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EXPLORING THE POST-ESSENTIALIST, PLURALIST, AND INTERACTIVE HUMAN NATURE: APPLICATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

ISTRAŽIVANJE POST-ESENCIJALISTIČKE, PLURALISTIČKE I INTERAKTIVNE LJUDSKE PRIRODE: PRIMENE, IMPLIKACIJE I KRITIČKO PREISPITIVANJE

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IZ RADA INSTITUTA

I

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EDITOR'S NOTE

Aleksandra Knežević

EXPLORING THE POST-ESSENTIALIST, PLURALIST, AND INTERACTIVE HUMAN NATURE: APPLICATIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

The papers featured in this special issue offer an original and critical perspective on the complexities surrounding the concept of human nature, sparked by an in-depth exploration of Maria Kronfeldner's seminal work: *What's Left of Human Nature?*

In June 2022, Kronfeldner visited the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory to discuss the key ideas of her book. She explained why we can talk about post-essentialist, interactive human nature*s* (namely, classificatory, descriptive, and explanatory human nature), despite the widely received arguments that expose the outdated essentialism about human nature and the misleading nature versus nurture, or nature versus culture dichotomy.[1]

The authors of this special issue, some of whom participated in the June event and others new to the discussion, extend beyond Kronfeldner's book.[2] Marko Porčić demonstrates the application of Kronfeldner's classificatory and descriptive accounts of human nature in archeology. Ana Lipij delves into explanatory human nature, exploring Kronfeldner's response to the developmentalist challenge and its applications to discussions about the origin of human language faculties. (The developmentalist challenge is the claim that human nature cannot be explained by appealing to genes only due to the intricate

1 More on the June event: https://ifdt.bg.ac.rs/events/lecture-maria-kronfeldner-whats-left-of-human-nature-criticlab/?lang=en (Accessed: 18th March 2023)

2 For readers looking at this special issue as a whole, please note that the order in which the papers are mentioned here and their sequence in the special issue differs. While Porčić and Lipij focus on applications, Knežević explores implications, and Žakula and Janković critically assess either Kronfeldner's work (Žakula) or topics surrounding the issue of human nature (Janković). The ordering of papers in the special issue follows a different logic.

interaction of genes (nature) and developmental resources (culture) during development.) Within the context of an uneasy relationship between sociocultural anthropology (studying human cultures) and evolutionary psychology (studying human nature), Aleksandra Knežević examines Kronfeldner's integrative pluralism, the claim that scientific disciplines can be integrated but only as separate ones. Knežević approaches this issue by comparing Kronfeldner's separationism with Tim Ingold's holism regarding the conceptual relationship between nature and culture.

Sonja Žakula remains faithful to the anthropological tradition that abandons any concept of human nature. Concerning Kronfeldner's tripartite model of human nature, Žakula argues that while it effectively navigates challenges related to the idea of human nature, it nevertheless implies human exceptionalism in comparison to other animals. Furthermore, she raises concerns about the social ramifications of scientific narratives that perpetuate human exceptionalism, particularly within the context of the Anthropocene. Amid discussions on the Anthropocene, Stefan Janković, however, suggests a reintroduction of the notion of human nature into social theory (despite the previous theoretical exclusion of this concept due to its association with dehumanization, as delineated by Kronfeldner in what she terms "the dehumanization challenge"). Janković proposes that doing so could lead to a more "humanizing" understanding of the relationship between humans and their natural world, creating a "geo-bio-social" epistemic synthesis.

The exchange of views, arguments, and criticism following the June event does not stop here. Namely, Kronfeldner's contribution to this special issue serves as an answer to concerns raised in the individual papers. Thus, although her paper opens the special issue, it stands as the last (but not final) word in this discussion. In her paper, Kronfeldner emphasizes the scope of her pluralism regarding human nature considering that other tenets of her view (anti-essentialism and interactionism) were less contested. She argues that an account of what it means to be human is always partial and hinges on the perspective one adopts in the pursuit of knowledge. However, such pluralism, in principle, allows the integration of knowledge in cases when a concrete, local issue awaits resolution. Thus, for Kronfeldner, exploring post-essentialist, pluralist, and interactive human nature is like looking through a kaleidoscope – the view is complex yet it is possible to find order in it.

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Maria Kronfeldner

BEING HUMAN IS A KALEIDOSCOPIC AFFAIR

ABSTRACT
This paper spells out the ways in which we need to be pluralists about "human nature". It discusses a *conceptual pluralism* about the concept of "human nature", stemming from post-essentialist ontology and the semantic complexity of the term "nature"; a *descriptive pluralism* about the "descriptive nature" of human beings, which is a pluralism regarding our self-understanding as human beings that stems from the long list of typical features of, and relations between, human beings; a *natural kind term pluralism*, which is a pluralism that concerns the choices we have in deciding how to apply the kind term "human"; and an *explanatory pluralism* that results from the causal complexity of life. Because of the complexity of being human, which gives rise to these pluralisms, being human is, the paper claims, a kaleidoscopic affair, and one far from concerning the life sciences only.

KEYWORDS
being human, human nature, pluralism, going beyond the life sciences.

Introduction

Ideas about "human nature" have always been important, be it for sciences, politics, or philosophy. At the same time, the idea that there is something like a "human nature" has been repeatedly questioned. From a scientific perspective, the idea has been criticized for relying on an outdated essentialism that is incompatible with contemporary biological knowledge and for relying on a misguided nature-culture divide. From a social and political perspective, it has been criticized for furthering dehumanization – the regarding, depicting, or treating of a human being as not or less human, a problem for anyone believing in equality and justice.

These critiques are discussed in detail in my book *What's Left of Human Nature* (Kronfeldner 2018a). The aim of the book was to offer an approach that takes these critiques seriously and responds to them with a constructive and systematic account, to overcome the resulting challenges and to preserve what is worth preserving. The goal was to develop an account that provides new foundations for the production and use of knowledge about the human. The resulting account is post-essentialist since it eliminates the concept of an essence. It is interactive not only since "nature" and "culture" are understood

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as intensely interacting at the developmental, epigenetic, and evolutionary level, but also since humans are shown to create their "nature" via explanatory and classificatory looping effects, i.e., by the intriguing ways in which deciding *how one wants to be* influences *how one is*. This then has led to the claim that the concept of being human is an essentially contested concept.

In the following, I will resist the temptation to simply repeat what I said already elsewhere.[1] I will rather try to set light on the complexity involved in being human. I want to spell out – in a more systematic manner than done in the book – the ways in which my post-essentialist and interactive account is *pluralist*. Given the limited space available here, I will nonetheless often have to refer to the assumptions and arguments used in the book. In result, this contribution is more comparative than argumentative. It explicates the pluralism inherent in my account, without being able to argue in depth for it.

Furthermore, at issue in this paper is the pluralism that results *if we agree on the other two tenets of my account* – namely, first, that there is no "essence" that "makes us" human (post-essentialism), and, second, that there is no hard divide between biologically inherited developmental resources and culturally inherited developmental resources since these resources interact at all relevant levels, i.e., the developmental, the intergenerational, and the evolutionary level (interactionism). The paper aims to show how a post-essentialist and interactive pluralism of the human allows to see some order despite the complexity involved in being human, and how that very complexity creates a space that allows the humanities and social sciences to collaborate with the life sciences – to contribute together to our understanding of what it means to be human.

1. Overview: A Multidimensional Pluralism of the Human

To understand the full complexity of the phenomena that are at issue when we talk about "human nature", in the diversity of contexts in which we use that language, we need a pluralism that is itself multidimensional. In this Section, I will introduce four such dimensions in overview, so that I can discuss each separately and in more detail in the remaining Sections.[2] With this systematic approach – presenting a classification of dimensions of my pluralism – I aim to prevent that only the first dimension is noticed.

The first dimension of my pluralism is a *conceptual dimension*. The claim is that there are – in the world – different (set of) things that correspond to three

1 In addition to the book itself (Kronfeldner 2018a), there is also a synopsis of the book (Kronfeldner 2018b).

2 In Kronfeldner (2018a) these four dimensions are inscribed in the overall architecture of the book and discussed in too many places to point to specific pages or individual chapters. The first is mainly discussed in chapters 1, 3, 5–7, 11, the second in chapters 2, 6, 10, the third in chapters 1, 3, 5, 6, and the fourth in chapters 4, 6–9. In Kronfeldner (2018c), these four dimensions map onto five reasons (two of which are classificatory) why we disagree about "human nature" within scientific and scholarly debates. Two further reasons relate to non-scholarly contexts, which I must ignore here, for lack of space.

different post-essentialist concepts of "human nature". There is the *typical lifeform of being human*, there is a *set of developmental resources that is biologically inherited*, and there are *necessary and/or sufficient criteria for counting somebody as human*. We can call the first the "descriptive nature", the second the "explanatory nature", and the third the "classificatory nature" of human beings, if we want to use that terminology.[3] But irrespective of whether we use that language or not, these are different concepts, the words used refer to different (set of) things in the world, and, I claim, there is simply nothing in the world that allows us to give priority to one of them. If so, then we must acknowledge a *conceptual pluralism, a pluralism about the concept(s) of "human nature"*. I will spell out below that this pluralism stems not only from post-essentialist ontology but also from the semantic complexity of the term "nature", which involves meanings of the term "nature" that point beyond the life sciences. This is the dimension of my pluralism that is most directly visible in the book. Yet, inscribed in it are further pluralisms, at further dimensions, each relating to one of the three resulting concepts of "human nature".

At a *descriptive dimension*, we have to acknowledge that there are – in the world – many typical features (properties or relations) that *together* shape the human lifeform. This richness gives rise to another pluralism, namely a *descriptive pluralism, a pluralism about the "descriptive nature" of human beings,* a pluralism regarding our self-understanding as human beings. After all, many different (combinations of these) features have been picked out by different people *as important* for our self-understanding as humans, and thus for describing who "we" are and how "we" are, without a clear winner in sight. I will show below that this is so since *what is important* (rather than trivial) depends on the question asked, which in turn depends on social and disciplinary contexts. Because of this context-dependency, as I argued in the book, there is no ontological way to give priority to some rather than other features that are typical for being human and traditionally selected as important. I will give examples below to illustrate this pluralism, and to explicate how it points beyond phenomena studied by the life sciences.

The different features that shape the human lifeform can also gain importance in classificatory senses. Hence, they can give rise to a "classificatory nature", i.e., they can epistemically function as necessary and/or sufficient criteria for counting an organism as a human being. And once again, the claim in my book is that we have a choice in picking these classificatory criteria. If so, we have to acknowledge a *classificatory pluralism*. I will illustrate below that, as part of classifying living beings, different groups have been called "human", and that doing so does not itself force one to give up the claim that the term "human" refers to a natural kind, i.e., to a kind whose members share – as the

3 The book closes with the Wittgensteinian recommendation not to use that terminology anymore. Yet, since that is difficult given the setup of this Special Issue, I will use the terminology but in quotation marks to signal that I would prefer not using the terminology.

traditional natural kind view has it – at least a large set of features. Hence, the term "human" is not necessarily referring to a biological group category and, independent of context, no ontological priority exists for a reference to a biologically delineated group. Because of this situation, we need to acknowledge a *natural kind term pluralism regarding the term "human"*. "Natural kind" is not to be equated with "biological kind" since some social kinds are also natural kinds.

Finally, it holds that whatever we decide to focus on, within the set of features that we can call our "descriptive nature", the respective lifeform is *causally explained* by a diversity of factors. While there will also be non-causal factors, the most prominent factors in discussions about "human nature" in the descriptive sense are causal factors – developmental resources, some biologically inherited, some culturally inherited, and some environmentally inherited. Often, we call what we inherit biologically our "nature", using the term "nature" in an explanatory role. As I describe in detail in the book, there is a broad consensus that none of the just mentioned sets of resources has any context-independent explanatory priority. Taking this seriously means defending an *explanatory pluralism about the causal complexity of life*. I will show below that this does not conflict with defending, as I do in Kronfeldner (2018a, 2021a), that there are different "channels" of inheritance (i.e., different causal pathways for developmental resources to travel between individuals), with cultural inheritance being the channel that points beyond the life sciences.

Epistemically, the four dimensions of the pluralism that I advocate entail that we make quite some choices when we use the term "human nature", or when we produce knowledge about humans. After all, one rarely has the opportunity to take all aspects of the just portrayed complexity into account. That means that, usually, a scientist or scholar (or somebody else thinking about "human nature") takes a specific perspective, i.e., a selective focus on one or a subset of the three concepts of "human nature", one or a subset of the typical and important features that characterize the human way of life, one or a combination of the different groups that can be meant with the term "human", one or a subset of the many causes of the human life form. If two onlookers set a different focus, then they take different perspectives on "human nature". They take a different view through the *kaleidoscope of being human*.[4]

The core aim of this paper, and thus of the Sections 3-6, is to describe how my *pluralism of the human* entails that one must go beyond the life sciences to understand what it means to be human. Section 7 has a few notes on why the resulting pluralism should be understood as an integrative pluralism. With that in focus, I will address why we need to disambiguate not only the term "human" but also the term "nature" whenever we use this term (Section 3), why we won't ever agree on what is most important about us (Section 4), why there are many natural kinds of being human (Section 5), and why the channelism

4 I take the metaphor of the kaleidoscope from Longino (2013: 206). She used it in relation to what I call explanatory pluralism.

of developmental resources is not in tension with acknowledging interaction at the developmental, intergenerational, and evolutionary level (Section 6).[5]

2. Conceptual Pluralism, or Why We Need to Disambiguate What We Mean by the Term "Nature" if We Want to Continue Using that Language

The above-mentioned conceptual pluralism about different things in the world that we can call and have called "human nature" stems not just from the failure of essentialism. It also stems from the semantic complexity of the word "nature", which is standardly taken to refer to one or a combination of the following:

- Nature as something that is an important part of the empirically accessible world (as in claiming that it is "part of our nature" to be social and altruistic),
- Nature as something that is essential, i.e., a necessary or sufficient condition for being a member of a kind (as in saying that "the nature of" human beings is to be rational), or

5 Here is an open list of further pluralistic themes discussed in Kronfeldner (2018a) that I will have to ignore in this paper: If the term "human nature" can be used for different concepts, then the usage of the term "human nature" is necessarily ambiguous. If we ask whether we should thus get rid of the term "human nature", we end up with a pluralism of epistemic and social values that are all relevant for the question, but which are easily pointing in different directions (chapter 11). With respect to my explanatory pluralism, the following issues are discussed in addition to what is mentioned in this paper: The more one abstracts away from polymorphisms the more certain causes can be ignored. Something can thus be made (by abstraction) to be "due to nature" (chapter 6). If the explanandum (the situation in need of explanation) is a statistical pattern (rather than an abstract property such as "being able to speak a language"), then different statistical patterns (different differences) can be in focus. There can thus be a situation where the different explanations ignore (and legitimately so) the causes that are relevant for the other difference (statistical pattern). So, one perspective looks at non-biologically inherited resources (summarized as "nurture") and the other at biologically inherited resources (summarized as "nature"). Even if two perspectives are interested in the same difference regarding a trait, causes can still be selected, and without ending up with the pessimism of nature-nurture integration that characterized the two major accounts in the field that discussed the issue to quite some depth, namely Keller's (2010) and Longino's (2013) account (chapters 8–9). With respect to classificatory business, it is important to notice that groups that show polymorphisms are lumped together by some scholars and split up by others (chapter 6). In addition, there is no consensus on the many concepts of a species in use, even though it is a key element in grouping individuals into kinds if evolutionary thinking is at issue (chapter 5). Finally, when speciation occurs is quite a tricky issue. The "age" of our species (*Homo sapiens*) has been moved up and down, depending on historical context and sensitivity regarding "inclusiveness" of being human along its temporal extension (chapter 5). The latter, how exclusive the biologically or morally delineated group boundaries are chosen to be, also depends on the context, in part a moral context (chapter 10).

– Nature as something that is given, i.e., not man-made (as in mentioning that this or that in somebody's behavior is "due to nature").[6]

With respect to expressions such as "human nature", we thus always have to disambiguate which of these we mean, so as not to contribute to, or repeat, unproductive equivocations or associations, in particular essentialist ones.

Essentialism establishes a priority between these different meanings either directly by giving priority to the second meaning or by not sufficiently distinguishing between the three meanings. Essentialism, as I show in the book, tends to be monist with respect to the notion of "human nature": The third, the "given", is the second, the "essence", which is the first, the most "important" aspect about us. Since Aristotle, being rational, for instance, has repeatedly been claimed to be not only innate (i.e., biologically inherited) but also the feature that makes us human (in the classificatory sense of "making") and an aspect of our way of life that is of utmost importance. Since essentialism packages the three "natures" together, and thus anchors the "package" in a givenness claim, it usually ends up with a monistic frame that is simultaneously biologistic since "innateness" is the givenness that seems to be left (as an option) as part of Darwinian ontology.

Taking the different meanings of "nature" into account and acknowledging that they can fall apart (so that it is not one and the same feature (or set of features) being simultaneously our "nature" in all three senses), as I will show below, helps, I hope, in further clarifying the way in which the above-mentioned conceptual pluralism shows that we need to go beyond the life sciences to understand what it means to be human.

So, let's talk about the three "human natures" in a non-essentialist manner. If we talk about the human lifeform (the human way of being), we talk about the descriptive knowledge we have about human beings in general. We ask what we know about us in terms of features that are typical and important. If we call that lifeform a "nature" – "human nature" – then we utilize the first meaning of "nature" mentioned above. The crucial point is that *to have a "human nature" in that descriptive sense is pointing to much more than biological knowledge*. It simply points to any empirically generalizable knowledge about human beings. Taking our sociality and morality to be part of "human nature" often happens without any presumption or claim about it being "due to" biological inherited developmental resources (and thus innate in that sense). Hence, from a non-essentialist point of view not just life sciences contribute to the endeavor to understand what it means to be human in that descriptive sense. That also means that a lot is included in the "descriptive nature" that is clearly known not to be "due to nature", e.g., the wide-spread cultural habit to

6 I have to ignore here the history of the term and that it shows that the term "nature" also confers authority, analyzed instead in Kronfeldner (2018c) and important in understanding the antagonisms between different scientific or scholarly fields that haunt discussions about "human nature".

bury the dead (slowly ceasing to be part of our "descriptive nature"), or that we use the techniques of written language like mad, and since quite a while.

If one, instead, uses the term "human nature" to talk about the features that decide whether an individual is a human or not, then we refer to the second meaning of "nature". We refer with the word to something that is "essential" to the being at issue. The features that are meant thereby can be called a "human nature" in the classificatory sense, a "classificatory nature" of being human. The very features that "make us" human in a classificatory sense can however vary quite significantly and differ from what is taken to be most important descriptively. As the book shows, our "essence" in the classificatory sense can simply consist in the relational property of being a descendant of an already existing member of the species *Homo sapiens*. If so, then the "classificatory nature" is not the same thing as the "descriptive nature". At best, the former is a subset of the latter. Finally, if one simply wants to talk about developmental resources that appear to be "given" from the myopic standpoint of the onlooker (e.g., biologically inherited "genes"), then one is referring to a "given" that is not "man-made", not "culture". In doing so, one triggers, or uses, the third meaning of the term "nature". But the fact that something is developmentally given for a specific individual organism, and is "nature" in that sense, does not imply that it is "nature" in any of the other senses since that "given" can be far from typical and simply irrelevant for classificatory purposes.

In result, the pluralism that I defend with respect to the terminology and concept(s) of "human nature", a pluralism that follows from the post-essentialism of contemporary life sciences (in particular, Darwinian theory) as well as from the semantic complexity in the term "nature", states two things. First, as the above shows, there is not necessarily one thing in the world that is a "nature" of humans in more than one of the three senses of "human nature" presented. If we continue to observe that rationality is typical in the descriptive sense and relevant enough to be selected as of utmost importance for our self-understanding, then that does not mean that it is necessarily innate, nor that it is a mark of the human (i.e., a classificatory criterion for being a human). Somebody not exhibiting it is as human as those exhibiting it, and with that we can "break the spell" of essentialism, the normalizing or discounting of variation that so often results in dehumanization.[7] In addition, it shows why the monism of essentialism fails, and with it goes the strong tendency to end up with a biologistic frame of being human since that stems from the third meaning of "nature". Second, with the monism, any a priori justification for giving priority to either the "descriptive nature", or the "classificatory nature", or the "explanatory nature" as the primary meaning of the term "human nature" disappears. What is left are distinct concepts of "human nature", not aligned anymore, referring to different (set of) things in the world.

The picture can be summarized as follows: what we traditionally call our "descriptive nature" consists in a list of typical features of individual human

7 As described in Kronfeldner (2021b).

beings, quite a long list, including being social and altruistic, our rationality, consciousness, language, walking on two legs, opposable thumb, tool use, culture, bury the dead, using written language like mad, etc. What we traditionally call our "classificatory nature" consists, by contrast, either in a subset of these properties or in one or a set of relational properties. It consists in whatever we have self-referentially chosen in the past and will choose in the future (and maybe differently) to matter for being a member of the group that we call "human". The chosen "classificatory nature" can point at the same properties or relations chosen to be part of the "descriptive nature", but it does not do so necessarily and it currently does not do so in the case of the group *Homo sapiens* (which is what "human" primarily refers to if we use that term in a biological sense) since, according to the contemporary consensus in evolutionary biology, the relational property of being a descendent of other humans is the only "essential" thing for being a member of that group. Finally, what we could call our "explanatory nature" *cannot*, as a matter of principle, be the same thing as the "descriptive nature", and it is often, as a matter of fact, not the same as the "classificatory nature". Let me explicate these last two points in a bit more detail, to prevent misunderstanding.

With respect to the relationship between the "explanatory nature" and the "descriptive nature", two things are crucial. First, used as an explanatory category, the term "human nature" refers to either *all* developmental resources (typically available for the respective group) or to a *subset* of these, namely the subset that travels a biological channel of inheritance. I defend (in the book and in Kronfeldner 2021a) that we can choose the first, the inclusive notion of an "explanatory nature" of humans, or we treat the biological channel as so distinct (channelism) that we can draw a line and regard the biologically inherited developmental resources as our developmentally given "explanatory nature". The latter is the traditional way of using the distinction between us having a "nature" and us having a "culture". So, the "descriptive nature" and the "explanatory nature" are distinct since the latter often refers to only a subset of developmental resources. In addition, even though many of the developmental resources available for humans are as typical as the features we standardly include in our "descriptive nature", they are the cause of the latter. Since cause and effect are standardly taken to be different things in the world, the "explanatory nature" cannot, as a matter of principle, be the "descriptive nature". So, the "descriptive nature" and the "explanatory nature" have to be taken as distinct.

With respect to the relationship between the "explanatory nature" and the "classificatory nature", I mentioned above that by using the notion of a "classificatory nature", we usually pick one (or a few) features from the "descriptive nature" as being of classificatory import, but we could also pick developmental resources as being of classificatory import. Just imagine that "we" agree to pick out one specific gene as the one necessary and sufficient condition for being human. In such a case, the "classificatory nature" would be a subset of the "explanatory nature".

To sum up: Superimposed, the three meanings of the term "nature" – together with our contemporary post-essentialist knowledge about life and our contemporary ontology of cause and effect – still allows for a unified picture, even though it is a complex one. There are connections between the "three natures" (the descriptive, the classificatory, and the explanatory use of the term), three concepts that we can form by using the age-old notion of a "nature", but the "three natures" do not necessarily map onto each other and there is no way to give priority to one sense over the others, except by fiat. Being human is a kaleidoscopic affair.

3. Descriptive Pluralism, or Why We Won't Ever Agree on What is Most Important about Us

The list of features that are typical for human beings is quite long. In that sense, "human nature" is rich, too rich since some such features will be utterly unimportant, i.e., irrelevant for a specific theory of "human nature". The crucial question is however: what or who decides what is important?

Recall how a human foot is built. It happens to be the case that typically human feet are too small and too far away from the respective heads to function as a sunscreen. Yet, in medieval imagination of European science and scholarship, some earthly people were depicted as having giant feet that can be put over the head for sun protection (see Figure below).

Figure: "Plinian races" (distant people, believed to live at the edge of the perceiver's world, with reference to Plini the Elder) in Sebastian Münster's Cosmographia (1544: DCCLII). (Public domain)

Even if such human characteristics were only imagined, it seems that the inexistence of variation with respect to that property in the European population was *important enough* for the imagined abnormality to be included in a kind of prescientific world atlas of human affairs, namely Sebastian Münster's *Cosmographia* (1544). The importance of that property might well have resulted from the importance of the climate for human self-understanding at the time. After all, the edges of the perceived world in the 16th century were often environmental, with areas too hot for human beings to thrive. No surprise that sunscreen-feet were a thing.[8] With this example, I want to illustrate in the following that whether the human foot is of importance for a specific theory of "human nature" depends on context. It is not the case that it is clearly, in all circumstances, a trivial fact about us, too unimportant to be mentioned.

Importance of a property depends on environmental, social, and disciplinary context. And who knows (if I am allowed to do a bit of "magic" projection into the future) whether such feet will be among the enhancements for our species – during or after the ecological disasters that we created and continue to create. Yet, even if, let's imagine, such giant sunscreen feet become part of what's typical for humans, that does not mean that it will therefore be regarded as part of our "descriptive nature". Why? Since most of us might still not agree on it being important enough to be regarded as part of our "descriptive nature", and for reasons.

Here is one such reason:[9] The features of our lifeform that are usually selected as being important and thus part of our "descriptive nature" have some explanatory significance for other features of the lifeform. Since explanatory importance depends on the explanandum chosen, the importance of the explanandum is transmitted to the explanans. For most who talk (or talked) about "human nature", the feet of humans are (or were) *not* an important feature for explaining how we are, but for some, it is (or was). The precise structure of our feet and legs, the muscles and fibers enabling our unique heel-to-toe stride, is for some as important in explaining our evolution as the opposable thumb is for others.[10] Still others focus on properties such as language and consciousness. The difference in focus often stems from differences in explanatory goals.

8 See Friedman (1981) for the relevant history of such imaginations.

9 For further reasons, see Kronfeldner (2018a: 139–145, 2018c).

10 Experimental as well as evolutionary biologists have worked on how our heel-to-toe stride, and everything related to it, could have evolved. See, for instance: Webber et. al. (2016) or McNutt et. al. (2018). We can even imagine a group of philosophers, let us call them the "footists", who ascribe high philosophical importance to our feet. They state that walking (not tool use, as others have claimed) made us human, evolutionarily speaking. Walking, footists claim, explains the evolution of mind and consciousness (in the full sense we ascribe it to ourselves exclusively). They thus appraise pedestrian mobility in practice and theory and defend the peripatetic principle (PP), which states that you will not understand anything if you just sit and watch. Only walking will enable rational cognition since it is the only natural movement of the body. Swimming or cycling are, according to them, as unnatural as flying. In short, the foot is of highest importance for understanding "human nature" (if not "sacred" or "cosmic") – say the "footists". It

To illustrate this context-dependency a bit further, I will compare in the following two similar properties, the opposable thumb and the human foot. Both typical properties of human bodies can be important in explanatory senses, after all they both do some explanatory work. They explain why certain other things became possible for us. The typical characteristics of our feet explains why our nomadism (eventually migrating globally) became possible since it allowed us to walk long-distances with high efficiency, while the typical characteristics of our hands explain why it was possible for cumulative cultural evolution of tool use and eventually full-blown technology to emerge. Different explananda require different explanations. Which explananda are important is in turn dependent on our epistemic background and our social values. Backgrounding that migration made us human speaks of certain values and interests. Backgrounding that tool use made us human speaks of other values and interests, some social, some disciplinary.

Finally, backgrounding some characteristics that are typical and stably reoccurring in human beings (such as the use of written language) as merely "cultural" also speaks of certain values and interests. Using written language is, in and of itself, as much part of our lifeform as our heel-to-toe stride. So, why is the one sometimes taken to be mere culture and the other part of our "deeper" "descriptive nature", given that both are rather typical features? As I argue in the book, it is a specific focus, an interest in a specific kind of stability (i.e., typicality over time), namely the stability that the biological channel of inheritance guarantees. That interest tricks us into the thought that the one property is not part of our "nature" in the descriptive sense, while the other is. But that is just one interest, even if the existence of the respective stability is a matter of fact. Some of us, after all, might not be interested in what is stably reoccurring, but in what makes change possible (e.g., a change that might save the planet as one on which human life will still be possible). For such an interest, the use of written language (enabling the spread of knowledge at a speed that is as fascinating as it is needed for saving the planet, given the harm done already) is a very important feature of our "descriptive nature", whereas the opposable thumb is by now rather a residue of our past, a trivia of our history, given that we moved on.

The descriptive pluralism that I defend takes all of the above into account and claims that, although we have the right to set a focus, we should accept that others have the same right, namely a right to set a different focus, because it is their job, their idiosyncrasy, or social positionality. Thus, even if two scientists (let's imagine) are both interested in the "descriptive nature", they can still disagree on which of the typical properties is "important", with no context-independent way to decide who is right. A property such as the use of

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should therefore also be the foundation of understanding fundamental ontological units, such as length. etc. This is why they advocate for feet (ft) versus meter (m) as universal standard for measuring the length of something... A silly story, but not much sillier than some others, inside and outside of philosophy, in which one feature "takes it all", in the name of the worship known as human supremacy beliefs.

written language, a feature of the human lifeform which *cannot be understood if social sciences and humanities are not considered along with life sciences,* is in and of itself *as important as* the opposable thumb and our foot. If one asks whether it is the one or the other that makes us human, one is asking a meaningless question. Similar points hold for other questions, such as "Are we a particularly war-faring and egoistic species or are we a particularly social and altruistic species", "Are we nomads or settlers?" For thousands of years, evidence for and against the respective claims has been accumulating, and from a variety of perspectives, with no clear winner in sight. Without context or the question asked added, these questions are meaningless.

Once the context and the question are added, we see that there is a choice of focus involved, which is underdetermined by data and very likely influenced by our values and self-understanding. We choose among the available "theories" of being human. As a result, one sees – in studying such theories – that what it meant to be human (i.e., what the we-sayers deem/ed to be important about being human) varied across time and space, is often idealized, and is rarely about an easy-to-capture matter.

This then leads to the claim that "being human" is an essentially contested concept.[11] It is part of being human to endlessly contest what it means to be human, i.e., to contest what is important about us. While contesting how "we" want to be, the group of "we"-sayers becomes human, not in a progressivist sense of becoming, but in a cyclic sense of becoming. Being human means to maintain a process of being in which our values, self-understanding, and decisions make a difference. "Human nature", if it exists, consists in a process, an open dialectic of repeated *becomings and failings*. The freedom we have is a freedom that allows us to flourish and to perish. Pope (1871), famously, portrayed the human being as one that "hangs between, in doubt to act or rest, in doubt to deem himself a god or beast". Indeed, we play god *and* beast, and often simultaneously so. We are responsible for doing so since it involves our choices.

4. Classificatory Pluralism, or the Many "Natural Kinds" of being Human

With the term "human", scientists often refer to a group that is biologically delineated, the species *Homo sapiens*, the only "human" species that is still alive. But that again is a choice, and one that is still far from universal. First, it is likely that not all human beings have internalized the ontology of modern taxonomic and evolutionary thinking. Second, even in contexts where the modern evolutionary ontology is included in school curricula or similar education and thus widespread and frequent, the term "human" often *simultaneously* refers to a differently delineated group, usually a group delineated along social criteria. Thus, being human can refer to our *social relations*, our morally specified ways

11 In Gallie's (1956) original and rather than narrow sense, depicting a specific kind of contestation. For details, see: Kronfeldner (2018a: 226–228).

of behaving to each other, our humanness. These are relations that can easily go beyond the species boundary, exactly in the sense in which the anthropological literature traditionally portrays such interspecies relations.[12] Traditionally, the concept of personhood stands for that notion of the human. For being human in that social group sense, the book claims, it can be sufficient whether one is able to interact in the morally specified ways with other beings. Hence, the species-boundary becomes irrelevant. If certain imagined humanoids (pick your preferred science fiction movie) fulfill the respective classificatory criteria, then they can count as human in that social sense (a sense, as said, not to be conflated with the biological group sense). The crucial point is then that while some share that humanoid-intuition, others are so deeply wedded to the biological group reference that they will have difficulties with any view of the human that allows to cross the species-boundary, be it toward animals or humanoids.

In result, our "nature" in the classificatory sense can simply be our social relatedness to other beings, or whatever we care about most in our way of being. Thus, our social ways of behaving, studied by social scientists and scholars, can also be classificatory criteria, even though for a different notion of the human. The "classificatory nature" (the set of membership conditions chosen) *does not have to refer to the biological category of a species*. If our concept of who counts as human is referring to biological facts, then that is simply reflecting the contingent self-understanding of those who have chosen the respective membership conditions. Pointing to the biological species (e.g., the way contemporary biology is doing) is just one possible way of how one can classify living beings. The contemporary importance of genealogy, and with it the importance of family and kinship, is historically contingent.

Seeing that contingency, which is one of the tenets of the classificatory pluralism that I defend, is important, not only to understand non-Western ontologies but also to imagine new options for a future of the human. Moving to a classificatory pluralism means that we have chosen and will have to choose (via our reflective self-understanding) who counts. Without a chosen reference class, no generalization about human beings can get off the ground. Finally, that there is a dialectic of explanatory and classificatory looping effects (which I discussed in the book with reference to authors such as Cassirer, Collinwood, or Hacking) means that the boundaries of "us" will further change with our self-understanding. In the language of Stuurman (2017), the *invention of the human* is ongoing, and it involves, as this paper aims to show, much more than just the life sciences.

Finally, it is important to note, philosophically speaking, that there are no a priori reasons for claiming that only a biological group delineation (*Homo sapiens*) allows for a traditional "natural kind" picture of humans, as part of which (as the tradition has it) there needs to be at least a large set of features or relations shared by those included in the group. Being socially related in a

12 As authors such as Viveiros de Castro (1992), Ingold (2000), Haraway (2003), or Sahlins (2008) advocate.

specific sense also involves a rich cluster of features shared among the members of the resulting kind. It is the point of many science fiction movies that some of the humanoids showing up in these movies exhibit many of the typical human traits, sometimes even more so than the stereotypical human. The female character in *Bladerunner* (1982, directed by Ridley Scott) is clearly depicted, and from the start, as "more human than human". Stories like Dick's (1968) story, used for *Bladerunner*, disturb our intuitions on what makes us human. We start reflecting on whether it is just, or at all, about our biological heritage and "wetware". There is thus no in principle priority of the biological over the social way of delineating a group of "humans", as long as the delineated groups show high similarity with respect to a rich set of features. The biological context should not be taken to be the only context that can uncover real, i.e., "natural", kinds (natural, in the first meaning of the term introduced in Section 3).

5. Explanatory Pluralism, or Why Channelism Is Not in Conflict with Acknowledging Interaction

I take the "explanatory nature" of being human to not be more "essential" or "fundamental" than the other sets of developmental resources (standardly called "culture" or "environment"). As many others, I assume that all developmental resources are, as such resources, of equal explanatory importance, even if they have a different developmental and evolutionary dynamic. They are ontologically on a par, as the famous "parity thesis" of developmental systems theory stated, an approach that is central to the developmentalist challenge described in detail in the book.

My account presented in the book, further developed in Kronfeldner (2021a), stresses that cultural evolution, a change in developmental resources that are – once available – socially learned, can happen without a concomitant change in biological evolution. Cultural inheritance of developmental resources is not only near-decomposable from biological inheritance (argument from near-decomposability), but culture can also take off (argument from autonomy), and it has, usually, a much higher stability over time (argument from temporal order). "Nature" and "culture" (if understood as systems that connect individuals via the inheritance of developmental resources) are simply two distinct channels of inheritance. In that and only in that sense, there is, in my view, an autonomy of culture. An autonomy that was and is emancipatory for many people, freeing them from any ideology that preaches "biological" or "developmental" destiny. I still have not seen any argument that shows that channelism to be wrong, even though it is regularly attacked in a wholesale manner or silently ignored, especially by some of those who want to overcome the outdated idea of genetic determinism and throw out, in my opinion, the proverbial "baby" (the freedom that culture confers) with the biologistic-deterministic "bathwater".

At the same time, it is very important to acknowledge that the two channels are nonetheless fully interactive, at the developmental, intergenerational, and

evolutionary scale, and intensely so, as many before me have stressed.[13] Even if a lot has changed in culture from one generation of people to the next, while less has changed in "nature" (biologically inherited developmental resources) during such a time of cultural acceleration, what is inherited in these two channels is still interacting intensely at every moment of the development of an individual, from point zero (conception of a new human being) to the last gasp this person takes. And the same holds for the intergenerational and evolutionary level.

At the level of the individual, there is thus no way to keep "nature", culture, and environment distinct. There is simply one developmental system. An individual living being is, so to say, ego-centric, it looks from the inside out, sucks in whatever it can get (or resists it), and does something with it. If something is a developmental resource, it is a developmental resource. At the intergenerational and evolutionary level, "nature" and "culture" interact via epigenetic inheritance and as part of so-called co-evolution. Niche inheritance and niche construction are further mechanisms of interaction at these levels, working at the individual level and the populational level. In sum, everything is interacting to give rise to the human life form and is in that sense of equal explanatory import, and nonetheless, culture can change or vary without a concomitant change in "nature".

It follows that the channelism that I stress in my work, which I took, even though in revised form, from Alfred L. Kroeber (1917)'s classic contribution, does *not conflict with* any of the popular claims about developmental systems, biosocial becomings, entanglements, naturecultures, cyborgs, etc. Yet, in contrast to many others, my account does not ignore the one kind of separation that survives interactionism, namely that there are dynamically separate channels of inheritance: biological and cultural.

The pictorial representation that properly captures this structured complexity of entanglement (ordered, but plural, since there are different channels of inheritance) is again the kaleidoscope. Since some of the processes and mechanisms at the different levels of change are studied by life sciences, while others are studied by cognitive sciences, social scientists or scholars from the humanities, *we need interdisciplinary interaction to capture the causal interactions in the world as completely as possible*. All these scientists and scholars *should* interact (integrate the knowledge accessible with their tools, join their epistemic forces) to capture the complex grandeur that we call "life".

But there is no hierarchy between them. There is no sense left in which biologically inherited resources are ontologically "deeper" or in general explanatorily more important. True, they are "bookkeepers", but as such they are neither more nor less important than other kinds of developmental resources, executing other roles. For instance, why should something "built for stability" (biological channel) be more important (in and of itself) than something "built

13 At least since Lewontin's (1974, 1985) dialectical approach and Oyama's (1985) and Griffiths & Gray's (1994) developmental systems theory. For review of the debate and contributors till then, see: Kronfeldner (2018a: chapter 4).

for quick reaction" (cultural channel)? In a world of unbound evolution, "nature" and "culture" are in general equally relevant for explaining how we are, despite their different dynamical features.[14]

6. From Parity to Integration

All of the above was meant to elucidate in which sense the different perspectives (that we can take on the phenomena involved when we talk about human beings) are in parity: there is no hierarchy between a descriptive, classificatory, or explanatory use of the term "human nature" and no hierarchy between the different features of being human that can be picked out as part of the respective description, classification, or explanation. As mentioned above, if two onlookers set a different focus, they make different choices and in result they take different perspectives on "human nature". The respective focus can simply be idiosyncratic, or it can be justified via a certain social or epistemic context, but none of the perspectives has priority independent of the respective contexts.

Nonetheless, the different perspectives can be integrated, at least in principle. This is why the pluralism that I defend is not only an interactionist pluralism but also an integrative pluralism. All the perspectives – once they helped to produce knowledge about human beings – can in principle contribute to *solving a specific, concrete issue* (e.g., about written language as part of "human nature"). Hence, there is no need to be afraid of the pluralism of being human developed in my book and summarized here. One often (if not always) can go from parity to integration.

This integration claim has two aspects. First, it claims that there is no way to align the different perspectives (to reduce one to the other or make one the servant of the other), at least not without risking the loss of opportunities to see something relevant from these different perspectives. Different things become visible via the different perspectives, things that can then be used to solve concrete questions or issues. Second, acknowledging the diversity is not doing any harm. Conflicts and tensions in the knowledge produced that can arise while integrating the knowledge produced from separate perspectives could still arise even if the perspectives would have been integrated from the start, just that certain bits of the knowledge visible from the different perspectives would not have been produced in the first place. So, there is no danger of losing bits of knowledge in being pluralist. On the contrary, it can be very productive, even though it can certainly also fail to be so, depending on context and willingness of those involved, to aim at an integration at the end of the process of producing knowledge from the different perspectives. This is my argument from the fruitfulness of integration *as well as* separation, developed in more detail elsewhere.[15]

14 This Section is the second step in my response to Buskell (2019). For the first step in my response, see: Kronfeldner (2021a).

15 For details and cases from the history of evolutionary thought about humans, see, in addition to the above-mentioned chapters in Kronfeldner (2018a), Kronfeldner (2010,

As a result, the different perspectives relate to each other like the pieces in a kaleidoscope: they are plural but ordered, integrated in application to a specific situation. If different perspectives are organized in a specific way, integrated for a specific occasion, then something complex but ordered becomes visible. Such a *view from the kaleidoscope* will still not give access to everything. Something will always be ignored; after all, in epistemic matters, nothing is ever complete.[16] But why should completeness, a perfection of a specific kind, even be the goal? All we need is a functioning epistemology of the human for limited knowers, for real knowers – not for imagined perfect knowers.

So, what does it mean to be an integrative pluralist about "human nature"? A monist is allowing for only one perspective, whereas a pluralist recognizes a set of stable perspectives on an issue and is "separationist" in that sense. A non-integrative pluralist is an incompatibilist with respect to the different perspectives. An integrative pluralist aims at and believes in the *local* integration of the nonetheless persisting separate perspectives since integration is often (if not always) possible and, once it is time for it, useful. An integrative pluralist acknowledges the interaction of the phenomena visible from different perspectives, without giving wholesale priority to one of the perspectives. An integrative pluralist grants the "right to ignore" (for a while at least), which is the right to set a focus, and appreciates the beauty in the complexity of the kaleidoscope.

As a Final Note

This paper meant to show that understanding what it means to be human is for an integrative pluralist like looking into a kaleidoscope that clearly reaches beyond the life sciences, and one that drags the onlooker into it. The kaleidoscope is "immersive"; the onlooker becomes part of the processes that are visible via the entanglements and representational mirrors that make up the ever-changing and never-ending kaleidoscope that we call "human nature". The kaleidoscope does not have essences, fixed nuts-and-bolts, or clear boundaries but it has a structure, channels, parts, and specific kinds of interactions that can be put in focus – to learn *through* each other, rather than to oppose those that happen to focus on something else.

2015, 2017), where I spelled out this integrative pluralism in more detail, but mainly with respect to explanatory pluralism. As part of that, I defend, for instance, the right to ignore "human nature", a right that the cultural anthropologists of the 20th century often requested and that evolutionary psychologists like to challenge with their call for integration. In general, my integrative pluralism is much inspired by Mitchell (2003, 2009), Keller (2010), and Longino (2013), even though I slightly depart from each of them, as Kronfeldner (2015) clarifies.

16 Longino (2013: 206) thus also writes that "kaleidoscopic" knowledge is "piecemeal" and that "understanding the image produced requires appreciating its partiality."

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Marija Kronfeldner

Biti čovek je kaleidoskopska stvar

Apstrakt

Ovaj rad opisuje načine na koje treba da budemo pluralisti u pogledu „ljudske prirode“. U radu se razmatra *pojmovni pluralizam* pojma „ljudske prirode“ koji proizlazi iz post-esencijalističke ontologije i semantičke složenosti pojma „priroda“; *deskriptivni pluralizam* „deskriptivne prirode“ ljudskih bića, odnosno pluralizam u pogledu našeg samorazumevanja kao ljudskih bića koji proizlazi iz dugačke liste tipičnih karakteristika koje pripisujemo ljudskim bićima i odnosa između njih; *pluralizam termina koji se odnosi na prirodne kategorije*, odnosno pluralizam koji se odnosi na izbore koje imamo prilikom odlučivanja kako primeniti izraz „ljudsko“; te *eksplanatorni pluralizam* koji proizlazi iz uzročne složenosti života. Zbog složenosti koje podrazumeva bivanje čovekom, koja dovodi do ovih pluralizama, biti čovek je, kako ovaj rad tvrdi, kaleidoskopska stvar koja uveliko prevazilazi samo nauke o životu.

Ključne reči: bivanje ljudskim bićem, ljudska priroda, pluralizam, prevazilaženje nauka o životu.

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Marko Porčić

DEPLOYING KRONFELDNER'S CONCEPT OF HUMAN NATURE IN ARCHAEOLOGY

ABSTRACT
This essay represents a reflection on the role and relevance of the concept of human nature in archaeology, inspired by the ideas about human nature presented and elaborated by Maria Kronfeldner in the book *What's Left of Human Nature?*. It is a comment from an archaeologist's perspective. Kronfeldner formulated three ways in which human nature can be conceptualized: classificatory, descriptive and explanatory human nature. In the text, I review the archaeological and anthropological topics for which the three aspects of human nature are relevant. In the first part, I address the problems related to the concepts of classificatory and descriptive human nature in the late Pleistocene, when *Homo sapiens* was not the only species of the genus *Homo* on the planet. In the second part, I discuss the role of human nature from the epistemological position when it comes to the theoretical basis of reconstructing human behavior in the past and the more general anthropological issue of establishing cross-cultural regularities and laws. This is by no means a comprehensive and detailed survey of the potentially relevant topics, but it should illustrate the usefulness and relevance of Kronfeldner's concepts for the fields of archaeology and anthropology.

KEYWORDS
human nature, archaeology, anthropology, epistemology.

Introduction

In her book *What's Left of Human Nature?*, Maria Kronfeldner formulated three concepts of human nature: classificatory, descriptive and explanatory human nature (Kronfeldner 2018). Classificatory nature is needed to determine the boundaries of humanity – what it takes to be classified as a human being. In Kronfeldner's definition, classificatory nature refers to the genealogical nexus – the necessary and sufficient condition for being a human is to be descended from other humans. Descriptive nature, according to Kronfeldner, refers to the set of traits which are typical and stable for humans. These are statistical properties pertaining not to individuals but to populations – we can imagine

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a descriptive human nature as a set of univariate distributions for variables on which humans are described or relatively stable relationships between some of the variables. Explanatory nature consists of causal factors, i.e., developmental resources, which are typical of humans and are inherited biologically.

Kronfeldner conceptualized human nature in a way which provides a clear framework for discussing its various aspects and roles in different disciplines. Archaeology, as, discipline is intimately tied to anthropology, therefore it inevitably deals with the issue of human nature. This may not be explicit in empirical research, or even in theoretical debates, but it is not difficult to show that many archaeological topics, whether empirical or theoretical-methodological, touch upon the concept of human nature (Palavestra 2011: 38–41), or to be more precise, different concepts of human nature in Kronfeldner's terms. Nature vs. nurture always lurks when the fundamental questions are addressed. There are several domains of archaeology and anthropology for which the concept of human nature is relevant. In this short essay, I will try to identify some of these domains and to show how the concepts introduced by Kronfeldner correspond to the subject matter of these domains. The topics that I will cover represent or are related to some of the major questions and problems (the so-called "grand challenges" to use the term of Kintigh, Altshul, Beaudry et al. 2014) in anthropology and archaeology. This is no surprise, given the grandeur of the human nature concept itself. Needless to say, my ambition with this essay is not to provide definite answers and solutions to these big problems and topics, but simply to explore how the concept of human nature is present in archaeology and how Kronfeldner's terminology and conceptualization can help in making this clear.

1. The origins of humans and behavioral modernity

Archaeology is the scientific discipline which reconstructs the past based on the material remains of the past – the material culture used by people in the past, human and animal osteological remains, botanical remains, and other physical and chemical properties of the archaeological record. The beginnings of the artefact production are dated to around 3 million years ago (Harmand, Lewis, Feibel et al. 2015), so archaeology begins with reconstructing the past of the beings who were not modern humans, but ancestors of modern humans or species related to modern humans, such as Australopithecines, *Homo erectus*, Neanderthals, Denisovans etc. In other words, archaeology and paleoanthropology track the biological as well as the cultural evolution of humans and by extension – of human nature.

Of particular interest, in the light of the classificatory and the descriptive roles of the term, are the Middle Paleolithic and the Early Upper Paleolithic periods (roughly the time between around 300,000 and around 40,000 years before present), when there was more than one *Homo* species present on the planet. Establishing the reference class independently of the description (to use Kronfeldner's terms) is easy in the present by means of the genealogical nexus (everybody is human). But how do we do that in the case of the deep past,

i.e., in times when *Homo sapiens* was not the only *Homo* around, when Neanderthals and Denisovans, and possibly some other variants of *Homo*, were also there? We would have to set up an arbitrary threshold for the genealogical nexus or to reach for the descriptive criteria (e.g., phenotypic and genotypic), which we know is problematic. To make things worse, we cannot use the mating barrier, as we know that these populations could engage in sexual relations and produce fertile offspring. For example, genetic evidence suggests that modern humans and Neanderthals diverged from a common ancestor more than 500 thousand years ago (Stringer and Crété 2022). But it also suggests that there were multiple episodes of cross-breeding – that humans and Neanderthals mated and had fertile offspring (Reich 2018; Stringer and Crété 2022). It would be very difficult to apply the classificatory concept of human nature in this case, especially for the period close to the divergence and for the period when the mating between Neanderthals and modern humans was most frequent, which is between 60 and 41 thousand years ago (Stringer and Crété 2022). When the classificatory role is compromised, this also affects the descriptive role, as we are unable to establish the reference class.

Closely related to this problem is the origin of behavioral modernity and the relation between anatomical modernity and behavioral modernity. The anatomical modernity refers to the physical characteristics of the skeleton – skeletons which are similar to the skeletons of modern people are referred to as anatomically modern. The behavioral modernity refers to the set behaviors which are considered to be characteristic of modern *Homo sapiens* (the descriptive human nature) – e.g., symbolic behavior, complex technology, complex social structure etc. The oldest anatomically modern skeletons are dated to around 300,000 years before present (Hublin, Ben-Ncer, Bailey et al. 2017). Likewise, the molecular clock analysis indicated that the most recent common ancestors of all humans living today can be dated to around 160,000 years before present in the case of the most recent maternal ancestor (the so-called mitochondrial Eve) (Fu, Mittnik, Johnson et al. 2013), or to more than 300,000 years before present in the case of the most recent ancestor along the paternal line (the so-called Y chromosomal Adam) (Mendez, Krahn, Schrack et al. 2013). However, the first archaeological evidence of behavioral modernity (primarily symbolic behavior and advances in the lithic technology) postdates the evidence of anatomical modernity for tens or even hundreds of thousands of years. During the third quarter of the 20th century, it seemed that behavioral modernity appeared only in the Upper Paleolithic, 45 thousand years ago. Blade technology, portable art and cave art were thought to be exclusively Upper Paleolithic phenomena, heralding the domination of modern humans over the Neanderthals. The explanation was that the anatomically modern humans acquired their true human nature through a series of mutations which immediately preceded the start of the Upper Paleolithic and heralded the era of *Homo sapiens* who managed to dominate the world and the *Homo* lineage due to an evolutionary advancement, primarily related to superior cognition and intelligence (but see Shennan 2001).

In the meantime, archaeology revealed at least two facts that cast doubt on this rather speciesist and essentialist narrative (d'Errico 2003; d'Errico, Henshilwood, Lawson et al. 2003). We now know that the Neanderthals also used superior Upper Paleolithic technology, and there are many lines of evidence (some of it contested, though, see White, Bosinski, Bourrillon et al. 2020) pointing to the conclusion that they also practiced symbolic behavior (d'Errico et al. 2003; Pitarch Martí, Zilhão, d'Errico et al. 2021). Therefore, it seems that the indicators of behavioral modernity were present in the Neanderthal contexts as well. The traces of modern behavior predated the beginning of the Upper Paleolithic among anatomically modern humans as well. In South Africa, there are sites dated to around 100-70k years before present where traces of symbolic behavior are found (e.g. Henshilwood, d'Errico, Yates et al. 2002; Henshilwood, d'Errico, Van Niekerk et al. 2011; Henshilwood, d'Errico, Van Niekerk et al. 2018). So, we have a temporal discontinuity in the evidence of modern behavior for modern humans as well.

As I already mentioned, this situation poses great challenges to both the classificatory and descriptive aspects of human nature. Should we include or exclude the Neanderthals and Denisovans from the reference class, or should we say that human nature in the Paleolithic was different from today (e.g., perhaps traits having larger variances)? Should we exclude anatomically modern humans before 100,000 years ago from our species, as they lacked behavioral modernity? In practical terms, the answer is easy, at least for the Neanderthals and Denisovans. We should include neither Neanderthals nor Denisovans into the descriptive nature of humans for the simple reason that their distributions of traits no longer influence the overall human distribution, as their biological, psychological and behavioral characteristics are gone. This underscores the temporality of the descriptive nature which stems from the Darwinian process and the fact that there are no species essences, as only variation and change are real.

2. Human nature and the reconstruction of the behavior of the people of the past

Human nature as an epistemic principle is relevant for the construction of archaeological and anthropological theory – analogous to the principle of uniformitarianism in archaeology (Cameron 1993). If we want to reconstruct some aspect of the past based on the material traces of human behavior in the archaeological record, we would be helpless without making assumptions about descriptive human nature as homeostatic property clusters. The large portion of archaeological theory, which tells us how to reconstruct the dynamics of the past based on the static characteristics of the archaeological record in the present, the so-called middle-range theory (Binford 1977, 1981; Raab and Goodyear 1984) or behavioral correlates (Schiffer 1976, 1995), relies upon ethnographic knowledge and analogy (Wylie 1982; Kuzmanović 2009; Porčić 2006). Therefore, if the contents of the descriptive human nature were significantly different

in the past than they are today, this epistemic bridge would crash down. But the question is how far back in time can we project the contents of descriptive human nature? The problem is that if we assume stability in advance, it is impossible to show that the contents of human nature were different in the past. On the other hand, if we do not make any assumptions about stability, how can we hope to reconstruct human behavior from material remains in the first place? The answer to this question depends on the time scale. At short time scales, it is not a problem to talk about human nature as the current snapshot of the existing variability, but it does become problematic to do so at larger time scales.

3. The issue of cross-cultural laws

This leads to a deeper issue, related to the essentialist versus materialist ontology, discussed by Kronfeldner in her book. In this framework, the essentialist is viewed as being appropriate for physics and chemistry, but not for the evolutionary accounts and historical sciences in general, for which the materialist historical ontology is more appropriate. The implication would be that there can be no laws in the historical sciences, as laws require entities which have essences, whereas the biological and social entities are always in the state of becoming and changing (see also O'Brien and Lyman 2000).

One of the big aspirations of anthropology, and by implication, archaeology as its part, is the discovery of cultural laws, or, more generally, laws which may include the interaction between biology and culture, as well. Cross-cultural studies (Ember and Ember 2009; Hrnčíř and Květina 2023), as well as long-term diachronic studies, based on archaeological and historical data (e.g. Bocquet-Appel 2011; Kohler et al. 2018; Turchin, Currie, Whitehouse et al. 2018), suggest that statistical tendencies do exist, which may count as some kind of statistical laws of culture which may have a basis, at least partly, in human nature. For example, the theory of the Agricultural demographic transition predicts that the fertility rate of a population will increase when a previously mobile hunter-gatherer population switches to sedentary farming (Bocquet-Appel and Bar-Yosef 2008; Bocquet-Appel 2011). This prediction has been confirmed by many cases from prehistoric, historic and ethnographic records (Bocquet-Appel 2002; Bocquet-Appel and Bar-Yosef 2008; Bocquet-Appel and Naji 2006). Likewise, we can also see large-scale statistical tendencies related to the increase in inequality for the societies and cultures which made the transition to farming – the social complexity and inequality develop in the Holocene in many cases independently, but such developments are always preceded by the transition to agriculture (Kohler, Smith, Bogaard et al. 2018; Kohler and Smith 2018).

These examples show us that there is some structural regularity in the development of cultures and societies which do not share any recent cultural genealogical links. Perhaps we can also interpret this as having something to do with human nature, as the stable distribution of traits, which when combined with similar environmental and structural situations, yields similar results. Perhaps

the most illustrative example is Brian Hayden's hypothesis for the emergence of transegalitarian communities (Hayden 1995), which resonates with Kronfeldner's concept of descriptive human nature. Namely, Hayden suggested that in each population there is a proportion of people with certain psychological personality traits – the ambitious aggrandizers (Hayden 1995). When the subsistence economy allows the accumulation, storage and manipulation of resources, these people will gain power and generate a specific social structure, or the *Big Man* cultural institution. Therefore, the emergence of Big Man is something which is potentially possible in any community if the circumstances are right, as the distribution of personality traits in all human cultures is similar in the sense that in all communities we find a certain kind of people.

This interpretation of cross-cultural regularities in the light of human nature is not without problems, though. An objection can be made that cultural regularities or statistical tendencies, which correspond to cultural laws, have nothing to do with human nature, but with culture as a phenomenon in its own right. Again, let us look at individual examples. In the case of the Agricultural demographic transition, the cultural factors, concretely, the subsistence technology of farming and the sedentary way of life, directly influence human biology – the fertility rate. We can interpret the resulting increase in fertility and population growth as a natural response to increased energy available to reproduction, as the relative metabolic load model would suggest (Bocquet-Appel 2008).

But what are we to make of the contemporary demographic transition? Is it also a consequence of human nature? The contemporary demographic transition is a phenomenon of the last two centuries when both mortality and fertility levels have been declining due to cultural developments – scientific advances in medicine and the use of contraception (Bocquet-Appel 2014). This would indeed be difficult to explain in terms of some simple mechanism of human nature, even though the process is also cross-cultural and universal. Of course, we can always postulate that this is also a consequence of how humans respond to some set of conditions – i.e., it is a part of their nature – but the problem with this kind of thinking is that we can always say this.

Conclusion

This short, and by no means comprehensive, exploration into the realms of archaeology and anthropology where the issue of human nature seems to be relevant, demonstrates the usefulness of concepts introduced by Kronfeldner. Archaeology is in a very difficult, yet interesting, position as a discipline when it comes to discussing human nature, provided that we do not wish to discard the concept altogether. It is the only discipline which can provide insights into the time depths over which humans and human nature evolved, yet in order to do so, it must make some assumptions about certain aspects of human nature. As we approach the present, these assumptions become less problematic, but in the deep past we find ourselves in a rather awkward epistemological

position. The topic of cross-cultural tendencies and principles is also related to the concept of descriptive human nature, which intuitively makes sense, yet it is not easy in practice to determine the role of human nature in complex patterns. Making an analytical distinction between different aspects and roles of the human nature concept (descriptive, classificatory and explanatory) is not automatically going to solve the old epistemological, theoretical and empirical problems, but it certainly makes thinking about them clearer and more disciplined.

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Marko Porčič

Primena koncepta ljudske prirode Marije Kronfeldner u arheologiji

Apstrakt

U ovom eseju razmatraju se uloga i relevantnost koncepta ljudske prirode u arheologiji, na osnovu ideja o ljudskoj prirodi koje je formulisala Marija Kronfeldner u knjizi *What's Left of Human Nature*. Ovo je, pre svega, komentar na ove ideje iz perspektive arheologa. Kronfeldner je predstavila tri načina kako se ljudska priroda može konceptualizovati: kao klasifikaciona, deskriptivna i eksplanatorna ljudska priroda. Ovaj esej predstavlja pregled arheoloških i antropoloških tema za koje su ova tri aspekta ljudske prirode relevantna. U prvom delu, bavim se problemima vezanim za koncepte klasifikacione i deskriptivne ljudske prirode u kasnom pleistocenu, kada *Homo sapiens* nije bio jedina vrsta roda *Homo* na planeti. U drugom delu, razmatram ulogu koncepta ljudske prirode u arheologiji i antropologiji iz epistemološke perspektive, fokusirajući se na teorijsku osnovu rekonstrukcije ljudskog ponašanja u prošlosti i na opšti antropološki problem uspostavljanja kroskulturnih pravilnosti i zakona. Ovo svakako nije sveobuhvatan i detaljan pregled potencijalno relevantnih tema, ali ilustruje korisnost i relevantnost koncepata koje je definisala Kronfeldner kada su u pitanju arheologija i antropologija.

Ključne reči: ljudska priroda, arheologija, antropologija, epistemologija.

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Sonja Žakula

HUMAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE LOT OF ANIMALS: TELLING STORIES ABOUT "HUMAN NATURE" IN THE ANTHROPOCENE[1]

ABSTRACT
This paper arose from a discussion of Maria Kronfeldner's book *What's Left of Human Nature?* In it, I am chiefly concerned with two things: the role that other animals are afforded in discussions about and attempts at defining "human nature", and a critique of the concept of nature that is utilized in the book. Furthermore, I view science as storytelling practice, and scholarly narratives about "human nature" as important stories in order to pose the question of accountability of telling such stories in the Anthropocene.

KEYWORDS
"human nature", human exceptionalism, other animals, Western epistemology.

The popular mind has always been in advance of the metaphysicians with reference to the mental endowments of animals. For some reason, there has been a perpetual hesitation among many the latter to recognize, in the manifestations of the animal mind, the same characteristics which are displayed by the human intellect: lest the high position of man should be shaken or impaired.

- Lewis Henry Morgan (1868),
The American Beaver and His Works

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Introduction

In late 2022, I was invited to participate in a discussion about Maria Kronfeldner's book *What's Left of Human Nature* by colleagues from the Institute for philosophy and social theory in Belgrade. I found the book intriguing, informative and, above all, intellectually – or rather anthropologically – frustrating. As an anthropologist and as a scholar of human-animal relations, I was irked by the (explicit) anthropocentrism and (implicit) human exceptionalism of the whole endeavor of philosophical consideration of the concept of "human nature". While I wholeheartedly agree with the author that the concept (and language) of "human nature" should be abandoned (Kronfeldner 2018: 241), as it does more harm than good, I believe we arrive at the same conclusion by somewhat different paths. However, in this paper, I will limit my arguments to two main focal points: what I would term "the lot of animals" – their almost complete absence, or rather, implicit presence in the discussions of "human nature", and a critique of the concept of Nature as utilized in the book. Furthermore, following Haraway (1989: 4), I espouse the position that scientific practice can be considered story-telling practice, and that, in that vein, stories about "human nature" such as the one constructed by Kronfeldner, are especially important, and even more so in the era of the Anthropocene. In that sense, the aim of this paper is to consider the implications of anthropocentric, human exceptionalist narratives about "human nature" for (chiefly) *other animals*[2] (but also other living beings and the environment) we humans are, and have always been, entangled with. Who are we accountable to when we tell stories about "human nature"? Because, quite frankly, it seems irresponsible to continue tooting our own horn whilst standing in the midst of anthropogenic ecological devastation, during a Great Extinction.[3]

1. Shaken or Stirred?

Before he became an anthropologist (some might say, invented the profession of "anthropologist"), the great American, well, *anthropologist*, Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-1881) worked as a railroad lawyer. This work took him around the United States, to various pristine environments where the railroad was being built. This, in turn, allowed him ample time and opportunity to observe American beavers (*castor Canadensis*) in their natural habitat. His observations and fascination with beavers resulted in the publication of a book entitled *The American Beaver and His Works* in 1868. The book is still influential in ethological circles concerned with beavers; however, it is its last chapter that is of interest here. In chapter 9, titled "Animal psychology", Morgan – who, interestingly, had not yet read Darwin at this point – poses the question of the "mental endowments of animals", and critiques the idea of "instinct" as the

2 Language is important, and humans are a species of animal, lest we forget.
3 Otherwise known as the Holocene or Anthropocene extinction: Ripple et al. (2017), Saltre and Corey (2019), Drake (2015).

only governing principle of the "lower animals". Anticipating, in a sense, both Darwin and his own evolutionist stances, Morgan goes on to state:

> It would be difficult, in right reason, to discover the slightest tendency to lower the personal dignity of man, or to alter in the least his responsibility to God, by recognizing the existence in the mutes of a thinking self-conscious principle, the same in kind that man possesses, but feebler in degree; nor even by conceding their possession of a moral sense, although, so far as our present knowledge extends, it is so faintly developed as scarcely to deserve the name (Morgan 1868: 249).

So, a difference of *degree* and not *kind* (for more on this see: Ingold 1988b, Žakula 2013). However, what I believe is of more importance for this article is the fact that Morgan recognized that there was a kind of social reluctance to afford *other animals* the same kind of *metaphysical* (that is to say, philosophical) considerations that are afforded to humans, *because "the high position of man" could be "shaken or impaired"* (Morgan 1868: 248). What Morgan recognized, but did not have the words for, are the ideas (I would go so far as to say *doctrines*) of human exceptionalism, and its ever-present handmaiden, anthropocentrism.[4] More than a hundred years later, anthropologists are finally tackling these issues.

I will borrow a succinct definition of human exceptionalism from Lori Marino and her announcement[5] for a new course ("The Psychology of human exceptionalism") at NYU in the fall of 2023:

> Human exceptionalism is the view that humans are not only qualitatively different from other animals but that we are greater in moral value. This idea is ancient and pervasive and is the foundation for the complex, and often inconsistent, relationship between humans and other animals. It is intimately related to the denial of our animal nature, ingroup/outgroup biases, anthropocentrism, speciesism, and even human prejudice (see also Marino and Mountain 2015: 12).

Anthropocentrism, while sharing the tenets of human exceptionalism (and sometimes considered synonymous with it), is "the ethical belief that humans alone possess intrinsic value. In contradistinction, all other beings hold value only in their ability to serve humans, or in their instrumental value" (Goralnik and Nelson 2012). What is important for this discussion is that, outside of "belief" and philosophical and ethical considerations, anthropocentrism is also a *kind of perspective on the world*, and one which is intrinsic to most, if not all, scientific and philosophical endeavors. In recent times this perspective has

4 I purposefully omit the concept of speciesism from this paper for two main reasons: firstly, I deem it too entangled with issues of *intent* to be able to address it adequately within the paper. Secondly, and more importantly, Kronfeldner's arguments in the book are structured in a way that manages to avoid speciesism.

5 The announcement appeared on the Facebook group "Ethnozoology" on April 15th 2023, and can be found here: https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=101586374978 75738&set=a.49794250737 (last accessed: April 29, 2023)

come to be questioned in the social sciences and humanities (Ingold 1988a; Noske 1993; Sanders and Arluke 1993; Knight 2005; Kirksey and Helmreich 2010; Descola 2013; Overton and Hamilakis 2013; Žakula and Živaljević 2018, 2019; Živaljević 2021; Branković 2022), especially within what is sometimes referred to as "the animal turn" (for a discussion of the "animal turn" in social anthropology and archaeology see Žakula and Živaljević 2019). However, as Barbara Noske noted in 1993, the social sciences and humanities were formed as *sciences of discontinuity* between humans and other animals as they deal with those aspects of human existence that were historically believed to be missing in other animals (Žakula 2017: 27), and they still largely remain so.

As an anthropologist, I would be remiss if I did not point out that anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism are not universal ways of thinking about or relating to other beings, and while they do have a psychological component (see Branković 2022; Marino and Mountain 2015), like the opposition between "human" and "animal", they are a distinctive feature of Western thought[6] (Žakula 2010, 2013; Ingold 1988a, 1994; Salins [2008] 2014; Kohn 2007, 2013; Nadasdy 2007; Viveiros de Castro 1998), and I would argue, more importantly, *practice*. What I mean by this is that human exceptionalism/anthropocentrism is not just an idea floating around in people's heads. It is constantly enacted, embodied and reiterated through various kinds of (often violent) practices – from animal exploitation and experimentation, deforestation, industrial farming, to education and socialization, and even (I would argue *especially* historically) philosophical discussions about what makes humans so special. And all of these practices have significant (devastating) material consequences for other animals as well as humans and the environment as a whole. I would argue that it's high time for the "high position of man" to be shaken; it's time to stir up some trouble and *stay with it* (Haraway 2016).

2. Telling Stories in the Anthropocene

First proposed as a term for a new geological epoch by atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen and limnologist Eugene Stoermer (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000), the term "Anthropocene" soon gained traction beyond the field of climatology (Živaljević 2021: 659). Over the last few years, it has morphed into a sort of all-encompassing term for the anthropogenic ecological calamities we are surviving in – climate change, mass extinctions, rampant pollution, ecosystem collapse and the Covid-19 pandemic being some of the more noteworthy symptoms of the end times. As archaeologist Ivana Živaljević writes: "Along with [the term "Anthropocene"] entering the public sphere, the ecological and social challenges facing all life on Earth were also a call to "unsettle the humanities", historically concerned with the cultural part of the Nature–Culture dichotomy."

6 While by no means endemic only to Western thought, these ideas were violently spread and imposed through colonialism at the expense of indigenous ontologies and lifeways.

(Živaljević 2021: 659–660). I would argue that one of the ways in which this "unsettling" can be brought about is by interrogating the grand (anthropocentric) narratives and fundamental dichotomies of Western culture that are (at) the root of the whole horrible business. Here, I am again (Matić and Žakula 2021; Žakula and Matić 2023) concerned with what Donna Haraway calls *storytelling for Earthly survival* (Chachkhiani et al. 2019), and (in an old school anthropological manner) with the structure and function of stories, because:

> As argued by many anthropologists throughout the discipline's fraught history (starting with Bronislaw Malinowsky (1954: 96)), *origin stories are important*. They tell the story of where we came from, where we're going, and most importantly, *who we are*. Sylvia Yanagisako and Carol Delaney (Yanagisako and Delaney 1995: 1–6) emphasize this by underlining the implicit "sacredness" of scientific evolutionary narratives in modern society, and point to a marked similarity between the social clout such narratives are given and the clout afforded to the Christian story of *Genesis* in Western societies (Matić and Žakula 2021: 679).

Furthermore, following Donna Haraway (1984: 1989) I am inclined to view scientific accounts of human nature as especially potent stories, and pose the question of accountability. I believe that, as scholars and scientists, we tend to slip into the belief that we are only, or chiefly, accountable to other scholars and scientists and funding bodies that finance our research.[7] However, this has never really been true. In the wider sense, and especially when faced with the ticking time bomb of climate change and ecological collapse, our accountability must include both the wider human public and other beings and natural systems we are entangled with. When I state that scientific practice is storytelling practice, I mean just that – scientists tell stories about the world, the way it *was*, the way it *is*, the way it *works*, sometimes even the way it *should* be. We humans are a storytelling species, and, as far as we can tell, that might be *the* thing that differentiates us from all the other animals – the way in which we are able to knit together various strands of experience, experiment and imagination, using the faculty of language, in order to say something (to other conspecifics) about the world which we inhabit. Scientific storytelling is only the newest in a long line of such practices[8], and while there's a lot to be said about scientific rigor and methodology, the end product of all science is always a story about the world. Stories hold power, some more than others. And stories about what it is that makes us human hold more power (and interest) than most, as they tend to target our sense of (both personal and group) identity as well as our sense of self.

In her book, Maria Kronfeldner (2018) proposes three kinds of human nature: 1) classificatory nature that poses the question of "who are we and who counts?" that refers to the genealogical nexus that includes the human species

7 The neoliberalization of higher education and scientific research is a process that has greatly influenced this.

8 I am grateful to one of the reviewers of this paper who introduced me to Deborah Bird Rose (2008) and her work with indigenous storytellers in Australia – that is exactly the point – the world we inhabit is inhabitable through stories.

(termed "humankind") and the moral community ("humanity"); 2) descriptive nature that poses the question "how are we?" and refers to the human life form and generalizations that can be made about humans; and 3) explanatory nature that poses the question "why are we the way we are?" and refers to biologically inherited developmental resources. All three are rooted in a biological understanding of the human body (with its myriad variations and their inclusion in "humanity") as descended from past human bodies through the process of biological evolution. In that sense, the author's definitions of human nature are deeply connected to human origins, and can constitute an origin story. Nature, however, is understood as biology and physiology, and while this is (certainly) a choice that enables the discussion of human uniqueness in the biological sense without the complex meanderings an inclusion of culture would entail, as an anthropologist I find the equation of nature and biology in the discussion of a topic as fraught as "human nature" to be epistemologically problematic. This, of course, is a much wider issue, however I believe it is always good to be wary of universalist conclusions based on a narrow epistemology. Historically, definitions of "human nature" have been problematic – as attested by Kronfeldner herself in the discussion of the three challenges faced by such narratives: the dehumanization challenge, the developmentalist challenge and the Darwinian challenge. While the author arrives at a definition that would withstand these challenges, she concludes that the concept and language of "human nature" should be abandoned and perhaps replaced by something less static, such as "the human condition". While I wholeheartedly agree, I simply do not see the merit in clinging to an epistemological distinction between nature and nurture (or culture), as in this case it results in a kind of revamped biological essentialism. Of course, in the context of the book, "species" is understood as a relatively stable biological category, and it is expected that it should be defined in biological terms. "Nature", however, is not a biological category. I am also puzzled by the need for arriving at a whittled down definition of "human nature" that still manages to be so convoluted and requires such a deep understanding of science that it could never presume to take the place of the problematic vernacular definitions of the term. While I understand that this might simply be a case of disciplinary incommensurability, I must reiterate: we are not, and especially not in the Anthropocene, accountable only to other academics.

3. What about Animal Nature(s)?

By its nature (pun intended), any discussion of "human nature" is anthropocentric. However, most attempts at defining what makes humans special have a lot to do with *other* contemporary *animals* against which the human animal is measured. And they have a lot to do with who is doing the measuring.[9] As scholars of human-animal relations have argued, in the West humans have

9 Historically, the (ahem) measuring was mostly done by white European men with enough personal wealth to afford a career in philosophy and (what would become) the social sciences and humanities.

historically been defined as an animal with "a vital addition" (Noske 1993: 188) – variably, the addition could be language, rationality, a "capacity for culture" (Tapper 1988), the soul and so forth. Kronfeldner's attempt at arriving at a definition differs in that respect, as it does not presuppose such a "vital addition", however it does follow the beaten logical path of searching for a definition that excludes all other animals. As Barbara Noske noted:

> Biology and ethology have somehow become *the* sciences of animalkind. It is from these sciences that social scientists (the sciences of humankind) uncritically and largely unwittingly derive their own image of animals and animalness. Animals have become associated with biological and genetic explanations.
>
> This has led to an "anti-animal reaction" among scholars in the humanities. They bluntly state that evolutionary theory is all right for the interpretation of animals and animal actions but not for humans. Hardly any critic of biological determinism will stop to think whether animals indeed can be understood in narrowly genetic and biological terms.
>
> Many people in or allied with the social sciences err in accepting biology's image of animals as *the* animal essence. They fail to appreciate that that image of animals is a de-animalized biological construct. The anthropocentric social sciences view their own subject matter, humans, as animal in basis plus a vital addition. This view turns animals automatically into reduced humans.
>
> The argument goes as follows: If biologists and ethologists are reductionists this is because animals, as reduced beings, prompt them to think so (Noske 1993: 188–189, emphasis in the original).

The point I'm trying to make here is twofold: For one, defining humans as different from all other animals is a culturally specific practice, one rooted in Western epistemology and ontology (Povinelli 1995; Descola 1996; Kohn 2013). Or, as Richard Tapper observed: "For us [social and cultural anthropologists], the views of modern Western philosophers are just further examples of cultural variation, which need to be explained in both social and historical terms" (Tapper 1988, 49). While I find Tapper's chapter in Ingold's influential *What is an Animal?* (Ingold ed. 1988) objectionable and dated on a number of accounts, I agree with the sentiment expressed in the quote above.

The second part of my point follows Noske more closely, and it is this: we actually know very little about the lived, everyday lives of other animals. While scholars within the field of animal studies have done abundant and important work to change this, the fact remains that we are still discovering new species, and the knowledge we have about wild animals in their natural habitats remains limited. As Donna Haraway (1984) pointed out in *Primatology is Politics by Other Means,* when studying primates, we tend to focus on modes of production and modes of reproduction – that is feeding and mating – and this is largely true about our studies of other wild animals as well. We know a lot about their anatomy and genetics, even their neurophysiology and their deaths, and we have general ethological knowledge about a great number of species, but that knowledge is fragmented and fraught as it is often influenced by the

presence of researchers and/or the context of observation (Candea 2010). This is not to say that biology and ethology have not given us any knowledge about other animals, on the contrary, but it is about how, by whom, for what purposes, and from what perspective that knowledge has been historically acquired.[10]

As Tapper succinctly puts it:

> Medieval and Renaissance theology and philosophy – rooted in the Bible and Aristotle, and confirmed by Descartes, Spinoza and Kant – were wholly anthropocentric: nature was created for the interests of humanity, 'every animal was intended to serve some human purpose, if not practical, then moral or aesthetic' (Thomas 1983: 19). Man, made in the image of God and endowed with reason, was fundamentally different in kind from other forms of life, which he was entitled to treat as he chose (Tapper 1988: 48).

And as Yanagisako and Delaney (1995) noticed, these ideas were not abandoned after Darwin, they just changed form: "In Darwinian theory the natural order retained both the hierarchical order of Creation and its god-given quality; the difference is that the power no longer came from God, it came from Nature" (Yanagisako and Delaney 1995: 5). This has influenced the scientific gaze directed at the lives of other animals to a great extent. Even putting these thorny epistemological issues aside, our knowledge about other animals is hazy. For instance, a lot of (early) animal behavior studies came from the observation of captive animals in laboratories and zoos – in fact, zoos were established, among other reasons, to make the observation and study of living (wild) animals and their behaviors accessible to early naturalists (Rothfels 2002; Žakula 2017). The assumption that animals would act as "naturally" in concrete cubicles behind iron bars as they would in the savannah or the jungle or wherever was par for the course.[11] However, we now know that, like humans, other animals behave rather differently in captivity than they do in their natural habitats[12], and it is only with

10 Speaking of anatomical knowledge: the *human* clitoris was only anatomically described in 1998 by Helen O'Connell (O'Connell at al. 1998), with the results of further study published in 2005 (O'Connell et al. 2005), and we are only just beginning to discover – or rather, take note of – its presence in other species. We discovered it in snakes (who have two!) in 2022 (Folwell et al. 2022 – interestingly, all the authors on the paper are women), and it looks like wherever there is a penis, there is also a clitoris. I am thankful to my dear friend and colleague, biologist Dr. Vladimir Jovanović for clarifying that we have known about the existence of the clitoris in snakes for a while, but (which I believe only strengthens my argument) we did not think of it as a clitoris. As always, it depends on who is doing the looking.

11 I have previously written about the diets of wild animals in captivity (Žakula 2017, 2021). In 2019 artist Andrea Palašti staged an exhibition titled "Emil (B5044)", about the life of Emil, an orangutan who lived at Schönbrunn zoo in Vienna (1927-1938). The exhibition included a detailed menu of what Emil ate – as most great apes in captivity at the time, he was fed human food (which included beef stew, cocoa, coffee, wine, boiled potatoes and the like) that contributed to his obesity and untimely death (Žakula 2021: 121).

12 A famous fallacy in this regard is the idea that wolves have a strict hierarchy in their packs, a fallacy that spilled over into dog training manuals that still go on about asserting dominance, while in reality the idea was based on the observation of captive wolves

the recent development of durable, inconspicuous filming and other recording technologies that we are starting to get a glimpse into the private lives of wild (and even domestic[13]) animals. Research on cetaceans is especially compelling in that regard, and in 2010, the first Declaration on the Rights of Cetaceans was promoted at a conference at the University of Helsinki.[14] The 6th clause reads: Cetaceans have the right not to be subject to the disruption of their *cultures*.

The way in which we (and by "we" I mean scientists educated in the Western scientific tradition) have observed and studied other animals is historically rooted in our own epistemologies and our own *culture*. The basic assumption had long been that all other animals are one category – an assumption utterly alien to many other peoples – and that they are, more or less, *automata*. Reduced and *reducible* to biological mechanisms ordered about by instinct, they are oblivious to their own living conditions and their own suffering. As Noske notes, "it may well be that animals continue to be objectified because biologists prefer to remain reductionist and because social scientists, for their part, prefer to remain anthropocentric" (Noske 1993: 189). While things *have* changed, especially in the social sciences and humanities (Mullin 1999, 2002; Žakula and Živaljević 2019), the fact remains that, when discussing "human nature", the nature of the other animals that we are left with (or rather, begin from) is, in Noske's terms, a *de-animalized biological construct.* To put it bluntly: we simply do not know enough about the lives of other animals[15] (and especially not *all other animals*) in order to make (within the context of Western epistemology) valid assumptions about how they differ from the human animal. We are only just beginning to learn, and one thing we are learning is that animal ways of life are not (and never were) static[16] or homogenous[17]. And they cannot be separated from the lives and actions of humans – or vice versa – the Covid-19 pandemic was a recent, stark reminder of this.

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who were put in enclosures with strange, non-related conspecifics which does not occur in nature and prompted aggression and the establishment of hierarchies. See, for example, Koler-Matznick 2002.

13 The attachment of small portable cameras to pet cats and dogs is a whole new genre of YouTube video.

14 Declaration of Rights of Cetaceans (2010).

15 For instance, we are just now beginning to acknowledge that fish feel pain. Not because it was a particularly hard thing to test experimentally, or because fish lack the neurophysiological capacity to feel pain (they do not), it is because we have always *believed* that they do not.

16 For instance, as I am writing this, orcas off the coast of the Iberian Peninsula have begun attacking and sinking boats, and teaching this behavior to other conspecifics (Pare 2023).

17 Živaljević (2021: 666–667), for example writes about the phenomenon ecologists refer to as trophic cascades (Terborgh and Estes 2013, quoted in Živaljević 2021) which is used to explain how entire ecosystems change when one element in the food chain becomes overabundant or perishes. A well-known example is the reintroduction of wolves to Yellowstone National Park that ended up changing the very landscape (Ripple and Beschta 2012, quoted in Živaljević 2021). It is foolish, Eurocentric (as well as

4. Putting the "Fun" in "Dismantling the Fundamental Dichotomies of Western Epistemology"

One thing that seems evident in discussions of "human nature" is how slippery and elusive the "vital addition" is: to me, it seems that in the end, defining "human nature" becomes an issue of word play, language and abstraction that has little to do with any actual, actionable, meaningful difference. But I would posit another question: Why not look at the *similarities* between humans and other animals? What knowledge, and more importantly, what conclusions can be gleaned from them? If it's such a bother to find actual stuff that makes humans different from all other animals, might it not be because we are not so different? That is not to say that humans are not different from other animals, it is to say that lions are different from tigers who are different from bears who are different from elephants who are different from squid who are different from the Eurasian blue tits who are different from humans. Mary Midgley wrote about the tendency to prefer difference and construct elaborate, supposedly "parsimonious", explanations of animal behaviour without affording other animals consciousness (to be clear, other animals are conscious)[18]:

> It is remarkable how, in scientific discussions of this topic, the charge of bias and emotional influence is always confidently levelled at the people who do consider animals as capable of thought, and never contemplated as one which might be affecting their opponents (Midgley 1988: 43).

This, I would argue, is the same kind of thinking that informs the need for the intellectual and linguistic gymnastics involved in attempts at defining "human nature" as different from all other animal natures. Midgley frames this phenomenon, "the dramatization of the species-barrier", as a legacy of Cartesian thinking:

> Descartes' sceptical, solipsistic, negative approach to problems about knowledge has done a great deal of useful work in its time. But when it is uncritically relied upon, its weaknesses are crippling; and wherever it is still used, so to say, *raw* – uncorrected by a full apprehension of the deeply social nature of our thinking - it makes mayhem. Its dramatic appeal, its penchant for stark black-and-white antitheses which strike the imagination, makes it especially dangerous. Because of this, patches of it still linger in far too many sheltered spots in

anthropocentric), and downright dangerous to assume that humans are in any way, shape or form outside of the scope of these entanglements.

18 To quote from the Cambridge Declaration on consciousness, written in 2012: "The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Nonhuman animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates."

> the social sciences, which ought of all others to be the most keenly aware of its faults. The dramatization of the species-barrier, which is our present topic, depends on several of these traditional arbitrary rulings. Its core is, of course, Descartes' own wildly perverse view that all non-human animals are merely unconscious machines - a view just excusable in the context of the creationist biology of his day and the manic euphoria produced by the emergence of good clockwork, but not, one might have supposed, destined to survive Darwin. What most protects such thinking today is, it seems, another legacy from Descartes, though a degenerate one - an uncritical respect for scepticism as such. Scepticism means here not what Descartes himself meant by it, namely critical doubt and questioning, but simply dogmatic denial. To many scholars denying something seems in itself to be more respectable than asserting it (Midgley 1988: 42).

What kind of world would it be if we suddenly decided to focus on the similarities and the things we have in common with other beings *to the extent we focus on differences?* And, more importantly, what would that mean for *how we treat them?* While Kronfeldner's book defines the human species as it would presumably define any other animal species – which I believe is its main strength – my issue with it is that it sets out to define "human nature" and not "human species". Within the context of all the caveats given, the definition is satisfactory, yet I find it to be a complicated abstraction of dubious instrumental value. I strongly believe that now is not the time for dealing in abstractions, now is the time for entanglements and commonalities, for naturecultures (Haraway 2003) and mutual becomings (Haraway 2008).

Mashall Sahlins famously said that "Culture is human nature" (Salins 2014: 114–121), in that evidence of culture is older than the specific biological form of the human species that is around today, and helped shape it. While this argument has its merits in the context of critiquing the Nature/Culture divide, and is in line with what Kronfeldner terms "the developmentalist challenge", I wish to take the argument a further step back, for as Descola put it: "Viewed from an unprejudiced perspective, however, the very existence of nature as an autonomous domain is no more a raw given of experience than are talking animals or kinship ties between men and kangaroos" (Descola 1996: 88).

5. The Decolonization Challenge

Over the past few decades, much has been written on the issue of decolonization, both as a political process in (formerly) colonized societies, and as a process of rethinking the epistemology of social sciences and humanities in the West. Here, I am concerned with the latter. While the issue is much too vast to deal with in detail in this paper, it bears consideration in light of the equation of "nature" with biology in Kronfeldner's book.

To wit, in a recent chapter Motta and Porr have surmised that "decolonizing is a means of exposing systemic violence perpetuated by Eurocentric epistemologies" (Motta and Porr 2023: 196) and that "the objective of decoloniality is to de-link itself from a Western epistemology intrinsically linked to modernity

and capitalism" (Motta and Porr 2023: 193). And that, I think, is the crux of the issue: as historian Keith Thomas (1983) demonstrated, the Nature/Culture divide is a product of specific European modernity, and is directly linked to violent imperial conquest. As Motta and Porr further argue:

> In decolonial approaches, it has been recognised that the animal and animal bodies are constructed in opposition to humanity and the human body. The animal is a part of nature and, as such, the colonial subject is always entitled to animals and their bodies as sites of commodification, food production, companionship and so on. The distinction, however, is not absolute. Animality is not restricted to animals but is further extended to non-white people and bodies (Motta and Porr 2023: 193).

As an example of a different kind of conceptualization, Viveiros de Castro famously writes about Amerindian perspectivism:

> In sum, animals are people, or see themselves as persons. Such a notion is virtually always associated with the idea that the manifest form of each species is a mere envelope (a 'clothing') which conceals an internal human form, usually only visible to the eyes of the particular species or to certain trans-specific beings such as shamans. This internal form is the 'soul' or 'spirit' of the animal: an intentionality or subjectivity formally identical to human consciousness, materializable, let us say, in a human bodily schema concealed behind an animal mask (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 470–471).

In the same vein, Kohn (2007, 2013) writes about how, when encountering a jaguar in the forest, Runa men will often divest themselves of their clothing in order to remind the jaguar that, beneath the animal exterior, the jaguar is also human; or how, when sleeping in the forest, Runa sleep on their backs so that a jaguar will see their face and recognize them as (also) human.

While Kronfeldner succeeds in her valiant effort to surmount the dehumanization challenge, her concept of "human nature" still hinges on an implicit opposition to de-animalized biological constructs and is thoroughly embedded in a narrow Western epistemology. This is not a bad thing, *per se*, but I cannot help but feel that there is something sinister in attempting to define something as presumably universal as "human nature" in such culturally specific terms. And a narrative of a species completely separate and distinct from all others is a very rugged individualistic narrative indeed, the kind of narrative that got us into the global mess that is the Anthropocene.

Conclusions

The concept of "human nature" as a defined set of traits however pluralist and interactive should be abandoned – among other things – because it is often based on faulty, incomplete and fraught knowledge about *other animals* that humans are, explicitly or implicitly, defined in opposition to. The point is that the idea and language of "human nature" always and infallibly designated *other*

animals as lesser than, and this was always to their detriment. While the dehumanization challenge is an important issue, another issue with trying to define "human nature" as utterly different from that of all other animals is that it re-enforces human exceptionalism and threatens to obscure *what we have in common with other animals*. Western philosophy's track record on that account is basically that of a bull in a china shop, and while notions of "human nature" can dehumanize people and render them animals, they almost always *deanimalize* animals and render them *things*. This makes it easy to dismiss animal cultures and even animal sentience or ability to feel pain[19], and more importantly, it enables humans to use and abuse animals as they see fit, which has real-world consequences in the form of unparalleled animal suffering, as well as ecological devastation. Furthermore, the notion of "human nature" is a culturally specific idea, entrenched in human exceptionalist discourses and binary thinking that are, again, culturally specific to Western epistemology that is intrinsically tied to modernity, capitalism and colonialism. While Kronfeldner's account of "human nature" succeeds in surmounting the dehumanization, develompentalist and Darwinian challenges, *what's left* is not enough to combat the vernacular uses of the language of human nature and the dangers that come with it; thus, the author argues that it should be abandoned. But even with all its caveats, Kronfeldner's account is based on the presupposition of the existence of a "nature" (however pluralist and post-essentialist) understood as, what is still, fundamentally, *biological essence*[20]*,* that can sometimes interact with but is separate from culture and detached from history. It is also an anthropocentric view that disregards the role of other species of living beings we are entangled with and treats the human species as completely separate and autonomous. I am not in the least bit convinced that such a nature (human or otherwise) exists outside the imaginarium of Western culture. As Anna Tsing writes:

> *Human exceptionalism blinds us.* Science has inherited stories about human mastery from the great monotheistic religions. These stories fuel assumptions about human autonomy, and they direct questions to the human *control* of nature, on the one hand, or human *impact* on nature, on the other, rather than to species interdependence. One of the many limitations of this heritage is that it has directed us to imagine human species being, that is, the practices of being a species, as autonomously self-maintaining—and therefore constant across culture and history. … What if we imagined a human nature that shifted historically together with varied webs of interspecies dependence? *Human nature is an interspecies relationship* (Tsing 2012: 144, emphasis in the original).

19 I am immensely grateful to one of the reviewers for pointing me toward this excellent, no holds barred take-down of this way of thinking Plumwood (2007).

20 Wearing the trench coat, hat and fake mustache of genes, evolution and descent. It's not *not* biological essentialism if you define biology as the process of evolution and manage to include all humans, you just have a more inclusive essence. This is laudable in the context of the dehumanization challenge, however I wonder what research trajectories might arise if we cracked open that essence "to the sides" to include our simian relatives, for instance.

From the retroviruses in our DNA and the microscopic mites living on our skin, to the bacteria in our guts (Haraway 2008), from the first canids accompanying human hunters, to my own dog sleeping peacefully with her stuffed llama next to me as I write this (Žakula 2023), from the cereals that brought about the processes of Neolithization, to the fungus that caused the Irish potato famine (and the potato itself) (Tsing 2012), from the beavers that Lewis Henry Morgan observed (Morgan 1868), to the bat that ignited the COVID-19 pandemic (Marjanić 2022), humans and their histories have always been shaped by our relationship with other species.

The Anthropocene is a "moving knot" of crises, most of which can be traced back to the fundamental Western idea that humans are somehow separate from the rest of the world and better than all the other animals. We do not need any more narratives about human specialness enshrined in scientific lingo and detached from the living world. The language of "human nature" should (also) be abandoned because it re-enforces human exceptionalism, and we are no longer (if we ever were) accountable only to other humans.

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Sonja Žakula

Ljudska izuzetnost i sudbina životinja: pričanje priča o „ljudskoj prirodi" u antropocenu

Apstrakt

Ovaj rad je nastao kao rezultat diskusije o knjizi Marije Kronfeldner *What's Left of Human Nature?* U njemu se prevashodno bavim dvema temama: ulogom koja je ostalim životinjama pripisana u diskusijama o i pokušajima definisanja „ljudske prirode", i kritikom koncepta prirode koji se koristi u knjizi. Nadalje, nauku posmatram kao praksu pričanja priča, a akademske narative o „ljudskoj prirodi" kao posebno važne vrste priča, kako bih postavila pitanje o odgovornosti koju pričanje takvih priča sa sobom nosi u Antropocenu.

Ključne reči: „ljudska priroda", ljudska izuzetnost, ostale životinje, zapadna epistemologija.

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Stefan Janković

A NEW CLIMATE FOR HUMAN NATURE? NAVIGATING SOCIAL THEORY THROUGH POSTNATURE, THE ANTHROPOCENE AND POSTHUMANISM

ABSTRACT

By examining debates on the Anthropocene era ignited by new materialist and posthumanist scholarship, this paper aims to discern how these perspectives can reframe the human-nature nexus. It also considers how various "developmentalist" approaches might assume the role traditionally held by the concept of human nature. The first section highlights concerns raised by posthumanist and neomaterialist scholars about the marginalized status of "nature", life, and biology within dominant constructivist viewpoints. A central argument posits that notions like "denaturalization" and biopolitics amplify societal dominance over nature, pushing social theory towards an anthropocentric and potentially biologically indeterminate stance. Contrasting this, the second section delves into modern interpretations of the planet in social theory, inspired by the emergence of the Anthropocene. This lens reveals a dynamic, co-constitutive relationship, tilting less towards the unilateral commands of "nature" and more towards understanding the evolution of human life and societal structures within Earth's expansive temporal and spatial realms. The third section further unpacks these developmental ideas by juxtaposing the theories of Bruno Latour and Tim Ingold. The paper contends that both approaches endeavor to illuminate the complex processes underpinning the evolution of life forms, underscoring the significance of culture. In conclusion, the intricate postnatural landscape of the Anthropocene necessitates a more integrated human-nature relationship. This calls for not only discarding dehumanizing facets of human nature, but also fostering a renewed sensibility – a deeper form of humanizing that acknowledges and celebrates our shared existence with other species and entities.

KEYWORDS

Anthropocene, postnature, human nature, posthumanism, planet.

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> *Human nature is not the oxymoron we imagined it to be. In this new planetary age of the Anthropocene, defined by human-induced climatic, biological, and even geological transformations, we humans are fully in nature. And nature is fully in us. This was, of course, always the case, but it is more conspicuously so now than ever before: people are entangled in co-constitutive relationships with nature and the environment, with other animals and organisms, with medicine and technology, with science and epistemic politics. We live and die, play, thrive, and suffer by each other. Now is the time for greater scholarly attentiveness to such human and more-than-human worlds in sociocultural research, saturated as they are with ethical and political implications.*
>
> (Åsberg & Braidotti 2018: 1)

Introduction: A Human (Nature) in a Postnatural Landscape?

Is human nature back on the agenda? Curiously, the quote above stands in stark contrast to what was largely taken for granted in the late 20th century. As Jesse Prinz (2012) noted, the infamous nature-nurture debate, traditionally centered around the fundamental aspects of human existence, grew weary. The stance on whether biological nature can continue to be seen as a backdrop or a constraint to human becoming has become widely unpopular, objectionable, and yet superficial. A key issue here is, as Philippe Descola (2013b) underscores, the contrast between the relative simplicity of adaptive processes championed by sociobiology and the evolutionary psychology, and complexity of institutions that emerge from them. Beyond the widely-taken scrutiny to which the various contentious applications of biology have been subjected to (cf. Lancaster 2003; Lewontin 1996), however, a thoroughly troubling relationship between humans and nature nowadays acquires another dimension. While very few people consider DNA to be the fundamental force behind behavioral outcomes, recent findings in epigenetics have led to a paradigm shift. According to Lock & Palsson (2016), experts such as developmental biologists, embryologists, philosophers of biology and social scientists now understand nature and nurture as inextricably intertwined from the moment of conception. In fact, throughout history, these concepts have been fluid and constantly changing due to ongoing disputes arising over their relationship. As a result, previously established boundaries are no longer clear, which has far-reaching implications for assigning responsibility in medical, political, and familial contexts, such as poor health. The politicization of nature, expressed in debates about environmental degradation, gender and prenatal sex selection (ibid.; Newton 2007), along with current controversies surrounding the climate migration (e.g., Baldwin 2017; Bettini 2017), additionally blurs the boundaries. Thus, a misleading character of these debates is unambiguous: neither nature and nurture can be easily defined as subjects of scientific

investigation, nor such controversies could be simply resolved by science (Lock & Palsson 2016).

Yet, the surface has only been scratched. From a theoretical point of view, these *postnatural* conditions have equally loosened disciplinary boundaries, but in doing so, they have imposed distinct challenges for navigating these entanglements. Over an extended period, nature and nurture ceased to be binomial, specifically because an emerging human-technological apparatus created imposing fields of ambivalent and multilayered character. A techno-scientific boom and biotechnological entanglements have already been widely explored in contemporary classical science and technology studies (e.g., Callon 1987; Latour 1987; 1999). Donna Haraway's ([1985] 1991) iconic figure of cyborgs presents probably the most famed expression of these emerging "naturecultures". Yet, in the complex postnatural landscape where "nature" has lost its deterministic strength and become highly manipulable and politicized, and where "society" is continuously rebuilt through these hybridities, such a view has scarcely become mainstream in social theory. A capital project of dispelling the ontological weight previously given to evolution and physical constituencies in favor of history attached to conscious beings dwelling in complex societies was something that certainly aligned apparently irreconcilable "classical" thinkers (e.g., Durkheim [1916], 2005; Marx & Engels [1845] 1998). Consequentially, this has left a strong imprint on further developments in social theory. Even after acquiring a relatively secured status as a research subject half a century ago, "nature" was firmly bound to societal processes. A *postnatural* landscape, with technoscience engineering nature, biotechnology manipulating with organisms and vast amounts of daily routines relying upon medical knowledge, self-help manuals, inventions of specific diets, only amplified this situation. Existing notions of nature have become even further reinforced as purely *cultural constructs*, historicized by *praxis* and society.

It is probably the reason why various social theories since the 1970s barely managed to think about *boundary objects* such as the body or environment without potentiating the cultural frames which encircle these "natural" entities. A social body is hardly thought of as a self-regulated organism with causal reference to anything else besides lifestyles. Nor does it present an apparatus adapted through specific phylogenesis of social classes, that results in capital neurological modifications of sensory and muscular patterns (Bourdieu 1990; 1992; 2000; Downey 2014; Wacquant 2014). Alternatively, being subjected to "reflexive monitoring", the body is a manipulable platform for the construction of personal identity that includes dictation over biological processes affecting health, reproduction or longevity (e.g., Bennet et al. 2009; Crossley 2001; 2006; Giddens 1992). Rampant tendencies to elevate "nature" as a virtuous object of admiration in late-modernity, through consuming organic and whole foods, vegetarianism and veganism, green and ethical consumerism or veneration of landscapes (cf. Sun-Hee Park & Naguib Pellow 2019; Szerszynski 2005), also emanate from distinct lifestyles as "cultures of natures" (Macnagathen & Urry 2001). Not even an "incidental" character of nature, more intensely encountered

through disruptions in assumed environmental "cycles", ended this fashion. The ascending popularity of environmental issues certainly has highlighted the deep societal interference into ecological processes, as famously being expressed in *Risikogesellschaft* by Urlich Beck ([1986], 1992). Still, the major explanatory frames have hardly provided environment with performativity: rather, they predominantly involved addressing how the human-induced metabolic machinery "engulfs", manipulates and mishandles the outside world (cf. Doyle 2011; Hannigan 2006).

The emergence of the Anthropocene concept has strongly encouraged social theories to delve deeper into postnatural circumstances. Ironically, it has forged a new climate for the relationship between humans and nature. The acquisition of insights on the anthropogenic imprint has imposed a novel magnitude of complexity that delineates a new geological epoch characterized by unparalleled human interference in the Earth's ecosystems, climate, and biological systems; yet, it surpassed a somewhat patronizing ecological awareness. From a philosophical perspective, the Anthropocene has fundamentally altered the idea of *human exceptionalism*, endowed with reason and living above things (Palsson et al., 2013; Savransky, 2021; Szerzinski, 2012; Viveiros de Castro, 2019). The inclusion of the Anthropocene in the conceptual pantheon of the social sciences could therefore be understood as an unprecedented momentum for challenging the fixed boundaries of the Great Divide with its traditional division between naturally occurring phenomena and human-made creations. In what Jensen (2022: 33, original emphasis) describes as "a world of shifted and diminished human agency", there has been a significant push in the social sciences. On the one hand, understanding uncertain material processes that are beyond human control has now become both urgent and foundational for new materialist thinking and posthumanist developments. This also brings human social and political projects closer to planetary geophysical and biochemical processes, ultimately invalidating a conventional demarcation of evolution from physical nature as Homo sapiens and history as conscious beings. On the other hand, transcending the entrenched categories that have kept the two domains separate embodies a unique, epochal mood. This sentiment is endorsed by a growing number of scholars aiming not just to step outside the rigid anthropocentrism of the Western episteme but also to reimagine future ecopolitical relations within broader, more-than-human constellations (cf. Blaser, de la Cadena 2018; Charbonnier, Salmon, Skafish 2016; Delanty, Mota, 2017; Descola 2013a; Debaise, 2016; Escobar 2016; Grear 2020; Savransky 2012; Strathern 2018; Viveiros de Castro 2014).

While not placing human nature on the agenda – particularly without reverting to its traditional humanist meaning – the issues discussed previously emphasize the need to expand our theoretical and conceptual frameworks. This expansion helps us understand the evolving dynamics of the human-nature relationship in postnatural contexts. A central question this paper aims to answer is how does this postnatural state influence our perceptions and potentially come in place of the long-debated concept of human nature? Drawing

inspiration from Maria Kronfeldner's (2018) call for a post-essentialist, pluralistic, and interactive view of human nature, our paper delves into the challenges and nuances associated with this perspective. Even though the concept of human nature has become somewhat elusive and less explored in social theory, its enduring presence cannot be denied (Abbott 2016). This is particularly evident in what Kronfeldner describes as the "developmentalist challenge:" the question of how the intricate interplay between humans and biophysical materiality unfolds. By examining new materialist and posthumanist scholarship – which is largely a product of the Anthropocene era – we aim to discern how these perspectives can reframe the human-nature nexus and how this "developmentalist" approach might take the role the concept of human nature traditionally had.

The paper is organized as follows. The first section addresses issues recently highlighted by posthumanist and neomaterialist scholars concerning the marginalized status that "nature", life, and biology have acquired due to prevailing constructivist perspectives. A key point in this argument is that concepts like "denaturalization" and biopolitics bolster societal control over nature, pushing social theory towards an anthropocentric and potentially biologically indeterminate stance. Counteracting this perspective, the second section explores contemporary conceptualizations of the planet in social theory, an exploration sparked by the rise of the Anthropocene. Through this planetary lens, we assert the unveiling of a dynamic co-constitutive relationship, which leans less towards the unilateral dictates of "nature" and more towards the extended evolution of human life and societal structures within Earth's vast temporal and spatial dimensions. The third section delves deeper into these developmental perspectives by contrasting the theories of Bruno Latour and Tim Ingold. We contend that both these approaches aim to shed light on the intricate processes driving the progression of life forms, emphasizing the role of culture in these mechanisms. In conclusion, we argue that the postnatural intricacies of the Anthropocene demand a more unified human-nature nexus. Essentially, this involves not only expulsing the dehumanizing aspects of human nature, but also cultivating a new sensibility – a more profound mode of humanizing that recognizes and reveres our shared existence with other species and beings.

1. Denaturalizing What? A Life Beyond Biopolitics

The growing discontent that social constructivism has encountered over the last decade provides perhaps the most fitting reflection of the perplexing postnatural landscape. Once an omnipotent framework that played a notable historical role in science studies, social constructivism underwent a profound reassessment, closely aligned with the rise of posthuman neomaterialism and methodological innovations. This transformation brought forth a robust realist approach, a focus on expanded material contexts, and, above all, the elimination of the categorical distinction between human bios and non-human zoe (cf. Pellizzoni 2015; Ulmer 2017). While actor-network theory can be seen as the

birthplace of such efforts, especially for its groundbreaking departure from the social reductionism of the Strong program (e.g., Latour 1987; 1999; Law 1999; 2004; 2011; Stengers 2010),[1] constructivism's blind spots go beyond endowing language, representations, and signs with enormous agency, historicity, and power over reality. Whereas with constructivism "the only thing that does not seem to matter anymore is matter", as Barad (2018: 233) vividly recalls, it also endangers non-human performativity and ultimately leads to an *uncanny biological indeterminacy*. Writing about this ambiguous legacy that numerous political, social, and philosophical projects have uncritically adopted, Pellizzoni (2022: 159, original emphasis) rightly concludes that "[i]f the human is the animal with no predetermined task and milieu, then it *can* do everything but *has not* to do anything." On the other hand, this appears to be rather problematic in posthuman thought, which attempts to be fully *bio-affirmative* and oriented toward life itself – as being bound up in complex, more-than-human webs. It is precisely for this reason that entrenched constructivist tropes saturated with the ideas of suppressing nature, as has been done through *denaturalization* or the famous *biopolitics*, are reaching a dead-end.

But how did nature become such a contested subject, especially among the modern, secular and well-educated ones, as Bennet (2010) observes, in their impulsive cultural, linguistic and historical constructivism? Following the decline of biological determinism in mainstream theory and the rejection of ideas

1 It is noteworthy that a radical interpretivist course generated under the so-called Strong Programme (SP) was a backbone for many variants of constructivism. However, for actor-network theorists, this kind of "constructionist machinery" (Knorr-Cetina 1999) simply resurrected semiological idealism, relegated the alterity of other entities and epitomized an exaggerated "social reductionism." Substantially, it obscured the co-production of our world. At the turn of the millennium, Latour (1999) claimed that constructivism, once fruitful in identifying the social aspects of scientific production, has ossified and become a relativistic platform incapable of capturing the intricate relationships between scientists and the objects of inquiry. Constructivism has simply extended the dramatic assessment that access to reality is limited or even blocked by socially-conditioned framings. On the contrary, scientific work sets in motion the realities it describes (Law 2004) through *fabrication*. As an emergent practical endeavour, fabrication does not detach the production of scientific facts from their deep embeddedness in collectives, as constructivists have been claiming; however, it also involves tools and equipment, as well as a multitude of interpretations, negotiations, and indispensable controversies that precede the "stabilization" of scientific facts in the broad political, cultural, and technical environment in which science is situated. An additional layer of complexity arises from the exposure of the agency and historicity of non-human entities. Contrary to being seen as mere objects of inscription, scientific endeavour is deeply attached to unveiling of their performances, behaviour and careful noting of their agency. There is nothing mystical, Latour (1993; 2005) repeats, with scientific collectives "socializing", transforming and learning from non-human entities. It is why ANT scholars prefer a notion of *factishes* over facts: the former displays a prolonged intertwinement with non-humans, their deep attachment to a work of fabrication within scientific collectives, dedicated to a diligent discerning of their qualities (Latour 2010; Stengers 2010).

that likened humans to biologically "pre-socialized" animals – views which emerged from a prevalent critical stance among late-modern social scientists – it is understandable why there was a compelling call to move beyond the essentialisms tied to many concepts. In this regard, denaturalization served as the main technique and tool for identifying the deeply cultural basis of phenomena otherwise perceived and experienced as "natural." Denaturalization itself is a tricky concept. As Rita Felski (2015: 71) instructively notes, "such a bad rap" attached to nature, natural and naturalizing reflected a delicate ethic of critical theory in its overwhelming effort to be named as the only "progressive" method and to present itself as a means of uncovering the most buried aspect of social power, oppression and domination.[2] Obviously, nature was one of the most important allies on this axis and was "portrayed as the realm of the automatic and unthinking, the tyranny of coercion and compulsion, associated with whatever is mandated either by biology's laws or society's norms." Dentauralization thus became a tool for discerning these "delusional" aspects of social reality, where specifically the oppressive appeals to nature were seen as extensions of power and domination. Reasons to "deconstruct" it seemed so obvious. However, nurturing such a theoretically suspicious and antagonistic approach proved to be inefficient (cf. Anker, Felski 2017).

Interestingly enough, in spite of a strong presence in gender theory, a new meaning provided to denaturalization came from this field – traditionally the most susceptible to ideas such as cultural construction of nature and deessentialization. Once revolutionary, a canonical conceptual detachment of gender from biological sex, according to Alaimo (2010; 2016), appears inadequate for addressing the questions of embodiment, materiality and various relational assemblages which partake in making of gendered bodies. The salient constructivist basis of feminism, certainly has played an immense role in separating the gender from allegedly continuous and somewhat haunting biological "destiny." Yet, in doing so, many feminist theorists have adopted the prevalent binary views instead of opposing them, by assuming that certain aspects of biology are fixed or even essential features of human nature. As biology has been drafted to serve as the armory for racism, sexism and heteronormativity, Alaimo reminds that such failure in displacement of determinism has prevented considering the biological body as transformable. Braidotti (2016; 2018) also argues that moving beyond denaturalization means breaking with common signifiers for all organisms. Without downplaying the importance of

2 Braidotti (2013: 3) also masterfully discerns that, in dispelling humanist endorsement of human nature, a critical spirit of the post-1968 thinking has led equally to the "implosion" of anthropocentrism and anti-humanism. "It turned out that this Man, far from being the canon of perfect proportions, spelling out a universalistic ideal that by now had reached the status of a natural law, was in fact a historical construct and as such contingent as to values and locations. Individualism is not an intrinsic part of 'human nature', as liberal thinkers are prone to believe, but rather is a historically and culturally specific discursive formation – one which, moreover, is becoming increasingly problematic."

language and the largely popular methodology of (de)construction, encountering such unstable materiality propelled with environmental crises and divisive character of new technologies, calls for "epistemic acceleration" and profound rematerialization by expanding the horizon of relations taken into account. Accordingly, "posthuman feminism embraces the tensions of new materialism and repurposes them in a dynamic manner, by alternatively re- and de-naturalizing strategically all naturecultural matter. It thus produces a process ontology of cross-species relations that includes the inorganic and the technological apparatus" (Braidotti 2022: 112).

Unlike denaturalization and the consideration of gender or a body as a field for semiotic inscriptions, a neomaterialist course taken by posthuman feminists situated such classical themes of embodiment into a matrix of embedded becoming that encompasses heterogeneous assemblages – equally organic, technological and social (ibid.; Åsberg & Braidotti 2018; Grosz 2010; Grusin 2017). Following the radical epistemologies, posthumanist feminism represents an innovative way of thinking beyond anthropocentric and masculinist fashion, focusing on performativities and alliances that transcend the human species. However, the analytical emphasis on flows between permeable bodies, also known as transcorporeality, goes beyond purely ecological motives by proclaiming the interdependence of humans, animals, and the environment. Rather, the rejection of the notion of human exceptionalism and supremacy is equally crucial to understanding the survival of living organisms, but far beyond the otherwise obsolete notion of nature. The emphasis on the productive and inherent power of *life* in all its non-human forms in posthuman feminism thus unfolds as a relational and *renaturalizing* philosophy. Itself, it is centered around the concept of *zoe* - replacing the inherently anthropomorphic conception of *bios* with a dense, vital, and transactional conception of life (cf. Huffer 2017). However, the shift to a geocentric or zoe-centered approach requires a thorough reassessment to determine what should be considered a thing in the context of feminist materialist theory, argues Braidotti (2017: 34). It is a "dislocation of difference from binaries to rhizomatics, from sex-gender or nature-culture to processes of differing that take life itself, or the vitality of matter, as the main subject."

Prior inquiries reflect a much broader renewal of interest in life, which has nonetheless imposed scrutiny to some of the widely appreciated concepts from critical repertoire – most notably, *biopolitics*. The importance of life acquiring historicity and, as Foucault ([1966] 2005) famously debated in *The Order of Things*, is what provided a peculiar basis for differentiating life and death, but more substantially, as an "untamed ontology" and a general law of beings that might erode them from within. Exactly the latter had a capital role in the parallel designing of life and human sciences. During a specific historical period, life began to be viewed as an object that could be managed and administered, respectively, becoming subjected to distinct regimes of "governmentality", giving rise to two forms of power: anatomo-politics, which focuses on the individual human body as a machine to be measured, disciplined and optimized, and

biopolitics, which focuses on managing populations as a "species body." These forms of power were crucial for the development and expansion of capitalism, as they allowed for bodies and populations to be effectively incorporated into productive and economic processes. Law also shifted towards regulating and measuring life, rather than simply punishing transgressors of sovereign power. This marked a new era where life was both placed outside of history as a biological and natural phenomenon, and inside of it, subject to politics and control within society (Foucault [1979] 2008).

Biopolitics specifically appeared to be a double-edged sword. One of the most vocal critics of the concept, British political theorist David Chandler (2018a; 2018b) contends that biopolitics has become a catch-all phrase used by both ends of the political spectrum to describe subtle population control mechanisms employed by the powerful pharmaceutical industry and genetic modification technologies. While the Covid-19 pandemic has only reinforced its widespread and easy application (Chandler 2020), Chandler also underlines the flawed interpretation, observing that Foucault's original concept, designed to illustrate the emergence of a distinct rationality and governance technology aimed at improving population health, has devolved into a gullible critique founded on the unproven assumption that there is an inherent manipulation of biological processes. Controlling the latter seems a somewhat unattainable task, especially in the Anthropocene epoch. As both Chandler (2018b) and other authors assert (e.g., Matthews 2019; 2021; Wakefield et al. 2020), by epitomizing the modernist command and control logic, biopolitics proves to be unfit for climatic risks and uncertainty. Namely, keeping such a conviction that the vast landscapes of biophysical and geochemical entities can be completely subjected to "governmentality" by using epistemic systems and management technologies, as we will soon argue, seems rather naive.

However, biopolitics reflects a much broader conundrum held by these "denaturalizing" critical approaches: it operates insofar as the humans are promoted as principal living beings, both in performing or subjugating to power. By setting the figure of humans into the foreground, as Elizabeth Povinelli (2016; 2017a; 2017b) convincingly argues, it enters into a rather peculiar continuity of "life", involving birth, growth, vulnerability and precariousness, and death with variations in quality – being both expected and unexpected. Like other life forms, the Anthropos is subject to the possibility of extinction, which is a much larger form of death. The idea of mass extinction, which refers to the extinction of all life forms, not just humans, may be linked to the biopolitical concept of population. However, the concept of extinction intensifies the problematic of death, affecting not only life and extinction, but also non-life, including the inorganic and inanimate. Thus, the Anthropos is considered part of the life set only as long as the distinction between life, death/extinction, and non-life is maintained: non-human entities are deemed only as elements of human metabolic processes, a matter of deriving sufficient energy for survival. Povinelli therefore contends that common models of "life itself" remain entrenched in the notion of a self-contained entity and reinforce oppositions

such as nature and culture, biology and technology, human and machine. But, neither life can be separated from non-life, nor do valuable properties of life – such as birth, becoming, or actualization – can be contrasted with a terror of non-living existence. Organic life is rather incited by preindividuated, underlying, inhuman geological forces, other than "powers" attached to human-controlled technologies (Grosz, Yusoff & Clark 2017). As Bennet (2010: 61) masterfully underscores, "life draws attention not to a lifeworld of human designs or their accidental, accumulated effects, but to an interstitial field of nonpersonal, ahuman forces, flows, tendencies, and trajectories" (ibid.: 61).

Much of the Anthropocene post-biopolitics has already been deeply embedded in this emerging biophilosophy. In contrast to the anthropocentric ideals of the Enlightenment and its deliberative politics of autonomy, many authors protest the compartmentalization of a distinct human realm of independence and freedom from the natural world. The bifurcating character behind the acquisition of greater political, economic, and cultural freedoms, they argue, not only capitalizes on the abundant uses of the environment, but also detaches the human political project from complex global patterns such as weather systems, carbon cycles, and more generally from the multiple agencies and actants participating in planetary processes (Charbonnier 2017; 2020; Latour 2018; 2020a; 2020b; 2020c; Nelson & Braun 2017; Stengers 2017). Post-biopolitics, in this respect, becomes a distinct *ontopolitical* project – an attempt to discern how realities come together through socio-material becomings of somewhat gigantic spatio-temporal scale (cf. Savransky 2012). Nonetheless, it epitomizes an idea of deep "submersion" into more-than-human constellations. In what appears to be the probably most exotic and heavily misunderstood philosophy coming under the banner of speculative realism, this is a matter of unbroken gigantic formations of objects (Bryant, Srnicek, Harman 2011; Harman 2018). The very adjective "speculative" illustrates well the diagnosis of the postnatural age: the impossibility of qualifying the ultimate ontological instance – either people or things, since the vast parts of reality are largely undisclosed or "black-boxed." What is thus characteristic about these *symbioses* (Harman 2016), *hyperobjects* (Morton 2013; 2016; 2018) or *machines* (Bryant 2014) is that the reality they hold remains complex and only partially accessible due to a number of interactions performed among the objects.

Later, this would become precisely a matter of concern in the postnatural Anthropocene era. An obsessive attaching of the world and things to human comprehension – although nominally marked as existing independently – thus necessitates capital corrections, since it obfuscates *what performs*. As Bryant (2014: 141) underscores, "we must take great care not to confuse the thesis that flees, rats, malaria and bubonic plague bacteria, power lines, and Hurricane Katrina belong to the social, with the claim that they are socially constructed (...) The powers of Hurricane Katrina arise not from how we represent it, they are not derived from 'society' but belong to the hurricane itself." Yet, this is not merely about reducing human intentionality and symbolic dominance, or attributing more agency to non-human entities. It delves deeper into understanding

the reality constructed by diverse agents across varying temporal and spatial scales that influence human existence and evolution. This is where denaturalization becomes pivotal. While it toyed with humanistic ideals, it simultaneously fortified the narrative of a "good" human nature, which paradoxically is framed as wholly anthropocentric and biologically indeterminate. As ecological devastation escalates, and we witness a rise in instant revisionism and anti-realist politics, the urgency to re-evaluate and potentially reverse denaturalization intensifies, especially given its increasingly *dehumanizing* consequences.[3] Yet, this trend appears incongruent when juxtaposed with significant shifts in our postnatural context, where numerous processes now eclipse human influence. The Anthropocene era has spurred calls for a reimagined macro-conceptual framework to evaluate human-nature relations, highlighted by efforts to expand social theory to a planetary scale.

2. Unfolding Planet: The Anthropocene Event in Social Theory

Undoubtedly, the Anthropocene is a very controversial concept (cf. Lorimer 2017; Sklair 2017). Recently, British cultural theorist Mark Bould (2021) listed more than 30 possible variants for naming the new geological epoch, among which the most notable contenders might be Jason Moore's (2016) *Capitalocene* and Donna Haraway's (2016) *Chthulucene*. Each of these variants describes quite different landscapes of climate change, involves different protagonists, but most importantly, how they can be distinguished in ethical terms, as the scales and scope of responsibility are quite different when we speak, for example, of London's urbanites or the inhabitants of the Bangladesh coast. The notion of Anthropos as the backbone of the Anthropocene therefore carries potentially dangerous connotations. According to postcolonial and Marxist authors, the greatest error is a hasty standardization of "humanity in peril" (Barry & Maslin 2014; Malm & Hornborg 2014; Swyngedouw & Ernston 2018). With such an overgeneralized category of species, they contend, the extractive machinery of political economy – as the primary cause of climate change – is invalidated. Moreover, the very convention inscribed in the conception of the human species deeply reflects colonial habits: under a universalist appeal now wrapped in a unified biological and geological agency, the species thesis smuggles an inequitable distribution of "common fate" while diluting genuine responsibility for climate change (see Boscov-Ellen 2020). Add to this the debates about officialization, which are still ongoing because of the (in)sufficient amount of stratigraphic evidence needed to clearly delineate the extent and scope of an

3 Postcritical authors specifically point out that the most gullible contemporary forms of instant revisionism, often too close to conspiratory thinking, have their origin in hard-line constructivist thinking. Deeming that "deeper" realities brought through language and meanings have to be deconstructed, such claims lead to a belief in artificial creation of reality, clandestinely performed by those who hold social power. Ultimately, this ends in somewhat radical antibiologism and flattening out any non-human entity from performativity (Anker, Felski 2017; Felski 2015).

ecological imprint on the environment (Zalasiewicz et al. 2019), and the Anthropocene seems even less enticing.

Despite the controversies surrounding it, there are valid reasons for adopting the concept of the Anthropocene, beyond the fact that it is the most popular trope in the current ecological vocabulary. Writing about the multifaceted character of the Anthropocene, Timothy Morton (2016) argues that the absurd teleologism and accompanying metaphysics regarding species is diminishing in this case. For the human species, he claims, can now be thought of in a completely *anti-anthropocentric* way – that is, outside being ontically given and distinct from all other beings. The Anthropocene, therefore, cannot be merely seen as a tool for delimiting human geological agency or as the backbone of current ecological consciousness: instead, it catalyzes a sense that "the human is decisively deracinated from its pampered, ostensibly privileged place set apart from all other beings" (ibid.: 24). Nonetheless, this interpretation depicts an uncanny immersion in processes of an Earth magnitude, a deep involvement in sometimes gigantic processes that nevertheless appear local. A figure of the Earth is particularly salient here: as the growing body of findings from the Earth systems sciences simply "stampedes" into social sciences, it imposes a deep engagement with the planetary processes – bonded into patterns, exhibiting a tendency to rearrange its constituent elements and undergoing sudden shifts or transformations in its functioning.

The planet has already become topical in social sciences and humanities, but the work of historian Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; 2019; 2021) stands out in this regard, because of its attempt of making such a concept a principal humanistic category. In contrast to a rather dogmatic way of thinking that prevails in most of the humanities, Chakrabarty's idiosyncratic attempt to juxtapose social and natural history has far-reaching implications. As he repeatedly argues, the habitual separation of the two historical streams overlooks a much broader level of "deep history" – related to a profoundly emergentist history of life on the planet. Chakrabarty's work is interesting not only in terms of the converging temporalities that are usually considered separately. Taking advantage of realism, his positions strongly oppose any variant of parallelism – particularly those that elegantly assert the autonomy of social history – as they each move away from mutually interacting physical, chemical, and biological processes (Chakrabarty 2017b). Above all, a pariah status for natural history eliminates any consideration of how social and economic systems are deeply embedded in those of the earth in a long-term coevolutionary matrix. By embedding human life in a network of reciprocal relationships with various other life forms – many of which precede humans, Chakrabarty seeks to revive a vital perspective that breaks away from a homocentric view. Many of the terms commonly used in social theory, such as empires, globalization, capitalism, socialism, Enlightenment, civilization etc., reduce the interactivity to human agency. Our historically recent awareness on climate change follows a similar fashion:

> By introducing new questions of scale – astronomical scales for space, geological scales for time, and scales of evolutionary time for the history of life - all in search of understanding the relationship between the history of the planet's atmosphere and its life-carrying capacity, and thus promoting what may be called a life, or zoecentric, view of the history of the planet, the literature on global warming works at a tangent to the completely homocentric narrative of globalization (Chakrabarty 2015: 154).

Engagement with the deep history encompassing the intertwined temporalities of evolution and geology, therefore, calls to uncover the web of complicated interdependencies that make human life possible, among other things (Chakrabarty 2016; 2020). Highlighting this *zoecentric* perspective, thus, neither ends with conclusions on recent dramatic environmental shifts due to climate change nor could it be simply reduced to twofold and disentangled regimes of history. Surely, the effects of the so-called Great Acceleration are indisputable (cf. Asher & Wainwright 2018): a remarkable increase in both human population and average life expectancy after the Second World War, which stand at a base of current cataclysmic events, such as global deforestation, desertification, accumulation of industrial wastes, and acceleration of extinction, can be attributed largely to the widespread use of fossil fuels for creating artificial fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation pumps, along with petrochemicals used for pharmaceutical products. Still, none of this resulted from a "sudden" conjunction of detached, parallel histories; rather, a Great Acceleration as a birthplace of current climate change marked a shift in interactive patterns: "this species–technology complex has flourished at the expense of many other species and now threatens to push the Earth system into another phase altogether" (Chakrabarty 2018: 25). Throughout their history, humans have been a part of biochemical cycles where waste from one organism served as a resource for another. Whereas this recycling process sustained life, significantly larger amounts of waste that cannot be broken down or reused now are being generated due to heavy reliance on cheap and abundant sources of energy, such as fossil fuels. A planet on its own was a key "supplier" and a vital basis on which human life-forms evolved. It is exactly what Chakrabarty (2021) names the *otherness of the planet*: its relative self-sustenance, which operates on gigantic spatial and temporal scales.

As much as Chakrabarty is interested in discerning the temporalities of Earth magnitude, planetary sociologists provide an additional emphasis to entanglements of the human and non-human, specifically by accentuating how the collectives adapt to *planetary physics* – flows, motions and mobilities that are occurring on various spatial scales (e.g. Clark & Szerszynski 2021; Clark & Yusoff 2017; Palsson & Swanson 2016; Szerszynski 2016, 2018, 2019). Planetary sociology has originated from indeed enviable attempt to capitally redefine the otherwise (physically) static ontology of social sciences through a "mobility paradigm" (cf. Büscher Sheller & Tyfield 2016; Sheller & Urry 2006; 2016; Tyfeld & Blok 2016). A key difference inserted with the planetary turn in this regard opposes usual methods deployed in the sociology of globalization. Unlike an

interest in discerning the vivid interconnectedness of social processes that occur *across the surface* of the planet, according to Szerszynski (2019: 224), "the foundational task of any planetary turn must be the interdisciplinary task of investigating the planet as a category of being in its own right" – that is, an engagement with the deep and dynamic space of Earth. Usually marked as a stable backdrop for human activities, planetary dynamics is commonly omitted from any social analysis, even though each collective engages in a quite distinct manner with the physics of motion and vertical mobilities occurring both within and in-between various strata of the Earth: atmosphere, biosphere, hydrosphere, magnetosphere etc.

Potentially the most innovative assumption put forward by the planetary sociologists is an inversion of the somewhat stereotypical depiction of collective life as simply adapting to a relatively stable environment. As particularly Clark and Szerszynski (2021: 10) underscore, this is "never simply a matter of inscribing a social or cultural power on a waiting landscape, but always an active conjoining of powers from across the different parts of the Earth." Multifarious means through which social formations achieve their distinct self-making by cultivating land, mobilizing fossil fuels or manipulating the forces of water-flows, never exceed the very dynamism of the Earth. An ontogenetic formula thus should rather be postulated by providing primacy to different *innovations in mobility*, based on stabilizing material flows such as food and energy sources, roads, infrastructure, etc., than simply "engrafting" human life to a finite and static environment. As Clark and Szerszynski convincingly show, long-term cycles of sedentary life result primarily from coalescing with *dynamic exchanges* between the layers of the Earth, such as the transfer of biomass like fuel, food, livestock, and even geomass like building materials. Different temporalities and forms that these materials gain are largely a part of "drifting" not only across the planetary surface, but due to mobilities between the strata. The notion of *Terra mobilis* indicates precisely this dynamic ensemble, which largely helps such discrete entities as human collectives to take shape, but also gain strength by harnessing energy and establishing the mechanics of movement. "[T]o geologize the social", Clark and Szerszynski point out, "is to prise open the question of how certain social actors acquired previously unthinkable powers or agencies, it is to ask what else might have been or might yet be done with the geopower they sought to make their own" (ibid: 49).

Albeit the planetary timescales often go beyond the scope of political and even emotional reach, creating a peculiar experiential puzzle on how to contemplate over extended periods beyond human comprehension, the concepts and ideas derived from the nonlinear Earth sciences impose accommodating social and cultural becoming into a context of rather dynamic ensemble of material entities. Yet, this can hardly be confined to a simple-minded theoretical syncretism. Due to somewhat critical entanglement of human life with "geo-biochemical" processes of the planet, there is an urge for equally genealogical, epistemic and fundamentally ontological redefining of human. According to Chakrabarty (2021), a notion of force, that has been traditionally reserved for

natural sciences, is equally applicable in social sciences and humanities as the notion of power was, since collectives "negotiate" with the Earth's surface and depths and are embedded in its extensive duration with other beings – living and non-living. As humans cannot be detached from the vast planetary timescales of geobiology, therefore they cannot be classified and thus detached from other species, whose role is of capital importance for sustaining the planetary life. The placement of humans in a novel topology gives an impetus to explain the overall problem of species development by bringing it closer to *environmental epigenetics*, while it also necessitates attention to the intertwining and co-evolving aspects of the human/nature interface. It is where the projects of Bruno Latour and Tim Ingold, that is, ontologies of *networks* and *meshworks* (un)surprisingly converge.

3. Lines of Biosocial Becomings: Life, Sustenance and Interactive Account

In spite of minor frictions that occurred a decade and a half ago (see Ingold 2007), there are many affinities which the recently deceased French anthropologist, sociologist and philosopher and British anthropologist had in common – especially, *a conception of life forms being profoundly entangled*. This is what also largely resonated in Latour's reinterpretation of the famous Gaia hypothesis by James Lovelock which, *inter alia*, served as a principal inspiration for much of the planetary thinking discussed above. Latour's quite voluminous study *Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime* (Latour 2017a) along with a series of other papers written in the past several years (e.g., Arenes, Latour & Gaillardet 2018; Latour 2017b, 2020b; Latour & Lenton 2019; Lenton, Dutreuil & Latour 2020), center around the inability of classical conceptions of nature(s) to account for indeed unprecedentedly complex interactions of humans and the planet. Latour's ambition to offer a new image of the Earth engenders several important theoretical breaks, leading to a distinct *anti-holistic reformulation* of the Gaia hypothesis. Namely, Latour abandons the previous focus on maintaining or self-adjusting connections between Earth's components such as organisms that have been widely held in the Earth system sciences, thus aligning with a growing awareness of the potential for interconnectivity within complex systems to exacerbate disruptions and lead to uncontrolled destabilization. A climate regime under the Anthropocene, certainly serves as an important platform for such theoretical turn, especially because it presents a "golden spike" for abandoning the modern ontology and accepting a more symmetrical treatment for already distorted (concept of) nature (cf. Latour 2004). Yet, Latour adds an additional layer to such an encompassing task: producing a new image of the Earth as a non-coherent assemblage of *networked* entities, profoundly enabling a *permanent sustenance of life*.

There are several important points to be underlined here. First, since it could hardly be pictured as a homogenous entity, Gaia escapes from being confined in fixed and pre-defined spatial and temporal frames. As Latour & Lenton (2019:

664) warn, such an approach escapes from situating life-forms within larger frames. "Whatever the name given to such a frame – God's providential dispensation, neo-Darwinist natural selection, strictly mechanistic laws of nature, ecological systems, biosphere – it was from this larger frame that life forms found their limits and their definitions." Instead, a "bewildering heterogeneity" of life forms generates a multiplicity of possible frames and mechanisms: temporal scales and spatial boundaries are fluctuating and highly dependent on interactions performed among the life forms. In such delicate webs of organic transactions, life forms coevolve and their spatial extensions are an offspring of "deep history." Secondly, complex occurrences that result from the interactions of various biological agents and abiotic factors ultimately create a heterarchy, not a hierarchy. Latour is at pains to abolish images, particularly the anthropocentric one, which potentiate either the idea of dominant species or vacuous referring to natural selection: as he continually repeats, the importance of each agency in these concatenated formations could not be undermined, nor they could be reduced purely to intermediaries. Rather, life forms are coherent entities which, while not possessing any intrinsic features or following strict teleology, modulate their immediate environments. As much as Latour dismisses holistic thinking and refuses to align Gaia to a self-regulating superorganism, he nonetheless decisively refutes an atomistic imagery where organisms are equated to diligent, entrepreneurial-like entities (see particularly: Latour 2017b; 2020). A renewed Gaia theory rather requires seeing each life form as relationally located into delicate biochemical feedback loops and retroaction. Overall, this makes Gaia more or less a dynamic feedback arrangement, established through a long history of evolvement between the life forms and abiotic conditions of habitability, that is situated in a delicate envelope, "a few kilometers thick" (Latour 2017a: 140). A concept of *critical zone*, which Bruno Latour borrows from biochemistry, illustrates well these earthly processes: biochemical evolution and geophysical emergence of reciprocal connections between organisms in a thin "biofilm."

Ultimately, these interventions epitomize Latour's ambition to apply the rigid findings of geology, climatology and biology and develop a broad research protocol (cf. Latour 2013) which would make the fragile Gaia loops more visible, sensible and – politically relevant. Such endorsement does not simply mean to transpose the methods of natural sciences into the realm of social sciences; rather, it means to produce localized inquiries on climate, soil or cities and to display interactive sequences that enable human life forms, as some research on metabolic processes has already shown (e.g., Brenner & Katsikis 2020). In order to trace these relational territorialities of organic flows and exchanges Latour and his associates were extensively developing a *geotracing*, as a method with a strong visual component, which enables precise inquiries on three fundamental principles of Gaia mechanisms: *autotrophy*, *networks* and *heterarchy*. Autotrophy plays a vital role in the Anthropocene era, as it provides a means of deriving energy from metabolic by-products. In order to establish proper circular economies and move away from extractivism, it is important

to further explore these processes. Additionally, life within the critical zone involves tracing global biogeochemical networks of micro-actors exchanging materials, electrons, and information. It is also essential to recognize the importance of heterarchy in sustaining life on Earth. Despite the various feedback mechanisms that operate within Gaia being dependent on the scale and duration observed, they are crucial for maintaining the habitability of the planet. Therefore, by emphasizing the links, webs, and mechanisms that sustain life, we can strive towards a better coupling of life forms and ensure the long-term viability of our planet (Lenton & Latour 2018).

Since such complex, life-sustaining webs depend on "wayfaring" for their diachronic and synchronic modes, the construction of life into a horizontal, entangled "meshwork" eventually produces the idea of *biosocial becomings*: intertwined trajectories of "social" and "biological." The motif of biosocial becomings has been echoed repeatedly in the work of anthropologist Tim Ingold. However, while it was derived from his broader *thesis of complementarity*, which accounts for the organic and cultural nurture of humans through distinct interaction with the environment, his recent writings have even further been pushed towards genuine relational ontology guided by an idea of cumulative organic entanglements between the two domains. A culmination of such a break from the notion of organisms as discrete, delimited entities, might be found in his most recent writings. As Ingold and his collaborators argue, contemporary environmental crises make it necessary to abandon rigid distinctions – especially the one between solidity and fluidity. A common partition of reality into blocks, consisting of solid material objects on the one hand and fluid and subjectively interpretable ones on the other, simply cannot help in grasping the *flowing materiality* – especially the one involving climate change (Simonetti & Ingold, 2018; see also: Clark et al. 2022). With an aim of elucidating a continuum of human-environment interactions, it is necessary to break away from the entrenched assumptions that prevent thinking on materiality as characterized concurrently with plasticity, viscosity, and elasticity, as well as from keeping the culture as a realm where "fluidity" originates. Likewise, against theses on occasional overlapping, Ingold underscores that a complex metabolic exchange intertwines equivalently *microscopically and macroscopically*.

Nonetheless, this line of argumentation imposes a novel glimpse into evolution. Much of Ingold's claims have been developed through a direct encounter with mainstream evolutionary and environmental biology. In his widely noted study, *The Perception of Environment: Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling and Skill* (Ingold, 2000), Ingold develops a quite complex project that opposes viewing organisms in terms of self-contained and relatively detached entities confronting a virtual world "out there." By opting for a relational thinking – rather than a "populational" one – Ingold accompanies the criticism from developmental biology towards the dominance of neo-Darwinian theory and instead, intends to understand the intricate processes that shape the growth and maturation of organisms, leading to their unique forms and abilities. With no predetermined designs or by simply being a blueprint determined by natural selection

and genetic composition, characteristics of organisms are emergent properties generated throughout its development, which are indissolubly a resultant of interactions and performative engagement with matter, flows and other life forms in an immediate "environment." Besides underlining that the conception of firm spatial and temporal boundaries between life forms poorly describes vivid organic transactions, Ingold also holds that flows allowing *growth* and *development* cannot be detached from what is thought under "culture." Namely, standard evolutionary scenarios effectively narrow down the scope of biology by reducing it to the innate, in opposition to cultural forms that are purportedly obtained through non-genetic methods. As a result, the diverse ontogenetic and developmental processes that enable humans and other animals to acquire expertise in various ways of life, are neglected. Instead, a strong relational model which Ingold suggests, imposes detecting overlapping trajectories or *lines* of cultural and organic growth. The quote below, taken from his *Lines* might serve as a nice illustration for this idea:

> As inhabitants of the world, creatures of all kinds, human and non-human, are wayfarers, and that wayfaring is a movement of self-renewal or becoming rather than the transport of already constituted beings from one location to another. Making their ways through the tangle of the world, wayfarers grow into its fabric and contribute through their movements to its ever-evolving weave. This is to think of evolution, however, in a way that contrasts radically with the genealogical conception implied by conventional models of biological and cultural transmission (Ingold 2007: 116).

Implying quite a different ontological scenario from the one inscribed into conventional theories, lines play an immense epistemic role for comprehending evolution. The very language that accompanies the concept of lines is a good marker of such a shift: instead of finite entities, Ingold rather deploys a term of *tangles* or *knots*. The environment is similarly understood as a zone of interpenetration, composed as a current assembly of life forms attached one to another, with each adopting their distinctive shapes by assimilating the life trajectories of other organisms along the way. Furthermore, lines appear as a convenient substitute for the concept of development. Specifically, Ingold finds that the traditional separation of ontogenesis and phylogenesis, which distinguishes the changes that occur during growth and maturation within a generation from those in the heritable characteristics across generations, is no longer valid. Assuming that the evolution process *unfolds* through the life histories of the organisms themselves as they transform along their developmental trajectories, standard models of transaction also surface as problematic. What is at stake is not an explanation itself. As Ingold (2011; 2013; 2015) underscores, contrary to what traditionally has been assumed, elucidating why forms transform should not be a principal point of interest. Despite being linked to a fixed genetic pattern whose components are duplicated with impressive precision across generations, the genuine question is how forms *remain constant* from one generation to another in the absence of such fixed anchors.

Ingold finds this a part of a bigger problem brought about by the genealogical model – the one, reliant upon the metaphor of transmission, commonly used to denote both biological and cultural reproduction. According to this genealogical model, cultural knowledge is imported into practical situations without being influenced by its surroundings. However, organizing knowledge in a context-independent way can only be achieved through classification, and claiming that all knowledge is classified is simply a result of this model's initial assumptions. Moreover, this notion is contradicted by numerous anthropological studies that show how people acquire knowledge by interacting with their environment. They do not learn by following a hierarchical classification system, but rather by moving through a network of connections and gradually integrating the knowledge *along the way*. In a similar vein, Ingold underlines that acquiring a particular culture is neither a universal trait of human nature nor that culture presents a reservoir of already given knowledge and skills that are simply transmitted. Rather differently, in Ingold's model, physiology and phenomenology come together: a developing human organism incorporates skills needed for performing particular tasks, through training and experience, and gains a specific modus operandi as its vital feature brought up in a relational manner. All human life is caught, Ingold (2015: 145) reminds, in "a never-ending process of attention and response." But could this post-Darwinist, non-genealogical model of human life, entangled in diverse relationalities, resonate further to become a more inclusive form of humanizing the human/nature nexus?

4. A Non-Hierarchical Academic Regime or...? On Perspectives Beyond Human Nature

While the aforementioned approaches represent a sustained effort to re-naturalize social theory, offering a pathway towards a genuinely integrated perspective of the human/nature nexus in light of pressing climatic challenges, they still present their own set of ethical, epistemic, and ontological dilemmas. Clearly, moving beyond the dehumanizing connotations of human nature – whether it refers to inborn instincts, genetically-based temperaments, socially-driven facets of human organization and collective experience, or inherent tendencies as suggested in concepts like Homo Economicus – *is unquestionable*. Kronfeldner (2018) thus convincingly argues that even "sanitizing" this soiled concept might not fully neutralize and expel its essentialist baggage and accompanying dehumanizing effects, such as revocations of racism, for example. The concept of human nature belongs in the dustbin of history: as Sahlins (2008: 98) famously stated, "nothing in nature [is] as perverse as our idea of human nature." This highlights the deeply ethnocentric foundations of the concept, which either rejects "nature" by considering it a source of bestiality or elevating it as a basis for the ethical grounding of society. But, even after diverting from various remnants of essentialist leanings that were inscribed into human nature as a concept, particularly with risky conceptions of pre-social

and anti-social animals, the challenge remains intricate: how to move beyond dehumanization and foreground the rich fabric of life and interspecies relationships? In this planetary landscape of the Anthropocene, there is a yearn for alternatives that would allow for postnatural understanding of dynamic assemblages that encompass the former realms of human and nature.

The approaches presented in this paper basically advocate for a non-hierarchical academic regime that would allow for evolving of a novel conceptual landscape. In this sense, the Anthropocene has ultimately been depicted as the ground where the division of academic labor, firmly established at the *fin de siècle*, evaporates. Still, these partitions are far from over. In his enticing paper on the concomitant metamorphosis of the Anthropocene into a tool for ecopolitical action and its ponderous scientific formalization, Simonetti (2019) unveils persistent differences in how the academic regime operates. A highly conservative process of validation, on the one hand, is dictated by a slow-paced accumulation of evidence by geologists who attempt to solidify the stratigraphic sequences before they can be considered as potential markers for the start of the Anthropocene. The focus on solidification stems from a rigid understanding of change, where time is perceived as an accumulation of solid surfaces that are only accessible in hindsight. A fossilized perspective of change, on the other hand, certainly confronts the widely held ambitions of many scholars in the humanities to highlight the moral and political dimensions of environmental degradation that surfaces in "fluid" changes in atmospheric composition. To challenge this symptomatic tendency, which mirrors the traditional intellectual separation of matter and meaning, Simonetti argues that it is necessary to expand our understanding of Earth's history and focus on fluid flows beyond what is commonly thought as solid surfaces. Some rightfully fear this would further impose a hierarchical division between academic work and once again enforce a neglect of social issues and especially divisive character the ecological risks bear (e.g., Lövbrand et al. 2015). According to Meloni et al. (2022: 487), "related local and collaborative practices across disciplines, communities, and human and nonhuman agents", give a unique opportunity to acquire knowledge along the way; however, the rift between the disciplines remains and disables creating a major "geo-bio-social" synthesis.

In this context, the need for further supplementing such optimistic scenarios with ethical considerations and ontological reflections becomes apparent. Contemporary discussions in the humanities (e.g., Citton 2016; Chakrabarty 2016; Muecke 2016) assert that their traditional emancipatory universalism faces a unique challenge today: the inability to address moral and political questions without accounting for the interplay of biological and geological forces. Here, the response transcends the realm of mere epistemic tools, regardless of their indisputable role, and instead ushers in a new era of sensibility. In this light, the recognition of our co-evolving trajectories with the environment, coupled with the emerging concept of postnatural uncertainty as a novel ontological process, emphasizes the paramount importance of mapping and sensing Earth processes. This reimagining entails a shift in attention

towards the flows of energy and matter, equipping us to discern the intricate planetary patterns and movements. However, this shift does not downplay the socio-ecological dimension; it transforms into an ethical imperative to address the inequalities stemming from climate vulnerabilities, environmental degradation, and health disparities. As explored throughout this paper, the emerging human-nature nexus prompts us to shift our focus towards intricate layers and interwoven relationships, thereby drawing us closer to an ethics that extends beyond human-centric considerations. Navigating this multi-species world prompts a new sensibility – a deeper, nuanced form of humanizing that acknowledges and responds to our interconnected destinies. Devising alternative conceptual frameworks becomes imperative for future ecopolitics. While the concept of human nature may not be on the agenda again, the Anthropocene urges a paradigm shift, encouraging humanity to reposition itself: not as a dominant force, but as an integral part of a multifaceted tapestry interwoven with diverse non-human agencies.

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Stefan Janković

Nova klima za ljudsku prirodu? Proučavanje društvene teorije kroz postprirodu, antropocen i posthumanizam

Apstrakt

Proučavajući rasprave o antropocenskoj eri pokrenute od strane novih materijalističkih i posthumanističkih pristupa, ovaj rad nastoji da prepozna kako ove perspektive mogu preoblikovati vezu između čoveka i prirode. Takođe, u radu se razmatra kako različiti „razvojni" pristupi mogu preuzeti ulogu koju je tradicionalno imao pojam ljudske prirode. Prvi deo ističe probleme koje posthumanistički i neomaterijalistički uočavaju povodom marginalizovanog statusa „prirode", života i biologije unutar dominantnih konstruktivističkih gledišta. Centralni argument tvrdi da pojmovi poput „denaturalizacije" i biopolitike pospešuju društvenu

dominaciju nad prirodom, gurajući socijalnu teoriju prema antropocentričnom i potencijalno biološki neodređenom stavu. Nasuprot tome, drugi deo se bavi modernim tumačenjima planete u socijalnoj teoriji, inspirisanim pojavom antropocena. Kroz ovu perspektivu otkriva se dinamična, ko-konstitutivna veza, koja manje naginje jednostranom diktatu „prirode“ a više ka razumevanju evolucije ljudskog života i društvenih struktura unutar prostranih vremenskih i prostornih domena Zemlje. Treći deo dalje razrađuje ove razvojne ideje upoređujući teorije Bruna Latura i Tima Ingolda. Rad tvrdi da oba pristupa teže osvetljavanju složenih procesa koji stoje u osnovi evolucije životnih oblika, naglašavajući značaj kulture. Zaključno, složeni postprirodni pejzaž antropocena zahteva integrisaniji odnos čoveka i prirode. To zahteva ne samo odbacivanje dehumanizirajućih aspekata ljudske prirode, već i podsticanje obnovljenog senzibiliteta – dublje forme humanizacije koja priznaje i slavi naše zajedničko postojanje s drugim vrstama i entitetima.

Ključne reči: antropocen, postpriroda, ljudska priroda, posthumanizam, planeta.

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EXPLANATORY ACCOUNT OF THE HUMAN LANGUAGE FACULTY: THE DEVELOPMENTALIST CHALLENGE AND BIOLINGUISTICS[1]

ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to explore whether Maria Kronfeldner's analysis of human nature could be applied to the concept of cognitive systems and related capabilities, such as the human language faculty. Firstly, I will address the nature-nurture debate, that is, explanatory claims of nature as having a role in causing the language ability, and explanatory claims of culture as responsible for the development of human language capabilities. The nature-nurture divide generates a problem since it overlooks the interaction of nature and culture during the development of language capabilities, the problem called the developmentalist challenge. I will demonstrate different standpoints that try to answer this challenge, most famously the constructivist theory of Jean Piaget and the theory of universal grammar of Noam Chomsky. Following the insights of Kronfeldner, if we opt for an explanatory (and not classificatory or descriptive) account of the human language, we will search for the explanatory epistemic roles and their fulfilments. As Kronfeldner states, different sciences search for different differences regarding explanandum, and I hope to show that the integrative interdisciplinary framework dealing with cognitive systems is needed. The conclusion is that biolinguistics is an interdisciplinary field with a necessary unifying potential regarding explanatory account of the human language faculty.

KEYWORDS
language faculty, the nature-nurture divide, the developmentalist challenge, Piaget-Chomsky debate, biolinguistics.

Introduction

Maria Kronfeldner's book *What's Left of Human Nature? A Post-Essentialist, Pluralist and Interactive Account of a Contested Concept* challenges and revises the concept of human nature by dealing with it in three independent

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questions: the classificatory question of human nature, the question of a descriptive account of human nature and the explanatory question of human nature. All these questions are considered after removing the essentialist way in which traditional human nature is imagined: as a way for concepts that classify, describe, and explain "human nature" to play more than one epistemic role for different accounts. The aim of this paper is to explore whether an analysis like Kronfeldner's could clear up some of the debates regarding the concept of cognitive systems and related cognitive abilities. Specifically, I will analyse the accounts of the human language faculty, that is, the cognitive system that supports the acquisition and use of certain languages – with several core properties (Pietroski and Crain 2012). For Kronfeldner, the classificatory account of human nature should deal with the question of "who are we and who counts" (Kronfeldner 2018: 210). This question is notably debated by John Locke, who introduced the term "sortal" to account for what the essence of a thing is (Grandy and Freund 2023).[2] This question is also an important question about personal identity, in a way that poses the problem of which criterion defines what people/persons are.[3] The descriptive question of human nature asks "how are we?" or "what is it like to be a human?" (Kronfeldner 2018: 92). In the philosophy of mind, Thomas Nagel (1974) was the one to pose the "what is it like to be a bat?" question to address the problem of the subjective character of phenomenal consciousness, later formulated as the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 2010), which was preceded by the problem of the explanatory gap (Levine 1983) between the functional properties of a conscious experience and its subjective, phenomenal character. The explanatory account considers the question of *why are we the way we are*? This question, I hold, has a good potential to define and clarify what was established as the subject of cognitive science and the philosophy of cognition, namely, the acquisition, formation and development of human cognitive capabilities. Among human cognitive capacities, the ability to have a language is one of the most prominent ones; human's capability to speak is, for many philosophers following the (in)famous essentialist presuppositions, which Kronfeldner tries to refute, one of the hallmarks of human nature: being human means having a language.

In this paper, I will deploy Kronfeldner's strategy of using divided and differentiated concepts of human nature accounting for different epistemic roles of classifying, describing and explaining, to apply and analyse the explanatory epistemic role as the ability of formation, development, and evolution of human language. In accounting for the human language faculty with an explanatory (and not classificatory or descriptive) epistemic role, I will claim, we can see the unificatory framework of different explanatory accounts for this capability.

2 I thank the anonymous reviewer for this remark.

3 For example, two dominant and opposed criteria are: 1. The Physical Criterion, that states that x = y if and only if x's body = y's body; and 2. The Psychological Criterion, stating that x = y if and only if there are times t and t′ such that y is at t′ psychologically connected with x at t (Thomson 2008).

Human language capability is susceptible to the developmentalist challenge, which Kronfeldner introduces to explain the needed interactionist consensus when we speak about characteristics developed "due to nature" and, in our case, characteristics of language faculty developed "due to culture". Language acquisition and its use is one of the characteristics to which the interactionist consensus is grandly applicable, and where the nature-nurture interaction shows its biggest enmeshment. Cognitive science developed several mechanisms regarding human linguistic abilities, but they are still incommensurable, as are explanations in cognitive science in general. This incommensurability can be seen as stemming from the enmeshment of the classificatory, descriptive and explanatory accounts, and that is why I think Kronfeldner's strategy of divided natures can be shown fruitful applied to concepts of cognitive abilities. The problems with incommensurability can also be seen as stemming from Leibniz's mill argument, which is formulated as the Leibniz' Gap: that "there is a gap between the concepts of BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) psychology and those we use to describe the brain" (Cummins 2000: 133).[4] So, there is a problem with integrating explanations from different sciences, especially of the "higher", psychological layers of explanation to the "lower", biological layers. A central part of the reply to the question of the unification of explanations deals with abstraction (which Kronfeldner also considers), or the question of where abstraction should stop. Peircean principle of abduction, I will claim, can be shown as valuable in dealing with the abstraction problem. The abductive principle, as Chomsky formulated it, "puts a limit upon admissible hypotheses" so that the mind can "imagine correct theories of some kind" and discard infinitely many others consistent with evidence (Chomsky 2007). I will start by illustrating the problem of the nature-nurture divide in regard to human language capability, mentioning the gene-centric stance of Steven Pinker and Barbara Herrnstein Smith's and Lewontin, Rose and Kamin's critiques of biological determinism. Then, I will compare Jean Piaget's theory of development of language capability and Vigotsky's critique of "fixed development". As Anette Karmiloff-Smith states, the development of the brain and cognitive abilities cannot be seen as uniform, because of neuroplasticity. Lewontin, Rose and Kamin regarded development as a dialectical process of inputs from both nature and nurture and their enmeshment. Kronfeldner uses

4 Some authors, for example Fodor, argued for the autonomy of psychological explanations (Fodor 1997). Other ones, such as Piccinini and Craver, think we need to find a way to integrate psychology and neuroscience (Piccinini and Craver 2011). Two problems related to the Leibniz' Gap in contemporary cognitive science are the problem of realization – that every functionalist account needs to consider a physical system that realizes respective functional roles; and the problem of unification – that different explanations in contemporary cognitive science and psychology all have very different frameworks and "explanations constructed in one framework are seldom translatable into explanations in another" (Cummins 2000: 140). Throughout this paper, I hope to address both problems regarding the cognition of human language faculty, especially the insistence on a unified framework of explanatory accounts.

the term developmentalist challenge, after which the interactionist consensus, i.e., the claim that nature and nurture interact at evolutionary, developmental, and epigenetic levels is established. In part 3, I will analyse the famous debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky regarding the development of human language faculty. In that debate, the problems of confusing the levels of description and the level of explanation can be seen, as well as the problems of remaining essentialist presuppositions. In explanatory accounts, different sciences search for different differences regarding explanandum, and I will try to demonstrate, they ultimately aim at the explanatory unification of the cognition of human language. In part 4, I will show that biolinguistics is one of the fields with a unifying potential to explain language traits that reliably reoccur because of developmental resources that travel the channel of biological inheritance, over time as well as in space, which is coextensive with Kronfeldner's account of the stability property of human traits and capabilities. In that way, I will try to deal with the explanatory account of something previously called (a part of the) human nature: explaining why human beings speak the way they do.

1. Nature-Culture Debate and Language Acquisition

In the chapter "Sewing Up the Mind: The Claims of Evolutionary Psychology" from *Alas, Poor Darwin*, Barbara Herrnstein Smith criticizes the nativist claims of Steven Pinker, specifically his nativist gene-centricity. Starting from the very use of the concept of *mind*, this reductive methodology is questionable, according to Herrnstein Smith, because it reduces the various characteristics of human cognition (e.g., observable patterns of behaviour and introspective experiences to various capabilities, processes, and innate mechanisms) to one concept, that we accept in different times and different informal and formal discourses (Herrnstein Smith 2001: 162). Pinker uses "due the nature" explanation as a causal explanation, that stems from Galton's divide between nature as referring to the hereditary developmental resources handed down from parents to children via biological reproduction and nurture as an inclusive term for culture, environment, and everything else not transmitted via biological reproduction (Kronfeldner 2018: 61). One of the most confusion-leading consequences that this division yields regarding cognition is a simultaneous misuse of the term "mind" and the term "brain", that leads to more confusion and explanatory gaps in the philosophy of mind and cognition – such as statements that the hardware of the mind is the subject of neuroscience and the software is for evolutionary psychology (Herrnstein Smith 2001: 163–164). This division can be seen as inherited from the Cartesian view of body-mind dualism and leads to the well-known problem of interaction: we do not know how to explain how the "physical" factors relate to "mental" ones and vice versa, and this problem also constitutes the mentioned contemporary problems in cognitive sciences stemming from Leibniz' Gap. There are also problems visible in related parallel dualisms such as "the contrast between biological and cultural

determinisms that is a manifestation of the nature-nurture controversy that has plagued biology, psychology, and sociology since the early part of the nineteenth century"[5] (Lewontin et al. 1984: 267).

Lewontin, Rose and Kamin describe the view that human characteristics are "due to nature" as a biological determinism stance: "a reductionist explanation of human life in which the arrows of causality run from genes to humans and from humans to humanity" (Lewontin et al. 1984: 18). One of the most illustrative examples is shown in the book *Oliver Twist*, where we can follow the orphanage-raised and living on a street Oliver, who has impeccable grammar and the way of speaking, as opposed to Jack Dawkins, whose "English was not of the nicest" (Lewontin et al. 1984: 17). The explanation that Oliver's language-using abilities are due to the fact that he is actually a son of an upper middle-class family shows constant affirmation of "nature above nurture". However, maybe the example of language was not the best example of Charles Dickens, because, as Lev Vygotsky showed, debating the ideas of Jean Piaget, "a child is not a miniature adult, and his mind is not the mind of an adult on a small scale" (Vygotsky 1986: 13). The idea of *development* is a crucial idea of human thinking and speaking, according to Piaget. But, according to Vygotsky, Piaget also had problems with the nature-nurture divide, and "the prevailing duality (materialism versus idealism) that is reflected in the incongruity between theoretical systems" (Vygotsky 1986: 13) because his theory contains a gap between biological and social. The biological is seen as initial, primal, contained in the child itself, the thing which makes its physical essence; the social, on the other hand, is something that acts forcedly, as an external and foreign force in relation to the child. The fundamental problem of the nature-nurture divide as well as Piaget's developmental theory is the problem of causation. Lewontin and the critiques of sociobiology also claimed that in bad theories regarding human nature, such as sociobiology, theorists turn effects into causes, for example, "biological determinists use the concepts of nature and nurture as separate causes when developmental genetics long ago showed them to be inseparable" (Lewontin et al. 1984: 24). This nature-nurture division assigns explanatory epistemic roles that "involve locutions such as 'X is due to human nature', treating human nature as an explanatory category" (Kronfeldner 2018: 59). Confusing the categories of classification, description, and explanation rests, according to Kronfeldner, on an essentialist presupposition that nature

5 This debate is also actual in contemporary cognitive science. The thesis of extended cognition, as proposed by Clark and Chalmers (Clark and Chalmers 2008) states that the cognition extends beyond the boundaries of a cognitive subject. For example, an interesting question would be: should we regard, following the parity principle proposed by Clark and Chalmers, the extended machinery used to generate speech, as in subjects that suffer from Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, as the part of that subject's cognitive system? The thesis of the extended mind could be shown valuable in rethinking the nature-nurture divide. Unfortunately, the scope of this paper doesn't allow for treating this and similar questions, and in this paper, I will focus mainly on Kronfeldner's strategy of dealing with the nature-nurture question.

(of a human species) has a monistic essence. Essentialist causation is usually theological, such as sociobiological "gene-causation" that describes the universal goals of human nature. The communication and socialization purpose of speech in Piaget's theory of language would also be an example. Essentialism ignores that "nothing can be understood ahistorically" (Sober 2000: 7), and that "the ascension from the effect to the cause is pure historical understanding" (Vygotsky 1986: 42). For example, evolutionary psychologists defined the explanatory account of the evolution of the mind as an account of how and why the information-processing organization of the nervous system came to have the functional properties that it does (Barkow et al. 1992: 8).

The problem of reductive causation exists in general scientific methodology,[6] but regarding human nature, Kronfeldner points out the Darwinian challenge. Darwin's theory of evolution is a combination of a Lamarckian idea of the common ancestor and the idea of natural selection as a factor of variability, adaptation, and heritability as processes of evolution. That implies that there is a division of questions of description and the question of explanation, as well as the division of labor in methodology and sciences: one question should have an answer in terms of structures: such as "how ivy plants manage to grow toward the light is to describe structures that cause the plants to do so", and the other, in terms of processes: "the presence of these internal structures explains why the plants grow toward the light" (Sober 2000: 8). As Kronfeldner stated, the Darwinian challenge refutes essentialism, because, given the Darwinian ontology, there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in a biological species (fulfilling the classificatory role of an essence) that are the same time explaining the traits characteristic of a kind (Kronfeldner 2018: xxiv). However, an essence fulfills all these roles: classificatory, explanatory, and descriptive. Essentialism, as well as simple reductionism, thus, cannot accommodate the Darwinian challenge. Evelyn Keller also describes the following nature-nurture divide that stems from the Darwinian challenge:

> The first question is statistical. It asks about the percentage of variation in, say, IQ, that arises from inherited differences among individuals (do some parents pass on smart genes to their kids?) versus the percentage that arises from environmental differences (do some parents pass on books to their children?). The second question is mechanistic. It asks about how genes behave within individuals... (Keller 2010: 3)

According to Kronfeldner, the divide of questions can be regarded as a strengthening of a nature-nurture divide, but it can also be seen as a division

6 For example, physicalism is a reductionistic stance with a claim that all entities, states and processes in nature can be reduced to physical processes (Neurath 1931). There are many refutations of this stance, especially in the philosophy of mind, such as the problem of the subjective character of consciousness (Nagel 1974), the explanatory gap between functions and properties of a conscious experience (Levine 1983) and the epistemological inadequacy of physicalism (Jackson 1982). There are also many methodological problems with the physicalistic program, as shown in Chomsky (2000).

of the channels of inheritance. Firstly, "Anti-Lamarckism made it conceivable that culture is autonomous and human nature shared across all human groups", or that nature is "universal" (Kronfeldner 2018: 64). The Lamarckian view requested the inseparability of "natural" and "cultural" causes: "culture was coupled with and reducible to nature since culture slowly but steadily and repeatedly becomes nature, habit becomes instinct, acquired becomes innate – all via the biological inheritance of acquired characteristics" (Kronfeldner 2018: 65). Anti-Lamarckism and Darwinian challenges show that heritability is not a one-to-one relationship: effects that descendants exactly resemble their ancestors almost never happen in organisms that have a sexual way of reproduction. (Sober 2000: 10). But, when nature and culture are decoupled, the take-off of cultural evolution amounts to an underdetermination of culture by nature[7] because of a one-to-many relationship (Kronfeldner 2018: 65). And nature and nurture are decoupled from the very first moment when the first animal managed to learn socially from another one, that is, from the moment of birth – if there was any concrete such date (Kronfeldner 2018: 66).

Decoupling of nature and nurture made possible constructivist theories of human capabilities, such as Piaget's theory of language acquisition. But, treating nurture or culture as independent causal factors may lead to wrong correlations and causal chains: according to Vygotsky, "in his attempt to substitute functional explanation for the genetic explanation of causes, Piaget, without noticing this, made vacuous the very concept of development" (Vygotsky 1986: 42). The most serious consequence in Piaget's theory, according to Vygotsky, is the wrong explanation of the function and development of the egocentric speech, correlated to autistic thinking. In trying to postulate social interaction as a main ("due to culture") cause for which a child develops a language, paradoxically, Piaget created a barrier between a child and its environment, and regarded the first stage of language development, egocentric speech, as completely separated from reality, or fulfilling no function of the "realistic thinking". Piaget's theory of speech development postulates phases of development in a fixed order: 1. Unspoken autistic thinking, 2. Egocentric speech and egocentric thinking, 3. Socialized speech and logical thinking. That is because Piaget has a nature-nurture divide as a presupposition, where nurture is something external, which acts as an outside force regarding a child's "nature"; while the original function of the child's ontogenetic speech development is intimately individual and has no social function at all. Then, after the empirical influence of the environment, the child develops logic and meaningful speech, so, nurture has a complete shaping role for "unrealistic nature" that, after the process of

7 For example, there is a symbolic-connectionist debate in studying "U-shaped" language acquisition and past-tense formation in cognitive sciences. Symbolic approach postulates two mechanisms – the rule application and lexical lookup, which directly modifies symbolic representations. In contrast, the connectionist approach explains past-tense formation by means of a single subsymbolic mechanism in feedforward connectionist networks (Abrahamsen and Bechtel 2006).

socialization, simply disappears. To Vygotsky, on the other hand, the scheme looks as follows: 1. Social speech, 2. Egocentric speech, 3. Inside speech (Vygotsky 1986: 35). Vygotsky postulates this scheme on an important function of the egocentric speech that shows objective, realistic and social characteristics regarding a child's nature: child's egocentric speech deals with problem-solving and clarification of its thoughts and is, in fact, developmentally the most important factor in transgressing of the external speech to the internal, or the relation between speaking and thinking. One problem that a relatively late development of autistic thinking shows is the biological unsustainability of Piaget's theory of developmental phases.

Another problem is that there is a coevolution, where there is nature via culture and culture via nature, not only ontogenetically but also phylogenetically, even though there are no "genes for" X, according to Kronfeldner. "An important philosophical consequence that can be derived from coevolution is that it revises the dualistic picture about the evolutionary relationship between biological and cultural inheritance" (Kronfeldner 2018: 84). In Vygotsky's theory of language, we have the nature of the speech constituted after the forced assimilation of inputs from the environment. But if we get rid of the essentialist and theological claims, the function of speech is not to serve as communication, but to serve as a problem-solving skill and clarification of one's thoughts, a hypothesis which the biolinguistics program will adopt. When the child talks to itself, it makes commentary regarding its environment, actions, problem-solving and thoughts, so it is highly "realistic" thinking, for example: "Where is the pencil? I need the blue pencil..." (Vygotsky 1986: 30). So, Piaget, in the effort to ascribe to a child's thinking development factors "due to nurture" created an unproved presupposition that a child's relation to reality in speaking and thinking is not "natural" but is a result of the social pressure to conform to the thoughts of others. From the outset, a child's mind is shaped to interact with "objective reality", and during the developmental process, the child employs egocentric speech and thinking as integral components of this development, rather than in opposition to (social) reality. Demarcation and division of the autistic nature and social reality leads to dualism, that, as shown, refutes the very concept of development:

> The latter idea does not belong exclusively to Piaget. Recently, the same thought has been clearly expressed by Eliasberg in his study of so-called autonomous child speech. Eliasberg comes to the conclusion that the image of the world that appears in language forms does not correspond to a child's nature... Only through the speech of adults does a child acquire the categorical forms of subjective and objective... Such a conclusion is simply a natural outcome of the original view of social and biological factors as alien to each other. (Vygotsky 1986: 47)

At first sight, interactionism, with its recognition of the unique interaction between genes and environment in determining the organism, would seem to be the correct alternative to biological or cultural determinism. However, it also supposes the alienation of organism and environment, drawing a clean

line between them and supposing that environment makes an organism, while forgetting that the organism also makes environment[8] (Lewontin et al. 1984: 270). Secondly, it acknowledges the primacy of the individual's ontology over the collective one and, as a result, the epistemological adequacy of explaining individual development in the context of understanding social organization. The term development, in this way, is understood that "organisms, societies, cultures are seen as containing all that they ever are to be immanent in their earliest form and requiring only an initial triggering to set them off on their preset path of developmentally unfolding" (Lewontin et al. 1984: 271). This is, as Kronfeldner has shown, an Aristotelian essentialist claim: developmental unfolding that is often described in terms of stages that succeed each other in a fixed order. Theories of unfolding prioritize internal developmental factors, assigning the environment the role of initiating or impeding the process at various stages. In this sense, it embodies a model rooted in biological determinism. On the other hand, the challenge with constructivism and the attempt to define an independent environment is the multitude of ways in which the components of the world can be combined to create different environments. Organisms do not simply adapt to previously existing, autonomous environments; they create, destroy, modify, and internally transform aspects of the external world by their own life activities to make this environment (Lewontin et al. 1984: 273). We must not forget that "the genetic system itself is a product of evolution" (Sober 2000: 5). Neither the organism nor the environment is a closed system; each is open to the other. So, "development, and certainly human psychic development, must be regarded as a co-development of the organism and its environment, for mental states have an effect on the external world through human conscious action" (Lewontin et al. 1984: 275).

2. The Developmentalist Challenge: Piaget and Chomsky

Separating nature and culture (and also the environment) in the way described has been attacked because it leads people to ignore the interactions of nature, culture, and environment at the developmental, intergenerational, and evolutionary levels (Kronfeldner 2018: 67). Anette Karmiloff-Smith says that nativists as well as evolutionary psychologists use the early developed capabilities

8 For the continental discourse on the problems of this kind of relationship between the individual and the environment, see, for example, Adorno and Horkheimer: "The strength to stand out as an individual against one's environment and, at the same time, to make contact with it through the approved forms of intercourse and thereby to assert oneself within it... represented a tendency deeply inherent in living things, the overcoming of which is the mark of all development: the tendency to lose oneself in one's surroundings instead of actively engaging with them, the inclination to let oneself go, to lapse back into nature" (Horhkheimer and Adorno 2002: 188–189); and Latour: "If we do not change the common dwelling, we shall not absorb in it the other cultures that we can no longer dominate, and we shall be forever incapable of accommodating in it the environment that we can no longer control... It is up to us to change our ways of changing" (Latour 1993: 145).

of infants as a confirmation of their claims, but the specialization and localizations are very *gradual* (Karmiloff-Smith 2001: 189). In studying developmental disorders, she concludes that "abnormal brain is not a brain with some intact parts, it is a brain that develops in a different way during embryogenesis and postnatal development of the brain" (Karmiloff-Smith 2001: 184). For example, Williams syndrome is used as an argument for domain specificity and modularity of the brain, since the capabilities of language and face recognition, which are intact in Williams syndrome, function simultaneously with other intellectual abilities that are defective. This view, however, lies in the nativist presupposition (refuted in the nature-nurture decoupling) that genes and behavioural outcomes are mapped in one-on-one relationship. Karmiloff-Smith shows that children with Williams syndrome successfully solve tasks of face recognition using different strategies. Processes which children and adults with Williams syndrome use to learn new words are not subject to the same lexical constraints as in normal children. "For instance, normal children expect new words to refer to whole objects unless they already know the name of the object. People with Williams syndrome, by contrast, take a new word to refer just as readily to a part of an object" (Karmiloff-Smith 2001: 188). Behaviour cannot, therefore, according to Karmiloff-Smith, be directly mapped to the cognitive processes in the back because some behaviour can be an effect of a developmental delay. The alteration occurs in the learning process itself, leading to distinct cognitive abilities: numerous components within the system mutually evolve, with various phases initiating at the early stages of a developmental event, and multiple layers of interaction are harnessed to gradually build complexity. So, the answer to the false dichotomy cannot be evolution *or* ontogenesis because development relies on both: what is important is the gradual process of ontogenesis, in which a child enters in interaction with the abundance of environmental input (Karmiloff-Smith 2001: 192). The influence of modularity and domain specificity does not necessarily require a developmental origin that is itself modular or domain specific.

A famous debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky regarding the acquisition of linguistic competence took place in Paris in 1975. The debate also delved into a much broader spectrum of issues concerning the fundamental nature of the mind and the origin and acquirement of cognitive capabilities. These included questions about whether this capacity is uniform across various species and domains or instead varies by species and task, whether its development represents genuine learning, characterized by what Piaget described as "authentic constructions with stepwise disclosure of new possibilities", or resembles a genetically pre-programmed maturation, simply involving the "actualization of a set of possibilities existing from the beginning". Additionally, the discussion explored the role of interaction with the environment, debating whether it has a "shaping" function or merely serves as a "triggering" mechanism (Marras 1983: 277–278).

According to Piaget, constructivism is the best theoretical framework to explain the precise patterns of cognitive development. Piaget's form of

constructivism presupposed a kind of evolution that is "unique to man", and which grants the "necessity" of the mental maturational stages. The transitions between one stage and the next are formally constrained by "logical necessity" and dynamically come about by processes of nature-nurture interactionism (Piatelli-Palmarini 1994: 320). The transition is marked by the attainment of more advanced concepts and frameworks. Once these are reached, they remain fixed and encompass the specific concepts and frameworks of the previous stage. Piaget's theory of language acquisition proposed a developmental progression in human cognition from infancy to adulthood, involving distinct, qualitatively different stages that are universal across cultures, although some cultures may not reach the highest stages. However, the problem for Piaget's theory was that the necessary and invariant nature of these transitions cannot be captured by the Darwinian process of random mutation plus selection (Boeckx 2014: 88). Chomsky's suggestion was that one should not establish any dualism between body and mind, and that we should approach the study of "mental organs" exactly the way we approach the study of the heart, the limbs, the kidneys, etc. (Piatelli-Palmarini 1994: 324). Opposed to Piaget's generality, he argued for specificity and relied on concrete instances of language (Piatelli-Palmarini 1994: 327–328), such as:

> The simplest and therefore (allegedly) most plausible rule for the formation of interrogatives:
>
> The man is here. Is the man here?
>
> Is the following (a "structure-independent" rule): "Move 'is' to the front". But look at:
>
> The man who is tall is here.
> *Is the man who tall is here? (bad sentence, never occurring in a child's language)
> Is the man who is tall here? (good sentence)

The "simple" rule is never even tried out by the child, Chomsky concluded, and asked an explanatory question – "Why?" The correct rule, uniformly acquired by the child, is not "simple" and involves abstract, specifically linguistic notions such as "noun phrase" (Piatelli-Palmarini 1994: 328). Children don't try the formulation of sentences by trial and error, and their relevant experience is lacking. This amounts to the famous argument from "poverty of stimulus": "it is reasonable to conclude that the child's knowledge… derives from initial endowment" (Chomsky 1980: 160).

Piaget drew a distinction between structures and functions (the *how* and *why* questions), claiming that although some cognitive functions are innate, no cognitive structures are. He regarded language learning as an integral part of cognitive development, with an onset coinciding with the formation of the "semiotic function" at a specific and relatively fixed stage of cognitive development, made possible by the acquisition of previous non-linguistic structures which constitute the preconditions for language learning (Marras 1983: 280). It is crucial for Piaget, according to Marras (1983) that the autoregulatory

mechanisms active in cognition are a special case of universal biological mechanisms which are operative all the way from the cellular to the complex behavioural level: Piaget's biological model of cognitive construction is "phenotypic adaptation", that uses the phenomenon of "phenocopy", which he equates with "genetic assimilation" – a phenomenon which for Piaget involves "a genetic or gene-linked reconstruction of an acquisition made by the phenotype"... As Piaget states it, the central problem for constructivism is to understand how new operations and structures come about and why, even though they result from non-predetermined constructions, they eventually become "logically necessary" (Marras 1983: 280).

The account is that a "fixed nucleus" containing a set of structures or schemes is accessible to the child from the very beginning of the representational ability of "semiotic function". Precisely because of this alleged "necessity", Piaget will argue against Chomsky that no cognitive structures can plausibly be thought to be innate (Marras 1983: 280).

In contrast to Piaget, Chomsky presented ideas regarding the specific content of the fixed nucleus. Essentially, he associated it with the (innate) system of universal grammar, which is believed to form the foundation of linguistic competence and act as a "prerequisite" for its development. Specific features of universal grammar (and thus of fixed nucleus) which Chomsky discussed are the "structure dependency" of rules and the "specified subject condition". We should suppose these mechanisms to be innate because:

> In studying the process of language acquisition, ... we observe that a person proceeds from a genetically determined initial state through a sequence of states, finally reaching a 'steady state' S. Investigating this steady state, we construct a hypothesis as to the grammar internally represented... (Marras 1983: 285)

For, as Chomsky sees it, "the issue is not to account for the stability of the fixed nucleus; rather, it is to account for its specific character" (Marras 1983: 286). In separating linguistic "competence" from linguistic "performance" Chomsky (1965), sought to accomplish two goals: (1) to focus attention on the knowledge of speakers of natural languages about the well-formedness and grammaticality of possible utterances in those languages, and (2) to provide a justification for directing attention away from the "how" of language, the biological capabilities that make it possible to implement knowledge in speaking and understanding languages (Oller 2008: 344). Evidently, the growth of language in the individual ("language learning") must involve the three factors that enter the development of organic systems more generally: (i) genetic endowment, which sets limits on the languages attained; (ii) external data, which select one or another language within a narrow range; (iii) principles not specific to the language faculty. The theory of genetic endowment is commonly called "universal grammar" (Chomsky 2010: 51).

The key question, according to Piaget, in the constructivist/selectionist debate, whether it is at the ontogenetic or phylogenetic level, is whether an

established structure represents a truly new acquisition independent of genetic determination – "an authentic disclosure of new possibilities", or whether it merely involves the manifestation of something genetically preprogrammed – "the actualization of a set of possibilities existing from the beginning" (Marras 1983: 284):

> In tracing the constructive mechanism of autoregulation down to the organic level, Piaget entertains the hypothesis of a mechanism "which is as general as heredity and which even, in a sense, controls it". This mechanism would thus have the power to overstep the constraints of the genetic program and even to rewrite it. No non-Lamarckian evolutionary theory allows for such transfer of structure from phenotype to genotype; except through (random or artificially induced) mutation... As a biological, evolutionary hypothesis, constructivism does not appear to provide a viable alternative to natural selection; if a structure is innate, it could only have evolved by mutation and selection. This conclusion has the following consequence: if Piagetian constructivism is to be sustained, it must be sustained independently of its dubious biological underpinning – that is, merely as a developmental psychological theory. (Marras 1983: 284–285)

The conclusion of the Piagetian constructivist programme, then again, rests on the essentialist presupposition, that everything developed is already contained within the innate system that is developing. And this essentialist view rests, as we have seen, on the presupposition of the nature-nurture divide:

> The non-biologist frequently and mistakenly thinks of genes as being directly responsible for one property or another; this leads him to the fallacy, especially when behavior is concerned, of dichotomizing everything as being dependent on either genes or environment. It might be more fruitful to think of maturation as the traversing of highly unstable states, the disequilibrium of one leading to rearrangements that bring about new disequilibria, producing further rearrangements, and so on until relative stability, known as maturity, is reached. (Miller and Lenneberg 1978 in Marras 1983: 291)

3. Biolinguistics: The Stability of Human Language Faculty

The term "biolinguistics" was proposed in 1974 by Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini as the topic for an international conference he organized that brought together evolutionary biologists, neuroscientists, linguists, philosophers, and others concerned with language and biology. At that time, according to Boeckx (2014), everyone clearly steered from behaviourism and assumed that there were biological foundations of language worth looking for, "the limits of the genetic contribution to culture, the boundaries or the *enveloppe génétique* in shaping the human mind" (Piatelli-Palmarini 2001 in Boeckx 2014: 84). A primary focus of the discussions was the extent to which apparent principles of language are unique to the specific cognitive system, one of the basic questions to be asked from the "biological point of view" and crucial for the study of development of language in the individual and its evolution in the species. In terminology

used more recently, the "basic questions" concern the "faculty of language in the narrow sense" (Chomsky 2010: 45). The naturalistic studies of Darwin's close associate and expositor Thomas Huxley led him to observe, with some puzzlement, that there appear to be "predetermined lines of modification" that lead natural selection to "produce varieties of a limited number and kind" for each species (Chomsky 2010: 51). According to Chomsky, over the years, in both general biology and linguistics, the pendulum has been swinging towards unity, yielding new ways of understanding traditional ideas. Research programs that have developed have some similarity to conclusions of the so-called "evo devo" revolution that "the rules controlling embryonic development" interact with other physical conditions "to restrict possible changes of structures and functions" in evolutionary development, providing "architectural constraints" that "limit adaptive scope and channel evolutionary patterns" (Chomsky 2010: 51). Pointing out how developmental considerations have led to a shift in perspective in the "evo devo" view in biology, is bringing new focus on phenotypic development, rather than on genetic variation as the point of departure for evolutionary analysis (Larson et al. 2010: 9).

Linguists of the emerging tradition in the 1960s and 1970s came to view "data" as primarily, if not solely, the grammatical assessments provided by native language speakers. Biolinguistics, on the other hand, argues that language's fundamental purpose is not communication but, instead, "the expression of thought". This notion is linked to the belief that language did not evolve as a communicative system under the influence of selection pressures. If we remember Vygotsky's claims, that can be supported in the light of a child's development of egocentric speech and its realist function that has to do with clarification of one's thoughts and actions.

A second failure of interactionism, according to Lewontin, Rose and Kamin (1984), after the problems of essentialism in the theories of unfolding, is that it is unable to come to grips with the fact that the material universe is organized into structures that are capable of analysis at many different levels:

> Conventional scientific languages are quite successful when they are confined to descriptions and theories entirely within levels. What is not so easy is to provide the translation rules for moving from one language to another. This is because as one moves up a level the properties of each larger whole are given not merely by the units of which it is composed but by the organizing relations between them. (Lewontin et al. 1984: 278)

Interactive explanations claim that to the goal-directed (and evidently theologically caused) organism, there are multiple paths to a given end. But there is a danger of confusing the epistemological plurality of levels of explanation with the ontological assumption that there are really many different and incompatible types of causes in the real world (Lewontin et al. 1984: 281). Holistic and reductionist accounts of phenomena are, therefore, not "causes" of those phenomena but merely "descriptions" of them at particular levels, in particular scientific languages. The language to be used at any time is contingent on

the purposes of the description; difference of purpose should define the language of description to be used (Lewontin et al. 1984: 282).

The difference of levels of descriptions is known as the problem of incommensurability. Incommensurability of the causal relevance of nature and nurture can be compared to the incommensurability of the causal contribution of two people building a wall, with one bringing bricks and the other the mortar. Following the illustrative example of Lewontin in Kronfeldner (2018), if we imagine that Suzy brings the bricks and Billy the mortar, the contributions of Suzy and Billy cannot be compared quantitatively since they contribute in qualitatively different ways to the wall (Kronfeldner 2018: 72). Similarly, in the philosophy of mind, Gilbert Ryle (1949) refuted Cartesian dualism in a critique of a category mistake that exists when we say "something mental is happening" and when we say "something physical is happening". Cartesian dualism regarded the mind and the body as the same explanatory categories. Descartes searched for mental mechanisms that underlay mental processes in the same way in which the physical mechanisms underlay physical processes. But mind and body are different categories of things. Mind is a way in which the physical is organized, in a similar way to which a university is not another building in addition to the buildings that form the university, it is a way of organizing its integral components (Ryle 1949: 18).

Biolinguistics describes the development of linguistic processes by adopting something that Charles Sanders Pierce regarded as the abductive process of forming conclusions. The abductive conclusion can be regarded as a following inferential structure:

> Recognizable type of object M has characteristics which are distinctly recognizable;
>
> Presented object S has the same characteristics p_1, p_2, p_3, etc.;
>
> Therefore, S is species M. (Peirce 1891: 32).

The Peircean point was that through ordinary processes of natural selection, our mental capacities evolved to be able to deal with the problems that arise in the world of experience (Jenkins 2000: 36). In the abductive process, the mind forms hypotheses according to some rule and selects among them with reference to evidence and, presumably, other factors. It is convenient sometimes to think of language acquisition in these terms, according to Chomsky, "as if a mind equipped with universal grammar generates alternative grammars that are tested against the data of experience with the most highly valued one selected" (Chomsky 1980: 136).

> Quite generally, construction of theories must be guided by what Charles Sanders Peirce a century ago called an "abductive principle", which he took to be a genetically determined instinct, like the pecking of a chicken. The abductive principle "puts a limit upon admissible hypotheses" so that the mind is capable of "imagining correct theories of some kind" and discarding infinitely many

> others consistent with the evidence. Peirce was concerned with what I was calling "the science-forming faculty", but similar problems arise for language acquisition, though it is dramatically unlike scientific discovery. It is rapid, virtually reflexive, convergent among individuals, relying not on controlled experiment or instruction but only on the "blooming, buzzing confusion" that each infant confronts. The format that limits admissible hypotheses about structure, generation, sound and meaning must therefore be highly restrictive. The conclusions about the specificity and richness of the language faculty follow directly. Plainly such conclusions make it next to impossible to raise questions that go beyond explanatory adequacy – the "why" questions... (Chomsky 2007: 17)

Explanatory questions about the evolution of language can be seen in light of the solution to the incommensurability problem in Kronfeldner and with the nature-nurture dichotomy: since the contribution of "nature" and "nurture" cannot be quantitatively measured, we must find "different differences to respected explanandum":

> Language is another example: people differ regarding the concrete languages they speak. Some speak English, some Japanese, some this, some that. The differences in their language are exclusively due to differences in developmental resources traveling by cultural inheritance. Which language one speaks is thus due to culture alone. This holds even though biologically inherited developmental resources are necessary to produce organisms that have a language. None of the individuals would speak either of the concrete languages without also having had thousands of developmental resources available that travel through the channel of biological inheritance. The difference in their language (language now taken as something abstract) is an abstraction from the comparison of the concrete languages they speak... (Kronfeldner 2018: 160)

This issue of abstraction, or the problem "that there is neither a priori argument on where abstraction has to stop nor any general empirical rule where to stop" (Kronfeldner 2018: 132) has to do with traits typicality. There is a simultaneous danger of our descriptive account to be too thin, with regress uncovering typical traits as being abstractions from disjunctions; and too thick, with regress spreading toward all differences being included in the nature of capabilities (Kronfeldner 2018: 137). In an explanatory sense, we can refer to the developmental resources that are typical and biologically inherited. We saw the problems with essentialist presuppositions in descriptive accounts and explanations – they ignore interactionist consensus and regard the explanatory essence and the developmental process as first being a fixed, innate property and second acting as a trigger for actualizing that property. Kronfeldner offers the concept of *stability* to replace fixity. The innateness of mechanisms of language can be seen in the light of the human-animal boundary, or claiming that human language is species specific, but that account will only amount to the classificatory role of human language. Although classificatory accounts can be explanatorily relevant and have a part in descriptive accounts, "traits do not have to be species specific to belong to the descriptive or explanatory

nature of humans" (Kronfeldner 2018: 201). Another important thing is that populations of individual organisms show typicality understood as similarity not only in space – synchronically, but also over time – diachronically (Kronfeldner 2018: xxvi). This typicality, for Kronfedner, can be seen as stability.

As per Kronfeldner, resources need to endure to consistently bring about the characteristic properties of a species over an extended period. Their endurance leads to the coherence and stability of a species, which in turn ensures the stability of the associated cluster of properties. If things do not simply persist (such as mountains separating two populations), they must be transmitted to the next generation by biological or cultural transmission (Kronfeldner 2018: 157). The stability over time results from the fact that traits that are part of human nature rely on resources that travel the biological channel of transmission, which has a high stability built in because biological factors can rarely change from a vertical to another mode of transmission (Kronfeldner 2018: 157). Traits that are "due to culture" are traits that may vary, but for which the conditional (or respective counterfactual) holds: if they vary, the difference between them relies on a difference in developmental resources transmitted by cultural inheritance. "Speaking English" (rather than another concrete language) would be a case in point (Kronfeldner 2018: 166).

The explanatory account of human traits, then, according to Kronfeldner, is a statistical cluster of biologically inherited developmental resources that happen to be prevalent and stable over a considerable time in the evolutionary history of the human species (Kronfeldner 2018: 185). The explanatory nature is a historically and statistically individuated entity: a property of a population that changes over evolutionary time. The organism is not the system that bears the alleged explanatory nature, one must move to a populational level to make sense of a species' nature (Kronfedner 2018: 185).

> We saw that, at a minimum, knowledge of language includes a system of computation that computes such structures as *Is the child that is in the corner happy?* Furthermore, some properties of these computations, such as structure-dependence, appear to be part of our genetic endowment. So, children are able to acquire language by (i) accessing their UG (universal grammar) and (ii) processing data input with information in order to set the parameters for a specific language. Finally, we can inquire into the evolution of our genetic endowment for language by, for example, searching for and investigating genes associated with human language. (Di Sciullo and Jenkins 2016: 206)

According to Kronfeldner, one can even play the game of highlighting or ignoring differences to have effects that are due to one kind of causal factor alone:

> Imagine a gene known to be relevant for language development (e.g., the FOXP2-gene, the putative "language gene", coding for the Forkhead box protein P2). Imagine that it influences whether an individual can develop a full-blown spoken language or suffers from some severe limitations… Although the production of every individual's specific language ability is due to nature and nurture, it is still possible to say that the FOXP2-gene makes a difference to the difference

> between having a full-blown spoken language or not and the environmental factor makes a difference to differences in specific spoken languages, that is, a difference to which specific language an individual speaks (regardless of whether it has the FOXP2-caused impairment). (Kronfeldner 2018: 161)

If we ask classificatory questions about human language such as questions about human language specificity; or descriptive questions, such as "how do humans speak?", we can have accounts from separate sciences, such as phylogenetics and anatomy or linguistics. However, if we ask an explanatory question of – why humans have the language faculty they do, we will need to take into account the evolutionary factors as well as the environmental ones. That is, an interdisciplinary framework is needed.

Conclusion

The division of descriptive and explanatory labour as well as the problem of underdetermination and making category mistakes shows that we can have different classifications or descriptions of a given phenomenon or capability, but explanations require their own framework. Problems of the methodology of investigation "human nature capabilities" show that different stances such as reductionism of gene-determinism and sociobiology, the dualism of nature-nurture divide, the problems of interactionism and causal essentialism also stem from the need for integrative explanation. That aim can be described by not falling into the mistake of confusing pluralism of levels of description, with the plurality of phenomena investigated. That is a realistic claim. Kronfelder states realism in a "search for mind-independent property" (Kronfeldner 2018: 9). Biolinguistics, as an interdisciplinary science, is aware of the needed choice regarding *what* trait differences make a difference and searching for different explanatory goals for different science fields. If we regard explanatory account as a "stable property that expands over space and time" that answers to the question of "why is it the way it is", we can see that diving into, on the one hand, description of mechanisms responsible for language acquisition in psychological terms, and on the other, biological processes and states that underlie them, as well as the interaction of biological processes and cultural inheritance that make possible the transmission of given capability, different explanations are expected. We must not fall into the pits of reductionism, such as biological or cultural determinism, but accept the effects of both factors in constituting the explanatory nature of a given phenomenon. The problems of dualism and incommensurability in interactionism show that there is a plurality of approaches regarding different descriptions of a given phenomenon. If we opt for an explanatory account, we need to find complementary explanations from different disciplines. That means that an interdisciplinary research programme is needed, with a focus on the "why questions" that, on different levels and in different structures, show unifying potential. The explanatory account of language faculty can be seen as particularly important today, in the

rise of artificial intelligence and artificial language systems, such as Chat-GPT. The phenomenon of cognition can soon be in the same status as the concept of human nature, that is, defended on the basis of species-typicality, dogmatic beliefs and theological objections.[9] The language faculty, as a part of human cognitive capabilities, can be seen in a priori opposition to artificial neural networks and machine learning, defended on unscientific claims and motivated by human (nature) centrism. In this setting, challenging the concepts of human nature and the explanatory analysis of human capabilities can be seen necessary and fruitful. Kronfeldner's division and revision of human nature can be a good strategy for challenging human nature's capabilities and related phenomena, such as cognitive systems and human language faculty, but maybe also many more capabilities (previously) ascribed (specifically) to humans.

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9 Alan Turing, back in the 1950, claimed that the impossibility of machine thinking is defended on theological and dogmatic basis, reminding us that a statement "only humans have immortal souls, therefore only humans have consciousness and are able to think" can be seen in relation to the Muslim view that women do not have immortal souls, that is, to (dangerous) dogmatic beliefs (Turing 1950: 451).

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Ana Lipij

Objašnjenja ljudskih jezičkih sposobnosti: razvojni izazov i biolingvistika

Apstrakt

Cilj ovog rada jeste istraživanje primene analize pojma ljudske prirode Marije Kronfeldner na pojam kognitivnih sistema i povezanih sposobnosti, kao što je ljudska jezička sposobnost. Na početku ćemo se pozabaviti debatom priroda-odgoj, odnosno eksplanatornom tvrdnjom o prirodi kao uzročnoj ulozi jezičke sposobnosti, i eksplanatornim tvrdnjama koje kulturu smatraju odgovornom za razvoj ljudskih jezičkih sposobnosti. Podela priroda-odgoj generiše problem jer ignoriše činjenice interakcije prirode i kulture tokom razvoja jezičkih sposobnosti, problem koji se naziva razvojnim izazovom. Pokazaćemo različita stanovišta koja pokušavaju da odgovore na ovaj izazov, kao najpoznatije, konstruktivističku teoriju Žana Pijažea i teoriju univerzalne gramatike Noama Čomskog. Sledeći uvide Kronfeldnerove, ukoliko se odlučimo za eksplanatorno (a ne klasifikatorno ili deskriptivno) objašnjenje ljudskog jezika tražićemo eksplanatorne epistemičke uloge i ono što ih ispunjava. Kako tvrdi Kronfeldnerova, različite discipline traže različite razlike u pogledu eksplananduma, i, pokušaćemo da pokažemo, postoji potreba za integrativnim interdisciplinarnim okvirom koji se bavi kognitivnim sistemima. Zaključak je da je biolingvistika jedna od oblasti sa potencijalom za interdisciplinarno ujedinjenje objašnjenja koja se tiču ljudskih jezičkih sposobnosti.

Ključne reči: govorna sposobnost, dualizam priroda-odgoj, razvojni izazov, debata Pijaže-Čomski, biolingvistika.

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Aleksandra Knežević

THE INTEGRATIVE POTENTIAL OF CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE NATURE/CULTURE CONCEPTUAL RELATIONSHIP[1]

ABSTRACT
In this paper, I analyze and compare Maria Kronfeldner's and Tim Ingold's views on the conceptual relationship between nature and culture. I show that despite the differences, their views remain close, particularly in terms of their integrative potential. The ultimate purpose of this examination is to lay the groundwork for further research on the problem of conceptual integration between sociocultural anthropology and evolutionary psychology. The paper comprises four main sections. First, I briefly explore the history of Darwinism to show how nature and culture were conceptualized within this framework. Second, I deal with Kronfeldner's separationist stance and Ingold's holistic perspective on the nature/culture conceptual relationship. Third, I discuss the implications of their views on the choice of research heuristics in the sciences that study human nature and cultures. While I interpret Ingold as supporting methodological integration, Kronfelder argues for a version of integrative pluralism. Lastly, I provide an outlook for further discussions on conceptual integration and integrative pluralism.

KEYWORDS
human nature, culture, integrative pluralism, conceptual integration, evolutionary psychology.

Introduction

This paper explores contemporary perspectives on the conceptual relationship between nature and culture. In the lines that follow, I analyze and compare two contemporary views regarding the issue at stake. I discuss the view developed by Maria Kronfeldner who argues in favor of the conceptual separation of these notions. I then explore Tim Ingold's account. Unlike Kronfelder, Ingold holds that this divide is obsolete and that we need to move past it in a holistic

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fashion. Despite Kronfeldner's and Ingold's opposing ways of conceptualizing the relationship between nature and culture, I show that their perspectives exhibit important similarities, particularly in terms of their integrative potential for the sciences that study human nature and human cultures.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1, I present a brief history of the conceptual relationship between nature and culture. The historical overview has three purposes. Firstly, it provides a scientific context in which both Kronfelder and Ingold develop their views. Secondly, it serves to highlight the political implications of the nature/culture debate. As I will discuss, our understanding of this debate has implications for both society (influencing our perception of the Other) and science (demarcating the boundaries between disciplines). Thirdly, I will show that how this relationship is conceptualized relates to one's choice of research heuristics, which I demonstrate throughout the paper in Section 1, and in more detail in Sections 3 and 4. By research heuristics, I simply mean a way of engaging with scientific theories, methods, or procedures in scientific research. In this paper, I consider genetic determinism, conceptual integration, methodological integration, and integrative pluralism as specific instances of research heuristics in the sciences that study human nature and cultures. Finally, the main body of the paper (Section 2) is dedicated to Kronfeldner's (as she calls it) separationist stance in relation to the conceptual nature/culture dichotomy and Ingold's holism. Let us, however, start with some history.

1. From Darwin to neo-Darwinism in Social Science

a) The Entanglement of Nature and Culture in the 19th Century

The separation between nature ("physis" or everything transmitted via biological reproduction) and culture ("nomos" or everything transmitted via social learning) traces back to ancient philosophy and science. However, I begin my investigation into the conceptual relationship between these two notions from Charles Darwin, and his intellectual legacy – Darwinism. Darwinism, or the idea of evolution by natural selection, is (roughly) a claim that natural species change due to environmental pressures. Namely, the environment "favors" individuals that can survive and reproduce despite its pressures. Since they survive and reproduce, these individuals transmit, via biological reproduction, their traits, including the ones that enable them to adapt to their environment. In other words, due to their heritability, these advantageous traits are inherited by the subsequent generation. On the other hand, the traits possessed by individuals that did not survive and thus did not reproduce do not show up in the next generation. Evolutionary change, thus, occurs when there is a shift in the frequency of traits within a population of the same species. In other words, Darwin's theory implies that evolution takes place at the level of populations (an idea referred to as populational thinking) when there is variation in traits between individuals of the same species. The question, however,

arises: what is the source of this variation? This question is important for the present purposes since, as I will explicate shortly, its answer requires the conceptual nature/culture dichotomy.

In its beginnings, during the second half of the 19th century, Darwin's theory was intertwined with another view of evolution: Lamarckian evolution (Laland, Brown 2002: 40–47). Jean Baptiste de Lamarck held that evolutionary change occurs when subsequent generations inherit traits their parents acquired during their lives due to, again, environmental pressures. Thus, unlike Darwin, who believed that variation in traits is a given that "enables nature to select" the advantageous one and thus, thanks to their heritability, enables evolution to occur, Lamarck argued that evolution happens when the subsequent generation inherits advantageous traits their parents acquired during their life. Thus, for Lamarck, variation was not a given but a consequence of evolution.

In terms of the nature/culture dichotomy, Lamarck's theory of evolution implies that nature and culture are not conceptually separate since culture, as the most important part of the human environment, becomes nature via the inheritance of acquired traits (Kronfeldner 2018: 65). This further implies that the differences between cultures indicate differences in the biological endowment of their members. In the realm of social science, Lamarckism, coupled with ethnocentrism, offered a scientific rationale for racism.

By the late 19th century, Lamarck's theory had made its way into sociocultural anthropology, most notably in the works of Lewis H. Morgan and Edward B. Tylor. Morgan and Tylor used evolutionary theory to argue against, at that time, the widely held idea that people from different cultures are different biological species (i.e., different races) (Laland, Brown 2002: 46). This idea was used to justify slavery as natural, since it was considered as an outcome of nature's order. Instead, Morgan and Tylor argued that all people have a common ancestry, and thus a shared biological nature, emphasizing the concept of the *psychic unity of mankind*. However, they also posited that some (i.e., their, Western) cultures are more progressive than others. Under the framework of Lamarckism, where culture becomes nature via the inheritance of acquired traits, the (alleged) progressiveness of some cultures was taken as evidence that their members had "larger and more effective brains" (Laland, Brown 2002: 45). Likewise, the (alleged) crudeness of other cultures was regarded as an indication of the less developed cognitive features of their members. Therefore, although originally aimed at opposing slavery, 19th-century evolutionary sociocultural anthropology provided a new justification for the racist perception of the Other.

At the turn of the century, Lamarck's theory gained prominence in both science and society while Darwin's theory was in decline (Laland, Brown 2002: 40–47). The main reason behind this turn of events was Darwin's inability to explain the origin of variation, a crucial factor for the mechanism of natural selection to operate (Kronfeldner 2009: 117). As a result, Darwin himself resorted to Lamarckism to account for the source of variation, deviating from the core principles of his theory. I do not go into details about how Darwinism

and Lamarckism intertwined in Darwin's work and the work of others like, for instance, Hebert Spencer (see e.g., Ingold 2004: 209–212). However, what needs to be emphasized is that Darwin, as an advocate for antiracism, employed a theory of evolution, which relies on common descent, to support the scientific case for the abolition of slavery (Kronfeldner 2018: 22). Regrettably, Darwin's reliance on Lamarckism, which became evident in subsequent editions of his *Origin of Species* (the first edition being published in 1859) as well as in his later book *The Descent of Man* (1871), was interpreted as providing a scientific justification of racist attitudes. As a consequence, the misuse of Darwin's theory obscured the reception and understanding of Darwinism and the evolutionary approach in the social sciences in the years to come (Ingold 2006).

To recapitulate, the causal coupling of nature and culture, specific to Lamarckism, provided scientific support for racism and racist policies. However, Darwin's theory initiated a process of decoupling these systems, leaving the question of the source of variation to be addressed. In the following, I explore how Darwin's theory was further developed, ultimately leading to the conceptual separation of nature and culture, which was the final blow to the scientific justification of racism and secured the disciplinary independence of sociocultural anthropology.

b) The Separation of Nature and Culture in the 20th Century

A move forward in evolutionary thinking in the first half of the 20th century was driven by at least two key ideas: August Weismann's notion of hard inheritance and Alfred Kroeber's cultural determinism. Weismann, influenced by Francis Galton, provided a theoretical foundation for the missing source of variation. He postulated the existence of material, fixed, innate, and heritable entities that contain all the instructions necessary to build an organism (Kronfeldner 2018: 62–66). He called them germ plasm, and today we call them genotype, which refers to the full collection of genes in an organism. Most importantly, Weismann believed that germ plasm is unchangeable in response to environmental and cultural pressures. He understood it as being permanent and *hard*. As a consequence, any change in germ plasm, as he proclaimed, occurs independently of cultural change (Ingold 1990: 212–213). In this way, by postulating the existence of germ plasm, Weismann was able to provide the source of variation that was missing, making the final cut between Darwin's theory and the Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics.

Building upon Weismann's insights, Kroeber (1917) argued that culture changes in an autonomous yet analogous way to nature. He famously proposed that from a particular moment in human history, when humans developed cognitive capacities for acquiring and learning culture, cultural evolution unfolded independently of biological evolution. Moreover, Kroeber's insights about the causal independence of cultural change from human biology (not necessarily human action, see Kronfeldner 2009: 115–116) underscored the idea that culture can only be explained by culture itself, known as *cultural determinism*.

As a consequence, cultural determinism solidified the conceptual separation of nature and culture. In this way, it challenged the notion that cultural differences reflect inherent biological, cognitive, or intellectual differences among individuals. Namely, if cultures differ, they do so because of historical, cultural, or environmental reasons that have nothing to do with the differences in the biological endowment of their members. This, in turn, meant that the scientific justification of racism lost all its support within the Darwinian evolutionary framework.

Finally, by establishing culture as both the subject to be explained (explanandum), which cannot be reduced to human biology for the purposes of its explanation, and as the explanatory framework (explanans), Kroeber secured the disciplinary autonomy of sociocultural anthropology. At the time of his writing, this accomplishment was significant considering that there were no clear boundaries between this discipline and, on the one hand, biological anthropology, and on the other, genetics, both of which were gaining more and more popularity (see Kronfeldner 2009).

The conceptual separation of nature and culture allowed new ways for the deployment of the evolutionary framework in the study of culture and cultural change. Unlike 19th-century evolutionary sociocultural anthropology, which did not make a clear conceptual distinction between nature and culture, contemporary evolutionary social science such as dual inheritance theory recognizes both nature and culture as distinct conceptual systems of change in their own right. Importantly, it acknowledges both nature and culture as equally important channels of inheritance (the first transmitted via biological reproduction, the second via social learning), emphasizing their interaction as crucial in shaping the course of human evolution, be it biological or cultural (Kronfeldner 2011: 5–6; for more on dual inheritance theory see e.g., Cavalli-Sforza, Feldman 1981; Boyd, Richerson 1985; Richerson, Boyd 2005).

Once Kroeber's insights were confirmed by the Mendelian laws of genetic inheritance, meaning that genes were finally introduced as a theoretical entity, the principle of natural selection, as the sole engine of evolution, was finally on solid ground. This "Modern Synthesis" of Darwin's theory and Mendelian genetics marked the beginning of neo-Darwinism in evolutionary biology. Moreover, neo-Darwinism found its way into social science as well.

In 1975, E. O. Wilson published the book *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*. Wilson's observations of ant social behavior led him to propose that social behavior in all animals, including humans, can be explained by way of directly applying the principle of natural selection to that behavior. What was controversial about sociobiology is the claim that cultural phenomena can and *should* be reduced to biological, that is, genetic factors, for the purposes of their explanation. This reductionist research heuristics, known as *biological* or *genetic determinism*, negates the significance of culture – since it reduces it to nature – both as the subject to be explained and as the explanatory framework. As a result, sociobiology poses a challenge to the autonomy and integrity of sociocultural anthropology since it calls for a "new synthesis" in which the social

sciences, as nothing more than "the last branches of biology", are included in the Modern Synthesis (Wilson 1975: 4).

Sociobiology and its contemporary counterpart, evolutionary psychology, have faced significant criticisms stemming from evolutionary biology (Rose, Lewontin, Kamin 1984), philosophy of science (Bleier 1997; Kitcher 1985; Dupré 2001), sociocultural anthropology (Sahlins 1976), and multidisciplinary perspectives (Rose, Rose 2000). Evolutionary psychology states that human social behavior is determined by psychological mechanisms that evolved in response to ancestral environmental challenges. In addition, it assumes that our brain comprises numerous specialized units, known as modules, which were shaped by natural selection to solve specific environmental problems set in the past, namely in the Pleistocene, the period preceding human civilization by one or two million years (see Barkow, Cosmides, Tooby 1992).

Although evolutionary psychologists "reasonably enough protest when accused of holding that genes determine behavior, they do generally hold that genes determine psychological mechanism" (Dupré 2014: 249). As a result, a shared critique of both sociobiology and evolutionary psychology is that by focusing solely on genes, these disciplines neglect the role of culture in shaping human sociality, which ultimately renders their theories empirically inadequate (Kitcher 1985). In addition, many authors hold that sociobiology and evolutionary psychology offer unfalsifiable *just-so stories* about human evolutionary history (Rose, Lewontin, Kamin 1984).

These methodological critiques were accompanied by more political ones. For example, Sahlins (1976) and Bleier (1997) argue that sociobiology provides a scientific justification for the social and sexual *status quo*. That is, if the current (patriarchal, racist, competitive) social order is the consequence of human biology, and human biology is not something we can change easily, then the current social order is deemed almost inevitable. In a similar manner, Dupré writes "[b]iological determinism suggests political nihilism, as attempts to alter the natural biological state of human life must ultimately be futile" (2014: 275–276).

Dupré grants that evolutionary psychology's search for the biological foundation of human sociality inherently involves the search for what is universally shared among all humans, namely human nature (2014: 277). As demonstrated by Darwin's failed efforts, this objective can serve as a basis for refuting racist views. However, if we examine more closely the theoretical assumptions underpinning evolutionary psychology, we stumble upon a different set of politically and ideologically troubling implications. Namely, as Dupré explains, evolutionary psychology assumes that "our minds" are "shaped by natural selection to solve particular problems set in our evolutionary history" (2014: 246). Such a theoretical setting is problematic because, according to Dupré, it provides us with evolutionary arguments "presented in terms of universally optimal behavior for humans" (2014: 278).

The controversy surrounding evolutionary psychology can be summarized in the following way. By seeking what is universal to humans, evolutionary psychology inevitably, albeit not necessarily intentionally or explicitly, leads

to making normative inferences about certain ways of being. That is to say, evolutionary psychology is more often than not received as justifying discriminatory perceptions of the Other (also within one's own culture) who does not conform to what is considered an optimal way of life. For instance, when it comes to an explanation of gender differences, evolutionary psychologists use the principle of natural selection, which they interpret in terms of survival and reproduction. They argue that commonalities in gendered behaviors exist across cultures despite the diverse and fluid cultural expressions of gender. They also hold that gender differences describe different mating strategies for men and women, where what is optimal for one gender may not be optimal for the other. While for men optimal behavior (which is as such because it ensures survival and reproduction) includes aggressiveness, promiscuity, and the constant search for sex, for women it is coyness, sexual manipulation, and cautious choosing of their mating partners – offering sex only in exchange for good genes or economic stability (see Dupré 2003: 112–118).

Certainly, there are behaviors that deviate from what is considered optimal. However, as the argument goes: what is optimal is inscribed in our universal human nature. Thus, deviating from the optimal means deviating from human nature.

To circumvent such normatively laden conclusions, and to make their theories empirically adequate, evolutionary psychologists are pressed to attend to cultural explanations of gender differences rather than explaining gendered behaviors solely in terms of survival and reproduction. And the same goes for other cultural phenomena. In the remainder of this section, I further problematize the implications of disciplinary differentiations along the nature/culture divide.

a) The Argument from "Deep Biology"

Returning to the nature/culture debate, the trajectory of evolutionary thinking demonstrates that reliance on evolution by natural selection to explain the origin of human life was received as a positive political statement. It meant that all peoples share a common descent and thus the same human nature, and sharing the same human nature grants them an equal share of human rights. However, the rise of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, which directly apply the principle of natural selection to social behavior implying genetic determinism, with all its deeply worrying political implications, has led to a highly critical stance towards evolutionary research on human nature as a way of explaining human cultures.[2]

However, despite the many forceful critiques of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, the quest for the biological basis of human sociality continues. In this endeavor, evolutionary psychologists today reject any kind of

2 Moreover, this skepticism about evolutionary thinking in social science was accompanied by a paradigm turn in sociocultural anthropology (from evolutionism to cultural relativism), which I will discuss shortly.

reductionism and call for the *conceptual integration* of those disciplines that study human nature and human cultures. For them, such integration requires external consistency which "involves learning to accept with grace the intellectual gifts offered by other disciplines" (Cosmides, Tooby, Barkow 1992: 12).

Despite the contemporary rejection of reductionism, what seems to remain as the legacy of genetic determinism is a conviction, a cultural presumption that *genetic causes are more important than cultural ones* in explaining evolution and human development. I call this claim the argument from "deep biology". The argument from "deep biology" is noticeable in Kronfeldner's study when she, for instance, writes:

> "The anti-Lamarckism has led to a separateness of nature and nurture that influenced the 'century of the gene' ... as part of which ideas about genetic factors (equated with nature) were regarded as more important than other developmental resources [equated with nurture, that is, natural environment and *culture*]" (2018: 62).

Furthermore, this observation is also found in Dupré's writings. While arguing against the assumption about the immutable nature of genes inherent in evolutionary psychology, Dupré writes:

> There is a widespread if inchoate intuition that there is something especially *deep* and important about genetic causes. One thing that may contribute to this is a sense of their immutability (2014: 286, emphasis added).

Considering the argument from "deep biology" and the plea for the integration of the sciences that study human nature and human cultures, the question in the background of this paper is: which disciplines should provide "irreplaceable intellectual gifts" and which disciplines should "accept [them] with grace"?[3] To put it differently, I wonder how to achieve conceptual integration between the sciences that explore different causes of the same cultural phenomena and in this endeavor provide, let us presume, inconsistent explanations. Or, simply, the question is what does conceptual integration amount to not only in theory but also in practice?

So far, I have presented some preliminary insights into the debate on the conceptual relationship between nature and culture to provide context for discussing the uneasy relationship between evolutionary psychology and sociocultural anthropology. Evolutionary psychology, as one of the most contested evolutionary approaches in the social sciences yet quite popular among the public as well as academia, puts emphasis on human universals, while for sociocultural anthropology cultural diversity is all there is. Regarding the relationship between these disciplines and conceptual integration, a research heuristics that arguably could overcome deep and hostile divisions, more will

3 To some extent, Kronfelder (2010, 2017a) has already emphasized the complexity of this question. I will return to her points in the last section.

be said in Section 4.[4] In what follows, I explore a separationist and a holistic stance concerning the conceptual relationship between nature and culture to show, in Section 3, what these positions imply for the integration of the disciplines that study them.

2. Introducing the Contemporary Views on the Nature/Culture Debate

In her 2018 study, Kronfeldner uses an evolutionary approach to defend the concept of human nature. In doing so, she is meticulous in her analysis of, as she calls it, "the politics of human nature" (Kronfeldner 2017; 2018: 15–32, 213–242).

"The politics of human nature" refers to the political use of claims about universal human nature. Namely, as discussed, these claims were received as resistance to race thinking. Nevertheless, they can also be employed to justify marginalizing and dehumanizing others, that is, to justify perceiving others as *less* or *no* humans, if others do not exhibit traits considered part of human nature (Kronfeldner 2018: 15–31). This was exemplified in the case of evolutionary psychology. In her conceptual analysis, Kronfeldner offers a pluralist perspective on the notion of human nature that aims to minimize the dehumanizing potential of claims about universal human nature by leaving the question of what human nature is essentially open and contested.

As a sociocultural anthropologist, Ingold acknowledges the paradigm shift that occurred within his field, in the first half of the 20th century, which rejected 19th-century evolutionism and progressivism in favor of Boasian *cultural relativism*. Cultural relativism is a methodological stance that emphasizes the need to understand another culture "from within" by analyzing, interpreting, and explaining its social norms, rules of behavior, habits, and practices on the basis of that culture's own beliefs. As a consequence, in contrast to the inherently racist perspective of evolutionism and progressivism, which placed different cultures on a hierarchical scale ranging from less developed to more advanced, cultural relativism asserts that different cultures cannot be compared or evaluated in either descriptive or normative terms, as social norms, standards, rules, and ways of life differ and are incommensurable across cultures (Koskinen 2020; Kulenović 2016: 38–59). Thus, in addition to being a methodological stance, cultural relativism is a political statement as well.

Even though Ingold comes from a tradition that is generally cautious, if not openly opposed (for both methodological and political reasons), to the use of evolutionary thinking in the social sciences, he nevertheless dedicates much of his research to understanding how human biology interacts with the social aspects of human life (Ingold 1986, 1990, 1998, 2004, 2006, 2007; Ingold and Palsson 2013).

In the next section, I discuss the differences between Kronfeldner's and Ingold's perspectives on evolutionary thinking and the nature/culture divide.

4 See Ingold's (2007) commentary on Mesoudi et al. (2006) paper for a vivid depiction of this hostility.

a) The Nature/Culture Separation

Populational thinking. In her defense of the human nature concept, Kronfeldner relies on populational thinking. Populational thinking locates evolutionary change at the level of populations. In other words, in line with the theory of evolution by natural selection, populational thinking assumes that evolution happens when there is a change in the frequency of evolutionary units within a population.

Note that with the conceptions of genes as the source of variation of traits on which natural selection acts, evolution can be defined by reference to the change in the frequency of genes. Previously, I defined Darwin's theory of evolution as the change in the frequency of traits, since I had not yet introduced the underlying mechanism of genes. However, although not precise, this way of putting it is not incorrect. Namely, since the principle of natural selection specifies the mechanism and not the units of selection, it allows natural selection to act on different kinds of things. For example, for the purpose of explaining cultural evolution and gene-culture coevolution, dual inheritance theory assumes that natural selection operates on cultural units.

Why does Kronfeldner need populational thinking in her account of the human nature concept? Firstly, it needs to be mentioned that the concept of human nature was rendered obsolete due to its essentialist implications. Traditionally, human nature was used to define who is and who is not human (Ingold 2006). This means that the traits associated with human nature – according to which humans are classified as such if they possess them – are considered as the essential features of what makes us humans. That is to say that human nature traits are, from the essentialist perspective, shared by *all* and *only* humans. However, this view was challenged by both evolutionary biology and sociocultural anthropology. In evolutionary biology, David Hull (1986) notably argued that there are no traits uniquely shared by all humans; variation is all there is. Similarly, in light of the ethnographic evidence that attests to diversity rather than universality in the ways how humans are, sociocultural anthropology dismissed the claims about the universality of human nature traits implied by essentialism and, as a result, rejected this view on human nature.

While abandoning essentialism, Kronfeldner argues in favor of a post-essentialist notion of human nature. To do so, she uses populational thinking to claim that human nature is not a bundle of traits that *all* and *only* humans possess, but traits that are typical and stable across the population and shared by *most* humans. Importantly, not every typical and stable trait is part of human nature; rather, only traits that are inherited by subsequent generations via biological reproduction are considered as such (2018: 121–145). This leaves us with the question of how culture fits into Kronfeldner's perspective.

Separation. In Kronfeldner's post-essentialist account, the concept of human nature comprises three different epistemic roles: description, explanation, and classification. For this reason, she argues in favor of three kinds of human nature (i.e., descriptive, explanatory, and classificatory human nature),

making her perspective a pragmatist and a pluralist one.[5] In terms of explanatory human nature, she argues that nature and culture remain conceptually separate channels of inheritance that also function as causal factors relevant to the explanation of human development and evolution. While human nature is transmitted via biological reproduction, culture is transmitted via social learning. Therefore, much like dual inheritance theory, she remains strongly committed to Weismann's and Kroeber's legacy that recognizes the conceptual separation of nature and culture despite the developmentalist challenge, and the resulting interactionist consensus, both of which she does not deny.

The developmentalist challenge, as she explains (2018: 59–88), questions this conceptual separation by emphasizing the entanglement and interaction between nature and culture at the level of individual development. However, the developmentalist challenge is later widened so that it refers to the interaction between nature and culture not only at the developmental (ontogenetic) level but at the evolutionary (populational) and intergenerational (short-time epigenetic) levels as well. The interactionist consensus is the outcome of the developmentalist challenge. It states that since nature and culture interact at all levels, they are too entangled to regard them as separate and parallel channels of inheritance and kinds of causes.

Kronfeldner's defense of the conceptual separation between nature and culture as separate channels of inheritance and explanatory resources – which is compatible with the interactionist consensus since, according to Kronfeldner (2021: 2), separation does not exclude interaction, and vice versa – rests on three arguments: the argument from the autonomy of culture, the argument from near-decomposability, and the argument from temporal order (2018: 102–114; 2021). Briefly, these arguments (intended to show that the divide is not only conceptual but *real*) state that on the level of population, changes in cultural resources are independent of any changes in biological resources, that biological reproduction and social learning are channels of inheritance that can be empirically distinguished, and that culture, unlike nature, lacks stability.

Important for current purposes, I demonstrate how Kronfledner states her case about nature and culture as separate causally relevant developmental resources by way of an example. Basically, the claim that nature and culture are separate developmental resources means that we can frame a trait as being "due to nature" or "due to culture". This is precisely what the developmentalist challenge and the interactionist consensus do not allow. However, Kronfeldner (2018: 157–164) argues that we can use this talk if we deploy the following epistemological strategies: if we make a distinction between explaining a trait and explaining a difference between traits and if we use abstraction from a disjunction to reconstitute a phenomenon in need of explanation.

Is speaking the Japanese language a trait that is "due to nature" or "due to culture"? If we consider this particular trait, Kronfeldner is clear that it is caused by both nature *and* culture, as the interactionist consensus states. However,

5 For more details see Kronfeldner (2018).

if we consider the difference between, let's say, the Japanese and the Swedish language, then "nature averages out", to use her phrase. That is, the causal influence of nature on this difference becomes epistemically insignificant because it does not make a difference to this difference. Instead, if we want to explain the differences between Japanese and Swedish, we need an explanation that refers to culture since these languages differ, as Kronfledner (2018: 160) holds, "due to culture" alone. In a similar manner, we can use abstraction from a disjunction to claim that regardless of the culturally produced differences in specific languages, all humans share the capacity for having *a* language. In the case of explaining this capacity, "culture averages out". Namely, the causal influence of culture on the capacity for having *a* language becomes epistemically irrelevant, since it no longer makes any difference. In other words, the capacity for having *a* language is "due to nature" alone (Kronfeldner 2018: 161). I move now to Ingold to demonstrate a holistic way of conceptualizing the relationship between nature and culture.

b) The Nature/Culture Holism

Relational thinking. "Neo-Darwinism is dead". With this opening, Ingold (2013: 1) begins the collection of essays on evolution edited by himself and Gisli Palsson. His views on neo-Darwinism are important here since they are connected to his rejection of the nature/culture conceptual separation.

How does Ingold criticize neo-Darwinism? Firstly, his primary concern is neo-Darwinism's exclusive focus on genes as the most important factor in explaining evolution. Much of his criticism of gene-centrism centers around the idea that genes contain all the information necessary to build an organism; information that is predetermined, fixed, and remains unchanged throughout one's lifetime (Ingold 2004: 214–215). In contrast, following developmental systems theory (DTS), an alternative evolutionary biology, Ingold (2007: 16) holds that the information relevant to evolution emerges during the process of development: it is "beyond the gene but beneath the skin", to use Keller's (2001) phrase. Furthermore, Ingold strongly disagrees with the claim that evolution can be fully explained by invoking the principle of natural selection. According to him, "natural selection may occur *within* evolution, it does not *explain* evolution" (2004: 219, emphasis in the original). As a consequence, he rejects populational thinking, stating that it "systematically disrupts any attempt to understand" evolution since it assumes that the locus of evolutionary change is at the level of populations (2004: 219). Consequently, populational thinking provides a "strictly statistical" account of evolution, in terms of the changes in the frequency of genes, which remains fully inadequate to explain human development (1990: 216). However, if we want to explain human life, which Ingold sees as the ultimate goal of an evolutionary theory, humans, their development, and the relations they have with others and their environment must be at its center. For this reason, instead of populational thinking, Ingold proposes *relational thinking* (see e.g., Ingold 1990, 2004, 2013).

Thus, Ingold is critical of all the basic tenets of neo-Darwinism: gene-centrism, the assumption that "natural selection alone can explain the evolution of life", and populational thinking (Ingold 2013).

Since evolutionary psychology gives primacy to genes and deploys natural selection and populational thinking in its explanation, this discipline is Ingold's main opponent. However, regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with the neo-Darwinian assumptions inherent in evolutionary psychology, it seems more difficult to get over the presumption of genetic determinism evolutionary psychology is so often accused of making – since it "reduces everything to a 'long leash' of the genes, as did their predecessor, sociobiology" (Kronfeldner 2021: 2), thus putting strong constraints on what culture can be. Since genetic determinism had been rejected half a century before Wilson revived it, a different evolutionary social science was pressured to include culture, emancipated from genes, in its explanations. Therefore, dual inheritance theory emerged.

Although one might not consider dual inheritance theory as a neo-Darwinian social science since it does not give primacy to genes but includes culture, it seems that Ingold is not reluctant to view it as such due to its reliance on natural selection and populational thinking (1990: 219–220). Furthermore, Ingold is critical of this theory because it rests on the conceptual separation of genes (nature) and culture, as separate but parallel channels of inheritance, which, as Ingold claims, implies that humans are "passive sites of evolutionary change" (1998: 31), no more than the "*products* which are assembled, if not entirely from genetic instructions, then from genetic *plus* cultural instructions (1990: 219, emphasis in the original). For Ingold, on the contrary, humans are "creative agents, producers as well as products of their own evolution" since they, "through their activity, can influence the environmental conditions for their own future development and that of others to which they relate" (1998: 31).

Therefore, in contrast to the neo-Darwinian approach, which puts emphasis on genes and populations, and in which the environment that puts pressure on the evolution of traits is set in the distant past, Ingold holds that for a proper understanding of human life and evolution, one must take a processual, developmental, and relational perspective (Ingold 2013: 20). The processual perspective highlights the importance of understanding evolution as an ongoing process. The developmental perspective emphasizes the need to study human lifecycles to truly understand their development and thus their evolution. Finally, the relational perspective posits that humans are best understood within the context of their relationship with others and their environment, which they actively construct and reconstruct through their activity, thereby influencing the course of their own development and evolution. As a result of these perspectives, Ingold states that humans bear full responsibility for the present order of things. Therefore, the *status quo* is not an option since "[l]ife is a task, and it is one in which we have, perpetually, never-endingly and collaboratively, to be creating ourselves" (Ingold 2013: 8). This brings us to the

question of what does relational thinking imply for the conceptualization of the nature/culture relationship?

Holism. Boas' cultural relativism initiated the process of decoupling nature and culture. Namely, inherent to cultural relativism is the assumption that cultural differences do not co-vary with biological differences. Kroeber's contribution was in recognizing that Lamarckism does not allow the full conceptual separation of nature and culture, and thus needs to be discarded. In other words, cultural relativism, alongside cultural determinism, acknowledges that *facts of culture are distinct from facts of biology*. As I have explicated earlier, this claim signifies progress in understanding different cultures in a way that is unencumbered by ethnocentrism and progressivism. However, somewhat controversially, Ingold takes a step further to argue that facts of culture *are* facts of biology and vice versa, with the crucial caveat that the biology in question pertains not to genetics but to development (see e.g., Ingold 1998: 26–29; 2004: 215–218).

Let us consider an example to elucidate this viewpoint. Neo-Darwinism recognizes two separate kinds of inheritance that run parallel: biological and cultural. This implies that traits such as bipedal locomotion, being universal and thus transmitted through biological reproduction, are biologically inherited. Conversely, a skill like playing the cello is specific to particular human cultures. Therefore, like other cultural skills, it is transmitted via social learning, thereby culturally inherited. Ingold (2004) challenges this divide by arguing that both types of traits are outcomes of developmental processes. In other words, Ingold believes that for the expression of both traits nature *and* culture are equally relevant. The absence of a "natural" way of walking illustrates the point: the way humans walk is conditioned by various environmental factors like geological terrain, traditional customs, ethnic footwear, and other aspects of their cultures. Similarly, culturally specific activities like playing the cello are not possible without certain biological predispositions, let's say, having good hearing (Ingold 2004: 215–218).

What Ingold ultimately claims is that simply acknowledging the interaction between nature (genes) and culture, wherein humans are viewed merely as products of this interplay, is not enough. From his developmental perspective, not genes but humans are those who interact with the environment, leading to continual changes in both. For this reason, Ingold argues that the nature/culture divide has to go considering that it does not help us in explaining this interaction, thus development and evolution. Instead, he takes a holistic approach in which nature and culture are integrated within developmental systems – whose existence stems from various causes, which cannot be subsumed under the traditional nature/culture divide (Ingold 2004: 218). In the remainder, I demonstrate what Kronfeldner's and Ingold's perspectives on the nature/culture divide imply for the choice of research heuristics in the sciences that study human nature and cultures. Moreover, I show that despite their differences in conceptualizing the nature/culture relationship, their views exhibit closeness in terms of having strong integrative potential.

3. Concluding Remarks on Integration

When it comes to Ingold, I believe his holism leads him to advocate methodological integration. Namely, after lowering the focus of evolutionary explanation from the level of populations to the level of individual development, Ingold argues that from a developmental perspective, nature and culture are so deeply intertwined within developmental systems that their conceptual separation is not possible. This entails that traits traditionally conceived as biological cannot be explained on purely biological grounds without taking into account the environment in which they develop. The same goes for cultural traits: they cannot be explained if biological constraints and circumstances are not included in the explanation. As a consequence, Ingold (1998) claims that disciplines, traditionally separated along the nature/culture divide, should *dissolve* their boundaries since the theoretical foundation of their division no longer holds. This especially goes for the division between biological and sociocultural anthropology (Ingold 2013: 12–13). Nevertheless, Ingold (1998: 50) acknowledges that if there are divisions within the field of anthropology they are not absolute and established a priori, but rather relative to one's research focus.

Unfortunately, Ingold does not specify what this dissolution entails in practice. However, in a slightly different context, he states that there should be "no absolute division of method" within the humanities and the social sciences. He then continues to praise participant observation as the most adequate approach to understanding human-environment interaction, which he sees as crucial to explaining human development (1998: 48–50). For this reason, I interpret Ingold's position as endorsing methodological integration.

While Ingold posits that the nature/culture divide does not survive the latest developments in evolutionary and developmental biology, Kronfeldner holds that the divide can and should be made, both on populational and developmental levels. I have provided some details concerning the claim that we *can* conceptually separate nature and culture despite the interactionist consensus. In essence, Kronfeldner argues that nature and culture compromise distinct developmental resources traveling through separate channels of inheritance. Even if we agree, the question remains: why *should* we make this distinction?

Kronfeldner argues in favor of a separationist epistemic stance, which she specifies as "an epistemic research heuristics that defends the right to ignore a specific phenomenon (e.g., human nature) or a specific causal factor in an explanation typical for a disciplinary field" (2017a: 210). By "the right to ignore" Kronfeldner means that in cases of causally complex phenomena (i.e., phenomena with multiple causes), it is epistemically legitimate to study only the causes that align with one's disciplinary interests. In that sense, her (2018: 182) criticism of the holistic perspective on the nature/culture divide amounts to claiming that although both nature and culture matter for the production of traits, one simply cannot study all the causes relevant to development due to their sheer number. Furthermore, her (2010; 2017a) support of the separationist research heuristics rests on the recognition that separation can be

equally epistemically fruitful, that is, equally generative of new knowledge, as integration. Her claim goes against the view she associates with evolutionary psychology that only integration can be epistemically fruitful. She refutes this view by using Kroeber's case that demonstrates, as she argues, the fruitfulness of the separationist stance. For this reason, even though Kronfeldner grants that the knowledge of the human is indeed truly fragmented, she holds that striving towards integration should not be an a priori goal.

Kronfelder, however, does endorse integration, but integration in which different perspectives are "united – as separate ones" (2010: 122). More specifically, she (2015) argues in favor of integrative pluralism. In Kronfeldner's version of integrative pluralism, disciplines that study the same phenomenon (e.g., body height) are separate. However, the explanations they offer provide partial perspectives that complement each other given that they study different differences regarding the phenomenon in question. For example, a biological perspective studies the average difference in body height between women and men, and for these purposes, it ignores environmental factors and focuses only on the impact of genes. In a similar manner, social constructivist perspectives study the average difference in body height between, let's say, the Middle Ages and the twentieth century, and for these purposes, they ignore the causal influence of genes and focus on environmental, historical, and cultural trajectories in their explanations (Kronfeldner 2015; 2018: 70–71).

To conclude, while Ingold advocates the dissolution of boundaries between biological and social constructivist perspectives given that the causes they study (nature and culture, respectively) cannot be decoupled due to their interaction, Kronfeldner states that the division between disciplines is legitimate as long as they study different differences in the same phenomenon. Even though they provide opposing accounts, I understand both Ingold's holism and Kronfeldner's separationist stance as a cautious opposition to giving primacy to genetic factors in the explanation of evolution and development – the problem I call the argument from "deep biology". Moreover, as I have shown, their positions are close in terms of enabling the integration of different aspects of the sciences that study human nature and human cultures. In the remainder of this paper, I identify topics and questions for future research.

4. Outlook for Further Discussion

a) Conceptual Integration in Theory and Practice

So far, I have mentioned two research heuristics. There was, first, the reductionism of sociobiology in the form of genetic determinism. Second, the conceptual integration of evolutionary psychology, which recognizes, in (arguably) a non-reductionist manner, both genes and culture as separate kinds of explanatory factors. As Kronfeldner (2017a) explains, achieving conceptual integration requires consistency between one's own theory and other related external theories in the field. This can be attained through "corrective

consistency-checking", a process where a theory corrects its assumptions to ensure consistency with another previously inconsistent theory. Corrective consistency-checking can be asymmetrical or symmetrical: it can either assume hierarchy between disciplines, meaning that only the subordinate theory needs to adjust its assumptions, or it can go in both directions, making both theories liable to changes in relation to each other. Returning to Cosmides, Tooby, and Barkow's proposal that conceptual integration entails "learning to accept with grace the intellectual gifts offered by other disciplines" (1992: 12), Kronfeldner (2017a: 4–7) grants that they, in principle, have in mind corrective symmetry. Even though, as one might speculate, the passage seems to suggest that sociocultural anthropology should be the only one that needs to adjust its theoretical assumptions to embrace the well-established knowledge of evolutionary theory in order to secure external consistency.

If two theories are inconsistent and there is no higher-level evidence that provides direction for symmetrical corrective consistency-checking – which means that this process is underdetermined by data – the decision about who needs to correct their theory cannot be made on purely epistemic grounds. In other words, this decision will have to rely on factors external to science. That is, it will become relevant *who* decides and in *whose* interest. If I am correct, then new questions arise.

Presuming that we live in a society where genetic factors seem to be more important than cultural ones in explaining development and evolution and that science and society interact and intersect in ways that are crucial for the functioning of science, how should the symmetry of corrective consistency-checking between sociocultural anthropology and evolutionary psychology be secured in practice? To put it more bluntly, if evolutionary psychology, for various reasons, remains a discipline with greater power than sociocultural anthropology, in both the scientific and social arenas, I wonder if corrective symmetry remains achievable.

b) Integrative Pluralism and Inconsistent Explanations of the Same Difference in the Same Phenomenon

While I agree with Kronfeldner that the conceptual separation of nature and culture, and consequential disciplinary separation is an epistemic stance that provides clarity, facilitates analysis, and, in the end, enables integration, I do not see how integrative pluralism is reached in cases when two disciplines study the same difference in the same phenomenon but provide inconsistent explanations. For instance, Haslanger (2003: 317) reports that some feminist researchers argue that the average body height between men and women is the causal outcome of the long history of exposure to gender norms related to access to nutrition and exercise. These types of explanation wholeheartedly embrace their "right to ignore" and go fully social constructivist. That is to say, they do not consider any relevant biological circumstances and constraints that might play a role in the explanations they seek. What they appear to arrive at is an

account that is rather antagonistic from a biological perspective. Moreover, I think this is the case with most evolutionary psychology and sociocultural anthropology. These disciplines study different causes of the same difference in the same phenomenon (e.g., the difference in mating strategies between genders), and in this endeavor offer competing explanations. This brings me to the question: does integrative pluralism under Kronfeldner's framework require external consistency in cases like these? In other words, if integrative pluralism ultimately seeks to unite disciplines (as separate ones), then does it need to overcome external inconsistency, and if yes, then how?

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper is to showcase two views on the conceptual relationship between nature and culture: the separationist stance, which views nature and culture as conceptually decoupled notions, and an Ingoldian holistic perspective, which integrates nature and culture in a non-reductionist manner. A nuanced understanding of these views allows us to make further inferences regarding the choice of research heuristics in the sciences that study human nature and cultures. In particular, I aimed to show that how we conceptualize this relationship matters for our understanding of the prospects of integration between evolutionary psychology, a discipline that studies human universals by way of evolutionary theory, and sociocultural anthropology, a social constructivist perspective that in most cases recognizes only culture, as an explanatory resource, in its explanations of human traits.

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Aleksandra Knežević

Integrativni potencijal savremenih perspektiva na konceptualni odnos prirode i kulture

Apstrakt

U ovom radu analiziram i upoređujem tvrdnje Marie Kronfeldner i Tima Ingolda o konceptualnom odnosu prirode i kulture. Pokazujem da uprkos razlikama, njihovi stavovi ostaju bliski, posebno u pogledu njihovog integrativnog potencijala. Krajnji cilj ovog istraživanja je postavljanje osnova za dalje ispitivanje problema konceptualne integracije između sociokulturne antropologije i evolucione psihologije. Rad se sastoji od četiri glavna dela. Prvo, ukratko istražujem istoriju darvinizma kako bih pokazala na koji način su priroda i kultura konceptualizovane unutar ovog teorijskog okvira. Drugo, bavim se separacionizmom koji zastupa Kronfeldner i Ingoldovom holističkom perspektivom kada je u pitanju konceptualni odnosa prirode i kulture. Treće, raspravljam o implikacijama njihovih teorija na izbor istraživačke heuristike u naukama koje proučavaju ljudsku prirodu i ljudske kulture. Dok tumačim Ingoldovu poziciju kao metodološki integracionizam, Kronfelder se zalaže za verziju integrativnog pluralizma. Na kraju, postavljam okvire za dalja istraživanja konceptualne integracije i integrativnog pluralizma.

Ključne reči: ljudska priroda, kultura, integrativni pluralizam, konceptualna integracija, evoluciona psihologija.

II

STUDIES AND ARTICLES

STUDIJE I ČLANCI

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THE NARRATIVE OF AMANDA LABARCA AND THE *CRIOLLISMO*: NOTES FOR INSERTING IT INTO CHILEAN LITERARY HISTORY (OR NARRATING IT TO DEPICT AND CHANGE CHILE)[1]

ABSTRACT
This paper explores a set of narratives that the writer, educator and feminist leader Amanda Labarca published in the first quarter of the 20th century, namely the novel *En tierras extrañas* (1915), the short novel *La lámpara maravillosa* and the collection of stories *Cuentos a mi señor* (both 1921). We are interested in inscribing this corpus of Labarca's work mainly in the *criollismo*, thought of as the Latin American and Chilean literary sensibility of the first half of the 20th century. With this, we contribute to the studies that have set out to explore one of Labarca's most unknown areas: her literature. Specifically, it traces the spirit that runs through these texts, emphasizing the typification of discourses, characters and social contexts that allow sustaining the proposal of analyzing this prose from the point of view of *criollismo*. Indeed, the results show the presence of several characteristics of this trend, such as the presence of the peripheral or marginal element, the traveler as protagonist or the enhancement of local customs. It is concluded that Labarca's lyrics dialogue with the proposals of Chilean *criollismo*, although they are also inspired by other aesthetic and ideological proposals of her time.

KEYWORDS
Amanda Labarca, *criollismo*, literature, narrative, women, Chile.

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Introduction

It is not simply to demonstrate her literate culture that Amanda Labarca[2], in the introduction to her 1934 essay *¿A dónde va la mujer?* [Where does the woman go?] titled "As a prologue. The lamp and the mirror", begins by saying:

> I embrace Cervantes with renewed pleasure. He is like a wide and generous river. His thoughts flow without haste, without pettiness and without artifice. They spring from the magnificent fountain of his personality and are certain of their richness ... his characters are lavished with reasons ... In search of this deep delight I have reread his *Novelas ejemplares* [Exemplary Novels] *La gitanilla* [*The Little Gypsy Girl*] and *La ilustre fregona* [*The Illustrious Scullery-Maid*]. (Labarca 2022: 31)[3]

She then develops an argument based on her analysis of the women protagonists of these novels, ending with a reflection that can be summarized as follows: although Cervantes' protagonists are independent women endowed with their own strength, they finally abdicate their will and end their days by accepting what the family and society want from them. They are different, Labarca tells us, from the characters of the 20th century in, for example, Henrik Ibsen or Herbert George Wells, who are women who rebel against social impositions in acts of profound will.

That is to say, through observation of the literature of the two eras, Labarca establishes a position in which "woman" finds herself in her time, and with this she suggests that women are no longer "mirrors" of men and society, as in Cervantes. Rather, the "women of today, small lamps lit by the economic revolutions of the last century, lamps that laboriously burn the oil of their will to cast an uncertain flame that contrary winds still try to extinguish!" (Labarca 2022: 34–35).

The use of the "lamp" concept is neither curious nor coincidental, but rather an itinerary that fits in with Labarca's influences and ideals. For instance, we know that in 1921 she published the short novel *La lámpara maravillosa* [*The Marvellous Lamp*], which takes place in the intricate daily world of Matilde, the wife of a bohemian and wasteful artist who has created an award-winning painting inspired by her, in which a young woman appears in front of a waterfall. In view of his first success, the bohemian wishes to paint its sequel, and he describes to Matilde and his friend Andrés how the young woman could appear "in the instant in which, her eyes open to love, she discovers the world for the first time ..., the hidden beauty, the marvelous mystery of life" (Labarca 1921: 24). In this point, his friend reminds him of "the old symbol of the marvelous lamp: what is Aladdin's lamp but triumphant love, the love that blooms life,

2 For more information on Amanda Labarca and her literary work see: Salas and Hurtado (2022) and Salas (2024).

3 This and all translations of textual quotations from Spanish to English are the responsibility of the authors. This is important since they may not represent precisely what Amanda Labarca stated in her original work.

populates it with illusionary geniuses ...?" (ibid.: 25). To which the artist replies: "That will be the title of my painting. The marvelous lamp of life, which is love. And I will paint it on the face of a woman in such a way that it can be guessed that the fire springs from her entrails and that she is at the same time the lamp, the oil and the bearer of the light" (ibid.: 25).

Undoubtedly, Labarca exposes the dynamics between art and life, philosophical symbolism and love, both physical and emotional. Let us recall that the Spaniard Ramón del Valle Inclán published *La lámpara maravillosa, ejercicios espirituales* [*The Marvellous Lamp, Spiritual Exercises*] in 1916 (with a revised reprint in 1922; Del Valle Inclán 1922).[4] The work pursues an itinerary of self-knowledge based on various occult, aesthetic and philosophical theories. Possibly the title of Amanda Labarca's novel was inspired by the work of this Spanish author; she had known it very well since the beginning of the 20th century, as he was one of the writers that she commented on in her *Impresiones de juventud* [*Impressions of Youth*] in 1909:

> The novels and comedies of Valle Inclán leave the impression of greatness, of heroism, and the reader, placed in that plane of subjection, does not feel obscene in his phrases, sometimes frightening, nor looks ashamed at the picture of the forbidden and sensual loves. And this impression emanates not only from his way of creating characters and scenes, but also from that talent with which he puts the surrounding nature in exact harmony with the soul of man and his current emotional state (for if there is something tragic and august in his paintings, it is surely the state of the soul that his landscapes reflect); it flows more than from any other factor from his grandiloquent and wise language. (Labarca 1909: 84)

Although Labarca, a writer, educator and feminist, was closed to the spiritualist or occultist currents favored by other writers of her time (*Mente* 1921),[5] such as Iris or Gabriela Mistral (Rubio Rubio 2011; Graña 2014; Arre-Marfull 2017, 2020), she does not show disdain for the literature of Spanish modernism or contemporary literary sensibilities, which dialogue with these philosophical and artistic trends as a way of extracting meaning from life through art or aesthetic appreciation.

In this article, we are interested in demonstrating, on the one hand, the importance per se of the literature written by Amanda Labarca, although it does not represent the bulk of her published work. We will work with three narrative works in book format: the novel *En tierras extrañas* [*In Strange Lands*] (1915), the short novel *La lámpara maravillosa* and the collection of short stories *Cuentos a mi señor* [*Stories to My Lord*], the latter two published in the same volume in

4 This edition states on the cover: "Live life as if it were a work of art. The most beautiful work of Spanish modernism and the most singular of the great Valle-Inclán in its original edition".

5 This idea is reinforced by the mention in the magazine *Mente* of an article written by literary critic Hernán Díaz Arrieta in the newspaper *La Nación*, in which he quotes Amanda Labarca as strongly criticizing "those theosophical, spiritualist and orientalist mysticisms".

1921. Although we understand that it is impossible to classify the works of an author with a single label, we believe that, although she drinks from Hispanic, American, French and European literary sources in general, her vocation is to understand the Chilean idiosyncrasy in order to contribute with a critical and national view to the improvement of our society. In this sense, and considering that *criollismo* – school, tendency or artistic sensibility – is one of the frames of reference for a good part of the Chilean writers of the first half of the 20th century, we want to inscribe – not without good reason and in general terms – the narrative work of Amanda Labarca in the literary history within this sensibility.

1. *Criollismo* and Chilean Literature in the First Decades of the 20th Century

According to writer and critic José Miguel Oviedo, many things happened simultaneously during the first two decades of the 20th century. As he explains,

> it is not easy neither to order them nor to recognize them with clarity. In the congested literary panorama, the lines are crisscrossed and chronologies are of little help. On the one hand, it should not be forgotten that – despite everything – the modernist spirit disappeared very slowly from the scene and has refluxes even in the decade of the 30's [*sic*] ... even fin-de-siècle naturalism had not disappeared. (Oviedo 1998: 25)

In 1909, in the midst of a modernist boom and the naturalist decline of Hispanic and Latin American literature, the critical Amanda Labarca introduces us to her youthful literary impressions by turning to the Castilian novel of her time and analyzing some of the relevant Spanish authors of the generation of 1898. Emilia Pardo Bazán, Vicente Blasco Ibáñez, Pío Baroja, Manuel Ciges Aparicio, Francisco Acebal, Gregorio Martínez Sierra, Azorín, Ramón del Valle Inclán and Felipe Trigo are the ones chosen to show us the synthesis and overcoming that modernism meant against the naturalist (physiologist) and psychologist (subjectivist) tendencies of the second half of the 19th century.

Without delving into Chilean literature at that time, Labarca makes clear her literary preferences toward the end of the first decade of the 20th century, indicating that the previous realist novel (naturalist and psychologist), although it shows the miseries, is "the most bitter document that Art has produced" (Labarca 1909: 23), although modernism, with other literary strategies, also receives the sad inheritance of realism, but with more frightening forms: abulia, boredom "resulting negatively in the currents of moral progress" (ibid.: 23). Thus, the "new" literary works reveal "that her ideal was to bring restlessness to all souls. Most of her writings are a question mark, a formidable question mark placed on some transcendental problem of life, on a question of principles, whether philosophical, social or merely individual" (ibid.: 25). Thus, Labarca concludes, modernism relies on the new philosophical theories rather than on science, exposing the "voluptuousness of pain" and the "beauty of melancholy" (ibid.: 25).

The multifaceted Ricardo Latcham speaks of the "quarrel of criollismo" that confuses peasant or *costumbrista* literature with the narratives developed since the 1910s that possess, in addition to a local and criollo – or autochthonous – tinge, a marked taste for naturalistic sensibility. American and Chilean *criollismo*[6], although it has antecedents in the *costumbrismo* of the 19th century, will not be established as a "school" until the 20th century (Latcham 1954, 1963a, 1963b). Its main exponent in Chile, and this has not been open to discussion to date, was Mariano Latorre, who wrote his first works in the decade of the Centenary of Chilean Independence.

For Latcham, what in Spain occurred around 1900 as a conflict between naturalist and psychologist schools, as Labarca told us in her *Impresiones de juventud*, would occur in Chile around 1928 between the first *criollismo* and imagism (Latcham 1963b: 317). Nevertheless, it is necessary to return to what Oviedo indicated to us, on the complexity of falling into the pigeonholing of the sensibilities of this time, when great changes were taking place at all levels. In addition, we must not forget the diversification of the multiple Vanguards – which began to appear with the *futurism* of Marinetti in 1909 and the *creationism* of Vicente Huidobro in 1916 – and the emergence of socialist realism following the Russian Revolution, both of which impacted the processes of literary creation of Hispanic America (Alegría 1967; Subercaseaux 2004; Arre-Marfull 2018).

The sensibilities of the Chilean Centenary (around 1910), diverse in their back and forth between foreign influences and local inspirations, permeates Labarca's literary aesthetics. She was a great reader, as is well evidenced by her numerous articles of criticism and literary production published in specialized magazines, such as *Atenea* (of the *Universidad de Concepción*), and in others, such as *Familia* (Ramos-Vera, Arre-Marfull & Salas 2022). We must not forget that Guillermo Labarca Hubertson, Amanda's husband since 1905, was one of the exponents of the *criollista* tendency of the Centenary, with his two works *Al Amor de la Tierra* [*To the Love of the Land*] (1908) and *Mirando al Océano* [*Looking at the Ocean*] (1911), although he would later devote himself fully to politics (Latcham 1954).

Another of the elements that will shape the writing of the Centenary, and not only in Labarca, is the question of the identity crisis experienced by the political and intellectual world that has seen progress – or the idea of progress

6 The concept of *criollo* has a long history in America, with some different interpretations depending on the area of the continent where it is used. In Chile, *criollo* defines the person of Spanish descent born in the New World, and by extension all the traditional culture that arises from the new society forged by this European migration that draws on various influences on the continent. Therefore, *Criollismo* is a sensibility or literary tendency that, although it has a continental manifestation in the Americas, specifically in Chile, it frames the first generation of professional writers that emerged in a critical moment of Chilean society, one hundred years after Chilean independence. *Criollismo* is also relevant for Chilean intellectual and literary democratization, since its main representatives are not from the aristocracy, but from the middle class.

– threatened since the last years of the 19th century (Gazmuri 1980; Subercaseaux 2004). This crisis emerged with the rise of nationalism, typical of a moment of strong Chileanization of spaces considered peripheral and wild, as was the so-called Norte Grande, as well as Araucanía and Patagonia (Soler Escalona 2017; Osorio Soto 2021). It is precisely in these dates and scenarios that the first initiatives of the later named *criollista* trend are forged, narratives that seek to collect the local color, the "authentic" spirit of the rural or non-urban space – supposedly more authentic than the urban, cosmopolitan and modern – from proposals linked mainly to naturalism by way of describing explicitly and starkly the local types, their vices and singularities. In the words of Patrick Barr-Melej, "as urbanization, industrialization and the export economy altered the life and rhythms of society during the oligarchy-controlled Parliamentary Republic (1891–1925), many urban Chileans began to cling to images of the countryside and peasants in their search for traits of national and cultural uniqueness" (Barr-Melej 2010: 93).

However, this local color, presumably typical of that autochthonous Chileanness hidden in corners and "small homelands," is sought as a tributary of a centralized Chileanness emerging from a metropolis containing in its national discourse all those particular manifestations. What Mario Verdugo tells us about the "criollo topogen" (Verdugo 2013: 49)[7] is significant, affirming "its specific spacing operations in the absolute availability of the corner or the *patria chica*, ready to function – both economically and symbolically – as a zone of primary supplies or as a virgin land whose only function is to increase the treasure of Chileanness" (ibid.: 62).

What is more, according to Barr-Melej, although one might assume that representations of the rural emerged from the landed elite, *criollismo* was a genre promoted especially "by the urban middle class that was realizing its political and cultural power during the first decades of the last century ... inspired by European naturalist authors such as Zola, Maupassant, Daudet, and Flaubert, ... criollistas sought to portray the everyday existence of their subaltern compatriots" (Barr-Melej 2010: 94). Labarca belonged to this middle class, by the way.

In this sense, the *criollista* sensibility, school or tendency would be not only related to the intention of narrating customs and aspects of hidden, marginal or virgin places to the occupation of the national state but also expressed in the narrative through the topic of travel and the foreign observer's relation to the place observed, where it is the curiosity of the traveler that allows capturing the observations of the experienced, from a supposedly neutral and realistic outlook. Thus, moving toward the periphery, with apparently unsuspecting eyes, "constitutes a typical scene of criollismo, and helps to naturalize the activity of the look-holders of the center" (Verdugo 2013: 52).

7 Topogen is defined as a real space that generates meaning within a text or set of texts. In this case, the *criollo* topogen is the metropolis, the city of Santiago, whence the narrating observer emerges. Verdugo says about the topogen that it is "a spatial foundation, a founding order, the 'order of Chile' that is original to *criollismo*" (Verdugo 2013: 49).

At this point we can bring up Amanda Labarca's first published novel, *En tierras extrañas* (Labarca 1915). Although the journey of the protagonist Carlos Solar is not to peripheral spaces of the national territory, as the son of a businessman from La Serena, in this sense an inhabitant of a region of traditional Chile or of colonial roots – and therefore the central simile of the work[8] – he embarks on a journey to the core of cosmopolitanism and English-speaking modernity that was New York in 1912, which in a sense is the periphery to Chile. Even so, we can make a reading from *criollismo* in this work, if we follow Verdugo: the heroes of these novels "enter, move away, travel through territories and mark novelties according to a criterion that not only provides a physical or geographical position, but also axiological, aesthetic and political, since the mapping correlates with other types of values (good/bad, beautiful/ugly, civilized/barbarbaric) in respect of which space plays the role of metalanguage" (Verdugo 2013: 52). We will return to this point later.

In the case of *La lámpara maravillosa* and the *Cuentos a mi señor*, the relationship with *criollismo* is more oblique; they possibly pay tribute to a sensibility that appeals more to modernism and even to the late naturalism inscribed in the narrative that Labarca analyzes in 1909, although she does not exempt herself from describing local color or social types in, especially, some of the stories. A possible entrance to the narrative of marginality proper to *criollismo* that is told from an organizing center of meaning where the male/national reader is found is to think of these works from these peripheral spaces as signifying the experiences of women and childhood or the feminine and infantile "corners"; those *patrias chicas* where the masculine and adult national narrator/reader is not situated (Pinto 1990: 142).

2. Amanda's Literary Sensibility: Between Naturalism and Modernism in *Criollista* Synthesis

We agree with the position of Ernesto Montenegro, who states that when one closely examines the work of a "real" writer, of a "literary artist," "what remains as original value, is always a way of his own, a personal style, in short, something that defines and separates a novelist before identifying him with a school. In literature, the idea of school, because of its didactic implications, does not agree with the work of individual creation, free and even rebellious to classification" (Montenegro 1956: 53). Nevertheless, we recognize our exercise of ascribing Labarca to *criollismo*, but not as a mere literary chronology; rather, it is to understand her in her complex sensibility as a narrative writer.

The set of stories *Cuentos a mi señor* contains nine texts ordered as follows: "Los cuatro", "La historia que no ha ocurrido", "Poema de amor", "Sin madre",

8 The city of La Serena, founded in 1544, was the second city established by the Spaniards during the conquest of Chile. It functioned as the capital of the northern limit of the colonial Kingdom of Chile and was one of the northernmost cities of republican Chile until the triumph in the War of the Pacific, which allowed Chile to considerably extend its northern border over Peruvian and Bolivian territories.

"Las Catreras", "Monotonía", "Se llamaba Raquel", "Amor que pasas" and "El reyecito", all set in central Chile, rural or urban, except "La historia que no ha ocurrido" which takes place in an imaginary context in the purest modernist fairy-tale style (Portillo 2005).[9] That story features a princess for whom hundreds of noble suitors are waiting; her only love obsession is the evening star; and a shepherd will be the only one to risk going in search of such a precious treasure, dying when he reaches the feet of the princess, burned by the fire of the star he had kept in his heart.

Marisanta, the princess, is the archetypal character of the "woman who waits", like Penelope (Pérez Miranda 2007), who is tied to a single love but, because of her social position and characteristics, is sought after by many. The character of the shepherd is the archetype of the "hero" in his journey toward the reward, which in this case is the love of the princess, an unattainable character for him ordinarily but one who, if he manages to bring her what she craves, she could be his. Of course, a shepherd could never marry a princess, so the journey to the star and back will be his undoing. In this act of sacrifice, although his body does not stay with his beloved, because he dies and ascends to heaven, he unknowingly transmits the sensation of warmth (love) to the princess. In this relationship, we are faced with the literary topic of impossible love, which is reiterated in various ways in several of the stories, although in a writing style that is closer to naturalistic or modernist realism.

In five of the nine stories the framed narration or story-frame (story inside a story)[10] is used, where there is a narrator who tells the story to "my lord" or "my owner", hence the series title, and it is expressed on brief occasions, except in the aforementioned story "La historia que no ha ocurrido," where the reference to the "lord" is made at several points in the story; even the environment in which the narrator begins to tell the story is described. The stories, those with story-frame and those without, are placed in an apparently random order. In the other story-frame tales, namely, "Poema de amor", "Las Catreras", "Monotonía" and "Se llamaba Raquel" the narrator appeals to her listener, "my lord," at brief unexpected moments, either in the middle of the story or at the end, though never at the beginning. The ending of "Las Catreras" a story in which three sisters who harbored romantic illusions in their youth end up in painful circumstances, due to the family's ruin caused by the death of the mother and the father's alcoholism, is striking. In this story the archetype of "the woman who waits" is subverted, for two of the sisters did not wait for romantic love; instead, they took what was at hand, yet it went badly for them. The story tells us that, specifically, they only "hoped to die," and it is here that the narrator intervenes: "Die! They did not know that with each illusion we

9 At the thematic level in modernism, the use of the fairy tale is made possible by the influence of French symbolism, which employs Greco-Latin aspects such as mermaids, nymphs and satyrs as well as the princesses of the Middle Ages. On a structural level, the modernists follow the outline of the classical fairy tale, which is based on the compilations of Charles Parrault.

10 In the style of *The Thousand and One Nights*.

abandon, life kills us relentlessly, until the moment comes when we are – like you, lord, and like me – nothing more than the memory, the specter of what we wanted to be and could not" (Labarca 1921: 128).

This wink to a certain mood or state of mind that overwhelms the narrator and "her lord" can be traced and compared in the other stories, observing the precise moment in which she alludes to her "lord" and, above all, making the connection with the first story in which this frame of the story appears:

> It rains! There are shades of mother-of-pearl in the atmosphere, in the ambience, whispers of water falling with the murmur of kisses, in the bedroom, the warmth of love. Do not ask me, my owner, to tell you reliable stories. From the truth of life, my heart bleeds today; let me besot my sorrows in the sweet lie of fantasy ... (Labarca 1921: 91) [It ends with:] But do not be sad, sir; this story has never happened: this princess and this shepherd ... this princess and this shepherd have never existed. (ibid.: 95)

This story-frame in which we perceive the narrator and her owner telling and listening to these tales, all with sad outcomes (except "El reyecito"), gives the series the backdrop of this work: They begin as a couple in love in a warm and sensual setting "in the atmosphere, whisper of water falling with the murmur of kisses, in the bedroom, warmth of love", ready to listen to sad but fantastic stories; however, the narrator can no longer create fantasies, and simply turns to narrate real-life stories, which turn the lovers into "nothing more than the memory, the specter of what we wanted to be and could not".

This dialogue between the story-frame and each of the stories appeals to the reader's awareness, with the intention of stirring the spirits through literature. As Labarca said in her *Impressions* on the new modernist or naturalist literary works of the 20th century: "It would seem that its ideal is to bring restlessness to all souls" (Labarca 1909: 25). And that is precisely what our author does: she shows us the crudest stories of real life that her sensitive imagination can achieve, with the intention of disturbing us. But what is *criollista* in all those texts? We shall see.

Within the set there are two stories that could be established as closer to the *criollista* sensibility owing to the types of character and peasant scenario they portray; and they are the first and the last: "Los cuatro" and "El reyecito". We do not think it is a coincidence that they are placed in this order, opening and closing the series. Also, because of their contents, they are different in certain points from the others: the first one has no child or juvenile characters like the rest, nor are there mothers or fathers; its protagonists are five adults, four men and a woman, all of them part of a band of rustlers. This first story deserves special mention for being, in our opinion, the most palpably feminist of them all.

On the other hand, the last story has as its essential characteristic that it is an uplifting story with a happy ending. It tells of a single man, a rich landowner, who sponsors and raises a child, the seventh son of the gardener of his land. Thanks to the love that unites them, the landowner begins to take care of the problems of all the children of his tenants: he installs an infirmary with a

doctor in the empty rooms of his mansion, creates a school, and is concerned that all the children have the basics to clothe themselves. Labarca tries to give it naturalistic overtones in the description of certain characters, but, even so, the narrator makes it clear that she does not want to give it a sad ending.

This resistance to happy endings (in the rest of her narratives, including her novels) seems to emerge from the deep conviction she has of literature as a means to impact readers and to make visible, in addition, the admiration she feels for the renowned European writers of her generation. To this can be added the meliorism that our author emphasizes, for example, José Maria Eça De Queirós, which she has made her own, according to what she writes in "*La Torre de Santa Ireneia*," a text referring to the Portuguese writer published in "*Las Veladas del Ateneo*" (Labarca 1906).

A macro thread running through almost all these stories is the theme of care and the caregivers of children and adolescents. Mothers and fathers, present or absent, other caregivers by obligation or decision, and children and adolescents who experience the process of growing up and facing the world of affection and social and work relationships are portrayed in almost all the stories. Alongside the concern for society and childhood and its various problems, consistently and artistically represented in *Cuentos a mi señor*, is the issue of the situation of women and their economic and social dependence on men, which appears in several of the texts.

A story that does not speak to us of this dynamic of care and does not refer to childhood, as we had anticipated, is "Los cuatro". In this story, it is the female figure disrupting male gender solidarity that is clearly represented; in these areas of sociability among men – which could be equated to the public space of society in general – when a woman breaks into it, she must be eliminated. While the woman performs tasks in the shadows, in the private space of care and servitude, she is accepted, just as the quartet of bandits accepted Mena, the girlfriend of Pedro, the boss. What the story shows us is that if a woman wishes to establish herself in the spaces of male access, she is already a danger to the group of men who see themselves, by the mere fact of her presence, as threatened. We believe that this is the properly feminist storyin the series. The others, while slipping in more or less explicit criticisms of the situation of women, focus mainly on the experiences of childhood and care.

According to what we explained above, the Chilean literature of *criollismo* that began to emerge in the generation of the Centenary has several observable characteristics in its exponents: they deal with the theme of the non-urban periphery or the "patria chica"; their main character is a traveler or foreign observer who measures his or her observations on the basis of value contrasts (the good/bad, the beautiful/ugly, etc.) that appeal to the national referent of the country whence the narrator comes; there is the explicit or implicit presence of the center that represents the synthesis of Chileanness; there are typical characters, natural spaces and customs that appeal to traditional contexts.

On the other hand, the stark way of narrating the facts and describing the characters, the tendency to expose open or unhappy endings, the existence of

characters with their chiaroscuros: there are no great villains or holy doves, in addition to a concern for the social, or, to go into a kind of literary sociology, all point to the influence of naturalism in this type of narrative. It is, above all, these elements that we observe in Labarca's stories. However, as mentioned, each author is a world, and each work will have its own logics and formulas.

To return to *En tierras extrañas*, from our *criollista* reading to be the work that fits more properly into this sensibility, as it has as protagonist the traveler-observer who evaluates and differentiates the here and there of his experience (López-Torres 2022), since part of the protagonist's experience is looking outside the national center – of the geographical center, as represented by the traditional Chile – to affirm his own Chileanness. That is the operation that Carlos Solar performs when he finds or searches in the foreign space for the variety of Chilean social types that represent the essence of Chileanness, varied, but at the same time only one. The nationalism that emanates from the proposal of this novel, very much in consonance with the generation of the centenary, is clearly observed in several episodes and, above all, in the final speech of Carlos, who speaks to the Chilean men and women – to the *criolla* race – in an effort to exalt the view that they have of themselves, thus predicting an august future of progress (Arre-Marfull & Amigo Dürre 2024; Amigo Dürre & Sanzana Sáez 2024).

As for *La lámpara maravillosa*, it is the placing of the marginal alongside the national/male reader that could situate this novel in a *criollista* reading, as well as its narrative that mixes naturalistic and modernist elements. Thinking, however, that Labarca writes for a mainly female audience – perhaps not only by choice but also because of the literary field's prejudice against women's writing – (Luongo 2007) we propose that in each female reader there subsists, likewise, a national/masculine self. In this sense, it is these feminine realities and subaltern masculinities that are exposed, to be integrated into the national narrative or excluded from it. We can make a similar reading of *Cuentos a mi señor*, as we have already mentioned, in this case, integrating the peripheries of the national narrative contained in the childhood and youth experiences, placing the narrator and the "lord" in the foreign observers who look toward these social edges.

Final Reflections

Considering the above, we believe that the narrative works of Amanda Labarca show, in many cases, a *criollismo* more akin to the modernist sensibility than the naturalist one. Emerging in her stories, also, is the concern for national and social progress so typical of the literature of the centenary. This is evidenced by the multiple components that the author developed in the works analyzed.

In the first place, the experience of many narrators takes place mainly in the central areas of the country, showing sociocultural transit in the rural-urban binomial; however, they also travel to those peripheral and forgotten areas – both geographical and social – where the homeland is also made. Precisely, in

this journey to scattered areas of the country or even to distant lands, readers are accompanied by the traveler/observer, a character who shares his impressions and visions of the customs that refuse to perish and those that seem to flourish in a Chile that is in social and literary turmoil.

Another aspect that can be appreciated in a good part of the narrative is the comparison, sometimes more explicit, sometimes more hidden, of the usual dyads of *criollismo*, as was the case of the rural versus the urban or the idea of center versus periphery. At the same time, Labarca presents us with the simplicity of diverse characters who share dialogues and experiences with sophisticated characters, portraying the dichotomies that were accentuated at the time, in addition to the detailed description of beautiful and welcoming spaces, in contrast to the other reality, that of earth and dust.

We are also interested in emphasizing these other Labarquian peripheries, those located outside the male/national reader, at the social edges, spaces that account for private, feminine and infantile places. This *sui generis criollismo* of our author's works emerges from her pen to lead us to reflect on those other characters that usually lack name and voice in canonical and "adult" literature.

Finally, this work also intends to invite us to explore other literary spaces that Amanda Labarca used to dialogue with the community of national literature, such as magazines, meetings, talks and gatherings, which, together with analysis of the new documents by this author that have been discovered in recent years, may allow us to refine our look toward the deep and detailed analysis of the literary trajectory and the aesthetic imagery of this relevant Latin American intellectual.

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Apstrakt

Ovaj rad istražuje skup narativa koje je spisateljica, prosvetiteljka i feministička vođa Amanda Labarka objavila u prvoj četvrtini 20. veka, a to su roman *En tierras extrañas* (1915), kratki roman *La lámpara maravillosa* i zbirka priča *Cuentos a mi señor* (objavljeni 1921). Zainteresovani smo da ovaj korpus Labarkinog dela razumemo kroz *kriolizam*, zamišljen kao latinoamerički i čileanski književni senzibilitet prve polovine 20. veka. Ovim doprinosimo studijama koje su imale za cilj da istraže jedno od Labarkinih najnepoznatijih oblasti: njenu književnost. Konkretno, ovaj rad prati duh koji se provlači kroz ove tekstove, naglašavajući tipizaciju diskursa, likova i društvenih konteksta koji omogućavaju da se održi predlog analize ove proze sa stanovišta *kriolizma*. Zaista, rezultati pokazuju prisustvo nekoliko karakteristika ovog trenda, kao što je prisustvo perifernog ili marginalnog elementa, putnika kao protagoniste ili unapređenje lokalnih običaja. Zaključujemo da Labarkina lirika ima dijalog sa predlozima čileanskog *kriolizma*, iako je inspirisana i drugim estetskim i ideološkim predlozima njenog vremena.

Ključne reči: Amanda Labarka, *kriolizam*, književnost, narativ, žene, Čile.

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INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN CONTEMPORARY ART: FROM PROVOCATION TO INTEGRATION

ABSTRACT
The article analyzes the forms of transmission of cultural values (meanings) through modern works of art. The novelty of the approach to artistic creation lies in it being studied both as a result of intercultural communication and as a means of conveying cultural meanings. The purpose of this article is to identify, analyze and describe the forms of transmission of values through works of contemporary art. The author identifies three forms of value translation in art: provocation, similarity, integration. Provocation means that the artist shows the interaction of the values of different cultures, focusing on their hostility and inconsistency. As an example, an art object is given by a Russian artist living in America, a representative of Sots Art A.S. Kosolapov "Lenin – Coca-Cola." Similarity, on the contrary, is a form that demonstrates the proximity of meanings, the search for common ground in the value systems of society. This thesis is visualized by the sculptures of Buddha and Christ by the Chinese artist Zhang Huan. The third form of translation of values in art is designated as integration, when the work expresses values that are universal for all peoples: a clean environment, security, peace, health, freedom, justice and others. The works of the winners of the Venice Biennale 2019 (opera-performance "Sun and Sea (Marina) " by the Lithuanian National Pavilion and "White Album" by American cinematographer Arthur Jafa) are given as an example. It is concluded that art, thanks to its supranational, symbolic and universal language, is able to build intercultural communication between peoples.

KEYWORDS
intercultural communication, contemporary art, cultural values, forms of transmission of cultural meanings.

Introduction

The relevance of studying the interaction of values of different cultures through art is connected, first of all, with the political strategy of "soft power." The spheres of "soft power" are usually education and the arts. Support for cultural projects, development of creative initiatives, training of students in other countries, support for masters of art – all this can be attributed to manifestations of "soft power," and thanks to these manifestations, people get acquainted with

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the values of different peoples. Art, as a means of conveying values, is actively used in pedagogical and artistic practice. The axiological function is one of the most important among the functions of art. For example, the author Yu. B. Borev, in his discourse on the axiological function of art, posits that "art serves to orient a person in the world, aids in the development of a value consciousness, and teaches the ability to view life through the prism of imagery. Without value orientations, an individual is even more vulnerable than one who lacks vision, as they are unable to comprehend how to relate to something, prioritize their activities, or construct a hierarchy of phenomena in the world around them" (Borev 2002: 100). From the perspective of the Russian philosopher M.S. Kagan, the social functions of art within the "art-culture" system are exemplified by its capacity to serve as the self-awareness of culture and to communicate its values in interaction with other cultures (Kagan 1978: 13). This leads to the conclusion about the significant potential of art as a means of organizing intercultural communication.

Authors such as V. L. Alikhanova (2019), Yu. B. Borev (2002), N. V. Brovko (2007), M. S. Kagan (1978), N. S. Pichko (2016), L. N. Stolovich (1985) and others write about the accumulation and transfer of cultural meanings, but I am unaware of scientific works that reveal the forms of transfer of values in art. The phenomenon of a work as a result of intercultural communication occurs when an artist has a bicultural or multicultural identity, which is not uncommon in the globalized world. In this case, a work is interpreted in terms of an accomplished interaction of cultures, it demonstrates the merging of values, and at the same time, it can be used to convey to the audience the specifics of the process of intercultural communication.

1. Materials and Methods

It is important to distinguish between art as a value and art as a means of conveying values. This article explores the forms of value transfer in art: the fact that art has value in itself, connecting the world of nature (the world of rigid determinism) and the world of freedom (the world of morality, culture) is not disputed. This approach was first described in the eighteenth century by Kant (1994). In Baden's neo-kantianism, this approach was developed by Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, who believed that the world of culture consists of values (Rickert 1998). Values in culture are always objectified, art as a cultural form is a concentration of meanings. Obviously, there are a huge number of cultural mechanisms that accumulate and transmit values. The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur believed that the interpretation of cultural texts, which are works of art, contains a deep meaning and possibility to overcome cultural distance, since any tradition lives only thanks to interpretation. For Ricoeur, art was the means that reproduces and transmits traditions; as a result of the interpretation of the work, "a project of the world in which I could live and realize my most secret possibilities" is created (Ricoeur 2002: 24). In Russian cultural studies, the problem of systematization of cultural meanings

was studied by A. Ya. Flier, who concluded that the cultural meaning of an artifact depends on the social context, and "allegorical polysemy, stimulating freedom of interpretation, is one of the hallmarks of art" (Flier 2017). The Russian thinker Mikhail M. Bakhtin, examining the transfer of meanings in dialogue, communication, wrote:

> Meaning is potentially infinite, but it can be actualized only by coming into contact with another (outside) meaning ... The actual meaning does not belong to a (single) meaning, but only to two met and related meanings. There can be no meaning in itself, it exists only for another meaning, that is, it exists only together with it (1979: 280).

Currently, the fact that art is an accumulator of cultural meanings and a translator of cultural values is recognized, but the question of the forms of the translation process remains open. The purpose of this article is to identify, to analyze and to describe some of the existing forms of the process of translating cultural values on the example of contemporary works. Based on the purpose, the following tasks are formulated: firstly, to study the form of transferring values as "provocation;" secondly, to explore the form of value transfer as "similarity;" thirdly, to consider the form of translation of cultural meanings as "integration."

2. Results

Contemporary art is a space for intercultural communication due to globalization processes. Understanding messages and concepts without knowledge of national languages is provided by the symbolic nature of art. The denationalization of art is a striking feature of our time. It is not the features of the national style that come to the fore, but the methods, techniques, technologies for conveying meanings and values through art. Responsibility of artists is increasing and they are forced to master the languages of different traditions in order to adequately convey the idea for people who live in a "world without borders." In the conditions of standardization and homogenization of culture, there is an increasing need to defend one's national identity, to establish markers of one's presence in the world; even the term "glocalization" (introduced into scientific circulation by sociologist Roland Robertson) appeared to refer to the relationship of multidirectional trends of globalization and localization.

Let us call the first form of the transmission of cultural values in art "provocation." In contemporary art, we often encounter taboo violations. Scandal and outrageousness are the norm of mass culture, the viewer is accustomed to scandal and is looking for it, and artists are doing everything possible to surprise the audience as much as possible and gain even more popularity. Of course, you can find a provocation in any artistic statement in the form of hints and allegories. Genius is one who establishes new rules of the game in art, according to Kant, but "at the present stage of the development of art, provocation becomes its central, and sometimes its only component" (Dmitriev and

Sychev 2017: 85). As an example, let us cite the work of the famous Russian social realist Alexander Semenovich Kosolapov, now living in New York, "Lenin – Coca-Cola." At one time, this picture was the cause of much controversy and was even the subject of a trial. It is possible to interpret art objects in different ways, but from the point of view of intercultural communication, is piece is a vivid example of accomplished interaction of Western and Soviet values. The artist himself explained his work in an interview, stating that "American culture has produced a consumer product, while Russia has produced an ideological product, which is also a consumer product. Both of these processes are symmetrical. When I came to the West, I saw that both systems of propaganda create a void, it is the sale of a non-existent paradise. The similarities between the capitalist American advertising and the totalitarian Soviet and post-Soviet poster, slogans, are huge." ("I create a meme" 2017).

The artist's ironic provocation brightly highlighted the metamorphosis that took place in his mind, which is now obvious to modern viewers, but in the early 1980s produced the effect of an exploding bomb.

Much later, in 2014, the Chinese artist Ai Weiwei, who entered into a confrontation with the government of his native country, repeated the artistic technique of Kosolapov, placing the same red logo on an ancient Chinese vase. The art object symbolizes the destruction of China's traditional values by Western influence. Here is a statement by Kosolapov, illustrating the interaction of cultural meanings that simultaneously play a unifying and separating role:

> At some point, I realized that I could preserve my uniqueness [in emigration] only if I introduce an element of Russian culture into art. Maybe Russian avant-garde or socialist realism. Or maybe its politicization. I try to do radical things, thanks to which I got on trial in Russia, but at the same time I entered the Western textbooks of contemporary art as a Russian artist. [...] Ai Weiwei used my idea with Coca-Cola. Because when Weiwei smashes ancient vases with Coca-Cola written on them, he builds on Kosolapov's discovery. In a postmodern situation, we integrate everything (Kosolapov 2017).

So, the form of translation of cultural meanings in the art of "provocation" focuses on the difference and incompatibility of different peoples, combining their values.

Let us designate the following form of translation as "similarity." The emphasis is placed precisely on the closeness of the values of different cultures, on the possibility of equal dialogue. As an example, let us take the sculptures of the contemporary Chinese artist Zhang Huan. He collects the ashes of burnt incense in Buddhist temples and makes sculptures out of them. Sculptures of Buddha and Christ were installed opposite each other. Ash sculptures became part of a larger exhibition called "East and West Wind."

According to the artist, the material, unusual for sculpture, astounds the European and Russian public, while the Chinese do not see anything remarkable in it, considering the ashes an integral part of Chinese culture. This material, according to the artist, contains the power of prayers and holy spirits, the dust

of death and rebirth, as well as the hopes, aspirations and desires of hundreds of people who come to the Buddha to bow. Zhang Huan expressed the hope that the figures of Buddha and Christ would show similarities between Eastern and Western religions (Buddha, Ashes, and Donkeys).

We will show another form of the translation of values "integration" using the works of the Venice Biennale 2019 as an example (the 58th Biennale with the theme: "May you live in interesting times"). Integration means the unification of parts into a single whole, or the inclusion of elements in a certain community. The peculiar expression of problems common to all mankind finds the greatest response in the hearts of people. Lithuania received the "Golden Lion" award for the best national pavilion. Artist and composer Lina Lapelyte, playwright Vaiva Grainite and director Rugile Barzjukaitė presented an experimental environmental opera "Sun and Sea (Marina)." The performance was attended by professional actors, and atmosphere players, and volunteers who played vacationers on the beach, and the audience watched them from above, playing the role of the sun. Vacationers only complain about the deteriorating environmental situation, but do nothing. The beach opera speaks about an important problem of mankind – climate change (Posokhova and Saldakeyeva 2019). The arias sing about everyday things such as sunscreen, garbage in sea water, unpredictable weather, people's workaholism, but through this a symbolic reminder of the fragility of our nature and the need to protect it is subtracted.

Lorenzo Quinn's sculpture "Building Bridges" shows how value transmission can be used to integrate values. This work is devoted to the issue of global disunity among humanity and the imperative for fostering intercultural communication. United hands symbolize love, friendship, hope, faith, wisdom and mutual assistance, these qualities, according to the artist, are necessary for dialogue and understanding.

Six pairs of giant hands symbolize the bonds between people and the connection between different cultures. Five pairs of hands can also be interpreted as five inhabited continents, and the sixth symbolizes love, without which life has no meaning. Hands touch, which means that we must strive for mutual understanding and interaction between cultures. Mankind has always achieved incredible things only by joining forces, but barriers only hinder development.

3. Discussion

The interpretation of works of art in terms of its significance in the transfer of cultural meanings is sufficiently developed in specialized scientific literature. The traditional approach to the interpretation of a work in the process of intercultural communication is as follows: it is understood as a "bearer of values" of its culture. Some part of the meanings of the work is interpreted incorrectly due to the difference in cultural codes, some part is accepted by representatives of a foreign culture due to similarity, evaluated, criticized, new meanings can be attributed to the work in the process of deciphering by representatives of

a foreign culture. Let us call this process of intercultural communication acquaintance with a foreign culture through art.

The novelty and relevance of our approach lies in the fact that we change the perspective of viewing a work of art in the process of intercultural communication. It is created as a fact of an already accomplished process of intercultural communication, because artists began to have multiple national identities, which is a clear sign of modernity. For example, the work "Lenin – Coca-Cola" by Kosolapov could only appear as a fusion of the values of two countries – the Soviet Union and America – and the sculptures of Jesus and Buddha from the ashes of Zhan Huan are the result of a combination of Buddhism and Christianity. Of course, not all works can be called "the result of intercultural communication," some, indeed, are carriers of the meanings of their own culture only. For example, while studying an ancient vase from the Han Dynasty, the viewer gets acquainted with the main symbols of traditional Chinese culture. This is the implementation of intercultural communication through familiarization with the work. A vase with Ai Weiwei's Coca-Cola logo tells us about the conflict between Eastern and Western values in modern Chinese culture. The work itself demonstrates biculturalism in the form of a provocation. The approach we have declared is debatable; other authors have not come across such reasoning. Work on this issue will continue, it is necessary, first of all, because such works are multiplying in our multicultural reality, it is necessary to clarify the methodology for their study, since art is a diagnostician of the spiritual health of society, its mirror, through which futurological forecasts have been and are being made.

Conclusion

The article described three forms of translation of cultural values in art: provocation, similarity, integration.

A provocative work occurs when an artist has found a common value base for different cultures, but wants to destroy some stereotyped images that have become so familiar that people are no longer aware of them. If masters set the task of shocking the viewer, they will desacralize, reduce images and ironize.

The transmission of cultural values through similarity is also based on the search for a common cultural foundation. However, the artist's task is to demonstrate the congruence of values. Respecting cultural traditions and taking into account the mentality of a foreign culture, the master will treat sacred images with care.

Integration as a method of value transfer arises when it is imperative to convey universal values that are comprehensible to individuals from diverse cultures. The artists will seek out the most iconic images to convey their concept.

The form of translation depends on the axiology of the artist and the artistic tasks they are assigned. The works of art described in the article were interpreted by us as the result of the artist's assimilation of the values of a foreign culture.

Knowledge of forms is necessary, first of all, for the organization of intercultural dialogue. Depending on the country, nationality, cultural context, target audience, purpose and expected results of the impact, there is a choice of the form of value transfer.

This choice result does not always have positive connotations, often the conflict of values also indicates the ongoing process of accumulation and translation of meanings. The author of the article suggests that it is possible to strategically model intercultural communication, which is of course significant both in cultural policy and at the group and individual levels, considering the forms of the process of transferring cultural meanings.

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Svetlana A. Mitasova

Međukulturalna komunikacija u savremenoj umetnosti: od provokacije do integracije

Apstrakt

U radu se analiziraju oblici prenošenja kulturnih vrednosti (značenja) kroz savremena umetnička dela. Novina pristupa umetničkom stvaralaštvu je u tome što se ono proučava i kao rezultat interkulturalne komunikacije i kao sredstvo prenošenja kulturnih značenja. Svrha ovog rada je da identifikuje, analizira i opiše oblike prenošenja vrednosti kroz dela savremene umetnosti. Autorka identifikuje tri oblika vrednosnog prevođenja u umetnosti: provokacija, sličnost, integracija. Provokacija znači da umetnik pokazuje interakciju vrednosti različitih kultura, fokusirajući se na njihovo neprijateljstvo i nedoslednost. Kao primer, umetnički objekat daje ruski umetnik koji živi u Americi, predstavnik Sots Art-a A. S. Kosolapov „Lenjin – Koka-Kola". Sličnost je, naprotiv, forma koja pokazuje blizinu značenja, potragu za zajedničkim osnovama u sistemima vrednosti društva. Ovu tezu vizualizuju skulpture Bude i Hrista kineskog umetnika Džanga Huana. Treći oblik prevođenja vrednosti u umetnosti označava se kao integracija, kada se u delu izražavaju vrednosti koje su univerzalne za sve narode: čista životna sredina, bezbednost, mir, zdravlje, sloboda, pravda i drugo. Kao primer dati su radovi pobednika Venecijanskog bijenala 2019. godine (opera-predstava „Sunce i more (Marina)" Litvanskog nacionalnog paviljona i „Beli album" američkog snimatelja Artura Jafe). Zaključuje se da je umetnost, zahvaljujući svom nadnacionalnom, simboličkom i univerzalnom jeziku, u stanju da gradi međukulturalnu komunikaciju između naroda.

Ključne reči: međukulturalna komunikacija, savremena umetnost, kulturne vrednosti, oblici prenošenja kulturnih značenja.

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WHAT IS WRONG WITH ANTI-PATERNALISM?

ABSTRACT
The article scrutinizes anti-paternalistic arguments concerning the best judgements, the autonomy and the moral status of persons. The first two have been criticized by Quong as inadequate, and the article attempts to point out the shortcomings of this critique. The best judgement argument can be reformulated, having in mind particular situations in which person's own judgement should be considered as decisive. The autonomy argument cannot be disregarded as too permissive regarding paternalism as it allows paternalistic interventions, which are weak and confined only to a strictly limited scope. Also, when considered as the condition for the validity of choice, autonomy cannot be treated as an ultimate value. Finally, the moral status argument proposed by Quong is plausible to some extent, when claiming that it is presumptively wrong to treat persons as not having equal moral powers. However, this argument does not cover the legitimate institutional policies in specific cases when it can be reasonably presumed that people will omit to act in favour of their well-being. Also, this argument would prohibit any interventions in order to increase availability of goods, even if the moral status of the persons is not affected

KEYWORDS
autonomy, availability of goods, paternalism, anti-paternalism, Quong.

Introduction

The first thought when mentioning paternalism is what it refers to etymologically, that is, the relationship between adults and children. In the literature on the philosophical concept of paternalism, this relationship is often instantiated as paradigmatic. Suppose the child does not want to eat healthy food, and the parent thinks they should do it regardless of the child's aversion to it. A parent can get a child to eat healthy food in several ways, for example through coercion, by giving rewards for having healthy food, or by eliminating the option of junk food which the child prefers. At the same time, the intentions of parents are aimed at the well-being of the child, regardless of their agreement or disagreement with the parent's food choice. The action will, therefore, be paternalistic if the person or more of them believe that the other person does not have sufficient rational capacities, the ability of independent decision-making and the

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will to act or choose in their own interest.[1] In this case, it would be permitted to apply restrictive measures against a deficient person, with the condition of good intentions or motives of the person or group that deploy restrictions, in order to change the values and preferences of the deficient person towards increasing their rational interest and well-being. Bearing in mind this example, it would be necessary to establish whether persons have a special relationship, as it existed between parent and child, in order for a certain act to be considered paternalistic. The moral justification of this interpersonal paternalism is not questionable, but the case is different when it comes to state intervention aimed at the well-being of an individual, assuming that without certain regulations or obstacles, their well-being will be threatened or diminished.

Another frequently instantiated paradigmatic case is the obligation to wear seatbelts, which stems from the assumption that people will not (or will not always) be responsible or careful to fasten seatbelts, primarily endangering themselves by this lack of character. Although most theorists agree that this rule can be characterized as paternalistic, it is an open question whether legal paternalism is the same type of paternalism as interpersonal or they differ radically. In addition, some might even claim that institutional intervention, i.e., the prohibition to drive without a fastened seatbelt, is unjustified considering the coercion and disregard for the will, autonomy and moral status of a rational adult person.

There are several reasons why institutional or legal paternalistic intervention could be different than interpersonal. First of all, the state, that is, the legislators, do not have a special relationship with individual citizens in the way that exists in the interpersonal relationship between parents and children. Second, in the justification of legislation, both paternalistic and non-paternalistic motivations and intentions are most often present. Strict paternalistic laws are difficult, or even impossible to detect, since in a democratic state laws are passed by a multitude of persons and groups who have different reasons for enacting laws and which are based on both paternalistic and non-paternalistic motives (Husak 2003: 390-391). Third, there is no justification for the state's imposition of a good or healthy life on a person as it exists in interpersonal relationships. Coercion to prevent bad actions towards oneself can be considered legitimate only in extreme cases when it leads to severe impairment of mental and physical capacities.[2] For example, hard drugs are prohibited for the reason that their use leads to complete addiction, i.e., significant impairment of judgment and autonomy, in the extreme cases to death, and it is difficult to

1 Evidently, the insufficiency in intellectual and moral abilities – which is considered as the justification of paternalism in parents-children relationship – is neither the reason for state or institutional paternalism towards citizens, as the state is not a being with human capacities, nor it is the only reason for paternalistic actions. On various relational modes of paternalism cf. Quong (2011: 76) (paternalism between parent and child), Wall (1998: 200) (paternalism between friends), Dworkin (2015: 19), and Enoch (2016: 27) (paternalism between spouses).

2 Cf.: Brock (1988: 551).

consider those drugs as one of the thrills, the enjoyments or the lifestyles that would be equal to others and which people use in full consciousness and autonomously. Fourth, laws are general and legislators cannot regard all citizens as lacking autonomy or ethical integrity. As it will be analysed in the last part of this article, this treatment of persons will lead to diminishing their personal sovereignty and render null and void their moral status.

Nevertheless, numerous liberal countries enact laws that could be characterized as paternalistic, in the sense that the paternalistic component in the motivation of the lawmakers is more pertinent. As it has been noticed (de Marneffe 2006: 91), it would be too inhumane, but also incorrect to claim that when banning driving without a fastened seatbelt, legislators are guided by the interest of insurance companies due to the increased number of premiums they have to pay to accident victims. A similar conclusion can be applied to the cases of regulation of gambling, alcohol and tobacco, the prohibition of drugs and the obligation to wear a helmet on construction sites. Although there are controversies about the nature and scope of regulation, about the effectiveness of particular measures and outcomes that may be contrary to the intention of the legislator (the ban can lead to a significant increase in crime), critics of paternalism object that supervision, over-regulation and criminalization by the state leads to restrictions to personal autonomy in determining their ends. State paternalism means a violation of the right of persons to choose what is best for them, and this choosing should be independent of state interference.

This arose two arguments against paternalism, scrutinised in details by Quong (2011: 96–100).[3] In the best judge argument, a person is in the best position to determine what is good for them, and the state is wrong when it assesses that other goals serve better for their well-being than those they prefer. The second argument refers to the autonomy of the individual, whereby the autonomy is threatened when the state limits certain aims, assuming that, on the one hand, people are not capable of making valid judgments about them or, on the other hand, that there are values or goods that are more important than autonomy itself. Therefore, paternalists claim that it would be wrong to give priority to autonomy whatever in the conflict between autonomy and other goods. The anti-paternalist argument implies that autonomy is vital to an individual's well-being, so even bad choices, if voluntary, have moral priority over choices imposed on them by someone else, regardless of the desirability and value of these heteronomous choices. In the further sections of the paper, I will deal with Quong's criticism of these arguments against paternalism, in which he points out their inadequacy, and I will try to bring out the weaknesses of this criticism. Also, I will explicate my claim that Quong's explanation of the incompatibility of liberalism with paternalism through the moral status argument also has its own shortcomings.

3 Mill is considered as the main proponent of the best judge argument, while Feinberg's and early Arneson's positions are treated by Quong as exemplary for the thesis on the primacy of a person's autonomy over her well-being.

1. The Best Judge Argument

One of the enduring traits of philosophical and political liberalism is skepticism regarding the legitimate use of paternalistic policies. As a paradigmatic, we will analyze Quong's criticism of anti-paternalism, whereby he rejects two already mentioned standard anti-paternalist arguments, i.e., the best judge argument and the autonomy argument, introducing his own argument against paternalism which is constructed in order to be fully compatible with liberalism. The first argument elucidating what is wrong with paternalism is the best judge argument, which considers that a person have the best assessment of what is good and beneficial for them, and this argument can be found in the most pertinent form in Mill, although with certain exceptions.[4] The best judgment argument has often been associated with the figure of a rational actor in the economy who can better than society or the state comprehend the aims and consequences of his actions and thus more efficiently economize with the available resources and plan economic activities optimally.

Also, certain theories of person in philosophy assumed that an individual, independently of psychological, social and political influence, will set and pursues their goals consciously, purposefully and rationally. Both the first and second theories have been proven to be fallacious.[5] As it has often been pointed out, another person or group can, on many occasions, know what the interests of a given person are better than herself/himself, and not only in terms of means, but also of the very ends that the person has set for herself/himself (Quong 2011: 97, ff. 51).[6] Just as a person can choose inadequate means due to insufficient rationality or faulty logic, in the same way, due to neurosis or some other reason, they can have irrational goals and will focus their life around unrealistic matters. It would be better for the person's well-being if someone else corrects their flaws and irrationalities, that is, to decide on their behalf if it would lead to improvement of their aims. Indolence, weakness of will, akrasia and biases can permanently harm a person's well-being. Paternalistic guidance could give a person an objective perspective and direct them to

4 Thus, Mill considers voluntary slavery and women's consent to polygamous union as illegitimate because those practices lead to diminishing a person's future ability for voluntary choice (Mill [1859] 2001: 94 and 84–85.). As it is well-known, Mill allowed that on certain occasions, where a person puts himself in danger due to a lack of information, or due to his doing something which is not his desire (when somebody wants to cross the bridge but does not wish to die), there may be a justifiable reason for legitimate paternalistic coercion. Accordingly, paternalism is prohibited in any situation where a person is informed about the nature and consequences of his decisions.

5 In recent decades, numerous winners of the Nobel Prize in economics have developed theories that have criticized classical theses on the individual as a rational agent aware of his own best interests. Psychology after Freud takes the irrational as an integral part of the personality, while the cure of neurosis consists in (paternalistic) redirection of the person's wishes to other, more realistic goals.

6 See also: Sunstein and Thaler (2003: 1167–1170), Arneson (1980: 486), de Marneffe (2006: 89), against Mill's epistemic basis for a general right against paternalism.

realistic goals, could correct them concerning adequate means, and thus paternalism would be justified. Having in mind the facts from economics and psychology on individual's imperfect rational judgments regarding their own welfare and their difficulties with handling internally conflicting self-interest motives, Quong, along with numerous authors such as Arneson, deMarneffe, Sunstein and Thaler, conclude that the best judge argument is inadequate as anti-paternalistic.

It should be noted that critics of the best judge argument often relate well-being and the best interest of the person to health, productivity, and the future development of human capacities. It can be reasonably argued that other people can know better than me about my future well-being, as well as about the means by which I can achieve my goals and preferences, but it is questionable whether their judgements can be considered as superior independently of my assessment of how to organize my own life in accordance with my interests and preferences, and what kind of activities suit my character and most satisfy my affinities and ambitions. The best judge argument cannot be dismissed unhesitatingly if it is reformulated in an appropriate way, claiming that interference in the judgment on certain harmless activities is unjustifiable. A hobby, such as philately, may be considered by most people to be less valuable and trivial, having in mind that there are much more useful ways to spend time, but this does not mean that a person is not the best judge when they consider that going in for philately is great for them and fulfills them with peace and joy. After all, who can condemn a person for counting blades of grass if it calms them down or if it is a form of meditation? Can we blame a person who spends fifteen minutes every day counting blades of grass for wasting their life? The sole purpose of the argument is to point out that there is a domain of personal activity (the so-called "authority of the first person") which is impermeable to external critique, when such activity is not harmful to others and debilitating for the very person who pursues it, as well as when the activity is not completely time-consuming and exhausting. The anti-paternalist argument is correct in this narrow and trivial domain, and in it the personal sovereignty has its place, which does not imply that the argument is correct in ethical considerations related to a person's overall well-being and in the domain of a significantly valuable ends. It is necessary to reconsider the inviolability of personal sovereignty concerning their overall well-being and complex goods. The autonomy argument tries to defend this inviolability.

2. The Autonomy Argument

A more common and well-reasoned approach against paternalism is to challenge paternalism on the grounds that it infringes personal autonomy. The argument states that autonomy does not have only the instrumental value of achieving the good or well-being of the individual, but should be taken as a value independent of goods and results of their actions. Moreover, autonomous choice has primacy in relation to well-being that is externally imposed on the

individual (Quong 2011: 97–98).[7] Although other person or more of them can know better than the person herself/himself what their interest is in terms of well-being (the smoker can admit that other people are right when they say that smoking harms their health), the person still has sovereignty over the decisions because their own life is at stake[8] (the person can still continue to smoke despite counselling and awareness of the harm). Anti-paternalistic justification of autonomy frequently is also anti-perfectionistic and differs from Raz's justification of autonomy, which regards the development and preservation of autonomy as a legitimate, if not the most important, function of public policies. Here we will scrutinize autonomy as the basis of the anti-paternalistic argument, that is, the assumption that paternalism is illegitimate for the reason of infringing autonomy.[9]

As autonomy surpasses well-being and choices that are determined externally, personal choices, however bad, should be respected, so paternalistic intervention is unjustified (Feinberg 1986: 62). Justified state intervention must be compatible with respect for personal autonomy, and when state promotion of the person's good is in conflict with the right of self-determination, this right always has priority over the good. Quong distinguishes two flaws in this justification of anti-paternalism. First, this argument is not as anti-paternalistic as it *prima facie* appears, as it keeps a back door open for paternalism in cases where it is necessary to protect a person's capacity for autonomous choice. Since the set of such activities that can impair this capacity, i.e., can put a person's physical and mental integrity at risk, is undetermined (for example, such activities can include the use of hard drugs, the consumption of foods containing saturated fats, or extreme dangerous sports, as well as mountaineering), soft paternalism becomes a hard limitation of freedom of choice.

Second, autonomy as the highest value in the anti-paternalistic argument is a conception of the good that not all rational subjects as participants in the deliberation about constitutional political principles would accept: someone prefers membership in an authoritarian non-political group, others are satisfied with the non-reflected existing social order, and some will choose a non-autonomous life, say in a monastery, as better than an individualistic one. This criticism stems from Rawls' rejection of comprehensive conceptions of the good

7 The primacy of autonomy over well-being and other ethical values is defended, among others, in Arneson (1980), Feinberg (1986), VanDe Veer (1986) and Scoccia (1990). On the critique of this primacy, see: Brock (1988) and de Marneffe (2006).

8 "The life that a person threatens by his own rashness is after all his life; it belongs to him and to no one else. For that reason alone, he must be the one to decide—for better or worse—what is to be done with it in that private realm where the interests of others are not directly involved." (Feinberg 1986: 59.) The term *autonomy* can be used synonymously with Feinberg's concept of *personal sovereignty* and VanDe Veer's concept of *the right to self-determination*. Those concepts will be used in this text interchangeably.

9 Therefore, here will be no discussion about autonomy as a value that requires a perfectionist constitution of the basic structure of society, that is, about its place within perfectionist theories.

as the basis of the construction of the principle of justice, since the acceptance of a particular conception (in this case the value of autonomy, which according to Rawls is accepted by philosophical liberals such as Mill and Kant as the basis of justice) would lead to the exclusion of persons who accept different comprehensive, but reasonable, conceptions of the good, and thus it will disregard them as equal and free members of society. Institutional interference in such a non-autonomous life, claiming that such life is less admirable, is a form of paternalism because this type of policy singles out one value as supreme one and treats the person's affirmative judgment on a non-autonomous life as ethically defective or less valuable.

The first critique is part of Quong's broader anti-perfectionist argument, and his first objection to the flaws of the anti-paternalistic autonomy argument is prone to the same controversy as the critique of perfectionism, in which any, however weak and non-intrusive, perfectionist policy is repressive for the individual's liberty. However, contrary to Quong surmise, it can be argued that perfectionist actions are not always paternalistic in the strict sense which includes coercion and repression of personal self-determination. Perfectionism legitimizes non-coercive actions that, according to some definitions of paternalism, are not paternalistic, or are so weak that the liberal political order could tolerate, even encourage them in some circumstances. For example, liberal perfectionism is akin to nudge theories that emphasize the compatibility of liberalism with posing incentives, as people's decisions are subjected to biases, prejudices, weaknesses of the will and recklessness, and an intervention can influence people non-coercively to correct their wrong orientation.[10] In the case of bias and prejudice, it is straightforward that, if the non-coercive influence of institutions or other persons leads to a change in decisions, the person himself would admit that the previous decisions (for example, to employ people on the basis of skin colour) were non-autonomous (that they were dictated by the influence of prejudices rooted in family, environment, social networks he follows, etc.). In addition, the above-mentioned influence on autonomy does not justify coercion and intrusion into, in Rawls' terms, reasonable conceptions of the good that are compatible with the principles of justice, so the impact is legitimate up to certain limits. The autonomy argument can allow certain modes of paternalistic intervention, as well as influence on decisions that are autonomous only apparently, and at the same token, the assumption on the wrongness of paternalism due to the restriction of autonomy will be correct all things considered.

Let us now consider the second critique, according to which the autonomy argument treats autonomy like any other conception of the supreme good. Rawls's theory of justice distinguishes full autonomy, or autonomy as a condition of the legitimacy of proposed political principles, and autonomy as

10 On this view, see: Sunstein and Thaller (2003), Sunstein and Thaller (2008), as well as Dworkin (2020). Quong (2011: 78) argued that these choice-improving measures are not the proper cases that can be labelled paternalistic.

the ultimate value i.e., as a part of a conception of good. In the first case, the place of autonomy is different from that comprised in Rawls' critique of perfectionist accounts of Mill and Kant, considering that their treating autonomy as a supreme value is a basic part of the comprehensive conception of good. As such, autonomy would be unwarranted as the political principle because many members of society would not accept it as the value on which the basic principles of justice should be based. In contrast, as a strictly political value, full autonomy has a prominent place when it is understood as reasonableness in the formation and acceptance of principles of justice that would have a reflexive and universalizing component by means of which the principles as political could be confirmed as fair by all reasonable persons in a society. Understood this way, autonomy is not a value chosen between others, and it is not a choice similar to, say, a choice of profession, membership in a group, or the course in which the person will lead his life. The exclamation "I decide to be autonomous" would be rather odd. Autonomy is a condition for a person to be able to decide about the fundamental principles of justice, to maintain and follow them. As Rawls in *Political Liberalism* stated, „full autonomy is realized by citizens when they act from principles of justice that specify the fair terms of cooperation they would give to themselves when fairly represented as free and equal persons" (Rawls [1993] 1996: 77).[11]

But Quong would object that the autonomy argument works on a different level than the political one in constituting fair public principles, as the autonomy argument concerns the domain of ethics and morality when autonomy is singled out as an aim of ethical action, or as an achievement in personal self-development. Also, the anti-paternalistic argument claims that paternalism is unjustified because any voluntary (which can be understood synonymously with autonomous) choice that does not harm another person is valid regardless of whether it can be rationally explained and universalized in order to be accepted by everyone. Ethical autonomy is fundamentally different from universalizing and rational full autonomy in the context of the constitution of a just order, which Kant and Rawls have in mind.

Autonomy can nevertheless be considered as a formal condition of moral and ethical judgments, so that only if a person has independently chosen certain activities as a self-legislator their choices should be considered as valuable and immune from intervention (even if they, as part of ethical action, were imprudent and in accordance with the capricious character of the person, and not

11 As Forst wrote, "reason is autonomous ("self-originating and self-authenticating" /.../) and does not need any other normative source to bind moral persons – categorically, we may add, because no other comprehensive system of value can justifiably trump the normativity of reason and its constructions" (Forst 2017: 131). About "full autonomy" see also: Forst (2017: 140). Scoccia notes that Rawls' fully autonomous subject is part of the philosophical understanding of the person in liberalism, according to which autonomous persons will inevitably develop diverse values and conceptions of the good. (cf. Scoccia 1990: ff. 16.) On the similarity of Rawls' approach with Kant's on autonomy, see also: Kogelmann (2019).

well-thought-out).[12] In a pseudo-Kantian way, two conditions of autonomy can be introduced: the first is that a person must be self-legislator, that is, be able to defend their intentions, interests, actions or values in a conscious way and to provide endorsement for them (with the already mentioned disclaimer that it does not include Kantian rational and universalizing justification of choices and values as prerequisite for personal sovereignty). The second condition is the negative aspect, claiming that a person should be able to discern in their actions, judgments and beliefs those which are independently chosen, and those which originate from heteronomous motives, such as natural impulses and the influences of the environment. An autonomous person can accept other people's interests, beliefs, concepts of good, etc. as their own, but at the same time they can admit that they were created under the influence of external incentives. We would not call a person autonomous when they emulate all the values and judgments of another person, group or society to which this person belongs. The choices that meet these two conditions could be characterized as those that are not susceptible to paternalistic coercion at any rate.

My aim was to show that the autonomy argument that would vindicate anti-perfectionism can still be valid, beside the question whether autonomy can be defended in a perfectionist and limited paternalistic way. The protection from infringement of voluntary choice can be a strong anti-paternalistic trump card, although its extension to all cases is highly disputed, i.e., the self-endangerment of a conscious choice, when a person is engaged in the destruction of his own mental and physical abilities, can be reckoned as the limit of autonomy.[13] If my interpretation is correct, the non-paternalistic autonomy argument is not 1. too permissive as it allows paternalistic interventions in a strictly limited scope, nor 2. does it represent a specific conception of good that is based

12 The case is different, however, with moral action, which must also take into account the consequences it would have on other people, as well as the opinions of other people affected by this action.

13 As it can be seen, this permission of paternalistic intervention is limited. This strict limitation of paternalism is the response to the objection of early Arneson, invoked by Quong, that the justification of paternalism in preventing voluntary slavery, health risks, and similar cases opens up space for the wide application of paternalistic measures. Banning both the sale of tobacco and fried food can be justified by the fact that they extend the lifespan of people, and thereby increase their future autonomy, albeit at the price of a significant reduction in present freedom of choice (Arneson 1980: 475.). But since every food is to some extent a medicine, and to a great extent a poison, if we were to carry out this argument ad absurdum, every food could be subject to prohibition. No one is keen to defend this kind of concession to paternalism. Soft anti-paternalism in the autonomy argument can justify prohibition measures in a strictly limited range of clear and present self-destruction of a person, as well as some restriction measures, such as tobacco taxation, regulation of casino advertising, and serving exclusively healthy food in workers' canteens. As Scoccia claims in defending the autonomy argument: "In general, the desire to live one's own life free from outside meddling will almost certainly be weaker when the consequences of implementing the choice are disastrous, unforeseen when the choice was made, irrevocable, and imminent" (Scoccia 1990: 313). See also: Husak (2003: 403).

on the ultimate value of autonomy, about which there is no agreement of all rational persons in a society. When understood as a condition for the validity of choice, autonomy (as the primacy of personal sovereignty or self-determination) does not deny a person the right to choose a non-autonomous life and does not promote autonomy and its enhancement as the highest good, but limits the institutional infringement of voluntary personal choice.

3. The Moral Status Argument

Quong's argument from moral status is part of his anti-perfectionist argument, where paternalism has been considered as one of the main hallmarks of perfectionism. Considering the failure of anti-paternalistic arguments from the best judgment and the autonomy, Quong proposes a third reason why paternalism is unsustainable from a liberal point of view. He introduces the moral status argument, according to which the unacceptability of paternalism is in the suspension of a person's judgment and consequently in denial of their status as free and equal. By preventing a person from following their conception of the good, or by pressuring them to replace it with a better one, the state does not recognize them as free. Also, if a person is treated as one who does not have the necessary capacity to possess moral powers, this person is denied the right to be a cooperative member of society, and therefore to be equal with others. Paternalism introduces relationships of supremacy, since the affected persons are treated as inferior in terms of moral status, as deficient either in terms of their intellectual or volitional abilities, while society, state, or group, by imposing restrictions on choice, considers itself to be significantly better equipped with these potentials.

Obviously, this third anti-paternalistic strategy originates from Rawls' theory. As is well known, Rawls claims that persons are regarded as equally competent members of society if they have two moral powers, namely the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good. The first moral power is the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice as a rational cooperative member of society, while the second moral power is the capacity to form, revise, and rationally pursue a conception of the good which she/he regards as worthy of living as a human being (Rawls [1993] 1996: 19 and 303). Paternalism disregards above all the second moral power by attempting not only to impose, but also to institutionally interfere with the conception of a person's good, thereby making the person aware that she/he is not able to follow their own values and choose goals independently, and thus she/he is in need of external interference to narrow down specific choices and exclude unacceptable ones. Quong calls this determination the judgmental definition of paternalism, according to which "A's act is motivated by a negative judgment about B's ability (assuming B has the relevant information) to make the right decision or manage the particular situation in a way that will effectively advance B's welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values" (Quong 2011: 80).

Quong anticipated a potential objection that is often raised to the initial assumption that persons should be treated in such a way that they are always presupposed to possess two moral powers and are equally endowed with the capacities to exercise them. The objection is that empirically those capacities are not equally developed, and Quong does not disagree with this statement. Apparently, it is possible that these moral powers are so unequally distributed that a person with a reduced capacity to judge his own good would benefit from delegating choices to others who make better choices of the good and can accomplish them more effectively. This, after all, entails the description of paternalism, as this concept refers to the fact that children, addicts and mentally impaired persons are not able to know, choose, or pursue their own good. Quong does not deny that it is possible to justify paternalism *all things considered*. Paternalistic policy is *prima facie* or *presumptively wrong*, which means that in some cases, the overall good of the paternalized person can outweigh the cost of limiting free choice, i.e., disregarding their moral status, but only with solid justification under particular conditions. Prima facie, moral wrongness is implied when persons or classes are treated as if they do not possess the first or second moral power, i.e., prima facie, it is morally right only to treat persons *as if* they possess both moral powers above the threshold (Quong 2011: 102-104).

By introducing the presumptive wrongness of paternalism that applies to everyone, as different from the matter of fact of special cases in which paternalism can be justifiable, Quong partially answered Birks' future criticism that gradation in ability concerning second moral power should be considered. It has not been denied that people in fact differ in their ability to choose ends, as well as to pursue them rationally and consistently, but a policy that treats them unequally with regard to these powers is not morally acceptable. The concept of the second moral ability is a threshold, instead of scalar, which implies that a person competent to determine the principles of justice always already has a constituted concept of good that is prudent and acceptable from a moral point of view. On the idealized level of deliberation and enacting the constitutive political principles, it should be considered that people already possess two moral powers and possess them equally. Nevertheless, all things considered and with special justification, it is not excluded that specific paternalistic measures are justified (Quong 2011: 102–103).[14]

14 On unequal capacity for second moral power, see: Briks (2014: 492–493). Here, I will not deal with Rawls'/Quong's idea of idealized moral powers. I generally agree with the rest of Birks' excellent criticism, in particular with the assumption that the argument of moral status "is incapable of discriminating between the wrongness of various cases of interventions" (Birks 2014: 497 as well as 491, ff. 25.). Birks examines the Grass encounter and Fatal enhancer cases, which in the moral status argument are unjustifiably treated as the same. The first is a well-known example of a person who counts blades of grass all day without any artificial aids that would enhance this counting. Despite its pointlessness, we are not entitled to intervene in this activity. In the second case of fatal enhancer, we prevent a person from taking pills that improve their ability to count blades of grass if those pills can fatally deteriorate a friend's health. We are

The question is, however, whether those measures can be justifiably applied only to a certain segment of the population or whether there are certain measures legitimately applicable to entire people. Bearing in mind that in the political sphere adult persons are taken as decision-making subjects, individuals with certain mental or volitional impairments can be treated as if they do not possess moral powers, so, for example, mentally impaired persons are assigned a tutor, and addicts are referred to rehabilitation and special courses for the retrieval of their intellectual abilities. As for binding regulations, which are considered paternalistic and applicable to the entire population, it can be argued that there are special cases in which paternalistic measures are imposed on all people, such as the case of seatbelts or mandatory contributions to pension funds. Quong does not scrutinize this type of paternalism, and we can only guess how he would accommodate it in his argument. He can claim that here, too, we are concerned with the cases requiring special justification and that all things considered, state intervention can be adopted, but this explanation would thereby extend the notion of paternalism significantly, which would also include those cases in which two moral powers are not called into question.

On the other hand, he can claim that this is not a matter of paternalism, but a matter of enforcement of the rule of justice when it comes to pension insurance when it is introduced in the absence of the employee's explicit consent, that is, a matter of general safety measures mandatory for everyone when it comes to the obligation to wear seatbelts. In both cases, coercion would not call into question the citizen's respect concerning their moral powers, and the respect of citizens as free and equal persons is preserved. Since "[T]he state's coercive power may be necessary to provide the requisite assurance to each citizen that others will do their fair share," citizens, as ideal legislators, might enact coercive measures related to social security and safety if all people are equally covered by them and if everyone is giving their fair share for their achievement (Quong 2011: 103, ff. 72).

However, this non-paternalistic explanation of such cases is controversial because it deviates from the standard understanding of paternalism and marks examples that are usually considered paternalistic as those that do not belong to paternalism. According to the non-paternalistic understanding, the mandatory contribution for pension insurance does not differ from the obligation to pay taxes, while the obligation to wear seatbelts has the same status as the obligation to respect traffic signs. In Quong's interpretation, paternalism is equated with perfectionism, as it is intended to the improvement of moral character and the change or correction of the conception of the good of those who are

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prone to justify anti-paternalism in the cases similar to a grass encounter, but we are much less willing to justify anti-paternalism as refraining from preventing a person from taking a potentially lethal drug. Quong should argue that these two cases are equally wrongful (Birks 2014: 495-497). Cf. also a part one of this article on the best judgment argument. For criticism of Quong's understanding of paternalism see also: Düber (2015: 38), Grill (2015: 51, ff. 2), and Tahzib (2022, chapter 9).

influenced. As we can see, this is a much narrower definition than the usual and received one, in which obligations such as wearing seatbelts and contributing to pension insurance are considered paternalistic and differs from the obligatory cases of tax contribution and obeying safety measures. Later measures are directed toward non-perfectionistic and non-paternalistic aims such as equal distribution of resources, security of property, safety of other persons in traffic etc. Although it can be considered to some extent that the function of the laws regulating the above-mentioned paternalistic obligations is to correct moral traits such as weakness of will, carelessness and negligence, it cannot be argued that these laws at any rate underestimate the moral capacities of persons, diminish or insult their moral status and disregard equal respect or freedom. Even less do they negatively affect the second moral power and persons' deeply rooted conception of the good.

It has already been mentioned that Quong apprehends that paternalism is acceptable in special cases in the interaction between individuals when a person is benevolently influenced to adopt certain values that due to intellectual or volitional weaknesses the very person does not acknowledge. Some theorists believe that paternalism can be justified on an interpersonal as well as an institutional level. Wall gives an example in which one friend gives money to another for the purpose of going to see a landscape and beginning to appreciate the aesthetic value of natural beauty (Wall 1998: 200). According to Wall, such a procedure is justifiable not only on an interpersonal level, but on an institutional level as well, since the incentive given by the state for visiting a certain landscape does not violate the moral status or personal integrity of the persons to whom the support is intended. Although, according to Quong, the interpersonal action is paternalistic and, as such, prima facie unacceptable, it can still be justified by reliable information that person has about their friend, knowing his character traits, preferences, aspirations, etc. This cannot be justified in the case of state incentives because a specific person has reliable information about the weak character or insufficient interest of friends, while the state does not have such detailed information. Friends and closely related persons are in a special relationship and have detailed information about each other, while such a position and information do not exist between the state and citizens. By imposing paternalistic measures in order to induce people to appreciate natural beauty, the state shows a lack of respect for citizens because all persons are treated without sensitivity for their distinctness, as if they do not have the capacity to appreciate valuable things on their own in the absence of an incentive from a higher authority.

However, just as a person can give a financial incentive to his friend to visit a national park in order to begin to appreciate the value of natural beauty, the state can build a road that leads to an uninhabited remote area. Why should we assume that people in general (or anyone except adventurers and a few avid nature explorers) would acquire the ability to appreciate this value if it is considerably difficult to access at a given moment? If greater justifiability of a person's paternalistic action can be given based on detailed information about

their friend's particular situation, the representatives of the state can correctly assume that the great majority of people would not be inclined to exert considerable effort to reach almost impassable areas. When officials have information, or at least justified assumptions, that people would be eager to visit the landscape if it were easily available to them, they could legitimately propose to build a road leading to it.[15] In this case too, some people could start to value natural beauty positively because a new opportunity would open up for them, but it would be dubious to claim that the decision to build the road is degrading people's second moral power, as it can be argued by Quong.

Quong omits to mention this reason in favour of perfectionist action in his critique of the experience argument for perfectionist, albeit allegedly non-paternalistic intervention. The experience argument claims that there are many valuable activities that people will not appreciate until they experience them, so the state intervention in order to create the opportunity for this experience will be legitimate. Quong criticized and refused several accounts of why people are not willing to experience valuable activities and therefore are in need of external influence, but he does not consider the low availability of the good (which is the case of remote landscape) as the reason for the public non-coercive actions which can form or increase admiration of that good.[16] The critique of experience argument deals with the paradigmatic question of why more people do not value going to the opera highly. Hypothetically, similar to the landscape case will be the situation where there is no proper road to the opera house and officials have decided to build it for non-commercial reason to make the valuable activity more available to a potential audience. This reason is not derogatory concerning people's moral and intellectual abilities whatsoever.

Conclusion

Quong's theory, as one of the most versatile defences of Rawls' liberalism and critique of perfectionism, served as a pretext for my examination of anti-paternalistic arguments. I argue, pace Quong, that the best judge argument can be reformulated so that in some morally and ethically trivial actions, priority should always be given to a person's choice and their judgement concerning the choices over third-party paternalistic pressure. In the case of the autonomy

15 It can be objected that the representatives who decide on financing the construction of the road are guided by non-paternalistic motives of attracting tourists and thereby advancing the economic prosperity of the region. But the problem is whether all the representatives will vote exclusively from the economic motive, or whether the majority will vote from this motive, or maybe the perfectionist motivation will prevail, and the representatives consider that people should appreciate and positively value the beauty of the landscape. There is a difficulty in distinguishing purely paternalistic and purely economic motives, since the representatives, who in this case vote for or against the construction of the road, are a multitude of people with different motivations for approving the same thing.

16 On the experience argument, see: Quong 2011: 94–95.

argument, autonomy, when conceived as the condition of choosing ends but not end itself, in a particular class of case may trump paternalistic measures. Like many others, Quong begins with the negative definition of paternalism and endeavor to provide valid reasons for its wrongness. But as some critics have already noticed, it is necessary to distinguish different types of influence, interpersonal as well as institutional, which are usually labelled as paternalistic, and some of them can be morally justified under certain conditions. Instead of strict anti-paternalistic approaches, perhaps it would be more plausible to distinguish a class of cases in which paternalism will be justified, while in another class, anti-paternalistic arguments will be valid.

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Michal Sládeček

Šta je pogrešno u antipaternalizmu?

Apstrakt

U članku se ispituju anipaternalistički argumenti koji se odnose na najbolji sud, autonomiju i moralni status osobe. Prva dva argumenta je Kvong (Quong) kritikovao kao neadekvatne i ovaj članak nastoji da ukaže na nedostatke ove Kvongove kritike. Argument najboljeg suda može se preformulisati tako što se uzima u obzir posebna situacija u kojoj bi vlastiti sud osobe trebalo da se smatra za odlučujući. Razlog za odbacivanje argumenta autonomije ne može da bude to što isuviše dozvoljava paternalizam, pošto paternalizam koji ovaj argument dopušta jeste blag i ograničen na striktno određeno područje. Takođe, ukoliko se razmatra kao uslov valjanosti izbora, autonomija se ne tretira kao najviša vrednost. Konačno, argument moralnog statusa koji uvodi Kvong jeste primeren do određene granice kada se njime tvrdi da je prema osnovnoj pretpostavci pogrešno da se osobe tretiraju kao da ne poseduju moralne moći. Ipak, ovaj argument ne obuhvata legitimne institucionalne politike u specifičnim slučajevima u kojima se može opravdano pretpostaviti da će osobe propustiti da delaju u korist svoje dobrobiti. Takođe, ovaj argument zabranjuje svaku intervenciju koja bi povećala dostupnost dobara, čak i kada ova intervencija ne utiče na moralni status osoba.

Ključne reči: antipaternalizam, autonomija, dostupnost dobara, paternalizam, Kvong.

III

REVIEWS

PRIKAZI

ADAM J. BERINSKY, *POLITICAL RUMORS: WHY WE ACCEPT MISINFORMATION AND HOW TO FIGHT IT*, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2023.

Čedomir Markov, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade

Did George W. Bush allow the 9/11 attack to happen? Was Barack Obama born in the United States (US)? Did Russia tamper with vote tallies to help Donald Trump win the presidency in 2016? Was the 2020 US election rigged in favor of Joe Biden? Berinsky uses these and similar narratives as examples of *political rumors*, defining them as weaponized fanciful stories that insidiously circulate through the informational ecosystem, gaining influence through social transmission. Across seven chapters, he tackles critical questions essential for understanding information disorder, primarily within the US context but with clear implications for democracies worldwide: What constitutes a political rumor? Why do people find political rumors appealing? What strategies successfully counter these rumors?

Berinsky employs the analogy of a pebble in a pond to describe the dynamics of political rumors. He likens the initiation of a rumor to tossing a pebble into water. The ripples that spread out represent different groups' relationships to the rumor. Those who accept the rumor – the believers – and those who reject it – the disbelievers – are located closest to and furthest from the center, respectively. Between them lie the uncertain – a group of people who, for one reason or another, have not made up their mind about the rumor. Most of the book is devoted to theorizing and testing how individuals come to align with one of these groups and how they might move to the disbeliever category. Berinsky argues that acceptance of political rumors is driven largely by a combination of conspiratorial disposition and partisanship. Simply put, Republican supporters are more likely to endorse rumors targeting Democrats, particularly if they are prone to conspiratorial thinking, and vice versa. In countering rumors, Berinsky emphasizes the effectiveness of debunking – providing factual corrections after rumor exposure. He finds evidence that debunking can be effective and shows that the source of the debunking message may be particularly consequential. In that respect, sources that are perceived to benefit more from perpetuating the rumor than from debunking it – referred to as "surprising sources" – are particularly impactful. Yet, this finding comes with a caveat: the effect of debunking on belief correction fades within a week, underscoring the persistent nature of misinformation. While the book stresses the importance of partisanship in rumor dynamics, Berinsky is also attentive

to a notable asymmetry: during the observed period in the US, the majority of rumors circulated within conservative circles. This observation is not to suggest conservatives are inherently more susceptible to rumors; instead, Berinsky blames Republican political elites, finding that they spread misinformation considerably more than their Democratic counterparts in addition to using ambiguous and weak statements even when attempting to refute rumors.

I find Berinsky's approach to political rumors and his emphasis on the uncertain to be the most thought-provoking parts of his argument. In contrast to the prevalence of works on disinformation and fake news in the mainstream literature, Berinsky puts the spotlight on political rumors conceptualized here as false narratives gaining traction through social transmission and moving from the fringes to the mainstream. It is this latter characteristic that makes political rumors a particularly impactful type of mis- or dis-information due to their endurance even in the presence of counter-evidence. Berinsky takes a firm stance: any position short of outright rejection is normatively undesirable. This includes the don't-knows or the uncertain. While acknowledging that this is probably a widely heterogeneous group – comprising, among others, the uninterested, the uninformed, and the skeptical – he contends that not rejecting the rumor regardless of the reason, keeps the rumor alive and fuels it. Berinsky suggests that debunking efforts should focus on reaching this group, as they are yet to make up their minds regarding the rumor and may be more open to corrections. Berinsky is clear that no single strategy is a panacea, but he clearly prioritizes debunking as superior to its alternatives, most notably inoculation strategies. Inoculation, or prebunking, rests on developing skills and mechanisms to deal with manipulation attempts prior to the exposure to misinformation. One of the reasons Berinsky offers for discounting inoculation in favor of debunking is its reliance on media literacy that typically fosters skepticism. While acknowledging the value of skepticism, Berinsky warns that excess skepticism may be paralyzing and disruptive to a functioning democracy. But considering the epistemic uncertainty of contemporary information environments, too much skepticism is the last thing that should worry us. In addition, quality media literacy interventions teach more than "don't believe anything". They foster doubt and a critical mindset but also self-reflection and skills necessary to assess the quality of evidence, reliability of sources, and the validity of arguments presented. Media literacy interventions help to cultivate a public that can engage constructively with the complexities of the modern information landscape. This, in turn, supports the foundations of a healthy democracy. In light of this book's findings on the short-lived positive effects of debunking, it is clear that a long-term strategy to combat misinformation cannot be envisaged without a media literacy component.

With no shortage of writings on mis-information in recent years, it is fair to ask what *Political Rumors* brings to this rich body of literature and who would benefit the most from reading it. Berinsky leverages his rich experience in studying public opinion and political behavior to provide a comprehensive insight into how political rumors operate, where their strength comes from, and what can be done about it. His arguments are tested with survey and experiment data collected over more than a decade of empirical research. This makes *Political Rumors* a must-read for researchers interested in contemporary information disorder, with valuable lessons for educators, practitioners, and policymakers interested in fostering more democracy-supporting political informational environments.

CYNTHIA FLEURY, *HERE LIES BITTERNESS: HEALING FROM RESENTMENT*, CAMBRIDGE: POLITY PRESS, 2023.

Zona Zarić, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade

In an insightful and probing exploration, Cynthia Fleury's book *Here Lies Bitterness: Healing from Resentment*, translated from French by Cory Stockwell, delves into the shared domain of political philosophy and psychoanalysis, confronting an issue fundamental to both the life of individuals and the fabric of societies – the pervasive discontent that undermines our existence. At the heart of this analysis is the quest to trace origins, to understand the inner self, its failings, disturbances, and desires. However, the book reveals a critical juncture where knowledge alone proves inadequate for healing, calming, or soothing the troubled psyche. It argues that overcoming sorrow, anger, mourning, resignation, and, most notably, resentment – the bitter sentiment that threatens to consume us, even as we might find its subtle and liberating flavor – is essential.

Here Lies Bitterness: Healing from Resentment presents a profound examination of the multifaceted nature of bitterness, exploring its genesis from personal grievances to its expansive influence on societal discord and political unrest. Fleury's exploration is not just an academic endeavor; it is a timely intervention into current sociopolitical debates and discourses. Amidst growing polarizations, her insights into the internal and external manifestations of bitterness offer a critical lens through which to understand and navigate the challenges facing modern democracies. By contextualizing the book within her broader body of work, it becomes evident that Fleury is not merely diagnosing societal ailments but also proposing pathways towards reconciliation and healing. Fleury's book emerges as a crucial resource for scholars, and anyone seeking to comprehend the complex interplay between individual emotions and the structural dynamics of power and inequality in our contemporary world. Fleury's contributions to philosophy and psychoanalysis are not just academic; they encompass a broader societal impact, particularly in the domain of healthcare, where she emphasizes the importance of humanity in patient care, describing it as more than mere repair work. She also asserts the significance of care as a fundamental truth within democracy, suggesting a deep connection between ethical caregiving and democratic values. Her work also enriches the discourse on power, social hierarchies, and personal agency, offering a poignant critique of the mechanisms through which resentment is cultivated

and sustained. The uniqueness of her contribution lies in elucidating the pathways through which individuals and societies can recognize and overcome the bitterness that undermines social cohesion and personal fulfillment.

The democratic adventure, the book posits, similarly engages with this challenge of victimhood rumination. It raises a pivotal question: How can the democratic entity, at any level, whether institutional or otherwise, manage to curb the resentful impulse that endangers its longevity? Both individuals and the rule of law are presented with the same daunting task: to diagnose resentment, acknowledge its dark power, and resist the temptation to let it drive our personal and collective narratives.

The book is composed of three parts, each containing a collection of very small subchapters, an average of two to three pages. This unorthodox structure makes for an easier, almost encyclopedic or dictionary entry style read, to which the reader can easily return, thus making a not so accessible and highly intellectual style more welcoming. Part I explores the essence of bitterness, delineating its universality and its intricate relationship with individual experiences and societal structures. Fleury introduces the concept of resentment as a deeply ingrained emotional and psychological state that affects individuals' interactions within society, as well as the collective ethos of communities and nations. The chapters within this section systematically unravel the layers of resentment, from its origins to its manifestations in personal identity, societal dynamics, and even literature. Part II shifts the focus towards the socio-political dimensions of resentment, particularly its role in shaping political ideologies and movements. Fleury examines how resentment fuels the rise of fascism and other forms of political extremism. Through a detailed analysis, she elucidates how collective resentment can be manipulated by political entities, leading to the erosion of democratic values and the perpetuation of social divisions. Part III, entitled "The Sea," symbolically represents the potential for healing and transcendence beyond the confines of resentment. Fleury posits that through understanding and confronting our bitterness, individuals and societies can navigate towards reconciliation and unity. This section offers a philosophical and practical guide for overcoming the barriers erected by resentment, emphasizing the importance of empathy, self-reflection, and the willingness to engage with the 'other.'

It is important to underscore the book's compelling argument that the path to overcoming the undercurrent of discontent lies not only in understanding our deepest troubles but also in transcending them, through personal agency, thus fostering a society capable of confronting and mitigating the seeds of its own potential undoing. Through a nuanced examination of the interplay between personal psyche and political governance, it calls for a collective effort to address and overcome the resentment that imperils both individual well-being and democratic resilience. "That said," as Fleury writes, "it is good to remember the extent to which pathologies are integrated into eras, and that the two are difficult to separate, even if certain pathologies are personal in nature" (2023: 24).

Fleury's book demonstrates significant strengths, primarily through its meticulous analysis, interdisciplinary methodology, and the lucidity of its arguments. The book's strength lies in its ability to weave together insights from psychoanalysis, philosophy, and political science, providing a holistic view of how resentment and bitterness permeate individual and societal levels. Fleury's clear and persuasive arguments facilitate an in-depth understanding of complex concepts, making them accessible to a broad audience. Her analysis

can be juxtaposed with Nietzsche's philosophical examination of resentment, particularly as discussed in works exploring Nietzsche's views on resentment, love, and pity. While Nietzsche views resentment as stemming from a place of powerlessness and a reactive stance towards perceived injustices, Fleury extends this concept to critique contemporary societal structures and the dynamics of power within them. Fleury's in-depth exploration illuminates how these emotions, rooted in feelings of inferiority and unmet expectations, can destabilize democratic institutions and social harmony. Engaging with authors ranging from Frantz Fanon, Theodore Adorno, Max Scheler, Donald Winnicott, Emil Cioran to Wilhelm Reich, the book stands out for bridging theoretical insights with empirical realities, enriching the academic discourse on the emotional underpinnings of political and social behavior.

The practical implications of Fleury's book are manifold. For policymakers, understanding the root causes of resentment can inform the creation of more inclusive, equitable policies that address societal grievances before they escalate. Social scientists can leverage Fleury's interdisciplinary framework to further examine the intersections of emotion, power dynamics, and societal structures. For the general public, this book demystifies the sources of societal division, offering a roadmap towards empathy, dialogue, and reconciliation. *Here Lies Bitterness: Healing from Resentment* not only advances academic discussions but also serves as a crucial guide for addressing the challenges of modern democracy. Fleury's call to acknowledge and address resentment's corrosive effects is a timely reminder of the urgent need for comprehensive strategies that foster societal resilience and unity.

IV

FROM THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE

IZ RADA INSTITUTA

PREGLED TRIBINA I KONFERENCIJA U INSTITUTU ZA FILOZOFIJU I DRUŠTVENU TEORIJU ZA 2023. GODINU

Vukan Marković i Marija Branković

PREDAVANJA, SEMINARI I PROMOCIJE KNJIGA:

JANUAR:

27.01. Predstavljanje projekta *Introducing the First MA Program in Holocaust and Genocide Studies in Serbia*

FEBRUAR:

08.02. Razgovor o tematu časopisa *Filozofija i društvo 33-4*: „Nasilje rata" (CriticLab):

- Učesnici: Kornelija Ičin, Oleg Nikiforov, Vasilisa Šljivar, Andrej Menjšikov, Petar Bojanić.

09.02. Seminar „Moris Blanšo i fragmentarno pisanje" o knjizi *Korak (ne) na onu stranu* (CriticLab)

- Učesnici: Tomislav Brlek, Zrinka Božić, Sanja Bojanić, Nemanja Mitrović

09.02. Uvodni seminar o digitalizaciji kulturnog nasledja za angažovane na projektu - Filecon "Distributed Archiving at IFDT"

13.02. – 14.02. Radionica: „Razdvajanje urbanog i ekološkog nasleđa u Beogradu na vodi" (PerspectLab):

- Govornici: Nikolina Bobić, Sanja Iguman, Iva Čukić, Ana Perić, Maja Ćurčić, Marko Đukić, Aleksandar Obradović

17.02. Predavanje Kristiana Randelovića „Izvan binarnosti: sve što niste znali o interseks varijacijama" (GenLab)

21.02. Predavanje: Kodi Dž. Inglis „Republikanska levica u Podunavskoj Evropi, 1900-1948: Komparativna istorija političke misli" (CriticLab, YugoLab)

23.02. Predavanje Denise Kostovicove i Ivana Sokolića „Deliberalizacija i tranziciona pravda" (ActiveLab)

24.02. Radionica „Istraživanje položaja pokreta osoba sa invaliditetom u centralnoj i istočnoj Evropi", Gabor Petri (SolidCare, ActiveLab)

28.02. Razgovor o knjizi Lucije Balikić *Najbolje namjere: Britanski i francuski intelektualci i stvaranje Jugoslavije* (YugoLab)

MART:

03.03. Promocija knjige *Istorija Jugoslavije u svjetlu kritike* (prir. Božidar Jakšić) (YugoLab)

- Učesnici: Božidar Jakšić, Olga Manojlović Pintar, Damir Agičić, Petar Žarković, Marija Mandić

06.03. Razgovor o knjizi Aiše Liviane Mesine *The Writing of Innocence: Blanchot and the Decontruction of Christianity* (CriticLab)

- Učesnici: Aiša Livina Mesina, Patrik Frenč, Kristofer Finsk, Petar Bojanić, moderator Nemanja Mitrović

08.03. Predavanje Aditi Sing „Feministička buntovnica: Sofoklova Antigona, Bizeova Karmen i Urban Gadova Die Suffragette“ (GenLab)

08.03. Predavanje Rorija Arčera i Mladena Zobca „Na severozapad! Unutrašnja migracija jugoslovenskih Albanaca (1953-1989)”

08.03. Predavanje Džoane Žilinske „Ne-ljudska kreativnost: Veštačka imaginacija: Ljudska anticipacija” (u okviru ciklusa predavanja „Budućnost veštačke inteligencije”) (DigiLab)

10.03. Seminar o knjizi Miloša Ćipranića *Opisi arhitektonskih objekata u antici* (PerspectLab)

- Učesnici: Miloš Ćipranić, Nenad Ristović, Olga Špehar, Petar Bojanić, Snežana Vesnić, Tamara Plećaš, Tatjana Ristić, Vladimir Mako, Vojislav Jelić, Zoja Bojić

14.03. Promocija knjige Ivana Nišavića *Priroda, duša i sreća: temelji epikurejske etike* (EduLab)

- Učesnici: Ivan Nišavić, Mašan Bogdanović, Aleksandar Dobrijević, Tamara Plećaš, Predrag Krstić, Aleksandar Ostojić

16.03. Predavanje Kevina Lagrandura „Implikacije digitalnog poboljšanja mozga” (u okviru ciklusa predavanja: Budućnost veštačke inteligencije) (DigiLab)

20.03. Predavanje Aleksandara Ostojića „Teorija vs. posmatranje: Kvajn-Dijemova hipoteza i pojmovna neodređenost u nauci”, (CriticLab)

23.03. Promocija knjige Slađane Kavarić Mandić *Filozofija Danka Grlića* (CriticLab)

- Učesnici: Slađana Kavarić Mandić, Lino Veljak, Miloš Ćipranić, Dragan Stojković, Igor Cvejić

27.03. Razgovor o knjizi *Socialist Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement: Social, Cultural, Political, and Economic Imaginaries*, ur. Pol Stabs (YugoLab)

- Učesnici: Pol Stabs, Nemanja Radonjić, Jelena Vasiljević, Stefan Gužvica

28.03. Radionica „Etnografski priručnik za istraživanje industrijskog nasleđa kroz fotografiju” (PerspectLab)

- Radionicu vode Sara Nikolić i Dušanka Milosavljević

29.03. Predavanje Katrin Herold „(Ponovno) mobilisanje masa: građansko društvo i društvene promene u 21. veku” (SolidCareLab)

APRIL:

03.04. – 07.04. Čitalačka radionica „Može li metafizika da razbije cigle? Radionica o društvenoj metafizici, društvenoj konstrukciji i društvenoj promeni” (CriticLab)

- Jorgos Karagianopulos: “What can Class Abolition teach Metaphysics?”
- Aleksandra Knežević: “Uncovering the Metaphysics of Social Change”

04.04. Predavanje Stefana Gužvice „Marksističke teorije zavisnosti i nejednakog razvoja na Balkanu do kraja 1920ih” u sklopu seminara „Jugoslavija unutar svetskog sistema: teorije zavisnosti i nejednakog razvoja” (YugoLab)

07.04. Projekcija i razgovor o filmu Filipa Martinovića *Telenovela: sivo u koloru* (PerspectLab)

13.04. Predavanje Milice Lazić „Kriza u nauci: upotreba i zloupotreba scientometrije” (CriticLab)

18.04. Predavanje Ane Gavran Miloš „Aristotelijansko građansko prijateljstvo i pluralizam sposobnosti"

19.04. Predavanje Tanje Petrović „Slovenačka alternativna scena 1980-ih: efekti ambivalentnosti" (Yugolab)

22.04. Javno vođenje u Logoru na Sajmištu povodom obeležavanja Dana sećanja na žrtve genocida (ShoahLab)

25.04. Predavanje: Radeta Pantića „Kraljevina SHS/Jugoslavija u klasičnoj međunarodnoj podeli rada" (u okviru seminara „Jugoslavija unutar svetskog sistema: teoriju zavisnosti i nejednakog razvoja") (YugoLab)

27.04. Predavanje Mihaila Buhtojarova „Konektovan, augmentovan i diskonektovan učenik: Besprekornost i interupcije obrazovnog iskustva" (DigiLab, EduLab)

28.04. Seminar o knjizi Siniše Malešević *Why Humans Fight* (CriticLab)

MAJ:

03.05. Razgovor o knjigama Majkla Nasa *Don DeLillo, American Original* i *Apocalyptic Ruin and Everyday Wonder in Don DeLillo's America* (CriticLab)

- Učestvuju: Majkl Nas, Kristofer Finsk, Tomislav Brlek, Nemanja Mitrović

04.05. Predavanje Matije Vigato „Ontologija percepcije i proširena stvarnost" (CriticLab)

04.05. Predavanje Luka Perušića „Opravdanost Ajdove kritike Hajdegerove romantizacije na primeru umetne inteligencije" (CriticLab)

05.05. Seminar o knjizi Željka Radinkovića *Filozofija tehnike. Uvod u teoriju tehničkog odnošenja prema svijetu* (PerspectLab & CriticLab)

- Učesnici: Petar Bojanić, Damir Smiljanić, Luka Perušić, Snežana Vesnić, Tamara Plećaš, Olga Nikolić, Srđan Prodanović, Igor Cvejić

09.05. Predavanje Rastka Močnika „Istorijski značaj jugoslovenskog socijalizma" (u okviru seminara „Jugoslavija unutar svetskog sistema: teorije zavisnosti i nejednakog razvoja") (YugoLab)

10.05. Seminar o knjizi Daniela Markovića *Promoting a New Kind of Education: Greek and Roman Philosophical Protreptic* (EduLab)

- Učesnici: Daniel Marković, Darko Todorović, Igor Cvejić, Ivan Nišavić, Milica Sekulović, Olga Nikolić, Predrag Krstić, Sandra Šćepanović, Tamara Plećaš

11.05. Predavanje Daniela Markovića „Aristotel, Ciceron i kritičko razmišljanje kao obrazovni ideal" (EduLab)

12.05. Radionica „Pojedinačni činovi" (PerspectLab)

- Snežana Vesnić: „Od čina do pojave: disjunkcije realnog"
- Željko Radinković: „Razumevanje i performativnost"
- Zoran Erić: „Derive: Teorija I praksa Situacionističke internacionale"
- Prezentacija performansa „Pojavljivanja" uz koordinaciju Saše Karalića

15.05. Seminar o knjizi Ivane Dobrivojević Tomić *Izmedju nebrige i neznanja.* Žene, seksualnost i planiranje porodice u Jugoslaviji 1918 - 1991. (YugoLab, SolidCareLab)

- Učesnice: Ivana Dobrivojević Tomić, Sanja Petrović Todosijević, Ljiljana Pantović, Jelena Ćeriman, moderatorka Milica Sekulović

16.05. Seminar o knjizi Kevina Meklolina *The Philology of Life: Walter Benjamin's Critical Program* (CriticLab)

- Učesnici: Kevin Meklolin, Kristofer Finsk, Avital Ronel, Petar Bojanić

18.05. Promocija časopisa Khōrein: Journal for Architecture and Philosophy; (PerspectLab), Serra dei Giardini, Venecija.

22.05. Predavanje Bruna Ganšea „Budućnost veštačke inteligencije i njena sadašnja prisutnost" (DigiLab)

23.05. Predavanje Dimitrija Birača „Koncept socijalizma u sovjetskom i jugoslavenskom udžbeniku političke ekonomije" (u okviru seminara „Jugoslavija unutar svetskog sistema: teorije zavisnosti i nejednakog razvoja") (YugoLab)

24. 05. Prvi okrugli sto: „Nasilje u medijima i izveštavanje o nasilju: Profesionalni standardi, zakonske obaveze i posledice po društvo"

- Učesnici: An Mari Alves-Ćurčić, Olja Jovanović Milanović, Judita Popović, moderator Čedomir Markov

24.05. – 25.05. Radionica sa stipendistima u okviru projekta sa Fondacijom za otvoreno društvo "Srbija i globalni izazovi"

30.05. Predavanje Jegora Senjikova: "Transformacija sovjetske televizije: uloga novinara u promeni narativa" (YugoLab)

30.05. Predavanje Maksima Mirošničenka: "Kibernetika drugog reda: Od refleksivnosti do biokosmologije"

31.05. Drugi okrugli sto: "Kako danas razumeti decu i mlade: Razvojne sposobnosti, potrebe dece i mladih, šta mi iz starijih generacija propuštamo da vidimo"

- Učesnici: Aleksandar Kontić, Hana Korać, Luka Babić, Marija Krunić, Irena Fiket

JUN:

01.06. Promocija knjige Ane Đorđević *Miris ajvara i miris lavande. Ograničenja i slobode (od) etničke identifikacije za mlade u Srbiji*

- Učesnici: Biljana Jovanović, Jelena Vasiljević, Igor Cvejić, Tijana Nikitović

06.06. Predavanje Ane Podvršič „Jugoslavija pod vašingtonskim konsenzusom: Od dužničke krize do raspada države" (u okviru seminara „Jugoslavija unutar svetskog sistema: teorije zavisnosti i nejednakog razvoja") (YugoLab)

09.06. Seminar o knjizi Jovana Bajforda *Genocid u nezavisnoj državi Hrvatskoj na slikama: Fotografije zverstava i sporno sećanje na Drugi svetski rat u Jugoslaviji* (ShoahLab)

- Učesnici: Olga Marjanović Pintar, Gavro Burazor, Dragana Stojanović, Milovan Pisarri, moderatorka Marija Velinov

09.06. Predavanje Andreasa Kaminskog „Zastarelost naših koncepata: Interakcija čoveka i mašine u kontekstu veštačke inteligencije" (u sklopu ciklusa predavanja „Budućnost veštačke inteligencije") (DigiLab)

12.06. Predstavljanje časopisa *Khorein: Journal for Architecture and Philosophy* (PerspectLab)

- Učesnici: Petar Bojanić, Snežana Vesnić, Vladan Đokić, Branko Mitrović, moderatori Milica Mađanović i Zoran Erić

12.06. Seminar o knjizi Branka Mitrovića *Architectural Principles in the Age of Fraud* (PerspectLab)

- Učesnici: Branko Mitrović, Petar Bojanić, Snežana Vesnić, Marko Ristić, Miloš Ćipranić

14.06. Treći okrugli sto „Školstvo na raskrsnici: U kakvom je stanju školski sistem i ko je pozvan da ga uređuje?"

- Učesnici: Aleksandar Baucal, Ana Dimitrijević, Marina Vidojević, moderatori Petar Žarković i Jelena Vasiljević

15.06. Razgovor o knjizi Bogomira Hermana *Quo Vadimus*

- Učesnici: Dušanka Milosavljević, Milica Resanović, Stefan Gužvica

19.06. Razgovor o knjizi Marije Branković *Psihologija odnosa ljudi i (ostalih) životinja*

- Učesnice: Tamara Džamonja Ignjatović, Ivana Živaljević, Jelena Čeriman, Marija Branković

20.06. Predavanje Marka Kržana „Suvremeni imperijalizam" (u okviru seminara seminara „Jugoslavija unutar svetskog sistema: teorije zavisnosti i nejednakog razvoja") (YugoLab)

30.06. Predavanje Nenada Jovanovića „Politike refleksivnih dokumentaraca"

JUL:

12.07. Predavanje Petra Bojanića „Šta pobeda sada znači u etici rata?" (Steinmatte Campus)

SEPTEMBAR:

11.09. – 13.09. Sastanak istraživačke grupe YUGOFUTURISM – Projekat *Testing Ground: Reparative Practices for New Cultural Ecosystem* (Maska, Kurziv, Krytyka Polityzna, IFDT)

13.09. Predavanje Volfganga Merkela „Otpornost demokratija – odgovori na iliberalne i autoritarne izazove" (ActiveLab)

14.09. Razgovor o knjizi Davora Džalta *Beyond Capitalist Dystopia: Rethinking Freedom and Democracy in the Age of Global Capitalism.* (CriticLab)

- Učesnici: Davor Džalto, Marjan Ivković, Mark Lošonc, Milan Urošević, Damir Zejnulahović.

21.09. Razgovor o knjizi Larsa Ajera *My Weil* (The European Graduate School, IFDT)

- Učesnici: Lars Ajer, Kristofer Finsk, Aron Akilina, moderator: Nemanja Mitrović.

OKTOBAR:

04.10. Predavanje Klausa Vigerlinga: „Tehnička autonomija i problem otpornosti" (DigiLab)

05.10. Predstavljanje projekta „Procena uticaja neoplatonizma na Balkanu u 14. i 15. veku"

- Učesnici: Vladimir Cvetković, Aleksandar Đakovac, Hristina Mitić, Maja Kalezić.

06.10. – 8.10. Radionica „Nevidljive stvarnosti: radionica vizuelne i arhitektonske etnografije", (KABA-HAT, PerspectLab)

14.10. Seminar za nastavnike „Čemu još filozofija?" (EduLab)

27.10. Predavanje Tome Piketija povodom dodele nagrade *Miladin Životić*: „Kratka istorija ravnopravnosti" (L'Institut français Serbie, Akademska knjiga, IFDT, moderatorka događaja Zona Zarić).

28.10. Predavanje Žilije Kaže: „Kako sačuvati nezavisnost medija?" (L'Institut français Serbie, Akademska knjiga, IFDT).

28.10. Seminar o knjizi Tome Piketija *Kapital i ideologija* (CriticLab, YugoLab)

- Učesnici: Toma Piketi, Branko Milanović, Jahati Goš, Nikola Duvo, Ivica Mladenović, Jelena Žarković, Marjan Ivković, Mihail Arandarenko, Gazela Pudar Draško (moderatorka).

NOVEMBAR:

02.11.-03.11. Internacionalni sastanak radne grupe „Contesting Identities of Roma and Muslims in Central and Eastern Europe - Multiple Discrimination and Various Strategies of Inclusion"

- Učesnici: Selma Muhič Dizdarevič, Gvendolin Albert, Adriana Cupcea, Zora Hesová, Amina Easat-Daas, Ksenia Trofimova, Ivan Ejub Kostić, Laslo Fosto, Milovan Pisarri, Hikmet Karcić, Muamer Džananović, Rubin Zemon, Ljuan Koko, Osman Balić

02.11. Predavanje Žeroma Rudijea: „Makijaveli i rađanje "političkog programa" u modernom smislu" (CriticLab).

06.11. Okrugli sto „Revolucija i emancipacija: Mitra Mitrović i *Žena danas*" (YugoLab i GenLab)
- Učesnici: Veljko Stanić, Stanislava Barać, Tijana Matijević
- Moderator: Petar Žarković

08.11. Predavanje Sergeja Ševčenka: „Izgubljeni u vremenu i prostoru. Migracije, 'zavisnost od droga' i epistemiološka nepravda" (SolidCareLab).

09.11. Predavanje Igora Dude: „Nigdje nema idealne mjesne zajednice, ali...": o društvenom samoupravljanju u Jugoslaviji" (YugoLab).

09.11. Predavanje Neena Singh: „Podizanje AI pismenosti i zajedničko kreiranje AI rešenja za društvene izazove" (DigiLab).

16.11. Razgovor o knjizi Hajke Karge: *Čar šizofrenije: psihijatrija, rat i društvo u hrvatsko-srpskom region* (ShoahLab)

16.11. Predavanje Žoaa Bačura „Pravila, sleđenje pravila i implicitna normativnost: nova paradigma pravne teorije?" (CriticLab)

17. 11. Tematski sastanak „Ko se boji roda još?" (GenPolSEE, Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju i Instituta za društvene nauke).
- Uvodna reč: Goran Bašić, Tamara Plećaš, Paola Petrić
- Panel: "The troubles with gender-sensitive language"
  - Moderatorka: Lilijana Čičkarić
  - Učesnici: Zorica Mršević, Milica Antić Gaber, Roman Kuhar, Svetlana Tomić, Marina Nikolić, Marija Mandić, Jelena Ćeriman
- Panel: "Is anti-gender only about gender sensitive language?"
  - Moderatorka: Adriana Zaharijević
  - Učesnici: Biljana Kotevska, Miloš Jovanović, Roman Kuhar, Tanja Vučković Juroš, Vjollca Krasniqi
- Panel: "Post-Yugoslav context of anti-gender mobilisations"
  - Moderatorka: Đurđa Trajković
  - Učesnici: Maja Gergorić, Manja Veličkovska, Milica Resanović, Rok Smrdelj, Tijana Matijević

20.11. Promocija knjige *Refusing to Be Silent: Engaged Conversations with Leading Intellectuals*, (The Centre for Critical Democracy Studies, American University of Paris, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory)
- Učesnici: Erik Fasin, Gazela Pudar Draško, Zona Zarić, Filip Golub

22.11. Predavanje Klausa Bahmana „Međunarodna pravda u kontekstu rata u Ukrajini"

28.11. Predavanje Kasie Hmielinski „Unos i ishod pristrasnosti: kreiranje bolje veštačke inteligencije kroz transparentnost podataka" (DigiLab)

30. 11. Okrugli sto „Od akušerskog nasilja do dostojanstvenog porođaja: istraživanja i iskustva" (GenLab)
- Učesnici: Ana Petrović, Mina Šarenac, Biljana Stanković, Ljiljana Pantović; moderatorka: Rácz Krisztina

DECEMBAR:

07.12. Razgovor o knjizi Franciske Caug *Regrutacije za Vafen SS u Jugoistočnoj Evropi. Ideje, ideali i stvarnost multietničke vojske* (ShoahLab)

13.12. Panel diskusija "Kako do socijalne zaštite koja odgovara potrebama građana? Socijalna prava i građanske skupštine". (ActiveLab)
- Učesnici: Gazela Pudar Draško, Danilo Ćurčić, Irena Fiket, Jovana Timotijević, Nađa Marković, Uroš Randelović

14.12. Promocija knjige Slaviše Orlovića *Nadziranje demokratije* (ActiveLab)
- Učesnici: Gazela Pudar Draško, Jelena Vasiljević, Despot Kovačević, Sanja Domazet, Dušan Spasojević

21.12. Seminar o knjizi Filipa Balunovića *Beda ljudskih prava: Desnica, pandemija i nauka kao novo polje političke borbe*. (ActiveLab i CriticLab).

- Učesnici: Adriana Zaharijević, Ivica Mladenović, Aleksandar Pavlović, Jelena Lončar, Igor Štiks, Nevena Mijatović, Danilo Čurćić, Filip Balunović

KONFERENCIJE, SIMPOZIJUMI I PANELI:

JANUAR:

24.01. Konferencija „Model održivog razvoja za arheološke parkove u jadransko-jonskoj regiji", projekt Transfer, Narodni muzej u Beogradu:

- Pozdravna reč: Sanja Iguman, Miloš Ćipranić, Bojana Borić Brešković
- Glavni govornik: Roberto Vannata
- Jutarnji panel: "A New Integrated and Sustainable Approach: New Management Plans and Concrete Experience from Pilot Actions in Italy, Albania, Slovenia, Greece, and Croatia"
  - Učesnici 1: Sofia Cingolani, Melsi Labi, Jana Horvat
  - Učesnici 2: V. N. Papadopoulou, P. Yiouni, I. Katsadima, E. Vasileiou, Kristijan Lončarić, Petra Furčić, Sandra Dubravica
- Adrion Programme: "Present experiences and future possibilities of European territorial cooperation in the Adriatic Ionian Region"
  - Govornik: Antonia Agrosi
- Zaključna reč jutarnjeg panela: Roberto Perna
- Uvodna reč: Roberto Perna
- Okrugli sto "A Sustainable Development Model for Archaeological Parks"
  - Moderator: Vesna Marjanović
  - Učesnici: Elena Calandra, Luan Perzhita, Irena Lazar, Ivana Samardžić

26. 01. Manifestacija „Holokaust: nasleđe fašizma 5 - tonovi zla" Spomen-park „Kragujevački oktobar" (ShoahLab/IFDT, Savez jevrejskih opština Srbije, Centar za primenjenu istoriju – Beograd, Univerzitet u Kragujevcu, Udruženje „Jevrejska digitalna biblioteka", Spomen-park „Kragujevački oktobar")

- Uvodna izlaganja: Marijana Stanković, Marko Terzić, Predrag Krstić
- Blok 1: „Holokaust i mladi"
  - Drita Tutunović: „Oni koji su preživeli Holokaust"
  - Nada Banjanin Đuričić: „Muzika kao nastavni materijal u obrazovanju o Holokaustu"
- Blok 2: „Izrazi neizrazivog"
  - Anja Lazarević Kocić: „Muzički memorijali Holokausta – umetnička muzika inspirisana Holokaustom"
  - Ivan Lončarević: „Da li muzika i dalje ima moć da leči, čak i u slučajevima kada je tragedija istorijski neuporediva? Odnos rok muzike i ostalih žanrova popularne i manje popularne muzike prema Holokaustu"
  - Tamara Plećaš: „*Mauthauzen triologija: sećanja* autora Mikisa Teodorakisa: studija slučaja muzičkog dela nastalog u kontekstu Holokausta"
- Blok 3: „Holokaust i muzika"
  - Moderator: Predrag Krstić
  - Učesnici: Marija Dinov, Vera Mevorah, Maja Vasiljević

FEBRUAR:

03.02. Kolokvijum o *Pismima* Svetog Maksima Ispovednika (IFDT, Fakultet slobodnih umetnosti Univerziteta

Karoli Gaspar Protestantske crkve u Mađarskoj)

- Uvodna reč: Gazela Pudar Draško
- Panel 1:
  - Moderator: Alex Leonas
  - Bronwen Neil: „Pisma Maksima Ispovednika i njegov epistolarni krug"
  - Miklos Vassanyi: „Asketske pouke u Maksimovim pismima"
  - Vukašin Milićević: „*Teosis* i *Adiairetos Artimos* u pismima Svetog Maksima"
  - George Siskos: „Sv. Maksimova kritika hristologije Severa Antiohijskog: Pisma 12, 13, 15 i 18"
  - Aleksandar Đakovac: „Neki aspekti promisli i logosa u pismima Sv. Maksima"
- Panel 2:
  - Moderator: Vladimir Cvetković
  - Dionysios Skliris: „Pojam ljubavi u pismima Svetog Maksima Ispovednika"
  - Vladimir Cvetković: „Da li je duša potpuno ili delimično funkcionalna posle smrti? 6 i 7. pismo Sv. Maksima Ispovednika"
  - Sotiris Mitralexis: „Maksim Ispovednik o duši (i telu) u 6. pismu"
  - Luis Sales: „Afrička pisma Maksima Ispovednika: Ključni dokazi za utvrđivanje njegovog porekla?"
  - Panayiotis Petar Hasiakos: „Prevođenje hristoloških pisama Maksima Ispovednika (Pisma 12-19)"

10.02. Panel diskusija „Rodna ravnopravnost ide unazad: Srbija, Bugarska, Severna Makedonija" (GenPol-SEE mreža, GenLab/IFDT)

- Moderatorka: Adriana Zaharijević
- Govornice: Irena Cvetkovik, Katarina Lončarević, Gergana Nenova

MART:

07.03. Okrugli sto „Misao Zorana Đinđića: filozofske i politikološke perspektive" (YugoLab)

- Učesnici: Petar Bojanić, Novica Milić, Lino Veljak, Aleksandar Molnar, Aleksandar Miletić, Ivica Mladenović, Bojan Dimitrijević, Slaviša Orlović, moderator Petar Žarković i Vujo Ilić

07. 03. Panel diskusija „Politička postignuća Zorana Đinđića" (YugoLab)

- Učesnici: Vesna Pešić, Vesna Mališić, Zoran Lutovac, Gordana Matković, moderator Milivoj Bešlin

10. 03. Panel diskusija: „Zoran Đinđić i spoljnopolitička orijentacija Srbije 2003-2023" (YugoLab)

- Učesnici: Vesna Pusić, Milovan Božinović, Ivan Vujačić, Anke Konrad, moderatorka Gazela Pudar Draško

APRIL:

27.04.-29.04. Konferencija: „U trvenjima: Fragmenti brige, zdravlja i blagostanja na Balkanu" (SolidCareLab, IFDT i Odeljenje za etnologiju i antropologiju Univerziteta u Zadru)

- 27.04.
  - Uvodne reči: Gazela Pudar Draško, Tomislav Oroz
  - Glavna govornica: Sabina Stan "Connecting the Fragments of Care: Transnational processes at the margins of Europe"
  - Panel 1: "Market Transformations of (Health)care"
    - Ana Luleva: "Precarity, Social Reproduction, and Moral Economy of Care after State Socialism in Bulgaria"
    - Christina Novakov-Ritchey: "The Politics of Strah: Traditional Meidicine and Balkan Capitalist Realism"

        - Andre Thiemann: "Fledgling farms and failing health: Transformations of multispecies labor and care in the Serbian raspberry fields"
        - Discussant: Senka Božić Vrbančić
    - Panel 2: "Healthcare Systems in the Balkans"
        - Tanja Bukovčan: "Fragments of the past for the fragmented future: taking care of (Balkan) healthcare"
        - Marija Ratković: "Biopolitical Regulations: The Obstruction of Intimacy, Trust, and Confidence. The case of women healthcare in Post-Yugoslav Space"
        - Eda Starova Tahir: "Public Healthcare Bureaucracies and Negotiating Notions of Care in North Macedonia"
        - Discussant: Atila Lukić
    - Panel 3: "(Health)care and Childbirth"
        - Marina Mijatović: "Mistreatment of Women in Gynecology and Obstetrics Institutions"
        - Danijela Paska: "Culture of Silence and the Medicalization of Women's Experience: Reproductive Health Discourse"
        - Erica van der Sijpt: "Citizens, customers, critics: Birthplace Choices and Subjectivities in Post-Communist Romania"
        - Discussant: Ljiljana Pantović
    - Panel 4: "Gender, Violence, Activism"
        - Eirini Avramopoulou, Eleni Papagaroufali: "I am an angry worker: The affective labor o care work on gender-based violence during the pandemic crisis in Greece"
        - Athena Peglidou: "Care, Ageism, Femicide, who cares"
        - Irena Molnar: "Women Living with HIV in Serbia: Impact of Donor Practices on Policies and Quality of Care"
        - Discussant: Biljana Kašić
    - Panel 5: "(Not) Caring in the Pandemic"
        - Ivan Đorđević: "The Forgotten People: Roma in Serbia during the Covid-19 Crisis"
        - Ivana Katarinčić: "The Policy of State Concern for the Health of Population in the Extraordinary Circumstances of the Covid-19 epidemic"
        - Ines Prica: "Irony, Crisis, and Social Change: The Impact of Political Criticism in Pandemic Croatia"
        - Milica Resanović, Milena Tokić: "Culture as Care and Care for Culture in the Pandemic"
        - A. Puljak, B. Kolarić, D. Štajduhar, T. Ćorić, M. Miloš, K. Arnaut, D. Sajko: "Control of the Consequences of the Pandemic and the Earthquake in Nursing Homes in the City of Zagreb"
        - Discussant: Gordan Maslov
- 28.04.
    - Panel 6: "(De)Institutionalized Care"
        - Miloš Pačelat, Maja Kolarić, Branko Ćorić, Tanja Gusić, Kristina Minea, Karmen Arnaut, Sajko Dalma: „Challenges and Needs of Informal Caregiver of Older People"
        - Pavao Parunov: "Who's "making a wish" and for what – reconfiguring the role of state in Croatian systems of elderly care"

        - Anita Prša: "Spirituality, Religion, and Unpaid Engagement at the End of Life: A Comparative Study of Volunteer Palliative Care Work in Austria and Croatia"
        - Gordana Šimunković: "Readiness of the Health System of the Republic of Croatia to further develop paediatric palliative care"
        - Discussant: Ljiljana Pantović
    - Panel 7: "Healthy Bodies and Human Rights"
        - Kostadin Karavasilev: "Caring about Rights: Rights advocates challenging (socio-political) notions of care for people with disabilities in Bulgaria"
        - Atila Lukić, Gordan Maslov: "Is thinking about Healthy Body possible? A Contribution to a Possible Dialogue"
        - Robert Dorčić, Ivanja Tutić Grokša: "How to Prepare Students for Diversity"
        - Discussant: Irena Molnar
    - Panel 8: "Community, Solidarity, and Care"
        - Phaedra Douzina-Bakalaki: "To feed, to clothe, and to heal amidst the crisis: Alternative forms of care in Xanthi, Northern Greece"
        - Jelisaveta Fotić: "It's like a second family - biosociality and biosolidarity in Belgrade: An association of people living with diabetes"
        - Biljana Stanković, Petar Lukić, Irena Stojadinović, Jasmina Bogdanović, Maša Vukčević Marković: „Living as a long-term psychiatric service user in Serbia: the importance of community-based mental health support"
        - Discussant: Peter Locke
    - Panel 9: "Feminism and the Art of Care"
        - Cyrille Cartier: "Beyond the Binary: The Intersection of Care, Identity, and Integration"
        - Biljana Kašić: "Responsive Connectedness in Times of Carelessness, or How to be a Feminist"
        - Juraj Šantorić: "Motifs of Care and Nurture in the Performances of Vlasta Delimar, or what Artists tell us about Motherhood and Ageing"
        - Discussant: Jelena Kupsjak
    - Panel 10: "Doing Gendered Care"
        - Valerija Barada, Blanka Čop, Pacao Parunov, Jasna Račić, Marija Šarić: "Doing Nature, Doing Nurture: Practiced and Symbolic Gendered Parenting Care Style in Family Life"
        - Nejra Nuna Čengić: "Domestic Paid Female Care Work: A Node of Social Reproduction"
        - Jasna Račić, Valerija Barada, Ivan Puzek, Blanka Čop: "Thinking about the Family: Conceptualization and Operationalization of Cognitive and Emotional"
        - Marija Šarić: "From Labour to Love: Migrant Women's Experiences of Paid Care Work"
        - Discussant: Danijela Paska
- 29.04.
    - Panel 11: "Pandemic Humanitarianism"
        - Romana Pozniak: "Humanitarianism and Social Reproduction: Ambivalences of Care Work in the Croatian Migration Regime"
        - Gorgos Raluca, Maria Trifon: "The Distance between us.

Diaspora Repatriation during the Pandemic"
- Eva Renaudeau: "Therapeutic Mobilities of French migrants in Romania"
- Discussant: Duško Petrović

◦ Panel 12: "Self-help and self-care"
- Pol Llopart i Olivella: "Seeking well-being of being-with. Care, sociality, and divine closeness among Sufis in the Serbian Sandžak"
- Marina Sakač: "Menstruation and self-care in contemporary Serbia"
- Milan Urošević: "Therapy Culture and the self-help culture in postsocialist countries of the Western Balkans – the neoliberal transition and new imaginaries of subjectivity"
- Discussant: Tanja Bukovčan

◦ Panel 13: "Caring for... Policies of Care"
- Lea Horvat, Sonja Lakić: "Caring for Mass Housing in the Post-Yugoslav Space: Maintenance, Common Good, Self-Care"
- Marija Melada, Orsa Mojaš, Karolina Štefok, Klara Rajković: "Affective Care among the care providers for the elderly in selected institutions"
- Vasiliki Kravva: "Caring for the Homeless? Social Policy and Wellbeing in a Northern Greek City"
- Peter Locke: "The Weight of Survival: Fragments of Care in Sarajevo, 2007-2022"
- Discussant: Ines Prica

◦ Panel 14: "Humanitarian Care"
- Elissa Helms: "Care, Control, and Covid: Layers of Crisis along the Balkan Route of Migration"
- Nina Khamsy: "New technologies and forced migration on the "Balkan Circuit": An Anthropology of Violence and Care"
- Dagmar Nared, Alihan Ozturk, Luka Kropivnik: "Racialized Care-Chains in Bosnian Border Towns: (Re)contextualizing Knowledge and Methodology in and of the Balkans"
- Duško Petrović: "Humanitarian Power as Sovereignty"
- Discussant: Peter Locke

JUL:

01.07. – 08.07. Letnja škola: *Vodeni pejzaži – nasleđe i životna sredina, vol. 2.* (PerspectLab), Severni Jadran

03.07. – 07.07. 15. međunarodni Deleuze and Guattari Studies kamp „Prostor, kontrola, otpor" (IFDT, FMK, University of Plymouth)
- 03.07.
  - Janae Sholtz: "Creative Resistance – An Aesthetico-Political Necessity"
  - Andrija Filipović: "MechanoAnthropocene: Periodizations"
  - Jovan Čekić: "Diagram of Control"
- 04.07.
  - Andrija Filipović: "MechanoAnthropocene: Periodizations"
  - Anthony Faramelli: "Introduction to Institutional Psychotherapy"
  - Chris L. Smith: "Concrescence"
  - Janae Sholtz: "Affective Resistance – Revolutionary Love as the Path to a Revolutionary War Machine"
- 05.07.
  - Ian Buchanan: "Assemblage"
  - Chris L. Smith: "Colonisations"
  - Jovan Čekić: "Capturing Forces"
  - Anthony Faramelli: "Crisis and Resistance"

- 06.07.
  - Chris L. Smith: "Tokyo Paris"
  - Ian Buchanan: "Affect"
  - Janae Sholtz: "Noological Resistance – the Iconoclasticism of the Cosmic"
  - Andrija Filipović: "Postsocialist Necroecologies"
- 07.07.
  - Ian Buchanan: "Differential Method (Workshop)"
  - Anthony Faramelli: "Institutional Cartographies (Workshop)"
  - Jovan Čekić: "Workshop: Art and Rendering the Invisible Force"

10.07. – 12.07. 15. međunarodna Deleuze and Guattari Studies konferencija (IFDT, FMK, University of Plymouth)

- 10.07.
  - Keynotes:
    - Janae Sholtz: "Deleuze, the Future of Thinking, the Thinking of Immanence"
    - Ian Buchanan: "What is Affect?"
  - Session 1:
    - Pedagogy 1:
      - Miriam von Schantz: "Minor pedagogies within media teacher education"
      - Ahreum Lim and Aliki Nicolaides: "Creative becoming(s) of adult education"
      - Chair: Nevena Mitranić
    - Ecology 1:
      - Mathias Schönher: "Guattari's Animism"
      - Volker Bernhard: "Ecosophy and Dwelling Machines"
      - Simone Aurora: "From Ecology to Eco-logy: Deleuze, Guattari and the Anthropocene"
      - Chair: Andrija Filipović
    - Philosophy 1:
      - Bojan Blagojević: "'Give me a body, then!' Reading Kierkegaard and Deleuze"
      - Gaia Ferrari: "Deleuze's Synthesis of Time: The Empty Future as a Form of Resistance"
      - Bryan Noonan: "Politics of the Paradox: A Sketch"
      - Chair: Daniel W. Smith
    - Technology 1:
      - Sebastian Hsien-hao Liao: "Becoming AI? Towards an Empathetic Relationship between Humans and Digital Technology"
      - Mohammad Hadi: "Resisting Humour"
      - Mirjana Stošić: "AI-Generated Face-LOAB as the Ghost in Cyberspace – Macabre D&G Faciality Resistance"
      - Chair: Jovan Čekić
    - Resisting Fascism:
      - Aragorn Eloff: "Resisting the present: psychedelics and somaterapia as contemporary schizoanalytic practices"
      - Kevin Siefert: "Resisting the Fascist Line of Flight: The Relationality of Being-With"
      - Doga Ayar: "Our Congruence in Decay"
      - Chair: Kai Denker
    - Philosophy 2:
      - James Emery: "Confrontations with the Possible: Deleuze, Bergson, and Spinoza"
      - Henry Somers-Hall: "Possibility and the Other: Tournier and the Transcendental Field"
      - Sohei Tokuno "Deleuze's concept of freedom"
      - Chair: Aidan Tynan

- Anthropology:
  - Carlos Segovia: "Neither Smooth nor Striated but a Third Kind: Deleuze, Guattari, and the Extra-Modern Politics of Space"
  - Marina Simić: "Deleuze, Guattari, and anthropology: from filiation/alliance to territorial machine/state and back"
  - Chair Andrea Perunović
- Philosophy 3:
  - Ridvan Askin: "Anorganicism"
  - Craig Lundy: "Virtual Encounters: Vestiges of Deleuze's Mobile Bergsonism"
  - Francesco Pugliaro: "Vitalism and Stratification: Deleuze and Guattari, Ruyer, and the Concept of Inorganic Life"
  - Chair Đorđe Hristov
- Literature 1:
  - Irena Javorski: "Expanded Paradigms of Reading – Deleuze Influence and Materialism"
  - Deniz Efsunkar Cazu: "Apparitions of Love-in-Death through the Broken Mirror: A Symptomatology of Westernisation in Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar's *Unfinished Poems*"
  - Sanita Delić & Karlo Gardavski: "Oedipa Maas's Struggle in the Space of Control in Thomas Pynchon's *The Crying of Lot 49*"
  - Chair Andrea Colombo

◦ Session 2:

- Discipline and Control:
  - Brent Adkins: "The Serpent and the Mole: Deleuze, Serres, and the Evolution of Capitalism"
  - Lenka Soukupova: "Control of immanent Use of Syntheses of the Unconscious"
  - Çiçek Yavuz: "The metaphysical conditions for freedom in the societies of control: space as a product-origin"
  - Chair Aleksandar Ostojić
- Philosophy 4:
  - Audronė Žukauskaitė: "The Transindividual in Simondon and Deleuze"
  - Kynthia Plagianou: "'In-between' ontology and politics: Revisiting the problem of modulation in Deleuze-&Guattari's intensive functionalism"
  - David Antonio Bastidas Bolaños: "The dividual remainder. For a Deleuzian history of dividuality"
  - Chair Andrej Jovičević
- Digital Media and Microfascism:
  - Virgina Lázaro: "From masses to mmorpgs: an analysis of internet memes"
  - Jack Z. Bratich: "Digital Anaesthetics and the Microfascist Manosphere"
  - Brett Zehner: "Dopamine Fascism: Whiteness is the Medium, Social Death is the Message"
  - Chair Anthony Faramelli
- Technology 2:
  - Lewis George: "Bloodworth Deleuze against Tinder: love and dating in Control Society"
  - Alexandru-Vasile Sava: "Endlessly gazing through the screen: on the temporal structure of digital narcissism"
  - Senka Božić & Mario Vrbančić: "Becoming Anonymous"
  - Chair Rebecca Louise Breuer

- Design and Architecture:
  - Marko Ristić: "Between the Primitive and Plastic: Deleuzian Ontology of Architectural Design"
  - Marko Jobst: "Great War Island: Instituting Worlds"
  - Charles Drozynski: "The desire in design"
  - Chair Nikolina Bobić
- Nomadism and the War Machine:
  - Rebekka Wilkens: "Beyond control: relation as resistance in the work of Édouard Glissant"
  - Zina Bibanovic: "Bumpy Borders: Subjectivity and Resistance on the Edge"
  - Christos Marneros: "'Under Jolly Roger': The Pirate as the War-Machine against the State"
  - Chair Chantelle Gray
- C(ha)osmology and the cosmicity in the work of Deleuze and Guattari
  - Kyle Novak: "Philosophers, Physicists, and Mineshafts"
  - Michael J. Ardoline: "Immanence and Truth in an Expressive Cosmos"
  - Alain Beaulieu: "Cosmic Interferences in the work of Deleuze and Guattari"
  - Chair Milan Urošević
- Spiritual Politics and Religion:
  - Allen Chiu: "On Deleuze, Nāgārjuna, and Religion/Mythology: A Possible Path to a Buddhist Deleuze"
  - Duncan Cordry: "Reform or Revolution: Univocity and Polyvocity in a Deleuzean Spiritual Politics"
  - Chair Nadja Pavlica
- Temporality and Resistance:
  - Anastasia Golubeva: "Resistance to the present: Deleuzian approach to theory of multitemporality"
  - John Dimopoulos & Michalis Tegos: "Dionysian Hangover: Event, Space, Time and the intoxication of power"
  - Chair Bojan Blagojević

- 11.07.
  - Keynotes:
    - Chris L. Smith: "The Nonhuman Sex of Architecture"
    - Patricia MacCormack: "From (immoral) Anthropos to Ethical Geo-Stratum"
  - Session 3:
    - Pedagogy 2:
      - Nevena Mitranić: "Thought of/on the Edge: Playing (with) the Resistance(s) in(/of) Kindergarten Practice"
      - Arthur C. Wolf: "Curricular Assemblages: Thinking Resistance in Education"
      - Lilija Duobliene: "On activity, passivity, and becoming child"
      - Chair Miriam von Schantz
    - D&G and Contemporaries 1:
      - Blaz Skerjanec: "Forceful Powerlessness: The Unspoken Commonalities of Deleuze's and Derrida's Minor Intervention into Foucault's Historicism"
      - George W. Shea: "Fabricating a Non-Fascist Way of Life: Foucault on Deleuze and Guattari's Capitalism and Schizophrenia"
      - Milan Urošević: "Genealogy as a Way of Building a War

Machine – Critique and Resistance in Deleuze's Foucault"
  - Chair Patricio Landaeta
- Technology 3:
  - Phelim Ó Laoghaire: "The Schizo's Library and Resisting the Search Bar"
  - Damiano Cantone: "Virtual and Virtual Reality: deleuzian remarks on Digital Philosophy"
  - Jan Jagodzinski: "Querying Deleuze and Digitalization: Is there an Artistic Response of Value?"
  - Chair Andrea Perunović
- Technicity, Expression, and the Earth:
  - Daniel W. Smith: "Deleuze and Guattari on Technicity and Truth: Is Knowledge Artifactual?"
  - Vernon W. Cisney: "Philosophy as Science Fiction: Summoning the New Earth"
  - Robert W. Luzecky: "The Fragile Hope for 'a New Earth, a New People'"
  - Chair Aleksandar Ostojić
- Memes, Screams, and Devouring Machines: Playing with Paradoxes of Resistence:
  - Mara Cayarga: "The Hysteric's Laugh: Philosophy, Repetition, and Resistance"
  - Meike Robaard: ""In the Beginning was the Noise": Disruption, Incorporation, and Becoming-Parasite"
  - Tirza Ben-Ezzer: "Cyberspace and the Absurd Laugh of Resistance"
  - Chair Tina Mariane Krogh Madsen
- Urban Spaces:
  - Sophia van Greunen: "Urban 'Informal' Settlement: The Emergence of Public Space"
  - Moises Ramirez: "Cognitive Topologies: Flanuer-workers, Circulation, and Dislocated Desires"
  - Liezl Dick & Anna Wilson: "Resisting the elements: stories of absence and imperceptibility in the Cape Flats, Cape Town, South Africa"
  - Chair Marko Jobst
- Artistic Resistance 1:
  - Susannah Gent: "Artistic Lines of Flight: The Mutual-Aid Rhizome and the Recovery Machine"
  - Philip Pihl: "Soft Spaces and Virtual Sculptures: works by James Turrell and Willy Ørskov as time images"
  - Derek Hampson: "Father, Mother, Daughter - an experiment in thinking"
  - Chair Tamkin Hussain
- Cinema 1:
  - Hsiu-ju Stacy Lo and Sanja Anđelković: "Unsettled Life: Escaping 'societies of control' to chaosmotic becomings in *Life on Earth*?"
  - Niall Kennedy: "Is *An Cailín Ciúin* an example of Deleuzian minor cinema?"
  - Lior Perelsztejn: "Return to *Twin Peaks* Through the Crystal"
  - Chair Nir Kedem
- Literature 2:
  - Cilliers van den Berg: ""No one retains their form": space, control and resistance in Christoph Ransmayr's *Die letzte Welt*"

        - Aleksandra Panić: "Corporeal Writing Center and their Lateral Revolution in Teaching Creative Writing"
        - Gopika Hari and Dr. Preeti Puri: "Mapping the nature to the human: Rethinking Becoming-Molecular through the self-narratives of the deviant in Shubhangi-Swarup's novel Latitudes of Longing"
        - Chair Nadja Pavlica
    - Session 4:
        - Music and Sound:
            - Aidan W. Syiem: "Of the Natal Refrain: Sonic Agency on the Margins of the Postcolony"
            - Marcos Neto de Cordova: "Free Flights of Desire and The Necropolitical Gravity: The Black Icarus Fate in the song *Ismália* by Brazilian Artist Emicida"
            - William Buse: "Carrying a Tune: Adventures in the Artistic Production of Sound"
            - Tina Mariane Krogh Madsen: "Molecular spatial-awareness and the critical potential of listening"
            - Chair Lilly Markaki
        - Philosophy 5:
            - Soyeon Lee: "Inhabiting the Rhythmical Space: Rhythm, Space, and Body in Deleuze's Thought"
            - Jaakko Jekunen: "Transcendent Thinking in Difference and Repetition"
            - Nataša Šmelc: "The "nonidentical" and "difference in itself" – a micro-resistance to domination"
            - Masumi Nagasaka: "Deleuze and Duns Scotus on the Question of Being"
            - Chair Đorđe Hristov
        - Critical and Clinical Interventions from the Global South (part I):
            - Chantelle Gray: "Creolizing individuation: Glissant with Deleuze and Guattari"
            - Cristina Pósleman: "Notes for a critique/clinic of the epistemological deficit"
            - Cristóbal Durán: "Logics of Pluralism: Ethical Difference and Continuous Variation"
            - José Ezcurdia: "Desire, territory, and counterthought in Deleuze's philosophy. Towards a clinical culture"
            - Chair Carlos Segovia
        - Borders, Migrations and Deterritorialization:
            - George Themistokleous: "Holding the Street: De-territorializing State Control in Nicosia's Buffer Zone"
            - Adam Bregnsbo Fastholm: "Modulating Movement, Segmenting Speed: Encampment and the Politics of Mobility"
            - Nikola Lero: "Using Deleuze and Guattari's Rhizome in Migration Studies?"
            - Zsolt Bagi: "Deterritorialization as infinite locality"
            - Chair Milan Urošević
        - Institutional Psychotherapy: The Politics and Therapeutics of the Sector
            - Anthony Faramelli: "Resistance as method: Institutional Psychotherapy at La Borde and Blida-Joinsville"
            - Rachel Wilson & Sebastian Birch: "Whose mind is it anyway? Deinstitutionalisation in the UK: from discipline to control and back again"

- Julie Van der Wielen: "Institution and Resistance: On Schizoanalysis' Peculiar Pragmatism"
- Eric Harper & Kevin S Polley: "Window not Walls: Schizoanalytic meta-modelling as horizons of possibilities"
- Chair Andrea Perunović

- Philosophy 6:
  - Diogo Nóbrega: "« Every day I die » - Time and Politics between Deleuze and St. Paul"
  - Katherine Filbert: "No Chinese Philosophy? On Closure and the Outside in What is Philosophy?"
  - Huma Saeed: "Exploring the Intersection of Khudi and Becoming in the Philosophy of Allama Muhammad Iqbal and Gilles Deleuze"
  - Chair Andrej Jovičević
- Artistic Resistance 2:
  - Alistair Macaulay: "The Genesis of an Improvisational Space: Cleaning the Canvas and the Thread of a Tune"
  - Franziska Strack: "Of *Intermezzi* and *Gray Points*: Klee, Schumann, and Deleuze & Guattari on Imagining Change from the Middle"
  - Andreas Hudelist: "From Sleepers to Guests to Dreamers. On Theatre and Affect"
  - Philipp F. Hennch: "*Becoming Terrestrial* in the *Critical Zone*. Re-measurements of Human-World Relationships in Political Fictions of the Center of Art and Media Karlsruhe"
  - Chair Irena Javorski
- Sexuality, Race and Gender:
  - Rachel Loewen Walker: "The Time of Human Rights: Queer New Materialisms in Conversation with Deleuze and Guattari"
  - Laura Hengehold: "The Colony as Event"
  - Míša Stekl: "Queer Desire and/as Race in Three Billion Perverts"
  - Chair Andrija Filipović
- Philosophy 7:
  - Evrim Bayındır: "Reconsidering the Self-Annihilation of Nihilism through Deleuze and Brassier"
  - Francesca Perotto: "Affects as active and reactive forces. A few remarks on the case of cynicism"
  - Hamed Movahedi: "Dramatization and the Poetics of Ideas in Deleuze"
  - Aidan Tynan: "The Passion of Abolition: Fascism's Affective Politics and Deleuze's Destructivism"
  - Chair Henry Somers-Hall

- Session 5:
  - The Balkans 1:
    - Konstantinos Retsikas: "Balkan Transits: Becoming-Minoritarian and Theo Angelopoulos' 'The Suspended Step of the Stork'"
    - Elvir Šahić & Nebojša Šavija-Valha: "Art of Asignifying the Reality – Mapping the Ambrosia"
    - Aleksandra Zlatković: "Belgrade Waterfront: Dark Rhizomatic Control"
    - Chair Nikolina Bobić

- Philosophy 8:
  - Claudio D'Aurizio: "Between the Subject and the World. Notes on Deleuze Rearranging the Space of the Monad"
  - Aleksandar Ostojić: "Unfolding the interior: codes of baroque vs. codes of control society"
  - Hamed Movahedi: "A Threefold Continuity in Deleuze"
  - Chair Đorđe Hristov
- Critical and Clinical Interventions from the Global South (part 2)
  - Patricio Landaeta: "Overflowing the critical. Revaluing the clinical"
  - Pedro Moscoso-Flores: "Sketches of a (tri)ecology as a critical practice of thought"
  - Catarina Pombo Nabais: "What is the critical and clinical creative power of the Amerindian cosmogonies?"
  - Chair Carlos Segovia
- Ecology 2:
  - Anna Wilson, Hannah Hamilton & Greg Singh: "Waste Stories: resistance through fiction"
  - Felix Birch: "Engineering Control"
  - Andrija Filipović: "The plasticness machine: Synthetic polymers and the becoming of necroecological"
  - Chair Simone Aurora
- Pedagogy 3:
  - Mona Tynkkinen & Sarah Evans: "Desire, resistance, control, repeat; ritornellos in educational becomings"
  - Kristina Börebäck: "Reading student's essays as a movement of repetition and differentiation"
  - Chair Arthur C. Wolf
- Politics and Culture:
  - Jess Mezo: "Bodies of Disappearance"
  - Cecilia Rose: "Inkol Culture as Domain of Revolutionary Praxis"
  - Zhifei Xiang: "The Filiative Capitalist Machine in Contemporary Chinese Society: Capturing and Coding Desire for Family and Nation"
  - Chair Milan Urošević
- Capitalism, Value, and Resistance:
  - Michael Giesbrecht: "Abstract Machines and Real Abstraction: For a Diagrammatics of Immanent Causality in Marx's Critique of Political Economy"
  - Quentin Badaire: "Conceptualizing the multiplicity of spaces of control and resistance in the Integrated World Capitalism as a problem of coexistence and becomings"
  - Erik Bordeleau: "'A Flow and a Break and a Flow': Cosmo-Financial Remarks around Surplus Value of Code"
  - Chair Nadja Pavlica
- Cartography and Mapping:
  - Luis Armando Hernández Cuevas: "Of cartographic logic"
  - Evgeny Blinov: "Securitize and Punish: Deleuzoguattarian concept of mapping revisited"
  - Simonetta Moro: "Artistic Mapping as Nomadic Practice"
  - Chair Irena Javorski

- Literature 3:
  - George K. Michaelidis: "On the Road towards Absolute Nomadism"
  - Christoph Hubatschke: "Cutting up control: Burroughs' notion of control and deleuzo-guattarian visions of resistance"
  - Andrea Colombo: "On the Road and in the Ocean: Deterritorialized American Literature through a Deleuzian Lens of Becoming"
  - Chair Ridvan Askin

- 12.07.
  - Keynotes:
    - Claire Colebrooke: "Ready-made and the Readymade: The Politics of Monuments"
    - Nicholas Thoburn: "Deleuze's Grandeur de Marx: A Midnight Book of Communism"
    - Igor Krtolica: "The Rhizome, Between Philosophy, Sceince, History, and Antropology"
  - Session 6:
    - Art, Thought, and Resistance:
      - Petros Satrazanis: "Space, signs, and control. Searching the physis of the artistic work in modern society"
      - Tamkin Hussain: "Desert Islands: Encountering Otherness between Deleuze and Badiou"
      - Lilly Markaki: "Escaping the Inescapable: Contemporary speculative poet(h)ics of the passage"
      - Chair Aragorn Eloff
    - The Balkans 2:
      - Nikolina Bobić: "The hypnosis of Belgrade's waterfront: Becoming abnormal"
      - Anna-Maria Papagiannakou & Christos Montsenigos: "The University as a potentially emancipatory space"
      - David Radović: "Controling the space and resisting the control. Exploring cultural landscapes in Montenegro with Deleuze and Guattari"
      - Chair Konstantinos Retsikas
    - Technology 4:
      - Jovan Čekić: "Algorithms of Control"
      - Rebecca Louise Breuer: "A desire to be someone? Mental resistance and productive desire"
      - Greg Singh & Anna Wilson: "Decolonising Data: Mapping the Moral Limits of Open Data as a Space for Resistance"
      - Chair Jan Jagodzinski
    - Cybernetics and Automata Theory:
      - Goran Kauzlarić: "Thought of (and Rule Through) the Outside: Remarks on the (Neoliberal) Cybernetic Spirituality"
      - Nikola Mlađenović: "Anti-Automata: Volume 3 of Capitalism and Schizophrenia"
      - Chair Aleksandar Ostojić
    - Feminism, Trans and Disability Studies:
      - Malvine Blaesser: "The Quest for Originary Plenitude in Immersion: How the Ontology of Space of the Metaverse Project is linked to the Idea of the Maternal Origin"
      - Alba Knijff: "The Passion of Difference: Feminist Mappings of Deleuze's Ontology of the Caesura"

- Matthew J. Cull: "Fabricating Spaces of Resistance"
- Chair Míša Stekl

- Fascism:
  - Kai Denker: "Theory of Fascism on Thousand Plateaus"
  - Mark Lošonc, Anita Zsurzsán: "(Post)fascism as Control - Deleuze/Guattari and G. M. Tamás"
  - Chair Đorđe Hristov
- D&G and Contemporaries 2:
  - Andrea Perunović: "The Spaces of the Unconscious: Freud and Lacan VS Deleuze & Guattari"
  - Andrej Jovićević: "From the Question to the Question-Problem Complex: Deleuze and Derrida, Readers of Heidegger"
  - Krzysztof Skonieczny: ""A sadness that knows nothing of repetition." Death between the Repeatable and the Unrepeatable in Deleuze and Derrida"
  - Chair Craig Lundy
- Cinema 2:
  - Nir Kedem: "The Cinematic Overwoman; or, Deterritorializing Control"
  - Manuela Zammit: "Becoming-Mermaid: Emilija Škarnulytė's *Sirenomelia"*
  - Jenny Evang: "Becoming-Molecular? *Serpent Rain* (2016) and Elemental Cinema"
  - Chair Niall Kennedy
- Literature 4:
  - Antonis Sarris: "Reading literature as a line of flight: A Deleuzian reading of Olga's Tokarczuk's novel *Flights*"
  - Nadja Pavlica: "The Power of Comics: Deleuze, Guattari, and the Graphic Novel *Watchmen* as a Form of Resistance"
  - Chair Irena Javorski

12. 07 – 14.07 EERA Summer School "Inclusive Approaches to Educational Research" (EduLab, Filozofski fakultet UB)

SEPTEMBAR:

04.09. – 06.09. 3. Mojze arhitektonski seminar Cres 2023: „Metodologija doktorskog istraživanja: dizajn, pisanje, istorija arhitekture, nasleđe". (PerspectLab, Univerzitet u Rijeci, Arhitektonski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Politecnico di Torino, Istituto Universitario di Architettura di Venezia, Faculty of Architecture – Ss. Cyril and Methodius University Skopje)

- 4. septembar
- Pozdravna reč: Petar Bojanić, Snežana Vesnić
- Snežana Vesnić, Seminar Introduction: "Concepts of Architectural Research Methodology: Radicality and Expression"
- Sesija 1: "Architectural History, Heritage, Design", Curators and Chairs: Luka Skansi and Emanuele Morezzi Moderator: Miloš Ćipranić
  - Emanuele Morezzi: "Authenticity in Ruin(s). A Journey through Archaeology and Contemporary Scenarios"
  - Luka Skansi: "A Border Architecture: The Cultural Contexts of Nova Gorica (1948-2023)"
  - Miloš Ćipranić. "Monument: Architectural Object and The Book"
- Radionica "Writing, Reading, Publishing"

- Milica Mađanović: "Getting Published: Navigating the Seas of Academic Journals"
- Miloš Ćipranić, Zoran Erić, Milica Mađanović: Presentation of Khōrein: Journal for Architecture and Philosophy

- Giovanni Durbiano: "A Research Program for Architectural Design"
- 5. septembar
- Sesija 2: "PhD Research Methodology", Curator: Snežana Vesnić Chairs: Petar Bojanić, Giovanni Corbellini, Emanuele Morezzi, Luka Skansi, Francesco Spanedda, and Snežana Vesnić
  - Petar Bojanić: "What Is Method?"
  - Marco de Nobili. "The Last Age of Italian Rural Architecture: Desire and the Revival of an Interrupted Tradition"
  - Sanja Avramovska: "Managing Spatial Conflicts and Flood Resilience in Urban River Redevelopment Projects (URRP) through Integrated Digital Modeling"
  - Anastasiia Gerasimova: "The Vocabulary of Architectural Pedagogies"
  - Matteo Carmine Fusaro: "Dwelling the Knowledge Age. Architecture and Production in the Design of Contemporary Housing"
  - Teodora Mihajlovska: "Application of Graphic Statics in Form Finding of Structures Subjected to Seismic Loading"
  - Francesco Maranelli: "Architecture and Computers in the Italian Sixties"
  - Giulio Marchetti: "Condoscape: Architecture of Speculative Tourism"
  - Davor Ereš: "Learning through Architecture vs. Learning about Architecture - An Inquiry on Open Modes of the Architectural Discipline"
- 6. septembar
- Sesija 3: "Digital Data: The New Urban Infrastructures", Curators and Chairs: Ognen Marina and Mitesh Dixit
  - Mitesh Dixit: "Transgressive Geographies: Beyond Territory"
  - Ognen Marina: "Digital Data: The New Urban Infrastructures"
- Sesija 4: "Postproduction – Future(s) of Architecture", Curator: Zoran Erić
  - Francesco Spanedda: "An Age of Shifting Contexts. Current Issues in Architectural Design"
  - Zoran Erić: "Postproduction – The Art of Displaying Architecture"
- Završna diskusija: "Novelty and Innovation in Research Methodology"

04.09. – 08. 09. PRAJD KVIR STUDIJE 2023: „Puno buke (ni) oko čega" (GenderLab)

- 04.09. Marko Marjanović: „Medicinski aspekti različitosti polnog razvoja"
- 05.09. Nada Sekulić: „Treći pol u prehispanskim kulturama Amerike"
- 06.09. Sonja Sajzor: „Transformativna moć trans oslobođenja – zajednički ciljevi progresivnih pokreta"
- 08.09. Dragana Pejović: „Aktuelni modeli zakonskog regulisanja prostitucije: Nordijski model vs. Novozelandski model"

18.09. – 22.09. ANDEM 4 – ČETVRTA ŠKOLA ANGAŽOVANOSTI I DEMOKRATIJE

- 18. septembar
- Srđan Prodanović i Bojana Radovanović: „Opšte dobro, javni interes, zajedničko dobro"

- Aleksandra Bulatović, Bojana Radovanović, Marko Konjović: „Blagostanje, dobrobit, procvat"
- Diskusija, moderator: Marko Konjović
- Simona Žikić, Vera Mevorah i Mirjana Nećak: „Digitalni angažman"

• 19. septembar
- Aleksandra Knežević: „Nauka, vrednosti i demokratija"
- Ana Đorđević i Sara Nikolić: „Angažovano istraživanje"
- Đorđe Hristov: „Angažman i konflikt"
- Okrugli sto: Nacionalni saveti nacionalnih manjina: Forme delovanja
  - Učesnice: Karolina Lendák Kabók, Ljubica Đorđević, Milica Rodić, Katalin Beretka
  - Moderatorke skupa: Krisztina Rácz i Jelena Ćeriman

• 20. septembar
- Aleksandar Pavlović: „Angažman u umetnosti"
- Igor Cvejić i Mark Lošonc: „Pojam angažmana"
- Marjan Ivković: „Angažman i radikalna društvena promena"
- Diskusija: Zašto i/ili za šta se ne treba angažovati?, moderator: Predrag Krstić

• 21. septembar
- Jelena Vasiljević: „Novi društveni pokreti i solidarnost"
- Ljiljana Pantović i Jelena Kupsjak: „Medicinska antropologija – angažovan pristup zdravlju"
- Jasna Kovačević: „Rod i ekonomija: kritička feministička perspektiva"
- Adriana Zaharijević: „Rod – na raskršću između ideologije i ravnopravnosti"

• 22. septembar
- Luka Glušac: „Demokratske institucije"
- Vujo Ilić: „Reprezentativna demokratija"
- Irena Fiket: „Deliberativna demokratija u teoriji i praksi"
- Aktivistička šetnja: vode Sara Nikolić i Dušanka Milosavljević

OKTOBAR:

02.10. - 3.10. Konferencija „Balkanski razgovori o ratu i mitu" (Debates on Europe, IFDT)

• 2. oktobar
- Pozdravna reč i dobrodošlica: Gazela Pudar Draško, Adriana Zaharijević
- Panel diskusija"*Nie wieder!* The historical responsibility for (non) action"
  - Govornici: Gentiana Kera, Ivan Vejvoda, Christian Voss
  - Moderator: Carl Henrik Fredriksson
- Panel diskusija „Da li na Balkanu postoji zajedničko razumevanje mira?"
  - Govornici: Idro Seferi, Tvrtko Jakovina, Senad Pećanin, Boris Varga
  - Moderator: Milivoj Bešlin
- Panel diskusija "Imperial legacy and the unrepentant past. A talk on history, literature and the present"
  - Govornici: Sergey Lebedev i Dubravka Stojanović
  - Moderator: Aleksandar Pavlović

• 3. oktobar
- Panel diskusija: "Decolonizing the Balkans: from Russia's soft power to 'Westplaining'"

    - Govornici: Nemanja Džuverović, Ognyan Georgiev, Nenad Markovikj, Miruna Troncotă
    - Moderatorka: Marija Mandić
  - Panel diskusija "Is pacifism an option only in peace?"
    - Govornici: Leandra Bias, Paula Petričević, Olga Shparaga
    - Moderatorka: Adriana Zaharijević

10.10. – 12.10. Konferencija „Žene u Holokaustu" (WHISC: Women in the Holocaust International Study Center, The Moreshet Mordechai Anielevich Memorial Holocaust Study, Research Center Givat Haviva, NGO Haver Srbija, ShoahLab)

- 10. oktobar
- Otvaranje i pozdravna reč: Sonja Viličić, Vera Mevorah, Lily Zamir, Yaakov Asher, Dragana Stojanović, Milovan Pisarri, Tamara Plećaš
- Yehuda Bauer: "Why is the History of Women in the Holocaust Important and the Necessity of Researching it"
- Carol Rittner: "Women Shaping Holocaust Studies"
- Panel I "Women's Body", moderatorka: Ljiljana Pantović
  - Beverley Chalmers: "Manipulating Birth to Implement Genocide"
  - Sarah Valente and Coral Katave: "Women in the Holocaust: The Abandonment of Medical Ethics"
  - Angela Ford: "Sex for Life: Conditions That Necessitated Sexual Barter in the Holocaust"
- Panel II "Faith", moderatorka Dragana Stanojević
  - Alex Kor: "Eva Kor: From Transylvania to Tel Aviv to Terre Haute – A Journey of Hope, Healing and Forgiveness"
  - Shannon Quigley: "When Women Entered the Conversation: Post-Shoah Jewish-Christian Dialogue and the Religious Thought of Women"
- 11.oktobar
- Krinka Vidaković Petrov: "The Gender Perspective in the Writings by Jewish Women Holocaust Survivors in Yugoslavia"
- Panel III "Memories and Memoirs 1", moderatorka Krinka Vidaković Petrov
  - Tal Bashan: "Feminine Dilemmas in the Ghetto and Concentration Camp: The Testimonies of Ruth Bondy"
  - Roseanna Ramsden:"Reanalyzing Familiar Narratives: Representations of Queerness in Women's Published Testimonies of the Holocaust"
  - Sara R. Horowitz: "„Since When Can't a Virgin be a Whore?": The Dynamics of Shame and Agency in Women's Accounts of the Shoah"
  - Stanislava Barać: "A Possible Approach to the Holocaust Experience and Memory Activism of the Yugoslav (Screen) Writer Frida Filipović"
- Panel IV "Memories and Memoirs 2", moderatorka Lily Halpert Zamir
  - Batya Brutin: "Halina Olomucki: Art as Documentation"
  - Pnina Rosenberg:"„My War Adventures: 1 September 1939 – ?": Dora Schaul's Autographic Diary in Rieucros French Women's Camp"
  - Dana Mihăilescu: "Haunting Specters of Holocaust Perpetration and Victimhood Reconstituting a Young Child's Memory Lens: On Miriam Katin's Graphic Memoirs „We Are on Our Own" and „Letting It Go""

- Panel V "Resistance 1", moderatorka Sarah Valente
  - Lily Halpert Zamir: "The Lily of Birkenau – The Writings of Lili Kasticher"
  - Joanna Sliwa: "An Unlikely Rescuer: A Jewish Woman Who Saved Thousands of Poles During the Holocaust"
  - Paul Kutner: "Intersectionality: Female and Gay Resistance in Dieulefit"
- Panel VI "Resistance 2", moderatorka Verena Meier
  - Bruna Lo Biundo and Caroline François: "The Diverging Fates of Perla Golda and Mindla Diament: Two Polish Jewish Sisters in the French Resistance"
  - Alessandro Matta: "Sardinian Jewish Women During the Holocaust – Between Resistance and Genocide"
  - Sylwia Szymańska-Smolkin: "The Fabrics of Resistance: The Contribution of Female Jewish Couriers in the Second World War"
- Panel VII "Motherhood", moderatorka Joanna Sliwa
  - Dalia Ofer: "Mothers and Motherhood in the Ghettos: Re-considering the Images from Diaries and Testimonies"
  - Micaela Procopio: "Clandestine Abortions as Resistance During the Holocaust"
  - Tiarra Cooper: "Gendered Bodies as Sites of Reproductive Investigation: Probing Female Holocaust Survivors' Fertility 1940–2022"
- 12. oktobar
- Staro Sajmište tour (led by historian Dr. Milovan Pisarri)
- Panel VIII "Victims and Perpetrators", moderator Milovan Pisarri
  - Verena Meier: "The Genocide of Sinti and Roma From a Gender-Historical Perspective "
  - Claire Topsom: "Female „Asocials": The Unworthy Victim"
  - Jesse Tannetta: "Female Perpetrators Within the Concentration Camp System"
  - Randi Becker: "Research Projects with Prospective Teachers on Local Women History in Gießen"
- Panel IX "Art and the Holocaust", moderatorka Dragana Stojanović
  - Roy Horovitz: "Actresses as Memory Keepers: The Stories of Lea Koenig and Miriam Zohar, Israel Prize for Theatre Laureates"
  - Nevena Daković: "Écriture Féminine of the Holocaust: Hilda Dajč and Diana Budisavljević"
  - Jane Saginaw: "Poetry of Women in the Holocaust"
  - Tamara Plećaš:"Unveiling the Emotions of Love, Fear, and Hope: Women of the Holocaust "
- Panel X "Narratives and Politics", moderatorka Vera Mevorah
  - Žarka Svirčev: "Women Writers and the Holocaust in The Jewish Almanac"
  - Katarzyna Taczyńska: "„Minsk, my Minsk, the old Bolshevik": Sara Kagan's Poetry as a Mirror of the Transformation and Development of Secular Jewish Culture in the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic"
  - Natalija Perišić: "Implications of the Holocaust for a Woman – Experiencing the PostHolocaust Migrant Integration with Sophie Zawistowska"

NOVEMBAR:

14.11. - 16.11. Regionalna škola političke filozofije dr Zoran Đinđić „Delo Zorana Đinđića - dvadeset godina kasnije" (IFDT/Fakultet političkih nauka)

- 14. oktobar
  - Svečano otvaranje – predstavljanje programa
  - Luka Petrović: „Đinđićev osvrt na Kozeleka: kritika utopijskog uma"
  - Maroje Višić: „Povratak od komunikativnog djelovanja na barikade - demokratski socijalizam Herberta Marcusea"
  - Petar Žarković: „IFDT i Zoran Đinđić: Od realsocijalizma do postsocijalizma"
  - Aleksandar Vranješ: „Bosna i Hercegovina u vrtlogu političkih narativa"
- 15. oktobar
  - Jelena Jerinić: „Zoran Đinđić i odnos prema ustavnim reformama početkom 2000-ih"
  - Ilija Vujačić: „Đinđićeva analiza jugoslovenskog društva"
  - Jasmin Hasanović: „Tranzicija kao kontrarevolucija? Jugoslavenski post-socijalistički prostor između demokratije i autoritarizma"
  - Aleksandar Miletić: „Đinđić, Jugoslavija i Srbija: ideološke i političke koncepcije, 1986-2003"
- 16. oktobar
  - Helena Hiršenberger: „Da li je znanje osnova moderne ekonomije, politike i kulture?"
  - Katarina Lončarević: „Krhka savezništva: ženska i LGBTQ+ prava u Srbiji u prvoj deceniji 21. veka"
  - Bojan Vranić: „Zoran Đinđić: između filozofije i praktične politike"
  - Đorđe Pavićević: „Političke borbe u ustavnim demokratijama"

20.11. Konferencija „EMERGE 23 Forum: Usklađivanje opšte veštačke inteligencije za budućnost čovečanstva" (DigiLab, The Institute for Artificial Intelligence Research and Development of Serbia, Data Science Conference). Moderatorka: Jelena Guga

- Pozdravna reč: Dubravko Ćulibrk, Luka Glušac,Ambassador Jan Braathu
- Srđan Vesić: "On Ethical Guidelines for Argumentative Persuasive Chatbots"
- Silvia Milano: "Preferences and alignment in AI systems"
- Cristof Royer: "Chat GPT and Critical Thinking"
- Ricardo Baeza-Yates: "Responsible AI"
- Julia Haas: "Human rights-centric AI governance"
- Kevin LaGrandeur: "Emotions, AI, and Ethics"
- Max Talanov: "Neuropunk Revolution: Robotic Emotions"
- Robert Braun: "AI and the Anthropocene"
- Bojana Kostić and Mario Hibert: "Digital Degrowth and Alternative Networks"
- Dina Damjanović: "Art in the World of AI"
- Ljubiša Bojić: "Open Discussion on Human Autonomy in the Age of AGI"
- Diskusija: "Acceleration of Global Research on AI: Discussion on scientific cooperation between speakers and all interested parties", moderatorka: Vera Mevorah

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