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THE THIRD ROAD POLICY: EUROCOMMUNISM AND ITS YUGOSLAV ASSESSMENT[1]

ABSTRACT
This paper deals with a critical stage in the dissolution of the Soviet Communist (Bolshevik) Party’s domination in the Communist commonwealth. The gradual emancipation of European Communist parties, starting with Yugoslavia (1948), through the developments that caused the Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), gave birth to independent strategies of political struggle, autonomous from Moscow’s ideological centre, which were implemented by the largest Communist parties in Western Europe. The attempts aimed at the syncretism of the communist platform, and ideas of political rights and adapting to the parliamentary regime resulted in the “Third Road” movement, which strove to unify the positive experiences of the two ideologically opposed sides of the Cold War international constellation. Although it was a belated and, eventually – purely ideological concept, the movement itself and the idea of Eurocommunism has remained as an important testimony of an attempt at finding new paths in the struggle for a more just society.

KEYWORDS
Eurocommunism, the Cold War, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Santiago Carrillo, Enrico Berlinguer

Eurocommunism was the ideational and political concept conceived within Western European communist parties in the 1970s. It appeared on the stage of history as a new but rather eclectic idea, the result of decades of attempts at reforming what was understood in theory and in historical practice to be the orthodox (Soviet) model of communism. The occurrence of Eurocommunism

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attracted a lot of attention from the European Left, especially against the background of the complexities of the Cold War political constellation. At the height of a serious crisis of capitalism in Western Europe, brought about by a sharp increase in the price of oil and general stagnation of the economy of Europe, accompanied by an unprecedented wave of violence on the streets of European cities, the ideational spectrum of European intellectual thought underwent a new reassessment of the contemporary social reality. The idea of continual prosperity resulting from the dominant post-war concept of "the welfare state" was brought into question due to the escalation of a number of unresolved economic and social problems in almost all European states. The era of progressivism, inspired by the revolutionary changes and optimism of the turbulent 1960s, receded before the atmosphere of violence and skepticism in the next decade. European communists were confronted with the collapse of "the Prague Spring" of 1968 and the forcible "authoritarian normalization" carried out by the "first socialist country", the Soviet Union. At the same time, there was the attempt of the great powers to initiate a visible process of détente and relaxation of tensions in Europe. From the time of the "de-Stalinisation" of communist parties, having originated in the mid-1950s, the once monolithic European communist bloc had for the most part fragmented before the onslaught of new initiatives, rejection of old authorities and the attempt at developing new political strategies. In the early 1970s, Western European communists rode on a wave of great expectations, based upon the view that the issue of a reform of their own political structure was compatible with the very essence of the expected and inevitable social and political transformation that they strove for (Judt 2005: 453–484; Mazover 2001: 354–358; Kotkin 2003: 11–18; Sasson 2010: 445–46; Balampanidis 2018: 1–15; Goode 1980: 1–10).

From its very beginnings, European post-October communism linked its political and theoretical role model solely to the realisation of the heritage of the October Revolution. The ideals of the Bolshevik Revolution were summed up in the codified Marxism-Leninism, which represented much more than just a phase in the development of Marxist thought in Russia, having established themselves as the only proven successful model of the revolutionary practice of the proletariat. As a far-reaching consequence of the revolution, the once united European Left began irrevocably splitting up into adherents and opponents of the Bolshevik strategy. Communist parties throughout Europe took over the model of a disciplined Leninist party of professional revolutionaries, which entailed a strict observance of several basic principles; for decades, these would be considered the key models of Leninism: democratic centralism, monolithic unity, proletarian revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat and proletarian internationalism (Aspaturian 1980: 9). The authority of Moscow as the ideological tutor and guide for the political actions of communist parties became unquestionable, excluding "independent initiatives" and flexible concepts of communist leaderships. The interests of all European communists had to be synchronised with those of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the

USSR, and any deviation from this line of conduct was considered opportunist and treacherous.

This hegemonic paradigm was long-lasting – whether it had to work for the political objectives of the Comintern (1919–1943) or the Cominform (1947–1956) – and applied equally to the mass-membership communist parties in France and Germany, as well as to the illegal parties of Central and Eastern Europe. In both cases, Moscow was the catalyst for deciding on the strategy of communist parties, on the possibilities and extent of the implementation of the more modern or radical strategies of European communism (Judt 2005: 140). With the onset of the Cold War context in Europe after 1945, the radicalisation of the homogeneity of the communist parties' bloc was justified as an existential need of the survival of communism in Europe. In the words of Andrei Zhdanov, one of the main Soviet ideological disseminators, the separation between communist parties on the eve of a new era was considered as "wrong, harmful and essentially unnatural" (Dimić 2010: 217).

However, the ideological monopoly of Moscow was not always constant and unchangeable; it occasionally adjusted to both the current circumstances in Europe and the challenges of the social transformation unfolding within the Soviet Union. During that process, many European communists became blind devotees of Moscow's policy, as well as its open "heretics". Within the framework of the seemingly unshaken dogmatic idea of strict observance of "democratic centralism" and the ideal of unquestioned unity within the party, differences of opinion among communists were still constantly manifested. Whereas the instructive examples of party ostracism directed against the ideas of Trotsky and Bukharin within the CP of the USSR were presented as a desirable "Stalinist" form of overcoming party factions and sectarianism, outside the Soviet Union, the beliefs of European communists were occasionally seriously shaken, whether concerning the idea of the Popular Front, the startling pact with Hitler or the post-war reawakened awareness of the possibilities of "a national road to socialism". However, as long as this was reduced to individual cases of loss of faith in the Soviet brand of communism, all European parties remained devoted to Moscow. Until the Communist Party of Yugoslavia left the fold in 1948.

Yugoslav communists were the first ones to openly bring into question the ideological authority of Moscow, insisting on two crucial principles in their resistance to it: the independence of their country and its independent road to socialism. The first great "schism" within the international communist movement had lasting consequences on the imposed ideological homogeneity of European communists. In the words of Edvard Kardelj, 1948 marked the beginning of a new epoch, in which "the building of socialism was no longer a matter decided upon by a single country" (*Borba*, December 30, 1948). This approach was considered utterly "heretical" and, at that time, only Palmiro Togliatti, the leader of the Italian Communists, did not join the other Communist leaders in condemning Tito's independent course in Yugoslavia. Togliatti believed that Yugoslav communists should have the right to establish the

system they considered most suitable for their own country. However, "it was not until 1956 that the full extent of Togliatti's differences with Stalin became known" (Goode 1980: 76).

To follow the example set by the Yugoslav communists would become an expression of reformist tendencies in many communist parties. It wasn't just because of Yugoslavia's insistence on a consistent observance of the sovereignty of the state and equality within the socialist bloc, but also due to insistence on the specific character of its own "road to socialism" and demands for the democratisation of political life, the abolition of the repressive system, the enabling of a greater intra-party democracy and the realisation of workers' self-management. Among the European communist parties, such topics would become dominant following the death of Stalin and with the beginning of the process of "de-Stalinisation", the first major evolutive step of European communists.

Stalin's contribution to the codification of Leninism as the official ideology was significant, especially in terms of the legitimising of the Soviet regime and the policy that the Soviet Union pursued for exerting control over a substantial number of loyal states and communist parties in Eastern Europe. Even though Hannah Arendt wrote that totalitarianism, just like tyranny, carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction, the phenomenon of Stalinism, which did not arise out of a single person, nor was it limited to the USSR, did not disappear along with the physical disappearance of its founder (Arent 1998: 486). For supporters of the Yugoslav version of socialism, the use of the term "Stalinism" meant terminological demarcation with the initial idea of the October Revolution, in order to indicate that it was a "new phenomenon" that was essentially "counterrevolutionary" and contradicted the main theoretical characteristics of Marxism (Golubović 1982: 265–266). In the Soviet Union, the term "Stalinism" was never officially accepted, but criticism of Stalin's rule was focused on the emergence of a "cult of personality", the main culprit for ideological deviations. Therefore the process of the de-Stalinisation of Eastern Europe, Communist parties, and the Soviet Union was inconsistent, contradictory, incomplete and, thus, with ambiguous results. This wavering process lasted until in the Kremlin centre, following the arrival of Leonid Brezhnev (1964), the tendency towards the re-Stalinisation of the regime proved to be victorious, and the entire attempt aimed at dismantling Stalin's heritage was put on hold.

Researchers registered three aspects of the process of de-Stalinisation: inside the Soviet Union, within other communist parties, and within the societies where communist parties held a monopoly on power (Živanov 1969: 54). The catalyst and the indicator of the degree of de-Stalinisation achieved was the aforementioned process in the centre itself, that is, in Moscow. Even though the 20th Congress of the CP of the USSR and Khrushchev's secret exposé are usually taken as the turning point that initiated the process of de-Stalinisation – the first actual blow to Stalinism and the event which exposed the first cracks in the Soviet monolith occurred when Stalin was still alive. This refers to the Yugoslav emancipation of 1948, whose significance was global in character., It was the first example of a socialist country and Communist party

openly disobeying the Soviet leader, undermining the foundation of the myth of his absolute infallibility.

The uneven and contradictory process of de-Stalinisation was initiated after Stalin's death, when the new leader Nikita Khrushchev had established his position. During the historic 20th Party Congress, he read his secret exposé, officially entitled "On the Personality Cult and Its Harmful Consequences", whereby the Soviet Party, formerly a bastion of Stalinism, became the subject of its partial and, in temporal terms, limited deconstruction. Khrushchev's exposé, presented to the delegates of the Congress of the CP of the USSR on 14 February 1956, even though it was limited in terms of qualifications, carefully dosed and in a sense – relativising, ended up being "historical", for it initiated the process of confronting the crimes as the legacy of Stalinism.

Khrushchev subjected Stalin's rule, marked by violence and lawlessness, to a critical examination. The Secretary General condemned, above all,the personality cult, striving quite conspicuously to present Stalinism as a deviation from the Leninist principles, as an aberration in the Soviet revolutionary movement. At the same time, Khrushchev established his own continuity with the already deified leader of the October Revolution. He reminded those present at the Congress of the well-known political assassinations of revolutionary leaders and Party officials, first of all in the purges carried out in the 1930s, of Stalin's trust in Hitler and the country's being unprepared for the war. Nevertheless, he failed to mention those most numerous victims: the inmates of the system of labour camps – gulags, numbering in their millions; still, the abolition of the system of gulags and the liberation of millions of people, due to the de-Stalinisation initiated during the 20th Congress, was an important historical step forward (Hruščov 1970: 15–72; Boffa 1985: 350–355). For the sake of establishing a balance, Khrushchev mentioned the positive aspects of Stalin's rule, singling out first of all Stalin's successful liquidations of "enemies of the people".

Even though Khrushchev's exposé was a half-way gesture and constituted a compromise of sorts, it was kept secret from the public in the USSR; several watered-down versions were circulated unofficially in the Soviet Union, while the integral version was published in the West soon.[2] Still, even this gesture, however hesitant, was an extraordinary step forward, for it exposed the mechanism of terror and the system of mass crimes, lawlessness and arbitrariness that reigned in the Soviet Union for close to three decades. (Živanov 1969: 67–78; Nekrič 2000: 495–499;).

The post-Stalinist transition initiated various tendencies in communist parties throughout Europe, reformist and anti-reformist ones, which used the same rhetoric and Marxist terminology when opening or closing possible perspectives in society. Nikita Khrushchev's exposé at the 20th Congress became the

2 It is interesting to note that in Yugoslavia Khrushchev's secret exposé also remained unpublished, even though it was rather milder compared to the Yugoslav accusations of Stalin. It would be published only a decade and a half later, in 1970, when the reform period in Yugoslavia was at its peak.

starting point of the accelerated "de-Stalinisation" of communist parties in Europe. This brought forth the formation of the first serious intra-party factions, which competed against one another and for the first time openly raised issues such as a greater degree of freedom and disposing of the Stalinist heritage.

The struggle against "revisionism" in Europe from the mid-1950s onward represented the main tool that party conservatives and dogmatists applied against democratic tendencies in communist parties. The events in Poland and Hungary in the second half of the 1956 became a warning to centralised communist leaderships, showing to what degree the processes of "liberalisation" and "democratisation" of post-Stalinist society could be tolerated. The Yugoslav experience of independent development of the socialist model already offered a dangerous precedent concerning the fate of the monolithic unity of the Eastern bloc and the legitimacy of post-Stalinist party leadership. The struggle against "Yugoslav revisionism", which, in its various phases, was primarily initiated from Moscow, became necessary to legitimise the firmness of the Soviet version of ideological orthodoxy, which would ensure not only the leading position of the CP of the USSR among communist parties but also the political and military cohesion of the Eastern bloc under the aegis of the Soviet Union.

The military intervention of the Warsaw Pact troops in Hungary set the first line of limitations, envisioned by the the Kremlin "ideological strategists", for excessively radical reforms of communist parties. However, the great support given to restraining reformist tendencies among European communists did not put an end to the further polarisation of communist parties into conservative and progressive forces, nor did it restrain the evolutive process of the younger generation of European communists. The intention of Moscow to maintain, forcibly if need be, the unquestionable political and ideational unity of European communism was seriously shaken by the "schisms" initiated by Yugoslavia and China. The reform programme of Czechoslovak Communists at the end of the 1960s added insult to injury. The peak of the process of de-Stalinisation was reached in Europe at a time when the USSR was already conducting the policy of re-Stalinisation and reaffirmation of the values of the Stalinist era.[3] The Czechoslovak reforms, known as an attempt at developing "socialism with a human face" (meaning: debureaucratized and more humane), represented the peak of the process of de-Stalinisation, as well as the hallmark of the historical failure of that attempt.

Czechoslovakia formally became a member of the bloc in 1948, through a combination of the electoral victory of the Communist Party and violence inflicted upon non-communist politicians. The Sovietisation of public life in

3 The policy of re-Stalinisation was inaugurated and established during the April Plenum of the CP of the USSR in 1968. The said change of policy and a more conservative course were announced by L. Brezhnev as early as 29 March 1968, in the course of a speech that he delivered during the city Party conference in Moscow. The culmination of that policy was the aggression against and the occupation of Czechoslovakia, initiated on 21 August that year, for the purpose of stopping the reformist movement. Živanov 1969: 74–75.

the spirit of Stalinism turned this Central European country into a fortress of the Warsaw Pact. The process of de-Stalinisation, characteristic of almost all Eastern European countries, reached Czechoslovakia last, and as elsewhere, was marked by hesitation and contradictions, the consequence of which were modest and half-way results (Crampton 2006: 319–325; Calvocoressi 2003: 294, 298; Laker 1999: 434–435;Connelly 590–622).

The autocratic course of communist dogmatism with state-socialist contents, personified in the state and Party leader Antonín Novotny, finally collapsed during the January Party plenum of 1968. Novotny was ousted from the post of the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), having held it for fifteen years, and Alexander Dubček, a Slovak, was elected as a new Party leader.[4] The politically imprisoned and economically devastated society, suddenly lifted by hope and enthusiasm, woke up from a stagnation, repression and collective apathy that had lasted for two decades The reform-oriented Party-members, led by Dubček, were at the forefront of this historical process.

The democratisation of public life, initiated in January 1968, reached its zenith during the April plenary Party session, when the Action Programme of the CPC was adopted, a Magna Carta of sorts of the reformist ambitions of the Dubček leadership, as defined by Jiři Valenta (Valenta 1984: 131). This document, emerging from "the Czechoslovak circumstances" and rejecting "a mechanical and uncritical" adoption of Soviet experiences, proclaimed the "Czechoslovak way of building and developing socialism". This presupposed: the demonopolisation of the role of the Party in social life; the abolition of censorship; freedom of speech, association, travelling abroad; the participation of workers in managing companies;, renewing the functions of the market and developing competition in the economy; a final and total rehabilitation of all politically persecuted individuals; a reorganisation of the judiciary on the basis of the principles of full autonomy; national equality, and the federalisation of the country; the strengthening of the role of the National Assembly (Prga 1989: 241–244; Gustinčić 1969: 31–49; Bašković 1983: 47–69; Mlynář 1985: 107–111; Dimić 2005: 219; Živanov 1969: 83, 91).

The new course won the plebiscitary support of the citizens, and in a short period of time, it brought a degree of freedom and democracy unprecedented in any socialist country in the world.[5] The experiment referred to as *socialism*

4 The official view of Soviet historiography, even ten years after the intervention, was that the election of A. Dubček marked the domination of the "right-wing opportunist" and "anti-socialist" tendencies within the CPC, directed "against the policy of the Party and the socialist system", Большая советская энциклопедия 1978: 152.

5 In Moscow, the Czechoslovak efforts in the process of democratisation were seen as "demagogic slogans", which were used to skilfully hide the aggressive attacks coming from the "right-wing opportunist and antisocialist" forces, aimed at toppling socialism, abolishing "the leading role of the working class", violating the alliance between Czechoslovakia and the USSR and other socialist countries. According to *The Soviet Encyclopaedia*, the "anti-socialist forces" camp, which was formed with the support of "the

with a human face,[6] the Prague Spring or renewal, has been compared by many scholars to the Soviet *perestroika*, twenty years before Gorbachev (Mlynář 1985: 208–211; Slavik 1989: 222–230; Fire 1996: 606–660; Nekrič 2000: 582). Still, the success of reform-oriented socialism reached beyond the state borders of Czechoslovakia. Its political significance the attractiveness of this undertaking and the new possibilities that it hinted at were not difficult to anticipate, which is why it provoked bitter reactions in the major part of the Soviet camp.[7]

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia put paid to the chances of socialism in Europe, which was a ballast for the Western Left. Its activities were heavily burdened by Soviet crimes and violence, this being the *modus operandi* of the Kremlin model of state socialism. As the Soviet Union, its satellite regimes, and Eastern European Communist parties were losing democratic legitimacy and the last vestige of reform potential, the policy of the Left in Europe after 1968 had to develop no longer through cooperation and solidarity, but in opposition to the communist parties connected to the Kremlin regime (Вопросы истории 2008: 3–23). What was created through a strong condemnation and critique of the violent crushing of "the Prague Spring" were the offsprings of Eurocommunism, as one of the fundamental new concepts of reform-oriented socialism. The Soviet invasion also heavily damaged the idea of a unified international workers' movement. This was the peak of de-Stalinisation in global terms, also spurred by the reaffirmation of the Marxist Left during the course of the revolutionary 1968 in Western Europe.

The until then unthinkable degree of anti-Soviet criticism among communist parties in the West created a broad movement in Italy, Spain, France, Sweden, Iceland, Greece, Great Britain and Japan. Even though the actual designation – Eurocommunism – did not come from them, the parties in these countries took it over in order to mark their own road towards socialism, which presupposed a distance and emancipation from the Soviet ideological and empirical paradigm.[8] For that matter, Eurocommunism was not geographic but an ideo-

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imperialist circles in the West", constituted a broad basis of "the counter-revolutionary overthrow" with a view to "the restoration of the bourgeois system", Большая советская энциклопедия 1978: 152.

6 This syntagm, often connected with the events taking place in Czechoslovakia in 1968, owes its etymology to the following sentence uttered by Dubček: "All we want to do is develop a socialism that will not lose its human character" (Geler, Nekrič 2000: 582).

7 The head of Yugoslav diplomacy Marko Nikezić, towards the end of July 1968, talking to the Deputy Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia Pleskot, had this to say: "The current process unfolding in Czechoslovakia is of great importance to Yugoslavia as well, because it is helping it to reach some neglected problems and raise those issues. [...] The success of your attempt is of fundamental importance to the entire socialist world. A lot has been done already, and it is in the interest of the forces of democratic socialism" (Pelikan 2008: 100).

8 The term "Eurocommunism" was used by the former Yugoslav journalist and editor-in-chief of the Belgrade weekly *NIN* Frane Barbijeri, who, after a period of repression following the ousting of the reform-oriented Serbian leadership (1972), escaped to Italy, where he became one of the biggest names of Italian journalism. On 26 June 1975,

logical-political designation, as testified by the fact that even Japanese communists were considered to be Eurocommunists. It was of crucial importance to accept the legitimacy of conforming each specific road to socialism with the given national circumstances, conditions and traditions. This has been postulated two decades earlier, by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as its guiding principle, after 1948, through the development of the Yugoslav self-management model of socialism.

Italian communists provided the first impulses to the contours of Eurocommunism, conceptualising a different political strategy and understanding of the relations within the international communist movement. Under the influence of the process of détente, which was unfolding in Europe in the early 1970s, following the failure of the reforms attempted in Czechoslovakia, Enrico Berlinguer, the leader of Italian communists, steadfastly advocated abandoning the blind obedience to the Soviet Union and the "sectarian" policy that has been, for many decades, embraced by Western European communists.

From the beginning of the Cold War, communist parties in the West exerted a minor influence on the political events in their countries, often being seen as the extended arm of the Soviet policy. Relying on the significant tradition of Marxist thought in Italy, from Gramsci to Togliatti, Berlinguer realised that the Communist Party of Italy (CPI), for the sake of exerting a greater influence on the changes in Italian society at a time of crisis, had to resort to innovations that would effectively leave behind the "old" Leninist views and significantly modernise its own political culture (Pons 2010: 49). For Italian communists, that meant reaching a "historical compromise" with the policy of the Cristian Democrats, accepting the European integration and NATO, as well as outright distancing from the Soviet model of development. The image of the Soviet Union as a bastion of progressive politics had no longer an inspirational and authoritative value among Italian communists. The high-ranking official of the Italian Communist Party Sergio Segre characterised the Eurocommunist idea as an "agreement of some communist parties in Western Europe and outside it, for example, in Japan, on what socialism should be in a highly developed society and what it should not be. It is a concept of a democratic road to socialism".

However, Segre's Spanish colleague Eugenio Triana wrote that the goal of Eurocommunism was "to turn capitalist society into a socialist democratic society, a society that would preserve the political freedom of all ideologies, be they left or right, a society which would guarantee the freedom of trade unions, where all human rights would be observed, where the right to a general election as the source of political power is observed, a society where the state is not connected to any religion, a decentralised society with regions and municipalities, wherein a democratic development of all the sectors of the

in the liberal, anti-communist paper *Il Giornale nuovo*, he first used the term referred to above in a negative context. Berlinguer used the term to designate their movement on 3 January 1976, in a conversation with Georges Marchais in Paris (Ili 2007: 548).

productive life of municipalities, regions and the parliament is ensured" (Oswald 1983: 248–249). In these and numerous other views of the leading Eurocommunists, one can recognise a new strategy for taking power, based on the insight that, in Western industrial societies, socialism cannot be achieved through the Soviet-style dictatorship of the proletarian avantguard party, but only through a democratic process.

The tragic defeat of the democratic Left in Chile finally made it obvious to Eurocommunists that, when taking over power, they could not rely on the enlightened minority (the avant-garde), but had to secure the support of all strata of the population. In order to gain as broad support as possible for their policy, Eurocommunists renounced the central concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which they replaced with the Gramscian narrative of the hegemony of the working class. In this way, they primarily wanted to avoid any associations and memories connected to the actual notion of dictatorship. They were also of the opinion that the designation *proletariat* was too narrow to express the breadth of the social consensus that the building of socialism had to rely on. One of the key inspirers of reform-oriented socialism in Europe, the Secretary of the Communist Party of Spain Santiago Carrillo, claimed that "parties that belong to the trend of Eurocommunism agree that they need to achieve socialism in a democratic way. They advocate the multiparty system, political pluralism, parliamentary methods, representative institutions, the sovereignty of the people derived from elections that are held at regular intervals, trade unions that are independent of the state and the party, freedom of the opposition, human rights, freedom of religion and freedom of culture, science and art" (Oswald 1983: 250).

Santiago Carrillo's book *Eurocommunism and the State*, one could say, represented a sole attempt at theoretically defining the ideas and concept of Eurocommunism. It was published at a time when representatives of the communist parties of Italy, Spain and France were striving to make their cooperation more concrete, meeting in post-Franco Madrid in 1977, when they specified the goals of the new movement. The example of "the Prague Spring" was still taken as a reference point, as a close source of inspiration concerning the possibility of realising and reconciling the principles of socialism and human rights, as well as proof of the necessity of confronting the Soviet dogmatic and hegemonistic notion of socialism. That was the reason why the representatives of the major Western European communist parties gathered in Madrid stressed, yet again, their distancing from Moscow, continued their harsh criticism of the invasion of Czechoslovakia and affirmed the right of every country to build its own road to socialism, and condemned the violations of human rights in the USSR (Bracke 2007: 342–345; Ili 2007: 548).

In his book, Santiago Carrillo rejected the claims to the effect that Eurocommunism boiled down to some parallel "organisation" and strove to follow its vision of "the third road". On a number of occasions, he stressed the "specificities" of the development of Western Europe, which made it necessary for the communists of those countries to opt for different political actions and

to engage in a struggle of sorts against “old views” (Kariljo 1980: 9). The fact that the leader of the Spanish Communist Party stressed that under the new circumstances of political struggle it was necessary for a “new” understanding of Marxism-Leninism to overcome the “old” one was sufficient proof for Moscow to assume that this constituted a grave danger, which potentially led to a possible “third” schism in the communist movement.

Carillo criticised Portuguese communists, who actively participated in the “Carnation Revolution” of 1974 with the support of the Soviet Union, on account of their insistence on Stalin’s post-war concepts of developing society. He openly questioned, first of all, Lenin’s authority as a universal thinker, whose ideas remained unchanged for more than half a century, serving as the well-known cornerstone of the communist identity. In line with E. Berlinguer’s reasoning, the leader of the Spanish Communist Party claimed that Western communists had to take into account “reality” when planning their actions, in the sense of paying their respects to the Western traditions of “political and ideological pluralism”, compared to which Lenin’s theses seemed outdated and inapplicable.

Insisting that Eurocommunism was “an independent strategic concept”, S. Carrillo attempted to promote a special Western European model of communist strategy that would unify ideological tendencies, theretofore utterly divergent. Such a model presupposed observance of certain preconditions: the ideological autonomy and independence of communist parties, rejection of violent revolutions (the dictatorship of the proletariat), adherence to certain Western democratic values (freedom of thought, movement, the press, political association, etc.), political cooperation with all the political factors in the country interested in establishing a new society and order, and finally, maintaining a greater distance from the Soviet Union (Aspaturian 1980: 11).

Italian and French communists, in their joint programmatic statement, declared that the road to socialism and socialist society, which they proposed as the prospective future of their countries, had to be realised in a democratic atmosphere of economic, social and political life. According to these projections, socialism was understood to be a higher stage of democracy. In that spirit, all freedoms were to be guaranteed and developed, whether they were the result of great bourgeois revolutions or socialist and workers’ revolutions. They also favoured the autonomy of trade unions, and expressly placed great emphasis on the development of democracy in companies. Namely, according to them, the workers should truly participate in managing their working place and should be given a broad scope of authority when it comes to decision-making. Special importance was attached to democratic decentralisation, which presupposed the principle of subsidiarity, that is to say, that as much authorisation and as many functions as possible should be handed over to regions and local self-governments, which should have a broad scope of autonomy at their disposal when exercising their powers (Oswald 1983: 250–251). In a nutshell, the direct advocacy of democracy and human rights, open criticism of the Soviet Union, rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and abandonment of the

doctrine of Leninism by Spanish communists mark a fundamental change of the ideological-political self-perception of reform-oriented socialism.

The above-mentioned principles, in a sense, brought Eurocommunism closer to social democracy, but only seemingly so. Namely, these two political orientations on the Left radically diverged when it came to their final goal. One of the key protagonists of reform-oriented socialism, the Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party Enrico Berlinguer, was of the opinion that social democrats, "had proved themselves incapable of really overpowering capitalism". The highly respected Spanish communist Manuel Azcárate was of a similar opinion: he accused socialist and social democratic parties that they had never brought the capitalist system into question in any country where they had come to power. Therefore Eurocommunism clearly rejected the social democratic political orientation as a corpus of values of the capitalist order. Representatives of the Eurocommunist orientation advocated a democratic, pluralist road that would respect political and individual freedoms, but whose fundamental goal was a transformation and overcoming of the capitalist system, not at all maintaining it in any form.

French communists, in the words of Jacques Denis, worked very intensely for the victory of democratic socialism. They transformed themselves in order to realise their goal, so that "they could better serve the working class and the French people", and in order to become better communists, never social democrats, as he put it (Oswald 1983: 250–251). In a word, the consensual rejection of social democracy, as well as the model of Eastern European, pro-Soviet regimes, led Eurocommunists to seek new paths to socialism and to constitute an alternative, their own third road – the last attempt of reform-oriented socialism, the last historical effort aimed at the syncretism of the principle of freedom and equality.

The aim of all these ideas of structural reforms was a kind of democratic market socialism, where the market and private capital would not be abolished, but would be subjected to social control and joint decision-making, and integrated within all-encompassing state planning. In this respect, there certainly existed a convergence with the protagonists of reform-oriented forces in Eastern Europe, which, on the other hand, propagated a change of the petrified state socialism, with its planned economy, into democratically managed market socialism, which supports individual initiative and joint decision-making. What is common to all these strands of socialism was the striving to find forms of development of modern societies that could overcome capitalism, in which, as Marx wrote, "the free development of every individual would be a precondition for the free development of all" (Spehr 2012: 80).

Eurocommunism inspired the hopes of the Left the world over, and was the last attempt before the breakdown of European socialism, to renew the goals and ideals of the Left through this reform movement, and to again achieve its legitimisation, irrevocably destroyed by the Soviet practice. Eurocommunism sympathised with the Yugoslav experience in the development of socialism, with the country's anti-fascism, anti-Stalinism and self-management, but it went

further in the pluralisation and democratisation of societies, all the more so because it reached its peak in the second half of the 1970s, when Yugoslavia's internal development was unfolding in the opposite direction. Still, Eurocommunism had a lot in common with the Yugoslav effort aimed at reforms and modernisation, especially in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. As the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was the only party that could have in its plans points of interest that coincided with the ideas of Eurocommunism, especially certain aspects of Yugoslavia's version of socialism and its distance from the USSR, meetings between the protagonists of the Eurocommunist concept and Tito were quite numerous. Edvard Kardelj viewed Eurocommunism as a "ground-breaking phenomenon in the history of the communist movement". Kardelj singled out its "independent strength" as the greatest value of Eurocommunism, which could open up an entirely different perspective of socialism in Western Europe, and thereby for the final overcoming of power bloc divisions (Kardelj 1977: 14). The joint activities of Yugoslav communists and Eurocommunists were most in evidence on the eve of and during the Berlin Conference of Communist Parties, held in the summer of 1976. Representatives of the Yugoslav Communist Party, with representatives of Western European parties, opposed the attempt of the Soviet Union and its most faithful "satellites" to impose a binding and too disciplined version of the final document of the conference. During the pre-conference meetings, they acted together, expressing views advocating a free exchange of opinions, refusing to reduce the political goals of the conference to a single document, binding on all parties, and proposing that the final document should contain just information about the conference, and that the basic ideas and possible solutions should be singled out through the exposés of the party leaders. In this way, as Yugoslav communists believed, the conference would avoid adopting a single political line of action, thereby providing communist parties in Europe with a broad scope of action in the political life of their countries (Arhiv Jugoslavije [The Archive of Yugoslavia], Kabinet Predsednika Republike [The Cabinet of the President of the Republic], file I-2/68, Konferencija komunističkih i radničkih partija socijalističkih zemalja [Conference of the Communist and Labour Parties of Socialist Countries])

The conference in Berlin demonstrated how fragile and mostly protocolary the "unity" of European communists was. Enrico Berlinguer used the term Eurocommunism for the first time in a public speech, while Tito's exposé contained conciliatory tones, aimed primarily at re-emphasising Yugoslavia's dedication to observing the principle of non-alignment and pursuing different paths to socialism (Bracke 2007: 349–350). Yugoslav communists were convinced after Berlin that "the Soviet concept of gathering communist parties, monolithic ideational and action unity of the movement" could not be realised any longer (Arhiv Jugoslavije [The Archive of Yugoslavia], 507, Arhiv Centralnog Komiteta Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije [The Archive of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia], file III/208, Magnetofonske beleške sa 24 sednice PCKSKJ, 3. novembar 1976. [Tape recordings of the 24th Session

of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, November 3, 1976]). The Yugoslav president was assured that the new Western European communist orientations presented clear results of "objective social changes" and "growing democratic forces" in their countries (Pribićević 1978: 26). However, apart from expressing its support to those aspects of Eurocommunism which suited Yugoslav communists (their own and independent road to socialism), Belgrade was unwilling to accept any "anti-Leninist" platform, especially when it came to observing pluralism and human rights in society. The authoritarian orientation that was in evidence in Yugoslavia in the 1970s was synchronous to a similar process in the Soviet Union, and was adjustable to the different political and social reality that characterised Yugoslavia at the time.

Even though they rejected the fundamental concepts such as the dictatorship of the proletariat or Leninism, Eurocommunists did not abandon the basic postulates of Marxism and scientific socialism, that is, Marx, Engels and Lenin. In one of their programmatic resolutions, adopted during a Party Congress, Spanish communists self-determined themselves as "a Marxist, revolutionary and democratic party, deriving its inspiration from theories of social development produced by the originators of scientific socialism – Marx and Engels". Following their investigative methods, Spanish communists did not renounce the Leninist contribution, nor the contribution of other significant revolutionaries. French communists wrote in the introduction to the Party Statute that their Party based its activities on Marxism-Leninism, as the most progressive philosophical, economic, social and political corpus of knowledge. A similar view was held by Italian communists: each Party member was obligated to attain the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, to deepen them and subsequently "apply those sciences when dealing with concrete tasks" (Oswald 1983: 250–251). In a word, Marxism remained the ideological basis of Eurocommunists, and consequently, in view of the fact that the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin determined the strategy and the concrete political activities of Eurocommunists regarding ownership, even though they did not restrict private property, they advocated the thesis that big companies should not be privately owned by a narrow circle of big capital owners, but that they should be owned by the entire society, that is to say, they strove for some form of collective, social property. Eurocommunism also rejected the Leninist-type model of the party, whereby the above-mentioned parties were taken out of their self-isolation, opening them to the broadest social strata, not just the workers' the proletariat, which also forced them to switch from militarism to a more moderate parliamentary practice, and also to a more democratic internal structure (Ili 2007: 555–556). However, the role of the party in society was still considered essential. Santiago Carrillo characterised the party as "the most valuable instrument through which working people achieve their own liberation." Within such a party, "unity in action and discipline" represented to Carrillo "indispensable weapons", which were the key principles of the Leninist notion of a monolithic party organisation (Kariljo 1980: 93).

Eurocommunism, as a new common political platform of Western European communists, was never completely realised. Coordination between French, Spanish and Italian communists was symbolic, rather than indicative of the existence of a common inter-party strategy. French communists remained faithful to the old Orthodoxy, viewing Eurocommunism as a useful tactical maneuver for the purpose of a more efficient gathering of the Left in France. Spanish communists soon saw how unattractive their Eurocommunist ideals were when they scored a rather disappointing result in the first free elections in Spain, which consequently led to a total marginalisation of that communist party and marked the beginning of sharp intraparty divisions. The success of the Communist Party of Italy (CPI) in the general parliamentary election of 1976, for a moment, opened up the possibility for Italian communists to be on the verge of entering the Government and realising their established programme. However, the CPI support to the "minority Government" of the Christian Democrats ended in a total political failure; in the atmosphere surrounding the assassination of Aldo Moro, Italian communists were faced with a total collapse of Eurocommunist enthusiasm. The new political activities of Italian communists and their adaptation to the "reality" of Italian democracy through the strategy of "historical compromise" did not offer any visible "alternative" to the policy that had been dominant in Italy for almost three decades. Faced with the challenges of the serious crisis in Italy in the 1970s, the CPI was caught between the new "Eurocommunist" hopes and the old orthodoxy, with a rather contradictory political programme, which, on the one hand, rejected cooperation with Italian socialists, and on the other, remained powerless faced with the political domination of the Christian Democrats. Even though Italian communists remained rather active in the years that followed, as a respectable political force, due to their political ineffectiveness, they were practically reduced to a party "without a future" in the political life of Italy (Sassoon 2010: 586). In the early 1980s, it was becoming increasingly evident that Eurocommunists were equally wrong concerning the potential for changes in the Cold War system and within the framework of European communism (Pons 2010: 64). Although eurocommunism promised at first to be a success story and attracted the support of many left oriented voters in the West, it has been from the very beginning sharply criticised by the Soviet communists (Goode 1980: 120; Willetts 1981: 1–22). Moscow has condemned these political "in terms usually reserved for Communist renegades such as Mao Tse-tung of China and Tito of Yugoslavia". (Goode 1980: 120). The same is true for the other communist "hardliners". This position is the most pregnantly epitomised in the title of the publication *Eurocommunism is anti-communism*, written in 1980 by Enver Hoxa, a long-serving First Secretary of the Labour Party of Albania (Hoxa 1980).

From a historical perspective, Eurocommunism remains as the peak of the attempt at defining the policy of reform-oriented socialism, as the most comprehensive attempt at offering an alternative both to Western European pro-capitalist social democracy and the dogmatic repressive communism of

the Eastern Bloc. It offered a confirmation, at least from the ideological point of view, of the possibility of reconciling socialism with individual rights and political pluralism. The ideas of Eurocommunists had a broader echo because of their criticism of the Cold War division of Europe and the intention to use the détente in a much more dynamic way to reduce the power of bloc-based exclusiveness.

Through their ideas and activities, Eurocommunists certainly represented the continuity of the idea of the liberalisation from the radical core of Bolshevism. They harbored this idea that was conceived and cultivated from the mid-1950s onward, bringing onto the scene their optimism concerning the possibility of reforming European communism, at least on the Western pole of the communist tradition, as well as awareness of the limitations of such an idea, unsurpassed by their political generation. As a rounded-off and specific reform-oriented movement, Eurocommunism never became the all-round alternative to the dominant Soviet communism, nor did it manage to define theoretical innovations opposed to the unquestionable authority of Marxism-Leninism. However, the very appearance of Eurocommunism, which attracted a considerable number of proponents and opponents on the European Left, testified to the existence of a cautionary deficit of legitimacy when it came to the survival of socialism in Europe – a chronic diminution of the authority of the Soviet Union as the bastion of revolutionary thought and the impossibility of finding a sufficiently clear reform-oriented political expression for European communists, different from the ideological canon of Marxism-Leninism, facing a new era.

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Politika trećeg puta: evrokomunizam i njegova jugoslovenska procena

Apstrakt

U radu se analiziraju kritični momenti disolucije monolitnog istočnog bloka kojim je dominirala sovjetska komunistička (boljševička) partija. Evolutivna emancipacija evropskih komunističkih partija počev od Jugoslavije (1948), preko sovjetskih intervencija u Mađarskoj (1956) i Čehoslovačkoj (1968), dovela je do konstituisanja samostalnih i u odnosu na Moskvu nezavisnih strategija političke borbe, koje su primenjivale najveće komunističke partije u Zapadnoj Evropi. Pokušaji sinkretizma komunističke platforme sa idejama poštovanja građanskih prava i adaptacije u parlamentarne režime zapadnih država, oblikovale su pokret "trećeg puta" koji je pokušao da objedini pozitivna iskustva obe ideološki suprotstavljene strane hladnoratovske međunarodne konstelacije. Iako zakasneo i politički nerealizovan, pokret i ideja evrokomunizma su ostali kao važno svedočanstvo o pokušaju pronalaska novih puteva u borbi za pravednije društvo.

Ključne reči: Evrokomunizam, Hladni rat, Sovjetski Savez, Jugoslavija, Čehoslovačka, Santjago Kariljo, Enriko Berlingver