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## INTUITIONS, TRUST, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN TIMES OF CRISIS<sup>1</sup>

### ABSTRACT

In this paper, I will investigate the complex relationship between intuition, trustworthiness, and trust. I will first examine some of the more prevalent accounts of trust which either (over)emphasize the cognitive aspect of generating trustworthiness, or indeed acknowledge the importance of affects and emotions, but only as part of a neatly organized dual structure – which is in essence complementary with the cognitive understanding of how we start trusting each other. I will argue that intuitions provide a more detailed insight into trustworthiness because they are simultaneously cognitive and affective in nature. I will also consider how inferential and holistic intuitions might influence our understanding of trustworthiness, especially in times of crisis.

### KEYWORDS

intuition, trust, trustworthiness, crises, social change

### Introduction: In-between “Gut and Brain”

With the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020 there seemed to be another contamination on the loose: the social virus of mistrust which is nowadays becoming ever more blatantly exposed within and between various social groups and social systems. Driven by modern forms of communication, the plague of social polarization (Adams et al. 2023; Arora et al. 2022; Beaufort 2021) seems less like a short-term aberration than a permanent “feature” of our social interaction that is continually pushing us into more precarious mode of life. A somewhat knee-jerk remedy to this predicament is to try to reestablish the importance of facts in the public sphere. According to this view, only facts and fact-based knowledge can generate “sustainable” forms of social trust. However, if recent

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events have taught us anything it is that this strategy is far from efficient (Ama-zeen 2020; Dunaway 2021: 42–44). And this should not come as such a surprise, since upon closer inspection it does seem somewhat problematic that trusting as a deeply subjective interpersonal feeling should be dependent on and generated by something so external to us, such as facts.

The second issue we encounter when contemplating the notion of trust is the fact that it always refers to the future. Trustworthy individuals, groups and institutions are expected to behave in a certain manner for the foreseeable future and this belief is usually, but not always, premised on previous patterns of behavior. However, trust is also an embedded phenomenon; once earned, trust has some sort of inertia, as if relations generated through trust have intrinsic value, even if there is some breach in the trustworthiness of actors. Essentially, we trust someone because she or he is trustworthy – and this tautological belief cannot be verified (exclusively) as a factual insight into other people’s behavior. The same argument applies to larger social groups or institutions. Therefore, it seems that theoretical consideration of trust must involve both an account of our “gut feelings” and cognitively informed factual knowledge that pertains to the way in which other people, groups and institutions might or ought to act in the foreseeable future. Moreover, it is difficult to distinguish these different aspects of trust because they are bundled together, especially in times of crises when events are sporadic, and it seems like anything could happen. Since intuitions usually refer to very similar types of bundled cognitive and emotional insight, in this paper we will aim to investigate to which extent intuitions could prove to be useful in providing a more detailed account of trust and trustworthiness.

In the first part of the text, I will offer an overview of cognitive-oriented approaches to trust. Although these approaches provide an important insight into the way in which trustworthiness is generated, I will aim to show that authors who subscribe to this account fail to explain how and why people trust in times of extreme contingency. In the next section, authors who focus more on the affective side of trustworthiness will be analyzed in order to see to what extent cognitive and affective understanding can be seen as neatly differentiated and compatible. I will then try to theoretically situate intuitions within the framework of the so-called dual process theory as well as with other insights into intuition which see it as an inherently hybrid mode of thinking that bundles rational insights with emotions. In that regard, two different kinds of intuitions – inferential and holistic – prove to be important in managing both minor contingencies and severe social crises. In the last section of the paper, I will try to see how intuitions can inform our understanding of trust in those situations where the outcome of social interactions is less certain, or even when there are ruptures in the general knowledge that is taken for granted by most actors.

## When Push Comes to Shove, In Cognition We Trust

Trust has been extensively studied from many perspectives. One famous framing (Hardin 2006) suggests that trust is essentially based on self-interest. To put the point somewhat simply: I trust you because I believe that in the future it would be in your interest that I put my trust in you since, for example, you wish to maintain previously established cooperation with me. Hardin here notices that when a relation of trust is established between agents A and B their interests might not overlap or even concur because, in fact, they previously become *encapsulated* within each other: “Trusted counts my interests as partly his or her own interests just because they are my interests” (Hardin 2006: 19). Hardin’s understanding of trust focuses on concrete interactions (with the subsequent critique regarding the scaling of this model) that are reiterated over time and in which the trustworthiness of actors A and B is constantly updated by the following of rules for defaulting and cooperating that are laid out by game theory. Namely, if your interest encapsulates mine and the concrete trust game between us is reiterated over time, then the cumulative gain from our interaction provides an incentive towards trust and cooperation (even though a single act of deflection (distrust) might have substantially bigger payoff) (Hardin 2006: 22–23). This effectively makes (concrete) trustworthiness a social norm.

In a somewhat similar vein, Bicchieri, Duffy and Tolle (2004) think that game theory is a good framework for understanding issues pertaining to trust; however, they maintain that trustworthiness is the kind of social norm that can emerge without self-interest (or, for that matter, embedded trust). Their argumentation is based upon Axelrod’s pioneering work (1986) on the evolution of cooperative strategies in game theory. Bicchieri, Duffy and Tolle maintain that there is no single strategy through which the general impersonal norm of trust emerges, rather this outcome is dependent on multiple conditional strategies (in which defaulting is variably sanctioned by different actors who play the “trust game”, but also in which more chances are variably provided to defaulters).

Coleman also sees trust as a rational phenomenon, but this time the constitutive rules are premised on probability. Namely, according to Coleman (1990), when A trusts B this boils down to the fact that A knows the gain (G) obtained by trust, potential losses (L), and the probability (p) that B will prove to be trustworthy. Trusting someone, according to Coleman, is thus analogous to making a very subjective and individualistic bet, where formal conditions for this “trust bet” could be defined as follows:  $pG > (1-p)L$ . This of course raises the question of how reliable information regarding G, L and p is to be obtained and in turn updated. Coleman here once again relies on rationality, but this time set up as a more general utilitarian principle, because “the search for new pieces of information should continue as long as the cost of an additional increment of information is less than the benefit it is expected to bring” (Coleman 1990: 104).

Although this cognitive approach to trust is very widespread and elegant in argumentation, it certainly has some drawbacks that tend to become more

apparent as the level of contingency rises. Namely, what all approaches to trust that focus on rationality have in common is the fact that the process of generating trust is iterative in nature. Iteration and feedback are a necessary condition for an evolution process to occur which will in turn enable the emergence of trustworthiness. Evolution, however, takes time – and this is an especially scarce resource in acute states of crisis when decisions need to be made at the moment's notice. If evolution is seen as the best “optimization” of different strategies that actors may have in their mutual interactions, then general trust cannot emerge timely (and thus effectively) whenever the level of contingency is relatively high.

Another problem with this perspective is its failure to account for the fact that trust is also generated in times of social change when a new norm can form rapidly. Luhmann famously insisted that trust is of pivotal importance regarding the “seamless” reproduction and even slight modification of the social system, while confidence is closer to the colloquial understanding of trust where most of the social actors should have more certainty about the outcome of daily interactions.

The distinction between confidence and trust thus depends on perception and attribution. If you do not consider alternatives ... you are in a situation of confidence. If you choose one action in preference to others in spite of the possibility of being disappointed by the action of others, you define the situation as one of trust. In the case of confidence you will react to disappointment by external attribution. In the case of trust you will have to consider an internal attribution and eventually regret your trusting choice. (Luhmann 1988: 98)

In other words, it is precisely in those times when some sort of perturbation occurs within the social system that we have the most pressing urge for social trust.<sup>2</sup> In fact, liberalism as a political system according to Luhmann is more centered around trust than on confidence because the former is compatible with the principle of free action that produces constant gradual change.<sup>3</sup> However, the scale of social change that we potentially face is extremely variable. When severe crises and system meltdowns occur, we might lack basic semantic resources needed for both (self)understanding and communicating whether my attribution of trust was successful. And yet, even in those types of situations trust can emerge. Think of the “diehard antivaxxers” who (upon losing their confidence in the health system) trusted their Facebook communities, regardless of the fact that they might have lost close family members due to complications caused by COVID-19 that could have been avoided if they had been vaccinated. It does not seem plausible to say that they should

2 Rus (2005) also makes the point that trust is closely related to situations of uncertainty. However, his account is closer to Coleman and Hardin because he maintains that particularistic personal interaction is the source of information about the trustee's trustworthiness, while for Luhmann trust is a property of the social system (Jalava 2003).

3 Although it should be highlighted that the relation between trust and confidence is not a zero-sum game.

only attribute internally their disappointment for misplacing trust, since at least some of them went into one of Facebook's many moneymaking rabbit holes due to their quite reasonable skepticism towards the commitment of big pharmaceutical companies to the common good. Moreover, it is precisely in these circumstances of vagueness and contingency that we hear about the polarization of society which is, among other things, characterized by blind partisan trust which remains indifferent to efforts to communicate facts within the whole public sphere. Ultimately, a rational/cognitive approach to trust cannot explain this phenomenon of rapidly spreading insufficiently calculated trust, which is not only lacking any embedded self-interest, but can quite often bring about (self)harm.

### The Affectivity of Trust

A possible solution would be to try to pay closer attention to the emotional aspects of giving trust to some individual, group or institution. After all, trust is an important element in forming emotional ties such as friendship or romantic relationships, which is why it is very plausible to maintain that besides cognitive there is also an affective component of trust and trustworthiness. If one subscribes to this idea that these two aspects are not mutually irreducible, then the central question is not only what trust is, but also how do its affective and cognitive aspects fit together.

Weigert and Lewis (1985) claim that our everyday reasoning is complex in nature and that it contains both rational and emotional components. According to these authors, cognition is used to select those institutions, groups and individuals that are trustworthy. Moreover, rationality is of key importance in formulating good reasons for generating trust (Lewis and Weigert 1985: 970). However, as Luhmann already noticed, our knowledge of sufficient reasons for trusting someone or something is always limited due to the general uncertainty of social interaction and the inherent instability regarding the reproduction of the social system. This is why every instance of trust always implies going beyond the trustor's knowledge and ultimately making him or her vulnerable to contingency which is inherent in the trustee's future actions.<sup>4</sup> According to Weigert and Lewis, this push beyond the given rational basis for trusting is generated through emotions and emotional dispositions. However, the "proportion" of cognitive and emotional components of trust is not determined primarily by psychological factors, but rather by the complexity of concrete situations in which actors interact with each other, as well as with various properties of

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4 Moreover, it can be argued that trust in itself can be understood as a form of action. As Dumouchel points out: "when I trust I increase my vulnerability to another agent through an action of my own, and that action is precisely what trust is. If I had not acted I would not be vulnerable, or at least not as vulnerable to the other agent" (Dumouchel 2005: 425). For the political implications of this insight, see also: Hamm, Smidt, and Mayer 2019.

the social structure (i.e., institutions). This is why, for example, the emotional component of trust is more prominent in primary social groups, as opposed to secondary (Lewis, Weigert 1985: 973).

In a similar vein, Karen Jones stressed the fact that, besides rational deliberation about trustworthiness, trust also entails the attitude of “optimism about the other person’s goodwill” (1996: 6). In other words, in order to establish a relation of trust, A must have optimism about B’s goodwill (as well as his or her general competence) to perform action X. One might argue that if trust is framed in this manner, then it remains rather limited to those people with whom we have a close relationship, or at least with those with whom there is some sort of previous social interaction and emotional rapport. However, Jones makes the argument that B’s competence about taking action is closely connected with her general ethical standards of taking the well-being of others into consideration, regardless of the fact how much other actors may count on B to do X (1996: 10). She thus maintains that this aspect of general understanding of what competence means would allow trust to “scale up”, since actor A would be justified in having the attitude of optimism towards B’s goodwill (as the crucial condition for generating trust), even though A would not have to see B as trustworthy (because they are strangers who lack previous interaction).

Some social psychologists have tried to see how different types of emotions impact social trust. For example, Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) conducted several experiments and found that emotions with positive valence (like happiness) increase the level of trust, while on the other hand negative emotions (such as anger) tend to reduce it. They also claim that the level of familiarity with the trustee to some extent reduces the importance of emotions in generating social trust, because, for example, incidental emotions (i.e., anger) among more familiar actors do not influence the level of trust between them (Dunn, Schweitzer 2005: 745). More recently, Dunning, Fetchenhauer and Schlösser (2019) have made an argument that the emotional component of trust is of pivotal importance. Trust, according to their empirical study (*ibid.*) for the most part pertains to feelings of obligation towards others that are usually normatively premised on goodwill and mutual respect between trustor and trustee. Potential defaulting on trust relationship is therefore often perceived as something negative and thus is associated with feelings of anxiety or blame (Dunning et al. 2019: 4).

Although this is just a snippet of the literature that tries to put emotions and affective attitudes into the focus of the general theoretical and empirical research of social trust, it is still indicative that most of the aforementioned accounts – as is the case with those authors who think that cognition is constitutive for generating trust – seem to claim that the relationship between emotional and cognitive element of generating trust is a) somehow neatly ordered, thus b) at least to some extent complementary. Both assumptions seem to be unwarranted. Firstly, emotion and cognition are not separate entities that are triggered at different levels of complexity of social interaction or in specific social situations. It does not seem likely that we are necessarily more “emotionally engaged” when we trust someone that we know very well, while

general trustworthiness, directed toward strangers, is more cognitive in nature. Let me illustrate this point: imagine that we are members of a group that has assembled to protest some social injustice. We might *feel* that we *know* how all members of this newly formed group will behave in the forthcoming time even though the actual unfolding of collective action remains highly contingent in this case.<sup>5</sup> In other words, at least in some situations it is possible to think about trust as a phenomenon where cognition and affect are merged in such a manner that it is difficult to delineate one from another. Therefore, trying to precisely pinpoint whether the emotional or cognitive component of trust is more “active” is not viable for the simple reason that both aspects of trust are simultaneously active at least in some situations.

### Varieties of Intuitions

One way to think about trust is to understand it as a specific form of *social intuition*. But before we elaborate this claim in more detail, we first must take a closer look at intuitions. At the highest level of abstraction, one could argue that intuitions are a type of knowledge that lacks a proper “methodology”. This is why in literature it is often defined as a mental capability thanks to which we know something without knowing exactly how we know it. For example, some authors stress the fact that intuitions are created in situations where there is an unavoidable lack of adequate input; accordingly, they are seen as an outcome of “[...] the process of reaching a conclusion on the basis of little information which is normally reached on the basis of significantly more information” (Westcott 1961: 267). Intuitions are thus inherently related to situations where there is “scarcity of facts” relevant for the formation of “fully fledged” rational knowledge.

This brings us to another important aspect of our ability to know stuff intuitively, which pertains to the question whether intuitions are a fully conscious mode of knowledge. Obviously, if some insight is generated without the proper understanding of steps involved in gaining it, then it is rather difficult to maintain that the whole process is conscious – at least in the conventional meaning of the word. However, even if we agree that intuitions are (at some level) unconscious, this does not mean that they are inherently irrational. In other words, acknowledging the unconsciousness of intuitions does not entail that they are ingrained and unmalleable, like some sort of epistemological instincts. In that regard, this unconsciousness that we regularly observe as a property of intuitive insights falls close to habit-based modes of reasoning and therefore depends upon prior experience, which is at least partly changeable through reflection. In other words, we are capable of “active intuition” (Williams 2018).

The fact that there are habitually formed unconscious aspects of intuitions also implies that this mode of knowledge is much quicker than those modes

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5 As Tanis and Postmes have argued in situations where there is little information about the trustee, trustors tend to infer reciprocity from in-groupers (2005: 415).

that have “proper methodology”. For this reason, intuitions are often featured in the so called dual-process theory of reasoning (Evans 2010). According to some of the pioneers in the field (Evans and Over 1996; Stanovich 1999), human thinking and decision-making involve two discrete reasoning systems: System 1, which is fast, automatic, and intuitive, and System 2, which is slow, deliberate, and more reflective. According to this theory, System 1 is responsible for quick and effortless responses to environmental inputs, while System 2 is involved in more complex and demanding mental processes (see also: Kahneman 2013).

Dual process perspective unfortunately fails to properly take into account situational factors, especially in relation to collective behavior (Price 2020). This has been addressed in recent insights from the sociology of protest and social engagement. For example, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2013) investigate the role of System 1 and System 2 thinking in social movements and collective action. They argue that instances of social engagement require social actors to deploy both intuitive and deliberative cognitive processes. The authors in turn suggest that System 1 thinking can play an important role in mobilizing individuals to participate in collective action, while System 2 thinking can help individuals make strategic decisions about whether to participate and how to achieve their goals. Price (2020), on the other hand, has argued that if we follow insights from symbolic interactionism – according to which the idiosyncrasy of individual actors’ interpretation of the given situation produces emergent and unpredictable social outcomes – then the rigid distinction between the two systems of reasoning will prove to be even more problematic. More importantly, neat separation of System 1 and 2 cannot, according to Price, explain the so-called non-deliberative innovation.<sup>6</sup> His argument is that if we take into consideration the micro-level of social interaction and the constitutive role of situations in regards to the way we reason, then it can be argued that: “[...] the neat model cannot explain why some individuals may rely on automatic processing in cognitively demanding social situations or why they might rely on deliberate processing during routine activities” (Price 2020: 12).

Moreover, to return to our previous example: if a group is formed through acts of social engagement, members of the group do not necessarily initially mobilize on purely automatic affectual grounds, nor do they integrate and act and consolidate their collective action purely by forming time-consuming rational and deliberative arguments. This is especially true in times of crises when idiosyncrasy of interaction is increased and where one intuitive and fast interpretation of some sudden contingent event causes action which is based both on System 1 and System 2 thinking, simply because within the confines of a crisis situation there must be an exchange of affective and rational interpretations

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6 In this regard, Price mentions Leschziner’ study (2015) of cooks and their cooking styles where she explains that in some situations avant-garde cooks that work in fine dining restaurants rely on deliberate processes in routine situations, while chiefs who work in traditional restaurants can generate new dishes by following an automatic mode of reasoning.



of social behavior. Think of the following theoretical example: there is an unpredicted event E which demands urgent action; actor A manages to formulate a rational evaluation of the overall situation S (now that E has occurred), which causes an intuitive consideration of agent B and – through social interaction and communication – ultimately helps A to further develop a deliberate evaluation of S'. Can one easily delineate whether S' primarily falls under System 1 or System 2 mode of reasoning? I am afraid that the effort to make such a distinction will be futile, and, as we shall see, even counterproductive.

When thinking about intuition, it is perhaps better to try to see what its specific inputs and outputs are and then try to explain it down these lines. This is a strategy adopted by Betsch who defines intuitions in the following manner:

Intuition is a process of thinking. The input to this process is mostly provided by knowledge stored in long term memory that has been primarily acquired via associative learning. The input is processed automatically and without conscious awareness. The output of the process is a feeling that can serve as a basis for judgments and decisions. (Betsch 2008: 4)

There are several important points that are highlighted by Betsch's definition. Firstly, (rational) knowledge is seen as the input of the associative process which pulls closer previously distanced elements of the long-term memory. So, intuitions are, at least at the input level, closely related to rationality – even though they might be produced instantly or automatically. Secondly, this association outputs emotion, the “feeling of knowing something”, that can be communicated as judgements and in turn used by social actors to form decisions. However, it would be wrong to infer that those decisions which are guided by intuitions are irredeemably irrational – and consequently incompatible with rational deliberation – simply because intuitions have this kind of “emotionally saturated” output.

For the argument that I am trying to make, it would be very important to have in mind that intuitions themselves are not a homogeneous mode of thinking. As Sinclair (2011) has argued, there are two ways of intuiting which process information rather differently (although both of them could be seen as part of System 1 mode of reasoning). Inferential intuitions reasoning “relies on automated responses based on a quick recognition of memory patterns accumulated through experience” (Sinclair 2011: 5). This kind of intuition is closely related to what we call expert knowledge. Think for example of an experienced emergency room surgeon who is summoned to see a patient whose life is threatened because all the other less-experienced residents cannot conclusively establish a diagnosis. The life of the patient is hanging by the thread and there is no time to run more diagnostics. The experienced emergency doctor is able to put the situation in another perspective by suggesting that he feels that seemingly unrelated symptoms might in fact be related and, together with the input from other surgeons, they resolve the issue in time. Notice that in this easily imaginable example, the expert doctor is in essence sharing a “feeling about knowledge” that can advance a debate about evidence based on rational knowledge.

In other words, inferential intuitions pertain to those situations which “[...] connect information in a new but predictable manner that builds on the existing domain knowledge, which opens the possibility that it could be mediated by the deliberative system” (Sinclair 2011: 6).<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, a holistic intuition connects relatively far elements of experience in a radically new manner. This way of processing information is characterized by the fact that it can synthesize “unconnected memory fragments into a new information structure” (Mintzberg et al. 1998: 164, quoted in: Sinclair 2011: 5–6). This type of intuition can be seen as an eureka! moment where one has a truly innovative insight into some aspect of the (social) environment. It is important to understand that if someone has a holistic intuition, the output does not necessarily need to be compatible with the current normative framing of the deliberative process (although this does not mean that knowledge produced by holistic intuitions is inherently unfalsifiable). Think for example of radically new ideas in the history of science where quite often scientists had an unexplainable epiphany that almost instantly integrated previously unconnected knowledge into an insight that was quite unexpected, or to put it somewhat ironically, counterintuitive. The idea of time-space, the structure of the DNA molecule and the theory of evolution all had this feature (Grinnell 2011; Pétervári, Osman, and Bhattacharya 2016). Therefore, holistic intuitions might be at odds with current procedures of deliberation (state of methodology which validates intuitively generated hypotheses), but this is only a temporary state of affairs since if the said intuition is truly heuristically fruitful new procedures of verification will be developed over time.

### Intuitions as Mental Grounds for Trust in Times of Crises

Now, how does this account of intuition help us to better understand the phenomenon of trust? We can easily see that inferential and holistic intuitions might play different roles in situations depending on the *level of contingency* that is involved. One could argue that inferential intuitions, together with the more cognitively premised emergence of trustworthiness, are of key importance in preserving the given social order once the confidence in its seamless reproduction is lost. Trustworthiness is a norm that has both normative and empirical expectations (Bicchieri 2005).<sup>8</sup> We have tried to argue that generating

<sup>7</sup> For an exploration of the boundary conditions that delineate between proper professional intuitions and potential bias “insights” see: Kahneman, Klein (2009).

<sup>8</sup> According to Bicchieri (2005, 2016) normative expectations refer to what individuals believe they should do, or what they believe others expect them to do, based on current social norms or values. For example, an individual may have a normative expectation that they should recycle, because they believe it is the right thing to do for the environment. Empirical expectations, on the other hand, refer to what individuals believe others are actually doing or are likely to do, based on their observations of behavior. For example, an individual may have an empirical expectation that others in their community do not recycle, because they have observed that few people put out recycling bins on garbage day.

this norm, especially in times of crises, involves a hybrid type of insight provided by intuitions, as well as that scope of trustworthiness towards strangers and impersonal relations depends upon the type of intuition that is involved in the process. Inferential intuitions fuel empirical expectations when we have a previous rapport between trustor and trustee, while holistic intuitions play an important role in generating novel normative and empirical expectations between persons who have not necessarily previously interacted with each other.

For example, inferential intuitions could help generate trustworthiness towards the stock market although inflation might be considerably on the rise. Holistic intuitions, on the other hand, create that type of trustworthiness which highlights agency and the inherent vulnerability involved in the act of trusting a fellow human being. This normative grounding can occur once the system enters a period of severe instability. When this happens, we as trustors are more focused on the problematic situations and potential innovation in the normative realm than on traits or behavior of trustees. In other words, the level of contingency fundamentally influences our *mental capabilities* that help us to (re)frame the given (crises) situation. Think of the trust that emerges between strangers if they went through wars, severe poverty, life-threatening illness or psychological trauma: they are capable to rapidly form close bonds in spite of their substantial mutual personal differences, as well as to formulate bold intuitive judgments that do not necessarily concur with the dominant way of understanding social issues in the given society (Ratcliffe, Ruddell, and Smith 2014). In that regard, the distance between the elements of our experience that are, depending on the level of contingency, synthesized into novel knowledge structures, and communicated as inferential or holistic intuitions are of key importance for generating trustworthiness once this norm ceases to be taken for granted by social actors.

However, intuitions are not only important in times of crises. As we already indicated, to find a person or institution trustworthy means that you foster some expectation regarding their future behavior. We also established that trust is different from confidence in that trust entails a “leap of faith” since there is no way to avoid the possibility of failure in predicting the future behavior of the trustee. When we speak of trustworthiness from the perspective of trustor there is always at least some lack of information at the input level which, depending on the level of contingency, might require some creative recombining of different – most often rationally generated – types of knowledge about situations in which the trustor and trustee interacted. Because this recombination does not always follow a fully reflexive method, the trustor forms a judgment which is affective in various degrees. The “leap of faith” that constitutes the complex output of the hybrid rational and emotional evaluation of the given social situation is in fact, at least partly, premised on the intuitive justification of trustworthiness. It therefore seems more important to investigate to which extent trust is guided by holistic or inferential intuitions than it is to try to conclusively show that it is inherently more rational or emotional.

Trust, on the other hand, could be seen as a social process that involves a concrete implementation of trustworthiness through the action of two or more actors. Namely, when we look at the problem from the perspective of the social system, trust as a process does not highlight the fact that actors face various contingencies in their daily life, but rather their mutual dependence (Dumouchel 2005: 427). Therefore, from this level of abstraction, Luhmannian confidence is for the most part premised on what we have called System 1 or automatic mode of thinking. When a small perturbation in the reproduction of the social system does indeed occur, inferential intuition is used to restore the process by reestablishing trustworthiness. The stability of the given system is at least partly proportional to the level of repair that can be delivered through the use of inferential intuitions. In other words, if experts can use their inferential intuitions to resolve contingency, nobody would claim that there is a crisis of social trust. However, in situations where there are crises of institutions – or even disruptions of semantic security (Boltanski 2011) – there are two relatively compatible reactions. First, crises might cause social actors to use System 2 mode of thinking and take time to reflect upon why trust as a social process is failing. This outcome does not involve the use of intuition but is relatively rare simply because time in this kind of situation is scarce (moreover, System 2 mode of thinking can also be biased). Secondly, this lack of certainty might cause a series of holistic intuitions (that are again premised on the speedy System 1 mode of thinking) about the *meaning of trustworthiness* that might generate radically novel modes of interaction.

Also, if we take a closer look, framing trustworthiness as a norm that is constituted through intuitions that are simultaneously cognitive and affective also allows us to see how trust as a social process supports or hinders agency. Namely, if agent A's desire to do x entails that A trusts B to do y, then A should consider whether action x can be intuitively inferred from y (given the current state of mutual understanding that the normative order encodes into the given situation). There are several important implications of this position. If x is habitual, or based on relatively undisruptive types of knowledge, then trust (as a system-wide social process) will be more or less automatic and supportive of A's agency. If, on the other hand doing x by A also implies a total novelty in how we understand the normativity of trust, then trust as a social process necessarily presents a hindrance of A's agency (the only way around it would be to develop a normative modification of trustworthiness through holistic intuitions).

From here, we can hopefully understand more clearly why trust is so important in every aspect of social life. It is the bedrock of stability of the social system, but also the vehicle of change through which genuinely new forms of interaction emerge. It has both a static and dynamic property and, as a process, generates the fabric of society. If this is the case, then we as social scientists and theorists need to develop more precise conceptual tools that could investigate the hybrid nature of trustworthiness which is both emotionally and cognitively fueled by our ability to form intuitions.

## Conclusion

In this paper I tried to show that trust is a very complex phenomenon that cannot be reduced either to its cognitive or affective/emotional component. This approach in turn enables us to see how trust perseveres and changes in those situations where there is crisis in the reproduction of the social system. In that regard, inferential intuitions play an important role in mending relatively small unpredicted situations that we face in our daily life or professional career. On the other hand, holistic intuitions have the potential to alter what constitutes trustworthiness and consequently to substantially change the way in which social order – premised upon the process of social trust – functions.

Another important implication (which demands more research) pertains to those situations where trust becomes a scarce social resource. Namely, if trustworthiness is somehow broken by social crises, insisting on the importance of proper, factually based, information will not in itself resolve this issue, because their processing demands time-consuming reflexivity, which is not at disposal to social actors. In this kind of situation, it seems prudent not to dismiss these judgments simply because they were constructed in an instance and without proper methodology, but rather to see which parts of the experience are getting interconnected through intuitive reasoning and why. This would ensure that a potential critique of wrong intuitions about trustworthiness in times of crisis is not set into the neat narratives of inherently rational and irredeemably irrational approaches to said crises. Moreover, this understanding of holistic intuitions could open the possibility for new unpredicted forms of trust relations, ones that are both radically more inclusive and intuitively understandable.

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### Intuicije, poverenje i društvena promena u vremenima krize

#### Apstrakt

U ovom radu ću istražiti složen odnos između intuicije, pouzdanosti i poverenja. Prvo ću ispitati neka od preovlađujućih tumačenja poverenja koja ili (pre)naglašavaju kognitivni aspekt generisanja poverenja, ili pak priznaju važnost afekta i emocija, ali samo kao deo uredno organizovane dualne strukture – što je u suštini komplementarno sa kognitivnim razumevanjem toga kako uspostavljamo međusobno poverenje. Tvrdiću da intuicije pružaju detaljniji uvid u pouzdanost jer su istovremeno kognitivne i afektivne prirode. Takođe ćemo razmotriti kako inferencijalne i holističke intuicije mogu uticati na naše razumevanje pouzdanosti, posebno u vremenima kriza.

Ključne reči: intuicija, poverenje, pouzdanost, krize, društvene promene