of the International Women's Year, Mexico City, 19 June – 2 July 1975, United Nations, New York, 1976, 203 pages, in *Women and Social Movements, International*. <http://wasi.alexanderstreet.com/>

of Mexico City (Greer 1986), something which strengthened the participants' sense of distance from international and national bureaucracies. The Tribune itself included 36 planned sessions, which were quickly followed by 192 extra meetings, spontaneously requested by participants. The planned sessions included debates on women's work, development, Third World women's craftsmanship, education, health, planned parenthood, peace and human rights – mirroring the themes of the UN conference – while improvised sessions went from Chicana, Afro-American and African women's meetings to issues of lesbianism, racism, sexism, gender violence and prostitution.²

According to the report written for *Signs* by U.S. anthropologist Hanna Papanek, an expert of South Asia and UNESCO advisor, the majority of Tribune participants from civil society organizations were from Latin America or from the United States because of their proximity, while Asian, African and Eastern European women were fewer due to travel costs. Despite the ambivalences of U.S. women's writing on Third World women at the time, including the writings of Papanek herself (Coogan-Gehr 2011: 57-58), her report from Mexico City is deeply aware of the risk of cultural hegemony and patronizing. The author noted that within the U.S. delegation “academics and others who had worked with women from other countries were conspicuously absent”, so that some of the participants “had little sensitivity to people from other cultures and tended to dominate meetings with the internal dissensions of the U.S. women's movements”. She also posed the feminist dilemma of “who speaks for whom”, feeling that

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we do not speak for women of other societies, no matter how long we have lived or worked there, if we are not full citizens with all the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. Our own civic responsibility must be formulated in terms of the influence we may be able to exert on our own governments and others who affect the lives of the people with whom we are concerned.

Paradoxically, as Papanek noted (1975:220), Western analysts and academics were less experienced in influencing policy making than women from less industrialized nations, so that “some of the most articulate expressions of powerlessness came from women in some of the richest nations, mainly from the floor of the Tribune, while some of the most self-confident women were those who had achieved important positions in their own ‘underdeveloped’ societies”. Moreover, while at the Tribune Western participants were keen to stress women's oppression in the private sphere, women from Asia, Africa and especially Latin America emphasized the importance of social and economic development and of the struggle against imperialism as a prerequisite for women's emancipation (Papanek 1975; Whitaker 1975).

² Report, International Women's Year Tribune, 1975, 35 pages, in *Women and Social Movements, International*. <http://wasi.alexanderstreet.com/>

Beside these transnational conflicts over the content and formulation of women's emancipation (women's individual freedom vs. women's social and economic rights), radical feminists' view of what they perceived as male-dominated institutions also led to their distancing from the official UN conference. Radical feminists present at the Tribune were generally skeptical of UN conference proceedings being led by populist and Third-Worldist Mexican president Luis Echeverria, who had a history of supporting violent repression against internal opponents. They also had reservations about prominent women delegates that were often chosen for their family ties to dubious politicians, as in the case of Imelda Marcos (wife of Philippines' notorious dictator) or Ashraf Pahlavi (the twin sister of the Persian Shah). As Germaine Greer (1986:202) wrote, "Instead of a conference about women, we had all been duped into attending a débâcle, where women who had come to prominence through their relationships with men were employed by those men to further their policies at the expense of women of the world. It was disgusting".

The official UN conference, therefore, was often perceived in negative terms by U.S. delegates and feminists, since its bureaucratic setting and the accent placed on development and the need for a New International Economic Order seemed to sideline the conference focus on women. As another *Foreign Affairs* report on the official UN conference noted, "the women's revolution was immediately faced by what seemed like a counterrevolution – the delegates from the developing countries appeared for a time so intent on the redistribution of resources between rich and poor that the redistribution of power between men and women seemed for them a competing priority". Furthermore, Western women "wondered whether the Third World position did not reflect a disdain or hostility by those countries and their male-dominated governments for the goals of the conference, an attempt to distract the women from how much they had in common" (Whitaker 1975: 173).

While Third World women's anti-imperialist stance was perceived as related to their understandable economic and social oppression, yet at risk of manipulation, women from the Second World were generally represented as manipulated beyond return in the U.S. reports of that time. Whitaker (1975: 173) wrote, for instance:

That both the conflict and the communication flowed almost exclusively between the Westerners and those from developing countries was striking. Regarding their own revolutions as complete, delegates from the communist countries complacently abstained from the revolutions of both women and the poor except for an enthusiastic endorsement of all attacks on neocolonialism, imperialism and similar evils.

Instead, Western delegates expressed distrust for any type of (men-led) revolution, arguing, as French state secretary to the women's condition

Françoise Giroud, that “Women have fought and died for countless liberation movements in the past, only to find themselves ‘making the coffee’, when it was all over. Therefore a woman’s feminist commitment often exists in an ideological vacuum as far as classical political movements are concerned” (quoted in Whitaker 1975: 174).

The language of women’s sisterhood against male sexism was perceived by Western feminists as the only radical option, leading also to problematic appropriations of Third World women’s experience, for instance when official Australian representative Elizabeth Reid argued that “All women are subject to colonization by mute consent” (Whitaker 1975: 174). According to Kelly Coogan-Gehr (2011), U.S. feminists’ attitude and positioning towards Third World women and women from socialist countries weren’t only originating in the activist character of their experience, which she singled out as a *stock narrative* of feminist scholarship. Feminist field formation, instead, was embedded in the specific geopolitical conditions of the 1960s and 1970s, namely in a wide array of state-sponsored and private funding which intended to use social sciences and newly emerging academic feminism to respond to Soviet influence over Third World women, promoting instead a less radical approach to women and development. Such economic and geopolitical links are often made invisible in the transnational history of the women’s movement.

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An interesting example of these links is the conference on Women and Development held at Wellesley College in 1976 with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation, which resulted in a special issue of *Signs* a year later. As Coogan-Gehr argued (2011:67), “the political and scholarly agenda of the Wellesley Conference reflected a conception of third-world women’s interests and needs based largely on perceptions of first-world scholars”. This led to a poignantly critical article written by three prominent scholars from outside the West who took part in the conference, namely Fatema Mernissi (Morocco), Nawal Al Sadawi (Egypt) and Mallica Vajarathon (Thailand).³ The case of the Wellesley conference shows how U.S. feminists’ positions were embedded in Cold War geopolitics, and how “global differentials of power made it very difficult for first-world feminists to identify the intricate workings of the international division of academic

3 “The women from industrially developed countries focused their attention on the oppressive conditions of women in developing countries; the causes of oppression became secondary. For example, discussion about the effects of so-called “development” and “modernization” on the degrading economic conditions of women in developing countries was not linked to economic/political factors such as the role of the multinational corporation. When Third World women tried to attract attention to the role of the multinationals, they were accused of being nonfeminist; of imitating the male in his political games; and “splitting the spirit of sisterhood in the Women’s Movement”. Saadawi et al. 1978, quoted in Coogan-Gehr 2011:71.

labor that fashioned their liberal worldview” (Coogan-Gehr 2011: 70). Another interesting aspect of the conference at Wellesley College was the complete absence of women from the socialist bloc, which was reproduced in the special issue of *Signs* that ensued. Further issues of *Signs* also showed a general absence of interest for socialist countries and socialist modes of development in the Third World (Coogan-Gehr 2011), thus contributing to the reductionist view of women’s position in state socialist countries and obscuring the numerous connections and translations between women’s movements in the Second and the Third World (Ghodsee 2014).

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Another notable example of second wave feminism’s ambivalent stance towards broader geopolitics – and of their principled refusal to engage with international and national organizations– is the grassroots-based International Tribunal on the crimes against women held in 1976 in Brussels, which saw the participation of over 2000 women from 40 countries⁴ and which represented a radical feminist response to the UN International Women’s Year and to the Mexico City conference (Russel and Van den Ven 1976). Simone De Beauvoir’s opening message, sent remotely, stated: “In contrast to Mexico where women, directed by their political parties, by their nations, were only seeking to integrate Woman into a male society, you are gathered here to denounce the oppression to which women are subjected in this society”. De Beauvoir defined the Tribunal as “the start of a radical decolonization of women”. She argued in another article published in *Nouvel Observateur* that “under whatever regime, law, moral code, social environment in which they find themselves, all women suffer from a specific form of oppression” (Russel and Van den Ven 1976:5). Such statements were clearly at odds with state socialist regimes’ emphasis on women’s emancipation as a tenet of their modernization policies (Donert 2013). Interestingly, the Brussels Tribunal did not include testimonies from the socialist bloc, except for a U.S. participant who mentioned testimonies of women’s political repression in the Soviet Union and Ukraine provided by Amnesty International.

The feminist language of sisterhood and of common women’s oppression made it difficult, in the West, to understand women’s agency as expressed within (male-dominated) state institutions, being them placed in the West, the East, or the rest of the world, since feminists mostly refused the type of equality with men that was proposed by the Mexico City conference. Against this framework of global sisterhood which undermined geopolitical differences among women, the representatives of countries belonging to

4 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, France, West Germany, Greece, Guinea, Holland, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Mozambique, the Netherlands, Antilles, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Scotland, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, the U.S.A, Vietnam and Yemen.

the Second World, the Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement treated geopolitical inequalities and Western countries' privileged status as a fundamental obstacle to women's emancipation. Many also saw women's participation to international and national institutions as a factor of progress and modernization, and strived to voice their views within the United Nations. In the case of Western participants, instead, there seemed to be an open conflict between feminist participants and official delegations, notably in the case of the U.S. (Whitaker 1975). Progress is often equated with the change in discourse brought by grassroots feminism: "between 1975 and 1985, activists from around the world used the UN Decade to challenge the patriarchal model that frames national and international relations" (Zinsler 2002: 144). In the next sections I will explore the influence of Cold War dynamics and of different languages of women's emancipation on two prominent Mexico City participants that were positioned on the opposite spectrum of the political (and feminist) scale: Betty Friedan and Vida Tomšič.

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Embodying liberal feminism: Betty Friedan's *Scary doings in Mexico City*

In her accurate reconstruction of the different voices that were present at the Mexico City Tribune, Joyce Olcott (2010:736) has argued that "the events quickly became stages for political performances directed not only at an international audience but also at audiences in participants' countries and communities". This led to conflicting performances in front of the local and international media, notably over issues of sexual rights, prostitutes' rights and lesbianism. While many women from Latin America resisted discussions that challenged heteronormative models of sexuality and were rather supporting gender complementarity, figures like Mexican lesbian activist Nancy Cárdenas did not fit into discourses that equated sexual rights with cultural imperialism (Olcott 2010). Meanwhile, within the Tribune, well known U.S. feminist Betty Friedan was perceived as the symbol of Western feminism by many non-Western participants, and her contested position – not only among Third World women but also among U.S. feminists – was emphasized by the fact that Friedan "gauged her performance to establish her role as a broker and a model for feminists around the world steering women's activism back towards what she perceived as core women's issues" (Olcott 2010: 739).

Betty Friedan was very well known at home and abroad, as a result of her bestseller, *The Feminine Mystique*, published in 1963. In the book, on the basis of her personal experience, Friedan wrote about "the problem that has no name", namely white middle-class women's dissatisfaction with their lives as housewives and mothers in the suburbs. She had co-founded the National Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966, which waged very

important battles for women's equality before the law, equal pay and abortion rights. While Friedan presented herself as a liberal feminist in the 1960s, she used to be a labor rights activist during the war and the immediate postwar period. As a response to widespread McCarthyism and anti-communism, however, Friedan concealed the left-wing political engagement of her formative years throughout the rest of her life (Horowitz 1998). Friedan's retrospective account of the Mexico City conference is an interesting document in this sense, as it reflects both her stance as a leading feminist figure at home, as well as the Cold War embedding of her positioning.

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In *Scary doings in Mexico City* (1977, first published 1976), the UN conference was turned into a spy story that had the author as the main character in the drama. Women from Latin America, China and other countries from the global South generally appeared as manipulated in Friedan's account. Some Mexican women, for instance, were allegedly paid to disrupt the women's unity created at the Tribune under the pretext of anti-imperialism, while "communists" were trying to hijack the women's movement by gathering attention on the WIDF conference to be held in East Berlin the following autumn. Friedan strived to rally Tribune participants, and to have a women's delegation speaking at the official UN conference, albeit unsuccessfully. She was allegedly spied on, threatened and generally at risk in a foreign country led by a repressive regime that wanted to limit the influence of Western feminism over local women. Friedan, therefore, realized that while being against imperialism and the Vietnam War, she was after all an American, and that the American feminist movement was based, as she writes, on "the values of American democracy – the belief in individual dignity and freedom, equality and self-fulfillment, and self-determination, as well as freedom to dissent and organize" (1977: 449). I won't summarize her entire account here, but only single out a few passages describing Cold War polarizations among women.

From the start, Friedan claimed that she personally went to see the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to make sure that a world conference would be organized for International Women's Year (IWY). Women from the WIDF and Soviet women, in fact, claimed to be the initiators of the IWY, but opposed the idea of a UN conference (as they initially did) and proposed instead to have one WIDF congress in East Berlin instead (as it happened the following autumn).⁵ Friedan also recalled how she saw at the Bucharest conference a year earlier "a curious alliance of the Vatican, the Communists and the Third World nations (Latin America and Arabs

5 On the Cold War tensions surrounding the preparations of the conference, see Ghodsee 2010; 2014. As Ghodsee (2014:245) notes: "Faced with the possibility that the Eastern Bloc countries would be hosting the *only* conference to debate women's issues on the international stage, the [U.S.] State Department reluctantly agreed to support an official United Nations conference in Mexico City."

especially) oppose women's rights to control her own body and equality for women as 'irrelevant'. In Romania, Friedan had witnessed women's double burden and restricted abortion rights, despite the fact that women were supposedly liberated by communism. The trip to Romania led Friedan to realize that "maybe you couldn't have women's liberation in a country where women weren't free to organize on their own behalf" (1977: 445). Again, the feminist grassroots activist trope was present, and so was Friedan's generalized description of state socialist regimes as opposed to women's rights.⁶ An ulterior proof of Communists' misdeeds came from Friedan's unsuccessful attempt to dialogue with women delegates from the People's Republic of China in Mexico City, on the basis of their common womanhood. Friedan compared the liberatory potential of the women's movement to the one of the proletariat, only for the conversation to be quickly interrupted by the Chinese ambassador. Friedan's work of feminist outreach was not in vain, however, since some Latin-American women during the Tribune began to speak "simply for ourselves as women" (1977: 452).

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Friedan's account, similarly to others by Western participants, presented the sisterhood between Western women and Third World women as something which could be established with some difficulties, while women from socialist countries refrained from any significant dialogue, a part from a Russian woman who told her jokingly: "You are too eloquent. I do not agree with you. I think you might be dangerous" (1977: 448). A post-scriptum to the piece was specifically dedicated to women's condition in Eastern Europe, and contained the classic "common knowledge" about socialist regimes (women's double burden, lack of political decision-making, repression). This was based on Friedan's experience in 1967 Czechoslovakia, just before the Soviet invasion, in which the author perceived local woman as "facing something similar to the feminine mystique", and in which she attempted to help in organizing a local women's movement through a translation of her writings (after being defined by a Czech activist as "Karl Marx for women", no less!). Friedan's postscript concluded that "the women's movement and feminism are threatening to Communists", due to the fact of being a real mass movement for revolutionary change that could not be controlled. Friedan self-confidently stated: "I don't think any existing Communist model can give us a blueprint for the 'new yes', because all the Communist regimes are stuck far short of real equality for women, further from sex-role revolution than we are" (1977: 469-470).

While Friedan's observations pointed at the well-known pitfalls of state socialist gender politics, they were also overly generalizing and stereotypical.

6 When taking part in the Bucharest conference, Vida Tomšič argued for planned parenthood as a human right. The right to planned parenthood was also inscribed in the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, see later in this article.

They contributed to reinforce the idea that the interests of women and of the state in socialist countries were necessarily in opposition to each other, since the (socialist) state was seen as patriarchal per definition. According to this representation, any female leader in the socialist system appeared to be a token of her government, since she was acting against women's interests, including her own. This stereotype has been recently challenged by the scholarly literature mentioned in the introduction, and particularly by Raluca Popa, who demonstrated Romanian and Hungarian women's initiative during IWY preparations (2009), as well as the opposition of the National Council of Romanian Women to officially sanctioned abortion politics (2016). Accounts such as Friedan's contributed to make invisible socialist and communist women's agency in advancing women's emancipation in their own country, as well as transnational connections between women from the Second and the Third World that were expressed through bilateral agreements or through the Women's International Democratic Federation (Ghodsee 2012; 2014; Bonfiglioli 2012).

Promoting Socialism and Non-Alignment: Vida Tomšić and the Yugoslav IWY

The invisibility of state socialist delegates in the history of the UN Decade for Women is being reproduced to these days, as made clear by two panels organized during the 2011 Berkshire Conference on women's history on the legacy of the Mexico City conference. Beside notable U.S. activists who engaged in the Tribune, such as Mildred Persinger, Charlotte Bunch and Arvonne Fraser (Ghodsee 2014), only Devaki Jain from India and another participant from Bangladesh teaching at Columbia University, Rounaq Jahan, were present as international guests. Women from post-socialist Europe weren't included in the panel, but Indian scholar and development expert Devaki Jain recalled Yugoslav representative Vida Tomšić as a remarkable figure of the 1975 event. She was aware, she added, that Tomšić wasn't part of the Western feminist canon of feminist goddesses (Ghodsee 2014: 245). The lack of knowledge about the Yugoslav representative mentioned by Jain is apparent from the transcription of her intervention. In the transcript, Tomšić's name is misspelled, anglicized and eventually lost in translation:

And we did not perhaps mention enough about when you mention east and west, about the non-aligned movement. (...) I think the non-aligned movement gave a very interesting new political space to the women's movement, which was often not known even by us, and there was one woman called Rita [Thompson?] [*Vida Tomšić*] (...) an extraordinary feminist, you know (...) so she was a feminist from Yugoslavia. And she brought together a whole lot of us in a little center in Belgrade in order to enable us to bring the non-aligned movement idea into Nairobi (...) I think

we should really study much more and give more tribute to people like Vida who are not in our pantheon of goddesses. But I put her here [in her book *Women, Development and the UN*, 2005] because I think she is a very important goddess.⁷

The fact that Jain remembered Tomšič as a *feminist* is quite significant, and also paradoxical, since Tomšič would have strongly refused such identification, and repeatedly criticized both interwar and second wave feminist movements for separating women's inequality from social and economic exploitation. At the same time, as I have written elsewhere (Bonfiglioli 2016: 147), her speeches make clear that her vision of women's emancipation was far from instrumental, and was embedded within a global web of antifascist, anticolonial, and internationalist postwar women's networks. Tomšič's political activism and beliefs were deeply shaped by her pre-war and wartime engagement, and by the role in the introduction of women's equal rights and modern welfare institutions in post-war Yugoslavia. She was also marked by the specific experience of socialist self-management, which had shifted decision-making on economic and social policies to the local factories and communes, involving workers in factory-based political participation. The so-called "Yugoslav way to socialism" came about after Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Soviet bloc in 1948, which had also led to the expulsion (and consequent rehabilitation) of Yugoslav representatives by the Women's International Democratic Federation (Bonfiglioli 2012; 2014). Since the late 1940s, while maintaining critical distance towards the WIDE, Yugoslav women's organizations had established contacts with Western organizations, mainly Scandinavian and Italian, and later with women's organization from Asia, Africa and the Middle East, as a result of Yugoslavia's foreign politics of Non-Alignment.

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The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was inaugurated by the 1955 Bandung African-Asian Conference, which represented an attempt to reunite newly decolonized countries. Yugoslavia joined this alliance with the Brioni meeting of 1956 between Tito, Nasser and Nehru, and with the Belgrade of the Heads of State of Government of Non-Aligned Countries in 1961. The NAM stressed the principles of *détente*, national sovereignty against great powers' hegemony and more equal relations in the international arena (Mates 1972). Certainly, imperialism did not end with Bandung, and newly appointed chiefs of state reproduced a pedagogical style of politics which emphasized catching up with Western modernity through development and modernization (Chakrabarty 2010). However, this discourse of national sovereignty and international equality opened up

7 "Generations of Change" "The United Nations International Women's Conferences" Panel, Berkshire Conference on the History of Women, June 2011. Panel 1 and 2 are available in the online database *Women's and Social Movements, International*.

possibilities for women's activism and transnational cooperation (Jain and Chacko 2009).

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In February 1958, an Asian-African Conference on Women was held in Colombo, Indonesia, affiliating twenty-nine women's organizations from the countries that took part in the Bandung conference. Another Afro-Asian Women's Solidarity Conference followed in Cairo in 1961. As Bier (2010: 150) argues in her piece about Egyptian women's organizations after Bandung, "patterns of global feminism (...) shifted in accordance with the dramatic political changes that occurred during the early cold war and postcolonial periods. But these shifts were not mere reflections of geopolitical transitions then current. Rather, the role of "Third World" women and their organizations must be understood as active and therefore vital in the shaping of these new and evolving global orders". Later on, in response to the UN mobilization on the International Women's Year, NAM conferences on the role of women held in Baghdad (1979), New Delhi (1985) and Havana (1991) were crucial in shaping cooperation among women from the global South. As Devaki Jain (2005:83) argues, the New Delhi conference served as a fundamental preparation to the UN world conference on women held in Nairobi in the same year, with Tomšič acting as a spokesperson of the NAM. According to Jain, "the NAM movement and gatherings offered a space where the women from these former colonies could reassert the standpoint that they were active agents in their nations, contributors to their country's progress, not just consumers of social services".

The emphasis on women's active participation in politics and institutional building was a constant feature of Vida Tomšič's contributions to UN and NAM expert meetings and conferences. Tomšič represented Yugoslavia in the Social Development Commission of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (1960–1963; 1971–1974) and chaired the Commission in 1963 (Jeraj 2006:577). She also had an important role in the Board of Trustees of INSTRAW, the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women set up in 1976. Tomšič supported women's abortion and contraception rights, and was a prominent member of the International Federation for Family Planning (IFFP). Women's (and men's) right to freely decide on childbirth was inscribed in the Yugoslav Constitution in 1974 (Jeraj 2006:578). That same year, during a speech given at a UN Expert Group Meeting on Social Welfare and Family Planning held in New York, Tomšič stated:

From this forum we should insist on a sustained effort to abolish every kind of discrimination between people and nations, be the discrimination racial, national, social or sexual. We should insist on new relations between people and between nations. Planned parenthood should be promoted as a human right closely related to and dependent on the promotion of other human

rights (...) The emancipation of women lifts a very serious obstacle from the road to progress, not only their own but that of the entire society.⁸

During the Mexico City Conference of 1975, Tomšič's position, therefore, was in line with the reflections of most delegations from the global South. Her vision of women's equality being intimately connected to transformations in social and geopolitical relations, however, as well as her faith in state-led modernization, was implicitly challenged by the new grassroots political paradigm brought about by second wave Western feminist movements (which in turn influenced the emerging new generation of Yugoslav feminists and their first conference three years later, see Bonfiglioli 2011).

Vida Tomšič's official discourse in Mexico City repeatedly connected the issue of women's emancipation to broader social and geopolitical inequalities. Tomšič started her speech by recalling a forgotten genealogy of women's activism, namely the women who had fought in socialist revolutions and in national liberation movement in the twentieth century, including "soldaderas" in Mexico (those who ended up making the coffee according to the French official representative). She then stressed the connection between women's emancipation, development and new economic relations, relating it to the requests of the NAM movement and recalling the struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism in South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Rhodesia and Mozambique, and the right to a state of Palestinians. A survivor of Fascist jails, where she lost her first husband, Tomšič also warned against the resurgence of fascist regimes, and reminded the audience that "fascism deeply humiliated the woman and abused her role as wife and mother" and caused "the most terrible suffering of millions during Second World War", so that it was necessary to take action against any possible fascist revival, thirty years after 1945.⁹

Tomšič then discussed the Yugoslav context, the liberation war, and her distancing from the pre-war feminist movement which, in her view,

limited itself to claim certain legislative correctives for women only, neglecting the exploitation of urban and country working people and discrimination based on national origin of different nations in Yugoslavia. Neither then nor now we could accept the view that women represent a unique social structure, and that they have to fight men for the division of rights and power but leaving untouched the whole system of exploitation.

8 "Contribution of women to the formulation and implementation of national and international policies relating especially to population and development", 19.4.1974, Vida Tomšič collection, AS 1413, box 36, The Archives of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana. Original in English.

9 Statement by Vida Tomšič, Head of the Yugoslav Delegation, Mexico City, June 23, 1975, Vida Tomšič collection, AS 1413, box 191 (original in English). Similar statements emphasizing anti-imperialist solidarity and anti-fascism were voiced at the 7th WIDF Congress held in East Berlin in the same year.

According to Tomšič, both men and women had instead to struggle for the revolutionary transformation of the system and for a new division of labour which would allow women to achieve a better social position on the basis of work, and not of her family status or property. The politician recalled the post-war mass mobilization against illiteracy and for industrialization, and the role of women in self-managing bodies. She talked explicitly of the need for “accelerated development”, claiming that “lasting prospects for women lie in their direct inclusion in the social economy, as workers, professionals or agricultural producers”. Motherhood, she argued, could be reconciled with women’s work through social services and through freedom of choice in the reproductive realm. She explained that she saw work as “a primary creative need of every individual and not as a necessary evil”, and that in the Yugoslav system the state was no longer conceived as a “protective power over the citizen” but rather as “an instrument in the hands of working people to protect the constitutional order”.¹⁰ Against Whitaker’s claim that communist countries’ delegates “complacently abstained from the revolutions of both women and the poor”, Tomšič showed a strong belief in the interrelatedness of both social and gender justice. Her talk was also an explicit response to the emergence of feminist discourse in the West, a discourse that was highly critical of socialist regimes’ official policies of women’s emancipation through welfare and labour. During the International Women’s Year of 1975, Yugoslav authorities were keen to stress the improvements in women’s conditions occurred between 1945 and 1975, and to emphasize the specificity of the Yugoslav “national way to socialism” in gender terms.

Another document from that time, issued by the Tanjug official press agency, claimed that “There is no ‘Women’s Lib’ movement in Yugoslavia fighting for women’s rights, as it is the fashion in many countries today. This, of course, does not mean that Yugoslav women have achieved everything in terms of their status in society and the home to make them entirely equal to men”. Despite women’s advancements in education and labour participation, the report admitted that many families continued to be strictly patriarchal, especially in rural and underdeveloped areas. The report also conceded that women’s increased literacy and work participation meant an increase in the double burden in the immediate postwar year: “husbands could not be changed overnight” and the state had limited resources for welfare services. While new canteens and childcare facilities had been built, and while some husbands started to help, often “it is the working mother who remains the one primarily responsible for looking after the children, for attending to cooking and housekeeping”. The backwardness of the region made the process of family transformation “neither easy of problem-free”, but the modernization of infrastructure, women’s

10 Ibidem.

labour participation, equal education and planned parenthood were opening up new opportunities.¹¹

The report concluded that Yugoslav women's emancipation could not be separated from the development of society as a whole, and that Yugoslav women's "aspirations and dreams" coincided with those of "the Yugoslav socialist and non-aligned society", based on equality regardless of national identity, religious convictions and sex. Yugoslav women were defined as "modern" for having assumed their responsibilities and burdens, "capably and with charm, with dignity and serenity".¹² Despite its propagandistic tone on the absolute coincidence between women's and state aspirations (which is somehow mirroring Western feminists' insistence on their absolute separation), the report appeared to be fairly balanced when it came to assessing the challenges presented by gendered modernization in the region, also highlighting state feminists' fear of a backlash in gender relations. While state socialist regimes are often disqualified *a posteriori* on the basis of women's "double burden", sources from the time show that Yugoslav authorities were very much aware of the problem and of its complex rootedness in patriarchal culture, rapid industrialization and unevenly developed welfare institutions.

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The Tanjug' press release, as well as Tomšič's speech, reflect Yugoslav authorities' utopian faith in institutional building and in the simultaneous "withering away" of the Yugoslav state (as opposed to Soviet centralism). This vision, as highlighted by various authors, eventually became a source of fragmentation leading to the Yugoslav Wars (Jović 2009), and was unable to solve social inequalities in its mediation with global and local market forces (Archer, Duda and Stubbs, 2016). When read from a contemporary perspective, however, Tomšič's emphasis on the nexus between women's emancipation, labour and global development appears as a particularly poignant reminder of the gradual vanishing of similar debates in the last forty years. Feminist critiques of neo-liberal capitalism have generally abandoned systemic aspiration to social change (Fraser 2013), while the politics of international gender mainstreaming and legal equality did not solve the gendered division of labour in the public and private sphere, nor structural violence against women on a global scale. In post-Yugoslav states, in turn, the re-traditionalisation of gender relations during the process of post-socialist transition was related not only to the emerging nationalist rhetoric, but also to the widespread expulsion of women from industrial jobs (Bonfiglioli 2014). The post-Cold War invisibility of the "working class" as a political subject has been highly damaging for both genders,

11 "The status of women in Yugoslavia", signed by Gordana Gračić (?), Tanjug, June 1975, Vida Tomšič collection, AS 1413, box 191, The Archives of the Republic of Slovenia, Ljubljana. Original in English.

12 Ibidem.

while neo-liberal mantras such as Thatcher's *There is no alternative* and Fukuyama's *end of history* are cracking under the weight of imperialist military interventions, proxy wars, right-wing populism, precarious labour, religious fanaticism and climate change – not to mention the current legitimacy crisis of the European Union. The nexus between women's emancipation, geopolitics and global development highlighted during the Mexico City conference by women from socialist and postcolonial countries, therefore, merits to be re-discussed, in order not to undermine women's agency when expressed outside a Western liberal or radical feminist framework.

Instead of a conclusion

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A new wave of scholarship has been recently unravelling the question of women's agency under state socialism in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, highlighting the transnational character of Cold War discussions over women's rights (Bonfiglioli 2012; Donert 2013; Ghit 2016). Critical of such perspectives, U.S. philosopher Nanette Funk singled out nine "Revisionist Feminist Scholars" (2014; 2015), arguing that their empirical research "did not establish women's agency throughout the whole period of 1945-1989", and that their claims on women's agency were "overstated and vague". In both interventions, Funk proceeded to assess the different degrees and forms of agency (or the lack of it) that could be attributed to state socialist women's organizations, fundamentally presupposing a separation between the interests of women and the interests of the (repressive) socialist state. Her argument already generated a wide array of critical responses (Bonfiglioli 2016; Daskalova 2016; De Haan 2016; De Haan, et. al. 2016; Ghodsee 2015). As Francisca De Haan noted (2016: 104), "perhaps the most basic problem with Funk's article is that she does not recognize the partiality of her own perspective and instead assumes that she can prescribe *the* right interpretation of the history of state-socialist women's organizations". In a follow-up answer to Kristen Ghodsee, who argued that state repression also affected left-wing women's organizations in the United States in the 1950s, Funk (2016: 354) indeed reinstated that the history of anti-communism in U.S. women's organizations had no relation with her stance on state socialist organizations in Eastern Europe – a claim that deserves to be problematized further in view of the impact of Cold War legacies on Western feminist knowledge production.

Transnational Cold War debates held during the Mexico City conference highlight the fundamental and contested intersection between political and social rights in the framing of women's citizenship, and the simultaneous transformation of gender regimes, nation-based citizenship regimes, and international geopolitics. Anti-imperialist, Non-Aligned and socialist genealogies of women's activism remind us of the competition and interdependency

between capitalist and socialist modes of development in the Cold War era, which in turn shaped transnational discussions on women's emancipation between the former West, East and Third World. The multiple voices at the 1975 Mexico City conference make clear that women's agency took different forms, which included both the refusal and the acceptance of women's activism within existing national and international institutions. A geopolitical, intersectional awareness is thus fundamental to feminist knowledge production, as it helps us to problematize epistemic categories inherited from the Cold War when establishing definitions and norms of feminist and women's agency, past and present.

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Chiara Bonfiglioli

Prva svetska UN konferencija o ženama (1975) kao hladnoratovski susret: vraćanje antiimperijalističkim, nesvrstanim i socijalističkim genealogijama

Sažetak

Ovaj ogled se uključuje u aktualne rasprave o ženskom transnacionalizmu i moći delovanja, razmatrajući okolnosti u kojima se održala prva konferencija u okviru UN dekade žena, održane u Meksiko Sijtu 1975. godine, s posebnim osvrtom na specifični kontekst hladnoratovske geopolitike. Osluškajući različite feminističke i aktivističke glasove, s naglaskom na manje vidljivim antiimperijalističkim, nesvrstanim i socijalističkim genealogijama ženskog aktivizma, ogled se zalaže za preispitivanje zapadne paradigme feminističke proizvodnje znanja. Reč je o pokušaju da se obuhvate višestruke forme ženske političke moći delovanja, koje se ne mogu izraziti liberalnom koncepcijom individualne autonomije žena od države. Poređenjem shvatanja koja su tokom konferencije iznele Beti Fridan i Vida Tomšič, u tekstu se pokazuje da je politička moć delovanja žena tokom Hladnog rata imala različite forme, koje su obuhvatale i odbijanje i prihvatanje ženskog aktivizma u postojećim nacionalnim i međunarodnim institucijama.

Ključne reči: Meksiko Siti, Dekada žena Ujedinjenih nacija, Hladni rat, moć delovanja, feminizam, državni socijalizam, Nesvrstani, Beti Fridan, Vida Tomšič

CONCEPTUALIZING CAPITALISM:
SEMINAR WITH GEOFFREY HODGSON
KONCEPTUALIZOVANJE KAPITALIZMA:
SEMINAR SA DŽOFRI HODŽSONOM

II

Edited by Marjan Ivković

Geoffrey Hodgson

Introductory Remarks

Thank you very much for inviting me. I'm honoured by your kind invitation and for devoting time to my 2015 book. I hope we can have a useful discussion and all learn from this. As an introduction I will focus on a couple of ideas, just to start the discussion going. My book grew out of my growing conviction, which dates back several decades, that standard economics had an inadequate understanding of property, markets, and the nature of capitalism. It has failed to define or understand these key institutions adequately.

I put a lot of pieces together to make the argument in the book. I'll focus, for this introduction, on just two basic components. I refer to the concepts of property and capital.

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Property is a foundational concept, which economists mention all the time. Many economists stress the importance of 'secure property rights'. But on closer examination their nature and meaning is problematic. For example, if you consider the concept of property in the so-called 'economics of property rights', you find it's not about property as we ordinarily understand it.

Consider the works of Armen Alchian, Yoram Barzel and several other authors in this area. For example, Alchian (1977, p. 238) defined a 'property right' as the probability that a decision over use will be effective. Barzel (1994, p. 394) defined property as 'an individual's net valuation, in expected terms, of the ability to directly consume the services of the asset, or to consume it indirectly through exchange.' With some terminological differences, they basically define property as control. So something is my property if I control it.

Strikingly, Marxism also has a control-based definition of property. Marxists stress control over the means of production. Karl Marx's (1975, p. 351) notion of property was revealed in 1844 in one of his many discussions of 'private property', where he argued that 'an object is only *ours* when we have it – ... when we directly possess, eat, drink, wear, inhabit it, etc., – in short, when we *use* it.' A capitalist system is defined in Marxism as the one in which the capitalist class controls the means of production. There is no notion of legal or other rights in the 'base' of the system. Law and rights are consigned to the 'superstructure'.

Consequently, this same identification of property with control is found among Marxists (who wish to abolish private property) and some free-market libertarians (who wish to secure it). Generally missing here is the role of law.

The legal theory on property, which goes back to the Romans, tells us that there are different aspects to property. One of those aspects concerns control, or control rights, called *usus* rights. *Usus fructus* rights are additional rights to control or use the fruits of property. A typical peasant in China today, with the *usus* right to use a plot of land, also has *usus fructus* rights, which are the rights to use the things that grow on that land and sell them. But the peasant does not have another property right – the right to sell or mortgage the land itself. This is because the local collective retains that property right.

In addition to *usus* and *usus fructus* rights, there are several aspects of property in legal theory, including the possible right to sell (or alienate), and the possible right to destroy or degrade (Honoré 1961). If you rent an apartment in Belgrade, the contract will give you the right to use the apartment, but not to destroy it. If you destroy the apartment, the landlord will sue you in a court of law.

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So contracts specify different kinds of rights. But much of this nuance is absent from the economics of property rights, basically because they are not primarily concerned about law. In addition, the vital concept of rights is only partially developed in the economics of property rights. In legal theory a right is often seen as an entitlement that some legitimate political or legal authority has granted or would endorse.

It is quite clear that in modern societies we have institutions for devolving rights, and for deciding ‘this is your property’. For example, if I buy something in a supermarket, then I have a receipt, which is legal evidence for my right to the item that I bought. Disputes over ownership can be tested in courts.

When it comes to land or housing, it is often important to have some kind of registry or other record of rights (Arruñada 2012). Different countries do this in different ways: some have national land registries, other countries rely on the accumulation of recorded contracts. In France there are *notaires*, who are state employees who note the sales of houses or pieces of land, and their registrations of these transactions become the official justifications of property rights, rather than using a centralized registry. In much of the US they do not use land registries or the equivalent of a *notaire*, so buyers are advised to take out insurance that the claim to title of the land is valid. In Britain, there is a centralized registry of land. So property is a complex thing, and it’s not simply about control. Legal right or title is also important, and this is downplayed in the economics of property rights.

Property has an important connection with finance. Once we establish the importance of legal title, we can understand how some property – particularly buildings and land – can be used as collateral to obtain loans from banks or other financial institutions. Collateralizable property is extremely important for capitalism (Pipes 1999, De Soto 2000, Steiger 2008, Heinsohn

and Steiger 2013). It is part of the structure of debt that makes the system work. This feature is downplayed in an analysis of property that focuses principally on control.

Law also relates to the matter of motivation. Why do we obey the law? For a standard economist, the answer is simple: we obey the law to maximize our utility. So the ‘economics of crime’ (Becker 1968) suggests that whether or not we commit a crime depends on estimating the probability of being caught stealing, estimating the disutility of being convicted for that theft, and estimating the expected utility of getting off scot-free with the thing we’ve stolen. It is simply a utilitarian calculus: we act rationally in the standard economic sense of maximizing expected utility.

In reality, in some cases, like speeding on highways, people do try to estimate the probability of being caught. But in many other cases we obey the law because we believe it is the morally right thing to do (Tyler 1990, Hodgson 2013, 2015b). We do not refrain from armed robbery because we worry about the risk of being caught, despite the possibility that the haul could make us rich. We generally avoid such acts because we believe them to be morally wrong.

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Moral motivation is very important to understand why people obey the law. There’s lots of evidence on why moral commitments are important, from interviews and experiments. As a result, the apparently simple question of property opens up a panorama of issues spanning multiple disciplines: philosophy (what do we mean by rights?), law (what do we mean by law?), and psychology (why are we motivated to follow the rules?). Understanding these things involves a long journey across several disciplines (Hodgson 2013).

Property is essentially relational, it is not a thing. But economists since Adam Smith have treated the economy as a physical entity, like a machine. It’s understandable why Smith thought that way. He was inspired by Newton and modern Enlightenment science. There were amazing breakthroughs in physics and other sciences, advancing our understanding of the universe and the physical world around us, and capturing everything in a few basic laws or principles.

Other economists, including Marx and most other nineteenth-century economists, followed Smith in that respect. By contrast, I suggest that the economy is much about relations and structures, and about the gathering, storing, replication, communication and interpretation of information. Property is basically about, claims concerning rights, which are supported by social relations and institutions. In particular we need a legal system to process that information, to record it, and to deal with disputes.

Austrian economists such as Friedrich Hayek (1948) rightly stressed the role of information and knowledge, and the complexity of economic systems.

But I differ with Hayek on the conception of law. Hayek saw all custom as law. Hence underestimated the distinctive nature of law when enacted and enforced by state institutions. For example, as I argue above, property rights are authenticated by the state. Recognition of the legitimacy of the state is extremely important for obeying the law or understanding the moral force of law. Hayek was right about the economy being an information system, with pervasive uncertainty and agents struggling with limited information. But the Austrians are generally wrong in diminishing the central role of the state in this process in modern societies.

548 This leads me to the second concept, which is capital. Consider the way economists and sociologists use the term capital, and compare with the usage by ordinary people on the street. For many economists and sociologists, ‘capital’ is a name to describe any useful thing or state of affairs – anything that helps to create wealth, or indeed anything else. By contrast, ordinary people refer to capital as a stock of money, or an asset with a collateralizable money-value (Hodgson 2014, 2015a). This same ‘ordinary’ meaning is used by accountants.

One of the elements associated with the rise of capitalism was the development of accounting. Max Weber (1927) noted how double-entry bookkeeping and systematic accounting became important, particularly when companies started to grow and transcended the family unit. Accountants understand capital as part of the balance sheet. A firm’s capital, for an accountant, is a set of legally owned assets, which can be used as collateral. Such assets must be saleable. It could be a physical asset, like a building, or something else owned, like a patent. Hence property can be tangible or intangible. It all goes onto the firm’s balance sheet.

If you go to any private business in Belgrade and say, ‘can you show me how much capital this firm has’, they’ll show you a balance sheet with a list of tangible or intangible assets. If that firm goes to the bank to borrow money, the bank will then ask ‘how much capital have you got as collateral?’ With a mortgage, you sign a contract which says that the bank can seize that property if you default on loan repayment.

Fernando De Soto (2000) argued in his book *The Mystery of Capital*, that one of the problems of economic development is the lack of capitalizable assets. Resources may be plentiful, but legally verifiable ownership is often unclear. In South America, much land is squatted upon by slum dwellers, but they have no legal title to that property so they have difficulty borrowing money, to set up small businesses or whatever. They have control of some resources, but they don’t have any *capital*, in the sense of registered property which they can use to borrow money and invest in businesses. They control the land but they do not own it legally. De Soto identified the need to register that property as a legal right.

While Adam Smith understood the role of moral motivation, he began to pervert the meaning of capital for economists. Smith saw capital as physical stuff or wealth. He also treated labour as capital. But he did not invent the term 'human capital'. This first appeared in the 1842, incidentally, in the context of slavery (Harris 1842). A slave is human capital: it is a collateralizable piece of property. In his book *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, Thomas Piketty (2014) pointed out that one of the biggest liquidations of capital in history was the emancipation of slaves in the United States during the Civil War. Their transition from being slaves to wage labourers (even if it made them no better off) mean they could no longer be used as collateral.

This important difference between slavery and wage labour is masked by the commonplace use of the term human capital by economists and sociologists. The misuse of language has subverted our thinking. It has undermined the proper meaning of capital that is used by ordinary businesses. To make it worse, you have 'social capital', or even 'erotic capital' (Bourdieu 1986, Hakim 2011). If you're George Clooney, then clearly you have oodles of erotic capital, because you have lots of sexual allure. Capital then becomes any form of asset, any form of wealth, for good or ill. This is a complete dilution and perversion of meaning. Capital as a term has become totally abused by a combined effort of economists and sociologists.

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Joseph Schumpeter argued that economists were abusing the concept of capital. Schumpeter (1954, pp. 322-3) insisted that the term *capital* should be applied to financial assets alone: 'What a mass of confused, futile, and downright silly controversies it would have saved us, if economists had had the sense to stick to those monetary and accounting meanings of the term instead of trying to "deepen" them!' Thorstein Veblen and Max Weber said something similar (Hodgson 2014, 2015a). The current, unfortunate and overly-broad usage of the word is unlikely to change, but we have to put a very strong warning sign whenever we see the term 'capital' – and particularly terms like 'social capital' – and appreciate that these abuses of meaning are helping us to *misunderstand* what capitalism is.

Capitalism is a monetizable system, working on money and debt. By treating capital as a physical thing, or applying it to varied assets such as good looks or skills, we are degrading its meaning. We have to switch the metaphor away from the economy as a machine, where the economy is mainly about the control of forces and material things. Instead, what the economy is doing (through its legal system, through markets, through its production system) is processing information - technological information, legal information, financial information. Switching the metaphor, using information-processing tools and information science, to help us understand how the economy works, would be a good strategic move for an economic or a sociological theorist. Words change the way we think about the world. We should be very careful how we use them.

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Seminar on Geoffrey Hodgson's *Conceptualizing Capitalism*

Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory,
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Jovan Babić

It's been a great pleasure to hear you in person after reading your voluminous and very rich book. What you just said about property is convincing me that what I am going to say might also be relevant in a way. What I thought as putting as provocation of a kind was a projection of a possible future of capitalism in context of the growth of economy based in fast development of new technologies. But before making a few remarks on this issue, let me make just one comment regarding a detail in your book. On page 8 you have a quote from Dani Rodrick: "Markets work best not when states are weakest, but when they are strong." There is a widespread prejudice that markets and state are opposing each other contained in the narrative of (over)regulation and its justification. In a strange way this reminds me on Milton Friedman's claim that the only social responsibility of business is to increase its profit. However, Friedman has a *caveat* there (which usually would pass unnoticed): this (i. e. increasing the profit, which is the business of business) is *possible* only within a frame of what he called "the rules of the game", on condition that such rules really exist, and they exist only if they are efficiently applied. Although Friedman has a specific characterization of what the rules of the game are ("open and free competition without deception and fraud"), it is far from clear that rules are that simple. First, free competition is more a normative ideal than a reality and if markets are dependent on something which itself depend on many other conditions. The rules of the game can be very different and if they are not of a high quality the game, be it market or something which is only part of it, would be miserable. The reason why "rules of the game" are important is that they give us predictability making the whole social life, not only economy, to be different accordingly. But in the end the rules will determine which profit is legitimate and which is not. This opens a wide range of possibilities regarding the articulation of the scope of possible distributions and redistributions of wealth. Distribution presupposes that there is enough to be distributed, but the rest is the matter of those rules. If "capitalism" might be "saved" by adequate changes of these rules is the issue I will come to back shortly.

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Yesterday in your lecture you said that usage of the term "capitalism" is not very illuminating. The word "capitalism" is usually used as an *ideologem*,

not as a real concept capable to explain something in social reality. You also said, speaking on predictability, that there are many kind of social rules that are not laws but still participate in shaping what the social and economic reality would be there. I would add moral rules as well, although they do not have enforceability (as both social and legal rules do). If the “rules of the game” contain also moral rules they would be, or at least I am inclined to think so, more stable, give more predictability and more consent and enable better economy including bigger profits and wider and more efficient distribution and redistribution (e. g. through taxes). But however wide and complex the redistribution might be it might still be “capitalism” if the markets are free and open to maximization of profit accumulation.

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Another point to your lecture. Your Figure 1 is very intriguing, that's where your definition of capitalism resides. Let me just shorten it – in that Figure you take that capitalism is a historical phase in the development of the economy, becoming a reality somewhere in the 18th century. If this is so than capitalism is not equivalent to market economy as such, but is a very specific historical phase in the development of social life, and, if I understood you well, starts at a certain level of the GDP. We can raise then the following question: Does it mean that, at a certain different level of GDP, we will go out of capitalism as the specific historical phase, and what does this mean? Is that point near to us in time, are we in the process of leaving capitalism, and where are we heading?

In your mentioning slavery, you said that one of the biggest liquidations of capital was freeing of slaves in the US. But despite that, or as a consequence of that, we had a huge growth of the economy. It's clear what you mean by “slavery”. It's political slavery. But in the context of the changes we face in economy could we take another angle and, starting from something that we can take as an axiom – that sovereignty of buyers is premise of free market – we can speak of another kind of slavery. Sovereignty of buyers implies real freedom to abstain from buying, you are not enforced to buy, you buy from desire not out to need. Although a significant part of economy is still based in satisfying needs (food, shelter, basic clothing etc.), more and more of it is directed to satisfying desires. In that sense economy is becoming more and more “free” (I exclude such “enforcing powers” as prestige, fashion, all such that are subject to constant changes). Couldn't we imagine that at a certain point of economic progress and accumulation of wealth the part of economy dealing with needs was separated from the other part, the part dealing with desires, so that satisfying needs be secured independently of the market, making the market to be the place for transactions to satisfy desires? We still might be the slaves of our desires and passions, but in that case our condition to be “slaves” would be our private matter. The only condition to realize this state of affairs is to make satisfying needs secured independently from markets and their laws. In such a

scenario markets would become really and literary free: buying, and working would cease to be matter of necessity. The nature of work would change.

Would such a condition still be “capitalism”? There are still all the features that characterize capitalism now: ownership over opportunities to work, inequality, potential unemployment etc. Perhaps there wouldn’t exist “capitalists” any longer, but decision-making power would be distributed very unequally (implying the “wastefulness of inequality”, as many opportunities wouldn’t ever be realized). With satisfying all existing needs (which might be the matter of robot-based production, or just a matter of taxation-based redistribution as they are trying to do it now in Finland and Switzerland) we still might be slaves of passions and desires, and, as a kind of *lumpenproletariat*, be at the disposal for part-time work, on-call work, working thus becoming the instrument to obtain happiness without freedom which would become jus an illusion. We can wonder if such conceived lumpenproletariat will be satisfied with happiness without freedom, or perhaps they will resist if they are, e. g., unemployed, or, although they have all their needs satisfied, they don’t starve, don’t die of hunger, they still have no chance to satisfy their desires?

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Alpar Losoncz

This book is dealing with a wide spectrum subject, and in the past, the most important representatives of the social sciences, like Schumpeter and Max Weber used to examine this subject. It is a misbelief that Karl Marx was determined to study capitalism, because this term, capitalism, as a substantive, can hardly be found in this work. By the end of the 80s, the great majority believed, ideologically, that this term was exhausted, and that it had to be replaced with some indicators related to the market. And it is no coincidence that, several times in this book, you warn us about the market expansion, and that private ownership should not be identified with capitalism. And your scrupulous analysis of the genesis of capitalism, and the confrontation with various interpretations of capitalism should be viewed in this respect. So with much analysis it is evident that heterodox economists find it more convenient to use substantive capitalism, at least, they use it more frequently when compared to orthodox economists who mostly avoid using the term capitalism.

And, reading your books about utopia, Marx, Sraffa, etc, it is evident that your interest in capitalism, or as you say, the understanding of capitalism, is far from conjectural, and it originates from your orientation which combines the insights of institutionalism and the theory of evolution. And you are one of the most significant representatives of the revitalization of institutionalism, especially in Europe. Which, unlike the new institutional economics, implies a criticism of heterodoxy. Let me just mention that I’ve

written a long review of your book in the journal *Panoeconomicus* in English, published a few days ago. And I would not repeat the things emphasized there. I will refer only to the phenomenon which is important for me – coercion. I would like to address this question here for the simple reason that it represents a common thread for different orientations, but is naturally opposed to heterogeneous representations, because I'm convinced that coercion belongs to the immanent structure of capitalism. Of course, this will be a very irresponsible sketch, with arbitrarily selected examples.

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Frist, the problem of coercion plays a significant role in old American institutionalism. There's a very clear connection between the treatment of power by Thorstein Veblen and coercion, for example, in his analysis of coercion of popular habits of thought. And to keep to the theme, he demonstrates the genesis of naturality in classical economics, and displays the convergence of reality and naturality (natural prices, Ricardo's natural wage) in the perspective of coercion. As where he speaks of natural law as coercive surveillance over the course of events – I quoted him. And John Commons has clearly emphasized the distinction between the private and social coercion. If I remember, this is happening in his famous shoemaker example. And in the sociological view of sovereignty, which urges a processual view of the state and anticipates, again to quote him, the injunction of order into coercion. Moreover, he characterizes (unclear) as a matter of degree of coercion. And Commons, who has denied that he has ever been pacifist, postulates that coercion is a basic precondition for the overcoming of evil in society. But probably as a writer who has analyzed Commons' work, you know this much better than me.

I could also refer to Alfred Marshall, who is of course not strictly in the trajectory of institutionalism, but is of great importance in your book, especially concerning the incomplete market. In *Principles* he discusses the market situation of the unskilled worker, in the context of cumulative market disadvantages, and he talks about the making of this unskilled type of work scarce and therefore, as he says, 'dear'. And to make a great leap into the contemporaneity, the late Warren Samuels robustly situates the coercion deeply into the market processes, denoting the economic processes as police-mediated. But also he puts us in the perspective of mutual coercion. For, in fact, this fact of mutual coercion is deeply rooted in the market, and such categories as prices and costs are characterized by institutional distribution of scarcity through mutual coercion. This could maybe be reconnected at least partially to Hegel's social philosophy. In modernity there is the expansion of freedom, but at the same time the spreading out of the form of extreme interdependencies. In accordance with Samuels' argumentation, the price and costs are, at least to some extent, a function of institutionalized mutual coercion embedded in the

market. So there is a very simple point – it seems that institutionalisms of different sorts, different orientations have a very close connection to the articulation of coercion. And the crucial explanations are based on the theoretical evocation of coercion.

But the libertarians and pro-market liberals, who are a frequent item of your critic, are interested in the explication of coercion as well. For example, we remember that Hayek interpreted the links between individualism and order, analogously with the theorists of self-organization who take into account the market and organizations as elements of order, coercion and freedom, puts together the configuration of subjectivity, especially into the configuration of will, thoughts and plans. Only, as a matter of fact, Hayek delineates the subjective horizon of coercion, that undermines the coherent plan of the individuals, and with Hayek we have the classical problem of the relationship between voluntariness and coercion, and the problem of forcing, treats and choice, within the framework of coercion. And, to go further, Marxism, which is the other main critical moment in your argumentation, is deeply interested in the development of the meaning of coercion. Marxists make a distinction between direct and indirect coercion, concerning the reproduction of capitalism as a system of self-perpetuating contradiction. They are involved in the discussion about the appropriateness of the persistence of the extra-economic coercion, identifying the traces and forms of forced labour, human trafficking, the captive migrant labourers, child labour. They are confronted with the multi-faceted reality of neo-liberalized capitalism.

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And this revitalizes the old issues of forced labour and the old issues of coercive contracts, this strange couplet between contract and forcing. That is of course a very difficult theoretical topic. Maybe different types of forced labour may be interpreted through your account of the impure principle, for the reason that neoliberal capitalism produces multidimensional forms of impurity within capitalism. A lot of modalities of forced labour are not to be reduced to free contract and wage labour. And let us not forget the field of law, the legal-economic nexus that is of substantial importance in your book. We know the old Marxist statement, that between equal rights, the force decides. And this statement is without doubt associated with the issue of coercion, in fact it anticipates the strange couplet between equality and coercion, but maybe it could through light on the expansion of inequality today. Of course, your orientation is directed by the logic of legal institutionalism, but the Marxist trajectory is dealing with the form of law. So, coming to the end, it is clear that in your concept of legal institutionalism, enforcement plays a crucial role. But is there a non-contingent relationship between coercion and capitalism in general? What is the relationship between capitalism and the non-legal type of coercion?

Marjan Ivković

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I have two questions. One is more general, the other more specific. I'll start with the more specific one, which relates to the previous comment, and it has to do with your crucial distinction of capitalism as an objective socio-economic system on the one hand, and what you call capitalism as a set of ideas, on the other hand. The question is how distinction relates to your crucial premise that the rule of law and the system of political freedoms is the most important precondition for a successful functioning of capitalism. So, you argue that the introduction of positive law, a system that restrains arbitrary power, is important for the functioning of capitalism because capitalism is primarily a system of legally codified rules, property, markets, contracts, money. Now, the rule of law also presumes the existence of a political system based on procedures and universalist norms codified in the constitution such as a parliamentary democracy. And, in your lecture yesterday, you reiterated this point that there is good reason to believe that a system characterized by political freedoms has proven to be the most favourable setting for capitalism.

You make the distinction between capitalism as an objective socioeconomic system, whose functioning is often not completely comprehensible to social actors, on the one hand, and capitalism as a set of ideas on the other – such as neoliberal ideology – which does not capture the complexity of capitalism also as you said today in the introduction. Many people who are arguing normatively in favour of capitalism don't quite understand what they are arguing for. And you said that these two are often conflated, so that in our discussions of capitalism we conflate the objective and the subjective. However, it seems to me that in the complex empirical reality there is an intertwining of these two levels, that brings this point of political freedom into question. It seems to me that the survival of capitalism as an objective system in many historical contexts depends on the actions of social actors – let's say the political elite that is in power at a given moment – who endorse the ideology of capitalism. So, for example, imagine a situation in which there is a threat of anti-capitalist political actors coming to power through regular elections and abolishing capitalism as an objective entity, on the basis of an anti-capitalist ideology which, once again, doesn't capture the complexity of the objective system, and these actors want to replace capitalism with another kind of system, say socialism, which will once again be a very different reality from the kind of ideology they are endorsing.

So, the survival of capitalism as an objective entity in this case depends on a political elite which endorses subjective capitalism, establishing an authoritarian order to preserve objective capitalism. And there are numerous historical examples – Chile in 1973, Spain after the Civil War, Greece, but also such societies as South Korea and Taiwan where there was an external

threat of anti-capitalism. Doesn't this historical condition, which seems to me has existed throughout the 20th century and has persisted into the 21st, run counter to the general theoretical claim that democracy and the rule of law are favorable to capitalism? We can easily imagine a scenario in which this threat of the abolishment of objective capitalism becomes permanent, and requires permanent coercion by a political elite which endorses neoliberalism in order to preserve objective capitalism even though they don't quite know what they are preserving. Doesn't it seem that today much of the developed world already has a trend towards this long-term erosion of the rule of law, exemplified by the war on terror, and also of the erosion of democracy exemplified by Donald Trump in the US, while objective capitalism continues more or less unchanged?

The more general question – could you clarify a bit the relationship of your legal-institutionalist perspective in social-theoretical terms in relation to the widespread notion in social theory that capitalist economy is a sphere of social action integrated through functional rationality. For example, in Jürgen Habermas' theory, functional reason means the interweaving of unintended consequences of actions of numerous individuals into systemic patterns. This idea figures not only in social theories like Parsons' or Habermas', but in many contemporary Marxists. For example, in Nancy Fraser, who argues that capitalism must not be reduced to some kind of normative order, but that it has to be understood as a kind of system based on the a-normative systemic rationality. Since you hold the view that capitalism is a constellation of institutions such as property, markets, money and contracts, which are systems of rules and are value-rational in their essence, this means that these rules must be justified through recourse to some overarching norm. Would you be opposed to the idea of capitalism being primarily a system of social action based on functional reason?

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**Geoffrey Hodgson:
response to Jovan Babić, Alpar Losonc and Marjan Ivković**

Thank you very much for those three great contributions and stimulating questions. I'll go through them in the order of each speaker. The first speaker raised at least two important issues. One is the distinction between desires and needs. I completely accept this distinction, and underline its importance. We can see the importance of this dramatically illustrated in something like climate change. Scientists tell us that we are at risk of global warming through human induced change. There are dissenters, but there has rarely been such a strong consensus on any empirical issue in science. But there is public opposition, by people who don't understand science, and by people who say: 'well, look, I'm not going to have the state tell me how much carbon I can consume. I believe in freedom and I'm normatively against this policy'.

Now, clearly, there is a need to do something about climate change, and it conflicts with the desires of many people to consume as much as they want. And we are all to some extent guilty, because we consume too much meat, gasoline and so on. Now how do we deal with that problem?

The problem is we need science to understand needs, and science itself has an imperfect understanding of what needs are. There is a lot of discussion in the UK about obesity – the US and the UK are two countries where this problem is serious. And the standard advice by health authorities was to cut down on fat. What that led to twenty years ago is the replacement in supermarkets of yoghurt by sweetened low-fat yoghurt. That advice is wrong – sweetened low-fat yoghurt will make you fatter than full-fat yoghurt. So science can get it wrong on something as basic as what the appropriate diet is. It is likely in this case that the food industry was lobbying and affecting the research and its interpretation.

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Science is fallible, and there are limits to what it can do. There are issues like abortion, where we know the science, we know about the development of the fetus in the woman's womb, the stages of the development of consciousness and the nervous system. And we make different countries legislate on when it's illegal to have an abortion. But science is not telling us what's moral here. We have to decide ourselves what is the moral solution.

So a whole Pandora's Box of issues opens up. If we say needs are important, and we should be governed by needs, we have to face the problem that science is not generally understood by everyone, it is imperfect, and science doesn't tell us necessarily what is moral or immoral. Science will not give you a moral judgment on whether it is morally justified to abort a fetus at any particular stage. You have to make a scientifically independent decision on whether it's moral or not. So in a democracy it is difficult. There are limits to democracy on this question.

The best way of thinking about these problems, as far as I am aware, was by John Dewey. Dewey argued that we can never know the truth, and science is a social process. The entire important thing is to understand the institutions that enable this process, and to get these institutions right, so that the best job can be done in any situation, and we can learn from our mistakes. So it's an evolutionary process of institutional design. Things like public education in science become very important in this view. Matching the coexistence of democracy with the preeminence of science involves public education. By this criterion there are a lot of problems – creationism being taught in schools and similar nonsense. This creates a threat to democracy, to our well-being and the satisfaction of our needs. So, the distinction between wants and needs is a big issue, and unfortunately it is shifted to the side by the utilitarian approach to economics. We have to bring that back on the agenda.

The first speaker asked about the future of work. We cannot predict the future and we must keep an open mind. At Davos recently there were discussions about the ‘fifth industrial revolution’, which is the explosion of growth in smart machines. It is anticipated that we will have robots doing our housework. We know that we will have driverless cars fairly quickly. The growth in computing power and artificial intelligence means that a lot of judgmental tasks can now be taken over by machines. The victory of that computer against that Japanese go player is symbolic. Go is a very complicated game, it’s more complicated than chess even. The computer can actually mimic our intuition using lots of computing power and running millions and millions of scenarios.

An obvious reaction to these startling developments in artificial intelligence is that they are going to strip jobs out of the system. Many jobs may go. It is possible that in 40 or 100 years’ time, robots are doing our housework and university teaching is done by robots. None of us may have jobs anymore. There could still be a high level of consumption, driverless cars, and nice wines, because robots are running the vineyards. We have all these things but we have no stimulation from activity. That is one possible scenario.

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But it is not the only possible scenario, because the way in which the machines replace labour is quite complex. A lot of what we are doing depends on body language and interpersonal skills, and depends on fine-tuned judgment and experience. Computers are taking over some of those things, but on the other hand these kinds of jobs are getting more numerous. There is a race here between the capacity of the computers to take over judgmental tasks and the growing complexity of economies, and the growing need for fine-tuned judgment and experience. You can automate some of these activities, particularly when they are routinized, but a lot of processes and technologies are changing so fast they are not even becoming quickly routinized, because they are moving on. Such a rapidly-changing world requires adaptable people to then adapt to the new situation, work out what’s going on, test it, compete with others, see what works. These are new judgmental skills. So there’s a kind of race going on, and that race could mean that we have a different scenario, where there’s an elite of people who are highly trained and adapted, who are still in work. Their work is highly demanded and highly paid.

In outline above, this is a second scenario, where some people are working for very high wages, but there is a lumpenproletariat who are not working or doing very menial jobs for low wages. The outcome is very high inequality.

There is a third scenario, where we race against these processes, by educating the population at large in judgmental capacity. We would train people so that everyone can participate in some economic activity. With

a basic income from the state, people would also be free to be artists, novelists or entrepreneurs.

So there are various scenarios which are attractive or unattractive, all of which have dangers. But the clear thing is education is crucial in this process. There are several drivers of inequality within capitalism, but in the highly complex capitalism, as skills become more concentrated and more judgment-based, the training of judgment and skills in people is important. Every developed country has a kind of education frontier which you must push back in order to minimize one of the processes of creating inequality in the system. I suggest a universal basic income for this reason, because it is a safeguard for those who are rejected by the system, if for some reason they are unable to negotiate and climb the skills ladder. A basic income will enable people to fulfill themselves in ways they choose.

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The second series of points was about the really important issue of coercion and power. Power is a multi-faceted concept, as Steven Lukes argued in his 1974 book. The most obvious sense in which power is used by force, military force or personal force. When a robber gets a gun or a knife out and says 'hand over your wallet', that's force. But this is not the only way in which coercion occurs. These other dimensions to power have to be appreciated and it's one of the reasons why standard liberal theory is weak. For example, we can consent to being employed in a factory, simply because we have no other option to survive and feed our children. People have no alternative in many circumstances to taking a bad job simply to feed their children. It is a form of coercion which is legal, and which is problematic for human flourishing and development.

And there is a third, even more subtle form of coercion, which is where our very mindset is changed by the system in which we operate. The third contributor raised this kind of argument – our mindsets get bounded by certain possibilities and we don't envisage other possibilities because of the way we think about things. For example, in a way economists have been coerced and are coercing us by their misuse of the term capital. They are making us think in particular ways about the real world system because they are abusing the language. Abuse of categories is coercive, makes us think in certain ways, where we rule in or rule out certain options. That form of coercion is very difficult to deal with, because it is a matter of analysis and opinion about whether it occurs and to what degree.

The issue of consent is vitally important, not only with commercial contracts but also with matters such as rape. Sometimes the lack of consent is obvious, in other cases it is more problematic and difficult to adjudicate. The expectation in some cultures, as in Europe in the nineteenth century, was that a woman must submit herself to the man in marriage, in a sexual act.

Consent to the marriage itself would then have been regarded as sufficient. But the woman may have been coerced by circumstances to marry, and by cultural stereotypes to be submissive as a wife. Coercion can occur even within a framework of consent.

You ended with an important question – the role of the non-legal in the real world, and in legal institutionalism analytically. Many social rules and relations that are not laws are nevertheless extremely important. The non-legal, rules which are not codified in laws, are vital to sustain law itself. That's not the only reason they are important, but a major one. Without custom there would be no law. Without regular patterns of behavior, without beliefs in things, and people taking for granted certain things, there would be no laws. But some people make the mistake of regarding all custom as law. I follow John R. Commons on this point, who said that while custom is essential to law, but law is not reducible to custom. So, custom is essential to make law work, and it's also essential to sustain the legitimacy of law. We have many examples in underdeveloped countries where law is not recognized because legal systems are imperfectly developed. For example, in India caste discrimination is illegal. But the caste system is there in the customs, and is pervasive. The law is ignored. That's in a country where law is highly imperfect, corrupt and semi-developed.

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But even in a developed country, where legal systems are pretty well-functioning, we have examples of where the law is ignored. One example is in France – apparently there is a law which forbids women from wearing trousers. Now, this would be ridiculed by anyone in France who confronted any attempt to enforce this law. It would be laughed at, because it's not in the customs. There are also ineffective laws in British law. Law has to have some sense or rootedness in reasonable behavior, and that's related to custom. Law itself depends on custom, and, in addition, custom is important in regulating our affairs outside the law.

There are zones of behavior where the law can't operate. If we operated our personal relationships, our personal friendships, relationships with our partners by looking at law books and legal rules, then everyone would think we are a pain in the ass. We don't work that way, we work more informally, through body language, appreciation of the other person, sympathy, and generosity. We have rules of politeness. We follow them because we know they are essential, not because they are laws, but because we understand that they are important for the functioning of society, as a way of showing respect for others.

The question about the distinction between capitalism as an ideology and capitalism as a system is interesting. I think it is mistaken to treat capitalism as an ideology, partly because no-one (including me) adequately understands

what capitalism is and how it works. Instead, capitalism is a real system, which we have to try to understand.

There was a question concerning capitalism and democracy. We may wish to change society radically, but in my view we have always to preserve the rule of law and basic human rights, including the right to own private property.

Take for example Chile in 1973. Chile had the democratically elected Marxist socialist government of Salvador Allende, which proceeded to nationalize some enterprises and try to plan the economy. Then the coup occurs, Pinochet seizes power, thousands of people are tortured and imprisoned. I can remember that happening, and I was a kind of Marxist at the time. For me it was black and white – this was an attempt to build socialism, and there is an anti-democratic coup. Now I think that it is more complicated. While Pinochet's coup was barbarous and unjustified, the Allende government had gone against the Chilean constitution and had seized private property. The best statement of human rights that we have is the United United Nations Declaration of 1948. It includes the right to own private property.

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The right to private property is the right in principle to have the means of your own livelihood independent of others. It's a non-coercive right, because it means that you have a default position where you have the right to build up your own business. That doesn't mean corporation rights, or the rights to exploit people or employ people for low wages, or to interfere in the democratic process in defense of private property, and so on. But that right is there.

Pinochet's coup violated other human rights. There was torture and execution without trial. Hayek, to his disgrace, didn't protest against these violations of basic human rights. He was in Chile shortly after the coup, and he was silent. Many libertarians either didn't protest against Pinochet, or they supported the coup, because it's necessary to support private property. But the right to your own life is more important than the right to private property. On balance, I would now say that the Allende regime was undermining some rights, but the Pinochet regime was worse on more fundamental rights.

Take the question of China, and the need for democracy. There is now strong evidence that democracy is beneficial for economic progress, at medium and high-levels of development. At lower levels of development, the evidence is not so strong. Maybe at lower levels of development capitalism doesn't require democracy so much as it does at high levels of development. In China the Maoist regime was a totalitarian regime, the and post-Maoist regime is still a dictatorship, a one-party state. When economic reform began in 1978 the communist party was able to do things which would be difficult to accomplish in a more democratic system. Building an infrastructure, enhancing the education system, and other key moves were possible because of the authority of the state in China, which would be less likely

elsewhere. India is a counter-example. India is achieving some considerable development within a (corrupt) democratic framework.

Another example of authoritarian capitalism at an early stage of development is Japan. Under the military government after the Meiji restoration, Japan built up infrastructure, unified the country, and created an education system. Yet another example is South Korea, which was an authoritarian country until about 20 years ago. So we have examples of an authoritarian interventionist state being crucial at certain levels of development. On the other hand, taking China which is just about to become the biggest economy in the world, but GDP per capita is one fifth of Western levels, so it's got a long way to go to develop.

There are problems with needed reform of the political system and to do with the operation of law. Let me explain in more detail. Experts point out that there are relatively few large indigenous Chinese firms. There are many small Chinese firms, millions of them. But, the large ones are relatively few in number, and if you go through those few, you find they are either state run, and typically defense related, or they are registered overseas, in Hong Kong, Taiwan or Macao, or even in the United States. Why? By contrast, in India, there are dozens of big Indian firms, big players in the West (Tata Steel, etc.), which are registered in India. Here are many of foreign companies located in China, but relatively few mainland-registered Chinese companies. Why? The answer is: fear of sequestration, fear that the government will nationalize. Look across the border, to Russia, where there is a relatively authoritarian, semi-democratic state. Companies have been simply grabbed by the state, sequestered. And because Putin controls the political system, it's difficult to protest against that. When law becomes an instrument of politics, recourse to the law to protect your assets from potential sequestration is tricky. So they in China don't take the risk – they register overseas. Until 2004 the Chinese Constitution had no protection for private property. China needs a legal system more independent of the state. Some significant degree of autonomy of the legal system from the state is necessary for capitalist investment.

How is that going to happen in China without some form of democracy and countervailing power? A worry is that if democracy is introduced in China, there'll be a political explosion. In China, there are very high levels of protest, local protest, particularly over property, over land, and against corruption. You can look up in the government statistics, there are hundreds of protests every day in China. The Western press ignores it, because it's just a daily affair. If there are means of democratic expression, if that protest can be organized into political parties, China will have some kind of internal strife. The Chinese government might be best advised to experiment with democracy at the local level. Keep the power in Beijing, but

democratize at local level, and then you can devolve much of the legal system down to the provinces, including matters such as corporate registration, and safeguard private assets in that way.

The most important thing about democracy is to legitimate government. It's an important issue for people like me in Britain, because we still have a monarchy. The Queen can in principle block bills – very rarely used power, but can be used. Democracy is not a simple recipe, it's a complicated issue.

Mihail Arandarenko

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Well, I am an economist, and of course this is not my first encounter with your work. I have actually encountered your 1988 book and recently I produced a book on the Serbian labour market, inspired by Boeri's and Van Ours' book called *Imperfect Labour Markets*. And this is a sort of approach that I find really useful, and a sort of a nice quote from your book, praising the evolutionary power of labour market institutions, has found its place. But also, being an economist, I am a nominalist, and that means that I am less concerned with the exact meaning of things, although I recognize that this is important when trying to do the demarcation, that it is important for our understanding of some key concepts. Just a side note, it is now for practical reasons very difficult to extinguish human capital from books on labour markets, and if you speak about the returns on investment and have thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of papers and books written and doctoral dissertations written about the returns on the investment in human capital, it is very difficult.

But to turn your argument around, perhaps those more recent bizarre examples like erotic capital and others would clearly show that it is a metaphor, that the term capital is used simply as a metaphor, rather than something which is essential. Being a nominalist I am of course free from knowing the intricacies of definitional science as much as you, and so I took the liberty of asking two fundamental questions related to your definition of capitalism, which basically consists of four ingredients: private property, widespread markets, widespread employment contact and a central role of financial institutions. I am sure that you basically thought of it, and discarded, the idea that capitalism could also entail, as one of the key ingredients, its property of being an engine of growth. That's something that I would like to perhaps explore a little bit. It is clear from the start of your short concept paper, you mentioned the book of Angus Deaton on the 'Great Escape', and that book has shaped my thinking enormously, because this is something that economists, especially if they are practitioners, do not take that often into account. The fact that capitalism, over the past two centuries, plus or minus, has managed to achieve a sort of average growth rate of 2 percent per capita (taking into account the

population growth), this is one great achievement. And then, on the other hand, also, to enormously increase the longevity of the population. Something that was like 40 years of human life in the mid-19th century is now close to 80 years in the most advanced countries, and 70 years in most other countries, including China. This is something that is unprecedented in the whole human history.

And then on the other hand, you use the sort of example of why functional definitions are improper in a narrower sense. You use the example of the definition of mammals, which includes only the fact that mammals suckle their young. But there is a difference of course, because capitalism is something like other historical periods or events, something that is clearly unique, and that you basically cannot test fully by looking at billions of its forms, which is possible with mammals or with other natural things. So in that respect, I think that we need to apply a sort of thought experiment that you do in thinking what the other 'book end' of capitalism is, and what should happen or not happen with the four key ingredients of capitalism. And so I think that, perhaps, if the engine of growth is stopped, and that engine actually translates into human development – something almost Hegelian as a potential – there is that sort of force and if it is stopped, then probably (at least when looking at the functioning of the financial system or even property rights). Of course, in the context in which capitalism is sort of an achieved system, it covers the entire globe, which we can, in a thought experiment, conceive to happen, either in 50 or in 300 years, but it is possible. So this is my question – why not somehow give credit to that unique situation in human history (economic history has explored various other episodes of growth, under the Roman Empire, which wasn't able to provide really lasting growth, that is something that capitalism has achieved for the first time in history). And I'm just stating something that is now an accepted fact; it doesn't mean that you couldn't be critical of capitalism, which I am very much.

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My second point relates to the question that has already been addressed somehow, and that is the necessity to include the widespread existence of employment contracts in the definition of capitalism. This is something that I consider less essential for capitalism. As a labour economist, I understand that you also are perhaps willing to relativize this as something that is really essential for the definition of capitalism. There are various, both empirical and theoretical indications that it is possible to have a sort of functioning market economy without having the domination of wage employment, or dependent employment. Of course, we, from this region of former Yugoslavia, have lived in the self-management system, and there is a theory (Ward and Vaniek and others) who explored this, which intended to prove that it could be incorporated or reconciled with capitalism, even

beyond the socialist Yugoslavia. So this is one aspect – the literature on employee ownership which basically could be extended beyond the small minority of firms. And then there is of course the other aspect that you mention, which is more actual and more typical for modern capitalism, and that is the possibility to have the expansion of service contracts instead of employment contracts. And again, in principle, I can understand the strong reasons why employment contract is essential – but in principle, we can envisage the capitalist world with most of the work being done outside of employment contracts.

Michal Sladeček

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On page 310 you quote Hayek and ask provocatively if he is a social democrat or not. Hayek said: in advanced societies the government ought to use its power in raising funds through taxation in order to provide various services which cannot be provided adequately by the market, such as sanitary and health measures. They could probably not be provided by the market for the obvious reason that it is not possible to confine benefits to those who are willing to pay for them. So from this basic premise we can see that Hayek acknowledged the ethical function of market restraint. But we can distinguish Hayek II who also saw government as providing most roads, as well as standards and measures of many kinds of information ranging from land registers, maps and statistics to the certification of the quality of some goods or services offered on the market. This is a different argument. That is an argument from market constraint which can be marked as system-functional. In my opinion those two arguments are not identical, they could collide. So a person who would defend the ethical function of the market, the restraint, can say that sanitary health measures and the regulation of pollution are more important, so they could be outside of the market. But, on the other side, other person could defend the market constraint for another reason. He could say “I don’t care whether the function of the market is beneficial for every person”. That functional argument is not far from market imperialism or absolutism, according to which everything could be explained as included in the market on the one side, and exempted from the market on the other - but which directly or indirectly serve the market. Therefore, market restraint is indispensable because it serves the market. I would like to ask you about this problem.

The second question concerns the examples of goods or services that cannot be transformed to an object of trade, which means commodified. You pointed at several items that are not reducible to commodity, such as knowledge, legal institutions, family, labour in its totality as an asset, which cannot be placed on the market. Science as well, the commercialization of science would threaten its viability. On page 14 you mentioned the so-called

impurity principle, the proposition that every socioeconomic system must rely on at least one structurally dissimilar subsystem to function. But we can distinguish different levels of those subsystems, for example non-market organizations, pre-capitalist organizations such as family, and goods such as information. Human labour also cannot be absorbed totally by the market. Second, the non-commercial public services such as job centers, state administration and courts. One of the central tenets of the book is that markets depended on institutional complements to the market. Third, the public services which could be market-competitive but need state regulation, such as public transportation and energy supply. This demarcation between public goods, public services is crucial – where is the boundary between them and commodities, and which public services cannot be transformed into commodity?

So, in Bad-Godesberg program, the German Social Democratic Party included the following criteria for those differences (it was in the 1950s when the Social Democratic Party abandoned historical materialism and the goal of the nationalization of the means of production). The Social Democratic Party said we should favor the free market whenever the competition really exists – as much competition as possible, as much planning as necessary. But there is some tension regarding that third set of subsystems, the public services which cannot be market-competitive, such as public transportation and energy supply, because they need strong state regulation which is in tension with free market principles. And the state should create competition, but in many cases such competition is missing, such as in the case of denationalizing of public transportation, particularly in the UK. Monopolies reemerged and the state-ownership is transformed to corporational monopoly. I think that's the reason why the public transportation in the UK is the most expensive in Europe. Moreover, at least in the UK, non-competitive institutions such as job centres nowadays include private companies involved in welfare. The government hired private recruitment agencies and private firms took over the training of those who were out of work. Not to mention UK visa centres, which are nowadays handled by private companies. So, what is your opinion about those market (excesses)? Is the reason that pure ideology, or are there political reasons, or is the reason an economic benefit?

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**Geoffrey Hodgson:
response to Mihail Arandarenko and Michal Sladeček**

Thank you again for those two very interesting comments, very inspiring. Again I'll go through them sequentially. You pointed out quite correctly that capital is a metaphor. You also pointed out that my task in trying to change of vocabulary is hopeless. But we can see the perniciousness or the multifacetedness of the metaphor in operation. Take the term natural capital, and

its brothers like environmental capital. There was a big debate within environmental economics when the term was pushed 10 years ago. And the debate went like this: those in favour of using the term natural capital argued that it would teach economists and others to take the environment seriously. The nature is a gift to us which we must respect, and therefore we must value it, and attaching the word capital to it would help us value it. And one of the opposing arguments against this metaphor was: oh yes, but the word capital connotes commodification and money value, and the whole issue about the natural world is that it couldn't be given a money value. They argued that that was dangerous to treat natural resources as objects to be sold on the market, which we know from experience has a bad record of despoiling the planet, of exploiting resources, against the interests of preserving biodiversity, rare species, human amenity and so on.

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So, the two connotations of the word capital – one was just wealth or usefulness, the other was as an object to be valued simply in terms of money – show how dangerous the word is. Another problem is social capital, and it's not to say the literature on social capital hasn't produced some insight, it has. Empirical studies of social networks of trust, reciprocity and so on, show that it's multi-dimensional. So one of the first conclusions is that different kinds of network, different kinds of normative principles have different kinds of effect. Consider religion for example. A religious institution can provide a welfare network, many churches offer help for the poor, and mosques likewise. These are institutionalized systems which preach care for others, and they to some extent care for others. That's one of the great positives of religious institutions. But the negatives are mumbo-jumbo, discrimination, ethnic conflict, all these other things which shape religion which are the downside. People realize that measuring social capital is multi-dimensional, where some things are positive and some negative. My argument is that the term social capital is obscuring the diversity of different things you are looking at, and preventing you from disaggregating them.

So the metaphor is doing a bad job, because what we should be doing is talking about different kinds of things – positive networks and negative networks. And we should start thinking about it in multi-dimensional terms. And precisely because capital comes from the system which does the opposite, which gives everything a money value, it countervails that.

Your point about the great escape is very much well taken. I think I do give credit in the book for what capitalism has given us. Capitalism has given us lots of things: it has created war, a downside of capitalism; it has created imperial conflict, has powered greed, etc. There's a positive side to capitalism too, and, as you say, there are two big things capitalism has given us: a huge increase in the standard of living and not just in developing

countries. Even more important, capitalism has led to a big increase in human longevity, not only in developed countries, but also globally. The outcome that as human beings we can live longer is a huge gift. Much of this has resulted from the creation within capitalism of systems of state welfare. Welfare states are very difficult to create when you don't have a legal system working properly, or you don't have a proper state administration. Try thinking about welfare state in Somalia, or Sudan – it would be impossible. But we've had welfare states as an option, as a byproduct of capitalism, and that also has helped human longevity. So I do give capitalism credit for that.

To turn to your other point about the role of the employment in the definition of capitalism, and more generally the future of employment. As you rightly say, I'm holding my options here. On balance, I prefer to keep employment in the definition of capitalism. Let's assume you persuade me the other way, that we should remove it. Instead of six points, there are five – so it's the Schumpeter definition of capitalism rather than Marx's. My point then would be that then we must distinguish between two types of capitalism. We could call one employment capitalism, where the contract is prevalent and post-employment or non-employment capitalism where it's not the case. So we would still need the terminological distinction. In any case, the issue of distinction between employment and non-employment is important. I think this is one of the agenda issues for the 21st century, for all sorts of reasons, because the nature of the employment contract will change.

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There's a forgotten classic by Shoshanna Zuboff, called *In the Age of the Smart Machine*, it's a really great book. She writes about a capitalism where intelligent machines abound. She shows how the classic relationship between the employer and the employee is undermined by this. When we were digging ditches our work was visible and could be supervised. But when workers are sitting in front of computer screens, the supervisor can have a quick look around and see whether you are playing a video game or not, but it's impossible for the supervisor to know what you are doing. You might be actually exercising judgment about a document, how it should relate to another document, etc. That's what most of the people are doing most of the time these days: looking at documents, making judgments about them. Even people in factories – they're looking at the manual of operation and the protocol for who does what job and all these things and this is all documented. We are all devolving judgment and training people to make skilled judgment, and the training is so specialized that the supervisor knows less about it than you do. You're more qualified to be able to say 'there's a problem here', and the supervisor doesn't necessarily know. So the whole idea of employment being a flexible contract where the employer delegates a supervisor who in turn regulates what you are doing is undermined.

To some extent people become their own masters. Zuboff also brilliantly sees the downside to this. Because we are exercising judgment over these things, we can't switch off. When you're exercising judgment all day, when you're processing documents, the boundaries between work and leisure are blurred. The Japanese have a term for this, 'karoshi', death by overwork, by deprivation of social and family life. These days, I have to do my e-mails on holidays. A lot of us are working a few hours a day simply to maintain information flows. And so, employment contracts are changing dramatically. There are also implications for trade unions. If everyone's a specialist, the role of 'united we stand' is more problematic. Trade unions may have remaining roles, including the provision of insurance or legal advice, but in the face of the new robotic world they will have to adapt dramatically.

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So there are upsides and downsides. Certain types of work could be transformed to service contracts – many managers work under service contracts. And I'm a great fan of worker cooperatives, but there are downsides to these too. They limit opportunities for mobility and tie people in. Keeping open the option of exit is the reason why we must be pluralist about this. We should experiment with cooperatives, a lot of empirical evidence shows that they are a very effective form of work organization. On the other hand, we have to keep other forms and experiment with them. I think this is one of the big frontiers for this century. Because the pace of change is so rapid, technologically and institutionally, and globally, one thing is certain – work is going to change radically.

What are the limits to markets? If the employment contract is part of the definition of capitalism, then capitalism cannot be a complete market system. Why? Because you can't have complete futures markets for labour. Complete futures markets for labour means we enter into contracts for the rest of our lives. The intellectual experiment of general equilibrium theory is quite illuminating in this respect. The Arrow-Debreu version of general equilibrium theory says you have markets for every commodity at every location, in every state of the world, in every point of the future time. And so, over the three dimensions, every possible market is specified. But in the real world, markets are both imperfect and incomplete. So there's a whole swathe of missing markets due to the fact that we cannot indefinitely contract future labour. We can to some degree have a pledge, a tie-in contract, that ties us in for a small horizon, 5 years, but we cannot do that indefinitely, it would be against our personal freedom and against employment law. That means, according to general equilibrium theory that we are in a second best solution.

It also means that extending markets is not necessarily an improvement, because we always have some missing markets. It has been shown in general equilibrium theory, that if some markets are missing, then the

extension of markets is not necessarily welfare-improving. So, contrary to the neoliberal rhetoric that for any problem we find a solution by creating a market for it, we know from standard economic theory that this is not necessarily the case. You can actually make it worse, because you are dealing with the world of incomplete markets. Doctrinaire neoliberalism goes out of the window, because we are living in capitalism. Capitalism implies incomplete markets.

I was asked about privatization. My answer is non-ideological; it depends on the practicalities of the case. You talked about the railway system. In Britain we have a system where one company runs the railway tracks and signalling and a number of competing private companies compete for the right to use the passenger and freight trains on that track. But the problem with that system, as you indicated, is that it's not meaningful competition. You're going to end up with only few players, and we ended up with only three or four. Some of them are actually foreign owned, and actually owned by foreign state companies. The irony is, one of the private contractors (called Arriva) on the rolling stock side of the story, running the trains, is owned by the German government, by the Deutsches Bahn. So a German public company is competing on British railways against other private companies. This is not a competitive market system.

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There are costs and benefits to competition, and there are cases like a railway system where it may be, on balance, necessary to nationalize it. State run systems have ups and downs, good sides and bad sides, you have to look at the detail, the problems of contracting, to what extent can you create genuine competition, would it work, would it benefit a customer, what's the record, compare different systems. Because these systems are very complicated, simple economic models often don't tell us very much. You need comparative examples.

This is true for health systems too. Even within the National Health Service, before Labour and Conservative governments in my country started privatizing elements of it, there were private elements at the core of the National Health Service in Britain. GPs, local doctors, were self-employed, they were their own businesses, they had a service contract with the NHS. The drug companies supplied drugs, drug companies are private corporations. The British National Health Service, even in its classical heyday, has never been purely public. So I have no doctrinaire view as to the exclusion of the private operators. Learning from the successful experience of other countries, France has a very effective health system. And the French system has a lot of private supply.

So what's important about the French system is that, like in the British system, you have compulsory insurance. Insurance is either provided free,

by the state, or it's compulsory. By some means you ensure that insurance coverage is universal. That's very important, because, if you don't make that provision, poor people will not pay insurance, and these people are penalized when they require expensive treatment like cancer. This is what Obama has been trying to fix in the US. And this is not just a tragedy for the poor, but it's also a tragedy for the whole system, because it means they can't work, their skills are not being used at work. For the capitalist system itself it's bad to have sick and uninsured people. So, the first principle is you need universal insurance. Whether the provider is public or private, again that's a secondary question. So we need comparative research on different kinds of insurance system, to see what works best. I personally would favor the state insurance system, because I see the downside of the American system of private insurance. But when it comes to the provision of services, doing the operations, running the wards, it's a still question of what works best.

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I think we should cease to be doctrinaire. Neither the state nor the market are panaceas. It's a pragmatic issue and a complex one, and we have to experiment piecemeal, move forward, see what works, compare, try different things out, incrementally adjust, and experiment with something in some region. And to do that, we have to understand institutions. We need a good set of theoretical tools to understand how institutions work, and we need to be well informed about human motivation, why do people follow rules, why do some institutions work and others don't. We need empirical case studies, we need databases, this is a way that social science can move forward to inform this debate in a non-ideological way. I'm not saying it's entirely free of ideology, but we should avoid these simplistic, tweedle dee – tweedle dum solutions to practical problems.

Aleksandar Fatić

Thanks very much. I'd like to go back to the point you made about the relationship between property and control in the introduction. You mentioned that an important aspect of property is that it facilitates control. To expand on that: in a sense, property, in the modern society, founds rights and entitlements. Those who own a large part of society somehow increasingly see themselves as being entitled to control that society, to exert political, institutional and informal control of the entire society. This is the very heart of modern corporatism, which is one of the grounds from which capitalism is most frequently criticized. The more you privatize, the more of society is in corporations' hands, and the greater social and even political role you grant to the corporations. Some modern corporations are larger, richer and politically more influential than many states, such as Google, Facebook and many other corporations. These corporations have

recently started to globally project a utopia of a caring employer, catering to the happiness of the employees, with all the alternative models of organization of the workplace, duration of the working week, conditions and things like that. So, basically, they are projecting what I'm not sure is either a utopia or a dystopia of a corporation which is really the motherly figure, which makes the employees happy, which helps the employees fulfill their full human potential, which makes them flourish.

So, the question that I guess I would have is to what extent you think this is consistent with the idea of property as a source of control. To what extent would you agree that this is a logical consequence of this idea brought to an extreme? The second question is more challenging. It is: can corporations in the future replace institutions, as in the privatization of the central registry in Britain, and, less recently, the privatization of prisons, which, you remember, caused quite some debate in Britain, Australia and other countries? There is a trend for corporations to replace institutions, and is this vision of a corporate society a utopia or a dystopia? This question is not cynical; I really do wonder whether corporations actually can perform better than institutions, and whether our leftist vision of the corporation as a potential source of danger in terms of a situation in which it takes too much control of the society is overly cynical.

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Ivan Mladenović

First of all I would like to say something about the book as a whole. I was really impressed, as I was progressing to the end of the book, how complex the argument is and how many themes were raised. It seemed as if the book was written by a team of social scientists. The whole argument consists of different parts, belonging to different social sciences, but there is also evolutionary theory and so on. It was really fascinating to see how these things hang together in this general aim to try to define and find out what would be the essence of capitalism. Second, I was also impressed with your approach. Since I'm a philosopher, it was quite interesting to see someone who is an economist doing some kind of conceptual analysis in a lot of the book. I would like to quote just from your introduction, where you say that one of the main aims of the book is to develop workable definition of capitalism and its constituent institutions: 'to do this, I must counter academic habits of a neglect concerning definitional tasks. Few social scientists these days have a solid grounding in philosophy, including the philosophy of their own discipline. Many in my opinion cannot distinguish acts of definition from those of abstraction or description. Many seem to believe that adequate definitions will emerge without reflection, during or after some process of empirical investigation. But all enquiry is theory driven, it requires conceptual guideposts, all of which depend on prior definitions'.

As I understand it, a large part of your book consists in defining what capitalism actually is. And it is interesting, your approach is interesting, because philosophers are usually interested in defining terms, finding their meaning, but they don't treat the problem of defining capitalism. You can barely find someone dealing with that problem. Then, in social sciences, you have economists, sociologists and so on, saying a lot of things about capitalism, but not trying enough to find out what would be a real definition. They usually rely on some definitions that define capitalism merely in terms of private property, markets, exchange and that's it. With your quite complex definition, with the six conditions, you try to somehow make some improvements in the whole field of thinking about capitalism, and that's really quite distinctive in the whole enterprise of thinking about capitalism. I actually have two comments, and two questions. One concerns your definition of capitalism and the other one concerns what I would call the epistemology of capitalism, the role of knowledge in the capitalist enterprise.

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My first question will be short. We heard already what your definition of capitalism is, what these six conditions are, the first three being essential, and the other three somewhat changeable. These conditions are of course a legal system that supports individual rights and liberties, market and commodity exchange, and widespread private property and means of production, that much of the production is organized apart from the house and family, that there is widespread wage labour and employment contracts and a developed financial system, banks, the selling of debts, having loans and so on. In large part of your book, you try to convince us that the state is crucially important for understanding capitalism; it is something that constitutes capitalism, something that is also essential for maintaining the whole system. But when I look at your definition, I realize that actually the state is missing from your definition. It is in a sense neutral to whether we will rely too much on the state, or rely a little bit, or not rely on the state at all. The definition of capitalism would still be neutral with respect to different interpretations. John Rawls famously made a distinction between a concept and a conception. We can have concepts, define them in quite a neutral way, but then we can fill in different parts of this definition with different conceptions. So, in this case, it could be the conception that we rely on the state more or less, different conceptions will differently fill in this part of the definition. And you actually argued in most of the book that all these notions of the legal system, banks and money are better understood when we rely on the state, than if we rely on some kind of spontaneous order, conventions and so on. So my question is: why there is no mention of the state in the definition if it is as important as you argue in your book?

My second comment concerns what I called the epistemology of capitalism. You write about that in a few places in the book. One concerns your reconstruction of the calculation debate between thinkers who were defending

some kind of central planning, and in that context you side with the critics of this central planning idea, who mostly come from the Austrian School, and you think that they have good arguments against central planning. The idea about central planning is that we can have some centralized organization, let's say we have a team of the best economists in some country. The question is: would the economy function better if we rely on a team of economists with their super abilities, or is it better just to rely on localized, contextualized knowledge that each and every person has – what Hayek calls knowledge of here and now, because those central planners cannot have every single piece of information about what is happening in different parts of some state? Their argument is that the economy would function much better if we use the information that is dispersed, localized, and one of their main defenses of the market system is that the market could somehow ensure that the system of information is fully utilized.

But, although you side with the Austrian School you also mention some problems with this view, and one problem would be that the same problem we encounter at the level of the state we also encounter at the level of a big company with different employees working on different tasks, the problem of how to control and collect all the information. And another problem that is also important is that the market actually cannot function without a lot of shared and free information. It's a kind of paradox that if we try to put a price on each and every piece of information, it would be much more inefficient than if much of the information is shared. You also added that Hayek realized that, and he insisted that the government should provide many channels of information and communication, in order for the market economy to function properly. And one other aspect that my question relates to: you are saying that today it is the case that the economy becomes so information-intense that it is unmanageable to supervise and control how all this information is processed. It's not just that we rely on computers and that it is hard to monitor whether we are working, thinking about a problem – It's impossible for managers to supervise how we are dealing with the complex information that we have.

It's impossible for a single person to control what's going on, what information is processed, how we are processing it, and, in that sense, it is not possible to supervise employees any more. But, as you explained, that is the reason for the shift of authority towards employees, because this shift of authority means that workers must become their own managers, must have organizational skills, must have administrative skills and so on. At least it's a tendency, it's not a dominant way of organizing employment relationships today, but there is a tendency, and you call this type of employment relationship quasi self-employment, because it is not self-employment but you are as autonomous as if you were self-employed. My second question is the following: why do you think that this change would be such a huge change

that we can no longer speak about capitalism? Maybe it is quite consistent with capitalism to have this kind of employment relationship.

Petar Bojanić

I had an opportunity to talk to you yesterday. I will follow Aleksandar and Ivan with their questions on the relationship between the institution and corporation, focusing on the last chapter, 'After Capitalism'. In it, you hesitate the whole time, because the accent is on that word 'beyond' in 'beyond capitalism'. What is non-capitalist in capitalism? Is it the cooperatives? How should they be used? Because I found something in an interview where you said that capitalism can survive only for as long as it is not completely capitalist. Does something exist in capitalism which is not capitalist? This could probably help your proposition, your mission? And I think that your mission, your principal question is how to make capitalism survive. Because, for example, you said: 'critics of capitalism have paid insufficient attention to the possibilities for the reform of corporate law'. That means that you know very well that the principal point of making capitalism survive is the corporation. How can we reform the corporation, or are the cooperatives the password for the survival of capitalism?

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Geoffrey Hodgson: response to Aleksandar Fatić, Ivan Mladenović and Petar Bojanić

Thank you again for that batch of great questions. There is some overlap between the first and the last question. The first speaker raised the question of the relationship between property and control, and also raised the question of corporation. I'll combine answers on that issue. The first speaker seemed to be arguing that the rise of corporations makes control the preeminent issue, and other aspects of property are eclipsed. If that is a correct interpretation, I would actually want to counter that view. I think that the issues of control are always vital to the question of property, control is very much the issue for the law and also for practice, but control is not everything. There are other property rights that also bear upon our power, and our rights within the system to act in certain ways. The rights to sell, rights to change the form, rights to rent, and rights to use the property as collateral are also highly relevant. And those other rights exist in regard to the corporate form. Control is there, but also the other aspects of property are there too, the role of shares in the financial market, the collateralization of property, the intervention of corporations in the financial markets, where they use surpluses to speculate on financial markets, along with other corporate activities. So I don't think that the corporation challenges this multi-faceted notion of property or the importance of aspects of property other than control.

It would also be wrong to say that privatization necessarily means corporations. Much discussion by advocates of markets and privatization ignores the corporation. Austrian economists like Hayek and Von Mises don't write very much about the corporation or about the employment contract, because in a libertarian system of free contracting, both the corporation and the employment contract are anomalies. Why? The employment contract involves asymmetrical authority, at least in law. The discretionary authority of the employer to direct the detailed operation of work creates asymmetric power. And that sits uneasily with a libertarian universe, where everyone is a free agent, a contractor.

The other anomaly is the corporation itself, as it creates a new individual. It is somewhat odd that we actually make corporations legal entities. That goes against libertarian individualism. It is wrong to presume that privatization means corporate activity. Other forms of privatization are self-employment, cooperatives, or partnerships.

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We take the current form of the corporation for granted, but there is a debate amongst legal scholars, not so much amongst economists, about the reform of corporate law. Making employee share ownership more prevalent is one possibility. In most European countries, including Britain, we have two major forms of corporation – shareholding and non-shareholding corporations. Charities are also corporations. This form of corporations doesn't have shares, simply has a purpose. Concerning the more conventional shareholding corporation, there's a whole debate about shareholder value, corporate social responsibility, which has been going on for decades. There has been a shift towards financialization, towards shareholder value, reflected in legislation. But that's problematic – what is shareholder value, how do we know whether someone is maximizing it, is it in the short term or in the long term? It may be in the long term interest of a company to run a loss for 15 years, so in the long run they can develop a project that makes profit. If we are running a company with losses for 15 years, we will not be maximizing shareholder value until the benefits of that, which are uncertain, come to fruit. So, the actual practice of maximizing shareholder value in an uncertain world is problematic. Legislating that is difficult. So there's a whole debate about the nature of the corporation, and different forms of corporation, which should be at the centre of policy making. We have a tweedle dum – tweedle dee politics – nationalize everything, free-market everything, but I want to look at the space in-between. This involves changing corporate law incrementally, allowing diversity, experimenting with different forms, and trying to solve some of the problems of the corporation. So, that should be explored rather than saying corporations are generically always going to do the same thing.

Turning to the second questioner, thank you for your kind words about the book. You raised two questions regarding definition. One is: why is the role of the state not in the definition of capitalism, and you also said why is employment so important? First, I would defend the exclusion of the state in the definition. Definitions identify what we are talking about. We need to have a conversation between different people about the nature of the beast we are analyzing, and agreement on what the beast is. If I wish to convince a libertarian that the state has a necessary role within capitalism, then I should not start with a definition of capitalism that highlights the state at the outset. If I did, then the libertarian would simply say that we are talking about different things. The role of the state has to be demonstrated, not presumed.

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If I define money as essentially something which is state-minted, state-created, then I lose my argument because a libertarian says that the Bitcoin is money as well. I'm not going to win the argument by definition. I need to win the argument by identifying what we are talking about, and then saying: is the state essential or not? If you put that in the definition then you preclude the argument. So, while I believe that many important structural formations in capitalism, including money, including property as well, require some state agency to facilitate, I'm not going to put that in a definition, because it's a matter of analysis. And there are interesting boundary cases where the state was not involved, which we shouldn't rule out as possibilities. It's a question of efficacy. There are systems of property where the state doesn't operate at all or very much. To rule them out at the beginning by definition is too sweeping, too dogmatic. The definition is classificatory, and because that issue is controversial, and is within the object of classification, that's an argument for keeping it out of the definition.

You rightly raised the fact that there are limits to markets, and you raised the epistemological question about knowledge and its role in the planning debate. You seem to be saying that the planning debate may involve a choice between different kinds of expert, and some experts may be able to say more than others about what's going on. So, the ordinary person in the street may have localized knowledge, but a super economist might have a much better insight. Yes, that's true, but on that point the Austrians still win the debate, because even that super economist has relatively little knowledge of what's going on. The world is so complex that we cannot gather more than a small part of information. Some of us may have a better understanding than others of certain aspects of the system, but our epistemological poverty is universal. The differences in the amount of knowledge we have, the amount of skill we have, the capacity for good judgment – there are huge differences, but we are all at a very poor level. The system is just far too complex. There are things we simply don't know about.

Epistemological impoverishment is pretty widespread, even amongst experts. You are absolutely right about free information, that's a kind of another paradox of the Austrian position. One paradox is their failure to deal adequately with employment relations and with corporations. Another one is to recognize that, while they stress the importance of information, they fail to recognize that the market system cannot operate without free information. That's the paradox - If you give a price tag to everything, it won't work. Your final point is whether capitalism without an employment relationship is still capitalism. It might still be capitalism in your view, but I put employment in the definition. It's the question of definition, and I'm more relaxed about that aspect.

The point about the need for non-market information relates to the final question about non-capitalist elements within capitalism. Information is essential to capitalism but to what extent can information be treated as a commodity? There is a case for having a market, having a price tag on some bits of information like patents. The patent has some advantages, encourages innovation and people to reap rewards, particularly in the early stages of an innovation. We need to reform the patent system. Perhaps we should reduce the lifetime of patents.

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The function of some privatization of knowledge can be beneficial, but in general, huge amounts of knowledge, particularly about the operation of the market itself, cannot be usefully traded. Lots of information has to be free. Internet has made much information freely available. Consequently, it has transformed our experience of shopping, of finding information, and doing research. Information is now much more readily available than it was 20 years ago. This is an example of capitalism being reliant on non-market and therefore non-capitalist elements. Another major area which is generic to capitalism is the original production of labour power: the production of babies. If the production of babies was done in a capitalist way, then it wouldn't be capitalism, paradoxically. The parents producing babies for sale would be engaged in a form of slavery. We do have surrogate mothers and sperm banks, so there's some commercialization going on already in this sphere, but you don't sell babies. You can buy the adoption rights, but you don't buy the baby. You can't buy people, legally. Capitalism can't have a capitalist system for the production of labour power.

So capitalism inevitably contains non-capitalist elements. I also think that given the nature of human interaction, the issue of scale is important here. Consider Elinor Ostrom's work on common pool resources like common land, fisheries. The way people manage these resources is that they don't rely on markets or central planning, but largely on customary rules which have evolved over a long period of time. If you've got a group of farmers in Vietnam running an irrigation system, there will be obligations under

customary rules, to maintain dykes, not to take too much water. It may not be written down in a contract, but the tradition and custom make the system reproduce itself. Crucially, these systems work by relatively intimate face-to-face contact, and involve social disapproval, 'you haven't done your job, maintaining your field', etc. Order in these systems arises in small groups, couple of hundred people at most, and relies on social mechanisms of scorn, shame, disapproval, reward, approval, esteem, which we've relied on for millions of years. So without the formal apparatus of law, without states, these systems can still work. The problem is if you scale this up from hundreds to thousands and then millions of people. I simply don't think it can work at that scale. So a lot of the things within capitalism are done at this social level, within small communities and particularly within the family. I made the point earlier – we don't run families according to legal rules. Capitalism can't do without that. Capitalism is impure, it is never a complete market system for all sorts of reasons. That's true for any system, all systems combine these different elements.

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Mihajlo Đukić

Thank you very much. When you're among the last speakers it is inevitable that some questions are going to be repeated. My first question is related to the role of the state. To what extent do you think it is important? Specifically, I would like to repeat also professor Babić's question, who mentioned your quotation of Roderick, who said that the markets are functioning best when the state is strong. So, in those terms, for example, we could probably argue that some socialist regimes or, maybe specifically the one in former socialist Yugoslavia, were more similar to some Western capitalist countries than the systems we can see in transition countries. For example, we have very weak states, states that are not able to satisfy some basic principles, some characteristics or conditions that you mentioned in your book when you defined capitalism. For example, states or governments that are not able to collect revenues, to collect taxes, to protect individuals when they're entering the labour market. In Serbia it is very hard to be paid legally, directly through your account. You receive the minimum salary to your account, and the rest is given directly to you. I also have two short questions regarding the future of capitalism and some modifications. How do you see the system in perspective?

The first thing I wanted to mention are the institutions functioning without people. My association is the EU elections, for example. You have a country like Croatia, which recently entered the European Union, in which the turnout for the EU elections was 44%. 60 percent of those 44 voted for entering the EU. That's a strategic decision, brought without the people. If you look at the statistics and data, in the last 30 years we have a

clearly decreasing trend in the turnouts for the EU elections, and if we look, for example, at the elections for the European Parliament it's even worse, 20-30 percent turnout. We will have some institutions, some elites who are bringing decisions on behalf of the majority, and the majority is not interested at all. I doubt that the people are happy, they actually don't care. My third question: I would like to hear your comments on recent trends and movements in Switzerland. There were movements and the referendum on limiting proportion between the lowest and the highest salary. Do you think it is realistic to expect some new referendums across Europe on that issue? What will be the potential consequences if this is accepted, if the referendum succeeds?

Aleksandar Matković

First of all, thank you for this inspiring lecture. As my colleague said, some questions have already been asked, so I'll try to reformulate the ones I wish to pose and they actually concern, on a more general level, the issues concerning the ontological claims of legal institutionalism. The second question in particular concerns the way in which we might conceptualize the political economy of fascism as a modification of capitalism. Those would be my two questions. Now, regarding the first, I wanted to start by questioning your critique or your description of the natural state model, which you make in the introduction of the book, where you criticize the conceptions that present capitalism through the natural state model. There you say that the variability within nature, understood as a deviation from what is natural is in a sense a simplification of capitalism, of its varieties. To that you contrast what you term the population thinking, where you say that multiple coexisting forms of capitalism or competing firms in an industry must be understood in population terms, as not deviating from a single model but in a sense constituting their own mutually coexistent entities. As far as I see it, legal institutionalism does approach this question by making two ontological claims. The first one is that there is a state which makes public ordering, by focusing also on individual agents which are accountable for individual ordering. Since you take the legal-institutionalist approach, how would you understand the integrating function function of capitalism today?

I ask this because of various legal agreements by which different strands of contemporary capitalism are being integrated into one single economy on a global level. I see that in legal agreements such as NAFTA, TTP etc. So it is these supra-state, supra-national legal institutions that are driving contemporary capitalisms to integrate into a whole, while still being mutually opposed through the principle of competition (when we speak of nation states, for example). Within this conception, state economies and national economies both lose, or at least must undergo a transforma-

tion of their conceptual significance, especially for any analysis which claims to depart from the state and private agents as drivers of public and private ordering, which are the two main ontological claims of legal institutionalism. So, are the consequences of these simply a reiteration of the essence of capitalism, which (unclear) to its varieties, or, if not, how would you conceptualize it, and how would you reflect on the content of the nation state under these international supra-state bodies? There have been many contributions to these questions from the Marxist perspective, from Poulantzas, Bob Jessop, Ellen Meiksins Wood, etc. I won't go into detail, but in fact all of these conceptions start not from the varieties of capitalism, but from what seems to be a conception of capitalism that is independent of the nation state, and their economies which do not conceptually coincide with the varieties of capitalism today, despite what some Marxist authors may claim. For example, Michel Albert, after 1990 and the Fall of the Eastern Bloc, had the conceptions of Rhine Capitalism, German capitalism as being opposed to American capitalism, etc. I think this question is important especially for how we conceptualize the different relations between firms, labour laws, etc, within a single state. How would you conceptualize these international -national relations which are being reconsidered and transformed within these agreements, such as TTIP and NAFTA? Just to remind the audience and ourselves that these are the agreements which are being put into force this year. I think it's a very actual issue.

And the second question concerns the political economy of fascism. We talked about these six criteria, I won't repeat them, but I wanted to ask whether these criteria, even when they have been breached to a certain extent – for example, as far as I can see, the political economy of German fascism could only withstand two or three of these criteria, production being organized apart from the family, etc, the markets were present, labour contracts, private property. This is an issue debated by different authors – Sohn-Rethel, Poulantzas, Pollock, etc. – they all raise questions whether these constitutive elements of capitalism have been inexistent during the political economy of fascism for its duration. The consequence of this is that some authors, like Friedrich Pollock for example, claim that, for our way of understanding crises, trade cycles and any known cause of contemporary crisis, it's interesting how we conceptualize these as a modification of capitalism. I think this question is very interesting because there is something that supersedes these definitions in a sense. Only once we account for what drives capitalism, both liberal and neoliberal economies, towards these modifications into fascist economies, can we fully account for any viable definition itself. For example, if we do not take into account value form theories in Marxism (Michael Heinrich, Backhaus, Ingo Elbe and others), how can we describe capitalisms specific modifications?

I think it's pretty important to describe these links between capitalism and its modifications (not its varieties, but modifications) – we must in a sense think in categories which are inherent in capitalism itself, and what drives it to this expansionary modes and modifications of itself. If I wasn't clear enough here, maybe I could just mention that most of these theories do take value as a form, as the determinant form (or commodity, you also quote Marx when you speak about the commodity as not being the *differentia specifica* of capitalism because obviously we have different systems that produce commodities) of the capitalist mode of production. How do you account for this and how would you explain the reason why capitalism goes into different modifications of its own, in the sense of the political economy of fascism, or even in neoliberal capitalist economies today? Thank you.

Mark Losoncz

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I would like to pose a very brief question concerning the origins of capitalism. I would like to know what you think of historical theories that emphasize that the rise of capitalism began much before the 18th century, such as theories of the agrarian or rural origins of capitalism, and the thesis of the primitive accumulation of capital in post-feudal England. Or theories that argue that the rise of capitalism can be traced to the post-15th century world economy context, as is the case in certain world-system theories. Namely, if the rise of capitalism was possible without a developed financial system, and without developing truly extensive financial mechanisms for a significant period, wouldn't it be more precise to say that the extended financial system is merely a possible effect of the all-embracing logic of abstract labour? What is more in that case – could communist regimes be defined as state capitalist systems? Despite what you suggested yesterday, my impression is that the theory of state capitalism can be quite serious, it is a challenge which we got for the definition of capitalism as it was represented by many thinkers, from Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff to Robert Kurz and many others.

Geoffrey Hodgson: response to Mihajlo Đukić, Aleksandar Matković and Mark Losoncz

Thanks again for the three sets of great questions. The first question was about the role of the state. I quoted Dani Rodrik: markets work best when states are strong. This doesn't imply that when states are strong, markets always work best. You can have a strong state without a market. I deliberately quoted him in the introduction and later in the book I explain the ways in which the strengths of states are important for markets, but also

can be counterproductive for markets. The sense in which I think the state is important for markets is not in the sense of state being a military force, or powerful or intervening, or restricting freedom. It's a sense in which the state has a powerful system of law, which is adhered to by a sufficient number of the population. So it means that when people make contracts, hold property and so on, then these transactions are honoured. So the basic, fundamental institutions of the market system are buttressed by an effective, well-working, sufficiently powerful legal system.

Other aspects of state power can be counterproductive for markets, can destroy markets or restrict them. I was interested in production in the Yugoslav system, I think there could be an opportunity to have a retrospective on that. The Yugoslav system was a third way, different from standard capitalism and from Soviet-style communism, one for which the worker cooperative is central. But was the Yugoslav third way inhibited by the relatively strong one-party state? Was state intervention in the economy effective or restrictive?

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As well as keeping a legal system: another reason why the state is important is that it is actually a source of moral legitimacy. I mentioned yesterday that it is underestimated. But this idea is there in Adam Smith. Some people characterize Adam Smith as a libertarian economist who celebrates the free market and talks about the invisible hand, and is therefore for a minimal state. But state was tiny at that time. If we brought Adam Smith back today, he might think differently of the minimal state. He repeatedly makes the point that the state has to dispense justice, to be seen as just. If the state is mistrusted, if it's corrupt, or administered badly, then the economic system will not work well.

The moral legitimacy of the state is extremely important. As you suggest, there are questions about that. There are questions when referendums occur with low turnouts, when democratic participation decreases. There are also questions about supra-national institutions. We have a democratic deficit within states. In regard to the European Union, we have a democratic deficit because the institutions are not fully democratic.

Concerning inequality, I think Piketty is absolutely right that one of the problems of capitalism is unequal wealth, and we have to tackle it. Within capitalism, most of the disparity of wealth is due to inheritance. Additional inequality is generated within capitalism itself. The problem of inheritance is not peculiar to capitalism, but it's a problem we have within capitalism. Inheritance taxes seem to me to be progressive, because why should someone who is born of poor parents have much less opportunity than someone with rich parents? The answer is we can't justify it. We should move towards equal opportunity, and part of that would be tackling the

problem of inheritance. A useful suggestion is found in the writings of Thomas Paine, who interests me greatly. How do you persuade people to vote for inheritance taxes? You persuade them by recycling the inheritance revenue from the inheritance tax into grants for everyone of an age of majority. So you have a double attack. You deal with one aspect of the inequality by inheritance, and you redress the inequality of opportunity by recycling that money. People of the age of majority get a grant in the order of 20 000 dollars. They can use this to acquire skills or start a business. We should consider other measures like employee share ownership schemes, where you redistribute some of the corporate wealth to employees, by share ownership. New ideas to deal with inequality need to be developed.

In the next question you raised the issue of globalization, supra-state institutions, and the natural state model. The natural state model has to do with Aristotle's concept of essence, where the essence of a kind is something that is unique in that kind and differentiates it from other kinds. Aristotle's notion of essence involves demarcating accidental features from essential features. For example, what's the essence of being human? The answer would be partly biological and partly cultural, that's the subject of anthropology. There's an essence to human culture and to human physiognomy. Having blue eyes or dark hair is an accidental feature of humans, because it can vary within that group, and is not essential to it. Essential features of humanity, like having a brain, being able to reflect on things, having moral dispositions, those are all essential and not accidental features.

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So that's the Aristotelian concept of essence. But Aristotle adds something else to that story, and that's the natural state model. According to this view, the variation in every class, there's always a tendency to move towards one ideal type. I accept Aristotle's notion of essence but not his natural state model. In the context of capitalism we don't have to assume that all capitalisms are gravitating towards one type to have a notion of the essence of capitalism. It's a real empirical and analytical question whether capitalism is converging or not. It may be that capitalism is converging, but that wouldn't alter the critique of the natural state model. So we throw out the natural state model because it's unnecessary for the concept of essence. It's an ontological leap to understand things in terms of population rather than ideal singular types. This is one of Darwin's philosophical innovations. To understand Darwin you have to understand that difference. But it may be true there is convergence within capitalism. That is partly an analytical question, and partly an empirical one. My answer to it would be there are strong elements of convergence within capitalism, which operate by a number of mechanisms. One is supra-national institutions, the other one is things like global corporations, yet another is the diffusion of best practices. Diffusion is underestimated, it's very important.

I agree there are elements of convergence, but there are also elements of divergence, and there are elements of lock-in which make convergence difficult if not impossible. There is a literature on institutional complementarities. The argument goes something like this: take Japan. The Japanese system, like other systems, depends on an interlocking set of institutions. If you try and change one without changing the others, you may make things worse rather than better. There are complementarities within the Japanese systems which have some benefits which exceed some arrangements in the US and vice versa. There are elements of the American system which have benefits which exceed the Japanese system. In any case, because of the locked-in nature of these institutions it's very difficult, politically and practically, to change one without changing the others simultaneously, and simultaneous change is virtually impossible, except by invasion from the outside. You're going to have divergence for that reason. Another major reason for divergence is the global division of labour. Consider the fact that China and a few other countries have become the manufacturers of the world. Even in a situation when convergence occurs between China and the West, they would still be different because all the manufacturing will be in China. So globalization doesn't necessarily mean uniformity. The very fact we have a global division of labour means you have differences in different countries. Britain becomes a service economy, China becomes a manufacturing economy, maybe with similar institutions but still very different. The logic of globalization is to create a global division of labour, which means divergence as well as convergence.

You asked whether one can understand capitalism without taking on board the questions about the value form and so on. Again it is important not to conflate definition with analysis. To have a conversation about the nature of capitalism, we have to agree on a definition of it. Once we agree about a definition we can argue about the use of different theories to help us understand the system. Personally I rejected the Marxist theory of value a long time ago. We can modify definitions. Throughout science, definitions are provisional, but they are doing a different job from analysis.

How and why does capitalism evolve? Well, there's no general theory of that. I do actually address the question towards the end of the book. What I do is classify different kinds of process, but I don't think in detail about how capitalism modifies. One thing I talk about in detail is external and internal processes. Lot of writers emphasizes processes from within, Marx and Schumpeter do. My criticism is that a lot of fundamental change in institutions happens from the outside. How did Japan become capitalist? Because American warships arrived in Tokyo Bay, and at the point of the gun said "Trade, or we invade". And then Japanese had an internal political revolution, and Japan became a capitalist country. Why did Britain

become capitalist? The shortest answer – war. Conflict, raising revenues to help transform Britain to a capitalist country. The bias in Marx is the focus on change from within. Another mechanism apart from external shock and internal development is diffusion. Japanese work practices became organizationally popular in the Western world 30 years ago, still are in some quarters. A lot of political innovation gets copied within countries, this is the advantage of the European Union, it facilitates the transfer of best practice and experimentation. Lot of legal forms get transplanted and copied. The World Trade Organizations forces China to conform to a certain kind of commercial law.

So there is no general theory, but we have a way of classifying different processes. The fact that capitalism modifies is very important, but I don't think there is a general theory of capitalist modification. Finally, you raised the issue whether capitalism is possible without a financial system. Well, a market system is possible without a financial system, and we've had markets for quite a long time. But, again, it depends on the definition. If you define capitalism as having one of the necessary features the financial system, then no, by definition you can't have a capitalist system. I suggest we use a different term for this other system. The financial system is centrally important for capitalism, we simply cannot understand it without that. It rules the whole system, it's the lifeblood of the system, it generates sources of finance for innovation, enables people to borrow money, creates competition in the market between different innovations, dynamizes it in a way, creates uncertainty, creates crises. The boom and bust cycle we see under capitalism is unique to capitalism. Markets before did have fluctuations, but not with the severity of financial capital markets.

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On the issue of state capitalism, some people classify former planned economies (The Soviet Union, Mao's China) as state capitalism. And there are different arguments to justify that position. One is to put the employment contract as central to the definition of capitalism. Then the only difference is that you have the state employers, as in North Korea or Soviet Union, or you have the private employers. But if you define it that way, then we've had capitalism for much longer in Britain, where employment relationships became commonplace from the 14th century. Again this downplays the role of finance. Whatever terms we use, if you say that's capitalism, we would need to subdivide that category, and say that the financial capitalism is a very different beast from planned economies. In that respect the transition process in recent years is very illustrative, particularly the European cases and the Soviet cases. Western advisers came in who believed in the spontaneity of capitalist institutions. They said 'markets will spring up when central bureaucracies are dismantled'. But you can't have markets without the state which is sufficiently strong to safeguard property, and

without a legal system that protects property, and that doesn't spring up like weeds, it has to be built. Just as importantly, you have to build up financial systems and get the investors to participate in them. And that didn't happen overnight, it took a decade to get the system to work.

So the transition process really underlines the importance of effective state administration in that transition, and in building a capitalist system as opposed to a centrally planned system. Part of the success of China's transition toward capitalism is due to its retention of a strong state. Now the problem for China is to develop an independent legal system. I think that the point here, to sum up, is that there is a huge difference between these two types of system – the Soviet-style centrally planned system, and Western-style capitalist system based on finance. Most people would not say that the Soviet Union was capitalist. I agree with them that it creates terminological havoc to insist that the Soviet Union was capitalist.

STUDIES AND ARTICLES
STUDIJE I ČLANCI

III

Maurizio Ferraris

A Brief History of New Realism*

Abstract In this paper I try to sketch a brief history of new realism. Starting from nineteenth century idealism, I then move on to discuss twentieth century post-modernism, which, I argue, is the heir of idealism and the theoretical enemy of new realism. Finally, I offer a reconstruction of how and why contemporary new realism came into being and propose a few remarks on its future perspectives.

Keywords: Idealism, Post-modernism, New Realism, Ontology, Epistemology

The fundamental claim of new realism¹ is not that what idealists take to be ideas are actually real things, like trees and chairs. In fact, any new realist is perfectly aware of the merits of a coherent idealism and is far from indifferent to the charms of a new and reworked transcendentalism.² The point is this: rather than an ontological commitment to the existence of given classes of beings (or, as I prefer to say, of objects), new realism is the claim that such ontological commitment shouldn't leave the issue of reality to science, thereby limiting philosophy to a merely educational function. In this sense, the way in which new realism understands philosophy (that is, as a construction and a system, together with a clear ontological commitment) is much closer to nineteenth century idealism than twentieth century postmodernism. I believe this is the right starting point to clarify the function and scope of new realism in contemporary philosophy (to which I shall limit myself for lack of space, thereby leaving aside its scope

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1 For an exhaustive review, cf. <https://nuovorealismo.wordpress.com/>. 'A specter is haunting Europe, and not only: the specter of "new realism". The concept of "new realism" was coined by the Italian philosopher Maurizio Ferraris of the University of Turin. [...] The debate on realism is now widespread in different parts of the world, and its promoters include the Argentinian Jose Luis Jerez, the Mexican Manuel DeLanda, the American Graham Harman, up to the German Markus Gabriel' (H. Kluver, 2014). The debate on New Realism has triggered almost 1700 contributions so far: 166 in 2011, 680 in 2012, 515 in 2013, 250 in 2014 and 20 in 2015 (see <https://nuovorealismo.wordpress.com/>). For the spread of New Realism in Germany see M. Gabriel (ed.), *Der Neue Realismus*, including contributions by J. Benoist, P. Boghossian, M. De Caro, U. Eco, M. Ferraris, M. Gabriel, D. Marconi, Q. Meillassoux, H. Putnam and J. Searle (Gabriel 2014a).

2 Cf. Gabriel, 2006. For the proposal of a transcendental realism à la Schelling, see my 'Sum ergo Cogito: Schelling and the Positive Realism' (Ferraris 2013d).

in fields like architecture,³ literature,⁴ pedagogy,⁵ art theory,⁶ political theory,⁷ social sciences,⁸ media studies⁹ and public discussion¹⁰).

Nineteenth Century Idealism

The twentieth century was a short century not only as far as history is concerned, but also philosophically speaking. At least until World War I, there were fully coherent and widely accepted idealist systems in the philosophical community (this held true for the English-speaking world and Italy more than Germany, which had been the cradle of transcendental idealism at the beginning of the 1800s). It is against such systems that, as we know, twentieth century thought set itself through what would later be called “analytic philosophy”. The *raison d’être* of the philosophy brought forward in England by Bertrand Russell and George Edward Moore was the critique of neoidealist systems and, specifically John Ellis McTaggart’s (1866-1925). It was a call for common sense and the ‘robust sense of the real’, thanks to which, to McTaggart’s claim that time doesn’t exist, Moore could object: ‘I’ve just had breakfast.’

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Next to this rebellious gesture, which would pave the way to a very influential philosophical current, something was stirring on the other side of the Atlantic. In the 1910s, six American philosophers joined the trend of

3 Cf. the conference ‘Neuer Realismus Und Rationalismus Eine Deutsch-Italienische Architekturdebatte’, Italienisches Kulturstiftung Berlin and Internationale Bauakademie (Berlin, 15 November 2013). Cf. also: Fusco et al., 2013; Kuhnert and Ngo (eds.), 2014.

4 Cf. the conference ‘Les nouveaux realismes dans la culture italienne a l’aube du troisieme millenaire. Definitions et mises en perspective’, Universite Sorbonne Nouvelle-Paris 3 (12-14 June 2014). Cf. also the series of conferences ‘Realisms New and Old’, University of Turin (Spring-Autumn 2015). Cf. also Quaglino and Scarpa (eds.), 2014.

5 Cf. Corbi and Oliverio (eds.), 2013; the edited collection ‘Educazione, pedagogia e “nuovo realismo”’, *Pedagogia e vita* (2014); Special Issue on ‘New Realism and Educational Research’, *Journal of Educational, Cultural and Psychological Studies* (2014).

6 Cf. the conference ‘Speculations on Anonymous Materials’, Museum Fridericianum, with M. Ferraris, M. Gabriel, I. Hamilton Grant, R. Mackay and R. Negarestani (Kassel, 4 January 2014), and the series of conferences ‘Phantome des Realen’, Zurcher Hochschule der Kunste, with A. Avanesian, A. Duttmann, M. Ferraris, M. Gabriel, I. Grant, G. Harman, D. Mersch and G. Schiemann (2014).

7 The political relevance of new realism was the focus of the series of conferences held at the Swiss Cultural Institute, Rome, in 2012, whose acts have been published in Riedweg (ed), 2013. The text has appeared in Italian (2013), French (2014) and German (2014)

8 Maccarini, Morandi and Prandini, (eds.), 2011; Martignani 2013.

9 See my ‘New Realism and New Media: From Documentality to Normativity’, (Ferraris 2015).

10 From 3 April to 3 July 2014 the German newspaper *Die Zeit* published a series of articles on new realism in philosophy, art and architecture, with contributions by T. E. Schmidt, U. Schwarz, B. Stegemann, B. Porsken, M. Gabriel, I. Radisch and M. Seel. Analogous debates have taken place in Italy (*La Repubblica* and *Alfabeta2*), Spain (*Revista de Occidente*) and France (*Philosophie Magazine*).

“New Realism”.¹¹ They were: Walter Taylor Marvin, Ralph Barton Perry, Edward Gleason Spaulding, Edwin Bissel Holt, William Pepperell Montague, and Walter Boughton Pitkin. These names are unlikely to ring a bell to the reader—which speaks for the little success of the movement. New Realism had no Bertrand Russell nor any Wittgenstein or Moore. In the successive phase of “critical realism”,¹² it had Lovejoy, Santayana, and Sellars (Roy Wood, father of the more famous Wilfrid Sellars), but the philosophical mainstream went along with analytic philosophy, which seemed to envisage a stronger break and more interesting new approaches.

However, if we want to understand what brought to New Realism a century ago (along with the realist versions of German neo-Kantianism¹³) as well as to early analytic philosophy, we should focus on idealism, against which they were set. Such task cannot be achieved in these pages, of course, also because neoidealism was very robust; it was endowed with an argumentative quality that post-idealist continental philosophy could not but envy (and a richness of content that analytic philosophy could not but envy). I shall limit myself to a small sample, which I believe is significant: the opening lines of *The Theory of the Mind as Pure Act* by Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944):

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Berkeley in the beginning of the Eighteenth century expressed very clearly the following concept. Reality is conceivable only in so far as the reality conceived is in relation to the activity which conceives it, and in that relation it is not only a possible object of knowledge, it is a present and actual one. To conceive reality is to conceive, at the same time and as one with it, the mind in which that reality is represented; *and therefore the concept of a material reality is absurd.*¹⁴

We must credit Gentile with the honesty with which he expresses his ontological commitment: only what is present to his thought is real, while everything else falls into the domain of the unreal. If this were true (unless

11 Holt, Marvin, Montague, Perry, Pitkin and Spaulding ‘The Program and First Platform of Six Realists’ (1910); Id., *The New Realism: Cooperative Studies in Philosophy* (1912; 2012). For a reconstruction of the origin of new realism see Marconi 2014, with papers by M. Alai, E. Baccharini, S. Bignotti, F. Botturi, M. Cangiotti, G. Cotta, G. D’Anna, P De Vitiis, C. Dotolo, M. Ferraris, V. Fano and S. Matera, M. Giuliani, L. Grion, P. Pagani and C. Zuccaro.

12 D. Drake et al., *Essays in Critical Realism: A Co-operative Study of the Problem of Knowledge* (1920).

13 In the same years that gave birth to New Realism and analytic philosophy, the neo-Kantian thinker Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) elaborated a criticism of neo-Kantianism based on realist assumptions. Cf. H. Rickert, *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Einführung in die Transzendentalphilosophie* (1904), and Id., *Die Logik des Prädikats und das Problem der Ontologie* (1930). For an analysis of this path to realism cf. A. Donise, *Il soggetto e l’evidenza. Saggio su Heinrich Rickert* (2002).

14 Gentile, *Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro* (1916): 3; *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act*, trans. by H.W. Carr (1922): 1. My emphasis.

you want to embrace a radically solipsistic credo), there would be serious consequences for our most obvious assumptions: those on which we all (including Giovanni Gentile) base our lives. In fact, if only our mental representations were real, then there would be no difference between introspection and knowledge of the outside world. All things past, from dinosaurs to the Sumerians, would be present exactly like the thoughts that think of them. All things future would be no less present than the things past (and therefore there would be no difference between possible and actual). Everything Giovanni Gentile ignored would have been non-existent; on the other hand, anything he thought of would have existed, including Pegasus. However, all of this would have ceased to exist with Gentile's death.¹⁵

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We might wonder how come a great thinker like Gentile did not see the blatant absurdity of his thesis, and the answer is easy. Gentile wrote almost three centuries after the *Meditations on First Philosophy* and 130 years after the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the subsequent Copernican Revolution for which, instead of inquiring into the nature of things, it was posited that we should investigate the way in which we can know them. In other words, Gentile had deeply interiorised assumptions that were far from obvious. The first is that we only have an immediate relationship with thought, which in turn mediates every relation we have with the world. The second is what I have called “transcendental fallacy”,¹⁶ that is, the confusion between ontology and epistemology, between what there is and what we know (or think we know) about what there is.

In addition to receiving the philosophical blessing of Descartes and Kant, this fallacy is also very natural. The psychology of reasoning has shown the theoretical deception due to which we are much more sensitive to the *modus ponens* than the *modus tollens*, and common sense has codified the confusion between what there is and the fact that we have access to it as “out of sight out of mind”. It is a very natural confusion, something very similar to the “stimulus error”: someone, after closing their eyes and being asked what they

15 “But everything is mind.” The mind is everything, the thought is there, near the stove, and it burns in the stove, it is fire (“... already Heraclitus, anticipating...”), it is solid wall. I'm thinking about all these things — I told myself — and certainly this is part of the mind; I remember the things that happened a while ago, or a long time ago, and this is also part of the mind. I'm almost falling asleep, the stove, the low light, the professor's words always so monotonous... this is a surrender of the mind, no doubt. Take my hands, here on the desk, are they part of the mind? You'd have to stretch the meaning of the word quite a bit. But then again, a straight line is a particular type of curve — although nothing evokes the idea of a curve. After all my hands move in obedience to my will, as directly as my thoughts, fantasies and other remnants of my will. The desk can be part of the mind even though it doesn't obey at all, you just have to extend the borders of the word: it is part of the mind, too. The same goes for the most distant and hardest things — let alone those postulated elsewhere and therefore merely thought of (Bozzi 1991: 110).

16 Cf. my Goodbye Kant! What Still Stands of the Critique of Pure Reason (Ferraris 2013).

see, says “Nothing” (while the truth is that they are seeing phosphenes, consecutive images, and so on). The subject is not giving a description, s/he is proposing a naive theory of vision: the eye is like a camera, so when the lens is closed there is nothing or, at most, perfect darkness. From this point of view, the *boutade* that Ramses II did not die of TB because Koch had not isolated the tuberculosis bacillus until 1882¹⁷ is an ingenious and epistemologically equipped variation of this human tendency to self-deceit and overestimation.

However, if we consider the metaphysical implications of this fallacy, we’ll notice that it entails a very strong ontological commitment to the existence of a spirit independent of matter, able to produce representations and, through them, things. Which is perfectly coherent with an idealistic framework, but is much less so within a postmodern one.

Twentieth Century Postmodernism

For much of the twentieth century, realism was marginal. A regional specialty, relegated to Australia, like marsupials,¹⁸ roaming marginal streets both compared to the analytic and to the continental mainstreams,¹⁹ or limited to extra-philosophical areas such as the psychology of perception.²⁰ Proposals for a realist epistemology, such as Roy Bhaskar’s (1944—2014) ‘critical realism’,²¹ appeared far less seductive than the anarchism brought forward by Paul Feyerabend,²² for whom all scientific methods are equally valid, or the fascinating theses expressed by Richard Rorty, for whom objectivity has no intrinsic value.²³ The idea of a “descriptive metaphysics” respectful of common-sense, advanced by the English philosopher Peter Frederick Strawson (1919-2006),²⁴ seemed a lot less heroic than the “deconstruction of metaphysics” proposed by post-Heideggerian reflection.

Should we conclude that, in many cases, there has been a continuation of nineteenth century idealism? In a way, paradoxical as it may seem, we

17 Latour 1998.

18 Think of David Malet Armstrong (1926-2014), professor at the University of Melbourne and of Sydney.

19 Gustav Bergmann (1906-1987), member of the Vienna circle and then Professor at Iowa University. His main works are *Logic and Reality* (1964) and *Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong* (1967).

20 Paolo Bozzi (1930-2003), the last exponent of the Gestaltpsychologie rooted in Franz Brentano’s thought and in Austrian realism. See in particular P. Bozzi, *Fisica ingenua* (1990), and Id., *Scritti sul realismo* (2009). Cf. also C. Barbero, R. Casati, M. Ferraris and A.C. Varzi, ‘Bozzetti in memoria di Paolo Bozzi’, monographic issue of *Rivista di Estetica* (Barbero et al. 2003).

21 Bhaskar 1975; 2008.

22 Feyerabend 1975; 1988.

23 Rorty 1979.

24 Strawson 1959.

should. Postmodern American philosopher Richard Rorty (1931-2007) noted the similarities between nineteenth century idealism and twentieth century postmodernism.²⁵ However, between the two idealisms there is a fundamental difference. Nineteenth century idealism laid its cards on the table: there is no time, there is only what is being thought of, etc. Conversely, postmodernism followed a very different strategy. With Rorty, it suggested that reality's dependence on thought is "representational",²⁶ meaning that it doesn't concern objects but the vocabulary we use to designate them. Now, if by "representational dependence" we mean that the existence of, say, the Tyrannosaurus Rex depends on our conceptual schemes, then it follows that when the Tyrannosaurus Rex existed, paradoxically the Tyrannosaurus Rex didn't exist, as we humans didn't exist yet either. However, if we mean that the *word* Tyrannosaurus Rex depends on our conceptual schemes, then this is no dependence in any serious sense of the term.

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At this point, there is an obvious question to be asked: how is it possible that such dependence, which is at most epistemological (our knowledge of dinosaurs is what makes them relevant to us, or we wouldn't have known a thing about them), is passed off as an ontological dependence (so that our knowledge somehow constitutes the dinosaurs' being)? The answer comes from another American philosopher, but a new realist this time: Graham Harman. Harman has noted how the fundamental trick of postmodern idealism consists in claiming to lie beyond both idealism and realism, as well as beyond both subject and object.²⁷ Formally, the postmodernist does not assume an idealist or subjectivist ontological commitment, since she claims to stand beyond the distinctions between subject and object and between idealism and realism. However, by claiming that reality or objectivity are given only in connection with a subject, she surreptitiously introduces an idealist and subjectivist thesis. Harman gives some significant examples of this attitude: for Husserl, objects are always the correlates of intentional acts; for Heidegger, beings are always related to *Dasein*; Merleau-Ponty formulated the slogan 'there is *for us* an *in itself*'; and Derrida wrote that the difference between signified and signifier is *nothing* (which, by the way, proves it legitimate to read his cryptic 'there is no outside-text' as "there is nothing outside the text").

Statements like 'being that can be understood is language' or 'language is the house of being,' which have been the catchphrases of twentieth century continental philosophy, are just as many variations of the existential thesis that there is no subject and object, but only the relation between them. The revival of Nietzsche's thesis 'there are no facts, but only interpretations,'

25 Rorty 1981.

26 Rorty 1998.

27 Harman 2015. For a history of this, cf. Braver 2007.

proposed by radical hermeneutics, appears to be a foreseeable outcome of this mind-set: if there are only relations, then there are only interpretations.²⁸ We would be wrong if we thought that this situation belongs to the past. As rightly noted by Thomas Kuhn, a philosophical dogma persists until the retirement of the last of its proponents. In this light, it is not surprising that in 2015 one can still read what follows:

Against this new realism I have merely quoted minor characters like Erwin Schrodinger, whom I have already referred to in the past, for instance in my first *Krisis*. The new realists' approach is far from being knowledge of nature. The problem of great contemporary science, as well as of true philosophy, is the overcoming of the subject-object discourse. There is no subject and no object: there is only the relation between them.²⁹

Which is like claiming that there is no left hand and no right hand: there are only the two hands joint in prayer—unless you want to embrace a coherently Berkeleyan perspective, which would also entail a formal demonstration of the existence of God.³⁰ Australian philosopher David Stove (1927-1994) has called this 'the worst argument in the world'. To claim that we can only know things if they are in relation to us, and that therefore we cannot know things in themselves, is not different from claiming what follows: since we are the ones eating oysters, when we eat oysters we cannot eat oysters as such, but only in relation to us.³¹ This is a radicalisation of the worst argument in the world. In fact, if we are to believe that 'there is no subject and no object, there is only the relation between them,' then we must conclude that there is no such thing as a customer in the restaurant, nor is there an oyster on the plate—there is only an impersonal "oyster-eating".

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The passage I have just quoted is interesting both as a document and because it sums up several prejudices towards new realism (for instance, it confuses it with a form of naturalism³²) and in general attributes to it the straw-man thesis according to which the mind mirrors reality as it is. Obviously, new realism has never supported a thesis of this kind, and the reference to naive

28 For more on the relationship between postmodernism and realism, see my 'From Postmodernism to Realism' (Ferraris 2014).

29 Cacciari 2015. For an analysis of the language used in the debate on new realism, see Scarpa 2013.

30 To my knowledge, the only philosopher who took some steps in this direction was John Foster (1940-2009). See his excellent *A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism* (Foster 2008).

31 Stove 1991. I have obviously simplified the argument due to lack of space. An excellent exposition can be found in Franklin 2002.

32 The insistence on the distinction between ontology and epistemology is what makes this hypothesis absurd. The relation between ontology and epistemology has been the focus of the conference 'New Realism: Ontology and Epistemology', within the International Conference 'Philosophy of Science in the 21st Century: Challenges and Tasks', CFCUL, Faculty of Sciences, University of Lisbon (5 December 2013).

realism and common sense plays an essentially methodological function in the new realist strategy: we must be able to provide explanations that account for commonsensical intuitions.³³ The price to pay for not considering common sense, in fact, is not giving up a sophisticated and demanding philosophy, but rather philosophical carelessness, catchphrases ('there is only the relation'), and an inflation of bad arguments that confirm the continuing validity of Hegel's saying that arguments are as cheap as apples.

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For instance, to say (with a bizarre generalisation of quantum mechanics) that the observer modifies the observed in any area and at any level would mean that using scales in shops is useless, as both the client and the owner modify the good's weight by looking at it. This simple consideration says nothing about reality, nor does it claim to assert (with a philosophical primitivism that no realist would ever tolerate) that reality is what it appears to be. Rather, one of the most relevant theses of philosophical realism is that not only reality is not what it appears to be, but also that there are areas of reality we know nothing about. This, however, does not legitimate the change of perspective implemented by Kant, who, noting the difficulty of knowing how things are in themselves, suggested that philosophy had to rather focus on how they should be made in order to be known by us. By doing this, Kant took the first step on a slippery slope whose final outcome is the argument that there is no subject or object, but only the relation.

The situation can be summed up as follows. Nineteenth century idealism was a coherent movement addressing the fundamental problem of philosophy: that is, being a thought accounting for the whole of reality. In order to do this, however, it had to hypothesise some role of thought over reality. This was favoured by the transcendental fallacy, that is, by the confusion between ontology and epistemology. With postmodernism things went differently: there was the "hermeneutical fallacy", that is, the confusion between the axiological relevance of something (language is important, history and the subject are important, but something even more important is to have a roof over your head and be able to cook lunch and dinner) and its ontological relevance. Language, thought, and history affect reality (who would ever deny that?), therefore they constitute reality (and this is simply absurd).

This is how a group of onomatourges has turned into a bunch of demiourges. If the worst argument of the world were true, not only Newton's physics wouldn't have been real before Newton³⁴ (there is only the relation between

33 See my 'Ontologia come fisica ingenua' (Ferraris 1998).

34 Which, notoriously, is claimed by Heidegger: 'Before Newton's Laws were discovered they were not 'true'; it does not follow that they were false [...] To say that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, cannot signify that before him there were no such entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. Through Newton the laws became true; and with them, entities became accessible in themselves

subject and object, therefore if the subject Newton is missing then the object Newton's Laws is missing too), but the very objects to which Newton's Laws refer would exist in a very problematic way.³⁵ Note that this is the same outcome as that reached by Gentile, only it is far less evident.

In the analytic world, the realist intuition that a proposition is true or false independently from the fact that we know or can know how things are—that is, in my terms, the distinction between ontology and epistemology—has been strongly reasserted in the seventies by Saul Kripke³⁶ and Hilary Putnam.³⁷

However, the situation there was very different from that of the continental world. In continental philosophy, in fact, antirealism was political. Claiming that reality decisively depends on the actions of the subjects means (as explicitly proposed by Foucault and Vattimo) holding up the principle of interpreting the world and, at the same time, transforming it. No such thing happened in the analytic tradition that, as we have seen, was born as a realist and commonsensical reaction against idealism, and therefore never supported theses like those that “power” or “the subject” can constitute reality.

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Twenty-First Century Realism

As is now well-known, the term “New Realism” has a precise date and place of birth: it was born on 23 June 2011, in a restaurant in Naples. Markus Gabriel was planning to organise an international conference on the new trends in philosophy, and I suggested he entitled it “New Realism”. In fact, it was my belief that, after postmodern antirealism, realism was back to the fore. I exposed my theses on new realism in a short article³⁸ and a few longer pieces,³⁹ and a huge debate followed. The first signs of this could be spotted in three major conferences (New York,⁴⁰ Turin⁴¹ and Bonn⁴²), as

to Dasein. Once entities have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as entities which beforehand already were’ (Heidegger 1978: 270).

35 Reality can very well be a thing in itself. This does not mean that this thing in itself has no effects, and mostly that it exists and has its properties independently of our knowledge of it. I develop this point in Ferraris 2015a.

36 Kripke 1972; 1980.

37 Putnam 1975.

38 Ferraris 2011a.

39 Ferraris 2011b and 2011c.

40 ‘On the Ashes of Post-Modernism: A New Realism?’, Istituto Italiano di Cultura, with A. Bilgrami, N. Block, P. Boghossian, P. Bojanic, G. Borradori, M. De Caro, U. Eco, M. Ferraris, M. Gabriel, H. Putnam and R. Viale (7 November 2011).

41 ‘Nuovo realismo: una discussione aperta’, Fondazione Rosselli, with M. De Caro, P. Flores d’Arcais, R. De Monticelli, M. Dell’Utri, U. Eco, C. Esposito, M. Ferraris, M. Gotor, A. Lavazza, D. Marconi, A. Massarenti, M. Mori, S. Rodota, R. Viale and A. Voltolini (5 December 2011).

42 ‘Prospects for a New Realism’, University of Bonn, with J. Babic, A. Bilgrami, P. Boghossian, P. Bojanic, M. De Caro, M. Ferraris, M. Gabriel, W. Gephart, L. Gordon, A. Kern,

well as my *Manifesto of New Realism*,⁴³ and the collective volume *Bentornata Realta*.⁴⁴ International reception was exceptional: suffice it to think that, as early as 2013, it was one of the topics addressed at the World Congress of Philosophy in Athens.⁴⁵ Such warm welcome shows that the time had come for realism also in continental philosophy. But why did it take so long? To answer this question, I have to provide the reader with a few remarks on the history of new realism.

When, in the early nineties,⁴⁶ I first started criticising the hermeneutical and postmodern environment I grew up in, I started from something that seemed to be unnameable back then: perception. In fact, if being that can be understood is language, and if there is nothing outside the text, then perception proper doesn't exist and has no autonomy: it is but the docile feud of conceptual schemes. So, recovering aesthetics as *aisthesis* has been the first step of my realism. The second has been to mark a difference between ontology and epistemology. The third has been to elaborate a realist theory of the social world. The fourth has been to provide a general realist ontology, and this is what I am currently working on.⁴⁷

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The first *annus mirabilis* of the history of new realism can be found in 1997. That year, together with the pamphlet by Alain Sokal and Jean Bricmont against the postmodern abuse of science,⁴⁸ Umberto Eco's *Kant and the Platypus*⁴⁹ came out, surprisingly (we thought⁵⁰) raising some perplexities with regards to Kant that were close to those mentioned in my *Estetica razionale* and in Diego Marconi's *Lexical Competence*.⁵¹ However, the general

S. Haack, D. Marconi, S. Poggi, H. Putnam, J. Searle, P. Stekeler-Weithofer and D. Sturma (26-28 March 2012).

43 Translated in Chile (Ariadne), France (Hermann), Germany (Klostermann), Spain (Biblioteca Nueva), United States (SUNY Press), and Sweden (Daidalos). Further developments of my thought can be found in *Positive Realism* (Ferraris 2015d) and *Introduction to New Realism* (Ferraris 2015b).

44 De Caro and Ferraris (eds.), 2012, with A. Bilgrami, M. De Caro, U. Eco, M. Ferraris, M. Di Francesco, M. Recalcati, C. Rovane, H. Putnam and J. Searle.

45 'New Realism: Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense', XXIII World Congress of Philosophy (Athens, 4-10 August 2013). Graham Harman has held 68 international conferences in 2014 (and has no intention of doing that again).

46 'Ferraris [...] made the realist turn at an earlier and lonelier date than DeLanda and the Speculative Realists' (Harman 2014: ix).

47 For the main stages of my path to realism, see M. Ferraris, *Storia dell'ermeneutica* (1988; 2008); *Estetica razionale* (1997; 2011); *Experimentelle Asthetik* (2001); *Il mondo esterno* (2001; 2012); *Documentality: Why It Is Necessary to Leave Traces*, trans. by R. Davies (2012). See also 'Immaginazione come idealizzazione intraestetica nella Critica della ragion pura', (1993); *Analogon rationis* (1994); *Lermeneutica* (1998); *Goodbye Kant! What Still Stands of the Critique of Pure Reason* (2013).

48 Sokal e Bricmont 1997.

49 Eco 1997.

50 Eco, Ferraris and Marconi 1998.

51 Marconi 1997.

climate remained deeply antirealist. Jean Baudrillard had recently declared that the Gulf War was nothing but media fiction,⁵² while Richard Rorty⁵³ and Joseph Ratzinger⁵⁴ argued for solidarity over objectivity. Ian Hacking ironised on the number of objects (including diseases, nature and quarks) that, according to postmodern thinkers, are the outcome of social construction.⁵⁵ Malcolm McDowell re-proposed a particularly idealist Kantianism⁵⁶ and Karl Rove, counsellor of the President of the United States George W. Bush Jr., claimed that America, as an empire, could create its own reality.⁵⁷

At the beginning of the new century, though, many original and theoretically relevant positions have come to the fore, which can be (provisionally) unified under the name “speculative realism”.⁵⁸ In this framework, the pioneer was Manuel DeLanda,⁵⁹ but also the realist re-working of Heidegger’s philosophy proposed by Graham Harman.⁶⁰ Thus we come to a second *annus mirabilis* of new realism, namely, 2006: the date of publication of a number of books introducing topics that would be long discussed. I am talking about Quentin Meillassoux’s metaphysics,⁶¹ Paul Boghossian’s epistemology,⁶² Gunter Figal’s hermeneutics,⁶³ Manuel De Landa’s social theory⁶⁴ and Iain Hamilton Grant’s philosophy of nature.⁶⁵ Hence the major event of 2007, when the first meeting of Speculative Realists took place at Goldsmiths College in London, including Graham Harman, Quentin Meillassoux, Iain Hamilton Grant and Ray Brassier.⁶⁶ A second conference took place in Bristol on 24th April 2009. In the same timeframe, there started being talk of “Object-oriented Ontology”:⁶⁷ almost a resurrection of the theory of the object of the Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong (1853-1920).⁶⁸ Finally, an international conference in Paris in 2014 marked the encounter between new realism, speculative realism, and the realist elements of phenomenology and analytic philosophy.⁶⁹

52 Baudrillard 1995.

53 Rorty 1991.

54 Ratzinger 1992.

55 Hacking 1999.

56 McDowell 1994. For my criticism of McDowell, see Ferraris 2000.

57 Suskind 2004.

58 Cf. Bryant, Srnicek and Harman (eds.), 2011; Gratton 2014; De Sanctis and Santarcangelo 2015.

59 DeLanda 2002.

60 Harman 2005.

61 Meillassoux 2006.

62 Boghossian 2006. See also Marconi 2007.

63 Figal 2006.

64 DeLanda 2006.

65 Grant 2006.

66 Cf. Brassier 2007.

67 Harman 2010; Bryant 2011; Garcia 2011.

68 Meinong 1904.

69 ‘Nouveaux Realismes. A partir du Manifesto du nouveau Realisme de Maurizio Ferraris’, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (Paris, 4-6 dicembre 2014). With

The Future of Realism

But let's now come to the present and, if possible, the future. On 20th February 2015, a conference was held in Amsterdam, entitled 'The Future of Realism'. I was there together with Graham Harman, the French philosopher Tristan Garcia and the Argentinian philosopher Gabriel Catren; during the final round table we discussed, indeed, what the next moves of realism would be. The common impression was that there would be many different forms of conflicting realisms, and that at some point probably idealism would come back to the fore, but stronger and better equipped than its twentieth century ancestor. For now, though, there are three prevailing forms of realism.

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The first is negative realism, which embodies the dutiful common-sensical objection to constructivism and offers a minimal basis for philosophical work to take place.⁷⁰ It is an essential element to any serious philosophy and I have personally tried to grasp it in my notion of "unamendability". If the world truly were the outcome of conceptual construction, if object and subject were not to exist separately but only in their relation, then why would objects resist subjects so much? Of course, one could reply with Fichte's *Doctrine of Science* that an infinite I opposes a finite Not I to a finite I, and such answer deserves to be taken into account. However, unfortunately, if there is one thing universally shared by all forms of twentieth century idealism, it is the rejection of infinity—so, such position turns out to be unacceptable.

The second form of realism is neutral realism.⁷¹ This type of reflection is adopted especially by Markus Gabriel: to exist is to exist in a field of sense. For analytic authors like Putnam, Boghossian and De Caro, this field of sense is traditionally referred to science, to be understood in a non-reductionist sense. For continental authors like Meillassoux and Gabriel, though, it has a different characterisation.

For Meillassoux, sense is conferred by a reference to mathematics (in accordance with Meillassoux's master, Alain Badiou). For Gabriel, instead, with what ultimately amounts to a re-proposal of the hermeneutic tradition, sense is a character proper of human existence. This point is articulated with a wealth of arguments in *Perche non esiste il mondo*, signalling Gabriel's fundamental belonging to a Heideggerian reflection.⁷² My concern, here, is

A. Avanesian, A. Bellantone, J. Benoist, P. Bojanic, B. Carnevali, E. Coccia, M. De Caro, S. De Sanctis, R. Donnarumma, P. Engel, M. Ferraris, T. Garcia, M. Gabriel, G. Harman, I. Hamilton Grant, A. Longo, C. Malabou, G. Origgi, C. Romano and V. Santarcangelo.
70 Cf. Eco 2012.

71 Cf. Gabriel 2014b. The essay can be found in English ('Neutral Realism') in the already mentioned issue of *The Monist* on new realism (Gabriel, ed. 2015).

72 Gabriel 2004. The issue contains papers by J. Backman, J. Benoist, M. Bosnic, M. Ferraris, G. Figal, F. Fraiosopi, S. Fumagalli, S. Gourdain, I. Kara-Pesic, T. Keily and V. Palette.

that to make existence depend on sense is excessive. There can be existence without any sense, as our own lives can very well demonstrate. For Heidegger, existence and sense coincide: for instance, in his course on the *Fundamental Principles of Metaphysics*, he claims that only man has world and is a world constructor, whereas the animal is poor in world and the stone is worldless. However, Heidegger thus seems to forget that—leaving aside the wealth of the animal and inanimate worlds — a human being can very well be poor in world (think of the working class during Dickens' age) or worldless (the people exterminated in Auschwitz), without this meaning that s/he doesn't exist.

Finally, there is positive realism. This is the direction followed by Harman and myself. The starting point here is a very simple observation. We have infinite proofs of the coexistence, within the same environment, of very different beings in terms of conceptual schemes, perceptual apparatuses and skills. This interaction (in fact, this has more to do with action rather than knowledge) can't certainly depend on the hypothetical epistemologies of the beings involved. Since this interaction is not (at least not always) doomed to failure—as should be the case according to a purely negative realism—we must necessarily conclude that the real is endowed with its own positivity allowing for these interactions and, through a process of emergence, complex performances and knowledge.

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As for me, I am working on the (I believe, legitimate) project of a transcendental realism,⁷³ no less ambitious than transcendental idealism. Summing negative and positive realism and overturning transcendental idealism, reality appears as the condition of possibility of knowledge. In this sense, positive realism can recover the tradition of emergentism⁷⁴ (thought as emerging from reality, as opposed to constructivism seeing reality as the construction of thought) and ecologism (the environment as the area of interaction of beings endowed with different conceptual schemes and perceptual apparatuses).⁷⁵ It appears as a general theory of the process of emergence that, starting from the organisation of animal life,⁷⁶

73 See my 'Transcendental Realism' in the *The Monist's* special issue on new realism (Ferraris 2015e).

74 The emergentism, i.e. the doctrine that entities arise from more fundamental entities to which they are irreducible (for example, the mind emerges from the brain and is irreducible to it) has been theorised at the beginning of the twentieth century by Australian philosopher Samuel Alexander (1859-1938) in *Space, Time, and Deity* (Alexander 1920) and by the English philosopher Charlie Dunbar Broad (1887-1971) in *The Mind and Its Place in Nature* (Broad 1925). It was recovered at the end of the century by many authors, including D.M. Armstrong (Armstrong 1997: 152–153).

75 In accordance with the perspective of the American perceptologist J.J. Gibson in *An Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (Gibson 1979). Such perspective was ontologically developed by Barry Smith. Cf. Smith 2001, Id., Smith 2009.

76 Holldobler and Wilson 2010.

goes up to addressing the formation of thought⁷⁷ and finally normativity and motivation.⁷⁸

In any case, something should be now clear. Unlike twentieth century New Realism, which was born too soon, twenty-first century New Realism has strong reasons to expect a significant flourishing within its domain—which is already happening. Furthermore, it is historically in a better position. As I mentioned above, twentieth century New Realism was a less powerful and structured answer to Idealism than that offered by analytic philosophy. A century later, the situation is very different. On the one hand, analytic philosophy is being rethought and renewed,⁷⁹ which makes it more open to continental philosophy. On the other hand, continental philosophy is no longer contented with commenting on tradition (for which indeed there is nothing outside the text!) and is open to argumentation and ontology.⁸⁰

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On 18th January 1895, in Vienna, Franz Brentano held the conference ‘The four phases of philosophy and its present condition’.⁸¹ The idea was that philosophy goes through different and reoccurring stages. The first is rapid progress due to a purely theoretical interest accompanied by a scientific opening to empirical cases. The second is a practical interest, in which the inquiry into nature and the search of truth are motivated by social usefulness and applied philosophy. The third is skepticism. Since human interests are not satisfied by exclusively practical focalisation, there is a prevailing skepticism about human cognitive possibilities. The fourth stage is mysticism: a hyperbolic reaction to skepticism, characterised by the invention of new methods and by the discovery of new powers seemingly able to create new types of knowledge (and this sounds very much like postmodernism). But the wheel keeps turning and goes back to where it started from. Again: realism, praxis, skepticism, mysticism and so forth. One may think that this is a sort of eternal return, but it isn’t: everything comes back, but is not the same.

77 Dennett 2009: 10061–10065.

78 See my ‘Total Mobilization’, in *The Monist’s* special issue on documentality (Ferraris 2014b).

79 Unger 2014.

80 New realism has entailed a recovery of ontological commitment in hermeneutics. Cf. Beuchot and Jerez 2013, and Jerez (ed.) 2015, with papers by R. Cadus, N. Conde Gaxiola, S. De Sanctis, F. Arenas-Dolz, M. Beuchot, M. Ferraris, J.A. Gomez Garcia, J.E. Gonzalez, E.M. Gonzalez Lopez, L.E. Primero Prinos and S. Santa Silia. The Decimo Coloquio Internacional de Hermeneutica Analogica, held at the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM) on 14-16 October 2014, was entitled ‘Una nueva hermeneutica para un nuevo realismo’. See my ‘Un nuevo enfoque realista a la hermeneutica’ (Ferraris 1014c).

81 Brentano (1968). An English translation of the text, along with an exhaustive commentary, can be found in Mezei and Smith (eds.), 1998.

Brentano was the last philosopher before the analytic/continental divide came into being. Things changed with the generation after him: the English philosopher Michael Dummett⁸² wrote that Frege (as a canonical author of analytic philosophy) and Husserl (as a canonical author of continental philosophy) were originally very close, just like the sources of the Rhine and the Danube, but their outcomes are as distant as the North Sea and the Black Sea (and, one might add, while the Rhine flows into a quite regular estuary, the Danube bogs down into a marshy delta, which might be a good allegory of many outcomes of continental philosophy). It would not be the first time in the history of philosophy that two philosophical traditions cease to communicate: in the eighteenth century there was a similar situation in many ways, since there was a fracture due to the abandonment of Latin as the common philosophical language. Ultimately, even if the only result of new realism was to overcome this schism, new realists would be very happy with that. And their heirs, be they realists or idealists, will find themselves with a philosophically more stimulating situation than the division that characterised good part of the twentieth century.

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Alesandro Feraris

Kratka istorija novog realizma

Apstrakt

U ovom tekstu pokušao sam da skiciram kratku istoriju novog realizma. Članak sam započeo razmatranjem idealizma u devetnaestom veku, da bi se prebacio na raspravljanje o postmodernizmu u dvadesetom veku koji je, kako tvrdim, naslednik idealizma i teorijski neprijatelj novog realizma. Na kraju sam pokušao da rekonstruišem problem kako i zašto je nastao savremeni novi realizam i dao nekoliko napomena o njegovoj budućoj perspektivi.

Ključne reči: Idealizam, postmoderna, novi realizam, ontologija, epistemologija

Milutin Stojanović

Strukturalni Realizam – Potraga za Nosiocem Realnosti

Apstrakt U poslednje dve decenije stara rasprava o realnosti nauke zaokrenula je od pitanja o statusu entiteta ka statusu strukura koje nauka opisuje. Pokušaću da predstavim prednosti i mane ovog novog realističkog fokusa na strukture i istovremeno analiziram širu sliku razvoja naučnog realizma. Strukturalnim realizmom baviću se u formi u kojoj se može naći kod Džona Voralta i Džejmsa Lejdmena. Posebno, ispitivaću odnos njihovih rešenja prema argumentu na osnovu naučnih revolucija – pesimističkoj meta-indukciji. Tvrdiću da ove realističke strategije nisu dovoljno ubedljive da bismo napravili takav skok u ontologiji i pretpostavili postojanje “onostrane” strukture (nezavisno od pitanja da li je to naučno relevantno) – prvenstveno zato što ni jedna ni druga ne uspevaju da na zadovoljavajući način identifikuju strukturu, koliko god generalnu, koja se u smeni naučnih teorija akumulira.

Ključne reči: realizam, pesimistička meta-indukcija, smena naučnih teorija, struktura, elektromagnetizam, simetrije, invarijantnost, naučna metodologija

Zaista, izgleda mi kao da je pozicija koju oni stvarno brane toliko razblažena forma ‘realizma’ – ako je to realizam uopšte – da je jedva razlučiva od pozicije instrumentaliste.

Lari Laudan, “Realizam bez Realnog”

1. Uvod

Naučne teorije referiraju na neopažljive entitete.¹ Preciznije rečeno, one sadrže *termine* poput bottom kvark, elektro-magnetno polje ili graviton koji nemaju opažljive analoge. Prima facie filozofsko razumevanje ovih termina jeste da oni predstavljaju realan opis sveta “sa one strane” pojava, odnosno da neopažljivi entiteti realno postoje. Posmatrano sa nivoa čitave teorije, prihvaćena naučna teorija se uzima kao istinita. Ovo stanovište, poznato kao naivni naučni realizam, biće temelj dalje analize statusa neopažljivih entiteta u nauci. Cilj ovog rada biće predstavljanje logičkog (nasuprot istorijskog) razvoja filozofskog shvatanja neopažljivog u nauci.

Naivni naučni realizam se odmah suočava sa starim anti-realističkim argumentom na osnovu promene naučnih teorija – takozvana pesimistička meta-indukcija – koji se može pronaći još u radovima Poenkarea i Dijema, ali je svoj najjači oblik dobio u radovima Kuna i Laudana. Argument je zasnovan

1 Istraživanje je rađeno u okviru projekta “Dinamički sistemi u prirodi i društvu: filozofski i empirijski aspekti” OI 179 041, finansiranog od strane Ministarstva prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja.

na tvrdnji da su se revolucionarne promene dogodile u prihvaćenim naučnim teorijama, gde je prilikom smene teorija došlo do odbacivanja starih teorija i njihovih neopažljivih entiteta. Ako su se prethodne teorije koje smo smatrali istinitim ispostavile lažne i ako su neopažljivi entiteti koje smo smatrali realnim sada odbačeni, verovatno je da će se isto desiti sa teorijama koje trenutno smatramo istinitim i entitetima koje smatramo realnim. Dakle, po indukciji, imamo jakog osnova da budemo anti-realisti u pogledu savremenih naučnih teorija.

Danas je opšte prihvaćeno da naučni progres nije striktno kumulativan na teorijskom nivou. Da bi realista objasnio modifikacije i revizije naučnih teorija (njihovu striktnu nekumulativnost) potrebno je da u određenoj meri izmeni svoju tezu. Ovo se obično čini tako što se realizam ograničava samo na "zrele" naučne teorije i na pripisivanje tim teorijama samo približne (tj. aproksimativne) istinitosti.² Jasno definisanje pojmova zrelosti i aproksimativne istinitosti nailazi na razne teškoće. Ja se neću njima ovde posebno baviti zato što čak i ako prihvatimo da se ovi pojmovi mogu definisati na odgovarajući način, gornji anti-realistički prigovor ostaje jer, kako god mi definisali približnu istinitost, još uvek je potrebno dokazati na konkretnim primerima da pored nedostatka striktno kumulativnosti naučnih teorija postoji kontinuitet onih delova teorija u vezi kojih želimo da budemo realisti. Problem ne zavisi od pretpostavljene definicije, već od analize slučajeva u istoriji nauke. Prigovor se tako svodi na pitanje o suštinskoj kumulativnosti dveju teorija u nizu, iznad kumulativnosti njihovih empirijskih posledica: ako uzmemo dve po svakom standardu "zrele" teorije – na primer, Njutnovu teoriju gravitacije i Ajnštajnovu teoriju opšte relativnosti – da li se može reći da je Njutnova teorija aproksimacija Ajnštajnovе?

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Ako bi mogao Njutnovu teoriju da predstavi kao specijalni slučaj Ajnštajnovе onda realista ne bi imao problema: Njutnova teorija bi bila približna istini utoliko što ne bi predstavljala čitavu istinu, ali bi bila istinita za brzine značajno manje od brzine svetlosti. Međutim, Ajnštajnova teorija se ne može predstaviti kao ekstenzija Njutnovе stoga što su ove teorije striktno govoreći inkonzistentne: ako je teorija relativnosti istinita, Njutnova teorija mora biti lažna u svakoj instanci. Ne samo što je klasična mehanika lažna čak i za makroskopske objekte koji se kreću brzinama malim u odnosu na svetlost, nego su čak i njena *predviđanja* kretanja najvećih i najspornijih objekata

2 Aproksimativnu istinu teorija na koju se pozivaju realisti treba pažljivo razlikovati od pojma "aproksimacije" koji se koristi u nauci i filozofiji nauke, a koji se odnosi na približnost matematičkih rešenja, nezavisno od približnosti njihovih referencija. Sa druge strane, pojam približne istinitosti pokušava da identifikuje specifične delove naučnih teorija koji najviše zaslužuju naše, bilo eksplanatorno ili ontološko, epistemičko obavezivanje. Klasičan primer izdvajanja ovog epistemički relevantnog dela teorije je Poperova, formalno legendarno problematična, definicija aproksimativne istine putem pojma "istinolikosti".

striktno lažna; samo što njihova lažnost leži duboko unutar eksperimentalne greške (!).³ Ovaj slučaj smene teorija je revolucionaran ne samo u smislu revizije istina, nego i samih entiteta koje Njutnova teorija postulira. Ona tvrdi, na primer, da je prostor beskonačan, vreme apsolutno, i da je masa tela konstantna, dok iz Ajnštanove sledi da je prostor konačan, a vreme i masa relativni. Ipak, u nekim slučajevima, Njutnovi zakoni izgledaju kao razumne aproksimacije jer mogu biti izvedeni iz Ajnštajnovih jednačina zanemarivanjem nekih termina i uvođenjem nekih aproksimacija (odustajanjem od akcije na distancu, linearizacijom jednačina polja...). Dakle, problem se svodi na određivanje *u kojoj tačno meri se tokom smene teorija neopažljivi entiteti odbacuju ili revidiraju i u kojoj meri stare istine ostaju da važe, kao i na odgovaranje na pitanje “Da li je to dovoljno za realizam?”*.

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U svakom slučaju, meni se čini, prihvatanje revolucionarnosti naučne promene – tj. odricanje jasne kumulativnosti naučnog teorijskog znanja – je tačka od koje svaka dalja analiza istine i neopažljivog u nauci mora da počne. Pre toga pomenuću neke realističke pokušaje da se ovaj zaključak izbegne.

Standardno postoje dva načina da se ospori argument radikalne teorijske promene u nauci: 1) da se usvoji tumačenje referencije (na neopažljive entitete) prema kome se napušteni teorijski termini ipak mogu smatrati kao da (približno istinito) referiraju (vidi na primer Hardin & Rosenberg 1982); i 2) da se realizam ograniči na one delove teorija koji igraju suštinsku ulogu u izvođenju kasnije potvrđenih (novih) predviđanja, i da se tvrdi kako su termini prošlih teorija koji se sada smatraju kao da ne referiraju zapravo nesuštinski (na primer Psillos 2011 ili Kitcher 1993). Oba ova pokušaja izbegavanja suštinske nekumulativnosti teorijskog znanja imaju ozbiljnih problema. Prvi čini uspešnu referenciju toliko lakom da neko može uspešno referirati na entitet (recimo masu) čak i ako je u krivu u pogledu mnogih njegovih osobina (u gornjem slučaju njene promenljivosti, tj zavisnosti od brzine). Očiti problem je što ovo čini pojam referencije toliko bledim i neodređenim da je pitanje da li njegova upotreba ima više smisla. Drugi pokušaj se oslanja na post hoc razlikovanje između centralnih (suštinskih) i nesuštinskih termina u jednoj naučnoj teoriji. Ovo stvara opasnost da odlučivanje koji su termini centralni a koji ne u jednoj napuštenoj teoriji zasnujemo na tome koji su termini zadržani u smeni teorija – što bi učinilo ovu strategiju ad hoc.

Ovi pokušaji izbegavanja suštinske nekumulativnosti naučnog teorijskog znanja – u smislu neaproksimativnosti istina i termina odbačenih teorija – ovde neće biti predmet dalje analize. Ono zbog čega ove alternative ipak jesu zanimljive, posebno druga od njih, jeste karakterističnost filozofske opcije da u nekoj tački napravimo podelu između suštinskog (ili čak naučnog)

3 Naravno, ako se ograničimo samo na približnost empirijski utvrđljivih posledica, odrekli smo se realizma.

i nesuštinskog dela naučne teorije. Podela koja nije, naravno, nužno pogrešna, ali koju je potrebno odbraniti u svetlu kritike. Ja ću se dalje prvenstveno baviti analizom realističke strategije koja *direktno* prihvata anti-realistički izazov za specifikacijom ‘realnog’, odnosno koja pretenduje da pruži odgovor na pitanje “Šta je *tačno* to u pogledu čega smo realisti?”⁴

2. Strukturalni realizam

Elementi strukturalnog realizma mogu se istorijski locirati kod niza velikih filozofa nauke, uključujući Poenkarea, Kasirera, Šlika, Rasela i Karnapa. Mene to neće ovde zanimati, već ću se baviti njime u njegovoj razvijenoj formi u kojoj se nalazi kod Džona Voralala (John Worrall) i Džejsma Lejdimenta (James Ladyman). Lejdimenov radikalni strukturalni realizam ostavićemo, zasad, po strani.

Voralova realistička pozicija temelji se na prihvatanju revolucionarnog karaktera naučnog teorijskog znanja i na neodustajanju od realizma. On se pita:

“kada bi mogla biti razvijena pozicija koja zadržava neke od intuicija ispod argumenta ‘bez čuda’ a koja se ipak, u isto vreme, poklapa sa istorijskim činjenicama promene teorija u nauci, onda bi ona bila uverljivija nego pragmatizam ili pretpostavljeni realizam [jedine dve anti-realističke opcije⁵].” (Worrall 1989: 111)

Iz ovog citata očit je Voralov motiv – modifikacija realizma tako da se sada slaže sa činjenicama u istoriji nauke. Razlog zbog koga Voral odlučuje da modifikuje umesto odbaci realizam je upravo argument “bez čuda”, odnosno intuicije koje stoje iza njega. On ima sledeću strukturu:

- a) bilo bi čudo da naučne teorije budu empirijski uspešne koliko jesu da nisu (približno) istinite,
- b) nećemo prihvatati čuda ako imamo alternativu bez njih,
- v) ta alternativa je (klasični) realizam,
- dakle, g) (klasični) realizam – tj. naučne teorije su (približno) istinite.

Iako je pretpostavka (a) vrlo važna zbog osporavanja anti-realističkih alternativa, ključna pretpostavka u ovom argumentu za realistu je, očit, (v)⁶

4 Za detaljnu analizu pretenzija ostalih formi realizma i za razloge njihovog uzdržavanja od odgovora na ovo pitanje vidi Psillos 2011.

5 Nije sasvim jasno da li je pretpostavljeni realizam zapravo anti-realizam ili realizam, kao što Voral tvrdi; iako je jasno da on značajno odstupa od realizma time što neopažljive entitete čini epistemički nedostupnim. Ova Voralova prethodna filozofska pozicija zanimljiv je uvid u njegovo razumevanje pojma “realnog”.

6 Trebalo bi spomenuti i nejasan status pretpostavke (b), pošto su se, na primer, upravo na nju pozivali osmnestovekovni mehanicisti protiv Njutnovog pojma sile, tj. akcije-na-daljinu, a danas vidimo kako je istorija nauke presudila. (Stara) filozofska poenta bi bila da,

– empirijski uspeh naučnih teorija objašnjen je njihovom približnom istinitošću. Drugim rečima, ako pretpostavimo realizam, onda nauka ne izgleda kao čudo. Pored ove tvrdnje o istinitosti naučnih teorija obično je implicitno prokrijumčarena referencija teorijskih termina, pošto većina realista prihvata (referencijalnu) tezu da svet verovatno sadrži entitete veoma slične onima postuliranim od strane naših najuspešnijih teorija (vidi Laudan 1981: 22).

614 Posle Laudanove razorne kritike (ibid.), čija instanca je gornji Njutn-Ajnštajnov primer gubitka ili revizija istina i neopažljivih entiteta, retko ko bi se usudio na pozivanje na (v), i na argument ‘bez čuda’ uopšte. Ipak, grubo rečeno, za negativnu intuiciju iz (a), nasuprot od one pozitivne iz (v), nije skroz jasno da je pogrešna. Otud ostaje određena sumnja da u ovom argumentu možda ‘nešto ima’, preciznije, da ako nam anti-realizam izgleda kao čudo (prema (a)), možda je problem samo u tome što nismo znali pravilno da formulišemo realizam, tj. da specifikujemo tačno koji delovi naučnih teorija opisuju ono što je realno.

Voral se, naravno, ne oslanja na ceo argument ‘bez čuda’ nego na intuicije iza njega zato što je klasični realizam, kao što smo već istakli, u neskladu sa istorijom nauke. Intuicije iza njega koje Voral deli bi se mogle sumirati na sledeći način: jedini način da nauka ne izgleda kao čudo je da postoji deo teorije koji je realan opis onostrane stvarnosti.

Da bi Voral opravdao ovu intuiciju on mora pronaći neki elemenat naučnih teorija koji se zadržava u njihovoj smeni – mora pokazati šta se *tačno* akumulira, iznad i pored njihovih istinitih empirijskih posledica. Videli smo da to ne mogu biti teorijski termini i istine o njima. Onaj deo koji on izdvaja kao realan je *struktura* naučnih teorija (Worrall 1989, 117). Kontinuitet ili akumulacija koja postoji u promeni teorija je kontinuitet forme ili strukture, a ne sadržaja. Ovo je, sa jedne strane, više nego prenošenje istinitih empirijskih posledica u novu teoriju, a, sa druge, manje nego prenošenje celokupnog teorijskog mehanizma (makar i u aproksimativnoj formi). Naravno, pojam strukture nephodno je jedinstveno izdvojiti.

Da bismo precizno razumeli koji deo teorije Voral ima na umu misleći na njenu strukturu analiziraćemo primer koji on daje u prilog teze o akumulaciji strukture. Ovaj primer je ujedno i najoštrije od primera koje Laudan daje upravo za isticanje neakumulativnosti relevantne za klasični realizam: odbacivanje pojma etra klasične fizike, i, posebno, odbacivanje pojma etra u smeni Frenelove (Fresnel) klasične talasne teorije svetlosti Maksvelovom (Maxwell) elektromanetnom teorijom.

ako neka teorija razumu izgleda čudno, to ne mora mnogo da govori o njenoj empirijskoj adekvatnosti; možda je kvantna mehanika najbolji primer ovoga.

Tačka Frenelove teorije na koju ćemo se skoncentrisati je pretpostavka da se svetlost sastoji od periodičnih poremećaja koji potiču od njenog izvora i prenose se opšte prisutnim mehaničkim medijumom – etrom. Osnovna osobina ovog medijuma je generisanje elastičnih sila koje svaki njegov deo koji je poremećen iz stanja ekvilibrijuma vraćaju u početni položaj. Uprkos izvesnih dinamičkih problema, ova teorija je, u svoje vreme, imala veliki predviđalački uspeh. Njena snaga i značaj nisu sporne tačke u realističkoj debati: “Ako se to [Frenelovo predviđanje ‘bele tačke’] ne računa kao empirijski uspeh, ništa se ne računa!” (Laudan 1981: 27); ili, jače, “Ako se Frenelova teorija ne računa kao ‘zrela’ nauka onda je teško videti šta se računa” (Worrall 1989: 116).

Ipak, Frenelov elastični mehanički etar je potpuno odbačen u daljem razvoju nauke i zamenjen elektromagnetnim poljem u Maksvelovoj elektromagnetnoj teoriji svetlosti. Primitivni entitet, u kome je svetlost bila periodični poremećaj, sada više nije bio etar nego “neotelotvoreno” elektromagnetno polje. S druge strane, sva uspešna predviđanja optičkih fenomena od strane Frenelove teorije su zadržana, odnosno posledica su i Maksvelove.

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Između ove dve krajnosti Voral pokušava da pronađe mesto za strukturalni realizam i tvrdnju da iako je Frenel potpuno pogrešno identifikovao prirodu svetlosti, njegova teorija joj je ipak pripisala pravu strukturu. Etar nije apokismacija elektromagnetnog polja, ali poremećaji u njemu prate zakone formalno slične elastičnim poremećajima u mehaničkom etru. Tako Voral zaključuje da:

“ako se ograničimo na nivo matematičkih jednačina – ne, primetite, fenomenalni nivo – postoji potpuni kontinuitet između Frenelove i Maksvelove teorije” (Worrall 1989: 119).

Prvo pitanje koje se nameće ovde jeste da li je ova tvrdnja u skladu sa istorijom nauke. S obzirom da su Frenelove jednačine preuzete potpuno neaktivne, samo reinterpetirane, od strane Maksvela, odgovor je, naravno, da. Jedino što je zbog toga ovaj primer unekoliko nereprezentativan. Mnogo češći slučaj matematičkog kontinuiteta u smeni teorija, prema Voralu, jeste da se stare jednačine pojavljuju kao granični slučajevi novih jednačina. U tom slučaju one su striktno govoreći inkonzistentne, kao u gornjem primeru Njutn-Ajnštajnovne smene, ali “nove teže starima kao što neka veličina teži nekoj granici” (Worrall 1989: 120).

Nije sasvim jasno da li je kontinuitet strukture definisan na osnovu analogije sa graničnim vrednostima funkcija nešto više od kontinuiteta istinitih empirijskih posledica. Odnosno, da li je ovaj drugi, češći tip kontinuiteta nešto više od toga da u određenom domenu nove jednačine daju rezultate kojima su empirijski približni rezultati starih jednačina. Jer pogledajmo kako se strukturalistička teza instancira u Njutn-Ajnštajnovom primeru.

Pretpostavimo da se bavimo slučajem u kojem materijalno telo ne poseduje potencijalnu energiju. U klasičnoj mehanici formula za kinetičku energiju tela je $E_k = \frac{1}{2}mv^2$. Po specijalnoj teoriji relativnosti, ukupna energija tela (bez potencijalne energije) je $E = \gamma m_0 c^2$ što kada se razvije ima oblik:⁷ $E = m_0 c^2 \left[1 + \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{v}{c}\right)^2 + \frac{3}{8} \left(\frac{v}{c}\right)^4 + \frac{5}{16} \left(\frac{v}{c}\right)^6 + \dots \right]$. U slučajevima kada je brzina tela značajno manja od brzine svetlosti, odnosno kada razlika v/c teži nuli, ova jednačina se prelazi u: $E \approx m_0 c^2 + \frac{1}{2} m_0 v^2$. Ako ovu jednačinu uporedimo sa jednačinom za kinetičku energiju u klasičnoj mehanici odmah uočavamo matematičku (strukturnalnu) sličnost – relativistička energija je približna klasičnoj kinetičkoj energiji uvećanoj za $m_0 c^2$, što je, za datu masu, konstantna vrednost. U skladu sa strukturalističkom tezom, slučaj u kome se stare jednačine pojavljuju kao granične vrednosti novih jednačina je kada razlika v/c teži nuli; odnosno, pošto je brzina svetlosti konstantna, kada brzina tela teži nuli.

616 Međutim, ako je brzina tela jednaka nuli relativistička energija jednaka je mc^2 , a, kao što je poznato, u klasičnoj mehanici telo u mirovanju nema kinetičku energiju. Kako protumačiti ovu činjenicu? Kao prvo, jasno je da su se pojam energije, kao i pojam mase, znatno promenili. Ono što je stvarni problem jeste da li ćemo gornju matematičku sličnost protumačiti kao dovoljnu za tvrdnju matematičkog kontinuiteta, odnosno da li je opravdano reći da se matematička zavisnost energije od brzine tela (s obzirom na datu masu mirovanja) prenela iz klasične u relativističku fiziku. Odgovor je, izgleda, i da i ne.

Da, zato što relativistička jednačina za energiju tela koje se kreće brzinom malom u odnosu na brzinu svetlosti ima sličan oblik kao klasična jednačina, odnosno na matematički sličan način zavisi od njegove brzine. Ne, zato što energija, pošto je moguće da je telo ima i u mirovanju, sada više nije samo mehanički (tj kinetički) fenomen. Ranije smo imali zakon održanja mase i zakon održanja energije. Sada, kada su masa i energija postali uzajamno pretvorivi, očito je da je pitanje da li je došlo do smene ili do razvoja teorije stvar pojmovnog okvira, tj. perspektive koju ćemo zauzeti.

Čak i ako prihvatimo postojanje određenog kontinuiteta na matematičkom nivou, to je, sasvim eksplicitno, kontinuitet koji ne uključuje zadržavanje teorijskih entiteta prethodne teorije i, što je posebno bitno, ne zadržava njene istine. Ovo drugo je veoma zanimljiv problem zato što postaje jasno da kontinuitet o kome je reč ne može da se svrsta u standardne matematičke oblike kontinuiteta, za koji su potrebni kontinuitet istina i kontinuitet ontologije, jer nova teorija ne može da pripiše vrednosti onim varijablama koje u njoj ne postoje (Grunbaum 1976: 22). Ovo, naravno, ne znači da ovakav kontinuitet nije moguće definisati (na primer putem Okvirne

⁷ m_0 je masa tela u mirovanju.

teorije – vidi Fletcher 2015), nego samo to da moramo biti veoma oprezni kada procenjujemo šta taj kontinuitet zapravo znači. Dalje razvijanje strukturalnog realizma mora se fokusirati na *specifikovanje koliki deo i na koji tačno način* se matematika teorije zadržava, ili akumulira, u smeni teorija. Bez toga nemamo oko čega da budemo realisti.

2.1 Problem odbačenih jednačina

Ono što bih sada istakao jeste da matematički kontinuitet još uvek nije dovoljan da bismo imali realizam. Da bi kumulativnost na matematičkom nivou bila osnova za realizam, potrebna je dodatna teza da matematika teorije, ili barem neki njen deo, reprezentuje neopažljive entitete ili procese, a ne da je samo korisno apstraktno sredstvo za izvođenje empirijski proverljivih tvrdnji. Pošto Voral ne izdvaja posebno nijedan deo matematike sadržane u jednoj naučnoj teoriji, moramo zaključiti da on pod strukturom misli na većinu (dobre) matematike sadržane u njoj. Ako ovde jeste reč o kontinuitetu ‘dobre’ matematike prethodne teorije, onda bi trebalo da su jednačine prethodnih uspešnih naučnih teorija mahom reinterpretirane u teorijama koje su ih nasledile ili prenesene kao granični slučajevi.

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Uzmimo za primer poznatu Frenelovu formulu za predviđanje i merenje delimičnog vučenja etra od strane masivnih objekata. Prema korpuskularnoj teoriji svetlosti, indeks prelamanja svetlosti supstance kao što je staklo zavisi od odnosa brzina svetlosti u vazduhu i u staklu. 1810, pokušavajući da izmeri brzinu svetlosti, Fransoa Arago (François Arago) je eksperimentalno utvrdio da pri posmatranju zvezda nema razlike u prelamanju svetlosti kada ona udari u staklenu prizmu ispred teleskopa, bez obzira na različite brzine kojima se zvezde kreću i na brzinu kretanje Zemlje u odnosu na njih u različitim godišnjim dobima. Da bi objasnio ovaj rezultat, Frenel je ispitao Aragov eksperiment pomoću talasne teorije svetlosti i predložio da staklena prizma vuče deo etra za sobom, tako da se on nalazi u njoj u većoj količini, što dalje povećava brzinu svetlosti u njoj. Pošto brzina svetlosti zavisi od gustine medijuma, njena brzina u pokretnoj prizmi treba da se prilagodi količini “povučenog” etra. Sa datim indeksom prelamanja svetlosti n , brzina svetlosti kroz staklo, ne uzimajući u obzir vučenje etra je $v_n = \frac{c}{n}$. Prilagodavanje vučenju je izraženo formulom $v_d = v\left(1 - \frac{\rho_e}{\rho_s}\right)$, gde je ρ_e gustina etra u okolini, ρ_s gustina etra u staklu, a v brzina prizme u odnosu na etar. Pošto indeks prelamanja n zavisi od gustine etra, konačna brzina svetlosti u staklu je data Frenelovom formulom $V = \frac{c}{n} + v\left(1 - \frac{1}{n^2}\right)$.

Ova Frenelova ispravka uspešno je objasnila nula-rezultat Aragovog eksperimenta. Takođe, ona je uvela koncept uglavnom stacionarnog etra, koga vuku supstance kao što je staklo, ali ne i vazduh. Takođe, njen koeficijent vučenja je 1851. potvrđen čuvenim Fizoovim (Armand Fizeau) eksperimentom gde svetlost putuje kroz krećuću vodu, a zatim i čitavim nizom

drugih eksperimenata od kojih su najpoznatiji Hoekov iz 1868. (Martin Hoek), Eriov iz 1871. (George Biddell Airy) i Maskartov iz 1872. (Éleuthère Mascart).⁸ Prvi udarac Frenelovoj teoriji bio je 1887. Majklson-Morlijev (Michelson-Morley) eksperiment, čime je počelo skupljanje evidencije protiv nje, sve do poptunog odbacivanja etra u specijalnoj relativnosti.

Sad, da li možemo reći da je gornja Frenelova jednačina granični slučaj neke jednačine iz teorije relativnosti? S obzirom da prema specijalnoj relativnosti etar kao supstacija ne postoji, kojih njenih jednačina gornja formula može da bude granični slučaj? Ovo otvara problem pripisivanja realnosti matematičkoj strukturi teorije. Ako se deo matematike koji je imao ekstenzivnu empirijsku proveru i potvrdu nije zadržao u smeni teorija, i samim tim ne predstavlja realnu strukturu stvarnosti, kakvog osnova imamo da pretpostavimo realnost onog dela matematike koji se zadržao. Ovo, dalje, dovodi čitav strukturalni realizam u opasnost da bude ad hoc teorija – da post hoc proglasi one delove matematike koji su se zadržali kao relane, a one koji su naučnim razvojem odbačeni kao ne. Kao što je van Frasen (van Fraassen) već primetio⁹:

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“razlika između strukture i sadržaja izgleda nikada nije razlučiva unapred. [...] Atomi su još uvek tu na nekom nivou, dakle to je bila struktura. Etar nije više tu, ni na jednom nivou, dakle to je bila greška u sadržaju.” (2006: 290)

Ovde vidimo da Voralovo neizdvajanje nekog *određenog dela* matematike kao baš onog koji reprezentuje realnost i istovremeno odbacivanje tokom smene teorija nekih, naizgled bitnih, delova teorije zajedno sa njihovim jednačinama, vodi do toga da razlika između strukture i sadržaja postane nejasna. Ovaj argument, naravno, nema za posledicu potpuno odbacivanje strukturalnog realizma. On je zapravo samo instanca problema istaknutog u prethodnom odeljku – da je strukturalni realizam potrebno razviti specifikovanjem na koji način se matematika teorije akumulira i koji tačno njen deo. Upravo na ovome zasnovan je rad Džejmsa Lejdimena.

3. Lejdimenov radikalni strukturalni realizam

Neposredan motiv Lejdimenovih istraživanja je problem identičnih čestica u kvantnoj mehanici, odnosno, šire, “nuđenje ontologije koja odgovara ‘novoj fizici’ kvantne mehanike i opšte relativnosti” (Ladyman 2001: 61). Specifično, ovo je “pokušaj zamenjivanja individualno zasnovane ontologije drugom koja više odgovara dvadesetovekovnoj nauci” (loc.cit.). Njegov strukturalni realizam je radikaln u smislu da se bazičnim ontološkim entitetom više ne

8 Zahvaljujući ovim novim predviđanjima koja je Frenelova teorija o vučenju etra imala, prema samim Voralovim standardima (koji su danas opšte prihvaćeni), ne može biti sumnje da je ona bila zrela naučna teorija.

9 Originalni prigovor o neodređenosti razlike između strukture i sadržaja pripada Psilosu (Psillos) 1995: 31-2.

smatraju individue koje sačinjavaju strukturu, već sama ova struktura. Uoliko, realizam više nije epistemološka teza da su realicije među individuama u svetu i relacije tih relacija (tj. njihova struktura) sve što možemo znati o prirodi, već metafizička – da u svetu ničega i nema osim strukture. Pre nego što pređem na Lejdimenovu vezu sa Voralom i analizu njegovog mesta u razvoju realizma napomenuću nešto o ovim Lejdimenovim motivima.

Prilagođavanje ontologije novoj fizici ne može da ima perspektivu u kontekstu ove filozofske debate o realnosti pretpostavljenih neopažljivih entiteta zato što takva jedna ontologija ne može da zaobiđe pesimističku meta-indukciju. I pored odgoaranja najsavremenijoj fizici, koja je potvrđena ogromnim brojem eksperimetalnih rezultata sa gotovo neverovatnom preciznošću, ona i dalje ostaje samo jedna ontologija kurentne naučne teorije. Meta-indukcija upravo o njoj zaključuje da nema osnova da verujemo da ona neće biti odbačena u daljem razvoju nauke, kao što su bile odbačene prethodne ontologije. Argument u prilog strukturalnog realizma mora da bude zasnovan dublje u istoriji nauke i mora, kao što smo gore već istakli, da pokaže kakva se tačno to struktura očuvala tokom smene naučnih teorija. Odnosno, mora tu, koliko god generalnu strukturu, matematički specificovati. Alternativno, mora se pokazati zašto, uprkos meta-indukciji, imamo osnova da smatramo aktuelnu teoriju kao baš onu koja je prva uspela zaista da "uhvati" stvarnost.¹⁰

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Pošto je predmet ovog rada logičko razvijanje realističke pozicije, ja ću se fokusirati smo na one aspekte Lejdimenovog rada za koje mi se čini da odgovaraju na probleme susretne u Voralovom strukturalnom realizmu. Analizirajući ovu poslednju poziciju, videli smo da je za čitavo pitanje realizma odlučujuća stvar precizno identifikovanje šta je to struktura. Motivisan ontološkim interpretacijama problema identičnih čestica u kvantnoj mehanici Lejdimen skreće pažnju na invarijantnost kao "definitivan trag strukture". Prateći eminentnog fizičara Hermana Vejla (Hermann Weyl) on na osnovu upotrebe teorije grupa u modernoj fizici pronalazi načine da odgovori na pitanje "šta je struktura?" i time eksplicira strukturalni realizam. Glavna filozofska poenta je da matematički pojam invarijantnosti Vejl koristi da okarakteriše pojam *objektivnosti* (Ladyman 1998: 420). Ideja je da u fizici imamo različite reprezentacije koje mogu biti transformisane

10 Za ovu alternativu teško da bi bili dovoljni isključivo filozofski razlozi. Izgleda da je jedini logički prostor za direktno suprotstavljanje meta-indukciji u pokazivanju unutar same nauke da za datu oblast više neće biti otkrivani relevantni fenomeni – a ovo već zvuči suludo – da smo, na primer, ispitali ponašanje čestica materije na najvišoj mogućoj temperaturi (recimo Plankovoj temperaturi – mada ovaj izbor očito zavisi od teorije i, što je važnije, naše predstave o njenoj potpunosti). Naravno, moguće je i dovođenje u pitanje samog meta-induktivnog argumenta, odnosno revolucionarnosti promena koje su se desile u istoriji nauke; što je standardna strategija klasičnog realizma (vidi, na primer, Psillos 1995).

ili prevedene jedne u druge, i da onda imamo invarijantno stanje pod takvim transformacijama koje predstavlja objektivno stanje stvari. Tako, prema ovom gledištu, elementarne čestice su samo skupovi veličina koje su invarijantne pod grupama simetrije fizike čestica (ibid: 421).

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Na prvi pogled, uzimanje invarijantnosti kao osnove za identifikovanje strukture na direktan način bi rešilo mnoge, gore pomenute probleme strukturalnog realizma. Kao prvo, pomoću nje bi mogla da se postavi jasna razlika između strukture i sadržaja: samo one matematičke osobine i zakoni koji su invarijantni pod permutacijama pripadaju strukturi, oni koji nisu pripadaju sadržaju. Time bi problem odbačenih jednačina postao rešiv tako što, pošto je struktura okarakterisana samo delom matematike, više ne bi bilo očekivano da se sva matematika prethodne teorije zadrži nakon smene; naravno, ovo bi onda trebalo ispitati slučaj po slučaj. Ujedno, bio bi nagovešten odgovor i na opštiji problem akumuliranja strukture – akumulacija je proizvod uočavanja invarijantnosti među konkurentnim teorijama, odnosno pronalaženja nove teorije u okviru koje su obe teorije specijalni (ili granični) slučajevi; na prvi pogled, u ovakvu sliku se lako uklapaju najupečatljiviji slučajevi akumulacije u istoriji nauke kao što je, recimo, Maksvelovo objedinjavanje Gausovih, Faradejevih i Amperovih zakona u njegovim elektromagnetnim jednačinama, ili izjednačavanje inercijalne i gravitacione mase tela u Njutnovoj mehanici.

Analiza invarijantnosti bi mogla da se ispostavi kao izuzetno značajna za dublje razumevanje nauke, međutim, postoji načelan problem u njenom korišćenju kao sredstva za eksplikaciju strukturalnog kontinuiteta potrebnog za realizam. Teorija invarijantnosti se bavi opisima simetrija pomoću grupa. Simetrija u geometriji je transformacija koja ostavlja objekat istim, tj. identičnim samome sebi. Simetrija u fizici je generalizovana tako da znači invarijantnost (tj. nedostatak promene) pod određenim transformacijama, na primer, arbitrarnim koordinatnim transformacijama. Problem je što u oba slučaja samoidentitet zapravo znači istost u *svim relevantnim aspektima*. Konkretno u fizici, invarijantnost je invarijantnost *pod određenim* transformacijama – tako je na primer klasična mehanika invarijantna pod Galilejevim, dok su za specijalnu relativnost potrebne Lorencove transformacije. Ova relativnost zakona spram odabranih transformacija čini objektivnim samo one veličine koje smo odabirom transformacija odabrali da budu invarijantne.¹¹ Ovu poentu jasno je izneo Robert Nozik:

“U fizici, invarijantnosti koje su otkrivene važe samo do određenog nivoa. Opšta relativnost ne pokazuje invarijantnosti pod globalnim Lorencovim transformacijama. Mi ne znamo za transformacije pod kojima postoji

11 Kao što je već van Frasen okarakterisao gornju Vejlovu ideju: “Koji su relevantni aspekti – koji su nesuštinski aspekti, irelevantni parametri koji u smertijama mogu da variraju – je ekvivalentno pitanju koje transformacije su simetrije” (2006: 292).

invarijantnost na svakom nivou (osim možda transformacije koje idu sa održanjem naelektrisanja). Ako je objektivnost invarijantnost pod svim dozvoljenim transformacijama, da li je onda *išta* objektivno?" (Nozick 1997: 27 – italik je u originalu)

Poenta je da invarijantnost zbog svoje kontekstualne zavisnosti ne predstavlja matematičku osnovu kakva je realisti potrebna. Zapažanje da u smeni naučnih teorija grupe invarijantnih transformacija postaju sve šire i šire¹² ima izuzetnog filozofskog značaja, ali nije sasvim očito šta nam eksplikacija strukture putem invarijantnosti govori o tako opisanom svetu, to jest, kako ide u prilog realizmu.

Treba napomenuti da Lejdimen ne insistira na invarijantnosti kao osnovi za definisanje strukture:

“Ovaj pojam strukture [definisne putem invarijantnosti] može nam pružiti jedan način da ekspliciramo strukturalni realizam, iako je ovo pitanje za dalju studiju.” (Ladyman 1998:421)

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On ne insistira na ovoj sugestiji ni u svojim kasnijim radovima¹³. Ipak ova sugestija je, barem u kontekstu ovog rada, najznačajniji predlog za razvijanje realističke pozicije.

Tačna uloga invarijantnosti ostaje otvoreno, perspektivno pitanje. Pored toga u radikalnom strukturalnom realizmu postoji problem kako shvatiti realnosti strukture osim preko nosećih entiteta. Pomenuli smo da je glavna razlika u Lejdimenovom pristupu u odnosu na Voralov njegovo razumevanje strukture kao ontološki fundamentalne.¹⁴ Problem koji ovo stvara jeste da, ako strukturu treba da shvatimo kao *jedini* realan entitet, nije jasno zašto to i dalje uopšte zovemo strukturom. Ako nema nečega što postoji, makar to bilo nesaznatljivo kao u Voralovoj slici, što stoji u odnosima opisanom strukturom, kakav je smisao razlikovanja strukture od ne-strukture? Lejdimenov odgovor na ovaj problem je da:

“Kada su teorije empirijski adekvatne one nam govore o strukturi fenomena i ova struktura je (barem delom) modalna struktura. Međutim, još uvek postoji razlika između strukture i ne-strukture: fenomeni imaju strukturu ali oni nisu struktura.” (Ladyman 2001: 74)

12 Zapravo skup zakona koji ostaju invarijantni se proširuje, a sami koordinatni sistemi postaju sve manji i manji: tako, na primer, u prelasku na opštu relativnost koordinatni inercijalni sistemi u kojima su zakoni specijalne relativnosti Lorenc-invarijantni imaju značajno redukovanu veličinu, u zavisnosti od stepena zakrivljenosti prostora.

13 U 2001, na primer, na eksplicitno pitanje “šta je struktura?” u odgovoru uopšte ni ne pominje invarijantnost.

14 Ovde je zanimljiva Psilosova sugestija da smo upravo ovu distinkciju između ontološki realnog i epistemički dostupnog odbacili “negde tokom naučne revolucije sedamnaestog veka” (1995: 31).

Ako je sve što postoji u prirodi fenomeni i njihova struktura (koja je predstavljena matematičkim i fizičkim opisima datim u teorijama), da li ovako formulisana pozicija može da se nazove realizam. Koliko se ovo malo razlikuje od onoga što bi anti-realista rekao vidimo iz sledećeg van Frasenovog citata:

“[P]ostoje (kako u individualnom iskustvu tako i u nauci) samo dve vrste stvari kojima se bavimo direktno. Ovo su, sa jedne strane, konkretne, opažljive stvari, događaji i procesi u prirodi, i, sa druge strane, apstraktne strukture proučavane u matematici. Strukturu prvih karakterišemo putem drugih.” (van Fraassen 2006: 297)

4. Zaključak

622 Bez invarijantnosti Lejdimenova pozicija dolazi u ozbiljnu opasnost da kolabira u empirizam. Neću da sugerišem da on toga nije svestan, nasuprot. Ono što hoću jeste da se njegova pozicija, koju on smatra neophodnim razvojem Voralovog strukturalnog realizma, veoma približila empirističkoj. To se jasno može videti po tome što se interna rasprava između Lejdimena i van Frasena svela na pitanje da li struktura koju empirizam pripisuje fenomenima ima modalni karakter (vidi Ladyman, 2000 i 2001). Bez dubljeg ulaženja u ovo pitanje na ovom mestu, izgleda da bi realističke intuicije mnogo više dobile specifikacijom akumulirane matematike nego modalnom analizom.¹⁵ Možda bi bilo bolje vratiti se invarijantnosti, sve da ona i povlači nepostojanje objektivnosti.

Govoreći o intuicijama, vidimo da originalni argument “bez čuda” nije opravdao mesto koje su mu mnogi filozofi pripisivali. Verovanje u postojanje različitog broja čestica u jednom istom prostoru zavisno od usvojenog okvira referencije (kako kvantne teorije polja postavljaju) svakako nije ono na šta je klasični realista mislio. Gledajući iz šire perspektive, izgleda da je čitava debata oko realizma išla sledećim tokom: intuitivno uverenje da je za objašnjenje uspeha nauke potrebno postojanje čitavog onostranog sveta, i postepeno ublažavanje te teze kroz inkorporiranje činjenica o istoriji nauke. To što još nismo pronašli tačku gde ćemo ovo prilagođavanje zaustaviti, naravno, ne znači da ničeg realnog ni nema. Ali znači da moramo biti veoma obazrivi (ako ne i rezervisani) kada se u filozofiji petljamo sa intuicijama umesto sa pravim argumentima.

Ipak, meni se čini da je osnova realističke motivacije (potreba za objašnjenjem uspeha nauke) u izvesnoj meri filozofski neadekvatno postavljena. Sporazumevanje šta se računa kao uspeh nauke neodvojivo je od odgovora

¹⁵ Pogotovo ako se uzme u obzir da je načine za razumevanje modalnosti bez ontološkog obavezivanja van Frasen razvio još u 1980. i u 1989.

na pitanje "Šta je cilj nauke?".¹⁶ Kada se jednom prebacimo na ovu perspektivu, nedvosmisleno je da je odgovor "empirijska adekvatnost". Direktna, mada, gledajući realističke spise, ne tako očita posledica jeste da nećemo pred buduće naučne teorije stavljati nikakva ograničenja, osim da budu empirijski adekvatne, odnosno, preciznije, da proizvode nova predviđanja.¹⁷ Suprotno, prihvatajući određenu verziju realizma implicitno ćemo postaviti uslove koje svaka naredna naučna teorija mora da zadovolji. Jer prema realizmu neke stvari, pošto su istinita saznanja o stvarnosti, se ne smeju nikad odbaciti u daljem razvoju nauke.¹⁸ Da li mi imamo epistemičkih osnova da bismo postavili pred nauku (i)jedno ovako jako ograničenje?

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16 Kako Poankare prosto odgovara na ovo pitanje: "Frenelov cilj nije bio da sazna da li zaista postoji etar, da li je ili nije sastavljen od atoma, da li se ovi atomi kreću na ovaj način ili onaj; njegov cilj je bio da predvidi optičke fenomene." (1905: 160).

17 Ovime zaobilazimo logički neprihvatljive, tj. veštački postignute empirijske adekvatnosti.

18 Ovo se ništa ne menja tvrdnjom da su naučne teorije aproksimativno istinite, jer i onda neka saznanja ipak moraju ostati. Inače, dolazimo u situaciju koju je Voral 1989: 106 opisao kao fotografisanje razvijajućeg punoglavca u razmacima od jedne sekunde – svake dve uzastopne fotografije liče jedna na drugu, ali ako se realizam sveo na tvrdnju da je punoglavac aproksimacija odrasale žabe onda to značajno menja stvari.

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Milutin Stojanović

Structural Realism – The Search for a Bearer of Reality

Abstract

In the last two decades the old debate concerning reality of science shifted from questions regarding scientific entities to questions regarding scientific structures. I will present and assess advantages and drawback of this new realists' focus on structures, and at the same time analyze the wider picture of development of the scientific realism. The structural realism will be tackled in the form encountered in works of John Worrall and James Ladyman. Special attention will be devoted to the relationship of their solutions to the argument based on the scientific revolutions – the pessimistic meta-induction. I will argue that these realist's strategies are not sufficiently convincing to steer us to make a leap in ontology and presume the existence of meta-physical structure (regardless of the question is it scientifically relevant) – in the first place because neither one of them manages to satisfactorily identify a structure, however general, which accumulates in the scientific-theory change.

Keywords: realism, pessimistic meta-induction, scientific-theory change, structure, electromagnetism, symmetries, invariability, scientific methodology

Volker Böhnigk

Eine Beziehung zwischen Relativismus und Nationalsozialismus. Tatsache oder Fiktion?

Zusammenfassung Nach einer bestimmten, in der historischen Forschung tonangebenden Auffassung sollen die in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren des letzten Jahrhunderts weitverbreiteten Rassenlehren einen Relativismus befördert haben. Dieser wurde, so wird argumentiert, Grundlage der nationalsozialistischen Weltanschauung. In letzter Konsequenz habe deshalb der Relativismus zur rassistischen Vernichtungsdoktrin des Nationalsozialismus beigetragen.

Der Relativismus hat eine lange philosophische Tradition. Es soll deshalb der Frage nachgegangen werden, welche Philosophen, die den Nationalsozialismus unterstützten, in ihren Werken den Relativismus vertreten haben. Ich werde darlegen, daß die unterstellte Beziehung zwischen Relativismus und Nationalsozialismus eine folgenschwere Fiktion ist. Sie führt zu einer (gewollt) geschichtsverfälschenden Darstellung des Verhältnisses von Wissenschaft und Nationalsozialismus.

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Schlüsselwörter: Ideologie, Nationalsozialismus, Partikularismus, Rassenlehre, Rassismus, Relativismus, Universalismus

„Der Gedanke: »diese Wahrheit, die ich erkenne, ist *meine* Wahrheit und vielleicht die keines anderen« kann den einsamen nordischen Denker zwar wohl manches Mal befallen.¹ Aber er meint damit nur, daß ihm vielleicht allein der Zugang zu einer an-sich-selbst-bestehenden Sache beschieden sei, daß ihm der Vorstoß in einen irgendwie daseienden schwer betretbaren Raum gelang. *Es liegt ihm aber fern, diese »seine Wahrheit« als eine nur »relative«, d. h. nur bezogen auf ihn selbst geltende anzusehen, oder auch bezogen auf seinen Menschenschlag, sein Volkstum, seine Rasse. Denn das würde dem für die nordische Wissenschaft führenden Leistungsgedanken widersprechen.* Der echte unverbildete nordische Forscher wird niemals zugeben, daß die zaubergläubige Weltanschauung eines Kongonegers in ihrer Art ebenso gut sei wie die Ergebnisse seiner mühevollen Naturbeobachtungen und gewissenhaft durchdachten Schlußfolgerung. Er weiß vielmehr: er allein sieht die Natur so, wie sie ist.“ (Becker 1938: 82f. Hervorheb. v. mir)

Diese rassistische Aussage des Logikers und Philosophen Oskar Becker aus dem Jahre 1938 schließt in einfacher, klarer und eindeutiger Weise eine relativistische Auffassung der Erkenntnis aus. Sie schließt demnach aus,

1 Diese Abhandlung geht auf einen Vortrag zurück, den ich am 16. September 2015 im Martin-Niemöller-Haus auf Einladung des Fritz Bauer Instituts und der Evangelischen Akademie Frankfurt unter dem gleichnamigen Titel gehalten habe.

An dieser Stelle danke ich Christian Dries und Rainer Noske für die kritische Durchsicht und wertvollen Hinweise im Vorfeld dieser Druckfassung.

daß jede Erkenntnis, ganz gleich, welchen Ursprungs oder Inhalts sie ist, und ganz gleich, mit welchen Mitteln oder Methoden sie erbracht wurde, als gleichwertig oder gleichberechtigt zu erachten ist. Im Gegenteil! Der Rassist dieser Provenienz besteht auf einem *universellen*, nämlich komparativen *Maßstab*, damit seine erkenntnistheoretischen und wissenschaftlichen Leistungen, die das Produkt einer bestimmten Rasse sind, *objektiv* und in besonderer Weise hervorgehoben erscheinen.

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Dieser Standpunkt steht im deutlichen Widerspruch zu der nach dem Ende der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft vielerorts von Intellektuellen verbreiteten Auffassung, nach der die nationalsozialistische Rassendoktrin den Relativismus untermauert habe. Der Relativismus, so die einhellige Überzeugung, habe den universellen Standpunkt, insbesondere den der zweckfreien Würde und den gleicher Rechte eines jeden Menschen, unabhängig von seiner Herkunft und Überzeugung, unterlaufen. Erst durch diesen relativistischen Standpunkt wurde eine »Herrenmoral« ermöglicht, die es den Nationalsozialisten erlaubte, von einer Verschiedenwertigkeit der Rassen zu sprechen, die letztlich in die nationalsozialistische Doktrin einer Vernichtung der von ihnen als minderwertig deklarierten Rassen führte. Wir werden darauf zurückkommen.

Kritiker des Relativismus unterscheiden meist verschiedene Varianten des Relativismus: einen kulturellen, einen erkenntnistheoretischen, einen historischen sowie einen ethischen, den sogenannten Wertrelativismus.

Für die nachfolgenden Betrachtungen reicht es aus, sämtliche dieser Varianten (es sei denn, es soll die Auffassung eines anderen Autors wiedergegeben werden) unter dem allgemeinen Begriff »Relativismus« zu diskutieren. Denn worauf es allein ankommt, ist, den relativistischen Standpunkt in jeder dieser Varianten stets so hinzustellen, als negiere er jedweden allgemeinen Standpunkt – eine universelle Regel oder ein universelles Prinzip –, so daß „jeder beliebige Standpunkt soviel taugt wie jeder beliebige andere“, oder anders ausgedrückt, „*kein* Standpunkt [...] in höherem Maße gerechtfertigt oder richtig [ist] als irgendein anderer“ (Putnam 1990: 163).

Wenn also jeder beliebige Standpunkt so brauchbar ist wie jeder beliebige andere, dann könne man auch es nicht verhindern, wenn sich ein Einzelner, eine Klasse oder Gesellschaft über als universell gedachte Prinzipien etwa der Menschenwürde hinwegsetze. Genau diesen Beliebigkeitsstandpunkt aber hätten sich die Nationalsozialisten zu eigen gemacht, indem sie nicht nur die Verschiedenwertigkeit der Rassen proklamierten, sondern sich selbst, als Abkömmlinge der arischen Rasse, für so wertvoll erachteten, daß es ihnen folgerichtig erschien, weniger wertvolle Rassen zu vertreiben oder zu vernichten.

Im folgenden soll so getan werden, als handele es sich hierbei um eine korrekte Beschreibung des Relativismus.

In der bisher skizzierten Sachlage gibt es hinsichtlich der historischen Darstellung der nationalsozialistischen Doktrin noch einen klärungsbedürftigen Aspekt. Mit seltenen Ausnahmen (vgl. Strub 2009) sind sich Forscher, die sich mit dem Nationalsozialismus befassen, darüber einig, daß sich der Nationalsozialismus im Gegensatz zum Universalismus befände. Ein Teil der Forscher beläßt es bei dieser Feststellung. Dem Leser/Interpreten wird damit die Aufgabe überlassen, zu mutmaßen, was denn (exakt) das Gegenteil von Universalismus sei. Ein anderer Teil der Forscher beschreibt den Nationalsozialismus als einen Partikularismus, der sich ausdrücklich gegen den Universalismus positioniere (siehe beispielsweise Laugstien 1990: 78f.; Wolters 1999, 2004, 2009; Zimmermann 2009; Bialas 2009; Tugendhat 2009; Pauer-Studer 2009; Faye 2009). Die erste Auffassung, die einfach nur eine Opposition deklariert, eröffnet ein spekulatives Feld, auf dem sich nicht arbeiten läßt. Die zweite Auffassung, die auf das Partikularistische der nationalsozialistischen Ideologie verweist, verfängt sich in einem Begriffsgewirr: Entweder der Partikularismus beansprucht für sich, unter Berufung auf die unterschiedlichsten Überzeugungen, Interessen, Absichten, Neigungen von Menschen, die es zu berücksichtigen gelte, universelle Geltung – wahrscheinlich am einfachsten zum Ausdruck gebracht durch den freiheitlichen Grundsatz »Jedem das Seine« –, oder der Partikularismus wird implizit relativistisch verstanden, im Sinne der Negation eines für alle geltenden verbindlichen Maßstabs grundlegender Überzeugungen. Wenn sich also die historische Forschung nicht in einen Selbstwiderspruch verwickeln möchte, kann nur die zweite Lesart plausibel sein. Folgerichtig läßt sich alles, was über die Beziehung zwischen Relativismus und nationalsozialistischer Ideologie gesagt werden kann, gleichermaßen auch über die zwischen Partikularismus und nationalsozialistischer Ideologie geltend machen.

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Was ist nun davon zu halten, wenn Beckers griffige Abgrenzung gegen eine relativistische »Verwässerung« rassischer (nordischer) Leistung von vielen Intellektuellen unserer Tage einfach ignoriert wird, obwohl Becker selbst bis in die jüngste Gegenwart hinein noch als subtiler, philosophischer Denker geschätzt wird?² Oder anders gefragt, welche Einsicht hat die

2 Stellvertretend für viele andere sei hier Wolfram Högrefe zitiert: „[S]ein Werk [ist] immer noch überaus reich an kraftvoll herausgearbeiteten Einsichten und Stimulationen, von denen wir auch heute noch profitieren und sollten.“ (Högrefe 2009: 181). Högrefes Studie über Becker sollte als Musterbeispiel für eine gründliche Analyse des wissenschaftlichen Wirkens von Wissenschaftlern unter der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft gelten. Nüchtern wird hier aufgezeigt – allerdings ohne auf die hier zu diskutierende Relativismusproblematik einzugehen –, wie Becker bis in die logisch-mathematischen Grundlagen seines philosophischen Arbeitens nationalsozialistische Ideologeme verarbeitet. Oberflächlichkeiten wie Zugeständnisse an das nationalsozialistische Regime oder Übernahmen des nationalsozialistischen, politischen Vokabulars Beckers bleiben

historische Forschung dazu bewogen, im Relativismus/Partikularismus das gedankliche Konstrukt ausgemacht zu haben, das den Rassismus der Nationalsozialisten erklärt?

Sehen wir uns zunächst einige Thesen an, nach denen der Relativismus die nationalsozialistische Rassenlehre begünstigt haben soll.

Nach Dietrich Böhler läßt sich die Beziehung zwischen einer relativistischen Auffassung und dem Nationalsozialismus wie folgt herstellen: Der „geistig[e] Abweg in den Nationalsozialismus [...] ist die Denunzierung des Universalismus, insbesondere des politisch-ethischen Universalismus und die Zerstörung seiner kulturellen Realisierbarkeitsbedingungen.“ (Böhler 1988: 171) Deshalb könne man sich „die Aufklärung des Zusammenhangs von Kulturrelativismus und Rassismus, von Anti-Universalismus und Zerstörung des Rechts schlicht [nicht] erspar[en].“ (Ebd.: 177) Denn der Kulturrelativismus spiele „sowohl bei der [...] Relativierung von Moral und Recht auf eine besondere Kulturgemeinschaft bzw. Volksgemeinschaft als auch bei der damit verbundenen Einführung des Rassenstandpunkts“ (ebd.) eine Rolle.

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Die Rassenlehre ist sicherlich ein grundlegendes Element der nationalsozialistischen Weltanschauung. Nach Böhler gibt es einen unmittelbaren Zusammenhang zwischen dem relativistischen Standpunkt und der Rassenlehre: Denn „die kulturrelativistische Einebnung der universellen Geltung von Prinzipien [wird] durch einen biologischen Determinismus gerechtfertigt, der die Kulturen und kulturellen Besonderheiten auf die Rasse zurückführt.“ (Ebd.: 178)

Wir können demnach festhalten, daß der (1) „kulturrelativistische Standpunkt [...] durch eine biologische Determinationsthese [untermauert – Böhlers eigene Wortwahl, VB]“ (ebd.: 177) wird.

Die relativistische Auffassung führt nach (1) also angeblich direkt ins Zentrum der nationalsozialistischen Rassendoktrin. Damit scheint eine enge Beziehung zwischen dem Relativismus und allen aus der nationalsozialistischen Rassendoktrin folgenden menschenverachtenden Konsequenzen, von der Doktrin höher- und minderwertiger Rassen bis hin zur Rassenvernichtung, ausgemacht zu sein. Unmißverständlich wird dies durch Frank-Lothar Kroll zum Ausdruck gebracht: Das

„allgemein verbindlich[e] Menschheitsideal, welches alle Rassen und Kulturen unter dem Signum ihrer Gleichheit und Gleichberechtigung

in dieser Studie völlig außen vor. Gleichwohl oder gerade deshalb stellt sich die Frage, weshalb wir von Becker noch profitieren solltenjenseits einer Untersuchung über die Verstrickung nationalsozialistischer Wissenschaftler. Wissenschaftliche Arbeiten, die von nationalsozialistischen Überlegungen durchsetzt und deren theoretische Termini davon infiziert sind, können nicht mehr »gerettet« werden. Zu diesem Aspekt siehe auch meine Abhandlung über Erich Rothacker (Böhnigk 2012).

zusammengehalten hatte [..., g]erade dieses »universale« Menschenbild aber hatte [...] im Umgang mit fremden Kulturen die Aufrechterhaltung eines [...] Mindestmaßes an verbindlichen sittlich-moralischen Standards gewährleistet.“ (Kroll 1998: 116)

Indem die Nationalsozialisten diese universelle Auffassung durch eine „individualisierende, wertrelativistische Position“ (ebd.) ersetzten, wurde es möglich, „»fremdem« Menschentum [...] die elementarsten Lebensrechte vorzuenthalten und den Exzessen hemmungsloser [...] Repressionsmaßnahmen auszuliefern.“ (Ebd.)

Es ist klar und braucht nicht weiter verdeutlicht zu werden, daß mit solchen Einschätzungen, wie sie Böhler und Kroll vortragen, den Ideen des Relativismus und damit auch denen, die sie vertreten, eine im geschichtlichen Kontinuum stehende Mitverantwortung an den nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen zugeschrieben wird – und dies gilt einer philosophischen Auffassung, die sich immerhin auf eine weit mehr als zweitausend Jahre alte Tradition stützen kann.³

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Abgesehen von dem Eindruck einer gewissen Unredlichkeit, einer einzigen Auffassung soviel Gewicht beizumessen – als ob ein einziger Standpunkt die nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen erklären könnte –, wie steht es nun um das Verhältnis zwischen der eingangs zitierten Aussage Beckers, der den relativistischen Standpunkt explizit ablehnt, und den Darlegungen Böhlers und Krolls? Sollte sich Becker demnach über sich selbst getäuscht haben? Hat er uns etwa in die Irre geführt? War Becker also ein verkappter Relativist? Oder sind die behaupteten Zusammenhänge zwischen Relativismus/Partikularismus und nationalsozialistischer Rassenlehre eine Chimäre?

Weshalb eine Klärung dieser Fragen überhaupt von Wichtigkeit ist, ergibt sich vorderhand durch einen sehr einfachen Umstand. Wenn es auch nur annähernd stimmt, eine relativistische/partikularistische Auffassung stünde in irgendeiner signifikanten Beziehung zu nationalsozialistischen Überzeugungen, dann sollten sich unter den während der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft in Deutschland arbeitenden Philosophen von gewissem Rang doch solche benennen lassen, die relativistische/partikularistische Positionen vertraten. Etwa einer der folgenden Philosophen: Alfred Baeumler, Bruno Bauch, Otto F. Bollnow, Hugo Dingler, Carl A. Emge, Hans Freyer, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Arnold Gehlen, Nicolai Hartmann, Martin Heidegger, Heinz Heimsoeth, Hans Heyse, Theodor Litt, Joachim Ritter, Erich Rothacker oder Eduard Spranger, um die Auflistung hier abzurechnen. Allein, hierüber dürfte in der Zukunft problemlos Einigkeit zu erzielen sein, unter den Angeführten

³ Zum Relativismus und seiner Geschichte siehe Feyerabend (1989) sowie Böhnigk (1999).

findet sich kein Relativist/Partikularist. Demnach, so die Konsequenz aus den Thesen von Böhler und Kroll, kann es keine Philosophie gegeben haben, die auch nur irgendeine Nähe zum Nationalsozialismus aufweist oder zumindest vorgab, eine solche Nähe aufweisen zu wollen. Und in der Tat, weder der Philosoph Böhler noch der Historiker Kroll führen einen einzigen Philosophen zur Stützung ihrer These an. Nach einer Beziehung zwischen Philosophie und Nationalsozialismus zu suchen, scheint also ein sinnloses Unterfangen zu sein.

Diese Einstellung ist nicht verwunderlich, wie eine Durchsicht der historischen Darstellungen zum Verhältnis von Philosophie und Nationalsozialismus verrät. Im allgemeinen wird bestritten, es habe eine nationalsozialistische Philosophie gegeben. Die Gründe dafür, dies zu bestreiten, lassen sich in sechs Punkten zusammenfassen, die hier als *Separat-Theorie der Ideengeschichte* bezeichnet werden sollen. Dabei wird nicht verlangt, daß ein Vertreter dieser Separat-Theorie alle Standpunkte gleichzeitig vertritt, mindestens jedoch (2), (3) und (4). Die Separat-Theorie ist hier speziell auf die Philosophie zugeschnitten.

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- (1) Hitlers Weltanschauung – vielleicht noch neben Alfred Rosenbergs *Der Mythos der 20. Jahrhunderts* – enthält als einzige paradigmatische Elemente der geistigen Grundlagen des Nationalsozialismus. Sie präsentiert vorurteilsgeprägte politische und ideologische Versatzstücke⁴ und kommt ohne Rückbindung an ideengeschichtliche Traditionen aus.
- (2) Unter der nationalsozialistischen Regierungsherrschaft hat es keine geistigen Strömungen gegeben, die zusammenhängende oder geschlossene Ideen repräsentieren, die als »nationalsozialistisch« zu bezeichnen wären. Allenfalls finden sich hier und da ideologiedurchtränkte Versatzstücke vom Nationalsozialismus (meist auch nur kurzzeitig) verführter Geister. Geistige Querschläger⁵, die bei genauer Betrachtung gar keinen philosophischen und methodologischen Ansprüchen genügen (vgl. hierzu exemplarisch Wolters 1999: 233).
- (3) Aufgrund der von den Nationalsozialisten betriebenen Gleichschaltungspolitik hat es innerhalb der philosophischen und wissenschaftlichen Zunft keine umfassenden, als »kritisch« zu bezeichnenden ideellen Auseinandersetzungen gegeben. Allenfalls finden wir

4 Eberhard Jäckel (1981) bestreitet diese Auffassung energisch. Allerdings gewinnt man nur dann ein kohärentes Bild dieser Weltanschauung Hitlers, wenn man – wie Jäckel – *Hitlers Zweites Buch* (1928) mit heranzieht.

5 So gibt Golo Mann (1965: 17) zu Protokoll, daß ihm „das Ausgraben des uralten Unfugs, der in den dreißiger und vierziger Jahren von deutschen Professoren geschrieben wurde“, keine Freude wäre.

einzelne Autoren (Hartmann, Heidegger oder Jaspers zum Beispiel), deren Werke – u.U. als Ausdruck innerer Immigration – in dieser Zeit hervorzuheben sind.⁶

- (4) Eine sogenannte Philosophie oder Wissenschaftstheorie, die als »nationalsozialistisch« zu bezeichnen wäre, ist eine ahistorische, von jedweder ideengeschichtlichen Tradition entbundene und zusammenhangslose Weltanschauung.⁷ Daraus ergibt sich, daß »Weltanschauung« eine subjektive und interessengebundene Weltdeutung ist, während Philosophie und Wissenschaft auf objektive, universelle und intersubjektive Prinzipien bedachte sowie nach Wahrhaftigkeit strebende Disziplinen sind.⁸
- (5) Eine philosophische Überzeugung ist erst dann nationalsozialistisch, wenn sie zur Zeit der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft von 1933 bis 1945 artikuliert wurde (vgl. wiederum Wolters 1999: 233).
- (6) Um die Ausgestaltung der nationalsozialistischen Ideologie haben sich verschiedene im nationalsozialistischen Herrschaftsapparat eingebundene administrative Organisationen gestritten, nicht jedoch die Philosophen oder andere, an allgemeinen Ideen interessierte Theoretiker, denen die nationalsozialistischen Politiker und Strategen gleichgültig gegenüberstanden (siehe hierzu stellvertretend Gadamer 1990: 551).

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Wenn schon ein echter Zusammenhang zwischen Philosophie und Nationalsozialismus bestritten wird, hilft vielleicht zunächst ein andere Betrachtung weiter, um herauszufinden, was es mit dem Verhältnis von Relativismus/Partikularismus und Nationalsozialismus auf sich haben könnte.

Nachweislich bekannte sich die Mehrheit der oben aufgelisteten Philosophen öffentlich zum Nationalsozialismus.⁹ Zweifelsfrei setzten sich alle in dieser

6 Klare Vertreter dieser Auffassung sind Hans M. Baumgartner/Hans. M. Sass (1978) und Herbert H. Schnädelbach (1983).

7 So erklärt Sebastian Haffner (1998: 77): „[W]as die »nationalsozialistische Weltanschauung« genannt wird, dient keinem anderen Zweck, als diese Spezies [den nationalsozialistischen Typus] zusammenzuhalten [...] Dies erklärt, nebenbei bemerkt, das erstaunlich niedrige geistige Niveau ihrer »Weltanschauung«, die anderen politischen Doktrinen nicht vergleichbar ist und es im Grunde nicht verdient, bekämpft oder diskutiert zu werden. Ihre politischen Leitsätze und ihr politisches Programm bestehen aus zusammenhangslosen und unverdauten Phrasen, die aus drittklassiger »Aufklärungsliteratur« zusammengeklaut sind.“

8 Dies ist durchgängig die von Wolters (1999) vertretene Auffassung.

9 *Bekennnis der Professoren an den deutschen Universitäten und Hochschulen zu Adolf Hitler und dem nationalsozialistischen Staat* (o. J.); *Völkischer Beobachter* (1932a), (1932b), (1932c), (1932d), (1933), (1934).

Zu E. Spranger siehe u.a. seine Beiträge (1933a), (1933b: 2), (1938).

Von H. Dingler, H. Heimsoeth und H. Heyse sind öffentliche Bekenntnisse nicht bekannt, sie standen aber nicht minder den Nationalsozialisten nahe: Dingler ab 1933 Mitglied

Liste mit dem Nationalsozialismus auseinander, mehr oder weniger ausführlich, niemals oppositionell, immer nur um Auslegung bemüht und kritisch allenfalls dann, wenn es galt, Unschärfen in der nationalsozialistischen Doktrin zu beseitigen oder Präzisierungen vorzunehmen. Demnach hätten wir uns nun vorzustellen, daß diejenigen, die den Umgang mit gedanklichen Konstruktionen zu ihrem Beruf gemacht haben, zwar in ihren philosophischen Arbeiten den Relativismus/Partikularismus nicht akzeptierten oder ihn sogar ausdrücklich argumentativ bekämpften, doch zugleich für eine politische Strömung eintraten, die den Relativismus/Partikularismus durch ihre Rassendoktrin zur Grundauffassung ihrer Weltanschauung machte.

Es mag hier eingewendet werden, das Parteiprogramm der NSDAP sei viel zu vage und dürftig gewesen, um hierin auch nur annähernd und frühzeitig den Stellenwert zu erkennen, den die Rassenlehre für die Nationalsozialisten hatte.¹⁰ Aber dieser Einwand wäre zu kurzichtig.

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Um dies zu demonstrieren, muß nun gesagt werden, woher Böhler und Kroll ihre Relativismusthese beziehen. Sie ist entnommen aus Alfred Rosenbergs 1930 erstmals erschienenem Buch *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Dieses steht im Mittelpunkt ihrer Betrachtungen und im *Mythos* meinen die beiden Autoren Überlegungen vorzufinden, die sie ermutigen, von einer Beziehung zwischen relativistischer Auffassung und nationalsozialistischer Rassendoktrin zu sprechen.

Will man die nationalsozialistische Weltanschauung verstehen, so ist es unumgänglich, Rosenbergs *Mythos* heranzuziehen. Insofern ist das Vorgehen von Böhler und Kroll fraglos berechtigt. Es ist sogar ausdrücklich zu begrüßen, denn der *Mythos* wird von der historischen Forschung über den Nationalsozialismus immer noch viel zu sehr vernachlässigt.¹¹

der SS, ab 1936 SS-Ahnenerbe, ab 1940 NSDAP; Heimsoeth ab 1933 NSDAP, ab 1934 Schriftleitung der *Blätter für deutsche Philosophie*; Heyse ab 1933 NSDAP, 1937 Leiter und ab 1938 Präsident der Wissenschaftlichen Akademie des Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Dozentenbundes an der Universität Göttingen.

¹⁰ Immerhin konnte aber dem Programm der *Nationalsozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei*, mit Beschluß vom 24. Februar 1920, folgendes entnommen werden: „4. Staatsbürger kann nur sein, wer Volksgenosse ist. Volksgenosse kann nur sein, wer deutschen Blutes ist, ohne Rücksichtnahme auf Konfession. Kein Jude kann daher Volksgenosse sein.“ Ferner: „7. Wir fordern, daß sich der Staat verpflichtet, in erster Linie für die Erwerbs- und Lebensmöglichkeit der Staatsbürger zu sorgen. Wenn es nicht möglich ist, die Gesamtbevölkerung des Staates zu ernähren, so sind die Angehörigen fremder Nationen (Nicht-Staatsbürger) aus dem Reiche auszuweisen.“ Und: „8. Jede weitere Einwanderung Nicht-Deutscher ist zu verhindern. Wir fordern, daß alle Nicht-Deutschen, die seit 2. August 1914 in Deutschland eingewandert sind, sofort zum Verlassen des Reiches gezwungen werden.“

¹¹ Noch im Jahr 1998 konnte Claus-Ekkehard Bärsch in seiner hervorragenden Studie für sich in Anspruch nehmen, daß „[m]it dieser Arbeit [...] ein neuer Weg zur Beurteilung des Nationalsozialismus eingeschlagen [wird]. Neu ist der Versuch, den

Der Begriff »Relativismus« wird im *Mythus* nicht verwendet, auch nicht dem Sinn nach. Der einmalige Gebrauch des Adjektivs »relativ« steht in folgendem Kontext:

„Der Individualismus ist ebenso als »relativ« erkannt wie der uferlose Universalismus. Beide erstrebten erneut eine logisch faßbare Summe ihres Suchens und sind daran zerschellt. Hier tritt die organische völkische Weltanschauung in ihr Recht, wie sie von jeher sich Bahn gebrochen hatte, wenn mechanistischer Individualismus und schematischer Universalismus die Welt in Ketten legen wollten. Die Systematiker der Philosophie sind über diese Zeugnisse des nordischen Daseins instinktos hinweggegangen, weil das Wesen dieses willenhaften Dranges kein logisches System darstellt, sondern ein Fluten der Seele bedeutet. Heute verlangt diese echt organische Weltanschauung inmitten der zusammenbrechenden atomistischen Epoche mehr als früher: ihr Recht, ihr H e r r e n recht: vom Zentrum der Ehre als Höchstwert der nordisch-abendländischen Welt soll sie mit beschwingender Seligkeit ihren Mittelpunkt erleben und sich das Leben unerschrocken neu gestalten.“ (Rosenberg 1942: 694f.)

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Nach Rosenberg bedeutet Individualismus *sozial-psychologisch* Atomisierung, Bindungs- u. Orientierungslosigkeit; Universalismus bedeutet *epistemologisch* Abstraktion, Formalismus, Schematismus, Inhaltsleere.

Die Aufhebung ist ihm zufolge die organisch völkische Einordnung des Menschen über Blut, Rasse, Herkunft; der Individualismus wird aufgehoben in einen gehaltvollen Universalismus; der abstrakte Universalismus zurückgebunden an die (durch Herkunft bestimmte, blutsmäßige) »Lebenswelt«.

Der Begriff »Partikularismus« wird einmal benutzt und fällt im Zusammenhang mit der Diskussion, ob Deutschland einer europäischen Förderation angehören könne, somit also seine nationalstaatliche Souveränität – in welcher Dimension auch immer – abzutreten bereit wäre. Rosenberg spricht hier „von der beschränkten Selbstgenügsamkeit des Partikularismus“ (Rosenberg 1942: 474), eine Äußerung, die sich ganz klar auf den Verzicht nationalstaatlicher Souveränität zugunsten einer europäischen Förderation bezieht. (Eine Fragestellung, die uns wahrlich auch in unserem gegenwärtigen Europa geläufig sein dürfte.) Jedenfalls hat diese Verwendung des Begriffs »Partikularismus« keinerlei Konnotation zur Opposition »Partikularismus vs. Universalismus«.

Wenn jedoch dem *Mythus* ein bedeutender Stellenwert bei der Ausgestaltung der nationalsozialistischen Weltanschauung eingeräumt wird, dann muß hervorgehoben werden, welche außerordentliche Informationsquelle der *Mythus* im Hinblick auf die Rassendoktrin des Nationalsozialismus darstellt. Denn viele der von den Nationalsozialisten ab dem Jahr 1933 getroffenen

Nationalsozialismus durch eine umfangreiche Darstellung und intensive Auslegung von Texten zu verstehen.“ (Bärsch 1998: 9).

Maßnahmen zur Rassenpolitik und Eugenik werden hier ausdrücklich angekündigt. Gleich hinzuzufügen ist, expliziter formuliert, als in Adolf Hitlers *Mein Kampf*. Dies möge nicht als die Feststellung eines Nachgeborenen begriffen werden, der mit einer gewissen moralischen Attitüde den damaligen Zeitgenossen vorhalten möchte, »hättet ihr den Mythos damals gelesen, hättet ihr schon früher Bescheid wissen können«. Eine solche Vorhaltung wäre aus mehreren Gründen hinfällig.

Nicht nur in seiner Funktion als Hauptschriftleiter des *Völkischen Beobachters* und anderer Presseorgane der NSDAP, sondern auch durch seine sonstige umfangreiche Publikationstätigkeit sich rasch verbreitender Schriften galt Rosenberg schon lange vor 1933 als einer der führenden ideologischen Köpfe der Nationalsozialisten. Wer das politisch-gesellschaftliche Geschehen verfolgte, dem konnte es kaum entgehen, als 1930 der *Mythus* erschien – und Aufmerksamkeit wurde diesem Buch auch zuteil; bereits 1933 war der *Mythus* ein Bestseller. Doch lassen wir eine zeitgenössische Stimme dieser Jahre zu Wort kommen, dargeboten als Vortrag und als gedruckte evangelische »Volksmiissions-Ausgabe« in Umlauf gebracht:

„Die folgenden Ausführungen haben den Zweck, evangelische Leser vertraut zu machen mit dem Inhalt eines Buches [des *Mythus*], das zweifellos gegenwärtig zu den meistgelesenen [sic!] in Deutschland gehört. [...] Wer Alfred Rosenberg ist, brauche ich nicht erst zu sagen. Schon lange vor der Machtergreifung war er als Schriftleiter des *Völkischen Beobachters* und als Gründer und Vorsitzender des Kampfbundes für deutsche Kultur eine bekannte Persönlichkeit.“ (Florin o.J.: 3)

Es ist kaum vorstellbar, weshalb dieser soviel Aufsehen erregende *Mythus* ausgerechnet von den Berufsdenkern unbemerkt geblieben sein sollte, und dies, obwohl er oder gerade weil er durch seinen Untertitel »Eine Wertung der seelisch-geistigen Gestaltenkämpfe unserer Zeit« die Neugier eines Philosophen wecken mußte. Zudem rezipierten einige der oben in der Liste angeführten Philosophen – bereits frühzeitig – Rosenbergs *Mythus*. Hier ist Rothacker ein interessanter Fall, nicht nur, weil er in seiner *Geschichtsphilosophie* von 1934 Rosenbergs *Mythus* wohlwollend hervorhebt, sondern auch, weil Rothacker als jemand herausgestellt wird, für den sich das „geisteswissenschaftliche Wirklichkeitsproblem [...] zu dem historischen Relativismusproblem [verdichtet, das es] zu lösen“ (Perpeet 1968: 107) gelte. Rothacker möchte also den Relativismus philosophisch überwinden, betont aber zugleich, daß

„[d]as eigentliche Gewicht der [...] politischen Konsequenzen des Rassegedankens [...] vor allem in seinem unzerstörbar aristokratischen Charakter [liegt. Und d]aß dieser Zug zunächst mit dem *Führergedanken* in besonders glücklichem Einklang steht [...] und ebenso zu dem von A. Rosenberg besonders verdienstlich betonten und mit dem Rassebewußtsein verknüpften Prinzip der *Ehre*.“ (Rothacker 1934: 147)

Ein anderer, besonders eklatanter Fall aus der obigen Liste der Philosophen ist Baeumler.¹² Dieser hat sich nicht nur ausdrücklich als Nationalsozialist bezeichnet; als Direktor des eigens für ihn geschaffenen *Instituts für Politische Pädagogik* in Berlin an vorderster Stelle um den wissenschaftlichen Ausbau der nationalsozialistischen Weltanschauung bemüht; eine wie alle seine philosophischen Arbeiten in bestechender Rhetorik verfaßte Würdigung des *Mythus* vorgelegt (siehe Baeumler 1943), sondern auch den Relativismus strikt abgelehnt. Aber wir sollten in diesem Zusammenhang nicht den Philosophen Ernst Kriek vergessen. Ein glühender Verfechter des Nationalsozialismus, der sich in einem umfangreichen Schrifttum um die philosophische Ausgestaltung der nationalsozialistischen Ideologie bemüht hat und festhält:

„Von jeher habe ich den Relativismus mit aller Schärfe bekämpft und abgelehnt. [...] Wir sind gerade aus unserer Wahrerkenntnis heraus, die keinen Relativismus und keinen Absolutismus gestattet, *ehrlicher, wahrhaftiger und bescheidener* als jene.“ (Kriek 1935: 317f.)

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Beispiele dieser Art ließen sich hier reihenweise anführen. Sie würden uns allesamt das gleiche Bild vor Augen führen wie die soeben herausgegriffenen: Die Philosophen aus der oben angeführten Liste¹³ müßten entweder einem Spaltungsirrsinn unterlegen sein, der sie dazu brachte, als »Privatperson« für die relativistisch-nationalsozialistische Rassendoktrin einzutreten, während sie als »Philosophen« diese ablehnten; die relativistisch-nationalsozialistische Rassendoktrin nicht erkannt, gar verstanden, oder ihre philosophischen Standpunkte bis zur Selbstverleugnung niedergelegt haben.

Es sind allerdings noch zwei weitere Erklärungsvarianten denkbar, die auch gleich als Einwände gegen die bisherige Darstellung vorgebracht werden könnten. Die eine wäre, Rosenbergs *Mythus* habe nicht als offizielle Schrift der NSDAP gegolten, und den Philosophen konnte deshalb nicht klar sein, eine relativistisch-nationalsozialistische Rassendoktrin zu unterstützen, als sie öffentlich für die NSDAP eintraten. Diese Behauptung liefe darauf hinaus, Philosophen hätten sich um die politischen Ereignisse in Deutschland wenig bis gar nicht gekümmert, weshalb ihnen die bedeutende Rolle, die Rosenbergs weltanschauliche Darlegungen für die NSDAP hatten, entgangen wäre. Eine solche Überlegung scheint äußerst abwegig zu sein. Dennoch ist sie nicht so

12 Auch wenn Baeumlers Entstehen für den Nationalsozialismus über jedweden Zweifel erhaben ist, so gelten doch seine Arbeiten zu Kant, zur Romantik und Ästhetik immer noch als höchst konsultierenswert u.a.: *Das Problem der Allgemeingültigkeit in Kants Ästhetik* (1915); *Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der Ästhetik und Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Kritik der Urteilskraft* (1923); *Der Mythus von Orient und Occident* (1926) sowie die Darstellung zur Geschichte der Ästhetik (1934).

13 Kriek habe ich wie viele andere Philosophen, beispielsweise Max Wundt, in die oben angeführte Liste nicht aufgenommen, da sie heutzutage im philosophischen Curriculum keine Rolle mehr spielen, während die gelisteten Philosophen immer noch Gegenstand von Forschung und Lehre sind.

weit hergeholt. Denn es gibt seit 1945 eine ganz klare Tendenz, eine wie auch immer geartete Einlassung von Wissenschaftlern zum Nationalsozialismus aus der *unpolitischen* Einstellung des Wissenschaftlers heraus zu entschuldigen und sie als weltanschaulich irrelevant wegzuerklären.

Die andere Erklärungsvariante wäre die, die uns bereits durch zahlreiche Intellektuelle im Zusammenhang mit Hitlers *Mein Kampf* nahegebracht wurde, nämlich, Rosenbergs *Mythus* sei zwar viel verkauft, aber dennoch nicht gelesen worden, folglich mußte eine genauere Kenntnis der nationalsozialistischen Vorstellungen ausbleiben.¹⁴ Nun, diese Erklärung hatte noch nie sonderliche Überzeugungskraft. Denn in ihr steckt offensichtlich eine Tatsachenbehauptung, die nicht nur jeder empirischen Stütze entbehrt, sondern, selbst wenn sie je als Hypothese gefaßt worden wäre, wohl kaum hätte empirisch bestätigt werden können. Davon abgesehen ist diese Erklärung methodisch beweislasterig, da sie kontraintuitiv unterstellt, man habe mit Absicht ein Buch erworben, nicht um es zu lesen, sondern um es zu besitzen. Eine schwächere Form dieser Erklärungsvariante besteht darin – auch diese ist allgemein geläufig, beim *Mythus* wie auch bei *Mein Kampf* handele es sich um schriftstellerisch minderwertige, pseudointellektuelle Pamphlete, denen entweder aufgrund der kruden Darstellung nicht gefolgt werden konnte oder die einem frühzeitig die Lektürelust verderben. Feststellungen dieser Art werden – davon ist jedenfalls auszugehen – erst nach erfolgter Lektüre getroffen.¹⁵ Aber auch dies ist im eigentlichen Sinne keine Erklärung, sondern offenbart einen gewissen Hochmut. Denn weshalb es für diejenigen Intellektuellen, die zu derartigen Urteilen gelangen, möglich ist, diese Werke zu lesen, und für den offensichtlich gemeinen Menschen auf der Straße nicht, muß dann ein Rätsel bleiben.¹⁶

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14 Nachzulesen etwa bei Norman Cohn (1969: 248 f.), der sogar behauptet, daß schon gar nicht die führenden Nationalsozialisten den *Mythus* Rosenbergs gelesen hätten. Auch Hitlers *Mein Kampf* sei nach Ansicht Cohns nicht gelesen worden (vgl. ebd.: 256). Aber bezüglich dieser Behauptung steht Cohn wahrlich nicht alleine da.

15 So vermerkt Cohn (1969: 251): „Rosenberg war ein schlichtes Gemüt und glaubte an den Unsinn, den er schrieb.“ Bei Georg Lukács (1962) lesen wir über Rosenberg: „[G]erade wegen seiner moralischen und intellektuellen Minderwertigkeit ist Rosenberg zum geeigneten Ideologen des Nationalsozialismus geworden.“ (14) Und über Hitler urteilt Lukács: „Hitler selbst war viel zu ungebildet und überzeugungslos-zynisch, um in irgendeiner Weltanschauung mehr zu sehen als ein augenblicklich wirksames Agitationsmittel“ (472), wobei Hitlers Agitationstechnik eine Produkt des amerikanischen Reklamewesens sei (vgl. ebd.). Nun, bei so viel geistiger Minderbemitteltheit fragt man sich, wie es dazu kommen konnte, daß „Hitler und Rosenberg [...] alles, was über irrationalen Pessimismus von Nietzsche und Dilthey bis Heidegger und Jaspers auf den Lehrstühlen, in den intellektuellen Salons und Cafés gesprochen wurde, auf die Straße“ (78) trugen.

16 Möglich ist auch, mit solchen Bemerkungen nur zu unterstreichen, welch intellektuelle Last zu tragen war, sich durch diese Werke hindurchgekämpft zu haben. So stellt Wolters (1999: 224) fest: „Ich habe mich bei der Vorbereitung dieser Arbeit durch *Mein Kampf* [...] hindurchgearbeitet – was eigentlich eine Art Erschwerniszulage verdiente.“

Ich fasse das Bisherige kurz zusammen: Nach einer bestimmten, in der historischen Forschung tonangebenden Auffassung sollen die in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren weitverbreiteten Rassenlehren einen Relativismus/Partikularismus befördert haben, der zur Grundlage der nationalsozialistischen Weltanschauung wurde. In letzter Konsequenz habe deshalb der Relativismus/Partikularismus zur rassistischen Vernichtungsdoktrin des Nationalsozialismus beigetragen. Da der Relativismus/Partikularismus auf einer langen philosophischen Tradition fußt, war es naheliegend zu fragen, welche Philosophen, die den Nationalsozialismus unterstützten, in ihren Werken den Relativismus/Partikularismus verfochten. Doch kein Philosoph, der irgendwann einmal öffentlich für den Nationalsozialismus eingetreten ist, hat in seinen philosophischen Arbeiten einen Relativismus/Partikularismus vertreten, ja diesen sogar mehr oder weniger vehement abgelehnt. Dieses Ergebnis legt den Verdacht nahe, daß die unterstellte Beziehung zwischen Relativismus/Partikularismus und Nationalsozialismus eine Chimäre ist und, indem dieser Relativismus/Partikularismus vermeintlich nur von nationalsozialistischen Ideologen (wie Rosenberg) vertreten wurde, es eine nationalsozialistische Philosophie nicht gegeben habe. Dieser letzte Aspekt findet wiederum seinen Niederschlag in der Separat-Theorie der Ideengeschichte.

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Während sich mit einer Chimäre vielleicht noch leben läßt, bestimmt die Separat-Theorie in weiten Teilen die Perspektive der historischen Forschung und führt zu einer ignoranten, gar geschichtsverfälschenden Darstellung des Verhältnisses von Wissenschaft und Nationalsozialismus. Der Separat-Theorie gebührt daher wohl kaum eine nachsichtige Behandlung.

Abschließend möchte ich in Umkehrung einer Abhandlung von Étienne Balibar fragen: Ist der Universalismus ein Rassismus?

Der Begriff »Menschheit« führt eine grundlegende Unterscheidung ein, die den Rassismus befähigt, seine Wirkung zu entfalten. Denn »Menschheit« kann nur »definiert« werden, wenn es eine klare Grenze zwischen dem *Menschlichen* und dem *Nicht-Menschlichen* gibt. Der Universalismus muß nach Balibar

„sobald er aufhört, ein simples Wort, eine mögliche Philosophie zu sein, um ein System expliziter Konzepte zu werden, notwendigerweise *sein Gegenteil in sich enthalten* [...] Es ist selbst den größten »laizistischen« Philosophen unmöglich, den *logos* zu definieren, ohne ihn von einer anthropologischen und ontologischen Hierarchie abhängig zu machen.“ (Balibar 2006: 235)

Jede Bestimmung der menschlichen Gattung erzwingt eine spezifizierende Hierarchisierung im Kontinuum der Lebewesen, die in der Regel mit der Vernunftbegabung des »Menschen« im Gegensatz zu anderen Lebewesen

begründet wird. Eine bestimmte Idee des »Menschen« muß also vorhanden sein, bevor eine Einordnung in »Mensch« bzw. »Nicht-Mensch« erfolgen kann. Die allgemeine Idee des »Menschen« wird an einem anzustrebenden Ideal des »Menschlichen« gemessen, das eine Hierarchie im Kontinuum des »Menschen« selbst festschraubt. Damit ergibt sich die Möglichkeit, immer weitergehende Unterscheidungen und Grenzziehungen innerhalb der »Menschheit« wie »Rasse«, »Volk«, »Ethnie«, »Stamm«, »Geschlecht« einzuführen. Die Tür zur Verdinglichung von Menschen ist geöffnet; je nachdem, wie weit sie in der Lage sind, sich dem vorformulierten Ideal des »Menschen« annähern zu können (vgl. ebd.: 235f.). Die Abspaltung von Menschen vom »(idealen) Menschen« kann so weit führen, daß bestimmte Menschen wieder aus der Gattung ausgestoßen werden. Bei vollständiger Ablehnung des »Anderen«, mitsamt aller von ihm hervorgebrachten »kulturellen« Formen moralischer, religiöser, gesellschaftlicher und ästhetischer Art, wird er als »barbarisch« oder »wild« eingeordnet und damit in eine Kategorie des Tierischen versetzt. Denn alles, so Claude Lévi-Strauss, „was nicht der Norm entspricht, nach der man selber lebt, wird aus der Kultur in den Bereich der Natur verwiesen.“ (Lévi-Strauss 1992: 369)

Es ergibt sich somit das Paradox, daß der Ausschluß der »Barbaren« durch die selbsternannten »Menschen«, selbst ein »barbarischer« Akt ist. Aber auch die Ausgegrenzten sind in ihrer Zwangslage zum Bruch mit menschlichen Konventionen verdammt.

Selbst wenn Rassismus und Universalismus nicht als eine funktionelle Einheit verstanden werden, sind sie nicht klar voneinander zu trennen. Deshalb ist auch keineswegs gewiß, weshalb der Universalismus nicht vom Rassismus kontaminiert sein könnte (siehe Balibar 2006: 237).

Dieser (mögliche) innere Zusammenhang von Rassismus und der Idee des »Menschen« macht deutlich, weshalb der Universalismus nicht in der Lage ist, den Rassismus zu beseitigen. Der Rassismus ist eine *Denkweise* (vgl. ebd.: 238), die nach Selbsterkenntnis fragt, um einen Standort in der universalistischen Matrix von sich alles einverleibenden kollektiven Identitäten einnehmen zu können. Nach Balibar ist die rassistische Denkweise „eine Produktionsweise »der eigenen Gemeinschaft«, der *rassistischen Gemeinschaft* [...], und zugleich einer Interpretationsweise der sozialen Welt, in der diese Gemeinschaft situiert werden kann.“ (Ebd.: 239f.)

Die rassistischen Interpretationsmuster des Konkreten haben die Tendenz, sich einen universalistischen Standort zuzuschreiben, von dem aus sie eine Bewertung des »Anderen« auf der Grundlage des »Eigenen« vornehmen. Das Andere wird nicht aus dem Blickwinkel seiner Eigenständigkeit, seiner *physis*, verstanden, sondern immer schon in einen allgemeinen Geltungsbereich eines bestimmenden Besonderen integriert.

Weder die Philosophen aus der obigen Liste und ihre mehr oder weniger engen philosophischen Verbindungen zur nationalsozialistischen Ideologie noch die Rassenideologie der Nationalsozialisten selbst lassen sich verstehen, wenn der Zusammenhang von Rassismus und Universalismus nicht ernsthaft in den Blick genommen, sondern einfach brüsk abgewiesen wird.

Die von Böhler in (1) herausgestellte biologische Determinationsthese der Nationalsozialisten soll nicht bestritten werden. Zu klären wäre jedoch, ob es sich bei den rassistisch-biologischen Vorstellungen der Nationalsozialisten um eine strikte oder emergente Determination handelt, was an dieser Stelle nicht weiter erörtert werden kann.

Die rassistisch-biologische Determinationsthese wird desweiteren durch verschiedene Varianten von Rassenlehren unterstützt. Ob die im Sinne der nationalsozialistischen Ideologie herangezogenen Rassenlehren untereinander kompatibel sind, kann hier ebenfalls nicht ausgeführt werden. Festgehalten werden darf jedoch, daß die rassistisch-biologische Herkunft eines Menschen im Sinne der Rassenideologen nicht nur seine Physiognomie, sondern auch sein ideelles und kulturelles Dasein bestimmt. Es ist naheliegend, diese aufgestellte Beziehung als eine allgemeine Theorie über den Menschen aufzufassen. Wenn wir uns nicht allein mit der empirischen Seite dieser Beziehung auseinandersetzen wollen, die dann auf das Gebiet der Erblehre und Genetik führt, sondern mit der allgemeinen Frage, wie es überhaupt denkbar ist, einen Zusammenhang von rassistisch-biologischer Herkunft und geistigen oder kulturellen Prozessen herzustellen, dann begeben wir uns auf das Gebiet der (philosophischen) Anthropologie.

Wir werden demnach zu fragen haben, ob es anspruchsvolle und weithin akzeptierte anthropologische Theorien gibt, die mit der nationalsozialistischen Weltanschauung verträglich sind, was insbesondere heißt, daß sie sich in Übereinstimmung mit der These einer direkten Abhängigkeit von rassistisch-biologischen bis hin zu geistigen oder kulturellen Prozessen befinden.¹⁷

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17 An anderer Stelle ist bereits gezeigt worden, daß Erich Rothacker mit seiner Kulturanthropologie eine nationalsozialistische Anthropologie verfaßt hat, die den unmittelbaren Zusammenhang von Rassen, deren Rassenwert und Kulturformen philosophisch begründet (siehe Böhnigk 2002). Demnächst werde ich aufzeigen, welche philosophischen Beiträge Arnold Gehlen und Nicolai Hartmann zur Fundierung einer nationalsozialistischen Anthropologie geleistet haben.

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Volker Böhnigk

A Relationship Between Relativism and Nazism. Fact or fiction?

Abstract

According to a certain view that is dominant in historical research, the wide-spread racial doctrines of the twenties and thirties of the last century is said to have advanced relativism. It is argued, that relativism then became the foundation of National Socialist ideology. In the last instance, relativism is accused of having contributed to the Nazi doctrine of racial extermination.

Relativism has a long philosophical tradition. The aim of this investigation is to find out how many of the philosophers who supported National Socialism actually held relativistic views. I will show that the assumed correlation between Relativism and National Socialism is a momentous fiction, which paved the way for an (intentional) misrepresentation of the relationship between science and National Socialism.

Keywords: Ideology, Nazism, particularism, raciology, racism, relativism, universalism

Folker Benig

Odnos između relativizma i nacionalsocijalizma. Činjenica ili fikcija?

Sažetak

Prema jednom određenom, u istorijskom istraživanju uticajnom shvatanju dvadesetih i tridesetih godina prošlog veka, rasprostranjene rasne teorije su promovisale relativizam. Relativizam je, tako je glasila argumentacija, postao osnova nacionalsocijalističkog pogleda na svet. Stoga je, na koncu, on i doprineo nacionalsocijalističkoj rasnoj doktrini uništenja. Relativizam poseduje dugu filozofsku tradiciju. Zbog toga treba da se pođe tragom pitanja koji su to filozofi, koji su podržavali nacionalsocijalizam, zastupali relativizam u svojim delima. Objasniću zbog čega je taj podmetnuti odnos relativizma i nacionalsocijalizma fikcija koja ima ozbiljne posledice. Ona vodi ka (željenoj) istorijskoj falsifikaciji odnosa nauke i nacionalsocijalizma.

Ključne reči: Ideologija, Nacionalsocijalizam, partikularizam, rasno učenje, rasizam, relativizam, univerzalizam

Đorđe Pavićević

Politički mesijanizam i demokratija: o mogućnosti političke samotransformacije demokratije

Sažetak Tekst se bavi odnosom političkog mesijanizma i rasprava o krizi demokratije. Pojmovni okvir političkog mesijanizma je pogodno analitičko oruđe jer u njemu pojam krize čini polaznu tačku na osnovu koje se formulišu različite politike izbjavljenja. Analizirana su tri shvatanja političkog mesijanizma: kao revolucionarne politike, kako kritičkog oruđa i kao otvorene mogućnosti radikalne promene. U sva tri slučaja pokazuje se da duboka uverenja imaju važnu ulogu u politici i da nije moguće imunizovati politički poredak od njih. U drugom delu teksta ukazuje se na značaj ovih uvida za razumevanje diskursa o krizi demokratije čiji važan deo čini gubitak vere u sposobnost demokratskih ustanova da formulišu okvir za smisaono političko delovanje građana. Usled toga, došlo je do transformacije pojma demokratije koji sada političko delovanje građana-amatera vidi kao smetnju. Takvo stanje proizvodi napetosti koji opterećuju funkcionisanje demokratskih režima. U zaključku se konstatuje da savremene demokratije nisu u stanju da obnove veru u osnove svog postojanja sve dok insistiraju na primatu forme demokratije, koja je u međuvremenu postala norma, a koja nije u stanju da uveri građane u svoje intrinzične vrednosti.

Ključne reči: politički mesijanizam, izbjavljenje, kriza demokratije, politička vera, obnova

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Demokratija je u poslednjih nekoliko decenija u neobičnom stanju. S jedne strane, postoji kontinuirani diskurs o deficitima i krizi demokratije koji se reflektuje i u akademskim raspravama i u razočarenju građana u učinke demokratske politike. Problematizovani su i dovedeni u pitanje politički pojmovi i obećanja koji su bili deo projekta realizacija demokratskih vrednosti i nosili teret političkog obećanja: opšta volja, javni interes, predstavljanje, fer i slobodni izbori, odgovorna vlada, itd. S druge strane, postoji ideološka hegemonija bez presedana. Ne samo da u političkoj ponudi ne postoji verodostojan konkurent demokratiji, nego je ona postala i briga međunarodne zajednice. (Schmitter 1997; Diamond 1997). Malo ko i pomišlja da bi u političkom prostoru bilo kakvu šansu imao režim koji ne bi prigrabio etiketu demokratski. Stanje, međutim, donedavno nije bilo tako. Ideološki pritisci i teorijski izazovi upućeni demokratiji u prošlosti govore o tome. Anti-demokratski diskurs i nepoverenje prema demokratiji dominirali su tokom većeg dela političke istorije i političke filozofije. Demokrate i demokratski teoretičari u prošlosti trudili su se da odbrane javnu veru u sposobnost demokratskih ustanova da istovremeno izlaze na kraj sa tekućim problemima i realizuju velike vrednosti iz prtljaga demokratske teorije i arsenala političkih obećanja. Svaki režim ima problem ukoliko zaboravi da svoje postojanje duguje neuslovljenim verovanjima

i ukoliko ne može da okrepi uverenja građana onda kada je to potrebno. Ovo pitanje posebno je osetljivo za demokratije, jer svoje postojanje i svoje opravdanje onezasnivaju na uverenjima i preferencijama građana.

Da li opisano stanje stvari predstavlja problem za demokratiju? Da li su ovako generisana očekivanja samo deo prtljaga političke filozofije koji nepotrebno opterećuje funkcionisanje demokratskih ustanova? Nemoguće je direktno odgovoriti na ova pitanja, jer demokratija je previše složen pojam sa mnogo nesamerljivih shvatanja i uzaludno (i prezahtevno) bi bilo tragati za jedinstvenom i koherentnom listom izneverenih obećanja i nerealizovanih vrednosti. Ova pitanja pokušaću da kontekstualizujem kroz jedan često uzurpirani i zloupotrebljavani politički diskurs koji ima religijske korene, politički mesijanizam. To je diskurs koji duboku krizu stavlja u temelje politike, a svoju transformativnu moć zasniva na verodostojnosti obećanja, odanosti i veri. Odlike mesijanskog diskursa mogu se prepoznati pod različitim imenima: politika vere, politika nade, politika izbacivanja/iskupljenja ili politika spasenja. On ukazuje na jednu pomalo zanemarenu stranu politike: njenu sposobnost da generiše duboka uverenja da pre-političke¹ ideje i vizije mogu da se realizuju u datom socijalnom i političkom okruženju, ili pruže orijentaciju u složenim političkim poslovima.

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Razmaranje mesijanizma i mesijanske politike vodi nas u osetljivo područje koje se graniči sa nekim opasnim političkim fenomenima: fundamentalizmom, fanatizmom ili militantnom politikom. U pitanju je područje u kome se sukobljavaju različite vizije, često avanturističke, sulude, diskriminatorne, čak i nasilne i ratoborne.² Ipak, kretanje po „minskom polju“ mesijanizma otkriva skrivene strane politike, one koje svaki režim, jednom kada se institucionalizuje, želi da skloni sa političke agende. Svaki režim svoje uspostavljanje duguje najpre kontigentnim mesijanskim vizijama i vizionarima koji su videli rešenje, a onda onima koji su podneli žrtvu jer su poverovali da ova uverenja mogu sama sebe naknadno da opravdaju. Jednom kada je uspostavljen, poredak više ne trpi ovu političku formu i institucionalno se imunizuje od nje. Ali, kada su putevi za nove političke artikulacije kolektivnog života zatvoreni, sistem postaje slep da identifikuje sistemske krize i nesposoban da ih rešava. Različiti vansistemski (ili polusistemski) izbaviteljski predlozi i poduhvati, koje ovde nazivamo mesijanske politike, skreću pažnju na to da demokratski režimi, prolazeći kroz različite transformacije, mogu izgubiti obeležja demokratije, a da niko to ne primeti. Svetska

1 Upotreba pojma pre-politički nije najsrećnije rešenje, čega je autor bolno svestan, jer se zahtevi izraženi u ovim idejama i vizijama mogu tumačiti kao politički, odnosno proto-politički. Ovaj pojam se u ovom tekstu odnosi na one ideje i vizije koje su izvan vidokruga institucionalne politike ili javne političke kulture.

2 „U apokalipsi se tako križaju dvije predodžbe mesije: ratoboran mesija židovskog naroda, koji dolazi suditi moći svijeta, i rođenje kojega se tek očekuje, te mesija u obličju jaganjca, koji se već pojavio“ (Taubes 2009: 92-93)

ekonomska kriza nakon 2008. godine delom je ogolila procese odlučivanja u postojećim demokratskim režimima i (još jednom) ukazala na njihovu suštinsku nesposobnost da formulišu demokratske odgovore na duboke društvene probleme.

U nastavku ću najpre razmotriti tri različita shvatanja pojma političkog mesijanizma da bi pokazao na koji način on može biti relevantan za raspravu o krizi demokratije. On ukazuje na jednu neuklonjivu odliku politike koju politička nauka često zanemaruje, a to je mogućnost kolektivnog „izbavljenja“ kroz politiku. Nakon toga, pokušaću da pokažem zašto kritikovana nesposobnost da se „pre-politička“ očekivanja i vizije prevedu u „politike izbavljenja“ (drugačiji rečnikom: emancipatorske politike) predstavlja problem za demokratske ustanove.

646 **Politički mesijanizam: od revolucionarne politike i kritičkog oruđa do otvorene mogućnosti radikalne promene**

Postoje mnoge kontroverze vezane za tumačenja i značaj mesijaniističke politike i mesijanizma. Takođe, postoji mnogo mesijanizama. Empirijska raznovrsnost politika koje su označene kao mesijanske varira u obeležjima, pre svega prisutnosti religioznih sadržaja, sveobuhvatnosti učenja i dubini zahvata. Bez obzira na to, moguće je istaći nekoliko obeležja koja čine važan deo logike ovog tipa političke argumentacije koja imaju korene u teološkoj tradiciji. To su: a) postojanje duboke, apokaliptične opasnosti/krize, b) koja je strukturna po karakteru, c) koja se može sagledati samo sa tačke gledišta koja je izvan sistema, d) u čijem svetlu se vidi izbavljenje i artikuliše politika izbavljenja, e) koja je egalitarna po karakteru i vodi se bez pravnog strukturisanja ciljeva i institucionalne prinude, f) unutar zajednice istomišljenika/vernika čija odanost i žrtva zajedničkom cilju se zahteva.

Po cenu dramatičnog pojednostavljivanja napraviću razliku između tri shvatanja političkog mesijanizma. To su: mesijanizam kao revolucionarna politika, kao kritičko oruđe i kao nesvodiva politička mogućnost. Na žalost, nije moguće je svako gledište pravedno tretirati. Ona dolaze iz različitih teorijskih tradicija i orijentacija i pišu u različitom pojmovnom registru. Uz sve rizike od neizbežnog analitičkog nasilja pri grupisanju različitih shvatanja mesijanizma, vredno je učiniti napor da se ona približe i zajedno analiziraju. Svako od njih, na svoj način, teži da proširi polje političkog kako bi u njega uključio i politike izbavljenja, ali i pokušava da se nosi sa „prvobitnim grehom“ političkog mesijanizma, njegovom fanatičnom, prozelitiskom i militantnom prirodom.

Mesijanizam kao revolucionarna politika

Pojam politički mesijanizam je skovan da bi označio politički stil koji se pojavio dosta rano u evropskoj istoriji. Volter je pojam mesijanizam, doduše bez oznake politički, uključio u filozofski rečnik da bi označio ideju, koja je

dolazila iz judaističke tradicije, božjeg pomazanika, osobu koja je izabrana da obavi određenu misiju. Prema njemu već u trinaestom veku u jevrejskoj zajednici pojavili su se samoproklamovani nosioci mesijanske poruke koji su imali plan kolektivnog izbavljenja i pretendovali na mesto vođe. (Volter 1973: 237) Jakob L. Talmon (Jacob L. Talmon), koji je skovao termin politički mesijanizam, konstatuje da se u prvoj polovini devetnaestog veka došlo do umnožavanja grupa sa političkim ambicijama i mesijanskim porukama. Ovaj uvid se odnosi na pojavu velikog broja često hirovitih i živopisnih učenja o sveobuhvatnoj društvenoj regeneraciji koja su inspirisala različite pokrete, kružoke, zavereničke grupe i klike u prvoj polovini XIX veka, a koje su pretendovale na to da imaju sveobuhvatne recepte za razrešenje protivrečnosti kojima su opterećena zapadna društva. Radilo se o radikalnim grupama i njihovim učenjima, koje su, prema Talmonu, nestrpljivim istraživačima više ličile na grupe „hirovitih megalomanijaka i živopisnih ezumnika“ (Talmon 1960a: 30). Junaci Talmonove knjige su Sen-Simon (Saint-Simon) i njegovi sledbenici, Furije (Fourier), Marks (Marx) i različite socijalističke i marksističke grupacije, vođe nacionalnih pokreta i različiti desni i radikalno demokratski pokreti. Liberalni mesijanizam nije u ovom društvu jer ga Talmon locira u drugu polovinu osamnaestog veka.

Za Talmona politički mesijanizam je po prirodi revolucionarna politika. Ove politike su mesijanističke jer zagovaraju sveobuhvatnu preobražaj i obnovu društava opterećenih apokaliptičnom krizom ili protivrečnostima koje je nemoguće iznutra otkloniti. Pri tome, ove politike različito identifikuju uzroke krize, spoljne agense izbavljenja, formu eshatoloških stanja i političku formu delovanja. Uzroci nepodnošljivog stanja krize različiti su u različitim mesijanskim politikama. Uzok može biti iskonski pad u greh, stanje nemoralna u kome se društvo nalazi, nesavršena ljudska priroda, nepravedna ili strana vladavina, privatna svojina, kapitalizam, itd. Uzroci su uvek strukturni i duboko ukorenjeni zbog čega ih nije lako videti i nemoguće ih je ukloniti bez spoljne intervencije. Mesijanska politika je obećanje izbavljenja iz nedaća u kojoj se referentna grupa nalazi. Oslonac za ispunjenje ovog obećanja su agensi čiju objavu mogu da shvate samo izabrani i koju, u formi mesijanskog proročanstva o konačnom stanju jednakosti, prenose kao dobru vest. Agensi mogu biti različiti, istorijska nužnost, *Mater dolorosa*, *élan vital*, priroda, razum, narod, a konačna stanja definisana kao carstvo nebesko, komunizam, republika jednakih ili nacionalna država.

Bez obzira što Talmon ne krije liberalnu skepsu prema ovim politikama i njihovoj neposrednoj učinkovitosti, on jasno vidi i neizbežnost mesijanizma u politici i dugoročne učinke takve politike.³ Ono što politički mesijanizam

3 Liberalna skepsa vezuje uz totalitarne potencijale mesijanizma. Talmon je ovu vezu razmatrao u svojoj mnogo slavnoj knjizi *Poreklo totalitarne demokratije* (Talmon 1960). O ovom obliku mesijanizma pisao je Dragan Lakićević (Lakićević 1994).

čini uverljivim, čak nezaobilaznim, jeste činjenica da „ideje dolaze prvo ... a argumenti kasnije“ (Talmon 1960a: 27). Sve velike ideologije su u početku bile skup ideja koje su zahtevale ostvarenje na osnovu „mesijanističkih“ svedočanstva o čudu koje se dogodilo, a ne dokaza o uspehu poduhvata. Onda kada je „nova artikulacija rođena“ ona utiče na razvoj događaja. To je vizionarski korak koji nezadovoljstvo ili nevolju pretvara u politički program. Tek neke od ovih ideja kasnije dobiju institucionalni oblik, a nekima od njih naknadno se stavlja kruna teorije ili nauke. Iz ovoga bi sledio prvi važan zaključak koji se može izvući iz Talmonove knjige, da mesijanizam ukazuje na neuklonjivu otvorenost političkog i na mogućnost njegove transformacije kroz „prosvetljenje“.

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Druga važna stvar u vezi sa mesijanskim politikama koja se može pronaći kod Talmona jeste da su mnogi zahtevi, koji su prvobitno bili ispostavljeni u revolucionarnoj formi ili formi nacionalnog oslobođenja, kasnije bili ostvareni tegobnim i neprincipijelnim, ali regularnim političkim putevima. U međuvremenu su ovi zahtevi bili prevedeni u zahteve koji su širili mogućnost opravdanja unutar granica, da upotrebim savremeniji pojam, javnog uma. Nešto što nije bilo politička stvar, postaje politički moguće, ali ne bi bilo moguće da nije bilo artikulacije koja je u početku bila stvar prosvetljenja i vere. Ovde se može izvući još jedan važan zaključak, koji nije Talmonov, koji je u skladu sa stavom Vilijama Džejmisa (William James) iznetom u obraćanju Filozofskom klubu Jejl i Braun univerziteta pod nazivom „Will to Believe“, da duboka verovanja nisu samo tvrdoglava, nego da „mogu proizvesti vlastito oporavdanje“ (James 1896: internet). Ona doduše imaju formu samoispunjavajućeg proročanstva, ali činjenica da je nešto proročanstvo ne govori mnogo o mogućnosti njegovog naknadnog opravdanja (Baier 2005: 292-295).

Ipak, Talmon je jasno uvideo paradoks u koji se politički mesijanizam upliće. S jedne strane, to je politika kratkog daha ukoliko ne izrodi političku organizaciju (univerzalnu ekumensku crkvu) koja će održavati veru u spasenje. Bez toga, mesijanske pretenzije ostaju samo lepe želje i prazni pokliči za pravdom. S druge strane, ukoliko se institucionalizuje, politički mesijanizam se nužno degeneriše i izlaže opasnosti da univerzalnu zajednicu pretvori u samolegitimišuću grupu istomišljenika, kojima često „hirovitost tiranina izgleda kao artikulacija istorijske nužnosti“, prema kojoj „svi moraju da se klanjaju, kao verni vojnici ili prokleti neprijatelji“ (Talmon 1960a: 514). Ukratko, ono što politički mesijanizam čini opasnim jeste zahtev za безусловnoj odanosti i vernosti mesijanskim idejama i ciljevima, koji se lako pretvara u potoke krvi.

Stoga ne čudi što Talmon za pobjednika devetnaestovekovnog mesijanističkog nadmetanja proglašava nacionalizam, „pastorče“ dva mesijanizma. Nacionalizam je napravio prvu u nizu aproksimacija u pogledu rešavanja gorenavedenog paradoksa. On je zamenio „mesijanistički univerzalizam“

sa nacionalnim bratstvom unutar nacionalne države, ali je zadržao univerzalnu pretnju: nacionalne neprijatelje i kosmopolitske eksploatatore (Talmon 1960a: 513-515). Pretnja je univezalna, ali je „eshaton“ definisan partikularno: univerzalno iskupljenje, pravda i individualne slobode mogu se kombinovati samo unutar nacionalne države. Politički mesijanizam se stoga, prema njemu, već u drugoj polovini XIX veka od „religije pretvorio u zarazu/bolest“, a u prvoj polovini dvadesetog u izvor nove katastrofe. Ovakve dijagnoze ne čude s obzirom da je Talmonova knjiga pisana u posleratnom ozračju u kome je Hitlerov nacizam, u liberalnim krugovima, viđen kao eskalacija mesijanskog nacionalizma.

Mesijanizam kao kritičko oruđe

Imajući prethodno rečeno u vidu, drugačija ideja političkog mesijanizma nastala je iz strahova koje je proizvela nastupajuća dominacija tehnike i njena upotreba u politici i u velikim ratovima. Problem je bio kako povratiti izgubljeni smisao i veru u spasenje kada mogućnosti tehničke manipulacije, systemske kontrole i na kraju uništenja besekrajno rastu. Još preciznije, pitanje je da li je i kako moguće sekularnu veru u izbavljenje povezati sa političkom praksom i kojom praksom. Dva različita, ali srodna, odgovora daju dva prijatelja, Benjamin (Walter Benjamin) i Adorno (Theodor Adorno). Oni izbegavaju direktnu politizaciju mesijanizma, ali njihov mesijanizmu ima dublji cilj – systemsku promenu. Njihov mesijanizam tačnije je karakterisati kao kulturni i filozofski sa političkim ciljem⁴. Benjamin priziva mesijansko svetlo istorije i tradicije, dok se Adorno više uzda u filozofiju i umetnost, obojica kako bi pronašli put izbavljenja od systemskih tlačenja i siromašenja života. U ovom kontekstu zanimljiviji je zaokret u razumevanju pojma mesijanizma: on se tumači kao konstruktivno kritičko oruđe koje ukazuje na mogućnost rekonceptualizacije i transformacije postojećeg političkog okvira u pravcu otklanjanja sistema dominacije i ugnjetavanja, tačnije iz njega se odsranjuju elementi koji su vodili ka direktnoj akciji (ili neposrednoj vezi sa političkom praksom). Tako nešto, za njih bi bilo nemoguće i otvaralo je opasnu mogućnost uzurpacije od strane vladajuće klase i vodilo ka još opasnijem mesijanizmu na vlasti.

Benjaminov stoga pravi uzmak. On govori o „slabom mesijanizmu“ koji dolazi iz semantičkih i emancipatorskih potencijala tumačenja prošlih iskustava.⁵

4 Pozicioniranje Benjaminove teorije i njegovog shvatanja mesijanizma je izuzetno teško zbog njegove vezanosti za različite tradicije mišljenja koje on drži razdvojeno, ali može se tvrditi da ga njegov politički stav i odnos prema političkoj situaciji, kao i deo uticaja koji na njega vrše Adorno i Breht (Berthod Brecht), vuče ulevo. Videti specijalni broj časopisa *New German Critique*, posebno tekst Habermasa (Habermas 1979)

5 “Prošlost sa sobom nosi vremenski indeks kojim se upućuje na iskupljenje. Postoji tajni dogovor bivših pokolenja sa našim. Nas su očekivali na zemlji. Nama je, kao i svakom prethodnom pokolenju, data u nasleđe izvesna *slaba* mesijanska snaga, na

Mesijanizam nije u direktnoj vezi sa političkim delovanjem, ali je sposoban da pruži orijentaciju i zapali iskru kroz različite oblike „profanih prosvetljenja“. Bez zalaženja u rukavce Benjaminove teorije iskustva i istorije, može se tvrditi da profana prosvetljenja dolaze iz partikularnih, čak ezoteričnih (prošlih) iskustava, koja se unose u javno polje i univerzalizuju. To je prosvetljujuću efekat koji ima posmatranje umetničkih dela, religiozno iskustvo svetaca ili neki politički čin čija aura se može preneti u sadašnjost i omogućiti da stvari sagledamo iz drugog ugla. Njihov efekat je sekularan jer ne ostaje u okviru religije ili bilo kog institucionalnog tumačenja. Prosvetljenje se opire politizaciji ili bilo kom drugom obliku „kolektivne fantazije“, ali „sa sobom nosi vremenski indeks kojim se upućuje na iskupljenje“. Ono što njega brine jeste mogućnost da se takva iskustva zatvore u “kao čelik tvrd omotač” koji se ne može lako odbaciti, nego da ostanu “tanka opna koju čovek može svakog trenutka odbaciti”.⁶ Konformizam, mitologizovanje i ideologizacija ovih iskustava su opasnosti koje su u pitanju. Oslabljeni mesijanizam nas čuva od toga, ali ne daje uputstvo za političku akciju. Mesijanistički teret je prema Benjaminu težak i ne može se lako iskupiti. Izbavljenje je nešto za šta se treba boriti sa uvek moćnijim neprijateljem koji pretenduje na isto nasleđe, ali sa drugim ciljem. Zbog toga je za njega mesijanizam kritičko oruđe koje otvara mogućnost emancipacije, ali ne daje uputstvo za političko delovanje. Prosvetljenje je ono što dolazi neartikulirano i tek treba da se izbori za artikulaciju. Tek tada ono može da stoji na raspolaganju onima koji se upuštaju u borbu da odbrane veru. U VI tezi koju je vredno citirati u celosti Benjamin to objašnjava:

„Istorijski artikulirati prošlost ne znači spoznati je „kakva je, u stvari, bila“. To znači ovladati sećanjem onako kako blesne u trenutku opasnosti. Istorijskom materijalizmu je stalo do toga da zadrži sliku prošlosti kakva se u trenutku opasnosti iznenada javlja istorijskom subjektu. Opasnost podjednako pretila i postojanju tradicije i njenim primaocima. Za oboje ta je opasnost istovetna: postati oruđe vladajuće klase. U svakoj epohi moramo pokušati da nasleđe ponovo preotmemo od konformizma, koji namerava da njime ovlada. Tá, Mesija ne dolazi samo kao spasitelj već i kao pobednik Antihrista. Sposobnošću da iz prošlosti raspiri iskru nade obdaren je samo onaj istoričar koji je prožet svešću da *ni mrtvi* neće biti sigurni pred neprijateljem, ako pobedi. A taj neprijatelj nije prestao da pobeđuje.“ (Benjamin 1974: 81)

Benjamin shvatanje mesijanizma je vremenom postalo veoma uticajno, ideja *slabog mesijanizma* varirana je na više načina od različitih autora, od Taubsa (Jacob Taubes), Deride (Jacques Derrida) do Agambena (Giorgio Agamben), Žižeka i Džudit Batler (Judith Butler). Adornovo shvatanje iz

koju prošlost polaže pravo. Ne možemo lako iskupiti tu obavezu. Istorijski materijalista to zna.” (Benjamin 1974: 80)

6 Ovo su Veberove (Max Weber) fraze koje odstupaju od uobičajenog prevoda (Miler 2013: 39).

kasnije faze njegove filozofije je, međutim, radikalnije, čak možda bliže novijim rekonceptualizacijama mesijanizma. Slavan je Adornov vapaj na kraju knjige *Minima Moralia* u kome kaže: „Filozofija koja se još jedino može opravdati napomol beznadežnosti bila bi pokušaj da se sve stvari posmatraju kako se prikazuju sa stanovišta izbavljenja. Spoznaja nema drugo svjetlo do onog kojim sija na svijet polazeći od izbavljenja: svako drugo svjetlo iscrpljuje se u naknadnoj konstrukciji i ostaje dio tehnike.“ (Adorno 2002: 302) Jedina smisaona filozofija je ona koja se bavi konstrukcijom nesistemskih perspektiva, ona koja priziva mesijanski zahtev ta sveobuhvatnom promenom. Ali takav zahtev priznaje vlastitu nemoć, a filozofija je nemoćna da uhvati bilo kakvu vezu sa društvenim životom. Društveni život je naprosto „beznadežan“, nije čudno što je podnaslov ove knjige, koja je pisana neposredno nakon Drugog svetskog rata, „zabeleške iz oštećenog života“, a da njegova kasnija dela (*Negativna dijalektika* ili *Estetička teorija*) odišu pesimizmom i pokušajima da se demaskira sistem-ska prinuda čak i na nivou forme teksta kojim su pisane. Adornov radikalizam se završavao na priznanju nemoći u ime ispražnjene nade i otvaranja mogućnosti. U poslednjoj rečenici kaže: „A naspram zahteva koji joj se [mišljenju] time obznanjuje, pitanje o zbiljnosti i nezbiljnosti iskupljenja je gotovo irelevantno.“ (Adorno 2002: 302)

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Dve važne stvari mogu se zaključiti iz ovakve rekonceptualizacije pojma mesijanizma. Prvo, pojam mesijanizma oslobođen je „militantnosti“ devetnaestovekovnog političkog mesijanizma i fokusiran je na nepolitičke vizije koje mogu biti tačka oslonca za politiku iskupljenja. Cena za to bila je gubljenje direktne veze sa političkom praksom. Drugi važan zaključak jeste da se mesijanizam oslobađa Mesije, kao jedinog garanta istinitosti mesijanističke vizije i osnovnog objekta umne vere u mesijanizmu, dok se, figurativno rečeno, naglašava se uloga apostola, nosioca dobrih vesti. Uloga mesije se umnožava, daje joj se mnoštvo glasova, mesijanski zato može biti bilo čije delo ili bilo koji događaj koji zaslužuje i omogućava univerzalističku artikulaciju. Naglasak se stavlja na mesijanističku artikulaciju za koju su ovi autori još uvek verovali da je moguća kao istorijski materijalizam ili društvena kritika.

Mesijanizam kao nesvodiva otvorenost politike

Poslednjih decenija ova ideja je obnovljena u sklopu rasprave o dehumanizujućim učincima i nepravdama globalnog (neoliberalnog) kapitalizma. U središtu rasprave je neobičan spoj teološke tradicije i marksizma, vere i emancipacije⁷. Kontekst u kome se on obnavlja u jeste diskurs o krizi demokratske

⁷ Tumačenje Marksa u eshatološkom ključu koje je osnova ovakvog povezivanja potiče još od veoma uticajne studije Jakoba Taubsa *Zapadna eshatologija*, koja je kao habilitaciona teza napisana još 1947. godine (Taubes 2009). Agamben i Žižek često odaju dug ovom autoru.

politike. Najpoznatiji takav pokušaj jeste Deridina ideja „mesijanističkog bez mesijanizma“ razvijena u knjizi *Marksove sablasti* (Derida 2004). Nešto drugačiju interpretaciju, ali unutar sličnog okvira, nude Badiju (Alain Badiou), Agamben i Žižek kroz političko tumačenje učenja svetog Pavla. Uprkos razlikama koje su značajne i uzajamnim kritikama, o ovim tumačenjima mesijanizma moguće je zajedno raspravljati jer svako od njih vodi do daljeg „pražnjenja“ pojma mesijanizma od konkretnih političkih sadržaja. Sporovi unutar ove grupe autora i nekih teologa, vode se oko pitanja prirode i karaktera mesijanističkog događaja koji otvara mogućnost unošenja nove artikulacije u javnost i zahteva univerzalno priznanje. Za neke, poput Deride, radi se samo o nesvodivoj i otvorenoj mogućnosti, dok o njenom sadržaju i artikulaciji ne možemo mnogo reći, osim da se radi o pozivu da se ispuni uvek otvoreno političko obećanje o pravdi, a koji je uvek sadržan u svemu što je „političko koje je u dolasku“. To je nesvodiva zagonetka politike koja se ne može rešavati i ne treba da se rešava, nego na kojoj treba „igrati“ i koju treba rasvetljavati. Za većinu ostalih, mesijanizam sadrži superiorni „pozitivni istinosni zahtev“, kakvu je sadržavala Pavlova politika, pre svega u *Poslanici rimljanima*.

Važnije od ovog spora u ovom kontekstu jeste teza da je u mesijanizmu, bilo u formi neukidivog mesijanskog glasa, ili u obliku superiornih „pozitivnih vizija“, sadržan kritički i subverzivni politički potencijal. Način na koji se mesijanistički glas ili pretenzija vide jeste uvek u vezi sa nekim događajem čija artikulacija ima sposobnost da promeni tok istorije i celokupno društvo. Mesijanizam je u ovom pogledu, da parafraziram, „politička bomba sa kojom treba pažljivo rukovati“. Ova bomba se nalazi u srcu svih poredaka, a demokratije više od ostalih, jer ona sama koketira sa pre-političkim vizijama okupljenog građanstva.

Pitanje je međutim kolika je „eksplozivna“ moć političkog mesijanizma i da li se ovom bombom može rukovati. Da li se je on možda prazna puška, kako se ispostavilo za veliki broj devetnaestovekovnih pokušaja. Deridin odgovor je oprezan. On ukazuje samo na neukidivost mesijanskog glasa u politici, koje političko čini večno otvorenim za nove i nadolazeće političke izazove koji proizilaze iz nepravednog položaja. Politika izbavljenja jeste ono što se priželjkuje prizivanjem pravde, a glasove koji prizivaju pravdu nije moguće učutkati. Oni su ti koji ne dopuštaju nijednom poretku da se bez ostatka konsoliduje. Derida odbija da kaže mnogo više o mesijanizmu u politici, tačnije demokratiji koja je u dolasku. On se zadovoljava time da konstuje nesvodiva formalna obeležja strukture mesijanističkog unutar koga ostaje otvoreno mesto za različite mesijanizme. Svako je pozvan da prizove pravdu i izbavljenje kao politički program, često sektaški i ratoboran. Ali i u takvim slučajevima ostaje ono mesijanističko, koje se ne zatvara, jer svaki konkretan, istorijski oblik mesijanizma sadrži paradoks: on je obećanje koje je prekršeno onog trenutka kad se ostvari, odnosno institucionalizuje. Ali

upravo zbog toga nije moguća imunizacija sistema od mesijanizma kao takvog (mesijanističkog) i zatvaranje mesijanističkog u poseban istorijski oblik mesijanizma. Štaviše takva ideja je autodestruktivna, ona kontaminira i razara zdravo tkivo, posebno u demokratiji.⁸

Derida hoće da oda počast mesijanskoj veri, ali ne i da prihvati neki njen specifičan oblik. Svaki njen specifičan oblik „vodi nas kao da smo slepi“ i sadrži klicu fanatizma koji se ne može oprati od krvi prosute u njegovo ime. (Caputo 2010) Religiozni fundamentalizam sa svojim političkim zahtevima, koji je u procvatu u nekim delovima sveta, ne može se isključiti iz korpusa političkog mesijanizma. Od fundamentalizma nije imuna ni liberalna demokratija onda kada u svom trujumfalizmu proročki štiti svoju viziju, ne oklevajući da je potkrepi bombama. Iz tog razloga moramo se zadržati na veri u mesijanističko, u ono što je stalno u dolasku, a nikada neće doći; veri u nepredvidivu i kontigentnu budućnost. Takva budućnost ne vrši represiju i čuva sadašnji pluralizam, heterogenost, različite glasove, svojevrstni nered koji održava demokratiju. Ova Deridina interpretacija kritikovana je kao plemenita ali prazna,⁹ odnosno da ne poseduje dovoljan kritički potencijal i subverzivnu moć da bi ogolila dehumanizujuću moć neoliberalnog kapitalizma i ukazala na alternativu.

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Nešto jaču snagu pripisuje se pavlovskoj verziji mesijanizma koju zastupaju Badiu, Agamben i Žižek. Mesijanski događaj je taj koji otvara vrata za novu artikulaciju i promenu. Badiju nudi teorijsku podlogu za takvo tumačenje. Njegovo ukazivanje na neotklonjivu kontigentnost političkog kroz matematički dokaz nepotpunosti bilo kog (etičkog ili političkog) skupa elemenata i njegove podložnosti promeni kroz nepredvidive događaje. Mesijanski događaj je jedinstveni (singularan) događaj, ali događaj koji u sebi nosi ono univerzalno. To je univerzalno koji izmiče identitetskoj logici i esencijalističkom poništavanju razlika. Događaj je istina koja se događa, koja ima moć prosvetljenja. Kao odgovarajući istorijski primer takvog događaja poslužila je, pored svih kontroverzi, mesijanska praksa svetog Pavla. Pavle je važan jer je subjektivnim gestom objavio istinu, bez pozivanja na proverive spoljne garante. To je gest kojim se istina i pravda izuzimaju iz nadležnosti zajednice i intelektualnog konformizma koji ona nameće. (Badiou 2010: 13-30) Događaj je ono što povezuje subjekta i istinu koja ima ima utemeljujuću

8 Derida upotrebljava reč auto-imunizacija koju preuzima iz medicinskog rečnika i delom neprecizno tumači. On je, razvio ovu ideju da bi objasnio delovanje savremenog religijskog fundamentalizma koji je kontaminirao sebe modernističkim oruđima koja koristi u borbi protiv zapadnih vrednosti i time sam ugrozio svoju suštinu (Derida 2007). Na isti način koristi ovaj pojam i kada upozorava da demokratija koja pokušava da se imunizuje od stranih uticaja ujedno napada i vlastite zdrave elemente. U medicini, organizam oboleo od autoimunih bolesti ne razlikuje obolele i zdrave ćelije i podjednako ih napada.

9 Za raspravu o dometima Deridinoj mesijanizma videti Bradley and Fletcher 2010.

snagu. Takvi događaji su retki, a mogu ih izvesti samo retki i odvažni subjekti čija vernost istini jeste suštinska. Ove odlike su prepoznate u Pavlovom „radu na uspostavljanju zajednica društvene pravde među ugnjetenom masom Rimskog carstva“ (Jennings 2013: 6). Ovaj rad se odvijao uprkos vlasti i mimo zakona, pravda koju Pavle priziva jeste pravda koja utemeljuje novu društvenost, onu koja se suprostavlja zakonu i zahteva preobražaj društva. Pavlove mini-zajednice okupljene oko ideje mesijanske pravde verno čuvaju ovu mogućnost univerzalne promene. Zbog toga, one su tempirane bombe u srcu poretka jer prizivaju potpuno novo stanje stvari i duboko veruju da вреди podneti žrtvu za njegovo ostvarenje. Jakob Taubs u tom smislu kaže da su Pavlove poslanice „politička objava rata Rimu“ (Taubes 2009a: 33-34).

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Na ovom mestu nastaju razlike u tumačenjima mesijanizma, čija zajednička tačka jeste insistiranje na njegovoj vanrednoj, ekscennoj i antisistemskej prirodi. Mada kod svakog od pominjnih autora mesijanističko prebiva na drugom mestu (istini događaja, čistom delovanju, vanrednom stanju), te razlike ne utiču na razumevanje uloge mesijanističkog argumenta. Argument u svim slučajevima ukazuje na mogućnost novog koje je kao mogućnost usidreno u prazninama koje postojeći poredak ne može da uključi i reguliše. U ovim prazninama mogu nastati događaji, stanja ili oblici delovanja koji su izvan vidokruga sistema i kojima on ne može upravljati. Sa stanovišta poretka, oni se pokazuju kao anomalije, aporije, paradoksi, ekscesi, itd., ali u sebi mogu sadržavati pozitivni potencijal za konstituisanje novog stanja stvari. U ovom smislu, mesijanističko se uspostavlja ni iz čega i zahteva preoblikovanje postojećeg stanja stvari uspostavljanjem novog semantičkog okvira razumevanja stvarnosti. „U događaju, ne menjaju se samo stvari, ono što se menja je sam parametar pomoću koga merimo činjenice promene, tj. tačka preokreta menja celokupno polje unutar koga se činjenice pojavljuju“ (Žižek 2014: epub izdanje). Novi okvir ne opravdava se u odnosu na društveno prihvatljive norme, tradiciju, kulturu ili verovanja, nego u odnosu na stanje stvari koje se otvara kada se događaj dogodi: on proizvodi vlastito opravdanje tako što tek u svetlu događaja pojavljuju se razlozi koji su do tada bili nevidljivi. Vremenski odnos uzroka i posledice je promenjen kroz proces naknadnog uklapanja u novi okvir. Kao u ljubavi, nauci ili umetnosti, najpre se događa prosvetljenje, a tek u svetlu njega vidimo razloge.

Mesijanizam je, dakle, otvorena ontološka i/ili politička mogućnost drugačijeg (semantičkog) strukturisanja stvarnosti iz koga se naknadno rađa novi politički projekt i pokreće građane na strpljiv i težak rad na restrukturisanju postojećih društvenih odnosa. On je objekt čiste vere. Uprkos tome, Badiju i Žižek nastoje da mesijanizam poguraju u pravom smeru. Ta pravac jeste izbavljenje iz okvira koji je definisan liberalnim kapitalizmom koji svodi ljude na ekonomske parametre i koji nameće ljudima način života vezan za eksploataciju, zavisnost i kontrolu. Cilj je da se podstakne, da Kantovu terminologiju uprkos kritikama koju mu upućuju ovi autori, „instinski

entuzijizam“ koji je „uvek bliži idealnom, i to čisto moralnom ... koji je u revolucionarima izazivao čist pojam prava“. Francuski revolucionari su bili nepotkupljivi jer su bili vođeni „čistim pojmom prava“, koji im je bio uskraćen, a koji je podstakao „revnost i dušenu veličinu“ (Kant 1974: 186). Naravno, pominjani autori ne veruju, kao Kant, u nužnost moralnog napretka koji leži u osnovi ovakvog stava. „Revnost i duševna veličina“ moraju proisteći iz kontigentne situacije, ali iz situacije koja referiše na anomalije i paradokse „pre-događajne situacije“. Duboka ekonomska kriza, na primer, može biti shvaćena kao „pre-događajna situacija“, a pokreti širom sveta shvaćeni kao ponovno buđenje vere da je čudo moguće.¹⁰ To je ono što Marksa povezuje sa svetim Pavlom i što usmerava mesijanizam u određenom pravcu. Događaj svojom istinom stvara postliberalni program koji se ostvaruje kao novi referentni okvir (Svenungsson 2013: 749).

Najdalje u ovom pogledu ide Badiju. Za njega deridijanska čista raznovrsnost ne može biti odgovarajući objekt mišljenja i vere, nego svaka istorijska situacija, mada kontigentna, sadrži istinu, i to samo jednu istinu. Badiju kroz artikulaciju uslova mogućnosti događaja dalje sužava opseg iskustava koja se mogu opisati kao događaj. Istina koja je imanentna događaju otkriva se u njemu samom kroz pripadajuću artikulaciju koja mnoštvo i raznovrsnost pretvara u događaj. Inerpretativna intervencijauvek se odnosi na sveprožimajući sistem znanja (“totalnu teksturu znanja”) i na sebe referiše kao na epohalno otkrovenje unutar koga se činjenice pojavljuju i tumače. Bez ulaženja u sofisticirane detalje onoga što čini događaj, može se reći da ovakvo tumačenje omogućuje Badijuu (ali i Žižeku) da neka iskustva isključe iz kategorije događaja.¹¹ Takve artikulacije se ne odnose na “simptomska krivljenja”, nego samo na probleme u funkcionisanju sistema. Hitlerov nacizam, Staljinove čistke, islamski fundamentalizam nisu događaji jer se mogu razumeti unutar referentnog okvira dominirajućih značenja pomoći kojih tumačimo politiku (Žižek 2014: epub izdanje).

Druge teškoće ovih teorija tiču se samoreferencijalnost događaja i iznevećavanje događaja. Žižekovo upućivanje na psihoanalizu teško da može biti od pomoći u ovom pogledu.

10 Badiju o protestima u Egiptu kaže: „Kao ponovo otvaranje istorije, događaj je najavljen sa tri znaka, a svi od njih su imanentni masovnim narodnim pobunama: intenzifikacija, kontrakcija i lokalizacija. Ovo su pre-politički elementi, ponovno buđenje Istorije kroz neredne koje nadilazi neposrednu pobunu i njen snažni nihilizam. Sa njima otpočinje rad nove istine, koja se, u politici, naziva 'organizacija'.“ (Badiou 2012: 63)

11 Razlika Žižekove i Badijuove verzije mesijanizma nije u ovom pogledu velika koliko Žižek ponekad to hoće da predstavi, mada postoji problem tumačenja Badijuove teorije s obzirom na periodizaciju njegovih dela. Protokoli istine Badijuu omogućavaju da pravi razlikovanja za koja Žižek misli da Badijuova teorija nije sposobna da ih napravi, nego da mora da potone u ideologiju i prizna različite oblike fanatizma. Videti Žižek 2010 i Bosteels 2011.

Događaj je samoreferencijalan i samo oni koji su već deo događaja mogu ga označiti kao događaj. Artikulacija je deo događaja, nije nešto što dolazi naknadno. Zbog toga događaj postoji samo za onoga ko je postojati sumnja da li je uopšte postojao događaj, osim za onoga ko je odlučio da bude upleten u situaciju". (Žižek 2010: 82). Stoga je događaj događaj samo za pripadnike zajednice vernika. Misija svetog Pavla, njegova mesijanska politika ljubavi, vere i nade, paradigmatičan slučaj postajanja nečega događajem za one koji nisu deo događaja. Naravno, "bajka" o čudesnom uskrснуću nije nešto što može biti ubedljiva artikulacija događaja koji je u osnovi mesijanske politike u moderno doba nauke i tehnologije. Unutar njih događaju se kontigentni uplivi istine koji antagonizuju iskvareno stanje. Događaj upućuje na radikalno novi početak koji se događa nakon intenzivnog prosvetljujućeg iskustva koje generiše veru i entuzijazam, pomoću kojih prepoznamo događaj kao događaj. Ali ovde se vrtimo u krug koji nam ne omogućava da razlikujemo događaj od nečega što liči na događaj. Stoga, iščekivanje velikog događaja suočava se sa problemom izostanka događaja i nemogućnosti kolektivnog delovanja i koordinirane političke akcije: „Pogledajmo evropsku krizu. Nikada u životu nismo bili suočeni sa situacijom koja je bila toliko nabijena revolucionarnim prilikama. Nikada u životu nismo bili toliko impotentni. Nikada intelektualci i borci nisu bili toliko nemi, toliko nemoćni da pronađu način da pokažu put u novom pravcu.“ (Žižek 2014: epub izdanje).

Drugi problem je što postoji mnogo načina da se izneveri istina događaja unutar zajednice vernika. Mnogi događaji iznevereni su tako što su bili kontaminirani "starim" obrascima delovanja i tumačenja. To su najčešće događaji koji su budili veru i izazivali erupcije entuzijazna ali su brzo okončavali u pesimizmu i melanholiji. Politička istorija može pružiti obilje primera. Čak i u onim trenucima kada politika pokazuje svoju mesijansku stranu izbavljenja, ne možemo biti sigurni da se radi o istinskom događaju. Posmatrano sa ove tačke, politika jeste medijum izbavljenja samo ako se potpuno rekonstituiše kao delatnost i oslobođena pragmatičnih obzira. Ali i tada, možemo se samo kladiti, sa visokim ulogom, ali i sa nepoznatom verovatnoćom, kao što je slučaj u Paskalovoj opljadi, da Antihrist nije taj koji i ovog puta pobeđuje.

Dakle, u oba slučaja postoji problem da se uspostavi veza događaja i specifičnih oblika delovanja koji odlikuju vernost događaju, tačnije da se uspostavi veza istine i subjekta. Ovaj oblik mesijanizma trudi da nam pruži analitička sredstva da se napravi razlika između događanja istine, događanja nalik istini i izneveravanja istine, ali ona nam ne pomaže mnogo u prepoznavanju istinskog događaja. Hajdegerov (Heidegger) pojam događaja (Ereignis) i njegovo tragično prepoznavanje istorijskog događanja jeste upozorenje koje stoji na umu. Ipak, uvođenje daljih formalnih ograničenja kako bi se napravila razlika i mesijanizam očistio od one svoje polovine koja nastupa „kada se zveri bude“ i razvija se „neobična mržnja ... prema svim stvarima i bićima koja se ne potčinjavaju bezrezervno Mesiji“

(Lorens 2009: 49), vodi do daljeg pražnjenja političkog i njegove impotentnosti da sledi vlastite ciljeve. U konkrentnom slučaju, radi se o zahtevu za čistom verom bez jasno određenog objekta vere, osim da je on moguć, i da se opklada na njega ima veliku vrednost. Vernost istini i entuzijazam koji proističe iz nje daju snagu za hrabrost, nepotkupljivost, istrajnost i težak politički rad koji je usmeren događajem, ali objekt vernosti je samo mogućnost teško prepoznatljivog čuda koje se događa kada verujemo. U ovom smislu, u pitanju je svojevrsna odbrana vere u veru, odbrana razložnosti vere.

Mesijanska politika

Tri analitički razdvojena oblika političkog mesijanizma ukazuju na problematičnu vezu mesijanizma i oblika političkog delovanja. Što je ta veza neposrednija, to su opasnosti od pojave ružnog lica mesijanizma izraženija. Što je ta veza posrednija, politički mesijanizam se pretvara u plemenite ali nemoćne pokliče za pravdom i istinom. Dubina mesijanističkog zahvata je takva da ona zahteva semantičko preokviravanje stvarnosti koje zahteva intenzivni ideološki rad (u gramšijevskom smislu), ali se istovremeno izlaže riziku suzbijanja jeresi raznim oblicima doktrinarne represije prema nevernicima. Dvostruko lice mesijanske politike često se koristi da deligitimiše mesijansku stanju politike kao vizionarsku i da udalji izbaviteljske pretenzije od granica političkog uma. Za Rolsa (John Rawls), na primer, „jaka osećanja i vatrene težnje“ nisu razlozi (Rols, 1998: 190). Snaga i gorljivost sa kojom zastupamo naša uverenja ne govore ništa ni o njihovoj istinitosti niti o opravdanosti njihovih pretenzija, ali govore o želji za vizionarskim redizajniranjem sveta prema vlastitim težnjama. Pitanje je da li ove pretenzije, mada samoispunjavajuća proročanstva, mogu naknadno proizvesti vlastito opravdanje i održavati veru u njihov sadržaj.

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Nezavisno od mogućnosti mesijanske politike da čuva veru u promenu, rasprave o mesijanizmu u politici ukazale su na neka neuklonjiva obeležja politike koja su relevantna za rasprave o demokratiji i njenoj krizi. Jedno obeležje je neuklonjiva otvorenost i nepredvidivost politike. Političko se ne može zatvoriti u skupove procedura koje isključuju mogućnost radikalne promene. Ovo ne znači da preobražaj zavisi isključivo od vernosti i posvećenosti mesijanskom događaju ili cilju, ali vernost i posvećenost pre-političkim ciljevima mogu da uzdrmaju svaki poredak. Drugo obeležje odnosi se na značaj dubokih pre-političkih vizija i događaja koji ukazuju da politika uvek sadrži dimenziju izbavljenja. Ukoliko demokratski poredak ne može da ih uključi i procesuiru kroz institucionalno legitimizovane politike, njegove institucije postaju okoštale forme koje nisu u stanju da održavaju veru u vlastitu vrednost, koja je od suštinske važnosti za njihovo funkcionisanje.

U poslednjem delu ću ukratko analizirati napetosti koje ukazuju na dvostruki deficit realno postojećih demokratija. S jedne strane, demokratske

institucije nisu u stanju da polože račun o tome da ideje o demokratiji imaju realni sadržaj i da njihovo ostvarivanje građanima pruža orijentaciju (obećanje izbavljenja) u datom društvenom okruženju ili istorijskoj situaciji. S druge strane, demokratska teorija ne može da položi račun o tome pod kojim uslovima demokratija može čuvati veru u vlastitu realizaciju bez obzira na to što nije razumno pretpostaviti da se političke ideje mogu do kraja realizovati u bilo kom fizičkom socijalnom okruženju.

Mesijanizam i vera u demokratiju

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Mesijanski elementi u modernoj politici tematizovali su se na različite načine. Margaret Kanovan (Margaret Canovan) sledeći Majkla Oukšota (Michael Oakeshott) pravi, pomalo nesrećnu, distinkciju između politike izbavljenja i politike pragmatizma (Canovan 2000: 8). Ovde ću političkom mesijanizmu, po sličnoj liniji razgraničenja, suprostaviti politički cinizam. Politički mesijanizam neguje pozitivnu veru da politika može biti medijum izbavljenja kroz političku artikulaciju pre-političkih očekivanja i vizija. Politički cinizam je skeptičan u ovom pogledu i politici dodeljuje ulogu rešavanja konflikata i konkretnih problema, pomoću javnih politika, nezavisno od njihovog krajnjeg cilja i sadržaja. Univerzalne vizije i vrednosti su posao propovednika i utopijskih sanjara, ne političara. Demokratski mesijanizam stavlja kartu na mogućnost kolektivnog delovanja i sposobnost udruženih građana da stave pod kontrolu političke procese, dok demokratski cinizam smatra da je demokratska politika, kao i svaka druga, umeće vladanja i političkog poslovanja u specifičnom institucionalnom okruženju i nije posao za amatere. Oba oblika politike, uzeti sami za sebi, ispuštaju nešto važno iz vida. Prvi, ne vodi dovoljno računa o uslovima vlastite ostvarivosti u realnom istorijskom i socijalnom okruženju, dok drugi gubi orijentaciju i oslonac koji mu obezbeđuju idejni sadržaji.

Na ovom tragu, Margaret Kanovan izdvaja tri napetosti realno potojećih demokratija (Canovan 1999: 10): a) normativnu napetost između obećanja sekularnog izbavljenja kroz kolektivno delovanje i demokratske politike kao "pohlepnog političkog poslovanja" profesionalnih političara-preduzenika; b) strukturnu napetost u pogledu moći demokratske politike da stavi pod kontrolu pitanja koja se tiču građana u odnosu na uplive ekonomske moći; c) institucionalnu napetost u odnosu na sve dublje "otuđenje" građana od života demokratskih institucija. Unutar realno postojećih demokratija neravnoteža ide na stranu politike cinizma. Empirijske analize potvrđuju ove uvide i često se u njima izražava zabrinutost za to što politika gubi zvanje "plemenitog poziva". Problem je što se ova dva aspekta politike ne mogu se zasebno artikulirati, naknadno spojiti i balansirati, posebno ne sa pozicije stabilnog i efikasnog funkcionisanja sistema vladavine. Takav pristup oslanja se na formalnu strukturu institucija i demokratiju svodi na procese koji zahtevaju prilagođavanje građana postojećim institucijama i procedurama.

Široko učešće građana ugrožava stabilnost demokratije. Neučešće građana je, nakon Drugog svetskog rata, posebno kod američkih političkih naučnika, smatrano za društveno poželjni politički fenomen, jer doprinosi stabilnosti demokratije. Grupa autora je u analizi američkih predsedničkih kampanja tvrdila da glasačka apatije održava poredak i da „ublažava šok od neslaganja, prilagođavanja i promene“ (Purzel 1973: 259). U nagrađenoj knjizi Američkog udruženja za političke nauke (American Political Science Association) iz 2006. godine, Džeri Stoker (Gerry Stocker) građane naziva političkim amaterima čije delovanje može „iritirati“ profesionalce, a povremeno biti i opasno. On se zalaže za ograničeno učešće građana, kako bi se sačuvalo demokratski karakter poretka koji je ugrožen preteranim cinizmom i odbojnošću građana prema institucionalnoj politici. Zbog toga Stoker poziva građane da budu „više moralno samokritični i reflektivni u odnosu prema politici. Oni bi trebalo da teže da postanu još kompetentniji amateri“ (Stocker 2006: 14). Čini se da se logika demokratije izokrenula. Ukoliko su nezadovoljni institucionalnom strukturom i procesom donošenja odluka, građani su ti koji bi trebalo da promene stav kako bi sačuvali istu onu institucionalnu strukturu koja ih čini nezadovoljnim i ciničnim. Za uzvrat, profesionalni političari obezbediće im prostor za amatersko bavljenje politikom, pod uslovom da ne iritiraju profesionalce i ne dovodi u opasnost proces donošenja odluka.

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Ovo udaljavanje demokratske politike od građana rezultat je evolucije pojma demokratije nakon svetskih ratova koja je vodila ka tome da se konkretna istorijska forma demokratije učvrsti kao norma demokratije (Purcell 1973). To je forma predstavničke demokratije sa univerzalnim pravom glasa i regularnim izborima, ali i ustavnim ograničenjima koja su sprečavala dublju političku intervenciju u cilju otklanjanja društvenih nejednakosti i ublažavanja “šoka od promene” koju je moglo izazvati širenje prava glasa. Demokratija se u velikoj meri pretvorila u samozaštićenu formu koja joj je otežavala samotransformaciju, ali koju je, makar u poslednjih sto godina, konstantno pratio diskurs o krizi demokratije.¹² Najpre je to bila kriza koju je prouzrokovala teškoća parlamentarnih demokratija da uspešno mobilizuju građane za rat, zatim kriza koju je izazvao uspon ideoloških neprijatelja, fašizma i socijalizma, onda kriza kapitalističke demokratije da uspešno servisira socijalne osnove svog postojanja, da bi se na kraju govorilo o

12 Literatura o krizi demokratije, čak i prema samim naslovima, je nepregledna. Proliferacija je počela dvadesetih godina prošlog veka, a nije se završila ni sa nestankom ideoloških neprijatelja sa scene tokom devedesetih godina. Naime, Nobelova fondacija je 1994. održala simpozijum *Pobeda i kriza demokratije* na kome su poznati svetski društveni naučnici raspravljali o tome da li je pobeda demokratije stvarna ili ona pati od nekih unutrašnjih ograničenja zbog kojih je neophodna stalna spoljna intervencija koja bi stabilizovala demokratske ustanove. (Haldenius 1997). Za informativne preglede kritika demokratije u dvadesetom veku videti Putzell 1973, Miler 2013.

imanentnoj krizi i prelasku demokratije u postdemokratiju. Stanje krize je specifično po tome što priziva spoljnu intervenciju u cilju održanja sistema čija ravnoteža je narušena. Intervencija, gotovo po pravilu, išla je ka jačanju izvršne vlasti na račun demokratskog procesa, shvaćenog u parlamentarnom smislu (Miler 2013: 147-153).

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Odgovornost za ovu krizu demokratije, u velikoj meri, snose i građani, koji su izgubili veru u demokratske institucije usled nerazumnih očekivanja od demokratije i preteranog uplitanja u politiku. Zbog toga se javio problem kako povratiti političku veru i obnoviti život demokratskih institucija, ali pod pretpostavkom očuvanja postojeće forme. Pored poziva na snižena očekivanja, neki su pokušali da osmisle spoljne, nepolitičke podsticaje za osnaživanje vere u smisaonu participaciju građana, ali uz ograničen pristup političkom igralištu koji je kontrolisan odozgo. Neke od karakterističnih mera uključuju, na primer, lutriju za glasače, demokratske kioske, finansijske poticaje, neobavezujuće forume (Trechsel and Schmitter 2004; Schmitter 2011: 207-209). Nezavisno od zabavnog karaktera ovih rešenja, ona ukazuju na to da forma ostaje nedodiriva i da se ne postavlja pitanje njene samotransformacije, uprkos tome što se dovodi u pitanje njen transformativni potencijal da građane-amatere motiviše i obnovi im veru (ili poverenje) da učešće u političkom procesu za njih može imati smisla. Politička vera, međutim, ne mogu se uspostaviti odlukom i spoljnim poticajima, oni moraju izrasti iz unutrašnjih odlika. Međutim, uslovi ostvarenja demokratije ne dopuštaju da u ovom procesu građani masovno učestvuju.

Ovakvo gledište kritikuje nedavno preminuli američki politički teoretičar Šeldon Wolin (Sheldon Wolin). Ukoliko želimo da zadržimo smisaono značenje pojma, demokratija se može u kontekstu modernih društava sagledati samo još u retkim momentima vansistemske politike u kojima se događaju bljesci kolektivnog delovanja demosa koji probijaju i proširuju redovno političko iskustvo. To je još jedini preostali politički oblik delovanja koji se može nazvati demokratskim. Nakon toga, demokratija se povlači i odlazi u izbeglištvo (Wolin 1996). Razlog za to jeste upravo vezivanje demokratije za bilo koju čvrstu političku formu vodi ka nestajanju demokratije. Demokratija je za njega norma koja se ne može imati čvrstu formu, pa ni onu koju joj nameću predefinisane moralne norme ili pravna forma, jer demokratija postoji samo u aktu prekoračenja (Wolin 1994). Ovo gledište o demokratiji je prilično ekstremno i dosta je kritikovano, ali ukazuje na jednu važnu stvar. Ispoljavanje demokratije nije imanentno bilo kojoj institucionalnoj strukturi. Štaviše, svaka čvrsta struktura, pa i ona konstucionalna, jeste smrt demokratije.

Wolin ukazuje na izlaz, mada ga ne razrađuje, kada kaže da je demokratija “fenomen koji može da se skući, ali ne može da se realizuje unutar bilo koje forme” (Wolin 1996a: 63). Demokratiji je, kao i svakom ukućaninu,

potrebno povremeno provetravanje kuće, a vremenom i adaptacija i rekonstrukcija. Politički mesijanizam pravi stalnu pometnju i upozorava da se ova kuća mora stalno dograđivati da bi demokratija, makar povremeno, prebivala u njoj.

Zaključak

Pitanje političke (umne) vere u demokratske ustanove jeste važno iz najmanje dva razloga. Najpre, vera građana jeste test za to da se kroz ove ustanove realizuju “prve i poslednje stvari” koje se tiču građana. Ne postoji forma demokratije koja to može garantovati. Štaviše, insistiranje na formi često vodi do zaborava koje su to “prve i najvažnije stvari” oko kojih su se građani prvobitno okupili. Drugo, postojanje vere stabilizuje ustanove iz “pravih razloga”. Ustanove ne mogu svoju stabilnost zasnivati samo na efikasnosti i beskrajnom ispunjavanju zahteva. Potrebno je da se one brane, održavaju i transformišu i kada su u krizi, kada je to politički potrebno. Teorije političkog mesijanizma razradile su konceptualni okvir na koji način se ova vera može održavati i motivisati građane da deluju politički i onda kada to nije u njihovom neposrednom interesu. On pruža test za to kada je ova vera istinska i kako se ostaje veran njenom sadržaju. Politički mesijanizam i demokratija jesu beskućnici, koji se ne mogu do kraja realizovati u bilo kom strukturisanom okruženju, ali mogu pružiti orijentire za snalaženje u složenom društvenom i političkom okruženju.

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Đorđe Pavićević

Political Messianism and Democracy: On Possibility
of Political Self-transformation of Democracy

Abstract

The article deals with the relation of political messianism to ongoing debate on the crisis of democracy. The conceptual framework of political messianism is the convenient analytical tool because it makes the concept of crisis a starting point for formulating a different politics of redemption. Three conceptions of political messianism are being analyzed: as a revolutionary policies, as critical tool, as well as open possibility of radical changes. It shows in all three cases that deep beliefs play an important role in politics and that it is not possible to immunize political order from them. The second part of the paper points to the significance of these insights for understanding the discourse on the crisis of democracy which important part represents the loss of faith in the ability of democratic institutions to formulate a framework for meaningful political actions of citizens. As a result, there has been a transformation of the concept of democracy which now sees political actions of citizens-amateurs as a nuisance. Such a condition produces tensions which are burdening the functioning of democratic regimes. In conclusion, it is noted that contemporary democracies are not able to restore faith in the fundamentals of its existence as long as they insist on the primacy of the form of democracy, which in the meantime has become the norm, but fails to convince the citizens in their intrinsic values.

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Keywords: Political messianism, Redemption, Crisis of democracy, Political faith, Regeneration

Miloš Ćipranić

Indić i Velaskez

Apstrakt Svrha rada je dovođenje u pitanje logike čitanja tekstova Ortege i Gasete o Velaskezu koje je sproveo Trivo Indić. Beogradski sociolog je u tekstu „Ortega i Velaskez“ prevideo bitno pitanje koje postavlja madridski filozof u okviru njegove interpretacije Velaskeza, a to je – koji je zapravo uslov mogućnosti poimanja dela (ovog) slikara? Slikarstvo je nema forma izraza. Ortega i Gaset se pita – kako govoriti o ljudima koji ne govore? Pošto Trivo Indić nije istakao bitnost ovog pitanja i otkrio taj transcendentni motiv, sam njegov njegov tekst o Velaskezu biće problematizovan u tom pravcu.

Cljučne reči: mutizam, slikarstvo, Hose Ortega i Gaset, Trivo Indić, Dijego Velaskez

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Tekstovi Triva Indića u odnosu na misao Hose Ortege i Gasete (José Ortega y Gasset) ne mogu da se posmatraju kao prolegomena. Oni ne pretenduju da budu opšti uvod u misao ovog filozofa. Delo Triva Indića o Ortegi i Gasetu ne može biti označeno na taj način, jer nema nameru da *tout court* iznese osnovne teze njegovog filozofskog sistema u celini.

Trivo Indić u najvećoj meri posmatra misao Ortege i Gasete sa stanovišta nauke o društvu. Njegov glavni tekst posvećen ovom misliocu je knjiga *U spon masa*, u kojoj razmatra dualističku koncepciju društva i istorije Ortege i Gasete sa sociološko-antropološkog stanovišta. Još dalje od svakog propedeutičkog momenta, ovo delo iz 1985. godine zasnovano je na istraživanju sa zaključkom koji je nastao uz pomoć precizno određenog metodološkog aparata. Iako izvesno najvažniji, ta knjiga nije njegov jedini tekst o ovom misliocu.

Upravo bi jedan rad Ksenije Atanasijević o Ortegi mogao da odgovara načelima prolegomena. U članku „Humanistička misao španskog filozofa Hose Ortege i Gasete“, zamišljenom kao kratki uvod u obimno delo, na elementaran način obuhvaćena je i pregledno izložena njegova misao i to je prvi tekst na srpskom jeziku koji ima takav cilj. Ako delo Triva Indića ne može da se posmatra kao opšti uvod u misao ovog filozofa, može kao suštinski doprinos njegovom uvođenju na ove prostore. Radi se o odlučujućem momentu prenosa Ortetine misli sa jednog na drugi kraj našeg kontinenta, iz Španije u Srbiju, sa jugozapada na jugoistok Evrope. U pitanju je bitan događaj približavanja Madrida Beogradu, kritičko preuzimanje i problematizacija ideja jednog u to vreme ovde delimično znanog filozofa. Već je Ksenija Atanasijević, krajem sedme decenije XX veka, sa pravom govorila o njegovoj delatnosti kao „nedovoljno poznatoj u našoj sredini“ (Atanasijević 1967: 234).

Kada sam naznačio da delo Triva Indića o Ortegi i Gasetu nije zamišljeno kao uvođenje u njegovu misao, to takođe mislim jer ono nema ambiciju da pokrije sve oblasti kojima se on bavio. Međutim, jedno područje kojim se Indić između ostalih konkretno jeste bavio je područje njegove estetičke teorije. Radi se o tekstu „Ortega i Velasques“. Tu ću i zastati. Dakle, moja namera nije da ovde pregledno izložim i rekonstruišem celokupno Indićevo čitanje Ortege i Gasetu. Zadržaću se jedino na stabilnosti jednog momenta koji me interesuje, a to je njegova analiza Orteginih radova o slikaru Dijegu Velaskezu (Diego Velázquez). Iako ovaj kraći tekst predstavlja tek jedan segment Indićevo delo o Ortegi i Gasetu, on se ipak čini vrlo vrednim njegovog isticanja.

Pored Indića, u projektu otpočinjanja promišljanja Orteginе teorije umetnosti bitnu ulogu imao je i Milan Damnjanović. Naglašavam „otpočinjanja“, jer uostalom i sam Damnjanović u članku „Mesto estetike u filozofskom mišljenju Ortege i Gasetu“ navodi, potvrđujući stav Ksenije Atanasijević, da „se malo pisalo i o njegovoj [Ortege i Gasetu] estetici ili filozofiji umetnosti“, a ne samo uopšte o njegovoj filozofiji (Damnjanović 1985: 41). U članku je napravljen logičan prelaz od opšteg sistema Orteginе filozofije ka njegovoj estetici, izvođenjem druge iz prve. Međutim, u njemu nije pokriveno celokupno delo sa estetičkom problematikom ovog mislioca, mnogi tekstovi nisu uzeti u razmatranje, već se Damnjanović zadržava prevashodno na uticajnom eseju *Dehumanizacija umetnosti* (1925).

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U odnosu na Milana Damnjanovića koji daje opšti pregled Orteginе filozofije umetnosti, Trivo Indić se prevashodno usredsredio na jedan poseban predmet, a to je Orteginа interpretacija umetnosti Dijega Velaskeza. Damnjanović uopšte ne pominje ciklus tekstova o španskom slikaru XVII veka, to jest predmet koji će obraditi Indić. Analiza Velaskeza od strane Ortege i Gasetu vrlo je snažna, promišljena i filozofski utemeljena. Zbog toga je od velikog značaja namera Triva Indića da je prenese ovdašnjim čitaocima i da ukaže na nju. U pitanju je jedan vrlo specifičan segment Orteginog opusa uopšte, znalački i pažljivo odabran, i da nije bilo Indićevo gestu ta celina bi svakako duže vreme na ovim prostorima ostala neopažena i nepoznata. U tom pravcu njegov tekst, koliko informativan, toliko je i dobrodošao.

Odmah na početku teksta „Ortega i Velasques“ ukazano je na širinu životne delatnosti madridskog filozofa, i na praktičnom i na teorijskom planu, koju je pratila njegova široka erudicija. Pri tome, naglašena je raznovrsnost problema kojima se bavio i o kojima je promišljao, i to „nikada bez sluha“ da ih čuje u njihovovoj izazovnosti. Predmeti njegovog interesovanja bili su raznovrsni – od metafizike do politike – ali ih je vodila i spajala jasna ideja, uprkos specifičnom načinu pisanja.

Težio je ka sistematičnoj, metodičnoj, rigoroznoj misli, mada sam nikad nije napisao ono što bismo nazvali kompletnom knjigom, završenom studijom. (Indić 1985b: 33)

U delu Ortege i Gasete slikar „Vulkanove kovačnice“ i „Demokrita“ ima istakuto mesto, bez ikakve sumnje najistaknutije od svih slikara. „Velázquez je, naime, trajna Ortegina preokupacija.“ (Indić 1985b: 34) Njime se bavio celog života, njegovo ime bilo je čest motiv u njegovim analizama, slikar kome se iznova vraćao, prvo kao prateći primer na koga se pozivao u bavljenju različitim estetičkim razmatranjima, a potom i kao središnja figura njegove analize. Trivo Indić tačno navodi da se Ortega i Gaset naročito intenzivno usredsredio na njegovo proučavanje između 1943. i 1954. godine. Zašto baš interval koji se proteže između ove dve godine? Iako to izričito ne navodi, razlog je zato što su tada izdata dva *Uvoda u Velaskeza*. Takođe, u međuvremenu je Ortega 1947. godine držao kurs pod istim nazivom u San Sebastijanu. Tri godine kasnije pojaviće se i njegov tekst „Velaskezovske teme“. Ti radovi čine jezgro ciklusa Orteginih tekstova o ovom slikaru.

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U istom tekstu, pre fokusiranja na glavni predmet, izložena je geneza poimanja fenomena evropskog slikarstva u misli Ortege i Gasete. Indić navodi da je ovaj fenomen prvo sagledavan kroz kategorije umetničkih stilova, da bi potom takav klasifikacioni pristup bio odbačen okretanjem ka istraživanju biografije umetnika, odnosno „ontologije ljudskog života“ (Indić 1985b: 36). Kao paradigma prvobitnog pristupa uputan je esej „O tački gledišta u umetnostima“ (1924). U njemu se razvoj zapadnoevropskog slikarstva posmatra kao proces interiorizacije, to jest kao „progresivna introverzija tačke gledišta“. Promenom stilova kroz istoriju prvo su se – smatra Ortega – slikale stvari, zatim čulni utisci i, na kraju, ideje.

Kako se Ortegina misao o umetnosti bude dalje razvijala, njega će – napominje Indić – sve više počinjati da interesuje život umetnika kao centralna kategorija u vezi sa ovom problematikom (Indić 1985b: 37). Naravno, ne ulazeći u mogućnost promene relacionih shema, pitanje je koliko je u stvari moguće razdvojiti slikarev život od njegovog dela. Velaskez ne bi bio Velaskez da ne postoje slike koje su ga učinile time što jeste. Njegovo ime stoji za njegova dela. Zbog toga ne bi bila greška ako bi se, zbog ekonomičnosti izraza, umesto Velaskeza govorilo o Velaskezima, na onaj način kao kada se kaže da jedna zemlja, institucija ili osoba poseduje određeni broj Velaskeza. U tom pravcu, može se reći: „Srbija nema nijednog Velaskeza.“ Ako bi se ovaj iskaz uzeo u doslovnom značenju, ispalo bi da postoji više njih, a u stvari se sve vreme metonimijski govori o njegovim pojedinačnim slikama, a ne o više različitih osoba.

Paralelno sa prebacivanjem akcenta na figuru umetnika, uz insistiranje na singularitetu vrsnog pojedinca kao odlučujućeg elementa u okviru razvoja zajednice kojoj pripada, težiće se izbegavanju pozitivističkog modela interakcije značajnog umetnika i njegovog epohalnog konteksta. Po filozofovom mišljenju, ideja o eliminaciji pojedinih ličnosti koje ne odgovaraju vrednostima određene epohe u kojoj su situirani, to jest onih koje ne izražavaju

najjasnije norme u njoj ustanovljene, mora biti odbačena. U suprotnosti sa takvim modelom, Ortega anti-pozitivistički brani ideju po kojoj znamenita osoba ne mora idealno da reprezentuje vladajuće ideje vremena u kome živi, nego da ih svojim delanjem odlučno negira i prevazilazi.

Ne može se razumeti Velaskez ako se ne sagleda kao oštra suprotnost zanosima svog vremena. Greška je pretpostaviti da su veliki ljudi uvek predstavnici svoje epohe, kao da se ne razume da biti predstavnik znači suprostaviti se svojoj epohi. Istina je najčešće obrunuto: veliki čovek je veliki jer se opire svom vremenu. (Ortega y Gasset 1965, VIII: 589)

U čemu se sastojala Velaskezova izuzetnost prema Ortegi i Gasetu? Kao važan podatak navodi da on pripada generaciji Dekarta (René Descartes). U njegovim očima to neće biti nebitna konstatacija. Velaskez je rođen 1599. godine, Dekart „tri godine ranije“. Ono na čemu španski filozof insistira jeste da je tzv. „kopernikanski obrt“ u mišljenju počeo istovremeno da se događa i u filozofiji i u slikarstvu.¹ U eseju „O tački gledišta u umetnostima“ rečeno je kako se pre Velaskeza slikarevo oko „ptolomejski okretalo oko svakog objekta držeći se svoje ropske putanje“. Subjekt umetnika, međutim, sada dolazi u centar, istiskujući tako objekt postavljajući ga ispred i na osnovu sebe:

Oko umetnika postavlja se u središte plastičkog Kosmosa i oko njega počinju da kruže forme objekata. (Ortega y Gasset 1966, IV: 452)

Dovođenje u vezu Dekarta i Velaskeza, započeto u ovom eseju, biće kasnije razrađeno u dva *Uvoda u Velaskeza*. Već na početku prvog Ortega i Gaset će istaći da primedba da oba pripadaju istoj epohi i, još uže, istoj generaciji, može da deluje iznenađujuće za čitaoca, pretpostavljajući da se oni retko dovode u vezi jedan sa drugim, da se radi o potpuno različitim putevima bez njihovog ukrštanja ili zajedničkog imenitelja. Iako Ortega i Gaset vidi filozofiju i slikarstvo kao „suprostavljene discipline“, on ide ka tome da Velaskeza vidi kao Dekarta slikarstva, a Dekarta kao Velaskeza filozofije. U svakom slučaju, oba jesu mislioci *proze*.

Sada će se razumeti zašto sam na početku ovih stranica smatrao bitnim podsetiti da Dekart strogo pripada generaciji Velaskeza. Discipline kojima se obojica bave ne mogu biti udaljenije – one su skoro dva suprotna pola kulture. Međutim, pronalazim primeran paralelizam između ova dva čoveka. [...] I jedan i drugi vrše, dakle, istu promenu unutar svojih suprostavljenih disciplina. Kao što Dekart svodi mišljenje na racionalnost, Velaskez svodi slikarstvo na vizuelnost. (Ortega y Gasset 1965, VIII: 484)

1 Dok Ortega aluzivno govori o Velaskezovom delu kao o „kritici čistog oka“ (*la crítica de la pura retina*) (Ortega y Gasset 1965, VIII: 477), Maravalj (José Antonio Maravall), čiji je dug prema Ortegi očigledan i višestruko isplativ, u obimnoj studiji *Kultura baroka* iznova iznosi ideju o Velaskezu kao umetniku koji slika u prvom licu (*en primera persona*) (Maravall 1975: 354).

Obojica se okreću protiv modela ustaljenih u tradiciji koji više nisu dovoljni. Kada Ortega i Gaset promišlja njihov odnos prema tada aktualnoj društvenoj stvarnosti, često i konstitutivno iskrsava reč *contra*. I jedan i drugi, u konfliktu sa prevladajućom klimom svog vremena, kao uzorni pojedinci „orijentišu se ka budućnosti“, težeći u efektivnosti svoje misaone delatnosti „putu najkraćem, ali najstabilnijem“, razborito pročišćavajući polja svojih disciplina. I na ovom konkretnom mestu prisutna je i primenjena Ortegina paradigma logike društvenog kretanja i razvoja, to jest ono što čini glavni predmet Indićevo istraživanja povodom misli madridskog filozofa.

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Sociološke aspekte Ortegine teorije u bitnome je, dakle, proučio Trivo Indić. U knjizi *Uspón masa*, koja je objavljena iste godine kada i tekst „Ortega i Velaskez“, on je izložio temeljna načela i pojmove društvene teorije Ortege i Gasete, ali i dao racionalnu kritiku istih. Bit tog učenja nalazi se u ideji borbe između dva pola društvene zajednice, tzv. „elita“ i „masa“, i ta dihotomija je ono što određuje prirodu i strukturu svakog društva kao takvog. Španski filozof ključnu ulogu u održanju i razvoju jedne zajednice bezuslovno pridaje njenim elitnim slojevima i Indić je sa pravom označio ovo stanovište kao „aristokratsku interpretaciju istorije“ (Indić 1985a: 74).

Prema tome, u okviru intersubjektivnih razmena dešava se proces sličan zakonu gravitacije, gde jedna grupa ili pojedinac svojom snagom aktivno privlači one kojima nedostaje odličnost prvih. Fenomen takvog društvenog raslojavanja evidentan je već na najjednostavnijim nivoima međuljudskog odnošenja, već na nivou obične konverzacije. U prilog toj tezi Indić ističe jedan čisto empirijski argument:

Kada se šest ljudi nađu da razgovaraju, u početku neizdiferencirana masa sabesednika uskoro se artikuliše u dve grupe, od kojih jedna u razgovoru vodi drugu, utiče na nju, poklanja više nego što prima. Ako se to ne događa, radi se o tome da se inferiorni deo grupe nenormalno opire da bude vođen, da bude pod uticajem superiornijeg dela, i tada je svaki razgovor nemoguć. (Indić 1985a: 73)

Treba ponoviti da Ortegina ideja o društvenoj stratifikaciji nije klasno, nego etički koncipirana. Nije toliko bitno ko kom društvenom sloju pripada, bitno je da pojedinac stremi vrsnosti i autentičnosti kao svrsi života. Moralna norma je uslov pripadnosti boljem delu društvene zajednice. Trivo Indić odlučno kritikuje ovakvu Orteginu poziciju, jer smatra da ona zanemaruje „konkretno-istorijsku analizu klasne strukture“ društva, to jest da je Ortegina društvena teorija u osnovi neistorična (Indić 1985a: 16, 113, 158). Izvor dinamičke strukture društva nije ništa drugo nego borba između njegovih boljih i lošijih pripadnika i u takvoj vrsti odnošenja jedino što se dešava je da jedna elita dolazi umesto druge, da je menja u jednoj vrsti cirkularnog kruženja, ali to ne treba da iznenadi, jer je „ciklično poimanje

istorije tipično za sve elitističke koncepcije“ (Indić 1985a: 76) određivanja prirode društvene konstitucije.

Polazeći od navedenih Indićevisih zapažanja u Orteginoj misli, očitava se suštinska protivrečnost – kako to da filozof koji se zalaže za ideju „istorijskog uma“ (*razón histórica*) koristi neistorično određene kategorije? Ovakve to da mislilac koji je napisao da „čovjek nema prirodu, nego ima... istoriju“ (Ortega y Gasset 1964: VI, 41), tvrdi da je priroda čovjeka u proseku koruptivna i loša, to jest istovremeno vrši „dedukciju iz neistorijskih, metafizičkih shvatanja o ljudskoj prirodi“ (Indić 1985a: 131)? Da li je Ortegina filozofska pozicija po ovom pitanju u osnovi kontradiktorna?

Sa druge strane, Indić naglašava da se u načelu na osnovu kojeg Ortega definiše ove pojmove nalazi psihološki mehanizam, jer se njihovo određivanje svodi na određne tipove ljudskog ponašanja – primernost i poslušnost (Indić 1985a: 147). Zaista, tragovi psihologizma primetni su i na stranicama posvećenim Velaskezu. Tražeći uzrok broju naslikanih slika i njihovoj prirodi, Ortega će posegnuti za psihološkim tipom objašnjenja. Štaviše, na osnovu poznatih istorijskih dokumenata pokušao je ući u profil njegove ličnosti, to jest u konstituciju njene psihe.

Velaskezova flegmatičnost bila je, dakle, poznata. Ipak, flegmatičnost je najviši stepen mirnoće a flegmatik multimilioner vremena, onaj ko uvek ima previše vremena. (Ortega y Gasset 1965, VIII: 462)

Na mestu gde se bavi ovim pitanjima, Ortega i Gaset upotrebljava termin „parsimonija“. On nosi barem tri značenja. Može da označava usporenost prouzrokovanu spokojnošću, štedljivost u pogledu trošenja i razboritost u ponašanju, ali parsimonija se takođe uzima kao jedno od načela valjanog filozofskog mišljenja, u ontologiji i logici. Sve u svemu, u pitanju je jedan od načina opšte ekonomije života.

U cilju temeljnijeg razumevanja misaone pozicije pisca „Istorije kao sistema“ s obzirom na logiku društvene morfologije dobrodošao je, ako ne i neophodan, osvrt na kontekst u kome je filozof delovao. Čini se da su okolnosti u kojima je Ortega bio ne samo filozofski, nego i politički aktivan doprinele uobličavanju njegove teorije društva. Antikolektivističke tendencije u njegovoj misli, oličene u izdizanju i odbrani figure uzornog i samosvesnog pojedinca, od kojih bira Velaskeza kao u istoriji jedne od te vrste egzemplarnih, mogu da se posmatraju i kao odgovor na krize koje su potresale španski politički sistem tokom prve polovine XX veka. Vredan prilog analizi ove teme dao je Trivo Indić studijom pod naslovom *Savremena Španija*.

Najvažniji i najpoznatiji Ortegin tekst posvećen problemu razvoja modernih društava svakako je *Pobuna masa*. On je pisan 1926. godine (objavljen u formi zasebne knjige četiri godine kasnije) kao diskurzivno uobličeno

svedočenje nastanku i razvoju totalitarnih ideologija i pokreta tog vremena. To je generalno razdoblje krize liberalne države u Evropi, a u Španiji konkretno razdoblje vojne diktature Prima de Riverera (Miguel Primo de Rivera) (1923–1930). Period u kome je Ortega razvijao svoju teoriju o masifikaciji društva i njenim posledicama, naročito kroz članke štampane u listu *El Sol*, Indić je opisao na sledeći način:

„Novi poredak“ je počeo „zavođenjem reda“ i „ozdravljenjem nacije“: ukinut je parlament, zabranjene političke aktivnosti, proganjane političke partije, zavedena cenzura, ućutkani intelektualci. (Indić 1982: 30)

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Međutim, uprkos jakom Orteginom republikanskom i liberalističkom impulsu, veoma je znakovito da je iz njegovih tekstova crpeo inspiraciju i jedan Hose Antonio Primo de Rivera (José Antonio Primo de Rivera), sin prethodno pomenutog generala i osnivač Falange, fašističke organizacije koja je postala oslonac frankističkog režima.² Ambivalentnost Orteginih filozofsko-političkih ideja, koje kao takve mogu biti različito interpretirane, ili barem upotreba njegovog pojmovnog aparata i jezika, odnosno zavodljive terminologije i njihova performativna snaga unutar ambijenta u kome su pisane, ali i Ortegina kritika i rezerva prema parlamentarističkom sistemu, pružili su mogućnost i za jedan takav oblik politikološkog uticaja.

Slom Druge Republike i građanski rat, naročito njegov epilog, doveli su do toga da je veliki broj građana usled straha od odmazde i nasilja nad njima napustio granice razorene države, među njima i Ortega i Gaset, ulazeći u okvir onoga što se naziva „Španijom izgnanstva“ (*España peregrina*). Ortega je prvo izbegao u Francusku, da bi na kraju prešao u Portugaliju i odatle, iz zemlje Velaskezovog porekla, nakon godina egzila vratio se u Španiju. Strahovanje je bilo opravdano, represalije nad gubitnicima rata bile su naročito intenzivne odmah u početku, za vreme tzv. „Plave epohe“ (*Era Azul*). „Španijom vlada muk“, a zemlja pretvorena u „ogromnu tamnicu“, utvrdiće Indić u *Savremenoj Španiji* (Indić 1982: 89 i 90). Represivnost režima, koji se održao do sredine sedamdesetih godina XX veka, ogledala se i u zabranjivanju štampanja određenih stranih knjiga, među kojima je bila i *Rasprava o metodi* već pomenutog Dekarta.

Da bi se utvrdilo kako se implikacije Orteginе društvene teorije manifestuju na jednom posebnom nivou intersubjektivnog odnošenja potrebno je zadržati se za trenutak na njegovoj studiji pod nazivom *Čovek i ljudi*. Već u samom njenom naslovu, u kome između dva njegova glavna elementa postoji odnos oponiranja, iako ih spaja veznik „i“, postavljena je Ortegina osnovna ideja društvene strukturalne i dinamike. One će se analoški preneti i na konkretne vidove čovekovog izražavanja i odnošenja. Ovaj delom nezavršeni tekst publikovan je posle njegove smrti, 1957. godine. Međutim,

2 Uporedi Indić 1982: 172–173 i Indić 1985a: 118.

iako takve prirode, njegova poglavlja jasno su artikulirana a sveukupna ideja koju nosi nesumnjiva. On nije završen pre svega iz razloga što mu nedostaju poslednja poglavlja, čiji naslovi su nam ipak poznati. Sama misao koja ga oblikuje u njegovom kretanju nedvosmisleno je jasna i ocrta.

Jedan od osnovnih načina konstitucije društvenosti izvesno je jezik, jer je on „činjenica u kojoj se najjasnije i najčistije daju karakteristike društvene stvarnosti i, zbog toga, u njemu se ispoljava neopisivom preciznošću biće jednog društva“ (Ortega y Gasset 1964, VII: 237–238). Ortega je potom u vidu dodatka napravio terminološku ogradu u vezi sa reči koju je na prethodnom mestu upotrebio. To je uradio zbog toga što „jezik nikada nije „činjenica“ (*el hecho*) iz jednostavnog razloga što nikada nije „učinjen“ (*no está nunca „hecha“*), to jest zatvoren i statičan.

U tekstu *Čovek i ljudi* vidno je naglašena ideja o „dehumanizirajućem“ aspektu jezika. U svim društvima na delu je tenzija između jezika kao opšteg sistema govornih sredstava koji je nametnut pojedici spolja u obliku pritiska i njegovih vlastitih stremljenja u verbalnom izražavanju. Uz to, treba reći da je govor (*habla*) tek jedan od načina ispoljavanja njegovog bića. U istom tekstu naveden je i jedan drugi modalitet izraza, za predmet ove studije podjednako bitan. „Sve lepe umetnosti, na primer, jesu načini govora (*decir*).“ U nameri da se autentično izrazi, čovek ne mora da se apсолutno okrene protiv ustaljenog obrasca govora ljudi, ali se mora diferencirati u odnosu na njega. Iz ovakve pretpostavke proizilazi da se razvoj jedne društvene zajednice izvorno zasniva na sukobu unutar nje, a koji se, sa svoje strane, otvara i u upotrebi jezika.

Ova borba između izraza pojedinca i izraza ljudi normalan je oblik postojanja jezika. (Ortega y Gasset 1964, VII: 254)

Da bi se razumela umetnikova namera, da bi se pojnilo ono što je hteo da kaže, do toga se dolazi na osnovu onoga što je već kazao. U čemu se sastoji obrt koji je umetnik izveo u odnosu na dotadašnju tradiciju evropskog slikarstva može da se sagleda ako se spozna šta je specifičnost Velaskezovog govora naspram drugih umetnika, ali i, što je važnije, naspram u to vreme ustaljenih konvencija slikovnog izražavanja. Šta je umetnik nameravao da saopšti zavisni od toga šta ga je stimulisalo da to učini.

Kada slikar nanese jedan potez, on ga nanese zbog određenih motiva koje, manje ili više jasne, ima na svom umu. Ti motivi su oni koje nam je slikar hteo kazati (*decir*). (Ortega y Gasset 1965, VIII: 564)

Gledano iz postavljene perspektive, značenje slike bi bilo ono što nam slikar njome govori. To je legitimno prihvatiti kao polaznu osnovu. Međutim, mnogo teže je reći šta je to što je slikar hteo da izrazi, to jest da „kaže“. Upravo i sam Ortega kaže da su takvi motivi „manje ili više jasni“ (da ne govorimo što je reč „motiv“ stavljena u množinu). Ovaj dodatak treba

ozbiljno uzeti u obzir i ne treba preletati olako ili brzo preko njega, jer je „govor“ slikara vrlo specifičan, on nije verbalne prirode.

Indić prepoznaje doprinos Ortege i Gasete nauci o društvu, posebno knjigom *Pobuna masa* iz 1929. godine. Isticanjem sociološkog aspekta Orteginе misli, on će je blisko toj logici čitati i interpretirati. Iako ona u bitnom sadrži društveno-političku dimenziju, ne bi je trebalo i ne bi se smela sociologizirati, poistovetiti u potpunosti sa tom problematikom. To nije namera Triva Indića i on to ne čini. Nauka, a samim tim i nauka o društvu, zasniva se na jednom dubljem, metafizičkom mišljenju, onome što je Ortega i Gaset označio kao filozofiju „vitalnog uma“ (*razón vital*).

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Dijego Velaskez je za Ortegu i Gasetu nesumnjivo paradigma „aristokratskog ideala čoveka“ o kome se govori. Izvesno to je *jedan* pravac koji može legitimno da se sledi u okviru Orteginе analize španskog slikara XVII veka. Logično iz više razloga, Trivo Indić u svom tekstu „Ortega i Velaskez“ to i čini. On naglašava Orteginu tezu prema kojoj je Velaskez označen kao „vršni pojedinac“ koji se suprostavlja „socijalnog inerciji“, oličenoj u nepovoljnim spacio-temporalnim uslovima unutar kojih nastoji da ostvari zahteve svoje vokacije (Indić 1985b: 34). U tom smislu, osa Indićevoг istraživanja iz knjige *Uspón masa* korelativna je osi njegovog teksta „Ortega i Velaskez“. Opozicija elite/mase svakako jeste jedna od osovina kategorijalnog aparata Ortege i Gasete i postaviti je kao predmet u prvi plan jeste apsolutno utemeljen i opravdan gest. Ali glavno je pitanje da li u Orteginom poimanju suštine umetnosti ovog slikara postoji još jedan put koji nije obuhvaćen u tekstu beogradskog sociologa.

Trivo Indić zapravo u svom tekstu i daje naznake za jedan drugačiji pristup, on prenosi Orteginu ideju prema kojoj je zadatak Velaskezovog dela „problem slike kao same slike“. Sa svoje strane, u takvoj vrsti istraživanja postoji osnova za pokretanje fundamentalnog pitanja o uslovu mogućnosti govora o njima. Međutim, Indić ne pravi taj odlučujući korak i zadržava se na sledećem zapažanju povodom Velaskezovog gesta:

„Predmet se pretvorio u čisti vizuelni entitet [...]. Time je slikarstvo prihvatilo samo sebe i postalo isključivo slikarstvo.“ (Indić 1985b: 38)

Čini se da ovaj momenat, gde Ortega govori o redukciji slikarstva na sebe samog, o otkrivanju njegove biti koja se manifestuje u optičkoj pojavnosti slike, jeste onaj koji je trebalo dalje radikalizovati i izvući iz njega krajnje konsekvence, umesto da se tek ostane na prethodno navedenoj konstataciji. Upravo Orteginim tekstovima pravdaju i nalažu rizik takve odluke.

Velaskezova namera sastojala se u pokušaju izgradnje jedinstvenog vizuelnog jezika. Radi se o jednom od odlučujućih momenata u ukupnom razvoju evropskog slikarstva. „Još od Đota (Giotto) ovo je najradikalnija promena u

likovnoj umetnosti.“ Za čas ću se odmaknuti od ove tvrdnje iz članka „Ortega i Velaskez“ i vratiti se na tekst „Velaskezovske teme“, da bismo videli u čemu je za Ortega bit individualnog jezika bilo kog značajnog slikara.

Niko nije veliki slikar ako nema jedan jezik (*idioma*). Zbog toga veliki umetnik se ne razume ni sa kim. Kako će se razumeti ako je njegovo poslanstvo da govori drugim jezikom (*lenguaje*)? Zbog toga istorija umetnosti jeste Vavilonska kula. Slikari se ne razumeju se među sobom – isključuju se. Veliki umetnik gradi oko sebe vlastitu izolaciju i guši se unutra. Takva je njegova sudbina. (Ortega y Gasset 1965, VIII: 612–613)

Posledica ovakvog viđenja, gde se insistira na posebnosti i neponovljivosti formalnog jezika svakog značajnog slikara zasebno, jeste uspostavljanje monadologije slikarskih jezika. Više njih iz sebe egzistiraju naporedo, poput monada, kroz idiomatsku mnoštvenost. Međutim, ono što je presudno – smatra Ortega – jeste to što je kod Velaskeza došlo do negiranja slikarskih jezika u ime jezika slikarstva.

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Svrha Velaskezovog rada se, prema tome, vidi u jednoj konkretnoj nameri. Njegov projekat je bio svesti slikarstvo na slikarstvo. Rečeno vokabularom vizibilističke teorije umetnosti, oduzeti stvarima koje slika svaki elemenat korporalnosti, odbaciti ono voluminozno u njima, negirati „taktilno“ u ime čisto „optičkog“.

U prvom *Uvodu* postavljeno je pitanje zbog čega o ovom umetniku ima malo podataka datiranih u vreme njegovog života. Zašto se o njemu, danas nesumljivo jednom od napoznatijih i najpriznatijih španskih i evropskih umetnika, malo govorilo, odnosno zašto on nije bilo popularan koliko je to objektivno zbog svog umeća zasluživao? Odakle to „ćutanje pisaca u odnosu na Velaskeza“? (Ortega y Gasset 1965, VIII: 463) Štaviše, od njega je, ukupno gledano, ostalo tek nekoliko izjava, i to uvek u formi „sentenciozne sažetosti“. Ortega, slikovito govoreći, razlog takve okolnosti pronalazi u „zmijama zavisti“ prisutnim u njegovom okruženju.

Nije se širila [njegova slava], nije proizvodila efekte, i budući da je značenje reči „slava“ (*fama*) „govoriti o“, o Velaskezu se ćutalo. Zavidni, već kada nisu mogli da je razore, pokušali su da je parališu, zaustave njene efekte i spreče njeno širenje. (Ortega y Gasset 1965, VIII: 465)

Izvedeni zaključak psihološke je provinijencije. Umesto da se jedno negativno ljudsko osećanje, kakvo je ljubomora, traži kao uzrok prećutkivanja, odnosno odsustva biografskih informacija, on može da se traži i u društvenom položaju i ugledu profesije slikara u Španiji XVII veka, to jest o njenoj, na primer u poređenju sa situacijom na Apeneninskom poluostrvu, nezavidnoj poziciji. Takvu liniju istraživanja ustanovio je i otvorio 1976. godine Hulijan Galjego (Julián Gállego) knjigom *El pintor de artesano a artista*, gde je dao istoriju pravne borbe španskih slikara od XVI do XVIII veka u

cilju poboljšanja svog statusa u društvu i drugačijeg vrednovanja njihovog rada i delatnosti. Pored psihološkog, na ovom mestu valjalo bi tražiti i odgovor sociološke prirode.

674 U drugom *Uvodu*, u kome je u odnosu na prvi više pažnje posvećeno analizi pojedinačnih slika, kao razlog u početku nepopularnosti Velaskeza van granica Španije naveden je podatak da su duže vremena njegova dela bila zatvorena u kraljevskoj palati i samim tim nedostupna za javnost. Taj fenomen svakako predstavlja predmet sociologije kao nauke. Velaskezova zaštićenost od podilaženja ukusu svakog klijenta ponaosob doprinela je – Ortega tvrdi – da svakom svojom slikom slobodno razvija vlastite slikarske ideje. Njegov karakterističan način slikanja, označen kao *manera abreviada*, to jest ekonomičan potez kistom, kojim nanosi tek onoliko elemenata koliko je potrebno da bi ispunio svoju nameru, do te mere da su njegove slike izgledale kao „nezavršene“, to jest da su čekale da ih oko posmatrača „završi“, mogao je nesmetano da se razvija bez rizika od uslovljavanja potencijalnih konzervativnijih naručioaca. Otvaranjem kolekcije na uvid široj publici situacija se znatno promenila i Velaskezova slava potom se širila i dostigla *akmé* – smatra Ortega – između 1880. i 1920. godine. Šezdesetih godina XIX veka od strane Manea (Édouard Manet) biće označen kao *le peintre des peintres*. Njegova iskustva usvojili su oni umetnici koji će postati začetnici modernog slikarstva.

Ortega i Gaset navodi kako je početak XIX veka vreme kada u Evropi počinju da se prepoznaju Velaskezova dostignuća i uočavaju vrednosti koje otvara njegova umetnost. Otkriven je „Velaskez, jedan novi Velaskez“, *un nuevo Velázquez*, onaj koji će biti prepoznat od strane umetnika koji će na njegovom tragu određivati dalju sudbinu evropskog slikarstva. Slikarstvo „se zatvara u sebe“, pročišćivanjem postaje ono samo. Trivo Indić, sledeći Ortegu i Gasetu, potvrđuje da je tek „impresionizam posle 1870. shvatio ovo Velázquezovo otkriće i doveo ga do ekstrema“.

U eseju „O realizmu u slikarstvu“ iz 1912. godine pronalazimo jednu rečenicu čiji početak nas tera da se tu zaustavimo. Filozof na tom mestu počinje: „Velaskez o kome se danas govori...“ (Ortega y Gasset 1966, I: 566). Ne jednostavno Velaskez, nego *onaj* o kome se danas govori (*El Velázquez de que hoy se habla...*). Taj određeni član „el“ koji stoji ispred imena slikara ima odlučujuću bitnost za ovu problematiku. To nije Velaskez, to je određeni Velaskez (*El Velázquez*), ovaj a ne neki drugi, neki o kome se priča danas (*hoy*), to jest juče, baš taj a ne onaj o kome se pričalo ranije ili o kome će se pričati ubuduće.

Velaskez je u određenom trenutku bio prepoznat kao otac impresionizma i posmatran je iz te perspektive. Stoji li iza Orteginih reči izvestan istorizam koji njima upravlja? Potkazuje li ga u toj rečenici prilog „danas“? Međutim,

možda se ovde uopšte ne radi o istorističkom načinu mišljenja, nego o ukazivanju na postojanje različitih praksi govora o slikaru? Gde bi one govora o Velaskezu „o kome se danas govori“ ili o „Velaskezu, jednom novom Velaskezu“ bile tek jedne među ostalim? Nijedna perspektiva ne može biti apsolutizovana isključivanjem drugih načina posmatranja njegovog dela. Artikulaciju te ideje barem pratimo još od teksta „Istina i perspektiva“ iz 1916. godine. Načelo takve vrste mišljenja u svojoj demokratičnosti onemogućava esencijalizaciju jednog pogleda na španskog slikara i obezbeđuje prostor za postojanje diskurzivnog perspektivizma.

Ono što je vrlo indikativno, što upozorava u startu na ozbiljan i oprezan način kretanja u istraživanju Velaskeza od strane Ortege i Gasete, jeste to što njegov tekst o ovom slikaru u svom naslovu nosi termin „uvod“ (*introducción*). Iako je tekst vrlo sadržajan i otkrivalači i iako je Ortega posvetio dosta vremena njegovom izučavanju, on mu ipak daje naziv *Uvod u Velaskeza*. To ipak nešto govori. Uprkos ili upravo u ime onoga što je tu zapisao i izneo, on tako definisan ipak ostaje uvod u delo slikara. Ortega rezultate svog istraživanja ne smatra, dakle, toliko zaključkom. Ako se radikalnije promisli ova ideja, onda se tu zapravo ni ne radi o „uvodu“, nego o „uvođenju“. „Introducción“ znači i jedno i drugo, ova glagolska imenica nosi u sebi i svoj svršen i nesvršen oblik. Kao takva ona dozvoljava oba prevoda.

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Promišljati o slikarima znači uvoditi u njihova dela. Ispred mislilaca o slikarstvu stoji određeni zadatak. Međutim, cilj koji treba ispuniti jednostavno se ne može ispuniti, što ne znači da treba odustati od te radnje. Na kraju krajeva, kada su predmet mišljenja slike, ta namera ne cilja na svoje ispunjenje, ako njena realizacija znači završetak uvoda. Govoriti o jednom slikaru znači praviti beskonačan uvod i pred misliocima stoji beskonačan rad. Uprkos tome napor neće biti uzaludan. Uvođenje je i ovde i sada na delu.

Sa druge strane, nikada ne postoji jedan uvod. I zaista, ako pogledamo knjige i studije o Velaskezu postoji mnoštvo tema i problema koje one pokrivaju i kojima se bave. To znači da sve tekstove o slikaru „Menipa“ i „Predaje Brede“, a ima ih dosta, koliko god između sebe bili različiti, treba posmatrati pre svega kao uvode u njegovo delo. To ne protivreči njihovom karakteru kao gotovim studijama. Ukupno govoreći, takva strategija izgleda obećavajuće i čini se valjanom. Ono što bi bilo pogrešno jeste čitati je kao negativnu stvar.

Sama sinteza, u svojoj ekonomizirajućoj strategiji, nužno podrazumeva *isticanje* određenih ideja. Jedan momenat dođe do izražaja u prvi plan, dok se u istom aktu drugi gubi. Kakav je bilans teksta Triva Indića o Ortegi i Gasetu i Velaskezu s obzirom na neumitnost posledica takve logike? U njegovom sažimajućem pregledu estetičke misli ovog filozofa kroz odnos prema španskom slikaru, izostavljena je jedna naizgled nebitna napomena, a za koju se čini da je od odlučujuće važnosti.

Kako Trivo Indić sa pravom primećuje, estetika Ortege i Gasete jeste „razuđena“. Ne samo što postoji njena razuđenost, što je rasuta u mnoštvu tekstova, ona pored toga pokriva „raznovrsne teme“, što ipak ne sprečava – dodaje Indić – da one budu „uvek u funkciji osnovnog filozofskog opredeljenja“ Ortege i Gasete (Indić 1985b: 33). Treba priznati da ih je nemoguće na jednom relativno malom prostoru sve obuhvatiti. Međutim, ona o kojoj govorim nije jedna od ostalih, ona je uslov svih drugih tema. Upravo usled tematske raznovrsnosti u okviru njegove estetike, i rekli bismo usled njene perspektivističnosti, otvaraju se različiti pravci kojima ona može da bude izlagana i dalje razvijana.

676 Prvo što bi trebalo uraditi jeste promisliti na kakvoj je osnovi uopšte moguć takav projekat bavljenja i pisanja o jednom slikaru. Koje je ono pitanje koje prethodi analizama kakve daje Trivo Indić, ali i svim onima takve vrste? Šta prvo treba uraditi i rešiti da bi se one preduzele? Vratiti predmet u predsociološki prostor i postaviti njegovo istraživanje na transcendentalnu ravan.

Postoji jedna tema, jedna perspektiva koja je zapravo tema svih tema, perspektiva svih perspektiva. Ona se tiče same mogućnosti pisanja i govorenja o slikarstvu uopšte. Tek kada se jasno promisli ovaj problem i postavi kao polazište za sva dalja istraživanja, uz prihvatanje svih posledica koje njegovo postavljanje sa sobom nosi, onda se oprezno može preći na analizu drugih problema. Ortega i Gaset postavlja radikalno pitanje koje se sastoji u tome kako uopšte govoriti o onome što ne može da govori? Sa tim problemom mora da se suoči onaj ko, generalno govoreći, hoće da se bavi slikarstvom.

Ovaj problem predstavlja bitan motiv u tekstovima o umetnosti Ortege i Gasete. Njega pronalazimo i u oba *Uvoda u Velaskeza*. U prvom *Uvodu*, onom iz 1943. godine, za početak je izneseno jedno zapažanje koje se konkretno odnosi na ovog slikara, a povodom osobine za koju smatra da je tipična za ljude čiji je proizvod zasnovan i na radu manuelne prirode.

Međutim, često je da slikari, u kojima istrajava izvesna zanatlijska osnova za divljenje, ona manuelnog radnika, budu ćutljivi (*taciturnos*), a o Velaskezu znamo da je to bio u najvećoj meri. (Ortega y Gasset 1965, VIII: 463)

Ova opservacija ima privremenu vrednost i na njoj se kao takvoj ne može ostate. Ne radi se tek o pretpostavci da Velaskez nije voleo da priča, ili da to slikari u empirijskom preseku izbegavaju da rade. Ortega i Gaset kasnije u istom tekstu ističe temeljnu pretpostavku od koje mora da krene mislilac o umetnosti slikarstva. On mora da govori o onome ko ne govori i to je suština. Konstitutivna neizvesnost zasnivanja takvog projekta, kojim upravlja *a priori* vitalnog, mora se očitovati na njegov rezultat. Drugačije je kada se govori o onima koji koriste reči i bave se njima, jer slikar se prashodno nemo izražava.

Biti slikar znači odlučiti se na nemost (*mudez*). (Ortega y Gasset 1965, VIII: 482)

U drugom *Uvodu* (1954) Ortega i Gaset potvrđuje ideju izrečenu u prethodnom, ali sada ovo svojstvo premešta i proširuje sa slikara na slikarstvo u celini, što bitno s obzirom na dominantne relacije u njegovoj misli ne menja stvari. Ako se slikar izražava na nem način, slikarstvo jeste nema forma izraza. U pitanju je transcendentalna tišina slike kao uslov njenom pristupanju. Pošto Velaskez hoće da od slikarstva načini ono što ono zaista jeste, njegov jezik najadekvatnije pokazuje ovo opšte svojstvo koje ono u sebi nosi.

Ovaj opšti mutizam (*mutismo*) slikarstva štaviše je naglašen kod Velaskeza. (Ortega y Gasset 1965, VIII: 631)

Oni koji su proučavali estetiku Ortege i Gasete i njegovu misao o slikarskoj umetnosti, a na ovim prostorima su tome dali svoj doprinos Ksenija Atansijević, Milan Damjanović i Trivo Indić, morali su da se susretnu i suoče sa problemom mutizma slikarstva kao njegovim radikalnim određenjem. Poslednji pomenuti od njih je, uzimajući za predmet Orteginu misao o Velaskezu, otvorio, tako što je nije istakao, upravo onu temu koju je Ortega i Gaset u svojim tekstovima o velikom evropskom slikaru XVII veka postavio. U odnosu na sve ono do sada rečeno – da li je to uistinu Velaskez, taj *gran silencioso*? Šta nam govore njegove slike? Ko može poslednji da da odgovor na to pitanje i kako ga jednom za svagda rešiti i zatvoriti?

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Kao što pisac „Istine i perspektive“ kaže da se slikar određuje ne samo po onome što je naslikao, nego i po onome što nije, isto tako se može kod Triva Indića posmatrati šta on smatra za bitno kod Orteginine misli o umetnosti, a šta ne toliko. Ono što se ne pominje u njegovom tekstu o Velaskezu ne znači da nije bitno, na osnovu tog odsustva moguće je odrediti njegovu poziciju. Zato što nije uzeo u razmatranje i taj problem i sam njegov tekst o Velaskezu se na kraju dovodi u pitanje.

Ovaj gest se čini opravdanim iz razloga što je u tekstu Triva Indića propuštena da bude istaknuta temeljna ideja, ona koja propituje samu mogućnosti govora i pisanja o slikarstvu generalno. Moj tekst nije toliko kritički, koliko označava dopisivanje u odnosu na postojeći. Ne označava nikakvu reviziju prethodnog, on je tek jedan dodatak, aneks koji istovremeno potvrđuje i destabilizuje ideje izložene u njemu.

Ne kažem da Trivo Indić nije bio svestan tog problema ili jeste, nego da i sam njegov tekst o Velaskezu ne ostaje izvan, nego podleže radu ograničavanja izrečenih ideja. Iz područja dejstva temeljne opservacije o mutizmu slikarstva nije isključen ni onaj koji ju je izrekao. Upravo zbog transcendentnog motiva koji je otkrio i istakao, mora se uzeti kao uslovno i ono što je Ortega i Gaset pisao o Velaskezu. Pronaći i iznova naglasiti taj motiv ne znači biti pošteđen njegovog efekta. Ni ovaj tekst nije izuzet od te opasnosti.

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Miloš Čipranić

Indić and Velázquez

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to call into question the logic of interpretation of the texts of Ortega y Gasset about Velázquez made by Trivo Indić. The sociologist from Belgrade in his text „Ortega i Velasques“ [„Ortega and Velázquez“] overlooked an important question which the philosopher from Madrid proposed with regard to his interpretation of Velázquez – what is actually the condition of possibility to comprehend the work of (this) painter? Painting is a mute form of expression. Ortega y Gasset asks – how to speak about the persons who do not speak? Because Trivo Indić did not stress the importance of this question and did not discover this transcendental motif, his text will be problematized in that direction.

Keywords: mutism, painting, José Ortega y Gasset, Trivo Indić, Diego Velázquez

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How Does the Use of “Culture” and “Tradition” Shape the Women’s Rights Discourse in Transitional Serbia?

Abstract Although social anthropologists have mostly abandoned the essentialist view of “culture” and “tradition”, these static notions are still frequently used in Serbian public discourse regarding women’s rights. I believe that analysing the production of cultural meaning and knowledge among different social actors and the state is important when exploring the implementation, transformation and protection of women’s rights at a local level. In this article, I shall investigate how “culture” and “tradition” are being constructed and used by certain right wing groups, political leaders, intellectuals and by the Serbian Orthodox Church. On one side, arguments of “culture” and “tradition” are used in order to “preserve the national identity” and save it from “imposed Western norms” and “Western imperialism”, while on the other, they are used to explain the cultural obstacles regarding the effective protection of women’s rights. “Tradition”, often constructed as a linear project of inherited “cultural” and “moral” values and practices, stands in opposition to the EU; therefore, it calls to be nurtured and protected or changed and abandoned. Consequently, I see women rights issues trapped into a pro-EU or against EU, pro-traditional values or pro-liberal values discourse. I conclude that women rights in Serbia are and probably will be affected more by the use and abuse of different concepts of “culture” and “tradition”.

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Keywords: culture, tradition, women’s rights, public discourse, EU, Serbia, Balkan

The aim of this article is to explore in what ways and for what purposes concepts of “tradition”¹ and “culture” are being used in the public discourse related to women’s rights in contemporary, transitional Serbia. Although social anthropologists have mostly abandoned the essentialist (Grillo 2003) view of “culture” and “tradition”, these static definitions are still used in Serbian public discourse. Different actors, such as politicians, state officials and right wing groups are referring to women’s rights using arguments of “culture” and “tradition”. Moreover, in its observations regarding the implementation of CEDAW, Serbia has “acknowledge[d] in paragraphs 100 and 105 of its report that traditional views on the role of women and their status in society persist” (CEDAW/C/SRB/Q/2-3). After democratic changes in 2000 and the fall of Milošević regime, Serbia has chosen the path towards EU. Among many accession criteria is the obligation of the candidate state to guarantee the protection of human rights. Therefore, women’s and human

1 I am using terms “culture” and “tradition” in inverted commas, as there is no consensus on their definition among anthropologists and other social scientists, and I “define” these terms as socially constructed, fluid, contested, relational, changing and dynamic.

rights have been a part of every government's agenda. Consequently, in order to meet relevant EU requirements, the Serbian parliament adopted several laws on human and women's rights, (Council of the European Union, 2012) and expressed no reservation on CEDAW (CEDAW/C/SCG/CO/1/CRP). This article explores the public discourse and the production of cultural meaning related to women's rights in this particularly sensitive moment of struggle to obtain a date to open the negotiation process for joining the EU. How concepts of "tradition" and "culture" are used in explaining women's rights and with what purpose? How do these arguments reflect the EU debate and how these arguments and the EU debate affect the women's rights?

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As Merry (2003) points out, in human rights discourse, particularly in CEDAW, "culture" is often seen as subordinating women while women's rights and modernity are freeing them. The same view of "culture" and "tradition", as this paper intends to show, is present in Serbian public discourse, where the fight for women's rights becomes a fight against "backward mentality", "tradition" (Nešić 2013), "rural thought" (Ramet 1996) and "Balkan's re-traditionalisation" (Božilović 2010). On one hand, ruling state elites, which embrace women's rights together with the EU perspective, are using the arguments of "culture" and "tradition" to explain encountered difficulties in the implementation of these rights. In this article, I argue that state officials use these arguments as an excuse, by blaming "tradition" for the inefficiency of the state to protect women's rights. As a consequence of this, they turn the women's rights fight into a fight against tradition (Merry 2003, Cowan 2001). On the other hand, right wing groups² ("Dveri", "Naši", "1389"³) and the Serbian Orthodox Church present themselves as the protectors of "tradition" against "imposed Western values". They also

2 Some far right groups in Serbia, created a couple of decades ago as marginalised, religious, sport, sub cultural, para-political organisation gradually changed into legitimate political parties. It has been estimated that almost 10% of Serbs voted for different far right representatives (CESID 2012).

3 "Dveri", "Naši" and "1389" are three influential right wing organisations created in 1999 -"Dveri", in 2004 - "Naši" and in 2005 -"1389", declaring themselves as patriotic, non-government, non-profitable, aiming to "preserve tradition and [...] [affirm] culture, historical, spiritual and other values of Serbian people[...]"(1389 2013). Those values are, for all three organisations, the Orthodox church [...] and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia (against the independence of Kosovo). They all declare themselves as being firmly against Serbia entering EU and NATO and they proclaim state alliance with Russia. "Patriotism and family values are among our most important, basic principles. We are also developing campaigns against drug addiction and abortion" (1389 2013). "Dveri" is more intellectually oriented, and highly political, producing a lot of studies, written documents and academic papers in support of their theories, "Naši" is firmly fighting "traitors and foreign spies" (Naši 2013) by producing lists of enemies and organising marches against gay pride while "1389" declares itself open to new ideas and even has a part of their website in foreign languages (1389 2013).

strongly oppose the EU integration process. In their view, “tradition”, constructed as a linear and static project of inherited “cultural” and “moral” values and practices, stands in opposition to the “shameful” and “perverted” Europe and calls to be nurtured and protected.

The result of this analysis hints that the EU process may not be incentive to further development of women’s rights in Serbia but rather likely to marginalize the issue by setting those rights among mandatory and unpopular political EU conditions.⁴ This may explain the fear of some human rights activists that the EU may turn a blind eye on women issues if Serbia does fulfil “more important” political conditions, like the normalisation of Serbia’s relations with Kosovo, judicial reforms etc. (Mršević, personal interview 27 Feb 2013).

The production of cultural meaning, especially in relation to Serbia’s EU-accession and to the Serbian symbolic battlefield around “tradition”, “culture” and women’s rights, cannot be understood without knowing the patterns of the Western “orientalist discourse”⁵ (Said 1978) in which Balkans is perceived as unfinished and “uncivilised” Europe. Created a couple of centuries ago, mostly in France and Great Britain, this set of negative images on Balkans and Serbia has been resurrected during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s and has been kept alive since, both internationally and locally, deeply affecting contemporary Serbia and, more precisely, the EU and the women’s rights discourse. This oriental discourse has its roots in early travel books in which the Balkans was perceived as a mystical, patriarchal, tribal and rural place. After World War I, it inspired the creation of new words (balkanization, to balkanize) designating the breaking up “into smaller and often hostile units” (*Encyclopædia Britannica*, 2013). During fifty years of communism in the second half of the XX century, Yugoslavia was mainly known for its third way into socialism and an allied force during World War II. However, the old patriarchal and tribal discourse made its forceful comeback in Western literature during Yugoslav wars (Drezgić and Žarkov 2006). As Drezgić and Žarkov (2006) notice, in most feminist academic literature regarding the Balkans and Serbia, men are presented as violent, misogynous warriors, while women are mostly defined as passive victims of the war (see Allcock 1991, Stiglmyer 1993). These revived “Western” media and cultural definitions of the Balkans and Serbia have

4 Slow progression towards EU, unpopular political conditions (cooperation with the ICTY, Kosovo independence) made the public support to the EU integration process drop from 72 in 2002 to 41% in December 2012 (Serbia European Integration Office 2013).

5 The term describes what Said argued was an academic and artistic tradition of outsider interpretations of the East, based and shaped by prejudices and the European imperialism in the 18th and 19th centuries.

been adopted and also partly produced by regional and local academic and political actors; they have contributed to this image and perpetuated these "imagined geographies" (Bakić-Hyden 1992).

682 In that sense, Drezgić and Žarkov (2006) provided an excellent analysis of the work of Slavenka Drakulić, often perceived as "Simone de Beauvoir of Eastern Europe" and "Gloria Steinem of Socialism" and whose works regarding communism and wars in ex-Yugoslavia represent an "authority in the West" (Drezgić and Žarkov 2006: 293). Throughout examples from her work, they reveal how Western stereotypes of communism were reproduced and combined with descriptions of the "savage" Balkans. Authors demonstrate how Drakulić demonises communism through metaphors of tumour and dark, brainwashed people whose mentality and system of beliefs needs exorcizing, depicting irrationality that is about to explode, women as passive victims without agency and the communist society divorced from all individual responsibility. Furthermore, the savageness of the Balkans is illustrated through the images of wars in ex-Yugoslavia and examples of nationalism and the rural, male brutality, where "rural" becomes almost an explanation for violence itself (Drezgić and Žarkov 2006: 293–296). This "rural" motive as an explanation of violence and nationalism may be found elsewhere, for example in the work of Ramet (1996: 78):

"The rural character of the Serbian national movement explains the movement's 'traditional' values, which are stridently anti-feminist, strongly oriented towards the Serbian Orthodox Church, and laced with xenophobia: in short, the paradigmatic 'traditional' values that one associates with the countryside. It is also significant that the increase in inter-ethnic violence that had already begun in earnest in 1990 was accompanied by a simultaneous increase in wife-beating in Serbia."

As Todorova (1994) points out, "Balkanism and its subject are imprisoned in a field of discourse in which 'Balkans' is paired in opposition to 'West' and 'Europe', while 'Balkanism' is the dark other of 'Western civilization'. [...] the Balkans are left in Europe's thrall, anti-civilization, alter ego, the dark side within" (Todorova 1994: 482). This is important to note, when examining the production of cultural meaning, especially in relation to Serbia's EU-accession.

European Union has an important role in spreading women's rights and different gender policies, such as, for example, gender equality and gender mainstreaming policies (Spehar 2011). However, the contemporary political discourse regarding the Western Balkans and its EU accession (which includes Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) stresses that "countries in this region have serious political and security problems, including the existence of intolerance, pathological nationalism and xenophobia, underdeveloped

democratic political culture and lacking the art of compromise” (Pritham 2008, cited in Spehar 2011: 365).

Therefore, some Serbian academics believe that European integration of the Balkan countries implies, among other things, the release of their societies’ burdens of the past embodied in various traditionalist prejudices, superstitions, inferiority complexes or multiple values, habits, and mentalities (Božilović 2011: 114). Moreover, Božilović (2011: 117) argues that Serbia, since it belongs to the Balkans, still reflects strong tribal relations. As a consequence, he argues that Serbia should not count on support and aid from Europe, unless it gets rid of the negative burden of the past still present in people’s patterns of behaviour, such as hatred, contempt, envy, greed, hypocrisy, greed, deceit and malice. Therefore, the modernization, the development of Balkans’ societies appears as a basic condition for its integration to the EU. In this way, this essentialist argument which reproduces the discourse of “Balkanism” (Todorova 1994) became strongly related to EU-accession, the perspective of which is described as a project of civilisation, of modernising and upbringing of the “savage” countries from the region.

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As, arguably, the Western Balkans represent the most difficult set of prospective accession countries so far encountered by the EU (in Spehar 2011: 365), the described context – related to the Balkans, Serbia and the EU – frame women’s rights discourse in more than one way. These “imagined geographies” (Bakić-Hyden 1992), embraced as well as produced locally, define and generalise the Serbian context and “culture” as “rural”, “backward”, “barbarian”, “traditional”, “patriarchal” and “misogynous” while the implementation of women’s rights becomes related to the project of “modernisation”, “de-communisation”, “europeanisation” and “civilisation”. Describing them as “imagined geographies” (Bakić-Hyden 1992) does not qualify them as false or true, but stress the symbolic weight they contain, the generalised pictures they produce and the feelings they invoke.

Filipescu (2012) have identified the orientalist discourse in the enlargement documents of the European Union regarding the Western Balkans. The opposite may also be said: such academic and political discourses on the Balkans and Serbia shape the symbolic battlefield around EU in transitional Serbia and reflect on the women’s rights. In order to examine in what way they do so, the next section of the article analyses relevant examples of the use of “culture” and “tradition” related to the women’s rights issue in Serbian public discourse in the recent past.

In 2009, when the Serbian government announced it would soon deliver a Law on Gender Equality, an important public debate on “Gender Equality in Serbia” was organised as a part of the project called “Democratic political forum” which gave the floor to representatives from different subject fields, ministries, institutions and organisations such as the Director of

Gender Equality of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, several university professors, the European Movement in Serbia, the Belgrade Centre for Human rights, Ombudsman, the Belgrade Fund for political Excellence, Incest trauma Centre – Belgrade, Centre for Gender Equality, Centre for Women's Studies and Gender Research, The Centre For Democracy Foundation, eminent political democratic leaders, researchers, journalists and many more.

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Almost all actors in the debate agreed that the Serbian legislation is largely aligned primarily with the consolidated EU Directive in 2006, mostly in dealing with social and economic issues of gender equality. In this sense, they consented that Serbia would "at least not have a problem at the normative level, when the experts from the Commission and the Council of Europe come", as Gasmi (2009) pointed out. Nevertheless, all participants agreed as well that the implementation of legal provisions was likely to be difficult. While some actors concentrated on political, economic and educational constrains which were compromising the implementation of gender equality provisions, others were using the argument of "tradition" and "culture" as being a significant obstacle to a successful implementation of the adopted legal framework. However, the static and essentialist notion of "tradition" and "culture" they used in their discourse was not meant to serve nationalistic interests and discredit the universality of human rights as Pollis (cited in Harris-Short 2003: 164) would point out, or to give misleading interpretations of "culture", but was rather used to demonstrate that state elites, favourable to the EU integration of Serbia, were favourable to women's rights and gender equality standards as well, but were having difficulties to implement them. As those difficulties were related mainly to cultural tradition, it almost implied that the state should not be held responsible for them.

In this respect, the statement of an influential politician, philosopher, and – at the time – member of the parliament for the Democratic Party, Dragoljub Mićunović (2009), seems particularly illustrative:

"I see the problem of male-female relationships, above all, coming from a male oriented, criminal and traditional culture and this has been like that since the time of old epics and Greek tragedies through the present day. This affects society and shapes its values. There is no relationship between men and women that is not marked by endemic violence by men against women [...] It comes from the depths of our society [...] That is how our society is like and that is what comes from culture. We have to act against this anti-women, violent culture. Take 'Building of Skadar on Bojana'[traditional folk poem] as an example, and how they bricked up one unfortunate woman with her child. When epics like this are taught, we have to say it is a terrible shame and that this poem is not beautiful but hideous, disgusting. Thus, it is an attitude requiring a change of values. We should count on facing terrible resistance [...]"

Furthermore, Mićunović (2009) argues that “no good law can help. The problem of the rule of law in Serbia is not so much in the lack of legal documents, but in their complete disregard”. What he failed to explain was by whom these laws were disregarded or who was responsible to enforce and implement legal provisions. At the time he delivered this statement, Mićunović was a member of the formerly governing Democratic Party, which introduced significant police and judiciary reforms during 2003, 2006 and 2009 (EU Delegation to the Republic of Serbia 2012). These reforms, however, kept old inefficient strategies, procedures and less than mild punishment penalties against violence and discrimination towards women in Serbia (EU Delegation to the Republic of Serbia 2012). The Coordinator of Safe houses and the Counselling Centre for domestic violence Stanojević (2013) argues that Serbia’s regulations to punish violence against women are nothing more than a dead letter on paper, as the prosecutors, the judges and the police does not seem willing to apply them during the criminal chain process. Proceedings are slow, inadequate and long, dismissal of criminal investigation or dismissal of court case frequent, sentences are light and the protection of women by the police or during proceedings is rare and inefficient, she explains. Therefore, the number of victims has not been reduced, says Stanojević (2013). Moreover, she stresses out that legal provisions are wrongly interpreted and performed in practice in a discriminatory way, involving witnesses and victims going through secondary victimization (Stanojević 2013). This example makes it obvious that relevant institutional actors are actually contributing to further violations of women’s rights and that the state have failed to protect those it has the duty to protect, demonstrating its incapacity to deal with those issues through the system and existing institutions. On the contrary, “tradition”, “customs” and “backward culture” arguments in the discourse of state officials may be seen rather as an abuse of existing stereotypes, which consequently transfer the blame and the responsibility from the state to culture. As Ombudsman and LGBT rights defendant Mršević (2009) points out, most victims of violence with tragic consequences had been seeking help from public institutions and the police or social welfare centres years before the tragic event occurred. Therefore, it may be concluded that arguments of “tradition” or “culture” in the state officials’ public discourse in Serbia serve as an excuse for inaction, inefficient government policies and deeper socio-economic reasons for violations of women’s rights, as described by Harris-Short (2003).

At the other end of the Serbian public discourse, the use of “culture” and “tradition” as arguments in the public discourse regarding women’s rights is observed among right wing groups. These groups declare themselves as defenders of Serbian “authentic tradition and culture” which is threatened by “imposed Western ideas” (groups like “Dveri”, “Naši”, “1389”). This example

illustrates Narayan's (1997, cited in Lilly and Irvine 2007: 96) argument that nostalgic reactions are often present in non-Western societies as a reaction to the potential threats to the established gender roles. Following this, it may be said that in Serbia, the concepts of "culture" and "tradition" are used against the emerging new order, West and its dominant model of gender.

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In Serbia, right wing groups use culture, which includes different cultural and religious symbols, myths and history, as a powerful nationalist and political tool. Although the instrumental use of tradition has never been absent from the Serbian society, as Naumović (1994) explains, being a part of different nationalistic and political projects through history, its particularly powerful comeback is observed during the 80s and the 90s. The instrumental use of tradition in Serbia, according to the same author, includes three separate but interrelated set of phenomena. The first is the Serbian Orthodox tradition which involves the conceptual system, churches, monasteries, frescoes and icons, religious rituals and holidays. The second set relates to the Serbian historical tradition (real and mythic images that people have about their state and national past), and the third set is embodied in the folk, rural tradition. The instrumental use of tradition is a practice of manipulating with any of those sets (cited in Božilović 2010: 116). Although the instrumental use of tradition in the last three decades of the Serbian past is mainly referred to as to the political manipulation from the government, especially at the time of Yugoslav wars, it continues to shape all aspects of public life in Serbia. However, one striking contemporary example of the instrumental use of tradition is observed in relation to human rights issues in general, and women's rights in particular.

Bearing in mind that all right wing groups in Serbia share a similar approach to tradition, women and EU, in order to illustrate this, I shall analyse how the most influential⁶ among them, the nationalistic and pro-fascist⁷ organisation "Dveri", uses the concept of "tradition" and "culture" and how it manipulates with different cultural, historical, political and religious symbols in building its arguments against women's rights.

"What is the meaning of a new, extreme feminism, arising out of the Bolshevik, who is now being imposed not only to Serbia, but to all Christian nations of the world, under the guise of fighting for women's rights?" asks

6 During parliamentary elections in May 2012 "Dveri" almost crossed the threshold and succeeded in entering the local administration after the local elections. (CESID 2012)

7 As Kuljić (2002) and Griffin (2006) (cited in Stakić 2013: 2) point out that contemporary right wing extremism has routes in fascism. Stakić (2013: 2) gives a brief overview on different definitions of contemporary fascism and provides a theoretical common ground. According to her, contemporary fascism includes: anti-liberalism, anti-modernity, anti-communism, cult of tradition, extreme nationalism, conspiracy theory, anti-Semitism and romanticism with militarism.

the organisation via its website. The question is answered through a set of mixed arguments against the communist heritage, the “imposed Western norms” and critiques of tradition, illustrated, among others, by Mićunović’s speech during the debate on “Gender equality in Serbia”. They begin with the critique of communism and its secularity:

“The 8 March, the day [...] celebrated as the Day of Women only in Eastern Europe, which is still partially polluted by Communism, coincides with the day the Church celebrates the Finding of the Head of St. John the Forerunner. St. John’s head had been cut off by the lawless king Herod the Younger, at the urging of his wife Herodias [...] the darkest female character in the New Testament [...]. Herodias, unlike other women described in the New Testament, is the personification of lust, malice and hatred towards everything that is holy. So the Communists, accidentally or not (inspired by the Father of lies) have selected [for the Women’s Day] the same day the Church celebrates the honourable head of St. John the Baptist, inviting women to follow the example of Herodias, a personification of darkness, sin and death, instead of following the example of the Holy Mother of God” (Dveri 2009).

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According to the organisation, the “usurious globalization” and the EU, as the Satan’s kingdom or the Fourth Reich,⁸ should be blamed for putting the pressure on Serbia to implement the Law on Gender Equality. This imposition is based on false ideological assumptions that women are subordinated and discriminated in all societies, that their opportunities to engage in politics are limited and that all differences between men and women ultimately lead to discrimination of the latter (Dveri 2009). It claims that this legal provision is based on promoting the androgynous concept of a human being and continues: “Authorities appoint their Commissioners for ‘gender equality’ anywhere and everywhere: they continue to claim that the other names of Serbia are misogyny and violence [...] because, of course, Serbian culture is more violent than others”. This argument illustrates both the reaction of “Dveri” to the Western “hegemonic” discourse on Serbia, as well as the organisation’s perception of women’s rights as an integral part of that “imposed” discourse. Women’s rights are perceived as something externally imposed and not as something genuinely important. Moreover, the organisation criticises Mićunović’s attack on tradition and culture and his ambition to influence the way some traditional folk poems are interpreted in schools: “by starting a legislation on gender equality [and by] attacking the poem ‘Building of Skadar’ [they intend to] complete the creation of a society with no incest and no taboos, in which paedophilia is normal [leading, in the end to] the triumph of cyborgs” (Dveri 2009).

8 More on “Dveri” and their vision of EU can be found in a special issue for Easter 2008 of their magazine *Dveri srpske* called EUtanasia. http://www.dverisrpske.com/pdf/casopis/37_KosovoiEvropskaunija.pdf

If we assume that all the members of this right wing group share the same feelings of being pressured, threatened and conditioned by the "hegemonic and perverted" West, then, they may, as described by the hedgehog theory⁹, tend to resist and reject all ideas or policies of a presumably Western origin. This is a response to the oriental discourse as well: "Finally, we are the Balkans, 'the Other' in Europe, the screen where [the EU] is traditionally projecting its own negative side, and we look at ourselves through that Western pair of glasses, we see ourselves as backward, monstrous and all wrong" says Papan (2008), one of the right wing ideologists.

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Although it would be interesting to explore whether members of this right wing group, either as a group or individually, really believe to be threatened or are just manipulating with this idea, it would require a research of the internal group organisation and ideology that goes beyond the scope of this paper. Analysing their website, however, shows how they construct the "authentic tradition" and how, by combining different religious, national or mythical symbols in opposition to communism and the West, they intend to "defend the nation" from "this new revolutionary ecstasy about democracy, human rights and the EU integration" (Dveri 2009).

Consequently, some right wing groups published, in 2012, a "black list" of Serbian NGOs (Autonomous women center 2012) :

"There is a new wave of traditionalization in Serbia which is reflected in the strengthening the role of the church and right-wing organizations [...] There are 3 women's NGOs out of 17 civil society organizations on the list of 'undesirables' (Women in Black, Autonomous Women's Center and Reconstruction Women's Fund)" (Autonomous women center 2012).

However, conservative ideas are not the exclusive property of right wing organisations. Some independent researchers, for example, use cultural arguments to discredit adopted legal provision regarding women's rights on the basis of their incompatibility with the local context. Certain laws "simply cannot be implemented here, because they are essentially betraying the established patriarchal relations, which is not good" says a well-known criminologist for a wide-circulation newspaper (Nikolić 2012). This betrayal of established gender relations, explains Nikolić (2012), has led to a situation where mothers are spending the whole day at work, come home "frustrated" and therefore quarrel with their husbands. In this case, the argument of patriarchal tradition is given a positive connotation. Women's agency should, according to him, be reduced to private sphere, to family and home, while the violence against women is described as a consequence of change in gender roles. Consequently, working women

9 The hedgehog dilemma, in psychology, describes how people's possible reactions to ostracism, or any other social rejection. (Maner et al. 2007)

are to blame for playing an inappropriate role in a recommendable patriarchal context.

Finally, regarding the use of notions of “culture” and “tradition” in Serbian public discourse, Malešević (2006, cited in Božilović 2010: 125) points to the complete marginalization of those aspects of Serbian tradition that are based on rationalism and the Enlightenment, the liberal and universal values of openness towards the other and all those elements of Serbian heritage that are complementary to the best aspects of European tradition.

Apart from the described problematic discourse going from the “civilising the savage” to “defending real Serbian traditional values”, women’s rights in transitional Serbia are also trapped inside the imperative obligation of abandoning “inappropriate” heritage and tradition related to communism. By this inappropriate heritage I mean everything that was created and installed by the former communist regime. In respect to this, we should bear in mind that most international women’s rights have not been alien to the local context, due to the country’s fifty years long communist past and to the significant role women had played as guerrilla fighters in the communist-led Yugoslav Liberation Army during the World War II. Therefore, Yugoslav women were recognised as officially equal and were granted civil rights (Gudac-Dodić 2006). However, in a transitional context where the state seeks to distance itself from all its communist past, this positive heritage has been entirely left out from the public discourse.¹⁰

On the contrary, as Malešević (2006, cited in Božilović 2010: 125) stressed out, conservatism and patriarchy, xenophobia and primitivism with elements of hate speech remain unreasonably vital.

10 The debate on women’s position and women’s equality within Yugoslav communism goes beyond the scope of this paper. On one hand, it is said that “After the success of the ‘partisans’ in suppressing the fascists, and the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republics of Yugoslavia, the Anti-Fascist Front of Women was disbanded by the Communist Party, on the basis that, under communism, women would have equal rights with men, and so there was no need to organise separately. However, communism has never effectively addressed the fact that societies throughout the world are patriarchal, regardless of their political and economic structures. This means that there are a number of unwritten rules and regulations, implicit to our cultures, which explicitly disadvantage women” (Stanisavljević 1995: 37). In contrast, there is the argument that “In communist Yugoslavia, the Titoist programme was archetypally of the city. The emphasis on self-management (a model of decision making drawn from a specifically industrial context), like the accompanying efforts to promote secularism, gender equality, and ethnic coexistence all undercut the ethos of the village. Titoist politics was hostile to the political aspects of traditional culture, and made strong efforts to overcome traditional-rural prejudice against women, to erode the political authority of the Churches (always strongest in the countryside), and to anathematize all manifestations of nationalist sentiment, especially when translated into political programmes or demands” (Ramet 1996: 76).

Public actors in Serbia use the essentialist notion of "culture", where culture is perceived as a static, shared, consensual and coherent system. This old notion of culture is a form of cultural essentialism that defines culture as a way of life, a property of the people who are the carriers of that culture. Culture, perceived in a static way that determines individual and collective identities (Grillo 2003), can be easily blamed for disadvantages or violations of human rights and this old, misread notion of culture makes it harder to spread and implement human rights (Merry 2003). Paradoxically, although – as we have examined – state representatives' talk about culture conceals their incapacity to efficiently protect and implement women's rights, by indirectly or directly putting the blame on "rural thought" and engaging in a fight against "tradition", they actually do perpetuate "tradition" as an essentialist notion and consequently, it does become an issue. On the other hand, despite the fact that right wing conservative groups use different "cultural" and "traditional" arguments for different purposes than the pro-EU state officials, they keep perceiving culture in the same essentialist and static way, mainly in order to oppose the hegemony of the official discourse while spreading their nationalistic ideology or conservative ideas.

Presenting patriarchy, primitivism and misogyny as "Serbian tradition" is a form of politically ineffective essentialism. It perpetuates the post-war media and political discourse about Serbia people may easily find offensive, thus giving fuel to right wing groups to "defend the authentic tradition" and to discredit women's rights and all policies coming from the "West". As authenticity is just a historically specific dominant ideology, which can change over time (Asad 1979, cited in Wright 1998: 8), the official presentation of "culture" and "tradition" in such ways normalises this problematic discourse without having the power to challenge it. Thus, the patriarchal and misogynous definitions of culture become a dominant discourse and unquestionable truths. This politicisation of "culture" is a form of ideology that becomes a prevalent way of thinking and in such a hegemonic system "culture" appears coherent and consensual (Wright 1998). As Merry (2003) points out, culture is not only a system of beliefs, it is also a product of institutional arrangements and legal provisions so, in this process, the state plays an important role in shaping culture and public opinion.

I strongly agree with authors who claim that human rights should be grounded in the local "culture" (Merry 2003, An Na'im 1990, Dundes Ruteln 1988); therefore, investigating the local context is important. Before blaming "culture" or "tradition" for the lack of implementation of women's rights, all specific causes for gender inequality, violence against women and others structural obstacles on the ground as well as within institutions, laws and constitutions should be examined. The country will not advance on human rights matters if there is no honest political will to implement

and spread women's rights through all state's structures and official institutions such as education and social services. Unfortunately, it appears that Serbian government and state officials are willing to fight for the advancement of women's rights only through legislation and because it is a condition set by the EU.

The analysis of the public discourse of different actors who have the power to define "culture" and "tradition" in relation to women's rights in Serbia shows that women rights issues in Serbia are trapped into a pro-EU or against EU, pro-traditional values or pro-liberal values discourse, between tradition or modernity and that consequently, in the public discourse, women's rights appear as a condition to access the EU rather than a genuinely important issue. I agree with Višnjić (2012) who evaluates women's rights in Serbia as being a mere decoration of democracy. Therefore, in my view, women rights in Serbia, as a kind of collateral damage, are and probably will continue to be strongly affected and shaped in the future by the use and abuse of concepts of "culture" and "tradition".

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Sara Petrovski

Kako upotreba „kulture“ i „tradicije“ oblikuje diskurs o ženskim pravima u tranzicionoj Srbiji?

Rezime

Iako su kulturni antropolozi mahom napustili esencijalističko viđenje „kulture“ i „tradicije“, njihove statičke definicije su i dalje prisutne i često upotrebljavane u javnom diskursu o ženskim pravima u Srbiji. Smatrajući analizu proizvodnje ovih kulturnih značenja od strane različitih i relevantnih društvenih aktera na društveno političkoj sceni u Srbiji važnom za razumevanje implementacije, transformacije i zaštite ženskih prava na lokalnom nivou, u članku proučavam na koji način desničarske organizacije, politički lideri i intelektualci iz različitih društvenih sfera, kao i Srpska pravoslavna crkva, konstruišu i upotrebljavaju „kulturu“ i „tradiciju“. Sa jedne strane se argumenti „kulture“ i „tradicije“ upotrebljavaju u cilju „zaštite nacionalnog identiteta“ od „nametnutih zapadnih vrednosti“ i „zapadnog imperijalizma“. Sa druge strane, oni služe da opravdaju kulturne poteškoće sa kojima se susreću državne institucije i drugi relevantni akteri u procesu zaštite ženskih prava, gde je „tradicija“ često percipirana kao neupitni, linearni projekat nasleđenih „kulturnih“ i „moralnih“ vrednosti i praksi koje su u suprotnosti sa politikom i kulturnim vrednostima Evropske unije. U skladu sa tim, „tradicija“ mora biti ili branjena i zaštićena, ili izmenjena i napuštena. Posledica toga je da su ženska prava upletena u diskurs o borbi za ili protiv EU, za ili protiv „tradicije“ koja stoji nasuprot „modernim“ i „liberalnim“ vrednostima. Zaključujem da upotreba i instrumentalizacija različitih koncepata „kulture“ i „tradicije“ na mnogo načina utiče na razumevanje, prihvatanje i zaštitu ženskih prava u Srbiji.

Ključne reči: kultura, tradicija, ženska prava, javni diskurs, Evropska unija, Srbija, Balkan

REVIEWS
PRIKAZI

IV

Social capital - multiple dimensions of one concept

Social Capital, Social Identities - From Ownership to Belonging, Dieter Thoma, Christoph Henning, Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), de Gruyter, Berlin/Boston, 2014

Marko B. Tmušić¹

The term social capital is increasingly gaining in importance. Its multidimensionality affects to deal with it not only theoreticians from the opus of economic sciences, as expected, but also scholars from the field of sociology, philosophy, political sciences and religious studies. Book „*Social capital, social identities – from ownership to belonging*“ points to this crucial feature of social capital as a significant phenomenon of modern social science.

As a collection of papers, this book actually starts from the question what is social capital? What is its role in contemporary society? Pierre Bourdieu finds social capital as a network of relationships and products of investment strategies, individual or collective, consciously or unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term, implying durable obligations subjectively felt (respect, feeling of gratitude, etc.) or institutionally guaranteed (rights) (Bourdieu, 1986). James S. Coleman use the concept of social capital as a part of generally theoretical strategy and he is taking rational action as starting point but rejecting the extreme individual premises that often accompany it (Coleman, 1988). Robert D. Putnam by “social capital” means features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively (Putnam, 1995). In contemporary political or economic sciences, reference is most generally made to the works of Putnam when dealing with the notion of social capital. It is precisely on these issues leads the biggest polemic in this book, starting from different theoretical viewpoints.

Made up of three key components, social networks, moral obligations, norms, and also social values, social capital is looked upon as a central condition of social integration and cohesion, economic success and the well-being of nations (p. 85.). All three of these components can be seen as parts of a larger whole, and that is a social strategy, permeated with the rules of behavior followed by the members of the community. For a rule of behavior to be a social norm, it must be in the interest of everyone to act in accordance with the rule if all others were to act in accordance with it. Social norm are (Nash) equilibrium rules of behavior (p. 48.). Because of this, economic success of developed countries and high level of political integration among their population, is a result of a high degree of accumulated social capital. The quality and the structure, but also societal consequences of those components

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(norms, networks, and rules, especially informal social relations) have increasingly attracted the notice of sociologically, politically, and economically oriented scholars, culminating in the development of the concept of “social capital”.

Dieter Thoma linked the concept of social capital for the concept of belonging, and identity: “I can make something belong to me by an act of appropriation, or I can belong to something (membership or association).” He points out the two dimensions of social capital: a) a person is a part of (or belong to) a network; b) social capital is a resource that is at the disposal of a person (or figures among her belongings) (p. 16.). He describes the metabolism of social capital as well as taking the initiative, as active participation in social processes and as the development process in terms of connecting with others. It is about building relationships and acceptance of own position in the light of these new experiences.

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Starting from the assumption of most authors (Mike Savage, Martin Endress, etc.) that social capital is an important for understanding the meaning of contemporary inequality, especially its cultural and symbolic aspects, Martin Endress conclude that while forms of belonging as well as types of social capital are highly rooted in constellations of social inequality and therefore structurally ambivalent, the societal problem with which we are confronted is not the fact that there are boundaries and forms of exclusion in general. The problem, more specifically, that has to be analyzed is the historical and power-based specificity of forms of exclusion and disqualification in contemporary societies (p. 37.). Every discussion about social capital and belonging is political.

It is interesting to mention the view of Hans Bernard Schmid, who says that “...in terms closer to social science, social capital leads to a form of self-alienation in which the means by which people can achieve their goals somehow turn against them so that the goals they jointly pursue do not reflect their aims. Social capital corrupts our agency in such a way that what we are doing is not what we want to achieve.” (p. 62.). Because of that, he conclude that social capital can be intrinsically dangerous thing: it is a means for

the pursuit of our goals which may easily turn against us and direct our actions from our values, but conditions under which membership don't alienate the participants from their own goals are conditions under which individuals can at the same time satisfy their need for companionship and unity, and their need to be able to make sense of what they are doing collectively in terms of their own individual perspective. He points out that this is one of the core normative ideals of democracy – making sure that the goals pursued as a society are rooted in the whole of the lives of the participating individuals (p. 61 – 68.). Following up on Schmid, Henning stressed that it is not very clear why social capital should be considered as a good thing and why is it so attractive in the first place? Social capital may also have its bad effects. But, its good effects are the main reason for its attractiveness. At the state/macro level among good effects we can find social cohesion, stability, democracy, and perhaps growth, as a consequence of their efficiency. At the civic/meso level we can mention participation, and on the family/micro level there are good health, better education, good jobs, happiness, in short: fulfilling lives. All of these are good ends, and what serves these ends the best is good as a means (pp. 112 – 118.). He points out that it is good because of its desired effects, not because we call it “social capital”.

So we can on the basis of a short insight into the most significant conclusions of mentioned authors point out that the concept of social capital sublimates a series of political, economical, sociological, and philosophical assumptions, which must be taken together into account if we want to have one overall approach of the analysis of social capital in contemporary society. Book „*Social capital, social identities – from ownership to belonging*“ provides us with a handful of initial assumptions from the corpus of those disciplines, which is an excellent starting point for any future research in this area. This book opens many questions and dilemmas concerning of this highly current topic and thus further inflame the imagination of the scientific research. Thus provides excellent opportunities for future researchers to find their own direction of scientific arguments.

Sven Nyholm, *Revisiting Kant's Universal Law and Humanity Formulas*, De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston, 2015

Jelena Govedarica¹

At the beginning of his book *Revisiting Kant's Universal Law and Humanity Formulas* Sven Nyholm asks: "Why Yet Another Book on How to Interpret Kant's Ethical Theory?" This may seem like an odd question to begin with. However, since there are countless books on Kant's ethics, many written by distinguished Kant scholars, the author's desire to lay out his reasons for writing a comprehensive analysis on this subject is quite understandable. He offers two main reasons: firstly, Kant's theory is widely misunderstood in contemporary Anglophone moral philosophy and that is why many objections to his theory fail; secondly, contemporary ethics is heavily influenced by "methodological intuitionism", often leading to moral relativism or skepticism, and Kant's theory can offer an alternative stance, which he calls "moral constitutivism". In answering this question, Nyholm also wants to emphasize his opinion that the majority of influential interpretations of Kant's ethics are in fact distortions of his theory; if we truly want to understand Kant's thoughts, we must read his words carefully and accept that nothing in his theory is redundant.

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The book itself is divided into four main parts, of which the first one is the introduction. In the introductory chapter, Nyholm explains in what sense Kant's ethics is a "kind of constitutivism", building his view on Christine Korsgaard's "Constitutional Model" of human agency and its relation to the principles of morality (p. 12). Korsgaard offered two models for understanding human agency: "combat" and "constitutional" model. While the former model explains human agency as the outcome of a struggle between different forces within the agent, such as passions, desires, impulses, etc. (the paradigm example for this model is Hobbes's moral theory), the latter pictures human agency as an act of self-constitution. Korsgaard thinks that Plato and Kant are the best representatives of "moral constitutivism". Plato gave the first hint by claiming that the unity required for human agency is the same kind of unity that the republic with just constitution has, and that virtue is the outcome of the inner harmony among different parts of our soul with reason acting as a ruler, helping people achieve inner peace. On the other hand, Kant claimed that the distinction between agency and a mere behavior or reaction to impulses consists in the fact that it is authored and that the unity necessary for an action cannot be achieved without commitment to morality because we constitute ourselves by making laws for ourselves. Furthermore, Korsgaard claims, the only way to be well-constituted is "by

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governing yourself in accordance with universal principles which you could will as laws for every rational being” (p. 13). Thus, agency is the result of a person’s constitution and it sets a criterion for judging the morality of an action.

Nyholm affirms that moral law is the constitutive principle of *particular kind* of agency and that Kant’s theory is a theory of moral constitutivism, but he also argues that Korsgaard’s view is much more stringent than Kant’s. Namely, while she claims that agency is *only* possible if we act according to the moral law we set for ourselves, Kant thought that agency is actually possible outside of the moral law and that is in fact why moral law is an *imperative* for human beings. Because of freedom that each human has, all of us exercise some form of agency: if, for example, someone chooses not to be guided by moral principles, but rather by maxims which promote their own happiness, they enjoy freedom of the will in the sense they are not absolutely determined by impulses (like animals are), and if someone acts in accordance with the categorical imperative they can be considered autonomous because their will is independent from determination through the sensual drives. Hence, the agent is any creature capable of exercising some degree of impulse-control by reason. “The agent who is *not* governed by the moral law is somewhere on a *continuum* between the following two extremes: full autonomy through the rule of her own practical reason, at the one extreme, and a complete lack of agency and freedom through the rule of irresistible impulses, at the other extreme” (p.14). Accepting that moral law is constitutive principle of fully autonomous agency (or positive freedom), Nyholm relates this idea to the humanity formula. Since we are beings with dual nature – rational, capable of autonomy, and animal, subject to needs and desires – we can fully realize our humanity only if our pursuit of happiness does not come before our autonomy. In other words, if our actions are always guided by principles which could serve as universal laws of autonomous human agency, without abandoning our personal pursuit of happiness, the preservation and full realization of humanity becomes the most general purpose of morality. Therefore, Nyholm concludes, Korsgaard is right in claiming that human beings constitute themselves through the principles they choose for their actions, adding that full realization of humanity is only possible if the sensual aspect of human being is governed by the rational one, that is, only if people subject themselves to maxims that can serve as universal laws.

Furthermore, Nyholm points out that Kant had accepted Plato’s analogy between just political constitution and just constitution of the soul, and this is an additional argument in favor of Kant’s moral theory being a kind of constitutivism. Namely, the author claims that Kant formed his view regarding the freedom of the will by employing Rousseau’s theory of civil liberty: just as people can only achieve civic liberty by subjecting themselves to laws they give to themselves as citizens, so too human will can only be free from external rules by subjecting itself to self-legislated laws. The analogy, however, ends here. When explaining the nature of moral laws autonomous people set for themselves as guiding principles for their actions, Kant uses the analogy with laws of nature, as defined in his critical philosophy. Laws of nature serve as a model on which we form our moral laws, and that is why Kant had argued that the universal law formula is also equivalent to the law of nature formula. In the formal sense the term “nature” refers to a particular constitution or a type of being that is possible in accordance with some universal law. The term “reason-endowed nature” refers to beings who can be governed by their own practical reason, and whose existence is possible in accordance with maxims such beings give to themselves that are fit to serve as universal laws. Consequently, when reason-endowed beings act according to such principles, they are making the existence and realization of their nature into the most general end or purpose around which all other actions are organized. On the other hand, human beings are also animals with needs and desires, from which their general wish for happiness springs. So, when humans make their twofold nature and full realization of humanity into the most general purpose of their action, they never treat other human beings only as means for some other purpose, but at the same time as a purpose in itself. Thus, the author concludes that the principle of humanity is the constitutive principle of human nature. Extensively explaining these arguments and contrasting them with various objections all throughout the book, he will offer a plausible argumentation in favor of Kant’s claim that the humanity and the universal law formulas are equivalent.

The second chapter is dedicated to a detailed analysis of the universal law formula. Nyholm firstly presents the main features and characteristics of prevailing understanding, or as he calls it “the standard reading”, of Kant’s universal law formula, in order to explain the background

assumptions leading to “the various seemingly devastating objections that have been raised against” it (p. 24). These objections are summarized in Derek Parfit’s book *On What Matters*, but they are also previously put forward by authors such as Barbara Herman, Onora O’Neill, Thomas Hill, Christine Korsgaard, and Allen Wood. Nyholm points out five features of this „standard reading“, showing that mentioned authors base their objections on some peculiar understanding of the meaning of Kant’s term „maxim“, or on an insertion of the notion of rationality into his universal law formula, or on a quite common disregard for the wider context of his ethics and philosophy as a whole. Having done this, the author then presents seven objections against the universal law formula, designed to illustrate that it has completely absurd and outrageous implications. Going through these objections one will surely understand better Nyholm’s motives to write “yet another book on how to interpret Kant’s theory”, as the extent of distortions, interpretative mistakes and overlooked fundamental features of Kant’s theory had led some philosophers to draw conclusions “that we are morally permitted to engage in convenience-killing, mass-murder, deception when it benefits us etc., while at the same time forbidding us to save drowning children if we are egoists and requiring us not to devote our lives to philosophy or to move to Iceland, etc.” (p. 30).

Moreover, Nyholm stresses, most of these interpretations show a remarkable misunderstanding of the claim Kant repeatedly makes that the universal law and humanity formula are two formulations of one law, or in other words that if we subject ourselves to maxims that could hold as universal laws, we are in fact treating the humanity in each person as a purpose in itself. Being unable to understand the logic behind this so called “equivalence claim”, some of these authors simply ignore it, and some analyze two formulations as different laws, attempting to prove that Kant was mistaken as the “equivalence claim” is false. Because of this, Nyholm offers “eight steps towards new understanding of the universal law formula” (p. 32) devised to help the readers form a better understanding of the universal law formulation of the categorical imperative, to show in detail why Kant’s “equivalence claim” is undeniably true and why all mentioned objections must fail. Indeed, if the readers had any doubts or confusions about the essential features of the categorical imperative, Nyholm’s “steps” would help them understand every aspect of Kant’s thoughts by indicating

crucial terms and their meaning, underlining Kant’s examples and clarifications, as well as notions which have to be considered within wider context of his entire philosophy.

In the third chapter Nyholm thoroughly investigates the humanity formula with respects to its interpretations offered by influential contemporary scholars who teach in the American universities – the members of “the American school of Kant’s interpretation” as he calls them (p. 46). What they all have in common is the conviction that the humanity formula does not have the same content as the universal law formula, because the former, as opposed to the latter, affirms one substantive value – the absolute value of all human beings. The point of dispute here is Kant’s reasoning leading up to articulation of the humanity formula. The American school believes that, on the one hand, he claimed that the humanity in each person has an absolute value, and that, on the other hand, he did not defend this claim with the arguments having to do with the universal law formula being the constitutive principle of human agency, but rather on some other grounds (upon which they disagree amongst themselves). The second controversial issue is their understanding of the relation between what has an absolute value – a good will and what is an end in itself – the humanity within each person. Nyholm, however, argues that the only thing Kant had believed to have an absolute value is a good will, and humanity „has absolute value only in a derivative or conditional way, only insofar as it is related to the capacity for morality (i. e. the possession of a good will)“ (p. 47).

In order to show why the American school’s understanding of the humanity formula is unjustified, the author locates key sections in the *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* and main claims Kant himself had made before he put forward the humanity formula. At this point he is letting Kant speak for himself, cautiously clarifying his words and intentions to the reader, trying to hold up his own comments. After Kant’s words, Nyholm introduces arguments held by the members of the American school, most notably Wood and Korsgaard. When reconstructed attentively, their interpretation of the humanity formula implies that the humanity and the universal law formula are not equivalent and that Kant attributes the absolute value to the same thing he claims to exist and should be treated as an end in itself. The author suggests a simple test for this reading: if these implications were correct, there should be a match between the

reasons they think Kant had offered in favor of humanity being an end in itself in the *Groundwork*, and those he explicitly gave in other works such as the *Critique of Practical Reason* and *The Metaphysics of Morals*. However, bearing in mind previously cited passages, Nyholm concludes that Kant's own words do not confirm this reading and the only conclusion possible, other than Kant was completely inconsistent, is that the American school's understanding of the humanity formula is not accurate. This conclusion leads to Nyholm's reconstruction of Kant's reasoning, which passes the test of consistency with Kant's other works and, therefore, proves to be superior to those offered by highly praised Kant scholars. In addition, he writes: "In offering us a way of approaching the basic principles of ethics that derives these from the basic preconditions for the possibility of fully responsible self-governing agency, while at the same time recognizing that the human being also has (if you will) a "non-rational" side (which means that many of our personal values tied to our individual or communal conceptions of happiness are based in our "particularly constituted faculties of desire" or our personal sensibilities), Kant offers us an important alternative to the intuitionist approach to moral theorizing that plays such a dominant role in much contemporary moral philosophy." (p. 74)

The last chapter of this polemical book explores Kant's views on virtue, human flourishing, the highest good and permissibility in relation to the humanity formula, by refuting some further objections against his theory. The major source of misunderstanding on these subjects, Nyholm thinks, is the inability to detect two important distinctions Kant rigorously makes. The first one is between morality and legality: moral action is done out of respect for the moral law and legal action is merely in accordance with it. Furthermore, the action is permissible if it has the property of legality, but, as some commentators fail to notice, we cannot infer anything about its morality. The second distinction is between holiness and virtue: while it is in the nature of the holy will that it necessarily acts in accordance with the moral law, human beings are not capable of holiness; because of their twofold nature, people are only capable of virtuousness. Another recurrent source of misunderstanding is related to Kant's view of morally ideal human life and the content of his notion "the highest good" with respect to the humanity formula. Nyholm argues that, although concepts of permissibility and holiness do have a role in Kant's moral philosophy,

in the analysis of the humanity formula virtue is the key concept. However, many authors understood Kant to be claiming that holiness is the highest moral ideal (which is false because holiness is not even possible for human beings), and that the humanity formula's chief function is to determine permissibility of actions (which is also not the case because Kant's discussion is mostly concerned with virtue and, as already mentioned, there is no inference to be drawn from permissibility to virtuousness). In order to clarify Kant's thoughts on these subjects, Nyholm chooses the objections to the humanity formula being a test for permissibility made by T.M. Scanlon and Derek Parfit, and an interesting (albeit unjustified) analysis of the distinction between virtue and holiness in relation to the humanity formula in Rae Langton's discussion of Kant's correspondence with his admirer Maria von Herbert.

After careful analysis of Scanlon and Parfit's interpretation of Kant's examples, the author detects their basic assumption: that *permissibility* of person's action depends on what attitudes, motives, etc. they would be acting on in performing these actions (p. 82), which means that Kant is mainly interested in the legality of actions when he discusses the humanity formula. But, if Kant had been exploring the legality of actions, then he would have considered only whether the action is *compatible* with treating the humanity in each person as a purpose in itself, without going into that person's motives for acting in a certain way. Alternatively, if Kant had also been interested in morality of actions, then the question of whether actions are performed on the basis of, or out of respect for, the moral law would have become the crucial one. In order to test Scanlon and Parfit's objections, Nyholm presents Kant's own words in the suicide example, the example of leaving one's talents and capacities uncultivated, the example of being helpful to others and the example of the lying promise. He concludes that, firstly, Kant was also interested in morality of the actions and not just their legality, and secondly, permissibility of actions does not depend on a person's attitudes, motives, etc. Therefore, their objections fail because they overlook Kant's crucial distinction between legality and morality.

Having said quite a lot about Kant's theory about one aspect of human nature – the rational one – and its capacity for inner freedom (with regard to which human flourishing consists in acting in accordance with the categorical imperative), Nyholm calls our attention to the sensual or

animal aspect of human beings. Arguing against Langton's interpretation that morally ideal human life includes apathy understood as a state of indifference, he claims that human flourishing from the sensual aspect simply consists in happiness, viewed as "the achievement of a state where we can be content with our lives since everything goes in accordance with our desires and wishes" (p. 91). Besides morality, human beings also seek happiness, and because of that making the humanity in each person into an end of ours also involves making the happiness of every other person an important part of that goal. Therefore, Kant's term "the highest good" relates to both sides of our nature, and it must be understood as the best possible state of affairs we could imagine from the point of view of practical reason – achievement of both happiness and virtue. The highest good is possible "if we subordinate our pursuit of happiness to the condition that we always act in according with and on the basis of self-adopted basic maxims that are fit to serve as universal laws in accordance with which all human beings can fully realize their nature as the particular kind of reason-endowed beings they are." (p. 385)

Returning to the starting point of his book, in the concluding passages Nyholm defies Langton, O'Neill and Korsgaard's understanding of the humanity formula, as they claimed its main purpose is to enable everyone exercise agency. This

reading captures Kant's intentions only partially, because it does not take into account the sensual part of person's humanity and, consequently, happiness of an agent. Therefore, according to this reading, the highest good would not constitute the world "of virtue (which indeed involves the exercise of fully autonomous agency) in which everyone *also* gets all the happiness they desire and their virtue makes them worthy of" (p. 94). Making the full realization of the humanity in each person into an end of ours involves the flourishing of the whole human being – with respect to their capacity for autonomous agency, as well as their desire for happiness. Thus, Kant's suggestion to use the laws of nature as a type when choosing maxims in accordance with which we will act, means that we should choose the most general principles in accordance with which human beings can exist and fully realize their nature, and that both the capacity for agency and fulfillment of needs and desires have to be the objects of the moral law.

Overall, this study presents a systematic, carefully conducted evaluation and refutation of major objections against Kant's "universal law" and "humanity" formulations of the categorical imperative discernible in contemporary interpretations of his ethics, aiming to show that Kant's insistence on the fact that these formulations express the same law is not to be neglected or considered false.

Alex Gourevitch, *From Slavery to the Cooperative Commonwealth - Labor and Republican Liberty in the Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2015

Szilárd Tóth¹

In the conclusion of his book, Alex Gourevitch writes that at the outset of his research, his intention was to provide a Marxist critique of the 'republican revival' associated with authors such as John G. A. Pocock, Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit or others. In the end however, the book turned out to be something fundamentally different. For the findings strongly suggest that the very concept of freedom espoused by Marx also builds on the republican tradition, in other words, that Marx himself could be considered something of a republican too. The claim in itself is quite extraordinary, given Marx's hostility to some notable figures of the republican tradition such as Cicero or others. So to prove the plausibility of his suggestion, Gourevitch draws our attention to the fact that when Marx talks about wage-slavery, alienation and so on, he apparently uses a republican political vocabulary, and in fact talks about un-freedom stemming from domination, rather than interference which is, so to speak, a distinctly republican concern.

This might need a word of clarification. Domination is a state when one's freedom is *dependent* on the goodwill of others. It need not require actual interference from the side of these 'others', no concrete form of coercion; it also need not manifest in the use of a lash or anything of the sort. Domination is something much more subtle. It only requires one to be at mercy of others, to be in an asymmetric power relation; in other words to depend on certain other's choices. For the powerful may prefer to interfere, or not to interfere, but that is not the point. The point is that freedom understood as non-domination requires one to have immunity from *any* arbitrary interference, which means that the powerful need to be barred from interfering no matter what their preferences are. A benevolent master is considered just as dangerous to freedom as an evil one, since he is what he is: a master. He can only cease to exist as a master, once his power is effectively limited, or - to be more precise - controlled by the citizens of the republic. In short: once he no longer has the power to interfere arbitrarily with others. This is at the heart of republican political philosophy. And it seems that the concerns put forward by Marx, such as wage-slavery touch on the very same aspect of freedom. For a wage-slave is unfree not because he is interfered with, but because he is in an asymmetric power relation with his employers.

Therefore, republicans and Marxists do not seem so distant from each other after all. This realization made it difficult for Gourevitch to follow up on his original intentions - namely to provide a

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Marxist critique of the republican tradition. Instead, he sets out to unfold the radical emancipatory potential *within* the republican tradition itself. He turns to the writings of nineteenth century labor republicans, most notably to those of the *Knights of Labor*. These nineteenth century unionists radicalized republican political philosophy by claiming, that freedom understood as non-domination requires the liberation of labor itself from the alienating tendencies of market capitalism. They attempted nothing less, but to transpose the republican program to the domain of private labor relationships: 'into the mines and factories, not to mention the Louisiana sugar country'. This was no easy task since in order to do so, they first needed to transcend what Gourevitch calls the 'paradox of slavery and freedom', a paradox that had haunted the republican tradition for centuries.

The paradox - analyzed beautifully in the first chapter of the book - consists of two conflicting propositions. The *first* one states that republican liberty is a condition that has certain requirements, namely social requirements. It is also not accessible to all, since no society can provide the necessary economic resources for all of its citizens to enjoy non-domination. The reason is plain and simple: the mentioned resources require the slave labor of certain segments of the population. As it happens, slave labor (and even wage-labor for that matter) by definition means that the laborer has no control over his activity. Therefore it is a specific form of un-freedom. In other words, the freedom of the few always presupposes the slavery of others, or in some versions - the slavery of the many. Indeed, it is commonplace that the most notable 'advocates of liberty in the classical republics were some of the most ardent slave-owners.' Aristotle for example famously defined slaves as people who lack deliberative reason by nature, or to put it bluntly, who cannot form independent judgements about the *common good*. They therefore naturally bear the burden of coerced labor, and there is nothing objectionable about this, because the products of their toll wins the freedom of the few deserving. Similarly, Sallust and Cicero, two key figures of the Roman republican tradition, argued that the "only real independence is that of leisured, landed wealth", and evidently 'this land would have been worked by slaves'. To sum up, ancient liberty was dependent on the domination of a large segment of the population, which means it was a highly particularistic political ideal.

The *second* proposition is the product of modernity - claims Gourevitch. It states that any political

ideal that cannot be universalizable comes into conflict with the demand of equality, which was intended to become the 'organizing principle for collective life'. Here lies the essence of the paradox. How could republicanism maintain its positions in modernity, or more precisely, how could it be modernized? The problem pushed republicans to reformulate their positions. According to Gourevitch, two relevant reactions unfolded between late eighteenth and mid nineteenth century America.

One of them could be associated with the southern élites, including figures such as James Henry Hammond who famously rejected universal equality in favor of republican liberty. They intended to hold on to the classical particularistic position of Cicero and Sallust, and effectively spoke against the abolition of slavery. For slavery, be it natural or not, was a 'necessary convention to uphold the common interest in republican institutions.'

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The other reaction, associated with the late Abraham Lincoln and others, took a very different path. They proposed a solution to accommodate republican liberty with the demand of universal equality. This solution - called the 'agrarian ideal' by Gourevitch - would envisage a commonwealth of free small scale agricultural producers, each owning a small patch of land that ensured their ability to control their own labor, and where 'the independence of each citizen is guaranteed through their own, self-developing efforts.' To meet the most urging demand of equality, the proponents of the agrarian ideal fought for the abolishing of slavery - in this they eventually succeeded.

The viability of their proposition rested of course on the delicate balance of land and population. According to Gourevitch, Lincoln believed that the 'new world' had plenty of unused land for the settlers and the former slaves as well, so therefore the question of reform was only of a technical kind. In other words, the natural resources were given, they only had to be distributed justly. However, Lincoln's plan was never put to the test. The reason lies not in the failure of the United States' government to act, but in the massive social and economic transformation of the second half of the nineteenth century - industrialization. Factory production rapidly extended, thus creating a large number of 'permanent wage-laborers', who had no reasonable chance ever to 'own productive property, be it land or tools and raw material, which appeared to mean that they could not be independent' - at least from the point of view of the agrarian ideal. Some tried to oppose

industrialization - among them republicans too, namely Thomas Jefferson -, but their efforts were futile. The times had irreversibly changed. After industrialization, America would never be the same again. Similarly, republicanism would never be the same again either.

For with the transformation of the social reality, an 'intellectual crisis' hit the defenders of republican freedom. It became unrealistic to cling to the agrarian ideal, therefore the position needed to be reformulated once more. The question was no longer whether every citizen could attain economic freedom stemming from land ownership. Instead, it was *what to do with the masses of factory workers?* What were the requirements of universal freedom in the age of industrialized America? One possible answer - dealt with in chapter two - was provided by the so called 'laissez faire republicans'.

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Their idea - associated with William Lloyd Garrison and others - was that the freedom of any laborer requires nothing more but the freedom of the labor contract itself. Chattel slavery was gone, no human being could be coerced into working for another according to law - everybody had the right to choose with whom they wished to step into contract with. Unlike slaves, wage-laborers could now decide to leave their jobs at any time they wished. According to laissez faire republicans, this effectively guaranteed liberty for all. But what followed from all this? To answer the question, Gourevitch makes two illuminating remarks. *First*, by equating non-domination with the right of free contract, 'laissez faire' republicans became undistinguishable from modern market liberals. In other words, there was nothing specifically republican about them, except for the rhetoric. *Second*, the defense of freedom of contract 'contributed to a rejection of many attempts to regulate or control through various types of collective actions' but on the other hand gave employers full freedom to put workers into certain new forms of dependence through the contracts and the labor process as well.

Thus the laissez faire position in the end resulted in the defense of asymmetric power relations between workers and employers, the latter being the more powerful of course. For the 'weakness' of the workers lie precisely in the fact that they could not bargain successfully over the conditions of the contracts, and consequently these contracts, despite their legal legitimacy, bore the marks of the power of the employers. Once again: this was not considered to be a form of domination by the laissez faire republicans.

But it was considered to be just that by others, namely the labor republicans. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 deal with them, and this is where Gourevitch is at his best. Using the debates published in American periodicals such as the *Journal of United Labor*, the *Knights of Labor*, or *The Liberator*, books, pamphlets and novels published, and speeches given by notable, and less notable members of the movement, he reconstructs the honorable intellectual heritage of labor republicanism. Its ideas come to life on the pages of the book, and it soon becomes evident that Gourevitch intends not only to give an antiquarian account of a long lost tradition. On the contrary, the stakes are much higher. Namely, the question is whether labor republicanism has something relevant to say about contemporary emancipatory struggles? I shall come to answer this shortly.

But first, who were these so called labor republicans? According to Gourevitch they were a loosely knit movement that included individuals - for example Langdon Bylesby, William Heighton, Stephen Simpson and Thomas Skidmore -, parties, and labor unions as well. As for the latter, the most extraordinary case is that of the Knights of Labor, a biracial (white and black) union that was active between the 1860s and early 1890s. At their height the *Knights* numbered possibly up to 700 000 members, with assemblies active all over the United States. They believed in the idea that 'everyone should have not just higher wages, shorter hours, or better conditions, but full economic independence. A life spent working should not be a life spent working under someone else's will.' Furthermore, they were the first labor union 'ever to organize black workers together with whites on a mass basis - an effort not meaningfully duplicated in the United States for nearly a century'.

Their eventual downfall was brought about by the horrors of the 1887 Thibodaux massacre, when white citizen-vigilantes, called the 'Peace and Order Committee', unleashed a three-day 'torrent of killing' on the protesting black sugar cane workers, led by the Knights. Although no body counts were done, the news of the killing quickly spread around the country and discouraged workers from any further participation in strikes and union activity for some time. This effectively ended the career of the Knights.

But what did they want? What is their legacy? Before answering these questions in detail, we need to make two preliminary remarks. *First*, the movement was far from homogenous - as Gourevitch himself admits it. But this does not mean

that we cannot find certain common motives and ideas, therefore it might not be an exaggeration to call it a tradition. *Second*, it was highly political in the sense that it was always articulated *in opposition* to the aforementioned laissez faire republicanism. In other words the movement can only be understood in a political context, in the very struggles fought over the rights of workers, the structuring of economic production and so on.

Let us enumerate the key ideas and motives of labor republicanism, as identified by Gourevitch. The *first* is their theory of value, from which important conclusions can be drawn with regards to freedom understood as non-domination. In short, the claim is that wage-laborers are on the one hand dependent on employers - for they *must* find work, if they are not starve, whereas propertied employers are not in danger of starving -, and on the other hand they are exploited by these same employers. For 'if a worker received a lower wage than the value he created, the employer unfairly acquitted (...) the value of that worker's labor'. This meant that 'the labor market was not defined by relations of equal independence, but rather by relations of unequal dependence and thus domination. The employers' regular extraction of profits was a sign of their arbitrary power over employees.'

The *second* idea follows from this. If un-freedom stems from the unequal power relations, the unequal dependency relations within the labor market itself, a republican position requires much more than the formal 'freedom of contract'. Namely, labor republicans proposed the concept of *cooperative production*, which was 'broadly understood as a form of associated production in which property was held in common, all able-bodied members of the community worked, in exchange for which they received a guarantee that they would be provided all necessities'. In other words, workers should take over ownership of the means of industrial production, they should cease to work under the will of employers, and thus they should cease to be dependent on their current masters. For cooperative production means that workers have the opportunity to live and work on their own terms, exercising *full* control over the process of production, over decisions concerning working hours and leisure time, and of course control over the products of labor as well.

Two points need to be noted here. For one, labor republicans demanded that it should be the workers who shall be provided with all necessities

in exchange for their toll, and no one else. Second, they demanded that these workers should have full control over the products, in other words, they should be able to enjoy the 'full fruits' of their labor. Now any old Marxist would of course object to these points - as does Gourevitch himself in the conclusion of the book. As for the first point, it could be argued that 'it is hard to accept the justice of a society that links consumption *exclusively* to the ability to work', for this would leave the weakest groups of society - the unemployed, the sick, the old, the mentally or physically disabled - completely at the mercy of the powerful. They would depend on private donations of various sorts, and this of course would mean complete and utter un-freedom. This stands in clear contrast with the concept of universal liberty, understood as non-domination. 'There are some needs that people should be able to satisfy without being able or even willing to work.' As for the second point - the one regarding the enjoyment of the full fruits of labor -, it might be argued that if 'workers received the full value of what they produced', the political community would be left without means to finance the realization of certain common goals, such as the building of roads, energy supply or whatever.

The *third* key idea in labor republican thought is that those participating in emancipatory struggles for the establishment of a system of cooperative production should effectively form a community, which means they should foster a sense of solidarity and an attachment to the common good. Labor republicans formulated this 'way of thinking about virtue as something neither absolutely counterposed to self-interest nor simply assimilated to it. (...) In all, they identified the politics of virtue with the practices of self-organization and self-education through which workers acted collectively to transform society.' Now this is no mere radicalization of the standard republican theory of virtue - which of course has taken many forms in the course of the centuries -, but something profoundly different. Namely, labor republicans break with the traditional idea that civic virtue should be linked to the potentially coercive state, and that it is in a way conservative. Instead, they proposed that it can be used to give normative arguments for participation in emancipatory struggles, and that it need not involve the active interference of any kind of state authority. In Gourevitch's words: 'Labor republicans sought to transform not preserve institutions, to cultivate virtue in themselves rather than have virtue coercively inculcated'.

To sum up the noted points, labor republicans found that the masses of factory workers were in a state of domination precisely because of the structure of the labor market, and this led them to focus their attention not on state institutions, but on the institutions of the market and the economy in general. They argued that universal freedom could only be acquired by radically transforming the mode of production, founding it on the cooperation of workers, rather than the self-interest of capital holders. To achieve this transformation, emancipatory struggles were needed with the active participation of virtuous worker-citizens.

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We are now in a position to ask what salience these ideas have in our age. According to Gourevitch, when Facebook comments, the holding of political views to which bosses object to or the support of unionization may lead to the loss of jobs, when employers may force employees to attend rallies, or when after-hours activities are monitored on a regular basis, it seems all too apparent that domination is here to stay in the labor market. 'Controversies over power and control in the workplace remain a part of our economic and political experience.' Moreover, 'liberty is most frequently invoked to argue against worker attempts to exercise collective control over their labor', and *in favor* of increasing managerial domination over the workforce. In other words, labor republicanism may yet provide a useful political vocabulary, since the very power relations that were its target remain intact.

However, a few theoretical objections may be raised - objections that are not, indeed, voiced by Gourevitch. First of all, by focusing on the transformation of economic institutions, labor republicans fall short on providing a coherent theory of the state. They argued for some sort of a minimal state that would only institute the most basic regulatory limits, such as a maximum-hours law, 'some' public schooling and so on. But - according to their concept - it would be the worker-citizens who would 'provide the actual content, through their own institutions'. Now this claim is highly problematic from a republican point of view. For according to most republicans it is precisely the state that should be seen as the defender of liberty - as long as it is effectively controlled by its citizens. This means that a strong and democratic state that actively interferes in the life of the citizenry is not seen as dominating, but rather as a necessary tool to forward the

common good. Second, the minimal state opens the doors for potentially over powerful worker institutions - a problem that could be tackled with the republican concept of the mixed constitution. The danger seems even more apparent if we take into account the fact that bottom-up institutions may organize on a variety of bases other than class, such as culture, religion or the like. A minimal state has no power to effectively limit cultural institutions that are potentially oppressive towards their membership. This leads to the third problem, which is that labor republicans saw class conflict as the only relevant political cleavage, and therefore completely neglected others. The truth of the matter is that domination may arise from a variety of power relations that of course may nevertheless be connected with the economic aspect, no question about that. Fourth, there is an apparent problem with the labor theory of virtue as well - a problem not quite separable from the labor theory of the state. Namely, it seems quite implausible to trust the cultivation of civic virtue solely on bottom-up institutions, for they may prove to be volatile in doing the task. Why the state - provided it is effectively controlled by the citizenry - should not be entrusted with this? It is the state that has both the resources and the legitimacy to effectively cultivate civic virtue, not to mention it is only through central/common institutions that inter-group solidarity can be easily forwarded, solidarity that would encompass the entire political community.

Apart from these objections, it is safe to say, that Alex Gourevitch is right when he claims that labor republicanism indeed *does* have relevant things to say about contemporary theoretical debates and political struggles as well. The picture of an ever changing, ever adapting republican tradition arises, a tradition that has succeeded many times to reformulate its position on liberty and its requirements. It is truly an eye-opening book, beautifully written, that challenges contemporary history of political thought and political philosophy as well, drawing our attention to certain neglected aspects of the republican tradition. Most notably, it shows two things. One is that republican liberty has not always had a universal scope - on the contrary. The other is that it can be successfully radicalized even in opposition to the institutions of the capitalist market economy. This is a claim that should be kept in mind - for it may still be used in the struggles 'for a freedom that is yet to come'.

Levoliberalna kritika putinizma

(Milan Subotić (ur.), *Druga Rusija, XX vek*, Beograd, 2015)

Miša Đurković¹

Milan Subotić je teoretičar i istoričar ideja koji se u našoj kulturi najozbiljnije sistematski bavi tokovima ruske misli i ruskom intelektualnom tradicijom. Njegove monografije o evroazijstvu (*Put Rusije – evroazijsko stanovište*, Beograd, 2004) i o tumačima ruske ideje (*Tumači ruske ideje*, Beograd, 2001) imaju status klasika u našoj savremenoj političkoj teoriji. Nažalost, najveći deo njegovih obimnih i intrigantnih radova razvejan je još uvek po časopisima koji generalno imaju slabu recepciju, i nadamo se da će u neko dogledno vreme biti objavljeni u zbornicima ili monografijama poput onih radova koje je sakupio u poslednjoj knjizi *Ruske teme* (2013).

Krajem prošle godine Subotić je za potrebe poznate Čolovićeve biblioteke XX vek priredio veoma zanimljiv i koristan zbornik radova savremenih ruskih autora, koji nosi naziv *Druga Rusija*. Paralela sa ovdašnjim poduhvatom sličnog tipa koji je objavljen početkom jugoslovenskih građanskih ratova 1992² je više nego jasna i značajna. Kao što su pre dvadeset i pet godina ovdašnji levi liberali pisali kritičke tekstove o stanju srpske nauke, politike, društva i vezi politike i intelektualnih tokova, tako su pre svega pod okriljem i utiskom rata u Ukrajini, aneksije Krima i organizovane vojne pobune u istočnim delovima Ukrajine, ruski liberalni autori pojačali ranije započetu dekonstrukciju i kritiku adekvatnih vladajućih misaonih i političkih tokova. Analogije su brojne i ovdašnji čitalac će pronaći mnogo toga što je kod nas mogao da pročita pre četvrt veka: Donjecka i Luganska Republika se slično kao onomad Republika srpska krajina tretiraju kao plod agresije Rusije na suverenu susednu državu, vrh Rusije se optužuje za skretanje ka nacionalizmu, konzervativizmu i imperijalizmu, a sve se to objašnjava kao prikrivanje diktature i enormne pljačke koju politički vrh sprovodi nad svojim građanima. Takođe se tvrdi da Putin kao Milošević svesno gura Rusiju u izolaciju od „sveta“ i pravi civilizacijski izbor koji Rusiju odaljava od evropske kulture i civilizacije. Itd.

Čitalac će vrlo lako naći paralelu i sa statusnim položajem autora koji su zastupljeni u knjizi (Subotić daje vrlo korisne biografske crtice o svakom na kraju knjige). Najveći deo njih je vezan za strane fondacije, univerzitete, finansijere i druge institucije bliske zemljama sa kojima je Rusija danas u sukobu. Setićemo se uloge pre svega Fonda za otvoreno društvo u Srbiji devedesetih. Ovaj podatak je važan zato što može da

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² Ivan Čolović, Aljoša Mimica, (ur.), *Druga Srbija*, Beogradski krug, Borba, Beograd, 1992.

objasni niz jednostranosti i pristrasnosti koje se mogu naći u tekstovima. Doduše, i sami autori uglavnom ne skrivaju svoju angažovanost i političnost članaka.

Zbornik se sastoji od Subotičevog uvodnog članka i dvanaest autorskih priloga koje je priređivač izabrao prateći savremenu rusku intelektualnu i publicističku produkciju. Jedini autor prisutan sa dva teksta je nedavno preminuli veteran ruske liberalne scene i rukovodilac poznatog Levada centra za istraživanje javnog mnjenja Boris Dubin.

Osnovni motiv priređivanja ovog zbornika Subotić je precizno objasnio u uvodu. On je u pravu kada tvrdi da ova vrsta intelektualne produkcije nije prisutna u našoj javnosti u kojoj su poslednjih godina objavljena brojna izdanja autora koji su predmet liberalne kritike: Dugina, Naročnicke, Rešetnjikova. To su takođe i autori koji su ovde više puta dolazili i davali intervjue u pre svega pisanim medijima (uz njih treba pomenuti i Leonida Savina, ali i generala Ivašova i Aleksandra Prohanova, rukovodioca Izborskog kluba itd). Od autora ove druge provenijencije zaista je malo šta objavljeno: Čolović je objavio Vladimira Kantora³, a portal *Peščanik* pre par godina knjigu Ane Politkovske *Putinova Rusija*.⁴ U tom smislu ovaj zbornik pre svega treba da prikaže drugačiju sliku Rusije, ali i savremene ruske politikološke produkcije od one koja dominira u našem javnom mnenju. Sam priređivač je svestan da ovaj izbor radova nije mogao da bude sasvim reprezentativan, već je nastao kao rezultat odabira od materijala do kog je Subotić mogao da dođe radeći u Beogradu. Stoga je zbornik kako autor kaže „prilog reazumevanju Druge Rusije“ u kome je izdvojeno nekoliko zanimljivih i ilustrativnih tema.

Posle Subotičevog teksta sledi okvirni članak Olge Malinove koja podseća na ključni ideološki spor u Rusiji između zapadnjaštva i antizapadnjaštva tumačeći ga kao proces dugog trajanja između onih koji vide Rusiju kao deo zapadne civilizacije i onih koji na različite načine traže elemente posebnosti i posebnog ruskog puta. Sledi zatim kratak temat o aktuelnom obliku te posebnosti, neoevrazijstvu. Maksim Kantor najpre govori o sablasti Evrazije. Radi se o izrazito propagandnom i borbenom tekstu u kome autor više nego olako deli etikete i osnivačima evroazijskog pokreta i njihovim savremenim nastavljajcima,

pokušavajući da *en gross* dezavuiše i popljuje svaki misaoni napor koji kritički posmatra zapadno delovanje prema Rusiji, ili traži drugačiji odnos sa Zapadom od onog koji je postojao u Jeljcinovo doba.

Daleko je vredniji i kvalitetniji tekst Mihaila Suslova u kome se detaljno i sistematski analizira razvoj geopolitike u savremenoj Rusiji. Autor je detaljno pobrojao i analizirao udžbenike, diskurs na kome se gradi geopolitika kao posebna disciplina, „zakone“ koje njeni promotori razvijaju itd. Suslov takođe pokušava da razjasni poziciju koju po njemu konzervativna i misticizmu okrenuta geopolitika igra u savremenoj ruskoj javnosti. No, dosta su problematične ocene koje on iznosi, da je geopolitika u savremenoj Rusiji zauzela mesto koje je nekada imao marksizam, kao i da su njeni nalazi bazirani na ideji o nacionalnom ili imperijalnom interesu Rusije nešto što treba smestiti u teorije zavere, odnosno paranoidni stil politike.

Slede dva teksta koji se bave tzv. politikom istorije, odnosno načinima na koji se proizvodi istorijski diskurs i kako se prilagođava zahevima praktične politike. Nikolaj Kuposov obrađuje istorijsku politiku za vreme Putina, a Igor Torbakov upotrebu politike istorije u kontekstu međunarodne politike savremene Rusije. Kuposov daje i koristan materijal analizirajući udžbenike istorije, i posebnu pažnju obraća na ratove pamćenja u pogledu gulaga, krivice i tumačenje Drugog svetskog rata. Za njega je to jasna evolucija koja objašnjava i „agresiju na Ukrajinu“. Torbakov se posebno bavi sporovima sa istočnoevropljanima oko Katina, okupacije Poljske, a zatim i ovladavanja tim zemljama nakon Drugog svetskog rata. Krivica je po njemu isključivo na ruskoj strani koja bi morala da preuzme svoju odgovornost i vrati se u okvirve zapadne civilizacije prihvatajući ono što joj se nameće.

Dolaze zatim tekstovi Aleksandra Etkinda i Ilje Kaljinina koji govore o popularnom pojmu *demodernizacije* u Rusiji. Oni ukazuju na značajan problem resursne orijentacije ruske privrede i države koja i dalje polovinu budžeta puni prodajom nafte i gasa. Etkind to pokušava da stavi u dugu tradiciju ruske privredne delatnosti, a Kaljinjin iznosi čudnu tezu o povezanosti takve orijentacije privrede i konzervativnog zaokreta u ruskoj kulturi i javnom mnenju (kao da takva orijentacija nije postojala i pre Putina i navodnog skorašnjeg konzervativnog zaokreta).

Aleksej Miler i Igor Zeveljev kritički govore o koncepciji i granicama „ruskog sveta“, pojma

3 Vladimir Kantor, *Rusija je evropska zemlja*, XX vek, Beograd, 2001.

4 Ana Politkovska, *Putinova Rusija*, Peščanik, Beograd, 2008.

koji je zaista dobio mnogo širi uticaj u Rusiji tokom poslednjih dvanaestak godina. Zeveljev vrlo lepo uočava veoma široku političku i geopolitičku upotrebljivost ovog pojma kojim se obuhvataju i Rusi, ali i pripadnici drugih naroda van Rusije koji dele odlike ruskog kulturnog identiteta, osećaju naklonost za Rusiju itd, što ih čini legitimnim objektom približavanja i brige od strane Rusije.

Tu su još dva Dubinova teksta nastala kao rezultat tumačenja rezultata istraživanja javnog mnjenja, kao i tekst Sergeja Medvedeva koji povodom dešavanja u Ukrajini govori o ruskom resentimanu. On npr. zaključuje da Zapad ne želi sukobe sa Rusijom, da ne namerava da joj uzima resurse, već samo da želi da ona bude stabilna i neagresivna.

Onaj ko poput autora ovog prikaza ne deli stavove autora zastupljenih u knjizi imao bi mnogo podsticaja za polemiku i oko činjenica, i oko tumačenja i oko vrednosnih i ideoloških stavova. Ovde ću se međutim osvrnuti na ono što je čini mi se najveći nedostatak zbornika. Ako neko pokuša da na osnovu priloženih tekstova formira sliku o Rusiji dobiće predstavu o konzervativnom, imperijalno usmerenom Putinu koji preoblikuje i kontroliše celu društvenu, političku i obrazovnu scenu, medije, privredu, resurse itd. Dobija se slika o maltene homogenom konzervativnom establišmentu gde su jedina opozicija ovakvi liberalni i prozapadni glasovi. To bi ličilo na situaciju koju smo imali u Srbiji početkom devedesetih.

No to za Rusiju apsolutno ne važi. Putin npr. ne kontroliše moćni Gasprom čiji su mediji poput NTV ili moskovskog Eho radija najglasniji kritičari Putina i tokom izbornih kampanja i u regularno vreme. Drugo, Putin je pripadnik pragmatičnog, ali pre svega liberalnog kruga koji je nastao oko nekadašnjeg gradonačelnika Sankt Petersburga Anatolija Sopčaka. Najveći deo pripadnika njegove administracije su liberalno i prozapadno usmereni političari i biznismeni kojima strašno teško padaju sukobi oko Ukrajine jer su im ugroženi poslovi i mogućnosti za život i putovanja u luksuznim zapadnim gradovima i mondenskim mestima. Npr. u ministarstvu spoljnih poslova, na univerzitetima, u medijima, jasno dominiraju takvi stavovi, a o tome u ovom zborniku nema govora. Dugin koji se predstavlja maltene kao nekakav sveučajni guru vlasti i novog diskurzivnog poretka, je u Rusiji deo politički marginalne alternative, čovek koga je moćni član Putinovog kabineta Surkov isterao sa Moskovskog državnog univerziteta jer ga je optužio da na čelu šeste kolone podriva borbu *opolčenaca* u Novorusiji.

Unutrašnji politički, ideološki i idejni odnosi u Rusiji su daleko složeniji od onoga što nam ovi autori prikazuju. Međutim, kako je Subotić i najavio, ovaj zbornik treba da nam dopuni postojeću sliku o Rusiji i sa te strane njegov poduhvat je zaista uspeo jer nam donosi niz podataka, korisnih analiza i osvetljavanja procesa o kojima se kod nas gotovo uopšte nije pisalo.

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