

Filozofija i društvo, godište XXV, broj 1
Izdaje Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju
Kraljice Natalije 45, Beograd, telefon: +381 11 2646242
institut@instifdt.bg.ac.rs
www.instifdt.bg.ac.rs

IZDAVAČKI SAVET / INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD

Petar Bojanić Beograd; Miran Božović Ljubljana; David Chandler London;
Igor Cubarov Moskva; Mario de Caro Roma; Ana Dimiskovska Skopje;
Aleksandar Fatić Beograd; Markus Gabriel Bonn; Christoph Hubig
Darmstadt; Kornelia Ičin Beograd; Dejan Jović Zagreb; Jean François
Kervegan Paris; Cornelia Klinger Wien; Nicholas Onuf Miami; Snježana
Prijić - Samaržija Rijeka; Luca Taddio Udine; Ilija Vujačić Beograd; Alenka
Zupančič Ljubljana

REDAKCIJA ČASOPISA / EDITORIAL BOARD

redakcijafid@instifdt.bg.ac.rs

Ana Birešev, IFDT; Dušan Bošković, IFDT; Maurizio Ferraris, Facoltà di
Lettere e Filosofia dell'Università degli Studi di Torino; Peter Klepec,
Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti; Slobodan Perović, Filo-
zofski fakultet, Univerzitet u Beogradu; Mirjana Radojčić, IFDT; Jelena
Vasiljević, IFDT

Urednik izdavačke delatnosti
Predrag Krstić

Glavni i odgovorni urednik / Editor in Chief
Rastko Jovanov

Sekretari redakcije
Srđan Prodanović, Biljana Albahari

Dizajn: Milica Milojević
Lektura i korektura: Olgica Rajić, Edvard Đorđević
Grafička obrada: Sanja Tasić
Štampa: Colografx, Beograd
Tiraž: 300. Časopis izlazi četiri puta godišnje.
Cena 350 dinara; godišnja pretplata 1200 dinara.

Objavlivanje časopisa finansijski pomaže Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke
i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije.

Radove objavljene u časopisu nije dozvoljeno preštamovati, u celini
ili u delovima, ukoliko nije naveden izvornik.

Pun tekst brojeva Filozofije i društva može se naći na sledećim adresama:

www.instifdt.bg.ac.rs/fid.html
www.doiserbia.nb.rs
www.ceeol.com
www.komunikacija.org.rs
<http://obavezni.digital.nb.rs/izdavac/institut-za-filozofiju>

Univerzitet u Beogradu
Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju

FILOZOFIJA I DRUŠTVO

broj 1, 2014.
godište XXV

Beograd 2014.
YU ISSN 0353-5738 UDK 1+316+32
3

- 3 Editor's Preface
Reč priređivača
- 5 Ivan Cerovac
An Overview of Liberalism without Perfection
Osvrt na knjigu *Liberalizam bez savršenstva*
- 12 Andrew Lister
Public Reason and Perfectionism: Comments on Quong's Liberalism Without Perfection
Javni um i perfekcionizam: komentari na Kvongovu knjigu *Liberalizam bez savršenstva*
- 35 Enes Kulenović
Defending Perfectionism: Some Comments on Quong's Liberalism without Perfection
U odbranu perfekcionizma: kritika Kvongovog *Liberalizma bez savršenstva*
- 47 Enrico Zoffoli
How "Political" is Quong's Political Liberalism?
Koliko je „politički“ Kvongov politički liberalizam?
- 57 Nebojša Zelić
Is there a Need for Political Liberalism to have an Account of Pre-Overlapping Consensus Reasoning?
Da li je političkom liberalizmu potreban neki model rasuđivanja pre preklapajućeg konsenzusa?
- 75 Elvio Baccharini
Public Reason. The Consensus and the Convergence View
Javni um. Konsenzualno i konvergentno viđenje
- 96 Jonathan Quong
Liberalism Without Perfection: Replies to Lister, Kulenović, Zoffoli, Zelić, and Baccharini
Liberalizam bez savršenstva: odgovori Listeru, Kulenoviću, Zofoliju, Zeliću i Bakariniju

THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER PHILOSOPHY

SAVREMENO ZNAČENJE VITGENŠTAJNOVE KASNE FILOZOFIJE | Michal Sládeček (ed.) |

- 125 Editor's Preface
Reč priređivača
- 127 Ken Shigeta
Exposition of Two Forms of Semantic Skepticism: Wittgenstein's Paradox of Rule Following and Kripke's Semantic Paradox
Obrazloženje problema dve forme semantičkog skepticizma: Vitgenštajnov paradoks sleđenja pravila i Kripkeov semantički paradoks
- 144 Tamara Dobler
The Autonomy of Grammar and Semantic Internalism
Autonomija gramatike i semantički internalizam
- 164 Michael O'Sullivan
The Poverty of the Stimulus: Quine and Wittgenstein
Slabost stimulusa: Kvajn i Vitgenštajn

STUDIES AND ARTICLES

STUDIJE I ČLANCI

- 183 Alenka Zupančič
Seksualno i ontologija
The Sexual and Ontology
- 193 Aleksandra Zorić
O razlici između Dijemove i Kvajnove holističke teze
On the Difference Between Duhem and Quine`s Holistic Theses
- 208 Todor Kuljić
Politička teologija: o mogućnosti poređenja upotrebe smrti u teologiji i politici
Political Theology: Possibility of Comparison of the Usage of Death in Theology and Politics

IN MEMORIAM – LJUBOMIR TADIĆ (1925–2013) | Mirjana Radojičić (prir.) |

- 221 Trivo Indić
Ljubomir Tadić – *L'homme revolté*
- 227 Slobodan Divjak
Ljubomir Tadić ili posvećenost principu slobode
- 233 Jagoš Đuretić
Sloboda, idealitet i stvarnost: Ljubomir Tadić – i mislilac i borac

PRIKAZI

REVIEWS

- 239 Igor Cvejić
(Nebojša Grubor: *Lepo, nadahnuće i umetnost podražavanja*, Plato, Beograd 2012)
- 243 Marko Konjović
(Martha C. Nussbaum, *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA and London UK, 2011)

IZ RADA INSTITUTA

FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE | Dušan Bošković (prir.) |

- 251 Pregled tribina i konferencija
Presentations and Conferences
- 265 Submission Instructions
Uputstvo za autore

LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION.
AN ENGAGEMENT WITH THE WORK OF JONATHAN QUONG

I

LIBERALIZAM BEZ SAVRŠENSTVA.
SUSRET SA DELOM DŽONATANA KVONGA

Elvio Baccharini (ed.)

Editor's Preface

Reč priređivača

The idea for publishing this collection of papers originated with Jonathan Quong's visit to the symposium dedicated to his book *Liberalism Without Perfection*, held at the University of Rijeka, June 22nd and 23rd, 2012. The collection comprises texts by Ivan Cerovac (whose paper introduces the book to the reader perhaps not familiar with its subject), Andrew Lister and Enrico Zoffoli, who very kindly accepted the invitation for a contribution, along with Jonathan Quong's replies, as well as papers by Enes Kulenović, Nebojša Zelić and Elvio Baccharini, all initially presented at the symposium in Rijeka.

There is no need to remark on the importance of *Liberalism Without Perfection* to the reader familiar with the current debates in political philosophy. In a symposium dedicated to this book published in *Philosophy and Public Issues*, Gerald Gaus wrote that Quong is "the leading Rawlsian political philosopher of his generation" – a sentiment I full-heartedly endorse. It is, therefore, a privilege and an honour to have the possibility to discuss the book with him. In addition to his intellectual merits, very well known in the world community of political philosophers, Quong was engaged in the discussions with kindness, patience and attentiveness in the symposium itself, and I would like to thank him for his generous and engaging support for the project.

I am also very grateful to all the authors who accepted the invitation to contribute to this symposium. It has been a great pleasure to cooperate with them in this undertaking and it is a great honour to have edited this collection of papers.

I would like to thank the editorial board of the Journal *Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society*, who supported this project, in particular the editor-in-chief, Rastko Jovanov, as well as Petar Bojanić, the Director of the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory of the University of Belgrade, the publisher of *Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society*, who supported our initiative.

Ivan Cerovac
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Rijeka

An Overview of *Liberalism without Perfection*

Summary *Quong's influential book probably represents the most sophisticated defence of Rawlsian political liberalism. This review focuses on its content and systematizes it by chapters, emphasizing its relevance both in the first part, where the author puts the liberal perfectionist position under critical scrutiny by advancing three major objections (regarding autonomy, paternalism and political legitimacy), and the second, where the author presents and defends a distinctive version of political liberalism that clearly differs from the one presented by Rawls in several important features. The review also summarizes Quong's innovative arguments regarding the nature of an overlapping consensus, the structure of political justification, the idea of public reason, and the status of unreasonable persons.*

Keywords: *Liberalism, Perfectionism, Public reason, Overlapping consensus, Quong, Rawls, Raz*

5

Quong's *Liberalism without Perfection* (Quong, 2011) represents one of the most sophisticated defences of Rawlsian political liberalism, although the author's position clearly differs from the one presented by Rawls in several important features. The book itself has two main objectives; first, it builds a detailed critique of liberal perfectionism, and second, it presents a new conception of political liberalism (i.e. internal conception) and defends it from various objections.

This influential book begins with a description of the main differences between varieties of liberalism; he distinguishes perfectionist and anti-perfectionist form of liberalism, as well as its comprehensive and political form. However, Quong focuses the detailed discussion to two forms: comprehensive perfectionism (or liberal perfectionism), as presented by Raz and Wall, and political antiperfectionism (or political liberalism), presented by Rawls and Larmore. Quong's intention is first to set up a clear distinction between different forms of liberalism, and then to argue against liberal perfectionism and in favor of political liberalism.

In the following chapters Quong presents three well developed arguments against liberal perfectionism. His first objection targets famous argument from autonomy put forward by Joseph Raz, according to which the best way of justifying principles of liberal toleration is by

appealing to the value of leading an autonomous life. Raz's central claim is that liberal state can, as least sometimes, legitimately promote or discourage particular ways of life on grounds relating to their inherent or intrinsic value. Raz believes that this idea is compatible with the harm principle, since the liberal state can use means other than coercion (e.g. conferring honors, giving grants, taxing some activities or products) to protect autonomy and to promote valuable ways of life. Quong's first objection adopts Raz's idea that autonomous choice cannot be achieved unless persons are free from coercion and manipulation by others, but points out that, since all non-coercive policies used by a perfectionist liberal state are a form of a manipulation, liberal perfectionism is not consistent with the conception of autonomous choice Raz adopts, not with the perfectionist version of harm principle derived from it.

6 Second argument put forward by Quong points out that liberal perfectionism is paternalistic and therefore *pro tanto* objectionable. Though many perfectionists might endorse non-coercive methods to promote a certain way of life, Quong underlines that even non-coercive actions can be paternalistic when motivated by a negative judgment about the ability of others to lead their own lives. Paternalism is than rejected because it denies one's moral status of free and equal citizen, and since even a non-coercive perfectionism is a form of paternalism, it is rejected on the same grounds.

Quong's final argument builds on A. J. Simmons' distinction between the justification and legitimacy of a political institution. While justification appeals to institution's virtues and qualities, legitimation is achieved only by the consent of the governed. Liberal perfectionism claims that states that enable citizens to lead flourishing lives are justified, and since they are justified they are also (for the same reason) legitimate. It thus fails *Simmons' Challenge* since it is unable to construct an account of state's legitimacy without appealing to its justification. Unfortunately Quong does not discuss Estlund's influential idea of normative consent that can be used by liberal perfectionist to reconstruct the link between justification and legitimacy.

Having displayed three convincing arguments against liberal perfectionism, Quong focuses on what he sees as a far more plausible alternative, i.e. on political liberalism. This position is motivated by two notable ideas: first, a moral idea according to which states must, in order to rightfully exercise power over citizens, be able to justify it to the citizens, and

second, an assumption about the existence of pluralism. Quong points out that we should, based on their interpretation of the second idea, distinguish two different conceptions of political liberalism. External conception sees the fact of pluralism as a fact about the world to which liberalism must accommodate itself (p. 138). Basic liberal principles and institutions must thus be justified to actual citizens in existing liberal societies, despite their differences. External conception of political liberalism recognizes that we owe public justification only to reasonable citizens, but takes them in a real (non-idealized) form, drawing them from public political culture of existing liberal democracies. Quong admits that this is an important and praiseworthy goal, yet he doubts that it can be achieved. Furthermore, he displays two important arguments against this conception; it is political in the wrong way since it gives actual citizens, despite prejudices they might have and irrationalities they might display, a normative authority over what legitimacy requires. Second argument is based on an idea that liberal society needs the support of the majority of citizens in order to be stable over time. However, since it is not clear that the majority of people endorse liberal principles for the right reasons, Quong concludes that the external conception fails because it becomes dependant on too many empirical contingencies (p. 150).

7

Contrary to external conception that sees the fact of pluralism as something outside of political liberalism, internal conception understands pluralism as a consequence of liberalism itself. It is more modest since it does not aim to justify liberalism to non-liberals, but to construct a model of political justification for those who already endorse liberal values and commitments. Public justification is now owned to idealized (reasonable) citizens, making the internal conception safe from the empirical facts of our societies.

But why should we care about internal conception if it cannot solve numerous political problems that contemporary liberal societies face? Quong emphasizes that the goal of the internal conception is to show that political liberalism can create its own support under ideal conditions, and thus is not incoherent or unstable (p. 158). However, he also anticipates the next question; why do we need a coherent theory if it does not address the problems we currently face? Quong points out several points about the value of internal conception; it shows that political liberalism is not a practically impossible ideal, that we should strive to bring our own political behavior and institutions closer to ideal conditions, and finally, it allows a stronger account of legitimacy of our political principles.

Having adopted the internal conception of political liberalism, in the next few chapters Quong displays three important objections that have been pressed against political liberalism. His argumentative strategy is to show that these objections target only the external conception of political liberalism, remaining ineffective against his own position.

8 The first objection targets the traditional role of an overlapping consensus; it is seen as a final stage of a full or public justification of justice. This traditional conception holds that a justification is not complete until we show that the principles within political conception can be the subject of an overlapping consensus amongst all the reasonable comprehensive doctrines that might exist under liberal conditions (p. 162). However, critics warn us that such idea of overlapping consensus is either redundant to the justificatory process, playing no important role in the theory (since reasonable people will, by definition, endorse the political conception), or the demand for consensus might make political liberalism hostage to the claims of the unjust. Quong agrees that this objection represents an important critique of external conception of political liberalism, and claims that this traditional (external) role of an overlapping consensus should be modified. Instead of being a test that a political conception of justice must pass in order to be fully justified, the consensus should provide an initial common ground from which any attempt at public justification needs to proceed. Quong's alternative view places overlapping consensus in the beginning, not the end, of political justification (p. 163). Quong also modifies the subject of the public reason; it is no longer a conception of justice, but the fundamental idea of a society as a fair system of social cooperation amongst free and equal people. This modification is necessary since public reason requires citizens to have a fundamental stock of ideas they can draw on when they deliberate on the disagreements about justice. By modifying both the role and the subject of overlapping consensus Quong successfully dodges the first objection.

The second objection against political liberalism focuses on an asymmetry between disagreements over the good life, and disagreements over the principles of justice. Political liberalism distinguishes between reasonable disagreements (disagreements about good life) that back up the idea that claims about good life are illegitimate reasons for state action, and (unreasonable) disagreements over justice, that back up the idea that state can act on reasons of justice even when many people do not accept these reasons. However, the problem is that reasonable

people disagree on principles of justice just as they disagree on conceptions of good life. It seems that this asymmetric approach, though it plays so important a role in liberal argumentation, does not seem defensible (p. 192). To answer this objection, Quong introduces two different types of reasonable disagreement: *foundational disagreements* are characterized by the fact that the participants do not share any premises which can serve as a mutually acceptable standard of justification, while *justificatory disagreements* occur when there are shared premises that can serve as a mutually acceptable standard of justification, but participants still disagree on certain substantive conclusions. Arguing from the perspective of internal conception of political liberalism, Quong concludes that disagreements about justice are, by definition, justificatory disagreements, while disagreements about good life represent foundational disagreements (p. 193). This distinction enables Quong to justify and keep the asymmetric approach.

9

The third and final objection focuses on the fact that political liberalism does not refer to the concept of truth, but limits itself to presenting political principles as reasonable. Many philosophers find this move disturbing, and Quong summarizes their concerns in three separate objections. *The priority question* raises a serious doubt when political liberalism asks us to refrain from referring to the (whole) truth; why should one, when basic matters are at stake, appeal only to public conception of justice, and refrain from appealing to the whole truth? Two more objections rise from the first one; in order to answer the priority question political liberalism must admit either that there are some metaphysical truths that support public justification (*the truth objection*), or adopt certain skepticism about people's capacity to know the truth about the good life (*the skeptical objection*). However, political liberalism cannot embrace either of these answers since both rely on controversial epistemology that political liberalism is trying to avoid. These three objections together form a strong argument against political liberalism; it seems that this position lacks the persuasive power to convince other people, who do not accept basic liberal values and commitments, to embrace them. It is clear that this objection targets the external conception of political liberalism. Quong can thus conclude that this objection misses his internal conception, since its ambition was never to justify liberalism to non-liberals, but instead to answer a question that is internal to liberal theory: what should be the structure and content of political justification amongst people who already

embrace certain liberal values (p. 254). Following his argumentative strategy based on the distinction between external and internal conception of political liberalism, Quong has successfully defended his version of political liberalism.

In the final two chapters Quong clarifies his position in detail, giving additional attention to the scope and structure of public reason, as well as to the rights of unreasonable citizens. This clarification can be extremely useful since Quong in a clear way simply places his position in relation to ideas and theories of other influential public reason philosophers: John Rawls and Gerald Gaus.

10 Having explained the idea of public reason and presented several ways how this idea can be defended, Quong focuses on the scope of public reason, i.e. to the set of political issues to which the idea is meant to apply. Unlike Rawls, who claims that the idea of public reason should be applied only to constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, and not (or at least not necessary) to other democratic decisions, Quong argues that the idea should have a much broader scope – it should regulate all the political decisions in a liberal democratic society (p. 258). He is aware that it will not always be possible to produce a public justification of every political decision, but in principle believes that all instances where citizens exercise political power over one another should be subject to the idea of public reason (p. 274). Quong also considers the structure of public reason, i.e. the way in which we can justify a political decision. Arguing against Gaus, who claims that public justification can be accomplished by convergence on a political decision for different non-public reasons, Quong argues that the structure of public reason requires shared or public reasons. He develops an argument against the convergence view which relies on the importance of sincerity in public reasoning. Quong argues that, according to the convergence view, citizens might use arguments they themselves do not find convincing in order to persuade other citizens to adopt their conclusion. Such citizens would not act sincerely (in fact, they would intentionally manipulate other citizens), and Quong worries that such behavior cannot represent an acceptable form of public reasoning amongst free and equal persons.

In the finishing chapter Quong discusses the position of unreasonable citizens. He argues that unreasonable citizens should not be excluded from the benefits of citizenship, though they are rightfully excluded from the constituency of public justification. Finally, he argues that the

state can sometimes be justified in limiting or even denying the rights of unreasonable citizens. Quong adopts the argument put forward by Rawls (unreasonable citizens threaten the stability of liberal democracies), but also argues that the right claims of unreasonable citizens cease to be valid when they are used to pursue unreasonable objectives (p. 291). He concludes with an idea that the state can legitimately exercise political power over unreasonable citizens, even when such citizens are not given arguments for the exercise of state power that they can find acceptable.

Quong's argumentation is rich and insightful; he thoroughly clarifies his assumptions, presents in detail both his position and the arguments put forward by critics, as well as of the authors that he criticizes, and resourcefully anticipates many of the objections to his position. It would be worthwhile to engage future debates in the attempt to clarify the exact contribution the internal conception of political liberalism can have on contemporary liberal democracies, as well as to specify the implications of Quong's position, from those regarding global and distributive justice to those regarding actual policy-making in liberal democratic states.

11

Primljeno: 2. oktobar 2013.

Prihvaćeno: 15. februar 2014.

Literatura

Quong, J. (2011) *Liberalism Without Perfection*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Ivan Cerovac

Osvrt na knjigu *Liberalizam bez savršenstva*

Apstrakt

Uticajna knjiga Džonatana Kvonga verovatno predstavlja najsofisticiraniju odbranu Rolsovog političkog liberalizma. Ovaj pregled se usmerava na njen sadržaj, koga sistematizuje po poglavljima, naglašavajući istovremeno važnost prvog dela, u kojem autor kritički sagledava poziciju liberalnog perfekcionizma i protiv nje izlaže tri uticajna prigovora (vezano uz autonomiju, paternalizam i političku legitimnost), kao i drugog, gde autor izlaže i brani posebnu verziju političkog liberalizma koja se jasno razlikuje od Rolsove u nekoliko važnih karakteristika. Pregled takođe sažima Kvongove inovativne argumente vezane uz prirodu preklapajućeg konsenzusa, strukturu političkog opravdanja, ideju javnog uma i status nerazložnih osoba.

ključne reči: Liberalizam, perfekcionizam, javni um, preklapajući konsenzus, Quong, Rawls, Raz.

Andrew Lister
Department of Political Studies
Queens University

Public Reason and Perfectionism: Comments on Quong's *Liberalism Without Perfection*

Abstract *Liberalism Without Perfection* elaborates a generally Rawlsian conception of public justification in order to defend antiperfectionist liberalism. This critical response raises questions about the link between the two parts of the project. On the hand, it is possible to reject that demand that reasons for political decisions pass a qualified acceptability requirement even if one is strictly opposed to paternalism. On the other hand, the commitment to public justifiability does not rule out all perfectionism, if there are some claims about the good that are not reasonably rejectable.

Keywords: liberalism, political liberalism, public reason, public justification, neutrality, perfectionism

12

1. Introduction

Jonathan Quong's *Liberalism Without Perfection* has two connected purposes: to reject perfectionism, and to defend a public-justification model of political liberalism. Perfectionism, broadly speaking, is the view that it is legitimate for us to exercise political power in order to promote the leading of truly good lives. Perfectionism therefore rests on claims about what constitutes human flourishing, beyond simply avoiding death, pain, and other obvious evils. Perfectionism is not necessarily antithetical to liberalism, for if one's conception of flourishing gives pride of place to values such as autonomy and individuality, one will likely support familiar liberal rights (conscience, speech, education, etc.). It is even possible, on the basis of a liberal conception of flourishing, to argue that the state ought not favour or disfavour other, more specific conceptions of the good. Quong agrees with Thomas Hurka, George Sher, Steven Wall and Joseph Chan, however, that attempts to ground neutrality on a liberal conception of the good don't end up being fully neutral, because they must permit gentle, pluralistic perfectionism.¹ Unlike Hurka et. al., Quong maintains that this lack of neutrality is a problem.

¹ Thomas Hurka, "Indirect Perfectionism: Kymlicka on Liberal Neutrality," *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 3 (1995): 36-57; George Sher, *Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Steven Wall, *Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint* (Cambridge, England ; New York: Cambridge

Even if it doesn't permit violations of basic rights and generally supports neutrality, a liberalism grounded in a liberal conception of the good will involve paternalism, and such paternalism is inconsistent with recognition of one's fellow citizens' moral status as free and equal persons.²

The main alternative to a liberalism that begins from a liberal theory of the good is some form of "political liberalism," which rules out appeals to controversial, i.e. reasonably contestable conceptions of the good as the foundation for liberal principles. While acknowledging the existence of "modus vivendi" and "value pluralist" forms of political liberalism, LWP defends a Rawlsian version of political liberalism based on the idea of public justifiability. No one disputes that the exercise of political power should have to be justified in public. The Rawlsian principle of public justification is distinctive and controversial, however, because it holds that the exercise of political power must be justifiable *to all* those subject to that power, where "justifiable to A" means something like "would be acceptable to A, if A took the necessary time to think about it, without A having to give up the reasonable religious or philosophical doctrine A currently espouses." Justification to each of A, B, C... therefore involves a partly idealized unanimity standard, or what following David Estlund I will refer to as a qualified acceptability requirement.³ The exercise of political power must be such as to receive unanimous approval on the part of all reasonable or otherwise qualified perspectives.

13

This idea of unanimous idealized acceptability may be met with scepticism. Who is to say who counts as reasonable? Isn't it dubious to argue that because you *would* agree with me if you were reasonable I don't have to ask for your consent, and can simply impose my views? As Quong argues in Chapter 10 of LWP, such objections are wrong-headed, because they misunderstand the scope and point of the principle. Of course everyone gets a say, reasonable or not; everyone gets to vote and run for office. The idealized unanimity criterion is not a social decision procedure intended to replace ordinary democratic processes (based on a franchise limited to card-carrying late-Rawlsians). It is a moral principle that is meant to identify when and how the exercise of political power

University Press, 1998); Joseph Chan, "Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 29, no. 1 (2000): 5-42.

2 Jonathan Quong, *Liberalism Without Perfection* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 23-6, 97-107. Henceforward I will refer to this work as "LWP", with page references in parentheses in the text.

3 David M. Estlund, *Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 3-5, 40-65.

is legitimate, a principle citizens themselves are meant to apply in deciding how to exercise their democratic rights. Everyone is part of the actual voting constituency, but only some are part of the “constituency of public justification” (292), the “constituency of reasonable persons” (143, 261) to whom the grounds of our political decisions must be unanimously acceptable. Perhaps some political liberals are guilty of drawing the justificatory constituency too narrowly. Yet those who reject the requirement of public justifiability cannot complain about this, for they draw this constituency narrower still. Those who reject public justifiability accept what Steven Wall calls a “correctness” standard of justification.⁴ Correctness justification can be viewed as a degenerate case of public justification; it is simply public justification when the circle of qualification (the justificatory constituency), is reduced to one. People who think that reasons for political decisions don’t have to be acceptable to *any* other points of view, just true, are not in a good position to complain that political liberals require acceptability to *too few* points of view.

Quong’s version of public justification liberalism is generally Rawlsian, but with some important differences. It is Rawlsian first because it requires that political decisions be justifiable in terms of reasons that pass the qualified acceptability requirement; it is not the principle that state action must pass the qualified acceptability requirement otherwise we default to inaction.⁵ In the latter formulation, as a constraint on state action directly, the principle of public justification would permit laws that are *not* justifiable on the balance of public reasons *if* the total balance of reasons of each reasonable comprehensive doctrine favoured the law (although such unanimous convergence is likely to be rare). The direct application of the qualified acceptability requirement

4 Steven Wall, “Is Public Justification Self-Defeating?,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 39, no. 4 (2002): 385-94. A correctness-based justification ‘demonstrates that a conclusion is correct, irrespective of whether all persons can reasonably accept it’ (386).

5 Here is how Quong put this point in an earlier article: “The standard of liberal legitimacy, after all, is not (or should not be) reasonable rejection... Rawls’s standard of liberal legitimacy asserts that the state should not act on grounds that citizens cannot ‘reasonably be expected to endorse’. There is all the difference in the world between these two conditions... As Rawls says, ‘reasonable political conceptions of justice do not always lead to the same conclusion, nor do citizens holding the same conception always agree on particular issues. Yet the outcome of the vote is to be seen as reasonable provided all citizens of a reasonably just constitutional regime sincerely vote in accordance with the idea of public reason;’ Jonathan Quong, “Disagreement, Asymmetry, and Liberal Legitimacy,” *Politics, Philosophy, Economics* 4, no. 3 (2005), 316; citing John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), lvi. The analogous passage in LWP does not contain this statement, but I do not think Quong’s position has changed; see p.210 of LWP.

to state action would also permit a negative total balance of reasons on the part of just one reasonable comprehensive doctrine to trump a positive balance public reasons (a scenario that is more readily imaginable). The idea of public justification via convergence without consensus has recently been defended by Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier, but Quong rejects this model, insisting on Rawls's shared reasons requirement (265-273).⁶ The second Rawlsian aspect of Quong's position is that ordinary citizens as well as designers of political institutions are to apply the principle of public justification. It is conceivable, even if one might think unlikely, that we could do better, in terms of the goal of enacting publicly justifiable laws, by deliberating and voting on the basis of our various comprehensive doctrines, within the context of institutions designed to maximize public justifiability. Again, the model here would be Gaus and Vallier's indirect model of public justification. Quong sticks with Rawls' view that public justifiability is something we should all aim for, not just something we should hope ends up happening.

15

Quong deviates from Rawls in two important respects. Rawls claimed that that the principle applied only to (or at least in the first instance to) so-called "constitutional essentials" and "matters of basic justice."⁷ In contrast, Quong believes that the principle applies to all exercises of political power (273-287). His political liberalism is therefore more broadly antiperfectionist than Rawls's. Also, the idea of "overlapping consensus" plays a different role in Quong's theory than it did in Rawls. For Rawls, there were two stages of justification. First, we articulate a free-standing defense of a political conception of justice, one meant to be acceptable to all reasonable moral points of view. Then we check to see if that conception might become the object of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. A number of Rawls's critics took issue with this two-fold structure of justification.⁸ If the first stage

6 Gerald F. Gaus, and Kevin Vallier, "The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity: The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry and Political Institutions," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 35, no. 1-2 (2009): 51-76. For further discussion of the differences between "convergence" and "consensus" modes of public justification, see Kevin Vallier, "Convergence and Consensus in Public Reason," *Public Affairs Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (2011): 261-80 and Andrew Lister, "Public Justification of What? Coercion Vs. Decision as Competing Frames for the Basic Principle of Justificatory Liberalism," *Public Affairs Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (2011): 349-67.

7 As Quong notes, Rawls' position is ambiguous; compare Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 215; John Rawls, and Erin Kelly, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 91, note 13.

8 See in particular Brian Barry, "John Rawls and the Search for Stability," *Ethics* 105 (1995): 874-915; Jurgen Habermas, "Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Liberalism," *Journal of Philosophy* 92, no. 3 (1995): 109-31.

argument is correct, all reasonable comprehensive doctrines ought to accept the political conception of justice, or some similarly liberal political conception. Requiring that the political conception of justice (or the liberal family of conceptions) receive support from doctrines that reject this argument would seem to make the political conception hostage to the unreasonable (167). Quong's solution is to argue that overlapping consensus is the starting point for the freestanding argument, not a second-stage test with independent justificatory force. By definition, reasonable comprehensive doctrines accept certain basic ideas: that society is a fair scheme of cooperation, that there are burdens of judgment, and thus a fact of reasonable pluralism, and that therefore the exercise of political power ought to be publicly justifiable. This convergence of reasonable doctrines on the fundamental elements of political liberalism holds because acceptance of the ideas in question is one of the criteria of reasonableness.

16

Quong therefore insists, rightly in my view, that political liberalism is not a theory intended to justify liberalism to the non-liberal. Quong distinguishes what he calls the "external" and the "internal" conceptions of political liberalism, and defends the latter (138-160). The main difference between the two concerns the constituency of public justification. The external conception holds that political principles, as well as (decisions about) laws and policies, are justifiable to all when they are acceptable to all of the real citizens in current societies who are reasonable a weak sense, e.g. being willing and able to reason sincerely and live cooperatively with others. Citizens who are reasonable in this sense need not share any basic liberal commitments, let alone a commitment to the principle of public justification. In contrast, the internal conception counts as qualified only those points of view that recognize the existence of burdens of judgment, accept the fact of reasonable pluralism, (hence) conceive of society as a fair scheme of cooperation between free and equal moral persons (summarizing 140 and 143-4). Fully reasonable points of view also accept the principle of public justification (207), a fact that will be important to Quong's response to the so-called "asymmetry" objection, discussed below. This more highly idealized standard of qualification makes the internal view's account of the justificatory constituency more restrictive, and so makes the unanimity requirement easier to satisfy than it would otherwise be. At the same time, the internal model requires acceptability to all possible views that meet these criteria, not just the subset of qualified views currently existing in a particular society. This hypothetical aspect of the internal view broadens

the justificatory constituency, making the unanimity standard harder to satisfy than it would otherwise be. These differences in the two model's standards of qualification reflect deep differences about the purpose or point of public justification, I believe. On the external conception, with its weak conception of reasonableness and its focus on actually-existing views, public justifiability is closely connected with stability. On the internal conception, with its more strongly idealized and hypothetical constituency, public justifiability is meant to be a consequence of respect for persons' equal moral status, and a way of constituting a relationship in which this mutual respect is manifest.

In my comments, I want to focus on the connection between the two sides of Quong's argument, the critical and the positive. I want to question whether one needs the principle of public justification in order to be a strict anti-perfectionist, and also whether if one does accept the principle one will end up being as strictly anti-perfectionist as he claims. In short, I want to suggest that public justification is neither necessary nor sufficient for a strict anti-perfectionism. I will argue that one could be firmly opposed to all perfectionism that involves paternalism, but still reject the requirement of public justifiability, and also that one could endorse public justification while permitting perfectionism on the basis of claims about the good that are not reasonably rejectable.

17

2. Two (or more) Questions about the Good

Quong distinguishes two questions about the role of conceptions of the good in (liberal) political philosophy:

- “1) Must liberal political philosophy be based in some particular ideal of what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile human life, or other metaphysical beliefs?
- 2) Is it permissible for a liberal state to promote or discourage some activities, ideals, or ways of life on grounds relating to their inherent or intrinsic value, or on the basis of other metaphysical claims?” (12)

Question 1 distinguishes “comprehensive” from “political” theories, while question 2 distinguishes “perfectionism” from “antiperfectionism”, yielding four possible views. The two questions differ in their objects, first of all: the principles that compose a political philosophy, for question 1, as opposed to laws, policies and other state actions, in for question 2. They also differ in the role played by conceptions of the good: sources

of justification, in question 1, as opposed to objects of promotion as well as sources of justification, for question 2.⁹ And they differ finally in the nature of the question being asked. Question 1 asks about possibility, Question 2 about permissibility. According to Quong, political liberals assert and comprehensive liberals deny that liberal principles can be derived from nonliberal religious and philosophical doctrines, as well as from liberal ones. I don't think that is the right way to draw the comprehensive-political contrast. One certainly hopes that political liberals are right that it is possible to accept liberal political principles on the basis of non-liberal religious and moral doctrines, that one does not have to be a Millian or a Kantian to accept freedom of conscience, representative democracy, and other familiar liberal rights. However, there is no reason for comprehensive liberals to deny that such broad liberal principles are endorsable from multiple points of view. Comprehensive liberals also hope that philosophical liberals and philosophical nonliberals will converge on some general set of liberal rights and freedoms. There will be disagreement about the specification and ranking of these freedoms, as well as about which rights are included, and so too about the laws, policies, and institutions they require or permit. The comprehensive liberal maintains that in debating and deciding on these matters, there is nothing wrong with making up one's mind based on the full set of reasons one accepts, including reasons based on what one takes to be truths about human flourishing, even if reasonably contestable. In contrast, the political liberal maintains that there is something wrong with making these decisions on nonpublic grounds. We all hope that generic liberal principles can be accepted by people from diverse backgrounds. But if we find ourselves disagreeing about political decisions because

9 Question 2 refers to promoting activities or ways of life on the grounds of their inherent goodness, not just to promotion in general. There are two ways that we could promote conceptions of the good without making any claim about their inherent goodness. First, we might promote a conception of the good because its general adoption would have beneficial consequences unrelated to its goodness, consequences such as social stability. Establishing a religion on grounds of avoiding religious war would fit into this category. Establishing one religion to avoid civil conflict could in principle be an effective policy motivated by the familiar public consideration of maintaining peace; Richard Arneson, "Neutrality and Utility," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 20, no. 2 (1990): 215-40; Alan Patten, "Liberal Neutrality: A Re-interpretation and a Defence," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 20, no. 3 (2012): 249-72. Second, we might find ways of promoting human flourishing that don't presuppose any specific account of what flourishing consists in. One might argue that providing education and requiring courses in world religions and philosophies would promote the leading of good lives without making any particular claim about what the good life is. However, views that answer "yes" to Question 2 permit the promotion of specific conceptions of the good *on grounds of the claim that they are true*.

of religious or philosophical differences that lead us to accept different principles of justice or different rights and duties, political liberals claim that we must decide on public grounds, while comprehensive liberals recognize no such duty of restraint on the part of citizens, nor any fundamental criterion of legitimacy involving qualified acceptability.

We could therefore modify Question 1 to focus on permissibility:

- lb) *May* liberal political philosophy be based in some particular ideal of what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile human life, or other metaphysical beliefs (i.e. is it permissible to base liberal principles on a liberal conception of the good)?

This formula is not satisfactory either, because if it turns out that people can converge on general liberal principles from diverse religious and philosophical perspectives, there is clearly nothing wrong with their doing so. When we talk about “basing” liberal principles on controversial comprehensive doctrines, our concern is not with convergence on shared principles (i.e. overlapping consensus), but with specifying principles, and making decisions based on these principles, in the context of disagreement. The question is what happens when citizens disagree about the nature, meaning, scope, or implications of principles of justice. Is it permissible at that point to advocate and vote for policies that one thinks justified according to the true principles, which are based on one’s own distinctive conception of the good, even if others can reasonably reject these conceptions?

19

We might reformulate Question 1 so as to focus on political decisions:

- lc) Is it permissible to base political decisions on some particular ideal of what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile human life, or other metaphysical beliefs?

Framed in this way, Questions 1 and 2 would not be independent. If political decisions may *never* be based on conceptions of the good, then the state may not promote conceptions of the good *on the grounds of their goodness*.¹⁰ We want to leave space for a negative answer to the first question but a positive answer to the second, yielding political perfectionism in one of two forms. First, one might think that although

¹⁰ Comprehensive antiperfectionism would still be a possibility, so long as there are ways that conceptions of the good can figure in the justification of decisions that do not involve attempts to promote those conceptions, permitting us to answer “yes” to Question 1c but “no” to Question 2.

decisions about some class of basic political rules such as basic rights and liberties must not draw upon conceptions of the good, it is permissible to promote conceptions of the good so long as one does so in ways that do not violate these rules. Second, one might think that although political decisions may not draw upon controversial conceptions of the good, they may draw upon claims about the good that are not reasonably contestable. To allow for these positions, we should reformulate Question 1 so as to focus on decisions about basic matters, and we should indicate that both questions can be asked with respect to conceptions of the good in general, or just reasonably contestable ones.

20

- 1d) Is it permissible to base decisions about basic political rules (e.g. basic liberties) on (reasonably contestable) claims about what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile human life, or other (reasonably contestable) metaphysical beliefs?
- 2b) Is it permissible for a liberal state to promote or discourage some activities, ideals, or ways of life on (reasonably contestable) grounds relating to their inherent or intrinsic value, or on the basis of other (reasonably contestable) metaphysical claims?

Because each question now embeds two separate questions, depending on whether or not one includes the “reasonably contestable” limitation, there are now more than 4 possibilities, but for simplicity’s sake I will persist in using a 2 x 2 framework. Taking into account these revisions, clarifications, and simplifications, and allowing for some abbreviation, we have the following possibilities:

		Question 1: <i>May decisions about basic policies be based on (controversial) conceptions of the good?</i>	
		Yes	No
Question 2: <i>May the state promote (controversial) conceptions of the good on the grounds of their goodness?</i>	Yes	Comprehensive Perfectionism	Political Perfectionism
	No	Comprehensive Antiperfectionism	Political Antiperfectionism (aka Political Liberalism)

With these modifications, the two questions are once again independent.

3. Two Kinds of Comprehensive Antiperfectionism

With this exercise in classification out of the way, I want to turn to Quong's critique of comprehensive antiperfectionism (CAP). CAP maintains (in my formulation) that decisions about our basic rights and liberties may be based on a liberal conception of the good, but that the state may not promote conceptions of the good (at least not on grounds of their goodness). The tradition Quong has in mind here runs from Mill through Dworkin to Kymlicka, particularly as Kymlicka is interpreted by Hurka. If autonomous individuality is crucial to leading a good life, but otherwise there are lots of different good lives to lead, concretely specified, and if the state must act via general rules backed by coercion based on limited information, and if valuable activities don't make someone's life go better unless that person recognizes and endorses their value¹¹, then the best rule of thumb for state action may be a policy of neutrality with respect to conceptions of the good. According to this way of thinking, the fundamental criterion for assessing the exercise of political power is the promotion of human flourishing, but because the truth about human flourishing is liberal, then, at least as a general rule, we can best promote human flourishing by not trying to. The state should remain neutral between specific conceptions of the good, limiting itself to enforcing individual rights and securing the other social conditions that permit people to formulate and pursue their own view of the good life – and this, all because of the truth of the liberal claim about the importance of autonomy and / or individuality.

21

Quong argues that comprehensive antiperfectionism cannot yield a consistent antiperfectionism.¹² He illustrates his case with the example of Mike and Sara, who disagree about the value of recreational drug use, and hence also about whether it should be legally permitted. Mike

11 Even if theatre is better than monster trucks, my life isn't improved by attending the theatre if I just sleep or grumble my way through the show, without seeing the point of it all. Kymlicka calls this the "endorsement constraint;" Will Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy : An Introduction* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 203-04. It is a kind of feasibility constraint; use of coercion to promote ways of life that are truly valuable may be futile or backfire, because of the need for endorsement. 12 Quong says that he doesn't directly confront comprehensive antiperfectionism, apart from a few brief pages in Chapter 1 (22-25). However, it seems to me that Chapter 3's critique of paternalism applies to comprehensive antiperfectionism as well as to comprehensive perfectionism. Chapter 3 argues that all attempts to promote conceptions of the good on the grounds of their goodness involve an objectionable element of paternalism. If we assume that comprehensive antiperfectionism à la Mill and Dworkin isn't strictly antiperfectionist, however, then Chapter 3's argument that perfectionism involves paternalism also applies to comprehensive antiperfectionism.

22

thinks not, because he believes that seeking pleasure via intoxication is a perversion of human nature. Sara believes drug use should be permitted because she rejects Mike's perfectionism. If she bases her rejection of perfectionism on the value of autonomy, however, she runs into trouble. If she says that the reason it is wrong to coerce someone for his own good "has to do with autonomy, the importance of being the author of your own decisions and your own life" (23), Mike will deny that autonomy is so important that it always trumps other considerations. Sara can insist that autonomy really is always more important, but Mike will claim that she is drawing on a controversial view of the good, just like he is. Since it is grounded in the goal of promoting a controversial liberal conception of human flourishing, comprehensive antiperfectionism can't coherently object to the perfectionism of views that aim to promote other conceptions of human flourishing; at best, it can claim that they are promoting the wrong conception of the good. "Sara's objection to the criminalization of drug use is no less perfectionist than Mike's judgment in favour of criminalization," Quong concludes.

Furthermore, even if Mike were persuaded that autonomy is more important, with respect to the legal permissibility of drug use, he would insist that autonomy is not the only value state policy ought to promote. Comprehensive antiperfectionism must permit pluralistic, non-coercive promotion of good lives, since such promotion will not undermine people's autonomy (25). This kind of liberal perfectionism still involves objectionable paternalism, which Quong regards as involving disrespect for people's status as free and equal moral persons (100-6). The label "comprehensive antiperfectionism" ends up being misleading, because the state ends up acting for controversial perfectionist reasons anyway, in so far as it is committed to autonomy, and it is permitted to act perfectionistically with respect to other aspects of the good, so long as it does so in ways that don't undermine autonomy, e.g. via taxes and subsidies. Quong acknowledges that his criticisms target a specific form of CAP, not the family as a whole, but nonetheless concludes that his argument "suggests that comprehensive liberalism cannot yield a consistent anti-perfectionism" (25). This is the first main claim I want to challenge.

Quong effectively traces the limits of the consequentialist form of comprehensive liberalism. There is an alternate, deontological form of comprehensive liberalism, however. This kind of comprehensive liberalism denies that it is ever just to use the state to promote one reasonably contestable conception of the good over another simply on the grounds

that the people who accept the correct conception will lead better lives. Yet it insists that when it comes to determining what rights and duties individuals have with respect to one another, as a matter of justice, we may appeal to conceptions of human flourishing. Once someone has passed a minimal threshold of cognitive and practical capacity, we must respect the choices they make about how their own lives should go, even when these choices are wrongheaded, rather than trying to second-guess them, substituting our judgment for theirs about what is after all their life. However, when it comes to determining what we owe each other – what rights and duties people have, how to define “harm,” how to set the metric of distributive justice, or the boundaries of moral status – we should aim at the truth full stop, without qualification or limitation by any principle of unanimous reasonable acceptability. For example, to identify an appropriate scheme of basic liberties, we would normally make judgments about the relative importance of the different opportunities that different schemes will make available, or preclude – that is, we would do so if we were not restricted by a principle of public justifiability. Similarly, to determine what the relevant metric of equality is, in debates about social justice, we would normally need to know what resources are necessary for leading a good life. There is a crucial difference between deciding what is just *on the basis of* views about the good life, and deciding what is just *so as to promote the adoption of* those views. Not only does the latter view involve an objectionable form of paternalism, it subordinates the fundamental value of justice to a quite different goal, which is maximizing aggregate human excellence, or perfection. The suggestion that we should define “justice” to as to produce the greatest amount of individual or aggregate excellence involves treating the lives of some as mere tools for the achievement of greatness on the part of others. Defining justice on the basis of relevant claims about the content of human flourishing involves no such subordination of justice to perfection, but simply the insistence that we ought to figure out and enact true justice, even if in doing so we make reasonably contestable claims about the good.

23

To illustrate the possibility of deontological comprehensive liberalism, let us return to the disagreement between Mike and Sara about recreational drug use. Sara can argue that the reason it is wrong to coerce someone for their own good is that it is paternalistic, and disrespects another person’s autonomous agency. This reason “has to do with” autonomy, but the claim is not that the state ought to act so as to promote human flourishing (which happens to include autonomy as one of its

central components). The claim is rather that once a person passes some threshold of rational functioning, her choices about her own life merit respect, even if they are mistaken and have the consequence that her life will be less worthwhile or successful. It is her life, and she ought to be able to make her own mistakes; I should not substitute my judgment for hers even if I am right that my judgment is better, because her capacity for making choices is good enough such that her judgment merits respect. The claim that Sara's position is 'no less perfectionist' than Mike's rests on an equivocation between the promotional and justificatory senses of perfectionism. Sara's position is staunchly antiperfectionist in the promotional sense, since she denies that it is legitimate to use political power to promote controversial conceptions of human flourishing, just because the people who end up adopting these ways of life will thereby lead better lives. Sara is strongly opposed to paternalism, particularly when coercive, but also when non-coercive (for, as Quong rightly argues, paternalism can exist without limitation of liberty).¹³ Sara's position is justified on the basis of reasonably rejectable claims about the value of autonomy, however, and about the proper form of our relationship to this value (respect, not promotion). This second, merely justificatory sense of perfectionism does not necessarily involve any taint of paternalism. Sara thinks that justice forbids paternalism (once people pass the threshold of cognitive and psychological capacity), but acknowledges that this claim depends upon controversial claims about the good. Drawing on controversial conceptions of the good in this way, in order to identify and specify the rights and duties we have as a matter of justice, does not in any way legitimate perfectionist *imposition* of controversial conceptions of the good. We identify justice based on claims about the good; we do not define "justice" *so as to promote* the favoured conception.

Later Quong labels this kind of position as "perfectionist justice" (29; see also 85).¹⁴ He argues that theories of perfectionist justice cannot "practically distinguish" themselves from non-perfectionist theories.

13 Quong offers the following example of an option-expanding but paternalistic offer: "My girlfriend asks me whether I will finish that conference paper I am meant to be working on this afternoon or succumb to temptation and watch the football match instead? I assure her I am perfectly capable of applying myself to work this afternoon, but she does not believe me, and so offers to take me out to my favourite restaurant (which she dislikes and generally would not go to) as an incentive to make sure I sue my afternoon appropriately" (75).

14 He calls perfectionist justice a "stronger" thesis, noting that contemporary perfectionists are typically committed to the "weaker" thesis that regardless of how principles of justice are derived, perfectionist reasoning constitutes legitimate

He makes this argument with respect to principles of distributive justice. Quong provides two different statements of the perfectionist position on distributive justice:

- 1) “[Th]e metric or currency of distributive justice must be defined by reference to perfectionist considerations” (85).
- 2) “[E]ach person’s fair share of resources or advantage should be determined by how much each person needs to flourish to the appropriate degree, as specified by the correct conception of the good life” (122).

The first defines perfectionism about distributive justice as the view that the metric of distribution depends on reasonably rejectable claims about human flourishing; the second adds that shares should depend on individual needs, so as to achieve equal levels of flourishing. Quong thus says that perfectionist justice “will distribute resources unequally in order to give each person the amount they need to achieve the same level of flourishing, whereas the non-perfectionist theory merely aims at an equal distribution of resources (122-3). Equality of flourishing must be both plausible and remain distinct from equality of resources in its practical implications, Quong claims, if it is to constitute a real alternative. Quong denies that it can be both (123-26). I agree with Quong’s criticisms of the principle of equality of flourishing, but don’t think they tell against perfectionism about justice. We ought to set aside once and for all the sleight of hand Dworkin used to define equality of resources. Those who reject neutrality and think that the question of human flourishing is relevant to the principle of distributive justice do not believe in enforcing equality of flourishing regardless of the choices people make, any more than Dworkin believed in equality of resources regardless of the choices people make.¹⁵ Dworkin’s metric was defined in terms of the total amount of resources devoted to a

grounds for political action (30). However it is not clear why one is stronger than the other, as opposed to just being different.

15 Arneson argued that there are two independent distinctions: “(1) straight equality versus equal opportunity and (2) welfare versus resources as the appropriate basis for measuring distributive shares.” I would simply add that we should also consider human flourishing, objectively characterized, as well as effective functioning as a citizen under question 2. Arneson goes on to point out that given his two binary questions there are four positions to consider. “On the issue of whether an egalitarian should regard welfare or resources as the appropriate standard of distributive equality, it is important to compare like with like, rather than, for instance, just to compare equal opportunity for resources with straight equality of welfare.” Dworkin’s “What is Equality?” is “marred,” Arneson says by “a failure to being these four

person's whole life, as determined by the prices generated by all of the choices they and everyone else make in an ideal market.¹⁶ A more perspicuous formulation of his position would be "equal opportunity to acquire resources as defined by everyone's aggregate preferences."¹⁷ Perfectionists can agree that justice requires equal opportunity, not equality of outcome, but they believe that the relevant opportunity is opportunity to flourish, as defined by an objective account of well-being, not equal opportunity to obtain resources as defined by average preferences. The fundamental question highlighted by the p.85 definition but not the p.122 and 123 definitions is how we determine the metric of distributive justice: resources as identified by aggregate preferences (Dworkin), resources necessary for exercise and development of capacities of free and equal citizens (Rawls), or resources necessary for human flourishing. The perfectionist position may be wrong, but it is a legitimate contender, and it is practically distinct.

26

4. Political Perfectionism

According to political perfectionism, decisions about basic political rules e.g. rights and liberties may not be based on reasonably contestable conceptions of the good life, but they may be made based on claims about the good that are not reasonably contestable, and / or the state may promote conceptions of the good even if reasonably contestable, so long as it does so in ways that respect these basic rules, e.g. within the scope permitted by basic liberties.¹⁸ LWP offers two responses to

distinct positions clearly into focus" Richard Arneson, "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," *Philosophical Studies* 56 (1989), 88.

16 R. M. Dworkin, "What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 10, no. 4 (1981), 307, 310.

17 Elizabeth Anderson points out that the difference between welfare and resource egalitarians does not consist in the fact that one attributes a role to subjective preferences and the other does not. "They differ only in that for welfare egalitarians, the claims a person makes are dependent on her tastes, whereas for resource egalitarians, they are a function of everyone's tastes" Elizabeth Anderson, "What is the Point of Equality?," *Ethics* 109, no. 2 (1999), 295. On this account, Rawls would not count as a resource egalitarian, since his social primary goods are not defined in terms of preferences at all, but based on what is necessary to function as a free and equal citizen.

18 See, for example, Taylor's discussion of two kinds of liberalism in his essay "Shared and Divergent Values," Charles Taylor, *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism* (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 156-86. Taylor distinguishes a bad, American form of liberalism based on neutrality, which he associates with Dworkin, and then a good, capacious form of liberalism that permits pursuit of collective (perfectionist) goals within the constraints of basic individual rights. If Taylor accepts that our basic rights and liberties must be identified and justified based on a limited set of public reasons rather than on the basis of specific religious doctrines, then the gap between Taylor and Rawls is very small.

political perfectionism. First, even if some goods are reasonably non-rejectable, state promotion of them will involve paternalism and / or unequal treatment, and so will be wrong even if not a violation of any basic liberty. That health and pleasure are good other things equal is not reasonably rejectable, let's assume; still, one might think that it would be paternalistic for the state to discourage smoking on grounds that smokers are making a mistake about the relative importance of health and pleasure.¹⁹ Quong's discussion of paternalism merits a longer discussion. Here, I want to limit myself to questioning the role that the principle of public justification plays in this argument. Even if we accept that it is paternalistic for the state to promote one ranking of reasonably-non-rejectable goods over another simply because this is the correct ranking and people's lives would go better if they adopted this ranking, it is not the principle of public justification that is doing the work in this case. The problem with the policy of discouraging smoking on grounds that health is more important than pleasure is not that it is animated by non-public reasons, values or convictions that some people will not unreasonably view as being fundamentally alien. The problem that the policy is paternalistic.

27

To illustrate the fact that the demand for public justification goes beyond the rejection of paternalism, I would point out that not all anti-smoking laws based on an assessment of the relative importance of smoking and pleasure are paternalistic.²⁰ Judgments about the relative importance of health and pleasure can figure in justifications of decisions about social policy in two ways: as the object of promotion, or as the basis for determining the scope of the rights and duties we have as a matter of justice. Consider the question of the boundaries of our duty not to harm, in relation to second-hand smoke. On the one side of the debate, we have the legitimate concern of protecting people's health from the harmful effects of other people's smoking. On the other side of the debate, we have the legitimate concern that others take pleasure in smoking. If the latter did not count as a public reason, we could simply ban smoking across the board. That we do not do so suggests that

19 On this point, see Daniel Weinstock's case for mildly coercive policies intended to discourage smoking, and Gerald Gaus' critical response Daniel M. Weinstock, "Neutralizing Perfection: Hurka on Liberal Neutrality," *Dialogue* 38 (1999), 55; Gerald F. Gaus, "Liberal Neutrality: A Compelling and Radical Principle," in *Perfectionism and Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory*, ed. Stephen Wall, and George Klosko (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc., 2003), 157-58.

20 This paragraph draws on Andrew Lister *Public Reason and Political Community* (Bloomsbury, 2013), Chapter 2, Section 3.

we think that the fact that some people like to smoke deserves some weight, in our decision about where to draw the boundaries of the right to smoke (airplanes? restaurants? doorways to buildings? patios?). Unless restricted in scope, the principle of public justification rules out appeals to controversial conceptions of the good in decisions about such policies, even though they are not paternalistic.

28

It might be said that the value on the other side of the equation is not pleasure but simply liberty. Yet liberty as such, in the descriptive sense (absence of moral obligation or legal duty to refrain from doing X) does not have a fixed value, independent of what “X” is. Other things equal, liberty should be the default, I grant. But if “X” = murdering my neighbour, then this liberty has no moral value. Second-hand smoke is a long way from murder, of course. But the the bare, pro tanto value of lack of restriction is not going to answer the question of how important the liberty to smoke is, when it comes at the expense of harm, or risk of harm, to others. In setting the boundaries of people’s liberties, so as to make them consistent, we must draw upon judgments about the urgency of the various interests people have. Measurements of liberty will depend on qualitative assessments of the significance of the opportunities people have available to them, and will therefore normally depend upon judgments about the good, unless reasonably contestable and hence excluded by the principle of public justifiability. The case for exclusion of reasonably contestable conceptions of the good with respect to “perfectionist justice” cannot piggyback on the strength of the case against paternalism.

Even if one can be an anti-paternalist without accepting public justification (as my earlier discussion of the deontological variant of comprehensive antiperfectionism was meant to show), it may be that the principle of public justification provides a plausible reason for rejecting paternalism. If all or nearly all conceptions of the good are reasonably rejectable, public reason would by itself rule out all or nearly all perfectionism (unless its scope of application were restricted). The idea that no conceptions of the good will be agreed upon by all reasonable persons is certainly true if one takes “conception of the good” to refer to a body of evaluative or philosophical claims that forms a whole, one whose adherents consciously identify it as a system, or in other words a philosophy of life. Reasonable unanimity that one such system is best is extremely unlikely. As Joseph Chan has argued, however, it is more plausible to think that there can be reasonable unanimity on

single, local judgments about the value of particular activities or relationships.²¹ A life involving friends, family, and meaningful work is better than a life of loneliness and drudgery. Such judgments might pass the test of qualified acceptability, and thus constitute a legitimate basis for political decision-making, it seems.

Quong offers a partial response to this objection in his answer to what he calls the “asymmetry” objection, in Chapter 7. If reasonable disagreement about the good life makes conceptions of the good illegitimate as reasons for state action, why does reasonable disagreement about justice not make conceptions of justice illegitimate as the basis for state action?²² One answer would be that there is no reasonable disagreement about justice, but the view that there is this sharp epistemological asymmetry between the right and the good is implausible. Quong’s response is to distinguish fundamental from non-fundamental or “justificatory” disagreement, and to argue that reasonable disagreement about justice is necessarily justificatory, while disagreement about the good life is “almost certainly” going to be foundational (193). To illustrate the distinction, Quong contrasts Mike and Sara’s debate about the morality of recreational drug use, which is foundational, with Sara’s disagreement with Tony about discrimination, which is justificatory, or non-foundational (205). The question at stake between Sara and Tony is whether the Catholic Church should be allowed to hire only male priests. Tony thinks it should, because it is a private, voluntary association. Sara believes that it should not, because private organizations have to respect all kinds of laws, and nondiscrimination in hiring is just one of these. This disagreement is non-foundational because Sara and Tony accept a range of reasons that they agree are relevant to the case at hand, but simply interpret or apply them differently. They conceive of society as a fair scheme of cooperation between free and equal persons, they recognize the burdens of judgment and reasonable pluralism, they accept the principle of public justification, and so on. They arrive at different conclusions about the application of shared reasons in specific (perhaps disputed) factual circumstances, but these judgments do not count as non-public, in Quong’s (and Rawls’s) view. Public justifiability

21 Chan, “Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism,” 13-14.

22 Many people have made this objection, but see in particular Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd Edition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 202-10 and Simon Caney, “Liberal Legitimacy, Reasonable Disagreement and Justice,” in *Pluralism and Liberal Neutrality*, ed. Richard Bellamy, and Martin Hollis (Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999).

requires that we make political decisions based on public reasons, not that the decision to put in place a common rule be invulnerable to reasonable rejection. Thus if Sara thinks that the balance of public reasons favours a broader antidiscrimination law and Tony a narrower antidiscrimination law they may each advocate and vote for their preferred position, despite the fact that each conclusion (about where the balance of public reasons lies) is reasonably rejectable. Quong is not applying the idea of qualified acceptability to state action directly with a default of inaction, but to general reasons for political decisions, with a default of exclusion, and the stipulation that judgments about the application, interpretation, and ranking of public reasons do not necessarily count as non-public.

30

The main question about this argument is why reasonable disagreements about the good life don't get to qualify as justificatory in the same way that reasonable disagreements about justice count as justificatory, which is to say by definition. Reasonable disagreements about justice are justificatory because if they weren't they wouldn't count as reasonable. To qualify as reasonable, disagreements about justice must be disagreements between intellectual positions that accept the basic beliefs or values that are criterial for reasonableness, and they must accept the principle of public justifiability itself. Reasonable disagreements about justice are non-foundational because if they were foundational, they would involve appeal to non-public reasons, contrary to the principle of public justifiability, acceptance of which is necessary for reasonableness. Reasonable disagreements about justice are therefore necessarily – by definition – disagreements about the interpretation, application, and ranking of public reasons. Why can't we make the same argument about reasonable disagreements about the good? Reasonable points of view share the commitment to public justification. Therefore any disagreements about the good that arise in the course of political deliberation must be disagreements about the interpretation or application of shared views about the good. Consider the case of Sara and Matthew. Sara and Matthew agree that autonomy is an important aspect of the good life. For this reason Sara thinks that recreational drug use should be legal. Matthew disagrees, on the grounds that some recreational drug use compromises autonomy, because it generates addiction, and reduces people's powers of reasoning. Matthew and Sara are not having a foundational disagreement, it seems to me, but a justificatory disagreement – a non-foundational disagreement about the good.

But autonomy is controversial, some will say; it is not invulnerable to reasonable rejection, and it is not simply an interpretation of some meaningfully shared higher-order value that is invulnerable to reasonable rejection. For some definitions of autonomy, this is true. Suppose I claim that what gives human beings their dignity, raising us above animals and giving us a special place in the universe, is our ability to act for reasons rather than on mere impulse, and that we must accept no beliefs or commitments as valid reasons except those that we have subjected to critical scrutiny, and that I must consider myself my own final authority on what counts as a reason. I take it that many religious people will reject this view. Yet if what is at stake is just the claim that it is bad to become addicted to crack cocaine, because (among other things) this undermines one's ability to recognize and act on reasons, it seems to me that there is no reasonable disagreement. To be sure, there is disagreement about whether it is more important to respect or protect / promote autonomy, and about the importance of autonomy relative to other values. But such disagreement could be seen as disagreement about the interpretation and application of a shared value.

31

Autonomy in this weak sense is not the only value reasonable views share. Friendship is good; music is good. I grant that it is not unreasonable to be a hermit, who enjoys solitude and silence. Yet the reasonableness of this choice doesn't undermine the claim that it is unreasonable to deny that friendship and music have value, and are pro tanto goods (relationships or activities that make a life go better, in a constitutive sense, other things equal). There are, I take it, lots of values one could realize in one's life. Yet no one can realize all values, and some people can't realize specific values, because of their emotional and psychological make-up. Moreover, there may be values whose realization precludes the realization of other values. These ethical commonplaces mean that reasonable choice of one activity or way of life over another need not involve any disagreement with the claim that other activities or ways of life are good, and have value. Perhaps there are special states of consciousness available only to those who isolate themselves from others in order to commune with nature; perhaps a commitment to great art requires a single-minded devotion that is incompatible with family and friendship. It would nonetheless be unreasonable to maintain that friendship is not a good.

In order to establish the necessary asymmetry between the right and the good, Quong would have to argue that we have no way of knowing

32

for sure whether any particular claim about the good is not reasonably rejectable, whereas we know for sure that some claims about justice are not reasonably rejectable. The reason for this asymmetry is that the idea of reasonableness is constructed out of specific kinds of ideas – that of society as a scheme of cooperation between free and equal persons, for example. Whether all reasonable persons agree that friendship is a good is an empirical question, a question that can only be answered by canvassing the beliefs of all reasonable points of view. But they necessarily accept that persons are free and equal, because otherwise they wouldn't count as reasonable. Suppose all presently existing reasonable doctrines accept that friendship is a good; still, we don't know that all must, not for sure, whereas we do know that all reasonable doctrines accept free and equal citizenship, *because we have made such acceptance one of the criteria for being counted as reasonable*. The asymmetry between the right and the good in political liberalism is definitional, a matter of construction rather than a discovery, so to speak.

Whether or not the definitional nature of the asymmetry between the right and the good is a problem for Quong's political liberalism, I am not sure. The issue depends on who we should count as reasonable, or otherwise qualified, which in turn depends on why we should care about qualified acceptability of our reasons for political decisions. These kinds of question are always tricky to answer for a political liberal because 'the' justification of political liberalism must always at some point rest on (convergent) non-public grounds, as Quong's argument about the internal conception and overlapping consensus shows. My own view is that public justification makes possible a relationship of civic friendship across deep moral disagreement. I don't think Quong would disagree, but he would I think insist that public justification is in the first instance a condition of legitimacy or justice, not simply a matter of political community.

Primljeno: 2. oktobar 2013.

Prihvaćeno: 15. februar 2014.

Literatura

Anderson, Elizabeth (1999), "What is the Point of Equality?," *Ethics* 109: 287-337.

Arneson, Richard (1989), "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," *Philosophical Studies* 56: 77-93.

Arneson, Richard (1990), "Neutrality and Utility," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 20: 215-40.

Barry, Brian (1995), "John Rawls and the Search for Stability," *Ethics* 105: 874-915.

- Caney, Simon (1999), "Liberal Legitimacy, Reasonable Disagreement and Justice," in R. Bellamy and M. Hollis (eds.), *Pluralism and Liberal Neutrality*, Ifford, Essex: Frank Cass Publishers, 19-36.
- Chan, Joseph (2000), "Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 29: 5-42.
- Dworkin, Ronald (1981), "What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 10: 283-345.
- Gaus, Gerald (2003), "Liberal Neutrality. A Compelling and Radical Principle", in S. Wall, and G. Klosko (eds.), *Perfectionism and Neutrality. Essays in Liberal Theory*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc., 157-58.
- Gaus, Gerald and Vallier, Kevin (2009), "The Roles of Religious Conviction in a Publicly Justified Polity. The Implications of Convergence, Asymmetry and Political Institutions," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 35: 51-76.
- Habermas, Jurgen (1995), "Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason. Remarks on John Rawls's Liberalism", *Journal of Philosophy* 92: 109-31
- Hurka, Thomas (1995), "Indirect Perfectionism: Kymlicka on Liberal Neutrality", *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 3: 36-57.
- Kymlicka, Will (1990), *Contemporary Political Philosophy. An Introduction*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Lister, Andrew (2001), "Public Justification of What? Coercion Vs. Decision as Competing Frames for the Basic Principle of Justificatory Liberalism," *Public Affairs Quarterly* 25: 349-67.
- Lister, Andrew (2013), *Public Reason and Political Community*, London/New York: Bloomsbury.
- Patten, Alan (2012). "Liberal Neutrality: A Reinterpretation and a Defence," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 20: 249-72.
- Quong, Jonathan (2005), "Disagreement, Asymmetry, and Liberal Legitimacy", *Politics, Philosophy, Economics* 4: 301-330.
- Quong, Jonathan (2011), *Liberalism without Perfection*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rawls, John (1996), *Political Liberalism*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Rawls, John and Kelly, Erin (2001), *Justice as Fairness. A Restatement*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Sandel, Michael (1998), *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd Edition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sher, George (1997), *Beyond Neutrality. Perfectionism and Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, Charles (1993), "Shared and Divergent Values," in C. Taylor, *Reconciling the Solitudes. Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism*, Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press: 155-186.
- Vallier, Kevin (2001), "Convergence and Consensus in Public Reason," *Public Affairs Quarterly* 25: 261-80.
- Wall, Steven (1998), *Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint*, Cambridge, England; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wall, Steven (2002), "Is Public Justification Self-Defeating?", *American Philosophical Quarterly* 39: 385-94.
- Weinstock, Daniel (1999), "Neutralizing Perfection. Hurka on Liberal Neutrality," *Dialogue* 38: 45-62.

Endrju Lister

Javni um i perfekcionizam:

komentari na Kvongovu knjigu *Liberalizam bez savršenstva*

Apstrakt

Liberalizam bez savršenstva razrađuje opšte Rolsovsko shvatanje javnog opravdanja sa svrhom odbrane antiperfekcionistačkog liberalizma. Ovaj kritički odgovor postavlja pitanja o vezi između dva dela projekta. S jedne strane, moguće je odbiti zahtev da razlozi za političke odluke prođu kvalifikovani zahtev prihvatanja, čak i ako je neko striktno protivan u odnosu na paternalizam. S druge strane, zalaganje za javno opravdanje ne obara svaki perfekcionizam, ako postoje neki zahtevi o dobru koji se ne mogu razložno odbijati.

Ključne reči: Liberalizam, politički liberalizam, javni um, javno opravdanje, neutralnost.

Enes Kulenović
Faculty of Political Science
University of Zagreb

Defending Perfectionism: Some Comments on Quong's *Liberalism without Perfection*

Abstract *The article offers a defense of liberal perfectionism in the light of criticism of perfectionist politics stated in Jonathan Quong's book Liberalism without Perfection. It argues against Quong's claims that perfectionism is incompatible with demands of individual autonomy and non-paternalism as requirements of liberal commitment of treating all persons as free and equal.*

Keywords: *Quong, perfectionism, autonomy, paternalism, liberalism*

35

Introduction

This paper offers a defense of perfectionist politics within a liberal framework in opposition to Jonathan Quong's main arguments presented in his book *Liberalism without Perfection*. Quong's argument is that perfectionism is not compatible with a core liberal presupposition of treating all persons as free and equal because it shows disregard for individual autonomy, entails paternalism and lacks true political legitimacy. In this paper I will address first two issues – autonomy and paternalism. My argument will be that perfectionist policies are not only compatible with demand for autonomy, but in the context of unequal material distribution present in liberal societies today, are also welcomed. Also, I will argue that policies promoting certain conceptions of good and ways of life at the expense of others do not necessarily have to be paternalistic, i.e. rest on an assumption that some citizens don't know what is in their own interest and, therefore, the state is justified in using coercion or manipulation to promote their welfare. I will not address the third issue of legitimacy for two reasons. First, the discussion between Quong and his critics on that issue has already been published in some detail (Chan 2012; Quong 2012b). Second, I believe that the claim of lack of legitimacy of liberal perfectionism in most part rests on accepting arguments about its paternalistic and disrespecting-autonomy character, arguments which I hope to put into question in what follows.

In short, Quong's book *Liberalism without Perfection* is an impressive work in a sense that it puts liberal perfectionism to tight scrutiny that

has often been lacking in contemporary liberal theory. Additionally, it convincingly points out some of the inconsistencies present in theories of most prominent advocates of perfectionism (most notably Joseph Raz). However, I will argue that it fails in its main mission of showing that liberalism and perfectionism can't go hand in hand. *Liberalism without Perfection* is persuasive when it comes to warning us about possible perfectionist *hubris* that can lead to illiberal policies, but it falls short in demonstrating that perfectionist state is inevitably violating basic liberal *ethos* by refusing to treat its citizens as free and equal persons.

Autonomy

The argument that attempts to justify perfectionist policies on the basis of autonomy is pretty straightforward. To lead an autonomous life, individuals need to have valuable options to choose from. If we agree that one of the roles state has to play is to provide its citizens with a framework for leading such a life, it makes sense to embrace perfectionism as a way of promoting and sustaining valuable options through political means¹. We can ask ourselves what would happen if the state remained neutral and refused to promote and subsidize these valuable options, letting individuals themselves pay for those options they find valuable. The answer is that many valuable options would either a) disappear or b) be accessible only to chosen (richest) few. As Joseph Chan points out, “the cost of” disallowing perfectionist state policies “is that people risk losing the opportunities to experience valuable goods and worthwhile ways of life” (Chan 2000: 34). Take one of Quong's favorite examples: opera. If we remove the government subsidies out of the equation the only way the opera could survive would be for it to be commercially sustainable. To make it profitable either a lot of people have to be ready to pay for it (by buying tickets or donating money to opera-loving fund-raisers) or a smaller amount of people have to be willing to pay a lot of money for it. Both of these scenarios are problematic because nobody could convincingly argue that most profitable activities are also the most valuable and worth maintaining (think Hollywood blockbusters, Dan Brown's novels or Lady Gaga) or that if you are unable to afford certain cultural activities such as opera it's only fair that you are deprived of such experiences.

¹ Part of perfectionist agenda can also be *negative* by banning or discouraging certain activities (gambling, prostitution, drug use, smoking, high-cholesterol diet, etc.), but Quong's argument mainly deals with *positive* perfectionism (promoting certain activities, practices and goods) rather than with *negative* perfectionism, so in my discussion I will also concentrate on *positive* perfectionism.

This is where perfectionism comes in by using state power to maintain those activities that are valuable but not profitable. If we agree that the essential element of autonomous life is having a range of valuable activities available to us and we are afraid that leaving the survival of these options to market logic would lead to many of them dying out or accessible only to the richest among us, then perfectionism seems like a reasonable way to go. “Anti-perfectionism in practice”, Joseph Raz argues, “would undermine the chances of survival of many cherished aspects of our culture” (Raz 1986: 162). On this account, perfectionism plays a *corrective* role of maintaining those valuable practices and goods that would probably not survive in the context of unequal material distribution and market logic of supply and demand.

One could argue that if it is the variety of options that autonomous life requires then any and every practice is worth saving. To use another Quong’s example (this one borrowed from Hurka): why chose to subsidize opera and not mudwrestling? This complaint only makes sense if we presuppose a certain skepticism or subjectivism about making value judgments when comparing different activities. Who is to say that opera is more valuable than mudwrestling? Maybe pushpin is as good as poetry. If it’s the variety we need to live autonomously then the best option would be to have opera, poetry, mudwrestling and pushpin. However, if we can’t maintain all of these activities, which of them should survive – considering they are all mere preferences that have equal weight – should be decided by how many individuals are ready to pursue (and pay for) a specific activity. This line argument is not available to Quong because he rejects such skepticism or subjectivism.

37

Some philosophers claim that we can never hold views about human flourishing with any degree of certainty or confidence either because such matters are too difficult, or more radically, because there are no right or wrong answers about human flourishing, only preferences. These objections are sometimes pressed against perfectionism in order to defend political liberalism, but these arguments are deeply flawed (Quong 2011: 33).

As rational and reasonable persons we are able to make valid judgments on which options are valuable and which are less valuable or have no value at all². On this point Quong goes along with Raz and acknowledg-

2 Quong is right in pointing out that endorsing skepticism and subjectivism would put the whole liberal project of public justification into question.

es that it is not the variety of options, but a variety of valuable options that matters.

Quong relies on a different strategy to show us what is wrong with invoking autonomy in the defense of perfectionism. His main target is Joseph Raz and his understanding of autonomy. I want to avoid getting entangled in scholastic-type argument here (interpreting Quong's interpretation of Raz), so I'll just assume that what Quong has to say about Raz is correct. I do, however, want to argue that even if Quong's criticism of Raz is convincing, perfectionism doesn't stand or fall depending on validity of Raz's position. One doesn't need to embrace Raz's understanding of autonomy to show that perfectionism as a set of corrective policies makes sense if we want to ensure that citizens have valuable options constitutive of autonomous life available to them³.

38

The core of Quong's argument is that autonomy requires that we are neither coerced nor manipulated in choosing between different options. Limiting his discussion on the issue of state subsidies, he argues that, by offering financial incentives, the state is manipulating its citizens in choosing some options over others. Quong does acknowledge that "mere offers... need not be manipulative" (Quong 2011: 63), but state subsidies are not mere offers because what the government is actually doing is taxing its citizens to pay for the activities – such as opera – that citizens are not willing to pay for themselves. These kinds of policies are government's attempt to "subject the will of citizens to its own perfectionist judgment" (Quong 2011: 66) and are, therefore, manipulative and incompatible with the requirements of autonomy.

This, I want to argue, is a wrong way to look at what is happening when state offers subsidies for activities such as opera. Quong's view is that "the aim of such subsidies is to make the subsidizes activity cheaper and thus more attractive to citizens – presumably to get people to engage in the activity when they would not be willing to do so at its market cost" (Quong 2011: 61-62) and that "state intentionally acts to alter the price of tickets with the aim of changing people's options" (Quong 2011: 63). This is a very narrow view of the role of subsidies as one of the instruments of perfectionist government. The goal of such subsidies is not to manipulate people into engaging with the activities they would

3 Quong admits that different understanding of autonomy than one endorsed by Raz would be immune to the his criticism (Quong 2011: 60) and offers himself such an alternative notion of autonomy (Quong 2011: 58)

otherwise not want to engage, but to maintain and keep open for everyone valuable activities that are not profitable (or profitable at the price that would exclude the majority of citizens from accessing them). Take the example of opera again. First, it is highly unlikely that anyone who dislikes opera or has not interest in it whatsoever would go to opera just because the tickets are now made affordable by government subsidies (I have failed numerous times in convincing my friends who think jazz is just a noise to join me in going to jazz concerts even when I offered to buy them tickets or the concert was free). Second, if the government's main goal was to get people to go to opera the best policy would be to buy the tickets and give them out to citizens, not to make the tickets cheaper. Also, perfectionist policies are not limited only to subsidies that make paying for certain activities cheaper, but also grants which are first and foremost directed to maintaining these activities and not making them more finically attractive to potential audience (think of grants to music schools where opera singers and musicians are trained or grants to opera houses where performances are held).

39

Certainly, a perfectionist would hope that more people than not will decide to engage in valuable activities such as opera once they had a chance to experience it (and if enough people decide to do that then opera would become profitable, and therefore would not need to be subsidized anymore), but that is not perfectionism's main goal. It is not going to the opera that makes our lives more autonomous, but having an option of going to the opera. One can live an autonomous life without ever going to opera, but living in a society where only available activities are those that are profitable and many among those available only to the richest among us would result in the loss of autonomy for many.

Paternalism

The second line of Quong's attack is based on the argument that perfectionism "treats citizens as if they lack the ability to make effective choices about their own lives" and, therefore, denies them the moral status of free and equal persons. Treating people as if they are unable to rationally pursue their own good is clearly paternalistic and if Quong's claim that "paternalism is... (almost) unavoidable part of perfectionism" (Quong 2011: 106) is right, then perfectionism is incompatible with liberal *ethos*. The challenge he puts before us is the following: can perfectionism avoid paternalism?

There are some clear cases where perfectionist non-coercive policies are not paternalistic. Wall's example of nonhumanistic version of perfectionism is one such case.

Not every kind of noncoercive state perfectionism is paternalistic, however. Recall nonhumanistic versions of perfectionism. Those who accept these views might favor state support for excellence in science and art not because doing so will enable citizens to lead better lives, but because the state ought to promote excellence. This defense of noncoercive state paternalism does not presume that some citizens are not good at making independent moral decisions about how to lead their lives (Wall, internet).

40

Second example would be *corrective* perfectionism that I discussed in the previous section. If perfectionist government is in the business of providing valuable range of options for its citizens, rather than trying to coerce or manipulate them in taking these options, then the government is not behaving paternalistically. State subsidies and grants serve as a message that, as a political community, these are the practices and goods we find valuable and, therefore, we want them to be available to all citizens. It is up to each individual citizen to decide which of these practices and goods are an important part of his own conception of good life.

Quong's criticism of perfectionism goes deeper than this. In the *Précis* to the discussion on his book published in *Philosophy and Public Issues* journal, he summarizes his argument in the following way:

Liberal perfectionists must explain why the state needs to enact perfectionist policies. Why not simply give each citizen their fair share of resources and let them make their own decisions? The perfectionist answer must be, I suggest, that people will not make the right decisions if left to their own devices. But this means that perfectionist policies are justified by reference to paternalistic reasoning. The perfectionist believes the state must act because she makes a negative judgement about citizens' capacities to make effective decisions about their own lives. This negative judgement, I claim, makes perfectionist policies presumptively wrongful, since it fails to treat people in accordance with their moral status as free and equal (Quong 2012a: 2).

The question "why not simply give each citizen their fair share of resources and let them make their own decisions?" is crucial here, because it allows Quong to argue that even if *corrective* perfectionism makes sense when we are faced with dramatically unequal distribution of resources, in the context where citizens have enough resources to pay for those practices and goods they find important, perfectionist policies

become unavoidably paternalistic. In *Liberalism without Perfection* this argument is stated even more clearly when Quong talks about non-justice-based perfectionism:

What this form of perfection must claim, in order to practically distinguish itself from theories such as Rawls', is that even if everyone has been given their fair share of rights, liberties, opportunities, income, and wealth, further perfectionist policies will be necessary (Quong 2011: 85).

By imagining a certain liberal egalitarian utopia in which no one lacks resources to pursue his or hers idea of good life, Quong makes the appeal of *corrective* perfectionism redundant. Corrective perfectionism's role is to correct the injustices that would arise from the fact that many people can't afford valuable goods and practices and to ensure the survival of those goods and practices that are unprofitable. In the world where everyone has enough income and wealth, there is no non-paternalistic way to defended perfectionist policies⁴.

41

This argument is problematic in two ways. First, there is a bit of sleight of hand going on: it is not very hard to argue that a certain theoretical position – in this case perfectionism – is unconvincing if we can just imagine political and social context in which the problem that this theoretical position is trying to resolve doesn't even exist.

Corrective perfectionism makes sense because there is unequal distribution of income and wealth in liberal democracies. Removing the fact of unequal distribution pulls the rug under the justification of perfectionist policies. It's like a critic of egalitarian liberalism arguing that if we all lived in societies where there is perfectly just distribution of resources we would have no need for egalitarianism and this, by itself, is a proof enough that egalitarianism is a failed model. Actually, by resorting to "egalitarian utopia" though experiment Quong implicitly admits that in current, not ideally egalitarian context of liberal societies, *corrective* perfectionism is a valid theoretical position. Second, for Quong's argument to work we would have to assume that every rational and reasonable person in our society would have to embrace Rawlsian model of distribution as the only just model, otherwise this egalitarian utopia would become more oppressive, paternalistic and disrespectful of citizens' autonomy than any liberal perfectionist state could ever be. Most

⁴ Quong talks about five arguments used to defend non-justice based perfectionism and shows that they all reveal "liberal perfectionism's true paternalistic colours" (Quong 2011: 86).

liberals would have a hard time accepting that the price worth paying for non-perfectionist state is to dismiss all those who do not accept some kind of Rawlsian scheme from the process of public deliberation.

42

Nevertheless, it's worth addressing the question that Quong possess through his thought experiment: is there a way to defend perfectionist policies in a perfect egalitarian society without resorting to paternalist argument? My answer is yes. Even if we lived in a society where all citizens have enough resources to pursue those activities, practices and goods that give meaning to their lives, there is still a danger we might lose some of these activities, practices and goods if citizens are paying for them directly and not through taxes. If everyone is paying only for those activities and goods they are participating in or using, that would not ensure the survival of many valuable activities and goods. Let me give an example. Let's assume that Amy is big fan of Bruce Springsteen's music and she is ready to pay for tickets for his concerts and for his CDs. She doesn't like to listen to opera, so she never goes to opera concerts or buys opera music CDs. However, Amy understands that this is her personal preference and that opera is equally important to many people, as Springsteen's music is to her. Both Springsteen and opera are valuable, but she is ready to pay only to listen to Springsteen. Even if she didn't mind going to the opera sometimes, she doesn't have time to go because time is a limited resource and there is only limited amount of valuable activities and goods that we can invest ourselves in⁵. To record or enjoy first-rate opera in concerts is more or equally expensive as for Springsteen to record or perform, so more or equal amount of resources are necessary to sustain opera as it is to sustain Springsteen's music. Unfortunately, there are much less fans of opera than there are of Springsteen, so unless we presuppose a society where material resources are not only equally distributed, but also unlimited, it is fair to assume that if not enough people are willing to pay for opera concert tickets or CDs, opera will die out. Even in egalitarian utopia, valuable practices, activities and goods would disappear. Possible counter-argument, suggested by Quong himself⁶, is that opera fans could appeal to Springsteen fans like Amy who are not willing to listen to opera, but accept it as a valuable practice, to donate money so that opera could survive. This would put

5 Unless we take Quong's thought experiment one step further and assume that in our egalitarian utopia time is an unlimited resource, but then we are not doing political theory anymore, but writing science fiction.

6 This counter-argument was proposed by Quong during our discussion at the symposium dedicated to his book held at the University of Rijeka on 23rd of June, 2012.

the survival of non-profitable practices not only at the mercy of possible donors, but also entrepreneurial skills of fans of these non-profitable activities. If opera fans in one generation are not very skilled at collecting money from non-opera fans, future generations of possible opera-lovers will never have chance to experience opera performed live.

There is, however, a deeper issue at stake. When discussing the free-rider problem in relation to public goods Quong points out that perfectionists have a valid claim in arguing that although we all have interest in enjoying public goods, it is also in our selfish interest to benefit from these goods without paying for them. If everyone reasons this way, nobody will want to pay for public goods, so this is where the state should step in. The problem is, Quong argues, that “subsidies usually called for by perfectionist almost never involve genuine public goods” (Quong 2011: 89). Valuable goods that perfectionist most often want to subsidize – goods like “performance art, art galleries, public parks, works of literature, sights of cultural significance, educational programs for adults, and athletic events” – are not genuine public goods because “they lack the essential feature of non-excludability” (Quong 2011: 89). Let us take the example of public funding of parks. Parks do not qualify as strictly public good: they are neither non-excludable (one can put a fence around the park and charge the admission at the gate), nor non-rival (use of park reduces its use for others)⁷. From Quong’s perspective, this means that perfectionist argument about need for public funding of parks is misguided. There is no justifiable perfectionist reason why parks should be funded from taxes because those who find parks as important goods can pay for them at the entrance⁸. In economic terms, Quong’s argument makes sense: let those who want to enjoy certain goods (in this case, walks in the park) pay for them without taking money away from those who do not want to enjoy these goods or are indifferent to them.

I want to argue that there is more to goods such as parks than just their economic value. When the government uses taxes to pay for upkeep of parks it is doing so in the name of its citizens. Public funding is a way of saying that citizens as equal members of political community are ready to support certain goods – performance art, art galleries, public parks, works of literature, sights of cultural significance, educational

⁷ Fresh air produced by the trees from the park is non-excludable and non-rival, but we can leave that aside for now.

⁸ Of course, fencing off parks and guarding them from non-paying trespassers would make visits to the parks much more expensive for individual visitors than if everyone paid taxes and they were left open to everyone.

programs for adults, and athletic events – that are not public goods in strict economic terms, but are common goods that should be available to everyone and immune to market logic of profit. In Quong’s egalitarian utopia where everyone has enough resources to pay for whatever they deem important for living a good life, why do we need a state to tell us what to pay for? The answer is that public funding also plays a symbolic role by removing certain goods from the market and transforming them into common goods. Even if everyone could afford these goods, the fact that we pay for them as citizens through taxes and not as individual consumers has an important political significance. By making people pay individually at the entrance to the park we are turning citizens into consumers and common goods into market goods⁹. This leads to impoverished view of politics that eliminates the ideal of true citizen – *citoyen* – participating in a common political project with his fellow citizens and leaves us only with bearers of individual rights as consumers – *bourgeois* – satisfying their personal preferences. It also leads to impoverished view of the state where its role is nothing more than to provide fair and equal playing field for each consumer to satisfy his or her needs. State is no longer seen as a guardian of common goods, but a company that charges us for the services it provides. If the state is driven solely by market logic there is no reason why it should sustain the provision of those services that not enough people are ready to pay for or why it shouldn’t privatize all these services.

Quong’s egalitarian state is more sophisticated than that because the government would also have a role of making sure that through fair distribution everyone is able to pay for activities and good they find valuable. Still, this doesn’t change the fact that in non-perfectionist state citizens are mere consumers voicing their individual preferences through their (now more or less equal) purchasing power. The appeal of perfectionist state is that it invites its citizens to publicly debate which good should be labeled as common goods and to offer public justification why they should not be privately funded, but supported through taxes. This ideal is a far cry from coercing or manipulating citizens into paying taxes for something – predetermined common goods designated as such by political and cultural elites – they would otherwise never spend money on.

⁹ For criticism of substituting social goods for market goods from the economic perspective, see: Ariely 2008, Ch. 4. For more comprehensive criticism of allowing market mechanisms to be the sole determining factor of maintaining practices, activities and goods, see: Sandel 2012.

Conclusion

Jonathan Quong in his book *Liberalism without Perfection* offers a well-argued criticism of liberal perfectionist project. Where it succeeds is in showing us that there always looms danger that perfectionist state might violate the liberal *ethos* by disregarding individual autonomy and turning paternalistic. It fails, however, in its main argument that liberal perfectionism is a contradiction in terms. One can consistently, I've tried to argue, be both liberal and perfectionist. In the context of existing liberal societies with their growing social inequalities, it would be self-defeating for liberals to abandon perfectionist policies. That would only result in many valuable practices, activities and goods dying out or surviving at the cost of being available only to the richest few. But even in the context of egalitarian utopia where everyone is given their fair share of rights, liberties, opportunities, income, and wealth we would still have need for perfectionist intervention into the market. First, such interventions would ensure the survival of many valuable, but less popular goods for both this and for future generations. Second, perfectionist state allows us to be more than just consumers, it ensures the framework within which we act as true citizens involved in the common project of determining what practices, activities and goods are valuable enough to threaten them as common goods that are worth sustaining. There is a neat trick that political theorists can apply to any theoretical model they are advocating: following John Stuart Mill we can ask ourselves what would happen if all the elements of our theoretical model came to life. In this particular case, the question is how many liberals would support Quong's anti-perfectionist model coming to life? My hunch is that the answer would be: not many.

45

Primljeno: 2. oktobar 2013.

Prihvaćeno: 15. februar 2014.

Bibliography

- Ariely, Dan (2008), *Predictably Irrational*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
- Chan, Joseph (2012), "Political Authority and Perfectionism: A Response to Quong", *Philosophy and Public Issues*, Vol. 2 (1): 31-41.
- Chan, Joseph (2000), "Legitimacy, Unanimity and Perfectionism", *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Vol. 29 (1): 5-42.
- Quong, Jonathan (2012a), "Liberalism without Perfectionism. A Précis", *Philosophy and Public Issues*, Vol. 2 (1): 1-6.
- Quong, Jonathan (2012b), "Liberalism Without Perfection", *Philosophy and Public Issues*, Vol. 2 (1): 51-79.

- Quong, Jonathan (2011), *Liberalism without Perfection*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Raz, Joseph (1986), *The Morality of Freedom*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Sandel, Michael (2012), *What Money Can't Buy*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Wall, Steven, "Perfectionism in Moral and Political Philosophy", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), (internet) available at: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/perfectionism-moral/>.

Enes Kulenović

U odbranu perfekcionizma: kritika Kvongovog *Liberalizma bez savršenstva*

Apstrakt

Članak nudi odbranu liberalnog perfekcionizma u svetlu kritike perfekcionistačkih politika koju je izneo Džonatan Kvong u svojoj knjizi *Liberalism without Perfection*. Članak kritički pristupa Kvongovim tvrdnjama da je perfekcionizam nekompatibilan sa zahtevima za poštovanje autonomije pojedinca i za nepaternalizam kao uslovima liberalnog stremljenja da se sve osobe tretiraju kao slobodne i jednake.

Ključne reči: Quong, perfekcionizam, autonomija, paternalizam, liberalizam.

Enrico Zoffoli
TU Darmstadt

How “Political” is Quong’s Political Liberalism?

Abstract *In this short paper I ask to what extent the sharp contrast between the political and the comprehensive, on which political liberals such as Rawls and Quong place primary emphasis, caters to a truly “political” conception of liberalism. I argue that Quong’s own take on this point is more distinctively “political” than Rawls’s, in that it assigns far less weight to citizens’ comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, I suggest that Quong’s exclusion of comprehensive doctrines (exemplified by his worries about an “overlapping consensus”) has more radical implications than Quong himself seems to think. In doing so, I offer a streamlined version of Quong’s critique, which encompasses two more or less direct criticisms of Rawls’s doctrine of the overlapping consensus. I will call them the “sincerity objection” and the “liberal objection”.*

Keywords: *Comprehensive Doctrines; Overlapping Consensus; Political Liberalism; Public Reason; Rawls*

47

1. Introduction

Political Liberalism, as Rawls and Rawlsians in general understand it, hinges upon the crucial distinction between the political and the comprehensive. Very roughly, and despite the diversity of their specific views, political liberals suggest focusing primarily on the shared “political” ideas that are latent in liberal democracies, and to construct principles of political association out of those ideas. Leaving aside the issue of whether it is possible to draw a clear line between “political” and “comprehensive” ideas,¹ an important question is how far political liberalism should go in expunging comprehensive doctrines from the construction of political principles. This question is spurred by Rawls’s own worries about a purely “political” conception of liberalism, which, as such, would eschew all appeals to citizens’ comprehensive doctrines. For Rawls, the problem is that a liberal conception worked out exclusively from shared political values might be not only unstable, but also not “fully justified” (Rawls 2005: 386).² To achieve stability and full justification, so Rawls’s thesis, such a conception should also be the focus of an “overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines”

1 This line of criticism has been pursued by Gaus 2003: 177–204 and Habermas 1995.

2 Stability and full justification are actually two very different desiderata, as I stress elsewhere. Cf. Zoffoli 2012.

(Rawls 2005: 134). In short, Rawls's own conception is only *partially* political, so to speak, as it makes the acceptability of a political conception dependent upon the assent of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.

In his masterful overview of liberal conceptions, Jonathan Quong rejects Rawls's suggestion, arguing from different angles that political liberals should be wary of letting comprehensive doctrines shape the structure of the political conception. In short, Quong suggests taking a stance toward the justification of liberalism that is more distinctively political than Rawls's. In this paper I do not mean to challenge Quong's elegant arguments, but only to invite those who are impressed by them to think more carefully about their implications, which I think are more radical than Quong himself seems to think. In doing so, I will also offer a streamlined version of Quong's critique, which encompasses two more or less direct criticisms of Rawls's doctrine of the overlapping consensus. I will call them the "sincerity objection" (§2) and the "liberal objection" (§3), respectively.

48

2. Quong's sincerity objection

Instead of attacking the idea of an overlapping consensus directly, Quong's sincerity objection raises serious worries about the impact that an overlapping consensus would have on public reason.

Rawls is explicit that overlapping consensus and public reason have two different subjects: while the former is meant to support a political conception in its entirety, the latter kicks in when it comes to assessing the permissibility of certain laws and policies within a liberal constitutional framework. Still, as Quong himself notes, the overlapping consensus does risk affecting the pool of reasons that citizens can legitimately draw upon when reasoning publicly with one another. Suppose, for instance, that Andy accepts liberalism mainly because it is consistent with his utilitarian doctrine. In this case, an overlapping consensus (encompassing Andy's utilitarian doctrine) would be crucial to gaining Andy's reasoned assent. Most probably, though, Andy's utilitarian reasons for accepting liberalism will resurface whenever Andy is asked to assess the legitimacy of specific laws and policies. Because he accepts liberalism on utilitarian grounds, Andy will probably withdraw his assent from laws and policies that turn out to be inconsistent with his utilitarian convictions. Conversely, and for pretty much the same reason, he will probably demand a utilitarian justification for the laws he should be subjected to.

The issue, however, is that by advocating his sheer comprehensive views in public political advocacy, Andy would end up defying the ideal of public reason as Rawls understands it, since according to Rawls public reason requires reliance on shared “political” values, or at the very least the sincere willingness to offer proper political reasons “in due course” (Rawls 1999: 590-91). Some advocates of the overlapping consensus accept this implication, indeed wholeheartedly so, arguing that public reason should in fact allow citizens to advocate their comprehensive reasons when discussing the legitimacy of collectively binding political proposals. Call this a “convergence” view of public reason.³ Quong, however, rejects this view, on the grounds that it would be at odds with public reason’s *sincerity* requirement.

Quong thinks that a requirement of this kind is necessary to ensure that attempts at public justification do not lapse into rhetorical manipulation. Only when we are sincere with others, Quong argues, do we respect them as free and equal fellow citizens, as “... we acknowledge that every citizen is to be treated as someone ... who is the source of moral claims ... someone over whom power cannot be exercised without appropriate justification” (Quong 2011: 266). More specifically, Quong endorses what he calls the “principle of justificatory sincerity” (hereafter: PJS):

Principle of Justificatory Sincerity (PJS): Andy can support proposal X only if he reasonably believes that (a) he himself is justified in endorsing X, that (b) Bea is/could reasonably be justified in endorsing X and that (c) Bea is/could reasonably be justified in accepting the arguments he has offered in support of X (and vice versa for Bea’s proposals).⁴

Quong thinks that PJS undermines the convergence view of public reason, thereby providing an indirect case against Rawls’s doctrine of the overlapping consensus. Quong has in mind the following scenario. Suppose Andy accepts a given proposal X for some comprehensive reason R_A , while he argues that Bea has her own comprehensive reason R_B to endorse X. In this case, Andy would put forward what Gaus calls a “convergence argument”, which seeks “to show that we have different reasons for endorsing X, though we all have some reasons for endorsing it” (Gaus 2003: 190-91). Rawls himself admits of this kind of reasoning, which he

³ For a defense of the convergence view of public reason see Gaus 2011, Gaus and Vallier 2009, Stout 2004 and Zoffoli 2013.

⁴ I have slightly simplified Quong’s original formulation of PJS. Other principles of sincerity, which are more or less in tune with Quong’s intuition, can be found in Nagel 2003: 66, Gaus 1996: 139, Schwartzman 2011, Postema 1995 and Rawls 1999: 578.

terms "reasoning from conjecture". If we reason "from conjecture", we "argue from what we believe, or conjecture, are other people's basic doctrines, religious or secular, and try to show them that, despite what they might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political conception" (Rawls 1999: 594). However, Quong is convinced that arguments of this kind are a clear example of insincere justification. Consider again our case. By stipulation, Andy "does not believe that R_b justifies X", so how could he sincerely say to Bea " R_b is a reason for you to accept X"? Robert Audi (1991: 47) makes a similar point when he asks: "Why should others be moved if I am not? . . . [I]f the reason is adequate, why does it not move me?" It thus seems that Andy's convergence argument falls foul of requirement (c) of PJS, since Andy does not think R_b is a good reason for Bea. Moreover, should Andy be unable to offer any further reasons to Bea other than R_b , he would most probably violate requirement (b) as well, since he could hardly think that X is justified to Bea after all. Quong concludes that PJS bars the use of convergence arguments in public reason; this, in turn, would provide an indirect case against the idea that the political conception should be able to gain the assent of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, for the reasons I hinted at above.

Elsewhere I examined in greater detail Quong's sincerity objection (cf. Zoffoli 2013: 162–193), but here I would just like to point out that, even if it were sound, such an objection would not fully undermine the role of comprehensive views within political liberalism. To see why, we must note a peculiar feature of PJS, namely, that this principle of sincerity is addressed exclusively to those who propose or support coercive laws. Like most public reason liberals, Quong is concerned primarily with the (sincere) justification of coercion – i.e., with the justification of laws that limit citizens' freedom by means of legal sanctions. This is probably the reason why Quong's formulation makes it explicit that PJS applies only to those proposing pieces of coercive legislation, and not to those opposing coercion.

The upshot is straightforward. Although PJS would, if Quong is right, bar citizens from *justifying* or *accepting* coercion on sheer comprehensive grounds, it would not prevent them from *rejecting* coercive proposals by appeal to their comprehensive doctrines.⁵ The worry here is

5 Although Quong repeatedly insists that PJS should lead us to reject convergence views altogether, sometimes he seems to admit that an independent argument is needed to explain why, contrary to the convergence view, comprehensive reasons should not be allowed to defeat coercion. See Quong 2011: 265n.

not only that citizens could reject coercive laws within public reason, thus defeating a number of political proposals that might be supported by political values. More problematically, the issue that comprehensive doctrines might enjoy a “veto right” at the deeper level of the very justification of the liberal conception which should be the subject of the overlapping consensus. The obvious worry is that some reasonable comprehensive doctrine could, at least in principle, refuse to endorse liberal principles altogether, in which case the whole Rawlsian project of political liberalism would either collapse, or, at the very least, be constantly held captive by comprehensive doctrines.

3. Quong’s liberal objection

An obvious way of addressing this worry would be to argue that *reasonable* comprehensive doctrines and citizens, being reasonable, would not reject liberalism. In other words, one could claim that being committed to liberal principles is a necessary condition for being a reasonable citizen. Now while Quong explicitly subscribes to this claim, he insightfully notes that to assume a priori that reasonable citizens will accept liberalism is to make the idea of an overlapping consensus ultimately superfluous. What is the point of the overlapping consensus if we already assume that such a consensus should be reached on pain of unreasonableness? Why seek to show that all reasonable comprehensive doctrines could converge on the liberal conception if we already know that accepting that conception is a precondition for qualifying as a reasonable doctrine? In Quong’s words, advocates of the overlapping consensus face an inescapable “dilemma”: “... (a) either the overlapping consensus is superfluous within political liberalism ... (b) or people could reject the political conception without being unreasonable” (Quong 2011: 167). This dilemma constitutes what I call Quong’s liberal objection to Rawls’s doctrine of the overlapping consensus.

Now apparently Quong’s liberal objection aims to discard the idea of an overlapping consensus altogether. Because Quong insists that political liberals should not embrace the second horn of the dilemma, it seems that they should willy-nilly endorse (a). In effect, I think this is the inevitable upshot of Quong’s own argument: if we agree with Quong that political liberalism faces the dilemma he describes, and if we further agree that (b) is not a viable option, we are committed to embracing (a), thus recognizing that the overlapping consensus serves no relevant function within political liberalism. In this case, political liberalism would be

genuinely, perhaps even radically "political", in that its whole architecture would be entirely independent of citizens' comprehensive doctrines.

Interestingly, however, Quong does not think that political liberals should accept (a), and hence do away completely with the idea of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. In fact, he argues that the dilemma *can* be overcome, provided we deny the implicit and almost universally accepted assumption that the subject of the overlapping consensus should be the *political conception*. Contrary to this widespread view, Quong maintains that the overlapping consensus is necessary to justify the fundamental political values of freedom, equality and fairness, on which the construction of the freestanding justificatory procedure is based, rather than the substantive liberal principles it yields. For Quong (2011: 182), then, it is only the conception of the person as free and equal and the "fundamental idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation between free and equal citizens ... which should be the subject of the overlapping consensus". By shifting the focus of the overlapping consensus from the conception of justice to the basic political ideals of political liberalism, Quong tries to catch two birds with one stone: on the one hand, he wants to safeguard liberal principles by depriving comprehensive doctrines of the right to "veto" the political conception; on the other hand, he seeks not to jettison the idea of an overlapping consensus altogether, which, in turn, allows him to let reasonable comprehensive doctrines play some role in political liberalism.

52

I am not sure, though, whether Quong's move accomplishes much. The obvious problem, I think, is that it is not clear why Quong's novel view about the subject of the overlapping consensus should not be vulnerable to the same objection he levels against the common view. It seems to me, in other words, that Quong's view would be trapped in a strikingly similar dilemma: (a) either reasonable citizens accept by definition the fundamental ideals of freedom, equality and fairness, in which case the overlapping consensus will be superfluous, or (b) reasonable citizens can reject those ideals. Unsurprisingly, Quong discards (b), asserting that reasonable comprehensive doctrines are committed to those ideals "by definition" (Quong 2011: 182). But then we are left with (a): the overlapping consensus turns out to be superfluous. As Quong suggests, the theorist must assume that all reasonable comprehensive doctrines will endorse the fundamental liberal ideals by definition, and proceed from that basis with the construction of liberal principles (cf. Quong 2011: 190-91). Again, though, if reasonable citizens are by definition

committed to the subject of the overlapping consensus, then it is not clear why such a consensus is relevant in the first place.

I do not mean to deny that Quong's view about the subject of the overlapping consensus has some merits. For instance, it can offer a fresh solution to the problem we mentioned in §2, namely, that the comprehensive reasons that are meant to support the political conception could end up playing a major role within public reason. Because Quong does not allow comprehensive reasons to support directly the liberal conception, he manages to rule out the possibility that citizens use those reasons within public reason, to wit, when it comes to assessing the legitimacy of specific laws and policies that should be consistent with the principles supported by an overlapping consensus. In this way, Quong's peculiar doctrine of the overlapping consensus would not be open to the charge of letting comprehensive reasons skew the ideal of public reason (as Rawls understands it) – though of course Quong could still raise his sincerity objection against convergence views of public reason. Still, Quong could drive this point home only at the price of making the overlapping consensus ultimately redundant, for the reasons I indicated above.

53

The same line of reasoning applies to another possible advantage of Quong's view, namely, that it suggests a viable solution to the well-known problem of the moral foundations of liberalism. Political liberalism rests on the assumption that a just system of social cooperation should be justified to all its addressees understood as free and equal moral persons, who are committed to cooperating on fair terms. But what is the justification of this commitment? Why should we view others as free and equal moral persons who deserve equal respect? The literature offers several answers: some talk of a fundamental "right to justification" (Forst 2012); others argue, in slightly different ways, that the commitment to justification among equals is already implicit in our everyday (communicative) practice (Habermas 1990; Gaus 2011); yet others draw on the idea of "humanity" (Korsgaard 1996). However, political liberals are wary, and reasonably so, of endorsing philosophical views of this kind, which would in fact consort ill with political liberalism's commitment to remain neutral on controversial issues on which reasonable citizens are most likely to disagree. Now one of the virtues of Quong's view is precisely that it does not purport to embark on a justification of the fundamental values of liberalism: rather, it permits citizens to choose the (comprehensive) justification (if any) that they find most compelling. All these convergent justifications would thus constitute an

overlapping consensus on the fundamental values of liberalism, which Quong thinks should be the only subject of such a consensus.

Appealing though it may be, however, this view runs up against the same sort of problem I have been stressing so far: in order to be part of the "constituency of the overlapping consensus", as Quong often calls it, a citizen is committed by definition to endorsing the subject of the overlapping consensus. So whether or not Andy accepts the fundamental liberal values on comprehensive grounds, he is committed to endorsing them by definition on pain of unreasonableness. He *can*, to be sure, find those comprehensive reasons, but the political liberal starts from the assumption that, for whatever reasons, the subject of the overlapping consensus *must* be accepted by all reasonable citizens. Once again, an overlapping consensus on the ideals of freedom, equality and fairness would be irrelevant, for the same reason why it would be irrelevant if it were meant to support the liberal conception of justice.

54

4. Conclusion

Although it is primarily concerned with the importance of political values and ideals, Rawls's political liberalism also assigns some weight to reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Specifically, Rawls's doctrine of the overlapping consensus weakens the "political" character of his liberalism in a twofold sense. First, it can lead, albeit indirectly, to permit the use of sheer comprehensive reasons within public reason. Second, it confers a potential "veto" right to "illiberal" comprehensive doctrines. In his great book, Quong seeks to avoid these implications by weakening the role of the overlapping consensus, which in his view should cover only the fundamental elements of political liberalism, and not the substantive liberal conception based on those values. In this way, Quong defends a "more political" liberal conception, as it were, without however doing away with the idea of an overlapping consensus altogether. Despite its virtues, though, Quong's solution looks hardly tenable because, ironically enough, it is vulnerable to the very same problem that leads Quong to abandon the traditional view concerning the subject of the overlapping consensus. More precisely, I argued that Quong is committed by his own arguments to rejecting the very idea of a (non-superfluous) overlapping consensus. This, in turn, commits him to endorsing a more radically political conception of liberalism.

Primljeno: 2. oktobar 2013.

Prihvaćeno: 15. februar 2014.

Literature

- Audi, Robert (1991), "Religious commitment and secular reason: a reply to Professor Weithman", *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 20: 66–76.
- Forst, Rainer (2012), *The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Gaus, Gerald (2011), *The Order of Public Reason – A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gaus, Gerald and Vallier, Kevin (2009): "The roles of religious conviction in a publicly justified polity: The implications of convergence, asymmetry and political institutions", *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 35: 51–76.
- Habermas, Jürgen (1990), *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
- Habermas, Jürgen (1995), "Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism", *Journal of Philosophy* 92(3): 109–131.
- Korsgaard, Christine (1996), *The Sources of Normativity*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Nagel, Thomas (2003), "Rawls and Liberalism", in *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 62–85.
- Postema, Gerald J. (1995), "Public Practical Reason: Political Practice", in *Nomos XXXVI: Theory and Practice*. New York: New York University Press, pp. 345–385.
- Quong, Jonathan (2011), *Liberalism Without Perfection*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rawls, John (1999), "The idea of Public Reason Revisited", in *Collected Papers*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 573–615.
- Rawls, John (2005), *Political Liberalism* (expanded edition). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Schwartzman, Micah (2011), "The Sincerity of Public Reason", *Journal of Political Philosophy* 19(4): 375–398.
- Stout, Jeffrey (2004), *Democracy and Tradition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Zoffoli, Enrico (2012), "The Place of Comprehensive Doctrines in Political Liberalism. On Some Common Misgivings About the Subject and Function of the Overlapping Consensus", *Res Publica* 18(4): 351–366.
- Zoffoli, Enrico (2013), *Beyond Consensus. Public Reason and the Role of Convergence*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2013.

Enriko Zofoli

Koliko je „politički“ Kvongov politički liberalizam?

Apstrakt

U ovom kratkom eseju postavljam pitanje do koje mere oštro suprotstavljane između političkog i sveobuhvatnog, na kojemu politički liberali poput Rolsa i Kvonga polažu primarni naglasak, snabdeva istinski „političko“ shvatanje liberalizma. Dokazujem da je Kvongov pravac po tom pitanju više distinktivno „politički“ nego Rolsov, s obzirom da pridaje dosta manju težinu obuhvatnim doktrinama građana. Štaviše, sugerišem da Kvongovo isključenje obuhvatnih doktrina (što je oprimereno njegovom brigom o „preklapajućem konsenzusu“) ima puno radikalnije implikacije nego što izgleda da sam Kvong smatra. Pri tome, nudim smer Kvongove kritike koja obuhvata dve više ili manje neposredne kritike Rolsovog učenja o preklapajućem konsenzusu. Nazvaću ih „prigovor iskrenosti“ i „liberalni prigovor“.

Ključne reči: Obuhvatne doktrine, preklapajući konsenzus, politički liberalizam, javni um, Rawls.

Nebojša Zelić
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Rijeka

Is there a Need for Political Liberalism to have an Account of Pre-Overlapping Consensus Reasoning?

Abstract *In his Liberalism without Perfection, Jonathan Quong argues for internal conception of political liberalism which goal is to show that a liberal well-ordered society is internally coherent ideal and that citizens who would be raised in such society could endorse and support their own liberal institutions and principles if those institutions and principles are justified in particular way. These institutions should be justified by particular conception of public reason which main feature is that overlapping consensus is the first stage of its justificatory structure. So, public reasoning of citizens in well-ordered society should be based solely on values and ideas inherent to liberal conception of justice – freedom, equality, fair system of cooperation and burdens of judgment. Another important feature of Quong's conception of public reason concerns its scope. Quong argues for a wide scope of public reason which demands that all coercive or binding laws or public policies should be justified (whenever possible) on basis of these values alone. Thus, reasonable citizens in well-ordered society by definition accord deliberative priority to public reasons over their other comprehensive or nonpublic beliefs whenever they exercise their collective political power over one another. The problem I raise in this paper is that it is very likely that in well-ordered society there will be a group of citizens that will not accord full deliberative priority to political values, especially not at all levels of political deliberation. On certain issues they will like to see their particular values being realized through common political institutions. If our political theory excludes this group from justificatory constituency on this particular issue or categorize them as unreasonable it can easily undermine their general adherence to liberal conception of justice and endanger stability of well-ordered society. Thus, my point is that we need a further development of political liberalism to solve such problems not as a part of non-ideal theory but as a part of its ideal of well-ordered society.*

Keywords: *Quong, Rawls, political liberalism, public reason, reasonableness, sincerity, moral duty of civility*

It is a great privilege to have the opportunity to discuss Jonathan Quong's *Liberalism without Perfection*. This book is one of finest accounts of political liberalism that will surely have wide impact on new generation of political thinkers interested in liberal political theory. Perfectionist liberals have good target to attack and political liberals have a great starting point for further development of their theory. I agree with Quong's account of political liberalism, so the aim of this paper is not to raise

critical points about his book. Rather, aim is to provoke Quong to elaborate more on certain problems concerning stability of well-ordered society that can possibly go beyond his initial account.

58

Starting point in Quong's thinking of political liberalism is to develop an internal conception of political liberalism the goal of which is "to show that a kind of citizens who would be raised in a society well-ordered by a liberal conception of justice could endorse and support their own liberal institutions and principles if those institutions and principles are justified in particular way".¹ The main feature of Quong's internal conception of political liberalism is that the constituency of public justification is made only of reasonable citizens that, by definition, accept political values and *always accord them deliberative priority* in reasoning about political rules that their common political institutions should implement.² These political values – fairness, equality, freedom and reasonable pluralism (characterized by burdens of judgment) – are in the focus of overlapping consensus. Thus, overlapping consensus is conceptualized as the first stage in the justificatory structure of a political liberalism.³ We begin by asking what values or ideals citizens in an ideally well-ordered liberal society would all accept, and then we use those ideas as the basis for subsequent philosophical argument and public reasoning about the content of liberal justice. So, political reasoning according to this picture is post – overlapping consensus reasoning (post-OC reasoning).

Further aspect of post-OC reasoning is that we have two kinds of disagreement – *foundational reasonable disagreement* (FRD) and *justificatory reasonable disagreement* (JRD).⁴ Former kind of disagreement is characterized by the fact that there are no shared premises or frameworks between the parties, latter kind of disagreement is characterized by the fact that the parties share certain premises which frame their dispute. First kind of disagreement is part of pre-OC reasoning, while the latter is part of post- OC reasoning. So, there is a principled reason for treating these two kinds of disagreements differently. Quong's main point is that there is asymmetry between these two kinds of disagreement. FRD is disagreement about the good, and JRD is disagreement about justice. Even in well-ordered society it would be implausible to

1 Quong (2011), p. 158

2 Ibid, ch. 5

3 Ibid, ch. 6

4 Ibid, ch. 7

think that all reasonable citizens would give equal weight to same public reasons and hold same particular law justified by these same reasons. Citizens will differently weigh public reasons and they will disagree on outcomes of their post-OC reasoning. But, the important thing is that whatever decision is reached we can expect that all citizens can reasonably accept it, because it is based on shared political values, even if they think that some other decision is more reasonable or more just.⁵ Thus, the criterion by which the law is just and legitimate is that it can be reasonably accepted and not that it cannot be reasonably rejected.

The criterion of reasonable acceptance and not reasonable rejection is in accordance with Rawls' principle of liberal legitimacy which states that "our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with constitution the essentials of which *all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse* in light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason".⁶ In this way we can see the link between justice and legitimacy. If liberal theory of justice is based on political values that all citizens accept in JRD and if they base their reasoning solely on these values then, even if they reasonably disagree on which outcome is best, whatever decision is reached will be reasonably just and legitimate.⁷ Thus, our exercise of political power over each other can be legitimate only if it is within the range of liberal theory of justice, and we know that it is within this range only if it is based on political values all reasonable citizens share. Society for which internal conception of political liberalism is designed is *well-ordered liberal society* and that is the reason we start from *liberal* theory of justice.

59

Essential idea of political liberalism which refers to practice of political justification is idea of public reason. Since idea of public reason refers to question of legitimate exercise of our political power over each other then it is evident that for Quong the idea of public reason is grounded in the value of justice.⁸

This, I believe, can also be said for the moral duty of civility which refers to moral demands that norms of public reason place on citizens and officials in their political behavior or, in other words, in their exercising

5 Ibid, p. 209–210

6 Rawls (1996), p. 137 (my italics)

7 On difference between *reasonably* just and *perfectly* just institutions see Quong (2011), p. 133.

8 On different ways of grounding the idea of public reason see Quong (2013).

their political power over each other in well-ordered society. Moral duty of civility, similarly as liberal principle of legitimacy, requires from citizens to “to be able to explain to one another on this fundamental question how the principles and policies they advocate can be supported by the political values of public reason”.⁹ Moral duty of civility asks from citizens to reason with each other only in terms of public reasons or political values, at least when fundamental questions of justice are at stake. As we will see below, Quong does not restrict public reason only to fundamental questions of justice, but for now we can leave this problem aside. So, we have a moral, not legal, duty to restrain our reasoning on political issues on post-OC reasoning. Where that duty does come from? I believe that it is possible to ground that duty in more fundamental duty – *natural duty of justice*¹⁰. Natural duty of justice “requires us to support and comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us. It also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be done without too much cost to ourselves”.¹¹ How do citizens in well-ordered society fulfill their duty of justice? Since reasonable pluralism is an internal fact about well-ordered society it would be wrong to determine one true or perfect conception of justice backed by comprehensive reasons and then demand from all citizens to comply with it. Disputes about comprehensive doctrines are part of foundational reasonable disagreement and any such proposal can be reasonably rejected. Demands of justice are not demands to accept certain comprehensive doctrine. Alternative approach is to define core political values of very broad liberal theory of justice – freedom, equality, fairness, cooperation and reasonable pluralism. Thus, if political decisions are reached solely on these values they will be reasonably just and therefore legitimate. When we as citizens exercise our political power over each other we should rely solely on political values (moral duty of civility) because this is the way how we support just institutions (natural duty of justice) in well-ordered society characterized by reasonable pluralism. Also, if we respect moral duty of civility we can demand compliance from other citizens on the basis of natural duty of justice even though there will be reasonable disagreement about political outcomes.

Further aspect of public reason and moral duty of civility is *sincerity requirement*. As Quong says – “We cannot, in other words, merely aim at

9 Rawls (1996), p. 217

10 Quong grounds principle of liberal legitimacy in the natural duty of justice. See Quong(2011), p. 131–135

11 Rawls (1971), p. 99

getting others to assent to our proposals, we must sincerely believe our proposal can be justified to them".¹² When we offer political proposals or reasons for these proposals to others "we should sincerely think that our view of the matter is based on political values that everyone can be reasonably expected to endorse".¹³ The reason for sincerity requirement is nicely stated by Quong:

"If we acted insincerely toward other citizens, if we offered arguments we believed to be invalid, or which we believed others had no good reason to accept, we would fail to respect their status as citizens who can understand and respond to moral reasons, and are owed justifications for the rules that regulate social cooperation".¹⁴

Quong formulates sincerity requirement as a *principle of justificatory sincerity* (PJS). If we suppose we have political constituency of only two persons, A and B, and they face a choice as to whether or not to endorse proposal X, PJS "requires that A may only endorse X if the following are true (and vice versa for B):

- 1) A reasonably believes he is justified in endorsing X.
- 2) A reasonably believes that B is justified in endorsing X.

Furthermore, following Rawls's duty of civility,

- 3) A may only (in the political domain) offer arguments in favor of X to B that he reasonably believes B would be justified in accepting".¹⁵

It is clear that respecting PJS requires that our justification must be based on shared reasons. These shared reasons as we already mentioned are grounded in core political values of liberal theory of justice, so we can once again find basis of public reason in value of justice. But, as Quong notices, sincerity requirement has also further role – "it distinguishes public reason from rhetoric and manipulation".¹⁶ This role is very important in sustaining the value of civic friendship and respect.¹⁷ It means that by manifesting our adherence to public reason in our political

12 Quong (2011), p. 265

13 Rawls, (1996), p. 241

14 Quong (2011), p. 266

15 Ibidem

16 Quong (2011), p. 265

17 Ibidem

behavior we constitute a valuable kind of relationship with our fellow citizens. I believe that this kind of relationship is necessary for a just society to be stable over time. Thus, it is not only that idea of public reason plays important role to sustain justice in well-ordered society, but also it plays important role to sustain stability in such society in terms of relation between citizens. Problem of stability will, I believe, confront internal conception of political liberalism with need for widening its scope from post-OC reasoning to consider some issues of pre-OC reasoning.

62

To see this problem let us start with imagining a political community we can name *Political Liberal Expert State* (PLES) with deliberative legislative body such as parliament constituted by representatives and judicial body as Supreme Court constituted by experts. Further, let's imagine that in parliament there are no constraints on reasons officials can appeal to when they deliberate with each other on certain laws or public policies. They simply propose a certain law and offer perfectionist or comprehensive reasons of the group they represent. Of course, they deliberate with each other about these reasons arguing for or against certain comprehensive beliefs, they listen to each other, they respect each other and they are willing to meet each other halfway by making compromises on certain laws. After certain time given for deliberation they vote for proposed laws and law chosen by majority is passed on this level of legislation. But, this level is not enough for law to be enacted. There is also a second level that every elected law must pass – level of very active Supreme Court that questions if this particular law can be justified by public reason irrespectively of its prior justification it has got in parliament. In this body, Justices check if the law is in line with political values of freedom, equality and fairness and if it can be justified solely on reasons that reasonable citizens can accept. If the law does not pass the test of public reason then the issue it was supposed to regulate is again discussed in parliament. There is another round of discussion and another voting procedure and again elected law comes in front of the Justices. On the other hand, if the law is not in contrast to liberal political values, if it can be justified by public reasons alone then Justices will provide such justification and enact the law. Will this law be just and legitimate? Well, there is no reason why it should not be. First, the content and rationale for the law is in line with liberal theory of justice. Second, concerning legitimacy, Quong advocates *duty-based conception of legitimate authority*: “One way to establish that a person has legitimate authority over another person involves showing that the alleged subject

is likely better to fulfill the duties of justice he is under if he accepts the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying to directly fulfill the duties he is under himself”¹⁸. So, by respecting the authority of our imagined Supreme Court it is likely to be the best way to achieve what justice requires.

Will this law be publicly justified? I suppose it will if we stipulate that in such society there are only reasonable citizens who by definition ascribe deliberative priority to political values and public reason. Thus, even though citizens and public officials offer each other their comprehensive reasons for certain law because they ascribe priority to political values, they accept when the law for which they voted is turned down by Supreme Court even if they were in majority. On the other hand, minority can also accept the law they voted against because finally it is justified in terms of public reasons and by definition it is part of justificatory reasonable disagreement, so they can reasonably accept such justification for the law. So, the law finally is justified by the shared perspective (given by Supreme Court) even though on the first step officials presented the case for the law in terms of their comprehensive or perfectionist perspective. After the law is enacted everybody knows that others accept the law and consider it justified either because they ascribe priority to shared perspective and political values (minority group) or because they consider it justified within their own comprehensive doctrine (majority group).

63

So, in a sense, ascribing deliberative priority to political values can be seen as delegating to others – experts like Justices in the example above – job of finding public reasons for certain rule and accepting the rule because shared perspective was found and legally explicated. The rule is just, legitimate and enacted by procedure all reasonable citizens accept. Also, important aspect of this example is that every group has equal chance to be heard and to try to realize their values through common institutions, even though these values will be translated to public reasons. We can say that no one is exposed to injustice in their political interaction, they are all treated justly because they are treated in terms they all find acceptable – everyone can pursue their own values and finally the law and rationale for the law will be in terms they can reasonably accept.

But, there are certainly lots of things that are undesirable in our imagined arrangement. Of course, many undesirable things are connected

18 Quong (2011), p. 128

with disputes about value of democracy, but I will only mention problems from the point of idea of public reason.¹⁹ I will mention three problems concerning the point of public reason, scope of public reason, and idealization of reasonable citizens. First, as said above, public reason is not only about justice and justification of political rules. It is also about our political behavior in the role of public officials or citizens. It is about our exercising political power over each other and not only about our accepting political power that is exercised by some expert body. There is something valuable in relationship in which citizens themselves offer each other reasons they sincerely believe others can accept, and not simply abiding by the rules that are reasonably justified by some agency outside of their political cooperation. This is linked to the question of stability. One important point of the idea of public reason is that it aims at establishing inherent stability in plural democratic society. *Inherent stability* means that there are forces within the system that can correct deviations from justice in contrast to *imposed stability* that always imposes some agency out of cooperation that will correct deviations.²⁰ For inherent stability it is not enough that overlapping consensus obtains and that citizens endorse political values within their conceptions of good but also that in their practice this fact is manifested and made transparent. So, public reason can be grounded in justice in the sense of relation of democratic governance to the citizens, but also its moral basis is relation between citizens themselves. It is not only important that laws are justified to each of us, it is also important that citizens propose to each other fair terms on which these laws should be justified. When citizens in their political practice give priority to post-OC reasoning it ensures stability that can not be generated by experts. Rawls was clear on this problem:

„It is important for the viability of a just democratic regime over time for politically active citizens to understand those ideas. For in the long run, the leading interpretations of constitutional essentials are settled politically. A persistent majority, or an enduring alliance of strong enough interests, can make of Constitution what it wants”.²¹

19 For example, one problem is that it can give wrong picture about democratic politics. As Gaus notes: “To allow that principled deliberation is in some way the special purview of the judiciary is to accept, and encourage, the corrupted understanding of politics as a battle among interest groups, each claiming to impose its favored policies on the rest with no better justification than it has marshaled the numbers to do so.” Gaus(1996), p. 280

20 On this difference see Weithman (2010).

21 Rawls (1999), p. 496

It is citizens that have the responsibility to maintain a stable and just regime over time, and to do this they must have certain virtues for political cooperation. This surely gives republican flavor to liberalism but Rawls himself was aware of this:

„Classical republicanism, on the other hand, is the view that the safety of democratic liberties, including the liberties of nonpolitical life (the liberties of the moderns), requires the active participation of citizens who have the political virtues needed to sustain a constitutional regime. The idea is that unless there is widespread participation in democratic politics by vigorous and informed citizen body moved in good part by a concern for political justice and public good, even the best-designed political institutions will eventually fall into the hands of those who hunger for power and military glory, or pursue narrow class interests, to the exclusion of almost everything else. If we are to remain free and equal citizens, we cannot afford a general retreat into private life”.²²

65

This requirement of citizens participating in political life on terms of public reason becomes more important if we defend broad view of public reason as Quong does. This is part of the second major problem with PLES concerning the idea of public reason.

Second problem with PLES is that it supposes that Justices have certain *ex ante* list of public reasons and then apply it in checking if the proposed law can be justified by them. Also, we would need to have a list of political issues that are amenable to public reason – should all laws that can be interpreted as coercive be sent to Justices or some of them should be solved solely by majority voting? How do we know which laws should be supported simply by majority voting in the parliament or by referendum and which should be sent to Justices? One proposal is that we can make a list of laws that concern only constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice and only these laws should be the subject of public reason. Quong rejects such view of public reason and argues for a *broad view of public reason* according to which public reason should include all decisions where citizens exercise collective power over one another – all coercive or binding laws or public policies, and not only constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.²³ So, in principle, whenever possible, we should justify our exercise of political power over each other in terms of public reasons. As Quong writes: „My main point

22 Rawls (2001), p. 144

23 Quong (2011), p. 273–287.

is this: whether or not these reasons do exist, and if they do, how much weight they should carry in our political deliberations, can only be determined *ex post*. In other words...we should try and adhere to the idea of public reason when debating non-essential political issues to see if they are resolvable on publicly acceptable grounds. If they are, then we can ground a larger number of our political decisions in substantive reasons that are suitably public”.²⁴ As I understand him on this point he says two things. First, which issues can be solved by public reasons cannot be known in advance, but rather only if citizens deliberate together about these issues and try to find public reasons that can support political decision. Second point is also important, it is not only that through deliberation we can see which issues are appropriate subject of public reason, but also through deliberation we can see which reasons are suitably public, which refers to the content of public reason. Quong writes that „we should be open to the idea that the detailed content of public reason can only be worked out as part of the process of public reasoning”.²⁵ In Quong’s political liberalism there is no prior list of issues that are subject of public reason and prior list of reasons that are content of public reason like in PLES.

Third problem I want to mention about PLES is that it has an overly idealized picture of citizens. According to this picture citizens offer each other their comprehensive views about desired rules and then simply accept rules justified by public reasons given by experts because we simply stipulate that they ascribe priority to public reason. Problem is that PLES only has idea of laws as they should be, but it does not take people as they are. It only presents an answer (albeit not good one) to the question how *just* society is possible in circumstances of reasonable pluralism, but it does not answer to the question how just and *stable* society is possible in these circumstances? Namely, stability in political liberalism depends on moral development of sense of justice of citizens growing in just society. It is unlikely that our Supreme Court will have such profound and pervasive educative role. Simply, saying that citizens will be the kind of persons that ascribe such priority to public reason even though they try to win for their own particular values is illusory. It is more likely that such situation will give rise to group polarization. As Cass Sunstein notes “In brief, group polarization means that members of a deliberating group predictably move to a more extreme point in

24 Ibid, p. 285

25 Ibid, p. 289

the direction indicated by the members' predeliberation tendencies".²⁶ When citizens enter public forum without any constraints of public reason it is more likely that they will deliberate within small groups of like-minded people that will make their views more extreme moving them further from other citizens and weakening their adherence to public justification. Thus, we can say that picture of citizens in PLES is overly idealized even for well-ordered society.

But, this problem of idealization of justificatory constituency also presents problem for stability in Quong's idea of public reason and political liberalism. By Quong's definition reasonable persons are persons who ascribe full deliberative priority to public reason when discussing all political issues. So, reasonable citizens, according to Quong, are reasoning like experts in PLES on every political issue. In process of political justification reasonable citizens ascribe priority to post-OC reasoning. It would be unfair to say that Quong's society is utopian because he is aware that in well-ordered society there will also be unreasonable citizens. In well-ordered society political power is coercive power that must sometimes be used to contain threats to justice. It is then clear that institutions of well-ordered society will not generate its own support on behalf of all citizens living under them. There will always be citizens who want to see values of their comprehensive doctrine be realized on state level excluding interests of those citizens that do not share their comprehensive view. But, if this is true than there will always in well-ordered society be a number of citizens that generally do adhere to liberal institutions and political values of public reason but on certain political issues they want to see their values or good be realized through common institutions. Thus, they do not ascribe full deliberative priority of public reason, especially not on all levels of political deliberation, and they also do not definitely reject deliberative priority of public reason. They are not reasonable citizens according to Quong's definition, but they are also not unreasonable citizens. So, maybe Quong's grouping of citizens as reasonable and unreasonable does not exhaust all citizens living in well-ordered society.

We can say that problem is that Quong takes as constituency of public justification persons who are reasonable in a very idealized way. The idealization here is that they always accord deliberative priority to public reasons over other values in their comprehensive conceptions of good

26 Sunstein (2001), p. 15

at all levels of political deliberation. They always reason like experts in PLES. Political domain of well-ordered society according to this idea is always characterized by post-OC reasoning. But, such definition of reasonable persons, because of this feature, is too idealized; it does not take into account number of citizens who surely will populate well-ordered society.

68

It seems that Rawls himself was aware of problem of overly idealizing reasonable citizens. According to Rawls reasonable citizens are citizens whose conception of good or value system are most of the time „either congruent with or supportive of, or else *not in conflict* with, the values appropriate to the special domain of the political as specified by a political conception of justice for a democratic regime”.²⁷ They „*normally* outweigh whatever values are likely to conflict with them. “ But, also these persons are deeply committed to some of their comprehensive values and in certain cases they want to see them realized through public rules and shared institutions. So, when these particular values come into a conflict we have a disagreement, but I would still name it disagreement among reasonable persons because it is among persons whose value systems as whole are mostly reasonable. In this particular case they do not pursue shared ends with others, and this conflict can easily come to impasse endangering their future political cooperation and stability of well – ordered society.

So, the problem Quong avoids, but that will likely occur in well-ordered society is that foundational reasonable disagreement can easily become value conflict which can end with a situation of impasse. In such situations it would be wrong to say simply that such persons are unreasonable because this can move them further away from accepting priority of public reason even in situations where they would otherwise give priority to public reason. Now, it seems likely that two situations can occur – they can make deliberative enclaves with likely effect of group polarization which can turn them into unreasonable citizens or they can become resident aliens feeling alienated or ambivalent to liberal values or shared institutions without striving to impose their values on others.

It seems that between ideally reasonable citizens and unreasonable citizens there will always be a large group of non-ideally reasonable citizens. And an important question for political liberalism then becomes how is it possible for non-ideally reasonable citizens “to be *wholehearted*

27 Rawls (1996), p. 169

members of a democratic society when they endorse an institutional structure satisfying liberal conception of justice with its own intrinsic political ideals and values, and when they are *not simply going along with it in view of the balance of political and social forces?*"²⁸

This *problem of wholeheartedness* becomes more serious if we have in mind broad view of public reason. For narrow view this problem is not so severe because they do not ask so much from citizens. Narrow view only demands from citizens to ascribe full deliberative priority to public reason only when they deliberate on issues concerning constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. It can also demand full deliberative priority when they discuss democratic procedures through which other political issues will be resolved. But, when these essentials and procedures are settled then they can express their values and try to win the day respecting constitutional and procedural constraints when other political issues are on the table. But, for the broad view of public reason which demands that norms of public reason be applied to all levels of deliberation where citizens exercise their political power over each other problem of wholeheartedness can not be so easily avoided. Particularly, if we want well-ordered society to implement some democratic innovations that are open to wider citizen participation in democratic decision-making like, for example, participative city budgeting.²⁹

69

I believe that it is plausible to imagine that in broad view of public reason that includes some institutions for wider citizen participation in political deliberation there will be more situations where non-ideally reasonable persons will try to see their values realized through common institutions. Can we then simply say as Quong does that although as citizens we should try to reason with those citizens and persuade them that they should give priority to public reasons but that political liberalism *qua* political philosophy need not and should not aspire to resolve such situations?³⁰ Can we say that political liberalism simply passes the buck to non-ideal citizens how to translate their reasons into public

28 Rawls (1996), p. xxxviii. In this quotation Rawls explicitly mentions citizens of faith, but I put notion of non-ideally reasonable persons to cover wider range of conceptions of good like, for example, ecocentric.

29 In *participative city budgeting*, citizens are through popular assemblies at a neighborhood and district level participating in decisions about the distribution of significant portions of the city's budget. For more on this see Smith (2009). Here I mention participative city budgeting because example given by Quong for broad view of public reason – decision whether we should build an art gallery or football stadium (p. 280) – is an issue suitable for such democratic procedure.

30 Quong (2011), p. 189

reasons and than deliberate together on terms of these reasons alone? Well, if political liberalism is concerned with stability and not only with justice, it seems to me that problem of wholeheartedness is a problem of political liberalism qua political theory. Problems of non-ideal citizens retreating to private life and becoming resident aliens or worse making deliberative enclaves that can polarize citizens to become unreasonable citizens are problems of political liberalism qua political theory.

It seems to me that political liberalism must have a certain account of pre- overlapping consensus reasoning and not only account of post – overlapping consensus reasoning. The problem of pre-OC reasoning is how are we to reason with non-ideally reasonable persons in order for them to become participants of post-OC reasoning. It is important to note two things. First, pre-OC reasoning is not comprehensive reasoning. We do not reason with others in order to question the truth of their comprehensive doctrine, this should not be part of political theory. Second, aim of pre-OC reasoning is not to check if certain law can be justified on basis of comprehensive reasons citizens hold. Here I agree with Quong that justification of laws or policies must be public in a sense that it is based on shared public reasons. The point is not that we reason with others to achieve that certain outcome (law or policy) is justified according to their pre-OC reasons, but to reason with others to achieve that they accept reasons that are suitably public for outcomes to be justified. As is already said, we do not demand that citizens accept wholeheartedly outcomes, but only deliberative process and public reasons by which this outcome is justified. I believe that this is also clear in Rawls's own example of pre-OC reasoning, *reasoning from conjecture*:

“We argue from what we believe, or conjecture, are other people's basic doctrines, religious or secular, and try to show them that, despite what they might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political conception that can provide basis for public reasons. The ideal of public reason is thereby strengthened. However, it is important that conjecture be sincere and not manipulative. We must openly explain our intentions and state that we do not assert the premises from which we argue, but that we proceed as we do to clear up what we take to be a misunderstanding on other's part, and perhaps equally on ours.”³¹

Thus, as I understand him, Rawls is not saying that in reasoning from conjecture we try to show others that particular outcome is justified in

31 Rawls (1999), p. 594

terms of their particular reasons but that they can still endorse political conception that can provide basis for public reasons and then to enter post-OC reasoning based on these reasons alone. Otherwise, we would behave like experts in PLES, providing justification for a law from perspective of political values, but then explaining others how this law can be justified to them on terms of their particular reasons. But, we already saw that this is not idea of public reason we want to have in well-ordered society.

Thus, to have justice and justification we need moral duty of civility with PJS in political *justificatory* domain where laws are finally being justified. Justification of laws is domain of post-OC reasoning. But, having in mind broad view of public reason and wider citizen's political participation we also need political *deliberative* domain where non- ideally reasonable citizens will sometimes offer each other their comprehensive reasons. This will be the domain where pre-OC reasoning will most likely occur. But, if moral duty of civility and PJS are only notions of civility and sincerity that political liberalism qua political theory employs then it will not have its own resources how to deal with such situations because they are, by definition, elements of post-OC reasoning. It is important to have notions of civility and sincerity on pre-OC level also because we want to avoid manipulation, strategic reasoning and bargaining – these things can endanger stability even if final outcome will be suitably justified.

71

Appropriate notion of sincerity at a level of pre-OC reasoning is nicely captured in Principle of Sincerity proposed by Gaus. According to Gaus's principle of sincerity, "If we have two persons, A and B, and different reasons R_a and R_b , A can sincerely appeal to B (and vice versa) only if A believes that (i) B would have sufficient reason to endorse R_b and (ii) A could see this as intelligible and relevant, though he does not endorse it".³²

Let's see Gaus's own example of this principle:

"I believe that virtue theory is an erroneous account of basis of social morality, and I believe that at some level of deliberation this can be shown. Yet I believe that my colleagues who are virtue theorists have considerable warrant for their beliefs. Now suppose that I am deliberating with one of these colleagues about the proper rule governing, say,

32 Gaus (2011), p. 289

property, and I point out that, on grounds of her virtue theory, rule x is to be ranked as superior to rule y . I believe that she has sufficient warrant for her beliefs at this level of deliberation, and so for her endorsement of x (over y). I have respected her moral autonomy and have appreciated that on these difficult matters highly competent reasoners have conflicting beliefs. No insincerity, manipulation, or deception is involved in our relations: I treat her as a free and equal person with her own store of warranted beliefs at this level of deliberation, which quite properly guide her as a rational agent.”³³

Now, as already said, I do not agree with Gaus that we should justify particular rules or laws on reasons we hold unjustified.³⁴ But, if instead of rules we put public reasons then I think this Principle of sincerity can be appropriate as part of political liberalism for pre-OC reasoning. For example, in debate about gay marriages there are many reasons that anti-gay marriage group can offer. Reasons that heterosexual marriage is part of tradition, that it has intrinsic spiritual value and reasons concerning interests of children. So, if we can show to this group that according to their comprehensive doctrine, that we do not hold justified, they should rank reason concerning interests of children over other reasons, I think that we should do it without behaving insincerely, even if we clearly violate PJS. Interest of children is public reason, it should have deliberative priority over tradition and spirituality, and it is appropriate reason for justificatory domain irrespectively of the outcome itself.

This kind of sincerity is essential part of our virtue of civility like PJS is essential part of our moral duty of civility. Virtue of civility I have in mind is one of political virtues that are „specified as those qualities of citizens’ moral character important in securing a just basic structure over time“.³⁵ Virtue of civility directs us how to approach non - ideally reasonable persons when they see the threat to realization of their very important values through public rules in certain situations. Saying that this is their problem with which our theory is not concerned but unfortunately they are not part of justificatory constituency on this issue can make them feel exposed to injustice which can endanger stability of just

33 Gaus (2011), p. 291. Elvio Baccharini offers an attempt to reformulate the convergence view in order to show that sincerity can be respected even by justification related to convergence. Baccharini (2014).

34 It may be useful, here, to mention the importance in Gaus’s theory of balancing the reasons that one has with the reasons that others have, in order to establish common moral demands with them. Cfr. Baccharini (2013).

35 Rawls (2001), p. 142

basic structure. We act in accordance with our virtue of civility when we listen to others and try to see things from the point of view of their conception of good. In this way we do not only *treat* others in a tolerant and respectful way, but we *communicate* in a tolerant and respectful way.³⁶ The place where this communication occurs is part of pre-OC reasoning and its aim is to manifest readiness on our part and insurance on part of others that in justification of particular political decision everyone will respect moral duty of civility as essential part of post-OC reasoning. Finally, developing certain account of pre-OC reasoning that is part of political liberalism can possibly be a first step for political liberals to give directions how our actual societies can move more closely toward the ideal of well-ordered society. In actual circumstances we are very far from fulfilling moral duty of civility and principle of justificatory sincerity, but I believe we can still cooperate together manifesting virtue of civility with its own notion of sincerity.

73

Thus, I can summarize my point in this paper by one question to Quong – can political liberalism still be a coherent account of just and stable society if it does not try to develop a certain account of pre-OC reasoning as part of political theory?

Primljeno: 2. oktobar 2013.

Prihvaćeno: 15. februar 2014.

Bibliography

- Baccarini, E. (2014), "Public Reason. The Consensus and the Convergence View", *Filozofija i društvo* 25: 75-95
- Baccarini, E. (2013), "Having a Reason and Distributive Justice in *The Order of Public Reason*", *European Journal of Analytical Philosophy* 9: 25-51.
- Calhoun, C. (2000), "The Virtue of Civility", *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 251-275.
- Gaus, G. (1996), *Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gaus, G. (2010), *The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Quong, J. (2011), *Liberalism without Perfection*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Quong, J. (2013), "Public Reason", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/public-reason/>>.
- Rawls, J. (1971), *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rawls, J. (1996), *Political Liberalism*, New York: Columbia University Press.

³⁶ For more on difference between civility and tolerance see Calhoun (2000).

Smith, G. (2009), *Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions For Citizen Participation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sunstein, C. (2001), *Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weithman, P. (2010), *Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls's Political Turn*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nebojša Želić

Da li je političkom liberalizmu potreban neki model rasuđivanja pre preklapajućeg konsenzusa?

Apstrakt

U svojoj knjizi *Liberalism without Perfection*, Džonatan Kvong zastupa unutrašnju koncepciju političkog liberalizma, čija je namera da pokaže da je liberalno dobro uređeno društvo unutrašnji koherentan ideal i da će građani odgojeni u takvom društvu moći prihvatiti i podupreti svoje liberalne institucije i načela ukoliko su te institucije i načela odgovarajuće opravdani. Odgovarajuće opravdanje podrazumeva posebnu koncepciju javnog uma, čija je glavna osobina to da je preklapajući konsenzus prvi stupanj opravdava-lacke strukture. Dakle, javno rasuđivanje građana u dobro uređenom društvu treba se temeljiti samo na vrednostima i idejama inherentnim liberalnoj koncepciji pravednosti – sloboda, jednakost, pravedan sistem kooperacije i tereti suđenja. Druga važna osobina Kvongove koncepcije javnog uma odnosi se na njegov doseg. Kvong brani široki doseg javnog uma što znači da bi svi obavezujući zakoni i javne politike treba da budu (kad god je to moguće) opravdani samo na temelju spomenutih vrednosti. Dakle, razložni građani u dobro uređenom društvu po definiciji pridaju deliberativni prioritet javnim razlozima nad njihovim drugim sveobuhvatnim verovanjima kad god koriste svoju kolektivnu političku moć jedni nad drugima. Problem koji postavljam u članku jeste da je vrlo verovatno da će u dobro uređenom društvu postojati grupa građana koja neće pridati potpuno deliberativno prvenstvo političkim vrednostima, a posebno to neće činiti na svim nivoima političke deliberacije. Oko nekih pitanje sigurno će hteti da vide svoje partikularne vrednosti realizovane kroz zajedničke političke institucije. Ukoliko naša politička teorija isključuje tu grupu iz opravdanja oko nekog pojedinog problema ili ih određuje kao nerazložne, tada je verovatno da će se narušiti njihova opšta odanost liberalnoj koncepciji pravednosti i ugroziti stabilnost dobro uređenog društva. Dakle, ono što želim da istaknem jeste da nam treba dalje razvijanje političkog liberalizma, kako bi mogao da se suoči sa pomenutim problemima, ne kao deo ne-idealne teorije, već kao deo liberalnog idela dobro uređenog društva.

Cljučne reči: Quong, Rawls, politički liberalizam, javni um, razložnost, iskrenost, moralna dužnost građanstva.

Elvio Baccharini
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
University of Rijeka

Public Reason. The Consensus and the Convergence View

Abstract Jonathan Quong proposes and defends the consensus, shared reasons, view of public reason. The proposal is opposed to the convergence view, defended, among others, by Gerald Gaus. The strong argument that Quong puts forward in opposition to the convergence view is represented by the sincerity argument. The present paper offers an argument that embraces a form of convergence and, at the same time, is engaged in respecting the requirement of sincerity.

Keywords: Consensus, convergence, Gaus, public reason, Quong.

75

1. Jonathan Quong's *Liberalism without Perfection* is an impressive book which will strongly influence debates in political philosophy, and especially in Rawlsian political philosophy, in the future. Together with Gerald Gaus's *The Order of Public Reason*, this is, in my opinion, the most stimulating book in political philosophy written in recent years, and the two books, as, in many senses, two poles in the debate on public reason, will persistently be strongly influential in the future. It is a great occasion to discuss *Liberalism without Perfection* with the author.

The fundamental distinctive aspect of Quong's proposal in the context of Rawlsian philosophy is that it defends the internal conception of political liberalism. According to such view, the main feature of public justification is that it is oriented to people who already endorse a liberal point of view. It is not required to offer justification to people who do not endorse the basic commitments of liberalism. Justification is meant as justification based on such fundamental commitments. The issue of pluralism does not regard pluralism external to liberalism, but pluralism that appears in a liberal society as a consequence of the free exercise of human reason. As Quong says, "I do not believe liberal rights and principles can be consistently justified to persons who do not already embrace certain liberal values (e.g. the moral ideal of persons as free and equal, and of society as a fair system of cooperation). The internal conception's more modest ambition – to work out a model of political justification for *liberals* – is not an attempt to do the impossible, and thus it avoids the difficulties that beset the external model" (Quong 2011: 140). *Liberalism without Perfection* "represents the answer

to a question that is internal to liberal theory, namely, what should the structure and content of political justification be in a well-ordered society, given the fact of reasonable pluralism? Given that we are committed to certain liberal values, what does that imply about the nature of a just and stable liberal regime?" (Quong 2011: 137-160).

This fundamental aspect of Quong's conception of political liberalism has several consequences, and one of them regards his approach to public reason, i.e. the justification of specific policies and political and public decisions in the context of a political society based on basic liberal commitments.¹ As regards the structure of public reason, Quong's proposal is mainly loyal to Rawls's concept that relies on consensus and shared reasons. On the opposed side there is the convergence interpretation of the structure of public reason championed by Gerald Gaus. Not only shared reasons, but all evaluative standards embraced by the members of society are relevant for public justification.

76

In the following part of the paper, I discuss Quong's criticism and refusal of the converge view of public reason and I try to offer an employment of justification from convergence that is different from Gaus's. In my view, the basic public justification relies on consensual shared reasons, but convergence has a justificatory role, as well. In some sense my claim is that both Quong and Gaus are right. But, on the other hand, I try to show that both are wrong (not an easy task, they are the two leading public reason philosophers in actual debates!). Gaus, in my opinion, is wrong because he refuses the shared reasons model and defends the convergence view as basic. Quong, as I see it, is wrong in thinking that justification by convergence must be totally dismissed.

The consensus view puts comparatively strong limits to the reasons that may be employed in public reasoning: "First, there are the substantive principles provided by the political conception of justice, or the family of liberal conceptions, all of which agree on the three general principles" (Quong 2011: 259) that (a) contains certain basic liberal rights and freedoms, (b) assigns special priority to those rights, and (c) ensures that all citizens have the resources to make use of those freedoms" (Quong 2011: 198). To this, Quong adds "that the content of public reason must also include the more foundational idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation between free and equal citizens, since this

¹ Quong endorses the broad view of the scope of public reason, as opposed to Rawls's narrow view, focused on the constitutional essentials (Quong, 2011, 273-289).

foundational idea will be necessary in order for citizens to publicly reason about the interpretation, weight, and ranking of the general liberal principles” (Quong 2011: 159 n. 10). We may not appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines. The reason is that they are perennially controversial. A second important aspect of the content of public reason is represented by the guidelines of inquiry that specify ways of reasoning and the criteria for the rules of evidence in the public political debate from the general political content represented by a political conception of justice to more specific conclusions.

For the converge view (championed by Gerald Gaus) a broader variety of reasons can be employed in public reasoning. In such a view, it is required that all persons have a reason to accept a rule, but different agents can base the justification on different reasons. A rule can be justified even if the reasons for acceptance of the rule for some persons are derived only from their comprehensive doctrines. In brief, a rule must be justified to all people on whom it is applied, but it is not required that the justification is based on a common set of reasons represented by consensual political reasons; different persons can have different reasons and the appeal to comprehensive doctrines is legitimate. The only limit to the use of reasons is that they must be intelligible as moral reasons (Gaus 2011: 279-283).

77

I defend the employment of convergence in the process of justification of laws, but I take it as an additional resource and not as an alternative to the consensus model. The latter is basic. Because of the fact that Quong fully embraces the consensus / shared reasons view, I avoid here to show possible reasons to take it as basic. For Quong it is not only basic, but the only legitimate model of public reason. In virtue of this, in this discussion I indicate why it is appropriate to employ the convergence model as an additional resource.

2. The first reason for employing the convergence view is that the content of the consensual base may be too general to lead to precise results – understanding and judgment may be required. Rawlsians are aware of the problem of generality of principles (Quong 2011: 148) and Quong tries to resolve it and the possibility of differences in their interpretation by relying on the understanding of the reasons behind them. This is why Quong introduces the more foundational ideas of society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal citizens in the content of public reason (Quong 2011: 161-191). But the problem is that these foundational ideas are very general, as well, and there is a problem for their

understanding. In cases of such disagreements, and the resulting difficulties for justification from consensus, justification from convergence can represent an additional resource. To be sure, Quong is confident about the possibility of consensual resources to not be indeterminate (not disposing of answers to relevant questions) in public justification (Quong 2011: 281-289). In any case, even if public reason with the resources conceded to it by Quong is not indeterminate, it is difficult to think that it will not be rather frequently inconclusive (will not have conclusive answers to many relevant questions). In order to resolve such issues, voting is the only alternative to try to find solutions with justification from consensus. It is not immediately clear that in such cases voting is a better resource than trying to make use of the resources of convergence, as well. Moreover, I think that convergence, at least in some cases, can be a preferable resource, because it indicates to all citizens a more direct reason to fully embrace a decision.

78

Second, there is the question of unreasonable people, i.e. people who do not endorse the ideas of reasonable pluralism and the related idea of burdens of judgment, of society as a fair system of social cooperation among free and equals, as well as one of the conceptions of justice that (a) contains certain basic liberal rights and freedoms, (b) assigns special priority to those rights, and (c) ensures that all citizens have the resources to make use of those freedoms. There are at least four attitudes that we can take toward them. The first is simply to enforce on them a reasonable order. The second is to enlarge the constituency, i.e. the set of people and views that can represent the content of public reason, for example by changing the consensual ground, like Rawls does in the *Law of Peoples* (Rawls 1999a). The third is to merely establish with them a *modus vivendi*. My proposal is represented by the fourth attitude: to not renounce to the consensual ground represented by the basic content of reasonableness as the basis of a just order, but not to simply enforce this order and the consensual ground on unreasonable people, but to try to develop arguments for unreasonable persons and justification to them, whenever possible. In some cases, maybe, this will be possible, but only through convergence with their comprehensive views.

I find the issue of unreasonable people as particularly important for the question of stability. I agree with the Rawlsian project, and with Quong specifically, that gaining stability for the right reasons corresponds to acquiring “the reasoned allegiance of citizens. It is crucial for a just constitutional regime to generate its own support in order to avoid decay

and decline” (Quong 2011: 300). I agree, as well, that “normative stability requires an overlapping consensus to exist on the core political values of freedom, equality and fairness. If enough people reject these political values, then a normative stable democratic regime becomes impossible. It is therefore essential that doctrines which deny the freedom and equality of persons, or the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation, not become so prevalent that they threaten to undermine the fundamental ideals of a well-ordered liberal regime” (Quong 2011: 300).

However, unreasonable people will always exist, and even a proper idealization must take this in consideration. An important part of the strategy toward unreasonable people is to try to convert part of them to the core liberal commitments, or, at least, to avoid, or reduce, the presence of unreasonable people who are strongly inimical to the liberal order. Reasoning with them on basis of reasons that may be specifically acceptable to them, that are not strategic, but that look for convergence of various moral reasons, may be a good attempt to try to develop a level of civic friendship, or at least to reduce civic animosity with unreasonable people. Justification from convergence may possibly help to convert some of them gradually, by showing, case by case, in as much occasions as possible, that the liberal order is not inimical to their comprehensive views (because there is a relevant field of convergence), or, at least, it may be possible to show them that the liberal order is not inimical to them because it can converge on relevant parts of their comprehensive views (although there are differences that impede unreasonable people to convert to liberalism) and that, therefore, there is no reason for them to be strongly inimical to the liberal order. At least, it might be possible to show that adherents to the liberal conception of justice are not disrespectful toward their fellow citizens who do not adhere to the liberal conception. Here I borrow the words of Christopher Eberle, although his general intention is opposed to mine (i.e. he defends an overall legitimacy to pass laws even if based on non public reasons only): “There is, of course, no alternative to the frustration engendered by losing out in a fair and free political contest. But there is an alternative to losing out to those who exhibit a callous indifference to one’s well-being and thereby to the impact of their winning policies on one’s life prospects” (Eberle 2009: 169). Obviously, there may be some comprehensive views, or unreasonable people, so strongly inimical to the core liberal commitments that attempts to find convergence with them does not make any sense.²

² The last sentence similar to what Schwartzman says in relation to reasoning from conjecture Schwartzman 2012: 521-544.

The third reason to complement justification from consensus with justification from convergence is the broadening of the scope of public reason. I agree with Quong that public reason must regard not only constitutional essentials and basic justice, but wider laws and public policies, as well. It is correct to try to justify such laws and public policies through consensus on reasonable political terms whenever possible, and sometimes we will find such public reasons during the process of justification (Quong 2011: 281-289). But it is still to be shown that this will always be the case. If the response will be negative, justification by convergence can be an appropriate additional resource. We had a relevant example of the helpfulness of employment of convergence in Croatia when we had the referendum for joining EU, when the parallel appeal, for example, to catholic arguments, to the historical tradition of Croatia, and to the internalization of the solidarity of working class was important.

80

3. I go now to Quong's criticism of justification from convergence. He mainly relies on the principle of sincerity. "Sincerity requires that we not support or advocate laws when we do not sincerely believe they can be justified to others, regardless of what those others may themselves believe" (Quong, 2011a).³ One of the reasons for supporting the sincerity requirement, according to Quong, is that it distinguishes public justification from rhetoric or manipulation. In the specification of the sincerity argument, Quong says that there is nothing uncontroversial in saying "I don't adhere to your doctrine myself, but I believe that your doctrine clearly supports a commitment to rule X", but the controversial point is the claim "I believe your doctrine clearly supports a commitment to rule X, and I believe you are justified in believing the relevant part of your doctrine" (Quong, 2012a). If A is not able to endorse this claim, A cannot sincerely believe that B's endorsement of X satisfies the principle of justificatory sincerity, i.e. A cannot sincerely believe that X is justified to B. Here Quong is opposed to what Gaus says about justification, i.e. that it is path-dependent and what is a defeater in A's system of beliefs is not a defeater in B's system of beliefs. As a consequence of this conception of justification, Gaus's view is moderately relativistic. What can be justified to one person, can be not justified to another person. Moreover, a crucial aspect of Gaus's view on justification is that a standard of justification can be a source of justification, without being justified

3 Among authors that basically endorse a consensus view of justification, Nebojša Zelić appeals to the importance of sincerity and the duty of civility. Zelić 2012, Zelić forthcoming.

itself (Gaus 1996; Gaus 2011). This is refused by Quong in his opposition to the convergence view. Only justified standards of justification can be sources of justification.

Schematically, this is Quong's basic argument:

- 1) Convergent justifications amongst people adhering to different comprehensive doctrines can only be made consistent with PJS [principle of justificatory sincerity] provided each person involved sincerely believes that the other people involved are justified in adhering to their different comprehensive doctrines.
- 2) The belief required in (1) is generally not possible unless citizens accept certain epistemological or axiological doctrines (e.g. Gaus's).
- 3) The fact of reasonable pluralism means we cannot and should not expect citizens in a liberal society to adhere to any particular epistemological or axiological theory.
- 4) Therefore, as a general rule, we cannot expect convergent forms of justification to be consistent with PJS in a liberal society" (Quong 2011: 272).

81

Quong thinks that Gaus avoids the conclusion of this argument by renouncing to the condition in (1), i.e. to the justification requirement, and by substituting it with the intelligibility requirement. In my opinion, Gaus has always followed the same concept of justification, as, for example, in his book *Justificatory Liberalism* (Gaus 1996). In his epistemological view, some reasons may be not justified, but be justificatory reasons at the same time. In order to serve as justificatory reasons, it is sufficient that such basic standards of justification are intelligible as justificatory reasons. But, says Quong, the appeal to such an epistemology in public justification is not permitted in virtue of reasonable pluralism: there are reasonable people who do not endorse this concept of justification, like, for example, externalists. Insisting on justification by convergence, as a consequence, has a high price. Either it is required to renounce to PJS and be engaged in public justification with insincerity, or it is needed to renounce to public justification and say that all views are legitimate simply because they are intelligible, even when they are not justified. In the latter case, as Quong says, Gaus renounces to his commitment for an order of public reason and opts for an order of public intelligibility (Quong forthcoming).

I think that it is possible to reformulate the use of justification from converge in order to avoid Quong's objection. In my answer, however, I depart from Gaus's formulation.

The important premise of my argument is that the context of the present discussion is determined by the endorsement of the ideas of agents as free and equal, of burdens of judgment and of reasonable pluralism. In virtue of the burdens of judgment and of reasonable pluralism, it is not to be expected that agents will have equal standards of justification. Moreover, it is to be expected that they will be distinguished by plural evaluative standards. But every person is entitled to follow her standards of justification, in so far (like I endorse from the consensus view) as they do not conflict with what is justified by shared reasons related to the foundational commitments of liberalism, i.e. to the common standards of justification of reasonable citizens (the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation among equals and reasonable pluralism, as well as the three main principles of liberalism). As Samuel Freeman remarks, it would be unreasonable to "not normally accept or tolerate people's affirming and acting on the particular beliefs that provide them with reasons. Persons and principles of justice are unreasonable in so far as they do not tolerate or accept that false beliefs can provide others with good reasons for acting. [...] To insist that others cooperate with you only on grounds and for reasons which you believe are true is the paradigmatic case of an unreasonable person. [...] Respecting others as persons and as citizens involves allowing them to non-coercively decide their values and (within limits of justice) act on their chosen ways of life. This moral requirement implies a duty to allow others to make their own mistakes of judgment and action, and, within limits of justice, act on their false beliefs as well" (Freeman 2004: 2037, 2042).⁴

82

So, it is possible for reasonable Betty to offer to unreasonable Alf this justification:

(i) You are entitled to follow your standard of justification Σ in every case when there is not a successful defeater for the reasons that it justifies.

This may be a common premise for Betty and Alf. Betty accepts such entitlement in virtue of her adherence to the fundamental liberal commitments. Alf thinks that he is entitled to follow his standard of justification Σ , otherwise it would not be possible to explain why he endorses Σ .

⁴ To be sure, Freeman's quotation, in his paper, is not intended as part of a support of any kind of justification from convergence.

There are differences in the reasons why Alf and Betty endorse Σ , but I think that this does not represent a problem. If the justificatory consensus on premises would have to be so deep, there would be problems with the justification of shared reasons among reasonable people, as well. Even in their case, it is left to each individual to look by himself/herself for his/her justification of the shared reasons. In fact, below, in the discussion of the endorsement of the shared reasons, I try to show that a weaker conception of justification than Quong's is needed, but I skip on the details here.

For the sake of sincerity, Betty must explicitly declare to Alf the qualification that she thinks that he is entitled to follow his standard of justification Σ in every case when there is not a successful defeater for the reasons that it justifies. Alf may think that there are no such defeaters if he thinks that Σ provides indefeasible justification, but I do not see why this is a reason for him to stop Betty's argument at this point, and to not let Betty to develop her argument and, if she wants so, to try to find a defeater for some of the reasons sustained by Σ later. In the hypothetical case that I describe, Alf expects that all such possible challenges will be unsuccessful, but there are no reasons to debate about this at this point of the argument.

83

(2) The standard of justification Σ sustains rule R.

As a hypothesis, in order to exemplify the argument from convergence.

(3) R is justified to you if there is not a successful defeater for it.

Premise (3) follows from (1) and (2).

(4) There are no defeaters of R.

As a hypothesis, in order to exemplify the argument from convergence. Alf can endorse (4) in the hypothetical case if he thinks that R is a pro tanto rule and there are no available defeaters in his standards of justification, but in the case that he takes R as an absolute rule, as well, because in such a case for him the possible defeaters of R are an empty set. Betty can endorse (4) because, in the hypothetical case, R converges with the liberal standards of justification.

(5) R is overall justified to you.

This seems to me as a case of sincere justification, where no controversial epistemology is implied.

One may say that in my defense of justification from convergence as an addition to justification from consensus I have simply reformulated Rawls's justification from conjecture (Rawls, 1999b: 155-156). Let it be. The basic thing in my discussion is to show why a citizen, Betty, who reasons with an unreasonable citizen, Alf, on the base of his evaluative standard could be sincere. It appears to me that my explanation is sensibly more concessive than what Quong admits in his position toward reasoning from conjecture.

As he says, "reasoning from conjecture can be consistent with the PJS [only] if Betty believes there are sufficient shared reasons for rule X, but she also believes Alf's unjustifiable comprehensive doctrine supports X, then I think she can engage in sincere reasoning from conjecture with Alf where she tries to show him his own doctrine commits him to X (but she probably ought to publicly articulate the shared reasons too if we believe in a strong publicity condition)." (Quong 2012a)

84

If I understand correctly him, Quong refers to cases like in his (Quong 2012) and Gaus's (Gaus, 2012) dispute of cases where citizens endorse shared reasons that support a rule R, but some of them (championed by, let's say, Alf) endorse additional reasons that speak against R. In such a case, the reasonable citizen Betty, who endorses R on the base of shared reasons, may engage in reasoning from conjecture with Alf, in the attempt to show him that his basic evaluative standard commits him to endorse R, exactly the rule that is sustained by shared reasons.

The condition of shared reasons put forward by Quong for the legitimacy of reasoning from conjecture is clearly exclusive in several cases of reasoning from conjecture with unreasonable people. Only reasoning from conjecture with, let's say, semi-unreasonable citizens (those that share reasons with the reasonable, but don't think that they are always overriding) is saved. For the reasons indicated above, I think that such exclusion is not supportive of the requirements of stability and I hope that I have shown that there are no reasons based on PJS to endorse such a restriction.

Maybe it is worth deserving to question whether Quong's limited acceptance of reasoning from conjecture is exclusive in another case, i.e. in the case of disagreements in the understanding of the content of public reason (for example, in the understanding of the foundational ideas of society as a fair system of cooperation between free and equal citizens), or principles that protect some freedoms, which interpretation is

inconclusive in virtue of their generality. I am not able to say whether, for Quong, in the case of agreement on the general formulations about freedom, equality and fair society, but disagreement on their understanding, there are sufficiently shared ideas in order for reasoning from conjecture to be legitimate, or this condition is not present.

To be sure, the problem of limiting the resources of reasoning from conjecture that I am pressing here, in particular with unreasonable people, is not immediately an issue for Quong, in virtue of his internal conception. But, as I have tried to show in virtue of the requirement of stability, unreasonable people deserve specific care even in an idealized liberal society, as that pictured by Quong.

4. I indicate now two concerns related to Quong's four steps argument that appeals to the strong concept of justification and the PJS. The two issues that I indicate are meant to question whether Quong's strong concept of justification is appropriate for political liberalism, or it must be replaced by a more permissive concept of justification. First, it appears to me that Quong's sincerity argument could be a threat to the proposals of several Rawlsians that endorse the shared reasons / consensus view of public reason,⁵ as well as to Rawls's himself.⁶ As Rawls says, the freestanding argument for principles of justice (the argument related only to premises characteristic of public political culture of democratic societies and free from controversial premises of comprehensive doctrines) is only pro tanto justified. In order to obtain full justification, each qualified person must put in coherence her view with her comprehensive doctrines. Public justification is obtained when this is done by all qualified persons (Rawls 1996: 386-388). This is, in fact, a form of convergent justification and it is liable to the same objection raised by Quong to Gaussian convergence view.

I skip on the issue of how Rawls and various Rawlsians can deal with this proposal and I will focus on Quong's reply. In Quong's view, no role is played in public justification by comprehensive views.

But there is a problem, nonetheless. Quong says: "The alternative view that I have offered [the internal conception] does not present the freestanding argument – the move from the fundamental ideas to the general

5 For example, Stephen Macedo says that reasonable citizens will be ready to adjust the freestanding justified conception of justice in order to render it acceptable to reasonable fellow citizens who endorse various comprehensive doctrines Macedo, 2012.

6 One of the problems is raised by Micah Schartzman Schwartzman, 2012.

liberal principles – as a *pro tanto* justification which then depends on an overlapping consensus in order to achieve a full or public justification. Because the freestanding argument builds on certain fundamental ideas that are already assumed to be the subject of an overlapping consensus amongst reasonable people, the conclusions of the freestanding argument should be taken as fully justified to all reasonable persons. Reasonable persons are already assumed to have their own comprehensive or otherwise non-public reasons for endorsing the fundamental ideas, and thus the free standing argument requires no further justificatory support” (Quong 2011: 186). The possible problem is that even if all citizens rely in public reasoning on ideas and principles assumed to be the subject of an overlapping consensus amongst reasonable people, some of them endorse these ideas and principles by relying on what others take as unsound justificatory reasons. As Quong accepts similarly to Rawls, the comprehensive or otherwise non-public reasons, endorsed by citizens, can be in an epistemological bad shape. This seems to me as a possible problem, in accordance with the strong conception of justification that Quong endorses in his use of the PJS in opposition to the convergence view. If we accept the strong view of justification, it appears the same dilemma that Quong puts forward to Gaus’s convergence view: either some qualified members of the constituency are not sincere toward other members of the constituency (and think that others are not justified in endorsing the fundamental liberal commitments), or they endorse a controversial epistemology or theory of reasons. Everybody participates in the project of building or sustaining a liberal society with others in virtue of their common shared commitments, but here it appears to be an issue of sincerity, because some citizens do not see some other citizens as justified in accepting such commitments.

A possible explanation that says that the fundamentals of liberalism are self-justifying, will not work, because the foundationalist concept of self-justifying beliefs or reasons represents a controversial epistemological view, something that is defined as a problem by Quong. In another reply, the fundamentals of liberalism may be taken as strong enough to survive in a process of reflective equilibrium (Quong 2011: 155-156). Their justification is obtained in reflective equilibrium. But, this, again, would not do the work, because reflective equilibrium is itself a controversial epistemological concept.

Quong’s reply is that “I think an essential part of PL’s strategy of epistemic abstinence involves taking it as given that all reasonable persons

are justified in endorsing the fundamental political values, and accepting the burdens of judgement. PL does not directly enquire into the question of whether individuals are justified in accepting those values in order to abstain from controversial epistemological theories over which we assume reasonable people disagree. We just take the fundamental political values as given, and then can appeal to those shared values in any instance of public justification and stipulate that in doing so, we can assume our starting premises are justified to reasonable persons. Making good on that assumption is something political liberalism as a theory remains silent about: we leave that up to individual citizens as part of the background culture or comprehensive philosophy” (Quong, 2012a).

I have still worries in relation to how it is possible to say this, in coherence with the criticism of Gaus’s convergence view, based on the sincerity argument. Quong requires to Betty to refrain from justification from convergence of rule R to Alf because she does not believe that Alf is justified in endorsing his evaluative standard Σ . How is this different from Betty, who is allowed to reason with Alf on the base of shared public reasons SRs, although she does not believe that Alf is justified in endorsing them? One answer is that in the former case Betty needs to investigate about Alf’s justification of R, while in the latter case she avoids to investigate about the justification of SRs, because she does not need to do so. But is this really so? Betty may have a strong rationale to investigate about why Alf endorses SRs. For example, she may want to know how stable Alf’s endorsement of them is. If Alf’s endorsement is based, for example, on a doctrine with contradictions, or too ambiguous formulations, she may be wary of the stability of Alf’s endorsement.

In any case, an attitude of attribution of merits to a person related to avoiding information about her merits appears as shallow. I suppose that every reasonable person would judge as regrettably shallow the sincerity of a person in a relation with a spouse, or friends, if, for example, she admires them, but she deliberately avoids knowing facts about them. Isn’t it a regrettable shallow attitude to admire a husband for how successfully he financially cares about the family, and neglect to get information about how he does so (perhaps he is a gangster). In a similar way, it appears to me that it is a regrettable shallow attitude to sincerely engage in justification of public rules with my fellow citizens on the base of some sustaining reasons, if I admit that justification may be so defined that it is obtained only if one is justified in endorsing the

sustaining reasons (which is exactly what Quong establishes about justification in his criticism of Gaus's convergent justification), and I neglect to know about my fellow citizens' justification of the sustaining reasons on which ground we are engaged in justification of public rules.

A further problem is that in order to obtain justification in a strong sense, basing it on sound justificatory reasons is not sufficient. A person must relate the justificatory reason *R* to the conclusion *C* with a sound inference. As Quong says, "in order for decisions to be justified, they must be grounded in sound reasons or arguments" (Quong, 2012a). But, as it is well known, ordinary people are not very good in developing good arguments. They are subject to logical mistakes and rely on heuristics (see, for example: Gaus 1996: 130-136). As a consequence, either we must think that only epistemological elites can include qualified members of the constituency, or we must renounce to the strong idea of justification put forward by Quong in his criticism of Gaus. It seems to me that the latter option is more congruent with the intentions of public reason, i.e. not to exclude people as qualified members of the constituency because of not being more than ordinarily rational from the epistemological and logical point of view. It is true, as Quong says, that "public justification does not aim at mere agreement or consent – the aim is for political decisions to be *justified* to each person who is bound by them" (Quong, 2011a).

The problem, in my view, is that the conception of justification that Quong associates with PJS is too strong. I just indicate the issue, here, and leave a discussion of possible alternative conceptions of justification for another occasion.

6. At the end of the paper I raise some doubts about the relevance of the religious issues among supporters of the consensus and supporters of the convergence view. Contenders on both sides show the divergences on this question that derive from the employment of the justificatory structure, but I think that the topic is worth-deserving of further analysis, in particular more focused on specific issues, before reaching this conclusion.⁷ The initial ground for such a thought is that in virtue of the presumption of freedom, religious reasons can be efficaciously employed, for Gaus, only in the defense from coercion, not in support of

⁷ It may be important, as well, to direct the discussion among consensus and convergence view to debate which of them is more able to oppose those views that admit the legitimacy of coercive laws based on religious reasons only.

requirements of coercion, while, on the other hand, the defense of religious rights is relevant for Rawlsians, as well. As Samuel Freeman says, “Only the most compelling reasons of justice, those regarding the protection of others’ fundamental rights, should be allowed to outweigh the freedom of religious doctrine, sacraments and liturgical practices” (Freeman 2002: 24).⁸

However, the opponents in the debate do not share my intuition. Kevin Vallier, for example, takes as one of the advantages of the convergence view the possibility to offer a stronger support to religious freedoms (Vallier 2011: 261-279). The main reason to which he appeals is that the consensus view restricts the kind of reasons that citizens may use in order to stop coercive laws. In order to support his thesis, he indicates an education example, and he says that the convergence view, but not the consensus view, allows parents to object on religious grounds to a policy that organizes school curricula so that, in public schools, children are thought only shared and accessible reasons.

89

The question is complicated. On one hand, as we see, for example, from Freeman in the quotation above, the consensus view allows strong protection of religious rights. On the other hand, it is not so clear how extended protection of parents’ rights in the education of children the convergence view offers. Let’s remember the teaching of J.S. Mill, who distinguishes among the freedom of parents in relation to choices in their life and choice in the lives of their children. The two questions are frequently conflated. But this is wrong. Children are not the property of their parents (Mill 1859/1977: 301-304). For this reason, there is a question about, as Gaus would say, the jurisdictional rights in the education of children. As Brian Barry wrote, there are good reasons for the legitimacy of the state to interfere in the education of children, specifically in the context of school curricula, in order to protect their legitimate interests. Barry certainly opposes the presumption of the right of parents to block a school curriculum that teaches evolution, or the bases of civic freedom (Barry 2001: 194-249). It seems to me that Vallier would be ready to accept such entitlement for the parents by the same token by which he defends the right of parents to block a school curriculum that teaches only shared and accessible reason. If he is not ready to do so, then he admits that parents do not have absolute jurisdictional rights in the education of children. But, then, the issue about the entitlement

⁸ See also Freeman 2004: 2036-2037, 2042.

to veto school curricula that teaches only shared and accessible reason becomes an open question, even in the context of the convergence view. In my opinion, there is a strong rationale for this, precisely the one addressed by Mill: children are not parents' property.

Quong may complain on his side to the, let's say, ecumenical view that I show by expressing worries related to the clarity of the concept of coercion. In his *Three Disputes about Public Justification*, he indicates difficulties by using an example that shows that the basic issue is not that of an independent definition of coercion, but of what is just and what is unjust. So, a possible problem might be that religious people can define what is just in accordance to their view and, consequently, define the legitimacy of a law in accordance to their view, and, consequently, again, enforce laws that override others' evaluative standards in matters of personal life.

90

But let's remember that, for Gaus, it is possible to pass a law only if, for each and every person, no regulation of the field is better than the law regulation of this field by this law. This is a powerful tool to stop religious regulations of the lives of non religious people. Think about the (in many countries, like Croatia) controversial case of regulation of marriage. Religious people frequently require a regulation that forbids marriage among homosexuals. Gaus's test is to see whether such a regulation is better for all, than no regulation of this field. But for some homosexuals no regulation of marriage at all may be better than discriminative regulation. Such a regulation is, therefore, defeated. On the other hand, probably, even for religious people it is better to have a liberal regulation of marriage than no regulation at all. As a consequence, the liberal regulation of marriage is the appropriate space of convergence.

Quong, however, can still raise challenges to the legitimacy of employing religious reasons in justifying public decisions, by appealing to the problem that this will cause hard divergences with the liberal concept of justice. So, similarly to Vallier, Quong shows that the justificatory structure that he endorses is more suitable for protecting the fundamental ideas of liberalism. Think about Quong's example of Anna, a rather reasonable citizen (Quong 2012a: 55). Anna accepts the core liberal commitments, but she thinks that they have not absolute priority over the commitments of her comprehensive view. In the balance of her political liberal and of her comprehensive commitments, among else, she generally accepts anti-discriminative rules, with only one exception. Her religion requires

that only members of this religion (or, of any religion, which excludes atheists and agnostics) can be hired in religious associations, and this is the rule that she accepts as the best balance among all of her commitments. Quong's conclusion is that "if Anna is included in the constituency of public reason, then our theory will no longer be able to deliver what I take is uncontroversially accepted as a liberal right" (Quong 2012a: 55).

The right to not be discriminated in employment policy is certainly a very high ranked liberal right. But, perhaps, the employment policy endorsed by Anna is not so clearly illiberal, at least in some of its interpretations, and after having considered overall liberal values and principles. First of all, there may be some kinds of occupations in religious associations where the religious belonging of the employee is functional to the religion. For example, there are good egalitarian liberal arguments to permit to catholic associations not to hire priests or nuns who are not Catholics. Among others, a strongly committed egalitarian liberal like Brian Barry offers even a reasonable argumentation for the right of catholic institutions to limit the access of women to the role of priest, or, more precisely, denies to the state the right of being the umpire in such an issue. As he says, by quoting one US court: "who will preach from the pulpit of a church and who will occupy the parsonage" is a purely ecclesiastical question" (Barry 2001: 175). Admitting here the role of umpire to the state would simply mean to deny the autonomy of catholic religion as such. Those unsatisfied with this rule can try to change it from inside, or try to found a new religion that fits better with their worldview (Barry, 2001: 176).

91

A different issue is represented by jobs in religious associations that are not religious in their essence. Think about the case of a janitor in a religious school. Is the school allowed to differentiate here on religious grounds? In such a case, precisely the case of a janitor in a Mormon school, Brian Barry refuses the right to the differentiation, because it is not functional to the job. Being religious, or following religious rules, is not a distinctive feature for being a good janitor (Barry 2001: 166). Here Barry endorses a view similar to Quong's: discriminating in the employment policy on religious grounds is not acceptable.

However, things can be more complicated. As Gaus says, "Entrepreneurship is itself a form of human flourishing. [...] Start-ups, innovation, risk taking, organizing groups to resolve problems and implement new ideas – all these are not simply ways to produce the stuff to be

distributed according to ‘economic justice’: they are basic to evaluative standards of some Members of the Public” (Gaus 2011: 379). It seems to me a corollary of Gaus’s statement that entrepreneurship, and, in general, organizing associations can be more than a functional activity in the sense of leading financially successful systems, or providing good education, and that heading such activities can be related to a worldview, or a broader value life project of a person or members of a group.

I do not see as something that clearly must be outlawed leading an organization with, among else, an intention to show that “we Catholics,” or “we Protestants”, etc. are able to do this in a successful way, in particular if the intention is to show the possibility to do so in conformity with a strict conformity to the general system of values correlated to the groups. In general, I do not feel sympathy for such kind of initiatives, but I feel, at the same time, a duty to be cautious in thinking that egalitarian liberalism allows requiring that they be outlawed. In some cases, I can find such initiatives as repugnant and I would boycott them whenever this would be possible to me, like, for example, if they include only people that are traditionally privileged in a society, or if they are inspired by hate for other groups. But, again, I am cautious in thinking that egalitarian liberalism entitles to require that they be outlawed. After all, coming back to the case of the Mormon school mentioned above, the US Supreme court did not refused the decision of the school: “All the justices united behind the rationale that it would be an interference with the autonomy of religious organizations for the government to decide which non-profit activities are religious and which are not” (Rosenblum 2000: 90, quoted from Barry 2001: 167)

However, there might be a particularly strong reason to outlaw such firms, even in Gaus’s argumentative scheme. It is important to remark, as Barry does, “that the effect of the decision [of the US Supreme court in relation to the Mormon school case] was to give religious bodies extremely broad scope for exercising job discrimination – so broad that it might be thought to threaten religious liberty itself. For, as Rosenblum has said, “there is no sharper deviation from liberalism than coercing belief by conditioning vital secular benefits on declarations of faith” ” (Barry, 2001: 167).

In conclusion, several things may be said in reply to Quong’s examples. There may be good public reasons to support the decision of religious organizations to hire only religious people, in some contexts. There might be good resources, in other contexts, for the convergence view to

rebut the proposal of a law that permits religious organizations to hire only religious people, or only people who respect religious prescription, because it might be reasonable to say that such a law threatens religious liberty itself. Gaus says that justification of public rules must respect a structure of justification and that there are higher ranked issues that put constraints on the justification of other issues (Gaus 2011). Religious freedom is a high ranked issue in the structure of justification and, therefore, if it is threatened by a policy that admits employment of only religious people in religious organizations, then there is a strong case for rebutting such a policy.

The previous discussion was not intended to be a conclusive proof of the thesis that the use of religious reasons in public justification is not a divisive issue with practical implications between the consensus and the convergence view, but only an indication that it is not obvious that it is so. Both Vallier's, as well as Quong's examples, deserve further discussion in order to see what would be the outcomes of their discussion in the context of a consensus, as well as a convergence view of justification. Perhaps, it is not so clear that both examples represent clear counterexamples for a view of justification, instead of being disputable hard cases.⁹

Primljeno: 2. oktobar 2013.

Prihvaćeno: 15. februar 2014.

Bibliography

Barry, Brian (2001), *Culture and Equality*, Cambridge: Polity.

Eberle, Christopher J. (2009), "Basic Human Worth and Religious Restraint", *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 35: 151-181.

Freeman, Samuel (2002), "Liberalism and the Accommodation of Group Claims", in P. Kelly (ed.), *Multiculturalism Reconsidered*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.18-30.

Freeman, Samuel (2004), "Public Reason and Political Justifications", *Fordham Law Review* 72: 2021-2072.

⁹ I thank very much for the really precious help numerous colleagues and friends who have discussed earlier drafts of the paper, and, more in general, issues of public reason with me. First, I thank Jonathan Quong for his participation at the symposium dedicated to his book that the Department of Philosophy has organized in 2012 in Rijeka, as well as for his patient discussion of my paper in Rome in the official part of the symposium organized by the LUISS, as well as for the helpful conversation in the informal part of our stay in Rome. I owe many thanks to Gerald Gaus for his patient and thoughtful discussion of issues of public reason during his stay in Rijeka. Many thanks to all the colleagues of the Department of Philosophy in Rijeka who discuss with me questions of public reason, and in particular to The Fellowship of Public Reason: Ivan Cerovac, Luca Malatesti, Andrea Mešanović, Snježana Prijić-Samaržija and Nebojša Zelić.

- Gaus, Gerald (1996), *Justificatory Liberalism. An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gaus, Gerald (2011), *The Order of Public Reason*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gaus, Gerald (2012), "Sectarianism without Perfection? Quong's Political Liberalism", *Philosophy and Public Issues* 2: 7-15.
- Macedo, Stephen, "Why Public Reason? Citizens' Reasons and the Constitution of the Public Sphere", (internet), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1664085> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1664085> (accessed on June 19th, 2012).
- Mill, John Stuart (1859/1977), *On Liberty*, in J.S. Mill, *Collected Works*, Vol. XVIII. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 213-310.
- Quong, Jonathan (2011), *Liberalism without Perfection*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Quong, Jonathan (2012), "Liberalism without Perfection. A précis by Jonathan Quong", *Philosophy and Public Issues* 2: 1-6.
- Quong, Jonathan (2012), "Replies to Gaus, Colburn, Chan, Bocchiola", *Philosophy and Public Issues* 2: 51-79.
- Quong, Jonathan, "Three Disputes about Public Justification. Commentary on Gaus and Vallier", (2011a) available in <http://publicreason.net/wp-content/PPPS/Fall2008/JQuong1.pdf> (accessed on November 10th, 2011).
- Quong, Jonathan, "Blog on *The Order of Public Reason*", (2012a), available in <http://publicreason.net/2011/03/07/opr-v14-part-2-sincerity-and-shared-reasons/> (accessed on February 10th, 2012).
- Quong, Jonathan, "What Is the Point of Public Reason?", (forthcoming).
- Rosenblum, Nancy L. (2000), *Membership and Morals. The Personal Uses of Pluralism in America*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rawls, John (1996), *Political Liberalism*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Rawls, John (1999a), "The Law of Peoples", in J. Rawls, *The Law of Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 3-128.
- Rawls, John (1999b), "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited", in J. Rawls, *The Law of Peoples with The Idea of Public Reason Revisited*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp. 131-180.
- Schwartzman, Micah (2012), "The Ethics of Reasoning from Conjecture", *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 9: 521-544.
- Schwartzman, Micah, "Blog on *The Order of Public Reason*", (2012), available in <http://publicreason.net/2011/03/07/opr-v14-part-2-sincerity-and-shared-reasons/> (accessed on February 10th, 2012).
- Vallier, Kevin (2011), "Convergence and Consensus in Public Reason", *Public Affairs Quarterly* 25: 261-279.
- Zelić, Nebojša (2012), "Political Liberalism, Natural Duty of Justice and Moral Duty of Civility", *Ethics and Politics* 2: 214-238.
- Zelić, Nebojša (2014), "Is there a need for political liberalism to have an account of pre-overlapping consensus reasoning?", *Filozofija i društvo* 25: 57-74.

Elvio Bakarini

Javni um. Konsenzualno i konvergentno viđenje

Apstrakt

Džonatan Kving predlaže i brani konsenzualno viđenje javnoga uma ili viđenje zajedničkih razloga. Predlog je suprotstavljen konvergentnom viđenju, koga brani, između ostalih, Gerald Gaus. Snažan argument koji Kving suprotstavlja konvergentnom viđenju jeste argument iskrenosti. Ovaj tekst nudi argument koji prihvata oblik konvergencije, ali se istovremeno zalaže za prihvatanje zahteva iskrenosti.

Ključne reči: konsenzus, konvergencija, Gaus, javni um, Quong.

Jonathan Quong
School of Philosophy
University of Southern California

Liberalism Without Perfection: Replies to Lister, Kulenović, Zoffoli, Zelić, and Baccarini

I would like to begin by thanking all the contributors to this symposium, especially Elvio Baccarini, who hosted the conference at the University of Rijeka where several of the papers in this symposium were initially presented. I've learned a great deal from these essays, and I'm very fortunate for my work to be the subject of such careful and perceptive philosophical attention. Below I offer some replies to each contributor, though I do not address all the important points raised in each paper.

96

Reply to Lister

In his wide-ranging and thoughtful essay, Andrew Lister focuses on the relationship between the critical and constructive portions of my book, *Liberalism Without Perfection* (hereafter LWP).¹ Lister defends two important claims. First, he contends, contra my suggestion in chapter 1 of LWP, that a coherent and plausible form of comprehensive antiperfectionism is possible. Second, he suggests that a modest form of perfectionism is perfectly compatible with a commitment to public reason or public justification (I will use these terms interchangeably here). I disagree with Lister on both points, and in this brief reply I will try and explain why. But before doing so, a small amount of terminological clarification will be useful.²

Comprehensive liberals, as I define them, are those who answer 'yes' to the following question: must liberal political philosophy be based in some particular ideal of what constitutes a valuable or worthwhile human life, or other metaphysical beliefs? Comprehensive liberals believe there is a particular view of the good life, usually one that gives personal autonomy a central role, which grounds or justifies our liberal principles

1 References in the main text are either to LWP, or else to the individual symposium contributions. All other references are provided in footnotes. For comments and useful discussions about the issues raised in this reply, I am very grateful to Elvio Baccarini, Rebecca Stone, and Nebojša Zelić.

2 The next paragraph is taken from my "*Liberalism Without Perfection: Replies to Gaus, Colburn, Chan, and Bocchiola*," *Philosophy & Public Issues* 2 (2012), 58-59.

and rights. Comprehensive liberals can be either *perfectionists* or *anti-perfectionists*, that is, they can answer either 'yes' or 'no' to the following further question: is it permissible for a liberal state to promote or discourage some activities, ideals, or ways of life on grounds relating to their inherent or intrinsic value, or on the basis of other metaphysical claims? *Comprehensive perfectionists* answer yes: the state may permissibly aim to promote the good life and discouraging citizens from making disvaluable choices. *Comprehensive antiperfectionists*, by contrast, believe that there is a distinct view of the good life that grounds a form of liberalism in which the state is required to remain neutral between competing conceptions of the good life or human flourishing.

Lister modifies these terms somewhat, but I do not believe these modifications bear on the central areas of disagreement between us. Although chapters 2-4 of LWP are largely focused on developing reasons to reject perfectionism, in chapter 1 I offer a brief argument intended to illustrate the instability of comprehensive antiperfectionism. I present a debate between a proponent of comprehensive antiperfectionism, Sara, and Mike, who defends a perfectionist position. In the debate Mike favors criminalization of recreational drug use for perfectionist reasons, whereas Sara favors the legal permissibility of recreational drug use by appeal to the value of autonomy (LWP 23-26). I argue that while Sara may be able to ground a commitment to various liberal rights and freedoms in the value of leading an autonomous life, the value of autonomy cannot yield a consistent form of antiperfectionism. The reason for this is simple: when pushed by Mike to explain why recreational drug use ought to be legal, Sara must say one of two things. Either she must declare Mike's perfectionist view about the use of recreational drugs to be false, or else she must say that even if Mike's claims about the disvalue of drug use are true, they are decisively outweighed by the value of leading an autonomous life. But either response entails that Sara's position is no less perfectionist than Mike's. She must appeal to controversial and reasonably rejectable views about the good life in order to justify her position. As Lister notes, I do not claim to show that all versions of comprehensive antiperfectionism are vulnerable to this sort of objection. However, I suspect the example is indicative of a general instability that all such views face.

Lister disagrees. As I understand his argument, he claims that my objection only succeeds against *consequentialist* forms of comprehensive antiperfectionism, but that it does not succeed against a *deontological*

version of the view.³ According to Lister, “this kind of comprehensive liberalism denies that it is ever just to use the state to promote one reasonably contestable conception of the good over another simply on the grounds that the people who accept the correct conception will lead better lives, but insists that when it comes to determining what rights and duties individuals have with respect to one another, as a matter of justice, we may appeal to conceptions of human flourishing” (p. 23). If Sara endorses this version of comprehensive liberalism she “can argue that the reason it is wrong to coerce someone for their own good is that it is paternalistic, and disrespects another person’s autonomous agency”. But Sara’s position can be “staunchly antiperfectionist in the promotional sense, since she denies that it is legitimate to use political power to promote controversial conceptions of human flourishing, just because the people who end up adopting these ways of life will thereby lead better lives” (p. 24). Lister thinks it avoids being perfectionist because, although it does depend on a controversial conception of the good, it “does not in any way legitimate perfectionist *imposition* of controversial conceptions of the good” (p. 25).

I fail to see, however, how Sara’s position can avoid being perfectionist. Suppose those who share Mike’s substantive position on drug use attempt to stop others from engaging in recreational drug use: let’s call this group *the Puritans*. The Puritans try to steal some people’s drugs, or use force to prevent others from taking drugs. Because Sara favors the legal permissibility of recreational drug use, she must believe that users should be protected from such illegitimate interference—she will want the police to use appropriate measures to stop the Puritans. Thus, the Puritans will be legally prevented from acting on their aims, and the reason they will be prevented from doing so is (according to Sara’s revised view) ultimately grounded in the value of personal autonomy. It thus seems clear to me that the Puritans are subject to the legal imposition of a controversial view of the good.

Perhaps Lister might protest that no one imposes a conception of the good on the Puritans; rather, the Puritans are merely prevented from imposing their conception of the good on others. But this response

3 Note that Lister’s contrast between consequentialism and deontology, though widely adopted, is unfortunate since the two concepts are not mutually exclusive. My reply above does not rely on this fact, but for a more detailed explanation see my, “Consequentialism, Deontology, Contractualism, and Equality,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice*, Serena Olsaretti ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

cannot succeed for two reasons. First, this reply only appears to succeed by equivocating between moralized and non-moralized senses of “imposition”. The moralized sense of imposition can be defined roughly as follows: A imposes on B if and only if A prevents or otherwise interferes with B’s efforts *to do something that B ought to be permitted to do*. The non-moralized conception of “imposition”, on the other hand, can be defined roughly as follows: A imposes on B if and only if A prevents or otherwise interferes with B’s efforts to do anything. If we adopt the moralized account of imposition, then it’s true that the state does not impose a conception of the good on the Puritans when it defends the drug users from their attempted interference (provided we endorse Sara’s general position). But this is a hollow victory, since it will also be true that the state does not impose a conception of the good on recreational drug users when it prevents them from taking recreational drugs (provided we endorse Mike’s general position). Because the moralized version makes imposition entirely dependent on which conception of the good is adopted as the sound basis for individual rights and liberties, it yields the conclusion that the use of legal sanctions and coercion never qualifies as imposition provided it’s done in the name of the correct conception of the good. I assume this conception of imposition is thus of no real use in defining a view as perfectionist or antiperfectionist. But if we adopt the non-moralized conception of imposition, then it remains clear that the state does impose a conception of the good on the Puritans when it prevents them from interfering with recreational drug users.

99

Second, the mooted reply looks even less plausible when we shift our attention to a different topic, for example, the topic of the treatment of same-sex couples. Suppose Sara defends the view that shop owners cannot be legally required to serve gays and lesbians because doing so would pose an undue threat to the personal autonomy of shop owners who have religious or ethical objections to homosexuality. If Sara’s view is endorsed by the state, then gays and lesbians might be legally prevented from entering various shops, and this would be done in the name of a controversial view about the good life. This surely constitutes the imposition of a controversial conception of the good. But suppose Sara adopts the opposite position: suppose she favors a law that requires shop owners to serve gays and lesbians regardless of their religious or ethical views, and again the basis for her position is the intrinsic value of personal autonomy (though this time, focusing on the autonomy of gay and lesbian

persons). Shop owners will then be legally forced to serve gay and lesbian customers in the name of the intrinsic value of autonomy. Again, this surely constitutes the imposition of a conception of the good. In sum, so long as Sara grounds her support for certain legal rights and duties by appeal to the intrinsic value of personal autonomy, I cannot see how her comprehensive liberalism can remain resolutely antiperfectionist.

We can now turn to Lister's second main claim: a commitment to public reason or public justification does not preclude a modest form of perfectionism. Lister's argument in favor of this conclusion echoes an argument advanced by Joseph Chan.⁴ The idea is that while it may be true that full-blown comprehensive doctrines or conceptions of the good must be the subject of permanent reasonable disagreement, "there can be reasonable unanimity on single, local judgments about the value of particular activities or relationships" (p. 29). For example, "if what is at stake is just the claim that it is bad to become addicted to crack cocaine, because (among other things) this undermines one's ability to recognize and act on reasons, it seems to me that there is no reasonable disagreement" (p. 31). If such local perfectionist judgments can be the subject of reasonable agreement, then even if laws and other political institutions must be publicly justifiably, they may still incorporate certain limited perfectionist judgments.

Whether this attempt to marry moderate perfectionism and public reason succeeds depends on how the constituency of the reasonable is defined. On the one hand, we might define the constituency of the reasonable in such a way as to leave it open whether all reasonable people could agree on limited perfectionist claims. On this view, let's call it the *underdetermined account*, the constituency of the reasonable is given partly by philosophical or definitional fiat (e.g. reasonable persons must endorse the political values of freedom and equality), but the definition allows some of the content of the reasonable to be supplied by what actual persons in our society, who otherwise qualify as reasonable, believe or endorse at some modest level of idealization. On another view, call it the *fully determined account*, our philosophical account of the reasonable provides an exhaustive account of those things that all reasonable persons can be expected to endorse—anything not listed by the philosophical account as a component of the reasonable is by definition a potential subject of reasonable disagreement.

4 Joseph Chan, "Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 29 (2000), 5-42.

It should be clear that Lister's proposed marriage of modest perfectionism with public reason can only succeed in one of two ways: (i) by adopting the underdetermined account and showing that, as a matter of empirical fact, all reasonable people (at some level of idealization) do agree about certain perfectionist judgments or (ii) by adopting the fully determined account and including the relevant objects of perfectionist agreement in the definition of the reasonable person. As Lister notes, in section 7.5.2 of *LWP I* consider a challenge very similar to the one he presses, and I consider both strategies described in the preceding sentence. I continue to endorse the responses I offered in that section of the book. In brief, with regard to the first strategy, this would require an extraordinarily difficult empirical survey of all existing comprehensive doctrines, one that seems practically impossible to carry out in a manner that will be both accurate and complete. More seriously, I think the first strategy risks incoherence, since the motivation for finding out what actual citizens believe or endorse seems to conflict with the motivation for constructing an idealized account of the reasonable person whose authority is meant to be independent of any actual agreement amongst real citizens. With regard to the second strategy, I concede that I have no very well developed objection. Rather, I cannot understand why a perfectionist would want to pursue this strategy. Political liberals who take the fact of reasonable pluralism as an essential premise in political philosophy have a clear rationale for seeking to construct a freestanding conception of political justice that could be the subject of agreement amongst an idealized constituency of persons who agree only on some abstract political values. But it is unclear what would motivate a perfectionist to pursue a contractualist strategy of this sort. Once particular claims about what is intrinsically valuable are assumed to be true and to be the legitimate source of political reasons, the main impetus behind seeking a freestanding conception—the fact of reasonable pluralism—seems to have been jettisoned. I don't see why such perfectionists wouldn't simply prefer to make direct appeals to what they take to be true claims about the good life or human flourishing (which is, of course, what most contemporary perfectionists do).

In closing, though I disagree with two of the main claims Lister advances in his essay, we agree about much else, and I lack the space here to address several of his other innovative claims about paternalism and the relationship between perfectionism and distributive justice.

Reply to Kulenović

In his incisive contribution, Enes Kulenović seeks to defend liberal perfectionism from two of the main objections I press against it in LWP. The first objection—developed in chapter 2—is that the ideal of personal autonomy, at least as the ideal is developed by Joseph Raz, cannot *both* provide a justification for the harm principle, while also permitting many of the non-coercive policies favored by liberal perfectionists. Two of Raz’s central claims are:

- R₁ The harm principle, defined as the rule ‘coercion is generally not permissible unless used to prevent harm,’ is justified (at least given current empirical conditions) as a means of promoting/protecting the value of personal autonomy.
- R₂ The harm principle referred to in R₁ does not preclude certain forms of non-coercive political perfectionism (e.g. sin taxes, subsidies, and other forms of state incentives).

102

I argue (LWP 70-71) there is a deep tension between these two claims:

- D₁ The autonomous pursuit of the good is not possible unless the condition of independence is met.
- D₂ Both coercion and manipulation undermine the independence of persons.
- D₃ Non-coercive forms of political perfectionism such as sin taxes, subsidies, and other forms of state incentives are manipulative (the defense of this premise can be found on pp. 63-67 of LWP).
- D₄ Therefore, if Raz’s autonomy-based harm principle precludes coercive forms of perfectionism, it must also preclude those non-coercive forms of perfectionism referred to in R₂. This renders R₂ false.

I concede there is a way for Raz or those sympathetic to his view to avoid the conclusion in D₄ (I call it the diachronic defense), but I argue deploying this defense entails that R₁ is false.

Kulenović targets premise D₃. He claims that “the goal of [at least some] such subsidies is not to manipulate people into engaging with the activities they would otherwise not want to engage, but to maintain and keep open for everyone valuable activities that are not profitable (or profitable at the price that would exclude the majority of citizens from accessing them)” (pp. 38-39). And he goes on to say, with regard to the example of a subsidy for the opera: “It is not going to the opera that makes our lives more autonomous, but having an option of going to the opera. One can live an autonomous life without ever going to opera, but living in a society where only available activities are those that are

profitable and many among those available only to the richest among us would result in the loss of autonomy for many” (p. 39).

I am not persuaded by this reply for several reasons. First, the state’s tax-and-subsidize policy remains manipulative even when done with the best of motives. I define manipulation (following Nozick, with some modifications) as the attempt by one agent, A, to subject another agent, B, to his will by placing B in a choice situation B would rationally disprefer relative to a morally acceptable status quo (LWP 65-66). By taxing citizens and using these tax dollars to subsidize particular activities, the state puts citizens in a situation they must rationally disprefer relative to the otherwise morally acceptable status quo (the status quo being a world where citizens keep the money for themselves). The state aims to shift each citizen from [having status quo level resources and a choice to attend opera at market rates] to [having somewhat less than status quo resources and a choice to attend opera at a price somewhat lower than market rates]. By using the tax-and-subsidy scheme to shift citizens from the former to the latter situation, the state intentionally puts citizens in a situation they must rationally disprefer (since it reduces the range of ways citizens can spend their own resources). Even if the state does so, as Kulenović argues, in order to make a commercially non-viable or expensive option more widely available, and even if merely providing the option is intended to increase the autonomy of citizens, this motive does not render the policy non-manipulative. Many forms of manipulation may be done with the best of intentions. If my modified Nozickian view of manipulation is plausible—and Kulenović does not challenge the account of what manipulation is—then the tax-and-subsidize policy is manipulative and thus (following Raz) a threat to independence, and thereby a threat to autonomy.

103

The second objection that Kulenović focuses on is the charge—developed in chapter 3 of LWP—that most liberal perfectionist policies are paternalistic. I define paternalism as follows (LWP 80):

- 1) Agent A attempts to improve the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of agent B with regard to a particular decision or situation that B faces.
- 2) A’s act is motivated by a *negative judgment* about B’s ability (assuming B has the relevant information) to make the right decision or manage the particular situation in a way that will effectively advance B’s welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values.

Almost all perfectionist policies are paternalistic, I argue, because almost all such policies are justified partly by appeal to the assumption that individual citizens will not make the best choices about their own lives when left to their own devices (e.g. they will not spend their time or resources on appropriately valuable activities or pursuits).

Kulenović presents two purported counterexamples to this view. First, there are what he calls (following Steven Wall) nonhumanistic perfectionist policies, where the aim is not to improve the quality of individuals' lives, but rather to promote excellence (e.g. artistic or intellectual excellence) for its own sake. I concede such policies are not paternalistic, but since Kulenović does not concentrate on this category in his reply, I will set it aside and focus on the second category he identifies: corrective perfectionism. According to Kulenović: "Corrective perfectionism's role is to correct the injustices that would arise from the fact that many people can't afford valuable goods and practices and to ensure the survival of those goods and practices that are unprofitable... Corrective perfectionism makes sense because there is unequal distribution of income and wealth in liberal democracies" (p. 104). As he notes, I argue that such corrective policies would seem to be unnecessary in a reasonably well-ordered society, one where there is no injustice in the distribution of income and wealth. But this, he insists, is no objection to the policies since we live in a non-ideal world where some people have been unjustly deprived of the resources to which they are entitled.

But, once we agree that we live in non-ideal conditions where income and wealth is not justly distributed, we must decide what is the best way of responding to this injustice, and which ways of combating this injustice can avoid the charge of paternalism. As I say:

Surely the most obvious remedy to this injustice would be a redistribution of the resources to the unjustly disadvantaged group, rather than the subsidy of activities that they do not currently enjoy? If the state favors a scheme where current economic injustices are rectified by state subsidies for valuable activities, rather than by a straightforward redistribution of wealth, that must be because the state does not believe the citizens to whom the redistribution is owed would spend their resources appropriately. In other words, the rationale for redistributing resources to the economically disadvantaged in services rather than in cash, would be a paternalistic one (LWP 93).

Kulenović does not, I think, directly respond to this point, though he does offer an indirect response in his essay. He says "public funding is a way of saying that citizens as equal members of political community

are ready to support certain goods – performance art, art galleries, public parks, works of literature, sights of cultural significance, educational programs for adults, and athletic events – that are not public goods in strict economic terms, but are common goods that should be available to everyone and immune to market logic of profit” (pp. 43-44).

But even if this is what is expressed, symbolically, by such public funding, this does not necessarily defuse the charge of paternalism. Such public funding would only be needed, presumably, if the state judges that the relevant activities or pursuits will not be readily available at low cost if citizens are given their fair share of resources and allowed to spend them as they see fit. And so it is difficult to see how even the symbolic motivation described can avoid being premised on a negative judgment about the choices citizens will make with their own resources. Of course Kulenović might insist such policies are not paternalistic because the state is motivated entirely by the importance of the symbolic gesture, and in no way motivated to try and improve the welfare or wellbeing of its citizens. Such a position is possible, but it seems very unlikely that many, if any perfectionists, advocate such policies without any regard for improving the lives of citizens.

105

Kulenović’s deepest objection to my brand of non-perfectionism is, I think, more clearly revealed when he says; “non-perfectionist state citizens are mere consumers voicing their individual preferences through their (now more or less equal) purchasing power. The appeal of perfectionist state is that it invites its citizens to publicly debate which good[s] should be labeled as common goods and to offer public justification why they should not be privately funded, but supported through taxes” (p. 44). This passage raises several important issues that are too complex to be adequately addressed here—I will make only the following brief comment. Although I think there is a kernel of truth in the contrast he draws in the quoted passage, I think the contrast is exaggerated. The citizens in a non-perfectionist state are not “mere consumers” since they too will vigorously engage in deliberation and debate about justice and the common good. It’s rather that, on my view, it is preferable to allow citizens to make their own decisions about which activities and pursuits have intrinsic value or are important for human flourishing, rather than using the legal and political authority of the state to promote some views about the good life in the name of the entire political community. Doing so may, in one way, promote a valuable form of public debate

about the common good, but it also entails a form of paternalism that ought to be troubling to liberals.

Reply to Zoffoli

106

In his penetrating contribution to this symposium, Enrico Zoffoli encourages me to be more radical. Indeed, he claims that my own arguments commit me to more radical conclusions that I acknowledge. In his view, the account of political liberalism I develop in LWP is even more “political” than Rawls’s since, unlike Rawls, my account precludes comprehensive doctrines from playing any role in shaping the content of political principles. More strongly, he thinks my account of political liberalism must dispense with the notion of an overlapping consensus altogether, despite what I say to the contrary in chapter 6 of the book. My version of political liberalism, on Zoffoli’s reconstruction, has no role for an overlapping consensus, and allows comprehensive doctrines or perfectionist considerations to play no part at any stage in the justificatory structure of political liberalism. Although Zoffoli says that, in this paper, he does not intend to challenge my arguments (p. 106), this isn’t quite right. He does not merely try and draw out what he sees as the more radical implications of my arguments; he also seeks to cast some doubt on whether the position that emerges is really tenable.

Zoffoli focuses on two arguments in LWP: he calls the first *the sincerity argument* and the second *the liberal argument*. I develop the sincerity argument as an objection to what are known as convergence models of public justification. Convergence models declare that a law, L (or other appropriate object of public justification), can be legitimate when each member of the justificatory constituency is justified in endorsing L for his or her own comprehensive reasons, even though there are no shared or common reasons that all members of the constituency take to be sufficient to justify L. Here is a simplified example of the convergence model (LWP 266–267). Person A holds that rule X is justified for non-shared reason *Ra*, whereas person B holds that X is justified for non-shared reason *Rb*. Assume further that A rejects *Rb*, that is, he denies it is a sound reason for X, and likewise B rejects *Ra*. Finally, assume that there are no other relevant considerations that speak in favor of X: the only possible justifications are the two that are separately held by A and B. So we have the following (the \rightarrow symbol denotes a justification relationship):

A believes $Ra \rightarrow X$.

B believes $Rb \rightarrow X$.

A does not believe $Rb \rightarrow X$.

B does not believe $Ra \rightarrow X$.

This is a pure version of the convergence view, where there are no shared reasons in support of X , but nevertheless each member of the relevant constituency believes X to be justified for his or her own non-shared reasons. If the convergence model succeeds as an account of public reason, this has dramatic implications for our moral and political practices. Contra John Rawls and many other theorists of public reason, religious and otherwise comprehensive reasons could play a central role in the process of public reason, and citizens could deeply disagree on the underlying rationale for a law, yet the law could still be publicly justified.

107

The sincerity objection to this model is roughly as follows (LWP 267-273). Some rule, X , has not been publicly justified unless each member of the constituency of justification sincerely believes that each other member of the constituency has sufficient reasons to accept X . If this sincerity requirement is not met, then some people would be making moral demands on others that they do not believe those others have reasons to accept. Now consider the example above. How can *A* sincerely believe *B* is justified in endorsing X (or vice versa)? *A* can only believe *B* is justified in endorsing X if *A* believes that *B* is justified in believing $Rb \rightarrow X$. But Rb is derived, we can assume, from an evaluative doctrine that *A* rejects. Thus, in order for *A* to believe that *B* has a sufficient reason to endorse X , *A* must believe that *B* can be justified in adhering to a doctrine that *A* rejects. So unless *A* endorses some moderately relativist philosophical thesis about reasons and justification, then *A* cannot sincerely believe that *B* is really justified in accepting X . And if we believe, following Rawls, that philosophical theories about reasons or epistemology are the subject of reasonable disagreement, then we cannot reasonably expect *A* to adopt a moderately relativist account of reasons and justification. It's thus too much to expect convergence models of justification to succeed in societies where there is reasonable disagreement.

Zoffoli says that even if the sincerity argument were sound, it "would not fully undermine the role of comprehensive views within political liberalism". This is true because the sincerity requirement "is addressed exclusively to those who propose or support coercive laws. Like most

public reason liberals, Quong is concerned primarily with the (sincere) justification of coercion – i.e., with the justification of laws that limit citizens’ freedom by means of legal sanctions” (p. 50). But—following Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier—Zoffoli suggests that even if it is illegitimate to favor imposing coercion on others by appeal purely to comprehensive or non-shared reasons, this does not preclude someone from effectively vetoing the imposition of a coercive law upon herself by appeal to purely comprehensive or non-shared reasons. Put differently, there can be comprehensive or religious *defeaters* of otherwise valid public justifications: non-shared reasons that exempt an individual from being bound by otherwise justified rules. In appealing to such defeaters, the individual in question does not seek to impose her religious or comprehensive views on others; she only seeks something like a religious exemption from an otherwise applicable law.

108

I do not, however, endorse the view that public reason or public justification is only applicable to coercively imposed laws or rules. I concede the text of LWP may be ambiguous or unclear about this,⁵ but in a more recent essay I have tried to make my position clearer.⁶ In my view, public reason is the appropriate standard for regulating the terms of our interactions with others with whom we share social, political, legal, and economic institutions. These are the terms of cooperation among free and equal persons, and as such, ought to be mutually acceptable to reasonable persons regardless of whether those terms are coercively enforced or not. As I say in the more recent essay: imagine a social world similar to our own—one where laws are debated and decided democratically, and where there is deep and sharp disagreement about which laws ought to be passed—but which differs from our own in one crucial respect. Laws are never coercively enforced because each citizen (or the vast majority) obeys the law out of a sense of civic duty or obligation even when he or she thinks the law is mistaken. In this world there is no political coercion, but I think it’s clear that the idea of public reason should nevertheless regulate the basic structure of this imagined society.⁷

Once we reject the view that coercion stands uniquely in need of public justification, the argument for comprehensive defeaters is seriously

5 Though see pp. 274 and 289 where I say public reason should apply to all our political decisions or exercises of political power, without qualifying this by reference to coercion.

6 Jonathan Quong, “On the Idea of Public Reason,” in *A Companion to Rawls*, Jon Mandle and David Reidy, eds. (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2014), 271-273.

7 *Ibid.*, 272.

undermined. Without the presumption that it is only the coercive imposition of rules that must be justified by appeal to shared reasons, competing political proposals or demands have (absent some further explanation) the same status regardless of whether they involve coercion or not. Albert's demand to be exempt from laws requiring him to serve gay and lesbian customers in his store should be subject to the same standards of sincere public reason as the proposed law from which he demands an exemption. The debate is about the fair or legitimate terms of interaction between members of the polity, and the arguments we offer in support of our preferred terms should meet the principle of justificatory sincerity regardless of whether we are seeking to coerce others or make ourselves exempt from the coercion of others. Either way, we are seeking to justify the fair terms of cooperation or interaction with others.

The second argument on which Zoffoli focuses is what he calls the liberal argument. As he notes, one of the main ways I depart from Rawls's account of political liberalism is in the role I assign to the overlapping consensus. As Rawls presents it, once we have constructed a freestanding political conception of justice (for example, via a constructivist device like the original position), we must then check to see whether this political conception could be the subject of an overlapping consensus amongst reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Rawls says that if the political conception of justice cannot meet this second justificatory test, "it is not a satisfactory political conception of justice and it must be in some way revised".⁸ But, as many have pointed out, if this is the role assigned to the overlapping consensus, it seems vulnerable to a fatal dilemma: "(a) either the overlapping consensus is superfluous within political liberalism, since reasonable people will be definition endorse the (correct) political conception of justice...(b) or the overlapping consensus is not superfluous, and people could (in the second justificatory stage) reject the political conception without being unreasonable" (LWP 167). But embracing the latter horn of the dilemma opens political liberalism to the objection that it allows illiberal or unjust people to effectively veto a liberal conception that has otherwise been impeccably constructed via the freestanding argument.

My solution is to revise the role of the overlapping consensus. I suggest that it should not represent a second justificatory stage or test that a political conception needs to pass. Rather, it represents the very first

⁸ John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 141.

stage in the political liberal project. We begin by asking what fundamental ideas all reasonable persons must endorse (e.g. ideas of freedom, equality, and fairness), and then use this as the basis for our subsequent reasoning about justice. The role of the overlapping consensus, on this view, is to identify the common ground from which political justification in a well-ordered liberal society can proceed, but it does not serve as any sort of justificatory test for the political conception, and so avoids the dilemma described above.

110

Zoffoli doubts, however, that my proposed solution really does avoid the dilemma. On my internal conception of political liberalism, it is true by definition that reasonable persons endorse the fundamental ideas of a liberal well-ordered society, and it will also be true that reasonable persons will endorse the three general liberal principles that Rawls identifies as common to all reasonable political conceptions of justice. Zoffoli says of my revised view, “an overlapping consensus on the ideals of freedom, equality and fairness would be irrelevant, for the same reason why it would be irrelevant if it were meant to support the liberal conception of justice” (pp. 54).

I disagree. The overlapping consensus only seems superfluous or irrelevant if one assumes that the role or point of the overlapping consensus is to justify political principles, or else to justify the more fundamental ideas on which those principles are based. Zoffoli attributes this view to me when he says, “Quong maintains that the overlapping consensus is necessary to justify the fundamental political values of freedom, equality and fairness” (p. 52). But this is not my view. The political liberal philosopher does not say that the fundamental values of freedom, equality, and fairness are justified because they are the subject of an overlapping consensus among reasonable people. “Reasonable persons”—at least on my account—is a technical term used to denote those who accept these fundamental ideas, and thus we cannot also appeal to the fact these persons endorse the values as evidence of their justification. Rather, as I make clear in chapter 8 of *LWP*, political liberalism does not take a stand on why the fundamental liberal ideas are justified or true. It remains silent on this question and leaves it to each individual citizen to work out for herself, from within her own comprehensive doctrine, why the fundamental ideas are justified and should be accorded deliberative priority. On the internal conception of political liberalism that I favor, liberal philosophy in a well-ordered society must abstain from offering a justification of our most basic political values and their priority, since

any attempt to do so will go beyond the boundaries of the political, and as such, will not be acceptable to all reasonable citizens (see LWP 242).

But what, then, is the role of the overlapping consensus? Why don't I, as Zoffoli wonders, dispense with it entirely? I don't dispense with it since I think it plays an essential role: the overlapping consensus "identifies what normative ideas citizens in an ideal, well-ordered liberal society would share. The need to identify this common ground is driven by the internal conception of political liberalism's aim: to understand how the public justification of political power can be made consistent with the reasonable pluralism generated by liberal institutions" (LWP 191). As Rawls famously tells us, justification typically proceeds from what parties in dispute have in common.⁹ The role of the overlapping consensus is to identify that common ground within a well-ordered liberal society.

Reply to Zelić

111

In his imaginative and challenging paper, Nebojša Zelić suggests that my account of political liberalism may lack the theoretical resources to address certain threats to the stability of a well-ordered liberal society. The paper begins by asking us to imagine an apparently well-ordered liberal society, but one that is unusual in several respects. Citizens and legislators debate and vote on laws and political issues by appeal to the full range of their comprehensive doctrines—there is no Rawlsian duty of civility in this society. But once a proposal has been debated and passed by the legislature, it must pass a further test before becoming law: a panel of Supreme Court Justices must examine the law and determine whether it can be adequately justified purely by appeal to public reasons, regardless of whatever comprehensive reasons may have been offered in support of the proposal at the legislative stage. Only proposals which the Supreme Court deems justified by appeal to public reason become law, and since all citizens accept this two-stage mechanism as appropriate, the society is apparently well-ordered and governed by an appropriate ideal of public reason or public justification. Zelić calls this the *Political Liberal Expert State* (PLES).

Zelić suggests that there are at least three potential problems with the PLES. First, it seems troubling that citizens and legislators do not directly take up the task of engaging in public justification with one another,

⁹ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 508–09.

rather they delegate this task to the experts on the Supreme Court. By delegating this responsibility to others, citizens may not fully realize a valuable form of civic relationship: the relationship of civic friendship characterized by a certain form of reciprocity and mutual reason-giving. Moreover, Zelić appeals to the civic republican view that active participation in civic life by citizens is the best way to safeguard the political liberty of one's society, and in a society where crucial deliberative tasks are delegated to experts, such civic virtue may be lacking. Second, Zelić suggests that if, as I do, one endorses a broad conception of public reason's scope, it may be more difficult to understand how a Supreme Court can be, *ex post*, tasked with determining whether a given law can be justified by appeal to public reasons. The difficulty is that, on the broad view that I favor, there is no way to be confident, *ex ante*, what public reasons may exist that are relevant to a given decision. And whether a particular policy really can be justified by appeal to public reasons is something that must be worked out via the process of democratic deliberation. I have a great deal of sympathy with what Zelić has to say on both these points, and so I will say nothing further about them here.

112

But Zelić presents a third worry about the PLES that offers a more direct challenge to my own view. He worries that the picture of citizens who exist in the PLES is insufficiently realistic. Citizens in a well-ordered society must come to endorse the fundamental liberal ideas on which the society is based, and accord those political values deliberative priority when deciding whether to comply with legitimate laws. But a society where a panel of experts, rather than individual citizens and legislators, do the hard work of determining whether each proposed law really meets the test of public reason will be less likely to create a society where citizens have this *wholehearted* commitment to fundamental liberal ideas. Instead, Zelić thinks it is more likely that a substantial number of citizens will be what he calls "non-ideally reasonable" (p. 68). Non-ideally reasonable citizens endorse the public political values, but "they do not ascribe full deliberative priority of public reason, especially not at all levels of political deliberation" (p. 67). They will thus sometimes promote policies that are supported by their comprehensive doctrine, or by other perfectionist considerations, even when these policies cannot be justified by appeal to public reasons. They believe in the importance of public reason, but they are not fully committed to the ideal.

For Zelić, non-ideally reasonable citizens pose a general problem, not one that is unique to the PLES. He thus thinks political liberalism, as a

theory, must have something to say to such citizens in order to ensure the long-term stability of a well-ordered society. But my account has very little to say to such citizens. In *LWP* I focus on an ideally well-ordered society, one where all reasonable persons are fully committed to the ideal of public reason and are always willing to accord deliberative priority to the requirements of liberal justice.

Zelić thinks this model is too limited to secure long-term stability, and so he favors an additional stage of public reason or public justification, what he calls the pre-overlapping consensus (pre-OC) stage. As I understand his position, the aim of the pre-OC stage is to engage others in dialogue and persuade them to endorse the fundamental liberal ideas and accord those ideas deliberative priority—in other words, to persuade others to be wholehearted in their commitment to the political liberal ideal. As he presents it, this process of dialogue or justification bears some similarity to what Rawls calls “reasoning from conjecture” (p. 70). Zelić argues, however, that this pre-OC stage of justification must be governed by different, less stringent standards. In particular he suggests that the demanding conditions of civility and sincerity that I defend for public reason in the post-overlapping consensus stage are too demanding for the pre-OC stage. He suggests that Gerald Gaus’s recent, less demanding account of sincerity is better suited for the pre-OC stage.

113

Zelić’s idea of a pre-OC stage of public reason is intriguing, and though he presents this as a challenge or at least a potential modification of my own position, our views may not be that far apart. I’ll make three brief points about his proposal. First, with regard to those who may sometimes be tempted to act unreasonably, as the non-ideally reasonable citizens are, I say the following in *LWP*:

As citizens we are, of course, at liberty to try and reason with those other citizens who are struggling with these decisions, to persuade them that they should remain committed to the core political values of freedom, equality, and fairness, and jettison any beliefs that are in conflict with those values...but political liberalism...need not and should not aspire to resolve these problems of coherence that may arise within a particular citizen’s set of beliefs (*LWP* 189).

The effort to justify to individual citizens why they ought to accord deliberative priority to liberal justice is not, I stress throughout, part of the political liberal project, but is rather part of a comprehensive public philosophy that must necessarily go beyond the limits of the political, and make comprehensive claims about which political liberalism must remain agnostic (*LWP* 242).

My position on this remains unchanged. Political liberalism cannot, as a theory, advance a particular comprehensive view regarding why citizens ought to be ideally reasonable, since to do so would be to go beyond the limits of the strictly political. But this is entirely compatible with an activity similar to the one Zelić describes, where individuals deliberate with one another not as citizens, but as Catholics, or Jews, or adherents of other doctrines. Rawls's idea of reasoning from conjecture—where we try and persuade adherents of other doctrines to be more firmly committed to certain fundamental liberal ideas by appealing to features internal to the doctrines themselves—is one way to pursue this activity. Provided one is explicit about one's aims, I think this can be a laudable activity. It's just not an activity that constitutes part of political liberalism as I understand it.

114

Second, we need to be clear about the aim of the pre-OC stage, and why this aim would call for a different and weaker principle of justificatory sincerity. On my account of political liberalism, the pre-OC stage is not a part of public reason or public justification. On the internal conception of political liberalism we simply begin by assuming that all citizens are reasonable and fully committed to the fundamental liberal ideas. Put differently, on the internal conception, the fundamental liberal ideas do not stand in need of some prior justification, they are taken as given—as the starting points for the political liberal project. If this is the picture of political liberalism we adopt, then conditions that apply to public reason—conditions like the principle of justificatory sincerity—are inapplicable to the pre-OC stage since, on the internal view, the pre-OC stage is not a part of public reason, but rather a precondition for it. To hold that the fundamental liberal ideas that form the basis of political liberalism stand in need of public justification is to adopt what I call the external conception of political liberalism, a conception which I believe is vulnerable to a series of fatal objections (LWP chapter 5). In sum, provided one adopts the internal conception of political liberalism, then one might go much further than Zelić does: it's not simply that different and weaker standards of justificatory sincerity apply in the pre-OC stage, it's rather that standards of public reason do not apply at all at this stage. Of course there might be other standards of interpersonal private morality that ought to regulate the way individuals reason and deliberate with one another regarding their comprehensive beliefs, but that's not something about which I have well-developed views, and it falls outside the project of political liberalism as I understand it.

But—and this is my third and final comment about Zelić’s proposal—suppose you endorse a different view of political liberalism. Suppose you believe that the pre-OC stage forms an essential part of the justification of political liberalism—that persuading the non-ideally reasonable to be ideally reasonable is somehow necessary for the full justification of a liberal conception of justice. If this is your view, should you endorse Zelić’s suggestion that a weaker standard of justificatory sincerity is appropriate for the pre-OC stage? Here is how he, following Gaus, describes the view he favors: “If we have two persons, A and B, and different reasons R_a and R_b , A can sincerely appeal to R_b (and vice versa) only if A believes that (i) B would have sufficient reason to endorse R_b and (ii) A could see this as intelligible and relevant, though he does not endorse it” (p. 71). The main difference between this view of sincerity and the Principle of Justificatory Sincerity (PJS) I propose is the idea that A need only view B’s reasons as intelligible and relevant, where this seems to stand for something less than justificatory.

115

I will have more to say about Gaus’s principle of sincerity in my response to Baccarini, but for now I will just note that I do not see why intelligibility and relevance should be sufficient at the pre-OC stage, once we assume that that stage is an essential part of justifying a liberal conception of justice or family of liberal conceptions. It seems to me that the same reasons why PJS is appropriate for regulating public reason at the post-OC stage apply to the pre-OC stage *if* these two stages are both part of the same overarching project of public justification. Why would it be acceptable for A to invoke reasons which she does not think can serve as justificatory for B in the pre-OC stage if it would be inappropriate for her to invoke such reasons in the post-OC stage? Zelić says, in defense of his proposal, that “we act in accordance with our virtue of civility when we listen to others and try to see things from the point of view of their conception of good. In this way we do not only *treat* others in [a] tolerant and respectful way, but we *communicate* in [a] tolerant and respectful way” (p. 73). I agree that showing others that we are trying to see things from their point of view can be an important way of treating them respectfully and communicating that respect. But communicating our respect for others is one thing, and which reasons we may sincerely appeal to when attempting to justify the use of political power over others is another. If A does not think R_b is truly justificatory for B, then it seems to me he may not sincerely think political power can be legitimately exercised over B by appeal to R_b alone.

Reply to Baccharini

Elvio Baccharini shares my view that public reason is a central part of an ideal and well-ordered liberal society, and in his innovative contribution to this symposium he seeks a middle ground between my view of public reason and Gerald Gaus's account. In particular, Baccharini argues that there is a greater role for the convergence model of public reason than I allow, though he still allows it less of a role than Gaus would like. The convergence model, recall, allows that a law or political principle, L, can be justified to all members of the relevant constituency without appeal to any shared reasons: provided each member of the constituency has his or her own sufficient non-shared reason to endorse L, then L is publicly justified. The consensus model, on the other hand, requires a law or political principle to be justified by appeal to shared reasons—reasons that all members of the justificatory constituency can accept as reasonable grounds for endorsing the law or principle.¹⁰ In LWP I present an objection to the convergence model which is summarized as follows (LWP 274—also see my response to Zoffoli above):

116

- 1) Convergent justifications amongst people adhering to different comprehensive doctrines can only succeed provided each person involved sincerely believes that the other people involved are justified in adhering to their different doctrines.
- 2) The condition described in (1) will not be met unless people accept certain epistemological or axiological theories (e.g. Gaus's).
- 3) The fact of reasonable pluralism means that we cannot and should not expect individuals to adhere to any particular epistemological or axiological theory.
- 4) Therefore, as a general matter, we cannot expect convergent forms of justification to succeed under conditions of reasonable pluralism.

Baccharini believes this objection is not decisive against the convergence model. He aims to defend the convergence model, however, in a way that departs from Gaus's view. Here are the key steps of Baccharini's argument in support of convergence (pp. 82-83):

¹⁰ Note that, on the version of the consensus model that I favor, members of the constituency need not all share the very same reasons for endorsing some law, L, in order for L to count as publicly justified—it only needs to be the case that each member of the constituency sincerely and reasonably believes that there is a justification for L grounded in shared reasons (LWP 264).

- 1) You are entitled to follow your standard of justification Σ in every case when there is not a successful defeater for the reasons that it justifies.
- 2) The standard of justification Σ sustains rule R.
- 3) R is justified to you if there is not a successful defeater for it.
- 4) There are no defeaters of R.
- 5) R is overall justified to you.

In this argument the “standard of justification Σ ” refers to your comprehensive doctrine or non-public evaluative standard. Baccharini’s argument has an apparent advantage over Gaus’s defense of the convergence view because there is no appeal to a particular epistemological theory over which reasonable persons are assumed to disagree. Instead Baccharini relies, in premise (1), on something closer to a normative or moral claim, one he suggests could be shared by people with diverse comprehensive doctrines. If we agree that individuals are entitled to follow their own standard of justification—subject to some conditions—then we need not take a position on whether they are justified in doing so, rather we simply grant individuals the normative permission, as it were, to take their own doctrines as given.

117

There is another feature of Baccharini’s argument that distinguishes his position from Gaus’s. In his initial description of what it means to be entitled to follow one’s standard of justification, Baccharini says the following: “but every person is entitled to follow her standards of justification, in so far...as they do not conflict with what is justified by shared reasons related to the foundational commitments of liberalism, i.e. to the common standards of justification of reasonable citizens” (p. 82). If Baccharini means that any individual’s private or comprehensive justification for f is always defeated whenever there is a public or shared justification for $\neg f$, then the conclusions of convergence reasoning can never conflict with whatever is justified by consensus or shared reasoning—this latter form of reasoning has lexical priority over the convergence model. This feature of Baccharini’s argument ensures his account avoids the most counterintuitive implications that would arise from convergence reasoning—convergence reasoning can never justify laws that would be unjust or illegitimate from the perspective of our shared public political values.

118

I do, however, think Baccharini's argument is vulnerable to a serious worry: I think that it trades on an ambiguity regarding what it means to be "entitled" to follow your standard of justification. On one interpretation of the first premise, it is a straightforward moral claim: Albert does nothing morally wrong by believing his own standard of justification in any given case (provided there is no successful defeater). When understood this way, premise 1 looks very plausible, and I can see how, as Baccharini suggests, this premise might be endorsed by people from a variety of different perspectives.¹¹ But this interpretation of premise (1) does not, I think, support the conclusion that Baccharini wants to reach. Even if Albert would do nothing morally wrong in believing the conclusions of his own standard of evaluation, it does not follow that Betty may permissibly appeal to this standard in justifying the exercise of political power over Albert. Suppose Albert's standard of evaluation is astrology. Even if it is true that he does nothing morally wrong by believing the conclusions of astrology, it does not follow that Betty does nothing morally wrong by appealing to "astrological reasons" in justifying the exercise of political power over Albert, assuming she does not believe Albert is justified in believing astrology. If the law, L, that Betty favors can only be "justified" to Albert by appeal to astrology—if there are no considerations that Betty believes are genuinely justificatory for Albert which also support L—then I think it is wrong for Betty to appeal to astrology in support of imposing L on Albert.¹²

Suppose, however, we do not interpret premise (1) as a straightforward moral claim, but rather as an epistemological or semi-epistemological claim. On this interpretation, it has something like the following implication: "Albert's beliefs are epistemically acceptable/respectable—i.e. sufficient to be used as justificatory with regard to Albert—when he follows his standard of justification Σ in every case when there is not a successful defeater". Understood in this way, the premise can support the convergence conclusion that Baccharini aims to defend. The difficulty, however, is that premise (1) does not look nearly so plausible when interpreted in this way. Albert's beliefs are not epistemically acceptable or respectable whenever he follows his standard of justification Σ in every

11 I don't say that premise 1 is correct when interpreted in this way, only that it seems very plausible. A full assessment of its truth would depend on several other considerations that need not detain us here.

12 It is important to remember, in examples like this one, that we must not imagine Albert consents or agrees to L. We must imagine he does not consent or agree, but that he "should" endorse L *given* his astrological beliefs, and this is the basis on which Betty might support the imposition of L on Albert.

case when there is not a successful defeater. If, for example, Albert's standard of justification is astrology, and astrologically speaking, Albert ought to believe *f* (within the framework of astrology there are no defeaters for *f*), this is not sufficient to conclude that if Albert were to believe *f*, this would be epistemically acceptable or respectable. Albert may, after all, not be justified in believing astrology. The mere fact Albert accepts astrology as his standard of justification does not mean he is justified in doing so. And if he is not justified in doing so, then Betty cannot sincerely appeal to astrological claims when justifying political proposals to Albert, since in doing so, she would be appealing to considerations which she does not sincerely think can serve as justifications for Albert.

Of course Baccarini might follow Gaus's position, as developed in *The Order of Public Reason*, and insist that Betty need not sincerely believe Albert is justified in adopting his framework, but rather she need only view his framework as "as intelligible and relevant".¹³ But if the standard for sincerity is this low—if we only need to see others' non-shared reasons as intelligible and relevant—then the argument succeeds at the price of abandoning the project of public justification. Beliefs and actions can be perfectly intelligible without being justified. My friend's deep fear of spiders, for example, is perfectly intelligible, but it is not justified.

I now want to set aside Baccarini's argument in support of a limited form of the convergence model, and move on to consider an important objection he raises against my own position. He suggests that my account of political liberalism may be vulnerable to the very same objection I press against the convergence model. As several of the symposium contributors note, my account of political liberalism depends on a view in which the overlapping consensus constitutes the first stage of political liberalism. Political liberalism begins by asking what values or ideals reasonable persons in a well-ordered society would all share, and then uses these points of consensus as the basis from which to begin the project of the public justification of political power. But the overlapping consensus might be better described as a convergence model of reasoning—adherents of different comprehensive doctrines all converge on the shared political values (e.g. freedom, equality, and fairness) for their own distinct comprehensive reasons—they find their

13 Gerald Gaus, *The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 289.

own non-shared grounds for endorsing the fundamental liberal ideas. But if so, then Baccharini says “the possible problem is that even if all citizens rely in public reasoning on ideas and principles assumed to be the subject of an overlapping consensus amongst reasonable people, some of them endorse these ideas and principles by relying on what others take as unsound justificatory reasons” (p. 86). Reasonable Catholic citizens, for example, may view reasonable Muslim citizens as unjustified in endorsing Islam, and thus believe reasonable Muslims are unjustified when they take themselves to have sufficient reasons grounded in their Islamic doctrine to endorse the fundamental political ideas of freedom, equality, and fairness (and vice versa). The same objection I press against the convergence model—that it is inconsistent with the Principle of Justificatory Sincerity (PJS)—thus applies to my own account of political liberalism.

120

This is a serious objection, but I believe it does not succeed. As I say in LWP:

The same problem (the failure to be consistent with PJS) does not afflict the Rawlsian consensus model of justification because (as I argued in chapter 6) this model takes the fundamental ideas of the overlapping consensus as given, that is, as the justified starting points from which all reasonable public justifications can proceed. All suitably public justifications thus necessarily begin from fundamental and shared political ideas that we sincerely assume all other reasonable citizens are justified in accepting (LWP 271 n. 47).

As I also emphasized in my response to Zelić, on the internal conception of political liberalism, the pre-OC stage—the reasoning that leads individuals to endorse the fundamental political values from within their own comprehensive perspective—is not part of the process of public justification at all, and so the standards of public justification (like PJS) do not apply to this stage. The comprehensive deliberations of citizens may be a necessary precondition for a well-ordered liberal society to emerge and for public justification to begin, but those deliberations are not subject to the same standards of sincerity and civility that apply when we engage one another in public discussion in our roles as citizens.

The objection I press against the convergence model succeeds in part because proponents of the convergence model—like Gaus—adopt a different picture of the public reason project. On Gaus’s account, there can be no normative commitments that are taken as given—as beyond the test of public justification. Rather, any normative claim that is alleged

to ground a demand on others must be subject to the test of public justification, and so it is always appropriate to ask, about any individual's normative commitments—even the most fundamental liberal values—whether we sincerely believe the individual in question is justified in endorsing those commitments.

My view of public reason is different. I begin with a puzzle that arises for those who share certain moral commitments and aim to live together with others on just terms that can be reasonably and willingly accepted by all, but who recognize that among those who share this aim there is no agreed religious, moral, or philosophical framework that can determine what justice requires. Individuals who share this aim, and recognize this kind of disagreement, should realize that the terms of justice will have to be grounded in public reasons: in reasons we all share by virtue of our common normative commitments to the values of freedom, equality, and fairness. Public reason is thus not, on my view, as foundational to moral reasoning as it is on Gaus's account. As I see it, public reason is further downstream in the justificatory structure of moral and political philosophy. It is essential in helping us to understand what justice requires given a commitment to values such as freedom, equality, and fairness, but it cannot vindicate or undermine those prior normative convictions. As a result, we do not worry about whether individuals are justified in endorsing the fundamental liberal values—those values or not up for debate—they are rather the grounds from which we begin thinking about what political justification must look like in a well-ordered liberal society.

121

I have not managed to address all the points Baccarini raises in his fascinating paper, but I will conclude here by thanking him again for organizing this symposium and providing me with the opportunity to engage with such a thoughtful and constructive group of philosophers.

Primljeno: 10. mart 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 15. mart 2014.

Bibliography

- Baccarini, Elvio (2014), "Public Reason. The Consensus and the Convergence View", *Filozofija i društvo / Philosophy and Society*, xxxxxxx
- Chan, Joseph (2000), "Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 29: 5-42.
- Gaus, Gerald (2011), *The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Kulenović, Enes (2014), "Defending Perfectionism: Some Comments on Quong's Liberalism without Perfection", *Filozofija i društvo*, 25: 35-46.
- Lister, Andrew (2014), "Public Reason and Perfectionism: Comments on Quong's Liberalism without Perfection", *Filozofija i društvo*, 25: 12-34.
- Quong, Jonathan (2012), "Liberalism Without Perfection: Replies to Gaus, Colburn, Chan, and Bocchiola", *Philosophy & Public Issues* 2: 58-59.
- Quong, Jonathan (2014), "On the Idea of Public Reason", in J. Mandle and D. Reidy (eds.), "On the Idea of Public Reason," *A Companion to Rawls*, Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, pp. 265-280.
- Quong, Jonathan (forthcoming), "Consequentialism, Deontology, Contractualism, and Equality", in S. Olsaretti (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rawls, John (1996), *Political Liberalism*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Rawls, John (1999), *A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Zelić, Nebojša (2014), "Is there a Need for Political Liberalism to Have an Account of Pre-overlapping Consensus Reasoning?", *Filozofija i društvo*, 25: 57-74.
- Zoffoli, Enrico (2014), "How "Political" is Quong's Political Liberalism?", *Filozofija i društvo*, 25: 47-56.

THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE
OF WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER PHILOSOPHY

II

SAVREMENO ZNAČENJE
VITGENŠTAJNOVE KASNE FILOZOFIJE

Michal Sládeček (ed.)

Editor's Preface

Reč priređivača

The 125th anniversary of Ludwig Wittgenstein's birth provides the occasion for the texts presented here. These articles, by mainly younger researchers, are a modest contribution to this anniversary. Despite the distance in time, if we judge according to Wittgenstein's impact on contemporary philosophical production (his works span numerous subjects including questions of the limits of philosophy, the foundations of language and meaning, the problems of necessity, the existence of the external world and the nature of the mind and the self, as well as questions of religion, ethics and the significance of human existence), he is our contemporary and interlocutor maybe more than any other philosopher from the past. Wittgenstein's thought is a subject of discussion not only in philosophical circles, but in those of the theory of literature, cognitive science, psychology, linguistics, anthropology, sociology and cultural studies as well.

125

Wittgenstein's influence on 20th century philosophy is immeasurable and it continues unceasingly into the 21st century. The articles presented here underwrite a continued interest in his philosophy manifested not only in the exegesis and interpretation of his work, but, above all, in scrutinizing the interconnections of Wittgenstein's thought with relevant endeavours in current philosophy. Ken Shigeta elaborates Kripke's skeptical argument in rule-following considerations as well as the possibility of its revision, which would make the argument compatible with Wittgenstein's understanding of the paradox of interpretation. Tamar Dobler surveys the place of Wittgenstein's understanding of the autonomy of grammar in the dispute between externalism and internalism. Finally, Michael O'Sullivan in his article analyses affiliations and differences between Wittgenstein's and Quine's understanding of the relation of language and meaning to the stimulus and the speaker's environment.

Ken Shigeta
Graduate School of Engineering
Nagaoka University of Technology

Exposition of Two Forms of Semantic Skepticism: Wittgenstein's Paradox of Rule Following and Kripke's Semantic Paradox

Abstract *Despite persistent attempts to defend Kripke's argument (Kripke 1982), analyses of this argument seem to be reaching a consensus that it is characterized by fatal flaws in both its interpretation of Wittgenstein and its argument of meaning independent of interpretation. Most scholars who do not agree with Kripke's view have directly contrasted his understanding of Wittgenstein (KW) with Wittgenstein's own perspective (LW) in or after Philosophical Investigations (PI). However, I believe that those who have closely read both PI and Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language without any preconceptions have a different impression from the one that is generally accepted: that KW does not directly oppose LW. Indeed, KW seems to present one aspect of LW with precision, although the impression that KW deviates from LW in some respects remains unavoidable.*

127

In this paper, I will attempt to elucidate the underpinnings of this impression by formulating the paradoxes presented by Wittgenstein and Kripke and revealing the complicated relation between the two forms of semantic paradoxes. I will then not only propose a new interpretation of the argument about meaning contained in PI but also suggest a schema or condition for semantics that I think holds by itself, independent from exegetical matters.

Keyword: *Semantics, Skepticism, Rule-following Consideration, Later Wittgenstein, Kripke*

1. Introduction

Two lines of criticism of Kripke can be used to argue against his interpretation of LW.¹ The first is based on PI §201. KW thinks that the skeptical paradox about meaning constitutes the central problem of PI,² and he accepts this as a valid conclusion.³ On the other hand, in the second paragraph of §201, LW rejects the skeptical paradox as a

1 This paper is a greatly extended and revised version of another paper ((2012), "On Semantic Skepticism: Wittgenstein's Paradox of Rule Following and Kripke's Semantic Paradox," in *Proceedings of the 35th International Wittgenstein Symposium XX*, 309–312). This work was supported by JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific-Research (C) Grant Number 26370017.

2 cf. Kripke, *ibid*, 7.

3 "Wittgenstein holds, with the sceptic, that there is no fact as ... or quus." (Kripke, *ibid*, 70–1)

misunderstanding.⁴ Therefore, if KW's semantic paradox were essentially identical to LW's paradox of rule following, these thinkers would disagree with each other regarding the paradox.

However, notwithstanding his own insistence, KW's semantic paradox is fundamentally different from LW's paradox of rule following. If this view were correct, LW's denial of the latter paradox, based on the aforementioned misunderstanding, would not entail his rejection of the former. In this case, criticism of Kripke's interpretation based on PI §201 must be seen as missing the point. I illuminate the difference between the two paradoxes by extracting the structure of LW's paradox of rule following in the next section.

128

The second line of argument for opposing KW against LW concerns KW's skeptical solution to the skeptical paradox. As many scholars have pointed out,⁵ if the skeptical solution were inconsistent with LW's view of meaning and if the skeptical solution were integrated into KW's skeptical paradox as a theory of meaning, then it would follow that LW should not accept KW's skeptical paradox as valid. Indeed, I think that the skeptical solution is invalid both as an interpretation of LW and as an independent argument that attempts to solve the skeptical paradox. I believe that KW diverges from LW most dramatically with regard to the skeptical solution. However, according to my view, KW's skeptical paradox is separable from the skeptical solution. It seems possible to provide another skeptical solution while maintaining the skeptical paradox as a valid argument. I believe that another skeptical solution is at least compatible with LW's view about meaning, even if LW did not propose it explicitly. In section 3, I will formulate KW's semantic paradox and examine LW's possible response to it. I will then show that we cannot help but confront an aporia regarding the interpretation of LW. In section 4, I will show that this aporia can be avoided by a new skeptical solution.

2. Formulation of Wittgenstein's paradox of rule following

I will quote the first two paragraphs of PI §201 for the purpose of formulating Wittgenstein's paradox of rule following (WP).

4 cf. Baker & Hacker 1984, Malcom 1986, McDowell 1984, McGinn 1984.

5 cf. Wright 2001, Ch. 4, Harrison 1991.

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was that if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.

It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases.

Wittgenstein's paradox (WP) is presented in the first paragraph. In the second paragraph, LW describes how to dissolve it by pointing out a misunderstanding in WP, namely "we give one interpretation after another" when we follow a rule. In other words, he insists that WP arises from the thought that "every act of grasping a rule is interpretation." Thus, if the thought that "every act of grasping a rule is interpretation" were negated, WP could be dissolved as a disguised paradox. Of course, some room exists for the interpretation of §201. However, in the context of the aforementioned points and of the descriptions in PI that precede §201, WP and the dissolution thereof can be formulated as follows:

129

[WP]

Premise 1: Every act of grasping a rule is interpretation.

Premise 2: [Fact-A] Whether a rule might be expressed as a picture or an illustrated formula or sign (literal or phonetic) and whether it might occur in one's mind or stand explicitly outside of the mind, it is always possible for us to interpret an application that differs from the one that naturally strikes us. (cf. PI §86, 139–141, 146, 185)

Thus, an application that strikes me as natural on the occasion on which I am going to apply the rule is equally valid as an interpretation of the rule as are other applications that are logically consistent with past applications. For example, "1002, 1004, 1006, ..." may initially be thought to be a correct interpretation about applying the rule "+2" after 1000. However, this is only one of many possible interpretations of this rule; other possibilities, such as "1004, 1008, 1012, ..." also exist. Even if I appeal to "a rule for interpreting a rule" to justify the former interpretation, the meta-rule itself can be interpreted in various ways. Thus, the process by which presentation of a rule opens possible interpretations of it will continue without end. Therefore, like Buridan's ass, I cannot

help but keep confronting possible alternatives without being able to select any one.

Conclusion: A rule cannot determine any course of action.

This conclusion is said to express the paradoxical situation that arises in advance of applying a rule in that we cannot select a particular way to apply it in a new circumstance. The question of PI §198 clearly demonstrates this feature of WP: “But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule.”

130

However, a fallacy is evident in this inference because in the daily praxis of language, “when I obey a rule, I do not choose,” “I obey the rule blindly” (PI §219), and thus a rule *can* determine a course of action. This outright fact contradicts the conclusion of WP. To avoid this conclusion, one of the premises must be denied. Premise 2 is the thesis that LW draws from his preceding consideration of rule following (PI §86, §139, etc.). Thus, premise 1 is supposed to be negated. It follows from it that grasping a rule is *not* an interpretation. “A way of grasping a rule which is not interpretation” can be said to be exhibited in our applying rules or in our reference from a meta-level perspective to “obeying the rule” or “going against it” in circumstances involving the praxis of language.

Once WP is formulated in this way, it is not indispensable to showing the essential difference between WP and Kripke’s semantic paradox (KP) to formulate KP and compare it with WP. Indeed, it can be easily shown that WP can be dissolved within the schema of KP; in other words, WP can be dissolved within the substantive efficacy of KP. Kripke evidently admits that an individual who is separated from a community and who therefore cannot be provided even with a skeptical solution can apply a rule to new examples without hesitation.

[N]o one actually hesitates when asked to produce an answer to an addition problem! Almost all of us unhesitatingly produce the answer “125” when asked for the sum of 68 and 57, without any thought to the theoretical possibility that a quus-like rule might have been appropriate!⁶

A circumstance in which everyone unhesitatingly applies the rule to a new example contradicts the conclusion of WP (that no one can select one among multiple alternatives when attempting to apply a rule in

6 Kripke, *ibid*, 87.

a new situation). Thus, following the same inference described above, KW is also supposed to attain “a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation.” One must be attentive to the fact that the individual discussed here, who is isolated from a community, remains under the influence of KP. Indeed, those individuals who are thought to be isolated from a community are not admitted even of a skeptical solution. Therefore, I can conclude that KP is fundamentally different from WP.

Of course, it does not follow from the fundamental difference between KP and WP that LW is supposed to consider KP valid while rejecting WP as a disguised paradox. It is conceivable that PI as a whole is incompatible with KP, even if LW does not directly argue KP.

3. Kripke's semantic paradox

3-1. Formulation of KP

131

Let me formulate KP for the purpose of examining the relationship between LW and KP.

[KP]

Premise 1: No facts about meaning exist.

Premise 2: A semantic statement is true if and only if a fact about meaning exists.⁷

Conclusion: Every sentence has no meaning.

Because KW does not formulate KP in this way, I will offer a few explanatory remarks. Needless to say, premise 1 is nothing but the conclusion that KW draws in Part II of the book. To be precise, it is expressed in this way: “There is no fact about me that distinguishes between my meaning plus and my meaning quus” and “there is no fact about me that distinguishes between my meaning a definite function ... and my meaning nothing at all.”⁸ Premise 2 was not referenced explicitly when KW examined the counterargument to draw premise 1. It is not until the skeptical solution is proposed that the existence of premise 2 is revealed. The conclusion is drawn based on the following inference:⁹

1) For any S, p: [“S” means that p] is false.

7 According to Kripke, a picture of language based on truth conditions lies behind this conditional. cf. Kripke, *ibid*, 74.

8 Kripke, *ibid*, 21.

9 The inference is basically based on Boghossian (Boghossian 1989: 523).

This is the case because although a semantic statement \llbracket “S” means that p \rrbracket is true iff a fact about meaning exists (premise 2), no such fact exists (premise 1). Then, the disquotational properties of the truth predicate guarantee that (1) entails the following:

2) For any S: S has no meaning.

However, because (2) is supposed to apply to any sentence, a self-refuting consequence follows: the argument that draws (2) has no meaning. No other option but to deny premise 2 exists if one is to avoid this paradoxical consequence because KW has accepted premise 1 as valid. Thus, by converting an understanding of language based on truth conditions to one based on assertibility conditions, KW makes it possible to distinguish “following a rule” from “thinking one is following a rule” by resorting to the mutual confirmation of community members. As a consequence, the condition under which semantic statements can be considered as true is barely secured under the skeptical constraint that all statements cannot be infallible.

132

3-2. KW’s deviance from LW

How is LW supposed to respond to KP when the latter is formulated in this way? As indicated in section 1, despite defenses of Kripke’s interpretation, I cannot help but conclude with many scholars that LW would reject such a skeptical solution as that proposed by KW. First among the most potent grounds for criticizing KW is that in PI §243, a solitary language (individual language),¹⁰ which stands in contrast to a private language that cannot be understood by anyone except the individual who uses it, is explicitly admitted to be possible. Second, the insistence corresponding to the communitarian theory of KW that “human agreement decides what is true and what is false” is definitely denied in PI §241. Third, the skeptical solution is thought to have its own deficiency¹¹ as an independent argument that attempts to avoid the paradoxical conclusion of KP. If the criticism of the skeptical solution were valid, we would be compelled to believe that LW advocates such a defective argument when the skeptical solution is attributed to LW. The third

10 For example, Goldfarb (Goldfarb 1985: 475) and McGinn (McGinn 1984: 79) make it clear that the solitary language that KW thinks is impossible is essentially different from the private language whose impossibility LW attempts to prove.

11 Blackburn (Blackburn 1984), Goldfarb (Goldfarb, *ibid*), and Boghossian (Boghossian, *ibid*) are examples of criticisms about the skeptical solution that are framed not in terms of the interpretation of LW but in terms of an independent argument.

criticism, which has great significance for the following argument, can be summarized as follows.

If the skeptical solution worked effectively, then each member of a community could confirm whether other members' usage of a certain sign agreed with her own. If this were possible, then she would have to be able to compare her own present usage of a certain sign with her own past usage of it. It would then become possible for her to correct miscalculations, written mistakes, or speech errors made by her at any time in the past. That is to say, if the skeptical solution worked effectively, then it would imply that "following a rule" has already been distinguished from "thinking that one follows a rule" in a solitary setting.

Conversely, if the distinction did not come into existence within a solitary language, the skeptical solution could not work properly, because if it did not, the conception of "following a rule *correctly* (or *incorrectly*)" cannot come into existence.

133

3-3 Wittgenstein's acceptance of KSC

In the absence of LW's proposing the skeptical solution that resorts to the existence of community to negate premise 2, no other options seem to exist save negating premise 1 to avoid the self-defeating conclusion of KP. In other words, LW's refusal to accept the skeptical solution is supposed to provide convincing grounds for his denial of premise 1.

For the purpose of providing the entire structure of KW's argument, I formulate KP as I did in section 3-1. Although this formulation might prevent clarity in this regard, the crux of KP is, no doubt, premise 1. This is because KW believes that we cannot help but accept the skeptical conclusion with respect to meaning expressed by premise 1, whereas we can at least avoid the self-defeating conclusion of KP, although in a skeptical way. I will refer to premise 1 as "KSC" (Kripke's skeptical conclusion) to avoid confusion with KP.

Although not attributing the skeptical solution to LW provides the grounds for believing that LW negates KSC, as I have shown, does LW really do this? Negation of KSC amounts to believing that it is possible to provide a "straight solution" to KSC. Does LW present a straight solution anywhere? I cannot reply in the affirmative. In my view, not only can a straight solution not be found anywhere in PI,¹² but also the very

¹² For example, Wright (Wright 2001, Ch.7, 2007) provides a precise and persuasive argument for this interpretation of PI.

assumption that LW proposes such a straightforward solution is incompatible with the later views of Wittgenstein. Therefore, Kripke's interpretation that LW accepts KSC is certainly valid, at least in that respect. Let me confirm the grounds for this conclusion.

Two candidates for the straight solution to KSC can be identified: 1) a non-intentional, reductive fact (a variety of a dispositional view) and 2) an intentional, primitive fact.¹³ Scholars who claim that LW provides either of these solutions basically identify the grounds for this claim in the fact that LW dissolves WP as a disguised paradox.¹⁴ As described in section 2, the fact that "we follow a rule blindly" in a normal situation based on our natural disposition (non-intentional, reductive fact) is opposed against the paradoxical conclusion of WP that "a rule could not determine any course of action." Thus, *reductio ad absurdum*, the insistence that our grasping a rule is not an interpretation follows. Grasping a rule in a way that is not an interpretation seems to indicate the existence of intentional, primitive facts about a meaning that can be grasped only in a peculiar manner.

134

Here however, the fact that WP differs fundamentally from KP, which was pointed out in section 2, must be noted. In fact, KW begins to prove KSC under the presupposition that WP can be dissolved as a disguised paradox. The "I" who responds to the skeptical challenge is acknowledged as immediately producing the answer "125" to the question " $68 + 57 = ?$ " based on his natural disposition. Therefore, "a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation" is exhibited in the answer "125." Presupposing this, he who is challenged by the semantic skeptic sets out to provide a counterexample to a skeptical argument, but his attempts ends in failure.

At this point, I can provide a more definite description of the difference between WP and KSC. WP represents the paradox that arises in advance of applying the rule, namely that one cannot select any one of the logically possible alternatives. On the other hand, KSC signifies the paradox that you cannot prove *afterword* and *retrospectively* that the application of the rule applied without hesitation ($68 + 57 = 125$) accords with your previous intention. To be more exact, you cannot prove that only the application that you have performed accords with

13 Soames (Soames 1998) provides this classification about straight solutions.

14 I can adduce that Horwich (Horwich, 1998) is one typical example of the former, and McDowell (McDowell, *ibid*) is one typical example of the latter.

your previous intention and that it is logically impossible that any other alternative accords with your previous intention. (It is evident that KW's argument begins under settings in which the justification for the application that has already been executed is investigated retrospectively.) Therefore, whereas WP can be dissolved only if the conditions for blind obedience to a rule are satisfied, the skeptical doubt that leads to KSC can be said to begin where WP is dissolved. Thus, I cannot help but conclude that attempts to identify the argument that enables us to dissolve WP as a disguised paradox with the rationale for negating KSC misses the point completely.

I think a still more convincing rationale for endorsing LW's acceptance of KSC can be identified. For the sake of argument, let us assume that LW negates KSC; that is, let us assume that Wittgenstein thinks that a fact about meaning exists. Then, for example, the answer "125" that I produce at t_1 (present) to the question " $68 + 57 = ?$ " is justified by the fact about meaning, "+," at t_0 (past). Of all the possible alternatives, only "125" is given the status of truth. However, is it conceivable that the person who reaches such a conclusion goes on to persistently investigate the certainty of a calculation (e.g., $12 \times 12 = 144$) (*On Certainty* (OC) §43, 447, 651, 653-4)? Alternately is it conceivable that the same person states "even when the calculation is something fixed for me, this is only a decision for a practical purpose" (OC §49) about such a calculation or asks, "[w]ould the certainty really be greater for being checked twenty times?" (OC §77) (For example, with respect to the latter question, it is thought that the problem of whether the degree of certainty of a calculation depends on how many times recalculation is performed ought not be investigated philosophically when the certainty is believed to be conferred by a fact about meaning.) That is to say, the assumption that LW negates KSC renders the ardent investigation of the certainty of an elemental kind of arithmetical equation, which he undertook after PI, totally incomprehensible.¹⁵

135

4. An aporia of KP and another skeptical solution

Based on the grounds described above, I cannot help but agree with Kripke that LW accepts KSC. However, under these circumstances, a serious aporia about KP presumably arises. LW is not thought to accept

15 Wright (Wright 2004), who basically agrees with KW, at least in respect to LW's acceptance of KSC, argues that LW's consideration of certainty presupposes that LW admits the revisability or non-infallibility of mathematical propositions.

the self-refuting consequence of KP, namely, that every sentence has no meaning. To avoid this consequence, one of the two premises must be negated. Yet, neither negating premise 2 and attributing the skeptical solution to LW nor negating premise 1 and attributing the straightforward solution against KSC to LW can be consistent with LW. It thus seems to be impossible to avoid the self-refuting consequence of KP. This is an aporia for LW regarding KP.

The interpretation that LW has remained under this aporia without being aware of the predicament is possible because it is not LW who explicitly formulated KP. Therefore, this inconsistency in LW can be revealed only when the whole of LW's arguments is seen from the perspective provided by KP. But this is the worst interpretation of the subject. Given this, how should we avoid adopting the worst interpretation?

136

The aporia of KP stems from the assumption that the negation of premise 2 implies the adoption of KW's skeptical solution. However, it is possible to negate premise 2 without adopting KW's skeptical solution. Thus, when the bi-conditional, "a semantic statement is true iff a fact about meaning exists," and the assertibility condition, which resorts to the existence of community, are denied, what kind of condition is possible?¹⁶

Let me clarify the conditions under which we will seek a solution of the aporia. First, we have to accept premise 1 of KP (= KSC) as valid. In short, we admit that no facts about meaning exist. Second, we are forced to negate premise 2 to avoid KP. That is to say, we admit that it is possible that semantic statements are established as true (or meaningful), even under the condition that there exist no facts about meaning. Finally, we reject Kripke's skeptical solution, the communitarian view, as an alternative that can make semantic statements true (meaningful). Our task is to search for a way out of the aporia of KP under these three conditions.

Before beginning this task, we must take several detours to elucidate the features of semantic statements within Kripke's argument. Indeed, the settings under which Kripke develops his argument give them a peculiar

¹⁶ KW's expression of a conversion of "a picture based on truth conditions to one based on assertibility conditions" is also misleading because it seems to entail abandonment of the concept of truth. Although I cannot discuss this subject here, suffice it to say that introducing two different types of concept truth, inflationary and deflationary, is supposed to settle the problem.

kind of complexity. For example, Kripke uses the following semantic statement: "Jones means addition (quaddition) by '+'." ¹⁷ According to him, because there is no fact that corresponds to the semantic statements and makes them true, they have no sense. Conversely, under the supposition that facts about meaning exist, they have sense and can turn out to be true or false. What will follow from this supposition? To clarify the comparison with the skeptical solution that we will present in a following argument, let me confirm this.

Suppose that there existed a fact about the meaning of plus among the inner (mental) or outer (physical) facts about Smith at time point t_0 . At t_1 , he unhesitatingly calculates " $57 + 68 = 125$ " using the number 57 for the first time. The result of this calculation could be justified absolutely by the fact about meaning of plus at t_0 . All calculating formulas that are incompatible with " $57 + 68 = 125$ " such as " $57 + 68 = 5$ " would be completely denied as false. In this way, the equation " $57 + 68 = 125$ " that Smith produces would be infallible and absolutely certain.

137

If the existence of a fact about the meaning of quus was assumed, the same type of argument would hold for the equation " $57 + 68 = 5$ " and calculating formulas that are incompatible with it. If Smith produced " $57 + 68 = 125$," it would be denied as totally false by the fact of quus.

Then, if there were a condition that could render such semantic statements true (or meaningful) under the premise that no fact about meaning exists, what would it be? It is our task here to provide a convincing answer to this question. According to my view, there can be no answer to it other than the following. It is that a subject believes *with some degree of justification* ¹⁸ that a new sentence, which is constructed under a new circumstance, is true and that any sentence that the constructor believes to be incompatible with it is false. For example, Smith believes that " $57 + 68 = 125$," a statement he has constructed by using a number that is equal to or larger than 57 for the first time, is true and that any calculating formula that he believes to be incompatible with it (such as " $57 + 68 = 5$ ") is false. The essence of this proposal, a new skeptical solution, consists in its individualism: that it is ultimately any individual's

17 cf. Kripke, *ibid.*, 77, etc.

18 By "with justification to some degree," I mean justification that enables us to distinguish a totally blind belief without any reason from a belief resting on some reasonable reason that the believer herself is ready to present if required. In the following argument, I will use the term "believe" or "belief" to designate one with this tacit condition.

belief in a sentence that is constructed by using signs that can make semantic statements meaningful (or true).

Although the proposal seems to offer little at present, I will elaborate on its details to provide a certain degree of justification. For the sake of clarity, I will formulate this proposal based on the example described above.

[Cp -So]

“Smith means plus by ‘+’ is true iff Smith believes that “68 + 57 = 125” is true and “68 + 57 = α ,” which he believes to be incompatible with “68 + 57 = 125,” is false.

α : any sign except ‘125’

138

This formulation is obviously insufficient, because it is not only “68+57=125” but also other sentences including ‘+’ that Smith has used in the past that contribute to the meaning of plus. Therefore, the set of sentences that it is necessary for Smith to believe to be true must comprise the formulas of addition that are produced by adding a pair of numbers that are lower than 57 and that Smith believes to be true, such as “56 + 39 = 95,” as well as the theoretical sentences including natural numbers and “+” that Smith believes to be true, such as “ $x + y = y + x$.” I will use the abbreviated notation “plus-T(x)” to represent such sentences. Moreover, the set of sentences that it is necessary for Smith to believe to be false must comprise every sentence that Smith believes to be incompatible with each member of plus-T(x), such as “56 + 39 = 5” and “ $x + y \neq y + x$.” I will represent all of them with the abbreviated notation “plus-F(x).” Then, [Cp-So] can be revised in the following way.

[Cp-S₁]

“Smith means plus by ‘+’ is true iff Smith believes that “68 + 57 = 125” is true, “x” is true, “68 + 57 = α ,” which he believes to be incompatible with “68 + 57 = 125,” is false, and “y” is false.

{x | x \in plus-T(x)}

{y | y \in plus-F(y)}¹⁹

α : any sign except “125”

Then the bi-conditional for “Smith means plus by ‘+’” can be formulated in the following manner.

19 Here, “x” and “y” are used as variants that represent sentential compositions.

[Cq-S₁]

“Smith means quus by ‘+’ is true iff Smith believes that “68 + 57 = 5” is true, “x” is true, “68 + 57 = α,” which he believes to be incompatible with “68 + 57 = 5” is false, and “y” is false.

{x | x ∈ quus-T(x)}

{y | y ∈ quus-F(y)²⁰}

α: any sign except “5”

At this point, we admit that there is no fact about meaning. Therefore, any calculation that Smith performs using “+” is not infallible. Suppose that Smith satisfies [Cp-S₁]. However, at some point Smith’s belief in “68 + 57 = 125” may be converted to a belief in “68 + 57 = 5.” If he satisfies [Cq-S₁] along with this belief, then he is supposed to mean not “plus” but “quus.” In this way, uncertainty persists in that Smith is not guaranteed unrevisability about which function he means by “+.” Because the existence of a fact about meaning is negated, it is impossible for us to evade such uncertainty.

139

However, semantic statements can be adequately meaningful even under the skeptical constraint. For example, it is actually possible for Smith to fulfill [Cp-S₁]. Then, “Smith means plus by ‘+’” is attributed to him. Because he cannot satisfy [Cq-S₁] at the same time, he does not mean quus by “+” at this point. The contrary case can be supposed logically. In that case, the specific semantic statement, “Smith means quus by ‘+’” will be attributed to him. What is still more important is that when he notices his own mistake, for instance, he finds not “68 + 57 = 125” but “68 + 57 = 5” to be true, satisfying not [Cp-S₁] but [Cq-S₁], it becomes possible for him to say “I have believed that I mean plus by ‘+,’ but now realize it is a mistake. In fact, I have meant quus by ‘+.’” Here, the distinction between “to think one is obeying a rule” and “to obey a rule” (PI§202) comes into existence although in a relative sense. In this situation, it seems to Smith that his past self only thought he was following a rule (= meaning) for “+.” This is because the past Smith followed a feigned rule of “+” without knowing the correct rule (= meaning) of “+,” that is, quus. On the other hand, the present Smith can be said to follow the rule (= meaning) of “+” (quus) without any such divergence.

However, there is a bizarre character to the formulations ([Cp-S₁] [Cq-S₁]). If the new skeptical solution proposed here is to be individualistic in a

²⁰ “quus-T(x)” and “quus-F(y)” are abbreviated notations that represent sets in the assumed cases of quus that correspond to sets in the case of plus.

genuine sense, all the conditions must be formulated from Smith's perspective. When Smith satisfies the conditions of the right side of the biconditional in [Cq-S₁], the semantic statement "Smith means quus by '+'" will be attributed to him. Yet, Smith ought not attribute a semantic statement such as "I (= Smith) means quus by '+'" to himself. Indeed, because he believes that the correct answer achieved by following a correct rule (meaning) for "+" is (not "68 + 57 = 125" but) "68 + 57 = 5," he ought think that he does not mean an anomalistic meaning such as quus but instead means a canonical meaning of plus even under this situation. Therefore, these conditions ([Cp-S₁] [Cq-S₁]) are thought to be formulated from a perspective of third person other than Smith.

140

If this view is valid, the skeptical solution proposed here is nothing but a communitarian variant, which is contrary to my initial intention because whether the meaning intended by any subject by any sign is canonical or anomalistic depends on the view of a third person (community) in these formulations. They are reformulated by Smith's viewpoint to avoid this difficulty.

[CS]

"Smith means plus by '+' is true iff Smith believes that "x" is true and "y" is false.

$$\{x \mid x \in P-T(x)\}$$

$$\{y \mid y \in P-F(y)\}$$

Here, any member of the set that is composed of both of equations of addition and sentences of the theory of natural numbers ("x + y = y + x"), which Smith believes to be true at present, is supposed to be substituted for "x." (This extended version of plus-T(x) will be named "P-T(x)"). Any member of the set that is composed of sentences that Smith believes are incompatible with each member of the set P-T(x) and are false is substituted for "y." (This extended version of plus-F(x) will be called "P-F(x)"). Generalizing [CS] in terms of subject, sign, and meaning, we can gain

[C*]

For any s (subject), M (meaning): "s means M by 'M'" is true iff s believes that "x" is true and "y" is false.

$$\{x \mid x \in M-T(x)\}$$

$$\{y \mid y \in M-F(y)\}$$

Any member of a set composed of beliefs that are specified by a given subject (including Smith), a given meaning (including plus), and a given sign (including "+") (M-T(x), M-F(y)) is substituted for "x" and "y" in [C*]. The remarkable feature of [C*] is that the disquotational relation between sign and meaning holds in the semantic statement ("s means M by 'M'") in [C*]. Anomalistic kinds of semantic statements such as "Smith means quus by '+'" can be ruled out by this stipulation. Therefore, it can be said that a third-person perspective, one other than that of the subject(s) represented in [C*], does not tacitly creep into the formulation.

This individualistic condition for semantic statements restores the solitary language, which is fundamentally distinguished from the private language, which Kripke's skeptical solution unjustifiably exiles from the domain of language to a reasonable status as a legitimate language. It is not the agreement with others or the community, but each individual's usage of signs and beliefs that enables semantic statements to become true (or meaningful). According to my view, insofar as the meanings that each subject understands generally coincide, a theoretically fatal defect, such as that pointed out about Kripke's skeptical solution, is not produced by this solution.

However, as this argument admits that no fact about meaning exists, it is possible that a crucial and fundamental disagreement, such as that between plus and quus, will arise. It is logically possible that complete anarchy arises when the meaning attributed to a sign, such as 'E', differs for all individuals. In such an anarchic situation, which meaning is or is judged to be true?

My reply to this question is very clear. It is this I who determines which meaning is correct or true in such anarchy. Indeed, if it were essentially different from mine, I could not help but comprehend the meaning that the other person accords a given sign as an anomalistic and deviant one.

However, which I is meant by "this I" in the previous paragraph? At this phase, the individualism of the skeptical solution advocated in this paper is forced to confront the problem of solipsism, which haunted Wittgenstein for the whole of his life. Yet, I think that solipsism does not pose a theoretical difficulty, at least against this new skeptical solution. In short, solipsism can, at most, make the solution unable to identify the condition for semantic statements in a *general* form. However, as this issue requires an exceedingly cautious and exact approach, I must address it in another paper.

At any rate, it seems to me that there can be no alternative but the new skeptical solution proposed above if the aporia of KP is to be avoided. Although the proposal obviously requires considerable modification and elaboration, I think that this paper elucidates one way to evade the aporia and provide a certain degree of grounding for it.

By himself, LW does not formulate KP differently from WP. Therefore, it is not the case that LW explicitly advocates this kind of skeptical solution. However, it seems to be the only interpretation that is consistent with LW and that enables him to avoid the aporia of KP.

Primljeno: 15. mart 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 10. april 2014.

Bibliography

142

- Baker, Gordon and Hacker, Peter Michael Stephan (1984), "On Misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's Private Language Argument," *Synthese* 58: 407-450.
- Blackburn, Simon (1984), "The Individual Strikes Back," *Synthese* 58: 281-301.
- Boghossian, Paul (1989), "The Rule-Following Considerations," *Mind* 98: 507-49.
- Goldfarb, Warren (1985), "Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules," *The Journal of Philosophy* LXXXII: 471-488.
- Harrison, Bernard (1991), "Wittgenstein and Scepticism," in Puhl, Klaus (ed.), *Meaning Scepticism*, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 34-69.
- Horwich, Paul (2013), *Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Horwich, Paul (1998), *Meaning*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kripke, Saul Aaron (1982), *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kusch, Martin (2006), *A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules*, Acumen.
- Malcom, Norman (1986), *Nothing Is Hidden: Wittgenstein's Criticism of His Early Thought*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- McDowell, John (1984), "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule," *Synthese* 58: 325-363.
- McGinn, Colin (1984), *Wittgenstein on Meaning*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Soames, Scott (1998), "Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Suppl.23: 211-249.
- Wilson, George Mcgahey (1998), "Semantic Realism and Kripke's Wittgenstein," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* LVIII 1: 99-122.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1953), *Philosophical Investigations*, by Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret (tr.), Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1969), *On Certainty*, by Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret and Paul, Denis (tr.), Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wright, Crispin (2007), "Rule-following without Reasons: Wittgenstein's Quietism and the Constitutive Questions," *Ratio* XX 4:1-23
- Wright, Crispin (2004), "Wittgensteinian certainties," in McManus, Denis (ed.), *Wittgenstein and Scepticism*, London: Routledge, pp. 22-55.
- Wright, Crispin (2001), *Rails to Infinity*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ken Šigeta

Obrazloženje problema dve forme semantičkog skepticizma:

Vitgenštajnov paradoks sleđenja pravila i Kripkeov semantički paradoks

Apstrakt

Bez obzira na uporne pokušaje odbrane Kripkeovog argumenta (Kripke 1982), čini se da su analize ovog argumenta došle do konsenzusa oko toga da se on odlikuje kobnim nedostacima kako u interpretaciji Vitgenštajna, tako i u argumentaciji povodom značenja kao nezavisnog od interpretacije. Većina filozofa koji se ne slažu sa Kripkeovim gledištem direktno su upoređivali razlike njegovog razumevanja Vitgenštajna (KW) sa samom Vitgenštajnovom perspektivom (LW) u *Filozofskim istraživanjima* (PI) i nakon njih. Ipak, smatram da su oni koji su pažljivo i bez predubedenja čitali kako PI, tako i Kripkeovu knjigu *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, stekli utisak drugačiji od onog koji je opšteprihvaćen: da KW nije direktno suprotstavljen LW. I zaista, čini se da KW predstavlja jedan aspekt LW na izoštren način, mada neizbežno ostaje utisak da KW u izvesnom pogledu odstupa od LW.

U ovom članku pokušaću da razjasnim osnove ovog utiska tako što ću formulisati paradokse koje su izložili Vitgenštajn i Kripke i ukazati na složenu relaciju između ova dva oblika semantičkih paradoksa. Zatim ću predložiti ne samo novu interpretaciju argumenta o značenju koji se nalazi u PI, nego i shemu ili uslove za semantiku koja, kako smatram, jeste samosvojna, nezavisna od predmeta egzegeze.

ključne reči: Semantika, skepticizam, problem sleđenja pravila, kasniji Vitgenštajn, Kripke.

Tamara Dobler
University of East Anglia

The Autonomy of Grammar and Semantic Internalism

Abstract *In his post-Tractatus work on natural language use, Wittgenstein defended the notion of what he dubbed the autonomy of grammar. According to this thought, grammar – or semantics, in a more recent idiom – is essentially autonomous from metaphysical considerations, and is not answerable to the nature of things. The argument has several related incarnations in Wittgenstein's post-Tractatus writings, and has given rise to a number of important insights, both critical and constructive. In this paper I will argue for a potential connection between Wittgenstein's autonomy argument and some more recent internalist arguments for the autonomy of semantics. My main motivation for establishing this connection comes from the fact that the later Wittgenstein's comments on grammar and meaning stand in opposition to some of the core assumptions of semantic externalism.*

Keywords: *Later Wittgenstein, grammar, autonomy, arbitrariness, meaning as use, semantic internalism and externalism, reference, mentalism*

144

1. Introduction

Wittgenstein's later comments on meaning as use, with their emphasis on the significance of social practices, activities, circumstances, contexts, occasions of use etc., are sometimes taken to lend support for some form of semantic externalism. Thus, it is argued for instance, that Wittgenstein's contextualism about meaning entails semantic externalism, and that his views on meaning and grammar are perfectly consistent with Putnam's version of externalism (see Child 2010; Putnam *forthcoming*). This is understandable given that Wittgenstein strongly criticised mentalist accounts of meaning, which are typically of an internalist bent.

That said, however, in this paper I want to focus on those aspects of the later Wittgenstein's arguments regarding meaning and grammar, which are aimed directly against certain core externalist ideas; e.g. the idea that the meaning of a word is the object to which the word refers, and so that the objects to which words refer should play a key role in semantic explanations.

My aim here is to show that there are important connections between Wittgenstein's arguments against externalism and certain contemporary

arguments for semantic internalism, where the latter are aimed at denying the kinds of metaphysical commitments brought about by an outlook I shall refer to as *mentalist referentialism*. I shall argue that drawing such a connection puts us in a position to maintain a strong opposition to a certain form of mentalism *without* having to adopt standard externalist commitments.

The main focus on this paper will be on a particular post-*Tractatus* argument for the autonomy of grammar. The idea is that the grammar of language, and in particular linguistic meaning, is constituted independently of metaphysical considerations concerning the nature of things that words are used to refer to. According to some commentators, the argument regarding the autonomous grammar forms part of Wittgenstein's critical response to the treatment of grammar in the *Tractatus*.¹ For the purpose of this paper I will stay neutral as to whether the argument is aimed at the *Tractatus* or not; I shall assume that the target is a certain generic form of externalism regardless of whether this is the position Wittgenstein adopted in the *Tractatus*.²

145

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces and offers an analysis of the later Wittgenstein's argument for the autonomy of grammar. To prepare the ground for a comparison with semantic internalism in later sections of the essay, I shall distinguish what I understand to be the main critical import of Wittgenstein's argument from his constructive response to it. As we shall see, despite it motivating a number of new positive assumptions about meaning, the argument is still fundamentally negative. Section 3 turns to a contemporary debate concerning the role that external objects play in the determination and explanation of linguistic meaning. I explain and distinguish two different brands of semantic internalism according to which meanings are internally individuated and found 'in the head'. I argue that there are some striking similarities between Wittgenstein and methodological internalists, especially vis-à-vis their rejection of the referentialist theory of meaning. Section 4 then examines Wittgenstein's

1 Peter Hacker is the most prominent representative of this view. See e.g. Hacker 2000.

2 To be sure, there are some important indications that the *Tractatus* is indeed committed to externalist semantics. For instance, the analysis of nonsensical sentences makes reference to non-existing properties: "The reason why 'Socrates is identical' means nothing", Wittgenstein maintains, "is that there is no property called 'identical'" (TLP 5.473). And even more patently, objects that constitute states of affairs in the world are considered to be meanings (semantic or referential values) of lexical items (TLP 3.203).

anti-referentialism and his use conception of meaning in more detail. In section 5, I critically discuss several notions all of which represent Wittgenstein's attempt to constructively respond to the autonomy argument: the conventionality of meaning, the arbitrariness thesis, and the role of nature in the determination of meaning. Although these, on the face of it, seem to be inconsistent with semantic internalism, a closer scrutiny reveals that these notions do not seem to carry a lot of weight in Wittgenstein's account of grammar and meaning. Section 6 considers and rejects two additional problems for drawing the parallel with internalism: Wittgenstein's contextualism and his opposition to the mentalist account of meaning. Finally, section 7 concludes the discussion and briefly lists several remaining points of disagreement between the later Wittgenstein and methodological internalists.

146 2. The autonomy of grammar

In analysing Wittgenstein's argument for the autonomy of grammar it is helpful to differentiate its main *critical* import from Wittgenstein's *constructive* responses to the argument. As a critical reaction against the externalist construal of semantics by reference to the nature of things, the argument aims to show what does *not* figure in the determination of semantic facts. Its main purpose is to convince us that grammar (semantics) doesn't have any external source of determination but is, instead, "self-contained and autonomous".³

Wittgenstein's argument against the world-dependent grammar turns on the idea that grammatical rules cannot be *justified* as correct by reference to the nature of the things represented. This is because, as part of justification, we would need to mention how things are, or how things are not, and "any such description already presupposes the grammatical rules" (PR 9). Wittgenstein expresses the same point by saying that "[one] cannot use language to get outside language" (PR 54). There are different variants of the argument for autonomy that attempt to show that the justification of grammatical rules is futile.⁴

We may have certain reservations about this particular argumentative strategy, but the conclusion Wittgenstein reaches is important for present purposes; namely that, in contrast to what the externalist would

3 "The connection between "language and reality" is made by definitions of words, and these belong to grammar, so that language remains self-contained and autonomous." (Wittgenstein 1974: 55)

4 For the discussion see Hacker 2000, 74ff.

maintain, the grammar of language – i.e. the rules that assign meanings to words and regulate how words are put together to form meaningful sentences – is independent, and not answerable to the nature of external objects and their combinatorial properties. In Wittgenstein's words, "grammar is not accountable to any reality" (Wittgenstein 1974: 184; also 2005: 184). However, once grammar is shown to be autonomous, there are some more positive suggestions as to what constitutes linguistic meaning. First of all, Wittgenstein would now characterise the nature of linguistic meaning as *arbitrary* rather than answerable to something extra-linguistic. He writes, "[grammatical rules] are not answerable to any meaning and to that extent are arbitrary" (Wittgenstein 1974: 184; also 2005: 184). Another positive suggestion concerns the way in which meaning is determined and explained once the idea that the external objects play this role is rejected. It consists in the notion that grammar and grammatical rules are *constitutive* of meaning.⁵ Grammatical rules are characterised as conventions⁶, and grammar is taken to consist of conventions (Wittgenstein 1974: 190).

147

Wittgenstein does not discuss the idea of conventionality of meaning in any great detail. So we are somewhat left wondering how we ought to understand his positive proposal. It seems certain, however, that he wants to say that the determination of meaning, which is governed by rules understood as conventions, is in some sense "up to us", and definitely not fixed by the way the world happens to be independent of human interests, activities, practices, etc. But does Wittgenstein's notion of conventionality exclude the determination of meaning by *human* nature, or even the nature of the *human mind*? I shall return to this question in section 5. Now I want to examine a more contemporary version of the idea that grammar is not answerable to *what there is*.

3. Semantic Internalism

The main aim of this essay, as mentioned in the introduction, is to argue for a potentially interesting connection between Wittgenstein's argument for the autonomy of grammar and some recent attempts to defend the autonomy of semantics. However, the connection I want to

⁵ 'It is grammatical rules that determine meaning (constitute it)' (Wittgenstein 1974: 184)

⁶ "We said that by "meaning" we meant what an explanation of meaning explains. And an explanation of meaning is not an empirical proposition and not a causal explanation, but a rule, a convention" (Wittgenstein 1974: 68).

establish between these two philosophical positions concerning the idea of autonomy applies only to a particular brand of internalism defended by Chomsky (2000) and his supporters (e.g. Collins 2009, *internet*; Pietroski 2003a, 2003b, 2005, 2006; McGilvray 1998) This internalist position is known as the *methodological internalism* (MI). So, what is MI and how does it differ from other versions of internalist semantics?

148

MI is a fairly thin version of internalism: “a very modest, metaphysically light-weight doctrine, which neither denies any first-order metaphysical claims nor introduces a new internalist metaphysics” (Collins, *forthcoming*). According to Collins, what characterises linguistic internalism is that “the explanations offered by successful linguistic theory neither presuppose nor entail externalia. There are externalia, but they do not enter into the explanations of linguistics *qua* externalia. Linguistics is methodologically solipsistic” (Collins, *forthcoming*). In contrast, semantic externalism is a heavy-duty metaphysical doctrine according to which semantic explanations essentially depend on the nature of external objects and their ontological status, and ought to reflect how things are anyway. Semantic externalism thus makes semantics fundamentally intertwined with metaphysics. As any other version of internalism, MI takes linguistic meanings to be individuated internally rather than by reference to any external objects or properties that expressions are used to refer to.

However, there are versions of semantic internalism that are metaphysically more substantial. An example is Jackendoff’s brand of internalism, which is, essentially, a form of idealism. Jackendoff (1983, 2002) maintains that the referents of words are internal, mental objects rather than external objects. In this way he simply exchanges one variant of the referentialist theory of meaning (with all its difficulties) for another. But a methodological brand of internalism, according to its advocates, has no such commitments; the methodological internalist “is someone who rejects the entwinement of semantics with general metaphysical doctrines, including idealist ones” (Collins, *forthcoming*). The methodological internalist, unlike an idealist, doesn’t deny the existence of externalia, or that we refer to externalia when we communicate.

According to methodological internalists, the theory of meaning is not a theory of reference and truth; the latter phenomena are not, strictly speaking, semantic and are not scientifically intractable. As Pietroski writes,

Sentences, as products of (largely innate and modular) language systems, have truth-conditions only by virtue of their relation to other cognitive systems and the environments in which the sentences are used. But sentences have their *meanings* by virtue of more local facts concerning the psychology (and hence biology) of language-users. So a semantics that makes the right theoretical cuts will not *itself* associate sentences with truth-conditions. (Pietroski 2003a: 218)

On this view, semantic features, which are systematically tractable, supervene on syntax, which is to say that semantics is basically a species of syntax.⁷ The kinds of semantic facts that for internalist semanticists stand in need of explanation are, for instance, structural effects on interpretation brought about by the meanings of lexical items⁸, other interpretive effects recorded in alternations⁹, certain structurally based semantic entailments¹⁰, structural non-ambiguities¹¹, etc.

7 But, as Chomsky explains, there is an important difference between this conception of semantics and what is typically considered by this name. He writes, "Virtually all work in syntax in the narrower sense has been intimately related to questions of semantic (and of course phonetic) interpretation, and motivated by such questions. The fact has often been misunderstood because many researchers have chosen to call this work "syntax," reserving the term "semantics" for relations of expressions to something extra-linguistic. (Chomsky 2000: 174). As suggested here, for a MI like Chomsky, semantics is importantly linked to the study of syntax rather than to the study of the nature of extra-linguistic things.

8 The parade case is the contrast between *eager* and *easy* in the following constructions:

- (i) John is eager to please
- (ii) John is easy to please
- (iii) It is easy to please John
- (iv) *It is eager to please John (on the intended interpretation; i.e. with pleonastic 'it')

In (i) *John* is understood as the subject of *eager*, whilst in (ii), it is the object of *easy*. This structural difference is confirmed by the fact that (ii) has a paraphrase formulated in (iii), whilst (i) cannot be paraphrased as (iv) (here 'it' must be construed as a referring expression rather than an expletive in order to preserve interpretability). See Chomsky 2000, Pietroski 2006, Collins 2012

9 The parade case is the contrast between ergative and non-ergative verbs as regards the THEME argument alternation:

- (v) Bill broke the bed
- (vi) The bed broke
- (vii) Bill made the bed
- (viii) *The bed made

So whereas ergative verbs admit of alternation of their THEME argument, non-ergative verbs don't, this being a result of their inherent lexical structure (see Levin 1993, Collins 2011).

10 Certain structurally founded relations of entailment are considered to be part and parcel of an internalist semantic inquiry. Some examples in the literature are relations between *chase* and *follow*, *persuade* and *intend* (Chomsky 2000), *kill* and *cause to die* (Pietroski 2003b).

11 Pietroski (2005, 2006) calls attention to 'negative facts' (e.g. non-ambiguity) about the interpretability of certain constructions that stand in need of explanation:

There are some classic examples that internalists use in support of their claim that semantics explanations are not answerable to the nature of external, mind-independent things. Chomsky, for instance, asks whether we must assume that there is a unique kind of object (or set of objects) in the world that the word *London* or *book* refers to in the following examples:

- (1) a. The book weighs five pounds
- b. He wrote a book
- c. He wrote a book and it weighs five pounds
- d. London is polluted
- e. London has a population of 8 million people
- f. London is polluted and it has a population of 8 million people

150

We refer to objects such as books from various perspectives: as concrete objects, from an abstract perspective, or from both perspectives simultaneously (cf. Chomsky 2000: 21). Similarly, London can be spoken of in different ways: as a given portion of the atmosphere, as a population, or as both. However, none of this warrants any ontological commitment to the existence of a particular object, corresponding to the name *London* that possesses all these properties at once.

Collins (*forthcoming*) calls attention to some cases of inter-sentential co-reference, which he also considers problematic for semantic externalists.

- (2) a. [Barack Obama]_i has been damaged by the health care issue, but he_i remains likely to achieve a second term.
- b. [The average American]_i is optimistic no matter the setbacks he_i faces.

As Collins explains, the coherence of intra-sentential co-reference in the examples of (2) remains invariant even though the way that *Barack Obama* denotes seems radically different from the way that *the average American* denotes.

Another kind of cases that can't be successfully explained within a standard externalist framework concerns the interpretation of generics. Consider the following sentences:

-
- (ix) The millionaire called the senator from Texas
 - (x) The millionaire called the senator, and the senator is from Texas
 - (xi) The millionaire called the senator, and the call was from Texas
 - (xii) #The millionaire called the senator, and the millionaire is from Texas
- Clearly (ix) is ambiguous and can be interpreted either as (x) or (xi) but not as (xii).

- (3) a. Beavers are mammals
- b. Beavers build dams

As Pietroski (2006) notes, whereas (3a) requires that *all* beavers are mammals (3b) requires that *only typical* beavers build dams. Externalist semantics that associates a standard semantic value with a lexical item *beaver* is unable to explain this contrast.

Lastly, we might add to this list the cases of logical metonymy. Consider (4):

- (4) Bill enjoyed the book

We typically interpret (4) as meaning that Bill enjoyed some *event* that involves the book (some claim that this, by default, is the event of reading the book). So, when combined with the verb *enjoy*, the noun *book* doesn't have its typical denotation (an individual) but rather it denotes an event, or, more precisely, it has an 'eventish' construal. All these different examples are aimed at showing that subtle semantic differences that affect interpretation are not properly captured by a referentialist theory of meaning, which makes semantic explanations reliant on the nature of external objects and their ontological status.

151

Those who defend methodological internalism about natural language semantics are usually also committed to methodological naturalism and methodological individualism. This basically means that scientifically tractable semantic features are considered to be part and parcel of individual minds. Knowledge of language is individualistic and internal to the human mind/brain, and this 'I-language' is treated as a proper subject for a scientific study of natural languages. As Chomsky argues, it is naturalistic inquiry of the human mind in particular that imposes internalist, individualist limits: "if we are interested in accounting for what people do, and why, insofar as that is possible through naturalistic inquiry, the argument for keeping to these limits seems persuasive" (Chomsky 2000: 32). On the first blush, this particular aspect of MI is in a strong disagreement with the spirit of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Still, although Wittgenstein is deeply skeptical of the science of meaning, Chomsky, in fact, shares his skepticism. In other words, Wittgenstein and Chomsky have a common enemy: the referentialist theory of meaning. The latter represents an attempt to systematically explain meaning by means of the objects referred to, and to reduce semantic explanation to the procedure of assigning standard semantic values to linguistic expressions.

4. Wittgenstein's anti-referentialism and the use-conception of meaning

It is notable that Chomsky explicitly mentions Wittgenstein and Turing as key forerunners to anti-externalism (cf. Chomsky 2000: 44-45). In his opinion, Wittgenstein (like Turing) “does not adopt the standard externalist account”, and indeed, an “internalist perspective... seems suitable to [his] intuitions” (*ibid.*). What brings Chomsky to view the later Wittgenstein as a latent internalist?

152

In *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein appears highly critical of attempts to conceive of a word's meaning in terms of objects, properties, relations, or processes referred to via uses of that word. The opening discussion in *Philosophical Investigations* is set against “a particular picture of the essence of human language” according to which a word's meaning is the object for which the word stands (Wittgenstein 1953: §1). On this picture of linguistic meaning, *naming* worldly objects, activities, processes, etc. is “the foundation, the be all and end all of language” (Wittgenstein 1974: 56). One reason the semanticists, Wittgenstein maintains, think of words as labels for ‘things’ is that they are inclined to take common nouns and proper names as paradigmatic examples of linguistic items: one is “thinking primarily of nouns like “table”, “chair”, “bread”, and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself” (*ibid.*).

The referentialist picture of meaning, Wittgenstein argues, oversimplifies the ways we use language, and can lead to serious distortions of our ordinary notion of names and their meaning. The paramount example of how adherence to referentialism can create such distortions comes from Russell's theory of logically proper names, where a set of putatively legitimate requirements stemming from the referentialist framework led to the view that only demonstratives qualify as ‘real’ names. Wittgenstein rejects this conclusion, arguing that it should lead us to question referentialist assumptions and seek alternatives to the view that the meaning of a name is its bearer (cf. Wittgenstein 1953: §40). To facilitate this, his later work illustrates how our understanding of the meanings of words is at least partially revealed in our ability to put those words to different uses on different occasions – a thought summarised in the slogan ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’ (Wittgenstein 1953: §43).

Wittgenstein's *use-based* conception of meaning emerged in the early 1930s in the context of discussions concerning the foundations of mathematics. Wittgenstein disagreed with the formalists that mathematics is merely about signs, but he also disagrees with Frege who thinks that there must be something corresponding with the mere signs which gives them meaning:

Frege was right in objecting to the conception that the numbers of arithmetic are signs. The sign '0', after all, does not have the property of yielding the sign '1' when it is added to the sign '1'. Frege was right in this criticism. Only he did not see the other, justified side of formalism, that the symbols of mathematics, although they are not signs, lack a meaning. For Frege the alternative was this: either we deal with strokes of ink on paper or these strokes of ink are signs of something and their meaning is what they go proxy for. The game of chess itself shows that these alternatives are wrongly conceived—although it is not the wooden chessmen we are dealing with, these figures do not go proxy for anything, they have no meaning in Frege's sense. There is still a third possibility, the signs can be used the way they are in the game. (Wittgenstein 1979: 105)

153

The central idea in this early version of the theory is that *rules* regulating the employment of expressions in sentential and extra-sentential contexts determine their meaning. As we saw earlier, according to the autonomy thesis, these rules are not answerable to the nature of things. *Pace* Frege there need be nothing to which expressions correspond that gives them meaning, if they have a use. If we compare language and its use to a game like chess it is clear that the rules that govern the possible moves of particular pieces constitute their role, and not some object they go proxy for. The actual playing of a game on a particular occasion (namely, an act of communication by means of language) represents an implementation of what is set forth in the rules for that game. Nothing external to a sign is responsible for its having a particular meaning.

In *Philosophical Investigations* a more mature version of the use conception of meaning is demonstrated in a number of examples, the key point being that our language is analogous to a toolbox with different types of tools that serve different functions and have different possibilities of use. "The functions of words", Wittgenstein stresses, "are as diverse as the functions of [tools]" (Wittgenstein 1953: §11). Words fall into different classes or parts of speech in accordance with the kind of function they serve; there are number-words that generally serve (are used for) for counting and calculating, colour-words that serve for distinguishing objects based on their colour, common nouns that serve

for distinguishing and grouping objects based on their generic type, and so on.

To sum up then, on adopting a use-based conception of meaning, we come to the view that to understand the meaning of an expression is just to understand how that expression might be employed in sentential and extra-sentential contexts. This marks a significant departure from the view that the meaning of an expression is some extra-linguistic (mental or physical) entity that somehow corresponds to that expression.¹² Both Wittgenstein and MI are in favour of characterising the semantics of expressions in terms of their employment (broadly construed) and they are equally opposed to views that characterise meaning in terms of reference. But is this enough to establish the connection between these two positions? Doesn't Wittgenstein have qualms regarding the mentalist construal of meaning? And doesn't he think that meaning is conventional and arbitrary? In the next two sections I turn to these concerns.

154

5. Reinforcing the connection: arbitrariness, conventionality and human nature

I have argued that there seems to be an interesting connection between Wittgenstein's argument for the autonomy of grammar – in particular, its critical part – and several arguments for the independence of semantics from ontology recently put forward by semantic internalists. But we have also seen that, for semantic internalists, all semantic facts, although not derivable from, or answerable to, the external world, are still a product of the human mind, and are, to that extent, certainly *not* arbitrary. So, there seems to be an unquestionable conflict between Wittgenstein's and the internalist's response to the autonomy argument. I am ready to concede that a gap between these two positions cannot ever be fully closed; however, I want to give a few reasons in favour of reducing the gap. In this section I examine a few potential problems that are directly related to the autonomy thesis and in the next section two more general problems are considered.

12 It is crucial that the methodological internalist doesn't subscribe to a mentalist variant of referentialism, which is what distinguishes this view from that of Katz and Fodor's (1963), Lakoff's (1970, 1987), or Jackendoff's (1997, 2002). As Pietroski stresses, the MI proposal is not that "linguistic expressions have *Bedeutungen* that are mental as opposed to environmental" (Pietroski 2005: 270). A similar point is argued for in McGilvray (1999: 164ff.). I shall discuss this objection to MI in more detail below.

(i) Wittgenstein's idea of arbitrariness of grammar as merely negative

Wittgenstein calls grammatical rules arbitrary and this qualification seems to imply that they are dispensable, alterable, or a matter of choice or decision. However, Wittgenstein's notion of arbitrariness is purely negative and, therefore, *very thin*. So, to say that a rule of grammar is arbitrary is merely to say that it cannot be justified by reference to the nature of external objects: "the saying that the rules of grammar are arbitrary is directed against the possibility of this justification, which is constructed on the model of justifying a sentence by pointing to what verifies it" (Wittgenstein 1967: 331). With such a thin notion of arbitrariness Wittgenstein's conception of grammar is definitely not up against the idea that the meaning and use of words is constrained in a way that is not easily alterable by an individual or social decision, and, to that extent, he is on the side of semantic internalists. Furthermore, in his mature work (*Zettel, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*) he holds that grammar is equally akin to what is arbitrary and what is non-arbitrary (Wittgenstein 1967: 358), and that grammatical systems, such as the semantics of colours or numbers, "may 'reside in our nature' but certainly not in the nature of things (Wittgenstein 1967: 357)".

(ii) Conventionality, choice and human nature

I finished off section 3 by asking the question: does Wittgenstein's notion of conventionality exclude the determination of meaning by human nature, or the nature of human mind? Insofar as conventionality may imply some degree of choice then the answer should be affirmative since the facts of nature cannot be easily tampered with. Certainly, Wittgenstein sometimes compares the arbitrariness of grammatical rules to the arbitrariness of the choice of the unit of measurement.¹³ I can choose to measure the length of a table in centimetres or in inches.¹⁴ But who chooses grammatical rules? And how? Can they be changed? Are there some constraints on which grammatical rules we could choose to follow?

I noted earlier that Wittgenstein maintains that the rules cannot simply be altered or substituted. To be sure, one could attempt to change

13 He writes, "the rules of grammar are arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement" (Wittgenstein 1974: 184).

14 We should bear in mind that the choice of measurement is constrained by various practical considerations. It wouldn't be at all practical to measure the length of a shelf in light-years, for instance.

a convention but this, Wittgenstein argues, would not be sufficient for changing the use of a word, hence, also its meaning:

[...] If what gives a proposition sense is its agreement with grammatical rules then let's make just this rule, to permit the sentence "red and green are both at this point at the same time". Very well; but that doesn't fix the grammar of the expression. Further stipulations have yet to be made about how such a sentence is to be used; e.g. how it is to be verified (Wittgenstein 1974: 127).

156

So, even though grammatical rules *qua* conventions are said to determine use, any modification of grammatical rules seems to be importantly constrained by the history of current use. But is this particular history of use just a matter of our *habituation*? Wittgenstein's answer here is 'no'. In fact, in his more mature work Wittgenstein's commitment to the idea of arbitrariness of grammar is even more diluted. Now he is prepared to admit the possibility that our colour grammar, for instance, *could* even have a physical substrate, and, furthermore, the way we use colour words or number words is not merely a matter of our habituation to the current colour or number concepts:

But doesn't anything physical correspond to [the gap between red and green]? I do not deny that. (And suppose it were merely our habituation to *these* concepts, to these language-games? But I am not saying that it is so.) (Wittgenstein 1980: 424.) [Wittgenstein 1967: 355.]

It bears emphasis that, in his mature works, Wittgenstein's view *vis-à-vis* grammar does not relapse into referentialism: not for a moment would he accept the view that grammar is after all answerable to the nature of the objects referred to by words. As he stresses, "[we] have a colour system as we have a number system. Do the systems reside in *our* nature or in the nature of things? [...] *Not* in the nature of numbers or colours" (Wittgenstein 1967: 357). So semantic externalism is definitely ruled out. But what we witness now is a reluctance to call grammar arbitrary: insofar as grammar may 'reside in *our* nature', it is akin both to what is arbitrary and to what is not arbitrary (Wittgenstein 1967: 358). That is, the grammar of some concepts (colours, numbers) seems to be more hard-wired and thus more resistant to a change by stipulation, whilst the grammar of other concepts (e.g. technical terms) seems to be more arbitrary, flexible and open to modification. Or, more precisely, some *aspects* of meaning are arbitrary and open to fluctuation whilst some are fixed and constant.

The reference to '*our* nature' as opposed to the nature of external objects, and the radical dilution of the arbitrariness thesis, brings the

mature Wittgenstein's views on grammar even closer to contemporary semantic internalists. However, an important caveat is in order: although both positions are in some sense *naturalist*, for Wittgenstein, *human nature*, which gives rise to the systematicity that characterises language use, is to a critical degree *nurtured*; in other words, it represents a result of training and experience:

If we teach a human being such-and-such a technique by means of examples,—that he then proceeds like *this* and not like *that* in a particular new case, or that in this case he gets stuck, and thus that this and not that is the 'natural' continuation for him: this of itself is an extremely important fact of nature. (Wittgenstein 1980: 424)

Semantic internalists are devoted rationalists, and when they say that semantics is answerable to human nature and to facts that are internal to the human mind, this certainly doesn't mean that they originate in learning and experience, but are part and parcel of an innate biological endowment of human beings. So where Wittgenstein would focus on learning and training as a source of natural tendencies of human beings, that is, those that are manifested in language use, an internalist would tend to emphasise human innate capacities.¹⁵

157

6. Are Wittgenstein's contextualism and anti-mentalism fatal for establishing the connection with internalism?

The final two points I want to make concern two additional worries that arise in connection with an attempt to associate the later Wittgenstein with semantic internalism. The first obvious problem is Wittgenstein's widespread anti-mentalism, and the second is the special significance for interpretation he assigns to contexts of use. I take these points in turn.

In *The Blue and Brown Books*, *Philosophical Investigations*, and other later writings Wittgenstein argues against postulating hidden psychological mechanisms and processes as a method of explaining what we mean by the words we use. The picture Wittgenstein tries to eschew is one in which the act of using expressions must be accompanied by hidden mental processes or images that give those expressions the meanings they have. Wittgenstein argues that use itself should be enough to explain their meaning or significance. As he notes:

¹⁵ However, Wittgenstein's scepticism about learning language (in particular, what individual words mean) by ostensive methods (PI 28-31) could be construed as some sort of the poverty of stimulus argument, which would then lend support to the innateness thesis, but this possibility can't be explored here.

The mistake we are liable to make could be expressed thus: We are looking for the use of a sign, but we look for it as though it were an object *co-existing* with the sign... [One] is tempted to imagine that which gives the sentence life as something in an occult sphere, accompanying the sentence. (Wittgenstein 1958: 5)

158

One might rightly see a semantic internalist as succumbing to exactly this temptation. However, it should be clear by now that the matter is not all that simple. Wittgenstein's target here seems to be a particular version of the psychological conception of meaning where words go proxy for internal, mental *referents* ('the objects co-existing with the sign') that are their meanings. However, we have seen earlier that, in contrast to *metaphysical* internalists, *methodological* internalists, to whose views Wittgenstein's autonomy thesis was compared in this essay, do not defend this sort of naïve, mentalist referentialism where the only significant difference with the standard, externalist referentialism is replacing environmental *Bedeutungen* with their supposed mental counterparts (see Pietroski 2005: 270). Methodological internalists, like Wittgenstein, understand linguistic meaning as the potential to use an expression in a certain (linguistic) context (i.e. its syntactic employment) rather than something that corresponds to the expression. So, Wittgenstein's opposition to internalism is restricted to a particular kind of mentalist or internalist referentialism, which inherits the similar difficulties as the externalist referentialism. Furthermore, as emphasised in the *Blue Book*, Wittgenstein has nothing against the attempts to scientifically explain certain aspects of language, and, moreover, nothing against a *psychological* explanation of certain aspects of the mind, where the internal basis for language use might be located. But, as he clearly states, "this aspect of the mind does not interest us. The problems which it may set are psychological problems, and the method of their solution is that of natural science" (Wittgenstein 1958: 6).

The second worry stems from Wittgenstein's endorsement of radical contextualism. Wittgenstein maintains that "[one knows] what a word means *in certain contexts*" (Wittgenstein 1958: 9). Some authors, however, take for granted that contextualism inevitably supports semantic externalism. Namely, they assume that insofar as the facts about particular contexts of language use play a role in the determination of meaning, meaning is therefore determined by the facts that are external to an individual mind/brain.¹⁶ There are three possible responses to this objection.

16 Child (2010) defends this view.

First, there is a widespread confusion about what 'internalism' means. So it is common to run internalism about the linguistic meaning and internalism about mental content together. However, these two positions are importantly different in that former is restricted to the language faculty whilst the latter concerns the whole of mental operations. Thus, it is possible to be an internalist about linguistic meaning (LMI) and an externalist about mental content (MCE) (see Pietroski 2006), or both an LMI and a mental content internalist (MCI). One could therefore argue that Wittgenstein's contextualism is compatible with LMI even though he is an externalist about the mental content.

Second, an internalist (MCI) might argue that there is an important difference between a *constitutive* and *epistemic* (diagnostic) role of context; on this view, context plays an important epistemic role for an interpreter who needs to identify the thought expressed by an utterance; context, however, has *no constitutive* role in determining the semantics of the speaker's utterance, which is achieved completely internally. So, when Wittgenstein speaks about knowing what a word means in a certain context (as per the above quotation) what he has in mind is the interpreter's perspective and the epistemological role of context.

Third, an internalist (MCI) might argue that insofar as the knowledge and beliefs about context are formally represented in the mind, they are also internally individuated. These formal internal mental/computational structures will not strictly 'mean' anything external like 'shared social practices' (except by stipulation or for explanatory purposes) for the reasons inherent in the MC internalism – these (and all mental states) are not individuated in relation to the world in virtue of being, by hypothesis, computations. An internalist can tell a causal story up to a point as to how the particular formal states in the mind were formed, but she can't claim any external content for such states. Wittgenstein's contextualism, on this account, would be strictly speaking orthogonal to the issues concerning the individuation of mental states.

7. Conclusion

In this paper I argued for a particular connection between Wittgenstein's views regarding the autonomy of grammar and some more contemporary attempts to distinguish the study of meaning from considerations concerning the ontological status of external objects. It should be emphasised, however, that I do *not* intend to claim that this itself is

sufficient to prove that Wittgenstein is an internalist. My argument certainly does not rule out other possible areas of disagreement and here I want to briefly mention what I think these are.

160 First, the most prominent point of contrast between Wittgenstein and semantic internalist lies in their radically different conceptions of *language*. An essential mark of Chomsky's 'cognitive turn' in linguistics is his novel conception of language as an internal, psychological state of an individual human organism. Language, in other words, is a psychological (biological) phenomenon, which we can put to use in various activities: "a mental reality underlying actual behaviour" (Chomsky 1965: 3). What we learn by observing the use of language in the context of activities represents a source of evidence for what makes such use possible (i.e. grammatical competence). For Wittgenstein, by contrast, an essential thing about language is precisely that it is woven with activities and practices, and its communal, practical nature, the fact that it is usable and used. There is, moreover, nothing further that matters about language apart from what one might observe by studying different social practices and adopted techniques (i.e. language use). From that point of view, the theorist's appeals to individual psychologies as a way to explain meaning is seen as a kind of explanation that is *not* strictly speaking linguistic, since it appeals to entities and processes that are outside the domain of language. For Chomsky, however, individual mental states are exactly what counts as the proper domain of linguistics.

Another area of disagreement worth highlighting concerns language acquisition. As noted above, Chomsky's generative linguistics is a species of the rationalist theory of knowledge whereby vital linguistic structures are considered innate. The role of experience is to *stimulate* the acquisition of linguistic knowledge, rather than representing the main source or origin of linguistic knowledge. The main motivation for the nativist view comes from 'the poverty of stimulus argument', which trades on the fact that a child typically acquires language in certain minimal environmental conditions, whereas a non-human animal doesn't. On this view, the difference between us and other animals is due to the fact that the child possesses a certain biological property that the animal lacks. Given that they focus on a radically different conception of language, Wittgenstein's views often seem to be geared towards some form of empiricism rather than rationalism.¹⁷ Hence, not infrequent-

17 See Chomsky (1969) for a critique of Wittgenstein's empiricist leanings in the discussion of language learning.

ly, he talks about language learning in terms of training or drilling, as one trains an animal to react to certain stimuli. On Wittgenstein's view, a child acquires a language in the context of getting initiated into everyday practices (language games), and in the course of mastering techniques of using signs within those practices. This process is essentially normative in that there are correct and incorrect reactions to certain prompts in teaching; a child normally learns to do things by using language 'as we do' and it 'comes naturally' to the child to react to certain tasks as the rest of us do. Although Wittgenstein undoubtedly takes teaching and initiation into practices to be the key aspect of a child's acquiring a language, he also seems to be aware that there is perhaps more to this process than what the child may receive in the form of instructions by adults. This additional component he calls 'the (very general) facts of nature'¹⁸, however, the strictly conceptual character of his philosophical project simply rules out any further interest in such facts.

161

This is not meant to be an exhaustive account of the potential contrasts between the two positions but merely an illustration of the most obvious differences that might give us a good reason to pause before we decide that Wittgenstein could be a semantic internalist. However, I hope to have shown that in spite of such contrasts, there is a great deal that unites these positions. In particular, both reject the prevailing externalist view that to investigate a language is just to investigate those relations that supposedly hold between linguistic expressions and the extra-linguistic world. Accordingly, there is no need to look to such relations as constitutive of our notions of grammar and linguistic meaning.¹⁹

Primljeno: 15. januar 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 10. mart 2014.

Bibliography

- Child, William (2010). "Wittgenstein's externalism". In Whiting, Daniel (ed.) *The Later Wittgenstein on Language*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan
- Putnam, Hilary (*forthcoming*) "On Content and Context: Context-Sensitivity and Some of its Critics". In Collins, J., Davies, A. and Dobler, T. (eds.) *Themes from Charles Travis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

18 "If we teach a human being such-and-such a technique by means of examples, -that he then proceeds like *this* and not like *that* in a particular new case, or that in this case he gets stuck, and thus that this and not that is the 'natural' continuation for him: this of itself is an extremely important fact of nature" (Wittgenstein 1967: §355).

19 A version of this paper was presented at the conference "The contemporary significance of Wittgenstein's later philosophy" at University of East Anglia in November 2013. I want to thank the audience for useful feedback.

- Hacker, Peter (2000). *Wittgenstein: Mind and Will, Volume 4 of an Analytical Commentary of the Philosophical Investigations, Part 1 Essays*. Oxford: Backwell
- Chomsky, Noam (1965). *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- _____. (1969). "Some Empirical Assumptions in Modern Philosophy of Language". (ed.) S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes & M. White. *Philosophy, Science and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel*. US: St. Martin's Press. pp. 260-286
- _____. (2000). *New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Collins, John. (2009) "Methodology not Metaphysics. Against Semantic Externalism" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume lxxxiii*: 53-69
- _____. (2011a). "Impossible Words Again: Or Why Beds Break But Not Make". *Mind and Language* 26: 2. 234-260
- _____. (2011b). *The Unity of Linguistic Meaning*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- 162 _____ (forthcoming) "Semantics and Sensible Ontology". Available at https://www.academia.edu/714521/Semantics_and_Sensible_Ontology (viewed 5/11/2013)
- Jackendoff, Ray (1983). *Semantics and Cognition*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press
- _____. (2002). *Foundations of Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Katz, Jerrold, and Fodor, Jerry. (1963). 'The Structure of a Semantic Theory'. *Language* 39: 170-210.
- Lakoff, George. (1970). *Irregularity in Syntax*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston
- _____. (1987). *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Levin, Beth. (1993). *English Verb Classes and Alternations: A Preliminary Investigation*, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press,.
- Pietroski, Paul (2003a). 'The Character of Natural Language Semantics', in Barber, A (ed.) *Epistemology of Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp: 217-257
- _____. (2003b). 'Small Verbs, Complex Events: Analyticity without Synonymy'. in L. Antony and N. Hornstein (eds.), *Chomsky and his Critics*. Cambridge: Blackwell. Pp: 179: 214
- _____. (2005). "Meaning Before Truth". In Preyer, G. & Peter, G. (eds.), *Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 255-303
- _____. (2006). "Character Before Content" In Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.), *Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker*. Oxford: Clarendon Press (2006). pp. 34-61
- McGilvray, James (1998). Meaning are Syntactically Individuated and Found in the Head. *Mind and Language* 13:2. 225-280
- _____. (1999). *Chomsky*. Cambridge: Polity
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1953). *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- _____. (1958). *The Blue and Brown Books*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- _____. (1967). *Zettel*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- _____. (1974). *Philosophical Grammar*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- _____. (1979b). *Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- _____. (1980). *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, vol. II. Oxford: Blackwell.
- _____. (2005). *The Big Typescript: TS 213*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Tamara Dobler

Autonomija gramatike i semantički internalizam

Apstrakt

U svojim radovima o prirodnoj upotrebi jezika nakon *Tractatusa* Vitgenštajn je branio pojam autonomije gramatike, kako ga je nazivao. Prema ovom mišljenju, gramatika – ili semantika, prema recentnijem idiomu – suštinski je autonomna u odnosu na metafizička razmatranja i nije saobrazna prirodi stvari. Ovaj argument je imao nekoliko srodnih otelovljenja u Vitgenštajnovim radovima nakon *Tractatusa* i doveo je do pojave brojnih važnih uvida, kako kritičkih, tako i konstruktivnih. U ovom radu zastupaću stav o potencijalnoj vezi između Vitgenštajnovog argumenta autonomije i nešto recentnijih internalističkih argumenata za autonomiju semantike. Moj glavni podstrek za uspostavljanje ove veze potiče iz činjenice da su komentari kasnijeg Vitgeštajna o gramatici i značenju protivstavljeni određenim središnjim postavkama semantičkog eksternalizma.

Cljučne reči: Vitgenštajn, gramatika, autonomija, arbitrarnost, značenje kao upotreba, semantički internalizam i eksternalizam, referencija, mentalizam.

Michael O'Sullivan
Department of Philosophy
King's College London

The Poverty of the Stimulus: Quine and Wittgenstein

Abstract *Quine and Wittgenstein were dominant figures in philosophy in the middle of the twentieth century. Many readers, like Quine himself, have felt that there are deep similarities between the two thinkers, though those similarities are difficult to articulate. I argue that they share the project of understanding the meaning of utterances by reference to the environment of the speaker, though they understand that environment in radically different ways. In particular, Quine has a much thinner conception of the environment than does Wittgenstein. For Quine, the stimulus is impoverished in a way that it is not for Wittgenstein. I also argue that they share a certain deflationary approach to ontology.*

Keywords: *Quine, Wittgenstein, meaning, empiricism, language games, ontology*

164

Introduction

W.V. Quine and Ludwig Wittgenstein have enjoyed and suffered similar fates. Their voices were dominant in philosophy in the middle of the twentieth century and for some time afterwards. Since then, their influence has dwindled. The dwindlings have differed in nature. Wittgenstein has a dedicated group of followers who labour both to interpret his work and to apply his ideas, but these labours are often ignored by philosophers outside the group. Quine has suffered an even crueller fate: he has become an inspiration. He is routinely credited as a pioneer of philosophy's naturalistic turn, but it is becoming rare to find philosophers engaging with the detail of his arguments.

Perhaps this is just and right; perhaps their reputations were inflated, and philosophy was right to move out of their shadows. But it is also possible that a reassessment is due. One way to reassess both thinkers is to make them communicate with each other. This paper is meant as a small contribution to that project.

There are obvious and massive differences between these two thinkers.¹ Perhaps most obviously, Quine believed in integrating philosophy and

1 For scepticism about the possibility of a comparison such as I draw in this paper, see Kripke (1982: 5-7) and Hintikka (1990: 167-9).

science, whereas Wittgenstein's tendency was to separate them almost entirely. Nevertheless one has a vague feeling, in reading both authors, that their thought is similar in ways that are difficult to capture. Quine himself felt this similarity, and said so, but he never expanded on the point.²

In section one I define a project in which, I claim, Quine and the later Wittgenstein³ were both engaged. In section two I discuss Quine's approach to the project; in section three I turn to Wittgenstein. These sections together display the differences between these philosophers. In section four I defend my view that beneath these important divergences lies a deeper convergence.

In brief, the crucial difference lies in their conception of the environment which humans confront. For both, reference to this environment explains the content of our thought and talk. But Wittgenstein's conception of the environment is much richer than Quine's. As a slogan, I will say that for Quine the stimulus is impoverished, while for Wittgenstein it is not.

165

The convergence lies in a certain deflatory attitude to questions of ontology. But Wittgenstein carries out this project more thoroughly. I shall argue that it is precisely the poverty of the Quinean stimulus that prevents Quine from going as far as Wittgenstein does in the deflation of ontological questions.

§ 1. The project

Quine and Wittgenstein have an enemy in common. As Wittgenstein puts it in the Blue Book, this enemy is the illusion of explanation that arises when one attributes the meaningfulness of discourse to "something in the occult sphere" (1958: 5). What is the occult sphere, and how does this illusion of explanation arise?

2 Quine remarks (1960: 76-7) on the connection between Wittgenstein's dictum that "understanding a sentence means understanding a language" and his own theory of the indeterminacy of translation, making the intriguing but unspecified suggestion that the latter "will have little air of paradox" for those familiar with Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language. He also connects (p. 260) his own and Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical views. Wittgenstein never mentions Quine in print; neither, so far as I have been able to discover from published sources, did he ever mention him in conversation. For comparisons of the two thinkers from a largely Wittgensteinian perspective see the papers in Arrington and Glock 1996. The feeling alluded to in the text is well captured by the title of Peter Hacker's contribution to the volume: "Proximity at great distance". See also Heal 1989.

3 Our focus here will be on the Wittgenstein of the Blue Book, composed in 1933-4 and part one of the *Philosophical Investigations*, complete by 1945.

Suppose that we are interested in understanding the meaningfulness of some utterance, say the command "Shut the door!" How did this utterance come to mean what it does? We notice that the command expresses someone's wish that the door be shut. Having noticed this, it is tempting to suppose that the content of the utterance is explained by the content of the wish that it expresses. On this view, what explains the fact that "shut the door!" means what it does is the prior fact that the speaker wishes *that the door be shut*.

This fact about the psychology of the speaker alone cannot do the explanatory work, since the speaker could have that wish without having even the means to express the wish in that work – the speaker might not speak English, for example. So we have to postulate a further fact about the speaker's psychology: that something about that psychology maps the content of the wish onto the words uttered.

166

This is the move to which Wittgenstein objects. His objection is not to the appeal to psychology as such. Nothing in this passage suggests that there is anything illegitimate about positing facts about psychology or about the speaker's mental life. He objects, rather, to the idea that mere appeal to psychology helps in the particular task of explanation at hand.

The account supposes that an explanatorily relevant mapping between content and words takes place in the speaker's psychology. It assumes that merely attributing the mapping to the psychological domain will provide an explanation where one was lacking before. The mapping between content and words was what was to be explained in the first place. We have attempted to do our explanatory work simply by moving the mapping into the psychological sphere, without showing why a mapping in that sphere should be any less problematic than the mapping with which we started. The explanation is illusory.

The illusion consists in supposing that mental states are, like sentences, bearers of meaning, but unlike sentences are self-interpreting. Thus it is supposed that thoughts, intentions and mental images are like self-interpreting signs. It is this idea that strikes Wittgenstein as "occult".

Quine, too, frequently complains of uncritical appeals to a mentalistic domain of meanings, made when we think about language.⁴ His project

4 The criticism of such appeals is a theme of Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". But the felt need to carry on both philosophy and linguistics without unexplained appeal to meanings motivates much of Quine's work: see for example Quine

can be understood as an attempt to construct an understanding of language without reference to such a domain.

The project is a difficult one because of the many ways in which the notion of meaning is presupposed in our ordinary thought and talk about language. Let us take, as an example, the notion of synonymy. (This notion is of crucial importance to Quine). Take two synonymous sentences: the French sentence “mes pantalons sont vertes” and the English sentence “my trousers are green”. What does this relation of synonymy consist in?

Clearly, we cannot explain the synonymy relation by appealing to the fact that the two sentences have the same meaning. For two sentences to be synonymous just is for them to be alike in meaning. Thus their having a meaning is not explanatorily prior to their being synonymous.

Here a temptation similar to that with which Wittgenstein was concerned arises. Given that the two sentences are synonymous, we may infer that they both express the same thought: that *my trousers are green*. So we may suppose that by referring to this thought, we can provide an explanation of the meaning of each sentence, and thus of their synonymy.

167

But, once again, this line of thought can provide only an illusion of explanation. In order for reference to thoughts to be explanatory we have again to postulate mappings, on the part of speakers of both the French and the English sentence, of content onto sentence. But, again, how one content is mapped on to another was what was to be explained. If we are dissatisfied with appealing to a mapping of sentence on to sentence directly, it has not been made clear why we should be any more satisfied with a mapping of the same thought on to each sentence individually.

Both philosophers, then, oppose a style of explanation which, by looking inward to a psychological domain of meaning and thought, yields a mere illusion of the understanding of language. They both demand something better. The direction in which they look for an alternative is also similar. Both look in the direction of what might vaguely be called external, public points of reference and modes of response: things with which the discursive subject interacts. Just what this means will turn out to be a very delicate matter – indeed, the crucial factor separating these philosophers – but in both cases the drive is towards the outer.

1953c: 48, where the danger of illusions of explanation is mentioned explicitly, and 1970: 1 and throughout.

§ 2. The drive to the outer: Quine

To understand Quine's drive to the outer, it helps to understand a similar drive on the part of the philosophical tradition which Quine both absorbed and criticised – that of radical empiricism. In particular, it is an empiricist account of the meanings of utterances in which we are interested.

A simplified version of the empiricist account might run as follows. The theorist takes certain utterances to be appropriate responses to certain environmental conditions.⁵ The empiricist move is to identify the meaning of the utterance outright with the environmental condition to which it is an appropriate response.

168

Any empiricist approach of language must proceed on the basis of the empirical evidence available to the linguist: the sounds made by speakers and the environmental conditions under which those sounds are made. The simple empiricist account just mentioned has the advantage of making the job of empiricist linguistics – matching utterance to environmental condition – identical with the job of giving a theory of meaning for the language.

If we assume that our theory of meaning must preserve what we take pre-theoretically to be the meanings of our utterances, then the simple empirical approach will fail. Many utterances – for example, truisms – are appropriate under any empirical conditions, but they do not all mean the same thing. Thus the environment underdetermines their meaning.

It is, further, very plausible that the environment can overdetermine the meanings of utterances. Some utterances depend for their appropriateness on more than the environment: they depend, for example, on the values of the speaker. Thus, plausibly, whether my utterance to the effect that the result of the horse race was a good one depends not only on which horse won but also on which horse I wanted to win (perhaps, which horse I had betted on).

One possible response is to attempt to develop empiricism such that it provides an account of our pre-theoretical conception of meaning. The logical positivists attempted to do so by providing independent

⁵ Carnap, Quine's major influence in the empiricist tradition, took appropriateness to consist in truth. But in putting things in this general way, I abstract from different possible ways of understanding appropriateness. It is the general point in which we are particularly interested.

accounts of truisms (in terms of logical truths) and value judgements (in terms of the expression of emotions).

Another possible response is to maintain the empiricist method as it is, and replace our pre-theoretical conception of meaning for another conception for which empiricism does provide a good theory. This is Quine's route.

It is often said that Quine rejects verificationist theories of meaning as the "second dogma" of empiricism. This is true, but easily misconstrued if one supposes that Quine replaces the verificationist theory of meaning with some other theory intended to carry out the same task. Instead of adopting some other theory meant to account for the pre-theoretical notion of meaning, Quine retains verificationism as the right methodology both for philosophy and for linguistics, and rejects the notion of meaning.

169

He adopts verificationism as a theory of another notion – stimulus meaning – which unlike our ordinary notion of meaning is, he considers, scientifically respectable, precisely because an empiricist theory of it is possible. Thus, the notion of stimulus meaning is not meant to approximate the ordinary notion of meaning. It only does so for a limited class of expressions (1960: 36-7). For many others, there is no approximation. Indeed, part of Quine's point is that the scientifically respectable notion of stimulus meaning falls well short of the pre-theoretical notion of meaning. The gap between the two notions is the measure of the poverty of the stimulus.

The stimulus meaning of an expression is a class of stimulations: the class consisting of those stimulations upon which assent to the expression would be elicited. In order to understand the notion of stimulus meaning there are thus two further Quinean notions to be understood: that of a stimulation and that of assent.

What, precisely, is a stimulation? Tentatively, Quine identifies it (in the visual case) with a "pattern of chromatic irradiation of the eye" (1960: 31). There are two features of Quine's choice which are of particular relevance to us. First, stimulations are to be described in physical terms. The notion of chromatic irradiation is drawn from physical theory. It is based on what we know about the physiology of vision and its physical basis. Second, the physically described features of the world chosen by Quine are located at the surface of the subject's body. They are proximal rather than distal.

Since they are to be described in physical terms, Quinean stimulations are not private mental entities. It can be ascertained by a third party just what stimulations a subject is undergoing. At least in principle, one could ascertain this by examining the retina.

More importantly, one can without expertise in physiology or the use of specialised technology empathise with the point of view of others by the use of what one might call the geometric imagination. The difference in retinal pattern from subject to subject is a matter of angle and distance from the objects of vision. Thus I can imagine how things look to you by allowing for your location and point of view.

170 We might identify Quinean stimuli with perspectives on the world, provided we remember that these perspectives are not mental entities. This is why Quinean stimuli are still external. In the relevant sense of "perspective" my perspective would be the same as yours if we were to stand in the same place.

The choice of proximal over distal stimulations is also crucial. Retinal patterns vary with the disposition of the subject as well as with the subject's physical environment. Because they are proximal, Quinean stimulations can vary independently of their distal cause. A physical object in the dark or at a distance creates a different retinal pattern from the same object in better visual conditions.

Further, distal objects can differ independently of stimulations. Different objects can create the same retinal pattern. This occurs whenever two different objects look alike from a given location under given conditions. These variations can, in principle, be predicted and taken account of by third parties.

Quine counts these features of retinal patterns as reasons for choosing them over physical objects as candidates for the role of stimulation (1960: 31). The reason is that a closer correlation can be made between utterances, on the one hand, and stimulations, on the other, if the stimulations in question are proximal. If I know not only what sort of physical environment a speaker inhabits, but also how that environment affects the speaker's sensory organs, I will be in a better position to predict the speaker's utterances.

What of the notion of assent? For Quine, empiricism demands that assent must be understood in purely behavioural terms, on a narrow conception of behaviour (1960: 57-8). Assent must consist in the making of

some sound, audibly distinguishable by a third party, or in some bodily movement.

This notion of assent is far removed from our ordinary notion. To assent to something is, roughly, to agree to it. Such agreement can be signalled by sound or gesture, but does not in general consist in either. Once again, this gap between the ordinary concept and the Quinean concept is deliberate. Quinean assent is the form of assent that can be appealed to in a theory of language, under empiricist principles.

To see why, suppose that we were to liberalise this conception of assent, and say that a subject assents to an utterance whenever he or she expresses agreement with it. This assent can then take the form of expressing what the utterance expresses. We are now appealing to our prior knowledge of the equivalence of the contents of utterances – that is, of their synonymy. But it is just this relation of synonymy which was to be explained.

171

Let us suppose, optimistically, that for a given speaker a good theory of stimulus meaning can be formulated. That is, we can predict with some accuracy what utterances a speaker will assent to given certain stimulations.

Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation is then as follows. Such speaker-relative theories of stimulus meaning will not be sufficient to determine a single scheme of translation between the utterances of different speakers. But the notion of stimulus meaning is that on which, on empiricist grounds, a theory of language must be based. Since the notion of stimulus meaning is not sufficient to distinguish between systematically different schemes of translation nothing empirical can distinguish between them. The famous thesis of the indeterminacy of translation is nothing more than empiricism plus a recognition of the poverty of the stimulus.

§ 3. The drive to the outer: Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein's drive to the outer is encapsulated, above all, in his notion of *use*. According to the Blue Book, the "life of a sign", what distinguishes a meaningful utterance from a mere sound, is best thought of as the use of a sign, and not as an occult accompaniment of it (1958: 4-5). The same idea is reflected in the slogan repeated throughout the *Philosophical Investigations*, to the effect that for many expressions and in

many contexts, the meaning of an expression can usefully be identified outright with its use.

But the notion of use is itself in need of clarification. This is so not so much because of any ambiguity in the word "use". Rather, it is because there are many ways to describe the use of a given expression. The content of the dictum that "meaning is use" will depend on what vocabulary is available to describe how an expression is used.

An economic analogy may clarify matters here. Suppose I claim that one five pound note, on the one hand, and five one pound coins, on the other, are of equivalent value. Wherein does this equivalence consist? It does not, of course, consist in the value of the materials out of which the note and coins have been made. We are within reach of a better explanation if we say that they are of equivalent value insofar as they can be used for the same purposes.

172

But this will only be true if we restrict the range of uses which count as relevant in this context. It is relevant to point out that they can be used in exchange for the same goods and services. But other facts about possible uses are not relevant. The note can be used as a bookmark, for example, whereas the coins cannot. Equally, the coins can be used to stop the needle of a record player from jumping, by being laid on top of it, whereas the note cannot. Such considerations should not lead us into supposing that the note and coins differ in value.

Analogously, suppose that we ask of two expressions whether they have the same meaning. Wittgenstein's slogan suggests a criterion for answering this question. The two expressions have the same meaning if and only if they have the same use. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, for example, Wittgenstein claims that the sentences "Bring me a slab" and its elliptical form "Slab!" have the same meaning because a builder can use either for the purposes of acquiring a slab from his assistant, and that the latter counts as elliptical merely in virtue of being shorter (1953: § 20).

But such a criterion will only give us a general theory of synonymy if we know, in general, what it is for two expression to have the same use. And there will be a clear answer to that question only if our notion of what counts as a use is narrow enough.⁶

6 On this point I am indebted to Goldfarb 1983.

We could, for example, define the use of an expression as follows. The use of an expression is to elicit a signal of assent – a sound or bodily gesture – under certain environmental conditions. So two expressions are equivalent in meaning if they elicit assent under the same conditions. On this highly specialised notion of “use”, Wittgenstein’s criterion would then simply reduce to Quine’s.

Though it is highly specialised, this is a perfectly legitimate notion of “use”. However, it is obviously not the only one that is explicable to expressions. Wittgenstein, indeed, places great emphasis on the enormous variety of uses to which expressions of a language can be put, and gives a long list of such possible uses in the *Philosophical Investigations* (1953: § 23). Some of the items on this list are:

- Giving orders, and obeying them.
- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements. ...
- Reporting an event.
- Speculating about an event. ...
- Guessing riddles.
- Making a joke; telling it. ...
- Translating from one language into another.
- Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.

173

Each of these activities, and many others, are called by Wittgenstein “language games”. It bears emphasising that these games are meant as the *explanans* and not as the *explanandum* of the meaningfulness of utterances. When we try to understand what it is for two expressions to be synonymous we appeal to their use, where to use an expression is to be involved in activities of the sort mentioned in the list.

It is clear that, if these activities are to be understood as types of language game, we must conceive of a language game as something more than a game the rules of which enjoin the production of sounds under defined environmental conditions, certainly if those conditions are understood in the narrowly visual way which Quine proposes.

The item which comes closest to the purely visual case is “describing the appearance of an object”. But even in this case, there is no indication that a description of the appearance of an object is to be construed as a response to a visual stimulus in Quine’s sense. To describe an appearance can be to respond to an object – a three-dimensional material thing – and not to respond to a chromatic irradiation, or any other sort

of physiological or mental event in the perceiving subject. That Wittgenstein immediately afterwards mentions the giving of measurements suggests that what he has in mind is indeed a response to an object and not to anything like a sensory stimulation. Even in this case, then, the Wittgensteinian stimulus is more enriched than the Quinean.

The other examples show an even richer conception of the environment in terms of which utterances are to be understood. To understand an utterance as an instance of *thanking*, for example, one must already understand the speaker's environment as one in which there are other agents who are candidates for gratitude.

Again, if praying is a type of language game, then to know what someone is doing when they utter words one must, sometimes, know what it is to pray, and in order to know what it is to pray one must know what God is.

174

The point is one which operates in two distinct directions. Wittgenstein's conception of the speaker's environment is richer than Quine's. And so is his conception of what speakers are doing when they use expressions. Thus both Wittgensteinian stimuli and Wittgensteinian behaviour are richer – require greater resources to describe – than their Quinean counterparts.

It is unexceptionable to call greeting, cursing, praying and so on forms of behaviour. But if we include these forms of behaviour in our descriptions of the uses to which speakers put expressions, we have flouted the empiricist restrictions observed by Quine. Wittgenstein differs from Quine, then, in the much richer conception of behaviour which he appeals to in the evaluation of the meanings of expressions.

Similar remarks apply to the description of the environmental conditions of utterances. For Wittgenstein, no restriction is placed on the way in which the environment is to be described. In particular, there is no attempt to describe the environment in exclusively visual terms, let alone in the rigorously perspectival terms of Quinean retinal patterns.

§ 4. Convergence

The discussion so far has emphasised a sharp divergence between Quine and Wittgenstein in their approaches to their common problem. They both advocate a drive to the outer in order to answer questions about meaning. But they have contrasting conceptions of what the outer consists in.

Despite this contrast, there is I believe a deeper convergence than we have seen so far. The convergence I have in mind manifests itself in a similar attitude to ontological questions. By ontological questions, however, I have in mind nothing abstruse. I mean, simply, questions about what things there are. By this criterion, if one were to ask how many chairs there are in the world, one would be asking an ontological question. With a little looseness, one could even admit into this category questions about how many chairs there are in a given room.

In order to understand the convergence, I wish to turn first to some remarks Wittgenstein makes at *Philosophical Investigations* § 80. I will elaborate the scenario that is imagined in that section in a way that suits our purposes. Wittgenstein imagines finding himself in a room furnished with what is apparently a perfectly ordinary chair. It looks ordinary, and feels ordinary to the touch; sitting in it is like sitting in any other chair.

175

But the chair disappears before his eyes. He pinches himself to make sure he is awake. Perhaps the chair has been spirited away by some trick, but no way in which this could have been done can be found. Perhaps he was hallucinating the chair, but sustained, vivid multi-modal hallucinations of this sort do not occur. Perhaps he is hallucinating its absence now, but no explanation or evidence of such can be found. What is more, he is assured by his friends that in this country it is the way of chairs to appear and disappear.

Was there a chair in the room? It may be supposed that there was, for after all Wittgenstein sat in one. It may be supposed that there was not, for chairs are not the right sort of thing to disappear into thin air (as rainbows are, say) so it must not have been a *chair* that Wittgenstein sat in. It may be that there are further things we can find out about the situation which will provide an answer to the question. But this may not be the case: even if the situation is fully described, it may not determine either a “yes” or “no”.

Wittgenstein's thought is that, in the latter circumstance, neither English nor German has sufficient resources to determine an answer to the question “was there a chair in the room?” No doubt this is because those languages are spoken in a world in which such things, as a matter of fact, do not occur. Were our world different enough, then no doubt we would speak a language in which we were not puzzled as to what to say, given the circumstances.

Now suppose that there is such a language, L. It is enough like English that speakers are prepared to say the words “there is a chair in the room”, but also enough unlike English that they are non-plussed by the chair’s disappearance. It does not tempt them to withdraw their claim.

Is what they say true? No doubt it is, provided that the description given by Wittgenstein at § 80 holds of their environment. The description, then, is in a sense all that need be said about chair-ontology, from the point of view of speakers of L. Provided that L-speakers can read English, they will be able to read from Wittgenstein’s description whether or not they would be prepared to assent to the sentence of L.

176 But, someone might insist, an ontological question still remains. Is there a chair there? As English-speakers, confronted with this question, how are we to proceed? It seems that are two courses of action which are open to us. We can recount the story of § 80, and allow ourselves to be satisfied with it. We could, alternatively, investigate the conditions under which chairs appear and disappear, as we never previously knew they could, thus learning something new about the world. But neither course of action, in itself, determines a “yes” or a “no” answer to the question whether there is a chair in the room.

The difficulty is that (i) our English sentence ‘there is a chair’ is not translatable into any sentence of L; and (ii) is not translatable into any sentence of the theory we develop to explain the appearance and disappearance of the chair. No doubt, were the scenario envisaged in § 80 to become common, we would begin talking in ways that accommodated the facts. The language we speak would change so that our question did after all admit of a definitive answer.

But Wittgenstein’s point is that even in such a reformed language, “the application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules” (1953: § 84). The reform would handle the situation we are discussing, but not every possible situation.

Wittgenstein’s thought is this: we have not uncovered a flaw in English when we discover that our knowledge of the language determines no answer to ontological questions under the conditions described in § 80. In this sense, ontology is language-relative. A determinate answer is available to the question how many chairs are there in this room, but it need not be. If there were not, there would be no ontological task left to us except to understand why there were not.

My contention is that Quine's attitude to ontological questions mirrors Wittgenstein's. Quine advocates approaching ontological questions through a notion of ontological commitment.⁷ What is in question is the commitments of a particular discourse: what a given system of sentences held true says there is in the world.

According to Quine, we can deduce the ontological commitments of a discourse or theory by expressing it in a way that conforms to the requirements of first order quantificational logic. The discourse is committed to the existence of those things that the variables range over. The appeal to the logic of quantifiers is thus meant as a criterion for ontological commitment, to be applied to the utterances of speakers.

Ontological commitment is, on this understanding, language-relative. What a speaker is committed to will depend on what language is being spoken. Quine has not shown us how to go about the business of arriving at an ontology – an account of what there is in the world – until he has told us what language we ought to carry out such an investigation in. Is there, for Quine, such a privileged language?

177

It may seem that Quine believes there is, so that he is unable to follow Wittgenstein into a deflation of ontological questions. What debarbs him from doing so, according to the objection I have in mind, is his physicalism. According to this doctrine, what exists is given by a physical description of the world, or at least will be given by a description of the world in the terms of a completed physics.

If this were so, then for any ontological claim, in any language, we could say that the claim is true if and only if it corresponds, when translated into a purely physical language, into part of a purely physical description of the world.

The essential appeal this doctrine makes to the notion of translation should be enough to alert us to the fact that this cannot be Quine's view. According to Quine, any translation of a sentence of one language into a sentence of another is at best correct relative to some translation manual. Thus physicalism could only provide a criterion for settling ontological questions if it determined a translation manual: the mere provision of a physical description of the world would not be sufficient. But Quine's verificationism precisely rules out the possibility of a single translation manual.

7 See Quine 1953a; Quine 1960: 238ff and – especially – 243n.

Indeed, Quine's reasons for accepting physicalism are pragmatic in nature, in the sense that he does not recommend physical descriptions of the world on the grounds that they are more correct than other sorts of description. Physics is preferred, among the other ways of talking about the world, for its high degree of predictive power and sensitivity to subtle changes in the way the world is (see Quine 1978). The reason for these advantages is, ultimately, that sentences about physical objects are "fairly directly associated with sensory stimulation" (Quine 1960: 237).

178

Quine's contention then, is that physics is the best means available to us of describing the world. For the sake of argument, let us accept Quine's contention. It does not follow that claims made within other discourses should only be accepted insofar as they are translatable into a true claim of physical discourse. The indeterminacy of translation rules out this move. In particular, then, it is not the case that the question "is there a chair in the room?" can be settled by translation into the terms of physics.

There is however a tension in Quine's thought. Certain aspects of his approach militate against ontological deflation. As we have seen, Quinean linguistics is committed to a privileged vocabulary in which to describe environmental stimuli. Such stimuli are to be described in physical terms: in the visual case, in terms of the "chromatic irradiation" of the speaker's eyes. Similarly, the speakers' responses to that environment, whether spoken or gestured, are to be described in physiological terms, as bodily movement and produced sound.

A form of physicalism is thus presupposed by Quine's way of conceiving the empirical constraints on our understanding of language. Since no such constraint is presupposed by Wittgenstein's drive to the outer, his deflation of ontology is more thoroughgoing than Quine's.

Primljeno: 15. februar 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 20. april 2014.

Bibliography

- Arrington, Robert and Glock, Hans-Johann (eds.) (1996), *Wittgenstein and Quine*. London: Routledge.
- Goldfarb, Warren (1983), "I want you to bring me a slab" *Synthese* 56: 265-282.
- Heal, Jane (1989), *Fact and Meaning: Quine and Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Language*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hintikka, Jaako (1990), "Quine as a member of the tradition of the universality of language", in Robert B. Barrett and Roger F. Gibson (eds.) *Perspectives on Quine*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- Kripke, Saul (1982), *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Quine, W.V. (1953a), "On what there is", in *From a Logical Point of View*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
- Quine, W.V. (1953b), "Two dogmas of empiricism", in *From a Logical Point of View*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Quine, W.V. (1953c), "The Problem of meaning in linguistics", in *From a Logical Point of View*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Quine, W.V. (1960), *Word and Object*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Quine, W.V. (1970), *Philosophy of Logic*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Quine, W.V. (1978), "Otherworldly", *New York Review of Books*. November 23rd, p. 25.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1958), *The Blue and Brown Books*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953), *Philosophical Investigations*. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.

Majkl O'Saliven

179

Slabost stimulusa: Kvajn i Vitgenštajn

Apstrakt

Kvajn i Vitgenštajn su bile dominantne ličnosti u filozofiji sredinom dvadesetog veka. Brojni tumači, kao i sam Kvajn, smatrali su da postoje duboke sličnosti između ova dva mislioca, iako ih je teško artikulirati. Smatram da je ovim autorima zajednički projekat razumevanja značenja iskaza pomoću referencije na govornikovo okruženje, iako oni ovo okruženje razumevaju na radikalno različit način. Tako Kvajn ima znatno tanju koncepciju okruženja od Vitgenštajna. Kod Kvajna stimulus je oslabljen na način na koji to nije kod Vitgenštajna. Takođe, u ovom radu branim tezu da obojica autora zastupaju određeni deflacionistički pristup ontologiji.

Gljučne reči: Vitgenštajn, značenje, empirizam, jezičke igre, ontologija.

STUDIJE I ČLANCI
STUDIES AND ARTICLES

III

Alenka Zupančič
Filozofski institut
Slovenačka Akademija nauka i umetnosti

Seksualno i ontologija

Apstrakt *Tekst ispituje neke ključne filozofske, i posebno ontološke, implikacije psihoanalitičke teorije seksualnosti frejdovsko-lakanovske orijentacije. Kao nešto što se ne može svesti na različite seksualne prakse i sadržaje, pojam seksualnosti dobija pojmovnu težinu koja ga čini posebno značajnim za filozofsko ontološko mišljenje. Polazeći od hipoteze da je nešto u vezi sa seksualnošću na konstitutivan način nesvesno – odnosno da postoji samo u formi nesvesnog – tekst ukazuje na jedinstveni kratki spoj epistemološke i ontološke ravni na delu u psihoanalitičkoj teoriji, koji se ne može zanemariti u filozofskom razmatranju odnosa znanja i bića.*

Ključne reči: *filozofija, psihoanaliza, seksualnost, biće, znanje.*

183

Kakve su implikacije nekih ključnih pojmovnih otkrića psihoanalize po filozofiju, i posebno po filozofsku ontologiju?¹ Ovo pitanje pruža opšti okvir za specifičnu argumentaciju koja se nudi u ovom tekstu. Odmah ću izneti sledeću temeljnu tezu: pojam nesvesnog – u svojoj intrinzičnoj i nesvodivoj vezi sa seksualnošću – nije jednostavno pojam koji se odnosi na neko tek otkriveno biće ili entitet, već je pre reč o otkriću singularnog, paradoksalnog entiteta koji niti je naprosto biće, niti je nebiće. Vrlo kratko rečeno: ako kažemo da je nešto u vezi sa seksualnošću *na konstitutivan način nesvesno*, to nas ne upućuje na neki određeni seksualni sadržaj ili značenje, već pre na neku temeljnu negativnost („jaz“), implicitnu seksualnosti koja, kao takva, daje svoju strukturu nesvesnom.

Nasuprot Jungu (Jung), Frojd (Freud) je insistirao na tome da seksualna „energija“ nije prosto neki element kojem pripada mesto u celini ljudskog života; središnja tačka Frojdovog otkrića odnosila se upravo na to da nema „prirodnog“ ili unapred ustanovljenog mesta ljudske seksualnosti, da je ona na konstitutivan način izmeštena (*out-of-place*), fragmentirana i rasejana, da postoji samo u otklonima od sebe same i od sopstvenog takozvanog prirodnog objekta, da najzad nije ništa drugo nego „iz-mešte-nost“ sopstvenog konstitutivnog užitka. Druhim rečima, Frojdov temeljni potez odnosi se na desupstancijalizaciju

¹ Tekst predstavlja priređenu verziju izlaganja koje je održano u Rimskoj dvorani Biblioteke grada Beograda 18. decembra 2013. godine u organizaciji Instituta za filozofiju i društvenu nauku.

seksualnosti: seksualno nije supstancija koju treba podesno opisati i odvojiti – ona je sama nemogućnost sopstvene omeđenosti ili odvojenosti. Ona se ne može u potpunosti odvojiti od bioloških, organskih potreba i funkcija, ali se ne može ni naprosto svesti na njih. Seksualno nije odvojeni domen ljudske aktivnosti ili života, i zbog toga se može naći u svim domenima ljudskog života. Takođe bismo mogli da kažemo: seksualnost je nešto što postoji „po sebi“ samo kao nešto drugo.

Ono što u frejdovskom otkriću uznemirava i danas nije naprosto njegovo naglašavanje seksualnosti – ta vrsta otpora, indignacije nad psihoanalitičkom „opsesijom opscenostima“ nikada nije bila tako jaka i ubrzo ju je marginalizovao sve liberalniji seksualni moral. Teza koja je unosila daleko više nemira odnosila se na uvek problematičan i (ontološki) nezvestan karakter same seksualnosti. Na viktorijansko podvriskivanje o tome kako je „seks prljav“, Freud nije odgovorio – „ne, nije prljav, seks je prirodan“. Njegov odgovor bi pre bio: „Šta je taj 'seks' o kojem govorite?“

184

Vratimo se, dakle, tezi prema kojoj je nešto u vezi sa seksualnošću *na konstitutivan način nesvesno*: rekla sam da nas to ne upućuje na određeni seksualni *sadržaj* ili *značenje*, već pre na neku temeljnu negativnost („jaz“), implicitnu seksualnosti, na nešto što tamo nedostaje a što ipak daje nesvesnom njegovu strukturu. U filmu *Ninočka* Ernsta Lubiča (Ernst Lubitsch) pojavljuje se izvrsna šala koja nam može pomoći da bolje razumemo ovu naizgled paradoksalnu konfiguraciju.

*Momak ulazi u restoran i kaže konobaru: „Kafu bez šlaga, molim“.
Konobar mu odgovara: „Žao mi je, gospodine, ostali smo bez šlaga.
Može li kafa bez mleka?“*

Ako se čini da psihoanaliza nikako ne može da nas „usluži“ bez seksualnosti, to je zbog toga što nema seksualnosti (nema prave seksualne supstancije) kojom bi ona mogla da nas usluži. U isto vreme, međutim – ostajući i dalje na logičkom tragu ove šale – seksualnost je taj jedinstveni šlag čije ga nebiće ne svodi na puko ništa. Jer, to ništa se šepuri naokolo, pravi nevolje i ostavlja tragove.

Ako je ontologija diskurs gospodara, kako je govorio Lakan (Lacan), a biće je uvek „biće-na-zapovest“, bilo bi odveć jednostavno razumeti to u svetlu gospodarenja nad bićem, nad time šta će biti, a šta neće. Ovde je reč o nečemu malo složenijem, a navedena šala ponovo može da nam pomogne da ukažemo na to. Ono što obično ostaje izgubljeno za ontološko mišljenje, nije nešto (neko određeno biće), već pre paradoksalna vrsta „ničeg“ ili negativnosti, upravo ona dimenzija prema kojoj kafa

„bez šlaga“ nije nužno isto što i kafa „bez mleka“. Drugim rečima, pored negativnosti koja upućuje na prosto odsustvo ili nebiće, postoji i jedna temeljnija negativnost koja iskrivljuje, „magnetizuje“ sam prostor bića, diktira njegovu topologiju ili strukturu. (I to se obično izgubi u ontologiji, nauci o „biću-kao-biću“.) U onome što sledi, predložiću jedan mogući način da ove iskaze učinimo opipljivijima i pojmovno čvrstima.

—

U filmu Džona Hjustona (John Huston) *Freud: The Secret Passion* (Frojd: tajna strast, 1962) postoji vrlo moćna scena u kojoj je Frojd prikazan kako predstavlja svoju teoriju o dečjoj seksualnosti pred velikom publikom obrazovanih muškaraca. Njegovo kratko predstavljanje, prekidano povicima posle gotovo svake rečenice, dočekano je snažnim i bučnim negodovanjem; nekoliko muškaraca je iz protesta napustilo izlaganje, pljujući na pod pored Frojda. U nekom trenutku, nastojeći da uspostavi red, predsedavajući uzvikuje: „Gospodo, nismo na političkom skupu!“

185

To je vrlo intrigantna opaska koja nas direktno upućuje u pravom smeru: u pravcu čudnovate, iznenađujuće koincidencije između politike i (frojdovske teorije) seksualnosti. Kao da svaki put kada se ponovo pokrene pitanje seksualnosti računamo s nečim što pripada i redu političkog. To bi svakako moglo da važi za politiku samog psihoanalitičkog pokreta i za razdore koje je u njemu proizvela. No, to bi moglo da bude tačno i u načelu uzev.² Time se dakako ne sugerise da je politika nešto što, u sopstvenim najdubljim dubinama, ima veze sa seksualnošću. Ovde nije reč o psihološkoj ravni implicitnoj tvrdnjama o seksualnoj motivaciji politike (ili političara). Reč je zapravo o borbi oko ontološkog statusa seksualnosti, što implicira izvesnu odluku o njoj. Frojdovska koncepcija seksualnosti odnosi se na to – ako nastojimo da je stavimo u jednu formulu – da je seksualnost strukturirana oko karike koja nedostaje u ontološkom lancu njene sopstvene stvarnosti. Ona niti prosto jeste, niti nije. A to se jasno suprotstavlja drugim shvatanjima seksualnosti koja je uzimaju kao pozitivan entitet koji treba uočiti, a potom ograničiti ili podsticati, ignorisati kao drugorazrednu pojavu ili ga isticati kao nešto suštinsko. Pitanje za Frojda nije da li seksualnost treba smatrati važnom ili ne: ključ je u tome da je ona važna (da determiništa postajemo) zato što nikada naprosto nije nešto što „jeste“. Upravo u ovom smislu se možda može ponoviti dobro poznati slogan „seksualno je političko“ i može mu se dati novo, radikalnije značenje. „Seksualno je

2 Iscrpan komentar o ovim pitanjima nudi Dolar 2007.

političko“ može se misliti ne kao sfera bića gde se takođe odigravaju političke borbe, nego kao naprslina u biću, omaška bića koje otvara jedinstveni ontološki međuprostor, koji je takođe i prostor političkog.

Dakle, vratimo li se nemiru koji je isprovociralo frojdotsko shvatanje seksualnosti (koje uključuje i dečju seksualnost) – iz današnje perspektive, veoma se lako može dogoditi da propustimo šta se tu tačno zbiva i da pripišemo burnu reakciju viktorijskom moralu Frojdrovog doba. Mi smo naučili da „tolerišemo“ mnogo i da o seksualnosti govorimo krajnje otvoreno, mi znamo da „seksualnost nije nešto čega bi se trebalo stideti“, i da je čak dobra za naše (mentalno i fizičko) zdravlje. Takođe, mislimo da su Frojdova otkrića o determinantnoj ulozi „psihoseksualnog“ u našem razvoju postala prilično integrisana u psihoanalitičke terapijske prakse, iako u ponešto razblaženom obliku. Otud bi moglo da bude veliko iznenađenje ako bi se pokazalo da je to daleko od istine. Šalev i Jerušalmi (Shalev i Yerushalmi) su 2009. godine objavili zapanjujuću studiju o statusu seksualnosti među savremenim terapeutima koji se bave psihoanalitičkom psihoterapijom. Rezultati ove studije nagnali su Kaveha Zamanijana (Kaveha Zamanian) da objavi članak u kojem sumira neke rezultate te studije na sledeći način:

Terapeuti u studiji Šaleva i Jerušalmija uglavnom su verovali da seksualnost služi kao odbrana od dubljih i težih pitanja, poput onih koja se odnose na intimnost i lični identitet. [...] U stvari, seksualna pitanja su posmatrana kao prepreka da se pomogne pacijentima da se prilagode svom okruženju i funkcionisanju u celini. [...] Oni su se fokusirali na seksualne susrete pre no na psihoseksualne aspekte razvoja. Zapanjujuće je da su dva terapeuta rekla da bi 'seksualna pitanja trebalo da tretiraju seksolozi, a ne psihoterapeuti'. [...] Jedan terapeut je zaključio da njegovi pacijenti 'retko govore o seksualnim pitanjima' i da njihove priče o romantičnim vezama 'nikada nemaju seksualne konotacije'. Četvrti i finalni faktor, a za mene najproblematičniji, odnosi se na tendenciju terapeuta da izbegavaju seksualna pitanja zbog nelagodnosti. Nekoliko terapeuta u ovoj studiji doživelo je raspravu o seksualnim stvarima kao 'oblik neprijateljstva koje je upereno ka njima', osećajući čak da ih 'njihovi pacijenti zlostavljaju'. Šokantno, jedna terapeutkinja je opisala jednog od svojih pacijenata na sledeći način: 'On kao da je mislio – ovo je terapija, pa mogu da pričam o čemu god hoću' (Zamanian 2011: 38).

Imajući u vidu Frojdrovu formulaciju *jednog i jedinog* pravila ili imperativa u psihoanalitičkom tretmanu, koji podrazumeva da se kaže apsolutno sve što pada na um, koliko god nam delovalo nevažno ili neprikladno, poslednja navedena rečenica zapravo zvuči kao izvanredna psihoanalitička šala.

Ako je ovakvo stanje stvari u „psihoanalitičkoj psihoterapiji“, ne treba da nas iznenadi da se generalni *Stimmung* u vezi sa seksualnošću ne razlikuje mnogo. Tome ni na koji način ne protivreči blatantno medijsko izlaganje seksualnosti i način na koji se ona koristi u medijima. Nema protivrečnosti jer je ovde na delu sistematično svođenje pojma seksualnosti – svođenje na (različite) „seksualne prakse“ koje su u osnovi „seksualnih odnosa“. To očigledno važi i za terapeute koji su bili uključeni u studiju Šaleva i Jerušalmija: seksualnost postaje nešto više-manje bezobrazno, što se radi ili se ne radi, i čime se na kraju može zlostavljati vlastiti terapeut ili terapeutkinja. Ako se shvata na ovaj način, gotovo da se možemo složiti s tvrdnjom da „seksualnost služi kao odbrana od dubljih i težih pitanja“. Ironija je, naravno, u tome što je za Frojda seksualnost bila „dublje i teže pitanje“ iza različitih seksualnih praksi i navika – nešto inherentno problematično, što remeti identitete – jer „samo mali deo nezadovoljenih seksualnih tendencija... može naći izlaz u koitusu i drugim seksualnim radnjama“ (Freud 1910: 137). Ono što se ovde dešava može se opisati na sledeći način: prvo, potpuno se odstupa od frojdovskog pojma seksualnosti, koji se svodi na činjenični opis izvesne vrste fenomena. Zatim, drugo, otkriva se da je seksualnost upravo ono na šta je u prvom koraku svedena: precenjeni epifenomen. Kad se, na primer, pretpostavi da psihoanaliza tvrdi da svi naši (neurotični) problemi potiču iz lošeg seksa ili otud što ga nema dovoljno, onda tu više nema prostora – za šta? Pa, upravo za psihoanalizu (Ibid). Šta je ono što dve naizgled oprečne terapijske perspektive (ona koja tvrdi da je seks odgovor na sva pitanja, i ona koja odbacuje seks kao precenjen) imaju zajedničko? Ni u jednoj od njih ne ostaje prostora za psihoanalizu i za ontološku ravan njenog preispitivanja. Ne ostaje prostora za psihoanalizu pošto ona vidi nemogućnost punog seksualnog zadovoljstva – u odsustvu svih spoljnih prepreka – kao konstitutivan *deo* nesvesne seksualnosti kao takve, kao deo njene problematične ontološke konstitucije, koja je upravo vezuje za pojam nesvesnog.

187

Međutim, ako je taj stav odista „odbrana“ od nečeg što je uključeno u frojdovsku *teoriju* seksualnosti, šta je tačno to nešto? Jer, jedno je sigurno: moramo se odupreti iskušenju da odbranu od seksualnosti uzimamo kao nešto što samo sebe objašnjava. Ne može „seks“ da objasni odbranu, upravo suprotno, odbrana može da osvetli nešto inherentno problematično o prirodi seksualnosti – nešto što nas, kako ćemo videti, nužno vodi ka duboko metafizičkim pitanjima.

Osvrnimo se sada na sledeće ključno pitanje: šta je to što čini nešto u seksualnom *konstitutivno* nesvesnim (i na taj način povezanim s

označiteljem i njegovim rezom)? Drugim rečima, šta je to što seksualnost čini nesvesnom čak i kada se javi prvi put, a ne usled naknadnog potiskivanja? Šta je to u vezi sa seksualnošću što se može pojaviti samo kao potisnuto? Implikacija ovog pitanja mora, naravno, biti sledeća: šta je to u vezi sa seksualnošću što se u stvarnosti registruje samo u formi potiskivanja (a ne kao nešto što prvo *jeste*, a potom je potisnuto)?³ Veza između nesvesnog i seksualnosti nije veza između nekog sadržaja i njegovog skladišta; *seksualnost pripada samom tu-biću nesvesnog* u njegovom paradoksalnom ontološkom statusu.

188

Pitanje „šta je to što čini nešto u vezi sa seksualnošću *konstitutivno* nesvesnim (*unbewußte*)?“ vodi pitanju o paradoksalnom kratkom spoju seksualnosti i znanja (*Wissen*), objedinjenih u negativnosti koja im je oboma zajednička. Bez sumnje, nesvesno nije prost opozit znanju, nego je „znanje koje sebe ne zna“ (Lakan), i postoji samo u izmeštenim formama (formacijama nesvesnog). Ovde se događa jedinstveno zakrivljenje ontološkog prostora. Seksualnost i znanje se strukturiraju oko temeljne negativnosti, nedostatka koji ih ujedinjuje u tački nesvesnog. Ili možda preciznije: psihoanalitički pojam nesvesnog je pojam inherentne veze između seksualnosti i znanja u samoj njihovoj negativnosti.

Paradoksalni kratki spoj znanja i seksualnosti dobija, naravno, svoj prvi i najepskiji prikaz u Bibliji. Čin kušanja s drveta saznanja uvodi seksualnost u svet (i čini je sramnom, nečim što treba skrivati). A tu je i činjenica da „poznavati, u biblijskom smislu reči“, kao što svi znamo, označava seks. Ovaj određeni način upućivanja na seksualni odnos očigledno nije iste vrste kao drugi česti eufemizmi za snošaj koje nalazimo u Bibliji: „ući“, „leći sa“ i „ući u“. Ta ključna biblijska priča koja prikazuje neodvojivost seksualnosti i znanja od scene prvobitnog greha, utoliko upućuje u pravom smeru. Ima nečeg u vezi s (označujućim) *znanjem* što je na konstitutivan način uključeno u postajanje seksualnim („grešnim“) u seksualnosti. I to nas, na možda neočekivan način, vraća ravno Frojdu. Prema Frojdu – bar prema jednom od izvora (npr. Freud 1908) – dečja seksualnost postaje „seksualna“ kada se ukrsti s (potragom za) *znanjem*, što se obično organizuje oko čuvenog pitanja: „Odakle dolaze deca?“

Osim u kontekstu svog ključnog i uopštenog pojma nesvesnog, Frojd je razmatrao vezu znanja i seksualnosti kada je sugerisao da je upravo

3 Frojd se s ovom dimenzijom nesvesnog susreo vrlo rano; zbog toga se odlučio na odbacivanje hipnoze kao prikladne tehnike pomoću koje se prvo ustanovljuje potisnut sadržaj, da bi se potom obznanio analizandu. Pošto to nije uspeo, Frojd je počeo da veruje da se nesvesno ne odnosi naprosto na ovaj ili onaj potisnuti sadržaj.

dečja seksualnost područje u kojem počinje (opšta) potraga ili želja za znanjem. Frojdska genealogija strasti za znanjem je po sebi složena i intrigantna, iako može delovati izrazito jednostavno (Ibid). Ovo je njen bazični okvir: kod ljudi ne postoji izvorni nagon za znanjem. On se pojavljuje u trenucima egzistencijalnih poteškoća, na primer kada se deca osećaju ugroženo činjenicom (ili mogućnošću) da će dobiti brata ili sestru. (Prokreativna) seksualnost vrlo brzo postaje očigledni igrač u svim pitanjima (tu) *bivanja* sobom i drugih. Ona na scenu stupa pitanjem o biću („Kako mi postajemo?“), i na nju stupa kao negativnost, kao junak koji ne zadovoljava nijedan mogući pozitivan odgovor. Iako je očigledno da učestvuje u postajanju bića, uprkos tome, seksualnost ne pruža nešto za šta se možemo uhvatiti, ne pruža sidrište u objašnjenju bića (kao bića). Štaviše, za ljubopitljivo dete seksualnost je takođe vezana za priče i mitove, sramotu i izbegavanje, ponekad čak i za gađenje i kaznu.

189

Ključno je još jednom ukazati na to da pravo pitanje počinje tek ovde. Stid od seksualnosti i njeno prikrivanje (koje dolazi od odraslih) ne bi trebalo uzeti kao nešto što je samom sebi objašnjenje, odnosno kao nešto što se može objasniti „tradicionalnom“ kulturnom zabranom seksualnosti, već upravo obratno. Uzrok stida zbog seksualnosti nije u nečemu što je tu, što je njome izloženo, već suprotno tome, u nečemu što nije tu, i čega (u njoj) zapravo nema. Bajke kojima objašnjavamo seksualnost deci ne služe toliko da bi maskirale i izobličile realistično objašnjenje, već treba da zamaskiraju činjenicu da potpuno realističnog objašnjenja nema, ili, preciznije, da čak i onim najiscrpnijim naučnim objašnjenjima nedostaje označitelj, „znanje“, koje bi objasnilo seksualno *kao seksualno*. Upravo se ovde događa kratak spoj između epistemološkog i ontološkog: jer je taj epistemološki nedostatak istovremeno i ontološki. Drugim rečima, pitanje nedostatka se ne odnosi na odsutni deo znanja o seksualnom (kao o potpunom entitetu po sebi), već na seksualno kao ne-sasvim uspostavljeno biće (i otuda kao konstitutivno nesvesno). Nesvesna seksualnost je kratak spoj između epistemološke i ontološke ravni: ona nije ništa drugo do oblik egzistencije negativnosti u kojoj se te ravni preklapaju.

U tom smislu, kultura nije naprosto maska za seksualno, nego maska *ontološke omaške* uključene u seksuaciju; ona je dvojnjak za nešto u seksualnom koje „nije“. I upravo u tom (indirektnom) smislu kultura je – prema klasičnom frojdsvom stanovištu – seksualno „motivisana“. Nju nagoni ne ono što u seksualnom jeste, već pre ono što nije ili nije u potpunosti (ono što nije potpuno ontološki konstituisano). Zaključak koji

možemo izvesti iz svega ovoga bi stoga bio sledeći. Kada god dođe do društvenog, kulturnog, religijskog prikrivanja seksualnosti, možemo da budemo sigurni da se nikada ne prikriva samo ono što je tu (recimo, polni organi), već *takođe* i neka temeljna dvosmislenost, omaška koja, od samog početka, uvodi *metafizička* pitanja. Drugim rečima: što se više trudimo da mislimo seksualno kao seksualno (odnosno, što se više trudimo da je mislimo samo kao ono „što ona jeste“), to se brže nalazimo u sferi čiste i duboke metafizike.

190

Odlična i neposredna ilustracija ovoga može da se nađe u formi problema s kojim su se rani umetnici suočavali kada su slikali Adama i Evu. Da li treba da ih predstave s pupkom ili bez njega? Adam je stvoren iz blata, a Eva od Adamovog rebra. Nije ih rodila žena, pa kako onda mogu da imaju pupak? Međutim, bez njega bi izgledali čudno: oni su bili prvi ljudi, pa je trebalo i da izgledaju kao (drugi) ljudi. Ali, ako su kao ljudi oni stvoreni prema Božjoj slici, onda i Bog mora imati pupak, što stvara nove pojmovne poteškoće... Umetnici su se dovijali tako što su smokvino lišće povećavali toliko da je ono pored polnih organa, pokrivalo i donji stomak. Zar to uvećanje smokvinog lista koji treba da pokrije više od polnih organa nije savršena ilustracija argumenta koji ovde pokušavamo da razvijemo? Naime, prikrivanjem „seksualnog“, uvek se *takođe* – a možda i primarno? – prikriva jedna duboka dvosmislenost (nedostatak, jaz) koja se od njega ne može razdvojiti i koja se obično otvara u pravcu metafizike. U tački te negativnosti (jaza u biću) nesvesno proizvodi metonimijski lanac značenja kojima se napaja uobičajena hermeneutika nesvesnog.

Uvećani list smokve ne pokriva samo seksualno, nego i pupak kao izabranu figuru ožiljka koji ostavlja omaška bića – omaška bića uključena u seksuaciju (i seksualnu reprodukciju). Ako se čini da seksualnost postoji samo na ontičkom nivou i nema pravi ontološki dignitet, razlog za to nije što ona ne odgovara ničemu na ontološkom nivou, nego zato što odgovara jazu unutar tog ontološkog nivoa. A kad govorimo o pupku, nije slučajno da kod Frojda nalazimo čuveni, i neobičan, izraz: *der Nabel des Traums*, „pupak sna“, koji se ne odnosi na ono što znamo, već na rupu u samoj mreži znanja koja se može izneti tokom analitičkog tumačenja.

Čak i u najtemeljnije protumačenim snovima, često postoji deo koji mora da ostane neprohodan; i to zbog toga što tokom interpretativnog rada postajemo svesni da u toj tački postoji zaplet misli-sna koje ne mogu biti odgonetnute, i koji štaviše ne dodaje ništa našem saznanju o sadržaju sna. To je pupak sna, tačka u kojoj se dopire do neznanog (Freud 1991: 671).

Sugerisala bih da se termin „neznano“ ne čita kao da upućuje na nešto što je „neznano nama“, već u snažnijem smislu, kao znanje koje izvorno nedostaje, koje „nedostaje u realnom“, i koje je konstitutivno za nesvesno kao takvo. A ako je, za Frojda, nesvesno po definiciji seksualno, onda to nije tako zato što nesvesno uvek ima seksualni sadržaj, nego zato što se ta prava ontološka omaška, prelom ili „pad“ prenosi jedino seksualnošću. Termin „prenosi“ bi ovde trebalo razumeti takođe u smislu u kojem govorimo o prenošenju znanja (ili, u ovom slučaju, o prenošenju konstitutivne zapreke znanja).

Čuvena je rečenica Ronalda Dejvida Lenga (Ronald David Laing): „Život je seksualno prenosiva bolest od koje se umire u sto posto slučajeva“. Možda bismo ovo mogli da preformulišemo u naše svrhe i da kažemo: omaška u biću je seksualno prenosiva bolest samog bića.

Primljeno: 9. januar 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 10. februar 2014.

191

Literatura

- Dolar, Mladen (2007), „Freud und das Politische“, *Texte. Psychoanalyse, Ästhetik, Kulturkritik* 4: 14–38.
- Freud, Sigmund (1908) „Über infantile Sexualtheorien“, u *Studienausgabe*, Frankfurt am Main 2000, str. 37–145.
- Freud, Sigmund (1910), „Über „wilde“ Psychoanalyse“, u *Studienausgabe*, Frankfurt am Main 2000, str. 133–141.
- Freud, Sigmund (1991), *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Penguin.
- Shalev, Ofra i Hanoch Yerushalmi (2009), „Status of sexuality in contemporary psychoanalytic psychotherapy as reported by therapists“, *Psychoanalytic Psychology* 26: 343–361.
- Zamanian, Kaveh (2011), „Attachment theory as defense: What happened to infantile sexuality?“, *Psychoanalytic Psychology* 28: 33–47.

Prevela s engleskog:

Adriana Zaharijević

Alenka Zupančič

The Sexual and Ontology

Summary

This paper explores some of the crucial ontological implications of the psychoanalytic theory of sexuality in its Freud-Lacanian orientation. As irreducible to different sexual practices and contents, the concept of sexuality obtains conceptual weight that makes it particularly relevant for philosophical ontological thinking. Starting from the hypothesis that something about sexuality is constitutively unconscious – that is to say, existing only in the form of the unconscious – the paper points at the singular short-circuit of the epistemological and ontological level which is at work in psychoanalytic theory, and which cannot be neglected in philosophical examination of the relation between knowledge and being.

Keywords: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, Sexuality, Being, Knowledge

Aleksandra Zorić
Filozofski fakultet
Beograd

O razlici između Dijemove i Kvajнове holističke teze

Apstrakt Iako između Dijema i Kvajna postoje brojne sličnosti, čini se da postoje jaki argumenti u prilog tvrđenju da ono što možemo izolovati kao Kvajnovu tezu, Dijem ne bi bio sklon da prihvati. Dijemova holistička teza zajednička je obojici autora: empirijska tvrđenja su međusobno povezana na način da ne možemo govoriti o opovrgavanju ili potvrđivanju izolovanih iskaza. Kako je, kao što ćemo u nastavku videti, Kvajnov holizam radikalniji, njegova teza postaje tvrđenje da uvek možemo zadržati neki pojedinačni iskaz tako što ćemo izvršiti izmene u drugim delovima sistema. Pokušaćemo da pokažemo, kako bismo Dijemu mogli s pravom da pripišemo samo prvo tvrđenje, da ove dve teze nisu identične i da nisu identične sa onim što se u literaturi naziva tezom subdeterminacije. Kao što ćemo videti u nastavku, ni jedna ni druga teza ne govore o mogućnosti empirijski ekvivalentnih teorija. One su pre svega holističke teze koje uz neke, dodatne, pretpostavke povlače tezu subdeterminacije.

193

Ključne reči: Dijemova teza, holizam, Kvajnova teza, subdeterminacija.

Kada se pomenu imena Dijema (P. Duhem) i Kvajna (V. V. O. Quine), gotovo svakome je prva stvar na umu teza koja se u filozofskoj literaturi naziva Dijem-Kvajnovom ili tezom subdeterminacije.¹ Iako između Dijema i Kvajna postoje brojne sličnosti, čini se da postoje jaki argumenti u prilog tvrđenju da ono što možemo izolovati kao Kvajnovu tezu (u nastavku KT), Dijem ne bi bio sklon da prihvati. Dijemova holistička teza (u nastavku DT) zajednička je obojici autora: empirijska tvrđenja su međusobno povezana na način da ne možemo govoriti o opovrgavanju ili potvrđivanju izolovanih iskaza. Kako je, kao što ćemo u nastavku videti, Kvajnov holizam radikalniji, njegova teza postaje tvrđenje da uvek možemo zadržati neki pojedinačni iskaz tako što ćemo izvršiti izmene u drugim delovima sistema.

Pokušaćemo da pokažemo, kako bismo Dijemu mogli s pravom da pripišemo samo prvo tvrđenje, da DT i KT nisu identične teze i da nisu identične sa onim što se u literaturi naziva tezom subdeterminacije. Sadržaj ove teze možemo predstaviti u vidu tvrđenja da su moguće empirijski ekvivalentne, inkompatibilne teorije koje objašnjavaju i jednako

¹ Ovaj članak je nastao u okviru projekta „Dinamički sistemi u prirodi i društvu“ (179041), Instituta za filozofiju Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu, koji finansira Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije.

su potkrepljene istim skupom svedočanstva. Svedočanstvo nam, otuda, ne može pomoći da odlučimo kojoj od njih da damo prednost. Kao što ćemo videti u nastavku, ni DT ni KT (kako Kvajn formuliše u radu „Dve dogme empirizma“) ne govore o mogućnosti empirijski ekvivalentnih teorija. One su pre svega holističke teze koje uz neke, dodatne, pretpostavke povlače tezu subdeterminacije.

U svom najznačajnijem delu *Cilj i struktura fizičke teorije* Dijem nastoji da objasni, kako sam naslov dela govori, specifičnu strukturu, ulogu i ciljeve fizičke teorije. Dijem je pre svega kritički razmatrao realizam koji su mahom zastupali teoretičari u drugoj polovini 19. veka. Ovaj realizam se ogledao u ubeđenju da nauka traga za istinom te da, iako teorija ne može da bude potvrđena, možemo da se nadamo kako ćemo eliminacijom rivalskih hipoteza na kraju doći do one istinite. Ovakav postupak, koji nam omogućava da jednu hipotezu odbacimo a drugu potvrdimo, nazvan je *krucijalni eksperiment*.

194

Odbacujući ovakve realističke pretpostavke o stvarnosti koju bi teorija trebalo da oslikava, Dijem se priklanja instrumentalističkom objašnjenju teorije kao ekonomičnog predstavljanja fizičkih zakona i njihove klasifikacije (Dijem 2003: 37). Ako je jedini cilj fizičke teorije prikazivanje i klasifikacija eksperimentalnih zakona, onda je način na koji utvđujemo da li je ona dobra ili loša poređenje posledica te teorije i onih eksperimentalnih zakona koje ona predstavlja i klasifikuje. Naučni zakoni nisu ni istiniti ni lažni, već samo aproksimativni. Budući da samo simbolizuju prirodu, ne možemo očekivati da će nam pružiti tačnu i konačnu sliku stvarnosti. Dijem je osim zahteva za empirijskom potvrđenošću i jednostavnošću, zahtevao da teorija bude minimalistička tj. da se kloni objašnjenja koja se tiču neopažljivih aspekata prirodnih fenomena.

Dijem modifikuje dva aspekta klasičnog empirizma (sličnu poziciju kasnije nalazimo i kod Kvajna) (Hesse 1976: 186–188): za razliku od tradicionalnog empirizma, Dijem se okreće od pitanja empirijske osnove ka pitanju teorijske interpretacije te osnove. On upravo napušta induktivističku sliku nauke karakterističnu za taj period. Induktivisti su, na čelu sa Njutnom, smatrali da nauka treba da odbaci hipoteze koje se tiču neopažljivih entiteta i procesa i prihvati samo one zakone do kojih se dolazi induktivnim putem. Za Dijema je ovo neprihvatljiv opis onoga što naučnici treba da rade. Naime, iako postoje okolnosti u kojima se nauke mogu držati induktivnog metoda, te metode ne važe za sve nauke i to, pre svega, za fiziku.

Dijem uviđa da za nauku nije od primarnog pitanje precizne prirode onoga što direktno opažamo, već interpretacija koju dajemo onome što opažamo, tzv. *teorijski termini*, suprotstavljeni grubim datostima koje su predstavljene onim što direktno opažamo. Teorijski termini su nesavršen prevod onoga što direktno opažamo. Štaviše, relacija između njih nije jedan-na-jedan, budući da bezbroj idealizacija može manje ili više odgovarati istom objektu opažanja. Otuda, ukoliko pokušamo da odredimo pojam temperature ili težine, na primer, videćemo da nam je za to neophodna izvesna teorijska interpretacija: samo iskustvo tu neće biti dovoljno. Osnov nauke je, tako, skup teorijskih termina putem kojih interpretiramo iskustvo. Kako njihova veza sa iskustvom nije u potpunosti jasna, ne možemo biti sigurni da pružaju čvrstu empirijsku osnovu.

Unutar fizičkih teorija nalazimo termine za čije referente ne možemo reći da su opažljivi: masa, temperatura i sl. Za ove termine se kaže da su *operacionalno definisani*: nešto definišemo putem procesa kojim utvrđujemo njegovo postojanje, trajanje ili kvantitet. Tako, na primer, težinu definišemo na sledeći način: težina je broj koji se pojavljuje kada predmet stavimo na vagu. Jasno je da njihovo značenje zavisi od metoda merenja, ali ono zavisi i od teorije o samim instrumentima. Oni su implicitno definisani teorijom o mernim instrumentima. Svaka upotreba instrumenta uključuje i stipulativne i kauzalne elemente. *Kauzalnost* se ogleda u tome što prilikom svakog merenja pretpostavljamo da postoji zakonolika veza između svojstva koje se meri i svojstva kojim se meri, a *stipulativnost* u tome što svojstvo koje se meri nije direktno opažljivo. (Giannoni 1976: 166) Ideje mase, temperature, pritiska nisu apstraktne, one su simboličke (teorijske): to su simboli koji dobijaju značenje zahvaljujući teoriji. Budući da je pojam temperature takav da nikada ne možemo biti sigurni kako tačno reprezentuje nešto u stvarnosti, slobodni smo da stipulišemo kakvu god želimo vezu između visine živinog stuba i temperature. Ali ova veza je ujedno i kauzalna, budući da kao takva varira u zavisnosti od spoljašnjih uslova, od kojih su nam bar neki nepoznati. Ovo je srž Dijemovog konvencionalizma koji se najbolje ogleda u tvrđenju da postoje zakoni prirode koje moramo stipulisati kao istinite. (Giannoni 1976: 167)

Dakle, teorijski termini se ne mogu operacionalno ili eksplicitno definisati putem opservacionih termina, već se u nauku najčešće uvode putem samih teorija. Otuda su teorijski termini u većini slučajeva implicitno definisani teorijom. Usled toga što iz teorije izvodimo tvrđenja koja ne sadrže teorijske termine i koja nam služe za testiranje teorije, za

teoriju se može reći da ima empirijski sadržaj i da je možemo potvrditi ili opovrgnuti. Međutim, budući da teorijska tvrđenja sadrže i teorijske termine koji su samo delimično interpretirani putem iskustva, ona ne mogu biti izolovano testirana. Dijemov zaključak je da se teorije suočavaju sa iskustvom kao celina.

Drugi aspekt u kojem se Dijemova (i kasnije Kvajnova) pozicija razlikuje od klasične empirističke ogleđa se u prihvatanju *teorije koherencije*. Teorijska tvrđenja ne stoje sama za sebe, već su međusobno povezane unutar mreže zakona koji čine potpunu matematičku reprezentaciju iskustva. Odatle sledi da se istinitost ili lažnost takvih tvrđenja ne može odrediti nezavisno od ostatka sistema. U holističkoj slici nauke koju Dijem i Kvajn prihvataju, jedinica empirijskog značenja nisu termini ili pojedinačni iskazi, već celokupne teorije. Kvajn je prihvatio oba aspekta Dijemovog empirizma. Kada je reč o naučnim teorijama, Kvajn odbacuje realistička tvrđenja o stvarnosti koju bi teorija trebalo da oslikava i teorijske entitete posmatra kao pozite koji imaju smisla samo ako ih posmatramo unutar okvira teorije koja ih postulira. S druge strane, Kvajn takođe zahteva da se naša tvrđenja o spoljašnjem svetu suočavaju sa čulnim iskustvom kao telo, nikada pojedinačno. (Hesse 1976:188)

196

Kada je reč o Dijemu, osnovni cilj koji je sebi postavio bio je da pokaže kako izvođenje krucijalnog eksperimenta (kojim bi jednu hipotezu trebalo da opovrgnemo a drugu potvrdimo) zahteva ispunjenje dva uslova: (1) da postoji nedovosmislena procedura opovrgavanja i (2) da na naučno zaključivanje možemo primeniti metod *reductio ad absurdum*. On ističe da nijedan od ovih zahteva ne može biti ispunjen. (Laudan 1976: 155–156) Naime, svako predviđanje zasnovano je ne na jednoj već na nekoliko hipoteza i pretpostavki tako da nikada ne možemo testirati izolovanu hipotezu. Čak i kada bismo uspeli da opovrgnemo izolovanu hipotezu (npr. da je priroda svetlosti korpuskularna), time ne bismo dokazali istinitost bilo koje alternativne hipoteze (da je njena priroda talasna). Jedino što smo ustanovili opovrgavanjem hipoteze H jeste $\neg H$, a to nije neka određena hipoteza već potencijonalno beskonačna disjunkcija hipoteza.

Razlog leži u sledećem. Izvođeci neki eksperiment fizičar implicitno priznaje tačnost čitave grupe teorija bez kojih taj eksperiment ne bi ni mogao da bude izveden, pa otuda u slučaju da se predviđanje ne ostvari možemo samo konstatovati da je pogrešan neki od stavova koji su poslužili za izvođenje predviđanja, a da pri tom ne znamo koji je to. Na

pitanje koji je od tih stavova pogrešan, krucijalni eksperiment ne pruža odgovor. (Dijem 2003: 190)

Neka je H hipoteza čiju valjanost treba testirati. Hipoteza H sama po sebi ne implicira nikakve opservacione iskaze. Da bismo dedukovali njene opservacione posledice, moramo joj dodati neke početne uslove A . Pored toga, kako hipoteza H najčešće ne predstavlja neki izolovani sistem, moramo pretpostaviti i neku pozadinsku teoriju T . Pretpostavimo sada da $H + A + T$ implicira opservacioni iskaz O . Pretpostavimo dalje da nakon krucijalnog eksperimenta opažamo da je $\neg O$ slučaj. Da li nam ovo omogućava da zaključimo da je hipoteza H lažna?

Odgovor je negativan. Možemo zaključiti samo to da postoji bar jedno lažno tvrđenje unutar korpusa $H + A + T$, a ono nikako ne mora biti upravo hipoteza H .² Ovo Dijema navodi na zaključak da je „fizička nauka sistem koji se mora uzimati kao celina“ (Dijem 2003: 192) te da se „poređenje nužno uspostavlja između teorije kao *celine* i eksperimentalnih činjenica kao *celine*“ (Dijem 2003: 211).

197

Tako, na primer, možemo da postavimo pitanje³ kakva je struktura fizičkog prostora. Recimo, da li je on euklidski ili ne-euklidski? U prostoru od tri dimenzije možemo razlikovati tri klase geometrija konstantne zakrivljenosti. Grubo rečeno, sve tri klase zasnivaju se na prva četiri Euklidova postulata, ali svaka koristi svoju verziju postulata paralelnosti. Geometriju nulte zakrivljenosti nazivamo euklidskom (ili paraboličkom) geometrijom, dok se termin „ne-euklidske geometrije“ odnosi na hiperboličku i eliptičku geometriju.⁴ Već smo pomenuli da se ne-euklidske

2 U nekim slučajevima, $\neg O$ se čak može smatrati lažnim. Uvek možemo poništiti eksperimentalne rezultate, iako to ne bi trebalo da bude praksa naučnika.

3 Ovakvih primera ima mnogo. Takvo je pitanje da li je struktura vremena linearna ili ciklična, ili pitanje interpretacije kvantnih fenomena. Kad je reč o kvantnoj mehanici, tvrdi se da alternativne interpretacije kvantnomehaničkog formalizma daju empirijski ekvivalentne ali različite teorije, koje svet objašnjavaju polazeći od drugačijih principa i mehanizama. Najočitiya je suprotnost između kopenhagenske interpretacije, po kojoj čestice ne mogu da imaju tačan položaj i momentum u istom vremenskom trenutku, i bomovske, po kojoj čestice uvek imaju tačan položaj i brzinu, dakle vreme, ali se oni ne mogu istovremeno utvrditi. Naime, kvantni fenomeni koji se mogu eksperimentalno opažati mogu se konzistentno i tačno objasniti uz pomoć više od jednog matematičkog formalizma. Ortodokсни kvantni formalizam i bomovska interpretacija dele neke zajedničke centralne pretpostavke: Šredingerovu jednačinu i Bornovo pravilo (poznatnije kao kvantna hipoteza ekvilibrijuma). Ovo čini empirijski sadržaj (eksperimentalno opažljive posledice) i osnov za opservacionalnu nerazlučivost. O navedenom videti Belousek, 2005: 670.

4 Tvorac hiperboličke geometrije jeste ruski matematičar Nikolaj Lobačevski, mada je pravično reći da su do sličnih rezultata u gotovo isto vreme došli i mađarski matematičar Janoš Boljaj kao i Karl Fridrih Gaus. Otkriće eliptičke geometrije

geometrije razlikuju od euklidske u pogledu petog Euklidovog postulata. U hiperboličkoj geometriji ovaj postulat zamenjen je sledećim:

Za proizvoljnu pravu l i tačku P koja se ne nalazi na njoj postoje bar dve različite prave koje sadrže tačku P i ne seku l .⁵

U eliptičkoj geometriji, pak, stoji:

Za datu pravu l i tačku P koja se ne nalazi na njoj, ne postoji prava koja sadrži datu tačku a sa datom pravom nema zajedničkih tačaka.

Međutim, da bi se sačuvala konzistentnost sistema, moraju se posle dodavanja ovog aksioma malo modifikovati i neki drugi aksiomi, na prvom mestu aksiomi rasporeda.

198

Gde, dakle, počiva problem? Poenkareov (Henri Poincaré) primer je veoma poučan. Poenkare je zamišljao svet smešten u unutrašnjost kruga c , u kojem je brzina svetlosti u svakoj tački obrnuto proporcionalna udaljenosti te tačke od kružnice kruga c . U tako zamišljenom svetu svetlosni zraci će imati oblik kružnih lukova koji su na krajevima normalni na kružnicu od c , što naizgled pokazuje da je to svet u kojem vladaju zakoni hiperboličke geometrije. Ipak, umesto da posmatramo svetlosne zrake kao ne-euklidske prave, možemo ih opisati kao euklidske krugove normalne na c . U tom slučaju geometrija je euklidska. Dakle, ista fizička situacija može da se opiše različitim geometrijama, pod uslovom da su fizički entiteti (ovde svetlosni zraci) dovedeni u vezu sa različitim pojmovima geometrija koje ispituje. (up. Poenkare 1989: 37–72)

Slično Poenkareu, Ajnštajn (A. Einstein) smatra da te dve različite geometrije mogu tvoriti sisteme koji su u operacionalom skladu sa iskustvom. Pošto su geometrija i fizika u tesnoj vezi, ni jedna ni druga izolovano nisu podložne empirijskom testu. Sama geometrija ne govori ništa o relacijama realnih stvari, to jedino može učiniti ako joj se dodaju fizički zakoni. (Sinđelić 2005: 124–125) Ali fizičke teorije se kao takve ne izvode iz iskustva: njihovi stavovi se većim delom slobodno biraju, pa se zatim modifikacijom dovode u operacionalni sklad sa iskustvom. Ajnštajn smatra da je moguće dati odgovor na pitanje kakva je geometrija

nedvosmisleno se pripisuje nemačkom matematičaru Berhardu Rimanu, inače Gausovom učeniku. Konzistentnost hiperboličke geometrije dokazao je 1868. godine italijanski matematičar Beltrami. On je pokazao da je hiperbolička geometrija konzistentna ako je konzistentna euklidska geometrija. No, kako u konzistentnost euklidske geometrije niko nije ni sumnjao više od dve hiljade godina, to je bio efikasan način da se ove nove, „čudne“ geometrije spasu daljih napada.

5 Naravno, prava l i tačka P leže u istoj ravni. Isti je slučaj i sa dole navedenim aksiomom eliptičke geometrije.

fizičkog sveta samo ako imamo *određeno kruto telo*. Međutim, za određivanje krutog tela moramo imati *određenu geometriju*. Na ovaj način se ulazi u neku vrstu rđavog kruga: merni štap kao kruto telo ne može biti čak ni definisan bez apriornog pretpostavljanja fizičke geometrije sveta, jer je geometrija nužno potrebna za izračunavanje korekcija bez kojih merenje nije moguće. Time pitanje o realnoj geometriji sveta postaje empirijski besmisleno pitanje.

Ipak, situaciju možemo predstaviti i drugačije i pokazati da je opovrgavanje ponekad moguće, iako to, naravno, ne znači da su odbačene teorije zauvek napuštene. Tako, na primer, možemo uočiti da 1543. godine svedočanstvo nije bilo dovoljno jako da dâ prednost Kopernikovom (N. Copernicus) sistemu u odnosu na Ptolomejev (C. Ptolomaeus). Empirijska otkrića do kojih su kasnije došli Tiho Brahe (T. Brahe) i Galilej (G. Galilei) nisu se mogla pomiriti sa Ptolomejevim sistemom. Otkrićem zakona kretanja planeta Kepler (J. Kepler) je dalje poboljšao Kopernikovu teoriju. Na kraju je Njutn (I. Newton) krunisao, pokazavši da inercija i gravitacija objašnjavaju eleptične putanje planeta. (up. Weinert 2009: 68) Ovo pokazuje da je eliminacija moguća, budući da teorije imaju različite vrste ograničenja. Dostupne činjenice su samo jedno od ograničenja, tu su još i koherencija, verovatnoća objašnjenja i sl.

U ovakvoj situaciji najviše što bi Dijem bio spreman da tvrdi jeste da *ne postoji odlučivo opovrgavanje*. Naime, on ne nastoji da dokaže nemogućnost opovrgavanja, već neodlučnost opovrgavanja koju smatra posledicom holizma: tvrđenja da fizičar nikada ne može testirati izolovanu hipotezu. On ne govori o mogućnosti da se za svaku teoriju može konstruisati alternativna teorija, jer to i nije praksa naučnika. U slučaju kada imamo dve hipoteze (kod Dijema su to najčešće stara i nova teorija) koje jednako dobro objašnjavaju rezultate eksperimenta, a logika ćuti, zdrav razum će presuditi kojoj da se priklonimo. Neodlučnost izbora je, otuda, uvek samo privremeno obeležje naučne prakse. Ontološka pitanja, ili ontološke obaveze teorijskog diskursa, nisu predmet Dijemovih razmatranja. Tačnije, on ih unapred odbacuje kao neplodan i prolazan rad.

U skladu sa tim možemo razlikovati dva oblika Dijemove teze

- 1) Logika opovrgavanja, kao i potvrđivanja, empirijske hipoteze H , upućena je na mrežu hipoteza u kojima je H deo a ne izdvojena celina koja se može nezavisno testirati.
- 2) Nijedna hipoteza H ne može se izolovati iz ovakve mreže hipoteza i pomoćnih pretpostavki zarad potvrđivanja i opovrgavanja.

Kritikujući Dijemovu tezu, Grinbaum (A. Grunbaum) ističe dve stvari. Naime, Dijemovo prvo tvrđenje izražava elementarnu logičku istinu da ako je opservaciono tvrđenje O implicirano konjunkcijom hipoteze H i pomoćnih pretpostavki A , onda njegova neistinitost ne dozvoljava da zaključimo kako je H neistinito, već samo da H i A ne mogu oboje biti istiniti: opovrgljivost H je neodlučiva u smislu da lažnost H ne sledi deduktivno iz premise $[(H \wedge A) \rightarrow O] \wedge \neg O$. Drugo tvrđenje je, po mišljenju Grinbauma, problematično. Opservaciono tvrđenje $\neg O$ koje je inkompatibilno sa O , omogućava nam da tvrdimo da je H istinito a da je A lažno, zbog toga što dozvoljava teoretičaru da zadrži H i modifikuje A , tako da H i modifikovana vrezija A' zajedno povlače $\neg O$. Prvo tvrđenje, iako tačno, nije dovoljno da pokaže da je opovrgljivost H uvek neodlučiva. (Grunbaum 1976: 116–117) Ono ne može da isključi mogućnost neke netrivialne⁶ verzije A' koja će zajedno sa H implicirati $\neg O$.

200

Na osnovu toga, Grinbaum zaključuje da je ova teza neodrživa u netrivialnoj formi, tj. da teza o nepodložnosti hipoteze opovrgavanju nije ni logički ni naučno održiva. Nasuprot tome, on smatra da su konkluzivni opovrgavajući eksperimenti mogući, kao i da su se krucijalni eksperimenti javljali u fizici.

Osnovno pitanje je zbog čega smatramo da uvek postoji A' pomoću kojeg bismo spasili hipotezu? Naime, ukoliko nemamo dokaz da uvek postoji neko netrivialno A' za svako H i $\neg O$, onda ne moramo verovati da je svako opovrgavanje neodlučivo. Naime, Dijem nikada nije tvrdio da

$$(H) (O) (\exists A') (H \wedge A') \rightarrow \neg O$$

Njegova pozicija je daleko umerenija i slabija. Odnosno, on ne tvrdi da možemo spasiti svaku hipotezu, već da ukoliko nije dokazano da ne možemo da je spasimo, ne možemo ni da je opovrgnemo. (Laudan 1976: 158) Na onima koji poriču H je teret dokaza da pokažu da ne postoji A' koje bi H učinilo kompatibilnim sa $\neg O$. U skladu sa tim Laudan (L. Laudan) razlikuje dve forme DT: jaču, koju napada Grinbaum, i slabiju, za koju smatra da je Dijem zastupa.

Jača DT (tj. KT): Za svaku hipotezu i svako opservaciono tvrđenje postoji skup netrivialnih pomoćnih pretpostavki A' , takvih da H i A' povlače $\neg O$.

6 Poseban problem je da se utvrdi kada ćemo A' smatrati netrivialnom modifikacijom. Bez ulaženja u probleme koje ovo pitanje otvara, netrivialnom ćemo smatrati onu modifikaciju pomoćnih hipoteza A koja nije samo jezička.

Slabija DT: U nedostatku dokaza da postoje pomoćne pretpostavke A' , $\perp O$ ne predstavlja slučaj koji dovodi do odlučivog opovrgavanja H , čak i ako $H \wedge A \rightarrow O$. (Laudan 1976: 159)

Jača teza koju Grinbaum kritikuje nije Dijemova već Kvajnova. Kvajn je smatrao da je teoriju uvek moguće prilagoditi nepokornom svedočanstvu, tako što će se izvršiti izmene u ostatku sistema (Kvajn 2007: 161), a to bi u ovom kontekstu značilo da uvek postoji grupa teorijskih pretpostavki A' . Dijem međutim ne smatra da A' uvek postoji: njegova teza je slabija i njom se tvrdi da fizičar nikada ne može biti siguran da nijedno takvo A' ne postoji. (Wedeking 1976: 178–179)

Grinbaum je nastojao da pokaže da je DT tačna samo u trivijalnom smislu u kojem se drastične promene na drugim mestima u sistemu mogu sprovesti pomoću *ad hoc* izmene jezičkih pravila. Otuda je po njemu nužan uslov netrivialnosti DT da teorijski jezik bude semantički stabilan u relevantnim aspektima. Grinbaum smatra da nam je neophodna neka teorija izmene i zadržavanja značenja unutar mreže. Treba još jednom istaći da je teza koju Grinbaum pripisuje Dijemu u stvari Kvajnova.

Kvajnova dalja modifikacija DT ogleda se u sledećem. Na prvom mestu, za Kvajnovu poziciju karakterističan je radikalniji oblik holizma. Kao što smo videli, Dijem je smatrao da fizička teorija sačinjava povezanu celinu i da ne možemo proveravati izolovane hipoteze. Kvajn ovoj celini dodaje i matematiku i logiku, što onda znači da kada proveravamo izvesne hipoteze, provera uključuje sve elemente celine. Jedinica empirijskog značenja je, kao što bi rekao Kvajn, *celokupna nauka*. (Kvajn 2007: 160) Za razliku od Kvajнове, DT ima istorijski karakter, ona počiva i dobija utemeljenje unutar istorije nauke. Nasuprot tome, Kvajn započinje i ostaje unutar današnje, savremene, nauke i to pre svega fizike. Dijemova teza ima ograničen opseg, ona se ne tiče na primer psihologije, dok se Kvajnova tiče *celokupnog znanja*. (Vuillemin 1986: 599) Tako DT uključuje u sebe i razgraničenje između nauke koja se koristi matematičkim jezikom i prirodnog jezika koji pod nju ne potpada, dok se KT odnosi i na prirodni jezik. Kao što je poznato, Kvajn odbacuje razliku između analitičkih i sintetičkih iskaza, pa je matematika (koja je za Dijema analitička i kao takva nepodložna proveru i opovrgavanju) samo jedan od mitova koje smo stvorili i koji je, za razliku od Homerovih bogova, pokazao veću pragmatičku vrednost.

Pored toga, Kvajn, za razliku od Dijema, ne ostaje na poziciji koja priznaje da ne možemo znati koje iskaze naše teorije treba odbaciti u

svetlu opovrgavajućeg iskustva – on ide korak dalje tvrdeći da *posedujemo izbor u pogledu načina revizije* naše teorije u ovoj situaciji jer „svaki iskaz se može posmatrati kao istinit ukoliko načinimo dovoljno radikalne izmene druge u sistemu... I obratno... nijedan iskaz nije imun na reviziju“. (Kvajn 2007: 161)

202

Možemo ukazati na neke od teškoća sa kojima se ova interpretacija suočava putem dva jednostavna primera. Neka T bude Ptolomejva teorija, neka A bude nepromenljiva sublunarna sfera u Aristotelovoj kosmologiji, neka H bude tvrđenje da ne postoje zvezde koje se ne okreću oko Zemlje, tj. da Jupiter nema mesece, te neka IO stoji za Galilejevo otkriće Jupiterovih meseca. Ovo Galilejevo otkriće, zajedno sa otkrićem faza Venere, kao i Braheovo posmatranje pojave supernove 1572, pokazuju promenljivost (*mutability*) neba. Ovakva otkrića je teško inkorporirati u geocentrični model, pa se ne vidi na koji bismo način mogli da promenimo pozadinske pretpostavke da bismo objasnili empirijske rezultate. Ako bismo A promenili u A' kojom bismo tvrdili promenljivost neba, time bismo ujedno urušili geocentrični model. Mogli bismo poricati Galilejevo otkriće, dokle god možemo ignorisati svedočanstvo. Međutim, onda kada je svedočanstvo u dovoljnoj meri pouzdano, ovakva strategija postaje dogmatička.

S druge strane, ponekad je lako odbaciti pomoćne pretpostavke. Neka T bude Kopernikova astronomija, A pretpostavka o uniformnim, kružnim orbitama sublunarne sfere, H hipoteza o kružnom kretanju planeta oko centralnog sunca, te neka IO stoji za Keplerovo otkriće eliptičnih, neuniformnih kretanja planeta. Kepler je odbacio A i zamenio sa A' kojom se izražava neuniformno kretanje, budući da je samu Kopernikovu teoriju smatrao tačnom. Ako bi odbacio Kopernikovu teoriju, to bi značilo povratak na neke od prethodnih koje nisu bile kompatibilne sa opservacionim podacima. Dakle, on je izmenio pozadinske pretpostavke tako da zajedno sa T povlače IO . Međutim, pitanje je da li je tu zaista reč o spašavanju teorije po svaku cenu, budući da je ova teorija po njemu bila uspešna teorija.

Ovo pokazuje da situacija nije uvek tako jednostavna kako to sugeriše pojednostavljena shema koju predlaže Kvajn. To, naravno, nisu jedini problemi sa kojima se suočava. Tako je, na primer, Lakatoš (I. Lakatos) isticao da ukoliko možemo da se uzdržimo od ma kog iskaza suočeni sa opovrgavajućim iskustvom, time dovodimo u pitanje svaki pravi progres u nauci, a sama nauka kolabira u konvencionalizam. Kvajn, međutim,

ne sugerše da bi teoriju trebalo prilagođavati proizvoljno (uključujući tu i mogućnost odbacivanja samog opovrgavajućeg iskustva kao iluzornog) da bi se „sačuvali fenomeni“. On naprosto tvrdi da su čak i navodno analitički iskazi (uključujući iskaze logike i matematike) podložni reviziji, iako u različitom stepenu, kao što je slučaj sa empirijskim iskazima. Tako je bilo predloga da se zakon isključenja trećeg klasične logike odbaci ne bi li se pojasnila kvantna mehanika, euklidska geometrija je zamenjena Rimanovom u Ajnštajnovoj teoriji itd. Ukoliko su ova rešenja opravdana, onda logička i matematička tvrđenja nisu u onoj meri sakrosanktna kako se to obično smatra, pa je moguće očekivati i neke buduće revizije na ovom polju. Štaviše, Kvajn predlaže i kriterijum koji bi trebalo da rukovodi revizijama: revizije treba sprovoditi na takav način da se „celokupni sistem remeti što je manje moguće“. (Kvajn 2007: 162) Iako se može prigovoriti da ovaj kriterijum ne zadovoljava u potpunosti (primera radi, može se smatrati isuviše konzervativnim jer očigledno favorizuje postojeće etablirane teorije), on poseduje i tu prednost što stavlja van snage one interpretacije Kvajna koje mu pripisuju gledište da se usvojena teorija mora braniti po svaku cenu.

203

Uprkos svemu, čini se da je ova Kvajnova modifikacija DT relativno neproblematična. Često se ističe da ona izražava prostu logičku činjenicu primenjenu, u ovom slučaju, na nauku. Naime, *modus tollens* pokazuje jedino da je *antecedens* lažan, ali ne i koji njegov deo je za ovo odgovoran. (Lakatos 1978: 98) Ukoliko se sa Kvajnom složimo u odbacivanju razlike između analitičkih i sintetičkih iskaza, iz čega sledi da matematički i logički iskazi imaju isti status kao i naučni iskazi, njegova prva modifikacija DT takođe izgleda prihvatljivo. Međutim, ona je svakako jača i šira od DT.

U kasnijim radovima Kvajn svoju tezu formuliše kao tezu subdeterminacije i ističe da se ona tiče odnosa između naučnih teorija i svedočanstva na kom te teorije počivaju. Grubo govoreći, ona tvrdi da može postojati više nesaglasnih teorija koje objašnjavaju isti korpus svedočanstva. Ukoliko su nam dostupna ista svedočanstva, moguće je konstruisati dve različite teorije koje će ih podjednako dobro objašnjavati.

Jednostavan dokaz teze o subdeterminisanosti teorija možemo formulisati i na sledeći način: ukoliko su dati hipoteza (H), skup iskaza koji se odnose na svedočanstvo (P), kao i određeni broj dodatnih iskaza koji se ovima mogu pridodati kao početne hipoteze (S_1, S_2, S_3, \dots) onda važi sledeće:

- | | |
|-------------------------------|---|
| 1) $H \rightarrow P$ | Hipoteza; |
| 2) $H \& S_1$ | Hipoteza; |
| 3) H | Iz 2., eliminacija $\&$; |
| 4) P | Iz 1. i 3., eliminacija \rightarrow ; |
| 5) $(H \& S_1) \rightarrow P$ | Iz 2. i 4., uvođenje \rightarrow . |

Pokazali smo da ukoliko teorija implicira neko svedočanstvo, onda možemo konstruisati čitav niz teorija koje to takođe čine. Drugim rečima, postoji beskonačno mnogo teorija ($H\&S_1$, $H\&S_2$, $H\&S_3$, ...) koje impliciraju iste iskaze svedočanstva. Ovo je, u najkraćem, ono što Kvajn podrazumeva pod subdeterminacijom fizičkih teorija. Treba doduše imati u vidu da ono što smo upravo izložili predstavlja najjednostavniji oblik subdeterminacije.

204

Kvajnova dalja modifikacija DT (koja se naziva još i „jakom interpretacijom“ DT, o kojoj ćemo u nastavku govoriti kao o tezi subdeterminacije), naprotiv, bila je predmet kritika. Reč je o tezi o *jednakosti* kojom se tvrdi sledeće: svaka teorija je jednako dobro potvrđena svedočanstvom, kao i bilo koja njena konkurentkinja. Odnosno: bilo koja teorija *može se pomiriti* sa bilo kojim nepokornim svedočanstvom, tako što će se načiniti prikladna prilagođavanja u drugim pretpostavkama koje imamo u prirodi.⁷

Kao što je rečeno, ako teorije povlače opservacione posledice samo uz pomoć dodatnih pretpostavki, onda je teoriju zajedno sa odgovarajućim pomoćnim pretpostavkama uvek moguće prilagoditi bilo kojem svedočanstvu koje joj se protivi. Posledica toga jeste da za bilo koje svedočanstvo i bilo koje dve rivalske teorije, T i T' , postoje odgovarajuće pomoćne pretpostavke A takve da će T & A biti empirijski ekvivalentno T -u (zajedno sa njenim pomoćnim pretpostavkama). Otuda, svedočanstvo ne može da odluči između njih.

7 Kritikujući Kvajna, Vulemin (J. Vuillemin) ističe da priroda dopušta stepene blokova, gde pod „blokovima“ podrazumeva „kvazi-zatvorene i samodovoljne sisteme, u velikoj meri nezavisne od spoljašnjeg uticaja.“ (Videti Vuillemin, 1986:608.) Upravo se ovi blokovi podvrgavaju testovima falsifikacije i određenim revizijama. Imajući ovo u vidu, najprosto nije tačno da se ma koji iskaz može smatrati istinitim pod bilo kojim okolnostima, pa je i holizam uopšte znatno oslabljen. Kao odgovor na ovu primedbu Kvajn ističe da je „blokovska podela“, koju Vulemin navodi, kompatibilna sa holizmom ukoliko primetimo da „veze između delova nauke veoma variraju u stepenu bliskosti“ (Quine, 1986:620–621). Tačno je da naučnici proveravaju i opovrgavaju pojedinačne hipoteze, ali treba imati u vidu da ovi blokovi i gradacije jesu stvar prakse pre nego stvar principa. Ukratko rečeno, pojedinačne hipoteze se zaista potvrđuju ili opovrgavaju u praksi ali samo zbog toga što ih naučnici posmatraju kao relativno izolovane sisteme ujedno pretpostavljajući prihvatljivost pozadinske teorije.

Protiv razlikovanja Dijemove od Kvajnove teze možemo istaći činjenicu da se Kvajn pozivao na DT kao premisu u izvođenju svoje teze subdeterminacije. Naime, on je pretpostavljao da sve što implicira DT jednako implicira i teza subdeterminacije. Kao što je rečeno, u tekstovima „Dve dogme empirizma“ i „Naturalistička epistemologija“ Kvajn ističe da je celokupno polje nauke u toj meri subdeterminisano graničnim uslovima, iskustvom, da postoji izbor koje ćemo iskaze menjati u svetlu nepokornog iskustva. Ovde je Dijemov holizam izjednačen sa subdeterminisanošću.

Nasuprot tome, smatramo da ove teze nisu ekvivalentne, budući da se tezom o subdeterminisanosti ne govori o unutarteorijskoj zavisnosti termina i rečenica, kao što to čine DT i KT. DT, kao i slabija interpretacija KT, tvrdi da konjunkcija zakona implicira opservacione posledice, dok subdeterminaciju možemo predstaviti kao tvrđenje da svedočanstvo implicira različite teorije. Otuda su ove dve teze *istinite za svaku teoriju, čak i ako postoji samo jedna teorija*. Da bismo imali slučaj subdeterminisanosti neophodno je da budu ispunjena dva uslova: (a) moraju da postoje bar dve empirijski ekvivalentne teorije i (b) te teorije moraju biti logički inkompatibilne i ne mogu se načiniti kompatibilnim rekonstruisanjem predikata. (Roth 1986: 437) Dijemova i Kvajnova teza su konzistentne bilo sa istinitošću bilo sa lažnošću teze subdeterminacije, one se tiču istinitosnih uslova pojedinačnih teorijskih tvrđenja. Odnosno, *čak i ako subdeterminacije nema, one ne prestaju da važe*.

205

Možemo zaključiti da postoje razlike između ove dve teze, kao i da Kvajn modifikuje DT kako bi došao do svoje teze o subdeterminaciji. Poenta Kvajnovih argumenata nije da sama DT implicira subdeterminaciju. Da bismo dobili subdeterminaciju potrebne su nam dodatne pretpostavke: moramo imati rivalske, empirijski ekvivalentne i logički inkompatibilne teorije.

Dakle, možemo tvrditi da su DT i KT dve različite teze. KT je jača teza kako iz razloga što nije ograničena na fizičke teorije, tako i usled Kvajnovog odbacivanja distinkcije analitičko/sintetičko. Kvajnova teza u sebe uključuje ono što smo na početku označili kao DT, ali kako DT ne tvrdi ništa o matematičkim i logičkim istinama, njen je opseg širi. One nisu identične budući da DT ništa ne tvrdi o izmenama u sistemu zarad spašavanja pojedinačnih tvrđenja. DT je u osnovi teza holizma kojom se tvrdi da ne možemo proveravati izolovane delove sistema, a kako je sistem takav da u sebe uključuje pored teorije i pozadinske pretpostavke,

ne možemo u slučaju neostvarenih predviđanja lokalizovati izvor greške. KT je u svom slabijem obliku bliska DT ali, kao što smo videli, jača. U svom jakom obliku, u kom je možemo čitati kao tezu subdeterminacije, ona tvrdi nešto više i od onoga što je Dijem pisao o krucijalnom eksperimentu, kao i od onoga što smo označili kao KT.

Dijem je pokazao zbog čega su krucijalni eksperimenti u nauci nemogući: usled holizma ne može se govoriti o nedvosmislenoj proceduri opovrgavanja i potvrđivanja. Kada imamo dve rivalske teorije, čak i ako bismo uspeli jednu od njih da opovrgnemo, time ne bismo dokazali istinitost druge. Kvajnova teza subdeterminacije ima, pak, drugačiji sadržaj. Njome se uvodi mogućnost konstruisanja alternativnih, inkompatibilnih teorija, pa je možemo shvatiti kao algoritam za stvaranje empirijski ekvivalentnih teorija. Iako je Kvajn u kasnijim radovima odustao od ovako shvaćene teze subdeterminisanosti, treba imati na umu da čak i blaži oblici subdeterminisanosti koje je smatrao prihvatljivim, nisu ekvivalentni sa Dijemovom i Kvajnovom holističkom tezom. Naime, one *važne čak i ako subdeterminisanosti nema*. S druge strane, subdeterminacija je fenomen koji nije isključiva posledica holizma, već, pre svega, nesavršenosti svake ljudske konceptualizacije stvarnosti, ograničenosti modela kojima se služimo, jednom rečju, činjenice da naše teorije uvek prevazilaze ono što predstavlja empirijsko svedočanstvo. Otuda, iako je holizam možda nužna pretpostavka subdeterminisanosti, nije i dovoljna.

Primljeno: 14. januar 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 17. februar 2014.

Bibliography

- Belousek, Darrin W. (2005), „Underdetermination, Realism, and Theory Appraisal: An Epistemological Reflection on Quantum Mechanics“, *Foundations of Physics* 35, str. 669–695.
- Dijem, Pjer (2003), *Cilj i struktura fizičke teorije*, Sremski Karlovci: Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića.
- Giannoni, Carlo (1976), „Quine, Grünbaum and the Duhemian Thesis“, u *Can Theories be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis*, Dordrecht: Reidel, str. 162-175.
- Grünbaum, Adolf (1976), „The Duhemian Argument“, u *Can Theories be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis*, Dordrecht: Reidel, str. 116–131.
- Hesse, Mary (1976), „Duhem, Quine and a New Empiricism“, u *Can Theories be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis*, Dordrecht: Reidel, str. 184–204.
- Kvajn, Vilard van Orman (2007), „Dve dogme empirizma“, u: *Ontološka relativnost i drugi filozofski ogledi*, Sremski Karlovci: Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, str. 137–164.

- Lakatos, Imre (1978), „Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes“, u *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Vol. I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, str. 8-93.
- Laudan, Larry (1976), „Grünbaum on 'The Duhemian Argument'“, u *Can Theories be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis*, Dordrecht: Reidel, str. 151-161.
- Poenkare, Anri (1989), *Znanost i hipoteza*, Zagreb: Globus.
- Quine, Willard Van Orman (1986), „Reply to James Vuillemin“, u *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine*, La Salle: Open Court, str. 619-622.
- Roth, Paul A. (1986), „Semantics Without Foundations“, u *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine*, La Salle: Open Court, str. 433-458.
- Sindelić, Svetozar (2005), „Grinbaumova kritika Dijemovog konvencionalizma i Ajnštajnovog filozofije geometrije“, u *Relativnost naučne racionalnosti*, str. 113-155.
- Vuillemin, James (1986), „On Duhem's and Quine's Theses“, u *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine*, La Salle: Open Court, str. 595-618.
- Wedeking, Gary (1976), „Duhem, Quine and Grünbaum on Falsification“, u *Can Theories be Refuted? Essays on the Duhem-Quine Thesis*, Dordrecht: Reidel, str. 176-183.
- Weinert, Friedel (2009), *Copernicus, Darwin and Freud: Revolutions in the History and Philosophy of Science*, London: Wiley.

Aleksandra Zorić

On the Difference Between Duhem and Quine's Theses

Abstract

Although there are numerous similarities between Duhem and Quine, there are strong arguments which suggest that what can be isolated as Quine's thesis would be unacceptable to Duhem. On the other hand, they both share Duhem's holistic thesis: empirical statements are interconnected in such a way that they cannot be confirmed or refuted taken in isolation. Since Quine's holism is more radical, as we shall show, his thesis claims that we can always keep a statement by making necessary adjustments somewhere else in the system. We will try to show that only the first thesis can be rightfully ascribed to Duhem, that these two theses are not identical, and that they are both different from what is usually called the theses of underdetermination. As we shall see, neither of them speaks about the possibility of empirically equivalent theories. They are, first and foremost, holistic theses which, under certain additional assumptions, have the thesis of underdetermination as their consequence.

Keywords: Duhem's thesis, holism, Quine's thesis, underdetermination.

Todor Kuljić
Filozofski fakultet
Beograd

Politička teologija: o mogućnosti poređenja upotrebe smrti u teologiji i politici

Apstrakt Razmotrena je saznajna vrednost pojma politička teologija u tana-topolitics i zaključeno da kod tumačenja političke upotrebe smrti ovaj pojam može biti koristan. Ne samo otuda što je granica između politike i teologije nejasna, nego i zbog opštije, dublje društvenointegrativne srodnosti politike i teologije i raznovrsnih prošlih i savremenih politizacija onostranog spasenja. Iako tumačenje smrti u političkoj teologiji ima drugačiju ulogu nego u svetovnim ideologijama, kod svake političke teologije je poslušnost vlasti uslov spasenja. U njenom idejnom središtu prožimaju se podele na javnog prijatelja i neprijatelja iz ovostranog političkog sa sličnim podelama iz onostranog sveta. Osim uticaja teologije na politiku razmotrene su i neke analogije između teologije i svetovnog pravosuđa.

Cljučne reči: politička teologija, onostrano spasenje, pravda, greh, krivica.

208

Bilo bi preterano reći da je kontroverzni pravnik Karl Šmit (*Schmitt*) otkrio pojam politička teologija, ali ga je sasvim izvesno prvi jasno i provokativno formulisao u istoimenoj knjizi iz 1922. rečima: „Svi pregnantni pojmovi modernog učenja o državi su sekularizovani teološki pojmovi. Ne samo zbog svog istorijskog razvoja, zato što su iz teologije preneti u učenje o državi, pa je npr. svemogući Bog postao sveltasni zakonodavac, nego i zbog svoje sistematske strukture, čija su saznanja neophodna za sociološko razmatranje ovih pojmova“ (*Schmitt*, 2004: 43).¹ Drugim rečima, novovekovno pravo teško se može razumeti bez teologije. Ovde se neće ulaziti u šire razmatranje niti u kritiku ove Šmitove makroistorijske teze, nego se treba samo pozabaviti pitanjem da li i koliko kod tumačenja političke upotrebe smrti može biti koristan pristup u čijem je središtu pojam politička teologija?

Čak i ako se na samom početku složimo da je ovaj pojam prilično rastegljiv i da se koristi najčešće za obeležavanje onih stanja gde je granica između politike i religije nejasna, to nipošto ne znači da ga treba ignorisati. Naprotiv, zaslužuje svaku pažnju. U širem smislu, sintagma

¹ Članak je nastao u okviru rada na projektu „Društveni akteri i društvene promene u Srbiji 1990–2010“, br.149005 koji finansira Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije.

politička teologija obuhvata mnoštvo pojmova iz politike koji su prožeti teologijom i pokazuje koliko je religije potrebno državi i koliko je paradržavnih elemenata potrebno religiji. Ova spona politike i teologije nije, doduše, centrirana oko upotrebe smrti nego oko opštije, dublje društvenointegrativne srodnosti politike i teologije, što, naravno, ne umanjuje njenu tanatopolitičku važnost. Ako se ima na umu da se politička teologija bavi uzajamnim uticanjem političkog poretka i religijske zajednice, tj. politizacijom onostranog spasenja, onda je jasno da je i ovde reč o upotrebi smrti. Radi se, dakle, podjednako o domišljanju teoloških implikacija političkog i o razvijanju političkih strana teološkog. Najposle, kod oba pokušaja prisutan je Bog kao krajnji arbitar postmortalne sudbine. Istraživači religije nisu na isti način koristili ovaj pojam niti su ga uvek vezivali za isti predmet. Dok ga je Karl Šmit isključivo vezivao za katolicizam, Jan Asman (*Assmann*) i Maks Veber (*Weber*) su isti problem istraživali i kod drugih religija i političku teologiju shvatali kao manje ili više razvijenu dogmatiku odnosa vlasti i spasenja sa raznovrsnim religijskim, antropološkim, kulturnim i institucionalnim osobenostima. Uprkos razlikama, kod svake političke teologije je poslušnost vlasti uslov spasenja. U njenom idejnom središtu prožimaju se podele na javnog prijatelja i neprijatelja iz ovostranog političkog sa sličnim podelama iz onostranog sveta. Gledišta se razilaze oko toga koja je podela izvornija. Za razliku od K. Šmita, J. Asman tvrdi da su neki središnji pojmovi teologije zapravo „teologizovani politički pojmovi“ i da je religija rođena iz duha politike (u Izraelu i u Atini), a ne obrnuto. Ako su, kako misli J. Asman, fundamentalni pojmovi i vrednosti (pravda, moć i krivica), nastali u politici i tek potom preneti u teologiju (cit. prema A. Schmitt 2001) i ako je reč o teologizaciji istorije i teologiji volje (Asman 2011: 258–260), onda je i figuru spasenja hrišćanstvu nametnula antička politika. Drugim rečima, tek božja pravda ispunjava događaje smislom i to je proces koji Asman naziva „semiotizacija teologizacijom“ (Asman 2011: 243). Ovo mišljenje nije usamljeno. Francuski istoričar Le Gof tvrdi da je u 13. veku teologija bila projekcija vrlo složenog svetovnog mišljenja o pravdi i sudstvu (Le Gof 1992: 11). Pozivajući se na Sokrata i Platona, Lj. Tadić tvrdi da je paganski svet anticipirao Strašni sud (Tadić 2003: 31). Niče, međutim, nije mislio da je u tom pogledu evropska antika odgovorna, jer je na hrišćanstvo gledao kao na prodor Orijenta u Evropu. Bog na krstu, po njemu, nije antika, nego, naprotiv, uvreda njenog ukusa. Filozof Leo Straus (*Strauss*) je simboliku iste napetosti između Evrope i Orijenta markirao kao suprotnost Atine i Jerusalima, tj. kao razliku između samoodređujuće filozofije lišene transcendentnog autoriteta s

jedne i života koji počiva na veri o otkrovenju s druge strane. Ne treba zaboraviti ni Marksovu (*Marx*) socijalnu ocenu da je religijska beda izraz stvarne bede i protest protiv stvarne bede preusmeren u iracionalno. Dakle, politička teologija je kod svih navedenih ocena religije podjednako prisutna, ali je različito akcentovana.

210

Ovde ne treba ulaziti u raspravu oko problema istorijskog primata političkog ili teološkog mišljenja u raznim istorijskim fazama, nego samo konstatovati njihovu snažnu i postojanu vezu. O političkoj teologiji je reč svuda gde se teološki sadržaji sistematski koriste zarad (1) podvlašćivanja, ili (2) održanja društvene integracije. Raznovrsne ideologizacija ove vrste polaze od božanske apsolutne istine otkrovenja i od spiritualističkog tumačenja materijalnih procesa, a tumačenje smrti u političkoj teologiji ima drugačiju ulogu nego u svetovnim ideologijama. O čemu se radi? Politika ideologizuje smrt kao događaj (prekid života), dok religija više koristi smrt kao stanje (nakon prekida života). U oba slučaja se manipulativno koristi fizička nepovratnost kao komponenta smrti, ali i kao ulog u simboličku povratnost i neuništivost. I za politiku i za religiju važi da sve ono što se može moralizovati može se i politički iskoristiti: uzvišena smrt, sećanje na žrtvu i blaženo onostrano stanje. Neke tanatopolitičke razlike ipak postoje. U religiji je strah od smrti kao fizičkog nestanka tesno vezan za strah od kažnjivog greha na drugom svetu i ova okolnost se na sasvim drugi način ideologizuje nego kod idejnih tvorevina gde nema zaprećenosti onostranim mukama. Osim toga, ni pretnja paklom zbog greha, ni teološka upotreba smrti uopšte, ne mogu se razumeti ako se nema na umu temeljni religijski antropološki pesimizam. Čovek je slab i veliki je grešnik i u to ga treba i ubediti. Zadatak je crkve kao ustanove spasenja da neguje strah od greha. Hrišćanska pedagogija ide još dublje i uči da je greh praroditeljski jer izvire iz nepokoravanja bogu (Adamov greh), a Isus je žrtvovao sebe za naše grehove. Na drugoj strani je Milosrdni Svemogućí Bog koji je i okrutan. Ruku okrutnog boga osetio je njegov sin jedinac, Isus. U njega je Bog stavio sve grehe i svu osvetu, pisao je francuski katolički teolog Žak Bosije (*Bossuet*) u 17. veku, a isto su ponavljali i jezuiti (Delimo, 1986 I: 447–448). Isus je, dakle, žrtvovan zbog ljudskih grehova. Važno je uočiti da bez postulata o grešnoj ljudskoj prirodi nema isticanja Hristove žrtve ni njegovog spasiteljstva, ali ni legitimnosti kontrolora iskupljenja – hrišćanske crkve. I još više od toga, bez antropološkog pesimizma nema hrišćanske tanatopolitike. Bez postulativne vizije grešne, loše i povodljive ljudske prirode, koja se ne može bitno popravljati ni prevaspitavati nego samo

podučavati skrušenosti, nema ni učenja o spasenju i o milosti božjoj. Tome nasuprot, da je čovek dobar, ove mere bile bi izlišne, a samim tim i ustanove koje se staraju o njihovom sprovođenju. Upravo u tome se sa teolozima slažu politički konzervativci raznih boja.

Kod kritike ovih postulata ne treba polaziti od oprečnog, takođe isključivog, antropološkog optimizma, tj. od stava o u osnovi dobroj i plemenitoj ljudskoj prirodi. Odmerenije je imati na umu jednostranosti oba apriorizma. Čovek jeste opterećen i slabostima i vrlinama, ali je važno istaći da je kadar da bez vere ili predrasude uspostavi racionalan odnos prema iskustvu. Dakle, može se vaspitanjem popraviti. Tome nasuprot, viđenje sveta kao doline suza je duboko pesimistično. Kada crkva tvrdi da je čovek sklon grehu, onda se smrt preko kategorije smrtnog greha uvlači u krivicu. Ako je, hegelovski gledano, kazna pravo zločinca, onda je ispaštanje pravo grešnika. To što je ova analogija u osnovi formalna, jer se svetovni sud suštinski razlikuje od Strašnog suda i krivica od greha, ne znači da je i neumesna. U sledećem izlaganju treba navesti još nekoliko sličnih poređenja. Greh je prekršaj božanskog, crkvenog ili građanskog zakona sa snažnom dodatnom komponentom moralne osude. U katoličkoj i protestantskoj teologiji gresi se dele na smrtno i na lake, a na ispovedi se mogu priznati svi smrtni gresi. U pravoslavlju toga nema iako su i ovde grešni na Strašnom sudu osuđeni na oganj večni (vladika Nikolaj Omilije). Analogno tome, laki gresi se razrešavaju u parnici (na ispovedi), a smrtni su predmet krivičara (inkvizicije). Jedan od smrtnih grehova je huljenje boga ili jeres, koji zaslužuje beskrajnu muku – pakao. Dok u pravosuđu država goni okrivljenog, u teologiji je grešnik dužnik bogu. Priznanje jeste donekle slično ispovedi, ali se instance isleđivanja razlikuju po normativnoj strukturi. U prvom slučaju okrivljenog samo država može pomilovati, u drugom, grešniku samo bog može oprostiti. Bez odslužene kazne nema priznate resocijalizacije, a bez okajanog greha nema spasenja. Samo se grešni, dakle, svi izuzev Boga, i spasavaju, kao što se samo okrivljeni mogu osloboditi.

Upravo na pretećoj upotrebi ove neupitne hijerarhizacije između spasitelja i spasenih, počivaju raznovrsni konzervativizmi. Da u njihovom antropoškom pesimizmu nema vizije paternalističke božje pomoći, tj. onog aksioma da pojedinac ne može izgraditi samostalan odnos prema svetu zasnovan na racionalnom odnosu prema kraju života, moglo bi se bar uslovno govoriti o nekoj toleranciji kod konzervativizma. Tolerancije, međutim, nema tamo gde su nesamostalni upućeni na Božju pomoć i gde nevidljivi svemogućí arbitar pomaže pravdom, milošću i

osvetom? Teolozi kažu da beskrajno dobri i strogi bog svima određuje sudbinu, a grešne izvodi na Strašni sud. Religijska vertikalna greh-kajanje-ispajanje-iskupljenje može se uslovno porediti sa sličnom svetovnom vezom između krivičnog dela, priznanja, izdržavanja kazne i oslobođenja. Ova podudarnost nije nipošto slučajna ako se ima na umu već pomenuta Šmitova odredba o vezi teologije i svetovnog zakonodavstva i njegova izričita tvrdnja: „Vanredno stanje ima za jurisprudenciju sličan značaj kao što ga ima čudo za teologiju“ (C. Schmitt, 2004: 43). Nije reč o pukom poređenju vanrednog stanja sa biblijskom zamisli čuda, nego i o realnom stanju u 17. veku gde je monarh u državi izjednačavan sa bogom i imao istu ulogu koju je bog imao u kartezijanskoj slici sveta. I ovde je suveren postuliran kao tvorac u krajnjoj liniji (C. Schmitt, 2004: 51). Tek se u 19. veku uklanjaju teističke i transcendentne naslage državne legitimnosti i republika lagano odmiče od božje milosti. Pomenute analogije nisu potpuno formalne, jer se mesto smrti može potpunije shvatiti tek ako se ima na umu teološki ili laički kvalifikovana ustanova koja donosi odluku o kažnjavanju pre ili nakon prekida života. Naravno da se realno vešanje na trgu ne može porediti sa fiktivnim mukama u paklu, ali što se dublje ide u prošlost, to je sličniji smisao zaprećene kazne vešanjem ili paklom, a i strah od ovih kazni.

Nije bez značaja ni podsećanje da su tek radikalne promene s kraja 18. veka otvorile put i onom saznanju da se politička teologija ne da razumeti bez methodske srodnosti teologije i jurisprudencije, na koju je, osim K. Šmita, ukazivao i Hans Kelsen (*Kelsen*). O čemu se radi? Lako je uvideti da, formalno gledano, i kod Boga i kod sudstva postoji pretpostavka o svevidećem arbitru koji reguliše ili greh ili krivicu. To što je u prvom slučaju autoritet iracionalnog sudije fiktivan i iskonstruisan, ne umanjuje u normativnom pogledu važnost ove imaginarne instance. Premda je slava Boga srazmerna količini prokletih, božja instanca, pored zastrašivanja, služi i redukciji nepregledne i nelagodne složenosti društva. Uz božju volju, koja kontroliše pravdu, milost i osvetu, izgledaju mnogo jasniji uzroci protivrečnih i haotičnih zbivanja, sukoba i nasilja. I danas bi bez Boga u svesti mnogih vernika nastao haos i pometnja. Dakle, ako se ima na umu nelagoda haosa, koju je u svesti neobrazovanog sveta u prošlosti svladavala božja volja, onda je i njena politička upotreba shvatljivija. Naravno da je i sama misterija života nakon smrti uz pomoć boga kao reduktora složenosti manje zagonetna. Verska tatanopolitika je najpre mistifikovala grešno biće, a zatim redukovala njegovo nastajanje i nestajanje uz pomoć božje volje. U proceduralnom

pregledu, ispoved je saslušanje, a oprost i ispaštanje su moguće presude. Analogno tome, čistilište je neka vrsta pritvora, a pakao zatvor. Nisu ni na zemlji svi jednaki. Mnogo je pozvanih (koje Bog štiti), a malo izabranih (koji koriste dodeljenu milost) (Delimo 1986: II 639). Da pri tome teologija nije uvela milost, kaznu, greh i bogougodne vrline, manje bi se radilo o politici, a više o mistici. Ali budući da je uvela posmrtno nagrađivanje i kažnjavanje, i uz sve to jasno razgraničila javnog prijatelja od javnog neprijatelja (boga i sotonu), teologija je nužno morala postati politička teologija. Unutar političke teologije središnje mesto zauzima upotreba smrti kao sudnjeg dana (ročišta) odnosno manipulacija pretnjom od onostrane kazne ili obećanjem isto tako onostranog blagostanja koje može biti shvaćeno kao blaženstvo ili kao zemlja Dembelija. Maštovita geografija drugog sveta nije samo pretila paklom nego i apokalipsom: „Sotona će biti puštena s lanca“. Služila se, naravno, i rajem, obećanim vrtom naslada i zabranom lišenim smrti, bola, zla i, što je možda i bilo najvažnije, obećavala je stanje bez straha.

213

Strah od stanja nakon smrti razgorevao se opisima postmortalnog kažnjavanja prilikom kojih se politička teologija obilno služila dramatizacijom. Propovednici su isticali „proždirući plamen i večnu jaru pakla“, večne muke kojima se najlakše može uzburkati duša, izazvati strah od Gospoda i podstaći na pokajanje (Sveti Kiril Aleksandrijski). Naravno da propovedanje nije puko nabranje, nego više od toga – dramski strukturisana pretnja koja aktivno utiče na stvaranje moralne svesti. Dosledno tome, sveštenici sa predikaonice redukuju neukima kaos i nejasnoće, tumače prošlost i budućnost dramtizovanim, a ne suvo-
parnim besedama, obećanjima blaženstva i pretnjama sotonom, i na taj način spajaju preko kategorija spasenja i greha pojedinca sa kolektivom. Vešta sveštencička retorika, kao ona N. Velimirovića, virtuoza fikcije, sugestivno nameće politička i moralna uputstva (vladika Nikolaj Omilije). Kao u svakoj političkoj propagandi, i u tanatopolitici su vrlo važna usmena veština ubeđivanja, skladno pripovedačko povezivanje dešavanja i sračunata dramtizacija. Naročito su uverljive metafore o paklu uvek ostavljale prostor za maštovitu preteću priču. Muke koje trpe prokleti predstavljane su kao duhovne, telesne i večne. Kod opisa pakla nije se radilo o metaforama, nego o sugerisanju realnog mesta večne patnje gde gori vatra, vije se gust dim, a prokleti se kuvaju u usijanom kotlu sa kipućim uljem i u užarenoj peći sa rastopljenim olovom. Neki teolozi su crkvenoj besedi o večnoj mucu u paklu prigovarali to što Bog večnom kaznom kažnjava greh. Odgovor je bio vrlo sholastički – da je i duša koja je

grešila bila besmrtna, pa joj je otuda i potrebna muka prema njenoj prirodi (Delimo 1986: II 582). Važnija od ovog odgovora bila je neiscrpna mašta zastrašivanja paklom u političkoj teologiji.

Uostalom, i čitava Biblija je sugestivna i dramski vešto oblikovana priča o žrtvi, trpljenju, gresima, smrti i vaskrsenju. Neukima se ne prilazi teorijom nego pričom. Pri tome narativni sadržaji direktno ili indirektno moraliziraju i kroje smisao životu i smrti. Kao u svim veštinama ubeđivanja, i u crkvenoj retorici najpre treba konstruisati kontekst, pa unutar njega oštro markirati polove. Osnovna binarna suprotnost nije konstruisana između života i smrti, nego između spasenja i prokletstva, jer se ova druga napetost lakše moralizuje nego prva. Vaskrs, anđeli i sotona su samo pomoćne retoričke figure.

214

Na božjem sudu krivica se ne sastoji samo u kršenju zakona, nego i morala. Da bi se razni gresi izbegli, nužna je pokornost Bogu i caru. Greh je zavist, ali pre svega prema bogatima, jer ova rađa bune, pohlepu za vlašću i mržnju, pa je gora i od smrti, pisao je Toma Akvinski. Pakao čeka okrivljene za taj greh (cit. prema Delimo 1986 I: 318). Crkva je upozoravala da se na zemlji ne vredi buniti protiv nepravde, pa je i kažnjavanje nepravednih bogataša ostavljala za strašni Sud, gde će zle kazniti Sve-mogući. Do tada se valjalo naoružati strpljenjem (Delimo 1986: II 628). „Blaženi siromasi“, propovedali su sveštenici, a Bosije je govorio o „uzvišenom dostojanstvu siromaha“ (Delimo 1986: II 657). Ove cinične poruke crkve uokviravane su Isusovim zavetom „Caru carevo“, koji je teološki direktno propisivao političku pokornost i poslušnost.

Premda ovde nije teško prepoznati ogoljenu tanatopolitičku apologiju pokornosti vladajućim snagama feudalnog poretka, bilo bi uprošćeno tumačiti je samo u ideološko-kritičkom smislu. Treba, naime, uvek imati na umu da se hrišćanska teološka kazuistika, a naročito moralisanje smrti, katkada gubila u spekulativnim domišljanjima smrti koja su izvirala iz autohtone strepnje od nestanka kod nepismenog naroda, ali i kod samih sveštenika. Sve do današnjeg dana, ove dve bojazni su se u raznim fazama manje ili više preplitale ili suprotstavljale. Utoliko treba priznati da nije politički korišćen samo strah od smrti sirotinje, nego i ista strepnja bogatih. Ne treba zaboraviti da su duhovni strahovi od Svemogućeg i od Sotone (iskušenja) i prokletstva zahvatali i sveštenstvo. To što je i vrh katoličkog klera nekada proživljavao stravu od smrti (Delimo 1983 I 491; II, 513–514), a verovatno i danas, samo pokazuje da, uprkos raznim pripisivanjima, strepnja od smrti ostaje antropološka

konstanta. Ako su se i popovi bojali smrti, nije li religija bila i za njih opijum, a ne samo za narod?

Ili se možda, ako se ode korak dalje, može čak tvrditi da opšta raširenost ove strepnje svedoči o tome da je teologizacija smrti bila klasno neutralna? Nikako, i to ne samo otuda što je ovozemaljski život bio u klasnom pogledu vrlo različit, nego i stoga što je i samo svladavanje straha od smrti bilo u klasnom pogledu drugačije. Vladari su bili kadri da se brane od zaborava verskim zadužbinama, donacijama i impresivnim spomenicima kao zalogom večnog pamćenja. Sveštenstvo je zaborav svladavalo različitim unutarcrkvenim rangiranjem zaslužnih podvižnika. Javni zaborav stizao je samo podvlašćene čije su vrline ostajale u privatnom krugu porodice. Rečju, dominacija je pamćena, trpljenje je zaboravljano, a empatije nije bilo. Uostalom, tako Bog miluje. Selektivnu božju milost oštro je prozreo Niče, kada je razlažući podložnost i trpljenje veri konstatovao da „bogovi svakako na nas mogu gledati nemilostivo zbog sreće, a milostivo zbog našeg trpljenja – nikako ne sapatnički“ i dodao: „milostivo zato što ih prizor ljudskog trpljenja dovodi u dobro raspoloženje i daje im osećanje moći“ (Niče 1979: 21). Ničeova ironija se ovde, naravno, odnosi na sveštenstvo, a za njega je teologija pre svega strahopoštovanje.

215

Ničeova kritika religije je odveć otvorena da bi je trebalo domišljati. Ovde su neke njegove ocene navedene da bi se izbeglo relativističko tumačenje smrti u teologiji i jasno definisale oprečne sastavnice političke teologije. Simbolika same Isusove smrti jeste svakako ključna teološka metafora spasenja kroz trpljenje i mogla je svakoj vlasti biti korisna. Ali ne treba smetnuti s uma ne manje politički korisno pomeranje i izvrtnje smisla u rastegljivim biblijskim metaforama o smrti i o vaskrsu moralizovane žrtve. Nema nikakve sumnje da je Biblija katkada služila i sprečavanju nepravdi, nudeći kao naknadu pravednima, doduše, maštovita mistična praštanja nakon smrti. Doduše, i u svakoj politici se razna trpljenja pravednika pravdaju „višim“ životom i gipkom mističnom vezom sa raznim političkim kolektivima. Ovde samo treba dodati da utehe raznih propovednika o tome da što se više strada u ovom životu, to će manje imati da se pati u onom drugom, možda i mogu smirivati napaćene, ali su uvek u temelju političke, jer pozivaju na pokornost poretku.

Uprkos prikazanim srodnostima, verska obećanja ipak nisu isto što i politička. Dok politika obećava večno pamćenje hrabrima, dotle religija nagrađuje i smerno trpljenje. Crkva nudi nešto drugačiju utehu i

surogat istinskog posmrtnog života, i to ne samo hrabrima nego i bojažljivima koji život doživljavaju kao strah od smrti. Dosledno rečenom, ne mogu se iracionalna crkvena podgrevanja strepnje od kazne nakon smrti i razna zastrašivanja u cilju podsticanja trpljenja tumačiti u istom smislu kao i političke pretnje. Naime, nikakvoj emancipaciji ne doprinose razna obezvređivanja ličnosti, zastrašivanje Sudnjim danom, niti širenje straha od večnog prokletstva koji podstiče pripremu za smrt. Još manje pojedinca oslobađa podsticanje straha od svetogrđa i nuđenje crkvenog odrešenja. Kako može oslobađati retorika političke teologije koja veliča trpljenje? Nikako. Uprkos osobenosti teološkog diskursa, ipak nije nimalo slučajno što je pomenute strepnje, strahove, melanholijske i malodušnosti koje je podsticala crkva, na sličan način manje ili više koristila i politika. Strah od Strašnog suda, osećanje grešnosti i žeđ za poniznošću pred sudbinom nisu nikakve autentične ljudske potrebe. Naprotiv, podučavanje skrušenosti i smernosti prema raznim autoritetima koje Bog miluje (ocu, popu i monarhu) jesu klasična konzervativna sredstva podvlašćivanja.

Utoliko je potrebnije podvući da je antropološki pesimizam jezgro svake tanatopolitike koja preta kaznom nakon smrti. Sa istog razloga je pojmljivo zašto je teologija uzor svim konzervativcima. Lek je vera, krštenje i pokajanje i sve one vrline koje garantuju pokornost Bogu i njegovim slugama. Ispovest je vrlo važan ritual. Delimo ide čak dotle, da tvrdi da su odluka o obaveznom ispovedanju doneta na IV lateralnom koncilu 1215. i njena kazuistika duboko promenile mentalitet civilizacije (Delimo 1986 I: 316). Crkveno tumačenje smrti je u krajnjoj liniji iracionalno. Na pitanje: „Zašto Bog dopušta smrt nevinih?“, italijanski dominikanac Bartolomeo Spina (*Spina*) odgovara 1523: „To čini s pravom. Jer, ako i ne umiru zbog grehova koje su sami počinili, oni umiru uvek grešni zbog prvobitnog greha“ (Delimo 1986 I: 366). Dijalektika greha i spasenja je maštovita i cinična. Prvobitni greh Adamov što je jeo voća sa drveta saznanja doveo je do nereda i greha, ali zahvaljujući žrtvi na krstu, ponuđeni su nada i spasenje. Da nada nije bila nada u onostrano, možda bi i bila autentična.

Hrišćanske crkve i danas svuda i neprekidno suočavaju pastvu sa grehom i kaznom. Pakao i Strašni sud su postmortalna mesta svođenja konačnog računa. Najmučnija od svih patnji koju duše trpe u čistilištu jeste neizvesnost u pogledu njihovog spasa. Da na strahu od kazne ne počiva i poštovanje svetovnog prava, srodnost teologije sa jurisprudencijom bila bi svakako slučajnija. Ali nije tako. Ne svedoči samo čistilište,

fiktivno sudilište, o tome da je veza politike i teologije složena, nego i čitav niz savremenih klerikalizovanih političkih stanja gde je granica između politike i religije nejasna, ali stabilna. Premda su heroji pretežno žrtve za ideologiju, a mučenici za veru, savremena dobrovoljna žrtvovanja počivaju na različitim vizijama spasenja i onostranog. S obzirom na to da zanose i ekstaze ideologizovanih heroja i božanstvom nadahnutih mučenika vezuje ekstatična uzvišena smrt, tanatopolitičko poređenje ovih stanja se samo po sebi nameće. Ako se uz rečeno ima na umu da pravda povezuje sfere prava, religije i morala (Asman 2011: 241), već time je i poređenje upotrebe smrti u teologiji i politici smislenije. Upravo otuda istorično definisan pojam političke teologije može pomoći kod poređenja onih sklopova koji su manje ili više iracionalno teološki ili racionalno tanatopolitički akcentovani.

Primljeno: 29. januar 2014.

Prihvaćeno: 10. april 2014.

217

Literatura

- Asman, Jan (2011), *Kultura pamćenja* – pismo, sećanje i politički identitet u ranim visokim kulturama, Beograd: Prosveta.
- Delimo, Žan (1986), *Greh i strah* – Stvaranje osećanja krivice na Zapadu od XIV do XVIII veka I, II, Novi Sad: Književna zajednica.
- Le Gof, Ž. (1992), *Nastanak čistilišta*, Novi Sad: Izdavačka knjižarnica Z. Stojanovića.
- Niče, Fridrih (1979), *Osvit* – misli o moralnim predrasudama, Beograd: Rad.
- Schmitt, Axel (2001), 'Politische Theologie' und Tod – Jan Assmanns Rettung ägyptischer Kultur vor der Vereinnahmung durch abendländische Diskurse, *Literaturkritik.de*, 11. 3.
- Schmitt Carl (2004), *Politische Theologie* – Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von Souveränität, 8. Auflage, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot.
- Sveti Kiril Aleksandrijski, *Reč o ishodu duše i strašnom sudu*, (internet) dostupno na: http://www.pravoslavni-odgovor.com/Crkva_Hristova/ishod_duse_i_Strasni_Sud.htm (pristupljeno marta 2013).
- Tadić, Lj. (2003), *Zagonetka smrti* – Smrt kao tema religije i filozofije, Beograd: Filip Višnjić.
- Vladika Nikolaj Omilije, *Nedelja mesopusna – Jevandlje o Strašnom sudu*, (internet) dostupno na: <http://www.svetosavlje.org/biblioteka/vlNikolaj/Omilije1/Nikolaj040111.htm> (pristupljeno marta 2013).

Todor Kuljić

Political theology: possibility of comparison
of the usage of death in theology and politics

Abstract

This paper considers the epistemological value of the concept of political theology in thanatopolitics. The concept can be useful if one wants to interpret political usage of death. In addition to blurred boundaries between politics and theology, there is a more general and deeper socially integrative affinity between the two. In addition, there have been various politicizations of salvation in the past and in the present. Every political theology accentuates obedience as an immanent condition of salvation, although interpretation of death in political theology has a different function than in secular ideologies. In the centre of politically theological ideas one can find crosscutting of the divisions between public friend and public enemy from political world with similar divisions from religious world. Finally, beside the theological influence on politics, this paper considers some analogies between theology and the secular judiciary.

218

Keywords: political theology, salvation, justice, sin, guilt.

IN MEMORIAM – LJUBOMIR TADIĆ (1925–2013) IV

Mirjana Radojičić (prir.)

Trivo Indić

Institut za evropske studije
Beograd

Onom najboljem što je kao misao socijalistički pokret u južnoslovenskim zemljama iznedrio, od Svetozara Markovića do Vase Pelagića, od Skerlića i Dimitrija Mitrinovića do Gaje Petrovića i Dobrice Ćosića, pripada i opus Ljubomira Tadića. Veliki deo toga misaonog toka u prošlom veku prekinula je Staljinova čelična pesnica i tiranija dogme koju je vaspоставio u Trećoj Internacionali (Sima Marković, Filip Filipović, Kosta Novaković, Milan Gorkić, i drugi), a njegovi naslednici i sledbenici u Jugoslaviji takođe su dali svoj dopinos fizičkoj i duhovnoj likvidaciji svega što je mislilo u tom pokretu (setimo se samo spiska „izdajnika“ u zvaničnom organu KPJ „Proleter“ iz maja 1939. i Brozovog članka u njemu pod naslovom „Trockizam i njegovi pomagači“, slučaja Kerestinec iz 1941, sudbine Augusta Cesareca, Price, Adžije, Rihtmana, Keršovanija, Masleše, Živojina Pavlovića, Labuda Kusovca, itd). U vreme vlasti Josipa Broza zatiranje istinski leve, socijalističke kritičke inteligencije bilo je ugrađeno u sam politički sistem jedne partije i jednog vođe i opšte cenzure pod zakonskom etiketom „moralno-političke podobnosti“.

Ljubomir Tadić je rođen 1925. u Smriječnu, na hudom i posnom pivljanskom nebotačniku (Staroj Hercegovini), u porodici dokazanih rebela i rodoljuba, na planinama koje su, prema Cvijiću i Jaši Prodanoviću, u našem dinarskom civilizacijskom krugu bile čuvari kulturne i nacionalne osobenosti i demokratskih ideala plemenskog društva održavanog sve do sredine prošlog veka. Sa šesnaest godina, Tadić je 1941. iz nikšićke gimnazije otišao u partizane, preživevši ratnu epopeju oslobodilačke borbe, ali i gorko iskustvo tragičnih razdora i nesporeduma među samim antifašistima, koje su svojim životima platili i članovi njegove najbliže porodice.

Studirao je pravne nauke u Sarajevu i Beogradu, a doktorirao u Ljubljani 1959. sa tezom o Hansu Kelsenu i teoriji „čistog prava“. Bio je profesor Pravnog fakulteta u Sarajevu do 1962, a onda prelazi u Beograd gde je,

prvo, upravnik Odeljenja za pravne nauke Instituta društvenih nauka, a od 1965. redovni profesor Odeljenja za filozofiju i sociologiju Filozofskog fakulteta, za predmet Sociologija politike i prava. Na zahtev Josipa Broza, u januaru 1975. Skupština Srbije donosi odluku o isključenju osam profesora Filozofskog fakulteta u Beogradu iz radnog odnosa, zbog političke nepodobnosti. Među njima je bio i Ljubomir Tadić.

Kada je knjaz Nikola pozvao u Biljardu sve glavare da utvrde naslednost prestola, tj. njegovu dinastiju, tadašnji upravitelj narodnih škola, Vasa Pelagić (proteran iz Srbije, pa zatražio utočište u Crnoj Gori), izjasnio se za republikanski izborni sistem i protiv ambicije knjaževke. „Za 24 ure da te moje oko nije videlo na Cetinju!“, uzviknuo je knjaz. Tako je, u logici despotije, prošao i Ljubomir Tadić, kada je, kao savetnik komisije za izradu novog jugoslovenskog ustava, početkom šezdesetih, izjavljivao da je demokratskiji ustav u kome je predsednik republike ličnost sa ograničenim mandatom, a ne (kako će biti zapisano) „bez ograničenog mandata“. To mu Broz nikad nije oprostio, pa je najuren iz komisije, iz Saveza komunističara, ali i sa univerziteta.

Jedan je od osnivača jugoslovenske intelektualne zajednice poznate kao Grupa Praxis (1964), koja je razvila snažnu teorijsku kritiku tadašnjeg vladajućeg državnog, autoritarnog socijalizma i u praktičnoj politici branila pravo na ljudske i građanske slobode, pravo na dijalog i slobodu pojedinca kao uslov slobode za sve, demokratski pluralizam i pravnu državu. Obnavljajući Marksovo načelo „bespoštedne kritike svega postojećeg“, razvijajući nasleđe Roze Luxemburg (Luxemburg – „Nema socijalizma bez demokratije“), Gramšija (Gramsci), kritičke teorije Frankfurtskog kruga i drugih radikalno levih alternativa, ova grupa je ušla u sukob sa oficijelnom dogmom u tadašnjoj Jugoslaviji, i zbog toga su njena delatnost, objavljivanje časopisa *Praxis* i rad njene međunarodne letnje škole (Korčulanska škola) 1974. godine bili zabranjeni.

Deo ove grupe, u kojoj je bio i Tadić, nastavio je da izdaje časopis u Londonu, na engleskom jeziku, kao međunarodno izdanje.

Tadić je jedan od najaktivnijih i najradikalnijih političkih analitičara ove grupe, o čemu svedoče njegovi brojni tekstovi i preko dvadeset knjiga koje je napisao, a među kojima su i one koje je Brozov režim sudskim zabranama uklanjao još i pre izlaska iz štamparije. Bio je i glavni urednik beogradskog časopisa *Filosofija* koji je, takođe, zabranjivan i na kraju ukinut odlukom vlasti. Sa Dobricom Ćosićem u oktobru 1980. pokrenuo je nezavisni levi časopis *Javnost*, ali vlasti nisu dozvolile njegovo objavljivanje. Sa Ćosićem je, takođe, 1984. osnovao Odbor za odbranu slobode misli i izražavanja, koji je štiti prava na nezavisno mišljenje svih onih koji su u Jugoslaviji dolazili u sukob sa režimom. Bio je gostujući profesor na mnogim univerzitetima u svetu, a njegovi radovi prevedeni su na strane jezike.

Njegova izabrana dela objavljena su u Beogradu 2008. godine u sedam tomova. To su knjige izuzetne erudicije, jasne misli i pitkog stila, u sazvežđu najboljeg što je napisano kod nas u oblasti društvenih i humanističkih nauka. Svaka njegova knjiga je bila čin slobode koji služi slobodi, prihvaćena od mladih generacija i pre juna 1968, kada je sa pobunjenim studentima na novobeogradskom Podvožnjaku osetio penetre Brozove policije.

Posedovao je enormnu snagu razuma i sposobnost dubokog promišljanja: opažao je i uočavao mnogo i široko, uvek lučio dobro od zla, pravdu od nepravde, istinu od laži i mudrost od lukavstva i privotstva. Raspolagao je merilima znanja kojima se moglo verovati. Takvi ljudi su, rekao bih, „so soli“ Zemljine. Ispovedao je javno sumnju, nevericu u red i poredak zasnovan na ličnim privilegijama, uzurpaciji vlasti, socijalnim razlikama i paragrafskoj pravdi, i u takvom svetu video „otrovnu klicu narodnih nesreća i beda, omraza i svakovrsnih rđavština, religioznih i nacionalnih lažarija

i eksploatatorskih nedjela“ (Pelagić). Nepoverljiv prema svakom poretku, sem poretka slobode, gnušao se režima utemeljenih na nasilju, zatiranju dijaloga i upotrebi sile.

U duši je ostao komunar, mišlju i ponašanjem liberterski socijalist, koji se najrađe identifikovao kao sledbenik one škole mišljenja koju oličava Roza Luksemburg. I kasnije, kada su se mnogi saborci iz 1968. razišli i preobratali u profesionalne funkcionere novoutemeljene demokratije, Tadić je ostao gde je bio – van režimske politike i milosti, radikalni republikanac, neprilagodljiv, nepotkupljiv, svojeglav, van protokola, van unosnih poslova i titula, plebejac koji deli sudbinu svoga naroda. Nikad mu nije pala na pamet misao da bi mogao nekim dominirati. Uvek se klonio šefovanja u svim ustanovama u kojima je radio ili morao da se prihvati poslova predvodnika. Mrzeo je, kao što reče Kropotkin (Кропоткин) za Reklia, i najmanji znak duha željnog dominacije. Verovao je da čovek može bolje živeti a da ne teži vladati drugim, i tako se ponašao.

Nauku o politici tumačio je kao potragu za spregom borbe za opšte dobro, istinu i slobodu. Rehabilitujući praktičnu filosofiju u Aristotelovom značenju, posebno u domenu politike i prava, Tadić je stvorio osobenu kritičku teoriju slobode i demokratije, na fonu ličnog iskustva sa dva totalitarna sistema dvadesetog veka: fašizma i staljinizma. Shvatajući politiku kao učenje o oslobođenju i kao permanentni zahtev za višim slobodama, ljudskim dostojanstvom i odbranom stvaralačkih potencijala slobodnih i jednakih pojedinaca u zajednici, Tadić je porekao svaku vrednosnu neutralnost nauke, pragmatizam realpolitike i ambiciju da se apologetikom ukloni svaka intencija ka promeni, revolucionisanju postojećeg, izopačenog sveta. Ovo razumevanje politike kao sinteze teorijskog i delatnog, praktičnog života, odbacuje ideju politike kao tehnike vladanja i etičke ravnodušnosti. Dilema poredak ili sloboda prevazilazi se Tadićevim nastojanjima da koncipira poredak

slobode (*Ordo libertatis*) oko koga će gravitirati sva njegova teorijska istraživanja, ali i lična sudbina.

Zato ga je kritika volje za moć, za dominacijom, usmerila da nauku o politici koncipira kao jednu teoriju oslobođenja ili emancipacije, odlučno odbijajući da se ona pretvori u slugu vlasti, apologiju datog poretka, tj. ustoliči kao metafizika porobljavanja. On je bitno doprineo renesansi Marksove (Marx) misli u vreme kada je ta misao u jednom delu sveta bila poricana kao ideologija subverzivnih snaga, a u drugom („real-socijalističkom“) bila pretvorena u državnu religiju čiji je vrhovni žrec bio Staljin. Politiku i pravo nikada nije lučio od etike, nije ih video lišene sudova vrednosti, poričući tako pozitivizam i „čistu nauku“ kao ornament moralne ravnodušnosti prema uzurpaciji i tiraniji vlasti. Tadićeva misao kritike uvek je denuncirala poslušne „realiste“ i intelektualce „građanskog reda“ i „mirnog života“, nalazeći da je u praktičnoj i umnoj negaciji šansa za prevlast slobode nad sudbinom, ljudskog dostojanstva nad poniženjem i ugnjetavanjem čoveka, istine nad laži i pravde nad nepravdom (kako je govorio u pristupnoj akademskoj besedi u SANU).

Pravnik po obrazovanju, filosof po vokaciji, Tadić je svoje osnovno uverenje u tim nazgled razmeđenim disciplinama objasnio pozivajući se na Kantov (Kant) stav da se pravnik, koji po svom moralu nije istovremeno i filosof, nalazi u najvećem iskušenju, jer mu je dužnost samo da primenjuje postojeće zakone, a ne da ispituje treba li te zakone usavršiti: „Jer kako njihov posao nije da sami mudruju o zakonodavstvu, nego da sprovede postojeća naređenja zemaljskog prava, to im uvek mora izgledati najbolje ono zakonsko uređenje koje upravo postoji ili, kada ono bude izmenjeno sa najvišeg mesta, ono sledeće, i tako je sve u svom odgovarajućem mehaničkom redu.“ Od ove Kantove osude pravnog pozitivizma, Tadić će i samu filosofiju prava *stricto sensu*, kao disciplinu, odrediti kao čedo nemačkog klasičnog idealizma, i pri

tome učiniti korak ka Hegelu (Hegel) koji je Kantovu emancipaciju volje od prirode, kao slobodnu (ili misleću) volju pretočio u supstanciju i određenje prava, proglasivši pri tome pravni sistem carstvom ostvarene slobode (Hegel: *Filosofija prava*). Smeštajući svoju misao u toplu struju evropskog liberterskog nasleđa (posebno od Rusoa pa nadalje, preko mislilaca i prakse Francuske revolucije), nije nikakvo iznenađenje što se ona, u svom izboru po srodnosti, prepoznala u Hegelovom projektu prava kao ograničavanja ne sloboda nego samovolje. Rehabilitujući Hegelovo uverenje da je sloboda supstancija prava, a da su sila i prinuda, „apstaktno uzevši“, nešto neprihvatljivo, tj. da je filosofija prava filosofija slobode, Tadić će se pridružiti onima koji smatraju da je humanitet osnov svakog prava, da je dostojanstvo čoveka izraz priznanja prava na samoodređenje i prava na slobodnu egzistenciju pojedinca, da je (prizivajući Paskala) pravda bez sile nemoćna, a sila bez pravde nasilnička.

Čitava Tadićeva filosofija prava utemeljena je na negaciji sile i prinude zaodenutih u ruho prava. Zato se on posebno koncentrisao na kritiku pravnog pozitivizma, koji je kao pravo priznao i svaku uzurpaciju i samovolju ukoliko je efikasna, tj. ukoliko uspe da nametne svoje „važenje“, ukoliko „fizičko nasilje“ učini legitimnim. Ako se pravo redukuje na pozitivne, važeće zakone i sudske odluke, ako se tvrdi da onaj ko može da sprovede pravo time dokazuje i da je pozvan da postavlja pravo, ako se time briše razlika između pravnog poretka i poretka uzurpacije („Pravedno je ono što koristi jakome“ – citira Tadić sofistu Trazimaha), onda dobijamo „pravnu nauku bez prava“. U našem veku – piše Tadić misleći na 20. vek – u veku terorističkih orgija nacifašizma i staljinističkog boljševizma, formulisane su pravno-pozitivističke teorije koje su priznavale pravni karakter i despotским režimima, opravdavajući takav stav tobožnjom naučnom objektivnošću i ideološkom nepristrasnošću. Ako bi se država definisala kao monopol fizičkog nasilja ili kao „monopol

legitimnog fizičkog nasilja“, onda bi se kao *ultima ratio* svake političke organizacije proglasila pretnja i primena nasilja, odnosno iracionalnost prinuđivanja. Lučeci političke i etičke pojmove, podvajajući pravo i pravdu i pripisujući prvom objektivnost, a drugom subjektivnost (subjektivni osećaj), pravni pozitivizam – kaže Tadić – smatra da niko ne može definisati pojam pravde i pravednog. Odbacujući pravni pozitivizam, Tadić je pravdu smatrao kritičkom instancom važećeg prava, „nekom vrstom apelacione instance“, sinonimom za pravomernost i nepristrasnost koje počivaju na priznavanju jednakosti među ljudima. Zato je Tadić filosofiju prava prihvatao kao istraživanje smisla prava i pravde u ljudskom svetu i njen zadatak video u ispitivanju kriterijuma pravde u društvenom životu, najtešnje povezanom sa ispitivanjem kriterijuma slobode, pri tome se stalno pozivajući na onaj Marksov zahtev, ili kategorički imperativ „da se sruše svi odnosi u kojima je čovek poniženo, prezreno, porobljeno i napušteno biće“. To je, dakle, značilo da uzurpacija i „pravo jačega“ ne mogu biti priznati kao principi – govorio je Tadić – a upravo ljudsko dostojanstvo jeste i mora biti genuini princip svakog umnog prava.

Insistirajući na tesnoj vezi morala i politike, prava i pravde, etike i delatnog života u zajednici, kao pouzdanom sredstvu za prepoznavanje i kritiku izopačenih oblika države i politike uopšte, Tadićeva kritička nauka o politici i pravu prihvata dijalog kao središte filosofije politike i umetnosti političkog života, kao volju za razumevanjem učesnika, poštovanje njihove slobode i nepovredivosti, tj. jednakosti i uzajamnosti. Otuda i Tadićeva obnova retorike, retoričkog agona kao argumentativnog mišljenja. Odnos uma i slobode i problem racionalnog delovanja, Tadić rešava zahtevom da se ne odvajaju teorija od prakse, sloboda od stvarnog života i njegovih ustanova. Zato je kritika instrumentalnog uma i modernog pozitivizma, posebno „naučne“ politike i pravnog pozitivizma, bitan doprinos naučnog dela Ljubomira Tadića.

Duh slobode, bratstva i jednakosti širio je gde god je radio ili u bilo kom društvu se nalazio. Tako je postupao i u godinama raspada druge, brionske Jugoslavije, kada su njeni narodi ušli u krvave građanske i verske sukobe, uveren kako je tzv. nacionalno pitanje (o kome je takođe mnogo pisao) uvek bilo i ostalo pitanje o demokratiji i ustanovama slobode i mogućnostima individuuma da u potpunosti, u zajednici slobodnih i jednakih, lišenoj, dakle, svakog

etnocentrizma, verskog fanatizma i šovinizma, razvije svoje ljudske potencijale. Što je tražio za druge, to je tražio i za Srbe, svečan vrednosti i ograničenja vlastitog etničkog i kulturnog identiteta.

On je ostvario sebe, ali je formirao i druge, pružao je i davao nesebično i zato bio voljen i cenjen ne samo od svojih sledbenika.

Slava mu i hvala!

LJUBOMIR TADIĆ ILI POSVEĆENOST PRINCIPU SLOBODE

Slobodan Divjak

Treći program Radio Beograda
Beograd

Čast je, ali i velika odgovornost, pisati o stvaralaštvu i javnom angažmanu Ljubomira Tadića, jedne od najznačajnijih ličnosti naše društvene teorije i javnog života posle Drugog svetskog rata. Iza njega stoji ogroman stvaralački opus, koji, po svome značaju, prevazilazi granice naše zemlje, ali i bogata moralna biografija koja svedoči o kontinuiranoj privrženosti kulturi otpora svakoj represivnoj logici, pa i onoj koja se vrši u ime uzvišenih humanističkih ideala. Ako bismo na najsažetiji način hteli odrediti temeljni unutrašnji *spiritus movens* njegove teorijske i praktičke delatnosti, onda bi se bez ikakvih zazora i rezervi moglo reći da je to bio motiv slobode. Jer traganje za poretkom koji će omogućiti zajednički život ljudi, uz najveći mogući stepen individualnih sloboda – to je bilo ono što je obeležilo čitav njegov teorijski i javno-politički angažman. Ovo insistiranje na unutrašnjoj vezi između poretka i individualne slobode on je, na najapstraktnijem nivou, najeksplicitnije iskazao u svojoj knjizi *Poredak i sloboda* u kojoj je sintetisao oba pojma u stavu da *nema slobode bez poretka*. Tim stavom on se, s jedne strane, suprotstavio koncepcijama po kojima su moguće neograničene individualne slobode, svestan činjenice da je sistem apsolutnih individualnih sloboda samopotirući sistem, jer bi nužno, pošto mu je imanentna logika prava jačega, doveo do uspostavljanja tiranije najjačega ili najjačih, tj. do dominacije moći i sile nad individualnim pravima. S druge strane, on je tim pristupom odbacio i koncepcije „poretka neslobode“, u kojem se individualna prava instrumentalizuju i žrtvuju u ime viših ciljeva ili državnog razloga. Drugim rečima, on je poredak slobode uvek pretpostavljao slobodi poretka. Glavni razlog zbog kojeg se on u svom mladačkom periodu priklonio marksizmu bilo je njegovo ubeđenje da je Marks (Marx) mislilac slobode i ljudskog samooslobođenja: „... marksizmu se veštački oduzima problematika slobode, a na njeno mesto etablira ideja etatizma i kolektivizma, koja pomaže produženje vladavine otuđenja u društvu... Ali kao misao i praksa slobode, on može da živi i razvija se samo u takvom poretku u kojem

sloboda zajednice nije nadređena kao apsolut slobodi njenih članova“ (Tadić 1967: 72–73). Vođen idejom slobode, on je, možda najviše od svih naših mislilaca u navedenom periodu, ispoljavao odvažnost izricanja u kontekstu teorijskog i političkog delanja.

228

Pripadao je stradalničkoj, ali i „zlatnoj i slavnoj generaciji“ srpske filozofije, tzv. praxis grupaciji, čije su vodeće ličnosti, u koje je i sam spadao, bile izbačene sa Beogradskog univerziteta za vreme Titove vladavine. Dakako, iz sadašnje perspektive, za „filozofiju prakse“ bi se moglo reći da su joj bila imanentna mnoga ograničenja (privrženost neposrednoj, neparlamentarnoj demokratiji, društvenoj svojini, radikalno kritički odnos prema robnoj proizvodnji i slično), ali je nesporno da je ona, ukoliko se situira u tadašnji društveno-istorijski kontekst, pomerala granice slobode i učinila našu filozofiju svetski relevantnom. Njena istorijska zasluga sastojala se u tome što se upravo zahvaljujući njoj u nas počeo formirati intelektualni sloj koji će biti kritički usmeren kako prema apologetskoj inteligenciji, tako i prema socijalističkoj praksi i prema vrhu političkog establišmenta, koji je nastojao da usmerava tu praksu. Zahvaljujući ovim kritičkim impulsima, u nas se počela širiti emancipatorska kultura, kultura „uspravnog mišljenja i hoda“ koja je insistirala na fundamentalnom značaju individualnih sloboda i autonomije ličnosti. Iz ove kulture nastajalo je tendencijski ono što bih nazvao *unutarkomunističkim osporavanjem komunizma*, koje će u vreme radikalne krize „realnog socijalizma“ poprimiti oblik dovođenja u pitanje samih komunističkih ideala i, u krajnjoj liniji, samog komunizma. Puka je iluzija misliti da je u vreme dok su komunistička ideologija i njoj saobrazan sistem bili jaki, ne samo u našoj zemlji nego i u svetu, delatna intelektualna kritika mogla dobiti oblik drugačiji od onog koji sam nazvao *unutarkomunističkim osporavanjem komunizma*. Da je zaista tako, belodano svedoči i činjenica da je disidentska struja unutar „istočnog socijalističkog bloka“, posebno ona u Poljskoj, okupljena

oko pokreta Solidarnost, jednopartijskoj diktaturi dugo suprotstavljala ne višepartijski, već nepartijski pluralizam.

U vreme svoje čvrste uverenosti u istorijsko-epohalnu snagu i oslobodilačku funkciju autentičnog marksizma, Ljubomir Tadić se, oslanjajući se na Marksove humanističke zahteve za kritikom svih društvenih odnosa u kojima je čovek poniženo i prezreno biće, suprotstavljao svakoj metafizici porobljavanja, ustajao protiv gušenja stvaralačkih sloboda, protiv ugrožavanja i gaženja elementarnih ljudskih prava, podržavajući pri tome svaki oblik samoorganizovanja građana, radnika i studenata koji je bio u funkciji korigovanja očiglednih društvenih nepravdi i odbrane ljudskog dostojanstva. Sami njegovi najbliži „saborci“ iz tog vremena pričali su da je Ljubomir Tadić bio najsmeliji i najkonsekventniji u kritici suptilnih manipulativnih mehanizama ondašnje političke vlasti, usmerenih na „glajhšaltovanje“ masovne svesti i na integrisanje tačaka otpora u tada postojeći sistem. O verodostojnosti tih ocena svedoči i činjenica da je Tadić otvoreno istupio protiv odredbe a u ustavu po kojoj se Titu dodeljuje doživotni predsednički mandat, ocenjujući da takva odredba ima antidemokratski karakter i da je protivna samoj prirodi ustava.

Jedan od ključnih momenata tadašnje Tadićeve marksističke koncepcije bila je ideja građanske neposlušnosti, koja svoje izvorište ima u liberalističkoj prirodno-pravnoj koncepciji, tačnije u Lokovoj (Locke) tezi o pravu naroda na pobunu protiv vlasti koja je izigrala njegovo poverenje pretvorivši se u arbitrarnu vlast: „Jer ko će biti sudija o tome da li njegov poverenik ili poslanik radi pravilno ili u skladu sa ovlašćenjem – do onaj koji ga je odaslao i ko mora, pošto ga je odaslao, da još raspolaže vlašću da ga odbaci kada prenebregne svoje ovlašćenje... Narod će biti sudija... Kad god zakonodavci pokušaju da oduzmu ili razore svojinu naroda ili da ga dovedu do ropstva pod arbitrarnom vlašću, oni sebe stavljaju u stanje rata sa narodom koji je odmah razrešen

svake dalje poslušnosti...“ (Lok 2002, paragrafi 240 i 222). Tadićeva kritika liberalizma nikada nije bila njegova apstraktna negacija i stoga njegov marksizam nije nikada bio antiliberalizam. On je odbacivao svaku paušalnu ocenu liberalizma koja ne uzima u obzir i njegova univerzalno važeća, civilizacijska dostignuća, tj. koja označava liberalizam kao „trulu“, „mlitavu“ ideologiju, zalažući se istovremeno za antiliberalnu „jaku državu“. „Takva ocena“, ističe on, „liberalizmu suprotstavlja obnovljenu ideologiju apsolutizma, makar i u različitim njegovim varijantama. Ovaj poslednji vid kritike liberalizma nosi u sebi snažne naboje ne samo antiliberalne već i antidemokratske politike, kojom se podastire legitimnost decizionističkom totalitarizmu na kojem počiva ne samo fašizam, već i ‘socijalistički’ apsolutizam staljinističke provenijencije. Ako je osnovni politički princip liberalizma počivao u pravno (zakonski) ograničenoj državnoj vlasti, princip neoapsolutizma ili totalitarizma zalaže se za obnovu apsolutističke vlasti koja nije ograničena nikakvim ustavom, zakonom ili pravnim poretkom, a čija samovolja posebno ruši liberalna načela u krivičnom pravu i izvrgava svakog građanina stvarnoj ili potencijalnoj represiji tzv. političke justicije“ (Tadić 1985: 150).

Tadić marksizam nije intepretirao kao odbacivanje negativnih sloboda kao glavne tekovine liberalizma, već kao njihovo dopunjavanje i prevazilaženje pozitivnim slobodama: „Marksistička sloboda je primarno pozitivna sloboda, ljudska praksa, sloboda za nešto. Međutim, da bi slobodno delovanje bilo iole moguće, potrebno je da postoji i negativna sloboda, sloboda od pritiska i nasilja. Nema ljudskog dostojanstva bez ukidanja bede, nema ljudske sreće bez ukidanja poniženja. Čovečnost i pravednost nisu, kako je to isticao Engels, ‘juriističke iluzije’, već termini socijalne i prirodno-pravne *utopije*“ (Tadić 1967: 100).

Knjige Ljubomira Tadića iz socijalističkog perioda, posebno *Poredak i sloboda* i *Tradicija i revolucija*, mogu se označiti kao

kultne knjige naše disidentske literature jer je u njima, sa marksističkog stanovišta, podrivena dotadašnja idilična slika socijalističkog fakticiteta.

Kao antidogmatski usmereni mislilac koji ne robuje shemama doktrinarnog rigorizma, Tadić je nastojao da ideale ne unosi spolja u istoriju, već da ih izvodi iz *imanicije* samog istorijskog toka, te otuda nije nikakvo čudo što se on među prvima u nas, u vreme agonije realno postojećih socijalizama, otvorio prema ideji parlamentarnog sistema i što je u skladu sa tim bio jedan od osnivača Demokratske stranke. Iz njega je i tada progovorio onaj mladalački impuls koji ga nikada nije napuštao, jer je to u stvari bilo njegovo ključno egzistencijalno opredeljenje – motiv slobode koji je uvek zasvođen egzistencijalnim rizikom.

Međutim, otvarajući se, pod pritiskom naloga istorijske realnosti, prema parlamentarnoj republici kao modelu liberalne države, prema podeli vlasti i vladavini prava, Ljubomir Tadić se nije, za razliku od mnogih naših intelektualaca, priklonio propovedanju nove „liberalne utopije“ koja je nekritički veličala smitovsku „nevidljivu ruku“ tržišnog samotoka i glorifikovala i mitologizovala moć prava, jer je bio svestan permanentne napetosti koja postoji između kapitalizma i demokratije, tržišta i socijalne pravde, prava i moći. Posebno su bila uputna njegova upozorenja da u uslovima neravnoteže moći na globalno-političkom planu postoji tendencija pretvaranja međunarodnog prava u instrument velikih sila koje, u takvim okolnostima, teže da upražnjavaju ono što je Kant (Kant) nazivao „varvarskim slobodama“, slobodama koje nisu ograničene nikakvim pravnim i moralnim stegama.

Ma koliko da je napustio ideju o socijalizmu kao sistemu, Ljubomir Tadić je ostao otvoren za dosadašnja postignuća socijalističkog demokratskog pokreta (socijalna država, socijalna pravda, kritika neregulisanog „lesefer“ tržišta, oblici neposredne

demokratije unutar parlamentarnog sistema i slično), ali i za određene forme marksističkog utopijskog mišljenja koje mogu biti u funkciji kritike svakog poretka, pošto nijedan poredak, u načelu gledano, ne može biti idealan.

230

U ovakvom tipu teksta, u kojem se tematizuje je istorijski značaj dela Ljubomira Tadića, nemoguće je ne istaći pionirsku ulogu ovoga autora u konstituisanju savremene srpske i jugoslovenske *filozofije prava*, jer je njegov doprinos u tom pogledu svakakao najveći – on je utemeljitelj naše filozofije prava. Za ovu problematiku on je ispoljio interesovanje već na samim počecima svoga teorijskog rada, koje je obeležila njegova knjiga *Filozofske osnove pravne teorije Hansa Kelsena* koja je objavljena u Sarajevu 1962. Naravno da je u njoj Ljubomir Tadić, kao marksistički orijentisan mislilac, izložio kritici tzv. čistu teoriju prava po kojoj je pravo, budući da nema svoje utemeljenje u vanpravnoj sferi, zatvoreni sistem u kojem je sadržaj svake pravne norme izveden iz sadržaja druge norme, te je otuda pravo lanac normi na čijem početku nije vlast svih vlasti već norma svih normi, bazična norma, *Grundnorm*, tj. ustav. Naime, naš autor je tada nastojao da pokaže da i moderno pravo, odnosno pravna država, ima svoj koren u društvenim odnosima, ili, još preciznije, u kapitalističkim društvenim odnosima. Ali, način na koji je on pokušao da demonstrira društvenu utemeljenost prava bio je originalan, i to ne samo u tadašnjem jugoslovenskom kontekstu. Originalnost njegove kritike čistog prava bila je, između ostaloga, i rezultat njegovih dubokih uvida u delo J. B. Pašukanisa (Пашуканис), čija se knjiga *Opšta teorija prava i marksizma* na srpskom jeziku pojavila u njegovom prevodu 1958. Važno je imati na umu da je ova rasprava Ljubomira Tadića o karakteru modernog univerzalizovanog prava, objavljena pre velike i čuvene nemačke debate o izvođenju oblika i funkcija države u kontekstu kapitalističke društvene reprodukcije, koja je takođe bila inspirisana Pašukanisovim delom. Konkretnije rečeno, centralni predmet i jedne i druge

rasprave bilo je u suštini pitanje koje je pregnantno formulisao Pašukanis: „Zašto dominacija klase nije ono što jeste – tj. podređivanje jednog dela stanovništva drugom delu? Zašto ona poprima oblik javne državne vladavine ili, što je isto, zašto mehanizam državnih ograničenja nije stvoren kao privatni mehanizam dominantne klase? Zašto je on odvojen od dominantne klase i uzima oblik bezličnog mehanizma javne vlasti koji je odvojen od društva?“ Drugim rečima, suštinsko pitanje je bilo zašto u doba kapitalizma dolazi do odvajanja pravne države u zasebnu instancu koja, zajedno sa svojim aparatom sile, stoji izvan i pored društva i proizvodnog procesa. Odgovor na to pitanje svodio se i u jednoj i u drugoj raspravi na tezu da sam proces kapitalističke proizvodnje, po samoj svojoj unutrašnjoj prirodi, zahteva institucionalno razdvajanje ekonomske i pravno-političke sfere. Pošto, naime, akumulacija kapitala kao prisvajanje tuđeg rada bez razmene, koje se zbiva u proizvodnji, mora poprimiti oblik ekvivalentne razmene između slobodnih i međusobno nezavisnih proizvođača, onda i pravo i odnosi prinude moraju poprimiti oblik depersonalizovane, klasno neutralne instance, odvojene od procesa proizvodnje i njegovih glavnih društvenih aktera. Dakle, u samom obliku kapitalističkog prisvajanja viška rada, u kojem se potrebni rad (rad za sebe) i višak rada (rad za drugoga) poklapaju u vremenu i prostoru, sadržana je nužnost „depolitizacije“ ekonomije, tj. oslobađanja ekonomije od tradicionalnih oblika kontrole odnosno apstrahovanja odnosa sile iz neposrednog procesa proizvodnje i njihovog smeštanja u zasebnu instancu koja uzima oblik garanta opštih interesa, odnosno garanta opštih i eksternih uslova robno-kapitalističke proizvodnje. Kao što odnos eksploatacije uzima oblik ekvivalentne razmene između međusobno jednakih i nezavisnih robnih proizvođača, tako i odnos klasne vladavine uzima oblik vlade *res publica-e* (anonimizacija klasne vladavine).

Stajući na stanovište da sama robna proizvodnja, po svojoj prirodi, zahteva da se

odnosi između robnih proizvođača regulišu ne neposrednom primenom sile u samom procesu proizvodnje, već pomoću novca i zakona, tj. prava, Ljubomir Tadić je na našim prostorima prvi na sistematičan način izvršio, oslanjajući se na centralne pojmove Marksovog *Kapitala*, kritiku vulgarno-marxističkih shvatanja po kojima su građanske slobode, individualna prava i pravna država tretirani kao puki privid, kao „juristička iluzija“. Posmatrano iz ondašnje perspektive, to je bio ogroman iskorak iz antiliberalno interpretiranog marksizma, zahvaljujući kojem su kod nas postavljeni temelji filozofije prava sa marksističkog stanovišta. Autor ovih redova je i sam u svojoj marksističkoj fazi pokušao, inspirisan Tadićevim i Pašukanisovim analizama, da u knjizi *Roba i revolucija* izvede pojam pravne države iz robnog oblika. Ma koliko da sam se kasnije priklonio, pod uticajem prirodno-pravnih koncepcija, pre svega Kantove, čisto teoriji prava, ne mogu a da ne istaknem činjenicu da je Ljubomir Tadić utemeljivač savremene filozofije prava kod nas i da je u toj oblasti on neosporno najveći autoritet.

Valja reći i to da je Ljubomir Tadić po svojoj životnoj vokaciji *intelektualac* u čijoj ličnosti su sintetisani briljantni logički um i izuzetan dar za spekulativno mišljenje. Kao takav, on je kritičku funkciju intelektualca uvek pretpostavljao politici kao profesionalnoj delatnosti. Za razliku od mnogih naših teoretičara koji su u višepartijskom

sistemu, vođeni političkom strašću i voljom za moći, žrtvovali svoju intelektualnu karijeru zarad karijere profesionalnog političara, Tadić je ostao veran svome intelektualnom pozivu: u težnji da doprinese rušenju „partijske države“ i autoritarne vladavine, on se aktivno uključio u proces partijsko-političkih borbi, tj. u profesionalnu politiku, ali kada je taj posao obavljen, on se praktično vratio svome intelektualnom pozivu, demonstrirajući na taj način visoku moralnu privrženost pojmu kritičkog intelektualca, nezavisnog od centara političke moći.

Zbog svega rečenog, izražavam svoje najdublje poštovanje prema velikoj intelektualnoj i časnoj moralnoj biografiji jednog od korifeja naše društvene teorije, koji je tokom celokupnog svoga stvaralalačkog veka tragao za principom slobode. Srbija treba da bude ponosna na to što je iznedrila teoretičara evropskog formata kakav je Ljubomir Tadić, koji je mnogim generacijama bio intelektualni i moralni uzor i Učitelj.

231

Literatura

- Lok, Džon (2002), *Dve rasprave o vladi*, Beograd: Utopija.
 Tadić, Ljubomir (1967), *Poredak i sloboda*, Beograd: Kultura.
 Tadić, Ljubomir (1985), „Liberalizam“, *Theoria* 3-4: 143-150.

SLOBODA, IDEALITET I STVARNOST:
LJUBOMIR TADIĆ – I MISLILAC I BORAC

Jagoš Đuretić

IP „Albatros plus“
Beograd

U obimnom teorijskom opusu Ljubomira Tadića ništa nije tako uočljivo kao njegova konsekvantna zaokupljenost idejom istinske slobode čoveka kao pojedinca, odnosno kao pripadnika klase, nacije, građanina. Čak i Tadićeva bezbroj puta potvrđena privrženost Marksovoj teoriji proletarijata ne može biti nipošto shvaćena kao njegova iluzorna vera u neposrednu emancipatorsku moć empirijski date radničke klase. Naprotiv, ono čime je Tadić impresioniran jeste Marksova (Marx) ideja proletarijata data u istorijskoj perspektivi kao filozofija definitivne emancipacije, kako društvene celine tako i svakog pojedinca. U tom smislu, vladavina proletarijata mora biti u funkciji postepene emancipacije čoveka kao pojedinca u njegovoj neposrednoj empirijskoj datosti. Otuda vladavina proletarijata nije ništa drugo do negacija svih vidova suštinske neslobode čoveka kapitalističkog sistema društvenih odnosa, koju sažima – upravo vladavina buržoazije. Ti vidovi neslobode u Marksovom delu dati su u filozofskim i sociološkim terminima: vladavina otuđenja, postvarenja, novca, najamnog rada, formalizma građanskih sloboda i demokratskih prava i dr.

233

Imajući u vidu upravo tako shvaćenu ideju proleterijata i Marksovu filozofiju opšte-ljudske emancipacije u istorijskoj perspektivi, Tadić se na više mesta sa sledbeničkom strašću poziva na Marksov stav iz njegovih *Ranih radova*: „Proletarijat je apsolutna strana društva“, jer je u njegovom položaju (tj. položaju radničke klase) sažeta sva beda kapitalističkih društvenih odnosa. Budući da u tom društvu, sa stanovišta istinske slobode, niko nije stvarno slobodan, „ni rob ni gospodar, ni radnik ni poslodavac, ni građanin ni vlastodržac, uprkos svim formalno zagarantovanim građanskim i političkim slobodama, Marks će *bit* toga društva sažeto izreći u svom poznatom dijalektičkom aforizmu – ‘emancipovano ropstvo‘“. Stoga proletarijat „oslobađajući sebe, oslobađa čitavo društvo“.

Tadiću će navedeni aforizam biti stalna inspiracija za kritički obračun sa svim vidovima

formalizma političkih sloboda sa kojima se u svom životu suočavao, i kao filozof i kao građanin. Na tom tragu, mada izbegavajući rigorizam Marksovih istorijsko-materijalističkih zakonomernosti, on će u svojim poznatim obračunima sa Lenjinovim avantgardizmom, „boljševičkom gvozdenom voljom“ i nasiljem Oktobarske revolucije nad istorijom, i tim povodima, na ubedljiv način samo potvrditi visok nivo svojih filozofskih uvida, ukazujući još jednom na istoričnost Marksove ideje proletarijata, i jasno razlikovati idealitet od neposredno date stvarnosti, odnosno idealitet slobode kao stalne kritičke pozicije spram te neposredno date stvarnosti.

234

U tom smislu, filozof marksističke provenijencije nikada ne može biti apologetski oduševljen postojećom društvenom stvarnošću, ma kakva da je, a kamoli onom u boljševičkoj, odnosno staljinističkoj verziji. Ta okolnost je izuzetno važna za razumevanje čitavog teorijskog opusa, pa čak i životne biografije Ljubomira Tadića. S druge strane, uzimajući u obzir duh celine njegovog dela (onog teorijskog, kao i same životne biografije) teško je izbeći zaključak da je upravo ta i tako shvaćena Marksova ideja slobode, ako ne jedini, a ono ključni razlog Tadićeve trajne privrženosti Marksovom učenju. Stoga nije ni čudno ni slučajno što je sve društvene promene koje su se događale u jugoslovenskom društvu (čak i one koje je, u principu, s odobravanjem pozdravljao), podvrgavajući ih analizi, s gledišta slobode, ocenjivao gotovo redovno – negativno, zahtevujući pritom doslednost umesto polovičnosti, suštinu umesto privida, istinu umesto laži, pravdu umesto nepravde, stvarnu umesto formalne jednakosti, istinsku umesto formalne demokratije, itd.

U tom smislu, on će pozdraviti Oktobarsku revoluciju kao načelno moguću čin razrešavanja dubokih i nepomirljivih društvenih protivrečnosti, ali će odmah primetiti da rusko društvo nije dovoljno zrelo za ispunjenje zadataka jednog istinskog socijalističkog društvenog prevrata, pa nije ni

čudno što je uspostavljanje socijalističkog društvenog poretka proteklo u znaku najmračnijeg mogućeg terora pod okriljem svedržavlja, a da se ni u jednom trenutku nije našlo u „društvu slobode“.

Tadić je pozdravio ideju radničkog upravljanja preduzećima i uspostavljanja samoupravnog društvenog poretka u Jugoslaviji, ali će vrlo brzo sintagmom „socijalizam u državnom omotaču“ skrenuti pažnju na činjenicu da se dogodila samo formalna radikalna promena, budući da je vlastodržac u skrivenoj formi ostavio odlučujuću ulogu državne birokratije u svim institucijama i tekućem društvenom životu. Na isti način je negativno ocenio i transformaciju KPJ u SKJ, čime je trebalo da društvene institucije budu oslobođene monopartijskog tutorstva, kao korak bliže bespartijskom sistemu, dezideologizaciji i besklasnom društvu, ali je zadržavanje svih iole bitnih funkcija društvenih institucija u rukama komunista organizovanih na principima demokratskog centralizma učinilo ceo taj „obrt“ beznadežno sterilnim, gotovo besmislenim.

Ta strasna volja jugoslovenskog političkog vrha da, s jedne strane uspostavi „originalni socijalistički sistem“ kao sistem oživotvorene demokratije i slobode, a s druge da, zadržavanjem svih poluga vlasti, usmerava sve društvene procese i restriktivno kontroliše upotrebu svih prava i sloboda, neizbežno je reprodukovala samo „originalne“ društvene protivurečnosti – izvesne slobode, kao npr. slobode javnog govora i društvene kritike, zakonom su zaista bile zagarantovane, ali čim bi ih građani shvatili kao konačno stečeno pravo, podvrgavajući kritici neke režimske svetinje, posebno neprikosnovenog vođu, suočavali bi se s gotovo nepodnošljivim posledicama. Sistem se tako izvrtao u specifičan vid autoritarnog političkog sistema sa jakim primesama totalitarizma u kome je vođa mogao lako i bezgrešno, štaviše, uz plebiscitarnu podršku da bude izabran za doživotnog predsednika države. Za svest, dostojanstvo i moral čoveka,

intelektualca i borca, kakav je bio profesor Ljubomir Tadić, to je bio suviše veliki izazov, pa je, u ime poniženih građana čitavog jugoslovenskog društva, to „ustoličenje“ podvrgao oštroj kritici, rizikujući svoju materijalnu egzistenciju i egzistenciju svoje porodice.

Uostalom, Ljubomir Tadić nije bio intelektualac koji je svoja politička opredeljenja tražio i nalazio sa kalkulatorom u ruci na tezgama tzv. slobodne političke pijace, kako to čine, u okolnostima savremene vladavine novca, mnogi politički perspektivni intelektualci. Tadić je, naprotiv, svoja politička opredeljenja izvodio iz sopstvenog ukupnog dela, i svesti o totalitetu društvenih protivrečnosti, protivrečnosti čovekovog bića i istorijske perspektive čovekovog osvajanja slobode.

Današnja „kritička inteligencija“ koju najčešće nadahnjuje neoliberalistička ideologija i kojoj pritom, po pravilu, nisu strane ni lične političke ambicije, *de facto* smatra da Tadićev opus, kao i teorijski i politički učinak čitave njegove generacije, nema šta da kaže i poruči njima kao nosiocima pre-vratničkih zadataka današnjeg doba, budući da se kritički učinak te generacije svodi na puko prepravljavanje, zapravo učvršćivanje postojećeg sistema društvenih odnosa, umesto na njegovo radikalno negiranje i rušenje. Kako, dakle, ta kritika, kao u suštini prorežimska, deli sudbinu propalog sistema kome je služila, njihov zadatak počinje *ab ovo* i bez oslonca na učinak prethodnih generacija.

Tačno je, međutim, samo to da su za ove politički ambiciozne borbe, u odsustvu svesti o stvarnoj istoričnosti ovih ili onih važnih događanja, prave tačke savremenog svet-sko-istorijskog obrta – pad Berlinskog zida i Peti oktobar – prva u svetu, druga u Srbiji.

To bi moglo biti tačno, da se gromoglasno najavljene sloboda, jednakost i demokratija za sve narode faktički nisu svele na puko preraspodelu vojno-političke i ekonomske

moći u međunarodnom prostoru, s opštom, neposredno iznuđenom i apokaliptički opasnom trkom u naoružavanju: i da novouspostavljena međunarodna hijerarhija moći u velikoj meri i sve više ne usmerava distribuciju međunarodne pravde, nacionalne nezavisnosti, svetskog bogatstva, političkog uticaja u međunarodnim odnosima, itd. To bi takođe moglo biti tačno, da se gromoglasna najava socijalne pravde, građanskih i ljudskih prava i blagostanja za svakog pojedinca, u skladu s principima neoliberalističke ideologije, nije svela na prelazak materijalnog bogatstva na nacionalnom nivou u najmanji broj ruku u ljudskoj istoriji, odnosno da reči: „tranzicija“, „nerazvijeni“, „demokratizacija“, „liberalizacija“, „slobodno tržište“, „ekonomska pomoć“, i dr. danas ne svedoče o pukom povratku materijalne bede i političke neslobode koje je davno demaskirala Marksova kritika otuđenja, postvarenja, eksploatacije i najamnog rada, nejednakosti, formalizma političkih i ekonomskih sloboda, i sve to samo u zaoštrenijoj formi. Stoga bi se pre moglo reći da je zadatak nove generacije političke i intelektualne elite da zaustavi društvenu regresiju, poštujući iskustva istinskih protagonista slobode i pravde iz prethodnih generacija.

Jugoslovenska zajednica kritičke inteligencije kojoj je Ljubomir Tadić pripadao je najpre, u skladu sa svojom primarnom odgovornošću, a zatim i neposrednim političkim angažovanjem u smislu svoje građanske odgovornosti, nastojala da se afirmiše kao važan faktor u demokratizaciji jugoslovenskog društva. Tadić je bez sumnje pripadao najužem, vodećem krugu te zajednice koja je hrabro postavljala filozofske i teorijske temelje za razaranje marksističkih i kvazimarksističkih dogmi i proširenje prostora političkih sloboda u jugoslovenskom društvu, čiji su manjak građani, posebno inteligencija, osećali jače nego manjak hleba.

Ta intelektualna zajednica je svoj program ostvarivala preko mnogih istorijski važnih

skupova, počev od Bleda, preko Vrnjačke Banje, Dubrovnika i naročito Korčulanske filozofske škole, koja je svojim značajem daleko prevazišla jugoslovenske granice, a zatim preko časopisa: *Perspektive*, *Naše teme*, *Gledišta*, *Filozofija* i, najzad, *Praxis* koji je brzo okupio i širok krug najznačajnijih inostranih mislilaca toga doba.

Ali, prostor slobode osvojen u mislima nije sloboda; to je tek spekulativna sloboda koja čeka da u „živom životu“ i neposrednoj stvarnosti bude obistinjena. Istina, ta tekovina koju je jugoslovenska kritička inteligencija stekla na tragu izvorne Marksove misli, predstavljala je veliki izazov za sve one kojima je do istinske slobode stalo. Trebalo je u uslovima monopartijske vladajuće ideologije i totalitarnih ograničenja slobode delati na način slobode, a to će reći – sa rizikom i po visokoj ceni koja za prekoračenje tih granica mora da se plati da bi uslove izborne slobode uživala društvena celina i svaki njen pojedinac.

Ako je Zagreb bio pretežni centar onog filozofskog *mišljenja* slobode, Beograd je sa svojom relativno dugom tradicijom borbe za osvajanje *praktičnih* građanskih sloboda, bio centar odakle su kretale gotovo sve inicijative, svi rizični pokreti i sve praktične borbe za to realno proširenje prostora slobode. To je bila skupa i riskantna borba, čiju visoko plaćenu cenu žive generacije pamte.

Pamti se, dakako, i to da je Ljubomir Tadić na javnim tribinama rečju i, gde god mu se ukazala prilika, perom, svojim slušaocima i čitaocima, hrabro i beskompromisno, na način koji nije bio dozvoljen, ukazivao na puteve praktične borbe za osvajanje stvarnih prava i sloboda. Pamti se, naravno, i to da je prof. Tadić, braneci od režimskog policijskog nasilja svoje studente u njihovoj političkoj liberterskoj pobuni 1968. godine, izložio sebe konkretnim policijskim batinama, da bi najzad, zajedno sa još pet svojih kolega i saboraca, bio isteran s Filozofskog

fakulteta na ulicu, bez posla i bez elementarnih uslova za egzistencijalni opstanak.

Raznovrsnim teorijama naučnog i umetničkog, odnosno intelektualnog stvaralaštva, nije nepoznata činjenica česte, ponekad i zjapeće nepodudarnosti između poruka koje sa humanističkog stanovišta šalje jedno veliko delo i onih poruka koje emituje empirijska ličnost i životna biografija autora tog dela. Poznato je da u suočenjima sa iskušenjima i dramatičnim izazovima društvenog i političkog života, empirijska ličnost često popusti, negirajući sebe kao autora. U biografijama mnogih poznatih umetnika i pisaca veoma često ćemo naći potvrdu tog teško objašnjivog iskustva. Hajdegerov slučaj među filozofima je čak neka vrsta razočaravajuće „klasike“.

Međutim, u profesionalnoj, teorijskoj i političkoj biografiji Ljubomira Tadića takve nesaglasnosti nema. Tadić je, van svake sumnje, autor koji je bio istinski odan svojim filozofskim, etičkim i političkim uverenjima i sasvim sigurno je smatrao da je moralna norma nešto što se mora u celosti poštovati i u životu aktivno slediti. Slobodu i dostojanstvo koje je kroz sva životna iskušenja branio i tražio za sebe, u jednoj meri i uz sve rizike, tražio je i za druge. Tražio je pravo na život u slobodi i dostojanstvu uopšte, i tome je bez ikakve dvojbe posvećeno čitavo njegovo delo i svaki pojedinačni njegov redak. U tom smislu, biću slobodan da zaključim ovaj napis onim istim rečima kojima sam zaključio i priredivačku reč za knjigu *Ljubomir Tadić – mislilac slobode*, koja je objavljena za njegovog života, pre nepune dve godine: „Tadićevo delo, budući zaokupljeno kritičkom vizijom globalnog čovečanstva, na tragu Blohovog (Bloch) mišljenja, snažno sugerise, podržava i ohrabruje, pa ako je to, s gledišta konačnog mirenja istorije, tek utopijska nada, ona je sasvim sigurno ona strana čovekovog lika koja ljudski život čini smisljenim, stvaralačkim i aktivno odupirućim“.

PRIKAZI
REVIEWS

v

NEBOJŠA GRUBOR: *LEPO, NADAHNUĆE
I UMETNOST PODRAŽAVANJA, PLATO,*
BEOGRAD 2012.

Igor Cvejić

Kada pred sobom imamo jednu knjigu o Platonovom shvatanju pojmova koji danas očigledno pripadaju razmatranjima estetike, uobičajeno bi bilo očekivati jedno istorijsko razmatranje. Međutim, već prva strana autorovog predgovora jasno nas odvodi sa tog puta, ukazujući da je interes ove knjige „pre svega problemsko-estetski“ (str. 5). Sama knjiga podeljena je u četiri poglavlja od kojih poslednja tri predstavljaju specifičnu tematizaciju estetskih oblasti: lepog, nadahnuća i podražavanja u Platonovoj filozofiji, dok je prvo u izvesnom smislu uvodno i određuje zadatak ove knjige dvostrukim okvirom. S jedne strane, rad je uokviren Šnedelbahovim (Herbert Schnädelbach) razlikovanjem tri osnovne filozofske paradigme: ontološke, mentalističke i lingvističke. U tom smislu, rad je neminovno istorijski uokviren, uzimajući Platona kao predstavnika ontološke paradigme. Pogrešno bi bilo, ipak, na šta ovaj okvir može da zavede, shvatiti da prikaz Platonove estetike ovde ima za cilj da pokaže (istorijsko) specifično pristupanje estetici u okviru ontološke paradigme. Drugi okvir knjige predstavlja shvatanje filozofske estetike Marije Rajher (Maria Reicher). U tom smislu, knjigu treba razumeti kao pokušaj da se pokaže na koji način Platon „*utemeljuje*“ (str. 5) savremene poglede filozofske estetike, na koji način Platonovo postavljanje pitanje odgovara metodi pitanja savremene filozofske estetike, i najzad, na koji način Platonova estetika, uprkos relativno različitim predmetima ispitivanja, može biti od značaja za savremenu filozofsku estetiku.

239

Herbert Šnedelbah u svojim člancima „Uz savremeni položaj filozofije“ i „Filozofija“¹ razlikuje tri osnovne filozofske paradigme: ontološku, mentalističku i lingvističku. Ontološkom paradigmom označava se, pre svega, klasična antička filozofija koja polazi od predmeta (*to on*) i pitanja „šta jeste?“, mentalističkom možemo označiti period od Dekarta do jezičkog obrta, u kome se polazi

¹ Oba članka objavljena su u E. Martens, H. Schnädelbach (prir.), *Philosophie. Ein Grudnkurs, Band 1*. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1998.

od sumnje i pitanja izvesnosti: „šta mogu da znam?“, dok sa jezičkim obrtom ulazimo u lingvističku paradigmu i pitanje „šta mogu da razumem?“. Knjiga o Platonovoj estetici u izvesnom smislu nadopunjuje projekat autora prema kome je već objavljen jedan tekst o estetici u lingvističkoj paradigmi pod naslovom „Vitgenštajn i lingvistička paradigma u filozofiji i filozofskoj estetici“² i najavljen rad na Kantovoj estetici, kao predstavniku estetike u mentalističkoj paradigmi (7). U tom smislu, Platonova estetika, ovde zaista zauzima mesto predstavnika ontološke paradigme, ali kao što je već napomenuto, značaj ovog dela nikako ne treba meriti prema tome koliko svoj predmet predstavlja kao istorijski određen, uslovljen ontološkom paradigmom. Naprotiv, celo ispitivanje postavlja teži zadatak: da Platonova razmatranja, koja po sebi pripadaju ontološkoj paradigmi, pokaže kao značajna za savremena, od ontološke paradigme vrlo udaljena, pitanja filozofske estetike.

Da bi objasnio šta je filozofska estetika, autor koristi *Uvod u filozofsku estetiku* Marije Rajher³. Način na koji se filozofska estetika razgraničava od estetike (kao predmeta empirijskih nauka) pokazuje se ključnim u smislu transparentnog prikazivanja značajna Platonove estetike za savremena razmatranja. Filozofsku estetiku od estetike kao predmeta empirijskih nauka (na primer sociologije, psihologije, antropologije) treba razlikovati po metodu pristupa. Filozofski metod, kojim pristupamo predmetima estetike, pre svega je pojmovna analiza. Filozofija se ne bavi posmatranjem ili eksperimentom, njeno pitanje je uvek „šta je x?“ pri čemu je „x“ neki pojam, a odgovor na ovo pitanje je definicija (56). Odbacujući leksičke i stipulativne definicije, kao odgovor ostaju *eksplikacije*, odnosno objašnjavačke definicije – „definicije kojima se razjašnjava neki, prethodno već poznati pojam“.

2 N. Grubor, „Vitgenštajn i lingvistička paradigma u filozofiji i filozofskoj estetici“, *Arhe* 11: 33-46, 1998.

3 M. Reicher (2005), *Einführung in die philosophische Ästhetik*. Darmstadt: Buchgesellschaft.

(57) Takve definicije razjašnjavaju pojam o kome već imamo nekakvo prethodno stanovište (*Vorverständnis*). Adekvatnost ovih definicija određuje se prema kriterijumu da one ne smeju biti ni preširoke ni preuske (60), što će reći, da uključuju sve ili makar veliki deo onoga što se pod tim pojmom podrazumeva, i da isključuju ono što se ne podrazumeva (*ibid*). Poseban problem ovog postupka u filozofiji je *ambivalencija* filozofskih pojmova koja se sastoji u tome što s jedne strane „refleksija putem pojmova mora da se odnosi na naše uobičajeno, svakodnevno odnošenje sa stvarima“ (61), dok se s druge strane „podrazumeva da filozofski pojmovi moraju da odstupaju od svakodnevnog i običnog jezika, jer samo na taj način, svojom distanciranošću i neobičnošću, filozofski pojmovi omogućavaju artikulaciju i formulaciju onoga što je netransparentno i tamno, a ipak se nalazi u osnovi i struktuiru samorazumevanje čoveka“ (str. 61 – 62). Ovakav stav može se objasniti i poznatim Hajdegerovim razlikovanjem ontičkog i ontološkog nivoa pitanja, pri čemu je tubitak sebi ontički najbliži, ali ontološki najdalji.⁴ Autor taj problem predstavlja na sledeći način: „Problem se sastoji u tome što nam je sopstveni život s obzirom na njegovo jednostavno bivstvovanje poznat i uobičajen, ali je s obzirom na principijelne strukture tog bivstvovanja, s obzirom na ono što je život načelno i što ga u celini prožima i struktuiru, odnosno upravo s obzirom na ono što bi u filozofskoj analizi trebalo da se eksplicira, faktički život sam sebi taman i neproziran“ (str. 61). Shodno ovom problemu, određuje se i zadatak filozofiranja, a prema tome i specifičnost filozofske estetike: „Filozofija, dakle, predstavlja proces usmeren da se naše prethodno, implicitno razumevanje sveta oko nas učini pojmovno artikulisanim i eksplicitnim“ (str. 63); „(Z)adatak filozofske pojmovne eksplikacije, koji sadrži jezgro metodološkog problema filozofije, sastoji (se) u ekspliciranju predteorijskih razumevanja odnosno predteorijskih intuicija“ (str. 64).

4 M. Heidegger (1967), *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, str. 15.

Postavlja se onda pitanje da li se Platonov metod pristupa može smatrati filozofskom estetikom, i autor na to pitanje odgovara kroz tri poglavlja knjige: „Platonova estetika lepog“, „Rapsodska veština između znanja i nadahnuća“ i „Umetnost podražavanja“. Sledi još teže pitanje: da li kao takva, Platonova filozofska estetika može imati značaja za probleme savremene filozofske estetike? Pozitivan odgovor na ovo pitanje omogućen je samim prethodnim označavanjem filozofske metode i osobenostima aplikacija u filozofiji, koje je označila Marija Rajher, a koje ćemo ovde navesti: „(1) eksplikativne definicije nisu istinite ili lažne nego manje ili više adekvatne, (2) eksplikativne definicije ne bi trebalo razumeti kao tvrdnje nego kao predloge, (3) uvođenje nove definicije umesto stare u filozofiji ne znači da je stara definicija bezvredna, (4) definicija koju neko iz određenih razloga ne prihvata, može da sadrži vredne uvide, (5) cilj definicije nije (...) propisivanje načina na koji bi trebalo da se razumeju i upotrebljavaju neke filozofski ili filozofsko-estetički značajne reči i pojmovi kao što su reči „estetika“ ili reč „umetnost“, „lepo“ itd., (6) u eksplikativnim definicijama se u prvom redu radio o tome da se nešto nauči o samoj stvari, radi se o pokušajima da se formuliše suština neke stvari.“ (str. 65)⁵

Platonova estetika lepog. Autor Platonova razmatranja ideje lepog raščlanjuje pomoću dve različite metode pristupa: *dijalektičkoj* (u dijalogu *Hipija veći*) i *anamnestičkoj* (u dijalogima *Gozba* i *Fedar*). U dijalogu *Hipija veći* Platon izlaže različite definicije lepog, aporetičnog završetka, ne uspevajući da nađe odgovarajuću. Autor navodi jednu karakteristiku Platonovog pristupa, koji, takođe, odstupa od čiste eksplikacije: „(m) ože se reći da osnovni pravac Platonovog filozofiranja nije toliko eksplikacija onoga što već prethodno razumemo, već pre konstrukcija onoga kako bi nešto trebalo da razumemo“ (str. 68). Upravo u toj tački Platonova estetika se na izvestan način može izdvojiti od svoje proste istoričnosti, kao

da iskazuje nešto „nadjudsko“, „nasuprotljudsko“ (*ibid*). Zajedno sa izlaganjem anamnestičke metode, i funkcije ideje lepog u njoj, autor dolazi do centralne veze Platonovih razmatranja i savremene filozofsko-estetske problematike, a to je ambivalencija pojma lepote, što je „za nas i danas“ (str. 100) centralni problem. Radi se o problemu da li estetska kategorija lepog poseduje potpunu autonomnost u odnosu na druge osnovne pojmove, kao što su dobro i istina, ili se treba posmatrati u odnosu sa njima. Pravo meta-pitanje u odnosu na ovo je zapravo da li treba prihvatiti ovu alternativu ili je prikazati kao neispravnu i ukazati na ambivalentnost lepog (str. 74). To je upravo put kojim se Platon kreće, označavajući posebnost ideje lepog i njenu funkciju u odnosu na druge ideje: „Anamnestičko saznanje lepog ujedno je lepotom posredovano anamnestičko saznanje pravednog, razboritog i dobrog“ (str. 104).

Rapsodska veština između znanja i nadahnuća. Ovaj problem autor razmatra uz pomoć dijaloga *Ijon*, ukazujući na uvođenje tri važna estetička problema. Prvi je *hermeneutički problem*, odnosno pitanje pravog smisla tumačenja i razumevanja umetničkih dela, i ujedno njegovog odnosa prema znanju (str. 112). Drugi je problem koji proizilazi iz Ijonovog odgovora na pitanje da li je rapsodska veština znanje ili nadahnuće, koje ukazuje na „paradoksalnost“ estetskog iskustva, jer je ono istovremeno i prepuštanje i zadržavanje distance (str. 121). Autor, takođe, ukazuje na jednu mogućnost razmatranja ovog pitanja koja je u dijalogu naznačena, ali nije više razmatrana, da se radi o znanju *forme*, ne *sadržaja* (str. 120). Treći problem takođe izriče Ijon, o pitanju obima rapsodskog znanja, ukazujući na mogućnost da rapsod ne poseduje sva moguća znanja i kompetencije, nego, na drugi način, znanje o „čovjeku kao čovjeku“, ne kao čovjeku ove ili one veštine (str. 120).

Umetnost podražavanja. Razmatrajući dijalog *Sofist* i II, III i X knjigu *Države*, autor pokušava da pokaže da se Platonova teorija

5 Prema Reicher, *op. cit.*, 30–31.

podražavanja ne može shvatiti kao naivna teorija kopiranja, već se radi o „relaciji sfere postojanja onoga što se predstavlja i sfere postojanja onoga putem čega se predstavlja odnosno podražava.“ (str. 154) Autor, takođe, naglašava Platonovo razlikovanje vernog podražavanja postojećih stvari i fantazije, naglašavajući da Platon učenje o fantaziji nikada nije izveo kao sposobnost predstavljanja ideja, kako je kasnija likovna umetnost samorazumevala, niti je takvo učenje moguće uskladiti sa Platonovim učenjem o idejama (Grubor 2012: 153), već je fantazija pre podređena vernom predstavljanju (str. 154). Platonovo prepoznavanje uticaja umetnosti na emocije, a zatim i na obrazovanje, na koje Platon odgovara radikalnom kritikom pesništva u *Državi*, predstavlja izazov za one koji hoće o pesništvu da govore pohvalno; izazov koji je već Aristotel prihvatio (str. 155).

Uz jedno precizno i iscrpno izlaganje Platonovog razmatranja i danas aktuelnih estetičkih pojmova, koje pokazuje da je Platonova metoda takođe odgovarala filozofskoj – estetici, knjiga se završava na izgled paradoksalnom rečenicom: „upravo zbog toga što njegovi teorijsko-umetnički stavovi odudaraju od savremenih estetičkih intuicija, oni predstavljaju nezamenljivo sredstvo razjašnjavanja naših sopstvenih estetičkih pojmova“ (str. 155). Tome treba

dodati i da autor jasno navodi odstupanje starogrčkih pojmova od današnjih (str. 67 – 68). Ovaj problem treba razumeti pomoću određenja filozofske estetike iz uvodnog dela knjige. Ako se setimo da je njen zadatak eksplicacija pojmova, a da eksplikativne definicije nisu istinite ili lažne, nego manje ili više adekvatne, da ih ne treba razumeti kao tvrdnje nego kao predloge, da uvođenje nove definicije ne znači da je stara bezvredna, a pre svega se u eksplicaciji radi o tome da se „o stvari nešto nauči“ (str. 65), onda se jasno vidi na kom osnovu se može tvrditi da, iako Platonove definicije ne odgovaraju savremenim estetičkim shvatanjima, upravo zato što predmet razmatraju na drugačiji način, proširuju naše razumevanje samih problema. Drugi momenat koji osvetljava ovaj odnos je ontološka pozadina metoda filozofske estetike koji je u ovoj knjizi izložen, koja se sastoji u tome što nam je svakodnevni život poznat, ali po svojoj strukturi koja ga prožima taman i neproziran (str. 61). Platonova estetika mogla bi se onda shvatiti, s obzirom da ona s jedne strane predstavlja utemeljenje savremenih umetničkih teorija i shvatanja lepog (str. 165), a s druge strane odudara od savremenih intuicija o ovim pojmovima, kao upravo ono sredstvo kojim možemo dati više odgovora o onom tamnom i nejasnom koje „načelno struktuirā“ naše svakodnevne intuicije o estetici.

STVARANJE SPOSOBNOSTI: TEORIJA O LJUDSKOM RAZVOJU

Martha C. Nussbaum, *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach*, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA and London UK, 2011

Marko Konjović

Marta Nussbaum (Martha Nussbaum) jedna je od najplodnijih filozofa današnjice. Ona u svojim delima oštroumno preispituje i dalje razvija, između ostalog, teorije o osećanjima, društvenoj pravdi i književnosti, feminističke uvide, ideje o ulozi obrazovanja u liberalnim demokratijama, kao i ključne ideje antičke grčke i rimske filozofije. Njena knjiga *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach* (*Stvaranje sposobnosti: Teorija o ljudskom razvoju*), međutim, ima malo drugačiji zadatak. U ovoj knjizi, Nussbaum nastoji da približi široj publici novu teorijsku paradigmu o kvalitetu života i o društvenoj pravdi, poznatu u filozofskoj literaturi kao *teorija o ljudskom razvoju* (*Human Development Approach*) ili kao *teorija o sposobnostima* (*the Capabilities Approach*). Ovo svakako nije lak zadatak, imajući u vidu kako interdisciplinarni karakter teorije, tako i činjenicu da je Nussbaum, u saradnji sa ekonomistom Amartyjom Senom (Amartya Sen), više od jedne decenije razvijala ovaj alternativni pristup. Ipak, svojim prijemčivim stilom i bogatstvom primera iz stvarnog života, ona uspeva u ovom zadatku. Stoga knjiga *Creating Capabilities* predstavlja izuzetan uvod u teoriju o sposobnostima, te uspeva da podstakne čitaoca na razmišljanje o sledećim pitanjima: Šta je potrebno da bismo jedno društvo smatrali pravednim? Na koji način treba da organizujemo društvene institucije ne bismo li ideal pravednog društva dostigli?

Nussbaum opisuje teoriju o sposobnostima kao novu teorijsku strukturu koja postavlja jednostavno, ali zanemareno, pitanje: *šta su ljudi zaista sposobni da rade i da budu?* (str. 18). Postulirajući ovo pitanje kao osnovno pitanje pravde, teorija o sposobnostima oštro se suprotstavlja postojećim modelima koji su tradicionalno problem društvene pravde posmatrali kao problem preraspodele materijalnih resursâ.

U svom karakterističnom stilu, autorka započinje knjigu snažnom i uznemirujućom pričom o životu Vasanti, siromašne Indijke, koja je zarobljena u „u nasilničkom braku“

jer je suprug tuče, bez sopstvenog novca i imovine. Vasantina priča trenutno zaokuplja čitaočevu pažnju, pružajući istovremeno intuitivan uvid u glavne pretpostavke teorije o sposobnostima. U drugom poglavlju Nusbaum daje detaljniji opis teorije, gde eksplicitno podvlači distinkciju između sopstvene verzije pristupa sa jedne strane i Senove verzije sa druge. Možda najznačajni deo drugog poglavlja predstavlja definisanje ključnih pojmova teorije. Zamislimo dve osobe, poziva nas Nusbaum, pri čemu jedna od njih gladuje jer nema dovoljno hrane, dok druga posti iz religijskih razloga. Iako obe osobe imaju isto „funkcionisanje“ (*functioning*), odnosno isti nivo uhranjenosti, one imaju različite „sposobnosti“ (*capability*), jer dok druga osoba ima sposobnost, odnosno mogućnost, da dostigne neophodni nivo uhranjenosti, prva osoba tu sposobnost nema. Teorija o sposobnostima, kako i sam naziv otkriva, nastoji da prikaže upravo ovu distinkciju, te da dokaže da pravedna država treba da obrati pažnju na razvijanje minimalnih ljudskih sposobnosti (str. 20–28). Kao što je poznato iz njenih prethodnih radova, Nusbaum razvija teoriju univerzalnih i osnovnih političkih prava koja su detaljno, ali neodređeno, predstavljena kroz listu deset centralnih sposobnosti: (i) život, (ii) telesno zdravlje, (iii) telesni integritet, (iv) čula, mašta i misao, (v) osećanja, (vi) praktični razum, (vii) pripadnost, (viii) druge vrste, (ix) igra, i (x) kontrola nad sredinom. Nažalost, autorka u ovoj knjizi ne nudi argument u prilog svoje liste; umesto toga, plauzibilnost liste Nusbaum brani tako što tvrdi da je ovih deset ljudskih sposobnosti intuitivno prisutno u pojmu ljudskog dostojanstva, kao i da su deset ljudskih sposobnosti koje ona identifikuje sposobnosti koje bi razumni građani mogli da žele.

Treće poglavlje, naslovljeno „Neophodna protiv-teorija“ (“A Necessary Counter-Theory”), sažeto ističe sličnosti i razlike između teorije o sposobnostima i drugih preovlađujućih teorija. Tačnije, u ovom poglavlju autorka ukratko predstavlja debatu sa Džonom Rolsom (John Rawls). Slično tome,

autorka nudi i utilitarističko tumačenje BDP (bruto domaći proizvod) pristupa ekonomskom razvoju, te ističe značajne mane ovakvog pristupa pitanju društvene pravde. Ovo poglavlje sadrži i kratko poređenje teorije o sposobnostima sa dominantnom teorijom o ljudskim pravima.

U četvrtom poglavlju, autorka nas vodi na vrtoglavo putovanje kroz nekoliko ključnih filozofskih pitanja: (i) kako možemo da izaberemo relevantne sposobnosti, (ii) koja je razlika između teorije o sposobnostima i teorijâ društvenog ugovora, (iii) da li teoriju o sposobnostima treba da shvatimo kao deontološku ili kao konsekvencijalističku teoriju? Ovo su vrlo interesantna filozofska pitanja koja zahtevaju detaljnu analizu; no filozofska publika verovatno neće biti zadovoljna njihovim sažetim i nedovoljno razvijenim spominjanjem. Imajući u vidu Rolsovu pretpostavku o postojanju „razumnog pluralizma“ (*reasonable pluralism*), odabir ključnih političkih principa nije nimalo lak zadatak koji se može sažeti u svega nekoliko stranica. Slično tome, i teorija o sposobnostima i teorije društvenog ugovora imaju bogatu i raznovrsnu istorijsku podlogu; stoga, poređenje ove dve tradicije zahteva daleko opsežniju analizu. Filozofi se mogu zapitati, najzad, da li teorija o sposobnostima uopšte može i treba da se tumači ili kao deontološka ili kao konsekvencijalistička teorija. Odnosno, filozofi se mogu zapitati da li su ove dve tradicije jedine paradigme koje zaslužuju da se razmotre. Moguće je, na primer, da teorija o sposobnostima predstavlja kombinaciju ove dve dominantne porodice, ili pak, da teorija o sposobnostima deli mnogo karakteristika sa etikom vrlina. Istovremeno, ovo su pitanja koja verovatno neće biti od naročite zanimljivosti za ne-filozofsku publiku, koja se lako može izgubiti u mnoštvu specijalizovanih termina, poznatih i nepoznatih imena, kao i u skokovima iz jedne istorijske epohe u drugu.

U narednim poglavljima, autorka obrazlaže niz problema koji su u dosta detalja raspravljani u filozofskoj literaturi. Tema petog

poglavlja jeste analiza pitanja poštovanja kulturne raznolikosti, kao i prigovora o kulturnom imperijalizmu teorije, dok je tema šestog poglavlja proširivanje teorije o sposobnostima na područje globalne pravde. U narednom, sedmom poglavlju, Nusbaum nas vodi na još jedno zanimljivo putovanje: na putovanje kroz istoriju filozofije. Na dvadesetak stranica, autorka daje obrise onih filozofskih ideja, tradicija i mislilaca koji su inspirisali stvaranje teorije o sposobnostima. Problem sa ovim poglavljem, međutim, isti je kao problem sa četvrtim poglavljem. Sa jedne strane, neki filozofi (barem oni koji su zainteresovani za istorijski pristup) doživće ovo poglavlje kao zanimljivo i podsticajno, dok će ga drugi doživeti kao zbrzano i zbunjujuće. Sa druge strane, ne-filozofi će se ponovo naći u čudu kada iz paragrafa u paragraf budu čitali neke od ideja Aristotela, Cicerona, Seneke, Adama Smita (Adam Smith), Tomasa Pejna (Thomas Paine), Džona Stjuarta Mila (John Stuart Mill) i Tomasa Grina (T. H. Green).

Osmo poglavlje ukratko predstavlja brojna pitanja kojima se bave novija istraživanja inspirisana teorijom o sposobnostima. Neka od tih pitanja su: (i) problemi nepovoljnog položaja marginalizovanih grupa u razvijenim društvima, (ii) problemi rodne neravnopravnosti (pogotovo položaj žena u mnogim društvima), (iii) problemi uključivanja (fizičkih i mentalnih) invalida i bolesnih, (iv) uloga obrazovanja u liberalnim demokratijama, (v) prava životinja, i najzad, (vi) briga o prirodnoj okolini.

Knjiga se sastoji, povrh svega, i od dva dodatka koji su, svaki na svoj osoben način, od naročite zanimljivosti za filozofe. Dodatak A, nazvan „Hekman o sposobnostima“ (‘‘Heckman on Capabilities’’), hvali doprinos ekonomiste Džejmsa Hekmana (James Heckman) teoriji o sposobnostima. Ovim dodatkom Nusbaum ujedno sugerše da filozofi ove tradicije treba da aktivno istražuju doprinose ostalih teoretičara, što svakako ne deluje neuobičajeno. Ono što jeste neuobičajeno, međutim, upravo je izbor

teoretičara za kojeg autorka smatra da u značajnoj meri doprinosi razvoju teorije. Hekman, ipak, koristi ideju o sposobnostima na krajnje ograničen način: u njegovim delima, naime, sposobnosti predstavljaju isključivo veštine, talente, karakterne osobine i lične potencijale za razvoj. Ovakvim uskim shvatanjem sposobnosti, Hekman zanemaruje jednu od ključnih briga koju Sen i Nusbaum uporno ističu: ne smemo zanemariti niti društveni uticaj niti prožimajuće društvene implikacije određenih prirodnih karakteristika. Njihov poznati primer je nemogućnost osobe koja je fizički hendikepirana da bude u potpunosti pokretna. Razlog za tu nemogućnost nije njena prirodna karakteristika (fizička hendikepiranost), već nepostojanje adekvatne infrastrukture (rampe, posebna vozila, posebna parking mesta i tome slično) koja bi je osposobila da se nesmetano kreće. Stoga, čini se da bi bilo daleko korisnije da se filozofi koji rade u paradigmi sposobnosti uključe u konstruktivan dijalog sa onim teoretičarima koji istražuju iste probleme, iako koriste drugačije termine. Istaknuti primer jesu začetnici etike razvoja (*development ethics*).

Dodatak B, suprotno ovome, sažeto predstavlja debatu između dva idejna tvorca teorije o sposobnostima: same autorke i Amartje Sena. U ovom delu knjige Nusbaum oštro kritikuje Senovu distinkciju između ljudske delatnosti (*agency*) i blagostanja (*well-being*). „Distinkcija je nejasna“, piše Nusbaum, „i nimalo korisna za sve one koji su, poput Sena, odbili (sa dobrim razlozima) utilitarističke pojmove blagostanja“ (str. 200). Nasuprot Senu, autorka tvrdi da su dovoljne dve stvari kako bi se shvatila distinkcija koju Sen uvodi: (i) insistiranje na razvijanju ljudskih sposobnosti, a ne funkcionisanja, i (ii) sposobnost praktičnog razuma, koja zauzima jednu od ključnih pozicija na listi centralnih ljudskih sposobnosti. Ovaj argument ubedljiv je, međutim, samo za one koji, zajedno sa autorkom, podržavaju formiranje jedne konkretne, ali neodređene, liste ljudskih sposobnosti, poput

liste koju sama autorka predlaže. Sen je poznat, pak, po tome što odbija da podrži bilo kakvu listu ljudskih sposobnosti, te smatra da proces stvaranja liste treba prepustiti samim članovima društva koji bi se kroz javne rasprave i „atinske agore“ složili oko ključnih sposobnosti za to konkretno društvo. Senovo odbijanje, kao i njegov argument za takvu poziciju, nisu naročito ubedljivi. Sen u svojim delima, najpre, neprekidno spominje važnost adekvatne zdravstvene nege, obrazovanja, kao i političkih sloboda, sugerišući time da su sposobnosti, barem one koje su zastupljene u njegovim delima, dovoljno važne da bi bile institucionalno zaštićene. Drugo, neke sposobnosti previše su značajne i krhke da bismo njihov izbor prepustili diktatu kulturnih tradicija, jer kulturne vrednosti predstavljaju odraz onih vrednosti koje najmoćniji članovi društva cene. Najzad, ukoliko je jedini liberalni način da se izaberu relevantne sposobnosti putem javnih diskusija, Sen već pretpostavlja sposobnost praktičnog razuma koju Nussbaum ističe, kao i sposobnost društvenog i političkog učestvovanja. Senov argument je, dakle, nekonzistentan i cirkularan.

U knjizi od 203 stranice (dodajmo tome uvod, bogatu bibliografiju i indeks), neophodno je istaći, prisutna je jedna dvoznačnost: Nussbaum ističe da teorija o sposobnostima može da se razume kao komparativna analiza kvaliteta života sa jedne, i kao delimična teorija pravde, sa druge strane. Prvo tumačenje teorije najbolje je predstavljeno u delima Amartje Sena, dok Nussbaum nastoji da ovu teoriju predstavi kao teoriju o društvenoj pravdi. Ovaj donekle drugačiji razvoj jedne ideje predstavlja ujedno i najveći izazov koji autorka ne rešava na najbolji način u knjizi koja treba da bude uvodnog karaktera. Naime, Senova verzija teorije kao komparativne analize kvaliteta ljudskog života u značajnoj meri je zapostavljena, te je naglasak upravo na verziji pristupa kao teorije o društvenoj pravdi.

Ovo nije naivan previd, s obzirom na to da je Sen razvio ideju o ljudskim sposobnostima

kao reakciju na duboko ukorenjene teorije koje su analizirale kvalitet života tako što su posmatrale ekonomski razvoj, meren kao bruto domaći proizvod (BDP) po glavi stanovnika. BDP po glavi stanovnika, međutim, samo je prosek. Zamislivo je, a i prisutno u određenim društvima, da neka država ima visok BDP, a da pritom ne znamo na koji način je bogatstvo raspoređeno, niti ko ga kontroliše. Takođe, BDP pristup u potpunosti zanemaruje ostale činioce koji su važni za merenje kvaliteta života: tačnije, BDP pristup ne govori nam ništa o zdravlju, nivou obrazovanja, mogućnostima, niti o slobodama građana. Dakle, imajući u vidu da je cilj knjige predstavljanje teorije o sposobnostima široj publici, bilo bi prikladno da je Nussbaum u više detalja objasnila Senovu verziju pristupa. Opisujući teoriju o sposobnostima ili kao teoriju pravde ili kao komparativnu teoriju o kvalitetu života, autorka pravi još jedan značajan previd: ovakav dualistički opis daje utisak da se teorija o sposobnostima može tumačiti samo na jedan od ova dva ponuđena načina. Moguće je, pak, opisati teoriju o sposobnostima na apstraktniji način, te je koristiti kao osnov za obrazovanje moralne teorije, ili kao osnov za različita sociološka, antropološka, psihološka, i rodna istraživanja.

Važno je još napomenuti da bi filozofi mogli biti iznenađeni činjenicom koliko često Nussbaum naglašava da određena pitanja i problemi zahtevaju dodatnu analizu. Ovakva strategija može se protumačiti, međutim, kao poziv i ohrabrenje da se filozofi aktivnije uključe u analizu teorije o sposobnostima kroz druga dela, kako same autorke, tako i ostalih mislilaca. Zaista, Nussbaum u zaključku primećuje da su upravo čitaoci knjige „autori sledećeg poglavlja u priči o ljudskom razvoju“ (str. 187), te ističe postojanje Asocijacije za ljudski razvoj i sposobnosti (*The Human Development and Capability Association*) koja broji preko 700 članova.

Poput autorke, i ja se nadam da će se filozofi, kao i šira publika, u budućnosti podrobnije

baviti analizom teorije o sposobnostima, s obzirom na to da ovakav pristup problemima društvene pravde obećava plodne rezultate i privlačne zaključke. Teorija o sposobnostima, takođe, privukla je pažnju mnogih međunarodnih organizacija, poput Ujedinjenih nacija, te ima potencijal da izađe iz relativno uskih filozofskih okvira i da značajno doprinese pravednijem razvoju mnogih društava.

Uprkos njenim nedostacima, knjiga *Creating Capabilities* predstavlja dašak svežine

u moru usko specijalizovanih knjiga o problemima društvene pravde. Napisana u čitljivom stilu, karakterističnom za autorku, obogaćena mnoštvom živopisnih primera koji podstiču na razmišljanje o ključnim problemima današnjice, knjiga *Creating Capabilities* pogodna je za ne-filozofsku publiku koja će se možda, inspirisana ubedljivim argumentima, pridružiti borbi protiv nepravde; istovremeno, knjiga predstavlja izuzetan uvod u teoriju o sposobnostima za one filozofe koji uviđaju neke od mana duboko ukorenjenih teorija pravde.

IZ RADA INSTITUTA VI
FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE

Priredio Dušan Bošković

TRIBINE

Iz rada Instituta
Pregled tribinâ i konferencijâ 2013.

Dušan Bošković

FEBRUAR

Aleksandar Pavlović, „Vrag i Turčin: privatni teološki i politički koncept neprijatelja u srpskoj tradiciji“, sreda, 20. februar;
Дмитрий Узланер, „Дело 'Пусси Райот' и особенности российского постсекуляризма“ / „The Pussy Riot and Peculiarities of Postsecular Society in Russia“, четвртак, 21. februar;

Bojana Stojanović Pantović, „Kritičke kontroverze o feminizmu Isidore Sekulić“, ponedjeljak, 25. februar;

Razgovor o knjigama *Bioetika* i *Horizont bioetike: moral u doba tehničke reprodukcije života*. Govore: Vojin Rakić, Predrag Krstić, Aleksandar Dobrijević, sreda, 27. februar;

Dragoljub Kaurin, „Profesionalno obrazovanje u Srbiji u postsocijalizmu“, sreda, 27. februar;

MART

Ayesha Ahmad, „Should we erase trauma memories?“, Tuesday, March 5;

Jonathan Wolff, „Is It Immoral to Put a Price on Life“, Friday, March 8 (predavanje održano u Rimskoj dvorani Biblioteke grada Beograda);

Boran Berčić, Razgovor o knjigama *Filozofija I* i *Filozofija II* prof. Borana Berčića i predavanje „Šta je filozofija?“. Govore: Živan Lazović, Vojislav Božičković, Saša Krnic, autor Boran Berčić, sreda, 27. mart;

Andreas Poltermann, „Medically Assisted Dignified Death“, Wednesday, March 27;

APRIL

Sandra Radenović, „Bioetička edukacija i smanjenje etničkih stereotipija i predrasuda – primer posete romskim nehidijenskim naseljima“, sreda, 3. april;

Mirko Blagojević, „Revitalizacija religije i religioznosti u Srbiji: stvarnost ili mit?“, sreda, 3. april;

Prezentacija knjige Veselina Mitrovića, *Iskorak bioetike: Nove biotehnologije i društveni aspekti „poboljšanja“ zdravih*. Govore: Vojin Rakić, Marija Bogdanović, Nada Sekulić, Jovan Babić, autor Veselin Mitrović, sreda, 10. april;

Michal Sládeček, „Istorija i kolektivno sećanje: kontinuitet i diskontinuitet“, sreda, 10. april;

Aleksandar Damjanović, „O filozofiji samoubistva: pogled jednog psihijatra“, sreda, 17. april;

Radmila Radić, „Monaštvo u Srpskoj pravoslavnoj crkvi: istorijski razvoj i savremeno stanje“, sreda, 17. april;

Razgovori o knjizi Božidara Jakšića *Mišljenje kao diverzija*. Govore: Lino Veljak, Slobodan Gavrilović, Nebojša Popov, Predrag Milidrag, četvrtak, 25. april;

Jack Knight, „Democratic Experimentalism“, Tuesday, April 30;

MAJ

Predstavljanje knjigâ Sretena Marića o likovnoj umetnosti. Govore: Slobodan Gavrilović, Miško Šuvaković, Dušan Bošković, sreda, 8. maj;

Davor Džalto, „Nacionalizam, etatizam i pravoslavlje“, sreda, 8. maj;

Paul Mojzes, „Religija i religioznost u Americi“, sreda, 15. maj;

Petar Bojanić i Sanja Todorović, „Više od primera: dug (Schuld) u Kantovom spisu Pokušaj uvođenja pojma negativne veličine u filozofiju (1763)“, sreda, 22. maj;

Milanko Govedarica, „Habermasova filozofija psihoanalize“, sreda, 29. maj;

Dva predavanja o Hegelu. Birgit Sandkaulen, „Bildung bei Hegel – Entfremdung oder Versöhnung“; Walter Jaeschke, „Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Hegels“, Donnerstag 30. Mai (predavanja održana u Goethe-Institutu, Beograd);

JUN

Robert M. Hayden, „Antagonistic Tolerance: Competitive Sharing of Religious Sites“, Monday, June 3;

Razgovor o knjizi Milorada Belančića *Bele stranice istorije*. Govore: Zagorka Golubović, Branko Romčević, Vladimir Milisavljević, autor Milorad Belančić, sreda, 5. jun;

Aleksandra Mirović, „O građanskoj neposlušnosti: za redefiniciju kontekstualnog okvira“, sreda, 5. jun;

Predrag Krstić, *Etika* – sto šesnaesta epizoda serijala *Zvezdane staze: sledeća generacija*, sreda, 12. jun;

Novica Milić, „Zoran Đinđić i njegova filozofska bibliografija“, sreda, 12. jun;

Promocija knjige *PRAXIS. Društvena kritika i humanistički socijalizam*. Govore: Dragomir Olujić Oluja, Krunoslav Stojaković, Božidar Jakšić, Lino Veljak, sreda, 12. jun; Nebojša Vuković, „Uvođenje u geopolitiku – prilog pokušaju njenog određenja“, sreda, 19. jun;

JUL

Rosamond Rhodes, „Hobbes's Fifth Law of Nature and its Implications“, Wednesday, July 10;

AVGUST

William McBride, „The World Philosophy Community Today“, Saturday, August 13; Angela McBride, „The Changing Face of Leadership“, Saturday, August 13;

SEPTEMBAR

Dušan Bošković, „Finalna razmatranja o likovnoj umetnosti i Sretenu Mariću“, sreda, 25. septembar;

Velizar Mirčov, „Odnos države i crkve u Evropi“, sreda, 25. septembar;

OKTOBAR

David Tombs, „Images of an Execution: News Media, Sexualised Violence and Theology“, Thursday, October 3;

Srđan Sremac, „O mogućnosti dijaloga između (empirijske) teologije i društvenih nauka: primer društvene konstrukcije konverzije“, četvrtak, 3. oktobar;

Igor Cvejić, „Niče: tragedija i teleologija“, sreda, 9. oktobar;

Jelena Vasiljević, „Ljudska prava i kulturna prava – neki problemi pravnog uokviravanja društvenih praksi“, sreda, 16. oktobar;

Marinko Lolić, „Kantova kritika i novo utemeljenje društvenog ugovora“, sreda, 23. oktobar;

- Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc, „Causes mineures: bilan-programme sur le sujet de la politique“, Mercredi, 23 Octobre;
- Lev Kreft, „Radikalna kritika sporta“, četvrtak, 24. oktobar;
- Slaviša Raković, „Svetovi posvećenih pravoslavnih vernika u Srbiji: potreba za etnografijom“, sreda, 30. oktobar;
- Jelena Đurić, „Postsekularnost kao povratak volje za smislom“, sreda, 30. oktobar;

NOVEMBAR

- Rasprava povodom knjige Slobodana Divjaka *Teror uma ili teror nad umom. Karl Šmit – ikona postmodernizma*. Govore: Aleksandar Ilić, Milenko Bodin, Jovan Babić, Nenad Daković, Vladimir Cvetković, Dragan Prole, Đorđe Vukadinović, Ljubomir Kljakić, Rade Kalik, Trivo Inđić, autor Slobodan Divjak, sreda 6. novembar;
- Jelena Mijić, „Feministički empirizam i naturalistička epistemologija“, sreda, 13. novembar;
- Milan M. Ćirković, „Posmatrački selekcionarni efekti i globalni rizici“, četvrtak, 14. novembar;
- Vladimir Milisavljević, „Platon i izmišljanje autohtonosti“, sreda, 20. novembar;
- Srđan Prodanović, „Spor oko teorijskog statusa zdravog razuma u klasičnom pragmatizmu i sociologiji: Dirkem vs. Džui“, sreda, 20. novembar;
- Graham Ward & Davor Džalto, „Religion in the Contemporary World“, Saturday, November 23;

- Stranački pluralizam ili monizam – trideset godina posle*. O prvom izdanju knjige Vojislava Koštunice i Koste Čavoškog govore: Nebojša Popov, Aleksandar Ilić, Momčilo Pavlović, Nikola Popović, Časlav Koprivica Slobodan Samardžić, autori Vojislav Koštunica i Kosta Čavoški, moderator Mile Savić; uvodne reči Dušan Bošković i Aleksandar Nikitović, sreda, 27. novembar;

DECEMBAR

- Jelena Simić, „Rodne varijacije – u susret priznavanja pravnih posledica 'promene pola' u Srbiji“, ponedeljak, 2. decembar;
- Marjan Ivković, „Dve 'paradigme' savremene kritičke teorije društva: između 'socijalno-filozofske' i deontološke kritike dominacije“, sreda, 4. decembar;
- Aleksandar Nikitović, „Neograničena vlast monarhije i vladavina zakona“, sreda, 4. decembar;
- Alenka Zupančič, „Seksualno i ontologija“, utorak, 17. decembar (predavanje održano u Rimskoj dvorani Biblioteke grada Beograda);
- Alenka Zupančič, „Hegel i Frojd“, sreda, 18. decembar;
- Danilo Mandić, „Društveni pokreti i separatizam“, sreda, 18. decembar;
- Predrag Milidrag i Marinko Lolić, „Uticaj jezuita na formiranje moderne evropske intelektualne zajednice: naučni, filozofski i pedagoški aspekti“, sreda, 25. decembar.

5-7. MART

Erörterung grundlegender Fragen zum Verhältnis von Biopolitik und Institutionen / Razmatranje temeljnih pitanja odnosa biopolitike i institucija

Dienstag / Utorak 5. 3.

Gespräche über Lehre und Zusammenarbeit / Razgovori o nastavi i saradnji

Christoph Hubig (Darmstadt), „Die biotechnische Herausforderung – Zwei Optionen machththeoretischer Modellierung“ / „Biotehnički izazov – dvije opcije modeliranja u okviru teorije moći“

Željko Radinković (Belgrad), „(Bio-) Macht – eine transzendentalphilosophische Frage?“ / „(Bio-) moć – transcendentalnofilozofsko pitanje?“

Mittwoch / Sreda 6. 3.

Jan Müller (Darmstadt), „Biopolitik als Politik der Gewalt? Vom Vitalismus zur Institutionenkritik“ / „Biopolitika kao politika nasilja? Od vitalizma do kritike institucija“

Markus Manojlović (Banja Luka), „Die Grenze – biopolitische Aspekte“ / „Biopolitički aspekti granice“

Petra Gehring (Darmstadt), „Bioethik als Form von Biopolitik“ / „Bioetika kao forma biopolitike“

Igor Cvejić (Belgrad), „Ästhetik der Schuld“ / „Estetika duga“

Petar Bojanić (Belgrad), „Biopolitiken und Institution“ / „Biopolitike i institucija“

Kaja Tulatz (Darmstadt), „Biomacht des Empire? Der souveränitätstheoretische Rückfall hinter Foucault“ / „Biomoc imperija? Pad teorije suvereniteta iza pozicija Fukoa“

Milijana Sladojević (Banja Luka), „Foucaults Verständnis der Freiheit“ / „Fukoovo poimanje slobode“

Michael Nerurkar (Darmstadt), „Reflexion der Modalität. Macht als Instanz bedingter Möglichkeit“ / „Refleksija modaliteta. Moć kao instanca uslovljene mogućnosti“

Maja Mandić (Banja Luka), „Biopolitik für Kulturwissenschaften“ / „Biopolitika za kulturološke studije“

Rastko Jovanov (Belgrad), „Krieg, Politik, (Bio-) Macht: Verhältnis und Strategie“ / „Rat, politika, (bio-) moć: odnos i strategija“

Donnerstag / Četvrtak 7. 3.

Philipp Richter (Darmstadt), „Dynamik der Macht. Vom logischen Raum zum Handlungsraum“ / „Dinamika moći. Od logičkog prostora ka prostoru delanja“

256

Klaus Wieglering (Darmstadt), „Zur Normierung des Gesundheitsverständnisses in Zeiten der technischen Aufrüstung des menschlichen Körpers“ / „O normiranju razumevanja zdravlja u doba tehničkog opremanja ljudskog tela“

Željko Šarić (Banja Luka), „Biopolitik und die Ideologie der Menschenrechte“ / „Biopolitika i ideologija ljudskih prava“

Lektürekurs: Hardt, Michael/Negri, Antonio: 'Empire. Die neue Weltordnung' / Lektira: Hardt, Michael/Negri, Antonio: 'Imperij. Novi svetski poredak'

Lektürekurs: Giorgio Agamben: 'Homo Sacer' / Lektira: Giorgio Agamben: 'Homo sacer'

* * *

8-9. MART

Democracy, Identity, European Integration / Demokracija, identitet, evropske integracije

Friday 8th / Petak, 8. 3.

Chandran Kukathas (London School of Economics), „Antipolis“

Ivan Mladenović (University of Belgrade), „On the Priority of (Deliberative) Democracy“

Emanuela Ceva (University of Pavia), „Toleration, Respect, and the Cultural Defense“

Michal Sládeček (University of Belgrade), „The European Memory and Identity as Reconciliation with the Past“

Fabienne Peter (University of Warwick), „Epistemic Circumstances of Democracy“

Snježana Prijic-Samaržija (University of Rijeka), „Epistemology and Democracy. Epistemological Benefits of Democratic Procedures“

Saturday 9th / Subota, 9. 3.

Symposium on J. Wolff's Ethics and Public Policy. A Philosophical Inquiry

Jonathan Wolff (University College, London), „Précis to Ethics and Public Policy. A Philosophical Inquiry“

Enes Kulenović (University of Zagreb), „Political Philosophy and Public Policy: Six Models“

Nebojša Zelić (University of Rijeka), „The Role of Ideal Theory in Public Policy Making“

Elvio Baccharini (University of Rijeka), „Ethics and Public Policy. The Role of Public Reason“

David Owen (University of Southampton), „Demos problems in the European Union“

Miriam Ronzoni (Technical University of Darmstadt), „Republicanism, Democracy, and the European Union“

* * *

18-20. APRIL

Mind the Gap – Family Socialisation and Gender

Thursday 18th

Mihailo Đukić, „Presentation of RRPP Western Balkans programme“

Sanja Milutinović Bojanić and Jelena Čeriman (CELAP), Documentary Film Projection „Parents on parenting“

Women, Gender and Social Environment

Nada Sekulić (University of Belgrade), „Motherhood as a social construct“

Katerina Kolozova (Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities, Skopje), „The Cut of the Real“ – a presentation of a forthcoming book on feminist philosophy published by Columbia University Press, supported by RRPP

Andrea Racles (European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg), „Mother–Daughter Relationships among Roma from Romania: Value-transmitting Domestic Activities“

Elidiana Shkira (University of New York, Tirana), „Critical Approach in Children’s Social and Educational Progress in Albania. Consequences of the Family Problems and Education System Mistakes“

Natalia Skoczylas (University of Maria Curie Skłodowska in Lublin), „City with a Gender“

Representation and Acceptance of Different Gender Identities and Gender Roles in Family and Society

Manfred Zentner (Institute for Youth Culture Research, Vienna), „Creation of Self-perception in the Families and Social Groups: Lifestyle or Destiny“

Rada Drezgić (University of Belgrade), „Family Values: The Role of Culture and Cultural Policy in Contemporary Serbia“

Jelena Đurić (University of Belgrade), „Family Values and Modern Identities“

Mirjana Popović (Faculty of Philosophy Nikšić), „Feminism and gender studies – the beginnings of school women education in Montenegro“

Marina Matejević, Jelisaveta Todorović, Dragana Jovanović (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Niš), „Traditionally and Contemporary in Assessments of Family Relationships of Students of the University of Nis“

Friday 19th

From Traditional to Modern and Postmodern Concepts of the Family and Gender Roles

Marija Todorović Tatar (University of Belgrade), „Benevolent Sexism in Family and Romantic Relationships: Subtle and Efficient Mechanism of Persistent of Modern Patriarchy“

Zorica Mršević (University of Belgrade), „LGBT children in their parental families – dismissal instead of solidarity and protection“

Ioanna Fokou (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens), „How are women presented? What messages do they communicate through the role of women in advertisements?“

Ozhan Hancilar (Pamukkale University in Denizli), „Women in the PKK“

Ivana Artonović (Institute for Serbian Culture, Priština-Leposavić), „Women in Northern Kosovo – Daily Life in Between Social and Political Division“

Gender research

Verica Pavić Zentner (CELAP), „Semiotic Analysis: Presentation of Gender Roles in a Family-Oriented Online Media in Serbian Language“

Oana Ivan (University of Kent), „On Tourism, Tradition, Family and Gender in South-Eastern European Fishing Village“

Ewa Cukrowska (University of Warsaw), „Measuring Gender Inequality: Gender sensitive indicators and Aggregate Indexes: What stories do they tell?“

Staša Lučić (University of Belgrade), „Representation of Divorce: TV Series and Movies in 1980s in Serbia“

Snežana Grujić and Jelena Petrović-Desnica (University of Belgrade), „Gender and Visual Arts in the Sumadia Region“

Workshop *Gender and Family in Theory and Praxis* (Moderator Verica Pavić Zentner, CELAP; Workshop in BHS language, other participants are free)

Saturday 20th

Challenges of Gender Mainstreaming in Law, Policy-Making Processes and Client-Oriented Professions

Verica Pavić Zentner (CELAP), „Presentation of the workshop results. Discussion round on workshop results“

Zorana Antonijević (PhD candidate, University of Novi Sad), „Influencing Policies – Emerging Paths in Mainstreaming Gender in National Policy Frameworks. Challenges of Gender Mainstreaming in Public Policies in Serbia“

Amanda Orza (European Policy Centre, Belgrade), „Gender Mainstreaming in the Serbian Policy-Making Process. What are the Odds?“

Snježana Vasiljević (University of Zagreb), „Challenges of the Modern Anti-Discrimination Law and Policies – Light at the End of the Tunnel“

* * *

29–30. APRIL

Ontologie et politique des institutions / Ontology and Politics of Institutions / Ontologija i politika institucija

Lundi 29 / Monday 29th / Ponedjeljak, 29. 4.

Massimo La Torre (Università di Catanzaro, Italy), „Natural Law, Legal Positivism, and the Place of Law as Institution“

Caroula Argyriadis-Kervegan (Université de Cergy-Pontois, France), „La théorie de l'institution et la doctrine allemande à la fin du 19^{ème} et au début du 20^{ème} siècle“

Jack Knight (Duke University School of Law, USA), „Explaining the Rise of Neoliberalism: A Case Study in the Mechanisms of Institutional Change“

* * *

14–16. MAY

Enhancement: Cognitive, Moral and Mood / Poboljšanje: kognitivno, moralno i poboljšanje raspoloženja

Tuesday 14 / Utorak, 14. 5.

Discussion of the thesis „Moral Enhancement should not be pursued because it is a threat to Freedom“. Papers: Julian Savulescu (Oxford University), *Negative*; John Harris (University of Manchester) *Affirmative*. Discussant: Peter Singer (Princeton University) / Julian Savulescu (Oxford University), pobijanje teze i John Harris (University of Manchester), potvrđivanje teze: „Moralno poboljšanje ne treba vršiti jer predstavlja pretnju Slobodi“; diskutant Peter Singer (Princeton University)

Moral Bioenhancement: Can it Offer Anything Valuable in the Future? / Moralno bio-poboljšanje: može li da ponudi bilo šta vredno u budućnosti?

Ingmar Persson (Goteborg University and Oxford University), „Autarchy and enhancement“ / „Autarkija i poboljšanje“

Nicholas Agar (University of Wellington), „Against moral bioenhancement“ / „Protiv moralnog bio-poboljšanja“

Vojin Rakić (University of Belgrade), „Voluntary moral bioenhancement and the creation of post-persons“ / „Dobrovoljno moralno bio-poboljšanje i stvaranje post-osoba“

Moral Enhancement and Virtues / Moralno poboljšanje i vrline

Stefan Sorgner (University of Erfurt), „Moral enhancement as obstacle to the good life: Only prisoners and 'saints' might love it“ / „Moralno poboljšanje kao prepreka za ostvarivanje dobrog života: Samo zatvorenici i 'Sveci' mogu da ga vole“

James Hughes (Trinity College, Hartford, Connecticut), „Enhanced moral character requires multiple virtues“ / „Poboljšani moralni karakter zahteva višestruke vrline“

Wednesday 15 / Sreda, 15. 5.

Peter Singer (Princeton University), „What are acceptable ways of making people better and happier?“ / „Koji su prihvatljivi načini stvaranja boljih i srećnijih ljudi?“

Nicholas Agar (University of Wellington), Discussion keynote speech / Komentari na uvodno izlaganje

Towards a New Culture of Enhancing Humans and Human Reproduction / U susret novoj kulturi poboljšanja ljudi i ljudske reprodukcije

Tom Douglas (Oxford University), „Neuroenhancements in Crime Prevention“ / „Neuro-poboljšanje u prevenciji kriminala“

Katrien Devolder (Ghent University), „Procreative altruism: Beyond individualism in reproductive selection“ / „Prokreativni altruizam: Više od individualizma u reproduktivnom izboru“

Rob Sparrow (Monash University), „Egalitarianism and Moral Enhancement“ / „Egalitarizam i moralno poboljšanje“

Mima Fazlagić (Cryo Save Belgrade), „Stem cells and regenerative medicine in the service of enhancement of the quality of life and health“ / „Matične ćelije i regenerativna medicina u službi poboljšanja kvaliteta života i zdravlja“

Bennett Foddy (Oxford University), „The right and wrong of growing old“ / „Dobro i zlo u starenju“

Enhancement: General Concepts / Poboljšanje: opšti pojmovi

Jovan Babić (University of Belgrade), „Enhancement and Freedom“ / „Poboljšanje i sloboda“

Ayesha Ahmad (University College of London), „Distinctions of 'artificialness' in moral enhancement and their impact for the future of human culture/s“ / „Razlike u 'arteficijalnosti' u moralnom poboljšanju i njihov uticaj na budućnost ljudske kulture/a“

Sarah Chan (University of Manchester), „Cognitive enhancement, creative beneficence and the cross-species problem“ / „Kognitivno poboljšanje, kreativno dobročinstvo i problem među vrstama“

Michael Barilan (Tel Aviv University), „Why it is impossible to enhance human beings and how is this impossibility relevant to the 'enhancement' debate?“ / „Zašto je nemoguće poboljšati ljudska bića i zbog čega je ova nemogućnost relevantna za raspravu o 'poboljšanju'?“

Jonathan Pugh (Oxford University), „Enhancing autonomy through the use of cognitive enhancements“ / „Poboljšanje autonomije kroz upotrebu kognitivnih poboljšanja“

Thursday 16 / Četvrtak, 16. 5.

Regional Bioethics 1: „Integrative Bioethics“ / Regionalna bioetika 1: „Integrativna bioetika“

Tomislav Bracanović (University of Zagreb), „Integrative Bioethics: Handle with care“ / „Integrativna bioetika: pažljivo rukovati“

Aleksandar Dobrijević (University of Belgrade), „Skepticism about Integrative Bioethics“ / „Skepticizam prema integrativnoj bioetici“

Regional Bioethics 1: „Integrative Bioethics“ (continuation) / Regionalna bioetika 1: „Integrativna bioetika“ (nastavak)

Tomislav Janović (University of Zagreb), „The strange fate of academic ethics in Croatia: From Marxian disintegration of ethics to Integrative Bioethics“ / „Čudna sudbina akademske etike u Hrvatskoj: od marksističke dezintegracije etike do integrativne bioetike“

Nenad Cekić (University of Belgrade), TBA / Naslov izlaganja biće naknadno prijavljen (govorio)

(New) Perspectives on Moral Enhancement / (Nove) perspektive u moralnom poboljšanju

Maartje Schermer (Erasmus University) and Farah Foqueart (Ghent University), „Moral

enhancement: do means matter morally“ / „Moralno poboljšanje: da li su sredstva moralno relevantna?“

Veselin Mitrović (University of Belgrade), „Moral Enhancement: Back to the Future?“ / „Moralno poboljšanje: povratak u budućnost?“

Hannah Maslen (Oxford University), „Neuro-interventions, altruism and enhancing morality“ / „Neuro-intervencije, altruizam i poboljšanje moralnosti“

(New Perspectives on Moral Enhancement (continuation) / (Nove) perspektive u moralnom poboljšanju (nastavak)

Owen Schaefer (Oxford University), „Indirect Moral Enhancement“ / „Indirektno moralno poboljšanje“

Chris Gyngell (Australian National University), „Cognitive Diversity and Moral Enhancement“ / „Kognitivna raznolikost i moralno poboljšanje“

Ivan Mladenović (University of Belgrade), „The Enhancement Debate and Deliberative Democracy“ / „Rasprava o poboljšanju i deliberativna demokratija“

Cognition, Morality and Mood in Psychiatry / Kognicija, moralnost i raspoloženje u psihijatriji

Aleksandar Damjanović, Srđan Milovanović an Aleksandra Damjanović (University of Belgrade), „Ethical challenges of modern psycho-pharmacotherapy“ / „Etički i filozofski izazovi savremene psiho-farmakoterapije“

Aleksandar Fatić (University of Belgrade), „The intentionality of madness: checking the cognitive issues in DSM-based diagnosis“ / „Intencionalnost ludila: provera kognitivnih problema u DSM-zasnovanim dijagnozama“

Regional Bioethics 2: Variae / Regionalna bioetika 2: Razno

Zoran Todorović (University of Belgrade), „Cognitive enhancement: 'of mice and men“ / „Kognitivno poboljšanje: 'miševa i ljudi“

Dušanka Krajnović, Andrijana Milošević (University of Belgrade), „Do ethics committees contribute to a morally enhanced health care system in Serbia?“ / „Da li etički odbori doprinose moralno poboljšanom sistemu zdravstvene nege u Srbiji?“

Milijana Đerić (University of Belgrade), „Euthanasia in Serbia: in need of enhanced debate and regulation“ / „Eutanazija u Srbiji: potrebno je poboljšanje debate i regulacije“

* * *

MÁJUS 20 / 20. MAJ

A magyar filozófia napja – Fenomenológia és társadalom / Dan mađarske filozofije – Fenomenologija i društvo

Hétfő 20 / Ponedjeljak, 20. 5.

Bagi Zsolt, „Fenomenológia és társadalomfilozófia. A fenomenológiai közösség“ / „Fenomenologija i filozofija društva. Fenomenološka zajednica“

Petar Bojanić, „Mi (Wir; Wirsein): O uslovi-ma institucionalnog delovanja kod Heideggera“ / „Mi (Wir; Wirsein): Az intézményi cselekvés feltételeiről Heideggernél“

Losoncz Alpár, „Töretlen és megszakított interszubjektivitás: Merleau-Ponty és Sartre társadalomfilozófiája“ / Alpar Lošonc, „Neprekidna i izlomljena intersubjektivnost: filozofija društva Merlo-Pontija i Sartra“

Takács Ádám, „Interszubjektivitás, társadalmi világ és objektiváció: egy egyirányú fenomenológiai viszony?“ / „Intersubjektivnost, društveni svet i objektivacija – da li je reč o jednosmernom fenomenološkom odnosu?“

Losoncz Márk, „Az áru hiperfenomenológiája“ / „Hiperfenomenologija robe“

Farkas Henrik, „Előítélet, elnyomás, ellenál-lás“ / „Predrasuda, represija, otpor“

Pavlovits Tamás, „A francia fenomenológia teológiai fordulata és a végtelen ideája Descartes-nál“ / „Teološki preokret francuske fenomenologije i ideja beskonačnog kod Dekarta“

Sanja Todorović, „Odnos logike i vremena u (ranom) Deridinom tumačenju Huserla“ / „A logika és az idő viszony a korai Derrida Husserl-értelmezésében“

* * *

7-8. JUN

Svetozar Stojanović – ličnost i delo

Petak, 7. 6.

Slobodan Divjak, „Svetozar Stojanović – od disidentskog marksiste do socijal-eko-demokrate“

Dragoljub Mićunović, „Životni put i idejni razvoj Svetozara Stojanovića“

Jovan Babić, „Tri ključna momenta u intelektualnoj biografiji Svetozara Stojanovića“

Bogoljub Šijaković, „Svetozar Stojanović i antropološke osnove filozofije politike“

Ljubomir Kljakić, „Poredak i alternativa – uzorni slučaj srpskog mislioca Svetozara Stojanovića“

Jagoš Đuretić, „Svetozar Sveta Stojanović: filozof, homo politicus, čovek“

Miloš Knežević, „Svetozar Stojanović kao pripadnik *Praxis* grupe“

Jovica Trkulja, „Svetozar Stojanović kao kritičar marksizma“

Mirjana Radojičić, „Svetozar Stojanović kao tumač raspada/razbijanja SFR Jugoslavije“

Vučina Vasović, „Stojanovićeve etičko-politička ortopedija“

Aleksandar Nikitović, „Jedan pogled na politički angažman Svetozara Stojanovića“

Subota, 8. 6.

Marinko Lolić, „Svetozar Stojanović kao novinar“

Aleksandar Dobrijević, „Stojanovićevo tumačenje Ričarda Mervina Hera“

Voin Milevski, „Stojanovićeve analiza etičkog naturalizma“

Zoran Ivošević, „Filozof u nevladinoj organizaciji“

Zoran Kindić, „Život i načela – preispitivanje odnosa“

* * *

27. SEPTEMBAR

Rod i obrazovanje u osnovnoj školi (Okrugli sto)

Petak, 27. 9.

Verica Pavić Centner, „Principi i praksa rodne inkluzije u osnovnom obrazovanju u Evropi“ (izveštaj). Moderacija Sanja Milutinović Bojanić, a određene panele su vodile Jelena Ćeriman, Nađa Duhaček i Melita Randelović.

* * *

OCTOBRE 22 / 22. OKTOBAR

Analyse philosophique et économique de la dette / Filozofska i ekonomska analiza duga

Mardi 22 / Utorak, 22. 10.

Maurizio Lazzarato (Paris), „La dette infinie“ / „Beskonačni dug“

Márk Losoncz (Beograd/Novi Sad) et Aleksandar Stojanović (Beograd), „Historisation de la dette et les stratégies de la résistance“ / „Istorizacija duga i strategije otpora“

Petar Bojanić et Sanja Todorović (Beograd), „La dette: l’ambiguïté du négatif“ / „Dug: dvosmislenost negativnog“

Entre dette et liberté

Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc (Paris), „La dette souveraine, anthropologie et politique“ / „Suvereni dug: antropologija i politika“

Elettra Stimilli (Rome), „The Cult of Debt“ / „Kult Duga“

Igor Krtolica (Beograd/Lion), „La dette et la critique de la dette (le problème de la confiance)“ / „Dug i kritika duga (poteškoća sa poverenjem)“

Maurizio Lazzarato (Paris), „Povodom knjige: *La Fabrique de l'homme endetté. Essai sur la condition néolibérale*, Paris, 2011“ / „Proizvodnja zaduženog čoveka. Eseji o neoliberalnom stanju“

* * *

NOVEMBER 22 / 22. NOVEMBAR

Sacred and Social/Political Freedom. The Political Dimension of Religion

Friday 22 / Petak, 22. 11.

Keynote speakers

Ingeborg Gabriel (Faculty of Catholic Theology, University of Vienna), „In the World but not of the World (John 18,36) Reflections on the Public Role of the Church in Pluralistic Societies“

Graham Ward (University of Oxford), „Church and State: Sovereignty and Competence“

Panel on Religion, tolerance and justice

Boris Begović (University of Belgrade), „Religion and Social Justice: Is There a Room for Social Engagement of the Church?“

Miroslava Hukelova (University of Liverpool), „The Politics of Tolerance: Minority Religious Groups in Secular Society – the Case of Muslim Communities in Europe“

Marko Veković (University of Belgrade), „Religion, Politics and Tolerance-Experiences of Roman Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity and Islam“

Tea Janković (University of Freiburg), „The Sacred and the Political: Serbian Orthodoxy in Church-State Relations“

Panel on Political and Metaphysical Freedom

Nikola Knežević (Faculty of Protestant Theology in Novi Sad), „From Contested Christianity to Contested Freedom: Political Transformation of Christianity and Contemporary Implications“

Aleksandar Fatić (University of Belgrade), „The Politics of Tolerance and the Idea of Christian Character“

Vlada Stanković (University of Belgrade), „Political Power and Social Role of Autocephalous Orthodox Churches in the Middle Ages and Today: The Case of Cyprus and Serbia“

Davor Džalto (University of Belgrade), „Truth and Freedom: An Orthodox Approach to the Problem of Pluralism“

* * *

6-8. DECEMBAR

Uvod u kritiku političke ekonomije

Petak, 6. 12.

Aleksandar Stojanović, „Čemu služi i čemu ne služi kritika političke ekonomije“

Mislav Žitko, „Novac, kamata i akumulacija kapitala: Marx i suvremene interpretacije“

Subota, 7. 12.

Sašo Furlan, „Marx's theory of crisis and the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall“

Luka Mesec, „Posleratni kapitalizam“

Primož Krašovec, „Transformacije rada u neoliberalizmu“

Nedelja, 8. 12.

Darko Vesić, „Država i kapital – marksističko shvatanje problema forme i funkcije kapitalističke države“

Andrea Jovanović, „Šta feminizam duguje Marksu, a šta marksizam duguje feminizmu?“

Anej Korsika, „Basics of Marxism through the reading of Communist Manifesto“

* * *

11. DECEMBAR

(Post)sekularni obrt: religijske, moralne i društveno-političke vrednosti studenata u Srbiji

Sreda, 11. 12.

Мирко Благојевић, „Религијске и моралне вредности студената у Србији – Савремена религиозност студената и десекуларизација српског друштва“

Драгана Радисављевић–Ђипаризовић, „Религиозност студената у Србији и став према ЕУ“

Дискусија Зорица Кубурић (Универзитет у Новом Саду), Драган Тодоровић (Универзитет у Нишу)

Јерина Васић, „Друштвено-политичке вредности студената у Србији – Верски и национални идентитет младих интелектуалаца у Србији“

Тијана Бајовић, „Постконфликтна демократија: политичка култура студената у Србији“

Дискусија Јово Бакић (Универзитет у Београду)

* * * * *

Otvoreni razgovori (skupovi mladih) održani su 19. januara, 1. marta i 30. aprila 2013.

Pri pisanju tekstova za *Filozofiju i društvo* autori su u obavezi da se drže sledećih pravila, uglavnom vezanih za citiranje. Standardizacija je propisana *Aktom o uređivanju naučnih časopisa* Ministarstva za prosvetu i nauku Republike Srbije iz 2009. U *Filozofiji i društvu* bibliografske jedinice citiraju se u skladu s uputstvom *Harvard Style Manual*. U ovom uputstvu naveden je način citiranja najčešćih bibliografskih jedinica; informacije o načinu citiranja ređih mogu se naći na internetu.

1. VELIČINA TEKSTA

Do dva autorska tabaka (60.000 karaktera) s apstraktom, ključnim rečima i literaturom; napomene se ne računaju.

2. APSTRAKT

Na srpskom (hrvatskom, bosanskom, crnogorskom...) i jednom stranom jeziku, između 100 i 250 reči.

3. KLJUČNE REČI

Do deset.

4. PODACI O TEKSTU

Relevantni podaci o tekstu, broj projekta na kojem je rađen i slično, navode se u fusnoti broj 1 koja se stavlja na kraju prve rečenice teksta. Fusnota ne sme biti zvezdica, niti stajati uz naslov teksta.

5. AFILIJACIJA

Puna afilijacija autora, odeljenje i fakultet, institut i slično.

6. INOSTRANA IMENA

Sva inostrana imena (osim u bibliografskim jedinicama) fonetski se transkribuju u skladu s pravilima pravopisa, a prilikom prvog javljanja u zagradi se navodi njihov izvorni oblik. Imena geografskih i sličnih odrednica takođe se fonetski transkribuju bez posebnog navođenja originala u zagradama, osim ukoliko autor smatra da je neophodno.

7. CRTA I CRTICA

Kada se navode stranice, od jedne do neke druge, ili kada se to čini za godine, između brojeva stoji crta, *ne crtica*.

Primer:

33-44, 1978-1988; ne: 33-44, 1978-1988.

8. KNJIGE

U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov knjige, mesto izdanja, izdavač. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomenama, knjiga se citira isključivo na skraćeni način.

Primer:

U literaturi: Haug, Wolfgang Fric (1981), *Kritika robne estetike*, Beograd: IIC SSO Srbije.

U tekstu: (Haug 1981: 33).

U napomeni: Haug 1981: 33.

9. ČLANCI

U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov teksta pod navodnicima, naslov časopisa u italiku, godišće časopisa, u zagradi broj sveske u godištu ukoliko paginacija nije jedinstvena za ceo tom, dvotačka i broj stranice. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. Ne stavljaju se skraćeni „str.“, „vol.“, „tom“, „br.“ i slične. U napomenama, članci se citiraju isključivo na skraćeni način.

Primeri:

U literaturi: Miller, Johns Roger (1926), „The Ideas as Thoughts of God“, *Classical Philology* 21: 317–326.

Hartman, Nikolaj (1980) „O metodi istorije filozofije“, *Gledišta* 21 (6): 101–120.

U tekstu: (Hartman 1980: 108).

U napomeni: Hartman 1980: 108

10. ZBORNICI

U spisku literature: prezime i ime priređivača, u zagradi skraćeni „prir.“, u zagradi godina izdanja, naslov zbornika u italiku, mesto izdanja, izdavač i strana po potrebi. U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomenama, zbornici se citiraju isključivo na skraćeni način.

Primer:

U literaturi: Espozito, Džon (prir.) (2002), *Oksfordska istorija islama*, Beograd: Clio.

U tekstu: (Espozito 2002)

U napomeni: Espozito 2002.

11. TEKSTOVI IZ ZBORNIKA

U spisku literature: prezime, ime autora, u zagradi godina, naslov teksta pod navodnicima, slovo „u“ (u zborniku), ime i prezime priređivača zbornika, u zagradi „prir.“, naslov zbornika u italiku, mesto izdanja, izdavač, dvotačka i broj stranice (ako je potrebno). U tekstu: u zagradi prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. U napomeni: prezime autora, godina izdanja, dvotačka, stranica. Skraćeni „str.“ dopuštena je samo u spisku literature.

Primer:

U literaturi: Nizbet, Robert (1999), „Jedinične ideje sociologije“, u A. Mimica (prir.), *Tekst i kontekst*, Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, str. 31–48.

U tekstu: (Nizbet 1999: 33).

U napomeni: Nizbet 1999: 33.

12. ČLANAK IZ NOVINA

U spisku literature: prezime, ime, u zagradi godina, naslov članka pod navodnicima, naslov novina u italiku, datum, stranica.

Primer:

U literaturi: Logar, Gordana (2009), „Zemlja bez fajronta“, *Danas*, 2. avgust, str. 12.

U tekstu: (Logar 2009: 12).

U napomeni: Logar 2009: 12.

13. INTERNET

Prilikom citiranja tekstova s interneta, osim internet-adrese sajta na kojem se tekst nalazi i naslova samog teksta, navesti i datum posete toj stranici, kao i dodatna određenja ukoliko su dostupna (godina, poglavlje i sl.).

Primer:

U literaturi: Ross, Kelley R., „Ontological Undecidability“, (internet) dostupno na: <http://www.friesian.com/undecd-1.htm> (pristupljeno 2. aprila 2009).

U tekstu: (Ross, internet).

U napomeni: Ross, internet.

All submissions to *Filozofija i društvo* must conform to the following rules, mostly regarding citations. The Referencing Guide is the modified Harvard *in-text* referencing style. In this system within the text, the author's name is given first followed by the publication date and the page number/s for the source. The list of references or bibliography at the end of the document contains the full details listed in alphabetical order for all the in-text citations.

1. LENGTH OF TEXT

Up to two double sheets (60.000 characters including spaces), abstracts, key words, without comments.

2. ABSTRACT

Between 100 and 250 words.

3. KEY WORDS

Up to 10.

4. AFFILIATION

Full affiliation of the author, department, faculty, university, institute, etc.

5. BOOKS

In the bibliography: last name, first name, year of publication in parentheses, book title, place of publication, publisher. In the text: last name in parentheses, year of publication, colon, page number. In a comment: last name, year of publication, colon, page number. Books are cited in a shortened form only in comments.

Example:

In the bibliography: Moriarty, Michael (2003), *Early Modern French Thought. The Age of Suspicion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

In the text: (Moriarty 2003: 33)

In a comment: Moriarty 2003: 33

6. ARTICLES

In the bibliography: last name, first name, year of publication, title in quotation marks, name of publication in italic, year of issue, in parentheses the volume number within year if the pagination is not uniform, colon and page number. In the text: last name

in parentheses, year of publication, colon, page number. In a comment: last name, year of publication, colon, page number. Do not put abbreviations such as 'p.', 'vol.', 'tome', 'no.' etc. Articles are cited in shortened form only in comments.

Example:

In the bibliography: Miller, Johns Roger (1926), "The Ideas as Thoughts of God", *Classical Philology* 21: 317–326.

In the text: (Miller 1926: 320)

In a comment: Miller 1926: 320

7. EDITED BOOKS

In the bibliography: last and first name of editor, abbreviation 'ed.' in parentheses, year of publication in parentheses, title of collection in italic, place of publication, publisher and page number if needed. In the text: last name in parentheses, year of publication, colon, page number. In a comment: last name, year of publication, colon, page number. Collections are cited in shortened form only in comments.

Example:

In the bibliography: Harris, John (ed.) (2001), *Bioethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

In the text: (Harris 2001)

In a comment: Harris 2001

8. ARTICLES/CHAPTERS IN BOOK

In the bibliography: last name, first name, year of publication in parentheses, text title in quotation marks, the word 'in' (in collection), first and last name of editor, the abbreviation 'ed.' in parentheses, title of collection in italic, place of publication, publisher, colon, page number (if needed). In the text: Last name of author in parentheses, year of publication, colon, page

number. In a comment: last name of author, year of publication, colon, page number. The abbreviation 'p.' is allowed only in the bibliography.

Example:

In the bibliography: Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret (1981), "You can have Sex without Children: Christianity and the New Offer", in *The Collected Philosophical Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, Ethics, Religion and Politics*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 82–96.

In the text: (Anscombe 1981:82)

In a comment: Anscombe 1981:82

9. NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINES ARTICLE

In the bibliography: last name, first name, year in parentheses, title of article in quotation marks, name of newspaper in italic, date, page.

Example:

In the bibliography: Logar, Gordana (2009), "Zemlja bez fajronta," *Danas*, 2 August, p. 12.

In the text: (Logar 2009: 12)

In a comment: Logar 2009: 12

10. WEB DOCUMENTS

When quoting an online text, apart from the web address of the site with the text and the text's title, cite the date of viewing the page, as well as further markings if available (year, chapter, etc.).

Example:

In the bibliography: Ross, Kelley R., "Ontological Undecidability", (internet) available at: <http://www.friesian.com/undecd-1.htm> (viewed 2 April, 2009).

In the text: (Ross, internet).

In a comment: Ross, internet.

CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд

1+316+32

FILOZOFIJA i društvo = Philosophy and
society / glavni i odgovorni urednik Rastko
Jovanov. - Knj. 1 (1987)- . - Beograd :
Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju,
1987- (Beograd : Colografx). - 24 cm

Tromesečno. - Drugo izdanje na drugom
medijumu: Filozofija i društvo (Online) =
ISSN 2334-8577
ISSN 0353-5738 = Filozofija i društvo
COBISS.SR-ID 11442434