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YUGOSLAV COMMUNISTS AND EUROPEAN FAR-LEFT – FROM FIRST SUPPORTERS OF ITALIAN EUROCOMMUNISTS TO LAST ALLIES OF FRENCH NEO-STALINISTS (1965-1985)

ABSTRACT

Complex structural changes of social reality in SFRY and Western Europe during post-war decades have created the need for the largest Marxist parties of Europe outside Eastern Bloc to accommodate their party policies to new political challenges and social circumstances. Gradually, communist parties of Mediterranean started to contemplate creation of a new Marxist ideology for the welfare state era, which in practice meant seizing attempts to adjust principles of Bolshevik socialist model to their unique local circumstances, and moving away from the influence of Soviet party. League of Communists of Yugoslavia supported the reformist fractions of Italian, French, Greek and Spanish communist parties, which opened the path for further expansion of international influence and prestige of the Yugoslav communists. However, historical evolution of SFRY state policies and Yugoslav party ideology eventually took a different course than the reforms of party policies and ideologies of early Eurocommunist parties. The purpose of this article is to contribute to further understanding of the long term social and historical process which created a drift between the leading reformist parties of Europe. This is to be achieved by applying comparative method to the results of archival research conducted on historical sources that testify about the cooperation between Yugoslav, Italian and French communists at various time points during the twenty year long period, while using the findings of numerous historical, sociological and philosophical books and articles in order to bring the research results in the appropriate social and historical context.

KEYWORDS

Eurocommunism,
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of Yugoslavia, Josip
Broz Tito, Enrico
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Marchais

The Long Search for the Third Path of Socialism in Europe and Gradual Creation of Yugoslav Socialist Model

Long aftermath of the Second World War was marked by the constant rise of popularity and political influence of the far-left parties in the countries of Western Europe and especially, of the Mediterranean (Pons 2001: 3–27; Macdonald 1996: 152–188). Researchers from the fields of social sciences and humanities are



still debating about the structural causes of the events that later became known as the Red Spring (*Primavera Rossa*) of Europe (Brogi 2018: 134–157; Sassoon 1992: 139–169), starting from the civil war in Greece, and ending with the series of strikes and rebellions in Italy and France.¹ While some are attributing more contribution to factors of economic and social circumstances, destruction or conversion of European heavy industry, post-war unemployment, homelessness and poverty, others are emphasizing the psychological consequences of the war, long lasting collective feelings of depression and guilt, which can be seen to this day in the contemporary art of the period (Moynihan 1964: 594–606; Salt 1969: 93–103; Testa 2012: 343–354; Morand 1960:167–192). However, it should be also noted that defeats of far-right forces in the war might had an influence on the rising popularity of European socialists and communists, especially in Italy and France, where Marxist resistance movements played a crucial role in war efforts against both foreign and domestic forces of the far-right.²

Numerous debates have also been waged among the authors of various historical and sociological studies in regard to possible extent of the influence that „Red Scare” in Western Europe and in the United States of America might have had on the creation of the *welfare state* policies in the countries of the Western Bloc (Weller, Sant’Ana 2019: 2–30; Obinger and Schmitt 2011: 246–270; Petersen, Mioni 2022: 43–59). Almost two decades later, Italian communists have argued that *welfare state* in Western Europe wasn’t a collection of social and economic reforms, but rather a circular process during which labor unions and leftist parties pressured the governments into expanding welfare policies, state subsidies and changes of the labor legislation, which led to the further strengthening of unions and parties on the European far-left, which were then able to organize larger initiatives in order to gain even more concessions from the governments, thus repeating the whole circle.³ Italian com-

1 For example, in France, it was only after the governments of United States and Great Britain threatened military intervention that French provisional government decisively engaged in efforts to put down the revolts and strikes led by the French Communist Party, while the American role in pyrrhic victory of the anti-communist coalition in Italy, as well as the previous expulsion of the Italian communists from provisional governments, remains to this day a subject of various debates, conspiracy theories and new historical researches of the early Cold War period (Drake 2004: 47–63).

2 Moral and popularity of Italian Communists, as well as the international prestige of Italian Communist Party were greatly increased by the victories of the red brigades (which, according to modern estimations, outnumbered the forces of the official allied Italian government in the ratio of at least 3 to 1) in the North of Italy against the fascist forces and their German allies. On the other hand, French Communists were growing bitter and resentful towards De Gaulle, French post-war governments and Western allies for the way communist resistance was integrated into De Gaullist movement or/and disarmed, while the war achievements of the communist resistance were to a certain degree neglected in the early years of the Fifth Republic (Pons 2001: 3–27; Kriegel 1967: 253–268; Raymond 2005: 40–63).

3 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-490-525, Recorded conversations with Italian Communists about the social and political situation in Italy, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-513-597, Reports about the important attitudes of PCI leadership.

munists would later recognized the constant renewal of “welfare state circle” as a necessary condition for the gradual evolution of economic and political system from capitalist reality towards socialist utopia, thus justifying the decision of Italian Communist Party (PCI) to abandon the efforts to appropriate principles of Bolshevik socialist model when defining new party policies in Italian circumstances.⁴

Both contemporary social surveys and later sociological analyses agree that introduction of *welfare state* reforms in the countries of Western Bloc brought forward dramatic changes in the social structures of the Western European countries, while various authors of historical literature have declared the period of great social changes (followed by political and cultural turmoil that became apparent to the contemporaries during the late 50s and early 60s) that started after the creation of new economic and social policies in the West to be one of the fastest and most radical “times of change” in the entire human history (Goldthorpe 1967: 11–37; Crewe 1986: 620–638). According to many Yugoslav, Italian and French communists, social changes that followed increasingly global economic reforms created necessary conditions for the creation of the new human rights movements, cultural and artistic waves, new ideologies and political philosophies, as well as later famous rebellions of students and labor unions in the countries of Western Bloc.⁵ Testimonies of many French and Italian philosophers that visited SFR Yugoslavia during that period imply that structural changes caused by *welfare state* policies influenced the formulation of new Marxist ideas while simultaneously creating material circumstances for questioning the dominant doctrines of European communist parties, thus creating foundations for the future “great schism” on the European far-left.⁶

During the fifties and sixties of the 20th century, large parts of the party leadership of the Italian Communist Party, as well as a certain number of prominent French communists, have openly declared themselves in favor of changing their approach to defining party policies, and ultimately, of creating new Marxist ideology that would be able to incorporate both the historical problems of Italian and French provinces and their local communities, and the new needs of the increasingly more politically and financially influential European working class of the *welfare state* era.⁷ However, analyzed sources show that Italian and French reformists were fully aware that the road towards

4 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-429, Reports of the Yugoslav delegation present at XII Congress of PCI in Bologna.

5 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-52-81, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-392-426, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-210-255, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-712-779, Information on the development of cooperation between LCY and PCI, PCF, PCE and KKE.

6 AJ, KPR, I-3-a/27-18, About the visit of Jean Paul Sartre to Josip Broz Tito on 13.05.1960, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-237, Information about the stay of Roger Garaudy in Belgrade, August of 1969.

7 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-395-439, Recorded conversations with the members of PCI leadership, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-213, Information on the development of cooperation between LCY and PCF.

creation of a new Marxist ideology for the communist parties of the Western Block will inevitably lead to radical changes in relations between the powerful Soviet party leadership and its “*growingly independent clients in the Western Europe*”, as some Yugoslav communists would define the relations between the “*Hegemon of the socialist world*” and the parties of the European far-left outside of the Eastern Bloc.⁸ Reports from various League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) party offices testify that contacts between Yugoslav communists and their Western European counterparts were continuously becoming more frequent in the period in which Italian and French communists begun their long search for the *Third Path of Socialism* in Europe.⁹

During progressively more common visits to SFR Yugoslavia, many Italian and a certain number of French communists were slowly beginning not only to criticize the policies of the Soviet party with the members of LCY, but have openly stated their intentions of changing their party ideologies and introducing a new socialist model.¹⁰ When Leonid Brezhnev rose to power in Soviet Union in 1964 and subsequently promised to change attitudes of the Soviet party towards the reformist tendencies of other communist organizations in both Eastern and Western Bloc, Palmiro Togliatti, Luigi Longo, Waldeck Rochet and Santiago Carrillo have conveyed to Josip Broz Tito their estimations that League of Communists of Yugoslavia have more than two decades long advantage over the other Marxist parties of Europe in the experience with the problems of abandoning the principles of Bolshevik socialist model and creating a new party ideology.¹¹ Left out from the currents of complex relations between communists parties of Western and Eastern Europe after the split with the Soviet party in 1948, Yugoslav Communists were at the same time forced to create their own socialist model and free to conduct all the endeavors necessary for the creation of new state policies and party ideology without the interference from the Soviets and those international communist institutions which upheld the Bolshevik socialist model to be universal and timeless pattern for achieving the state of socialist transition on the road from capitalist reality towards utopian Marxist society.¹²

8 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/1-52-81, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-392-426, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/1-210-255, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/1-712-779, Information on the development of cooperation between LCY and PCI, PCF, PCE and KKE.

9 AJ, SKJ, Ideological Commission, II/2-b-(244-252), Documents for preparation for the sessions of the Ideological Commission, AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International Cooperation, Reports on cooperation with PCI and PCF.

10 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-395-439, Recorded conversations with the members of PCI leadership, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/1-213, Information on the development of cooperation between LCY and PCF.

11 AJ, KPR, I-3-a/44-59-62, AJ, KPR, I-3-a/27-96, AJ, KPR, I-3-a/110-4, Information about the visits of general secretaries of PCI, PCF and PCE, Recorded conversations between party delegations.

12 On several occasions, Italian communists stated that Yugoslav party returned to the Marxist thought of Antonio Gramsci much sooner than the leadership of PCI did the same. In his famous letters to communists of Torino, Gramsci defended the opinion

Development of the Yugoslav socialist model was a very complex and multidimensional historical and social process, often shaped by the internal clashes of Yugoslav communist and structural struggles for power within the party bureaucracy of Yugoslav party, as well as the changing role of SFR Yugoslavia in the international relations of the bipolar Cold War world, and followed by numerous structural changes of the Yugoslav society. For example, recent historical research have brought new arguments in favor of the hypothesis that the inter conflict between centralist and decentralist faction of Yugoslav communists, which started almost immediately after the war and formally ended only with the famous Fourth plenary session of Central Committee of LCY, became at some point during the fifties related with the different attitudes of Yugoslav communists towards the social changes that were caused by the process of industrialization, modernization and urbanization in Yugoslav republics (Dimić 2014: 33–67; Dimitrijević 2020: 286–365; Bešlin 2012: 1–24; Sekelj 1990: 11–59). The constant strengthening of Yugoslav economy was followed by the expansion of Yugoslav influence in the international relations, the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, eventual renewal of cooperation with the Eastern Block, and the growing presence of Yugoslavia in the currents of Western European politics.¹³

Long term success of Yugoslav carefully planned and methodically executed approach to the foreign affairs resulted in the growing influence of the Yugoslav Communist Party (later LCY) in the sphere of changing relations between the far-left parties, first among the new anti-colonial movements and Marxist parties of Middle East, Africa, East Asia and South America, and later, among the socialists and communists of Western European countries (Mijatov 2019: 58–91; Miletić 2022: 289–333). According to the later testimonies of the Italian communists, Yugoslav party have already during the late fifties and early sixties became a fierce competition to Soviet party in terms of providing ideological guidance and financial aid to young Marxist parties of the former European colonies, and Italian party leadership was expecting “*a new force of the*

that “*there is no magical formula*” for defining party policies of Marxist parties in order to change social values and political balance of power and thus influence the transition from capitalist reality towards socialism, but that every single local party leadership has to find a way to achieve those goals in a manner that is suited to its own social and cultural habitat, historical traditions and economic circumstances (AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-395-439, Recorded conversations with the members of PCI leadership).

¹³ As the newest analyses of the previously scarcely research historical sources indicate, Yugoslav communists started approaching the socialist and social-democratic parties of Europe almost immediately after braking relations with the communist party of Soviet Union. Although initially unsuccessful in during 50s due to shifting political circumstances in Western Europe and changes in SFRY, Yugoslav approachment towards the parties of European moderate left eventually resulted in formation of close and long lasting cooperation between Yugoslav communists and European socialist and social-democratic parties, especially in the case of Italian and French socialists, who represented the main leftist political competition of Italian and French communists (Mijatov 2019: 13–19; Miletić 2022: 21–52).

socialist world” to establish itself as an alternative to Soviet influence among the far-left parties of Western Europe in the near future.¹⁴ Simultaneously, rising financial capabilities of constantly growing economy of the Yugoslav state provided ample means for Yugoslav party to offer financial support to European Marxist and organize abundance of activities for the European communists and socialists, including paid vacations to Yugoslav Adriatic shore, research-visits of leftist academics, international conferences and seminars of leftist parties and labor unions, as well as many sponsorship contracts for supporting the publishing leftist newspapers and books in the countries of Western Bloc.¹⁵

Paving the Way for Eurocommunist Reforms – The Role of Yugoslav Communists

Almost immediately after the formal renewal of the relations between the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and communist parties of Western Europe in 1956 and 1957, delegations of the PCI Central Committee started to visit Yugoslavia almost regularly every year, while it was not uncommon for the individual members of the Italian Communist Party leadership to make more than a few visits to their Yugoslav comrades during the course of the same year.¹⁶ At the same time, Italian Marxist papers started to gradually increase the number of articles dedicated to the questions related with the problems and successes of Yugoslav economy, foreign policy, and most frequently, about the evolution of Yugoslav party ideology and development of the Yugoslav socialist model.¹⁷ Already in the late fifties and early sixties it became common for Palmiro Togliatti and Luigi Longo, as well as for other members of the PCI leadership, to openly criticize the policies of the Soviet party in their increasingly frequent conversations with Josip Broz Tito, Aleksandar Ranković or Edvard Kardelj, and to propose such changes of PCI policies that would be similar to the principles of Yugoslav conceptions of self-governance, internal democratization and decentralization of the party.¹⁸

Although not as enthusiastic about the possibilities of researching the Yugoslav socialist model nor as willing to risk damaging the relations with the

14 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-395-439, Recorded conversations with the members of PCI leadership.

15 AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International cooperation, Reports about cooperation with the workers parties and syndicates in Italy and France, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-433, Analyses of the drafts concerning financial aid to PCI, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/1-113, Analyses of the drafts concerning financial aid to PCE.

16 AJ, KPR, I-3-a/44-59-62, AJ, KPR, I-3-a/27-96, AJ, KPR, I-3-a/110-4, Information about the visits of general secretaries of PCI, PCF and PCE, Recorded conversations between party delegations.

17 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-374-665, Reports about the articles concerning Yugoslavia published in PCI party press.

18 AJ, KPR, I-3-a/27-15, AJ, KPR, I-3-a/44-7, Conversations with the delegations of PCI and PCF party leadership, AJ, KPR, I-3-a/110-7, AJ, KPR, I-3-a/100-8, Reports about receptions of S. Carrillo and D. Ibarruri.

Soviet party as their Italian counterparts, French communists were also beginning to propose expansion of the cooperation between PCF and LCY from the late fifties, but have been reluctant to engage in real endeavours, other than in the very cordial correspondence with their Yugoslav comrades, in order to realize their formally often stated decision to work on strengthening relations between the three largest and most influential European communist parties outside the Eastern Bloc.¹⁹ Analyzed sources testify that Italian and Yugoslav communists were also, on their behalf, rather reluctant to include the French Communist Party in their increasingly complex and ambitious plans of organizing international conferences of the European and Mediterranean far-left parties which will be held outside the sphere of Soviet influence.²⁰

It is important to note that until the „great split“ on the European left of 1968 and 1969, almost every major conference of the European Marxist parties was held either in Moscow or in the countries of Eastern Bloc, and exclusively ended with the unanimous conclusions, which were, according to later testimonies of Santiago Carrillo and Dolores Ibarruri, sometimes even drafted inside the walls of Kremlin before the opening of the conference, and almost always preceded by friendly exchange about the general affairs in Europe and the world, instead of the actual debate.²¹ Party leaderships of LCY and PCI planned to organize a series of leftist conferences, starting with the great conference of the Marxist parties of the Mediterranean, which will be held outside the „iron curtain“ and will not only allow, but emphasize the exchange of different opinions and party attitudes defined by various communist, socialist and other leftist parties of Southern Europe, Middle East and North Africa.²² It was exactly during the conference debates that Italian communists planned to inform other parties of Mediterranean far-left about the development of their reformist ideas and about their new conceptions of defining party policies and ideologies of different Marxist parties in accordance with their current needs and local socio-historical habitat, while Yugoslav communists agreed to finance and organize these and other gatherings of the communist parties outside the Eastern Bloc.²³

19 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/1-52-81, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-392-426, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-210-255, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-712-779, Information on the development of cooperation between LCY and PCI, PCF, PCE and KKE.

20 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-395-439, Recorded conversations with the members of PCI leadership.

21 AJ, KPR, I-3-a/12, AJ, KPR, I-3-a/110-10, AJ, KPR, I-3-a/110-3, Reports about receptions of S. Carrillo and D. Ibarruri, Recorded conversations between the delegations of LCY and PCE in 1965, 1968 and 1976.

22 AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International cooperation, Reports on Mediterranean conferences, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-392-426, Recorded conversations with Italian communists about the possible organization of Mediterranean conference, AJ, KPR, I-3-a/44-59-62, Recorded conversations of J. B. Tito and L. Longo.

23 However, plans of Italian and Yugoslav communists didn't manage to achieve the desired results in 1967 and 1968, when they have been for the first time formally drafted during the meetings of Josip Broz Tito and Luigi Longo, and to a large degree,

Almost immediately after the renewal of the cordial relations and cooperation between League of Communists of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) in the early sixties, and defining the first financial policies of LCY towards the Spanish party in 1965, Spanish communists have eagerly joined the efforts of Yugoslav and Italian party leaderships to prepare the international conference which will discuss the possible changes of policies and party ideologies of Mediterranean communists.²⁴ Two years later and during the split in the Greek Communist Party (KKE), the newly formed Interior Greek Party have also joined the informal initiative of reformist parties in Western Europe, which was already informally called the *Reformist Bloc* of the European communist parties by the leftist press in Italy and France.²⁵ Reports of numerous Yugoslav state institutions and LCY party offices imply that policies of financial aid towards Spanish and Greek communists, defined during the process of reestablishing relations between two European “parties in exile” and Yugoslav communists, started to be expanded exponentially after the LCY analysts declared changes of PCE and KKE party ideologies to be certainly expected in the near future.²⁶ The same sources also showcase that, despite the hostile relations or unspoken animosities of Yugoslav governments towards the military junta in Greece and Frankist regime in Spain, Yugoslav communists stopped providing support for the anti-reformist fraction of Greek party in exile, and have later denied financial aid to new Spanish Communist Party that have split from the reformist leadership and decided to keep close relations with the state and party institutions of the Soviet Union.²⁷

unsuccessfully implemented during the following year. Analysts from the departments of LCY concluded that it was the fear of the Soviet reaction which prevented Italian Communists from fully engaging in the discussions about reforms of party ideologies on the European far-left, and this made Yugoslav communists reluctant to provide necessary organizational support. Later during the year 1968, when Italian communists came to terms with the fact that antagonizing the Soviet party became imminent after the events in Prague, the Italian party leadership formally apologized to LCY leadership for abandoning the original plans agreed upon by Broz and Longo, which now had to wait until early seventies to be successfully implemented (AJ, KPR, I-3-a/44-38, Information on the conversations between delegations of LCY and PCI in January of 1967).

24 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-81-110, Reports about cooperation and communication with Spanish Communist Party.

25 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-728, Informations about the internal conflicts in Greek Communist Party, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-723, Reports about formation of the new United Central Committee of KKE.

26 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-82-110, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-1-710-736, Analyses of the drafts concerning financial aid to Spanish communists in exile and representatives of the Interior Greek party.

27 Furthermore, the communication between the official institutions of LCY and Greek party in exile have almost completely ceased to exist during the months that followed the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia, despite the hostile relation between Yugoslavia and the governments of Greek military junta, and active involvement of Exterior Greek party members in resistance movements against the military dictatorship in Greece (AJ,

Thus, in the beginning of the crucial year 1968, Communist Party of France (PCF) was left standing alone as the only major communist party of Western Europe that still refused to join the informal group led by Yugoslav and Italian communist, and opted to maintain close relations with the parties of *Antireformist Bloc*, which was led by communist parties of East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia.²⁸ After Brezhnev opted to support the reformist fraction in the Czechoslovakian party, which led to the downfall of Novotny's leadership and later, to the acceptance of the Dubček's reformist program by Czechoslovakian communists, reformist fraction in the French party finally decided to revolt against the party leadership which strived to preserve close relations with Moscow and continue with the traditional practice of defining party policies, which consisted of moderately unsuccessful attempts to apply the principles of Bolshevik socialist model in regard to economic, social and historical circumstances of different French regions.²⁹ However, analyzed sources show that even after French reformists started openly criticizing the conservative fraction and the Central Committee, which was forced to balance between the two powerful fractions while itself wavering, a certainly large number of French communists still remained indecisive while facing the possibility of the future split in the party. This may have influenced the decision of LCY leadership to propose talks about expanding cooperation with the French party, introduce new policies of financing the vacations and research-visits of French communists, and even to consider braking the tradition of not providing financial aid in cash, but instead in other means to those communist parties that were operating legitimately and as the first or the second largest opposition parties in the countries of Western Bloc.³⁰

In the late summer of 1968, which was filled with the civil unrest and political turmoil all around Europe and United States of America, authors of the reports submitted to Central Committee by Department of International Relations and Connections of LCY claimed that "*the lines of the future conflicts on the European left have been clearly drawn even before Soviet divisions entered Czechoslovakia*".³¹ After the military intervention of the Eastern Bloc troops in Czechoslovakia, parties of Western European far-left found themselves pressured to condemn the actions of Soviet Union by the general public of their countries, other political parties, and also by the reformist fractions whose

SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-1-722-736 Information on the activities of Exterior Greek communists, correspondence with Greek party in exile).

28 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-210-255, Reports on cooperation and communication with the French Communist Party.

29 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-279-310, Reports concerning the writing of the PCF party press about Yugoslavia.

30 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-213, Information about proposal for expanding cooperation with French Communist Party.

31 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-52-81, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-392-426, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-210-255, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-712-779, Information on the development of cooperation between LCY and PCI, PCF, PCE and KKE.

influence was almost constantly on the rise during the last decade.³² Reports of the LCY commissions confirm that most Western Marxists were fully aware that condemnation of Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia will necessary lead to decline, or even braking of the relations between communist parties of Western Block and the party who held udesputed control over the international communists institutions and International Workers Movement.³³ Amnong the parties of Wester European far-left who were going through “*never after the war seen state of shock, doubt and fear*”, Italian communists were the first to act, not only by criticizing the role of the Soviet party in the outcome of the events in Czechoslovakia, but also by declaring their intentions to reform the party policies and ultimately, change the party ideology.³⁴

New ideology of the Italian Communist Party, defined on the „historical“ XII Congress of the Italian communists (*congresso storico*) was offically named “*Italian road to socialism*” and was classified as one of the ideologies of *democratic socialism*, while the term *Eurocommunism* was formally accepted by the PCI leadership only during the early seventies.³⁵ Alongside communist parties of Spain, Belgium, England, Denmark and Japan, League of Communists of Yugoslavia was among the first communist parties in the world to recognize the new ideology of Italian communists, and it remained for a long time the only Marxist party in power to offer its support for the reforms conducted by the Italian Communist Party.³⁶ Already in the first months following the official introduction of the new PCI party ideology, Yugoslav communists have defined new policies with the aim of providing financial aid to Italian Eurocommunists and formally confirmed the already apparent decision to use the international influence of Yugoslav party in order to establish new connections between various communist and socialist parties outside the Eastern Bloc and the Italian Communist Party.³⁷

32 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-449-489, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-250-235, About the political situation in Italy and France.

33 AJ, SKJ, Ideological Commission, II/2-b-(244-252), Documents for preparation for the sessions of the Ideological Commission, AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International Cooperation, Reports on cooperation with PCI and PCF.

34 It is important to note that by the late 1968 only Yugoslav and Italian communist openly criticized the ideology of Soviet party ant emphasized the possible connections between Bolshevik socialist model and the results of the events in Czechoslovakia, while other communist parties of Europe were contempt with criticizing just the current policies of the governments of Soviet Union, thus enhancing the possiblity of improving their relations with the Soviet party in the future (AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-392-426, Recorded conversations between delegations of LCY and PCI).

35 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-427, Most important thesis for the upcoming congress of PCI in Bologna.

36 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-429, Reports from the Yugoslav delegation present at XII Congress of PCI in Bologna.

37 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-432, Information about the requests of PCI to gain financial aid from LCY.

Winds of Change – Evolution of the Relations between Yugoslav Communists and the Western European Far-left During Political Crises of the Last Welfare State Decade

During the years that followed the change of PCI ideology, League of Communists of Yugoslavia continued to develop cooperation with the Communist Party of Italy, while the increasingly closely connected Yugoslav and Italian communists worked together on organizing new collective political initiatives of European Marxist parties and lobbying in the international communist institutions in endeavor to secure wider support of the numerous far-left parties for the new Eurocommunist ideology.³⁸ Analyzed sources show that in this period Italian and Yugoslav communists often engaged in long disputes with the communist parties of the Eastern Bloc, and clashed with the leaderships of Soviet and Chinese parties over many different questions, from the debates about the influence of Soviet party on the European far-left, to the joint efforts of Italian and Yugoslav communists to support king Sihanouk against the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.³⁹ Notes taken during the conversations between delegations of Italian and Yugoslav communists in the early seventies show that Enrico Berlinguer and others members of the Italian party leadership openly promised to follow the path of Yugoslav party in the affairs of international communist institutions, while Josip Broz Tito and members of LCY Central Committee promised that Yugoslavia will continue to provide financial aid to all the plans of Italian communists in regard of expanding their new ideology through Europe and the world, expand the policies of financing activities of Italian communists in Yugoslavia⁴⁰, while providing “*every possible form of protection*” for the Italian communists against possible retribution of the Soviet party leadership.⁴¹

38 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-392-426, Reports about cooperation and communication with Italian Communist Party.

39 During the conversation with Enrico Berlinguer, when Josip Broz Tito was informed about the newest arguments presented by both sides in the later famous debate on the European left about the ethical implications of supporting the Khmer Rouge rebellion, Yugoslav leader stated the following: “*Even a democratic, institutional monarchy like Great Britain is far more closer to us both now, hopefully* (refereeing to the recent changes of PCI official party ideology), *than any leftist regime who had regressed into betraying democratic principles*” (AJ, KPR, I-3-a/44-48, Reception of the general secretary of PCI, Enrico Berlinguer).

40 Which included, among other expenses, covering the significant part of the expenses for filming scenes directed by famous Italian film directors in Yugoslavia, providing all the life expenses and salaries for the Italian journalists living in Yugoslavia, giving scholarships to Italian students, giving financial aid to numerous Italian artists and inviting syndical representatives of Italian labor unions for long vacations in Yugoslavia (AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-392-426, Reports about cooperation and communication with Italian Communist Party).

41 AJ, KPR, I-3-a/44-48, Reception of the general secretary of PCI, Enrico Berlinguer, AJ, KPR, I-3-a/44-59, Recorded conversations between Josip Broz Tito and Enrico Berlinguer.

According to analysts from the various departments of LCY, the decisive conflict between two leading parties of the Reformist Bloc and Soviet party happened during two year long preparations for the international conference of the European communist and socialist parties that was supposed to be held in Berlin, in 1976.⁴² In the course of the conference preparations, Yugoslav and Italian communists determinately refused to accept Soviet ideas about the themes of discussion and goals of the conference, going as far as threatening not only to abstain for participating, but also to influence other smaller European parties into boycotting the conference in East Germany.⁴³ In the end, Soviet party reluctantly agreed to formally recognize the new Eurocommunist ideology as a valid approach to applying Marxist philosophy in the 20th century, just as Soviet leadership has accepted the Yugoslav socialist model years earlier, and in turn Yugoslav and Italian communists agreed to sign the joint declaration of the parties involved in the Berlin conference. Analysts from the party offices of Yugoslav and Italian communists defined the joint declaration of the Berlin conference as detrimentally important to Soviets, since it showcased both their renewed influence on the powerful leftist parties of Europe, and their willingness to restrain from using that same influence in accordance with agreements with the United States of America in the times of *détente*.⁴⁴

Interestingly or ironically, the only party insisting that certain changes be implemented in the joint statement of the communist parties from the Western and Eastern Europe after the agreement was reached between Soviets and Yugoslav-Italian Bloc, as well as for the further theoretical justifications of the jointly stated Marxist ideas, was the Communist Party of France.⁴⁵ After overcoming the internal conflict between conservative and reformist fraction of French communists, French party have slowly been implementing moderate reforms of party policies since the rise of new party leadership of Georges Marchais in 1972, while trying to maintain the fragile compromises between the two main interest groups within the party structure and to prevent an open rebellion of those French communists who still opposed the abandonment of the Bolshevik principles.⁴⁶ Italian communists judged that remaining influence of the conservative French communists comes from the specific political position of the PCF in France, which had much less ground for potential political

42 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/1-52-81, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-392-426, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-210-255, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-712-779, Information on the development of cooperation between LCY and PCI, PCF, PCE and KKE.

43 AJ, KPR, I-2/68, Reports about preparations for the conference of European communist parties in Berlin.

44 AJ, KPR, I-2/68, Analyses of the conclusions of International conference of communist parties in Berlin.

45 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-213, Information about proposal for expanding cooperation with French Communist Party.

46 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-331, Information about the internal changes in French party and changes of PCF attitudes.

compromises than parties of those Mediterranean countries who faced the strong far-right competition at home.⁴⁷ On the other hand, Yugoslav communists thought that the French party is forced to retain the political identity of the radical, revolutionary and uncompromising party with mesianistic rhetoric that heavily implied Bolshevik zealotism of the earlier historical periods in order to attract those voters that remained unsatisfied even with the economic reforms of the *welfare state*, and many groups that remained on the margins of French society despite the overall improvements in labor legislation and the general rise of living standard of the French working class.⁴⁸

In the early seventies, Italian, Spanish and Interior greek communists have on multiple occasions conveyed to the Yugoslav communists their fears that French Communist Party will never come to truly accept Eurocommunist reforms, but will rather remained content with official proclamations of reformist attentions which will continue to keep the reformist fraction of the party from creating internal unrest.⁴⁹ On the other hand, authors of various reports that circulated around LCY party instutions claimed that French party leadership was constantly becoming more open towards expansion of reformist policies while facing the chaning political landscape and balance of power in France during the turbulent last decade of the *welfare state* in Western Europe, and that "*political opportunism will sustain French Eurocommunism*", even if reformist enthusiasim within the leadership of PCF remains as scarce and temporary as presented by Italian communists, greatest allies and rivals of the French party within the international communist institutions.⁵⁰ Almost immediatelly after the "historical" success of Italian Communist Party in the 1976 elections in Italy, French communists have made arangements to organize XXII Congress of PCF, during which they had offically defined new party ideology.⁵¹ Soon after the successfull negotiations of Yugoslav and

47 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-395-439, Recorded conversations with the members of PCI leadership.

48 Especially since the creation of New Left and after those reforms of the PSF policies which brought the French Socialists very close to De Gaulists. New Let movements created a new form of competition for the PCF on the French left, with rivalries over political and social influence between PCF and New Left organization resulting in violent clashes, while the French Socialists and socialist led labor unions, especially the fraction created by future president François Mitterrand, threatened to isolate PCF from the institutional politics in France by creating an informal political alliance with the powerful De Gaulists, who still controlled most of the government and state institutions (DA, SSIP, F-41, France, year 1980, Analyses of current political situation in France).

49 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-712-779, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-135-155, Recorded conversations between delegations of LCY and members of PCE and KKE party leadership.

50 AJ, SKJ,507-IX,30/I-213, Information about proposal for expanding cooperation with French Communist Party, AJ, SKJ, Ideological Commission, II/2-b-(244-252), Documents for preparation for the sessions of the Ideological Commission, AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International Cooperation, Reports on cooperation with PCI and PCF.

51 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-315, Reports about XXII Congress of the French Communist Party.

Italian delegations with the Soviets in Berlin, and a few weeks before the later famous meeting of Western European communist party leaders in Madrid, a certain amount of reports arriving from the LCY party offices were devoted to the fact that Marchais and French party leadership have finally adopted the term Eurocommunism.⁵²

However, it was not until mid seventies that development of cooperation between Yugoslav and French party reached the level which could be, according to Yugoslav and Italian communists, comparable with the cooperation between Yugoslav and Spanish, or Yugoslav and Interior Greek party.⁵³ Analyzed sources show that mild conflicts between Yugoslav and French official party institutions remained almost a constant occurrence during the years in which PCF remained undecided about the possibility of changing party ideology and political practices, even though these conflicts were constantly becoming shorter and less passionate after 1972, while numerous philosophical and ideological disputes between PCF and LCY members and redactions of party newspapers only ceased in the aftermath of conference in Berlin.⁵⁴ Despite the lack of closeness in relations of LCY and PCF, both conservative and reformist fractions of French communists used Yugoslav socialist model as an example during their long debates in party newspapers and various leftist gatherings in France. While the conservative fraction saw social turmoils in Yugoslavia and internal conflicts in LCY as an exemplar case of consequences that must necessarily follow the abandonment of Bolshevik ideological doctrine and practices, the reformist fraction upheld certain aspects of Yugoslav reformist policies to be the possible role models for the expected changes in the structures and political practice of the French Communist Party.⁵⁵

On the other hand, during the late seventies, first signs of distancing were beginning to appear in already traditionally close relations between Yugoslav and Italian communists, as some authors of the articles in Italian Marxist papers started to question Yugoslav devotion to reformist cause in the emerging international institutions of the European far-left, and for the first time, they haven't managed to provoke the response from the Italian party leadership, which was usually swift to act in order to distance itself for all the possible critics of the Yugoslav socialist model among Italian Marxists.⁵⁶ The possibility that PCI leadership might harbour hidden animosities towards LCY only

52 AJ, KPR, I-2/68, Analyses of the conclusions of International conference of communist parties in Berlin.

53 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/1-52-81, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-392-426, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-210-255, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-712-779, Information on the development of cooperation between LCY and PCI, PCF, PCE and KKE.

54 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-331, Information about the internal changes in French party and changes of PCF attitudes.

55 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-210-255, Reports about the debates in PCF press about Yugoslav socialist model.

56 AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, Reports about cooperation with leftist political parties and labor unions in Italy.

occurred to members of Department for the International Relations of the Yugoslav party after Berlinguer and his colleagues failed to extensively inform their Yugoslav counterparts about their new plans to create joint political initiatives of Mediterranean communists with the help of Spanish and French party.⁵⁷ Still, very rare and temporary Yugoslav doubts about the sincerity of the cordial relations with their oldest and closest ally in the European sphere of the International Workers Movement were quickly disregarded as the two leading reformist parties of European far-left resumed their close cooperation and forged new plans about expanding the Reformist Bloc and further increasing the international influence of both LCY and PCI.⁵⁸

According to analyses submitted to LCY departments by Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in Italy, ambitious plans of Yugoslav and Italian communists became destined to remain outside the sphere of practical realization after the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, which have marked the beginning of a sudden reduction of the intensity at which party institutions of Yugoslav and Italian communist parties conducted the written correspondence.⁵⁹ After the death of Josip Broz Tito, the visits of Berlinguer, Carrillo and Interior Greek party leadership suddenly disappear from historical sources, while Yugoslav delegations travelling to Italy and France were almost exclusively received by less important and influential members of Central Committees of Eurocommunist parties (with the exception of Interior Greek party).⁶⁰ It was only after the beginning of the financial crisis in Yugoslavia in early eighties that leadership of the Italian Communist Party openly revealed that a certain number of Italian communists were becoming increasingly worried about the course that development of Yugoslav state and party policies took after the events of 1972 in Yugoslavia and the adoption of new Yugoslav constitution in 1974.⁶¹

57 Even then, authors of the Reports produced by the Department for International Relations of LCY restrained themselves from openly criticizing the actions of PCI, possibly having in mind close personal relationships between certain Italian communists and Yugoslav party leadership, and remained rather satisfied with just issuing a note to Central Committee stating that they advise further inquiries on international policies of PCI (AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-392-426, Reports on the attitudes and activities of Italian communists).

58 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-634-694, Information on cooperation and communication with the Italian Communist Party.

59 DA, SSIP, F-65, Italy, year 1980, Information on attitudes and activities of Italian communists, AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International cooperation, PCI, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-613-665, Correspondence between LCY and PCI.

60 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/I-110-162, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-513-688, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-290-356, Information on the meetings with the representatives of PCI, PCF, PCE and KKE.

61 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-634-694, Information on cooperation and communication with the Italian Communist Party.

Invisible Distancing between the Yugoslav and Eurocommunist Parties – Yugoslav Support for the Authoritarian Coups in Marxist Parties of Europe

Even in the aftermath of great student rebellions in Yugoslavia of 1968, while the early Italian Eurocommunists and members of the reformist fraction of French communists painted in their articles almost astonishingly lavish pictures of Yugoslav socialist model and the party that was “*strong and at the same time, flexible enough*” to break the opposition while at the same time incorporating its political agenda into its own party ideology, among the former Blosheviks and now democratic socialists of Europe there were some who criticized the authoritarianism of the LCY leadership, and spoke openly about the supposed corruption in the institutions of SFRY.⁶² And while Berlinguer and the rest of PCI leadership praised the Yugoslav economy, with the market that represented, according to the Italian communists, a perfect balance between socialist and welfare state policies, between aspects of free market and state given assurances against the creation of monopolies and exploitation of workers, and as such was able to become “*the fuel of the political engine behind the Yugoslav international influence*”, some among the Italian and even French reformists spoke about the constant rise of economic and social inequalities in Yugoslavia, followed by growing insecurities of those who were left at the margins of the Yugoslav “economic miracle” and the subsequent process of urbanization and many cultural changes that followed.⁶³ It is important to note that analyzed sources don’t show any cases in which early Eurocommunists during the years 1968 and 1969 went as far as some members of liberal circles at the European Universities or some organizations of the New Left who asked the question – Would Yugoslav communists implement or even tolerate the proposition of conducting at home the same reforms they support in Czechoslovakia?⁶⁴

After the removal of the “liberal wings” of local party leadership in SR Serbia and SR Croatia in 1972, and the replacement of the rebellious university professors at Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, those who were politically prosecuted in Yugoslavia received vocal support from various left and right wing liberals, socialists, anarchists and some organizations of the New Left, while

62 DA, SSIP, F-41, France, year 1968, Information about the writing of French press about the events in Yugoslavia.

63 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/1-52-81, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-392-426, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-210-255, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/I-712-779, Information on the development of cooperation between LCY and PCI, PCF, PCE and KKE.

64 While Eurocommunists insisted on the idea that LCY was the first reformist party of Europe which financed and inspired reforms of political practice and party ideology in other Marxist parties of Europe, some socialists, liberals, anarchists and New Leftists argued that Yugoslav reforms are, though in the spirit similar to policies of Czechoslovakian new government and earlier ideas of democratic socialism, in practice far less extensive than those reforms proposed by Dubček under the concept of “Socialism with the Human face” (AJ, SKJ, Ideological Commission, II/2-b-(244-252), Documents for preparation for the sessions of the Ideological Commission).

Eurocommunist party leaderships remained silent about the events in SFRY.⁶⁵ It is very hard to estimate to which degree were the leaderships of Eurocommunist parties aware of the new currents in interior affairs of SFRY, while it also needs to be noted that analyzed sources also don't showcase the instances in which influential Eurocommunist leaders invested more than symbolic efforts to defend the policies of Yugoslav government and party against those critics that mainly came from the parties and organizations which presented a competition for the Eurocommunists on the European left. However, at that time Yugoslav party was constantly expanding its policies of providing financial aid to Eurocommunist parties, while using its international influence to gather wide support for the reforms of their party ideologies, thus it can be concluded that Eurocommunist parties had a certain interest to ignore those changes in SFRY that went against those values of democratic socialism that LCY promoted in the sphere of turbulent relations of European communist parties.⁶⁶

Documents produced by numerous party offices of LCY show that it was only after the death of Josip Broz Tito that Yugoslav party started to decrease the efforts that Yugoslav communists invested into supporting the initiatives of former president's "*dearest and closest friends in Western Europe*", Santiago Carrillo and Enrico Berlinguer, in the international communist institutions, and that it was only after the beginning of economic crisis in SFRY that Yugoslav communists started to lessen the extent of their financial policies towards the Eurocommunist parties.⁶⁷ At the same time, recorded conversations between Yugoslav communists and their Italian and Spanish counterparts became noticeably shorter and far less cordial than before, visits from the delegations of Italian and Spanish party leadership to SFRY almost ceased to exist, while the first open critics of Yugoslav socialist model appeared in the ranks of influential Italian and Spanish communists. Then, as two Eurocommunist parties of Western Mediterranean began to distance themselves from the LCY further and further, the new generation of the Yugoslav party leadership and state bureaucracy became the target of ever more frequent accusations of authoritarian conduct, corruption and disregard for the affairs of the international communist institutions, made by the new generation of European Marxists and published in the party journals of Italian and Spanish communists.⁶⁸

65 AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International Cooperation, Reports on cooperation with leftist political parties and labour unions of Italy, France, Greece and Spain.

66 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-433, Analyses of the drafts concerning financial aid to PCI, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/1-113, Analyses of the drafts concerning financial aid to PCE, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 33/1-731, On financial aid to KKE.

67 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/1-98-155, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-556-667, Information on correspondence and meetings conducted with members of PCI and PCE party leadership, AJ, KPR, 1-2/68, Analyses of conversations between Josip Broz Tito, Santiago Carrillo and Enrico Berlinguer, AJ, SKJ, Ideological Commission, II/2-b-(244-252), Documents for preparation for the sessions of the Ideological Commission.

68 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 122/1-110-162, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/1-513-688, AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/1-290-356, Information on the meetings with the representatives of PCI, PCF, PCE and KKE.

Contrary to course of development in relations between Yugoslav party and communist parties of Italy and Spain, political successors of Josip Broz Tito and the old leadership of LCY were starting to approach French communists, especially after the fallout between socialists and communists in the first government of François Mitterrand, and other smaller communist parties of Europe that gradually moved away from the Reformist Bloc and its original goals.⁶⁹ After the rebellion of new conservative communist and neo-Bolshevik youth of the French party, Georges Marchais and the party leadership abandoned Eurocommunist reforms in the early eighties, while simultaneously braking the earlier compromises and agreements with more moderate parties of the French left, prosecuting and banishing leading reformists from the PCF, and initiating the process that would be later become known as *Re-Stalinization* of the French Communist Party.⁷⁰ New leadership of LCY did not only failed to provide even a formal protest against the new political practice of French communists, which went against almost all previous joint statements and agreements of the three leading parties of the Reformist Bloc (PCI, PCF and LCY), but also initiated talks about possible expansion of cooperation between the party institutions of Yugoslav and French communists.⁷¹

Subsequently, Georges Marchais revealed his plans to start his world tour of visits to socialist countries whose ruling parties were friendly towards Communist party of France with the visit to SFRY, and also asked LCY leadership to finance travel expenses of numerous French communists that wanted to visit Yugoslavia for the purpose of conducting research on the Yugoslav socialist model.⁷² It is important to note that leader of French party openly stated that he is embarking on such a world tour in order to protest the debate about the possible neoliberal economic reforms in France, and to show his support to those communist parties who, like PCF, will even refuse to argue in favor of the *welfare state* policies, for it was, according to new ideological doctrine of French communists, “*just a defense of one form of capitalism against another, suitable for social democrats, socialist reactionaries and Italian reformists, not for the real Marxists*”.⁷³

69 AJ, SKJ,507-IX, 30/I-366, Reports on cooperation and communication with French Communist party.

70 DA, SSIP, F-41, France, year 1980, Information about the attitudes and activities of the French communists.

71 Yugoslav diplomatic representatives in France reported that Marchais have on several occasions stated that Yugoslavia under the governments that came to power after the death of Josip Broz Tito represent the last “*stronghold of try socialism*” outside of the Eastern Bloc and that he is ready to forget all the previous differences with the Yugoslav communists “*since they remain the only party that refuses to compromise with current capitalism in fear that future capitalism may inforce upon us something that we haven’t already seen in two hundred years of capitalist oppression*” (DA, SSIP, F-41, France, year 1980, Analyses of current political situation in France).

72 AJ, SKJ,507-IX, 30/I-290-356, Recorded conversation with the members of the French Communist Party.

73 AJ, SKJ,507-IX, 30/I-366, Reports on cooperation and communication with French Communist party.

While the question of whether the absence of PCF support was a defining factor in Mitterrand's decision to accept negotiations with international monetary institutions and to begin to offer larger and larger reforms of the French labor legislation remains the matter of debates until this day, analyzed sources show that new leaderships of growingly distant Central Committees of Yugoslav republics in the mid 80s supported the decision of PCF to refuse even to contemplate showing resistance to early neoliberal reforms in continental Europe in fear of being accused of relativizing the flaws of the current form of capitalism in Western European states.⁷⁴

The late and unexpected rapprochement of Yugoslav and French communists came after PCF left French government, and at a time of constantly decreasing political power and popularity, as well as the international influence of French communists, thus it can be concluded that there wasn't really anything for Yugoslav communists to gain by investing financial and other resources in the renewal of the cooperation with the Communist Party of France.⁷⁵ On the contrary, Yugoslav governments and party bureaucracy were risking the permanent loss of their previously achieved favorable position in relations with French government, increasingly influential socialist party of Mitterrand, and with other parties of the European far and moderate left, which weren't sympathetic towards the conservative coup within the French party nearly as much as it was the case with the new establishment of growingly distant local Committees of Yugoslav party.⁷⁶ Soon after the death of Enrico Berlinguer in 1984⁷⁷, Italian Communists concluded that it was "*no longer appropriate nor useful*" for the Italian party leadership to cultivate close relations with the authoritarian and neo-conservative Marxists in the institutional structures of LCY and PCF, who were at the time working together on reestablishing and nurturing relations with the communist parties of China and North Korea⁷⁸, while refusing to join the efforts of other European leftist parties who were trying to contain the spread of neoliberal economic reforms in continental Europe.⁷⁹

While the Italian and Spanish communists continued the reforms of their party ideology and contributed to the further development of Eurocommunism and other ideologies of democratic socialism, the evolution of the party

74 DA, SSIP, F-41, France, year 1980, Information about the attitudes and activities of the French communists.

75 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 30/I-290-356, Reports on political and social situation in France.

76 AJ, SSRNJ, A-074-078, International Cooperation, Reports on cooperation with leftist political parties and labour unions of France, AJ, SKJ, Ideological Commission, II/2-b-(244-252), Documents for preparation for the sessions of the Ideological Commission.

77 About the last encounters of Josip Broz Tito and Enrico Berlinguer, see Živković 2022: 273–300.

78 About the Yugoslav role in renewal of the relations between PCI and CCP see Živković 2021: 273–300.

79 AJ, SKJ, 507-IX, 48/I-656-688, Reports on cooperation and communication with the Italian Communists Party.

ideology and political practice of League of Communists of Yugoslavia took an almost completely opposite direction. The consequences of abandonment of the LCY reformist course were not clear in the sphere of the relations between Yugoslav communists and Eurocommunist parties for almost an entire decade after the events of 1972 and 1974 in Yugoslavia. When the cooperation between LCY and Eurocommunist parties reached its peak in the latter half of the 70s, Yugoslav party was still largely perceived by the leaderships of European far-left parties as the leader of the reformist movement among the Marxist parties of Europe and the world. It was only after the death of Josip Broz Tito and the beginning of economic crises in Yugoslavia that analyzed sources indicate first signs of LCY declining influence in the Reformist bloc, such as the distancing of Yugoslav communists and PCI. At the same time, Yugoslav party started to reform close cooperation with the French communists who were also in the process of abandoning reforms that can be associated with democratic socialism. It remains the task of future historians and sociologists to determine to what extent this path may have influenced those events and structural changes that eventually led to the collapse of former Yugoslavia.

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Luka Filipović

Jugoslovenski komunisti i evropska krajnja levica – od prvih pristalica italijanskih evrokomunista do poslednjih saveznika francuskih neostaljinista (1965-1985)

Apstrakt

Složene strukturne promene društvene realnosti u SFRJ i zapadnoj Evropi tokom posleratnih decenija stvorile su potrebu da najveće marksističke partije Evrope van istočnog bloka prilagode svoju partijsku politiku novim političkim izazovima i društvenim okolnostima. Postepeno, komunističke partije mediteranskog područja počele su da razmišljaju o stvaranju nove marksističke ideologije za eru države blagostanja, što je u praksi značilo prigradivanje pokušaja da se principi boljševičkog socijalističkog modela prilagode njihovim jedinstvenim lokalnim prilikama, kao i udaljavanje od uticaja sovske partije. Savez komunista Jugoslavije podržao je reformističke frakcije italijanskih, francuskih, grčkih i španskih komunističkih

partija, što je otvorilo put daljem širenju međunarodnog uticaja i prestiža jugoslavenskih komunista. Međutim, istorijska evolucija državne politike SFRJ i jugoslovenske partijske ideologije na kraju je krenula drugačijim tokom od reformi partijske politike i ideologija ranih evrokomunističkih partija. Svrha ovog članka je da doprinese daljem razumevanju dugoročnog društvenog i istorijskog procesa koji je stvorio zaokret između vodećih reformističkih partija Evrope. Ovo se postiže primenom komparativne metode na rezultate arhivskih istraživanja istorijskih izvora koji svedoče o saradnji jugoslovenskih, italijanskih i francuskih komunista u različitim vremenskim periodima tokom dvadesetogodišnjeg perioda, uz korišćenje saznanja brojnih istorijskih, socioloških i filozofskih knjiga i članaka kako bi se rezultati istraživanja doveli u odgovarajući društveni i istorijski kontekst.

Ključne reči: evrokomunizam, demokratski socijalizam, Savez komunista Jugoslavije, Josip Broz Tito, Enriko Berlinger, Žorž Marše