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ALIÉNATION, ENTFREMDUNG – AND ALIENATION. HEGEL'S SOLIDARY DISPLACEMENT OF DIDEROT

ABSTRACT

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* put alienation high on the philosophical agenda, as was readily recognized by Marx. Relatively well-known is also that Hegel's concept of alienation was inspired by Goethe's translation of Diderot's dialogue *Rameau's Nephew*, but the details and the conceptual implications of these details typically escape scholarly attention. Recognizing the basic idea of alienation as not-belonging to or being deprived of something, I emphasize that alienation implies a movement towards the limits of the human being, in which the mental suffering this involves is conditioned by social pathologies. To substantiate this claim, I show how Diderot's satire implies uncompromising materialist social criticism, but that it does not employ the term '*aliénation*' but instead reserves it for a kind of frenzy that borders on insanity. My claim is then that, in Goethe's translation of Diderot's dialogue, and in his translation of '*aliénation*' to '*Entfremdung*', Hegel found a general key for the conceptual critique of the spirit of Modernity. I therefore argue that, in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel employed alienation in more than one sense, raising madness to the level of a characteristic of Modernity, stressing the detrimental implications for consciousness under such living conditions, emphasizing how alienation works as negation, and, finally, pointing nevertheless to the possibility of embracing social and political reality.

KEYWORDS

alienation, Hegel, Goethe, Diderot, spirit, Modernity, critique, pathology

Introduction

When philosophy tries to come to terms with life in Modernity, the concept of alienation often plays a crucial role. Themes discussed under the heading of alienation can trace their roots back more than 200 years, and one major tradition is the discussion in German philosophy undertaken under the heading of *Entfremdung*.¹ Hegel is often recognized as giving alienation a systematical

1 All translations from non-English sources have been translated by the present author, consulting published translations when available and considered necessary.

position on the philosophical agenda (Boey 2006: 195; Schacht 1971: 3) just as he can be recognized as using the term with a sense similar to the one used today (Schacht 1971: 15). Traditionally, the concept of alienation directs our attention towards experiences of not being at ease; for instance, of not belonging to, not relating to, not possessing, or becoming deprived of one's home, identity, social relations or possessions, or of mourning the loss of something one was rightfully entitled to as a human being or as a member of a given community, family or society.

In the history of alienation, there have been differences as to who is the subject and who is the object in the alienation process, i.e. whether the individual becomes alienated from society (for instance) or society becomes alienated from the individual. Rather than matters of conceptual history, however, I would like to emphasize the processual aspect of alienation, namely that alienation is not simply a state of being in conflict or discord with something or of relating to something unfamiliar, unknown or strange, a "deficient relation to world and self" (Jaeggi 2005: 183); instead, it refers to the experience of becoming separated, unfamiliar or estranged from something that one previously belonged to or identified with (Schacht 1971: 49). As I see it, by stressing the processual aspect of alienation in addition to the relational aspect, we are in a better position to insist that things could be otherwise, i.e. that alienation can be overcome.

Important contemporary arguments concerning alienation take place among Critical Theorists, some of which I have critically engaged with on other occasions (Sørensen 2019a). Participants in these discussions typically demonstrate their awareness of both Marx's seminal discussion of alienation in his 1844 *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* and the subsequent, intense discussion of these manuscripts in the 20th century. As early as 1969, these manuscripts could be characterized as "unquestionably the most talked about philosophical work in this century" (Mészáros 2005: 11). However, since then, and especially since the neo-liberal and postmodern breakthroughs in the 1980s, alienation has somehow gone out of fashion. Even if scholars sometimes recognize that Marx by no means is outdated (Henning 2015: 133), a more common urge has been to move beyond what are perceived as the limitations and restrictions of Marxist heritage (Jaeggi 2005: 12). I will return to Marx and Marxist heritage in relation to alienation in a future article, arguing that what was abandoned without much piety decades ago, i.e. both Marx and the Marxists, in fact deserves some recuperation, at least when it comes to alienation. In the present work, however, I will limit myself to presenting some lesser-known aspects of its pre-history.

It is relatively well known among cultural Marxists that the young Marx drew his main inspiration for the critique of alienation from Hegel. In fact, Marx himself refers to this inspiration in the manuscripts mentioned above, referring explicitly to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Marx 1968: 571–580). In his systematic register of Hegel's works (Reinicke 1979: 152–154), Helmut Reinicke also confirms that, when it comes to Hegel's concept of alienation,

the relevant place to look is the *Phenomenology*.² Moreover, by counting the occurrences and frequency of the noun ‘*Entfremdung*’ and the verbs and adjectives with the same root in the *Phenomenology* (Boey 1972: 96), we can even identify the most relevant section to study in detail, namely the second section of chapter six on the spirit, VI.B. “The Spirit Alienated from Itself. *Bildung*”.

Allow me initially to continue this arithmetic approach a little further and thus to indicate the intrinsic worth of a subject through the relative size of the discussion. In German, the *Phenomenology* is approximately 200,000 words long, of which chapter VI on the Spirit covers 60,000 alone. The chapter is divided into three sections, A, B and C, and chapter B – the primary section on alienation – is almost as long as the other two put together, i.e. almost 30.000 words. Hence, the discussion on alienation occupies a lot of space in the *Phenomenology*, and, just from the relative space attributed to it, it must be assumed that the concept plays a crucial role in Hegel’s overall argument.

Hegel put alienation on the philosophical agenda, and his concept of alienation – found in the *Phenomenology* – is similar to the concept of alienation we have today. It is safe to assume that the concept was important to him, but we still need to explain how he got his idea of alienation and what it was supposed to mean. It has been suggested that important inspiration for Hegel’s concept of alienation came from Rousseau, Schiller and other contemporary philosophers (Schacht 1971: 18–25), and Hegel certainly discusses Rousseau’s *Social Contract* in relation to the 1793 terror of the French Revolution, explicitly linking the figure of absolute freedom to the general will (see GW 9, 317–323; TWA 3, 432–440; see also Heidegren 1995: 257–260). However, among scholars of the *Phenomenology*, it is widely believed that the account of *Entfremdung* – i.e. alienation – primarily was inspired by Goethe’s translation of Diderot’s dialogue *Rameau’s Nephew*, which was published just a few years before the *Phenomenology*.³ In the present article, I will also argue that Goethe’s translation of this work inspired Hegel’s conception of alienation. Again, let me just remind about some proportions in the attribution of space. The subsection discussing alienation, where *Rameau’s Nephew* is the main reference, is subsection VI.B.I. named “The World of the Spirit Alienated from Itself”. It alone is almost 15.000 words long.

In this article, I will explore the roots of the discussion of alienation and their fascinating history, investigating into layers of the idea of alienation that rarely receive the attention they deserve. In particular, I will focus on how the concept of alienation travelled from Diderot via Goethe to Hegel, and how Hegel expanded Diderot’s idea beyond its originally rather narrow confines.

2 In the present article, I will refer to two editions of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel 1980 and Hegel 1970. The page references will be indicated in brackets in the text as, respectively, GW 9 and TWA 3.

3 See, e.g. Hyppolite 1967: 387, 398–401; Hyppolite 1974: 400, 411–415; Heidegren 1995: 232–240, 465–466; see also, e.g. Granier 1980:18 ; Siep 2000: 196 ; Brauer 2008: 478, or Sørensen 2019b: 182 or Sørensen 2015: 60.

Most important for this history is presumably Goethe's decision to translate the French word 'alienation' with 'Entfremdung' (Goethe, 1996: 166–167; Goethe 1820: 126). However, this particular fact does not seem to have received much attention in the Hegel literature or in modern discussions of alienation referring back to Marx. In fact, even when serious efforts are made to map the intellectual landscape around the original discussions of alienation, the fact goes unmentioned (Feuerlicht 1978), and otherwise very interesting works on alienation also seem to be completely ignorant of it (Mészáros 2005; Jaeggi 2005).

Moreover, the particular section in which Hegel develops the idea of alienation, VI.B., has attracted very little interest among Hegel scholars (Sandkaulen 2014: 430–431), and this has apparently been the case for decades (Schacht 1971: 38). Hence, Hegel's main argument concerning alienation is rarely examined in detail. The only exceptions to this are the commentaries by Jean Hyppolite, Richard Schacht and Carl-Göran Heidegren, to which my argument owes a lot to. This conspicuous lack of scholarly interest also extends to Hegel's idea of *Bildung*, since this idea is mainly determined in the same section in relation to alienation (Sørensen 2019b: 192–193). However, I have discussed the relationship between alienation and *Bildung* in the *Phenomenology* elsewhere;⁴ and, in the present article, I will focus on alienation *per se*.

Ultimately, I will argue that the transition of the term from Diderot via Goethe to Hegel has interesting conceptual implications for the concept of *Entfremdung*, i.e. alienation. Assuming that Hegel took over the concept from Goethe, I will examine Diderot's dialogue more closely in order to provide a better idea of what kind of phenomenon Goethe had in mind when he selected the German word 'Entfremdung' as his translation. In doing so, I wish to reach a better understanding of the kind of human and societal reality this word referred to for Hegel and which later proved so important for Marx himself, the 20th century Marxists, and today's critical theorists.⁵ In particular, I will highlight the dual character of alienation in the *Phenomenology*: On the one hand, it implies a movement of discord towards the pathological limits of human being, indicating mental sufferings possibly conditioned by social pathologies; and, on the other hand, it assumes the operational role of the negation in the *Phenomenology*, driving consciousness forward from one figure to the other.

My overall argument is thus that, in order to understand why generations of critical scholars since Hegel and Marx have been so preoccupied with alienation, we would do well to examine not just Hegel's *Phenomenology* but also *Rameau's Nephew* and its reception in the *Phenomenology*. Such an examination must of course focus on the specific goal of inquiry, i.e. to better understand what alienation is about in terms of its semantic meaning and reference, but it must do so without disregarding the texts, thus keeping in mind the argument, narrative, structure, form and content. As Hegel is known to emphasize,

4 See Sørensen 2015, sect. II.A. (which is ch. 6, sect. B.ii. in Sørensen 2019b).

5 Apart from Jaeggi 2005, see also, e.g., Rosa 2010 and Rosa 2016, all three of which I discuss in Sørensen 2019a.

without knowledge of the realization of a concept, the truth of the matter will not be achieved. As I will argue, rather than simply using Goethe's translation of the particular term '*aliénation*', in the *Phenomenology*, Hegel interpreted the whole of *Rameau's Nephew* (and the idea of Modernity depicted there) as a genuine expression of alienation.

Moreover, to determine the meaning of a particular word, the context and ultimately the whole of the particular language must also be taken into account. Whether we employ the vocabulary of hermeneutics, structuralism, ordinary language philosophy or pragmatism, the meaning of a term depends on its specific role as part of a larger whole. Even the most careful translation of a term from one particular language to another will imply a transmission that displaces the original conceptual meaning of that particular term. Keeping in mind a future conceptual argument regarding the concept of alienation I wish to put forward, in the following paragraphs, I will therefore allow myself to delve into historical and philological details that are often considered inappropriate for conceptual argumentation. In doing so, I will follow a simple inclination, i.e. curiosity and fascination, but my claim is that showing these details sheds more light on, and helps us understand, what alienation is all about. Again, knowledge of the becoming of a concept adds to the truth of the matter.

I will first present Diderot's dialogue, stressing the claims of its open-ended dialogical and dialectical character (A.). I will then show how Diderot's satire implies an uncompromising social criticism of the material living conditions in 18th-century France that defies allegations of cynicism (B.), but that this criticism does not employ the term '*aliénation*', reserving it instead for a kind of frenzy at the limit of insanity (C.). My claim is that, in Goethe's translation of Diderot's dialogue, and in his translation of '*aliénation*' to '*Entfremdung*', Hegel found a key for the conceptual critique of the spirit of Modernity (D.). To demonstrate this, I first reconstruct Hegel's idea of the spirit as the ethical life of a people (E.); I then argue that, in the analysis of the spirit alienated from itself, Hegel employs alienation in a double sense, both expanding the madness depicted by Diderot to the societal level, stressing the implications of modern living conditions for consciousness, and letting alienation assume the role of negation (F.).

In the latter sense, Hegel lets alienation set the scene for his dialectics of Enlightenment, returning again to epistemological skepticism and highlighting its emptiness (G.). Finally, I argue that alienation in the first sense is tied to the historical world of *Bildung* and that, in the same world, exteriorization becomes pathological as alienation (H.). After pausing briefly to reveal some amusing details concerning the history of Diderot's dialogue (I.), I conclude that social criticism plays a much larger role than usually thought for both Diderot and Hegel, which is why Hegel can expand Diderot's concept of alienation to become the main characteristic of Modernity. I end the article with the claim that, considering the arguments presented, it is indeed meaningful to consider the particular origin of the term alienation in Enlightenment social philosophy.

A. Rameau's Nephew: Open-Endedness as a Principle

*Rameau's Nephew*⁶ is widely recognized as Diderot's 'masterpiece' (White 1970: 74). It is a substantial literary work of around 35,000 words in French and is often typeset to form a book of more than 100 pages. It is set in Paris in Diderot's time and explores the world of 18th-century operas – their composers and the antics of the cultural elite (and their followers) of the era. As J. F. Falvey explains (Falvey 1985: 38), the work uses fashionable society gossip and scandals as a social panorama for ridiculing and staging satirical attacks on ideas, groups and named individuals. Nothing or nobody appears to be sacred.

The dialogue takes place between *Moi* and *Lui*, i.e. Me and Him. *Moi* presents himself as a moral and rational philosopher, whereas *Lui* is the eccentric nephew of "le grand Rameau", i.e. Jean-Philippe Rameau, who was a successful composer of French operas in Diderot's time. *Lui* is thus the portrait of a real person living in Paris at the time Diderot wrote the dialogue. His name was Jean-François Rameau, but he was always called (and called himself) "*Rameau le neveu*", and he even used this nickname as his signature (Magnan 1993: 9–10). In contrast, *Moi* is left unspecified, and there have of course been discussions about the extent to which *Moi* represents Diderot.

It is almost certain that Diderot first drafted the dialogue in 1761, seemingly in April (or shortly afterwards). The fact that we can conclude so precisely when the dialogue was first put to paper is due to various events referred to during the conversation – and not because Diderot or anybody else has provided an original manuscript with a date. For example, in the dialogue, there is mention of the death of *Lui*'s wife (NR 131/08) but not the death of their only son; and we know that the former died in January 1761 and the latter in June the same year (Falvey 1985: 13).

Moreover, the dialogue refers to other real people and events in Paris that confirm this date, in particular *Lui*'s declaration at the end of the dialogue that he will see an opera by "Dauvergne" (NR, 132/09), which is most likely *Hercule mourant* by Antoine Dauvergne. This opera was staged only 19 times, all of which in April 1761 (Falvey 1985: 13), the opening night being Friday 3rd April.⁷ Hence, thanks to the meticulous studies of generations of historians, philologists and literary critics, and the extensive comments of the first translator Goethe (Goethe 1820: 167–228; Goethe 1996: 237–280), we do in fact know a great deal about the factual references of the dialogue. Some interpreters even believe that the dialogue may have been constructed by Diderot but was based on real life dialogues that took place around the time the text was written.

Referring to the work as a dialogue does not require much interpretative talent. Almost the entire text is structured by entries alternating between *Moi*

6 I will refer simultaneously to the following two editions, Diderot 1983, ed. Jean-Claude Bonnet, and Diderot 1963, ed. Jean Fabre. The page references will be indicated in brackets in the text as NR, nn/nn.

7 See, e.g., "Hercule mourant"; see also Pedersen 1987, "Noter", 126.

and *Lui*, constituting a continued conversation between two people on various themes. From time to time, however, the dialogue is interrupted by explanatory notes and reflections for the reader that can be attributed, respectively, to *Moi*, a third person narrator of the text, or to the author himself, and the structure of the narrative is not dramatic in a classical sense. Its reflections thus seem suitable for reading rather than experiencing or listening to, and, as a genre, one could describe *Rameau's Nephew* as a “conversation novel” (Falvey 1985: 12). Still, the choice of dialogue as the main structural principle of the text was in all likelihood deliberate. Diderot is known to have brought with him a small volume of Plato’s dialogues when he went to prison in Vincennes in 1749, and, from that volume, he translated the *Apology of Socrates* (Jauss 1983: 3).

As Hans Robert Jauss tells the story, Diderot’s entries in the *Encyclopedia* on “The Death of Socrates” and “Socratic Philosophy” clearly demonstrate that he identified himself and his role in the French Enlightenment with that of Socrates (Jauss 1983: 3). Moreover, as in a Socratic dialogue, what sets *Rameau's Nephew* in motion is a seemingly coincidental meeting between *Moi* and *Lui* in the garden of *Palais Royal* (see NR, 45/3). Before entering into the dialogical mode, Diderot devotes a few pages to a first-person narrative introducing the reader to Rameau’s nephew as one of the most “bizarre persons in this country” (NR, 46/4). Still, as Jauss argues, the overall dialogical form reflects the fact that, in the French Enlightenment, the dialogue was highly valued due to its didactical qualities and its ability to signal both openings and even open-endedness (Falvey 1985: 12), and this is indeed the case in *Rameau's Nephew*. Diderot can thus be said to provide a restoration of a “dialogical concept of truth”, dismantling “the one-sided authority of pedagogical authority” and giving “equal rights to the opposite voice”; through the question and answer format, he lets openness prevail, to the point of provoking the reader with “unsolved *aporia* in the end” (Jauss 1983: 1).

While Jauss argues that Diderot is able to retain the dialogical quality inherited from Plato and Socrates, when Hegel makes use of Diderot’s text, this quality is arguably lost; whereas advanced Enlightenment can supposedly be dialogical, according to Jauss, “finished Enlightenment” can only exhibit a “monological dialectic” (Jauss 1983: 8). Dialectic thus signals system and closure. Nevertheless, Jauss recognizes that Hegel himself understood his renewal of dialectics as a sublation of the dialogical principle (Jauss 1983: 20), just as he admits that Hegel did not use *Rameau's Nephew* to complete the dialectical movement and that his dialectics of Enlightenment seems unconcluded (Jauss 1983: 26–28). Jauss ultimately asks himself and his readers whether “dialectic is necessarily monological by nature” (Jauss 1983: 29); and, as I have argued elsewhere,⁸ with particular reference to both Hegel and the man Jauss recognizes as his teacher,⁹ Hans-Georg Gadamer,¹⁰ I think the most fruitful answer

8 See Part Two in Sørensen 2019b.

9 See *Minutes of the Colloquy*, 1983: 52.

10 See ch. 5 and 6 in Sørensen 2019b, in particular 141–142, 168–169.

to this question is ‘no’.¹¹ Hence, I will insist that Hegel’s dialectic also retains a fundamental openness, both in itself and in the way Hegel incorporates quotations from Goethe’s text in his own.

B. Satire and Social Criticism, not Cynicism

The motto of the first page of Diderot’s dialogue is a quotation from the *Satires* of Horace (NR, 45/3), referring to the god of change and seasons, Vertumnis, who can be considered rather unstable and unreliable, just like *Lui* (Falvey 1985: 61). However, *Lui* can even be said to be unpredictable in his unpredictability. Initially, he thus casts himself as a fool, who, as a professional parasite hosted by rich households, can entertain the master and his guests with amusing stories, insults and caricatures, i.e. by making everybody laugh; and he insists that he is uniquely well qualified in this regard (see NR, 92–96/60–65). However, as the dialogue develops, *Lui* demonstrates laudable moral character traits, first in his frankness and truthfulness in relation to his own identity, role and weaknesses, and ultimately in his sense of parental responsibility regarding the education of his son.

Lui declares that he “loves” his little “savage” and will raise him according to his own “molecule” rather than forcing him to become a “decent man” (NR, 116/90). He wants his son to be “happy, or what is the same: rich and powerful”. (NR, 119/93) *Lui* is aware of the danger of being “penetrated by the value of money” but does not believe that morality can come without some “inconvenience”. (NR, 118/92) Hence, the dialogue clearly contains some moral ambivalence when it comes to virtue and vice, and some have even perceived an inversion of roles throughout the work, which would demonstrate the above-mentioned openness of dialogical truth even further – radical Enlightenment thus forcing, or leaving, the reader to think for him- or herself. Foucault, for instance, emphasizes how madness assumes the task of revealing the truth but can only claim it by coincidence: The “coincidence is the only necessary link between truth and error” (Foucault 1978: 367).

As mentioned earlier, the dialogue has an introduction but no real end; instead, it is simply interrupted when *Lui* decides to leave for the above-mentioned opera. So, in this very literal sense, the dialogue is also open-ended. Moreover, the characters’ comments may appear dispersed and coincidental, and, like in many real-life conversations, what leads from one specific theme to another – and how these themes relate – may not always be clear. Still, by structuring the exchanges of the text, Falvey has identified a number of stages and recurring elements, the most central themes being genius, satire, education,

11 I will not go further into the heated and otherwise interesting discussion generated by Jauss’s essay, since most of the interventions relate less to *Rameau’s Nephew* and the *Phenomenology* than to literature theory, contrasting Jauss’s reception theory and literary hermeneutics with traditional philology and other kinds of hermeneutics, as well as with post-modernism, post-structuralism and deconstructionism (see *Responses*, 1983, and *Minutes of the Colloquy*, 1983: 30–67).

morality and music. Furthermore, in many cases, the particular points are related to money, i.e. possible or actual wealth (Falvey 1985: 15, 19–21). Hence, like Falvey (Falvey 1985: 83), in Diderot’s dialogue, I cannot help noticing an entire group of themes that relate to the micro- and macro-economy, thus indicating the importance attributed to money and power in human life. In my reading, I will emphasize these aspects much more than has been done previously.

Diderot’s dialogue is indeed a satire and, as such, it is not just open-ended and unpredictable; like any true satire, the targets of contemptuous caricatures are typically rich and powerful people who are ridiculed as hypocritical, insensitive or mean – or a combination of the three. Virtues are thus recognized and considered normatively valid, though often only negatively or implicitly, which is precisely what characterizes ideology critique and social criticism. It is thus misleading to present *Lui* as an example of Benjamin’s “destructive character”, whose “scornful nihilism” (Bewes, 1997: 114) makes him criticize everything. For *Lui*, some things are indeed considered sacred. As such, it is mistaken to characterize him as cynical, provoking or merely bitter or miserable, as previous scholars have done.¹² On the contrary, I will claim that *Lui* is enraged and desperate, filled with indignation and revolted by the conditions of human life in the modern world. He wants to tell this truth, but, to avoid suffering the consequences of such impropriety, he has to make a fool of himself, disguising the truth as a slip of the tongue, i.e., a mere coincidence.

Hence, the point is not, as it has been claimed, that “Rameau’s cynicism consists [...] in his refusal to entertain the ‘Notions’ of state power and wealth”, or that he dismisses “patriotism, friendship [and] social responsibility”, or that he is indifferent to “freedom, independence, virtue, genius, wisdom, posterity, truth and dignity”, or “the cultural ‘Notions’ of good, evil, honour, shame, nobility, ignobility, justice, indecency, etc.” (Bewes, 1997: 112–113, 137). In fact, the exact opposite is true. What *Lui* criticizes is the actual holders of power and wealth and their hypocrisy when legitimizing their possessions normatively through such notions: Rather than denouncing the notions *per se*, the nephew conducts a social criticism of their particular instantiation in a real societal configuration. As Foucault poignantly put it, “his secret is precisely that he is not able to be hypocritical” (Foucault 1978: 367).

In one of the early exchanges, *Lui* tells a story about the king’s ministers, who had allegedly said that “nothing is more useful for the people than lies; nothing is more harmful than the truth”. (NR, 50/9) This, however, is not a critique of the notion of truth or a transformation to a dialogical concept of truth; the point is to reveal those in power as routinely lying, and this is social criticism. Hence, when the minister of justice is ridiculed for his wig and gown, it is also mentioned that he owns “millions”, while honorable officers “don’t even have bread”. (NR, 85/52) Again, this is a criticism of real social inequality. Moreover, in relation to the education of his son, he exclaims: “Gold is everything, and the rest, without gold, is nothing”. (NR, 118/92) As recognized by

12 See, e.g., Falvey 1985: 10; and Bewes 1997: 111 and Hansen-Löve 2018: 157.

Hyppolite (Hyppolite 1967: 400–401; Hyppolite 1974: 413–414), this is clearly a way of criticizing a society ruled by money whilst also demonstrating the impotency of *Lui* and his likes. Hence, in such a situation, patriotism cannot be an issue; as *Lui* puts it: “There is no longer any patrimony. All I see from pole to pole is tyrants and slaves”. (NR, 75/40) This is a criticism of the hypocrisy manifested by those who in fact ask for, and benefit from, patriotism – i.e. the king and nobility – it is not the refusal to endorse patriotism *per se*.

This argument becomes more powerful when we consider the word ‘cynicism’ in itself. Today, the dictionary can define it as the belief “that people are motivated purely by self-interest rather than acting for honorable or unselfish reasons”,¹³ and such a belief can also be described as “sneering and [...] sarcastic” (Hornby 1985: 215). Moreover, it is not uncommon to associate cynicism with apathy and introspection, “a refusal to engage with the world, [...] an abnegation of politics, [...] a flight into solitude and interiority, [and] a condition of disillusion” that implies “relativism, irony and even decadence” (Bewes 1997: 1, 8, 111).

Some of these traits can certainly be recognized in *Lui*, and, as Louisa Shea argues (Shea 2010: ix-xii), cynicism in this sense can be considered a consequence of losing faith in the historical Enlightenment project for education and justice, and such disillusion is quite different from the ancient Greek Cynicism – with an uppercase ‘C’ – as attributed to Diogenes of Sinope, who was one of Diderot’s favorite references. As became common in Germany after Sloterdijk (Kallscheur, Niehues-Pröbsting, Eldred, Ebeling 1984), Shea thus wants to distinguish between the *Zyniker* (with a lowercase ‘c’) and the *Kyniker* (with an uppercase ‘C’). Shea’s claim is that the original Cynicism became attractive in late 18th century precisely because it offered a possible language for communicating social criticism, distancing itself from both philosophical abstraction and paralyzing skepticism.

As Shea argues, it was precisely the employment of Cynic eloquence, frankness and wit (plus a portion of provocational shamelessness) that landed Diderot in prison in 1749. In the tales told about Diogenes, he was thus reputed to have “masturbated publicly” (Shea 2010: 23), and, in order to avoid subsequent censorship and imprisonment, Diderot deliberately rejected “the bluntness, asceticism and obscenity” of the ancient Cynics, adopting instead the Socratic style of the “polite philosophers,” recognizing the dialogue as a way to draw out the truth rather than to “bark it out” (Shea 2010: 41, 48). Engaging in open-endedness and pursuing dialogical truth was therefore only a second choice, having experienced first-hand the dire consequences of telling the monological truth publicly in an unjust society.

Moreover, as *Rameau’s Nephew* demonstrates, Diderot did not give up his youthful Cynicism but merely confined it to his private chambers. The open-endedness of the dialogue may thus be said to express his inability to reconcile two conflicting aspects of his own personality as they are portrayed by *Lui* and *Moi*. As it is generally recognized (Falvey 1985: 13–14, 50–51; Shea,

13 *Oxford English Dictionary*, quoted by Shea 2010: ix.

2010: 41), Diderot kept the manuscript a secret even to his closest friends, most likely considering the uncompromising satire of the contemporary Parisian elite too sensitive a subject for both the general public and his own good. As Shea argues, within the framework of Socratic dialogue and Platonic dialectics, what is revealed is a confrontation between *Moi's* domesticated and “polite Cynicism” and *Lui's* almost classical display of “biting, mocking, and irreverent voice” (Shea 2010: 41), both of which also reveal traits of modern cynicism.

Towards the end of the dialogue, *Moi* introduces a puritan and ascetic version of Diogenes for his moral denouncement of *Lui's* betrayal of principles, the latter being accused of prostituting himself and crawling for the sake of mere “pleasure”. *Lui*, however, does not accept this domesticated image of Diogenes, arguing that the ancient Cynic also “danced a pantomime” when confronted with power and money. In addition, he insists that “a good bed, good food, warm clothes in the winter, cool in the summer, plenty of rest, money and other things” he would “rather owe to kindness than earn by toil”. As *Moi* argues, *Lui* is then just “a lazy, greedy lout, a coward and a rotting soul”, to which *Lui* simply remarks that “I believe I told you so myself” (NR 130/07).

As emphasized by Timothy Bewes, the depth of understanding of what Hegel would later consider the “disrupted, ignoble consciousness” is clearly “far more profound than that of the philosopher” (Bewes 1997: 116). Still, I contest Bewes’ understanding of this depth as plain cynicism. As Shea makes clear, what is revealed by *Lui's* wisecracks and polemics is that Diderot still recognizes the “moral strength [and] virtue” of the “radical and disruptive” (Shea 2010: 42–43) ancient Cynics. The enlightened politeness of philosophers such as *Moi* may enable the expression of “subversive ideas in a discreet manner”, thus keeping the proponent “out of trouble and in good money”; but this implies a “degeneration of philosophy” due to the “betrayal” of philosophers who bow “to the demands of property” and shut “their eyes to social reality” (Shea 2010: 55).

However, even Rameau accepts the social and material conditions as they are given. *Lui* ridicules and unmasks “social conventions” and, as Bewes stresses, such expressions of “alienation” constitute a movement towards “total political involvement” (Bewes 1997: 200). However, as Shea identifies, *Lui* makes no attempt of “resisting or overturning the practices he mocks” (Shea 2010: 59). His main concern is not how to engage in political practice or long-term plans but how to deal with a real and imminent threat, i.e. hunger. *Lui* lives as a hanger-on, receiving board and lodging in exchange for entertainment and various illicit services. And, on the day of his casual encounter with *Moi*, he has just been thrown out of his household, not knowing where his next meal would come from (see NR, 78/43). As a true materialist, and referring to Montaigne (see NR, 128/104), Diderot lets *Lui* argue that the “most important is to ease the bowels freely, agreeably, copiously, every night” (NR, 63/25). Not to be ignored is therefore the “tumult of [the] intestines” and “the audible pang of a complaining stomach” (NR, 83/49). Again, this shows that, for him, something is indeed sacred: the acute needs of the living sensual body of each human being.

This is what makes *Lui* and those like him (i.e. the parasites of bourgeois wealth) humiliate themselves, flattering the masters and mistresses, bowing “low, the forward knee bent” (NR, 82/49). As *Lui* stresses, “it is always the appetite I return to, the sensation that is always present; I find that an [societal] order is not good when sometimes there is nothing to eat. Damned economy”. Some people luxuriate, while others have nothing to eat. Thrown out of his household, *Lui* is left with neither shelter nor food, neither for himself nor for his son. And, for *Lui*, this results in humiliation and a loss of personal dignity. The “man in need does not walk like another; he skips, twists, cringes, crawls” (NR, 127/104). In a “monarchy only one person walks. That is the sovereign. All the rest take positions” (NR, 128/105). As *Lui* himself readily admits, in his own pantomime, he takes a position that is “almost the same as that of the flatterers, the courtesans, the servants and the scoundrels” (NR, 129/105); confronted with “the rigor of need”, he surrenders to an “egoism without escape” (Foucault 1978: 368).

As Shea emphasizes, *Lui* does indeed reconstruct and cry out the behavior of powerful people in terms of egoism and strategy, but he does not adopt this cynical way of living himself (Shea 2010: 62–63). Rather than a cynic, or even an ancient Cynic, Rameau represents the necessary self-critique of the well-mannered Age of Reason (Shea 2010: 46). What he expresses is social criticism that has rightly been recognized as radical (Boey 1972: 107), being grounded in both corporal and spiritual empathy and compassion. In both the satire and the admissions *Lui* makes about his own way of living, there is a clear and radical social criticism of class society and the inequalities and vices generated by accumulated wealth, e.g. sycophancy, parasitism and prostitution. What from a superficial moralistic reading may appear as cynicism, or “self-prostitution” (Bewes 1997: 115), is in fact a commitment to organic materialism and realist social criticism.

Clearly, what Diderot highlights is material consequences and injustices of societal exploitation and poverty in modern society. In contrast to Bewes (Bewes 1997: 137–138), I therefore prefer Jon Stewart’s characterization of *Lui* as “an anarchistic radical” (Stewart 2000: 330). As it was later claimed by the classical 19th-century anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, so also for *Lui*: property is theft (Woodcock 1975: 104–107). To cheat the wealthy is thus to “steal” back, which is only fair. This helps to “restitute” things in the anarchist way, i.e. without recurring to the state. As *Lui* puts it: “We make justice between us, without interference by the law” (NR, 73/38). And there is no remorse: “The voice of conscience and honor is pretty feeble when the guts cry out” (NR, 74/38).

C. Alienation as Being Out of Your Mind or Insane

It is in the conflict between genius and sorry material conditions that *Lui* finds the most talented expression of his dismemberment and laceration, being torn apart from within and from without. *Lui* can be considered vile and immoral, and he even prides himself on having systematically refined – i.e. pursuing in

a “reasonable and true way” – the vices that most people follow through “instinct” (NR, 92/61). It is clearly his attempt to handle the material conditions of living in a modern class society in an enlightened – and thus rational – way that has led him to become the man he is.

The open-endedness and unpredictability of *Lui*'s performance does not mean that Diderot leaves it to the reader to decide what is right or wrong, or that he himself is a cynic. A societal order that inflicts hunger on human beings is wrong, even though we may not know precisely what is right, and even though we may individually have found ways to cope with it. *Lui*'s unpredictability may be considered part of a survival strategy in a hostile society, demonstrating the adaptability and flexibility required to be part of Modern life as a self-conscious and conscientious, yet still realist, human being. Apart from simply letting *Lui* ridicule his enemies and other people worth insulting with pantomime and gossip (i.e. being generally ironic and satirical towards the Parisian upper-class culture), Diderot clearly stages a materialist social criticism of inequality and oppression in the French society of his time; and it is this societal aspect of the dialogue that I will claim Hegel developed further.

As Shea mentions, Hegel considered Ancient Cynicism banal and theoretically insufficient, apparently ignoring its “potential model” for “philosophy as a way of life” (Shea 2010: 188), and he clearly contributed to relegating the Cynicism to the “dustbin” of the official history of philosophy, thus making generations of philosophers and historians of ideas consider it only “on the margins of serious philosophy” (Shea 2010: 133). In his very short account of the Cynics, Hegel thus emphasized both their lack of philosophical education and their failure to develop thought into system and science (Hegel 1986, TWA 18: 551). However, as I will argue, this is not the whole story. By recognizing the importance of *Rameau's Nephew* and the malaise of being alienated from social conventions and reality, Hegel in fact raised the social criticism of the Cynics (i.e. the criticism of injustice and alienation) to become the core of social philosophy and politics, forging a path for Marx and those who related to his agenda to follow. As will become clear below, Hegel did indeed take seriously what a materialist Cynic like Diderot had to say about the burdens of modern society.

To get to this, we must focus on the parts of the dialogue that explicitly address alienation, which are fewer than we might assume. In fact, it is only in one spectacular scene – what has been recognized as the “the central mime” (Falvey 1985: 62) – in the last part of this hilarious dialogue that we encounter the word ‘*aliénation*’. In this scene, the nephew is acting and pantomiming a story with “thirty different airs”, taking turns in French and Italian, being both comic and tragic:

Now in a baritone voice he sank to the pit; then straining in falsetto he tore to shreds the upper notes of some air, imitating the while, the stance, walk and gestures of several characters; being in succession furious, mollified, lordly, sneering. First a damsel weeps and he reproduces her kittenish ways; next he is a priest, a king, a tyrant; he threatens, commands, rages. Now he is a slave, he

obeys, calms down, is heartbroken, complains, laughs; never overstepping the proper tone, speech, or manner called for by the part. (NR, 111/83).¹⁴

This is where *Moi* takes *Lui* to be “caught by an alienation of his spirit [i.e. in French ‘*esprit*’, in German ‘*Geist*’], an enthusiasm so close to madness that it seemed doubtful whether he would recover; if not, he would have to be thrown into a cab and driven straight to *Petites-Maisons*” (Goethe 1996: 166–167), (NR, 111/83), which, at that time, was an “*asylum d’aliénés*”, i.e. a madhouse. Obviously, the alienation of the spirit in this sense means something like being in a frenzy or out of one’s mind, approaching the state of outright madness. Still, *Lui* is not suffering acute mental illness in a clinical sense; his performance may have an aspect of folly, but he is also recognized by *Moi* as an extremely gifted artist performing at his best:

While singing fragments of Jomelli’s *Lamentations*, he reproduced with incredible precision, fidelity and warmth the most beautiful passages of each scene. That magnificent recitative in which Jeremiah describes the desolation of Jerusalem, he drenched in tears which drew their like from every onlooker. His art was complete – delicacy of voice, expressive strength, true sorrow. He dwelt at the places where the musician had shown himself a master. If he left the vocal part, it was to take up the instrumental, which he abandoned suddenly to return to the voice, linking them to preserve the connection and unity of the whole, gripping our souls and keeping them suspended in the most singular state of being that I have ever experienced. (Diderot 2001: 67) (NR, 111/83–84)

We thus find ourselves at the famous threshold between genius and madness. The alienation from himself enables *Lui* to assume, and alternate between, characters and instruments almost at will, and *Moi* is both impressed and moved. The entire account of *Lui*’s performance is attributed to *Moi* but is written in the third narrative voice and thus directed at the reader, i.e. it is not part of the dialogue. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, when it comes to alienation, this is in fact all we have from Diderot’s hand in *Rameau’s Nephew*.

The French word ‘*aliénation*’ appears only once in the entire dialogue, and when it comes to Goethe’s German translation, the word ‘*Entfremdung*’ also only appears once.¹⁵ Only very few people have noticed this remarkable fact, among them Schacht and Heidegren.¹⁶ Interestingly, however, the English translation of the dialogue avoids the word ‘alienation’ altogether in this context (Diderot 2001: 67; see also Falvey 1985: 35), indicating thus a possible displacement of meaning of the term ‘alienation’ between the French and English language with regards to this particular use. James Schmidt thus clearly feels a need to explain Diderot’s use of the French homonym to English language

14 See also the English translation Diderot 2001: 67.

15 See Goethe 1996: 166–167. The precise spot was pointed out to me by Heidegren during a seminar in 2019.

16 See Schacht 1971: 43. I was only made aware of this crucial fact due to a casual remark by Heidegren at the occasion just mentioned.

readers (Schmidt 1996: 642), and, in the discussions on Hegel and alienation, I have only encountered one scholar, namely Schacht, who relates to this issue.

As Schacht explains, the use of alienation as “mental disorder” can be encountered in 15th-century English, and it is still used as a “technical” term in psychiatry, although in “current English” – i.e. the English of 1971 – it is “infrequently encountered” (Schacht 1971: 10–11). This displacement of the meaning of the term between French and English is, I would think, likely to have contributed to the widespread ignorance about the present issue in English language discussions of alienation. Interestingly, the Danish translation of Diderot’s dialogue also avoids the common Danish word for alienation, *fremmedgørelse*, and instead uses *galskab* (Diderot 1987: 85), i.e. ‘madness’. With this in mind, I will now turn to the reception of Diderot’s dialogue by Hegel.

D. Goethe Translating Alienation – and Hegel

In the current discussion of alienation, hardly anybody notices that the key word for Hegel, *Entfremdung*, is only mentioned this once in Goethe’s translation, that it is mentioned in a very specific sense brought over from French, and that it is unclear whether Hegel is using the word in the same specific sense. In spite of the possible English language displacement in relation to the French homonym *aliénation*, which tends to neglect the aspect of insanity, and the consequent avoidance of translating *aliénation* to ‘alienation’, Diderot’s use of the French term has nevertheless had an important reception in English, namely thanks to the above-mentioned translation of alienation to the German *Entfremdung*, and especially because of its intellectual destiny, i.e. the philosophy of Hegel and Marx *et al.*

Hence, it is presumably due to Goethe’s translation of Diderot’s dialogue that *aliénation d’esprit* becomes *Entfremdung des Geistes* (Heidegren 1995: 226) and that we consequently encounter *Entfremdung* in Hegel’s *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Schmidt 1996: 642). Moreover, in Hegel’s hands, *Entfremdung* surely becomes a term of the utmost conceptual importance. In the *Phenomenology*, *Entfremdung* is thus used in all kinds of morphological variations, i.e. as a name, a verb and an adjective, and, as mentioned above, especially in the long chapter on the Spirit. Moreover, in the same chapter, in section VI.B., Hegel quotes extensively from Goethe’s translation.

However, in the place where we would expect to find at least some mention of alienation in the *Phenomenology*, namely when Hegel quotes from the passage in Diderot’s dialogue in which *Lui* is approaching the frenzy characterized as an alienation of the spirit (i.e. the one passage in which Goethe uses the word *Entfremdung*), there is no mention of alienation or any morphological variations of it – despite the fact that, in this section, Hegel quotes extensively from Diderot’s dialogue (see GW 9, 283–284; TWA 3, 387 and NR, 110–111/82–83). Instead, Hegel prefers to introduce the situation in terms of a “lacerated [*zerrissene*] consciousness” (GW 9, 283; TWA 3, 386) and comment on “the madness [*Vorrückheit*] of the musician” (GW 9, 283; TWA 3, 387). In

this way, Hegel seems to side with the English and Danish translators, ignoring the connotations of the French term ‘*aliénation*’.

Moreover, as Schacht has noticed (Schacht 1971: 43), the expression ‘*Entfremdung des Geistes*’ is conspicuously absent from Hegel’s discussion, and nowhere does Hegel explicitly quote the word ‘*Entfremdung*’ with quotation marks. However, I will argue that Schacht draws the wrong conclusion from this. As he has noticed, Hegel does in fact use an expression close to Goethe’s, namely ‘*der sich entfremdete Geist*’, i.e. the spirit alienated from itself, and he uses this expression as part of the title of the most important section regarding the discussion of alienation (section VI.B). Unlike Schacht, I therefore think that Hegel wants to convey a message that includes that of Diderot and Goethe, deliberately conceiving of ‘alienation’ as implying the “loss of one’s senses” (Schacht 1971: 43).

However, to explore this in detail, we first need to take a closer look at the *Phenomenology*. First published in 1807, it is often assumed that this is where Hegel first uses the term ‘*Entfremdung*’ (Schacht 1971: 25), inspired by Goethe’s translation of Diderot’s dialogue, which was first published in 1805. However, according to Heidegren, Hegel had in fact already used the term in a manuscript from 1805–06, the so-called *Jena System Sketches* (Heidegren 1995: 463), but it is only in the *Phenomenology* that we can talk of a real “innovation of philosophical terminology” (Heidegren 1995: 226): from something just mentioned, and maybe only in passing, *Entfremdung* had become a crucial conceptual element of systematic importance in the analysis of the formation – i.e. the *Bildung* – of consciousness to spirit, religion and absolute knowledge.¹⁷

So, even if Hegel hesitated to quote Goethe’s translation of the French ‘*aliénation*’ to ‘*Entfremdung*’, or, more precisely, the translation of ‘*aliénation d’esprit*’ to ‘*Entfremdung des Geistes*’, *Entfremdung* as such had clearly become a crucial moment in Hegel’s argument, and it appears that, in some way or another, Goethe’s translation of the dialogue must have influenced this. The question then becomes: what was this influence, how can it be explained, and what conceptual implications can we draw from it?

The incorporation of *Rameau’s Nephew* into the *Phenomenology* has aptly been described by Schmidt as “situating this most peculiar of dialogues into [the] most baffling of books” (Schmidt 1996: 626), thus wrapping “a riddle in-[to] an enigma” (Schmidt 1996: 629). There is, however, no doubt that Hegel was inspired by Diderot’s work: Hegel quotes passages *verbatim* from Goethe’s translation of *Rameau’s Nephew* in his analysis of *Entfremdung* (see GW 9, 268, 283–284, 295–296; TWA 3, 365, 387, 403),¹⁸ and, as Heidegren has noticed, this is the only work of his contemporaries that Hegel quotes with quotation marks in the whole of the *Phenomenology* (Heidegren 1995: 466).

¹⁷ See, e.g., my Sørensen 2015. Or ch. 6 in Sørensen 2019b.

¹⁸ In the former edition, index and *Anhang* point to the relevant pages and lines; in the latter edition, the quotations are marked in the text with editorial footnotes referring to Diderot.

Goethe's translation was not a great commercial success (Schmidt 1996: 625), but it was exactly what Hegel had been looking for, and he attributed a similar role to Diderot's dialogue as he attributed to his favorite classical tragedy *Antigone*, where Sophocles addresses the conflict between human law and divine law. Indeed, both of these literary works are crucial for the argument in the longest and arguably most important chapter of the *Phenomenology*, i.e. chapter six, which is simply called "The Spirit", i.e. "*Der Geist*" (GW 9, 238-362; TWA 3, 324-494).

Antigone is quoted in the first of the three sections, "The True Spirit. Ethical Life [*Sittlichkeit*]", and *Rameau's Nephew* in the second, "The Spirit Alienated from Itself. Formation [*Bildung*]"; in both cases, Hegel marks the quotations in the original text with quotation marks but does not provide information on the authors or the works quoted. However, whereas *Antigone* is quoted only once (see GW 9, 236; TWA 3, 348), *Rameau's Nephew* is quoted three times and paraphrased at least once (see GW 9, 268, 283-284, 295-296; TWA 3 365, 387, 404) (Heidegren 1995: 465-466). In the Hegel literature, much more attention has been devoted to Hegel's use of *Antigone* than his use of Diderot,¹⁹ and this is a bias I hope to put an end to.

As David W. Price argues, one can consider Hegel's incorporation of literature as an "intertextual dialectic", in which, rather than interpreting the text loyally, he uses it to say something himself. When Jauss criticizes Hegel's use of Diderot, he "fault[s] Hegel for not being Diderot", thus claiming exclusive access to "Diderot's text". However, in the playful spirit of Diderot, Hegel in fact "inserts, and at times, subverts, quotations taken from Diderot" (Price 1998: 276-277). Hence, into the quotation referring to *Lui's* mime that impresses and moves *Moi* (i.e. *Lui's* "greatest moment of triumph"), Hegel introduces another quotation in which *Lui* depicts something less impressive, namely from a scene in which he pantomimes the relationship between a pimp and a young girl.

By combining the two quotations in this way, Hegel thus very concretely reveals the "truth of the Nephew", i.e. this bewildering combination of "shrewdness and depravity" (Price 1998: 274-275) (see also NR 46/4). Interestingly, however, Price also avoids relating to alienation; but, as I will argue, much of what Hegel wants to tell us about alienation is in fact located here. Alienation is what brings consciousness to the point where nobility becomes mixed with baseness, we find "true as well as false ideas, [...] complete shamefulfulness as well as full openness and truth", implying emotions going from the "highest admiration to the deepest contempt and rejection" (GW 9, 284; TWA 3, 387).

19 Hence, Charles Taylor discusses *Antigone*, but not *Rameau's Nephew* (see Taylor 1975: 173-177), Stewart also includes *Antigone* in the systematic discussions, whereas *Rameau's Nephew* is just mentioned in passing (see (Stewart 2000: 299-209, 317, 326, 330). Siep also discusses *Antigone* systematically, relegating Diderot *et al.* to a footnote of two lines (see Siep 2000: 181-186, 196), and Klaus Vieweg and Wolfgang Welsch allot a chapter to Hegel's discussion of *Antigone*, but none to alienation or *Rameau's Nephew* (see Vieweg, Welsch 2008: 8-9, 455-473).

Upon comparison and closer inspection, it becomes clear that Hegel does not only refer extensively to Diderot's dialogue. As Jauss notes (Jauss 1983: 19), Hegel also interprets the dialogue as a whole, and, as I would like to add, he does so by expanding its basic themes, and in particular the meaning of alienation, in his construction of the dialectical formation of the spirit to science. This is particularly clear in the subsection already mentioned, but also in the chapter on the spirit as such. Even though Hegel does not associate the word '*Entfremdung*' with the specific context in which Goethe employs the term, I will argue that Hegel did in fact endorse Goethe's translation, including the connotations regarding mental disorder and insanity, but that he displaced the focus from a matter of individual psychology to a matter of social psychology, i.e. of culture, history and spirit. I will also argue that he recognized how Diderot stressed the material underpinnings of the spiritual achievements. Hence, rather than merely subverting Diderot, Hegel displaced and expanded *Lui's* social criticism of Enlightenment France anno 1761 to a systematic critique of Modernity.

Alienation of the spirit in the French sense should thus be taken seriously, but at a supra-individual and ideological level. In a way, Hegel can be viewed as an early anti-psychiatrist, arguing that insanity is the only sane reaction to an insane society, or, at least, a rational adjustment to it. Or, as it has also been put, that mental suffering is a healthy reaction to a sick society. As Ronald D. Laing argues, schizophrenia is a failure to adapt first to family and then to society (Laing, 1981: 57; see also Sedgwick 1972: 35–41). He describes normality as an "appalling state of alienation" (Laing 1981: 136), emphasizing how "normally' alienated" people have killed "perhaps 100,000,000 of their fellow normal men in the last fifty years", i.e. primarily in the two world wars of the 20th century. In such a world, it is "absurd" to educate children to "lose themselves" and become "normal" (Laing 1981: 24). However, Laing also proves to be one of our contemporaries when he argues that it is only by violating ourselves that we have "achieved our capacity to live in relative adjustment to a civilization driven to its own destruction" (Laing 1981: 64). Our "'normal' adjusted state" is a "betrayal of our true potentialities", many of us being simply "too successful in acquiring a false self to adapt to false realities" (Laing 1981: 12). This is, I would claim, also what Hegel hints at. To explore this claim in more detail, however, it is necessary to look more closely at chapter six of the *Phenomenology*.

E. The Spirit as it Immediately is

Hegel's *Phenomenology* can be considered the prime example of a philosophy of consciousness. As readers, we follow consciousness raising its consciousness of its objects and of itself from mere sense perception to self-consciousness until it finally reaches absolute knowledge. Famously, Hegel thus constantly stresses the contrast, conflict and sometimes contradiction between how reality is in-it-self and how reality is experienced for-it-self, typically by

consciousness, but also sometimes by the reader. In order to avoid unnecessary complications in the present discussion, I will largely leave this aspect of the dialectics aside. However, it is important to consider that consciousness is the English translation of *Bewußtsein*, which, translated literally, and taking seriously the constitutive elements, would be ‘conscious being’, in German ‘*bewußt Sein*’. Hence, as Marx and Engels put it, “the consciousness [das *Bewußtsein*] can never be anything other than the conscious being [das *bewußte Sein*]” (Marx, Engels 1969: 26; MEW 3).

What Hegel reconstructs conceptually is thus the process where human being becomes conscious of itself as human being and even of itself as self-conscious human being. A crucial stage of this process is self-consciousness, where the struggle for recognition between two such consciousnesses provokes a battle of life and death, which ultimately results in the famous dialectic of master and slave. Through self-consciousness, we get a first glimpse of the concept of spirit, the unity of the “*I* that is *we* and the *we* that is *I*”, (GW 9, 108; TWA 3, 145) i.e. collectivity retaining individuality. From self-consciousness we move to the stage where consciousness can claim to have reason, and, from here, we reach the stage where consciousness becomes reason as such, where consciousness “is the spirit, is the real ethical essence [*Wesen*]” (GW 9, 239; TWA 3, 326).

At this point, it could be helpful to consider how the term ‘spirit’ is used in everyday language. Think, for example, of expressions such as ‘team spirit’ or ‘the spirit of 1989’, i.e. something eminently human but supra-individual. The spirit in these examples has of course been created by a number of individual consciousnesses, but the creation and constitution take place through an infinite interplay of interactions; as such, the stability and endurance of the spirit achieved extends beyond any of the individual contributors. For these reasons, the former cannot be reduced to any of the latter. Think also of terms like ‘culture’ or ‘atmosphere’, or phenomena such as language or religion.

Hegel recognizes that humanity develops at levels where genuine collective entities gain relative independence in relation to individual entities, and that a developmental logic proper for these levels (i.e. for the collective entities) must be recognized. In fact, their importance is signaled by the term Hegel chooses for them: “ethical substance” (GW 9, 229; TWA 3, 311) or merely “substance” (GW 9, 242; TWA 3, 328). Hence, this holism is not only methodological; Hegel argues that substantial entities at this level must necessarily be included in the metaphysical account of conscious human being. This is why he claims that only now, in chapter six, after hundreds of pages, has he reached the point in the conceptual reconstruction at which consciousness is “real and alive”; all the foregoing “figures of the consciousness were [only] abstractions of it” (GW 9, 239; TWA 3, 325) (see also Hyppolite 1967: 320–321; Hyppolite 1974: 331–332).

The first four, or perhaps five, chapters of the *Phenomenology* – which Hegel students and scholars have spent thousands of hours studying – are only introductory analytical abstractions that establish elements to be used when exploring the real issues. In reality, individual human beings are only human

when part of, or mediated by, something beyond themselves – be that people, the state or (wo)mankind, i.e. spirit; or, to put it in another, more fashionable, way: As conscious being, we are always already spirit. The point is not merely that the spirit must be understood as repeating the architecture and the dialectical movements of the analytical components at a higher level, as it has sometimes been suggested (Stewart 2000: 294). It is rather that the spirit is the immediate historical reality in all of its experienced complex supra-individual particularity, demonstrating societal and existential aspects, the logic of which so far Hegel has not analyzed, because it could not be detected in the abstract analytical figures analyzed in the preceding chapters. In chapter five on reason, Hegel thus reinterprets the epistemological and metaphysical categories of the first four chapters in terms of, and mediated by, social relations, ethics and religion (Stewart 2000: 166–167), and this is what prepares the ground for his reconstruction of the particular historical logic constituting the experienced political and cultural reality.

Hence, in chapter six, in its most immediate figure, the spirit is constituted by the people. This is a people that decides for itself, like in Greek Antiquity, and this is where Antigone illustrates the tragic conflict. First, as Hegel says, there is “the spirit as the ethical life [*Sittlichkeit*] of a people [...]; the individual that is a world” (GW 9, 240; TWA 3, 326). As such, the spirit must become conscious of itself, and ultimately attain knowledge about itself, through a series of figurations, and this dialectical movement is what Hegel describes in the three sections of this chapter that cover more than one quarter of the book. Hence, from the outset, in ethical life, we are part of a people, i.e. the substance, and, as was previously the case in the other analytical figures of consciousness, this constitutes a fundamental conflict between plurality and unity, or particularity and universality. In this case, i.e. when we are dealing with the real spirit, Hegel first confronts “the universality of the known law and the ethical life ready at hand” with the “simple individuality” (GW 9, 242; TWA 3, 329).

For the spirit, this general conflict between individual and society is at stake for almost any possible figure. However, within ethical life, Hegel first pursues another more specific conflict. On the one hand, we can consider spirit as “human law”, because it takes the form of being “a reality conscious of itself”. As universals we can speak of “known law” and “the existing ethical life”; as particulars we can consider human law “the real self-consciousness of the individual” or even as “government” (GW 9, 242; TWA 3, 329). This is the idea of the democratic polis, i.e. “the ethical state power”. On the other hand, we have “another power, the divine law”, which does not relate directly to the polis but to the immediate “natural ethical common essence”, the “ethical being of the family” (GW 9, 243; TWA 3, 330). In the latter case, Hegel stresses the “duty of the family member”, e.g. in relation to the “death” of an “individual” (GW 9, 244; TWA 3, 332), and also the “piety” between man and wife and between parents and children, the latter being mixed and with “natural relations and emotions” (GW 9, 246–47; TWA 3, 336). The individual pursuit of the “pleasure of enjoyment” within the family, or the “law of the heart”, is

thus in potential conflict with the “self-consciousness as citizen of a people” (GW 9, 249; TWA 3, 339).

The dialectical argument developing the “bifurcation [*Entzweiung*]” of the “simple immediacy” (GW 9, 254; TWA 3, 345) of the ethical life does of course contain several more elements, but one relation stands out as uncompromised, that between sister and brother of the “same blood”. In this case, there is a “free individuality”, and here we find the highest kind of ethical “femininity” (GW 9, 247; TWA 3, 336). This is where Antigone comes in. Her two brothers have tragically killed each other in the struggle over the throne of Thebes, which is then taken over by their uncle, Kreon. He decides that one of the brothers has violated civil law and must be left unburied outside the city walls. However, referring to divine law and right, Antigone nevertheless buries offending brother, and, for this violation of profane city law, the king Kreon has to punish his niece (Heidegren 1995: 215–216).

The tragedy of the ethical life of true spirit is constituted by a number of conflicts, most prominently those between profane and divine law and between communality and individuality. Many of these conflicts can be considered variations of the basic logical conflict between universality and particularity, which is the fuel that keeps the Hegelian dialectics moving throughout the *Phenomenology*. However, even before reaching the stage of the true spirit, Hegel has already introduced another kind of conflict, namely when two elements or aspects are “alien [*fremde*] to each other” (GW 9, 175; TWA 3, 237). This possible relation becomes crucial for consciousness when it assumes the figure of the “law of the heart.” Here consciousness poses its good intentions with “immediate simplicity” but is subsequently contradicted not just by the reality that includes the good hearts of others but also the realization of its own intentions. The final result is the “alienation [*Entfremdung*] of itself” (GW 9, 204; TWA 3, 279).

What is important here is that, in such a self-alienating substance, i.e. in a society where the *we* is not the *I*, typically because injustice is prevalent, alienation does not simply refer to the constitutive or objectifying process of consciousness relating to something that can be both itself and not itself. As suggested by Diderot, alienation rather refers to an extreme mental state that both implies and is implied by the experience of estrangement and material sufferings in some combination. Brought to the extreme, alienation may thus involve the suffering implied by being in a state of fluctuating and unstable flux of objectification, exterioration and estrangement, as is exemplified by *Lui*’s performance.

Among Hegel scholars, however, the exact relationship between alienation and the constitutive terms is the object of conflicting opinions, which I cannot fully explore at this point – yet one of these opinions needs to be addressed. As much as I appreciate Hyppolite’s commentary, I have to contest, and in fact inverse, his wording regarding a crucial issue, including the way this wording is translated into English. As I see it, Hyppolite rightly acknowledges that Hegel distinguishes between *Entäusserung* and *Entfremdung* (I will return to

this question below). However, Hyppolite wrongly juxtaposes this distinction with the distinction between, respectively, ‘*aliénation*’ and ‘*extranéation*’, i.e. alienation and estrangement, claiming that the latter terms are stronger than the former (Hyppolite, 1967: II, 372; Hyppolite 1974: 385, 607). In the present argument, I assume that the opposite is the case; I thus emphasize the element of hostility, pathology and insanity in alienation, whereas I consider estrangement a process that is much less dramatic – a process of losing familiarity with something disposed of, which by implication becomes exterior, objectified and independent.

Moreover, for centuries, in both French and English, alienation has had a meaning that stretches from law to psychology. As a contemporary of Diderot, for Rousseau the *Social Contract* thus requires a “total alienation of each associate with all his rights to the community” (Rousseau 1993: 182–183, bk. 1, ch.vi). Hence, given that Goethe translated ‘*aliénation*’ to ‘*Entfremdung*’ and that Hegel adopted this German term in the *Phenomenology*, it requires a very good reason not to translate it back in the same way in a commentary on the *Phenomenology*. I therefore accept the well-established chain of equivalents from French via German to English, i.e. ‘*aliénation*’, ‘*Entfremdung*’ and back to ‘alienation’. Even though we may wish it had been different, considering the material qualities of the linguistic signs involved – i.e. the combined letters – this is the best way to maintain the conceptual continuity from Rousseau and Diderot via Goethe, Hegel and Marx to the established English language discussion on alienation that involves psychiatry, psychology and education as well as philosophy and sociology (see, e.g., Johnson 1973; Besag 1966; Schweitzer, Geyer 1989).

F. The World of the Spirit Alienated from Itself

The experiential and self-reflective conflict of alienation defines the second major stage in the formation of the spirit, i.e. section VI.B. entitled “the spirit alienated from itself”, and which is also called the “formation [*Bildung*]” (GW 9, 264; TWA 3, 359). Even though Hegel, as Schacht has emphasized, does not quote *verbatim* Goethe’s expression ‘*Entfremdung des Geistes*’ with all of the pathological connotations mentioned above, he employs the expression ‘*sich entfremdete Geist*’, i.e. ‘Spirit Alienated from Itself’ in the titles at both levels in the sequential specification that brings us to *Rameau’s Nephew*. First, Hegel calls section VI.B. “Der sich entfremdete Geist; die Bildung”, and he then names subsection VI.B.I. “Die Welt des sich entfremdeten Geistes”, i.e. “the World of the Spirit Alienated from Itself”. It is as an example of what can be experienced in such a world that Hegel refers to the said nephew, including the awe-striking frenzy of genius in the central mime described above. This is the best of what can be offered by the cultural Modernity of *l’ancien régime*.

As a figure of consciousness, the spirit alienated from itself reaches a culmination in the “lacerated consciousness” of “absolute distortion [*Verkehrung*]” (GW 9, 283; TWA 3, 386). This conflict is different from the fundamental negation of the *Phenomenology*, that is, the recurring operation that creates logical

and conceptual conflicts which forces consciousness to move onwards in the pursuit of knowledge and truth.²⁰ Hence, we are still dealing with conflict, and this conflict is still operational for the development of consciousness; however, instead of merely a logical conflict of negation, what is at stake here is the failed existential identity of consciousness, i.e. the unfulfilled desire of identifying and uniting oneself spiritually with something beyond oneself, be that family, people, society, the state or humanity.

Considering the architecture of Hegel's argument, *Lui's* performance of laceration and dismemberment is clearly of central importance, but it does not bring an end to alienation. Keeping Goethe's spectacular use of the term 'alienation' in mind, one could even say that, simply by including the term in the titles of the above-mentioned section and subsection, Hegel refers directly to *Lui's* unforgettable performance on the one hand but raises the significance of alienation to a higher-order level (to a real historical figure of not just consciousness but spirit) on the other hand.

Hence, in the chapter on the spirit, we are dealing with real historical figures of the spirit. As Heidegren explains, in section VI.B. "The World of the Spirit Alienated from Itself", Hegel thus gives an account of how the breakdown of the true spirit of Antiquity opens up for a figuration of consciousness that can be recognized historically from the fall of the Roman empire to the absolute monarchy, culminating in the Enlightenment and the French Revolution (Heidegren 1995: 226). Hegel thus reconstructs the spiritual or cultural implications of pre-revolutionary French Modernity, emphasizing in particular, as Schmidt notices, money, musicality and morality (Schmidt 1996: 640). What is at stake is not the implications of psychological, corporal or genetic disorders of one specific person, e.g. the young Rameau, or other kinds of individual pathologies, but the general fractures and divisiveness of culture that reaches a culmination in the unforgettable scene in which *Lui* finally gets excited – almost beyond control – by his own caricatures and pantomime.

In general, I thus agree with Hyppolite, who argues that, with the figure of the spirit alienated from itself, Hegel generalizes what may be thought of as merely individual torments, a spectacular case being that which Diderot ascribes to *Lui* (Hyppolite 1967: II, 398–402; Hyppolite 1974: 411–415). Hence, for Hegel, the state of mind or the culture implied by experiences of *Entfremdung* is conditioned by the political, social and economic structure of the society in question. In Hegel's dialectical reconstruction of the world of the spirit alienated from itself, consciousness is torn, or alternating, between politics and economy, stressing the desirability of freedom and wealth but also problems of inequality, oppression and suffering.²¹ As alienated from itself, consciousness can thus assume the figures of elevated obedience, nobility and honour, but, as "lacerated consciousness", it can also become "vile [*niederträchtige*]"

20 See, e.g., the preface, "A Note on Dialectics" in Marcuse 1960.

21 See, e.g., my account in Sørensen 2019b, DDD I, ch. 6, sect. B.ii. or Sørensen 2015, sect. II.B.

(GW 9, 273, 283–385; TWA 3, 372, 386–388), which is the adjective form of the noun Goethe initially used to describe *Lui*'s baseness, i.e. “*Niederträchtigkeit*” (Goethe 1996: 11).

Hence, in what Hegel calls “the world of *Bildung*” (GW 9, 286; TWA 3, 391), i.e. when the spirit becomes alienated from itself in a particularly strong sense, substantial identification and communality are likely to fail and alienation of the spirit to emerge. With inspiration from Goethe and Diderot, for Hegel, *Entfremdung* clearly signifies a state of mental or spiritual disarray that can be rather extreme; being alienated thus ultimately implies “consciousness being completely torn apart” (GW 9, 291; TWA 3, 398). Brought to the extreme, however, such alienation also implies self-consciousness. As Hegel claims, the “existence” of the “honest consciousness” is the “universal speech and lacerating judgement”, which speaks out “what is true” about what “in this real world truthfully must be done” (GW 9, 283; TWA 3, 386). This is *Lui* in a nutshell. Hegel’s consciousness is not just “tranquil”, as Bewes seems to think. On the contrary, Hegel clearly appreciates how Rameau is alive to “the utter alienation of the world from culture” (Bewes 1997: 137). As Hyppolite states, for Hegel, the vile consciousness becomes the one to speak out “the truth of the whole process” (Hyppolite 1967: 386; Hyppolite 1974: 399).

As emphasized by both Hyppolite and Heidegren (Hyppolite 1967: 389–404; Hyppolite 1974: 402–417; Heidegren 1995: 234–241), and as I have also recognized (Sørensen, 2019b: 196–197), language plays a crucial role in completing Hegel’s dialectical argument concerning alienation. However, in the present context, recognizing the materialism of Diderot, I wish to stress Hegel’s sensitivity to the material aspects of the spirit alienated from itself, i.e. on the one hand, inequality and poverty and, on the other hand, hunger and corporal suffering. As Hyppolite notes, this opposition can of course not be reduced to one “between two economic or social classes” (Hyppolite 1967: 386; Hyppolite 1974: 398). However, Hegel clearly recognizes the significance of the unequal distribution of wealth and political power in pre-revolutionary society, stressing what we, with reference to current discourse, could refer to as the ‘power-wealth nexus’ highlighting the realities of wealth whilst demonstrating a sensitivity towards those without it (see, e.g., GW 9: 270–273, 278–279, 282–283; TWA 3: 367–372, 379–380, 384–385).

Hegel explains how the arrogant rich host may believe that he has bought the “subjugation of the interior nature” of his guests merely by serving them a “meal”, but, in doing so, that he overlooks the “indignation [*Empörung*]” of the poor recipient, having already thrown off his “chains”. To again allude to traditional fixed phrases, having nothing left to lose except for chains, the poor “self-consciousness” employs the language of indignation against the “state” and the “wealth”; ultimately, however, due to the material realities of poverty and impotence, self-consciousness must humiliate itself through the “language of obsequiousness [*Schmeichelei*]” (GW 9, 281–282; TWA 3, 383–384). Again, *Lui* is clearly the reference (Hyppolite 1967: 398; Hyppolite 1974: 411). Due to the unexpected effects of the donation of the meal, the rich benefactor may face

the “interior abyss, the bottomless depth, where all the support and substance have disappeared” (GW 9, 281; TWA 3, 384), but the poor alienated genius and his family are constantly starving. Confronted with the offer of a much-desired meal, the “spirit of gratitude is therefore the feeling of the deepest abjectness as well as the deepest indignation” (GW 9, 280; TWA 3, 382). This is clearly “a pre-revolutionary state of mind” (Hyppolite 1967: 387; Hyppolite 1974: 400).

In addition, Hegel refers to the above-mentioned discussion in section B between *Moi* and *Lui* concerning Diogenes, recognizing that, confronted with the “vile” consciousness of the latter, the former may well demand the “dissolution of this whole world of distortion”, arguing for the “excellence” and “demand” of “universal reality” and the “universal individual”. However, as Hegel emphasizes, recognizing the above-mentioned egoism without escape of Rameau’s nephew, even though it may be considered “bad”, in the “real world”, the first demand of each “individual” is “to care for-it-self” (GW 9, 285; TWA 3, 388–389).

It is clear from *Lui*’s arguments in the dialogue that culture and spirit in this materialist sense affected Diderot. Through his spiritual suffering, *Lui* demonstrates, if not a healthy, sane or rational reaction, then at least a perfectly understandable reaction to the material and cultural living conditions of a particular kind of insane society – in which social inequality is extreme and the institutionalized recognition of property rights makes money necessary for bare survival. As Ludwig Siep remarks, responding to Rousseau’s critique of civilization, Hegel’s subject of alienation is the “modern human being” (Siep 2000: 192), i.e. a somatically and psychologically sound person being gravely affected by the societal living conditions he or she must endure.

Hegel thus generalizes, radicalizes and displaces the alienation experienced by *Lui* to become a general social phenomenon, i.e. another and more general world, ‘the world of the spirit alienated from itself’, which is conditioned by a particular historical phase, namely the emergence of capitalism as a societal formation. It is the material conditions of this particular historical period that really bring alienation to the fore. Alienation is not restricted to this period, but the growing social pathology of this period puts alienation on the historical agenda as a fundamental existential problem. Moreover, I will claim that this line of thought (i.e. the social criticism implied by the work of Diderot, Goethe and Hegel) sets the agenda for a critique of ideology that must have caught the interest of young radicals such as Marx.

G. Alienation beyond the World of Bildung: Faith, Insight and Enlightenment

Hegel clearly takes seriously the idea of alienation. In fact, as I argue, Hegel takes it even more seriously than Diderot. In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel gives special prominence to the spectacular performance of *Lui* in the crucial section on the spirit alienated from itself. As mentioned above, however, Hegel does not employ the word ‘alienation’ to describe the experiences of self-consciousness

tearing itself apart, even though this is the only way it is used by Diderot and Goethe. Instead, Hegel displaces and expands the idea of alienation of the spirit to become an intrinsic constitutive quality of Modernity, and, in the construction of the argument of the *Phenomenology*, the spirit alienated from itself therefore becomes the figure comprising the pathologies of the historical period from Antiquity to Modernity.

However, even if the level of alienation is raised to that of Hegelian spirit, alienation does not become less pathological and less acute, quite the contrary. The expansion only means, I will claim, that alienation also assumes the task of providing the epistemological critique and negation that drives forward the dialectical movement of spirit through experience to results. Chapter VI on the spirit thus has three sections, A., B. and C, each reconstructing the developmental logic of a particular stage in the epistemic progress of the spirit. From the immediate ethical truth – i.e. *Sittlichkeit* – spirit is brought to traverse the alienation from itself and the resulting *Bildung* that together provide the mediating movement towards the morality of the spirit certain of itself.

Alienation thus assumes a crucial structural role in the *Phenomenology*, mediating between immediate ethicality and self-conscious morality. Still, given the importance attributed to the alienating performance of *Lui*, alienation cannot be reduced to that which instigates the developmental logic of spirit. Just as it was the case with the Cynicism of Diderot, for Hegel, alienation comes in two guises: one that follows directly from the existential estrangement and material discomfort expressed in the argumentative rage of *Lui* and another that is domesticated and rationalized as exemplified by the reasoning of *Moi*. Hence, alienation is a pathology that provokes certain arguments at both the individual and societal level of self-consciousness, and it is also constitutive for the universal development of spirit. And, as in Diderot's dialogue, for Hegel, neither of these comes without the other. Both are intimately connected, inconclusive, and open-ended, but not without meaning or bite.

In the rest of subsection VI.B.I, the alienation of spirit becomes manifest in pure faith that ignores the realities experienced in the world of formation, but this faith is shown by Enlightenment to be, at best, an illusion. Furthermore, in subsection VI.B.II., "The Enlightenment", the reason professed is shown not to be able to escape alienation, neither in relation to reality and the essence of everything nor in relation to itself as consciousness and spirit. Enlightenment can demonstrate the superstition involved in relation to religious idols and icons, but it has no positive answer to the fundamental questions that haunt human existence. Finally, in subsection VI.B.III, "The Absolute Freedom and the Terror", the spirit, being still deeply tormented and alienated from itself, can only utter its cry for absolute freedom, and the attempt to realize such freedom was what occurred during the French Revolution, albeit in a distorted way.

Hence, as a prelude to the dialectics of the Enlightenment, Hegel demonstrates the alienating contradictions and thus the futility of the figure that real self-consciousness may recur to after the exhausting culmination of the world of formation, namely "faith [*Glauben*]". Faith is a transitional stage, on the one

hand contraposed to the world of *Bildung*, on the other hand still part of the process of *Bildung*, and, as such, it is alienated from itself (Hyppolite 1967: 369; Hyppolite 1974: 381). To characterize Faith, Hegel explicitly refers to the famous figure discussed much earlier in the *Phenomenology*, namely the Unhappy Consciousness (see GW 9, 287; TWA 3, 392). Similar in structure, faith is thus characterized by taking refuge in thought, imagining as “pure consciousness” that the “real essence” is to be found “beyond reality” (GW 9, 287; TWA 3, 391). The pure consciousness is therefore in conflict with the real consciousness. Pure consciousness is immediate and simple “pure thought” that assumes “the essence of faith” to be an “image” in a “supra-sensible world” (GW 9, 289; TWA 3, 394), which is different from, and alien to, self-consciousness. Such a pure consciousness is “alienated” and even “alienated from itself” (GW 9, 288; TWA 3, 392–393) in the existential sense, identifying its truth with a beyond that can never be reached, an imagined self in another world than can only be alien to the real self.

Or, at least, this is how it looks from the figure that opposes Faith, namely “Pure Insight [*Einsicht*]” for which “only the concept is real” (GW 9, 290; TWA 3, 396–397). Hence, while Faith finds its truth in images of thought beyond reality, “Pure Insight relates negatively to the absolute essence of the consciousness of faith” (GW 9, 299; TWA 3, 408). It is Pure Insight that calls consciousness to be “*for itself*, what everybody *is in itself* – reasonable” (GW 9, 292; TWA 3, 398). This is the call that we know so well. Insight has the “purpose [*Absicht*]” to be “general pure insight”, since, as “pure purpose”, it “has as content pure insight”. However, Insight opposes Faith only by completing the negation of reality as the truth of spirit, ultimately recognizing as content only concepts. Faith and Insight, and thus Reason, are of the same kind, placing truth in a “perpetual beyond” (Hyppolite 1967: 423; Hyppolite 1974: 437). As Hegel argues, the pure “consciousness of the spirit” thus only presents itself as “concept” – it has not yet been “realized” (GW 9, 291; TWA 3, 397).

This sets the scene for the entry of a new major historical figure, “the Enlightenment”, i.e. sub-section V.B.II. As Kant famously claimed, the goal of enlightenment is to have the courage to think for yourself, and this implies criticism, both in the form of anti-authoritarian satire approaching existential self-alienation and in the form of epistemological skepticism nourishing the negation of received opinion. In the dialectics of Enlightenment, Hegel thus returns to the principled logical and epistemological conflicts that initiated the formative journey of consciousness, contrasting the conceptual content of pure consciousness with the thing sensed by the Sensuous Certainty of chapter I (see GW 9, 299–300; TWA 3, 409).

When it comes to the skeptical figure of Enlightenment, however, we have reached the historical realization of the spirit. Hegel thus emphasizes that the pure thought of insightful consciousness realizes itself as a movement that fights the images of institutionalized superstition and the power structures that rely on it. Hegel thus denounces how, due to their “stupidity and confusion”, people become “victims of deceit by the priesthood”, which is driven by

“selfishness” to “despotism”. It is against the “deceitful priesthood” (GW 9, 294; TWA 3, 401) that Enlightenment directs itself. Just like Diderot, Hegel is revolted by the “deliberate [*bewußte*] lie” (GW 9, 299; TWA 3, 408) of those in power.

Pure Insight clearly manifests a “simplicity” in its “reflective negativity”, being thus “according to its nature displayed as in opposition” (GW 9, 295; TWA 3, 403), and this quality is maintained in the realization as Enlightenment. However, it is mistaken to claim that, for Hegel, there is no real alienation, that alienation is simply an error of thought that must be sublated by correct philosophy, and that, as such, Enlightenment is just a transitional stage (Henning 2015: 80). It is true that Hegel takes issue with what he considers false thought and that this implies recognizing truth as the goal; hence, just like the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment, Hegel practices ideology critique, in this case in relation to the Enlightenment itself as a realized project. Adding alienated realization and self-reflexivity to epistemological skepticism, Enlightenment thus achieves special significance in the world history of the spirit. However, Hegel can be rightly accused of covering his tracks by employing a certain level of obscurity.

Pure Insight and Enlightenment thus reveal the deceit by revealing the falseness of received opinion. Interestingly, however, even when self-consciousness has committed to the past the drama of tearing oneself apart in the world of formation, when it comes to commenting on the principled epistemological arguments against faith and superstition, Hegel gives the word to *Lui*, not *Moi*. In the dialogue, *Lui* mockingly tells *Moi* that the new Trinity of Truth, Goodness and Beauty simply replaces the old one of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. First, the new “strange God” modestly takes the seat on the bench besides the “countryside idol” (NR 110/82). For Hegel, this introduces a “spirit” that is “invisible” and goes “unnoticed”, and then – and this is where Hegel quotes *Lui* – “one beautiful morning, with the elbow it gives the comrade a push, and then, Bang Crash! there’s the idol flat on the ground” (GW 9, 295–296; TWA 3, 403; see also NR 110/82) (see also Diderot 2001: 66). As Hegel presents the case, this is clearly a *coup d’état*; however, as Heidegren points out, “this silent and bloodless revolution” introduces the much more “noisy” Enlightenment that leads to the “bloody revolution” (Heidegren 1995: 246).

As Diderot lets *Lui* explain in continuation, this was how the Jesuits introduced Christianity in China and India, and, just to completely erase all suspicions of cynicism, *Lui* believes that this “political method” without noise, bloodshed and “martyrdom”, without “touching even a hair on the head”, is “the best” (NR 110/82; see also GW 9, 512–513). Even though *Lui* is obviously polemic and confrontational, his goal is not a violent revolution.

By quoting Diderot out of context and introducing *Lui* again at this stage of the argument, Hegel demonstrates his intertextual playfulness, expanding again the scope of the original argument, in this case radicalizing the humble and peaceful idealism expressed by *Lui*. However, by displacing the quotation of *Lui* as praising a silent coup, Hegel can be said to recognize the insight of Diderot even more, revealing the insufficiency of domesticated enlightenment

Cynicism when it presents its secular normativity politely with reason and without confrontation. Hence, without the material push from a radical Cynic, enlightened reason will never replace superstition, and this is the tragedy of Enlightenment as a “philosophy of the world” (Hyppolite 1967: 414; Hyppolite 1974: 427).

The realization of the Enlightenment as a historical event, and the subsequent revolution, receives insufficient momentum from the domesticated rationality of the philosophers, such as it was expressed in many of the technical contributions to Diderot’s famous *Encyclopaedia*. Without the material and corporal drives of real people desiring something beyond reason, no action will take place. Still, when it comes to Hegel’s dialectics of enlightenment in the *Phenomenology*, the logical contradictions and the epistemology of the negation are what sets in motion the movement of realization. Again, the one aspect of alienation does not come without the other.

I will not pursue Hegel’s dialectics of Enlightenment in further detail here. As scholars have noticed, it is likely that Hegel discreetly refers to an entire range of now forgotten Enlightenment writers, and there are also many interesting details in the dialectics that bring to mind the similar dialectics of Horkheimer and Adorno (Brauer 2008: 475–478); however, the basic conflict is rather simple: Enlightenment denies eternal life and insists on the perishability of everything, emphasizing in particular the sensuous qualities of religious symbols. It points out to Faith that its assumed “absolute essence” is merely “a piece of stone, a block of wood that has eyes, but does not see” (GW 9, 300; TWA 3, 409). However, due to the inherent negativity of Enlightenment, which even denies connections between sense impression and reality, ultimately empiricism is all that is left. As Hegel argues, Enlightenment thus fails to provide any positive content, leaving reality without truth or essence (Heidegren 1995: 248).

Denouncing any image of God, Enlightenment is left with “the empty” (GW 9, 305; TWA 3, 416). Instead of “truth” and “reality”, the focus shifts to “action [*Tun*]”, “natural drives” and “pleasure” (GW 9, 309; TWA 3, 421), and the only meaningful relation to reality is practical and functional, meaning that now “utility” can offer itself as positive content, i.e. as the essence, but which to faith is “horrible” and merely expresses a “platitute” (GW 9, 305; TWA 3, 417). Moreover, this demystification, which reduces reality to that which the senses can tell us, goes even further in its negativity, hence finally insisting on the “pure abstraction” of “pure matter” (GW 9, 313; TWA 3, 426). This alienating materialism sets consciousness completely free, and then we are faced with the “absolute freedom and the terror” (GW 9, 316; TWA 3, 431) of the revolution.

H. Relating Alienation to *Bildung*, Alienation and Exteriorization

For Hegel, alienation thus has at least these two aspects, the existential and the epistemological, the latter juxtaposing alienation with negation rather than pathological estrangement. Nevertheless, for Hegel, it is possible to speak

interchangeably about “negation or alienation” also within a “world of *Bildung*” (GW 9, 322; TWA 3, 439), which, as we know, is destined to culminate in a pathological alienation. Adding to determine the idea of alienation is thus its intimate relation to *Bildung*. Hegel emphasizes that the “spirit of the alienation of oneself has its existence [*Dasein*] in the world of *Bildung*” (GW 9, 286; TWA 3, 391). Moreover, summing up the entire movement of alienation in section V.B., this “world of formation” (GW 9, 319; TWA 3, 435) is said to be “ethical [*sittliche*] and real” (GW 9, 321; TWA 3, 438). However, even though *Bildung*, judging from the title of section V.B., seems to accompany alienation all the way to the French Revolution, as I have argued (Sørensen 2019b: 194–198), for Hegel, *Bildung* clearly culminates in the uncomfortable truth realized and revealed by the bohemian consciousness of *Lui* tearing itself apart. After this dramatic incident, alienation continues to be the overall framework, but there is no further mention of *Bildung*.

Hence, when it comes to ethics, law and politics, the alienated “shamelessness” (GW 9, 283; TWA 3, 387) of *Lui* is as far as the world of *Bildung* can bring us. As Hyppolite concludes, the truth of *Bildung* is “a truth which the naïve, and non-dialectical, philosopher cannot understand” (Hyppolite 1967: 402; Hyppolite 1974: 415). The Enlightenment as such and the “absolute freedom” of the revolution brings no *Bildung*, since ultimately its realization implies its opposite, namely the abstract “negation” of terror and “meaningless death” (GW 9, 322; TWA 3, 439). As also suggested by 20th-century anti-psychiatry, being brought to the edge of insanity is the implication of a particular historical figure of the spirit, and the tragedy is that, for Hegel, this pathological self-reflexivity of the spirit cannot be overcome or reconciled by continued formation, neither psychologically nor historically. Hegel’s consciousness can continue its quest for Morality, Religion and Science, but then we are past formative alienation in the sense just mentioned; hence, in relation to these three figures, Hegel no longer speaks about *Bildung*.

Moreover, discontinuing the world of *Bildung* seems to indicate a displacement of alienation from the pathology of existential torments and laceration to the epistemological operation of negation that brings to the fore the next figures of the progression of the spirit alienated from itself towards becoming a spirit certain of itself on the way to Absolute Knowledge.

The figure of the spirit alienating itself is thus much more comprehensive than the spectacular scenes discussed above. As the first part of section VI.B. on alienation, one may consider the story of the world of formation, a very elaborate introduction to the next two sub-sections. Hence, by reconstructing the dialectics of the world of alienation and the lacerated self-consciousness of *Lui*, Hegel prepares the ground for the epistemological discussion of the period made famous by Diderot and the rest of the *philosophes*, namely the Enlightenment, and, as we have seen, to introduce the epistemological discussion, Hegel again gives the word to *Lui* – for the last time.

Adding to the complexity of the issue is the preface and the introduction to the *Phenomenology*. Whereas alienation is only mentioned in passing in these

sections (see GW 9, 18; TWA 3, 24), *Bildung* is presented in a general sense as being the entire dialectical movement of the spirit, that is, as the “movement” of spirit going through “stages of *Bildung*” to complete the “*Bildung* of the world” (GW 9, 25; TWA 3, 32), which may also be described as the “*Bildung* of consciousness to science” (GW 9, 56; TWA 3, 73). Apparently, just like alienation, *Bildung* also has two rather distinct uses, although they are related differently. In the case of *Bildung*, the two uses may be united by the thought that, as a real historical figure of the spirit, the world of *Bildung* is the fulfillment of *Bildung* in a general sense, that is, that the historical realization brings us the truth of the concept. Moreover, the “pure *Bildung*” is “the absolute and universal distortion and alienation of reality and thought” (GW 9, 282; TWA 3, 385), and this may also be said to be the full realization of *Bildung* in general, i.e. the world of *Bildung*, which is where alienation has its existence and culminates in self-alienating laceration. In modern society, *Bildung* may culminate in the formation through laceration (Sørensen 2019b: 198–199), but, unfortunately, that does not bring an end to alienation; it only changes its form.

As mentioned above, alienation also comes in at least two senses. First, there is the state of affairs implied by *Lui*’s alienation of the spirit and the socio-cultural generalization of it through Hegel’s historical narrative. However, abstracting from the pathologies and particularities of the spirit, alienation *per se* also gets the fundamental systematic meaning just indicated, namely as the negation, that is, the particular kind of existential and logical conflict that fuels the continued dialectical movement of the spirit. In this case, however, it may seem strange to consider the negation the full realization of insanity, and the opposite may seem equally strange. Still, Hegel subsumes and fuses both under the same heading, i.e. alienation, and this does in fact make sense, since the ultimate historical realization of alienation in the *Phenomenology* is the French Revolution, being both the ultimate form of alienation and a result of the formation provoked by alienation.

In his analysis, Schacht also aims to relate alienation to itself, but in another way. Schacht argues that, as well as understanding alienation as following from the involuntary experiences of discord, loss or conflict, Hegel also actively endorsed another aspect of alienation brought over from French, namely the deliberate and voluntary surrender of yourself to something bigger than yourself, that is, society or substance. As mentioned above, this aspect of alienation was emphasized by Rousseau in his *Social Contract*, where the voluntary surrender of individual rights and the renunciation of oneself is made reasonable because of the gains of becoming a member of something greater, i.e. a community or a state (Schacht 1971: 20). The solution of alienation for Rousseau is therefore political (Henning 2015: 53).

Schacht argues that, for Hegel, alienation can apparently arise both in relation to lost substantial identity and when principled opposition against the essence of a substance is raised (Schacht 1971: 68). On some occasions, Hegel thus uses the term ‘alienation’ similarly to the social contract tradition, even though, in German, this does not reflect any standard use of ‘*Entfremdung*’

(Schacht 1971: 13). In his German argument, Hegel thus seems to make good use of the dual sense of the key term inherited from French. In his analysis of alienation in the *Phenomenology*, Schacht therefore distinguishes between ‘alienation₂’ and ‘alienation₁’, where the former denotes what I have so far reconstructed as something existential or social, and the latter is more political, signifying a deliberate course of action. Interestingly, by using this distinction, Schacht can argue that, for Hegel, in the *Phenomenology*, alienation₁ may be overcome by choosing alienation₂ as a conscious project (Schacht 1971: 55), be that existentially, ethically or politically. Recognizing Hegel’s playfulness, we may thus say that alienation is to be overcome by alienation, emphasizing, however, that this is in fact also a serious political strategy.

In Hegel’s argument, alienation thus involves a loss whatever sense we employ. Hence, as Hyppolite emphasizes, the general will initially appears alienating to the individual (Hyppolite 1967: 376; Hyppolite 1974: 388). However, as Schacht argues, alienation in this sense can be converted to a deliberate political project, the gains of which far outweigh the losses (Schacht 1971: 57), and I find this an attractive interpretational strategy. For Schacht, Hegel is thus much more reconcilable when writing the *Phenomenology* than in his radical republican youth (Schacht 1971: 34–37). Moreover, as I have discussed earlier, a few years later, as the headmaster of a grammar school (*Gymnasium*) in Nuremberg, Hegel even conceptualizes alienation as possible with only minimal pain and thus promotes it as an attractive and operational way for his students to achieve *Bildung* (Sørensen 2019b: 199–202; see also Henning 2015: 81–85): Things are thus as they should be, even though they may be too repugnant, or alien, to embrace completely; as Schacht correctly concludes, such resignation is in fact “compatible with intense alienation” (Schacht 1971: 37). What Schacht does not see, however, is that precisely this uncomfortable and unstable reconciliation with the substance of Modernity is what Hegel recognizes in Diderot and in particular in *Rameau’s Nephew*. Unwittingly, Schacht thus confirms the significance I attribute to Hegel’s reading of Diderot through Goethe in the present article.

Adding finally to the determination of alienation, the historical realization of the concept may be considered a species of exteriorization. In general, Hegel’s idea of alienation implies that something is “exterior” to “self-consciousness”, and, as such, it is “negative”. What is exterior may be the “world.” Still, it can also be the “work of the self-consciousness”, and, as such, it may be “spiritual”, i.e. consciousness may by its deliberative expressive activity have created something itself, but, as a finished product, such a creation is nevertheless exterior and disposable, negative and thus potentially “strange [*fremd*]”. The “doing and becoming” involved in this process of “exteriorization [*Entäußerung*]” that makes the “substance [*Substanz*] real” can therefore be determined as the “alienation [*Entfremdung*] of the personality”: Its “substance is its exteriorization and the exteriorization is the substance”. Hegel even claims that “existence” is upheld through “exteriorization”, and thus estrangement and objectification, and that, without alienation in this sense, personality is “without substance” (GW

9, 264–265; TWA 3, 359–360). Hence, “self-consciousness is only *something*; it has only *reality* when it alienates itself from itself” (GW 9, 267; TWA 3, 363).

However, as Herbert Marcuse argues in relation to Marx’s *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, the alienation of the spirit from itself is not a necessary condition of human existence *per se*. What is necessary for human being is the exteriorization and objectification of the spirit that happens through work or utterance, in German *Äußerung*. Objectification thus forms part of an expressive anthropology, where self-realization and realization of ideas are essential. However, in a historical situation in which private property rights deprive the worker of the products of his or her work, work becomes wage-labor, realization through work becomes its opposite, i.e. *Ent-wirklichung*, and *Äußerung* becomes *Ent-äußerung*, i.e. disposal. Moreover, what has to be disposed of forms a system of commodities that acquires an independence that ultimately turns against the producers as an alien power (Marcuse 2004: 517–519). For Marx, alienation is thus the pathology conditioned by these specific historical circumstances.

In the chapter on the spirit, Hegel also relates to real historical circumstances. As I see it, Hegel’s argument concerns a specific historical configuration, namely Modernity that gets its reality by a formation that includes alienation in both of the senses mentioned above. When it comes to anthropology, it is therefore most fruitful to consider the basic expressive intentionality of conscious human being as enabling exteriorization, objectification, disposal and estrangement. Hegel clearly uses ‘*Entäußerung*’ to signify a process of objectification or exteriorization (see, e.g., GW 9, 290; TWA 3, 396). In this process, alienation is the epistemological motor that can take a pathological form, which offers consciousness the existential experience of being brought to the brink of insanity. My claim is thus that, at this particular stage in the historical development, i.e. just at the time of writing the *Phenomenology*, the uttering and exteriorization of consciousness as the essential expressive activity becomes indistinguishable from estrangement and alienation, and that Hegel criticizes this pathology. For Koen Boey, alienation is simply a particular historical form of exteriorization (Boey 2006: 195).

As Marx argues, by referring explicitly to Hegel’s *Phenomenology* (Marx 1968, MEW 40: 468–469, 574–575), *Entfremdung* in the pathological sense is implied by the categories of classical political economy (Marx 1968, MEW 40: 521). As Lukacs read the young Marx, however, the claim is that Hegel did not distinguish between *Entfremdung* and *Entäußerung* (Heidegren 1995: 464), and, in general, there is a long tradition within Marxism of conflating these concepts (Schacht 1971: 63). I cannot claim that Hegel was consistently committed to distinguishing between the two terms, but I think that emphasizing the distinction – as both Marcuse and Hyppolite do – helps to make sense of Hegel’s argument, and, today, this distinction is commonly assumed regarding Hegel (Boey 2006: 195; Quante 2009: 248). Michael Quante thus argues that Hegel made this distinction but Marx did not (Quante 2009: 248). However, I will postpone my discussion of Marx’s understanding of *Entfremdung* to a forthcoming article currently in progress. In the present article, I have restricted

myself to claiming – by considering genealogy, etymology, interpretation and reception – that Hegel was already engaged in the materialist social critique of alienation as a pathology of Modernity.

I. Excursion: The Destiny of Diderot's Dialogue

Before concluding, allow me to digress slightly. I cannot help being fascinated by *Rameau's Nephew* and its remarkable history of reception and interpretation. As is presumably clear by now, my primary interest in this work has been its possible implications for the semantic meaning of alienation and the conceptual role of *Entfremdung* in Hegel's work. Still, I must admit being attracted by some curious aspects of the history of the dialogue itself.

As mentioned above, *Rameau's Nephew* was in all likelihood originally written in 1761. It was, however, reworked several times up until Diderot's death in 1784. In the literature there is mention of an important revision in 1773-74 and later adjustments and addenda as late as 1778 and 1782. Comparing various statements about known individuals and various facts, the main period of reference has been determined as 1752-76. As mentioned earlier, the first draft most likely dates back to 1761-62 and the last corrections stem from 1782 (Bonnet 1983: 9; see also Falvey 1985: 13). For reasons unknown, and in spite of several copies of the manuscript being produced during Diderot's lifetime, no version of the work was ever published before his death, nor does it appear that he made any provision concerning its publication after his death. And the apparent lack of intention to publish it at all is remarkable considering that Diderot published extensively throughout his career, i.e. including 28 volumes of the original *Encyclopedie* that appeared between 1745 and 1772 (of which he was Editor-in-Chief) and several literary and philosophical works, some of which were highly controversial. As mentioned above, it was his early Cynic writings that landed him in prison for three months in 1749.

Whatever the reason, the first publication of the dialogue was Goethe's translation, published almost 20 years after Diderot's death. As the story is told, it was Friedrich Schiller who suggested Goethe do the translation, and it was also he who provided a copy of the dialogue. The copy had been presented to Schiller by the poet Maximilian Klinger upon returning from Saint Petersburg, where he had copied it from a collection of works by Diderot (Heidegren 1995: 236; Barzun 2001: 3-4). The explanation for the manuscript being in Russia was that Diderot had received support from Katerina the Great during his years working on the legendary *Encyclopedia*, and, in return, she was to inherit some of the works he would eventually leave behind.

Hence, upon Diderot's death in 1784, a collection of manuscripts and books had been sent to Katerina by Diderot's daughter, Marie-Angélique, now Madame de Vandeul, and this was the collection that Klinger had encountered during his time in the service of the Russian czar. Hence, not only Diderot himself but also his daughter and the finest German poets of the time considered the dialogue a work of great value.

It was only after this fantastic trajectory that *Rameau's Nephew* was finally published in French in 1821, and this first French edition was in fact a translation back to French of Goethe's German translation (Bonnet 1983: 6–7). Only a few years afterwards, however, it was possible to publish a better version using a manuscript that was in Madame de Vandeul's possession. Later, when Diderot's collected work was published in the 1870s, the text of *Rameau's Nephew* was based on copies of the manuscript received by the tsarina in 1785. Then, finally, in 1891, yet another manuscript was discovered by Georges Monval, who was the librarian at the Parisian *Comédie Française*, a theatre founded in 1680 that today is home to the oldest active theatre company in the world.

The manuscript was encountered in the box of a *bouquiniste*, i.e. the famous second-hand bookstalls that are still found along *Quais de Seines*, where it was part of a collection of tragedies left behind by a duke who had recently passed away. What makes this particular manuscript especially interesting is that it is the only known manuscript of *Rameau's Nephew* in Diderot's own handwriting, and, after Monval's publication of it, it has been used as the basis of most subsequent editions. However, as late as in the 1960s, three more copies of the manuscript were discovered in the papers of Madame Vandeul – however, like the copies discovered earlier, they do not constitute real variations, only versions ameliorated with a few corrections and refinements (Pedersen 1987: 5–7; Heidegren 1995: 236–237; Falvey 1985: 12–13). As such, several versions and editions of the work exist (Diderot 1983: 241–243), but variations are in fact few (Bonnet 1983: *ibid.*), and, today, most scholars agree to follow the text in Jean Fabre's critical edition,²² first published in 1950.²³

Conclusion

It should come as no surprise to readers of the *Phenomenology* that Diderot's dialogue played a crucial role for Hegel's argument concerning alienation. What may be a little surprising, however, is the specific way Hegel allowed himself to be influenced by Goethe's translation, employing the idea of alienation in a very comprehensive sense. Moreover, what may also come as a surprise is the radicality of Diderot's social criticism and the fact that this radicality is reflected so strongly in the *Phenomenology* – also how Hegel may be said to expand and displace Diderot's rather narrow conception of alienation. I hope I have also been able to shed light – even for specialists – on some details concerning the terms used to designate alienation in English, French and German, and that I have shown that these linguistic details do in fact have import when it comes to conceptual matters.

On the one hand, we have the literary reception of Diderot's dialogue, which emphasizes open-endedness, instability, laceration and dismemberment. This

22 See, e.g., Barzun 2001: 3–4 and Horst Günther, „Zu dieser Aufgabe“ in Goethe 1996: 322–323.

23 See Diderot 1963, ed. Fabre.

reception sometimes recognizes the material societal conditions of such spiritual hardship but pays little attention to a particular French word mentioned only in passing, i.e. ‘*aliénation*’. On the other hand, we have the philosophical readers of the *Phenomenology*, who know that Hegel paid a lot of attention to Goethe’s translation of *Rameau’s Nephew* and may also know that this somehow relates to the important subject of *Entfremdung*, even though the details mentioned above often go unnoticed. We have different disciplinary discussions of different aspects of the case in question that are conducted separately, i.e. without much mutual awareness or interaction. Part of my ambition in this article has thus been to let the awareness achieved from studying across disciplinary boundaries enrich the understanding of what made the idea of *Entfremdung* so appealing to the social philosophical criticism of Hegel, Marx *et al.*

My point is thus, in light of the arguments presented above, that we would do well to be attentive to the particular origins of the term alienation in Enlightenment social philosophy. As Hegel insists, knowledge of the becoming of a concept always adds to the truth of the matter. Hence, alienation is part of the logic of negation that drives forward consciousness from one figure to the next. In this sense, it can be juxtaposed with negation. This epistemological sense also has an existential aspect, namely the experience of becoming unfamiliar with or no longer belonging to what one used to identify with. Moreover, one further aspect of alienation points to having lost or being deprived of some entitlement. In the latter cases, for Hegel, the experience of alienation gets fueled by the extreme inequality and exploitation of capitalist Modernity.

This is also the case when alienation ultimately becomes the experience of consciousness being brought to the limits of human being, and the pathology of this situation is what both Diderot and Hegel make evident. Alienation is both conditioned by suffering and implies itself such suffering, and this is why the society alienated from itself must be the object of relentless social criticism. It is a process that can have both involuntary and voluntary aspects; hence, we can be objects or victims of what happens, but we can also make ourselves subjects and overcome the situation. Criticism does not imply that one has to know precisely what is right; however, we do know that unnecessarily inflicted human suffering due to a malign social order is simply wrong and that things could be otherwise. When *Lui* does not know wherefrom he will get the next meal for himself and his son, when he does not know where they will shelter the next night, there is something wrong, and something must be done. This is what Diderot, Goethe and Hegel wanted to tell us, and this message was readily understood by Marx.

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Asger Serensen

Aliénation, Entfremdung – i otuđenje. Hegelovo solidarno dislociranje Didroa

Apstrakt

Hegelova *Fenomenologija duha* je postavila otuđenje u sam centar filozofske agende, kako je Marks uvideo. Relativno je dobro poznato i da je Hegel u ovome bio inspirisan Geteovim prevodom Didroovog dijaloga *Ramoov sinovac*, ali detalji i pojmovne implikacije ovih detalja najčešće ostaju nerazmotreni. Prepoznajući osnovnu ideju otuđenja kao ne-pripadanja nečemu, ili lišenosti nečega, u radu naglašavam da otuđenje podrazumeva jedno kretanje ka granicama ljudskog bića, da ono podrazumeva načine na koji socijalne patologije uslovljavaju potencijalne mentalne probleme, i da ovaj problem zahteva društvenu kritiku. Da bih ovo potkrepio, pokazujem da Didroova satira predstavlja beskompromisnu materijalističku društvenu kritiku, ali i da ova kritika ne koristi pojam '*aliénation*', koji ovde ostaje rezervisan za neku vrstu mahnitosti koja se graniči sa ludilom. U tom smislu argumentujem da u Geteovom prevodu Didroovog dijaloga, i posebno u njegovom prevodu '*aliénation*' kao '*Entfremdung*', Hegel pronalazi opšti ključ za konceptualnu kritiku duha modernosti. Stoga argumentujem da u *Fenomenologiji*, Hegelov pojam otuđenja ima više značenja – Hegel ludilo uzdiže do nivoa Modernosti, naglašava negativne implikacije života u ovakvim uslovima po ljudsku svest, objašnjava da otuđenje funkcioniše kao negacija i, naposljetku, ukazuje na mogućnost pomicanja sa društvenom i političkom realnošću.

Ključne reči: otuđenje, Hegel, Gete, Didro, Duh, modernost, kritika, patologija