

Filozofija i društvo, godište XXV, broj 2
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Štampa: Colografx, Beograd

Tiraž: 300. Časopis izlazi četiri puta godišnje.

Cena 350 dinara; godišnja pretplata 1200 dinara.

Objavlivanje časopisa finansijski pomaže Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke
i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije.

Radove objavljene u časopisu nije dozvoljeno preštamovati, u celini
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FILOZOFIJA I DRUŠTVO

broj 2, 2014.
godište XXV

Beograd 2014.
YU ISSN 0353-5738 UDK 1+316+32
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PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIETY
FENOMENOLOGIJA I DRUŠTVO

I

Mark Losoncz (ed.)

Introductory Note

Phenomenology is one of the major streams in Hungarian philosophical tradition. It is worth noting that phenomenology not only originates from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, but this territory was also of great importance with regard to the deepest conceptual roots of Husserlian thinking, it is sufficient to mention Brentano and Meinong. This background played an essential role in the development of Hungarian philosophical ideas: the young Lukács created a phenomenological aesthetics in his so-called Heidelbergian art philosophy, Vilmos Szilasi inherited the Department of Philosophy in Freiburg after Husserl and Heidegger, while the other leading thinkers of that epoch, from Antal Szűcs to Ákos Pauler, were systematically dealing with phenomenological problems as well.

It is not an exaggeration to say that today there is a renaissance of phenomenology in Hungary. This collection of papers reflects the new tendencies, among others, with emphasis on the phenomenology of social reality. These papers can be conceived as an outcome of the international conference entitled *Hungarian Philosophy Today – Phenomenology and Society*, that was held on May 20, 2013, with the participation of philosophers from Hungary and Serbia.

Among topics discussed are the „phenomenological community“, as a possibility for an authentic integration (Zsolt Bagi); the institutionalization of the institution from the viewpoint of the theory of the document (Petar Bojanić); the „theological turn“ of French phenomenology by relying on the analysis of the idea of infinity (Tamás Pavlovits); the Simmelian theory of the constitution of social and cultural objects as a necessary supplement to Husserlian intentionality (Ádám Takács); the phenomenology of intersubjectivity in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, from the perspective of social philosophy (Alpar Losonczi).

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Phenomenological Community and Integrative Social Agency. Critique of a Phenomenological Concept of Inter-subjectivity

Abstract *The term „phenomenological community“ is not among the most well-known concepts of phenomenology. It was used by Marc Richir referring to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of „natural“ community. The paper examines this concept from the point of view of social philosophy. It analyses its relevance in the context of a post-Hegelian philosophy of inter-subjectivity. The community conceived this way is origin and result at the same time, giving rise to a theory of a historically grounded formation of a previously not given and heterogeneous communicative integration; moreover, social mediation defining the subject of action is an open, non-totalizing process, which makes it possible to conceptualize an integrative action that does not neutralize the heterogeneity of the contemporary society. The theory of the phenomenological community is the ontology of a disintegrated but common world. Social action never happens on the basis of chaos but of the inter-subjective world, thus it can provide a new basis for such an action. On the other hand the „phenomenological community“ is essentially a form of the „passive synthesis“ thus it is unable to provide foundation for a unifying action, the only possibility for an authentic integration (a non-representative form of social integration). Thus it necessitates a critique.*

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Keywords: *Inter-subjectivity, Marc Richir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, nature, infinity, phenomenology, social philosophy, integration*

Recent social movements pose previously rarely emphasized questions in the field of social philosophy. Mass movements in various countries in the last few years proved to be unclassifiable with the inherited concepts. One of the recognizable common characteristic of these movements is the lack of stable ideological backgrounds. While mass movements of the 20th century tended to have ideas or ideals shared by the individuals or at least ideals that were readily acceptable by most of them, there is no sign of such commitment nowadays. In case of Turkish anti-government mass demonstrations, or London youth demonstrating on the streets, or say Hungarian student protest movements, unifying ideology is non-existent. A social philosophy with an emancipatory allegiance has to deal with the question of the possibility of action of a *radically heterogeneous* mass, one that has no common ground not only in ideals but in most cases not even in interests. Although far from being an entirely new phenomenon, the decline of 20th century mass societies rendered this the rule instead of the exception. A situation which necessitates a model

of interaction between heterogeneous agents, individuals or groups that are radically „other“ to each other.

One possible point where such a social philosophy could take its departure is a phenomenological concept of community. Unlike most tendencies in social theories, phenomenology defines its base on the various – not only conflicting or incoherent, but in the case of Merleau-Ponty: inconsistent – phenomena of „being-in-the-world“. The thinkers of a phenomenological community elaborated this point to the extent of a theoretical statement on the „plurality of worlds“ (Richir 1992b: 52sq) and the communication among them (a phenomenology of language). Such a philosophy has many achievements that are clearly relevant in the situation described above. Here I would like to address two of these achievements: 1. the community conceived this way is origin and result at the same time, giving rise to a theory of a historically grounded formation of a previously not given and heterogeneous communicative integration; 2. social mediation defining the subject of action is an open, non-totalizing process, which makes it possible to conceptualize an integrative action that does not neutralize heterogeneity. Lastly I will criticize a third property of phenomenological theory of community, namely its passivity, which for me makes it impossible to take this theory as is, barring a unifying *action* that is in my mind the only possibility for an authentic integration (a non-representative form of social integration).

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Without doubt, phenomenology has a vague relation to social philosophy. Their relationship is clearly existent but not clearly defined. One of the major subject-matters of the late history of phenomenology was inter-subjectivity, a theme that is predominant in contemporary social philosophy as well. Moreover, social philosophy often declares its debt to phenomenology in this regard. But the phenomenological concepts of inter-subjectivity are not evidently equivalent to corresponding concepts in social philosophy. It is even questionable whether phenomenological terminology utilized in social theories – like the Husserlian concept *Lebenswelt*, which has a noticeably successful carrier in various social theories – does not lead to a fatally limited meaning of these terms. It seems that what is missing from them is exactly what distinguished phenomenology from sociology, namely the „metaphysical“ positioning of its subject.

The term „phenomenological community“ is not among the most well-known concepts of phenomenology. It was used by Marc Richir – perhaps the most important contemporary thinker of the phenomenology of

language – referring to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of „natural“ community (Richir 1992a). Taking this concept as the focus of our consideration has at least two advantages: first, it is a radical concept that is taking phenomenology to its limits; second, it is an essential concept, and thus it allows us to grasp directly the problems inherent in phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty serves here as a point of departure, since he is, without doubt, the most radical thinker of social being among the phenomenologists. Nonetheless, the concept of „phenomenological community“ is – as I would like to point out – clearly unsatisfactory if one is determined to engage the problems of integrative social agency, which is a theory of a community based on social activism. Though phenomenological community gives us a stable conceptual ground for establishing a theory of this kind of agency (being anarchical and non-teleological), its essential passivity, non-constructivity and non-integrativity offers no way for integrative social constructivism.

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Community as Origin and Result

It is somewhat of a commonplace that every social philosophy has to presuppose some kind of original, that is, non-constituted (natural), kind of inter-subjectivity.¹ In its narrow meaning, as I would like to employ the

1 Early modern political philosophy made use of the concept of „natural state“ for this theoretical requirement. Later social philosophy often explicitly relied on the reformulation of this concept making use of an inter-subjectivist vocabulary instead that of the natural law. Take for example the early Hegel, who utilized Hobbes’ idea of struggle among the subjects in the natural state to establish a theory of inter-subjectivity as a „struggle for recognition“. For Hegel the real radicalism of Hobbes consisted in establishing political philosophy on the lack of pre-established hierarchy of subjects in the natural state. On the other hand the lack of hierarchy unavoidably supposes a perpetual power struggle among the people. Hegel in his early works intended to reinterpret the Hobbsean struggle as a „struggle for recognition“ that is an original (non-constituted, natural) inter-subjectivity (Axel Honneth 1996: 7–30). On the other hand Marx opposed firmly the idea of finding this „original“ inter-subjectivity in any natural state. He established the social philosophy on the most advanced form of inter-subjectivity, on the „present fact“ of reified work. In the *Economical manuscripts of 1844* he writes: „Versetzen wir uns nicht wie der Nationalökonom, wenn er erklären will, in einen nur erdichteten Urzustand. Ein solcher Urzustand erklärt nichts. Er schiebt bloß die Frage in eine graue, nebelhafte Ferne. Er unterstellt in der Form der Tatsache, des Ereignisses, was er deduzieren soll, nämlich das notwendige Verhältnis zwischen zwei Dingen, z.B. zwischen Teilung der Arbeit und Austausch. So erklärt die Theologie den Ursprung des Bösen durch den Sündenfall, d. h., er unterstellt als ein Faktum, in der Form der Geschichte, was er erklären soll. Wir gehn von einem nationalökonomischen, gegenwärtigen Faktum aus“ (Marx 1968: 511). Still, it remains a question how one can oppose to this fact a non-reified form of inter-subjectivity; on what grounds non-institutional community („communism“) is possible. Does it precede reification or follow? One has to conclude that original inter-subjectivity must always be both an origin and a result.

term in this paper, social philosophy is not merely philosophy *on* society, rather a philosophy *based on* inter-subjectivity or social agency. Thus the task before a genuine inter-subjective social philosophy is actually twofold. To establish philosophy of society on inter-subjectivity one must be able to trace constituted forms of inter-subjectivity (state, institutions, etc), to non-constituted ones (or at least ones with some kind of original legitimacy as we shall see).² Moreover to establish social philosophy based on inter-subjectivity rather than subjectivity one must be able to trace pure theoretical or epistemological concepts, like perception, consciousness, self-consciousness etc. to these original forms of inter-subjectivity. Essentially, this original state is what I call – following Richir – the phenomenological community.

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Origin in Merleau-Ponty is always formulated in metaphysical terminology. One must not forget that Merleau-Ponty's *The Visible and the Invisible* is an ontological project. He took this effort in its strictest sense; ultimately he meant to redefine the concept of „nature“ itself. One can actually describe the latest philosophy of Merleau-Ponty as an effort to redefine the opposition between culture and nature by a phenomenological ontology of nature and institution respectively.³ Thus „phenomenological community“ is nature itself taken in a redefined sense. Merleau-Ponty's prime example to contrast with his own is the concept of nature in the Cartesian sense, which is infinity of the physical universe, or more precisely, an infinite extension. Nature in his sense is not the „infinite universe“ that – according to Koyré (Koyré 1957) – replaced the „closed world“ of antiquity, although it can be formulated by redefining its key terms, in this case: infinity. In a working note of February 17 1957 this reference to Koyré is apparent:

Infinity: it is to be sure a conquest to have conceived the universe as infinity – or at least on the ground of infinity (the Cartesians).

2 Again taking the example of Hegel, he argues that Kant errs in not realizing that the concept of 'Ich' which he seems to take as a non-constituted basis that transcendental constitution presupposes, is itself a result of abstraction. „Ich hingegen ist die einfache Gewißheit seiner selbst. Aber Ich überhaupt ist auch *zugleich* ein Konkretes, oder Ich ist vielmehr das Konkreteste, – das Bewußtsein seiner als unendlich mannigfaltiger Welt. Daß Ich Anfang und Grund der Philosophie sei, dazu wird die Absonderung dieses Konkreten erfordert, – der absolute Akt, wodurch Ich von sich selbst gereinigt wird und als abstraktes Ich in sein Bewußtsein tritt. Allein dies reine Ich ist nun *nicht* ein unmittelbares, noch das bekannte, das gewöhnliche Ich unseres Bewußtseins, woran unmittelbar und für jeden die Wissenschaft angeknüpft werden sollte.“ (Hegel 1986: 76)

3 Two major subject-matters of his courses he thought in the Collège de France in the fifties are nature and institution. See Merleau-Ponty (1995) and (2003). In the working notes of *The Visible and The Invisible* it is a constant theme as well. See also Barbaras.

But have the Cartesians really done so? – Have they really seen the depth of being, which is recognized only with the notion of infinity [an inexhaustible reserve of being which is not only this and that but could have been other (Leibniz) or is effectively more than we know (Spinoza, the unknown attributes)]?

Their notion of infinity is positive. They have devaluated the closed world for the benefit of a positive infinity, of which they speak as one speaks of some thing, which they *demonstrate* in „objective philosophy“ – the signs are reversed: all the determinations are negation in the sense of: are *only* negation – This is to elude infinity rather than to recognize it. Infinity congealed or given to a thought that possesses it at least enough to be able to prove it.

The veritable infinity cannot be that: it must be what exceeds us: the infinity of *Offenheit* and not *Unendlichkeit* – Infinity of the *Lebenswelt* and not infinity of idealization – Negative infinity, therefore – Meaning or reason which are contingency (Merleau-Ponty 1960: 169).

9

The phenomenological community is the borderless world of openness (*Offenheit*), not the infinity of the physical world (the „nature“ of the 17th century philosophy and also of later natural science), nor the „actual infinity“ of Cantorian mathematics. It cannot be taken as „some thing“, because it is precisely the open horizon of things. Infinity taken as borderlessness is what Richir calls a „phenomenological *apeiron*“. *Apeiron* meaning here 'what cannot be defined': Greek thinking thought what has no border (*peras*) is indefinable. The infinity of the physical world can be proved, the infinite set of mathematics can be defined, but the phenomenological *apeiron* is a sensual *world* of impossibilities, a world of otherness, a world of inconsistency. Phenomenology according to Merleau-Ponty is a meaningful language of an inconsistent world.⁴ The „depth of being“ is an indefinite and indefinable open horizon of actual being that cannot be conceived as a reserve of possible, or actual but unrecognizable being.⁵ It is rather a reserve of „impossibles.“ Negative infinity is

4 Hence the constant struggle for a philosophical language, which cannot be based on formal logic. However, this is not an apodictic necessity. Lyotard tried to give a solid and consistent metalanguage to a Merleau-Pontyan world of sensual impossibilities, rejecting his quest for a new, „corporal“ language.

5 One can wonder here if Merleau-Ponty thought of this „openness“ as a form of „possible worlds“, which the reference to Leibniz (and Spinoza in a way) certainly proposes. Both Heidegger and Sartre thought that the open horizon of the world can be conceptualized by reformulating the notion of „possibility“, in case of Sartre this involved an explicit critique of Leibnizian concept of possibility. But the reference here is misleading. Merleau-Ponty does not ask if Leibniz and Spinoza would have formulated the problem of openness right (Leibniz as possible worlds, Spinoza as infinite number of attributes unrecognizable by men), but that they might have indeed seen the „depth of being“ though they have definitely formulated it wrong.

precisely this background of an indefinable horizon behind every actual, given being. „It is this negative that makes possible the *vertical* world, the union of the impossibles, the being in transcendence, and the topological space and the time in joints and members, in disjunction and dis-membering“ (Merleau-Ponty 1969: 227). The sensible world, the world of the *chair* is radically open, by virtue of its impossibility, thus the phenomenological community is not an ideological or political community, it is not unified by any *telos* or *arkhé*, it cannot be unified by any idea or ideal.

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This ontology is therefore the ontology of the „phenomenological *apeiron*“, which is fundamental and original in an absolute way; it gives foundation to any existential orientation. On the other hand it is itself a result. Its primordially is „an-archistic“ since it is based on the openness of the negative infinity and negative infinity itself is constituted in inter-subjectivity and has an immanent history.⁶

The first working note of *The Visible and the Invisible* from January 1959. mentions three pillars of the project: the „subject-object question, the question of inter-subjectivity, the question of Nature“ (Merleau-Ponty 1969: 165). But this superficial equality among the pillars is misleading. In fact between the „subject-object question“ and „the question of Nature“ it is precisely the question of inter-subjectivity that mediates, or to put it in a more fundamental way: inter-subjectivity constitutes the essence of all of the major concepts here: the essence of nature, the essence of the subject and the essence of the object. Redefining the concept of „nature“ means first and foremost to take away its „objectivist“ meaning as we have seen above. But this may in no way lead to a „subjectivist“ meaning of the term. In the first chapter Merleau-Ponty dismisses the possibility of a subjectivist ontology with the same, or even more radical, vigor as the objectivist: „We would arrive at the same conclusion if, instead of underscoring the inconsistencies of the 'objective' order, we would address ourselves to the 'subjective' order which, in the ideology of science, is its counterpart and necessary complement – and perhaps our conclusion would be more easily accepted through this way. For here the disorder and the incoherence are manifest, and one can say without exaggeration that our fundamental concepts – that of the psychism and of psychology – are as mythical as the classifications of the societies called archaic“

⁶ Again, one can compare this to Hegel's project in the *Science of Logic*: the science (philosophy) must start with something that is absolute and thus *Unmittelbares* but it also has to be *vermittelt* at the same time (Hegel 1986: 65)

(Merleau-Ponty 1969: 18). The subjectivist form of a possible ontology would not be other than the „*Gegenabstraktion*“ (Merleau-Ponty 1969: 167) of the objectivist one. The emergence of the ontological point of view in Merleau-Ponty's late philosophy is precisely a solution for an unresolved problem of the first period where these mutually abstract categories (although in a phenomenologically neutralized way) stood firmly opposed (Barbaras 1991: 21–36). Ontology of nature means ontology of a pre-subjective (and without doubt: pre-objective) nature, the ontology of sensual world, that is the ontology of original „inter-corporeity“.

Since redefining nature is not possible neither through subjectivity nor objectivity, he had to find a *tertium* that he called the ontology of the *être sauvage*, that is an ontology of the inter-subjective nature. It is of paramount importance that inter-subjectivity does not precede nature *in time*, nature is not posterior to inter-subjectivity: „the objective transcendence is not posterior to the position of the other: the world is already there, in its objective transcendence, before this analysis, and it is its very meaning that will be rendered explicit as meaning“ (Merleau-Ponty 1969: 172). It precedes it as a *conditio sine qua non*, a condition of its possibility. This is why one can reasonably say that for Merleau-Ponty inter-subjectivity is the *essence* of nature. Since there is no nature without (inter-)subjectivity, or more precisely the concept of nature without subjectivity is the product of the philosophy of the *âge classique* (and the natural sciences based on it), one can revise Descartes' error of defining nature as *res extensa* by rethinking the essence of nature as inter-subjectivity. Descartes called essence the property that is the condition of possibility of all other properties in a given substance. Likewise in Merleau-Ponty it is chiasm, interpenetration between subjects, inter-corporeity that can be called the essence of nature. This is what constitutes the „depth of being“, the indefinable infinity (*apeiron*), the horizon of any being.

Thus phenomenological community is more than just one form of community among others. It is the „aesthetic“ (that is: sensual) world that is common for all of us. There is no human nature, no universal humanity but the infinite openness of the sensory world, an element in which the subjects can reach each other, in which their relations and thus they themselves continuously constitute and what is continuously constituted by these very subjects at the same time. What makes the phenomenological community an *original* concept is its difference to institutions in its exemption from time. Merleau-Ponty defines institution by duration, (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 6) but phenomenological community (or nature)

has no duration. Having no duration on the other hand does not mean it is exempt from constitution. Although Merleau-Ponty avoids using the word „constitution“ in a positive way in his late philosophy (a constitutive subject being the main target of his critique), inter-subjective constitution of objectivity is still an unquestioned theoretical achievement (of Husserl, naturally) for him. Nature differs from institution not by its supposedly unconstitutional essence but by its non-duration. Essential passivity defines both of them: the subject is earning its meaning from them but while in the case of institution it is a series of events that is the basis of this meaning in case of nature it is a pre-eventual world of inter-corporeity.

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Richir opposes phenomenological community to „symbolical community“, that is, to any community based on symbolic institutional act, subsisting as an institution or symbolic form. This actually includes any kind of suspension of the „phenomenological apeiron“, the indefinable „depth“ of the phenomenological community. This is why at first glance every social relationship seems to be subject to a symbolic *order*, a system of power-relations. As we have seen phenomenological community is a new definition of nature, so any „cultural“ institution is its counterpart. Now the vague relation between social philosophy and phenomenology I have mentioned in the introduction is finally taking shape: that of an inconsistency in the suggested theory. It seems that while it is possible to fulfill the second task of a social philosophy with phenomenology (to trace the theoretical concepts to inter-subjectivity) it is impossible to fulfill the first one: the phenomenological reduction deprives us from saying anything on symbolic communities; one cannot trace their reality to inter-subjective constitution. But this is to reach a hasty conclusion. Although Richir does think of institutions as a non-phenomenological subject-matter, Merleau-Ponty precisely did not. While Richir is concerned with a „hyperbolic reduction“ to be able to reach a metaphysical ground where social communities do not matter anymore, only the „apeiron“ of the phenomenological inter-subjectivity, Merleau-Ponty on the other hand was deeply engaged in social issues and on what kind of answer philosophy can offer to social questions. The question of institution in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty shows this clearly. My own suggestion however will lead in another direction: there must be a third kind of community between symbolic (institutional) and phenomenological: a form of integration that does not lead to representational forms of the community.

Mediation

The phenomenological community is characterized by its *openness*. To further define the meaning of this characteristic we look into the concept of *mediation* of the subject that is the constitution of the subject through the mediation of the community. From the standpoint of the inter-subjectivity the most important philosophical statement of even the earliest forms of social philosophy was that the theory of the subject cannot be elaborated on the grounds of the immediate recognition of the „I“. Hegel has shown that self-consciousness (*Selbstbewusstsein*) is constituted through inter-subjectivity rather than the supposedly immediate evidence of the consciousness. „Hegel’s dialectic of self-consciousness passes over the relation of solitary reflection in favor of the complementary relationship between individuals who know each other. The experience of self-consciousness is no longer considered the original one. Rather, for Hegel it results from the experience of interaction, in which I learn to see myself through the eyes of other subjects. The consciousness of myself is the derivation of the intersection [*Verschrankung*] of perspectives. Self-consciousness is formed only on the basis of mutual recognition; it must be tied to my being mirrored in the consciousness of another subject. That is why Hegel cannot answer the question of the origin of the identity of the „I“ as Fichte does, with a foundation of self-consciousness returning into itself, but solely with a theory of spirit. Then spirit is not the fundament underlying the subjectivity of the self in self-consciousness, but rather the medium within which one „I“ communicates with another „I“, and from which, as an absolute mediation, the two mutually form each other into subjects“ (Habermas 1973b: 144–145). The fact, that the „I“, the transcendental subject loses its originality, that it cannot be a stable ground to build a philosophy of reflection upon, makes it clear that social-philosophy is not a mere supplement to theoretical philosophy but a form of theoretical philosophy itself. Social philosophy from the very beginning of its history was a radical critique of philosophy as such. Hegel in his early works reinterpreted Kant’s theory of „synthesis“ in inter-subjective terminology, later Marx replaced the epistemological term of „synthesis“ with the social philosophical term „social labour“ (see Habermas 1973a: 36–59) both philosophers strongly implied that the most important categories of transcendental philosophy can only be defined through social philosophy.

Nevertheless the point of departure of *phenomenological* philosophies of inter-subjectivity is the immediateness of the „I“. Husserl’s insistence

on the absolute evidence of the I is well-known and broadly interpreted. On the other hand the immediate givenness of the „I“ does not mean that it would be possible to determine or define the „I“ in any immediate manner. Therefore it is impossible to think of it as the „transcendental unity of the apperception“ as Kant did. Richir claims that all of the enigmas in the interpretation of Husserl's *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* derive from the fact that with the immediate givenness of the monadic subjectivity the other is given essentially with the same immediacy. There is no subjectivity without inter-subjectivity. The other is given through an „analogical presentation“ in the same manner as the primordial sphere of the monadic subjectivity.

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The only – and without doubt essential – difference between the givenness of the primordial sphere of the ego and the sphere of the other is that the later is not and cannot be *present*. Although the givenness of the other is the „first genuine transcendence“ of the consciousness, by experiencing it the consciousness transcends itself (Husserl 1973: 8–9), it is however a condition of possibility of a common world: the objectivity is constituted through inter-subjectivity, through the absence of the other. Indeed this is one of the major characteristics that *define* phenomenological inter-subjectivity. While mediation in the Hegelian tradition means the dialectic comprehended as the „identity of the universal and the singular“, (Habermas 1973b: 146) in the phenomenological tradition it is comprehended as the mediation between present and absent.

It is however one of the most crucial difference between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl, that for Merleau-Ponty the mediation between „I“ and other is *at the same time* a mediation between present and absent on one side and universal and singular on the other. While Husserl's concern is the inter-subjective constitution of the objective world and Hegel's is the constitution of the singularity of the „I“ through the universality of the spirit (or in his early works: the mutual constitution of the spirit and the singular subject), Merleau-Ponty poses another question: how is it possible to mediate between impossible worlds.

In one unfinished text published after his death he wrote about the questions posed by modern painting: „the question of knowing how one can communicate without the aid of a preestablished nature upon which all men's senses open and of knowing how there can be communication prior to communication and, finally, how there can be a reason before reason“ (Merleau-Ponty 1973: 56). This is the same question as the one he is confronted in his own philosophy. At the time of his ultimate work,

The Visible and the Invisible it is also clear that „communication prior to communication“ can only mean a communication on the basis of a world of „impossibilities“, a world where communicating subjects are radically other to each other. For Merleau-Ponty the universality of the inter-subjective „Nature“ in its redefined sense (just like the particularity of institutions) is a problematic one. It is precisely a universality burdened with the (dialectical) identity of presence and absence. The universality of the Hegelian „spirit“ (identity of universality and singularity) is insufficient, since the „phenomenological *apeiron*“, the „depth of being“ is indefinable and inconsistent by virtue of a phenomenological kind of inter-subjectivity: presence and absence. The „wild spirit“ (*esprit sauvage*) as opposed to the Hegelian one is characterized by a universal inter-subjectivity of present-absent. The absent, the invisible is certainly immediately given, put precisely as something that cannot be present immediately: „*Urpresentiert* as *Nichturpresentierbar*.“

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A certain relation between the visible and the invisible, where the invisible is not only non-visible (what has been or will be seen and is not seen, or what is seen by an other than me, not by me), but where its absence counts in the world (it is 'behind' the visible, imminent or eminent visibility, it is *Urpresentiert* precisely as *Nichturpresentierbar*, as another dimension) where the lacuna that marks its place is one of the points of passage of the 'world.' It is this negative that makes possible the vertical world, the union of the impossibles, the being in transcendence, and the topological space and the time in joints and members, in disjunction and dis-membering (Merleau-Ponty 1969: 227–228).

Between impossible worlds there is still a „transpassibility“, that of communication. Language in a phenomenological sense is not a Saussurean „*langue*“, but a „*parole*“, a corporeal communication between impossible worlds. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of language tries to grasp this language of the inconsistency (Merleau-Ponty 1960: 19–69). Nature (phenomenological community) itself has a language the signs are „quasi-corporeal“.

Phenomenological unconsciousness and social action

According to Marc Richir the phenomenological community is essentially passive. It works as a „phenomenological unconsciousness“, structuring the passive syntheses. This interpretation seems accurate to me. The phenomenological community always remains passive, since it is without *arkhe* or *telos*, it has no other choice than to remain deconstructed. From the viewpoint of the phenomenological community the integrated community

will always be a transcendental illusion, a Kantian „regulative idea“, unreachable goal. But this is the point where the roads diverge, where phenomenology proves to be insufficient. Richir blames Merleau-Ponty for being unfaithful of the phenomenological community when he tries to move further, to establish a theory of institutions. And he indeed might be right – as I see it – in claiming that institutions will always be „symbolic“, they always turn the phenomenological language (the communication among radically other subjects) into a symbolic order in the Lacanian sense (communication according to a *discourse*). This is why I think it is necessary to find another form of social integration.

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Is it possible to think of a political and social community, which is not symbolic? It must be a form of community based on *participation* and not *representation*. A symbolic institution is always a representational one; it is structured according to a system, a *langue*. A community based on participation at least has the possibility to transgress the symbolic order. It all depends on the concept and praxis of integration we use. There must be a *tertium* between phenomenological community and symbolic institutions, between the passive language of the phenomenological unconsciousness and the institutional political discourse. There must be a form of integration of the phenomenological community that does not want to totalize it, does not want to give it an ideology, does not want to close it and oppose it to other political communities. I call this form *integration through differentiation* and I claim that the Spinozean concept of integration fulfills these criteria. Although I have no opportunity to elaborate this here further, integrity according to Spinoza does not mean totalization but the interdependent processes of differentiation and involvement in a common causation. According to him the more differentiated an *individuum* (*individuum* being any set of causations cooperating in a common effect), the greater its power to act as a self-sufficient cause. Spinoza offers us a model of cooperation that relies on the participation by the very essence (his „impossibility“, singularity) of an individual, not the determination of the individual as a part of the totality of the process.

The theory of the phenomenological community is the ontology of a disintegrated but common world. Social action never happens on the basis of chaos but of the inter-subjective world. Badiou is right about saying that an event is always undetermined, but has no right to claim that one must suppose the absolute otherness of the multitude of beings.⁷

⁷ See (Badiou 1988: 41–59) where he puts forward the ontology of a pure multiplicity, the ontology of the absolute heterogeneity.

What I call a *radical* heterogeneity is definitely not an *absolute* heterogeneity: it is the impossibility but „transpassibility“ of worlds, a phenomenological *aperion* a multiplicity of „vertical“ worlds. What I call social action is always given together with the construction of a subject. A social action is when a community is produced, which is no longer a phenomenological community, not the inter-corporeal experience of the borderless sensible world, but the event of integration. Every action is integration and only action integrates through differentiation. The social action produces a „we“, a first person plural subject, but this subject is necessarily transitory. If it would not be than it would be an institution: it would be symbolic community, it would be representation but it would not be action anymore.

The phenomenological community should not be transgressed in the direction of political institution but in the direction of social integration. But integration through differentiation can only be produced by common action, not by common ideology, ideas, or ideals. If one wants to radically criticize the concept of social integration one does not need to find new ideals to synthesize society. We do not gain anything by substituting the idea of the nation with any other idea, if we substitute the nation state with another form of the state. We have to criticize the very notion of the state, social integration must not be built on the state but social action, cooperation. The phenomenological community might offer a basis for this aim, but the event of cooperative action transgresses it in the direction of an integrated community.

Primljeno: 14. juna 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 20. jula 2014.

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Žolt Bagi

Fenomenološka zajednica i integrativna društvena delatnost.
Kritika jednog fenomenološkog pojma inter-subjektivnosti

Apstrakt

Termin „fenomenološka zajednica“ nije među najpoznatijim konceptima fenomenologije. On je bio upotrebljen od strane Marka Rišira koji se služio konceptom „prirodne“ zajednice kod Merlo-Pontija. Rad ispituje ovaj koncept iz perspektive socijalne filozofije. U njemu se analizira relevantnost tog koncepta u kontekstu posthegelijanske filozofije intersubjektivnosti. Zajednica shvaćena na ovaj način je istovremeno izvor i rezultat, a time nastaje teorija istorijski zasnovanog formiranja komunikativne integracije koja prethodno nije data i heterogena je. Zatim društveno posredovanje, koje određuje subjekta delanje, shvaćeno je kao otvoren, ne-totalizirajući proces koji omogućava da se konceptualizuje integrativno delanje koje ne neutralizuje heterogenost savremenog društva. Teorija fenomenološke zajednice je ontologija dezintegrisanog, ali zajedničkog sveta. Društveno delanje se nikada ne odvija na osnovu haosa, već na osnovu inter-subjektivnog sveta, a tako on može da rezultira novom osnovom za takvo delanje. Sa druge strane, „fenomenološka zajednica“ je u suštini forma „pasivne sinteze“, što znači da je ona nesposobna da zasniva ujedinjavajuće delanje, koje je jedina mogućnost za autentičnu integraciju (kao ne-reprezentativna forma društvene integracije). Dakle, ona mora da se kritikuje.

Ključne reči: Inter-subjektivnost, Mark Rišir, Moris Merlo-Ponti, priroda, beskonačnost, fenomenologija, socijalna filozofija, integracija

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Real Institution. Document and Realism¹

Abstract *Regardless of the fact that I am using certain texts by Searle, Ferraris, Smith and De Soto, my intention is not at all to reiterate someone else's position in my own words, nor is it to question or modify some such position. My intention for now is to, using Ferraris' theory of the document, affirm the existence of a paradox – one rejected by Searle, but unconvincingly so, I think – regarding the institution (or the institutionalization of the institution). In order to do that, it seems to me that I am forced to slightly disturb both Searle's and Ferraris' conception, in attempting to offer my own contribution to a new future theory of the institution.*

Keywords: *institution, document, realism, documentality, writing*

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My intention is to, using Ferraris' theory of the document and Searle's theory of institution (including one criticism of a position of Searle's, and the response thereof),² affirm the existence of a paradox regarding the institution. Thoroughly simplified, this paradox can be formulated like this:

„The creation of institutional facts by declaration presupposes the creation of other institutional facts. In order to avoid an infinite regress, there must be a way of creating institutional facts which does not require any special authority,³ – which seems to be impossible. Clearly I would like to remove both the words 'seems' and 'impossible', since I am not satisfied with the perspective offered by Searle's response.⁴ My point,

1 Tekst je nastao u okviru projekta „Istraživanje uticaja klimatskih promena na životnu sredinu: praćenje uticaja, adaptacija i ublažavanje“ (43007) koji finansira Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije, u okviru Programa Integrisanih i interdisciplinarnih istraživanja za period 2011–2014. godine. Šira verzija ovog teksta predstavljena je 27. marta 2012. godine u Bonu, u okviru međunarodnog skupa „Prospects for a New Realism“, koji je organizovao Univerzitet u Bonu, a čiji je urednik bio Markus Gabriel. Deo ovoga teksta predstavljen je 20. maja 2013. u Beogradu tokom kolokvijuma „Mađarska filozofija danas – Fenomenologija i društvo“, koju su organizovali IFDT i CELAP, a čiji su urednici bili M. Lošonc i A. Lošonc.

2 I am speaking of the text by Prien, Skudlarek, Stolte 2010: 163–171; Searle 2010: 227–229. Both of these texts came about as the result of a conference held in Münster in December 2009.

3 *Ibid.*, 167.

4 Searle's response to this problem is that it is not a problem. „A further point of disagreement between me and them is that they think you need a special authority to create institutional reality by (representations that have the same logical form as) Declarations. This is a mistake as several of my examples illustrate. You do not need special authority to create every type of institutional fact, otherwise it would not be

however, is not to claim that there is necessarily something outside the institution (something extra-linguistic) or some necessary authority (special or not), power or violence. Rather, it is that an institutional fact is immediately preceded by the document, in the broadest sense of the term. That is, a document as a special kind of institutional fact. And if I had to 'document' this paradoxical moment now in Searlean language, I would take a sentence he writes about the corporation in his latest book *Making the Social World*: „So the Law is a Declaration that authorizes other Declarations.“ (Searle 2010: 100)⁵ In this case, 'Law' is the document, and it is not at all surprising that it is precisely when we arrive at „A Complex Case: Creating a Corporation“ that the „special role of writing“ is problematized and that syntagmas like „writing language,“ „written speech act,“ „written constitutive rules,“ or „written record“ appear. (Searle 2010: 98–100, 115)⁶ To the extent to which the title and subtitle of this text had to be imprecise, I will now assume that in between so-called

possible for the system of institutional fact to ever get started. You have to begin somewhere, simply by creating and getting other people to accept institutional reality.“ *Ibid.*, 229. I think it was sentences like this, in which someone who creates institutional reality ought to get others to accept it, that caused Raimo Tuomela's criticism about individualistic collective acceptance of what has been declared and of speech act theory as essentially an individualistic theory. Cf. Tuomela 2011:708. In the book *Making the Social World*, the word 'making' serves Searle in explaining the beginning of the institution or institutionalization. „God can create light by saying „Let there be light!“ Well, we cannot create light but we have a similar remarkable capacity. We can create boundaries, kings, and corporations by saying something equivalent to „Let this be a boundary!“ „Let the oldest son be the king!“ „Let there be a corporation!“ J. Searle, *Making the Social World*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 100.

5 The corporation is the novelty in Searle's latest book, even though he mentions it for the first time in 2004 at a conference at the University of Hertfordshire that is in the text „What is an Institution?“ *Journal of Institutional Economics*, vol. 1, n. 1, 2005, 15. It is interesting that the origin of the corporation is the old system of fellowships (*Genossenschaft*) (*universitas* or *universitas personarum*, or else *collegia personalia* in Latin), and is a form of association or the form of the juridical personality which was always at odds with the institution (*Ansalt*) (*universitas bonorum* or *collegia realia*). I write about this elsewhere, following the texts of Innocent IV, Gierke, and Sorokin.

6 Law is law, or the document is the document, because it is alive and vocal, because the letter (the paper) „has a voice.“ For example, Jewish political theory and Jewish Law Theory recognize a clear distinction between the Verbal and Written Obligation. A written obligation entitles the creditor to recover payment out of the debtor's encumbered assets which are in the hands of a third party, a right unavailable in the case of a mere verbal obligation, since the obligation or debt has no *kol* („voice“) and does not provide notice that will put prospective purchasers on their guard. In the case of a written obligation, a plea by the debtor that he has repaid the debt is not accepted without written proof, as would be the case with a verbal obligation. Thus, for example, an undertaking, even if in the debtor's own handwriting but not signed by witnesses, will be treated as a verbal obligation, since only properly written, witnessed, and signed obligation carries a „voice and constitutes notice.“ *Bava Batra* 175b. Elon 1975: 244.

'brute' and 'social' facts, and then in between 'social' and 'institutional' facts, there is some sort of documental reality. Having here mentioned the document, let me tangentially insist on the material (the paper, the ink, the body of the text, or if you will, the sound, the phoneme, the materiality of the signifier, the body of one making it – an insight for which we do not need Saussure or Derrida, rather any stoic is enough, for example Vitruvius). Namely, between, on the one hand, the virtual reality of the law or certain rules (a space in which a usually small group of people, certainly empowered or protected by some authority [or more precisely protected by weapons], imposes an institutional reality on others [or on all] by constructing [formulating, designing] the text of the law or rules) and, on the other hand, various statements often read (or uttered) by a rabbi, priest, lawyer, officer or stewardess, or else a money bill, property, marriage, or a declaration of the type 'This is my house' – that is, between these two 'realities' there is a so-called „written record.“ This is the charter which creates a legal person or corporation, a decision of the governor to issue bills of this specific design, a record, a birth certificate, marriage license, lease, contract, proof of ownership, etc. I do not have to declare „This is my house,“ nor say „I am married to Sonia,“ to only then create the right to the house „because the right only exists by collective acceptance.“ The possibility to document what I say when I say that „This is my house,“ to show my papers, my ID, driver's license, to demand that the lawyer show me the article in the law that allows the creation of a corporation, or the employer the decision based on which I am being let go – is paramount for the creation of institutional reality. But not sufficient. The sentence „our marriage exists only on paper“ (I am not sure whether this sentence works in English; this is what it would be in German. „Wir sind nur noch auf dem Papier verheiratet“) marks that our currently relationship is not in harmony by the contract we signed, and that our marriage is not worth the paper it is written on. One of the main characteristics of the institution, which Hume differentiates from and opposes to the contract (law) – apart from that the institution, unlike the contract, supposes the existence of a third party (that is the possibility that someone else join, a sense in which the institution implicitly counts everyone in, excludes no one, and ultimately assumes that there is nothing outside the institution), and that the institution is coercive because formed by various transformations of violence and force – is its artificial nature, as well as the possibility of incorporating law into a group or tying a collective together. The fact that the paper (the marriage certificate), as a document, is not a strong enough glue to keep a couple in love – after all, neither is the once upon a time performed ceremony in which we promised to have and to hold

one another – does not exclude the institutional fact that our marriage still exists. Then the question implied by the „normal little words 'real'“ (and which are not normal at all; cf. Austin 1962: 62–78) in the title and subtitle of this paper ('real' and 'really') regards the existence of the institution of marriage that exists only on paper, that is, the status of the document within the institution. Do we have a real marriage (or a factual marriage) because we are not divorced, or is the document the source of reality and then the institution? In other words, does the document institutionalize, or are we in fact, really separated, we could say organically separated, and together on paper only? (Cf. Hodgson: 1999 and further) This is a tough and complicated question, and I immediately have two associations: first, that only something that exists in time⁷ (this being one of the characteristics of the institution, as something man made and on the other side of nature or God), and declines in time is real (marriages decline in time, do they not?); and second, a quote I have taken from Tony Lawson's book *Economics and Reality*, and changed it slightly: „No reality, please. We're philosophers!“ (Lawson 1997: 12)⁸ The first option is that an institution is real if and only if it can be documented, that is to institutionalize (I chose the verb) means in fact to publish or further attach documents (a synonym for *documentum* or its prototype, is *instrumentum* [a statement made publicly, or in the presence of a few witnesses]; in a different context, documentation is nothing other than argumentation), that the institution becomes an institution if it is constantly in the process of institutionalizing or documenting. To defend this first option, it seems necessary to me to show that a greater transfer or distribution of paper (documents) between partners, certainly makes the marriage not only on paper. The more invoices, bills, receipts, tax declarations, etc., – the more documents, the more love.

Reality is thus ensured by the production and proliferation of documents, and their collecting.

In section 5.1.1 'Documents,' of the book *Documentalità*, Ferraris writes:

The detailed examination of the phenomenology of the institutional and social difference seems to me to be of somewhat less importance than a substantial point that reveals the role that social reality, and

7 This determination of the „real“ is constructed by Nicolai Hartmann, and used thereafter by Otta Weinberger and Neil MacCormick, or today by Massimo La Torre. Namely, 80 years ago, nearly 500 kilometers from here, in the city of Halle, Hartmann holds his famous plenary lecture in *Kant-Gesellschaft* „Zum Problem der Realitätsgegebenheit“ (28–29 May 1931).

8 The original quote is „No reality, please. We're economists!“ and is taken from *The Times Higher Education*, from 25 March, 1994.

even more so institutional reality, have in documents. Thus the theory of social objects, and their specialization into institutional objects, naturally develops into the theory of documents (Così, una teoria degli oggetti sociali, e della loro specializzazione in oggetti istituzionali, evolve naturalmente in una teoria del document) (Ferraris 2009: 298).

It seems to me that this phrase „Fenomenologia dell’istituzionale“ or Phenomenology of the Institutional (institutionality or institution) Ferraris mentions only once in his texts, and that it is very appropriate for me to insist once again on some difficulties we have with the word or the figure ‘institution’. Therefore, my intent is twofold: on the one hand I would like to claim, against Ferraris and with Searle, that the theory or phenomenology of the institution (Searle mentions the „ontology of the institution“ or the „ontology of the creation of the institution,“ [Searle 2009: 252]⁹ „institutional phenomenon“ or „institutional phenomena“ [Searle 2006: 23]) is always the most important task in the construction of social ontology, even though the theory of the institution is „still in progress,“ or „still in its childhood“ (Searle 2005: 22). Along the way, I would like to try to point to the importance of violence (and power) and violent strategies during the creation and maintaining of institutions. It is interesting that both Husserl’s and Searle’s project is marked with a common resistance towards the written language, even though we find in both of them a sketch of a very timid *documentalità*: with Searle it is the idea of „official documentation“ and in Husserl „*der Ausweis*“ (certification). A hundred years ago, Husserl has the same problem with mutual recognition or collective recognition. Here is his suggestion:

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How did this being a Master / Servant (Herr-und-Diener sein) at all happen? I notice Johann, my servant. In this way, I do not notice him yet as a servant, if we can use the word „notice“ at all. It is more a registration (Ausweisung), a „fulfilling“ (Erfüllung). However, the registration (certification) (Ausweis) is given in the certificate B, according to which he is ready to follow my will in regards this or that action, ready to execute a certain task to which he is committed, such that this certificate is based simply in that Johann, in executing my order, is subject to me.¹⁰

9 „I have not ventured far on the subject of imitation in *The Construction of Social Reality* because it did not have a central place: I was not looking to show how new institutions are born by imitating old ones, but rather to determine the ontology of the creation and sustaining of these institutions“ (*Je me suis peu étendu sur le sujet de l’imitation dans La construction de la réalité sociale parce qu’elle n’y tenait pas une place centrale : je ne cherchais pas à montrer comment naissent de nouvelles institutions par imitations des anciennes, mais plutôt à déterminer l’ontologie de la création et du maintien de ces institutions*). Searle 2009: 252.

10 „Wie kommt dieses Herr-und-Diener-sein zur Gegebenheit? Ich nehme Johann wahr, meinen Diener. Damit nehme ich ihn noch nicht als Diener wahr, wenn man

And not only that. Two short appendices authored by Husserl a hundred years ago and dedicated to social ontology and to the community and norms are incredibly convergent with Searle's intentions. We can say without reservation that these appendices are a precise sketch of Searle's longterm effort to construct a new social and political ontology.¹¹ On the other hand, I am interested in the importance of Ferraris' theory of documents or documentation for the making of institutions or the institution, but also for the construction of a new theory of the institution, which is our main goal, I think. Thus by answering the question in the sub-heading of this paper, „does to institutionalize“ mean in fact „to document“, my intention is to understand Ferraris' project first as a necessary addition to, and as that which lacks in the ontology of John Searle (or Barry Smith¹²), on multiple different levels (the most important being that the document intensifies the normative effect of the use of language because it contains explicitness and stability – that it is given once and for all) (Ferraris 2009: 183). But also, I would like to argue that in the future this project could „incorporate“ these same famous theoretical attempts, which precede it. In particular I would like to argue that the future of this project is in political and legal theory, in the understanding of the great and truly „ultimate institutional structures.“ Ferraris, as the inheritor and contributor to the great project of Paul Otlet (*Mundaneum*), surpasses „the government as the ultimate institutional structure“ (Searle 2007: 96; Searle 2010: 161), and puts in the place of the state – Europe and *la Cité mondiale*.¹³

das Wort wahrnehmen hier gebrauchen kann. Es ist Ausweisung, „Erfüllung“. Nun, der Ausweis liegt in der Anerkennung des B, dass er gewillt ist, meinem Willen hinsichtlich der und der Leistungen zu folgen, dass er gewillt ist, die und die Verpflichtungen, die er übernommen, auszuführen, und eventuell einfach darin, dass er in der Ausführung meines Befehls eben erweist, dass er sich mir in diesem Sinn unterordnet.“ (A und B, Herr und Diener) Husserl 1973: 104.

11 *Ibid.* The titles of appendices XVIII and XIX in the original are: „Die Gegebenheit konkreter sozialer Gegenständlichkeiten und Gebilde und die Klärung auf sie bezüglicher Begriffe. Sozialer Ontologie und deskriptive Soziologie“ and „Gemeinschaft und Norm“ (98–107).

12 Smith admits Ferraris' engagement, even if he does not fully understand him and asks for additional explanations. Searle mentions the document or „official documentation“ only a few times, although in his last book for the first time he thematizes the importance of writing in social ontology. The resistance to the importance of documents is likely the result of decades-long antagonism (in classic John Wayne style) of Anglo-Saxon philosophers towards a theory of the text and writing by French philosophers, that is, towards Jacques Derrida (or intellectual nonsense à la Derrida), one of Maurizio Ferraris' main inspirations.

13 „The institution, says Paul Otlet, is a free grouping of forces of the will, a federation of organisms, a union of national and international associations.“ Otlet 1989: 417.

Let me return to the beginning once again. „Does 'to institutionalize' in fact mean to 'document', to distribute and add documents, or to forward and transfer documents?“ More precisely, is the *documentalità* a particular protocol that can bridge and secure (ease) social objects into institutional objects? Is the institution made in this way? If we say that something (a fact, for example) is very well documented, are we within the space of the institution or institutional facts? It seems to me that questions constructed in this way could to a great extent suit the context and rhythm of Searle's expositions and his regime of use of arguments. Exclusively when he speaks of the institution, Searle not only has no intention of analyzing the ordinary use of the word 'institution', but does not even find it important whether what he speaks of when he talks about the institution has anything to do with institutional reality. So regardless of Searle being most interested „in getting at the underlying glue that holds human societies together“ (Searle 2005: 18; Searle 2006: 27–28), to at all begin to think the institution, according to Searle, it is necessary to understand that the institution does not „constrain people as such,“ but produces new power relations: institutions are *enabling* because they create (deontic) powers or human power, and „that institutional structures create desire-independent reasons for action“ (Searle 2005: 10–11; Searle 2009: 48), that „the creation of an institutional fact is thus the collective assignment of a status function“ (Searle 2005: 22), that the institution of language is at the same time the foundation of all other institutions (Searle 2010: 110), etc. Two remarks: the position that the institutional structures create desire-independent reasons for action does not have to be correct, and essentially does not, for example, respond to the first famous attempts at thematization of the institution in Hume, and the relationship between instinct and institution. Can sexuality not be satisfied within marriage, or greed within the institution of private property?

25

These words too, inheritance and contract, stand for ideas infinitely complicated; and to define them exactly, a hundred volumes of laws, and a thousand volumes of commentators, have not been found sufficient. Does nature, whose instincts in men are all simple, embrace such complicated and artificial objects, and create a rational creature, without trusting anything to the operation of his reason?

But even though all this were admitted, it would not be satisfactory. Positive laws can certainly transfer property. It is by another original instinct, that we recognize the authority of kings and senates, and mark all the boundaries of their jurisdiction? Judges too, even though their sentence be erroneous and illegal, must be allowed, for the sake of peace and order, to have decisive authority, and ultimately to determine

property. Have we original innate ideas of praetors and chancellors and juries? Who sees not, that all these institutions arise merely from the necessities of human society?

All birds of the same species in every age and country, built their nests alike: In this we see the force of instinct. Men, in different times and places, frame their houses differently: Here we perceive the influence of reason and custom. A like inference may be drawn from comparing the instinct of generation and the institution of property (Hume, internet).

26

The second remark could eventually also follow from the first one, and could be substantiated by some of Hume's thoughts. It concerns the relationship of institutions and Brute Force, which Searle develops and continuously edits in later years as part of his thinking about power. It seems now that the origin of this problem can be found in Searle's discovery that there exists the so-called extra-linguistic institution, and which, during his last years and endless explanations and corrections, he managed to make yet more complicated. That is to say, in thinking about performatives as declarations, Searle differentiates *extra-linguistic* declarations „such as adjourning the meeting, pronouncing somebody man and wife, declaring war, and so on – and *linguistic* declarations – such as promising, ordering and stating by way of declaration“ (Searle 2002: 170). These non-linguistic cases Searle names as prototypical of declarations and their main characteristic is that they are not derived from semantics. In a well-known example, which Searle quotes several times in different places and in different ways, a man can divorce his wife by uttering three times the sentence „I divorce you.“ The divorce will in certain Muslim countries actually take place, says Searle, because speech acts in these cases are derived from legal or theological powers (Searle 2002: 171). Power or powers is a word, which is used here perhaps for the first time in this way, whereas recently, as we know, many of Searle's texts are organized around that word or words force, violence or constraint. It might be important that what Searle names as power or *extra-linguistic* declaration, could also be named a document. War has been declared because the decision was reached and the declaration dispatched to the other side, the meeting was suspended because someone holds a warrant, a piece of paper, and exercises an authority, while the procedure of repetition of the sentence „I divorce you,“ is in fact a quote found in codices and religious rules of some Muslim minorities and tribes. For war to be declared and of course begin, it necessarily needs to be written down somewhere. So, what Searle in this place names „power(s)“, in fact comes from the document and the consent that precedes the *linguistic* declaration, and in a sense even institutions in general. What will be a new problem, which here

ought to remain aside, is that even so-called speech acts, which are derived from semantics (promising, ordering, stating, etc.), could also follow from various collections of rules and laws, and have a documentary origin.

Searle's reconstruction of the term power, which is in the beginning set in a sort of *extra-linguistic* or pre-linguistic sphere – meaning that there is something which has a non-linguistic or non-lingual power to institutionalize – contains two simultaneous processes. Searle first introduces several new concepts (background, authority, political power, political ontology), which ought to soften and set aside the considerations of the origin of social facts and institutions. Force or violence found in the foundations of authority and institutions, which Hume talks about („Time and custom give authority to all forms of government, and all successions of princes; and that power, which at first was founded only on injustice and violence, becomes in time legal and obligatory“, Hume 2010: 310), are displaced elsewhere – in order to protect institutional power. As if Brute Force (or different coercive mechanisms and coercive powers which characterize the institution itself) protected the institution from itself. It seems to be Searle's understanding – this being the second simultaneous operation – that the process of institutionalization of social facts or the process of turning social facts into institutional ones, can be secured if and only if the institution protects itself from some of its own disloyal parts („many people lie, steal, and cheat“). The function of the police and the military, who „presuppose the deontology rather than being inconsistent with it“ (Searle 2010: 141–142), meaning the function of the threat of force or a monopoly on organized violence, is *de facto* to break the resistance of counter-institutional actions, or actions which in themselves have desire-dependent reasons. On this second level, or from this second perspective, what would constitute the source of police or military power?

27

I am not sure that all the uses and wanderings of the term „power“ in the construction of Searle's argument can be explained with precision. However, I am convinced that the introduction of „the document“ or Ferraris' *documentalità* could strengthen this argument, and perhaps better define Searle's real intention. In that vein, although Searle analyzes certain texts by Michel Foucault in his latest book (unfortunately not the ones which explicitly regard the institution) (Searle 2010: 152–155), Searle's position is entirely opposed to Foucault's. Searle is foremost interested in the power of the institution or the power which founds the institution, and which the institution then distributes preventing and abolishing any counter-institutional elements. In contrast, Foucault, in

order to analyze institutions, insists on starting from power relations that precede the field of the institutional, and on resisting the institution („*Soyons très anti-institutionnaliste*“):

In question is not the importance of institutions in power relations. But rather to suggest that institutions should be analyzed starting from power relations, and not the other way around; and that these relations are to be found prior to these institutions, even when they take hold and crystallize within them (Foucault 2001: 1058).

28

As opposed to Searle, with Foucault there is no „ultimate institutional structure,“ no special or last instance which protects and regulates the process of institutionalization. For Foucault, the analysis of power as resistance to the institution or institutions is really the only process by which the institution is institutionalized. No institution simply exists, but rather there is only the process of institutionalization and endless codification. It seems like a good idea to me to define the state, which has a monopoly on violence, and is according to Searle the „ultimate institutional structure,“ and the absolute paradigm of power, as a collection of documents. The document, let us say with Ferraris that this is the document in the „strong“ sense of the word (the constitution, for example, being the first and last in a series of such documents), is found in a place of power and is power. In that case, it seems to me that we succeed in demystifying the secret reason for authority and the origin of power which cause certain difficulties in Searle’s argument, even if that leaves us with a new and complicated task of reconstructing the system and order of documents. The threat of violence and violence are possible because there is a document, which limits that violence, and at the same time, a document can be reconstructed, changed and weakened with another document. The right of a state to secession, the integration, for example, of the Bulgarian state into the European Union, or perhaps an integration of the USA into a world state, is a documentary game. In the text „What is an institution?“ Searle mentions the document as an addition to, but not as a condition or background of any deontology. This is precisely the problem.

But the deontic powers stop at the point where the larger society requires some official documentation, they lack full deontic powers. Collective recognition is not enough. There has to be official recognition by some agency, itself supported by collective recognition, and there have to be status indicators issued by the official agency (Searle 2005: 15).

The insufficiency that Searle speaks about, refers to the difficult transformation or transfer of a social fact into an institutional one. To reinforce or stabilize collective recognition (it seems to me institutionalization is

precisely this process), it is necessary to *de facto* 'draw' or 'extract' (or activate) the document from some, in this case, third place. This emitting of the document or its transfer from place to place, could be explained with a sort of specifying of the social, which in turn is the unconditional condition of any institutionalization.

Primljeno: 17. maja 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 20. juna 2014.

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Petar Bojanić

Stvarna institucija. Dokument i realizam.

Apstrakt

Bez obzira na to što upotrebljavam neke tekstove Serla, Ferarisa, Smita ili De Sotoa (kao i jedan ne tako davni prigovor i kritiku Serlove pozicije i njegov odgovor), moja namera uopšte nije da ponovim nekim drugim rečima nečiju poziciju niti da je dovedem u pitanje ili popravim. Namera mi je za sada da potvrdim postojanje jednog paradoksa koji se tiče institucije ili teorije institucije (ili institucionalizacije institucije), bez obzira što ga je Serl odbacio (mislim da u tome nije uopšte uverljiv), koristeći se Ferarisovom teorijom dokumenta. Da bih to uradio, čini mi se da neumitno moram da pokvarim i Serlovu i Ferarisovu koncepciju, pokušavajući, da i sam dam prilog jednoj novoj budućoj teoriji institucije.

Ključne reči: institucija, dokument, realizam, dokumentologija, pisanje

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Descartes et le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française¹

Abstract *I will analyse Descartes' role in the „theological turn“ of French phenomenology. Although in Husserl's phenomenology the Cartesian cogito was the central element, in the phenomenologists of the „theological turn“ (Janicaud) it was exchanged for the idea of the infinite. I examine why Marion and Lévinas are interested in the Cartesian idea of the infinite. In the phenomenology of Marion this idea is interpreted as a „conceptual icon“ and a „saturated phenomenon“, in the phenomenology of Lévinas this idea represents the structure that provides the possibility of the phenomenological description of transcendence. In order to see if Marion and Lévinas turn back to the onto-theo-logical tradition of the metaphysics, like Janicaud affirms, we have to see how Descartes describes the idea of infinite and how Marion and Lévinas interpret it.*

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Keywords: *Phenomenology, theology, Lévinas, Marion, Descartes, infinite, concept of God*

Descartes est un auteur apprécié par les phénoménologues. Dans les *Méditations cartésiennes*, Husserl souligne la parenté entre la phénoménologie et la pensée cartésienne. D'après lui, par la mise au centre de l'*ego* et par la mise en valeur de la perception, Descartes doit être considéré comme l'inventeur du subjectivisme transcendantal. En appelant la phénoménologie transcendantale « néo-cartésianisme », Husserl affirme que la phénoménologie doit suivre la même radicalité par laquelle Descartes retourne au *cogito* (Husserl 1992: 18). Dans la phénoménologie post-husserlienne, l'intérêt témoigné à la philosophie cartésienne n'a pas diminué, il est même devenu parfois plus intense que chez le fondateur de la phénoménologie. C'est le cas chez deux auteurs : Emmanuel Lévinas et Jean-Luc Marion. Il s'agit des phénoménologues qui, selon Dominique Janicaud, ont effectué, parmi d'autres, le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française dans les années 1970 et 80 (Janicaud 1991). Leur approche de la pensée cartésienne diffère pourtant d'une manière fondamentale de celle de Husserl. Alors que la phénoménologie classique s'est concentrée sur le *cogito* de Descartes, la phénoménologie contemporaine met au centre de ses analyses l'idée cartésienne de l'infini. Le *cogito* et l'idée de Dieu sont les deux fondements de la pensée cartésienne. Le tournant théologique de la phénoménologie va ainsi de pair avec

¹ Cette étude a été rédigée avec la subvention de OTKA (projet n° K81165).

un tournant dans l'interprétation de Descartes même : l'accent a été déplacé de l'auto-évidence du *cogito* à l'autre fondement : à l'idée cartésienne de l'infini. Dans cette étude, nous posons la question de savoir pourquoi la phénoménologie contemporaine se tourne vers l'idée cartésienne de l'infini. Janicaud accuse les phénoménologues du tournant théologique de s'être éloignés de la phénoménologie immanente et d'être retournés à la tradition métaphysique avec laquelle la pensée continentale, à partir de Nietzsche, avait voulu rompre. Contrairement à Janicaud, il nous semble que les recherches de la phénoménologie française dans les années 1970, 80 et 90 ne retournent pas à cette tradition. Il faut voir cependant que Lévinas et Marion apprécient ouvertement la manière cartésienne de penser Dieu : ils la considèrent comme un modèle qui rend possible de penser Dieu dans un contexte phénoménologique. N'est-ce pas un signe qui montre que Janicaud avait raison ? D'après notre thèse, il faut répondre à cette question négativement. Nous soutiendrons que les analyses phénoménologiques consacrées à l'idée cartésienne de l'infini dans les œuvres de Lévinas et de Marion évitent soigneusement de mettre cette idée dans un contexte ontologique et qu'elles déploient uniquement la dimension phénoménologique de cette idée.

L'idée cartésienne de l'infini chez Marion et Lévinas

Dans la phénoménologie de Jean-Luc Marion et d'Émmanuel Lévinas, l'idée cartésienne de l'infini est l'objet d'analyses profondes en vue d'une description phénoménologique de la transcendance.² Chez Descartes l'infini se caractérise par deux aspects fondamentaux : l'infini est un nom divin et l'idée de l'infini se trouve dans l'esprit humain. Afin de comprendre la portée de ces deux thèses, il faut voir que Descartes distingue entre l'infini et l'indéfini en réservant strictement l'attribut d'infini à Dieu. Tout ce qui n'a pas de fin mais qui n'est pas Dieu est qualifié d'indéfini.³ Chez Descartes, à part son infinité, Dieu a de nombreux attributs : « tout-puissant », « tout-connaissant », « éternel », « immuable », « parfait », « substance ». Les commentateurs se demandent s'il y a une hiérarchie parmi les attributs divins, et si oui, quel attribut est le plus important. Certains disent qu'il n'y a pas de hiérarchie parmi eux, d'autres affirment

2 Il est à noter que chez les autres penseurs du « tournant théologique », notamment chez Michel Henry et Jean-Louis Chrétien, Descartes est un auteur moins important. Paul Ricoeur, dans *Soi-même comme un autre*, consacre une analyse au *cogito* cartésien en y voyant un modèle de l'identité personnelle métaphysiquement et ontologiquement fixé qui doit être dépassé (Ricoeur 1990: 15-22).

3 Cf. Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, I, 27, AT VIII, 15.

le contraire en privilégiant certains attributs (Beysade 1992). Lévinas et Marion sont d'accord pour considérer l'infini comme le premier et le plus important attribut divin chez Descartes. Leur choix s'explique à partir de la phénoménologie : la primauté de l'infini fonde la phénoménologie de l'infini et rend possible la mise entre parenthèses des attributs ontologiques et théologiques de Dieu (perfection, toute-puissance, tout-connaissance, substance)⁴. L'infini distingué de l'indéfini se trouve donc chez Descartes dans l'esprit humain et sa présence dans l'esprit comme idée rend possible sa perception immédiate. Voici pourquoi Descartes est un auteur privilégié pour les phénoménologues du « tournant théologique » : par l'affirmation de la présence de l'idée de l'infini dans l'esprit humain, la voie est ouverte pour une phénoménologie de l'infini.

Dans ses ouvrages phénoménologiques, Marion interprète l'idée cartésienne de l'infini d'une part comme une icône conceptuelle, d'autre part comme un phénomène saturé. Dans *Dieu sans l'être*, il distingue entre idole et icône. Et l'idole et l'icône appartiennent au champ de la visibilité, mais alors qu'une idole se donne à voir comme « le maximum de visibilité que peut supporter tel ou tel regard » (Marion 2012: 179), l'icône se caractérise par un paradoxe : il est visible tout en restant invisible. Ce paradoxe s'explique par le fait que le sens du regard s'inverse lorsque nous regardons une icône : c'est l'icône qui nous regarde. L'icône devient donc un visage au sens lévinassien du terme : « l'icône ouvre l'expérience d'une contre-intentionnalité, d'un contre-regard, d'un visage comme dit Lévinas » (Marion 2012: 181). Comme dans l'icône, c'est le regard de Dieu qui nous regarde, l'icône s'ouvre à l'infini : « l'icône ne rend visible qu'en suscitant un regard infini » (Marion 1991a: 30). Marion interprète la différence esthétique entre idole et icône également sur un plan conceptuel. Sur ce plan, l'idole et l'icône sont les concepts philosophiques de Dieu. Le concept de Dieu dans la tradition onto-théo-logique est une idole : « Quand une pensée philosophique énonce, de ce qu'elle nomme alors 'Dieu', un concept, ce concept fonctionne exactement comme une idole » (Marion 1991a: 26). En revanche, le concept de Dieu peut également fonctionner comme une icône : « l'icône peut procéder aussi conceptuellement, pourvu du moins que le concept renonce à comprendre l'incompréhensible, pour tenter de le concevoir, donc aussi de le recevoir à sa propre démesure [...] Ne peut servir de support – intelligible – à

4 Lévinas parle uniquement de l'infinité à propos de Dieu cartésien, Marion souligne la primauté de l'infini parmi les attributs de Dieu dans un contexte plutôt historique que phénoménologique (Marion 1986: 241-242), mais y insiste également dans ses écrits phénoménologiques.

l'icône qu'un concept qui admette de se laisser mesurer à la démesure de l'invisible qui entre en visibilité par la profondeur infinie » (Marion 1991a: 35). Marion retrouve un tel concept dans l'idée cartésienne de l'infini : « Quand Descartes établit que l'*idea Dei* se dirait *idea infiniti* [...] il nous indique un chemin, au moins voisin : l'icône impose au concept de recevoir le parcours de la profondeur infinie » (Marion 1991a: 36).

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Dans les œuvres postérieures à *Dieu sans l'être*, Marion réinterprète l'icône conceptuelle comme un « phénomène saturé ». Dans une étude qui porte ce même titre : « Phénomène saturé », il soutient la possibilité de la donation d'un phénomène qui dépasse tout horizon et qui ne peut pas être réduit à un *ego* qui le perçoit (Chrétien, Marion, Henry, Ricoeur 1992: 96-127). Ce phénomène est qualifié de « saturé ». Sa doctrine relative au phénomène saturé se précise dans ses œuvres ultérieures, notamment dans *Étant donné* (Marion 2005) et dans *De surcroît* (Marion 2001). Bien que sa conception change légèrement, l'un des exemples les plus éminents reste l'idée cartésienne de l'infini (Chrétien, Marion, Henry, Ricoeur 1992: 124 ; Marion 2005: 305). Comme nous allons voir, en restant dans un contexte purement cartésien, on peut soutenir que l'idée de l'infini dépasse tout horizon et qu'il ne peut pas être réduit à l'*ego fini*.

L'importance de Descartes dans la phénoménologie de Lévinas n'a plus à être démontrée. Le concept lévinassien de l'infini, qui apparaît dans le titre de *Totalité et infini*, est issu de la philosophie cartésienne, même s'il a subi des transformations considérables. Dans cette œuvre, on trouve plusieurs interprétations consacrées à l'idée cartésienne de l'infini. Un passage dans la préface *De Dieu qui vient à l'idée* montre également l'importance de Descartes dans la pensée de Lévinas. Il pose la question de savoir comment penser Dieu sans blesser sa transcendance et sans l'intégrer dans la tradition onto-théo-logique de la métaphysique occidentale : « Quelle est cette pensée autre qui – ni assimilation, ni intégration – ne ramènerait pas l'absolu dans sa nouveauté au « déjà connu » et ne compromettrait pas la nouveauté du neuf en le déflorant dans la corrélation entre pensée et être, que la pensée instaure ? [...] Exigences impossibles ! À moins qu'à ces exigences ne fasse écho ce que Descartes appelait idée-de-l'infini-en-nous, pensée pensant au delà de ce qu'elle est à même de contenir dans sa finitude de *cogito* » (Lévinas 1992: 9). Dans ce passage, Lévinas trouve chez Descartes une structure qui est capable de répondre à l'exigence de la pensée post-métaphysique, notamment de penser Dieu en dehors de l'onto-théologie. La pensée cartésienne répond à cette exigence dans la mesure où elle pense par l'idée de l'infini « plus

qu'elle ne pense », de telle sorte que la pensée humaine est incapable de réduire à soi-même le surplus qui se présente dans cette idée.

Descartes joue donc un rôle important chez ces deux phénoménologues, non seulement parce qu'il a découvert la subjectivité transcendante par la mise en valeur de l'*ego cogito*, mais aussi parce qu'il a donné un accès phénoménologique à l'Autre en soulignant la présence de l'idée de l'infini dans l'esprit humain. Une question néanmoins se pose : le « tournant théologique » de la phénoménologie est-il motivé par la pensée cartésienne, ou bien est-ce tournant qui a rendu possible la réinterprétation de Descartes ? Une remarque de Lévinas favorise la deuxième réponse : « Phénoménologie de l'idée de l'Infini. Elle n'intéressait pas Descartes à qui suffisaient la clarté et la distinction mathématiques des idées, mais dont l'enseignement sur l'antériorité de l'idée de l'Infini par rapport à l'idée du fini, est une indication précieuse pour toute phénoménologie de la conscience » (Lévinas 1992: 11). La pensée cartésienne ne peut pas être la source du « tournant théologique » de la phénoménologie car Descartes reste enraciné dans la tradition métaphysique. Selon Lévinas, quoique Descartes ait élaboré la possibilité de la phénoménologie de l'infini, il n'en a pas lui-même profité. Descartes ne s'est pas intéressé à la phénoménologie de l'infini car, chez lui, la perception de l'infini devient le fondement de la preuve de l'existence de Dieu. Lévinas répète la critique de Husserl envers Descartes en y ajoutant la sienne : « Husserl reproche à Descartes d'avoir avec précipitation reconnu, dans le *cogito*, l'âme, c'est-à-dire une partie du monde, alors que le *cogito* conditionne le monde. De même pourrions-nous contester cette réduction à l'ontologie du problème de Dieu, comme si l'ontologie et le savoir étaient l'ultime région du sens » (Lévinas 1992: 11). Selon Lévinas, par l'élaboration de la preuve de l'existence de Dieu sur la base de la perception de l'infini, Descartes dépasse ce qui est immédiatement donné à la perception et, par conséquent, devient victime d'une « illusion transcendante ». Par cette illusion, Descartes revient à l'identification onto-théo-logique entre l'être et Dieu, alors que l'idée de Dieu représente une structure « extraordinaire », une structure qui ne coïncide pas forcément avec « l'auto-identification de l'identité » où tout sens et tout savoir se produisent en corrélation avec l'être.

Cette critique est d'autant plus importante qu'elle montre quels sont les aspects de l'idée de l'infini que Lévinas emprunte à Descartes et quels sont ceux qu'il rejette. Il apprécie la description cartésienne de l'idée de l'infini dans la mesure où elle rend possible la phénoménologie de l'infini, mais

il devient critique dès que l'idée de l'infini s'intègre dans la tradition onto-théologique de la métaphysique. Le rapport de Lévinas à Descartes se caractérise donc d'une ambiguïté qui se trouve également chez Marion, au moins dans son interprétation phénoménologique de l'infini cartésien. La phénoménologie ne s'intéresse pas aux dimensions ontologiques de l'idée de l'infini. Toutefois, en dépit de ces dimensions ontologiques, la phénoménologie contemporaine apprécie la manière dont Descartes décrit la perception de l'infini dans l'esprit humain. Examinons donc la nature de cette perception chez Descartes.

La phénoménologie de l'infini chez Descartes

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Quelles sont les caractéristiques de l'idée de l'infini chez Descartes qui la rendent susceptible d'une analyse phénoménologique ? Tout d'abord, être présente dans l'esprit humain. Le simple fait que l'esprit forme un concept de l'infini ne serait pas suffisant si Descartes ne soulignait pas qu'il s'agit d'une idée *positive* et non pas négative. Les idées négatives sont formées par la négation d'autres idées. L'idée de l'infini, en revanche, ne contient pas de négation, mais inclut un contenu positif qui dépasse tout contenu fini. Le rapport entre le fini et l'infini tourne à l'envers : l'infini n'est pas formé par la négation du fini ou de la finitude, mais, au contraire, c'est le fini qui limite et nie l'infini : « Il n'est pas vrai que nous concevions l'infini par la négation du fini, vu qu'au contraire toute limitation contient en soi la négation de l'infini »⁵. Si l'idée de l'infini était négative, elle ne donnerait pas accès à une analyse phénoménologique. Locke, contrairement à Descartes, définit l'idée de l'infini comme négative⁶. Cette idée se produit dans l'esprit par l'augmentation des quantités finies (espace, temps, mouvement) de telle manière que cette procédure ne peut jamais se heurter à une limite. Il en résulte une idée négative et dynamique qui s'accroît sans cesse, mais qui ne peut pas être contemplée en tant qu'infini, car l'infinité n'y est jamais donnée actuellement, mais seulement potentiellement. L'infini négatif, même s'il se présente comme une idée dans l'esprit, n'est jamais capable de dépasser la finitude. L'idée cartésienne de l'infini, contrairement à celle de Locke, dépasse la finitude d'une manière radicale, car son infinitude ne se produit pas par une procédure sans fin, mais elle est donnée positivement. L'idée cartésienne de l'infini se donne ainsi positivement à la perception et cela rend possible son analyse phénoménologique.

5 Réponse aux cinquièmes objections, AT VII, 365. Voir aussi le texte latin des *Principia philosophiae* I, 27 : "in eo solo omni ex parte, non modo nullos limites agnoscimus, sed etiam positive nullos esse intelligimus" (AT VIII, 15).

6 Cf. John Locke, *Essai sur l'entendement humain*, II, 17, Paris, Vrin, 2001.

Le fait que l'idée de l'infini est donnée positivement à l'esprit a des conséquences importantes. Premièrement : l'esprit est incapable de produire cette idée. Si l'idée de l'infini était négative, elle pourrait être naturellement formée par l'augmentation des idées des quantités finies. Mais si l'idée est positive, on est en face d'une donnée mentale qui ne peut pas être la production de l'esprit fini, parce que son contenu positif transcende radicalement tout contenu fini. Par conséquent l'esprit trouve l'idée de l'infini telle qu'elle est, comme une donnée originaire. Descartes l'appelle « *innata* ». Cette caractéristique de l'infini s'avère très importante pour Lévinas. C'est l'infini qui crée l'ouverture de l'esprit fini à l'Autre, une telle ouverture que l'esprit ne pourrait pas produire par sa propre force. Quoique chez Lévinas l'infini ne soit pas inné, mais provient du Visage d'autrui, la structure reste la même : l'esprit fini est originellement ouvert à l'absolument Autre qui ne peut pas être réduit au soi. L'Autre se donne à l'esprit par l'idée de l'infini, mais se prive en même temps de lui. Cette structure inclut un paradoxe auquel Descartes fait référence en disant que l'idée de l'infini est l'idée la plus claire et la plus distincte („*maxime clara et distincta*“)⁷ tout en restant incompréhensible („*est enim de ratione infiniti, ut a me, qui sum finitus, non comprehendatur*“)⁸. Lévinas exprime ce paradoxe en parlant d'une pensée pensant « au-delà de ce qu'elle pense » (Lévinas 1992: 10).

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Dans un contexte phénoménologique, l'idée positive de l'infini dans l'esprit fonde une situation particulière : l'infini se donne à la perception, mais sa manière de se donner est différente par rapport aux autres donations où le phénomène donné est fini. La présence de l'idée de l'infini dans l'esprit rend possible sa description phénoménologique dans la mesure où il y a une perception claire et distincte qui s'oriente vers elle. En même temps cette perception ne peut jamais être achevée car l'« objet » la déborde en s'opposant à une compréhension définitive. Par conséquent l'idée de l'infini pousse sa description phénoménologique jusqu'à l'extrême. L'idée lévinasienne de l'infini, aussi bien que le phénomène saturé de Marion, se trouvent ainsi à la limite de la phénoménologie.

Voyons maintenant cette caractéristique de l'idée cartésienne de l'infini que Lévinas considère la plus importante d'un point de vue phénoménologique. Il s'agit de la priorité de l'infini dans l'ordre de la perception. La perception de l'infini précède donc la perception des objets finis. Dans *Totalité et infini*, Lévinas cite longuement le passage dans lequel Descartes

7 *Troisième méditation*, AT VII, 46

8 *Ibid.*

souligne cette priorité : « je vois manifestement qu'il se rencontre plus de réalité dans la substance infinie, et partant que j'ai en quelque façon premièrement en moi la notion de l'infini, que du fini, c'est-à-dire de Dieu, que de moi-même. »⁹ Selon Descartes, l'évidence de cette priorité provient de la connaissance évidente de l'imperfection de l'*ego*, car l'*ego* ne connaîtrait jamais sa propre imperfection et finitude sans connaître préalablement l'idée de la perfection absolue, c'est-à-dire celle de l'infini. Or le doute, qui est le point de départ de toute réflexion philosophique chez Descartes, révèle ma finitude et mon imperfection avec évidence. La perception de l'infini ne précède pas temporellement la perception des objets finis. Sa priorité consiste à créer la possibilité de la perception de tout objet fini. Marion appelle cela la condition transcendante de la possibilité du fini : « l'infini ne précède pas le fini seulement à titre d'étant transcendant, mais surtout à titre de condition transcendante de la possibilité du fini » (Marion 1986: 241). Dans cette optique, l'infini est l'horizon de la perception qui rend possible l'apparition des objets finis. Par conséquent l'affirmation de Descartes soutenant que le fini est la négation de l'infini peut être interprétée non seulement dans un contexte ontologique, mais aussi dans un contexte phénoménologique. Par son apparition le fini cache l'infini, alors que sans l'infini rien ne pourrait se donner à la perception.

Descartes appelle « connaissance *implicite* de l'infini » celle qui s'effectue à travers la connaissance des objets finis. Nous venons de voir les conséquences phénoménologiques de cette connaissance. Mais les phénoménologues du tournant théologique s'intéressent encore davantage à la connaissance de l'infini que Descartes appelle *explicite*¹⁰. Dans ce deuxième cas, on perçoit l'infini non pas « derrière » des objets finis comme leur horizon, mais d'une manière immédiate. Descartes appelle cela l'« idée » de l'infini et en donne une description ambiguë. Si on veut l'interpréter à partir de la priorité transcendante, il faut dire que l'infini ne peut pas être l'objet explicite d'une perception, c'est-à-dire qu'il ne peut pas être un objet intentionnel et, par conséquent, il met en cause l'intentionnalité même, sauf si une intentionnalité infinie et sans objet n'est pas impossible. L'ambiguïté de la description est d'autant plus visible que Descartes appelle le phénomène de l'infini « idée » (voire « image »), alors que la définition cartésienne de l'idée suppose la finitude. Certains

9 *Troisième méditation*, AT IX, 45-46, et Lévinas 1990: 232.

10 En ce qui concerne la définition et la distinction de la connaissance implicite et explicite voir Descartes, *Entretien avec Burman*, éd. J.-M. Beyssade, Paris, PUF, 1981, p. 44-45.

de ses contemporains lui ont objecté que la perception positive de l'infini est impossible parce qu'elle est contradictoire (Hobbes, Gassendi). En revanche, Lévinas et Marion soutiennent que la perception de l'infini en tant que structure de l'extériorité ou en tant que phénomène saturé n'inclut pas de contradiction et qu'elle n'est pas impossible.

Doit-on donner raison à Lévinas lorsqu'il déclare que Descartes ne s'est pas intéressé à la phénoménologie de l'infini ? Sans doute, dans la *Troisième méditation*, la description de l'idée de l'infini s'intègre dans la preuve *a posteriori* de l'existence de Dieu. Cependant chez Lévinas deux faits importants restent inaperçus. Le premier est que l'ouvrage de Descartes présente des méditations et ainsi qu'il a plusieurs niveaux. L'argumentation discursive ne constitue que la couche superficielle de l'œuvre et repose sur une autre, plus profonde, qui suppose l'élaboration d'une perception intérieure claire et distincte. Alors que les considérations phénoménologiques sont moins importantes dans la première couche, elles deviennent plus fortes dans la seconde. L'autre fait est que Descartes, depuis la première explication du rapport entre le fini et l'infini (à partir de 1630) jusqu'à sa mort, souligne sans cesse l'importance de la distinction entre deux manières de connaître : la compréhension et l'intellection. Lorsque la connaissance claire et distincte est relative aux idées finies, la compréhension et l'intellection vont nécessairement de pair. Mais quand la perception s'oriente vers l'infini, ces deux modes de connaissances se séparent brusquement, étant donné que l'infini reste incompréhensible à l'esprit fini, alors que l'intellection permet de le percevoir avec la plus grande évidence. Par la distinction de l'intellection et la compréhension, Descartes met accent sur la même structure phénoménologique qui apparaît chez Lévinas avec l'idée de l'infini et chez Marion avec le phénomène saturé. Ces structures servent à décrire comment l'Autre peut se donner phénoménologiquement : l'Autre se donne et se prive à la fois, il se dévoile tout en restant incompréhensible et irréductible au Même, à la compréhension finie de l'*ego*. Il semble qu'en soulignant l'importance de la distinction entre la compréhension et l'intellection à propos de l'infini, Descartes s'est approché encore davantage de la phénoménologie de l'infini que Lévinas ne le pense.

Nous venons de soutenir que Lévinas et Marion ne retournent pas à la tradition métaphysique par la description phénoménologique de la transcendance. Cela devient clair par leur interprétation de l'infini cartésien. Ils apprécient chez Descartes la description phénoménologique de l'Autre

sans l'intégrer dans un cadre onto-théologique. Lévinas devient critique à l'égard de Descartes lorsqu'il semble suivre ce chemin. Sans doute, la description phénoménologique de l'infini pousse la phénoménologie à l'extrême, mais nous ne sommes pas d'accord avec Janicaud pour dire qu'il s'agit ici d'une destruction de la phénoménologie. Il nous semble que dans le cas de Lévinas et de Marion c'est justement le caractère phénoménologique de ces descriptions qui nous protège du glissement dans le domaine de la théologie et de la métaphysique. La description phénoménologique de l'Autre est un argument en faveur de l'ouverture de la nature humaine finie à l'infini. Mais cette ouverture ne signifie nullement que l'homme est capable d'aller (ou de glisser) à l'infini, mais seulement qu'il est capable de l'expérience de l'infini qui est en même temps l'expérience de sa finitude indépassable. De même que la perception de l'idée cartésienne de l'infini, l'ouverture de l'infini dans le visage d'Autrui ou bien l'expérience de la donation du phénomène saturé sont nécessairement les expériences d'une ultime limite que la pensée humaine n'est pas en mesure de dépasser.

Primljeno: 07. juna 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 20. jula 2014.

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Tamaš Pavlovič

Dekart i teološki preokret fenomenologije

Apstrakt

Analiziraću Dekartovu ulogu u „teološkom preokretu“ u francuskoj fenomenologiji. Iako je kartezijanski *cogito* bio centralni momenat u Huserlovoj fenomenologiji, on je u „teološkom preokretu“ (Žaniko) bio zamenjen za ideju beskonačnog. Ispitaću zašto se Marion i Levinas interesuju za kartezijansku ideju beskonačnog. U Marionovoj fenomenologiji ova ideja je interpretirana kao „konceptualna ikona“ i „saturirani fenomen“, a u Levinasovoj fenomenologiji ova ideja predstavlja strukturu iz koje proizilazi mogućnost fenomenološkog opisa transcendencije. Treba da ispitamo način na koji Dekart opisuje ideju beskonačnog odnosno Marionovu i Levinasovu interpretaciju ne bi li proverili da li se Marion i Levinas vraćaju onto-teološkoj tradiciji metafizike, kao što Žaniko tvrdi.

Ključne reči: Fenomenologija, teologija, Levinas, Marion, Dekart, beskonačno, ideja Boga

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Intentionality and Objectification

Husserl and Simmel on the Cognitive and Social Conditions of Experience

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Abstract *Husserl's transcendental turn can be best regarded as a turn in his phenomenological models of intentionality. While in the *Logical Investigations*, he maintains a conception according to which intentionality is a structure of cognitive directedness in which objectification plays a formative role, in his later works the intentional relation is considered as a structure of consciousness founded on a sphere of purely subjective interiority. This paper argues that if Husserl had extended the scope of his early phenomenological research to the problems of object formation in the domain of historical and cultural sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*), the radical subjectively oriented transformation of his theory of intentionality would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. We also argue that in Simmel's theory of historical cognition and culture one can detect the elements of a theory of intentionality that can account for what is missing in Husserl, namely the attention devoted to the specific constitution of social and cultural objects. It is precisely the objective mediation through exteriorization and symbolization deployed in social and cultural values, and in historical time that constitutes the specificity of these objects which also conditions subjective experiencing, rather than remains dependent on it.*

Keywords: *Husserl, Simmel, Intentionality, Objectification, History, Cultural Objects*

Intentionality as a structure of objectification

Although it was Franz Brentano who rediscovered the idea of intentionality for 20th century philosophy, it is nevertheless correct to say that it was Edmund Husserl who first tailored this idea to be the subject of a systematic philosophical elaboration. In fact, among all of the members of the Brentano School, Husserl seems to be the only one who, in discussing intentionality, could have reiterated Leibniz's words: „It is the greatest remedy for the mind if a few thoughts can be found from which infinite others arise in order“ (Leibniz 1973: 1).

We know that Husserl first laid down the phenomenological principles of intentionality in his *Logical Investigations* in 1900–1901. But we also know that he designed this work, in terms of its problems and composition,

to be as much a philosophical overture as an attempt seeking an ultimate epistemological foundation. The presence of these somewhat disparate aspirations in the *Logical Investigations* results in that in the phenomenological elaboration of the problems of ideality, meaning, perception and knowledge, Husserl does not attempt to provide a unified system of philosophical responses. The relatively diffuse arrangement of the principal ideas in the *Logical Investigations* also reflects the fact that the presentation of the phenomenological problem of intentionality is far from being definitive. Indeed, in dealing with intentionality, Husserl does not seek to provide an unambiguous answer to the question of the ontological status of the intentional object, nor to the problem of the subjectivity of the intentional consciousness. One could even say that in the *Logical Investigations* the idea of intentionality maintains its philosophically optional status. This is because in this work Husserl suggests that before one can even attempt to provide philosophical definitions of „objectivity“ and „subjectivity“, one must acknowledge that the principal problem of the intentional relationship between the consciousness and its object arises in the determination of the essential interrelatedness of the two.

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Husserl resorts to this strategy when he takes up the task of elaborating the problem of intentionality at the beginning of the *Fifth Logical Investigation*. Here, he offers the three concepts of consciousness – „stream of consciousness“, „inner awareness“, and „intentional experiences“ (Husserl 2001: 81). The privilege accorded to the third concept serves to provide the necessary gnoseological neutrality for the phenomenological analysis of intentionality. Accordingly, Husserl considers intentionality as a cognitive relationship in which a lived experience „refers to“ or „aims at“ an object as its correlate. What is more, he claims that in this relationship neither the experience nor the object can be defined independently of one another; they are both elements of a cognitive unity in which what is lived in experience can only be defined in terms of the object of that experience. One can also note that this definition rules out the notion of „subjective interiority“ as a vital component in the explication of consciousness. In fact, defining consciousness as intentional experience means explaining it by means of objective elements that do not belong to the immanent sphere of that consciousness.

From this point, the analysis of intentionality in the *Logical Investigations* takes an investigative turn. Husserl starts by critically analyzing one of Brentano's claims that „each intentional experience is either a presentation or based upon underlying presentations“ (Husserl 2001: 129). This approach

entails the phenomenological elucidation of the notions of „presentation“ and „representation.“ In the context of the *Fifth Logical Investigation*, Husserl's increasingly detailed analyses of these notions serve to foreground his conviction that intentionality can only be understood as the cognitive relatedness of the consciousness to its object where the object is so to speak „representatively present“. In other words, the object, in being apprehended as intentional content, forces its own intentional properties upon the acts, depending on its objective representational qualities that can be formal or material, ideal or empirical, simple or complex, etc.

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Husserl capitalizes fully on these results when he raises the problem of „knowing“ and „knowledge“ in the *Sixth Logical Investigation*. According to him, knowing means the „fulfilment“ of a signitive, meaning oriented intentional act with a corresponding act of perception. At the same time, that fulfilment is defined by Husserl as an act of „identifying synthesis“ through which the meaning of an object becomes intentionally corroborated by the intuitive presentation of that same object. Accordingly, fulfilment can provide knowledge insofar as it allows for the „recognition“ and „classification“ of the object (Husserl 2001: 201–202) while representing it in its „objective identity“ (Husserl 2001: 207).

This demonstration of the essential components of the theory of intentionality in the context of the *Logical Investigations* can permit us to conclude that intentionality is principally conceived by Husserl not so much as an *a priori* or overall form of objective constitution effectuated by a constitutive conscience, but rather as a structure of cognitive directedness in the configuration of which the modes of subjective representations and the characters of objects play an equally formative role. On this basis, Husserl can evenly consider the intentionality of consciousness as the basic structure of knowledge in general, insofar as this latter is produced as an act of identification that is based on the epistemic unity of signitive and intuitive intentional acts representing the internal qualities of objects. Thus, even though consciousness is considered by Husserl as sphere of lived experience, in his early writings the structure of objectification remains the horizon within which the phenomenological problem of intentionality is essentially exposed and elaborated.

Intentionality as a structure of pure consciousness

In order to highlight the contrast between Husserl's early conception of intentionality and his later ideas, one does not necessarily need to turn to the *Ideas*, the *Cartesian Meditations* or some other *chef d'oeuvre* of his

transcendental phenomenology. To clarify this issue, it seems more salient to turn to Husserlian texts that point toward the transcendental turn but still draw upon the problems and terminology of the *Logical Investigations*. This is the case with Husserl's lecture course given in 1906-07 entitled *Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge*. The importance of this text lies in the fact that when Husserl re-establishes phenomenological research in light of the horizons opened up by the *Logical Investigations*, he locates the key problems of intentionality in the context of a new conception of consciousness.

Just as in the *Fifth Logical Investigation*, in the lecture course of 1906-07 Husserl begins his phenomenological analysis of intentionality by distinguishing between three concepts of consciousness. But, in sharp contrast to his earlier work, he presents these concepts with a clearly hierarchical model in mind. Husserl defines the first concept of consciousness as that of „mere experiences“ in which „the datum has not yet become objective“ (Husserl 2008: 243). This definition brings into play the immanent temporal structure of the flow of the data of consciousness – what Husserl calls „pre-phenomenal being.“ He also describes this sphere as an „absolute“ and „not objectified“ dimension of experience, one which can be made thematic only in reflection, but in itself pertains to a „being that is, but is not perceived“ (Husserl 2008: 243). The second concept of consciousness is based on the first and refers to the experiences that have the distinctive quality of „being-conscious-of-an-objectivity“ (Husserl 2008: 245). Consequently, this concept covers all of the aspects of the intentional consciousness in the proper sense. Finally, the third concept of consciousness is based on the second insofar as it labels consciousness as „position-taking toward an objectivity“ such as judgments, evaluations, etc.

Certainly, it is not difficult to notice the fundamental differences separating the Husserlian idea of consciousness exposed in the lecture course of 1906/07 from that of the *Logical Investigations*. The fact that Husserl rules out the entire apparatus of „representation“ from the list of the basic determinations of intentional consciousness – the notion of „representation“ is being related only to the third concept of consciousness (Husserl 2008: 246–247) – is perhaps the less radical consequence. Husserl makes the most radical step in arguing that the structure of intentionality is founded on a sphere of experiencing that in itself has no objectifying character. In describing this fundamental cognitive sphere as an „absolute“ and „pre-phenomenal being“, Husserl conceives of it in terms

of internal time consciousness. And because, in this conception, intentionality is reduced to being a distinctive characteristic of certain experiences that presuppose the internal consciousness as fundamental, he can now claim, „all objectification is realized in time-consciousness“ (Husserl 2008: 262).

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Indeed, this new conception of consciousness is defined by the configuration of time-consciousness, experiencing, and intentionality, and clearly outlines the basic phenomenological constitution, as well as some of the fundamental aspects of what Husserl refers later to as „transcendental subjectivity.“ This concept of consciousness can no longer be simply described as a unity of cognitive relations with an independent objective reference for correlate. Rather, Husserl is more and more convinced that the intentionality of consciousness should be founded on a sphere of purely subjective interiority that possesses the laws of its essential constitution in its own temporal effectuations. Accordingly, while consciousness remains the centre of all intentional relationships, objectification and the production of knowledge become dependent on a structure of experiencing that, in its basic form, has nothing to do with objectivity and its epistemic standards.

This explains why after its transcendental turn, around the 1910s, Husserlian phenomenology tends more and more to turn towards the inherently subjective elements in the structure of intentional constitution, i.e. on what is immanent, temporal, genetic and passive within consciousness. Subjectivity becomes a transcendently qualified instance for Husserl insofar as it is claimed to be generating all kinds of intentional relations as being exclusively grounded in the sphere of the immanent phenomenal performances of conscious life.¹ And even if it is misleading to affirm that in his transcendental approach Husserl dismisses the intentional analysis of the objective order, it is certainly true that objects are usually interpreted as correlates in a process of intentional constitution of which the immanent effectuation lacks any reference to modes of objectifications. One could also note that Husserl extensive analyses dedicated to the problem of the constitution of the „world“ or „life-world“ do not really change this scenery. The phenomenology of life-world is principally about the foundation of objectivity, and not so much about its proper functioning in human life. Also, it is within context in mind that Husserl offers his views on the phenomenological constitution of intersubjectivity which is supposed to condition any objective world-formation.

1 For a detailed analysis of this doctrinal configuration in Husserl, see Takács 2014.

Intentionality and objectification in history: an unexploited possibility

Before turning to Husserl's views on intersubjectivity and sociality, I would like to put forward the following argument: if Husserl could achieve such a radical transformation in his idea of intentionality – i.e. understanding it primarily as a basic structure of subjectivity and intersubjectivity instead of that of objectification – it is because in his early phenomenological approach one of his principal intentions was to elaborate a theory of knowledge and experience, paying special attention to the gnoseological problems. These problems were primarily related to elucidations of questions of meaning formation, perception and justification associated with logical, mathematical idealities. In other words, in his early period, Husserl was mainly preoccupied with the problem of the „role of the subjectivity“ in the natural sciences (Husserl 2008: 116). However, one could argue that if Husserl had extended the scope of his phenomenological research to the problems of knowledge and experience in the domain of historical and cultural sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*), the radical (inter)subjectivity oriented transformation of his theory of intentionality would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. In effect, Husserl very seldom seems to seriously account for the fact that the nature of the objects and the types of knowledge in the domain of historical and cultural sciences might be drastically different from those in the natural sciences – an argument made by Dilthey, Simmel, and certain neo-Kantian philosophers of the epoch.

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Georg Simmel's work *The Problems of Philosophy of History*, published in its final form in 1907, points to some of the essential features of the problematics that might have been decisive for Husserl had he raised in a phenomenologically sophisticated way the issues of *Geisteswissenschaften*. Although in many aspects Simmel's approach remains more faithful to the Kantian perspective than to the phenomenological approach, his analyses focus on the „internal conditions of the historical inquiry,“ providing a set of epistemological claims and perspectives that can be rightly measured by the standards of Husserlian phenomenology. In any case, the basic question of the Simmel's work points clearly in a phenomenological direction: „how can the theoretical construction called history be generated from the matter of the immediately lived experience?“ (Simmel 1907: vii).

Simmel's basic answer to this question can also be considered as phenomenological in its orientation. He claims that history is only possible as a unity of experience and knowledge (Oakes 1980: 6). But, when he adds

that there is no simple mediation between lived experience and historical constructs, it is not just because his notion of *a priori* undoubtedly stands closer to the Kantian than to the Husserlian sense of this concept. In fact, his approach can be rightly characterized as „phenomenological“ insofar as the focus is placed clearly on the conditions of historical knowledge as seen through the lens of the descriptive analysis of the structure of historical cognition.² Simmel conceives of this cognition as a form of understanding, the aim of which is to seize upon human thoughts, perceptions, and actions distant in time. According to him, historical cognition faces the task of „sensing something that is genuinely not sensed“ (Simmel 1907: 32) and is necessarily played out in an interpersonal relationship. However, in explaining the possibility of this mediating relationship between different consciousnesses across time, Simmel is not satisfied to simply point out the essentially similar cognitive structures that are supposedly assigned to these consciousnesses. Rather, he takes it a step further by emphasizing that „the essential identity of two subjects does not abolish the necessity of a having a mediation between the two in the various form of exteriorization, transposition and symbolization“ (Simmel 1907: 31). It is precisely this type of objective mediation through exteriorization and symbolization unfolding in historical time that constitutes the specificity of the domain of history as science, which is at the same time the product and the source of the cognitive processes proper to historical understanding.

Although Simmel does not rely explicitly on a concept of intentionality in his analyses, his theory of historical knowledge and experience can nevertheless help us to reassess some aspects of the Husserlian position. For in setting the phenomena of knowledge and experience on the horizon of historical development and its temporal and intersubjective conditions, Simmel's analyses tend to revitalize the problem of cognitive representation as being regulated by objective components inherent in the process of cognition itself. According to Simmel's basic claim, historical understanding is carried out in the form of a projective representation that aims at endowing human experiences and actions that are distant in time with objective significance and value. But he also claims that the experiences and actions situated in the past possess such objectivity insofar as they become objects of mental acts produced in historical cognition. In other words, representation is a sign for objectification, but this latter is precisely what makes history something more than a set of external conditions

2 See Owsley & Backhaus 2003.

influencing human life. Hence, just as in Husserl's early work, for Simmel, „representation“ determines a subject–object relationship in which the objective side modulates and regulates what is to be represented and known while remaining inherent in the subjective process of cognition. As has been noted, here, Simmel is not far from advocating for certain concept of intentionality (Oakes 1980: 28, 49, and 56).

Intentionality, intersubjectivity and the social dimension in Husserl

There could hardly be more serious misunderstanding than to consider transcendental phenomenology as a philosophy that neglects the question of the *alter ego* and its related topics. In fact, from intersubjective to interpersonal relations, from community formation to aspects of sociality and history, Husserl's phenomenology offers a wide range of considerations taking into account the fact that consciousness is by no means an abstract or isolated entity. Husserl's phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity has two main tendencies in order to provide a conceptual frame within which the problem of human coexistence, community formation and history can be situated as well as elaborated. Drawing upon some of the key analysis of the second volume of his *Ideas Pertaining to Pure Phenomenology*, one could be justified to speak of a „naturalist“ and a „spiritual“ orientation of the intersubjective analysis in Husserl.³ In fact, these two analytical tendencies are clearly present in his works from his texts of the 1910^s to the latest writings.

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For Husserl the constitution of the body and its experimental environment are crucial for the understanding the basic lines along which the problem of the constitution of the nature can be unfolded. The second volume of the *Ideas* talks in this sense the „material“ and the „animalistic“ dimension of nature (Husserl 1989: 30–32). The nature defined in this way as the fundament of the formation of any intersubjective relation. However, Husserl's main aim here is not simply to try to integrate the problems of nature into the frame of a transcendental anthropology. Although the human body remains the phenomenological focal point within the analysis of the constitution of nature and that of intersubjectivity, it cannot be considered as the ultimate layer of natural constitution, not even that of intentionality. According to some later texts, Husserl considers the ultimate layer of the constitution of nature the „instinctive structure“ of all

³ Needless to say, these phenomenological designations have nothing to do with the traditional conceptions of naturalism and spiritualism.

living being (Husserl 1981: 335). According to him, the instinct (*Trieb, Instinkt*) is a fundamental form of „not-objectivating intentionality“ (Husserl 1981: 336) insofar as it is designed to be not an object focused relation of sensory experience, but a pure bodily tendency within the living. Thus, from a phenomenological point of view the instinct integrates human beings into the animal nature. However for Husserl it also designates the first and most fundamental form of human community formation defined as „instinctive community“ (*Triebgemeinschaft*). It is this form of community that is supposed to provide the basic monadological and teleological structure of intersubjectivity in Husserl.⁴

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In most of Husserl's work unfolding the spiritual aspects of intersubjectivity means first and foremost to relate it to the elucidation of the problem of the intentional constitution of the world. This is also the context within which the problem of „lifeworld“ (*Lebenswelt*) is usually explicated. The main question here for Husserl is to understand how the achievements of the sciences and that of the cultural reality of humanity can be generated out of a common world-horizon constituted by human experiences. In this sense, one can speak at least three levels in Husserl where the phenomenological problem of intersubjectivity becomes one with that of the world-constitution: 1) the level of the subsistence of a common validity of horizon of intentional sensory and cognitive world-experiences belonging to different consciousnesses; 2) the level on which this horizon can serve as a fundament for basic collective experiences manifested in various form of empathy-relations; 3) the level which Husserl considers as a process of an universal rational development of human reason as it manifests itself through the history of science and culture which governed by the „idea of universal teleology of reason“ (see Husserl, In effect, these levels delineate the experimental, monadological and teleological grounds based on which the transcendental phenomenological elucidation of the constitution of the world as intersubjective performance is supposed to be carried out.

As early as from the 1910s, Husserl constantly elaborates and revisits the question of sociality and social constitution in his various unpublished research manuscripts. One of the particularities of these analyses is however the fact that Husserl tends to separate the question of sociality from the question of intentionality and treats it as a problem of constitution of higher order. This means that for Husserl the problem of society and

4 On the relationship between instinct and intersubjectivity in Husserl, see Nam-In-Lee 1993.

social constitution is somewhat deduced from his phenomenological approaches of intersubjectivity. For him the social sphere consists in its basic structure of acts of co-willing and co-acting based on common structures of experimental and communicative activity (Husserl 1973: 165–170). However, the governing principles of these common performances are also founded, on the one hand, on the sphere of natural-bodily constitution, and on the other hand, on the process of „spiritualisation“ driven by the teleological development of validities of human cultural cooperation. In brief, society for Husserl is a result of intersubjective constitutions where these constitutions in themselves are not socially constituted instances.⁵ In other words, although socially embedded, natural and spiritual intentionality and its founding subjective components tend to preserve its constitutive autarchy with regard to the very effects that might emanate from the social world.

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Objectification as a primary field of intentionality in Simmel

Without doubt, contrasting Simmel's and Husserl's theories of representation can do more than simply call attention to the relevance and merits of Husserl's early object centred concept of intentionality as developed in the *Logical Investigations*. As Simmel's example shows, this contrast can also provide insight into the functioning of intentionality in spheres other than those which Husserl tends classify to under the label of transcendental constitution, be it related to the consciousness or the world. In other words, investigating the role of cognitive subject–object relationship in the formation of historical reality, cultural values, social representations, and symbolic forms can not only reveal the specific nature of cognition and objectivity at stake here. It also points to a dimension within which the process of intentional objectification tends to leave radically behind the order of consciousness. In Simmel, the analysis of cognition usually makes an appeal for an analysis of its socio-objective conditions.

5 One could argue that this Husserlian vision of the double intersubjective foundation of social relations is inherited to a large extent in post-Husserlian phenomenology. In most cases, in later phenomenological thinkers society is considered as a phenomenological residuum which is to be explained, rather than explored, by going back to the original „natural“ dimension of community formation (sensibility, body, flesh, etc.) and/or to certain original „spiritual“ modes of coexistence (co-understanding, co-affection, sense of community, ethics, etc.). In other words, social relations are supposed to be explained by having recourse to intersubjective formations or original forms of collective experiences which in turn, in their own constitution, are not considered to be the part of the social fabric.

In sum, his example can demonstrate that once history and the order of cultural or symbolic configurations become the targets of a phenomenologically fashioned investigation, the intentional objects and their corresponding forms of cognitions cannot be fully accounted for from a perspective based on first-person or intersubjective experience.

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Far from reducing philosophical issues into sociological ones, this simply means that one could rely on Simmel's approach in claiming that there is a fundamental sphere of objects of which the intentional setting reabsorbs subjectivity, rather than provides an evidence of an original subjective constitution. No one can experience nation, state, property, money, law, social class, democracy, or even history, as such. Rather, it seems that these „cultural objectivities, or „spiritual objects“ of higher order, possess a capacity to involve and generate personal or collective experiences insofar as one acknowledges their validity and recognizes oneself as being their subject of reference. The referential character of these objects therefore can be said to be intentional, but in reverse; these objects can direct, orient and modulate human experience, creating instances of „consciousness of,“ whereas their genesis and functioning cannot be simply explained by reference to merely subjective or intersubjective experiences. Instead, they presuppose a social constitution mediated by objective components (values, norms, institutions, etc.) and displayed in history. In this sense, they indicate the structural and genetic functioning of an objectivating intentionality that lacks direct subjective foundation. However this intentionality remains connected to (inter)subjectivity in the sense that it is capable of involving or even producing subjective experiences of „seeing as,“ „apprehending as,“ and „understanding as.“

It must be noted that in his late text entitled „The Origin of Geometry,“ published in 1936 as an appendix to the *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Husserl takes up the task of accounting for the intersubjective and historical constitution of object of higher order. He affirms that his „considerations will necessarily lead to the deepest problems of sense, problems of science and of the history of science in general, and indeed in the end to problems of the universal history in general“ (Husserl 1970: 353). With this argument however, he raises only the question of the intersubjective formation and historicity of ideal objects (*ideale Gegenständlichkeit*), in particular that of geometry. But no matter how strongly he emphasizes the role of some social conditions such as language and human communication in the formation of these idealities, Husserl remains entirely faithful to his basic phenomenological

insight according to which the production of an ideal object can only take place in an original subjective experience of „self-evidence,“ or through its act of reawakening that is valid for all knowing subjects (Husserl 1970: 59–60). However, in the case of ideal objects that belong to the sphere of society, culture, or even the historical sciences, this mode of explication seems to fall short. Not only might one find it difficult to subscribe to the concept of historical *a priori* required by Husserl for all genuine historical explications, but it seems even more doubtful to have recourse to an original sphere of experience that plays the role of a primarily instituting function in the formation of historical-cultural forms and objectivities.

In his famous essay „On the Concept and the Tragedy of Culture,“ published in 1911 in the revue *Logos*, Simmel draws a different picture and conclusion on these developments. Although he does not deny the fundamental role that subjective life plays in the constitution of cultural forms (works of art, religions, sciences, technologies, laws, and other social institutions, etc.), he seeks to acknowledge the fully objective character of the functioning of these forms with regard to personal and interpersonal experiences. According to him, the creation and experience of cultural or historical forms presuppose the correlation of the productive activity of the subject and the objective spiritual product. However, in this correlation, the cultural level can acquire an objective independence that in turn determines, rather than depends on, the experiential ground of human subjectivity. As he points out, „subjective life [...] can become truly cultivated only through forms which have become completely alien and crystallized into a self-sufficient independence“ (Simmel 1968: 30). Or in other terms, „creative life constantly produces something which is not life itself, something on which it somehow peters out, something which raises its own opposing legal claim. It cannot express itself except in forms that are, and signify, something for themselves independently of life“ (Simmel 1997: 103).

With this context in mind, one can also notice that once confronted with the problems of the constitution of historical and cultural objects, the concept of intentionality should be fully reinscribed into the sphere of the social. In fact, one of the results of Simmel’s analysis of culture consists in highlighting the fact that in this sphere the levels of „we“ experience or intersubjectivity can hardly provide means by which the constitution of cultural objects could be rightly accounted for. Instead, it is precisely the social and historical disposition of these objects which provides the very field in connection with the phenomenon of „self-sufficient independence“

and its relation to subjective experience are supposed to be analyzed. This further means to take into account specific social practices (work, consummation, collective actions), specific social structures (language, social institutions, symbolic order, power), and specific social dynamisms (distribution of knowledge, information, collective memory, history) as being the concrete forms in which the independence of cultural forms manifests itself.⁶ This independence however is not ontological, but intentional in its character. In other words, everything points to the fact that, in this domain, the objectivating intentionality of spiritual and cultural objects contribute constitutively to the formation of subjects and their sphere of experience. One can wonder as to what extent the subjectivity can remain intact in the face of this reversed intentionality through which the social constitution of objects fashions the spheres of experience and conditions the structures of life.

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Primljeno: 15. juna 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 20. jula 2014.

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6 For an example of such an analysis, see Simmel 1978.

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Adam Takač

Intencionalnost i objektivifikacija – Husserl i Zimel
o kognitivnim i društvenim uslovima iskustva

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Apstrakt

Husserlov transcendentelni preokret se može smatrati preokretom u pogledu njegovih modela intencionalnosti. Dok je u Logičkim istraživanjima Husserl imao koncept prema kojem je intencionalnost struktura kognitivne usmerenosti u kojoj objektivifikacija igra formativnu ulogu, u njegovim kasnijim radovima se intencionalni odnos pojavljuje kao struktura svesti koja se bazira na čistoj subjektivnoj interiornosti. Ovaj rad argumentuje da ukoliko bi Husserl proširio obim svojih ranih fenomenoloških istraživanja na probleme formiranja objekta u domenu istorijskih i humanističkih nauka (Geisteswissenschaften), onda se radikalno subjektivistički usmerena transformacija njegove teorije intencionalnosti ne bi dogodila toliko lako, odnosno možda bi bila nemoguća. Takođe ćemo da argumentujemo da u Zimelovoj teoriji istorijske spoznaje i kulture možemo da pronađemo elemente teorije intencionalnosti koja nedostaje kod Husserla, naime, pažnju koja je posvećena specifičnoj konstituciji društvenih i kulturnih objekata. Upravo objektivno posredovanje kroz eksteriorizaciju i simbolizaciju, razvijeno u društvenim i kulturnim vrednostima odnosno u istorijskom vremenu, konstituiše specifičnost tih objekata koji mnogo manje zavise od subjektivnog iskustva, nego što čine uslov istog.

Ključne reči: Husserl, Zimel, intencionalnost, objektivifikacija, istorija, objekti kulture

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Two Conflicting Interpretations of Social Philosophy

Abstract *In this paper I present two philosophers, namely Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre, but from the perspective of social philosophy. I emphasize that social philosophy proves to be a rarity today, and this explains the necessity of articulation of the achievements of these philosophers. In particular, I analyze the relationship between the articulation of intersubjectivity and social philosophy and on the basis of these relations I present the differences and conflicts between the aforementioned philosophers. Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is explained from the perspective of unbroken intersubjectivity; the philosophy of Sartre is presented on the basis of the relation between transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity. The article follows the genealogical approach, that is, it highlights the dynamics of the thinking of these thinkers in order to show the displacements. Finally, I develop the thesis that the late Sartre, who remained within the frames of Marx's approach, actually reinterprets the early indications to be found in Merleau-Ponty concerning social philosophy. Consequently, late Sartre is still an important reference point in terms of the critical philosophy of society.*

Keywords: *Sociality, corporeal sociality, embeddedness, social philosophy, intersubjectivity, transcendental subjectivity, being-for-others*

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Introduction

The necessity to analyze society from the aspect of philosophy is related to modernity. This is why Ernst Cassirer is right when he talks about the philosophy of a society only in the context of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (See Cassirer 1945): it was the French thinker who laid the foundation for the philosophy of society, of course with the reception of other modern thinkers. It was he who discovered strong tension in empirical existence and human evolution. He set historical-philosophical duality with clear critical intentions: a man is originally good but history forced him to exist in a society which is a predetermined formation. While his contemporaries hesitate about separating society and community (Cassirer 2009), Rousseau is unambiguous; the final questions in his opinion can be answered only based on „social issues“. Only the analysis of society can unveil the secret of human existence, and dominant forms of egotism should be assigned to social existence (Lošonc 2009).

As for Rousseau, sociality (*das Soziale, the social*) becomes a special dimension which opens new perspectives and it should be remembered that

the question of society is a critical question in Rousseau's opinion. A neglect of critical aspect of his thinking would imply an unacceptable deformation of the philosophy of this French thinker. Karl Marx follows him, *mutatis mutandis*, in this, with his in-depth critical analysis of socialization (Lošonc 2012). It seems that his criticism regarding political economy, i.e. his project of criticism of political economy, could not be understood unless his attitude to the thematization of society is taken into consideration.

However, this tradition of social philosophy has often been criticized, and for the sake of our subject it should be particularly pointed out that those voices of criticism could be heard from the followers of phenomenology. We should mention here a monumental piece of work by Michel Henry who is an important representative of French phenomenology and who made some serious accusations against the philosophy of society. It is not a coincidence that Henry uses Marx to show fragility and inadequacy of philosophy which relies on society (Henry 1976: 188). From the viewpoint of his philosophy, which is based on self-affection, this French phenomenologist claims that Marx made a crucial breakthrough only when he rejected society as the main idea. Henry's subject of criticism is obvious, and it refers to certain moments that the young Marx described as: hypostasis of society, an assumption that society is a unique subject, emphasizing the society as a personality; on the contrary, the affective life of individuals, who are absolute assumptions of historical dynamics, is mobilized.

However, we will allow ourselves some freedom: the doubt about philosophy of society is cast not only by phenomenology but other philosophical orientations as well. Former vigorous criticism of the genesis of social issues made by Hannah Arendt is continued by Jacques Rancière: politics or communal sphere as a constituent are against sociality (Rancière 2009: 160 and Fischbach 2013: 7–20). Something is lost with the philosophy of society: philosophical orientation towards society decreases sensitivity to political action and introduces the fetishizing of economic relations. By emphasizing a society as a theoretical problem, the importance of economically mediated existence is accentuated and according instrumentalized relations are hypostatized. Society is an over-determined entity, and politics is a dissolution of society. Claude Lefort said something that should not be forgotten: it is politics which establishes a society. However, this is being forgotten with the establishment of social philosophy. Thus, it could be said that projects such as the philosophy of Cornelius Castoriadis (which develops autonomy, individuals and societies at the same time and sees the possibility of auto-constitution of society even in a heteronomous constellation (Castoriadis 1987: 160)), or

a more modern one of Frank Fischbach (with a manifesto for social philosophy – Fischbach 2009. On the achievements of the critical social philosophy, Haber 2012: 131–149) are just exceptions, rather than a rule.

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So, the relationship between phenomenology and philosophy of society is not simple at all, and there is no evidence of possibility of critical understanding of society. Finally, based on everything said the following question is not merely a rhetorical one: can phenomenology be critical with respect to the dynamics of society? Can phenomenology discuss irreducibility of society with respect to an individual? Phenomenology would certainly be against understanding the society which is based on predetermined relations, and against coexistence of different elements which belong to closed sets; it would be contrary to the genuine goals of this philosophical movement. Pondering over indetermination is something that exists deeply in phenomenology. Phenomenology does not see the society as the one characterized by complex fixed forms of identity. Philosophy with deep sensitivity towards the modalities of different forms of genesis, and philosophy which is present at places where reflection is coming to existence, just like the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, must consider society from the aspect of genesis as well. Society, *pace* Henry, is not a subject, but complex determinations that are more significant than the individuals should be considered. Society does not represent only a unity of varieties; it is the irreducible level of analysis, thus a surplus with respect to individuals who do not lose their productive capacities. Still, in spite of the fact that society does not represent a synthesis of predetermined relations, phenomenology must consider *new occurring determinations* which determine the dynamics of society. Critical opinion of society and its configuration cannot be created without it. It is obvious that both thinkers that we are mentioning here were in confrontation with the society in capitalism, that is, with social determinations in capitalism, and this confrontation was sometimes explicit (like in the case of Sartre during the fifties and sixties of the 20th century) and sometimes implicit, but it was always present.

The question of relationship between intersubjectivity and society is raised here and it will run through our entire argumentation. *Thus, our thesis is that the oscillations between intersubjectivity and complex relations constituting a society are actually the perspective that Jean-Paul Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's philosophies can be analyzed from.* To be more precise, their differences can be thematized with respect to the philosophy of society. Their relation has already been analyzed in detail because it is very interesting and can be thematized from different aspects (Stewart

1998): we are particularly interested in casting light on certain points of their relation, as for other points should be regarded as the background for our thinking.

Both thinkers, at some points of their lives, shared the opinion about Marxism and existentialism: the first one is related to critical, problematized, non-positive idea of society, and the second one is against alienating abstractions in the name of lost concrete experiences. If this was not taken into consideration it would be difficult to understand their intentions related to the philosophy of society. Both of them are faced with the problem of the Other and otherness: that question was framed by Edmund Husserl, the father of phenomenology, who questioned the presence of Other in phenomenology. Husserl gave an original answer to this question: the Other is never immediately accessible; it can be approached only indirectly. Or, as he said: there is accessibility only in inaccessibility (Husserl 1973: 627). This was the problem that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty must have been faced with.

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Merleau-Ponty and the Unbroken Intersubjectivity

We should start with Merleau-Ponty because an important work of this French thinker, *Phenomenology of Perception*, explicitly relates to the issue of sociality. Merleau-Ponty, a thinker of perception, body and world, speaks about „social world“ at a crucial point – it should be noted that Merleau-Ponty relates „the world“, i. e. his main category to society. Here it is: „We have discovered, with the natural and social worlds, the truly transcendental, which is not the totality of constituting operations whereby a transparent world, free from obscurity and impenetrable solidity, is spread out before an impartial spectator, but that ambiguous life in which the forms of transcendence have their Ursprung...“ (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 425). It clearly says that: Merleau-Ponty assigns „truly transcendental“ function to the society. Thus, society cannot exist as an *object*: society is ontologically-phenomenological, it is a „dimension“ of our being. Also, society is a „constant field of our existence“, and we can read about „existential modality of sociality“.

Existentialism is also present when Merleau-Ponty analyzes *solipsism* in detail. There is irrefutable „truth“ about solipsism, but caution prevails: solipsism is possible only in the context of society; solipsistic expression is possible only in discursive formations of society. Solipsism cannot be overcome, yet it is strongly related to the category of „social event“. Isn't it a contradiction? Solipsism yes, says French thinker, but philosophy of

solipsism is *not*, because each expression of subjectivity represents entrance to the „intersubjective world“. Sociality is always marked with „*al-ready*“ because its existence is always in connection with previousness: „Prior to the process of becoming aware, the social exists obscurely and as a summons. At the end of Notre Patrie Péguy finds once again a buried voice which had never ceased to speak, much as we realize on waking that objects have not, during the night, ceased to be, or that someone has been knocking for some time at our door“ (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 422). We cannot dissuade from society: it is impossible to encounter a situation where sociality is objectivized because society is the existential dimension. Every relationship with things is an already socially mediated relationship with *social* things between already socialized individuals. This refers even to history: Merleau-Ponty was convinced that a historian cannot „embrace“ history because he/she treats it as an object, just like Stendhal’s Fabrizio del Dongo who is trying to see a battle as a scenery. We could say that society is a structure of eventness, something beyond subject-object relationship; society represents a kind of liminal moment which, according to Merleau-Ponty, cannot be put into any perspective. Finally, we will not forget the fact that Merleau-Ponty distinguishes himself from the rest of phenomenologists because he was highly appreciative of social sciences and he put some effort into giving sense to different endeavors made in the field of social sciences (for example, Merleau-Ponty 1960: 184–203).

Now, we should introduce the notion of *culture* so that the question of sociality and intersubjectivity could be resolved (See Visser 1999). Also, it should be noted that existence of culture throws light on the relationship between Me and You. Merleau-Ponty gives lots of examples for dyadic relationships. Still, the negative side should be mentioned as well, because it is quite clear that the constitution of the other does not solve the problem of society. Society cannot be encompassed by intersubjectivity between Me and You; it is not a sum of dyadic relations. Merleau-Ponty uses here the language of consciousness, the language of this emanating capacity, and he relates society to *undetermined* number of consciousnesses. Thus, there should always be a constitutive *surplus* in society with respect to intersubjectivity and dyadic relations: indeterminacy is the dimension that cannot be determined reflexively or calculated because there will always be someone who does not fit into this calculation. Let us put it differently: in culture Me turns to You, that is, culture is a system of face-to-face relations and society represents the coexistence of an *undetermined* number ($n+1$) of subjects. Merleau-Ponty was not as explicit as Sartre: society should be *minimally* considered in the context of *ménage à trois* (Badiou 2008), in

triadic structures where the third one is always constitutive. But it is clear what this is about. There are no dyadic relations without a constitutive third one; to develop the previously expressed thought: without the constitutive part of „undetermined number of consciousnesses“. Here, the French philosopher gives a glimpse of thought about institutions which are superior in comparison to everything that seems natural to us. Actually, Merleau-Ponty was never clearer, nor did he ever separate sociality and interjectivity so clearly; other attempts of his were marked with oscillations.

Is Merleau-Ponty's criticism of society possible? The French philosopher was unambiguous so many times; we are familiar with his articles on different issues and his precise opinions (Merleau-Ponty 1960: 365–567): those opinions reveal a thinker who criticizes sociality in capitalism. We should not forget that this thinker was subtle in his talk about solidarity between philosophy and politics in the context of rejecting objects of philosophy as „pure objects“ (Merleau-Ponty 2000: 303); he did not accept „verbal liberalism“. When Olivier Todd reviewed his book and commented that philosophy was a „sovereign work“ for this philosopher, Merleau-Ponty replied that he had never said that because „philosophy was *not* deeper than passion or politics“. (Merleau-Ponty 2000: 208 – this is not that strange in comparison to Merleau-Ponty for whom Sartre claimed that he was truly interested in politics). As numerous critics said, this happened in the period of Merleau-Ponty's life when he was staggered and drawn into liberalism because of the disappointment with Marxism and its historical results. However, it is not that simple (Losoncz 2010). In any case, Merleau-Ponty was not a type of thinker who could be described as a neutral observer; on the contrary, his philosophy of the world always shows the intention of the philosophical consideration of participation. Philosophy sets the conditions for intervention in the world: it is a pattern for established engagement. He was interested in participation in the world, engagement at the very source. It was not a coincidence that he did not describe consciousness as „consciousness of something“ but „how I can do it“, thus, as a form of power (*potentia*). That tells us a lot about his intentions.

It should be noted that he writes a lot about the existential ground in his entire work, about *Boden* (on this notion, Visker 1999), like a world substrate for the common. Ground is a horizon which provides possibility for something that he calls „indisputable coexistence“, and somewhere just a simple dialog based on „common ground“. We need philosophy which mulls things from below, and which is reflected to the collectiveness which base is *beneath* us. „Attachments“, constitutive „bonds“ and „webs“

are mentioned, although they are not above, but always below us. Hence the concern for spatial aspects, for horizon and perspective; the aim is to consider a critical thought with regard to *Boden*. Merleau-Ponty uses every opportunity to say that we should not count on unilateral action of a subject: it is quite clear, even in his earlier works which refer to consciousness and intention, that he was interested in what preceded intersubjective relations. Thus, it is not a coincidence that the later work of Merleau-Ponty is characterized by strong decentralization of embodied subject; the statement „I am given to myself, but I am not the light of myself“ becomes crucial (Butler 2004: 192). Still, the most important for us is to have *embeddedness* of subjectivity and intersubjectivity as critical formula: numerous critical indications are given in this statement, namely that we lose this embeddedness in capitalism. It is a critical opinion based on imminent ambivalence because every engagement is ambivalent (On this paradigmatically, Merleau-Ponty 1996: 89), *simultaneously* representing freedom, affirmation and „constraint“. The restriction of freedom is not an external obstacle for established engagement because restriction is transposed into freedom, that is the opposition between freedom and *restriction is imminent to freedom itself* (Chari 2010).

However, something should be clarified. Merleau-Ponty talks about dual anonymity which is, as he says, related to the „atmosphere of society“: „...yet each other person does exist for me as an unchallengeable style or setting of co-existence, and my life has a social atmosphere just as it has a flavor of mortality“ (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 425). „Social atmosphere“ that refers to „society“ occupies even our loneliest manifestations. When Merleau-Ponty explains the scope of historical materialism he even speaks about the „total and concrete notion of society“; then, he analyzes the „Unity of Social Event“ which he even relates to the „social body“, to the corpus that represents an unity of „law, economic structure, and morality“ (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 403–429. There is a clear parallel between the body as the unity of gesture and the society as the unity of law, etc.).

It is crystal clear here that the society is treated from a corporeal aspect and that it represents unifactorial entity (Reuter 1999: 85). But we are facing some dilemmas here. It could be said that we are anonymous in terms of absolute individualism and absolute generalism. The convergence of these modalities of anonymity confirms the fact that solipsism, although impossible to overcome, from the aspect of interior and exterior, is still not a closing paradigm as we have already seen. If we wish to create a unity of coexistence of body and communication then the aim of philosophy is to

connect solipsism and openness towards others (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 399): we claim that there are problems related to the maintenance of balance between these moments. On the horizon of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy the problem of transcendental subjectivity will not be the focus of attention, but his opinion must be confronted with the fact that the above-mentioned „dual anonymity“ questions the transcendental possibility of subjectivity which is not restricted by norms of intersubjectivity. Or, to make it clearer: there is a possibility to lower the „atmosphere“ of common anonymity (Fischbach 2013), the atmosphere of strong promiscuity, on *solus ipse*. The real question is: is there something that is not included in intersubjectivity or subjectivity is already so integrated in intersubjectivity that distance cannot be kept? Is not subjectivity already „out of itself“, evacuated for intersubjectivity? Are not all kinds of loneliness possible only as intersubjective data? In the philosophy of „interbodies“ the problem is not in *alter ego* and the reflection of alterity but in *ego*, to be more precise, transcendental self-referentiality and autoaffection become questionable. The relation between the self and subjectivity becomes problematic in the context of „strong“ intersubjectivity. Even though significant transformation of Merleau-Ponty's thought can be observed throughout his entire work, this moment seems to be constantly present. Thus, no wonder this orientation caused Merleau-Ponty to claim that the relationship between I and Other is simply not enough. He invites us into the world of European tension: „The I-other problem – a Western problem“ (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 221). The West loses the mentioned „common ground“, i.e. ontological embeddedness. What is interesting here is not an expedient to solve the „problem of the other“. It is a *transformation* of the problem (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 322, 269). This is affirmed based on the thematization of *perfect* coexistence, a flux that circulates between the bodies. This is how unbroken intersubjectivity is created. Nothing less important is the fact that social coexistence implies that everyone should *experience* community. Intersubjectivity is the problem of *adults* only: the adults gain perception of Other, when they achieve undisturbed intersubjectivity they actually remember the childhood (Poster 1975).

The problem of alterity loses its significance in these argumentations and it is attributed to the surplus of centralism in subjectivity. Thus, Husserl's problem concerning intersubjectivity is resolved. Let us pay attention to the next quote: „There is no problem of the alter ego because it is not I who sees, not he who sees, because an anonymous visibility inhabits both of us, a vision in general, in virtue of that primordial property that belongs to the flesh, being here and now, of radiating everywhere and forever, being an

individual, of being also a dimension and a universal“ (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 322). Now we are facing the problem of *alter ego* from another perspective.

Undisturbed intersubjectivity of early Merleau-Ponty is undoubtedly created by *corporeal sociality*. He criticizes Sartre for sociality which is on slippery ground; there is no „in-between“, his philosophy is open to plural subjectivities only („In Sartre there is a plurality of subjects but no intersubjectivity“, Merleau-Ponty 1973: 205) which can be confronted, but not to real, body-based, carnal intersubjectivity: Sartre’s ontological duality that prevents consideration of intersubjectivity is criticized (Merleau-Ponty 1996: 89). *However, the question is whether criticism of society is possible, critical philosophy of society, if reflection relies on symmetric intersubjectivity which transforms into unproblematized existence?*

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Sartre, Transcendental Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity

Sartre follows the footprints that might be Hegel’s (Butler 1999: 101–175): here, we refer to the philosophy of desire and needs which invokes intersubjectivity, as well as the „normative idea of society“ (for this dimension of normativity, see Fischbach 2013). Tension caused by intersubjectivity and expressed in *Being and Nothingness* can undoubtedly be related to Hegel. *Being and Nothingness* was criticized not only by Merleau-Ponty but some other well known thinkers as well. Here is an example: Sartre’s philosophy is extremely nominalistic (Adorno). He tries to abstract from historical circumstances which makes him think about metaphysical concepts especially with respect to absolute freedom (Marcuse); even Alain Badiou, whose philosophy is influenced by Sartre’s thinking, claims that freedom is rooted in individual consciousness and that every collective project is predetermined to be passive (Badiou 2008: 26). Still, if we accept those thoughts without any corrections then there is no other option but to exclude the mentioned Sartre’s work from the register of critical philosophy of society. We do not argue that the given opinions might have valid perspective, but we wish to make some changes.

Let us turn to *Being and Nothingness* in order to confirm the divergences between Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. They are not hard to find. The beginning of one important chapter in the book starts with: „While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me. We are by no means dealing with unilateral relations with an object-in-itself, but with reciprocal and moving relations. The following descriptions of concrete behavior must therefore be envisaged

within the perspective of conflict. Conflict is the original meaning of being-for-others“ (Sartre 1956: 364).

Interpretative frame leading Sartre can be noticed here. He obviously starts from a certain homological structure because he considers the fact that same descriptions apply both for us and the others, but he places it into a radical perspective of *conflict*. It is not true that intersubjectivity is missing here and that subjectivities are multiplied here, but it is true that we are witnessing the rising of a new philosophy of *asymmetric intersubjectivity*. The impossibility to avoid the objects can also be found in *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, and it is not just some youthful enthusiasm: „It is impossible to exist amongst men without their becoming objects both for me and for them through me, without my being an object for them, and without my subjectivity getting its objective reality through them as the interiorisation of my human objectivity“ (Sartre 2004: 105). Through some philosophical effects of phenomenology, Sartre praised intentionality during the thirties of the 20th century, and not just as an orientation that relieves us from the burden of idealism, but as a philosophical moment that opens the door to understanding of subjectivity *amongst* subjectivities (Sartre 1947: 34–36). Sartre had a program for overcoming solipsism: he criticized Husserl who, although defined otherness as the absence he could only have knowledge as the bridge between my being and the other one (Sartre 2004: 235). He did not see existential loneliness as solipsism. The mentioned interpretative frame makes intelligibility of intersubjectivity obtain its form differently than in the case of Merleau-Ponty (here we do not account the similarity between the *Phenomenology of Perception* and the *Being and Nothingness*, but see Butler 1998). The vocabulary speaks for itself and sheds light on strong divergences between Merleau-Ponty’s monism and Sartre’s dualism. When the first one speaks about dispossessed individual from the aspect of ontological communality, the second one speaks about different forms of possession: „Wherever I go, whatever I do, I only succeed in changing the distances between me and the Other-as-object, only avail myself of paths toward the Other. To withdraw, to approach, to discover this particular Other-as-object is only to effect empirical variations on the fundamental theme of my being-for-others. If we start with the first revelation of the Other as a look, we must recognize that we experience our inapprehensible being-for-others in the form of a possession. I am possessed by the Other; the Other’s look fashions my body in its nakedness, causes it to be born, sculpts it, produces it as it is, sees it as I shall never see it. The Other holds a secret the secret of what I am“ (Sartre 2004: 280). The Other watches us and takes „the secret of our

being“. We cannot watch without being watched at the same time. It is not questionable that we are forced to ecstasies and to be out of ourselves, to put ourselves in the frame of intersubjectivity because we cannot reach ourselves and our identification without the Other. But Sartre uses the words which mean „assimilation of the Other“, „absorbing of the Other“: instead of unity a separation between Me and Other occurs, alienating gaze of the Other: „Me“ is the object of the gaze of the other (see the critique concerning the relationship between the gaze and eye, Lacan 1973: 84 and Jay 1993.), I am „always under the gaze of the other“, this is Sartre’s famous statement which made grounds for establishment of ocularocentric philosophy of intersubjectivity. When Merleau-Ponty talks about communal attachments, Sartre will find discrepancies that lead him to conclusion that there is no possibility of unity of Me and the Other – the main separation point which generates far reaching consequences is the one between the In-itself and the For-itself. This is why we cannot analyze Sartre if the transformed problem of intersubjectivity is used to solve the problem of alterity: there is no unity between Me and the Other, thus, not only that I find myself through someone else but I am also testing the alterity which does not solve the problem of my being. It has already been shown that Sartre’s dialectics of intersubjectivity increases discrepancies and emphasizes the ambivalence of freedom and common realization of freedom (Cabestan 2005: 19–41). (Genuine examples of asymmetric intersubjectivity are related to sexual sphere, i.e. for sadism and masochism; this represents the drama of intersubjectivity).

Obvious examples of divergence with respect to the author of *Phenomenology of Perception* are the parts where Sartre talks about consciousness that represents „exile from the world“, or when he treats consciousness from the aspect of „negativity“: this is too far from Merleau-Ponty. Of course, man is a being who is the being-in-the world but he has to pay for this inherent determination. His freedom is paradoxical. Unlike Merleau-Ponty, Sartre’s subjectivity is not dis-embodied and it is not his philosophy that is cut off from sociality. In spite of the fact that Sartre rarely speaks in *Being...* about society (although he did mention „social event“ once), Michael Theunissen treats him within the frames of „social ontology“, i.e. he analyzes his social philosophy from the ontological aspect (Theunissen 1960: 230–240). His philosophy offers possibilities for different analysis: frequently mentioned interpretation of „bad faith“ as a possibility for „self-deception“, self-negation of the consciousness, has generated numerous social analyses (Dupuy 1995: 53–69. On the analysis of the waiter in a café, Bernasconi 2006: 35. Hacking 2002: 109. This analysis could lead to the

social interpretation of the „overidentification of the rule“ and „theatrical gestures“ as the form of social habitualization). For us, this is a fantastic introduction in the theory of ideology. We agree that in *Being and Nothingness* we witness a *transhistorical* phenomenological analysis (Langer 1998: 93–121). In spite of the efforts made by Sartre to include a lonely individual in the being-in-the society, a critical thought emerges here, based on „reflexivity as institution“ (O’Neill 1972: 231) or „multidimensional critique“ (Waldenfels) - for us it is „situated critical reflexivity“.

We think that Sartre is in the space between freedom and restriction: we have already said that it is important for the perspective to be inner with respect to freedom; we have pointed out the problem of the *perspective of self-referentiality* of freedom. Considering his intention to emphasize the key importance of self-choice, Sartre could be analyzed from the aspect of philosophical paradox „to choose one’s predestination“. This does not imply an underestimation of contextual determinations, but it includes something we have determined as self-referentiality of freedom (Dupuy 1995: 63). Naturally, our intention here was to show that Sartre solves the same problem in a different way: situatedness of freedom is analyzed here (contingency of freedom in the world in Sartre’s work) by moving across divergent paths. We cannot say anything about the thinker who connects situation and freedom: one can be free only in a „situation“. We believe that Sartre is confronted with dialectics of attachment and detachment in relation to the world; he contemplates about constitutive moments of detachment where Merleau-Ponty thinks about primordial attachment.

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Tensions in the intersubjectivity; Merleau-Ponty versus Sartre

It should be noted that although Sartre’s philosophy suffered big changes on its way from *Being and Nothingness* to *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, there are still some clear signs of continuity (This is emphasized by Jameson 1971: 206–306. He characterizes the *Critique...* as the supplement to the *Being...*). It is very indicative that Sartre several times recalls in *Critique...* the *Being...*). It is not true at all that later social engagement has no previous foundation and that it is not based on earlier starting points. Could it be any different with a philosopher who pathetically claims that freedom has the same meaning as the possibility of transformation, or who implies responsibility for the world – moreover, the latter indication keeps continuity in the later part? It can be noted that Sartre (once again, in spite of the ambivalences) creates conditions for occurrence of „dialectical voluntarism“ (Hallward

2010: 129–157 and Badiou 2008): his philosophy of will creates *possibilities* for consideration of collective self-emancipation. We are talking about possibilities *only* and nothing else: even Sartre had some difficulties with the comprehension of collective will in a systematic way, as well as with the articulation of that everlasting will. However, none of the critical social philosophies that take into account genesis of different collectivities renounce the merits of philosophy of will that can be found in Sartre's work.

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It is important to confirm those elements of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy which are relevant to us and which affirm the intensification of *strong* intersubjectivity; it is called intersubjectivity without residual. The world is a bunch of different bonds, a medium of originary attachment, and the existing ground for every process of phenomenalization. Of essential importance are those indications that shed light on the relationship between the world and man and which refer to the „power“ of the world. Let us turn to the explanations regarding the birth and which point to the engagement – with respect to the world: „To be born is both to be born of the world and to be born into the world...We choose our world and the world chooses us. What is certain, in any case, is that we can at no time set aside within ourselves a redoubt to which being does not find its way through, without seeing this freedom, immediately and by the very fact of being a living experience, figure as being and become a motive and a buttress“ (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 404). This impossibility of finding „shelter“ against the world leads us to the dynamic meaning of intersubjectivity and interworld. Nothing less specific is the fact that body which is united with the world appears as the „power of the world“. Living in a collective world, primordial attachment is the ground for intersubjectivity. What are the characteristics of intersubjectivity? „Activity: passivity“ (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 264) – we read later, which testifies the modality of existence of subjectivity. To conclude, intersubjectivity is always *interpassivity*, a form which emerges to surface in the structures of interworld.

Merleau-Ponty's philosophy became marked with an orientation which overpowered centralized efforts based on the consciousness, just like it overpowered the postulate about „natural Ego“, whereat the mentioned natural entity is only a preform of consciousness. Different transformations of his philosophy (language, aesthetics) emphasized the importance of decentralization with respect to subjectivity (Zaner 1964: 237). We recognized intersubjectivity in *Phenomenology of Perception*. but it was related to *cogito*. Now, *radical* destruction of a subject's proprietary position is observed; it is now in the possession of „Seeing and Thinking“;

and not vice versa (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 19). Cohesion embedded in the world goes beyond transitory dissonances; the Other is not a rival but part of ontological circulation which characterizes the being-in the world: the fact that without vision of others we could not see, is symptomatic and *contra* Sartre. The outlines of intramundanity become clearer with a subject, we can discuss the ontological continuity between body and the world, which is much deeper than any opposition between the world and body and much deeper than the wounds given to the man by the world. In any case, these efforts are part of the endeavor to construct an idea of subjectivity which is, *at the same time*, embedded in the structures of dependence and has the capacity to start, i.e. inaugurate. His philosophy aims at depicting the logic of exchange between *constitutive and constituted* moments in the structure of subjectivity: but we are emphasizing the fact that ontological concordance, different forms of synergy inside the world, and structures of transitivity are present here. Merleau-Ponty performs a subtle analysis of „aesthetic logos of the world“ and while doing this he discovers numerous, as he says „impossibilities“ in the world. However, „forms of unity“ always prevail, an ontological *synergy*. We might even read that the positions of Me and the Other are *only* „mysterious“ forms of dissociation. We could even assume that Merleau-Ponty is close to that corporeal philosophy which appreciates certain mystical elements of „unique body“ and „intercorporality“ with respect to the world (On the meanings of corpus mysticum in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, Visker 1999: 212. It is very interesting to evoke such statements that lead us to an other type of destination: there is violence as the inevitable aspect of human relationship, the perception is already the form of violent act in the context of the world. We could argue that it is difficult to reconcile this type of reflection on the primordially of violence with the primordial attachments and ontological concordia. Staudigl 2007: 250.). In other words, he develops a strong philosophy of the whole with respect to the segments, which attracts some religious connotations.

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We have discovered similar tendencies before, namely when we thematized „Unity of social event“ where parts of „social body“ are mutually implied. Then, we determined that „social atmosphere“ somehow overdetermines the modality of mutual implications. Still, Merleau-Ponty did not make such references to sociality in his later work. The concept of „eventness“, which had the crucial role in Heidegger’s work and in French philosophy (Badiou, for example), did not become clearer. We remember some great critical intentions of Merleau-Ponty which suggested an insight into the existing critical situation: we particularly refer to his reflections on the

ground and possible negative consequences of losing that ground. Can we say that dissociations and specificity become predominant even if we do not have insight into the „common ground“? Can we make it possible for divergences to affirm when we lose the ground under our feet?

As for the philosophy of society, a possible point of breakthrough could be Merleau-Ponty's understanding of „nature“. This could not be understood as deflection from his thinking or some occasional stop; on the contrary, we can see from his earliest attempts that his intellectual engagement regarding the above mentioned subject was constant. Accordingly, the importance of his reflections regarding nature is beyond any doubt; they show tendencies of his thinking. No wonder the analysts interested in the explication of the natural world found him (for example, Dufrenne 1970: 201–212 and Langer 1990: 115–129): his contemplation on necessary opacity of the natural world shows his critical attitude towards ambivalent achievements of modernity. It is evident that his consideration of the natural world includes political issues as well (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 95). Nothing less important is that humanism, which is the subject of criticism here, is represented by Sartre, i.e. the „natural world“ gives possibilities for further confrontation. Immersing into natural ontology, de-subjectivation of perception, leads a phenomenologist to the zones with symbiotic relations between human and inhuman spheres. This is actually in accordance with the basic intentions of inclusive ontology.

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However, the unfinished work of Merleau-Ponty left dilemmas. Is critical philosophy of society possible based on such inclusive ontology, or do we have to accept that all the roads to social criticism end here? Is it possible to, maybe, to include Merleau-Ponty in the consideration of phenomena such as *Weltentfremdung* (Hannah Arendt), or loss of the world, processes of „demonialization“ (*Entweltlichung*) that take us to some robust implications regarding today's epoch? (Fischbach 2011: 12) We do not wish to assert that ontological philosophy of the world makes critical philosophy of society impossible, on the contrary: we have only emphasized our question regarding the problematic relationship of *unfractured* and unbroken intersubjectivity and critical philosophy of society.

Sartre's philosophy developed in a different way than Merleau-Ponty's philosophy: we analyze the genesis of his thought from the perspective of *Critique of Dialectical Reason* which gives a retrospective. His thinking ranges from being-in the world to being-in the society. Mikel Dufrenne (Dufrenne 1998: 279–289) clarifies the relationship between Merleau-Ponty and Sartre in such a way that the writer of *Visible and invisible* is oriented

towards the natural world and the author of *Critique of Dialectical Reason* is oriented towards the „social world“. The first author shows „abandonment of social“ in order to grasp the primordial aesthetic experience and the „ontological feelings“; and the second one analyzes „intelligibility within the social“. Dufrene obviously thinks that later philosophical work of Merleau-Ponty is closed for the social world. Still, we would like to alter that statement a bit. Namely, natural and social worlds are undoubtedly confronted and we have just demonstrated the importance of Merleau-Ponty's orientation towards natural world. Also, it is obvious that Sartre shows tendencies towards the social world and that he takes an anthropological viewpoint. He uses concepts which have elements like totalization and detotalization, practico-inertness, praxis, project or contra-finality and which are deeply situated in the social world; they could not be understood without it. Still, let us not forget that Sartre, although from the aspect of anthropology, draws the line between social and natural world by using the idea of scarcity. Scarcity, carefully analyzed in *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, is definitely one of the key ideas here: it is *reflected difference* between social and natural world. In other words: Sartre gives differentiation between social and natural world. Some issues have remained unclear in Sartre's work: does he consider scarcity as transhistorical phenomenon, or does he place it in the *capitalism*? It could be argued that scarcity, as a *qualitative, socially produced category* is a historically conditioned phenomenon, and only then can it be understood (that is the main point of our endeavour on the problem of scarcity, Lošonc 2012: 35–60). A thinker who relates sociality to the phenomenon of history could think this way because there is a wide network of social mediation which explains the modalities of scarcity. Scarcity is not a transhistorical phenomenon; it is rooted in determinations created throughout the history. It is not a coincidence that Sartre uses the context of „institutions“ to „deal with economic sphere and consumption, *without which consideration of society would not exist*“ (Sartre 2004: 106) – he does not do that but we can talk freely about social institution of scarcity. Anyway, Sartre's philosophy has socio-economical frame for the „intelligibility of social“ and this is how he accepts certain subjects related to Hegel-Marx line of thinking (on the problems of the embeddedness of Sartre on this Hegel-Marx line of thinking, Chiodi 1976: 39–58), i.e. he articulates man as the locus of the need, as the being who is lacking ontology. Scarcity offers a historical landscape of socialized people who communicate via socialized things: a complex picture with subtle analyses of subjectivities and objectivities occurs, as well as the already familiar conflicts regarding things, that is, conflicts that are deeply set in commonly used things. Trauma of meeting another man,

being an object of other person's look, which led the thoughts in *Being and Nothingness* is present here as well, but with some social features. The importance of this analysis is that scarcity represents a kind of short circuit between subjectivity and objectivity, and we see it as a form of socio-economic dialectic tension. Subjectivity has on its side constitutive structures of reciprocity, traces of conflictual socio-economic intersubjectivity, and processes of totalization which give structure to the already used idea of project. Objectivity and matter have not only „inertia“ as adversity, but „power of reality“ as well which is maliciously directed against people, like in the case of „contrafinality“ (capital understood as „contrafinality“). Thus, we arrive at one not simple analysis of relationship between objects and people: we can even talk about the subjectivization of matter and objects.

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As it is well known, Heidegger criticized Sartre and claimed that his argumentation is just a new edition of metaphysics. This cast doubt on the scope of Sartre's subjectivity. Wasn't it all just overemphasizing of metaphysical subjectivity? (Renaut 1993: 39) Some points should be analyzed here: Sartre does try to relate anthropology and praxis. He seeks for normative determinations of a man, and expects generation of emancipation from anthropology and radical humanism (this is another divergence from Merleau-Ponty (on the differences between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Badiou 2005: 178)). At the same time, he always reminds us that subjectivity is separated from substantiality („existence precedes the essence“) and that it can never be naturalized. This non-substantiality of subjective engagement rejects metaphysical definitions: *Critique of Dialectical Reason* is the unfinished work but it is still a monumental piece of work because of subjective engagement, i.e. subjectivity as freedom. Here, scarcity and socio-economic analysis play the key role because they add realistic historical social substrate to this engagement.

Merleau-Ponty used to say that contradictions in Sartre's work were impossible to correct (Merleau-Ponty 1996: 86), thus suggesting the hypostatized pessimism. We can really see that Sartre does have phenomenology of different failures and defaults that are ascribed with ontological importance, and it was like this from the very beginning of philosophical career. Different analysis presented in *Critique of Dialectical Reason* also take us to the mentioned failure zone. Traumatic forms of intersubjectivity, confrontation with forms of objectifications and self-objectifications leave deep traces: human interdependence systematically creates forms of alienations and reifications. Objects and people have relationships based on exchange as well as substitutions. There is also Sartre's fascination with the „Number“: let's look at the beginning of the introduction

that he wrote for Frantz Fanon's work where he thematizes (and not for the first time) *ontological* importance of possibility of living people to outnumber the dead, or phenomena such as „the horror of multiplicity“ and „too many people“ (Sartre 1963: 7. See, Jameson 1997: 363 and Chari 2004: 110–122). He always expresses astonishment, from philosophical point of view, about the existence of another man, which is opposite to Merleau-Ponty. However, it is important that subjective engagement is not *ex nihilo* here and that it is not omnipotent to the reality. It could be said that Sartre generates certain type of *pessimistic* engagement or *pessimistic activity*, probably like Gramsci; besides he explores the possibilities of development of subjectivity in society which is defined in accordance with impersonal determinations.

The Later Work of Sartre with the Early Merleau-Ponty

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Our thesis is that later work of Sartre shows certain indications of the early Merleau-Ponty. Philosophy of society in Sartre's work can be read from the perspective of different implications given by Merleau-Ponty. We have seen the difference between intersubjectivity and society: Sartre adopts it and adds a mark of concreteness. First, he systematically proves the insufficiency of intersubjective-dyadic relationships for understanding of society. Constitutiveness of the „third“ party gives way to numerous analysis: we no longer observe only interpersonal relationships or simple relation between a man and an object, but the entire context of *structured* social world. Then, when the author of *Phenomenology of Perception* recognizes the necessity of existence of „undefined number of consciousness“ Sartre performs a concrete analysis of *layered collectiveness* in modern society. He talks about triadic structure:

- a) seriality – represents a community established for external reasons and within which „passive unity“ and possibility of mutual substitution and indifference exist; it seems that Sartre's descriptions evoke Rousseau's critical analysis: seriality represents the dominance of the Others and „powerless of people“ (Badiou);
- b) group – takes seriality apart and provides conditions for community created for internal reasons and which has jointly established values;
- c) organization – the key moments are initiation and infrastructure with according rules.

Sartre does not deny that seriality is embedded deeply in the structure of modern society: that is part of his critical endeavors. This triad makes

possible the consideration of dynamics of collectiveness in modern society: it offers a perspective from which analysis could be performed within the frame of critical philosophy of society. That is a possibility that still has not been used up.

We chose the perspective of critical philosophy of society. Divergent paths of thought can be observed if the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre are considered. We studied these paths paying special attention to the dynamics of intersubjectivity of these philosophers. Merleau-Ponty shows traces of unbroken intersubjectivity, and in Sartre's work intersubjectivity is anchored in asymmetric relations. In his early days, Merleau-Ponty had some indications regarding the comprehension of society, but his analysis is based on the mentioned idea of intersubjectivity. Although we did not analyze his philosophy in detail we could still conclude that it developed towards *syncretic philosophy of the world* with addition of opinions on the problems of the whole and parts. Sartre reaches the edge of critical philosophy of society articulating the categories such as scarcity and layerness of a collective being. Both paths are quite representative and exhibit paradigmatic possibilities, but with respect to *critical philosophy of society* Sartre's is the one we should rely on.

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Primljeno: 15. maja 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 20. juna 2014.

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Alpar Lošonc

Dve sukobljavajuće interpretacije filozofije društva

Apstrakt

U ovom radu predstavljam dva filozofa, Morisa-Merlo Pontija i Žan-Pol Sartra, ali iz perspektive filozofije društva. Naglašavam da filozofija društva predstavlja na izvestan način retkost, danas i ova činjenica objašnjava zašto je potrebno propitivati odgovarajuće naznake ovih filozofa. Posebno se analizira u radu artikulacija intersubjektivnosti u filozofiji društva i na osnovu ovog izabranog momenta se tretiraju argumentacije pomenutih filozofa u smislu njihove konfrontacije. Filozofija Merlo-Pontija se analizira iz vidokruga nelomljene intersubjektivnosti, a filozofija Sartra se tumači iz perspektive relacije između transcendentale subjektivnosti i intersubjektivnosti. Rad prati genealoški pristup, i analizira dinamiku pomenutih filozofa u cilju toga da se prezentuju pomeranja i relevantni otkloni. Na kraju rada razvija se teza da je kasni Sartr, koji ostaje u okvirima Marksovog mišljenja, u stvari realizuje reinterpretaciju onih elemenata koji se inače mogu naći u filozofiji ranog Merlo-Pontija. Shodno tome se tvrdi da je filozofija društva kasnog Sartra vredna za promišljanje u cilju stvaranja kritičke filozofije društva.

Cljučne reči: Društenost, korporealna društenost, ukorenjenost, socijalna filozofija, intersubjektivnost, transcendentala subjektivnost, biće-za-drugog

STATE AND CHURCH:
THE LOGIC AND STRUCTURE OF RELATIONS

II

DRŽAVA I CRKVA:
LOGIKA I STRUKTURA ODNOSA

Ivica Mladenović (eds.)
Priredio Ivica Mladenović

Introductory Note

Taking their cue from John Locke, the Enlightenment philosophers of the 18th century, for the first time, placed the question of church-state separation in the centre of political and broader social debate. Ever since, relations between religion and society, on the one hand, and state and church, on the other, have undergone an immanent evolution, gained different forms and passed through several phases. One could even state that there is no such thing as full synchronization and parallelism between those relations, and we shall even determine that they have taken opposite directions. Namely, in the 19th century, relations between state and church were rather tense and antagonistic and even marked with violence, while the majority of society remained religious. In the 20th century, however, quarrels were minimized, an adequate *modus vivendi* and a way of cooperation were found, but the process of secularization nevertheless took deep root in a large portion of the world, particularly in Europe. Thus, in our preparation of this thesis, we were guided by the established meanings of the words „laicisation“ (concerning the relation between religion and state) and secularization (a sociological process of society’s distancing from the religious ethos). Also, it is important to stress that what is meant by „church“ here includes every community of followers of a religion, without the exclusion, which often seems present, of non-Christian religions, or of religions lacking a more or less hierarchical structure. In that context, we have limited this thesis, first and foremost, to an inquiry into different kinds of relations between the state and religious communities within individual national contexts. This relationship, which is very complex and directly mediated by concrete historical and structural factors, is approached from various perspectives by the authors.

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Ideological conflicts in Slovenia over religious issues

Abstract *Since attaining independence, Latin pattern (Martin, 1978) disputes and conflicts have characterized the Slovenian political scene, particularly as to relations between the state and religious communities. Slovenia adopted a law on the issue only in 2006, availing itself of the law from the 1970s. The 2007 Religious Freedom Act contained many privileges for the dominant Roman Catholic Church, including those of a symbolic nature and those of an economic one. The Constitutional Court declared the Act unconstitutional and void, departing from the European Convention of Human Rights and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Thus, it set other beliefs at the same level with religious ones, did away with many privileges and obstacles in recognition and registration of new religious communities. However, this decision has legislatively been implemented only in a small portion, remaining to be fully implemented. However, the absence of substantive agreements with the Holy See and the absence of religious instruction in public schools indicate a predominance of liberalism on the public scene.*

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Keywords: *Slovenia, Church and State, Religious freedom, Roman Catholic Church, Latin pattern*

It may help to understand the crux of the Slovenian situation if we begin with the sociological analysis of David Martin who speaks of „Catholic monopolies“ or the „Latin pattern“, as the specific path to secularisation. Within this pattern, „the union of the Church with the political right“ is typical during entry into modern society, along with the Church demonstrating „official militancy“ despite having been truly relegated to a „subordinate posture“ in its relations to the right wing political forces in power (Martin 1978: 37–38). In such a situation, all cultural attempts at „cross breeding“ are understood by Catholic forces as „traitorous“ (ibid: 39). As a consequence, opposition to Catholic forces brings about „a split endlessly reproductive of itself“ (ibid: 40).

Slovenia clearly fits into Martin's category of „Latin pattern“ in terms of its political organisation of religious affairs. The Latin pattern arises in the absence of denominational plurality and with the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) enjoying a position beyond the hegemonic one, being almost a monopolist. „Enlightenment and religion clash“ (Martin 2005: 20) is the crux of the pattern. This goes for practically all areas of social and cultural life and energizes political life. There has historically also been a Lutheran

minority, limited to the region of the country in the North East which historically belonged Hungary, and not impacting critically on the picture. In early modernity (from the 16th to the 18th centuries) the Habsburgs practically disallowed religious minorities (Vidic and Cvirn 1999).

Subsequently, in the development of modern society in the 19th century, there arose the pattern of Catholicism being the only „historical“ religion of Slovenians, as well as all its neighbours (Italians, Austrians, Hungarians and Croats). Catholicism was also the major institutional structure, since Slovenia was divided administratively into different Habsburg „crown lands“, it was politically disunited, which represented a major obstacle to its political and cultural growth.

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Modern political development began under the Catholic aegis, the first political party being the Catholic sponsored Slovenian People's Party. It was established in 1892, remaining the most influential party in Slovenia until World War II. The liberals followed by establishing the liberalist National (Progressive) Party in 1894, followed by the Yugoslav Socialdemocratic Party in 1896 (the two formed the political part of the anti-clericalist camp). Prior to World War II, the liberals, flanked by the Socialists (and Communists), never attained majority support. However, the cultural forces behind the two camps have fed the basic cultural and political conflict in Slovenia, dynamising and energising political life and raising issue that defined and articulated the matter of dispute on the public scene throughout the modern period, with the partial exception of the Communist period (1945–1990). Liberals were not necessarily atheists or proponents of atheism, their major goal was to diminish and sideline the public nature of Catholicism and to enable political discourse to be freed of religious and clericalist tutelage.

It was usually Catholic thought that articulated the subject of the contest: at the end of the 19th century, it promoted the ideas of society being established by estates, of the arts needing to promote Christian values, as interpreted by the RCC, of political life being defined by the Church, and of authority originating from RCC authority alone (Ušeničnik 1910). Liberal artists and thinkers were attacked and stigmatised in a drive for the „separation of spirits“, i.e. isolation of everything not under Catholic control became the main objective (an idea advanced and practiced under the leadership of Bishop Mahnič, around the turn from the 19th to the 20th century). The Catholic Church dominated all cultural-artistic societies, disallowing their becoming religiously neutral. The same went for the press. The liberals found ways to assert themselves, however, through

professional organizations. The teaching profession was focus of interest for both sides, as was public elementary and secondary education, which was continuously religiously permeated and controlled (Dolenc 1996).

On the sensitive issue of ethnic identity the authoritative and authoritarian Bishop Mahnič stated (allegedly speaking for all Catholic Slovenians): „German and all other Catholics are closer to us than Slovenian liberals“ (1888, as cited in Pleterski 1998: 38). This may sound convincing from certain varieties of Christian point of view, but the essence of the communication was to strip Slovenian liberals of any legitimacy. On the other hand, political Catholicism before World War I denied the possibility that ethnic Slovenians could be anything other than Catholics (Dragoš 1996: 136–137, analysing messages at the First Slovenian Catholic Meeting 1920). Setting aside the niceties and details of the debate on the strength of the Catholic hegemony was, we note only that in 1891 the liberal novelist Ivan Tavčar published in 1891 a satiric novel, *4000*, on how Slovenia would remain under Catholic authoritarian hegemony in the year 4000.

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During the first Yugoslav state (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), clericalist politics was still dominant in Slovenia, at home declaring its intentions to win autonomy for Slovenia, while conceding that it was not possible „at that moment“, whereas in Belgrade, the capital, where political life was concentrated, Slovenian politicians of the Slovenian People’s Party played well within the centralist governmental orchestras and even took positions of prime minister and minister of the police (Konstantinović 1998).

Indeed, during the entire period prior to World War II, the crux of the cultural conflict between the clericalists and anti-clericalists was muddled by the fact that Slovenia was not an independent state and both sides needed to present themselves as the true combatants for Slovenian emancipation (although it could not be said that Slovenia was in a subjugated position during Tito’s Yugoslavia). This issue was particularly acute where it involved the relationship towards the traditional hegemon, the Germans. Both the liberals and the clericalists considered themselves as true combatants for Slovenian emancipation. However, during the period ending with World War II, the clericalists were the dominant factor in the discourse, articulating it and defining the terms. Simultaneously, both sides needed to coalesce with extra-Slovenian political entities and to present that to the Slovenian public as acceptable. We shall not enter into the details of the history. The issue is well summed up by the historian Pleterski, himself evidently siding with one camp, in depicting the logic of the clericalist camp:

In the motto 'A Germanophile (*Nemškutar*) is preferable to a Young Slovenian (liberal), because Germanophilia and Christianity do not exclude each other, whereas Young Slovenianhood means Atheism', the subjects are to have changed: the Young Slovenian is replaced by the Slovenian Partisan [member of Tito's armed forces during World War II – remark by authors], whereas the Germanophile is replaced by the 'Occupier' and in a new era (World War II and after) the old conclusion is adapted: fascism and Christianity do not exclude each other, whereas partisanhood means atheism (Pleterski 1998: 4).

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After World War II, during the Communist period, public discourse radically changed, and conditions for religious life for the RCC were severely limited. However, conditions for religious life continuously improved after initial attempts to radically suppress, although not completely to do away with religious life. A certain amount of suppression would be understandable, given that three major religions operated in the federal communist state, having also major shares in the population, amongst which interconfessional relations were inimical, at least until Vatican Council II in the 1960s (Alexander 2008). The history of relations between the three groups (in the wider region) was full of bloody conflict in modern times. With governmental privileging, the first Yugoslav state symbolically identified with Eastern Orthodoxy (via the dynasty) and genocide and generalized interethnic and interreligious strife during World War II (Dedijer et al. 1972). However, the initial suppression after World War II set aside such objective reasons and tended toward complete marginalization and persecution of religion, on the basis of an initial attempt to introduce communist totalitarian rule (Alexander 2008; Radić 2002).

By the 1960s, the situation had changed and accommodation seemed on the horizon. Besides tolerating strictly religious activities (but not public ones, with a limited exception for charity), the situation changed by allowing the entry of new entities on the religious scene. Initially, these were mainly protestant groups originating from the United States, which availed themselves of religious liberty and the possibility of publishing brochures (Alexander 2008; Flere 2012).

Religious activities were governed as of the 1970s by republic and provincial laws, which limited their activities mainly to „spiritual affairs“, but this formed the framework in which religious activities and constructions grew and the press flourished.

Hereinafter, the paper will be structured in different sections: the structure of the religious scene, the legal position of religious entities within independent Slovenia being the central issue, followed by presentations

on the national reconciliation issue, religion and education, religion and family, financial and property issues of the RCC, meriting special treatment (because of the relevance of the issue, at that point insight into religiosity dynamics will be introduced), and a discussion. All issues will be presented taking into account that the RCC is the major, almost monopolistic religious player, and considering conflict between laicist and clericalist forces, as main axis of division.

However, this goes for the public discourse scene. At the in depth structure of Slovenian society, a sound secularization has been noted (Flere and Klanjšek 2007; Lavrič and Flere 2011).

Pluralisation of the Religious Scene

Since 1976, there has existed a register of registered religious communities operated and published by the Slovenian Government („Register“ 2012). At the beginning of 2014, 44 religious communities (43 of which are active) were registered in Slovenia. Most of these are historically new, both substantively and in terms of their presence in Slovenia. Besides the RCC, the Lutheran Evangelical Church, the Calvinist Reformed Church (now almost extinct) and marginally, the Serbian Orthodox Church, can be considered as historically rooted (Komac et al. 2013).

The communities indicate a wide variety, including some communities about which more information cannot be attained publicly (e.g., The Mithraic Gnostic Religious Community). Beside those which can easily be considered Christian, there are two Islamic communities registered and a number of faiths established internationally in the 20th century (The Unification Church, Church of Scientology), as well as Buddhist and Hindu communities.

Some of these groups substantively arrived from the United States, even though their roots and paths may be more complicated (the Christian Baptist Church, Christian Adventist Church, Jehovah's Witnesses). Sixteen groups were registered before the attainment of Slovenia's independence (1991), the majority being registered after. Demographically, the RCC, the Islamic communities, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Lutheran Evangelical Church are the most significant ones. The portion of Muslims was 2.2% in 2002. Numerically, the RCC remains approximately twenty four times more numerous than the second group, the Islamic Community. Thus, the scene remains not only a predominantly Catholic one, but almost a monopolistic one.

Legal Position of Religious Entities within Independent Slovenia

Slovenia attained independence and democratic pluralism rather gently, if not quite in a „velvet“ manner, with little conflict, particularly in comparison to the other Yugoslav successors (Ramet 2006). As to the position of religion, important factors were the newly adopted Constitution of 1991 and the Religious Communities Act of 1976, which remained in effect, with slight changes until 2007 (one provision is still in force).

The Constitution holds typical liberalist provisions on separation of church and state and on equality of religious communities. The Act of 1976, however, proved to be surprisingly adaptable to new conditions, with some supervisory provisions set aside and some considered irrelevant. This, along with the liberal spirit of the 1990s, enabled the establishment of a large number of religious communities in Slovenia. As Lesjak and Lekić state, this structural change did not basically alter the religious demographic picture of Slovenia, but enriched the religious scene (2013).

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The Religious Freedom Act (RFA) Adoption

On the legislative front, under Vatican pressure, the Slovenian Government entered into an agreement with the Holy See in 2004. The Agreement does not stipulate substantive obligations on either party but envisage entering into other agreements and there are practically no commitments on the part of the state. However, there are agreements between two states, creating a special situation. The Slovenian Constitutional Court interpreted the Agreement as valid in so far as it is interpreted in accordance with Slovenian Constitution article 7, i.e. religious communities being equal before the law and the state and the RCC observing the Slovenian legal order (Constitutional Court 2003). Basically, it was a test to see how far Slovenia would go in conceding to demands for RCC ideological hegemony.

After attaining independence, it was 2007 before Slovenia adopted a statutory act on religion, the RFA. This was undertaken under the rightist government led by Janez Janša, with Lovro Šturm being the Minister of Justice in charge of the matter. In fact, the first draft was prepared by a private institute previously headed by Šturm. There were some public discussions on the draft, mainly promoting liberalist objections to the draft, but the Ministry held strong to its original positions. The RFA was adopted with a slight majority: except for deputies belonging to rightist

parties, the votes of the national minority deputies were needed, a rare situation in Slovenian parliamentary history, indicating a division in Parliament and in society, as well.

The main provisions, also the ones that would become contentious, are the following:

- On the symbolic level, the RFA systematically adopts the wording „churches and religious communities“, although not granting to the former any particular legal advantages, it symbolically differentiates between the two.
- More substantial discrimination is to be found in Article 5, where the RFA states: „Churches and other religious communities promoting spirituality and human dignity in private and public life, also promoting extending meaning to existence in the area of religious life and simultaneously also having a significant role in public life by developing their educational, charitable and other activities in the area of the welfare state, enriching national identity, thus discharging a significant social role, shall be generally beneficial organisations.“ This „generally beneficial nature“ of certain „religious organisations“ does not automatically imply any specific privileges. Nevertheless it is a provision symbolically granting precedence to certain organisations. The legislator does introduce a difference summing it up as „a general social beneficial nature“ of some, evidently the traditional ones. Except for the Lutheran Church, it can hardly be expected that the legislator would be prepared to designate any other as such, along with the Roman Catholic Church. The Act allows for these „generally beneficial organisations“ to receive further state aid, within a discretionary supplementary concept (Article 29, para. 3).
- The Act governs provision of organised religious services in „total institutions“, in particular in prisons, hospitals, police units and within the military (The RFA does not deal with the situation in education, which had previously been governed in statutory manner). The solution is a novel one (not a continuation of previous regulations). Articles 24 and 25 provide for the employment of priests by the respective ministries for tending those hospitalised and incarcerated, meaning that the state would also pay their salaries, where an appropriate number of people needed such care. Similarly, the state would take care of the religious needs of policemen and the military, particularly with a view to duty abroad.

The provision dealing with providing policemen with such services is particularly vague, as they would be entitled to such state provided services whenever „the practice of religious freedom becomes difficult“, not indicating whether this would be at services abroad only (Article 23).

- The Act provides for new requirements as to registration of religious communities. Article 13 provides for registration of a new community if 100 members have subscribed, the members being citizens or permanent residents of Slovenia, and for the community to have operated for 10 years (without registration, i.e. without the capacity of a legal entity). The applicants also need to submit a large number of supplements to the request for registration, including a description of the community's teachings in the Slovenian language, its rituals and its „worship of God“, thus presupposing a monotheist notion of religion. Although there are European countries with stricter conditions, in the Slovenian situation these conditions are rather strict, as evidenced by a lack of registration on the basis of this Act (Lesjak and Lekić 2013: 159).
- The Act, to some surprise, left in force one portion of the 1976 Act. This is the portion dealing with payment of retirement, disability and health protection insurance by the state to priests and monks of registered communities (The history of the state's accepting the burden of these payments is a lengthy one, involving the attempts of Tito's regime to domesticate the major religious communities; see Alexander 2008). The 1976 Act in Article 20 allowed for state discretion in financial support for religious communities, in a provision which did not define either the limits or the intent of the funds. Upon independence, the Slovenian state continued to extend such support, although without undertaking any legal precisions (Lesjak and Lekić 2013: 159). This provision remained in force after the adoption of the 2007 Act. However, the Act envisages taking care of these benefits within a „reasonable proportion“ of 1 priest/monk per 1000 registered community members (Article 27, para. 4).

Developments upon the adoption of RFA

Upon the Act's adoption, the State Council, a chamber adjoined to the Slovenian Parliament, immediately (March 21, 2007) submitted a motion to the Constitutional Court alleging several unconstitutional provisions

in the Act. The State Council contested all provisions of the Act that could be considered suspicious from the point of view of a strict understanding of separation of church and state: financial support of religious groups, since the Act allegedly introduces no criteria for such support, differentiation among religious groups in employment by the state for the purpose of religious services, as being at variance with the principle of religious freedom; the failure to clarify which religious group deeds would be inadmissible as intervening in state sovereignty, the imprecise definition of the „general beneficial nature“ of certain religious groups; State dialogue only with registered religious groups would be at variance with the principle of equality of all religious groups; religious officials being dutiful to observe their highest ecclesiastic authority, but not also state regulations in „mixed areas“ – all this is considered to have offended state sovereignty. Not long thereafter general elections in 2008 brought into power a leftist government, headed by Borut Pahor. Aleš Gulič, a colourful liberal personality, was appointed head of the Office for Religious Communities. By itself this is of little relevance today, but it is instructive how the RCC reacted. „Even the [Communist] Party would not dare such a provocation!“ as with this appointment, stormed Cardinal Rode, then the head of the Slovenian RCC (as cited in Slovenian Press Agency 2009). Furthermore, on this behalf, the Slovenian Prime Minister was not received in the Vatican by the Pope. Both these events are indicative of how arrogantly the RCC attempted to regain its hegemonic position.

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The Constitutional Court (CC) passed a decision on the move by the State Council in a grand manner, contributing decisively to a swing of the pendulum as to ideological hegemony, although (at the beginning of 2014) the decision is yet to be fully implemented in legislation. The decision tackles the issue of constitutionality of the Act radically, in terms of technical conformity of the Act with the Constitution, but also with European Court of Human Rights case law and standards (Constitutional Court 2010).

The basic point of departure of the CC is to deal with religious matters as part of world view matters, i.e. religious beliefs are placed on the same level as irreligious and „philosophical“, i.e. world views. It pursues from this premise that religious and irreligious groups are all of the same nature; thus all should be granted legal entity status. On the other hand, the state has no obligation to finance or otherwise support any of them, particularly not without specific criteria. Furthermore, the „beneficial nature“ of religious and irreligious groups should be granted to all of them

and in no way should the state be called to judge their nature in this respect (pt. 131 of the Judgment). By this, the most important building block of the RFA was knocked down. Registration should not be the criterion for awarding funds (nor the „general beneficial nature“, now generalized to all communities), but other criteria should be set, pertaining to the purpose of the funds (pt. 134). As to total institutions, the state is obligated to tolerate and to facilitate religious activity, as this is a right, but it has no duty to finance it and even less to allow identification of state and religion by employing priests to discharge religious services. In criticising the legislator, the CC stated: „The legislator’s inclination towards (financial) support of individuals’ religious life may not reach the limits set by the principle of separation of religious communities and state, particularly the guarantee of state neutrality“ (pt. 146).

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The CC did not accept all the State Council’s objections, but it did make considerable inroads in the philosophical discourse on the position of religion in public life, particularly state-church relations, more so than ever in Slovenian history. This is the second such instance where the CC moved Slovenian public life into new grounds of human rights affirmation (the first being the issue of the „erased“). The Leftist Government in power at the time planned to adopt major changes to the Act, to achieve conformity with the CC Decision. Owing to situational circumstances, the draft was proposed by some of the parties in the governing coalition (Zares, Liberal Democracy, and Pensioners’ Party). However, neither this nor other drafts to replace the voided Religious Freedom Act was ever adopted by the Parliament (Lesjak and Lekić 2013: 160).

The Draft was consistently separation motivated, allowing for some limited relations of cooperation. The potentially most hurtful issues for the RCC was the envisaged provision on state financing: it would not be limited as to areas of financing, in comparison to the present, but it would pursue only from explicit income tax apportionments by individuals, of 0.5% of the income tax with which all individuals dispose of, indicating, a voluntary, charitable purpose (Urad Vlade 2010: 31). Taking into consideration that most people do not avail themselves of this discretionary power, this would mean a substantial decrease in the subsidies received by the RCC.

The tensions caused by attempts to govern the issues in a more liberalist manner were always met by strong statements on the part of the RCC and rightist parties. For example, Jože Jerovšek, on September 8, 2011, considering this draft at a Parliamentary commission, stated: „The more I listen to the discussion on issues from the Draft, the angrier I feel, discerning

how literally Stalinist sediments have remained in our space [Slovenia]. Ideological hatred, intolerance are typical forms of Stalinism still active.“ (as cited in Kolednik and Grm 2011). On the other hand, there are a few or no individual objections to the constitutionality of the draft, just a generalized expression of disgust. Bypassing the basic fact that the Act had been found unconstitutional, Archbishop Stres pleaded for „legal stability“ and „safety“ in an attempt to stop the legislative initiative, even before the draft was entered, again warning about „the great quantity of intolerance against the Roman Catholic Church in Slovenia“ (as cited in Mavsar and Weilguny 2010).

The present situation

At present (2014), Slovenia is still awaiting full implementation of the 2010 CC decision. A small portion of the Act was amended in 2013 (Act on Amending RFA), mitigating conditions for registration of new religious communities. Now, 10 subscribers of the appropriate age and citizenship would suffice, and the documents describing faith and practice submission have been omitted. However, full implementation is yet awaiting sufficient political resolve. However, by itself the declaration of the invalidity of the provisions privileging the RCC turned the ideological hegemony pendulum toward a stricter understanding of separation as the only legitimate option.

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Of course, as many authors cite, some degree of state-church cooperation is inevitable in contemporary circumstances (Fox 2006), and one can hardly expect the implementation of the provision covering social security payments by the state to be withheld after 50 years practice under very varied political regimes. Šturm is right in claiming that this has become an „acquired right“ (Šturm et al. 2004), despite its contravention of the separation clause. The same goes for the presence of the RCC in public media, to a certain extent, i.e. considering its majority nature. All these issues may be raised anew, however, under the pressure of economic exigencies and possible anti-clerical parliamentary majority.

Primljeno: 21. maja 2014.

Prihvačeno: 15. jula 2014.

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Sergej Flere

Ideološki konflikti oko religijskog pitanja u Sloveniji

Sažetak

Od sticanja nezavisnosti, Latinski obrazac (Martin, 1978) svojstven je za Sloveniju, posebno za odnos između države i verskih zajednica. Slovenija je usvojila zakon o tom pitanju tek 2007, služeći se do tada odredbama odgovarajućeg zakona iz 1970-ih godina. Zakon o verskoj slobodi iz 2006. sadržao je brojne privilegije za preovlađujuću Rimsko-katoličku crkvu, uključujući simboličke i ekonomske. Međutim, Ustavni sud Slovenije ubrzo je utvrdio protivustavnost i poništio taj zakon, polazeći od Evropske konvencije o ljudskim pravima i pravne prakse Evropskog suda za ljudska prava. Time su druga verovanja postavljena u istu ravan sa religioznima i uklonjene brojne privilegije i prepreke kod priznanja i registracije novih verskih zajednica. Međutim, ta presuda nije u celosti zakonodavno primenjena. Ipak, odsustvo sadržinskih sporazuma sa Svetom stolicom i veronauke u javnim školama ukazuje na prevlast liberalizma na javnoj sceni.

Ključne reči: Slovenija, crkva i država, religijske slobode, Katolička crkva, latinski obrazac

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Država i crkva u Francuskoj: društveno-istorijski kontekst, strukturalna uslovljenost i karakter laiciteta

Apstrakt Autor se u tekstu bavi pitanjem odnosa države i religijskih zajednica u Francuskoj. Prvi deo rada čini analiza istorijskog konteksta kovanja francuske laičke države, njenih lokalnih osobenosti, vrednosti i društvenih snaga koje su ih oblikovale. Činjenica da je Katolička crkva bila jedan od glavnih legitimacijskih stubova „starog režima“, trajno je odredila karakter odnosa države i crkve, a pre svega njenu buduću društvenu isključenost pod Republikom. Kao najvažniji događaji koji definišu sudbinu veze političkog i religijskog u Francuskoj sve do naših dana izdvajaju se Francuska revolucija iz 1789. godine i Zakon o odvajanju crkava i države iz 1905. godine. U drugom delu se izlažu principi na kojima se temelji savremena relacija između države i religijskih zajednica u Francuskoj. Zaključuje se da tvrdokornim insistiranjem na čisto laičkom modelu odnosa između države i crkve, naciji kao zajednici građana i državi u veberijanskom smislu te reči, te shvatanjem javne sfere kao zajedničkog prostora u kome se negiraju komunitarni interesi, Francuska danas predstavlja usamljeno ostrvo na evropskom kontinentu.

Cljučne reči: Francuska, laicitet, sekularizam, republika, nacija, crkva, religija, separacija

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Odnos verskih zajednica i države je jedna od najistraživanijih tema među sociolozima i drugim društvenim delatnicima kojima je pitanje religije primarna sfera naučnog interesovanja. U tom ključu, „slučaj Francuske“ posebno je intrigantan i izazovan za proučavanje. Na prvi pogled, Francuska se ni po čemu ne izdvaja iz evropskog proseka. Naime, reč je o državi koja, kao i druge velike nacije jugozapadne Evrope, pripada staroj katoličkoj tradiciji. Međutim, njena posebnost se ogleda u oštroj odvojenosti između države i crkve i u snažnoj sprezi s idejom laiciteta shvaćenom kao jednom od fundamentalnih i stvaralačkih vrednosti same Republike. Ova supstancijalna karakteristika proishodi iz činjenice da je Francuska skoro do krajnjih granica emanirala „logiku države“, te da je ovaj sistem proizvod dugog procesa koji svoje poreklo vuče još iz perioda monarhije i njenih protivurečnosti, dok Zakon o odvajanju crkava i države iz 1905. godine predstavlja samo završni čin tog kretanja. Republika je tako u ovoj velikoj evropskoj državi postala osobeni oblik „civilne religije“ (*religion civique*) koja konsenzualno povezuje građane različitih konfesija i uverenja, bez obzira na to da li je reč o teistima ili ateistima, i odbacuje svaki upliv bilo koje religije u javnu sferu.

Francuski model laičke države (zasnovan na načelu laiciteta) u tom smislu garancija je narodnog suvereniteta, demokratije, univerzalizma, opšteg dobra, slobode, jednakosti i bratstva kao temeljnih principa na kojima je kovana Republika. Da bi zaista predstavljala javnu stvar (*res publica*), država u Francuskoj teži da bude neutralna i da ne utiče na verski izbor svojih građana, obezbeđujući jednakost svih u javnoj sferi i slobodu religijskog izražavanja u privatnom domenu. Ona je time određena i principom interkulturalizma odbacujući globalno hegemonu ideju multikulturalnosti koja često vodi fragmentiranosti i komunitarizmima. Drugim rečima, glavni zadatak države je da obezbedi univerzalni prostor kao zajedničko dobro svih stanovnika, a ovaj njen karakter jedan je od preduslova uspostavljanja nacije kao jedinstvene i moderne političke zajednice građana (Chnapper, 1994). Republika u tom smislu kao pravni subjekt priznaje isključivo pojedinca, boreći se protiv svih vrsti partikularizama i zauzimajući neprijateljski stav prema klerikalizmu i drugim pokušajima instrumentalizacije i političke upotrebe religije. Naravno, laička država je istovremeno „ideal- tip“ (Maks Veber), vrednost *per se* kojoj se teži, ali koja verovatno nikada ne može biti operacionalizovana u čistom obliku. Jer, podudaranja između ideja i ostvarene realnosti nikad nigde nije bilo, niti može da bude, s obzirom na to da je čovek jedino sposoban da je ocrtava i da se za nju bori, a ne da je, poput Boga, stvara iz svog uma (Đilas 1990: 21).

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U nastavku rada pokušaćemo da utvrdimo da li je rečeni model laičke države zaista ostvaren u Francuskoj, i u kojoj meri, te da vidimo koliko je *l'exception française* uslovljen osobenim lokalnim vrednostima, istorijskim kontekstom i socijalnim snagama koje su oblikovale takvu društvenu stvarnost, kao i na koji način je strukturno regulisan ovaj odnos države i crkve danas. Naravno, ovako kompleksan problem traži izuzetno nijansiranu i višeslojnu analizu, tako da ćemo se truditi da ispoštujemo i taj naučni zahtev.

Na ovom mestu važno je napraviti kratka kategorijalna razjašnjenja. I pored činjenice da se u francuskom govornom području pravi jasna razlika između pojmova *sekularizam/sekularizacija* i *laicitet/laicizacija*, u srpsko-hrvatskom jeziku ova dva koncepta se najčešće koriste kao sinonimi. Tako u rečniku stranih reči i izraza Milana Vujaklije možemo da uočimo da se latinska reč *sekularizam* prevodi kao *svetovnost*, dok se istovremeno pojmu *laički*, koji izvorno potiče iz grčkog jezika, takođe daju ista ili slična značenja: *svetovni, narodni, pučki*. Inače, ovakva naučna i dnevno-politička praksa nije neobična, niti potpuno neosnovana, jer je samu kovanicu *sekularizam* prvi put javno upotrebio filozof Džordž Džejkob

Holiouk (George Jacob Holyoake) da bi označio društveni pokret koji se bori za slabljenje značaja religije u javnom životu zajednice, za odvajanje crkve od države i za slobodu mišljenja i savesti. Međutim, s druge strane, francuski sociolog religije i historičar Žan Bobero (Jean Baubérot) predlaže posve razvijenije i historijski potpunije shvatanje koncepta *sekularizacije* i *laicizacije*, koje je već odomaćeno u francuskoj i širedruštvenoj nauci i čvrsto je naslonjeno na francusku tradiciju. On tako navodi da *sekularizacija* podrazumeva relativan i progresivan gubitak društvenih i individualnih povlastica koje je religija imala u društvu u nekim ranijim epohama, a sve u korist zajedničke kulture, dok, s druge strane, *laicizacija* uključuje analizu mesta i socijalne uloge religije na institucionalnom, državnom, planu (Baubérot, 2004). Dakle, drugačije kazano, *sekularizam* se uglavnom vezuje za društvo, a *laicizam* za državu, odnosno *sekularizacija* predstavlja jedan više sociološki proces udaljavanja društva od religioznog etosa, dok *laicizacija* uvek podrazumeva javnu politiku kojom se institucionalizovane religije guraju u privatnu sferu, u unutrašnji svet individua. U tom smislu, moguće je postojanje *sekularizacije* bez *laicizacije*, kao u Engleskoj, gde anglicizam uprkos duboko sekularizovanom društvu ostaje državna religija, i obrnuto, *laicizacija* bez *sekularizacije*, kao u Turskoj na primer, gde na institucionalnom nivou imamo potpunu odvojenost države od religijskih zajednica. Na tom tragu će ove kategorije biti tretirane i u nastavku teksta.

Strukturalna uslovljenost borbe za laičku državu u Francuskoj: socioistorijska perspektiva

Kao i u ostalim delovima Evrope, od formiranja moderne francuske države, verske zajednice i državne vlasti bile su u sprezi koja je svakako imala izrazito kompleksan karakter. Taj karakter su određivala različita pitanja društvenog života, poput: državnog uređenja, obrazovanja, verskih sloboda, legitimnosti države, monopola na istinu, autonomije bilo države, bilo crkve, finansiranja verskih zajednica itd. Katolička crkva u Francuskoj redovno je pokušavala da iskoristi svoje dobre odnose sa svetovnim vladarima kako bi uz pomoć države ostvarila što jači duhovni uticaj na društvo. Međutim, odmah treba reći da je istorijat ovih odnosa između profanih i autoriteta u oblasti svetog, veoma buran, tj. prožet kako procesima saradnje, tako i periodima velikih sukoba, pa čak i otvorenih neprijateljstava (Borne 2004). Takođe, pitanje uređenja odnosa verskih zajednica i države je u novom veku predstavljalo značajan izvor unutar-državnog političkog sukoba između francuske levice i desnice posebno, a u širem smislu i između pristalica laičke države i zastupnika čvršće

povezanosti države i crkve kao osnove moralnog zdravlja društva i intrinzičnog hrišćanskog identiteta nacije. Naravno, postoje brojni, pre svega istorijski i društveni razlozi koji su određujuće uticali na ovaj odnos koji tvori osoben „francuski slučaj“.

„Francuski put“ je posebno intrigantan zbog toga što Francuska, kao jedna od najvećih evropskih sila, neposredno učestvuje u svim kontroverzama oko izbora pape, „velike šizme“, premeštanja poglavarove prestonice iz Rima u francuski gradić Avinjon itd. Osim toga, uprkos Reformaciji, ova velika evropska država ostaje većinski katolička zemlja, što nije slučaj s drugim silama centralne i severne Evrope. Naravno, to ima svoje korene u osobenoj francuskoj socijalnoj i političkoj istoriji. Naime, u odnosu na Poljsku, Austriju, Španiju i ostale uticajne katoličke zemlje, u kojima je papstvo ostvarivalo nesumnjivu suprematiju nad svetovnim vlastima, u Francuskoj je situacija bila mnogo složenija, pa i potpuno drugačija u smislu odnosa države i crkve. Tako Stejn Rokan (Stein Rokan) konceptualnu kartu zapadne Evrope deli na Francusku i na ostale katoličke države obeležene kontrareformacijom, definišući Francusku kao primer „nacionalnog katolicizma“ (Selier 1998). S obzirom na to da precizan opis i objašnjenje serije dramatičnih promena u odnosu države i crkve u Francuskoj zahteva jednu posebnu naučnu studiju, na ovom mestu ćemo u osnovnim crtama naznačiti najvažnije događaje koji određuju sudbinu veze političkog i religijskog u Francuskoj sve do naših dana: to su svakako velika Francuska revolucija iz 1789. godine i Zakon o odvajanju crkava i države iz 1905. godine.

Katolička crkva je u okolnostima praktične monarhističke simbioze crkvene i državne vlasti (uz prevashodnu nadmoć druge), dočekala događanja iz 1789. godine i došla pod udar većine revolucionara. Francuska revolucija nesumnjivo predstavlja tadašnji vrhunac praktičnog odvajanja države od crkve – pa i početak ere dovođenja u sumnju same vere – a nakon nje je inicirana svetovna država kao negacija srednjovekovne države utelovljene na teološkim učenjima. Ovaj događaj brzog ritma možemo da razumemo i kao deo procesa dugog trajanja (Fernan Brodel) u kontekstu intelektualne klime koja ga je ideološki inspirisala i pripremala (pre svega u krugovima racionalista i prosvetitelja). Naime, duhovnu klimu XIX, a dobrim delom i XVIII veka čini verovanje u razum, progres i slobodu. Naravno, koreni laiciteta sežu mnogo dalje od prosvetiteljstva, dok se sama filozofija prosvetiteljstva često tumači intencijom da se sve stvari procenjuju pomoću prosvetiteljstva razuma koji se pomalo simplifikovano suprotstavlja „mračnjaštvu“ hrišćanskog otkrovenja.

Zanimljivo je i to da filozofi prosvetiteljstva uopšte neće biti funkcionalni ateisti, već više deisti.¹

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Kako je tekao istorijski tok događaja u tom periodu koji je kasnije u najvećem odredio sudbinu crkve i njenu društvenu ulogu u Francuskoj? Da bi pronašla rešenje za finansijsku krizu i ublažila socijalna nezadovoljstva, francuska kraljevska vlada saziva *Etats Generaux*.² U inicijalnim žalbenim beleškama, podnesenim od strane sva tri staleža (plemstvo, kler i treći stalež), ne može se naći nikakav antireligijski stav, a kler se čak i ujedinjuje s revolucionarnom buržoazijom tokom konstituisanja Ustavotvorne skupštine, što predstavlja okidač za revoluciju. Početkom avgusta 1789. godine, kler i plemstvo se odriču dela svojih privilegija, a 26. avgusta iste godine svi glasaju za Deklaraciju o pravima čoveka i građanina. Međutim, 2. novembra, naknadno dobrovoljno raščinjeni revolucionar, Taljeran (Talleyrand), biskup od d'Autuna, predlaže da se crkvena dobra stave na raspolaganje naciji kako bi se lakše prebrodila finansijska kriza, što izaziva žestoku i negativnu reakciju klera i podršku revolucionara. Ovim počinje definitivni „razvod“ između revolucije i Katoličke crkve, a crkveni analitičari tvrde kako je ovaj predlog u stvari bio podsticaj za kasnije pljačkanje crkvenog blaga i rušenje njenog inventara. U februaru 1790. godine Ustavotvorna skupština zabranjuje glas kleru, a Crkva polako gubi svoj institucionalni položaj posle „nacionalizacije“ od strane revolucionarne vlade (Bedouelle i Costa 1998). Zakon koji se tiče religije i Katoličke crkve iz ovog perioda ipak nema antireligijski naboj, ali svakako nastoji da crkveni život uredi u duhu melanža prosvetiteljstva i galikanizma. Evo glavnih elemenata tog zakona: 1. rekonstrukcija uništenih biskupija po departmanima; 2. sveštenici postaju plaćeni državni funkcioneri; 3. institucija biskupa više ni na koji način ne zavisi od pape, 4. „zakletva vernosti“ Republici Francuskoj je ključni zahtev kleru (Rouche 2007).

Otopljanje odnosa između pape i Pariza, kao i između države i crkve u samoj Francuskoj, dolazi po ustoličenju Bonaparte na vlast, koji iz pragmatičnih razloga svoj dodatni legitimitet crpe u religiji, dok zauzvrat

1 Jedan od najistaknutijih predstavnika deizma bio je znameniti Fransoa Mari Arue (François-Marie Arouet), poznatiji kao Volter (Voltaire). Inače, deizam potiče od latinske reči *Deus*, što znači Bog. Deisti veruju u postojanje Boga, ali u racionalnom smislu, pri čemu su osnova njihovog verovanja razum i nauka, a ne otkrojenja i tvrdnje pojedinaca koje se ne mogu proveriti. Deisti se ne vezuju ni za jednu od tradicionalnih religija, a sam Volter denuncira zloupotrebe i „tiraniju“ institucije kao što je Katolička crkva uz sada već legendarnu parolu: „smrviti bestidnicu!“ (*écraser l'infâme!*).

2 Vrsta skupštine sastavljene od predstavnika najvažnijih staleža, koju bi sazivao kralj kako bi se pronašlo što legitimnije rešenje za političku ili ekonomsku krizu u državi. Ovaj oblik „demokratske“ procedure praktikovan je čitavih 487 godina, tj. od 1302. do 1789. godine.

potpisuje konkordat 1801. godine – kojim je Papska država obnovljena – čime Crkva delimično rehabilituje svoj institucionalni položaj. Ipak, točak istorije se ne može vratiti nazad, tako da Crkva više nikada neće imati onaj status iz predrevolucionarnog perioda. Prema konkordatu, crkve i manastiri koji su bili konfiskovani pod „Terorom“ ne podležu pod režim restitucije (oni su dakle i dalje vlasništvo Francuske), ali ostaju istovremeno i na raspolaganju Crkvi, a neki od njih počinju da se tretiraju kao nacionalno blago. Takođe, država je ta koja bira kardinale, dok se uloga pape svodi na to da samo potvrđuje njihovu investituru. U suštini, Crkva, iako u boljem položaju, biva podređena Republici.³ Bilo kako bilo, iako su u drugim državama i jezicima crkva i republika i te kako kompatibilni koncepti, u Francuskoj je njihov odnos loš od samog početka. „Ljudi od politike“ XIX veka ne umeju da budu istovremeno katolici i republikanci: izbor strane je jednostavno bio nužan. Bonapartino Drugo carstvo (*Le Second Empire*) definitivno pada 1870. godine nakon sukoba sa Bizmarkovom Pruskom, ali ideja monarhije i dalje je prisutna u Francuskoj.

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Treća Republika (*La Troisième République*), shvaćena više kao privremen i tranzitorni režim, biva instalirana samo zahvaljujući odlučnosti glavnog pretendenta na tron. Republikanci su svesni da je njihova pozicija slaba. Oni svoju borbu primarno usmeravaju ka laicitetu i obrazovanju, a laičko školovanje, naročito žena, postaje glavni cilj borbe. Razlog je najefektnije objasnio jedan od „očeva osnivača“ republikanskog identiteta na francuskoj desnici, Žul Feri (Jules Ferry): „U političkoj borbi, žena ne može da bude neutralna: onaj ko pridobije ženu, dobija sve, najpre jer pridobija dete, a zatim i muža [...] To je razlog zašto vlast želi da sačuva ženu, a to je i razlog zašto mi želimo da im je preotmemo.“⁴ Nakon Ferija (1880. godine) prolazi skoro dvadeset godina bez stvarne promene na planu laicizacije. Sa aferom Drajfus (Dreyfus), koja je eksplodirala 1898. godine, Francuska se deli na dva bloka: „drajfusovce“ (među kojima uglavnom nalazimo deo leve) i „antidrajfusovce“, koji grupišu u najvećem „ljude desnice“ i jedan veliki deo vojne hijerarhije. Međutim, bilo bi pojednostavljeno da aferu

3 Videti recimo član 6. konkordata: „Biskupi, pre stupanja na dužnost, pred Glavnim konzulom (titula koju je Bonaparta sam sebi nadenuo – *prim. I. M.*), izriču zakletvu vernosti koja je bila u upotrebi i pre promene vlade, koristeći sledeće reči: „Kunem se u svete anđele i obećavam Bogu da ću se pokoravati i biti veran vladi etabliiranoj na osnovu Ustava Republike. Obećavam takođe da neću sklapati nikakve sporazume, niti učestvovati u savetima ili udruživati se u savezima, bilo unutar ili izvan države, koji bi bili u suprotnosti sa javnim mirom; i da ću, ako saznam da se u mojoj eparhiji ili drugde podriiva državni poredak, obavestiti vladu o tome.“ Sadržaj celog konkordata pogledati na: <http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/france/1801concordat.htm> (pristupljeno 15. 8. 2013)

4 Videti <http://revuesocialisme.pagesperso-orange.fr/s12femmes.html> (pristupljeno 15. 8. 2013)

Drajfus gledamo samo kroz prizmu suprotstavljanja između republikanske levice i klerikalne i militarističke desnice (npr. prvi Drajfusov branilac je jedan pukovnik, katolički vojnik). Predsedničko pomilovanje potvrđeno Drajfusu u septembru 1899. godine predstavlja jednu vrstu kompromisa, međutim, ova afera, koja je osvetlila nivo antisemitizma i polarizacije francuskog društva, vodila je ka obnovi antiklerikalizma na levisi i kritičkog mišljenja, kao i pitanja o odvojenosti države i crkve (Rosanvallon 1983).

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Drugi markantan događaj koji je odlučujuće uticao na laički karakter današnje Francuske jeste svakako usvajanje Zakona o odvajanju crkava i države, koji je izglasan 9. decembra 1905. godine.⁵ Naravno, kao što smo pomenuli, proces stvaranja laičke države kakvu poznajemo predstavlja deo širih gibanja koja počinju još 1789. godine (dok su 1876. godine prvi put zabeleženi parlamentarci koji su zahtevali ukidanje javnog finansiranja religijskih zajednica) i u koje su intrinzično ugrađeni republikanski principi. Predlozi zakona se umnožavaju počevši od 1900. godine, a s obzirom na njihovu radikalnost, zbog straha od ateističke republike, dolazi do zajedničkog nastupa katoličkih, protestantskih i jevrejskih predstavnika kako bi se ublažili predloženi projekti. Svojom odlučnošću, premijer nove vlade (1902–1905), levi radikal Emil Kombe (Emile Combes) i ujedinjena levica koju čine levi radikali i Žoresovi (Jean Jaurès) socijalisti uspevaju da protiv sebe okupe u isti front sve religije koje se praktikuju u Francuskoj. Zakon o odvajanju crkava i države napokon je bio izglasan 9. decembra 1905. godine uz brojne amandmane i uprkos žestokim podelama u društvu, čime Francuska definitivno postaje laička država, a religija od tada pripada uglavnom privatnoj sferi. Ovaj zakon se nastavlja na onaj od 1. jula 1901. i često balansira između slobode i represije. Čine ga 44 člana grupisana u šest poglavlja (Larkin 2004).

Prvo, važno je reći da je reč o Zakonu o odvajanju crkava od države, jer su njime obuhvaćene pre svega četiri tradicionalne i dominantne konfesije: katolicizam, luteranizam, kalvinizam i judaizam. Takođe, ovaj zakon definitivno ukida konkordatski režim, tj. konkordat etabliran još 1801. godine od strane Napoleona Bonaparte koji je do tog momenta suštinski regulisao odnose između dve institucije. Duh zakona o odvajanju najautentičnije je izražen u prva dva člana, kojima se najpre proklamuju sloboda savesti i praktikovanja religije (član 1), ali se i zabranjuju bilo kakve javne subvencije svim religijama, kao i finansiranje sveštenika (član 2).⁶

5 Videti <http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/france/1905laicite.htm> (pristupljeno 7. 8. 2013)

6 Veliki zakon Republike, videti <http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/france/1905laicite.htm> (pristupljeno 28. 8. 2013).

Isto tako, država objavljuje svoju religijsku neutralnost: prvi put u zemlji koja je prozvana „starijom ćerkom crkve“, ako izuzmemo period „Terora“ (Paul 2005). Dakle, država smatra da je njena dužnost da garantuje uslove u kojima će se slobodno vršiti religija, bez obzira na to o kojoj religiji je reč. Bez apsolutne redukcije religije na privatnu sferu, postaje evidentno da se Zakonom propisuje da religija ne treba da interveniše u poslove države, kao ni država u poslove religije, što je bio glavni cilj republikanaca.

Koje su najvažnije posledice Zakona?

1. Praktične posledice su posebno važne za crkvu, jer prvi put nakon Revolucije sveštenici, pastori i rabini više nisu državni činovnici, pa samim tim nisu ni na platnom spisku države.
2. Iz ovoga sledi da ni država više ne interveniše u poslove crkve, ni na jednom nivou, tako da se rešava problem postavljanja biskupa od strane svetovnih vlasti koji okupira odnos države i crkve još od srednjeg veka.
3. Što se tiče postojećih katoličkih, protestantskih i jevrejskih građevina, one postaju vlasništvo države, a država mora da obezbedi pristup u ovim objektima i novim kulturnim udruženjima, ali samo ukoliko vrše religijske obrede, bez mogućnosti korišćenja religijskih svetinja u druge socijalne, kulturne, obrazovne ili komercijalne svrhe (Boyer, 2005).

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Dakle, za razliku od perioda Revolucije, religijske bogomolje nisu konvertovane u muzeje ili skladišta, kao što su se neki plašili a drugi nadali da će biti posledica tih gibanja na prelazu između vekova. Zakon je naravno oštro kritikovan od strane Vatikana, a papa Pije X jednostrano prekida svaki odnos s francuskom Vladom.⁷ On je ispravno shvaćen u Crkvi kao poslednja etapa dugog procesa laicizacije i sekularizacije koji je započeo s Revolucijom, a i dalje se razume kao brutalan prelom i negativno iskustvo za razliku od separacije *à la américaine*, koja je podržana od strane liberalne manjine u katoličkom mnjenju. Ovaj *modus vivendi* etabliran između Republike i katolicizma u Francuskoj i dalje reflektuje inicijalnu tenziju, čak i kada su njihovi odnosi danas uglavnom obeleženi srdačnošću. Važno je napomenuti i da istočne francuske pokrajine Alzas i Mosel, koje su bile pod nemačkom upravom 1905. godine, a u pravni i politički poredak Francuske se vraćaju tek 1919. godine, nisu

⁷ Diplomatski odnosi između Francuske i Vatikana zvanično se obnavljaju tek nakon završetka Prvog svetskog rata, 1921. godine.

obuhvaćene ovim zakonom o odvajanju države i crkve. One i danas beneficiraju specijalan status, kao dugo nasleđe konkordata iz 1801. godine. Neki autori smatraju da je ovaj primer dokaz o nedoslednosti sprovođenja principa laiciteta u Francuskoj (Peña-Ruiz 2003).

Osnovni principi i logika odnosa države i crkve u Francuskoj

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Odnos crkve i države deluje nam kao pogodno tle da na elementarnom nivou osvetlimo značaj i značenje religije u Francuskoj, kao i u kratkoj uporednoj perspektivi, sličnosti i razlike sa ostalim zemljama Zapadne Evrope. Taj se zadatak najpre može ispuniti ukoliko uporedimo najkarakterističnije modele odnosa religijskih zajednica i države u naznačenom delu sveta. Danas nailazimo na svega nekoliko primenjivih modela ovih odnosa: 1. *model državne crkve*, 2. *model priznatih ili istorijskih, tradicionalnih religija*, 3. *model potpune odvojenosti crkve od države*, i najzad 4. *model saradničke separacije* (Vukomanović 2004: 77).

Prvi model, tj. *model državne crkve* podrazumeva da država priznaje jednu religiju, tj. crkvu kao državnu, čime se njene dogme ugrađuju kao društveni svetopogledi, a njoj samoj garantuju monopolske ili privilegovane pozicije u verskom životu. Verski status državne crkve u ovom slučaju legitimise se činjenicom da okuplja veliku većinu vernika. U ovakvim konstelacijama snaga, verska institucija često je deo državne administracije, a ukoliko to nije slučaj, država zadržava neku vrstu kontrole nad njom, pogotovo u pogledu finansiranja i nominacija verskih dužnosnika. To je, uostalom, slučaj sa Luteranskom crkvom u Finskoj i Norveškoj, ili sa Anglikanskom u Engleskoj. Međutim, i tu postoje važne razlike, poput onih da se u Norveškoj, na primer, crkva finansira iz javnih prihoda, dok u engleskom slučaju ona ne dobija nikakvu državnu pomoć. S druge strane, u Engleskoj je crkva u zakonskom okviru potpuno podređena državi, odnosno kraljevskoj porodici, pa tako imamo situaciju da je monarh (Vrhovni poglavar i „Branilac vere“) taj koji bira biskupe, a ne svešteno lice na najvišem položaju u crkvenoj hijerarhiji (kao što je kanterberijski nadbiskup). Ovaj model se, dakle, najčešće sreće u protestantskim državama Evrope, u prvom redu iz teoloških razloga. U najkraćem, državna crkva uglavnom služi kao nosilac tradicije date nacije i centar okupljanja većeg dela populacije. Takva pozicija daje crkvi ne samo privilegije nego i autonomiju koja se najčešće ne može sresti u zemljama s katoličkom većinom (Riis 1988).

Model tradicionalnih religija pak znači da država uglavnom priznaje određeni broj religija i daje im jednaka prava, dok nepriznate verske zajednice

nemaju ista prava. Dakle, ovde se priznaje određeni broj verskih tradicija koje su istorijski i duhovno odlučujuće učestvovala u oblikovanju nacije ili drugih kolektiviteta unutar nekog društva, čime im se daju neka prava koja se negiraju nepriznatim crkvama. Ovakva praksa poznata je recimo u Belgiji, u kojoj su priznate samo katolička, protestantska, pravoslavna i jevrejska zajednica i samo se za njih organizuje verska nastava u školama.

Model pune odvojenosti crkve od države primenjuje se u svojoj striktnoj i umerenoj varijanti u državama poput SAD, Holandije, Nemačke, Portugalije, Luksemburga i Francuske. Naravno, savremena primena ovog modela u zapadnom, a verovatno i u svetskom kontekstu (ako izuzmemo iz analize države u kojima preovladava antireligijski konsenzus, poput Kine), najdoslovnija je u Francuskoj, gde se religija tretira kao privatna stvar svakog pojedinca, što praktično znači da se isključuje bilo kakvo mešanje političkih vlasti u unutrašnje poslove crkve, ali i bilo kakav uticaj crkve na javni prostor. Nigde separacija nije bila toliko velika kao u Francuskoj gde je i sekularizacija otišla najdalje (Remond 2001: 248).⁸ Najpoznatiji primer umerene varijante ovog modela svakako su SAD, koje su specifične i zbog koegzistencije izrazito velikog broja konfesionalnih zajednica. Za razliku od Francuske, u SAD se permanentno više od 90% građana izjašnjavaju kao verujući, a od toga veliki broj njih čine aktivno religiozni ljudi koji redovno pohađaju religijske manifestacije, učestvuju u ritualima, čitaju versku literaturu itd. Odvajanje crkve i države u SAD naslonjeno je na Prvi amandman Ustava ove države koji kaže da zakonodavno telo „neće doneti nikakav zakon u smislu etabliranja religije, ili zabrane njene slobodne ekspresije“, čime je prema Tomasu Džefersonu (Thomas Jefferson) „podignut zid između crkve i države“ (Weber, 1988). Ipak, ovaj model nije striktno primenjen u SAD ni u jednom periodu njene istorije, a primeri njegove relativizacije svakako se mogu naći u javnom finansiranju verskih škola u nekim državama, u polaganju zakletve predsednika i javnih funkcionera nad Biblijom,⁹ u naglašavanju značaja religije u pojedinačnim ustavima svih država SAD, u činjenici da senat i predstavnički dom započinju svoje sednice molitvom i imaju plaćene sveštenike, te da na papirnim novčanicama nacionalne valute dolara od 1865. godine piše „u Boga verujemo“ itd.

8 Treba reći da postoje autori koji tvrde da je svet generalno danas u istoj meri religiozan kao što je oduvek bio, te da su naučnici koji se koriste teorijom sekularizacije u suštini u krivu (Berger, 2008: 11–31). Citirani autor je inače bio jedan od kreatora tzv. teorije sekularizacije.

9 Tako je Barack Obama položio zakletvu kao 44. predsednik SAD na Bibliji koju je pre toga koristio Abraham Linkoln (pre 148. godina), u istoriji zapamćen po svojoj misiji ukidanja ropstva.

Najzad, postoji i tzv. *model saradničke separacije* koji je prisutan u zemljama poput Španije ili Italije, a karakteriše ga sklapanje sporazuma s verskim zajednicama. Italijanski slučaj posebno je ilustrativan zbog specifične geografske i istorijske uloge ove države u religijskom svetu. Naime, nakon supstancijalne uloge pape kao svetovnog vladara centralne Italije do njenog ujedinjenja, preko kontradiktornog odnosa države i crkve u fašističkom periodu, kao i tesne veze između katolicizma i vladajućeg režima političke desnice do 80-ih, 1984. godina označava početak nove epohe u odnosima države i verskih zajednica. Naime, konkordatom iz tog perioda Crkva je zadržala brojne privilegije (uključujući i veronauku u državnim školama), ali je ipak došlo do određenog distanciranja između Crkve i države, uključujući i činjenicu da se država odriče mešanja u imenovanje sveštenika. Sva ostala pitanja – uključujući i pitanje finansiranja, koje sada karakteriše sistem dobrovoljnog verskog poreza – takođe su rešena posebnim ugovorima kojima se verskim zajednicama priznaje njihova komplementarnost s modernim društvom (Francis 1992). Ovo je manje više model prema kome se teži u Evropskoj uniji. U svakom slučaju, nijedan od modela ne postoji u čistom obliku u evropskim državama, odnosno, svaki od ovih glavnih modela u konkretnoj praksi uključuje pojedine elemente iz preostala tri.

Francuska predstavlja arhetipski model unitarne i centralističke nacije-države.¹⁰ Neki autori čak je stavljaju u rang idealnog tipa „rukovođenja državom preko države“ (up. Badie i Birnbaum 1983). Poznata formula Žula Ferija da se „moderna država svuda oslanja na koncepciju javnog interesa koji pred sobom ruši sve posebne interese“, što u stvari „modernu državu razdvaja od feudalne“, na najbolji način ilustruje francusko shvatanje prirode države i omogućava da se razumeju ne samo laicitet nego i uloga namenjena javnom servisu. U nastavku ćemo pokušati da rezimiramo francuski etatistički model najpre kao državu u čisto veberijanskom značenju pojma, tj. izrazito diferenciranu i šaroliku tvorevinu koja predstavlja „stvaraoća društvenog“. Ovaj njen karakter je vodi ka promišljanju religiozne sfere, pre nego što će uticati na transformaciju odnosa između religije i društva. Naše je mišljenje, dakle, da francuski model države u velikoj mери odgovara klasičnoj definiciji Maksa Vebera (Max Weber) prema kojoj je država „političko preduzeće institucionalnog karaktera čije administrativno rukovodstvo zahteva uspešnu primenu svojih pravila i koje ima legitimni monopol nad fizičkom prisilom“ (Weber 1995: 96–97). Da bismo ostali verni celini Veberovog izlaganja, definiciju možemo dopuniti sledećom

10 U ovom delu rada se u najvećem oslanjamo na uvide iz istraživanja francusko-belgijskog politikologa Danijela-Luja Selijea (Selier 1998 i 2002).

sentencom: „na datoj teritoriji“, čime naglašavamo da se monopol svake države zaustavlja na jednoj preciznoj tački, tj. tamo gde počinje druga država. U veberijanskim kategorijama politike, država predstavlja specifičan vid političke dominacije koji se razlikuje od drugih svojim razumskim karakterom, i u političkoj oblasti predstavlja ono što kapitalizam reflektuje u ekonomskom, ili hrišćanstvo u teološkom domenu. Razumska perspektiva koja se upisuje u veberijanskoj sociologiji, inkarnirana je u administraciji, tj. birokratiji koja proizvodi i primenjuje pravila i norme u procesu obezbeđivanja političke kontrole na državnoj teritoriji.

Ovim karakteristikama treba dodati da je republikanska država u Francuskoj želela i želi da bude „društveni učitelj“ (Rosanvallon 1983). U stvari, reč *instituteur* na francuskom može značiti osnivač i učitelj, od čega je ovo drugo u stvari derivat i izvedenica iz prvog. S jedne strane, uloga države je da „utemeljuje“ društvo, ili, tačnije, da nastoji da ga reosnuje na novoj bazi, a u isto vreme ona je i uzrok i odgovor na individualizam. Naime, država ne poznaje ništa drugo do pojedinaca, kojima dosta kasno dozvoljava pravo na udruživanje, tj. tek 1901. godine. Drugim rečima, država ne priznaje staleže, korporacije, niti bilo kakve privilegije ili (nad)zajednice, bez obzira na to da li je reč o etničkim ili religijskim. Ona isto tako stvara naciju, jedinu legitimnu političku zajednicu, shvaćenu kao solidarni skup građana: slobodnih i jednakih u pravima. Takođe, državna (javna) škola u Francuskoj ne predstavlja, kao recimo u Engleskoj, odgovor na društveni zahtev za neutralnom edukacijom, već pre svega služi da kao „svetionik demokratije“ formira građanina (*citoyen*), kritički ga „indoktrinirajući“ republikanskim vrednostima i pripremajući ga za ulazak u naciju negiranjem svake partikularne privilegije na osnovu pola, religije, klase ili etniciteta. U operacionalizaciji ove uloge, uzimajući u obzir istorijsko nasleđe, država kao „društveni učitelj“ jednostavno je morala da se stavi u opoziciju prema religijama, a posebno prema katoličanstvu kao glavnoj konfesiji Francuza koja je igrala značajnu ulogu u stvaranju „francuskog identiteta“. U tom ključu, Francuska će dugo predstavljati model progresivnim pokretima i organizacijama na jugu Evrope, kao i u Belgiji, a i muslimanska Turska je u velikoj meri uvezla francuska rešenja koja su bila na snazi u periodu između Zakona Feri i Zakona o odvajanju crkava i države.

Međutim, francuski uticaj ima svoje granice jer logika racionalno-birokratske države, u veberijanskom značenju tog pojma, leži, između ostalog, i u prisvajanju institucionalizovane religijske sfere. Ona se, dakle, obično sprovodi preko *modela državne (etablirane) crkve* čiji je poglavar svetovni monarh, a uloga religijskih zajednica uglavnom je relativizovana

društvenim kontekstom u kome dominiraju sekularizacija i tolerancija. Takva je situacija, kao što smo pomenuli, u Velikoj Britaniji i Skandinaviji. Neuspeh protestantske reforme u latinskim državama južne Evrope prate nasilni sukobi između Katoličke crkve, s jedne strane, i „tvoraca nacionalne države“, s druge. Konfrontacije koje se u ovim državama završavaju regulisanjem odnosa između države i crkve, koji je uglavnom bio uređen u korist crkve, ipak predstavljaju začetak jedne labave sekularizacije. Iz ideološke perspektive, opozicija između crkve i države koja se javlja u Francuskoj, na Pirinejskom poluostrvu, i manjim delom u Italiji, obeležena je antagonizmom između monarhističkog katoličkog integralizma i nostalgije za starim režimom (*ancien régime*), i laičkog republikanizma koji proklamuje tvrdi antiklerikalizam, narodni suverenitet i demokratiju. Čuvena je maksima „oca osnivača“ francuskog socijalizma Žana Žoresa (Jean Jaurès): „Demokratija i laicitet su identični pojmovi.“¹¹ U jednom takvom kontekstu, levica proizašla iz radničkog pokreta biva gurnuta u amalgam između socijalnog i religijskog pitanja,¹² a hrišćanska demokratija koja pokušava da, povezujući hrišćanstvo i demokratiju, ponudi vernicima drugačiju opciju od one predložene od strane klasične desnice, nikada nije izašla sa margina, osim u Italiji, čime se ova zemlja približava modelima u Austriji, Nemačkoj, Belgiji, Švajcarskoj itd. U tom smislu, Francuska izvorno pripada istoj kompaktnoj osnovi sa Španijom i Portugalom. Međutim, francuski i „pirinejski“ put se račvaju kada u Francuskoj Republika trijumfuje i otvara vrata prosvetiteljstvu i laicitetu, dok s druge strane Pirineja ona doživljava neuspeh i biva uništena od strane reakcionarne diktature. Dakle, sve supstancijalne potonje razlike počivaju na činjenici da u prelomnim istorijskim trenucima imamo različite pobednike, čime „francuski eksces“ postaje petrifikovano stanje do naših dana.

11 Đorđević, M., *Republika*, br. 352–353 (<http://www.republika.co.rs/352-353/20.html>; pristupljeno 25. 7. 2013).

12 Generalno, stvaranje suprotstavljenih mreža desnice i levice naročito se kristalizuje u periodu između 1880. i 1914. godine. Radi se o epohi u kojoj su pitanja republike, prava na obrazovanje, sekularnosti i dr. određivala tada aktuelne političke izazove. Crkva, na primer, u tom periodu, odbacuje republiku, pravo na školovanje ženske dece, pravo na odmor učenicima, kao i pravo na građanstvo (*citoyenté*) za nekatolike. Crkvena utvrđenja, naime, čvrsto brane desničarski monopol iz sela u selo. Politički rascjep desnice i levice reflektuje se u ovoj epohi i kroz geografiju glasova, gde stari republikanski feudi i jakobinska utvrđenja iz revolucije glasaju u mnogo većoj meri za levicu. Takođe, u pomenutom formativnom periodu radnički pokret se ubrzano konstituše i povezuje s levicom, tako da regioni poput: le Pas de Calais, le Nord, la région de Saint Etienne, Saint Nazaire itd. postaju „crveni bastioni“. Levica tako korespondira socijalnoj stvarnosti, radničkoj i narodnoj, dok se desnica oslanja više na gazde i na nezavisne sitnoburžoasko profesije. Recimo, u pariskom regionu, dvadeseti „narodni arondisman/opština“ glasa više za levicu, dok u šesnaestom, buržoaskom, desnica ima apsolutnu hegemoniju. I tako decenijama unazad, uključujući i poslednje predsedničke i parlamentarne izbore.

Sistem zajedničkog verovanja (svojevrсна *religion civique*) koji utemeljuje vrednosti Republike Francuske podrazumeva jednu osobenu strukturu koju bismo mogli da izrazimo kroz dijalektiku između individue i države, a ne, kako bi to u najvećem bio američki slučaj, u odnosu pojedinca i društva. Pojedinaac je tu shvaćen kao pomalo „automatizovani“ građanin i prirodni posednik fundamentalnih prava, od kojih su glavna: sloboda i jednakost, dok se država pojavljuje kao garant za realizaciju individualne slobode i jednakosti kod svakog građanina, bez obzira na njegove religijske, etničke, teritorijalne, rodne itd. identitete ili pak klasni položaj (iako se ne negira činjenica da između građanina i Republike postoje brojne formalne i neformalne zajednice). U tom kontekstu, postoji intencija da se rečene partikularnosti prebace u privatnu sferu svakog pojedinca, pa tako i odnos prema religiji postaje privatna stvar (Massignon 2000). To je i razlog zašto univerzalistička Republika zvanično ne prepoznaje ovu paletu razlika da bi uopšte pomišljala na to da ih organizuje i garantuje im suživot promovisuci vrednosti tolerancije. Jedino društveno legitimna politička zajednica, tj. država, kao inkarnacija nacije, može iz te perspektive da osigura solidarnost – od 1848. institucionalno obeležena i ugrađena u temelj Republike kao *fraternité* ili bratstvo – između pojedinačnih građana. Sve verske denominacije, od katolika, protestanata, preko Jevreja i sve brojnijih muslimana, ali i neverujućih ljudi, politeista, sekularnih humanista i agnostika, mogu da prepoznaju svoje interese u ovoj koncepciji, iako najbrojnija i istorijski najrelevantnija katolička zajednica posledično pokazuje najveće nezadovoljstvo zbog gubljenja ranijeg privilegovanog položaja. Država je načelno neutralna u odnosu na religijske uticaje, a nijedno duhovno uverenje nema primat niti uživa simboličke ili materijalne povlastice koje bi mogle da dovedu u pitanje princip jednakosti.¹³ U tom smislu, francuska laička država neizostavno i sistemski ukida bilo kakvu mogućnost

13 Ova manje ili više uspešna stoletna tradicija insistiranja na laičkoj i sekularnoj državi ostavila je traga na francusko društvo. Naime, prema relevantnim sociološkim istraživanjima iz 2012. godine u Francuskoj 52,7% stanovništva pripada Rimokatoličkoj crkvi, 30,7% su nereligiozni, oko 5% su muslimanske veroispovedi, protestanata ima 2%, a Jevreja 0,6%. Preostalih skoro 5% pripada drugim religijskim zajednicama, ili se ne izjašnjava. Videti <http://www.cevipof.com/fr/2012/notes/electoratssociologiques/> (pristupljeno: 15. 9. 2013). Dakle, ukoliko poredimo navedene podatke Centra za politička istraživanja Fakulteta političkih nauka u Parizu s onim od pre samo 25 godina predstavljenim u istoj studiji, primetićemo značajan porast nereligioznih i drastično smanjenje osoba koji se izjašnjavaju kao katolici. Naime, za 1988. godinu možemo videti sledeći odnos ovih kohorti: 81,9% katolika, 12,9% ateista, oko 0,6% muslimana, 1,9% protestanata i Jevreja 0,4%. Prema rezultatima pak globalne studije WIN-Galup International Češka i Francuska dele prvo i drugo mesto po broju ateista u Evropi (po 30% i 29% učesća ateista u ukupnoj populaciji), a u svetu su ispred njih još samo Kina sa 47% i Japan sa 31% ateista. Videti http://www.tnsmediumgallup.co.rs/newsletters/Newsletter_TNSMediumGallup_Religioznost%20i%20ateizam_Jul_12.pdf (pristupljeno 15. 9. 2013).

povlašćenosti nekog religijskog ili filozofskog shvatanja, a narodna suverenost, kao plod prosvetiteljstva i Revolucije, posledično se prenosi i na najniži nivo, tj. u ovom slučaju na suverenitet samog građanina (Boyer 1993).

Kako se ovi temeljni principi implementiraju na konkretnom planu glavnih nivoa vlasti?

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1. *Na zakonodavnom planu*, u francuskom Ustavu država je definisana kao laička, a političko-administrativna i religijska moć potpuno su odvojene. Ova separacija potvrđena je ustavima iz 1946. i 1958, a po potrebi se uređuje posebnim zakonima. Aktuelni predsednik Francuske, socijalista François Hollande (François Hollande), tokom izborne kampanje 2012. obećavao je da će Zakon iz 1905. godine implementirati u najviši akt Republike, tj. u Ustav.¹⁴ Stanovništvo se ne popisuje po veroispovesti, a država može da ima uticaj na vernika samo ako se on pojavljuje u svojstvu građanina. Takođe, državnim funkcionerima se zabranjuje isticanje religijskih simbola, a svaki građanin ima pravo da se usprotivi religioznom delovanju koje ugrožava javni poredak. Država isto tako odbija da se meša u poslove crkve, a verski identitet nekog građanina, ne sprečava ga da ostvaruje prava koja uživaju i drugi građani, ali mu ne priznaje ni mogućnost da se poziva na posebne privilegije zbog te pripadnosti. Religijska nastava strogo je zabranjena u državnim školama, a država ne sme da finansira religijske organizacije s obzirom na to da se religija tretira kao privatna stvar svakog pojedinca. Religijski simboli dozvoljeni su svuda, osim na mestima i u institucijama koje simbolišu laičku državu, poput škole, javnih službi, pošte, univerziteta itd. Država ostavlja mogućnost da zabrani svaki kult koji ugrožava javni poredak i mir,¹⁵ dok religiozne manifestacije (poput sklapanja braka ili pogreba) nemaju nikakvu validnost ukoliko nisu verifikovane u nadležnoj civilnoj instituciji, tj. opštini, a sveštenici se kažnjavaju ukoliko sklope brak pre nego što je sklopljen civilni brak.
2. *Na nivou sudske vlasti* ne postoji nikakva, niti negativna niti pozitivna diskriminacija u odnosu na partikularne religijske identitete.

14 <http://www.atlantico.fr/decryptage/francois-hollande-inscrire-separation-eglise-etat-dans-constitution-inutile-dangereux-franc-macons-grand-orient-franc> (pristupljeno: 4. 8. 2013)

15 Tako se 30. maja 2001. godine donosi zakon koji nudi pravni osnov za zabranu rada sajentolozima i njihovoj crkvi u Francuskoj.

3. *Na izvršnom nivou*, vršenje političke vlasti potpuno je nezavisno od uvažavanja religioznih propisa ili pak nadležnosti neke religiozne grupe (Peña-Ruiz 2003).

Međutim, na kraju treba reći da odvajanje crkve od države u Francuskoj ne implicira istovremeno i njihovu međusobnu ignoranciju. Generalno, možemo da utvrdimo najmanje četiri nivoa kooperacije, koja ćemo rangirati od onih najviše institucionalizovanih do najlabavijih i najneformalnijih.

1. Prvi nivo podrazumeva nasleđe starih uredaba koje, iz raznih razloga, nisu ukinute nakon usvajanja zakona iz 1905. One i danas imaju svoju legalnu potporu u departmanima kao što su već pomenuti Alzas i Mosel, zatim u O'ranu (Haut-Rhin), Ba'ranu (Bas-Rhin), ili pak na nekim prekomorskim teritorijama koje su uključene u francuski pravni poredak, poput Gvajane (Guyane). U ovim oblastima postoje zakonske regulative kojima se direktno uređuju religijska pitanja, a koje su od gašenja ministarstva za kultove, pod ingerencijom ministra unutrašnjih poslova. Tako je istaknuti desni republikanac i degolista Šarl Paska (Charles Pasqua) s ponosom podsećao da je između ostalog i *ministar za kultove*, iako je zvanično obavljao funkciju *ministra unutrašnjih poslova*. Štaviše, ministri poznati po svojim agnističkim i lačkim uverenjima, poput socijalista Pjera Žokse (Pierre Joxe) ili Žana Pjera Ševenmona (Jean-Pierre Chevenement), sa pozicija ministara za unutrašnje poslove i odbranu, delovali su sa jednom „napoleonskom“ odlučnošću kako bi se francuski islam najzad institucionalno organizovao.
2. Drugi nivo saradnje vezan je za aplikaciju međunarodnog prava na nacionalni okvir, a dotiče neka pitanja iz odnosa s Katoličkom crkvom i drugim institucijama koje deluju u Francuskoj i u čijim su matičnim sredinama odnosi između države i religijskih zajednica rešeni na potpuno drugim osnovama nego u Francuskoj. Osim toga, i sama Katolička crkva predstavlja transnacionalnu instituciju čije se eksteritorijalno središte suštinski percipira kao suverena država. Naime, grad-država Vatikan i njegov poglavar papa, koji u međunarodnim odnosima uživa status šefa države, održavaju diplomatske odnose s velikim brojem država. Tako nuncij (papin izaslanik) ima ulogu apostolskog ambasadora države Vatikan, dok papska nuncijatura podleže istom imunitetu kao i bilo koja druga diplomatska rezidencija.
3. Treći nivo odnosa i kooperacije između države i crkve u Francuskoj vezan je za školsku nastavu. Naime, iako državna škola strogo

zabranjuje svako religijsko izražavanje u svojim objektima, razmetljivo isticanje religijskih simbola i izbegava dublju istorijsko-kulturnu analizu religija u nastavi, u državnoj legislaturi predviđen je jedan slobodan dan u toku radne nedelje,¹⁶ kako bi roditelji koji to žele omogućili religijsko obrazovanje svojoj deci. Suprotno svojoj imanentnoj logici shvatanja države, ali i u skladu s onim drugim principom o samoograničenju, francuska država danas ipak priznaje slobodu nastave, za razliku od državnog monopola u obrazovanju koji je bio na snazi pod carstvom i restauracijom. Tako pored državnih ili javnih škola postoje i tzv. privatne škole (*écoles privées*) u kojima, pre svega, dominira katolička nastava. Dakle, kao i u svim drugim katoličkim (i šire) zemljama, škola predstavlja glavni izvor sukoba između države i crkve. U tom smislu, uprkos brojnim direktnim i indirektnim pokušajima da se preuzme „evropsko iskustvo“ (čime bi se relativizovala zabrana javnog finansiranja religijskih aktivnosti), u Francuskoj i dalje ostaje petrifikovan duh Zakona iz 1905. godine koji najčešće uslovljava poštovanje maksime: „javnoj školi – javni fondovi, privatnim školama – privatni fondovi“ i „čist karakter“ državnih škola.

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4. Najzad, četvrti i poslednji nivo saradnje možemo da pronademo na simboličkoj ravni, a on se uglavnom izražava prisustvom religijskih elemenata na državnim svečanostima („republikanskim liturgijama“), njihovom aktivnom participacijom u civilnom društvu s kojim država sve više saraduje, ali i kroz javni dijalog sa zvaničnim predstavnicima pojedinih religija. Ovaj odnos uslovljen je pre svega karakterom i političkom pragmom najistaknutijih francuskih državnika. Tako je Lionel Žospan (Lionel Jospin), socijalistički premijer Francuske od 1997. do 2002. godine, indirektno podržavao, kao i njegovi prethodnici, organizovanje reprezentativnih organa islama u Francuskoj (kako bi država lakše kontrolisala sve masovnu muslimansku zajednicu), ali je uglavnom izbegavao da se javno sastaje ili da učestvuje na svečanostima religijskih predstavnika. U tom ključu on nastoji da poštuje duh Zakona o odvajanju crkava i države odbijajući da učestvuje na godišnjoj večeri Predstavničkog saveta jevrejskih institucija Francuske, ali zato pred kampanju za

16 Svojevremeno je to bio tzv. odmor četvrtkom, a zatim i sve do današnjih dana sreda. Međutim, aktuelna socijalistička vlast insistira na temeljnoj reformi obrazovanja koja, između ostalog, podrazumeva i zakon kojim bi se ovaj dan proglasio radnim danom u školi, čime bi se smanjilo preveliko opterećenje kojem su deca izložena u preostala četiri dana školske nedelje.

predsedničke izbore 2002, kako bi ublažio reputaciju radikalnog antiklerikaliste, organizuje sastanak u Vladi s predstavnicima katoličke zajednice nameravajući da pokrene veliki dijalog o rešenjima za „administrativne i zakonske probleme koji postoje između crkve i države“ (*Le Monde* 14. februar 2002). Ovo je naravno izazvalo reakciju pre svega protestantskih grupacija, odakle poreklo vodi i sam Žospan, kroz optužbu predsednika Protestantske federacije u Francuskoj da je reč o „privilegovanju dijaloga s Rimokatoličkom crkvom“ (*Le Monde* 26. mart 2002). Dakle, odvajanje crkava od države u Francuskoj nikako ne znači i potpuno ignorisanje religija (jer to nije u duhu francuskog etatizma naslonjenog na veberijansku koncepciju države), kao ni njihovo potpuno izbacivanje iz političke sfere. Ovo neignorisanje podrazumeva ne samo povremeno učestvovanje pojedinih kardinala na „republikanskim liturgijama“ (proslave u znak završetka Prvog svetskog rata, 11. novembra 1918, itd.) nego i, što je posebno interesantno, religijske sahrane velikih državnika koji su bili poznati ne isključivo po svojim zalaganjima za laicitet, već i za laicizaciju.¹⁷ Tako je kardinal Verdije (Verdier) došao da se lično pokloni mrtvom Aristidu Brianu, koji je i jedan od najzaslužnijih socijalista za donošenje zakona iz 1905, a kardinal Lustiže (Lustiger) drži poznatu misu u katedrali Notrdam u znak sećanja na predsednika Miterana (François Mitterand), u isto vreme dok se odvija obred pred njegovu sahranu u crkvi Žarnac (Jarnac). Miteran je pritom bio sve do 2012. jedini predsednik levice u istoriji Pete republike, i generalno jedini predsednik Francuske koji nikada nije viđen da prisustvuje religijskim liturgijama.

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Zaključak

Kao i druge države Jugozapadne Evrope, Francuska ostaje duboko obeležena katoličkom i romanskom kulturom, ali i idejom o avgustinovskoj separaciji spiritualnih i temporalnih sfera, odnosno između „božje države“ i građanskog društva. Naravno, ona se svakako ne može svesti samo na tu dimenziju (Seiler 2002: 54). Kao što smo pokazali, današnji odnos

17 Za razliku od laiciteta koji praktično podrazumeva odvajanje crkve i države i neutralnost države u odnosu na religije, laicizam, s druge strane, predstavlja čitavu jednu idejnu struju (filozofiju često povezanu s ateizmom) koja se bori za aktivnu odbranu javne sfere od svakog religijskog uticaja, pa čak i potpuno ukidanje religijskog verovanja. Dakle, dok se laicitet uglavnom ograničava na relativno neutralno odvajanje države i crkve, laicizam nastoji da potpuno redukuje religijski život građana isključivo na njihovu privatnu sferu, ne prihvatajući bilo kakvu društvenu ili javnu manifestaciju religijskih dogmi (Turcotte 2011).

države i crkve u Francuskoj duboko je određen specifičnostima francuske socijalne i političke istorije. Bez razumevanja ovog konteksta, prosto nije moguće objasniti savremene procese i aktuelno stanje. Istorijski gledano, odnosi između države i religijskih zajednica, tj. pre svega Katoličke crkve kao glavne denominacije, veoma su burni i obeleženi kako bliskom saradnjom s monarhijom, tako i otvorenim neprijateljstvima, pa i mržnjom koja je sa sobom nosila i ljudske žrtve u pojedinim periodima Republike. Crkva je jednostavno platila cenu „pogrešnog izbora“ i nestražskog postupanja. Rušenje monarhije u krvi donelo je i potpunu institucionalnu marginalizaciju Katoličke crkve koja je bila jedan od nosećih stubova tog društvenog uređenja. Osim toga, nije bilo mnogo sličnih primera na evropskom kontinentu tako okrutnog postupanja prema kleru od strane civilnih vlasti, kao što je to bio slučaj s francuskom revolucionarnom buržoazijom. Kao da je priroda monarhističkog nasilja kasnije odredila prirodu i bezobzirnost postrevolucionarnog terora.

S druge strane, kao što je Crkva bila propagator i ideološki branilac starog režima (*l'ancien régime*), tako je i Republika svoj legitimacijski oslonac tražila u filozofiji prosvetiteljstva i raznim intelektualnim idejama u kojima se mogu naći koreni onoga što će se kasnije nazvati laičkom republikom. U radu smo kao prelomne tačke u definisanju laičkog karaktera države istakli veliku Francusku revoluciju iz 1789. i donošenje Zakona o odvajanju crkava i države 1905. godine. Principi i vrednosti kojima su se vodile glavne društvene snage u tim formativnim vremenima uglavnom definišu i karakter savremene Francuske. Tvrdokornim insistiranjem na čisto laičkom modelu odnosa između države i crkve, naciji kao zajednici građana i državi u veberijanskom smislu, te shvatanjem javne sfere kao zajedničkog prostora u kome se negiraju komunitarni interesi, Francuska danas predstavlja usamljeno ostrvo na evropskom kontinentu (Cabanel 2006). Ipak, i pored ortodoksnosti u ostvarivanju ovih načela, relativna neutralnost (ne i ignorisanje) države predstavlja negaciju ne samo klerikalizma nego i borbenog ateizma, čime se ostavlja prostor i za neke labave vidove saradnje između političke i religijske sfere. Pitanje uređenja odnosa verskih zajednica i države, kao što smo pokazali, takođe predstavlja značajan izvor političkog sukoba između francuske levice i desnice, pri čemu je leвица oduvek bila odlučnija i radikalnija u svojim laičkim i sekularnim nastojanjima. To je i razlog zašto verujući ljudi, a pogotovo oni koji se izjašnjavaju kao katolici praktikanti, daju nesumnjivu i čvrstu podršku desnici do današnjih dana.

Ipak, novo vreme donosi i nove prioritete i izazove. Naravno, trenutno je najveći problem savremenog francuskog društva integracija islama.

Teškoće koje postoje na tom putu nisu rezultat samo osobenog karaktera ove religije, nego i činjenice da se Republika kao „sekularna religija“ temelji na pravima koja su proizašla iz jude-hrišćanske tradicije i koje je izrodila epoha prosvetiteljstva. Ova „civilna religija“ je uz mnogo teškoća umela da integriše katolicizam, dok se danas najveći izazovi republikanskoj koncepciji separacije vide, pre svega, u inkorporiranju islama, marginalizovanju „političkog islama“ i prevazilaženju tenzija između islamske i jevrejske zajednice. Rečeni procesi znatno su otežani činjenicom da globalno dominantni kulturalistički komunitarizam zabranjuje i osuđuje svaku kritiku protiv „manjine“, tako da je „meta“ naprednih republikanskih snaga danas uglavnom limitirana na dominantni i već skrajnuti katolicizam. S druge strane, brojni su primeri društvene netolerancije prema najbrojnijoj manjinskoj religioznoj zajednici, koja se muči da se pomiri sa svojom manjinskom situacijom i da prihvati specifičan laički i sekularni kontekst u kome obitava (Remond 2001: 258–260). U suštini, savremeno francusko društvo se nalazi u još jednom istorijski formativnom periodu u pogledu odnosa države i religije, preplavljeno javnim debatama o prirodi opasnosti koje danas prete laičkim vrednostima i sekularizaciji, ali i suočeno s brojnim socijalnim, ekonomskim i političkim problemima koji dodatno otežavaju situaciju i unose neizvesnost u ishod svih ovih gibanja.

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Primljeno: 16. oktobra 2013.

Prihvaćeno: 22. februara 2014.

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Ivica Mladenović

The French State and the church: socio-historical context,
structural conditionality and character of laicism

Abstract

In the article, the author deals with the political and social influences of the relationship between the state and religious communities in France. The first part of the paper is an analysis of historical context and the construction (evolution) of laicism in France through its local characteristics, values and social strengths, contributing to its formation. The fact that Catholic Church was one of the main legitimizing pillars of „the old regime“, permanently determined the relationship between church and state, most importantly – it's subsequent social exclusion under the Republic. The 1789 French revolution in conjunction with the 1905 law on the Separation of church and state, up until present time, have been seen as the most important events in defining the relationship between political and religious entities in France. The second part of the paper continues in outlining the founding logic and principles of the contemporary relationship between religious communities and the French state. The article concludes in suggesting that through its persistence of a purely Laicistic model of state-church affiliation, view of the nation as a community of citizens, Weberian definition of the State, and the acceptance of the public sphere as common space in which communal interests are negated, France today represents an isolated island on the European continent.

Keywords: France, laicism, secularism, republic, nation, state, church, religion, separation

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Laïcité et sécularisation aux Pays-Bas et en Belgique ou la fin de la pilarisation de la société civile

[Partis politiques, religion, sécularisation, Pays-Bas, Belgique]

Résumé *Les relations entre l'Eglise et l'Etat en Belgique et aux Pays-Bas furent longtemps déterminées par un compromis historique établissant une paix larvée entre les forces politiques prônant la « liberté scolaire » et celles défendant la laïcité, de facto les valeurs de la Révolution française. A l'origine, il s'agissait essentiellement d'une lutte visant le contrôle de l'éducation publique et le rôle des congrégations religieuses dans l'organisation de l'enseignement. Ceci avait ensuite conduit à une segmentation accrue de la société en « piliers » gérant leurs propres réseaux sociaux dans un système communautaire subventionné par l'Etat et dont les élites décidaient entre elles des modalités à suivre. Avec la déconfectionnalisation et l'expansion économique influençant de plus en plus les rapports humains, cette organisation de la société a perdu sa signification et a conduit à la disparition plus ou moins complète des « piliers ».*

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Mots-clés: *Laïcité, sécularisation, Eglise, Etat, Pays-Bas, Belgique, pilarisation, Partis politiques*

La segmentation de la société

Selon les sociologues et les historiens, cette lutte idéologique entre les convictions politiques et religieuses était à l'origine des « piliers » qui s'organisaient déjà dès la fin du XIX^e siècle et qui avaient ensuite formé des segments philosophiques ou religieux quasi autonomes. Cette segmentation de la société civile en « piliers » était le résultat de conflits issus de la Révolution française de 1789. Celle-ci avait organisé la société et l'Etat sur une base laïque et avait donné libre cours à un essor économique sans précédent sous la houlette des partis libéraux belges et hollandais (Chlepnier 1956: 55-71; De Wit 1980).

La grande période libérale prenait fin vers 1870. Les partis libéraux des deux pays se divisaient en une aile radicale et une aile plutôt conservatrice, tandis que les forces réactionnaires se mobilisaient pour défendre les intérêts de l'Eglise contre les visées des libéraux radicaux qui voulaient étatiser l'enseignement. Les forces laïques voyaient dans l'école officielle un instrument majeur contre l'obscurantisme, tandis que les conservateurs se servaient du principe de la « liberté d'enseignement » pour avoir

leurs écoles subventionnées sous le couvert du budget de l'Etat. Pour ces derniers, l'école officielle n'avait pas de raison d'être.

L'aile radicale du libéralisme, vite dépassée par le mouvement socialiste exigeait des réformes sociales et démocratiques. La lutte scolaire prenait fin par la signature d'une « paix scolaire » entre les deux camps opposés, en 1917 aux Pays-Bas et seulement en 1958 en Belgique. Cet écart de plus de 40 ans s'expliquait par l'impact exercé par les institutions catholiques et surtout le parti catholique, omniprésent tout au long de cette période dans les campagnes et les petites villes de Flandre. Cette « paix scolaire » était également le produit d'un compromis plus large et plus profond englobant la société entière. Elle couronnait, au niveau idéologique, un système de contrôle politique basé sur des organisations de masse (ouvriers, paysans, indépendants) en des mondes parallèles d'obédiences diverses.

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Une « paix scolaire » signée en 1917 aux Pays-Bas ne pouvait étonner en pleine Première Guerre Mondiale obligeant les partis politiques à se mettre d'accord sur l'essentiel. Le suffrage universel pour les hommes était alors voté afin de satisfaire les socialistes en échange de subventions généreuses aux écoles confessionnelles. La « paix scolaire » de 1917 était donc une victoire pour les partis confessionnels qui s'accommodaient du suffrage universel, ce dernier tout au profit de leurs électeurs modestes (ouvriers, petits paysans). Le suffrage universel pour les hommes était introduit en Belgique en 1919, sans révision constitutionnelle préalable. Sous occupation durant toute la guerre, la Belgique voyait son potentiel industriel réduit de façon drastique. Ainsi les partis politiques (libéraux, socialistes et catholiques) au pouvoir à la sortie de la guerre donnaient alors toute priorité à la reconstruction économique du pays, sans pour autant vouloir initier un débat au sujet de la question scolaire ce qui présentait le risque de mettre le gouvernement d'union nationale en danger.

La présence des partis confessionnels au pouvoir leur donnait un droit de contrôle social et idéologique peu commun en étant au sein de toutes les coalitions gouvernementales. Ils pouvaient dès lors bloquer le processus de décision. Ils devaient cependant s'accommoder de la présence socialiste dans les grandes villes et les régions économiquement plus développées, ainsi que de celle des libéraux qui représentaient une force considérable au niveau de la presse et du monde financier.

Le Parti Ouvrier Belge (POB) et le Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij (SDAP) hollandais étaient des adversaires redoutables pour les conservateurs confessionnels. En ayant la capacité de mobiliser les ouvriers de

la grande industrie et des transports, ils pesaient sur la politique sociale et économique de leurs pays respectifs.

Le parti catholique en Belgique et son homologue hollandais RKSP (Roomsche-Katholieke Staatspartij) étaient en désaccord quant à la stratégie à suivre, car divisés au sein du Parlement entre conservateurs et progressistes, ainsi qu'entre représentants des organisations ouvrières, paysannes et patronales. En Belgique toujours, les catholiques étaient parfois obligés de faire une coalition gouvernementale avec les socialistes afin de débloquer la situation politique. En 1939 seulement, les socialistes hollandais sont invités à siéger au gouvernement. Néanmoins les socialistes se heurtaient à l'attitude des catholiques, toujours hostiles à une idéologie socialiste sans Dieu tout en prônant des valeurs chrétiennes.

Les « piliers » s'intéressaient non seulement aux croyances, mais également à la défense des intérêts des adhérents en couvrant les grands risques sociaux de la classe ouvrière par des interventions multiples de l'Etat. G. Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen 1980) avait nommé l'institution du système d'assurances sociales la « décommodification » de la force du travail.

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En effet, les allocations de chômage et les pensions de vieillesse ou d'invalidité garantissaient maintenant à tout le monde une sécurité sociale assez poussée tout en portant un coup mortel au système de bienfaisance. De plus, l'Etat-providence gérait la répartition des revenus et conservait l'idéologie des partis confessionnels en instituant les allocations familiales. Celles-ci étaient octroyées aux « femmes au foyer », tandis qu'il incombait au mari de subvenir aux besoins de sa famille. Les Pays-Bas et la Belgique adoptaient dès lors le modèle rhénan (ou bismarckien) d'allocations sociales.

Un système corporatiste avorté

Cette organisation de la société en « piliers » influençait profondément le fonctionnement des institutions représentatives. Les parlementaires ne représentaient désormais plus les électeurs d'une circonscription géographiquement bien définie mais bien un parti politique. Certains de ses membres étaient désignés par les organisations des « piliers » au Parlement et celles-ci faisaient observer une certaine discipline de faction.

Le catholicisme social, né de l'ultramontanisme réactionnaire, donnait naissance vers 1900 à un syndicalisme catholique, principalement organisé par des prêtres « sociaux ». Ces prêtres n'hésitaient pas à se lancer dans la lutte sociale et électorale en opposition aux syndicats socialistes. Profitant de la démocratisation du suffrage, ces prêtres – ou « intellectuels

traditionnels » – comme disait Antonio Gramsci –, connaissaient de la sorte leurs moments de gloire. Dans un même temps, ils renforçaient le catholicisme politique dans les campagnes en organisant des ligues paysannes et des coopératives de crédit, qui assuraient au parti catholique la stabilité électorale. Ces organisations catholiques étaient ensuite systématiquement contrôlées par des prévôts.

La société civile était à l'évidence de plus en plus réduite à l'existence de « groupes sociaux » aux intérêts parfois contradictoires. Ce projet de société avait rapidement gagné une certaine audience grâce à l'encyclique papale *Rerum Novarum* de 1894 et à l'engagement des prêtres catholiques dont plusieurs siégeaient plus tard au Parlement.

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En Hollande, le RKSP occupait une place centrale au Parlement en formant un bloc composé des deux partis protestants Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (ARP) et Christelijk-Historische Unie (CHU) pour défendre les intérêts de l'école confessionnelle. En Belgique, le parti catholique était majoritaire au Parlement entre 1884 et 1914, avantage perdu après la Grande Guerre.

Après l'introduction du suffrage pur et simple, les « piliers » s'employaient à bloquer toute dynamique sociale et culturelle. En marginalisant l'influence laïque, ils favorisaient un cléricalisme sous-jacent. Le catholicisme se manifestait comme une force retardataire voulant freiner l'expansion économique dans la sphère culturelle, tandis que les protestants restaient trop divisés pour parler d'une seule voix. Les libéraux et les socialistes se livraient une guerre idéologique contre l'obscurantisme, sans pouvoir atteindre la suprématie ni contrecarrer les idées réactionnaires propagées dans les journaux et revues catholiques, lus dans ces milieux.

Aux Pays-Bas, cette situation s'accompagnait d'une lutte de l'Église catholique pour le contrôle des intellectuels, formés désormais à la nouvelle université catholique à Nimègue. L'Université Catholique de Louvain faisait déjà fonction de centre intellectuel pour les catholiques belges.

Le corporatisme (Spann 1921) gagnait de nouveaux adhérents dans le monde catholique à l'issue de la Grande Guerre. Il était d'application dans un certain nombre de pays catholiques, mais avait peu de succès en Belgique et aux Pays-Bas.

En effet, les syndicats catholiques devenus de plus en plus forts, n'y voyaient pas un système améliorant la défense de leurs intérêts face à un patronat de plus en plus intraitable et bien organisé. Par ailleurs, le corporatisme était un cheval de bataille aux mains des réactionnaires visant à établir un État autoritaire capable de décréter l'état d'exception (Schmitt

1996). Enfin, ce même corporatisme limitait la liberté d'action des syndicats en les intégrant dans un système dans lequel l'Etat et les patrons prenaient les décisions essentielles (Joye et Lewin 1967: 229–64).

Faisant suite à cette situation, le monde catholique était en ébullition permanente. L'Eglise exerçait encore sa domination spirituelle malgré une concurrence accrue entre les prêtres et les intellectuels qui marquaient leur indépendance face à la hiérarchie catholique par presse interposée. C'était notamment le cas de *L'Action Française* qui pouvait se targuer d'une popularité croissante dans les milieux catholiques belges (Defoort 1978; Chenaux 2009: 37–49). Ensuite, l'*Action Catholique*, pourtant bien contrôlée par l'épiscopat belge, devenait en même temps une force militante, berceau ensuite du parti *Rexiste* de Léon Degrelle (Conway 1993). Dès 1919, le nationalisme flamand s'organisait en un parti politique indépendant attirant des électeurs catholiques des campagnes avec à leur tête des instituteurs flamingants.

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Tous ces mouvements autoritaires avaient un impact profond sur la culture politique de l'époque, comme les socialistes influencés par cette idéologie corporatiste et autoritaire. Pour combattre la crise économique Henri de Man lançait, fin 1933, son *Plan du Travail* (Dodge 1966: 124–72; Horn 1996: 74–95), que les socialistes hollandais reprenaient ensuite à leur compte. En renouvelant leur doctrine, ces derniers s'ouvraient ainsi aux socialistes chrétiens.

Ce renouvellement néo-socialiste s'inscrivait d'ailleurs dans un mouvement intellectuel promouvant l'irrationalisme philosophique contre le rationalisme et le marxisme (Lukács 1962; Sternhell 1987). Au niveau idéologique ces rénovateurs socialistes s'étaient déjà démarqués du marxisme et de la lutte des classes en prônant une approche éthique du socialisme. En 1945, les socialistes hollandais, tentaient même une opération « *doorbraak* » (« la brèche ») pour former un grand parti progressiste avec les chrétiens et les libéraux de gauche, mais sans succès remarquable. En Belgique, une tentative éphémère avec l'Union Démocratique Belge (UDB) ne rencontrait guère de succès électoral (Beerten 1990). La pilarisation voulue par l'épiscopat catholique se reconstituait dès lors partout sur les fondements sociaux d'avant-guerre.

Quelle société civile?

Avec ses organisations sociales, la société pilarisée ne ressemblait en rien à la société civile décrite par Alexis de Tocqueville (1848) ou Adam Ferguson (1995). Le cléricalisme avec ses intellectuels traditionnels – décrit

par Antonio Gramsci (1959) – y restait fort présent tout en excluant le développement de la libre pensée. Cette nouvelle société civile, dans laquelle les organisations cléricales dominaient, posait des problèmes conceptuels. L'Ancien Régime avait bien disparu, la liberté de conscience était discernable malgré un espace public largement envahi voire colonisé par des organisations cléricales guidées par l'épiscopat catholique.

Un consensus conceptuel pouvait néanmoins être trouvé en se référant à la définition formulée par le *Centre for Civil Society* de la *London School of Economics*. Selon cette définition, la société civile se référait principalement à une arène d'action collective non-répressive autour d'intérêts, de valeurs et buts communs.

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En théorie, ses formes étaient distinctes de celles de l'Etat, de la famille et de la sphère économique. Pourtant, en pratique, les frontières entre ces trois groupes étaient très alambiquées, floues et souvent discutées. La société civile comprenait normalement une diversité d'espaces, d'acteurs et de formes institutionnelles qui variaient selon leur degré de formalisation, d'autonomie et de pouvoir, telles que les sociétés caritatives, organisations non-gouvernementales, communautés spontanées, organisations féminines, communautés religieuses, associations professionnelles, syndicats d'ouvriers, groupes d'entre-aide, organisations patronales, groupes partisans, etc...

Dans les pays en voie de développement, ces organisations défendaient les principes d'une économie non marchande basée sur la communauté des biens, le libre accès à la terre et à l'eau, le droit à la santé ainsi qu'à la participation sociale. Dans ce contexte, Karl Polanyi (Polanyi 1957) avait d'ailleurs remarqué que le capitalisme ne pouvait qu'anéantir l'aspect traditionnel basé sur des coutumes garantissant la production non marchande. Ce sont principalement les mouvements religieux parfois fondamentalistes qui ralentissaient la percée du capitalisme dans le schéma social.

Le rationalisme du XVIII^e siècle avait voulu réformer la société en la basant sur un contrat social conclu par des citoyens libres et égaux, non assujettis aux dogmes de la religion chrétienne. Etant responsables de leurs actes, ils devaient toujours s'assumer. L'enseignement aidant, tous les hommes pouvaient avoir accès au statut de citoyen. Par le respect de la loi, l'ordre public s'établissait sans contrainte. Cette conception libérale de la société civile était donc basée sur l'existence fictive d'un contrat social entre citoyens libres. La réalité était pourtant autre car, au XIX^e siècle, ce sont les propriétaires payant des impôts qui avaient le droit de

vote et qui exerçaient le pouvoir politique, celui-ci formalisant un cadre juridique dans lequel la bourgeoisie poursuivait ses propres intérêts au détriment des autres classes sociales. La résistance de ces dernières ne pouvait cependant se développer que dans le cadre d'une société civile déjà pleinement subjuguée par des relations de type mercantiles.

Pour contrecarrer l'expansion du capitalisme dans les sphères restées non marchandes, des systèmes de patronage et d'entraide se développaient au cours de cette période de grande mutation du système économique. C'est ainsi que les partis conservateurs avaient la capacité de se transformer en partis de masse par la mobilisation et l'organisation des petits paysans, artisans, commerçants et ouvriers. Afin d'aplanir les conflits d'intérêts entre ces groupes sociaux plutôt disparates, les partis confessionnels mettaient en place, entre les citoyens et l'Etat, une intermédiation au niveau national. Ce système néo-corporatiste installé en Belgique et aux Pays-Bas après 1945, ne supplantait pas le Parlement qui lui, restait souverain. Il s'agissait principalement d'un dispositif permettant aux syndicats et aux organisations patronales de conclure des accords collectifs concernant les salaires. La politique salariale appartenait désormais à la sphère publique et se discutait aussi au Parlement.

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Cette expansion de la sphère publique vers le domaine social et économique était liée à une nouvelle conception de la citoyenneté. Le gouvernement devait désormais prendre soin du bien-être de ses citoyens en facilitant le progrès économique.

Pour les intellectuels catholiques, cette nouvelle donne posait un problème. En effet, l'Eglise n'était plus habilitée à s'occuper de cet aspect politique et économique. Après la défaite du fascisme, les partis catholiques se renouvelaient nécessairement en acceptant la doctrine personnaliste propagée par Jacques Maritain et Emmanuel Mounier (Domenach 1972; Loubet del Bayle 1969) avant la guerre. En Belgique, la démocratie chrétienne donnait désormais le ton (Verhoeven 1976; Neuville et al. 1996).

Former une coalition gouvernementale avec les socialistes restait encore pour les catholiques hollandais une opération hasardeuse (Visser 1986; Koole 1986: 99–117) bien que le Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP) gouvernât avec les socialistes jusqu'en 1958. Ensuite, le KVP et les partis protestants ont formé des coalitions avec les libéraux de droite (Brouwer et Ramakers 2007; Van der Heiden et Kessel 2010). En Belgique, la polarisation idéologique entre la gauche et la droite empêchait encore une collaboration

durable entre catholiques et socialistes. La normalisation de leurs relations après 1961 a permis de réunir leurs deux grands partis politiques respectifs au sein d'une grande coalition.

La déconfessionnalisation

Les églises catholiques se vidaient dès le début des années 1960. Grâce à la pilule contraceptive, les jeunes s'orientaient vers la liberté sexuelle, délaissant massivement d'autre part l'Église devenue désuète. Celle-ci voyait d'ailleurs son nombre de prêtres décroître fortement. Malgré l'enthousiasme suscité par le concile Vatican II, la crise du catholicisme était totale.

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La démocratisation des études supérieures nourrissait par ailleurs une révolution culturelle symbolisée par Mai 68, obligeant par la suite les partis politiques à légiférer concernant des réformes relatives au droit familial (notamment le divorce). Le droit à l'interruption volontaire de grossesse (IVG) constituait effectivement une demande du mouvement féministe voulant se débarrasser du patriarcat, mouvement pour lequel la femme devait librement décider de son propre corps. L'IVG votée en 1981 aux Pays-Bas ne la fut qu'en 1990 en Belgique. (Outshoorn 1995: 145-65; Botquin et Hannotte 2001).

L'accumulation rapide de capitaux permettait d'améliorer le niveau de vie de la majorité de la population, tandis que la suburbanisation déplaçait une partie de la population toujours plus importante vers de nouvelles cités dans lesquelles les habitants perdent peu à peu leur identité d'origine (Fishman 1987). En Belgique, où l'aménagement du territoire restait quelque peu chaotique, l'impact de la suburbanisation sur les mentalités restait bien moindre qu'en Hollande où celle-ci aide à soulager la congestion des villes (Wetenschappelijke Raad 1990; Hajer et Halsema 1997). Un nouveau paysage urbain s'est alors développé. Il couvre aujourd'hui un quart de la surface totale de la Hollande. Dans les années 1990, un tiers de la population hollandaise vivait déjà dans des villes satellites (Van Leeuwen 1990: 19-27). C'est là que la déconfessionnalisation a progressé le plus rapidement, tandis que le conservatisme religieux et social s'est maintenu dans les petits villages où vivaient encore plus de deux millions de citoyens. Le gouvernement cherchait à y développer de petites entreprises ainsi que le tourisme régional (*De dorpsmonitor* 2013; *Thuis op het platteland* 2006).

Cette suburbanisation peut expliquer la forte déconfessionnalisation de la société civile hollandaise. En 2012, 30 % des Néerlandais se réclamaient d'obédience religieuse, contre 75 % en 1960. Les lieux de culte sont devenus

des « centres de services » pour la célébration de mariages, d'enterrements, ou pour y donner des concerts même profanes.

Cette déconfectionnalisation prive les partis confessionnels d'une fraction de leurs voix. En Belgique (Botterman et Hooghe 2012: 1-17), les partis catholiques ne remportent pas plus de 20 % des voix exprimées en Flandre et 10 % en Wallonie. Aux Pays-Bas, le KVP, perdant beaucoup de voix, a dû fusionner avec les deux partis protestants ARP et CHU (Van Kersbergen 1995). Le nouveau parti CDA (Christen-Democratisch Appèl) avait de prime abord donné l'impression d'avoir durablement réinvesti la scène politique jusqu'à son déclin électoral dans les années 1990. Les partis confessionnels ont aussi beaucoup souffert de la fusion des petites municipalités. En Hollande, on comptait seulement 403 municipalités tandis qu'en Belgique le nombre de municipalités était de 589.

Le déclin des partis chrétiens est un phénomène lié à la déconfectionnalisation de la société et à la montée de l'idéologie néo-libérale qui a permis la formation de gouvernements de coalition dans lesquels s'allient les partis libéraux et socialistes.

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Dès 1994 c'est chose faite. Les sociaux-démocrates hollandais formaient un gouvernement de coalition avec les libéraux de droite (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD) et de gauche (D66). Celui-ci reste au pouvoir jusqu'en 2002. En Belgique ce nouveau type de coalition s'impose en 1999 suite à une défaite électorale cuisante des démocrates-chrétiens. Ce type de coalition nommée « mauve » signifie la fin définitive de la pilarisation de la société et du système de concertation entre les groupes d'intérêts différents. Le clivage idéologique entre travail et capital (Lipset et Rokkan 1967) s'estompe alors au niveau idéologique et politique, conduisant à l'émergence d'une réaction de type populiste qui n'est plus contrôlée par les élites. Les habitants des grandes villes (Rotterdam, La Haye, Utrecht et Amsterdam), où la qualité de vie est en régression constante, s'insurgent contre les élites politiques qui prônent le bonheur pour tous, mais ne s'occupent guère des problèmes des habitants des quartiers pauvres. Le tournant politique est atteint en 2002, quand le mouvement populiste de Pim Fortuyn (Pels 2002) gagne les élections parlementaires. En 2005, Geert Wilders prend le relais de Fortuyn en fondant son Parti pour la Liberté (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) (De Lange et Art 2011: 1229-49; Fennema 2010). Celui-ci mène par la suite une campagne hargneuse contre l'Islam et contre l'Union Européenne.

Cette dernière irruption populiste un peu tardive contraste avec la situation belge où les racistes du Vlaams Blok/Belang avaient déjà gagné

les élections parlementaires dès 1991. Pourtant, ce parti actuellement en perte de vitesse, se voit largement supplanté par la Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), un parti identitaire populiste conduit par son leader Bart De Wever. En Wallonie et à Bruxelles, le Front National, disparu à ce jour, a été relayé par le Parti Populaire.

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Cataloguer ces mouvements populistes n'est pas aisé. Selon Ernesto Laclau il s'agirait d'un populisme de tendance ethnique (Laclau 2005: 190-9). Les immigrés ne sont pas seulement responsables du haut taux de criminalité dans les grandes villes, mais ils profiteraient aussi exagérément de la sécurité sociale. Ils affaibliraient ainsi le financement de l'Etat-providence et porteraient atteinte au bien-être de la population autochtone. La responsabilité de cette dérive est largement imputée aux élites qui, s'enrichissant, ne s'intéressent plus aux problèmes des petites gens. Il s'agit ici d'électeurs d'un niveau moyen qui subissent aujourd'hui de plein fouet la récession économique et la libéralisation du marché du travail. Leurs attitudes politiques sont donc clairement influencées par des facteurs socio-économiques liés à la mondialisation de l'économie et à la libre concurrence. Ce mouvement de mécontentement ne conduit pas nécessairement à l'instauration d'un système totalitaire (Panizza 2005: 30), mais il exprime pourtant un malaise profond de la société civile après l'implosion du système pilarisé et la néo-libéralisation de l'Etat-providence.

Récemment, le financement de l'Etat-providence a été fortement amenuisé suite à « l'abus » des chômeurs et des malades « abusant » des aides sociales. Il ne couvre donc plus tous les risques sociaux à long terme. La logique néo-libérale du capital promouvant la responsabilité personnelle du citoyen a réussi à instaurer un type de société qui soumet tous les citoyens aux lois du marché. Ainsi, la notion de profit est présente dans le discours politique voulant soutenir la croissance du capital en faveur d'une petite minorité de riches capitalistes, les grandes fortunes boursières qui, en échappant à tout contrôle, flouent la collectivité. Dans ce cas, l'absence de transparence est patente (Piketty 2014: 569-70). Au vu de cette situation, le citoyen est devenu inexistant, superflu. Comme au XIX^e siècle, seules lui restent sa volonté et sa capacité de travail. Sa citoyenneté est dès lors lourdement dévaluée par son incapacité à contrôler les mouvements des capitaux.

Le « citoyen introuvable »

Le thème du « citoyen introuvable » est l'objet d'études de sociologues hollandais et belges. Ils ont surtout analysé le fonctionnement et les mécanismes du système pilarisé. Il convient donc d'en donner un aperçu.

Le politologue Arend Lijphart (Lijphart 1968) fut le premier à analyser le fonctionnement du système politique hollandais en établissant les mécanismes de son fonctionnement: les élites des piliers se partagent le pouvoir et décident de tout en comité restreint. Faisant écho au même constat, le sociologue Luc Huyse a mis en lumière l'exclusion du citoyen du système politique belge (Huyse 1969). Le mécontentement populaire actuel pourrait y trouver son origine. Les « piliers » ayant disparu, le mécontentement a pu s'exprimer plus librement et plus facilement. Avec la disparition du clivage entre le capital et le travail ainsi qu'avec des gouvernements qui ne veulent plus d'une politique des revenus, le populisme est devenu plus attrayant en présentant de nouveaux boucs émissaires aisément trouvés (les immigrés, l'Union Européenne).

Pourtant, les plaidoyers pour une restructuration politique autour de deux pôles, l'un conservateur et l'autre progressiste, possédaient aussi des relents populistes, car, en se débarrassant des « piliers », le citoyen était censé être en mesure d'influencer les décisions à prendre.

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Aux Pays-Bas, les démocrates de gauche (D66) et l'aile gauche de la sociale démocratie ont voulu éliminer le système pilarisé dominé par les partis confessionnels. L'élection directe du premier ministre devait être pour eux un puissant levier dans le but de faire éclater les partis confessionnels et d'imposer une restructuration durable du paysage politique (Van Praag 1991; Bleich 2008). En fusionnant, les partis confessionnels affaiblis ont néanmoins pu résister à cette attaque frontale de la part de la gauche progressiste.

En Belgique, le président du Parti Socialiste, Léo Collard, lance en 1969 un appel à la formation d'un front progressiste alliant les socialistes aux démocrates-chrétiens. L'idée est de créer un parti travailliste englobant aussi les syndicats. L'organisation des jeunes du CVP réagit avec enthousiasme, mais sans pouvoir toutefois changer le cours des choses. Pourtant, aux Pays-Bas, les syndicats sociaux-démocrates de la NVV (Nederlands Verbond van Vakverenigingen) et catholiques de la NKV (Nederlands Katholiek Vakverbond) forment, en 1976, la FNV (Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging). En Belgique, une fusion des syndicats socialistes et chrétiens est encore hors de question. Ils préfèrent aujourd'hui la coordination de leurs actions à une fusion des organisations de culture très différente.

La fin des idéologies

Il est difficile de conceptualiser le système pilarisé. Le politologue Luc Huyse (Huyse 1987) a comparé le fonctionnement des « piliers » au comportement des grands groupes financiers qui se partagent le marché en

signant des pactes ou en formant des cartels. Ce fût le cas en Belgique lors de la signature du « pacte scolaire » en 1958 par les trois grands partis politiques. Le pacte avait alors pacifié les relations entre les deux partis « laïques » et le parti catholique.

Aux Pays-Bas, les élites des « piliers » avaient pilarié la radio en autorisant d'émettre à des associations d'inspiration religieuse ou politique afin de pouvoir mieux contrôler la communication. En Belgique, par contre, les leaders des partis politiques s'autorisaient un droit de regard quant au contenu et à l'émission de discours ou de messages des responsables politiques et syndicaux.

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Avec les radios libres et la télévision commerciale, cette emprise politique a pratiquement disparu. Une révolution culturelle et mentale a suivi cette restructuration. Depuis lors, des « célébrités » ont fait leur apparition sur le petit écran et occupé l'espace public. Les politiciens y ont vu l'opportunité de promouvoir leur image et leurs idées en s'exhibant aux côtés de ces célébrités lors de jeux télévisés. Force est de constater que ce phénomène tente de promouvoir le populisme antipolitique.

La fin de l'idéologie, annoncée par Daniel Bell (Bell 1960) aux États Unis et bien plus tard complétée par la théorie de la « fin de l'histoire » énoncée par Francis Fukuyama (Fukuyama 1992), a donc largement contribué à la disparition des « piliers ». Actuellement, ces derniers sont partout remplacés par une multitude d'entrepreneurs privés (lobbies, consultants, bureaux d'études) représentant les grandes firmes auprès des gouvernements, des parlements et des institutions internationales. Les « piliers » ont donc disparu, mais le « citoyen » est encore absent. Le citoyen dépourvu d'idéologie politique peut librement participer à des initiatives citoyennes et pratiquer le volontariat. L'américanisation de la vie sociale est aujourd'hui la norme, car encouragée par les autorités et les médias. La société civile moderne est dès lors menée par le marketing et les gains qu'il génère. Il convient ici de souligner que la démocratisation de la société a conduit à une plus grande liberté d'expression et d'initiative, ce qui explique l'apparition de nouveaux partis politiques avec le soutien des médias.

Cette médiatisation de la société contribue non pas à la politisation mais bien à une dépolitisation de celle-ci. Les scores électoraux des partis populistes et leur progression dans les grandes villes l'attestent. Le populisme est donc un phénomène largement urbain.

Après l'irruption de la liste de Pim Fortuyn à Rotterdam, lors des élections municipales de 2002, les sociaux démocrates ont perdu en 2014 les villes

d'Amsterdam, d'Utrecht et de La Haye, mais cette fois au profit des libéraux de gauche D66 (Van Weezel 2014: 10–11) suite à un désistement accru d'une partie des électeurs.

Cette tendance électorale s'observe aussi en Belgique où, en 2012, les nationalistes flamands de la N-VA ont acquis les faveurs de la ville d'Anvers au détriment des socialistes (Hostyn 2014).

Suite au déclin des démocrates-chrétiens, les sociaux-démocrates subissent les effets d'un climat libertaire ou assertif qu'ils avaient eux-mêmes soutenu après la chute du Mur (Moschonas 2002: 305–12). On peut d'ailleurs imputer leurs défaites aux Pays-Bas et en Flandre au tournant néo-libéral opéré aux cours des années 1990.

En suivant le *New Labour* de Tony Blair, ils ont accepté de favoriser la concurrence plutôt que de contenir le marché. Même l'Etat-providence y a été intégré totalement. De ce fait, le rôle de l'Etat et du parti socialiste a été fortement amoindri. Le parti n'est plus un lieu de participation où les membres se retrouvent, mais il est devenu une machine de campagne électorale se désintéressant de ses membres. Le parti cadre a ainsi remplacé l'ancienne association d'électeurs acquis à la cause de leur parti, mais hermétiques aux changements opérés dans la société. L'avènement d'une *société ouverte* dont Karl Popper a été le premier protagoniste (Popper 1971), s'annonçait au moment où Blair imposa son leadership. Cette société ouverte prônée par les néo-libéraux dans les partis socialistes écarterait les idéologies désuètes et favoriserait une société prônant la liberté de l'individu ainsi que son autonomie en adéquation avec les droits de l'homme.

Ce projet néo-libéral, transformé par les partis sociaux-démocrates et initié en Grande Bretagne par Tony Blair, est rapidement repris par les socialistes aux Pays-Bas et en Belgique.

En Belgique, c'est le socialiste flamand Frank Vandenbroucke, auteur d'une thèse à l'Université de Cambridge, qui jette la base d'une réorientation doctrinaire basée sur un socialisme éthique (Vandenbroucke 2001) conformément à l'idée de John Rawls (Rawls 1999). Cette doctrine vise un Etat-providence (Vandenbroucke 2002: 83–93) capable de former et rapidement orienter les chômeurs afin de les diriger vers le marché du travail. Il faut noter que cette nouvelle pratique est contraire aux principes de l'ancien Etat-providence garantissant aux chômeurs une allocation dite de chômage, au détriment de leur insertion professionnelle.

Cette réforme inspirée par *New Labour* est idéologiquement soutenue par une nouvelle classe moyenne éclectique composée tant d'universitaires

que de travailleurs salariés. C'est cette classe montante qui rejette en majorité l'existence d'un Etat-providence entièrement basé sur la solidarité intergénérationnelle et interprofessionnelle. Elle s'oriente aujourd'hui davantage vers une société basée sur un système d'assurances privées personnalisées, ne couvrant donc pas l'ensemble des risques sociaux. Cette nouvelle classe sociale portée sur ses propres intérêts est d'avantage séduite par le concept de libre échange qu'à celui d'un système se préoccupant du social. Ces nouvelles couches sociales veulent aussi exercer un contrôle plus direct sur les sphères sociales et culturelles et se concentrent de plus en plus dans des quartiers spécifiques des grandes villes où elles peuvent organiser leur vie sociale et culturelle sans devoir négliger leurs activités professionnelles. C'est cette même classe qui a repris la direction des partis socialistes, écologistes et libéraux de gauche et qui domine les médias. Pour Pim Fortuyn il s'agissait ici de l'« église de gauche », classe dirigeante par excellence.

Il faut néanmoins noter qu'en Belgique l'offensive néo-libérale n'est pas initiée par le parti socialiste flamand, mais bien par Guy Verhofstadt, un libéral flamand. Au milieu des années 1990, il avait déjà tenté d'introduire une politique *thatchérienne* visant à réformer l'Etat-providence (Verhulst 1996: 210-25) qui se soldait par un échec, l'incitant à réapparaître sur la scène politique avec un programme davantage progressiste. En 1999, il s'allie aux socialistes de Vandenbroucke et aux « Verts » pour former une coalition « mauve » (ou « arc-en-ciel » en Wallonie). Son alliance persiste jusqu'en 2007, année de la perte des élections par sa coalition.

La situation est identique en Hollande où, en 1994, apparaît un gouvernement « mauve » fruit de l'alliance des libéraux de droite et de gauche et des sociaux-démocrates qui depuis 2 ans imprime une nette tendance néo-libérale. En s'écartant de son idéologie, le parti de Wim Kok allait encourager une politique économique pour stimuler la croissance. Avec ce tournant néo-libéral, il préparait les conditions d'émergence du populisme nouveau de Pim Fortuyn et de Geert Wilders ensuite. S'opposant à l'église « de gauche » et aux élites, ces deux précurseurs, soutenus par les électeurs nostalgiques, aspiraient au retour d'une société protégeant sa culture propre de l'influence de l'immigration.

Vers la société permissive

Cette offensive néo-libérale trouve non seulement ses origines dans les milieux de la droite politique, mais aussi dans les courants issus de Mai 68.

Sous la bannière de l'émancipation, les nouveaux mouvements sociaux ont bel et bien fait triompher des réformes touchant surtout à l'existence de l'individu. Dans la foulée de Mai 68, ces mouvements ont longtemps combattu pour une société libérée des contraintes religieuses et morales. Il s'agit notamment du droit à l'avortement, de respecter les droits des homosexuels, des enfants illégitimes, des personnes malades ou handicapées, de sanctionner la cruauté envers les animaux. L'écologie devient un thème universel discuté aussi bien en milieu universitaire, que dans les mouvements et partis écologistes. La plupart des militants sont de souche catholique, souvent en rupture avec leur milieu familial, plaident pour une autre manière de vivre. En formant des partis politiques (Ecolo en Wallonie et Agalev en Flandre) au début des années 1980, ils affirment leur différence avec les autres partis. On assiste à l'émergence d'une nouvelle classe moyenne composée d'individus cultivés souvent issus d'universités et hautes écoles dont la tendance n'est ni de gauche ni de droite.

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Ces mouvements écologistes sont souvent associés à l'avènement de la société permissive ou libertaire largement encouragé par les coalitions « mauves » en réformant le droit familial et patrimonial : le mariage des homosexuels est reconnu en Hollande en 2001 et en Belgique en 2003, les droits des enfants naturels sont réglés en Hollande en 2001 et en Belgique en 2007, l'euthanasie est légalisée en Hollande en 2001 et en Belgique en 2002. Cette dynamique émancipatrice est largement soutenue par les médias, tandis que les conservateurs chrétiens, relégués dans l'opposition, ne réussissent point à contrecarrer cette offensive libertaire. Un retour aux valeurs traditionnelles est donc exclu. Même les populistes de droite ont rompu avec le traditionalisme des générations précédentes ! Ils ne défendent plus la morale chrétienne et ne s'opposent plus à l'émancipation de la femme ou des homosexuels. Le « contentieux éthique » ne divise presque plus l'opinion publique ceci ne voulant pas dire que les différences n'existent plus mais se révèlent dans les nuances.

Les partis chrétiens hollandais et belges ont malgré tout conservé un certain impact, mais leur influence est plutôt marginale et largement dépendante de l'autorité morale de l'Eglise. Cette autorité morale (surtout de l'Eglise catholique) s'est vue fortement remise en question par les affaires de pédophilie. Les églises délaissées par les jeunes générations doivent se contenter d'un rôle de plus en plus symbolique. Beaucoup d'institutions chrétiennes ont d'ailleurs abandonné leur identité chrétienne au profit d'une identité humaniste.

Dans le respect mutuel, la tolérance vis-à-vis des autres croyances est actuellement de mise et le prosélytisme n'est plus le but premier des Eglises. La modernisation de l'Eglise n'est pas acceptée unanimement, notamment dans les milieux intégristes ou chez les calvinistes orthodoxes. Dans ce même esprit de respect, les autorités invitent les ministres des différents cultes à une collaboration souple et une gestion ordonnée de leurs activités. Dans ce contexte d'émancipation, le paysage scolaire se modifie de plus en plus. Des écoles appliquant les méthodes de pédagogie active Montessori, Dalton, Steiner-Waldorf, Plan de Iéna ou Freinet voient le jour. Dans un environnement tolérant et démocratique, les membres des nouvelles classes moyennes y transmettent leurs propres valeurs (d'inspiration chrétienne ou non) aux générations futures. Une société ouverte ne tolère pas l'intolérance.

130 **La société multiculturelle**

Avec l'ouverture de tous les partis politiques aux minorités ethniques, religieuses et mêmes sexuelles, la marge de manœuvre des conservateurs chrétiens est devenue de plus en plus réduite. Ils sont aujourd'hui très dispersés. D'autres ont trouvé refuge dans des sectes d'inspiration fondamentaliste.

Aux Pays-Bas, où le système électoral reste très favorable aux petits partis politiques pour conquérir un siège au Parlement, les protestants conservateurs ont pu s'assurer de quelques sièges. Ils dominent même les municipalités rurales dans les régions protestantes où ils s'emploient à régler le repos du dimanche au maximum. Religion oblige pourtant. Ces calvinistes résistent là-bas massivement à la vaccination obligée des enfants et refusent même de recevoir les allocations familiales. Une déduction fiscale leur est allouée. La tolérance de la part du gouvernement hollandais est donc de mise.

En Belgique, surtout en Flandre, le réseau scolaire catholique est resté très prédominant et se targue de préparer au mieux ses élèves pour l'université. Dès lors, il regarde d'un œil moins tolérant le nombre croissant d'élèves de familles musulmanes voulant entrer dans ses écoles. Cela n'exclut pourtant pas la présence d'autres croyances dans les écoles catholiques. Tout élève apporte une subvention de la part de l'Etat, ce qui peut expliquer la tolérance des autorités catholiques envers ces autres croyances devenues dominantes dans les grandes villes.

Cette tolérance regarde surtout les musulmans. La multiplication des mosquées pose des problèmes dans certains quartiers des grandes villes

et alimente de facto le racisme culturel exploité par le Vlaams Blok/Belang en Flandre et par Geert Wilders en Hollande (Reuter 2011: 55-75). Les démagogues populistes aiment d'ailleurs à défendre la culture « judéo-chrétienne » contre la prétendue islamisation de l'Europe. Il s'agit pour eux de défendre les valeurs chrétiennes contre l'invasion musulmane. Les coalitions « mauves » sont blâmées pour avoir créé une société multiculturelle dont les classes populaires ne veulent plus. C'est en jouant sur ce registre que le Vlaams Blok/Belang avait augmenté son score électoral jusqu'à 25 %. Aux Pays-Bas, la liste de Pim Fortuyn avait fait en 2002 une percée médiatique et électorale en attaquant la société multiculturelle.

On a cependant dit que Fortuyn a été un phénomène inclassable. Cet intellectuel progressiste et homosexuel égaré en politique après avoir fait une carrière universitaire remarquable, s'est néanmoins mis à pourfendre la société multiculturelle, le système scolaire inepte et l'Etat-providence corrompu. Homosexuel déclaré, il lui convenait aussi d'attaquer les jeunes immigrés de souche marocaine pour leur comportement violent envers les homosexuels et les femmes. En louant la philosophie des Lumières, il s'emportait facilement contre la religion musulmane restée obscurantiste. Tout cela n'est pas, sauf pour les Hollandais, très original. Fortuyn a été certainement influencé par la « confrontation des civilisations » de Samuel P. Huntington (Huntington 1992, 1996). Ensuite, Fortuyn fut certainement un démagogue très habile. En évitant de fustiger l'obscurantisme des sectes protestantes ou juives et les pratiques du courant intégriste dans l'Eglise catholique, il sut déplacer le problème de l'obscurantisme unilatéralement vers le monde musulman. Bien que son mouvement ne lui ait pas survécu longtemps, sa « pensée » reste encore très vivante dans les milieux populistes. Pour eux, il est un prophète qui voulait sauver la civilisation européenne et la nation hollandaise contre l'Islam. Pour les autres il est un démagogue qui aimait à se mettre en évidence.

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C'est principalement grâce à la révolution fortuyniste que les démocrates-chrétiens hollandais ont pu retrouver leur seconde vie en gagnant, eux aussi, les élections parlementaires de 2002. Avec à leur tête l'idéologue calviniste Jan Peter Balkenende, le CDA perce alors à nouveau en collectant les voix de la petite bourgeoisie traditionnelle. Mais il n'est certainement pas question d'une restauration conservatrice durable. Les élections de 2002 annoncent plutôt une période d'instabilité politique causée par la montée du populisme. Parce que les sociaux-démocrates et les libéraux n'attirent plus à eux deux toute la masse flottante d'électeurs, Balkenende doit dès lors gérer la crise idéologique pour un certain temps.

Parce que le changement social a profondément perturbé la composition du corps électoral, les partis traditionnels sont incapables de mobiliser leurs électeurs d'un seul coup. Les libéraux font encore appel aux classes moyennes traditionnelles, tandis que les nouvelles catégories sociales, principalement les habitants des banlieues, ont gonflé leurs rangs. Les sociaux-démocrates, qui collectaient jadis les votes de la classe ouvrière, attirent maintenant de plus en plus un nouveau prolétariat travaillant dans les services. Il reste encore le vote des immigrés dans les grandes villes. Pour les socialistes il s'agit d'une masse d'électeurs potentiels qu'on peut attirer avec un discours multiculturel qui rebute pourtant une bonne partie des électeurs autochtones.

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Il devient aussi de plus en plus difficile pour les partis politiques de gérer ce conglomerat instable et hétérogène d'électeurs dans une période de crise financière qui nécessite l'application de mesures d'austérité mal reçues par les électeurs. La crise boursière *dot.com* de 2001 avait déjà donné le signal que l'euphorie boursière toucherait à sa fin, ce qui aurait des conséquences désastreuses pour le secteur immobilier hollandais devenu très vulnérable à tout flottement des cours boursiers. La privatisation des entreprises d'Etat a déjà miné la confiance de pas mal d'électeurs dans le courant nouveau néo-libéral de ces sociaux-démocrates.

En guise de conclusion

Au temps des « piliers » la représentation proportionnelle pouvait garantir une grande stabilité parlementaire aussi longtemps que les électeurs restaient fidèles à leurs partis respectifs. Cette fidélité s'effacera grâce à la déconfessionnalisation de la société. Une libéralisation des médias a alors donné le coup de grâce au monde pilarisé. Les opinions sont ensuite régies par des maisons de production commerciales. Tout autant, le paysage politique s'est de plus en plus divisé avec l'apparition de petits partis politiques exprimant des opinions particulières. Ceci est surtout le cas en Hollande où le sectarisme religieux connaît une longue tradition. En Belgique, la fédéralisation des structures politiques n'a pas seulement fait éclater les partis politiques en formations régionales, mais a aussi stimulé le développement d'un discours régionaliste de plus en plus populiste.

En Belgique, le déclin des démocrates-chrétiens a suivi à peu près le même parcours électoral qu'aux Pays-Bas. Le démocrate chrétien flamand Yves Leterme, en s'alliant à la N-VA (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie) et en reprenant le discours de ce dernier petit parti, a su défaire en 2007 la coalition

« mauve » conduite par Guy Verhofstadt. Ce tournant vers le populisme flamand a été fait après un ressourcement idéologique qui avait fait de l'ancien CVP le Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V). La victoire électorale de Leterme (29 % des voix exprimées en Flandre) se termine ensuite en une crise de son propre parti. L'ancien Parti Social-Chrétien (PSC) des francophones s'est alors transformé en un Centre Démocrate Humaniste (CDH). Pour le CDH guidé par Joëlle Milquet, une stratégie progressiste devrait faire regagner le terrain perdu aux Verts.

La révolution populiste a bien démontré que le système parlementaire peut aussi créer sa propre déchéance en s'ouvrant trop facilement aux démagogues et fantaisistes soutenus à un certain moment par les médias. En Hollande, Geert Wilders a su collecter le vote protestataire en s'attaquant à l'Islam et à l'Union Européenne. Bien qu'il ait aussi mordu sur l'électorat plutôt populaire des grandes villes et quelques régions dévastées par la crise économique, sa percée électorale est néanmoins concurrencée par les ex-maoïstes du Socialistische Partij (SP) (Voerman: 179–204). En Belgique, c'est le populiste Bart De Wever qui tient le même discours, mais en pointant du doigt les Wallons qui profitent largement des subventions versées par les Flamands. Avec le déclin des démocrates-chrétiens, ce discours contre les Wallons a pu se renforcer. D'ailleurs, former un gouvernement de coalition stable n'est pas simple dans un Parlement qui compte trop de partis politiques. Le déclin électoral des démocrates-chrétiens a d'ailleurs vidé le centre parlementaire de sa substance. Aussi bien aux Pays-Bas qu'en Belgique, la stabilité politique a été donc minée par l'effritement des partis confessionnels, un vide que les socialistes et les libéraux n'ont pas su combler durablement.

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Primljeno: 30. maja 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 15. jula 2014.

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Laïcité et sécularisation en Hollande et en Belgique
ou le déclin de la laïcité en Belgique

Sažetak

Odnosi između crkve i države u Belgiji i Holandiji već dugo vremena određeni su historijskim kompromisom kojim je uspostavljen latentni mir između političkih snaga koje su se zalagale za tzv. „liberté scolaire“, i onih koje su branile laïcité, tj. *de facto*, vrednosti Francuske revolucije. Izvorno, radilo se o borbi oko kontrolisanja javnih službi i uloge religijskih kongregacija u organizovanju obrazovanja. Ovo je odmah vodilo velikoj segmentaciji društva na nekoliko „stubova“, rukovodeći se kriterijima o njihovim socijalnim mrežama u jednom više komunitarnom sistemu subvencionisanom od strane države čije elite među sobom promišljaju delatne modele. Sa dekonfesijalizacijom i ekonomskom ekspanzijom koji sve više utiču na ljudske odnose, ova društvena organizacija je izgubila postojeće značenje i vodila je ka manje-više kompletnom nestajanju rečenih „stubova“.

Ključne reči: laïcité, sécularisation, crkva, država, Hollande, Belgique, pilari-
zacija, političke partije

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Who should take care of the poor? Religion and social welfare in America

Abstract *The purpose of this study is to examine the church-state relations in the United States from the perspective of the social welfare system. More precisely, we are questioning the way the conceptual foundations and practical activities of religious organizations influence the directions of social policy and shape the way of dealing with the poor. The first part of the text outlines the main features of religious life and social welfare system in America, while the second contains an analysis of the impact of basic moral and religious principles of the Reformed Protestantism and Roman Catholicism (the two most widespread religious traditions) and the ways in which religious organizations are taking part in the modern social welfare system in America.*

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Keywords: *religion, social welfare, the poor, America*

Religion is embedded in the deepest layers of social reality, its influence very much varying, depending on political, economic and cultural circumstances. Through its preaching and moral guidelines, religion forms the values, priorities and shapes decisions. In nations with high numbers of religious people, policies and political decisions will inevitably be strongly influenced by religion, directly or indirectly. Due to specific position that religion has in the today's American society, we have attempted to examine the ways that the two most widespread Christian confessions (Protestantism and Roman Catholicism) are interlinked with the basic postulates and practices of social welfare in this country. In parallel, the focus of our analysis will also be on direct effects of the involvement of religious organizations by the state in the provision of social welfare services and support.

The religious philosophy (especially of Protestantism) is deeply integrated into American political culture and is, from such a position, in different ways influencing the formation and functioning of political institutions. (Lambert 2008) On the other hand, religious organizations are characterized by two important features, entitling them to be qualified as very influential types of citizens' associations: (1) formal establishment (including the resources: organizational, financial, human, administrative

etc.) and (2) ideas that signify charity, virtue and goodness. While the former represents a necessary precondition for functioning in a modern society, the latter is a motivational basis for action aimed at welfare of the community. Having this in mind, the goal of this paper is to show the interdependence of the following dimensions of social life in the USA: (1) the welfare system, (2) the social aspects of religious teaching and (3) practical aspects of charity that are realized through the activities of religious organizations.

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Narrowly focusing on the role of religion in social policy formation, we do not suggest that it is free from different sorts of political influence. In Marxist tradition, religious influence on people's behavior is seen as politically mediated and instrumentalised for different purposes. On the other hand, the direct impact of political factors (i.e. political parties, social movements, ideology, state institutions etc.) on social welfare policy is far reaching. However, although it will be acknowledged and incorporated in the main arguments in the text, political dimension will not be discussed separately as it is not the focal point of our study, concerned with the specific impact of the religious factors (teaching and practice).

Religion and Politics in the USA

Despite the formal separation of church and state, proclaimed already in the First Amendment to the Constitution, religion is important in the United States, not only in private life, but also in public sphere (Lambert 2008; Hays 2001; Wald & Calhoun-Brown 2011). For numerous Americans, confessional identification and religious routines represent an inseparable part of their daily lives and of their personal identities. In vast numbers, Americans believe in God, pray to God, contribute financially to churches, synagogues, temples, and take part in Sunday masses, morning prayers and other religious rituals. Over 80% of Americans define themselves in different ways as believers (Martin 2010: 60). Although some analysts predict the decrease of the importance of religion, statistics demonstrate a stability of the ratio of membership in church organizations in comparison with the overall population numbers, even since the 1950-ies, while some estimations assert that this ratio is higher now than it was during most of American history (Finke & Stark 1992: 239–241). However, religion in the US is not only the issue of private lives and personal identities; it is also a public, political issue, at least to the same extent as it is personal. Despite predictions, the processes of modernization have not succeeded in lessening the importance of religion

in the US, and the European model of secularization has not grown roots on American soil (Berger *et al.* 2008). Compared to Western European countries, the US represents an exemption in terms of the importance of the role that religion plays in both private and public spheres (Prothero 2006). The explanations for the continued influence of religion in the US are to be found in the colonial past, when ethnic and religious loyalties represented the bases of social life, while religion was considered a ground for preservation of the identity of immigrants through centuries and was an important mechanism of establishing the relationships with local communities in the new surroundings. Moreover, the competitiveness present at the „religious market“, without a monopoly of one dominant religious group and without the state promotion, did not allow for passivity and lack of inventiveness, otherwise characteristic for religious organizations with guaranteed positions (North & Gwin 2004). Striving to attract new members, denominations have over time refined the techniques of proselytizing, marketing and promotion (Stewart 1989). One additional reason for persuasiveness of religion in everyday life is found in the fact that religion represents a counterbalance to extreme individualism and relativism that characterizes American culture (Prothero 2006). People go to church in search for a feeling of unity, so much missing from their everyday lives. In addition, religious teaching provides guidance and rules to be observed in life, and these are often missing in a culture that nurtures relativism toward values. Facing the uncertainty in almost all segments of their lives, a significant number of people in religion find peace, sense and direction. In addition, the neutral attitude of the state, actually the lack of preference towards one particular religious group, contributes to the vitality of religion in US, by preserving a wide choice to people who arrived there from different cultural traditions. The ideas of personal liberty and individualism are not antagonistic to faith, because in a country that prefers pluralism; religious organizations create the market, while individuals are able to make certain choices according to their needs. However, it should be noted that the liberty of religious choice is rather limed since, even in the pluralistic societies, mass media, political parties, governments etc. often politically instrumentalise religion for their own purposes (Silk 1989, 1998; Meyer & Moors 2005; Schofield-Clark 2007; Fowler *et al.* 2010).

The religious map of North America is rather interesting, one of the reasons being the fact that such religious diversity is rarely to be found. Not even one of the religions gathers at least a half of the religious Americans, although different Protestant denominations, taken together, are closing

that number (around 30% of Evangelicals, 18% members of the mainline Protestantism and around 10% of Black Protestants). Roman Catholics are somewhere over 20%, due to which they rank among the most numerous religious groups. There is also a little over 1% of Jews, while around 5% belong to other religions (other Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus etc.) (Wald & Calhoun-Brown 2011: 28). Just a bit over one fifth of the population have declared themselves as „secular“¹, which is significantly less when compared to most other developed countries. Doubtless, a religious diversity of large proportions is present, several waves of immigration having contributed to its development. The first settlers, i.e. the generation of founders, were mostly the Protestants from the British Isles. During those first years, the number of Roman Catholics was minimal (below 1% of population), while other religious groups were even less in numbers. The increase of ratio of Roman Catholics in overall population started between 1830-s and 1850-s, due to the influx of immigrants from Ireland and Germany² (Prothero 2006). The fast growth of Roman Catholics gradually brought about the spreading of the collective identity of the nation from almost purely „Protestant“ to Christian in a wider sense. Subsequent arrival of numerous Jews caused additional spread of national identity and culture, turning it into Judeo-Christian. The fast growth of the number of Muslims and their gradual integration has caused some of the authors³ to predict the development of the „Abrahamic“ collective identity (Wald & Calhoun-Brown 2011). The latest waves of immigration, mostly coming from Asia, have added to religious diversity. It should also be mentioned that each new immigration wave has opened specific problems related to integration, challenging the established forms of public life and culture, creating antagonisms and intolerance on the side of the early settlers, causing exclusion, marginalization and forced displacement of newcomers⁴. However, once it became clear that the new settlers will not just leave, the attitude towards them gradually started to change, allowing for an increased acceptance. Over time, in parallel with democratization and increase of religious tolerance, the newly arrived religious groups managed to fit in more and more easily.

1 www.electionstudies.org accessed on March 10, 2014.

2 There were also some other ethnic groups, but to the far lesser extent.

3 However, this hypothesis is rather controversial since especially following September 11, 2001 American openness to immigrants and their beliefs have, many times, come into question (Haddad *et al.* 2003: 298).

4 The massive arrival of Jews was closely followed by the growth of anti-Semitism, while nowadays the Muslim religious community is facing intolerance.

From the very foundation of the US, religion played an important role in public life; some authors are inclined to conclude that even the Constitution itself represents a specific fusion of rules of Christianity and of principles of civic life (*ibid.*). The Constitution pronounces the separation of state and church in a way of forbidding preference of any confession over other, or establishing any religion as the official one. Taking into account that religion is of exceptional importance for the majority of the US citizens, the separation does not comprise resentment towards religious influences. On the contrary, the fact that national anthem, legal oath in court, national stamp and currency bear the religious symbols is another argument in favor of the fact that the importance of religion in public life in the USA is officially recognized.

During the longer part of the country's history, the relationships between religious organizations and state used to be characterized with cooperation, especially in terms of mutual adjustments. The only exception was between the 1940-s and the 1970-s, when the separation was more pronounced, and the influence of religion in all social spheres less present than ever before or after. The engagement of religious organizations was restricted, by, for example, prohibiting the expression of religion in public schools, or by means of limiting budget spending on religious schools, etc. (*ibid.*) Since the 1970-ies, the cooperation has again been established, which is particularly apparent in terms of the renewal of financial provision to religious schools, in regard to increased freedom of expression of religious affiliation and in again permitting for religious symbols to be posted in public places. These changes occurred, in large part, due to the strengthening of neo-conservatism and the rise of political evangelicals in the late-twentieth-century politics (Katz 1989: 17–18).

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In favor of the thesis that the religion is an inseparable part of the American political life are also, for example, data related to the level of exploitation of religious affiliation in electoral campaigns (e.g. the issue of alleged secret affinity of President Obama towards Islam that his opponents used in electoral campaigns) or the linkage between political orientation and religious affiliation (e.g. the tendency of Jews and Black Protestants to support the ideas of the left; or closeness of mainstream Protestants and Roman Catholics to conservative positions) (Greenberg & Wald 2001).

However, in spite of the developed religious pluralism (especially after the liberalization of immigration policy in 1965, allowing easier admission of immigrants from very different religious backgrounds) and the fact that various religious groups have been influencing the basic features of social

justice, law, tolerance, protection of public goods and defining public policy, the influence that Protestantism has had, from the very beginning, on creating the political culture and key political institutions is still significant. Somewhat lesser, but by no means unimportant, is the mark left by the Roman Catholic community, particularly related to issues of social welfare and care of the vulnerable, especially the children.

Social welfare and care for the poor in the U.S.

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Before we move on to a brief description of basic characteristics of social welfare system and care for the poor, it is necessary to present some facts about poverty in the US. According to official statistics⁵, 15% of Americans lived in poverty in 2010, which is the highest number registered in last twenty years. Poverty is not evenly distributed. African-American and Hispano-American populations are especially vulnerable, with poverty rates above 25%, while the white population is in a much better position. Single-parent families (mother-headed families), children and elderly are in a particularly unfavorable situation. Despite its economic strength, the United States significantly differ from developed European countries in terms of social disparities and poverty rates (Smeeding 2006).

According to the Esping-Andersen's classification, welfare policy in the United States is of the liberal type, characterized by minimal social assistance and a narrow circle of beneficiaries (Esping-Andersen 1990). The amount of aid is measured and allocated according to precise criteria, primarily financial status and position of an individual in labor market. The basic idea is that welfare policy should not disturb market principles, but only serve as a support for existing market mechanisms (Čekerevac 2008). There are three main features of social welfare system in the United States. The first is *pragmatism*, in the sense that programs are created for practical reasons, in response to specific problems, and not derived from the pre-set national social security schemes, as is the case with most European countries. Another feature is the high degree of *decentralization*. In the basis of this kind of organization is the idea of subsidiarity, according to which the local authorities, as the closest to the citizens and well acquainted with their problems, are the most appropriate to be the first to engage in the implementation of social policy measures, while higher layers of government should be engaged only in a situation when other instances prove to be inefficient. The system is not universal on the national level, which results in significant regional differences. The third feature

5 <http://www.npc.umich.edu/poverty/> Accessed on 11 March 2014.

is the significant role of *private sector* in provision of social welfare, especially in healthcare, education and pension system, which further enhances the disparities in the access to these services (Puljiz 1997).

The nineteenth century English Poor Laws have made significant influence on main features of the anti-poverty policy in the U.S. The fundamental idea of these laws was that all forms of charity should be envisioned in terms of establishing discipline among workers and developing strong labor market (Martin 2010). In order to turn away as many people as possible from asking for support, conditions and requirements were rigorous (e.g. hard work in prisonlike factories), while the shaming, stigmatizing and even criminalizing the poor was a common practice. The New Poor Law (1834) has made some progress regarding the attitude towards the poor, in a way that it drew distinction between those who deserved support (sick, elderly, handicapped, etc.) and those who were able to work and therefore did not deserve help, despite their poverty⁶ (*ibid.*).

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A century later, in 1935, the *Social Security Act* was adopted, which laid the foundations of the American welfare state⁷. The great economic crisis that struck the United States in 1929, drew attention to the fact that capitalist market economy without government intervention was not able to get out from the crisis on its own. Mass unemployment and almost arbitrary distribution of economic hardship have challenged the ruling beliefs about the nature of poverty. For the first time, the poor were seen as victims of the processes that went beyond personal responsibility, work ethic and dedication. Consequently, the ideas that it is necessary to increase the level of income security in times of crisis and to establish various social security schemes became prominent in this period. It is right to conclude that without the Great Depression of the 1930s, there would have probably be no Social Security Act of 1930-s. It should be noted, however, that this reform, at least partly, had to do with political expediency, i.e. to avoid or control radical and popular movement's (such as the militant movement of unemployed American workers during the Great Depression) demands for change (Piven & Cloward 1977).

Although the level of federal involvement in social and economic affairs enabled by the New Deal is rather exceptional in American history, it still

6 For the development of social welfare system in France, a good example is provides by Donzelo (1988).

7 In this system, a prominent place was occupied by program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), also adopted in 1935. That program involved taking care of single-parent families, disabled or unemployed parents with minor children.

did not make a complete breakup with the past. Actually, compared to European welfare systems, the United States abandoned the values of individualism and *laissez-faire* economy to a significantly lesser extent. The social security system was not completed, and different categories of population remained excluded in one way or another (Bejaković 2000). The focus on building insurance system as a basic mechanism for protection of workers from risk of unemployment, illness, aging and death also remained. Thus, the redistributive effect of the introduced measures remained minimal and the work ethics was highlighted as the main value and principle. Finally, the system continued to stigmatize recipients of social assistance, subjecting them to various checks and conditioning. Members of ethnic minorities remained in a particularly disadvantaged position (*ibid.*).

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Although the level of security and protection attained in northern and western European countries has never been reached, the period between the 1930s and 1970s can be considered the golden age of social welfare in America. However, the oil crisis and economic stagnation and the resurgence of the right-wing politics in the 1970-s, were accompanied by a gradual reduction in social privileges, while the definitive break with the previous system was made in 1996, after the adoption of the *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act*, PRWORA. New legislation has made significant changes in the US social welfare system. „Welfare“ approach was abandoned in favor of „workfare“ strategy. The fundamental goal of the newly introduced policy measures was to prepare the recipients of social assistance for employment immediately after the termination of the program. The basic idea was that the state aid programs should exist only as a temporary security net, not as a permanent arrangement for the poor. During the AFDC anyone with income below certain level, and who also met other requirements prescribed by law, had the right to permanent financial assistance. However, since PRWORA entered into force, obtaining financial aid was granted only for a limited period of time (no longer than five years), and only if the very strict conditions were fulfilled. One of the consequences of newly introduced measures was that a significant part of population was left both without state support and employment. On the other hand, the supported poor created a category of poor people who work in very difficult and uncertain conditions, and are exposed to different types of conditioning, harassment and abuse at work.

Period after 1996 was characterized by the general tendency to privatize social services, but with no intentions of returning to traditional concept

of a local charity, typical for earlier period. Transformation of social welfare system went toward the establishment of public-private partnerships in the provision of social services. In this system, religious organizations have gradually become important actors and partners of the state, accepting a good part of the burden of caring for the poor.

The Influence of Religion on the Treatment of the Poor in the United States – conceptual foundations and practical activity of religious organizations in social service provision

Social welfare programs contain responses to some of the key questions: Should we care about the poor? Who should take care of them and how? Who deserves help and who does not? Social programs and policies always reflect the values and understandings of the nature of poverty, its causes, as well as specific concepts of individual and/or collective responsibility for poverty alleviation. Even in the highly secularized societies, religious norms and values indirectly make influence on basic assumptions of social policy (Dobelstein 1986). Contemporary social policy of western countries bears a deep imprint of biblical principles and practices, given in a socially and politically mediated way (Stark 1996).

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The influence that religions have on welfare policy and the treatment of poor in the US are twofold at least. On one hand, there is a more or less direct impact of religious teachings and moral principles that are deeply embedded in the political culture and laws of this country. On the other hand, there is the practical work of religious organizations as social service providers. In the rest of the article, we focus on these two aspects, first taking into account the impact of the predominant Protestantism. Then we move on the effects made by the Roman Catholic Church and related organizations.

Protestantism

Protestants were the first to arrive on US soil and their teaching made a deep influence in virtually all spheres of social life (Skocpol 2000). Analysts of the relationship between religion and state in the United States noted that the Bible strongly influenced those who led the War of Independence and wrote the Constitution (Lutz 1984). The marks of Puritan heritage can still be found in the conceptual foundations and practical measures of social policy in United States.

A good overview of social teachings of reformed Protestantism, Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism is given by Kahl (2005: 119–120). Protestantism developed a specific attitude towards poverty and insisted on values of hard and disciplined work, which should provide material well-being. According to Jean Calvin's teaching, material success is a sign of God's blessing, while poverty has quite the opposite connotation. The worker is the closest to God, while the poor are the furthest (Kahl 2005; Martin 2010; Veber 2011). Considering the importance ascribed to work within this teaching, it becomes clearer why in countries with Protestant tradition the workshops represented the basic institutions of social welfare and why was hard work a prerequisite for remunerations. Unlike Roman Catholic hospitals, schools and orphanages, whose creation was an act of mercy of the wealthy classes seeking to secure their place in Heaven, in Protestant-influenced schemes the work of poor was exploited in workshops. A reflection of these ideas can be found in modern US social legislation, where the policy of social assistance is conditioned by training for subsequent employment⁸.

Protestant teaching emphasizes the values of independence, personal responsibility and self-reliance. In such a value system, *individualism* and *self-sufficiency* in hard work prevail upon the values of compassion, solidarity, mutuality and charity. This value system is reflected in the basic concepts of social welfare in predominantly Protestant countries, such as the United States, with focus on work contribution (training for employment) and negative attitudes towards various forms of charity that are seen as potentially leading to unintended consequences such as laziness and welfare mentality (Kahl 2005). The emphasis on individualism and self-sufficiency influenced the development of competitiveness and weakening of care and compassion for those less fortunate in market competition. Such value foundations were a good basis for the formulation

8 In *The Tragedy of American Compassion*, a very popular book in conservative circles in the US, Olasky (Olasky 1992) has tried to highlight the problems that raised as a result of abandonment of traditional values of work, individualism and self-sufficiency. He argues that a system where welfare recipients live at the expense of hardworking people is unjust. The author actually reaffirms the thesis that underprivileged are to be blamed for their own situation and that they need a change of values. Olasky made a number of critical remarks at the expense of the social welfare system, whose effects on welfare recipients are much smaller than traditional direct and intimate relationships that representatives of local religious communities have had with protégées, on whose moral development and training for independent living they worked, allowing and encouraging them to free themselves from the vicious cycle of poverty and dependence (*ibid.*: 224). The same author in an article published in the U.S. Today (1997) writes: „Private charities are not always effective, but at least they have a chance to be effective. State social welfare programs are notorious for their inefficiency“.

of main principles of social policy in accordance with the *laissez-faire* doctrine, as is the case with PRWORA, whose main characteristics were: limited duration, strict requirements associated with work engagement, control of behavior, especially sexual promiscuity of program recipients, etc. (Hudson & Coukos, 2005; Chunn & Gavigan, 2004).

Following the logic of the Calvinist concept of *predestination*, one might ask why the poor should put the effort to improve their position when their fate is already outlined. The success of an individual, who managed to rise from the bottom, is actually a sign that he was elected from the very beginning, but was not visible at the start. Calvinist concept, which lays in the very basis of the „American dream“, does suggest, on one hand, that the poor should blame themselves and not others for their own failure (and curse), but on the other, it opens the opportunity for them to prove that they are chosen with their hard work and success (Veber 2011). Some authors are inclined to argue that the drastic reforms of social welfare that took place in 1996 were the result of revival of this aspect of Protestant theology. The consequence is the creation of a new social class – the poor who work (Martin 2010).

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Skepticism which has roots in the Puritan worldview influenced the formation of distrustful and cynical attitude of Americans toward those in power. The role of social state is seen as harmful, as it supposedly jeopardizes individual freedom. Therefore, its influence should be limited to the role of a „night watchman“ of property and security of citizens. (Wald & Calhoun-Brown 2011) Accordingly, belief that an important role in maintaining social life should be given to the local community, market and civil society organizations, including religious organizations, is widely accepted. (Diamond 1977) Considering the fact that state intervention in social affairs is incompatible with the doctrine of self-help and local solidarity, we should not be surprised that national social welfare system similar to those established in Scandinavian countries with Lutheran tradition has never been developed in any country where Puritan Protestantism played an important role (Kahl 2005).

Tendency of using „moral“ arguments in public discourse is also partly a result of Puritan heritage. *Moral approach* can be noticed, among other things, in the attempt to accurately determine who deserves welfare help on the basis of individual personality characteristics and degree of compliance with moral norms. For example, there is a discretionary right to reject up to 20% of requests for help, on the basis of relevant officials assessment. Another example is a practice of moral appropriateness

checks of female social assistance recipients (men night visits were banned and sanctioned) (Hudson & Coukos 2005). One example of racial and gender bias associated with allocation of social assistance is the stereotype of the „welfare queen“ – African-American woman with many children that manages to extract large amounts of social assistance while driving a Cadillac (Martin, 2010). These and other similar stereotypes have only fueled the already existing hostility of wider population against social welfare users, which eventually resulted in a drastic change in legislation.

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The influence of Calvinistic doctrine proved to be strong and persistent, with some decline in times of crisis, like the 1930s Great Depression, when a sudden impoverishment of larger number of people obviously without personal guilt and responsibility shook the deep-rooted beliefs. However, with the resurgence of economic life, the dominant opinions again drew near the Protestant principles (Hudson & Coukos 2005; Weaver, Shapiro & Jacobs 1995). A relatively easy return to old ideas and interpretations speaks in favor of the thesis of perseverance and influence of Puritan Protestant teachings in American political culture.

Roman Catholicism

As a religion, Roman Catholicism has a long history of charity and caring for the disadvantaged. When it comes to poverty, the starting belief of this religion is that wealthy individuals can express their love to God and receive blessing by helping those in need. It is the duty of the wealthy to help, even though the poor do not have a special right to that help. The act of charity actually provides salvation for the donor, while the positive effect that it has on the recipients is of a secondary importance. One of the key values of Roman Catholic ethics is *sharing and communalism* (Duncan & Moore 2003). The poor are seen as a part of community, not as someone who does not belong to it, and consequently the resources that are produced within community should be accessible to them as well. In many countries, Roman Catholic Church had a prominent social role as a provider of aid to disadvantaged population. Roman Catholic schools, hospitals, orphanages and other similar institutions century spread all over Europe during the nineteenth, becoming the forerunner of the later established welfare state. This tradition is very different from the Protestant practice of engaging the poor in the workshops (Kahl 2005). While in some countries, such as Ireland, the Roman Catholic Church entered into various agreements with the state, in the nineteenth

century United States it established an independent social security system which operated in parallel with the state (Fahey 1998).

In the US, Roman Catholic Church was one of the first that offered help to those in need, keeping continuity with the early seventeenth century tradition of establishing hospitals and orphanages. However, until the mid-nineteenth century, the aid has been provided sporadically (Dege-
neffe 2003). Roman Catholic charities began to develop particularly during the second half of the nineteenth century, when the number of poor Roman Catholic immigrants (mostly from Ireland) started to grow rapidly. The situation was especially difficult in New York City, and the representatives of Roman Catholic religious communities realized that the stigma will expand to them as well if something is not done. It was then that Roman Catholic schools, hospitals, orphanages, shelters and other facilities for the most vulnerable started to open in great numbers. Concern was that in the context of the dominant Protestantism and the presence of other religious options, Roman Catholic population would start to fall apart. Roman Catholic clergy raced to take care „of their own“ so that they do not fall under the influence of Protestant institutions and teaching (*ibid.*: 377–379). Special attention was given to education of children in Roman Catholic institutions, and mercy and care for children steadily became recognized characteristics of Roman Catholic identity in America. These organizations merged gradually into the so-called *New York System*. At the end of the nineteenth century, working together, Roman Catholic organizations were positioned as the largest provider of social services in the US. Over time, they gained political influence and managed to obtain a number of legislative solutions, most of them directly related to child protection.

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When the *New Deal* shifted a significant part of care for the poor to the authority of public institutions, representatives of Roman Catholic organizations expressed dissatisfaction, stating that the poor were their concern. Certainly, a negative reaction was partly caused by the concern of job loss of staff dealing with vulnerable population. Under the new conditions, especially since the 1960-ies, when it was realized that government agencies were not sufficient to meet all the needs, Roman Catholic organizations were once again engaged in the system through subcontracts with public authorities and continued service provision. In this period, Roman Catholic organizations started to provide assistance also to members of other religions and to those who were religiously undecided. In the 1990-ies, public funds were securing over 60%

of the budget of Catholic Charities USA, an organization that today represents the largest system of private social provision in the country (Brown & McKeown 1997: 194).

The role of religious organizations in provision of social services

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Until recently, religious organizations in the US were not able to receive funding from the state directly for the implementation of social programs. However, with the adoption of the aforementioned Act in 1996, and a special section called *The Charitable Choice*, as well as the *Faith Based Community Initiatives Act of 2001*, funding of religious organizations from public budget was fully legalized, provided that it was not used for spreading religious teachings, but only for the provision of contracted services (Martin 2010: 61; Cnaan, Boddie 2002: 224–225).

One of the consequences of changes in social legislation in 1996 was that the charity associations began to play an increasingly important role in compensating services from which the state withdrew. In accordance with the desires of conservative circles, America began to return to traditions of self-help on the level of local community. The basic idea was to return to voluntary work based on the principles of problem solving within the community, through the (in)formal networks of support, reciprocity and solidarity. However, the processes of modernization and individualism present in American society made civic participation less vibrant than before. Changes in lifestyle, influence of popular culture and mass media, frequent internal migration, lack of free time and weakening of civic virtues have further contributed to the fading of civil society (Putnam 2000). In addition, despite the problems created by supposedly inefficient bureaucracy, it was clear that a return to the old mechanism of charity is no longer possible. Total transfer of care for vulnerable groups to local community and weak civil society was neither possible nor desirable. Therefore the concept of the so-called public-private partnerships was applied, making civil society organizations and private firms subcontractors in the implementation of social programs financed from the public budget. Social support organized in this way, respected the principle of subsidiarity as civic associations, religious organizations and professional associations were the first instance to be contacted by citizens in case of need. Only in cases when civil society organizations and local communities are not able to cope with large-scale problems, higher levels of government take charge.

One of the arguments in favor of greater involvement of religious groups and associations in social care, was that the widespread individualism reduces solidarity and reciprocity that are essential for functioning of a community. It was assumed that this type of organizations is best suited to develop solidarity, compassion, and mutual assistance among community members. What is expected of religious organizations is to participate in the reconstruction of broken social networks and to strengthen depleted social capital in the community.

Under the strong pressure coming from conservative circles, the new legal framework PRWORA enhanced the role of religious organizations as social service providers by giving the opportunity of assistance choice (*Charitable Choice*). This means that public institutions got the chance to select religious organizations which would be financially supported from the state budget for their provision of social services. And while many religious organizations already had some form of humanitarian activities, such attitude of the state encouraged them to professionalize in certain domains and thus widen the conditions for their own action. Although many religious organizations assumed the role in providing social services, Roman Catholic associations were particularly successful. For example, Catholic Charities USA (founded in 1910) is currently the largest private provider of social services in the United States, with more than 1,400 organizations, 283,000 employees and volunteers, the circle of users that exceeds 12 million individuals, and a budget of over two billion dollars. Services provided by this organization cover a broad area of social work, from organizing soup kitchens, psychological counseling, (in)formal education, employment support, family support, healthcare, programs for integration of migrants, help for the homeless, help for the victims of violence and users of psychoactive substances etc. (Degeneffe 2003; Cnaan Boddie 2002: 224–225).

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Despite the positive attitude of most Americans toward the activities of religious organizations and their recognized contribution to the development of social welfare in the past, their inclusion has encountered much criticism, especially from the secular left (Skocpol 2000). One of the objections made to this type of engagement argued that, despite their contribution in the field of social care and assistance, it was not their main goal, but a tool which helped these organizations to spread their teachings and gain new followers (Fahey, 1998). Another cause of dissatisfaction was the fact that in this way the principle of separation of church and state would be put in question. Then, the concern was raised about the potential bias and discrimination based on religious affiliation of the prospective

assistance recipients, staff employed in these organizations, as well as about violation of basic democratic principles and human rights, etc. Doubts have also been expressed in terms of the capacities of certain religious organizations (especially the smaller ones) to perform a given job (Chaves 2001). Although the majority of citizens approve the inclusion of religious organizations in social activities, as shown in a survey conducted by the Pew Institute, still a significant number did not agree with the inclusion of non-Judeo-Christian groups, such as Muslim Americans, Buddhist Americans, Nation of Islam or the Church of Scientology. The public attitude indicates the potential danger of unequal treatment of organizations and associations of different religious orientations⁹ (Skocpol 2000).

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The building of partnerships with other civil society organizations and governmental agencies (*ibid.*) was seen as a way to avoid these traps of the involvement of religious organizations in state affairs.

Despite present debates on advantages and negative aspects of inclusion of religious organizations in state affairs, large organizations such as the Salvation Army, Catholic Charities USA, and Lutheran Services in America or Jewish Family Services have been active social service providers for a long time. The current trend of devolution of responsibility for social issues from the federal to the lower levels of government has a positive effects on building firmer ties between government and religious organizations in the form of public-private partnerships. However, it does not go without complications, which are largely a consequence of exceptional variety of organizations, their legal statuses, organizational forms, teaching and dominant practices that are hampering their work in the public sphere (Dobkin-Hall 2007).

Concluding Remarks

In America, unlike European countries, religion maintained a privileged position and important role in both private and public spheres. As we have seen, the influence of religious factor is expressed indirectly, through religious teachings deeply incorporated in the political culture and the basic principles of the organization of social and political life, but also

⁹ Results of research conducted in 2001 showed that citizens are in large numbers (75%) supporters of funding of religious organizations from government sources, but there the favoring of Judeo-Christian concept was also present, so that the only half of respondents expressed a positive attitude towards equally distributed money to other religious organizations (PEW Forum on Religion and Public Life). Studies also show that the largest part of funding from the budget went right into the hands of the Judeo-Christian organizations (Prothero 2006).

directly, through the actions of religious organizations in solving problems faced by the poor.

As it was demonstrated, Roman Catholic and reformed Protestant understandings of the main causes, consequences and approaches in treatment of poverty significantly differ. In short, while for Roman Catholics the very act of mercy is important and has a role important for the benefactor; Protestants emphasize diligent work as a way to salvation, while the help for the poor is limited by the assessment of their moral suitability. For Roman Catholics, poverty is a heavy burden that the entire community should take care of through charitable activities, while Protestants emphasize personal guilt and responsibility for the miserable situation of an individual. The principle of operation of Roman Catholic organizations is *caritas* – assisting without much discrimination, while for the Protestants the main tool is test and punishment of the workshop.

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The similarity of these two religious traditions is primarily reflected in the rejection of state authority and in the importance given to civil society and local initiative. This resulted in the fact that the system of social care at the national level has never been developed, neither in Roman Catholic countries, nor in the countries dominated by reformed Protestantism in a way it was achieved in countries with Lutheran tradition, which was open for the impact of higher structures of government (Kahl 2005). The development of the social welfare system in America generally followed Protestant principles. They are also present in the aforementioned changes that directly include religious organizations in social services provision. Social assistance that is received is not necessarily citizens' right motivated by social solidarity, but it includes in itself religious connotations and social teachings of the Churches.

Despite the undeniable changes that are the result of the establishment of welfare state in America, social policies and practices aimed at reducing poverty still carry the traces of strong religious influence from the past, and also the current efforts of religious groups to capture and maintain their position in the public sphere. Attitude of the state towards religious organizations can be seen as a function of its relation to social care system. In a country where the dominant principle is individual responsibility and where the local level is seen as the primary field of solving social problems, the significant presence of religious organizations appears as a logical result of such policies.

Primljeno: 15. juna 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 15. avgusta 2014.

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Jelisaveta Vukelić

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Ko treba da se brine o siromašnima? Religija i socijalna zaštita u Americi

Apstrakt

Namera ovog rada je da ispita odnos religijskih organizacija i države u Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama iz perspektive sistema socijalne zaštite i brige o siromašnima. Konkretnije, postavljamo pitanje na koji način idejne osnove i praktično delovanje religijskih organizacija utiču na pravce formulisanja socijalne politike, odnosno oblikovanje odnosa države prema ugroženim kategorijama stanovništva. U prvom delu se skiciraju osnovne karakteristike religijskog života i socijalne zaštite u Americi, dok je drugi deo rada posvećen analizi uticaja osnovnih moralno-religijskih pretpostavki reformskog protestantizma i katolicizma (kao dve najrasprostranjenije religijske tradicije u SAD) i načina na koji se religijske organizacije uključuju u savremeni sistem socijalne zaštite u Americi.

Ključne reči: religija, socijalna zaštita, siromašni, Amerika

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A Left „Theocracy“: The Church and the State in Revolutionary Nicaragua

Abstract *This paper analyses the antagonism between the established (Nicaraguan and global) Catholic Church and the Sandinista movement and government, which was one of the focal points for the ascendancy of a continental and global liberation theology movement. The paper provides a critical overview of the Nicaraguan liberation theology movement, as well as Sandinista strategies, primarily in relation to the social functions of religion and religious institutions. The central focus of this essay is to identify how the left-theological and Sandinista understanding of the imperatives of the counter-hegemonic project, the „historical bloc“ (conceived as a system of political and social networks and alliances) and the „national-popular“ strategy contributed to the tentative naissance of a novel state religion and a novel political project: a left-wing „theocratic“ social order. The Nicaraguan experience is useful for focusing the wider discussion about the importance of context-specific normative judgments about Church-state relations.*

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Keywords: *liberation theology, the historical bloc, national-popular, left „theocracy“*

Introduction

Cooperation and conservative symbiosis have been the main historical pattern of church-state relations in Nicaragua. The main orientation shared both by the state and the ruling church hierarchy in this relationship had been the preservation of mutual class interests and privileges of the Church and state hierarchies (Berryman 1984). An innovative new religious divergence within and beyond the church structures allowed an alternative radical and (arguably) politically emancipatory and democratising model of Christianity („liberation theology“) to flourish, in tension with the *ancién regime*, with the Church hierarchy, and (in a more moderate and attenuated way) in tension with the Sandinista state as well.

I shall first contextualise and discuss the emergence of liberation theology (as an ideology and a movement), which eroded the traditional conservative symbiosis between the Nicaraguan church and state. Of course, the party-political arm of the socialist movement, the FSLN (*Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional*), was a critical intervening variable which, by conquering state power and seeking to instrumentalise liberation theology, disrupted the old patterns of Church-state relations, as well as the

internal coherence and unity of the Church itself. As the Nicaraguan situation clearly illustrates, in different circumstances the official state religion can be both a base for the power of the Church's hierarchy and a challenge to the church hierarchy, compatible with and subversive to the established social order.

The Emergence of Liberation Theology

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The Nicaraguan context was one of drastic inequalities, where half of the country's farmland was owned by less than 200 families, and the poorer half of the farming population owned just 4 per cent of land. There were 200,000 landless peasants while the ruling Somoza dynasty owned 5 million acres. Even more explicitly obscene was the fact that around fifty per cent of all deaths were of children under five years of age. The population suffered extreme exploitation and oppression at the hands of the Somoza family, the rest of the state elite, large capital and the National Guard. National life was characterised by extreme corruption and a brutal economy dominated by agro-exporters (producing cash-crops) and by other business elites (Bradstock 1987).

For decades, since the Somoza family came to power in 1936, the Catholic Church hierarchy in Nicaragua had supported its highly repressive ruling regime and system, which has been described as a „prototypical seigneurial *latifundismo*“ (West 1992: 394). As the popular dissatisfaction and governmental repression escalated, the upper class hierarchy of the official Church was also becoming increasingly remote in the eyes of a significant segment of the population (Berryman 1984; Bradstock 1987). In these trying circumstances, a divide within the Church, both on the level of the clergy and of the broader Church community or *ekklesia*, began to develop.

Class analysis is a key methodological prism for understanding the turbulent events of the Nicaraguan revolution. The clergy, largely originating from the „upper“ and „middle“ classes, was partially fused with the rest of the upper class elite due to its common socialisation experiences and continuing personal and social links. Moreover, for a long time the clergy reflected in its political positions a relatively clear, largely un-ambivalent functional connection to the ruling elite, i.e. its role as the „gatekeeper“ of a conservative capitalist ideology against attempts to reform, transform or crush this hegemonic worldview. However, the differences among the religious elements and the different organisational levels of the Church in their positioning towards radical structural change (and FSLN itself) were complex and multi-causal, irreducible to a reductionist, purely economic,

class-deterministic explanation. After all, the revolutionary priests were themselves often of upper or middle class social background; they possessed substantial social and cultural capital, and occupied a privileged position in the social division of labour. Yet, in the late 1960s this radical clergy started to engage in a strategy of „going to the people“ and popular „*concientizacion*“. This religious activity at the grassroots was mainly conducted by the lower clergy (united in the Association of Nicaraguan Clergy) and the Christian base communities (*comunidades eclesiales de base*) based on cooperative living, working and sharing. The most prominent Nicaraguan examples of these grassroots Christian communities were the one in Solentiname, the San Pablo parish, barrio Riguero, as well as the work of the Capuchins in the countryside (Berryman 1984). Several Christian base communities, like Solentiname, also served as important sanctuaries for revolutionary leaders (*ibid.*). Solentiname's leading figure, the celebrated poet and priest Ernesto Cardenal, later became the Minister of Culture in the Sandinista government. Such progressive religious figures constituted, to a significant extent, the Nicaraguan revolutionary intelligentsia.

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Over-deterministic class perspectives which negate the role of ideological and practical subjectivities in the Latin American liberation theology movement can be challenged even more fundamentally by pointing to the openly reformist, even radicalising, response of some parts of the senior Church hierarchy. As an idea and a movement, it would appear that liberation theology was partly induced and energised by the liberalising effect of the reform-minded Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) and the Second General Conference of Latin American Bishops in Medellin, Colombia (1968), which postulated the „preferential option for the poor“ as the basis of a different, socially responsive theology (partly perhaps as a pragmatic response to the Church's waning popularity), reflecting a conversion to dependency theory (popularised by the concept of „underdevelopment of development“ proposed by neo-Marxist theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank – see Brewer 1990). The Conference produced intense intellectual and spiritual ferment in religious circles (to an extent simply by opening new space for dialogue and non-conformism), with large numbers of the clergy and lay people meeting to discuss the Medellin documents (Bradstock 1987).

In terms of interest representation, however, it was clear that liberation theology's main „constituency“ were the poor (as the „preferential option for the poor“ concept openly explicated). The vast majority of these Christian base communities were based in poverty-stricken communities,

although people from elite and middle-class layers of society participated as well (Sabia 1997). These religious activist and discussion groups were often based on the method of Socratic dialogue, enabling the people involved to develop an empowering self-awareness, which supported the wider processes of the democratisation of the public sphere. A truly revolutionary aspect of these discussions was the fact people started interpreting the Scriptures independently, without uncritically adhering to the traditionalist understanding that those „above“ have a monopoly on „truth“ (Berryman 1984). The people are entitled to become the protagonists of their culture and history. However, it is important to note that the emphasis only gradually shifted from personal spiritualism („internal renovation“) to social activism (collective liberation) in many of these grassroots Christian communities (*ibid.*). This grassroots and participatory approach of the base communities threatened both the Church hierarchy and the state's authoritarian *modus operandi*.

The „Delegates of the Word“ (groups of lay preachers working among the rural poor not only to lead worship but also to bring about improvements in health, agriculture and literacy) were another important Christian progressive and pro-participatory sector. They were to a significant extent trained by the Center for Rural Education and Development. By late 1970^s a number of Delegates became active collaborators of FSLN, and some „had been pressured, jailed, tortured and killed“ (*ibid.*: 73). Small groups of evangelicals (particularly Baptist) became increasingly radicalised and involved in the Nicaraguan liberation struggle – some of them even became important Sandinista leaders. The arrival of a number of new priests in mid-60s from their studies abroad further contributed to this radicalisation. „Given the tremendous prestige local priests held in the very religious Nicaraguan society, they were key elements in the coalition's efforts in the countryside. [...] The Sandinistas used the priests and philosophy of liberation theology to provide unassailable moral high ground for the insurgency“ (Hammes 2006: 85–87). Indubitably, many Sandinistas had their worldviews shaped by the egalitarian and humanistic aspects of the Christian teaching. Besides, the use of biblically phrased language often must have helped in expressing politically dangerous, counter-hegemonic and subversive ideas. Additionally, the adoption of the parish structure as an organisational base for anti-regime activities made sense considering the material and cultural resources that this offered.

Castañeda characterised the Christian base communities as „the most important [grassroots] movement, because it is so firmly anchored in the

region's history and psyche" (Castañeda 1994: 205). The proponents of liberation theology gave priority to „orthopraxis“ (right practice) over the traditional Church emphasis on „orthodoxy“ (dogma, doctrinal concerns) (McHugh 2003: 314). Liberation theology is about serving the poor and the oppressed, about „feeding the hungry, clothing the naked and healing the sick“. It is a message of solicitude for the underdogs, the poor and the oppressed. The leading Nicaraguan liberation theologian and Sandinista Minister of Culture, Ernesto Cardenal, expressed a readiness to reconcile his differences with non-believers, allowing a respectful, relaxed fellowship of believers and non-believers (a position other progressive priest-politicians like the foreign minister Miguel D'Escoto have also embraced): „prefer to be with those who, without putting God's name on their lips, and perhaps without even formally knowing God, are doing all God asks to be done for a suffering people“ (Ernesto Cardenal in Cabestrero 1983: 76-77).¹ Liberation theology counter-posed the „horizontalist“, grassroots level of pastoral work to the traditional Church hierarchy. The Christian base community members laid stress in their criticism of the official Church on its authoritarianism and unwillingness to participate in democratic dialogue.

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Another radical ideological aspect of liberation theology is its rejection of the crude division between the body and the soul, the physical and the spiritual². The „Church of the Poor“/„Popular Church“ was committed concretely to the creation of the „Kingdom of God on Earth“, a new society based on gospel principles, „universal brotherhood“, a beloved community of justice and equality, freedom from oppression, etc. Revolution was a form of „effective charity“, and democratic socialism was to be that „society of love“ the oppressed longed for, a society of „human dignity, basic human equality [...], unity, struggle, hope“ (Berryman 1984: 22). The liberation theologians emphasise that Christ himself was a social

1 In fact, the liberation theologians also found support for this stance in the Scriptures: „Did not your father eat and drink and do justice and righteousness? Then it was well with him. He judged the cause of the poor and the needy; then it was well. Is not this to know me? Says the Lord“. (The Book of Jeremiah, in Bradstock 1987: 20)

2 The potential progressive implications of this, from the rejection of economic servitude to the rejection of sexual repression, should be apparent. A particularly mobilising aspect of this grassroots left-theological movement was its development of women's political consciousness and role in society. Even the image of the Virgin Mary, an orthodox symbol of female submissiveness, passivity and inferiority, was transformed into a Louise Michel-like figure of revolutionary sacrifice and social initiative, providing a diametrically opposite role model to Nicaraguan women and girls (Linkogle 1998). The traditional ahistorical, fatalistic (seemingly) apolitical institutional approach (no big changes are possible due to human nature, destiny etc., no socialist structural reforms, capitalism as the natural form of human relations...) loses its appeal as people acquire a measure of self-initiative and self-control over their lives.

revolutionary who preached a kingdom of unity and love, serving the poor and the oppressed, who declared that „it is easier for a camel to go through the eyes of a needle than it is for a rich man to enter the gates of heaven“ (The Gospel According to St. Mark, 10: 25), and was therefore executed by the authorities who were in fear for their privileges. They believe that „identifying with those who are hungry and thirst for justice, with the exploited and oppressed, brings reprisals. These reprisals for having taken the side of poor who suffer, this is the Cross“ (D’Escoto, 1992, 65).

The „historical bloc“, „national-popular“, and the Nicaraguan interregnum

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It is quite understandable that the Nicaraguan Church did not rush to place itself at the helm of the movement against the Somoza dictatorship in the context of state terror, a vicious Guardia Nacional and death squads (Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 1978). They must have been conscious of the threat that courageous opposition entails, even for the Church leadership. Oscar Romero, the progressive Archbishop of El Salvador, proved this point with his own life in 1980. However, many other very senior members of the clergy had the moral courage to align themselves quite closely to liberation theology (e.g. the Brazilian Archbishop Dom Helder Camara, Bishop Gerardi in Guatemala, Bishop Rubén López Ardón of Estelí in Nicaragua, etc. – Berryman 1984).

Although increasingly critical of the regime in the context of its continued repressiveness and, probably more importantly, in the context of increasingly powerful grassroots rebellion, the Nicaraguan Catholic Church bishops still made it clear they weren’t endorsing the radical Sandinistas (FSLN) either. Perhaps opportunistically, they sent public messages of concern for Somoza’s health after his heart attack in 1977, and at least 233 masses were organised by his supporters for his recovery. As already mentioned, it would be wrong to overgeneralise with regards to the conservativeness of the hierarchy, as significant variations could be found even among bishops. Bishop Calderon y Padilla refused to attend the funeral of Somoza Garcia, while Bishop Donaldo Chavez Nunez even publicly condoned the bloody repression of an opposition demonstration in January 1967. (Berryman 1984).

The split in the Nicaraguan Church, and the success of the Sandinista insurrection itself, would have been far less likely had the FSLN’s strategy not evolved in a creatively counter-hegemonic way. At first, the Sandinistas rather uncritically subscribed to the guerrilla „foco“ theory of insurgency,

which they abandoned after the strategy's debacle in 1963, as well as the failure of this approach in other countries (especially in Bolivia in 1967). The second (more orthodox Marxist) tendency oriented its activities to the city and the urban proletariat. The *terceristas* (or the Third Way advocates) led by Humberto Ortega devised the most creative strategy based on the minimisation of antagonising leftist rhetoric, the creation of a broad anti-Somoza front which included a broad, extensive network of social forces (including the alienated, fragmented „business classes“), mass organisations supporting FSLN, and a joint unified leadership of all the three Sandinista tendencies. (Hammes 2006)³

This innovative wing of the Sandinista movement understood better than others the importance of constructing a progressive „historical bloc“, a system of political and social alliances able to counteract the centrifugal tendencies which usually undermine movements for deep social change (Gramsci, 2000). In the Nicaraguan context, this pragmatic perspective entailed the construction of a compact revolutionary bloc of forces allying atheistic Marxist and Christian socialist intellectuals and activists with the often more traditionally religious broad masses.

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Gramsci's concept of the „national-popular“ (Gramsci 1982), which denotes the national character of the movement for change, is of critical importance in the construction of progressive strategies based on the analysis of concrete social conditions. In relation to the Sandinista stance towards religion, the adherence to a „national-popular“ strategy was, obviously, not a question of essentialist identification, of intrinsically Catholic national identity, but of a relatively dynamic, historically constructed one. However, existing deep-seated beliefs are not easily malleable, nor is it necessarily productive to attempt to radically unseat them, as the more politically mature Sandinistas understood. The social context (i.e. the balance and organisation of social forces) strongly precluded the creation of a laicised new social order.

After the initial failure to develop a sufficiently broad political base, largely due to committing violence towards popular beliefs and norms, by failing to establish an organic connection with the masses and popular consciousness – the rebels increasingly attempted to root themselves in

3 This pluralism was, nonetheless, tempered by the FSLN leadership's highly pragmatic (and lucidly strategic) judgment: „Despite the appearance of a broad front, Ortega ensured that the key elements of power, namely all of the coalition's military and security elements, remained firmly in the hands of the Communist leaders.“ (Hammes 2006: 83)

the Nicaraguan tradition, for instance through the lionisation of Augusto Sandino, the unifying symbol of trans-class anti-colonial patriotism.

Like Gramsci, the Sandinistas realised that „the internal relations of any nation are the result of a combination which is 'original' and (in a certain sense) unique: these relations must be conceived and understood in their originality and uniqueness if one wishes to dominate and direct them. To be sure, the line of development is towards internationalism, but the point of departure is 'national' – and it is from this point of departure that one must begin“ (Gramsci 1982: 140). A crucial political task for the Sandinista revolutionaries was to frame their strategy for gaining power and for constructing a new state within the shared cultural and public discourse, the shared experiences of the Nicaraguan people. The Sandinista approach entailed the adaptation and integration of religion and of popular religious beliefs into their revolutionary practice, ideology and mode of public communication.

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The Church leadership initially responded by attempting to place itself in the role of „neutral mediation“, as well as, since the 1970s, the advocacy of limited, non-structural reforms from above („somocismo sin Somoza“) which were presumably intended to prevent deeper, structural and anti-systemic change (Berryman 1984). Just prior to the overthrow of the Somoza regime, the bishops took part in a US-organised attempt to install the capitalist opposition and sidestep the socialists – the broad, relatively radical coalition that was the Sandinista National Liberation Front, including its Christian elements (such as the Association of Nicaraguan Clergy). However, through its creative and flexible popular counter-hegemonic work and a strategic cross-class alliance (including the establishment of a legitimising „Group of Twelve“⁴), FSLN was capable of immediately taking power following the overthrow of the Somoza family in 1979.

Church-State conflict under the Sandinista administration

FSLN's (publicly revealed and practically manifested) programme in power was not particularly radical, let alone „communist“ in the usual established sense of the word. It included a commitment to a mixed economy, a non-aligned foreign policy and a degree of political pluralism. However,

4 „The linkage by the FSLN with a group of persons active in public life, priests, business men, professionals, intellectuals, who thereby appeared to give support to the armed struggle, was decisive in changing the panorama“. It enabled FSLN „to widen its legitimacy with the masses“ (Velasquez 1986: 114 in Morray 1992: 18).

FSLN nationalised the property of the Somozas and some of their collaborators, expropriated bank, insurance and mining companies, initiated land reform which started to redistribute land to the peasantry, established agricultural and industrial cooperatives, improved public services, conducted a vaccination program and strengthened the health care system through socialised medicine (Murray 1992; Wehr and Nepstad 1994). They abolished torture and the death penalty (in fact, the Sandinistas also managed to secure discipline and greatly reduce the number of „spontaneous“ executions immediately after the overthrow of the Somoza dynasty – Berryman 1983), made certain tentative moves towards greater equality for women, etc. (Murray 1992). In real-life terms, „Archimedean“ strides were made by the new government: „Infant mortality rates were drastically reduced and health levels increased not in decades or years but in a matter of months. In education, the illiteracy rate was reduced from 52 percent to 12 percent in one year“ (Bendaña 2004: 150). Forty thousand landless peasant families were given land in the first two years of Sandinista rule. Free health care and schooling were also introduced, as well as workers' participation in decision-making in some workplaces, etc. (Targ 1989).

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Christians were leading an important role in this rapidly evolving social endeavour. Pastoral agents and members of Christian communities actively participated in the Sandinista Defense Committees (neighbourhood participation schemes). Four priests became government ministers, and Father Ernesto Cardenal (Minister for Education) initiated a „Literacy Crusade“ during which illiteracy was reduced from 52 per cent to 13 per cent (Berryman 1984), enabling a greater political and cultural participation of the impoverished masses, the improvement in job skills, better health campaigns and greater social development in general. Nonetheless, although the Nicaraguan bishops offered some initial support for the campaign, it ended being heavily criticised as „Marxist indoctrination“, partly also due to a small number of Cuban teachers who participated (Bradstock 1987). Furthermore, the Sandinistas managed to reduce infant mortality, their health campaigns helped eradicate or control many diseases, and substantial amounts of land were redistributed to co-operatives and peasant farmers (*ibid.*).

It took decades for the official Church hierarchy to start criticising the brutal, oppressive and elitist Somoza regime. A week and a half was all that was necessary when it came to distancing themselves from the popular Sandinistas (Berryman 1984). Grim tones of caution and scepticism

were discordant with the general atmosphere of popular enthusiasm and renewed hope in a better future. Of course, rather than being interpreted as the Church's „Damascene moment“, a sudden shift from its traditional role as the member and „transmission belt“ of the ruling elite in favour of an authentic and independent critical stance, the Church's rapid positioning against the Sandinistas should probably be understood as the hierarchy's continued commitment to elitist values and interests (both in terms of the social order as a whole and, as I shall later show, in relation to the Church's particularistic ideological and material interests).

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However, the Nicaraguan Bishops' Conference of November 17, 1979 (admittedly still during the „honeymoon period“ of relations between the Church and the new administration) was an indication of the complexity of the intra-Church power struggles and of a degree of political flexibility and openness (and even authentic conceptual differences). At that conference, the bishops' statement made a positive assessment of the base Christian communities and Delegates of the Word, as well as of the revolutionary process in general, was produced. The tone, although instructive, was atypically positive:

„We think the conscious and active participation of the Nicaraguan majorities [...] should take place through bodies of direct popular democracy. [...] We are confident that the revolutionary process will be something original, creative, deeply national, and in no way imitative, because along with the majority of Nicaraguans, what we want is a process that strides firmly toward a society that is fully and authentically Nicaraguan, neither capitalistic, nor dependent, nor totalitarian“ (Nicaraguan Bishops' Conference letter in Berryman 1984: 234–235).

It is difficult to ascertain, especially considering the exceptionally dynamic nature of post-insurrectionary politics, the extent and degree to which some segments of the senior clergy were or might have been open to an accommodation with the Sandinista regime. It should be clear, however, that in order to avoid its own crisis of legitimation, the Church had to modify its previous conservative intransigence, if only to „purchase time“ to regroup and resume its advocacy of the pre-revolutionary *status quo*, or perhaps the advocacy of a somewhat more socially sensitive and moderate form of mainstream capitalist rule. In any case, the bishops, along with other elite conservative protagonists, rapidly assumed a hostile stance, and Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo became perhaps the central figure of the entire opposition movement. Just as the Church's position towards the Sandinistas and rebellion against the Somoza followed the

mood of the bourgeois opposition, it began its attacks on the Sandinista government simultaneously with the broad capitalist and conservative opposition movement. Conveniently, the central pro-capitalist (and United States-funded – West 1992) newspaper *La Prensa* insisted on the necessity of „the strictest respect for church authorities“ (Berryman 1984). The conservative Church authorities remained a material and ideological force, akin to a parallel ideological government around which the defeated economic and state elite could regroup, plan and mobilise its counter-offensive. The central concern of the propertied classes and the other segments of the anti-Sandinista opposition appeared to be the perceived threat of a turn towards a more stabilised and, gradually, a more radicalised socialist system.

As the political crisis of the new regime deepened, frequent public pastoral letters criticising the government began to be made. Long a stabiliser of the *status quo*, the church leadership now fully committed itself to the destabilisation of the Sandinista regime. Although some efforts at defending neoliberal „free markets“ had been made, instead of stressing the alternative to the Sandinista project (which would have exposed its defence of upper-class privileges), the capitalist opposition and the Church focused on criticising the „errors“ of the Sandinistas, warning of the dangers of Marxism and utilising the rhetoric of „human rights“ and „freedom“ (*ibid.*)⁵.

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The institutional Church against Liberation theology

The Catholic Church is not a democratic institution, and could not tolerate more explicit forms of religious „parallelism“ – the challenge to its ideological authority, hierarchical character and organisational unity. The official Church, both domestically and in the Vatican, did not appreciate the efforts of the „popular church“ (*iglesia popular*), i.e. the grassroots Christian community, to subject the oligarchic Church structures to a democratic class analysis (Berryman 1984).

The Sandinistas moderately and cautiously encouraged these challenges to the Church hierarchy through their Christian „populism“, the appointment of priests in positions of governmental authority, close links with

5 An example of these inauthentic Church tactics was its hostile reaction to the FSLN's literacy campaign: „The Catholic hierarchy perceived the entire campaign as a threat to their own historic monopolisation of the educational process. Thus, a certain rivalry for moral leadership developed between the Sandinistas and the church“ (Sabia 1997: 88).

the Christian base communities and the like (while also attempting to reach an accommodation with the official Church). It is possible that the Sandinistas overplayed their Christian credentials by attempting to install an essentially new state religion: a socialist activist Christianity, whose *ekklesia* were the politicised Christian base communities, and whose bishops were increasingly the charismatic priest-politicians with ministerial portfolios in the FSLN government, rather than the somewhat marginalised official Church oligarchy. The new ideological supremacy of the Sandinistas, and of their revolutionary priests in government (a powerful alternative source of moral authority), threatened the continued influence of the Church leadership through a novel phenomenon: a historically progressive socialist „theocracy“.

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One of the crucial points of contention had to do with the relationship of the religious movement towards the Sandinista government. The hierarchy accused the base communities and the left-wing clergy of politicising religion. The Church authorities had real cause to fear they might be displaced by new politicised structures of religious „dual power“. The Sandinistas' revolutionary project appeared to require (or, at least, the FSLN believed it required) a highly totalising strategy for the accumulation of power. An entire new apparatus of power was being constructed, assuming the recognisable contours of a revolutionary party-state. The external US pressures, the militarised culture and the „natural“ oligarchy of the guerrilla movement limited the potentials for cohabitation with the Church leadership. The emergence of the right-wing insurgency and the ensuing civil war led FSLN to commit half of the Nicaraguan national budget to the military (Gharakhanian, 2006), drastically reducing the scope for progressive social programmes and reforms. Under these troubled circumstances, the struggle for ideological hegemony favoured the conservative forces, and the Church leadership (including the Vatican planners to which the Nicaraguan Church ultimately had to answer to) found itself naturally drawn to its old allies.

It would appear that, at times, uncritical support given by certain tendencies within the grassroots religious movement to the Sandinistas made the entire liberation theology movement more vulnerable to political attack, since the conservative elements could claim (and fear) it was entirely subservient to the emerging FSLN power structure, i.e. simply a politicised „religious wing“ of the Sandinistas. The contestation of the left-wing clergy's legitimacy by the Church authorities limited the public support for it (Sabia 1997), just as the perceived „partisanship“ of the

politically engaged Christian base communities is likely to have limited the breadth and the reach of their message. A more politically open and independent grassroots movement, less fragmented communal leadership (capable of stimulating more effective action, self-reflection, charisma and cohesion) and greater constructive grassroots pressure on the FSLN government perhaps could have increased the feasibility and likelihood of more participatory democratic patterns in the economy and the society, as well as increasing the credibility and inclusiveness of the progressive Christian movement itself. Radical Christian socialists were clearly too weak to decisively transform the Church on their own. While progressive Christian elements were relatively deep-rooted in the fabric of the broad population due to their grassroots approach and work closer to the poor, revolutionary Christian clergy and religious activists were estimated to have constituted only about 25 per cent of the overall clergy in Nicaragua in the first half of the 1980-s (Berryman 1984).

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The response of the Church authorities and of the ambivalent sector of the clergy was crucial, as the traditional Church and traditional religious ideology proved to be more stable than many may have expected. The basic dilemma experienced by the Church leadership in Nicaragua was whether to attempt a cohabitation, or even to align itself with the new regime, or to defend the *status quo ante*, the safe and the known position it had held in the past, protecting the interests of other privileged minorities (with which it was partially fused) in the process. That the Nicaraguan Catholic Church hierarchy chose the latter is probably to a significant extent the result of the Sandinista failure to build a mutually reassuring and beneficial alliance with the Church leadership (in the context of strong domestic and United States capitalist opposition). It is here that the centralised power of the Vatican might have been decisive. Somewhat paradoxically, the Vatican may have been less overtly hostile to the Sandinista government had the new regime been able to establish a more decisive social hegemony.⁶

The complex, highly contingent situation in which the Church hierarchy found itself presented various dilemmas with regards to the Church's optimal political positioning. The independent organisational logic of

6 The case of Yugoslavia, where the national Catholic Church leadership was partly allowed by the Vatican to maintain relatively cordial relationships (although this entente did not extend to liberation theologians such as the Slovenian „red bishop“ of Maribor, Vekoslav Grmič, who was demoted on account of his clear left-wing positioning – Delo 2005), demonstrates the potential validity of this point.

the Nicaraguan Catholic Church complicated the „bourgeois“ class position of the hierarchy, since the objective material interests of the Church as an organisation and of its leading individuals were not always easily discernible. A pact with the Sandinistas may have even solidified and deepened the Church's power. The explosion of base communities and of liberation theology, if it had been kept under control by the Church hierarchy, had the potential of organisationally reinvigorating the Church, giving it a power and reach which an ossified bureaucratic strategy would not have been able to achieve, especially in the context of a relative crisis of legitimation which the Church faced in the emerging Sandinista social order. Additionally, it may have been seen as potentially in the interest of the Church to attain and retain a „foothold“ in Nicaragua's liberation politics, lest the anti-clerical, assertively secularist (or even atheist) Marxist elements were to gain a greater role in the political process. The goal of constraining the independent initiative of the progressive clergy and the „Popular Church“ may have also initially required the Church hierarchy's positioning to be more akin to a balancing act than a monolithic denunciation of liberation theology.

What appears to be clear is that the Nicaraguan Church's rather monopolistic conception of religious life entailed a pronounced intolerance for democratic standards. This may have been a decisive strategic consideration of the Catholic hierarchy, although a close investigation of internal debates within the hierarchy would probably detect the existence of a relatively sophisticated set of intertwined strategic arguments. In any case, the Archbishop (later Cardinal) Obando and the rest of the Church authorities demanded that the priests withdraw from their governmental posts, which they refused, and a compromise under which the authorities would allow the priests to remain in the government if they abandoned their priestly functions was later reached. Furthermore, the pro-Sandinista Nicaraguan Association of Clergy was ultimately forced to disband. The deployment of pro-Sandinista priests to insignificant posts became a common practice, while the government expelled foreign „counter-revolutionary“ priests (Sabia 1997). A rift between the base communities opened up as well: while some base communities accepted the bishops' criticisms, others chose to defy their authority. A base community member stated: „The bishops come with great authority, with great publicity, to denounce us. It is tiring and exhausting for members of our community“ (*ibid.*: 107). The „righteousness“ of Christian base communities, their „missionary“ character, sometimes gave them the popular appearance of a sect (*ibid.*). The comforting traditionalism of the mainstream Church, at least after

years of counter-insurgency, the introduction of general conscription and a soaring inflation rate (Bendaña 2004) is likely to have been to the Church's advantage in the religious confrontation over mass legitimacy.

Although the global reach of Vatican has impacted the national politics of many countries, the confrontation between the global leadership of the Catholic Church and the Nicaraguan state was particularly sharp. Various attacks against the Sandinistas were persistently made by the religious hierarchy, and as late as May 1983, after *Newsweek* had already ran a cover story on the US „covert war“ in Nicaragua, Archbishop Obando still cynically expressed disbelief that the US was fomenting aggression „since all the information comes from only one side“ (Berryman 1984: 275). Obando was even promoted into a Cardinal by the Vatican, which appears likely to have been an eminently political decision.

The sharply anti-Sandinista political position of the official Church came at a time when the US, particularly after Jimmy Carter lost the presidency to Ronald Reagan in 1981 (Blum 2004), began to pursue an aggressive strategy of prolonged destabilisation of the Sandinista regime through a war of attrition. During that time, CIA was giving various forms of support and aid to the capitalist and right-wing opposition, including the Contras (counterrevolutionary death squads), which the International Court of Justice found to be illegal in 1984.⁷

Far from advancing some kind of „high-minded aloofness“ from the „greasy pole“ of politics, Cardinal Obando's outspoken hostility to the Sandinistas in this context amounted to (subjectively as well as objectively) counter-revolutionary political initiative:

„Cardinal Miguel Obando and the Catholic Church in Nicaragua received hundreds of thousands of dollars in covert aid. [...] Nicaragua's ports were under siege: mortar shelling from high-speed motor launches, aerial bombing and rocket and machine-gun attacks were designed to blockade Nicaragua's exports as well as to starve the country of imports

7 Both a direct and indirect military intervention by the US was initiated, including the following methods:

„The CIA, in addition to training, arming, and directing the Contras, conducted military actions on its own, including aerial raids against military bases and oil storage tanks, and the mining of Nicaraguan harbours in early 1984. The Reagan administration also blocked international loans to Nicaragua, imposed an economic embargo against Nicaragua in May 1985, subsidized internal opposition groups besides the Contras, sidestepped peace initiatives promoted by Latin American leaders, ignored a World Court decision in 1986 that ruled U.S. actions against Nicaragua illegal“, etc. (Peace 2008: 64).

by frightening away foreign shipping. [...] It was disclosed in October 1984 that the CIA had prepared a manual of instructions for its clients which, amongst other things, encouraged the use of violence against civilians. [...] Congressional intelligence committees were informed by the CIA, by present and former contra leaders, and by other witnesses that the contras indeed „raped, tortured and killed unarmed civilians, including children“ and [...] „groups of civilians, including women and children, were burned, dismembered, blinded and beheaded“ (The Guardian, 3 June 1983, in Blum 2004: 292–293).

This is the context in which the Catholic Church hierarchy chose to confront the „Popular Church“ and the Sandinista government.

The revolutionary impasse

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The rise of the „Popular Church“ vs. the official Church was both one of the key initial strategic advantages, and subsequently one of the crucial sources of antagonism in the entire Sandinista political project. While the Church hierarchy focused on its own power, the preservation of its ruling traditional position in society as a paternalistic institution, the Christian base movement and the politicised clergy took as their *raison d'être* the commitment to the poor, to the elevation of the oppressed masses from poverty and to an end of their passive subservience to the ruling elites. Traditional charitable work and paternalism could no longer serve as an acceptable substitute for structural and transformative social change. Speaking in a post-Sandinista situation, a base community member vividly identified the contrast between the two conflicting concepts of Christianity and of the Church's relation to democratic, public and dialogic life: „Today there is no place for biblical analysis and discussion. The priest tells us that only he can do reflections and he silences us if we try to speak“ (Uri Schmidt in Sabia 1997: 129). Moreover, the educational courses for new priests were centralised (Sabia 1997). Mark Lester, a former Catholic priest who was involved with the base community movement, said this of the traditional Church's relation to the realm of public life: „It is a ministering divorced from the people's immediate reality. The element of reflection on the reality in Nicaragua has simply been taken out“ (Lester in Sabia 1997: 131–132). Priests were also drawn towards the upper classes due to not being paid a salary, which made them dependent on the contributions from the wealthy (Sabia 1997).

However, by turning inward to their base communities, and often away from the official religious institutions (especially as the authorities became

increasingly critical of their activities), the progressive Christians might have actually limited their reach to the still traditionalist majority and to the shared discourse of the general population: „The campesino people are very traditional. They love the church but at the same time they can be very radical. [...] Internally, the campesino people are very traditional, but politically they can be very radical“ (Uri Schmidt in Sabia 1997: 153).

The Sandinistas were faced with a daunting task of avoiding both the danger of self-isolation by „out-of-place“, inorganic „radicalism“ and the prospect of accommodation with the oppressive capitalist elites.

A consistent commitment to the protection of human rights and human dignity is both most conducive to the creation of a more advanced society, as well as an important response to the „anti-communist“ demagoguery.⁸ The real human rights improvements under the FSLN government were hypocritically ignored by the Right in Nicaragua and in the United States (West 1992). Yet it is clear that the Sandinistas could have projected a significantly more civil libertarian and humanistic image. The early alienation of the Native American and Creole population on the Atlantic Coast, the pursuit of a unitary state (though it was not devoid of various safety-valve mechanisms and grievance channels), as well as a perhaps overly swift and far reaching programme of property confiscations (Wehr and Nepstad 1994), reduced FSLN's political capital. While much ideologically and morally transformative work had been done in relation to the Nicaraguan Revolution's enemies (*ibid.*), the FSLN's strategy could have been significantly more creative. A firmer commitment to the strategic concept of a pluralistic „historical bloc“, combining a more authentic commitment to decentralisation and popular grassroots empowerment with greater economic and status concessions to segments of the middle and upper class (at least in the transitional period) – along with more effective communication of the broader

8 An important point in this regard is that a more pluralist and non-corporatist stance of the Sandinistas might have been able to more successfully mobilise US churches and other religious actors, who might have found it easier to transcend Cold War posturing and official propaganda if the Nicaraguan revolutionaries had taken more care not to alienate the US public and the US government (to the extent that this was possible without losing basic political authenticity). The progressive religious community in other countries, especially in the US, led an important campaign against the US governments' destabilisation programme in Nicaragua, but this peace movement, despite the Iran-Contra affair (which led to highly publicised hearings in Congress), never truly succeeded in breaking out of the progressive US activist and religious ghetto (Peace 2012).

horizons for human emancipation regardless of one's class background – might have been able to substantially reduce the breadth and the virulence of the opposition in and beyond the Catholic Church. No fair critique could deny the existence of formidable challenges posed by the destabilisation efforts of the domestic and foreign opposition. Nonetheless, this lack of sufficiently structurally empowering reforms along with more consistently and creatively non-corporatist peace-building efforts by the Sandinistas appears to have had a strong role in the diminution of their political legitimacy. A less alienating political strategy, including the advancement of a more universalistic notion of human emancipation and empowerment, might have been more successful in moderating opposition against and building support for progressive change than a more stereotypical discourse reminiscent of „class warfare“ and the seemingly exclusive „option for the poor“. The Church and the rest of the opposition were able to seize upon this supposed „corporatism“, asserting that God loves everyone, not just the poor. In the process of its political crystallisation, FSLN failed to effectively advance the strategy of the „historical bloc“ to a new stage which would be both sufficiently pluralistic and non-corporatist, yet still deeply progressive. The stability of the Sandinista project to a large extent relied on the FSLN's ability to advance the decentralising structural empowerment of the broad masses while minimising, and in some other ways compensating, the challenge that communal self-organisation posed to the established structures of the mighty Catholic Church. Still, it should be acknowledged that tension, conflict and contradiction are (to some extent) the *sine qua non* of revolutionary dialectics. The grassroots Christian movement was both a major source of conflict with the Church and a critical Sandinista asset. Nonetheless, more consideration should probably have been given to the supposition that the left-wing religious parallelism (through Christian base communities and the organisations of the radical left-wing clergy) went too far in conflating the spheres of public and Church politics. Even in the Nicaraguan context, Christian base communities were not an adequate replacement for secularised formal structures of communal self-government.

Perhaps, if the Catholic Church and the rest of the established elite had experienced a more conciliatory treatment by the Sandinista government, the Catholic hierarchy would have been willing to perform a more progressive or conciliatory function in the civil war. The Protestant Churches paved the way in this respect, especially the historically pacifist and peace-making Mennonite and Moravian Churches. The Moravian Church, as

the leading religious organisation in the East of the country, assumed the role of the intermediary in the conflict between the FSLN government and the Native American and Creole population on the Atlantic Coast (Wehr and Nepstad, 1994). The Catholic Church later also began to support the peace negotiations, primarily through its role as an intermediary between the government and the opposition. The Nicaraguan National Reconciliation Commission in 1988 and 1989 was chaired by Cardinal Obando y Bravo (*ibid.*). Perhaps the Church's involvement in the peace process reflected the changing international context (the strengthening of the international solidarity campaign in support of the Sandinistas in conjunction with US-Soviet détente and the heightened scrutiny of the US destabilisation programme in the US Congress). Considering the Catholic hierarchy's hostility to the Sandinistas, it is also possible that the Church authorities were seeking to ease the transition to a post-Sandinista regime.

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This peace-building role of various religious organisations and networks within and outside of Nicaragua, as well as the contribution of Christian base communities (as structures of participatory democracy) to civil society, clearly demonstrate the potentially constructive role organised religion can play in public life. Besides, even on the level of public ideology, the supposedly „exclusivist“ discourse of Christian politics is, paradoxically, sometimes actually better at speaking to the Rawlsian „public reason“ intelligible to the broad public due to its potential to communicate deeper social truths which a less spiritual or „poetical“ (i.e. more banal) discourse and normative framework perhaps could not. One of the founders of liberation theology, Leonardo Boff, summated the theological resources for a peaceable and pluralistic political stance: „In this struggle, theologians of liberation give clear preference to peaceful means because these are the means that generate life. We find in the gospel the renunciation of all vengeance, of all domination of one over another. We learn solidarity and love of enemy. But traditionally this gospel has only been preached at the personal level. We must reclaim it for our politics as well“ (Boff 1991: x). I have already outlined the role that some progressive religious actors in Nicaragua had in advancing the role of love as the creative and integrative form of power (Boulding 1989; Wehr and Nepstad 1994). This kind of tolerant discourse of Christian nonviolence is supportive of civil liberties and the public good, yet it has been challenged in many contexts both by rigid laicist impositions (which are, effectively, restrictions on the freedom of conscience) and by conservative religious actors committed to the defence of existing oligarchic class relationships.

Concluding remarks

Depending on the specific national contexts, the imperatives of pragmatic political activity based on the „national-popular“ approach and the wide historical bloc of progressive forces sometimes preclude the adherence to secularist and laicist normative suppositions. Liberation theology in particular, as a political religion in its very essence, challenges the easy secularist political formulas postulated by the French Revolution. Attempting to uncritically copy the historically specific (and decidedly atypical) political trajectory of countries like France would, in certain national contexts, be to test the very limits of a society's „elasticity“. Any attempt to progressively redefine the relationship between the Church and the state must, as its fundamental guiding principle, give due respect to the exigencies of organic social development.

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Many past and contemporary examples have demonstrated the (historically contingent) potential for some religious beliefs and religious institutions to contribute to progressive and democratic social change. The reformist Second Vatican Council, as well as the current Pope Francis I (already noted for his socially conscious and strongly critical positioning *vis-à-vis* the prevailing militarism and what he has termed the murderous global economy – Pope Francis, 2013) have demonstrated that even the global Catholic Church, a highly traditionalist and historically highly conservative institution, nonetheless holds potential for progressive political positioning in certain contexts.

The relationship of the religious institutions with the state and the public sphere will, understandably, need to be more pluralistic in countries with more heterogeneous religious affiliations of the population than in the context of Nicaragua, which has been very predominantly Christian and Catholic. Religious actors are objectively required to show greater tolerance of differing perspectives, sometimes even discretion, in other political contexts, such as in laicised Western states.

This essay is a *plaidoyer* for a greater understanding of the varieties of Church-state arrangements and of the importance of not basing political expectations of the relationship between the Church and the state on static and de-contextualised conceptual presuppositions. Instead, they should be organically rooted in the (dynamic) processes and institutions of actual social life. As I have attempted to demonstrate, the concept of a historical bloc of progressive forces, rooted in (though not slavish to) the specific social and cultural realities of the national context (the

„national-popular“), is the most fruitful theoretical and strategic approach. It is nonetheless possible to generalise the progressive normative position on a certain level of abstraction: a progressive republic should strongly protect all forms of non-monopolistic and non-exclusionary public speech. The more coherently and constructively pluralistic the dispersion of power and influence becomes, the richer the political sphere is likely to be. In such a truly democratic public life, humane religious and political visionaries such as Martin Luther King and Ernesto Cardenal, as well as the movements and organisations inspired by their noble ideals, would always have their place under the republican sun.

Primljeno: 17. marta 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 15. juna 2014.

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Daniel Jakopovich

Leva „teokratija“: država i Crkva u revolucionarnoj Nikaragvi

Sažetak

Ovaj esej analizira antagonizme između Katoličke crkve (u Nikaragvi i svetu) i sandinističkog pokreta i sandinističke vlade, koji su predstavljali jednu od žarišnih tačaka za uspon kontinentalnog i globalnog pokreta teologije oslobođenja. Esej daje kritički pregled pokreta teologije oslobođenja u Nikaragvi, prvenstveno u vezi sa socijalnom funkcijom religije i religijskih institucija. Centralni fokus ovog eseja jeste identifikacija načina na koji je levoteološko i sandinističko razumevanje imperativa kontrahegemonskog projekta, „istorijskog bloka“ (shvaćenog kao sistema političkih i socijalnih veza i savezništava) i „nacionalno-popularne“ strategije doprinelo opreznom stvaranju nove državne religije i novog političkog projekta: levog „teokratskog“ društvenog poretka. Iskustvo Nikaragve korisno je radi fokusiranja šire diskusije o značaju kontekst-specifičnog normativnog prosuđivanja o vezama između države i crkve.

Gljučne riječi: teologija oslobođenja, istorijski blok, nacionalno-popularno, leva „teokratija“

STUDIJE I ČLANCI
STUDIES AND ARTICLES

III

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Neuroetika i filozofija

Apstrakt *Neuroetika je najnovija i verovatno najbrže rastuća grana bioetike i, možda, primenjene etike uopšte. U njoj se polazi od teze da određeni prirodni procesi u mozgu i nervima proizvode određena moralna i nemoralna ponašanja (a nisu samo prirodna osnova takvih događanja). Kao prirodni procesi ovi događaji se onda mogu do kraja i bez ostatka uzročno objasniti. U tom smislu neuroetika bi trebalo da je završnica i vrhunac neuronauke (neurologije i drugih njoj bliskih nauka), koja u naše vreme zaista doživljava ogroman napredak. U tekstu se ukazuje na izvesne metafizičke i etičke teškoće ovog pristupa, pre svega u preklapanju pojmova (uzročnog) objašnjenja i (razložnog) opravdanja u načinu definisanja vrednosti, ne samo moralnih. Sasvim je sigurno da je funkcionisanje nervnog sistema važan parametar u opisu i objašnjenju pre svega oseta i osećanja, a onda i svega ostalog što se na vrednosnom planu gradi na toj osnovi. Znanje o procesima sa kojima se tu srećemo sigurno može pomoći ne samo da se otklone razni problemi koji ugrožavaju kvalitet ljudskog života nego se može iskoristiti i za poboljšanje tog kvaliteta tamo gde on nije direktno ugrožen. U tom smislu neuroetika spada u etiku sredstava (kako koncipirati, proizvesti, distribuisati i upotrebiti to znanje). Ali pretenzija neuroetike ide dalje od ove instrumentalne upotrebe znanja do kojih dolazi neuronauka i proteže se na artikulaciju ciljeva i na pretpostavku da se ta artikulacija može u potpunosti uzročno objasniti. Glavni fokus rada upravo je analiza ove pretenzije, kroz analizu razlikâ između uzroka i razloga, objašnjenja i opravdanja, sredstava i ciljeva. Na kraju, u odeljku o primenama, daje se sumarni pregled koristi i rizikâ koje neuroetika donosi, sa zaključkom da ona sigurno može značajno pomoći da se kvalitet ukupnog života, individualnog i socijalnog, unapredi.*

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Gljučne reči: *Neuronauka, neuroetika, objašnjenje, uzroci, opravdanje, vrednosti, razlozi*

1. Uvod

U ovom tekstu daću nacrt filozofske analize „neuroetike“, u njegova dva osnovna dela, metafizičkom i etičkom. Ova dva aspekta filozofske artikulacije problema u deskripciji i definiciji onoga što predstavlja domen neuroetike uobičajeno se stapaju, što i nije neobično jer etička pitanja kojima neuroetika¹ pokušava da se bavi u suštini su zasnovana na određenim metafizičkim pretpostavkama o prirodi tih pitanja, pre svega pretpostavci o mogućnosti uzročnog objašnjenja fenomena vrednosti.

1 Naziv „neuroetika“ prvi je upotrebio Vilijam Safajr (William Saphire) u magazinu *New York Times*, 2002. godine. V. Martha J. Farah, *Neuroethics: An Introduction with Readings*, The MIT Press 2010, p. XIII.

Ako je to moguće onda je moguće i naučno objašnjenje ne samo nastanka nego i načina funkcionisanja vrednosti u ljudskoj društvenoj i moralnoj stvarnosti.

182 Objašnjenje nastanka, a onda i načina funkcionisanja vrednosti u ljudskoj društvenoj stvarnosti (a kada je u pitanju društvenost onda se to pitanje ne ograničava na ljudsku vrstu) povezuje se sa prirodnim procesima koji deluju kroz evoluciju, bruseći funkcionalnost ponašanja živih bića tako da ono bude maksimalno dugoročno efikasno. Ista pretpostavka pojavljuje se i na planu fizioloških i neuroloških (a onda, po pretpostavci i hemijskih?) procesa, koji se do kraja i bez ostatka mogu, ili moraju, objasniti uzročno. Postoje neki uzroci koji, delujući po prirodi svoje uzročne snage, proizvode neke posledice, i pravilnost založena u ovaj odnos daje objašnjenje toga šta se tu zapravo dešava. Vrednosti su onda samo rezultante uspešnih shema ponašanja, onih ponašanja koja efikasno doprinose svrsi za koju se opredelila evolucija. A ona se opredelila, dugoročno, za ono što je ne samo „dobro“ nego je „najbolje“ (najfunkcionalnije, instrumentalno dugoročno najefikasnije) u skupu mogućnosti različitih delovanja koja bi mogla postojati ili koja se mogu zamisliti.

Da li ista ta shema može da pokrije celinu ukupnog vrednovanja, da li može da objasni i one vrednosti koje definišemo kao „moralne vrednosti“? To, naravno, zavisi od toga kako konačno definišemo te vrednosti. Ovo je veoma složeno pitanje, pre svega logički složeno, jer obuhvata više različitih nivoa obrazloženja koja jedno sa drugim nisu u lako utvrdivoj korelaciji. Sa jedne strane, vrednosti po definiciji nastaju iz činjenice nečije zainteresovanosti za nešto: nešto za šta niko nije zainteresovan je bezvredno. U tom smislu vrednosti su subjektivne i relativne, zavise od toga da li stvarno postoji neko ko uopšte može biti „zainteresovan“, da li neka određena zainteresovanost postoji, koliko je ona intenzivna i koliko je stabilna. Vrednosti se otuda mogu meriti, one imaju svoju cenu. Cena neke vrednosti uključuje sve ove parametre, oni su potrebni za postojanje zainteresovanosti *određene* veličine. Ono za šta postoji intenzivnija i stabilnija zainteresovanost vrednije je i ima veću cenu. *Cena* je integralni deo vrednosti. Ovde se već pojavljuje mogući razlaz sa onom pretpostavkom koja u evoluciji funkcionise kao objašnjenje: da uzroci proizvode svoje posledice i da sve teče po nužnosti prirodne kauzalnosti. Ali taj razlaz ne mora biti stvaran jer zainteresovanost može biti proizvod neke potrebe koja nastaje prirodno i bez stvarne slobode izbora: mi *imamo* potrebe koje treba zadovoljiti, nismo te potrebe slobodno postavili nego smo ih *našli* u svojoj prirodi. *Zadovoljenje* tih

potreba je onda prirodna potreba i prirodni proces. Ako sve vrednosti nastaju na ovaj način, a može izgledati da nastaju, one će biti sasvim uklopive u prirodne uzročne sheme, pa cela struktura ljudskih bića uzročno funkcionise na jedan organski način koji je determinisan na uzročni način, po principu maksimalne, ili optimalne, efikasnosti u proizvodnji najboljeg rezultata. Postojanje cene kao mere vrednosti otuda ne uklanja mogućnost funkcionalnog, npr. evolucionog, objašnjenja rada organizma, pojedinih organa, a među organima posebno mozga i nerava kao onih organa koji u ukupnom procesu funkcionisanja organizma najviše doprinose koherentnosti i jedinstvu funkcionisanja bilo koje jedinice na najbolji način. (Zanimljiva implikacija je da će *svaka* cena povlačiti najbolje funkcionisanje u *nekom* konkretnom skupu okolnosti; funkcija cene je upravo to da obezbedi najbolje moguće rešenje u datom polju mogućnosti.) Sloboda izbora je onda samo uzročna usmerenost na ono što je funkcionalno bolje, a mogućnost da se utvrdi šta je bolje jeste proizvod evolucije koja je proizvela tendenciju, ili sklonost, da se izabere ono što evoluciono, ukupno gledano, više doprinosi ostvarenju njenog cilja. Tako čulo ukusa daje da se *oseti* ono što treba da se oseti, a to je ono što doprinosi da se potreba za hranom bolje zadovolji i da se izbegnu najčešće opasnosti od trovanja. Čulo ukusa obezbeđuje da se bira ono što je hranljivije, a kroz mehanizam zasićenosti obezbeđuje da se bira raznovrsnost koja je posebno biološki korisna. To jednako važi za pse kao i za ljude (i ostala živa bića). Međutim, u suštini nema nikakvog stvarnog biranja već preferencije prirodno, a to znači uzročno, a to znači mehanički, idu u smeru koji je unapred determinisan.

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U moralu, međutim, možda imamo posla s vrednostima koje nemaju cenu, vrednostima koje su *apsolutne* i ne trpe upoređivanja. Kod tih vrednosti reč je o postupcima koji *nikako* ne mogu da se opravdaju, upravo zato što vrednosti koje su povređene tim postupcima nemaju nikakvu cenu (odnosno cena je nemerljiva, beskonačna). Međutim i u ovom slučaju možemo pribeći uzročnom objašnjenju tako što ćemo reći da je reč o vrednostima koje su, evoluciono ili sa stanovišta dugoročnog održanja života, *veoma velike*, toliko velike da zahtevaju apsolutni primat u zaštiti, maksimalnu zaštitu koja je moguća. Vrednost samog života npr. takva je da život mora da se brani kao da je iznad svake cene, pa zabrana ubistva ima istu vrednosnu strukturu kao i svaka druga vrednost, osim što je superiorna u odnosu na sve ili većinu drugih vrednosti. To bi značilo da kauzalna determinisanost, tako potrebna za solidno i konzistentno *prirodno objašnjenje*, možda može da se nađe i kod moralnih vrednosti. Te se vrednosti ne razlikuju od drugih suštinski nego samo po svom

bezgranično velikom značaju zbog čega ne mogu funkcionisati drugačije nego kao predmeti bezgranične zainteresovanosti. Pravda, na primer, funkcioniše tako: da bi je bilo, mora da se uzima kao da je iznad svake cene, pa se njom ne može trgovati, ona ne dopušta kompromise itd. Te vrednosti onda *funkcionišu* tako da bi svako njihovo „merenje“ uništilo pretpostavku o njihovom primatu i tako ih obezvređilo, odnosno učinilo manje funkcionalnim ili (faktički, u susretu sa drugim vrednostima koje takođe proizvode velika iskušenja) nefunkcionalnim.

To je pozicija *naturalizma* u etici, i neuroetika, pošto se zasniva na tezi da određeni prirodni procesi u mozgu i u nervima proizvode određena, moralna i nemoralna, ponašanja, nužno pretpostavlja ovakav naturalizam. U njemu zapravo nema *slobode* kao moći da se postupi drugačije jer je svako „drugačije“ determinisano određenim prirodnim uzrocima, i samo treba naći te uzroke da bi se neko ponašanje objasnilo do kraja i bez ostatka.

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2. Objašnjenje i opravdanje

U svetu ima mnogo raznih pojava, ali za nas stvarno postoje samo one koje su objašnjene. Mnoge pojave, međutim, nisu objašnjene, a postoje. Ali ipak, možemo reći da postoje, čak i potencijalno, samo one pojave koje se *mogu* objasniti. Za ono što nikako, ni u principu, ne može da se objasni mora da se kaže da ne postoji. Objašnjenje pojava, svedeno na najprostiju formulaciju, jeste opis kako se nešto događa. Pojave koje se objašnjavaju su, otuda, *događaji* neke vrste. I mada pored događaja u svetu postoje i *stvari*, kada dođemo do objašnjenja i stvari ćemo tretirati kao događaje: u objašnjenju stvari opisivaćemo kako stvari *nastaju*, kako *traju*, kako *propadaju* i *nestaju*, dakle u objašnjenju se i stvari uzimaju kao događaji. Objasniti kako se nešto događa znači utvrditi uzrok iz koga to nešto nastaje na pravilan, redovan, način. *Uzroci* su ključna kategorija u objašnjenju.

To je ono čime se bavi nauka: uzročnom analizom, utvrđivanjem iz čega i kako nešto nastaje. Pitanje zašto se išta dešava izmiče ovoj shemi, zato što je to filozofsko a ne naučno pitanje; takva su i pitanja do kojih ćemo uskoro stići, pitanja smisla i vrednosti onog što postoji u svetu. Ali u nauci imamo posla samo sa objašnjenjima, što znači sa onim šta je uzrok nečega, kako nešto nastaje i kako opstaje.

U nekom trenutku, međutim, suočavamo se s veoma specifičnim događajima – s takvim događajima za koje smatramo da ih ne bi bilo prostim uzrokovanjem iz nekih određenih uzroka po prirodnoj pravilnosti (prema

nekom prirodnom zakonu), odnosno po prirodnom determinizmu, jer tih događaja uopšte ne bi bilo da ih nismo proizveli *odlukom* da ih bude. U pojmu odluke se podrazumeva nešto veoma neobično, jedna pozicija, ili moć, da se stvarnost nekog događaja proizvede *uz pretpostavku* da je bilo moguće da se taj događaj i ne proizvede, da smo mogli *slobodno* odlučiti i da ga ne proizvedemo, kao što smo slobodno odlučili da ga proizvedemo. Ova pojava iza pojave koju ovde detektujemo, sloboda, jasno se vidi u onim događajima koji su rezultat odluke – *postupcima*. Postupci se razlikuju od pukih događaja po tome što je bilo moguće i da ih ne bude da smo odlučili drugačije, što je u potpunosti bilo u našoj moći kada smo odlučivali.

Zašto je ovo važno? Važno je zato što *uzroci*, koji su bili glavni parametar u objašnjenju onoga što se događa (celokupnoj) prirodi, više nisu dovoljni da se dođe do potpunog objašnjenja. To je ona tačka u kojoj se pojavljuje razlika između *uzroka* i *razloga*: za razliku od dešavanja koje nastaje zbog nekih uzroka, da bi se nešto *učinilo* potrebni su *razlozi* (nešto što se dešava „bezrazložno“ je prirodna pojava, a ne postupak koji je rezultat odluke da se taj postupak izvrši). Ili bar mi tako smatramo ili smo smatrali dok nam neurologija nije napravila osnovu za neuroetiku. Podrazumevali smo da su *razlozi* a ne *slepi uzroci* izvor nastanka i osnov realnosti postupaka. A šta radi, ili je uradila, neurologija? Ništa posebno, ona samo traži prirodno objašnjenje onih procesa koji se *dešavaju* u nervima, u mozgu, i to traži njihovo naučno, uzročno, objašnjenje. U tome nema ničega misterioznog, jer je sve što se događa, uključujući i postupke, objašnjivo na taj način. U čemu je onda problem? U tome što se na neuronauku naslanja neuroetika, ponavljajući priču o uzrokovanju, ali tako da objašnjenje koje se tako postiže treba da posluži kao, ili i kao, *opravdanje* za postupke, koji jesu događaji, ali nisu samo događaji. To je ozbiljan metafizički problem koji stoji pred neuroetikom. Da bismo je spasli moraćemo da nađemo manje plauzibilnu ambiciju za ovu novu granu primenjene etike. Ali pre nego što se upustimo u to moramo prvo završiti priču o postupcima.

U priču o postupcima uključujemo pripisivanje *odgovornosti*, pripisivanje krivice i zasluge, i druge egzotične pojmove (npr. odobrenje ili osudu, ili kajanje, ushićenje itd.). Svi ovi pojmovi sa naučnog stanovišta izgledaju opskurno upravo zato što se formiraju, delimično ili potpuno, izvan sheme uhvatljive uzročnosti.

Kako funkcionišu *razlozi*? Oni funkcionišu tako da nam pružaju osnove za motivaciju da *postavimo neki cilj* i da pokušamo taj cilj da ostvarimo. Mogućnost da se postupi drugačije znači da je bilo moguće postaviti i

neki drugi cilj, ili bar da je bilo moguće ne postaviti cilj koji je postavljen, i da onda motivacijske snage ili ne bi bilo ili bi ona bila drugačija. I mada neki razlog može biti uspešan u proizvodnji postupka samo tako što će taj razlog postati stvarni uzrok u realnom nizu dešavanja, razlog prvobitno, u trenutku kada je *izabran* kao osnova da se postavi cilj, nije, ili još nije, uzrok. Ako razlog ne bi postao uzrok onda bi „postupak“ koji može nastati na osnovu tog razloga bio samo zamišljen, ili eventualno stvar želje ali ne i htenja. Ali i tada bi to bio taj isti razlog, bilo da je postao uzrok odluke i postupka koji iz nje proizlazi ili da se to nije desilo. „Neizabrani“ razlozi, razlozi na osnovu kojih nije izvršen nikakav postupak, nisu manje razlozi od onih razloga koji su bili efektivno uspešni u proizvodnji postupaka. Nije tako sa uzrocima: uzroci koji ne daju posledice nisu uzroci.

186 Šta onda „rade“ razlozi? Imamo utisak da oni rade nešto više od pukih uzroka, koji proizvode svoje posledice; kao što smo videli uzroci, kada uspemo da ih opišemo, daju objašnjenje događaja koje ti uzroci proizvode. Čini se da razlozi rade nešto drugo, nešto drugačije od toga što rade uzroci. Imamo utisak da razlozi zapravo ne objašnjavaju da, sa jedne strane, to ne mogu (jer ne ukazuju na nužnost da će se nešto desiti, pošto će oni jednako biti razlozi i ako se ništa ne desi), dok, s druge strane, čine nešto više od onog što se postiže objašnjenjem. Šta je to „više“? Razlozi *opravdavaju* da se neki postupak izvede. I oni to čine bilo da se taj postupak stvarno izvrši ili ne. Mislim da je, metafizički posmatrano, ovo glavni problem sa obrazloženjem neuroetike koja bi trebalo da se zasniva na neuronauci (neurologiji i drugim naukama o funkcionisanju ljudskih organizama). Iz ove metafizičke teškoće onda proizlazi i *etički* problem koji, kako izgleda, povlači neku vrstu naturalističke greške, koja se po svemu sudeći sastoji u naturalizaciji vrednosti i svođenju vrednosti na (puke) činjenice.

Ali u čemu je ovde problem, zašto se vrednosti ne bi mogle uzeti kao podskup u skupu činjenica? Nakon što nastanu vrednosti zapravo jesu neka vrsta činjenica, doduše veoma specifična vrsta, ali sličnu situaciju imamo i sa mnogim drugim metafizičkim pitanjima, na primer onim koje se odnose na svojstva, ili na osećaje ili doživljaje. Ni oni se ne mogu „svesti“ na puki zbir fizičkih i hemijskih procesa, i kod njih postoji eksplanatorni jaz između onoga što te pojave konačno jesu i onoga iz čega se one sastoje. Ali to nas ne sprečava da nastojimo, često i uspešno, da nađemo *objašnjenje* za te pojave, i ne osećamo nikakvu potrebu da tražimo njihovo „opravdanje“: činjenica njihovog postojanja je njihovo opravdanje. Ne i kod vrednosti. Kod vrednosti imamo i potrebu i mogućnost opravdanja. To je zato što uzimamo da vrednosti zaista *nastaju*

tako što ih mi proizvodimo, i to ne iz uzroka koji ih ispostavljaju kao svoje posledice, već delatnošću naše volje, ili još preciznije našom *zainteresovanošću* za njih. U zainteresovanosti se artikuliše cilj, a cilj konstituiše vrednost. I kao što razlog „postoji“ nezavisno od toga da li se išta desilo na osnovu tog razloga, tako i cilj „postoji“ nezavisno ne samo od toga da li je realizovan nego čak i od toga da li je uopšte postavljen (kao cilj). Za mogućnost postojanja cilja dovoljna je sama mogućnost da nešto nastane u budućnosti.

Doduše *nosilac* vrednosti, njegova stvarnosna osnova, nastaje, kao i svaka druga stvar u prirodi, tako što je neki uzrok ispostavi kao svoju posledicu, ali činjenicu da je to nešto što tako, uzročno, nastane ima i vrednost mi doslovno stvaramo aktom volje koja, sadržavajući zainteresovanost za tu stvar, stvara vrednost koja je zapravo nezavisna od bilo kog uzroka koji se tu nađe.

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I tu je i metafizička i etička osnova razlike između činjenica i vrednosti. Ako se nauka bavi činjenicama, a bavi se samo njima, onda bi vrednosti morale biti ili postati činjenice da bi se mogle uvesti u onaj domen u kome imamo naučna objašnjenja. To je tačno ono što se i radi u neuroetici, u kojoj se podrazumeva da su vrednosti *objašnjene* na osnovu nekih parametara ili rezultata neuronauke. Ovde se suočavamo sa filozofski zanimljivim ali i praktički i moralno važnim pitanjem šta uistinu znače ova objašnjenja, šta ona objašnjavaju, dokle seže njihova objašnjavačka moć, i da li ta objašnjenja mogu da premoste onaj epistemološki jaz koji bi trebalo premostiti da bi se validno moglo reći da objašnjenja u neuronauci predstavljaju odgovore na *etička pitanja*. Privlačnost ovog pristupa je očigledna: to bi značilo da je etika, barem u ovom domenu, postala *nauka*, i da na moralna pitanja imamo egzaktne naučne odgovore. Čini se zapravo da bi neuroetika trebalo da bude jedan deo, možda neka vrsta završnice, neuronauke.

U poslednje vreme suočavamo se sa velikim razvojem primenjene etike koja se razvija u dva pravca: u pravcu diversifikacije u mnoge nove oblasti etičkog istraživanja i u produblivanju argumentacije u mnogim od tih istraživanja. I kao što je *bioetika* bila zapravo prva oblast primenjene etike nakon koje su se razvile mnoge druge oblasti primenjene etike (poslovna, ekološka, kompjuterska itd.), tako je sada *neuroetika* ona oblast, ili podoblast bioetike koja ne samo da je u fokusu pažnje nego se možda i najbrže razvija i predstavlja najviši domet, ili najveću pretenziju, bioetike.

Ali šta je neuroetika? Zar termin ne zvuči pomalo kontradiktorno? Ili, s druge strane, ako se potisne utisak o kontradiktornosti, zar onda ne zvuči pomalo pleonastično?

Prvo njegovo kontradiktorno „zvučanje“. Predmet svake etike, pa i primenjene (i tako je u svakoj oblasti primenjene etike: bioetici, poslovnoj, ekološkoj ili bilo kojoj drugoj), jeste *moral*, jedan veoma specifičan vrednosni kriterijum kojim se, uprošćeno govoreći, utvrđuje da li u nekom postupku postoji svojstvo krivice ili zasluge. Krivica ili zasluga su nešto za šta se može poneti odgovornost. Odgovornost podrazumeva da postoji *postupak* koji je posebna vrsta događaja nastala nečijom odlukom da nešto bude slučaj, nešto što bi inače ostalo samo puka mogućnost. Ne možemo ovde ulaziti u više detalja o ovom složenom pitanju² koje uključuje i pitanje *kompatibilizma* (pitanje usaglasivosti prirodnog determinizma i slobode delanja). To je pitanje kako je moguće uskladiti objašnjenje prirodnih događaja, koji se bez ostatka mogu objasniti svojim *uzrocima*, i objašnjenje onih događaja koji se ne bi desili da neki *razlozi* nisu podstakli onoga ko je odlučio da izvrši neku radnju, da *ti razlozi* nisu postali stvarni uzroci toga da se te radnje izvrše i da onda imamo posledice kod kojih se suočavamo sa jednom veoma čudnom posledicom: one se u jednom smislu zaista, retroaktivno, mogu bez ostatka objasniti svojim *uzrocima* ali istovremeno takvo objašnjenje neće dati odgovor na pitanje *zašto* je ta posledica postala stvarnost jer neće odgovoriti na pitanje *zašto* je radnja koja ju je uzrokovala uopšte izvedena.

Čudnovatost te situacije uobičajeno se razrešava tako što se kaže da kod radnji i nije reč o njihovom uzročnom objašnjenju nego o nečemu drugome. To drugo jeste *opravdanje radnje*, opravdanje koje se dobija uvidom u razloge zbog kojih je radnja izvedena a ne u uzroke koji su je proizveli kao posledicu. Ili, rečeno uprošćeno, događaji se *objašnjavaju uzrocima*, a radnje se *opravđavaju razlozima*. Ako na trenutak zaboravimo da *razlozi* moraju da postanu efektivni uzroci (a ne da ostanu samo zamišljeni, pa makar i kao predmet želje ali bez odluke da se upotrebe za *opravdanje* da se neki cilj postavi i donese odluka o pokušaju njegove realizacije), onda imamo objašnjenje *zašto* nam termin „neuroetika“ *izgleda* protivrečno. To je zato što *razlozi* nisu puki uzroci i što nikakav opis uzroka ne može da detektuje da neki uzrok može imati i razložnu snagu, da može biti razlog za odluku koja je stvar slobode da se učini nešto čega ne bi bilo da je odluka bila drugačija – i da je istovremeno ta odluka zaista

2 Kratko ali dosta precizno obrazloženje ovih tvrdnji može se naći u mom tekstu „Etika i moral“, *Theoria* 2/2008.

i mogla biti drugačija. Taj moment slobode izgleda kao i da nije deo bilo kakve stvarnosti, iz čega se može zaključiti da u prirodi slobode i ne može biti, a pošto je faktički nalazimo onda bi trebalo da je lociramo negde drugde a ne u neki segment prirode. A neuroni, i njihova fizička i hemijska struktura, jesu, po pretpostavci, deo prirode. Sve što se u njima dešava podleže prirodnoj kauzalnosti, i sve je objašnjivo na osnovu neke kauzalne sheme po kojoj neki određeni uzrok, ili tip uzroka, daje određenu posledicu, ili tip posledice.

Ali zašto bi termin „neuroetika“ zvučao *pleonastično*? To je možda malo teže formulirati nego prethodnu tezu o izgledu kontradiktornosti, iako je to, kako izgleda, samo druga strana iste medalje. Naime da bi neki postupak bio moralno ispravan ili neispravan on prvo mora da se izvrši. To znači da nešto što je samo zamišljeno, pa ma koliko nam se moglo dopadati, nije predmet moralnog ocenjivanja, nije nešto za što se može poneti krivica ili zasluga. Ali kako se neki postupak može izvršiti? Opet uprošćeno možemo reći da se to dešava tako što se nešto što zamišljamo (i prema čemu možemo biti potpuno ravnodušni) postane predmet naše zainteresovanosti, što na osnovu te zainteresovanosti formiramo želju, a onda i nameru, da to ostvarimo, i konačno što donesemo *odluku* da to i učinimo. Ovaj poslednji momenat je ključan: odluka da se nešto realizuje. Ostavivši po strani šta je (materijalna) osnova mogućnosti da se išta zamišlja (kako funkcioniše mozak) i kako i zašto se nešto od toga što se zamišlja postaje predmet zainteresovanosti i predmet želje (za šta je potrebna i moć čulnosti – kao i moć da se oseća zadovoljstvo i bol), možemo pretpostaviti da je za ovu materijalizaciju potrebna neka fizička (i hemijska i fiziološka) osnova.

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Možda možemo reći da je organizam *hardware* ličnosti, a da je neurološki sistem njen *software*. Ostaje pitanje, naravno, da se precizira šta je to „ličnost“, kao nešto po pretpostavci nesvodivo na bilo koji od ova dva njena *uslova*.³ Ta osnova, da bi obavila ovaj zadatak, mora, čini se, biti dovoljno složena, dovoljno funkcionalna. U svakom slučaju ona mora biti realna i prisutna, i mora biti u dobrom stanju da obavi posao. I kao što je za pitanje fizičkog rada, npr. pitanje njegove efikasnosti, potrebno

3 Iz činjenice da mene nema bez mog mozga ne može da se zaključi da sam ja isto što i moj mozak. Naprotiv, pitanja kao što su: „U čemu je razlika između mene i mog mozga?“ i „Šta radim ja a šta (za to vreme) radi moj mozak?“ su savršeno smisljena, i u suštini empirijska, pitanja. Empirijsko je, ili bi trebalo da je, i pitanje razlike (u čemu je razlika) između svesnog i nesvesnog (jer toliko toga nesvesnog čini ili uslov ili deo onoga što je svesno). Stvari mogu biti još složenije, npr. kod pamćenja: ono što pamtim ja takođe pamti i moj mozak (i moje telo). Kako odatle stići do razlike između mehaničkog, spontanog i slobodnog delovanja i „pukog“ dešavanja?

da postoje kosti i mišići, njihova adekvatna struktura, tako je za ona pitanja sa kojima se suočavamo u etici potrebno da postoji ono što nam omogućava da mislimo i osećamo, tj. potrebni su mozak i nervi. Upravo je neurološka osnova čoveka ono mesto na kome se *locira* sve što se *dešava* na planu etike, pa onda dok bi izraz „fiziologija etike“ (ili „fiziologija morala“) zvučao besmisleno, izraz „neuroetika“ zvuči pleonastično: gde bi drugde bila fizička osnova moralne stvarnosti ako ne u mozgu i nervima?

Ali šta to znači, i kako izaći iz ovog začaranog kruga između kontradikcije i pleonastičnosti?

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Odgovor bi morao da bude u preciznoj karakterizaciji objašnjenja koja nudi neuronauka, tj. u tome da se precizno utvrdi šta objašnjavaju ta objašnjenja. Da li ona, kao objašnjenja, pružaju i ono što objašnjenja *normaliter* ne pružaju: opravdanje (opravdanje onoga što se čini, za razliku od objašnjenja onoga što se dešava), ili pak, možda, čine opravdanje izlišnim (jer je objašnjenje dovoljno, a opravdanje oblik samozavaravanja, jedna fikcija)? Sve bogatija literatura o ovom pitanju proizvodi utisak da je to upravo tako: da je opravdanje nešto što ili ne postoji ili predstavlja prečicu u sažimanju opisa složenih objašnjenja koja bi, kada bi se razvila potpuno i do kraja, više i ne bi potrebovala bilo kakvo potezanje termina, i pojma, „opravdanje“. Doduše, nema univerzalne saglasnosti oko ovoga, kao ni direktno izložene argumentacije u prilog ovom redukcionizmu. Umesto toga imamo paletu stavova koji variraju od umerenog (i kako se čini neuverljivog) pokušaja da se opravdanje nekako ipak provuče u priču prevođenjem na objašnjavalачku terminologiju (npr. kod Gazanige) do radikalnog negiranja bilo kakve potrebe za opravdanjem, pod uslovom da se postigne adekvatno objašnjenje pojave u pitanju (nešto što bi moglo da se percipira kao radikalni redukcionizam, npr. kod Patriše Čerčland). (Pretpostavljam da će „pravoverni“ naučnici onda verovatno smatrati da je *kvalitet* pristupa P. Čerčland bolji od onog kod Gazanige, za koji će misliti da je neplauzibilan.)

3. Neuroetika

Školski gledano *neuroetika* je deo primenjene etike koja je opet deo etike kao filozofske teorije o moralu.⁴ Njen predmet ima, čini se, više slojeva. Svi oni se, na različite načine, odnose na to kako funkcionisanje ili disfunkcionisanje nervnog sistema, i posebno mozga, utiče na moralni aspekt

4 Moguće je moralu teorijski prići i na druge načine, psihološki, sociološki, istorijski, ekonomski itd., ali to više ne bi bila etika, već neka druga disciplina: psihologija morala, sociologija morala itd. Striktno govoreći etika je filozofija morala, a filozofija morala zahteva filozofsku, a ne neku drugu argumentaciju.

našeg života. Da bi se to moglo istražiti treba prvo precizno odrediti šta je moral, kao vrednosni kriterijum, i kako on funkcioniše u skupu svih drugih vrednosti. Moral se ne odnosi na sve *pozitivne* vrednosti, to je samo samo jedna vrsta vrednosti u carstvu vrednosti. Sasvim je izvesno da je funkcionisanje nervnog sistema uslov za bilo koje osećanje, i da se znanje iz neurologije može iskoristiti ne samo za to da se otklone razni fiziološki i psihički problemi koji mogu značajno da ugroze kvalitet života, nego i za poboljšanje kvaliteta života zdravih i tzv. normalnih ljudi.

U tom smislu neuroetika spada u etiku sredstava – kako napraviti, proizvesti, pribaviti, distribuisati i upotrebiti sredstva da se ovi ciljevi postignu. U ovom smislu u njoj se podrazumeva da su ciljevi već, barem načelno, određeni, tj. da je pitanje o tome za koje se ciljeve upotrebljavaju, ili treba da upotrebe, ta sredstva prethodno već dobilo svoj odgovor. U ovom opisu, u okviru kog se neuroetika ne bavi ciljevima, ona može čak da pretenduje na empirijski, naučni, karakter. Prvi etički problem sa kojim se ubrzo suočavamo jeste gde postaviti granice dopustivosti takvih upotreba i šta možda ne treba dozvoliti u okviru onoga što se može postići. Lekar je svoj cilj postavio radikalno različito od trovača, na primer, ali obe ove delatnosti će biti uspešne u meri konačnog postignuća – postignuće je realizacija bilo kog cilja pod uslovom da je taj cilj stvarno postavljen. Kao što smo u Uvodu videli ovo nije nužno nerešiv ili veliki problem ako se polje postignuća protegne na ceo život i neki opis njegovog kvaliteta: neuroetika bi se odnosila na pitanje kako neurologija i druge nauke mogu da utiču na kvalitet ukupnog života, na mentalnom i socijalnom planu, života pojedinaca ali i života kao procesa koji traje i koji, po pretpostavci, treba da se nastavi. Ona bi onda mogla pomoći ljudima da bolje kontrolišu svoje živote u bolje organizovanim i funkcionalnijim zajednicama.

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Drugi deo neuroetike išao bi dalje od ispitivanja sredstava za postizanje (po pretpostavci ne svih nego samo legitimnih ciljeva) bolesnih i zdravih ljudi i poboljšanje ljudskih zajednica, i uključivao bi dublju filozofsku analizu o prirodi čoveka, slobodi volje, odgovornosti za ono što ljudi čine (kao bića determinisana u tome šta čine – pored ostalog?! – i neurološkim procesima). Imamo dva dela ovog sloja:

- 1) uzročna analiza načina funkcionisanja mozga i nervnog sistema u (sa)proizvodnji postupaka (neuronauka slobod[n]e volje) – ovaj deo se odnosi na analizu načina na koji neurološki procesi funkcionišu u organizmu (da li mozak „luči“ misli kao što neka žlezda luči svoje sekrete, ili kao što pauk luči svoju mrežu, da li pulsira

kad je aktivan, npr. dok „misli“, kako se, kojim grafikonima, mogu vizuelno predstaviti ovi procesi) – ovo sve u delu koji je relevantan za etička pitanja; i

- 2) uzročna analiza načina na koji se to agregira i akumulira kroz vreme u proizvodnji tipskih reakcija koje imaju, odnosno zadobijaju, društveni karakter: kako nastaju i funkcionišu emocije, osećaji empatije, stida, kajanja, osvete (i osvetničke pravde) i druga moralna i kvazimoralna osećanja, kao i ponašanja koja nastaju na toj osnovi: saradnja, podela rada, uzvraćanje, zabrana, ili na drugoj strani prevara, ruganje, izopštavanje i tako dalje.

Oba dela ovog sloja se preklapaju sa neurologijom kao naukom, naročito prvi koji se direktno bavi ispitivanjem kauzalnih veza između hemijskih i fizioloških procesa, među njima i neuroloških, i učinaka koje ti procesi imaju na ljudsko ponašanje.

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Treći sloj, u kome se drugi sloj gleda spolja, i sa izvesne distance, odnosi se na ispitivanje vrednosti samih ciljeva, u meri u kojoj postoji neka indicija da je to determinisano neurološki. Tu spadaju npr. pitanje odnosa između sebičnosti i altruizma, pitanje biološke osnove moralne univerzalnosti, pitanje u kojoj meri supervenijencija vrednosti na neurološkim i čulnim sposobnostima determiniše šta će vrednosti na kraju uopšte konkretno biti i sl. Za ovaj deo je možda neposredno očigledno da i ne spada u neuroetiku, iako po pravilu u pozadini objašnjenja koja se nude (kao neka pretpostavka, aksiom, ili kao predrasuda) stoji neka veza sa pretpostavkom o bazičnoj povezanosti epistemoloških, aksioloških i ontoloških pitanja smisla i vrednosti života i njegovog sadržaja sa (nekom, nekom određenom) neurološkom osnovom. Ovde se direktno preklapaju naučna i moralna pitanja.

Jedno od tih pitanje tiče se slobode volje i odgovornosti. Uloga mozga u onome što mislimo svakako je ključna; ono što se dešava u mozgu artikulirano je međutim uzročno – sve što se u mozgu dešava nastaje zbog uzroka koji su to proizveli kao posledicu. Ako se onda pretpostavi da su naše mišljenje i naš razum determinisani onim što se dešava u mozgu možemo poverovati da su naša razmišljanja, verovanja, odluke, a onda i postupci koji na osnovu tih odluka nastaju uzročno determinisani, na isti način, onim što se dešava u mozgu. Sve je rezultat uzročnih procesa, procesa u kojim uzroci proizvode svoje posledice nužnošću prirodnog determinizma. Pitanje neposrednosti koju nalazimo u doživljaju da nešto zamišljamo ili, više od toga, nameravamo i odlučujemo (ili se kolebamo)

jeste stvar neuroloških procesa. Tu *neposrednost doživljaja* onda nazivamo slobodom volje, iako činjenica naše svesnosti u celom tom procesu mora takođe biti samo jedna posledica, jedan dodatak, u celini procesa koji je (uglavnom) nesvestan. Ili, drugim rečima, nesvesni procesi proizvode svesnost (stanje direktne percepcije svesti – svesni proces). U tom procesu nam se onda nekako prošvercuje utisak da su *odluke* proizvedene „slobodnom voljom“, iako su one – *u celini* [ovo je važna teza, koju možda nije lako potvrditi ali je isto tako nije lako negirati] – proizvod neuroloških uzroka.

Ovde se možda suočavamo sa ključnim problemom: da li je ovo *samo* utisak, i stvar (potencijalno neuverljivih) filozofskih teorija o odnosu slobode i determinizma, ili je reč o nečem drugom, možda radikalno drugom. Jer, iako možda neki filozofi (libertarijanci) i, još više, teolozi, veruju da odluke dolaze *potpuno* nezavisno od svih uzročnih delatnosti (nezavisno od delatnosti postojećih uzroka na tom mestu u to vreme), čini se da se ljudi, i to *svi* ljudi, *ponašaju tako kao da* bespogovorno veruju da odluke nastaju činom slobodne volje, iako takođe neće dovesti u pitanje to da su te odluke u velikoj meri *determinisane* uzrocima koji uopšte nisu slobodni. Ljudi uzimaju veoma ozbiljno (spoljnju) determinaciju stvarno postojećih uzroka ali ne odustaju od toga da u onome što rade sasvim ozbiljno – i konstitutivno – uzmu i slobodu kao nešto što učestvuje u „determinaciji“ onoga šta će se „učiniti“ (što je osnova razlike između „želeti“ i „hteti“ i osnov ovlašćenja za pripisivost odgovornosti samo za ono što se čini, za razliku od onoga što se „samo“ događa ili „samo“ zamišlja).⁵ To se pokazuje praktično u *svemu* što *rade*, a naročito u aktu vrednovanja (u svim aktima vrednovanjima) i onim postupcima koji su rezultat (ili, uzročno, posledica akata vrednovanja), najdirektnije možda u pravnim (sudskim) postupcima u kojima se *uzima kao pretpostavka* da je sloboda volje *bila* (faktički bila) osnova za nešto što je učinjeno. Deo ove pretpostavke je i teza koja kaže da *ako nije bilo slobode* (ako postupak nije izvršen slobodno) onda nema osnova za primenu pravnog postupka (suđenja), i umesto da se *delatnik* pošalje na vešala ustanovljuje se da delatnika nema, što za posledicu ima da se *pacijent* šalje u bolnicu (ludnicu – a pitanje šta je bolje, ludnica ili vešala, ne postavlja se jer se to pitanje percipira kao prazno). Pretpostavka koja se ovde uzima kao stvarna jeste, svedeno na maksimalnu jednostavnost, sledeća: ono što se čini je, nužno, rezultat mnogih prirodnih uzroka (nalazi

5 Cf. J. Babić, „Želeti i hteti“, *Sistem vrednosti i psihijatrija*, prir. B. Ćorić, Fakultet za specijalnu edukaciju i rehabilitaciju i FASPER, 2010.

se u prostorno-vremenskom kontinuumu, u stvarnosti, nije samo zamišljeno, ili eventualno poželjeno), ali *gledano ukupno* ova prirodna uzročnost ne „pokriva“ ceo teren uzročnosti, nego se pojavljuju i *razlozi* (koji prvobitno uopšte nisu uzroci, jer neće prestati da budu razlozi i ako nikad ne postanu uzroci) koji, kroz čin odluke, ulaze u postupak kao *efektivni uzroci*. Ti razlozi koji su postali uzroci predstavljaju dovoljnu osnovu za pripisivost odgovornosti za postupke – onima koji su *slobodno odlučili* da te razloge, na neki način koji možda nije do kraja objašnjiv prirodnim uzrocima, učine uzrocima.

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Kao što se može očekivati, filozofi će ovde pokušati da pomire zahtev za jedinstvom sveta (kao metodološku osnovu objašnjivosti svih pojava u svetu, inače bismo se suočili sa „čudima“ i raznim „rupama“ u stvarnosti, i svet konačno ne bi bio objašnjiv jer se nikada ne bi moglo znati kada je reč o nekom takvom čudu a kada o prirodnoj pojavi) i neotklonjivu potrebu za vrednovanjem koja pretpostavlja validnost pripisivanja odgovornosti. U tom pokušaju oni će onda kreirati i egzotične teorije kao što je ona sadržana u Platonovoj priči o Eru (gde će se determinizam sačuvati po cenu teze da je odluka, za koju se nosi krivica, donesena pre početka vremena, kada je duša „slobodno“ birala u kakvom će biću biti „gospodar“).⁶ Ma koliko takve teorije mogle na prvi pogled izgledati neuverljivo, one zapravo nisu nimalo „lošije“ od „naučnih“ teorija koje problem rešavaju u suštini tako što ga negiraju – na šta se konačno svode svi redukcionizmi, ne samo scijentistički. To doduše ne mora uvek da se vidi na prvi pogled; na primer kod Patriše Čerčland to će biti svođenje na evoluciono prilagođavanje kroz razvoj empatije i brige prvo za potomstvo a onda i za druge u blizini, u procesu koji se brusio i izbrusio sve do altruizma. Taj proces prirodno, ili „prirodno“, polazi od egoizma i onda kroz snažnu identifikaciju sa (nekim) drugima prenosi snagu egoizma na one do kojih taj proces stigne, tj. do tačke do koje identifikovanje sebe i svog interesa dosegne.⁷

Moral je onda prirodni fenomen, determinisan dugim procesom prirodne selekcije, a sve se zasniva na neurobiologiji, uz dodatni uticaj dugoročnih uslova za uslovljavanje koji dolaze iz svojstava okoline i nataloženih prethodnih znanja o svetu. Moral ljudi i moral životinja u ovom pristupu

6 V. Platon, *Država*, 617 d, e.

7 Na ovaj način može se uverljivo objasniti snaga porodičnih, plemenskih, pa i nacionalnih osećanja vezanosti i privrženosti. Od te tačke ovo objašnjenje počinje da gubi na plauzibilnosti (ali ne sasvim: vezanost za svoju religiju, svoju civilizaciju, pa i vezanost za artifičijelne „osobe“ kao što su kompanije, klubovi, ideologije, može se donekle objašnjavati na ovaj način).

se ne razlikuju suštinski već samo po razvijenosti. Pretpostavka slobode nije potrebna. Saradnja je rezultat evolucionog prilagođavanja, ali ona ima svoju genetsku i neurološku osnovu u funkcionalnosti takvog ponašanja kao inteligentnijeg i „boljeg“. To otvara mogućnost da se i inteligencija, ali i neuronska struktura, takođe bruse tokom evolucije, tako što će „pametniji“ geni lakše preživeti kroz generacije. Privid pravljenja izbora onda je samo eho tog dugog procesa, a pripisivanje odgovornosti i kažnjavanje samo dodatak na prirodno kažnjavanje grešaka, homeostatska ispomoć evoluciji koja bi bez toga išla sporije. Tako osećaj (prirodne) odvratnosti, na primer, postepeno prerasta u (društveni) prezir, koji deluje sa više mehaničke spontanosti i nepristrasno (ili nepristrasnije). Uzajamnost, ili recipročnost, onda su prirodne posledice takvih kooperativnih stavova. Redosled ide od efikasnosti rešavanja problema, od kojih su mnogi zajednički i konačno društveni, do socijalnih praksi, što postaje stvar učenja. Proces svoj pun kapacitet dobija u proizvodnji stvarnog poverenja, koje saradnju čini maksimalno efikasnom. Za neuronauku onda ostaje da istraži neurološke mehanizme zajedničkog života kao jedinstvenog procesa življenja. Doduše ostaje problem *free riding* (izražen u još efikasnijem individualnom, i partikularno-grupnom, ponašanju po drugim matricama ponašanja čije društveno priznanje ne zavisi toliko od altruizma ili čak kooperativnosti (spretnost, lukavost, bezosećajnost, ponekad i pristrasnost). Ove matrice mogu biti takođe veoma korisne za rešavanje problema, i ponekad za dovoljno dugo vreme funkcionisati još bolje nego kooperacija, pogotovo za pojedince (za društva to vodi ne samo u korupciju nego i u razorni gubitak poverenja i samopoštovanja, što obezvređuje sva postignuća).

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U zaključku ovog dela možemo se, vraćajući se na onaj prvi sloj neuroetike, etiku sredstava usko povezanu sa neuronaukom zapitati: Zašto se *neuroetika* ne bi zaustavila na tom sloju? Čini se da drugi sloj (način funkcionisanja nervnog sistema i agregiranja [„kolektivizacije“] tog funkcionisanja kroz vreme, evolucija), iako je i on povezan sa neurologijom kao naukom, ne mora, a verovatno i ne može, da uđe u *etičko* polje (nego mora da ostane samo na nivou metafizičkog pitanja o tome kako se odnos prirode i slobode može opisati tako da se objasni uzročna veza između neuroloških procesa i različitih genotipskih i fenotipskih tipova ponašanja).

Ako tako uradimo oslobodićemo se velikog balasta utvrđivanja demar-kacione linije između nauke i filozofije i oslobodićemo prostor za stvarnu primenu ogromnog znanja koje donosi neuronauka na poboljšanje

šansi za postizanje ciljeva koji su načelno već određeni.⁸ Naravno, nije se lako odmaći od pitanja odakle dolazi moral, i kakav je odnos između morala i prirodnih sila (sebičnosti, moći, društvene konvencije i sl.), odnosno kako opravdati onu pretenziju na apsolutnost koju detektujemo u moralnim pojmovima kakav je npr. pojam *pravde*. Kako su moguće vrednosti iz kojih proizlaze norme koje su više od konvencija, čija je obavezujuća snaga isključiva i iznad svake prirodne kalkulacije. Kako bi takve vrednosti mogle biti zasnovane na čvrstim činjenicama, biološkim, hemijskim, fizičkim, o ljudskoj prirodi a da istovremeno imaju obavezujuću moć koja se ne svodi na te prirodne determinante.

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Nije lako se izmaći neodoljivosti pitanja da li neuronauka negira, ili čini suvišnim, pojam slobodne volje. Takva pitanja zaista povlače dalekosežne implikacije: da možda treba (kao što se tvrdi u teoriji rehabilitacije) da se ukinu pojmovi uračunljivosti i (krivične) odgovornosti ili nevinosti, da čovečanstvo može da pređe na „naučno“ planiranje svojih delatnosti na širokoj ili opštoj osnovi itd. Ali čini se da postoji razlika između takvih strategija opšte kontrole, ili aspiracije na opštu kontrolu, koje bi dopustile i obezbedile samo najbolje rezultate (po nekoj krajnjoj računici) i postepenog i stvarno slobodnog razvoja ka boljem stanju života. Ono prvo bi bila arogantna pretenzija na savršenstvo i ona ne bi dopuštala izuzetke i greške već bi sve ljude tretirala kao materijal iz kog treba izvući maksimum mogućeg. Ovo drugo bi omogućilo poboljšanje ljudskih performansi koje bi možda ugrozilo demarkaciju između „zdravlja“ i „bolesti“ (pa bi i oni koji nemaju problema sa pamćenjem, koncentracijom, nisu gluvi i slepi, imali pristupa onim hemijskim i drugim sredstvima koja stoje na raspolaganju onima koji imaju takve probleme – da bi bili *još bolji*). To bi se onda odnosilo i na mozak i na ono što on daje ljudima: kognitivnu i emocionalnu sposobnost i blagostanje. I tu bi se pojavio prostor za ono što i treba da je sfera neuroetike: primena postignutih znanja tamo gde je to potrebno i poželjno.

4. Primene

Neuronauka je doživela ne samo ubrzani razvoj u poslednje vreme nego je proizvela i očekivanja koja idu do neslučenih granica ovladavanja ljudskom sudbinom, pojedinačnom i ukupnom. Novo razumevanje mentalnih

8 Ovo ne znači da naučnici ne treba da učestvuju u procesu revalorizacije tih ciljeva, ravnopravno i čak povlašćeno u odnosu na druge ljude, ali sa jasnom svešću da to nije prosta primena neurološkog znanja, već upotreba tog znanja, pored drugih parametara, u određivanju šta je poželjno i šta treba da se čini (šta su ciljevi). Te dve delatnosti naučnika su radikalno različite, i odgovornost u njima je takođe sasvim različita.

procesa i stanja koja rezultuju iz tih procesa otvorilo je ne samo prostor da se (lakše) savladavaju mentalni poremećaji nego i da se usavrši funkcionisanje normalnih mentalnih procesa i da se potencijalno značajno usavrše mentalna stanja koja iz njih nastaju. Mnoge abnormalnosti koje su ranije bile izvan kontrole sada se mogu ukloniti ili ublažiti. Poboljšanje (*Enhancement*), tema koja preuzima sve veći deo bioetike kao oblasti primenjene etike, svakako dobija novo značenje u okviru neuroetike. I mada se poboljšanje ne svodi samo na neurološku stimulaciju i kontrolu koja se tako može postići (deo „poboljšanja“ su i protetički aparati, kao što su ulošci u cipelama, ili razni hemijski stimulansi koji ne zahtevaju striktno neurološko objašnjenje iako verovatno ništa u organizmu – ni kalcifikacija kostiju npr. – ne može da se obavi bez pomoći nervnog sistema), ipak najznačajniji prostor za poboljšanje može se videti u onim regijama istraživanja kojima se bavi neurologija. Tu se onda po pretpostavci artikuliše i neuroetika.

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Neke od tih upotreba, ili bar njihovih svrha, i odranije su, ili oduvek, bile prisutne. Na primer čitanje tuđih misli, ponekad toliko potrebno za utvrđivanje precizne istine na vreme, bilo je ne samo predmet maštanja nego i stvarnih postupaka; uz malu pomoć torture brzo se stizalo do željenih informacija. Ali zar ne bi bilo bolje da se to prosto „očita“ iz nekog dijagrama, ili još neposrednije prostim „prisluškivanjem“ šta drugi misle? Ili, i tu neurologija sasvim sigurno može da pomogne, da se usavrši detektor laži koji će, za razliku od starih i nepouzdanih sprava te vrste, davati precizne i uverljive rezultate, toliko precizne da mogu da se upotrebe i kao dokazni materijal u sudskom postupku. Ovo je istinski izazov: obično se smatra da je *lukavost* deo opisa onoga što se podrazumeva pod *univerzalnošću* uma. Um je univerzalan, nije mašina sa unapred specifikovanom svrhom, zato što je mišljenje zasnovano na stvarnoj moći slobode volje i povlači da mogu slobodno da zamišljam sve što je moguće. Kontrola ovog procesa, koja izgleda kao njegova suštinska pretpostavka (kako bi se moglo – slobodno – misliti ako bi sadržaj mišljenja unapred bio determinisan, što povlači da se od svake misli može slobodno *odustati!*), izgleda da na nužan način ukida mesto za lukavstvo, sposobnost koja je, iako zavisi od inteligencije, ipak dostupna svakome na sasvim privatan način. (A šta ako je mogućnost lukavosti pretpostavka same mogućnosti bilo kakve *privatnosti?!*). Tako lukavost, kao i mogućnost privatnosti, postaje, čini se, puka fikcija ako je moguć aparat koji može čitati i zapisivati misli. Pogotovo ako to može iz daljine i bez svesti o tome onoga čije se misli čitaju.

Ovakve mogućnosti otvorile bi ogroman prostor za ekonomske upotrebe, za jedan „neuromarketing“, koji bi omogućio neviđeno visok stepen

satisfakcije, u postupku koji bi se sastojao od simultane proizvodnje želja i efikasnog načina njihovog zadovoljenja. Mogle bi se prvo zadovoljiti postojeće želje (uključujući i fizičke osobine: ne samo da bi niski i rošavi mogli postati visoki i lepi, već bi glupi mogli postati pametni, već šta ko poželi), a zatim bi se, kada se sve te želje realizuju moglo preći na proizvodnju novih želja i njihovo usavršavanje, uz garanciju za sigurno zadovoljenje. Zar to ne bi otvorilo put ka prostoru sreće? Doduše, takav postupak imao bi malih problema sa nazadnim idejama o ličnom identitetu i „duši“, i pitanjima kao što su: Kakav je smisao i kakva je vrednost npr. „pobede“ u šahu, ili bilo čemu, koja bi se mogla „kupiti“ ili *obezbediti* neurološkom proizvodnjom zadovoljstva koje su pobeda, ili *uspeh*, u prošlosti davali ljudima, kao što ih i sada daju? Čemu uspeh, ako on nije predmet takvog izbora u kome je *moguće* izgubiti, i kakva je vrednost takvog uspeha? Pojavila bi se i druga pitanja, npr. pitanje koje želje uopšte treba proizvoditi da bi se one onda efikasno i takoreći automatski, mehanički, zadovoljile? Da li bi to bile želje koje daju najviši nivo intenziteta zadovoljstva (nešto poput zadovoljstva u alkoholu, npr., ili „čistog seksualnog zadovoljstva“ dobijenog kupovinom i ugradnjom u mozak odgovarajućeg čipa), ili bi bilo moguće formirati neki standard kvaliteta tih želja?

Mnogobrojne su primene znanja iz neuronaukâ, i raznovrsne. Poboljšanje ukupnog stanja života ima razne i dalekosežne implikacije od kojih nisu sve neposredno vidljive. Na primer, ublažavanjem ili uklanjanjem onih nedostataka ili abnormalnosti koji nastaju zbog malfunkcija mozga ne samo da se nekim ljudima konkretno pomaže nego se doprinosi i povećanju ukupne jednakosti u društvu, odnosno uklanjanju onih (po doživljaju nepravednih, iako prirodnih) nepravdi koje nastaju zato što zbog bolesti ili abnormalnosti u funkcionisanju naših organizama nismo jednako gospodari svojih sudbina. Dugoročni učinci poboljšanja svakako su još veći i raznovrsniji (iako ne moraju svi biti pozitivni). Zato se moramo sasvim ukratko osvrnuti na koristi i rizike koje to donosi.

4a) Koristi

U čemu je korist od neuroetike?

Koristi su svakako velike i dugoročno verovatno i nemerljive. Kako znanje napreduje tako i naša moć kontrole prirodnih procesa u svetu napreduje. Sve više znamo šta iz čega proizlazi, i kako možemo učiniti da se nešto desi. Mogućnost kontrole tih procesa stalno se povećava. Mogućnost pristupa dosada nepoznatim regijama neurološke stvarnosti, upotreba neuroloških intervencija za poboljšanje fizičke pokretljivosti

i raspoloženja,⁹ mogućnost hemijskog uticanja na mnoge funkcije mozga (oduvek korišćene na osnovu stohastičkog znanja skupljenog kroz iskustvo), direktne intervencije na mozgu, prediktivni testovi za teške ili neizlečive neurodegenerativne bolesti, povećanje memorije, „kognitivne proteze“, *neuroenhancers*, kontrola kvaliteta i stabilnosti intelektualnih procesa, sve su to stvari koje su potencijalno polje za ovo znanje, znanje koje ne bi bilo nepouzdan rezultat sakupljenog iskustva kroz dugo vreme već rezultat direktnog uvida u same procese koji im stoje u osnovi.

Ogroman razvoj neuronauke u naše vreme je dramatično unapredio naše razumevanje procesa koji se odvijaju u mozgu i stanja u kojima ti procesi funkcionišu na različite načine, manje ili više dobro, manje ili više „funktionalno“. To otvara ogromno polje za kontrolu onoga što se „tamo“ dešava. Po metodološkoj pretpostavci da je sve što postoji (i što nastane) primarno dobro a da može postati loše i zlo samo ako nešto krene kako „ne treba“ ili ako se zloupotrebi, svi ovi rezultati se mogu upotrebiti za dobrobit ljudi. Produženje kvalitetnog života kao i poboljšanje (pojačanje) raznih mentalnih i fizičkih funkcija koje doprinose tom kvalitetu svakako da predstavlja veliki benefit. Benefiti ove vrste već su uveliko vidljivi na sve strane oko nas, čak i ako se naš sadašnji život uporedi sa životom ljudi od pre samo pola veka ili vek. (Naravno, pitanje smisla i konačne vrednosti teško se može pokriti ovakvim kvantitativnim pristupom: kao što se na primer teško može porediti vrednost kratkog života jednog pesnika i dugog života jednog bonvivana koji u životu nije ostvario ništa – ali je sasvim sigurno da će život pesnika koji *ima vremena i zdravlja* da završi započetu knjigu biti kvalitetniji i bolji od života pesnika koji nema tu šansu.) Ako dopustimo malo imaginacije možemo reći da perspektiva da se nečiji život produži *zato* da bi se završili *započeti* projekti izgleda takoreći neodoljivo. To bi sigurno doprinelo ukupnoj vrednosti života. A možda će neuronauka, ako nastavi da se ovako razvija, jednog dana čovečanstvu ponuditi tu mogućnost.¹⁰

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9 A. Čejterdži (A. Chatterjee) to naziva „kozmetičkom neurologijom“ („cosmetic neurology“). V. Anjan Chatterjee, Martha J. Farah, *Neuroethics in Practice*, Oxford University Press, USA; 1 edition (January 7, 2013), p. 3. To je postupak u kome se „koriste neurološke intervencije da se poboljšaju kretanje, raspoloženje i mentalno stanje kod zdravih pojedinaca“.

10 To će naravno, ako se desi, proizvesti mogućnost novih zloupotreba – npr. u ovom slučaju započinjanje novih projekata „samo zato“ da bi se živelo malo duže! To će otvoriti potpuno novi prostor za primenu moralnog kriterijuma: prostor u kome će se formirati dužnost umiranja, kao komplementarni deo celine u kojoj je drugi deo pravo na život. Pravo na život nije pravo na večni život: život je temporalna, smrtna, pojava, njegov smisao i vrednost zavise od ove temporalnosti zato što se praktička, stvarna, sloboda ne može zamisliti izvan vremena: izvan vremena nije moguće postavljati ciljeve niti pokušavati da se oni realizuju.

4b) Rizici

Rizici su takođe veliki. Po istoj metodološkoj pretpostavci da je sve što postoji načelno dobro¹¹ ali da takođe može biti i zloupotrebjeno jasno je da se rezultati neuronauke mogu zloupotrebiti na razne načine. Ali ta se mogućnost vremenom smanjuje, kako znanje napreduje. To naravno nije velika uteha – to što će nešto biti realnost u (dalekoj) budućnosti ne mora da se nas puno tiče sada, kada treba da se suočimo sa problemima koji nas pritiskaju. Ali ipak se može reći da ono što predstavlja najveći problem i potencijalno najveći izvor rizika nisu zloupotrebe (koje se i bez prirodne nauke mogu efikasno realizovati, najčešće indoktrinacijom, proizvodnjom fanatizma, manipulacijom činjenicama) nego onaj prostor koji se nalazi u oblasti onoga što se (još) ne zna. Navešćemo nekoliko rečenica prvo o jednom, zloupotrebama, a onda o drugom, opasnostima koje dolaze iz nekompletnosti znanja i odsustvu uvida u implikacije u daljoj budućnosti.

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Tipične zloupotrebe su, po pravilu, povezane sa načelno dobrim upotrebama (čak i ugrožavanje, sopstvene ili tuđe, privatnosti skopčano je sa ciljevima koji su za onoga ko to čini *prima facie* opravdani). Na primer zahtev poslodavaca da se neuroenhanseri upotrebe na poslu radi povećanja produktivnosti nije moralno rđav zato što je povećanje produktivnosti loše već zato što se tako povećava eksploatacija i ulazi u rizike koji ne mogu da se opravdaju. (Nasuprot tome zahtev poslodavaca da rudari nose rukavice i šlemove, i u onom delu u kome je njihova motivacija sasvim sebična – da se izbegnu prekidi u radu, da se izbegnu nepotrebni troškovi zbog povreda itd. – nije moralno neispravna.) Kreiranje raspoloženja po volji opet biće moralno neispravno jer razara samopoštovanje i brigu o svojim postignućima. Intervencije na mozgu, povećanje koncentracije memorije, kognitivne proteze, sve to može biti zloupotrebjeno za ciljeve koji ne mogu moralno da se opravdaju, pored toga što se tako, možda, ulazi i u nepoznate (ili poznate) rizike da se na duže staze ugrozi sopstveno ili tuđe zdravlje.

Neurološke zloupotrebe, isto kao i farmakološke (npr. zlonamerno trovanje) relativno se lako regulišu kada se jednom uoče. Na primer mogućnost menjanja raspoloženja (uklanjanje straha, instaliranje besa) očigledno se

¹¹ Ova pretpostavka zapravo je varijanta pretpostavke o vrednosnoj neutralnosti sredstava (koja mogu biti sredstva za bilo koje ciljeve, i ispravne i neispravne). Ova pretpostavka implicira važnu stavku u pitanju odgovornosti naučnika: naučnik nije odgovoran za rezultat, otkriće, do kog je došao, taj rezultat je odranije bio u strukturi sveta, barem kao potencijalnost, i predstavlja deo objektivne stvarnosti. Odgovornost pada na one koji, sa lošom namerom ili neodgovorno, zloupotrebjavaju taj rezultat.

može upotrebiti u vojne svrhe, čitanje tuđih misli (ako bi se postiglo da to bude na relativno priuštiv način) u političke svrhe, menjanje memorije, menjanje ličnih karakternih osobina i sl. isto tako se može upotrebljavati na razne načine; sve to zavisi od moći imaginacije onoga ko je u poziciji da tu upotrebu izvede, bilo da je ta upotreba legitimna ili nije. I mada zloupotrebe nikako nisu beznačajna stvar, ipak izgleda neuverljivo da bi one po svom opsegu ikad mogle kvantitativno dostići opseg dobrih upotreba. Razlog za ovo je jednostavan: zloupotrebe mogu biti uspešne samo ako parazitiraju na terenu na kome su dobre upotrebe preovlađujuće (kao što laž parazitira na istini, jer može biti uspešna samo ako se predstavlja kao istina).

Ali pravi problem su *rizici* koji se nalaze u daljoj budućnosti. Oni, ili se bar meni tako čini, dolaze iz nemogućnosti da se unapred zna kumulativni efekat malih promena na duže vreme (ili relativno malih za ljudsku vrstu, kada se te promene uzimaju pojedinačno ili u kraćem periodu). Čini mi se da je mogućnost dugoročnog predviđanja glavni nedostatak ogromne količine stečenog znanja u poslednje vreme: često veoma precizno znamo kako da uradimo nešto što isplaniramo, i možda takođe znamo zašto to hoćemo da uradimo u većini slučajeva, ali ne znamo (a često se i ne pitamo) kakav će rezultat biti ako se neki određeni postupak ponovi mnogo puta, ako postane praksa ili standard.

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5) Zaključak

U zaključku ćemo reći nekoliko reči o prirodi rizikâ koji nastaju iz naučnog progressa. Pritom ćemo se ograničiti na opis neuroetike kao grane etičke teorije o tome šta je ispravno a šta nije ispravno *raditi* na polju mogućnosti koje se otvorilo razvojem neurologije i drugih nauka o ljudskoj organskoj prirodi. Filozofska pitanja, o kojima smo raspravljali na početku teksta, ostavićemo po strani. Bez obzira na njihovu filozofsku zanimljivost ta pitanja ne moraju da se percipiraju tako kao da imaju stvarnu moralnu važnost (pitanje krivične odgovornosti u kontekstu rasprave o tome da li postoji ili ne postoji sloboda jeste zapravo pitanje da li da odustanemo od pripisivanja odgovornosti ljudima za ono što rade – i prestanemo da kažnjavamo i počnemo da lečimo kriminalce – što jeste važno pitanje ali ne spada u neuroetiku ako se ona kao što treba shvati kao deo primenjene etike). Zato su, čini mi se, *rizici* glavno etičko pitanje neuroetike, kao što je to i u drugim oblastima etike, posebno primenjene.

Rizici su sve manji kako znanje napreduje. To je u neku ruku povezano s prirodom empirijskog znanja: ono je nužno nekompletno i njegov razvoj

je, po pretpostavci, nešto što se nikada neće iscrpsti. Svet je *veći* od onoga što može da „pokrije“ bilo koje znanje, bilo koja nauka. Ovo međutim ima dva sasvim različita aspekta. Jedan je otkrivanje novih detalja u usavršavanju znanja o onome o čemu nešto već znamo. Drugi je otkrivanje potpuno novih regija stvarnosti koje će, uprkos normativnoj pretpostavci o vrednosnoj neutralnosti nauke (jer se ona „bavi“ sredstvima) proizvesti cele regije potencijalnih i stvarnih *novih ciljeva* čija evaluacija tek treba da se obavi. Često se dešava, kao i kod drugih novih praksi, da se ti ciljevi nametnu svojom neodoljivom privlačnošću, i u nedostatku kompletnog opravdanja kao i vremena i resursa da se do njega dođe imaćemo odluke da se novi ciljevi postave i pre nego što se dovoljno precizno zna šta to, naročito dugoročno, znači.

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Dugoročni učinci prevashodno su učinci na čovečanstvo, na buduće ljude. Ti ljudi sada nisu tu i ne mogu ništa da kažu o tome da li je nešto „prihvatljivo“ ili nije. Oni još ne postoje, ali mi ne znamo niti da li će zaista postojati niti šta će biti njihove preferencije. To radikalno otežava uzimanje u obzir njihovih interesa sada. Ali, s druge strane, urgentnost potreba, naročito kod lečenja ali i kod „na izvol’te“ dohvatljivih neodoljivih, pritom priuštivih, mogućnosti da se život sada i ovde (malko) usavrši, imamo pitanje da li imamo stvarnog opravdanja da žrtvujemo sadašnje ljude na oltaru ukupnog budućeg progressa, ili progressa u nauci.

Ipak, sasvim izvesno možemo zaključiti da ima razloga za oprez. Kratkoročne koristi mogu biti dugoročno štetne. Spasavanje genetski sve slabijih jedinki (u okviru stava da treba spasiti što više životâ, ili svaki život) donosi produženje života, sve bolje zdravlje i kondiciju ljudi itd. – a ipak može dugoročno da se osveti. Doduše, priroda se „potrudila“ da, barem ponekad, ima rezervne strategije (npr. u slučaju preovlađujuće ili totalne neplodnosti čovečanstva, koje bi moglo da nastupi u budućnosti iz raznih uzroka – među njima i zbog slabljenja selekcije kojom se evolucija do sada služila, a što je posledica ljudske intervencije u spašavanju životâ – postoji mogućnost alternativnog načina razmnožavanja, kloniranje, koje može da se usavrši i da u nekom trenutku bude slamka spasa). Ovaj oprez koji zahteva da se interes ljudske vrste ne ugrozi ne bi smeo da se zanemari, kao što, po pretpostavci, ne može da bude ni jedini ili najvažniji faktor u odlučivanju o tome šta će se, u okviru onoga što je moguće (i što se možda uklapa i u društvenu sliku onoga što je poželjno) na kraju zaista u učiniti.

Primljeno: 15. maja 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 20. jula 2014.

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Jovan Babić

Neuroethics and Philosophy

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Abstract

Neuro-ethics is probably fastest growing part of applied ethics. The main thesis is that certain natural processes in brain and nerves produce certain moral, and immoral, behaviors. All these processes can be explained causally, and (if this is so) neuro-ethics might be the final result of neuroscience. There are some metaphysical and ethical pitfalls to be considered, however, like the (incorrect) conflation of causal explanation and rational justification in defining values, not only non-moral values but moral values as well. Certainly, the knowledge of how neurological processes function could help to enhance the quality of human life, not only in coping with defects but also in improving the so-called „normal life“. This implies that neuroethics is instrumental, dealing with values which are instrumental as well. However, neuroethics, it seems, aspires to go further than that: to explain how goals come into existence and what their articulation should look like. All of this should be causally explained, or at least explainable; and the main focus of the paper is an analysis of this aspiration. The analysis refers to some important distinctions like the distinction between causes and reasons, explanation and justification, or the one between means and ends. At the end of the paper there is a section about applications, where some of the benefits and risks are summarily indicated, with a conclusion that neuroethics surely might help in advancing the overall quality of human life, individual and social.

Key words: Neuroscience, neuroethics, explanation, causes and consequences, values, justification, reasons

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The Intentionality of Madness: Checking the Cognitive Issues in DSM-based Diagnosis

Abstract *In this paper I discuss John Searle's selective view of intentionality of mental states, and place it in the context of impairment to personal identity that occurs in mental illness. I criticize Searle's view that intentionality characterizes some but not all mental states; I do so both on principled and on empirical grounds. I then proceed to examine the narrative theory of self, advanced by Paul Ricoeur, Marya Schechtman and others, and explore the extent to which the theory fits a more generalized view of intentionality that would apply to all mental states. This discussion is followed by a brief consideration of the way in which the modern DSM-based psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, reductively and mechanistically, dispenses with the issues of „strong ontology“, namely the life events and values that mental states might in fact reach for, even when ostensibly without reference. In this sense, DSM-inspired psychiatry is based on a Searlian view of mental states. It is contrasted with the narrative theory of self (and therefore also of mental states) which, rather than defining madness by clusters of symptoms, seeks to understand the underlying ontology of reference by looking for both the initial script of the person's „life narrative“ and for ruptures and knots in that narrative that might give rise to madness. Finally I discuss and evaluate the perspective of personality enhancement through counseling aimed at repairing the personal narrative.*

Keywords: *intentionality, personality enhancement, counseling, psychotherapy, narrative, script, mental states*

Searle's view of weak intentionality of mental states

John Searle usefully defines the intentionality of the mind as a general directedness of mental states. Most mental states, Searle says, are intentional not in the sense that they are related to our intentions to do something, but in the sense that they are *about* the world or *concern* the world. Mental states generally tend to have a reference outside the mind, although some, admittedly, are self-referential (Searle, 1983).

According to Searle there are, however, non-intentional mental states such as elation, depression or anxiety, which appear to be „about nothing“. Waking up in the morning and feeling a generalized sense of anxiety is a reference-less mental state on this account, while feeling anxiety about the impending surgery is an intentional mental state. Both instances of anxiety might be characterized by roughly the same emotional content, yet they are different types of anxiety judged by the presence or absence

of reference in the outside world (Searle, 1983: 2). The mental states that lack outside reference (i.e. non-intentional ones) are distinguished from intentional mental states by being experiences of themselves only (of the feelings that make up the anxiety, depression or euphoria), while intentional mental states are experiences of something outside themselves. This seemingly naïve distinction, which at the time of his writing Searle might have considered a mere remark on the obvious, is constitutive of the main topic of my argument here. The reason is that it generates serious methodological issues for psychiatry and encourages a highly undesirable, reductive understanding of mental disorders and their treatment.

In a nutshell, my issue with Searle's weak view of intentionality (most mental states tend to be intentional, but some are not) is that there are no sound *epistemic* grounds for this claim. A person suffering a depressive episode may not be aware that the depression is „about“ anything, or that it has a trigger either in the inner experience or in the outside world. It may seem generalized and unprovoked. Trivially, however, the fact that something seems a certain way does not mean that it is that way, especially when this concerns the relationship between mental states and outside events. One may be depressed „about“ the general meaninglessness of one's life and a lack of satisfaction or challenge that has become so familiar that one no longer perceives the clear reference in what appears to be a generalized depression „of itself“. Still, this does not make the depression unintentional: all it makes it appear unintentional to the sufferer. The experience of the sufferer may initially be that of the content of the depression alone, however if pending successful counseling the counselee discovers that the depression was in fact about the general meaninglessness of her life, the experience will become one of depression due to the meaninglessness of her life, not just of depression of its own. Experiences are not only the *prima facie* mental states, but also cognitively informed *meanings* attached to those states. These meanings often include an understanding of the causes of the mental states as integral parts of the experiences associated with such states. The fact that the person may not be aware of the meaning (of which reference is a part) of their mental states does not entail that such meanings do not exist.

On the other hand, a person suffering „blues“ because of a romantic break-up accompanied by feelings of intense longing for the lost lover will most likely have a distinct depressive experience „of“ the loss she suffered. The two cases may or may not be different types of depression, depending on whether the mental states are actually intentional or not, for which, in Searle, we have no epistemic account at all.

There are many well researched reasons for the blurring of reference in cognitive and emotional states. Notoriously, victims of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) often blame themselves for their ordeal and suffer protracted periods of depression years after the event where the content of their experience does not appear to refer to the traumatic event at all. Fear and uncertainty often manifest themselves in „psycho-somatic“ disorders resulting from long stress that has a clear trigger of which the sufferer is entirely unaware. Various personality crises concerning „the meaning of life“ for which people seek counseling often have a seemingly unprovoked onset that, after counseling, proves to have been triggered by a specific dissatisfaction or failure. Examples of only seemingly reference-less states of mania, depression or anxiety are countless.

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This concludes the first point I wish to make here: Searle's weak view of intentionality of mental states is not epistemically sound. There is nothing to prevent us from assuming equally that all mental states are intentional, some obviously so, and some not so obviously. The latter view makes it possible to construe explanations of mental states, and by extension of mental disorders, based on what I will call a „strong ontology of referents“, namely events or values whose reality may exert such strong influence on the person that they determine her identity and the fundamental choices she makes to such an extent that, once obscured or blurred, they might precipitate madness. This strong ontology suggests the reality of the good and evil, and the reality of the person's autonomy to choose one or the other. In this sense, choosing good makes the person good; choosing evil makes the person evil. When the autonomy to make this choice is impaired, when a choice occurs outside the freedom the autonomy creates, or when circumstances blur the very distinction, this can warp the personal narrative so severely that the person becomes „mad“. Again, the point is almost trivial in moral philosophy, however in the reductionist psychiatry based on the DSM it is abstracted and represents a major methodological challenge to such psychiatry.

Narrative identity

According to Marya Schechtman and other „narrative theorists“, the constitution of a life-story which positions various important events within a single logical context of the past, present and future is the core of personal identity; it allows the formation of continuous self-perceptions and facilitates agency, so that the person is the author of her life (Schechtman, 1996). Disruptions to the personal narrative, or life-story, in times of trauma

or identity crises threaten self-understanding and can have a profound influence on our lives, including inducing mental illness.

Schechtman argues that narratives, in order to properly constitute the person's identity, must meet two key conditions: the articulation condition, and the reality condition. The articulation condition means that the narrative must be sufficiently comprehensible to others and able to explain important events in the person's life as parts of an „intelligible story“ (Schechtman, 1996: 114). The reality constraint means that the narrative must be coherent with the basic „observational facts and interpretative facts“ (Schechtman, 1996: 120). „This is because core to being a person is that we engage with other persons and as such we need to agree on the basic features of reality between us“ (Poltera, 2011: 68).

A narrative construction is not simply „story-telling“: it is a perspective through which we perceive our lives and define who we are, and it thus must be based on the truth of events and allow for a meaningful interpretation of the past and future plans in order to integrate the personality into an effective agent and „owner“ of one's life. Psychotherapy and counseling are often based on the narrative: once the damaged narrative is restored, ideally the person's sense of empowerment and functionality will return. At the same time, structures of the narrative are used in counseling to untangle missing references for many seemingly reference-less mental states. Experientially, psychology has arrived at interpretive tools such as compensation, denial or suppression that target precisely the sorts of emotional states that appear resilient to other types of treatment (such as drugs), and may be the result of an „unhinging“ of perceptions from their proper reference. Reconstructing the part of the narrative that is missing, blocked or damaged due to various perceptual, cognitive or emotional experiences or problems often re-establishes the basic „directedness“, or intentional reach-out of the mental state. Such re-connection to the referent has healing properties in psychotherapy and counseling and is widely accepted as a necessary complement even to pharmacological therapy for psychoses.

The usefulness of the narrative is in its ability to present mental states as *communicative states*. The pre-requisite for an effective communicative role of the narrative is *transparent meaning*: at least transparent to the person whose narrative it is. The narrative theory allows us to conceive of mental life as fundamentally communicative, and consequently, of mental issues as ones arising from a distorted or impaired ability to communicate with oneself and with others. The constraints that define a healthy

narrative are in fact the pre-requisites for effective communication both on the intra-psychic and on the interpersonal level. Schechtmann correctly identifies two such constraints: a basic consensus on what essential facts define the world that connects us, and a basic consistency and intelligibility of the narrative both within and the narrative and between the narrative and the salient facts of the world. There may be more such constraints, but when the mentioned two are not met, this makes up most official psychiatric diagnoses, from mild neuroses to deep psychoses.

DSM-based diagnosis: The skeptic way¹

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On first glance, the DSM-based diagnosis acknowledges the communicative issues arising from ruptured or warped narrative. It identifies a set of symptoms on various levels and „axes“ and provides an algorithm that allows the clinician to „calculate“ the diagnosis of mental disorder by simply keying in certain „mandatory“ and certain „optional“ symptoms and counting each. If the person has x mandatory and z optional symptoms, she is a bipolar, but if one has $x-1$ mandatory and $z+2$ optional she is a borderline. If, however, she has $x+1$ mandatory and $z+2$ optional she is a bipolar on one axis, and borderline on another axis. If she has $x+2$ and $z+3$ she is a bipolar on one axis, and a co-morbid borderline and histrionic personality disorder on another axis, and so on. Each algorithm carries specific prescriptions of treatment, which, seemingly curiously, tends to boil down to just a few generic antipsychotics and a few more mood-modifying drugs that are used across the board of most „distinct“ disorders. The discrimination is provided by rhetoric cautions that mention different dosing and a critical role played by „the experienced clinician“, however little substance is provided to either convince an informed reader that the classification correlates with any real illnesses, or that there are any real distinctions between many of them, at least on the

1 The discussion of the DSM here relates to its structure and symptomatic grasp of mental disorders. It is not focused on a particular version of the DSM. Although the future of the DSM now seems less certain than before due to the controversial descriptions of pathology in the DSM 5 (to enter clinical use in 2014), the philosophy of the DSM remains definitive of the way the psychiatric profession conceives of mental illness. The National Institute of Mental Health has rejected the DSM 5 in 2013, and this opens a clear cleavage within the mental health professions with regard to the usefulness and appropriateness of the entire DSM approach to diagnosis and treatment. The formulae given in this section do not correspond to any specific version of the DSM, but illustrate the general structure of the diagnosis, based on „ticking the boxes“ of „compulsory“ and „optional“ symptoms. The argument should thus not be taken as a detailed critique of a particular DSM, but rather as a principled critique of „DSM philosophy“ as a diagnostic approach of psychiatry.

level of the criteria. This general nature of the DSM is the reason for skepticism about its value as a tool to define and treat mental problems, however it is only a description of what the DSM is here, and is not the primary objection I wish to direct at DSM-inspired psychiatry. Even if the DSM's classification and method were much more discriminating and precise, the objection I wish to level at it here would hold.

The objection is the following: if epistemological skepticism is expressed in the thesis that „we have reason to doubt our knowledge of anything“, then the DSM is a skeptic instrument to interpret mental states. It provides enumerative diagnoses based on collections of mandatory and optional symptoms. The DSM psychiatry does not even consider the meaning of mental issues, nor does it even purport to understand mental states. It is a reductionist approach to mental health that takes mental phenomena at face value without looking for the ontology or the story behind them.

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Psychiatrists Thomas Lewis, Fari Amini and Richard Lennan have correctly pointed it out that throughout the 20th century the popular saying was that „neurotics build castles in the air, psychotics live in them, and psychiatrists collect the rent“, however it is precisely the psychiatrists and psychologists who spend their time in a castle of theory suspended in the air above nothing (Lewis *et al.*: 15). DSM psychiatry believes that it has explained madness by classifying it into diagnoses based on appearances. Just as Bertrand Russell remarked, man is a gullible animal and must believe in something; if one does not have good reasons for such belief, one will believe for bad reasons (as per Lewis *et al.*: 17). Instead of seeking to establish whether there are „hard realities“ (events and values) that madness is about (other than neurophysiology, which is no more the ontological reference of madness than the mechanics of a car's engine is the ontological reference of travel), the DSM, in a characteristic reductionist way, does away with intentionality in favour of a seemingly practical functionalism based on collections of symptoms. This turns the quest for the understanding of potential issues of personal identity behind madness into a mere instrumental skill-base for managers of mood and cognition who use drugs. The two vocations are very different indeed, even though, due to the prevalence of psychiatry in the public discourse about madness in the last century, we have become accustomed to this reductionist shift from knowledge to ideology.

The main problem of DSM-inspired psychiatry is, in a sense, in its Searlian reductionism in taking the characteristics of mental states at face value, while forgoing the greater intellectual effort to understand the personal

narrative that manifests itself in madness and to relate this understanding to the „big“ issues that determine the nature of the persons we are. DSM psychiatry does not ask about reasons for madness, nor does it ask moral questions about the kind of person one is: it shies away from viewing persons in moral terms, medicalising instead many moral concepts and choices. This was well expressed by a psychiatrist whose work with divorcing couples I was able to follow: „There are no behavior standards in human relationships; there is no good and no evil. Such distinctions are for priests. In real life, everything is allowed.“ This statement was made as a matter-of-fact one, in a counseling session dealing with high moral stakes.

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While perhaps more experienced and cautious psychiatrists would avoid making such flagrant nihilistic remarks about the big moral issues involved in personal circles, DSM psychiatry is in fact morally nihilistic in the way well reflected by this unfortunate therapist. Its nihilism arises from its attempt to treat reactions to, or consequences of, morally bad choices as self-sufficient phenomena, and to invent non-moral names even for the most ordinary cases of immoral character. A good example of this ideology of superficiality is the DSM-inspired representation of „personality disorders“, which is entirely functionalist in nature. It is well summed up by James Morrison in his practical handbook for psychiatrists to use the DSM IV:

„All humans (and numerous other species as well) have *personality traits*. These are well-ingrained ways in which individuals experience, interact with, and think about everything that goes on around them. Personality disorders are collections of traits that have become rigid and work to individuals“ disadvantage, to the point that they impair functioning or cause distress. DSM-IV personality disorders are all patterns of behavior and thinking that have been present since early adult life and have been recognizable in the patient for a long time. Personality disorders are probably *dimensional, not categorical*. This means that their components (traits) are present in normal people, but are accentuated in those with the disorders in question (Morrison, 2006: 460–461).

Given all the descriptive and conditional statements included in this characterization of personality disorders, the absence of a strong ontology of reference is quite conspicuous. The diagnosis of disorder morally neutralizes bad personality traits: it carefully circumvents the distinction between the ontologically strong „good“ and „evil“, and allows us to elegantly avoid the question of whether there are people who are simply of bad character, who are attracted to evil rather than the good, who are ill-tempered and unfriendly: in other words, people who make others unhappy.

Throughout human history the distinction between the good and evil marked character evaluations: along with the saints, there were deliberate and habitual sinners; along with heroes – the traitors, along with exemplary spouses, there were cheats and manipulators, and along with sages there were unreflective and reckless people. The very distinction marks the basic structure of moral autonomy: one is able to choose between the good and evil in most situations; some people will chose the good, the others will opt for the evil. Does the latter choice make them ill or „personally disordered“? And if so, what does this do for moral autonomy?

The medicalisation of madness is the easiest to criticize in personality disorders, because they are just so poorly described in the DSM and are treated with such obvious arbitrariness. In most cases it is entirely sufficient for someone to exhibit „bad“ personality traits and make evil choices „from early adulthood“ to be diagnosed with a personality disorder, depending on the specific nature of the „badness“ of character that one chooses (or acquires). However the deeper philosophical failure of DSM psychiatry here is the same as with its interpretation of mental states generally: although psychological theories ascribe a degree of freedom of choice to people who develop various mental health problems, the general approach to such problems after their onset is to deprive them of reference and, by extension, of intentionality, and „manage“ them as self-sufficient phenomena.

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Transactional analysis, for example, insists that a young child „decides“ to adopt a certain „life script“ in response to certain typical situations that the child encounters, although such reaction is by no means necessary, and not all children will adopt the same script. The outcomes that the script may lead to and often do include madness or suicide at a later stage in life. Regardless of the epistemological foundations of such claims (or the similar yet even more epistemologically problematic claims of psychoanalysis), which, upon careful analysis, turn out to presume everything and prove nothing, the assumption of freedom of choice is built into the foundations of most psychological theories of the origin of madness. This freedom is cancelled out by the DSM-based diagnosis and treatment: even the psychotherapy that is administered after a DSM diagnosis tends to be manipulative rather than truly discursive, and treats the „patient“ as a means, and not as an end in oneself: it completely cancels out the presumption of autonomy. In its reductionism, the DSM psychiatry thus militates even against the psychological theories that parented it as a discipline.

The DSM-based approach is cognitively self-limiting and philosophically skeptical, because its methodology does not envision the possibility of understanding madness or mental states in general as meaningful and based on a set of hard realities (including the big values) of life that the illness might be a conceptualization or projection of, or a reaction to. The DSM does not deny such hard realities or the intentionality of madness as such; it merely assumes that there is no way of knowing or proving such intentionality, and therefore, in the standard skeptic manner, reduces the concept of madness to collections of symptoms; correspondingly it reduces healing madness to the management of symptoms.

The perspective of therapeutic personality enhancement

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Just as a person is more than a collection of character traits, so a mental state is more than a set of its symptoms. There seems to be little principled argument against the idea that healing madness, if it was possible, would have to include healing the person rather than managing the symptoms; however the skeptic approach taken by western psychiatry nicely converges with Searle's (and others') reductionist view of mental states as either intentional or unintentional depending on whether they have an *obvious* referent outside the immediate experience itself. Contrary to this approach to mental life, the narrative theory acknowledges the possibility (and likelihood) that all mental states could have an essential reference and might thus be essentially intentional, whether this is obvious (as it is in examples given for intentional mental states by Searle), or less so (the extreme being many cases of madness). The narrative theory is cognitively optimistic, and envisions the possibility of addressing mental issues at their root by seeking to understand its intentionality. It does not deny the neurophysiological aspects of madness, nor does it claim, in its mainstream form, that psychiatric treatment is not necessary. To the contrary, psychiatric treatment is absolutely necessary for most mental health patients, however it is not sufficient either to understand, or to heal mental problems; it supervenes, as it were, on a more fundamental and more holistic view of the person, the suffering and the spirit involved in and affected by mental disorders.

For all of the above reasons, it seems to me that curing mental illness is inseparable from personality enhancement. In fact, nothing short of working on repairing the narrative, with the concomitant full recognition of its missing reference and a comprehension of the intentionality of mental

life as a whole, may amount to curing madness, no more than mere cardiac surgery to by-pass the blocked blood vessel is sufficient for achieving holistic vascular health. The phrase „therapeutic personality enhancement“ thus seems warranted; it is capable of integrative psychopharmacological intervention, when necessary (and admittedly it is often necessary), the managerial approach to mental health that characterizes psychiatry, and the deeper and further-reaching methodology of work on personality enhancement through repairs and enrichment of the life narrative, or personal identity. In this perspective, madness is a problem of identity and autonomy, both of which are closely inter-related.

Counseling and psychotherapy are geared to improving the quality of life by enhancing the strength of personality and helping people adapt their value systems and emotional reactions to the reality that they share with important others. Philosophical counseling in particular can help people „appraise the pragmatism of their personal values and sentiments, and thereby help to buffer them against their emotional whims. This model is not 'therapeutic' in the sense of healing mental illness, but it aims to improve the quality of life“ (Brown, 2010: 112). Some philosophical counselors, such as Peter Raabe, go a step further and argue that philosophical counseling is a form of therapy even from clients suffering from serious mental disturbances: „(...) philosophical counseling is an attempt to both understand and alleviate the suffering of another human being“ (Raabe, 2002: 98). Raabe in fact goes as far as saying that psychiatric diagnoses are more or less arbitrary labels, and that psychotropic medication generally does not work, saying specifically that „it is a placebo“ (Raabe, 2009: 95–97). Whatever the merits of those arguments, clearly counseling in all its forms is aimed at facilitating the human flourishing by removing anguish and emotional problems via facilitating the acquisition of explanatory insights.

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Conclusion

Searle's selective intentionality thesis addresses mental states in healthy people, and suggests that there are reference-less „elation anxiety or depression“ just as there are elation, anxiety and depression that are clearly intentional. The rich experience of psychotherapy and counseling in their various forms shows that in many cases of seemingly unintentional mental states in healthy people the uncovering of a reference, and thus the restoration of the sense of intentionality of these states, has led to personality and/or mood improvement. Thus, it seems, there is no more

reason for the selective intentionality thesis than there is for a „full intentionality thesis“, namely the thesis that all mental states at least in healthy people are intentional. Arguing this does not prevent us from allowing, unlike Raabe, that there is indeed genuine mental illness which requires medication, without prejudicing the claim that the mental states of mentally ill people may also be universally intentional, though admittedly more severely obscured than those of mentally healthy individuals. This idea seems supported by the experiential fact that mental illness is often precipitated by „triggers“: many mentally ill people appear (and perhaps are) „normal“ for much of the time; only in certain particularly provocative situations (provocative for them, not necessarily to be seen as such by others) does their illness flare up and they exhibit clear signs of mental disorder. This would suggest that their mental life is also fully intentional, directed to and concerned about the external world, namely that it crucially strives towards an ontologically strong referent. If so, their illness might largely arise from the denial of transparent reference. This obscurity might block the self-communication power of the personal narrative thus threatening their sense of identity and, consequently, disrupting their mood and ability to govern themselves so severely that they enter the realm labeled „madness“. By extension, they enter the management game of DSM psychiatry which, by its reductionist myopia and lack of interpretative courage, promises to treat their symptoms as „reference-less“, non-intentional mental events whose ontology does not go beyond the chemical, electrical or anatomical realities of their brains.

Primljeno: 22. februara 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 20. aprila 2014.

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Aleksandar Fatić

Intencionalnost mentalne bolesti: kognitivna pitanja
u psihijatrijskoj dijagnozi zasnovanoj na DSM standardu

Apstrakt

U tekstu se razmatra selektivno shvatanje intencionalnosti svesti koje je predložio Džon Serl (John Searle) u kontekstu problema narušavanja ličnog identiteta koje se dešava pri mentalnom oboljevanju. Autor kritikuje Serlovo shvatanje da je intencionalnost karakteristika nekih, ali ne i svih mentalnih stanja; ta kritika je zasnovana kako na principijelnim, tako i na empirijskim razlozima. U tekstu se potom detaljnije razmatra mera u kojoj narativna teorija identiteta, kakvu su predložili Pol Riker (Paul Ricoeur), Marija Schechtman (Marya Schechtman) i drugi može da podrži jedno generalizovano shvatanje intencionalnosti koje bi sva mentalna stanja opisalo kao intencionalna. Autor potom ukratko razmatra način na koji moderna psihijatrijska dijagnostika i terapija, koje su zasnovane na američkom Dijagnostičkom i statističkom priručniku (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual – DSM), reduktivistički i mehanicistički, odbacuju ideju o „jakoj ontologiji“ mentalnih stanja. Reč je o ideji da mentalna stanja uvek na neki način „posežu“ za životnim događajima i vrednostima ili upućuju na njih, bez obzira na to što neka takva stanja, površinski posmatrano, izgledaju lišena reference. U tekstu se zaključuje da je u opisanom smislu „DSM psihijatrija“ zasnovana na serlovskom shvatanju mentalnih stanja. To shvatanje je u suprotnosti sa narativnom

teorijom ličnosti (a time i mentalnih stanja) koja, umesto da definiše mentalnu bolest ili ludilo upućivanjem na grozdove simptoma, nastoji da razume skrivenu ontologiju reference poremećenih stanja svesti. Narativna teorija to čini posmatrajući inicijalni „skript“ ili predložak životnog narativa ličnosti, tragajući za oštećenjima, „rupama“ i čvorovima u narativu koji mogu biti uzrok nastupanja mentalne bolesti. Konačno, autor razmatra i procenjuje perspektivu poboljšanja ličnosti putem savetovanja koje je usmereno na popravku ili „krpljenje“ ličnog narativa.

Ključne reči: Intencionalnost, poboljšanje ličnosti, savetovanje, psihoterapija, narativ, skript, mentalna stanja

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Discursive Institutionalism and Institutional Change

Abstract *This paper outlines relevant aspects of institutional theory in social sciences and gives a more detailed overview of the New Institutionalist approaches. Moreover, the paper explores Discursive Institutionalism, one of the newest theoretical approaches to institutions, and discusses its application in empirical research. The aim of the article is to bring this innovative theoretical framework closer to the academic community and practitioners who are interested in exploring public debates in interaction with institutions.*

Keywords: *institutional theory, Discursive Institutionalism, Vivien Schmidt*

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Introduction

This study offers an overview of institutional theory in social sciences and illustrates the change in studying institutions over time. The article starts with Old Institutionalism, which focuses on structural elements in institutional change, and continues by examining the behaviourist approaches and maximisation of individual's self-interest as an explanation of institutional change. The article elaborates in more detail the New Institutionalist approaches, their basic assumptions and inter-connectedness.

The main focus of this article, however, is the newest approach to the study of institutions and the one of the New Institutionalisms with the strongest focus on policy change – Discursive Institutionalism (DI). This theory proposes that public discourse, in its formulation of idea and the communication of that idea, has a potential to influence public policy. The aim of the article is to invite researchers and practitioners, studying discourse and institutions, to consider this theoretical tool and contribute to its development.

The topic will be discussed in two main sections. The article, first, gives general background of institutional theory by the mid-1960s and discusses the approaches within New Institutionalism. In the second part, the article focuses on Discursive Institutionalism, its explanation of institutional change and methodological limitations of the theory.

Institutional Theory

The role of institutions in shaping political and social life is the main focus of institutional theory. In order to distinguish institutions from other forms

of human organisation, institutions are defined within this approach as formal and informal structures with stability over time and the ability to adapt (Peters 2012: 19). Individuals, who are affiliated to institutions, can make an impact on these institutions by promoting certain values and meanings, or by imposing rules and incentives. On the other hand, institutions transcend the individual, which implies that individual behaviour is, to a certain extent, predictable. Institutions can be differentiated according to the degree of formalization, the degree to which they are collectively binding, whether they are 'self-reinforcing' or require intervention by some sort of meta-institution. As for their function, institutions are conceptualised, in institutional theory, as mediators and regulators of human liberation – both from social bonds and from constraints of nature.

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Research on politics between the mid-nineteenth and the mid-twentieth century was mainly focused on political, legal and administrative structures; and political studies were identified by an analysis of institutions (Lowndes 2013: 22–28; Peters 2012: 6; Lowndes 2002: 90). This approach, known as Old Institutionalism, had several distinctive features. For instance, the view that law and the role of the law in governance have priority in political analysis, as law dominates individual behaviour. Moreover, prominent persons, or the Great Men of history, can make significant impact on institutions (Peters 2012: 3–11). The formation, design and change of institutional settings were considered strictly related to the history of a society. Therefore, the Old Institutionalists argued that the development of a system could be predicted if analysts identified the most important features of the structure (Peters 2012: 8). Moreover, Old Institutionalism was a normative theory as, from an analytical point of view, it did not address facts and values separately, that is to say the legal framework and the system of values, but rather they were approached as a whole.

By the 1950s, Old Institutionalism had been pushed into the background by approaches based on behaviouralism and rational-choice theory. The former relates to social-psychological assumptions about individual behaviour, while the latter assumes that an individual action is the result of cost-benefit calculation with the goal of maximising self-interest. The shift of focus onto individual behaviour emerged as a reaction to Old Institutionalism and its limitations, which include an over-emphasised importance placed on structure. Moreover, amongst other drawbacks, Old Institutionalism under-analysed the role of individual behaviour in collective action and decision-making; Old Institutionalism involved certain methodological limitations, and the nature of the approach was more descriptive than analytical (Peters 2012: 3).

Behaviourist approaches tended to address 'facts' separately from values in order to reduce the normative aspects of the theory to a minimum. Moreover, the main argument of the behaviourist approach is that certain factors, such as self-interest and utility, maximisation-oriented decision-making, condition human behaviour regardless of the institutional setting and the socio-historical context in which decisions are being made. As far as political analysis is concerned, these assumptions led to the general conclusion that individual behaviour is exogenous to the political process (Peters 2012: 12–16).

The shift from structural assumptions to an individualistic approach in political analysis had significant implications on methodology. Rational choice and behaviourist approaches required new methods of research, which would enable micro-level analysis and the quantification of individual behaviour. Moreover, there was a need for the development of theoretical frameworks, which would make the analysis of politics closer to the research being undertaken in natural sciences.

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In the late 1960s, as a reaction to the limitations of the behaviourist and rational choice approaches to politics, such as methodological individualism and concerns with theory development and anti-normative bias (Peters 2012: 12–16), Institutionalism re-emerged in a new form. Guy B. Peters points out: „The new institutionalism grew up not so much merely to reassert some of the virtues of the old form of analysis but more to make a statement about the perceived failings of what had come to be the conventional wisdom of political science“ (Peters 2012: 11). The era of New Institutionalism began with the seminal work of James March and Johan Olsen (1984) and other literature that focused on bringing institutions back into political research (Almond 1988).

New Institutionalism

The assumption of New Institutionalism is that, as Lowndes posits, „institutions do not necessarily 'fit' together to form a whole, or represent functionally desirable solutions“ (Lowndes 2002: 100). Therefore, New Institutionalism analyses institutions as disaggregated concepts – not holistic ones – and focuses on their components, such as electoral systems, immigration policy or international relations. Moreover, institutions have internal norms and values that facilitate power relations within them by favouring some solutions over others or including some actors and excluding others. New Institutionalists do not observe institutions in a vacuum, outside of time and space. They argue that institutions are embedded in a particular context, either in the historical background or in the system of structural constraints and incentives. The common ground between the

different approaches of New Institutionalism is the argument that individual behaviour is relevant for political analysis and that this behaviour can have a significant impact on institutions. However, they also agree that the action of individuals takes place within an institutional framework – regardless of the differences in defining institutions – that shapes or facilitates their action.

There are several analytical continua along which New Institutionalism shifted the focus in political research and ensured a wider and more dynamic analytical framework compared to the Old Institutionalism (Lowndes 2002: 97). First, New Institutionalism changes the concept of institutions by introducing both rules and behaviour into the definition. Instead of being understood only as formal organisations, institutions are viewed as a „stable recurring pattern of behaviour“ (Goodin and Klingemann 1996: 22).

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Secondly, Lowndes emphasises the dynamic element in the conceptualisation of institutions that results from the shifting of focus from a one-way influence of institutions on individuals to the interaction between institutions and individuals. These novelties are mostly developed by the approaches within the rational choice wing of the New Institutionalism. Lastly, New Institutionalism questions the neutrality of the embedded institutional values and argues that values are contested concepts in constant change. Their perceived neutrality, according to Lowndes (2002), comes from the theoretical assumptions of Old Institutionalism that values are fixed, embedded and shaped.

The diversity of approaches within New Institutionalism brought about a debate concerning the distinctiveness of these streams of thought. The number of approaches varies depending on the analyst's position concerning the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the approaches within New Institutionalism. While March and Olsen (1984) considered New Institutionalism using a single approach, Peter A. Hall and Rosemary Taylor (1996) differentiated from this position suggesting three approaches. In the latest edition of his seminal book, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism* (2012), Guy Peters offers an analysis of seven new institutional approaches. Lowndes and Robert, in their recent publication *Why Institutions Matter* (2013) identify nine subtypes (2013: 31). Based on the current literature, however, it is reasonable to argue that New Institutionalism includes more than ten theoretical sub-approaches, which are Historical Institutionalism, Rational Choice Institutionalism, Sociological Institutionalism, Normative Institutionalism, Empirical Institutionalism, International Institutionalism, Network

Institutionalism, Actor-oriented Institutionalism, Constructivist Institutionalism, Discursive Institutionalism and Feminist Institutionalism.

The approaches within New Institutionalism can be grouped around two positions in relation to their positivist or constructivist nature (Hall and Taylor 1996: 940–941). On the positivist side, there are calculus-oriented approaches including Rational Choice Institutionalism, Actor-oriented Institutionalism, and certain approaches within Empirical Institutionalism. On the constructivist side, there are culture-based approaches, such as Sociological Institutionalism, which is focused on „values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs“ (March and Olsen 1989: 17), as well as Normative, Feminist, Constructivist and Discursive Institutionalism. The classification is less straightforward when it comes to Historical Institutionalism, since a part of this literature is close to rational-choice theory (Immergut 1992; Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005), while other studies come from the culturalist tradition (Katzenstein 1996; Dobbin 1994). International Institutionalism and Network Institutionalism also develop in two directions, and explain behaviour both as norm-governed and strategic.

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Another debate concerning New Institutionalism is to what extent the approaches are distinctive and incompatible, or would these approaches benefit from cross-fertilisation. Hall and Taylor (1996) argue that New Institutionalism would benefit from intellectual borrowings if institutionalist scholars renounced their most extreme positions at the positivist-constructivist spectrum. Knill and Lenschow (1999) argue the opposite: the different streams of thought within New Institutionalism can benefit precisely from the fact that their differences are unbridgeable. Current literature views New Institutionalism as a multi-theoretical approach (Peters 2012; Lowndes 2002) within which the different approaches can benefit from each other, if the links between them grow stronger and become more relevant than the links which bind the approaches to the traditions from which they are derived (Schmidt 2008).

Further to this point, Lowndes (2013) argues that the New Institutionalisms are currently in a state of convergence, as researchers do not focus exclusively on one of the dimensions of institutions. Instead, according to Lowndes, institutions are increasingly viewed as structures which are organised by rules, practices and narratives at the same time. As the studies are problem-oriented, the sub-types of institutional theory can be used instrumentally, according to their ability to offer insight into the studied problem. The following table outlines characteristics of the three types of institutional constraints in relation to political analysis:

	Rules	Practices	Narratives
How we recognize them	Formally constructed and recorded	Demonstrated through conduct	Expressed through the spoken word
Empirical examples	Clauses in a constitution, terms of reference, national and international laws	How elected members conduct themselves in parliaments, assemblies, or local councils	Speeches by politicians explaining the need for change; the collections of stories in an organization which justify the status quo
Enactment by actors through	Writing and formal interpretation – e.g. law to policy documents to guidance	The consistent rehearsal of „the ways in which we do things around there“	The linking together and spoken expression of ideas in to explanation and persuasion
Impact on actors through	Reading representations and interpretations of rules (e.g. speed limit signs, procedure manuals)	Observing the routinized actions of members of the group and seeking to recreate those actions	Hearing familiar stories and recognizing shared understandings to the point where the normative implications are taken for granted
Sanctioned by	Coercive action through formal rewards and punishment	Displays of disapproval, social isolation, and threats of violence	Incomprehension and ridicule, and attempts to undermine the reputation and credibility of non-conformists
Interconnections between modes	Narratives are often used to justify the existence of rules; rules often formalize well-established practices	Practices often form the basis of narrative; rules may specify the practices through which actors must enact the rules	The case for changing the rules is usually made in narrative form; narrative accounts can present prevalent practices in a positive or negative light
Indicative research methodologies	Documentary analysis, laboratory studies including the use of games, mathematical modelling	Observation of conduct in formal meetings and behind the scenes, ethnographic approaches	Interviewing actors and recording their stories, seeking verbalized explanations for policies, narrative analysis of speeches and interviews

Table 1. Modes of Institutional Constraint: Key Characteristics (Lowndes 2013: 52–53)

New Institutionalism and Ideas

The ability of New Institutionalism to empirically explore institutional impact on political behaviour became increasingly challenged over the past decade (Przeworski 2004). The shift of focus in New Institutionalism towards the topic of ideas and ideational processes is often explained as a reaction to the limitations of other new institutionalist approaches to analyse change and to assess the impact of institutions on politics. This change was named differently, as the „ideational turn“ by Blyth (2002), or as constructivist institutionalism by Hay (2006) and as strategic constructivism by Jabko (2006). The name Discursive Institutionalism (Campbell and Pedersen 2001) was adopted by Vivien Schmidt (2010a, 2008) who gathered these streams of thought in one theoretical approach. According to Schmidt, „the turn to ideas undermines the basic premises of the older institutionalisms, i.e. that institutions are in stable equilibria, with fixed rationalist preferences (RI) [Rational Choice Institutionalism], self-reinforcing historical paths (HI) [Historical Institutionalism], or all-defining cultural norms (SI) [Sociological Institutionalism]“ (Schmidt 2008: 304).

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In rational-choice theory, ideas are mainly viewed as instrumental and as a result of interests, which are separable from ideas. With the ideational shift, rational choice theory became more inclined to see ideas as an important factor in political decision-making, even though only as incentives in the interest-maximisation calculation. The group of approaches around Sociological Institutionalism, such as the Normative, Feminist and Constructivist, have always considered that ideas and norms frame action. However, from this perspective, ideas are viewed as socially-constructed static structures (Schmidt 2010a: 320). Historical Institutionalism, in its non-ideational tradition, acknowledges the importance of ideas in institutional change, but only to a certain extent. For instance, when strong institutional obstacles or the lack of appropriate framing resources hamper political actors from promoting alternative policies, ideational processes appear to be a useful tool in influencing policy change.

On the other hand, the ideational side of Historical Institutionalism argues (Béland 2009) that ideas – defined by Parsons as „claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions“ (Parsons 2002: 48) – are relevant to the process of policy-making as much as the institutional legacy. Moreover, Béland

(2009: 703) identifies three ways in which ideas can influence institutional change. First, ideas are instrumental in defining a problem as a priority in the policy-making process. Secondly, ideas can shape the content of the policy that addresses the problem. Lastly, ideas underlie strategies, which political actors use in order to ensure public support for their policies. Therefore, ideas, when developed into a discourse, can facilitate change by influencing public opinion and convincing interest groups, and the public, that policy change is or is not necessary (Blyth 2002: 4; Schmidt 2002).

Discursive Institutionalism

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Discursive Institutionalism (DI) embraces approaches to discourse from various perspectives, and with different ontological and epistemological assumptions. The comparison between DI and other new institutionalisms reveals differences concerning the conceptualisation of agency and institutional change. Historical Institutionalism stresses structure more than agency, and when it comes to explaining agency, Historical Institutionalism turns either to Rational Choice Institutionalism or Sociological Institutionalism. These two, however, offer a static and equilibrium-focused explanation of agency. On the other hand, Rational Choice Institutionalism argues that ideational processes are a useful explanation for change only when the primary explanation related to objective or material interests proves to be inefficient (Goldstein and Koehn 1993). As a response to that view, Boudon (2003) argues that rationality should not be understood as instrumental, but as cognitive, while actions should be explained in terms of their meaning to the actor, instead of being viewed as a result of interest-based decision-making. This view suggests that interests are inseparable from ideas, and both are subjective. Discursive Institutionalists, as Schmidt points out, analytically separate material interests into material reality and interests and „take the actual responses to material reality as their subject of inquiry“ (Schmidt 2010b).

According to Schmidt and Radaelli, DI „helps to overcome the structure-agency divide and, thereby, to explain the dynamics of change by lending insight into how actors in different institutional contexts with new ideas may overcome entrenched interests, institutional obstacles and cultural impediments to change“ (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004: 207). DI explores institutional change by focusing on institutions, interests and norms from the perspective of discourse.

There are several common elements in research on institutions from the discursive perspective. Firstly, institutions are primarily concerned with ideas, in comparison to other approaches, which are primarily concerned with interests, values or institutional performance. Secondly, these elements analyse ideas within an institutional setting and emphasise the relevance of social, political and historical context on the formation and development of discourse. Thirdly, DI does not assume that discourse is the only dimension of political life, but that discourse should be taken into account, together with structural constraints, in the analysis of politics. Lastly, the discursive institutionalists give weight to the logic of communication and the interactive process of conveying ideas, which gives dynamic to their explanation of institutional change.

As for research interests, discursive institutionalists are concerned with a wide range of topics, different contexts and different levels of discourse analysis. As Schmidt explains, the difference that lies between discursive institutionalists is in „the kinds of questions they ask and the problems they seek to resolve, which tend to come from the institutionalist tradition(s) with which they engage“ (Schmidt 2008: 304). It is possible, however, to identify the common key issues that discursive institutionalists are currently focused on. The main debates are related to the relationship between ideas and political action, strategies of public persuasion, the importance of deliberation for political legitimacy and the concept of change in history and culture (Schmidt 2008: 305).

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Schmidt insists on the same epistemological status of discourse analysis as the other new institutional approaches have (Schmidt 2010a: 47). However, she explains that DI does not stand in opposition to or independently from other new institutional approaches. Instead, as Schmidt notes, „discourse institutionalism offers a framework within which to theorize about how and when ideas in discursive interactions may enable actors to overcome constraints that explanations in terms of interests, path dependence, and/or culture present as overwhelming impediments to action“ (Schmidt 2006: 5). Thus, with its inclusive and eclectic nature, DI can significantly contribute to reconciliation between the new institutionalist approaches and help bridge the division between the positivist and constructivist views on discourse.

The following table, by Vivien Schmidt (2011a: 5), summarises the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the approaches which theorists consider the three main stands within New Institutionalism.

	Rational Choice Institutionalism	Historical Institutionalism	Sociological Institutionalism	Discursive Institutionalism
Object of explanation	Behaviour of rational actors	Structures and practices	Norms and culture of social agents	Ideas and discourse of sentient agents
Logic of explanation	Calculation	Path-dependency	Appropriateness	Communication
Definition of institution	Incentive structures	Macro-historical structures and regularities	Cultural norms and frames	Meaning structures and constructs
Approach to change	Static-continuity through fixed preferences [...]	Static-continuity through path dependency interrupted by critical junctures	Static-continuity through cultural norms and rules	Dynamic-change (and continuity) through ideas and discursive interaction
Explanation of change	Exogenous shock	Exogenous shock	Exogenous shock	Endogenous process through background ideational and foreground discursive abilities
Recent innovations to explain change	Endogenous ascription of interest shifts through RI political coalitions or HI self-reinforcing or self-undermining processes	Endogenous description of incremental change through layering, drift, conversion	Endogenous construction (merge with DI)	Endogenous construction through reframing, recasting collective memories and narratives through epistemic communities, advocacy coalitions, communicative action, deliberative democracy

Table 2. The four New Institutionalisms (Schmidt 2011a: 5)

Discursive Institutionalism: key concepts

The basic proposition of Discursive Institutionalism is that institutions are defined by ideas, which members of the institution put forward in public debates. According to DI, institutions are defined by ideas and the ways these ideas are communicated by individuals. This conceptualisation of structure/agency is new to institutional theory, as ideas are inherent to individuals and to exogenous elements such as norms, values or interests. Therefore, according to DI, institutional change can be triggered by any member of an institution, depending on the power of their discourse to put forward their ideas. Moreover, this implies that, besides the structure/agency dichotomy, DI brings a novel approach to the nature of ideas as endogenous and inherent to individuals.

Moreover, DI conceptualises the institution both as fixed and contingent, which makes the idea of an institution less structural than in other approaches within institutional theory. Institutions are changing and becoming, through the process of communication of ideas, which makes them fixed and contingent at the same time. In order to understand the principle of institutional change in DI, it is necessary to understand institutions as a given environment in which political actors think, speak and act. At the same time, institutions are contingent on the thoughts, words and actions of actors. DI argues that institutions are structures, which constrain the action of actors working inside them, and which are, at the same time, created and changed by actors.

Schmidt (2002, 2006; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004) introduces the concept of discourse in political analysis and explains discourse's two-fold nature. Schmidt differentiates between *discourse as content*, which is „the substantive content of ideas“, and *discourse as process*, which involves „the interactive processes that serve to generate those ideas and communicate them to the public“ (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004: 197).

According to DI, ideas can be differentiated according to their content and the level of the generality as myths, programmes, narratives and so forth. As opposed to other new institutional approaches, DI offers a three-dimensional explanation of the concept of ideas. Firstly, in terms of their form, ideas can be myths, narratives, frames, memories and so forth. Secondly, ideas can be differentiated according to their level of generality as policies (that is, specific solutions to the problem put forward by policymakers), programmes (which contain and support individual policies) or paradigms and philosophies (which represent platforms based

on specific assumptions and organizing principles of knowledge and society according to which programmes and policies are being created and developed) (Mehta 2010).

DI conceptualises ideas both as interests and rational decision-making, which is in line with rational choice theory, and as values and appropriateness, such as in the cultural approach to institutions. On the one hand, *cognitive ideas* are practical guidelines for political action and represent a formalisation of the first two levels of ideas – policies and programmes. Cognitive ideas are expected to provide efficient solution to the problem and they are often based on scientific knowledge and rational explanations of the issue. On the other hand, *normative ideas* are based on values and aimed at legitimising policies and programmes by assessing their appropriateness.

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It is important to mention that, according to DI, institutions are not fixed formal structures, but are more open for debate (Peters 2012). Even though the formal structures are not excluded from analysis, they are secondary to the less structural forms of institutions. However, ideas and communication within institutions are not sufficient for institutional change to take place. Debates can be intensive and frequent; however, they can remain only what they are – debates (Peters 2012). Discursive Institutionalism aims at explaining why some discourses are more successful than others; or, why discourses are more successful in some countries and in other countries the same discourses fail. Therefore, this approach differentiates two spheres within which discourses are created and performed.

The *coordinative discourse* takes place in the sphere of policy and it has the role of coordinating ideas of political actors within the institutions regarding the policy. In the sphere of policy-making, *coordinative discourse* represents the way in which political actors create, elaborate and coordinate their action. Actors can have different roles in facilitating a change from being members of epistemic communities, to entrepreneurs and mediators. The other, *communicative discourse*, takes place in the sphere of politics, and its role is to communicate a coordinated idea to the public. This part of the framework has elements in common with the literature on agenda setting and framing, as the way an idea is communicated to the public can be crucial in securing legitimacy for a new policy. *Communicative discourse* is formalised between the policy sphere and the public sphere, and this type of discourse is the means that political actors use to present, deliberate and legitimise their ideas to the general public.

DI aims at exploring how political actors bring change to institutions. In creating and maintaining institutions, agents use their ability to make sense of the rational or ideational rules within a given setting, i.e. use their *background ideational abilities*. This concept had been previously elaborated by Bourdieu (1994), Habermas (1989) and Giddens (1984), who focused on how individuals create and develop ideas; they did not, however, analyse „the processes by which institutions change, which is a collective endeavor“ (Schmidt 2008: 315).

Therefore, Schmidt introduces a complementary concept of *foreground discursive abilities*, or the logic of communication which, as she explains „enables agents to think, speak and act outside their institutions even as they are inside them, to deliberate about institutional rules even as they use them, and to persuade one another to change those institutions or to maintain them“ (Schmidt 2008: 314). The concept of discursive abilities originates from the idea of communicative action (Habermas 1989, 1996) and the literature on discursive democracy (Dryzek 2000), which focused on breaking the monopoly of elites in national and supranational decision-making, and on ensuring wider access to the decision-making process (Schmidt 2008: 315).

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It is important to associate the studied discourse with specific political actors, since, in Berman's words, „ideas do not have any impact by themselves, as disembodied entities floating around in a polity“ (Berman 1998: 21). According to DI, the position of power in formal institutions is not necessary for the actors in order to bring change successfully. Instead, it is the strength of their arguments and the convincing communication of their ideas that empower the actors (Schmidt 2011b: 59; Peters 2012). Therefore, a discourse should be assessed with respect to coherency and consistency of its ideas, and the strength of its cognitive and normative arguments. The relevance of the ideas should be explored, as well as the timing and viability of policy solutions. The ideas can also be assessed regarding their appropriateness in terms of national values, tradition and culture (Schmidt 2008; Metha 2010). The analysis can explore whether the discourse reached consensus on relevant issues, as this can increase its transformative potential (Peters 2012: 158).

Methodological Limitations

According to Discursive Institutionalism, institutional change is possible every time when the actors in discourse voice their ideas and upset the equilibrium within an institution. A 'good institution', according to DI,

is open to new ideas, flexible and adaptable: „if discourse is good, than more discourse is better“ (Peters 2012: 156). Moreover, there is a type of institutional change within this theoretical approach named as *bricoleur* (Peterson 2012), when the policy solution is not based on an entirely new approach to the contested issue; instead, the existing ideas in the debate are combined and transformed into a decision. What is important in both cases, according to Peters, is that members of institutions with diverse and opposing views find a common ground. Identifying the common denominator increases the transformative potential of discourse and makes it more possible to bring change to the existing policy.

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However, DI lacks a comprehensive explanation of the process of institutional change (Lowndes 2013; Peters 2012). The theory needs further improvement regarding the explanation of causality in institutional change: how change occurs exactly, under what circumstances and when the outcome can be expected. According to Sheri Berman, these methodological challenges are due to the nature of ideas which are „vague, amorphous and constantly evolving [...] and never surrendered easily to empirical study or quantification“ (1998: 16). Berman also points out that all ideational theories face the same obstacle when it comes to their testing against the real-world environment: it is the difficulty to conceptualise ideas in such a way that they can be observed as „purely“ independent variables, separate from other influences in a given context and that their impact on political behaviour can be measured (Berman 1998: 15).

Moreover, Peters argues that DI defines an institution so widely and loosely that the institution cannot be clearly delineated from its environment. If anyone can join an institution, if there are no exogenous principles of hierarchy and organisations, then anything can constitute an institution, regardless of its organisation, level of formalisation and membership. Moreover, if ideas are inherent to individuals, and institutions are contingent for the communication of ideas by individuals, it is difficult to analyse or assess these elements separately. Due to these shortcomings, DI does not enable the formulation of a hypothesis which could be empirically tested with high degree of accuracy and reliability (Peters 2012: 154).

In order to overcome these limitations, an ideational theorist, according to Berman, should aim at examining „how different conditions enable certain ideas to take on a life of their own, influencing political behavior over an extended period of time. If this can be done [...] then the fact that its development was influenced by other factors is an analytically distinct subject that is only indirectly related to the ultimate outcomes being

explained“ (Berman 1998: 18). An increasing number of studies have been conducted with the aim of exploring the causal relationship between ideas and institutional change by using this ideational theory. For example, Sheri Berman used a process-tracing method to explore ideas which led to different policy solutions (Berman 2010, 1998); Vivien Schmidt observed matched pairs of country cases in which the impact of discourse on welfare adjustment was assessed, while other variables were controlled (Schmidt 2002).

Moreover, other studies observed the impact of discourse on political action through analysis of the speeches and debates of the political elites (Wincott 2011; Rich 2010; Dobbin 1994; Art 2006). A suitable method for measuring the impact of communicative discourse includes opinion polls and surveys, while coordinative discourse can be assessed through interviews and network analysis. This body of literature suggests that DI framework is being increasingly adapted in order to facilitate empirical studies of the causal relationship between ideas and political action. As Peters argues (2012), DI is an innovative approach aimed at introducing a substantially different conceptualisation of an institution. The innovative element of DI is the flexible and less structural conceptualisation of an institution. Therefore, Peters points out, it is important not to wrongly assess the new understanding of the concept by the old rules.

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Conclusions

This paper outlines the relevant aspects of institutional theory in social sciences and gives a more detailed overview of the New Institutionalist approaches. Moreover, the paper explores Discursive Institutionalism, one of the newest theoretical approaches to institutions, and discusses its application in empirical research. In sum, basic assumptions of Discursive Institutionalism is that debates concerning fundamentally important issues in a society have a potential to significantly influence institutional change in relevant areas. DI focuses primarily on the role of ideas in political processes and understands ideas as a constitutive part of the concept of discourse. DI also takes into consideration the role of individuals in the process of institutional change and views political actors as being conceptually intrinsic to the institutions within which and about which they think, act and talk. The concept of an institution within DI, as both a process and structure, as flexible and contingent, offers better insight into public debates related to contested political and social issues. Lastly, DI shares the multi-theoretical character of New

Institutionalism and includes a wide range of methodological approaches. Limitations of DI include the one common to other ideational theories, which is the lack of ability to conceptualise ideas in such a way that their nature and impact on political behaviour is suitable for empirical analysis. Therefore, DI lacks a comprehensive explanation of the causal mechanism concerning the transformation of ideas in public debates into public policy. What makes DI relevant, however, is its potential to develop in the future a more dynamic explanation of institutional change than other institutionalist approaches can offer.

Primljeno: 15. aprila 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 20. jula 2014.

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Marija Zurnić

Diskurzivni institucionalizam i institucionalne promene

Apstrakt

Rad razmatra najvažnije aspekte institucionalne teorije u društvenim naukama i detaljnije obrazlaže pristupe u okviru Novog institucionalizma. Osim toga, rad istražuje osnovne pretpostavke diskurzivnog institucionalizma, najnovijeg teorijskog pristupa institucijama, i razmatra primenu ove teorije u empirijskim istraživanjima. Cilj rada je da približi ovaj inovativni teorijski okvir akademskoj zajednici i stručnjacima, koji su zainteresovani za istraživanje javnih debata u interakciji sa institucijama.

Ključne reči: teorija institucionalizma, diskurzivni institucionalizam, Vivien Smit

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Platon, filosof i državnik

Apstrakt *Platon je pošao od sadržaja starohelenske običajnosti i nastojao da teorijskom refleksijom u filozofskoj formi reinterpretira ovaj sadržaj. Teoretizacijom, običajnost je ontologizovana, što se najbolje vidi u postavci o filosofu vladaru, koji upravlja savršenom državom. Međutim, uviđajući da vladaru nije dovoljno da bude samo filosof, dakle da poseduje samo teorijski uvid u suštinu stvari, iako to jeste nužan uslov, dolazi se do uvida da se mora problematizovati i praktično-delatna strana upravljača državom. Upravljanje kao praktična delatnost koja se ispoljava u iskustvu, mora voditi računa o običajnosti koja kao sabrano iskustvo potvrđuje istinitost državničkog umeća upravljanja. Krajnja svrha umeća državničkog tkanja je postizanje prave mere ispreplitanja u čvrsto i jedinstveno tkanje celokupne strukture države.*

Ključne reči: državnik, filosof, vrlina, običajnost, zakon, državničko tkanje

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Izvođenje značenja pojma državnik

Svoje filozofsko učenje Platon (Πλάτων) započeo je uzimajući za predmet pojam *arete* koji je izvorno pripadao tradicionalnoj običajnosti.¹ Međutim, filozofskom refleksijom običajnosti, zaključno sa izvođenjem idealnog polisa u *Državi*, ona je prevedena u ontologiju. Naravno, misli se na onaj deo običajnosti koji se mogao uklopiti unutar sistemskih pretpostavki Platonove ontologije. I tu se sada, posmatrano iz perspektive izvedene, ontologizovane savršene države, otvara značajno pitanje: da li je filozofsko poznavanje metafizičkog uzora dovoljan uslov da filosof preuzme mesto upravljača državom koje prvenstveno podrazumeva praktičnu delatnost? Naime, pokazuje se da je postavka iz *Države* o filosofu vladaru višeslojna i da je do sada tematizovana samo ona njena strana koja govori o filozofskom znanju i njegovim teorijskim aspektima. Može li se celokupno znanje koje podrazumeva ova postavka pridati filosofu, a vladaru ostaviti samo puka politička vlast? Platon dolazi do saznanja da je neophodno dalje razmatrati ono što je ostalo nerazlučeno u postavci iz *Države*. To zapravo znači da je potrebno da se pored značenja pojma filosof, izvede i previđeno značenje pojma državnik (πολιτικός), koje treba da osvetli praktično-delatnu stranu upravljača državom.

¹ Tekst je nastao u okviru projekta br. 179049 koji finansira Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije.

Pojavljivanje dijaloga *Državnik* treba posmatrati upravo u svetlu rešavanja ovog problema.² Već sam naslov govori da pojam „državnik“ ima na određen način zasebno značenje i da se ne može u potpunosti utopiti u pojam „filosof“ i poistovetiti s njim, kako to možda može da izgleda na osnovu postavke iz *Države*.³ Kad izuzmemo filozofsko utemeljenje državnika, ono što ostaje odmah asocira na praktično-delatnu sferu. A uzimanje u razmatranje delatne strane državnika otvara put povratku običajnosti, jer je politika kao delatnost, ukoliko se ona posmatra u realnom kontekstu a ne u nekoj apstraktnoj besadržajnosti, nerazdvojiva od običajnosti. Radi jasnijeg pregleda učešća običajnosti u Platonovom političkom učenju, može se naznačiti jedna uopštena shema: 1) Platon je pošao od sadržaja starohelenske običajnosti i nastojao da teorijskom refleksijom u filozofskoj formi reinterpretera ovaj sadržaj; 2) teoretizacijom, običajnost je ontologizovana, što se najbolje vidi u postavci o filozofu vladaru, koji upravlja savršenom državom; 3) uviđajući da vladaru nije dovoljno da bude samo filozof, dakle da poseduje samo teorijski uvid u suštinu stvari, iako to jeste nužan uslov, Platon dolazi do uvida da se mora problematizovati i praktično-delatna strana upravljača državom. Ovom tematizacijom Platon ponovo uvodi običajnost u političko učenje (up. Jeger 1991).

Pošto je filozofija kao uvid u metafizički uzor stvarnosti nužan uslov pojma „državnik“, onda se ova ontologizovana običajnost pojavljuje kao osnova svih daljih ispitivanja o državniku. Razmatranje pojma „državnik“ pretpostavlja filozofsku stranu državnika i mora biti saglasno postavljenoj ontološkoj strukturi. To znači da istraživanje delatnosti državnika treba da uzme u obzir običajnost koja je usled svoje sadržinske saglasnosti sa metafizičkim načelima teorijski preobražena, odnosno ontologizovana.

Za razliku od *Države* gde se filozof i vladar stapaju u jedno, dijalog *Državnik* za svoju glavnu temu ima razlikovanje ovih pojmova,⁴ odnosno izvođenje značenja pojma državnik. *Državnik* i započinje time što se kaže da će se posebno prikazati „lik državnika i filozofa“ (*Polit.* 257a).⁵ Naravno, ovo utvrđivanje značenja pojma „državnik“ ne znači da Platon odustaje od ideje o filozofu vladaru, niti da na kraju razdvaja filozofa od državnika, već u smislu koji je naznačen, radi se o reflektovanju delatne strane

2 O mestu dijaloga *Državnik* u poznijoj Platonovoj političkoj teoriji v. Kahn 1995; Klosko 2006: 195–209.

3 O pravom filozofu kao pravom političaru, odnosno državniku v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 1, 1920: 304.

4 O dijalektičkoj podeli pojmova (διαίρεσις) u *Državniku* v. Miller 2004: 16–33.

5 Uporediti O'Meara 2005: 73; Spaemann 2011: 122; White 2012: 19.

državnika koja pretpostavlja filosofiju i proizlazi iz filosofije. Platon hoće da utvrdi distinkciju između filosa i vladara, teorije i prakse, ne, dakle, da bi napustio tezu o filosu državniku nego, naprotiv, da bi preko izvedenih razlika ojačao njihovu sintezu. Možda Platonova analiza pojma znanja, gde on razlikuje dva aspekta znanja – znanje u strogo teorijskom smislu i znanje kao delovanje u Aristotelovom smislu praktičnog znanja – na najbolji način izražava strane koje treba razlikovati, a oba ova značenja znanja ponovo se objedinjuju u državniku, koji je državnik filosof.

Prvo određenje državnika na koje nailazimo u dijalogu, definiše da je on jedan od „onih koji imaju znanje“ (*Polit.* 258b). Da bi se ustanovilo o kojem je znanju reč, Platon nastoji da izvede klasifikaciju znanja. On najpre deli znanja na praktična i teorijska. Pod praktičnim podrazumeva veštine „rukotvornog rada“ (*Polit.* 258d) u smislu onog znanja koje je kasnije Aristotel (Ἀριστοτέλης) nazvao poetičkim znanjem (up. Arist. *EN* 1140a 2). S druge strane, nalazi se teorijsko znanje koje je, poput aritmetike, upućeno samo na saznanje.⁶ Može se reći da bi teorijska znanja najvećim delom odgovarala Aristotelovom određenju teorijskog znanja (up. Arist. *Met.* 1026a 13–16). Uočljivo je da u Platonovoj podeli izostaje određenje praktičnog znanja, koja se pojavljuje kod Aristotela kao –ἐπιστήμη πρακτική.⁷ Ovo Platonovo izostavljanje sfere čisto praktične delatnosti može se tumačiti i kao činjenica koja dosledno proizilazi iz njegovog određenja filosa-vladara u *Državi*. Tu se, naime, celokupno određenje postavke iscrpljivalo u strogo teorijskoj strani pojma filosof (Reeve 2006). Iz tako postavljenih odnosa nužno sledi izostavljanje praktične delatnosti kao zasebno određene sfere.

Međutim, na tome se stvar nije mogla završiti, i ukoliko Platon nije hteo da njegovo učenje ostane nedovršeno, bilo je neophodno postavku iz *Države* dalje razvijati u smeru izvođenja praktičnog znanja. Problematizujući pitanje teorijskog znanja, Platon otkriva u njemu i dimenziju koja se odnosi na praktičnu delatnost. Naime, pokazuje se da u teorijskom znanju učestvuju dve različite vrste znanja koje se „međusobno razlikuju s obzirom na prosuđivanje i naređivanje“ (*Polit.* 260b). Ako se pod prosuđivanjem, uslovno govoreći, prepoznaje znanje u smislu Aristotelovog teorijskog znanja, a pod naređivanjem praktična znanja, onda je zanimljivo postaviti pitanje zbog čega Platon nije izveo do kraja ovu

6 O dijalogu *Državnik* i dugotrajnom filsofskom obrazovanju u kontekstu Platonove Akademije i nepisanog učenja (up. 258c; 267a–c; 276e–277a, 283a–b) v. Miller 2004: 142 i dalje.

7 Videti više u: *Griswold* 1989.

podelu, kao što će kasnije uraditi Aristotel, već je praktičnodelatnu stranu zadržao pod „teorijskim znanjem“. Jedan od mogućih odgovora kreće se linijom naznačenog tumačenja, prema kojem je važno da i posle uočene i izvedene razlike između teorijskog znanja filozofa i praktičnog znanja državnika, opstane očuvana sinteza ovih znanja u postavci filozof državnika.⁸

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Da je neophodno tematizovati i praktičnu delatnost upravljača, Platon čini očiglednim postavljajući pitanje na sledeći način: „Da li ćemo ga [kraljevskog čoveka] uvrstiti u umeće prosuđivanja, kao nekog gledaoca, ili radije u umeće naređivanja, jer njemu pripada da zapoveda kao gospodar?“ (*Polit.* 260c). Tim pitanjem Platon pomera, u odnosu na raniju postavku o državniku filozofu u *Državi*, perspektivu posmatranja pojma „državnika“. Dok je u *Državi* sva pažnja bila usredsređena na filozofa, s ciljem da se izvede teorijsko znanje koje je neophodno da poseduje državnik, sada se, nakon što je završeno istraživanje pojma „filozof“, razmatranje pomera na neistraženu, praktičnu delatnost koja je neodvojiva od državnika. Umeće⁹ naređivanja svakako je svojstveno državniku i, za razliku od drugih mnogobrojnih vrsta naređivanja, državnika karakteriše „samo-svojno naređivanje“ (*Polit.* 260e).

Određujući bliže prirodu državničkog naređivanja, precizira se da se ono odnosi na upravljanje ljudima. Na prvi pogled izgleda da je pleonazam reći da se upravljanje vladara odnosi na ljude, a ne, recimo, na nežive stvari. I zaista, ukoliko vladar države nečim upravlja, on upravlja ljudima. Međutim, kad je reč o samom upravljanju nad ljudima, Platon problematizuje ovu stvar posmatrajući je u širem metafizičkom kontekstu. Sa ovim proširenjem polja u kojem se posmatra pojam upravljanja, pojavljuje se ideja da upravljanje ljudima, kao praktična delatnost državnika, ne pripada uvek čoveku, pa samim tim ni državniku. Osnovna teza pomoću koje Platon izmešta upravljanje ljudima izvan čoveka, izražena je u sledećoj metafizičkoj postavci: „Ovaj kosmos sam Bog sada vodi na njegovom putu i preokreće ga, sada ga opet pušta, kada njegova obilaženja već dostignu meru vremena njemu određena, pa se ponovo sam od sebe preokreće u protivnom smeru“ (*Polit.* 269c–d).¹⁰

Objašnjenje ovako postavljenih metafizičkih principa pojašnjava mnoga rešenja u ovom političkom učenju. Tako, ističe se da stanje apsolutnog mirovanja, u smislu postojanja u nepromenljivom stanju, može pripadati

8 Aristotel ima primedbe na gledište da političko znanje državnika ima prednost nad zakonom (*Arist. Polit.* 1285b35 i dalje).

9 Misli se na umeće u smislu znanja.

10 Uporediti Ricken 2008: 109.

„samo onome što je od svega najbožanskije“ (*Polit.* 269d).¹¹ Nasuprot tome, sve ono što stoji u vezi s telom imanentno sadrži promenu i kretanje i ono ne može biti u večno istom stanju (*Polit.* 270e). Pošto čovekov kosmos ne može biti potpuno „slobodan od promene“, on se kreće uvek putanjom natrag u krug, jer to izaziva najmanje promena (*Polit.* 269e). S obzirom na karakter i posedice koje proizlaze iz određenog perioda kružnog kretanja, samo kretanje biva proizvedeno pomoću dve vrste uzroka. Jedan je božanski uzrok, kada Bog upravlja kosmosom, a drugi je sam svet kada je ostavljen na upravljanje samome sebi.

U periodu kretanja sveta koje ima božanski uzrok, Bog upravlja celokupnim svetom uključujući i ljude. Čoveku se u ovom razdoblju, koje Platon naziva periodom Kronove vladavine, pružalo samo od sebe sve ono što mu je bilo potrebno (*Polit.* 272a). Opis Kronove vladavine u bitnim se tačkama podudara s opisom uzorne države iz treće knjige *Države*.¹² Kao što u savršeno pravičnoj državi nema vladara, jer su se metafizički principi pravičnosti sami po sebi ispoljili, ni u Kronovoj vladavini, budući da sam čovek nije onaj koji upravlja, nema vladara. Pošto se ljudima sve samo od sebe pružalo, oni su imali dovoljno dokolice, i vremenom su započeli bavljenje filosofijom (*Polit.* 272c). Ovde je naročito važno primetiti da filosofija prethodi umeću državničkog upravljanja, odnosno da je čovek, pre nego što je nastupio period kada on sam preuzima upravljanje nad samim sobom, zadobio filofsoko znanje o onom što istinski jeste.

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Kada je Kronova vladavina „dostigla meru vremena njemu određena“ (*Polit.* 277d; Cropsey 1995: 119), dotadašnji savršeni upravljač se povlači i nastupa promena. Čovek sada mora vlastitom snagom da upravlja i vodi svoj život. Tek s ovom promenom ostvaruju se uslovi da se postavi pitanje određenja upravljačke delatnosti državnika. Upravljanje ljudima postojalo je i u prethodnom stanju Kronove vladavine, ali se za takvog upravljača ne može reći da je državnik. U tom razdoblju upravljanje je ostalo izvan ljudi i čovek jedino time što ima filofsoko razumevanje istinitih načela na kojima počiva stvarnost, ima uvid i o postojanju u tom kontekstu pravilnosti prema kojima se izvodi upravljanje.

U novim okolnostima čovek tek treba da u skladu sa filosofijom, kroz praksu stekne iskustvo vladanja. Pošto je čovek promenu kretanja dočekao bez i najmanjeg iskustva upravljanja i poznavanja umeća vladanja državom, nastao je metež, nered i velika opasnost za čoveka (*Polit.* 274b–d).

11 Uporediti Miller 2004: 37–38.

12 O ulozu mita u *Državniku* (268d–274e) v. Miller 2004: 36 i dalje; Colloud-Streit 2005, Sayre 2007: 25–27.

Jednostavno iskustvo nezaobilazan je osnov umeća državičkog upravljanja, a da bi se nešto kroz iskustvo ustanovilo, neophodno je da prođe potrebno vreme. I uopšte, svaka praktična delatnost je neodvojiva od iskustva kroz koje se utvrđuje prihvatljivost i ispravnost te delatnosti. Imajući u vidu da se praktična delatnost može ispoljiti samo u realnom iskustvu i ukoliko se u političkoj zajednici određene praktične delatnosti ponavljaju po prepoznatljivoj zakonitosti i bivaju opšteprihvaćene, onda to iskustvo njihovog ispoljavanja izgrađuje običajnost. Otud sledi da se praktična delatnost putem svog ispoljavanja u iskustvu, istovremeno i kao određeno praktično znanje zasniva u običajnosti koju predstavlja sintetisano iskustvo. Jer se kroz manifestovanje u iskustvu stvara situacija da je samo to iskustvo pokazatelj istinitosti praktičnog delovanja što ujedno predstavlja konstituisanje tog načina delovanja u znanje. U tom smislu običajnost se pojavljuje kao temelj znanja praktičnog delovanja.

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Politička delatnost

Metodološki gledano, Platon dvosmerno zasniva političku delatnost, nastojeći da istovremeno sačuva jedinstvenost celine. Jedan smer predstavlja deduktivno izvođenje politike iz ontoloških načela i taj pristup je primenjen u *Državi*. Međutim, samo praktično delovanje koje proizlazi iz teorijskog znanja postaje problematično. Razlog leži u tome što, za razliku od teorijske sfere u kojoj se razmatraju ontološka načela, kod praktične delatnosti iskustvo je medijum u kojem se ona ispoljava. Zbog toga je i samo umeće kako delovati u skladu s filozofskim znanjem, zavisno od iskustva. Pojedinačan primer delovanja ne može biti oslonac za uspostavljanje umeća delovanja, već je potrebno šire iskustvo koje prelazi u običajnost da bi postojao sigurniji osnov za uobličavanje umeća delovanja u pravo znanje. Običajnost označava iskustvo u kome se najpre ispoljava, a potom i potvrđuje praktična delatnost. I upravo kroz potvrđivanje i očitovanje istinitosti tog delovanja, običajnost legitimiše ontološka načela iz kojih se praktična delatnost izvodi.

U *Državi* je Platon bio prvenstveno zainteresovan da odredi značenje pojma „filosof“ i u skladu s tim izvrši podelu oblika država s obzirom na ontološka načela. I za određenje umeća državičke delatnosti upravljanja polisom neophodno je razmatranje oblika uređenja države.¹³ No, pošto je u *Državniku* predmet ispitivanja praktična delatnost upravljanja, zbog prirode ovog predmeta, oblici državnog uređenja se ne razvrstavaju neposredno u zavisnosti od ontoloških načela. Kako se upravljanje polisom

13 O kralju-filosofu u *Državi* v. Reeve 2006; Spaemann 2011.

kao praktična delatnost može ispoljiti jedino u iskustvu, onda i početni kriterijum za podelu oblika državnog uređenja predstavljaju formalni principi vladavine u državi poznati iz istorijskog iskustva.

Platon na osnovu forme vladavine razlikuje tri oblika države, u zavisnosti od toga da li vlada jedan, mali broj građana ili mnogi (*Polit.* 292a). Posmatrajući, dakle, apstraktno samo formalni princip vladavine, postoje tri oblika državnog uređenja. Međutim, kada se dalje ova apstraktna forma ispunjava određenim sadržajem, kao što su „nasilje i prinude, siromaštvo i bogatstvo, zakonitost i bezakonje“ (*Polit.* 291e),¹⁴ onda se umesto tri pojavljuju pet oblika države. Vladavina jednog čoveka može biti monarhija ili tiranija, a vladavina nekolicine aristokratija ili oligarhija. Jedino vlast mnogih građana, bez obzira na razlike u sadržaju, prema Platonovom shvatanju, zadržava jedinstven oblik u vidu demokratije (*Polit.* 292a).

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Ako uporedimo razvrstavanja oblika državnog uređenja iz *Države* i *Državnika* koja počivaju na različitim principima, uočava se i postojanje određenih razlika.¹⁵ Već na prvi pogled može se zapaziti da su u *Državi* zastupljeni svi oblici države koji su navedeni u *Državniku*, dok se na drugoj strani u *Državniku* ne pominju imena uzorne države i timokratije. Nepojavljivanje tih oblika pod njihovim imenima iz *Države* u razmatranju koje ima za predmet praktičnu delatnost, u određenom stepenu je razumljivo. Platon razlikuje uzornu državu i timokratiju kao oblike državnog uređenja na osnovu ontoloških načela koji konstituišu te oblike, a ne po formi vladavine koje se ispoljavaju u istorijskom iskustvu. To što se po principu razvrstavanja u *Državniku* ne pojavljuju ova dva oblika, ne znači da su oni isključeni ili da nisu podrazumevani. Platonu su uzorna država i timokratija, po svojoj formi vladavine, monarhija ili aristokratija, što otvara mogućnost da su i u *Državniku*, u oblicima monarhije ili aristokratije na određen način prisutne uzorna država i timokratija.

Kako je formalni princip vladavine samo početna tačka u razmatranju podele oblika uređenja, koja se vrši da bi se došlo do određenja umeća državičkog upravljanja polisom, pokazaće se da u daljem toku istraživanja Platon u velikoj meri uzima uzornu i timokratsku državu kao sa-držinsku podlogu monarhije i aristokratije, u kojima se ispoljava umeće

14 Uporediti Annas 1995: 19; Wallach 2001: 342.

15 *Država*: 1) uzorna država (monarhija ili aristokratija), 2) timokratija, 3) oligarhija, 4) demokratija, 5) tiranija; *Državnik*: 1) samovlada (monarhija ili tiranija), 2) vladavina nekolicine (aristokratija ili oligarhija), 3) demokratija. Uporediti Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1920, 1: 584.

upravljanja državom. Osnov za ovakvu pretpostavku nalazi se u Platonovim rečima da se praktična delatnost upravljanja ne može odrediti samo na osnovu formalnog principa vladavine (*Polit.* 292c), jer se u osnovi iz koje zapravo proizlaze sami formalni principi nalazi određeno znanje koje na bitan način definiše ove oblike polisa (*Polit.* 272c).

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Platon je smatrao da se samo u državi koja je uređena na osnovu pravog znanja, može istovremeno pojaviti i „znanje vladanja ljudima koje je najteže i najvažnije steći“ (*Polit.* 292d; up. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1920, 1: 576). Može se primetiti da se ovde govori o dve vrste znanja: o pravom znanju na osnovu koga se uređuje država i o praktičnom znanju vladanja ljudima. Prvo znanje nesumnjivo ukazuje na teorijsko znanje iz koga se konstituiše uzorna država, a drugo na praktično znanje koje je preuzeto iz običajnosne prakse timokratske, odnosno spartanske države. Razlika između uzorne i timokratske države u *Državi* ogledala se najpre u tome što se u timokratiji izgubila filosofija kao teorijsko znanje o metafizičkom uzoru država. U timokratiji je nastavljeno da se upravlja po istinitim načelima, ali bez filofske samosvesti o istinitosti ispoljene prakse.

Međutim, ono što je izuzetno važno jeste da je praksa timokratske države imala svoju realnu istoriju u Sparti i na Kritu, a pošto je ontologizovana uzorna država faktički izvan istorije onda njoj nedostaje praksa, pa samim tim praktična delatnost ostaje neispoljena. Drugim rečima, to znači da se za uzornu državu vezuje samo teorijsko znanje i da ona usled toga što nema ispoljenu istorijsku običajnost ne može doprineti određenju samog praktičnog znanja. Za određenje državnika neophodno je u jedinstveno znanje objediniti teorijsko znanje uzorne države i praktično znanje timokratske države, koje se potvrdilo u običajnosnoj praksi i istovremeno je u skladu s teorijskim znanjem (up. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1920, 1: 580 i dalje).

Problem koji ostaje odnosi se na činjenicu da ne postoji iskustvo tog objedinjenog znanja, i da se ne može ukazati na polis gde je ono ostvareno. Jedino što se može uraditi jeste da se ide u preciznije teorijsko određenje ove sinteze. U tom smislu Platon navodi osnovno pravilo kojeg nužno treba da se drže državnici: „U svakoj prilici pružiti svojim sugrađanima potpunu pravičnost, koja se temelji na razumu i umeću“ (*Polit.* 297b).

Razum i umeće na kojima se temelji pravičnost, predstavlja teorijsko znanje i umeće praktične delatnosti upravljanja polisom. Oni treba da služe kao osnov da se bude pravičan u svakoj prilici. Ispunjenje postavljenog pravila predstavlja u osnovi radikalni zahtev i svakako je najznačajniji deo

citiranog teksta. Jer, postavlja se pitanje kako je uopšte moguće ostvariti pravičnost uvek i u svim prilikama. To jest, traži se forma znanja koja državniku može da posluži kao osnov za pravično postupanje u svim prilikama. Da bi razrešio taj problem, Platon najpre razmatra da li zakon kao pisano pravilo predstavlja adekvatnu formu, koja državniku pruža mogućnost da u svim prilikama dela pravično. Iz rečenog se može nazreti da, time što usmerava pažnju na istaknuti zahtev da državničko umeće upravljanja mora biti pravično u svim prilikama i pored uvođenja iskustva i običajnosti kroz praktičnu delatnost, Platon i dalje teži da u izvesnom smislu zadrži određenje državnika u sferi idealne i neistorijske države.

Granice zakona

Nema sumnje da Platon kada govori o pravičnom državničkom upravljanju, pretpostavlja postojanje istinitih načela koja tu delatnost uređuju po određenim pravilima i zakonitostima (Berges 2010). I u osnovi svake države stoji neko zakonodavstvo. U tom smislu se i kaže „da kraljevskom poslu pripada na neki način i zakonodavstvo“ (*Polit.* 294a). Ali ono što ostaje ovde neodređeno istovremeno je od suštinskog značaja, a to je priroda zakonodavstva na kojem se temelji polis i upravljanje državom. Najpre nas interesuje o kakvom je zakonodavstvu reč kada se radi o istinskom državniku. Da li zakonodavstvo, koje treba da bude osnov pravičnog upravljanja pretpostavlja zakonodavstvo u formi pisanih pravila, ili se radi o jednom unutrašnjem zakonodavstvu „u kraljevskom čoveku obdarenom razboritošću“ (*Polit.* 294a)?¹⁶

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Razmatrajući prvu mogućnost Platon daje objašnjenje zašto smatra da pisani zakon ne može da ispuni postavljeni cilj: „Zato što zakon nikada neće moći u jedan mah obuhvatiti ono što je najbolje i najpravičnije za sve, pa naređivati ono što je najprikladnije. Nejednakost naime među ljudima kao i među njihovim delima, jeste činjenica da nikada ni jedna, da tako kažem, stvar ne miruje, ne dopuštaju da bilo koje umeće u ičemu pruža neko jednostavno pravilo koje bi vredelo za sve slučajeve i za svako vreme“ (*Polit.* 294b; up. Berges 2010: 20).

Ne može se osporiti da ovaj uvid izoštrava problem granica pisanog zakona kao zakonodavstva. Platonova kritika pisanih zakona nije usmerena protiv zakona kao zakona, već protiv njihove nemogućnosti da se uvek ispolje kao istiniti zakoni. Pisani zakon je u svojoj apstraktnosti i imanentno konačnoj formi uvek neko jednostavno pravilo koje nenadoknadivo

16 Do kada Platon veruje da je moguć idealan kralj filosof, v. Samaras 1996.

zaostaje za bogatim sadržajem konkretne situacije.¹⁷ Svaki pojedinačni predmet, od mnoštva slučajeva koji potpadaju pod neki zakon, nosi svoju specifičnost koja nestaje u apstraktnosti zakona. U tom smislu i običajnost kao nepisani zakon sadrži slične teškoće i ograničenja. Umeće upravljanja ispoljava se u iskustvu i potvrđuje kroz kontinuitet iskustva, odnosno u običajnosti.¹⁸ Međutim, ispoljavanje praktične delatnosti u iskustvu i njeno potvrđivanje u običajnosti još ne znači da se umeće upravljanja može poistovetiti sa zakonima običajnosti. Naprosto, zakoni običajnosti uvek su ograničeni u odnosu na umeće koje proizlazi iz teorijskog znanja i ima za svoj cilj da u svim prilikama postupa pravično.

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Običajnosna praksa koja je proistekla iz umeća utemeljenog u ontologiji predstavlja potvrdu pravičnog delovanja, ali ona ne može zameniti samo umeće upravljanja. Državničko umeće upravljanja pokazuje se kod Platona kao bolja osnova od zakona, jer ono ima za svoj cilj da u svakoj specifičnoj prilici prepozna na kojim ona metafizičkim principima počiva. Zakon je apstraktan i on zbog toga sve situacije koje su po nekoj osnovi slične podvodi pod isti kriterijum. Zbog svoje statičnosti zakon nema mogućnosti da na adekvatan način odgovori na brojne promene i neprestane procese koji se odvijaju u državi.

S obzirom na iskazanu funkcionalnost, ali i ograničenost običajnosti, potrebno je razmotriti mogućnosti i načine na koje običajnost timokratske države učestvuje u državnom uređenju u kojem se određuje i manifestuje umeće državnika. Ambivalentnost prirode običajnosti otkriva se u tome što je ona, s jedne strane, medijum u kome se praktična delatnost ispoljava i potvrđuje, a s druge strane, zbog toga što se pojavljuje u formi nepisanih zakona, sa pretenzijom da normira svako delovanje, ona ograničava mogućnost da se pravično deluje u svim prilikama. U tom smislu određenje državnika sadrži, ali i prevazilazi običajnost timokratske države.

Zakon i običajnost se u stvari odnose na „ono što odgovara mnogima i u mnogo slučajeva“ (*Polit.* 295a). Cilj postavljanja apstraktne i opšte forme zakona jeste da se postigne univerzalnost važenja zakona, ali se upravo zbog nemogućnosti da apstraktna forma na adekvatan način pokrije mnogoznačnost raznorodnih pojedinačnih primera ne postiže cilj zbog kojeg je ona uvedena. Umesto univerzalnosti, iz apstraktnosti zakona

17 Zakoni su pisani i nepisani. Običaji su nepisani zakoni (*ἀγράφοι νόμοι*). Nepisani zakoni (verski, porodični) važniji su od pisanih. Uporediti Arist. *Polit.* 1287 a 34 (o važnosti pisanih zakona). Videti komentare u: Newman 1901: 298.

18 O važnosti pojma iskustvo i najvišem iskustvu zahvatanja istine u *Državi* v. Walach 2001: 277.

proizilazi njegova manjkavost, pošto on može da se odnosi samo na mnoge slučajeve i mnoge ljude. A razlika od mnogih do svih, i u teorijskom i u praktičnom smislu može biti izuzetno velika. Ta razlika dolazi do izražaja u Platonovom zahtevu da državničko umeće treba u svim prilikama da ostvaruje pravičnost. Pošto zakon može da posluži kao osnov pravičnog delovanja u mnogim, ali ne i u svim slučajevima, to znači da je potrebno tragati za drugačijim rešenjem. Uporišna tačka za državničko delovanje koje bi moglo da se ispolji kao pravičnost u svim prilikama, može biti jedino vrlina (ἀρετή), i to u prvom redu sama vrlina pravičnosti (Krämer 1967). Vrlina je nesvodiva na zakon jer, između ostalog, uvek ostaje razlika između vrline čija je suštinska odlika da se u svim situacijama ispoljava kao vrlina, i zakona koji može pokrivati samo mnoge slučajeve.

Ako obratimo pažnju na suštinsku odliku vrline da se ona u svim raznorodnim situacijama mora iskazivati kao vrlina, da bi uopšte bila vrlina, tada zapažamo da i načelo državničkog umeća da se u svim situacijama dela u skladu sa pravičnošću, predstavlja takođe vrlinu, možda i najvažniju vrlinu. Rečeno je da se vrlina pravičnosti ispoljava u tome da svako radi svoj posao u skladu sa svojom prirodom. Radeći svoj posao, državnik upravlja državom saglasno svojoj prirodi koja se odlikuje time da njome vlada umni deo duše koji se rukovodi vrlinama i na taj način se ne ispoljava samo državnik kao pravičan, već ova pravičnost označava da ona vlada u celoj državi. Osnov državničkog umeća leži u vrlini, jer vrlina omogućava da se princip političkog delovanja ispolji u svim okolnostima i pojedinačnim prilikama. Tako se vrlina pokazuje kao osnov, pravilo i svrha državnikovog umeća.

Zakon zaostaje za vrlinom zbog svoje nemogućnosti da važi univerzalno u svim prilikama. Pošto su ljudi i njihovi međusobni odnosi predmet zakona, činjenica da među ljudima i njihovim delima vlada nejednakost upućuje Platona na mišljenje da zakon kao jednostavno pravilo ne može „tačno pružiti svakom pojedincu ono što mu pripada“ (*Polit.* 295a). Da bi bolje razjasnio nedostatak zakona, Platon upoređuje državnika sa lekarom navodeći zanimljiv primer (*Polit.* 295c).¹⁹ Ako neki lekar mora zbog putovanja na duže vreme da ostavi one koje leči, on će im kao zamenu za neposredno lečenje ostaviti pismena pravila kojih treba u njegovom odsustvu da se pridržavaju. Međutim, zamislimo da se lekar umešto da ostane predviđeno vreme iznenada vrati sa puta i neplanirano

19 O primeru lekara v. Arist. *Polit.* 1287a. Uporediti Weiss 1995.

zatekne poboljšanje bolesnikovog stanja, koje je nastalo „usled delovanja vetrova ili neke druge nebeske pojave, koja se neočekivano zbilila nekako drugačije nego obično“ (*Polit.* 295d).

Pismena uputstva mogla su se zasnivati na osnovu onog što se obično dešava u sličnim prilikama i ona ne mogu anticipirati veliki broj mogućih neočekivanih događaja. Postavlja se pitanje da li će lekar s obzirom na bitno nove okolnosti prestati da se drži sada već neadekvatnih pismenih pravila koja je propisao, ili će ostati pri njima usled ubeđenja da se ne smeju napuštati stara pravila koja su se obično pokazivala kao istinski dobra i donosila ozdravljenje.

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Gledano na planu države, ostajanje pri pravilima koja su nastala iz običajnosti i obično se pokazuju kao dobra, predstavlja jedan nivo koji očigledno ne iscrpljuje znanje i pravo umeće. Običajnost kao iskustvo istorijske prakse u kojoj se ispoljava i potvrđuje državničko delovanje, a ne običajnost kao zakon, nužno učestvuje na konstitutivni način u određenju umeća upravljanja državom. Učestvovanje običajnosti ne znači i njeno poistovećivanje sa umećem, što bi bio slučaj kada bi se običajnost kao zakon uzimala kao jedino pravilo delovanja. Pre nego što će se političko delovanje ispoljiti u iskustvu i pokazati se kao istinito u običajnosti kao kontinuiranom i sistematizovanom istorijskom iskustvu, stoji prethodno ontološko znanje koje rukovodi i određuje političko delovanje kao saglasno istinitim idejama, tj. političkim vrlinama. Poznavanje vrline je onaj celovit stepen znanja koji prethodi običajnosti i koji prevazilazi običajnost u onim specifičnim prilikama koje ne pripadaju uobičajenom redu događaja.

Potrebno je razgraničiti oblik običajnosti koji nužno učestvuje u umeću političkog delovanja od običajnosti kao zakona (*Polit.* 295a; Arist. *Polit.* 1287 a 34), i razmotriti odnos između prvobitne običajnosti i umeća državničkog upravljanja, kao i odnos ovog umeća prema običajnosti koja se redefiniše u zakone. Pošto se političko umeće kao praktična delatnost nužno ispoljava u iskustvu, prvobitno je običajnost predstavljala sabrano sistematizovano iskustvo, koje je potvrđivalo istinitost političkog delovanja proizašlog iz vrline. Ovaj vid običajnosti, kao medijum u kome se ispoljava i potvrđuje ispravnost političkog umeća, nerazdvojiv je od umeća političkog upravljanja (Becker 2012: 80). Iz ovog primarnog oblika običajnosti, zbog određenih elemenata njegove prirode, sve više raste intencija da običajnost preraste u zakon. Zapravo, i ovaj primarni vid običajnosti, usled svoje sistematičnosti, struktuiranosti i pravilnosti koje ga određuju, nosi u sebi formu određenih zakonitosti. Zbog toga je jasno da je potreban samo jedan korak da se običajnost modifikuje i preraste u zakon.

Postajući zakon, običajnost iz osnova menja svoj odnos prema vrlini kao načelu političkog umeća. Pošto je u prirodi vrline uvek neka zakonomernost onda će i njena praksa zadobiti izgled te zakonomernosti. Važno je pitanje da li se taj izgled može poistovetiti s vrlinom kao načelom. Najpre je izgled označavao ispoljenu vrlinu, ali vremenom, samim tim što je izgled vrline, izgled nastoji da oponaša načelo na način da, zadobijajući formu zakona, on sam postane osnov političkog delovanja. Od odgovora na pitanje oko identičnosti vrline i njenog izgleda u vidu običajnosti zavisi da li i u kojoj meri ovaj izgled uzimajući formu zakona može da supstituiše vrlinu kao osnov političkog delovanja.

Razlikovanje vrline i običajnosti kao njenog izgleda nije moguće izbeći, jer ono proizlazi kako iz karaktera vrline tako i iz prirode njenog izgleda. Radi se o tome da nikada u iskustvu nije ispoljen totalitet ideje vrline, što bi omogućilo poklapanje ideje i njenog ispoljenog izgleda. Umesto totaliteta, iskustvo povezuje, s obzirom na kontekst, u određene celine izgled vrline. Svaka od ovih u iskustvu formiranih celina samo je isečak vrline, jer je reč o delu vrline čija je ideja neuporedivo šira. Ukoliko ovi isečci, time što nose izgled vrline, postanu zakon, odnosno počnu da oponašaju vrlinu u smislu da se pojavljuju kao osnov za političko delovanje, jasno je da ovo oponašanje može imati samo ograničen domet. Izvan ovih isečaka vrline ostaje veliki sadržaj koji zakon ne može da podvede pod svoju formu.

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Takođe, zbog već navedenog problema apstraktnosti zakona, nastaje problem s konkretnošću pojedinačnih primera koji izmiču apstraktnoj formi zakona. S druge strane, vrlina unutar bezobalnosti svog pojma, sav sadržaj i raznorodnost situacija na koje nailazi preobražava i uređuje saglasno načelu koje određuje vrlinu. Vrlina, odnosno njeno načelo starije je od svakog zakona i ona ima principijelnu mogućnost da u svakoj situaciji bude saglasna sa svojim načelom.

Razlika između vrline i njenog izgleda može da se posmatra kao razlika između celine i dela, pri čemu celina nema karakter paradigme, a deo nije njena kopija.²⁰ Delovanje koje je u skladu sa vrlinom, i ponavlja se pod sličnim okolnostima, nosi izgled vrline, ali zbog toga što je ono samo jedan deo od mnogih raznorodnih delovanja u skladu sa vrlinom, ovaj izgled ne može biti sama vrlina. Potiskivanjem razlike koja postoji između vrline i izgleda vrline, izgled preuzima ulogu vrline i postaje zakon i time osnov političkog delovanja. Razumljivo je da zakon imajući izgled vrline nastoji da je oponaša (*Polit.* 300c).

20 O pojmu paradigme kod Platona v. Sayre 2007: 73–91; Lane 1998: 46.

Postavlja se pitanje da li to oponašanje može biti funkcionalno u ostvarivanju pravičnosti. S obzirom na uočenu razliku i na unutrašnja ograničenja samog pojma zakona, ispostavlja se da u idealno teorijskom smislu umeće upravljanja zasnovano na vrlini bitno odskače od zakona i da zakon ne može biti adekvatna zamena. Platon iznosi primer koji ukazuje da ni u mnogo jednostavnijim poslovima pisana pravila ne mogu nadoknaditi značaj pravog umeća: „Ako bismo videli da se po pisanim pravilima obavlja uzgajanje konja i uopšte umeće negovanja stada... Kada bi se u svemu tome tako radilo, naime kada bi se sve obavljalo po pisanim propisima, a ne po samom umeću, koja bi bila posledica? Očito je da bi nam sva ta umeća propala“ (*Polit.* 299d–e).

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Kako se pokazuje da ni ova jednostavnija umeća od umeća upravljanja državom ne mogu opstati pridržavanjem samo pisanih pravila, time je jasnije da je to u politici još manje moguće. Ali, s druge strane, to još ne znači da zakon zbog toga što samo oponaša istinu nema svoju funkcionalnost. Određivanje umeća upravljanja kroz složen odnos koji vlada između vrline i zakona koji time što ima izgled vrline oponaša vrlinu i tako često postaje osnov upravljanja, nalazi svoje razrešenje u zavisnosti od ontološkog statusa država u kojima se umeće primenjuje. Platon smatra da je u uzornoj državi umeće samo po sebi dovoljno za upravljanje državom. Kad je reč o zakonima, funkcionalnost zakona koji imaju izgled vrline, na osnovu čega se uzimaju kao dobri zakoni, pokazuje se u tome što oni oponašajući istinu konstituišu najbolje državno uređenje odmah posle uzorne države.

Platon u *Državniku*, s jedne strane, tematizuje proces nastanka zakona u smislu ontološke degradacije države i „isklizavanja“ iz pravog umeća koje jedino može da omogući pravičnost u svim prilikama, na zakon koji oponašajući istinu može da osigura, u najboljem slučaju, pravičnost u većini prilika. Pored ovog razmatranja nastanka zakona, u *Državniku* postoje naznake koje u drugačijem svetlu predstavljaju pojavu zakona, ili bolje reći anticipiraju neophodnost uvođenja zakona u državi (up. Jovanović 1990: 47). Potreba za zakonom kao dopunskim sredstvom umeću, nezaobilazno prati usložnjavanje države, što dovodi do toga da samo umeće više nije dovoljno za upravljanje polisom.

Umeće državnika kao veština tkanja

Ako se nedostatak zakona ogleda u tome da on može da važi samo za „mnoge i u mnogo slučajeva“ (*Polit.* 295a), a nije u stanju da „tačno pruži svakom pojedincu ono što mu odgovara“ (*Polit.* 295a), onda je, s druge

strane, lako pretpostaviti da u iole većoj i složenijoj državi državnik na osnovu svog umeća ne može postići da neposredno vodi računa o ispunjenju pravičnosti za svakog pojedinca: „Ta kako bi iko ikada bio kadar za vreme svog života neprestano sedeti uz svakog pojedinca i tačno naređivati ono što tome odgovara“ (*Polit.* 295b; v. Colloud-Streit 2005: 47). Za ukazivanje na nemogućnost da se samo uz pomoć umeća neposredno upravlja životom celokupnog polisa još je važniji primer organizovanja sudstva u državi. Platon navodi da je sudstvu imanentan princip zakon na osnovu koga se sudi, a vrlina se ovde zahteva u smislu da sudija ne sme niti pod pretnjom niti zbog nuđenih darova odustati od predviđenih zakona (*Polit.* 305b–c). Međutim, umesto daljih izvođenja ovih anticipacija neophodnosti uvođenja zakona u državi, Platon njihov nastanak vezuje za kontekst njegove osnovne ontološke sheme.

Tako se polazi od prvobitne uzorne države koja jedina ima istinski valjano uređenje i u kojoj se upravlja na osnovu umeća utemeljenog na vrlini. Jedan od najvažnijih uzroka prelaska iz ovog jedinog dobrog državnog stanja u najbolje od nesavršenih uređenja jeste napuštanje umeća upravljanja državom i njegovo zamenjivanje zakonima koji oponašaju vrlinu. Razlozi za napuštanje umeća i njegovo zamenjivanje zakonima Platon pronalazi u naraslom mnjenju da od takvog načina upravljanja građani mogu trpeti velike štete (*Polit.* 298a). Pošto su načela državničkog umeća nedokučiva najvećem broju građana, oni počinju da strahuju od neograničene vlasti vladara: „Koga naime od nas... žele održavati u životu, onog održavaju, a koga žele uništavati, uništavaju“ (*Polit.* 298a).

Podrazumevajući da se umeće državnika zasniva na pravom znanju i vrlini, Platon je smatrao da to predstavlja dovoljnu osnovu da takvo upravljanje bude oslobođeno svih ograničenja: „I bilo da oni neke ubijaju ili teraju iz zemlje i tako državu čiste za njezino dobro, bilo da šalju skupine naseljenika kao rojeve pčela i tako je umanjuju, bilo da dovode od nekud izvana druge, te od njih stvaraju građane i tako je povećavaju, dok je god čuvaju pomoću znanja i pravičnosti i po svojim silama od lošije čine boljom, tako dugo i po tom merilu možemo kazati da je to za nas jedino valjano uređenje“ (*Polit.* 293d–e).

Većina građana počinje da zazire od mogućih posledica neograničene vlasti i vremenom počinje da se stvara opšte mnjenje da od takvih vladara mogu svi da „najstrašnije trpe“ (*Polit.* 298a) i da se ne sme dopustiti da se na osnovu umeća vlada „kao neograničen gospodar“ (*Polit.* 298c). Nastupa politička svest koja zahteva da se načela umeća upravljanja, koja su u njihovoj teorijskoj ravni ostala nesaznatljiva za većinu, pretoče u zakone

koji oponašaju vrlinu, bez obzira na to što ti zakoni nisu u mogućnosti da u potpunosti zamene pravo umeće (*Polit.* 300c–d; up. Stern 1997).

Platon nesumnjivo žali što su „ljudi zazirali od onog jednog samovladara“ (*Polit.* 301c), što je dovelo do napuštanja savršene države (Miller 2004: 101–102). Može se reći da se ovaj žal ne odnosi toliko na državu koja je neposredno nastala iz uzorne države, tako što je načela umeća pretvorila u zakone koliko na države koje su daljom degradacijom nastajale. Prvenstveno, Platon misli na tiraniju gde takođe vladar neograničeno vlada bez zakona, s tim što su se ovde ispunila strahovanja koja su srušila prvobitnu državu, jer tiranin će „zlostavljati, ubijati i oštećivati koga mu se god u svakoj prilici sviđi“ (*Polit.* 301d).

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Ostajući privržen svojoj ontologiji, Platon pravo umeće vladanja državom pretpostavlja zakonima, jer oni samo oponašaju istinu. Umeće državnika prepoznaje se kao veština tkanja (*Polit.* 305e) koja se ogleda u mogućnosti da se ispreplitanjem različitih delova satka jedinstvena celina. U tkanju državničkog delovanja neophodno je umećem ispravno ispreplitanja usaglasiti različite i često suprotstavljene delove.²¹

Ali, za razliku od običnog tkanja koje zahteva samo veštinu da se na pravi način ujednače materijali, budući da nema za svoj predmet jednoznačnu opipljivu stvar, državničko tkanje mora svoj osnov tražiti u teorijskom znanju. Suprotnosti kao što su umerenost i odlučnost mogu se utkati državničkim umećem u jedinstvenu celinu, samo ukoliko postoji jedna zajednička ravan koja omogućava da nastupi tkanje. Ravan koja Platonu omogućava da izmiri suprotnosti jeste ontološki nivo teorije ideja.²² Platon smatra da kada je reč o suprotnostima, u konkretnom primeru radi se o odlučnosti i umerenosti, potrebno je postupiti tako da „u svemu treba da istražujemo ono što nazivamo lepim“ (*Polit.* 306c). Drugim rečima, ispravno istraživanje upućuje da predmete ispitivanja posmatramo u kontekstu teorije ideja.

Da bi, dakle, tkanje bilo moguće i uspešno potrebno je razabrati ponasob pravo znanje koje određuje svaku od suprotnih strana, što je za Platona moguće jedino ukoliko se posmatraju kroz njihove ideje. Pokazuje se da tkanje omogućava prethodno istraživanje koje se razvija u dva različita smera. Na jednom planu, cilj je da se putem pravilnog određenja značenja odlučnosti i umerenosti, njihova suprotnost izmesti i prevede

21 O paradigmi tkača u *Državniku* v. Miller 2004: 60–64, 106–108; Sayre 2007: 92–112. Svedočanstva o tkačima v. u Lane 1998: 167.

22 Da je i saznavanje nerazdvojivo od ontologije v. Castoriadis 2002: 74.

u komplementarnost. Kako učiniti da se evidentne suprotnosti kao što su brzina i živahnost, koje leže u odlučnosti, i sporost i blagost, koje nalazimo u umerenosti, razumeju kao saglasni različiti delovi. Platon pokušava da preko sledeće postavke dođe do postavljenog cilja: „U svemu treba da istražujemo ono što nazivamo lepim, ali ipak uzimamo to kao dve vrste i to suprotne jedna drugoj“ (*Polit.* 306c).

Mogućnost da i suprotne strane imaju nešto zajedničko predstavlja osnovu uspostavljanja veza između njih, što ocrtava postojanje neke celine u kojoj se nalaze. A ako je ono zajedničko suprotnim stranama neka periferna pojava, već ih povezuje ono po čemu se one određuju kao lepe i dobre, što neposredno upućuje na njihov ontološki nivo, onda iz perspektive Platonovog mišljenja to zajedničko nadvladava pojavni vid suprotnosti. Odlučnost i umerenost kao osobine koje idu uz nekog čoveka, nikada ne postoje u vakuumu i u nekom apstraktnom obliku, već se uvek odnose prema nečemu i ispoljavaju u nekom realnom kontekstu. Samo u ovom zamišljenom i nepostojećem apstraktnom obliku one se mogu uzeti kao suprotnosti.²³ Jer ako se odlučnost i umerenost u njihovom konkretnom ispoljavanju rukovode i određuju po onom što je u njima lepo i dobro, dakle istinito, onda ni predmet ni situacija koja zahteva njihovo manifestovanje nikada neće biti identični ili konkurentni. To znači da ukoliko su određene na pravi način, radi se o različitim osobinama koje državnik držeći se onog dobrog u njima i primenjujući ih u adekvatnim situacijama, komponuje u jedinstvenu celinu valjanog upravljanja.

Međutim, Platon dobro zapaža da je konkretno ispoljavanje odlučnosti ili umerenosti najčešće povezano s karakterom čoveka, što znači da je kod nekih naglašeno izražena odlučnost, a kod drugih umerenost (*Polit.* 307d). Smer ispitivanja koji omogućava da se dođe do spajanja i preplitanja odlučnosti i umerenosti, kao suprotnosti u smislu da različite ljude karakteriše istaknuta odlučnost, a potisnuta umerenost, ili obrnuto, još neposrednije kod Platona upućuje na ontologiju kao jedino moguće ishodište. Urođena osobina odlučnosti kod određenog čoveka svojim izraženim stepenom dispozitivnosti, stoji u suprotnosti s obzirom na isto tako kod drugog čoveka naglašenu osobinu umerenosti.

Da se ne bi ostalo na ovom prirodnom stanju i pri njegovim potencijalnim razlikama koje dovode u pitanje ostvarenje jedinstva celine potrebno je

23 O (in)kompatibilnosti odlučnosti, odnosno vrline hrabrosti i umerenosti v. Bonich 1995: 14.

putem obrazovanja ove osobine saobraziti plemenitosti, i u toj zajedničkoj tački istkati njihovo stapanje i usaglašavanje. Obrazovanje na koje smera Platon odnosi se na spoznaju ontoloških načela stvarnosti. Sam tekst koji nas uvodi u sadržaj obrazovanja delom je nepristupačan i nedovoljno je jasan: „Najpre prema srodnosti spaja besmrtni deo njihove duše božanskom vezom, a nakon tog božanskog dela spaja opet smrtni deo ljudskim vezama“ (*Polit.* 309c).

252 Vidimo da se razlikuje i razdvaja mogućnost spajanja koje se ostvaruje božanskim vezama od onog koje to čini ljudskim. Pritom treba obratiti pažnju da predmet spajanja nije isti kod ovih različitih veza. Šta znači kad se „najpre prema srodnosti spaja besmrtni deo njihove duše božanskom vezom“? Platonov odgovor glasi: „Kad se u dušama pojavljuje uistinu pravo i čvrsto usađeno naziranje o lepoti, pravičnosti, dobroti i njihovim suprotnostima, kažem da se ono nalazi kao nešto božansko u delu duše koji je srodan božanstvu“ (*Polit.* 309c).

Pod besmrtnim delom, koji je ujedno srodan božanstvu, nesumnjivo se misli na umni deo duše. Umni deo poprima ono božansko kada se u njemu „pojavljuje uistinu pravo i čvrsto usađeno naziranje o lepoti, pravičnosti, dobroti i njihovim suprotnostima“. Tada je ostvarena srodnost između umnog dela i božanstva, i oni su spojeni božanskim vezom. Dakle, obrazovanje koje treba da omogući tkanje različitih ili suprotstavljenih osobina, kao što su umerenost i odlučnost, u karakterima različitih ljudi mora doseći teorijsko saznanje ne samo o onom što je dobro i pravično, već i o njihovim suprotnostima. To znači da saznanjem istine odlučna duša otkriva pravomernost u kojoj odlučnost učestvuje u pravičnosti, a s druge strane, da odlučnost bez poznanja istine „naginje više nekoj zverskoj prirodi“ (*Polit.* 309e).

Odlučan i umeren čovek saznanjem ideja i usaglašavanjem svoje umerenosti i odlučnosti s pravičnošću ostvaruje povezivanje uz pomoć zajedničkog prihvatanja istinitosti ontološke ravni. S druge strane, odlučnost kojoj ostaje stran svet ideja i koja ne učestvuje u pravičnosti, naginje, kako Platon kaže, zverskoj prirodi, pa samim tim neizbežno se nalazi u trajnoj suprotnosti u odnosu prema umerenosti. Naravno, najveća suprotnost vlada između odlučnosti i umerenosti kada nijedna od ovih osobina nije preobražena putem saznanja ideja.

Sada postaje jasnije šta je Platon mislio pod božanskim vezama. Kada umeren i odlučan čovek, zahvaljujući umnom delu duše, saznanju istinske ideje preobražava svoju odlučnost i umerenost u duhu saznate istine,

onda se „spajaju i isprepliću“ osobine koje su na nivou mogućnosti označavale suprotnosti.

Osim o božanskoj, Platon govori i o ljudskim vezama koje pomažu da se ostvari tkanje suprotnih osobina. Pod ljudskim vezama se misli na sklapanje adekvatnih brakova, što u ovom slučaju znači da treba nastojati da brak spoji umerenu i odlučnu prirodu, a ne istorodne karaktere (*Polit.* 310b–e). Razlog za uspostavljanje ovakvih veza Platon vidi u tome što se odlučna ili umerena ćud, ukoliko kroz više pokoljenja ostanu međusobno nepomešane izokreću, pa odlučnost postaje „besnilo“, a umerenost „mlitavost“. I za ostvarivanje ovih ljudskih veza Platon pretpostavlja poznavanje ontoloških načela. Da bi ljudi shvatili zbog čega je potrebno voditi računa na koji način treba sklapati brakove, neophodno je da oni imaju „isto mišljenje o lepoti i dobroti“ (*Polit.* 310e).

Kroz teorijsko posmatranje ideja državnika svojim umećem skupa tka umerenu i odlučnu prirodu: „U tome jedinome i stoji sav posao kraljevskog umeća tkanja da nikada ne dopušta da umerene prirode stoje daleko od odlučnih, nego da ih skupa tka jednakim shvatanjima, častima, odlikovanjima i međusobnom izmenom zaloga, stvarajući od njih glatko i, kako se kaže, čvrsto satkano tkanje, pa da im uvek zajednički poverava državne službe“ (*Polit.* 309e–311a; up. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1920, 2: 204). Umeće državičkog tkanja temelji se i polazi od teorijskog uvida u ontološku stvarnost, ali se ono ne završava samo na ovom nivou. Pošto ovo tkanje predstavlja praktičnu delatnost upravljanja državom, ono samim tim što je praktična delatnost, mora izaći iz sfere teorijskog. Tkanje u prvom redu vodi računa o ontološkom aspektu, ali potom takođe i o „časti i odlikovanjima“. To jest, upravljanje kao praktična delatnost koja se ispoljava u iskustvu mora voditi računa o običajnosti koja kao sabrano iskustvo potvrđuje istinitost državičkog umeća upravljanja. Krajnja svrha umeća državičkog tkanja jeste postizanje prave mere ispreplitanja u čvrsto i jedinstveno tkanje celokupne strukture države, a prvenstveno priroda umerenih i odlučnih ljudi, što je prema Platonovom shvatanju primarni залог održavanja pravične države (*Polit.* 311b–c).

Primljeno: 15. maja 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 20. jula 2014.

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Aleksandar Nikitović

Plato, Statesman and Philosopher

Abstract

Plato theoretically reinterpreted the contents of early Greek ethics, aspiring to revitalize the fundamental principles of a traditional view of the world. The best example of philosophically ontologized ethics is philosopher-statesman governing the best state. The ruler, however, should not be only a philosopher, though it is a necessary condition. Plato realised the necessity of problematisation of practical side of the activity of the ruler of the polis. Government as a practical activity manifested in experience must consider ethicality which as heritage confirms verity of statesman's art of government. The ultimate end of statesman's „art of weaving“ is the achievement of a due measure of the tightly united web of the whole structure of state.

Keywords: statesman, philosopher, virtue, ethicality, law, statesman's art of weaving

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Problem realnosti u spisima Riharda Vagnera

Realnost umetničkog dela kao tranzicija od „realnosti sveta sadašnjosti“ ka „realnosti sveta budućnosti“

Apstrakt Rihard Vagner počeo je svet da sagledava u kategorijama propadanja tokom četrdesetih godina 19. veka, a posebno tokom revolucije 1848–1849. Nije kritikovao savremeni svet (i pripadajuću mu realnost), već ga je naprosto razumeo na svoj način. Vagner je imao sopstvenu verziju sveta koja je trebalo da postane referentni okvir za stvaranje jedne potpuno drugačije realnosti u budućnosti. Jedan od najrelevantnijih dokumenata za razumevanje njegovog poimanja sveta i realnosti jeste njegovo pismo Avgustu Rekelu poslato 24/25. januara 1854. godine. U njemu je Vagner svoja ranija razmišljanja o realnosti pokušao da sklopi u smisaonu celinu. Učinio je to uz pomoć nekoliko koncepta: „svet kao celina“, „svet sadašnjosti“, „stvarnost sveta“/„savremena stvarnost“. U tom pismu, kao i na drugim mestima, on je propustio da razradi svoju ideju sveta i da objasni njen odnos prema „modernoj realnosti“ koja se menjala. Umesto toga, Vagner je razvio drugu ideju: ideju umetničkog dela koje je trebalo da bude neka vrsta medijatora između „savremenog sveta“ i „sveta budućnosti“, kao i između njihovih realnosti. Njegova verzija „savremenog sveta“ i njegove realnosti sadržavala je, zapravo, dve komponente: sam „savremeni svet“ i umetničko delo koje je smeralo njegovoj promeni. Takvo delo opisivalo je promenu, shvaćenu u kategorijama regeneracije, i samim tim predviđalo način na koji će se realnost menjati u budućnosti, kao i sam pravac promene.

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Cljučne reči: Rihard Vagner, realnost, umetničko delo, svet, regeneracija

Najiscrpniji izvor za sticanje uvida u Vagnerovo (Richard Wagner) shvaćanje realnosti jeste poznato i često citirano pismo koje je 25/26. januara 1854. uputio Avgustu Rekelu (August Rekel).¹ U njemu je Vagner svoja dotadašnja i sasvim sporadična razmišljanja o realnosti, kojima je prožeo *Umetničko delo budućnosti* (*Das Kunstwerk der Zukunft*, 1849), „Saopštenje mojim prijateljima“ („Eine Mitteilung an meine Freunde“, 1851) i *Operu i dramu* (*Oper und Drama*, 1852), povezao u koliko-toliko smislenu

1 Ovaj rad je modifikovana verzija saopštenja „Richard Wagner’s Construction of Reality“ koje sam prezentovala na konferenciji *Richard Wagner’s Impact on His World and Ours*, održanoj u Lidsu, Velika Britanija, u proleće 2013. Zbog toga su svi primarni izvori (sem u nekoliko slučajeva) navedeni prema prevodu na engleski jezik. Tekst je, inače, nastao u okviru rada na projektu br. 177019 koji se sprovodi na Katedri za muzikologiju Fakulteta muzičke umetnosti iz sredstava Ministarstva za nauku Republike Srbije.

celinu. Neki pojmovi koje je upotrebio u ovom sadržajnom pismu pokazuju da je duboko ušao u problematiku realnosti i njenog konstruisanja. O tome dobro svedoči (do danas neanalizirano) mesto na kom je opisao čovekovo viđenje sveta. Wagner je izneo stav da čovek uspeva „da pojmi Svet kao celinu (*Welt als eines Ganzen*)“ tako što „postupajući u skladu sa svojom organizacijom, pribegava beskrajnim pomoćnim sredstvima (*Hilfsmittel*)“ (Wagner 1897a: 80). Konstatacijom da su pomoćna sredstva „u svoj svojoj beskonačnoj složenosti“ samo „koncepti“, Wagner je hteo da kaže kako „pojmiti celinu putem koncepata (*Erfassen eines Ganzen durch die Begriffe*)“ ne znači ništa drugo do osloniti se na diskurzivnu, razumsku aktivnost (Wagner 1987: 302).

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Do vremena kada se ovim pismom obratio Rekelu, Wagner se već deklariseo kao antiracionalista koji uvek iznova ističe primat osećanja nad razumom.² Takav stav je u pismu došao do izražaja u kritici kojoj je podvrgao predstavu „sveta kao celine“. Wagner je tu kritiku vodio u dva pravca. Čim je objasnio konstrukciju „sveta kao celine“, redukovao ju je na nivo fantazma i gole iluzije, nečega nerealnog koje, što se više razrađuje, svog konstruktora sve „više udaljava od stvarnosti sveta (*Wirklichkeit der Welt*)“ (Wagner 1987: 302). „Svet kao celina“ je nerealan, tj. samo zamišljen, jer je nedostupan čulima i osećanjima koja su, kako je verovao Wagner, jedini meritorni čovekovi vodiči kroz realnost. Ovaj nivo kritike bio je prilično jalov, pošto i sam Wagner prilikom konstruisanja alternativnog „sveta kao celine“ u svojim spisima nije mogao da izbegne istovrsnu racionalizaciju. Vagnerove filozofske pretenzije dovele su ga do toga da u svojoj teoriji i sam operiše alternativom „sveta kao celine“ koja je bila, kao i svaka konkurentska predstava takvog sveta, racionalni konstrukt koji je pretendovao na istinitost (tj. usklađenost sa „stvarnošću sveta“). Zato je mnogo važniji drugi pravac Vagnerove kritike koji ju je usmeravao protiv jedne sasvim konkretne varijante „sveta kao celine“ – „sveta sadašnjosti“ (*Welt der Gegenwart*).

Pojam „svet sadašnjosti“ Wagner je u pismu Rekelu upotrebio samo jednom, i to u negativnom smislu (Wagner 1897a: 88); o onome što je podrazumevao pod tim pojmom implicitno se izjašnjavao tokom celog pisma. Za Vagnera „svet sadašnjosti“ nije bio ništa drugo do pervertirani teorijski

2 U *Operi i drami* Wagner je uzdigao osećanje u jedan od centralnih pojmova svoje estetike deklarirajući se – barem u tom aspektu – kao antiracionalista (Bermbach 1994: 203). Wagner je već tada isticao da misao (*Gedanke*) poima samo ono što je neostvareno, što ne pripada sadašnjosti (*Ungegenwärtige*), a osećanje (*Gefühl*) je preko čula okrenuto onome što se dešava u sadašnjosti (*Gegenwärtige*), što je ostvareno (Wagner 2003: 235).

(„ideološki“) okvir koji odražava/održava samu pervertiranu realnost – „stvarnost sveta“ (*Wirklichkeit der Welt*) ili, kako ju je takođe nazvao u pismu, „savremenu stvarnost“ (*moderne Wirklichkeit*). „Savremena stvarnost“ bila je, verovao je Wagner, „nemoćna da zadovolji“ „želju da se iz najduhovnijih visina survamo u dubine ljubavi, čežnju da se utopimo u osećanje“ (Wagner 1897a: 93). Ta nemoć „savremene stvarnosti“ dovela je, prema Vagnerovom mišljenju, celu sadašnjost u „najdublju moguću tragičnu situaciju“ (Wagner 1987: 306).³ Opis situacije u društvu kao tragične, doživljaj realnosti kao nezadovoljavajuće i razmišljanja o njenoj promeni (kroz revoluciju), naravno nisu novina u Vagnerovoj misli.⁴ „Svet kao celinu“ i „svet sadašnjosti“ Wagner nikada nije kritikovao s pozicije nekoga ko ih je samo shvatao na svoj način, nego nekoga ko je zagovarao alternativu (jednu u nizu sličnih u Nemačkoj u 19. veku) koja bi trebalo da postane referentni okvir drugačijeg sveta. Pismo Rekelu značajno je pre svega zbog toga što je upravo u njemu svoje shvatanje realnosti artikulisao kroz nekoliko različitih pojmova i što je, pomoću njih, povezao ustrojstvo sveta i realnost.

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Vagner je termin „svet sadašnjosti“ u pismu Rekelu upotrebio u srodnom značenju u kom je koristio termin „život sadašnjosti“ (*Leben der Gegenwart*) u *Umetničkom delu budućnosti*, u „Saopštenju mojim prijateljima“ i u *Operi i drami*. U sva tri spisa iz oblasti estetike on je „život sadašnjosti“ suprotstavio „životu budućnosti“ (*Leben der Zukunft*). Takav način razmišljanja sugeriše da je i u vreme kada je pisao Rekelu na umu verovatno

3 Na sličan način razmišljao je tri godine ranije, u vreme kada je pisao „Saopštenje mojim prijateljima“ u kom je izlazio iz tog „tragičnog trenutka sadašnjice“ video jedino u „potpunom ponovnom sjedinjenju razuma i duše“ (Wagner 1892b: 342).

4 Vagner je svet u kom živi počeo da sagledava u kategorijama propadanja već od sredine pete decenije 19. veka, a posebno intenzivno u revolucionarnom periodu 1848–1849. Na nužnost revolucije koja jedina može da donese „fundamentalnu promenu“ počeo je da ukazuje već 1846. O tome svedoči sećanje njegovog tadašnjeg poznanika, Alfreda Majsnera (Alfred Meissner) (Krohn 1992: 159). U pismu Ernestu Kosaku (Ernst Kossak) skraja 1847. prizivao je revoluciju koja će „izgraditi pozitivne temelje“ za novi društveni poredak (Wagner 2000a: 578). Godine 1848. pridružio se revolucionarnom, republikanski orijentisanom levičarskom Otadžbinskom društvu u Drezdenu. U proleće 1849. našao se među onima koji su neuspešno pokušali da promene postojeći politički poredak, te samim tim i realnost, shodno demokratskom svetonazoru sa snažnim anarhističkim crtama. O manama postojećeg društva i konkretnim načinima njihovog prevazilaženja pisao je u tekstovima u kojima se bavio pitanjem političke reforme. Reč je pre svega o govoru „Kako se republikanska nastojanja odnose prema kraljevstvu“ („Wie verhalten sich republikanische Bestrebungen dem Königtum gegenüber?“, 1848), i tri eseja objavljena 1848. u Rekelovom *Volksblätteru*: „Nemačka i njeni kneževi“ („Deutschland und seine Fürsten“), „Čovek i postojeće društvo“ („Der Mensch und die bestehende Gesellschaft“) i „Revolucija“ („Die Revolution“). Pomenute tekstove, zajedno s dva otvorena pisma i esejom *Vibelunzi. Istorija sveta iz sage* (*Die Wiebilungen. Weltgeschichte aus der Sage*, 1848), Jürgen Kinel (Jürger Kühnel) je nazvao revolucionarnim spisima (Kühnel 1992: 576–579).

imao, iako ga nije spomenuo, „život budućnosti“. Njegova predstava „sveta/života budućnosti“ koji je suprotnost „svetu/životu sadašnjosti“ može se rekonstruisati na osnovu brojnih natuknica o priželjkivanim ishodima revolucionarne promene, rasutih u različitim spisima, kao i na osnovu opisa one realnosti, iz pisma Rekelu, koja je kontrast „stvarnosti sveta“. Ipak, ni u ovom pismu ni u dotadašnjim spisima, Wagner tu svoju predstavu sveta nije konkretizovao i teorijski razradio, niti je objasnio njen odnos prema u međuvremenu promenjenoj realnosti. Umesto toga, detaljno je razradio ideju umetničkog dela koje bi trebalo da bude svojevrsan posrednik između „sveta sadašnjosti“ i „sveta budućnosti“ i njima pripadajućih realnosti. O takvom tranzicionom zadatku umetničkog dela dobro svedoče redovi skraja *Opere i drame*: „U životu budućnosti umetničko delo će biti upravo ono za čime se danas samo čezne, a što još ne može da se ostvari: život budućnosti će postati ono što može da bude samo ako u svoje okrilje primi pravo umetničko delo“ (Vagner 2003: 254). Citirani zaključak *Opere i drame* važan je jer pokazuje da je Vagner pošao od aksioma da čovekova osnovna čežnja (*Verlangen, Ersehnen*) za utapanjem u osećanje, o kojoj je pisao i Rekelu, ne može da bude ispunjena u „realnosti sveta sadašnjosti“, ali da optimističku perspektivu njenog zadovoljenja u „realnosti sveta budućnosti“ otvara upravo umetničko delo zahvaljujući kojem se ta čežnja artikuliše *in nuce*. Vagnerova verzija „sveta sadašnjosti“ i na njemu zasnovane realnosti nije, dakle, bila fokusirana samo na antipodni „svet budućnosti“. Ona je imala dve komponente: sam „svet budućnosti“ i teorijsku refleksiju o umetničkom delu koje se menja već u „svetu sadašnjosti“. Takvo delo sadrži opis promene, shvaćene kao put regeneracije, i na taj način predskazuje pravac promene realnosti. U daljem toku rada ću, shodno tome, Vagnerovoj verziji „sveta sadašnjosti“ i njoj primerenoj realnosti pristupiti kao učenju o regeneraciji.

I

Danas je rasprostranjeno mišljenje da je Vagner koncept regeneracije počeo da razvija šezdesetih godina 19. veka,⁵ a da ga je razradio u starosti, u tzv. regenerativnim spisima (*Regenerationsschriften*)⁶, stvarajući svojevrsnu

5 Karl Fridrih Glasenap (Carl Friedrich Glasenapp) je u šestom tomu biografije *Das Leben Richard Wagners* konstatovao da je Vagner pojam *regeneracija* prvi put upotrebio u tekstu „Nemačka umetnost i nemačka politika“ iz 1867. (Glasenapp 1905: 354). Za slično mišljenje videti Hofmann 2003: 227–228.

6 „Regenerativni spisi“ oznaka je kojom se najčešće objedinjuju Vagnerovi kraći tekstovi, objavljeni na stranicama *Bayreuther Blätter*. Prvi regenerativni spis je „Moderna“ („Modern“, 1878) a poslednji „Herojstvo i hrišćanstvo“ („Heldentum und Christentum“, 1881).

teorijsku platformu za *Parsifala* (1882). Istina je, ipak, da je Wagner o regeneraciji počeo da razmišlja znatno ranije, još tokom četrdesetih godina 19. veka, i to nakon što je u Francuskoj dobio maglovite predstave o tome. Te predstave počeo je da zaodeva novim slojevima značenja tek kada se duboko razočarao zbog gašenja revolucionarnog požara koji je buknuo u Francuskoj i proširio se na kontinentalnu Evropu (Jeremić Molnar 2013).

U pismu Avgustu Šmitu (August Schmidt), uredniku *Allgemeine Wiener Musikzeitung*, od 14. septembra 1843, Wagner prvi put reč *regeneracija* nije upotrebio na čisto deskriptivan način, kako je činio do tada.⁷ On se požalio Šmitu na poražavajuću kritiku *Rienzija* (*Rienzi*, 1839) i uputio je „dobronamernu molbu da u interesu regeneracije (...) nemačke opere (...) debiji (*Debüts*) nemačkih muzičara budu prijateljskije pozdravljeni“ od njegovog (Wagner 2000b: 324). Šest godina kasnije, u spisu *Umetnost i revolucija* (*Kunst und Revolution*, 1849), napisao je da je Atinjanin prilikom izvođenja Eshilovih (Αἰσχύλος) tragedija mogao da doživi „preporod (*Wiedergeburt*) svog vlastitog bića (*seines eigenen Wesens*) kroz idealni izraz umetnosti“ (Wagner 1892c: 33). Razlika između ova dva pozivanja na regeneraciju veoma je velika. U prvom slučaju Wagner je regeneraciju nemačke opere uslovio povećanjem naklonosti kritičara, što znači da ju je razumeo sasvim jednostavno, kao obnovu kvaliteta; u drugom, pak, vezao je preporod bića pripadnika jednog naroda za (pozorišnu) umetnost i akcenat stavio na moralnu i duhovnu regeneraciju.

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Ako je revolucija pokrenula Wagnera da svoja ranija, prilično naivna razmišljanja o regeneraciji opere jednog naroda stavi u širi kontekst moralnog preporoda tog naroda, onda mu se Eshil (i to Drogenov [Droysen]) ponudio kao jedini istinski regenerativni uzor (Wagner 1983: 342). Od 1849. nadalje regeneracija je u Wagnerovoj svesti bila proces koji se paralelno odvija u pozorištu (kao i, ultimativno, u svim umetnostima) i u narodu (kao i, ultimativno, u celom čovečanstvu); inspiraciju za njihovo trajno i neraskidivo saodnošenje dobio je iz modela Eshilove *mousike* (preznačene u *Gesamtkunstwerk*) namenjene atinskom *Gesamtvolk*u. Taj misaoni obrazac vodio je Wagnera zaključku da u svakom narodu postoji skrivena suština koja svoj „idealni izraz“ dobija u umetničkom delu izvedenom na („preporođenoj“) pozornici pred okupljenim narodom; upravo u pozorištu narod može na najrealističniji način da opazi tu suštinu i da je prihvati kao polaznu tačku vlastitog preporoda. Wagner je i tada i kasnije verovao da se suština bića naroda po pravilu artikuliše kroz

7 O ranijim upotrebama reči preporod, sinonima za regeneraciju, videti u Jeremić Molnar 2013.

religiju. Ipak, bio je svestan nedostatnosti religije da sama sprovede regeneraciju – zbog manjka realističnosti njenih praktika – i njene upućenosti na pozorišnu umetnost, kao najrealističniju.

U narednim godinama, pa i decenijama, Wagner je u osnovi nastavio da u Eshilovom delu prepoznaje mesto *rođenja* zapadne umetnosti, a u sopstvenom delu mesto njenog *preporođenja*. Takav način razmišljanja ispoljio se i u spisu „Nemačka umetnosti i nemačka politika“ („Deutsche Kunst und deutsche Politik“, 1867), napisanom u euforiji očekivanja stvaranja Drugog rajha. Na jednom mestu tog spisa Wagner je vrlo pregnantno izložio svoj *credo*:

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Dve glavne i karakteristične faze pokazuju se u evropskoj umetnosti: njeno rođenje među Grcima, i njen preporod među modernim narodima. Preporod se neće u potpunosti uobličiti u ideal sve dok još jednom ne dosegne polaznu tačku rođenja. Renesansa je živela na ponovno otkrivenim, proučavanim, imitiranim delima grčke umetnosti, koja je jedino mogla da bude vajarstvo; do prave stvaralačke snage antičke umetnosti može se jedino doći napredovanjem ka izvoru iz kog je ta umetnost crpla snagu. Kao što se simbolički običaji ceremonija u hramu poredi s izvedbama eshilovske drame, poredi se starija vajarska umetnost Grka s proizvodima njenog procvata: taj procvat toliko je blisko sledio usavršavanje pozorišta, da se Fidijska ukazuje kao mlađi Eshilov savremenik. Umetnik vajar nikada nije prevazišao granice simboličkih običaja, sve dok Eshil nije oblikovao svešteničku horsku igru u životnu Dramu. Ukoliko bi bilo moguće da u savremenom Životu, preoblikovanom usled preporoda umetnosti, iznikne Pozorište koje će odgovarati najdubljem motivu njegove kulture u jednakoj meri u kojoj je grčko pozorište odgovaralo grčkoj religiji, onda će vajarstvo, i svaka druga umetnost, konačno još jednom dostići oživljavajući izvor s kog su se napajale za vreme Grka; ako ovo nije ostvarivo, onda je sama preporođena umetnost odživela svoje (Wagner 1895a: 73–74).

Za razumevanje punog smisla Vagnerovih reči potrebno je imati na umu njegovo razlikovanje učinka reformacije i renesanse. On je smatrao da je renesansa oponašala grčku umetnost i da evropskim narodima (Francuzima pre svega) koji su u prethodnom istorijskom razvoju prošli kroz nju, nije mogla da donese ništa više od „besprimernog kapricioznog preobražaja na pukom mehaničkom nivou, diktiranom odozgo“. U Nemačkoj je, međutim, reformacija označila početak pravog „preporoda duha naroda“ koji je, potom, inicirao „uskrsnuće nemačkog naroda“ (Wagner 1895a: 40). Preporod nemačkog duha, a s njim i naroda, nastavljen je, i to nakon dvovekovnog propadanja, polovinom 18. veka zahvaljujući književnicima koji su se angažovali na preporodu pozorišta (po antičkom grčkom modelu), otkrivajući potrebu usaglašavanja regeneracije umetnosti i naroda

(Wagner 1895a: 43). Vagnerova samonametnuta umetnička misija bila je da pregnuća ovih književnika dovede do uspešnog završetka. Ako se to ima u vidu, može se reći da je u spisu „Nemačka umetnost i nemačka politika“ Vagner povezao pet svojih ciljeva:

- 1) da od grčkog (atinskog) naroda, u čijem se okrilju *rodila* umetnost, napravi prototip regenerisanog naroda;
- 2) da pozorišnu umetnost (ali samo kao *Gesamtkunstwerk*) uzdigne u odnosu na ostale umetnosti i predstavi je kao jedinu koja je u stanju da na najrealističniji način predstavi idealitet narodne suštine;
- 3) da kritikuje tekovine renesanse i odbaci ih, zato što je ona, prema njegovom mišljenju, evropske narode odvela na stranputicu pukog oponašanja antičke umetnosti, umesto da ih je uputila u pravu prirodu regeneracije;
- 4) da svoju pozorišnu (muzičko-dramsku) umetnost proglasi za savršeni spoj regeneracije naroda i umetnosti: za logični završetak (a) religiozne obnove koju je započeo Martin Luter (Martin Luther), ali i (b) obnove umetnosti koju su započeli Lesing (Lessing), Gete (Goethe) i Šiler (Schiller), vođeni Eshilovim duhom;
- 5) da stvaranje Drugog rajha, već uveliko najavljivano u javnosti, stavi u kontekst vlastitog učenja o regeneraciji, a time i neraskidivo spoji sa svojim muzičkim dramama (za koje je tražio odgovarajuće mesto izvođenja koje bi pogodovalo njegovim pretenzijama na sakralno dejstvo).⁸

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Iako je svoje regenerativno učenje kasnije obogatio konzervativnim,⁹ anti-revolucionarnim,¹⁰ pa i rasističkim¹¹ sadržajima, Vagner nikada nije odstupio od već pomenutog aksioma da je umetničko (pogotovo muzičko-dramsko)

8 U jednom pismu iz tog vremena Vagner je otvoreno tvrdio da „s preporodom i napretkom Nemačke stoji i pada ideal moje umetnosti: samo u njoj ova može da napreduje!“ (Wagner 1912: 461).

9 U pismu kralju Ludvigu (*Ludwig*) od 23. septembra 1865. Vagner je napisao reči koji je kasnije preneo u članak „Šta je nemačko?“ („Was ist Deutsch?“, 1878): „Nemački narod dospeo je do preporoda, razvoja svojih najviših sposobnosti, zahvaljujući svom konzervativnom smislu, svom unutrašnjem držanju za sebe samog: svojevremeno je on iskrvario za održanje svojih kneževa. A sada je na njima da pokažu nemačkom narodu da mu pripadaju; a tamo gde je nemački duh sproveo preporod naroda, tamo je mesto gde narod treba da iznova prihvati kneževu“ (Wagner 1936: 24).

10 „Snaga moralnog napora u cilju regeneracije trebalo bi da bude ista kao i snaga fizičke revolucije koja je prouzrokovala degeneraciju ljudskog roda“ (Wagner 1975: 240).

11 Tako će Vagner, primera radi, pisati o „stvarnom preporodu rasnog osećanja, stvari koja svoj prvi izraz uvek pronalazi u duboko ukorenjenom instinktu“ (Wagner 1897d: 271).

delo most koji povezuje „svet sadašnjosti“ sa „svetom budućnosti“. Rodno mesto takvog uzdizanja umetničkog dela i isticanja njegovog regenerativnog potencijala bilo je Vagnerovo nezadovoljstvo neuspelom revolucije 1848–1849. i iznalaženje strategija za pomirenje s tim. U *Umetničkom delu budućnosti* Vagner je pisao da sama priroda ima potrebu za „najvećom višestrukom raznovrsnošću“ koju zadovoljava zahvaljujući „porađajućoj sili“ koja započinje od priznavanja drugosti, a svoju najvišu manifestaciju dobija u odnosima između muškarca i žene (Wagner 1892a: 78–79), „u skladu s prirodnim zakonima Ljubavi, (kao) predavanje zajedničkom (*Gemeinsame*) uz pomoć ljubavi“ (Wagner 1897d: 149). Iako se u davna vremena pokoravao prirodnim zakonima čulne ljubavi čovek je, prema Vagnerovom mišljenju, tokom procesa civilizovanja vrlo brzo podlegao zlu egoizma, „koji je doneo tako nemerljiv jad u svet i takvo žalosno sakaćenje i neiskrenost u Umetnosti“ (Wagner 1897d: 99). Egoizam je do 19. veka već ušao u sve pore života, podredio čovekove potrebe diktatu mode (Wagner 1897d: 84) i podrio umetnost kao principijelnu emancipativnu praksu. Umetnosti koje su nekada bile združene u *mousike* postale su egoistične, razdvojile su se i postale predmet mode (Wagner 1897d: 153).

Godine 1849. Vagner je u opštečovečanskoj (komunističkoj) revoluciji još uvek video jedini način za prevazilaženje zla egoizma i spasenje sveta (Wagner 1897d: 78–79). Međutim, u isto vreme je, i to u istom tekstu, počeo polako da uzmiče s revolucionarnih pozicija i da vezuje spas sveta za „stvarno umetničko delo“ (*das wirkliche Kunstwerk*), shvaćeno u smislu muzičke drame, odnosno *Gesamtkunstwerka*. Smatrao je da se kroz „stvarno umetničko delo“ najpre spasava njegov tvorac (koji kroz njega kanališe svoju „stvaralačku snagu“),¹² a potom i ceo narod (koji spasavajući sebe spasava čak i „svoje neprijatelje“) (Wagner 1897d: 81). To je bio prvi Vagnerov regenerativni program, formulisan pod uticajem revolucionarnih zbivanja, koji je ostavio dubok trag na *Prstenu Nibelunga* (*Der Ring des Nibelungen*, 1848–1874). Kasnije, međutim, kako je u njemu splašnjavalo ushićenje revolucijom, kako je počeo da tone u sve dublju egzistencijalnu krizu, kako su mu nazori (pogotovo nakon što se vratio u Nemačku) postajali sve konzervativniji i, naposljetku, kako je stario i „hladio“ se prema čulnoj ljubavi, tako je na mesto (komunističkog) puta spasenja iz zala egoizma počeo da se probija nacionalistički put, „neprijatelji“ nemačkog

12 „Stvarno Umetničko delo, to jest *njegova čulna predstava, u trenutku njegovog najtelesnijeg pojavljivanja*, jeste pre svega spasenje umetnika; eliminacija poslednjih tragova stvaralačke proizvoljnosti; nesumnjivo određenje onoga što je prethodno bilo zamišljeno; oslobođenje misli i čulnosti; zadovoljenje životne potrebe u životu“ (Wagner 1897d: 73).

naroda (koje je on sam trebalo da spasi zajedno sa sobom) konkretizovali su se u liku Francuza i, pogotovo, Jevreja, a ljubav u kojoj je trebalo da vrhuni stvaralačka snaga (i umetnika i naroda) postala je spiritualna.

II

U tzv. regenerativnim spisima Wagner je ustrajao na stavu da „naša cela civilizacija propada (...) zbog nedostatka ljubavi“. Međutim, pod ljubavlju tada više nije podrazumevao čulnu ljubav. Upravo suprotno: „Kako mladalačka srčanost, za koju se današnji svet sve jasnije otvara, može voleti taj svet, kada je on, u svakom dodiru s njim, upozorava na oprez i podozrenje? Sasvim je izvesno da može postojati samo jedan put kojim bi ona trebalo da ide i na kojem bi joj nedostatak ljubavi u svetu postao razumljiv kao patnja tog sveta: na taj način u njoj probuđeno sapatništvo značilo bi da spozna uzroke te patnje sveta, požude strasti, i izmakne im se, kako bi patnju drugoga mogla da smanji i spreči“ (Wagner 1897c: 259). Ljubav lišenu „požude strasti“ Wagner je na drugom mestu opisao i kao „božansku Ljubav izvan svakog poznavanja poročnosti, Ljubav koja je najdublje poricanje sveta preokrenula u prihvatanje spasenja“ (Wagner 1897b: 219). On nije krio da je takvim shvatanjem ljubavi želeo da se direktno nadoveže na hrišćansku asketsku tradiciju. Zato je uglavnom i govorio o „Ljubavi“ u uzvišenom hrišćanskom smislu“ (Wagner 1897c: 259), o „iskupljujućoj hrišćanskoj Ljubavi, u koju su uključene i Vera i Nada“ (Wagner 1897c: 260), pa čak i o „ljubavi (*wahre Liebe*) prema iskupitelju od ovog sveta“ (Wagner 1897e: 117) čije je razapeto telo koje pati „kvintesencija svemilosrdne Ljubavi“ (Wagner, 1897b: 217). Ipak, Wagner nikada nije smatrao da takvu ljubav u čoveku treba da probudi samo Isus, nego je zagovarao i „ljubav prema bližnjem“ (*Nächstenliebe*) (Wagner 1911: 197–198) koja se ispoljava u okvirima jednog naroda. Sumnjajući da bi mogao da postoji čovek koji bi bio toliki kosmopolita da oseća „ljubav za celu ljudsku vrstu“ (čije su se povezujuće niti tokom dosadašnje svetske istorije „pokidale“), Wagner je svoj koncept sapatničke ljubavi utemeljio u „osećaju srodstva s neposrednom nacijom iz koje smo iznikli“ i u kojem je sapatništvo (sa sunarodnicima kao daljim srodnicima) jednako snažno kao i u porodici (s neposrednim srodnicima) (Wagner 1897d: 272). Time je na mesto Zigfrida kao spasioca čovečanstva, koji je doživeo neuspeh jer je osećao zov čulne ljubavi (tj. „požudu strasti“ i „poročnosti“), stupio Parsifal kao spasilac Nemaca, koji je sapatničkom ljubavlju prema sunarodnicima i neimenovanom Spasiocu (koga je spašavao očigledno samo kao sunarodnika) nadomestio realnu mržnju prema ženama, jereticima i ostalim „neprijateljima“ naroda.

Ipak, uprkos svim ovim menama, u Vagnerovom regenerativnom učenju ostao je neupitan aksiom da spas od zala egoizma (koji vlada „svetom sadašnjosti“) i otvaranje perspektive ujedinjujuće ljubavi (koja će vladati u „svetu budućnosti“) može doneti samo umetničko delo koje će spasenje prikazati kao čulima primalaca dostupnu realnost. Zato je osnovni zadatak njegovog regenerativnog učenja bio da pruži odgovor na pitanje kako je moguće prevazići realnost primerenu „svetu sadašnjosti“ i umetničkim sredstvima stvoriti *realnosti prelaza ka* realnosti primerenoj „svetu budućnosti“. To je bila „realnost muzičkih drama“ koju je Vagner konstruisao na bini društveno i moralno regenerisanog pozorišta; realnost drugačija i od „realnosti sveta sadašnjosti“, i od „realnosti sveta budućnosti“ – „realnost spasenja“ samog. Takva *transformacija „realnosti sveta sadašnjosti“ u „realnost sveta budućnosti“* trebalo je da bude posadašnjena (*Verwirklichung*) za čula i osećanja okupljene publike. U realnosti spasenja, kao prelaza, trebalo je da budu prisutni elementi i starog (tj. sadašnjeg) i novog, i zla egoizma i dobra ljubavi; ona je trebalo da bude realnost njihovog žestokog sukoba u kojoj „svet sadašnjosti“, skupa s odgovarajućom realnošću, pretrpljuje konačni poraz, biva spoznat kao prolazan i ništavan,¹³ a „svet budućnosti“, skupa sa svojom realnošću, obznanjuje se i počinje da nezadrživo sebi krči put.

Da bi uopšte bio u mogućnosti da u svojim muzičkim dramama prikaže kontinuiranu transformaciju realnosti postojećeg, potpuno pervertiranog sveta, u buduću, potpuno regenerisani svet, Vagner je u realnosti „sveta sadašnjosti“ morao da identifikuje potencijal za promenu. Stoga ne čudi što je u spisima nastalim nakon 1849. insistirao na tome da je promena sama srž svake realnosti. Značaj promene za realnost Vagner je najbolje objasnio u već citiranom pismu Rekelu. U osnovi svake realnosti, pa i realnosti „sveta sadašnjosti“, pisao je Vagner Rekelu, stoji beskrajna i neiscrpna „mnogostrukost“ (*Vielheit*) koja izmiče aktivnosti razuma u konstruisanju celine sveta i koja se može pojmiti isključivo pomoću osećanja. Osećanja su ta koja iznova obnavljajuću nepresušnu mnogostrukost spoznaju samo kao pojedinačnu „sveprisutnu iako svepromenljivu“ pojavu, a promenu (*Wechsel*) kao suštinu *realnog*. Ako je realno samo

¹³ Spoznaju ništavnosti „sveta sadašnjosti“ u realnosti umetničkog dela Vagner je najpregnantnije opisao na kraju spisa *O državi i religiji (Über Staat und Religion, 1864)*. Tu je zaključio da se „veliki, istinski plemeniti duh razlikuje od uobičajene organizacije svakodnevice“ po tome što se suočava sa „suštinskim prafenomenima sveg postojanja“ i dolazi do „te unutrašnje praspoznaje (*Ur-Erkennniß*) suštine sveta“. Tu svoju praspoznaju on drugim ljudima (koji su zarobljeni „uobičajenom organizacijom svakodnevice“) može da prikaže samo kroz (umetničko) „delo one iluzije koja spasava čoveka“ (Wagner 1895b: 32–34).

ono što se menja, onda, smatrao je Wagner, biti realan znači „biti rođen, rasti, cvetati, venuti i umreti“ (Wagner 1987: 302), rečju živeti shodno kosmičkom zakonu promene i obnavljanja (Wagner 1987: 307). Na taj način je Wagner ono realno povezoao s celokupnim kosmičkim ustrojstvom, koje se opire fiksiranju, zaustavljanju ili ovekovečenju. Glavna implikacija tog stava bila je da sve što postoji ima kraj, uključujući i „svet sadašnjosti“. O tome najbolje svedoči njegova konstatacija da „bez nužnosti smrti nema mogućnosti života: kraja nema samo ono što nema početak, a pespočetno je samo ono što nije realno, nego je zamišljeno“ (Wagner 1987: 302).¹⁴

Početakom 1854. Wagner je čulnu ljubav uzdizao u najintenzivnije osećanje koje muškarcu i ženi omogućava punu participaciju u realnosti i pomicanje s celokupnom dinamikom promene, čak i sa smrću. Samo sjedinjeni u čulnoj ljubavi, muškarac i žena mogu prevazići svoju dotadašnju, po prirodi nastalu posebnost, početi da na drugačiji način gledaju na život i smrt i postati slobodni – a to znači istiniti ljudi, verni svojoj suštini.¹⁵ Svaka druga ljubav, nemoćna da proizvede takvo emancipatorno utapajuće, tj. stvarno osećanje, pokazuje se tek kao ideja (a ne realnost) i ovekovečuje se u nekoj razumskoj (pojmovnoj) konstrukciji.¹⁶ „Svet sadašnjosti“ bio je, prema Vagnerovom mišljenju, jedna takva konstrukcija, koja je negirala čulnu ljubav „realnog čoveka“, koja je izolovane i otuđene ljude upućivala na samoljublje (egoizam) i koja je promenu (skupa sa smrću) – koju, naravno, nije mogla da negira – uzdigla u nešto zastrašujuće što zatire slobodu i protiv čega se treba boriti svim snagama. Pošto je za egoistične ljude u „svetu sadašnjosti“ realna, čulna ljubav na paradoksalan način samo nešto zamišljeno, željeno, a sam život neprirodan, neizdrživ i neodrživ, oni su upućeni na surogate ili nadomestke ljubavi

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14 Spoznati potpunu istinu o stvarnosti, pisao je Wagner Rekelu, znači prihvatiti „s radošću i tugom“ životni ciklus od stvaranja do smrti, ili, drugim rečima, prihvatiti stvarnost da u zadovoljstvu i patnji živimo i – umiremo. Samo je to značilo, kako je verovao Wagner, „biti načisto s istinom“ (Wagner 1987: 302).

15 Za Vagnera je istinitost (*Wahrhaftigkeit*) bila sinonim za slobodu (*Freiheit*). U pismu Rekelu je to i objasnio: „Onaj ko je istinit (*wahrhaft*) – to jest, veran sebi, u savršenom skladu sa sopstvenom prirodom – taj je slobodan. Spoljno ograničenje je nemoćno osim ako ne uspe da uništi tu istinitost u svojoj žrtvi i prinudi je na prikriivanje, pokušavajući tako da nju i druge navede da veruju da su nešto drugo od onoga što su zaista. A to je pravo ropstvo“ (Wagner 1987: 301).

16 To pojašnjavaju Vagnerove reči: „Mi možemo stvarno da pojmimo neku pojavu samo ako dozvolimo da budemo u potpunosti apsorbovani u nju i ako smo u stanju da je bezostatno upijemo u sebe. Kako se ovaj čudesni proces najpotpunije ostvaruje? Pitajmo Prirodu. Samo kroz ljubav“ (Wagner 1987: 303). Slično je tvrdio i u „Saopštenju mojim prijateljima“: „[S]ušтина ove ljubavi [...] je čežnja za konačnom čulnom realnošću“ (Wagner 1892b: 335).

(Wagner 1987: 304–305), kako bi uopšte mogli da opstanu. Brojni su primeri takvih surogata ili nadomestaka – Vagner je čak pisao da je „osećanje za dete ili prijatelja samo surogat“ (Wagner 1987: 304) – ali samo jedan vodi izbavljenju od „sveta sadašnjosti“: umetničko delo (shvaćeno kao rezultat autentičnog „umetničkog nagona [*Kunstdrang*]“) (Wagner 1987: 304).

268 Ovaj momenat je veoma bitan i daje povoda da se u Vagnerovoj misli razdvoje tri vrste realnosti s kojima je operisao. Prva realnost je „realnost sveta sadašnjosti“, u kojoj je prava čulna ljubav za egoističnog čoveka samo apstrakcija, promena zastrašujući usud, a umnožavanje surogata jedini način preživljavanja. Druga realnost je „realnost sveta budućnosti“ u kojoj će ljubav biti moguća zato što će osećanja biti u potpunosti slobodna, a promena shvaćena kao nužnost potpuno kompatibilna sa slobodom osećanja, usled čega će celokupan život moći da se vodi „istinito“. Čak i pred kraj života, kada je u regenerativnim spisima revidirao svoju mladalačku teoriju *čulne* ljubavi, Vagner nije promenio shvatanje „realnosti sveta budućnosti“: ona će omogućiti ljudima da žive u ljubavi zato što će njihova osećanja biti slobodna, a njihova „suština“ (ili priroda) biti „istinito“ pomirena s celokupnim kosmičkim poretkom, pa i samim društvom.¹⁷ No, Vagner je svakako bio najviše zainteresovan za treću realnost, „realnost umetničkog dela“ – ili tačnije, realnost muzičke drame izvedene na bini regenerisanog pozorišta – koju je *on sam trebalo da konstruiše u „svetu sadašnjosti“, anticipirajući „svet budućnosti“ i, štaviše, pripremajući njegov nastanak*. Za razliku od „realnosti sveta sadašnjosti“, koja je posledica egoizma, i „realnosti sveta budućnosti“, koja će proisteci iz nesputane ljubavi, „realnost muzičke drame“ morala je da bude u službi *spasenja*, kao prelaza iz prve u drugu realnost.

Po Vagnerovom mišljenju, samo je umetničko delo bilo u stanju da omogućiti „poštenu uvid u dato stanje stvari, otvoreno priznanje istine“, i da pokaže „put koji vodi spasenju“ (Wagner 1987: 305). Taj put počinjao je u lošoj sadašnjosti koja je opterećena zlima egoizma ali nije potpuno lišena perspektive regeneracije. Regeneracija nije bila moguća bez spoznaje najvažnije „istine“ *promene*, svojstvene celokupnom kosmičkom

17 Vagner je već tokom revolucije 1849. zaključio da čovek, da bi bio srećan, mora da živi u srećnom društvu, pa samim tim i da voli sve ljude s kojima živi, a ne samo osobu suprotnog pola. Tu poruku pokušao je da inkorporira u nezavršenu operu o Hristu, čijom se smrću ljubav proširila na sve ljude, postajući univerzalna. U skicama za operu Isus iz Nazareta (*Jesus von Nazareth*, 1848–1849), nastalim upravo u vihoru revolucionarnih zbivanja, Vagner je „moralni proces oslobođenja od egoizma“ vezao i za ljubav i za smrt. Najpre je egoizam prevaziđen u ljubavi, da bi onda smrt, kao „poslednji i konačni preokret egoizma“, donela „uzlet života pojedinca u život celine“, nalazeći u tome najvišu slobodu (Wagner 1899: 313–314).

poretku: da iza smrti sledi *preporod*, koji nikada *nije* iznenađan i neočekivan *dogadjaj*, nego proces s razvojnou dinamikou. Samim tim, „realnost umetničkog dela“ je, iako *klica* „realnosti sveta budućnosti“, imala svoju posebnost i autentičnost u tome što je u prvim napuklinama realnosti „sveta sadašnjosti“ otkrivala „istinite“ momente večne promene – nagoveštaje ne samo dolazeće smrti nego i *regenerativne borbe* u kojoj, jedan po jedan, nestaju relikti „sveta sadašnjosti“.

III

Time se ukazuje paradoks u Vagnerovom regenerativnom učenju: regeneracija je započinjala u jednom od surogata unutar „sveta sadašnjosti“ – umetničkom delu – koji se od ostalih surogata razlikovao po tome što je mogao da predstavi spasenje kao realnost. Međutim, Vagner nije mislio da svako umetničko delo može da izvrši taj zadatak. Već u *Operi i drami* konstatovao je da se svaki „predmet“ mora „u najubedljivijoj stvarnosti“, izneti pred čula a da se to „moglo postići samo u drami“ (Wagner 2003: 92) u kojoj je ulogu komunikacije s osećanjima publike (rezervisanu u antičkoj tragediji za hor) preuzela muzika. Imajući to u vidu, samo spasenje moralo je da dobije posebnu realnost – „realnost inscenirane muzičke drame“ – jednaku realnosti koju je imao egoizam i realnosti koju je trebalo da dobije nesputana ljubav. Vremenom je Vagner postajao sve ubeđeniji da realnost spasenja može da bude predstavljena samo posadašnjem njegovih muzičkih drama – ciklusa *Prsten Nibelunga* i *Parsifala* – na sceni pozorišta koje nalikuje hramu i kao deo svetkovine s aurom religioznog rituala. Razvijajući stav da „sva delotvorna snaga koja dovodi do velike regeneracije može izvirati samo s dubokog tla istinite religije“ (Wagner 1897b: 243), Vagner je čin izvođenja svojih regenerativnih muzičkih drama preobrazio u svojevrstan misterijski kult.

Realnost spasenja koju je Vagner uspeo da konstruiše u Bajrojtskom pozorištu nije bila tek projekcija realnosti „sveta budućnosti“ regenerisanog nemačkog naroda; nije bila ni obična pozorišna realnost, lako usaglasiva s „realnošću sveta sadašnjosti“. Od svojih muzičkih drama i svih ljudi koji su bili involvirani u njihovu realizaciju Vagner je očekivao mnogo više. On je verovao u to da su muzičke drame izvedene u njegovom društveno i moralno regenerisanom pozorištu dovoljno realistične da stvore „idealni izraz“ suštine naroda (kojim se, inače, bavi religija), dovoljno ubedljive da motivišu njegove savremenike (okupljene u gledalištu, mističnom ponoru, na sceni i iza nje) da se angažuju u zadatku spasenja nacije i navedu ih da razmisle o pretvaranju tog „idealnog izraza“ u „realnost sveta

budućnosti“. Vagner nije očekivao od bajrojske publike da se odrekne spoljnog sveta, bez obzira na to što se činio efemeran, neistinit, neslobodan i pervertiran u poređenju s „realnošću umetničkog dela“ koju je on konstruisao. Publika nije smela ni da se začauri u realnost koju je doživela u Bajrojskom pozorištu. Upravo suprotno: muzičke drame trebalo je da joj uliju dodatnu snagu potrebnu za traganje za svim kopčama sa spoljnim svetom koje bi mogle da se iskoriste u svrhe realizacije projekta regeneracije.

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Iako je u Bajrojsko pozorište mogao da stupi svako s kartom (dakle, i veliki broj stranaca), izvođenja Vagnerovih muzičkih drama tokom svečanosti bila su zapravo namenjena „istinskim“ Nemcima i onima koji tek što to nisu postali. „Istinski“ Nemci bili su oni koji su svesni svog „odrođenja“ (*Entartung*),¹⁸ ali ipak imaju vrlo izražen „osećaj srodstva s neposrednom nacijom iz koje [su] iznikli“. Oni su bili u stanju da osete „realnost insceniranih muzičkih drama“, da emotivno, mentalno i duhovno urone u nju, da je dožive kao klicu potpuno nove realnosti, da razviju senzibilitet za sapatničku ljubav kao najsubverzivniju silu u postojećem svetu i da dođu u poziciju da prihvate Vagnerovu viziju „sveta budućnosti“ i shvate neophodnost borbe za njega, u predstojećoj revoluciji ako je potrebno. Vagnerov konačni cilj bio je da u „istinske“ Nemce preobradi svoje uvažene sunarodnike, posebno pripadnike političke elite. Ispostavilo se da je taj ambiciozni cilj bio neostvariv. Umesto toga, pošlo mu je za rukom da oko sebe okupi sledbenike koji su introjektovali njegovo učenje, objektivirajući ga unutar čvrsto integrisane grupe. Vagnerove pristalice bezostatno su usvojile njegov svetonazor, bezuslovno su prihvatile sva njegova objašnjenja i poslušno sledile uputstva kako bi „pravilno“ doživele okultnu prirodu realnosti spasenja utemeljene u posebnoj koncepciji umetničkog dela.

Vagneru se ne može osporiti delimičan uspeh u sprovođenju regenerativnog učenja. Njegova verzija realnosti je, čak i pre nego što ju je posadašnjio na sceni Bajrojskog pozorišta, naišla na odjek kod mnogih intelektualaca i pokrenula ih da sarađuju s redakcijom *Bayreuther Blätter* ili da se, barem, pretplaćuju na časopis, da osnivaju „Richard-Vagner-udruženja“ ili da se, barem, učlanjuju u njih, da doniraju novčana sredstva ili

18 Za regenerativnu misiju bili su sposobni samo oni Nemci koji kao svoj *credo* prihvate Vagnerove reči: „Mi prepoznamo razlog pada istorijskog čoveka i nužnost njegove regeneracije; mi verujemo u mogućnost takve regeneracije i posvećujemo se njenom sprovođenju u svakom smislu“ (Wagner 1897c: 262). „Istinski“ je, prema Vagnerovom mišljenju, bio samo onaj Nemač koji „nemstvo (*Deutschsein*)“ prepoznaje ne u realnom životu, u nekoj od postojećih „formi postojanja“, nego tamo gde one pokreću loše osećanje ili inspirišu na pobunu (Wagner 1896: 332).

da, barem, nalaze one koji to mogu da učine. Najotrašćeniji među njima pokazali su spremnost za uključivanje i u agresivnije vidove borbe koja je vođena izvan pozorišta, a sve zarad širenja Vagnerovog regenerativnog svetonazora i umetničkih predstava o germanskom mitskom pravremenu, preporodu nemačkog naroda i duhovnoj transformaciji sveta.¹⁹ Bez doprinosa ovih „istinskih“ Nemaca, Vagnerovih sledbenika koji su u potpunosti introjektovali njegovu verziju „sveta kao celine“, ne bi bio zamisliv udar na „svet sadašnjosti“ koji je usledio u Vajmarskoj republici; dve realnosti ostale bi izolovane jedna od druge, a Bajrojske svečanosti bi odmah postale ono na šta su zaista degradirane nakon 1945. – tek jedna od mnogih realnosti u životima posetilaca.

Primljeno: 21. septembra 2013.

Prihvaćeno: 20. novembra 2013.

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19 Fridrih Niče (Friedrich Nietzsche) je u eseju „Rihard Vagner u Bajrojt“ („Richard Wagner in Bayreuth“, 1876), u uzavreloj atmosferi priprema za održavanje prvih Bajrojskih svečanosti, pisao: „Za nas Bajrojt znači jutarnju zakletvu na dan borbe. Ne bi nam se mogla naneti veća nepravda nego da se kaže da nam je stalo samo do umetnosti: kao da je ona neko lekovito i omamljujuće sredstvo, uz pomoć kojeg bi se sva ostala bedna stanja mogla ukinuti sama od sebe. U slici tog tragičnog umetničkog dela u Bajrojt vidimo upravo borbu pojedinca sa svim onim što mu se suprotstavlja kao prividno neprinudna nužnost, s državom, zakonom, običajem, ugovorom i celokupnim poretkom stvari“ (Nietzsche 2007: 212). Postavljajući 1882. *Parsifala* na pozornici Bajrojskog pozorišta, Vagner je suočio nemačke patriote s još jačim iskušenjem predavanja žudnji za nacionalnim i religioznim spasom. To je potvrdio Hans fon Wolcogen (Hans von Wolzogen), priznajući da ga je izvođenje *Parsifala* pokretalo na „čista, idealna junačka dela“, pod kojima je podrazumevao priključivanje borbi za „Spasiočevo delo“ (Wolzogen: 44).

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Dragana Jeremić Molnar

The problem of reality in writings of Richard Wagner

Reality of Artwork as Transition from „Reality of the Contemporary World“ towards „Reality of the Future World“

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Abstract

Richard Wagner began perceiving the world in terms of decay as early as the mid-1840s and especially during the 1848–49 revolution. He did not critique the contemporary world (and its accompanying reality) as someone who merely understood it in his own way. Wagner actually developed his own version of the world that was meant to become the referential framework for creating an entirely different reality in the future. The most exhaustive source concerning Wagner's idea of the world and reality is his famous letter to August Röckel, from 25–26 January 1854. In it Wagner put together his earlier reflections on reality into a relatively coherent and meaningful whole. He did it by the means of several different concepts: „the World as a whole“, „the actual world“, „reality of the world“/„the modern reality“. In this letter and elsewhere, he failed to elaborate his idea of the world, as well as to explain its relationship with „the modern reality“ that was undergoing change. Instead, he developed another idea: that of the artwork which was supposed to be a sort of mediator between „the actual world“ and „the world of the future“, as well as between their accompanying realities. Wagner's version of the „actual world“ (as well as its appropriate reality) comprised two components: „the actual world“ itself and the artwork, which was already changing it. Such a work contained a description of the change, understood in terms of regeneration, and thus also a prediction of the way reality itself should change in the future, as well as the direction of the change.

Keywords: Richard Wagner, reality, artwork, world, regeneration

PRIKAZI IV
REVIEWS

SABINA HADŽIBULIĆ: DRUŠTVENI ŽIVOT
OPERE U LJUBLJANI
(VLADO KOTNIK, *OPERNO OBČINSTVO
V LJUBLJANI: VZPON IN PADEC NEKE
URBANE SOCIALIZACIJE V LETIH
1660–2010*, UNIVERZITETNA ZALOŽBA
ANNALES, KOPER 2012, STR. 400)

Dr Vlado Kotnik nije prvi antropolog koji se bavi proučavanjem opere, ali svakako jeste jedan od retkih i, po svom bogatom i pasioniranom radu, izuzetno značajnih autora u toj oblasti. Naime, knjiga *Operno občinstvo v Ljubljani: Vzpon in padec neke urbane socializacije v letih 1660–2010 (Operska publika u Ljubljani: Uspon i pad urbane socijalizacije u periodu od 1660. do 2010. godine)* predstavlja već petu u nizu njegovih knjiga posvećenih operi, kojoj prilazi kao kompleksnom društvenom, kulturnom i istorijskom fenomenu. U žiži ove obimne interdisciplinarne studije nalazi se društveni život vezan za operu u Ljubljani, s posebnim naglaskom na društvene i kulturne karakteristike procesa formiranja operske publike i rituale posećivanja operskih predstava od sredine 17. do početka 21. veka. Kotnikov cilj je da prikaže istorijski razvoj operske publike u Ljubljani, pre svega njenu organizaciju, socijalizaciju i oblike potrošnje, a kroz pet ključnih poglavlja organizovanih prema različitim, hronološki poredanim obrascima identifikacije.

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Studiju otvara Kotnikova tvrdnja da značaj i uloga operske publike u Ljubljani u jačanju nacionalnog identiteta u važnim događajima i procesima na slovenačkom kulturnom i etničkom prostoru još uvek nisu u potpunosti priznati, niti temeljno naučno istraženi. Ne postoje saznanja o društvenim procesima reprodukcije i regrutacije operske publike u Sloveniji, o faktorima koji odlučuju o učestalosti posećivanja operskih predstava, niti o vezi tih specifičnih kulturnih praksi s osnovnim sociodemografskim korelatima. U nastavku uvodnog dela sledi kratak osvrt na istorijsku vezu operske koncertnom i pozorišnom publikom, a zatim i upoznavanje čitaoca s različitim shvaćanjima i određenjima pojma operske publike u naučnoj literaturi.

Prvo poglavlje knjige „Ekskluzivna publika: Opera kao privatna atrakcija kranjskog plemstva“ („Ekskluzivno občinstvo: Opera kot zasebna atrakcija kranjskega plemstva“) odnosi se na razdoblje između 1660. i 1756. godine, odnosno period od prve dokumentovane reference na operski događaj u Ljubljani, pa

sva do trenutka kada ona postaje bogatija za prvu stalnu opersku i pozorišnu kuću. Kulturni život glavnog grada Vojvodine Kranjske kreirala je i usmeravala najuticajnija plemićka porodica Auersperg (Auersperg), a retki operski, plesni i pozorišni događaji bili su rezervisani za pripadnike kranjskog plemstva, državne zvaničnike i višu klasu. Opera postaje nužni deo aristokratskog identiteta, a rituali javne recepcije opere izraz nove sentimentalne senzualnosti shvaćene kao pouzdan znak socijalnog prestiža i kulturnog napretka. Gostovanje prvih profesionalnih putujućih operskih grupa bila su vrhunac kulturnog života Ljubljane, ali i razlog da ona postane vidljiva na kulturnoj mapi Evrope.

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Sledeće poglavlje „Stratifikovana publika: Nacionalno pozorište kao mesto javne socijalne diferencijacije“ („Stratificirano občinstvo: Stanovsko gledalište kot kraj javnega družbenega razlikovanja“) Kotnik je posvetio periodu postojanja prve stalne pozorišne i operске kuće Stanovsko gledališče (*Ständisches Theater*) u Ljubljani (1765–1887), osnovane kao simbol odanosti Habzburškom dvoru. Sama arhitektura ovog centra kulture pratila je statusnu stratifikaciju njegove publike, jer on je, prema Kotnikovim rečima, za stanovnike grada mnogo više od onog što se dešava na sceni. Tako su plemstvo, buržoazija i zvaničnici rasporedom svojih mesta u publici slali jasnu poruku o sopstvenoj društvenoj poziciji. Posedovanje lože smatrano je svojevrstnim simbolom statusnog prestiža i, kao takvo, pripadalo isključivo plemstvu i najbogatijim građanima. Ipak, tokom 19. veka operске predstave gube na ekskluzivitetu, što dovodi do stvaranja operске publike iz redova srednje klase. Gubitak privilegovanog socijalnog statusa u drugoj polovini 19. veka „izbacio“ je plemstvo iz loža, a omogućio buržoaziji da posećivanje opere, koncerta ili pozorišne predstave bude njena najčešća javna kulturna aktivnost.

Nestanak Nacionalnog pozorišta u požaru (1887) načelno je i početak nove faze koja, prema Kotniku, traje do 1945. godine. Naziv trećeg poglavlja „Nacionalna publika: Poseta ljubljanskoj Operi kao društvena dužnost“ („Nacionalno občinstvo: Obisk ljubljanske

opere kot družbena dolžnost“) upućuje na organizovani proces nacionalnog buđenja Slovenaca u kome je muzika imala ključnu ulogu. Kao idealna veza između ideje o nacionalnoj svesti i sugestivne snage muzike, opera postaje vrsta nacionalnog simbola. Osnivanje slovenačke operске kuće Državni teatar (danas Opera i balet Ljubljana) 1892. godine među Slovencima je interpretirano kao simboličan čin konstituisanja slovenačke nacije, a njeno posećivanje kao jasan iskaz nacionalnog identiteta i osećanja. Kotnik ovaj čin opisuje kao materijalizaciju dugovečnog slovenačkog sna, ali i znak političke emancipacije Slovenaca od roditeljskih kultura susednih imperijalističkih nacija. Do sredine 20. veka posećivanje Opere postalo je najpopularniji vid kulturnog života u Ljubljani. Prvi radijski prenosi opere i koncerata klasične muzike Radio Ljubljane i stasavanje lokalnih operskih zvezda (Julij Betetto, Zlata Đundenac, Vjekoslav Janko, Jože/Josip Gostič, Zinka Kunc Milanov) dodatno su približili operu publici i učinili da se muzički život u Operi ne prekida „zarad dobrobiti nacije“ ni tokom Drugog svetskog rata. Zahvaljujući činjenici da su postali operska publika, zaključuje Kotnik, Slovenici su se konstituisali i kao kulturna nacija.

Opera u vreme socijalizma (1945–1991) predmet je poglavlja „Trijumfalna publika: Operska kuća kao utočište slavni od realizma socijalističkog sveta“ („Triumfalno občinstvo: Opera hiša kot zatočišče zvezdniškega realizma socialističnega ljudstva“). Posleratni period Kotnik predstavlja kao najplodniji i najpobedonosniji period ljubljanske Opere i njene publike kada, zahvaljujući socijalističkom shvatanju kulture i umetnosti kao vlasništva radnih ljudi, operu prihvataju širi slojevi društva. Frapantni razvoj i trijumfalni uspon ansambla ljubljanske Opere privukli su nove generacije publike i stvorili kult masovnog obožavanja domaćih pevačkih zvezda (Wilma Bukovec, Rudolf Franc, Ladko Korošec, Miro Brajnik, Samo Smerkolj). Članovi političke nomenklature bili su redovni gosti Opere, a posete jugoslovenskog predsednika Tita uobičajene. Ovo vremensko razdoblje obilovalo je televizijskim i radio prenosima operskih

predstava iz ljubljanske Opere, snimcima pevačkih zvezda i popunjenim auditorijumom. Ipak, kako podvlači Kotnik, pozicija opere u socijalističko vreme nije bila uniformna, već je konstantno redefinisana rasporakom između ideološkog restriktionizma i trijumfalizma opere. U tipično demagoškom maniru, na operetu je gledano kao na buržoasku formu zabave i kao takva bila je nedostojna naroda u socijalizmu. Upravo u tom krutom negativnom stavu prema opereti Kotnik pronalazi uvod u kasnije samoupravno strukturalno demontiranje ljubljanske Opere, što nakon 1970. godine dovodi do krize u njenom radu.

Iako su sva poglavlja, u kontekstu predmeta istraživanja, jednako važna, čitaocu se danas najinteresantnijim može učiniti upravo poslednje poglavlje naslovljeno „Tranziciona publika: Operska scena kao simptom post-socijalističkog sjaja i bede“ („Tranzicijsko občinstvo: Operska scena kot simptom post-socialističnega blišča in bede“). Sasvim očekivano, Kotnik svoje istraživanje zaokružuje analizom publike ljubljanske Opere u prvih dvadeset godina slovenačke nezavisnosti, koje su, prema njegovim rečima, obećavale kosmopolitizam i propulzivniji kulturni identitet, a zapravo se vrlo brzo pretvorile u svoju suprotnost. Poslednja decenija 20. veka za ljubljansku Operu, navodi Kotnik, bila je bojno polje moći, katastrofalnih i apokaliptičnih ideologija s jakom dozom sindikalizma, nacionalizma, neoliberalizma, diletantizma i provincijalizma, što je svakako ostavilo traga i na stanje u publici. Društvene promene donele su Opere institucionalnu nestabilnost i finansijsku krizu. Broj izvedenih opera tokom svega pet sezona opao je dvostruko, a slična tendencija je obeležila i ukupan broj posetilaca. Analizom godišnjih repertoarskih lista Kotnik je utvrdio postojanje markantne dominacije opera Verdija i Pučinja, koje je često pratila Štrausova opereta *Slepi miš* (*Die Fledermaus*). Istinski ljubitelji i vrsni poznavaci opere ovakvu situaciju uglavnom su doživljavali kao višestruk problem, a posebno su bili nezadovoljni lošim tretmanom i nemarnim odnosom rukovodstva prema njenoj dugogodišnjoj publici. Kotnik ističe da

je u to vreme još jedanput demonstrirana ambivalentna društvena uloga opere u urbanom i nacionalnom habitusu Ljubljane, jer je operska kuća uživala reputaciju „balkanske krčme“ i „kuće afera i skandala“, postavši tako prvoklasni primer primene post-socijalističke neoliberalne logike glamura i bede. Novi milenijum ne menja znatno postojeću situaciju: Opera i dalje služi kao pogodno tlo za promociju lažnog prestiža i praznog glamura tranzicione elite, *nouveau riche*, dobrostojećih medija i zvezda biznisa.

Iako menadžment Opere nije dozvolio Kotniku da istraživanjem na samom terenu direktno priđe njenoj publici, on je preko drugih kanala (operskih udruženja, turističkih agencija, različitih koncertnih događaja) stekao neophodne uvide o njenim karakteristikama i detaljno ih prikazuje rukovodeći se različitim načelima podele. Danas operu u Ljubljani sluša pretežno starija, penzionisana ženska populacija srednje klase. Muški deo populacije brojniji je u pokušaju da demonstrira svoj „elitizam“, pa odlazak u Operu, kao po pravilu, prati njihov uspon na društvenoj lestvici. Sledeći determinante ukusa i kulturnih izbora, Kotnik razlikuje deset idealnih tipova ljubljanske operske publike (ekspert, gundalo, dobrovoljac, konformista, eskapista, nostalgijar, kraljica, ignorant, poklonik i blefer), a zatim otvoreno saopštava da je profil *blefera* najzastupljeniji i najfleksibilniji među posetiocima. Ilustrativni uporedni prikaz operske publike u Sloveniji iz istraživanja sprovedenog 2007/2008. godine, uz mnoštvo zanimljivih detalja o njenim ustaljenim operskim praksama, ujedno je i deo koji zatvara poslednje poglavlje knjige.

Opera i njena publika u Ljubljani s početka 21. veka, zaključuje Kotnik, ne predstavljaju važnu urbanu komponentu koja bi slovenačku prestonicu mogla približiti ostalim kulturnim centrima Evrope. Ono što nedostaje jesu svest i refleksivnost o operi kao održivoj i privlačnoj sili, koja bi regrutovala ne samo stanovnike grada, nego i turiste i putnike. O Ljubljani kao operskoj prestonici moglo bi se govoriti samo onda kada Opera postane turistička atrakcija vredna posete, iskustva i pamćenja.

Predstavljeni rad Vlada Kotnika opsežna je akademska monografija o razvoju ljubljanske operne scene zasnovana na bogatoj istorijskoj, sociološkoj i antropološkoj građi. Iako je problem u fokusu po svojoj prirodi nešto uži i specifičniji od onih koji su obrađeni u njegovim prethodnim radovima, ova knjiga nesumnjivo jeste uzbudljivo i zani-

mljivo putovanje kroz svet društvenog života operne publike i njenih kulturnih praksi. U svakom slučaju, svako upoznavanje s rezultatima temeljnog i posvećenog rada ovog slovenačkog antropologa predstavlja izuzetno interesantan, okrepljujuć i podsticajan susret ne samo za stručnu javnost već i za širi čitalački auditorijum.

ALEKSANDAR KANDIĆ: POVODOM
KNJIGE *PRISUTNOST TRANSCENDENCIJE*
BOGOLJUBA ŠIJAKOVIĆA
(BOGOLJUB ŠIJAKOVIĆ, PRISUTNOST
TRANSCENDENCIJE: HELENSTVO,
HRIŠĆANSTVO, FILOSOFIJA ISTORIJE,
BEOGRAD: SLUŽBENI GLASNIK, 2013)

Čitajući i promišljajući *Prisutnost transcencije: helenstvo, hrišćanstvo, filozofija istorije* Bogoljuba Šijakovića, susrećemo se s jednim višeslojnim delom koje je, u izvesnom smislu, interdisciplinarnog karaktera, budući da, oslanjajući se na oblast filozofije i britkost filozofske misli, zadire i u oblasti teologije i istorije, pozajmljujući iz njih pojmove, uvide i saznanja relevantna za svoju osnovnu tezu. Tradicionalni filozofski pojam *transcencije*, onostranosti, pojavljuje se kao povezujući momenat, a svoju snagu nesumnjivo crpi još iz Platonovih i platoničarskih spisa. Knjiga je 2013. godine objavljena i na srpskom, i na engleskom jeziku, na srpskom u izdanju Službenog glasnika i Pravoslavnog bogoslovske fakulteta, a na engleskom u Los Anđelesu, u izdanju kuće *Sebastian Press* pod naslovom *The Presence of Transcendence: Essays on Facing the Other through Holiness, History and Text*. Kao recenzenti potpisuju se naši ugledni profesori i istaknuti intelektualci Ljubodrag Dimić, Ilija Marić i Petar Jevremović.

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Interesantno je da je knjiga sastavljena od trideset tekstova, uglavnom izlaganja i saopštenja na istaknutim međunarodnim i domaćim skupovima, nastalih u različitim periodima i kontekstima, pa tako najstariji tekst, odnosno poglavlje knjige pod naslovom „Karl Marks s Aristotelovim ključem u pogrešnoj bravi“ potiče još iz, sada već daleke 1983. godine. I pored toga, tematsko jedinstvo knjige je čvrsto i nimalo narušeno, a u tekstu se prepoznaje doslednost i konzistentnost filozofskog pristupa koji odoleva mnogobrojnim turbulentnim promenama koje su nas zadesile, kako na nivou filozofske zajednice tako i čitavog našeg društva. Entuzijazam kojim je napisan „Problemski snop metafizike svetlosti“ (1984) prepoznaje se i u spisima novijeg datuma. Uostalom, u duhu svoje misli o transcendentnom, svetom i nepromenljivoj, tj. onom što se odupire modernom i savremenom „trendovskom“ relativizovanju stvari, autor uspeva da zadrži i očuva svoju osnovnu, izvornu filozofsku misao tokom svih burnih decenija koje su pred nas, stanovnike brdovitog Balkana, postavile izuzetno teške izazove. Nije svaka

inovacija, svaki vid modernizacije dobar i poželjan, kako nam to neke liberalne škole mišljenja nastoje predstaviti, ali nije ni ostanje u tradiciji po svaku cenu uvek dobrobitno za čoveka, pogotovo ukoliko ta tradicija nema sluha za one univerzalne, večite vrednosti o kojima su opširno govorili antički i hrišćanski mislioci.

Šta nam, dakle, poručuje Šijaković?

Pre svega, tekstovi su grupisani u tri glavna dela: „Pred licem Drugog“, „Pred licem Istorije“ i „Pred licem Teksta“. Iako je tema kojom se autor bavi izuzetno obuhvatna, sveprožimajuća, te se verovatno može razmatrati i sa stanovišta prirodnih nauka i filozofije prirode, Šijaković se zadržava na planu metafizike drugog, filozofije istorije, kao i hermeneutike. Naše doba, prema tome, karakteriše svojevrsno otuđenje čoveka od onog svetog, pa i od samog sebe: na delu je *relativizacija vrednosti* putem koje je omogućena i dopuštena manipulacija stvarnošću, „izmišljanje“ istine. Zaborav transcendentije ogleda se, prema Šijakovićevom tumačenju, u mnogobrojnim aspektima ljudskog života, u književnosti, u umetnosti, istorijskoj nauci i uopšte *kulturi*, što nadalje dovodi do pojave jedne opšte „strukturne amnezije“, odnosno „deformisanog, konstruisanog i izmišljenog pamćenja“. S jedne strane, obećanja novog društvenog poretka slatkorečiva su i raskošna, progon svetog i transcendentnog, izvršen delovanjem određenih centara moći, trebalo bi da nas oslobodi stega starih, dugo građenih sistema vrednosti i otvori put modernom, liberalnom, inovativnom, gde se vrednost poima kao nešto što je „tržišno“ određeno, pa samim tim i fluidno, nepostojano, u potpunosti zavisno od konteksta u kojem se pojavljuje. Odsustvo čvrstog i strogog kriterijuma, odsustvo oslonca, trebalo bi da vodi apsolutnoj slobodi, ali za sobom povlači i mogućnost manipulacije istinom, kao i pre naglašenu subjektivnost u delanju, budući da je zakon moći taj koji nameće viđenje događaja a ne sama istina, odnosno stvarnost. Nije reč o tome da se nekakvim savršenim čulom može spoznati prava stvarnost ili drugost, već da se to čak više ni ne pokušava! Stoga Šijaković primećuje, i u tome je,

čini nam se, sasvim u pravu, da naše doba karakteriše stanja nostalgije, melanholije, traume, dosade... Čovek, zatvoren u sebe i otrgnut od drugog, žali za onim što ga ukorenjuje, sećanje na transcendentno jeste duboko potisnuto, ali ne i sasvim izbrisano. Bez tačke oslonca nema ni straha od drugog, ni brige za drugo, a našim životima dominira ravnodušnost.

Relativističku filozofiju Šijaković naziva „intelektualnom melanholijom“. Iza obećanog spektakla i šarenila kriju se samoća, otuđenost, nemogućnost prisne i bliske međuljudske komunikacije, što je prouzrokovano potiskivanjem svega onoga što nas spaja i što nam je zajedničko. Egoizam je osnovna crta čoveka koji je izgubio sluh za onostrano: on je zatvoren u svoj svet, ispunjen dosadom koju pokušava da zamaskira svetlucavim ukrasima.

Od posebnog su značaja poglavlja poput „Prevladavanje distancije: O bogopoznanju u helenskoj filozofiji i hrišćanstvu“, ili „Paradoksija mističkog bogopoznanja“, u kojima se detaljnije ispituje odnos ljudskog i svetog, filozofije i teologije. Šijakovićeva razmatranja neretko se oslanjaju na Platonove metafizičke uvide, koji su prisutni bilo neposredno bilo kroz nekog potonjeg mislioca, i predstavljaju autorovu polaznu tačku. Dok kod Platona i starih Helena postoji dubok jaz između nas i drugog, onostranog, sa hrišćanstvom dolazi i nada da se taj jaz može prevazići. Čovek na taj način postaje *mediator* transcendentnog i imanentnog, on dobija središnju i krajnje odgovornu ulogu. „U imanentnom, u onome što je u granicama mogućeg iskustva, prisutno je transcendentno, pa je antinomičnost našeg iskoraka u transcenciju dvostruka. Tragovi transcendentnog u imanentnom vidljivi su kao *konstitutivni momenti naše egzistencije*“, piše Šijaković u „Proslavu“ *Prisutnosti transcencije*. Ove misli adekvatno sumiraju autorovu filozofsku tezu na osnovu koje sagledava i uzima u obzir pojmove drugosti, istorije, tumačenja. Koliko god nastojali, transcendentno ne možemo „proterati“ iz naših života, celokupnost iskustva podrazumeva sjeđinjenost transcendentnog i imanentnog.

Transcendentno nam nije dato na neposredan način, ono je posredno prisutno u vidu strukture, odnosno Šijakovićevim rečima, *konstitutivnih momenata egzistencije*. Dok neki od nas ostaju slepi za transcendentno, neki se pak okreću bavljenju filozofijom i teologijom koje bi trebalo da budu praktičke, terapijske veštine koje nas leče od kobnog zaborava transcendentije. Mogli bismo dodati, svaka nauka i svaka želja za (samo)spoznajom doprinose prevazilaženju distinkcije između transcendentnog i imanentnog, pa je i sam Platon, putem svog složenog filozofskog aparata, nastojao da sintetički objedini svet ideja i idealnih, nepromenljivih matematičkih objekata sa svetom čulnih, promenljivih stvari, govoreći, recimo u dijalogu *Timaj*, o matematičkim entitetima kao o osnovnim elementima strukture stvarnosti, ili tzv. Duše sveta.

Naše „ja“ konstituiše se u odnosu prema drugom – bez drugog, „ja“ se dezintegriše i zaboravlja na sebe. Pitanje je samo da li mi tu činjenicu prihvatamo i umemo li da se s njom nosimo. Kako više puta primećuje Šijaković, odnos prema drugom prevashodno je *etičke prirode*, jer bez drugog nema moralne, istorijske, ili bilo kakve druge odgovornosti.

U domenu istorije i istorijskih nauka, zaborav transcendentije, prema Šijakoviću, karakteriše odsustvo svesti o transgeneracijskoj odgovornosti i pripadnosti širem istorijskom kontekstu. Kao pojedinci, bačeni u svet i uhvaćeni u splet nužnih okolnosti, skloni smo da previdimo dugotrajno jedinstvo istorijskog vremena, da sagledamo sopstveno polje delanja i stepen moralne odgovornosti. Savremeno doba sa sobom donosi jednu naročitu paradoksalnost po ovom pitanju: dok je dostupnost informacija i saznanja ne samo iz oblasti istorije, već i o svakodnevnom svetskim zbivanjima veća nego ikad, ponajviše zahvaljujući dostupnosti savremenih tehnologija, čovek je upravo u situaciji da, pod bremenom svakodnevene egzistencije, sve teže i teže sagledava smisao sopstvenog bivstvovanja i sopstvenih postupaka (živi se „od danas do sutra“). Upravo je ta nepregledna količina informacija,

i odsustvo jasnog kriterijuma prema kojem bi se razlikovalo bitno od nebitnog, vredno od bezvrednog, razlog zbog kojeg savremeni pojedinac zapada u stanje izolovanosti, postajući najobičniji šraf koji gotovo nesvesno obavlja svoju društvenu funkciju. Samo putem prevazilaženja, tj. transcendiranja svog ograničenog, nametnutog polja delovanja, čovek može sagledati smisao svojih postupaka u istorijskom vremenu i biti moralan u pravom smislu reči.

U poglavlju „Istorija, moć, identitet“, između ostalog se raspravlja o (ne)mogućnosti „objektivne istorije“. Čini se, veli Šijaković – raspravljajući brojna stanovišta iz filozofije istorije – da istorija ne može biti „objektivna“ u strogom smislu reči, no to ne znači da ona nužno podrazumeva relativističku poziciju. Istorija neophodno uključuje i našu subjektivnu perspektivu, lični doživljaj stvari. A baš tad dolazi do izražaja potreba da sebe spoznamo i odredimo u odnosu na drugo. Ukoliko smo dopustili da transcendentno iščezne iz naših života, bićemo nesposobni da razumemo da druge osobe mogu imati drugačije viđenje identičnih istorijskih događaja, bićemo nesposobni da saosećamo, da iskusimo svoj život kao jedan delić ogromnog istorijskog procesa. Istorijski podaci za nas će biti samo podaci, poput brojeva, bez ikakvog dubljeg značenja i smisla, a pogotovo bez moralne dimenzije. Možda je to i cilj tvorca novog društvenog poretka. Čovek bez sluha za transcendentno jeste čovek podložan manipulaciji, koji veoma lako postaje instrumentalizovan.

Fenomenom rata, kao najstrašnijim fenomenom instrumentalizacije čoveka, bavi se poglavlje pod naslovom „Rat i racionalnost“, u kojem Šijaković odlično zapaža da je naučno-tehnička racionalnost danas stavljena u službu vojne tehnologije, a da su mediji postali „infrastruktura rata“. Ovo je srpski narod na svojoj koži više puta osetio u prošlom veku, a poslednji put 1999. godine.

Poslednji, treći deo knjige, sadrži tekstove iz oblasti hermeneutike, metafizike, hrišćanstva. Baš kao što pojedinačni događaji dobijaju smisao tek u kontekstima dugoročnih,

teško sagledivih istorijskih procesa tako i tekst pred kojim se nalazimo biva osmišljen, protumačen, u okvirima starijih, obuhvatnih filozofskih, literarnih i kulturoloških tradicija. Razumevanje je moguće samo ukoliko transcendiramo granice teksta, i sagledamo ga kao jednu kariku u dugom lancu istorije. U tom smislu, preterana analitičnost nije dobra, i mora biti ojačana sintetičkim, integrativnim pristupom, kao i saradnjom između brojnih filozofskih, naučnih i drugih disciplina.

Kao dobar primer ove metode nameće se poglavlje „Problemski snop metafizike svetlosti“, u kojem Šijaković sintetički sagledava ideje filozofa i hrišćanskih mislilaca od Heraklita, preko Platona, Dionisija Pseudo-Areopagite, pa do Nikole Kuzanskog, a sve u vezi s pojmom svetlosti. Tu, dakle, uopšte nije reč o svetlosti kao čulnom fenomenu, iliti „osvetljanju“, već o svetlosti kao temelju svega postojećeg, onome što daje biće svim stvarima, kao načelu saznanja, a i kao izvoru dobrog i lepog. Autor ne propušta da nam navede čuveni odeljak iz Platonove *Države* u kojem se o suncu govori ne samo kao o nečemu što vidljive stvari čini vidljivim, već i onome što omogućuje njihovo nastajanje, rasteenje.

Pravu filozofsku „poslasticu“ predstavlja kratak osvrt na Platonovo nepisano učenje. Komentarišući već dobro poznata mesta iz Aristotelove *Metafizike* zahvaljujući kojim

je i nastao „mit“ o Platonovom nepisanom učenju, kao i Teofrastova razjašnjenja, prema kojim se načela Jednog i „neodređenog dvojstva“ nalaze na vrhu hijerarhije stvarnosti, Šijaković ne propušta da istakne ulogu i značaj matematike kao modela za ontologiju. Ontologija od matematike, dakle, može dobiti strukturni model za opisivanje stvarnosti. Možda se može pretpostaviti, imajući u vidu matematički karakter Platonovog sveobjašnjavajućeg spisa *Timaj*, da sadržaj nepisanog učenja predstavljaju izvesne dublje matematičke spoznaje, koje su bile saopštene samo najupućenijim pripadnicima Platonove Akademije.

Naposletku, možemo presuditi da *Prisutnost transcendencije* predstavlja istaknuti doprinos srpskoj filozofskoj baštini, naročito u pogledu svojih sintetičko-komparativnih kvaliteta. Značajan je poduhvat razmotriti iz ugla jedne filozofske paradigme tako velik broj raznovrsnih pojmova, kao što su Bog, transcendencija, svetost, odgovornost, zlo, krivica, istorija, rat, racionalnost, svetlost. Šijaković uspeva u tome, zadržavajući svoju izvornu poziciju tokom dugog niza godina pisanja i filozofiranja. Kao što autor smatra da je ključna uloga filozofije *terapeutska*, tako se i njegovo delo može uzeti u vidu jednog svetionika, orijentira u haosu modernog ne-svetog vremena, u kojem temeljni pojmovi sve više gube svoj osnovni smisao i nestaju iz naših života.

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CIP - Каталогизacija y publikaciji
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FILOZOFIJA i društvo = Philosophy and
society / glavni i odgovorni urednik Rastko
Jovanov. - Knj. 1 (1987)- . - Beograd :
Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju,
1987- (Beograd : Colografx). - 24 cm

Tromesečno. - Drugo izdanje na drugom
medijumu: Filozofija i društvo (Online) =
ISSN 2334-8577
ISSN 0353-5738 = Filozofija i društvo
COBISS.SR-ID 11442434

