

To cite text:

Varda, Milan and Nemanja Anđelković. 2024. "The Great Invigilator: Is Interference Over Polities Ever Justified?". *Philosophy and Society* 0 (0).

Milan Varda
Nemanja Anđelković

THE GREAT INVIGILATOR: IS INTERFERENCE OVER POLITIES EVER JUSTIFIED?¹

ABSTRACT

This article assesses if interference over polities is unjust due to its possibility to structurally undermine the freedom of polities. The thesis of this article is that the global processes' interference over polities is unjust unless it does not violate the principles of self-government. The article makes this claim by introducing the concept of structural invigilation. The article claims that globalization's interference is unjust even when there is polity consent because globalization's mere existence is causing the invigilation of polities to occur. However, things can be reversed in the case of a dominating polity, in which case globalization's domination can actually lead towards the non-domination of citizens. In the last part of the paper, a threshold for judging the justness of interference will be articulated in the form of three conditions based on the principles of self-government, individual and communal autonomy and deliberation.

KEYWORDS

non-domination, neo-roman republicanism, invigilation, globalization, deliberative democracy, autonomy, self-government.

We will coup whoever we want! Deal with it.
Elon Musk on X, 25th July, 2020.

Introduction

This article will explore if and under which conditions globalization's interference with a polity on any level is ever just. This paper will critically assess the argument that globalization is unjust because it "structurally undermines the freedom of states" (or any other polity) (Laborde and Ronzoni 2016: 279). Even

¹ This research was supported by the Science Fund of the Republic of Serbia [grant number 7744512] Monitoring and Indexing Peace and Security in the Western Balkans – MIND.

Milan Varda: Junior researcher at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade: milan.varda@fpm.bg.ac.rs

Nemanja Anđelković: Junior researcher at the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade: nemanja.andjelkovic@ifdt.bg.ac.rs.



though Cécile Laborde and Miriam Ronzoni focus on states, our paper does not, but rather, the focus is on polities on any level of governance, although, acknowledging the importance and current centrality of state as a form and level of governance. Here, under the term polity, we understand any level of governance that is “the institutional structure...in which politics takes place, leading to policies” (Größler 2010: 3). Thus, in this regard this paper looks more from the perspective of republicanism of multiple polities as articulated later in the paper by Meine (2022), but also considers the perspectives of global republican position and republican cosmopolitanism in various instances trying to give a full picture of the given issue this paper deals with.

We are examining the question of global process interference because globalization brings many changes to polities and assessing its normative implications is important for us in order to know how to position ourselves in relation to it. We will point out potential issues in the neo-roman republican argument and set the criteria for assessing if and when that structural undermining of freedom of polities is (un)just. In this regard, we acknowledge the perspective of a global republican position. This is considered to be neither weak nor strong cosmopolitanism (Laborde 2010: 61). Our thesis is that structural interference of globalization over non-dominating polities is unjust, even when there is polity consent because its mere existence is causing what we claim to be the structural invigilation of polities to occur. In addition, in this paper, we will also rely on the notions coming from republican cosmopolitanism and plural polities republicanism with a focus on individual autonomy and deliberation as an assessment of the justifiability of the interference relationship over the dominating polity (Meine 2022, Bohman 2004). In this article we will argue that character of interference of any actor (global agent or state) is assessed based on how it affects the level of citizen self-government manifested through 3 specific conditions that protect the space for deliberation and communal and individual autonomy. This way we escape the binary generalization in terms of good (polities) and bad actors (globalization) and make the citizen self-government the prime tool for assessing the quality and level of interference.

We will start by defining domination and showing how polities are being dominated by globalization. This will serve to make further distinction between just and unjust (domination) interference. Then, we will go through the problem of the dominating polity. After that, we will assess the argument that the domination of a polity by globalization is always unjust. Afterwards, we will explore how due to structural invigilation this domination cannot be justified with the idea that the polity’s consent to globalization. Finally, we will explore how deliberation and an introduction of individual autonomy and communal self-government can help us build a theoretical threshold for assessing whether global structural interference can be justified and distinct from domination.

How Globalization Dominates States and Polities

Ronzoni and Laborde view the structural undermining of the freedom of states as the domination of states (2016). While Ronzoni and Laborde's argument is focused on the domination over the state, our claim is that all polities could be dominated. In order to show how states are dominated by globalization, we must first define domination. It is important to note that being dominated is equal to being unfree in the republican perception of liberty, meaning that being free is equal to non-domination (Carter 2018). Being dominated is understood as being subjected to the will of another agent, even if that agent does not interfere with the subject's action (Laborde and Ronzoni 2016: 280). This is also known as arbitrary power since an agent can limit one's freedom if he so chooses, even if he ultimately does not (Lovett 2018). For example, we can be unfree if someone who so wishes can prevent us from buying our food if they want to, even if they do not do that. Our life choices will certainly be different if we are aware of that, making us unfree. That, however, does not mean that interference is necessarily domination. If we want to be subjected to interference, for example, be driven to work by an uncle who offered help, that interference is a non-dominating interference (Pettit 2010: 75). It did not depend solely on someone else's will, but it was rather us who had to allow for the action to happen (Pettit 2010: 75). This, in turn, makes such an interference nondominating.

That is precisely why an ideal republican state ruled by deliberative democracy is not a dominating one, despite interference (Laborde and Ronzoni 2016: 280). People choose which rules they abide by through intense deliberation, making those rules non-dominating, like the uncle's help from the previous example (Ibid: 280). This is also known as self-government since people choose how they will be governed by themselves (Besson and Marti 2009: 12). Since they have created those rules, they are not dominated by them. However, it is important to note that a single actor is not necessary for domination to occur. A plurality of actors can dominate an individual (Ingham and Lovett 2019: 780–785). As Laborde has shown in her earlier work, slaves are being dominated not just by their own masters, but also by the culture of slavery (2010: 57). The culture of slavery is, however, caused by the structure, not by a single actor. Structural domination is a type of dominations that “systematically empowers some while systematically depowering others” (Gadeke 2020). This means that structure can dominate people as well (Laborde 2010: 56–57). Therefore, we can consider domination to be the position of an actor who is subjected to the arbitrary power of another agent or structure. Now is the time to see how states are being dominated by globalization.

Ronzoni and Laborde show that states are being dominated as a result of market globalization (2016). Throughout history states have been dominated by other states, common examples are conquests (Laborde and Ronzoni 2016: 281). Today, we have market globalization, which leads to greater economic interdependence between states and the creation of new dominating structures

that can undermine their freedom (Gadeke 2020: 204–205) International organizations that are meant to manage globalization often amplify domination between states (Ibid: 282). For example, many transnational private actors, notably multinational corporations, are known to be dominating agents. These companies often change states' policies for their own interest (Laborde and Ronzoni 2016: 283). For example, competition for investment will prompt the state to ease labour regulations, which states would not do without it (Ibid: 280). However, it is sometimes hard to tell who the agent of domination is. Companies sometimes pressure national governments in order to influence international organizations to adopt policies that are beneficial to those companies (Cox 1983). This means that there are multiple agents of domination within the network of power (Forst 2007: 247). That is also known as multiple domination (Forst 2007: 247). Although Ronzoni and Laborde do not elaborate on this in-depth, they agree that both structure and agents can dominate (2016: 287). Further, those within the structure are not even required to have the intent to dominate for domination to occur (Allen 2015: 127). For example, if someone buys cheap clothes, those clothes were probably produced in sweatshops that dominate their employees. However, impoverished polities will also be dominated by such a relationship. Therefore, that person is reproducing domination despite not having intentions to do so, while sweatshop employees are being dominated. This is the result of a structure that empowers some, while disempowering others (Gadeke 2020). However, polities themselves can be dominated as a result of this process. Think of a very disadvantaged self-government system. Despite potential deliberation, options to such a polity would be very limited and it would be prompted to reproduce the extractive economic system and thus dominated.

While market globalization could indeed dominate both individuals and polities, that is not necessarily the case. In many instances structural interference is sought, and even pursued by some polities. In this article, our initial focus is on the dominating aspects of market globalization, the latter part will explore the justifiable interference. Because our goal is normative, we will not further challenge the empirical notion that the market globalization dominates polities and will presume that the statement is correct. So why is this unjust? Intuition tells us that it is people who have intrinsic moral values, not polities.

Is Domination over States and Polities Unjust?

Ronzoni and Laborde claim that domination over the state by globalization is unjust but, in our opinion, they do not address this issue as much as they should. For this reason, we will try to present not only what they are explicitly saying, but also things that are implicit in such an argument. While globalization can dominate individuals directly, we will not focus on that (Allen 2015: 127). Instead, we will be assessing the soundness of the argument that domination over the state is unjust. It is important to note that states have great value in neo-roman thought not because of some intrinsic reasons, but because they are the

best possible instrument for upholding the non-domination (Iverson 2010: 35). This means that domination of the state is not intrinsically unjust. However, domination over people that domination of a state leads to is unjust. As such, neo-roman republicanism argues for a free, non-dominated state (Meine 2022: 277–280). This is in accordance with both normative individualism and our intuition, and probably most people would agree with the fact that individuals being dominated is unjust (Pettit 2015: 52–53). It is now time to see how the domination of a state leads to domination over individuals in it.

When states are dominated, they are unable to secure republican freedom within themselves (Laborde and Ronzoni 2016: 289). Simply, their capabilities of upholding non-domination are limited. A self-governing republic cannot properly function if the potential choices of people are limited by an agent or structure. Choices that a republic can make are then limited by domination. For example, a state in neo-colonial relations is subjected to the arbitrary power of developed nations. Being in that situation, it cannot implement some development policies without the agreement of dominating agents which is dependent on their will (Bennoune 1977). This makes those people subjected to arbitrary interference and thus dominated since they are unable to choose to develop their communities. This shows that the republican freedom of individuals is undermined in a dominated state. Ronzoni and Laborde (2016) show that domination over the state leads to domination over its people because they can be free only in a republican state. However, it is important to remember that the interference over a state that dominates its people could be justifiable as it could lead to no domination of individuals within it. Here we are referring to ideal republican states. Although there are not many truly republican states, if any at all, it is important to remember that this is a normative theory, which means that authors are assuming that states are republican when making an argument that domination over them is unjust. As Skinner claims, people can be free only in a non-dominating state, and that state can function properly only if it is not being dominated (2010: 99). This argument is certainly valid. If the non-dominated republican state is the only possible way to protect freedom, then dominated republican state makes individuals unfree. Now, we will explore if this argument is sound.

The previous argument may not be sound because of the things that it presumes. If the republican state is the only way to preserve non-domination, then it being dominated would automatically lead to domination over individuals. This also seems intuitively correct, since most people would agree that domination over people is unjust. However, this argument presumes that a republican state is the only way to preserve republican freedom. One can imagine that a person could remain non-dominated despite the state being dominated. Many authors within neo-roman thought have shown that a republican state is the best way to protect freedom because of the self-government that it offers. Perhaps making parallel self-governing sub-structures functioning in accordance with republican ideals within a state would be just. This is nothing new to republican thought, as some authors have suggested the creation of sub-state

self-government structures as well (Young 2007: 58–69). That way, people would still have self-government in non-dominated polities. They would be protected from domination since they themselves would be able to decide the rules that they want to be subjected to within society. The state would still be dominated, but since individuals and their products of self-government are not dominated, this should make the domination of a state morally insignificant, even under the republican conception of justice. This means that globalization undermining the state would not be unjust. Ronzoni and Laborde have not prepared a potential counterargument to this. However, other neo-roman republican theories can provide a response to this objection, as we will now show.

According to Pettit, domination over the state is necessarily unjust (Pettit 2015). The Republican state is an organization of self-government, as previously said. This means that it is a product of the people (Pettit 2015: 47). People have collectively decided that they want to create a state in order to act together in the first place (Pettit 2015: 53). That means that domination of the state is also the domination of their collective project, constructed by their self-government (Ibid: 53). If their collective project is being dominated, people are being dominated, since their self-government is subjected to domination (Ibid: 53). Therefore, Pettit says that the domination of the state is on its own the domination of its people (Ibid: 53). This then makes the domination of a state unjust, even from the perspective of normative individualism (Ibid: 52–53). Furthermore, if people are being dominated, then our intuition is telling us that their dominated position is unjust, as previously said. This makes it also intuitively unjust. Since globalization is dominating the republican state, globalization is necessarily dominating its people.² This means that the domination of the republican state by globalization is always unjust. Ronzoni and Laborde have not shown this in their work so that seems to be an issue in their argument. However, they have focused more on exploring potential frameworks in which republican global justice can function properly despite globalization. Still, not exploring potential counterarguments to their argument was an issue in our opinion. However, we do believe that they would implicitly agree with our claim here. In her earlier work, Laborde has also shown that the state is a product of people (2010: 51). Although she did not explore the normative issue of a dominated state as Pettit did, we still think that her work would agree with this. We believe that because both she and Pettit show that the republican state is a product of self-government. Since that is the case, domination over that product automatically means domination over people, regardless of the existence of self-governing sub-structures.

It is important to note that this argument can be sound only if one assumes a deliberative republican state which is a product of the people. If it were not the case, and we dealt with the dominating state, then the domination over such state could be justified, should it increase the republican freedom of sub-state polities. In this section, we have shown that domination over the state

2 Here, we are again referring to ideal republican state.

which is a product of its citizens due to market globalization is unjust because it always leads to the domination of the people themselves. Now we will see if the domination of the state, or any polity for that matter, can be justified using the state's consent.

The Great Invigilator: Why Domination Cannot Be Justified by the Polity's Consent

We will now try to offer a justification for globalization's effects on the polity. This might be possible using a republican theoretical framework. If the state has consented to globalization and the arbitrary power that comes with it, would that be just? According to Pettit, if A agrees to B's intervention then domination does not occur (2010: 75). It is important to note that Pettit is focused on the relation between actors, not structures. However, since structures can be dominating as well, it is safe to assume that A is not being dominated by it if they consent to it. Recall the example with the uncle. We have accepted our uncle's ride and therefore agreed to his interference. If we have agreed to be subjected to arbitrary power, then that would mean that it was our own choice. It seems that this type of interference is not actually domination, just consent to interference. However, things change if we agree to be dominated. If we have agreed to that, we will be dominated, but since we have agreed to the action, the act leading to domination would not be dominating, but rather an act of self-government. The same could be said about the polity. If it has agreed to be affected by globalization, then it has made its own free choice. That choice does lead to domination because it was an act of self-governance. That would mean that it was ultimately the polity's choice to accept globalization. This makes domination by globalization a product of self-governance. There is also some empirical support for such a stance, since states and polities in general are the ones that ultimately choose to open themselves to the global market and other aspects of globalization (Wolf 2002: 182–184). It seems that domination over the state by globalization is justified now since it is the result of self-governance. That is, however, not true, as we will now show.

Even if the polity has consented to be dominated it would still be unjust, because it was dominated even before it could make the decision. This can be shown by using Pettit's earlier work (2008), specifically something that Pettit calls invigilation (Ibid: 72). According to this concept, A will interfere with B's choice only if that choice does not please A (Ibid: 70). B is obviously dominated as a result of that since it has to consider the potential reaction of A before making a choice. However, A does not even need to have any intention to act in order to dominate B (Ibid: 70). In that case, the presence of A on its own is enough to dominate B (Ibid: 70). B will be dominated because it will have to consider the preferences of A that is there, simply out of fear of potential action. This can easily be applied to globalization. While globalization is not an actor but a structure, as previously established, this framework can work in this case as well. We call this structural invigilation. Globalization is a powerful structure

present when polities had to make choices. Globalization as a structure had a great potential impact on the future of various states and polities. Therefore, they had to be careful when making a decision not to be harmed by globalization. Fearing the harm of not globalizing, numerous polities had to globalize. This has a lot of empirical confirmation as well, since polities and states that refuse to globalize, such as Venezuela, often become sanctioned (Sohan et al. 2004). While these negative repercussions are often committed by the great powers, the entire structure leads to this response. Multinational corporations and even individuals seeking their interests all have influence over the structure leading to the ultimate action. Much like a person buying clothes dominates another individual, a person buying oil or batteries can through the structure of domination lead to the invigilation of the polity. The average Western person seeking to buy batteries will, through the structure of market, lead to the increased demand of raw lithium. If a polity were to consider entering market globalization or a trade of lithium, the structure as a whole would have an invigilating effect on the polity, as the adverse effects of avoiding the market globalization would be known to deliberators. This means that the polities were dominated before being able to make a choice by the invigilation. Since they were dominated before making the choice, their choice to be dominated was not free. It was a choice made while the state was already being dominated. This means that the polity choice to be dominated was not just, but unjust, since it was already dominated. It is now easy to see that domination over the polity by globalization is unjust even if it accepts that domination, due to the structural invigilation.

We would argue that structural invigilation and domination by actors are not necessarily mutually excluding but often reinforcing and simultaneous. As said before, A does not have to act but merely be present to impose changes on B's behavior. One of the most effective ways to do that is through shaping discourse and meaning. As Hillary Putnam points out "[a] formal language has, after all, an inventor, and like any human being, he can give commands. Among the commands he can issue are ones to the effect that 'If you want to speak my language, then do thus and so' (1975: 55). Since "word meanings derive from the complex social and linguistic process" (Abend 2008: 193), it is no wonder that it has been shaped by the dominant elites or structures. Word meanings such as globalization, liberal market, privatization, etc., can be shaped and presented in such a way as to represent desired and fairly positive social outcomes and processes, discrediting any political or social actor (again, for example a state) who goes against any of the mentioned outcomes and processes. Those actors are labelled or presumed to be retrograde, radical, or sources of instability. Globalized structures thus limit the scope of legitimate political actors and legitimate options.

A good example of what we are discussing can be found in the idea of neo-liberal state-building which rests on the notion of the universal liberal state, supported by the free market, Western-like state, and individual liberties (MacGinty 2011). Many post-socialist states went through this process, especially

ones that went through violent dissolutions, such as the case of Yugoslavia (Džuverović and Milošević 2020). One of the main instigators of the neoliberal state-building in those cases was the European Union, a supranational globalizing political actor, which insisted on the process of deregulation of the market and privatization of resources and means of production, along with the democratization and strengthening of the institutions of representative democracy. Even though this process was supported by the national political elites, it did not resonate with citizens, as they felt left out and without any sort of impact on public policies (Ibid.). This shows us that a line of demarcation can be drawn between structure and dominating actors on one side, and citizens (local actors) on the other. Going back to Pettit's form of domination, the EU in this case would not intervene directly if relevant political actors in the Balkans chose to halt the process of liberal reforms or even turn back the clock. Some of the possible consequences could be freezing the integration process, blocking various funds and diplomatic isolation, but also issuing a statement that would resonate with pro-EU NGOs and citizens.³ Knowing the high cost of such choices, states would change their behavior to be more aligned with the preferences of dominating actors and globalizing structures, despite the fact that actors and structures may not even choose to dominate states willingly. This is precisely an example of domination through invigilation. But what if the state itself is dominating?

The Problem of Dominating State

By discussing the domination of the process of globalization over the states, in the last two sections, we referred to the ideal type of the state, but fully aware of the possibility that a state itself can cause domination over its citizens. That is why the state can be “characterized by its capacity to restrict, in more or less significant proportions, the field of critique or (which in practice comes down to the same thing) deprive it of any purchase on reality” (Boltanski 2011: 117). In such cases, citizens are having restrictions on their actions (right to critique or public participation) making their ability for self-determination and self-government significantly diminished. The forms of state domination can sometimes be subtle and not easy to spot and point out, for example in hybrid regimes or states characterized by competitive authoritarianism. Such regimes can nowadays be observed in some parts of Africa, Asia, or post-communist Europe where “formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy” (Levitsky and Way 2002: 52). Citizens are deprived of open political competition and participation,

³ The last option serves as a great example of shaping the discourse and the meaning by labelling some actions anti-EU or anti-liberal, thus making those options out of the consideration by the controlled actor.

but it does not end there. Since media and free speech are restricted as well, the space for deliberation and exchange of information is shrinking, affecting not just the ability for informed decision-making, but also for realizing that one is under the domination of the state. As Boltanski warns, people will find it difficult to realize that they are being dominated and that they share common problems, especially in a state of oppression (Boltanski 2011). While the state can dominate individuals overtly, it can also do it in a subtler manner.

Structural domination by the state is also possible. It is important to note that state domination is not isolated from the context in which it happens: often some forms of domination are supported and justified by the dominant norms that are historically rooted and therefore, subtler, making the domination take the form of structural violence, rather than open and direct (Galtung 1969). For example, a state can reside in patriarchy and can thus limit the impact of women through the “glass ceiling,” a set of very subtle and widely spread social norms that prevent women from more meaningful participation in public space (Singh 2007). As a result, women (or any other oppressed social group for that matter) can form adaptive preferences. Such preferences are “formed in unconscious response to oppression” (Walsh 2015: 829). Emancipation and self-government then come in the form of *sour grapes*.⁴ Since emancipation looks out of reach, oppressed individuals value it less. Members of marginalized social groups learn to love the oppression in order to cope with it and adapt their goals accordingly, thus keeping the structural violence within a state alive and well. When that is the case, the process of globalization can sometimes act in such a way that it leads to the empowerment of marginalized groups and expands the space for self-determination and self-governance.⁵ As such, under those special conditions, globalization can be a motor of non-domination.

For Whom the Bell of Non-Domination Tolls

However, no matter how elaborate and compelling the arguments that authors of the neo-roman republican laid out, many authors have criticized the orientation towards the state. Authors of republican cosmopolitanism such as James Bohman argued for Democracy across borders focused on reflective citizens, thus disputing the strong link that should exist between statehood and citizenship (2007). Bohman “sketches a polyarchic political order of plural trans- and supranational publics and political institutions which is meant to allow citizens to reflexively democratise this order...” (Meine 2022: 281). The author posits the importance of the various forms of citizenship that are not bounded or exclusionary but are grounded in political status that is enabling for initiating

4 “*sour grapes* is a purely causal process of adaptation, taking place ‘behind the back’ of the person concerned” (Elster 1983: 117).

5 We are not implying here that the state should be forced to implement mandatory citizen participation, but that it should facilitate an inclusive space for potential participation.

deliberation and reflective democracy as a way to non-domination (Bohman 2007). Aware of the sources of domination within states, but also coming from the interdependency created by the process of globalization, he argues for a new form of membership and citizenship located within “a decentralized system of potentially numerous, reflexively interlocking publics, a polyarchic system of political institutions and plural citizenships. Plural citizenships in publics and institutions enable individuals to engage with an institutional order from various perspectives, to discover jurisdictions’ and boundaries’ blind spots and to contest domination even across borders” (Meine 2022:281).

For us, Bohman is also important because of his elaboration of centrality of democracy, specifically, deliberative democracy, in the dynamics of inter-relations between polities that should aim at creating a more complex ideal of democracy, i.e., transnational democracy (Bohman 2010). He articulates democracy as a set of institutions that should empower citizens “to form and change the terms of their common life together, including democracy itself”, thus articulating democracy as an ideal of self-rule, which is crucial in this paper (Bohman 2010: 2). We base our conditions for assessing the quality of interference in regards to how it affects the principles of self-rule (governance), viewed primarily through space for deliberation and participation.

Even though we believe this approach addresses the domination coming both from the state and globalized international environment, further intensified by the multiple relations of codependence, it is crucial, as we have explored, that we do not underestimate the power and importance boundaries have in contemporary politics (especially state ones). This is why we turn to Meine and her Republicanism of plural polities in order to set a theoretical background in assessing if and when the domination over the state is justified. She states that the “new forms of interconnectedness and inter-, trans- or supranational decision-making, in turn, open avenues for new post-Westphalian forms of governance beyond the state” (Meine 2022: 275, Scheurman 2018). This means that we should focus on various levels of governance, i.e., democratic arenas where policies can be articulated and implemented. This is a perspective that we share in this paper as well.

Much like neo roman republicanism, republicanism of plural polities recognizes the importance of belonging to a bounded polity such as the state. On the other hand, it posits the importance of both individual and communal autonomy (Meine 2022, Bellamy 2008, Celikates 2014).

Meine asserts that “democratic decision-making presupposes a bounded demos,” but later adds that “...while citizenship is thus bound to particular polities, jurisdictions and *demos*, insisting on citizenship’s boundedness must neither be equated with supporting communitarian or statist positions nor with understanding citizenship as necessarily exclusive. While the interpersonal and individual-institutional relations citizenship encompasses are bounded and particular, they are, from a conceptual vantage point, neither bound to specific communities nor to state institutions. The argument originates in individuals acting together and shaping their relationships – and not

in some pre-conceived conception of a political collective or community” (Meine 2022: 285). This point is important since the state remains an inevitable contemporary boundary or level of expressing autonomy through decision-making. That being said, the state is not a sacred cow that no one should interfere with since individual autonomy and non-domination are not inherently bound to any specific polity. This brings a question of various forms of identifications and citizenship coming from plural polities that exist in parallel with the state. While the state remains the dominant polity, citizens are not exclusively bound by it but can have other citizenship identification related to other polities. This means that citizens have a right to choose their primary identifications and participate in other forms of polities than a state, for example, such polities can be embodied through the EU principle of subsidiarity and interregional cooperation where the state is not a primary entity in certain policy areas, thus showing that multilevel governance as a product of globalization does not necessary involves domination.

This section was important for our attempt at creating an interference assessment stand-point since both republican cosmopolitanism and republicanism of plural polities show the importance of other polities and their role in creating the relations of non-domination, but also the necessity of focusing on individual autonomy and non-domination manifested through an opportunity for participation and deliberation. We have outlined above the issues of both the domination over the state and the dominating state. Thus, in order to assess whether interference of the state represents injustice, one must look into the decision-making practices of the respective state, but also at the consequences of domination coming from other polities. Therefore, we suggest a theoretical threshold for assessing the nature of interference and its justifiability.

Justifiable Interference

We can conclude that not all forms of interference over the polity are unjust, but in order to be able to judge when one relation of interference between the polity and a globalized structure is just or not, we have to set a threshold that could direct us toward the right answer. In this section, we will outline and articulate three conditions for interference over a polity to be justifiable. In conceptualizing conditions for just, non-dominating interference, we will base it on conditions for which we believe to protect the ideals of democracy as self-rule and based in neo-roman republican tradition, thus establishing a theoretical threshold for assessing the quality of interference.

Our starting point, coming from the republican tradition, is that freedom is “a social and political condition and linked to citizenship” (Meine 2022: 284). This means, that freedom is articulated through the lenses of autonomy between and within the polities, i.e., in relation to other individuals but also to a polity, thus shedding light on democratic citizenship on a polity (political community) and individual level that encompasses “interlinked elements of individual rights and duties, belonging, participation and status” (Meine 2022:

284). Because of that, Meine sees polity as an “ensemble of a bounded demos or citizenry and political and legal institutions that hold authority over a jurisdiction” (Meine 2022: 286). The last two quotes point to the interlinked importance of autonomy on both the levels of polity and individuals, which is why some republicans argue for “plural citizenship that provide possible and justified alternatives for guaranteeing individual freedom and self-determination as well as preserving the legitimacy of the distinct polities and of the overarching political order in its entirety” (Meine 2022: 286). In an ideal polity, based on the idea of democratic minimum, citizens should be able to “initiate deliberation, not only on issues of policy but also on constitutional questions – and thus on the framework of democracy itself” (Meine 2022: 281, Bohmans 2007). This means that citizens should be able to be the rule-makers of their polities and should be able not just to decide on decision and government mechanisms, but also boundaries of polities to which they belong. Finally, not less importantly, any polity should be capable of being responsive to citizens and able of carrying through the will of its citizens (Laborde and Ronzoni 2015). Therefore, the following conditions should embody and protect the values of autonomy and self-government on various levels of governance in order to represent the viable theoretical threshold for assessing the quality of interference in terms of domination over a certain polity.

The first condition is that interference with a polity have as a consequence the expansion of the space for individual and/or communal autonomy and participation. That means that interference can be non-dominating if it brings a certain polity closer to the ideal of democratic citizenship and self-government. For example, deliberation as a decision-making process has been seen by many as a mechanism for achieving self-government within a polity, therefore, interference that improves conditions and scope of deliberation, in terms of number of participating citizens, but also, the scope of issues open for deliberation, can be deemed to be justifiable and just (Bohmans 2007, 2010; Pettit 2001, 2012).

The second condition demands that interference is not targeting a policy or decision that was reached through the process of citizen participation or deliberation. This condition is connected to the notion that a polity should be responsive to its citizens and not to external actors (Laborde and Ronzoni 2015). For example, that would mean that decisions reached through mechanisms of participation, deliberation or any other mechanisms that embodies the principles of self-government, cannot be overran by an external agent or other polity. This of course, also means that if citizens of a polity opt for representative or delegate mechanisms, decisions made through those mechanisms should not be interfered with, unless they violate the principles of autonomy, self-governance and freedom. That would be the case, for example, if citizen power to change the mechanism were hindered.

The last condition that urges that interference should not meddle with the autonomy of the polity created by its constituents unless the respective polity itself is violating the above-mentioned principles. A prime example of this could be the concept of a dominating state (as described earlier in this paper)

that violates the principles of individual autonomy and self-governance, acting as big invigilator towards its citizens. Violation of the principles of self-governance can occur when decision-making process excludes some citizens of the polity, or creates imbalance of power or when voted decisions and policies inhibit deliberation and participation space and mechanisms. One way to look at the violation of these principles would be to look if interference has a negative effect on two most constant variables of democracies (polyarchies), namely inclusivity and public contestation (Coppedge et al. 2008). That relates to Dahl's conception of polyarchy in which all citizens should participate in public contestation, that is, they should "have unimpaired opportunities ... to formulate their preferences; ... to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action; ...to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the government..." (Dahl 1971: 2). Interference that trumps those ideals should be regarded as unjust domination. On the other hand, interference that opens up or defends space for citizen participation and public deliberation within a polity,⁶ can be deemed as just.

Still, there some caveats and limitations that we must address, as these, rather abstract, conditions cannot fully or exhaust all situations due to the complexity of social reality. First, it should be noted that participation and deliberation is not mandatory, nor lower level of participation problematic if it is the authentic and autonomous decision of citizens to refrain from participation. Secondly, even though the focus was on mechanisms of participatory and deliberative democracy, other democratic mechanisms such as representative, electoral or delegate democracy are not excluded, but are necessary as well. The same can be said for an independent judiciary and the rule of law. Citizens can delegate some functions or roles as long as they can retract it in any time; nothing should be set in stone in that regard. Thirdly, citizens are allowed to "make mistakes and arrange their own affairs in ways that deviate from optimal non-domination (within limits...)" (Laborde and Ronzoni 2015: 289). Since no one can make optimal and informed decisions all the time and is bound to make some mistakes, our conditions do not try to meddle and fix every decision that has negative effect on basic principles of self-governance; freedom precisely means to make mistakes. However, should those mistake have significant negative effect on democratic citizenship, level of public contestation or deliberation, interference can be a possible option to mend the damage.

Fourth, during the articulation of the conditions for just interference, we referred to the two most constant variables that are used to assess the quality of democracy, inclusiveness and public contestation, but, as Bohman points out, mere contestation is not enough, but we also have to point out the importance of "the capability of citizens to transform communicative freedom into communicative power" (Bohman 2010: 4). In other words, public contestation of citizens should have an effect on policies and decisions within a polity. Fifth, as Meine points out, citizens will belong to various polities at once,

6 In terms of inclusivity and contestation.

those polities will interact and since they can have various interests they could clash at some point regarding a given issue or common good (2022). There would be numerous models for resolving this clash, one could be introducing the principle of subsidiarity where the lowest capable level (vertically) should be delegated to govern the common or deal with an issue. Other possible option would be a delegated sortition or representative body of involved polities that would go about resolving the issues. Finally, it should be noted that these conditions are theoretical and rather abstract, meaning they require operationalization and fine graining in order to avoid manipulation and ambiguity, but also to further adapt in order to cover more nuances that we overlooked and that will certainly come up due to the social complexity of reality.

All in all, by articulating these conditions for interference assessment, we tried to follow the neo-republican tradition and make sure that our conditions pay enough attention to all relevant aspects of self-governance and freedom, including its individualist foundations (for example citizenship); jurisdictional structures and *demoi* (in our case free polities); and inter-jurisdictional relationships (such as international relations and globalization) (Meine 2022).

Conclusion

In this paper, we have discussed how can we assess when globalization's interference with polities is unjust from the republican perspective. We have pointed out that the domination of the free polities as a result of globalization is unjust. By introducing the notion of structural invigilation, we have explained that this domination is unjust even when there is consent from the polity. For this reason globalization dominates the polities even in cases of polity consent. But as not all interference is domination, we tried to come up with conditions that would derive from neo-roman republican tradition, thus embodying the values of democratic self-governance and freedom, but would also help us create a theoretical threshold for assessing the justifiability and justness of any given interference with a polity. Namely, those conditions assert that interference with a polity as a consequence has the expansion of the space for individual and/or communal autonomy and participation; that interference is not targeting a policy or decision that was reached through the process of citizen participation or deliberation; and that interference should not meddle with the autonomy of the polity created by its constituents unless the respective polity itself is violating the principles of democratic self-government and freedom. Being theoretical and abstract, these conditions come with some caveats that future deliberation can help to resolve and focus further on these issues, but our goal for now was to try to articulate a possible threshold for assessing the character of interference with a polity in terms of domination as described within the neo-roman republican tradition.

References:

- Abend, Gabriel. 2008. "The Meaning of Theory." *Sociological Theory* 26 (2): 173–199.
- Allen, Amy. 2015. "Domination in Global Politics: A Critique of Pettit's Neo-Republican Model." In: Buckinx Barbara, Jonathan Trejo-Mathys and Timothy Waligore, eds. *Domination and Global Political Justice: Conceptual, Historical and Institutional Perspectives*. New York, NY: Routledge: pp.: 111–132.
- Bellam, Richard. 2008. *Citizenship. A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bennoune, Mahfoud. 1977. "Mauretania: Formation of a Neo-Colonial Society." *MERIP reports* 54: 3–13.
- Besson, Samantha and Jose L. Marti. 2009. "Law and Republicanism: Mapping the Issues." In: Samantha Besson and Jose L. Marti, eds. *Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: pp.: 4–38.
- Bohman, James. 2004. "Republican Cosmopolitanism." *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 12 (3): 336–352.
- Bohman, James. 2007. *Democracy Across Borders. From Dêmos to Dêmoi*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Bohman, James. 2010. "Introducing Democracy Across Borders. From Dêmos to Dêmoi." *Ethics and Global Politics* 3 (1): 1–11.
- Boltanski, Luc. 2011. *On Critique: A Sociology of Emancipation*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Carter, Ian. 2018. "Positive and Negative Liberty." In: Edward N. Zalta, ed. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition)*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/liberty-positive-negative/> (last accessed: November 14, 2022).
- Celikates, Robin. 2014. "Freedom as non-arbitrariness or as democratic self-rule? A critique of contemporary republicanism." In: Christian Dahl and Tue Andersen Nexø, ed. *To Be Unfree. Republicanism and Unfreedom in History, Literature, and Philosophy*. Bielefeld: Transcript: pp.: 37–54.
- Coppedge, Michael, Angel Alvarez and Claudia Maldonado. 2008. "Two Persistent Dimensions of Democracy: Contestation and Inclusiveness." *The Journal of Politics* 70 (3) 632–647.
- Cox, Robert W. 1983. "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method." *Millennium* 12 (2): 162–175.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Džuverović Nemanja and Aleksandar Milošević. 2020. "‘Belgrade to Belgradians, not Foreign Capitalists’: International Statebuilding, Contentious Politics and New Forms of Political Representation in Serbia." *East European Politics and Societies* 35 (1): 190–209.
- Elster, Jon. 1983. *Sour grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Forst, Rainer. 2007. "Justice Morality and Power in the Global Context". In: Forst, Rainer, ed. *The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press: pp.: 27–36.
- Galtung, Johan. 1969. "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research* 6 (3): 167–191.
- Gadeke, Dorothea. 2020. "Does a Mugger Dominate? Episodic Power and the Structural Dimension of Domination." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 28 (2): 199–221.

- Größler, Andreas. 2010. "Policies, Politics, and Polity." *Systems Research & Behavioral Science* 27 (4): 385–389.
- Ingham, Sean and Frank Lovett. 2019. "Republican Freedom, Popular Control, and Collective Action." *American Journal of Political Science* 63 (4): 774–787.
- Iverson, Duncan. 2010. "Republican Human Rights?" *European Journal of Political Theory* 9 (1): 31–47.
- Laborde, Cecile. 2010. "Republicanism and Global Justice: A Sketch." *European Journal of Political Theory* 9 (1): 48–69.
- Laborde, Cecile and Miriam Ronzoni. 2016. "What is a Free State? Republican Internationalism and Globalisation." *Political Studies* 64 (2): 279–296.
- Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2002. "The rise of competitive authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 51–65.
- Lovett, Frank. 2018. "Republicanism". In: Edward N. Zalta, ed. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition)*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/republicanism/> (last accessed: October 14, 2022).
- Mac Ginty, Roger. 2011. *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Meine, Anna. 2022. "Free state for Free citizens!?: Arguments for a republicanism of plural polities." *Journal of International Political Theory* 18 (3): 274–293.
- Pettit, Philip. 2008. "Dahl's power and republican freedom." *Journal of Power* 1 (1): 67–74.
- Pettit, Philip. 2010. "A Republican Law of Peoples." *European Journal of Political Theory* 9 (1): 70–94.
- Pettit, Philip. 2012. *On the people's terms: a republican theory and model of democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Pettit, Philip. 2015. "The Republican Law of Peoples: A Restatement." In: Buckinx Barbara, Jonathan Trejo-Mathys and Timothy Waligore, ed. *Domination and Global Political Justice: Conceptual, Historical and Institutional Perspectives*. New York, NY: Routledge: pp.: 37–70.
- Singh, Val. 2007. "Women and the Glass Ceiling." URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265291871_Women_and_the_Glass_Ceiling (last accessed: December 25, 2022).
- Skinner, Quentin. 2010. "On the Slogans of Republican Political Theory." *European Journal of Political Theory* 9 (1): 95–102.
- Sohan, Sohan, Tracy Sue and Kumar Surinder. 2004. "Venezuela – Ripe for US Intervention." *Race and Class* 45 (4): 61–74.
- Walsh, Mary B. 2015. "Feminism, Adaptive Preferences, and Social Contract Theory." *Hypatia* 30 (4): 829–845.
- Wolf, Martin. 2001. "Will nation-state survive globalization?" *Foreign Affairs* 80 (1): 178–190.
- Young, Iris M. 2007. *Global Challenges: War, Self-Determination, and Responsibility for Justice*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Milan Varda
Nemanja Anđelković

Veliki nadzornik: da li je mešanje u države ikada opravdano?

Apstrakt:

Ovaj članak razmatra da li je dominacija globalizacije nad državama nepravedna zbog toga što strukturalno podriva slobodu država. Teza ovog članka je da je strukturalna dominacija globalizacije nad nedominirajućim državama uvek nepravedna. Članak iznosi ovu tvrdnju kroz uvođenje koncepta strukturalne invigilacije. U članku se tvrdi da je dominacija globalizacije nepravedna čak i kada postoji saglasnost države sa dominacijom, jer samo postojanje globalizacije izaziva invigilaciju nad državama. Međutim, odnosi pravednosti se mogu preokrenuti u slučaju dominirajuće države, u kom slučaju dominacija od starne globalizacije nad državom zapravo može dovesti do nedominacije građana. U drugom delu rada će biti dizajniran prag za prosuđivanje pravednosti dominacije u vidu tri uslova zasnovana na principima samouprave, individualne i komunalne autonomije i deliberacije.

Ključne reči: nedominacija, neoromanski republikanizam, invigilacija, globalizacija, deliberativna demokratija, autonomija, samoupravljanje.