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What Is an *Architectural* Concept? The “Concept” of Deleuze and “Project” of Eisenman

Abstract Two great theories – one in philosophy, one in architecture – emerge nearly simultaneously in the twentieth century: Gilles Deleuze’s understanding of the “concept,” that is, defining philosophy as an activity that produces concepts, and Peter Eisenman’s idea of the “project” as a platform, “position,” or “theory” of an architect. My intention is to suggest and problematize the idea of the concept as “capacity” or “potentiality” implying the production of a multitude of “concepts” or varying “conceptions.” Deleuze’s great significance for architecture of this century allowed for the construction of the “concept” as “author’s potential,” the source of activity and creative architectural acts. An *architectural* concept, determined in the course of the text, and thanks to which architectural terminology is redefined, could potentially be quite useful in philosophy and theory of the subject.

Keywords: notion, concept, conception, architecture, philosophy

We had never stopped asking this question previously, and we already had the answer, which has not changed: philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts.¹ (Deleuze 1994a: 2)

Philosophy as the art of production of concepts, in the sense suggested by Deleuze-Guattari, is projected completely and consistently into architecture. Allow me to paraphrase a sentence section: “architecture is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating architectural concepts.” Both clauses of this claim carry equal importance: “is the art” and “forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts.” Although at first glance the two phrases achieve balance (of the claim), they actually problematize both the method and the presence of the subject. However, not all creation is art, nor does all art produce “concepts.” Therefore, the claim that the creation of concepts is *art* implies that the concept is the product only of a special act or such “creative” activity that allows for or enables the possibility of concepts. The idea of formation, construction or production of concepts clearly points to the existence of a subject, through whose subjective action something is produced. Deleuze-Guattari thematize the potential of the subject or subjectivity by

1 “*Et nous n’avions pas cessé de le faire précédemment, et nous avons déjà la réponse qui n’a pas varié: la philosophie est l’art de former, d’inventer, de fabriquer des concepts.*” (Deleuze 1991: 8).

constituting *personages conceptuelles* – figures that contribute to defining concepts. (Deleuze 1991: 8) In the first place, it is the philosopher who offers the possibility of making concepts: “the philosopher is the concept’s friend; he is potentiality of the concept... philosophy is the discipline that involves *creating* concepts.” (Deleuze 1994a: 5) Thus, the philosopher “has the capacity” to create concepts, making the philosopher “the potential” for the existence of the concept. Aside from the conditionality of subject and process, Deleuze-Guattari’s second significant intention is to relativize the concept in relation to the problem before it. Concepts in philosophy take the place of the problem, and as such, every concept refers to the problem to which it is tied and which gives it meaning. (Deleuze 1994a: 16-17) The procedure allows the concept to simultaneously recognize and resolve the problem, while paradoxically, the problem itself ‘holds’ and articulates the concept the entire time. In such a way, the concept takes up the position between creative activity of the subject and the very problem that it (the concept) problematizes while also creating it. Deleuze explained at length, drawing on Bergson, how, in establishing a problem, the problem is also invented, and that the basic goal is not the solution of a problem, but its discovery, that is, its formulation. (Deleuze 2001: 7) The third important characteristic of the concept is the multiplicity in unity. The concept is a ‘whole’. Although fragmentary by nature (Deleuze 1994a: 16)² – regardless of how well organized its elements or in what processes of dissolution or mitosis they end up – the concept always has the capacity to totalize its parts. The potential acquired through a specific fragmentation of the whole allows the concept to take place in the (in) consistent unity of philosophy. Which is what Deleuze-Guattari declare the plan of immanence (*le plan d'immanence*). Finally, and I feel most importantly, Deleuze-Guattari offer the concept the possibility to alter its identity, that is, the capacity to transform from the role of subject into the role of object:

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In fact, if the other person is identified with a special object, it is now only the other subject as it appears to me; and if we identify it with another subject, it is me who is the other person as I appear to that subject. (Deleuze 1994a: 16)

It is important to note here the possible architectural value of this idea of translation and transformation of the subjective into the object and object into subject. The comprehension of the problem through the concept could have a purely functional architectural value in initiating the *desire* for the object. Although at first glance, for Deleuze-Guattari the relation of the subject (freedom) and the object (finitude) is not central, there is nevertheless a certain intention for the presence of the subject and a sort of ‘expectation’ of

² “The concept is a whole because it totalizes its components, but it is a fragmentary whole.” (Deleuze 1994a: 16)

object (in absence). The question is then twofold: how is the concept created (and what creates it) and what does the concept create (and how)?

The “Concept”: Deleuze’s “Project”

Despite potential pitfalls and reservations, I will try to distinguish ‘notion’ (*Begriff*) and ‘concept’ (*concept*, *Konzept*).³ There is no philosophical or linguistic precisely defined relation between notion and concept. I insist on the existence of their difference because it seems to me that its elucidation could also reframe numerous philosophical doubts. Christian Wolff defined notion (*Begriff*) as a representation of a thing in thought (“*Was ein Begriff ist. Einen Begriff nenne ich eine jede Vorstellung einer Sache in unseren Gedanken*”). (Wolff 1713: 123) I draw on Wolff because by designating ‘notion’ (*Begriff*) as *representation of things in thought*, indirectly he gives a simplified distinction between ‘notion’ and ‘concept’: notion is exhausted in representations, images, cognition or drawings.

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The problem with concept arises due to its double role. First, concepts constitute philosophy, in which they also simultaneously emerge, thus establishing internal relations that then later reflect beyond philosophy. Second, concepts examine a comprehensive configuration, a framework of fundamental elements and ‘philosophical configurations’. A theory of concepts is complicated by unresolved traditional distinctions between concept/*Begriff* and concept/conception. ‘Concept’ derives from the Latin *conceptus*, *concupiere*, allowing for concept to always be tied to creation of mind (literally, *conceptus* is the product of *interior pregnancy*). The semantic base (*con-capere* means together to take) points to the possibility of joining into a *single whole* that leads to generalization. In this sense, the meanings of ‘concept’ and ‘notion’ begin to overlap and correspond one to another. This etymology points to the formation of a group from a multiplicity of elements (an entirely Deleuzian idea) into a single whole with a determined degree of generality. Perhaps the ultimate (mis)understanding of the concept lies precisely in its intrinsic semantic-etymological (a)symmetrical ambivalence. Alterations of the concept, both in the sense of meaning and with regards to *action*, open complex fields of transgression and a morphogenesis of concepts.

3 Colloquially, the German verb *begreifen* designates an understanding on an intellectual level – the meaning of the intellectual ‘reach’ of a thing or idea (*begreifen* includes echoes of the verb *greifen*, from whence English ultimately derives grasp) and points to an approach of ‘encompassing’ things or ideas. The word *Begriff* is interpreted in various ways in philosophy, and transformed asymmetrically in epistemologies. Gottlob Frege directed the meaning of this word to the psychological, but still kept a portion of the original meaning: “Frege maintains a naturalness in the use of *Begriff* that is probably lost in later English translations and the most contemporary uses of ‘concept.’” (P. Büttgen, M. Crépon and S. Laugier in Cassin 2014:93).

Although the issue of translating or carrying the ‘concept’ into ‘*Begriff*’ varies in Kant’s and Hegel’s uses of the words,⁴ the relationship of ‘concept’ and ‘idea’ seems much simpler. It seems to me that in developing a strategic relation between the notions of *difference* and *repetition*, Deleuze gave a parallel interpretation (or simultaneously developed a parallel concept) of the transition of the idea into concept.

In every case repetition is difference without a concept. But in one case, the difference is taken to be only external to the concept; it is a difference between objects represented by the same concept, falling into the indifference of space and time. In the other case, the difference is internal to the Idea; it unfolds as pure movement, creative of a dynamic space and time which correspond to the Idea. The first repetition is repetition of the Same, explained by the identity of the concept or representation; the second includes difference, and includes itself in the alterity of the Idea, in the heterogeneity of an ‘a-presentation’. One is negative, occurring by default in the concept; the other affirmative, occurring by excess in the Idea. (Deleuze 1994b: 23)

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Such a projection of the idea and concept – a construction of *one* (concept) and *other* (idea) – is significant (and not only architecturally) because it explains how a concept produces objects that recur, whereupon both the object and repetition are determined by the identity of the concept, while the alteration of the Idea leads to interior difference (concept). The resolution of this relation presented in *Difference and Repetition*, the grounding of the concept and its role in philosophy, culminates in *What is Philosophy?* with a twofold, radical, and precise theory of the concept and theory of philosophy. The repletion and beauty of these theories, paradoxically, is located in their ephemerality: any definition of the concept melts into a definition of philosophy, allowing, in turn, the creation of new concepts.

Although emerging from multiplicity, the first significant characteristic of the concept is its wholeness, which, for Deleuze–Guattari, originates from its character (or strength) to render the *portions* inseparable within itself.

4 Colloquially, the German verb “*begreifen*” designates an understanding of intellectual order or an intellectual understanding of a thing or idea. For Kant, *Begriff* had, in a strict sense, a function of understanding, while Hegel gives an entirely different interpretation of the word. For him, *Begriff* is an independent figure of knowledge moving towards absolute knowledge. Frege brings a psychological redefinition: “The term “concept” (*Begriff*) has several uses; it is sometimes taken in the psychological sense, and sometimes in the logical sense, and perhaps also in a confused acceptance that mixes the two.” (P. Büttgen, M. Crépon and S. Laugier in Cassin 2014: 93) The various interpretations of *Begriff* and *begreifen* in Kant and Hegel can be seen in grammatical particularities: the nominative, *Begriff* and verb *begreifen* can be found in Kant, while Hegel uses the singular and plural *Begriffe*. Kant examines the limits of the verb *begreifen*, while Hegel is interested in the noun.

Like the wholeness (of physical form) as understood by the architect Peter Eisenman, it is not a matter of a single element reflecting the simple representation of the whole or of unity, but rather the wholeness determining the relative size of the portions within itself. The specific character of the concept is developed in actions of unification of a fragmented multitude of individual wholes or elements. The identity of its endo-consistency simultaneously sustains a dependence (passion of belonging to the whole) and independence of the elements (resistance to joining others). There is a cohesion of diverse parts or elements: by achieving the status of the individual, they all constitute a whole. Based on this position and fact that the concept is created, we mark the place “of overlap, condensation and accumulation of its own parts” – the place of achievement of interior strength, representing the first place of stability of concept. It would appear that the concept becomes embodied or is achieved in bodies. The crucial place where we encounter “the intensities” – true evidence of the existence of concepts – are precisely those places or positions, or projections of concepts, which are not identical with its original state. (Deleuze 1994a: 21)

We encounter an analogous situation in architecture, since the unified concept, as purely original intellectual content (an idea of an object, project or object), is never entirely equal or in agreement with what it implies. Following Eisenman then, although conceptual, architecture is intentionally directed toward an object, since the conceptual aspect of architecture is ultimately thought through the object that embodies (actualizes) the concept. It is important to point out that in architecture, the object is not only what has been built, but also includes the “idea of the object,” as an equally objective reality of the architectural concept – it contains both the *conceptual* and the implicitly physical presence. More specifically, a concept in architecture “materializes” in different formations – in the idea of the object, in the *ideal object*, the project or the material object. According to Eisenman, it is important for the conceptual aspect to be visible, regardless whether material or immaterial. It therefore seems to me important to establish a parallel between Deleuze-Guattari’s realization of concepts in bodies and Eisenman’s necessity of object. We can say that the objectivization (or transposition) of concepts into (philosophical) bodies and (architectural) objects determines its absolutism and relativism, in the sense presented by Deleuze-Guattari. At once absolute and relative, the concept is determined by its manifold consistency, simultaneously positing and creating both itself and its objects. In architecture, absolutism of the concept determines how it is positioned and how it exists in the ‘outside world’, that is, how it is contextualized.

For Deleuze, the concept is a singularity because it is always specifically and individually a philosophical creation. (Deleuze 1994a: 7) On the other hand,

for Eisenman, singularity always assumes *the other*, the different. (Eisenman 1993: 40) It is a unified individuality with the capacity and *material* for authentic objectivization. What is important is that the concept as singularity is not only unified, but that with its authentic constitutive power it determines a unified architectural reality. In other words, the identity of the concept is exhausted in the possibility of self-positing – “[it] posits itself in itself – it is a self-positing.” (Deleuze 1994: 11) This is the first *reality* of the concept: in its independent and necessary self-positing, the concept precisely becomes functional and ‘engaged’; in this activity it constitutes (a philosophical and/or architectural) reality. The simultaneous self-positing within “itself” and disclosure or revelation of the *subjective* through the production of the object essentially allows for various existences of concepts in its objective reflections.

“Project”: the “Concept” of Peter Eisenman

I would like to reconstruct what ought to be Peter Eisenman’s “concept of the project” by using an analogy with three particularities of Deleuze’s “concept:” relational question of the subject and problem, (post)structure: diagram and idea, and third, the fragmentary multiplicity of the whole. My aim is to connect Deleuze’s *plan of immanence* and Eisenman’s *meta-project*, for which I will use a mediator, Corbusier’s idea of the plan as generator.

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Two “Eisenman presences,” both real, the theoretical authority and professional practical activity in the studio, institutionalize one another within the (a)symmetric frame of a single architectural ‘figure’. The question regarding “the Work and the Project” or “the Work against Project” is analogous to the paradox of the relation of architectural deed and project of Peter Eisenman. My question is whether it is possible to think *the work* as an architectural work, practice or material architectural object without *the project* or *idea of the project*? More specifically, is *the idea of the project* consistently interpreted, perceived or felt throughout Eisenman’s work? An attempt at grasping the concept in ‘the work’ and/or ‘the projects’ (of Peter Eisenman) is a challenge of ‘gleaning’ (conceptualizing) the overall wholeness of an architectural philosophy and practice, of a single subject and *myriad* projects. The issue, then, above all, is the subject. It is clear that, just like Deleuze’s *conceptual personage* that allows for concepts, Eisenman also speaks of architects who “have a project” or who “practice a project.” The way in which he demonstrates this is a specific diagrammatic process that moves the subject: “The diagrammatic process will never run without some physical input from a subject...The diagram does not generate in and of itself.” (Eisenman 2010: 103) Such an operation implies the freedom to insist on the difference between the ‘phenomenological’ and ‘conceptual’, in which phenomenology is left to deal with the literal figuration of architectural reality, thus directing

the project as *conceptual* to deal with metamorphosis. Architecture explicitly insists on ideas that come to be built or realized.⁵

1128 How can we define project within the philosophical ‘order’ and architectural ‘thought’ of Peter Eisenman? Project is essentially what has a concept. In order to understand, but then also problematize Eisenman’s ostensibly simple concept – *the concept of the project* – it is necessary to distinguish the notions of ‘project’ and ‘design’, and thus attempt to reconstruct the potential of these ‘protocols’ to completely overcome their ontological status. *Disegno* or *design* is one of the main notions of Renaissance art theory, meaning at once design and project, drawing and intention, discovery, the idea in the speculative sense, and refers exclusively to intellectual activity. In the mid-18th century, the French word *dessein* split into *dassin* and *dessein*, that is, ‘design’ and ‘drawing’ (the arts of *dessin* were taught, but not of *dessein*.) (J. Lichtenstein 2014: 224–226)⁶. *Disegno*, then, is a notion that, in addition to ‘drawing’, which is equated with representation and the sign (*disegno*), also encompasses the project, intention and thought. The notion of ‘design’ as a unit of project or as drawing, meaning as mere translation of the notions of *disegno* and *dessein*, ultimately guides Anthony Ashley Cooper, 1st Earl of Shaftsbury. According to Shaftsbury, design serves to form the project and “...that after I had conceived my notion such as you see it upon paper, I was not concerned with this, but fell directly to work; and by practice, and by hand of master-painter brought it into practice, and formed a real design.” (Shaftesbury 1712: 396) The specific origin and character of the word design as an intellectual project or thought will in later iterations and modifications move further away from its Italian root *disegno*, moving toward drawing as procedure or representation, ignoring the specific form of thinking that is accompanied in the execution of design or the realization through design.⁷ Historians and art theorists have attempted to preserve the notion of *disegno* without translating the word, leaving it the meaning assigned by Raphael or Vasari.⁸ Giorgio Vasari emphasized that aside from drawing (as *the manual*

5 The conceptual in architecture serves to enable the transfer from the virtual to the actual, from the illusory to the real. The ultimate aim of architecture is to identically see and conceptually think an architectural object. It is for this reason that Manfredo Tafuri impresses upon Eisenman the necessity of building: “Peter, you have to build because ideas that are not built are simply ideas that are not built.” (Bojanić, Djokić 2017: 12)

6 From which time these two semantic fields, unified in *disegno*, come to diverge in French, as well as English and German.

7 Many languages today contain an analogy of use of *design*, which refers to the drawing, plan or project in the purely material sense, but it does not refer to intention or intellectual project.

8 Using the notion of ‘*ciconscrizione*’ to designate the contour (which is to be found in Alberti), historians and art theorists underscore that design is not merely drawing, but a mental representation, the form that represents thought and the imagination of the artist.

expression), design ought to reflect the artist's philosophy. He believed that the artist ought to possess a clear "conception of idea," which would be the basis of what the artist described in their work. "Conception" – for Vasari *concetto* – is a philosophical idea that stands behind any *work of art* (Vasari 1586: 490) and emerges through grasping (*cognizione*) all the relations, the whole and its parts, but also all the parts among themselves.

It is intriguing that, despite the deep understanding and interest in the Renaissance, Eisenman adopts the French-English tradition of the notion of 'design', which describes, displays, stylizes and simplifies. Paradoxically or not, Eisenman adopts 'project' (the notion of more severe origin), building his architectural philosophy around it. The origin of the word 'project' is tied to the blueprint, the schema, issuing from the Latin *proiectum* (something thrown forth, stretch out), but also meaning what is thought out, a mental plan with a function of specific exploration. Apart from the intention of remaining in the domain of purely architectural terminology, it seems that Eisenman's use of the 'project' is an intuitive reflection of some of Derrida's conceptions, emerging in turn from his reading of Husserl's ideas regarding the "origins of geometry." For Husserl, thought must first exist as *project*, and then as realized: "Successful realization of a project is, for the acting subject, self-evidence; in this self-evidence, what has been realized is there, *originaliter*, as itself." (Derrida 1978: 159-160) Husserl connects the process of realization of a project – process of projecting with the successful realization of meaning and sense that dwells within the subject – "the subject of the inventor." (Derrida 1978: 160) The 'project' is what gives the subjective "*originaliter*" a wholeness of thought, which will, in the very next instance, appear as a new form in the entirety of its content. Similarly, for Eisenman, the idea as the (possible) *original*, initiates the creation of mental space as a necessity for the development of an original conceptual structure:

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A conceptual structure is that aspect of the visible form, whether it is an idea, in a drawing, or in a building, which is intentionally put in the form to provide access to the inner form or universal formal relationships. (Eisenman 2004: 15)

The question of the project for Eisenman is the question of intention in architecture. The conceptual base of the project authentically places the idea, creating internal relations, as well as defining the overall specific context in which the idea 'materializes' as conception, and not merely as design or else pure technical production of the project. The second question of the project, within Derrida's thematization of continuity, is the essential question of contingency of the 'new' in "new project,"⁹ and the simultaneous integration of all that came before.

9 "...a scientific stage is not only a sense which "in fact comes later," but the integration of the whole earlier sense in a new project." (Derrida 1978:60)

Also, what is true of the Living Present is true of what supposes it as its ground, the historic present; the latter always refers more or less immediately to the totality of a past which inhabits it and which always appears under the general form of a project. At every moment each historic totality is a cultural structure animated by a project which is an “idea.” (Derrida 1978: 58)

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Finally, the third question of the project is a question of the pure ‘philosophic act’: for Eisenman, it is organized in the construction of the *diagram* that permeates the complete intellectual map of (architectural) thought. The diagram precedes any beginning of (architectural) activity or act, any creation, that is, any reality. Through transgression, overstepping and deconstruction of vital architectural ‘maps’, the methodological capacity of the diagram is to generate new theoretical and practical platforms of the individual project, as well as architecture as a whole. In that sense, Deleuze’s idea of superimposition, in contrast with Eisenman’s conception of superposition of the diagram (Eisenman 2010: 96), seems to allow for a conclusion that the nature of deconstructing diagram of (architectural-philosophical maps) always seeks to be twofold.¹⁰ Deleuze’s definition of the diagram as a flexible set of connections between forces (Eisenman 2010: 92-96) coincides with what Eisenman calls the architectural interior and meaning. We are dealing here with the establishing – with each new project – of a dynamic relation between (visible) space and (invisible) relations, amorphous, formless matter, unformalized and incomplete functions. Resisting finality and completion, the diagram itself generates new fragments and new “diagrams of diagrams” (Vidler 2006: 153), such as Corbusier’s villas that emerge from the Dom-ino diagrams, while at once sharpening and effacing it with “their own diagram.” These processes result in complex (manifold) conceptual (post)structures, the basis for any individual and new process of projecting.

Eisenman builds the (conceptual) whole around *the idea of a project*, whose conceptualization enables him ‘to have a project’. ‘Not having a project’, does not only mean *not being animated by concept*, but also not having ‘a desire for project’, not having a platform for the ‘possibility of project’. The significance of the (architectural) project is essential for its power to use critical reasoning of the discipline in order to shape the world, and, according to Eisenman, an architect who “has a project,” defines the world around him with that project, as opposed to an architect who “does not have a project” and allows himself to be defined by the world.

10 According to Deleuze, the diagram is different to the structure (Eisenman 2010: 93): “A diagram is the spatialisation of selective abstraction and/or reduction of concept or phenomenon. In other words, a diagram is the architecture of an ideal or entity.” (Garcia 2010: 18)

From a meta-position Eisenman introduces the construction of ‘meta-project’, as the meta-formation of continuous creation of an architectural philosophy. (Eisenman, internet) They at once form the discipline and historical order. By pure transformation of reality and using critical mechanisms, they posit new concepts and conceptions of architecture and the world it (architecture) defines.¹¹ However, even though he places it primarily in a historical context, it would appear that the significance of Eisenman’s introduction of the meta-project is an insistence on a meta-position of the architectural discipline as invention and positing of the new, what is to come, what is awaited, or even what we desire architecture to be. Part of the ‘project’ that “[opens] history to invention, which is in fact what the basic part of project is about for me,” (Eisenman 2017: 161) also opens and invests the very project as potential for the creation of the desire for the new. Similarly, Corbusier saw the potential of the ‘plan’ to overcome (spatial) explanations of traditional ‘geometry’: “The great problems of tomorrow, dictated by collective necessities, put the questions of ‘plan’ in a new form.”¹² (Le Corbusier 1993: 46) Corbusier’s plan is a formation that shapes the discipline: “a plan calls for the most active imagination. It calls for the most severe discipline also. The plan is what determines everything; it is the decisive moment.”¹³ (Le Corbusier 1993: 48) In the same way, Eisenman’s project defines the world. The plan, a strict abstraction, is what ‘determines and fixes ideas’. Corbusier’s ‘plan’, Eisenman’s ‘meta-project’ and Deleuze ‘plan of immanence’ are all formations through which the concept and concepts shape the world and architectural and/or philosophical reality:

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The plane of immanence is neither a concept nor the concept of all concepts. If one were to be confused with the other there would be nothing to stop concepts from forming a single one or becoming universals and losing their singularity, and the plane would also lose its openness. Philosophy is a constructivism, and constructivism has two qualitatively different complementary aspects: the creation of concepts and the laying out of a plane (Deleuze 1994a: 35-36)

11 Eisenman’s six meta-projects: Vitruvius’ 10 books, Leon Battista Alberti, Claude Perrault (with his French translation of Vitruvius), Giovanni Battista Piranesi, synthesis of disciplinary theory and history at the French Academy in the first decades of the 19th century, and finally, Corbusier’s project of autonomy and new conception with the Dom-Ino House: prefabrication, repetition, recurrence, new awareness of what modern life could be. (Eisenman, internet)

12 “*Le plan est le générateur. Sans plan, il y a désordre, arbitraire. Le plan porte en lui l’essence de la sensation. Les grands problèmes de demain, dictés par des nécessités collectives, posent à nouveau la question du plan. La vie moderne demande, attend un plan nouveau pour la maison et pour la ville.*” (Le Corbusier 1925: 33)

13 “*Le plan nécessite la plus active imagination. Il nécessite aussi la plus sévère discipline. Le plan est la détermination du tout; il est le moment décisif.*” (Le Corbusier 1925: 37)

For Corbusier, the plan is the generator. “The plan is the key of evolution.” (Le Corbusier 1993: 45) Deleuze-Guattari’s “plan of immanence” is a pure generator, much like Corbusier’s. Deleuze speaks of the idea ‘disciplined’ by the plan, allowing it to become executable and coherent, just like Eisenman speaks of conceptualization of the idea that will acquire the possibility of realization with the project. Thus emerge projects of architecture and architectural concepts. The plan or project become abstract thought architectural situations, and their functioning, like a medium, allows for the transposition of the idea into a *physical model of reality*. If projects or meta-projects define the world and discipline, *concepts* determine what Eisenman calls ‘architectural philosophy’.

Conclusion: “Architectural Concept” and “Philosophical Project”

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So, the question of philosophy is the singular point where concept and creation are related to each other. (Deleuze 1994a: 11)¹⁴

The problem of architecture is posited at the point of connection of architectural concept and creation. Architectural creation is grounded in architectural conceptual thought, which in turn arises from architectural creation. This is an architectonic *dislocation* of the architectural subject and object. Eisenman wrote about the *complex architectural act of dislocation*, that is, the particularity of architecture as the discipline that, paradoxically, always dislocates what it has just located, above all its own object. Without calling into question the presence of the concept or conceptual, Eisenman defines the particularity of the architectural discipline through the ‘object’: *the architectural idea* implies the presence of an object, that is, “demands the idea of an object presence,” (Eisenman 2004: 15) regardless whether the architectural object is material or immaterial. On the other hand, Deleuze designated all of philosophy through concepts it creates through which it is created. Creation and self-positing of concepts are the two things, according to Deleuze, that make the concept powerful. Much as this Deleuzian reciprocity that exists between creation and self-positing of the concept (that is, *the more it is created, the more it is self-positing*), the entire architectural design capacity of the concept turns the *interior* into the *exterior* (of architecture). The strength of the concept, in other words, is reflected in its potential objective projection. In the case of architecture, the more precise, authentic, compact the concept, the greater the intensity of its dynamic positioning. The condition for the creation of concepts in architecture, that Deleuzian *free creative activity*, which allows for the *self-positing in itself, independently and necessarily*, is in

14 “Ainsi donc la question de la philosophie est le point singulier où le concept et la création se rapportent l’un à l’autre.” (Deleuze 1991: 16)

fact occupied by the desire for the subjectively idealized object. Architectural concepts are thus creations that generate moments when “the most subjective will be the most objective.” (Deleuze 1994a: 11) In fact, the concept, in a twofold, two-sided, ambivalent manner, between two subjects, seeks out the moments when its *subjective and objective reality both become illusory*.¹⁵

The concept is created, it is the product of creative activity, but this creation is not a purpose in itself, just as the ‘concept-object’ is not the origin of this process. The essential value of the ‘concept’ for architecture (as for philosophy) is its pure creative, inventive potential for new creation, production of new concepts and new conceptions. If we take potentiality as the *potential not to cross into the real, the actual*,¹⁶ if we determine it temporally, then this ‘moment’ for something to be realized or actualized becomes the architectural (perhaps philosophical too) creative ground. It is this that constitutes the *difference* between project and architectural concept: project is the realization (of the concept or a portion thereof); architectural concept contains thought, thinking and ‘multiplicity’ that always surpasses its realization or objectivization (into another concept, conception, project or object). The content of the concept always allows for the possibility – the time and space – not to be actualized, not to pass into the finite. Eisenman’s ‘formation of the project’ is always a project of something, defining specific spatial and temporal conditions (definition in architecture means finitude, actualization, transposition into form...), while architecture necessarily implies constant shifting of borders, not only ‘defining worlds’, that is, reality. Architectural concepts create the very potential for the new and authentic, although always with a critical relationship towards the past and the extant. The concept is the invention of the problem, posing the question and the problem, while the project is one of the formations of the operationalization of the concept. The concept can and must appear and disappear, without necessarily being realized in a project. The project in Eisenman’s sense must always have a specific spatial and temporal context, while the architectural concept defines all that could comprise context. The potentiality of the architectural concept always surpasses its own ‘materialization’. The ‘project’ for Eisenman implies a kind of finitude or complete actualization (like an ‘idea in conceptualization’, ‘concept in diagram’). In a sense, the project is fulfilled in itself, binding itself,

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15 According to Theodor Adorno, “the separation of object and subject are both real and illusory.” (Ruth Grof 2014)

16 According to Giorgio Agamben, potentiality, following the Aristotelian tradition of conception, can be differentiated into ‘existing potentiality’ that is different from ‘generic potentiality’. Potential does not only exist in the actual: “[...]for Aristotle, [it] will be the key figure of potentiality, the mode of its existence as potentiality. It is a potentiality that is not simply the potential to do this or, the thing but potential to not-do, potential not to pass into actuality.” (Agamben 1999:79)

spatially and temporally, to a specific context. For Eisenman, the “project has nothing to do with looking forward. It has to do with an attitude towards space and time that is much more akin with poststructuralist thought and linguistic thought than it is with certain aspects of phenomenology.” (Eisenman 2017: 161) The architectural concept achieves specific relationships with the spatial and temporal dimensions in which it appears, making it always ontologically directed at the past, ever holding on to the capacity to not pass completely into reality, thus generating what we yet expect to appear in the future. In that sense, ‘the project’ can be a form of actualization of the architectural concept, or else, it is its *first* actualization. In this way, the architectural concept has the capacity to generate architectural conceptions. The directedness of the architectural concept towards its own (conceptual) projection in *architectural objects*, reveals to us a particular closeness between architecture and philosophy. Much as architecture, philosophy is ultimately directed at ‘its objects’ – concepts. When possibility becomes real in the true sense of the word, the architectural concept is fulfilled in a new concept, in conceptions or architectural object; whereas the philosophic concept actualizes in a new philosophical theory, the new virtual, in which *the virtual is not something lacking in reality* (Deleuze). Thus, philosophy operationalizes the possibility of defining the world and reality through ‘philosophical projects’, which are, like architectural ones, essentially paradigmatic, hierarchical, and referential. Philosophical projects organize concepts, plans, platforms, theories, thus ‘liberating always new forms of thought and new combinations of concepts. Architectural concepts reconstruct particular intellectual acts, thus generating the concept and new conceptions. The essence of Eisenman’s ‘project’ is the grounding of architecture as a discipline, which uses the *concept of the project* to define the reality and world around it. The architectural concept as ‘capacity’ or as ‘potentiality’ creates authentic and new values of space, time, but also thought as such.

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Snežana Vesnić

Šta je arhitektonski koncept?

„Koncept“ kod Deleza i „projekt“ kod Ajzenmana

Apstrakt

Dve velike teorije – jedna u filozofiji, jedna u arhitekturi – pojavljuju se skoro simultano u dvadesetom veku: Žil Delezovo razumevanje „koncepta“, odnosno, definisanje filozofije kao aktivnosti koja „proizvodi“ koncepte, i Piter Ajzenmanova ideja „projekta“ kao platforme, „stanovišta“, ili „teorije“ (jednog) arhitekta. Moja namera je da predložim i problematizujem ideju koncepta kao „kapaciteta“ ili „potencijalnosti“, implicirajući proizvodnju mnoštva „koncepta“ ili „konceptija“. Delezov veliki značaj za arhitekturu ovog veka omogućio je konstrukciju „koncepta“ kao „autorskog potencijala“, izvora aktivnosti i stvaralačkih arhitektonskih akata. Arhitektonski koncept, koji se određuje u ovom tekstu, i zahvaljujući kome se redefiniše arhitektonska terminologija, potencijalno može da bude veoma koristan u filozofiji i teoriji subjekta.

Cljučne reči: pojam, koncept, koncepcija, arhitektura, filozofija.