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THE CRISIS OF WISDOM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS¹

ABSTRACT

The topic of this paper is an examination of the practical dimension of contemporary philosophical culture, both in relation to the idea of wisdom in traditional philosophy and in relation to psychoanalytical practice. In the first part of the paper, we determine what philosophical culture is, primarily by emphasizing the differences between that culture and the scientific-technological culture. In the second part of the paper, we show that such a philosophical culture has fallen into a crisis. In the third part of paper, we offer a way out of that crisis, in the form of psychoanalysis, which criticizes the primacy that philosophical culture accords to consciousness, logic, diachronic and linear ways of thinking. In the fourth and last part of the paper, we present the shortcomings of this psychoanalytical model. As a solution, we offer a new model of philosophical culture, created by the synthesis of philosophy, psychoanalysis, but also other discipline of human thought, which has similarities with Nietzsche's anticipation of *Gay Science*, as well as with Jasper's idea of transcendence.

KEYWORDS

philosophy, philosophical culture, wisdom, psychoanalysis, Freud, hermeneutics of suspicion, Nietzsche, Jaspers

1. The Philosophical Culture

The topic of this paper is an examination of the practical dimension of contemporary philosophical culture, both in relation to the idea of wisdom in traditional philosophy and in relation to psychoanalytical practice. The reason for focusing particular attention on psychoanalysis consists in our research hypothesis that the Freudian doctrine and therapeutics represent one of the best expressions of the crisis of traditional philosophical wisdom, a symptomatic revelation of its weaknesses and an attempt to overcome it through an altered form of human experience and through a different way of living. According to

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this starting point, we will strive to explain the limits of a practically oriented philosophical culture through psychoanalysis, while the reservoir of philosophical ideas about wisdom, on the other hand, will be used to examine the limitations of the Freudian way of thinking, as well as to provide incentives for devising an eventual corrective to what is wrong with Freudian practice.

Etymologically, philosophy represents an inclination or a tendency towards wisdom, towards the right way of life or towards leading the proper life, but this discipline of human culture throughout its long and rich history has always meant something else than that. Among other things, philosophy was synonymous with science in general, “the handmaid of theology”, a tool of ideology and politics. Although philosophy originated in opposition to mythical thinking, many philosophers themselves resorted to myth-making or were inspired by myths. Also permeation of philosophy with non-mythological artistic experience and expression are no less intensive and ambivalent. Such ambiguity has imposed the need to distinguish between philosophical fields or disciplines, and one of the most general divisions consist in distinguishing between theoretical and practical philosophy: on the one hand the sphere of philosophical knowledge and standards of correct and valid argumentation about that which is immutable is emphasized, whilst on the other, the emphasis is on the sphere of conclusive philosophical thinking about that which is changeable, on that which lies within the domain of human decision-making and transformation of the existing state, its changing in direction of improvement or deterioration. Since our intention in this text is not to explore the history of the genesis of different meanings of philosophy, but to concentrate on the contemporary situation and status of its practice, here we will single out the love of wisdom and love of argumentation as the most important connotations of philosophical culture. At the same time, it should be immediately stated that today’s Western philosophy is more characterized by a commitment to logical argumentation than a dedicated pursuit of wisdom.

Naturally, it would not be justified to make a sharp distinction between theory and practice, because practical interests have a constitutive role in knowing that which exists, while each action involves a certain type of cognitive insight. Thereby logic is that which is common to both theoretical and practical philosophy, because in both cases, in relation to that which is always the same as well as in relation to that which is always different, it is a matter of striving towards the rational organization of human experience and towards thoughtful behaviour. In that sense, there is a connection between fundamental and applied (philosophical) sciences, between adequate theoretical obedience to natural laws and their successful technical exploitation for human needs and purposes. However, the wisdom or the art of living, ie. the practical side of the philosophical culture which we are considering, cannot be identified with the possession of valid theoretical knowledge, and its technical character can only be discussed in a conditional sense and by way of a distant analogy with the technical application of the results of specific subject-matter oriented scientific research. The question is not only about practical wisdom not being

the same as theoretical knowledge, but it is about the specific quality of human self-consciousness and dialogical coexistence, as well as the quality of the human attitude towards the whole world, and not just the degree of some specialist knowledge and mastery of a particular subject based on it. In short, the wisdom of philosophical culture signifies the value of that which is by its character non-objective.

Husserl's reflections from the period when he advocated the idea of philosophy as a strict science, are also evidence that there is a non-negligible difference between the theoretical and practical aspects of philosophical culture. In his words, "profundity is an affair of wisdom; conceptual distinctness and clarity is an affair of rigorous theory" (Husserl 1965: 144). According to our understanding, the impression of dubious profundity, insufficient clarity and an air of obscurity in the discourse on wisdom emanate from the aforementioned non-objectiveness of philosophical wisdom, from the fact that it does not have its own particular subject-matter that could be clearly spoken of and which could be technically mastered in a precisely measurable way. We may find additional illuminating remarks on the key properties of wisdom in e.g. Jaspers, Gadamer and Habermas. Jaspers emphasizes that knowledge of objects is, in the strict sense, inseparable from science and highlights that "here cognition ceases, but not though. By technically applying my knowledge I can act outwardly, but nonknowledge makes possible an inner action by which I transform myself" (Jaspers 1964: 127).

The point here is that wisdom concern the mysterious inner transformation, which occurs when man realizes that he cannot attain infallible knowledge, when like Socrates, he becomes conscious of his own ignorance and the vastness of his inability to control the cosmic order of things, which provides him with a strong incentive for greater empathy and openness to dialogical interaction, that is, for overcoming egocentrism and monological fixations. In a similar line of thought, Gadamer points to the "the primacy of dialogue" as a very important factor for human self-understanding and moral orientation (Gadamer 2004: 363), whilst Habermas emphasizes that (philosophical) self-consciousness requires the irreplaceable self-engagement of the subject and intersubjective communication, and that therefore it cannot be replaced by any technical function in the literal sense, ie. by technologically produced objects (Habermas 1971: 247–248). Although the technology is generally intended to be a substitute for man, it is unusable in the case of human activities taken in order to become self-conscious.

It follows from the above that philosophical culture differs significantly from the scientifico-technological culture, because the immanent practicality (i.e. applicability) of philosophical theorizing consists in cultivating the internal and communicative act, in the qualitative improvement of life and in deepening non-repressive communication, not in increasing dominance and power to dispose of any particular object. As such, the philosophical culture bears more in common with artistic and religious culture than with empirical science, especially in view of the importance of self-expressive articulation for

both philosophizing and artistic creation, on the one hand, as well as in view of mysteriousness of wisdom in philosophy and holiness in religion, on the other. However the strong commitment of philosophical culture to the pursuit for conclusive arguments is what makes it different from both art and religion.

2. The Crisis of Wisdom

The crisis of philosophical culture has various manifestations. After Hegel, it had to do with reflections on overcoming or ending philosophical culture, that is to say, it was concerned with the idea of the so-called post-philosophical culture. Thus, in Marx's writings, there is a tendency towards the realization of philosophy, towards its completion in social processes and in the form of revolutionary practice, Kierkegaard's deliberations are characterized by the commitment to replace philosophical rationality with religious sensibility, and in the case of Nietzsche, there exists a doctrine on the re-evaluation of traditional values which is aimed at the devaluation of the philosophical concept, in favour of celebrating and putting forward of the vital potential of art and aesthetic experience. On the other hand, philosophical refutation of traditional philosophical culture, especially due the propensity of its proponents to deal with unfathomable secrets and unverifiable claims, became especially characteristic of logical positivism (which empathically embraced antimetaphysical stance of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*) by promoting a new concept of scientific philosophy and by reducing this discipline to the logical analysis of language. This has resulted in a principled self-devaluation of philosophy, in its wider capacity, both in terms of discrediting metaphysical speculations in favour of the empirical sciences, in the form of public self-limitation of philosophical interest to the logical examination of arguments, as well as in prevailing attitude of professional philosophers that questions about the wisdom of living should be left to the sphere of private taste.

If we keep in mind that the etymology of the word crisis implies separating or distinguishing of what is good from what is bad, then we might think that the judgment of time has shown that the search for wisdom is a bad thing for philosophy and that the love of neutral argumentation is that which represents the true value of philosophical culture. In that sense, it could be argued that it would be a wise decision for philosophy to no longer deal with wisdom in its public usage, but advocating such a view in itself also inevitably represents a kind of philosophizing and speculating about the optimal role of philosophical culture in the modern world. The point is that the principled position of the proponents of logical positivism on the meaninglessness and unverifiability of philosophical claims about wisdom cannot be verified nor justified, empirically or logically, which means that it shares the same status of being a non-empirical and non-analytical proposition or a stance, as much like the traditional philosophical views it seeks to disqualify. According to this insight, we hold that the examination of wisdom is an inseparable part of philosophy in all of its variants, and that it will exist as long as there is a discipline that we deal

with. In other words, wisdom will always be important for philosophy, and the end of wondering about wisdom would also represent the end of philosophy. Since philosophical discipline constantly persists and resists various attempts of self-abolishing, the question of crisis of wisdom in the modern world should be understood as a problem of transforming or redefining wisdom, and not as something that justifies or further strengthens the demand for its elimination from philosophical discourse.

If we agree with the view that it is not possible or that it is not wise for today's philosophy to give up the search for its practical role, that is, the search for wisdom, then the right topic for our contemplation about a focused crisis becomes the question: what kind of wisdom do we need in the modern world? Regardless of the fact that is indisputable that wisdom is primarily a personal achievement, we think that, in this regard, the prevailing attitude in the western civilization of our time, is wrong, the supposedly liberal attitude according to which this topic merely has a private character and should not occupy an important place in public discourse, that is in the public use of the philosophical mind – is wrong and we also find this type of marginalization one of the aspects of the crisis under discussion. It is not about philosophers devising ready-made recipes for the right life, but it is a question concerning the importance of providing principled philosophical clarifications and advice publicly, and not only those of a psychologising or preaching nature, but rather concerning the ways to establish a valid relationship with the whole world, one's neighbour, and one's own person, i.e. the type of advice that improves the holistic framework of orientation and irreplaceable activity of individual self-reflection. In that sense, the practical dimension of philosophical illumination is very important, since it shows that non-objectively oriented wisdom of living is also achievable, in addition to wisdom colloquially constructed as a sort of specialized profitability in reaching an objectively formulated goal. For such authentic wisdom, it is also important to have an insight into the mutual familiarity or permeation of that which is individual (private) and that what is universal (public), contrary to the understanding of these concepts as opposite.

The crisis of traditional wisdom mostly concerns the way of philosophical communication and the role of logical argumentation within it. Unlike past times, in the modern world, in a society whose characteristic is the so-called "the ecstasy of communication" (Bourdillard 1988: 22), autarkicity is compromised as a feature of wise living, and wisdom is increasingly becoming a kind of sense organ for other and otherness. At the same time, it's not only about the lesser importance of abstinence from active participation in social life, or about the lesser importance of distanced contemplation of the world, but it is also a question about the insufficiency of the one-dimensional relation of the cognitive subject towards the cognitive object, within the framework of the empirical and experimental study of the "book of nature". We take that this is exactly the main reason why philosophers like Husserl and Wittgenstein, in the latter stages of their thought, gave up their own previously insistence on the scientific and logical rigor of philosophy, and dedicated themselves to

emphasizing and illuminating the importance of cohabitation, i.e. those forms of life that an individual shares with other people. Also, this is the reason why philosophers like Rorty (Rorty 1994) and Habermas (Habermas 1971) insist on the importance of the practical role of philosophical discourse for the integration of different dictionaries, i.e. for better communication between heterogeneous and divergent traditions and cultures. Of course, dialogical communication was already an important part in Socrates' doctrine, but our time deal with a different form of dialogical interaction, with such communication in which irrational contents is no less important than rational ones, which makes a significant difference between the current constitution of wisdom, and that which was characteristic of the philosophical wisdom of Plato's teacher.

Among other things, wisdom in crisis and its new faces, include much less presence of the so-called spirit of seriousness and much greater openness to play and uncertainty than was the case in the past. Thus Nietzsche and his followers, like Bataille, glorify the wise man who know how to dance, that is, who accept the "unbearable lightness of being" and transcend the boundaries of rationality and morality. Freud's psychoanalysis follows a similar line of re-examing of traditional philosophical theory and wisdom, and we shall focus on it in our subsequent consideration.

3. The Place of Psychoanalytic Theory and (Para)practice

At the beginning of the paper we assumed that psychoanalysis can be understood both as a symptom and an attempt to resolve the crisis of philosophical culture, i.e. philosophical way of thinking and wisdom. In doing so, we had in mind Freud's original doctrine and not the numerous revisions thereof by theorists of incomparably less philosophical influence, because we consider Freud a thinker who does not fall behind Marx and Nietzsche in his subversive radicalism. The doctrine of this Viennese physician and scientist is characterized by an effort to direct research attention to the this-worldly, rather than to the otherworldly of the traditional philosophy, in the form of naturally-historically founded psychic reality and deep psychic processes, in which the ultimate causes of all forms of human culture are sought, even man's metaphysical ideas and overall philosophical activities directed to making sense of life and achieving life wisdom. According to such an approach, Freud thought that psychoanalysis should be organized following the model of natural sciences, i.e. as a discipline that uses scientific methodology and provides verifiable causal explanations and predictions based on them, while avoiding reliance on intuition or sterile philosophical speculation that does not lead to effective theoretical and practical solutions. Of particular importance for our consideration is the fact that Freud believed that the key to progress in mental health, in that which is synonymous or analogous to wisdom, is not in improving logical relations and argumentation, but in better communicating with unconscious processes.

In the history of philosophy, Freud was remembered as a critic of traditional philosophy and especially of the primacy that it ascribes to consciousness.

Daniel Berthold-Bond notes that Freud mentions philosophy most frequently in the context of his charge that philosophy does undervalue the role of unconsciousness within the psyche (Berthold-Bond 1989: 277). Freud warns us of such an overestimation of consciousness at the expense of unconscious, because “it is much-abused privilege of conscious activity, wherever it plays apart, to conceal every other activity from our eyes” (Freud 1953: 613–614). In this critique of primacy of consciousness Freud’s main collaborators are Marx and Nietzsche, whom Paul Ricouer groups together under the title of *hermeneutics of suspicion*. (Ricouer 1970: 32). What they have in common is that they see the true as a kind of lie, that is, that they consider consciousness to be false, which leads them to the problem of Cartesian doubt, The Cartesians doubted that things were as they appear, but they did not doubt that consciousness is such as it appears to itself. However Ricouer points out that Marx, Nietzsche and Freud, although sceptics, are not destroyers (Ricouer 1970: 33). For them, destruction is only a phase that leads to a new creation. With their destructive criticism, but also with their art of interpreting, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud enable a more authentic world. Just as Decartes triumphed over the doubt in things, by proving the existence of consciousness, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud triumphed over the doubt in consciousness by an exegesis of meaning. Starting with them, the role of hermeneutics is no longer a mere spelling out the consciousness meaning, but rather a deciphering of those expressions of consciousness. If consciousness is not that which it was considered to be, then a new relation must be instituted between the patent and the latent, which corresponds to relation that consciousness had instituted between the phenomenal and the noumenal. Because of that Ricouer concludes that the essence of Marx’s, Nietzsche’s and Freud’s thought is in that, against the prejudices of their time, all three of them created a mediate science of meaning, irreducible to immediate conscious meaning. All three of them attempted to make conscious methods of deciphering coincide with the unconscious work of ciphering. (Ricouer 1970: 33–34).

Similarly to Ricouer, Alfred Tauber also thinks that the Cartesian model of psyche still dominates folk beliefs about selfhood. Common sense dictates that reflexivity reveals an inner self-identity, an entity that navigates the world and experiences, emotions and its environment as a subject. Accordingly, probing of personal thoughts, impressions and feelings through reflexive self-introspection, can lead to a private ego, which, even though elusive, still remains sufficient for capturing some inner essence of identity. From this postulation of self-consciousness as the basis of personhood, it further follows that the mind is distinct from the world, and that this very distinction makes man’s self-chosen action in the world radically his own. In this way, the commonplace sense of free will arises from the Cartesian metaphysics of selfhood, per which the mind decides its course in in the world in all respects. Tauber regards precisely this rational, contemplative, interpretative ego, which represents the Cartesian mind, as opposed by Freud’s unconscious, which consists of the instincts of brain-states (Tauber 2010: 147).

Katrina Mitcheson points out that not only Freud, but also Nietzsche's warning that mental activity is not synonymous with that which is conscious introduces a problem of self-knowledge into philosophy, because man can no longer take his mental life to be transparent to introspection, but must rather attempt to decipher this activity by taking the immediately observable thoughts, feelings and actions as symbols of further non-observable drive activity. Therefore, both Nietzsche and Freud employ the notions of interpretation and translation to describe the task of bringing to light the activity of the human drives (Mitcheson 2015: 334).

Brian Leiter comes to the same conclusion by referring to Jonathan Lear, who claims that Freud's philosophical significance consists in the fact that he shows that humans have depth, that they are complex psychological organisms who generate layers of meaning which lie beneath the surface of their own self-understanding. According to Leiter, Freud, like all practitioners of the hermeneutics of suspicion, shows that man is not transparent to himself. Leiter connects this lack of human transparency with Gettier's famous critique of the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief, in which he showed that man may possess beliefs that are both justified and true, but without thereby possessing knowledge. A justified true belief does not constitute knowledge when the justification for true belief is not the cause of that belief. Thus, the epistemic status of a belief depends on its etiology. Leiter believes that exactly this discovery is behind Marx's, Nietzsche's and Freud's suspicions. Beliefs with the wrong causal etiology can be true, but since they do not constitute cases of genuine knowledge, there is no reason to presume that to be the case. To the contrary, it is justified to be suspicious of their veridical properties (Leiter 2009: 103–104).

Thus, Freudian psychoanalysis is symptomatic and paradigmatic for examining the crisis of philosophical culture, in the sense that it occupies a very important place in revealing the inability of traditional philosophy to solve the (life) problems it deals with. In this respect, along with the leading minds of his time Freud shared a disappointment in (traditional) philosophy and was prone to setting up high positivist-scientific expectations for the practical application of the results of empirical research, but, at the same time, he differed from his contemporaries in that he did not attribute the key role to rationality or to logical connections of conscious contents when it came to the wise conduct of life. One of the basic points of what may be called *psychoanalytic wisdom* is the tolerance of ambiguity, ambivalence and contradictions, while philosophical wisdom, as well as scientific knowledge, has been inherently, from time immemorial, aimed at eliminating contradictions and ensuring coherence by means of logically valid ordering of thoughts. In fact, Freud considers that philosophy goes astray in its method by over-estimating the epistemological value of our logical operations (Freud 1964: 160–161). Admittedly, Socrates' wisdom is characterized by self-irony, which includes openness to opposing claims, but in Freud's case it is about something significantly different from methodological irony in order to philosophically lead his interlocutor

to rationally perceive the difference between good and evil, as was the case in the dialogues led by the ancient sage. Contrary to the antique intellectualistic chatter and the art of debating, as well as modern rationalist gradualness in perceiving problems, here focus is on non-verbal expressions, phantasmas and their symptomatic somatization, as well as on free association and logically unfounded leaps in thought. The real breakthrough in their processing does not consist of drawing crystal/clear philosophical conclusions, but in achieving cathartic emotional cognition through confrontation with one's own internal conflicts and unsolvable antinomies.

Psychoanalysis reveals the weaknesses of the diachronic and linear way of thinking, a procedure which is predominantly inherent in philosophical discourse, which is expressed by syllogistic or propositional logic, and philosophical construal of wisdom in everyday life, suggesting that by those means, in fact, only false or apparent wisdom of living is achieved. According to Freud's doctrine, mental health requires the affirmation of synchronic, cyclical and multidimensional thinking, thinking in which the clear line between normal and abnormal experience is erased, i.e. the demarcation line between convergent and divergent behaviour in relation to public standards of rationality, which is expressed in today's practical philosophy by modal logic. In this sense, the domain of psychopathology concerns not only psychiatric clinics of closed and open type, but also the daily life of people who do not need any professional help from professional psychotherapist. According to our understanding, the way to avoid the state of the need to use psychiatric and psychoanalytic services requires modifications of traditional wisdom in the conduct of one's own life, a change in direction of listening to that which is not the exclusive dictates of logic and philosophical thinking, but are illogical messages of the unconscious part of one's own being, as well as expressions of the unconscious in the other close persons. This implies that rationally designed and purposeful practice is not sufficient for the wisdom of living, which philosophical culture insist on, but that a quality parapactice is necessary, i.e. to give in to mistakes and participating in such unreasonable and aimless activities through which unconscious contents of experience are spontaneously projected and non-traumatically communicated.

To summarize, the (traditional) philosophical culture is characterized by the immanent of the conscious search for the standards of wise conduct or for mental health, and it concerns the inseparability of consciousness and reasonableness, i.e. inevitability of logical organization and founding of any conscious effort. On the other hand, psychoanalysis provide us not only with a theoretical explanation of this peculiar trap of philosophical rationality, but also by means of its practical dimension with an altogether different a model of wisdom, consisting of openness to parapactice, and to communication with parallel and unconscious contents of human experience. However, the psychoanalytic idea of wise living also has its weak points – which shall be discussed in the following two sections.

4. The Scope of Psychoanalytic Wisdom

Habermas stated that Freud's psychoanalysis is characterized by a discrepancy between its theoretical and practical aspects, i.e. between Freud's scientific self-understanding and advocacy of natural science methodology in the domain of theory, on the one hand, – and the emphasis upon specific hermeneutics, symbolic interpretation and communicative work at the level of therapeutic practice, on the other. At the same time, Habermas pointed out that the philosophical relevance of psychoanalytic wisdom, consist in enabling of the human progression in self-consciousness and a deepened movement of reflection, by means of the linguistic return of excommunicated psychic contents (Habermas 1971). According to our understanding of the matter, incoherence or inconsistency of this type does not have to be a bad thing in itself, because it can avoid rigidity and self-destructive repressiveness of logical consistency, however it renders the philosophical nature of the overall psychoanalytical way of thinking disputable, i.e. that which connects theory and practice, and goes beyond clinical work. The issue is that self-consciousness is improved not only through philosophy, but also through other forms of cultural life, for example through artistic expression, so it does not follow that psychoanalysis have optimal philosophical potential merely because it is useful for self-reflection. After all, it is indisputable that psychoanalysis in its non-clinical practice is closer to the surrealist art form, than to any form of philosophical wisdom.

The problem is that the psychoanalytic model of thought does not provide a basis for a valid understanding of life, in the form of human self-expression, through artistic practice, i.e. the kind of life that Rorty says erases the distinction between art and morality, and without adequate reflection of which it is not possible to ensure the sustainability of any form of human existence (Rorty 1989). Baudrillard also draws attention to this lack of Freud's doctrine, pointing out that it fails to grasp the qualitative difference between neuroticism and creativity (Baudrillard 2017). In our opinion, unlike scientific and pragmatico-technocratic psychoanalysis, valid and life-giving reflection can be best provided and secured by crisis-modified philosophical culture, which is why we believe we ought to strive for an interdisciplinary alliance of psychoanalytic, artistic and philosophical wisdom. It is a question of the mutual corrective role of the parapractical dimension of the Freudian way of thinking and non-scientific or non-objective contents of philosophical culture, through mediation of non-clinical artistic stylization of psychoanalytic experience and proper philosophical perspective and wise management of such artistic existence. From the perspective of philosophical wondering about the scope of psychoanalytic wisdom, the point is that Freudianism is not fruitful in articulating an adequate broader framework of orientation, which is necessary for human self-consciousness and sustainable wisdom of living.

In his critique of psychoanalysis, Jaspers has convincingly pointed out the shortcomings of the Freudian worldview as well as some of its harmful practical consequences, suggesting in which direction the psychoanalytic way of

thinking and acting should be corrected. One of these weaknesses is of a general nature, founded in *Zeitgeist* of Freud's lifetime and it concerns the fanatical overestimation of the natural and empirical sciences, that is, the expectation that the scientific and technological achievements can replace human subjective and interpersonal efforts aimed at self-construction, and in the future lead to effective solutions to all human problems. A more specific shortcoming consists in the psychoanalyst's excessive preoccupation with all the details of the analysand's private life, especially those belonging to the domain of sexual experiences, while neglecting his irreducible spiritual needs and experiences of all-encompassing transcendence (Jaspers 1951). We think that in this way the the analysand's harmful preoccupation with themselves is not only encouraged, but that it also creates a false and counterproductive image of cultural creativity as something that does not involve any encounter with transcendence, i.e. as something that is rightly considered only in the form of achieved results within the dynamics of man's internal biopsychological drives and his external natural and socio-historical limitations and influences. All in all, psychoanalysis has made a valuable contribution to the correction of wisdom in the direction of man's consideration of his own inability to base quality of his life on direct consciousness and logic. However, instead of continuing in that direction and cultivate new sense organ for the secret of transcendence, it wrongly redirects human expectations and the pursuit of happiness towards empirical sciences, on the one hand, and towards spiritless game of chance, on the other hand.

Thus, we believe that the potential of psychoanalysis, as a path to wisdom, and its significance for the future lies not in its confinement in within the model of natural sciences, but rather in its openness to cooperation with social sciences and humanities. This potential of psychoanalysis, despite his scientific inclinations, was noticed by Freud himself. For him, the pinnacle of culture is encouragement of man's higher mental activities, that is, science, art, religion and philosophy. However, it is significant that Freud realized that these mental activities are not mutually independent, but are on contrary closely interwoven, because they all arose from the motive of attaining utility and pleasure (Freud 1961: 94). Within this interdisciplinary approach, Freud attaches a special role to psychoanalysis. He regards text-books of psychiatry as not the only place for psychoanalysis, because psychoanalysis is not just one more type of therapy, cause its use for the treatment of neuroses is only one way of its application, which is not even the most important, Psychoanalysis, as a 'depth-psychology', contributed to the solution of the problems of the sciences that are concerned with the evolution of human civilization and its major institutions such as art, religion and social order, and has the potential to make an even greater contribution if historians of civilization, psychologist of religion, philologists, and etc., would educate themselves in the psychoanalytic method. For the sake of that education, they would have to undergo psychoanalysis themselves and within their education less emphasis would be on medical, and more on general education. Because of that Freud emphasizes that psychoanalytic education, alongside depth-psychology, which would always remain the principal

subject, must include both medical (biology, sexology, psychiatry etc.), and non-medical subjects (history of civilization, mythology, psychology of religion and science of literature etc.). That is why he concludes that the curriculum of psychoanalytic education must equally include elements of social sciences, such as psychology, history of civilization and sociology, and elements of natural sciences, such as anatomy, biology, and theory of evolution (Freud: 1959: 246, 248–249, 252)

Based on this text Howard Kaye notes that Freud believed that the most important contribution of psychoanalysis would be made in the social sciences, not in therapy. Calling psychoanalysis an indispensable instrument for sociologist, historian of civilization and a psychologist of religion, Freud expressed his belief that psychoanalysis could provide new insights into the sources of social feeling, the social causes of neuroses, the role of social institutions in the mastery of unsatisfied wishes, and the general nature and the dynamics of culture (Kaye 1991: 102).

Berthold-Bond considers that within this interdisciplinary approach, Freud's view of psychoanalysis, as a mediator between philosophy and medicine, is especially important. Referring to Guntram Knapp, he argues that the role of mediator indicates that psychoanalysis is neither philosophy nor medicine, but that Freud seeks a genuine annulment of philosophy and medicine, in the form of their synthesis which transcends the limitations of both disciplines. In this sense, the "middle position" of psychoanalysis represents the search for a genuinely new form of knowledge of the inner and outer reality of human existence (Berthold-Bond 1989: 277).

A similar point is suggested by Robert Grimwade, who warns that understanding philosophy and psychoanalysis beyond the artificial boundary lines of discipline, requires a philosophy of psychoanalysis and psychoanalysis of philosophy, i.e. something that is neither philosophy nor psychoanalysis, something entirely without borders and oppositions. In other words, it requires *philopsyoanalysis* (Grimwade 2012: 390).

We think that it is necessary to point out that the emergence of psychoanalysis, conceived in this way as an interdisciplinary project, was hinted at even earlier by Nietzsche in the form of his project of *Gay science*. Joshua Dienstag sees Nietzsche's philosophy as a combination of philosophy and medicine. He claims that Nietzsche refers to pessimism as a life-technique with medicinal qualities. In this way, Nietzsche's philosophy finds itself beneath the universal demands of categorical rationalism but above the wise advice of Galenic medicine (Dienstag 2006: 199). Nietzsche himself warned us that all values and imperatives require psychological and physiological interpretations, as well as medical criticism. Therefore, the problem of morality, that is of values, should concern physiologists and physicians alike, while academic philosophy would be given the role of a mediator who should enable amicable and fruitful exchange of knowledge between philosophy, physiology and medicine (Nietzsche 1967: 55). For these reasons Nietzsche believed that a wise man is needed, which will form a single unified whole consisting science, medicine,

art and ethics. Therefore, Nietzsche is, in a sense awaiting the arrival of the philosopher-physician, whose goal will be total health of the people, of a race, of some period, or of humanity as a whole and who will understand that the subject of philosophy is not truth, but future, health, growth, power, and life (Nietzsche 1974: 35, 173). We believe that such a philosopher-physician actually arrived in the form of psychoanalyst. In this, we agree with Silvia Ons, who claims that Nietzsche is the philosopher closest to psychoanalysis, because he rejects faith in metaphysical philosophy, and places more hope in the doctors of the future than in philosophers. Based on that, she concludes that, although Nietzsche did not know of psychoanalysis, his philosophy had psychoanalysis as its target (Ons 2006: 80).

To conclude – psychoanalytic critique of purposeful rationality has become an important part of today's eclectic and communication-oriented philosophical culture, that is, a component of the new multifaceted understanding of wisdom, born out from the crisis of traditional philosophy. This does not mean that relying solely on the Freudian way of thinking in pursuit of a wise life would be justified, because Freud's doctrine did not arrive to realisation that in the language of the unconscious there are also non-reductive transcendent contents, and not only biopsychological and socio-historical layers.

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Milanko Govedarica i Aleksandar Prica:

Kriza mudrosti i psihoanaliza

Apstrakt

Tema ovog rada tiče se ispitivanja praktične dimenzije savremene filozofske kulture, kako u odnosu na ideju mudrosti u tradicionalnoj filozofiji, tako i u relaciji prema psihoanalitičkoj praksi. U prvom delu rada određujemo šta je to filozofska kultura, prvenstveno tako što stavljamo naglasak na razlike između nje i naučno-tehnološke kulture. U drugom delu rada pokazujemo na koji način je takva filozofska kultura došla u krizu. U trećem delu rada nudimo izlaz iz te krize u vidu psihoanalize, koja kritikuje primat koji je dotadašnja filozofska kultura davala svesti, logici, dijahronijskom i linearnom načinu mišljenja, ali, još značajnije, nudi jedan alternativni model u odnosu na nju. U četvrtom, poslednjem delu rada, predstavljamo i manjkavosti ovog psihoanalitičkog modela. Kao rešenje, nudimo novi model filozofske kulture, nastao sintezom filozofije, psihoanalize, ali i drugih disciplina ljudskog mišljenja, koji ima sličnosti kako sa Ničeovom anticipacijom *vesele nauke*, tako i sa Jaspersovom idejom transcencije.

Ključne reči: filozofija, filozofska kultura, mudrost, psihoanaliza, Frojd, hermeneutika sumnje, Niče, Jaspers