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REVISITING POST-ISLAMISM A DECADE AFTER THE ARAB SPRING

ABSTRACT

The Arab Spring uprisings marked a watershed moment in regional politics, significantly impacting Islamist movements in terms of strategies, ideologies, and organizational structures. Accordingly, this paper examines whether these dramatic events strengthened or weakened the post-Islamist evolution of traditional political Islam movements, focusing on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (E-MB) and the Tunisian Ennahda Movement Party (EMP) as case studies. The proposed hypothesis is that the Arab Spring has variably influenced Islamists. In Egypt, it initially weakened the post-Islamist turn of the E-MB. However, owing to the 2013 coup and subsequent repression, the E-MB was politically excluded and weakened, creating a vacuum that was filled by various forms of less political or non-ideological forms of Islamic activism. The Tunisian Islamists had a different story. The Arab Spring seems to have strengthened their transition to post-Islamism. In its tenth conference, the EMP declared its exit from political Islam, adopting the new concept of Muslim Democracy. Even after the presidential takeover in July 2021, which resulted in the political exclusion of the EMP, the Work and Achievement party that defected from it maintained clear post-Islamist features.

KEYWORDS

Islamism; Post-Islamism; Muslim Democracy; Muslim Brotherhood; Ennahda Movement Party.

Introduction

Since its emergence in the late 1990s, the concept of post-Islamism has been a subject of continuous debate. Academics disagree on its exact meaning, the similarities and differences it has with traditional Islamism, and, more importantly, whether it signifies the failure of political Islam as theorized by Olivier Roy, or if it represents an evolution or transformation of Islamism in the post-ideological era as suggested by Asef Bayat.

Being not Islamist nor secularist, the Arab Spring uprisings could be described as post-Islamist. As Bayat (2014: xvii) put it, the Arab *refo-lutions* (i.e., mid-way between reform and revolution) didn't aim at establishing an Islamic



state; rather, “a pious society within a civil (secular) democratic state”. A multitude of uprisers were people of faith; however, they just aimed to gain their freedoms. In accordance with this argument, Roy (2012: 47) affirmed that the Arab Spring had nothing to do with the debate on Islam between liberal secularists and conservative Islamists for neither Islamism nor secularism was on the protestors’ agenda.

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Islamist movements throughout the region entered a new phase. On one hand, the removal of autocratic leaders created opportunities for Islamists to fill the political vacuum and assume power in many Arab countries. On the other hand, Islamists apparently failed to maintain their popularity or effectively address the transitional challenges. Consequently, from 2013 onward, Arab Islamists began to experience severe setbacks across the region.

This swift rise and profound fall of political Islam movements over the past decade has had a significant impact on their organizational stability, ideological outlook, and political behavior. Accordingly, this paper aims to examine the impact of these dramatic changes on Islamist movements and whether they have strengthened or weakened their transformation to post-Islamism.

Using the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (E-MB) and the Tunisian Ennahda Movement Party (EMP) as case studies, this paper argues that the Arab Spring has variably influenced Islamist movements in the Arab world. In Egypt, the Arab Spring initially weakened the post-Islamist turn of the E-MB. The intense competition with secularists during the transitional period and the ideological outbidding practiced by its rival Salafists empowered the conservative faction within the E-MB. Additionally, the remarkable electoral success achieved by traditional Islamist parties (both the *Ikhwanis* and Salafis) in the 2011–2012 parliamentary and presidential elections disproved the claim that post-Islamist alternatives were more attractive (Cavatorta and Merone 2015: 29–30). Later, owing to the 2013 coup and subsequent repression, the E-MB experienced a brief cycle of radicalism followed by organizational divisions. These changes weakened the E-MB, creating a vacuum that was filled by various forms of less political or non-ideological forms of Islamic activism.

The Tunisian Islamists had a different story. The Arab Spring seems to have strengthened the post-Islamist transition of the EMP, as evidenced by the party’s tenth conference held in 2016. At this conference, the party declared its exit from political Islam, adopting the new concept of Muslim Democracy (Ennahdha International Page 2016a). Even after the presidential takeover in July 2021, which resulted in the political exclusion of the EMP, an off-shoot party, the Working and Achievement party, showed clear post-Islamist features. The new party, emphasized its abandonment of identity politics and aversion to ideological conflicts (Wannas 2022).

To examine the impact of the Arab Spring uprisings on the Islamist movements, it is not enough to rely on the premises of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis. Legal recognition and political inclusion of social movements do not simply urge them to moderate their ideology and political behavior, as

suggested by this hypothesis (Schwedler 2013: 3). Rather, in accordance with the political structure opportunity theory, other variables related to organizational resources, institutional arrangements, and historical precedents do also influence the mobilization abilities and strategies of social movements (Landman 2008: 169). By focusing on the incentives and threats generated by changing structures, the political opportunity theory adds new dimensions that can explain why inclusion might lead to radicalization or the cases when political exclusion triggers moderation of social movements (Tezcür 2010: 776).

As qualitative research, this paper's data collection methodology relies essentially on content analysis. The ideological outlook of the political parties and organizations in the case studies will be examined through their political platforms, constitutional proposals during the transitional periods, and the statements made by their leaders. The prime goal of the analysis is to understand how these entities envision, even theoretically and discursively, the political and societal roles of Islam and whether these views reflect a traditional Islamist orientation or could be considered as a transition to post-Islamism.

Conceptual Framework: Islamism in the Era of Post-Ideology

To grasp the elusive meaning of the post-Islamism concept, it is mandatory to commence with the elaboration of three interrelated concepts: Islamism, post-ideology, and post-secular societies. Each of these concepts highlights a particular aspect of the multi-dimensional phenomenon of post-Islamism. Islamism, for instance, refers to the process of re-making Islam as a political ideology. In its turn, the post-ideology term describes the waning of ideology in an increasingly pragmatic and fluid political realm. As for the religious dimension, the post-secularism concept attempts to capture the ambiguous relationship and the blurring demarcation between religion and secularity in post-modern societies.

The concept of Islamism, to start with, could be broadly defined as any “political activity and popular mobilization in the name of Islam” (Ayoob 2011: 6). Ideologically, it refers to “the tendency to view Islam not merely as a religion in the narrow sense of theological belief, private prayer and ritual worship, but also as a total way of life with guidance for political, economic, and social behaviour” (Shepard 1987: 308). Furthermore, in its totalitarian form, Islamic reference could give rise to a rigid ideology or a comprehensive worldview that necessitates excessive state intervention and aims to influence both the public and private spheres. Sayed Qutb's concept of *al-Hakimiyyah* could be a good example of such an assertive ideology (Affan 2022: 55).

From this perspective, the post-Islamism term can be traced back and related to the concept of post-ideology, which emerged for the first time in the late 1960s. As a concept, post-ideology was not meant to state that all ideological manifestations in the political sphere ceased to exist; rather, it simply signified the end of the era of the “dogmatic” utopian ideologies such as classical Marxism (van Veldhuizen 2021: 64).

Similarly, post-Islamism, in one of its dimensions, indicates softening of the Islamist ideology. According to Olivier Roy, from the 1990s and on, Islamists no longer aim at establishing an all-encompassing Islamic state, as theorized by Abul'ala al-Mawdudi, Sayed Qutb and Ruhollah al-Khomeini. Instead, they started to believe in the relative autonomy and priority of politics over religion (Holdo 2017: 1801). In other words, in the post-Islamism phase, the state is no longer the main instrument for "Islamization" (Wolfering 2014: 109).

Asef Bayat (2014: xvi), from his side, envisioned post-Islamism as "a critique of Islamism from within and an alternative project to transcend it". It is neither anti-Islamic nor un-Islamic; it is another way of being religious by transcending classical Islamist politics and mixing religiosity, rights, and freedoms. The dream of the Islamic state, thus, has been replaced by the endeavor to install an electoral democracy within the framework of the civil state and pious society (Bayat 2013a: 593).

Mixing liberal democratic values and procedures with religious morality is one of the principal criteria of post-secular society, as defined by Jürgen Habermas (Reder and Schmidt 2010: 5). Post-secular societies have emerged in the West, according to Habermas, when it becomes clear that religion is not "destined to disappear" as previously expected by the secularization theory, and that religion is an indispensable source of morality that can even positively contribute to the ethical debates in the public sphere. In this narrative, religion, despite being able to maintain its presence and influence in an increasingly secularized society, had to adapt to the multi-vocality and entrenched diversity of the post-secular age (Yilmaz 2014: 93, Byrd 2016: 13).

Concludingly, post-Islamism is a controversial term that denotes remarkable changes in the Islamist phenomenon. Such changes are stimulated or catalyzed by the waning of the ideological age in the past few decades. It suggests that classical Islamism gives up its revolutionary zeal and utopian puritanical outlook. In contrast with its earlier exclusivity, Islamism becomes incorporating ideals from various sources, including liberalism and democracy side-by-side with Islamic culture and values. This hybridity, in a way, resembles the post-secularist features as experienced in some European countries such as the Scandinavian states (Yilmaz 2014: 94, Akhtar 2016: 222–223).

The relationship between Islamism and post-Islamism, though, is very controversial because it can be envisioned in four different ways: (1) Post-Islamism might be perceived as a sign of failure of Islamism and an attempt to replace it with a more feasible Islamic-driven value system; (2) post-Islamist transformation could be seen as a process of adaptation and evolution of Islamism into a more democratic and liberal version that makes "post-Islamism [perceived] to mean reformism and not failure" (Cavatorta and Merone 2015: 32); (3) sometimes, post-Islamism is claimed to be a defection from and a revolt against traditional Islamism; (4) finally, post-Islamism might be a less provocative variant of Islamism, tactically adopted by the Islamist actors as a mean of survival during unfavorable political circumstances (Abu Rumman 2015: 14–15).

What makes the post-Islamist concept even more ambiguous is that it is unclear which transformation in the Islamist ideologies and practices should be identified as post-Islamist. Luz Gómez García (2012: 454) righteously states that “[p]ost-Islamist theory is extraordinarily flexible since it can accommodate ... a constellation of different and even contradictory Islamic experiences.” According to her, the overarching concept of post-Islamism encompasses depoliticized forms of religious mobilization, Islamic-inspired women movements (usually dubbed as Islamic feminism), and an Islamic value system integrated with global culture and market economy.

The criticisms levelled against the post-Islamism concept due to its vagueness and ambiguity do not negate the fact that, since the 1990s, the Islamist parties and movements have gone through unmistakable changes in terms of their ideologies and political behavior (Kurzman and Naqvi 2010: 57). Moreover, the Arab Spring represents another important watershed moment in regional politics that creates totally different dynamics and necessitates academic scrutiny of its impact on the post-Islamism phenomenon.

Post-Islamism as a Revolt Against and Defection from Islamism

As stated before, there are different ways to understand the post-Islamism phenomenon and its relationship with Islamism. In the Arab Spring context, a simple way to put it is that Islamism is a traditional form of ideological Islam that adopts an authoritative approach to “Islamization” by emphasizing the role of the state and the religious establishment in Sharia implementation. Structurally, Islamism represents a typical social movement with well-established techniques of recruitment, socialization and mobilization.

Post-Islamism, on the contrary, has a different understanding of Islamic reference. In such a case, Islam is perceived as a value system and moral guidance for social and political life, not an ideology of the state. The ways of organization and mobilization in post-Islamism are less centralized, and its agenda is less political and more spiritual and intellectual.

Having that said, it can be assumed that the Arab Spring, in the case of Egypt, has aggravated the division between the Islamist movements and the post-Islamist factions. During the transitional period, it was clear that the political Islam movements (exemplified mainly in the E-MB and its Salafi allies) adopted a traditional form of Islamism. Judging from the 2012 constitution, drafted by an Islamists-dominated constituent assembly, the concept of Islamic reference showed an authoritative turn. Apart from Article 2 which was maintained from the 1971 constitution and enshrined the Sharia as the main source of legislation, many other articles were either added or modified to render the constitution more “Islamic”.

For instance, Article 4 was added to grant Al-Azhar institution autonomy, made the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar immune from being dismissed, and gave the Azhari Senior Scholars a consultative role in matters pertaining to Islamic

law. Article 219 was also added to determine the definition of the Islamic Sharia and narrow it down to include the rulings of the Sunni creed exclusively.

Other articles were also modified to give them more religious connotations. In Article 1, as an example, the Egyptian people are said to be “part of the Arab and Islamic nations”, not “the Arab nation” only as it was in the 1971 constitution. Article 6 states that the political system is based on the principles of democracy and Shura (the Islamic term for political consultation). Furthermore, Article 46 that granted religious freedoms universally in the 1971 constitution, was modified to confine them to divine religions only (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace n.d.).

In contrast to the premises of the inclusion-moderation theory, including the E-MB in formal politics during the transitional period apparently didn't soften its ideology. Based on the political opportunity structure, many factors could explain the E-MB's steadfast position. First, the ideological struggle between the Islamists and secularists reached its climax during the transitional process owing to repeated electoral competitions as well as their disagreements during constitutional drafting. Second, the traditional Islamist rhetoric and agenda proved very efficient in terms of mobilizing resources and voters during the transition. Lastly, the E-MB's Salafi rivals, such as the Salafi Call and its Al-Nour party, emboldened by their unexpected achievements in the 2011–2012 parliamentary elections, practiced ideological outbidding against the E-MB, accusing it of not adequately defending or upholding the Islamic Sharia (Cavatorta and Merone 2015: 29–30, Affan 2022: 178).

This conservative turn of the E-MB was not inconsequential. The reformist and more progressive factions within the group felt increasingly alienated and eventually decided to defect. Two important incidents are worth mentioning: The Strong Egypt party and the Egyptian Current party.

The first party was established by the prominent leader in the E-MB *Abdul-Monaem Abul-Fotouh*. A founding figure of the Islamist youth movement in the 1970s and a member of the guidance bureau for more than 25 years, *Abul-Fotouh* was known for his moderate political views and his tendency to cooperate with other political forces across the ideological spectrum. In the early transition, it seems that *Abul-Fotouh* felt dissatisfied with the E-MB's political choices. In May 2011, he decided to run for the presidency in a personal capacity – the decision that cost him his membership in the E-MB (Wolfering 2014: 111).

After coming fourth in the presidential race with almost 4 million votes, *Abul-Fotouh* established the Strong Egypt party, which can be categorized as central-left regarding its socio-economic program. The former Islamist leader was keen to position his party away from the political Islam umbrella, in a way that likens him to Tayyeb Erdoğan's departure from Necmettin Erbakan's party and his establishment of the Justice and Development (AK) party (Al-Zawawy 2022: 440).

The Egyptian Current party was another like-minded split. A group of *Ikhwani* youth activists, who were part of the Revolutionary Youth Coalition,

was dismissed from the E-MB in July 2011 as they objected to the political platform of the group's Freedom and Justice party. For its founders, "the party is not concerned with the burgeoning political polarization between secular and Islamist forces". Instead, they affirmed the priority of supporting democratic transition, economic development, and social justice (Ahram Online 2011). Being too close to the political line of the Strong Egypt party, the Egyptian Current party, in the wake of the military coup, decided to merge with the former in 2014 (Ahram Online 2014).

The traditional Islamist movement in Egypt suffered a significant blow after the 2013 coup. The E-MB was banned and designated as a terrorist organization, with its leaders and tens of thousands of its members and supporters either imprisoned or forced to flee the country (Aboul-Gheit 2014, Human Rights Watch 2017). Even the Salafi Call and its Al-Nour party, which aspired to fill the religious-political vacuum left by the crackdown on the E-MB, could not maintain their political gains in post-2013 Egypt. The Salafi popularity greatly diminished due to their internal disagreements over the military coup, the regime's autocratic policies that largely restricted their freedom, and the fierce attacks waged by the official religious establishment and the Sufi trend against them (Lacroix 2016). Therefore, the political presence of the Al-Nour Party, as manifested in its parliamentary seats, declined significantly in the past decade from 112 members in the 2012 parliament to only 7 in 2020 (Afan 2023).

The chances of the post-Islamist political parties were not much better, as the Strong Egypt party had to freeze its activities in 2018 after the arrest of its chairman *Abdul-Monaem Abul-Fotouh* and his deputy *Mohammed Al-Qassas* (Osman 2013). Nevertheless, it could be argued that, since 2013, other forms of non-partisan Islamic activism have relatively flourished. For instance, the Sufi organizations and networks practiced a form of "quiescent" Islamism. After the modest performance of its parties, the political mobilization of the Sufi base was restricted to campaigning and voting in favor of incumbents during the parliamentary and presidential elections. In return, the Sufi trend strived to replace the E-MB and the Salafis in the religious domain in Egypt. Empowered by the support of *Al-Azhar* and the official religious establishment, many initiatives were launched to attract the Egyptian religious constituency, such as the Corridors of *Al-Azhar* initiative. Others were established and generously supported by the regional Sufi institutions, such as Tabah foundation and the Council of Muslim Elders. However, it should be noted that the Egyptian authority did not tolerate some independent initiatives with similar mode of activism, such as the *Sheikh al-Amud* initiative, whose founder was arrested in 2015, then again in 2021 (Al-Baqary 2018: 54–60, Fotouh 2021: 40–41).

Other forms of Intellectual Islamism, i.e., Islamist activism focusing on revisioning, producing, and promoting political Islamic thoughts, have also expanded remarkably since 2011. Despite its cultural and educational nature, many initiatives such as Knowledge *Maerifa* and Awakening of Thoughts *Ya-qazit Fikr* entailed in-depth revision and critique of major political themes

of the Islamist ideology such as the Islamic state and the implementation of Sharia. Once succeeded to influence thousands of youth Islamists, intellectual Islamism managed to survive the resurgent authoritarianism after the military coup of 2013 and relatively maintained its presence virtually via the Islamist influencers – the phenomenon that can be called digital Islamism (Dogan 2023).

Post-Islamism as an Evolution of Traditional Islamism

As explained earlier, post-Islamism is not always at odds with traditional Islamism. The evolution of the post-Islamist trend in Tunisia is proof of otherwise. Since its establishment, the EMP has upheld a distinct version of Islamism, which Azmi Beshara (2012: 174) described as post-*Ikhwanism*. According to its founder, Rached Ghannouchi (1999: 81–84), the religious-political ideology of the EMP is a synthesis of various sources. Influenced by the key ideologues of the E-MB, Hassan Al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, the movement adopted the major premises of political Islam: comprehensive Islam or *Al-shumuliyah* and Islamic governance or *Al-hakimiyyah*. The EMP was also greatly influenced by the E-MB's methodology of religious education or *Al-tarbiyyah*.

Additionally, Ghannouchi identified two other intellectual sources: traditional Tunisian religiosity, shaped by the Maliki jurisprudential thought, *Ash'ari* creed, and Sufi spirituality; and the rational school of thought. This latter, he detailed, includes both Islamic sources, exemplified by the legacy of the 19th century Islamic reformers and the *Maqasid al-Sharia* school, and Western sources, encompassing various ideologies and social sciences approaches.

In a number of his books, such as *Public Liberties in the Islamic State* [الحريات العامة في الدولة الإسلامية], Ghannouchi advocated for an Islamic model of democracy, merging Islamic morality and values with democratic institutions and procedures (Tamimi 2001: 102). This composite clearly bespeaks Bayat's definition of post-Islamism that “fuse[s] religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam and liberty” (2013b: 8).

In the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings, the EMP showed a great deal of flexibility and pragmatism in comparison to the E-MB. For instance, during the transitional negotiations, Ghannouchi gave up on the EMP's demand to include the Sharia reference in the constitution. It was only “articulated in terms of values rather than binding legal norms” in the preamble of the constitution (Ben Lazreg 2021). Ghannouchi justified this concession by claiming that “the mission of an Islamist party today is to realize the broader objectives of sharia, which are, fundamentally, justice and liberty” (Cavatorta and Merone 2015: 30).

After surviving the crisis of the summer of 2013, when the political polarization between the Islamists and secularists in Tunisia jeopardized the whole democratization process and threatened an eruption of civil strife, the EMP's post-Islamist turn was affirmed at its tenth conference held in 2016. In his keynote speech, Ghannouchi announced a new identity for the EMP as:

a national democratic party devoted to reform, based on a national reference, drawing from the values of Islam, committed to the articles of the Constitution and the spirit of our age, thus consolidating the clear and definitive line between Muslim democrats and extremist and violent trends that falsely attribute themselves to Islam (Ennahdha International Page 2016a).

In the concluding statement, the implications of this post-Islamist rebranding of the EMP were further elaborated on. Ideologically, the Islamic reference was no longer an ideological project for an Islamic state. It was rearticulated to be only “a force of inspiration that opens up a vast field of interpretation” and can be translated into “a set of values in diverse political, social, economic and cultural expressions” (Ennahdha International Page 2016b). Also, the national identity of the party was emphasized in a rupture with the pan-Islamic doctrine, classically upheld by Islamist movements.

Structurally, the EMP abandoned the style of comprehensive social movement. In contrast to the typical organizational model usually followed by political Islam movements, the EMP decided to transform into a classical political party. This transformation was described as “specialization in politics”, ending the partisan-preaching dilemma of the movement and granting more autonomy to other fields of cultural, religious, and spiritual activism. Additionally, it was stated that the party will be organizationally decentralized and more inclusive in terms of its membership, to be open to all Tunisian capacities (Ibid.).

The political agenda of the EMP was also revisited and modified. Overlooking the issues of identity politics, the party’s priorities were set to be democratic consolidation, sustainable economic development, counterterrorism, and reforming the state bureaucracy (Ibid.). In his opening speech, Ghannouchi pointed to this shift in the party’s political program by stating that:

A modern state is not run through ideologies, big slogans and political wrangling, but rather through practical programs... Ennahda had evolved from defending identity, to ensuring the democratic transition, and today moves on to focus on the economic transition. (Ennahdha International Page 2016a)

In sum, the dramatic course of events after the Arab Spring potentiated the EMP’s transition to post-Islamism. This transition seems to be supported by the majority of the party members, given the extensive preparatory meetings and huge number of participants in the conference.

Later, in 2021, more than 100 members of the EMP decided to defect as an objection to Ghannouchi’s leadership and to establish their own party, which maintained the same post-Islamist tendency. The co-founder of the new Work and Achievement party, Abdellatif Mekki, affirmed that they still value the national and the liberal elements in the EMP’s political program and that his party will not engage in the futile identity battles (al-Thabhi 2021, Wannas 2022).

Conclusion

After a decade, examining the post-Islamism phenomenon in the Arab Spring countries reveals three major features. First, the post-Islamist transformation is largely affected by context and its dynamic is vulnerable to structure changes. In Egypt, for instance, during the transitional period, post-Islamist political and intellectual manifestations were overshadowed by the rising ideological polarization between the Islamist and secularist trends. In such an escalation, the traditional Islamist parties were more appealing to the conservative constituencies. Later, the political fall of E-MB gave room for post-Islamist modes of activism to expand.

Second, the relationship between Islamism and post-Islamism is not unidirectional nor does it have a fixed pattern. To put it another way, the transition to post-Islamism could be perceived as either a rupture or an evolution of Islamism. In the case of EMP, it was just a new step in its long path of transformation and an expansion in the non-Islamist sources of its hybrid unorthodox ideology. On the contrary, post-Islamist parties in the Arab Spring Egypt came as a revolt against the E-MB due to its conservative and authoritative attitude during the transitional period.

Third, in accordance with Luz Gómez García's argument, post-Islamism is a multi-faceted phenomenon. It could be manifested as a political party that adopts a non-ideological version of Islamic reference. The Strong Egypt party, the Egyptian Current party, the post-2016 EMP, and the Work and Achievement party are a few examples. Additionally, it could be exemplified in depoliticized forms of Islamic mobilization such as intellectual and cultural movements that aim at "Islamization" of societies and promoting new Islamic-driven value system without engaging in partisan activities.

[حل الحرية والعدالة ... تصعيد ضد المعارضة بمصر] t

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Mohamed Afan

Ponovno razmatranje post-islamizma deceniju nakon arapskog proleća

Apstrakt

Pobune Arapskog proleća bile su prekretnica u regionalnoj politici koje su imale i značajan uticaj na islamističke pokrete u smislu strategija, ideologija i organizacionih struktura. Shodno tome, ovaj rad istražuje da li su ovi dramatični događaji ojačali ili oslabili post-islamistički razvoj tradicionalnih političkih islamskih pokreta, fokusirajući se na egipatsku Muslimansku braću (E-MB) i tunisku partiju Pokret Enahda (EMP) kao studije slučaja. Predložena hipoteza je da je arapsko proleće imalo promenljiv uticaj na islamiste. U Egiptu je u početku oslabio post-islamistički zaokret E-MB. Međutim, državni udar iz 2013. godine i represija koja je nakon toga usledila, ostavili su E-MB politički marginalizovanu i oslabljenu, stvarajući vakuum ispunjen manje političkim ili neideološkim oblicima islamskog aktivizma. Tuniski islamisti su imali drugačiju priču. Čini se da je arapsko proleće potvrdilo njihov prelazak na post-islamizam. Na svojoj desetoj konferenciji, EMP je proglasila napuštanje političkog islama, prihvatajući novi koncept muslimanske demokratije. Čak i nakon predsedničkih izbora u julu 2021. godine, koji su rezultirali političkim isključenjem EMP-a, partija Rada i rezultata koja se odvojila od EMP-a pokazala je jasne postislamističke crte.

Ključne reči: islamizam, post-islamizam, muslimanska demokratija, Muslimanska braća, partija pokret Enahda.

