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POLITICAL AND WORLD-HISTORICAL COURAGE IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY¹

ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to develop a distinction between two types of courage in Hegel's philosophy: political and world-historical, in order to show the limitations of the former. The concept of political courage, or Tapferkeit, features in Hegel's political philosophy, and signifies the wartime form of mutual trust required of the modern citizen for defense of an established constitution. World-historical courage, on the other hand, relates to the personal virtue of the 'great individual', which acts as a force of destruction against decaying constitutions. The article shows that political courage for Hegel serves as an alternative to the idea of the contract as the foundation of state unity. However, when placed in comparison with world-historical courage, political courage does not fully correspond to its concept as defined by Hegel. I begin with Hegel's critique of Hobbes, his rejection of the social contract theory, and his introduction of the concept of Tapferkeit as an alternative principle of political unity. In the next step I show that world-historical courage differs but also shares many similarities with political courage, which taken together reveal the limitations of the latter. In the end, I argue that only in the instance of Hegel's conception of total war do political and world-historical courage coincide.

KEYWORDS

courage, war, contract theory, monarch, world-historical individual, Hegel, Hobbes

Hegel, Hobbes and the Social Contract Theory

Throughout his works Hegel has held a consistent, though an ambivalent view on the tradition of the social contract. On the one hand, and as Patrick Riley points out, Hegel viewed the social contract theory "with loathing" (Riley 1973: 157). On the other hand, and at the same time, Hegel would compliment Hobbes as the first author to locate the origin of the state in the "principles

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which lie within us” (quoted in Riley 1973: 146). In Hobbes’ theory, contractual foundation of the state takes place between free, autonomous individuals who willingly consent to its terms and abide by them. Not mythological or religious foundations, but “human characteristics and inclinations” (Hegel 1990: 182), as well as consent provided by free individuals, feature for Hobbes as legitimacy of political authority. This is why the contract for Hegel represents “the true distinctive ground in which freedom has its *existence*” (Hegel 1991: 102). In so far as the modern state cannot be founded on transcended principles of inherited tradition anymore, but must presuppose the free activity of the subjective will (Hegel 1991: 282), contractual relations play an essential role in the infrastructure of Hegel’s modern state presented in *The Philosophy of Right*.

However, Hegel’s “loathing” toward the idea of the contract reveals itself in his observation that the result of the contract in Hobbes ends up being “complete despotism” (Hegel 1990: 182), a term he uses to describe the *Leviathan*. In other words, although the Hobbesian state is founded on the principle of subjective will and individual consent, the result of contract is not a political community of free individuals, but a despotic state. How can this be the case?

The reason for this ambivalence, as Alan Patten argues, lies in Hegel’s belief that the contract theory rests on an “untenable analysis of freedom”, or a one-sided perception of what subjective freedom entails (Patten 2002: 114). Taken on its own terms, subjective freedom encompasses the contingency of passions and the arbitrariness of desire (Hegel 1991: 220–221), which as Hegel argues in his *Philosophy of History* “respect none of the limitations which justice and morality would impose on them” (Hegel 2001: 34). As Patten further notes, since the “social contract theory equates freedom with the capacity for individual choice (*Willkür*)”, in Hegel’s eyes, a state founded on a contract would be plagued by arbitrariness (Patten 2002: 114). In other words, were political union to be based on the primacy of the subjective will and the foundational validity of the contract, it would necessarily be defined by “arbitrary will and opinions” (Hegel 1991: 277). Hegel recognized two examples of this subordination of the state to a contractual foundation.

The first one is the self-destructiveness of Jacobinism, which according to him, relied on contractualism as the basis of its dictatorship (Hegel 1991: 277). In Jacobinism “these abstractions were invested with power”, the result of which was the “overthrow of all existing and given conditions within an actual major state and the revision of its constitution from first principles and purely in terms of *thought*” (Hegel 1991: 277). In a condition where political authority succumbed to the command of abstract subjective willing, all decisions ended up being made “on the basis of subjective representations [...] of opinion and the caprice of the arbitrary will” (Hegel 1991: 277). This gave way to the “most terrible and drastic event” (Hegel 1991: 277), where mutual suspicion and terror reigned.

The other example, less terrible and drastic, is represented by Hobbes himself. In the *Leviathan*, the abstraction of the contract was not directly invested with political power. Instead, this power was made to function as a measure

of securing the validity of contractual relations. The decision-making of the state was not compromised by arbitrariness, but was made to counteract the contingency of passions, in other words to “protect and secure the life, property, and arbitrary will of everyone” (Hegel 1991: 298). This is how the ‘complete despotism’ of Hobbes came to be. The *Leviathan* presupposes a state of nature populated by atomized subjective wills, a state of war where continual insecurity and fear of violent death reign (Hobbes 1998: 84). When these individuals come to a realization that only a political association may secure their lives and property (Hegel 1998: 114), the natural state gives way to a transcended instance that provides guarantees against their anxieties. However, the primary purpose of this unity is to alleviate the fear of death and formalize the relations of mistrust, in other words, to offer guarantees based on the common disposition of hostility that persists in the natural state (Riley 1973: 147). The result of this is that the fear of death, which drives the individual out of the natural state and leads them to sign a contract, does not disappear, otherwise the contract would have no reason to stand in the social state. This fear indeed persists, coming into the service of the state itself. The monarch must now “tie” the members of the state “by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants” (Hobbes 1998: 111). Political unity becomes a guarantee against the arbitrariness of passions and mutual hostility, thus preserving the natural fear of death, now turned into a common fear of punishment for violations against the contract. Since Hegel believes that “giving in to one’s desires and inclinations is no more a case of freedom than is submitting to an authority” (Patten 2002: 114), the arbitrariness of the natural state must presuppose a form of coercion, embodied for Hobbes in the monarch as a measure against these inclinations, including the drive for self-preservation. The situation in this case is not as dire as in Jacobinism, where mutual mistrust, suspicion (Hegel 2001: 470) and fear of death (Hegel 1977: 361) engulfed political authority itself, but the reduction of the state to a guarantee of contractual relations still presupposes an underlying hostility between the citizens.²

Hegel’s issue with such an arrangement is that this type of political union cannot feature as a realization of freedom, but may function only as its limitation or an “an arrangement dictated by necessity [*Not*]” (Hegel 1991: 298). The Hobbesian foundation of the state goes against one of his main concepts of political unity, what he terms “political disposition”, defined as mutual “*trust*” and “certainty” (Hegel 1991: 288). Although Hobbes does regard the contract

2 This distinction between Jacobinism and Hobbesianism is not clear, because Hegel regarded even the Hobbesian monarch as embodying an arbitrary will, not unlike Robespierre (Riley 1973: 147). Despite this, Hegel clearly differentiates the Hobbesian state from the Jacobin dictatorship, since as Riley points out, Hegel complimented Hobbes for recognizing in the monarch a “universal will” (ibid.). However, this will still functions as the only thing holding together individuals who remain confined to their “punctual atomicity” (quoted in Riley 1973: 146). The Jacobin dictatorship, on the other hand, did not give way to a despotic unity, but to a “fury of destruction” (Hegel 1977: 359) initiated by the unrestrained atomism of modern subjectivity laying claim to political authority.

as a form of “trust” (Hobbes 1998: 86), this belief is not the inner disposition of the citizen, but rests on the transcendent “awe” (Hegel 1998: 111) that the monarch commands in relation to their subjects, in other words, on the underlying fear of punishment that they possess over them.

The problem with the social contract theory for Hegel, following from this, does not reside in the fact of the contract itself, but in the attempt to apply this principle to political authority in any way. More specifically, the problem resides in the confusion of political authority with civil society (Hegel 1991: 276–278). Contract can function only as the principle of the latter, in other words, as a guarantee of economic and commercial relations of recognition, this much is true for Hegel. But these relations should not be confused with the political state, which cannot arise out of an association of subjective wills. Contractual relations of recognition must instead presuppose a general will that necessitates but cannot be reduced to the activity of the subjective will. By sharply distinguishing the sphere of civil society, where “all passions surge forth” (Hegel 1991: 221) from the political state itself, the dire consequences of this confusion can be averted.

Certainly, since the contract expresses the free activity of the subject, without its constitutive presence, no state could be regarded as an “articulated and truly organized totality” (Hegel 1991: 273). Hobbesian relationships must persist in Hegel’s state. They do so, however, only as elements of civil society. Since as members of civil society the *bourgeois* remain animated by individual, subjective interests, their will on this level does not necessarily embody the general will. Individuals ought, as citizens, at all times to direct “their will to a universal end [*in und für das Allgemeine wollen*]” (Hegel 1991: 273), but this cannot be counted on in a sphere where arbitrariness takes precedence and where each seeks to remain “his own end” and make others into their “means” (Hegel 1991: 220). Although this universal selfishness and the corresponding interdependence of needs provide an abstract blueprint for the modern state (Hegel 1991: 221), taken on their own terms these relations can subsist only by being subjected to the kind of a coercive force that Hobbes attributed to the monarch. In other words, the *bourgeois*, taken in abstraction, do remain subject to the “external necessity” (Hegel 1991: 283) of the state. But in Hegel’s case, the “arrangement dictated by necessity” (Hegel 1991: 298) is now relegated to the police and the law courts (Hegel 1991: 259–260) as measures of protection against the violation of contracts.³ However, Hegel’s need to distance the state from any contractual form is evident in the fact that the police and the law courts do not constitute a part of the political state itself, but feature as organs of civil society (Hegel 1991: 226). In this way, the political union remains uncompromised by the economic mistrust between the citizens, as well as the necessary coercive measures arising out of it.

3 Another measure Hegel introduces is an organic articulation of civil society through the institution of the corporation, which although prefigures the common willing of the political state, in the last instance remains animated by private interests (Hegel 1991: 273).

The Expansion of Civil Society and the Fear of Death

In *The Philosophy of Right* Hegel states that “it makes no difference what is or was the *historical* origin of the state in general ... whether it first arose out of patriarchal conditions, out of fear or trust, out of corporations etc.” (Hegel 1991: 276). The philosophical approach regards these external conditions as “appearance” which do not proceed from the “*concept as thought*” (Hegel 1991: 276). However, although such considerations are “a matter [*Sache*] for history” (Hegel 1991: 276), fear and trust do play a significant role in Hegel’s understanding of the modern state. The idea of the Hobbesian fear of death shapes Hegel’s conception of political freedom in general. He has held a consistent view throughout his works, that the natural fear of death on the one hand, and political freedom on the other, presuppose each other. This presupposition is one of cancelation and overcoming [*Aufhebung*] of the natural fear of death.

For example, the famous section on lordship and slavery from the *Phenomenology* is based on the principle that “only through staking one’s life” can freedom be “won” (Hegel 1977: 114). His political philosophy also fosters the idea that the “existence of what is free can be shown only in war” (Hegel 1995: 301), which is why he also writes in *The Philosophy of Right* that the citizens’ freedom remains in balance and can always be lost “from the fear of dying” (1991: 362). These are not surprising statements, considering that Hegel was influenced by Kant’s conception of morality, which as Dean Moyer argues, rests on the principle “that the moral law must be opposed to attachment to life” (Moyer 2019: 117). In Kant’s view, the “moral law creates an interest that is so strong that it *can* (not that it necessarily will) overcome even the desire for self-preservation” (Moyer 2019: 120). Hegel does follow in Kant’s argument that the moral law must be able to overcome natural inclinations. However, the argument that ethical attachments must stand above desires and drives is much older than that. It was already Plato’s notion that a citizen must be “accustomed to fearing slavery more than death” (Plato 1991: 387b), a connection which is evident in Hegel’s own subordination of the drive for self-preservation to ethical principles. The phenomenon of slavery itself is a case in point. As a modern author, Hegel abhors and rejects slavery (Hegel 1991: 88). Nevertheless, he still understands this phenomenon along ancient arguments. Despite slavery being “contrary to right” Hegel writes, if “someone is a slave, his own will is responsible” and “the wrong of slavery is the fault not only of those who enslave or subjugate people, but of the slaves and the subjugated themselves” (Hegel 1991: 88). The argument reflects Aristotle’s infamous legitimization of slavery, according to which a slave is made by their own submission to authority out of fear of death (Aristotle 1995: 1254b16).

Considering that Hegel does acknowledge slavery as a fact based “on regarding the human being simply as a natural being [*Naturwesen*]” (Hegel 1991: 87), the question arises, how would the Hobbesian natural individual appear within such a perspective? The *Leviathan* presupposes human beings as individuals in a state of nature, whose primary motivation for submission to coercive

authority is their fear of death. The arbitrary natural state of war over life and death gives way to a contract which alleviates anxieties, but conditions this by commanding submission. This same relationship is reflected in Hegel's passage on lordship and slavery from the *Phenomenology*, where relations of submission and work are preceded by a 'struggle for life and death' and a condition of war between two individual self-consciousness. As Robert B. Pippin notes, this passage represents a "contribution to a discussion that we recognize as a central one in all modern political and social thought", explicitly comparing the phase of 'struggle for life and death' from *Phenomenology* with the pre-contractual natural state of Rousseau, Locke and Hobbes (Pippin 2011: 61). The peace following in this struggle must then presuppose some form of an agreement between the two parties, one of which has willingly consented to slavery and work. The modern figure of the *bourgeois*, it would then appear, is haunted by the ancient figure of the slave.

Certainly, the *bourgeois*, despite acting as an agent and means of work, is not a slave. Hegel still holds fast to the modern argument that the "slave has an absolute right to free himself" and that "anyone is entitled to revoke such a contract" (Hegel 1991: 97). Any agreement, where someone would subject themselves to slavery would be "null and void" (Hegel 1991: 97). However, the *bourgeois* inhabit the sphere of civil society, which as a "system of needs" (Hegel 1991: 227) presupposes the subject as a natural being. It is only here, Hegel writes, that "we shall refer to *the human being* in this sense" (Hegel 1991: 228). And as long as the human "exists as a natural being" this animal remains "capable of enslavement" (Hegel 1991: 87). This is evident in Hegel's own description of the system of needs. Contractual relations do tend toward a reduction of a human being to mere 'means' under the weight of private interests, revealing a tendency of the subjective will toward heteronomy and dependence on the contingency of needs and drives, one of which remains the drive for self-preservation. In other words, civil society reveals a threat of self-enslavement arising out of the heteronomous nature of the subjective will, as well as the correlating submission to the status of means in relation to other *bourgeois*.

Although this might be true, Hegel still attempts to provide a different image of civil society in his theory. He views the sphere of work as an educational step toward citizenship, in so far as it enforces individual discipline whereby "each individual, by a process of self-determination, makes himself a member of one of the moments of civil society through his activity, diligence, and skill, and supports himself in this capacity" (Hegel 1991: 238). However, this holds true only if this discipline animates the *bourgeois*, who are also at the same time a citizen of the state taken in totality.⁴ Only by being subordinate to the

4 As Ángel R. Oquendo argues, Hegel also offers a world-historical justification for slavery, notoriously standing against its rapid elimination, advocating instead for a gradual process of abolition, due to "its contribution to the cause of freedom" (Oquendo 1999: 2). Not unlike in the *Phenomenology*, the experience of death and slavery play a constitutive role in world history as well. The same argument, however, can be made

general will, where the *bourgeois* in all particular affairs direct “their will to a universal end [*in und für das Allgemeine wollen*]” (Hegel 1991: 282) does the human being overcome “[*aufheben*] this formal phase of its being and hence also its immediate natural existence” (Hegel 1991: 87). The subordination of contractual relations to the spiritual authority of the state is thus an essential precondition of freedom. Whereas in antiquity “the particularity associated with needs” was “confined to a class of slaves”, civil society constitutes the interdependence of needs as “part of [the realm of] freedom” (Hegel 1991: 379). By being integrated into the political realm of freedom, civil society may subsist as a sphere of freedom itself and function in turn as an essential and constitutive element of the state. However, the mutual presupposition of civil society and the modern state is not a given, because it reveals tendencies which may disturb political authority.

Taken on its own terms and left to its own devices civil society does distance itself from the authority of the state. This process is gradual and takes place during times of prolonged peace. “In peace, the bounds of civil life are extended, all its spheres become firmly established, and in the long run, people become stuck in their ways” (Hegel 1991: 362). During peacetime the relations of civil society become “increasingly rigid and ossified”, as a result of which the spiritual unity of the state slowly disintegrates while its “parts” grow “internally hard” (Hegel 1991: 362). The sphere of contracts reveals a natural trajectory toward self-expansion, which simultaneously threatens the spiritual dominance of the state.⁵ This fear of sinking “into merely private life” and “the security and weakness” of civil existence (Hegel 1995: 303) reflects another element of Hegel’s criticism of contract theory, which was pointed out by Herbert Schnädelbach. Since for Hegel contractual bonds are exclusive to interactions between property owners, or subjects as *bourgeois*, the expansion of civil society would come to threaten the state itself. According to Schnädelbach the reason for this is that Hegel regarded the contract theory as a repetition and reversal of the feudal arrangement of power (Schnädelbach 1987: 117). Before the nation-state emerged, political power was bestowed as a form of private property. Contract theory repeats this confusion, only now centralized political authority itself becomes a theoretical object of the contract (Schnädelbach 1987: 117). If this is the case, then the periods of prolonged peace could prove fatal for the state, because the expansion of civil society could lead to an “intrusion” (Hegel 1991: 105) of contractual, private relations on the state. This encroachment of private claims on political power would turn the economic

for *The Philosophy of Right*, where the *bourgeois* cultivate themselves through work as a precondition of citizenship (Hegel 1991: 231–233).

5 This struggle between the two forces is also visible in colonialism, which results from the need of civil society to expand (Hegel 1991: 267–68) making the state dependent on its external markets, but which also places a burden on states as “wholes which can satisfy their own needs internally” (Hegel 1991: 368). On this ambivalence present in Hegel’s understanding of civil society, see: Jaeger 2002: 515.

reduction to means into a political one, bringing the subject closer to a kind of dependence that persisted in antiquity.⁶

For these reasons, periods of lengthy peace, which lead to an expansion of economic conflicts between the *bourgeois*, must be counteracted with a presentation of an external conflict in the form of political war.

The Concept of Political Courage

Individual anxiety and the drive for self-preservation permeate civil society, but for Hegel these elements by no means constitute the basis of the political state. Political unity presupposes peacetime relations, but its ultimate source lies in war. The phenomenon of war, as Rupert Gordon observes, appears in the first instance as a “test case” (Gordon 2000: 318) for Hegel’s conception of political disposition (Gordon 2000: 321). The presentation of a foreign enemy and the phenomenon of war serve as a trial of citizen’s trust and fidelity. But the process by which the state “must generate opposition and create an enemy” (Hegel 1991: 362) does not only test the freedom of its citizens, but also seeks, through war, to foster this freedom. War not only “shows” the “existence of what is free” (Hegel 1995: 301), but as the passage from the *Phenomenology* argues, freedom itself can only be won, or in this case, regenerated, through “staking one’s life” (Hegel 1977: 114).

This becomes fully evident in Hegel’s appropriation of the ancient virtue of courage. In general terms he defines courage as the willingness to “risk one’s life” (Hegel 1991: 365). However, defined in such terms, courage does not amount to a politically relevant virtue. Instead, Hegel develops the concept of courage from the basic idea of political disposition or patriotism, which signifies “trust” and “certainty” (Hegel 1991: 288) in the political order. The difference between political disposition and courage, however, rests in the distinction of two temporal lives of the state. Political disposition or ‘patriotism in general’ expresses the identity of the individual and the general will (Hegel 1991: 288). This disposition leads the citizens to recognize their particular interests in the common good and realize them “by directing their will to a universal end” (Hegel 1991: 282). Courage, on the other end, is the wartime manifestation of political disposition, which Hegel defines as the “highest abstraction of freedom from all particular ends, possessions, pleasure, and life” (Hegel 1991: 364). Valour calls not for subordination and preservation of particularity in the general will, but for its sacrifice in the name of this will. Whereas political disposition provides an “insight” (Hegel 1991: 288) into the complementarity of particular and universal ends, war reveals the “evanescence” of all things

6 In his lectures on the philosophy of right from 1819–1820 Hegel discusses the extremes of wealth and poverty, embodied in the figure of the rabble, which signifies the “corruption of civil society” (Hegel 1991: Note to §244). There he explicitly invokes the relationship of lordship and slavery, arguing that civil society reveals that the “disposition of the master over the slave is the same as that of the slave” (Hegel 1991: § 244).

temporal and particular, calling for the “sacrifice” of citizen’s “life and property, as well as their opinions and all that naturally falls within the province of life” (Hegel 1991: 360).

The willingness to risk one’s life, therefore, presupposes life as the natural particularity subordinate to the political life of the whole. This is why not all forms of courage are equal in Hegel’s eyes. There are “various kinds of valour” and “courage of an animal or a robber, valour for the sake of honour, and knightly valour are not its true forms” (Hegel 1991: 364). Even robbers and murderers, “adventurers whose end is a product of their own opinion, etc. also have the courage to risk their lives” (Hegel 1991: 365). Two elements distinguish political courage from all other various forms.

The first element is that valour is a “*formal* virtue” (Hegel 1991: 364), it does not signify the innate character of the individual, but the capacity for mutual trust and unity among individuals, for “not personal courage but integration with the universal is the important factor here” (Hegel 1991: 364). As Hegel argues, modern warfare, where soldiers encounter each other in an impersonal manner, symbolized for him by the use of the gun, leaves little room for courage as a personal quality (Hegel 1991: 364). Courage is “directed not against individual persons, but against a hostile whole in general, so that personal courage appears impersonal” (Hegel 1991: 364). Such an understanding of valour does not reflect traditional Homeric virtue or *thymos*, but as Gordon points out, a ‘distinctly *modern* virtue’ (Gordon 2000: 329). However, although it is true that Hegel’s idea of courage has little to do with individual heroism, so did ancient political courage. The principle of ‘integration with the universal’ that should distinguish Hegel’s conception of valour from its ancient counterpart is thoroughly ancient in its character. Hegel’s definition mirrors his understanding of “Roman *virtus*” from *Philosophy of History*, which is “valor; not, however, the merely personal, but that which is essentially connected with a union of associates; which union is regarded as the supreme interest” (Hegel 2001: 302). This understanding of valour echoes a description of the Roman Republic provided by the Greek historian Polybius, who identified the common enemy as the central impetus for unity among the aristocracy and the plebeians in times of war.⁷ When the “menace of some common danger”, writes Polybius, compels the Romans to act in “concord” then “all are zealously competing in devising means of meeting the need of the hour” and “all are co-operating both in public and in private to the accomplishment of the task which they have set themselves” (Polybius 1979: 309). “True valour” then, where “one” counts as “one among many” (Hegel 1991: 364) manifests not in individual, but in common discipline, or, the social and military organizational capacity of a

7 I have already presented Hegel’s appropriation of Roman conception of courage in the context of his adoption of the republican mixed constitution in my article *Roman Courage and Constitution in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right* (Hristov 2022). Here, I expand on the arguments presented there in order to juxtapose this conception of valour to Hegel’s understanding of world-historical courage.

political whole faced against a competing state.⁸ The economic and political struggles between the aristocracy and the plebeians, according to Polybius, were counter-balanced with unity brought on by the continual presence of a common enemy.⁹ This is why Hegel would quote Gibbon that the long peace which ensued after the destruction of Carthage – Rome’s last competitive enemy – introduced a “slow and secret poison” (Hegel 1975: 101) into the constitution of the Republic, leading to its eventual downfall. And although “personal valor remained” in imperial Rome, the prolonged peace which had set in after the Third Punic War extinguished “that public courage which is nourished by the love of independence, the sense of national honor, the presence of danger, and the habit of command” (Hegel 1975: 102).¹⁰

This leads into the second element which distinguishes Hegel’s understanding of valour from heroic virtue, or indeed from all other “various kinds of valour” (Hegel 1991: 364). The impersonal element of valour signifies not the pursuit of glory, honour or any other reward for courage on the part of the individual, but precisely the opposite, the complete subordination of individual’s aspirations to the guiding principle of the state. Hegel references the arguments of Socrates, who made a distinction between unqualified courage that can be possessed by anyone, namely the mere capacity to risk one’s life, and that courage which is guided by knowledge which prevents it from becoming mere carelessness or lunacy (Hegel 1892: 411–12). This is why although “to risk one’s life is certainly superior to simply fearing death”, such courage remains “purely negative and therefore indeterminate and valueless in itself” (Hegel 1991: 365). “*Thought*” and the idea of the ‘*universal*’ are what have “given a

8 Livy offers an example of this Roman virtue in the character of Titus Manlius Torquatus, consul and dictator of the Republic, who during the Latin wars issued an order under penalty of death that no one should leave their post. His son attacked some Latin skirmishers, proving his personal valour. Despite the son’s exemplary and heroic display of courage, his father had him executed for breaching the common discipline imposed through the order (Livy 1982: VIII, 5–10). The idea of courage as the mark of common discipline is also contained in the Greek conception of “standing one’s ground” (Rabieh 2006: 48), or the ability of a hoplite to remain in the ranks and secure the phalanx formation in the face of enemy attacks, which Thucydides terms “resolve of mind” (*gnome*), and which is also praised by Herodotus as “civic courage” (see Schmid 1985: 113).

9 Sallust, following Polybius, would later comment that the Roman fear before the common enemy (*metus hostilis*) “preserved good political practices” (Sallust 2010: 79). Machiavelli echoes this mindset, commenting that it was Fortune that provided Rome with enmities, giving the example of the sack of the city by the Gauls. Events and permanent threats such as these allowed Romans to continually nourish their common discipline (Machiavelli 1996: 209).

10 This was something that was predicted by Polybius, who witnessed the destruction of Carthage in person. He would comment that the Third Punic War would have the same effect on Rome as the Peloponnesian War did on Athens and Sparta, leading the state into a period of hegemony, peace and decline (Polybius 1968: 369). Sallust, who wrote a century after the event, would write that Rome’s lack of enemies after the destruction of Carthage has led to a peace “more cruel and bitter than adversity” (Sallust 2010: 79).

higher form [*Gestalt*] to valour” (Hegel 1991: 365). The fact is that “only a positive end and content can give significance to such courage” (Hegel 1991: 365). In the context of Hegel’s time and the modern age in general, this content is embodied in “fully developed reason” (Hegel 1991: 312). In other words, courage is politically significant only when in service of the common good, which in turn is embodied in the rational constitution of the modern state.¹¹

The concrete manifestation of such courage in wartime mirrors its ancient, republican counterpart as well. Although subjective freedom acts as a constitutive element of the modern general will, the resulting individuality of the state, embodied in the subjective will of the monarch, is not a *bourgeois* personality. The monarch are a hereditary citizen (Hegel 1991: 328). They appear in immediacy as a member of the state, without having to traverse the sphere of work that the *bourgeois* presuppose as a developmental condition of citizenship. The reason for this is that although the monarchic “apex of the state” (Hegel 1991: 359) features during peacetime as a symbolic centre of unity, in war the authority of this citizen becomes unrestrained. Only in war do they possess “direct and sole responsibility for the command of the armed forces, for the conduct of relations with other states through ambassadors etc., and for making war and peace and concluding treaties of other kinds” (Hegel 1991: 365). The monarch cannot be tied to other members of the state through a contract, since this “determination which, as we noticed some time ago, is of primary importance in civil society ... is not the [basic] principle of the family, let alone of the state” (Hegel 1991: 324). Not unlike the Roman republican dictator of antiquity, the monarch act as the centre to whom, according to Hegel, it is “justifiable” to “transfer more power” (Hegel 1995: 264) in wartime.¹² However, although the monarch acts as an individual around whom wartime centralization of power takes place, unlike an ancient dictator, who brings about unity through political authority backed up by force, the modern monarch foster a disposition that serves as the centre of self-recognition for other citizens (Hegel 1991: 288). In other words, whereas the ancient dictator acts in the name of the ‘objective will’ of the gods (Hegel 1991: 320), modern courage presupposes that this objective will is now the subjective disposition of each individual citizen.

Therefore, not the individual fear of death and the drive for self-preservation, but the common fear of political subjugation and wartime concentration of power is what for Hegel provide the community with a force of a state. Instead of submission to a monarch arising through a contract between hostile

11 The subordination of courage to political principles mirrors Plato’s arrangement of the state from *The Republic*, where the military strata, whose main quality is courage, is presided over by the philosopher kings, whose primary virtue is wisdom (Plato 1991: 429a–429d). As Laurence Dickey comments, Plato’s subordination of courage to reason also rests on “his attempt to distinguish *thymos* (i.e., courage as a natural passion common to men and animals) from *Andreia* (courage as informed by an appreciation of the virtue of an associative political life)” (Dickey 1987: 222).

12 On this expansion of monarchic power in wartime, see: Brooks 2007: 116.

individuals, Hegel's monarchy rests on courage as the highest manifestation of mutual trust¹³, arising out of terror before a common political enemy.

World-historical Courage

Hegel's concept of political courage relies on the integrative, formal and rational character of this virtue. However, this type of valour is not the only one that features in his philosophy. Another, less explicated concept of courage is world-historical, which albeit also political in nature, does not signify the virtue required for the maintenance of the political whole. Instead, this courage relates to the personal character of an individual who stands opposed to the established order.

As Hegel writes, although one of the "important" factors in world history is the "preservation of a people, a state, of the well-ordered spheres of life", the other essential element of freedom is the "degradation, destruction, annihilation of the preceding mode of actuality which the concept of the Spirit had evolved" (Hegel 1953: 38). Indeed, this second factor appears to bear greater weight in world history. Whereas passions in Hegel's political philosophy act as the engine of civil society, which simultaneously must be limited and integrated into the citizen's relationship to the state, in world history precisely their limitless nature acts as a productive force (Hegel 1953: 28). These passions manifest not in the integrated activity of an organized political unit, but in the deeds of world-historical individuals. Their passions, the "congeries of volitions, interests, and activities" serve as "tools" of historical change (Hegel 1953: 31).

However, although great individuals are "practical and political" figures, their passions are not directed at the common good, but stand in service of their own personal and "selfish" ends (Hegel 1953: 40). In this regard, world-historical figures share features with the *bourgeois*, whose activity is aimed at satisfaction of private interests. At the same time, not unlike the citizen, through this pursuit of private desires, great individuals end up realizing a higher goal. Hegel offers the example of Caesar, who pursued his own personal desire for power but also possessed a deeper insight into "what is needed and timely" (Hegel 1953: 40). Although great individuals are driven by their private ends, they derive "their purpose and vocation not from the calm, regular course of things, sanctioned by the existing order, but from a secret source whose content is still hidden and has not yet broken through into existence" (Hegel 1953: 40). Consequently, these individuals appear to embody both the disposition of the *bourgeois* and the citizen. The fate of great individuals, however, removes

13 Hegel is here consistent with his earlier writings. Dickey comments that the "*Tapferkeit-bourgeois* juxtaposition", which features already in Hegel's text on *Natural Law* offered for him a way for conversion of a merely natural being of needs, the *bourgeois*, into a political being of freedom, the citizen, where courage acts as a "key to this conversion" (Dickey 1987: 226). Already here *Tapferkeit* acts as an alternative to the contract as a way of transition "beyond the realm of nature" (Dickey 1987: 226).

them far from the *bourgeois*. Their life being “labour and trouble” (Hegel 1953: 42), “happiness” is not something that can be used to describe their “satisfaction” (Hegel 1953: 42). On the contrary, satisfaction in their case coincides with sacrifice, since when their purpose has been exhausted, as Hegel paints it, they “die early like Alexander, they are murdered like Caesar, transported to Saint Helena like Napoleon” (Hegel 1953: 41). Despite the selfishness of their passions, the end result of their activity is the same as that of the citizen: “sacrifice” (Hegel 1953: 29). The reason for this is that although great individuals follow only “their passions and arbitrary wills”, this comes “with this qualification”, namely “that the whole energy of will and character is devoted to their attainment; that other interests (which would in themselves constitute attractive aims) or rather all things else, are sacrificed to them” (Hegel 1953: 29). The “*cunning of Reason*” (Hegel 1953: 44) ensures that these individuals themselves become a sacrifice to the “*passion of their conviction*” (Hegel 1953: 41). Thus, world-historical individuals are engulfed with personal passions, which reveal “selfish desires” (Hegel 1953: 41), but which also correspond to their inner insight, their capacity to grasp the timely, the need for change.¹⁴

For all these reasons Hegel claims that world-historical individuals must be termed “heroes” (Hegel 1953: 40) and accords them the corresponding “*right of heroes*” (Hegel 1991: 376) to found states. Whereas the monarch and the citizens form themselves only in interaction with each other, in public life, the world-historical individual “draw the impulses of their lives from themselves” (Hegel 1953: 40). Certainly, they do possess a link to the political order from which they emerge, since although they “*have formed themselves in solitude*”, they have achieved this “*only by assimilating what the state had already created*” (Hegel 1953: 51). The world-historical individual remains a “*child of a people*” (Hegel 1953: 37). When Caesar conquered Gaul, it was Rome that conquered Gaul. But Caesar’s passion for power and glory exceeded the dispositional and constitutional limitations of the crumbling republican order. In Hegel’s view, the military virtues of a consul and a dictator that have made Rome the dominant power of their time was what Caesar embodied, but also what brought ruin to the republican order. These individuals, being embedded in a people, serve as leaders, they express a continuity with the preceding spirit, but they do not nourish it, but turn it against itself. Other individuals “*stream to their banner*” (Hegel 1953: 40), like citizens to a monarch, only one whose actions are not aimed at the preservation of an established order, but seek its ruination.

Since they are ‘heroes’, world-historical individuals must possess a heroic type of courage. This is evident already in the fact that their historical position reveals “*boldness to challenge all the opinions of men*” (Hegel 1953: 41).

14 Shlomo Avineri has pointed out that it is not quite clear in Hegel’s work to what degree world-historical individuals are conscious of their role in history. At some point they seem to possess the full consciousness of the Idea, whereas in other passages, they appear as a “mere instrument” of historical progress (Avineri 1972: 232). Charles Taylor has argued for a middle-ground, whereby great individuals have a sense of their goal in history, but are not fully conscious of it (Taylor 1975: 393). On this debate, see: Berry 1981: 155.

Their courage is shown in their devotion to “one purpose” to which they are prepared to sacrifice “other great and even sacred interests” (Hegel 1953: 43). Hegel’s individual examples of world-historical figures paint them all as courageous individuals. Alexander exemplified the unity of “the genius of a commander, the greatest spirit, and consummate bravery” (Hegel 2001: 292). Caesar demonstrated his courage when he “put an end to the empty formalism” of republican authority, “made himself master, and held together the Roman world by force in opposition to isolated factions” (Hegel 2001: 332). Hegel echoes the arguments of Socrates’ on the calmness and wisdom which accompanies courage in the face of danger (Rabieh 2006: 160), when writing that Caesar executed all this “with the greatest vigor and practical skill, without any superfluous excitement of mind” (Hegel 2001: 331). Napoleon exhibited this same kind of conviction as well. Hegel quotes his words before the peace of Campo Formio that “the French Republic is no more in need of recognition than the sun is” (Hegel 1991: 367). He argues that these words express “no more than that strength of existence [*Existenz*] which itself carries with it a guarantee of recognition” (Hegel 1991: 367). The new order, like Napoleon himself, did not need to seek recognition, for their very existence acted as a force of nature, which attracted some and made enemies from others.¹⁵ Thus, although great individuals emerge from their respective social orders, their activity is not motivated by a drive for recognition. They do not act from the standpoint of recognized right, but by bringing ruin to decaying patterns of recognition, they feature in history as founders of new systems of right.

There is therefore a politically significant personal and heroic type courage, which animates the world-historical individual. Such courage cannot be formal, since although it may draw its power from the assimilated principles of the preceding order, it does not function within an established framework of recognition. This personal courage remains confined for Hegel to world history, where its manifestation as a destructive force purposively brings ruin to established systems of recognition. In the example of Caesar, such courage is manifest in the capacity for a decision, which unlike the “formal decision” of the modern peacetime monarch that amounts to a “doted I” (Hegel 1991: 323), actually “puts an end” to formalism which became “empty” (Hegel 2001: 332).

The Two Types of Courage

Both the monarchic citizen and the world-historical individual exhibit courage in the pursuit of their goals. Their courage manifests during times of war

15 On this “irresistible force” of world-historical individuals, who first articulate “what men wanted”, see: Taylor 1975: 393. Not unlike the monarch, the world-historical individuals serve as the centre of wartime concentration of power. However, this power is not generated from within the social relations of an established social order as in the case of the monarch, but takes place in a historical vacuum, which is why the leadership of world-historical individuals rests much more on their own ‘strength of existence’.

and against the background of social decay. This decay is very much actual in world history, necessitating personal and heroic courage as means of transition to a new order. In the realm of political philosophy, social decay remains confined to philosopher's anticipation. In both cases courage serves to rejuvenate the vitals of spirit, whether through sacrifice made to world-spirit or one performed for the preservation of a particular objective order.

This difference in the fate of the political order which acts as the background for action introduces an important distinction between the courage of the citizen and that of the great individual. In acting against the established order, the world-historical individual is not held responsible by the moral precepts or subject to the limitations of the state that shapes them. The citizens and by extension the monarch are restrained by the judgments made possible from the standpoint of existing ethical life. Sacrifice for the citizen is worthy only to the degree that it is morally qualified. The world-historical figure, on the other hand, is capable of sacrifice even without proving their moral integrity. Indeed, as Hegel paints them, these individuals may be thoroughly immoral. The primary motivation of great figures is to "*realize their own interests*", which may make them appear "*bad and self-seeking*" (Hegel 1953: 43). Hegel famously scolds those "schoolmasters" (Hegel 1953: 43) who aspire to demonstrate that figures like Caesar or Alexander were immoral. The "*basis of duty is the civil life*" (Hegel 1953: 43), which is precisely what the world-historical individual places in question. They act in times where ethical morality itself is caught up in a process of change. It would thus be pointless to argue that such individuals exhibit "conduct which indeed subjects them to moral reprehension" (Hegel 1953: 43). It lies in their very nature that "so mighty a figure must trample down many an innocent flower, crush to pieces many things in its path" (Hegel 1953: 43).

Considering this difference, however, it remains questionable whether the courage of the great individual may be termed "true valour" (Hegel 1991: 364), in other words, politically significant courage. Hegel's argument for courage as "highest abstraction of freedom from all particular ends" (Hegel 1991: 364) rests on the idea that valour is significant only when in service of a rationally constituted political whole. Furthermore, courage itself serves as 'proof' of this order's rationality, it is rooted and generated from within the social relations of the state. The courage of great individuals, on the other hand, could be classified as such, but the questions remains whether it is 'true' political courage or if it amounts to no more than heroic spiritedness, a passing quality that flashes in revolutionary times of history, but is unable to maintain itself. The immorality of great individuals introduces further doubt in the authentic quality of their courage. Lacking the judgment and validation of an established order, their courage may amount to 'bravery', like the personal quality of Alexander, but this is something that can also be ascribed to criminals, who possess the bravado necessary to undertake risks, but lack the political and moral quality which the monarchic citizen possess. Great individuals appear to lack the "positive end and content" (Hegel 1991: 365) that animates 'true valour' where one

counts as one among many (Hegel 1991: 364). They move in the opposite direction and place themselves above the many in the pursuit of their selfish goals.

Although this might appear to be the case at a first glance, there are in fact similarities concerning these points between the two figures. In the first instance, neither the ‘positive end and content’ nor the judgment of an ethical order are completely absent in the case of the world-historical individual. Although “*it is true, they strive to realize their own interests*’ the ‘*universal must be actualized through the particular*” (Hegel 1953: 34). Despite not being “present in their consciousness”, the universal is still “latent in their action” (Hegel 1953: 34). In other words, there is a ‘positive end and content’ toward which the great individual performs their action. Their own sacrifice might not be their explicitly willed goal as is the case with the ethically driven citizen, but it comes inevitably and in service of a political unity to come. In fact, the sacrifice of the great individual precedes and founds the universal that serves as the principle of integration. Their heroic right as a ‘founder’ might grant them right to claim participation in the political unity to come out of their work – as founder indeed to a higher degree than the monarch, who merely repeats this act of foundation in the process of regenerating the union.

This is also evident in the fact that Hegel does not absolve these individuals from judgment. As Jason M Yonover argues, world-historical figures are “both guilty and innocent” (Yonover 2021: 242), a judgment that reflects Hegel’s understanding of the hero in his theory of tragedy. According to Yonover, two ingredients are essential for Hegel’s idea of tragedy. The first one is a conflict between two incompatible rights such as in the case of Antigone and Creon, where each side “one-sidedly identifies” (Yonover 2021: 246) with two contradictory but equally legitimate principles. The second ingredient is “belated recognition” (Yonover 2021: 247) on the part of the hero that their position is indeed one-sided, leading to reconciliation of two opposing rights. However, this recognition comes too late, as the damage in the conflict between the two rights has already been done. Antigone has already sacrificed herself for the right to bury her brother, whereas Creon realized his mistake after his family became victim to the right of the state to reject a burial of a traitor. According to Yonover, the picture provided by Hegel is that “of a battle that’s only fully understood after much of the fighting has taken place” (Yonover 2021: 247). This second ingredient – belated recognition – holds true for the world-historical individual, who perish in times when they will be seen by their contemporaries as criminals who seek to usurp the established order (Yonover 2021: 255). However, they will not be judged from the standpoint of reconciliation between two opposed rights as in tragedy. In the case of the great individuals, the opposing system of rights *must* be destroyed. The place of judgment comes not at the point of reconciliation, but resides in the insight of the philosopher who retrospectively evaluates the deeds of these individuals (Yonover 2021: 255). In other words, it is Hegel who can validate and recognize the exceptional courage of these figures, their devotion to a goal which makes them “immediately identical” (Yonover 2021: 248, see also Hegel 1991: 375) to the activity

of world-spirit. As such, the right of these individuals is judged by philosophy itself as “*absolute*” (Hegel 1991: 373), their opposition to the preceding right absolutely valid in the highest “court of judgment” (Hegel 1991: 372) of world history. The sacrifice of great individuals, therefore, is judged as worthy from the standpoint of a historically later order, which like Hegel’s political home, owes its existence to their activity.

This similarity between the two figures persists when the relation is regarded from the other side as well, the perspective of the monarch and in particular, that of the wartime monarch. During peace the will of the monarch remains symbolic, representing the inward individuality of the state. However, in their “outward orientation” (Hegel 1991: 365), the monarch’s sole discretion for waging war and peace (Hegel 1991: 365), as well as their concentration of political power (Hegel 1995: 264) rests on the fact that in relation to other states, they occupy a “state of nature” (Hegel 1991: 368). Although the citizen and the monarch might be judged in their activity from the standpoint of their order, the criteria of judgment concerning their interactions with other states cannot be based on “purely moral relations or relations of private right” (Hegel 1991: 366). Indeed, Hegel’s reference to Napoleon’s words before Campo Formio is made in the context of an argument that no higher arbiter exists in international relations. States themselves rely on their ‘strength of existence’ in relation to each other (Hegel 1991: 367). They command recognition, they do not ask for it, war being the most evident form of this ‘natural’ relation of atomized independence. However, this means that in relation to each other modern states occupy the same theatre as the world-historical individual. The latter, being suspended in a temporal limbo between a crumbling ethical order and a new political whole to come, find themselves according to Hegel, precisely in the same historical clearing of a state of nature (Hegel 1991: 120). As he argues, in a condition of the “state of nature, a state governed entirely by force ... the Idea sets up a *right of heroes* against it” (Hegel 1991: 120). War thus presents a temporal gap in the internal life of the modern state, where its decisions come under the actual sovereignty of the monarch, whose primary activity now takes place in the same theatre as that of the great individual. Neither moral relations nor those of private right have validity here.

The two figures, therefore, do come to resemble each other, allowing to qualify the world historical individual as possessing true, political courage. But further comparisons would lead to a conclusion that it is the world-historical individual, and not the monarch and the citizen, who realize political courage to its fullest degree.

The Passage to World History

Hegel’s conception of political courage serves as a counter-measure against the disintegrating effects of *bourgeois* contractual relations. Taken on their own terms these relations are not only incapable of sustaining a political union, but by leading citizens to “sink into merely private life” (Hegel 1995: 303) prove

detrimental to it. Courage in the face of loss of political independence serves to overcome the natural fear of death, which for Hegel remains the foundation of civil society. However, political courage, by strengthening the bonds between the citizens and acting as a virtue in defence of an established order, still aspires to preserve the particularity that inhabits the state. Although war reveals the evanescence of all things temporal and particular, leading courage to act as ‘highest abstraction of freedom from all particular ends’, what is defended in war is the very condition of particularity which constitutes the peacetime life of the citizens. In other words, the sacrifice of particularity for the political whole, which brings the citizen out of the web of contractual relations and orients them toward a common enemy, still serves to preserve these peacetime relations. This much is evident from the fact that war serves the purpose of defending an existing peacetime constitution and its arrangements. Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s conception of sacrifice could be applied here to him as well. As Smith argues, for Kant “one can say that one incurs these obligations to defend the state because it in turn defends one’s property, family and friends” (Smith 1983: 626). Hegel would come to reject this “liberal theory of obligation for foundering on an elementary conceptual confusion between civil society and the state” (Smith 1983: 626), writing that “security cannot be achieved by the sacrifice of what is supposed to be *secured* – on the contrary” (Hegel 1991: 361). Yet considering that Hegel’s own state is not built for perpetual war as the Roman Republic was, but presupposes and is theoretically presented during extended periods of peace, what remains protected in war are not social relations based on and purposed for war as the ancient ones were, but civil society and its peacetime processes. In other words, what war defends is the very sphere of contracts against which it is summoned.

This is evident from the fact that the formal nature of contracts extends into relations between states as well. Although no contract can genuinely bind a state, modern states still stand in relation to each other as “independent arbitrary wills ... which accordingly possess the formal nature of *contracts* in general” (Hegel 1991: 368). They of course “stand above these stipulations” (Hegel 1991: 366) which amount to “giving a pledge” (Hegel 1991: 112), but even if these inter-state treaties are invalidated – such as in times war – Hegel claims that wars will still “on no account be waged either on internal institutions and the peace of private and family life, or on private individuals” (Hegel 1991: 370). The basis for this limitation of war rests on the common European “legislation, customs, and culture [*Bildung*]” (Hegel 1991: 371) all of which presuppose the universal principle of rationality. This common ruleset ensures that even during wartime, elements of mutual recognition will persist. States ought not to disturb those principles in wartime which they share in common during peacetime. Consequently, the height of abstraction manifest in political courage remains attached to the particularity of contracts, which in some form persists between states and serves as a guarantee of a relation to which the citizens are able to return. Thus modern wars, despite relying on courage as a test that provides no guarantee of things that fall “within the province of life” (Hegel

1991: 360), still retains securities provided by the membership in the European family¹⁶, as well as by the peacetime and internal constitutional arrangements.

The world-historical individual, on the other hand, in so far as they act in the name of a novel order which presupposes the destruction of the preceding one, have no such guarantees. The wars that they lead necessitate the ruination of the state from which they have emerged. Their sacrifice contains neither rites of war, nor a promise of return to peacetime arrangements of an established constitution. Because they find themselves in a state of nature where no recognition between states persists, their only guarantee remains their 'passion of conviction' and 'fact of existence', as well as hope that posterity will recognize their acts. They might be judged as world-historical actors such as in the case of Napoleon, but their courage might also be evaluated as self-deception and fanaticism, as was the case with the judgment that Hegel passed on the Jacobins. Although the Jacobins fulfilled elements of Hegel's definition of courage, namely their total dedication to sacrifice in an uncompromising war against a decaying order, Robespierre and his followers still failed to qualify as world-historical actors. Despite finding themselves at the height of abstraction, their revolution could result only in permanent destruction of particularity, incapable of protecting or producing novelty.

From this perspective, the position of the world-historical individual is not unlike that of Kierkegaard's Abraham. Whereas Brutus, the founder of the Roman Republic, sacrificed his sons for the good of the newly established order, Abraham could rely on his faith alone in following the order to sacrifice Isaac. The execution of Brutus' sons was performed in front of "eyes of all", "senators, plebs, and all the gods and men of Rome" (Livy 2006: II, 5). But as Kierkegaard observes, Brutus' "heroic courage" manifested "within the ethical" (Kierkegaard 1983: 59), being witnessed and judged (Livy 2006: II, 5) by the order in which he acted. This is what made him a "tragic hero" (Kierkegaard 1983: 59). The world-historical individual, on the other hand, like Abraham, "transgress the ethical altogether" (Kierkegaard 1983: 59). No witnesses who may objectively judge are present, which is why the "tragic hero is great because of his moral virtue", while "Abraham is great because of a purely personal virtue" (Kierkegaard 1983: 59). However, the latter, lacking objective criteria of judgment, are left in a position that they are "either a murderer or a man of faith" (Kierkegaard 1983: 57). The courage of world-historical actors can be contemporaneously observed both as authentic valour and as delusions of a monster.

Since the world-historical individual are left with no 'securities and guarantees', they would appear to fulfil the concept of political courage as 'highest abstraction of freedom from all particular ends' thoroughly. But although it would appear that the monarch and the citizens fall short of embodying such courage, the case for them is not altogether lost. When the relationship is regarded from

16 This does not hold true for "barbarians" (Hegel 1991: 376) or states that are not at the same level of development as those in the European family. According to Hegel, they have no right to such guarantees (Hegel 1991: 376).

their perspective once more, it must be commented that there is one instance in which they might reach this level of abstraction. This possibility opens itself in Hegel's conception of total war. When there is "no longer any possibility of peace, where the independence of one of the peoples is threatened, it becomes a war whose sole aim is mutual destruction" (Hegel 1995: 305). In such a war, the whole life of a people is at stake and even the wartime relations of mutual recognition between states dissolve. Like with wars of world-historical actors, total war entails a 'destruction' of a competing social order, whereby the "entire state has thus become an armed power and is wrenched away from its own internal life to act on an external front" (Hegel 1991: 363). In the theatre of total war the individual becomes unreservedly exposed to the state of nature. This war, however, would reawaken the cruelties and terrors of history and could make a transition to "*the spirit of the world*" which "produces itself in its freedom from all limits" (Hegel 1991: 371).

It is at this point that the monarch and the world-historical individual come to fully mirror each other. In his *Philosophy of History* Hegel would observe that the monarchic element of the Roman constitution, the institutions of consulship and dictatorship, eventually gave way to "colossal individualities" (Hegel 2001: 329) such as Pompey and Caesar, who in turn would contest for the embodiment of world-spirit. However, it is in the condition of utmost violence, the infamous "slaughterbench" of history (Hegel 2001: 35), where no limitations on war are in place, that such revolutionary and wartime concentrations of power – embodied in an individual – take place for Hegel. In total war the world-historical individual and the monarch converge in their courage, entering a state of nature from which they have no guarantee of retreat or return.

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Politička i svetsko-istorijska hrabrost u hegelovoj filozofiji

Apstrakt

Cilj ovog članka je da se razvije razlika između dva tipa hrabrosti u Hegelovoj filozofiji: političke i svetsko-istorijske, kako bih pokazao ograničenja prve. Koncept političke hrabrosti, ili *Tapferkeit*, figurira u Hegelovoj političkoj filozofiji i označava ratni oblik međusobnog poverenja koji se zahteva od modernog građanina u svrhu odbrane uspostavljenog ustava. Svet-sko-istorijska hrabrost, s druge strane, odnosi se na ličnu vrlinu 'velike individue', koja deluje kao destruktivna sila protiv ustava koji su u procesu dezintegracije. Kao što ću pokazati, politička hrabrost za Hegela služi kao alternativa ideji ugovora kao temelja državnog jedinstva. Međutim, kada se uporedi sa svetsko-istorijskom hrabrošću, politička hrabrost ne odgovara u potpunosti svom pojmu kako ga definiše Hegel. U članku se prvo fokusiram na Hegelovu kritiku Hobsa, njegovo odbacivanje teorije društvenog ugovora i uvođenje pojma *Tapferkeit* kao alternativnog principa političkog jedinstva. U sledećem koraku pokazujem da se svetsko-istorijska hrabrost razlikuje, ali i da deli mnoge sličnosti sa političkom hrabrošću, što uzeto zajedno razotkriva ograničenja ove druge. Na kraju, tvrdim da se samo u slučaju Hegelove koncepcije totalnog rata politička i svetsko-istorijska hrabrost poklapaju.

Ključne reči: hrabrost, rat, teorija ugovora, monarh, svetsko-istorijska individua, Hegel, Hobs