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## THE MANIFOLD ROLE OF *PHANTASIE* IN HUSSERL'S PHILOSOPHY<sup>1</sup>

### ABSTRACT

Husserl's concept of imagination has been systematically presented in *Husserliana XXIII*, in which its manifold role has been set out. Through the different texts, the author shows that *phantasy* (*Phantasie*) should be considered as one of the modifications of *pure re-presentation* (*Vergegenwärtigung*). The article first tries to underline the distinction between Husserl's deliberation on this phenomenon and the traditional concept of imagination. Second, it shows the fundamental moments of constitutional consciousness in order to relate the notion of imagination to perceptual apprehension. At the very end, the notion of phantasy is connected with the idea of *first philosophy* and the question of possibility of its realization.

### KEYWORDS

first philosophy,  
imagination, phantasy,  
perception, re-  
presentation

### Introduction: Overcoming the Traditional Concept of Imagination

The trouble with understanding the *notion of imagination* lies in the fact that *Husserliana XXIII* leaves room for discussion of the different interpretations of this phenomenon. Although this edition has brought together a systematic and posthumous text on perception, phantasy, image consciousness, memory, time, and a variety of related topics, many authors have noticed that a unified definition of phantasy has not been delivered here, which leads to many different approaches to this question (Cavallaro 2017: 163). Husserl never manages to establish a complete theory of imagination, as some of his predecessor philosophers, such as Aristotle, David Hume, or Immanuel Kant did. This is the reason why we approach Husserl's question of imagination as an uncompleted task that invites us to respond to its unfinished conceptions. There are authors

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that try to underline this systematic role of phantasy by showing its place in the constitutional scheme of consciousness; Husserl's intention in delivering this notion was not descriptive, but a systematic one (Erhard 2014: 402, § 1). Regardless, although his intention was to found the complete science of consciousness, the role of phantasy is left for various interpretations to resolve.

At the very beginning, we need to underline some terminological distinctions. Although Husserl tries to provide a fundamental basis for the imaginative processes, he avoids the standard philosophical term for imagination, *Einbildungskraft*, and instead speaks of *Phantasie* (Jansen 2016: 69). In his philosophical conception, this differentiation is very important because his concept of imagination surpasses traditional understandings of this phenomenon, such as the correspondence theory and the reflections on this notion in German idealism, by showing its mediative role. For Husserl, imagination and phantasy has an almost *self-contained status* and represents the *third fundamental moment of consciences*. The task of the phenomenological method is to provide descriptions of concrete *acts of imagining* in an attempt to identify its essential characteristics.

Unlike traditional reflections on the notion of imagination, Husserl tries to define the term of phantasy (*Phantasie*) by comparing it to two basic modes of apprehensions: *presentation* (*Gegenwärtigung*) and *re-presentation* (*Vergegenwärtigung*). In a phenomenological analysis of the pure consciousness, this notion should not only be considered by showing and describing the way that object appears in the consciousness, but also, this consideration must show the different ways of subjective apprehension in order to show the active and constitutive role in understanding the object. In this context, the notion of phantasy is, on the one hand, a *self-contained moment* of consciousness, because the world of phantasy is an independent world, but, on the other hand, phantasy is dependent on the re-presentational consciousness. The object of phantasy is not a “real” object, so Husserl uses different syntagmas to refer to the way that an object appears in this apprehension, such as: “as it were” (*gleichsam*), “as if” (*als ob*), and “quasi”. Phantasy is in *opposition* to the existing world, while perception, memory, and expectation relate to *the way things are*.

Husserl's notion of phantasy should be interpreted by showing its role in the time-consciousness structure. Notwithstanding that Husserl shows that the rudimentary idea of imagination can be found in Saint Augustine's notion of the *inner sense*, which is founded on the new inner time conception.<sup>2</sup> In his later writings, we can see how he manages to find the inspiration for phantasy conception in Aristotelian philosophy. His movement toward history was slow and perhaps we could say that his *Crisis* was the turning point in his investigational process from a pure transcendental to an ontological position. Regardless, we can see how in the text from 1926, his concept of imagination

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2 Already in the introduction of his lectures, Husserl shows that Saint Augustine was the first to discover the complex role of temporality and the difficulty to define it as something “subjective” or “objective” (Husserl: 1928).

was already brought into relation with Aristotelian philosophy. He shows that Aristotle already discovered the *re-productive use of phantasy* - not necessarily as something negative, which was the case in the Platonist's use of *mimesis* (Husserl 1980: 575, ff. 10). Aristotle was the first to show how the notion of imagination should be reconsidered in a subjective structure because it is related through the question of *pure possibility*, which will later be one of the fundamental considerations in the phenomenological approach to this notion.

Aristotle's concept of imagination is ambiguous. He appeals to phantasy to explain not just behavior that seems to be guided by reason, but also in those cases where the agent lacks the capacity for rational judgment. He also appeals to phantasy to explain the human mind's ability to transition seamlessly between perception and thought, urge and thinking (Mondrak 2017: 15). He was the first to show the *manifold role of phantasy*. In his text *De anima se*, he deliberates on some of these functions. He shows that no action could be possible without the process of imagination (Aristotle 1984: 4, 403a3–403a25), that imagination is different and more fragile than sensation (Aristotle 1984: 50, 428a5–428a18), and that as much as we are free in thinking we cannot escape the truth by being able to imagine a different outcome (Aristotle 1984: 49, 427b7–427b27).<sup>3</sup> Phantasy is a special form of imagination for him:

As sight is the most highly developed sense, the name phantasia (imagination) has been formed from phaos (light) because it is not possible to see without light. (Aristotle 1984: 51, 429a3–429a)

The role of phantasy is fundamental in the subjective knowledge process because it is the guidance of all different possibilities for action and reflection. For Aristotle, phantasy does not have just a *poetic*, but also an *epistemic* role, and it is fundamental for the *world of praxis* too. The metaphor of light will be also used later by Nietzsche, who will show the connection of imagination with the Apollonian principle. This shall be discussed later in the chapter "*Phantasia* and the promise of the time". Here we just need to underline the ambiguous meaning of imagination. In other texts, Aristotle also shows a connection between phantasy and possibility, emphasizing its poetic role in the creative process. He presented how imagination is connected with searching for *τέλος* and that it also has a role in defining the *purposefulness* of things. Husserl also presents this role of imagination:

Phantasy is the realm of purposelessness, of play. (Husserl, 1980: 577, ff. 20; transl. and modif. by author)

He showed that phantasy is not just one formal part of an epistemic structure, but the potential of a subject to *construct the theme*, to give purpose to an appearing object, as much as for the things themselves. This means that

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<sup>3</sup> Brentano especially emphasizes Aristotle's notion of imagination in the role of "wandering from the truth" (Brentano 2007: 65).

phantasy does not have just a poetic, but also a metaphysical role in constricting the truth. Husserl only later directly affirms some of the Aristotelian insights into these questions:

Phantasy in the normal sense is neutral re-presentation, re-presenting ‘objectivation in phantasy’ [*Vorstellung*]. (Husserl: 1980: 579, ff. 25; transl. and modif. by author)

The similarity between these two conceptions lies in the fact that both Husserl and Aristotle manage to show that phantasy does not have just an aesthetic role, but also other constitutive roles; such as the role in the world of actions, in which it finds its place between the sensible and rational sphere in both a theoretical and practical way. Also, they both show the role of phantasy in a commonplace perspective. The most important role shall be discovered later – its role in the metaphysical construction of the truth.<sup>4</sup> Ergo, the *manifold role of phantasy* was not discovered by Husserl, but he was the first to show the possibility to interpret it differently and to show its different use. All these manifold roles come from the subjective possibility to *neutralize* content. This will be a topic later on.

Husserl affirms Aristotelian insights to these questions only in a few places. He also wrangles with Hume and Brentano in many places in order to define imagination. Although very different, these two conceptions of imagination have some similarities. Brentano appeals to the difference between presenting an act and content, and he also recognizes that there is a difference between perceptual and phantasy apprehension, but he never manages to deliver all of the different modes of apprehension, such as believing, doubting, wishing, possibilities, etc. (Husserl 1980: 8, § 3, ff. 30). This is the reason why he and Hume were not able to overcome a completely objectivistic presumption, assuming that the criterion for the differentiation of objective relations lies in itself, in *graduality* and *intensity* of appearance. This approach, from a phenomenological standpoint, reveals itself to be insufficient because this methodology shows that differentiation also lies in a subjective way of grasping and apprehending what has been given. Phantasy, according to this position, is not just mediation, but also the third fundamental mode of apprehension:

The interpretation of Humean *vivacity*, *vitality*, as *intensity* by Brentano and other innovators does not please me. (Husserl 1980: 95, § 46, ff. 35; transl. and modif. by author)

Methodologically, the difference must be found not just in the graduality and intensity of an object, but also in the *different kinds of apprehension*. The way of apprehending appearance in phantasy is radically different from

<sup>4</sup> De Warren emphasizes that already ancient Greek philosophers had discovered this manifold role of phantasy. Plato and Aristotle had differentiated at least two roles of imagination, such as power of image-formation and questioned the possibility for the concept of imagination to be unified. Cf. de Warren 2014: 94.

presentational and re-presentational consciousness. Here we have an object as something *present* but it is given in *in-actual* mode. The subjective modes of apprehension are changing. Modification of belief is present. In cases of presentation, memory, which has a great degree of certainty, is also a form of belief; in the case of phantasy, we have two streams of consciousness (presentational and imaginal) co-existing and interfering; they collide and tend to exclude one another. However, later on we can see that a phantasy world can only exist within this battle, in this urge of the consciousness to harmonize differently appearing objects. In the case of phantasy, we do not have an objectifying act, but an object as a *quasi-object*, as something that could or could not exist but doesn't appear in the mode of certain belief. Traditional philosophical reflections on imagination, including Brentano's, never managed to show the possibility of a manifold role of phantasy. Only Aristotle and Kant find its role in the play of the different forms of subjective correlations. Aristotle's contribution is already emphasized. Now we will try to demonstrate the role of phantasy for Husserl as potential and variance and, later, the relation of this form with the question of *Erste Philosophie*.

### The Manifold Role of Phantasie

The manifold role of phantasy shall be found in its different functions. Husserl shows that the notion of phantasy is usually understood as ability and possibility in a wider sense, like a mental disposition or in an artistic sense (Husserl 1980: 2; § 1, ff. 5). According to this ordinary understanding, the notion of phantasy is reduced to descriptive mental processes and an aesthetic role in a broader sense. Later, it becomes prominent that these functions are just a part of the process of imagination. Phantasy itself has a more diverse role. First, Husserl shows that differentiation between phantasy and other forms of apprehension cannot lie just in the object, but also in the way that the subject grasps the different phenomena. Consequently, we need to underline several distinctions between *phantasy* and *perceptual apprehension*.

The first distinction between *phantasy* and *perceptual apprehension* lies in the way that an object appears to the subject. While the object of perception is clear and independent, the object of phantasy is obscure and fragile. *Figment*, the phantasy object, is something *vague* and *obscure* (Husserl 1980: 70, § 33, ff.20). Husserl shows how the object of phantasy exists only as a *figment*. The subject in the case of phantasy doesn't have a positional act, but it only "hovers before us". It is just a "pure possibility" and its actualization must be questioned. Not every phantasm has the potential for realization, but some of them do. We need to neutralize the positing, i.e. to think of it as neutralized in order to be able to contemplate the object (Husserl 1980: 507, ff.5).

The second difference lies in the way that objects stand in correlation with other objects and the subjective modes of reflection. A figment has no strong correlation with the phantasy world or with the subject itself. The world of phantasy is a world of re-representation in which the object of sensation has

been nulled, but the perceptual field cannot be ruled out. This means that in phenomenological investigations of modes of re-presentation there are no clear and certain objects, such as exist in sensational content. In perception we have the origination of experience, and the visual field of sensation is not isolated, but objects stand together *in unity*. In the visual field, sensations appear not as isolated phenomena, but are tied up and stand together in unity (Husserl 1980: 73; § 34, ff. 35). On the other hand, phantasms also have some sort of unification, but it is completely separate from the visual field. Because of this, we can often come across a line of thought that the world of phantasy is independent of reality and that the *notion of phantasy has a self-contained status*. This second distinction and almost independent status of imagination shall be emphasized.

In the phantasy world, *the essential unity of the perceptual field is missing*. Objects of phantasy are real objects, but they have a different mode of appearance than physical objects. There is a different kind of objectivity in phantasy than the kind found in a perceptual field. For Husserl, one can't speak of objectivity in any way without showing its essential grounding in subjective relations. However, a physical object is the subject of perceptual apprehension, and it presents itself differently than a phantasm. The essential unity of the phantasy world is also different. This unity has its origin only in the subjective grounding of the phantasy world. There is no outness that gives it truthfulness. The field of phantasms is almost independent from the other forms of apprehension. But, because of the temporal structure of consciousness, a phantasy object doesn't have a completely self-contained status - it exists in the world of imagination only for as long as the subject presents it to itself. Although the phantasy field has its own logic of appearance, it does not have an absolute status of independence. The phantasy field doesn't annul the perceptual world. There *is coexistence and conflict* between these two fields (Husserl 1980: 76, § 36, ff. 10). This conflict is the reason why subjects can have apperception and awareness of the different modes of appearance of the objects. A consciousness that would not be able to maintain this conflict would be schizophrenic and hallucinated. Paradoxically, Husserl shows that *the possibility of conflict is what makes the consciousness be unified*. According to this, we can come to the third distinction between perceptual and phantasy apprehension and that is the way that these two fields interfere with one another.

The perceptual field is the genuine way of presenting the object. Here we have an object that appears in the mode of givens; it reveals itself as a phenomenological occurrence. On the other hand, the phantasy world has a non-genuine mode of appearance; the appearing object is mediated through the image and its significance:

Only this mediated process produces as insertion into present, which is already present objectivated by means of mediation, not the present that is genuinely sensed. (Husserl 1980: 78, § 37, ff. 25)

Previously, Hegel managed to show that the phenomenological process makes subjects live in an “inverted world” (Hegel, 1971). For him, in the sensual process itself, there is already a non-genuine approach to sensible objects, because an object always appears in one of its modes. Imagination in his phenomenological position has a mediative role. The possibility of re-presentation itself belongs to imagination, which is the mediator between the world of the sensible and the possibility for reflectivity. On the other side, Kant had discovered not just a mediative but also a manifold role of imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) in constitutive processes. For him, imagination has a synthetic role, and it is the mediator between a pure notion and the perceptual field. But his concept of imagination has a different role in the first and third *Critique*. This is the consequence of his first definition of this notion, which has been reduced to a theoretical role; later, it would not be adequate to explain its aesthetic function completely and re-discover other possibilities for its manifold use.<sup>5</sup> Unlike an idealistic approach, Husserl shows that there is a fundamental distinction between perceptual apprehension and the other forms of re-presentation, such as memory and phantasy. For him, imagination should not have a mediative or synthetic role that leads to a unified truth, but he shows its potential for *reversibility* in the dialectical process. This means that for Husserl, imagination will have a synthetic role only conditionally, and not in the same sense as for Kant.<sup>6</sup>

Perception and sensual experience are originated experiences in which an object is presented to a subject genuinely, but only through the process of mediation can it reveal itself intuitively. This means that unlike Brentano's descriptive position, Husserl manages to show that the basis for a conceptual foundation are not just the modes of the sensible, but also the subjective modes of *belief*. The field of perception has the most certain manner of appearance - this means that the verity of the object here is un-doubtful. On the other hand, the world of phantasy is re-presentational and its objects have different modes of belief than the ones in perceptual reflection. Their appearance is vague and fragile, as are their unification grounds. But the totality of apperception which is founded in a time-consciousness nature enables subjects to put all of these different ways of apprehension in a totality of reflection and to maintain their oneness, even in their different modes of appearance. Here, we come to the point where we need to show how the phenomenological method is the only one that is able to underline the differences between all of these different modes of apprehension, because only it can show the time-foundation of consciousness.

This third mode of distinction between perceptual and phantasy apprehension leads us to their time-consciousness basis, in which all of their similarities and distinctions should be founded. For Husserl, consciousness is a *stream*, a *nexus* of different modes of appearance and the possibility of a subject to focus on a particular object or the manner of its appearance; this is one of the

5 Heidegger in particular appeals to Kant's notion of imagination, showing its manifold use and some inconsistencies Kant had in trying to define this term (Heidegger 1991).

6 Husserl compares it with his own passive synthesis. Cf. Katz 2018: 68.

fundamental characteristics that he discovers. Husserl's criticism doesn't just bring into question psychologicistic conjecture which never manages to show this distinction, but also his early position, which at first was not able to show all of these manifold layers of apprehension (Prole 2006: 450). In his latter texts, we can see how time-consciousness is not linear and how, in practice, pure and empirical ego always operate together. So, he shows that one of the abilities of the subject is to focus its attention on a particular object, while at the same time maintaining awareness of the difference between the modes of appearance of the object. Knowledge is possible only where intention comes to its fulfillment, so it is particularly important to show the autonomous role of the subject in the constitutional process. As he later manages to show, unity for Husserl always means *paying attention, being present* in order to fulfill the subjective intention:

Now if we live in this consciousness of unity, we are paying attention. (Husserl 1980: 259, § 1, ff. 25; transl. and modif. by author)

Via the investigation of differences between perception and phantasy representation in the phenomenological process, we can show that phantasy is phantasy only for as long as we are aware that its object is something that is given as *present* but in the *in-actual* mode of *appearance*. This unity enables us to show the distinctions between the two modes of apprehension and to show their unified basis. From here, we can see that phantasy has an almost self-contained role. It is dependent not just on perceptual appearance, but also on the time-consciousness foundation. Phantasy is only secondarily dependent on perceptual apprehension, because sensual experience is a condition for phantasy deliberation. Previously, Descartes managed to show that empirical experience is conjecture for a free imaginational process. For Husserl, the world of the sensible only reveals to subjects the possible material and formal modes for creation. But, phantasy itself is primarily dependent on the time-consciousness structure, because it gives the basis for the subject to maintain its object as *something present*.

We can show how phantasy is a form of apprehension, but it is not recollection and unity in the original sense. Phantasy apprehension is a modification of perceptual apprehension:

In the meantime, I have made considerable progress. I have recognized that phantasy apprehension is not apprehension proper but simply the modification of the corresponding perceptual apprehension, that image apprehension understood as illusion is perceptual apprehension annulled by conflict, in which the 'annulling' is a matter of qualification and presupposes the 'competition' or 'interpenetrating' of simple apprehensions; in the means of physical-thing apprehensions. (Husserl 1980: 277, ff.20; transl. and modif. by author)

Unlike Descartes and later Leibnitz, Husserl shows that the differentiation between imaginative phantasy objects and objects of hallucination is not only

contained in the degree of perceptual awareness or apperception, but also in the fundamental way that consciousness maintains all different modes of apprehension. Based on the *third moment*, which shows the way that the stream of consciousness holds in dynamic unity all of these modes, we can show how the possibility to focus on one subject comes from the possibility of *annulment* – one of the fundamental methodological steps in the phenomenological process. Descartes had already discovered this first moment (showing the role of skepticism in the mediative process), but he never managed to present all of the different layers of consciousness. On the other hand, phenomenological examination had led Husserl to the point where he was demonstrating how the idea of *annulment* is connected with the phantasy notion. Although at first Husserl (Husserl 1983: 260) was trying to connect the *possibility of annulment* with the imaginative process, later on he stresses that phantasy modification differs fundamentally from the phenomenological *epoché* (Cavallaro 2017: 169).

In his investigations of phantasy, Husserl emphasizes how living in a mere phantasy without taking a position doesn't mean ingesting a hypothetical attitude (Husserl 1980: 360, ff. 15). It means abstaining from judgment and examining the new field of pure possibilities. In order to overcome the common and traditional role of imagination, phenomenological investigation must demonstrate the pure phantasy field. The intentional structure of phantasy is different from presentational and re-presentational consciousness. Phantasy is not only a stream of re-productions but also of free subjective imaginations, in which intentionality, in order to create something new, never manages to come to its complete fulfillment. The role of pure phantasy is to neutralize, modify all belief. In phantasy, the position of actual belief becomes as if: the being actual turns into being-as-if (as if it were reality):

Phantasy surely constitutes 'ideal', 'pure' possibilities. (Husserl 1980: 559, ff. 25; transl. and modif. by author)

Because of this specific role, the world of imagination is completely different from the sensual world. It has its *own field of play*. We need to stress that Husserl sharply differentiates between the perceiving and imagining process (Moran 2005: 63). Imagining itself is not an integral part of sensual perception. It has its own logic of constitution. Its role can be in filling out and supplementing perception, but it is not just a part of the sensual experience. Surely, the role of sensible experience should not be neglected. It is the main condition for constituting acts in a broader sense. Phantasy experience could also not be possible without perceptual experience. Image consciousness is modification of perceptual experience. De Warren emphasizes this transit:

“The underlying perceptual apprehension is modified in its manner of presentation by the imagination, transformed from a perceptual presentation (*Gegenwärtigung*) into a “re-presentification” (*Vergegenwärtigung*) of something other-than-visible – the depicted and “spiritual” (*geistig*) image-subject seen in the image. This opening of perceptual experience is in conflict with itself,

stamped by the interjected character of the virtual” (de Warren 2014: 104; underlined by author).

He underlines the second important role of phantasy apprehension which has been pointed out by Husserl: the phantasy is at the same time independent of the others forms of presentation, such as perception and re-presentation, but on the other side, on the fundamental ground of pure consciousness it has to be delivered as a pure modified form of representation. The difference between memorial re-presentation and phantasy is in its intentionality, in the way of apprehension, where in the phantasy filed object is non-existing (*ein Nichts*), there is no real existence of the object, the previous step of neutralization defines it.<sup>7</sup> Husserl believed that the role of the sensory field had been radically misunderstood in traditional philosophy. Due to some modern philosophical conceptions, the body itself is being neglected. One of the consequences of searching for the *First Philosophy* and its rational grounds is the dualistic philosophical construction in which the body and soul have been separated. Although his philosophical conception seeks to establish philosophy as a transcendental science, we can see how his conception reveals the importance of the sensible process for all spheres of knowledge.

*Epoché* puts aside not just materialistic, but also idealistic presumptions and leaves phenomenology the space to show how objects appear in their pure sense without the sediments of beliefs. This doesn't mean neutralizing the bodily process itself, but all of the assumptions of a unification basis, for which it has been believed establishes these processes. This leads to questioning the modern philosophical conceptions which believe that *res (cogitans or extensa)* can be the underlying subject for every particular modus of appearance. From Husserl's standpoint, if we are to speak of a subject as the grounds for establishing the clear forms of constitution, first we need to show that we don't understand subjectivity in the traditional way. The subject here is not *res*, or an *underlying thing*.<sup>8</sup> Revealing the spheres of subjectivity does not give us a finished product; they only represent the beginning of a research which only starts to examine new forms of content. Husserl was demonstrating that the self-folding of Ego which has been properly derived must concretely lead to transcendentalism. This methodology overcomes psychologism and Kantian idealism<sup>9</sup>, in order to finish the uncompleted project of a subjective constitution

7 De Warren emphasize that both image-consciousness and imagination are “the consciousness of non-present” (*Nichtgegenwärtigkeits-Bewußtseins*) and that they are forms of “re-presentification” (*Vergegenwärtigung*) (de Warren 2014: 108).

8 For Husserl, every aspect of conscious life that affirms empirical existence (every ‘positional act’) permits, ideally, a conversion into an ‘as-if existing’ mode of imaginative consciousness. Furthermore, he suggests two stages involved in this potential universal conversion of sense-experience: first, the transformation from actual to quasi-experience and, second, a transition from quasi-experience to pure imaginative possibility (Eliot 2004: 47).

9 In order to reconcile Husserl's concept of transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger's ontology Fink compares the conception between the pure ego relation and

of a system; for the subject, it shall unravel the path to pure egology and the meaning of Being, which should also have meaning for me as ego (Husserl 1963: 33, ff. 35). In addition to this, I tempt the world not just as a singular, empirical subject. The world is revealed to each subject as an intersubjective construction and is presented to every monad equally:

First, through epoché we must lose the world, in order to gain it back in universal self-reflection. (Husserl 1963: 39, ff. 25; transl. and modif. by author)

Although in *Cartesians meditations* Husserl was underlying Descartes' contribution to the idea of subjectivity as a possibility for a new beginning, in some later works he will emphasize the Greek contribution to these questions. In the addition to his *Ideas* (Husserl: 1983), he presented the importance of the traditional path of phenomenological methodology; also, in *First philosophy*, he elaborates on the impact of the oldest philosophical reflections (Prole 2005: 447). The role of phantasy will only later be delivered in its manifold constitutional role.

### **Phantasie and Promise of the Time**

Husserl was not the first philosopher who diagnoses a rising crisis and the need to refrain from the passable values of the present. In philosophy of life and avant-garde movement, these motifs were also present, especially in fantastic art and in a gesture of returning to primitive forms. This need for return has been present already in Nietzsche's philosophy, especially in his monumental attitude towards Greek philosophy and admiration for pre-Socratic thought. In order to show the beginning of the European crisis, he underlines how the notions of *imagination* and *body* have been neglected in whole philosophical tradition and used to as a metaphysical escape from reality. Nietzsche was metaphorically sketching how a human being is only a *rational animal* who can promise something to others. But he forgot to mention that it is also the only being who can try to accomplish its own promises. He didn't have trust in European civilization and its primordial idea of philosophy as the answer to the crisis of the Greek world. His reflections on crisis are completely different from Husserl's, who manages to save faith in the idea of subjectivity. Nietzsche was presenting that for the first time the idea of a new and better world had been brought into consideration in Greek philosophical reflections and that here the *real world had been neglected*. For him, Platonic considerations on the new and better *world of ideas*, which has nothing in common with the real world, were already a symptom of the advancing crisis. Paradoxically, he was showing that the philosophy which was initially founded on the Apollonian principle is nothing *purely rational*, but represents *the world of dreams*. For him, Apollo

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the objective question of the world and Being, in which the notion of imagination can have a mediating role as in Kant's philosophy, but in a completely new way. Cf. Fink 1985: 114.

is a “God of figure” (Nietzsche 1930: 47), “Predictor” and, most importantly, “interpreter of dreams” (Nietzsche 1930: 49)<sup>10</sup>:

He who by its origin represents ‘visible luminosity’, the Deity of light, rules by great illusion of the inner world of imagination. (Nietzsche 1930: 49; transl. and modif. by author)

He was demonstrating that when Greek civilization was not able to withstand the horror of real life and the intensity of the pain, it needed to create some form of *escape from reality*, some Good of dream, which should represent itself as metaphysics and reflection, to help people find shelter from life’s storms (Nietzsche 1930: 33). For him, metaphysic is nothing but a construction that represents the weakness of the civilization and its inability to face actuality. He was showing that living in the Apollonian culture is like “living in a dream which one wants continuously to dream” (Nietzsche 1930: 61). *Phantasy*, from this philosophical standpoint, is nothing but an *escape from reality* and philosophy has been built on the imaginative foundation in order to run away from its own actuality.

In this same Platonic gesture of creating a new, ideal world, other authors, such as Jan Patočka, will find a completely different manifestation of philosophy. For him, philosophy is nothing but caring for the soul of the self and the community, and there is no better way to answer a crisis but through imagination, which will lead us to the possibility of the correct path to overcome the crisis (Patočka: 2002). From this standpoint, reflection is just one possible answer to a crisis, but as long as we continuously try to find the answer, we are caring not just about the present circumstances but also about the future. He stresses that phenomenology must free itself from its epistemic foundations and show an essential connection to life. This was the manner in which Plato moved forward to overcome Socrates’ epistemic function of philosophy. However, according to Patočka and Nietzsche, modern philosophy had forgotten its own original basis. Its seeking for the truth has no better purpose than to progress for itself - knowledge that shall be used just for epistemic gratification.

Husserl’s trust in philosophy is open and real. Unlike Nietzsche, who in Greek philosophy finds the beginning of decadence, he shows that the original philosophical reflections had discovered the idea of ‘first philosophy’. The term ‘first philosophy’ refers to a long philosophical tradition and the Aristotelian idea of philosophy as a fundamental science (Prole 2002: 33). For him, tradition constitutes itself by trying to realize the original idea of a universal mind, and the whole history of philosophy was oscillating around this idea in order to complete this conceived project. In the chapter which reflects on the historical beginning of the subjective foundation of science, Husserl appeals firstly to Aristotelian philosophy, in which he finds the root of modern subjectivist conceptions:

<sup>10</sup> In other places, he was also using the same syntagmas, such as “Apollonian artist of the dreams” (Nietzsche 1930: 53), and also “interpreter of dreams” (Nietzsche 1930: 61).

This is already the case in ancient Greeks philosophy; in Aristotle's powerful spirit the first project of the universal science of subjectivity started to grow, mainly as psychology, which should have been arguing about all of the functions of the soul, but also about the possibilities of the human mind. (Husserl: 1992: 52; transl. and modif. by author)

Although he emphasizes that the first philosophical reflections had discovered the idea of universal science, he also underlines that these conceptions had stumbled on to the naturalistic self-understanding hypothesis. Because of this, real criticism and skepticism were not founded here, but just one dogmatic consideration (Husserl: 1992: 56). By all means, philosophy for Husserl has its origin in the ancient idea of the first philosophy which has never been realized through history because it wasn't able to reveal its own subjective foundational basis. Here, phantasy has the role to help the subject escape itself, its own potentialities, in order to help him construct the 'truth' as one finite and completed project. But the difference between his transcendental phenomenological ontology and other historical conceptions should lie in the fact that Husserl tries to establish *subjective science as an infinite project*. Phenomenology gives to subjects only the basics for starting investigations, not complete answers. Paradoxically, the first philosophy is possible only as an unfinished project which should find its basis for answers in the idea of subjectivity and its logic of constitution.

Husserl appeals to the history of philosophy in order to show how different philosophical conceptions were close or far from the idea of universal subjectivity. Notwithstanding that Aristotle never managed to accomplish this formal idea of the mind, he discovered the universal motivation for its foundation and managed to relate the notions of time and the soul, which shall later be fundamental to phenomenological research:

Aristotle explicitly notes in *De memoria* that the immediate past cannot be the object of memory, and should be considered, instead, as part of the now, since a now possesses a certain span, and includes within itself experiences which one has just had. (de Warren 2009: 63)

He was the first to discover that consciousness is 'bringing in present' objects for analyzing and that re-presentational apprehension is one of the fundamentally different modes of constitution from perception. But, this also leads to the idea that the time stream is an underlying basis for thematization and a condition for constructing objects. This means that to overcome an existing crisis we need to reflect on the past and bring into the present some philosophical conceptions in order to investigate which of them had been the key point for starting the crisis. He later shows that modern conceptions had forgotten the idea of universal subjectivity and reduced their methodology to naturalistic frames (Husserl 1993). However, time itself is only an un-thematic stream that enables us to apprehend everything else. Because of this, our concepts of the world should not be confined, but open for possible interpretations and

realizations. Living in a phantasy is not being able to face reality and usually means avoiding oneself, avoiding responsibilities. A positive meaning of phantasy can be found in the ability to try and find the possibility of a different path.

We can conclude that phantasy itself can be sharply distinguished in its positive and negative role. The negative role of phantasy is close to its psychological function and it is used to escape reality through different conceptions that only seemingly save us from the world, but cannot save the world from us. Its positive role has a place in exploring pure possibilities, in searching for a different connection to the world if the existing ones don't serve us anymore. Husserl's notion of phantasy has manifold roles in the constitutional process: it has epistemic, practical, aesthetical, ethical, methodological, and other roles. But the most important role of phantasy is its possibility to overcome reality, to negate it, and to seek for a new criterion of the truth. We need to re-think traditional concepts in order to find possibilities that are not confined to existing things. The world of the sensible and the world of phantasy are two independent worlds. Although the sensible dictates its own truth, the human-life world is open to refurbishment because it belongs to a shared intersubjective world basis (Ricoeur 1997: 166).

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### O mnogostrukoj ulozi *fantazije* u Huserlovoj filozofiji

#### Apstrakt:

Huserlov koncept imaginacije je sistemski izveden u ediciji *Husserlina XXIII* u kojoj možemo pratiti njenu mnogostruku ulogu. Autor kroz različite tekstove pokazuje kako pojam *fantazije* (*Phantasie*) treba razmatrati kao jednu od modifikacija čiste re-prezentacijske svesti (*Vergegenwärtigung*). Na samom početku rada pokušaćemo da istaknemo neke ključne sličnosti i razlike između Huserlovog koncepta imaginacije i tradicionalnog razumevanja ovog pojma. Nakon toga ćemo pokazati fundamentalne momente konstitucionalne svesti u kojima ćemo *fantaziju* porediti sa *pecepcijom*. Na samom kraju ćemo ovaj pojam *fantazije* dovesti u vezu sa Huserlovom idejom prve filozofije i pitanjima mogućnosti njenog ostvarenja.

Ključne reči: *fantazija*, *imaginacija*, *percepcija*, *prva filozofija*, *re-prezentacija*